NATO at 60: The Post-Cold War Enlargement and the Alliances Future (Nato Science for Peace and Security Series E: Human and Sociental Dynamics)

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NATO AT 60

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience. Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action. Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Sub-Series A. B. C. D. E.

Chemistry and Biology Physics and Biophysics Environmental Security Information and Communication Security Human and Societal Dynamics

Springer Science and Business Media Springer Science and Business Media Springer Science and Business Media IOS Press IOS Press

http://www.nato.int/science http://www.springer.com http://www.iospress.nl

Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 63

ISSN 1874-6276

NATO at 60 The Post-Cold War Enlargement and the Alliance’s Future

Edited by

Anton Bebler University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Social Sciences, Ljubljana, Slovenia

Amsterdam • Berlin • Tokyo • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on “Young at 60” Kranj, Slovenia 26–27 February 2009

© 2010 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-60750-093-3 (print) ISBN 978-1-60750-096-4 (online) Library of Congress Control Number: 2009943097 Publisher IOS Press BV Nieuwe Hemweg 6B 1013 BG Amsterdam Netherlands fax: +31 20 687 0019 e-mail: [email protected] Distributor in the USA and Canada IOS Press, Inc. 4502 Rachael Manor Drive Fairfax, VA 22032 USA fax: +1 703 323 3668 e-mail: [email protected]

LEGAL NOTICE The publisher is not responsible for the use which might be made of the following information. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

NATO at 60 A. Bebler (Ed.) IOS Press, 2010 © 2010 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Preface This volume is an outgrowth of the international conference which took place at Brdo near Kranj in Slovenia on February 26–27, 2009. Entitled “Young at 60”, it was devoted to NATO’s round anniversary. The conference was prepared and carried out by the Euro-Atlantic Council of Slovenia, with the support of the Slovenian government and, as a NATO “flagship event”, also by the Public Diplomacy Division of NATO. Most texts in this volume were based on the conference papers which were subsequently updated and edited. Two official opening speeches by Martin Erdmann, NATO Assistant Secretary General, and Ljubica Jelušič, Slovenian Defence Minister, follow this preface. Since its inception in the summer of 1948 and during the six decades of its legal existence, the North Atlantic alliance has been expanding in several dimensions: in the number of member states, in the scope and geographic reach of its activities, in its capabilities and organizational complexity both on the civilian political and the military side, in the width of its partnership relations with non-members, in the intensity of cooperation with other international organizations (OUN, OSCE, EU, African Union etc.). The concept of enlargement, however, has mostly been used in the literature narrowly to describe (a) the long-term process of expanding the Alliance’s membership and (b) individual steps, stages or rounds in this direction. Most co-authors of this volume use the term in the latter sense referring to several phases in NATO’s Eastern enlargement, starting with the absorption of Eastern Germany in 1989–90 and ending with the admission of Croatia and Albania in April 2009. The Eastward expansion of NATO came about unexpectedly. It followed and was closely related to another development unforeseen by most participants and expert observers – the breakdown of Eastern European communist regimes, the end of Soviet/Russian domination in Eastern Europe, the dissolution of its most visible expression – the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the implosion and breakup of the Soviet Union. A fundamental difference between the Eastern military bloc and NATO was reflected in the facts that two Warsaw Pact members were in the past badly aggressed by their alliance “protector” (1956, 1968) and that in 1990–91 several smaller members demanded the disbandment of the pact and achieved it against the “protector’s” resistance. On the other hand, the Western alliance since its inception has not experienced anything comparable and not only survived the “Cold War” power contest, but won it politically without a single shot fired. The next surprise to the members of the Western Alliance was the pleas by Eastern European post-communist regimes for admission into NATO. The Alliance’s initial reaction was rather cool. In 1994 NATO attempted to divert the rush into a soft security association called the “Partnership for Peace”. When the Poles refused to take it as a substitute to full-fledged membership, NATO has chosen a delaying tactic. In 1995 for the first time in NATO’s institutional history the explicit conditions for admission, called “expectations” were developed. A corresponding elaborate system of qualifying tests especially designed for the Eastern European post-communist states was subsequently upgraded by individually tailored premembership preparation programs.

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The chapters grouped in the sections II and III present various aspects of the new members’ experiences on the way to NATO. In spite of numerous similarities, these experiences have differed very considerably in a number of respects. These included the mixes of motivation, the degree of internal consensus among major national political parties, the level of public opinion support, the sharpness of Russian opposition etc. The next section deals with five states officially aspiring for membership, and also addresses the positions of several other post-communist states which have participated in the “Partnership for Peace”, but the potential membership in the Alliance of which remains a controversial matter. Two experts from Denmark and the Russian Federation present their country’s attitude towards NATO’s Eastward expansion. Several subsequent contributions analyze the general characteristics and the consequences of this important international development, which so far brought into the Alliance thirteen former Eastern European countries. During NATO’s entire institutional history its policy of enlargement has undergone considerable evolution, although the legal provisions contained in Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty remained unchanged. The geostrategic gains (although still important) ceased to be the overwhelming consideration, while liberal democratic congruence and several other considerations gained in salience. This evolution started surfacing already at the admission of Spain in 1982 and became fully visible and explicit after the end of the “Cold War”. Buttressed in most cases by the expansion of the European Union, the NATO enlargement process has promoted the democratic transition in Southern Europe and strengthened young democracies in Central, Eastern and South Eastern Europe. The Alliance has contributed significantly to the overcoming ideological antagonisms, notably the sharp “East-West” divide. NATO has thus advanced the cause of united, free and democratic Europe. The former “Iron Curtain” had expressed, however, not only the ideological confrontation between liberalism and communism, but also and even more profoundly the power struggle between the West led by the USA and the Russian-dominated USSR. This latter antagonism could not disappear with the fall of communism in Russia, but only took a different, much milder form as a new mixture of cooperation and conflict between the expanded NATO and the Russian Federation. This relationship will largely determine the likelihood and the extent of NATO’s further expansion into Russia’s “near abroad”, more specifically into Ukraine and Georgia. The final group of texts dwells on the prospects for NATOs’ further expansion into the Western Balkans and the post-Soviet space, on the Alliance’s current dilemmas, problems and challenges as well as on NATO’s future in the XXI century. Anton Bebler

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Contents Preface Anton Bebler

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Chapter I. Introduction Introduction Martin Erdmann

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Introduction Ljubica Jelušič

5

Chapter II. NATO Enlargement into Central and North Central Europe East Germany: NATO’s First Eastward Enlargement Hannes Adomeit

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Czech Republic Tomáš Karásek

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The Baltic States’ Rocky Road to NATO Maria Mälksoo

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Poland Longin Pastusiak and Maria Wągrowska

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Hungary Gabor Horvath

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Slovakia Ivo Samson

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Slovenia Anton Bebler and Milan Jazbec

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A Scandinavian Perspective Karsten Jakob Møller

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Chapter III. NATO Enlargement into South Eastern Europe Romania Alex Serban

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Bulgaria Plamen Pantev

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Croatia Lidija Čehulić Vukadinović

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Albania Arian Starova

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Chapter IV. Further Enlargement into the Western Balkans and the CIS Area Macedonia Lidija Georgieva

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Serbia Andreja Savić

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Montenegro Aleksandar Dedović

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Bosnia and Herzegovina Selmo Cikotić and Izet Beridan

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NATO and the Balkans Amadeo Watkins

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Ukraine Against Herself: To Be Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, or Neutral? Jeffrey Simon

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Russian Federation Konstantin K. Khudoley

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Chapter V. Strategic and Political Consequences of NATO Enlargement and the Alliance’s Future On the Geostrategic Aspects of NATO’s Enlargement Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte

131

On NATO’s Post-Cold War Eastern Enlargement Justus Gräbner

135

The Capabilities of the New Member States Bastian Giegerich

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NATO’s Demographic Dilemma Jeffrey Simon

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Transatlantic Relations and NATO’s Future Stanley R. Sloan

159

Crisis or Renewal Istvan Gyarmati

171

A Moment of Truth Michael Ruehle

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Rethinking NATO and EU Enlargement Ronald D. Asmus

177

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The Future of the Alliance Theo Sommer

185

Author Index

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Chapter I Introduction


NATO at 60 A. Bebler (Ed.) IOS Press, 2010 © 2010 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-096-4-3

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Introduction by Martin Erdmann1 At the age of 60, NATO has never been busier. The Alliance has remained a key instrument for addressing pressing security challenges. But it also remains a unique transatlantic family of like-minded democracies. In many ways, this notion of a transatlantic family of nations lies at the very heart of NATO. No one has captured this better than the famous American political commentator, Walter Lippman. Just a few days after the signing of the Washington Treaty in April 1949, when many observers were still sceptical about this new defence pact, Lippman viewed the Alliance between North America and Western Europe in a much more positive light. "The pact”, he wrote, “will be remembered long after the conditions that have provoked it are no longer the main business of mankind. For the treaty recognizes and proclaims a community of interest which is much older than the conflict with the Soviet Union, and come what may, will survive it." At the time, Lippman was almost alone in his optimism. But today, 60 years later, we can understand why Lippman got it right. His focus was not simply a military one. For him, the Washington Treaty was the expression of something much deeper and much wider: the notion of a community of like-minded democracies. In Lippman’s view, as in the view of many drafters of the Washington Treaty, this Atlantic community was a permanent community. It was independent of a common threat. For Lippman, the logic of transatlantic cooperation was timeless. And, indeed, it is timeless. That is why NATO did not disappear with the end of the Cold War, but turned into a major agent of political and military change. On the eve of its 60th Anniversary, NATO remains the pre-eminent institutional framework for the US, Canada and Europe – not just to consult together, but also to act together. NATO’s key stabilising role in the Balkans and, more recently, in Afghanistan; its role in fighting terrorism; the success of our partnership policies; and the continuing interest on the part of several nations in joining NATO, all demonstrate that the Alliance is very much in demand. Let me set out for you three areas of change that I feel NATO must embrace. The first area is Afghanistan. What we need to succeed in Afghanistan is not so much a change of strategy. What we do need to change, however, is our commitment. Simply put, we need to match our ambitions with sufficient means. If we fail to do this, if we allow our means to determine the ends, progress in Afghanistan will remain tentative at best. That is why I very much welcome the decision by the new US Administration to send more troops to Afghanistan. And I sincerely hope that this will also encourage all the other Allies to step up their efforts. There is much to do, for all our nations. We have had considerable success in training and equipping the Afghan National Army, and we must build on that progress. We also need to make a greater effort to increase the ability of the Afghan Police to play its role in providing security and stability. There is a lot more that we can do on the civil side – in helping the Afghans to build functioning institutions, to fight crime and corruption, and get a better grip of the narcotics problem. In all of these efforts we must be careful that individual nations don’t take a narrow view of their specific role in a particular geographical or functional area. We all 1

NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy

4

M. Erdmann / Introduction

need to keep our eyes on the overall picture, and it is vital that we continue our engagement in Afghanistan as a common, transatlantic endeavour. The overall picture stretches beyond Afghanistan. It includes the wider region, and especially Pakistan, which we must engage more closely in our efforts. Moreover, we must get our military and civilian institutions to co-operate much more closely and more effectively. In other words, we need a truly Comprehensive Approach – not just in Afghanistan but also in response to other urgent, transnational challenges. The UN-NATO Joint Declaration which the two Secretaries General signed last September should help us to move in that direction. The second major area of change is our relationship with Russia. The conflict in Georgia last August has invited many different interpretations, and I don’t want to add yet another. One lesson, however, is obvious: how to deal with Russia has emerged as one of the most difficult issues on our agenda. Simply put, either the Allies devise a new consensual policy vis-à-vis Russia, or Russia will divide us. Clearly, we are not going to let Russia derail NATO enlargement. That process is central to our aim of consolidating Europe as an undivided and democratic security space and, hence, it is not negotiable. But the NATO-Russia relationship is too valuable to be stuck in arguments over enlargement or, for that matter, over missile defence, or Kosovo. We need a positive agenda, one that befits the importance of both Russia and NATO. Afghanistan is one important area where we have obvious common interests and a greater chance of meeting those interests when we work together; but there other areas as well, like the fight against terrorism and piracy, and the need to counter the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In other words, the time has clearly come to give a fresh impetus to our relationship. The third area of change is dealing with new threats. Cyber attacks, climate change and the interruption of energy supplies can devastate a country without a single shot being fired. We need to define NATO’s role in meeting these challenges. Of course, NATO does not provide all the answers to the many challenges before us – but that should not serve as excuse for inaction. We must make the best possible use of the Alliance’s unique political and military value. After all, threats don’t wait until we feel that we are ready for them. In a new Strategic Concept will need to reconcile the Alliance’s core purpose of collective defence with the many requirements associated with out-of-area operations. It will need to emphasise NATO’s role as a unique community of common values and interests, and avoid the temptation to push regional or national agendas at the expense of our common purpose and objectives. And it will need to make clear NATO’s strong desire to engage with the UN, the EU and other international actors, as partners, in a comprehensive approach to the security challenges of our time. These challenges are fundamentally different from the challenges that once brought NATO into being. They are also quite different from the challenges we faced when Slovenia first expressed an interest in joining NATO, or even those before us when your country actually joined the Alliance five years ago. I do not want to suggest for one minute that NATO is the solution to each and every one of these challenges. But I do believe that a strong and united transatlantic family of nations is a vital asset in meeting these challenges. As long a there is a solid transatlantic relationship, and as long as this relationship rests on strong institutional foundations, I am convinced that we will be able to shape events, and not be their victims.


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Introduction by Ljubica Jelušiþ1 NATO has just turned 60, which calls for celebration, but also presents an opportunity for reflecting upon past achievements and setbacks, as well as for anticipating the future of the most successful military Alliance of the modern Euro-Atlantic history and beyond. Formed in 1949 with the signing of the Washington Treaty, NATO is now a security alliance of 28 countries from North America and Europe. Its fundamental goal is to safeguard the Allies' freedom and security by political and military means. As we have reached the 60th anniversary, NATO remains the principal security instrument of the transatlantic community and expression of its common democratic values. The NATO today is no longer the NATO of 1949. It has given up its cold-war posture focused on the defence of territory – while of course maintaining its very raison d’être, collective defence according to the Article 5. It has begun to contribute to international stability and to defend the interests of its members beyond its borders – in Bosnia, in Kosovo, in Afghanistan, and also quite recently off the cost of Somalia to combat piracy. After the collapse of Communism and the Soviet Union, NATO had to reinvent itself politically for the initial challenges of the post-Cold War era. The success can be seen in the Balkans, in strengthening democracies of Central and Eastern Europe and establishment of a new and cooperative relationship with the Alliance's former adversary, Russia. The Partnership for Peace Programme was the most valuable and successful tool NATO ever invented. In the space of a decade NATO successfully transformed itself from a North American-Western European Alliance focused exclusively on territorial defence into a pan-European institution with new members stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea and missions centred increasingly on what used to be called "out of area", which is no small accomplishment. In the wake of 9/11, however, the Alliance faced the need to reinvent itself a second time to face the challenges that are centred beyond Euro-Atlantic Area. Here we are still working towards our common success and need to develop capabilities capable of facing new challenges. With changes in the security environment, NATO had to evolve. It has had to adapt to the changing word and changing threats such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, transnational trafficking, piracy, cyber attacks, climate change to name just a few. NATO’s missions have changed and its structures have been reformed accordingly. The process of transformation is continuing. The Alliance remains committed to a broad approach to security. The fundamental guiding principle of the Alliance is still that of common commitment and mutual co-operation among sovereign states assuring the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Through collective efforts it enables member states to realise their essential national security objectives. The principles of Allied solidarity and strategic unity remain paramount for all Alliance missions. The achievement of the Alliance’s objectives depends critically on the equitable sharing of roles, burden, risks and responsibilities on the basis of reasonable challenge of individual Nation. The same goes for the benefits. At the last Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 2009 NATO celebrated its 60th anniversary. The venue of the meeting was carefully selected as a symbol of Europe’s post-World War II reconciliation, but it was also in accordance with France’s previous decision to again fully 1

Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana and Slovenia's Minister of Defense, assisted by Primož Šavc and Uroš Lampret

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L. Jelušiˇc / Introduction

participate in NATO structures. At its sixties NATO has also become stronger by admitting two members from the Western Balkans – Croatia and Albania. We hope that a mutually acceptable solution will be found as soon as possible to enable Macedonia to join the Alliance. The heads of state and government reaffirmed the basic values and fundamental principles of the Alliance by adopting the Declaration on Alliance Security. They also launched the process of developing a new Strategic Concept, which will define NATO's long-term role in the new security environment of the 21st century. Collective defence will remain the core mission of the Alliance, while it will remain ready, on a case-by-case basis and by consensus, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including non-Article 5 operations. Therefore, NATO must retain the ability to conduct a full range of its missions. National commitments need to be translated into concrete terms by developing and fielding flexible and sustainable capabilities, committing sufficient resources, and also by fair sharing of the burden. The process of transformation, including conceptual and organisational agility and the development of robust capabilities which are deployable, sustainable, interoperable, in one word usable, needs to be continued if we want to ensure NATO’s ability to confront the existing and emerging security challenges. And most of the Allies, including Slovenia, still have homework to do in this respect. The new realities demand the development of national inventories which allow for harmonious cooperation within NATO’s framework. The development of capabilities must be steered by operational experience. We must be honest and recognise what needs to be done in the area of interoperability and clearly articulate this on all levels. This process requires more collaboration and greater transparency. We have to raise political awareness and a sense of solidarity at home in order to gain support and legitimacy for our actions. Operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and elsewhere provide opportunities to nourish our EuroAtlantic bonds and strengthen them accordingly. One of the crucial issues with regard to the future of NATO is its relationship with the EU. It is in the strong interest of NATO to have a strong and reliable partner and to assure fair transatlantic burden sharing. The strengthening of NATO and EU military capabilities must be mutual, as in most cases both organisations are facing similar shortfalls. Besides, most of allies are also members of the European Union. We must indeed move towards true and extended cooperation based on necessary complementarity. As already mentioned, NATO developed and became engaged outside its borders in a wide varieties of missions, ranging from Afghanistan, protecting UN food carrying ships from pirates operating off the Somali coast, to training security forces in Iraq. Two years ago, NATO forces helped the African Union troops in Darfur, a year earlier they provided humanitarian assistance to the victims of an earthquake in Pakistan. Active engagement in operations raised the awareness of the need to work closely and consistently with all other players on the ground, including international and regional organizations, in an integrated, coordinated and comprehensive manner. NATO cannot and will not do everything by itself. Besides, it is crucial to ensure the engagement of military and civilian capabilities in order to achieve a success and provide stabilisation and reconstruction in the area of our engagement, and finally to achieve peace and security. Military operations alone cannot provide a long-term answer to creating a secure, stable and peaceful environment, be it in Afghanistan or elsewhere. Only a comprehensive approach involving all interested parties, and civil-military cooperation will enable successful outcome in the form of economic and


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social development, good governance, including rule of law and human rights, and providing for local ownership. At the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government also agreed to a number of new initiatives for Afghanistan, including a significant expansion of the training and support effort for Afghan National Security Forces, enhanced engagement with neighbouring countries and a more integrated approach to working with the international community and the Afghan government to implement the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). With Summit Declaration on Afghanistan, NATO leaders reaffirmed their strategic vision for Afghanistan based on four guiding principles: long-term commitment; Afghan leadership; a fully comprehensive approach? and a regional approach. Regarding Slovenian participation in operations, our ambition remains to gradually increase our future contributions, military and civilian, and to build on our positive experiences with a comprehensive approach. The latter was first tested in Kosovo, and we have excellent reports about the achievements and value of our civilian experts. Kosovo also remains our operational priority and I do not expect this will change in the near future. However, we are not disregarding our commitments in Afghanistan - Operation ISAF, which remains the priority operation for NATO. In addition to this, we are engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Lebanon and Syria, and just recently finished our engagement in Chad. Reflecting the new, broader approach to our involvement in operations, we are striving hard for a greater involvement by Parliament in the discussions about our future ambitions in international operations and in defining a clear national strategy in this regard. We are also broadening the debate by including interested public. And last but not least, we are striving towards achieving a new, improved level of inter-ministerial cooperation with the Ministries of Interior and of Foreign Affairs. I would like to praise and thank all Allied military personnel, our soldiers, civilian experts, police forces and diplomats, men and women who have served in our international operations and missions. With their outstanding commitment and work, professionalism and efficiency, they are not only contributing to the international peace and security, but are also defending our homeland. I am proud of their achievements and would like to express my support to them and care for their well-being. Today, after five years of NATO membership, we must view our national defence, collective defence and crisis operations differently. Today’s challenging security risks and threats, complex as we have described them for many years, are not strictly military in nature and cannot be solved by military means alone. The security we want to provide for our populations is much broader. We cannot look only to security within our borders or inside Euro-Atlantic area, but we have to deal also with instability outside our territories. We need to make all efforts to make our public understand that the notion of defence is wide. We need to maintain political consensus in the country on new ways of protecting our population in the changing security environment. This consensus is needed at all levels. Nationally, in understanding why we need deployable forces which cost a lot of taxpayers’ money, in understanding the need for adequate military capabilities for increasingly demanding international operations, for conceivable Article 5 operations and not the least, for our national defence, if ever needed again. The ability to protect at a strategic distance and the political will of the allies to contribute these forces are also extremely important. Maintaining a consensus among all Allies is a challenge and we can strengthen it by our ability to act effectively.

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To sum up, NATO has already achieved a lot. From initial political integration it has developed into an Alliance which has been successfully engaged in more missions and activities that ever before. Besides, its membership has increased and hereby also the area of confidence, trust and peace. The process of enlargement has not been concluded and this provides me with great optimism. Sixty years after its foundation NATO has not become rusty or outdated. On the contrary, in the new security environment its role has increased. We have to make sure that our capabilities remain adequate and our commitment firm to respond to a wide range of missions and to cope successfully with new threats and challenges. In the anticipation of further transformation of the Alliance, I am sure that we will all become stronger, individually and collectively. The time is right to have the Alliance proceed further on its path.

Chapter II NATO Enlargement into Central and North Central Europe



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EAST GERMANY: NATO'S FIRST EASTWARD ENLARGEMENT

This chapter analyzes the circumstances of NATO’s first eastward enlargement: the inclusion of East Germany in the Alliance as part of a unified Germany. The opening of the Berlin wall on 9 November 1989 had elevated German reunification from a mere theoretical possibility to the single most important topic on the agenda of international politics. The key question then was whether a unified Germany should be a member of NATO, neutral or a member of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In the end, even the Soviet leadership had to acknowledge that unified Germany’s NATO membership was the only feasible option. The prospect of German reunification had been an important topic of international discussion in the fall of 1989. But the opening of the Berlin wall on 9 November transformed the discussion of reunification from a mere theoretical possibility to the single most important topic on the agenda of international politics. This, in turn, raised the question not only of the internal structure of the new Germany but also of its external status. Concerning the latter, one of the most difficult problems was the question of the disposition of the GDR. A decision had to be taken as to whether a unified Germany could be a member of NATO, should be neutral, or – as Gorbachev seriously proposed – a member of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. If a unified Germany were to become a NATO member, the issue would have to be resolved as to any special status of that country in the alliance, perhaps along the lines of France, that is, for a unified Germany to become a member of the organization, but not participating in its integrated military structures. The position of Western policy makers after February 1990 was clear and firm: the new Germany should be a West Germany writ large. To forestall any separate national or nationalistic path, it should remain an integral part of European and Atlantic institutions, including NATO. This confronted Gorbachev with an exceedingly difficult problem. As late as December 1989, he had termed the GDR as the Soviet Union's "strategic ally" and reliable member of the Warsaw Pact, and assured the CPSU Central Committee that it would remain an alliance member. A few months later, he was called upon by the West not only to impute peaceful intentions to NATO and a constructive security role in Europe, but also to explain why it would be in the Soviet Union’s interest to accept a renversement des alliances for the GDR. The GDR as a “Strategic Ally” of the Soviet Union East Germany in 1989 constituted the Soviet Union’s most important strategic ally and spearhead of its offensive military potential pointing at NATO forces. The Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG), renamed the Western Group of Forces (WGF) in June 1989, comprised about 557,000 persons, including 337,000 servicemen and 200,000 dependents and civilian employees. Together with the 170,000 men, led by 36,000 officers, of the East Germany's National People's Army (NVA), the Polish and Czechoslovak armed forces, and Soviet units based in the western military districts of the Soviet Union, the WGF formed the Strategic Group of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. All of the Soviet units were classified as Category A, with 90 percent of personnel at wartime strength. The WGF maintained 1,026 Soviet military installations, which covered 243,015 hectares, about 2.25 percent of the GDR territory. It included 110 airfields and helicopter bases, 100 training and firing ranges, 70 radar and radio transmitter stations, 8 ammunition depots, the largest of which covered nearly 3.5 square kilometers, and 400 barracks and housing compounds. The full extent of the Soviet military presence and the area covered by the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany installations were not disclosed even to the East German authorities

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H. Adomeit / East Germany: NATO’s First Eastward Enlargement

until a few months before unification. Service in East Germany was considered prestigious because it appeared to be an indispensible rung on the career ladder. Most of the commanders-inchief of the GSFG/WSG became commanders-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact armed forces, six were appointed Marshal of the Soviet Union, and two – Zhukov and Grechko – Minister of Defense. Both the “Declaration on Sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic”, issued by the Soviet government on 25 March 1954, and the “Treaty on Relations between the GDR and the USSR” of 20 September 1955 considered the presence of Soviet troops on East German territory to be temporary. But neither of the two treaties nor the “Agreement on Questions Related to the Temporary Stationing of Soviet Armed Forces” of 11 April 1957 provided a legal basis for the presence of the Soviet forces other than the right to be there as an occupation force until the conclusion of a German peace treaty. Article 18 of the 1957 agreement stipulated that, "in case of a threat to the security of the Soviet forces," the Supreme Command of the GSFG upon consultation with the GDR government had the unrestricted right to take measures in order to “eliminate such a threat”. In June 1953, the Soviet military had asserted such a right when it suppressed the popular revolt in East Germany and East Berlin. In the 1957 agreement, the Soviet Union had reserved for its forces a large measure of extraterritoriality. Military personnel, civilian employees, and family members travelled in and out of the country effectively without East German control. Soviet troops enjoyed essentially unfettered freedom of movement, indifference of the GDR authorities to the violation of environmental regulations, almost complete absence of restrictions on low-level flights by military aircraft, and training unhampered by GDR civilian interference. Military officers had access to special hunting preserves. It seemed inconceivable in 1989 and early 1990 that the Soviet Union would voluntarily give up these privileges and assets. Gorbachev’s approach to the German problem was based on the idea of a gradual rapprochement of the Eastern and Western parts of Europe. The “Abandonment” of the GDR, whatever this may have meant in practice, seemed inconceivable. Such attitudes were reinforced by negative perceptions about the United States’ role in Europe and NATO as the American “bridgehead” and “staging point” on the European continent. Standard Soviet policies during the Cold War were directed against NATO not least because it provided a vital link between the United States and Europe, and because the American military presence constituted the foremost guarantee of European security. Consequently, as Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze was to acknowledge in February 1990: “Until quite recently our aim was to oust the Americans from Europe at any price.” This aim had changed in the period from Gorbachev’s ascent to power in 1985 until February 1990 in conjunction with the evolution of the New Political Thinking. The “New Thinking” on NATO and the Warsaw Pact The Soviet advocates of this new approach to international relations proceeded from the point of view that the effects of a withdrawal of the United States and thus the de facto dissolution of NATO would be destabilizing for European security. A withdrawal of American forces would create insecurity among West European countries and enhance their military integration. This would run parallel to US defense efforts and to the detriment of the Soviet Union. It could also induce European states, acting individually or multilaterally, to produce and deploy nuclear


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weapons. The US presence had served as a restraint on West German nuclear ambitions. If the Americans were to leave, Bonn could demand its own nuclear weapons. Such perceptions were endorsed by Gorbachev as early as 1986. In talks with West German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, he said he had no wish to undermine NATO: “We are of the opinion that, given the alliances that have taken shape, it is essential to strengthen those threads whose severance is fraught with the danger of a rupture of the world fabric.” To Henry Kissinger, in January 1989, he expressed the opinion that the Europeans needed U.S. participation to safeguard European security. Correspondingly, during his visit to Bonn in June 1989 he told his German hosts that the Joint Soviet-German Declaration adopted on that occasion does not demand that you, or we, should renounce our uniqueness or weaken our allegiance to the alliances. On the contrary, I am confident that maintaining [this allegiance] in our policies will serve to consolidate the contribution of each state to the creation of a peaceful European order as well as to shape a common European outlook. In Gorbachev's perceptions in 1989, the prospect of German unification even enhanced rather than detracted from the importance of the two military alliances. “Now is not the time to break up the established international political and economic institutions,” he told visiting French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas shortly after the opening of the Berlin wall. “Let them be transformed, taking into account internal processes, let them find their place in the new situation and work together.” Similarly, in a briefing for the leaders of the Warsaw Pact on the Soviet-American summit meeting on Malta in December 1989, he stated that the two alliances “will be preserved for the foreseeable future” because they could make a “contribution to strengthening European security” by becoming a bridge between the two parts of Europe. It could be argued that these positions predetermined the Soviet consent to the membership of a unified Germany in NATO. This, however, was not the case. In mid-February 1990, both the Western and the Soviet position on Germany's future security status were only beginning to take shape. Ambiguity surrounded both positions. The Western preference for a unified Germany's alliance membership was muddied by the discussion of whether the whole of Germany should be a member of the Atlantic alliance politically but remain outside its military organization, that is, have a status similar to that of France; what “association” with the Atlantic alliance would be all about; and what was meant by the extension of NATO's “jurisdiction.” Gorbachev was torn between different stands. He recognized the dangers of a repetition of the Versailles treaty syndrome and German nationalism, but did not seem to be averse to a neutral and perhaps even demilitarized Germany, and certainly not East Germany, in NATO in any shape or form. He was ready to allocate important security functions to the Atlantic alliance and American forces in Europe, but was opposed to the logical extension of this framework to unified Germany's membership in NATO. He agreed with chancellor Helmut Kohl to let the Germans decide the form and speed of unification, but left open the question of whether this also applied to its external aspects, including the right of the Germans to decide to which alliance, if any, they wanted to belong. However, in late February, all the ambiguities and with it any flexibility in negotiations seemed to dissipate, and on both sides. In what amounted to a reversal of the American position, at a meeting at Camp David on 24 February, Bush and Kohl agreed that a unified Germany should remain a full member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including participation in its military structure. We agreed that US

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military forces should remain stationed in the united Germany and elsewhere in Europe as a continuing guarantor of stability. They only held out an as yet unspecified concession, saying: The Chancellor and I are also in agreement that in a unified state, the former territory of GDR should have a special military status [that] would take into account the legitimate security interests of all interested countries, including those of the Soviet Union. This demand remained firm throughout all the subsequent negotiations with the Soviet Union but at the same time, the Soviet position hardened against precisely such a solution. Soviet Retrenchment In what can be regarded as having been related to the upcoming Two Plus Four negotiations, Gorbachev warned that Moscow would resist Western efforts to dictate the proceedings: “We rule out such a method,” he said in an interview with Pravda published on 21 February, “whereby three or four [countries] first come to an arrangement between themselves and then set out their already agreed-upon position before the participants. This is unacceptable.” On the form which an agreement should take, he thought that there should be a peace treaty. On substance, the treaty should provide for a role for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact; any change in the militarystrategic balance between the two alliances was “impermissible.” New and more intransigent inflections on the German security issue also surfaced in the foreign ministry. Shevardnadze formed a working group to deal with the German problem and the Two Plus Four negotiations, and on 24 February assembled the Foreign Ministry's Collegium, including his deputies and fourteen other officials, ostensibly to drive firm stakes into the international negotiation ground. The Collegium derided the “prescriptions advanced in some Western countries” and specifically the idea that NATO membership of a unified Germany in NATO would be in the Soviet interest. It was unacceptable that anyone but the Soviet leaders and people themselves should seek to determine what constituted the essence of Soviet security and how best to safeguard it. Gorbachev now retracted his position that unification was the prerogative of the Germans themselves. He objected to a procedure whereby “the Germans agree among themselves and then propose to the others only to endorse the decisions already adopted by them.” Similarly, on 6 March, at the second and last of East German prime minister Hans Modrow's visits to Moscow, he eschewed the terms “German unity” and “unification,” asserting instead that it was “by no means a matter of indifference how the rapprochement (sblizhenie) of the two German states takes place.” Concerning the external aspects of unification, Gorbachev now dispelled Western hopes that his and Shevardnadze's failure to demand a neutral status for a unified Germany had presaged Soviet consent to NATO membership. On the face of it, this settled the question: unified Germany's membership in NATO was unacceptable. This apparently firm stand, however, as so many others previously, was severely undercut by the course of events. The March 18 parliamentary elections in East Germany produced a stunning victory for the conservative alliance led by the Christian Democrats (CDU), which polled 48 percent of the vote. The social democrats (SPD), which had been regarded as the front-runner, received only 22 percent, and the communists (PDS) 16 percent. The most disastrous performance was that of the Alliance 90, the umbrella party for groups like the Neue Forum that


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had been in the forefront of the democratic revolution of the preceding year; it garnered less than three percent of the vote. The result was that there would be no reform socialism in the GDR. A new government was formed by the conservative parties with Prime Minister Lothar de Maizière of the Christian Democrats at the helm. This did not deter the CPSU Politburo from reiterating what had by then become an untenable position. The reiteration came in the form of PB “instructions” (direktivy) for Shevardnadze for his upcoming talks with president George Bush and foreign secretary James Baker in Washington on April 4-6. Shevardnadze was instructed to emphasize to Bush and Baker that the unification process should take place not in the form of an Anschluß of the GDR but should be the result of agreements between the two German states as equal subjects of international law. We should emphasize that, naturally, we favor the existence of the GDR as an independent state for as long as possible. At the beginning of May, in what Gorbachev’s foreign policy advisor, Anatoly Chernyaev, called a “rough” (zhestkii) meeting, the full Politburo discussed the German problem for the first and last time. Shevardnadze, assisted by his advisor Tarasenko, had prepared a position paper which was severely criticized by the conservative majority of that body. Gorbachev sided with that PB faction and at one point burst out heatedly, stating categorically: “We will not let Germany into NATO, and that is the end of it. I will even risk the collapse of the [CFE] negotiations in Vienna and START but will not allow this.”1 Notwithstanding his seemingly inalienable negative stance, within just a few weeks after his outburst, Gorbachev did consent to a unified Germany in NATO and to NATO’s first enlargement towards the east.

The Consent to NATO’s Eastern Enlargement When Chernyaev was asked, when and why it was that Gorbachev changed his mind, he unhesitatingly replied: “At the Soviet-American summit.” When the supplementary question was put to him, what had induced him to do so, the answer was equally short and precise: “Baker's nine points.” From May 16-19, Baker had again visited Moscow and talked to Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. The German problem was again the main focus of discussion. The secretary of state presented a comprehensive package of incentives designed to persuade Gorbachev to accept the basic foundation of all subsequent and supplementary measures for a German settlement. The incentives were as follows: Limitation of the size of armed forces in Europe, including in Central Europe, in a CFE agreement, with further reductions to be provided in CFE follow-on negotiations. The beginning of arms control negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles to be moved up. Reaffirmation by Germany that it would neither possess nor produce nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. No NATO forces to be stationed on the former territory of the GDR during a specified transition period.

1

Anatolii S. Chernyaev, Shest' let s Gorbachevym: Po dnevnikovym zapisiam (Moscow: Izdatel'skaia gruppa "Progress," "Kultura," 1993), p. 347. The record of the meeting has not been made available.

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An appropriate transition period to be agreed upon for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from German territory. A comprehensive review of NATO strategy and change of NATO's conventional and nuclear force posture. Settlement of Germany's future borders, that is, essentially confirmation of the PolishGerman frontier. Enhancement of the functions of the CSCE to ensure a significant role for the Soviet Union in Europe and linkage of a summit meeting of that organization with the finalization of a CFE treaty, both to take place at the end of 1990. Development of Germany's economic ties with the Soviet Union, including fulfilment of the GDR's economic obligations to the USSR.2 In the subsequent weeks, however, it seemed as if the Nine Points had made no impact whatsoever. At the Two Plus Four negotiating table and at home, Soviet representatives still vacillated between the various mutually incompatible positions they had advanced earlier. The breakthrough in the controversy about Germany’s security status occurred only at the SovietAmerican summit in Washington, May 30-June 3.3 On May 31, in response to President Bush's review of the assurances, Gorbachev initially reiterated the intransigent Soviet position on the central security issue arising from German unification: To let a united Germany join NATO, and NATO only, would “unbalance” Europe. He repeated the alternatives he preferred: Germany should either be a member of both alliances or not belong to any alliance. Shevardnadze supported the dual membership idea and Gorbachev added that perhaps any country could join either alliance, musing whether the Soviet Union should apply for NATO membership. Bush then introduced an argument that American and West German officials had begun to employ at lower levels. Under the CSCE's principles codified in the Helsinki Final Act, all nations had the right to choose their own alliances. Should unified Germany, too, not have the right to decide for itself which alliance it would want to join? Gorbachev nodded and agreed in a matter-of-fact fashion that it did. This constituted a de facto consent to unified Germany's membership in NATO and came completely unexpected. There was great surprise and consternation among the Soviet participants. There had been no prior consultation or coordination. Gorbachev had acted unilaterally and spontaneously. To try to make sure that the Soviet leader would not change his mind and be publicly committed to the new position, the American National Security Council staff prepared a statement for the president to be delivered on June 3, at the end of the summit conference. It submitted the draft statement to Soviet ambassador Alexander Bessmertnykh for his review and approval by Gorbachev. There were no objections. The statement read: On the matter of Germany's external alliances, I believe, as do Chancellor Kohl and members of the Alliance, that the united Germany should be a full member of NATO. President Gorbachev, frankly, does not hold that view. But we are in full agreement that the matter of alliance membership is, in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act, a matter for the Germans to decide. 2

Baker, James A., with Thomas M. Defrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace, 19891992 (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), pp. 250-51; Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, pp. 263-64; and interview of the author with former U.S. National Security Council staff member Robert Zoellick, who had prepared the Nine Points. The interview took place at a conference of the Freie Universität Berlin on July 5, 1994, attended by the Political Directors of the Two Plus Four negotiations. 3 The account of the proceedings at the Soviet-American summit follows Zelikow and Rice, Germany Unified, pp. 276-81, and Michael R. Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story of the End of the Cold War (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1993), pp. 215-30.


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Thus, it would seem that at this stage Gorbachev's change of position was neither unconditional nor irreversible. For him, vaguely and incongruously, there still existed different options, one of which would somehow make it possible to avoid Germany's full membership of NATO. Such ambiguities were reflected in his public stance. On 12 June, in his report on the Soviet-American summit to the Supreme Soviet, Gorbachev said that he had “told the [American] president that I think that the American presence in Europe, since it fulfils a certain role in maintaining stability, is an element of the strategic situation and does not represent a problem for us." He also outlined a solution, according to which “the Bundeswehr would, as before, be subordinate to NATO, and the East German troops would be subordinate to the new Germany,” which obviously meant that they would no longer be subordinate to the Warsaw Pact. However, this applied only to a “transition period.” What, if anything, would happen thereafter was left open. He muddied the murky security waters further by the ideas of “associate membership” of the GDR in the Warsaw Pact, a unified Germany having to “honor all obligations” inherited from the two Germanys (including East German’s obligations in the Warsaw Pact?), and by his return to the “dual membership” proposal. Only one thing was crystal clear: there was a complete and deliberate lack of clarity in the Soviet stance, except for the fact that the notion of a unified Germany in NATO as being absolutely unacceptable was no longer valid. This became apparent in the Two Plus Four meetings at the foreign ministers' level in Berlin on June 22, where clarification was achieved as to the form that NATO's eastward enlargement could take: Non-integrated German units could be stationed in the former GDR immediately after Germany regained full sovereignty. German NATO-integrated forces could be stationed after the withdrawal of Soviet troops but no allied forces. Germany would not produce or possess nuclear, bacteriological, or chemical weapons. NATO would transform its structure and its role in Europe, and emphasize its political role. The formal consent to unified Germany's membership in NATO occurred during Chancellor Kohl visit to the Soviet Union, July 14-16. On 15 July in Moscow, the two leaders exchanged papers containing their mutual ideas concerning the provisions to be contained in a treaty on partnership and cooperation between the Soviet Union and Germany. Gorbachev acknowledged that Germany should regain full sovereignty. On the central issue of NATO, Gorbachev said that membership of a unified Germany in that alliance constituted the most important problem. De jure the question was unambiguous. De facto matters were more complicated. NATO authority could not immediately be extended to the former territory of the GDR. A transitional period was necessary. Kohl and his foreign policy advisor, Horst Teltschik, like Bush and his advisers six weeks earlier, were stunned, but the German chancellor outwardly reacted calmly and was eager to make sure that there had been no misunderstanding. Pressed by Kohl, Gorbachev clarified that Germany could remain in NATO, but NATO had to take into consideration that its authority could not be extended to the territory of the former GDR for a transitional period, that is, for as long as Soviet troops continued to be stationed there. He reinforced this historic concession by a second commitment. The final settlement in the Two Plus Four framework should provide for the immediate abolition of Four Power rights. A separate treaty should govern the status of the Soviet armed forces on the territory of the former GDR. The fine points as to what was meant by de jure and de facto NATO membership were settled on 16 July in Arkhyz, a North Caucasian mountain resort about 100 miles south of Stavropol and

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announced at the neighboring spa of Zheleznovodsk. Concerning NATO and related security issues, the main points of the agreement were as follows: The rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers will end after the achievement of German unification, and unified Germany will enjoy full and unrestricted sovereignty. The unified Germany, exercising its unrestricted sovereignty and in accordance with the Helsinki Final Act, may decide freely and by itself to which alliance it may want to belong. The unified Germany and the Soviet Union will conclude a bilateral treaty providing for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the GDR within three to four years. For as long as Soviet troops remain stationed on the territory of the former GDR, NATO structures would not be extended to this part of Germany. The immediate applicability of articles 5 and 6 of the NATO treaty will remain in effect. Non-integrated units of the Bundeswehr, that is, territorial defense units, could be stationed on the territory of the GDR and Berlin immediately after unification. Troops of the three Western powers should remain in Berlin for the duration of the presence of Soviet troops on former GDR territory. The Federal government will seek to conclude corresponding agreements with the three Western governments. The Federal government is willing to make a binding declaration in the CFE talks in Vienna to reduce the level of the armed forces of a unified Germany to a personnel strength of 370,000 within a period of three to four years. The unified Germany will refrain from producing, storing, or controlling nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and continue to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Why the Soviet Consent? Why had Gorbachev changed his mind about unified Germany’s membership in NATO, apparently at the Soviet-American summit? One of the reasons, according to his foreign policy advisor, had been Baker's Nine Points facilitating the Soviet leader’s consent. There were two more basic reasons. First, Gorbachev was impressed by the reasoning that a neutral Germany could, and one day might, seek access to nuclear weapons. Second: “The West had the better arguments.” These included the idea that the presence of the United States on the European continent in NATO did not stand in contradiction to European security but could be reconciled with it. Another factor needs to be added: in the spring of 1990 the Soviet Union was running out of options – for two reasons. First, the idea of a neutralization of Germany failed to attract support not only in Western Europe and in the United States but also in Eastern Europe. Second, notions such as “associate membership” of the eastern part of Germany in the Warsaw Pact or “dual membership” of unified Germany in both alliances were rendered obsolete by the rapid disintegration of the eastern alliance. At the February 1990 Open Skies foreign ministers' meeting of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Ottawa, only two foreign ministers were calling for the neutralization of Germany: Shevardnadze and East Germany’s Oskar Fischer. This line-up was repeated at the mid-March Warsaw Pact foreign ministers' conference in Prague. Czechoslovak foreign minister Jiri Dienstbier said that neutrality would be “the worst alternative.” The Polish foreign minister, Krystof Skubiszewski, too, stated that a neutral Germany would “not be good for Europe”; it would “foster some tendencies in Germany to be a great power acting on its own.” When the East German foreign minister was replaced a few weeks later as a result of the free elections in the GDR, this left the Soviet Union as the only country in Europe more or less seriously discussing the matter. It does


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appear, however, that Gorbachev, and not only he, continued to cling to the notion that a reformed Warsaw Pact was a realistic proposition in the European security architecture. As late as 12 June Gorbachev – reporting to the Supreme Soviet on the results of the SovietAmerican summit in Washington – stated that the rival blocs would continue to exist “for longer than might be imagined.” Was there, then, a direct connection between Gorbachev’s consent to membership of a united Germany in NATO and the continued existence of the Warsaw Pact? In all likelihood there was, and the reason why may lie in the willingness of the Soviet political and, nolens volens, the military to convert the Warsaw Pact from an instrument of Soviet domination and control to a political institution respecting the sovereignty of its member nations. A transformation of the Warsaw Pact, they hoped, would be feasible even after the systemic changes in Eastern Europe, because the “state interests” of the member countries of the Pact would remain essentially unchanged. The then Polish prime minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, made precisely this point on February 21 when he said that, in its alliance with its eastern neighbor, Poland had passed from the ideological level to the state level. But this did "not mean that at the state level we do not see the importance of this alliance for the problem of security for our borders. “He even argued that Soviet troops should remain in Poland because of "the German problem.” The Soviet reform concept was presented to the Pact members at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC), essentially a Warsaw Pact summit conference, on June 7 in Moscow. The declaration adopted at the summit stipulated that efforts would be initiated “to transform it [the Warsaw Treaty] into a treaty of sovereign, equal states that is based on democratic principles.” The “character, functions, and activities of the Warsaw Pact” were to be thoroughly reviewed. The organization was to change from a military alliance to a political organization with military consultation; the centralized, Soviet-controlled command structure was to be abandoned, which in practice meant that a Soviet deputy minister of defense would no longer be the Pact's commander in chief and that perhaps the Supreme Joint Command would be dissolved; the member states would gain control of their own national forces in conformity with the principle of full national sovereignty; and for the duration of the existence of multilateral institutions representatives of the member states would fill positions by rotation. However, as Georgi Shakhnazarov, Gorbachev’s advisor on Eastern European affairs, recognized, by that time most of the member countries of that organization, while negotiating reform, or appearing to do so, were at the same time preparing to leave that organization. Above all, the new governments in three of the four countries where Soviet troops were still stationed (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary) made it clear that they wanted the Soviet forces out as quickly as possible. A final factor were the domestic conditions in the two Germanies: The governing coalition of Christian Democrats/Christian Socialists (CDU/CSU) and the Liberal Party (FDP), with chancellor Helmut Kohl and vice chancellor and foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, stood solidly behind the idea of united Germany’s membership in NATO. This was not the case for the Social Democrats (SPD) under deputy party leader and the party’s candidate for the chancellorship, Saarland prime minister Oskar Lafontaine, as well as the Greens with its alliance partner, the GDR’s democratic opposition (Bündnis 90/Grüne). In the SPD and the West German Green party, the idea of reunification had elicited concern in 1989, and in 1990 – notwithstanding the stunning results of the March 18 parliamentary elections in East Germany – the West German social democrats still clung to the illusion that many features of the GDR’s socialist system could and should be retained in a united Germany. Thus, only several days before the official unification of the two parts of Germany, Lafontaine stated that “our country [West Germany] is

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now assuming great burdens in order to finance the building of the GDR.” Even more so, for large sections of that party and the Alliance 90/the Greens, NATO membership of a united Germany was anathema. For instance, in February 1990, at the Leipzig party congress of the SPD, Lafontaine told the delegates that “the demand that Germany should remain a member of NATO is anachronistic.” However, even he did not advocate neutrality but a new European defense arrangement modelled after the European Defense Community (EDC), a project that had been advanced in 1954 but failed. Whatever the case may be, the March 1990 elections had conclusively demonstrated that the domestic and foreign policy of the coalition of CDU/CSU and FDP commanded strong support among the East German population. This, too, would have rendered ineffective international, including Soviet, support for German neutralism. Enlargement Farther to the East? Russian leaders have attacked all subsequent rounds of NATO enlargement on many grounds. One is political and military: NATO forces and NATO military structures, they say, are moving ever closer to Russian borders, thus upsetting the military balance of power in Europe and violating Russian security interests. The other is legal and moral: In the negotiations in 1990 on the external aspects of German unification, Western leaders promised that NATO would not enlarge beyond the former GDR but then reneged on the promises. Former American ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock has supported this contention: “We gave categorical assurances to Gorbachev back when the Soviet Union existed that if a united Germany was able to stay in NATO, NATO would not be moved eastward.” Western scholars have accepted this version and asserted that at the “Open Skies” meeting on February 12-13, 1990, in Ottawa, the Western foreign ministers “agreed not to extend NATO to the east and to let the Soviets know that the Western alliance would not accept the former Warsaw Pact states as members in NATO.” Sporadically, former Soviet officials and Russian diplomats state that comprehensive documentation will be provided to that effect. Thus far, however, it has not been provided, and it is doubtful that it ever will. According to this writer’s research, there is no evidence that further NATO enlargement eastward was dealt with at any time in any of the 1990 negotiating forums. This applies to the Two Plus Four negotiations and the talks between Gorbachev and Bush in Washington and between Gorbachev and Kohl in Moscow. There is also no reference to such a prohibition in any of the documents settling the external aspects of German unification, including the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany of September 12, 1990. The problem also failed to be raised in March and April 1991 during the protracted ratification process in the Supreme Soviet of the Final Settlement and six other associated treaties, among others, on Soviet-German good neighborly relations and the temporary stationing and ultimate withdrawal of Soviet forces from Germany. The issue could and, perhaps from the Soviet perspective, should have been raised by Gorbachev. But there is no evidence that he did. Nor, as far as this writer is aware, did any of the main officials from the foreign ministry or the communist party, nor his foreign policy advisor. There was a good reason why the issue was never put on the negotiating table. The negotiations and Soviet internal controversies in the spring and summer of 1990 were focused on Germany. Like unified Germany's NATO membership initially, it seemed inconceivable that any of the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact in addition to East Germany would one day want to join the Western alliance. But there had been some harbingers that this could happen. For instance, in a discussion in Budapest on European security matters at the end of February 1990, Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn said that “a new approach is possible in the framework of which


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one could not even exclude membership of Hungary in NATO.” But the notion that NATO enlargement would stop at the eastern borders of the new Germany certainly was a prevalent Soviet (and Western) assumption and a strong Soviet expectation. Harbingers to the contrary, such as Horn's vision of the future, therefore, either went unnoticed or were considered too outlandish to be raised officially in the negotiations or private talks with Western leaders. It is possible that the assumptions about Western promises, assurances or commitments have been fostered by confusion about the extension of NATO into East Germany, as opposed to beyond the GDR, that is, beyond unified Germany. On February 9, Secretary Baker had indeed during his talks with Gorbachev in Moscow assured the Soviet leader that if Germany were to remain part of NATO, “there would be no extension of NATO's jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east.” It is clear from the context that “east” meant East Germany. Furthermore, the ambiguities about NATO “jurisdiction” and any special political status for the former GDR were unequivocally resolved on February 24 in the Bush-Kohl meeting at Camp David: NATO would move eastward and unified Germany would be a full member of NATO but there would be a special military status for the former East Germany, e.g. no NATO forces would be placed there. The same clarification applies to many other Russian assertions. Thus, at the 43rd Munich Security Conference on February 10, 2007, then Russian president Vladimir Putin called NATO expansion a “serious provocation” and went on to ask: [W]hat happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr Wörner in Brussels on May 17, 1990. He said at the time that: “the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee”. Where are these guarantees? However, Wörner did not say that but rather: “The very fact that we are ready not to deploy NATO troops beyond the territory of the Federal Republic gives the Soviet Union firm security guarantees. Moreover we could conceive of a transitional period during which a reduced number of Soviet forces could remain stationed in the present-day GDR.” Nothing was said of former members of the Warsaw Pact. The context, as the subsequent reference to a transitional period for Soviet forces in East Germany underlines, was Germany, not the area outside it. By replacing “West Germany” with “German territory” the opposite impression is falsely being conveyed. Hannes Adomeit4

4

College of Europe, Bruges and Natolin (Warsaw)



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CZECH REPUBLIC

The author analyses changes in the international system after the end of the “Cold War” which allowed for the 1999 NATO enlargement; the changing Czech attitudes towards NATO; controversies related to NATO-led out-of-area operations, and to the anti-ballistic missile system. He concludes that the Czechs’ “devoted Atlanticism” is today shakier than used to be in the 1990s. It is noteworthy that the Czech Republic has spent more than a half of its independent existence as member of a defense organization which communist Czechoslovakia was prepared to fight only twenty years ago. From a historical perspective the ten years between the fall of communism and the Czech accession to NATO had confirmed the radical and rapid change brought about by the end of the “Cold War”. The End of Cold War as ‘strategic enabler’ The single most important event which allowed for NATO’s Eastward enlargement and for the Czech Republic’s accession to the Alliance was the end of the “Cold War” and the resulting domination by the United States in world and European politics. Without this change the Soviet Union (in some form) would have most likely continued to politically, militarily and economically dominate in Central and Eastern Europe. The shift in the balance of power from bipolarity to U.S. primacy created a window of opportunity for changes in many regions of the world, including Central and Eastern Europe. This however, is only half of the story, for it is not difficult to notice that the changes in global power distribution were accompanied by significant shifts in the perception and identities of the actors concerned. In several years the basic paradigm of international politics shifted from ‘mutual assured destruction’ to ‘mutual interdependence’ not only in economic but also in political terms. The United Nations Organization was transformed (perhaps only temporarily) from an arena of competition among superpowers and groups of their supporters to a hub of cooperation. This resulted in an outburst of peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations designed to cope with an array of regional conflicts. To sum up, the changes at the global level can be attributed not only to a shift in the balance of power. The new permeable international environment, sharply contrasting to the previous, tightly regulated “Cold War” system, opened the ways to radically new developments at a regional level, including Europe. Even if we call the period of contest between the free world and the communist regimes in Europe the “Cold War”, the striking fact is that the whole period is marked by surprising stability as far as the inter-bloc relations were concerned. Once the blocs or spheres of influence had been consolidated, the most dramatic events occurred afterwards only within the blocs. The division of Europe and its seemingly permanent character were underlined by two important factors. One of them was the competing sets of international organizations (NATO/EC/WEU vs. Warsaw Pact/COMECON); the other was nuclear weapons. Although their contribution to the stability is a matter of discussion, it is hardly disputable that the threat of a nuclear war made any major change in the status quo by military means almost impossible. The horrifying picture of mushroom clouds was a powerful deterrent to a war in Europe. This situation certainly did not support any change in the status quo in Europe. Détente itself was at its best an attempt to support reforms within the communist bloc rather than anything

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T. Karásek / Czech Republic

else. There were no significant territorial disputes or ethnic tensions across the Iron curtain. Indeed the fall of communism showed that the only thing that mattered was the nature of the Eastern European regimes, the conflict between ‘us’ and ‘them’. When ‘they’ (i.e. the communist rulers) suddenly and unexpectedly left the stage the main source of tension was removed. To put it metaphorically, one side in a chess game called the “Cold War” suddenly left the table and was replaced by a new player who shook hands with the former adversary. Together they started playing a completely new game while the table did not move at all. From the realist perspective the changes in the distribution of power were on our continent no less significant than the shifts at the global level. Despite the fall of the Soviet Union, it was evident that Russia would remain the most influential actor on the European continent. The other would inevitably be reunified Germany. But, as Brzezinski and others noted, it was especially important for the future development of Europe that a dominant position was retained by a non-European power – the United States. The fall of the “Iron curtain” extended further to the East their post-Second World War Two role of a guarantor of Western Europe’s security. In November 1990 most European governments together with the U.S., Canada and the Soviet Union adopted in Paris the “Charter for New Europe”. Members of the European Communities started a discussion on enhancing the integration process which has formalized two years later with the founding of the European Union. These debates also included the European security architecture, especially concerning the relations between EU, the Western European Union and NATO. NATO joined early the efforts of redefining European security with its London Declaration of July 6, 1990 which called for cooperation with the former adversaries in Eastern Europe. More substantially, NATO adopted the new Strategic Concept in November 1991. The document signaled a radical transition from the “Cold War” strategic thinking towards a new, wider approach to security based on regional stability, conflict management and cooperation with former opponents. A new approach to Europe-wide governance was born in the early 1990s. The change was less about power redistribution or creation of new institutional structures and more about redefinition of norms and identities. According to this approach, the processes of NATO and EU enlargement were not viewed as acts of territorial expansion but rather as preponderance of a peaceful ‘discourse’ among European societies and their elites. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Czech Republic, played a distinct role in the process. The Czech ‘return to Europe’ After 1989 it became clear that the United States would continue to play a crucial role in European security. It did not go unnoticed by the Czech political elites that major crises in Europe could only be solved by a U.S. intervention. From the early 1990s, the ‘return to Europe’ became the backbone of the Czech foreign policy orientation. The accession to NATO was its important part. However, it took some time before the vague notion of a “return to Europe” was transformed into a concerted effort. Initially the Czechoslovak foreign policy tended to view the international situation in rather similar terms as Gorbachev’s concept of a ‘European house’. The official ’Memorandum’ distributed to foreign embassies in Prague in April 1990 suggested that NATO and the Warsaw Pact would together form the basis of a new European security order. However, the proposal received a cold reception in Great Britain and France, while NATO was apparently in no mood even to seriously consider such a radical change. Consequently, the governments of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland reacted by advocating the dismantling of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The attempted anti-Gorbachev


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coup in summer 1991 sparked the fears of a potential revival of a malevolent power in Eastern Europe. The conflicts in former Yugoslavia revealed the disturbing incompetence of some major international organizations, while beyond any doubt only NATO seemed able to stop the Balkan wars. Other developments on the European continent also contributed to the feeling of insecurity which led Czech politicians to start advocating NATO accession as a vital part of the country’s foreign and security policy. In October 1993 President Václav Havel could publicly proclaim “We are really part of the NATO family”. The Czech ‘return to Europe’ meant in practical terms a close alignment with the United States of America. This went well not only with the political elite but also with the public also because there was no historical drawback in the Czech-U.S. relations. This situation stood in sharp contrast to the Czech relations with major European powers. Russia was widely regarded as heir to the Soviet Union – a negative reference in the new Czech identity. Great Britain and France were still ‘tainted’ in Czech eyes as culprits of the 1938 Munich Agreement, while Germany was still considered as the perpetrator of the Second World War. The inclination to enter the Alliance was only logical as the United States were viewed by many as a desirable protector in case of potential regional or other threats. However, according to public opinion polls the enthusiasm among the political elite was not fully shared by the population for quite some time. As late as in 1997 less than fifty per cent of those asked favored NATO membership. This situation changed only after an active information campaign was launched by the government. The integration of the Czech Republic into the NATO structures effectively started through the country’s involvement in NATO-led peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. Following the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement NATO launched, under the UN-mandate, its peacekeeping operations IFOR, SFOR and SFOR II. In February 1996 the Czech Republic contributed an 850 soldiers strong battalion and several officers to IFOR and later maintained its presence in the SFOR and SFOR II operations. Subsequently the Czech Armed Forces joined another major NATO operation in the Balkans – the Joint Guardian in Kosovo (KFOR). After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the scope of the Czech Armed Forces’ participation in international missions increased considerably, including notably in the U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan, in Kuwait and Iraq as well as in the NATO-led ISAF in Afghanistan. However, the seemingly unambiguous support to the idea of transatlantic security cooperation has had several cracks. Already the first participation as member in a NATO operation revealed serious disagreements within the Czech political elite. The 1999 Kosovo campaign aptly illustrated that the Czech Republic was perhaps well prepared to become a NATO member, but at times found it difficult to act like one. The campaign had been namely planned months before the Czech Republic became a full NATO member, while the air attacks were launched just ten days after the Czech accession to NATO. The Czech political scene became clearly split over the issue of Kosovo conflict despite the positive experience of participation in the previous NATO-led peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. President Václav Havel forcefully defended the military intervention as a legitimate response to wide-scale violations of human rights. He was joined by the two minor coalition parties - the Christian Democrats (KDU-ýSL) and the Liberals (US-DEU) who took a coherent, pro-action stance. The Communists were also united, but in their staunch opposition to NATO operations. On the other hand, the two largest parties in Parliament – the Social Democrats and the right-wing Civic Democrats (ODS) were clearly divided. Prime Minister Vladimír Špidla, who supported the NATO mission, faced vociferous opposition from the ranks of his own Social Democratic deputies. Quite surprisingly, the opposition party ODS (so far solidly pro-NATO and pro-U.S.) was split over the issue. Its chairman (former Prime Minister and current President) Václav

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Klaus regarded the action as a threat to the principle of national sovereignty. Nevertheless, a majority of ODS members and deputies were strongly for the action which they regarded as a test of loyalty to the Allies, especially to the United States. Hence, a consensus of the political elite was by no means self-evident despite the fact that no immediate interests of Czech Republic could be hurt by the NATO campaign (unlike Greece and Hungary). Future prospects It was too easy to dismiss the rift on the Czech political scene over Kosovo as a result of an extraordinary situation for which the country’s leadership simply was not prepared. However, subsequent events confirmed that the consensus over the importance of a strong transatlantic link has been rather weak. The first of these events was the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The Czech political parties were split again along the same dividing lines as on the Kosovo issue and showed lower overall support for the action. The U.S. intervention led to some paradoxical political alliances. The former ODS chairman and current President V. Klaus effectively sided with a leftist wing within the Social Democratic party who opposed the action, while the Social Democratic Prime Minister’s hesitant pro-U.S. position found support among ODS conservative deputies. The Parliamentary elections in 2006 resulted in a political stalemate in Parliament which brought to surface even more disagreements over the country’s foreign and security policy. One of these disagreements occurred over the Czech-based radar site as part of the U.S. ballistic missile defense system (BDM). Despite repeated assurances and declarations on the part of NATO that the system would be a major component in any future BMD system hypothetically built by the Alliance in the future, the opposition Social Democrats (whose previous government, paradoxically, started the secret negotiations over the radar site with the USA) signaled their resolute opposition to the treaty which was signed in November 2008. Given the fact that opposition parties used many of the arguments against the radar which were originally advanced by Russia, we may be witnessing not only a meltdown of supportive attitudes towards USA but also of the so far rather reserved attitudes towards Russia. Another case in point is the war in Afghanistan. The Czech deployments in that country date back to the Social Democratic governments. Nevertheless, in December 2008 the opposition in the Chamber of Deputies, including all its Social Democratic deputies, voted down the government’s proposal to increase the number of soldiers deployed in Afghanistan. The government obtained an approval of the overall plan for foreign military operations in 2009 at the beginning of that year and only after it trimmed the proposed increase of the Czech contingent. The aforementioned examples do not necessarily undermine the reputation of the Czech Republic as a ‘devoted Atlanticist’. With the exception of the Communists (and to some extent also the Greens) all major political parties still regard NATO as a fulcrum of the country’s security policy. The Czech Republic has been an active Alliance member during the past ten years. The current participation in the NATO missions in Kosovo and especially in Afghanistan clearly supports this conclusion. Nevertheless, the strong political consensus before the accession in 1999 which characterized the Czech attitudes towards NATO and the idea of transatlantic security cooperation seems to be fading away. By acceding to all important European and transcontinental international organizations (NATO, the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the World Trade Organization) the Czech Republic has by 2004 secured its


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position in the ‘club’ of stable and prosperous democracies. The ‘Europeanization’ of the Czech society and of its political elite has clearly resulted during the Bush Administration in a more reserved attitude towards to USA and their policies. To some extent this also concerned NATO. It remains to be seen whether the recent disagreements are just a result of a specific political situation, or whether the consensus on Czech foreign and security policy – with NATO at its centre – built throughout the 1990s has come to an end. Tomáš Karásek1 Bibliography Bezpeþnostní strategie ýeské republiky. Praha: ÚĜad vlády ýeské republiky, 2003. FAWN, Rick: Reconstituting a National Identity: Ideologies in Czech Foreign Policy after the Split. in: FAWN, Rick (ed.): Ideology and National Identity in Post-Communist Foreign Policies. London: Frank Cass, 2003. GATI, Charles: The Bloc That Failed. Soviet-East Relations in Transition. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990. HANDL, Vladimír – PICK, Otto: ýeská zahraniþní politika 1993 – 2005. Od “návratu do Evropy” k evropeizaci. Praha: Ústav mezinárodních vztahĤ, www.iir.cz, May 2005. KARÁSEK, Tomáš: Budoucnost transatlantických bezpeþnostních vztahĤ: þtyĜi scénáĜe. Mezinárodní vztahy, 2/2004, pp. 20 – 34. ěIHÁýKOVÁ, VČra: Czech Republic: “Europeanization” of a hesitant Atlanticist? SCHIMMELFENNIG, Frank et al.: The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric (Themes in European Governance). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

1

Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic



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THE BALTIC STATES’ ROCKY ROAD TO NATO1 This chapter shows how the initial Western perception of the Baltic states as falling within the Russian sphere of legitimate interests and therefore outside the area of potential NATO enlargement, changed in response to an US-led evolution of NATO from a defensive alliance to the framework of a democratic security community. The membership of the three Baltic republics in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was considered a ‘mission impossible’ throughout most of the post-Cold War debate over enlargement. Indeed, the question of their admission was the most contentious issue in the 1990s, for Russia opposed it most vehemently, major European allies supported it without enthusiasm, while US foreign policy establishment held highly contradictory opinions on the matter. Only a few years before the Prague Summit in November 2002 where the three Baltic states were finally invited, the ‘Baltic question’ in NATO was still highly controversial and keenly debated. That was hardly the case with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania themselves, however, as they regarded NATO membership as an ultimate security guarantee as well as a confirmation of their European identity. Since their re-gaining of independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union there was an unprecedented domestic political consensus and wide public support. Yet, a significant shift had to first take place in the ‘mental map’ of the old NATO allies regarding the image of the Baltic states before the invitations were actually issued. This shift in the image of the Baltic states from post-Soviet republics to success stories among the countries formerly belonging to the Eastern bloc enabled their ultimate joining as full partners of the Euro-Atlantic security community. The initial perception of the Baltic states as falling within the Russian Federation’s sphere of legitimate security interests, and therefore outside the area of potential NATO enlargement, changed in response to an US-led evolution of NATO from a defensive alliance to the framework of a democratic security community. Western understanding and portrayal of the Baltic states were transformed along with the selfprojection of the Alliance in the post-Cold War security environment. At the end of the day, NATO not only needed a new raison d’être or a new mission to justify its continued existence in the post-Cold War environment, but had to be bold (i.e. embracing the countries from the former opposite side). Although vigorous Russian resistance was perceived as the key reason for treating Baltic membership in NATO as a bridge too far for most of the post-Cold War debate over expansion, the allies initially had also doubts whether the Baltic states were truly Western. To many Western Europeans the Baltic states had more or less become part of the mental map of the former Soviet Union.2 This attitude was cunningly described by the then Estonian Foreign Minister and today’s President Toomas H. Ilves as ‘Minsk-Pinsk, Omsk-Tomsk; Tallinn-Stalin, what’s the difference’. The late Estonian President Lennart Meri noted pointedly that the greatest obstacle to the Baltic states’ aspirations for NATO membership lied not in Moscow but rather in the West. 1

This paper is an abridged version of Mälksoo, M. (2004) “Enabling NATO Enlargement: Changing Constructions of the Baltic States”, Trames: Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences, vol. 8. no. 3, pp. 284-98. Reprinted with the permission of The Estonian Academy Publishers. 2 Moreover, although the Western world never officially recognised the illegal Soviet annexation of the Baltic states from 1940-1991, their post-Second World War recognition of the Western borders of the Soviet Union indicated that the West had actually accepted the Baltic countries as being part of the Soviet Union.

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M. Mälksoo / The Baltic States’ Rocky Road to NATO

The question whether the post-communist Baltic states were able to join Europe politically, socially and culturally, or they would really remain an open flank to non-Europe, was thus fundamentally important. NATO enlargement to Eastern European countries tested Western Europe’s ability to overcome the traditional cultural and civilisational division of Europe. After all, Eastern Europe has historically functioned as a sort of surrogate, or a more rustic version of Western Europe. Soviet rule in Central and Eastern Europe had loaded the term ‘East’ with further negative connotations. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet empire called for an urgent revision of the political division in Europe and for the reconsideration of the concept of ‘Europe’ as such. The issues of identity may have been hidden in the day-to-day perspective, but they actually went to the heart of the Alliance’s post-Cold War eastward enlargement. A major conceptual issue was therefore concerned with the term ‘Europe’ and its boundary. The Baltic Three as ‘the Former Soviet Union’ Besides being conceived as ‘Eastern’, the Baltic states displayed yet another quality of ‘otherness’ in the context of NATO enlargement due to their late absorption into the Soviet Union. Indeed, in the early years of discussing NATO enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe, a firm dividing line was drawn between the republics of the former Soviet Union and the former Soviet military and political satellites in Eastern Europe. Most Western European allies regarded the Baltic states as the ‘second tier’ post-communist states and as a ‘red line not to be crossed’ in relations with the Russian Federation. Almost every leading Russian political or military official insisted that any Alliance’s attempt to offer membership to one or more Baltic countries would lead to a critical Russian reassessment of existing cooperative relations with NATO and the West. Most of the arguments put forward in the NATO debates on Baltic membership thus boiled down to a cost-benefit analysis. Nonetheless, the rationale was camouflaged by statements about the lack of these countries’ readiness for membership. The Baltic states were said to have been excluded from NATO’s first post-Cold War enlargement round in 1999 because their armed forces were unprepared for membership. Although the Baltic states had to start building their militaries from the scratch, this argument basically served as a convenient mask to hide real geopolitical calculations. There was a general inclination among the Western Europeans to consider the European Union (EU) as a more appropriate framework than NATO to embrace the Baltic states. However, in the eyes of the Baltics EU membership could not serve as a substitute for joining the Alliance and thus addressing their most existential security concerns. The Western long-time appeasement with the Russian “Cold War” mentality prevented Baltic membership in NATO’s first post-Cold War enlargement round, and conditioned also the debates in the preceding round. The general ‘yes’ to NATO enlargement to all Central and Eastern European democratic states in spite of their history or geography was cancelled by heavy ‘buts’ in case of Baltic membership. A constructive relationship with Russia was perceived by NATO to be of supreme importance. Given this Realpolitik-based approach to NATO enlargement the Baltic membership was seen as creating rather than solving geopolitical problems. That is why the ‘Russia first’ view was allowed to override the Baltic states’ sovereign right to join the alliance of their choice. Russia’s objections thus prevailed in the NATO enlargement discourse for a long time.


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From the perspective of Realpolitik, Baltic membership in NATO did not seem achievable until a fundamental shift in Russian’s reactions and/or NATO’s transformation occurred. The alleged ‘indefensibility’ of the Baltic states due to their size and location was an essential part of the Realpolitik argument against their inclusion into the Alliance. The New York Times columnist Thomas L. Friedman captured the spirit of the times by his dismissal of the possibility of NATO’s Baltic enlargement without diluting itself to a ‘mini-UN’, as there was arguably no way the US Army could have guaranteed the Estonia-Russia border in 1997. Around the same time another journalist, Anne McElvoy, maintained in her paraphrase of the historic mourir pour Dantzig-argument that the applications of former Soviet Union states to become members of NATO should be put on ice, because the West would not go to war over a Russian invasion of Ukraine or the Baltics.3 After all, ‘exactly how much oil is under the Baltic states?’, the cynics asked. On the one hand, there were signals that either Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania had a real chance to be part of the first enlargement package. US Defence Secretary William Perry stated in September 1996 that ‘in his judgement” they are not yet ready to take on the Article V responsibilities of NATO membership.’ At the same time, the Western press began to speculate that Baltic exclusion from NATO would be the price Moscow received for acquiescing to NATO enlargement. Moreover, the Baltic states were gradually regarded as a test case for the credibility of NATO’s promises with regard to further accessions. In the final analysis, Russia’s ‘red line’ rhetoric touched a very sensitive political nerve in the Alliance and ultimately tested the overall mindset and rationale of NATO enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe. Enlarging NATO on geopolitical grounds would have confirmed Russian anxieties about NATO as an aggressive military bloc moving right up to its borders. Moreover, a refusal to invite the Baltic states out of consideration for the anxieties or for the strategic concerns of the Kremlin would have ultimately amounted to admitting that Russia’s fears of NATO’s expanding to the region were justified – that NATO really harboured aggressive or imperialist anti-Russian intentions. Russia’s prejudice thus emphasised the significance of defining the enlargement in cooperative rather than in confrontational terms. In order to enlarge NATO without reviving Cold War tensions or recreating a divided Europe, the enlargement rationale had to be inclusive towards Russia, not implicitly confrontational towards it. The only conceivable enlargement logic that enabled Baltic membership in NATO without creating major Russian response could therefore be a cooperative one, envisioning a new partnership between NATO and Russia as a complementary imperative to enlarging the EuroAtlantic security community to Central and Eastern European countries. The purpose of NATO’s eastward enlargement was, thus, to be defined less in terms of defence than of providing an anchor of stability and building a new Europe together with Russia, rather than without or against it. Historically, expanding a military alliance has essentially meant creating an alignment – that is, drawing a line, and so far, Russian concerns could be regarded fair. Indeed, while NATO’s central task as a defensive alliance has traditionally been one of protecting the sovereignty of individual states, its security practice has subsequently involved the drawing of clear boundaries, specifying who was protected by the American security guarantee and who remained outside of it. Hence, Russia’s insistence on the ‘red line’ around the Baltic states as regards to the limits of post-Cold War NATO illuminated a substantial dilemma of NATO 3

Lumping Ukraine and the Baltic states together under the label of ‘former Soviet Union’ was symptomatic in the early years of discussing NATO’s eastward enlargement in the West. The fact that by any ‘measurable’ NATO criteria Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were in reality much closer to Visegrád states than to Ukraine, was generally disregarded for geopolitical convenience.

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enlargement, namely, how to enlarge a military alliance without drawing clear boundaries between those ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the alliance. The question of Baltic membership emphasised how difficult it was to enlarge NATO without either confronting Russia as a major geopolitical factor in the region or appeasing it. As such, it became the litmus test of the Alliance’s post-Cold War enlargement logic.

The Baltic Three as a Litmus Test After the Madrid Summit of 1997 it was gradually becoming clear that despite their smallness the impact of the Baltic Three’s on relations between Russia and NATO and on Russian and US politics in particular was disproportionately heavy. Moreover, the Baltic issue encompassed at the time the only moral component left in NATO’s enlargement process. The moral factor, however, was a very important incentive for the United States, the main promoter of the Alliance’s Eastward enlargement. As healing the wounds of the Cold War and erasing the injustices of Yalta became a major theme of NATO enlargement, leaving the Baltic states out became increasingly difficult. At the end of the day, the Baltic states were seen as prime examples of small states which had suffered, yet endured and regained their freedom by peaceful means. In order to maintain its identity as victor in the Cold War, the United States as well as NATO had to act with some semblance of consistency with the normative ideals which they proclaimed. Of course, the US’ reasons for bolstering the Baltic case for NATO were far from selfless and therefore the moral rationale for enlarging NATO to the region has always been intertwined with strategic calculations. Furthermore, the fact that the Baltic states were strongly Atlanticist in their orientation and as such potentially very good partners for the US, did not go unnoticed either. The Baltic region also provided for Washington an important laboratory for promoting closer regional cooperation between the East and the West. Thus, the Baltic membership became an issue of the further debate over enlargement, indeed, a matter of principle for NATO. Having repeatedly said that states should be able to join alliances of their own choice, that Russia would not have a veto, and that security in Europe is indivisible, the Baltic issue became for NATO a touchstone of its credibility in upholding all these principles. The initial underdog among other Central and Eastern European applicants for NATO membership was therefore paradoxically becoming the ultimate litmus test of the Alliance’s post-Cold War enlargement project. The qualification of the Baltic states as ‘former Soviet Union’ which implicitly emphasised the geopolitical straightjacket disabling their membership in NATO was gradually giving the way to their projection as the credibility test for the rationale of the Alliance’s eastward enlargement. The invitation to begin the accession talks with EU in 1998 became the ‘Baltic success story’ in Eastern Europe’s post-communist transition. Since the ‘former Soviet Union’ label was disregarded by EU, it became increasingly difficult for NATO, whose enlargement criteria was not that different from EU’s, to retain this implicit dividing line between the Baltics and the rest of Central and Eastern Europe. The Baltic states had pursued right policies, performed well and met Western standards of democratic development and military reform. Russia also softened its opposition towards further enlargement of the Alliance since NATO became perceived as less contentious and both Washington and Moscow saw each other as partners in dealing with the more pressing threat of Islamic fundamentalism. The fact is that in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks Russia oriented itself clearly towards cooperation with the West. If short-lived in hindsight, it greatly helped the Baltic states to leave the ‘special zone’. Furthermore, NATO’s first round of post-Cold War enlargement had convinced the allies that the actual military threat from Russia was insignificant. World War III or Cold War II that the pessimistic


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realists had predicted had indeed not happened as a result of the first NATO enlargement to the East. In essence, the Baltic membership in NATO was made possible by the shift to the liberal institutionalist rationale in the NATO enlargement discourse. The initially prevailing Realpolitik opposition to the Baltic states’ inclusion into the Alliance, mostly maintained by the Western Europeans, was ‘won over’ by the United States’ idealistic aim to build a ‘new Europe’, to undo historic injustice and to erase the old dividing lines. However, there is an important nuance to this conclusion here: besides Realpolitik-based opposition to the Baltic states’ membership, there was also a realist geopolitical pro-enlargement stance that the liberal institutionalists of the Clinton administration benefited from – although the two proenlargement groups made truly strange ideological bedfellows. Hence, to say that the institutionalist approach ‘won’, does not mean that rationalist motives for enlargement (such as enhancing NATO’s influence in the East or creating a security regime in the name of stability) were disregarded. By the beginning of the millennium, NATO brought its enlargement discourse to the stage where it would have been seriously discrediting for the Alliance not to include the Baltic states. Having stated repeatedly that no European democracy could be excluded from the enlargement process because of its history or geography, NATO’s failure to include the Baltic states at the Prague Summit of 2002 would have severely reduced its credibility, damaged the transatlantic relationship, and harmed US prestige around the world. At the end of the day, NATO became caught by its own words, and the eventual ‘inevitability’ of expansion driven by the necessity to save the face of the Alliance. Maria Mälksoo4

4 International

Centre for Defence Studies, Tallinn, Estonia.



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POLAND After the Warsaw Pact was dissolved in 1991, Poland found itself in a unique security situation, outside any multilateral alliance and with no bilateral security treaty with any country. Moreover, Poland found itself in a new geopolitical situation having lost three neighbors (Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and German Democratic Republic) and acquired seven new ones. Joining NATO was the right strategic decision to which there have been no good alternatives. Poland supports NATO’s transformation and its new missions, but at the same time is interested in maintaining the Alliance’s capability to protect the members against threats, including military ones that may occur and destabilise the region. Poland’s road to NATO was neither easy nor short. After Warsaw Pact was dissolved in 1991, Poland found itself in a unique situation. We were not part of any multinational alliance and we did not have any bilateral security treaty with any country. Fortunately, nobody threatened Poland at that time, but it was natural that Polish leaders wanted to anchor the security in an effective security system. The second specific aspect of Poland was Poland’s new geopolitical situation. Since 1945 Poland had only three neighbors: the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and German Democratic Republic. As a result of political changes in East-Central Europe, all three our neighbors disappeared. In place of nonexistent three neighbors Poland acquired seven new neighboring countries. In the years 1991-1994 we concluded treaties of friendship, cooperation and good neighbor relations, but those treaties did not contain any security provisions. President Charles de Gaulle used to say that countries do not change their geography, but they change their geopolitics. And Poland did. In the first years after political changes in Poland in 1989 there was wide discussion about available security options. Several were suggested. Generally speaking, they could be divided into two categories: a) undesirable options and b) desirable options. Let me state first the undesirable options: 1. Continuation of status quo. Followers of this option claimed that NATO and Warsaw Pact were relicts of the “Cold War”. Since it ended, there was no need to be in any alliance. 2. Neutrality. Some experts suggested that Poland should proclaim neutrality and thus gain prestige and save money on defense spending. But Poland has an important geostrategic position in Europe. Its neutrality would create in Central Europe a security vacuum which other countries would try to fill. Besides, it is cheaper to defend your country in the company of allies than to organize defense alone. 3. To rely on OSCE as a guarantee of security. OSCE is playing an important role in preventive diplomacy, but it does not have operational instruments of guaranteeing security. 4. Membership in the Western European Union. WEU had four categories of members: full members, associate members, associate partners and observers. An alliance which has four categories of membership can not be a cohesive alliance.

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L. Pastusiak and M. Wagrowska ˛ / Poland

Besides, only full members enjoyed security guarantees under Article 5 of the modified Brussels Treaty. To be a full member of WEU, the country had to be a member of the European Union. Poland at that time was not a EU member. 5. Subregional organizations. Some people suggested that Poland should seek security based on subregional organizations such as Vysehrad Group, Central European Initiative or Baltic States Cooperation Council. Yet none of those organizations has been involved in military cooperation. Thus we were left with the only desirable option: membership in NATO, the only effective military alliance in Europe. The Polish government expressed interest in joining NATO already in 1992. But NATO was not ready yet for the Eastern enlargement. During his visit in Warsaw on March 11-12 1992, NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner stated that the doors to NATO were opened, but the Alliance did not make a decision yet about accepting former Warsaw Pact members. President of Poland Lech Walesa on September 1, 1993 sent a letter to the NATO Secretary General, stating that membership in the North Atlantic Alliance is top priority of Polish foreign policy. An important step on the road to NATO was the Partnership for Peace Program initiated by NATO in 1994. It allowed countries aspiring for NATO membership to develop various forms of cooperation with the Alliance. Poland was the first country to conclude a protocol with the North Atlantic Alliance on cooperation within PfP. The Polish programs of cooperation within the framework of Partnership for Peace developed dynamically. In 1994 Poland had 45 programs of cooperation, in 1995 250 programs, and in 1998 over 400 programs. There were three paths that led Poland to membership in the North Atlantic Alliance: 1. Governmental path: dialogue, negotiations, signing the protocols of accession. 2. Legislative path: forming the legal framework for Poland’s accession to NATO which comprised eight documents. 3. Military path: achieving compatibility and interoperability of the Polish armed forces with NATO standards. The Polish government did not wait for an invitation to join NATO, and started to reform the Polish military to make them more compatible with NATO standards. Also in the area of politics we implemented reforms to meet the conditions of membership in the Alliance, e.g.: civil control of the military, strengthening our democratic system, free market economy, making contribution to the security of Euro-Atlantic region, respecting human rights and the territorial integrity of neighboring states, etc. On May 7, 1996 Poland started series of talks with NATO about possible membership. The final invitation to Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary to join NATO came at the NATO summit in Madrid on July 8, 1997. On November 14, 1997 Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs in the letter addressed to NATO Secretary General confirmed the Polish decision to join NATO and the acceptance of all obligations connected with membership in the Alliance. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary signed the protocols of accession to NATO in Brussels on December 16, 1997. The first NATO countries which ratified the protocols of accession were Canada and Denmark on February 2, 1998. The US Senate gave consent and advice to US President Bill Clinton to ratify the protocols of accession


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on April 30, 1998. Eighty senators voted “yes”, and only nineteen opposed. After the ratification process was concluded, the NATO Secretary General Javier Solana issued an official invitation to the three countries to join NATO formally. On February 17, 1999 Polish Parliament recommended to Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski to ratify the treaty of Poland’s accession to NATO. Polish President officially ratified the protocols of accession on February 26, 1999. The last act that crowned the process of Poland’s accession to NATO took place in Independence, Missouri on March 12, 1999 when Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek deposited the protocol of accession with US Secretary of State Madeline Albright. Thus Poland’s road to NATO membership ended on March 12, 1999. Longin Pastusiak1

1

Academy of Finances, Warsaw, Poland

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Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary were the first post-communist countries and former Warsaw Pact members admitted to NATO. For the Republic of Poland it was the right strategic decision, given its specific geopolitical position. Poland’s striving for membership in NATO could be in the simplest but probably the most accurate terms described with the following: turning away from Russia (Soviet Union), from the Warsaw Pact, departure from the communist era and turning towards the democratic West with its structures, such as NATO and European Community. The reorientation of Poland’s foreign and security policies was a derivative of the radical systemic transformation from a communist-ruled state towards a Western-style democratic country. But at the same time, especially in the period from 1989 to 1991, this transformation was out in a harmonious way and did not provoke any sharp political or diplomatic incidents in Polish-Russian relations. This phenomenon should be attributed mainly to the responsible policy by the first non-communist Prime Minister of Poland Tadeusz Mazowiecki. He never forgot that numerous units of Northern Group of Soviet Armed Forces were at that time still deployed on the Polish territory. The presence of Soviet armed forces as well as the role of the Polish Army in the Warsaw Pact’s strategic plans reflected the sensitive position of our country from the strategic point of view. During the “Cold War” Poland could have been the main theatre of direct armed confrontation between the two opposite political and military blocks. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and until 1999, Poland was situated in the so-called “grey” or “buffer zone”. This position could have been assessed as risky strategic location in insecure neighbourhood. Due to its specific location the Alliance was perceived as a powerful deterrent against any attack on Poland’s independence and sovereignty. It was believed that various forms of integration with NATO would bring Poland closer to obtaining the desired NATO security guarantee. The Russian Federation more or less vigorously opposed the possibility of the former Warsaw Pact members’ joining NATO. It particularly applied to Poland, a strategically important country with the biggest military potential. During his official visit to Warsaw in August 1993, Borys Yeltsyn, the then President of Russian Federation, had accepted the right of Poland to decide on its membership in NATO. Several days later, however, he sent a letter to the heads of eight most important NATO member states in which he voiced his objection. Since that moment we could see three processes taking place concurrently: Kremlin’s opposition to the expansion of NATO’s military infrastructure towards the Commonwealth of Independent States; the growing international importance of Russia; and negotiating modifications in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), which for Poland was considered as the second “pillar” of European security, beside NATO. Saying that Poland strived for NATO membership only because of the so-called Russian factor would be an oversimplification. Apart from the desire to become a member of democratic, affluent and well organised Western community of nations, there were two other interconnected factors which played important roles and which are still believed to be crucial for Poland’s security. One of them is the political and military presence of the USA in Europe. As NATO leader it has been perceived as the „ultimate guarantor” of Poland’s and of Central Europe’s security. It has been believed that the American presence in Europe constitutes the necessary and sufficient deterrence by NATO. It was assumed that Poland’s membership of NATO depended chiefly on USA. The other source of strong support for NATO membership was derived from the hope that the Alliance with USA participation would prevent the so-called renationalisation of security and defence policies of some Western European states, particularly united and ever stronger Germany. NATO membership and its security guarantee were conceived as protection against a hostile action. However, there were always sceptics who warned against the “blind reliance on paper security guarantees”.


39

The issue of joining NATO became the area of political competition among the personalities and political parties stemming from the same Solidarity Movement. The most influential, Freedom Union (Unia WolnoĞci) to which Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki belonged, strived for integration within European structures, including NATO, but in such a way that it would not to antagonise Russia. Right-wing politicians headed by the next Prime Minister Jan Olszewski from the Movement for Reconstruction of Poland (Ruch Odbudowy Polski) hid neither their antipathy towards Russia nor the fact that their main motive for joining NATO would be the Russian threat. In the early 1990s the weak post-communist Left was initially against Poland’s membership of NATO. However, later the Left started very actively supporting Poland’s membership both in NATO and EU. Polish Parliament has never approved the motion to hold a referendum on Poland’s membership in NATO. It was argued that security and defence issues cannot be decided upon by a popular vote because the voters require special knowledge which the public does not possess. The question of a referendum was not a hot issue, as more than 80% of respondents in public opinion polls wanted to support the country’s membership. Later the level of support hovered at about or above 60%, but sharply decreased for a short period following the NATO attack against Serbia in 1999. Many Poles were shocked by the fact that a dozen days after joining NATO they became co-responsible for what had happened. For the first time since 2002 the public opinion support for the North Atlantic Alliance, including its stabilisation missions has reached 51% in 2008, while 45% of Poles would like transatlantic relations to improve. NATO membership has become an important element of Poland’s raison d’état. In fact it still is despite some problems that have arisen between Warsaw and the capitals of several other member states. The main and invariably present issue related to the membership in NATO has been the credibility of its security guarantees in case of a hostile action against Poland. The Polish National Security Strategies emphasise that Poland as a NATO member is covered by solid security guarantees. However, some Polish politicians and experts still consider as possible the threats to Poland’s borders and even its territory either as a result of destabilisation in the Eastern part of our continent (in the area of the Commonwealth of Independent States) or even of a conscious use of force. “Hypothetic threats will occur until the nature of transformation of the area east of Poland becomes completely clear,” stated one of the more experienced observers predicting the event which had really happened. Among hypothetic military threats to Poland’s security the possible stationing of Russian middle-range ballistic missiles near Kaliningrad, concentration of Russian troops in the same area, deployment of additional S-300 missile systems in Belarus and the establishment of a joint Russian-Belorussian air-defence system have also been mentioned . Moreover, military operations by non-state actors are also conceivable. In the opinion of some Polish politicians and experts, the unpredictability of situation along and to the East of the Polish Eastern border is a chief argument for maintaining North Atlantic Alliance’s strong defensive function. It is worth noting the fact that among the new member states only Poland and the Baltic republics border Russia, while Poland due to its position and potential would probably have to play a special role in case of an armed incident or conflict in the region. This explains Poland’s efforts to protect itself against such a possibility and her appeals to upgrade NATO’s contingency plans which would allow for the Alliance’s forces and assets to be used to help Poland. Statements by some Polish politicians indicate that there are differences in their interpretations of the meaning of Art.5. Some suggest that the nature of the

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security guarantees is changing, while others insist on the traditional interpretation of Alliance’s security guarantees. The range of questions debated in Poland runs from the solidarity among the allies, possible or probable involvement by the United States in defending Poland to national security and defence policy, strength and structure of the Polish armed forces. According to the prevailing opinion, the Polish armed forces are not anymore capable to act alone, as they are increasingly integrated with the Allied forces. According to some expert opinions, they should again become more selfreliant because in face of a conceivable crisis they would have to act alone longer than expected (a dozen or so days) before NATO would be able to come to help. Poland is very interested in the development of the NATO Response Forces (NRF), in broadening the concept of solidarity forces capable to defend the member states, and in maintaining the Alliance’s infrastructure in a good shape. Poland has supported her immediate neighbours Slovakia and Lithuania as well as the other Baltic states in their efforts to gain membership in NATO. At present Poland supports the similar endeavours by Ukraine and Georgia although there are reasons that make admitting those two countries impossible in the foreseeable future. Both in short-term and longer-term perspectives Poland is strongly interested in keeping in force all key NATO functions, mainly those stemming from the traditional obligation to collective defence as well as those related to the stabilisation activities in various regions of the world, especially in Afghanistan. Maintaining the “primary” NATO function, as it is seen by Poland, means its capability to protect against the threats, including military ones that may occur and destabilise the region. This way of thinking reborn in Poland after the Russian campaign in Georgia. Answers should be found to many questions, for example concerning the share of NATO’s involvement in each of its functions. How can NATO keep these functions in balance? With which instruments? The last key question is: what should be done to make the cooperation between NATO and EU more harmonious and at the same time keep the tasks of these two organisations separable. At present, NATO is still the Polish priority in the context of territorial defence and military integration with the West, although the Polish armed forces do not meet some of NATO’s criteria. However, another trend has become visible which gives Polish security policy a pronounced European dimension. The European Union is not an alternative to NATO in the military sense. To political parties and the government it is very important that the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy would loosen or harm the TransAtlantic partnership with the United States. Maria Wągrowska2

2

Independant Researcher, Warsaw, Poland


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HUNGARY

The first round of NATO enlargement with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland ushered a new era in global security. This chapter reviews the benefits the new members as well as NATO enjoyed as a result. The author discusses the issues which will shape NATO’s future. On March 12, 1999, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland joined NATO, the most successful political and military alliance. This ushered a new phase in the history of the three new members, but also in that of the Alliance. I had the honour to be present in Independence, Missouri, when the foreign ministers of the three countries signed the accession protocols. The accession opened up a new era for Hungary, not only in legal terms, but in terms of Hungary, as a full-fledged member of NATO, accepting new roles, obtaining new rights, and having to live up to new responsibilities. A previously unimaginable umbrella of security gave self-assurance to a country which was at that time the only NATO member without a common border with the other 18 members of the Alliance. This was an enlargement that was thought impossible by many at the time. But as we look back on it now and evaluate the developments over the past decade, we can duly conclude that it was inevitable. The NATO enlargement, on the one hand, and Hungary's accession, on the other, was firmly based on mutual benefits for new members and for the Alliance. The tenth anniversary of Hungary's accession as well as the sixtieth anniversary of NATO’s creation entice me to review the benefits of the accession for NATO. In historic terms, Hungary’s accession marked the country's return to the mainstream of modern European political and economic development to which the country has always belonged on the basis of its aspirations, traditions and mentality, and from where only external pressure after the Second World War temporarily forced it out. In political terms, Hungary entering NATO constituted a clear recognition by the Allies of the success of democratic and economic reforms the country has pursued since the political change in 1989 - 1990. This was the first time after the Second World War that Hungary, by its free will, could join the alliance and adhere to its common values. In economic terms, the accession meant the recognition of Hungary’s stability in economy and business. During the first three years after the invitation to join NATO, the value of foreign direct investment in Hungary almost tripled. In military and defence terms, membership in NATO sped up the long awaited military reforms. Accession was the most cost-effective way to modernize the Hungarian armed forces as the country became part of an integrated defence organization. The conscript army was replaced by a professional army; new and modern equipment was introduced, procured and deployed, which made the Hungarian armed forces more flexible and deployable for NATO tasks in a wide range of scenarios. Hungary’s robust participation in KFOR in the Western Balkans with some 485 soldiers, in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan with about 375 soldiers, as well as its role in the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) in which it was the second largest contributing NATO nation, have offered unique experiences for the country's military. In security terms, joining NATO meant that the scope of the collective defence clause of the Washington Treaty “all for one, one for all” was extended to also cover Hungary. This was badly needed as at the beginning of the 1990s Hungary’s sovereignty was repeatedly violated

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G. Horvath / Hungary

by its southern neighbour. By the time of its accession, Milosevic’s third war and the fourth genocide had already been raging over the Western Balkans, while the Kosovo conflict was on the eve of breaking out. In strategic terms, as a NATO member, Hungary has become an equal participant in decisionmaking on major security issues which also concerned our region and specifically Hungary. This enabled Hungary to secure its national interests whenever important issues were discussed by the Alliance. The country thus ceased to be merely a passive receiver of strategic decisions but instead became an active participant in making and adopting such decisions. Last but not least, Hungary’s membership has increased its domestic political cohesion. Since the democratic change in Hungary, all political parties represented in the Hungarian Parliament have consistently and firmly supported the country’s membership. In November 1997, 85 percent of those who participated in the referendum on Hungary’s accession to NATO voted in favour of the new foreign and security orientation of Hungary. This decision was based on the clear realization of not only the country's common interests, but equally, if not more importantly, its shared values. Support was maintained throughout the period of preparation for the actual membership in which a broad communication campaign, pursued by the government, played a key role. The awareness of NATO reached the hearts and minds of the people. Even when, 12 days after joining the Alliance, Hungary found itself as the only front-line NATO state in the Alliance’s first out-of-area operation against the Milosevic regime and his horrendous acts in Kosovo against the Kosovar Albanians, public opinion support in Hungary never fell below 60 percent, although the Hungarian populated areas in Serbia were also bombed by NATO aircrafts. The political parties represented in the Parliament and the public have continuously supported various NATO-led missions, along with Hungary’s robust participation in the Balkans, and, more recently, Hungary’s role in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Public support did not decrease even when two Hungarian demining experts died tragically far away from their homeland. The most recent expression of this political unity was demonstrated by the unanimous adoption of a five-party declaration in the Parliament on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of Hungary’s accession to NATO. Let us now turn to the benefits the Alliance has enjoyed as a result of Hungary’s accession. Even before becoming a full-fledged member, Hungary eloquently demonstrated that it is willing, ready and capable of contributing to the Alliance’s security. As early as in 1995 and 1996, Hungary was an active participant in the IFOR and later SFOR operations - NATO’s first out-of-area missions in the Balkans. In 1999, Hungary contributed its troops to KFOR and took part in the NATO operation in Macedonia. For more than four years Hungary performed the task of a NATO contact embassy in Croatia, and is now taking over the same role in Podgorica, for the duration of two years, to help Montenegro’s preparation for membership, as it did successfully for Croatia. As a matter of fact, Hungary became a direct participant in the Kosovo war only 12 days after joining NATO as the US planes were taking off from Southern Hungary to bomb various targets in Yugoslavia during the air campaign. This was the clearest demonstration of the fact that Hungary’s membership in NATO was not a free ride, and that the country was not only a consumer but an active provider of common security. As a consequence of Hungary becoming a NATO member without a common border with any other NATO member state, Hungary’s membership, together with that of the Czech Republic and Poland, surely helped NATO to transform itself from a regional alliance based on territorial defence into a security organization with global responsibilities and the capability to

G. Horvath / Hungary

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perform out-of-area peace operations in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. Due to Hungary's manifold experience in the Central and Eastern European regions, and particularly in the Balkans, the Alliance may surely rely on the country’s expertise and contacts. New members, like Hungary, have proved that they are capable of assuming important roles in developing new capabilities which NATO lacked before. An example of this is the strategic air transportation capability with a hub in Hungary. The new members, including Hungary, have considerably contributed to maintaining NATO’s relevance, credibility and its raison d’être for the future. The new members of NATO have also contributed to NATO’s open–door policy towards other countries that expressed their willingness, proved their commitment, and met the accession criteria. It is not an overstatement that Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland played important roles in the process leading to the 2004 and 2009 enlargements. These countries managed to provide a positive experience and a favourable example for NATO and also demonstrated their moral and political obligations to assist others. What are Hungary’s and the Alliance’s common interests for the future? First, the relevance of the collective defence clause must be preserved unchanged. As membership and partnership will continue to grow, an appropriate balance with the non-Article 5 out-of-area peace operations must be maintained. Second, NATO should remain a political consultative forum and a defence and military security organization based on a transatlantic relationship. Third, solidarity among the member states must be maintained. Immediately after 9/11 solidarity was clearly demonstrated, but by 2003 it visibly weakened. Now it is again being restored. France’s full reintegration gives a new impetus to this process. But in the face of new external attempts to drive wedges among the members of the Alliance, it is quintessential to demonstrate vigilance and preserve NATO’s solidarity in the long run. Proportional burden-sharing and the expansion of common financing, wherever appropriate, must be considered very seriously in order to maintain the funding required by new tasks and new responsibilities appearing on NATO’s agenda. Fourth, transformation and internal reforms must be continued in order to enable the Alliance to face new challenges and to respond to new contingencies. To successfully achieve these prospective tasks, a firm pro-NATO attitude within every member state is necessary. This will require a positive and long-term support from the political elite, society and public opinion. When Hungary, together with the Czech Republic and Poland, recently celebrated the tenth anniversary of the accession to NATO, five major Hungarian political parties demonstrated full unity by unequivocally supporting a declaration which was adopted by the Parliament without a single vote against. On the occasion of the double anniversaries, Hungary solemnly reiterated its commitment to the Alliance. This is all the more important since public support, as well as political continuity, irrespective of changes in the government, is the major benchmark of reliability of an ally. Today, there is no serious political force or social group in Hungary questioning the country’s membership in NATO. The society at large also endorses Hungary’s participation in NATO-led peace and stabilization operations in the Balkans, in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Gabor Horvath1

1

Security Policy and Nonproliferation Department, Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs



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SLOVAKIA

Slovakia’s road to NATO was complicated. As successor state to former Czechoslovakia, Slovakia had to grapple simultaneously with three tasks: postcommunist transformation, finding another security anchor and building new statehood. The author analyzes several issues, notably, the remaining obstacles which prior to 2002 blocked Slovakia’s progress towards NATO membership; overcoming security deficits; obtaining the support of public opinion; adopting new security documents and carrying out military reforms. Although the final result was a success, several issues have remained open (transatlanticism, participation in NATO-led operations and continuation of military reforms). The Slovak Republic represents an example of a successful comeback. Slovenia was dropped from the first group of Eastern European invitees in 1997, and in 1999 was not even mentioned as a possible candidate for the second round of NATO’s Eastern enlargement. From 1999-2000 on, it appeared as a probable next newcomer. Slovakia’s road to membership was accompanied by tough political and military reforms in accordance with the Membership Action Plan (MAP). Its performance had been evaluated by NATO as good to very good. From September 2001, events developed rapidly: at the Prague NATO Summit in 2002 Slovakia was invited, and in 2004 became a NATO member. The problem Slovakia experienced in the process could be explained by the discrepancy between official declarations, on the one side, and the realpolitik, on the other. Since the achievement of its independence on January 1, 1993, all Slovak governments have unambiguously declared as their ambition to gain full membership in the Western institutions, including NATO and EU. Unfortunately, in 1994-1998 the governments´ declarations were contradicted by repeated violations of democratic norms, negating any chance for the country to join in the near future the Western political and security structures. At the beginning of 1993, when it became an independent state, the Slovak Republic shared equal opportunities with the neighbouring Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary by continuing political and economic transition to obtain invitations to the coveted Western institutions. While three of Slovakia´s neighbors were proceeding well on the track to both NATO and EU, the policy decisions taken by the Slovak government from 1994 on provoked growing criticism and finally clear warnings from the West that Slovakia was spoiling its chances. After Slovakia´s failure to get rid of the so-called “democratic deficits” these criticism and warnings were followed by the decision to exclude Slovakia from the 1999 phase of NATO enlargement. Prior to the 1998 elections the actions by the Slovak decision-makers did not allow for any other result. Whereas Slovakia met by then some MAP criteria, at least satisfactorily (such as the compatibility of the armed forces, gradual transition to market economy), some others could not be fulfilled for a number of reasons: democratic transformation, good relations with neighbours and the treatment of ethnic minorities. The political development in Slovakia in 1994-1998 could be summarized in the following manner: Years 1994-1998 brought a definitive halt in Slovak integration aspirations. A clear contradiction between foreign policy declarations and real political output became visible to such a degree that the Slovak government’s promises to rectify the "democratic deficits" ceased to be credible.

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I. Samson / Slovakia

Slovak foreign policy activities were strongly criticised by the European Council, Joint Inter-parliamentary Committee EU - Slovak Republic, the European Parliament and by NATO (indirectly also by USA). After November 1994, several Western institutions warned Slovakia that some of its foreign policy activities threatened its integration ambitions. In addition, the following features in Slovakia’s domestic politics were negatively high-lightened: concentration of power in the hands of the authoritarian Prime Minister; insufficient sensitivity to the balance of power, the authoritarian methods used in Parliament; the misuse of state-owned mass electronic media by the executive; lack of intransparency in activities of some state institutions (the civilian secret service); and conflicts between President of the Slovak Republic Michal Kovac and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar.

The Slovak executive disregarded the warnings and ignored the “Western pressure”.

Removing obstacles to NATO Membership The parliamentary elections in 1998 brought about an important change in the Slovak political leadership. The new governing coalition had to deal with several obstacles created by the outgoing Meciar government: the pro-Russian orientation in security policy; high dependence on raw materials imported from Russia (oil, gas); tensions with neighboring countries (the Czech Republic and Hungary) and with the national minorities (primarily with the Hungarian minority); sluggish military reforms. Slovakia’s foreign policy orientation started changing at the end of 1998. Several treaties between Slovakia and the Russian Federation were “scrutinized” by the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Slovakia also undertook several steps to strengthen the country’s credentials as NATO candidate: 1. The Slovak government expressed its trans-Western orientation by rescinding the Slovak-Russian agreement, decided not to acquire the Russian anti-missile system S300 and supported NATO’s military campaign against Serbia in 1999. These steps were sharply criticized by the Russian government. 2. In April 2000 the Ministry of Defense announced its decision to dismantle the Sovietmade SS-23 missiles with 400-kilometer range which Slovakia continued to deploy after the break-up of Czechoslovakia. The dismantling was carried out with U.S. technical and financial assistance. These steps helped to improve Slovakia’s standing with NATO, but came too late for Slovakia’s inclusion into the first round of NATO enlargement in 1999. To remove the remaining obstacles it was also necessary to ease tensions with the neighbouring countries (the Czech Republic and Hungary) and also to improve the government’s relations with Slovakia’s national minorities. In 1999, the Slovak government adopted the Law on the use of national minority languages, which was seen as a minimum for removing grievances by ethnic minorities. After a relative “lull” in Slovak-Hungarian relations in the years 1998-2006 (during this period the Hungarian political parties participated in the Slovak governing coalitions), the tensions between Bratislava and Budapest rose again to pre-1998 level. The


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deterioration reached its peak in 2008 due to the controversy concerning the textbooks in Hungarian language for public schools in Slovakia. This has once again brought about a discord between two Central European NATO members. Although Slovakia’s participation in the Partnership for Peace did not provide guarantees of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, it gave the opportunity of consultations in case of a threat to national security. Slovakia’s Partnership Program was clearly focused on achieving Slovakia´s membership accession goals: a reform of the armed forces; achieving the required level of interoperability and compatibility of the command and management structures, communication and intelligence systems, logistics and infrastructure; good language training; improved defense-related planning and procurement; achieving modernization of armaments, technology and military material. In implementing the National Membership Action Plan, Slovakia largely used the experience of NATO´s recent newcomers. Thus in several respects the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland indirectly influenced Slovakia’s new security orientation. Restoring political credibility: public support for NATO membership The new Slovak government strived to convince the Allies that Slovakia was a reliable and stable partner ready at any time to contribute actively to strengthening security and stability in Europe. Slovakia’s attitude towards the NATO military action during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 was designed to prove the change in the foreign policy orientation. In this matter, the Slovak government was in a much more difficult situation than other governments of the Visegrad group. Namely in Slovakia the public attitude towards NATO had always been more reserved than in the neighboring Visegrad countries. Since the attaining of independence in 1993 the support has only rarely been above 50 per cent. By the end of 1997 this support reached its peak in spring 1998 with about 52 percent and at the beginning of 2000 with about 55 percent respondents supporting Slovakia’s membership in NATO. During the Kosovo crisis the public opinion support for NATO decreased sharply but only temporarily. The Slovak government reacted faster and with a greater attention to NATO’s needs than, for example, the government of the Czech Republic – a brand new member of NATO. Two days prior to the first air attacks against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the Slovak government decided to allow the over-flights by NATO aircraft. The decision was so prompt that confusion arose over exactly what had been agreed to. Some Slovak officials interpreted the permission as applying to air refueling and to over-flights by transport planes only. The controversy stemmed in part from the widespread public concern that Slovakia by allowing bombers to cross its air space was taking part in a war against the fellow Slavs. Consequently, the cabinet at an extraordinary meeting clarified the government´s position which granted unlimited access by NATO aircraft to Slovakia’s air space. This public action showed that Slovakia stopped being a potential ally of the Russian Federation in Central Eastern Europe and became a NATO ally without any ”footnotes”. However, following the parliamentary elections in 2006, Slovakia’s foreign policy orientation has changed once again. Now situated safely in the NATO-guaranteed environment, the new Slovak government has shifted from “hard” Atlanticism of the previous right-of-the-center government to partly advocating Russian interests in Central Europe (the rejection of the antimissile defense in the Czech Republic and Poland, reluctance concerning the Slovak engagement in Afghanistan, support to Russia’s position during the Russia-Georgia war in

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2008, taking Russia’s side during the “gas dispute” between Ukraine and Russia at the beginning of 2009). Slovakia’s “road to NATO” can be seen as a “success story” and an example of a reversing negative trends and removing initial problems by fully satisfying NATO’s admission criteria. The crucial lesson learned from the NATO integration of Slovakia is that if there is a political will at NATO’s side and if a candidate country successfully removes the deficits, the road to NATO is open to a new member. Ivo Samson1

1

Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association


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SLOVENIA Slovenia differs in several respects from all other countries which have joined the Alliance since the end of the “Cold War”. From 1992 onwards, all Slovenian governments have strongly advocated NATO membership, primarily on longterm security grounds. The issue, however, cut across the Slovenian polity, initially with considerable opposition on both sides of the spectrum. Slovenia was the second candidate country to submit the issue to a referendum prior to the admission. The vote showed a two-third support for NATO membership. Since then it has become widely accepted by the public. Slovenia’s participation in the functioning of the Alliance has become regularized both in the civilian political and the military spheres. Slovenian experience since the admission has brought the country the most important lessons in realistic defence planning, solidarity among members and assistance to aspirants. Slovenia, in its relationship to NATO, differs in several respects from all other countries which have joined (and one which was absorbed into) the Alliance since the end of the “Cold War”. It was the first admitted former East-Central European communist-ruled country which never belonged to the Warsaw Treaty Organization, either as an individual state or as part of a pact member. Moreover, at the height of the “Cold War”, soon after the signing of the Washington Treaty in June 1949, Slovenia – then part of Yugoslavia – was included into NATO’s strategic plans as a potentially friendly territory in case of a continental war (plan Smartweed). Slovenia, unlike all the other former East European countries but Hungary, held a national referendum on membership, prior to its admission to NATO. Slovenia as part of Yugoslavia During the “Cold War” confrontation with the Eastern Bloc, Slovenia’s position as the northwesternmost republic in the federal Yugoslavia was considered by NATO planners as strategically highly important for NATO’s ability to thwart the expected Soviet-led massive armoured thrust from Hungary to Northern Italy. On the basis of a secret understanding between the Tito regime and the United States, the Yugoslav Army was positioned to defend the axis Maribor – Trieste – Gorizia and the area between Graz and Villach in the then still occupied Austria. Once this arrangement was operationalized with the Yugoslav General Staff, the United Stated signed a mutual assistance agreement with Yugoslavia in the autumn of 1951. In addition to the Marshall Plan-like economic aid to the Tito regime, the Yugoslav Army subsequently received a large quantity of heavy weapons from the US stocks in Western Germany. Most of these heavy arms, including tanks, heavy artillery, jet warplanes, trucks, ammunition etc. were to be deployed in north western Yugoslavia, mostly in Slovenia. Yugoslavia’s leader, Marshall Tito, assured the US and British governments that, in case of war with the Eastern Bloc, the Yugoslav Army would fight on NATO’s side even if Yugoslavia was not attacked directly.1 A US Army brigade stationed near Trieste was presumably to be moved across the present Slovenian-Italian border in order to help defend the Ljubljana gap. At a hearing in the US Senate in May 1951, the Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight Eisenhower, future US President, publicly argued that in order to protect NATO’s “soft belly”, its members should urgently invite four Mediterranean states into the Alliance – Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Spain. The first two governments responded enthusiastically to the soundings by American diplomats; their countries were speedily invited and joined the Alliance already in 1952. Yugoslavia’s leader Tito, however, gave a cunningly evading answer and 1

Bebler, Anton. The US Strategy and Yugoslavia’s Security. In: P. Simić, W. Richey and M. Stojčević (eds.) American and Yugoslav Views on the 1990’s. Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economy, 1990, pp. 175 – 176.

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A. Bebler and M. Jazbec / Slovenia

instead of Yugoslavia’s straight membership in the Alliance proposed a trilateral mutual assistance treaty among Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. The three countries signed a “Treaty of Friendship” in February 1953. After protracted negotiations and in spite of strenuous Italian objections, a tripartite “Treaty of alliance, political cooperation and mutual assistance” was finally signed by the three foreign ministers in Slovenia, at Bled, in August 1954. (The initial draft, however, was watered down sometime after Joseph Stalin’s death in March 1953.) Through this new Balkan Pact, Yugoslavia became legally linked to NATO’s network of mutual security guarantees.2 Soon after its signing, the Balkan Pact became irrelevant in practical terms, partly due to the tensions between Greece and Turkey. The still valid treaty has been never activated. The most important reason for a twist in Yugoslavia’s attitude, however, was the perceived diminished threat of a Soviet invasion. This assessment prompted Marshall Tito to normalize relations with the Soviet Union, distance Yugoslavia from the Alliance and assume a prominent role in the international movement of the non-aligned. Yugoslavia actively contributed to forging the Helsinki Final Act. Within the newly founded “Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe” it joined the group of neutral and non-aligned states. For about three decades since the mid-1950s, Marshall Tito manoeuvred skilfully between the two blocs, exploiting Yugoslavia’s geopolitically sensitive position. The presumed equidistance between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization remained an official foreign policy posture until the breakdown of the SFR Yugoslavia in 1991-1992. Already during SFRY’s last decade, its validity was openly questioned on several grounds. During the closing years of communist rule, the Yugoslav policy of non-alignment became to be viewed in Slovenia as inconsistent with and even contrary to the widespread desire to “(re)join Europe”. In early summer of 1990, this critical attitude was quietly adopted by the first post-1945 non-communist government in Slovenia. Slovenia’s qualification for NATO membership Since the proclamation of independence in June 1991 the successive Slovenian governments have abandoned the ex-Yugoslavia’s stance of “active non-alignment” and identified the country’s full-fledged memberships in the EU, WEU and NATO as their chief international objectives. The Slovenian political elite found too little comfort in relying on the country’s participation in OSCE and membership in the UN alone. The ineffectiveness of the international community in dealing with even a relatively small aggressor in the Balkans confirmed this dissatisfaction. Due to the greatly reduced influence of the pacifist “Greens”, to the lacking tradition of neutralism or any constitutional obligations in this respect, the Slovenian National Assembly has been able to pass several resolutions in favour of the country's membership in Western integrations since 1993. When the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was stopped by a NATO armed intervention, all major political parties came to support Slovenia’s entry both into NATO and the EU. However, as long as it remained outside the only functioning regional security organization in Europe, Slovenia had no other option but to pursue the policy of non-engagement and armed self-reliance. In addition, the Slovenian Defence Ministry signed bilateral cooperation protocols with the defence ministries of the USA, UK, Hungary, Austria, the Czech Republic etc. and a trilateral protocol on military cooperation with Italy and Hungary. Although successive Slovenian governments since 1991 have hardly missed a single opportunity to express their interest in being invited to NATO, the Slovenian diplomatic campaign to attain this goal was launched in earnest only in the first half of 1996. The signing 2

Ibid.


51

of the Dayton-Paris accords at that time allowed the ending of the UN-imposed arms embargo on all ex-Yugoslav republics. By then Slovenia had already joined the NATO “Partnership for Peace” programme and entered the Europe Association Agreement with the EU. It should be noted that the Slovenian government’s keen interest in NATO membership was not prompted by the fear of social and political instability, by internal dangers to Slovenia’s democratic order, unresolved conflicts with the neighbouring states or by the desire to obtain financial assistance or military hardware. Security concerns related to the geographic proximity of the volatile Western Balkans did play some role but the primary aim in joining NATO was the country’s integration into the community of Western democratic states. According to many experts and NATO officials, an important rationale for NATO’s decision to expand eastward lied in the desire to reduce the “gray zone” of insecurity and uncertainty in Europe. Although the underlying contention sounded plausible in general terms, it raised some doubts in relation to e.g. Slovenia. On the whole, the lines separating security and insecurity areas in Europe, Mediterranean and Asia did not coincide with the division between NATO members and non-members. Already for decades, there were flash-points of violence and terrorism on the territory of several NATO members, such as Ulster, the Basque country, Corsica, parts of Turkey etc. Actual or potential interstate conflicts took or could have conceivably taken place between several NATO member states, e.g. on the Greek-Turkish border, in Cyprus or at Gibraltar. Although situated in the geographic proximity of recent armed hostilities in the Balkans, Slovenia, together with a number of other European countries and like neighbouring Austria, belonged to the area of stability and security. The same has been true of Slovenia’s record as a democratic state. Since 1989, the country has successfully, relatively painlessly and peacefully overcome the stresses, tensions and crises surrounding its fast triple evolution - attaining independent statehood, transforming its political order and the economic system. The rapid transformation in all three dimensions in due legal form took the form of peaceful evolution based on a high degree of consensus between different political currents. In this process there was no politically motivated violence and very few cases of mass civil unrest. Since 1990, six rounds of multiparty parliamentary election, five presidential elections as well as local and municipal elections have been carried out successfully, in full conformity with the European rules for free, competitive and clean electoral contests. Already in 1997 Slovenia was viewed by qualified observers as a consolidated democracy. For instance, Freedom House rated Slovenia as a “free post communist” country with the highest score 1.53 (together with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Estonia). While being a candidate for membership both in NATO and the European Union, Slovenia’s credentials underwent thorough examinations by the US government, European Commission and NATO. In its published opinion on Slovenia’s application for the EU membership, the European Commission concluded on July 15, 1997: “Slovenia presents the characteristics of a democracy, with stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Slovenia can be regarded as a functioning market economy...”4

By 1997 Slovenia had also satisfied, to the highest degree, the key NATO-specific requirements elaborated in the Study on NATO Enlargement (1995). Having adopted a Western European 3 See Richard Rose, Prospects for Democracy in Post communist Europe and Stephen White, Judy Batt, Paul G. Lewis, Developments in Central and East European Politics. No. 2, London: 1998, pp. 281. 4 Agenda 2000, European Commission’s Opinion on Slovenia’s Application for Membership of the European Union, Brussels: July 15, 1997, p. 114.

52


pattern in civil-military relations, Slovenia reaffirmed democratic civilian rule as one of its fundamental constitutional norms. Moreover, these norms as well as human rights were being observed more thoroughly in Slovenia than in at least one older NATO member state and more thoroughly than minority rights in several NATO member states. Several circumstances have contributed to a very high degree of civilian domination over the Slovenian military: the strong rejection of the previous Yugoslav model of civil-military relations (which contained both militarist and praetorian proclivities); the smallness of the armed forces; the paucity of Slovenian military traditions; the numerical and intellectual weakness of the Slovenian military professionals; the underdeveloped corporate identity of the Slovenian military officers and the army leadership's extremely low political profile. The parliamentarian system of government gave the civilian domination its constitutional and legal foundation and form. An elaborate and partly redundant system of civilian oversight over the small military establishment has been erected in Slovenia. Diplomatic campaign to obtain an invitation After a pause in the second half of 1996, caused by parliamentary election and the formation of a new ruling coalition, the campaign for NATO membership was restarted in early 1997. Slovenian diplomats lobbied among the NATO member states using the following arguments: - Slovenia has conformed to the overlapping EU requirements and NATO expectations concerning successful reforms, functioning political democracy, market economy, human and minority rights, constructive international behaviour and settled relations with neighbours; - the country has complied with the NATO-specific expectations concerning civilian control over the military; - Slovenia borders on two EU members and two NATO members; her geographic position would provide for the shortest and safest land bridge between Italy and Hungary; - Slovenia has conducted a responsible and constructive foreign policy, and has actively supported all international efforts to bring peace, stability, prosperity and democracy to the troubled Balkans (UNPROFOR, IFOR, SFOR, UNFICYP, KFOR); - Slovenia was able to shoulder her membership responsibilities in NATO and the EU, including the financial ones (a reflection of Slovenia’s highest GDP per capita in CentralEastern Europe); - Slovenia’s admission would make NATO and the EU enlargement more geopolitically balanced, would move the area of security and stability in the direction of the volatile Balkans and serve as a positive incentive among the Balkan aspirants for NATO and the EU. In July 1997 Slovenia’s admission in the first round is said to have been supported by nine NATO members, including all Mediterranean members. Eventually, the considerable effort by Slovenian diplomacy to gain an invitation ended up unsuccessfully. It was to a considerable extend due to the French insistence on also inviting Romania and on having a French admiral appointed to head the NATO Southern Command in Naples. These demands were said to have been rejected by President Clinton. The position of the US administration in favour of a restrained enlargement in stages finally prevailed with only three new NATO members added by 1999. In a compromise move Slovenia and Romania were mentioned in the final document and singled out as serious candidates to be reconsidered in 1999. President B. Clinton’s arguments in favour of only three candidates, if understood as indirect disqualification of Slovenia’s candidacy, remained, however, mostly unconvincing. In some


53

respects, such as firm civilian control over the military, financial ability, low cost of admission for NATO, public support for NATO membership in 1997 etc., Slovenia should have certainly been ranked higher than no. 4. The US Department of State assessment also differed substantively from the US President’s statement: “Slovenia is moving rapidly toward integration into the Euro-Atlantic community of nations. Its immediate foreign policy goals are to join NATO and the European Union. In the five years since the break-up of the former Yugoslavia, Slovenia has become a democracy with a multi-party political system, a free press and an excellent human rights record. Slovenia’s market economy has registered a healthy growth in recent years, largely due to economic reforms introduced shortly after independence. Slovenia now has the highest per capita income in Central Europe. Slovenia’s successful democratic transition, economic transformation, peacefulness and stability serve as an example to other nations in the region. The US has a strong interest in supporting Slovenia’s efforts to consolidate and build on its accomplishments. The key (US) objective is: …full integration (of Slovenia) into the EuroAtlantic community of nations, including such institutions as NATO and the European Union.”

The NATO decision in 1997 to defer Slovenia’s admission could be explained in a number of ways. One conceivable calculation in NATO might have been that bringing Slovenia in the Alliance would not make any appreciable geopolitical and military gain in Central and SouthEastern Europe. Slovenian officials repeated time and again that Slovenia had not been in the past a Soviet/Russian satellite and a Warsaw Pact member, that the Russians did not object to Slovenia’s membership, that the country showed full cooperativeness with the US and NATO when their military forces were transiting or over-flying Slovenia etc. However, the Slovenian argumentation apparently did not impress the key NATO players. Some of them might have still blamed Slovenia for Yugoslavia’s breakdown and for the ensuing troubles in the Balkans. It was also informally suggested to Slovenian diplomats that the Alliance would need a convincing candidate for the next round and that Slovenia fit well into this role. Slovenian society and NATO membership The successive Slovenian governments’ advocating NATO and EEC/EU membership as soon as possible was buttressed by strong majorities in the Slovenian parliament. Among the five major political parties, three consistently advocated Slovenia’s accession (LDS, SDS, SKD), while two others showed certain reservations concerning either the EU or NATO (SLS, ZLSD). In three parties (LDS, ZLSD, SLS) there were minorities in disagreement with their leaderships’ pro-membership position. However, public opinion polls showed a very different picture. The discrepancy between the enthusiasm of the political elite and the more sanguine mood of the population was the largest during the first four years of independence in 19911995, when the principal sources of perceived threats were closely related to the armed violence and wars in the Western Balkans. During that period the Slovenian public mostly supported the stance of neutrality in foreign affairs (roughly 40 percent), while the reliance on Western Europe (32 percent) and the reliance on NATO and the USA (13 percent) trailed behind. Support for NATO membership started rising in late 1995, probably due to NATO’s successful intervention in the Balkans. A USIA-commissioned survey in April 1997 showed that 56 percent of respondents would vote in favour if a referendum was then to be held. The support reached its acme of 66-67 percent in summer 1997, at the time around the NATO Madrid summit. The opposition to NATO membership accounted then for about 20 percent, while the rest of the respondents were undecided. The Slovenian public opinion support for joining NATO significantly exceeded the corresponding figures in Hungary (32 percent) and the Czech Republic (28 percent) in 1997, while trailing behind those in Romania (76 percent) and

54


occasionally also Poland. However, like in Hungary and the Czech Republic, a very considerable number of respondents still did not accept some corollaries of possible NATO membership, such as increased defence outlays, sending national troops to defend a NATO ally, allowing routine over-flights by NATO aircraft, and particularly the otherwise utterly improbable placing of NATO nuclear weapons. Thus, although improved from the government’s standpoint, the state of public opinion on Slovenia’s NATO membership was contradictory and trailing behind the much more enthusiastic position held by the Slovenian political elite. NATO membership was most favoured by males over 49 years of age, with low education and status. Support for the government’s stance was the lowest among the age group under 30 and among those with university degrees. Slovenian housewives could not decide on this issue. The degree of support for EU membership was generally higher than that for NATO membership but occasionally slipped lower. This happened, for example, in the aftermath of the epidemic of “mad cow disease”. The NATO decision in Madrid in July 1997 had little immediate impact on Slovenian public opinion. However, the political opposition and critical press portrayed the Madrid decision as a heavy diplomatic defeat for the government. Two opposition parties seized the opportunity and demanded convening an extraordinary session of the National Assembly. However, the reaction of disappointment among the elite was soon softened when on July 15, 1997, the European Commission recommended the inclusion of Slovenia into the first round of the EU enlargement talks. This move helped the Slovenian government survive the interpellation. However, the Foreign Minister was replaced, partly due to the increased opposition pressure. Following the failure in Madrid and particularly after the US presidential election of George W. Bush in November 2000 the public support for NATO membership started sliding down appreciably, with occasional ups and downs of several percentage points. By April 2002 it had, for the first time, fallen below 50 percent. The opposition to membership then rose correspondingly to about 30 percent. By the second half of 2002 a virulent negative campaign in several Slovenian printed media brought the level of support further down to about 40 percent, occasionally below the corresponding figures for the opposing opinion. The altered post-Cold War perception of diminished external security risks (and downgrading the military ones) and the rather naive sense of security in South-Eastern Europe (to which NATO’s successful peace-enforcement in the Balkans greatly contributed) generally lowered the interest of the public in Slovenia’s joining any military alliance. As a consequence, the close relationship between Slovenia and the North Atlantic Alliance became increasingly an object of lively public debates and controversies. The negative trend in the public opinion support to membership ran time-wise parallel to the ever growing integration of Slovenia in the Alliance, and to considerable efforts to effect necessary reforms in the security sector. Slovenia was successfully completing the preparation for membership (MAP), while Slovenian soldiers and policemen were proving their worth as peacekeepers in NATO-led “out-of-area” missions. The rise of vocal opposition to NATO membership led the Slovenian government to accept the demand for a referendum on NATO membership, which otherwise was not constitutionally required. Under the pressure of criticism expressed in the Slovenian media and emanating from among several groups in civil society (cultural elite, pacifists, anti-globalists, anarchists, environmentalists, veterans etc.) the government decided to hold two simultaneous referenda on Slovenia’s EU and NATO membership on March 23, 2003. By late November 2002 Slovenia’s membership ceased to be a mere theoretical proposition or a pious wish by the government. When Slovenia, together with six other states, received an invitation to join the Alliance, this


55

question became a practical and politically acute one. The confluence of events put Slovenia into an exceptional position. Among 26 countries (19 NATO members and 7 invitees) which were to sign the new accession protocols on March 26, 2003, only in Slovenia was this decision submitted for a direct approval or disapproval by the voters. The Slovenian government alone exposed itself to an acid democratic test, while, according to available public opinion polls, NATO enlargement did not enjoy then the majority public opinion support in several older NATO member states. In internal debates the successive Slovenian governments argued in favour of Slovenia’s NATO membership, primarily on the long-term national defence and military security grounds. In general, security arguments dominated in the discussions. The underlying social values as well as the extensive common political, economic, cultural, technological and other interests with the NATO member states were also used in this context. Some ardent supporters of NATO membership, on the other hand, tried to present the Alliance as a bulwark of anticommunism. This dubious contention might have scared off some leftist voters who would have otherwise supported Slovenia’s membership. In this matter, the ruling left-of-the-centre coalition cooperated closely with the largest opposition party and several non-governmental organizations. However, the issue cut across the fabric of Slovenian polity on both sides of the political spectrum with heterogeneous mellays of supporters and rejectionists. Many opponents of NATO displayed outright ignorance of the Alliance as well as prejudices and unfounded fears, such as the presumed danger of losing Slovenian national identity, Slovenia’s independence, Slovenian Army etc. They claimed that the Alliance lost its raison d’être and became an obsolete and even dangerous remnant of the Cold War. In order to maintain peace in Europe, a much wider, all-inclusive continental security organization was presumably needed, such as OSCE. Many opponents claimed that Slovenia is not and will not be threatened by anyone if it were to stay neutral. By entering NATO, Slovenia would diminish its security, having become a target of international terrorists. In the post-Cold War environment it would be foolish to raise the country’s defence spending, which would be required by NATO membership. NATO was portrayed by some radical opponents as a militarist organization and even a threat to democratic freedoms. Some opponents cited the NATO enlargement policy in the past and Turkey’s poor human rights record. This presumably proved that NATO was not at all an alliance of democratic states. The pacifists and environmentalists opposed NATO because they rejected in principle the presence of foreign troops and nuclear weapons on Slovenian soil and/or everything related to the military and to nuclear energy. Some old-style leftists held NATO for a symbol of capitalism, of Western imperialism, and of globalization which, as they claimed, brought abnormal poverty and mass unemployment to the Third World. Among critics, one was also filled with nostalgia for the former Yugoslavia and Marshall Tito’s past policy of non-alignment. Some sharp opponents of NATO at the same time uncritically idolized the European Union, claiming that the EU membership would be an ample substitute for NATO membership. Some opponents were against NATO simply because they opposed the Slovenian government, disliked CocaCola, McDonalds’ hamburgers, the domination by the Hollywood film and TV industry etc. Some even linked NATO to global warming. Many of these arguments or objections were due to the relatively widespread misconception which equated George W. Bush with the USA and the USA with NATO. Indeed, the level of public opposition to NATO membership grew visibly in Slovenia after the neoconservative Bush administration came to power in the USA. However, in spite of the largely negative publicity in the Slovenian printed media, the twin referenda on March 23, 2003, clearly confirmed the government’s position. On that day, Slovenia became the third country (after Spain and Hungary) to hold a referendum on NATO

56


membership and the second country (after Hungary) to hold it prior to the country’s admission to the Alliance. The somewhat surprisingly positive results (in comparison with the public opinion polls only one month earlier) showed roughly a two-third support for NATO membership and a still higher support for EU membership (about 85 percent). Similarly to the Hungarian referendum, these results were apparently largely due to the publicly stated views of important opinion leaders, to the strong pro-membership position taken by the Roman Catholic Church and to a high abstention rate among the opponents of NATO membership. A solid majority of voting citizens recognized the country’s long-term security, political and economic interests in joining the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. Compared with the Hungarian referendum in 1997, the Slovenian referendum ought to be given a higher mark due to a more straightforward question and a much lower abstention rate. It also took place in a much less favourable international environment, as the war in Iraq clearly negatively influenced public attitudes toward NATO. The ratification of accession protocols by NATO member states in 2003 went more smoothly than in 1997-1998. There were several reasons for this difference. The Eastward opening of 1999 paved the way for the second (or more precisely the third) enlargement into the former Warsaw Pact area, the Balkans and to Slovenia. Thus, in spring 2004, about eleven years after the first pronouncement by the Slovenian National Assembly in favour of NATO membership, Slovenia finally joined the Alliance. Since the country’s admission, the Slovenian government has consistently supported NATO’s further enlargement to the Western Balkans. At the Bucharest summit of 2008 it was in favour of inviting Croatia, Albania and Macedonia, as well as of upgrading the Alliance’s relations with the rest of the region. The Slovenian delegation, however, went along with the omitting of Macedonia, thus bowing to Greece’s intransigence over that country’s official name (which Slovenia officially recognizes). It also fell in line when a compromise paragraph on Ukraine and Georgia was agreed upon between the USA and the more cautious Western European members. In February 2008, after short delays caused by parliamentary opposition parties and in spite of the second chamber’s appeal to postpone the decision, National Assembly, with 75 votes for and 11 against, ratified the protocol on Croatia’s and Albania’s accession to NATO. Since Slovenia entered the Alliance, the issue of NATO membership ceased to be a polemical item in Slovenian politics, as occasional verbal attacks on the Alliance in the press have time and again failed to ignite a wider public debate. The membership became a fact of life accepted by a great majority of Slovenian citizens, including many of those who opposed NATO membership in 2002-2003. The movement in Slovenian public opinion during the last decade is illustrated by the following tables: Table I: The level of trust in NATO (1999-2007) Year c.

NATO

1999 2001 2003 2005 2007

Full distrust Little trust 1 2 8,1 32,1 12,0 32,1 12,0 36,5 9,9 32,8 9,6 32,5

Considerable trust 3 31,6 32,1 32,1 36,2 38,8

Full trust 4 12,4 5,4 12,0 10,8 10,5

Unaware 8 5,4 9,0 3,3 2,9 2,2

Do not know 9 10,5 9,4 4,0 7,4 6,4


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Table II: The usefullness of Slovenia's membership in NATO (2003, 2005, 2007) 2003 2005 2007 1 - Useful 59,5 51,0 53,1 2 - Not useful 27,7 19,9 29,4 9 - Do not know 12,8 29,1 17,5 However, Slovenian public has been rather critical of NATO’s engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, has viewed the threat of international terrorism very differently from the official NATO (and EU) documents on the subject, and has not supported an increase in Slovenia’s defence spending in line with its government’s previous promise. Slovenian participation in the functioning of the Alliance has become regularized both in the civilian political and the military spheres, with about 25 civilians posted in the NATO headquarters in Brussels and about 40 military personnel serving in the NATO commands in Brussels, Mons, Naples, Madrid, Izmir etc. To these numbers one should add civilian and uniformed officials in the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs dealing with NATO matters. Anton Bebler5

Perhaps the most important experience acquired by Slovenia in the first and second MAP is related to realistic defence planning and execution. A realistic approach demands a sober evaluation of security threats, risks involved, available resources and capabilities to counter those threats and risks. As security environment changes over time, one has to adapt evaluations and plans correspondingly. So the main lessons are - never promise what you cannot fulfil, and each contribution counts, big or small. The second experience concerns the ability to show progress. In the MAP process a candidate country is being continuously screened. Through a series of consultations and discussions at various levels (from experts to ministers) both sides assure that the process is going on. It is much easier to correct development on the basis of regular and frequent consultations with a quick follow-up reaction than making needed corrections towards the end of the process. That is why transparency is of utmost importance. And with transparency also comes solidarity and familiarity, which lead to mutual trust. Both the Alliance and the candidate country share the interest in the progress and hence they also share information on the country’s detected shortcomings. The third most important experience concerns intense cooperation of the executive with the Parliament. It is of extreme importance to have continuous, productive and transparent relations with the Parliament and its bodies. The support which the Parliament can offer to the Ministry of Defence is vital since it passes laws, adopts resolutions and makes final decisions on defence expenditures. A regular dialogue with the parliamentary Defence Committee helps to clarify priorities, sharpens their articulation and encourages their prompt execution. Slovenia's experience with the media and public opinion has been largely positive. In the preparation for NATO membership, the government, with important parliamentary support, carried out an in-depth public awareness campaign as part of the information-communication strategy adopted in 2001. In preparation for the referendum several hundred public discussions, round tables, live TV and radio shows were organized at which both the pros and cons of NATO membership were debated for almost a year. The results of the double referendum 5

Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana

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confirmed the government’s policy and gave Slovenian representatives strong self-assurance when entering the Alliance. Since entering the Alliance, an important and obvious change has occurred, concerning Slovenia’s adaptation to the organizational routine of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). This refers in particular to the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Some other ministries and agencies have also had to follow the very demanding NAC rhythm which made NATO an outstandingly efficient bureaucracy. This way of NATO functioning demands an efficient, smooth and rational administration which facilitates decision-making by the cabinet also when the toughest decisions are to be promptly taken. With years, NATO membership has become a relatively boring routine for outsiders but remained a demanding political and organizational process for insiders. At different times each member state hosts important NATO events and participates in important activities of the Alliance, such as peace support operations and missions. Last but not least, the NATO enlargement process has depended on public opinion support. For Slovenia, this consideration has had an additional importance due to its support to expanding the Alliance to the Western Balkans. The Balkan countries’ participation in various NATO programmes and their eventual membership has greatly contributed to security and stability in the region. Three lessons from Slovenia’s experience as a NATO member could be summarized in the following manner: First, a realistic approach to all Alliance activities is a must. Second, a consistent and transparent policy allows the Alliance to learn much about a candidate and vice versa, furthers mutual trust and strengthens cooperation among NATO member states. Third, interaction with the Alliance is a process which has to be managed comprehensively. This approach strengthens the process and produces better results. Milan Jazbec6

Annex: Public opinion data related to Slovenia’s membership in NATO Table III: Views on the impact of Slovenia's membership in NATO (2005, 2007) Year

6

Little trust 2 18,2 22,4

Conside rable trust 4 50,9 48,0

Full trust 4 14,1 12,3

a.

Raised Slovenia's international standing

2005 2007

Full distrust 1 5,7 8,1

b.

Limited Slovenia's sovereignty

2005 2007

6,7 7,8

26,8 33,6

39,6 34,4

7,7 8,4

19,2 15,8

c.

Eased Slovenia’s access to modern weapons

2005 2007

3,7 6,4

13,8 17,0

48,9 53,1

15,8 11,6

17,9 11,9

Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Slovenia

Do not know 9 11,3 9,2

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d.

Eased Slovenia's activities in the EU

2005 2007

4,6 7,4

15,9 20,7

48,5 48,8

13,0 10,7

18,1 12,4

e.

Made the Slovenian Army more efficient

2005 2007

5,3 7,2

23,1 25,3

37,4 41,9

11,3 9,5

23,0 16,0

f.

Increased Slovenia's security

2005 2007

4,2 7,0

14,7 20,1

48,4 49,7

16,5 12,2

16,3 11,0

g.

Improved access of Slovenian enterprises to defence projects in other NATO member states

2005 2007

4,6

15,8

38,6

9,4

31,6

5,4

16,0

44,9

9,7

24,0

Table IV: Support to Slovenia's possible new obligations as a NATO member (1999-2007) Year

Conside No Little rable Full support support support support 1 2 4 4 8,7 13,4 39,4 29,4 11,3 13,6 37,3 26,3 21,2 21,5 34,2 19,1 11,4 22,8 39,9 15,4 14,6 26,2 39,6 12,2

Do not know 9 9,2 11,4 4,0 10,6 7,4

a.

Use of Slovenia's air space for overflights

1999 2001 2003 2005 2007

b.

Defence of other member states

1999 2001 2003 2005 2007

11,3 14,3 19,9 10,4 13,2

15,4 17,5 23,5 26,5 27,5

40,3 36,0 36,7 40,1 41,2

19,2 17,3 14,4 9,1 7,3

13,9 15,0 5,5 13,9 10,8

c.

Stationing NATO troops in Slovenia

1999 2001 2003 2005 2007

22,6 24,1 34,1 24,0 30,4

24,5 25,3 28,0 36,2 35,3

28,2 28,2 26,1 22,7 22,5

12,3 8,7 6,5 5,4 3,2

12,5 13,7 5,4 11,8 8,6

d.

Holding NATO military exercises in Slovenia

1999 2001 2003 2005 2007

23,5 26,3 36,3 22,0 27,0

22,6 24,2 26,4 32,4 35,1

29,9 27,7 24,5 27,3 24,8

13,3 8,5 8,5 6,2 5,1

10,8 13,2 4,2 12,1 7,9

e.

Hefty increase in Slovenia’s defence expenditure

1999 42,6 42,7 51,0 37,1 42,7

27,4 25,3 28,8 39,1 38,6

14,5 14,7 13,0 11,2 9,2

3,5 3,7 3,3 2,3 1,0

12,1 13,5 9,9 10,3 8,5

2001 2003 2005 2007

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f.


Placing nuclear weapons in Slovenia

1999 2001 2003 2005 2007

84,9 81,4 85,4 77,0 77,7

4,7 5,0 7,8 12,5 12,8

1,6 2,1 3,0 1,6 2,3

1,0 0,5 0,7 0,9 0,5

7,8 10,9 3,1 8,0 6,7

Bibliography - Annual Reports of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Slovenia for Years 2001, 2002, 2003. - Asmus D. Ronald, 2002. Opening NATO’s Door. Columbia: Columbia University Press. - Bahþiþ, Peter (Ed.). 2002. Slovenia and Nato: Public Debate in the Parliament. Ljubljana. - Bebler, Anton, ed., 1999. The Challenge of NATO Enlargement. Westport: Praeger. - Blank, Stephen J., ed., 1998. European Security and NATO Enlargement: A View from Central Europe. Washington DC: Strategic Studies Institute. - de Staercke, André, ed., 1985. NATO’s Anxious Birth. The Prophetic Vision of the 1940s. London: NATO Review. - Jazbec, Milan. 2002.b. Diplomacija in varnost (Diplomacy and Security). Vitrum Publishing. - Jazbec, Milan. 2003. Die Umstrukturierung der europäischen Streitkräfte am Beispiel Sloweniens, Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, 1/2003, pp. 50-52. - Jazbec, Milan. 2005.a Defence Reform in the Western Balkans: The Way Ahead. Geneva: DCAF Policy Paper. - Jazbec, Milan. 2005.b Slovenia and NATO – What are the Lessons Learned? In: ýehuliü, Lidija (ur. /ed.). 2005. Godišnjak Šipan 2004. Yearbook. Zagreb: Politiþka kultura. Atlantsko vijeüe Hrvatske. Str.145-150. - Jazbec, Milan. 2009. Slovenia and NATO: A Handful of Useful Experience. www.ifimes.org (07.05.2009) www.worldsecuritynetwork.com (07.05.2009). - Malešiþ, Marjan, 2002. Slovenska javnost: politiþno uradniška elita in NATO. Teorija in praksa, Vol.39, No.3, pp. 414-425. - NATO Office of Information and Press, 2006. NATO Handbook. Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press. - NATO, 1995. Study on NATO Enlargement. Brussels: NATO. - North Atlantic Assembly, October 2, 1998. NATO in the 21st Century. - Pierre, Andrew, 1999. NATO at Fifty. New Challenges, Future Uncertainties, Special Report. Washington DC: US Institute of Peace. - Pietsch, Lajos, ed., 1998. Hungary and NATO. Budapest: Hungarian Atlantic Council. - Pradetto, August and Alamir, Fouzieh Melanie, eds., 1998. Die Debatte über die Kosten der NATO-Osterweiterung. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft,. - Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications. Released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of State: February 24, 1997. - Simon, Jeffrey, 1996. NATO Enlargement and Central Europe. A Study in Civil-Military Relations. Washington: NDU Press. - Szayna, Thomas S., 2001. NATO Enlargement 200-2015. Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping. Arlington: RAND. - US Secretary of State, 1997. Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations for Fiscal Year 1998. Washington. - Wohlfeld, Monika, ed., 1997. The Effects of Enlargement on Bilateral Relations in Central and Eastern Europe (Chaillot Paper no. 26). Paris: WEU Institute for Security Studies.


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A SCANDINAVIAN PERSPECTIVE

The Scandinavian countries have been supporting the enlargement of NATO, particularly in the Baltic area where the security situation changed dramatically. Russia lost her former strategic dominance in the area. Unfortunately, the confidence between NATO and Russia has been severely weakened and needs to be restored. From the very beginning, all the Scandinavian countries have supported the enlargement of NATO, not only the two members of the Alliance, Denmark and Norway, but interestingly enough also the two neutral countries, Finland and Sweden. In the nineties all Scandinavian countries strongly advocated the Polish membership of NATO in order to establish Poland’s strong and lasting ties with the Western world. For the same reason they supported the membership of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. It was considered important to affiliate the three Baltic countries to the Western world, to secure their independence, bring them out of the Russian shadow – all in accordance with a profound desire of their population. This sounds almost altruistic, but the Scandinavians have a profound desire to save the world. However, underneath the surface there are often somewhat different realities. The strategic implications of German reunification and of the NATO enlargement with Poland and the Baltic countries have been tremendous. The area around the Baltic Sea has become stable and secure as never before in modern history. The former threat to our security – Russia as the main heir of the Soviet Union has lost her political strategic dominance in the area and has been pushed back to the bottom of the Gulf of Finland. According to the White Book issued recently, the Danish Defence Commission, the security situation in the area has never been better for the country in centuries. Denmark is no longer a front line state, a “security consumer”, but has become a “security provider”. This conclusion, of course, has been a subject of thorough deliberations. NATO’s eastward expansion has raised suspicions and fears in the political and military elite in Moscow. Russia’s strategic influence has diminished considerably in the Baltic area and in Eastern Europe as a whole. We have been repeating that the expansion is not directed against Russia. Nevertheless, the Baltic states and some former Warsaw Pact countries have hardly tried to hide that by their membership in NATO they wanted to shield themselves from Russian influence if not dominance as they have had painful historical experiences with Russia. It is a pity that NATO has never really been willing or sincere in trying to draw Russia into cooperation in which its legitimate interests would be acknowledged and seriously taken into account. During most of his first presidential term Vladimir Putin tried hard to develop close cooperation with the Western world. He realized that the modernization and economic development of Russia was dependent upon this cooperation. But the West and especially the former U.S. administration ignored basic Russian interests. The Western attitude can best be described as: we are listening to what you are saying, but by the end of the day we will decide according to our own interests – and not to what might have been our common interests. After 2004, as we all know, the situation changed when the disappointed leadership in Kremlin became more and more intoxicated by the smell of oil and gas and by the revenues from the sky rocketing energy prices. The financial crisis and the overstretching of our military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan have provided Russia with better opportunities to pursue its national interests. This of course affects Russia’s attitude towards further NATO enlargement. The

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K.J. Møller / A Scandinavian Perspective

enlargement with the Western Balkan countries probably does not worry Moscow, but the question is why this is necessary. When it comes to Ukraine and Georgia, however, the situation is profoundly different. The admission of these two countries would affect vital Russian strategic and geopolitical interests and hence its resistance will definitely be serious and stubborn. The assessment of the Georgian conflict and the so-called gas-crisis with Ukraine is different among the Scandinavian countries. In my opinion, it will be necessary in the next decade to develop alternative modes of cooperation between Ukraine, Georgia and the Western world. None of these two countries will be ready for membership in the foreseeable future. And the Alliance must seriously consider to what extent it is meaningful and reasonable to further expand its security guaranties. The Danish position is that Russia has regained some of her strength, but militarily it definitely does not pose a serious threat. However, politically Russia remains a very difficult partner. Norway, Sweden and Finland have been much more concerned, especially their military, but at the political level they will probably agree with the Danish position. The Alliance has to reconsider its relationship with Russia. The mutual confidence between Russia and NATO has been severely weakened in the last couple of years. It has to be rebuilt on the basis of common interests. Russia is still thinking in terms of geopolitics and zero-sum games. The task of the Alliance is to convince Russia that the concept of cooperative security is not hot air but could be beneficial also for Russia. The most important future challenge for the Alliance is to engage Russia as a constructive partner. Karsten Jakob Møller1

1

Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen, Denmark

Chapter III NATO Enlargement into South Eastern Europe



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ROMANIA In less than a decade Romania has succeeded to accomplish the transition from a centralized command economy, communist dictatorship and an isolated country to a free market economy, functional democracy and an open society. In the next decade the country has gained both NATO and EU membership. Romania has not had any problem in terms of public opinion support due to strong pro-American and pro-Western feelings among the population. The end of the Cold War and of the communist regimes in Southern and Eastern Europe enhanced Romania's geostrategic relevance in matters related to its integration in NATO. In terms of its size and economic potential, Romania became the second largest country situated between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, controlling the Danube River and a part of the Black Sea coast. Romania's relations with its neighbours have had geopolitical implications for NATO. The conflicts in former Yugoslavia and in Transnistria exposed ethnic, religious and economic conflicts, which negatively affected the region’s stability. Moreover, separatist and transnational threats started to arise from the former Soviet territory, the Middle East and Asia. These threats created serious obstacles to NATO’s efforts to infuse stability and cooperation into the region. The situation threats increased Romania’s role in containing and defusing the crises. According to some experts, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 led NATO to reevaluate the relevance of the Eastern European states. Due to the growing importance of the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Caspian basins Romania became a strong candidate for accession. Under these circumstances Romania had to focus its foreign policy regionally on the relations with Russia, Hungary and the Republic of Moldova, and domestically on the relations with its national minorities. Regionally, Romania's relationship with Moscow has been critically important. After 1989 Romania's desire to join NATO and Russia's efforts to dominate Eastern Europe often proved irreconcilable. Prior to 2001 the signing of a Romanian-Russian treaty was impossible due to the Russian demand that neither side would join an alliance and no foreign troops could be positioned in either of the two countries that may represent a threat for the other party. These stipulations could have practically precluded NATO membership and Romania had to reject them. However, Russia's fruitful cooperation with the NATO missions in Bosnia & Herzegovina and in Kosovo as well as the improved NATO-Russia relations following the attacks of September 2001 have led to the reconciliation between Romania and the Russian Federation. Thus the two countries were able to sign a cooperation treaty in July 2002. After 1989 there was also an ethnic dimension in Romanian-Russian relations. Moldova, one of the former Soviet republics, proclaimed its independence in 1991 and reintroduced the Latin alphabet. Romania and Moldova shared a rich historical and cultural heritage, and most of the Moldovan population sought reunification with Romania. However, the Romanian government feared that reunification would complicate the integration process since Moldova was experiencing great political, economic and ethnic difficulties. In 1991–1992 Romania provided military assistance to the Moldovan Army and had kept its frontier open to Moldovan guest workers. The conflict in Transnistria became a major security concern for Romania, as it involved also Russian regional interests. Russia fueled the grievances by maintaining the Russian Fourteenth Army in Transnistria despite the international community’s efforts to open a path to dialogue and to contain the armed conflict. When the Communist Party of Moldova led by President Voronin came to power, the Moldovan government started reintroducing Russian values, antidemocratic programs and also rejected the common cultural heritage with Romania. There was also no improvement in Moldova’s economic situation. These changes in

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A. Serban / Romania

Moldova went against Romania's aspiration for joining the Western integration. Aware of its future responsibilities within NATO, Romania had to take measures on its Eastern border to disrupt the smuggling of arms and drugs, organized crime and prostitution networks. Another relevant regional security issue concerned Romania’s relations with Hungary. Historic tensions between the two countries have revolved around the status of the 1.6 million-strong ethnic Hungarian minority living on Romania’s territory. Recognizing ethnic dialogue as a crucial ingredient of regional stability, in 1993 Romania created the State Council for National Minorities. The Hungarian minority in Romania was allotted representation in the government, while its party, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), joined every Romanian government coalition since 1996. Romania’s newly amended Law on Public Administration stipulated that in the regions where the minority population exceeds 20 percent of the total population, the use of its mother tongue in conducting official business is allowed. The status of the Roma minority is another example of Romania’s ability to address contentious issues and promote regional stability. The Roma are the second largest minority ethnic group in the country, numbering around 400,000 according to the latest census, although by an unofficial estimate the true number is close to one million. Following isolated examples of local violence against the Roma, the Romanian government sought the EU’s assistance in addressing the problem, in improving the education system for Roma and in providing a legal status to this minority. A decisive change for the countries aspiring to become NATO members was triggered by the transformation process undergone by the Alliance itself. The launching of the 1994 Partnership for Peace and the introduction of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 1999 helped shape the reforms and other measures adopted by candidate countries. Romania joined the PfP program in 1994, and later the Membership Action Plan, which paved the country’s way towards membership. What proved most difficult for Romania was the successful implementation of economic reforms, the rule of law, transparency in the acquisition processes (including in the military field), strengthening accountability and good governance, fighting corruption, providing information security, reforming and introducing effective democratic control of the security services. NATO’s Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process (PARP) became a main tool in the practical preparation for NATO membership as well as in the development of credible national defence capabilities. PARP included a series of Interoperability Objectives or Partnership Goals (PG) designed to provide standards for military units participating in NATO/Partnership for Peace operations, but was weak on the ability to assess properly the political, economic and social strengths of each aspirant country. Military reforms were implemented already in the early 1990s, but the process registered ascending and descending trends. For Romania, reforming its military system represented an essential condition for achieving compatibility and interoperability with NATO. Romania’s ultimate goal was to set up a modern, modular, efficient and NATO-compatible military force. To achieve these goals, the military reform focused on several dimensions: x a new structure to fulfill the NATO security requirements; x reorganization of the Ministry of Defence; x improved resource allocation and management; x establishment of an efficient and reliable personnel management system to better address the Army’s needs for training and modernization; x a reassessment of major acquisition programs to eliminate unneeded systems and to provide relevant capabilities for NATO’s out-of-area operations.

A. Serban / Romania

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By the end of 2000 it became clear that there was a major gap between the commitments undertaken within the Partnership for Peace and Romanian domestic realities and resources. With Romania’s defence expenditure dropping, the strategic arguments for the country’s accession became less convincing. Moreover, as Romania committed more resources to participation in NATO and PfP activities, it had to reduce the allocation for implementing domestic military reforms and to effectively delay them. The second Iliescu administration refocused military reforms on attaining the goal of NATO membership. Romania continued with its force reduction plans, while improving interoperability and combat effectiveness of troops assigned to NATO operations through modernization of major weapons systems and the implementation of NATO training standards. Training days for field operations personnel, flying hours and the days at sea were increased to reach the NATO standards. Since 1989 the size of Romania’s army was significantly reduced from 320,000 to 90,000 in 2007. This severe drop was accompanied by the adjustments in the personnel structure. First and foremost, by 2005 the ratio of officers to NCOs has shifted from three to one to one to 2.4. In 2001 more than 4,100 officers became redundant, while available positions of generals were reduced from over 450 to 90. The successful implementation of defence reforms allowed the doubling of our military capabilities for out-of-area operations. Romania’s real budget expenditures during the last decade, except for one year, constantly exceeded 2 percent of the GDP. In recent years the appropriations have reached 2.38 percent of the GDP. Moreover, Romania decided to amend its Constitution, eliminate conscription by 2007 and to create an all-professional army. The question of political support to NATO accession was a crucial one. We had to cope with frozen mentalities, uncertainties, insufficient budgets to push forward the needed reforms. Strong commitment, a clear political guidance and vision streamlined the efforts both at institutional and at higher political levels in order to keep the entire society on track to meet the standards for NATO membership. In Romania, parliamentary parties signed an agreement and even the ultra-nationalist Great Romania Party agreed to support NATO and EU membership. There was also the need for the academic community, NGOs and civil society to join in on these efforts. This condition was met easily. Various projects have been launched in view of disseminating sufficient information and knowledge about NATO among the general public. For several decades Romanian NGOs had been reluctant in associating their activities to those of the military institutions. Now this attitude belongs in the past. Another key element was to start behaving as a NATO member. Romania was the first PfP participant and not yet a NATO member to have established its intelligence cell in Bosnia which shared information with the Allies. Romania followed the Alliance’s evolution in attitude and philosophy of enlargement based on a pragmatic and realistic examination of the added value that each aspirant country could bring to the collective security of the Alliance. Under these circumstances security cooperation in the war against terror, the current contribution in forces to NATO’s out-of-area operations and their interoperability became exceedingly important criteria. Since the early 1990s Romania has committed more than 8,300 personnel to peace support operations under the UN, OSCE and NATO aegis in theaters ranging from the Persian Gulf and Somalia, to Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. To this one should add the hosting of US troops in Kogălniceanu base near Constanta in 2001–2004, as well as the agreement to offer to US troops four military facilities in Romania with up to 2,500 permanent personnel and the possibility of additional 500 personnel plus troops in transit. The hosting of US troops on Romania’s soil will help improving the training standards and the combat readiness of

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A. Serban / Romania

Romanian deployable units. In 2008 about 3000 troops were engaged in foreign theatres of operations. In 2002 at the Prague Summit NATO invited Romania, and in 2004 the country joined the Alliance. Some experts have argued that NATO’s further enlargement to the East would render NATO's decision making process more difficult. Their assumption was that as the number of NATO members increases, it would become more and more difficult to build consensus. Furthermore, there is a need for a variety of different security arrangements in order to meet each member's particular security interests and priorities. For example, Romanian President Basescu stated that Romania will seek for itself a stronger security role in the Black Sea area. On the other hand, the Eastern European members provide better proximity to possible conflict threats in Asia and the Middle East. The U.S.A. has already decided to reposition its forces toward Eastern Europe in order to better fight terrorism. It was also recognized that the Eastern European members have shown more progress in developing new expeditionary capabilities than some of the Western European members. Since 2007 Romania's membership in the European Union enhances its economic cooperation with the West and helps attracting foreign investments needed to develop our economy. This will ensure our stronger economic growth and will provide the resources needed to maintain Romania's considerable contribution to and its active role in the Alliance. Alex Serban1

1

Atlantic Council of Romania, »Casa NATO«, Bucharest.


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BULGARIA Bulgaria’s road to NATO was very uneven. Its membership is important for the country’s prosperity and stability. As NATO member Bulgaria strives to facilitate the integration of the rest of the Western Balkans in the Alliance. Modernizing Bulgarian armed forces and contributing to NATO’s out-of-area missions, especially in Afghanistan, are priority national tasks. Since the regime change and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, domestic discussions in Bulgaria had for several years turned around the management of the various problems of national security. The fundamental dilemma was about the status of the country: joining an alliance (NATO), concluding a bilateral military agreement with another powerful state (Russia) or claiming neutrality (similar to Switzerland, Austria or Sweden). There were very few voices in favour of establishing a bilateral military alliance with Russia. The legacy of Bulgarian-Soviet relations, the deep social, economic, political and ideological crisis in Russia and the rising European perspectives for Bulgaria made these ideas practically irrelevant. When in 1993 Bulgaria signed its association “Europe Agreement”, the country’s future foreign policy course became clearly identified – the integration into the European Union. This was well understood even by the staunchest political friends of Russia – the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) and its members. They launched the idea of Bulgaria’s neutrality as a substitute for joining NATO. However, the BSP propagation of neutrality did not last long. The proposal of a ‘neutrality status’ tried to poise the EU against NATO. This was an unrealistic aspiration. Many Bulgarians and the country’s expert community soon rejected this anachronistic concept for Bulgaria as both inapplicable and too expensive to implement. Having realized the mood, the BSP switched its position and proposed to work on a rather vague idea of strengthening the “Euro-Atlantic” structures, notably the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Another potential alternative for NATO membership was setting up a regional cooperation forum. This idea was ill-conceived also due to its timing – Serbia’s wars with its former partners in the Yugoslav federation were in progress – and this excluded any regional solution to Bulgaria’s security needs. In the 1990s few Bulgarians shared the vision of the country’s membership in NATO. Since then the idea has gradually became widely discussed and also scrutinized by national security experts and institutions, mostly of the newly-sprung civil society. Bulgaria’s historical memory and the country’s experience since November 1989 molded the traditional need of the nation for survival and prosperity into a well-conceived national interest for NATO membership. Despite the counter pressures coming from numerous internal and external actors, the idea of membership in NATO expressed the desire of all groups in Bulgarian society for survival, vitality, progress and welfare in the XXI century. The difficulties of transition from one social, economic and political system to another and of more than ten-year long conflicts on the country’s Western borders raised the awareness of the necessity to join NATO. NATO membership became also perceived as a guarantee for the implementation of the values which were in the foundations of the Bulgarian society: freedom, peace, security, democracy, private property, free market, the rule of law, respect of human rights and individual freedoms, the development of open society with reliable mechanisms of civil democratic control, and Bulgaria’s participation in the civil democratic space and security zone called the Euro-Atlantic community. The arguments for joining NATO had gained greatly due to their political and geostrategic value. In 1997 Bulgaria finally officially declared its wish to join the North Atlantic Alliance.

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P. Pantev / Bulgaria

Political parties and public opinion on the issue of NATO membership Four wars in less than ten years in the country’s immediate neighborhood called for a careful and responsible assessment of the state’s interests, objectives, friends and allies. The two most influential political parties during the period were the BSP, heir of the former Bulgarian Communist party, and the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), initially a coalition of centrist and right-of-center parties and later a single right-center party. Since 1990 the main driving force for joining NATO has been the UDF as well as the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) – a liberal political formation of Turkish minority. However, the lack of adequate foreign policy, security and defence professional expertise prevented the UDF from accelerating the process of integration in NATO. Civil society in Bulgaria had played a decisive role in pushing up this process. When the idea of acceding the Alliance had been launched for the first time by the Atlantic Club of Bulgaria, it gained initially only 15 percent support. Later it evolved gradually through lively and open national debates. The evolution of attitudes was not easy due to doubts and skepticism on ideological and professional grounds. By 1999 with the mobilization of the newly sprung democratic civil society, the level of public support reached 46 percent. The attitudinal watershed was NATO’s involvement in Kosovo in spring of 1999. It was clearly realized that the neighboring Serbia’s adventurous policy could easily become aggressive also towards the rest of the Balkan states and destabilize the region. South Eastern Europe needed NATO to move away from its traditional warring mold to progress towards stability, democracy and prosperity. As the BSP risked losing its domestic influence, it reluctantly adopted the platform of NATO integration – a welcome move in the light of this party’s strong political influence at that time. In 2002 the level of public opinion support rose even higher to 58 percent and by 2003 to 63 percent. Although Bulgaria suffered human losses in Iraq, this support reached 70 percent on the eve of joining the Alliance. This was to a great extent due to Bulgaria’s successful preparation for membership. The commitment of the Bulgarian armed forces – a highly respected national institution – strongly influenced this major shift in the country’s public opinion. The challenge of membership triggered the efforts of defence sector reform, reshaping the Bulgarian armed forces for the contingencies of the 21st century. The Bulgarian armed forces competently conveyed to the Bulgarian public the argument that collective security and defence would be the most cost-effective way of advancing national security interests, providing the adequate environment for country’s progress and prosperity. With the support of non-governmental organizations and think tanks, the government of the liberal National Movement Simeon the Second (NMSS) successfully ended the process of integration in the Alliance. On 29 March 2004, Bulgaria officially joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Domestic problems related to NATO membership A major problem on Bulgaria’s path to membership in NATO has been the fast change in the security environment and the general reluctance to adapt adequately. Thus the first and second wave of reforms in civil-military relations and the establishment of working civilian democratic control in the security sector had not been completed in time. Preserving the democratic momentum, good governance in this sector was necessary to make the struggle against terrorism efficient. Though this has been a general problem for all democratic states, the lack of tradition in national strategic assessment and leadership limited the capacity of adaptation to new developments.


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Another major problem in the adaptation to NATO standards, doctrines and structures and in becoming more efficient and cost-effective was the legacies of the Warsaw Pact past. The adoption of a new National Security Concept and of a new Defence Doctrine was major steps in the right direction, followed by purposeful efforts of downsizing the armed forces, their restructuring and repositioning. The restructuring involved primarily the defence administration. Intellectual and financial efforts were invested in changing the culture of strategic thinking through education and training – in the national, bilateral and Alliance formats and developing key documents in the field of national security and defence. A paradigmatic leap was the introduction of a new defence planning system. Establishing technical interoperability and further downsizing of the military personnel went in parallel with placing military activities under democratic civilian control. Bulgaria thus became prepared for the Membership Action Plan (MAP) – the most significant direct tool of preparation for the NATO membership. Bulgaria accepted 2.6 percent of GDP allocated for defence as a realistic level for Bulgaria and acceptable for NATO. Soon after the admission, however, this figure dropped to around 2 percent in 2008, at a higher level of GDP. The initial pledge to keep the modernization allocation at around 2.5 percent of the country’s defence budget has been kept, but not everything was perfect in the planning of and organization for modernization, including in the transparency of procurement and defence modernization. The task of modernizing the country’s armed forces still remains for the years to come. Another major issue has been the complexity of defence industry restructuring as it had immense political, social, technological and financial consequences. Bulgarian defence industry has had an opportunity to modernize, start producing according to NATO standards and to focus on the market niches where it has comparative advantages. One possibility has been to become subcontractors to North American and West European companies producing light arms, weapon systems and ammunition. Bulgaria has not yet fully grasped and utilized this opportunity. Bulgaria’s role in NATO and lessons for the future Probably the most significant consequence of Bulgaria’s having joined NATO is a new and unique security situation with the predominant membership of the South Eastern European countries in NATO. A regional security community in South Eastern Europe was a dream and political science fiction at the beginning of the 1990s. Getting rid of recurrent conflicts in the Western Balkans could not be achieved without the ‘homogenizing’ effect of membership in the same military and political alliance and in the European Union. Now the dream is close to ripening and has definitely passed the point of no return. Solving conflicting issues by war or violent means has become unacceptable to all South East European states. The solidifying effect of the membership of Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Albania, Croatia and Slovenia for the stability in the broader Western Balkan region cannot be contested in any way. NATO’s purposeful policy of expanding its Southern dimension plays a strong stabilizing role in this troublesome region. Bulgaria’s motivation for joining NATO had a strong “Balkan regional” aspect. It has become crystal clear that the progress, prosperity and belated modernization of South Eastern Europe would be possible only if all Balkan countries would belong to the same system of values and to the same security institutions. The involvement of NATO in overcoming the conflicts in Bosnia & Herzegovina and later – in Kosovo, proved the correctness of that analysis. While Macedonia was, not surprisingly, quite active in its preparation for membership in NATO it has been a real historic leap forward to have Serbia and Bosnia & Herzegovina

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joining the PfP family of nations. There can hardly be doubts that newly independent Montenegro and Kosovo will soon be ready to follow in the steps of the “Adriatic Charter” countries. The enlargement of NATO to the Western Balkan countries is a strategic and priority objective of Bulgaria’s policy. The strategic environment the Alliance would create has been assessed by Bulgaria as the most cost-effective investment in Balkan security and a necessary prerequisite for the region’s economic, political and social progress. This development would greatly improve the chances for the successful EU enlargement to whole South Eastern Europe. Bulgaria has an additional motive for contributing to NATO’s stabilizing role in the Western Balkans. This stems from its geopolitical, geo-strategic and geo-economic situation on the Western shores of the Black Sea, from its proximity to the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea region, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Bulgaria is deeply interested in EU and NATO’s developing an effective relationship with Russia, in assuring stable energy flows from the East, stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan, in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear material worldwide. The increasing effectiveness of joint military facilities with the United States in Bulgaria is another significant aspect of the country’s participation in the struggle against terrorism. Finally, Bulgaria’s own progress in social, political, economic, and legal fields and in good governance would add to the strength of the Alliance. Plamen Pantev1

1

ISIS, Sofia


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CROATIA

Croatia, which has gained its independence less then two decades ago, became a NATO member in April 2009. Its path to the Alliance was not easy. After the war, the liberation of its entire territory and the post-socialist reforms, the Alliance recognized Croatia as a modern, democratic and stable state, willing to help other countries in joining the Euro-Atlantic integration. Ever since its independence and the break-down of the former Yugoslav federation, Croatia has expressed its aspirations to rejoin the Western civilization circle, to enter the democratic Western Europe and to become an ally of the only remaining world superpower - the United States of America. Full-fledged membership in NATO and the European Union has been perceived as a confirmation of the young state’s pro-Western orientation. However, a series of objective and subjective factors in Croatia's post-communist development as well as wars raging not only on its territory but also in the neighbouring Western Balkans have slowed down the country’s progress and cooled off the population’s initial euphoria over the issue. Croatia's approaching NATO had been an oscillating process, with numerous ups and downs. Croatia's path can be divided into two stages. The first, covering the period from the country's proclamation of independence until the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2000, and the second, from 2000 to attaining a full-fledged membership in April 2009. Croatia in the Partnership for Peace In the early 1990s, like in most post-communist European countries, Croatia's desire to join NATO meant a demonstration of moving away as soon, as fast and as far as possible from the forty years of its communist past. Although former Yugoslavia was never a member of the Warsaw Pact, the Croatian government wished to re-confirm their commitment to democratic values. It also became increasingly clear that NATO was the only international organization capable of shouldering the main burden of the new European security architecture and of building a new system of international security. Croatia saw an opportunity for its inclusion into these processes through membership in NATO. Already in 1991, a motion by the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was passed unanimously in the Parliament, making NATO membership one of the foreign policy priority goals. However, as the speedy approach to NATO did not occur, not to mention the country’s full-fledged membership, the Alliance started gradually losing the positive public image in Croatia. Being engaged in the defence and liberation of its territory (one-third of the country was then occupied) and having observed the lack of unity and capability of the international community to stop the armed conflicts in the Balkans, Croatian leaders tried to find solutions for some of the country’s burning problems which included the UN-imposed arms embargo and evident international isolation. When the PfP programme was launched in 1994, the Croatian State Defence Council decided to apply. NATO, however, did not even consider Croatia’s application. Despite the Alliance’s reserved attitude, Croatian President F. Tudjman, in his address to both houses of Parliament on January 15, 1996, reconfirmed NATO membership as the country's priority. After the adoption of the “Study on NATO Enlargement”, the Croatian government filed a formal

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ˇ L. Cehuli´ c Vukadinović / Croatia

application for entering the PfP programme. NATO responded by only welcoming Croatia's aspirations to strengthen mutual cooperation. It was a clear signal to Zagreb that NATO would not absolve Croatia of meeting all specific demands. During that period Croatia was regularly cooperating with and assisting both NATO and the wider international community in dealing with crises on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Since 1995, after the agreement with NATO on the status of IFOR was signed, Croatia has been providing logistical support to NATO-led operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This includes the use of Croatian roads, airports, ports, hospitals as well as of other technical and logistic facilities without or with a minimum financial compensation. NATO also insisted on Croatia’s fulfilling several specific criteria for participation in the PfP programme, believing that by meeting them, Croatia would contribute to the stabilization, not only on its own territory but also wider in the volatile Western Balkans. However, Croatian government did not wish then to accept and consistently implement the NATO criteria. By the end of the 20th century Croatia therefore became the most politically isolated country in the region and from the institutional point of view the most distant from NATO membership. During her visit in Croatia in 1997, less than two years after most of Croatia's territory was finally liberated, the then US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, demanded the following from President F. Tudjman: Croatia's support to and implementation of the Dayton Accords; The return of refugees and displaced persons; Full cooperation with the newly established International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. The Croatian public and ruling political circles did not welcome these demands. The road to full-fledged membership Soon after President F. Tudjman's death, almost all presidential candidates, as well as representatives of the parties which took part in parliamentary elections, were promising in their campaigns to put an end to the country's international isolation and to cooperate in a constructive way with the West. The new, democratically elected left-of-the-centre coalition government and the newly elected President were warmly welcomed by the West. Croatia's political credibility was boosted by numerous and frequent international contacts and visits. During NATO's operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia also opened its airspace to allied aircraft and later provided logistical support to KFOR troops. In February 2000, during a visit to NATO headquarters, the first real changes occurred in the relations between Croatian authorities and NATO. The new Croatian Prime Minister was then handed a programme designed to prepare the country for the entry into PfP. By implementing these proposals Croatia showed its resolution and readiness, and practically overnight finally joined the PfP programme in May 2000. The Alliance's leaders, however, still demanded from Croatia to consistently comply with the Dayton Peace Accords, to fully cooperate with ICTY, to enable the return of Serbian refugees and to continue the process of democratization. Given very significant human and material loses during the 1991-1995 Homeland War, still fresh wounds, ruined economy and high unemployment rate, the new government had to face the population’s discontent with NATO’s constant demands. Croatia's accession to the PfP programme had a wider geostrategic connotation. While commenting on Croatia's accession to the PfP programme, the NATO Secretary General and the US Secretary of State were stating that Croatia was rewarded for its successful democratic


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transition. This was meant as a message to Serbia which was still ruled by Slobodan Miloševiü. Taking into account changes in the wider international environment and being fully aware that the honeymoon with NATO would not last forever, the Croatian government decided to use the favourable opportunity. It launched a series of projects and activities aimed at a thorough restructuring of Croatia’s national security system in order to achieve the highest possible level of compatibility with NATO. The government had to simultaneously deal with numerous unresolved internal problems, as well as with problems involving the country's neighbours and other countries in the region (border issues, division of the former Yugoslavia's assets, potential conflicts in the Western Balkans). The government also started to entice public support for NATO membership and for the legislation needed to institutionalize democratic changes according to the so-called Western standards. A solid political consensus among the ruling and opposition parties on Croatia’s membership in NATO was very helpful in this respect. However, there were different views on how and under what conditions this should be achieved. Initially, Croatian authorities did not bother with the differences in views on the issue among political parties. Public discussions on Croatia's NATO membership have for a long time been neglected and subordinated to the issue of the country's approach to the European Union. Although no postcommunist country entered the EU before joining NATO, Croatia's political leaders played down the question of membership in the Alliance. They considered it as a rather unpopular issue with the public, which could decrease the government's popularity. Thus, in the programme of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), again the main ruling party, “fullfledged membership in the EU and NATO” and an “active participation in the EU common foreign and security policy and in NATO operations” were mentioned in this order as Croatia's primary foreign policy goals. Croatia's Atlantic Council, a non-governmental organization created in 2001, was, however, actively spreading throughout the country the idea of Euro-Atlantism. Under NATO pressure, the Croatian government changed in time its public posture and launched various activities to explain to the population the benefits of the country’s membership in the Alliance. In that context the Atlantic Council of Croatia was recognized as a prominent and desirable partner. The reasons for Croatia's membership in NATO, which were presented to the public by the government, could be grouped in the following way:

Security Reasons In a radically changed international security environment, NATO has remained the largest (both by territory and the number of members), richest, most respectable and ablest (by military and technical criteria) security organization which is open for cooperation with all other actors in the maintenance of peace and stability. Within NATO's system of collective security and also in the “Coalition of the Willing”, Croatia has seen itself as active provider of international security. Political Reasons NATO is an Alliance of democracies to which the richest, most developed and most stable states of the Western civilization belong. Ever since its attainment of independence, Croatia has wished to become such a country. So it has been logical for Croatia to join NATO. The

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Alliance’s transformation from a primarily defence alliance into a wider political-military organization answered all critics who viewed it as a rigid military leftover from the “Cold War” era. Economic Reasons By joining NATO, Croatia, with its rule of law, would become part of a stable and secure community of developed nations in which direct foreign investment is fully legally protected. Although NATO membership is not a formal precondition for joining the EU, the country would be considered as a serious candidate for EU membership as well. Each segment in the Croatian society, depending on its particular position, goals and interests, has had its own reasons 'for' and 'against' NATO membership. When the NATO popularity was at its lowest level, the wide-spread Croatian stereotypes concerning NATO were similar to those in most other successor states of former Yugoslavia. They included the fear that Croatian soldiers would die abroad, the fear of NATO military bases established on the Adriatic coast, the fear that NATO generals would command the Croatian army, the fear of increased defence spending etc. Public opinion polls showed that during the 1991-1995 war, around 90 percent of Croatians supported NATO membership. In the 2000-2003 period, this support declined to a level between 35 and 45 percent, and in the 2004-2006 period increased to between 47 and 58 percent. In 2006-2007 it again fell to between 29 to 37 percent, grew again in late 2007 and by mid-2008 reached the level of about 50 percent. While the Croatian government was most intensively explaining the need for NATO membership, the political situation in the country decidedly soured. This downturn was caused by the war in Afghanistan, by the growing number of casualties, by the invasion of Iraq, by the threat of a military attack against Iran etc. Due to the lack of knowledge, average Croatians, including some university students, were simply equating NATO with the United Sates. Due to the unpopularity of the US Administration’s international behaviour under George W. Bush, including its brutal use of force, the public support for NATO membership declined very appreciably among large segments of the Croatian public. When the political elite realized that the public support to NATO membership was not at a desired level, it decided not to submit the protocol on NATO membership to a referendum but have it ratified by the Parliament. In July 2001 Croatia joined NATO's programme of “Individual Intensified Dialogue” and in mid-2002 the “Membership Action Plan” (MAP). At the NATO Prague Summit in November 2002 the results of Croatia's reforms were positively assessed by the Alliance, while four years later, at the Bucharest summit, Croatia was officially invited to become a full-fledged member, alongside with Albania. This was a reward for the achieved level of overall political, social and economic transformation, as well as for the development and compatibility of the country's armed forces and of the entire national security system with the Alliance's standards. Membership in NATO, like membership in any other international organization, is a two-way street. Croatia’s admission to membership at the Alliance’s summit in Strasbourg/Kehl in April 2009 was proof that the interests of both sides coincided. Croatia's international position is today much more favourable than in the 1990s, also due to its membership in NATO. Today, Croatia evaluates its capabilities more realistically, sets its goals and voices its aspirations more wisely. As a NATO member, Croatia thoroughly respects and follows the


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rules valid for all other member states and thus contributes to the Alliance’s cohesion and strength, as well as to its global security role. Lidija ýehuliü Vukadinoviü1

Bibliography: Vlatko Cvrtila, Hrvatska i NATO, Zagreb, 2004 Lidija ýehuliü, Euroatlantizam, Zagreb, 2002. Zlatko Gareljiü: „Croatia and NATO“, in L.ýehuliü (ed.): Yearbook Šipan 2006, Zagreb, 2007., pp. 115-24. Radovan Vukadinoviü, Lidija ýehuliü, Drago.Lovriü, NATO i meÿunarodni odnosi, Zagreb, 2006. Radovan Vukadinoviü, Lidija ýehuliü, Davor Božinoviü, NATO Euroatlantska integracija, Zagreb, 2007.

1

Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Zagreb, Croatia



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ALBANIA

After the democratic changes in Albania the Albanians have strongly supported their country’s membership in NATO and EU as a symbolic return to their Western identity. The NATO air campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina and later in Kosovo reinforced the appreciation of NATO as protector of human rights and as liberator of a part of Albanian nation. Albania has played a constructive political role in the Balkans by facing various challenges originating from old nationalist legacies. The positive and moderating role of Albania in the region has been especially appreciated by the international community during and following the armed conflict in Kosovo. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania established its first contacts with NATO in November 1991. In February 1994, the Albanian President Sali Berisha, today’s Prime Minister, signed the Framework Document of the Partnership for Peace. In order to comply with the NATO membership criteria, Albania had to consolidate its democratic order, reform its state institutions, implement the rule of law, wage the fight against organized crime, illicit trafficking and corruption, as well as preserve and promote common democratic values. Those efforts were accompanied by fast transformation of the Albanian armed forces in compliance with NATO standards. Albania has become the first country in the world to have eliminated all chemical weapons. It carried out a radical reorganization of the entire defense system, adopted a new national security strategy and many necessary laws. The Albanian military also contributed to regional or international security by taking part in international military missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan and Iraq. NATO officially opened its door to Albania’s membership at the NATO Summit of Prague, on November 21, 2002. At the NATO Summit of Bucharest Albania was officially invited. The evolution of relations between NATO and Albania has been full of challenges because Albania entered these relations with almost no experience, due to the country’s long political isolation under the communist regime. However, in securing the ratification by the parliaments of NATO member countries various difficulties occurred, mainly of technical nature sometimes mixed with prejudices and pressures. As long as all the procedures and the ratification process were not completed in all the NATO member states, this matter required the greatest attention of the Albanian authorities. One of the biggest challenges for the country has been the uncompromising struggle against organized crime, illicit trafficking of all types and corruption as well as further consolidation of public administration. A lot has been done in this area, but this task remains a long-term priority for Albania. Here are some indicators of the progress in this field. Albania has moved its position from 126th country among 158 states in 2005 to the 105th position among 179 states in 2007 according to the Transparency International classification. The Audit Service of the AntiCorruption Department at the Prime Minister’s Office has conducted so far around 3,000 inspections, out of which 200 cases have been referred to for criminal prosecution, while 400 public officials have been proposed to be either dismissed or subjected to other administrative sanctions. The newly established Joint Unit for the Investigation of Corruption and Economic Crime has performed a series of successful investigations which led to the arrests of over 120 high and middle level officials.

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A. Starova / Albania

Looking into the future, Albania pursues challenging priority political and diplomatic goals which could be divided into several groups. Firstly, to continue reforms and to consolidate the country’s democratic institutions and the rule of law. Secondly, to raise Albania’s role as a NATO member. Thirdly, to continue the reform in the security sector, including defense. The Albanian Armed Forces will become fully professional by 2010, while the military budget will increase to 2.1 % of the GDP. Shifting to a fully professional army by the beginning of year 2010, upgrading and modernizing the military equipment, improving military education, eliminating redundant ammunition, preparing a deployable military contingent for missions abroad etc., are only some of the most important tasks to be completed. Fourthly, to inform our public and to maintain its continuous support to NATO and the Euro-Atlantic values. NATO has long enjoyed very high public opinion support of over 90 percent, but that does not mean that there is no need for informing and discussing NATOrelated issues with the public at large. Fifthly, to promote Albania’s regional political role as a country of peace, dialogue, moderation and cooperation in the Western Balkans. Since deep democratic change Albania has firmly and actively supported all positive regional developments which enhance peace, security, stability, mutual confidence and goodwill through dialogue and good neighborly relations. Having become a NATO member, Albania will support all other Eastern European countries which are still moving towards NATO membership. Sixthly, to increase Albania’s military contribution to international security, particularly during emergencies. Bearing in mind that security risks and threats are global, asymmetric and unconventional, Albania must always be ready to offer its contribution to NATO’s out-of-area missions or to other Euro-Atlantic coalitions. In view of new global security threats, Albanian deployments abroad will probably become more numerous. Our goal is to make Albania a respected NATO member. This obviously cannot be achieved overnight and will require considerable efforts and time. Arian Starova1

1

Atlantic Council of Albania, Tirana, Albania

Chapter IV Further Enlargement into the Western Balkans and the CIS Area



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MACEDONIA Since the early 1990’s the political elite and the public have shared the opinion that joining the European integration and NATO is both a priority and an instrument for achieving Macedonia’s national political goals. This paper gives a short overview of Macedonia’s experience in transformation, democratization and decentralization. The decision at the NATO summit in Bucharest not to invite Macedonia generated dilemmas and controversies on whether NATO membership is more important than the country’s identity expressed in its name. From the early 1990s the primary goal of the Macedonian foreign and security policy has been avoiding the consequences and contagious effects of violent conflicts in the region and establishing/preserving stable internal conditions as a foundation for democratic transition and institution building. Since its independence Macedonia has been perceived as a country which fairly successfully managed to evade the nationalist climate that dashed through the region. As a newly emerged would-be democracy Macedonia has viewed its Euro-Atlantic integration as a way out of transitional traps and challenges. The perspective of NATO membership appeared officially on the Macedonian political agenda in 1993 when its Parliament adopted a declaration expressing the country’s political interest in joining the security alliance. Macedonia has officially started its cooperation with NATO in 1994 by entering PfP. From this symbolic act the relations between NATO and the Republic of Macedonia have gone through several phases. The initial partnership and cooperation phase lasted from 1994 up to 1999 when the first Membership Action Plan (MAP) started. Macedonia’s political and economic weakness, low institutional capabilities, high centralization, high unemployment, economic underdevelopment, social insecurity and contagious effects of the Kosovo conflict have been the limiting factors for effective statebuilding process and the creation of efficient democratic institutions. Following the deep internal crisis in 2001, the internationally negotiated Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) shaped the peace building process in the country. According to its provisions, the reconstruction of multiethnic democracy had to be accompanied by serious reforms in the security sector, with significant international assistance. The implementation of NATO’s and EU’s political and military requirements for peace building took place between 2001 and 2004. Finally, the most intense phase started in 2004 with the presentation of our Strategic Defence Review. This was the core political document on defence reforms with specific tasks and goals which had to be completed by the end of 2007. Acting along these lines Macedonia continued with the implementation of its twofold security policy through the institutionalization of OFA instruments and mechanisms. As a candidate for EU membership the country has kept strengthening its political and economic stability, the capacity for democratic management of political challenges related to interethnic relations. In Macedonia’s case, Euro-Atlantic integrations and an improvement in interethnic relations have been obviously mutually reinforcing developments. In expectation of enhanced regional and national stability, Macedonia’s security sector reforms have become the cornerstone of successful and democratic transition. After the crisis in 2001 the need for reorganization in the security sector, following the principles of civilian and democratic control, transparency and accountability, became even more obvious. The signing of the Stabilization and Association agreement (SAA) with the EU in 2001 gave a new impetus for comprehensive reforms specified in the post-conflict peace building provisions of the Ohrid Framework Agreement

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L. Georgieva / Macedonia

(OFA). This act formally put an end to the seven months’ confrontations and crisis in Macedonia which severely damaged interethnic confidence and stability. At the beginning of 2008 Macedonia started a new phase of defence reforms. The goal has been to establish a small professional army with high operational and deployable capabilities for international missions. About 20% of the defence budget was allocated for modernization and equipment of the Macedonian Army. 204 military personnel were deployed in international peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in 2008. The projection is to have up to 8% of the Macedonian land forces available for out-of area missions by 2018. The 2008 NATO Summit in Bucharest was expected to confirm the country’s progress in defence, political and economic reforms by issuing an official invitation for membership. It was stated in the final communiqué that Macedonia fulfilled the criteria for membership, but an additional precondition was introduced – resolving the so-called “name issue” and establishing good neighbourly relations. These additional criteria provided one of NATO members with an additional tool for exercising power politics against a weak candidate country. The name dispute with Greece prevailed then over the formal criteria for membership. Macedonian officials and the public, with the exception of a few independent experts, have expressed their huge disappointment. Direct political consequences of NATO’s negative decision appeared soon. The governing coalition announced an early parliamentary election in order to accommodate and divert political pressure. The most controversial election followed, with international observers recording considerable irregularities and even local violence. Despite the victory of the governing coalition led by Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, the election had clear negative consequences. It influenced the report by the European Commission on the progress of the country. The Commission proposed no date for the opening of accession negotiations with the European Union. The NATO decision to separate Macedonia from two other members of the Adriatic Charter, Croatia and Albania deepened the divisions over the country’s future and over the negotiation process with Greece under the UN auspices. On the other hand, the decision has only partly affected Macedonia’s security reforms and public opinion support. Soon after the parliamentary election the government announced that the country will continue the security sector reforms and will proceed with fulfilling Macedonia’s commitments. However, the public became divided on the question whether the NATO membership should be traded for Macedonia’s national identity expressed in its official name. Since then obvious dilemmas appeared in connection with the security relations among the Balkan countries and also with NATO’s and EU’s security policy in the region. The expectations obviously differed. The desire for the integration of the Western Balkan countries has been growing parallel with the fear of uncertainty. It was expected that the process of democratization will decrease the propensity to violence and prevent attempts of military resolution of frozen conflicts in the region. Prior to the Bucharest Summit, public opinion surveys had shown a very high support for NATO membership (often between 80–90%). There were two alternative explanations for these high figures: the Macedonian public is either poorly informed about the positive or negative consequences of membership, or that the figures reflect the public fear of regional insecurity. After the Bucharest Summit, the public support for NATO membership decreased slightly but still remained high. According to a survey conducted in November 2008, about a half of the respondents believed that the membership was most important for the country, while about 38 percent deemed it important but not a national priority. On the question how one would vote on a referendum 85 percent responded in favor of NATO membership, expecting increased stability and economic development. About half of the respondents believed that NATO did not

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L. Georgieva / Macedonia

change its attitude towards Macedonia after the Bucharest Summit. About 70 percent were, however, against changing the official name of the country as a price for NATO membership. The top priorities for Macedonia are to strengthen its political and financial capabilities, maintain public support for continuing reforms to be gained by clear political vision, and to pursue effective policy aimed at the country’s integration into NATO and the EU. This means i.a. the thorough implementation of security sector reforms. Finally, the key issue for Macedonia is to prove itself as a credible and reliable partner of NATO, of its member states and of other partner countries. It is to be expected that Macedonia will continue strengthening its security cooperation with NATO, thus contributing to peace and security of the Balkans. Lidija Georgieva1 Selected bibliography x Dimitrov, N.: Macedonia and NATO: Evolving Partnership .The Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal (CROSSROADS, Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal), no. 01/2006, on www.ceeol.com. x Milososki A.: Macedonian Perspectives and Challenges; Political Thought, Skopje, no. 22, June 2008. x Anja H. Ebnöther, Philipp H. Fluri, Predrag Jurekovic (Eds.) Security Sector Governance in the Western Balkans: Self-Assessment Studies on Defence, Intelligence, Police and Border Management Reform, Vienna and Geneva, 2007. x Pietz T.: Defence Reform and Conversion in Albania, Macedonia and Croatia; International Centre for Conversion, 2006, Brief 34, Bonn. x Defence Law. http://www.morm.gov.mk/english/defencelaw.htm. x Annual National Program (NATO MAP) http://www.morm.gov.mk/english/annualnational.htm. x National Security and Defence Concept of the Republic of Macedonia –2003. http://www.morm.gov.mk/english/nationalconcept.htm. x Adriatic Charter – 2003 http://www.adriaticcharter.gov.mk/thecharter.htm. x White Paper on Defence – 1998 http://www.morm.gov.mk/english/Assets/whitebook.pdf. x Strategy for the transformation of the defence and the Army of the Republic of Macedonia – 2004. http://www.morm.gov.mk/assets/transformation.doc. x Strategic Defence Review – 2003 http://www.morm.gov.mk/english/strategicdefencereview.htm. x Schnabel A.: Southeast European Security: Threats, Responses and Challenges; NOVA, 2001. x Väyrynen, Raimo (2000), "Stable Peace Through Security Communities? Steps Towards Theory-Building", Occasional Paper, The Joan B. Kroc Institute For International Peace Studies.

1

Institute for Defence and Peace Studies, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Skopje, Macedonia



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SERBIA

This chapter focuses on some aspects of Serbia’s national security strategy, on the relations between Serbia and NATO and on geostrategic options available to Serbia ranging from neutrality to joining NATO sometime in the future. Since 2000, Serbia’s extensive reforms have been based on the wish to build a strong state, while the relations with European and Euro-Atlantic integrations have only been to serve the fulfilment of this goal. The same holds true of the defence system reform conducted in accordance with the NATO standards. Even though Serbia is a militarily neutral country, it has in practical terms long behaved like a disciplined NATO member state. Through the “Partnership for Peace” Serbia has built up excellent military cooperation with NATO countries, especially with the USA. Unlike some NATO members, Serbia signed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). It also concluded an agreement with NATO on exchanging intelligence data. Serbian Army personnel regularly participate in exercises with the armies of NATO member states and with the National Guard of Ohio. The intensity of this military cooperation exceeds by far the level among some NATO member states. Following the disintegration of SFR Yugoslavia, NATO gradually entered the whirlpool of the Balkan crisis, as manifested by its air strikes against the Serbian Republic in Bosnia in 1995. The culmination of NATO’s involvement was the bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the entry of coalition forces in Kosovo and Metohia in June 1999. Not surprisingly, the attitude towards NATO in Serbia has created a line of political division between the “pro-NATO” and the “anti-NATO” camps. This divide is potentially deeper than the gaps between the reform-oriented and the regression-oriented camps, the pro-Western and the pro-Russian camps, between the globalist and the national camps, or between the forces that previously declared themselves as left- or right-oriented. Since the political turnabout in the year 2000, one of the most important items on the new authorities’ agenda has been the policy towards the “Euro-Atlantic integrations” within which Serbia’s cooperation with NATO has been largely re-established. The new governing coalition has in fact allowed the Serbian military to advance the country in the direction of NATO without any political decision officially and publicly taken. In Serbia there are several limiting factors concerning the “Euro-Atlantic integrations”. The most specific factor is the memories of NATO’s military campaign conducted in March – June 1999 under the code name “Merciful Angel”. During the last ten years these memories have been deliberately pushed into the background in political and media terms. Most Serbs reject the term “humanitarian intervention” and still consider the NATO attack as an act of blatant aggression by the most powerful military alliance in history against a sovereign state, perpetrated without any valid reason and without a UN Security Council mandate for the use of force. A majority of the population displays animosity towards NATO, accompanied by indignation arising from traditional morality which is strongly embedded in the Serbian cultural identity. On October 28th, 2007, the National Assembly of Serbia passed the “Resolution on the Protection of Sovereignty”, Territorial Integrity and “Constitutional System of the Republic of Serbia”. In its Art. 6 of the Resolution, military neutrality was proclaimed in relation to the existing military alliances until a referendum is called for the purpose of passing the final decision on this issue. To the populist coalition led by the Democratic Party of Serbia and headed by Vojislav Koštunica, the proclamation of military neutrality represented a manifestation of defiance of NATO and of the approaching independence of Kosovo. To the

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A. Savić / Serbia

pro-Western bloc led by the Democratic Party and headed by Boris Tadiü, the proclamation was of little significance. As this final appeal to the West not to support the secession of Kosovo failed, the government was disbanded and an extraordinary general election was called. It is still unclear what benefits or drawbacks this declaration of military neutrality has brought. No country undergoing transition has claimed neutrality so far. What is certain at this point is that neutrality cannot be interpreted as Serbia’s turning towards Russia, but rather as a hiatus in its relation to the North Atlantic alliance or more likely a brief rest in a situation without easy or pleasant solutions. As de facto, a neutral state Serbia has attempted to establish a kind of military-political balance. Neutrality as formulated in the resolution does not exclude close bilateral cooperation with NATO or any individual state. Potentially, this might be the most problematic aspect of the Resolution but also its greatest advantage. Serbia’s proclamation of neutrality was a reflection of the attitudes by the political elite and of the majority public opinion. The proponents of this idea believe that military neutrality is the most appropriate way of turning the current security threat to Serbia into active self-defence. It provides manoeuvring space in strategic cooperation with other countries without any limitations in its own state and national interests. This is all the more important because Serbia has not so far successfully rebuilt its military-political and economic cooperation with non-European non-aligned countries which existed during Tito’s Yugoslavia. In the meantime, some of these states have grown much stronger, gaining for themselves the status of rising powers. The anti-NATO campaign in Serbia flared up again in the autumn of 2007 at the instigation of national-oriented forces. In spite of a narrow victory by the “pro-European” and “pro-NATO” political forces, the outcome of the last presidential election and the formation of a new government in 2008, a political consensus on Serbia’s vital state and national interests has not been assured. The polarisation of the electorate, the incomplete transition accompanied by numerous social problems, the negative results of the neoliberalist economic policy in Serbia since 2000, the unilateral proclamation of Kosovo’s independence, the energy turnabout in the direction of Russia, on open conflict between Defence Minister and the Army’s Chief of Staff – these are some indications of Serbia’s uncertain political course and its possible evolution. Serbia’s greatest current security worry today has resulted from the amputation of Kosovo. If Serbia could solve this problem by entering NATO, then the public attitude would probably very appreciably change, while NATO would get a loyal but not servile and possibly its most strategically important member from the region. Among numerous arguments for Serbia’s joining NATO, the following ones deserve attention: - Serbia would become part of a system of collective defence, thus increasing its own security. By joining the most powerful military alliance it would acquire allies among the most influential states in the world, first of all the USA. By contributing to NATO’s out-of-area operations Serbia could enhance its political credibility, image and position in Washington, Brussels and other European capitals. In addition, by joining NATO Serbia would solidify its democratic orientation. - In economic terms, Serbia would send a signal that the country is safe for foreign investment. This would increase Serbia’s credit rating and speed up its economic development. - The citizens of Serbia are predominantly in favour of their country’s joining the European Union. However, if the accession to the EU were to be conditioned informally by entering NATO first, this would constitute an important consideration.

A. Savić / Serbia

-

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Most European post-communist states have joined NATO. If Serbia remains outside the Alliance, it will be surrounded on all sides by NATO member states. If the country remains outside NATO or opposes to it, Serbia might lose again in case of new territorial disputes if a crisis escalates again in the area of former Yugoslavia. NATO membership enhances the possibilities for Serbian Army’s professionalization, modernization and specialization. Reforms carried out in conformity with NATO standards require considerable outlays. However, remaining outside NATO increases these costs, since the country has to develop a much broader spectrum of its military capabilities.

The rational and irrational arguments advanced publicly against Serbia’s joining NATO run as follows: - By joining NATO Serbia would indirectly recognise the legitimacy of NATO’s military intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 and the decisions on Kosovo which run contrary to Serbia’s national interests. - EU membership in itself represents a solid security guarantee. EU has an autonomous security and defence policy. EU membership acts as a sufficient deterrent to third states against attacking a member, regardless of whether the country in question is a NATO member or not. Serbia could enter the EU while staying outside NATO as Ireland, Austria, Finland, Sweden, Malta and Cyprus have done. - Serbia would harm the geostrategic interests of the Russian Federation, a traditional (but not always dependable) ally of Serbia. The realisation of political (Kosovo) and economic (energy supply) interests which depend on Russian support would be brought into question. - Even though Serbia’s joining NATO reduces the chances of a conventional and symmetrical attack by another state against Serbia, it theoretically increases Serbia’s exposure to new transnational and asymmetrical threats such as international terrorism perpetrated by Muslim fundamentalists. NATO has a clear interest in monitoring the entire region of the Balkans. So for the time being, it probably will not reduce the level of its cooperation with Serbia and of the activities conducted jointly with the Serbian Army. Generally speaking, Serbia’s defense policy has been the least prone to disagreements with the Western powers. How will Serbia conduct its relations with NATO depends on the ability of its political elite to develop a prudent long-term strategy adjusted to the country’s capabilities. Unfortunately, a political consensus and a clear strategy are still lacking, while the Serbian public is kept uninformed about the government’s political moves related to NATO. Compared with the experience of others, Serbia will make a mistake if it decides against its future membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Andreja Saviü1

1

The Academy of Diplomacy and Security, Belgrade, Serbia



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MONTENEGRO Although the same political leadership has been in power in Montenegro for 18 years, its attitude towards NATO has changed considerably. Among Montenegro’s major challenges related to Montenegro’s membership in NATO are low public opinion support, insufficient capacities of the state administration, the slowness of necessary reforms and of their poor implementation in real life. Since the early 1950s Montenegro has maintained its relations with NATO as part of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After its breakdown, the war in the Western Balkans did not bypass Montenegro. The Yugoslav Army, with some 70,000 Montenegrin soldiers in its ranks, fought in Bosnia & Herzegovina and in Croatia. The NATO military intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 strongly affected the relations between Montenegro and the Alliance. This intervention resulted in civilian casualties, causing resentment not only in regard to NATO but also towards its member states. Montenegro took active part in the Balkan military conflicts and received refugees and displaced persons from Kosovo, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia. However, in order to oppose the Miloševiü regime in Serbia and to draw attention of international factors, the Montenegrin leadership declared its support to NATO’s policy in the Balkans. From 2001 the cooperation with the Hague Tribunal, democratic reforms and the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement advanced the relations between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO. In 2002 FRY submitted its application to join NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme. This became one of the officially stated goals of Yugoslav foreign policy, and FRY was given an observer status in NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly. The Agreement between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Concerning Transit Arrangements for Peace Plan Operations drew strong public attention and caused quite different reactions in Serbia and Montenegro. The proclamation of Montenegro’s independence in May 2006 ushered a new phase in the country’s relations with NATO. In the following year Montenegro opened its Mission at NATO as well as the office of its military representative in SHAPE. The newly created Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were charged with adapting the country to the requirements of membership in the Alliance. Several NATO member states offered their assistance which was selectively accepted. A number of relevant laws were very quickly (and often without a debate) enacted by Parliament. The government signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and adopted a Communication Strategy on Euro-Atlantic Integrations. Its implementation, however, has not resulted in an increase of public support. Since the beginning of democratization in Montenegro the same political leadership has been in power for already 18 years. During this time its attitude toward NATO has changed dramatically. From obedient followers and collaborators of Slobodan Miloseviü’s policy and fierce opponents of the “NATO Boot”, the political leadership of Montenegro has in a very short time switched to advocating the necessity of NATO membership, without an alternative. The efforts to obtain the membership have been presented by the regime as an expression of patriotism. The causes of this abrupt change are not difficult to guess. Since its coming to power the political elite of Montenegro, in cooperation with economic oligarchs, has been striving to solidify its long-lasting reign. Their sudden wish to join NATO has been suspected by many citizens and by some analysts as efforts to preserve the elite’s wealth and positions. This hunch has affected the public opinion support for NATO membership.

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A. Dedović / Montenegro

It seems that a general consensus has been reached in Montenegro on the desirability of entering the EU, whereas the membership in NATO has had both political opponents and supporters. All Montenegrin political parties included the question of NATO membership into their programs. Their positions are, of course, very different and depend on a number of factors. The ruling Democratic Party of Socialists and the Social Democratic Party advocate, naturally, the membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, albeit for unclear and sometimes confusing reasons. Among the opponents of membership one finds mainly members of political parties with an adjective Serbian in their names. The Socialist People’s Party, People’s Party and the Serbian Democratic Party advocate the existing “Partnership for Peace Programme” as a model of future cooperation with NATO. A more serious “No to NATO!” campaign was launched by the People’s Party, while the Serbian People’s Party has announced the creation of a political bloc under the name of “No to NATO”. NATO membership has been opposed also by a number of non-governmental organizations dealing with the protection of environment and human rights, as well as by some associations of citizens (e.g. the veterans, victims of war). Their attitudes towards NATO have been influenced by the notions of non-violence, peace and social welfare. The remainder of civil society, media, the University and most citizens have had no clear position on NATO. The attitude of an average citizen toward Montenegro’s membership in NATO does not depend solely on his or her political affiliation, national feeling, language, religion, profession and alike. Due to the lack of information the acronym NATO symbolizes to many a danger that should be avoided. The primary responsibility for popularizing NATO membership has been born in Montenegro by the Ministry of Defence. It seems that the presentation of benefits stemming from Montenegro’s membership in NATO has been directed mostly to Washington, Brussels and the capitals of other NATO member states as well as to their representatives accredited in Montenegro, whereas clear and simple information has not reached our citizens. The Government approved the Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Communication Strategy on the Atlantic Integrations. It envisions the participation of representatives from all public authorities, from the private and civil sectors. The goal of the Communication Strategy is to offer the Montenegrin citizens ample information on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and on the benefits of membership in it. The method of informing the citizens has however been inadequate. In 2007 and 2008 six surveys of the public opinion were completed on Montenegro’s membership in NATO, resulting in almost a half of negative responses and one fourth of positive responses. The major challenge now is to make the citizens of Montenegro understand that the membership in the family of most developed countries will bring a more certain and a better future for Montenegro. Simultaneously, it is equally significant to strengthen the capacities of state administration and of civil society. The reforms of the defence and security sectors have been launched, and so were related activities at national and international levels which link closely the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The real challenge is to implement the reforms and to introduce them into real life. The challenges we are now facing are numerous, including the fight for a higher level of democracy, for the rule of law and against corruption and organized crime. Four events in 2008 have influenced the attitudes of the Montenegrin public: the NATO Bucharest Summit; the declaration of Kosovo’s independence and its official recognition by Montenegro; and the parliamentary election. At the Bucharest Summit, two of our neighbours, Croatia and Albania were invited to join the Alliance. This decision received a positive response from those supporting the membership of Montenegro, while its opponents asked why

A. Dedović / Montenegro

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Montenegro needs to join NATO when our neighbours are already in. The declaration of Kosovo’s independence reanimated rather widespread animosity towards NATO, as the Montenegrin public was reminded of the painful events in 1999. The opponents of NATO and some political parties took advantage of the occasion. This issue has been reactivated again upon the official recognition of Kosovo by Montenegro which was accompanied by public protests and demonstrations. During these events some opponents emphasized that the membership in NATO would bring terrorist activities to the territory of Montenegro, causing casualties and harming Montenegro’s tourist industry. The membership in NATO is a chance which Montenegro must not miss. Moreover, the road to the Brussels’s table should be used to strengthen our democracy and the rule of law, as well as to bring Montenegro via comprehensive reforms closer to the standards of NATO’s more developed member states. Aleksandar Dedoviü1

1

Alfa Centar, Nikšiü, Montenegro



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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA The relationship between Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO has been a multidimensional and complex process. NATO has strongly supported the process of reconciliation among the recently warring factions. The decision of state institutions and consensus among the ethno-political structures to seek membership in NATO and EU paved the way to mutual understanding and to resolving numerous unsettled issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its immediate neighborhood. The relationship between Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) and NATO has been unique in many respects. No other country, including NATO members and non-member states, has had so diversified and numerous interactions with NATO as B&H. Unlike the UN and other international organizations during and after the war in B&H (19921995) NATO acted decisively and effectively: x while implementing the „No-Fly Zone“ provisions imposed by the UN Security Council; x executing precise and strong air strikes against the units and infrastructure of the Bosnian Serbian forces when their brutality and highly excessive use of force upon the innocent and unprotected population reached the level of genocide; x deploying a robust combat force (IFOR) on entire territory of B&H, which followed the signing of Dayton Peace Accords, thus successfully implementing its military provisions and imposing peace on the country; x maintaining and progressively downsizing the Stabilization Force (SFOR) between 1996 and 2004, undertaking activities designed to strengthen the cooperation between former belligerents, stabilizing the country and thus providing security environment for the progress in reconstruction and state building as well as creating prerequisites for comprehensive reforms within the country; x in cooperation with the Office of High Representative in B&H and with full support of USA facilitating defense reforms which sped up many other positive changes at the state level and contributed to reestablishing of the war-torn interethnic relations as well as to the improvement of the B&H international image and security role. By inviting B&H together with Montenegro and Serbia to the PfP Program at its Summit in Riga in November 2006, NATO opened a new chapter for B&H and the Western Balkans. A conclusion may be drawn that the NATO constructive contribution after the end of the war was more important in the long run than its engagement during the war. The NATO forces in B&H were not only implementing the Dayton agreement and stabilizing the peace process. NATOled SFOR was involved in many projects assisting local communities, the return of refugees and displaced persons, reconstruction and construction of roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, and so on. SFOR units have often supported cultural, artistic and social activities in many parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, NATO’s contribution to the process of rebuilding the distinctive multicultural character of B&H was the greatest in rebuilding the B&H defense structures, namely, in the area where the disruption of interethnic relations was most apparent. By supporting the defense reform NATO managed to reconcile the factions which were fighting each other less than a decade earlier, thus catalyzing a new experience of political, security and social character. It would be incorrect to say that the overall progress was due solely to NATO’s support and influence. The UN, EU and OSCE have also contributed to positive changes in the country.

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S. Cikotić and I. Beridan / Bosnia and Herzegovina

Shortly after the peace agreement was signed, OSCE immensely helped the implementation and stabilization of peace in the country, primarily by building and promoting confidence and security, overseeing the implementation of sub-regional arms control, by assisting in carrying out several general and local elections, etc. The European Union provided its support in many areas, but its military mission EUFOR and the police mission EUPM have been the noteworthy illustrations of EU’s growing security role on the international scene. The continuity and transfer of responsibility from NATO to EU was important for B&H, as both organizations are most important pillars in the Euro-Atlantic architecture. B&H perceives NATO and EU as separate but not separable organizations and is striving to become a member in both organizations, respecting the experience of the countries in transition which attained EU membership only after they became full-fledged members of NATO. In spite the general loss of credibility in B&H, some UN specialized agencies played a very important role in the post-war reconstruction. UNDP led a number of developmental projects, while UNHCR, UNESCO and UNICEF were present in a very positive way. The most important role in reconstructing the B&H society, however, has been played by ICTY and the International Court of Justice in the Hague. However, it is possible with a high degree of certainty to assert that without NATO’s leadership the contribution by all these international organizations to the post-war reconstruction would not have been so strong and positive. The interaction with NATO has produced also multiple, predominantly positive effects in internal relations and in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s international cooperation with other countries and international organizations. Despite political differences on many important issues the decision to seek membership in NATO was reached by consensus among the relevant political forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, primarily those representing the ethno-political elites. It was later followed by a similar decision concerning the European Union. These decisions not only reflected a clear agreement on the country’s international strategy, but also largely contributed to creating a positive political climate within Bosnia and Herzegovina. The defense reform guided by the idea of acceding to NATO became a generator of positive changes within B&H itself. It accelerated numerous changes also outside the defense structures required for the country’s progress within the PfP framework. The whole country and not only the defense structures has been moving towards the Alliance and EU as well. Internal relations in B&H are inseparably connected with the neighboring states, in the first place with Serbia and Croatia, to the extent that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish a sensitive internal matter from an eminent issue in relations with the neighbours. From this perspective, it is possible to conclude that B&H’s progression towards NATO favorably reflected on the cooperation between B&H and its neighbours, as well as between B&H and other countries in the region. The relations between B&H and NATO have had wider international relevance and in a certain cultural sense have brought consequences on a wider scale. The three cultural circles (Western, Eastern Orthodox and Islamic) exert influence on B&H’s progress towards NATO and on its pace. The Euro-Atlantic Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina Although all relevant institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina have supported the country’s further progress towards membership in NATO, some circles have reserves with respect to the

S. Cikotić and I. Beridan / Bosnia and Herzegovina

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corresponding foreign policy orientation. It is possible to single out several typical arguments in support of these positions. The proponents of membership assert the following x NATO membership would guarantee B&H’s security; x the accession to NATO would provide a safer and more attractive environment for foreign investments with multiple positive effects on the entire society; x an increase in foreign investment and stronger economic growth would speed up B&H’s progress towards EU and also produce improvements outside material production, i.e. in the area of social development; x NATO membership would strengthen B&H’s international position as more and more an exporter rather than importer of defense and security services, and thus as a constructive actor in international relations; x NATO membership would accelerate many unfinished reforms and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of state institutions in B&H. On the side the opponents, the following arguments are most frequently used: x the participation in NATO’s out-of-area operations implies a big risk, which the Bosnian armed forces should not take; x this participation entails considerable financial outlays which should rather be directed towards the country’s economic development; x this participation in predominantly Islamic countries may involve our soldiers of Islamic background in fighting against fellow Muslims. This text does not have the ambition to assess all positive and all negative aspects of B&H’s membership in NATO. However, the negative arguments do deserve some comments. Peace support operations do indeed entail potential risk. This risk, however, is lesser than the risk of staying outside the Alliance. Moreover, it is possible to considerably reduce this risk by proper selection of missions, organization and preparation and particularly by the quality and manner of execution. It is also true that the participation in peace operations produces some financial and material expenses. The experience of transition countries tells us that as a rule the gains from increased foreign investments only during the initial months of NATO membership exceed the overall financial costs of participation in peace support operations during several previous years. Multinational and multiconfessional units of the B&H Armed Forces have already participated in peace support operations in which there were Muslims among warring parties. However, B&H’s soldiers not only did not have to fight these Muslims, but on the contrary by deactivating huge quantities of thousands of tons of unexploded ordnances they protected thousands of children, women and men from potential mortal dangers. In addition to contributing to the security of Iraqi citizens the B&H soldiers improved the relations between the two states. Judging upon all measurable and realistic indicators, Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue its progress towards NATO. In parallel with its progress towards the EU it will internally strengthen the state building process. The European identity and the Euro-Atlantic future of Bosnia and Herzegovina promote mutual understanding and resolution of numerous unsettled issues in B&H and its immediate neighborhood. Selmo Cikotiü and Izet Beridan1

1

Ministry of Defence and Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina.



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NATO AND THE BALKANS1 The author revisits the Western Balkan region, which has remained a front line areas of engagement for NATO during the past decade or so and tries to answer over the short to medium term a few simple questions: have developments since 2006 benefited the Alliance , have they changed the political and security map of this problematic region and what remains to be done? NATO's post-Cold war evolution has been strongly influenced by events in the Balkans. And although at each consecutive NATO summit meeting the Alliance expands its areas of strategic interest and engagement, the Balkans remains a region of special concern to the organisation. This concern is primarily expressed through the desire of the Alliance to embrace the region either through membership and/or assistance, thus contributing to regional security and stability. Today, all countries from the region are in one way or another institutionally ‘connected’ to the Alliance, either through outright membership, or active partnership. Most significantly, Croatia and Albania joined the Alliance at the NATO Summit in Strasbourg/Kiel, held on 3-4 April 2009, NATO, thus allowing NATO to deeper penetrate towards the former ‘conflict zone’. Since it is exactly this remaining area which is of most concern, this paper will try to answer a few questions, namely: have recent developments benefited the Alliance, have they changed the political and security map of this problematic region and what remains to be done? The strategic landscape There is no doubt that from a strategic perspective, the expansion of the Alliance to include Croatia and Albania was the right move to make and has contributed towards the achievement of Alliance goals. This positive development can be seen in two respects: NATO’s strategic expansion and the achievement of Alliance goals in this region. Too little attention is paid to the strategic picture of NATO’s expansion to the Western Balkans and the contribution these countries can make to the Alliance in a more strategic sense. Regarding the latter point there has been much debate about the recent expansion of NATO, with many expressing concern about the readiness of the three states, namely, Croatia, Albania and FYRO Macedonia to join the Alliance. Reasons for this have been many, including the reinforcement of a two-tear (if not three-tier) Alliance at the NATO level, as well as more local concerns such as those relating to the dispute between Greece and FYRO Macedonia over the latter’s name. Although the newest Alliance members are small and their overall contribution is considered irrelevant in the grand scale of thinking, nevertheless it is important to assess this dimension as well. If the argument that NATO is primarily a political alliance is accepted, then new members are welcome by definition by creating a stronger and more importantly credible political coalition. From a military operational sense, these countries currently make a contribution of some 300 troops at any one time, which could potentially double in the medium term,

1

This article is a review of the original, published in the summer 2007in the NATO Defence Review. The views expressed by the author are entirely his own and do not necessarily represent the views of any part of Her Majesty’s government or any other organisation.

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A. Watkins / NATO and the Balkans

especially once Serbia moves closer to the Alliance and these the countries move into more advanced areas of reform, including modernisation and procurement. Even today, despite the fact that these troops provide mainly ‘background’ support, they do release alliance capacity for other front-line tasks. Furthermore, in terms of soft security (e.g. the development of the PRT concept) forces from these smaller countries are usually considered more friendly by local populations and do have in this sense ‘added value’ if properly trained and utilised. This is certainly an area to which not much thought has been devoted and a more comprehensive thinking plan needs to be devised and built into their long term development planning, especially regarding the above mentioned modernisation and procurement. When it comes to the achievement of NATO’s primary objectives in the region, on the premise of which it engaged in the region some years back, enlargement is a positive development. This is especially true considering stabilisation of relations between Croatia and Serbia, as well as the engagement of Albania in any potential flash-points further south. In terms of Croatia and Albania contributing, as members of the Alliance, to regional stability, assessment is not as positive. Furthermore, part of the primary objective has been the advancement of relations with other countries in the region, which were deemed not ready for a variety of reasons to enter preaccession modes of partnership (e.g. the MAP) in the short term. The Alliance has over the past few years expanded its engagement in the region by the advancement of pre-accession instruments and the diversification of bilateral engagement. Current State of Affairs As an active participant the Alliance shares responsibility for defining the post-conflict setting which has gradually evolved during the past nine years, during which time all Balkan states have moved to various degrees towards democratic practices. This is certainly the greatest achievement to date, despite the fact that many Western observers have noted that no special congratulation should be given for something that was within grasp, simply pending a political decision. NATO has been represented locally in Sarajevo, Skopje and Tirana. Since December 2006, the Alliance has set up a liaison office in Belgrade, primarily tasked with serving as a link with the military authorities of Serbia on the practical aspects of the implementation of the Transit Agreement between NATO and Serbia. This presence is a positive factor not only in terms of enhancing security which is for now not questionable, but also in helping to move the region closer to the Euro-Atlantic community, which is now a priority foreign policy objective for most states in the Western Balkans. During recent years the Alliance has shifted more and more towards advanced forms of assistance, related to governance issues, through engagement in different aspects of security sector reform. Hence, the Alliance is developing a new area of competence in line with its new strategic orientation. Specifically, NATO has assisted and supported reform initiatives through a variety of mechanisms. For example, prior to joining the Alliance, Albania and Croatia (and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia still) participated in NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) as 'advanced' regional candidates. Also, prior to joining Partnership for Peace (PfP), Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina benefited from Tailored Cooperation Programmes. Following the Riga Summit these programmes are now replaced by regular PfP mechanisms. Therefore, some of these countries have already developed Individual Partnership


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Action Plans (IPAPs) and launched Intensified Dialogue with the Alliance, while Serbia agreed to its Individual Partnership Programme (IPP). The depth of some of these programmes is significant and goes beyond the scope of military-tomilitary assistance. Areas that have been touched upon include the assistance in the development of strategic documents, institutional re-organisation, public & media relations and military education. There has been reasonable success in implementing these, usually via project-based processes and bilateral assistance. However, as we move away from immediate post-conflict rehabilitation and towards more advanced governance issues such as implementation and sustainability, many obstacles persist.

Challenges ahead Now that we are approaching a decade of relative peace with no major combat action having taken place since 2001 our assessment has to move beyond stabilisation and the first generation of Security Sector Reform (SSR), especially as some of these countries claim to be ready to join the Alliance as equal partners. There is no doubt that public perception is the biggest obstacle NATO faces in the region. While almost all governments declare NATO membership as a policy priority, in several of these countries public opinion attitude is negative, including in Serbia and Montenegro. Overcoming this will require time and much improved Public Diplomacy efforts, an area in which NATO has not invested sufficient resources. Recognising the difficulty in balancing domestic ownership in this area with external support, the latter should be improved considering the lack of capacity at local level. This means that in many cases public diplomacy is carried out by the NGO sector which has very limited capacity to promote this issue over a period of time. From this flows the second challenge for the Alliance, which relates to the question of micromanagement, or the depth of engagement into ongoing reform processes. All the countries in the region have namely undergone only first generation of SSR, with too much politizaton of the process and little substantive change beyond the surface. While on the highest level politization for the ‘greater good’ persists, on a more operational and tactical level there is the hesitation to use political weight to accelerate reforms where it really matters ‘today and tomorrow’. Reasons for this hesitation stem from the different policy approaches and capacity of various European states, with no clear strategy and sustainable commitment, contrary to the Paris declaration 2005. An important challenge is regional cooperation, which should be further improved. Limited local budgets for defence reform, especially for interoperability, increase the need for innovative approaches regarding regional cooperation in order to benefit all actors. The Alliance's initiative should place more emphasis on the regional aspect, particularly in 'soft' areas such as education and training. This would be a good way to boost practical regional cooperation, get the former conflicting sides to start working together and build trust. The importance of building local ownership in this process is essential and if this argumentation is accepted, then the Regional Cooperation Council should be the focal point of all regional initiatives. Last but not least when it comes to this area is expectations placed upon new member states, which should now show ability for advanced assistance to other regional

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stakeholders. This area will be a further test for the correctness of policy decisions made at the last NATO summit as regards the Western Balkans. One of the focal points of NATO's transformation is its cooperation with international organisations. The long-lasting crisis in the Balkans in which the Alliance was intensively involved set a new precedent for subsequent NATO relations with major international organisations such as the United Nations and the OSCE, a fact that was highlighted in the Comprehensive Political Guidance endorsed at NATO's Riga Summit. Perhaps the most viable cooperation, as a strategic partnership, is the one between NATO and the European Union (EU). This partnership was not only conceived in the Balkans, but the region represents a testing ground for future NATO-EU cooperation. Both NATO and the EU have an important role to play in Kosovo. The cooperation between NATO-led military mission KFOR and EUled civilian mission EULEX in Kosovo is an interesting test. However, despite these achievements, there is much to be improved in this respect. The lack of quality coordination and transparency among NATO Allies has been and continues to be an important challenge to a more effective engagement on the part of the donor community. NATO’s continued focus on the Western Balkans is important and should not be reduced, both for achieving long term strategic objectives, but also for more short term operational requirements. Whether the focus will remain on this region depends on two processes: NATO’s expansion towards other conflict areas which seems inevitable despite reservations by many Allies and the pace and depth of reforms within the Western Balkans. Now that the region has become stable there is decreased pressure to focus on this area. The slow processes of reform and negative public perceptions mean that much efforts is expected from NATO at a time when the global financial crisis is hard hitting defence and assistance budgets, and while out of area operations continue, such as Afghanistan. Hence, it will be in every Western Balkan country’s interest to take reforms more seriously and make it ‘easier’ for NATO to stay as committed as it has been to date. Beyond stability, economic development and recovery from the economic hardships that are begging to bite. Now that all Balkan nations, with different intensity, share the goal of Euro-Atlantic integration and all of them are engaged in a common forum via their relations with the Alliance, a riskladen threshold has to a large extent been passed. However, the security situation in the Western Balkans is still far from ideal, with many ‘security’ challenges remaining. NATO is aware of this fact - its Strasbourg/Kiel Summit Declaration mentioned that "We remain committed to the Balkans, which is a strategically important region, where Euro-Atlantic integration, based on democratic values and regional cooperation, remains necessary for lasting peace and stability.” However, although this commitment was expected, it is not realistic to expect that over the forthcoming period NATO will remain as focused on the Balkans, unless the above stated conditions are met in the short to medium term. There are still challenges ahead. Building trust which is fundamental to success has not been easy, both vertically between NATO and the regional capitals, and horizontally among the countries of the Western Balkans themselves. Euro-Atlantic integration is an important objective for most states in the Western Balkans and this factor can be used as a tool to help address several of the region's more difficult security and stability challenges. So mechanisms must be found to ensure continued active support to the Western Balkans' still-weak institutions. At the operational level the best way to achieve the kind of reform that NATO members would like to see in the Balkans, both in terms of quality and time, is to introduce


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within the existing cooperation mechanisms an even more intensified dialogue with the regional actors. Such dialogue would of course need to be tailored to the unique situation of each country (i.e. that each country should progress at its own pace and according to its ability to take on the obligations), while allowing for a much better implementation of the lessons learned process and common understanding and development. The magic circle of mutual dependence proposed in the paper must be understood and supported if it is to benefit all. Amadeo Watkins2

2

Research & Assessment Branch, UK Defence Academy (MoD).



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UKRAINE AGAINST HERSELF: TO BE EURO-ATLANTIC, EURASIAN, OR NEUTRAL? Since independence Ukraine has been evenly split between those who desire to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community and those who gravitate toward Eurasia. During the 1990s Ukraine was able to have it both ways. Since the Orange Revolution, Ukraine has made significant progress developing a Euro-Atlantic– style democratic political system, a vibrant open media and civil society and civilian oversight of military which has built strong ties with NATO. Despite this progress Ukrainian opinion remains sharply divided on integration into EuroAtlantic institutions. Profound political instability makes Ukraine a less appealing candidate for membership in either the European Union or NATO. Under these circumstances, the challenge is to provide Ukraine sufficient time to consolidate democratic governance and develop domestic consensus.

Ever since Ukraine declared independence in August 1991, its main security preoccupation and challenge has been its search for identity. Nostalgic to maintain its long and close association with Russia, which has become increasingly competitive with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), and at the same time eager to become a more cooperative and close partner with the Euro-Atlantic community, Ukraine has consistently tried to have it both ways. On the one hand, Ukrainian political leaders’ aspirations for membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions have been driven, in part, by the desire to solidify independence from Russia. This impulse has roots that go back to the earliest days of its independence, when the fate of ex-Soviet nuclear weapons deployed on Ukrainian territory was being decided and Kyiv appealed to the United States and its NATO Allies for security guarantees against the specter of Russian resurgence. Yet at the same time, Ukraine’s history, culture, and economy are closely entwined with Russia’s. Ethnic Russians and others living in eastern Ukraine are more negative about NATO and the EU than those in the western part of the country because they see such integration with the West as jeopardizing a good relationship with Russia. Since about half of Ukraine’s population is Russian-speaking, and about 17 percent are ethnic Russians, the country’s prospective membership in NATO and the EU has been met with apprehension by roughly 60 percent and 45 percent of Ukraine’s citizenry, respectively. In fact, roughly 45 percent of the population would rather participate in Russia’s Common Economic Space than the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Hence, Ukraine’s progress toward its government’s stated goals of NATO and EU membership has been anything but easy, stumbling over these domestic obstacles, which even 4 years after the Orange Revolution remain the most important barrier to the country’s Euro-Atlantic progress. Internal Symptoms of Crisis This Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian dichotomy and tension have been reflected in Ukraine’s often tumultuous domestic politics and had an impact upon its constitutional development. Indeed, since the Orange Revolution brought Viktor Yushchenko to the presidency in January 2005 with an agenda to bring Ukraine closer to the Euro-Atlantic community and after four governments marked by political turmoil, Ukraine’s efforts to define itself as either EuroAtlantic or Eurasian continue to be plagued by its lack of public and political elite support and absence of strategic focus.With popular support for NATO and EU integration consistently at only 20 percent and 45 percent, respectively, Ukraine’s centrist political parties have not even developed a consensus on the issue in the decade or more that it has been on the national agenda:

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J. Simon / Ukraine Against Herself: To Be Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian, or Neutral?

x

x

x

Of the eight parties with seats in the Rada following the March 1998 parliamentary elections, only the People’s Movement of Ukraine (with 9.4 percent of the vote and 46 of the Rada’s 450 seats) supported NATO integration, while the others opposed it, with platforms either to remain allied with Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or to be neutral. In the March 2002 election, of the seven Rada parties, only Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine (NU), which received 23.6 percent of the vote and 112 seats, sought membership in NATO and the EU. Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych was interested in a “single economic space” to bind Ukraine with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. In the March 2006 election, five parties won seats. Again, only Yushchenko’s NU bloc (81 seats) supported NATO integration, while former Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko’s BYT (Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko) (129 seats) was noncommittal, and the other three parties commanding a total of 240 seats—a clear majority—were opposed.

In other words, despite the remarkable consolidation of democratic governance in Ukraine and the clear erosion of support for the Communist Party over the past 17 years, this has not translated into popular support for membership in NATO. Indeed, the policy differences rapidly metastasized into a struggle over constitutional prerogatives between the president, the prime minister, and the Rada. When the new government convened in 2006, it was under a constitution that had been amended in December 2004 during the heavily contested presidential elections of the Orange Revolution. No longer could the president appoint or fire the prime minister, who is now selected by a majority of the Rada members, changing the power relationship between the two. President Yushchenko’s challenge would now be how to stitch together a governing coalition that could put aside past personal and political differences, build a consensus on NATO–EU integration, and convince society of its worthiness to rule. Unfortunately, he failed. While an Orange (Yushchenko and Tymoshenko) coalition attempted to form a government in coalition with Oleksandr Moroz’s Socialist Party, Moroz instead opted to enter a Yanukovych-led “anti-crisis” government, along with Petro Symonenko’s Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU), that would lead Ukraine in a Eurasian direction. Problems immediately arose over the president’s prerogative in foreign and security policy and the Rada’s control of the purse and power to dismiss ministers. When Prime Minister Yanukovych went to Brussels on September 14, 2006, to withdraw Ukraine’s bid for a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP), Yushchenko cried betrayal. Conversely, when Yanukovych visited the European Union to request Ukraine’s accession, EU external relations commissioner Benita Ferrer-Waldner informed him that the EU had no plans to offer membership, but instead proposed closer economic and political ties. This rejection undermined Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic supporters, who took up the argument that NATO was a first step toward the more popular (but unwelcoming) EU.The foreign policy rift between the president and prime minister was magnified by confusion over authority and led to a major constitutional crisis. The situation deteriorated further after the cabinet returned a number of presidential decrees unapproved. Yanukovych bypassed the president and foreign minister by conducting negotiations with Russia on Ukrainian membership in the Common Economic Space and providing Russia a stake in the Ukrainian gas transport system. In response, President Yushchenko dissolved the Rada on the grounds that Yanukovych was usurping the president’s powers and subverting the will of the people.Political destabilization worsened when the government accelerated its efforts to strip away the president’s powers. Yushchenko reacted by firing Prosecutor General Svyatoslav Piskun on May 24, 2007; Interior Minister Vasyl Tsushko retaliated by deploying troops to prevent the newly appointed minister from taking office. When Yushchenko announced that he was taking control of the interior ministry and ordered its troops to Kyiv, Tsushko countermanded the order. Fortunately, violence was avoided during a tense 2-month


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standoff, which resulted in an agreement to hold new parliamentary elections. The entire episode, however, strongly indicated the need for constitutional reform.The September 2007 parliamentary election resulted in a fragile Tymoshenko and Yushchenko (BYT–NU) coalition government with 30.7 and 14.2 percent of the vote, respectively, and only 227 seats of the Rada’s 450. Yanukovych’s Party of Regions (PRU) won 34 percent of the popular vote and 175 seats, and the Communist Party acquired 27 seats. As had been the case during Tymoshenko’s previous tenure as prime minister in 2005, she and the president found it difficult to work together, and their political infighting continued. Even after the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008, when Yushchenko criticized Russia and visited Tbilisi (with fellow presidents from Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) to render moral support to Georgia, Prime Minister Tymoshenko refused to support him, and her government collapsed. After months of continued political turmoil and once again facing the prospect of new elections, which would most likely result in yet another unstable coalition government, Tymoshenko and Yushchenko appeared to reach an uncertain peace on December 10, 2008, by reforging their Orange coalition. Only time will tell how stable this new arrangement will be. Political Schizophrenia While the Ukrainian political leadership has been slower than its neighbors to publicly promote the virtues of NATO integration, its military outreach toward NATO and other European countries has been fairly impressive. Even though Ukraine’s first Military Doctrine in October 1993 specifically rejected membership in military blocs, it was the first CIS state to join NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PFP) in February 1994. In December 1995, Ukraine deployed 400 mechanized troops to NATO’s Bosnia Implementation Force (IFOR) and increased the number to 550 in the follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR). From 1995 through December 1999, when they withdrew, more than 2,800 Ukrainian servicemen took part in this NATO mission. What is particularly important, though, is not just the troop numbers. NATO provided much-desired operational experience. On the other hand, the missions were extremely costly. While Ukraine had been active in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in Angola and in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, the UN had always reimbursed Ukraine for these operations. Indeed, UN peacekeeping was actually a money-maker for the Ukrainian armed forces, which received $72.5 million for UN operations from 1992–1999, far more than they had expended. In marked contrast, Ukraine’s defense ministry had to pay for NATO operations from its cash-starved budget, which also meant that in order to save money, Ukrainians deployed for 12 months, while their Polish partners rotated every 6 months. But the lengthier deployments paid benefits by raising their professional expertise, which the military recognized and appreciated. As has been the experience in many other post-communist transition countries, it is plausible (though no public data are available) that for professional reasons a higher percentage of Ukrainian servicemen support NATO integration than is found in the wider population. At the July 1997 Madrid Summit, Ukraine signed a “Charter on a Distinctive Partnership” that elaborated new areas for consultation and cooperation with NATO, to include creating Joint Working Groups on Defense Reform and Civil Emergency Planning and establishing a NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine’s defense ministry. In addition to the 2,800 troops to NATO IFOR/SFOR, Ukraine deployed 250 troops to Kosovo (KFOR) in September 1999, increasing the force to more than 330 in 2001, as part of a joint Ukrainian-Polish battalion. Ukraine ratified a PFP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) in May 2000, condemned on September 14, 2001, the acts of terrorism committed against the United States, and signed an Exchange of Classified Information Agreement with NATO in 2002. Ukraine first officially stated its intention to join the Alliance at the Reykjavik NATO-Ukraine Foreign Ministers session in May 2002. Despite NATO concerns about Ukraine’s transfer of air defense equipment to Iraq (for example, Kolchuga radars), the NATO-Ukraine Commission adopted an

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Action Plan at the November 2002 Prague Summit that provides a framework for intensified consultations and cooperation. Ukrainian supporters portray this Action Plan as preparation for its ultimate accession to the MAP.While Ukraine did not participate in direct military operations in Afghanistan, it provided overflight rights for NATO military transports on their way there. Later, in 2003, Ukraine did send 1,650 troops to Operation Iraqi Freedom with the joint Ukrainian-Polish battalion as part of the Polish-led Multinational Division Central-South. After 30 months and loss of 18 lives, Ukraine withdrew from Iraq in December 2005. In June 2004, President Leonid Kuchma replaced Ukraine’s 1993 Military Doctrine with a new one that portrays NATO as the basis for the European security system and pledges to pursue Euro-Atlantic integration. At NATO’s June 2004 Istanbul Summit, Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk presented the new doctrine as well as Ukraine’s Strategic Defence Bulletin, which stresses that “future membership in NATO and the EU continued to be the main priorities of Ukraine’s foreign policy.” After NATO expressed concerns about the status of Ukraine’s democratic development in light of the so-called Gongadze affair, President Kuchma issued yet another decree in July 2004 that removed preparations for NATO membership from the doctrine. After the 2004 Orange Revolution, President Yushchenko once again altered Ukraine’s policy, reaffirming interest in joining the MAP and NATO and reinstating the provisions in favor of joining the EU and NATO in the country’s Military Doctrine. On that basis, NATO and Ukraine launched an “intensified dialogue” on membership in April 2005, and military activities proliferated. To date, three major projects have been carried out in Ukraine using NATO/PFP trust funds. The first, completed in 2003 in Donetsk, destroyed 400,000 anti-personnel landmines. Another, led by the Netherlands, was established in Khmelnitsky in January 2006 for the retraining and resettlement of decommissioned military officers. The third, for which the agreement was signed in June 2006, is the largest, allocating €25 million over 10 years to destroy 1,000 manportable air defense missiles, 1.5 million small arms, and 133,000 tons of munitions. Surplus weapons and ammunition are a serious security issue. Ukraine maintains roughly 16,000 tons of liquid propellants and nearly 760,000 tons of surplus ammunition, of which 480,000 tons have expired their storage terms and must be disposed of. In 2004, 92,000 tons of ammunition exploded at a depot in the southern Zaporizhia region, spraying Ukrainian debris and shells and destroying buildings in nearby villages. To deal with such crises, the NATO-Ukraine 2006 Action Plan established a special National System of Coordination and Cooperation with NATO.In 2008, Ukraine maintained about 600 service personnel in peacekeeping operations; it had 185 service personnel in KFOR and 2 liaison officers (and 150 policemen) in the UN Mission in Kosovo, and provided 43 personnel to support NATO’s training mission in Iraq. In December 2006, President Yushchenko authorized the Ukrainian navy to participate in Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean Sea, and in early 2008 sent 10 Ukrainian peacekeepers to serve with the Canadians in Afghanistan. In an apparent effort to win further support from Washington, President Yushchenko announced in April 2008 that Ukraine will also send 15 peacekeepers to Iraq. Despite this extensive record of military cooperation, it became abundantly clear in the 4 months of “Orange” factions’ squabbling after the March 2006 parliamentary election that integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions, and specifically into NATO, was not a high priority for most Ukrainians, but was instead becoming an increasingly divisive issue for the country. Yushchenko, who supported Euro-Atlantic integration, emerged greatly weakened, while the Yanukovych-led PRU-Socialist-Communist governing coalition had little interest in convincing society of the importance of NATO membership. Some European members of the Alliance were disturbed by anti-NATO demonstrations that erupted against Sea Breeze military exercises in Crimea, the hardening of Russia’s position on Ukraine-NATO ties, and Yanukovych’s September 14, 2006, announcement to the Ukrainian-NATO Commission that Ukraine would suspend negotiations


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on membership, even though it would enhance cooperation with NATO. Days later, the Rada adopted a resolution supporting Yanukovych, stating that NATO membership would be decided only via national referendum.In early 2007, public opinion polls indicated that most Ukrainians believed NATO was fomenting insecurity and showed opposition to joining the Alliance actually increasing to nearly two-thirds of the electorate. At about the same time, the United States began promoting its missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic, and the U.S. Senate formally endorsed NATO enlargement by five members, to include Ukraine. These actions, too, were divisive, even within the Ukrainian cabinet. At a March 16, 2007, news conference, Defense Minister Anatoliy Grytsenko described U.S. missile defense as a “benefit . . . [that] could become an important element of the pan-European security system,” adding that “Ukrainian and Russian officers, if they want, can familiarize themselves with the characteristics of these facilities and carry out verification.” But Prime Minister Yanukovych, who had put NATO on hold, openly warned that deployment near Ukraine could harm relations with Russia. Since the September 2007 parliamentary elections, the new government has exerted little effort to build a national consensus on NATO. After Tymoshenko took over as prime minister once more in December, the new leadership—Yushchenko, Tymoshenko, and Rada Speaker Arseniy Yatsenyuk—again reversed Ukraine’s course on NATO membership, sending a letter (on January 16, 2008) to NATO requesting a MAP at the April 2008 Bucharest Summit. Predictably, the Russians responded with threats and another energy crisis, and when the Alliance convened in Bucharest, the Allies were divided and rejected MAPs for Ukraine (as well as Georgia). However, they “agreed that these countries will become members of NATO” at some point, adding that it was necessary to engage in “intensive engagement . . . at a high political level” to assess progress on their MAP applications. In the aftermath of Bucharest, confusion reigned in Kyiv, Moscow, and among some NATO Allies as to what the Alliance really meant by the Bucharest Summit statement, particularly looking forward to NATO’s April 2009 60th anniversary summit. Some in Kyiv hyped the offer of eventual membership to mask their disappointment in not getting a MAP, while those in Moscow, who were opposed to further NATO enlargement, were energized to prevent Ukraine’s accession by dividing the Allies. Disunity in Ukraine was exacerbated by the events of August 2008 when Russia responded to Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s assertion of sovereignty over South Ossetia with a full-scale invasion and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s issuance of a doctrine claiming the existence of Russian “privileged interests” in the former Soviet space.President Yushchenko (along with the three Baltic presidents and Poland’s Lech Kachynski) went to Tbilisi to render moral support and sought a Rada condemnation of the Russian invasion, but Tymoshenko instead criticized Yushchenko and broke from the coalition. Opposition leaders Yanukovych (PRU) and Symonenko (KPU) supported Russia and called for official Ukrainian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. After the government collapsed, Yushchenko again called for new elections, which will result in Ukraine’s fifth government since January 2005.In sum, Ukraine remains schizophrenic and gridlocked. Some internal political forces, supported by external forces, want to pull Ukraine in a Euro-Atlantic direction, while others, also supported by external forces, want closer association with Russia and the CIS. Hence, Ukraine’s political leadership skids back and forth, contributing to internal instability and to the Ukrainian public’s confusion about NATO, in the process confirming legitimate questions in the minds of some NATO Allies about the depth of Ukraine’s commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration. NATO Influence At the outset of its existence as an independent nation, Ukraine faced daunting, even unique, defense reform challenges. With 47 million people, it was by far the largest of the former Soviet or Warsaw Pact states not to have inherited its own armed forces from the communist predecessor regime—it had to build a national security establishment from scratch. Lessons

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from transitions in states confronting less severe challenges suggest that continuity in leadership is necessary to stabilize and deepen defense reforms so they can take root. Yet this kind of continuity is precisely what Ukraine has lacked. The country has had nine defense ministers since independence, an average of one every 22 months (see table). As has already been seen, the deep cleavages over the country’s security orientation have been a major contributor to this instability. It should come as no surprise that the constant leadership changes have tended to retard defense reform and to contribute to politicization of the armed forces, turmoil in the ministry, and operational disasters. The impact of this instability on defense reform is visible on a number of fronts, including the stop-and-go history of “Ukrainization” (replacing the Russian language and traditions of the military with Ukrainian ones), removal of corrupt officers, and decisions on defense production and procurement. Yet if internal and external pressures to move toward NATO membership have often been divisive and destabilizing, close military contact with the NATO countries through PFP and other mechanisms has nevertheless yielded a number of important defense reform benefits. Depoliticization. Not the least important of these is the progressive depoliticization of the armed forces. In the early years, political leaders of all factions tried to use the military for partisan political advantage, as when Defense Minister Vitaliy Radetsky issued a memorandum urging members of the armed forces to vote for President Leonid Kravchuk in the 1994 presidential election. A decade later, the norm had changed completely. When President Kuchma directed Defense Minister Yevhen Marchuk to order troops to support Kuchma’s chosen successor, Yanukovych, in the 2004 election, Marchuk refused. Kuchma fired Marchuk and reinstated Colonel General Oleksander Kuzmuk as minister, but to no avail, as Kuzmuk also refused to get the military involved in politics. Indeed, during the Orange Revolution at the end of 2004, Defense Minister Kuzmuk continued to hold the armed forces above politics, assuring demonstrators that the armed forces would not be used against the people, while his predecessor, Marchuk, also called on President Kuchma and Prime Minister Yanukovych to exercise good sense and ensure that there would be no bloodshed in Ukraine. Civilianization. Simultaneously, after a series of fits and starts, Ukraine seems to have broken with the Soviet model of having a serving officer as minister of defense and settled instead into a pattern of civilian defense leadership. After Kuchma defeated Kravchuk for the presidency in 1994, he replaced Radetsky (the minister who had ordered military personnel to vote for Kravchuk) with Ukraine’s first civilian defense minister, Valerii Shmarov, in an attempt to gain control of the armed forces. But many military personnel lacked confidence in the civilian Shmarov, and the poor condition of the armed forces further contributed to his unpopularity. It was not until 2003 that another civilian was named to the position, the same Yevhen Marchuk who would be dismissed—and replaced by a general—for refusing to get the military involved in the 2004 election. After the Orange Revolution, Yushchenko appointed Anatoliy Grytsenko as defense minister and Leonid Polyakov as first deputy minister. As former military officers with professional military educational experience in the United States and substantial exposure to Western models of defense management, both Grytsenko and Polyakov understood better than any of their predecessors what defense reforms and modernization tasks were necessary to enhance Ukraine’s interoperability with NATO. Under their mandate, the defense ministry exhibited signs of institutional improvement and friction with the General Staff moderated somewhat, although the armed forces continued to atrophy for want of resources. Grytsenko was succeeded as minister in December 2007 by Yuriy Yekhanurov, an economist with a background in industrial management, further solidifying the trend toward civilianization of the ministry.


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Planning and Organization. For the first decade, Ukraine’s force “planning” was nonexistent; underfunded defense budgets caused continuous “freefall” of the armed forces. It was only in November 2001 that Minister Volodymyr Shkidchenko introduced serious planning to the defense ministry. Shkidchenko had been the key author of Ukraine’s first real strategic document, State Program on Armed Forces Development and Reform, 2001–2005, calling for the transformation of Ukraine’s 310,000-man armed forces into a smaller force designed for limiting local conflicts and resolving emergencies on Ukraine’s territory. The country’s first comprehensive defense policy review, the Ukrainian Strategic Defence Review to 2015, was published in June 2003 on Yevhen Marchuk’s watch.

Improvement of the planning process at the strategic level was carried forward after the Orange Revolution, when, with NATO assistance, Deputy Minister Polyakov created a Defence Policy and Strategic Planning Department in the ministry that, for the first time, linked defense policy to plans. The influence of exposure to NATO was also evident in a series of organizational steps undertaken by Grytsenko and Polyakov. Based on lessons learned from participating in NATO expeditionary operations, Ukraine’s defense leaders reorganized the General Staff to fit assigned missions and to align the military command to NATO standards. To rationalize the

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budget, Grytsenko subordinated the Department of Finance and the Department of Surplus Funds and Lands to himself. To retain and promote capable personnel, the Personnel Policy Directorate developed a personnel policy concept and built a database system to track English language–trained personnel - clearly something driven by recognition of the need to be able to work effectively with NATO forces. Finally, the General Staff formed a Joint Operational Command with responsibility to employ all combined armed task forces in Ukraine and overseas. Challenges Remain Notwithstanding the commendable and even remarkable advances that have been made, particularly considering the point from which the Ukrainian forces began in 1991, Ukrainian leaders are cognizant of how far they have to go before the country can function militarily on anything resembling a NATO level. The need for vastly improved operational capacity has repeatedly been highlighted by Ukrainian forces’ experience in operations with U.S. and other NATO forces. Ukraine needs to create more standing units, modernize equipment, and improve language skills, a point that was highlighted when a Ukrainian contingent in Iraq found itself under enemy fire and was unable to communicate in English with forward air controllers to request F–16 support. These shortfalls were recognized in the defense ministry’s 2006 and 2007 Target Plans for the armed forces, prepared in support of President Yushchenko’s February 2007 National Security Strategy of Ukraine, which stressed the need to improve interoperability under the ministry’s so-called NATO Action Plan. The ministry’s main priorities were to reduce and reorganize the troops to better suit the threats faced by Ukraine. The most daunting challenges, however, would involve switching to an all-volunteer force by 2010 as mandated by the president, destroying surplus weapons and military equipment, updating and modernizing essential equipment, and harnessing technology to support Ukraine’s defense industry. Although Grytsenko placed a high priority on these issues, combat readiness continued to deteriorate because of chronic underfunding. In March 2007, Grytsenko noted that Ukraine’s first-line Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF) “would not be combat ready in one to two years when about 50 percent of the equipment will stop working.” His options to solve the resources problem were limited by lack of funds. Although the law “On Defence of Ukraine” calls for the allocation of 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to defense, the defense ministry was consistently receiving only about half this amount or less between 2000 and 2005. As a result of these shortfalls, the ministry was not only unable to provide adequate resources for weapons repair and modernization for the JRRF, but declining operating funds also led to inadequate training for the force. Though the defense ministry had abandoned the practice of using outdated munitions for training after two major missile disasters in 2000 and 2001 - including the downing of a Russian Tu-154 passenger aircraft over the Black Sea with a defective S–200 surface-to-air missile, killing all 78 aboard—Grytsenko was forced to resume this practice even for the most elite JRRF units in October 2006. President Yushchenko’s mandate to move Ukraine to an all-volunteer force by 2010 also ran up against budget realities, ultimately becoming a political issue during the September 2007 parliamentary campaign, as Tymoshenko actually advocated accelerating the schedule to 2008. Grytsenko argued that this was impossible on the grounds that selecting appropriate personnel required a well-developed human resource policy, which simply did not exist. Despite the significant improvements in civilian oversight and management and in accountability and transparency during Grytsenko’s tenure, the constant need to accommodate ambitious plans to insufficient resources led to a steady decline in both the size and capabilities of the force during his tenure. Grytsenko’s successor, Yuriy Yekhanurov, continues to face the same challenges that stymied his predecessors—to create an all-volunteer force, modernize its equipment, enhance its readiness, redress sociopolitical problems (such as inadequate housing), and prepare for NATO membership, all on a shoestring budget. Yekhanurov’s efforts to augment the 2008 defense


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budget, which was only 1 percent of GDP, unfortunately proved unsuccessful. Although the Russian invasion of Georgia has prompted plans for the addition of 2 billion hryvnyas (approximately $375 million) in 2009 to upgrade existing and form new army units in the south and east, it remains to be seen if these plans will actually materialize. External Environment Transformed Domestic tensions between those Ukrainians who support closer ties to Russia and the rest of the CIS and those who favor integration with the EU and NATO have often resulted in Ukraine’s schizophrenic policies pulling in opposite directions. These internal pressures are aggravated and made more difficult to resolve by the profound transformation that has taken place in Ukraine’s external environment over the last decade. A key element in this transformation is Ukraine’s increased strategic importance as an energy bridge. The country’s vulnerability to energy-related pressure, and the degree to which this vulnerability could exacerbate political instability, became evident in January 2006, when Gazprom, the world’s largest natural gas producer (half-owned by the Russian government), cut off gas supplies to Ukraine and then restored them subject to a doubling of the price. Since roughly 75 percent of Russian gas exports to Europe flows through Ukrainian pipelines, the cutoff affected not only Ukraine but its EU neighbors as well. Ukraine, which needs to meet its own domestic requirements, was caught between the EU and Russia, both of whom have an interest in safe transit of gas through Ukraine. When Prime Minister Yuriy Yekhanurov agreed to pay Russia nearly double the price it had previously paid for gas ($130 per thousand cubic meters, still less than half the European market price of $315), the Rada flexed its new constitutional powers, dismissed the government, and renewed political instability ensued. These problems resurfaced in December 2007 when Tymoshenko took over as prime minister for the second time and moved to raise the pipeline transit fees charged to Gazprom. Gazprom responded by demanding repayment of $1.5 billion in debt and threatening to cut Ukraine’s domestic natural gas supply by 25 percent. At the same time, Russia sought to drive a wedge between Ukraine and the EU countries by reassuring Europeans that they would not suffer shortages as a result of Russian action against Ukraine. In March, Gazprom claimed that it had not received its money and cut supplies of Russian gas by 25 percent, and then by another 25 percent a day later. After Ukraine threatened to reduce gas deliveries to Europe, Russia and Gazprom, not wanting to further harm relations with the West, restored deliveries and signed an agreement holding prices steady at $179 per thousand cubic meters through 2008. This agreement, however, only deferred the issue. At the end of 2008, with Ukrainian elections looming, Prime Minister Tymoshenko was again in Moscow to negotiate the size of its debt (which Russia claims to be $2.4 billion in arrears) and 2009 price of gas (which Russia threatens to raise to more than $400 per thousand cubic meters).How Ukraine ultimately resolves its internal debate over its strategic alignment is further complicated by the fact that the Euro-Atlantic community is itself divided over what it wants for Ukraine. When the EU rebuffed Yanukovych in September 2006, it had the effect of undermining pro-NATO Ukrainians, who had argued that joining the relatively unpopular NATO would provide a pathway to membership in the much more popular EU. The same message of divisions among the Euro-Atlantic countries was further driven home in April 2008, when President George W. Bush failed to get the Bucharest NATO Summit to support Ukraine’s bid for a Membership Action Plan. The EU’s recent Stabilization and Accession Agreement (SAA) with Ukraine, in marked contrast to its SAAs with the Balkan states, offers no prospect for future membership. At the December 2–3, 2008, NATO Foreign Ministers session, NATO reaffirmed the Bucharest Summit decision, made note of Ukraine’s progress, but added that significant work remained; hence, it did not grant Ukraine a MAP. The foreign ministers, though, did amend the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership, and agreed to provide further assistance to Ukraine, develop Annual National Programs to advance reforms, and augment the NATO liaison office in Kyiv. Last, but far from least, the strategic

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position of Ukraine’s powerful Russian neighbor to the north and east has undergone a transformation of its own. Given the fundamental sympathy for Russia felt by much of Ukraine’s population, Moscow’s renewed credibility as a major power would in itself tend to tug Ukraine in a Eurasian direction. In addition, however, Russia has become much more assertive and intrusive, thanks in part to the consolidation of autocratic power under Vladimir Putin as well as the strong Russian reaction to NATO enlargement, missile defense, and other perceived manifestations of Western aggrandizement. The dilemma of how to deal with a resurgent Russia was crystallized by Moscow’s August 2008 invasion of Georgia. The invasion forced Ukrainian politicians to focus on the defense sector and reassess the country’s Military Doctrine, but did little to resolve the tension between Euro-Atlanticists and Eurasianists in the Ukrainian political elite. While the current government has responded by seeking to strengthen defense capabilities, including the deployment of air defense units in the Crimea and along the eastern border with Russia, others feel the need to placate Russia. Ukraine’s transformed external environment has aggravated its internal problems, which in turn have further complicated its external problems. Not only has the dichotomy between eastern autocratic and western democratic neighbors increased, so too has their willingness to meddle in Ukraine’s politics. Ukraine’s increased strategic importance as a natural gas bridge for both the EuroAtlantic and Eurasian communities combined with Russia’s renewed assertiveness in other former Soviet republics has resulted in increasing equivocation within NATO and the EU and exacerbated internal problems for Ukraine. The Challenge Ahead The prospects for Ukrainian membership in Euro-Atlantic structures thus remain uncertain, in part because of Russia’s opposition, in part because of ambivalence among NATO and EU members, and in part because of divisions within Ukraine itself. Given the cross-cutting pressures, it is understandable that Ukraine’s political leaders and society have yet to make a clear strategic choice. Ukraine cannot at this point make a firm decision in favor of EuroAtlantic integration given Russia’s opposition—reinforced by periodic flexing of its military and economic muscle—and the Euro-Atlantic community’s own failure to clarify its objectives for Ukraine. So where does Ukraine stand? On the positive side, in marked contrast to the autocracies that continue to rule most of the other former Soviet states, Ukraine has resoundingly shown that it prefers Euro-Atlantic–style democracy, as evidenced by repeated free and fair elections followed by orderly transfer of power between rival parties, a thriving open media, and vibrant institutions of civil society. On the negative side, Ukraine’s external environment has been transformed. During the 1990s, Russia was weak and more cooperative; now it is more competitive. The more the United States and some Allies promote NATO accession, the more Russia interferes, and the more the Ukrainian government is destabilized, further undermining its Euro-Atlantic options. The challenge for the United States is to nurture Ukraine’s political stability and keep its Euro-Atlantic options open. This is difficult because the EU, which enjoys significantly greater Ukrainian domestic support, has clearly indicated that it is not yet ready for Ukraine. While Allies disagree over the timing of Ukraine’s MAP accession, due in part to the low popular support the Alliance enjoys within Ukraine, the April 2008 Bucharest Summit did provide a long-term membership horizon reiterated at the December 2008 foreign ministerial. But government stability is needed in Kyiv to reassure many skeptical European Allies and to build confidence among Ukrainian society. Ukraine needs time to make a strategic choice that can muster a popular consensus within the country. At this point, assertive U.S. promotion of Ukrainian accession to NATO is counterproductive: it engenders divisiveness with some Allies, encourages Russian interference, and, most importantly, shifts Ukraine’s internal politics in an undesirable direction, strengthening the hand of the Eurasianists at the expense of Euro-Atlanticists. The United States needs to foster a Euro-Atlantic orientation in Ukraine, but should exercise restraint in doing so. Thus, the United


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States should stress the language of the Bucharest Summit and promote NATO cooperation with Ukraine’s military independent of the issue of membership. Such cooperation has had positive effects on Ukrainian military reform, not only making the country a more credible candidate for eventual Alliance membership but also generating a constituency within Ukraine’s elite that is receptive to the Euro-Atlantic connection. To achieve a Ukrainian political consensus on strategic direction, those leaders who favor Euro-Atlantic integration will have to navigate a number of upcoming challenges. First, since independence, the victorious coalitions and centrist opposition political parties have been unable to lay out a clear and politically compelling strategic rationale for membership in NATO or the EU. They seem to have thought that they could lead the country to membership and that consensus support would be generated as a result. If so, it clearly has not worked. Second, since the Orange Revolution, even those elements that favor Euro-Atlantic integration have been more focused on the institutional power struggle between president and prime minister—a struggle contributing to chronic instability and reversals of policy direction—than on resolving the fundamental issue of the country’s strategic orientation. This instability, of course, further weakens the confidence in many NATO/EU capitals that Ukraine is a suitable candidate for membership. Third, Kyiv needs to coordinate its outreach to its western EU neighbors—Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania—to promote a more effective, open EU policy toward Ukraine. For its part, the Obama administration needs to recognize that its influence is limited, that it needs to act with restraint, and that it must closely consult with Allies. The United States is not an EU member, and many members see the U.S. promotion of Ukraine’s membership as interference. Hence, the United States should encourage Ukraine’s political leaders to follow the “non-aligned” EU example of Finland as it attempts to navigate between its Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian neighbors. This means the United States should openly support Ukraine’s place in the Euro-Atlantic community by actively promoting its military ties with the Alliance and EU neighbors. By placing a priority on nurturing Ukraine’s political stability, the United States will enhance its membership prospects if society ultimately decides to make a Euro-Atlantic choice. Jeffrey Simon1

1

Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.



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RUSSIAN FEDERATION The Russian Federation, unlike the Soviet Union is not NATO’s enemy. However, the legacy of the «Cold War» still has an impact on Russia’s relations with NATO in political and military spheres. Among several scenarios of future Russia–NATO relations the continuation of present relationship channeled through the Russia–NATO Council seems most likely. Over the last two decades the world has witnessed great changes with undoubtedly long-lasting effects. While the bipolar world order came to an end, a new system of international relations is only beginning to emerge. It is still unclear how some features of this new world order will look like. Quite many states, international organizations, and various other actors will have to search for a new place in a fast changing, globalizing world. This is also true for both Russia and NATO. Back in 1992 Russia proclaimed itself the legal successor of the Soviet Union. Moreover, according to some international documents, among agreements with several NATO members, Russia is presented as continuation of the USSR. In his memoirs, written after his resignation, the first Russian President Boris Yeltsin was urging to consider this decision.1 And in spite of certain nostalgia for the Soviet times among a sizable portion of Russian elite, especially lately, President Dmitry Medvedev pointed out that “Russia is not the Soviet Union. … Our set of values is totally different.”2 The main differences between today’s Russia and the former Soviet Union are as follows. First of all, there has been a change of the political system. The Soviet Union was a totalitarian communist state. Today’s Russia is a state in transition, even though it is at the very early stages of this process. But despite all difficulties and errors, the return to the past has become impossible. Secondly, while the Soviet Union pretended to fulfill a messianic mission by proclaiming itself the vanguard of the world historic process of evolution from capitalism to socialism and eventually to communism, Russia just wants to be a great power playing an important role in international politics and economic affairs. It is not trying to force upon anyone its political regime or ideology. Thirdly, in the size of its territory, population and economic potential Russia is significantly smaller than the Soviet Union. Regarding its foreign policy strategy, there are two prevailing views within the Russian political establishment. According to the first one, Russia should as soon as possible become an integral part of the international community by joining the major Western institutions and obtaining a voice in their decision-making. According to the second view, Russia must become a major hub in a multi-polar world in dialogue on an equal footing with other hubs. The first tendency was prevalent in the early 90s and at the turn of the XXI century (e.g. joining the anti-terrorist coalition), while the second one at the end of the 1990s and today.3 The pursuit of the second trend was caused mainly by the economic crisis of the 1998 when the Russian political establishment faced a dilemma: either to give up sovereignty in the area of finance or to embark on strengthening sovereignty in all spheres seeking an independent position in international relations. The choice was made in favor of the latter.

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It is still too early to say how the current financial and economic crisis will affect Russia’s foreign policy. Various opinions exist on this subject. For example, the State Duma Speaker Boris Gryzlov once declared: “We have no doubt that Russia will come out stronger from the global financial crisis. Also, there is no doubt that the United States and most European countries will come out of this crisis weakened”.4 On the other hand, a number of politicians, journalists, academics are inclined to believe that it is precisely the United States that will lead the world economy out of the crisis. NATO was created for the purpose of confronting the communist bloc and it acquired the task quite successfully. However, the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union deprived NATO of its reason-d’être. So NATO had to find its place in a new international environment and to adjust to new circumstances. Thus, the Alliance’s enlargement became one of its main tasks. The NATO enlargement resulted from the confluence of two trends. On the one hand, the Central and East European countries wanted to join NATO as quickly as possible. For them it symbolized the breaking with the communist past and the joining the exclusive club. It also guaranteed their security and created favorable conditions for further integration into the EuroAtlantic community. Russia’s attitude toward NATO enlargement however has been traditionally negative. Moreover, this official attitude is shared by practically all political parties who nevertheless cite different reasons for their opposition. There are several factors underlying such attitude in the Russian establishment toward NATO enlargement. Firstly, NATO enlargement reduces Russia’s political potential. Those who advocate Russia’s becoming one of the poles of a multi-polar world know very well that the entry of Russia’s neighbors into NATO means their automatic refusal to participate in one or another integration projects with Russia, thus lessening Russia’s chances to become such a pole. For the supporters of Russia’s Euro-Atlantic integration NATO enlargement presents several problems as well. There are domestic political obstacles and also foreign policy reasons related to Russia’s becoming part of the Euro-Atlantic integration process. Russia’s authorities are concerned mainly about the transformation of NATO into a league of democracies replacing the United Nations in international politics. That would entail a decline in Russia’s influence which the country enjoys with its veto right in the UN Security Council. For this reason Russia’s diplomacy disliked the nomination of Ivo H. Daalder as the new U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO as he is considered as a proponent of the idea of a league of democracies. In Russia, NATO is widely believed to be the military tool in the hands of the United States. Secondly, during the Cold War the military aspect of the confrontation that was most important. Over the last twenty years the situation has greatly improved. However, Russia and the United States possess huge military arsenals from the Cold War. It is particularly true for the strategic nuclear arms. And it is not just due to the fact that both sides possess enough nuclear potential to annihilate the whole planet. What is more, both sides point out that they take into account not only the situation at hand but all possible scenarios, including the worst ones in case of some unpredictable sequence of events. Russian military experts believe that the key source of mutual distrust comes from the fact that the intercontinental ballistic missiles are kept in a full alert mode – ready to be launched at short notice, and that it is technically impossible to change it.


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The Bush administration’s plans on a Missile Defense System caused a particularly strong negative reaction in Russia because they were in fact aimed at suppressing the nuclear missile capabilities of other countries, including Russia. Today the nuclear missile capabilities are truly the only attribute of Russia’s superpower status. That is why America’s attempts to gain superiority in this area are badly perceived in Russia. And even though the United States negotiated the Missile Defense System with Poland and the Czech Republic on a bilateral basis, such plans were perceived in Russia as an integral part of NATO’s activities. Russia is watching very closely whether the White House will reconsider these plans. Any positive sign would be well received in Russia. Thirdly, there are some contradictions in the sphere of Russian economy. The defense industry and energy sector are the main pillars of today’s Russian economy. It is natural that the NATO members as well as candidates adopt NATO standards. This translates into a significant loss in market share for the Russian defense industry. The Russian producers of weapons and NATO members are also in direct competition on the markets in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Russian energy sector has long been more concerned about the EU enlargement than about NATO. Lately though, this has started to change. Some Russian experts believe that Gazprom and the government of Kosovo could have settled the issue of building a gas pipeline through Kosovo’s territory, were it not for NATO’s damaging influence. The issue becomes even more disquieting when the Caucasus is concerned. Numerous Russian politicians and industry experts believe that NATO’s activities in that region have to do with the plans of building the Nabucco pipeline. Many in Russia believe that NATO has been used as a smoke screen for this project which is aimed at bypassing Russia and reducing the potential of Russian energy companies. Similar fears were caused by NATO’s Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer in January 2009 when he called for expansion of NATO’s operations into the Arctic Circle where vast reservoirs of oil and gas are believed to exist.5 Fourthly, a psychological factor plays a very important role. The former ideological confrontation during the Cold War years was gone. Nonetheless, the old thinking and certain cultural stereotypes have been extremely persistent. In 1997 it was officially stated that Russia and NATO did not see each other as enemies,6 but in reality in many cases their perceptions of each other prove exactly the opposite. Sometimes it may happen on the subconscious level. Additionally, the issue of NATO enlargement has been a subject of intensive domestic political debates in Russia. Different political parties have used the issue on a number of occasions for their narrow purposes. And in doing so, they often disregarded the potential damaging impact of their actions on the Russia–NATO relations. And very often it was exactly the case. We also should not overlook the fact that the West, including NATO, has acted mistakenly toward Russia. Russia’s weaknesses in the 1990s and its dependency on foreign aid were vastly overestimated. Russia’s sudden ability to act independently in the international arena turned out as a surprise for many. Almost from the very beginning the Western establishments were making pessimistic assessments about Russian reforms. According to a prominent American diplomat Strobe Talbott, the lack of faith in the success of reforms in Russia was in 1996 one of the main reasons for German Chancellor H. Kohl to go along with NATO’s Eastern enlargement.7 Doubtless, the same motive was behind the consequent series of enlargements. Little importance was given to the consideration of how NATO enlargement would affect the domestic political setting in Russia. Back in the mid 90s an eminent American expert on Russia G. Kennan spoke against NATO enlargement on the grounds that it could strengthen the antiWestern sentiments among the Russians.8 At the same time the NATO enlargement and the

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bombing of Serbia in 1999 were extremely alarming to the Russian establishment and to the public in general. The fear was rather widespread that after Belgrade and Bagdad Russia could also be bombed. Speaking to the State Duma on May 19, 1999, Prime Minister Sergey Stepashin declared that the events in Yugoslavia “were not only and not to the greatest extent targeted on Yugoslavia, but to a greater extent were aimed at Russia”.9 It looked quite credible that the attacks of NATO against Serbia were a dress-rehearsal for tearing Chechnya and possibly the entire North Caucuses apart from Russia. This fear played an important role in the events that followed in that region. The West, including NATO, usually paints the situation in Russia in dark colors and bets on tiny non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that have neither prestige nor political influence. Meanwhile, the dialogue with the political elite in Russia, particularly its reformist faction has been reduced to a bare minimum. In fact, this policy leads to further weakening of the reformists in Russia, since it is becoming more evident that the West totally ignores their position. The Russia–NATO relations have deteriorated significantly since the August 2008 armed conflict in the Caucuses. In essence, Russia and NATO had found themselves supporting the opposing parties to the conflict. Their perceptions of the conflict were also diametrically opposed. For the West, Russia had crossed “the red line” for the first time since its 1979 invasion in Afghanistan. In Russia, on the other hand, the most shocking effect was produced by the fact that the Russian troops had been attacked by the armed forces of another state – something that had not happened for decades. It is notable that Russia justified its recognition of independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia with exactly the same arguments as NATO did regarding Kosovo. It is worth noting that, despite tough rhetoric by some politicians, Russian authorities were not intended to recognize Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence in response to the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by the West. The appropriate decision was made afterwards and was mostly due to the armed conflict of August 2008. At the beginning of 2009 it looked that Russia–NATO relations were warming up and overcoming the crisis. NATO declared its willingness to resume activities within Russia– NATO Council. NATO–Russia Agreement on Non-Military Freight Transit to Afghanistan, several times delayed, was finally signed. However, subsequent events indicated that the entire situation is more complicated and controversial that it could have been expected. The NATO Summit Declaration of April 3-4, 2009, concerned Russia both directly and indirectly. On one hand, the declaration praised the role of Russia in security issues. It was stated that “despite our disagreements, Russia is of particular importance to us as a partner and a neighbor”, and that “NATO and Russia share common security interests, such as the stabilization in Afghanistan, arms control, disarmament and the non-proliferation of WMD, including their means of delivery, crisis-management, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, and anti-piracy”. However, the Summit Declaration devoted more space to a critique of Russia. Firstly, NATO member states demanded Russia to change its policy in the Caucasus: to meet the commitments under Medvedev–Sarkozy agreement in the Western interpretation of it, to desist from building Russian military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and to reverse Russia’s recognition of these countries as independent states. Secondly, NATO has not given up its plans for further enlargement. According to the Summit Declaration, “NATO’s door will remain open to all European democracies, which share the values of our Alliance”.10 This statement concerned first of all the countries of Western Balkans. The admission of Ukraine


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and Georgia, of which Russia is very much concerned, was delayed, but not withdrawn from the agenda. Thirdly, NATO is interested in cooperation with Russia concerning Afghanistan. It seems natural, given Barack Obama’s administration, to put Afghanistan as one of its top priorities. At the same time, Russia is offered an assisting role only, and its full-scale participation in postconflict management in Afghanistan is not considered even theoretically. Moreover, NATO is searching for alternative ways of supporting its activities in Afghanistan, including through its growing influence in post-communist Central Asia. Russian authorities are concerned about it as well. Fourthly, NATO has repeated that it considers the “CFE Treaty, including the flank regime, as a cornerstone of Euro-Atlantic Security”.11 Consequently, it criticized Russia for the suspension of its legal obligations under the CFE Treaty. Fifthly, NATO leaders confirmed their commitment to the erecting of an anti-missile defense system and called on Russia to agree to cooperation in anti-missile defense. At the same time NATO member states stated their “readiness to explore the potential for linking United States, NATO and Russian missile defense systems at an appropriate time” in very unclear terms. Moreover, the Summit Declaration included issues of which Russia is concerned, though Russia was not mentioned in the text. For instance, NATO expressed its interest in energy security, taking into consideration the conflict over natural gas of January 2009 in more active policy in the Far North, in the creation of a Cyber Defense Policy with Estonia playing a special role in it. Russia–NATO relations became even worse when NATO conducted military training exercises in Georgia in the framework of the Partnership for Peace Program. Russia condemned the exercise. Two Russian diplomats were expelled from the NATO Headquarters in Brussels. In response, Russia expelled two Canadian diplomats working in the NATO Information Bureau in Moscow. Barack Obama made an important statement during the 2009 NATO summit: “Our clear message to Russia was that we want to work with them, but they can’t go back to the old way of doing business”.12 NATO leaders are ready to listen to Russia’s opinion but not to make any concessions. NATO policies have not changed in any of the issues of which Russia is concerned. And there is no evidence that such changes will take place in the future. The Caucasian crisis of 2008 and its consequences will be more serious than it was expected. Of course, I do not envisage a return to the “Cold War” when the parties hovered on the edge of a real war. Unfortunately however, the parties might be finding themselves from time to time balancing on the edge of political confrontation, particularly concerning the relations in the post-communist space and the issue of arms control. One can sketch several conceivable scenarios of Russia–NATO relations in the future: x preservation of present character of relationship, “a kind of associated partnership mainly through the Russia–NATO Council; x Russia’s joining NATO or the political organization of the Alliance; x minimization of the scope of Russia–NATO relationship focusing on the relations between Russia and some NATO member states; x the relationship between two blocs, in one of which Russia is playing the key role; x the relations within the framework of a new Treaty on European Security which the Russian President Dmitri Medvedev proposed in June 2008.

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The first option means that the current state of relations will be maintained and developed on the basis of the Founding Act of 1997 and of the Agreements of Rome of 2002. The central role in that kind of relationship has been played by the consultative body originally titled the Permanent Consultative Council (PCC). In 2002 it was re-named into the Russia–NATO Council (RNC). Russian authorities criticized PCC for the fact that at every meeting NATO used to bring a joint position. That position was almost impossible to change during the meeting despite all efforts by Russian diplomats. Thus, in PCC there was a very limited possibility to compromise. RNC seemed to be a very different institution compared to PCC. Every country, both NATO members and Russia could express their opinion on the issue under consideration. Like in the North Atlantic Council, meetings of RNC were chaired by the NATO Secretary General. Both parties underlined with satisfaction that RNC had issued its documents classified as confidential for the third parties. However, very soon it became clear that the establishment of the new institution has not led to a breakthrough in the relations. It is true that discussions in RNC became more concrete and even sometimes more productive than those in PCC. However, the NATO members have taken similar to close positions on all issues even without preliminary consultations, while Russia remained isolated. The original over-expectations turned into a disappointment. Even brief analysis of RNC proceedings indicates that most of its decisions concerned issues outside Europe: Afghanistan, the pirates from Somalia etc. Relations between the parties, including Russia’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic space appeared very rarely on the agenda. Even more rarely such discussions resulted in meaningful decisions. Neither PCC during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 nor RNC during the Caucasus crisis in 2008 managed to prevent the freezing of relations between the parties, although the councils played an important role in the resumption of these relations once the active phase of the crises was over. At first glance, it seems that PCC and RNC are the key bodies in Russia–NATO relations. In practice, however, the cooperation between the military institutions has played a bigger role. At the same time, that aspect of cooperation seems less effective than the cooperation between civilian institutions. Moreover, the difficulties in the military sphere seem to result in a decline of effective negotiations in the political sphere. The Cold War inertia is also the strongest among the military. The main feature of Russia–NATO relationship is its unpredictability in many aspects, irregular development also due to populist reasons. There is no evidence that the relationship might change in the near future. There are at least two reasons for this. Firstly, both parties seem to be satisfied with the relationship. The West continues to build a European security system based on NATO in which Russia would have the right to be consulted, but will not co-decide. This tendency is most visible in the military sphere, to Russia’s obvious displeasure. The West is doing its best to use RNC as instrument to involve Russia in the implementation of its policies, which are decided upon without Russia’s participation. Russia, however, avoids committing itself, preferring to enjoy the wide freedom of maneuver. Both sides believe that time will work for them and thus put them into a better negotiating position. Both sides are well advised to give up this assumption if they want to improve their cooperation. NATO needs to understand that Russia would never agree to be a part of a security system in which it would not play a decisive role. In its turn, Russia should understand that no country can enjoy veto right in which it is not a member.


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Secondly, and most importantly, the instability and unpredictability in Russia–NATO relations have resulted from the transition from the bi-polar international system into a still undefined new system, and not from the inability of the two sides to act. Despite its low effectiveness at the present level of quality, the relationship between Russia and NATO is most likely to continue. The second scenario, i.e. Russia’s joining NATO has been occasionally discussed in the past. In 1954 the Soviet Union proposed to the governments of the U.S., Great Britain and France a new security system for Europe, one aspect of which would have been the Soviet Union’s entry into NATO.13 With this propaganda maneuver the Soviet leadership tried to put an obstacle to West Germany’s membership in NATO. The Western powers ignored the Soviet proposal. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Russian leaders changed their attitude to the idea of NATO membership. At some points both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin seriously considered that option. The first to openly express it in the autumn 1991 was Russian Vice President Alexander Rustkoy, who was known for close links with the military. Russia expected that the issue should be considered by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which Russia had overestimated at that time.14 However, the West was not ready for such a breakthrough and this possibility was dropped from political discussions also in Russia. Russia’s attempt to join NATO in 1991 was inspired by the euphoria among the Russian leaders when it seemed then that Russia’s integration into the Western community would come soon. NATO’s refusal to discuss Russia’s membership in the short run did not harm, however, the generally positive relationship between Russia and the West. In 1992–1993 Russia signed with NATO member states numerous agreements, declarations and other documents containing the statement that they do not consider one another as adversaries. However, the Russian authorities soon became suspicious of NATO’s activities in the Commonwealth of Independent States and of the Alliance’s enlargement in terms of both a wider sphere of responsibility and inclusion of new members. Another attempt was better prepared. During his electoral campaign in March 2000, Vladimir Putin stated that he did not exclude Russia’s becoming a NATO member.15 Contrary to Boris Yeltsin’s pronouncements in 1996, Vladimir Putin avoided to criticize NATO openly. Upon 9/11 Russia joined the counter-terrorist coalition, closed its military bases on Cuba and in Vietnam, agreed to establish US military bases in Central Asia and assisted NATO troops in Afghanistan. Practically Russia entered the Western security space and started examining the possibilities of joining NATO. The West was apparently divided on this issue. The more influential turned out to be that part of Western elite which viewed Russia’s willingness to cooperate as a sign of its weakness. NATO then ignored Russia’s willingness which some Western scholars recognize as a mistake.16 The possibility of a radical shift in Russia–NATO relations was thus missed. This time the disappointment among the Russian elite was much deeper than in the early 1990s. This disappointment became the key factor in shaping of Russia’s policy towards NATO in the future. Despite the Caucasus crisis of summer 2008 and the freezing of its relations with NATO, Russia’s possible membership in the Alliance remains on the agenda. In November 2008 President Dmitri Medvedev stated that the issue is not urgent, but one should “never say never”.17 Some Western politicians support the idea that Russia should join the Alliance. In early 2009 Polish Foreign Minister R. Sikorsky18 and ex-Foreign Minister of Germany J. Fischer19 expressed such an opinion. Italian Prime Minister S. Berlusconi has stated more than

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once that Russia should enter both NATO and the European Union. If Russia’s third attempt to join the NATO will face a similar response as at the two previous occasions, the consequences for future Russia–NATO relations would be disastrous. In order to avoid this outcome, the Alliance should decide at least theoretically, whether it would or would not wish to see Russia as its member. If the answer is in the negative, NATO should clearly and publicly explain the reasons. The answer will not be easy. In the absence of clear criteria any negative response to Russia’s efforts to join the Alliance would provoke suspicions among Russian elite. If the answer will be in the positive, there would be hard work ahead – bringing close both the military and civilian spheres, searching for compromises on all relevant issues and eliminating mutual suspicions in general. The attitudes of third countries to Russia’s possible membership in NATO should be considered as well. Obviously, China and Islamic countries would be concerned about it. In the long run, however, Russia’s membership in the Alliance would be beneficial to all parties concerned. In the early 1990s when discussing NATO’s enlargement with the members of his administration U.S. President Bill Clinton remarked that Russia’s joining NATO is a “blue-sky staff” which will require “different Russia, different NATO, different Europe”.20 One cannot help agreeing with this statement. Though it does not seem probable at the moment, Russia can become a NATO member in the long run or, at least, a member of the Alliance’s political organization. Among the Russian elite the third option is being discussed, i.e. the minimization of relations with NATO, while politicians on the margin very frequently even call for the termination of all relations. These discussions usually come to the conclusion that Russia should have relations with its separate member states and not with NATO. It is important to underline that these discussions take place from time to time among politicians of different, sometimes opposite political orientations. They include also anti-Western politicians whose positions are based on old-fashioned communist or radical nationalist ideas. Some politicians in Russia are nostalgic about the Cold War even though they understand that its return is impossible. They believe that contacts with NATO should be used only as the last resort. It is remarkable that even these politicians understand that Russia needs stable relations with NATO member states. Other politicians advocate the minimization of contacts with NATO for completely different reasons. For example, former Governor of the Bank of Russia Sergey Dubinin believes that relations with the U.S.A. play the key role for Russia. Thus Russia should not develop its relations with NATO, but sign an agreement on joint defense and military cooperation directly with the U.S.A.21 The third group of politicians, calling for minimization of relations with NATO, consists of those who would like to negotiate additional concessions for Russia, exploiting differences among NATO member states. An example of this position is the proposal of a “grand three” alliance of Russia with Germany and France. That line gained prominence at the turn of the century, particularly during the Iraq crisis in 2003. It should be noted, however, that even Boris Yeltsin, the initiator of the “grand three” strategy held that Germany and France were paying attention to Russian solicitation in order only to soften controversies between Russia and NATO caused by Russia’s concern about the Alliance’s enlargement.22 An expression of the “grand three” strategy was Russia’s allowing military transit through its territory to Afghanistan given not to NATO as whole but to its individual members such as Germany, France and later Spain. The realization of this strategy is hardly probable in the long run. Russia and NATO are too interdependent, and no bilateral cooperation can compensate for the lack of multilateral


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cooperation between Russia and the Alliance. There are no indications that the U.S.A. is inclined to accord Russia a special and privileged kind of relationship. Anti-Americanism is widespread and strong in Russia, especially among the elite. There will probably be new attempts to extract additional concessions for Russia, exploiting controversies among NATO members. These attempts, however, will concern minor aspects of Russia–NATO relations only. The forth scenario calls for the restoration of bilateralism in European and Eurasian security. This is a sweet dream of some members of the Russian political and military elite. On the one hand, NATO will remain the key actor in Europe while on the other hand, Russia will be the key actor in another security alliance in Eurasia. The two alliances will be thus playing similar roles in European and Eurasian security. At the beginning, the Russian leadership hoped that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) would be such an alliance. It was the first major security alliance without U.S.A., which emerged after the end of the Cold War. Some politicians hurried to declare the Shanghai Cooperation Organization an “Eastern NATO”. It rather soon became evident, however, that China does not favor such role for SCO. Having realized it, the Russian elite pinned its hopes on the Organization of Collective Security Treaty which the Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2008 declared as the “key instrument of stability and security in the Commonwealth of Independent States”.23 Nikolay Bordyuzha, Secretary General of the Organization, as well as other Russian officials has stated a number of times that the Organization must establish formal relations with NATO. However, NATO has not yet accepted this proposal. There are several reasons why NATO continues to decline the proposal. Firstly, the two alliances are too different in terms of their aims, models of organization, capabilities etc. The Organization of Collective Security Treaty resembles a miniature of the Warsaw Pact, having thus repeated its several weaknesses. Some NATO officials expect that the Organization of Collective Security Treaty will sooner or later follow the fate of the Warsaw Pact. The establishment of formal relations with NATO will only prolong its agony. Secondly, NATO maintains active relations with most members of the Organization of Collective Security Treaty. All members of the Organization participate in the Partnership for Peace Program and in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. These countries maintain their representatives at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels as well as host information bureaus and even invite NATO military missions to their territory. Even those members of the Organization of Collective Security Treaty who have no intention to join NATO and in their security policy rely on Russia, underline the importance of their relations with NATO. For example, the President of Armenia Serge Sarkisyan stated that cooperation with NATO is a part of Armenia’s national security. At the moment NATO can deal with all the important problems in relations with those countries without addressing the Organization of Collective Security Treaty. Moreover, no NATO member state has ever expressed its wish to establish relations with the Organization, neither the Organization has ever attempted to establish such a relation. Therefore, direct relations between NATO and the Organization of Collective Security Treaty are hardly possible. NATO does not need them. Some indirect contacts through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe could be maintained, but their influence on security in Europe would be minimal. Finally, last but not least, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev proposed a Treaty on Security in Europe containing new security arrangements for the entire Euro-Atlantic space from Vancouver to Vladivostok and establishing a security partnership of Russia, the European

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Union and North America as three branches of the European civilization.24 At first glance, European politicians viewed the initiative skeptically, but later paid to it more attention. Despite some similarities with the Soviet proposal in the 1950s, this initiative is significantly different. It does not mention the widening gap between the European Union and the U.S.A., neither hegemonic relationship with any country, inside or outside Europe. The aim of the initiative is to establish a new security system in which Russia could be a partner with a decisive voice. The Russia–NATO relations would be stabilized within such a system although their importance for international relations in general would decline. Russian diplomacy views this initiative as part of its long-term strategy. Some members of the Russian political and academic elite see the NATO Summit Declaration of April 2009 as an indicator of NATO’s readiness to discuss Medvedev’s proposal. At the same time NATO and Russia at present evidently favour different approaches. NATO takes the view that new initiatives should be discussed in the OSCE framework, while Russia considers OSCE as an important but not the only possible forum. Instead, Russia proposes the convening of a panEuropean Summit. Another difference is that Russia, while taking a complex approach to security issues, pays most attention to hard security issues. NATO hardly agrees with this position. The conclusion of this overview of conceivable scenarios in Russia–NATO relations may be that none of the scenarios will be implemented in full. The unpredictability will remain among their main features. Much will depend on movements in world politics and on domestic political situation in Russia, U.S.A., and in other European countries. The political will of the relevant actors will be required in order to achieve a significant shift in Russia–NATO relationship. In the August and September of 2009 Russian – U.S. relations improved again. Russian elite welcomed the U.S. decision not to deploy its anti-missile shield in Poland and Czech Republic. The position of Russia and America on Iranian nuclear program became more common. As a result, Russian – NATO relations improved as well. However, it will take both time and strong commitment from both sides to shift the relations to a qualitatively higher level.

Konstantin K. Khudoley 1

Yeltsin B. Presidentskiy marafon (President’s Marathon). Moscow: AST, 2000. p. 190. Rossiyskaya Gazeta Daily, September 15, 2008. 3 Khudoley K. The Evolution of Views of the Russian Elite on Foreign Policy at the Turn of the XXI Century // in Post-Cold War Challenges to International Relations// ed. by Y. Akimov and D. Katsy. St. Petersburg: University Press, 2006. p. 156 – 170. 4 Proceedings of the United Russia Party Meeting, November 11, 2009 // URL: http://edinros.er.ru/er/text.shtml?32298 5 Kommersant Daily, January 31, 2009. 6 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation. Paris, May 27, 1997. URL: http://nato.int/docu/basictxt/fndact-a.htm 7 Talbott S. The Russia Hand. Random House Trade Paperback Edition: 2003. p. 227. 8 New York Times, February 5, 1997. 9 Minutes of the State Duma of the Russian Federation, May 19, 1999. 10 Declaration on Alliance Security issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Strasbourg and Kehl on 4 April 2009. Press Release (2009) 043. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52838.htm?mode=pressrelease. 11 Ibid. 12 Obama, Sarkozy mark France’s full return to NATO // Observer, April 3, 2009. 2


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13 Nota sovetskogo pravitel’stva pravitel’stvam Frantsii, Velikobritanii I SShA (Soviet Government’s Note to the Governments of France, Great Britain and the U.S.) // Pravda Daily, April 1, 1954. 14 Diplomaticheskiy vestnik. Vol. 1, 1992. P. 12 – 13. 15 President Putin’s Interview to the BBC, March 5, 2000. Boradcasted on ORT news program ”Vremya” on March 5, 2000. Cited in: Sysoyev G. Putin ne vozrazhaet protiv vstupleniya Rossii v NATO (Putin Does not Argue against Russia’s Joining NATO) // Kommersant Daily, March 7, 2000. 16 Aslund A., Kuchins A. Pressing the Reset Button on U.S. – Russia Relations. Peterson Institute for International Economics. Policy Brief. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. March 2009. No. PB 09-6 // URL: http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/090405_policy_briefing_russia_balance.pdf 17 Rossiyskaya Gazeta Daily, November 17, 2008. 18 Izvestiya Daily, April 1, 2009. 19 The Guardian, January 11, 2009. 20 Talbott S. The Russia Hand. Random House Trade Paperback Edition: 2003. P. 132. 21 Dubinin B. Novaya Antanta (New Entente) // Rossiya v global’noy politike Quarterly. 2008. No. 6. P. 97. 22 Yeltsin B. Presidentskiy marafon (President’s Marathon). Moscow: AST, 2000. P. 130 – 131. 23 Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation adopted by the President of the Russian Federation on July 12, 2008 // URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2008/07/204108.shtml 24 Medvedev D. Speech at Meeting with German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders. Berlin, June 5, 2008. // URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_type82914type84779_202153.shtml


Chapter V Strategic and Political Consequences of NATO Enlargement and the Alliance’s Future



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ON THE GEOSTRATEGIC ASPECTS OF NATO’S ENLARGEMENT During the “Cold War”, NATO enlargement was motivated by the desire to obtain geostrategic gains for collective defense and manpower additions to deter possible aggression. Later, new members’ contribution to NATO’s out-of-area operations as well as improved territorial continuity became important. In the future, the key geostrategic consideration could be projecting stability into Asia. Throughout its sixty-year history NATO has rightly considered that the key criteria for any successive enlargement should be the political interest of the Alliance. It would be naïve, however, to think that during the screening process no analysis took place concerning the military advantages and implications of adding each new member to the “club”. Clearly, the focus of this analytical process was very much dependent on the current geostrategic landscape. The geostrategic side of all NATO enlargements could be broadly discussed in three parts: the “Cold War” era, the present “non-Article 5” period and the future. In this review the real results of enlargement will be highlighted and contrasted with the expected advantages. The “Cold War” era During the so-called “Article Five era” the most important objective was to contain the Soviet expansion in Europe. There have been two military imperatives conditioning the assessment on whether a new member would bring any advantage to the Alliance’s collective defense. The first was its geographic position determining whether the front would be easier to defend. The most essential considerations in this respect were (a) the access to key maritime areas allowing to project power in case of an armed confrontation on land and (b) a geographically coherent air space less penetrable by the Soviet Air Force. The further important aspect was each new member’s possible contribution to collective defense on land in terms of manpower and the possible need to deploy allied forces from elsewhere in order to defend the newcomer. Fortunately, at the beginning of enlargement the financial ability of new members was not a serious problem since USA had had a huge surplus of conventional weaponry to dispense so that the new members only needed to train their Armed Forces to use these weapons. The first round of NATO enlargement followed thoroughly the above enumerated imperatives. The admission of Greece and Turkey gave NATO an entry to the Aegean Sea and thus a “sanctuary” for the US Navy. Anatolia became a natural bridge to the Caucasus and NATO bombers acquired thus additional access to deeply penetrate into the Soviet airspace from the South, circumventing other Warsaw Pact members. The major disadvantage of the first enlargement though was that it brought along the additional burden of two isolated potential land fronts where reinforcement would have been possible only by sea. This was especially true of Greece, a country extremely vulnerable to a land attack from the North, as World War II had amply demonstrated. The Eastern Turkish border – directly exposed to a land offensive from the Soviet Union – was also worrisome to the Alliance. Its rugged terrain, ridden with mountains allowed though for easier defense as compared to what would have been possible in Greece. More importantly, however, Turkey’s accession to NATO increased considerably the total strength of the Alliance’s land forces. It thus tied down a significant number of Soviet troops and relieved partly the much exposed central front in Germany. Furthermore, since 1951 there existed a secret agreement between Yugoslavia and the United States, developed at the military staff level, whereby Tito’s government committed Yugoslavia to fight on NATO’s side in case of an aggression from the East. From the military standpoint, Tito’s decision brought a clear geostrategic advantage to NATO. The Alliance though would have encountered serious difficulties if it decided to defend Yugoslavia’s land borders which have been most vulnerable

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to an attack from the North-East. Another complication was due to the deep Austrian salient which would have prevented massive reinforcements from the central sector. The first round of enlargement resulted nevertheless in a significant improvement of NATO’s strategic posture. The next round - the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany also strengthened NATO. This time there was no change in the geography of a possible military confrontation, as the troops belonging to former allies and present adversaries were already positioned on both sides of the “Iron Curtain”. However, a big increase in NATO’s total strength was crucial due to Western Germany’s rearmament in the framework of the Alliance. The balance of land forces between the East and the West tipped significantly to the latter’s advantage, thus reducing the likelihood of a Soviet offensive. It is worth noting that Western Germany’s accession caused some years later a revision of NATO’s military strategy concerning the possible use of nuclear weapons in case of war. The next accession – that of Spain also brought about an additional important improvement in the Allied strategic posture. The then NATO strategy of collective defense relied heavily on the reinforcements from the other side of the Atlantic. If Spain were to remain neutral during a continental war, the arrival points of convoys crossing the Ocean would have been limited to the French Atlantic coast. It would have been difficult in case of a war to convince neutral Spain to allow important quantities of supplies and a significant number of troops coming from the continental USA and bound for the central front crossing its territory. This would have allowed the Soviet Navy to concentrate its submarines with potentially devastating effects on a relatively limited zone of operations. The accession of Spain allowed the convoys to reach Europe by a more southerly route, thus forcing the Soviets to spread their submarines in a much larger zone. It gave the Alliance a relatively secure assembly area and an adequate rear base for the transatlantic reinforcements. To sum up, at the end of the “Cold War” period the NATO strategic posture was much better than at its beginning. The non-Article 5 era The implosion of the Soviet Union and the self-destruction of Yugoslavia led NATO to engage for the first time in “out-of-area” operations. Quite understandably, most attention was focused for a while on these engagements. When several former Warsaw Pact members started insistently pleading for membership, a gradualist approach was adopted by the Alliance. These countries were then unable to comply with the required standards of membership, including, notably, their military readiness. NATO members had already a plenty of land forces whose importance had significantly decreased. In order to cope with the new “out-of-area” challenges, the NATO members had also to re-structure and to re-balance their forces. The post “Cold War” accessions increased the Alliance’s territorial continuity albeit with a few isolated gaps. The new member states also provided a significant and ever-growing contribution to NATO “out-of-area” operations, greatly enhancing their effectiveness. Looking at the future Notwithstanding the complicated and still debatable political aspects of future enlargement, it is worth taking a look at its strategic facets. Not counting several remaining West Balkan candidates, there are two more countries - Ukraine and Georgia whose wish to eventually join the Alliance was acknowledged by the NATO Summit in Bucharest. Once these two countries are stabilized and their armed forces modernized, their forward position could provide a significant input into NATO’s “North-South” role, should the instability in Asia become endemic.

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The accession of Ukraine and Georgia, while useful, would not however suffice to keep that part of Europe peaceful. Closer cooperation with the Russian Federation could provide the only possible way ahead. The NATO member states and Russia share some common strategic interests and are facing similar challenges in Asia. It is quite clear that the troubled belt of Asian countries will not become stable until and unless NATO and the Russian Federation will exert together significant pressure. Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte1

1

Admiral (Ret.), Italian Navy



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ON NATO’S POST-COLD WAR EASTERN ENLARGEMENT

The overall aim of NATO’s Eastern enlargement was to give the young Eastern European democracies a firm security perspective. The NATO enlargement was characterized by the accession to NATO before the admission to EU, by a structured step-wise sequence of fulfilling political and military requirements and by broader political versus more narrowly defined military requirements. This mode of enlargement has had more positive than negative effects. NATO must maintain its basic principles in any further expansion, including the priority of strengthening alliance security. Following the end of the “Cold War”, NATO has undertaken two rounds of Eastern enlargement in membership and territorial expansion in 1999 and 2004, without counting German unification which had resulted in integrating East Germany (former GDR) in the Federal Republic of Germany. The third round was accomplished in April 2009 with the accession of Albania and Croatia. Aim and Characteristics In comparison with the previous enlargements during the “Cold War” the Eastern enlargements differed by the number of acceding states, geographical expansion, political impact and conditional framework. The overall aim was to provide the new Eastern European States and the Balkan countries after their democratic transformation with a firm security perspective and to further advance the overall vision of a whole and free Europe united in peace, democracy and common values. In contrast with the previous enlargements during the “Cold War” NATO developed for Eastern European countries a set of criteria and conditions to be met by each candidate concerning its democratic features, civil-military relations and military capabilities. In the overall process of NATO’s Eastern enlargement, the following characteristics could be identified: The NATO accession preceded the EU admission. Both processes were, however, interrelated and mutually supportive; The NATO accession process included a structured sequence of political and military requirements to be met by each candidate which were regularly assessed and validated by NATO’s political and military bodies; While the political conditions were kept relatively broad, the military requirements to be met were well defined and specific in terms of capabilities and interoperability; The overall process was rather dynamic with relatively short time for planning and implementation, thus providing little opportunity for consolidation and sustainment; It appears that Russian concerns did not play a significant role in NATO’s internal debates preceding the second and third round of Eastern enlargement. The situation, however, changed after President Putin’s speech of at the 43rd Munich Security Conference in 2007 when it became apparent that any further expansion of NATO towards the Russia’s Western and Southern borders would be taken by Russia as provocative and prejudicial to its security. Outcomes and Impacts Stocktaking of the outcomes and impacts of NATO’s Eastern enlargements up to now results in more positive than negative impacts on stability and security:

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NATO’s Eastern enlargement further expanded and strengthened the Euro-Atlantic community of common values and democracy. It helped stabilizing the young Eastern European democracies by providing security guarantees to them and simultaneously giving them the opportunity to contribute actively to Euro-Atlantic security. It added geographical depth to the Alliance in Europe and increased NATO’s military capabilities for defense and crisis response operations. It strengthened the European pillar of the Alliance and also provided a broader basis for burden-sharing between the North American and European allies. It helped to consolidate the Baltic area and to stabilize the Balkans. And finally, it also contributed positively to revitalizing the Alliance at the end of the “Cold War” when it was looking for a new role and identity.

The speed and the dynamics of the process did not, however, give sufficient room and time for necessary synchronization and consolidation of efforts in the acceding countries. Furthermore, as in the previous enlargements some controversies with neighboring countries and also amongst the allies which had not been fully resolved prior to the accession of each candidate were introduced into the Alliance, bringing a negative potential for the future. And finally, with the increased number of members, representing a wider spectrum of historical experiences and political interests, the NATO decision-making process became more complicated and timeconsuming. Russia has opposed NATO’s Eastern enlargement since the early 90s and has regarded it as an extension of Western influence and as a part of its geostrategic encirclement. Furthermore, NATO’s extension to the East has also been considered by Russia as a breach of trust. These feelings in combination with the perception of Western encroachment on Russian interests, for instance with regard to Kosovo, the CFE-Treaty and missile defense, as well as the notion of lacking willingness on the part of US and NATO to take these Russian concerns seriously have finally resulted in clear deterioration of Russia’s relations with the USA and NATO. While the Russian Federation had only protested against the inclusion of Eastern European countries during the first and second round of NATO Eastern enlargement, it changed the line when NATO discussed Ukraine and Georgia. This time the Russians tried to influence the process by raising political pressure on the two countries and on NATO by threatening with potential countermeasures and by reducing the level of cooperation with NATO. Before the Bucharest Summit there were different views within the Alliance on whether the two countries had already made sufficient progress to be admitted to the Membership Action Plan (MAP). Some allies were concerned by the lack of domestic political stability in both countries and advocated the slowing down of the accession process. They were blamed for conceding to Russian political pressure and promoting appeasement. The compromise worked out during the Bucharest Summit was unique in the history of NATO’s enlargements. It did not award the MAP status yet promised – sine die – the accession for both countries in the future. The compromise jeopardized the basic principle which was agreed upon for NATO’s Eastern enlargement – the accession of a candidate should not be made politically binding or decided prior to its meeting all preconditions. Instead, NATO needs to return to the principles which have guided the process so far. These principles should include the following: Accession must primarily strengthen the Alliance and should not be guided by the desires of a candidate. It must pay off for the Alliance and must not bring in new problems;

J. Gräbner / On NATO’s Post-Cold War Eastern Enlargement

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NATO must be able and also willing to provide its security guarantees (Art. 5) to a candidate taking into account the capabilities versus potential challenges, including also the geographical ones; Accession should not be used as an instrument to influence Russian political attitudes – neither for punishing nor for rewarding the Russian Federation. Justus Gräbner1

Bibliography Adomeit, Hans / Kupferschmidt, Frank, Russland und die NATO, SWP-Studie, Berlin, March 2008. Bucharest Summit Declaration, April 3rd, 2008. Final Communiqué – NAC Meeting at the level of Foreign Ministers, December 3rd, 2008. Hamilton, Daniel (Lead author), Alliance Reborn: An Atlantic Compact for the 21st century – The Washington NATO Project, CSIS, Washington, February 2009. Kamp, Karl-Heinz, „Die NATO wird 60“, Der Mittler Brief, Bonn 4. Quartal 2008. NATO-Handbook, NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels 2006. “Study on NATO Enlargement”, NATO, Brussels, September 1995. Trenin, Dimitri, Towards a New Euro-Atlantic “Hard” Security Agenda, CSIS, Washington, July 2008.

1

George C. Marshall Center, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany



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THE CAPABILITIES OF THE NEW MEMBER STATES

This chapter draws together data on the NATO members who joined the alliance since 1999. It shows that the new members face many similar problems as the ‘older’ Alliance members. However the challenges of defence spending and international deployments are more difficult for new members. The increasingly difficult economic situation makes it important to focus on reforming essential capabilities while dispensing with others.

This chapter draws together data on NATO members who joined the alliance since 1999 on key indicators such as defence spending, contributions to international crisis management missions, and, where such information is available, on levels of ambition regarding such contributions. With defence reform processes including major restructuring of the armed forces in full swing in virtually all of these countries, making significant advances is necessarily a challenging task. Like the armed forces of fellow Alliance members, their militaries are increasingly deployed involved in multinational deployments beyond their countries’ borders. In fact, deployments have played a role in fostering military transformation and governments are trying to reorient their forces to reflect a modern security environment in which diverse global threats often demand military action. Operational demands have placed considerable strain on armed forces, in particularly since they are being asked to do more with less in the context of limited financial resources. Correspondingly, among the new members progress is clearly visible although it remains limited and uneven.

Defence Expenditure Even before the economic and financial crisis of 2008/09 unfolded, macroeconomic and demographic developments have created a fiscal environment that limits the overall availability of resources for European armed forces, the reorganisation of those forces to be better prepared to meet future threats has also added to funding challenges. Many countries, especially those moving away from conscription towards all-volunteer forces, have found it difficult to balance the various internal elements of their relatively limited budgets. As a result, personnel and other operational costs (particularly in countries involved in international operations) have steadily consumed a higher proportion of the defence budget than is desirable, while investment funding – that is, equipment procurement plus research and development (R&D) – has been squeezed. Among EU member states about 80% of investment funding is accounted for by the top-five spending countries: the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Spain.

The new NATO members are no exception to the Europe-wide downward trend as far as overall defence expenditure is concerned. In the period of 2003 to 2007 expenditure as a percentage of GDP has fallen across the board with Albania and Slovenia being the exception (see Annex 1) – however, this is not surprising since Albania and Slovenia also had the lowest percentage of defence expenditure of the twelve in 2003 (1.2% and 1.4% respectively). Average spending across the new members (2007: 1.6% of GDP) is currently slightly below the NATO average (1.7% of GDP, excluding the US in these calculations). In 2007, Bulgaria (2.2%), Latvia (1.7%), Poland (1.9%) and Romania (1.8%) spend at or above this NATO average with

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Bulgaria being the only country that spent more than 2% of GDP, the desired level according to NATO guidelines.

In general, European governments are striving to achieve a balance within their defence budgets that would allocate about 50% of spending to personnel costs, with 20–30% allocated to operational and maintenance costs, procurement and R&D. In 2006 of the then ten new members Bulgaria, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovenia spent between 50 and 60% of their defence expenditure on personnel thus finding it difficult to reach the desired balance. Several defence budgets have fluctuated because of changes in political leadership or government priorities. Where spending has slipped, some have acted to reverse the trend, though they have been constrained by broader economic priorities. It will take significant and sustained increases by many countries to reverse the downward real terms trend in spending on European defence, but neither European threat assessments nor the continent’s political and economic climates indicated that this will occur. In the context of the global economic downturn of 2008 and 2009 any such move has become even more unlikely for the foreseeable future.

Deployments While numbers of troops deployed show an upward trend, they remain a small percentage of overall armed forces. Reforms of armed forces and cuts in budgets have resulted in a decline in the numbers of active armed forces. In 1999, the new members had some 760.000 active forces between them – by 2008 this number had been more than halved to some 360.000. The NATO Istanbul summit in 2004 set deployability targets: each member state should be able to sustain 8% of ground forces on operations, and 40% should be deployable. While European countries have over time displayed an ability to deploy more troops on foreign operations, very few have attained the NATO targets. Of the European members of NATO only the UK had sustained more than 8% of its active forces on operations in 2007.

NATO members who joined since 1999 have gradually sustained higher percentages of active forces on deployments annually (see Annex 2). There are two marked shifts where increases where significant. The first on occurred from 2002 to 2003 when the Iraq war and the support for US action by many of the governments in the new and soon to be NATO member countries in itself meant an increase of deployments from 1% to 1.8% of active forces. The second occurred from 2005 to 2006 when increasing commitments, for example in Afghanistan, made up much more then the withdrawals and reductions to the Iraq mission that most countries where by then engaged in. Deployments rose from 1.8% to 2.5% of active forces. Currently, about 2.6% of active forces from the twelve are deployed on international missions. Compared to the EU-wide average of currently about 4% this level of contributions indicates that there is still a long way to go. In 2007 only the Czech Republic (4.7%) and Estonia (4.8%) surpassed the EU average; in 2008 Slovenia did as well deploying almost 7% of its active forces. In absolute terms the number of deployed troops from the new member states has risen from some 3.800 in 1999 to about 9.300 in 2008 and peaked in 2006 with just over 10.000 (see Annex 3). Since 2003 the twelve sustained deployments of between 9.300 and 10.000 troops with the only exception being 2005 when numbers dropped to some 8.250. It has to be pointed out that, in those last years, Poland accounts for between 26% (2005) and 42% (2004 and 2006) of total deployments from the new member states annually.


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For the deployments that the new member states undertake, NATO has clearly developed into the dominant framework (see Annex 5). This reflects a broader Europe-wide trend. However, it is remarkable that, in 2008, only Albania (not yet a NATO member in 2008), Poland, Romania and Slovakia deployed less than 60% of their troops abroad through NATO. Even they deployed a majority or near majority in KFOR and ISAF with 49%, 57% and 53% respectively. Four of the new members had deployed 85% or more of their troops on missions in KFOR or ISAF in 2008: Czech Republic (96%), Latvia (95%), Lithuania (96%), and Slovenia (86%). The overriding importance of the Alliance as a mechanism for deployments is thus evident.

In more general terms, deployments by European countries have definitively shifted ‘out-ofarea’. In 1995, 85% of European troops on multinational crisis-management missions were deployed within Europe – that is, in the Balkans. By 2000, the proportion had risen to 89%. By 2005, the situation had changed substantially. While deployments in Europe still accounted for the largest share by region, they had fallen to 39% of the total. Deployments in the Middle East had risen to 32%, and in Central and South Asia (including Afghanistan) to 27%. Africa, although host to a number of peace-support operations, accounted for only 2% of European troops deployed in 2005. Even if short-term deployments such as the two EU-led operations Artemis (2003) and EUFOR RD Congo (2006) were included, Africa’s share would still be well below 10% for both years.

Levels of ambition In comparison to other European members of NATO, the levels of ambition in the new member states are relatively well defined. Of course, this statement has to be immediately qualified by the fact that for most countries these levels of ambition are aspirational, i.e. describing a planned ambition, the realization of which is often still years away. The national level of ambition here refers to a state’s expression of the maximum military contribution it intends to make to international crisis management missions. This is of course distinct from the effort a country anticipates it would make in a territorial- or collective-defence scenario. Given that international crisis-management missions are not conducted to combat a direct existential threat to the contributing nation, governments will only ever make a part of a country’s total capability available for them. The following paragraphs outline levels of ambition for those of the new member states in which publicly available documents paint a relatively precise picture.

According to the 2005 Strategic Defence Review, by 2010Croatia aims to be able to deploy up to 700 troops on international missions. Between 2011 and 2015 the number is set to increase again, and the range of operations in which Croatian forces can become involved in will be broadened. Before 2011, these will be limited to low- and medium-intensity operations due to existing training and equipment shortfalls. Croatia aims to have up to 10% of its active duty personnel available at 5-day readiness once it ongoing defence reform process is completed and a new force structure is on place.

In 2005, the Czech Republic defined its level of ambition for crisis management as participation in a peace-support operation with a mechanised battalion and a special company (up to 1,000

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personnel in total), sustainable for a year with rotation every six months, plus deployment of another contingent of 250 personnel on a humanitarian or rescue mission for six months without rotation. It also offered an alternative contribution, whereby the armed forces should be able to deploy one brigade-sized army task force (up to 3,000 personnel) for six months and an equivalent air-force contingent for three months.

In Estonia, the level of ambition, to be attainable by 2010, was defined in 2005 as a ‘sustainable’ (i.e., sustainable for a year or longer) deployment of one infantry company, a special-forces platoon, several military observers, a staff element and two vessels. By 2008, up to 250 personnel and one mine-countermeasure vessel were to be available for long-term deployment, the personnel figure rising to 350 by 2010. The maximum number of Estonian troops available for short-term deployment is 850. Regarding concurrency, Estonia aims to be able to send a contingent on a short-term mission while maintaining one sustainable deployment.

Lithuania’s goal is to deploy larger, self-sustaining units, while simultaneously reducing the number of missions in which Lithuanian forces are involved. From 2015, a 950-strong battalion task force, including combat support and combat service support, plus a 50-strong specialforces squadron, is to be sustainable with full rotation in one operation. As an alternative, Lithuania also aims to make available three specialist units, each of company strength, for simultaneous deployment. The country aims to be able to participate in up to three international deployments in addition to up to two domestic-assistance missions.

From 2015 on, Romania aims to make available either one division with one combat brigade for six months without rotation; or two combat brigades in either the same or separate operations for six months without rotation; or three battalions in either the same or separate operations for up to 12 months, with rotation after six months.

Slovenia seeks to have the capability to sustain one long-term, medium-scale operation at company level and one long-term small-scale operation at platoon level until 2010. Between 2010 and 2015, the Slovenian government aims to be able to commit one company-level unit to two medium-scale operations for a long-term period and one platoon-level unit to a long-term small-scale operation. Alternatively, a battalion-sized unit could be deployed to a large-scale operation for up to six months. From 2015, the commitment of one company to two long-term, medium scale operations and one platoon to one long-term small-scale operation is planned, or alternatively one battalion to one large-scale operation for up to 12 months.

Conclusion A rise in demand for military operations and a decline in resources, the latter likely to become even more pronounced in the coming years, mean the days have long gone when European countries could afford to maintain large and static military establishments. The proportion of forces available in international missions remains on average low among the countries that joined NATO since 1999 and defence budgets are severely stretched. While in principle this situation is mirrored among most of the ‘older’ Alliance member states, the challenge is

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particularly daunting for some of the recent additions to NATO’s membership roster. Efforts are underway in each country and progress is being made. The increasingly difficult resource situation will make it all the more important to focus reform efforts on capabilities that are required to meet the stated level of ambition in each country and to dispense with others, even though this will necessitate difficult political choices.

Bastian Giegerich1 Bibliography: Bastian Giegerich and Alexander Nicoll (Eds): European Military Capabilities: Building Armed Forces for Modern Operations, IISS, London, 2008. Bastian Giegerich: European Military Crisis Management: Connecting Ambition and Reality, Adelphi Paper 397, IISS, London, 2008. IISS: The Military Balance IISS, London.

Annex 1: Defence expenditure % of GDP Country

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Albania

1.2

1.4

1.3

1.5

1.8

Bulgaria

2.4

2.4

2.5

2.3

2.2

Croatia

2.1

1.7

1.6

1.6

1.7

Czech Republic

2.1

1.9

1.8

1.7

1.5

Estonia

1.9

1.6

1.6

1.4

1.6

Hungary

1.7

1.5

1.3

1.2

1.1

Latvia

1.8

2.1

1.3

1.4

1.7

Lithuania

1.8

1.4

1.2

1.2

1.2

Poland

1.9

1.9

1.8

1.8

1.9

Romania

2.3

2.1

2

1.9

1.8

Slovakia

1.9

1.7

1.8

1.7

1.5

Slovenia

1.4

1.6

1.5

1.7

1.6

Average

1.9

1.8

1.7

1.6

1.6

NATO (Ex US)

1.9

1.8

1.8

1.8

1.7

Source: IISS, The Military Balance. 1

International Institute for Strategic Studies, London.

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Note: NATO’s defines military expenditure as the cash outlays of central or federal governments to meet the costs of national armed forces. The resulting figures have been used for the calculations above wherever sufficient data existed. Otherwise, the official defence budget figure, almost certainly lower than total defence expenditure, was used.

Annex 2: Percentage of active forces deployed on international missions Country

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Albania

NA

0.21

0.37

0.37

0.92

1.04

0.78

2.01

3.06

3.21

Bulgaria

0.05

0.05

0.05

0.06

1.06

1.07

1.09

1.28

1.76

1.93

Croatia

0.00

0.02

0.03

0.03

0.25

0.23

0.35

0.73

1.38

2.28

Czech Republic

0.99

1.27

1.28

1.57

2.14

1.25

3.27

3.63

4.71

3.51

Estonia

0.98

0.98

1.06

0.05

0.05

3.07

1.32

5.39

4.78

3.62

Hungary

1.09

1.84

2.41

1.99

3.11

3.25

3.79

2.18

3.12

3.35

Latvia

0.70

0.99

1.65

2.04

3.38

2.11

3.07

3.09

2.10

1.81

Lithuania

0.34

0.56

0.26

0.93

1.37

1.65

1.58

1.85

1.70

2.75

Poland

0.92

0.95

0.88

1.12

2.37

2.75

1.49

3.00

2.52

2.35

Romania

0.10

0.10

0.09

0.91

1.61

1.60

2.20

2.27

2.02

2.11

Slovakia

0.08

0.35

1.85

2.45

3.87

3.81

2.82

4.16

3.09

2.89

Slovenia

0.16

0.34

1.17

0.96

1.30

2.75

3.74

4.76

3.31

6.90

Average

0.4

0.5

0.7

1.0

1.8

1.9

1.8

2.5

2.5

2.6

Source: IISS, The Military Balance

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Annex 3: Deployment on international missions (Source: IISS, The Military Balance) Country

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Albania

101

101

101

101

203

224

167

222

338

459

Bulgaria

39

36

42

43

543

546

554

654

719

786

Croatia

0

10

15

15

53

48

72

152

245

425

574

734

684

775

1219

562

729

899

1089

846

47

47

47

3

3

153

65

221

196

192

475

806

816

665

1039

1049

1224

705

1010

845

Latvia

40

50

107

112

165

103

161

165

120

94

Lithuania

41

71

32

125

174

223

214

222

236

243

2205

2058

1812

1823

3856

3887

2113

4246

3205

2859

Romania

205

215

90

905

1569

1558

2137

1578

1503

1544

Slovakia

37

137

610

641

852

769

569

633

530

505

Slovenia

15

31

89

86

85

180

245

312

189

497

3779

4296

4445

5294

9761

9302

8250

10009

9380

9295

Czech Republic Estonia Hungary

Poland

Total (incl. obs)

Annex 4: Selected NATO Support Helicopters: Holdings of New Member States in 2008 (Source: IISS, The Military Balance) Helicopter Type

Country Holdings

Total

AS-532 Cougar

Bulgaria (5); Slovenia (4)

9

Bell 212

Slovenia (1)

1

Bell 412 Twin Huey

Poland (1); Slovenia (9)

10

Mi-17 Hip

Croatia (10); Czech Rep. (31); Latvia (4); Poland (13); Slovakia (10)

68

Mi-8 Hip

Bulgaria (17); Croatia (14); Czech Rep. (1); Estonia (2); Hungary (17); Lithuania (9); Poland (30); Slovakia (1)

91

PZL Mi-2 Hoplite

Latvia (2); Poland (64); Slovakia (6)

72

PZLW-3 Sokol

Czech Rep. (8); Poland (56)

64

SA-330 Puma

Romania (60)

60

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Annex: 5 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 KFO ISA KFO ISA KFO ISA KFO ISA KFO ISA KFO ISA KFO ISA KFO ISA R F R F R F R F R F R F R F R F 0 0 0 30 0 30 0 81 0 22 0 22 0 138 0 140 0 0 0 29.7 0 14.8 0 36.2 0 13.2 0 10 0 40.8 0 30.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 34 5 37 46 150 46 401 51 460 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6.2 0.9 6.7 7 22.9 6.4 55.8 6.5 58.5 0 0 0 0 0 30 0 22 0 45 0 120 0 199 0 280 0 0 0 0 0 56.6 0 45.8 0 62.5 0 78.9 0 81.2 0 65.9 175 0 400 0 409 133 408 19 500 17 501 103 500 435 400 415 25.6 0 51.6 0 33.6 10.9 72.6 3.4 68.6 2.3 55.7 11.5 45.9 39.9 47.3 49.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 98 7 25 7 26 120 28 128 30 120 0 0 0 0 0 0 64.1 4.6 38.5 10.8 11.8 54.3 14.3 65.3 15.6 62.5 325 0 325 0 325 0 294 130 484 187 268 175 484 225 317 240 39.8 0 48.9 0 31.3 0 28 12.4 39.5 15.3 38 24.8 47.9 22.3 37.5 28.4 10 0 15 0 11 8 0 2 10 28 9 35 18 97 19 70 9.3 0 13.4 0 6.7 4.8 0 1.9 6.2 17.4 5.5 21.2 15 80.8 20.2 74.5 30 0 29 0 30 4 30 6 30 120 32 130 30 195 34 200 93.8 0 23.2 0 17.2 2.3 13.5 2.7 14 56.1 14.4 58.6 12.7 82.6 14 82.3 532 0 574 0 574 0 574 22 312 3 312 10 312 937 271 1130 29.4 0 31.5 0 14.9 0 14.8 0.6 14.8 0.1 7.3 0.2 9.7 29.2 9.5 39.5 0 0 221 48 226 34 226 32 150 550 146 558 153 536 150 725 0 0 24.4 5.3 14.1 2.2 14.5 2.1 7 25.7 9.3 35.4 10.2 35.7 9.7 47 40 0 40 0 100 0 100 17 111 17 132 57 134 59 196 70 6.6 0 6.2 0 11.7 0 13 2.2 19.5 3 20.9 9 25.3 11.1 38.8 13.9 6 0 6 0 2 0 2 18 92 58 158 54 92 42 360 70


2000 KFO ISA R F 0 NA Albania 0 NA % of depl. 0 NA Bulgaria 0 NA % of depl. Croatia 0 NA 0 NA % of depl. Czech Rep. 160 NA 21.8 NA % of depl. 0 NA Estonia 0 NA % of depl. 325 NA Hungary 40.3 NA % of depl. 10 NA Latvia 20 NA % of depl. 30 NA Lithuania 42.3 NA % of depl. 763 NA Poland 37.1 NA % of depl. 0 NA Romania 0 NA % of depl. 40 NA Slovakia 29.2 NA % of depl. 0 NA Slovenia Country

0 NA 19.4 % of depl. 1328 NA 1118 Total 25.8 % all depl. 31.7 NA Source: IISS, The Military Balance

0 6.7 0 1610 0 31.1

0 2.3 48 1677 0.9 17.6

0 2.4 179 1732 1.9 19.2

21.2 51.1 32.2 64.5 22 48.7 22.2 72.4 14.1 287 1719 1024 1630 1392 1797 3055 1828 3500 3.2 21.5 12.8 16.9 14.4 20.4 34.7 21.7 41.6


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NATO’S DEMOGRAPHIC DILEMMA NATO finds itself increasingly stressed by current and prospective demographic shifts within its membership that will almost certainly hamper its collective ability to deploy operational forces and further strain the transatlantic relationship. The shift from large conscript forces toward smaller, all-volunteer military establishments has had different political consequences in Europe and USA, widening the demographic gap. The diverging patterns could negatively affect the transatlantic relationship and economic growth, leading to Europe’s rapid demographic marginalization and relative economic decline by 2050. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is no stranger to controversy. Over the past 60 years, it has endured disputes over defense strategy, the role of nuclear weapons, the size and composition of its membership, and how best to respond to looming challenges beyond its immediate territory. Today, however, the Atlantic Alliance finds itself increasingly stressed by emerging socioeconomic and political changes among the Allies—changes that are fundamentally influenced by larger demographic shifts now occurring within its membership and that, taken together, will almost certainly hamper its collective ability to deploy operational forces and further strain the transatlantic relationship in the years ahead. This chapter offers a preliminary assessment of these trends, focusing specifically on the kinds of impacts that each is having, or will have, upon the Allies and the challenges for Alliance solidarity that may result. Military Capacity: How Usable? The most immediate trend of concern is already being seen within NATO’s military manpower base. The shift from large conscript forces, which were useful in the defense of European territory during the Cold War, toward smaller, all-volunteer military establishments with a more expeditionary focus has had different and somewhat unexpected political consequences in Europe and the United States. When the Cold War ended in 1989–1990, the United States had an all-volunteer force of 2,181,000 troops, while NATO’s European Allies had 3,509,000 troops (roughly 60 percent more) under arms (see table 1). All European Allies—with the sole exception of the United Kingdom, which had an all-volunteer force since 1963—maintained largely conscript forces. During the Cold War, NATO’s main role was the territorial defense of Europe; it never engaged in expeditionary operations. Such missions only began in the early 1990s with air and naval operations in the Balkans and expanded dramatically in December 1995, when the Dayton Accords resulted in the deployment of a 60,000-troop Implementation Force and follow-on Stabilization Force to Bosnia-Herzegovina. After a 78-day bombing campaign against Serbia in 1999, NATO deployed a 50,000-troop Kosovo Force, 16,000 of which remain there today. In August 2003, NATO assumed command of the international Security Assistance Force, which was authorized after the events of September 11 and the start of the U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom and now maintains 52,700 troops in Afghanistan.

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J. Simon / NATO’s Demographic Dilemma

Since 1989, when the former Soviet threat to Europe was diminishing and out-of-area risks were increasing, NATO’s European armed forces declined by more than 1.5 million troops. When Europe was beginning to respond to new risks, it had already lost roughly half a million troops by 1995, then another 300,000 by 1999, and 700,000 more by 2004; by 2008, only 1,970,000 troops remained. At the same time, most of European NATO was abandoning conscription and moving toward smaller, all-volunteer forces. By 2008, seven of NATO’s military establishments had become professional; of the five military establishments retaining conscription (because of long-held threat perceptions in Turkey and Greece, territorial defense traditions in Norway and Denmark, and Germany’s commitment to Innere Fuhrung, or “citizens in uniform”), conscript terms have shortened because of declining social support. In sum, in 2008, the 12 Cold War European NATO countries man a force roughly equivalent to that of the United States—about 1,400,000 professional troops. During the post–Cold War period, NATO has added 10 new members (in 1999 and 2004) and has extended invitations to Croatia and Albania for entry in 2009. The militaries of NATO’s new members have experienced the same trends as the established members (see table 2). As expeditionary operations had become the main focus of NATO’s attention, the new members focused on developing this capability and participated in NATO operations to enhance their admission prospects. In 1999, the 10 militaries counted 230,000 professionals among their 618,000 troops. By 2004, their total force declined to 409,000 troops, but their professional strength increased to 270,000. By 2008, 8 of the 10 new members had become totally professional (with only Lithuania and Estonia retaining conscription for a small part of their armed forces). As a result, 314,000 of their 317,000 troops were professional soldiers and could be counted toward augmenting European NATO’s potential deployable force.


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But as European militaries have shifted to smaller, all-volunteer forces concentrated in fewer caserns, significant social and political consequences resulted. Public unease over the expeditionary use of military forces that one might have expected with heavy reliance upon young conscripts has not eased with the shift toward professional soldiers; if anything, those anxieties have increased. As defense was no longer the priority that it had been during the Cold War and armed forces were becoming less visible to their publics, many European societies began to raise questions about their utility. This was particularly the case when used in unpopular expeditionary operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Additionally, as the armed forces no longer constituted the large voting blocks of earlier years, they were becoming less politically important to their elites. This situation has already become acute in Bulgaria, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and is becoming more so with the other new members, with the notable exception of Poland. Defense versus Security Along with, and compounded by, these shifts in military capacity is the reemergence of diverging views within the Alliance of the role of the military in meeting current security challenges. In the aftermath of 9/11, although the United States did create a Department of Homeland Security, it substantially increased defense expenditures, consistently allocating 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to defense since 2004. The defense budget allocations reflect the fact that the U.S. public and political elite continued to see the military as providing a significant role in the defense of the country. For the United States, the main lesson of 9/11

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was that emerging non-state threats should be interdicted before they reach the American homeland, and the U.S. military has proved to be the best available instrument for that purpose. In contrast, most European NATO members are increasingly focusing on internal security, not defense, as a predominant concern. Not only do the recent White Papers issued by the United Kingdom, Germany, and France reflect their growing internal security concerns, but also their defense budgets, as well as those of other European NATO allies, seem to correspond to those perceptions. While European interior ministries are enlarging and playing more important roles in addressing security concerns, their defense budgets have been stagnating or decreasing. This downward defense trend has been consistent among NATO’s Cold War European members since 1990 (see table 3) and is unlikely to change any time in the future. Only 4 of the 12 Allies maintain budgets meeting the generally accepted 2 percent of GDP threshold: the United Kingdom and France, with all-volunteer and expeditionary capabilities and experience, and Greece and Turkey, with large conscript forces and mutual defense concerns. France pledges to hold its defense budget constant at 2 percent until 2012 but will reduce its defense establishment by 54,000 over the next 7 years. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and Spain have defense budgets that have declined to 1.3 percent or lower.

When a terrorist train bombing killed 191 and wounded more than 1,400 in Madrid in 2004, Spain did not want NATO to invoke Article 5; it increased its interior ministry budget and held defense expenditures steady at 1.2 percent. When other NATO European members have faced similar challenges, they, too, have focused on internal security institutions, where NATO’s defense instruments are less relevant. This emphasis conforms to the traditional tendency in many parts of Europe to view terrorism as a law enforcement problem first and foremost, thus


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falling within the purview of a country’s police and public security apparatus, rather than a threat to be countered by military means. In sum, internal security challenges are becoming more relevant to European societies and political elites, an area where NATO’s Article 5 has a diminishing role to play. Hence, many European NATO members apparently see defense allocations as less relevant to deal with their security challenges. The same stasis or downward trend has been evident even among NATO’s 10 new members since their accession (see table 4). Only Bulgaria meets the 2 percent goal, and only Poland and Romania come close at 1.9 percent. Despite earlier promises, some Allies— Hungary, Lithuania, and the Czech Republic— have clearly returned disappointing defense results. And this trend is not likely to change among NATO’s new Allies in the near future. In marked contrast to NATO’s Cold War and new European members, the United States continues to see defense as a vital instrument to deal with threats. These diverging transatlantic views on how the military contributes to defense and security are likely to exert further pressure on European defense budgets and military forces and on the transatlantic relationship. The Shrinking Military Age Cohort The issues of shrinking force size and resource commitments, while significant in their own right, pale in comparison to a much more profound challenge: U.S. and European NATO members’ military service cohorts are moving in opposite directions. The U.S. population of 283,230,000 in 2000 is projected to grow to roughly 397,063,000 in 2050. During the same period, the U.S. median age of 35.5 is to increase only slightly to 36.2 in 2050. Hence, the United States should have an adequate cohort available for military service at current troop levels. In marked contrast, European (Cold War and new) NATO members not only will experience population decline, but also the median age of 37.7 in 2000 is projected to rise to 47 in 2050. What this means is that the Europeans’ declining military service cohort could affect their ability to meet planned force levels and make it more difficult to modernize their smaller, expensive professional forces in the face of mounting health and social costs for their aging populations. Some European Allies actually may have to face the question of whether they will be able to maintain a viable military. Among NATO’s Cold War European members (see table 5), the declining cohort and aging problem will be felt most acutely in Italy and Spain, where overall declines of 21 to 25 percent in population are projected. As a result, between 2005 and 2050, Italy’s population over the age of 60 will increase substantially from 25.5 to 41.6 percent and Spain’s from 21.4 to 39.7 percent. Although Germany, Greece, and Portugal have overall projected population declines of 10 to 15 percent, they also will experience an aging challenge. Between 2005 and 2050, the 60and-over population will increase in Greece from 23 to 36.8 percent; in Portugal from 22.3 to 36.3 percent; and in Germany from 25.1 to 35 percent. In all these cases, a shrinking 15- to 59year-old cohort will find it more difficult to fill out military billets to maintain existing force levels, while the need to subsidize the increasing health care and social welfare costs of an aging population will compete with efforts to maintain and modernize existing armed forces. Even France and the United Kingdom, which have relatively more favorable demographics, face challenges. In 2005, both had 60-and-over populations of 21.1 percent; by 2050, those French and British populations will be 33 and 29.4 percent, respectively. In sum, NATO’s European Cold War members will find it increasingly difficult to recruit, retain, and modernize their military establishments.

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If this situation appears challenging for NATO’s European Cold War–era members, it is even more dire for the Alliance’s new members (see table 6) whose populations are projected to experience substantial decline. Between 2005 and 2050, Bulgaria and Estonia are projected to shrink to almost half their current size, facing declines of 43 and 46.1 percent, respectively. Bulgaria’s 60-and-over population is forecast to increase from 22.4 to 38 percent, and Estonia’s from 21.6 to 33.6 percent. Latvia, Hungary, and Slovenia are expected to face population declines of 28, 24.9, and 23.2 percent, respectively. Although their actual declines will be more moderate than those of Bulgaria and Estonia, they will face the burden of subsidizing an even larger aging population. Between 2005 and 2050, Latvia’s 60-and-over population is projected to more than double from 22.5 to 48 percent, Slovenia’s from 20.5 to 40.2 percent, and Hungary’s from 20.8 to 36.2 percent. Although the Czech Republic and Lithuania face lower overall population declines, they also share the burden of almost doubling 60-andover populations, facing increases from 20 to 39.3 percent and 20.7 to 37.9 percent, respectively. Hence, NATO’s new members will find it even more challenging than the European Cold War members to retain modernized military establishments at their already significantly reduced troop levels.


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In summary, the Europeans’ diminished cohort will make it increasingly difficult for their militaries to meet existing, already much smaller, all-volunteer force recruitment goals. Mounting health and welfare costs for an aging population will also compete more with resources necessary to modernize those smaller forces. Recruitment and retention pressures are already evident in Bulgaria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Romania. Declining European cohorts have resulted in lower intake standards and smaller forces and will further fuel the already strained transatlantic burdensharing debate. Impact of Immigration Any assessment of shifting demographics within the Alliance must consider the distinctive impact of diverging immigration patterns in Europe and the United States and the potential for these patterns to erode a common historic identity. As fertility declines in Europe, the contribution of international migration to its population growth is increasing in significance. Although immigration is one way to increase the number of European cohorts available for military service, other demographic forces are pulling the United States and European NATO countries in different directions. Worldwide, the countries with the highest levels of net emigration annually are projected to be China (í329,000), Mexico (í306,000), India (í241,000), Philippines (í180,000), Pakistan (í167,000), and Indonesia (í164,000). While the United States and Europe will be net receivers of international migrants, their intake composition is increasingly different. The traditional U.S. immigration pattern increasingly has shifted away from Europe, while Europe’s is increasingly shifting toward immigration from Muslim lands in Asia Minor, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and the Maghreb. This could pull each side of the Atlantic in different directions. The United States faces immigration demographics that are very different from Europe; its birth rate is higher, and it can absorb many more immigrants. From 2005 to 2050, the United States is projected to receive 1.1 million immigrants annually, many of whom are Hispanic (Spanish is rapidly becoming its second language) and Asian, whose populations will triple in size. The Hispanic population, 42 million in 2005, will rise to 128 million in 2050, constituting 29 percent of the U.S. population (compared to 14 percent in 2005 and 3.5 percent in 1960). The

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Asian population, 14 million in 2005, will grow to 41 million in 2050, constituting 9 percent of the U.S. population (compared to 5 percent in 2005 and 0.6 percent in 1960). This means that 38 percent of the U.S. population will be either Hispanic or Asian in 2050, compared to only 4.1 percent in 1960. During the same period, the internal demographics of NATO’s European Allies face drastic changes as well. Germany is projected to receive 150,000 immigrants annually, Italy 139,000, the United Kingdom 130,000, and Spain 123,000. Immigration from Turkey, the Muslim East, and North Africa to fill labor shortfalls is already having an impact on intercommunal relations and security concerns. Since the attacks of September 11, public anxieties about an influx of Muslim populations into Europe have risen, sparked in part by numerous outbreaks of violence. Security concerns have increased since the Madrid commuter train bombings on March 11, 2004; the assassination of filmmaker Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands in November 2004; terrorist bombings in London in July 2005; weeks of street violence and car bombings in France in October-November 2005; and widespread riots following the publication of cartoons offensive to some Muslims in a Danish newspaper in February 2006. Pew public opinion polls in Spain, Germany, Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands indicate that between 70 and 78 percent are either somewhat or very concerned about Islamic extremism. While Muslims in the United Kingdom constitute roughly 3 percent of overall population (mostly Pakistanis and Bangladeshis), in Germany, 4 percent (mostly Turks), in France, 8 percent (mostly Algerians), in Spain, 2 percent (mostly Moroccans), and in the Netherlands, 6.6 percent (mostly Indonesians, Turks, and Moroccans), their fertility rates are three times higher than nonMuslims. Muslim immigration has contributed to European NATO’s increasing focus on internal security (rather than defense) and will likely have an impact on Europe’s political relations with the external Islamic world. While Muslim population growth resulting from immigration and higher fertility rates is clearly a factor within European NATO, it is also having an impact in wider Europe. During the same period (2005–2050), Russia’s population is projected to decline from 145.5 million to 104.3 million, with Muslims approaching the majority of the population. Ukraine, facing increasing pressures in South Crimea, will decline from 49.6 to 29.9 million. Similarly, demographics in the Balkans will evidence some local Muslim populations (Albania, Kosovo, and BosniaHerzegovina) approaching majorities. In summary, U.S. and Europe’s diverging and shifting internal demographics will likely continue to pull each side of the Atlantic in different directions. The U.S. reorientation from predominantly European to increasingly Hispanic and Asian will likely pull diaspora attention toward these regions, while Europe’s increasingly Muslim diaspora probably will draw attention in different directions. The Age Factor Another phenomenon, closely connected to immigration, is that of aging. While a relatively young and growing U.S. population will be a factor in its slightly enhanced global economic profile in 2050, Europe’s aging and shrinking productive population will contribute to its diminishing presence. Within Europe’s NATO members, the link between aging and productivity will be especially acute. Europe’s fertility rates remain low (decreasing from 1.9 in the mid-1980s to 1.4) and are projected to decline over the next decade; its active working population will decline from 331 million to 243 million. Hence, fewer productive people will need to devote more resources to provide health and social services to an aging European population.


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As a result, according to some estimates, the share of the gross world product (GWP) of the 15 European Union (EU 15) members as of 1995 will decline from roughly 22 percent in 2003 to 12 percent in 2050. Europe’s aging population will comprise a shrinking portion of the global population with resulting economic, social, and security consequences. In marked contrast to Europe, the U.S. population will actually increase during the same time. Due to higher fertility rates (2.1) and immigration flows, the median age of the U.S. population (35.5 in 2003) will rise only slightly (36.2 in 2050), and its active working population will actually increase from 269 million in 2003 to 355 million in 2050. And according to some estimates, the U.S. share of GWP is projected to increase from roughly 23 percent now to 26 percent in 2050. In other words, the U.S. experience will significantly diverge from that of Europe. This factor, combined with immigration patterns noted earlier, could also have a dramatic effect on its identity and political orientation. While Europe will remain important to the United States, Asia and Latin America will be gaining in relative economic, social, and domestic political importance. These trends, too, are likely to have an impact on the transatlantic relationship and the Alliance’s future as we move toward the mid-21st century. Demographic and Economic Marginalization Finally, there is a global reality to be considered: The world’s population will continue to reflect the inexorable shift away from the Eurocentric world that existed when NATO was created in 1949 to the rapid demographic economic marginalization of Europe by 2050. In 1950, the world population stood at 2.519 billion; shortly after NATO’s 50th anniversary in 2000, the world population stood at 6.057 billion. Over those 50 years, the North American (including Canada) share of world population of 172 million (or 6.8 percent share) grew to 314 million (or 5.2 percent). In marked contrast to North America, although the population of the 25 member nations of the EU (the EU 25 as of 2004)—350 million (at 13.9 percent)—had grown to 452 million, this represented a decline to 7.5 percent of the world population. In effect, Europe registered a significant demographic marginalization within the world. Over the next decades, Europe’s demographic marginalization will become more rapid and will result in relative economic decline. If NATO still exists in 2050, it will do so in a world with a population projected to be 9.322 billion. The North American population is projected at 438 million (or 4.7 percent) with a 26 percent share of GWP; the EU 25, forecast as down from 452 million to 431 million (or 4.6 percent), is projected to only share slightly more than 12 percent of the GWP. Significantly, thanks to an increasingly non-European diaspora, U.S. political attention will shift away from Europe and toward Latin America and Asia as these areas become more important. The population of Latin America and the Caribbean, which stood at 519 million in 2000 (up from 167 million in 1950), is projected to surpass Europe by more than 30 percent in 2050, with a population of 806 million (or 8.6 percent). In Asia, China counted 1.275 billion in 2000 (up from 554.8 million in 1950) and is projected to be at 1.462 million in 2050 (or 15.7 percent). During the same period, India’s population of 1 billion in 2000 (up from 357.6 million in 1950) is projected to be 1.57 billion (or 16.8 percent of the world population) in 2050. The two countries together will comprise 32.5 percent of the total world population and will play a larger role in the world economy. China’s 25 percent share of GWP in 2050 will be roughly equal to that of the United States and twice that of the EU 15. Internal demographic factors and external global shifts increasingly will draw the attention of the United States away from its traditional European focus. Europe’s rapid demographic marginalization and diminishing social, economic, and political weight will mean that it will no longer be the “center” of the world or of U.S. attention.

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Is Demography Destiny? As the French philosopher August Comte suggested in his now-famous formula, a society’s demographic inheritance can indeed be a decisive factor in its fate. And what is true for countries is no less true for alliances. The future of the Alliance is increasingly challenged by a range of problems that are fundamentally rooted in its social demography, and these problems will very likely continue to divide both sides of the Atlantic. The Alliance’s future is being influenced by Europe’s shifting from large conscript armed forces to smaller, all-volunteer forces and by diverging transatlantic views on the military’s role in providing defense and security. In addition, as the Alliance advances toward the middle of the 21st century, increasing U.S.-European demographic divergences will likely continue, reflecting the shrinking European population cohort available for defense establishments; altered immigration patterns will further loosen traditional social ties; aging European populations will compete with defense for ever scarcer resources; and the changing global population mix will reflect Europe’s demographic marginalization and relative economic decline. How will the diminishing overall “weight” of the “West” affect both Europe’s and the U.S. positions and roles in the world? How relevant will NATO be to U.S. and European interests in 2050? Will the trends discussed above loosen further or actually undermine Article 5, the transatlantic foundation of the past half-century, or could these trends conceivably foster a sober Euroatlantic community discussion that could ignite the spark to seek a newly defined mutual security organization that could pull both sides of the Atlantic together to fend off the outside world? No one can answer these questions in any definitive way. What is clear is that as Europe’s 60and-over population expands and as NATO approaches its 60th anniversary in 2009, these social, economic, and demographic factors need to be consciously weighed by the Alliance as it looks ahead to writing a new Strategic Concept. A reexamination of the 1949 Washington Treaty and an assessment of how NATO responded successfully to 20th-century world challenges might be in order as the basis to explore how the Washington Treaty might be refocused, updated, and/or recast to deal with the greatly transformed world of the mid-21st century. If in fact NATO’s Article 5 has less relevance in a 21st-century world, and if internal security concerns are becoming more pertinent to Europe than external defense, NATO’s overriding task should be to identify what, if any, transatlantic interests remain—be they international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and failed states, transnational crime, energy and cyber security, migration, pandemic disease, or global warming—and how the Alliance can best act with common purpose in light of them. Without such concerted action, it is hard to foresee how demography will not prove to be NATO’s Achilles’ heel. Jeffrey Simon1

1

Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.


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TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS AND NATO’S FUTURE1

This essay discusses the factors that led to this most recent transatlantic crisis, its key components, and the way that all parties to the event moved toward and then away from the brink. It then addresses the question of how and why the alliance appears, at least until now, to have survived the crisis. The analysis concludes by deriving some lessons from this experience that might lead to a better understanding of NATO’s potential and future and, more importantly, that might help NATO governments avoid or, if necessary, deal with future crisis environments as the new American administration led by President Barack Obama begins its first term. The crisis in the transatlantic relationship that began with the advent of the George W. Bush administration in 2000 and then receded during President Bush’s second term in office was perhaps the most severe in the history of the alliance. NATO has experienced a succession of “crises” throughout its 60-year history. Differences among allies and with their publics leading to crisis environments in transatlantic relations have included the 1956 U.S. decision not to support the British/French/Israeli military attempt to reverse Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez canal Suez, European opposition to the U.S. war in Vietnam, French President Charles de Gaulle’s withdrawal of France from NATO’s integrated military command in 1967, divergent views on how to deal with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, European public opposition to the decision to deploy intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe in the early 1980s, and disarray over how to deal with turmoil in the Balkans in the early 1990s. However, the alliance crisis in the early 2000s was made more difficult by the fact that it was largely instigated by the policies and personalities of the U.S. government that were seen in Europe as unilateralist and anti-NATO. Most importantly, the George W. Bush administration produced statements and actions following the 9/11 attacks suggesting that the alliance leader no longer found this alliance worth the effort of leading, and followed them up with a controversial and divisive decision to go to war against Iraq. The new century crisis in the transatlantic alliance may or may not be seen by future historians as the “Bush” crisis. The roots of the crisis, of course, go deeper than the policies and personalities of the first George W. Bush administration. This administration may in the future be seen either as the main cause of the crisis or simply as the igniter of a fire that had been waiting to happen, as allies on both sides of the Atlantic tried to adjust their perceptions and priorities to new strategic realities that emerged following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. At the end of the Cold War, U.S. President George H.W. Bush clearly believed that the United States was required to play a strong international leadership role. Some of his advisers thought the United States should use its position as the sole superpower to discourage challenges to that position, even among current allies. President Bush nonetheless accepted the importance of building consensus in the United Nations and constructing coalitions to deal with international challenges (illustrated by his orchestration of the response to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait).

1

An earlier version of this analysis was originally published by the NATO College Research Directorate in October 2008.

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S.R. Sloan / Transatlantic Relations and NATO’s Future

In the first year of his presidency, Bill Clinton and his foreign policy advisers experimented with a number of different approaches to U.S. foreign policy. As Clinton moved toward the end of his first term, he appeared to have decided that an assertive U.S. international leadership role could be more of an advantage than a burden and in 1996 began arguing that the United States was the world's “indispensable power.” The Clinton administration mostly attempted to avoid policies that were, or could be perceived as, isolationist or unilateralist. But, on occasion, self-confident U.S. behavior rubbed some Europeans the wrong way. When the Clinton administration decided that only Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary should participate in the first wave of NATO enlargement, many allies privately applauded. But the fact that the United States appeared to have abandoned the process of NATO consultations and then said its decision was non-negotiable troubled even America’s closest allies. With the advent of the George W. Bush administration in 2000, European concerns had shifted toward the expectation that the United States would pull its troops out of the Balkans to leave the remaining tasks to the Europeans, as candidate Bush had recommended. However, the early policies of the Bush administration raised other concerns, most particularly about the unilateralism demonstrated by U.S. decisions to abandon the nuclear test ban treaty and oppose participation in the Kyoto Protocol on global warming. Administration policies after 9/11 began to bring the transatlantic crisis to a head. On the one hand, Bush’s strategy was based on building a broad international coalition against terrorism. On the other hand, the United States conducted the campaign with little reference to offers of assistance from the allies and without making much institutional use of the NATO framework. Interpreting the events that led to the new century crisis, some observers focused on a “structural gap” in the alliance that was seen as increasingly separating the United States from Europe. Such differences created the potential for U.S.-European divisions even before 9/11 and the Iraq War dramatically brought such differences to the surface. From this perspective, the stimulus for the crisis was provided by failure of European states to build sufficient military capabilities to make significant contributions to post-Cold War security problems and the resulting loss of U.S. confidence in the extent to which it could count on its European allies. Neo-conservative author Robert Kagan argued famously that Americans and Europeans were on two different planets, writing that “Americans are from Mars, Europeans from Venus.” Kagan judged that success of the European integration process, which created a zone of peace and cooperation among countries that had warred for centuries, had also given birth to a “nonuse of force ideology.” He concluded, therefore, that the United States and Europe were destined to disagree more and more in the future. At the time, the projection of further Euro-Atlantic division seemed compelling to many. The Dutch analyst, Peter van Ham, said that Kagan is “absolutely right” in judging that “Americans and Europeans no longer share a common ‘strategic culture’.” Van Ham wrote: “...for nonAmericans, this is gradually becoming a world where the U.S. acts as legislator, policeman, judge and executioner.” Ham’s answer was that Europe needed to unite more strongly against American power. A number of scholars and commentators believed that the end of the Cold War left NATO without a purpose and exposed an unnatural relationship between the United States and its security-dependent European allies. David Calleo has argued for many years that the


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“American protectorate” for Europe is both unnatural and unlikely to be sustained successfully indefinitely. Calleo, and others, suggest that Europe eventually must take responsibility for itself, and that failure to do so will ultimately undo the transatlantic relationship. Against this backdrop, all the extreme caricatures of U.S. and European behavior came to life early in the 21st century. In its early months, the George W. Bush administration applied shock and awe unilateralism to U.S.-European relations. After 9/11, the United States virtually ignored initial allied and NATO offers of assistance. Administration officials publicly disparaged NATO and allied militaries. The United States made it clear it was going to war against Iraq come hell or high water. Moreover, the Bush administration’s 2002 “New National Security Strategy” raised profound questions about international conventions on use of force, asserting the U.S. right to use pre-emptive, or even preventive, force to keep an enemy from attacking the United States. The response from Europe also damaged the Euro-Atlantic relationship. Germany declared it would not participate in an attack on Iraq even if the United States and Great Britain managed to get a UN Security Council mandate. Early in 2003, Germany joined France and Belgium in questioning whether they would support Turkey if it were attacked in the context of the looming conflict with Iraq, raising fundamental uncertainties about the NATO security commitment. Europeans left themselves exposed to the American observation that Europe now follows the dictum: “Speak softly and carry a big carrot.” French President Chirac did his part, insulting new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe who had supported U.S. policy in Iraq, advising them that they should know when to “shut up.” The Iraq war created huge political divisions in NATO and the EU and, according to a senior European diplomat, in every capitol and ministry in Europe. Even though many European allies acted unilaterally during the crisis and with little regard to alliance commitments and principles, the actions of the alliance leader, the United States, take the lead responsibility for the crisis. In sum, the first few years of the Bush administration raised existential questions about NATO’s future. Even if the “junior partners” in the alliance wanted to continue security cooperation with the United States, would this be possible if the United States no longer found the alliance relevant to its interests? Or, if the United States wanted to continue the alliance but mainly as an extension of controversial U.S. foreign and security policies, would this be in the interests of European states? These were fundamental questions that were asked in many quarters around Europe in 2002-2003. Why and How Did NATO Survive? The case could be made that NATO will, in fact, not survive for long and that the issues that came to a head in the new century crisis will return to undermine the alliance down the road. If, however, “survival” is defined by the will of the member states to sustain the alliance relationship, the alliance appears to be recovering from this most recent in a long line of crises in the relationship. The fact that NATO moved past this confluence of events cannot be explained in terms of the need for a response to an existential threat. Such a threat from the Soviet Union had been history for a decade before George W. Bush came to office, and had not been reconstituted. It also cannot be explained by the Bush administration’s post-9/11 argument – an argument not accepted by most Europeans – that the United States and its allies were at war with radical Islamic extremism.

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Even though the Bush administration carried unilateralism to new levels, the European allies had already experienced a taste of it in the alliance-friendly Clinton administration. The Bush administration’s actions, however, on top of the Clinton experiences, convinced many Europeans that U.S. unilateralism and hegemonic behavior were becoming the norm in transatlantic relations. The suggestion by some that Bush administration behavior was an American anomaly, was undermined by the fact that the American people re-elected George Bush for a second term. These European perceptions increased support for building up the European Union (EU) as a counterbalance to U.S. power. They fed support for the European Constitution agreed by EU governments in 2003. Such attitudes toward U.S. behavior also led to a “rump” meeting of France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg in April 2003 that produced agreement on establishing a separate EU military planning cell independent of NATO, which U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns subsequently called “the most significant threat to NATO’s future.” In sum, what could have been seen as a reason for European states to get used to America’s hegemonic behavior, started to turn into a dynamic that could have led to the end of alliance. Why did it not? The paragraphs that follow discuss some of the possible explanations. The Bush administration in its second term recognized the need for allies and the importance of NATO in mustering allied contributions to security and made serious efforts to show that the United States remained committed to the alliance. The Bush administration in its second term mounted a campaign to win back the trust and cooperation of European governments. Early in 2005, both Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and President Bush visited European capitals explicitly seeking to repair some of the damage done by the administration in its first term, and most particularly by the decision to go to war against Iraq. The administration made few formal changes in its policies toward the alliance, and many of the same officials whose statements had seriously damaged relations with the allies remained in place. But there was a change toward more conciliatory and less confrontational approaches to the allies. The new U.S. attitude notably included support for NATO taking over command of the International Security Assistance force in Afghanistan.

Following a NATO summit meeting in February 2005, President Bush praised the alliance saying “NATO is the most successful alliance in the history of the world…. Because of NATO, Europe is whole and united and at peace…..NATO is an important organization, and the United States of America strongly supports it.” During the question and answer period, one reporter suggested that Europeans remained skeptical about administration intentions, particularly as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was still suggesting “the mission should determine the coalition.” The reporter asked what the United States would do to improve transatlantic relations. The President’s answer was relatively straight-forward: we had a major difference with some allies over Iraq and now we need to put that issue behind us. For the most part, European governments did appear to put the issue behind them, by agreeing to disagree about the wisdom of invading Iraq, but accepting the new more NATO-friendly U.S. attitude as reaffirmation of U.S. support for the alliance. Few Europeans were convinced


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that the administration’s words and actions could be undone simply by a “charm offensive” by the President and his Secretary of State, but the more productive Euro-Atlantic relationship suggested that attitudes do matter. Failure of the EU constitution to win popular acceptance implied that arguments being made for the EU to become a “balancer” of U.S. power internationally could not be sustained by reality, at least not in the near term. The European Union constitution failed to win approval, being turned down in 2005 referenda in France and the Netherlands. The failure of the constitutional treaty did not signify popular rejection of the “balancer” argument. Decisions in France and the Netherlands were based far more on the desire to preserve national identities and cultures and on concerns about economic consequences than on any grand strategic arguments. But this failure did squelch talk about the EU as a “balancer,” and led to serious introspection among EU governments. How could one imagine the EU counterbalancing the United States if even the most “Gaullist” of European countries, whose government had argued the case, could not win popular approval for a document that would establish the platform for such a role? New European democracies in Eastern and Central Europe were strongly committed to NATO’s continuation, particularly because their historical and geographic proximity to Russian power and influence convinced them that NATO provided an essential link to U.S. power that was not provided by EU membership. Former Soviet satellites in Central and Eastern Europe and three former Soviet Republics (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) had worked hard to adopt “western” political and economic systems. They wanted to align with the United States and to protect themselves against Russian influence. They wanted to be EU and NATO members to ensure that they are part of Europe with strong links to the United States. Those who wanted the EU to become a “balancer” of American power were disappointed and even angered by the fact that the new democracies wanted a form of European unity that remained compatible with transatlantic alliance. The net impact, however, was to reaffirm the importance of the transatlantic link and NATO. European governments simply had no alternative to remaining in alliance with the United States, and NATO was still the most important symbol and operational component of the relationship. Even before the EU constitution went down in defeat, there were serious questions about the EU balancer concept. In a new balance of power system, the EU would have been required to align itself with Russia and China from time to time as required by disagreements with the United States. One presumes this also could mean that the United States would be free to align with other countries, let’s say India and Japan, or even Russia or China, against the European Union. It doesn’t take much imagination to envision how unstable international relations could become in such an environment. Moreover, how comfortable would Europeans feel about aligning themselves with autocratic or even authoritarian states against the American democracy? Somehow this model of international relations never made much sense.

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One answer, of course, is that the EU could be a “soft” balancer, simply opposing U.S. policies as necessary and acting as a friendly critic of the United States and not formally aligning itself with any other power. This, however, is not much different from the current state of transatlantic relations. A healthy dialogue over differing points of view is in the interests of democracies on both sides of the Atlantic. West European governments remained split concerning the future construction of Europe, and the default position (of European integration within the broader context of transatlantic cooperation) was sufficiently compelling to discourage other options. The debate in Europe over the U.S. invasion of Iraq reflected the fact that there were very different attitudes and assumptions concerning the relationship with the United States. While some European states opposed the U.S. action based on their judgment that the case for war had not been made, others lined up in support. Among some traditional NATO allies, the United States was supported by several governments led by conservative parties. In the United Kingdom, the powerful influence of the “special relationship” in the hands of Prime Minister Tony Blair aligned the United Kingdom with its American ally. The divisions among allies and even within allied governments were based not just on the merits of the case for war but also on differing images of Europe’s future. When the model of the EU as a balancer fell apart, the idea of a uniting Europe with the framework of continued transatlantic cooperation reasserted itself. In addition, the change of leaders in two key countries – France and Germany – substantially improved the dynamics of their bilateral and alliance relations with the United States. When Christian Democrat Angela Merkel assumed the chancellorship in Germany in 2005 she consciously sought to repair some of the damage to Germany’s relations with the United States, and to make NATO a high priority for German foreign policy.” Similarly, when Nicolas Sarkozy won the French presidency in 2007 he brought with him a fundamentally changed attitude toward NATO and relations with the United States. Sarkozy’s intent to return France to NATO’s integrated military command and to develop the European Union’s Security and Defense Policy in NATO-friendly directions was welcomed by the Bush administration. The fact is that, in spite of differences over Iraq and international relations generally, the United States and its European allies still share an impressive collection of values and interests. For those who argued in the 1990s and into the 2000s that Europe and the United States were inevitably drifting apart, the standard assertion of common Euro-Atlantic values appeared undermined by the many issues on which there seemed to be serious differences: the death penalty, global warming, abortion, gun control, when to use military force, among others. However, in spite of these differences, what made the transatlantic alliance special was the fact that it still stood in defense of core values such as individual liberty, democracy, and the rule of law. The validity of this value foundation found reaffirmation among the former members of the Warsaw Pact and former Soviet Republics that used these values as the keystones of their new democratic systems.


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The financial and economic fortunes of the United States and Europe had become so mutually interdependent that a political/security break with the United States could put vital European and American interests at risk. In addition to shared political values, the United States and EU member states have marketbased economic systems in which competition drives the market but is governed by democratically approved rules and regulations. European and American market economies are the essential core of the global economic system. The European Union is the largest U.S. partner in the trade of goods and services. The members of the EU have over $860 billion of direct investment in the United States. The United States has some $700 billion invested in EU states. The EU and the United States together account for more than 40 percent of world trade and represent almost 60 percent of the industrialized world’s gross domestic product. Joseph P. Quinlin concluded in his excellent 2003 study of U.S.-European mutual economic interdependence that: “In sum, the years since the fall of the Berlin Wall have witnessed one of the greatest periods of transatlantic economic integration in history. Our mutual stake in each other’s prosperity has grown dramatically since the end of the Cold War. We ignore these realities at our peril.” Finally, in 2008, developments in Russian policy starkly highlighted what could return as another reason why NATO will survive the new century crisis. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO’s members have attempted to develop cooperative political, economic and security relations with Russia. This has not stopped the allies from taking steps that they saw as warranted by their own values and interests, such as admitting former Warsaw Pact allies and Soviet republics to alliance membership. However, other dynamics have been working on Russian policies. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a chance that Russia itself would fall apart, as the Chechen separatist movement seemed to suggest. It was therefore not a surprise that Russia is experiencing a new, perhaps prolonged, period of authoritarian tendencies designed to keep the country from disintegrating. Moreover, after 2000, Russian economic fortunes brightened considerably with its international sales of oil and gas, apparently encouraging Russian leaders to flex their muscles once again. When new fighting broke out in South Ossetia, Russia took the opportunity not only to “punish” Georgian forces involved but also to push into Georgia, destroy Georgian military and civilian infrastructure, and seal off Georgia from its two break-away republics, Russian officials saying they would never again be part of Georgia. The last thing the NATO nations wanted was a new cold war with Russia, but Russian actions in Georgia have certainly chilled the atmosphere across Europe as well as between Russia and the United States. As one expert has observed, NATO and the European Union need to work together on this difficult relationship and “Russia must be reminded that cooperation with NATO, as an alliance of democratic states, requires compliance with democratic rules.” The longer-term consequences of this affair remain to be seen, but, at the very least, many European states will see Russia’s actions as a sign that they will be safer in the future with a NATO security blanket than without. The events, as well as raising questions about NATO

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membership for Georgia and Ukraine, could even move EU members Finland and Sweden to consider much more seriously joining the alliance. Lessons that should be learned The United States with which European leaders and states will have to deal in the foreseeable future will remain a de facto hegemon with the capacity to do much good or much harm in terms of their interests and international stability. “Europe” will remain a work in progress, acting united in many areas but with EU members acting very much like nation states particularly in the areas of foreign and defense policy. This will be a “uniting Europe of states” more than a “United States of Europe.” At the end of the day, the new century crisis in alliance relations seems to have demonstrated that the United States, Canada and the European states cannot afford to go it alone internationally, even if future differences might tempt them to do so again. If the allies wish to avoid or mitigate similar crises in the future, what lessons need to be learned? Lesson: As long as the United States retains such a strong international presence, it must learn how to be a hegemonic power without acting like one. In spite of its overwhelming military power, it nonetheless needs cooperation with allies and international institutions to legitimize use of force, win the peace. The United States will have to “speak more softly,” as U.S. President Teddy Roosevelt famously recommended. Everyone knows that the United States already carries the “biggest stick.” And, future U.S. administrations will be required to be more constructive and creative in the use of international institutions and multilateral cooperation. United States needs NATO. Ad hoc coalitions sometimes are necessary, but they can’t replace NATO cooperation. Even when the NATO integrated command structure is not directly in play, the day-to-day political/military cooperation among allies and partners provides the experience and habits of cooperation necessary to make ad hoc coalitions viable. Particularly in conflicts like the current one with al Qaeda leaders who use terrorist tactics on behalf of their radical ideology, the United States cannot “win” simply by the use of military force. It desperately needs the political legitimacy and assistance that is provided by allies and partners who share in the risks and take on military and non-military responsibilities. The bottom line is that the United States should not give the impression through its words or actions that it does not value the contribution the NATO alliance makes to its interests. Lesson: If European states do not develop more substantial international military capabilities, familiar burden-sharing tensions with the United States and among European countries will resurface as possible sources of new crises. As we have seen, the strongly-held view in the first Bush administration that the European allies and NATO had little to contribute to America’s security interests was a key factor behind events leading to the new century alliance crisis. The fact that Europe was perceived as having little to offer also suggested that the United States did not need to pay attention to European views or preferences. If this circumstance is not altered, the same sort of crisis could re-occur in the future.


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Lesson: Europeans need NATO as a source of involvement in international security and influence on U.S. decisions affecting European interests. A bigger European stick, with longer reach, will produce a more effective European voice in the alliance. Europeans will have to bring more resources and capabilities to the transatlantic security table. Europe’s speaking softly while carrying a big carrot simply won’t cut it. The U.S.–European relationship needs a better balance in terms of both authority and capability. However, it is not up to the United States to “give” Europe more authority. European nations and the European Union will wield greater influence in Washington and internationally based on their will and ability to contribute to solutions of international security problems. The return of France to NATO’s integrated command structure should help Europe play a more substantial role in the alliance. Lesson: Dealing with terrorism and other challenges requires U.S.-European soft- as well as hard-power cooperation. The experience in Afghanistan so far contains many potential lessons, but one of the key ones is that both the United States and Europe will need a variety of non-military capabilities and programs to deal with this and future security problems arising from failed states. More extensive and coordinated U.S. and European, NATO and EU, cooperation on the use of nonmilitary instruments of security policy could help keep transatlantic perceptions of security requirements and required policies closer to consensus approaches. A number of suggestions are already on the table for ways to improve transatlantic security cooperation without undermining the important roles of NATO and the European Union. So far, such proposals have not been sufficiently compelling to override resistance to change, including bureaucratic preferences for muddling through rather than taking chances on new approaches and institutional insecurities leading to fears that new ways of doing business might undermine the EU, NATO or the United Nations. Lesson: As much as the allies believe in democracy as the value foundation for their alliance, one of the lessons from Iraq should be that it is much easier to support democratic systems that have been freely chosen by other countries than to try to superimpose them on a base not yet fully prepared for them. The fact that the United States seemed to many Europeans to be on a crusade to establish democratic political systems across the United States was one source of transatlantic differences over policies toward Iraq. Trying to impose democracy on populations that either do not want it or are not prepared to implement it is a costly enterprise that should be undertaken only if the entire community of democracies is prepared to support the process. Lesson: Do not divide responsibilities between the United States and its allies, as this only deepens divergence in perceptions. Given the current disparities between U.S. and European military capabilities, some have suggested dividing responsibilities in the alliance. It does make sense for individual nations, or groups of nations, to take on specific tasks within the overall framework of transatlantic cooperation. In fact, the special capacities that European allies have for managing stabilization and reconstruction activities could be usefully combined with the potent U.S. ability for war fighting to develop a full spectrum of pre-conflict, conflict, and post-conflict coalition

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activities. This would require closer political and strategic cooperation and better integrated planning, including the will to imagine and project reactions to a wide range of contingencies. However, any formal division of responsibilities (hard power tasks for the United States, soft power jobs for the Europeans) would be a disaster for U.S.–European relations. In a world of divided Euro-Atlantic responsibilities, responses to every future security challenge would have to overcome growing divergences in appreciation of the problem before effective cooperation could even be imagined. The bottom line is that there should be a practical division of tasks among the transatlantic partners, but not a formal division of labor across the Atlantic. Ideally, both American and European forces should be engaged in the high intensity and lower intensity ends of future conflicts, sharing responsibility for the strategies required for the entire continuum. Lesson: In the near term, the allies need to prepare a new strategic concept that will take into account both these lessons and the experiences of the decade has passed since the last strategic concept was prepared. NATO Secretary General Jaap de hoop Scheffer has for over two years called for preparation of a new Strategic Concept for the alliance. With the advent of a new administration in Washington, the time has arrived for the task. Such concepts seldom break dramatic new ground, but they do consolidate realities in ways that provide guidance for future actions. This one, in particular, could effectively mark the end of the new century crisis and the opening of a new spirit of cooperation that is sorely needed to deal with the challenges now facing the alliance. Lesson: Perceptions do matter. The ways that the United States and the allies perceive each other’s intentions and actions have an important impact on the functioning of the alliance. Moreover, because all the allies are democracies, the way that publics on both sides of the Atlantic perceive the value of allies and the alliance can profoundly affect its future. NATO’s public information services perform an important function in providing material about NATO that can then be used by commentators, teachers, and governments. Over the long run, the way that the alliance is portrayed on op-ed pages and in classrooms will have an important effect on perceptions. This is even more important now that substantially fewer Americans serve in European countries on NATO duty resulting in substantially diminished person-toperson contacts that have in the past helped sustain transatlantic cooperation. In the near term, European and American governments need to take care that the impressions they give to their publics about the value of these relationships are consistent with their interests. And, if they believe that NATO is important to their interests, they need to be proactive in shaping public opinion in supportive ways. The Bottom Line The transatlantic alliance faces a complex and demanding set of issues, including: what will be required to succeed in Afghanistan; how can international terrorism best be confronted and contained; how should the allies deal with a Russia that is reconsolidating and reasserting its power and influence; should NATO remain a regional alliance with global partnerships and


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missions, or should it become a global alliance; and how can the allies best accommodate internal political and economic dynamics among European countries and within the overall Atlantic community? The allies cannot afford another crisis like the one the alliance has just survived. Perhaps this is the bottom line lesson: preserving cooperation among democratic states, of which the transatlantic allies are the essential core, is essential for the future security and well-being of them all. For that matter, such cooperation is essential to the effective functioning of the international system more broadly. Putting that cooperation at risk is unlikely to be the best answer to any imaginable future security issues. The new Obama administration in the United States seems to understand this lesson. It now remains for the administration to put this understanding into action. Stanley R. Sloan2

2

Middlebury College’s Rohatyn Center for International Affairs, Vermont, USA and Director of the Atlantic Community Initiative.



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CRISIS OR RENEWAL

NATO’s historical achievement of winning in the “Cold War” confrontation without waging an actual war is indisputable. Now the Alliance has to cope with different challenges and new threats. Unfortunately, the Alliance is at present incapable of fulfilling its two most important tasks: guaranteeing the security of its member states and helping to resolve out-of-area conflicts such as its most important current engagement in Afghanistan. The present situation must be rectified. Concrete efforts must accompany the elaboration of NATO’s new strategic concept, which will address new challenges and find new solutions. The sixty-year old NATO is a success story. It has not only overcome the opponent but achieved its success by avoiding war and winning peace. Since we spent a better part of the sixty years “on the other side”, it is particularly important for us to remember this achievement. The dangers, however, have not passed away, but only evolved. So we have to examine whether our Alliance will be able to meet the future challenges. It is time to review the present situation, which is not altogether encouraging, particularly in view of the upcoming elaboration of a new NATO strategic concept. The fundamental mission of NATO is collective defense. In the 1990s, conflict resolution in areas outside the territory of member states was added to this defense responsibility. The alliance needs to be able to fulfill both missions if it desires to contribute substantively to both international security and to the strengthened security of its member states. Regrettably, the Alliance is currently incapable of fully accomplishing either mission in a satisfactory manner. Let us begin with collective defense. The well known Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty commits NATO to common defense: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.” Contrary to popular belief, the provision of assistance is not given automatically and does not necessarily carry the obligation to use military force. Fortunately, during the “Cold War” Article 5 was widely interpreted as obligating a collective military action, for which NATO had been actually prepared. During the last decade NATO decided not to deploy Allied forces or place nuclear weapons in the territories of new member states. Due to the misconceived desire to dispel Russian concerns we have thus underestimated the degree to which these decisions undermined not only the credibility of the alliance but also its fundamental principle. As it currently stands, the three Baltic members will not be defensible in case of an aggression.

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I. Gyarmati / Crisis or Renewal

Some might naturally retort by asking the question: are you not thinking of Russia? An answer would be ambiguous. There is obviously no sane Russian politician to consider an attack on a NATO member. A year ago, however, we would have said the same about Georgia. And what do we make of the announcement that the first, nearly 10,000-strong contingent of the Russianinspired "anti-NATO" rapid reaction force may be based in the immediate vicinity of our Baltic members? The day after the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, NATO for the first time in its history decided that it was an attack on all its members and invoked the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. However, no military action followed this invocation and Article 5 appeared as only a possibility for collective action and not its certainty. We should restore the credibility of the collective defense mission as stipulated in Article 5. This should be accomplished both politically and militarily, even if this requires taking such measures as establishing permanent military bases on the territory of our Baltic members. Moreover, we have significant problems with several new "flagship" missions, including our intervention in Afghanistan. If we wish to avoid eventual failure, we have to admit the lack of a viable strategy in dealing with that country and also of the tools to accomplish our too ambitious objectives. The maximalist aim of creating a democratic and unitary Afghanistan has been never realistic. Afghanistan’s traditions and its level of development make the attainment of democracy and human rights possible at minimal level only. Our highest objective should be thus helping to bring about only a relatively stable and decentralized Afghanistan. Even this will require huge efforts. The new approach to a large extend coincides with but goes beyond the new strategy announced by US-President B. Obama. It will require finding new Afghan allies, mobilizing adequate resources for the very demanding undertaking, convincing guerilla fighters (but not terrorists!) that they cannot defeat us militarily and that we are sincere in our readiness for a dialogue. Naturally, a precondition to all of this would be a credible Afghan administration. The current economic crisis makes an increase in military expenditures on NATO member states impossible. Even the USA will reduce its defense budget substantially. It would be an illusion to expect that after the crisis defense budgets will bounce back to the levels before the crisis, let alone higher. We can only be successful in fulfilling our obligations if with the new NATO strategy we squarely confront the above mentioned problems. We need to examine new approaches, such as the Hungarian initiative for developing joint logistics and mission financing. We should not shy away from solutions that may be painful or injurious to some narrow interests. We, the Hungarians, are familiar with the real price tag for comfortable but misleading or fake solutions. Istvan Gyarmati1

1

Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy


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A MOMENT OF TRUTH1 Maintaining a transatlantic Alliance of sovereign nation-states over six decades remains a unique historic achievement that deserves praise. Yet the achievements of NATO's past cannot hide the challenges of the present. The mismatch between an ever growing number of operational commitments and limited military means and insufficient political will, on the other, could lead to a failure. Questions are raised about the proper balance between NATO's collective defense at home and expeditionary missions abroad. Afghanistan, restoring Allied consensus on Russia and defining NATO's response to new threats are the three key areas in which NATO needs to demonstrate progress.

As NATO celebrates its 60th Anniversary it does so with a few signs of euphoria or triumphalism. Maintaining a transatlantic Alliance of sovereign nation-states over six decades remains a unique historic achievement that deserves praise. Yet the achievements of NATO's past cannot hide the challenges of the present. It is not that NATO's very existence were at stake. The uncertainty about NATO's life expectancy, epitomized in the State Department Band playing Gershwin's "It ain't necessarily so" at the signing ceremony of the Washington Treaty on April 4, 1949, or in the Washington Post's unfriendly quip that this ceremony may be "more spectacular than the act itself", has long disappeared. While the choice of inappropriate tunes continues (the 2004 accession ceremony of seven new members was accompanied by the "Titanic" soundtrack), NATO's importance as the most important institutional bond between North America and Europe remains undisputed. The widespread unpopularity of the Bush Administration inevitably affected NATO's image among its own publics, yet this dent in NATO's public approval remained small and reversible. Moreover, there is no serious political force on either side of the Atlantic that would advocate NATO's dissolution. On the contrary, France who in the mid-1960 had caused one of NATO's deepest crises by withdrawing from the Alliance's integrated command has returned into the military structure thus ending 40 years of ambivalence vis-à-vis the Alliance. And even those who not so long ago argued passionately that the European Union would soon replace NATO as the supreme crisis manager have come to realize that Europe is still too weak, too divided and too regional in its security outlook to warrant such far-reaching claims. When the issues become really difficult NATO remains the institution of choice. What ails the Alliance, therefore, is not the challenge to its existence by internal forces as was the case in the Cold War, notably during the anti-nuclear protests in the 1980s. Rather, it is the concern that the mismatch between an ever growing number of operational commitments, on one hand, and limited military means and insufficient political will, on the other, could lead to a failure. In the 1990s, when NATO became engaged in the Balkans both the means and the political will were sufficient to succeed. The transition from a Cold War Alliance focusing exclusively on territorial defense through deterrence, i.e. through the mere display of force, into a panEuropean instrument for crisis management and peacekeeping appeared to have gone smoothly. After "9/11", however, once NATO started to become engaged in Afghanistan the picture became less optimistic. Amidst mounting operational difficulties NATO Allies are grappling with divergent threat perceptions, domestic constraints on the use of their national forces and 1

The original version of this text was published in »American Foreign Policy Interests”, Vol. 31, No. 2, March 2009, pp. 115-119.

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M. Ruehle / A Moment of Truth

overall force levels that always seem to fall short of politically agreed requirements. Moreover, the serious lack of progress in political and economic reconstruction threatens to hold NATO hostage to the engagement - or lack thereof - of the broader international community. And there is more. Just as NATO is trying to adapt to the globalization age, an assertive Russia has brought NATO's traditional European mission back into focus. Russia's new found selfconfidence, bolstered by an economic upswing due to huge oil and gas revenues, has allowed her to go beyond merely articulating its discontent with the observer role granted to her by the West. Russia's aggressive rhetoric against some of its neighbors, its (mis)use of energy deliveries as a political tool and most of all its disproportionate use of force in the August 2008 conflict with Georgia indicate that Moscow has decided that it will take action whenever it perceives Russian interests to be at stake. For Moscow Georgia's and Ukraine's bids for NATO memberships appear to fall into this category and therefore justify serious reprisals. This new Russian assertiveness has created a challenge for NATO at several levels. First, it has raised new questions about the proper balance between NATO's collective defense at home and expeditionary missions abroad. With several of NATO's easternmost Allies arguing for a review of NATO's defense planning and deployment patterns and with a palpable desire of some Allies to host additional NATO and/or US installations on their soil the limits of a mere "virtual" military presence in the new NATO members have become painfully evident. Second, Russia's assertiveness has called into question the future of NATO enlargement as a benign means of consolidating Europe as an undivided and democratic security space. With many pundits now criticizing NATO's enlargement policy as a problem rather than a solution to European security, there is a widespread expectation among the international strategic community that this process may now have come to a halt. Most importantly, however, the Caucasus conflict has exposed divisions among the Allies on how NATO's future relationship with Russia should be structured - divisions so profound as to invite notions of a "second Iraq". While the desire for a trustful and trusting NATO-Russia relationship is shared by all Allies, views continue to differ on whether that relationship should be conditional, i.e. dependent on Russia's behavior, or whether it should be pursued largely independently of Russia's rhetoric and policies vis-à-vis its neighbors. The freeze in NATORussia relations immediately after the August 2008 provided both NATO and Russia with some time to reflect on their future relationship. Sooner or later, however, the issue needs to be resolved. Given this backdrop and given the global financial crisis NATO's 60th Anniversary Summit in Germany and France was not simply a self-congratulatory event. While the accession of Albania and Croatia was a welcome reminder of NATO's undiminished role as a provider of both security and identity, the success of the Summit as well as NATO's success more broadly was defined by its decisions on operational issues. In this context, it is worth reminding that NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington, D.C. in April 1999 took place under equally unfortunate circumstances. With the Kosovo crisis reaching its tipping point, and with NATO's air operation against Belgrade about to commence many observers were prematurely writing off the Washington Summit as a "war counsel". Yet NATO was able to effectively defy such pessimistic predictions. By agreeing on a number of substantial new initiatives, including for Southeast Europe, and by unveiling a new Strategic Concept, the Allies demonstrated convincingly that they were not allowing the Kosovo crisis to distract them from the bigger picture of NATO's contribution to European security at large.


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This example of NATO's recent past should serve as a reminder of the need to avoid a "single issue" Summit and to focus instead on a broad, forward-looking agenda. Looking at the numerous developments that have unfolded since NATO's Bucharest Summit in April 2008, it is not too difficult to identify the key topics that require the Allies' attention. The first area is operations, notably Afghanistan. From the outset, this operation has been conducted as an "economy of force" campaign with force numbers remaining at the lower end of what most military analysts deemed feasible. Compared to ISAF's early days troop levels have increased considerably yet many agreed force goals still remain unfulfilled. Although there is widespread agreement that military power alone will not suffice NATO must avoid creating a situation in which the limited means determine the ends. The decision by the new Obama Administration to send additional forces to Afghanistan signals a renewed emphasis on this theater. If the European Allies were to respond with force increases of their own this would send a powerful message about NATO's unity of purpose. In addition to beefing up its military presence in Afghanistan NATO must also make a renewed effort to push towards better coordination among the key military and civilian actors, both on the institutional level and in the theater. NATO's operations increasingly take place in a "nationbuilding" context where the ultimate success depends on social, political and economic progress. This can only be provided by civilian actors. However, if the engagement of these actors falls short of what is required NATO cannot truly succeed, either. Not surprisingly, therefore, NATO has become the "demandeur" in championing a "Comprehensive Approach", in which the key organizations and institutions coordinate their efforts more effectively. The UN-NATO Declaration signed in September 2008 is a first step in this regard as it may help dispelling fears among both governmental and non-governmental organizations about cooperating more closely with NATO. The Alliance will also have to focus more on the regional dimension, by engaging even more intensively with Afghanistan's neighbors, notably Pakistan. The second major area of change is NATO's relationship with Russia. While Russia's heavyhanded approach in the Georgia crisis prompted a swift and coherent initial response by NATO the Allies failed to develop a united view on the consequences of the Caucasus war for the NATO-Russia relationship. In a debate that was largely conducted in public Allies appeared to be split into a "business-as-usual school" and a group that demanded a tougher line vis-à-vis Russia. NATO needs to overcome these divisions since they risk affecting NATO's agenda on various levels. For example, Allied attitudes to missile defense are partly determined by Russia's perception of this project. In a similar vein NATO's progress in carving out a distinct role in energy security will be determined to a considerable extent by the state of NATO-Russia relations. Finally, the health of NATO-Russia relations will inevitably affect the NATO enlargement process. While Russia will not be granted the right to veto this process the Allies' desire to pursue enlargement in a cooperative rather than confrontational context will make this process highly contingent on the overall atmosphere in NATO-Russia relations. To avoid the enlargement process from stalling requires both an intra-Alliance consensus on how to deal with Russia and, equally importantly, a positive NATO-Russia agenda that acquires a strategic value of its own and thus can withstand occasional disagreements. Irrespective of whether such a positive agenda is ultimately feasible NATO Allies need to send a strong signal that they are willing to seek new ways of engagement.

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The third area of change is how to deal with new threats. International terrorism, failing states, climate change, the scramble for energy and natural resources, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks and a revival of piracy are just some symptoms of a fundamentally altered security environment. While there is widespread agreement on the need for the transatlantic community to respond to these threats, there is not yet a unified vision on the specific role(s) for NATO in addressing them. As a result agreements by NATO Heads of State and Government to provide NATO with a mandate in energy security or to move ahead on missile defense have not yet been translated into consensual policies on the working-level. Whether a major crisis could compel the Allies to overcome their reluctance and quickly agree on a common approach remains doubtful. Some observers have tried to speed up agreement on the new threats by highlighting their potential Article 5 angle, i.e. by implying a potential Allied commitment to collective selfdefense. While it remains obvious that some of these threats might eventually trigger the invocation of Article 5 conducting the debate in such a context is a diversion. Trying to enforce Allied solidarity across a range of new challenges by evoking a potential Article 5 commitment will not work. NATO's invocation of Article 5 after the "9/11" attacks demonstrated as much. While it served as a powerful legitimizer for all Allies to engage in Afghanistan it did not compel them to lift their national caveats on the use of their forces nor did it help to overcome the hesitancy of some nations to deploy in the volatile South of the country. All this suggests that what NATO needs in a new security environment is a debate about the meaning of solidarity beyond collective self-defense. Enhancing the efforts in Afghanistan, restoring Allied consensus on Russia and defining NATO's response to new threats are the three key areas in which NATO needs to demonstrate progress. Needless to say, there is more. Relations between NATO and the European Union need to get out of their dogmatic straitjacket; NATO's relationship with other institutions, notably the African Union, will have to be intensified, structured relations with partners from across the globe, such as Australia and Japan, will have to be further developed. Finally, the shift towards expeditionary military forces will have to continue. Highly mobile and flexible forces promise both to enhance NATO's military effectiveness in new theaters and to help address the collective defense concerns of NATO's easternmost Allies. This is a fairly ambitious agenda. Implementing it requires Allied cohesion and a great deal of enlightened political leadership by Washington. A new U.S. Administration must not only reverse the worldwide decline of America's public image, it must also signal its readiness for a fresh start in its relations with the European Allies. One step that might facilitate this "rapprochement" could be the work on a new Strategic Concept for NATO. It would force the Obama Administration to focus on Alliance issues early on in its tenure, and it would provide the framework for a broad intra- Alliance debate on the role of NATO in the coming years. In the end, however, the question whether NATO can last another 60 years will not be answered by cleverly drafted documents. Rather NATO's future will depend on whether all Allies understand that the world has changed irreversibly and that many new security challenges require transatlantic responses. Above all, NATO's future will depend on whether Allies realize that solidarity in today's world is no longer measured by the sheer size of their countries' forces in peacetime, but by their willingness to act even if the going gets rough. Michael Ruehle2

2

Private Office of NATO Secretary General.


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RETHINKING NATO AND EU ENLARGEMENT The challenge of securing Europe’s eastern border from the Baltics to the Black Sea has been replaced by the need to extend peace and stability along the southern rim of the Euro-Atlantic community - from the Balkans across the Black Sea and further into Eurasia. The link between NATO membership and EU membership should be relaxed, if not dropped. The Atlantic alliance was reinvented in the 1990s but it sorely needs a second renaissance today. A new strategy of democratic enlargement can and must be part of this revival.

In the early 1990s, after the Iron Curtain lifted, Western leaders seized a historic opportunity to open the doors of NATO and the European Union (EU) to postcommunist central and eastern Europe. By consolidating democracy and ensuring stability from the Baltics to the Black Sea, they redrew the map of Europe. As a result, the continent today is more peaceful, democratic, and free. This accomplishment was the result of a common U.S.-European grand strategy that was controversial and fiercely debated at the time. The goal was to build a post–Cold War Europe “whole, free, and at peace”; to renew the transatlantic alliance; and to reposition the United States and Europe to address new global challenges. But as successful as the strategy of enlargement has been, the world has changed dramatically since it was forged. The United States and Europe face new risks and opportunities on Europe’s periphery and need to recast their strategic thinking accordingly for a new era. Current policy toward Europe’s periphery is increasingly out of date, for three reasons. First, the West has changed. The 9/11 attacks pulled U.S. attention and resources away from Europe and toward the Middle East. The reservoir of transatlantic goodwill and political capital accumulated during the 1990s has evaporated in the sands of Iraq. In Europe, enlargement fatigue has set in thanks to stumbling institutional reforms and the mounting expense of integrating new EU members. It was widely assumed that the western Balkan states (Albania and the former Yugoslav republics) would all eventually join the EU and NATO, but even that can no longer be taken for granted. Turkey’s chances of gaining EU membership are fading. Indeed, the window of opportunity to expand the democratic world that opened with the end of the Cold War is now at risk of closing. Second, the East has changed. The challenge of the 1990s was to consolidate democracy in central and eastern Europe along a northsouth axis from the Baltics to the Black Sea. Today’s even more difficult challenge is to stabilize the countries of Eurasia, the region where Europe and Asia meet, along a new axis extending eastward from the Balkans across the Black Sea region to the southern Caucasus and including Turkey, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Sandwiched between an unstable Middle East to the south and a hostile Russia to the north, these countries are the new flank of the Euro-Atlantic community. Old policies may still work in the Balkans, but countries such as Georgia and Ukraine—let alone Moldova and Belarus, if and when the latter opens up to the outside world—are weaker, poorer, and more politically problematic than the central and eastern European countries NATO and the EU sought to integrate earlier. Their claim to be part of Europe is more tenuous, and the perceived Western imperative to help is less obvious. The policy tools developed for central and eastern Europe a decade ago are, accordingly, no longer as effective. Finally, Russia has changed. In the 1990s, it was a weak, quasidemocratic state that wanted to become part of the West. Now, a more powerful, nationalist, and less democratic Russia is challenging the West. Moscow sees

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itself as an independent Eurasian power, offering its own authoritarian capitalist model of development as an alternative to democratic liberalism. It practices a form of mercantilist geopolitical hardball that many in Europe thought was gone for good. Nowhere is this more clear than in its policies toward Europe’s periphery, where it is seeking to halt or roll back democratic breakthroughs in places such as Georgia and Ukraine. Moscow’s willingness to use its energy resources as a political weapon has made European countries reluctant to confront Russia over its antidemocratic behavior. Until the EU can liberalize its energy markets and diversify its supplies, Moscow will have the upper hand. In this new strategic environment, Western policy toward the nations on Europe’s periphery cannot remain on cruise control as if nothing has changed. NATO and the EU need to articulate a new strategic rationale for expanding the democratic West and devise a new approach to dealing with Russia. There is another opportunity today to advance Western values and security and redraw the map of Europe and Eurasia once more. But new ideas will be necessary to seize it—and to reinvent the transatlantic alliance in the process. Out With The Old The grand strategy of democratic enlargement that lay behind the opening up of NATO and the EU early in the 1990s grew out of the twin imperatives of reuniting Europe following communism’s collapse and reinventing the transatlantic alliance for the post–Cold War era. The goal was to consolidate democracy across the eastern half of the continent by anchoring central and eastern European countries to the West. It reflected the vision of a peaceful Europe expanding its foreign policy horizons and sharing global leadership and responsibility with the United States. At the time, Washington concluded that the EU alone was too weak to lead the enlargement process. Thus NATO took the lead in bringing central and eastern Europe into the fold. NATO’s membership could more easily be expanded, and extending NATO’s security umbrella to countries in those regions was critical to the consolidation of democracy.NATO also contributed to reform by raising its requirements for new members, a “tough love” policy designed to reinforce positive transformation. As NATO played a key role in taking the security issue on the table and opening its doors to the East, the EU assumed most of the burden of transforming postcommunist societies into liberal democratic ones. EU enlargement policy was an asymmetric negotiation. Candidate countries simply had to accede to the EU’s existing acquis communautaire— the full range of its laws, regulations, and institutions. The newcomers had little say in anything but the timeline under which the EU’s requirements would be implemented. Nevertheless, it was this transformation that fundamentally tied these countries to the West and thus created enduring security on the continent. Great care was taken to ensure that countries not included in the initial round of enlargement would not be destabilized. The West did not want to repeat the mistake that U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson made in 1950, when he appeared to sketch a new Western security perimeter and thereby invited the conclusion that countries on the other side of the line were of no interest to the West. Therefore, NATO and EU policy sought to blur the lines between members, potential future members, and partners. In practice, this meant finding new ways to embrace and deepen cooperation with countries that did not seek membership or were not yet realistic candidates for it. NATO explicitly left open the possibility of further expansion down the road. The EU was more circumspect, but it, too, expanded its outreach to countries on Europe’s periphery whose future stability and orientation it wanted to shape.


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The West’s desire to mitigate any negative fallout was perhaps most visible in its handling of Russia. In different yet reinforcing ways, the Americans and the Europeans signaled their strategic desire to pull Russia toward the West in the hope that Moscow would eventually evolve into a partner and perhaps even a de facto ally. NATO and EU enlargement were accompanied by an unparalleled effort to engage Moscow and work for Russia’s own democratic transformation, while still taking what were seen as its legitimate interests into account. This strategy was not a new effort to contain Russia but an attempt to integrate it— albeit in a looser form and on a different timeline than that of its smaller western neighbors. And it was not merely rhetoric. NATO rethought its military strategy and force posture in order to underscore that it had no offensive intentions. Moreover, it offered to expand political and military cooperation and plan for future joint military operations with Russia. The EU set out its own far-reaching plans to deepen cooperation. The West took such steps despite uncertainty over where Russia was headed and despite the fear that Moscow would take advantage of these openings to paralyze Western institutions rather than cooperate with them. Looking back, Western policy achieved two of its goals—anchoring much of central and eastern Europe and preventing instability in those countries remaining outside NATO and the EU—and was partially successful in dealing with Russia. These successes were not inevitable, and their importance should not be underestimated. Had NATO and the EU not acted, Europe today would be a messier, less stable, and more inward-looking place. And Washington would have even fewer allies in dealing with crises beyond Europe, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Today, it is only too easy to forget that a decade ago there were concerns that enlargement would create new and sharper divisions between those countries joining NATO and the EU and those remaining enlargement, and the inclusion of countries such as the Baltic states, set a positive precedent for other former Soviet republics. Following the Rose and Orange Revolutions, democratic leaders in Georgia and Ukraine became more serious about seeking to tie their countries to the West. After all, if the Baltic states could do it, why should they not dare to do the same? The results in Russia were mixed, however. On the one hand, the train wreck that was so frequently predicted by enlargement critics never happened. New arrangements for cooperation with NATO and the EU were set up, and a breakdown of relations with Moscow was avoided. But the West’s broader hopes of establishing deeper relations with a more democratic Russia never materialized. Instead of becoming more democratic and cooperative, Moscow has become more authoritarian and adversarial. Hopes that the West and Russia could find common strategic ground after 9/11 have largely gone unfulfilled, and the two are even further apart now on issues such as Afghanistan, Iran, and Kosovo. The Orange and Rose Revolutions were interpreted in Moscow not as democratic breakthroughs but as threatening developments that needed to be challenged and reversed. Who or what is responsible for these trends is, of course, an issue of considerable dispute.Was it a lack of U.S. and European imagination and will that allowed Russia to drift in this antiWestern direction? Or was it the result of internal Russian dynamics over which the West had little, if any, influence? Did NATO and EU enlargement push Russia in the wrong direction, or was the West fortunate to act when it did given what has followed? Enlargement has created more democratic stability on Russia’s western border than at any time since Napoleon. Yet today, the Kremlin’s spin doctors are creating a new stab-in-the-back legend of how the West betrayed Moscow during the 1990s. The gap in historical narratives mirrors the increasingly tense relationship between the West and Russia.

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All Quiet On The Eastern Front? In light of these new circumstances in Russia, enlargement needs to be rethought from the ground up, starting with its strategic rationale. After the accession of a band of countries from the Baltic states in the north to Bulgaria and Romania in the south, many in the West assumed that the enlargement project was almost complete, with the western Balkans constituting the last piece of unfinished business. They were surprised to suddenly find new countries from Eurasia, and specifically the wider Black Sea region, starting to knock on the doors of NATO and the EU—and unsure how to respond. In dealing with these new candidate countries, the West must stick to the values and diplomatic principles it laid down in the 1990s, including the notion that countries are free to choose their alliances. But that alone is unlikely to be enough, because although these countries clearly consider themselves European, many Europeans do not feel the same historical or moral commitment to them or see a compelling strategic need to integrate them. Thus, in addition to moral and political arguments, the United States and Europe need to articulate a strong strategic rationale for anchoring them to the West. That argument is straightforward. The challenge of securing Europe’s eastern border from the Baltics to the Black Sea has been replaced by the need to extend peace and stability along the southern rim of the Euro- Atlantic community—from the Balkans across the Black Sea and further into Eurasia, a region that connects Europe, Russia, and the Middle East and involves core security interests, including a critical energy corridor. Working to consolidate democratic change and build stability in this area is as important for Western security today as consolidating democracy in central and eastern Europe was in the 1990s. It is not only critical to expanding the democratic peace in Europe but also vital to repositioning the West vis-à-vis both Central Asia and the Middle East.This strategy presents an opportunity to redraw the strategic map of Europe and Eurasia in a way that enhances the security of countries on Europe’s periphery as well as that of the United States and Europe. The United States and Europe also need to rethink what anchoring means in practice. In the 1990s, it meant pursuing membership in NATO and the EU roughly in parallel. Now the West needs to be more flexible and take a long-term view. The goal is to tie these countries as closely to the West as politics and interests on both sides allow. For some countries, this may mean eventual membership in both NATO and the EU; for others, it may mean membership only in NATO; and for the rest, it may mean membership in neither but simply much closer relations. Policy will have to be much more à la carte than prix fixe. The link between NATO membership and EU membership should be relaxed, if not dropped. The EU has enough on its plate sustaining its commitments to the western Balkans and Turkey; anything beyond that is probably a nonstarter for the time being. NATO will once again have to take the lead in anchoring countries such as Georgia and others in the wider Black Sea region. The West must also rethink how it should engage and reach out to these countries. If membership is less plausible as a short-term option, then the quality of ties short of membership must be improved to compensate. Outreach must grow in importance and may increasingly become the centerpiece of U.S. and European strategy. At the moment, the fear of future enlargement is one factor actually holding allies back, with institutions afraid of taking even small steps down what some fear could be a slippery slope. Yet precisely because the countries in question are weaker and more endangered, NATO and the EU should actually be reaching out and engaging them earlier. They need the security umbrella and engagement of the West as much, if not more, than the countries of central and eastern Europe did.


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The way out of this dilemma is to consider membership a long-term goal and focus in the mean time on strengthening Western outreach and engagement. This means recasting policy tools to address the different needs of the countries that are less developed politically and economically. Tools such as NATO’s “membership action plan” should be extended earlier and tied less closely to actual membership commitments, thus allowing these countries to benefit from guidance and engagement while downplaying the question of the end goal. At the same time, the EU needs to enhance its own tools, such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Neighborhood Policy, as well as reach out to these countries more directly by offering them political and economic support. When communism collapsed, NATO and the EU had little idea how to reach out to postcommunist countries and anchor them to the West. Bureaucrats in both institutions said it could not be done. But political will and strategic imagination prevailed, and fresh approaches were developed. Political will can do the same today. As for Russia, neither Washington nor Brussels wants a confrontation with Moscow at a time when they face daunting challenges beyond Europe. But this does not mean the West should abandon its belief that the spread of democracy along Russia’s borders contributes to peace and stability just because the current authoritarian rulers in Moscow disagree. Nor should the West abandon its principles and succumb to the sphere-of-influence thinking currently emanating from Moscow. If the United States and Europe still hope that democracy will eventually take root in Russia, they must recognize that consolidating a pro-Western, democratic Ukraine would indirectly encourage democratization in Russia. Of course, antidemocratic forces in Russia will oppose such a move. After all, Moscow only acquiesced in previous rounds of NATO and EU enlargement because it concluded that the United States and Europe were determined to carry them out and that its efforts to oppose the West would be futile. Western unity on issues such as the future of Ukraine is therefore of the utmost importance. Still, holding true to NATO’s and the EU’s core principles and expanding these organizations’ reach does not mean starting a new Cold War. The West and Moscow should look for other areas in which their interests are more aligned, such as expanding trade and investment or controlling nuclear proliferation and building a new arms control regime.The key question is whether Russia—when faced with a unified West—will start to look for common ground. As strong as Russia may appear at the moment, it remains a country with real long-term structural weaknesses and problems. It, too, needs friends and allies, and the United States and Europe should be among them. Uncertain Futures Three very different scenarios for the future of Western policy toward Europe’s periphery reveal just how high the stakes are in this region. In the best-case scenario, the United States and Europe would regroup under the next U.S. president and launch a new era of transatlantic cooperation by overcoming differences on Iraq, avoiding disagreements over Iran, and stabilizing Afghanistan. This renaissance would include a new and ambitious democraticenlargement strategy, and the results would be significant. Securing independence for Kosovo without turning Serbia against the West would facilitate the successful integration of the western Balkans into NATO and the EU. In Turkey, the akp-led government would continue democratic reforms, bringing the country closer to EU accession. Georgia and Ukraine would continue to move closer to the West as well. That prospect would help create positive pressure for democratic change in Azerbaijan and encourage Armenia’s reorientation toward the West. By 2012, a reunified West would have begun to build an arc of democratic stability eastward

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into Eurasia and especially the wider Black Sea region. Realizing that its real adversaries lie elsewhere, Russia would eventually have no choice but to reassess its policy and seek a new rapprochement with the West. A less optimistic scenario is stagnation. In this case, the United States and Europe would regain some political momentum after 2008 but fail to achieve any significant democratic breakthroughs. A new U.S. administration would manage to stabilize and then extricate itself from Iraq, but transatlantic tensions over Iran and other Middle Eastern issues would persist. Kosovo would achieve independence, but in a manner that leaves Serbia alienated and unable to find its way back onto the path toward EU accession. In the western Balkans, only Croatia would remain on track for both EU and NATO membership. Turkey’s prospects for joining the EU would fade, and reforms in Georgia and Ukraine would stall. Azerbaijan would remain an autocratic pro-Western ally increasingly vulnerable to growing radicalization from within. By 2012, the West would have patched up relations across the Atlantic but without breakthroughs in the Balkans or Turkey—let alone in Ukraine or the wider Black Sea region. All of this would lead to a more competitive relationship with Russia, resulting in stalemate and a new chill in relations with Moscow. In the worst-case scenario, rather than the West consolidating new democratic breakthroughs, Russia would succeed in a strategy of rollback. The United States and Europe would not achieve a meaningful rapprochement, and they would fail to consolidate democracy in the western Balkans. Kosovo would become independent, but without agreement from all sides. This would launch Serbia on a new nationalist trajectory, bringing further instability to the region. U.S. failure in Iraq would lead to partition, estranging Turkey and prompting Ankara to invade northern Iraq and further loosen its ties to the West. This, in turn, would badly damage Turkey’s already strained relations with both Washington and Brussels. Ukraine would drift back to autocracy, and Georgia, the one liberal democratic experiment in the Black Sea region, would lose reform momentum and teeter toward failure. Last November’s declaration of a state of emergency in Tbilisi was a reminder of how fragile and vulnerable this experiment is. Using its energy supplies and influence, Russia would emerge as an authoritarian capitalist alternative to the West, attracting autocratic leaders throughout Europe and Eurasia. Rather than a renaissance of the transatlantic alliance, the result would be a retreat of democracy and a further splintering of the democratic West. As these scenarios make clear, the western Balkans, Georgia, Ukraine, and the wider Black Sea region are less stable and more at risk today than central and eastern Europe were a decade ago. And the stakes are high. A world in which Ukraine has successfully anchored itself to the West would be very different from one in which it has failed to do so. A world in which Georgia’s success has sparked democratic progress in the region and helped stabilize the southern flank of the Euro-Atlantic community would be a much safer one than a world in which Georgia has become an authoritarian state in Russia’s sphere of influence. And a world in which the democratic West is ascendant would be very different from one in which an autocratic, nationalist Russia is on the rise.

Peripheral Vision The West needs to find the vision and the will to build on the successes of the 1990s by reproducing them under more challenging conditions. The Atlantic alliance was reinvented in the 1990s after the collapse of communism, but it sorely needs a second renaissance today. A new strategy of democratic enlargement can and must be part of this revival.


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The decision to open the doors of NATO and the EU to central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s was a triumph of statesmanship and an example of successful crisis prevention. During a time of peace, and in spite of considerable opposition at home and from Moscow, the United States and its European allies acted to lock in democracy and put an end to the geopolitical competition that had historically bedeviled central and Eastern Europe. One can only imagine how much worse off the United States and Europe would be today if NATO and the EU had not been enlarged and they now had to worry about instability in the heart of Europe. If U.S. and European leaders again succeed in linking new democracies to NATO and the EU, ten years from now they will look back at a redrawn map of Europe and Eurasia and be thankful that they acted when they did. If they fail, future generations may well pay a high price for their passivity. Ronald D. Asmus1

1

European Office, US German Marshall Fund, Brussels



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THE FUTURE OF THE ALLIANCE

NATO is still the world’s most formidable military machinery. Its residual function remains valid: an insurance against the (unlikely) resurgence of Russian aggressiveness. It also provides an operational framework for peacekeeping missions. NATO has to mark its Eastern borders in a way that does not further impair its relationship with Russia. It has to also clearly define its global responsibilities, balancing its capabilities with its ideals, its sensibilities with its interests, and its wishes with its wallets. On April 4, 1949, the foreign ministers of twelve Western nations assembled in the White House to sign the North Atlantic Treaty, the birth certificate of NATO. In his memoirs – Present at the Creation – Dean Acheson, President Truman’s Secretary of State, has left us a vivid description of the momentous and, apparently, somewhat incongruous event. As the dignitaries waited for the ceremony to begin, he recounts, “the Marine Band added a note of unexpected realism by playing two songs from the currently popular musical play Porgy and Bess – ‘I’ve got plenty of nothing’ and ‘It ain’t necessarily so’”. The two ditties described the initial state of the Atlantic Alliance with involuntary directness. Because of the speedy demobilization after 1945, its member states were for all practical purposes demilitarized. And despite all the high-sounding pledges that an attack on any one ally would be considered an attack on all, including the United States, those who had followed the hearings in the U.S. Senate could hardly help feeling that this was, indeed, not necessarily so. But the early doubts were soon dispelled. For my generation, NATO was essential: It was our life insurance. It was formed in 1949 – a year after the Communists took power in Poland and overthrew the democratic government in Prague – and a year before the North Koreans attacked South Korea. At the beginning, there was only a treaty, the North Atlantic Treaty. But over the years, the West built what gave its alliance clout and credibility: an impressive military organisation. NAT turned into NATO. NATO not only kept us safe from an attack. Eventually, it won the Cold War. I would like to present my views on the present situation of the alliance in ten brief theses. Thesis No. 1 is a truism, but one worth recalling: NATO is the most successful military alliance history has ever known. It warded off many assaults on the post-War II status quo, it weathered untold grave crises, and in the end it prevailed in the secular conflict between East and West without firing a single shot. In 1989/90 the Berlin Wall fell, the Iron Curtain came down, the Communist system collapsed, the Warsaw Pact crumbled and the Soviet Union imploded. NATO emerged triumphant from four decades of Cold War. Thesis No. 2 But, as Shakespeare would say, here lies the rub. At one fell swoop, NATO was deprived of its primary purpose: to protect Western Europe against a Soviet invasion. Quite suddenly, there was no enemy any more, no confrontation, no frontline. The new state of affairs resembled the predicament of the Romans described by the Greek diplomat and poet Konstantinos Kavafy: “Some people arrived from the frontiers / and they said that there are no longer any barbarians.

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T. Sommer / The Future of the Alliance

/ And now what shall become of us without any barbarians? / Those people were a kind of solution”. Nowadays we are at a loss for an enemy. This explains why there is little unity of purpose – and that there is scant likelihood that it can be fully restored. It also explains why ever since the collapse of the Soviet Empire, NATO has been a hammer in search of nails: a military alliance desperately looking for a mission. Thesis No. 3 There is nowhere any threat in the offing that is equally central, absolute and deadly as the old Soviet Union. As long as it existed, it forced the West to hang together. Whatever differences we had then – in the face of the overwhelming menace emanating from Moscow, we swept them under the rug. The Russia of Putin and Medvedev may get assertive again, as China is obviously seeking a place in the sun. But neither Moscow nor Beijing are imperialist powers, bent on expansion, let alone world domination. Terrorism alone will never provide the same cementing glue for NATO as the erstwhile Soviet threat. It is hard to pin down geographically and therefore hard to deter. Individuals fanatics yearning for martyrdom cannot be cowed by the threat of retaliation. And where the U.S. under Bush talked about a “war on terrorism”. Europeans tended to think in term of a protracted police action. In the absence of a common glue, the cohesion of the alliance rides on the congruence of interests and values. Our interests, however, differ and diverge in many parts of the world. In the age of Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo and torture sanctioned by the White House, the commonality of values has also been questioned. In addition, different value judgments divided Europeans and Americans with regard to the usefulness of international institutions such as the UN and the International Criminal Court, about the ABM-Treaty, the Bioweapons Convention or the Kyoto Protocol. There is no denying the fact that there has been a creeping cultural and attitudinal estrangement in recent years. No longer was America seen as the “City on the Hill”. Its moral standing plummeted under Bush. In addition, the financial and economic crisis unleashed by greed and irresponsibility in the U.S., destroyed the attraction of America’s muchtouted economic model. Luckily, we have meanwhile seen regime change in the United States. The climate between the transatlantic partners has warmed up considerably since Barack Obama moved into the White House. The new president is not a unilateralist. Nor is he an ideologue; his administration just scrapped the term “war on terror”. And he is trying hard to reform the American economic model. (I think he will take more than just one leaf from the European book.) But as last week’s summit series proved, differences remain. We’ll have to learn to live with them. Thesis No. 4 In the face of a myriad of diffuse challenges in a world filled with insecurity and instability, NATO’s erstwhile purpose has become blurred. There is no recognizable red line anymore and no existential threat even remotely comparable to the existential threat emanating from the Soviet Union during the four decades of the Cold War. Confronted with less than existential threats – threats which do not affect member countries equally or simultaneously – it will be very hard to reconstitute a common threat perception, let alone a common response to likely contingencies. NATO is still going to function if securing the existence of its member nations ever became a paramount concern again. In cases, however, where intervention merely aims at changing the existential circumstances of states and societies in outlying regions, it will at best be reduced to a toolbox from which “coalitions of the willing” help themselves. Regime


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change, nation building and democratization will never be an objective unanimously shared by all partners. Afghanistan is a case in point. The West has a natural interest to prevent it from becoming a training camp again for Al Qaeda, but beyond that its internal workings are not really any of our business. Thesis No. 5 When the Soviet Union fell apart, Senator Richard Lugar told NATO to go “out of area or out of business”. It did go out of area – in the Balkans first, then in Afghanistan. In Bosnia and Kosovo it managed to do a decent, if unfinished job, by now mostly taken over by the EU. But how far out of area should NATO go? How far could it go without losing popular support? To the Spratley Islands or to Korea? To the “global Balkans”, as Brzeczinski has called the arc of crisis extending from North Africa to the Pamir Mountains? To Chad or Darfur, too? Is it really the task of our armed forces to see to it that Muslim girls can attend school? NATO did not answer these questions at its 50th anniversary in 1999. At the time, it extended the mandate of the alliance to cover the whole “Euro-Atlantic Space” but studiously refrained from defining the concrete geographical confines of this space. I did not really expect that the 60th anniversary would bring more clarity. Let’s hope that the new Strategic Concept that is now to be drafted will do so. My personal view is that we should beware of imposing the overstretch crippling the U.S. forces on the entire alliance. NATO may have to go out of area in some cases. In the military world I hear that we must raise our capabilities and increase our resources to tally with our ambitions. In the political world it’s phrased the other way round: lower your ambitions to tally with our available resources and capabilities. As a rule of thumb I would say that the Balkans are more important to us than the Hindu Kush. At any rate, I’m pretty sure that the EU as a whole will not aspire toward a role of global reach. Thesis No. 6 In Afghanistan, going out of area has meant going into trouble. The allies’ commitment there was a response to Nine-Eleven: Article 5, originally meant to deter Stalin from attacking Western Europe, now brought the Old World to the aid of the United States. Its offer to support, registered thanklessly, even disdainfully at first, was accepted only two years later, as USA got sidetracked in the Iraq War and things threatened to go awry in Afghanistan. By then, Al Qaeda had been expelled, but the more troops ISAF – since 2003 under NATO command – deployed in the ravaged country, the more the resurgent Taliban went to attack them. Bringing democracy and secularism to Afghanistan looks more and more like an impossible task. Presumably, NATO cannot lose - but can it win? Can it win by extending the battlefield to Pakistan, a failing state for all practical purposes? The question whether an extra two or three brigades can make a difference has become the first bone of contention between the new Obama administration and the Europeans. Nor is it all clear whether increased outlays for the civilian reconstruction of Afghanistan and for beefing up both its army and its police force would have any measurable effect in a country where sloth, corruption and governmental inefficiency are endemic. Thank God, Obama does no longer speak of democratization, of turning Afghanistan into a Westminster replica. “Afghan ownership” is the new goal – the Afghans are expected to take the fate of their nation into their own hands. Clearly, the result is going to be decentralization, a

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diffusion of power, upgrading the role of local strongmen. The culture of corruption is likely to survive. So is poppy growing and, of course, Islam. A “Taliban light” is probably the best we can hope for. We should settle for that. Thesis No. 7 In the almost twenty years that have passed since the end of the Cold War, the NATO allies have not been able to find a new balance between the sole remaining superpower, the United States, and a European Union ambitious to develop a distinct defense identity of its own. Initially, the Bush administration left no stone unturned to prevent the European Union to develop its own defense and security profile Condy Rice’s recommendation to “disaggregate” the EU is a case in point, as was Secretary Rumsfeld mean distinction between “Old Europe” and “New Europe”. On the other hand, the Europeans were extremely slow-footed when it came to beefing up their capabilities in the field. Already in Bush’s second term, Washington started taking a more lenient view. It came to realize that a higher European defense profile could be an advantage. President Obama, it seems, has no qualms about Europe coordination and consolidating its military efforts. In turn, the Europeans have proved that their military capability is not negligible. They have taken over in Bosnia, and they are in the process of taking over in Kosovo; while in Afghanistan they are fielding a sizeable force that has earned the respect of its partners. Kennedy’s old idea to make Europe a second pillar of NATO next to the United States has suddenly been dusted off. And this time round it looks much more promising. The French, who withdrew from NATO’s military organization in 1966, have been straining to rejoin nad in April 2009 they were welcomed back to the fold. In fact, President Sarkozy has made it one of his objectives to create a common EU defense policy, and to give the European NATO pillar credibility by enhancing both civil and military defense capacities of the Europeans. This is to be welcomed. But we should not delude ourselves that the new course will necessarily overcome all differences of views, assessments and interests. Thesis No. 8 The Atlantic Alliance stands at a crucial crossroads. The advent of the Obama administration and the re-integration of France into NATO’s military organization presents the allies with a chance to put the altercations of the past eight years behind them and to make a fresh start. This, however, requires an honest, if agonizing, reappraisal of NATO’s premises, policies and purposes. The alliance must finally come up with a new Strategic Concept – the 1999 document, adopted before the enlargement of NATO, before Nine-Eleven, before Iraq and Afghanistan, ISAF and OEF, is hopelessly dated. It must design a workable relationship between NATO and the EU, including a resuscitated strategic dialogue. It must define its role: regional, global, ad hoc? And – most importantly – it must tailor its strategy to its means. It is high time for a return to realism, or, more precisely, to tried and tested old fashioned realpolitik. Politically, realism means several things. Beware of the “globecop” temptation: of geographical overstretch. Recognize that Afghanistan will remain the exception rather than becoming the rule. Beware of mindlessly muddling through, constantly giving in to requests of the military for more troops. Beware of international moral crusades, such as promoting democracy by armed force, and of guerilla warfare in alien cultures. And never get involved in remote regions


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without having a clear concept of your goals and an exit strategy that leaves your honor untarnished without overtaxing your capabilities. George Kennan’s advice is as valid today as it was fifty years ago: Beware of intervention in situations seriously injurious only to our sensibilities, but not to our interests. Thesis No. 9 The pecuniary side of the realists’ argument is no less cogent and compelling. So far, the fact that the West has been engulfed by the worst financial and economic crisis since the 1930s doesn’t seem to have penetrated the minds of our strategic planners yet. Foreign operations are obscenely expensive. At a time when nations spend trillions on salvaging their banking systems and the rescue of their manufacturing industries, military budgets will inevitably be pressured by domestic and nonmilitary international priorities. It stands to reason that defense appropriations are unlikely to increase as the threats to the internal stability of our democratic societies far outweigh the menace of terrorism. Saving East European EU and NATO members from insolvency is more important than making them deploy additional troops to Afghanistan. This applies also to the much-touted “comprehensive strategy” for the hapless country. Projected expenditures for reconstruction, agriculture, health, education and the build-up of the army and the police force surpass by far the sums pledged by international donors (pledges, by the way, which even before the global crisis were honored as much in the breach as in compliance). A West reeling under the impact of an economic tsunami just can’t afford to proselytize the Rest. No one can remake the world on a shoestring. Thesis No. 10 It would be an illusion to believe that we could simply return to the old transatlantic setup. But the recent regime change in Washington and the new approach of France to NATO offer the chance of building a new consensus. A renovated and innovated Atlantic partnership should be constructed around three central propositions. The first proposition is to build a modernized NATO – an alliance recognizing the emerging European reality and the new global threats. An independent Euro-Atlantic Blue Ribbon Commission should study how we can best handle future security challenges. Harking back to the Harmel Study of 1967, it would have to define a common threat perception; a common politico-military strategy for the Middle East and the arc of crisis further east; common criteria, rules and tools for interventions, humanitarian or otherwise; and common guidelines about mandating, organizing and executing the use of force. But resuscitating the military alliance won’t suffice. The second proposition is based on the fact that NATO, while still necessary for our security requirements, does not provide a broad enough base for comprehensive transatlantic cooperation. The alliance remit is limited to defence questions; non-military cooperation transcends NATO’s mandate. What is needed is a much broader framework. A new Atlantic Covenant enshrined in a treaty between the United States and the European Union should provide the basis for a far-reaching cooperative transatlantic relationship. It ought to set up a kind of political organization analogous to NATO’s military organization, topped by a permanent council – an Atlantic Steering Committee, as it were. At the same time, we should open a cultural dialogue to give new substance and sustainability to the community of values without which our partnership would lose much of its vitality and viability.

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The third proposition is that we must tame economic rivalry and conflict. We must put an end to protectionism. Moreover, it is indispensable to bolster the global financial and economic system by agreeing on a transnational regulatory mechanism for banks, including investment banks, for hedge funds, private equity firms, rating agencies and auditing companies. A Transatlantic Free Trade Area, as once proposed by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel, might be too ambitious a project. Moreover, given the fact that transatlantic trade is already 95 percent free and unencumbered by any tariff barriers, its added value would be limited. Thus the Transatlantic Economic Council set up two years ago, while less visionary, is perhaps more realistic. It is based on the realization that the abolition of non-tariff barriers is potentially far more effective than the abolition of the few remaining tariffs. Such non-tariff barriers are, for instance, different accounting standards (GAAP and ISFR), different financial market regulations, divergent standards and norms in the areas of agriculture and food safety, and wildly differing test requirements for cars, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics. Harmonizing these disparate rules and regulations, or at least mutually recognizing the results of our differing practices, could save companies – and consumers – billions of dollars and euros. The only problem is that the Transatlantic Economic Council has so far suffered the same fate as earlier projects of this sort: a steady decline after a promising start. Looking at the present turmoil in the world economy, it is clear that a great chance has been missed to prevent the worst. It is now up to the G-20 to get done on a global level what we failed to do on the transatlantic level. Conclusion The NATO Anniversary Summit in April 2009 did not resolve these issues. At least it gave the start signal for an overdue reappraisal. Waiting for its results, the Western publics would be well advised not to fall for the pomp and circumstance or for the self-congratulatory rhetoric of the birthday party on the Rhine. The Porgy and Bess message intoned sixty years ago by the Marine Band in The White House is still worth heeding: “We’ve got plenty of nothing” and “It ain’t necessarily so”. Theo Sommer1

1

„Die Zeit“ and „The German Times“, Germany

NATO at 60 A. Bebler (Ed.) IOS Press, 2010 © 2010 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Author Index Adomeit, H. Asmus, R.D. Bebler, A. Beridan, I. Čehulić Vukadinović, L. Cikotić, S. Dedović, A. Erdmann, M. Georgieva, L. Giegerich, B. Gräbner, J. Gyarmati, I. Horvath, G. Jazbec, M. Jelušič, L. Karásek, T.

11 177 v, 49 95 73 95 91 3 83 139 135 171 41 49 5 23

Khudoley, K.K. Mälksoo, M. Møller, K.J. Pantev, P. Pastusiak, L. Ruehle, M. Samson, I. Sanfelice di Monteforte, F. Savić, A. Serban, A. Simon, J. Sloan, S.R. Sommer, T. Starova, A. Wągrowska, M. Watkins, A.

117 29 61 69 35 173 45 131 87 65 105, 149 159 185 79 35 99




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