Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies (Nato Sciences for Peace and Security)

NUCLEAR DOCTRINES AND STRATEGIES

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience. Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action. Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Sub-Series A. B. C. D. E.

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Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 44

ISSN 1874-6276

Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies National Policies and International Security

Edited by

Mark Fitzpatrick Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, UK

Alexander Nikitin Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Russia

and

Sergey Oznobishchev Director of the Institute for Strategic Assessments, Moscow, Russia

Amsterdam • Berlin • Oxford • Tokyo • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Nuclear Strategies and Doctrines – National Policies and International Security Moscow, Russia 15–16 October 2007

© 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-58603-897-7 Library of Congress Control Number: 2008933696 Publisher IOS Press Nieuwe Hemweg 6B 1013 BG Amsterdam Netherlands fax: +31 20 687 0019 e-mail: [email protected] Distributor in the UK and Ireland Gazelle Books Services Ltd. White Cross Mills Hightown Lancaster LA1 4XS United Kingdom fax: +44 1524 63232 e-mail: [email protected]

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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Preface This book presents the results of the NATO-Russia Advanced Research Workshop “Nuclear Strategies and Doctrines: National policies and International Security,” held in Moscow on October 15–16, 2007. Co-directed by Dr. Sergey Oznobishchev, Director of the Institute for Strategic Assessments (Moscow) and Mark Fitzpatrick, Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) and hosted by the International Federation for Peace and Conciliation, the workshop was sponsored by the NATO Science Programme. The workshop brought together policy experts and government officials from eleven nations and NATO for two days of exchanges on some of the most serious issues affecting national and global security. The topic of the workshop was chosen in view of the overarching importance that nuclear strategies and doctrines continued to play in the modern world and in relations among the leading states. This introduction provides a summary of the workshop and the main issues that were discussed throughout the two-day event. The nuclear doctrines of the recognized nuclear weapons states and the activities these policies entail – beginning with the acquisition and modernization of nuclear forces – inevitably influence the defense and foreign policies of those nations which are without nuclear weapons capabilities as well as the policies of those nations that are considered to be de facto nuclear weapons states. The present unstable balance between the “haves” and the “have-nots” is becoming increasingly shaky. Many representatives of the latter countries consider this division to be illegal, immoral and unresponsive to the demands of their national security. The declaratory aspects of nuclear doctrines and their provisions, which now even more than in the past do not exclude the use of nuclear weapons when the national security is considered to be in jeopardy, look extremely outdated in today’s globalized world, when most countries are pursuing close cooperative and partnership-like relations. The nuclear doctrines still support the notion that only nuclear weapons may serve as a “supreme guarantor” of military security, despite the situation in which nuclear deterrence cannot fulfill its role effectively, especially against rogue states, and in view of new threats and dangerous regimes. The non-declared “operational” aspect of nuclear doctrines, which, as a remnant of the old times of nuclear confrontation, still presupposes the presence of hundreds of nuclear targets on the territory of the opponent (primarily between Russian and American forces) serves as an additional destabilizing factor in relations between countries. Throughout the conference it was emphasized that the existing policies of national security and military doctrines do not reflect modern realities and that nuclear deterrence, which still comprises the essence of nuclear doctrines of the nuclear-weapons states, cannot effectively fulfill its assigned role, especially in view of the new common threats posed by non-state actors and dangerous regimes. As outlined in an introductory presentation by Dr. Alexander Nikitin, Director of the Center for Euro-Atlantic Security, Moscow State Institute of International Relations, the acute problems to be discussed at the conference included the correlation between the declaratory and the “operational” aspects of the nuclear doctrines, the

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“first use” or “no first use” concepts in the nuclear policies of the nuclear weapons states, the launch on warning issue, the contemporary “crisis” concerning US plans for ballistic missile defense in Europe, and the present status of the nuclear arms control. The discussion of the first topic – on the new threats and challenges to international and national security and on the role of nuclear weapons under present conditions – focused on the situation of the nations that have nuclear weapons at their disposal. In addition to the five nuclear weapons states recognized by the NPT, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea are considered to be de facto nuclear power. Beyond these states, about 20 other countries have the technological potential to develop nuclear weapons. Analyzing these issues, Dr. Alexander Khryapin, Senior Research Fellow from the Center for Military Strategic Studies, General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, acknowledged that whether or not these countries would use their potential is dependent not only on the political will of their leaders, but on the security environment in the world and in their regions and on the degree to which the nuclear powers exercise self-restraint. Participants agreed that in contrast to the times of the Cold War, nuclear weapons are increasingly presented in official policy documents not as instruments of political containment but as combat weapons which may be physically used to deter the escalation of aggression executed even by conventional means. This situation was considered to be extremely dangerous. Many experts expressed their concern that the most mighty nuclear arsenals (of Russia and the USA) are still, as in times of the Cold War, aimed at each other. This factor, as well as the left-over disposition inherited from the Cold War period of regarding the partner as a potential “nuclear opponent” strongly impedes prospects for achieving true and effective partnership. An interesting and timely analysis was given by Dr. Harold Smith, Distinguished Professor at the Goldman School of Public Policy of the University of California, who presented a comparison of the Republican and Democratic Party policies towards nuclear weapons. His principal assessment was that differences between the parties are diminishing, as evidenced by the 4 January 2007 op-ed by Messrs. Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn, which advocated steps toward “A world free of nuclear weapons.” Smith predicted that in matters nuclear, candidates from both sides will move toward multilateralism, legally binding treaties and international verification and enforcement; e.g. sanctions. Professor Vladimir Baranovsky emphasized the new factors connected with nuclear weapons: the appearance of highly accurate weapons, the lowered possibility of regional conflict being escalated to the global level, and the crisis of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. A number of experts commented that in fact non-proliferation policies are subordinate to the status of political relations, the level of confidence between states and their ability to work cooperatively to achieve common goals. The deficit of partnership in many aspects of interactions between countries was acknowledged. Dr. Edward Ifft, Adjunct Professor of Georgetown University, in analyzing several aspects of nuclear deterrence, acknowledged that this phenomenon still exists. Several participants emphasized that nuclear deterrence is no longer suitable in the situation of a declared partnership between the former adversaries (Russia and the USA, first of all), is not able to deter rogue states, poses a threat to international security, and is impotent to counter the most acute modern threats and challenges, particularly proliferation and terrorism.

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Discussing the issue of Russia and US military strategies Major General (ret.) Vladimir Dvorkin, the former director of the principal institute of the rocket forces, also paid attention to the contradictory character of the present nuclear doctrines. He also emphasized the issue of transparency of the nuclear programs which are not open to the public in only two of the Permanent Five: Russia and China. His assessment was that Russia in the coming future will support the level of 2000 nuclear warheads, taking the course of MIRVing the Topol-M warheads. The experts discussing this issue expressed their opinion that Russia and US are interested in a new arms control treaty which should be more transparent. At the same time the opinion was expressed that the proposed enlargement of the INF Treaty to the “global” level does not seem to be possible in the near future. In suggesting a cooperative approach to managing the U.S.-Russian Strategic Relationship, Dr. Lewis Dunn, Senior Vice President of Science Applications International Corporation, recommended that the USA should address Russian uncertainty about U.S. strategic intentions; that Russia should address U.S. uncertainties about Russia’s commitment to preventing proliferation; and that both should find ways to build habits of cooperation in countering a terrorist WMD attack. A vision of an alternative future US nuclear policy was presented by Joseph Cirincione, Senior Vice President for National Security and International Policy of the Center for American Progress. In a document signed by several authoritative US experts on the Democratic Party side, a vision of such policy was presented. In their view, deep reductions in US and Russian nuclear arsenals are achievable. This would pave the way for the other nuclear states to join such reductions. Dr. Victor Mizin, Counselor, Analytical Division of the Russian Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly, reinforced many of these suggestions in his analysis of how to cure the inherent defects of the NPT. At the same time the discussion of British and French nuclear doctrines indicated that joining in nuclear arms reductions is not necessarily on the agenda of both countries, particularly France. As was confirmed during the discussion of these issues, both countries go along the way of their own national oriented understanding of minimum deterrence. The discussion segued to a presentation by Michael Rühle, Head, Speechwriting and Senior Policy Advisor, Policy Planning Unit of the Private Office of the NATO Secretary General, who gave his prognoses of the new NATO strategic concept which would appear rather soon. He paid attention to the fact that the situation in Europe concerning the providing of nuclear security is steadily improving and expressed the opinion that the nuclear doctrines of France, Great Britain and USA are developing in one direction towards the diminishing role of nuclear weapons in the whole defense doctrine. Dr. Jeremy Stocker, Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (London), assessed that the UK-USA relationship was of key importance in determining the UK’s nuclear stance and that while the Soviet threat has been replaced by a less threatening but more uncertain strategic environment, nuclear ties with the US remain as important as ever for the UK. Dr. Petr Romashkin, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, expressed his point of view that the nuclear doctrines of the UK and France, like that of the US, reveal a break from the doctrine and rhetoric of the defensive nuclear deterrence of the Cold War period and a shift to preemptive and coercive use of nuclear weapons.

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Special interest was devoted to the issues of Chinese nuclear preparations. Speaking on this topic, Dr. Jianqun Teng, Deputy Secretary General of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, emphasized that the term deterrence in connection with the national arsenal is not applicable to the understanding adopted among Chinese experts and politicians. He noted that China is not supposed to enlarge the number of warheads but would potentially go along the way of qualitative modernization. At present China consider the security situation around its borders to be the best in the last 50 years. Major General (ret) Pavel Zolotarev, Deputy Director of the Institute for USA and Canada Studies, agreed that Chinese nuclear strategy does not consider nuclear weapons to be battlefield armaments. China’s commitment not to use nuclear weapons first and its proposal to the other nuclear powers to undertake similar obligations deserve support. In analyzing Iran’s nuclear program, Fitzpatrick described the factors that lead to a conclusion that Iran’s nuclear program has a military dimension. Dr. Alexander Pikaev, Department Head of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations, presented the view that neither the sanctions nor the incentives employed by the international community to date have had any impact on Iran’s stance, primarily because Washington has undercut the value of the incentives offered. Representative of the Iranian Embassy in Moscow expressed confidence that Iran has neither the intention nor the capability to construct nuclear weapons and that “minor disputes” should not impede Iranian-IAEA cooperation. The example of North Korea was mostly treated as the successful case of cooperative efforts of the leading states. Dr. Jonathan D. Pollack, Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies at the US Naval War College assess the various strategies pursued to date to forestall North Korean acquisition of nuclear weapons, and noted that none of them have yet achieved definitive results. Discussion focused on the loopholes in the nonproliferation regime when a country can benefit from all the privileges of being within the NPT regime and then withdraw without punishment. The existence of the suspected nuclear arsenal in Israel, and the creation of arsenals by India and Pakistan outside the limitations of the NPT at present pose even more challenges to the NPT regime. Dr. Yair Evron, Professor of International Relations at Tel Aviv University, assessed that while Israel’s ambiguous nuclear posture signals self restraint and caution, the policy has not in fact deterred armed violence against the state, and it was only a secondary factor in inducing Arab regimes to seek peace. Dr. Rajesh M. Basrur, associate professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University Singapore, explained that while India’s rapidly growing international profile has raised concerns about the potential expansion of its nuclear capabilities. Indian strategic culture is minimalistic, the product of decades of slow growth and a firmly grounded policy of non-deployment. Pakistan’s ambassador to Russia also stressed the minimum deterrence underpinning of his country’s nuclear forces. Some experts lamented that “third states” are being presented with new incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. For instance, for many countries the US military campaign in Iraq served as an additional proof that only nuclear weapons may provide real security. The comment was made, for example, that “if Saddam Hussein really had nuclear weapons at his disposal Washington would not dare to intervene.” Hence the acute need for creating “security conditions” and collective security systems, including nuclear-weapon-free zones, if possible, in the most uneasy regions of the world. In this respect, Lt. Gen. (ret.) Vadim Grechaninov, President of the Atlantic Rada of

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Ukraine, argued that Ukraine’s disarmament experience can serve as a positive example for the world today.

Acknowledgments The workshop directors appreciate the contributions to the discussion of all the participants, including those not named above. Credit is due the NATO officials and staff who lent support, particularly Fernando Carvalho Rodrigues, Programme Director for Human and Societal Dynamics of the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme, and Elizabeth Cowan, program assistant. Special gratitude is extended to Adelina Akhmentzyanova, Eugenia Andryushina, Eva Kharitonova, Oksana Novikova, Varvara Sinitsina, Yulia Starilova, and Bejanishvili Zurab for their contributions in Moscow toward the organization of the conference, and for their translation and editing of chapters of this book. We also wish to thank Erin Blankenship and Rachel Yemini in London for their skillful copy-editing and lay-out assistance in the preparation of this book. Above all, Alexander Nikitin deserves acknowledgment for inspiring the workshop and for providing strategic direction and organizational advice before, during and after the proceedings. Sergey Oznobishchev and Mark Fitzpatrick Workshop Co-Directors

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Contents Preface Sergey Oznobishchev and Mark Fitzpatrick

v

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World Alexander Khyrapin

1

A Comparison of Republican and Democratic Policies Regarding Non-Proliferation Harold Smith Understanding Deterrence Edward Ifft Cooperative Security Management: Toward a New Approach for Managing the U.S.-Russian Strategic Relationship Lewis A. Dunn Prospects for Change in US Nuclear Policy Joseph Cirincione The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects” of the Nonproliferation Regime Victor Mizin

7 16

25 30

39

NATO’s Future Nuclear Doctrine: Factors Shaping a Decision Michael Rűhle

58

British Nuclear Strategy Jeremy Stocker

64

Nuclear Doctrines of the United Kingdom and France: A Russian Perspective Petr Romashkin

70

A New Look at China’s Nuclear Policy Jianqun Teng

79

Modern Nuclear Strategy of China Pavel Zolotarev

87

Iranian Nuclear Program – Peaceful or Military Goals? Mark Fitzpatrick

92

Iranian Nuclear Problem: Prospects for a Solution Alexander Pikaev

99

Unfinished Business: The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program Jonathan D. Pollack

113

Israel: The Role of Nuclear Weapons Yair Evron

121

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India’s Nuclear Arsenal: Prospects for Enlargement Rajesh M. Basrur

129

Non-Nuclear Ukraine and Its Nuclear Security Vadim Grechaninov

138

The Present and the Future of Nuclear Doctrines Alexander Nikitin and Sergey Oznobishchev

144

Author Index

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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-1

1

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World Alexander KHYRAPIN1

Abstract. Deterrence policy was officially acknowledged as a constituent part of national policy after the advent of nuclear weapons and therein became a main instrument of military confrontation. The role of nuclear weapons as a means of deterring aggression will be preserved for the foreseeable future. Deterrence as the basis for strategic stability, however, may be endangered by various military developments, including by: the creation of the global anti ballistic missile system; attempts to reach strategic military dominance by re-equipping ballistic missiles with conventional warheads and retaining a nuclear potential; the possible lifting of restrictions on the deployment of weapons in outer space and the creation of military bases in zones of so-FDOOHG³YLWDOLQWHUHVWV´

The strategy of deterrence Throughout the centuries-old existence of the intergovernmental relations, the deterrence of aggression has been one of the key elements of DVWDWH¶VQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\ SROLF\  $W WKH VDPH WLPH ³GHWHUUHQFH SROLF\´ ZDV RIILFLDOO\ DFNQRZOHGJHG DV D FRQVWLWXHQWSDUWRIWKHVWDWH¶VQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\SROLF\RQO\ZKHQQXFOHDUZHDSRQVKDG been created and thus became a main instrument of military confrontation. The term ³GHWHUUHQFH´LWVHOIWRRNRQVSHFLDOVLJQLILFDQFHDVZHOODVLWZDVQRZQHZO\DWWDFKHGWR nuclear scenarios. In time nuclear deterrence became the basis for strategic deterrence of a potential aggressor from unleashing war. When understood as force containment, nuclear deterrence aims to convince the enemy that aggression lacks any prospects in view of the consequences that such military actions may entail. Hence the first key determinant of deterrence is the FDWHJRU\ RI ³LQWLPLGDWLRQ´ ZKLFK SUHVXSSRVHV WR IULJKWHQ WKH PLOLWDU\-political leadership of the potential aggressor state with the consequences of the retaliation. In WKLVOLJKWVRPHDQDO\VWVLQWHUSUHWWKHWHUP³GHWHUUHQFH´DV³GLVVXDVLRQWKURXJKIHDU´ The intimidation is based on the threat of retaliation, i.e. the guaranteed punishment of a certain scale. The implementation of the retaliation threat suggests that certain consequences for the aggressor state will follow. As the numerous examples of armed conflicts including both world wars show, consequences in a broad sense may be of various character and scale ± from moral-political deprecation and economic sanctions imposed by the international community, up to heavy territorial, economic and demographic losses including the disintegration of the state or significant limitation of its sovereignty. 1

Leading Research Fellow, Center for Military-Strategic Studies of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces.

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A. Khyrapin / The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World

The consequences of deterring the aggressor are usually associated with the FRQFHSWRI³GDPDJH´PDLQO\XQGHUVWRRGDVSK\VLFDOORVVHVRILQGXVWULDOGHPRJUDSKLF and military capacities that the aggressor would suffer as a result of the retaliatory actions of the opposite party. Since the very moment of its formulation the category of ³GDPDJH´ KDV EHHQ RYHUWO\ RU GLVFUHHWO\ DFNQRZOHGJHG E\ DOO H[SHUWV DV WKH EDVLV RI deterrence. At WKH VDPH WLPH RQO\ WKH GDPDJH ZKLFK LQ YLHZ RI WKH DJJUHVVRU¶V political-military leadership, implies losses incommensurable with the benefits can keep the adversary from direct military aggression. The level of inflicted damage which exceeds the level RI ³DFFHSWDELOLW\´ GHILQHG E\ WKH HQHP\ KLPVHOI LV FDOOHG ³GHWHUUHQWGDPDJH´LQWKHGHWHUUHQFHWKHRU\7KHXSSHUOLPLWRIWKHGHWHUUHQWGDPDJHLV ³XQDFFHSWDEOHGDPDJH´LQLWVFODVVLFDOPHDQLQJ 7KHUHIRUH WKH KLHUDUFKLFDO FKDLQ RI ³LQWLPLGDWLRQ ± retaliation threat ± FRQVHTXHQFHVGHWHUUHQWGDPDJH ´SURYLGHVWKHJURXQGIRUQXFOHDUGHWHUUHQFH

Nuclear deterrence in the world It should be emphasized that for over 60 years of its existence nuclear weaponry has played an important role in preventing regional and large-sale wars in the first place, as well as local conflicts between the nuclear powers and the coalitions they formed ± the resolution of such conflict situations as the Taiwan (1954 and 1958), Berlin (1961), and Cuban (1962) crises at the climax of the military-political and ideological confrontation between the two world systems being glaring examples. Fortunately, each of these crises ended peacefully and at the same time helped to create the mutual deterrence system and the conceptual framework of nuclear security. However, at that time more than 200 local wars and armed conflicts which included the direct participation of nuclear states were unleashed: for example, the USA and their NATO allies took part in the conflicts in Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq and the Soviet Union took part in the war in Afghanistan. This shows that the existence of nuclear weapons cannot deter all armed conflicts, let alone terrorist attacks. Therefore the main purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter the escalation of conventional wars, meaning the development of local conflicts into regional, regional into large-scale, and large-scale into nuclear wars. Today there are five states which officially possess nuclear weapons de jure: Russia, the United States, Great Britain, France and China. India and Pakistan have acknowledged military nuclear programs. Israel neither confirms nor denies that it possesses nuclear weapons and North Korea has claimed to have obtained such weapons. According to the IAEA another 20 states possess the potential to create nuclear weapons but owing to different reasons have refrained from it so far. For some of them making the nuclear choice is only a question of political will, not of technological impediments. Countries have varying perspectives regarding their nuclear deterrent. The USA, Great Britain and France, as both nuclear powers and NATO member states, follow the coalition military strategy including nuclear strategy, though their national nuclear strategies diverge on certain positions. For example, NATO coalition strategy views QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DV WKH ³H[WUHPH LQVWUXPHQW´ ODVW UHVHUYH  ZKHUHDV $PHULFD¶V RZQ QXFOHDU VWUDWHJ\ GRHV QRW UHJDUG QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DV WKH ³H[WUHPH LQVWUXPHQW´ DV LW DLPVWR³FUHDWHWKHKLJKHVWSRVVLEOH XQFHUWDLQW\´DERXWWKHSRWHQWLDOSHULRGDQGVFDOHRI nuclear weapons use against the enemy.

A. Khyrapin / The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World

3

Interestingly, in contrast to the Cold War period, based on its economic and military capacities the United States today has rather shifted its emphasis from nuclear ZHDSRQVDQGEURDGHQHGWKHQRWLRQRI³WULDG´7KLVLQFOXGHVFRQYHQWLRQDOVWULNHIRUFHV (high-precision weapons), the ABM system, and flexible infrastructure which guarantee a possible quick build-up of operatively deployed nuclear forces. That being said, the United States does not rule out the possibility of delivering pre-emptive nuclear strikes against the adversary states possessing weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological or nuclear). It should be noted that in accordance with the Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty (2002), both Russia and the United States are to reduce their strategic offensive arms by 2012 to 1700-2200 strategic nuclear warheads. With regard to these reductions, however, the American side has implied that the agreemHQW SHUWDLQV RQO\ ³RSHUDWLYHO\ GHSOR\HG´ QXFOHDU ZDUKHDGV WKXV reserving the opportunity to build up its nuclear forces at any time. Other nuclear states have their own views of nuclear weapons and deterrence. The Chinese military-political leadership sees its nuclear weapons as the basic instrument to deter any attempts of military force pressure upon the state. India and Pakistan regard their nuclear weapons not only as the means of defense policy in contemporary conditions, but also as an indicator of high-tech development and status in the international relations system. The history of the nuclear deterrence in intergovernmental relations supports the viewpoint of many states (primarily the developing countries) that nuclear weaponry is one of the most effective instruments to protect oneself from the aggression of a more developed adversary. It seems that this view on the role of nuclear weapons in the overall system of international relations and national security will last for a long time. Besides, GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV¶ LQWHUHVW LQ DFTXLULQJ QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DQG PHDQV RI delivery has been heated by the conflicts in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, cases which clearly showed them that no state outside of NATO can feel safe if in confrontation with the western powers. As a result there are a number of states which strive to possess nuclear weapons production technology as an effective instrument to deter a more powerful adversary even when the opposing parties have significantly asymmetric capacities. It should be stressed once again that there are approximately 20 states today which have the potential to develop nuclear weapons and this number will only grow. There are several reasons underlying the desire to possess nuclear weapons: Strengthening national (military) security; Enhancing national status and prestige; Protecting national freedom of action.

5XVVLD¶VSRVLWLRQ The position of the Russian Federation concerning the role of nuclear weapons in the international relations system is close to the viewpoints of other nuclear powers. In accordance with its military doctrine Russia reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in retaliation against nuclear or any other WMD attack as well as in response to largescale conventional aggression if the situation is critical for the national security of the Russian Federation and its allies. The nuclear de-escalation of unleashed aggression is an extreme and forced measure and may be executed through nuclear strikes

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appropriate to the existing situation. The main aim of such strikes is to coerce the enemy to stop the war at the earliest possible stage. It should be stressed that Russia had further restrained its actions with the obligation not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear weapons states parties to the NPT except for the cases when Russia, its allies or states with shared security responsibilities are attacked or if the aggression is launched in alliance with a nuclearweapon state. Russia steadily adheres to the principles set in the international agreements in the sphere of limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. In particular Russia has completely fulfilled its commitments within the INF Treaty as well as the SORT Treaty. It is certain that by 2012 Russia will reach the quantitative level of nuclear warheads defined by the Russian-American Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty. However the treaty, which expires on December 5, 2009, does not provide any verificatioQPHFKDQLVPVDVLWLVDQ³DJUHHPHQWRILQWHQWLRQV´SHUVH:LWKWKLVLQPLQG it is necessary to carry on negotiations with the USA on a new agreement in the sphere of strategic weapons reduction that is supported by an effective verification mechanism. Such a new treaty should be legally binding and rest upon the basic principles of the SORT Treaty. It is necessary to stress once again that nuclear deterrence is based on the ides of assured possibility and capability to cause unacceptable (deterrent) damage to an aggressor through retaliation strikes of Russian forces, i.e. the threat of punishment which in fact keeps the potential enemy from attacking Russia and its allies for any rational political, military and economic reasons. The understanding of the disastrous consequences of the use of nuclear weaponry strengthens its role as a political instrument of prevention regional (large-scale) wars in the first place. However, nuclear weapons should be also viewed as the military means to destroy an enemy if the measures of deterrence turn out to be insufficient. Thus it seems that the main functions of nuclear weapons which determine its role and place in the strategic deterrence system are the following: Political function ± deterring the aggressor (state or coalition of states) from attempting to solve emerging differences by military means through the threat of inevitable punishment; Military function ± disruption or de-escalation of the unleashed aggression and decisive defeat of the enemy through the use of nuclear weapons. $IHZZRUGVDERXWWKHDWWHPSWVXQGHUWKHVORJDQRIµQXFOHDUULVNUHGXFWLRQ¶ZKLFK certain experts have been undertaking recently in order to revise the role of nuclear weapons in the Russian military security system, and hence change the essence of nuclear deterrence based on the threat of mutually assured destruction in the Russian$PHULFDQ³FHQWUDOQXFOHDUFRQIURQWDWLRQ´WKH PDLQGUDZEDFNRIVXFKDWWHPSWVLVWKDW they perceive nuclear deterrence as separate from strategic deterrence as it is. Suggested measures such as reducing the forces on duty, slowing down the build-up of high-alert elements of nuclear forces, and transparency about regions of SSBN patrolling can significantly increase the vulnerability of Russian nuclear forces against a sudden conventional, high-precision attack, especially considering the creation of the American global ABM system. After such a strike has been delivered, Russian nuclear forces may become incapable of fulfilling their tasks and thus fail to ensure 5XVVLD¶V nuclear deterrence capability. Therefore before the specific measures of nuclear risk reduction can be discussed it is necessary to address the whole spectrum of issues regarding the strategic deterrence maintenance, not only in the nuclear sphere but also

A. Khyrapin / The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World

5

in the field of general-purpose forces where the USA, let alone NATO, has certain predominance. It seems that before the revision of the essence of nuclear deterrence and nuclear risk reductions can be discussed it is necessary to eliminate a whole complex of differences and problems in the system of international and bilateral security. In order to reduce nuclear risks several urgent measures should be taken, in particular the commitment to: Solve emerging international problems only through political-diplomatic measures on the basis of the corresponding UN Security Council resolutions. The use of military force should be regarded as an extreme measure which can only be sanctioned by the UN Security Council and include a peacekeeping part; Ban the deployment of nuclear weapons and its carriers on the territory of new NATO-members as well as the use of the nuclear infrastructure created in the former Soviet republics and the former members of the Warsaw Treaty; Prevent (prohibit) the deployment of strategic ABM attack systems outside the national territories of the states building them; Take measures aimed at the practical reduction of strategic offensive arms and OLTXLGDWLRQRIWKH³UHWXUQSRWHQWLDO´RQWhe common basis with the USA; Involve other nuclear powers into the common process of fulfillment Article 6 of the NPT through nuclear weapons reduction and comprehensive disarmament; Sign new interrelated international agreements in the sphere of strategic offensive (both nuclear and non-nuclear) and defensive systems, including the ABM systems; Prohibit any opportunity of arms deployment in outer space, to fix permanently the weapons-free status of outer space; and Restrict the creation and deployment of high-precision long-range conventional systems as well as weapons based on newly developed technology. 5XVVLDLVDOVRFRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIWKHQH[WJHQHUDWLRQ³PLQLDWXUH´ nuclear warheads and re-equipment of strategic nuclear carriers with conventional warheads. The claims that such means increase the effectiveness of the war against terrorism are based on one-sided evaluations and do not stand up to critical analysis. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that the appearance of such weapons would lower the nuclear threshold and provoke the use of nuclear weapons. It should be also stressed that the role of nuclear weapons as the ultimate means of deterring aggression will hold out for a foreseeable perspective. However any steps attempting to restrict the potential capabilities oI RWKHU VWDWHV¶ VWUDWHJLF GHWHUUHQW systems would immediately lead to the collapse of the guaranteed security principles not only of the individual states but also of the whole world. In the first place such steps are as follows:

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A. Khyrapin / The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Modern World

Creation of the global ABM system which infringes upon the military security of other countries; Attempts to achieve military dominance in the sphere of strategic weapons by reequipping some of the ballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads and building up capabilities for nuclear reconstitution; Attempts to lift any restrictions on the deployment of weapons in outer space; and &UHDWLRQRIPLOLWDU\EDVHVLQWKH]RQHVRIWKHVRFDOOHG³YLWDOLQWHUHVWV´ Hopefully this approach to solving global problems will exhaust itself in the near future as no global challenge can be solved outside a multilateral framework and without considering the interests of all parties. In conclusion ,as long as nuclear weaponry exists and the possibility of using it in order to achieve military-political aims persists, and in the absence of a collective security system with an effective verification mechanism, Russia will continue to regard its nuclear weapons as the chief factor of deterrence and essential to maintaining stability in the world.

Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-7

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A Comparison of Republican and Democratic Policies Regarding Non-proliferation Harold Smith

1

Abstract. The use of nuclear weapons by terrorists against urban targets is generally agreed to be the most formidable threat faced by the United States today. Yet, there is remarkably little discussion of the threat in the presidential campaigns, and for good reason: one doesn’t win elections by frightening the voters – better to concentrate on domestic issues such as the economy or medical insurance or ethanol. Nonetheless, the populace is entitled to know what the candidates intend to do to protect the country from so formidable a threat. Insight can be found by studying the writings of key advisors on the general issue and applying their thoughts to programs that must be considered by the next administration, whether Republican or Democrat. In this case, modernization of the nuclear arsenal and ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty provide touchstones that separate the philosophical differences on these issues.

A Moving Target is Hard to Hit There is nothing like a long American presidential campaign, particularly as a divisive eight-year administration comes to an end, to show that Woody Allen was right: the future ain’t what it used to be.2 Following 9/11, the Bush Administration adapted a muscular, tightly controlled, unilateral approach to many areas, certainly to the area of non-proliferation. Over the years, however, the strong-man approach has steadily morphed into a more diplomatic, multi-lateral willingness to negotiate key areas of concern. For example, a few years ago North Korea was part of the “axis of evil” whose leader was a “tyrant”. This past year, however, Shapton in the New York Times, which has been no admirer of the Bush policy, summarized the approach to North Korea with a headline on October 8, “NK test – from regime collapse to multi-lateral negotiation”, and Steven Lee Myers, also of the Times, began an article on October 7, “Mr. Bush, who spent most of his presidency with a swaggering, go-it-alone style, has increasingly turned to China…”. Even more recently, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) concluded that Iran, also a member of the “axis of evil”, discontinued its nuclear weapon program in 2003. Evidently, Iran is no longer a proliferator of nuclear weapons, which is truly a major change in American policy on non-

1 Distinguished Visiting Scholar and Professor, Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley, California, USA; formerly Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Programs, 1993-1998 2 Attributed

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H. Smith / A Comparison of Republican and Democratic Policies Regarding Non-Proliferation

proliferation. One concludes that it is no easy matter to define a constant policy regarding non-proliferation in “[T]these most brisk and giddy-paced times”.3 If it is difficult to ascertain the changing positions of an incumbent administration, how much more so is the prediction of a policy of a dozen or so presidential candidates, all of whom are trying to avoid taking any position on any matter so far in advance of the actual election? Despite the cacophony, the answer is not as difficult as the question implies. First of all, the candidates are focused on domestic issues of interest to the primary election in the particular state at hand - Iowa at the time of this writing. Debate of foreign policy, including non-proliferation, is limited to the war in Iraq, a solution to the Palestinian problem, or the (now allegedly defunct) Iranian nuclear weapon program. All of these pale when compared to health care, immigration, trade balances, or farm policy, particularly in Iowa where ethanol – not a nuclear weapon – is the issue of choice. It is a near certainty that the candidates themselves, whether Republican or Democrat, will shed little light on their particular approach to nonproliferation.4

The Role of Advisors in Determining Non-Proliferation Policy The candidates may be evasive on such issues, but the advisors are certainly not, and it would not be unusual for a newly elected president to turn to respected and experienced (and published) advisors during the transition to and beginning of a new administration, much as President Bush supposedly relied on (now) Secretary Rice in forming his own foreign policy. The same could be said for most, perhaps all, of the recent presidents. If one wishes to gauge the policy of either party regarding a subject as arcane as nonproliferation, one should look to the published statements of presumably trusted advisors rather than statements of candidates themselves during an election campaign. One does not have to look far. Just as the candidates were beginning their campaigns at the beginning of 2007, the Wall Street Journal published an Op-ed with the strongest and most bipartisan statement on nuclear weapons that one can imagine. George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, experienced, respected, and trusted advisors, published an article entitled “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons”.5 It would be difficult to find four more qualified individuals to speak on the subject. Collectively, they represent both parties and have experience dating at least to the Reagan Administration as heads of the Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense, and the Senate Armed Services Committee. While one could question whether their position is a policy or a hope – as John Deutch6 and Harold Brown7 have 3

William Shakespeare, “Twelfth-Night” II, iv, 6. John Steinbruner and Nancy Gallagher provide an interesting twist to this conclusion. As a result of their polling of Russian and American citizens, they conclude “that if future U.S. and Russian leaders wanted to adopt cooperative nuclear risk reduction measures that match the changed circumstances of global security, their citizens would be favorably disposed.” Arms Control Today, January/February 2008. 5 George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007. 6 Harold Brown and John Deutch, “The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy,” Wall Street Journal, 10 November 2007. Both are respected senior advisors although their impressive credentials are based primarily on Democratic administrations. 7 Harold Brown, “New Nuclear Realities,” The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2007-08. (Former Secretary of Defense) Brown takes a particularly strong position against Shultz, et. al, by noting that they have the proposition backwards. “[A] peaceful and orderly world is a prerequisite for the abolition of nuclear weapons”; not the other way around. 4

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done, their recommendations on how to proceed to a world without nuclear weapons represent a forthright statement of non-proliferation policy as it might apply to the next administration, whether Republican or Democrat. Furthermore, many of their recommendations, but not all, have been espoused by the Bush Administration, the notable exceptions being ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and elimination of “short-ranged nuclear weapons designed to be forward deployed”.8 There are, however, notable absences in their recommendations; namely, whether to proceed with deployment of a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) and the possible need to modify the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in the face of new weapon states beyond the P-5 as well as an American willingness to provide nuclear technology to India.9 In short, to the extent that the elected candidate is willing to follow the recommendations of such senior advisors, there will be considerable unanimity between the parties, but it will not be total. Partisan politics, despite the old adage, will not end at the water’s edge.10 In this regard, the Reliable Replacement Warhead and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty offer interesting contrasts between the parties.

The Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) as a Touchstone The Bush Administration has made a strong case, using a clear-eyed analysis of the current American arsenal, for the design, development, and deployment of a new nuclear weapon, the RRW. Democratic members of Congress and their advisors are not against clear-eyed analysis, nor do they dispute the technical basis for the RRW concept, but they are strongly against proceeding to deployment at this time. The arguments for and against this program could well be a harbinger of the differences that will separate the parties regarding non-proliferation after the next president is inaugurated in January of 2009. Its omission in the bi-partisan opinion piece by Shultz, et al., underscores a possible significant difference regarding non-proliferation between the parties.11 The technical arguments; i.e., the facts The technical arguments in favor of deployment of the RRW, which are not in dispute, are similar to those associated with the common household decision to buy a new car even though the old car is operating satisfactorily. Significant improvements are possible, many of which will enhance non-proliferation (or operation, in the case of the current automobile): •

Reliability can be improved and, therefore, the size of the arsenal can be reduced.

8 Shultz et al. ,ibid. If the quoted statement were implemented, American nuclear weapons, under the control of NATO and based in Europe, would be eliminated, which has been an untouchable subject in American foreign policy for decades, despite Russian objections since the Warsaw Pact was dissolved and its weapons returned to Russia. 9 James E. Goodby, “Nuclear Nonproliferation’s Missing Link,” The Brookings Institution, Global Politics, 1 December 2006, http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/goodby/20061201.htm. 10 According to David Halberstam, the adage is nothing more than a myth: The Coldest Winter, America and the Korean War, page 171, Hyperion, 2007. 11 Shultz et. al. ,ibid.

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H. Smith / A Comparison of Republican and Democratic Policies Regarding Non-Proliferation

• •

•

•

Security of the new weapon can be enhanced; thereby further decreasing the likelihood that a stolen weapon could be detonated should it fall into the hands of terrorists. The new weapon will be certifiable without testing, an assertion that will surely be debated sometime in the future but not for the moment. It is presumed, although it is by no means certain, that the old weapons, the socalled legacy arsenal, will eventually require testing. Performance will not be enhanced. The Administration has gone to considerable effort to make this point. The RRW is a strict replacement; it does not add nuclear capability and, therefore, in the opinion of the administration should not be viewed as proliferation. Although not related to non-proliferation, it should be noted for completeness that the safety and manufacturability will be increased and, in the long run, costs will be reduced.

Although there is room for disagreement on these issues, they will not determine the outcome of the debate on deployment; they merely set the stage for the debate, much as a legal brief tries to establish the “facts of the matter” with a series of sentences beginning with “whereas”. The Bush position and, presumably, that of a succeeding Republican president The present Republican administration does not rest its case simply on the technical arguments; it goes further by noting that deployment of the RRW will have no effect with regard to proliferation on the players of interest: •

• • •

The established nuclear powers, the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China, the so-called P-5, see their reliance on nuclear deterrence as unaffected by the modernity or lack thereof of the American stockpile. The same could be said for the more recent nuclear powers, who entered the scene following the 1967 signing of the NPT; viz., Israel, India, and Pakistan. Even those nations that may be on the threshold of recognition as nuclear powers, North Korea and Iran, will not based their decision to cross the threshold on whether the US modernizes its arsenal. Most importantly, the non-state players, the terrorists, who seemingly would not hesitate to explode a nuclear weapon to further their cause, do not have a nation to lose, and will not be deterred by the nuclear weapons of the nuclear powers – whether modernized or not.

In short, the current Republican position is that no one who counts in the nuclear world cares whether the US modernizes or not and, therefore, the decision should be limited to the technical and economic advantages to the US. Simply put, the international community is not a factor, and the country should get on with it.

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The presumed position of a Democratic president regarding RRW Except for the conclusion, most Democratic advisors agree with the administration’s arguments. Where they part company is the size and importance of the international audience watching to see if the new weapon is to be deployed. Rather than just the nuclear powers and non-state terrorists, the Democrats see a much larger audience composed of the vast majority of non-nuclear states that have conformed to the conditions of the NPT.12 These nations have decided against the development of nuclear weapons – indeed, some have cancelled such programs or, in the case of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, have returned their nuclear weapons to the country of origin. The Democrats argue that the broader audience did so for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the assumption that the United States and the other members of the P-5 would act in accordance with Article Six of the NPT; that they would, over time, reduce and, eventually, eliminate nuclear weapons. Deployment of RRW would, in the eyes of these conforming nations, suggest otherwise. They will conclude, according to the Democratic advisors, that the United States, contrary to the NPT, intends to have a nuclear arsenal for the indefinite future; i.e., that the vision of a road to eventual world-wide nuclear disarmament is a mirage and that, therefore, they should reconsider their obligations under the treaty. Proliferation would, presumably, follow. There are also practical matters, such as time and money, which should be considered in addition to the softer issue of international psychology. The question of money, that most practical of matters, is of course, always with us, but especially so at a time, or so the Democrats will argue, when federal deficits are both large and fastrising and when the (Democratically controlled) Congress cannot find a way to increase taxes – as witnessed by its inability to fund the changes in the Alternative Minimum Tax. As a result many programs will be postponed or curtailed by the next administration. RRW will be a prime target for such postponement, thereby avoiding the more contentious questions associated with proliferation of nuclear weapons. Fiscal conservativeness will be abetted, in this case, by the simple question: why now? By all accounts, the Stockpile Sustainment Program (SSP), while expensive but probably less so than the early years of RRW, is proceeding satisfactorily. The directors of the weapons laboratories (Los Alamos, Livermore, and Sandia) continue to certify that the present arsenal is safe, secure, and reliable. Furthermore, they see no need for nuclear testing at the present time and are sustained in this judgment by reviews by multi-disciplined, prestigious advisory boards such as the Defense Science Board and the JASONS. Even nature seems to be in agreement: the aging of plutonium, the central ingredient of American weapons, has been studied intensively and found to be surprisingly resilient.13 In short, there is no need for a deployment decision at this time; hence, the Democratic advisors are clear: postpone the deployment.

12

Raymond Jeanloz, “Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation,” Science 316, 1541 (2007) with supporting material, including an extensive bibliography, at www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full316/5831/1541/DCI 13 NNSA NEWS, “Studies Show Plutonium Degradation in U. S. Nuclear Weapons Will Not Effect Reliability Soon,” National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy, Press Release on 29 November 2006

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The CTBT Adds a New Wrinkle; Viz., “Advise and Consent” of the Senate Whereas the RRW was conspicuous by its absence in the recommendations by Shultz, et al.,14 discussion of the CTBT merited one of the longest and most substantive paragraphs in the article, which suggests that there was little disagreement between the prestigious advisors who were drawn from both parties.15 The candidates, themselves, as is to be expected, have been relatively silent on ratification of the CTBT, or so the absence of reporting on the issue would have us believe.16 The conservative Republican senators are, however, another and important matter. They have resisted ratification since the Clinton Administration and have remained unmoved by either the report by General Shalikashvili in 200117 or that of the National Academy of Science in 2002.18 Because of its unique constitutional powers, the Senate, thereby, becomes a useful metric in seeking differences between the parties in foreign policy as it pertains to non-proliferation. Because one-third of the US Senate can reject ratification of a treaty, it really does not matter what the candidates think, let alone say, or what their advisors advise. Every candidate from both parties realizes that the conservative arm of the Senate will probably be able to block ratification, and therefore, there is little practical value in expending election potential or political capital on this issue. The CTBT will, as a result, probably remain in the Senate where there are stark differences among the members. These will have little impact on the presidential campaigns but are worth exploring for the insight they give into the philosophical differences between the parties regarding non-proliferation. In general, the differences can be characterized by the old metaphor of a glass half full or half empty. The Republican senators ask what’s to be gained by ratifying the treaty, and the Democrats ask what’s to be lost. Philosophically, the differences are similar to those that divided the house with respect to the RRW; i.e., the Republicans want to see tangible benefits and measure those benefits against risks and without regard to the opinions of the international community. The Democrats are not against risk/benefit analysis but want to consider less tangible benefits such as those sometimes captured by the (forever undefined) expression of “world opinion”. Some differences, such as the conservative fear that any treaty is an unacceptable invasion of national sovereignty or the liberal desire for international control or outright elimination of nuclear weapons can be set aside as debatable visions of the future, but other differences are more immediate, deserve scrutiny, and hopefully will be debated even though minority blockage seems the most likely outcome. These fall into the categories of [1] whether nuclear tests can be reliably detected, [2] if detected what can 14

Shultz et. al. ,ibid. The basis for the wide agreement is summarized in the comprehensive paper prepared by Professor Jeanloz for the second conference on "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons" held at Stanford University in October 2007, a meeting that resulted in a second Op-ed by the same authors in the WSJ on 15 January 2008, "Toward a Nuclear-Free World" 16 The strongest reporting on the matter has been by Zachary Hosford in Arms Control Today (December 2007) “The CTBT …has drawn little attention from the Republicans but widespread support from the Democratic candidates.” 17 J. M. Shalikashvili (2001) Letter to the President and Report on the Findings and Recommendations Concerning the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/text/ctbt_report.html 18 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) (2002) Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 84 pp 15

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be done about the violation, and [3] what impact the absence of nuclear testing may have on the reliability of the future arsenals. Is the technology up to the task? Most Democratic senators were convinced in 1999 that the available systems were adequate to detect and verify underground nuclear explosions of any useful magnitude anywhere in the world, and the capability has improved markedly since that time. As Professor Jeanloz points out, seismic networks to be available by 2009 can detect accurately the time of release of energy as low as 0.1 – 0.5 KT with good geographical accuracy and can distinguish between explosions, earthquakes, and implosions such as collapse of a mine or the sinking of the Kursk. Furthermore, what seismic networks cannot do, namely distinguish between a nuclear explosion and a large conventional one, can be done through radiochemical means, which have been vastly improved since the first Soviet test was detected by analysis of airborne debris off the coast of China in 1949. In fact, the two approaches are nicely complementary: radiochemistry provides the requisite information about the type of explosion,19 nuclear or non-nuclear, but with poor resolution of time and place; seismic nets provide the opposite. To this must be added the enormous expansion and availability of satellite photography, both classified and unclassified, which makes any activity on the ground related to nuclear testing difficult to hide – especially if seismology provides the archival clue of when and where to look. In short, technology is up to the task; detection of a test of a nuclear weapon should be viewed by one and all as highly likely. So what? The problem, as seen from the Republican side of the aisle, is not whether a nuclear test can be detected. That’s granted, as is the intrinsic value of the intelligence gained from measuring various aspects of a nuclear test. The problem, rather, is what to do about the detected test, aside from the intelligence gained there from. The Republicans will cite the successful international detection of tests by India, Pakistan, and North Korea and will ask, rhetorically, what was the effect of the treaty, did the known ability to detect deter, or even impede, these nuclear programs; what actions were taken as a result of the detection; and given these most recent tests, what would deter future tests by the three countries or by other currently non-nuclear countries. In short, what benefits accrue to the United States or any established nation, for that matter, from a treaty that bans testing, when those who want to test, announce that they intend to test, test, and nothing happens? There are no consequences. The Republicans will call this “realism” and the Democrats will call it “cynicism”. They will counter that an international treaty, where verification is essentially guaranteed, provides a clear statement that the total number of nuclear weapons and the number of nations possessing weapons and that there should be no major improvements to weapons that exist. The argument will be the classic debate between school children where every “why” is answered with a “why not”? The question of “so what” will add rhetoric to the debate, but it will not add substance.

19

For example, a xenon-isotope anomaly, related to the North Korean test, was detected in Canada fifteen days after the event; see Jeanloz.

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Impact on established nuclear arsenals Of far more substance would be a debate on whether testing is essential to maintaining the reliability and safety of the American arsenal, which was designed for high performance (high yield to weight ratio) at a time when it was assumed that testing would continue indefinitely.20 The positions of the two parties, in this case, will show a difference in degree – not in kind. There is no serious doubt within the parties that, for the time being, the United States must maintain a reliable, safe, and secure nuclear arsenal, and any development that compromises its retaliatory nuclear threat must be addressed, and addressed urgently and with highest priority. Furthermore, both parties will agree that if testing is required to ensure the nuclear deterrent, so be it; the US will test. The difference will be in the desired sequencing of events leading the test. The Democrats will argue that the treaty specifically allows a states-party to withdraw from the (ratified) treaty if it judges that testing is necessary to its national interest. Hence, the Democratic call will be: ratify now and withdraw later, if necessary. The conservative Republican senators will not accept this. They will note that international political forces will be so strong and so varied and that the scientific need to test will be so arcane that no president will have the political courage or capital to withdraw from the treaty. Hence, the Republican call will be: do not ratify in order to preserve a real option to test – not a paper option that realistically cannot be exercised. Given the willingness of the present Bush Administration to withdraw unilaterally from the ABM treaty, the Democrats will have the better of the argument – but the Republicans will have the votes; i.e., the required number of votes to block ratification.

Conclusions The quiet debate on non-proliferation among the advisors of both parties, which is taking place far from the hustings and the candidates, and the recent willingness of the Bush Administration to seek international agreement through negotiation, including multi-lateral negotiation, suggests that the degree of difference regarding nonproliferation between the parties will be not be a major factor in the forthcoming presidential race. In forming policy, the Democrats will consider the broader international community, while the Republicans will rely more on maintaining a stronger, unilateral position, but the differences will be small, especially when compared to the early years of the present administration. Deployment of the Reliable Replacement Warhead serves as a touchstone for this prediction. As far as non-proliferation is concerned, the (presumably Democratically controlled) Congress and a Democratic president will consider the effect of deployment on the large majority of signers of the Non-Proliferation Treaty rather than just the present nuclear powers or terrorists. They will opt for postponement. A Republican president may take the narrower view and be in favor of deployment, but it is difficult 20 The automotive metaphor which was applied above to the case of the RRW will be extended during the debates to the arguments over the CTBT in the sense that high performance automobiles (and warheads) need more maintenance and testing than more ordinary cars (and warheads). The comparison is a useful pedagogical tool but its usefulness stops there. Cars that are used continually and nuclear warheads that (so far) have seen no use have very little in common.

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to see how the new president could convince the congress to provide the funds. In either case, however, consideration of non-proliferation will be secondary: the normal bureaucratic processes will prevail; i.e., the absence of urgency and fiscal reality will lead to the easy road of postponement. Debate regarding ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will bring out the same points as those made with regard to the RRW. Neither will spark debate among the candidates but each will receive significant attention from presidential advisors where the Democratic advisors will insist on the importance of international standing and the Republican advisors will look for (and fail to find) more tangible reasons. Both programs will languish in the coming administration, but for different reasons: RRW deployment is easily postponed and CTBT ratification will be blocked by a minority of the Senate. Should there be a nuclear 9/11, or if the public suddenly becomes convinced that there is a clear and present danger of nuclear terrorism, all bets are off. At that point, all aspects of proliferation of nuclear weapons will be center-stage, and the absence of presidential statements during the campaign, including the long range aspects of nonproliferation such as RRW and CTBT, will be overlooked. The world will have entered a new era.

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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-16

Understanding Deterrence Edward IFFT1 Abstract. Nuclear deterrence continues to be an important concept in international relations, despite the dramatic changes since the Cold War. As efforts are made to reduce the number of nuclear weapons to very low levels, with the ultimate goal of elimination, it is important to consider issues such as who is entitled to have nuclear deterrence, how nuclear deterrence operates at very low levels, the proper role of ABM defenses and how to strengthen nonproliferation norms by assuring the security of states without nuclear weapons. One path to resolving these difficult issues may be a greater reliance upon collective defenses by groups of states, using conventional arms.

Introduction Deterrence is a word used frequently in international relations. Even a casual consideration of its usage shows that there is no common understanding of what it means or how the concept operates. All the Nuclear Weapon States say that the primary purpose, perhaps the sole purpose, of their nuclear weapons is for deterrence. India and Pakistan say that deterrence is the goal of their programs. North Korea’s Foreign Ministry declared that “nuclear weapons will serve as a reliable war deterrent for protecting the supreme interests of the state and the security of the Korean nation from the U.S. threat of aggression.”2 If Iran decides to seek nuclear weapons, one can be sure that they will justify it on the basis of deterrence. They would also tell us that a major cause of their disastrous war with Iraq was the lack of a credible deterrent. Nor is the concept of deterrence static even within one country. In the U.S., we have gone from massive retaliation to assured destruction to flexible response to tailored deterrence, with other variations along the way. Similar evolutions have taken place in other countries. Almost any proposed major new strategic weapon system will be both supported and opposed on the basis of its supposed effect upon deterrence. A prominent recent example is the ABM system proposed for Poland and the Czech Republic. The U.S. believes it would strengthen deterrence, while the Russian Federation believes it would weaken it. Evidently, someone is confused! Perhaps the most straightforward explanation for the confusion is the failure to ask “deter whom from doing what?” In view of the fact that this is a large and complicated subject, and in view of the limited time available and the sophistication of the audience, I would like to use the format of posing eight fundamental questions about deterrence and attempting to sketch out what will be rather simplistic answers. My hope is that this may shed some light on 1 Adjunct Professor in the Security Studies Program of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The views expressed are those of the author alone.

E. Ifft / Understanding Deterrence

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this important subject, or at least stimulate some useful discussion. Perhaps we can be guided by James Thurber’s observation that it is better to know some of the questions than to know all of the answers.

1. What is Deterrence? At the most basic level, deterrence, which comes from the Latin verb deterrere—to frighten—is convincing a person, group or state that the reaction to a contemplated course of action would result in a degree of pain or punishment that would exceed the expected benefit of such action. Seen in its most general terms, deterrence is clearly basic to law enforcement or the rearing of children. Deterrence could also be used, not to prevent an action, but to encourage one or to force the cessation of something. This could also be called “compellance” or even “coercion,” although the latter carries an emotional burden that makes rational discussion difficult. We are, of course, talking here about nuclear deterrence, although the concept is certainly relevant to discussions of other weapons of mass destruction or conventional weapons. As an aside it might be noted that the word frequently used for deterrence in Russian, sderzhivaniye, carries a slightly different meaning than the English word.

2. Has Nuclear Deterrence Been Effective? Yes and no. Most scholars believe that nuclear deterrence kept the major powers from going to war against each other for 60 years. There is no reason to dispute this proposition, though it cannot be proven and history does not reveal its alternatives. On the other hand, numerous actions almost universally condemned by the international community have not been prevented. In some cases, this was almost certainly because the international community did not really attempt to apply credible and effective deterrence. In other cases, deterrence may have simply failed. An interesting example is found in the first Gulf War. It is believed by many that Saddam Hussein did not use chemical weapons because he was deterred by strong warnings from the U.S. However, it is frequently overlooked that he was also strongly warned not to set fire to the Kuwaiti oil fields, but did so anyway. In addition, he attacked Israel with ballistic missiles, in spite of Israel’s nuclear potential. In any case, without going into specific cases, one might observe that there have been instances in which luck, or good decisions by a handful of individuals, saved us from disaster, more than the operation of an abstract theory. The Cuban Missile Crisis might be one such example.

3. What is the Relationship between Deterrence and Assured Destruction? It is relevant here to recall Churchill’s memorable phrase, “Safety will be the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation.” He correctly foresaw the implications of mutual deterrence between powerful and hostile powers armed with nuclear weapons. Elaborate theories of nuclear deterrence, which we need not explore here, were developed in an effort to impose some intellectual rigor on a confused and difficult situation. These efforts tended to be strong on mathematics, which we knew

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how to do well, but weak on psychology and politics. Elaborate computer simulations were carried out to attempt to predict how a nuclear war would develop, and how intrawar deterrence could be established. However, these almost always broke down after the initial nuclear exchange. In the real world, what resulted, in the name of deterrence, were grotesque levels of nuclear weapons in both the U.S. and Soviet Union. In an effort to answer the question, “How much is enough?” and to gain some control over the “mad momentum of the arms race,” Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara tried to quantify what levels of destruction would be sufficient to deter the Soviet Union from actions that would threaten the vital interests of the U.S. and its Allies. Various considerations led to the conclusion that the destruction of 30% of the population and three-fourths of the industry of the Soviet Union would be sufficient. The spirit of those times is further illustrated by the fact that, in the late 1960s, as we were preparing for the beginning of the SALT negotiations, we were told that, since the Soviet Union had “accepted” 20,000,000 deaths in World War II, much greater levels of destruction would be necessary for deterrence to be effective. That seemed absurd to me then and is, of course, even more so today. Similar calculations were presumably made by other Nuclear Weapon States. In the West, we referred approvingly to the policies of states with smaller nuclear arsenals, such as Britain and France, as “deterrence of the strong by the weak.” That phrase now has a much more negative connotation in connection with asymmetric warfare. In the U.S., an effort was eventually made to make deterrence less horrific by emphasizing the targeting of military and economic assets, rather than population per se. However, calculations of what would be the actual effects of a nuclear exchange indicated that any feelings of moral superiority from the change were hard to justify. All along, the concept should have been called Mutual Assured Deterrence, but the unfortunate acronym MAD would have been the same. Certainly there were, and are, differences in how individual states view the roles of nuclear weapons and deterrence. There are experts at this Workshop from all the Nuclear Weapon States who can address the views and policies of their countries authoritatively.2 As far as NATO are concerned, previously it described nuclear weapons as “weapons of last resort” and the possibility of their use as “extremely remote.” The current NATO Strategic Concept, which dates from 1999, proclaims that nuclear weapons make a “unique contribution” and describes them as “essential to preserve peace.”3

4. Do We Still Have Assured Destruction Today? The answer must be a qualified “yes.” Of course, we have the benefits of de-targeting and far better relations, including greater openness and cooperation, among the states of NATO, the former Warsaw Pact and China. One could claim that there is no longer a “policy” of assured destruction. However, to claim, as some have done, that assured destruction no longer exists, is a dangerous illusion. A more realistic view is to consider assured destruction as an existential fact, rather than a policy. The only prudent assumption is that, if the survival of a state possessing nuclear weapons were at stake, and especially if it were attacked with nuclear weapons, it would respond with nuclear weapons, probably on a large scale. The simple fact is that, as long as large numbers of nuclear weapons exist, the threat of assured destruction hangs over us. As

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former Secretary of State Colin Powell testified to Congress, “You can’t entirely do away with what has been known as mutual assured destruction.”4 There are clearly moral objections to be made to the policy, and perhaps legal ones as well, flowing from the 1986 Advisory Opinion rendered by the International Court of Justice. However, it is difficult to say that mounting a credible threat to inflict unacceptable damage on an aggressor was or is wrong. What was wrong, in my view, was the failure to recognize that the levels of nuclear weapons created by the two superpowers were grossly in excess of what was necessary to do this. This was caused by lack of trust, lack of communication, the extreme use of worst-case assumptions and the lack of arms control agreements to regulate the competition. The unhealthy competition has finally been brought under control by the SALT, INF, START and Moscow (SORT) Treaties, but thousands of nuclear weapons remain, both deployed and non-deployed. Another result of the arms control process of the 1980s and 1990s was the realization that not only the size, but also the structure of strategic forces, has important effects upon stability and deterrence. While “freedom-to-mix” was recognized as important to allow for differences in the geo-political situation, along with historical factors, more sophisticated analysis showed that certain kinds of nuclear deterrent forces would be more stabilizing, or at least less destabilizing, than others. Thus, the U.S. concluded that placing relatively greater reliance upon more survivable systems, such as SLBMs (submarine-launched ballistic missiles), mobile ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles) and bombers would be better for stability than relying upon fixed ICBMs, especially those with MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles). Similarly, systems which were slow-flying, and hence provided more warning time, such as bombers and cruise missiles, are less destabilizing than ballistic missiles, with their very short warning times. The U.S. devoted considerable effort in the START negotiations to trying to convince its Soviet partner of the wisdom of this view of deterrence, with some, though not complete, success. Perhaps the greatest achievement of this philosophy of deterrence was the agreement to a complete ban on ICBMs with MIRVs in the START II Treaty. Unfortunately, this Treaty never entered into force. Nevertheless, the trends in both U.S. and Russian force structures over the past 15 years do reflect this view of deterrence and stability.

5. Who is Entitled to Have Nuclear Deterrence? This awkward question is almost never asked, but is at the heart of the nuclear proliferation issue. One obvious answer could be the five Nuclear Weapon States, as defined by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, there would not be consensus on this point. Although each of the five would certainly assert its right to have nuclear deterrence, it is far from clear that each of the five would agree that the others have the right to deter it with nuclear weapons. The problem is that discussions of nuclear deterrence in any country will invariably deal with how deterrence works for that country, not how it might work to deter it. During the START negotiations, I sometimes heard from my colleagues on the U.S. Delegation the statement, “We are not trying to deter ourselves!” It is clear that both publics and policy makers are ambivalent about the subject. It would be quite easy to gain assent to the proposition that deterrence should be

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preserved. It would be quite another matter to gain acceptance of the idea that other countries should be allowed to maintain the capability to destroy us. The paradox is that these are simply two ways of stating the same question. If deterrence is legitimate and stabilizing, it would follow that countries should refrain from attempting to take away the deterrence of other Nuclear Weapon States. This is obviously a difficult proposition. It was the basic premise of the ABM Treaty, which is no longer with us. However, even in the ABM Treaty, there was always the feeling that the Treaty was simply recognizing a basic fact of the military situation between the US and USSR and the impossibility of an effective nationwide ABM defense. There was always the view, in some quarters, that this balance could and should be overturned as soon as technological developments permitted. This latter view was certainly at least part of the vision behind President Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). What we have is a collision between the need to maintain deterrence and the fundamental right and basic instinct for self defense. We have never really solved this problem. The situation becomes even more delicate when considering the situation regarding India, Pakistan and Israel. Of course, the fact that India, Pakistan and Israel never joined the NPT puts them into a different category than North Korea and Iran, but the fundamental question of who has the right to deterrence against whom remains. This leads us to the next question.

6. What is the Difference between Nuclear Deterrence and Nuclear Blackmail? Much of the discussion around the dangers of nuclear proliferation seems to be crystallizing around the term “nuclear blackmail.” The best way to understand nuclear blackmail is to recognize that it is simply nuclear deterrence in the wrong hands. The term has become suddenly popular in recent years, especially in the aftermath of the first Gulf War. In an important speech at the National Defense University in Washington in 2001, President Bush declared, “The international community would have faced a very different situation had Hussein been able to blackmail with nuclear weapons.”5 President Putin, former President Chirac and former Prime Minister Blair have all used the term. In the context in which it is being used, it basically expresses the concern that the freedom of action of the Nuclear Weapon States would be curtailed if other states acquired nuclear weapons, or perhaps other weapons of mass destruction. The scenario frequently cited is that a Nuclear Weapon State will be unable to intervene in a regional conflict if one of the hostile parties to that conflict has nuclear weapons. While this is certainly a legitimate concern, it does not take much thought to conclude that an argument that proliferation is bad because it would limit the ability of Nuclear Weapon States to attack other states is not likely to be at all convincing to Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Framing the proliferation debate so that it focuses on whether individual states can intervene without risk in distant regional conflicts will clearly not turn out well. If anything, such arguments merely confirm the utility of nuclear weapons and raise the incentives for rogue states to acquire them. Such arguments also tend to undermine the credibility of the security guarantees and extended deterrence that are so important to nonproliferation.6 Furthermore, they imply that we would not defend our vital interests, thus weakening deterrence itself. We would be better served to stop talking about nuclear blackmail and return to the

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traditional arguments used in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty for why it is in the best interests of all states to hold the line firmly on nuclear proliferation.

7. Can Terrorists be Deterred? The question of whether or not terrorists can be deterred has been discussed so extensively recently that there is little new to say. It has become commonplace to assert that terrorists cannot be deterred and therefore must be hunted down and eliminated at the source. There is, unfortunately, much truth to this. The concept of punishment as deterrence is difficult to apply to those who seek martyrdom or deranged fanatics who believe that terrorist acts can hasten the end of the world. At the same time, terrorists have to come from somewhere and states, and especially their leaders, can be held accountable for training camps and other preparations for terrorism which take place on their territory. The same is true for those who knowingly assist terrorist activities. After the experience of Afghanistan, regardless of how Iraq turns out, it is hard to believe that states would lightly welcome and shelter terrorists. Of course, in the case of failed states, or states unable to control their own territory, some action by the international community may be necessary. One should also recognize that denial can also be an effective counter, if not necessarily a deterrent, to terrorists. This could be brought about through cooperation in intelligence, missile defense, better regulation of the transfer of the tools of terrorism, effective management of the consequences of terrorist acts, and so on. More research on nuclear forensics, so that the source of nuclear materials used in an attack could be reliably determined would be very useful. As far as international law is concerned, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the International Convention against WMD Terrorism provide a good foundation upon which additional measures might be formulated.7

8. Can We Escape from Nuclear Deterrence and Assured Destruction? This is one of the crucial questions of our time. Real escape from under the sword of Damocles does not appear to be a realistic possibility as long as large numbers of nuclear weapons exist in the world. However, it should be possible to push the threat far into the background through deeper reductions and more enlightened policies. Over 20 years ago, Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev put forward competing visions of a world free of nuclear weapons. Many people at the time, including myself, considered these proposals rather unrealistic, and perhaps even an impediment to more practical measures that were desperately needed. However, the goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons entirely has reemerged in quite responsible circles. In an article in the Wall Street Journal on January 4, 2007, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn—certainly not inexperienced or impractical men—advocated precisely this course.8 In an important speech in Washington in June, 2007, Margaret Beckett, then UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, declared that almost no one believes that the current numbers of nuclear warheads are necessary and called for further work to determine the requirements for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons.9 Hans Blix has recently written that “There is no conceivable use for nuclear weapons and their deterrent effect is becoming increasingly ineffective. In

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regions where nuclear weapons might be a real basis for security, other measures, such as integration into the fabric of the international community, are likely to be more effective.”10 In the near term, a crucial question concerns what sort of a regime will replace the START Treaty, which is scheduled to expire in December, 2009. The Moscow Treaty of 2002, while usefully driving the START levels significantly lower, is clearly not the answer in the longer term, for reasons that are well known. A practical path toward very low levels of nuclear weapons may be through the gradual transformation of deployed nuclear forces into “virtual” nuclear forces. Under this concept, nuclear warheads would be separated from delivery vehicles (missiles and bombers), along with other measures to reduce the imminent threat and reduce the possibility of accident or miscalculation. On-site inspections and other transparency measures would assure that these measures were being carried out as agreed. Reconstitution would be possible as a safety net in the unlikely event that this became necessary. This concept has recently been given expression by respected scholars in both the U.S. and the Russian Federation.11 One could perhaps envision a sequential process involving five “D’s”: • • • • •

Declarations/Data Exchange De-targeting De-alerting Deactivation Disassembling/Dismantling

One would, of course, all the while be careful to preserve the most important “D”-deterrence. Our goal is certainly not to make the world safe for conventional war. Although we really do not know yet how to safely eliminate nuclear weapons entirely, we do need to think in greater detail about how deterrence could work as the levels approach zero. At some point, we would enter the realm of “minimum deterrence.” This undefined term has been in use for many years and generally refers to the minimum level of nuclear weapons that could still deter. Clearly what that level might be is dependent upon specific scenarios and the psychology and goals of those being deterred, but it is obviously far below current levels, or even those established by the Moscow Treaty. Anyone who has accepted the line of reasoning earlier in this paper will object that there will always be bad people and outlaw nations and groups that refuse to abide by international norms, and they must somehow be deterred. Weaker nations will especially demand that they be protected from stronger nations, if they are to give up nuclear aspirations. In order to achieve this, one can envision a system of positive and negative security assurances, supported by collective deterrence by conventional means. Although conventional weapons are more expensive than nuclear weapons for a given level of damage, groups of countries can inflict unacceptable damage without resort to nuclear weapons. Regional organizations, such as NATO, the EU and the AU come to mind. The most universal body that could threaten to inflict unacceptable damage is, of course, the United Nations itself. Conventional deterrence by collectives is more credible than nuclear deterrence, since the latter is quite properly constrained by very high thresholds and taboos. In addition, to the extent that one believes in blackmail, it would be much more difficult for an outlaw state to blackmail a large group of states than any individual state.

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Many recent examples demonstrate the consequences of the failure to apply credible deterrence, or to respond quickly and forcefully to flagrant violations of international norms. Although the Bush administration’s doctrine of preemptive/preventive war has been met with strong opposition, it is becoming clear that the international community does need to respond more quickly and more effectively to such outrages.

Conclusion Nuclear deterrence has been a fundamental factor in international relations for the entire lifetime of most of the people in this room. In recent years, the concept of nuclear deterrence has come under attack. It is said that nuclear deterrence: • • • • • • •

No longer exists Is no longer effective Is no longer necessary Is dangerous Is immoral Is inconsistent with our nonproliferation objectives Encourages irresponsible nations and organizations to acquire nuclear weapons

While there is some truth in each of these criticisms, in my view, they are too simplistic, at least as long as significant numbers of nuclear weapons exist. In retrospect, it is easy to see that the search for security led to deterrence, which led to nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence required the capability to inflict unacceptable damage, which was another name for assured destruction. With the spread of nuclear weapons, this became mutual assured destruction. Unfortunately, this led to levels and policies that were far beyond what was needed and were inconsistent with Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Although this process did achieve its primary goal—the prevention of nuclear war—we were lucky to survive the process. Our task now should be to reduce nuclear weapons to very low levels, relying increasingly upon collective conventional forces for deterrence, gradually pushing nuclear deterrence into the background as a last resort. If this sounds like the New World Order, it probably is. If it sounds naïve, it probably has that flaw as well. Nevertheless, it does sound preferable to the world in which we have been living for the past 60 years.12 NOTES 1. 2.

3. 4.

Washington Post, October 4, 2006, p. 18. Recent discussions of the deterrent policies of all five Nuclear Weapon States can be found in Debating 21st Century Nuclear Issues, Edited by Owen C. W. Price and Jenifer Mackby, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., 2007. “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” NATO Public Diplomacy Document SC99ENG0604, paragraph 46, Brussels, NATO. Secretary of State Colin Powell, Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 20, 2001.

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5.

Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University, Washington, D.C., May 1, 2001. 6. For a recent analysis of extended deterrence in the post-Cold War world, see Lewis A. Dunn, “Deterrence Today: Roles, Challenges and Responses,” IFRI Proliferation Paper No. 19, Security Studies Center of the French Institute of International Studies, Summer, 2007. 7. A further recent discussion of deterring terrorists is found in Daniel Byman, “US Counterterrorism Options: A Taxonomy,” Survival, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 121-150. See also M. Elaine Bunn, “Can Deterrence Be Tailored?” Strategic Forum No. 225, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, January, 2007. See also Dunn, op. cit. 8. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007. "The four authors elaborated their views in another article in the Wall Street Journal on January 15, 2008, as well as in a book entitled "Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons," edited by George P. Shultz, Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby, published by the Hoover Institution and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (2008). 9. Margaret Beckett, Address to the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference, Washington, D.C., June 25, 2007. 10. Hans Blix, “CTBT: Going the Last Mile to Banish Nuclear Testing,” CTBTO Spectrum, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (Vienna), July, 2007. 11. See, for example, Sidney D. Drell and James E. Goodby, What are Nuclear Weapons For? Recommendations for Restructuring U.S. Nuclear Forces, Washington, D.C., Arms Control Association, April, 2005 (revised October, 2007). See also Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: Transforming the U.S.-Russian Equation, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 2006. 12. For a more detailed discussion of nuclear deterrence by the author, see Edward Ifft, “Deterrence, Blackmail, Friendly Persuasion,” Defense & Security Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp. 237-256, Routledge (London), September, 2007.

Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-25

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Cooperative Security Management: Toward a New Approach for Managing the U.S.-Russian Strategic Relationship Lewis A. DUNN1

Abstract. U.S.-Russian strategic relations are approaching a turning point: a continued drift toward mutual suspicion, renewed military gamesmanship, and growing political-military confrontation or an opportunity provided by presidential elections in both countries to rethink and re-craft a non-adversarial relationship. 7RGD\¶V GULIW UHIOHFWV PDQ\ IDFWRUV SDVW PLVVWHSV GLIIHUHQFHV Rf interest and approach on specific issues; misperceptions; and the inherent difficulties of breaking free from the Cold War legacy. Among other issues on the agenda, action should be taken to address Russian uncertainty about U.S. strategic intentions; U.S. uncertainties about Russian commitment to preventing proliferation; and ways to build habits of cooperation in countering a terrorist WMD attack.

A Turning-Point: The U.S.-Russian strategic relationship is approaching a turning point. The next years may see a continued slow drift toward mutual suspicion, renewed military gamesmanship, and growing political-military confrontation ± but there also remains WLPH IRU D MRLQW HIIRUW WR ³UHZLQG WKH ILOP´ DQG VHHN DJDLQ WR PRYH WRZDUG WKDW QRQadversarial relaWLRQVKLS DIILUPHG E\ ERWK FRXQWULHV¶ OHDGHUV   7RGD\¶V GULIW LQ WKH opposite direction reflects many factors: past missteps; differences of interest and approach on specific issues; misperceptions; and the inherent difficulties of breaking free from the Cold War legacy. That said, the upcoming presidential elections in both countries offer one of those political points in time that can ± but need not ± provide an opportunity to rethink and re-craft the relationship.

The Principle of Cooperative Security Management Assuming a mutual interest in both Washington and Moscow to use that opportunity, one starting point would be to seek joint agreement on the principle that a cooperative security management approach should be the guiding concept for governing U.S.Russian strategic relations. As the phrase states, cooperative security management ZRXOGSDUWO\HQWDLODPXWXDOFRPPLWPHQWWRPDQDJHFRRSHUDWLYHO\ERWKVLGHV¶HYROYLQJ strategic choices ± ZLWKDQH\HRQHQKDQFLQJHDFKFRXQWU\¶VVHFXULW\DVZHOODVEroader 1 Senior Vice President, Science Applications International Corporation. The views herein are those of the author not necessarily those of Science Applications International Corporation or any of its sponsoring organizations.

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global stability. It would entail as well a commitment in practice to efforts to seek a mutual accommodation of interests, while containing any all-but-inevitable differences RILQWHUHVWRUSHUVSHFWLYH,WZRXOGDIILUPLQWXUQERWKFRXQWULHV¶UHDGiness to pursue cooperatively global strategic stability. With regard to means, cooperative security management would not rule out negotiated agreements (formal or informal, legally-binding or political). But it would encompass many other types of implementing activities (parallel unilateral actions and political understandings; exchanges of information and liaison personnel; joint political-military studies, planning, and operations; establishment of jointly-operated systems; and international reporting and monitoring). Most broadly, this concept of cooperative management could be used as well to govern other key global strategic relationships. In turn, it would provide a conceptual framework for broader great power cooperation to meet global stability challenges.

Dimensions of Strategic Stability Part of a cooperative security management approach would entail serious and sustained consultations to reach agreement on a shared vision of future global strategic stability ± and on the most pressing threats to stability. Even if some differences persisted, the very process would be valuable ± assuming a high-level mandate on both sides to work the issue in earnest. Strategic stability is a long used, if ill-defined concept. It also has many dimensions.2 IQWRGD\¶VZRUOGZKDWPD\EHWHUPHGSHDFHWLPHVWDELOLW\± ensuring that conflicting interests do not spillover to undermine the overall Russia-U.S. political relationship as well as the basis for cooperative actions to meet common security threats ± is taking on increasing importance. More traditional arms race stability also seems to once again be emerging as an issue. By contrast, given the extremely low probability of a military clash between the two countries, crisis stability appears less central to the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship. But it could be an area in which the two sides would seek to cooperate to dampen crises in other regions. Two other dimensions of stability today also could figure in the type of consultations being suggested ± proliferation stability and anti-terrorism stability defined respectively in terms of containing the risks and dangers of runaway proliferation and of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. Three Illustrative Areas for Action: Agreement on a principle of cooperative security management and on a vision of global strategic stability, however, would only be a starting point. Implementation in practice would be critical ± both to rebuild confidence between Washington and Moscow and to work the critical challenges that could fuel the drift toward suspicion, gamesmanship, and political-military confrontation. The agenda would be a full one. Consider very briefly three examples taken from that broader agenda, examples that span the different dimensions of stability: Russian uncertainty about U.S. strategic intentions; U.S. uncertainties about Russian commitment to preventing proliferation; and building 2 The following breakdown of the different types of stability draws on conversations with Leonard Spector.

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habits of cooperation in countering a terrorist WMD attack with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. 5XVVLD¶V8QFHUWDLQW\DERXW866WUDWHJLF,QWHQWLRQV Increasingly, Russian officials and experts have voiced concern about U.S. strategic intentions. Their statements point toward an alleged U.S. pursuit of nuclear primacy based on a mix of lower-yield nuclear capabilities perceived being acquired, advanced conventional strike options, and deployment of missile defenses. Some persons warn that ultimately U.S. actions ± combined with Russian inactions ± will undermine 5XVVLD¶V QXFOHDU GHWHUrent capability. Isolated voices go so far as to warn of U.S. military threats to coerce Russia in one or another area. Cooperative security management would seek mutually acceptable approaches to lessen this strategic uncertainty. A full discussion exceeds the scope of this brief presentation. Suffice it to suggest some pathways to explore. First, the possibility should be examined of putting in place sustained give-andtake strategic consultations, at multiple levels. These consultations would build on and LQVWLWXWLRQDOL]H WKH UHFHQW ³WZR-plus-WZR´ PHHWLQJV EHWZHHQ WKH 6HFUHWDULHV RI State/Foreign Affairs and Defense. These meetings could be extended to include possible exchanges of liaison officers between the two militaries and defense establishments in appropriate locations Second, a renewed but expanded effort should be made to put in place a joint Early Warning Capability. As a start this could entail bringing into effect the now moribund 2000 agreement for shared early warning (the Joint Data Exchange Center). But shared early warning could go beyond that agreement to exchange national data to explore creation of a jointly operated early warning capability, thereby providing each country with direct real-time access to comparable warning imagery. This type of step would JR IDU WR GHDO ZLWK RQH XQGHUO\LQJ URRW RI 5XVVLDQ VWUDWHJLF XQFHUWDLQW\ 5XVVLD¶V eroded early warning capability. Third, cooperative alternatives to regulate future missile defense deployments need to be pursued ± from exploration of agreed deployment guidelines to actual pursuit of a joint U.S.-Russian global missile defense capability against proliferation threats. Finally, building on the preceding, steps could be taken to put in place a set of confidence-building, transparency, and constraint measures ± technical, political, and operational ± to accompany any U.S. deployment of longer-range conventional ballistic missiles. For that matter, such measures also would be appropriate to accompany any Russian deployment of longer-range conventional ballistic missiles should Russia eventually follow suit. 868QFHUWDLQW\DERXW5XVVLD¶V&RPPLWPHQWWR1RQ-Proliferation Today, it often is remarked wistfully that during the Cold War, preventing proliferation was the one area of sustained and successful strategic cooperation between Moscow and Washington. Within some parts of the U.S. strategic community, there is a SHULRGLFVSHFXODWLRQWKDWWRGD\¶VODFNRIQRQ-proliferation cooperation actually reflects a Russian belief that more proliferation would be good ± especially as a means to tiedown and impede a United States perceived to be seeking global hegemony. Russian policies toward Iran are cited as an example. So far, strategic dialogue alone has not been sufficient to put such doubts to rest, particularly in the wider American foreign policy and defense community. Even so,

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that dialogue on proliferation challenges is essential ± particularly if as in the Cold War era, it can become a genuine give-and-take process. What is even more necessary, however, is to find ways to rebuild strong habits of non-proliferation cooperation between Washington and Moscow. This includes cooperation on the tough cases. By way of illustration, in the specific case cited of Iran, Russia and the United States ± along with other great powers ± could take the lead in signaling to the Iranian leadership that should Iran break out of the Nonproliferation Treaty and acquire nuclear weapons, the great powers would respond cooperatively to ensure that Iran did not gain from the bomb. By so doing, they could yet shift the balance of internal debate in Iran where a key question remains whether Iran ultimately would make itself less not more VHFXUHE\³JRLQJDOOWKHZD\WRWKHERPE´ Building Habits of Cooperation in Countering Terrorist WMD Attacks Russia and the United States clearly share a strong common interest in countering terrorist attacks using WMD ± chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. Most narrowly, each country has been the target of WMD threats or use: in 1995, Chechyan terrorists threatened the use of radiological weapons against Moscow; in 2001, an unknown individual or group mailed letters with anthrax to targeted Americans. Both countries support the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, are co-chairs of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and have cooperated under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to enhance protection against WMD terrorism. Cooperation in specific instances, however, has sometimes been more problematic ± as it was after the 2001 anthrax mailings (when the United States sought Russian expertise), or after the 2006 seizure by Georgian authorities of smuggled highly-enriched uranium (when it proved difficult to investigate the origins of the materials). From this perspective, a key challenge for cooperative security management would be to strengthen the habits of cooperation between Moscow and Washington ± and then more widely among the great powers ± to prevent, detect, disrupt, attribute, or respond to a terrorist WMD incident. Here, too, there are a variety of potential pathways to explore. By way of example, building on the Global Initiative, joint planning and exercises could be undertaken to enhance capabilities to detect, interdict, and otherwise prevent a successful terrorist WMD attack, from near-real time exchanges of warning intelligence to joint operational deployments. Closely related, emergency response and consequence management planning and exercises also could be begun. This could include assessment of possible on-call capabilities to provide joint support to a third country that requires assistance in assessing and rendering safe a terrorist device or in dealing with the consequences of an event. In the area of cooperative attribution of the sources of a terrorist WMD attack, discussions could focus on needed authorities and procedures that would enable cooperation to ensure that the perpetrator of a terrorist WMD attack (from the leaders to the aiders and abettors) will not be able to hide. Still another area would be consultations and planning for a coordinated response to a terrorist WMD event ± not least, on the one hand, to send the right global signal, and on the other hand, to leverage the shock of a terrorist WMD attack as a means to strengthen global counter-terrorist and non-proliferation activities.

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What Next 7RGD\¶VFKDOOHQJH LVWRUHYHUVH WKH GULIWWRZDUGSROLWLFDO-military confrontation in the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship. For the United States, reversing that drift will UHTXLUH DFNQRZOHGJLQJ WKDW WKH SDVW KDOI GHFDGH¶V SRVWXUH RI VWUDWHJLF ³ODLVVH]-IDLUH´ has not moved the U.S.-Russian relationship ahead successfully. But it will also require not simply aGRSWLQJ D ³EDFN WR WKH WUDGLWLRQDO DUPV FRQWURO IXWXUH´ ZD\ RI confronting stability challenges. For Russia, reversing the drift will require tempering WRGD\¶V³QHYHUDJDLQ´DVVHUWLYHQHVVDVZHOODVDFRPSDUDEOHUHDGLQHVVWRWKLQNDQHZRQ some issues. For both countries the stakes are high ± from strengthening stability in its many different variants through reinvigorated cooperation to deal with proliferation, WMD terrorism, and other global security challenges, to finally putting the Cold War legacy behind the two countries. The principle and practice of cooperative security management offer a possible way forward.

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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-30

Prospects for Change in US Nuclear Policy Joseph CIRINCIONE1 Abstract. Three trends are converging to increase prospects for a fundamental change in global nuclear policies: the failure of the existing U.S. national security strategy to stem the growing proliferation threats; a nearly simultaneous global change in executive leadership; and a developing consensus across ideological lines for a renewed commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. Leading U.S. presidential candidates have endorsed nuclear disarmament and numerous experts and non-governmental organizations are developing comprehensive proposals, most prominently George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry and Sam Nunn. These campaigns have created political space for officials to embrace a more ambitious agenda than most previously had. There is a greater likelihood of historic change in global nuclear policy now than at any other moment in the past 15 years.

For the first time in fifty-six years, the United States will conduct a presidential election in 2008 that does not include a sitting president or vice-president. This greatly increases the possibility of changes in nuclear strategic policy, particularly if the candidate of the Democratic Party wins over the Republican Party candidate, as is now widely anticipated. New leadership in the White House is one of four trends that indicate a high probability of positive changes in global nonproliferation policies. The other three are: • • •

the growing recognition that the radical counter-proliferation policies promoted by neoconservatives and adopted by the Bush administration have failed; the opportunities presented by elections that are simultaneously installing new governments in most of the leading nations or the world—a rare global political realignment; and the campaigns begun by leading non-government groups, primarily in the United States but also in Europe, that are promoting policies to increase international nuclear security.

This paper briefly examines these trends, focusing on the elements likely to emerge in the next nuclear strategy of the United States.

1 President of the Ploughshares Fund. When this paper was prepared and presented he was Senior Fellow and Director for Nuclear Policy at the Center for American Progress, Washington, DC

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Policy Failure The progress made over the past twenty years in reducing arsenals of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, in reducing the number of states with nuclear weapons or weapons programs, and fortifying the nonproliferation regime with new tools and new barriers to the spread of nuclear weapons has been reversed in recent years. As a result, dangers have grown and there is now a distinct possibility of the collapse of much of the nonproliferation regime. The security strategies championed by Washington-based neoconservatives and formalized in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and the National Security Strategy of the United States have not produced the results they promised. Nearly all of the proliferation problems inherited by the Bush administration have grown worse over the past 7 years. Today, we face greater nuclear insecurity than during the 1990s, including the risk of a Middle East with several nuclear states; the possibility that Osama bin Laden will eventually get a nuclear weapon from insecure stockpiles in Russia, Pakistan or some other state; the probability that an upsurge in nuclear power programs would bring many more states to the brink of nuclear weapons capability; and the possibility that the flaws in command and control systems—including those exposed in the US system by the unauthorized August 2007 B-52 flight with 6 nuclear bombs—could result in the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. The growing recognition that current approaches are counter-productive helps clear the field, providing space for policy alternatives, but does not, by itself, guarantee that more effective policies will be implemented.

New Leaders Prospects for policy change are increased by the period of political transition the world has now entered. By early 2009, four of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Russia) will have new leaders. Other key states, including Iran and Israel, may as well. The UK and France have already made the switch, as have other major powers such as Japan, Germany and Italy. International organizations, too, will refresh their leadership, with a new Secretary-General now installed at the United Nations and possibly a new head of the International Atomic Energy Agency in two years. Rarely have the political stars re-aligned so dramatically. The photo of the G8 summit in 2009 will likely not have a single leader present at the 2006 summit save for Canada’s Prime Minister Harper. This is a unique opportunity to advance new policies that can dramatically reduce and even eliminate many of the dangers that have kept political leaders and security officials worried about a nuclear 9/11.

U.S. Nuclear Politics Several leading candidates for the presidency of the United States have already rushed to fill the policy vacuum, detailing sweeping proposals for nuclear security. Former Senator John Edwards promised in September 2007 that he would lead a charge for a “Global Compact” to eliminate nuclear weapons. Governor Bill Richardson (D.-NM)

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has given a similar pledge. Senator Barack Obama (D.-IL) has a plan to eliminate and secure all loose nuclear materials in his first term as president, effectively preventing nuclear terrorism. In an October 2007 speech he committed to the goal of a nuclearfree world, and endorsed a plan that included negotiating a verifiable global ban on the production of fissile materials, creating an international fuel bank to back up commercial fuel supplies, increasing funding for IAEA safeguards, negotiating dramatic reductions in US and Russian nuclear stockpiles, seeking a global ban on Intermediate-range missiles, and taking missiles off of hair-trigger alert. Senator Hillary Clinton (D.-NY) has promised similar presidential attention to preventing nuclear terror and shrinking global arsenals. Her article in November/December issue of Foreign Affairs, “Security and Opportunity for the Twenty-first Century,” offers the first details of her plan. Senator Clinton laments the lost opportunity of the failure to build upon profound international unity created after the 9/11 attacks. She promises that she will not let her opportunity slip away, pledging to negotiate an end to the nuclear programs in Iran and North Korea; secure all loose nuclear materials in her first term; establish a nuclear fuel bank; negotiate an accord to verifiably reduce U.S. and Russian arsenals, and, significantly, to seek Senate approval of the CTBT by 2009, the tenth anniversary of the Senates’ initial rejection of the treaty. This last step, Senator Clinton says, “would enhance the United States’ credibility when demanding that other nations refrain from testing.” Summarizing this trend among the Democratic candidates, former National Security staff member Ivo Daldaar and former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director John Holum, two top advisors to Senator Obama, said in an October 5, 2007 op-ed: “Although successive administrations (at least until the current one) have mouthed the words affirming this objective, few have actually made this commitment an organizing principle of their nuclear weapons policies. That may be about to change….There is much that the United States can do to lift the dark nuclear shadow over the world. It can sharply reduce its nuclear stockpile to 1,000 weapons or less, if Russia agrees to go down to the same level. It can eliminate tactical nuclear weapons to underscore that it understands that a nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon, no matter its size, yield, range, or mode of delivery. It can agree never to produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes, and accept the need for intrusive verification if other states agree to end such production as well. It can commit never again to test a nuclear device, and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.” It is not clear if Senator Clinton accepts this as an organizing principle. Interestingly, in her Foreign Affairs article, she redefines the Nuclear Free World initiative of George Schultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry and Sam Nunn (detailed below), saying they “have called on the United States to ‘rekindle the vision,’ shared by every president from Dwight Eisenhower to Bill Clinton, of reducing reliance on nuclear weapons.” Republican candidates have not yet addressed these issues in detail. However, in the US Congress there is some support for these new policies, as demonstrated by legislation (SR 1977) introduced by Senators Obama and Chuck Hagel (R-NE) that

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would authorized the policies detailed by Senator Obama in his speech, plus others. Most significantly the bill would continue: “…the United States moratorium on nuclear test explosions, initiating a bipartisan process to achieve ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, working to secure ratification by other key countries, and fully supporting United States commitments to fund the international monitoring system to help detect and deter possible nuclear explosions by other countries…” The legislation also specifically endorses “pursuing and concluding an agreement to verifiably halt the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.” There is conservative opposition to these measures in the Senate. In October, in reaction to an effort by Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) to link production of the so-called “Reliable Replacement Warhead” to a sense of the Senate provision in the Defense Authorization bill that the CTBT should be ratified, Senator Jon Kyl (R.-AZ) organized a letter signed by 38 Senators opposing the provision. The principle reason given in the letter was that no hearings had been held on the CTBT since 1999, therefore it was impossible to declare that there was a “sense of the Senate” in favor of ratification. Republican presidential candidates are likely to keep their positions close to this conservative line. This underscores the urgent need for a thoughtful, nonpartisan review of the core issues involved with the test ban treaty, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and related issues. There are already bipartisan appeals for just such reviews in the U.S. House and Senate. Senators Diane Feinstein (D-CA) and Susan Collins (R-ME) introduced legislation (SR 1914, The Nuclear Policy and Posture Review Act of 2007) requiring that a comprehensive nuclear weapons policy and posture review be submitted to Congress by the administration (and prohibiting funding for any new nuclear warhead development until such reviews are completed). The legislation would require that the review examine “the role of nuclear forces in United States military strategy, planning and programming,” and the “policy requirements and objectives for the United States to maintain a safe, reliable and credible nuclear deterrence posture,” among other issues. There is similar legislation in the House, added to the Defense Authorization bill by the Chairwomen of the House Armed Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D.-CA). It includes a provision creating an independent commission to examine U.S. nuclear policy. This year, there have been other bipartisan Congressional actions that generally had the effect of blocking production of new nuclear weapons and construction of new anti-missile bases in Europe, reducing funding for these anti-missile programs overall, and providing funding for an international fuel bank, and in general moving toward a more progressive national security posture.

Positive Policy Initiatives Non-government organizations are already working to provide policies the new executive could adopt. “With this leadership change,” former United Nations UnderSecretary-General of Disarmament Jayantha Dhanapala told a February conference in

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New York organized by the Center for American Progress and The Century Foundation, “it is for us in civil society to try to urge new perspectives and new opportunities for them to seize so that we all make the right choices at the right time.” Analysts at over a dozen institutes are perfecting proposals to reaffirm the goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, ratify the nuclear test ban treaty, establish an international nuclear fuel bank, eliminate tactical nuclear weapons, move to zero deployed nuclear weapons and convene a global nuclear summit in 2009, among others. They are promoting their ideas in conferences, reports, testimony, blogs, interviews and film projects. Chief among them and propelling all of them, is the bipartisan appeal from Republicans George Shultz and Henry Kissinger and Democrats William Perry and Sam Nunn in their January 4, 2007 Wall Street Journal op-ed, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons.” Their campaign has already created political space for several leading officials to embrace a more ambitious agenda than they previously had. These four veteran cold warriors urged the United States to recommit to the vision of eliminating nuclear weapons and married their vision with a ten-point action plan including steep reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and the end to the production of nuclear weapons material. The four sponsored a follow-up conference at the conservative Hoover Institute at Stanford University in October to advance this agenda. The group plans an international conference in winter 2008, and will soon announce a broad list of additional supporters of their elimination vision. The October conference demonstrated the sophisticated approach of this moderate, bipartisan group and the political support their efforts have garnered thus far. Nancy Reagan sent a personal letter of endorsement to the conference and California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger provided a dramatic statement of his support. Former Secretary George Shultz read the speech for the governor, who was prevented from attending as planned only by the state emergency of wild fires then raging in southern California. He said, in part: “The words that this audience knows so well, the words that President Kennedy spoke during the Cold War, have regained their urgency: ‘The world was not meant to be a prison in which man awaits his execution.’ Here in California we still have levees that were built a hundred years ago. These levees are an imminent threat to the wellbeing of this state and its people. It would be only a matter of time before a disaster strikes. But we’re not waiting until such a disaster. We in California have taken action to protect our people and our economy from devastation. Neither can this nation nor the world wait to act until there is a nuclear disaster. I am so thankful for the work of George, Bill Perry, Henry Kissinger Sam Nunn, Max Kampelman, Sid Drell and so many of you at this conference. You have a big vision, a vision as big as humanity—to free the world of nuclear weapons….I want to help. Let me know how I can use my power and influence as governor to further your vision. Because my heart is with you. My support is firm. My door is open.”

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Thus, for the first time since the initial efforts of the Truman administration in the 1940s, a movement to eliminate nuclear weapons has developed, not from the political left but from the moderate middle. This promises to give the movement a political importance and policy relevance that previous efforts, even the broad-based Nuclear Freeze Movement of the 1980s, have lacked. The goals of the new movement enjoy strong support from the traditional, nongovernmental arms control and nonproliferation organizations. More than a dozen leading U.S. arms control organizations have formed the Campaign for a Nuclear-Free World to coordinate their efforts. The New American Foundation hosts a bi-partisan Nuclear Strategy and Nonproliferation Initiative that seeks to forge a consensus on a new policy among former senior officials from both parties. The most ambitious effort is led by World Security Institute President Bruce Blair. His plan for a Compact to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons already enjoys the support of a bipartisan group of senior experts and former officials. The campaign includes organization of a World Summit to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons in 2010 that would endorse a new treaty calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons by a date certain. The organizing document for the Compact explains: “Three circumstances have converged to create an historic opportunity to achieve this goal: a dramatic shift among conservative leaders to the belief that nuclear weapons must be eliminated; increased public awareness and support, with 82% of Americans now favoring elimination; and an unprecedented changing of the guard, with four of the five original nuclear weapons states electing new leadership between 2007 and 2009. While time is limited to act before a nuclear catastrophe occurs, history has shown that the right idea at the right time can capture the public imagination and shift the public mindset – when that happens, political change that once seemed impossible becomes inevitable.”

Towards A Comprehensive New Policy The circumstances that may make it possible for the first time since the beginning of the Cold War to move decisively towards the elimination of nuclear weapons also make it possible to secure long-sought nuclear security goals, including deep reductions in nuclear arsenals, the entry into force of the CTBT and the negotiation of a FMCT. One of the best previews we have of what a new nuclear policy might look like in the next administration comes from the October 2007 report, “Reducing Nuclear Threats and Preventing Nuclear Terrorism,” by the National Security Advisory Group. The group includes over 30 senior experts and former officials, including Madeleine Albright, Graham Allison, Samuel Berger, Thomas Daschle, Robert Gallucci, William Perry, John Podesta, Susan Rice, John Shalikashvili, and this author. The report proposes a consensus strategy for reducing all the nuclear threats – one that takes seriously the mission of preventing a nuclear 9-11, stops new states from going nuclear, deters any state from launching a nuclear strike on America and restores American leadership to the broad network of nations willing to work towards reducing nuclear perils.

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It is fair to say that this report represents the moderate middle of a significant part the American foreign policy establishment at this point. It is a balancing of the more cautious position sought by some to protect against charges that they are weak on defense, and the more ambitious agendas of those who seek dramatic policy change. The 20-page report details what the endorsers believe is an effective, realistic strategy to realize a bipartisan agenda. Key findings include: •

•

•

•

•

•

•

For the foreseeable future, the U.S will have to maintain effective, reliable nuclear forces to deter adversaries, but deterrence can now be achieved at significantly lower force levels. By reducing the political and military salience of nuclear weapons, global support can be built for the tough actions needed to stop terrorists and hostile regimes from obtaining nuclear weapons. America and other nations can be protected from nuclear terrorism by accelerating the currently weak efforts to secure and eliminate bomb-making nuclear materials worldwide, to detect and interdict illicit shipments of such materials, and to develop nuclear forensic technologies that would hold states accountable if they knowingly assisted terrorists in acquiring or using nuclear weapons. The United States must mobilize the nations of the world to roll back North Korea’s nuclear program and head off an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. That will require increasing the financial and diplomatic pressures applied by the UN Security Council and by states outside the Council, as well as offering the positive incentive of normalized and economically beneficial relations with the U.S. The United States should develop a range of conventional weapons and operational concepts that would give the President credible and technically suitable options for dealing with any threat. This would reduce and eventually eliminate any need to resort to nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear attacks. Given the widely-shared scientific judgment that U.S. nuclear weapons are reliable and safe, there is no urgency to proceed with any new warhead, included the “reliable replacement warhead” proposed by this administration, but questioned by the Congress. With North Korea and Iran actively seeking nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, the U.S. should pursue missile defenses. But the nation should not buy weapons that do not work. The government should continue a robust development effort and proceed with deployment only when warranted by the results of realistic test programs and the evolution of the threat. Plans to deploy new bases in Eastern Europe should be delayed until there has been a serious exploration with the NATO allies and Russia for a cooperative approach to missile defense that could help protect Europe, Russia, and the U.S. The tough verification agreements negotiated with the Russians by Ronald Reagan should not be allowed to expire in 2007. The United States should agree with the Russians to replace START I with a legally binding follow-on agreement that reduces nuclear forces significantly below the levels called for in the 2002 Moscow Treaty. The two sides should also agree to lower the current alert rates that keep thousands of nuclear warheads ready to launch

J. Cirincione / Prospects for Change in US Nuclear Policy

•

•

•

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within 15 minutes, reducing the risk that the weapons would be used by accident or misperception. A bipartisan effort should be pursued in the Senate to finally achieve the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty that would make it illegal for any nation to test a nuclear weapon. With more nuclear tests than all the other nations combined, the United States does not need any more tests; nor should it want any other nation perfecting or developing weapons. The U.S. should restore its historic leadership role in building and strengthening the nonproliferation regime, including by strengthening the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency ability to verify strict compliance, reassuring allies that U.S. security assurances remain reliable, and joining with all other nuclear-weapon states in reaffirming their pledges to seek full nuclear disarmament. States embarking on or expanding nuclear power programs should be given incentives to forgo their own uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. The U.S. should work with the IAEA and other states on an arrangement to provide reliable assurances of nuclear fuel supply to states that do not have their own fuel cycle facilities.

Conclusion These reports and efforts are harbingers of a new policy moment. There is a greater chance to achieve dramatic, historic change in global nuclear policy in the next few years than at any other moment in the past 15 years. Those involved in these policy initiatives all believe that a world of increasing numbers of nuclear weapon states is not inevitable. Neither is a nuclear attack by terrorists. Both can be prevented, but only if their prevention becomes an overriding national priority and only with strong U.S. leadership in international arms control and nonproliferation efforts. The prospects of that developing over the next few years are already encouraging. The next president of the United States—whether Republican or Democrat—will likely have a decidedly different nonproliferation policy than the failed neoconservative strategy attempted over the past few years. There are already signs that other governments are willing to develop and promote new initiatives, such as the remarkable June 2007 speech by then-Foreign Minister Margaret Beckett at the Carnegie International Nonproliferation Conference—by far the most dramatic reaffirmation of the goal of elimination of nuclear weapons yet delivered by any senior official in a nuclear-weapon state. This speech was approved by the incoming Prime Minister Gordon Brown and provided both vision and practicality. She said, in part: “When it comes to building this new impetus for global nuclear disarmament, I want the UK to be at the forefront of both the thinking and the practical work; to be, as it were, a disarmament laboratory. As far as new thinking goes, the International Institute of Strategic Studies is planning an in-depth study to help determine the requirements for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons. We will participate in that study and provide funding for one of their workshops focusing on some of the crucial technical questions in this area. The study and subsequent

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workshops will offer a thorough and systematic analysis of what a commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons means in practice.” With this vision and this type of practical, detailed work, it is very possible that the policy deadlocks of the past few years can be broken. Achieving a world free of nuclear weapons is—as even the most ardent proponents admit—a daunting task. By marrying the vision to pragmatic steps, however, is should be possible to implement measures that can restore the lost momentum of previous years, concretely reduce the risks of nuclear terrorism, nuclear war and nuclear use, and rebuild the global consensus to prevent the emergence of new nuclear weapon states and drastically reduce the arsenals of the current weapon states. As Minister Beckett said: “So my commitment to that vision, truly visionary in its day, of a world free of nuclear weapons is undimmed. And although we in this room may not see the end of that road, we can take those first further steps down it. For any generation that would be a noble calling. For ours, it is a duty.”

Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-39

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The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian 9LHZRQKRZWR&XUHWKH³,QKHUHQW 'HIHFWV´RIWKH1RQSUROLIHUDWLRQ5HJLPH Victor MIZIN1 Abstract. Due to a number of reasons, including the emerging crises in relations between Russia and the West, the urgency of global concerns regarding the proliferation of WMD and missiles appears to have diminished. But emergence of new threats brought back to life the key problem of global security: the survival of leading world powers. In the face of the new global security challenges, Russia and the West have revitalized the importance of non-proliferation. Still, the nonproliferation regime is suffering from intrinsic drawbacks and should be improved. Such improvement presupposes the close cooperation, or at least an accord, between the leading world powers as a core element.

Diminished sense of urgency Global concern regarding the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles appears to have lost its sense of urgency in world politics lately. This was partly due to the emerging crises in relations between Russia and the West, as well as what can be termed the North-South divide, stemming from the political and diplomatic rifts in their respective foreign policy approaches. 2 New confrontations between the former Cold War rivals on almost every major issue became particularly evident after the G-8 summits in 2006-2007 and the landmark speech of President Putin at the 43 rd Munich Conference on Security Policy. Supported in certain European circles, these Russian WKHVHV RQ WKH FROODSVH RI WKH ³XQLSRODU ZRUOG´ IROORZHG E\ 0RVFRZ¶V FODLP IRU HQWLUHO\ HTXDO VWDWXV ZLWK WKH OHDGLQJ ZRUOG SRZHUV DQG LWV ³QHZ ZRUOG RUGHU´ concept seemed to have ruined all prospects for Russia actually joining the West - thus once again underlining the lingering gap in values between the two sides 3. Likewise, plans to create a kind of broad front of the states which would make meaningful efforts to stop WMD proliferation and strengthen international security and strategic stability including the arms control process seem rather bleak. 4 Still, even in the long-HVWDEOLVKHG VFHQDULR RI WKH ³ZDU RI DOO DJDLQVW DOO´ RQ WKH world arena, the issue of nonproliferation and its core element ± the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) ± retain their importance. After all, 1

Counsellor, Analytical Division, Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly Andrew Kuchins, Vyacheslav Nikonov, and Dmitri Trenin, ³U.S.-Russian Relations: The Case for an 8SJUDGH´&DUQHJLH0RVFRZ&HQWHU5HSRUWJanuary 20,.2005 3 %UHW 6WHSKHQV ³/LWWOH 6ZHDW\ )LVW Why is Putin now getting tough on Iran?´ Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2007 4 The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons; Secretary-General's remarks at Macalester College Convocation to inaugurate Institute for Global Citizenship , St. Paul, Minnesota, 22 April 2006, http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=1999 2

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V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”

nonproliferation in fact relates to the key problem of global security- the survival of leading world powers, Russia and the West - in the face of new global security challenges. The current security situation is marked by the emergence of new threats the form of terrorist activities and the potential use of WMD by international Islamic IXQGDPHQWDOLVWVLQWKHLUILJKWDJDLQVWWKHµPDLQHQHPLHV¶± the so-FDOOHG³LQILGHO´:HVW and Russia, which prevent the former from attaining world dominance. 5 This SKHQRPHQRQLVODEHOHG³VXSHUWHUURULVP´E\VRPHH[SHUWV 6 Compared with other types of WMD and even subversive activities, nuclear weapons, obviously would be difficult to incorporate into the cannibalistic plans of the Islamists.7 But even the minor risk of the use of nuclear weapons, in view of their terrible destructive consequences, must be treated seriously. It is not accidental that President Putin referred to WMD proliferation as the main security threat of the 21st century.8 The advent of new actors possessing nuclear weapons in unstable regions, SDUWLFXODUO\UDGLFDO WHUURULVWJURXSVDQGLUUHVSRQVLEOHµURJXH¶VWDWHVKDVVXUSDVVHGWKH possibility of nuclear showdown between the members of the traditional nuclear SRZHUV µFOXE¶ DV WKH JUHDWHVW WKUHDW WRGD\ IRU WKH OHDGLQJ ZRUOG SRZHUV 7KLV VHW RI issues also presents the basis for the security dialogue between both East and West and North and South. Most probably it will continue to dominate the agenda in the sphere of defense and global security in the foreseeable future. In this respect, the developed countries still view the NPT of 1968 as the central, integral factor in maintaining peace and international stability. Russia, as the main successor of the USSR which was a founding member of the NPT at the very peak of WKH &ROG :DU DOVR VWLFNV WR WKLV VWDQFH 'HVSLWH DOO RI WKH GLIILFXOWLHV 0RVFRZ¶V approach is unambiguous. The Treaty, which comprises 189 member states today, has passed the test of time over its 30 year history. There is no obvious alternative to the NPT as a mechanism for containing the spread of nuclear weapons and strengthening international security on the global and regional levels. 9 In fact, there are no means for counteracting nuclear weapons¶SUROLIHUDWLRQWRGD\WKDWFRXOGEHPRUHVXFFHVVIXOWKDQ the NPT. Any other options that include the use of military force would be more costly, both in the financial and political aspects. The point is how to improve the NPT, increase its effectiveness and adjust this useful Cold War-era contraption to new realities.

5

'U .HQW +XJKHV %XWWV DQG 3URIHVVRU %HUW % 7XVVLQJ ³$GGUHVVLQJ The Conditions That Foster 7HUURULVP´8QLWHG6WDWHV$UP\:DU&ROOHJH6\PSRVLXP, Center for Strategic Leadership, CSL 1 Issue, U.S. Army War College , Volume 10-05, July 2005, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/Publications/10-05.pdf 6 Marvin J. Cetron, Terror 2000: The Future Face of Terrorism  (KXG 6SULQ]DN  ³7KH *UHDW 6XSHUWHUURULVP6FDUH´Foreign Policy, Fall 1998 7 ,$($'LUHFWRU*HQHUDO'U0RKDPHG(O%DUDGHL³1XFOHDU7HUURULVP,GHQWLI\LQJDQG&RPEDWLQJWKH Risks´International Conference on Nuclear Security: Global Directions for the Future , London, 16 March 2005, http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2005/ebsp2005n003.html 8 The BBC Interview with V. Putin, June 22, 2003, Novo-Ogarevo, http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2003/06/47510.shtml (Russian) 9 See /HZLV $ 'XQQ ³&RXQWHULQJ 3UROLIHUDWLRQ ,QVLJKWV IURP 3DVW µ¶:LQV /RVVHV DQG 'UDZV¶¶´ Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 13, No 3, November 2006

V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”

41

Treaty successes Conceived in a period of optimism over ideas to prevent nuclear war, and promote arms control and peaceful coexistence of the two radically opposite social and political global systems, the NPT has proven, in general, to be a helpful instrument of international law. Taking into account the complex realities of the modern world, it has HVWDEOLVKHGDUDWKHUHIIHFWLYHOHJDOUHJLPHZKLFKFRQWUDU\WRWKHSHVVLPLVWV¶SURJQRVHV managed to prevent the emergence of dozens of new nuclear states in the world. On the whole, by the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, a certain level of international security had been reached through the enforcement of this Treaty. During this period almost 40 countries joined the NPT. Access to nuclear weapons was blocked for Iraq. Military nuclear programs were shut down in countries like Argentina, Brazil and South Africa. The authority of the nuclear nonproliferation regime had been growing steadily. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the termination of confrontation between the two antagonistic military-political blocks, the NPT gained particular significance. Newly independent nations ± Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan ± agreed to become non-nuclear states, abandoning the nuclear weapons they had inherited as breakaway parts of the former Soviet Union. Thus Russia became the only nuclear power and therefore the natural though informal political and military leader of the CIS countries. In the new phase after the end of the Cold War, the importance of the NPT grew significantly when it became the key instrument of sustaining stability in the chaotic world where no politico-military blocs existed. At the historic NPT 1995 Review Conference, the Treaty was indefinitely extended. A series of countries which had refused to join it earlier, including such nuclear powers as France and China, joined the Treaty in the years leading up to the review and extension conference.

Inherent defects Concurrent with the above-mentioned positive processes, the so-called built-in defects of the treaty appeared. They can be roughly grouped into philosophical, political and technological categories. The inherent shortcomings of the Treaty became particularly evident with the HPHUJHQFHRIWKH³SUREOHP´VWDWHVWKHQRWRULRXVµJURXSRIWKUHH¶LQFOXGLQJ,UDQ,UDT North Korea and, to some extent, Libya) which in fact circumvented the NPT-imposed constraints and covertly started to develop nuclear weapons. As India and Pakistan MRLQHG WKH ³QXFOHDU SRZHUV FOXE´ DQG 1RUWK .RUHD DQG ,UDQ SXUVXHG WKLV VWDWXV D critical point was reached. By the middle of the 1990s, it became obvious that the NPT could not become the panacea for the mushrooming spread of nuclear-weapon states that it had seemed to be in the 1970-80s. The Treaty failed to develop into a ³XQLYHUVDO´ WRRO HPEUDFLQJ DOO VWDWHV RI WKH ZRUOG ZKLOH WKH LQHIIHFWLYHQHVV RI international nonproliferation regimes was exposed. The main dilemma of the nonprolifeUDWLRQSDUDGLJPWKHNH\³SKLORVRSKLFDO´IODZYLVLEO\FDPHWRWKHIRUH 10

10

-RVHSK61\H³1377KH/RJLFRI,QHTXDOLW\´Foreign Policy, Summer 1985

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V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”

Philosophical flaws First, the NPT regime discriminates between states, placing them into two unequal groups ± µRIILFLDO¶ QXFOHDU SRZHUV ZKLFK FRQGXFWHG QXFOHDU WHVWV EHIRUH  DQG all others. It is thus the question of the discrepancy between the rights of the most developed and military-PLJKW\ ³ROG´ JUHDW SRZHUV SRVVHVVLQJ IRUPDO QXFOHDU VWDWXV within the NPT and new players, seeking the role of regional power centers, as well as UDGLFDO ³URJXH´ VWDWHV  7KRXJK DFFHSWHG LQ WKH WLPH RI WKH JOREDO FRQIURQWDWLRQ between two antagonist blocs with respective nuclear-weapons leaders, this formula is rejected by the developing countries today. Second, there are many states mainly within WKH ³DQWL-Imperialist, anti-JOREDOLVW´ EORF ZKLFK VWLOO YLHZ WKH 137 DV DQ LQWULQVLFDOO\ XQIDLU ³:HVWHUQ SOR\´ GHVLJQHG WR prevent them from developing nuclear weapons potentials and benefiting from nuclear energy unhindered. Most leaders of the developing countries find it difficult to concede that they are in fact compelled to forego these crucial assets of military might that are particularly significant in the regional balances of power. The motivation to acquire nuclear weapons as a means of promoting foreign policy and strategic military interests is considerably weakened but is not eliminated completely. The argument in favor of the strengthening of the nonproliferation regimes needs further theoretical development, especially after the conflicts in Afghanistan, Yugoslavia and Iraq. It would be very difficult to persuade a regional leader of a developing country striving to build national defense capabilities to refrain from developing the weaponry that, in his perception, is the only definitive means of preventing the hypothetical aggression of great powers against his country (in the guise of a peacekeeping RSHUDWLRQRUD³KXPDQLWDULDQLQWHUYHQWLRQ´XQGHUWKH81IODJ  Political flaws Third, the NPT presumes that nuclear powers will assist non-nuclear states in mastering GRPHVWLFSHDFHIXOQXFOHDUWHFKQRORJ\LQUHWXUQIRUWKHLUUHMHFWLRQRIQXFOHDUZHDSRQV¶ GHYHORSPHQW +RZHYHU WKLV ³EDLW´ GRHV QRW DOZD\V ZRUN WRGD\ )RU VRPH ³URJXH´ VWDWHV QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV UHPDLQ DQ ³HQG LQ LWVHOI´ IDU PRUH DWtractive than peaceful technologies. Besides, the supply considerably exceeds the demand in the global markets of nuclear materials and technologies. Finally, among the political defects is the obvious fact that certain states including Russia and the USA, while being parties to the NPT, do not strictly comply with all its provisions (in particular, regarding the progress of disarmament and arms control talks and certain aspects of nuclear technology transfer). The remarkable nixing of decades of American nonproliferation policies by the US-India deal on peaceful use of nuclear energy that was declared in July 2005 by President George W. Bush and Prime Minister M. Singh, though sharply criticized by most nonproliferation and arms control ³]HDORWV´11 received unequivocal bipartisan support in the U.S. Congress, thus proving once again that economic interests tend to take precedence over nonproliferation objectives. Although some obstacles must be overcome to effectuate this sweeping agreement which has to be endorsed by the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group 11

See for example: Michael Krepon³Betting the Ranch on the US-India Nuclear Deal´June 5, 2006, ttp://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?id=297

V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”

43

(NSG) before it can take effect, it is obvious that India was de facto recognized as a nuclear state even by the nonproliferation-conscious Washington. Technological flaws At the same time - and this LVWKHNH\³WHFKQRORJLFDO´GUDZEDFNRIWKH7UHDW\- several developing countries even ventured to start the development of nuclear weapons under the front of their membership and to profit from certain lacunas of the NPT. The point is that any state member FDQ FUHDWH DOPRVW FRPSOHWH SRWHQWLDO IRU QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV¶ production while staying within the NPT confines and formally observing its obligations ± this opportunity is historically built into the NPT. All this poses the problem of the NPT implementation and compliance anew± both on the basis of the traditional mechanisms of international law including the IAEA and the UN Security Council venues (which by no means are able to stop attempts to acquire WMD capabilities each time) and by military counter-proliferation operations WKDW DUH DOVR FULWLFL]HG DV XQLODWHUDO ³LPSHULDOLVW´ HVFDSDGHV DQG IUHTXHQWO\ SURYH themselves inefficient, as the Bush and Clinton administrations have demonstrated).

Differing priorities It seems that the flaws and legal gaps of the NPT are obvious even to non-specialists. However, possible ways of improving the situation and eliminating these inherent defects raise much controversy as a result of the conflicting approaches between the followers of the traditional political and diplomatic methods and the advocates of the non-RUWKRGR[ DSSURDFKHV IRFXVLQJ RQ WKH WKUHDW RI IRUFH RU DG KRF ³FORVHG-FLUFXLW´ deals for any specific case of the NPT violation. Not every state ± for example, Russia or some members of the EU ± considers nuclear non-proliferation the top priority. 12 In real life, double standards are used rather often in assessing the threat of proliferation ± WKHUHLVDNLQGRI³JRRG´DQG³EDG´ proliferation.13 The world ± TXLWH IDU IURP .DQWLDQ ³HWHUQDO SHDFH´ SLSH GUHDPV - is VWLOOGLYLGHGLQWRRSSRVLQJFDPSVZKHUHFHUWDLQIDLOHGVWDWHVILJKWLQJWKHODUJHQDWLRQV¶ KHJHPRQ\ DFW LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK WKH +REEHVLDQ SULQFLSOH RI ³ZDU RI DOO DJDLQVW DOO´ spending almost the entirety of available resources on the arms race. Owing to its inborn imperfections, the NPT failed to prevent the development of covert nuclear ZHDSRQVSURJUDPVLQWKHFKDLQRI³DQWL-V\VWHPLF´VWDWHVZKLFKXVHGWREHWKHFOLHQWVRU allies of the Soviet Union and came to be rogue states later. Clash of systems Thus the essential problem is the clash of two broad concepts of ensuring international security and strategic stability in the extreme critical circumstances. On the one hand, there is the course on establishing dialogue, using political and diplomatic means, incremental strengthening of non-proliferation regimes and arms control mechanisms, HPSOR\LQJ WROHUDQW SHUVXDVLRQ DQG HQJDJLQJ IRUPHU DQG SUHVHQW ³URJXH´ VWDWHV LQ WKH 12

George Perkovich³7KH(QGRIWKH1RQSUROLIHUDWLRQ5HJLPH"´Current History, November 2006 5LFKDUG 1 +DDVV ³,QGLD ,UDQ DQG WKH FDVH IRU GRXEOH VWDQGDUGV´ Daily Times, May 14, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10685/india_iran_and_the_case_for_double_standards.html 13

44

V. Mizin / The Other Side of the NPT: A Russian View on How to Cure the “Inherent Defects”

international relations system as equal partners without demonizing them (for example, the traditional diplomatic rhetoric of Moscow that is shared by Beijing and most part of WKH³ROG´(XURSHQRZ 7KLVOLQHFDQEHWHQWDWLYHO\FDOOHGWKH³FDUURW´VWUDWHJ\ 7KLV ³SRVLWLYLVW´ DQG LQ PDQ\ UHVSHFWV LGHDOLVWLF DQG SURSDJDQGD-GULYHQ ³FDUURW´ modeOLVMX[WDSRVHGWRWKH³VWLFN´DSSURDFK± the policy pursued by a certain part of the conservative US elites. This new strategy is aimed at creating new mechanisms for SURWHFWLQJ $PHULFDQ LQWHUHVWV WKURXJK WKH UHYLVLRQ RI WKH RXWGDWHG ³GHSULYLQJ@)UDQFHRILWVRZQGHWHUUHQWIRUFHLILWLVFDSDEOH RIFUHDWLQJWKHPPHDQVWRLQFXUWKXQGHUZLWKRXWKDYLQJDOLJKWQLQJURG«7KLVZRXOG PHDQ WR UHO\ RQ WKH $PHULFDQ GHIHQVH FRPSOHWHO\« RQ WKeir politics in the foreign SURWHFWRUDWHDQGUHPDLQLQWKHXQFHUWDLQW\«'HILQLWHO\ZHGHVHUYHVRPHWKLQJEHWWHU´ Within NATO, France always occupied a unique position, somewhat distancing itself from the USA. When Paris had acquired its own atomic bomb in the early 1960s, the departure from NATO became a mere question of time. It happened in 1966 when General De Gaulle demonstratively made a step towards the Soviet Union and declared WKH GRFWULQH RI ³GHIHQVH RQ DOO D]LPXWKV´  7KLV PHDQW WKDW )UDQFH¶V VWUDWHgic forces were aimed not only eastward against the USSR (though mainly in this direction), but also towards the West. This annoyed Washington and, consequently, the French socialists who came to power in 1981 completely re-oriented French nuclear forces against the USSR. For a long time, France had ignored the calls to join the nuclear test ban treaty and to acknowledge the principle of non-first strike as China urged. As the disarmament process intensified under American and Soviet efforts at the end of the Cold War, it seemed that these principles had won. Almost all nuclear powers stopped nuclear tests and joined or declared their intentions to join the disarmament process (after the USA and Russia reduce their nuclear arsenals to comparable levels). But in 1998 the first thunder broke out: India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests and almost officially joined the privileged nuclear club (Israel had joined it already in the mid 1970s). The suspicions that Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea and some other states were seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction was once again revived. Strictly speaking, such suspicion which turned out to be unfounded was used as the official pretext for the military operation of the USA and Britain against Iraq. It is interesting that Paris actively protested against this operation. But the new French nuclear doctrine shows that France itself would act according to the American scenario if necessary. )UDQFH¶VQHZGRFWULQHGHSDUWVIURPWKHSUHYLRXVSULQFLSOHRIGHWHUUHQFHDQG shifts WRZDUGWKHDFWLYHSROLF\RI³QXFOHDULQWLPLGDWLRQ´ZKLFKLPSOLHVDWOHDVWLQZRUGVWKH possibility of pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons.

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P. Romashkin / Nuclear Doctrines of the United Kingdom and France: A Russian Perspective

Another new and important idea in the French nuclear doctrine is the inclusion of China in the list of the targets of nuclear deterrence. Certainly it is a purely hypothetical scenario of the French General Staff, but it stresses the shifts in the global VWUDWHJLFEDODQFHRISRZHUDQGUHYHDOV)UDQFH¶VUHDFWLRQWRWKHP 5XVVLDLV QRORQJHU the first and foremost target for the French nuclear forces, having become almost an ally of France, NATO and the West overall. However, this fact did not prevent France from modernizing its nuclear doctrine and shifting to the concept of pre-emptive nuclear strikes. Thus the French nuclear forces were designed as self-sustainable and independent from NATO and aimed to ensure the possibility of nuclear strike in case the United States were unable to fulfill its allied commitments, or in case it were necessary for France to protect national interests that did not coincide with American interests. France conducted its first nuclear test in 1960 in the Sahara. ,Q FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI )UDQFH¶V ORQJ DWRPLF KLVWRU\ ZKLFK LPSOLHV GHHS NQRZOHGJH about the consequences of the development and use of nuclear weapons) as well as its withdrawal from the military operation of NATO while remaining a member of the Alliance as a political power, France can also be regarded as one of the first nuclear weapons proliferants. Thus, the creation of the French nuclear arsenals not only significantly expanded the territory of nuclear deployment in the world but also led to the emergence of the third world power capable of pursuing independent nuclear policy. France is guided by its own atomic, aviation, shipbuilding and rocket production industry. By the early 1960s the strategic line on the creation of the nuclear weapons KDG IRUPHG 2Q 1RYHPEHU   LQ 6WUDVERXUJ GH *DXOOH VWDWHG ³D JUHDW VWDWH without nuclear weapons while others possess them is not the master of its own GHVWLQ\´$QGVLQFHWKHQ³WKHQDWLRQDOFKDUDFWHURIWKHVWUDWHJLFQXFOHDUIRUFHVKDGEHHQ QHYHUGRXEWHG´ In 1968, France tested its first hydrogen bomb. )UDQFH¶V RZQ QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV FDSDELOLW\ KDV DOZD\V UHPDLQHG RQH RI WKH Pain instruments of maintaining a great power status, the symbol of its national independence and sovereignty. De Gaulle was not the only one who wrote about it - his successors, including two-term President Jacques. Chirac, agreed with him. While France did not possess such intellectual resources as the USA, it has created and continues to develop its own independent school of nuclear strategic thinking. 2QH RI )UDQFH¶V NH\ GRFWULQDO SULQFLSOHV RQ QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV LV WR HQVXUH maximum freedom of choice in thHLUXVH)UDQFH¶VPLOLWDU\GRFWULQHGRHVQRWUXOHRXW pre-emptive nuclear strikes in certain situations. The number of the French warheads had reached its height ± 540 - in 1991-1992. 7KHLU VWUXFWXUH FRQVLVWHG RI WKH ³WULDG´  LQWHUPHGLDWH-range S-3 ballistic missiles deployed at the silo launchers on the Albion Plato, 6 Redoubtable type SSBNs and aircraft specially designed to use tactical nuclear weapons. However the SSBNs have always been main element of the strategic nuclear capabilities. )UDQFH¶V QXFlear forces are being modernized and at the same time reduced. In 1997, France possessed 450 warheads; at present, this number has been reduced to 348 units. Through the retirement of the whole land component (IRBMs were dismantled in 1998) the transition IURP WKH ³WULDG´ WR WKH ³G\DG´ VWUXFWXUH RI )UHQFK QXFOHDU armament was completed. The Redoubtable type submarines are being replaced with the series of four modern Triomphant-type SSBNs. Two of them are already operational, the third one was adopted in 2004, and the fourth submarine should be made operational in 2010 (armed with 16 SLBMs with new type MIRVs with the

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operational range of 5,300 km). The question of replacing these missiles with the new units armed with 6 warheads with the combat range of 10000 km in 2008 is also being considered. Guided missiles ASMP (Air-Sol-Moyenne-Portee or air-to-air guided missile) are operational in the French air and naval forces. The nuclear warhead has an explosive power of 300KT and the missile has a range of 300 km. Three squadrons of Mirage 2000N are prepared to deliver nuclear strikes. These guided missiles are deployed on the aircraft-FDUULHU ³&KDUOHV 'H *DXOOH´ IRU WKH DUPDPHQW RI WKH PRGHUQL]HG FDUULHUEDVHGDLUSODQHV³6XSHU(WHQGDUG´7KHQHZFUXLVHPLVVile ASMP-A which would have much larger range capacity and be armed with a new warhead, is being designed for the air and naval forces. There is a stable national consensus on nuclear issues which consolidates practically the whole political spectrum from the communists to the left parties. In 2003, France conducted a review of its nuclear doctrine. In January 2006, French President Jacques Chirac delineated the basic priorities of the national nuclear doctrine. These priorities included the struggle against terrorism, protection of the allies and maintaining a strategic delivery capability. President Chirac made this statement during his working visit to the naval base in the Brest region (in north-western France) where the nuclear-armed submarines and nuclear command FHQWHUDUHEDVHGDQGZKHUH)UDQFH¶VPLOLWDU\GRFWULQHZDVSUHVHQWHG During this visit, the President noted that the French nuclear forces were FRQILJXUHV IRU D UDSLG UHDFWLRQ VWUDWHJ\ ³+HDGV RI WKH VWDWHV WKDW PD\ XVH WHUURULVW methods against us, as well as all those who intend to use weapons of mass destruction in any form, must understand that they will be subjected to hard and adequate UHWDOLDWLRQIURPRXUVLGH7KHUHWDOLDWLRQFDQEHERWKFRQYHQWLRQDODQGXQFRQYHQWLRQDO´ claimed Chirac. Thus, for the first time the French president indicated the possibility RIXVLQJQXFOHDUZHDSRQVDJDLQVW³WHUURULVWVWDWHV´GHVSLWHKDYLQJUXOHGRXWWKLVRSWLRQ earlier. $WWKHVDPHWLPH&KLUDFVWDWHG³2QHVKRXOGQRWKRZHYHU\LHOGWRWKHWHPSWDWLRQ of restricting all defense and security-related considerations to this necessary fight DJDLQVW WHUURULVP 7KH IDFW WKDW D QHZ WKUHDW DSSHDUV GRHV QRW UHPRYH DOO RWKHUV « Our world is marked also by emerging assertions of power based on the possession of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Hence the temptation for certain States to DFTXLUHQXFOHDUSRZHUWKXVYLRODWLQJWUHDWLHV³ $QRWKHULQQRYDWLRQLQWKH)UHQFKGRFWULQHPHQWLRQHGE\&KLUDFZDVWKH³VWUDWHJLF IRUFHVIOH[LEOHUHDFWLRQ´WRH[WHUQDO threats. The President declared that starting from WKHVH FRQVLGHUDWLRQV )UDQFH KDG ³UHGXFHG LWV QXFOHDU ZDUKHDGV GHSOR\HG RQ VRPH RI WKHVXEPDULQHODXQFKHGPLVVLOHV´1RUPDOO\HDFK)UHQFKQXFOHDUVXEPDULQHFDUULHV missiles armed with 6 warheads per missile. &KLUDFVWUHVVHGWKDW)UDQFH¶VQXFOHDUIRUFHVVKRXOGEHSUHSDUHGWR³UHDFWIOH[LEO\´ to external threats. Up to now, the traditional French nuclear doctrine was based on the assumption of the total use of nuclear weapons which should guarantee the decisive VXSHULRULW\RYHUWKHHQHP\&KLUDF¶VVWDWHPHQWVLJQDOHGWKHGHSDUWXUHIURPWKLVSROLF\ thus opening broad opportunities of the punctuated use of WMD for the French armed IRUFHV ,Q IDFW WKH ILUVW VLJQV WKDW )UDQFH ZDV JLYLQJ XS LWV ³QXFOHDU GHWHUUHQFH´ GRFWULQHLQIDYRURIWKH³QXFOHDULQWLPLGDWLRQ´SULQFLSOHDSSHDUHGLQDXWXPQ At that time, the experts started to discuss the fact that the new French nuclear doctrine allowed the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the doctrine accounted not only for states that pose a direct strategic threat, but also those countries

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which France suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction. According to the nuclear doctrine, strikes should target WMD production facilities as well as training FDPSVDQGGLVSRVLWLRQEDVHVRIWHUURULVWV0LQLDWXUHQXFOHDUZHDSRQV³DWRPLFSDFNV´  that, according to some of the experts, until recently had been even more advanced in France than in the USA and Russia, should help the French armed forces to fulfill this difficult task. However, after the scandal with the never-found Iraqi weapons of mass destruction which had been used as the key pretext for unleashing the war against Saddam +XVVHLQ¶VUHJLPHLWLVLQDZD\DZNZDUGWRVSHDNDERXWSUH-emptive nuclear strikes. In WKLV YLHZ &KLUDF KDG SURPLVHG WR XVH ³XQFRQYHQWLRQDO´ PHDQV DJDLQVW WKRVH VWDWH OHDGHUVZKLFKXVH³WHUURULVWPHWKRGV´DJDLQVW)UDQFH7KLVLVDYHU\GDQJHURXVSURPLVH DV PRGHUQ WHUURULVWV XVXDOO\ GR QRW KDYH DQ\ ³KRPHODQG´ ,W LV E\ QR PHDQV DOZDys easy to determine the nationality of non-VWDWHDFWRUVRUPRUHLPSRUWDQWO\ZKLFK³VWDWH OHDGHUV´ WKH\ ZRUN IRU ,Q WKH JHQHUDO FRQWH[W RI WKH (XURSHDQ SROLF\ ZKLFK LV WUDGLWLRQDOO\ FDXWLRXV DQG ZHOO EDODQFHG &KLUDF¶V VWDWHPHQW VHHPV FOHDUO\ LOOconsidered. At the same time, it fits in perfectly with the loud rhetoric of the American ³KDZNV´± neoconservatives, preparing the public opinion for another big war against Iran this time. Certainly France would deliver no nuclear strikes against terrorists or DQ\ERG\ HOVH EXW &KLUDF¶V VWDWHPHQW GHPRQVWUDWHV SROLWLFDO VXSSRUW IRU WKH $PHULFDQ doctrine of pre-emptive strikes. Although France actively protested against the war in Iraq caused by the suspicions that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, the French nuclear doctrine after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 has been incrementally shifting from the deterrence principle to the active nuclear intimidation policy. 7DEOH)UDQFH¶VQXFOHDUIRUFHVGDWDIRU Type Deployed Year of Operational units deployment range, km Land-based aircraft: Mirage 2000N Carrier-based aircraft 6/%0Ɇ Total

Warhead number and explosive power ( kiloton) ɯ

Nuclear weapons stockpile 50

60

1988

2750

24

1978

650

ɯ

10

64

1996

6000

ɯ

288 348

In the foreseeable future, neither Britain nor France plan to create new strategic nuclear systems. However, taking into account the deep reduction of the Russian and 86 ³FHQWUDO´ QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV SODQQHG LQ WKH IRUWKFRPLQJ \HDUV RWKHU QXFOHDU VWDWHV may maintain the aggregate potential that would be comparable with the arsenal of each leading nuclear power or even surpass it under certain conditions. This is determined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, according to which the process of reduction should be continued. $WWKHSUHVHQWPRPHQWWKHWRWDOQXPEHURI%ULWDLQ¶VDQG)UDQFH¶VQXFOHDUZHDSRQV is 533 warheads. When discussing the nuclear doctrines of the United Kingdom and France one cannot but compare these documents with the nuclear doctrine of the USA as their main NATO ally.

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Since autumn 2005, the world media has been discussing the evolution of the American nuclear doctrine. . The draft document was prepared by the Pentagon and posted on the internet in March 2005, but it attracted broad attention only in the beginning of September after it was reported in the Washington Post. After that, the document was removed from the US Department of Defense website. In other words, there was an obvious leakage of information. In the preamble of the document which outlined the basic principles of the doctrine, the aims of the nuclear deterrence were IRUPXODWHG LQ WKH IROORZLQJ ZD\  ³Strategic deterrence convinces adversaries not to take grievous courses of action by means of decisive influence over their decision PDNLQJ´$QGIXUWKHURQ³The focus of US deterrence efforts is therefore to influence potential adversaries to withhold actions intended to hDUP86¶QDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWV´2 Such an interpretation of deterrence is equal to the radical broadening of its goals and potential acts. National interests of the United States are not limited to security issues; they include economic, energy, ideological and other interests that, most likely, would be much more important for the USA than any hypothetical threats to national VHFXULW\7KHHPSKDVLVLVSODFHGRQWKH³LQGXFHPHQWWRUHIUDLQ´LHRQWKHSUH-emptive DQG ³GHFLVLYH´ LQIOXHQFH RQ WKH GHFLVLRQ-making process at the stage at which ³SRWHQWLDODGYHUVDULHV´IDUIURPKDYLQJFRPPLWWHGDQ\DFWLRQVSDUWLFXODUO\WKRVHWKDW would justify the use of nuclear weapons against them), did not even make any decision in this sphere. Neither international terrorism, nor weapons of mass destruction are mentioned in this part of the doctrine; however the document stresses, ³The US does not make positive statements defining the circumstances under which it would use nuclear weapons.´  $SSDUHQWO\ WKLV PHDQV WKDW QXFOHDr weapons can be used ± and/or the threat of use can be actively employed ± in situations that have nothing to do with military and political threats to American national security. According to the assessments of the London Times this is a radical shift after almost KDOI D FHQWXU\ RI WKH QXFOHDU LQWLPLGDWLRQ SULQFLSOH EDVHG RQ WKH LGHD RI ³PDVVLYH counter-VWULNH´ The necessity of the operation in Iraq was justified by the supposedly existing Iraqi weapons of mass destruction; the falsity of these explanations has been generally admitted both in London and Washington today. Therefore, the references to the WMD problem in the doctrine do not impress. Moreover, the fact that the WMD issue in particular was highlighted in British and American mass media reports about the new doctrine invites a, certain speculation. The key phrase of the document, as the Times writes, appears in the list of possible scenarios of the use of pre-emptive nuclear strike; WKHILUVWRQHDVVXPHVWKDWWKHDGYHUVDU\XVHVRU³LQWHQGVWRXVH´:0'0RVWOLNHO\WKH enemy would not inform us about his intentions and thus the final assessment and decision would be left up to Washington. 2Q 6HSWHPEHU   %ULWDLQ¶V 'HIHQVH 0LQLVWHU ' -RKQ 5HLG VWDWHG WKDW KLV country could be involved in a nuclear conflict in the near future and it is, therefore necessary to renew the nuclear weapons arsenal which guarantees the national security. According to the minister, the decision should be made in the next two to four years. Thus the three nuclear powers ± France, the USA and the UK ± have in fact come out with a coordinated position which reveals a break from the doctrine of defensive nuclear deterrence of the Cold War period and the shift to the doctrine of pre-emptive 2

US Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, 15 March 15, 2005 http://www.nukestrat.com/us/jcs/JCS_JP3-12_05draft.pdf

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P. Romashkin / Nuclear Doctrines of the United Kingdom and France: A Russian Perspective

and coercive use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. The position of these three states determines the position of NATO on this issue even if no corresponding changes to the Alliance strategic doctrine have been made yet.

Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-79

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$1HZ/RRNDW&KLQD¶V1XFOHDU3ROLF\ Jianqun TENG 1

Abstract. 5HOHDVH RI WKH  'HIHQVH :KLWH 3DSHU EURNH &KLQD¶V WUDGLWLRQDO silence and ambiguity regarding its nuclear policy and strategy, which continues to be founded on the principles of self-defensHDQGJOREDOEDODQFH&KLQD¶VHPSKDVLV on its commitment to a minimal deterrence capability shows that its nuclear forces DUHSULPDULO\DVWUDWHJLFSROLWLFDOWRRO7KHFRUHHOHPHQWVRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\ are that nuclear weapons must be the last resort for China and it is the quality not quantity that plays the key role. Beijing is unlikely to change its non-first use nuclear policy in the future. The most important aspect of Chinese nuclear WUDQVSDUHQF\ LV D FOHDU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI &KLQD¶V DFWXDO SROLFies rather than its number of warheads.

A framework for nuclear policy Nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine are the three layers for a nuclear state to develop, plan, and use nuclear forces. Policy is the highest and dominant layer for achieving political, economic, and military goals through the development and future use of nuclear forces. The strategy level mainly deals with guidelines, constructions, and preparations for the future use of nuclear forces, while doctrine is the basic operational use of nuclear forces. Nuclear policy decisions depend on many elements, including the assessment of the current LQWHUQDWLRQDOHQYLURQPHQWWKHµJUDQG¶VWUDWHJ\RIDVWDWHIRU its development, the geopolitical situation of its neighborhood, as well as the social features and character of that state. Moreover, as part of assessing the nature of a country, it is important to have a good understanding of the country¶s history, culture, and philosophy of thinking. The subsequent nuclear doctrine will be in accordance with national nuclear policy and overall strategy.

&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\ Since the country first tested its nuclear weapons in 1964, Chinese officials have been reluctant to talk about China¶s nuclear policy, either at home or abroad. In fact, the release of the China Defense 2006 White Paper in December of that year was the first time China announced its overall nuclear strategy, specifically as one of self-defense. Scholars and correspondents tend to conclude that such an announcement is part of &KLQD¶V national military transparency endeavors, which Beijing has been attempting for years. Nevertheless, several reasons can be given for China¶s traditional silence on its nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine:

1 Deputy Secretary General of China Arms Control and Disarmament, and also Director of the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Studies Centre of the China Institute for International Studies in Beijing. He served in the PLA for 25 years and demobilized as a colonel in 2004.

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J. Teng / A New Look at China’s Nuclear Policy

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x

China¶s traditional culture and philosophy is one of doing things quietly and avoiding extremism. Sensitivities involving nuclear use in the military sphere led officials and scholars to seek to avoid any criticism from the government over possible misinterpretation of policy. Before the 2006 announcement of the self-defense strategy, there had been no clear divisions among the three layers and thus no need to distinguish among them. Sometimes scholars LQWHUSUHWHG &KLQD¶s ³non-first use´ as its official nuclear policy, sometimes as a strategy, and sometimes even as a doctrine. Basically, ³non-first use´ is the only a declaratory nuclear policy for China; The small size of its nuclear arsenal led decision-makers to think that an ambiguous attitude towards its nuclear policy would be of greater international benefit to China. Ambiguity is always a meaningful way for a weak side to protect its security interests when facing strong counterparts; and The foundation of WKH35&¶V nuclear policy established by its first-generation leaders consolidated ground that later leaders could not change in a dramatic way. The more than 40-year-long rational tradition of ambiguity did not provide any incentives for state leaders to make any comprehensive changes of its nuclear policy.

Many Western scholars have studied &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU VWUDWHJ\ in recent years. 2 Some thought that before the 1980s China had no nuclear strategy and that its use of nuclear weapons would be based instead by its nuclear doctrines. Some have argued that limited technologies and economic resources were the key factors influencing &KLQD¶VDGRSWLRQRIDPLQLPXP deterrent strategy. However, others noted that during the 1980s some PLA research fellows published articles saying that China should upgrade the minimum deterrent VWUDWHJ\WRDµOLPLWHGUHWDOLDWLRQ¶VWUDWHJ\7KH\DUJXHG that with the development of high technologies and in order to protect the achievements accomplished through the reform and opening processes, China today could not absorb any massive attack on the mainland, a risk that would be heightened by escalating its own nuclear strategy. However, neither of these two schools of thought comprehensively reflects the true HVVHQFHRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLFy.

2

See, in particular John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, Stanford University Press, 1988; &KLQD¶V6WUDWHJLF 6HDSRZHUWKH 3ROLWLFVRI 0RGHrnization in the Nuclear Age, Stanford University Press, 19994; Xue Litai, (YROXWLRQ RI &KLQD¶V 1XFOHDU 6WUDWHJ\ in John Hopkins and Weixing He eds., Strategic Views from the Second Tier: the Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain and China, Transaction Publishers, 1995; Alastair Iain Johnston, &KLQD¶V1HZ2OG7KLQNLQJ,QWHUQDWLRQDO6HFXULW\ Vol 20, No.3, Winter 1995/96, pp5-42; Lastair Iain Johnston, Prospect for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control, The China Quarterly, June 1996; Bate Gill and James Mulvenon, China and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Implications for the United States ,; Bate Gill and Mark Stokes, the Chinese Second Artillery Corps: Transition too Credible Deterrence, in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang eds., WKH3HRSOH¶V/LEHUDWLRQ$UP\DV2UJDQL]DWLRQ5HIHUHQFHVolume v1.0, Rand, 2002.

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3ROLF\RULJLQVDQGIRXQGDWLRQRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\ The basic framework of &KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\ZDVODLGE\WKHILUVWJHQHUDWLRQleaders of the PRC. Chairman Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai were the two key players LQWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\:LWKKLVPDVWHU\RI&KLQHVHSKLORVRSK\ Chairman Mao in the late 1940s viewed atomic bombs DVµSDSHUWLJHUs¶VWUHVVLQJWKDW victory in war does not depend on one or two weapon systems. However, he was also quite familiar with the strength of an atomic bomb and pointed out that strategically one should despise it while tactically one should respect it. After the first nuclear test on Oct 16th&KLQDGHFODUHGWKDWµWKHJRYHUQPHQWKDGEHHQDOZD\VLQIDYRURID comprehensive and complete dismantlement of nuclear weapons. If this could be realized, China would not devHORS LWV QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV¶ 3 In 1970, Mao Zedong GHPRQVWUDWHG KLV XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH PHDQLQJ RI GHWHUUHQFH ZKHQ KH VDLG µLW LV possible that only the big powers could wage a global war with nuclear weapons, but they are not going to war because of atomiFERPEVWKH\KDYH¶$VIRU&KLQDKHVDLG µ2XU FRXQWU\ ZLOO PDNH D IHZ DWRPLF ERPEV LQ WKH IXWXUH ZKLFK GRHVQRWPHDQWKDWZHDUHJRLQJWRXVHWKHP«ZKDWZHDUHJRLQJWRGRLV WR WDNH LW DV D GHIHQVLYH ZHDSRQ«$WRPLF ERPEV FDQQRW EH GURSSHG causally, even when we have acquired atomic bombs, we should not drop WKHPFDXVDOO\DQGRWKHUZLVHDQ\FDXVDOXVHZLOOYLRODWHWKHODZ¶4 Premier Zhou Enlai additionally emphasized that nuclear weapons depended less on the quantity than the quality and variety of nuclear weapons. 5 Even the Chinese scientists who had been involved in the research and development of nuclear bombs thought that nuclear bombs could only be used as a political tool rather than for military leverage.6 Year in and year out, the successors of WKH35&¶VILUVWGHFLVLRQ-makers continued to carry on this policy. During a May 1978 meeting with the PLA Second Artillery Force leaders, Deng Xiaoping pointed out that &KLQD¶VSRVVHVVLRQRIQXFOHDUZHDSRQV ZDVMXVWWRVKRZ&KLQD¶VFDSDELOLW\µ\RXKDYHDQd I have; you want to destroy us and \RX ZLOO EH UHWDOLDWHG DJDLQVW D OLWWOH ELW¶ 7 President Jiang Zemin gave a further H[SODQDWLRQ RQ &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU SROLF\ during a meeting with the Second Artillery leaders where he explained that the purpose of developing strategic nuclear weapons was not an offensive but a defensive one. He argued that such capability provided China with a strong deterrent against other nuclear-weapons states from using such weapons against it, thus proving its defensive value. Moreover, he illustratively wrote: µenhance the construction of the strategic missile force to safeguard the motherland and PDLQWDLQ ZRUOG SHDFH¶8 This nuclear strategic thought shown by the declarations and UHPDUNVRI&KLQD¶VOHDGHUVUHIOHFWVDQGUHLQIRUFHVWKH FRUHHOHPHQWVRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDU 3

See WKH3HRSOH¶V'DLO\ Oct 17th, 1964. Selected Work of Mao Zedong on Diplomatic Affairs, p 541, p 453. 5 Selected Work of Zhou Enlai on Culture, p 661. 6 Some interviews by Ms Su Xiangli, a Chinese scholar, see $VVHVVPHQWRQ&KLQD¶V1XFOHDU6WUDWHJ\in the Li Genxin and Teng Jianqun eds., Annual Collection of Papers on International Arms Control and Disarmament: 20005, World Knowledge Press, p 215. 7 Interviews by Xin Hua News Agency correspondent with the Second Artillery leaders, 8 Ibid. 4

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policy: (1) nuclear weapons must be the last resort for China; (2) it is the quality not quantity that plays the key role. So, from the very beginning of attempting to make an atomic bomb, the PRC leaders were quite aware of its strategic role. In their opinions, an atomic bomb is more a political tool rather than a military weapon, with a basic objective of self-defense. China believed then, as it does now, that it should have such a weapon as a basic means for the defense of the country. It is based on these understandings and principles that China developed its nuclear force. The central objective is to maintain the minimum, effective self-GHIHQVH 7KDW LV WR VD\ WKH LQWHQW LV WKDW &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU IRUFH ZLOO survive a first nuclear strike from any country and will be able to retaliate in kind.

7KHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\ 7KHUHDUHDWOHDVWWKUHHFKDUDFWHULVWLFDVSHFWVRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\ 1. The non-first-use policy makes nuclear weapons a last resort in war. National policy holds that: µ&KLQDUHPDLQVILUPO\FRPPLWWHGWRWKHSROLF\RIQRILUVWXVHRIQXFOHDU weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and stands for the comprehensive prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear ZHDSRQV¶9 This policy depends on a number of factors, including: an understanding of nuclear ZHDSRQV E\ &KLQD¶V OHDGHUV FRQILGHQFH WKDW &KLQD¶V FRQYHQWLRQDO IRUFH LV VWURQJ HQRXJK DQ DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO VLWXDWLRQ WKH FRXQWU\¶V FXOWXUDO DQG philosophical traditions and socialist ideology. China encourages other countries to IROORZ VXLW µ&KLQD VWURQJO\ DSSHDOV WR WKH RWKHU QXFOHDU VWDWHV WR UHVSRQG WR &KLQD¶V initiative, immediately reach an agreement on a treaty on non-first use of nuclear weapons and unconditionally reach agreement on no-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear ZHDSRQV]RQHV¶10 In recent years, the non-first-use policy has been challenged by some Chinese scholars and officers who argue that in light of the economic development along the coastal areas and the development of sophisticated military technologies, fundamental changes in the style of modern warfare are justified, and that the non-first-use policy should therefore be changed. However, it seems unlikely that China will change its non-first-use policy for the following reasons: (1) It is a state policy which reflects Chinese philosophy and culture on warfare. Just as Sun Tzu wrote in his work Art of War, war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence 9

Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, China's National Defense in 2006, December 2006, Beijing. 10 3HRSOH¶V'DLO\-XO\th, 1996.

J. Teng / A New Look at China’s Nuclear Policy

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it is too important an issue, with possible consequences too dire, to be neglected or de-structured from the non-first-use policy. To have a good understanding of China¶s nuclear policy, one must have a solid mastering of China¶s culture and history. (2) In the predictable future, there is slim possibility of a large-scale conventional war against China. According to government and scholarly assessments of the international situation in the coming years, China today enjoys its most favorable relations with world¶V big powers and its neighboring countries since the establishment of PRC. The war alert¶VWDWXVLV at its lowest level for years and this is expected to continue. (3) The PLA, which has been modernizing over the last twenty years, has the capability to defend the mainland from any invasion and prevent the separation of Taiwan, the chief security issue of the day. Since the early 1990s, the strategic guideline for national defense was shifted to focus on any crisis happening across the Taiwan Strait, which will absolutely not require a nuclear bomb. (4) Tactically speaking, changing its nuclear policy will would completely change the structure and deployment posture RI &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU IRUFH, which would cost billions of Chinese Yuan. For the 30 years since WKHFRXQWU\¶V openingup, the Chinese have been putting all their efforts into economic development and improving society; it seems unlikely that the government would pay the costs for such a large change in economic priorities as dropping the non-first-use policy would entail. 2. Maintain the minimum capability for self-defense. 7KHLQLWLDOGHYHORSPHQWRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUZHDSRQVFRPHVIURPWKHSUH-condition that the survival of the newborn socialist country depended on it. According to an Indian VFKRODUWKH\RXQJ3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRIChina had faced nuclear threats several times, both from the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, for example in the Korean War, over the Taiwan issue and &KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSURMHFWDQGWKH6LQR-Soviet border conflict from the 1950s to the 1970s. 11 The drive to go nuclear during the 1950s and 1960s can be understood as an effort to break up the nuclear blackmails from the two superpowers. $V 'HYLQ 7 +DJHUW\ SRLQWV RXW µ&KLQD¶V  QXFOHDU WHVW DQG VXEVHTXHQW ZHDSRQL]DWLRQ ZHUH URRWHG LQ %HLMLQJ¶V FRQFHUQ RYHU WKH 8nited States and later the 6RYLHW8QLRQDVWKUHDWHQLQJDGYHUVDU\¶12 6LQFHWKHODWHV&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUIRUFHKDVEHHQDVPDOORQHEXWLWLVHQRXJK for a second strike against any state which uses nuclear weapons against China. The justification for keeping a small arsenal is that China believes that even a small nuclear strike would create an unbearable disaster for the enemy. The level of retaliation capability maintained by China is lower than any other nuclear power in the world. Today, the Chinese gRYHUQPHQW VWLOO LQVLVWV RQ LWV µILYH QR¶V¶ principles on nuclear weapons development, further demonstrating its commitment to minimal capacity: (1) no competition with other nuclear powers; (2) no dependence on other nuclear powers; (3) no proliferation of nuclear weapons; (4) no deployment of nuclear weapons abroad; and 11

Jasjit Singh, Why Nuclear Weapons?, see Nuclear India, p 12-13. Devin T. Hagerty, the Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia, (London, 1998), p 72. 12

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(5) no nuclear alliance with any other countries. And as mentioned above, in 2006 the government announced clearly that its nuclear strategy was one of self-defense: µ&KLQD VQXFOHDr strategy is subject to the state's nuclear policy and military strategy. Its fundamental goal is to deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China. China upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons, and aims at building a lean and effective nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs. It endeavors to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent force. China's nuclear force is under the direct command of the Central Military Commission (CMC). China exercises great restraint in developing its nuclear force. It has never entered into and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country¶.13 3. China supports the process of nuclear disarmament and maintaining strategic stability among the nuclear weapons states. &KLQD¶VVWDQFHLVWKDWDOOQXFOHDUZHDSRQVVWDWHVVKRXOGUHGXFHWKH QXPEHURIQXFOHDU warheads until their eventual, complete abolishment. China pledges it will follow suit if the other nuclear countries destroy their nuclear weapons. This principle lends great value to the international efforts to maintain peace and stability through an arms control approach. China firmly supports the reactivation of arms control policies, advocating that all nuclear weapons states should genuinely undertake their obligations of disarmament as stipulated by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation-Treaty. It has consistently stressed that the first step should be the conclusion of a treaty by all nuclear weapons states to commit to a no-first use policy, emphasizing that such an agreement would be a significant confidence-building measure among these states to put their subsequent actions on the right track. Stable relations among the nuclear states are of great importance to the peace and stability of the world. While it proclaimed self-defense in its recent White Paper, &KLQD¶V LQ-depth rationale for its nuclear policy is to keep stable relations among the nuclear weapons states. Non-first-XVHKDVEHHQDSLOODURI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\DQGLW VHUYHV &KLQD¶V IRUHPRVW VHFXULW\ LQWHUHVWV 7KXV LW DSSHDUV KLJKO\ LPSUREDEOH WKDW China will abandon it.

7KHIXWXUHWUHQGRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\ The future trend RI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\KDVEHHQDKRW-topic at home and abroad in recent years. Some argue that China should expand its nuclear arsenals in order to meet national security requirements in the new era, which would mean a fundamental change RI&KLQD¶VSDst policy. In 1995, the Journal of International Security published a paper 13

Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, China's National Defense in 2006, December 2006, Beijing.

J. Teng / A New Look at China’s Nuclear Policy

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that pointed out that since 1987 many papers had been published within China supporting a limited war-ILJKWLQJ FDSDELOLW\ RI &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU IRUFH UDWKHU WKDQ minimal deterrence. IQ WKH DXWKRU¶V RSLQLRQ WKHVH DUJXPHQWV DUH RQO\ VFKRODUV¶ personal views rather than official ones. In the foreseeable future, China is unlikely to alter its nuclear policy since there has been no change to date, since its inception, in the foundation of its nuclear strategy and forces. However, this does not preclude possible change in the future evolution of &KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\:LWKUHJDUGWRWKDWIXWXUHVHYHUDOWUHQGVGHVHUYHPHQWLRQKHUH (as personal observations of the author): 1. The issue of greater transparency in military matters, especially regarding nuclear weapons and nuclear transparency, has been a sensitive subject not only for China but also for other nuclear weapons states. However, some officials and analysts have narrowed the fundamental meaning of the term µWUDQVSDUHQF\¶ ,Q FRPSDULVRQ WR RWKHU QXFOHDU ZHDSRQ VWDWHV &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU transparency has been at the forefront of international attention. From its first test of nuclear bombs in the 1960s, China had declared its aforementioned three basic principles on the development and use of an atomic bomb: nonfirst use, no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states, and support for nuclear disarmament. In additional moves towards more transparency, in October 2005 China opened the command post of the Second Artillery Force in Beijing to the then U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld; and as described earlier, in December 2006 China announced its nuclear self-GHIHQVHVWUDWHJ\LQWKH&KLQD¶V'HIHQVH:KLWH3DSHU Actually, the Chinese government had been considering announcing its White Paper on nuclear issues over a number of years. This is an understandably difficult challenge, and the government has been trying to find the best way to explain its nuclear policy to the world and it will continue in these endeavors. Of critical note, however, is that the most important aspect RI &KLQHVH QXFOHDU WUDQVSDUHQF\ LV D FOHDU XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI &KLQD¶V DFWXDO policies rather than its number of warheads. 2. Also in the future, China will continue the modernization of its nuclear arsenal to meet the new and changing security environment, for which there are several considerations. As official papers and academic journals confirm, China today is in its most secure position of the past 59 years. Its relations ZLWKWKHZRUOG¶VOHDGLQJSRZHUVDUHVWDEOHDQGLWVUHODWLRQVZLWKQHLJKERULQJ countries are also favorable. However, the nuclear challenge is still there. Nuclear weapons states have continued to modernize their respective arsenals and also began to deploy missile defense systems, which has already altered the balance of power among them. Meanwhile, with the proliferation of nuclear technologies through licit and illicit means, more countries have acquired the technology to make nuclear bombs. For China, it is absolutely necessary to face these challenges. &KLQD¶VRZQPRGHUQL]DWLRQZLOOEHIRFXVHGRQWKHTXDOLW\UDWKHUWKDQWKH quantity of the nuclear bombs. Moreover, today the overriding task for Beijing is to build up a fairly developed and harmonious society, leaving few resources leftover for building up the nuclear arsenal. The purpose of the

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J. Teng / A New Look at China’s Nuclear Policy

&KLQD¶V PRGHUQL]DWLRQ LV WR PHHW WKH UHTXLUHPHQWV IRU D VWUDWHJ\ RI VHOIdefense. Modernization of its nuclear force has been continuing since the 1970s with the development of precision technologies and long-range delivery systems. For example, silo-based and liquid-engine nuclear weapons have been replaced by mobile and solid-engine systems. All such efforts are explained as a means to enhance the self-defense capabilities of the PLA. ,QOLJKWRIWKH&KLQD¶VIXWXUHHQHUJ\GHPDQGVPXFKPRUHHIIRUWZLOOEH put into the civilian use of nuclear technology in the coming 15 years. In fact the use of nuclear energy by the military has already led to civilian purposes. :KLOH DW WKH 35&¶V IRXQGLQJ &KLQD¶V OHDGHUV JDYH JUHDW SULRULW\ WR WKH military use of nuclear technology to address the nuclear threat posed by other states, civil nuclear energy use was also given attention. In 1950, China established its first institute on nuclear technology, though it was only in March 1985 that China launched its first nuclear power plant in Qinshan, which then began to produce commercial power in 1994. Now China operates several nuclear power plants. AFFRUGLQJWR &KLQD¶V 11th Five-Year Plan, over the next 15 years, the portion of nuclear power in total national electricity production will be increased from its current 1.7% to 4%, which to implement requires 2 reactors brought online every year for the coming 15 years. Compared to the nuclear energy use of developed countries such as France (around 80%), South Korea (around 40%), Japan (around 30%), the U.S. (around 20%), UK (around 20%), and Russia (around 17%), the use of nuclear technology in power production in China is still at a low level. To meet the demand for energy and to protect its environment, China will give great effort to the development of nuclear energy in the coming years.

Conclusion ,QFRQFOXVLRQ&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUSROLF\LVWUDQVSDUHQW In recent years it has been under internal and external pressures to undertake some changes in a variety of and often opposing directions. However, as it considers the foundation of its nuclear policy to be sound, China does not judge such changes to be necessary and it is doubtful that they will happen in the foreseeable future.

Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-87

87

Modern Nuclear Strategy of China Major General (ret) Pavel ZOLOTAREV1

Abstract. Chinese military policy, including nuclear strategy, should be considered not only in the context of the policy of the state as a whole but also in the context of this ancient FRXQWU\¶VFXOWXUH&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUVWUDWHJ\FRUUHVSRQGV to the conditions of the rising world order and this does not presuppose that China would give up the development of its nuclear forces. Still it should be stressed that Chinese nuclear strategy does not consider nuclear weapons to be battlefield DUPDPHQWV&KLQD¶VFRPPLWPHQWQRWWRXVHQXFOHDUZHDSRQVILUVWDQGLWVSURSRVDO to the other nuclear powers to undertake similar obligations deserve support.

Chinese military policy, including nuclear strategy, should be considered not only in the context of the policy of the state as a whole but also in the context of this ancient FRXQWU\¶VFXOWXUH:LWKRXWDQ\SDUWLFXODUH[DJJHUDWLRQLWFDQEHVWDWHGWKDWFRPSDUHG to other countries, China lives within a slightly different system. Attempts to analyze any aspect of Chinese policy from the viewpoint of Western culture may lead to inadequate conclusions. 7KH YHU\ QRWLRQ RI ³ZDU´ KDV FRPSOHWHO\ GLIIHUHQW PHDQLQJV LQ :HVWHUQ DQG Chinese culture. The course of history demonstrates how economics, politics and war are closely and constantly interconnected. Karl von Clausewitz articulated the relationship between politics and war most clearly ± ³ZDULVWKHFRQWLQXDWLRQRISROLF\ E\RWKHU PHDQV´ $V ZDULVWKH GHULYative of politics, it therefore follows the patterns inherent to politics itself. Already in the sixth century BC, Chinese military theorist, 6XQ7]XKDGQRWHGWKDW³ZDUIDUHLVWKHZD\RIGHFHSWLRQ´ Further on, however, Sun Tzu gave recommendations which reflected the specific FKDUDFWHURI&KLQHVHFXOWXUH³ZKHQFDSDEOHRIDWWDFNLQJIHLJQLQFDSDFLW\ZKHQXVLQJ our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near; hold out baits to entice the enemy; feign disorder, and crush him; if he is secure at all points, be prepared for him; if he is in superior strength, evade him; if your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him; pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant; if he is taking his ease, give him no rest; if his forces are united, separate them; attack KLPZKHUHKHLVXQSUHSDUHGDSSHDUZKHUH\RXDUHQRWH[SHFWHG´ But even more typical are the following views of the Chinese military wriWHU³,Q the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's UHVLVWDQFH ZLWKRXW ILJKWLQJ´  2QH RI WKH 5XVVLDQ PLOLWDU\ WKHRULVWV VNHSWLFDOO\ QRWHG

1

Deputy Director, Institute for USA and Canada Studies

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P. Zolotarev / Modern Nuclear Strategy of China

that Sun Tzu was a military leader who had not won a single battle. This statement reveals the significant difference in approaches to war and victory. While Sun Tzu was certainly a military writer of antiquity, it is worth UHPHPEHULQJWKHUHFRPPHQGDWLRQVRI'HQJ;LDRSLQJZKLFKXQGHUOLH&KLQD¶VPRGHUQ PLOLWDU\ SROLF\ 7KHLU HVVHQFH LV DV IROORZV ³2EVHUYH FDOPO\  0DQDJH \RXU WDVNV evenly. Defend our position. Hide our might and wait when our time has come. Adhere to discreet position and never demand leadership´. In order to understand the foundation of the Chinese strategy, it seems appropriate to mention an analogy used by Russian military expert, Sergey Grinyaev. To illustrate the difference between Western and Eastern civilizations he compares two logic games popular in the West and in the East. Though both games had appeared in the east, the game of chess became more popular in the West, while the game of Go became popular in the East. One may assume that the logic of the chess game corresponds more to Western culture while the game of Go to Eastern culture. As is well known, chess implies the availability of the full set of pieces in the beginning of the game. Throughout the course of the game, the strength of both players diminishes with the mutual capture of pieces. Eventually the game is won by the player ZKRGHIHDWVWKHRSSRQHQW¶VNLQJ regardless of his own losses. In Go, the game starts with an empty board and strength is built up with the increase of control over the RSSRQHQW¶VVWRQHV2YHUWLPHSOD\HUVEHFRPHPRUHYXOQHUDEOHWRWKHLURZQPLVWDNHV DQG WKH SOD\HU ZKR PDQDJHV WR WDNH DGYDQWDJH RI KLV RSSRQHQW¶V PLVWDNHV ILUVW strengthens his position. The victory in Go goes to the player who establishes control over the larger part of the board; the more powerful the opponent, the more significant is the victory. From this comparison, the essence of Eastern strategy becomes more clear ± the pursuit of greater influence at minimal costs, not through annihilation of the enemy ZKLFK LQHYLWDEO\ HQWDLOV RQH¶V RZQ ORVVHV EXW DW WKH H[SHQVH RI WKH DGYHUVDU\¶V UHVRXUFHVE\XVLQJKLVPLVWDNHVIRURQH¶VRZQGHYHORSPHQW Not accidentally, China uses the Comprehensive National Power index (CNP) to assess the position of the country in the world and the Strategic Configuration of Power LQGH[6&3 LQLWVVWUDWHJLFSODQQLQJ$SSDUHQWO\6&3LVXVHGWRFDOLEUDWHWKHFRXQWU\¶V power, including military power, in order to correspond proportionally to existing and SRWHQWLDO WKUHDWV  ,Q GRLQJ VR &KLQHVH OHDGHUV VHHN WR VOLJKWO\ XQGHUVWDWH &KLQD¶V capabilities and avoid confrontation in order to create the best possible conditions for further development. Following the major transformation of its armed forces, China stressed that the first decades of the new century would be peaceful and that military might would not be necessary for further economic development. The threats identified in the official Chinese documents are related to the dispute over Taiwan and potential inter-state conflicts in Tibet and the Xinjiang±Uyghur region. However, it seems that the most serious problems which may constrain the development of the country are connected with the securing of stable energy sources. &KLQD¶V GHSHQGHQFH RQ IRUHLJQ HQHUJ\ VXSSOLHV   FRQWLQXHV WR JURZ GHPDQGLQJ security guarantees for the deliveries from various regions of the world. In light of this FRQFHUQ WKH PRVW VWUDWHJLF XVH RI &KLQD¶V DUPHG IRUFHV would be to carry out joint local operations in different regions of the world. Therefore, the emphasis within the technical transformation is placed on bringing both of the country and the armed forces into the computer age. This process in its turn demands the development of space programs and ensuring security in outer space.

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7KHTXHVWLRQRI&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUVWUDWHJ\VKRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[W of all these nuances of Chinese strategy and military policy. China possesses both strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. Chinese strategic nuclear forces include strategic missile forces, strategic aviation and a nuclear missile fleet. On January 1, 2007, the total number of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles was 244 units. Strategic missile forces are composed of 130 land-based ballistic missile launchers including 30 inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM),18 launchers of Dong Feng-5F ICBMs, 6 launchers of Dong Feng-31 ICBMs, and 6 Dong-Feng-31A ICBM launchers. The number of Chinese intermediate-range ballistic missiles is significantly larger:103 IRBMs including 11 launchers of Dong Feng-4 IRBMs, 36 Dong Feng-21 IRBM launchers and 35 Dong Feng-21A IRBM launchers. All ICBMs and IRBMs are single RV missiles. Strategic aviation is composed of 120 Xian-6 bombers (Chinese modification of the soviet bomber Tu-16). Each bomber is outfitted to carry one nuclear B-5 air bomb ZLWK  PHJDWRQV RI H[SORVLYH SRZHU &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU PLVVLOH IOHHW FRQVLVWV RI RQH submarine with 12 single RV ballistic missiles (SLBM) Julang-1. The total stockpile of nuclear warheads and air-dropped gravity bombs is estimated at 240-280 weapons. Information concerning non-strategic nuclear capacity is restricted. There is, however, information known about the Chinese fighter ± the Xian-5 bomber with a 400 km operational range and nuclear bomb-load of one air bomb with 5-20 kilotons of explosive power. Besides this, strategic missile forces include missile brigades armed with operational-tactical missiles Dong Feng-11A, Dong Feng-15 and Dong Feng15A.Chinese land forces are also armed with short-range ballistic missiles; they may also possess nuclear artillery systems and nuclear land mines. The stockpile of B-4 nuclear air bombs is made up of 350 units; the number of warheads for operational-tactical missiles is 40. The total number of tactical nuclear weapons is estimated at 120 units. &RPSDUHGZLWKRWKHUQXFOHDUSRZHUV&KLQD¶VQXFOHDUIRUFHVDUHDWDORZFRPEDW readiness level owing to the technical shortcomings of the nuclear missile potential of the country. In assessing Chinese nuclear potential in relation to other states, it can be stated ZLWKFHUWDLQW\WKDW&KLQD¶VVWUDWHJLFQXFOHDUIRUFHVDUHLQFDSDEOHRIODXQFKLQJDVXGGHQ nuclear strike against states, such as Russia or the United States. Consequently, in a crisis with either of these countries (i.e. conventional war) China would have no alternative to launching a nuclear strike first ± that is, a pre-emptive strike. Otherwise, &KLQD¶VVWUDWHJLFPLVVLOHV forces could be destroyed with one conventional strike due to their high vulnerability. Therefore another conclusion follows ± the key thesis of Chinese nuclear doctrine concerning the non-first use of nuclear weapons is nothing more than a declaration. The principle of nuclear non-first use can be based only on the concept of a limited nuclear retaliatory strike. The concept rests on the operational status of nuclear forces which creates a real threat of inflicting unacceptable damage to the enemy through the retaliatory strike. It is presumed that, in this case, the enemy would abstain from using nuclear weapons or military actions of such scale that would force the use of nuclear ZHDSRQVLQWKHLQWHUHVWVRIRQH¶VRZQVHFXULW\ Nevertheless, it seems thDW&KLQD¶VFRPPLWPHQWQRWWRXVHQXFOHDUZHDSRQVILUVWLV by no means of a declarative character. On one hand the concept of limited retaliatory

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nuclear strike allows a country to maintain a strategic nuclear force structure commensurate with the economic capabilities of the country, without engaging in a QXFOHDU DUPV UDFH EHWZHHQ WKH OHDGLQJ QXFOHDU SRZHUV  2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG &KLQD¶V policy also allows it to feel confident in terms of ensuring national security. But this is not the crucial point. The use of nuclear weapons in warfare is an extreme measure; it is the last step in inflicting the maximum possible damage to the HQHP\LQVSLWHRIRQH¶VRZQWUHPHQGRXVORVVHV6XFKDQDSSURDFKHQWLUHO\FRQWUDGLFWV Chinese philosophy of war and victory. Chinese philosophy of war and the use of nuclear weapons are incompatible. The difference between China and other official nuclear states, whose nuclear policies do not exclude the possibility of first use of nuclear weapons under certain circumstances, should be also stressed here. 5XVVLD¶V ³%DVLF 3URYLVLRQV of the Military Doctrine of the Russian )HGHUDWLRQ´ which was adopted in 1993, formulated the possible cases of first use of nuclear ZHDSRQV5XVVLD¶VSRVLWLRQ ZDVSDUWO\LQIOXHQFHGE\WKH 1$72DSSURDFK supported by the negative security assurances not to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear states. It was also shaped by the collapse of the Soviet armed forces and the incomplete forming of Russian armed forces, with their limited capabilities to wage conventional war. The conditions of possible first use of nuclear weapons aimed to prevent the development of local conflict into a large-sale war. 5XVVLD¶ PLOLWDU\ GRFWULQH RI  SUDFWLFDOO\ UHSHDWHG WKH FRQGLWLRQV RI QXFOHDU weapons use formulated in 1993. The capabilities of Russian armed forces have not yet reached a level at which the possibility of a large-scale conventional war could be practically excluded. In 2001, the United States has not only changed its previous approach to nuclear weapons use but also broadened the conditions of its use as far to include pre-emptive strikes. US nuclear policy, in contrast to Russian policy, reflects a desire to strengthen American global supremacy. However, the similarity of Russian and American doctrines lies in the fact that they both accept the appropriateness of nuclear weapons possession, in contradiction to the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The prospects of nuclear disarmament in such a situation become impossible. At the same time, Chinese doctrinal provisions are in accordance with the NPT. $SSDUHQWO\ &KLQD¶V QXFOHDU VWUDWHJ\ FRUUHVSRQGV WR WKH FRQGLWLRQV RI WKH DULVLQJ world order in the best way. But this certainly does not mean that China would give up the development of its nuclear forces. First, the operation life of nuclear missiles is limited; replacement is inevitable. Obviously, improved modern armaments which correspond to the emerging conditions would be made operational. 6LQFH  &KLQD¶V VWUDWHJLF PLVVLOH forces have been, and are being, equipped with missile complexes armed with advanced solid propellant Dong Feng-21A IRBM (compared to the prototype IRBM Dong Feng-21, whose operational range had been increased by 1,000 km ± from 2,000 to 3,000 km). In 2003, the first mobile missile complex with solid propellant Dong Feng-31 ICBM (estimated range of 12,300 km) was made operational. The development of the new mobile IRBM Dong Feng-25, based on the Dong Feng-31,31A has been started. According to some evaluations, this new missile would consist of the first and second stages of ICBM Dong Feng-31,31A and have an operational range of 4,000 km. The first tests of Dong Feng-25 IRBM can be conducted in the end of this year or in the beginning of the next.

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The US development of the ABM system induced China to adopt the program of equipping its strategic missiles with multiple reentry vehicles capable of penetrating the ABM systems. The Dong Feng-5B with a nuclear cassette warhead has already been developed. Still, it should be stressed that Chinese nuclear strategy does not aim to make QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV LQWR WKH EDWWOHILHOG DUPDPHQWV &KLQD¶V FRPPLWPHQW QRW WR XVH nuclear weapons first and its proposal to other nuclear powers to undertake similar obligations deserve support. This provides a means for persuading other states to give up the drive to possess nuclear weapons. It is only in this case that the question of compliance with the NPT requirement concerning the prospect of comprehensive nuclear disarmament can be discussed with practical results.

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Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-92

Iranian nuclear program ± peaceful or military goals?1 Mark FITZPATRICK2

Abstract. Iran has no known nuclear weapons or doctrine, other than an insistence on its right to sensitive fuel cycle technologies, which it asserts are for peaceful purposes. Yet THKUDQ¶VEHKDYLRUDQGWKHQDWXUHRILWVSURJUDPSURYLGHUHDVRQVWo conclude that the purpose is a nuclear weapons capability. The history of VDIHJXDUGV YLRODWLRQV DQG RI FKDQJLQJ VWRULHV LV RQH UHDVRQ WR GRXEW WKDW ,UDQ¶V answers to the IAEA work plan warrant early closure of the file. Other reasons for concern are the economic illogic of its enrichment effort and at least ten indicators of military involvement in the nuclear program.

If one were representing the Islamic Republic of Iran, one might protest why the WRSLFRI,UDQLVHYHQRQWKHDJHQGDDWDZRUNVKRSRQWKHVXEMHFWRI³QXFOHDUVWUDWHJLHV DQG GRFWULQHV´  ,UDQ KDV QR QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DQG QR QXFOHDU VWUDWHJ\ RU GRFWULQH± at least not any that are known to the world -- beyond an insistence on its right to the all QXFOHDU IXHO F\FOH WHFKQRORJLHV  ,UDQ¶V OHDGHUV UHSHDWHGO\ LQVLVW WKDW ,UDQ KDV QR intention to possess nuclear weapons and moreover has no need for them. Indeed, Iranians stress that their Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, issued a fatwa against the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. And yet, much of the world does not believe it. It is useful to remind ourselves why, and to try WR XQGHUVWDQG ZKDW ,UDQ¶V UHDO QXFOHDU LQWHQWLRQV DQG VWUDWHJLHV DUH, so that we might better find the best way, collectively and nationally, to deal with this proliferation problem. Nobody outside the Iranian decision-making circle knows if Iran has made a decision to produce nuclear weapons. Indeed, this is not a choice Iran needs to make yet; an actual decision to build a nuclear weapon can be made later. What can be said with a high level of confidence, however, is that Iran is seeking a nuclear weapons capability. For this, there is plenty of evidence. It has been suggested that Iran just wants to be like Japan ± with a fissile material production capability for use only in peaceful purposes and a latent potential for military use if a nuclear deterrent were ever deemed necessary. But it is a highly misleading to compare Iran to Japan in this way. Critically, Japan did not seek uranium enrichment technology as a security hedge; at least there is no evidence to suggest this. -DSDQ¶VIXHOF\FOHSURJUDPKDVDVWURQJHFRQRPLFUDWLRQDOH'HYRLGRIVLJQLILFDQWRWKHU energy producing resources and fearful of the effects of oil price shocks as the third ODUJHVWJOREDORLOFRQVXPHU-DSDQ¶VHQHUJ\VHFXULW\GHSHQGVKHDYLO\RQQXFOHDUSRZHU 5RXJKO\RQHWKLUGRI-DSDQ¶VJURZLQJHOHFWULFLW\GHPDQGLVVXSSOLHGE\QXFOHDUHQHUJ\ Throughout its nuclear history, Japan has never been suspected of hiding aspects of its 1 2

Paper updated in March 2008 Senior Fellow for Non-Proliferation, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London

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program, never violated its safeguards agreement, never refused to accept strengthened VDIHJXDUGVSURYLVLRQVDQGQHYHUUHIXVHGWRDQVZHULQVSHFWRUV¶TXHVWLRQVWRGHQ\ them DFFHVV RU WR LPSHGH WKHLU LQYHVWLJDWLRQV  -DSDQ¶V SURJUDP KDV EHHQ RQH RI FRPSOHWH transparency and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). ,UDQ¶V FDVH LV EHHQ YHU\ GLIIHUHQW  ,WV KLVWRU\ RI GHFHSWLRQ DQG VDIHJXDUGV violations, the economic illogic of its enrichment program, and the many indications of military connections provide a good deal of evidence that a capability for nuclear weapons ± whether for deterrence or hegemonic purposes ± is its real intent.

Safeguards violations ,UDQ¶VFHQWULIXJHSURJUDPVWDUWHGLQ7KLVZDVDWDWLPHZKHQWKH86DQG8665 were making arms control deals to sharply reduce their nuclear arsenals. The concept that horizontal proliferation is directly linked to vertical proliferation or the failure of disarmament does not apply to the Iran case. In comparison with the nuclear weapons programs of most other countries, however, Iran was not on a fast track for most of this time. Twenty-three years later Iran is still at least a year away from being able to produce enough fissile material sufficient for a nuclear weapon. By contrast, it took Pakistan eleven years to be able to produce a bomb from the time A.Q. Khan stole enrichment technology from Europe. In the past few years, however Iran has TXLFNHQHG WKH SDFH  3UHVLGHQW $KPDGLQHMDG¶V ERDVW RQ  $SULO  WKDW ,UDQ KDV begun installing an additional 6,000 centrifuges to add to the 3,000 already in place at the underground enrichment plant at Natanz suggests that Iran is now speeding ahead as rapidly as possible. 7KHIXOOH[WHQWRI,UDQ¶VILVVLOHPDWHULDOSURGXFWLRQSURJUDPVGLGQRWFRPHWROLJKW until August 2002, when an exile group revealed the existence of the underground enrichment plant under construction at Natanz and a heavy water-moderated research reactor at Arak, the latter ideal for producing weapons grade plutonium. Western intelligence agencies knew about these facilities but had not provided the IAEA with specific information about them for fear of compromising intelligence sources. The facilities and the deception surrounding them turned the glare of international attention to focus on Iran. Iranian representatives protest that they had no legal requirement to notify the IAEA about these facilities anyway until six months before any nuclear material was introduced. This is legally correct insofar as Natanz is concerned. Unlike every other country with a nuclear program, Iran had not signed a subsidiary arrangement to its safeguards agreement requiring giving the IAEA advance notification of the construction of any new nuclear facility as soon as a construction decision is taken. Iran finally did sign the subsidiary agreement in 2003, but then they unsigned it in 2007 ± an action for which there is no precedent or legal justification. For many other aspects of its nuclear development programme, Iran did in fact have legal obligations to notify the IAEA. Under its NPT-required safeguards agreement, Iran was required to report the importation of nuclear material, experiments ZLWKLWDQGIDFLOLWLHVLQZKLFKLWZDVLQWURGXFHG,UDQ¶VIDLOXUHWRUHSRUWWKHLPSRUWDWLRQ of uranium compounds from China, and its facilities and experiments involving both enrichment and reprocessing at places including Kalaye Electric, were among the 14 different kinds of safeguards failures that IAEA Director General ElBaradei reported to the Board of Governors in November 2003. If there were one or two failures to report, one might give Iran the benefit of the doubt that it was only a technical failure. But

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benefit of the doubt is not warranted when the failures are systematic. It was this systematic pattern of serious safeguards violations that obliged the IAEA Board of Governors to report safeguards non-compliance to the UN Security Council, although this step was put off as long as Iran suspended its enrichment activity. When Iran EURNHWKHVXVSHQVLRQWKH%RDUGILQDOO\UHSRUWHG,UDQ¶VQRQ-compliance to the Security Council in September 2005. As a second reason for reporting to the Security Council, WKH %RDUG VHSDUDWHO\ IRXQG WKDW WKH DEVHQFH RI FRQILGHQFH WKDW ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes gave rise to questions regarding international peace and security that are within the competence of the Security Council. ,W LV ZRUWK UHPHPEHULQJ WKH ,$($¶V DWWHPSWV WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH WUXH SLFWXUH RI ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDP HYHU VLQFH WKH YLRODWLRQV ILUVW FDPH WR OLJKW LQ   ,Q WKH course of the IAEA investigations, Iran repeatedly changed its story whenever the IAEA came up with new information that contradicted the old story. Two examples DPRQJ PDQ\ VXIILFH WR PDNH WKH SRLQW   )LUVW ZKHQ ,UDQ¶V HQULFKPHQW program was disclosed in 2002, the government insisted that the technology development and all of the material and equipment was indigenous. When environmental sampling proved this to be false, Iran admitted that it obtained technology and components from a black market network, but it continued to repeatedly change its answers regarding the degree of cooperation and to this day doubts remain about the degree of foreign assistance, including whether Iran received the same set of nuclear weapons plans that the A.Q. Khan network sold to Libya and apparently offered to Iraq. A second example FRQFHUQV WKH ,$($¶V efforts to inspect the Kalaye Electric Company facilities on the outskirts of Tehran, where open sources alleged that enrichment work had taken place. When inspectors arrived in March 2003, authorities claimed they had done no enrichment work at Kalaye and could not find the keys to the workshop. Later, when inspectors arrived again in August that year, authorities produced the keys to a room that had been fully refurbished and repainted in the intervening months. Yet the inspectors could still find traces of contamination, causing Iran belatedly to acknowledge work there with contaminated machines. 7KLVSDWWHUQRIFKDQJLQJVWRULHVLVXVHIXOWRUHFDOOLQDVVHVVLQJ,UDQ¶VSURPLVHVLQ $XJXVWWRDQVZHURQFHDQGIRUDOOWKH,$($¶VRXWVWDQGLQJTXHVWLRQs, after which it insisted there would be no more answers. Past experience thus rightfully raised GRXEWVWKDW,UDQ¶VDQVZHUVWKLVWLPHZRXOGZDUUDQWHDUO\FORVXUHRIWKHQXFOHDUILOH$V it transpired, Dr. El Baradei had to report to the Board of Governors in February 2008 WKDW ,UDQ KDG UHIXVHG WR DQVZHU PRVW RI WKH DJHQF\¶V TXHVWLRQV DERXW DOOHJHG weaponisation studies (see below).

Economic illogic 7KHUHLVQRDSSDUHQWVRXQGHFRQRPLFUDWLRQDOHWR,UDQ¶VXUDQLXPHQULFKPHQWSURJUDP especially when it does not yet have even one power reactor on-line that requires fuel. When Bushehr and any future reactors are ready for operation, it will be far cheaper for Iran to import enriched uranium fuel, like most countries with nuclear power do. Of the twelve countries most dependent on nuclear energy, only one has its own enrichment capability. Russia has already offered life-time fuel for Bushehr, and other producers stand ready to provide fall-back fuel cycle services, if Iran eliminates the suspicions about its programme.

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The Iranians argue that they need to be self-sufficient in fuel production because they cannot trust any country to provide fuel. Having been the target of US-led sanctions ever since the 1979 revolution, Iranians distrust the intentions of the powerful QDWLRQVRIWKH ZRUOG7KH KLVWRU\RIEURNHQQXFOHDUGHDOVZLWKWKH :HVWDQG5XVVLD¶V delay on delivery to Bushehr until late 2007 proved their point, the Iranians say. However, one might ask why Russia delayed delivery of fuel to Bushehr. If Iran met contractual obligations and international non-proliferation mandates it would have no reason to fear fuel cut-off. This is a vicious cycle. Iranian behavior incited proliferation concern, so its fuel for Bushehr was delayed. This in turn caused Iran to protest more firmly that it needed to produce its own enriched uranium to protect its interests, no matter what the Security Council mandates to the contrary, which only intensifies the proliferation concern. If Iran stopped the activity that gives rise to the concerns, then this vicious cycle could be turned into a virtuous cycle. In any case, for both technical and contractual reasons, Iran cannot produce fuel for Bushehr. Enriched uranium fuel is not a generic product; it is tailor-made for the specifics of the reactor. Russia is not going to turn over the specifications or allow Iran to break the contract by producing its own fuel for Bushehr. 0RUHRYHU ,UDQ¶V OLPLWHG XUDQLXP UHVHUYHV PHDQV LW FDQQRW EH VHOI-sufficient in nuclear fuel production anyway. Iran will have to import uranium ore if it wants to produce its own fuel for the additional reactors it plans to build. In the meantime, however, Iran will be in a good position to strike a deal that would give it a guaranteed source of foreign fuel. Many different plans have been put forward for how to guarantee enriched uranium fuel to countries that have solid non-proliferation records, so that they never need to consider enriching uranium on their own. Notwithstanding the economic illogic, Iran argues that it will enrich uranium because it has a right to do so. It is argued that the nationalistic sentiment in support of the programme, in defensH RI ,UDQ¶V ULJKWV WR SHDFHIXO HQHUJ\ LV VR VWURQJ WKDW WKH government could not in any case forgo the right. In fact, however, Iran currently does not have the right to enrichment. The inalienable right to nuclear energy development mentioned in Article IV is conditioned on fulfillment of the non-proliferation conditions of the NPT, which Iran has demonstrably violated. Also, the UN Security Council created a new international law status for Iran last year when it mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter that Iran must suspend its enrichment and reprocessing-related activity. This explains why IAEA Director General ElBaradei reportedly said recently that Iran has no right to enrichment. He was not, as has been implied, making some unfounded interpretation of his own; he was simply stating a fact of current international law.

Military involvement $W OHDVW WHQ LQGLFDWRUV RI PLOLWDU\ LQYROYHPHQW LQ YDULRXV DVSHFWV RI ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU program and of weapons intentions have come to light through IAEA reports or other reputable public sources. These indicators show military links to various phases of the fuel cycle, from mining to uranium conversion, centrifuge component production as well as procurement, along with administrative links. There is also evidence that suggests weaponization design work and testing.

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Together these indicators strongly suggest that, until 2003 at least, there was a coordinated military connection for purposes of exploring a nuclear weapons programme. As far as is known from unclassified sources, the trail stops in 2003, the date the last documents about explosives testing, missile re-entry vehicles and other damning evidence, was found on a computer hard drive turned over by an Iranian walkin at an American embassy. It is possible, of course, that the apparent weapons development and testing plans found on the computer were only feasibility studies that never left the drawing table. There is no confirmed evidence that development continued after 2003. In fact, the US National Intelligence Estimate released in December 2007 concluded that Iran stopped the explicit weaponisation work in 1RYHPEHU3UHVLGHQW3XWLQUHDIILUPHG5XVVLD¶VSRVLWLRQRQWKLVSRLQW2FWREHU  ZKHQ KH VDLG DIWHU PHHWLQJ )UHQFK 3UHVLGHQW 6DUNR]\ WKDW ³:H  GR QRW KDYH objective data that says Iran is trying to produce nuclear weaponV´  ,Q D QDUURZ definition, this is true. But this tapered statement overlooks the earlier evidence about intentions to produce a nuclear weapons capability. At least some of these questions were supposed to be cleared up in the course of WKH ,$($¶V GLVcussions with Iran under the terms of their work plan announced on August 21, 2007. In two of these areas ± circumstances regarding operation of the Gchine uranium mine and Polonium-210 experiments that have application in nuclear weapons designs ± the I$($ GHFODUHG WKDW ,UDQ¶V DQVZHUV ZHUH ³FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK LWV ILQGLQJV´,QWZRRWKHUDUHDV± the presence of highly enriched uranium contamination at a technical university in Tehran and procurement efforts by a former head of the Physics Research Centre at Lavisan-Shian of dual-use equipment useful in uranium conversion and enrichment work ± WKH ,$($ GHFODUHG WKDW ,UDQ¶V DQVZHUV ZHUH ³QRW LQFRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH GDWD FXUUHQWO\ DYDLODEOH WR WKH DJHQF\´  7KLV ODWWHU SKUDVH indicates that the IAEA has a lower lHYHO RI FRQILGHQFH WKDW ,UDQ¶V DQVZHUV DUH FRPSOHWH,WPHDQVWKDWWKH,$($KDVQRWEHHQDEOH\HWWRYHULI\,UDQ¶VDQVZHUVDQG will continue to evaluate them against other information. With regard to the weaponisation studies documented in a computer hard drive turned over to a Western LQWHOOLJHQFHDJHQF\E\DQ,UDQLDQGHIHFWRULQ,UDQVDLGWKHHYLGHQFHZDVµEDVHOHVV DQGIDEULFDWHG¶DQGGHQLHGWKHH[LVWHQFHRUUROHRIVRPHRIWKHSHUVRQQHOQDPHGLQWKH documents. It is difficult to draw conclusions about the authenticity of the computer documents, EXWLWVKRXOGEHQRWHGDOWKRXJKFDXWLRXVO\UHIHUULQJWRWKHPDVWKHµDOOHJHG¶VWXGLHVWKH IAEA showed no hint that it suspected them to be a fabrication. Reporters from the Washington Post and the New York Times, who after the Iraq experience are cautious about uncritically accepting US intelligence claims, also seem to believe that the documents are credible. They note that US intelligence officials subjected the defector, who was not a member of an exile group, to a number of polygraphs and interviews and, based on the volume, consistency and technical nature of the drawings, concluded it was highly unlikely that the documents were fabricated. British, French and German intelligence agencies, with whom the information was shared, all concurred that it appeared authentic. In briefing to IAEA member state missions about the weaponisation studies on February 25, 2008, IAEA Deputy DG Olli Heinonen indicated that the IAEA had multiple sources of information. With regard to the studies themselves, it appears that more than one Western intelligence agency provided documents from the computer hard drive. In addition, the IAEA obtained information from other sources about the military organization structure it briefed to IAEA missions. The IAEA also obtained

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information from various sources about Iranian procurement activity that was consistent with the allegations of weaponisation studies. $PRQJ WKH GRFXPHQWV RQ WKH KDUG GULYH ZHUH VFKHPDWLFV IRU ,UDQ¶V 6KDKab-3 medium-range ballistic missile showing a series of attempts between 2001 and 2003 to redesign the size, weight and diameter of the nose cone ± or re-entry vehicle ± to accommodate a spherical object with the characteristics of a nuclear implosion weapon. Miniaturizing a nuclear weapon to be able to fit the dimensions of the Shahab-3 would not present an insurmountable challenge for Iran, particularly if it obtained design help through the black market, such as the nuclear weapons design that the A.Q. Khan network provided to Libya. The exact specifications of that design are not publicly available, other than that it had a mass of about 500 kilograms and a diameter of less WKDQDPHWHU7KHZDUKHDGRI&KLQD¶VHDUO\QXFOHDUWHVWVIURP2FWREHU which used the design sold to Libya, appear to have a diameter of between 80 and 90 cm. It is ZRUWK QRWLQJ WKDW WKH GLDPHWHU RI WKH QRVH FRQH RI ,UDQ¶V 6KDKDE-3M version VRPHWLPHVGHVFULEHGDVDµEDE\ERWWOH¶EHFDXVHRILWVVKDSH WKDWZDVWHVW-launched in 2004 also appears to be about 80-90 cm in diameter.

Looking ahead While waiting for the results of the IAEA-Iran work plan, the Security Council delayed imposing any further sanctions until March 2008, even though most of the conditions of the three previous Security Council mandates remained unfulfilled. The additional sanctions imposed by UN Security Council Resolution 1803 will surely not be sufficient to persuade Iran to suspend its enrichment programme. This resolution only expanded the number of Iranian individuals and entities subject to the two previous sanctions resolutions without increasing the severity of the penalties. Maintaining the unanimity of the permanent members of the Council does send an important signal in GHPRQVWUDWLQJ ,UDQ¶V isolation. The most important aspect of UNSCR 1803 is that it gives the European Union and other states a basis individually to apply additional sanctions of their own. After each of the previous resolutions, the EU imposed its own tougher sanctions. Resolution 1803 calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over the activities of financial institutions in their territories with all banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and Bank Saderat. This clause could be a basis for the EU to stop transactions with these banks. Such financial sanctions will be the strongest pressure Iran faces. It is difficult to quantify the effect of such sanctions, however. In an 8 February 2008 speech, US Deputy Treasury Secretary Robert Kimmit said Iranian banNVKDG IRXQG ZD\VWRFLUFXPYHQW VDQFWLRQVDQG ³UHPDLQ XQGHWHFWHGDVWKH\ PRYH IXQGV WKURXJK WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO ILQDQFLDO V\VWHP WR SD\ IRU WKH UHJLPH¶V LOOLFLW DFWLYLWLHV´ Even if Iran were to satisfactorily address all the questions and to honor its safeguards agreement, enrichment in Iran would still be a problem until through a sustained period of honesty and transparency Iran restored the credibility gap it created with its history of safeguards violations, obfuscation, weapons-related procurements and experiments, lack of cooperation with the IAEA, and military involvement. The proposal put to Iran in August 2005 by Britain, France and Germany (the E3) and repeated by the E3 plus China, Russia and US in June 2005 included a provision that the suspension of enrichment could be reconsidered in ten years. If transparency allowed the IAEA to be in a position to provide guarantees about the absence of

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undeclared activity, then an enrichment programme in Iran would pose fewer grounds for objection, even though it would still be far more reassuring to the world and economically better for Iran if it obtained all sensitive fuel cycle services from overseas. In conclusion, there is ample reason to be concerned about the intentions behind ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPH It is good that Iran has foresworn nuclear weapons, but it remains very worrisome that it continues to develop the capability. To Iran¶VQHLJKERrs and to much of the rest of the world, there is little difference between having a capability and having the weapons. While there are ways to try to ensure that a latent capability does not become a weapons programme, they are far from perfect. The best option is to forego enrichment DQG UHSURFHVVLQJ WHFKQRORJLHV XQWLO FRQILGHQFH LV UHVWRUHG WKDW ,UDQ¶V LQWHntions are indeed peaceful, which is why the Board of Governors and the UN Security Council have demanded suspension. 7KH TXHVWLRQ SRVHG IRU WKLV WRSLF ZDV ZKHWKHU ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH KDV peaceful or military goals. The answer is both. Now the question is whether there will be a peaceful or military solution.

Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-99

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Iranian Nuclear Problem: Prospects for a Solution Alexander PIKAEV1

Abstract. Prospects for the resolution of the Iranian nuclear problem are still dim. 7KH GLVFORVXUH RI WKH VHFUHW ,UDQLDQ IDFLOLWLHV GHDOW D VHULRXV EORZ WR 7HKUDQ¶V assertions that it had not pursued any illegal nuclear activities. The present approach to the solution of the Iranian nuclear problem has little chance for success. The position of the world community towards the Iranian nuclear program can be characterized as the policy without a stick and carrot. Fortunately, in terms of technology, the Iranian nuclear program does not have the capability to FUHDWHDQXFOHDUZHDSRQVSURJUDPTXLFNO\HYHQLI,UDQ¶VOHDGHUVKLSKDGVHWWKLVDV its aim.

Prehistory Iran is one of the founding countries of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime. It signed this document on February 2, 1970. According to the treaty, Tehran pledged to neither produce nor seek to acquire nuclear weapons by any means. On May 15, 1974, a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) entered into force. In accordance with this agreement the IAEA had been given access to facilities on Iranian territRU\UHODWHGWR,UDQ¶VSHDFHIXO atomic activities. The acceptance of these documents opened the way to international cooperation between Iran and some Western countries in the peaceful atomic energy sphere. In particular, with the assistance of the German business group Siemens, Tehran started building an atomic power plant in Bushehr. However, after the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979 and a drastic deterioration of relations with the USA, Western companies were forced to stop cooperation with Iran in the sphere of the peaceful use of atomic energy. The construction of the Bushehr power plant was also frozen. At first the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran showed no interest in nuclear technologies. But in the late 1980s, as it became known later, Iran research and development activities continued in this sphere. It seems that this was caused by the Iranian-Iraqi war when Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran in defiance of its international commitments. This act received no serious condemnation by the international community, a factor which probably encouraged Tehran to launch its QXFOHDU SURJUDP ,Q YLRODWLRQ RI ,UDQ¶V  &RPSUHKHQVLYH 6DIHJXDUGV $JUHHPHQW however, Iran did not declare these activities and IAEA inspectors had no opportunity to verify they were in accord with the NPT requirements. 1

Department Head, Institute for World Economy and International Relations

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In the 1990s, Tehran significantly expanded the scale of its nuclear activities and in particular decided to resume construction of the Bushehr power plant. Afraid of tough reaction from the USA, including sanctions legislated by Congress, Western companies hesitated to render any assistance to Iran, and therefore the Iranian authorities asked Russia to finish building the Bushehr plant as well as to deliver and assemble all the necessary equipment. Iranians also wanted to buy equipment which was not related to the Bushehr project. 5XVVLDIRXQGQRJURXQGVIRUUHIXVLQJ,UDQ¶VUHTXHVWDVDWWKDWWLPHEHFDXVHQRWKLQJ was known about the secret nuclear activities of this country. From the legal viewpoint, Moscow in fact was required to assist Iran in the sphere of the development of peaceful atomic energy. This was the direct requirement of Article IV of the NPT, which obliged parties in possession of nuclear energy to share the technology with states parties to the treaty who did not yet enjoy the benefits of nuclear energy. Information about Russian-Iranian cooperation in the peaceful nuclear sphere caused concern in the United States, which feared that under cover of the Bushehr reactor construction, Iran would develop military nuclear technologies, prohibited by the NPT. Washington started to exert rather serious pressure on the Yeltsin administration in order to make it give up any nuclear cooperation with Iran. However, Moscow demonstrated unexpected persistence and managed to defend the Bushehr project. Still, Moscow was forced to refrain from the delivery to Tehran of certain technologies including uranium enrichment. As became known later, Iran purchased gas centrifuge uranium enrichment technology from other countries. Despite the 1995 deal with Moscow, the USA continued to follow Russian-Iranian contacts in the peaceful atomic sphere very attentively. Officially Washington opposed the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant although it kept from introducing sanctions against Russian companies and private persons participating in this project. At the same time, based on intelligence data including information received from Israeli intelligence services, Washington from time to time imposed sanctions against Russian companies which cooperated with Tehran on projects other than Bushehr. In doing so, the United States persuaded other countries, first of all Ukraine, not to cooperate with the Russian companies on Bushehr subcontracts. Sometimes this pressure yielded certain results. Under the pressure of their governments, subcontractors gave up projects and contracts had to be transferred to other companies. Certainly it complicated and even delayed the construction of the reactor. Washington was afraid that the irradiated nuclear fuel from the Bushehr power plant could be used to extract weapons-grade plutonium and to create an atomic bomb. The Russian side, in response, pointed out that according to Russian legislation Iran has no obligation to repatriate the spent fuel to Russia. As another argument, Russia cited :DVKLQJWRQ¶VUHIXVDOWRWDNHEDFNVSHQWQXFOHDUIXHORI$PHULFDQRULJLQIURPDZKROH number of countries including such near-nuclear states as Taiwan and South Korea. ,Q  5XVVLD¶V Oegislation was modified and repatriation of the spent nuclear fuel was permitted. After that, Moscow demanded that Tehran conclude a protocol on returning to Russia the spent fuel from the Bushehr reactor, upon threat of otherwise cutting off deliveries of fresh fuel. The absence of such deliveries would mean that Bushehr would never become operational. After many years of long and painful negotiations, the Iranian side accepted Russian terms and signed the corresponding protocol. It is interesting that in the dialogue with Russia, the United States had invariably refused to provide any concrete facts concerning Iranian illegal nuclear activities and

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about contacts between the Iranians and Russian companies. The USA was motivated by reluctance to disclose its sources of information. In fact it was most probably politically imprudent for the Americans to confess that they had received data from intelligence services of third countries. However, it is possible that Washington could have had other reasons for LW3UREDEO\LWZDVQRWWR:DVKLQJWRQ¶VDGYDQWDJHWRH[SRVH the information that Iran had started building the uranium enrichment facilities. Theoretically these facilities would allow Iran to develop nuclear explosive devices based on weapons-grade uranium instead of plutonium which could have been potentially extracted from the spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr power plant. The publication of this information would inevitably result in the decrease of the international pressure upon Russia aimed to induce it either to cease all activities on the Bushehr project or at least to achieve confirmation of the protocol with Iran on returning the spent nuclear fuel back to Russia. Only when the unwillingness to reveal this information became nearly absurd and the signing of the Russian-Iranian protocol on the spent fuel was inevitable, in August 2002 an Iranian exile group revealed the existence of Iranian uranium enrichment IDFLOLWLHV LQFOXGLQJ WKH XUDQLXP KH[DIOXRULGH ³\HOORZFDNH´  FRQYHUVLRQ SODQW DW Esfahan and the uranium enrichment centrifuges at Natanz. Soon an American nongovernmental organization published satellite photos of the facilities. It was also UHYHDOHG WKDW ,UDQ¶V FHQWULIXJHV KDG EHHQ PRVW SUREDEO\ DFTXLUHG WKURXJK WKH LOOHJDO nuclear black market network headed by the prominent Pakistani scientist - the creator RI WKH ,VODPDEDG¶V QXFOHDU ERPE - A.Q. Khan. This showed that contrary to longVWDQGLQJ$PHULFDQDQG,VUDHOLDOOHJDWLRQV,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPZDVGHYHORSLQJQRW due to Iranian contactVZLWK5XVVLDRUWKH%XVKHKUFRQWUDFWEXWWKURXJKWKH³VHFRQGDU\ SUROLIHUDWLRQ´OLQH± WKHQXFOHDU³EODFNPDUNHW´IHGE\GHOLYHULHVIURPWKHQHZQXFOHDU states.

The Diplomatic Process in 2003-2005 The disclosure of the secret Iranian facilities dealt a seULRXVEORZWR7HKUDQ¶VDVVHUWLRQV that it had not pursued any illegal nuclear activities. The construction of the abovementioned facilities and building of the heavy-water reactor in Arak as well as all previous experiments had not been declared to the IAEA as required under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement of 1974. The scandalous nature of these disclosures resulted in a rapid increase of international pressure aimed to induce the Iranian leadership to fairly cooperate with the IAEA and to lay bare all undeclared nuclear activities. However, it should be mentioned that the nature of these activities in itself apparently did not contradict Iranian obligations within the NPT. Only the fact that Tehran had not informed the IAEA about these activities could be viewed as an NPT violation. In fact, it contradicted the provisions of the 1974 agreement. $IWHU WKH SXEOLFDWLRQ RI WKH LQIRUPDWLRQ RQ ,UDQ¶V LOOHJDO QXFOHDU DFWLYLWLHV WKH United States proceeded to build up political pressure upon the country, demanding that it not only come clean about all undeclared nuclear activities but also that it give up any uranium enrichment programs. In response, Tehran agreed to cooperate with the IAEA on uncovering its previous nuclear programs but categorically refused to suspend its uranium enrichment activities. According to Tehran, such activities were allowed within the NPT framework and were aimed toward creating national capacities for fuel

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production for atomic power plants. Many non-nuclear states, including :DVKLQJWRQ¶V close ally Japan, possess similar capacities. The British-$PHULFDQ LQYDVLRQ RI ,UDT DQG WKH UHPRYDO RI 6DGGDP +XVVHLQ¶V regime from power in March-April 2003 had temporarily changed the attitudes not only in Tehran but also in a number of the European capitals. Clearly frightened by the ease with which American troops occupied Baghdad, the Iranian leadership started sending signals to the USA and European countries which stated its readiness to seek a compromise on its nuclear program. Tehran signed the Protocol on returning the spent nuclear fuel to Russia and accepted the IAEA safeguards Additional Protocol. According to this document, the IAEA inspectors obtained the right to visit not only the facilities declared by Iran itself but also other facilities where they suspected of illegal QXFOHDU DFWLYLWLHV 7KLV VLJQLILFDQWO\ LQFUHDVHG WKH WUDQVSDUHQF\ RI ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU programs. At the same time Iran decided not to speed up the parliamentary ratification of this agreement, obviously trying to retain freedom of action for the future. Until ratification - the date of which had not even been specified - the agreement was to be implemented on a provisional basis. In 2003, Iran decided to take a step which was unprecedented in the whole history of Iranian-American relations since the victory of the Islamic revolution. It proposed to the United States to start direct consultations on Iraq, clearly counting on the significant improvement of relations with Washington in exchange for the cooperation of American occupation forces on behalf of the Shia groups who were significantly influenced by Iran. Moreover, Tehran agreed to discuss its nuclear program not only with the IAEA but also with some of the Western countries. In late 2003, informal contacts between the representatives of Iran on the one side and Germany, France and Britain on the other side started. In November 2004 these contacts resulted in the signing of the Paris agreement according to which Iran was obliged to provide clear and long-term JXDUDQWHHV RI WKH SHDFHIXO QDWXUH RI LWV QXFOHDU SURJUDP 8QWLO WKHVH ³REMHFWLYH JXDUDQWHHV´FRXOGEH DJUHHG XSRQ7HKUDQDVVXPHG YROXQWDU\REOLJDWLRQVWRFHDVHDOO uranium enrichment activity as well as radio-chemical plutonium reprocessing from spent nuclear fuel. In return, West European countries made it clear that they would be UHDG\WR³UHZDUG´,UDQLILWJDYHXSXUDQLXPHQULFKPHQWRQDSHUPDQHQWEDVLV The diplomatic initiative of France, Germany and Britain (the EU-3) was sparked by a whole series of reasons. First, Britain and France strove to return to the region east of Suez which they had been forced to leave in the late 1950s. Second, Germany and )UDQFH KDG DFFXPXODWHG VLJQLILFDQW LQYHVWPHQWV LQ ,UDQ¶V FLYLO HFRQRP\ DQG VKRZHG great interest in the oil and gas sector of the country. Third, they wished to smooth over the differences between Paris and Berlin on the one side and London on the other, which appeared during the British-American preparation of the military operation in Iraq. The preservation of differences could have negatively influenced relations within the European Union on the eve of its enlargement planned for 2004. Finally, all three countries wished to avoid another military operation which could have unpredictably influenced both transatlantic and internal European relations as well as contacts between the West and the whole Islamic world. Besides, Britain needed contacts with Iran as its occupational sector in Iraq was situated to the south of the country, mostly populated by Shias who had close relations with the Iranian co-religionists. It should be mentioned that the initiative of the EU-3 was taken very painfully by some European countries, in particular Italy which had its own interests in Iran. In order to keep unity within the European Union, the EU-3 was forced to agree to the

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participation of EU High Commissioner for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana in negotiations with Tehran. This extremely complicated the format of the negotiations, which in fact were transformed from four-party to five-party talks. Under such conditions, it was simply physically difficult for the five delegations assembled in a small room to discuss very delicate issues and achieve any progress. Moreover, the four European delegations clearly did not always manage to coordinate WKHLU SRVLWLRQV $QG WKH %UXVVHOV¶ UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV KDG WR WDNH LQWR FRQVLGHUDWLRQ WKH interests of the unrepresented EU countries interested in a change of the negotiation format rather than in the success of the talks. This hardly added any constructiveness to WKHSRVLWLRQRIWKH%UXVVHOV¶GHOHJDWLRQ In fact the negotiations were programmed for failure from the very beginning. Although the Iranian leadership had not formulated its interests very clearly, in exchange for the refusal from the uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing it obviously sought to receive promises from the USA not to change the political regime in Iran by military actions; to loosen, and ultimately, to lift American sanctions which ZHUH YHU\ SDLQIXO IRU WKH ,UDQLDQ HFRQRP\ DQG WR DFKLHYH :DVKLQJWRQ¶V DFNQRZOHGJHPHQWRI,UDQ¶VLPSRUWDQWUROHLQWKH*UHDW0LGGOH(DVWUHJLRQ$OOWKLV,UDQ could have attained only through talks with the United States, not with the European Union. In such circumstances the negotiations with the West European countries were of interest to Iran from two viewpoints: first, to gain time and remove the immediate threat of the American invasion (which seemed quite real to Tehran in 2003-early 2004); and secoQGWRXVHWKH(XURSHDQQHJRWLDWRUVDVD³EULGJH´WR:DVKLQJWRQ7KH European Union could have possibly interested Iran if it had proposed a far-reaching political and economic partnership with Tehran. However, the West European representatives turned out to be clearly unprepared for that in view of the weakness of WKHLUFRXQWULHV¶SRVLWLRQVLQWKHUHJLRQDVZHOODVWKHLQWHUQDOGLIIHUHQFHVDQGFRQVWDQW looking over their shoulders at the USA. Initially, Washington regarded the initiative of the three European countries with great suspicion. It seems that the right-wing conservative wing in the Bush administration sincerely thought that this initiative was an attempt by France and *HUPDQ\WR³VWHDO´WKHUHVXOWVRIWKH$PHULFDQPLOLWDU\YLFWRU\LQ,UDT$QG though this position did not become the dominant one, in 2003-2004 the United States preferred to move away from its European allies. It restricted itself to the tough anti-Iranian rhetoric and urged that the Iranian issue be taken up in the UN Security Council. However, XQGHUVWDQGLQJ,UDQ¶VLQWHUHVWLQWKHGLDORJXHZLWK:DVKLQJWRQDQGDOVRJLYLQJLQWRWKH pressure of the pro-American lobby in the EU, West European states made certain attempts to enlist the support of the United States. This was also facilitated by the gradual softening of the American position influenced by the course of events in Iraq, which were unfavorable for the USA. In March 2005, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice promised that if Tehran agreed to curb uranium enrichment and other related elements of its nuclear activities, Washington would not block Iran entering into the WTO and would lift its embargo on deliveries of equipment for American-manufactured civil airplanes to Iran. In turn, the West Europeans agreed to bring the Iranian issue into the UN Security Council in case Iran refused to make the demanded concessions. The March deal between the EU and USA most probably reflected a significant shift in the American position and obviously was regarded in Europe as a serious victory of the moderate wing in the Republican administration. However, Iran did not share these feelings. Obviously, Tehran was not prepared to change its almost only

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diplomatic trump card for the symbolic concession from the Americans. At the same time it VWLOOKDGFHUWDLQKRSHVIRUELJ³FDUURWV´IURPWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ2QWKH RQH hand, in March 2005 Iran threatened to terminate its unilateral moratorium on uranium enrichment and plutonium if the EU, in fulfillment of the Paris agreements, did not present in a written form the list of benefits which Iran could have in exchange for its FHVVDWLRQRIFHUWDLQDVSHFWVRILWVQXFOHDUSURJUDP2QWKHRWKHUKDQG5XVVLD¶V'HSXW\ Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Kislyak who visited Tehran in May 2005, managed to persuade the Iranian leadership not lift its moratorium until it received the proposals from the EU. Also in May, the Iranian leadership for the first time had clearly defined what it would like to receive from the European Union. In view of the US unpreparedness for a serious dialogue with Iran the latter simply could not agree to the idea of the complete cessation of uranium-enrichment activities, and made an intermediate proposal which included a number of limitations on Iranian nuclear activities under the conditions of unprecedented transparency. The so-FDOOHG³IRXU-VWDJHSODQ´SHUPLWWHG,UDQWRFDUU\RXW uranium conversion at the facility at Esfahan and the construction of 3,000 uraniumenrichment centrifuges at the facility in Natanz. Tehran promised the immediate placing of the enriched uranium into the fuel rods in order to make further enrichment to the weapons-grade level impossible. It guaranteed the permanent presence of the IAEA inspectors at both plants in Esfahan and Natanz and promised to agree to other transparency measures outside the framework of the Additional Protocol. The agreement itself had to be ratified and until ratification was completed ± was to be strictly observed. Finally, the Iranians committed themselves not to extract plutonium from the spent nuclear fuel. In return, Iran demanded the delivery of the light-water reactor for the atomic power plants; the provision of firm guarantees of the reactor fuel deliveries as the alternative for its own production; a loosening of export control procedures on advanced technologies; and ensured broader access of Iranian products to EU markets. Besides, the Iranian proposal called for the creation of joint commissions on strategic cooperation and defense issues, as well as for the adoption of a joint statement on the principle of relations between the EU and Iran. 7KH :HVW (XURSHDQ UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV UHMHFWHG 7HKUDQ¶V SODQ ULJKW IURP WKH VWDUW 7KH\ KHOGWKH RSLQLRQWKDWD FHUWDLQ³UHGOLQH´ ZRXOGEH ,UDQ¶VFRPSOHWHFHVVDWLRQRI uranium enrichment. The diplomats from the EU were not prepared to agree with the idea of limited enrichment. Besides, they were required to make tangible concessions in exchange for the promise to keep from any future activities. It seems clear in retrospect that the :HVW (XURSHDQ UHMHFWLRQ RI WKH ³IRXU-stage SODQ´ ZDV D VHULRXV EOXQGHU 7KH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ UHIXVHG WR DFFHSW WKH ,UDQLDQ LGHD after the victory in the Iranian presidential elections in spring 2005 of hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. It was not difficult to predict that with such a leader Iran could altogether give up attempts to find a compromise. Especially as the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan were deteriorating, the Iranian leadership has less reason to fear the prospect of American regime-change intervention and some Iranian radicals used the persistent threat of US bombings as an argument to increase their own political influence. Further events unfolded according to the worst possible scenario. The European Union presented its proposals only on August 5, 2005, at the time of the ongoing governmental changes in Tehran when it was hard to expect any sensible answer from it. The EU-3 proposed to sign a long-term agreement consisting of the interconnected

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package of stimuli in the atomic energy sphere, technological cooperation and proposals in the economic and political sphere2. The central idea behind this package was the assurance of Iran that it would get access to international nuclear fuel services at market prices. The Europeans agreed to deliver a research reactor to Iran and committed themselves to cooperate with it in the nuclear security sphere. In the political and security sphere, the proposal of the three European states called for the strengthening of counterterrorism cooperation; implementation of joint programs in fighting against drug production and trafficking; and starting a dialogue between the EU and Iran on regional security issues. In the sphere of technological and HFRQRPLF FRRSHUDWLRQ WKH SURSRVDOV UHIHUUHG WR (8 VXSSRUW RI ,UDQ¶V entry into the WTO and proposed cooperation in various areas including scientific research, civil aviation, railway and sea transport, oil chemistry and communications. All these proposals were rather vague and clearly offered less than Iran had demanded in its 2005 plan. $WWKHVDPHWLPH,UDQKDGWRDFFHSWDOORIWKH:HVW¶VGHPDQGV7KHVHLQFOXGHGWKH legal obligation not to pursue any activities within the nuclear fuel cycle except for the construction and exploitation of the light-water reactor and research reactors (i.e. the complete termination of uranium enrichment); full cooperation with the IAEA in order to settle all the remaining issues concerning implementation of the 1974 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement; ratification of the Additional Protocol before the end of 2005; legal obligation not to withdraw from the NPT and to bring all nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; the return of spent fuel to the supplier; and cessation of the heavy-water reactor building in Arak. It is not surprising that the proposals of the EU-3 were met by the new Iranian leadership with an undisguised animosity and were completely rejected. On August 8, Iran made a decision on partial suspension of the unilateral moratorium on uranium enrichment. At the first stage, Tehran declared only its renewal of uranium-conversion activities in Esfahan, stating that it would keep from the exploitation of the pilot uranium-enrichment plant in Natanz. Besides, the IAEA inspectors continued to monitor both facilities. Nevertheless, the decision made in Tehran was interpreted as ,UDQ¶VFURVVLQJRIWKH³UHGOLQH´GUDZQE\WKH:HVW(XURSHDQGLSORPDWVDQGZDVWDNHQ badly in the European capitals. Already on August 9, the European Union decided to exacerbate the situation claiming its sXSSRUW IRU WKH LGHD RI UHSRUWLQJ ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU program to the UN Security Council. The next round of talks between Iran and the EU3EU-3 scheduled for the end of August was cancelled. In fact this meant the failure of the EU-3 mission. The format of negations on the Iranian nuclear program was radically changed.

Bringing the discussion of the Iranian record into the UN Security Council: late 2005 ± 2007 After the failure of negotiations in the EU-3 format, the focus of the international discussion shifted to the IAEA Board of Governors. The United States and, to the 2

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lesser degree, the EU countries demanded that the board should make a decision on moving the discussion of the Iranian issue into the UN Security Council. Obviously, under the conditions of a very restricted list of pressure instruments upon Iran, the Western states counted on the threat to bring the discussion within the UN Security Council to make Tehran show greater compliance in the talks. At the same time, the shift of focus to the IAEA implied the engagement of other players who did not quite share the Western position on the necessity of applying coercive measures against Iran. 7KH\ LQFOXGHG QRW RQO\ 5XVVLD DQG &KLQD WKH WUDGLWLRQDO SURSRQHQWV RI D ³VRIW OLQH´ towards Tehran, but also some influential developing countries like the South African Republic and Indonesia. The differences were also to be observed within the European Union as a number of states held the EU-3 responsible for the failure of negotiations, and demanded to continue the dialogue with Tehran, although in a different format. Thus in 2005 and in the early 2006 most countries were not prepared to sanction the transfer of the discussion of the Iranian record to the UN Security Council, but at the same time, in principle they did not object to the threat of such a transfer as an element of diplomatic bargaining with Iran. On September 27, 2005 on the wave of international indignation after the partial cancellation of the Iranian moratorium on uranium enrichment, the Board of Governors passed a resolution calling for reporting the Iranian nuclear issue to the UN Security Council, leaving open the date for this referral, (which happened in February 2006, as described below). Although Tehran had responded to this resolution rather sharply, it nevertheless continued its cooperation with the IAEA, assuming it was a better alternative to the UN Security Council discussion as a result of which it could be put under international sanctions. In November 2005, it even agreed to IAEA inspections at the military complex in Parchin, although the Agency traditionally restricted its activities strictly to the civil facilities. At the same time, the Iranians warned that if the Iranian issue was brought before the UN Security Council, they would not ratify the Additional Safeguards Agreement and cease its voluntary implementation. In November, the Iranian parliament adopted a resolution carrying out this threat. The results of voting in the Board of Governors on September 27 showed that the coPSURPLVHUHVROXWLRQZDVVXSSRUWHGE\WKHPDMRULW\RIWKH%RDUG¶VPHPEHUVRXW of 35) whereas the representatives from 13 countries including Russia and China turned it down. Thus, the Iranian pertinacity resulted in the fact that the majority of the BoaUG¶V PHPEHUV VXSSRUWHG WKH 86 DQG (8 KDUG OLQH 7KLV DOVR GHPRQVWUDWHG WR Moscow and Beijing that the possibility of bringing the Iranian issue into the UN Security Council was rather great and that most probably they would fail to prevent it. Under these circumstances, although potentially the possible UN economic sanctions could have threatened its extensive investment plans to a much greater degree as compared with Russia, China preferred to keep an expectant position leaving to Russia the initiative in attempting to unblock the Iranian knot. China restricted itself to rendering the diplomatic support to Moscow, obviously not wishing to exacerbate relations with the United States. Consequently Russia was forced to step into the diplomatic forefront, perfectly understanding that it was unable to solve this problem on its own. Moscow chose to advance in two directions. On the one hand, Moscow persuaded Iran to cooperate with the IAEA more actively so as to settle the issue concerning the violations of the 1974 Safeguards Agreement. If this problem could have been solved then the accusations against Tehran of violations of the international non-proliferation regime would be no ORQJHUUHOHYDQW$VLWZDVPHQWLRQHGDERYH,UDQ¶VXUDQLXPHQULFKPHQWDFWLYLW\GLGnot

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contravene any international norms. From the international law perspective the point was to make Iran agree to voluntary suspension in exchange for concessions on the part of third parties, first of all the United States. On the other hand, being aware of the importance of the enrichment issue both from the political perspective and in view of its real significance for non-proliferation, Russia made attempts to bring the positions of the EU and Tehran closely together WKURXJK³VLOHQWGLSORPDF\´WDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQW7HKUDQ¶V³IRXU-VWDJHSODQ´SURSRVHGLQ May 2005. At the same time, there was an effective plan presented by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov on the creation of a joint Russian-Iranian uraniumenrichment factory which had little chance of being accepted by the Iranian side. 7KH SURMHFWZDVEDVHGRQWKHLGHDRIUHFRQFLOLQJ,UDQ¶VULJKWWRGHYHORSSHDFHIXO nuclear technologies including uranium enrichment with the elimination of the international concerns that Tehran would use peaceful technologies to produce weapons-grade uranium. As far as it is known the plan foresaw partial uranium conversion at the Esfahan plant. After that the extracted intermediate product would be sent to Russia where the final stage of the hexafluoride uranium production would be completed and its enrichment up to the reactor-grade could be carried out. The enriched uranium would be delivered to Iran and the spent nuclear fuel would return back to Russia. Obviously such a plan was unacceptable for the Iranian side which asserted that it needed its own fuel production in order to be independent from foreign suppliers. ,QLWLDOO\ ,YDQRY¶V SODQ ZDV UHMHFWHG E\ ,UDQ DQG RQO\ ZLWK WKH GHWHULRUDWLRQ RI WKH situation surrounding Iran did it begin to show interest. The plan, however, was never accepted. ,WLVQRWWREHUXOHGRXWWKDW5XVVLDXQGHUVWRRGWKHLPSODXVLELOLW\RI,YDQRY¶VSODQ and hoped that it could serve as a catalyst for the resumption of negotiations with the EU, thus removing from the agenda the undesirable issue of bringing the discussion of the Iranian issue to the United Nations. In late 2005, it seemed that the talks with Iran could be resumed. Apparently, the EU-3 recovered from the August shock and some other EU countries were inclined toward this idea. Probably by November the consensus within the European Union regarding the resumption of the talks had been UHDFKHGEXWWKLVWLPHWKHQHJRWLDWLRQVKRXOGEHFDUULHGRXWQRWLQWKH³(8-6RODQD´ format. The office of the High Representative on the CFSP had to be the only participant representing the whole European Union. Most likely it is also one of the reasons that in November, the IAEA Board of Governors decided not to pass another resolution on Iran, despite the anti-Iranian majority, so as to give time to settle the problem through the direct talks. In December, Iran and the European Union decided to resume the talks in January 2006. However, on January 3, 2006 Iran suddenly informed the IAEA that it had withdrawn from the unilateral moratorium and resumed uranium enrichment activity. 7KXVWKH ³UHGOLQH´GUDZQE\WKH(XURSHDQGLSORPDWV ZDVILQDOO\FURVVHG0RUHRYHU ,YDQRY¶V SODQ ZKLFK LPSOLHG 7HKUDQ¶V DEVWHQWLRQ QRW RQO\ IURP HQULFKPHQW EXW DOVR from the production of hexafluoride uranium was crossed out. In such circumstances, reporting the Iranian issue to the UN Security Council was practically inevitable. The motives of this unprovoked Iranian demarche remain unclear. It seems that the circles of the new president chose rude and aggressive rhetoric as an instrument of consolidating their internal political influence and snatching away the power remaining in the hands of the moderate conservatives who gathered round Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani. Besides, through the resumption of activity at the Esfahan plant, Iran

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apparently managed to produce a certain amount of hexafluoride uranium and thus Tehran obtained the materials for uranium enrichment that it previously had lacked. Certainly after such a decision, the negotiations between Iran and the European Union could not take place and their first round scheduled for January 2006 was cancelled. Foreign ministers of the EU-3 and Solana issued a sharp statement demanding an extraordinary meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors and submitting the Iranian problem to the UN Security Council. The extraordinary meeting of the *RYHUQRUV¶%RDUGZKLFKWRRNSODFHRQ)HEUXDU\SUDFWLFDOO\UHIHUUHGWKH,UDQLDQ file to the Security Council. The majority of the members (27 members of the Board) voted for this decision. Russia and China also supported this resolution only after KDYLQJDFKLHYHGWKH:HVW¶VFRQVHQWWKDWWKH 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO ZRXOG QRWFRQVLGHUWKH Iranian issue until the next meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors scheduled for early March had taken place. Moscow and Beijing tried to give Tehran one more chance to overcome the deadlock through negotiations. However, the attempts of the Russian diplomats to bring Iran back to the way of restraint were unsuccessful. Already on February 6 Tehran started the implementation of the threats to decrease the cooperation with the IAEA in case its nuclear program was submitted to the United Nations for discussion. Tehran declared the cessation of observance of the Additional Protocol with the IAEA as well as a number of other voluntary measures, and demanded to break the seals and boxes in those places except where required by the 1974 Safeguards Agreement. On February 15 Ahmadinejad declared that experimental uranium enrichment of a 10-centrifuge cascade had started in Natanz. On February 27, the IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei issued a regular report on cooperation with Iran concerning the clarification of unresolved questions regarding its past nuclear activities. He noted that a number of questions still remained XQUHVROYHG $ORQJ ZLWK ,UDQ¶V FRQIURQWDWLRQDO DFWLRQV LQ -DQXDU\-February, the report gave a green light for the discussion of the Iranian issue in the UN Security Council in March 2006. On March 29, the President of the Security Council made a statement reflecting the unanimous position of all 15 members of the Council. He urged Tehran to stop the uranium-enrichment activities and fulfill other requirements of the IAEA resolutions. This statement was not legally binding. Still, Iran continued to pursue its hard line. It rejected the statement of the UNSC 3UHVLGHQW DV YLRODWLQJ ,UDQ¶V ULJKW WR D SHDFHIXO DWRPLF SURJUDP 2Q $SULO  Ahmadinejad reported on new successes in uranium enrichment. He claimed that the Iranians had succeeded in enrichment uranium to the 3.5% level necessary for its use as reactor fuel. According to Ahmadinejad, a certain quantity of uranium had been enriched in the laboratory conditions on the 164 centrifuge cascade. Some observers expressed doubt of the truth of the Iranian statements. According to them, at that moment the Iranian scientists had not managed to solve all problems connected with the reprocessing of a sufficient quantity of uranium hexafluoride, or to coordinate the centrifuge cascades properly. In fact, bringing the discussion of the Iranian problem to the UN Security Council had complicated the position of the West. While the West had the anti-Iranian majority in the IAEA Board of Governors, Russia and China possessed the veto right in the Security Council. This required constant consultations with Moscow and Beijing and closer attention to their positions. In this respect, in early 2006 an informal mechanism of interaction between the leading powers on the Iranian problem was established. The related issues were discussed at the regular meeting of high-ranking officials from the United State, Russia, France, China, Germany and Britain. The emergence of this

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mechanism brought US representatives into the negotiations process on a permanent and regular basis and allowed for the elaboration of a unified position depriving Tehran of the opportunity to play on the differences between the leading global players. At the VDPH WLPH 0RVFRZ DQG %HLMLQJ ZKR SDUWLFLSDWHG DV IXOO PHPEHUV DW WKH VL[ VWDWHV¶ meetings, bore the responsibility for the joint decisions. $IWHU ,UDQ¶V UHMHFWLRQ RI WKH 81 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO VWDWHPHQW WKH JURXS RI VL[ decided to advance in three ways. First, the six countries started to discuss the new package of proposals for Iran in case it gave up its undesirable nuclear activities. This time the proposal would be presented on behalf of all six states. Thus, the Western countries declared their readiness to continue the negotiations process with Tehran. Second, the United States had to slightly change its position. On May 31, Secretary Rice claimed that Washington was ready to take part in the dialogue with Iran if the latter suspended its uranium-enrichment activity. In other words, for the first time the USA made it clear that it was ready for direct talks with Tehran which it had refused since 1980. Third, the Western countries prepared the full draft UN Security Council resolution which repeated the demands made by the IAEA and the Security Council President earlier. Though the resolution did not imply any concrete sanctions or deadlines for implementation, the adoption of this document for the first time legalized WKH GHPDQGV WR VWRS ,UDQ¶V XUDQLXP HQULFKPHQW DFWLYLW\ IURP WKH SHUVSHFWLYH RI WKH international law. Thus a separate international regime was established for Iran, overseeing specific restrictions in the sphere of the peaceful atomic activities. On June 6, the group of the six officially proposed to Iran to start negotiations on the package of measures providing them with certain preliminary conditions. Before talks started, Tehran was required to settle all the remaining issues with the IAEA concerning its past nuclear activities; to suspend all uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities for the period of the negotiations; and to resume the implementation of the Additional Safeguards Agreement. In exchange, it was offered guaranteed delivery of the light-water reactor and nuclear fuel both through the creation of the joint Russian-Iranian plant and through the deployment of five-year fuel supplies on Iranian territory under IAEA control. Unlike the EU proposals presented in August 2005, the proposal of the six countries allowed for the production of reactor fuel in Iran after international confidence in the peaceful purposes of the Iranian nuclear program was restored, i.e. in the indefinite future. The 2006 package looked weightier that the EU proposals made in August 2005 as it was supported by all leading world powers, including the United States. At the same time, the package included preliminary conditions that were not raised in the previous year; it also did not specify the benefits which Iran could receive in the broader economic and political context. Even the EU initiative earlier rejected by Iran as an insufficient one, proposed more clear directions of cooperation. Therefore, in fact, Tehran had to pay beforehand for the goods that were to be agreed upon. Besides, these goods looked far less attractive than those proposed a year ago. Taking advantage of the unspecified time constraints in the proposals of the six countries, Iran declared that it would take as long as was necessary in preparing its answer. At the same time, Russia urged Tehran to give a positive answer by the Saint Petersburg summit in the beginning of June. For this purpose Ahmadinejad was invited to the summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), in which Iran took part as an observer. However after the SCO summit Iran made a statement in which it promised to give its answer only in the end of August.

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Most probably, this provoked serious irritation in Moscow, and on July 12, the group of six countries made a statement that it considered Tehran to have failed to give any answer to its proposals. This meant that the way to the adoption of the first full Security Council resolution concerning the Iranian nuclear problem had been opened. 2Q -XO\   WKH 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO DGRSWHG 5HVROXWLRQ  ZLWK  \HD¶V DQG  abstention (Qatar) which demanded Iran to cease all uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing works by August 31 under the IAEA control. Otherwise the GRFXPHQWWKUHDWHQHGWRWDNH³DSSURSULDWHDFWLRQ´DJDLQVW,UDQ It is unclear why the group of six which patiently tried to restore the negotiations process decided to adopt the statement of July 12 and the UNSCR 1696 even before Iran had presented its answer by the end of August. Probably it was an attempt to exert additional pressure upon Iran and make it give a positive answer to the June proposals. However, in practice these actions could not but provoke Tehran to further sharpen its statements as it was impossible for the Iranian leadership to demonstrate its weakness at this conjuncture. As would be expected by August 31 Iran did not cease its uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activity. In its long-awaited answer, made as promised in the end of August, Tehran declared its consent to start negotiations but without any SUHOLPLQDU\FRQGLWLRQV,QIDFW WKLV PHDQWDQ,UDQLDQ ³QR´ ERWKWRWKH-XQHSURSRVDOV and the UN Resolution 1696. The adoption of Resolution 1696 had radically changed the international situation around the Iranian nuclear program. The refusal to implement this resolution meant that Iran was violating the norms of international law, as implementation of UN Security Council decisions is obligatory for all member-states of the organization. A separate restrictive international regime was being created around Iran, which banned Tehran from carrying out the peaceful nuclear activities allowed in all other countries. And, most importantly, Russia and China who tried to avoid tough measures against Tehran ZHUHIDFLQJDVHULRXVGLOHPPD(LWKHUWKH\KDGWRLJQRUH,UDQ¶VYLRODWLRQVRIWKH81 SC resolutions supported by Moscow and Beijing thus undermining themselves the authority of the institution within which China and Russia enjoyed exceptional rights; RUIRUWKHVDNHRIPDLQWDLQLQJWKH816HFXULW\&RXQFLO¶VVWDWXVDVWKHNH\LQWHUQDWLRQDO forum which decided the questions of international war and peace, both countries had to agree to adopt more and more tough resolutions against Iran thus undermining their own important regional and economic interests. Clearly, such a situation suited the United States quite well. Iran was put under increasingly heavy international pressure exerted through the UN as well, which HQMR\HG JUHDW DXWKRULW\ DPRQJ WKH GHYHORSLQJ FRXQWULHV DQG (XURSHDQ DOOLHV ,UDQ¶V systematic violations of the Security Council resolutions allowed Washington to demand the adoption of more restrictive resolutions including those implying the use of military force. If the Security Council refused to adopt such resolutions the United States could still count on the broader international support for potential unilateral operation against Iran, in case America would seek to bypass the United Nations. The involvement of China and Russia in this process would prevent both countries from using the large Iranian resource for the attainment of regional and economic goals and would limit their influence in Iran and Asia. $OO WKHVH GLOHPPDV DSSHDUHG DOUHDG\ LQ DXWXPQ  ZKHQ WKH VL[ FRXQWULHV¶ JURXSZDVIRUFHGWRGLVFXVVWKHPHDVXUHVLQUHVSRQVHWR7HKUDQ¶VUHIXVDOWRLPSOHPHQW the 1696 Resolution. The USA and some European countries insisted on relatively harder measures whereas Russia and China supported a milder option though, for the

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sake of UN prestige, they were not contesting the necessity of such measures. After the many-month diplomatic marathon, on December 23 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1737 in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The document banned the delivery of technology and equipment for uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing and construction of the heavy-water reactor to Iran. At the same time, the sanctions did not cover the Bushehr project. Iran was also allowed to import weapons and prohibited from exporting them. The sanctions were also imposed on certain persons in the Iranian politico-military leadership connected to the nuclear program. They were forbidden to go abroad and their foreign accounts had to be frozen.

Conclusions The present approach to the solution of the Iranian nuclear problem has few chances for success. This is determined both by the internal political situation in Iran and insufficiently balanced frameworks of the international approach to its solution. The situation in Iran is characterized by deep differences between the representatives of the clerical and secular elites. President Ahmadinejad, elected on the ZDYH RI WKH SHRSOH¶V GLVFRQWHQW, does not possess the full power and is forced to compete with the conservative clergy. For this purpose, he broadly uses radical rhetoric to strengthen his positions in the electoral sector that is loyal to the Islamic regime. In these conditions, the moderate conservatives who seek compromise on the nuclear program have a very limited freedom of maneuver and hesitate to openly oppose the SUHVLGHQW¶VWRXJKIRUHLJQSROLF\FRXUVH7KHRQJRLQJILJKWIRUSRZHUSUHYHQWVGLIIHUHQW factions within the Iranian leadership from achieving consent on various key issues including those aspects of the nuclear activities which arouse the international FRPPXQLW\¶VFRQFHUQ The international diplomatic situation around the Iranian nuclear program can be characterized as a policy without a stick or carrot. The sudden weakening of the American position in the world after the unsuccessful attempts to stabilize the situation in Iraq and, to the lesser degree, in Afghanistan, allows the Iranian leadership to doubt that Washington would decide to start another regime change operation. The limited air strikes may, on the contrary, encourage the population to consolidate around the present regime and therefore they should not be feared. It appears that Tehran also regards the comprehensive economic sanctions as unlikely. In the situation of high world prices on oil ± the main item of Iranian export ± the introduction of an oil embargo against Iran seems highly unlikely as well. Such a step would cause another increase in prices and could seriously undermine the economies of Western states who buy the main part of the imported oil from Iran. At the same time, the restrictive resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council have very little impact on the economy and everyday life in Iran. $V WR WKH ³FDUURWV´ WKH WHUPV SURSRVHG WR ,UDQ LQ LWV RZQ YLHZ KDG EHHQ LQVXIILFLHQWULJKWIURPWKHVWDUWDQGLQGXHFRXUVHEHFDPHHYHQZRUVH7HKUDQ¶VPDLQ demands can be fulfilled by the USA. However, the United States refuses to engage in a direct dialogue with Iranian leaders until they agree to accept the hardly accomplishable American preliminary conditions. Within the framework of the six FRXQWULHV¶JURXS:DVKLQJWRQDOVRPHWKRGLFDOO\GRHVHYHU\WKLQJSRVVLEOHWRUHGXFHWKH attractiveness of the stimuli articulated by the international community for Iran.

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Fortunately, from the technological aspect, the Iranian nuclear program does not KDYH WKH FDSDELOLW\ WR GHYHORS D QXFOHDU H[SORVLYH V\VWHP TXLFNO\ HYHQ LI ,UDQ¶V leadership has set this as its aim. According to the CIA assessments, Tehran would be able to create nuclear weapons in the beginning of the next decade. Thus there are still a couple of years for the leading global players to coordinate a more realistic policy on Iran.

Nuclear Doctrines and Strategies M. Fitzpatrick et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2008 © 2008 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-897-7-113

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Unfinished Business: The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program Jonathan D. POLLACK1

Abstract. Over the course of 25 years, the U.S. and other states have employed IRXU VHSDUDWH VWUDWHJLHV WR SUHYHQW RU LQKLELW 1RUWK .RUHD¶V SXUVXLW RI D QXFOHDU weapons capability, none of which have yielded definitive success. The current efforts through the Six-Party Talks (also encompassing separate bilateral understandings between the United States and North Korea) seem likely to achieve measurable results, especially the cappLQJ RI 3\RQJ\DQJ¶V LQYHQWRU\ RI ILVVLOH material. But a host of larger issues remain unresolved, including the GLVPDQWOHPHQWRI1RUWK.RUHD¶VNQRZQQXFOHDr infrastructure and (in a more longWHUP VHQVH  WKH GLVSRVLWLRQ RI 1RUWK .RUHD¶V ZHDSRQV-related materials and technology, fissile material inventory, and any completed weapons.

1RUWK.RUHD¶VQXFOHDUZHDSRQVGHYHORSPHQWLVDPRQJWKHORQJHVWUXQQLQJGUDPDV LQLQWHUQDWLRQDOSROLWLFV7KHILUVWVLJQVRI3\RQJ\DQJ¶VLQWHUHVWLQQXFOHDUZHDSRQVLn then-secret diplomatic exchanges) date from the early 1960s, and evidence of developing an indigenous nuclear infrastructure was first apparent in the mid-1980s. ,QLWLDOHIIRUWVWRLQKLELWRUSUHYHQWWKH1RUWK¶VQXFOHDUGHYHORSPHQWDOVRGDWHIURPWKH mid-1980s. The Six-Party Talks underway in Beijing constitute the fourth distinct strategy of the past two and a half decades to forestall nuclear weapons acquisition in the 'HPRFUDWLF3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI.RUHD (DPRK), and are thus the latest iteration in a long policy lineage. To date, none of these strategies have achieved definitive results. Though the current approach may yield measurable achievements in denuclearization, there is no assurance that it will provide a solution any more lasting than previous efforts. $QDO\VWV GLYHUJH ZLGHO\ LQ MXGJPHQWV DERXW WKH SXUSRVHV XQGHUO\LQJ WKH 1RUWK¶V pursuit of nuclear weapons. There are three predominant schools of thought. Depending on the favored interpretation, the effort to forestall nuclear weapons development in the DPRK has been a partial success, an outright failure, or an illusion. The first school argues that the DPRK has pursued nuclear weapons out of legitimate fears for its security, but that external powers have failed to provide sufficient inducements and assurances to convince the North to forego nuclear development. A second school of thought asserts that the major powers have not imposed enough costs and punishment on Pyongyang to compel the North to desist from nuclear development. A third VFKRRORIWKRXJKWYLHZVSXUVXLWRIFRPSUHKHQVLYHGHQXFOHDUL]DWLRQDVDIRRO¶V errand. In this latter view, pursuit of a nuclear capability reflects the deepest internal compulsions of the North Korean system, and is not a negotiable proposition, except

1

Professor of Asian and Pacific Studies, US Naval War College. All views in this paper are personal, and should not be attributed to the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or the Naval War College.

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fRUWDFWLFDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVRUSUHFLVHEHQHILWVWKDWGRQRWLQKLELWWKHUHJLPH¶VORQJ-term nuclear goals. The choices facing policy makers, however, differ from mechanistic characterizations of North Korean behavior and intentions. No one disputes the determination of the DPRK leadership and technical personnel to pursue nuclear capabilities, all under acute international isolation and grievous internal privation. In WKLVUHVSHFWWKH1RUWK¶V nuclear history bears obvious FRPSDULVRQZLWK&KLQD¶VQXFOHDU wHDSRQV GHYHORSPHQW LQ WKH ODWH V DQG HDUO\ V  7KH '35.¶V ZHDSRQV program did not develop by accident or serendipity. But the impulses and strategies underlying the pursuit of nuclear weapons have shifted across the decades, thereby affecting policy options for forestalling realization of these goals. This essay will EULHIO\ UHYLHZ WKH 1RUWK¶V SXUVXLW RI QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DQG WKH HIIRUWV RI H[WHUQDO powers to inhibit or reverse this process. We will then assess ongoing possibilities in light of this nuclear history, and ask whether current efforts are likely to prove more successful than those in the past.

1RUWK.RUHD¶VSXUVXLWRIQXFOHDUZHDSRQVDQGIRUHLJQHIIRUWVDWUHYHUVDO The first evidence of DPRK interest in nuclear weapons dates (albeit secretly) from the early 1960s, though programmatic pursuit of these capabilities did not begin to emerge until the mid-1980s, following completion of the graphite moderated 5 MW (e) reactor at Yongbyon.2 Kim Il Sung presumably believed that the DPRK was entitled to possess advanced capabilities to gain notional equivalence with the major powers. Kim was no doubt mindful of U.S. nuclear weapons deployments on the Korean peninsula and of the subsequent disclosure of a covert nuclear weapons program in the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the 1970s. He may have anticipated or solicited direct nuclear assistance from the Soviet Union and from China, but neither state was prepared to LQFXUPDMRUULVNVWRDFFRPPRGDWHWKH1RUWK.RUHDQOHDGHU4XLWHDSDUWIURP.LP¶V fears of the United States, he likely believed that nuclear weapons were the best means to ensure that North Korea could not be controlled by any external power, including his Soviet and Chinese allies. Any meaningful prospect of a weapons capability presumed acquisition of civilian nuclear technologies that the Soviet Union was best able to provide. However, Soviet officials made major enhancement of civilian nuclear DVVLVWDQFHWRWKH1RUWKFRQWLQJHQWRQ3\RQJ\DQJ¶VUDWLILFDWLRQRIWKH1RQSUROLIHUDWLRQ Treaty (NPT)0RVFRZ¶VRIIHURIFRQGLWLRQDODVVLVWDQFHZDVWKHILUVWDWWHPSWWRLQKLELW WKH 1RUWK¶V SRWHQWLDO QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV GHYHORSPHQW  8QGHU 6RYLHW SUHVVXUH 1RUWK Korea signed the NPT in 1985, though it took another seven years before the DPRK ratified safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).3 2 )RUVRPHLQLWLDOKLQWVIURPGLSORPDWLFDUFKLYHVVHH³&RQYHUVDWLRQEHWZHHQ6RYLHWAmbassador Vasily Moskovsky and NRUWK.RUHDQ)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHU3DUN6XQJ&K¶RO´$XJXVWLQ%DOD]V6]DORQWDLDQG Sergey Radchenko, 1RUWK.RUHD¶V(IIRUWVWR$FTXLUH1XFOHDU7HFKQRORJ\DQG1XFOHDU:HDSRQV(YLGHQFH from Russian and Hungarian Archives (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project, Working Paper #53, August 2006, p. 33. 3 See, in particular the essays by Georgiy Kaurov, Valery I. Denisov, and Alexander Zhebin in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov (eds.), The North Korean Nuclear Program-Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York and London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 15-20, 21-26, and 27-37, UHVSHFWLYHO\DQG5RODQG7LPHUEDHY³7KH,$($6DIHJXDUGV-Dµ&UDVK7HVW¶´LQ$OH[HLArbatov (ed.), At the Nuclear Threshold-The Lessons of North Korea and Iran for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), pp. 59-61.

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These agreements were in jeopardy almost from the time the ink was dry. In the ,$($¶VLQLWLDOYLVLWVWRWKH1RUWKLQWKHHDUO\V$JHQF\SHUVRQQHOZHUHQRWDEOHWR resolve major GLVFUHSDQFLHVLQWKH1RUWK¶VFODLPVUHODWHGWRWKHRSHUDWLRQRILWVJUDSKLWH moderated reactor and associated facilities. 4 The North refused to allow IAEA inspectors unrestricted access to various suspect sites, and in March 1993 Pyongyang announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. In response, the United States (having initially weighed highly coercive military options) developed a second denuclearization strategy, congruent with NPT goals but negotiated bilaterally with the DPRK. This led to a U.S.-North Korea accord (the Agreed Framework) that froze the 1RUWK¶V SOXWRQLXP-based weapons program for eight years, in exchange for various inducements and assistance provided by the United States and other parties, primarily the ROK and Japan.5 The Agreed Framework ultimately foundered and then collapsed in the fall of 2002, when the United States accused the North of undertaking a covert highly enriched uranium program, which if fully realized would have provided Pyongyang with an alternative source of fissile material, thereby enabling it to circumvent the constraints imposed under the Agreed Framework. The Bush Administration decided to halt its heavy fuel oil deliveries to the North, and announced suspension and ultimate cessation of plans to construct two replacement light water reactors (LWRs) under the auspices of the Korea Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). In response, the DPRK abruptly withdrew from the NPT and the IAEA; unsealed its frozen facilities; restarted its long-dormant reactor; and reprocessed the spent fuel rods that had been in storage at Yongbyon, thereby moving the North much closer to a realized weapons capability.6 ,QUHVSRQVHWRWKH1RUWK¶VDFWLRQVWKH%XVK$GPLQLVWUDWLRQLQLWVILUVWWHUPRSWHG for a third strategy. The administration sought to raise the costs to the North for its weapons development, and to deny the North any presumptive claims to legitimacy as a negotiating partner outside the NPT. Washington demanded the complete, verifiable, irreversible dLVPDQWOHPHQW&9,' RIDOOWKH1RUWK¶VQXFOHDUZHDSRQVDFWLYLWLHVEHIRUH the United States would even consider proffering renewed assistance to the North. The United States also refused to agree to any bilateral negotiations with Pyongyang, though it did consent to trilateral discussions arranged under Chinese auspices in the VSULQJRI:LWK&KLQD¶VH[WHQVLYHLQYROYHPHQWDQGIDFLOLWDWLRQWKHVHSUHOLPLQDU\ discussions were then expanded into Six-Party Talks that opened in Beijing in the summer of 2003. However, for the next several years, these discussions were episodic, highly predictable, and singularly unproductive. They provided an arena for diplomatic interaction, but without undertaking meaningful negotiation. Unlike the Agreed Framework, the U.S. approach was no longer inducement-based, nor was there an authoritative bilateral channel for discussions between Washington and Pyongyang. 5DWKHUWKDQLQKLELWLQJWKH1RUWK¶s nuclear development, U.S. policy provided the DPRK with a rationale to justify its renewed pursuit of a weapons capability. As the Six-Party Talks proceeded fitfully and unproductively, North Korea steadily 4 For a detailed examination, see David Albright and KeviQ2¶1HLOOHGV Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle (Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, 2000). 5 Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical-The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). 6 -RQDWKDQ'3ROODFN³7KH8QLWHG6WDWHV1RUWK.RUHDDQGWKH(QGRIWKH$JUHHG)UDPHZRUN´ Naval War College Review, Vol. LVI, Number 3, Summer 2003, pp. 11-49; and Yoichi Funabashi, The Peninsula Question-A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007).

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augmented its inventory of fissile material and explicitly declared that it was moving WRZDUGD³SK\VLFDOGHWHUUHQW´Flaiming possession of nuclear weapons for the first time in February 2005. All six parties assented to an ³LQ SULQFLSOH´ DJUHHPHQW RQ denuclearization in September 2005, but a range of policy disputes and diplomatic impediments stalled any additional progress for well over a year.7 The North persisted ZLWKLWV ZHDSRQVGHYHORSPHQW FXOPLQDWLQJLQWKH '35.¶VILUVWQXFOHDU detonation in 2FWREHU   3\RQJ\DQJ¶V accumulation of separated plutonium was equally significant, since it provided the essential building blocks to operationalize a nuclear ZHDSRQV FDSDELOLW\   $ GHWDLOHG HIIRUW WR HVWLPDWH WKH 1RUWK¶V SOXWRQLXP LQYHQWRU\ SXEOLVKHGE\'DYLG$OEULJKWDQG3DXO%UDQQDQLQHDUO\ HVWLPDWHGWKH'35.¶V extant stockpile at between 46 and 64 kg, with between 28-50 kg in fully separated form and available for weapons fabrication. Depending on assumptions about the amount of fissile material required for weapons fabrication, Albright and Brannan concluded that the DPRK has sufficient separated plutonium for five to twelve ZHDSRQV  7KLV ZHDSRQV SRWHQWLDO ZDV DWWULEXWDEOH DOPRVW HQWLUHO\ WR WKH 1RUWK¶V breakout from the Agreed Framework constraints. 8 The fourth denuclearization strategy developed in the aftermath of the abject failure of the compellant apSURDFKSXUVXHGGXULQJ3UHVLGHQW%XVK¶VILUVWWHUPLQRIILFH Some U.S. officials (notably, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific $IIDLUV &KULVWRSKHU +LOO  DUJXHG WKDW FDSSLQJ WKH 1RUWK¶V H[WDQW SOXWRQLXP LQYHQWRU\ was more important than insisting on an immediate and unconditional end to all the 1RUWK¶V QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV DFWLYLWLHV 7KH IRXUWK VWUDWHJ\ OHG WR WKH ILUVW PHDQLQJIXO negotiated breakthroughs since the Agreed Framework deliberations of 1993-94, building on the September 2005 agreement and signed by all participants in the Beijing WDONV LQ )HEUXDU\ DQG 2FWREHU   7KLV DSSURDFK DVVXPHG WKDW 1RUWK .RUHD¶V nuclear test was not an irrevocable decision. Rather, the fourth strategy posited that a step-by-step process would enable tKH 1RUWK¶V HIIRUWV WR EH VORZHG DQG XOWLPDWHO\ reversed.

Current approach and prospects The current approach nominally represents an agreement among all six parties, but the accords are also premised on bilateral understandings between the United States and the DPRK. Pyongyang had long sought such bilateral negotiations with the United States. Though reminiscent of the Agreed Framework, the outcomes to date have been different. Embedded bilateral negotiations have advanced a multilateral diplomatic process involving China, the ROK, Russia, and Japan as well as the United States and the DPRK. The regional negotiations are focused on the six-decade abnormality in the '35.¶VUHODWLRQVKLS with the United States, the ROK, and Japan, and the absence of a longer-term framework governing political and security relations on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole. The essence of the recent agreements is 7 ³-RLQW6WDWHPHQWRIWKH)RXUWK5RXQGRIWKH6L[-3DUW\7DONV´%HLMLQJ6HSWHPEHU www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/53490.htm. 8 'DYLG$OEULJKWDQG3DXO%UDQQDQ³7KH1RUWK.RUHDQ3OXWRQLXP6WRFN)HEUXDU\´ (Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, 20 February 2007). For a reassessment in OLJKWRIWKH1RUWK¶VUHSRUWHGGLVFORVXUHVWR86RIILFLDOVVHH'DYLG$OEULJKW3DXO%UDQQDQDQG-DFTXHOLQH 6KLUH³1RUWK.RUHD¶V3OXWRQLXP'HFODUDWLRQ$6WDUWLQJ3RLQWIRUDQ,QLWLDO9HULILFDWLRQ3URFHVV´ (Washington, DC: The Institute for Science and International Security, January 10, 2008).

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two-IROG  )LUVW WKHUH LV DQ ³DFWLRQ IRU DFWLRQ´ SURFHVV ZKHUHE\ WKH UHOHYDQW SDUWLHV (especially Washington and Pyongyang) undertake parallel steps as various milestones are met. These include the provision of heavy fuel oil to the North in conjunction with the DPRK first shuttering and then disabling the reactor, reprocessing facility, and fuel fabrication plant at Yongbyon, as well as Pyongyang providing a full accounting of its past and current nuclear activities.9 In exchange for these measures, the United States pledged various assurances and political measures in addition to various multilateral forms of economic compensation to the North. Separate working groups addressing 1RUWK .RUHD¶V HQGXULQJ HVWUDQJHPHQW IURP WKH RXWVLGH ZRUOG KDYH also been established, with these efforts moving forward as specified milestones in denuclearization proceed. Assuming that the fourth strategy is sustained, it fulfills various requirements that earlier approaches did not. The process is addressing three irreducible expectations in 1RUWK .RUHD¶V negotiations with the outside world, and especially with the United States: compensation, validation, and assurance. In addition to specific assistance such as heavy fuel oil shipments, the symbolic value of these agreements for the North VKRXOGQRWEHGLVFRXQWHG86SOHGJHVWR³EHJLQWKHSURFHVVRIUHPRYLQJWKH'35.¶V designation as a state sponsor of terrorism and advancing the process of terminating the DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH 7UDGLQJ ZLWK WKH (QHP\ $FW ZLWK UHVSHFW WR WKH '35.´ DVVXPH intrinsic significance to Pyongyang, even if neither designation is related to the NoUWK¶V nuclear activities. At the same time, however, these accords obligate the DPRK to actions to which it KDG EHHQ SUHYLRXVO\ XQZLOOLQJ WR FRPPLW  7KH ³GHQXFOHDUL]DWLRQ DFWLRQ SODQ´ RI )HEUXDU\UHTXLUHGWKH 1RUWKWR³VKXWGRZQDQGVHDOIRUWKHSXUSose of eventual DEDQGRQPHQWWKHVLF@1RUWK

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J.D. Pollack / Unfinished Business: The North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program

leadership may have well have concluded that Yongbyon was a diminishing asset or even a liability; closing the facility may have been judged a prudent step that would in turn generate significant political, energy, and financial benefits for the DPRK. But Yongbyon remains WKH 1RUWK¶V RQO\ NQRZQ PHDQV WR SURGXFH ILVVLOH PDWHULDO IRU LWV weapons program. Shuttering, disabling and ultimately dismantling the facility would UHGXFHKLJKHUHQGHVWLPDWHVRIWKH1RUWK¶VSURVSHFWLYHQXFOHDUFDSDELOLWLHV 11 In an earlier publication, the author hypothesized three alternative nuclear scenarios to 2015, posed more in qualitative than in quantitative terms: (1) a largely V\PEROLFRU³SROLWLFDO´QXFOHDUIRUFH DQRSHUDWLRQDOO\RULHQWHGIRUFHZLWKDFUHGLEOH means of delivery; and (3) a deficient or failed effort to achieve an operational capability.12 A program capped at six to twelve weapons is smaller than what the North could achieve in the absence of binding, verifiable constraints on fissile material production. But it remains highly worrisome for regional security and in relation to non-proliferation objectives. To be sure, little is known or understood about how the DPRK views its deterrent options, or how it conceptualizes nuclear doctrine. It is entirely possible that Pyongyang has yet to give serious thought to this issue. But (as argued by Siegfried Hecker) it now VHHPV YLUWXDOO\ LQGLVSXWDEOH WKDW ³WKH '35. leadership has made the decision to permanently shut down plutonium production if the United States and the other four parties live up to their October 3, 2007 FRPPLWPHQWV´ 13 A political deterrent force (especially in the absence of additional nuclear tests) has inherent limits, and might under some conditions be valued less as a FRUHFRPSRQHQWLQWKH1RUWK¶VORQJHU-term national defense strategy. But even a fully implemented second phase action plan leaves wholly unaddressed the disposition of the 1RUWK¶VSOXWRQLXPLQYHQWRU\DQGRILWVDFWXDOQXFOHDUZHDSRQV The negotiating process has also entailed differences over the details of disablement and disclosure. Earlier hints from U.S. negotiators suggested that the North could undertake specific actions at Yongbyon to render these facilities inoperative and dysfunctional, perhaps permanently. More detailed technical assessments, presumably drawing from the evaluations and observations of U.S. personnel directly involved in the disablement process, suggest that it would take as ORQJ DV  PRQWKV ³WR UHVWDUW DOO IDFLOLWLHV´ DVVXPLQJ D GHFLVLRQ ZDV PDGH WR DJDLQ resume operations.14 This outcome falls short of irreversibility, though any effort by the DPRK to reverse course and restart the facility would entail major political and technical costs.15 Additional technical assessments by Siegfried Hecker (derived from multiple site visits) impart the highly complex technical and procedural issues accompanying the disablement process. In retrospect, the original target date of 31 December 2007 was in all likelihood an overly ambitious target, but such a goal does seem feasible by the end of 2008. 1RUWK .RUHD¶V REOLJDWLRQ WR provide ³D FRPSOHWH DQG DFFXUDWH GHFODUDWLRQ RI LWV nucleaUSURJUDPV´KDVSURYHQSDUWLFXODUO\QHWWOHVRPHDQG1RUWK.RUHDQGLVFORVXUHVRI Korea (DPRK), Pyongyang and the Nuclear &HQWHUDW