Building Terrorism Resistant Communities: Together Against Terrorism, Volume 55 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human and Societal Dynamics ... Security, E: Human and Societal Dynamics)

BUILDING TERRORISM RESISTANT COMMUNITIES NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results ...

Author: S. Ekici | A. Ekici | D.A. McEntire | R.H. Ward | S.S. Arlikatti

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BUILDING TERRORISM RESISTANT COMMUNITIES

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience. Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action. Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Sub-Series A. B. C. D. E.

Chemistry and Biology Physics and Biophysics Environmental Security Information and Communication Security Human and Societal Dynamics

Springer Science and Business Media Springer Science and Business Media Springer Science and Business Media IOS Press IOS Press

http://www.nato.int/science http://www.springer.com http://www.iospress.nl

Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 55

ISSN 1874-6276

Building Terrorism Resistant Communities Together Against Terrorism

Edited by

Sıddık Ekici University of North Texas Police Major, Turkish National Police

Ahmet Ekici Chief Superintendent, Turkish National Police

David A. McEntire University of North Texas

Richard H. Ward University of New Haven

and

Sudha S. Arlikatti University of North Texas

Amsterdam • Berlin • Tokyo • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Together against Terrorism: Building Terrorism Resistant Communities Washington D.C., USA 26–27 September 2008

© 2009 IOS Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-60750-006-3 Library of Congress Control Number: 2009924873 Publisher IOS Press BV Nieuwe Hemweg 6B 1013 BG Amsterdam Netherlands fax: +31 20 687 0019 e-mail: [email protected] Distributor in the UK and Ireland Gazelle Books Services Ltd. White Cross Mills Hightown Lancaster LA1 4XS United Kingdom fax: +44 1524 63232 e-mail: [email protected]

Distributor in the USA and Canada IOS Press, Inc. 4502 Rachael Manor Drive Fairfax, VA 22032 USA fax: +1 703 323 3668 e-mail: [email protected]

LEGAL NOTICE The publisher is not responsible for the use which might be made of the following information. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

Building Terrorism Resistant Communities S. Ekici et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2009 © 2009 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Preface This book includes the proceedings of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 2008 Advanced Research Workshop (ARW), titled “Together against Terrorism: Building Terrorism Resistant Communities.” The workshop was held in Washington D.C. on September 26–27, 2008, and was planned and organized by Sıddık Ekici from Turkey and Lindita Caci from Albania, with excellent sponsorship from NATO. This event was also co-sponsored by the University of North Texas (UNT); the College of Public Affairs and Community Service (PACS) at UNT; and the Department of Public Administration (PADM) at UNT. Distinguished participants representing twelve different countries (from the academia and law enforcement communities) were in attendance. The goal of the meeting was to explore methods to involve the community in the fight against terrorism in an effort to enhance its protection from terrorist attacks and to establish a network between the participants for future collaborations. Not only was there a comprehensive series of highly relevant presentations on strengthening the community against terrorism, but the meeting also provided an opportunity to share mutual concerns and meet academicians and practitioners in the field. The workshop was organized around two main topics: 1. 2.

Defining the problem of terrorism and collective community protection Counter-terrorism practices and their relation to the community

On the first topic, attendees presented their studies related, in particular, to why terrorism exists and why people join and/or support extremist groups. Although the studies were problem-oriented, at the conclusion of each presentation, suggestions were offered on how to diminish the threat. The second topic represented studies that primarily focused on developing non-orthodox methods to combat terrorism. In other words, the researchers presented their arguments as to why communities should be included in the fight against terrorism. In addition, suggestions were made concerning how this integration could be achieved and what kind of limitations could exist in the cooperation between law enforcement and the community. Following the classification of studies received, the articles contained in this book were categorized into three parts: 1. 2. 3.

Terrorism and its Causes Organizational and Structural Approaches to Terrorism Civil Society and Counter Terrorism Operations

It is hoped that this book will be a guide for policy makers and practitioners to gain a better understanding of how counter terrorism, as well as many other applications, require community support and involvement to the fullest extent possible. Because the existing threat of terrorism is proof of the failed classical militaristic approaches, the time has come to integrate our communities into the practice of fighting the threat

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together. Certainly, the integration of communities in counter terrorism policies bears some limitations. Therefore, attempts to counter terrorism together with our communities should be in accordance with the suggestions and recommendations offered in such and/or possible future studies. Sıddık Ekici March 2009

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About the Editors Sıddık Ekici, ABD, is a Police Major in the Turkish National Police. He received his M.S. degree from the Criminal Justice Department at the University of North Texas. His Ph.D. studies are focused on human needs that cause individuals to join terror groups in general and specific groups in particular. He is the author of Family Dynamics and the Runaway Problem: An Assessment on the Impact of Family Dynamics on the Runaway Problem among Teenagers, and the Co-Editor of Understanding and Responding to Terrorism. His research interest includes: security, policy development and emergency management studies. [email protected] Dr. Ahmet Ekici is a Chief Superintendent in the Turkish National Police. He has been in the agency for 15 years. He obtained his M.A at Kent State University, Ohio and Ph.D. at Sam Houston State University, TX. His studies are focused on policing issues, ethics, and management. Dr. David A. McEntire is an Associate Dean in the College of Public Affairs and Community Service. He teaches emergency management in the Department of Public Administration. He is the author of Introduction to Homeland Security: Understanding Terrorism with an Emergency Management Perspective (Wiley). His research interests include emergency management theory, disaster response, homeland security, and international disasters. [email protected]. Dr. Richard Ward is currently the Dean of the Henry C. Lee College of Criminal Justice and Forensic Sciences. A former New York City Detective, besides numerous other books and articles on international crime and terrorism he is the co-author of: Criminal Investigation: A Method for Reconstructing the Past (5th edition); and Homeland Security: An Introduction. [email protected] Dr. Sudha S. Arlikatti is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Public Administration at the University of North Texas. Her research interests include environmental hazards mitigation and management, spatial analysis, and sustainable development. She has published in premier environmental and disaster management journals including Environmental Management, Environment and Behavior, International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, Risk Analysis and Disasters. [email protected]

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Principal Contributors Sudha ARLIKATTI University of North Texas Alain-Michel AYACHE Université du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM) Fatih BALCI University of Utah Erik CASE University of North Texas Fatih DEMIROZ University of Central Florida Ahmet EKICI Turkish National Police Sıddık EKICI University of North Texas I. Sevki ELDIVAN Rutgers University Orhan ERDEM Turkish National Police Malatya Junior Police College Vladimir FEDORENKO George Mason University Silvia CIOTTI GALLETTI EuroCrime Research Institute – Italy St. John International University Nadir GERGIN Virginia Commonwealth University Ira GROSSMAN Winbourne and Costas Inc., USA

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J.B. HILL Institute for the Study of Violent Groups Sam Houston State University Sarah M. HUGGINS Virginia Commonwealth University Naim KAPUCU University of Central Florida (UCF) Lina KOLESNIKOVA Rossnova Solutions, Risk, Crisis and Disaster Consultancy, Belgium Daniel J. MABREY University of New Haven David A. McENTIRE University of North Texas Ekrem MUS Virginia Commonwealth University Igor OSYKA The Kharkiv National University, Ukraine Mahmoud SADRI Texas Woman’s University Bahadir SAHIN University of Central Florida (UCF) Emile SAHLIYEH University of North Texas Velizar SHALAMANOV Center of Operational Analysis, Institute of Parallel Processing – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences Angus SMITH Royal Canadian Mounted Police Nickolaj F. STARODUB A.V. Palladin Institute of Biochemistry of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, T. Shevchenko Kiev National University Benjamin STIPE Sam Houston State University

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Ali UNLU University of Central Florida (UCF) Igor VOLKOV University of Central Florida Richard H. WARD University of New Haven Richard WARNES RAND Europe &University of Surrey Jeffrey WINBOURNE Winbourne & Costas, Inc., USA Ismail YILMAZ Virginia Commonwealth University Farhod YULDASHEV University of Central Florida


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Contents Preface Sıddık Ekici

v

About the Editors

vii

Principal Contributors

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Introductory Chapter. Perspectives on Community Involvement in Counter Terrorism Sıddık Ekici and Emile Sahliyeh

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Part 1. Terrorism and Its Causes Origins of Terrorism: An Alternative Way for Political Expression Erik Case and Emile Sahliyeh

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Words Make Worlds: What We Talk About When We Talk About Terrorism Angus Smith

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Terrorist Profiling: Characteristics and Motivations by Arrest Rate Ismail Yilmaz

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The Creation of a Terrorist: A Look into Social Environments Involved Silvia Ciotti Galletti and Sarah M. Huggins

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Instrumental Express Control of Toxic Substances in the Environment and Ways for Its Rapid Decontamination as a Barrier for the Action of Bioterrorists Nickolaj F. Starodub The Impact of Law Enforcement Practices on Terrorism Ahmet Ekici and Orhan Erdem

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Part 2. Organizational and Structural Approaches to Terrorism Reconsidering Homeland Security Policy: Recognizing the Role of Emergency Management in Promoting Terrorism Resistance and Resilience David A. McEntire Terrorism: Notes on a Communitarian Approach Mahmoud Sadri Collaborative Crisis Management: Comparative Perspectives on Crisis Management in the European Countries, Germany, Spain, United Kingdom, and Turkey Naim Kapucu, Ali Unlu and Bahadir Sahin

109 118

123

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“Terrorism Watch” or “Natural Hazard Mitigation” Why the Difference? : Community Policing in the Indian Context Sudha Arlikatti

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Matching Incident Management Technologies and Human Factors for More Resilient Communities Velizar Shalamanov, Ira Grossman and Jeffrey Winbourne

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Part 3. The Society and Counter Terrorism Building Terrorism Resistant Communities (BTRC): The Problem and the Way Out Sıddık Ekici and Ekrem Mus

177

Importance of the Participation of Civil Society into Effective Counter-Terrorism Policies Vladimir Fedorenko

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Cooperation of Law Enforcement and the Public in Combating Terrorism in Ukraine Igor Osyka

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Pushing the Private-Public Partnership: Exploring Extant Tools J.B. Hill and Benjamin Stipe

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Terrorist De-Radicalization: Comparative Approaches for Reintegrating Terrorists into the Community Daniel J. Mabrey and Richard H. Ward

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Turkey’s Counter Terrorism Policies Against The PKK: The “Fish” or the “Water”? Nadir Gergin, Fatih Balci and I. Sevki Eldivan

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Fighting Against Terrorism in Kyrgyzstan: Collaborative Partnerships and Citizen Involvement Approach 284 Farhod Yuldashev, Fatih Demiroz and Igor Volkov ‘Re-Imagining Counter-Terrorism’: The Importance of Counter-Ideology as Part of the Wider Response to Terrorism Richard Warnes

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Achieving Resilience in Communities: Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks Lina Kolesnikova

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The Role of ‘Cultural Communities’ in Preventing Terrorism in the West Alain-Michel Ayache

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Concluding Chapter. Suggestion: Counter the Threat Together! Ahmet Ekici and Sıddık Ekici

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Subject Index

347

Author Index

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Building Terrorism Resistant Communities S. Ekici et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2009 © 2009 IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-006-3-1

Introductory Chapter Perspectives on Community Involvement in Counter Terrorism Sıddık EKICI1 and Emile SAHLIYEH2 University of North Texas

Abstract. This chapter provides a summary of the competing perspectives presented at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Advanced Research Workshop (“Together against Terrorism: Building Terrorism Resistant Communities”) that convened in Washington D.C. on September 26-27, 2008. Keywords. civil, community, counter terrorism, terrorism, non-orthodox approaches, policy

Despite its long history, terrorism is likely to continue posing a threat to our communities and occupy policy makers and scholars alike for the foreseeable future. In this chapter, we summarize the competing perspectives presented at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Advanced Research Workshop that convened in Washington D.C. on September 26-27, 2008. Participants attending the workshop, “Together against Terrorism: Building Terrorism Resistant Communities,” explored the causes of terrorism and various organizational and structural approaches to terrorism and proposed new methods to counter terrorism, including local communities in the fight against terrorism. They ascertained that traditional military approaches alone are not appropriate for all types of terrorist attacks and military means do not provide long term solutions. They further contended that local communities should actively participate in innovative counter terrorism techniques that would heighten efficiency and effectiveness. Accordingly, the contributions made by the authors are organized into three parts: (1) Terrorism and its causes, (2) organizational and structural approaches to terrorism and, (3) civil society and counter terrorism operations.

1

Ph.D. candidate, Department of Public Administration, University of North Texas. Police Major, Turkish National Police 2 Professor of Middle East Politics, Director of International Studies, University of North Texas

1

2

S. Ekici and E. Sahliyeh / Perspectives on Community Involvement in Counter Terrorism

1. Part One The first part of the book consists of six chapters that examine terrorism and its causes. In chapter one, Origins of Terrorism: An Alternative Way for Political Expression, Erik Case and Emile Sahliyeh provide a background on structural approaches to analyzing the roots of terrorism. Their research findings highlight the fact that state level variables (repression and state capacity) contribute to terrorism. In addition, structural features evidenced in the limitations on non-violent political expression increase the possibility of using violent political tactics (i.e. terrorism). In chapter two, “Words Make Worlds: What We Talk About When We Talk About Terrorism,” Angus Smith from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, provides a new perspective on approaching terrorism. He argues that our language can impact the creation of new Al-Qaeda-inspired extremism. Smith notes that scholars, policy-makers and the media should be more careful in using their language to define and describe certain types of terrorist activities. He further maintains that incorrect use of such language can compound the problem. Smith’s study also examines the Al-Qaeda’s terror organization and how it managed to inspire people and contribute to unstable politics and culture in a wide range of geographical locations stretching from the shores of the Mediterranean to the South China Sea, Europe, Australia and throughout America. Smith concludes by suggesting that the “resolution requires a global response and meaningful international cooperation since influential campaigns are rooted in the notion of a collaborated world,” and that there is a need for a “common language to describe terrorism adequately, along with a comprehensive understanding of the process of radicalization and the manner in which we may intervene.” In chapter three, “Terrorist Profiling: Characteristics and Motivations by Arrest Rate,” Ismail Yilmaz, doctoral candidate and member of the Turkish National Police, looks into terrorist profiling. His study examines the general characteristics of Turkish domestic terrorists and points out that, in general, previous studies provide descriptive analyses and/or reported backgrounds and demographics. Despite the valuable contribution of these studies, he believes that more should be done. Statistical analysis in a multivariate setting is applied to determine the socio-demographic forces that drive terrorists to repeat their offenses. Yilmaz further argues that early intervention methods must be complemented with policies that include a counter-terrorism strategy and should consider those who are already committed to terrorism. Yilmaz’s study aims to discover whether domestic terrorists in Turkey hold different demographic characteristics from the rest of the Turkish population and how extensive these terrorists are involved in terrorism. In chapter four, The Creation of a Terrorist: A Look into Social Environments Involved, Silvia Ciotti Galletti and Sarah Huggins explore the impact of the environmental factors upon extremism. Their research provides an overview of the issues and forces that contribute to the religious extremism in Morocco. They attempt to lay out the origins of terrorism and examine the sociological, demographical, and political environments in relation to terrorism. Current and past terrorist activities in Morocco are used to determine whether their findings support theories suggesting that socio-economical despair and political instability in the midst of densely populated areas are causes of terrorism, more especially extremist terrorism. In light of their findings, Galletti and Huggins emphasize that counter terrorism requires community cooperation; that counter terrorism policies must focus on the needs and desires of the community, break the isolation within communities and reintroduce these isolated


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communities into normal city “life”; and that they need to use networks to inform law enforcement and other community members about extremists. In chapter five, Instrumental Express Control of Toxic Substances in Environment and Ways for its Rapid Decontamination as a Barrier for the Action of Bioterrorists, Nikolaj F. Starodub from Ukraine examines bioterrorism. Starodub’s study introduces biosensors that control the total toxicity of environmental objects and reveal group toxic elements and individual toxins. He describes various toxins including mycotoxins, fumasine, atrazine and T2, for example, and notes that T2 is considered as a potential specimen that can be used in bioterrorism. Starodub also discusses ways to decontaminate polluted areas using two primary approaches and maintains that they provide all practices required for the prevention of disastrous consequences resulting from bioterrorism activities. In chapter six “The Impact of Law Enforcement Practices on Terrorism,” Ahmet Ekici and Orhan Erdem identify proper law enforcement conduct and practices that could possibly contribute in reducing the number of people sympathizing or joining terrorist organizations. The authors discuss in detail the battle between government and terrorist organizations in winning over the public. Data utilized were collected from actual terrorists confined in Turkish prisons. The study further explores the behavior of Turkish practitioners and law enforcement practices. In addition, focusing on militaristic and traditional policing methods used to respond to terrorism, the study endeavors to discover the impact that these methods might have on an individual’s decision to join a terrorist organization. The study reveals that although law enforcement attempt to fight terrorism, employing the wrong methods and tactics, however, may lead to an undesired effect, namely, encouraging people to sympathize or join terrorist groups. The concluding chapter offers suggestions to practitioners and policy makers as to where law enforcement should focus their attention while fighting terrorism. 2. Part Two The second part of the book consists of five chapters and discusses the organizational and structural approaches to terrorism. In chapter seven, “Reconsidering Homeland Security Policy: Recognizing the Role of Emergency Management Terrorism Resistance and Resilience,” David A. McEntire contends that emergency management (EM) should be recognized as an important contributor in homeland security policies. Highlighting the point that (EM) should be considered as an important partner in homeland security’s fight against terrorism, he notes that despite the common language used by emergency managers and homeland security officials in regard to vulnerability, resistance and resilience and despite the efforts of emergency managers in dealing with terrorism, EM has still not been recognized as a viable profession. The chapter underscores the benefits of linking emergency management with homeland security. McEntire, however, makes it clear that his intention is not to diminish the role of prevention agencies, namely intelligence, military and law enforcement personnel in terrorism incidents. In chapter eight, Terrorism: Notes on a Communitarian Approach, Mahmoud Sadri, outlines the general cultural approach to terrorism and contrasts it to instrumental and organizational approaches. Sadri contends that Americans and Europeans approach the problem of terrorism differently, with Americans considering

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terrorism a political problem while Europeans view it as a communal problem. Sadri argues that theories of terrorism developed in the United States overlook the cultural dimension of the phenomenon. He further underlines the need to evaluate terrorism as the “result of a radicalization of cultural norms and values prevalent in extremist ‘subcultures,’ making terrorists ‘enthusiastic champions of cultural aspirations.’ Sadri concludes the chapter by suggesting that greater attention should be devoted to the cultural dimension of terrorism in an attempt to understand and solve the problem; otherwise, efforts are less likely to be successful. Chapter nine, “Collaborative Crisis Management: Comparative Perspectives on Crisis Management in Four European Countries: Germany, Spain, United Kingdom, and Turkey” provides another EM perspective concerning the organizational and structural approaches to terrorism The authors, Naim Kapucu, Ali Unlu and Bahadir Sahin compare crisis management systems in Germany, Spain, United Kingdom, and Turkey and conclude that all of these countries apply different Crisis Management (CM) systems. They also investigate the training functions of central crisis management organizations and the role of local authorities in the emergency management system. The authors conclude that the four countries have their own national response and split regional emergency response systems. Additional findings suggest that local authorities are empowered for non-cross boundary emergencies and in the case of larger incidents; the central government plays additional roles. Another important finding is that empowered local authorities appear to be better than a centralized emergency management structure in dealing with emergencies. In chapter 10, “Terrorism Watch” or “Natural Hazard Mitigation:” Why the Difference?: Community Policing in the Indian Context,” Sudha Arlikatti discusses Indian community policing that provided for the state’s adoption to new challenges. She analyzes the change in the government’s approach concerning its emergency management style from command and control to more problem solving. The new emergency management style features continuity, coordination and cooperation in hopes of saving more lives and securing the Indian community, especially vulnerable groups including children, women, the elderly, and minorities. Arlikatti argues that this change aims to increase trust in the Indian government. She concludes her chapter by offering ideas on how to expand and sustain the community’s involvement in emergency management situations in an attempt to reduce the public’s vulnerability to all types of disasters and to achieve disaster resilient communities in India. Chapter 11, “Matching Incident Management Technologies and Human Factors for More Resilient Communities,” explores the communication aspect of collaboration between various services. Velizar Shalamanov, Ira Grossman and Jeffrey Winborn argue that communication is certainly a vital part of cooperation and system integration. In their analysis, the authors concur that integration between different services that handle civil security requires new communication systems. Their work is aimed at “matching the new technologies with the human factor (both in security organizations and from the community) to provide safety and security in a terrorism threatened environment.” They further ascertain that during the last ten years security concepts have changed and brought about new challenges in greater scope, namely involvement of a civil society. Thus, suggestions are provided on the horizontal and vertical integration of all possible information and communications systems.


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3. Part Three The third part of the book consists of ten chapters which investigate the possible role of a civil society in counter terrorism. In chapter 12, “Building Terrorism Resistant Communities (BTRC): The Problem and the Way Out,” Sıddık Ekici and Ekrem Muş offer recommendations by analyzing a number of existing community based security programs in an attempt to become familiar with the characteristics required for building terrorism resistant communities. Furthermore, they identify obstacles that could possibly undermine international cooperation to fight terrorism. Ekici and Muş contend that even in the absence of international cooperation, local communities can strengthen themselves against terrorism threats. By using the comparative content analysis method, they determine the characteristics of various existing community based security programs in the United States, United Kingdom and Turkey. Based upon their analysis of the case studies, they outline the required minimum qualities of a program seeking to build terrorism resistant communities. Recommendations include the need for communities to practice non-orthodox approaches for a safer environment, become actively involved in public security programs and participate in awareness training to aid law enforcement agencies in their fight against terrorism. In chapter 13, “Importance of the Participation of the Civil Society into Effective Counter Terrorism Policies, Vladimir Fedorenko examines the importance of involving society in long term counter terrorism policies. He argues that non-governmental organizations (NGSs) are the exact opposite of terror organizations. The study suggests looking at and using NGOs to understand and fight terrorism. His study underscores the importance of civil engagement and defines society’s role in counter terrorism. Structural analyses are provided for three key actors: state, civil society and terrorist groups. Various ways are suggested that to mobilize the community toward counter terrorism. In chapter 14, “Cooperation of Law Enforcement and the Public in Combating Terrorism in Ukraine,” Igor Osyka asserts that building terrorism resistant communities requires comprehensive multidisciplinary efforts in which the community’s role is no less important than that of the police. He suggests that a cooperative partnership between law enforcement and the public with support of the national government would serve to better counter terrorism, and draws the attention to the legal aspects of such policies. In addition, he stresses the significance of the media’s role in combating terrorism by noting that it should serve as the primary means of promoting education and awareness as well as developing added public trust in law enforcement agencies. In chapter 15, “Pushing the Private-Public Partnership: Exploring Extant Tools,” J. B. Hill and Benjamin Stipe highlight the problems encountered during public-private collaborations by examining a number of existing tools for to understand the state of these partnerships. Gaps in the private-public partnership applications practiced by the U.S. government are identified, and guidelines on filling these gaps are provided. Hill and Stipe suggest that some sectors that became popular in private-public partnerships largely ignored inter-sector coordination, which lead the government to fulfill this role, necessitating that the government defines its role in such matters. They argue that “…without a clearly defined government role, significant increases in the bidirectionality of information sharing, and a reduction of the costs to private entities joining in private-public partnerships, it is unlikely that the paradigm will be able to have the impact that it could were those issues resolved.”

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In chapter 16, “Terrorist De-Radicalization: Comparative Approaches for Reintegrating Terrorists into the Community,” Daniel J. Mabrey and Richard H. Ward investigate the de-radicalization programs of some countries. They assess the overall methodological approach and effectiveness of known de-radicalization programs in some countries, and offer a comparison on similarities and differences in these programs. The authors note that Indonesia and Saudi Arabia have successful deradicalization programs. However, they assert that although there is reported success in some countries’ de-radicalization programs, others are still poorly understood because the success reports came merely from government sources. In chapter 17, “Turkey’s Counter Terrorism Policies against the PKK: The ‘Fish’ or the ‘Water’”?, Nadir Gergin, Fatih Balci and I. Sevki Eldivan evaluate Turkish counter terrorism policies. Based on their findings they suggest policies they feel fit the needs of Turkey. In their research, they examine the past and current counter terrorism strategies applied in Turkey, specifically against The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) Terrorist Organization. The study covers counter terrorism policies between 1985 and 2008. The authors note that Turkey’s post-2000 period counter terrorism policies are significantly different from those before 2000. While counter terrorism policies before 2000 were based merely on coercive policies, in the post-2000 period, the government became more lenient in its policies that aim to win the hearts and minds of locals through economic investments, financing education, health, and other non-military policies. Gergin, Balci and Eldivan found that the new policies have almost dissolved the terror organization, and the government became more popular in the region subject to terror acts than before 2000. As a result, the authors conclude that militaristic policies should be subordinate to non-military solutions and that cohesive policies appear to be the best solution against the PKK terror organization. Chapter 18, “Fighting against Terrorism in Kyrgyzstan: Collaborative Partnerships and Citizen Involvement Approach,” conveys ideas about new counter terrorism approaches that focus on community involvement and partnerships with citizens in Kyrgyzstan. In their study, Farhod Yuldashev, Fatih Demiroz and Igor Volkov contend that terrorism was exhibited in both small and large scale incidents. They note that the state in Kyrgyzstan is the primary player in counter terrorism and, as such, the government increased its capacity for better results with international support. However, they argue, the involvement of community groups and citizens has largely been overlooked. They explored tools that will involve the community in terrorism fighting policies. Such community involvement is also likely to help government initiatives to curb corruption and increase state agencies’ legitimacy and efficiency in fighting terrorism, religious extremism, drug smuggling, and poverty. In chapter 19, “Re-Imagining Counter-Terrorism: The Importance of CounterIdeology as Part of the Wider Response to Terrorism,” Richard Warnes from the United Kingdom argues that the radicalization dimension of terrorism has increased in importance. Ward contends that the ideological motivation of terrorism has increasingly moved in the direction of religious extremism. As a result of this change, the threat terrorism poses to the community has increased due to networks of independent cells that may carry out suicide attacks. He argues that counter terrorism policies need to incorporate and utilize counter-ideology. Such policies should take into account that individual radicalization takes place within the community. Based on his finding, the author calls for the need to re-imagine counter terrorism. And, Warnes notes, re-imagining counter terrorism necessitates wider community assistance through the inclusion of key individuals within it.


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In chapter 20, “Achieving Resilience in Communities: Lessons Learned from Terrorist Attacks,” Lina Kolesnikova puts forward models to help manage the short and long term after-event phases. Kolesnikova maintains that these phases should be given the same importance accorded to prevention and deterrence of terrorist attacks. She argues that management of the terrorist attack response is crucial in view of maintaining public assurance and viability of the state. The study provides a framework to approach these management challenges and conceptualizes the response to management and formalizes the processes. Kolesnikova further contends that, based on inputs and outputs, the community can see the global picture, determine their role, and prepare for a resilient community. She concludes by stating that the resilience idea assumes communities are able to sustain and rebound from the effects of hazardous events. She also calls for enabling, inviting, planning for, and supporting active community participation in an attempt to achieve disaster resilient communities. Finally in chapter 21, Alain-Michel Ayaache points out why law enforcement should get closer to minorities and explains how such a diverse community can actually prevent terrorism in their societies. Mainly focusing on Canada, Ayaache first identifies different minorities (cultural communities) possibly living in Western societies and problems associated with communication and trust between these communities and law enforcement agencies. He notes the challenges in becoming closer with the ‘cultural communities’ but also provides practical suggestions in an attempt to obtain their support in counter terrorism. 4. Conclusion The book, like many previous studies, once again reveals the complexity of terrorism and possible solutions to it. However, efforts like these bring us closer to developing more effective counter terrorism policies. In here, the terrorism threat has been studied from several aspects and the authors (from various countries) have provided ideas that could be deemed as non-conventional. The book concludes with a consensus from the participants that counter terrorism policies need improvement, and that they need to include the community as an important counterpart of such policies.


Part 1 Terrorism and Its Causes



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Origins of Terrorism: An Alternative Way for Political Expression Erik CASE and Emile SAHLIYEH University of North Texas

Abstract. Structural approaches to analyzing the roots of terrorism have identified state level variables (for example, repression and state capacity) as possible causes of terrorism. We argue that these structural features represent limitations on nonviolent political expression, thus increasing the utility of using violent political tactics, namely terrorism. Our study expands upon existing empirical research to include both domestic and transnational terrorism, as well as conceptualizing economic freedom as a form of political expression. We present summary statistics that add support to our argument. Keywords. causes, expression, politics, repression, roots, state, terrorism, terrorist

Introduction There is much disagreement over both the meaning of terrorism and which groups and actions can be considered ”terrorist” in nature. For some, terrorists are national liberation heroes and “freedom fighters.” Despite divergent views, policymakers, scholars and practitioners agree that terrorism is a political act distinct from violent crimes, and that the motivation of the terrorist act hopes to affect political change by using unconventional violence designed to shock, gain publicity and instill fear. Viewing terrorism as politically motivated and as a form of political expression raises the question: Does the level of available political freedom affect the likelihood of terrorism? In this study, we will attempt to explain the recurrence of terrorism. We contend that differing conditions of political freedoms can contribute to the frequency and utility of terrorism. The findings will include implications for future terrorism and policymaking research. With noted exceptions, there has been little empirical research to support the arguments that political conditions play a role in terrorism. A review of the current literature pertaining to terrorism is presented followed by our findings regarding the occurrence of terrorism as it relates to political expression. We will conclude by offering suggestions for future research and policymaking.

1. Review of the Literature Although terrorism is not a new phenomenon, it has become a more serious concern in the last few decades. The openness of modern society and the availability of new means of communications and transportation allow terrorists to operate not only within the

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E. Case and E. Sahliyeh / Origins of Terrorism: An Alternative Way for Political Expression

confines of the nation state but also transnationally. The increased frequency and intensity of terrorism over the last three decades has generated a considerable body of research. Before reviewing the contribution and limitations of this research, we will briefly discuss the definition of terrorism, its utility, and its causes. 1.1. Definitional Issues There is strong disagreement among scholars concerning the characteristics that make terrorism a distinct form of political violence. Most definitions focus on the nature of the attacker, the purpose of the attack, and the nature of the victim or victims. For the purpose of our study, a specific set of terrorism requirements are identified. First, the perpetrators of terrorism must be non-state actors seeking to change the established order in some fashion. This requirement excludes incidences that are commonly referred to as ‘state terror,’ wherein a government or officially recognized government representatives perpetrate illegitimate violence against civilians through clandestine agencies or by funneling arms and other forms of support to terrorist groups. Second, the violence perpetrated by non-state actors must be directed towards non-security civilians. This is perhaps the constitutive element of terrorism that is most habitually ignored by nation states, with many countries tending to view any attacks on their security personnel as terrorism. Third, there must be some kind of overarching political objective behind terrorist violence. This adds an element of precaution to the act of terrorism, excluding random attacks by individuals seized with passionate frenzy. For example, in July 2008, a Palestinian construction worker intentionally plowed his vehicle into afternoon traffic, killing three Israeli civilians and wounding many more. Terrorism was initially suspected, but an investigation revealed that the man had no known connection to political organizations that use terrorism. Thus, he was a non-state actor, targeting non-combatants, but the seemingly random nature of his act was more accurately termed as a possible ‘hate crime’. For the purpose of this study, terrorism is defined as the use of violence by non-state actors, directed at civilians, with the intent of achieving an ultimate political objective. 1.2. The Utility of Terrorism Terrorism involves the deliberate use of unconventional violence upon civilians to create panic and fear in order to publicize their cause. The fact that civilian populations are less fortified than the military make them attractive targets for terrorist groups who face a disadvantage on the traditional battlefield. Groups that employ the tactic of terrorism use the lack of a conventional military force to their advantage, blending in with the general population until the operational phase of attack. In an effort to explain the political utility of terrorism, scholars employed a variety of approaches including game theoretic and rational choice modeling to clarify the utility of terrorism. After reviewing classic gaming scenarios including the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ and ‘Coordination’, Arche and Sandler applied them to the study of terrorism, specifically, to the reactive responses by the United Nations regarding the phenomenon of terrorism. Such reactive tools “include deterrence, embassy fortification, and United Nations (UN) conventions” [1 p. 325]. The deterrent effect of hardening targets can lead to a sort of ‘fortification race’ because, assumedly, countries that spent the least resources are most vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Game theoretic simulations, however, found little effectiveness for UN conventions against terrorism.


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The authors argued that for so-called ‘spectacular’ events, the cost of deterrence is lower than the cost of preemption, while the opposite is true for ‘normal’ terrorist attacks. In addition, game theory literature has not reached a consensus on the effect of negotiating with terrorists. Some writers have argued that negotiating with terrorists actually increases violence because the process naturally appeals to the more moderate elements of a terrorist group while the radical elements of the terrorist group would increase their attacks. Arche and Sandler did not fully explore a possible counterargument to this position. The authors concluded that more research was needed in studying the resource allocation of terrorist campaigns over time and the application of differential and cooperative forms of game theory to the topic of terrorism [1]. In their effort to explain the utility of terrorism, another group of researchers examined suicide terrorism -one of the most extreme forms of terrorism- and uncovered an underlying logic applicable to terrorism in general. In his study of suicide terrorism, Spriznak observed that the tactic is low cost. Bombings, kidnappings, assassinations, and suicide attacks do not require sophisticated weaponry, making such tactics attractive to non-state actors that do not have the ability to conscript a conventional standing army or purchase heavy weapons systems. Moreover, suicide terrorism reduces operational complexities by making escape plans unnecessary [2]. Likewise, Pape argued that the usefulness of suicide terrorism comes from its effective coercive power. Militarily inferior groups use suicide terrorism to punish civilians and armies since they can not confront them directly. Pape also observed that suicide terrorism is useful because it works and leads to tangible outcomes. In this context, he noted that former President Ronald Reagan cited the Hezbollah suicide bombing of U.S. Marines as a reason for withdrawing from Lebanon, exactly what Hezbollah desired [3]. As the case of 9/11 indicated, terrorism accomplishes a lot with relatively little expenditure. One of the goals of the terrorists who were engaged in 9/11 was to damage the American economy. Kunreuther cited estimates that the attacks created an $80 billion loss for the U.S. economy [4], while the 9/11 Commission reported the operational expense for the group was only $400,000-$500,000 [5]. Terrorist attacks also serve the purpose of sending multiple signals to the different parties involved. Hoffman and McCormick viewed the use of suicide terrorism as a form of communication that signals a group’s capability and willingness to employ violence for political aims. “Through the targets, tactics, and the timing of their attacks” [6 p. 247], terrorist groups can communicate to various target audiences a threat level that is higher than their actual abilities. The scholars further contended that the use of suicide terrorism has an advantage over other forms of terrorism because “the choreographed brutality of the act commands attention” [6 p. 249]. Target audiences can be captivated by the level of violence witnessed in such strikes. The authors also argued this cheap form of attention grabbing is an exercise in maximizing returns and minimizing costs. Recruitment and public support are vital to terrorist organizations. In this connection, the signals sent by terrorist attacks are intended to elicit a response [6]. Another group of scholars maintain that attacks are often conducted in the hopes of producing an over-response. In this connection, Buena de Mesquita and Dickson explored the logical process that drives terrorist groups to strike with expectations of provoking a government response that inflames the population the group claims to be fighting for and increases that public’s support for their tactics. Because terrorist groups operate discretely among a civilian population, government countermeasures run the

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high risk of netting innocent civilians. This leaves policymakers in a bind when choosing to implement counterterrorism measures. They must balance the risk of being perceived as weak with the risk of further increasing the support for terrorism among the group’s home audience. Using game theoretic simulations coupled with empirical statistical analysis, the authors argued that heavy handed government responses can serve to further alienate an aggrieved population by causing them physical and economic damage [7]. 1.3. The Causes of Terrorism: Towards Explanatory Perspectives Terrorism scholar Martha Crenshaw argued that three (seemingly interrelated) questions define the study of terrorism: “why terrorism occurs, how the process of terrorism works, and what its social and political effects are” [8 p 379]. Her focus was primarily on the first question, as she argued there was an absence of satisfactory literature regarding the subject. Crenshaw concluded that a terrorist campaign could be a “rational, political choice” [8 p. 385]. Ross identified the three key theories that dominated the terrorism literature during the early 1990s. He maintained that the causal models fall into three categories of psychological, structural and rational choices. Structural approaches generally maintain “the causes of terrorism can be found in the environment and the political, cultural, social, and economic structure of societies.” [9 p. 317]. In his opinion, the structural model had an advantage in terms of operationalization, metrics and predictive power. However, the structural model of analysis had several serious methodological problems including sloppy classification schemes or selective and incomplete case studies. Ross proposed a most different systems (MDS) approach to the causal modeling of terrorism with a minimum of three groups and including domestic, transnational and state sponsored terrorism [9]. In exploring the different levels of analysis that yield different insights into the causes of terrorism, researchers have focused on the psychological motivations of terrorists. Crenshaw noted that the advantage of psychological analysis of terrorism is that it links several levels of analysis from individual up to societal. She concluded that, while critical to the understanding of terrorism, causal explanations should be one part of terrorism literature and other avenues should be explored, including the analysis of terrorist groups moderating by ceasing their campaigns [10]. Krueger, et al. conducted a meta-analysis review of the literature that focused on the connection between poverty, education and terrorism. Policy prescriptions to combat these causes have proliferated since the September 11th attacks. However, the authors found little hard evidence to support this position. They argued that “any connection between poverty, education, and terrorism is indirect, complicated, and probably quite weak” [11 p. 119]. Other explanations of terrorism go beyond economic grievances of terrorists and view terrorism as a reaction to frustrations borne out of political realities. In this context, Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens argued that poor human rights conditions create a conducive atmosphere for terrorism. In their study, Toward a Theory of Terrorism, they “contend that the basis for terrorism is found in deprivation of political, subsistence, and security rights, and therefore any policy designed to decrease terrorism necessarily implies addressing these rights” [12 p. 680]. The authors focused on state capacity, repression levels and the manners of security response following terrorist


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attacks. They argued that those conditions represent the human rights conditions in a given country. Still, other scholars, Newman in 2007 and Piazza in 2008, explored the idea that weak or failed states served as incubators for terrorist groups [13, 14]. This claim is often made in reference to Afghanistan and Somalia. The basic argument of this perspective is that the power vacuums created by state failure, coupled with a lack of order, provide sanctuary for terrorist groups and offer opportunities for such groups to flourish. To test the possible causal relationship between weak or failed states and terrorism, Newman used the European Union and United States-designated terrorist group lists and the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base to compile a set of the deadliest terrorist groups. The author used the United Nations Human Development Index and the Failed States Index as indicators to measure state capacity. His correlation analysis concluded that “contested” states, rather than failed states, are more attractive to terrorist groups, and that failed states that do produce terrorism tend to produce more deadly terrorism. Newman concluded that “in terms of international terrorism and threats to western interests, there is insufficient evidence to formulate a rigorous hypothesis regarding the relationship between terrorism and state capacity” [13 p. 484]. In another study of transnational terrorism, however, Piazza found empirical support for three propositions. He contends that “states plagued by chronic state failures are statistically more likely to host terrorist groups that commit transnational attacks, have their nationals commit transnational attacks and are more likely to be targeted by transnational terrorists themselves” [14 p. 1]. Because of the nature of his data, Piazza restricted his analysis to transnational terrorism; that is, terrorist attacks perpetrated by non-domestic actors [14].

2. The Roots of Terrorism: Toward a Theory of Political Expression The existing literature makes significant contributions that serve as the foundation for our study. First, given the argument that terrorism is a rational act with specific utility, we can be more confident in predicting its occurrence than if it had been established as the purview of the criminally insane. Second, structural conditions within some states may make it more likely that those countries may experience terrorist attacks. Third, there is an economic component of political expression that has yet to be fully explored in the existing literature and may help explain why some authoritarian governments with high economic activity experience relative low levels of terrorism. Fourth, institutional approaches to terrorism focus on state capacity in the form of weak states or state failure, or state repressiveness. Incorporating these factors into a broader model will give a more complete picture of how limitations on political expression can create conditions that make terrorist attacks more likely. In addition to the main findings of the literature, the contribution of our study lies in explaining how limits on political expression, whether they be passively created by failed states, or actively propagated by repressive states, influence the occurrence of both domestic and transnational terrorist attacks. 2.1. Reduced State Capacity and Limits on Political Expression The research on state capacity and weak or failed states in relation to terrorism has thus far focused mainly on the argument that weak governments are unable to establish a

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monopoly on violence, enabling other violent groups to operate with a relatively free hand in their territory. Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens stated that weak or failed states contribute to a “deprivation of political, subsistence” because they cannot protect those practicing non-violent oppositional political expression [12]. In a deteriorated security environment, those expressing political opinions, whether it be through protest, the organization of civil society groups, or lobbying public officials, are at risk of becoming victims of political violence. Needless to say, any sort of overt political organization must be difficult to operate in a lawless environment since it would not facilitate a peaceful way to express political grievance. Political grievance, once suppressed, does not simply disappear. Rather, when the avenue to nonviolently express political grievance is closed, political violence, and specifically terrorism, becomes a viable alternative for political expression. In addition to providing the space for terrorism to operate, we argue that the failure of a state to provide basic protections also reduces the opportunity to express political grievance in an effective, nonviolent manner. This increases the attractive power of radical ideologies and radical tactics like terrorism. We expect that reduced state capacity will increase a country’s chances being attacked by both transnational and domestic groups. Domestic political groups, with limited options for expressing political grievances, would be more likely to turn to the use of terrorism to achieve their objectives, while transnational groups would be drawn in by the security vacuum, and perhaps also to claim the mantle of protector for a subgroup within a country they may share a particular kinship with. The prevailing conditions in Iraq since 2003 provide a clear example for such outcomes. After the March 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, a provisional government was initially created, where U.S. civilian administrators made major policy decisions. By July 2003, control was handed to a handpicked Iraqi governing council that had little power or popular support from the Iraqi people. While The U.S. military had routed the Iraqi army in a short time, building a consolidated government, however, proved to be much more difficult. The initial looting and lawlessness sent a message to the Iraqi people that the state was weak and powerless to stop challenges to its authority. Authors have argued that a security vacuum like the one which existed in post-invasion Iraq would be particularly attractive for groups willing and able to compete violently for political control of the region. In addition, the fledgling Iraqi government’s failure to provide basic services increased the level of hostility and grievance among the domestic population. The violence that grew in the face of an impotent governing authority limited the choices available to the Iraqi civilians to express political frustrations. The situation became like a pressure cooker whereby increasing grievances caused by the chaotic violence and lack of services as well as limited outlets to express those grievances, together with other factors, led to the sharp increase in terrorist attacks across Iraq after 2003. The state’s inability to protect those who were attempting to participate in the non-violent political process made the choice to use political violence, particularly terrorism, more attractive in the absence of political freedom. Sunnis who had previously held positions of political power found themselves victims of reprisal and violence from a multitude of parties that had suffered under Saddam’s regime. Such violent attacks must have dissuaded some of the Sunni from participating in a government that was unable and reluctant to protect them and pushed them, instead, into joining the nationalist insurgency and Sunni jihadist groups that embraced the use of violence against civilians.

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By August of 2003, Iraq had experienced its first terrorist car bombing and was beset by riots protesting the lack of adequate governmental services. The first major terrorist attacks targeted the United Nations, the Jordanian embassy, and a Shi’ite mosque, dispelling any doubt that nonviolent political and religious organizations were considered fair game in the deteriorating security environment [15]. As Iraqi civilians began to choose a permanent government in 2005, many of the political parties participating in the process were attacked. A substantial number of Sunnis boycotted the democratic political process wholesale [16]. Certainly their refusal was multifaceted, but the risk entailed by participating in the political process, absent a government capable of protecting them, most likely reduced its appeal. It is little wonder, then, that given the Iraqi government’s inability to protect political participants, that groups in the country increasingly turned to terrorism as an effective alternative way of political expression [15, 16]. We thus argue that where a security vacuum exists, groups violently competing for power essentially take turns in playing the role of a repressive state, each seeking to silence the particular societal elements expressing contrary political positions. In Iraq, it was the Shi’a militias targeting Sunni clerics, or the regional al-Qaeda group deploying suicide bombers targeting Shi’a religious festivals. The violence perpetrated by such groups serves to increase the risks of nonviolent political action and, as such, lead these groups to choose violent alternatives. Given the nature of a weak or failing state where the line between civilian and security personnel is exceptionally blurred, it is reasonable to expect terrorist attacks to increase. In his 2008 study, Piazza found that the 2006 Foreign Policy Failed State Index [17] was a significant predictor of transnational terrorism. Using data released by the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism [18] that included both domestic and transnational attacks, we count the number of attacks experienced in 2006, the year the data overlaps. In Figure 1, the first five countries listed on the left side of the graph are highest ranked, stable nations, and on the right side are the five lowest ranked countries in terms of state capacity.

State Capacity & Terrorism 6639

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Figure 1

Austra- Canada Austria lia

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The first five countries, displayed on the left hand side of the graph, experienced relatively few terrorist attacks. Norway and Austria were able to progress the entire year without a single terrorist attack. Australia and Canada, two democracies on opposite sides of the globe, experienced one and three attacks, respectively. On the right side of the figure we see the number of terrorist attacks in countries with failed or failing governments. Iraq, by far, has the dubious distinction of being a glaring example of the relationship between reduced state capacity and terrorist attacks, experiencing 6,639 recorded attacks during 2006. It is common knowledge that both foreign and domestic fighters utilized terrorism in the Iraqi war zone, adding credence to our belief that reduced state capacity attracts both domestic and transnational attacks. Although rated a failing state by the Failed State Index, Haiti stands out in that it only experienced one attack during 2006. Nepal, a weak state beset by internal conflict, also experienced over 1,000 attacks during the 2006. Pakistan, a nuclear armed nation that remains highly unstable, experienced 372 attacks. Sudan, a pariah state known for its ongoing genocidal campaign, is also ranked as a failing state and experienced 89 attacks. 2.2. Direct State Repression of Political Expression Not only weak or failed states create an environment where outlets for political expression are repressed, but the deprivation of economic subsistence in such states comes by way of a lack of state power, and powerful repressive states are able to monopolize the use of force and actively quell the political expression of their citizenry. Authoritarian states with a high level of control and consolidation are able to quash opposition through the use of a forceful security apparatus. The state exercise of political violence and its repression of the citizens are likely to encourage some civilians to answer with force. The violent options available to citizens in repressive states may include open rebellion against the state security apparatus or directing violence at civilians or civilian administrators perceived as supportive of the government. The fact that different ethnic groups, tribes and religious sects are spread across the globe also implies that transnational groups may be attracted to attack countries that are perceived as oppressing their kin. We therefore suggest that states which actively suppress political expression are more likely to experience internally and externally initiated terrorist attacks. The history of countries, namely Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe, among others, provide examples for the violence directed against repressing and authoritarian states. In Figure 2, we look at 2006 and compare the number of terrorist attacks in the most and least repressive states as ranked by the Political Terror Scale [19]. Again, the first five countries listed are displayed on the left side of the chart and have the lowest levels of political repression.

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Repression and Terrorism 6630

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Vene- Vietnam zuela

Figure 2 We see that those five countries on the left, with the lowest levels of repression, experienced few, if any terrorist attacks during 2006. Three of the least repressive states, Australia, Brunei and Cape Verde, experienced no attacks whatsoever. The other two, Butan and Canada, experienced only one and three attacks, respectively. On the right side of the graph, beginning with Iraq, we see the number of attacks in the most repressive states. Sri Lanka, home to one of the most effective and brutal terrorist groups, the Tamil Tigers, experienced 228 attacks in 2006. Iraq received one of the worst scores on the Political Terror Scale, experiencing over 6,000 attacks during the raging internal strife. Interesting, Iraq appears as both a failing and a repressive state. This could be due to the different methodologies that Freedom House and Foreign Policy use when scoring for state capacity or state repression. However, that Iraq appears as both a failing state and a repressive one may also be supportive of an argument made in comparative politics that state repression is actually a function of state weakness. 2.3. Economic Freedom as Political Expression Some states, despite the repressive nature of their governments, do not experience a large number of terrorist attacks. Oil Producing Countries (OPEC) and China, for example, are renowned for their heavy handed suppression of oppositional political activity. Although such states should be a prime target for groups that use terrorism, they are relatively rarely the victim of terrorist attacks or campaigns. While it is not always possible to disentangle economic freedom from political freedom, the OPEC and Chinese examples illustrate a situation where grievances built up by the lack of conditions for political expression are alleviated by providing for the basic human needs of the citizens and their economic freedoms. We contend that when citizens are not allowed to organize politically or participate in independent civil society, their opportunity for nonviolent political action is reduced. We also argue, however, that rewarding the citizens for their political silence with an opportunity to compete in the economic marketplace and satisfying their basic human needs are likely to mitigate the appeal of political violence. We believe that economic freedom and

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satisfaction can serve as an alternative form of political expression, discouraging domestic terrorist attacks. Likewise, we propose that transnational terrorism should be minimal and not target countries with higher levels of economic freedom. Thus, we expect the likelihood of both domestic and transnational terrorism to decrease with higher levels of economic freedom, higher standards of living and quality of life, even in nations that utilize a heavy handed security apparatus. Figures that measure the accuracy of our basic prepositions will now be presented. The non-profit Freedom House organization ranks the level of political freedom in all countries across the globe. One sub-category of its rankings deals with economic freedom. Freedom House assigns values to each country using the following criteria: “Have social and economic freedoms, including equal access to economic opportunities and the right to hold private property” [20]. Economic Freedom and Terrorism 100

90

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80 60 40

30

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0 Nether- Norway San Sweden Switzer- North Somalia TurkSudan Zimbabwe lands Marino land Korea menistan

Figure 3 Figure 3 compares the number of terrorist attacks in countries at the very highest and lowest ends of the economic freedom spectrum. There is a fairly noticeable difference between the countries with the highest levels of economic freedom on the left, and the lowest ranked countries on the right. The Netherlands, Norway and San Marino all ranked at the top in terms of economic freedom and experienced no terrorist attacks in 2006. Sweden and Switzerland, the only nations in the highest ranking economic freedom category to experience any attacks, did not experience more than two attacks. On the right side of the graph are countries ranked at the bottom in terms of economic freedom. Interestingly, North Korea and Turkmenistan did not experience any terrorist attacks in 2006, more closely resembling the attack tallies of their more economically free counterparts. However, Somalia and Sudan both experienced dozens of terrorist attacks while severely limiting economic freedom. Figure 4 depicts the number of terrorist attacks in some of the authoritarian nations that have high levels of economic activity. The scores assigned by Freedom House for economic freedom in these countries are relatively low, but they are much higher than the least economically free nations listed in Figure 3 [20]. We included China and several OPEC nations that are prosperous, but not necessarily tolerant of dissent.


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Terrorism and Economic Freedom 8

7

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3 2 1

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UAE

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Venezuela

Figure 4 All of the countries shown in Figure 4 experienced relatively small amounts of terrorism in 2006. China, a nation with over one billion people and an actively encouraging economic enterprise within, experienced only three attacks the entire year. Venezuela experienced the highest number of incidences, seven, which, when compared to Iraq during the same year, is smaller by a factor of almost one thousand. The Gulf States of Qatar, The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait experienced no terrorism at all while maintaining relatively high levels of economic freedom for nondemocratic nations.

3. Concluding Remarks 3.1. Assessment and Implications for Future Research Our study suggests that limits on political freedom and restricting avenues of nonviolent political expression increase the likelihood that individuals and groups will use terrorism and increase the likelihood that a country will experience both national and transnational terrorist attacks. These limits can be placed passively by states unable to protect political expression, or actively, by authoritarian governments seeking to silence political opposition. In line with the existing literature, our study also included the argument that economic freedom is an outlet for political expression. Based upon data from 2006, findings shown in the various figures support our main propositions. Although the statistics we presented provide some support for our argument, more advanced analyses in the future can offer an even more convincing case for a causal link between limits on political expression. Such an analysis may include a model that takes into account time and a host of other independent control variables.

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3.2. Implications for Policymakers This study includes policy implications for nations, NGOs and IGOs seeking to prevent the occurrence of terrorism. A critical step in preventing both domestic and transnational terrorism involves the ability to identify hot spots that increase the utility of terrorism as a form of political expression while decreasing the utility of nonviolent political competition. States that have collapsed, or are on the verge of collapse, should be monitored closely, because they offer few protections for those willing to participate politically in a non-violent manner and offer incentives for groups looking to utilize terrorism within, as well as groups looking for a base to direct outward attacks on other nations. This means that in countries like Afghanistan, a substantial part of the rebuilding process must be focused on protecting political actors and organizations that have opted to negotiate with words rather than weapons. In addition, it is advisable that nations experiencing increasingly high levels of state repression be monitored as well. We expect that nations ratcheting up their repressive actions put themselves at a higher risk for terrorist attacks, as well as increasing the likelihood that they too will spawn groups that attack transnationally. If upward trending repression levels are detected by other nations and organizations early on, it may be possible for those other nations to increase security measures in their interactions with high risk repressive states. Finally, when attempting to determine which repressive nations represent the largest threat in terms of spawning terrorism, we expect that the more economically free regimes are the least likely to be problematic.

References [1] [2] [3] [4]

[5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15]

Arche M., Daniel G, and Sandler, Todd., Terrorism and Game Theory. Simulation Gaming. 34 (2003), 319-337. Sprinzak, Ehud, Rational Fanatics. Foreign Policy. 120 (2000), 66-73. Pape, Robert A, The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. The American Political Science Review. 97/3 (2003), 343-361. Kunreuther, Howard C., Michel-Kerjan, Erwann and Porter, Beverly, Assessing, Managing, andFinancing Extreme Events: Dealing with Terrorism. NBER. Working Paper No. W10179 (2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=481451 The 9/11Commission.“TerroristFinancing.” http://www.911commission.gov/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Monograph.pdf Hoffman, Bruce, and McCromic, Gordon, Terrorism, Signaling, and Suicide Attack. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 27/4 (2004), 243-281. Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan and Dickson, Eric S, The Propaganda of the Deed: Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Mobilization. American Journal of Political Science. 51/2 (2007), 364-381. Crenshaw, Martha, The Causes of Terrorism. Comparative Politics. 13/4 (1981), 379-399. Ross, Jeffery Ian, Structural Causes of Oppositional Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model. Journal of Peace Research. 30/3 (1993), 317-329. Crenshaw, Martha, “The Psychology of Terrorism.” Political Psychology. 21/ 2 (2000): 405-420. Krueger, Alan B. and Maleckova, Jitka, Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection? The Journal of Economic Perspectives. 17/4 (2003), 119-144. Callaway, Rhonda, and Harrelson-Stephens, Julie, Toward a Theory of Terrorism: Human Security as a Determinant of Terrorism. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. 29/7 (2006), 679-706. Newman, Edward, Weak States, State Failure, and Terrorism. Terrorism and Political Violence. 19 (2007), 463-488 Piazaa, James, Failed States and Terror. International Studies Quarterly. Forthcoming (2008), http://www.politicalscience.uncc.edu/jpiazza/Piazza%20Terrorism%20and%20Failed%20States.pdf . Frontline, Timeline: Fighting on Two Fronts.”PBS. (2006), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/cron/ .

E. Case and E. Sahliyeh / Origins of Terrorism: An Alternative Way for Political Expression [16] Young,Jeffrey,IraqchoosesapermanentGovernment.”NewsVOA.(2005), http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2005-12/2005-12-13voa46.cfm?CFID=89294371&CFTOKEN=78845924 . [17] The Failed States Index. Foreign Policy. 154 (2006), 50-54. [18] MIPT, National Counterterrorism Center's Worldwide Incidents Tracking System 2004-2006 (Reformatted and provided by the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base). (2006). [19] Gibney, M., Cornett, L., & Wood, R., Political Terror Scale 1976-2006. (2008) http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/. [20] FreedomHouse,FreedomintheWorld2006CountrySubscores.(2008), http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=278

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Words Make Worlds: What We Talk About When We Talk About Terrorism Angus SMITH Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Abstract. This paper addresses the problem of language - specifically, the language that we use to define and describe certain types of terrorist activity - and how incorrect use of such language can compound the problem. It also uses language - specifically interpretations of the concept of jihad - as a backdrop to a discussion of radicalization, its linkages to extremist action, and possible mitigating strategies. This paper is intended to stimulate discussion around the need for a common language to describe terrorism adequately, along with a comprehensive understanding of the process of radicalization and the manner in which we may intervene. Keywords. terrorism, language, radicalization

Introduction Describing Terrorism: Are You Talking to Me? Since 9/11, Western intelligence and law enforcement agencies have often been criticized for the language that they use to describe the terrorism that has an ideological basis in Islam. Muslims have observed that terms such as “Islamic terrorism,” “Islamist terrorism,” “Jihadism” and “Islamo-fascism” succeed only in conflating terrorism with mainstream Islam, thereby casting all Muslims as terrorists or potential terrorists. Intelligence officers and analysts who, in Canada, are governed by criminal law that explicitly links terrorism and religiosity [1], may have (or believe they have) a precise understanding of what is meant by these terms. As they are filtered through the media and the public imagination, however, this precision is blunted, and even innocuous terms and completely legitimate expressions of belief become loaded with innuendo. This points to the difficulties inherent in finding language to describe forms of terrorism that are rooted in a particular interpretation of Islam, without implying that there is a “clash of civilizations” between Islam, in its broadest sense, and the West [2]. Like the other Abrahamic faiths - Judaism and Christianity - the fundamental tenets of Islam are rooted in compassion, kindness, forgiveness and, perhaps most importantly, social justice. One of the Pillars of Islam is zakat - the giving of alms to the poor - and during the Ramadan fast, Muslims are enjoined to remember the less fortunate for whom fasting is involuntary (2:177; 183-186) [3]. Incorrect statements

A. Smith / Words Make Worlds: What We Talk About When We Talk About Terrorism

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about the nature of Islam are deeply offensive to the huge numbers of Muslims who try to live within those tenets. More importantly, distorted and inflammatory linkages between Islam and terrorism can serve to convince Muslims - both in the West and in the larger Islamic world - that the West is, in fact, their enemy. Law enforcement and intelligence communities are acutely aware of this problem. Official communications about terrorism are increasingly at pains to downplay the Islamic component of terrorist conspiracies and terrorist acts, focusing on the mechanics of the plots rather than the cultural or religious backgrounds of the plotters themselves. The media and the public are often highly critical of these attempts to shape discourse, arguing that they distort reality by effectively ignoring a critical component of the problem [ 4]. There is merit to this argument. A peculiarly violent and “ideologized” form of Islam is a component of the contemporary security environment. To ignore or downplay this is to ignore the “first principles” of a critical global threat. Even attempts to take a more strategic or nuanced view by differentiating between “Islam” and “Islamism” can result in distortion. Islamism as a political ideology does not necessarily translate into terrorist “praxis.” For example, the Muslim Brotherhood a quasi-secret society to which members of al-Qaeda (including Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the planner and organizer of 9/11) [5] have been associated - is an Islamist group in that it explicitly links its political goals to an avowedly Islamic worldview. Its founders and chief ideologues (who include Sayyid Qutb, discussed below) were predominantly anti-Western and tended to characterize Islamic political aspirations as fundamentally counter to democracy. Increasingly, however, the Brotherhood has repudiated radicalism and adopted a gradualist perspective which, while not aligned to Western democratic principles (the Brotherhood is linked to Hamas, for example) is more positively oriented towards them [6]. Few members of the Muslim Brotherhood espouse terrorism and in many Muslim countries they have served as voices of moderation, channeling people away from violence and towards legitimate politics and charitable activities [7].

1. The Problem of Jihad Sometimes, the terminology that we reflexively employ when we discuss or describe “Islamist” terrorism is inaccurate. Moreover, the sense in which we use it can have the unintended consequence of authenticating or validating the very extremism we are trying to address. An example of this is the word jihad, which has become almost a catchall term for extremism of any kind. The nuances - to say nothing of the differing interpretations - of the term are much more subtle, however, and are worth examining. Translated literally, jihad means “striving” and is often expressed in the context of the expression jihad fi sabil illah, or “striving in the path of God” [8]. In this context, jihad describes the effort to live in the way that God intends for human beings [9] and to find the inner will and discipline to live according to the basic tenets of Islam [10]. Despite widespread popular belief to the contrary, jihad is not one of the Pillars of Sunni Islam (aside from fasting at Ramadan and the giving of alms, referred to above, these consist of the profession of faith, prayer and pilgrimage to Mecca - 1:1-7; 2:125129; 142-153; 196-202; 22:26-30, among others). Nevertheless, jihad as a constant act of piety remains a duty for all Muslims and often refers to some act aimed at social or personal improvement. A Muslim might speak of his or her jihad to stop smoking, to

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raise money for a community project or, simply, to become a better person. In 2005, Raheel Raza was the first Muslim woman to lead mixed gender Friday prayers in Canada. She characterized the courage and determination that allowed her to persevere over the objections of conservative and traditionalist elements as a form of “gender jihad” aimed ultimately at helping all women take their rightful and scripturally mandated place as full participants in the temporal and spiritual life of the community of Muslims [11]. So, in this way the concept of jihad is akin to the concept of ‘mission’, a term often used by Christians when referring to an individual or collective task, usually with a motive of community or self-improvement, which one has been called upon, by one’s beliefs, to carry out. Jihad also has a more combative interpretation. Like the basic texts of Judaism and Christianity, the Qur’an has numerous references to physical struggle and confrontation with unbelievers and others who represent a threat to the safety and the integrity of the community of the faithful. Tell the desert Arabs who stayed behind, ‘You will be called to face a people of great might in war and to fight them, unless they surrender: if you obey, God will reward you well, but if you turn away, as you have done before, He will punish you heavily.’ (48:16-18. See also 2:190-195; 8:12-20; 9:29, among others) Indeed, combat is one of the central metaphors of the history of early Islam, as the Prophet Mohammed and his followers did battle with and ultimately triumphed over idolaters and unbelievers [12]. Moreover, the canon of Islamic teachings stresses that it is the duty of all Muslims to defend dar al-islam (the land of Islam) from moral or spiritual corruption originating in dar al-harb (the land of war) where Islamic law does not prevail [13]. Despite this, Islamic law and tradition has always favored defensive over offensive war, the importance of mercy to enemies and the inviolability of women, children and non-combatants: Fight in God’s cause against those who fight you, but do not overstep the limits...If they cease hostilities, there can be no hostility...do good, for God loves those who do good. (2:190-196) Also, Islamic teachings often stress the importance of the “greater” (spiritual) jihad over the “lesser” (physical) jihad [14]. The concept of jihad as an all-out offensive war is largely a 20th century phenomenon, developed primarily in the writings of ideologues like Abdul Ala Mawdudi, founder of Pakistan’s Jamaat-I Islami, and Sayyid Qutb, the Egyptian thinker who is in many respects the ideological father of al-Qaeda and its offshoots. Mawdudi and Qutb found a refuge from both political repression at home and the perceived decadence of Western and secular societies in a particularly conservative interpretation of Islam. They reframed jihad as an obligation equivalent to one of the Pillars (and in the process transformed it from a spiritual concept to a political one). In this new understanding, jihad became a physical rather than a spiritual struggle, one that should be used against both the ignorance and barbarism of those who threaten the fundamental integrity of Islam (the Western world or the “far enemy”) and “secular” Muslim leaders (the “near enemy”) who turn their backs on the teachings of the Qur’an and the life of the Prophet [15]. Omar Bakri, the Syrian-born Islamic cleric recently


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barred from the United Kingdom, vividly illustrated both the thinking behind, and the consequences of, this form of jihad in a 2007 television interview: The duty of jihad...had been neglected by the Islamic nation for a long time, because of the arrogance and injustice of America and its allies against the Islamic nation, and because of their support for Israel...the 9/11 operations were a response to great acts of aggression by America - its attacks on Afghanistan, on Iraq, on Sudan, not to mention the historic Crusades from long ago...Killing innocent people is forbidden in Islam. But who is innocent that is another question [16]. This highly politicized interpretation of jihad has been a key driver in a series of critical events in the Muslim world, from the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981 to the rise of the Taliban. And filtered through the anti-Western ideology of Osama bin Laden and his adherents, it lies at the heart of a whole range of terrorist plots and attacks beginning with the first World Trade Center bombing of 1993, through 9/11, the Madrid and London bombings, to the Toronto 17 and Heathrow Bomb plots of 2006. If both interpretations of jihad can be termed “correct,” then both are highly problematic from the point of view of policing and intelligence. If we use jihad to describe either terrorist activity or the terrorist mindset, we risk alienating those Muslims for whom jihad describes either a highly personalized internal struggle or effecting positive change within or beyond the Muslim community. We effectively brand them, if not as terrorists, then as dangerous radicals, which in turn perpetuates popular mythology that equates Islam and its adherents with terrorism. On the other hand, the conflation of jihad and, if not terrorism, then at least violence in the name of faith (or a political creed masquerading as faith), is not incorrect. But by referring to extremists as jihadis - a positive component of the Muslim historical and cultural experience - we effectively recognize their actions as being in the path of God and, therefore, legitimate [17]. And in opposing jihad and its practitioners, we risk characterizing ourselves - again - as the enemies of Islam. Not only does this empower extremists, but it sends a strong message that we are engaged in a struggle, not with extremism, but to suppress Islam itself. Again, this is not a message that we can afford to send.

2. So What Do We Say? As the religious historian Karen Armstrong has observed, knowing who the enemy is not is just as critical as knowing who the enemy is [18]. In the process of naming enemies correctly, we learn more about them: how they think and how they are likely to act. Therefore, it is in the best interests of those at the forefront of addressing terrorism—the intelligence and law enforcement communities—to assume a leadership role in researching and determining appropriate terminology to describe extremism and its perpetrators. To date, work in this area has been dispersed and not well advanced [19]. A glossary of alternate terminology is beyond the scope of this report. Nevertheless, more appropriate descriptions of the challenges that we face do exist. As previously mentioned, Osama bin Laden and many other extremists are heavily

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influenced by and have added to the writings of the Egyptian ideologue Sayyid Qutb, who urged his followers not only to withdraw from the moral vacuum of modern society but also to destroy it [20]. Qutb validated extreme violence in the cause of faith, so “Islamic terrorism” could more accurately be called “Qutbian terrorism.” As always, however, we must remain mindful of words and their nuances. For example, many contemporary terrorist movements—including Afghanistan’s Taliban and al-Qaeda—have theological roots in Wahhabism, a sect that forms the “state orthodoxy” of contemporary Saudi Arabia [21]. Wahhabism is a particularly strict interpretation of Islam that adheres to the Salafist notion that “pure” Islam must be rooted in the teachings of the “early fathers”—the Prophet Mohammad and his companions [22]. Both “Wahhabist” and “Salafist” have been used extensively to define particular types of terrorism. But while elements of Wahabbism could give rise to a mindset that includes extremist action - as 9/11 itself demonstrates - the vast majority of Wahabbists and Salafists are not and never will be terrorists.

3. Jihad and People The debate over jihad, its meaning and its proper role plays itself out in Muslim communities around the world. In Canada, Muslim commentators like Raheel Raza emphasize the need for Muslims both to speak out and to take action to ensure that terrorism, extremism and anti-Western propaganda are eliminated from Muslim discourse. Muslims must “take back the mosques” to ensure that the voices of “reasonable Muslim men and women” are heard over calls for physical jihad [23]. Indeed, this imperative can itself be expressed as a form of jihad. The critical consideration is not so much what Ms. Raza says -reasoned, compassionate and very much a product of the Canadian “multiculturalist” environment - but rather the manner in which this diverges from other forms of Islamic discourse. There are real ideological and rhetorical differences among Muslim communities throughout the West and the larger Islamic world. These differences can be sufficiently profound to cause, not so much a “clash of civilizations,” but rather a series of clashes within a specific civilization - in this case Islam. In Europe, where the influence of extremist ideology tends to inhibit the integration of certain segments of Muslim populations into their host societies [24], the conception of the physical jihad exerts tremendous influence. Beyond this, ideological conflict within Islamic communities often manifests itself as conflict between two distinct cultural groupings. Tariq Ramadan characterizes the first of these as middle class, “integrated” Muslims whose Islam is sophisticated and attuned to broader social and intellectual currents [25]. The second group (and, necessarily, the group of greatest interest to the law enforcement and intelligence community) consists of young, unintegrated (often despite having been born in the West) and sometimes underclass individuals (but not always –members of the “Hamburg Cell,” discussed below, were enrolled in degree programs at German universities and the suspects in the botched 2007 attacks in London and Glasgow were physicians and other professionals) [26]. Characterized by a strong sense of specific or generalized grievance, they exhibit strong leanings towards a shared Islamic identity and a spirit of specifically Islamic activism and mobilization that is often in conflict with Western social and political norms. They reject Western culture (including westernized intellectuals and assimilated Muslims) as a reproach to


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“true” Islam and are drawn to historical and ideological discourse that “proves” the greatness of Islamic civilization. This combination of perceived oppression and the search for a dignified alternative, easily translates into openness to physical, or politicized, jihad [27]. Exemplars of this demographic include Mohammed Bouyeri, the Netherlands-born killer of Theo Van Gogh, the British-born London Bombers, and the “Hamburg Cell” that became the hard core of the 9/11 conspiracy. Exemplars of Ramadan’s first group, like Raza, tend to distance themselves from the second group, claiming that it has transformed the traditional concept of jihad as a form of spiritual struggle into an ideology of violence and revenge. But there is also distortion in portraying “true” Islam in an unremittingly positive light. Extremism in the name of a politicized Islam is a perversion of the faith. The problem is, to its adherents it is a legitimate form of discourse, fully justifying direct action that can range from proselytizing to overt acts of terror on the scale of New York, Bali, Madrid and London. The messaging - particularly the interpretation of jihad - that originates with “integrated” Muslim thinkers and commentators is comforting, particularly to nonMuslims who find themselves perplexed and disquieted by the violence inherent in alQaeda-type extremist ideology. But those thinkers and commentators may not speak for that portion of the Muslim world that is disconnected, isolated, or otherwise susceptible to such ideology. So it is difficult to state with any degree of accuracy how meaningful their message is in the overall context of Muslim discourse, or to what degree it can compete rhetorically with the siren call of extremism and physical jihad.

4. Making Worlds 4.1. The Extremist World An understanding of the nuances of concepts like jihad is critical. Any attempt to promote one understanding or interpretation over another is probably fruitless, however. As Douglas Streusand points out, “classical texts speak only to, not for, contemporary Muslims. . .”, and ultimately, individual Muslims will make up their own minds [28]. What is clear is that with the extremist mindset, we are addressing a cultural and an emotional phenomenon that is much greater than the sum of any of its parts, including “physical” entities like al-Qaeda. As one Saudi extremist exhorted, I do not need to meet the Sheikh and ask his permission to carry out some operation, the same as I do not need permission to pray or to think about killing the Jews and the Crusaders. There are a thousand Bin Ladens in this nation. We should not abandon our way, which the Sheikh has paved for you, regardless of the existence of the Sheikh or his absence [29]. Since 9/11 (and, in some cases, long before it), governments and law enforcement and intelligence communities have been engaged in a concerted strategy to confront extremism through a variety of means. In many respects, we have been successful. Conspiracies have been disrupted, terrorist operations have been pre-empted, meaningful alliances have been forged and knowledge and understanding of the threat posed by this particular form of extremism has become both sophisticated and widespread. The problem continues, however, and shows no sign of dissipating. Indeed,

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many indicators suggest that it is getting worse, particularly with regard to the link between radicalization of young Muslims in Western countries and extremist action against those countries. The phenomenon of radicalization is a critical subset of the terrorist threat and awareness of it as a challenge is growing rapidly among law enforcement and security agencies. Radicalization refers to the process by which individuals - usually young people - are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views. While radical thinking is by no means problematic in and of itself, it becomes a threat when individuals espouse or engage in violence or direct action as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious extremism [30]. Historically, radicalization has spanned not only the entire “left-right” political spectrum, from environmental and animal rights activists to neo-Nazis, but a range of ethnic and religious interests as well. Radicalization can occur due to a multitude of factors and influences. There is no single group that seeks out vulnerable and impressionable young people. Nor is radicalization limited to any single ethnic or interest group [31]. In a contemporary context, however, domestic radicalization associated with violent Islamist extremist ideology is a particular concern for law enforcement and security agencies. Since 9/11, virtually all of the planned or actual terrorist attacks in Western Europe and North America have been carried out by young Muslims of various national and cultural origins who were either native-born citizens or long-term residents and who had undergone an identifiable process of radicalization. These include the Theo Van Gogh killing and the “Hofstad Plot” in the Netherlands; the Madrid bombings; the 7/7 bombings and their aftermath; the “Toronto 17” case; Operation OVERT (the “Heathrow Plot”), and the 2007 firebombing of Glasgow Airport and failed terrorist attacks in Central London. These cases embody many of the key features of contemporary radicalization that are of particular concern to law enforcement and security agencies. Foremost among these is the speed with which radicalization occurs and the fact that pre-radicalization indicators are often extraordinarily subtle, particularly to a cultural outsider like a police or intelligence officer. It is also clear that trying to anticipate (or address) radicalization through concepts like “alienation” is not useful. Terrorists do not necessarily exist at the margins of society. Subtle (and largely immeasurable) social, political and religious motivations may trump belonging and citizenship [32]. 4.2. Alternative Narratives Ultimately, the most effective long term strategy against al-Qaeda-type extremism, whether domestic or global, may be rooted in the construction of “alternative narratives” designed to subvert extremist messaging. We need to find ways of counterbalancing the culture of death and martyrdom with a culture that celebrates the value of life [33]. In order both to develop a long term strategy and to create meaningful alternative narratives, however, a number of things need to happen. Intelligence and law enforcement communities must learn not only how to penetrate the extremist world effectively but, just as importantly, how to understand the discourse that defines that world. This includes not just words, not just rhetoric, but extends to the meaning and symbolism underlying even sounds, colors and images [34] - in short, a much broader and deeper understanding of the cultural roots of extremism than we currently possess.


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We also need to determine the targets of our messaging. The US Cold War experience shows that messaging campaigns tend to work best when they are asymmetric; focused away from the opponent’s center of gravity and towards groups that are more likely to be receptive [35]. Domestically, hardened activists are probably a lost cause, whereas confused and idealistic adolescents may represent real opportunities to exert far-reaching influence. Internationally, it may be possible to engage groups which, like the Muslim Brotherhood, remain Islamist while being prepared to repudiate extremism. The Internet is arguably one of the most important tools available to the contemporary terrorist, particularly for al-Qaeda-inspired entities which are less groups than they are loose associations of far flung networks. With little “physical” capacity, they must rely on the Internet to recruit and train adherents, to raise funds, to propagandize, to document their history and mythology and to organize terrorist attacks [36]. An interesting feature of the presence of al-Qaeda-inspired groups on the Internet is that much of the associated technological innovation/software development has been done by extremists who have received engineering and computer training at Western colleges and universities. Indeed, the path to radicalization often seems to lead from Muslim homelands to the Muslim Diaspora via the study of applied science in Europe and North America. The “Hamburg Cell,” discussed above, is by no means atypical in this regard. To the extremist mind, there is undoubtedly poetic justice in using the technology of the West as a means of attacking and terrorizing the very societies that created it (the choice of civil aviation as a continuing focus of terrorist activity is no accident) [37]. On a more practical level, it is notable how few extremists have any grounding in either the history or culture of the societies that they are bent on destroying. By immersing themselves in the applied sciences, they acquire a superficial understanding of the technological manifestations of Western culture, but not of its intellectual underpinnings. For this reason, the creation of alternative narratives requires not just cultural understanding on our part, but also on the part of the target audience as well. To be effective, however, any large scale cross-cultural initiatives cannot be rooted in a missionary sensibility that characterizes one culture as inferior to another. At the same time, they cannot ignore the political and social factors that combine to make the culture of extremism a compelling one, or the successes of Western political culture in promoting tolerance, freedom and prosperity. Nor can they fail to include key audiences such as women and - as the predominant demographic throughout the Muslim world - young people. Ultimately, they must seek to find common ground and to demonstrate what is worth saving in both cultures [38]. The concept of the alternative narrative is also applicable to community engagement strategies aimed at the prevention of domestic radicalization. It is important to note, however, that individual ethno-cultural communities may be extremely suspicious of engagement strategies that are linked explicitly to a security agenda. At best, counter-radicalization programming can seem like political expediency. At worst, it can provide activists and extremists with an opportunity to characterize the programming itself as a covert means of infiltrating and manipulating communities. While the radicalization issue is certainly more critical in some communities than in others, ideological and social stimuli are constantly evolving. Therefore, lasting radicalization prevention strategies must be applicable to society as a

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whole and not to any single religious, ethnic or cultural constituency. Beyond this, national counter-radicalization strategies are not solely the task of the police, of the security services, or of government. They must also involve health authorities, school boards, social and community services, faith- and ethnic-based groups and nongovernmental organizations. All must contribute equally to the counter-radicalization narrative, because all have a stake in its outcome.

5. Conclusion Al-Qaeda-inspired extremism, and its many offshoots and analogs, is a truly global phenomenon. Not only has it helped to create a highly unstable political and cultural fault line that runs from the shores of the Mediterranean to the South China Sea, it exists (and flourishes) in Europe, in Australia and throughout the Americas. This is precisely its importance as a venue for extremism and precisely the challenge inherent in any attempt to counteract extremist messaging. Again, no single agency, no single sector, and no single government can undertake such a strategy on its own. A global phenomenon requires a global response and meaningful international cooperation will be required if influence campaigns that are rooted in the notion of an alternative world are to have any real impact.

References

[1]

[2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19]

The Criminal Code of Canada (R.S.C. 1985, Chapter C-46, 2007), Part II.1, S 83.01 (1) (b) defines terrorism as “...an act or omission, in or outside Canada, that is committed in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause...” Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996. All scriptural references are to the M.A.S. Abdel Haleem translation of The Qur’an (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Blatchford, Christie. “Ignoring the Biggest Elephant in the Room.” Globe and Mail (5 June, 2006). National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004). 145. International Crisis Group. “Understanding Islamism.” Middle East / North Africa Report (No. 37 - 2 March, 2005), 7. Leiken, Robert S. and Brooke, Steven. “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood” Foreign Affairs (March / April 2007), 112. Streusand, Douglas E.; Tunnell, Harry D. Choosing Words Carefully: Language to Help Fight Islamic Terrorism (National Defense University, 2006), 3. Armstrong, Karen. Islam: A Short History (New York: Random House, 2002), 6. Raza, Raheel. Their Jihad...Not My Jihad. (Ingersoll, Ontario: Basileia Books, 2005), 18. Ibid., 118-122. Op. Cit., Armstrong, 18-22. “Jihad” in Martin, Richard C. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World (New York: Macmillan, 2004). Ibid. Op. Cit., Armstrong, 168-170. Middle East Research Institute. Special Dispatch Series (No. 1529 - March 30, 2007). Op. Cit., Streusand & Tunnell, 2. Armstrong, Karen. “Violent Islamic Radicals Know They Are Heretical.” Guardian (July 8, 2006). Douglas Streusand and Harry Tunnell have written on this subject and are cited elsewhere in this report. The European Union has also prepared a handbook of non-offensive terminology to use in


[20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31]

[32] [33] [34]

[35] [36] [37] [38]

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describing terrorism, but this remains classified (see Waterfield, Bruno, “Don’t confuse terrorism with Islam, says EU,” The Telegraph (March 31, 2007)). Op. Cit., Armstrong, 169-170; Wright, Lawrence. The Looming Tower: Al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Knopf, 2006), 28-31. Fisk, Robert. The Great War for Civilization: the Conquest of the Middle East (London: Fourth Estate, 2005), 1045. Allen, Charles. God’s Terrorists: the Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad (London: Little, Brown, 2006), 210. Op. Cit., Raza, 61. Op. Cit., International Crisis Group, 13. Ramadan, Tariq. Western Muslims and the Future of Islam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 106-107. “British Identify Two ‘Principal’ Suspects.” New York Times (July 8, 2007). Op. Cit., Ramadan, 107-109. Op. Cit., Streusand & Tunnell, 3. Cited in Stern, Jessica. “The Protean Enemy.” Foreign Affairs (July - August 2003), 35. This conceptualization of radicalization is in common use in the RCMP national security program. Personal experiences of the process of radicalization can be observed in the lives of figures as diverse as Vladimir Lenin, Ernesto “Che” Guevara and the American outlaw Jesse James. See Anderson, Jon Lee. Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life (New York: Grove Press, 1997); Service, Robert. Lenin: A Biography (London: Pan, 2000); and Stiles, T.J. Jesse James: Last Rebel of the Civil War (New York: Vintage, 2002). See, in particular, Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 107-135. This builds on ideas expressed by, among others, Gabriel Weimann of Haifa University, cited in Sinai, Joshua. “Defeating Internet Terrorists.” Washington Times (8 October, 2006). See, for example, Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy. The Islamic Imagery Project: Visual Motifs in Jihadi Internet Propaganda (http://www.ctc.usma.edu/imagery.asp). Rabasa, Angel; Benard, Cheryl; Schwartz, Lowell H. & Sickle, Peter. Building Moderate Muslim Networks. (Santa Monica: RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy, 2007), 142. Gabriel Weimann. “www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet.” United States Institute of Peace Special Report (No. 116, March 2004), 3-4. Ibid., 5 Benedict, Ruth. The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture (New York: Meridian, 1946).

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Terrorist Profiling: Characteristics and Motivations by Arrest Rate Ismail YILMAZ Virginia Commonwealth University

Abstract. The purpose of this study is twofold: First, it seeks to determine whether domestic terrorists in Turkey hold different demographic traits from the rest of the Turkish population. Second, this study focuses on terrorists’ degree of involvement in terrorism (as measured by arrest history) in relation to their sociological characteristics and backgrounds (age, gender, education, social class). In other words, to understand at what level domestic terrorists are involved in terrorism, the researcher aims to model patterns of arrest for DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah members. Keywords. commitment to terrorism, DHKP/C, involvement in terrorism, terrorist, Turkish Hezbollah

Introduction For the past three decades, studies of terrorism have expended tremendous efforts to determine whether there are unique social background and personality traits common to all terrorists; researchers from diverse parts of the world have attempted to draw a general terrorist profile in an effort to understand different processes of terrorism, as for example becoming a terrorist or engaging in terrorist activities [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Findings suggest that a typical terrorist is predominantly male, well educated, in his mid-twenties, and from the middle class. However, current studies are not immune to methodological issues. In general, previous studies suffer from two shortcomings. First, they did not use control groups that would allow for making a comparison between the characteristics of terrorists and non-terrorists. Second, they focused primarily on “who becomes a terrorist and why,” whereas other processes, namely involvement or engaging in terrorist acts and leaving terrorism are usually ignored. Most existing studies assume a homogenous terrorist profile which tends to ignore the possibility that terrorists may have different characteristics that may ultimately determine not only one’s vulnerability to becoming a terrorist in the first place but also the degree of involvement and dedication to terrorism. As a result, questioning whether terrorists are different from an average person and whether all terrorists are equally involved in terrorism have not as yet been answered. 1. Purpose of the Study This study aims to complement a series of research conducted by Teymur [9] and Yayla [10] who sought to identify general characteristics of Turkish domestic terrorists.

I. Yilmaz / Terrorist Proﬁling: Characteristics and Motivations by Arrest Rate

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Their studies used descriptive and bivariate statistical analyses to report backgrounds and demographics. However, further analysis is required to determine whether domestic terrorism in Turkey is borne out of social and demographical forces common to all terrorists and their families. Such an analysis is necessary in developing “early intervention” methods to counter terrorism. In addition, a counter-terrorism strategy must consider those terrorists who are already committed to terrorism. For example, terrorists are not equally committed to and involved in violent acts. Depending on arrest histories, statistical findings suggest differences that call for further statistical analysis conducted in a multivariate setting that establishes specific socio-demographic forces that drive terrorists to repeat their offenses. As such, this researcher attempts to answer the following research questions: 1.

To what extent are Turkish terrorists similar to or different from the general Turkish population? (terrorist versus non-terrorist) 2. To what extent are terrorists similar or different in terms of their degree of involvement in terrorist activities? (highly-involved offenders versus lowly-involved offenders) 3. What factors are influential in the degree involvement in DHKP/C and Turkish Hezbollah? (high/low involved DHKP/C members versus high/low Turkish Hezbollah members)

2. Review of the Literature 2.1. Current Gap in the Literature Understanding the nature of terrorism is the key to identifying the motivations of terrorists. However, the nature of terrorism has undergone significant changes recently. For example, modern terrorists of our era have extensive technical skills ranging from piloting an aircraft to making the most sophisticated bombs. Moreover, conducting deadly attacks went from being a highly technical issue to a matter of locating inexpensive explosives. Today, terrorist organizations have the ability to plot extremely violent attacks with little cost by using a human body as a bomb. Parallel to the changes in world politics, the nature of Turkey’s domestic terrorism has also changed. One of the significant changes occurred in the structure of leftist terrorist organizations. The collapse of the USSR and demise of communism as a promising prospect pushed leftist terrorists to a greater utilization of legal activities including, but not limited to, gathering around solidarity associations, student confederations and labor unions. Many potential recruits lost their belief in a communist revolution that has at least been the case for DHKP/C and other leftist terrorist organizations in Turkey for the last two decades. The legalization trend had an impact on recruitment methods of terrorist organizations as well. More precisely, to ensure survival DHKP/C and other leftist terrorist groups kept their recruitment criteria very lax by granting many sympathizers membership status. As a result, membership has become available to many more persons than in the past. The purpose of greater legalization is to create more propaganda and attract more potential recruits. Sympathizers now serve both overtly or publicly. Police witnessed a changing trend in the familiar terrorist characteristics, from professional and fully dedicated terrorists to non-professional and part-time workers.

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Interestingly and unexpectedly, new terrorists have regular occupations during the day whereas they may go out and plot a terrorist attack during the night. Terrorism literature, however, has a tendency to view terrorists as full-time workers. In this view, terrorists are not part-timers, but rather professionals who are thoroughly dedicated. The problem is that this view tends to ignore the differences amongst terrorists, which in turn creates a stereotypical terrorist profile in the minds of terrorism scholars. As a result, the degree to which a terrorist is involved in terrorist activities, the central focus of this study, does not draw enough attention from terrorism scholars. This study aims to fill this existing gap in the literature by examining the terrorist profile from a different angle. In other words, this study attempts to make a profile of terrorists according to their involvement levels. 2.2. Theoretical Framework Terrorism is a complex phenomenon; therefore, it cannot be “explained in a vacuum” [12]. What makes terrorism so attractive for dissident groups is its effectiveness among other alternative forms of dissidence. Terrorism is a choice made by terrorists and terrorist organizations. However, how, what, why, and when terrorists make these choices is subject to hot debate among scholars. Terrorism theories can be broken down into four categories depending on their point of interest: (a) strategic theories; (b) structural theories; (c) psychological theories and (d) sociological theories. Strategic theories envision terrorism as an instrument to achieve a set of goals identified by rational actors, while structural theories picture terrorism resulting from internal dynamics of political organizations. Psychological and sociological theories, on the other hand, emphasize the influence of individual personality, gender, age, education, and political affiliation factors. These set of theories have some applications for this research. However, in strategic and structural theories, the main focus is on the determinants of the decision to act. In other words, the dependent variable or the focus of interest is “terrorist act.” On the other hand, psychological and sociological theories center on individual characteristics and their likely relationship to terrorist decision making in different processes of terrorism. Both approaches attempt to draw a terrorist profile and try to discover common psychological and sociological attributes that lead terrorists to perpetrate violent terrorist acts. While these theories emphasize individual factors, there are significant differences between explanations that define factors leading an individual to resort to terrorism. Psychological theories of terrorism take a behavioral approach and assume an atypical personality. Sociological theories, however, emphasize the importance of demographic traits including age, gender, education, and social class, for example, on the behaviors of terrorists. Although the psychological approach is deemed more promising, it is subject to criticism in two respects. First, some scholars, namely Laquer [13] and Wilkinson [14], argued that there is no terrorist profile. In this opinion, the nature of terrorism varies over time, and geography results in a constant change in the profiles. According to Laquer, one can be certain about sociological characteristics such as the age of terrorists, by saying that they are mostly young, but their psychological characteristics may vary across different cultures. White [15] furthers a similar argument to that of Laquer when he states that individual personalities vary considerably, and it is impossible to draw a single behavioral profile. Second, studying psychological profiles have methodological restrictions such as limited accessibility to research subjects.


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According to Israel, even the most comprehensive studies regarding the personality of terrorists rely on historical analysis of biographical information. The issue of accessibility to research subject is also applicable for sociological profiling. However, juxtaposed to each other, sociological variables are far more accessible than psychological variables. Data regarding the demographical background of terroristsage, gender, education, and social classcan be obtained from government authorities or published biographies of terrorists. Hence, sociological profiling is considered a more reliable strategy than psychological profiling even though it is not completely infallible. Given the limitations of a psychological approach, this study utilizes a sociological approach, because psychological profiling appears to be less achievable in this situation since the researcher does not have direct contact with terrorists. However, the researcher has access to secondary resources that make it possible to gather data about terrorists’ sociological characteristics and backgrounds. The literature regarding sociological theories and variables examined by previous researchers will be reviewed next to gain a better perspective of a terrorist’s background and characteristics. Sociological terrorism explanations can be broken down into sociological profiling, social learning theory of aggression, frustration-aggression hypothesis, and relative deprivation theory. Sociological profiling does not offer a theoretical explanation to terrorism but rather focuses on the common sociological attributes of terrorists (age, gender, education, and social class). Although it assumes that terrorism is a function of socio-demographic characteristics common to all terrorists, it does not offer farreaching accounts as to why these demographic attributes are related to one’s choice or greater involvement in terrorism. In this sense, profiling is a simplistic way of understanding the relationship between terrorism and demographic attributes. For instance, simply reporting a proportional difference in gender is descriptive in nature but it provides little details about gender difference in participation. However, reporting demographics in relation to social processes of terrorism such as “joining in a terrorist organization” and “engaging (involvement) in a terrorist act” presents a more meaningful relationship. As an example, female’s lower levels of involvement in terrorist acts as compared to their male counterparts can be explained by the troublesome nature of committing a terrorist act that is typically incompatible with their feminine characteristics. Therefore, this study explains terrorists’ differential involvement in terrorist acts in relation to their socio-demographic characteristics. Learning theory of aggression, on the other hand, suggests that violence results from the observation and imitation of an aggressive role model. The frustration-aggression hypothesis of terrorism asserts that political violence is a result of desperation that occurs in the face of oppression. Finally, relative deprivation theory assumes that political violence results from the gap between expectation and actual achievement. Studies and evidence related to each sociological explanation are provided next to gain a better understanding about sociological characteristics of terrorists. 2.2.1. Sociological Profiling Profiling research regarding demographics of terrorists has some applications to this study. Demographic analysis is usually applied to discover who becomes a terrorist and for what reasons. This study, however, attempts to learn if there is a difference between the involvement levels of terrorists in relation to certain sociological characteristics. The hypothesis that terrorists have different involvement levels (which make some stay

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longer and others shorter) in respect to their educational levels, gender, social class and other characteristics has not been studied to date. The implications of this study would not only contribute to the current literature but also would help security personnel to identify terrorists who might repent and turn over information. Profiling studies attempted to define a common terrorist portrait in understanding why some individuals engage in terrorism while others do not under similar circumstances. This type of analysis has been used extensively in the past [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10]. Previous terrorist profiling studies relating to sociological characteristics can be categorized under two different headings: early terrorist movements in Russia in the late 19th century and modern terrorist organizations worldwide. Profiling studies were first introduced in the 1970s when scores of people were inspired by a socialist revolution ideal. Since then, many profiling studies have been conducted with different orientations. Most recently, the orientation has changed to religiously motivated terrorists. Thus, modern profiling studies can be analyzed under three headings: (a) worldwide analysis, (b) regional and domestic analysis and (c) Middle Eastern suicide and non-suicide terrorists 2.2.1.1. Worldwide Analysis of Terrorist Profile The first worldwide analysis of terrorist profiling was conducted by Russell and Miller [1] in 1977, and their findings were widely cited in terrorism literature. Russell and Miller attempted to draw a sociological profile of the modern urban terrorist by compiling more than 350 terrorist cadres and leaders from German, Irish, Turkish, Spanish, Argentinean, Brazilian, Iranian, Palestinian, Japanese, and Uruguayan terrorist groups. Their study confirmed some of the widely reported sociological characteristics of terrorists in 1970s such as age, gender, educational, occupational and socioeconomic backgrounds, and marital status that were collected from published data. However, Russell and Miller’s [1] study suffered from methodological issues that consisted of comparing the characteristics of terrorists from various part of the world and then making generalizations about those characteristics, which ultimately harmed the validity of their study. On the other hand, they limited their analysis with urban terrorists by omitting those carrying out rural guerilla warfare. Still, findings of this study have been cited widely and used as references when making a generalization about terrorist characteristics. Long after Russell and Miller [1], Sageman [8] compiled information from a public domain on 172 persons who identified themselves as members of “Salafi Mujahidin,” an informal umbrella organization under which a number of religiouslymotivated and transnational terrorist groups convened such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Al-Qaeda. When compiling the information for his analysis, Sageman used the documents and transcripts of legal proceedings, government documents, press and academic articles, and Internet articles. In his analysis, Sageman [8] included social background as measured by social origin, education, socio-economic status, occupation, family status; psychological background as measured by mental illness and terrorist personality (pathological narcissism, paranoia, and authoritarian personality); circumstances of joining the jihad as measured by age, place of recruitment, faith, employment, and relative deprivation; and social affiliation as measured by friendship, kinship, discipleship, and worship. Sageman also presented a social network analysis of global Salafi Mujahidin and the characteristics of this network. Sageman, however, did not include terrorists engaged in


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local terrorism; his sampling was biased towards groups engaged in transnational terrorism and towards those terrorists who had not investigated. 2.2.1.2. Regional and Domestic Studies of Terrorist Profile The lack of worldwide data sources about terrorists led many researchers to conduct regional studies on terrorist profiles. For instance, Clarke [2] focused on the profile of Basque separatists from what is known as ETA (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna) by using two different kinds of biographical information. The first consisted of 48 case studies of ETA members, and the second one included more limited information on 447 other ETA members. Clarke’s study examined the age, sex, socioeconomic background of members and families, and ethnic and linguistic characteristics of ETA terrorists. The study also discussed various processes in the lives of ETA members including radicalization of Basque youth, recruitment, relationships with families, friends, and loved ones, and leaving the organization. In another study, Weinberg and Eubank [3] examined the profiles of Italian terrorists. By obtaining information from two major newspapers in Italy and from court files, Weinberg and Eubank reported biographical characteristics of Italian terrorists consisting of sex, age, place of birth, place of residence, role in the organization, group affiliation, nature of relationship to other terrorists, occupation prior to becoming terrorist, and membership to political organization prior to becoming a terrorist. This was the first known study to examine the role of women in a terrorist organization; of the 2,512 terrorists whose biographical characteristics were reported, 451 were women. In the final study mentioned in this category, Handler [5] analyzed the socioeconomic profile of American terrorists. He placed the American experience with domestic terrorism as issue-oriented and reformist political groups, for example, antiabortionists, began to take stage in American politics toward the end of the 1970s. Biographical backgrounds of 280 known right-wing and left-wing terrorists who were active in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s were compiled. Different from previous studies, Handler [5] tabulated socio-economic variables with right-left wing affiliation, gender and position in the terrorist organizations. As for socio-economic variables, education, religion, race, occupation, income, and parent’s occupation and income were included. Handler’s study of right- and left-wing terrorists serves to understanding reasons why people choose to participate in specific groups. 2.2.1.3. Analysis of Middle Eastern Terrorist and Suicide Bombers Most recently, another category of profiling studies has emerged with a special interest in Middle Eastern terrorists. In fact, Russell and Miller’s [1] study included Middle Eastern terrorist organizations long before this category of profiling began. However, early terrorist organizations in the Middle East such as Al-Fatah and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) acted with a Marxist-Leninist motive even though their ultimate purpose was the same as their contemporary religious counterparts. On the other hand, recently established terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah (i.e. Turkish Hezbollah) [11], Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas came into the picture by using religious motives. Since these organizations were involved in highly sensational suicide attacks during the last two decades, the characteristics and motives of their militants drew considerable scholarly attention.

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For instance, Hassan [6] conducted an on-site study and interviewed approximately 250 members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza during three years between 1996 and 1999. Most of the terrorists Hassan interviewed were participants in attempted suicide attacks but failed to complete the attack as planned. Hassan was able to interview her subjects in meetings arranged by intermediaries. Hence, Hassan’s study has been extensively cited for her exceptional data collection method. Normally, the clandestine structure of terrorist organizations and terrorists’ lives, rarely allows an independent researcher to have a systematic access to the research subject. Most independent researchers who previously conducted profile studies had to rely on secondary resources. Hassan’s study [6], however, constitutes an exception. Unfortunately, she did not report any specific demographic and socio-economic variables of terrorists she interviewed as part of her agreement to keep the records strictly anonymous. Pedahzur [7] and his colleagues compared the characteristics of suicide terrorists and non-suicide terrorists in the Middle East. Pedahzur et al. did not limit their study with a specific terrorist organization. They collected data from an Israeli daily newspaper (Ha’aretz) by detecting all terrorist events (suicide or non-suicide) between 1993 and 2002. The population consisted of 819 subjects, 743 of whom were nonsuicide and 80 who were suicide terrorists. Among the variables included were previous experiences in terrorism acts, education, ideological affiliation, marital status, age, socio-economic background, and gender. Pedahzur et al.’s study offered a useful comparison of terrorists with different motives, suicidal and non-suicidal. However, this study was criticized on the basis of its data sources. More specifically, the study relied heavily on journalistic accounts which are problematic because researchers have limited ways of knowing the reliability of information given unless they triangulate or unless they confirm the same information from another data source [8]. Most recently, Berrebi [81] attempted to investigate the potential link between terrorism and economic desperation. Another focus of his study was to investigate the potential similarities and differences between terrorists from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the general population of Palestine. Berrebi collected data from the biographies of 335 killed terrorists from Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), Hamas, and Palestinian National Authority (PNA) from their online sources. His dataset included the age, poverty status, education, marital status, labor force status, resident type (rural vs. urban), and district of residence. Berrebi’s [81] comparison between terrorists and the general population of Palestine indicated that terrorism studies can take advantage of quasi-experimental research designs by using control groups. In the field of terrorism, the root cause of approach is highly problematic from a methodological standpoint; therefore, terrorism scholars have not been so eager to apply it. However, this study can be considered as an exception. One of the significant limitations of Berrebi’s study was related to the accuracy of biographical information. Since data were collected from terrorist websites, the possibility of exaggerating facts was high. In addition, there was no clear indication of terrorists’ poverty status in their biographies. Therefore, the researcher had to infer the poverty status by looking at an individual’s occupation, foreign travel history, car ownership, and computer availability, if any of these was available. In other words, poverty status of terrorists was conveniently constructed. As seen in this brief review, most profiling studies suffered from a common methodological problem and the reliability of the information collected. This was because of the nature of terrorism studies that gives little room of opportunity for an


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independent observer to conduct on-site data collection. Despite this shortcoming, previous studies found similar patterns in the profiles of terrorists. Evidence from the aforementioned studies will be provided next to demonstrate that terrorists have common social backgrounds and that a similar analysis is possible to determine their involvement levels as well. 2.2.1.4. Findings of Sociological Profiling 2.2.1.4.1. Age Findings from previous studies suggest that as age increases participation in terrorism diminishes. This is a relationship that also exists between crime and age, and this pattern (in terrorism) remains remarkably the same across time, geography and type of crime. However, this does not necessarily mean that there is no variance between participation age, peak age and dropout age. These terms refer to different time periods in a terrorist’s life. Participation age refers to the age of first engagement with a terrorist group. Peak age, on the other hand, represents the age when participation in terrorist activities peak. Finally, dropout age indicates the age when a terrorist quits. The participation age in terrorism shows great variance across region and organizations. The dropout age, however, is somewhat similar and begins towards the end of one’s twenties [1, 2, 3]. There is no evidence for peak age. Age trends change from one group to another. However, terrorists tend to be young. Russell and Miller [1] reported that the average age of a typical terrorist ranged from 22 to 25, except for German, Japanese, and Palestinian terrorists. The mean (participation) age for terrorists from these countries was even lower, ranging from 20 to 25. Sageman [8], however, found that the joining age was almost 26 for Salafi Mujahidin. Clarke found a similar result to that of Sageman when he stated that ETA members tended to be in their middle or late twenties when they joined the organization. [3] and Eubank found that a majority of terrorists were between 20 and 29 when they joined a terrorist organization. The same study also reported that the lowest age of participation was 15 for Italian women terrorists. A similar pattern was reported by Taylor concluding that the average age dropped in the 1980s for different terrorist groups such as Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The participation in the PKK is also as low as 14, as reported by the organization itself on their own website (www.hpg-online.net). Even though the mean age for a typical terrorist ranged between 20 to 29 in most studies, and even lower in some cases, terrorist leaders tend to be older than ordinary terrorists. Carlos Marighella of Brazil was 58 and Huseyin Velioglu of Turkish Hezbollah was 49 when they were killed; Abdullah Ocalan of the PKK is 60 and Dursun Karatas of DHKP/C is 55 and they are still alive. Russell and Miller [1] found that of the 17 terrorist organizations they examined most leadership cadres were in their mid-30s or early 40s. A similar pattern was reported by Weinberg and Eubank [3] for Italian women terrorists; almost 25 percent of their sample was at least in their early 30s and higher. Although there is evidence for participation and dropout ages, there is no evidence for peak age. Normally, a terrorist can participate in any terrorist activity at any point in his career. However, younger terrorists are more likely to take risks than older terrorists, which, in turn, affects their willingness to participate in terrorist acts. On the other hand, one can equally assert that older terrorists are much more committed to the causes and therefore their willingness to participate would also be more than that of younger

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terrorists. As a result, the relationship between age and participation in terrorist activities is not certain. Because there is no evidence for participation, it can be hypothesized that: H1:

There is no association between the age of terrorists and their willingness to participate in terrorist activities.

2.2.1.4.2. Education Profiling studies, in general, concluded that terrorists are well-educated. For instance, Russell and Miller [1] reported that two-thirds of the terrorists had some type of university degree. Educational level was even higher for German Baader-Meinof terrorists with almost 80 percent having university degrees. This pattern did not change for countries with a Muslim majority such as Turkey, Iran, and Palestine. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, terrorism scholars focused on the type of education as well as its level. Sageman’s [8] study of global Salafi Mujahidin measured education in two different ways: type of education and educational level achieved. According to Sageman, contrary to the common view that Pakistani and Saudi Arabia encourage a system of education that advocates hatred of the West, only 17 percent of the terrorists he analyzed had participated in religious schools. However, a majority had a secular education in elementary and secondary schools. Sageman also rejects the argument that links participation in terrorism to the low level of education, which, in turn, makes terrorists vulnerable to brainwashing by religious extremists. According to his findings, almost 71 percent of the terrorists from global Salafi Mujahidin had a college or graduate degree. Sageman’s [8] finding was consistent with that of Krueger and Maleckova [83] who measured the support for political violence among Palestinians. Accordingly, the support for political violence against Israeli civilians was more common among professionals than labor workers (43 vs. 35 percent), and the support was higher among people with secondary education than among people with no education (39 vs. 32 percent). However, the pattern that terrorists are highly educated is not the same across all terrorist organizations. Russell and Miller [1] reported that almost none of the terrorists from Provisional Wing of Irish Republican Army (IRA) had higher educational levels. Handler [5] found that the percentage of college degrees earned among American leftist terrorists was as high as 75 percent whereas this figure for rightist ones was only 22 percent. Nevertheless, the number of studies reporting that terrorists are highly educated is far more than the number studies reporting otherwise. Do education levels vary between highly involved and lowly involved terrorists? Previous studies did not report any findings whether there is a relationship between the levels of education and involvement. Yet, considering the evidence that most terrorists are well educated, one can still hypothesize that: H2: As educational level increases, one’s involvement in terrorist activities also increases.


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2.2.1.4.3. Gender Findings from previous research suggest that terrorism is a male profession. For instance, Russell and Miller [1] reported that among the Latin American and European terrorist groups they profiled, male terrorists accounted for more than 80 percent whereas female terrorists accounted for only 16 percent. Clarke reported that males accounted for 91 percent of all ETA terrorists arrested between 1979 and 1980. In Weinberg and Eubank’s [3] biographical study of Italian terrorists who acted between 1970 and 1984, 82 percent were male. Russell and Miller’s [1] findings suggested that gender proportion is closely associated with the strategy followed. In their study, urban terrorists were predominantly male. On the contrary, females usually assumed secondary positions in urban-based terrorist groups. On the other hand, rural-based insurgent groups in Latin America such as FSLN and the Shining Path of Peru included a large number of female terrorists in their cadres. Handler’s [5] findings indicated that gender proportion may also be related to the political orientation of a terrorist group. In his study of American terrorists, Handler found significant differences in the number of female cadres between the left-wing and right-wing terrorist organizations. Accordingly, of the American right-wing terrorists he studied, 89 percent were male and 11 percent were female. However, the gender proportion in American left-wing terrorist groups was almost even, with 54 percent male and 46 percent female. Similar to Handler’s finding, Russell and Miller [1] reported that the number of women served in two leftist Latin American groups, Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) and July Second Movement, reached up to 60 percent in 1976. Weinberg ad Eubank [3] reported a parallel pattern. Of the 451 Italian female terrorists they studied, only 10 percent were affiliated with neo-fascist terrorist groups, and the remaining 90 percent were connected with different leftist groups such as the Red Brigades. A couple of explanations were brought as to why females join a terrorist group at a low rate disproportionate to their society’s population. According to Galvin [16], women are involved in terrorism with a totally different motivation than men. In her opinion, most of the time women are attracted to terrorism with an expectation for glory and power. Weinberg and Eubank [3] found that companionship and family ties were cited as other reason for female involvement in terrorism. Of the Italian terrorists they profiled, 27 percent were related by family and companion ties to other terrorists. Previous research also questioned the level of involvement in terrorist activities by gender. Most studies reported that female terrorists typically carry out low profile jobs in a terrorist organization. For instance, Russell and Miller [1] found that most of the terrorist attacks occurring in Latin America and West Europe between 1966 and 1976 were planned and executed by male terrorists. Females were usually deployed in jobs that required little or no manpower such as intelligence collection or assisting terrorist cadres as a nurse or courier. A similar pattern was reported by Clark about ETA members in Spain. Clarke stated that ETA systematically denied women from being involved, particularly in active duties. In addition, there was a “pronounced antipathy” against women in the ETA. On the other hand, there have been women terrorists, especially from leftist groups, who assumed leadership positions. According to Handler [5], 35 percent of the American leftist women terrorists, were identified as a member of a leadership team, while of the men, 27 percent assumed leadership positions. In the past, there were

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charismatic female terrorist leaders who had great influence on many female terrorists such as Sofia Perovskaia of Narodnaia Volia, Susanne Albrecht, Gudrun Esslin, and Ulrike Meinhof of the Baader-Meinof, Leila Khaled of Popular Front for the Liberation of the Palestine (PFLP), and Dora Maria Tellez of Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). Nevertheless, women involvement in terrorism, in general and terrorist attacks, in particular, still remains low, a fact that suggests the following hypothesis: H3: When compared to their male counterparts, females are less likely to be involved in terrorist activities. 2.2.1.4.4. Social Class (Socioeconomic Status) Is terrorism a response to poor market opportunities? Previous profiling studies have attempted to answer this question by examining the socio-economic class that terrorists come from. Russell and Miller [1] found that most of the terrorists they surveyed were either upper-middle class or upper class. Most of the European and Japanese terrorists were the children of affluent families in contrast to those terrorists from certain groups such as the PKK, the LTTE and Revolutionary Armed Force of Columbia (FARC). For instance, the German RAF and Italian Red Brigades were exclusively composed of middle-class terrorists who had dropped out of high schools or universities. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, socialist ideology attracted many affluent young people from West Europe, the United States and Japan into the radical groups with a sense of responsibility for sufferings of the poor of the world. However, not all terrorists in Russell and Miller’s [1] study were middle- and upper- class members. Terrorists from the PKK, LTTE and FARC, as well as terrorists from paramilitary groups of Ireland such as the Official Irish Republican Army (Official IRA) and the Provisional Republican Army (Provisional IRA) who came primarily from working class families. Related to their social class, terrorists from these paramilitary groups also did not have a higher educational background. For Palestinian terrorist groups, most of the rank and file cadres were lower class in their society while their leadership cadres were middle and upper class. Similar to that of gender proportion, the strategy of terrorist groups (urban versus rural) seems to be one of the factors that determines social class. Most rural-based insurgent terrorist groups such as the PKK, FARC and the Provisional IRA attract people from lower segments of the society. On the other hand, most urban-based leftist terrorist groups such as the Japanese Red Army, German Baader Meinhof, and Uruguayan Tupamaros recruit people from middle and upper classes. This fact was clearly stated by Uruguayan Chancellor Jorge Peirano Facio in 1970 when he said “for each family of the upper class there is a Tupamaro” [1]. A similar prototype was reported by Clarke about terrorists from the Basque region of Spain. Most of the ETA terrorists in his study were either working class or lower middle class. Considering the fact that ETA is a rural-based insurgent group that is aiming to separate a part of Spain and that most of its members were industrial small town workers, this result corresponds to that of Russell and Miller [1]. The same analysis was also true for American right-wing and left-wing terrorists. According to Handler [5], right-wing American terrorists were mostly middle and lower class, while left-wing American terrorist were mostly middle and upper class. As a result, one can conclude that terrorists may come from a wide variety of social class backgrounds. However, upper-middle class and upper-class members prefer left-wing and urban-


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based terrorist organizations while lower-middle class and working class members make their choice for right-wing and rural-based terrorist organizations. Studies of Middle Eastern terrorists found similar results to the previous research. For instance, Hassan’s [6] interview with 250 Palestinian suicide bombers indicated that none of them were “desperately poor.” Similarly, Berrebi’s [81] comparison of 48 killed suicide bombers from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the general population of Palestine revealed that the terrorists were less likely to come from impoverished families when compared the general Palestinian population. Krueger and Maleckova’s [83] study found no support for the link between poverty and participation in (Lebanon) Hezbollah. Most recently, Sageman [8] points out that the traditional way of measuring socioeconomic status tends to ignore differences among the various clusters. His analysis of Global Salafi Mujahidin revealed that most of the leadership cadres and core Arab clusters (terrorists from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, and Syria) were middle and upper classes. On the other hand, most of the Southeast Asian cluster (terrorists from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore) and the Maghrep Arab cluster (terrorists from Morocco, France and Algeria) were middle and lower classes. Overall, three-fourths of all terrorists he examined were middle and upper classes. According to Sageman, this refutes the argument that terrorism emerges from poverty. Similar to Sageman’s point on socio-economic status of terrorists, this study is a comparison of two different clusters of terrorists: highly involved versus lowly involved ones. Previous studies, however, did not present any evidence of whether social class has an impact on the degree of involvement. On the other hand, there is no conceptual argument whether differential involvement in terrorism is a function of socio-economic status. Hence, this study hypothesizes that: H4: There is no difference in the socioeconomic status of highly-involved and lowly-involved terrorists. 2.2.1.4.5. Place of Recruitment (Rural versus Urban) Terrorist groups recruit members in the areas where they concentrate their operations most, because local recruits have the advantage of knowing the area of operation and the ability to contact local aides. Therefore, urban-based terrorist organizations focus on urban areas whereas rural-based terrorist organizations target rural areas for recruitment. For potential recruits, a terrorist organization’s being conveniently available in a surrounding area becomes a significant factor in their decision to join. Previous research supports this argument. For instance, Russell and Miller [1] reported that most of the terrorists in Latin American and European terrorist groups in the 1970s joined from urban areas. This pattern was almost the same across different groups such as Uruguayan Tupamaros, German Baader-Meinof and Italian Red Brigades. For Palestinian terrorists, especially those from PFLP, many were born or lived a significant portion of their lives in urban cities. Most of the terrorist organizations mentioned in Russell and Miller’s study were based on urban cities of their country of origin. Weinberg and Eubank [3] reported that 65 percent of the Italian terrorists they surveyed were recruited from small cities. On the other hand, 30 percent of the terrorists were born in small communities where the populations were under 100,000. When the place of birth is compared to the place of recruitment, it is clear that almost

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one-half of the terrorists recruited from large cities were mobile and emigrated from smaller communities. Weinberg and Eubank’s findings were similar to that of Russell and Miller [1] because they studied urban-based neo-fascist and leftist terrorists groups. Studies on rural-based terrorist organizations such as Clarke’s analysis of Spain’s ETA did not report the place of recruitment. Clarke, however, reported that a typical ETA member comes from a working class or lower-middle class. He concluded that those from a working class were not likely to be employed by large factories but rather by small factories in small towns. In other words, ETA which is a rural-based (Basque region) terrorist organization in Spain recruits its members from among the dwellers of industrial small towns in Basque, Spain. Despite ample evidence indicating a relationship between the place of recruitment and the type of organizations, there is no evidence for differential involvement in terrorism activities and the place of recruitment. In Turkey, both urban-based and ruralbased terrorist groups organize their activities in the slums of big cities where most of the residents are immigrants of rural towns of the inner country. The immigrant population is concentrated in certain neighborhoods, and integration of immigrant populations into the urban society takes a long time, which, in turn, makes them vulnerable to the exploitation of terrorist organizations. Even though most of the terrorists join from urban cities, many have a rural family background. However, to what extent this terrorist feature impacts the level of involvement is not clear. Therefore, this study hypothesizes that: H5: The place of recruitment does not correlate with involvement level in any way. 2.2.1.4.6. Marital Status According to Russell and Miller [1], being an unmarried terrorist is a rule. The need for security, mobility and dedication to the cause prevents many terrorists from taking the responsibilities of a family and forces them to remain single. Russell and Miller’s findings indicated that 75-80 percent of Latin American, European, Middle Eastern and Asian terrorists were single. The only exception was Uruguayan Tupamaros with almost 30 percent of its cadres married. Contrary to the findings of Russell and Miller [1], Sageman [8] found that almost 75 percent of Salafi Mujahidin members were married. Sageman attributes the high marriage rate among the Salafi Mujahidin to their faith. Accordingly, Islam encourages its believers to marry and have children. Thus, the pattern of low marriage among the Palestinian terrorists in Russell and Miller’s study was not confirmed by Sageman’s study of Salafi Mujahidin. For one thing, Palestinian terrorists in Russell and Miller’s study were not members of religious oriented groups. Rather, they were from Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Black September Organization, both of which were secular and did not have a religious orientation. Sageman also confirmed that this high marital status pattern is unique to Salafi Mujahidin as studies on other types of terrorism found that a typical terrorist is an unmarried one. Sageman also denoted that most of the single terrorists were single because they were either too young, still students or financially unable to afford a marriage. In conclusion, previous studies found that most of the terrorists from leftist groups are unmarried whereas most of the terrorists from religiously motivated groups are married. However, previous studies did not report any finding on the association


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between the level of involvement in terrorist acts and martial status. One can still assume that there might be a difference in the level of involvement among the terrorists in relation to their marital status. Those who have family responsibilities are expected to have a lesser involvement in terrorist acts because there is the risk of being arrested for married terrorists in frequent involvement. In other words, married terrorists have a stake in conformity and they take part in low-profile terrorist activities. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that: H6: The probability of involvement is higher for married terrorists than it is for unmarried terrorists. 2.2.2. Relative Deprivation (RD) Another line inquiry in terrorism research concentrated on what is known as relative deprivation (RD). This theory posits that people feel deprivation when they perceive that they are treated unjustly compared to some standards or reference groups. Relative deprivation is often related to economic conditions. Accordingly, people may turn to collective violence, namely revolutions, rebellions and riots when they are economically deprived. This study seeks to discover whether relative deprivation is related to the level of involvement in terrorism. The application of relative deprivation to terrorism is not new. Early studies of terrorist characteristics sought to understand whether low socioeconomic status was an indicator of a typical terrorist character [1, 2, 3]. None of these studies, however, indicated that terrorists were economically deprived. This pattern appears not to have changed for modern terrorists. The plight of Palestinian people pushed scholars to search whether terrorism in the Middle East is related to the poverty [6, 8]. Findings from these studies did not suggest a direct relationship between terrorism and poverty. However, reducing the relative deprivation concept simply to the poverty level may be considered as a flaw because not all people with low socio-economic status feel deprivation. Hence, researchers should fully understand theoretical underpinnings of relative deprivation before they initiate a test of the concept. 2.2.2.1. Assumptions and the Many Versions of RD The assumptions of relative deprivation theory correspond to the assumptions of frustration-aggression hypothesis of Dollard and his colleagues [17]. Both theories assert that individuals feel deprived of something they desire. The major differences between relative deprivation theory and frustration-aggression hypothesis is that the former asserts that believing others have something and feeling himself as entitled to have the same things are necessary preconditions for deprivation, whereas the latter asserts that a having a desire for something and believing it is feasible to obtain are sufficient for frustration. The term relative deprivation was first used by Samuel Stouffer and his colleagues of the Research Division of the U.S. Army in their study, The American Soldier. They used relative deprivation as a provisional explanation for their findings that respondents they examined were better off in some situations whereas they were worse off in other situations with reference to comparison groups. Since then, relative deprivation has attracted wide attention from political scientists Nagel, Gurr [18], [24], sociologists

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Merton and Rossi [20], and psychologists Crosby [21] and Pettigrew [22]. For further clarification, four famous models of relative deprivation will be discussed. Davies was considered first to establish a formal theory of relative deprivation. According to Davies, an individual who lacks certain goods and opportunities will have a sense of injustice whenever he feels that similar others have those goods and opportunities. His formulation of relative deprivation encompasses three essential conditions for deprivation: the individual who lacks something desired should (a) perceive others have it; (b) have a desire for it; and (c) have a feeling of entitlement for it. In the absence of any one of these, deprivation does not occur. In Davies’ opinion, an individual can make two distinct comparisons, the first of which occurs between ingroup members and the second of which occurs between out-group members. Adding another condition to that of Davies, Runciman [23] claimed that an individual should also feel that obtaining the desired goods and opportunities is feasible. According to Runciman, this last condition helps an individual distinguish unrealistic and realistic hopes. If an individual knows that his desire is an unrealistic one, he does not feel deprivation. However, if that individual thinks otherwise, he feels deprivation. Runciman [23] made a differentiation between egoistic deprivation in which an individual compares himself to others and fraternal deprivation in which an individual compares his group to other groups. Contrary to Davies and Runciman, Gurr [24] defined relative deprivation by making no assumption about the sources of expectation. In his definition, relative deprivation is viewed as an individual’s perception of discrepancy between his expectations and capabilities. Accordingly, expected status or standards may not only be determined in reference to others, but rather the so-called or perceived deprivation may also reflect a desire for one’s own past condition, or an abstract ideal or standards put by leaders. In Gurr’s [24] opinion, if the source of deprivation is based on a loss of what a person once had or believed he could have, it is a decremental deprivation. In this situation, that person experiences a relative deprivation by reference to his own past condition. In other words, a person’s value capabilities begin to decline while his value expectation remains at the same level. Examples include the loss of political influence by oppositional groups or the decline in status of a middle-class population as the status or influence of working-class population increases. In aspirational deprivation, however, a person does not experience a significant loss. Rather, he is angered because he has no means to attain increasing or intensifying expectations. Contrary to decremental deprivation, in aspirational deprivation expectations begin to rise while capabilities remain the same. For instance, contemporary demands of the African-American population in the 1970s for social equality compared to those made earlier reflected an increase in their expectations for more status. According to Gurr [24], traditionally an individual’s mere exposure to education increased their expectations. Such an increase in expectations may cause a relative deprivation if the level of actual achievement (or capabilities) remains the same. As a special case of aspirational deprivation [24], Gurr defined a third category of deprivation, progressive deprivation, in which an upward improvement in both expectations and capabilities generates an expectation of continued improvement. If the capabilities somehow stabilize or decrease, then a progressive deprivation is likely. This kind of deprivation is seen in societies where there occurs an economic recession in a growing economy.


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Gurr’s [24] concept of progressive deprivation can be considered as a generalized version of Davies’s J-curve [25]. According to Davies, individuals feel angry when they lack certain standards and opportunities if (a) they have a desire for them and if (b) they possessed them in the past. The major difference between relative deprivation theory and Davies’s J-Curve (and also Gurr’s progressive deprivation) is that the former claims that individuals should make a comparison with others while the latter posits that individuals can also make comparisons with their past. In addition, Davies did not discuss feasibility of desires. Of all the relative deprivation theories mentioned, the most applicable one to the current study is that of Davies’s J-curve and Gurr’s [24] progressive deprivation. These two concepts claim that an upward improvement in expectations and capabilities generates an expectation of constant improvement. If capabilities stabilize or begin to decrease, a relative deprivation occurs as the result of a rising gap between expectations and capabilities. More specifically, a change in the status or standards of a (non-professional) terrorist may result with a deprivation, which, in turn, may affect his degree of involvement in terrorism. Making a comparison between his past and current situation, a (non-professional) terrorist who has experienced a layoff or dropout may feel deprivation that ultimately leads him to greater involvement in terrorist acts. This type of deprivation may also be known as egoistic deprivation, because the person feels the deprivation as a result of a change in his own situation. On the other hand, a (non-professional) terrorist without experiencing deprivation is expected to take lesser risks because he has a stake in conformity. This type of terrorist is involved in terrorism less than others because he should be in a state of relative satisfaction compared to others who experience a relative deprivation. Consequently, this study will use progressive and egoistic deprivation theories as models because it is assumed that involvement in terrorism is a function of resentment that occurs as a result of an increasing gap between personal expectations and achievements. In this sense, this study will answer how much of the variation in involvement in terrorism can be attributable to the perceived deprivation felt by terrorists as a result of negative life experiences, namely school dropout and layoffs from work. 2.2.2.2. Empirical Support for RD Runciman’s [23] categorization of egoistic deprivation (self versus others) and fraternal deprivation (my group versus other groups) and Gurr’s [24] introduction of decremental, aspirational and progressive deprivation enhanced the earliest applications of relative deprivation theory. Since then, the theory has received mixed support. Brush [26] examined the extent of empirical support for relative deprivation theory (as manifested by Gurr) by reviewing the studies listed in the Social Science Citation Index. According to his findings, relative deprivation theory received considerable support during the first half of the 1970s. However, support for the theory declined during the second half of the 1970s and the first half of the 1980s, especially among political scientists and sociologists. This pattern, however, was not the same among psychologists. Crosby, who was a psychologist herself, reported that she found support for egoistic deprivation in 95 different studies. At this point, it is reasonable to ask why there is a disagreement on the empirical validity of relative deprivation theory between psychologists on the one side and sociologists and political scientists on the other side. According to Brush [26],

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psychologists more often direct their attention to the feelings of resentment, whereas sociologists and political scientists focus more on the occurrence of collective violence. More specifically, while psychologists often succeed in explaining individual deprivation, political scientists and sociologists fail to explain how individual deprivation is transformed into collective violence. Today, it is known that strains of aspiration can produce psychopathology; however, the relationship between strain and collective violence is suspect. According to Laqueur [13], no truly scientific theory of collective violence has emerged; perhaps because no quantitative measure is suffice to understand the qualitative nature of human frustration. On the contrary, Brush argued that refutation of a theory, in general, and relative deprivation theory, in particular, should not be taken as a failure. Rather, refutation, as well as validation, should be taken as progress because oftentimes social science theories are judged by harsh standards. In natural science, however, each experiment is considered as a progress towards the perfection of a theory regardless of failure or success. For example, theories about the assumed properties of an atom were accepted long before atoms could be observed. Hence, current charges against relative deprivation theory relating to its unobservable parts would not be taken as a critical flaw. Rather, each study in the literature has a contribution to the current status of relative deprivation theory. This researcher is interested in whether relative deprivation at the individual-level predicts participation in terrorist activities. Previous researchers rarely questioned the link between relative deprivation and participation in terrorist activities. Rather, they centered their focus on the link between relative deprivation and social violence. Nevertheless, there are a handful of studies that question the relationship between poverty and socio-economic class and participation in terrorist activities. For instance, Kruger and Maleckova tested the link between poverty at the individual level and the probability of participation in (Lebanon) Hezbollah among the population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and found no support. Similarly, Berrebi’s analysis of 243 suicide terrorists found no evidence for economic deprivation although suicide terrorists were considered as the most economically deprived of all terrorists. Hassan, on the other hand, conducted a vis-à-vis interview with 250 Palestinian terrorists and reported that none of the terrorists she interviewed were desperately poor, but many were middle-class members [6]. These studies, however, have failed to construct relative deprivation. Primarily in these studies, relative deprivation is implied or reduced simply to poverty, unemployment, or low socio-economic status without knowing, in reality, whether or not these factors lead people to relative deprivation. Relative deprivation, however, is a psychological process that cannot be identified without people reporting it. Deprivation is relative when a person makes a comparison between self and others (fraternal) or between present and past (egoistic). Thus, constant poverty or unemployment may not lead to relative deprivation when individuals have no way to make a comparison between past and present unless they have experienced a layoff and a school dropout. On the other hand, even though terrorists have a persistent poverty background and have no way to compare between present and past, a comparison of self to others is still possible. Such a comparison is often used by terrorist groups as a method of propaganda to recruit new members from the lower-class. However, most of the terrorists in the studies of Kruger and Maleckova [83], Berrebi [81] and Hassan [6] were middle or upper class members and well-educated.


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Then the question becomes: How can these people feel a relative deprivation if they belong to the upper classes of society? Krueger and Maleckova’s answer is enlightening: “Would-be terrorists could be inspired by the poverty of their countrymen. This is what they call the “Robin Hood model of terrorism’.” In other words, relative deprivation is also possible for middle- and upper-class members when they act out of altruistic purposes. On the other hand, even middle- and upper-class members can experience an egoistic type of relative deprivation when “their potential opportunities are less attractive than their expectations.” In such a situation, relative deprivation becomes more significant than absolute deprivation because a downward trend in expectations as opposed to an upward trend in opportunities is more likely to be frustrating than a stable trend in both expectations and opportunities. Middle- and upper-class members, in this sense, are more likely to be subject to such frustrating trends than lower class members. Thus, the finding that most terrorists are middle- and-upper class members should not be surprising if relative deprivation is considered as a change in (economic) expectations rather than as absolute poverty or as the state of unemployment. Consequently, for relative deprivation to occur there must be a decline in expectations and an increase in opportunities. Since relative deprivation is not identical to absolute deprivation, it does not belong to a social class. Furthermore, middle- and upper-class members are more likely to encounter relative deprivation because the probability of sudden change in economic situations is higher compared to lower-class members who are more likely to encounter absolute deprivation. On the other hand, middle- and upper-class members may participate in terrorist activities for altruistic reasons. In such situations, they may experience what is known as fraternal deprivation in which a person suffers for the grievances of others. Finally, lower-class members have no way to experience relative deprivation of an egoistic type if they live in constant (or absolute) poverty. They can only feel this type of deprivation in the event of a change in their situations such as a layoff. Lower-class members may still be inspired by fraternal deprivation by making a comparison between the poor and the rich. As a result, any person from any social class may experience relative deprivation of any type. Relative deprivation is related to changes which would ultimately affect a person’s economic prosperity. Thus, the following hypotheses can be developed in light of the evidence presented: H7: Participation in terrorist activities is not associated with social class. H8: The probability of participation in terrorist activities is higher for those who have experienced a school dropout. H9: The probability of participation in terrorist activities is higher for those who have experienced a lay off. 2.2.3. Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis The violent nature of terrorism brings an important question to the minds concerning the psychology of terrorists: Does frustration have a role in terrorist decision-making? For the purpose of this study, this question becomes: To what extent can frustration explain the variation in the involvement level of terrorists? At first glance, a relationship between a frustrating event and a consequent involvement in terrorism

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seems likely. However, constructing such a relationship requires an extensive psychological analysis of terrorists that is very demanding and hard to apply in the study of terrorism due to difficulties in the accessibility of research subjects. On the other hand, the relationship between frustration and aggression had been largely examined in the psychology field long before it was first applied to the study of social violence in 1970s. The frustration-aggression hypothesis dominated the psychological study of aggression during the preceding three decades of its invention in 1939 by Dollard and his colleagues [17]. Although the concept was extensively criticized in the following years and the original version has been reviewed several times, the central proposition of a causal relationship between a preceding frustrating event and a following aggressive behavior still remains as the rule. The hypothesis has inspired other modern concepts regarding the nature and source of human aggression, namely the relative deprivation theory of social violence [19, 18] and scapegoat theory of prejudices. 2.2.3.1. Basic Assumptions The hypothesis initially proposed that “the occurrence of aggression always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression” [14]. In this context, frustration was defined as the interference with an instigated goal response at its proper time in the behavioral sequence. Occasionally, however, the term frustration is used not only as the process of blocking a personal goal but also as the reaction to such blocking. In other words, in order for a person to be considered frustrated, that person should not only be thwarted from reaching his goal but also should show some type of reaction. If frustration always leads to aggression, how does this process occur? In developing the original formulation, Dollard et al. [17] stated that the certainty of aggression depends on (a) the reinforcement value of interfered goal responses, (b) the level of frustration and (c) the number of interferences. In the occurrence of aggression first, the reinforcement value of interfered goals is important, because frustration is related to goal attainment. Second, the level of frustration becomes a significant factor, because not all frustrations instigate aggression but rather frustration instigates aggression only if it is complete. Third, if frustrations can be leveled, then the number of interferences becomes important. That is, frustration is an additive process that develops cumulatively. Dollard et al. [17] recognized that sometimes aggression may be inhibited and may break out in a different form. Inhibition occurs when the anticipated severity of punishment exceeds the anticipated gratification of aggression. In such situations, frustration results in covert aggression. Dollard et al. denoted that inhibited overt aggression cannot be taken as nonaggression. Accordingly, inhibited overt aggression can be considered as covert aggression, or those who manifest the aggression covertly are sometimes known as “furious inside.” One of the significant components of the frustration-aggression hypothesis concerns the displacement of aggression. Dollard et al. [17] proposed that frustration directs aggression against the primary source of frustration. However, at times, frustration instigates aggression against an alternative target. The displacement of target occurs if there is an association between the primary and the alternative source of frustration. The strength of instigation is related to the similarities between the primary and the alternative targets.


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How long can instigation to aggression ensue? Instigation to aggression can only be reduced by aggressive or hostile activities either against the primary target or against the alternative target. Since frustration is an additive process, the instigation to aggression increases with every frustration until it eventually results in violence. Consequently, one may imply from the theory that frustration has long-term effects. 2.2.3.2. Different Versions of Frustration-Aggression As aforementioned, the frustration-aggression hypothesis assumes that (a) aggression is always based on frustration and (b) frustration always leads aggression. Proponents of the hypothesis soon acknowledged that these assumptions were too simplistic and general. Miller, one of the coauthors of the original version, then had to rephrase the latter part holding that frustration may lead to a number of responses, one of which is “instigation to aggression.” Thus, he clearly acknowledged that frustration may not only result in aggression but also may result in alternative actions. Miller’s revised version of the frustration-aggression hypothesis put forth that (a) any aggressive behavior occurs as a result of frustration and (b) frustration instigates behaviors that may or may not be aggressive. Accordingly, frustration is not viewed as a sufficient, but as a necessary condition for aggression. Thus, Miller’s reformulation was applied to the second part of Dollard et al.’s [17] original proposition. Other than Miller, there have been a number of attempts to revise the frustrationaggression hypothesis. For example, Barker, Dembo and Levin [27] proposed what they termed frustration-regression hypothesis. Maier [28], on the other hand, developed his frustration-fixation hypothesis. However, these two revisions made negligible contributions to the original version of the theory. Probably, the most sweeping contribution was made by a contemporary scholar, Berkowitz [29]. Like Dollard et al. [17], Berkowitz recognized that a frustrating event increases the probability of aggression, and this relationship exists “in many animal species, including man.” Berkowitz also agreed with Dollard et al. when he held that “frustration is an interference with an instigated goal response at its proper time in the behavioral sequence” [29]. On the other hand, he asserted that the goal response should be active, and the individual should be prevented from reaching that goal if frustration is to result in aggression. In other words, for Berkowitz, frustration is neither a simple deprivation nor a state of mind, but rather an interference with the realization of a (specific) goal-driven activity at a specific time. Contrary to Dollard et al. [17], and Miller, Berkowitz [29] identified frustration as neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for aggression. However, frustration stimulates an emotional reaction which then creates a “readiness” for aggressive behaviors. In Berkowitz’s opinion, even this readiness is not sufficient alone to create aggression unless there are “suitable cues.” Berkowitz defined suitable cues as stimuli that are associated with previous or present frustrating instigators. Accordingly, all stimuli that can be associated with a frustrating experience could be a potential aggressive cue someday. In this context, the probability of aggression depends on two factors: (1) the strength of association between the stimulus and the past or the present frustrating instigators and (2) the strength of readiness. When does frustration actually result in aggression? According to Berkowitz [29], the state of aggressiveness or aggressive drive ends whenever the frustrated individual encounters an aggression-triggering stimulus. In other words, aggression results whenever the frustrated individual finds an appropriate target in which to direct his

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aggression. However, the appropriateness of target or the existence of aggressiontriggering stimulus does not suggest that the target could be anyone or anything. For Berkowitz, aggressive means and agents may be substituted whereas a target may not. That is, aggression cannot be displaced in the sense of changing the primary target. Attacks on alternative targets can be explained by excess violence that is committed by extremely ready aggressors. 2.2.3.3. Empirical Evidence for Frustration The literature on terrorist profiles has often questioned the probable link between frustration and joining in terrorism groups. A majority of the existing studies found support for this relationship. For the purpose of this study, a summary of the literature is presented next to determine what factors have been considered to cause frustration that ultimately motivates potential terrorists to participate in terrorism. In a study of Palestinian women’s motivation to terrorism, Berko and Erez [30] found that five out of 14 women they interviewed reported that before they joined a terrorist organization, they sought revenge for the harms and losses they suffered which they attributed to Israeli’s military operations. Of the women who sought revenge, three mentioned offenses against their brothers and two indicated their brothers’ deaths as their motivations. Another study of Colombian terrorists by Morris [31] mentioned the police use of excessive force in demonstrations as a motivating factor for joining in a terrorist organization. Bruinessen [32] examined the biographies of 250 PKK terrorists and found that “almost all were receptive to the party’s romantic doctrine of revenge.” Bruinessen further argued that the concept of revenge seems to be the major doctrine for the PKK terrorists as well as most terrorist organizations. Bruinessen attributes PKK terrorists’ desires to revenge the counter terrorism measures taken by Turkish governments, namely, the Martial Law. On the other hand, there is an apparent dearth of literature that focuses specifically on frustration’s impact in engaging in terrorist activities. In fact, it is naïve to expect that frustration will end after the frustrated person joins a terrorist organization. As aforementioned, however, frustration is expected to persist until the frustrated person finds a suitable target to attack. This would only be possible if the frustrated person finds an opportunity to engage in (involve in) a terrorist activity in which he can release his frustration. In this sense, in identifying the characteristics of suicide bombers, researchers could better understand the role that frustration plays in the “involvement in” process, because a number of terrorism scholars point out that frustration has an undeniable role in participating in suicide attacks. Stern [33], for example, mentions that real or perceived humiliation of Palestinian people by Israeli policies has given a rise to desperation and unmanageable outrage among the Palestinians. Sprinzak [34], on the other hand, points out that Hamas’ resorting to suicide bombings did not result from their opposition to a peace process but rather a tactical choice which was meant to take revenge out on humiliating Israeli actions. According to Sprinzak, Baruch Goldstein’s massacre of 29 Palestinians in Hebron in 1994 was a turning point for Hamas to resort to suicide bombings. According to Hudson [35], “Hamas thrives on the misery and frustrations of Palestinians” (1999, p.183). Similarly, in Mogadham’s [36] opinion, the fact that many suicide bombers in Palestine have a desire to take revenge is attributable to the high rate of casualties and injuries, especially during the Second Intifada. In addition, Moghadam continues, many Palestinians, as well as Israelis, have “remained untouched


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by the violence” thus far and almost everybody has a loved one who has either been injured or killed. Empirical evidence supports the points made by Stern, Sprinzak, Hudson, and Moghadam. In a study of Palestinian suicide bombers, Yom and Saleh [37] reported that many of the bombers had an experience of violent encounters with the Israeli Defense Force in which they were either imprisoned or injured or lost family members. Soibelman’s [38] analysis of “the factors underlying the development of Palestinian suicide bombers” presented similar findings. Having interviewed five bombers caught before they detonated the bombs, Soibelman reported that all had some types of negative experiences with Israeli military such as shooting and killing a friend, beatings and unnecessary use of force at checkpoints. In light of existing evidence, one can comfortably suggest that frustration does not only play a role in joining a terrorist organization but also in the involvement of highly risky terrorist attacks. In other words, one can equally suggest that the involvement level may vary by the frustration level. Thus, it can be hypothesized that: H10: The probability of participation in a terrorist organization is higher for those who have experienced the death of a loved one. H11: The probability of participation in a terrorist organization is higher for those who have experienced the arrest of a family member.

3. Conclusion and Limitations The study has not been completed yet. However claims in this study should be empirically tested. The preliminary findings in this study suggest that frustration is an important factor for terrorist offender’s involvement in terrorist activities. In other words, if a terrorist has experienced a frustrating event such as the arrest of a family member or the death of a family member, this may affect his commitment to a terrorist organization or involvement in terrorist activities. This does not necessarily mean that social learning and relative (economic) deprivation have no implications in a terrorist life. However, social learning and deprivation may well affect an individual’s joining in a terrorist organization. However, subsequent involvement in terrorist activities or commitment may have different determinants, as suggested by the preliminary findings of the study. On the other hand, the study has some limitations. In the first part, the study analyzes the differences and similarities between terrorists and the general population. Thus, the comparison is limited to the variables found in the first dataset (N=1,076). For the second and third part, the study is limited with variables found in autobiographies. Obviously, involvement in terrorism can also be related to other variables such as the impact of the criminal justice system or the impact of terrorist leaders. Thus, the findings regarding involvement in terrorism are limited to individual factors such as age, gender, marital status, political party affiliation, education level, and so on.

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[64] McCormick, G. H. (1993). Sharp Dressed Men: Peru’s Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. [65] Morf, G. (1970). Terror in Quebec. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin. [66] Mythen, G., & Walklate, S. (2006). Criminology and Terrorism: Which Thesis? Risk Society or Governmentality? British Journal of Criminology, 46(3). [67] Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human Problem Solving. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. [68] Oberschall, A. (1973). Social Conflict and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. [69] Pearlstein, R. M. (1991). The Mind of the Political Terrorist. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resour Books. [70] Post, J. M. (1990). Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Psychological Forces. In W. Reich (Trans.), Origins of Terrorism (pp. 25-42). Washington, D.C: Woodrow Wilson Center Press. [71] Rapoport, D. C. (1997). Politics of Atrocity. In Y. Alexander & S. Finger (Eds.), Terrorism: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (p. 46). New York: John Jay Press. [72] Ross, J. I. (1996). A Model of the Psychological Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 2(2), 129-141. [73] Schelling, T. C. (1978). Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: W. W. Norton. [74] Schelling, T. C. (1984). Choice and Consequence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [75] Simon, H. A. (1976). From Substantive to Procedural Rationality. In S. J. Latsis (Ed.), Method and Appraisal in Economics (pp. 129-148). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. [76] Simsek, Y. (2006). Impact of Terrorism on Migration Patterns in Turkey. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, Virginia. [77] Sutherland, E. H., & Cressey, D. R. (1970). A Theory of Differential Association. In E. H. Sutherland & D.R. Cressey (Eds.), Criminology (8th ed., pp. 75-77). Lippincott. [78] Tullock, G. (1974). The Social Dilemma: the Economics of War and Revolution. Blacksburg, VA: Univ. Publ. [79] Turkish Anti-Terror Law. (12.04.1991). Act No. 3713: Law to Fight Terrorism. Retrieved February 9, 2008 from http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/btwc/nat_imp/leg_reg/turkey/anti-terror.pdf [80] Waterman, H. (1981). Reasons and Reason: Collective Political Activity in Comparative and Historical Perspective. World Politics, 33(4), 554-589. [81] Berrebi, C. (2004). The Causes and Consequences of Terrorism. Princeton University. [82] Davis, J. (1959). A formal interpretation of the theory of relative deprivation. Sociometry, 22(4), 280-296. [83] Krueger, A., & Maleckova, J. (2002). The economics and the education of suicide bombers. Does poverty cause terrorism. The New Republic, 24, 1-11.


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The Creation of a Terrorist: A Look into Social Environments Involved Silvia CIOTTI GALLETTIa and Sarah M. Hugginsb a EuroCrime Research Institute – Italy St. John International University b Virginia Commonwealth University Abstract. In this work, we conduct an examination of the sociological, demographical and political environments in relation to the origin of terrorist groups and similar illegal activities. Principally considering the significance of critical issues in the genesis and support of terrorist attacks, we attempt to suggest how these weaknesses can be transformed into strong elements devoted not only to prevent the development of terrorist organizations but also in support of the victims involved in these attacks. We will explore current and past terrorist activities in Morocco that will support theories suggesting that socio-economical despair and political instability amongst densely populated areas create a breeding ground for terrorist infiltration and extremist development. Keywords: Morocco, shanty towns, terrorist attacks, victims of terrorism

Introduction The recent terrorist attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan, Morocco, and other countries have forced us to examine the similarities of their social environments, cultural traditions, and political make-up. In fact, if we consider the civilians living in these areas and the origin of the terrorists, we can observe that they are coming from the same villages and neighborhoods with substantially similar ways of life, social levels, education, and so forth. Therefore, we can state that, in many cases, the social environment is a relevant variable in analyzing a terrorist attack. In our analysis, we will examine how the social environment and the community intervene in the “birth” of extremist movements and in the decision to participate in one of the movements. Considering that in many cases, attacks are made against people living in similar areas and social environments, we will analyze how these communities might not only be the “fishing pool” for terrorist organizations but also a high-quality and solid web of support for the victims of the terrorist attempts or attacks. Our analysis will focus on the Kingdom of Morocco and consider the attempts made in Casablanca in 2003.a The situation of the country is analyzed beginning with the three main critical issues that have been aiding the development of violent religious movements, frequently including the situation in shanty towns where many of the terrorists now live or previously lived. The strong social web of the shanty towns was, and still is, used by extremists to involve new members in their activities and to spread a

The analysis is focused on these attempts because we now have sufficient data and information to flag down their origin, development and consequences, thus allowing us to fully analyze their links with the urban and social environment and with the community.

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S. Ciotti Galletti and S.M. Huggins / The Creation of a Terrorist

their ideas; however, the same social web could be used to offer human and social support to the victims of eventual future attempts. In fact, even if the attempts in 2003 were directed towards a western target in Morocco (or, at least, places populated by western people, or in centers of western interests), it is probable that the future could face more dangerous and violent attacks against the local population in an attempt to spread terror and panic among the common people in order to destabilize the government and to increase their authority. Throughout this paper, one will observe that various elements play a role in the development of violent religious (or pseudo–religious) movements in Morocco, which are examined as an endeavor to provide an overview of the underestimated level of terrorist risks in this country. The complacency present will be revealed throughout this paper.

1. Critical Issue: The Spanish Enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla Ceuta (in Arabic Sebta) and Melilla are two Spanish enclaves located in the Moroccan territory. An enclave is a territory whose boundaries lie within another territory’s boundaries. This is not only a real point of access to Spain, but also to the entire Schengen European area. We are not going to describe in detail the particular situation in the cities of Ceuta and Melilla; however, it is necessary to underline various aspects that are relevant from a criminological point of view. First, the relationship between Spain and the two cities are far from easy to assess. Spain has difficulty in justifying to the presence of two of their own colonies in another independent country. Moreover, the colonies are not only in front of other countries, but as revealed in an internal public opinion, it is not desirable for the maintenance of the links with the enclaves. These difficulties have increased over the past few years since Ceuta and Melilla have truly been “under attack” by thousands of illegal migrants coming from the Maghreb and the sub-Saharan countries. In trying to use the two cities and their contacts with the motherland as a passage to the European Union (E.U.), discontent increased in Spain, Ceuta and Melilla, not only against the migrants, but also against Spanish control that was rejected, for instance, by the terrorist group “21st August,” based in Ceuta. As a first consequence of these mutual difficulties, while Morocco can not control these areas, Spain somehow does not want strict control over Ceuta and Melilla either, as they are centres for various negative behaviours. The situation of the two enclaves is highly critical. For example, enormous and solid enclosures are realised throughout the cities in an attempt to maintain illegal migrants, and camps were created to host migrants who come to the enclaves in hopes for an opportunity to travel to their motherland, Spain. Calamocarro was the centre for migrants in Ceuta; however this camp, as the one realised near Melilla, was completely inadequate to accommodate the large numbers of people arriving daily to the cities. Thus, the internal situation that developed became highly explosive. On September 27, 2005, almost 500 African migrants assaulted the metallic barrier that divided the Moroccan territory from the Spanish territory of Melilla. At least 200 illegal migrants managed to cross the double metallic gate; however, they were immediately arrested by


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the border police. Although the migrants were arrested and rejected by police, the local population was still deeply upset and affected by this event. Currently, the seven and a half mile barrier in Melilla is defended by law enforcement officers who use rubber bullets to reject the migrants’ assaults. Additionally, in an attempt to stop the aggression, the Spanish government recently built the barrier almost 10 feet higher. In October of 1995, local authorities decided not to allow the illegal migrants to leave Spain. In retaliation, the migrants began to throw stones at the local officials’ cars; thus, the citizens reacted with violence and tried to lynch the migrants who had been arrested. Discontentment was great, and Ceuta and Melilla were the preferred passage ways to the E.U., not solely for the migrants but also for the criminal organizations involved in human smuggling, drug trafficking and other criminal activities. Trucks carrying fruits and vegetables conducted the drug trafficking, typically reaching Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, or France upon leaving Morocco from Ceuta or Melilla, and criminal groups used fast and powerful boats to transport illegal migrants, cocaine or weapons at coasts near the two cities in order to reach the Strait of Gibraltar, a part of Spanish territory. The lack of regulations inside the enclaves enabled shelter for many terrorists, who used Ceuta and Melilla as a base of operation or as an intermediate stop during their movements. Situations in Ceuta became worse in 1999, when the Spanish Secret Service (Cesid) began an investigation directed towards the Grupo Indipendiente Liberal (GIL), Jesus Gil’s party. Jesus Gil was the very controversial mayor of Marbella and owner of the Atletico Madrid football team. Beginning in May of 1999, the Cesid began informing the Spanish government about the risks of a possible victory of the GIL in the near administrative elections in Ceuta and Melilla. The primary risk was the diffusion in the two enclaves of the same building. Speculation was carried out in previous years by Jesus Gil in Marbella, and more importantly was the existence of strong bonds between Gil and organized crime groups who brought drugs, human trafficking and money laundering into Marbella. On August 23rd, 1999, the GIL won the elections in Ceuta, a victory that enabled the power of Ceuta’s organized crime associations to become stronger, resulting in chief control on trafficking and smuggling humans. This uncertain position in Ceuta and Melilla, as well as difficulties in obtaining a clear role and position in the national and international chequers provided a great opportunity for terrorist and criminal organizations to conceal their businesses and coordinate their activities abroad, while maintaining a safe base of operation [1].

2. Critical Issue: the Western Sahara and the Polisario Front The critical political situation regarding Western Sahara and the relationship between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front are, in actuality, too complex to be effectively examined in this work. Therefore, we must simply draw attention to the fact that there were prolonged and uncertain situations in this section of the Maghreb territory. The various influences on their political culture connected to changing international policies, and the support given by some countries, including the Polisario

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Front and Morocco, created a difficult situation, by offering shelter and resources to criminal and terrorist organizations. For years, Western Sahara has become a base operation for many terrorist groups; not only for the Polisario Front and the connected groups, but also as a better passage way for cocaine coming from Colombia and travelling to Europe under the control of international and Moroccan criminal organizations. Moreover, weapons were often seen entering either Morocco, Europe or other Maghreb countries from the Western Sahara territories. Even if the Western Sahara situation appears to be currently quite stable, the ambiguity of the circumstances in this area and the uncertainty about who holds the responsibility of controlling and managing Western Sahara’s security, contribute to create a “grey area” in which illegal activities are tolerated and can thrive, spreading to the nearby areas [2].

3. Critical Issue: the Moroccan Shanty towns In previous years, a large portion of the Moroccan population moved from poverty stricken areas to the larger and wealthier cities, usually Casablanca and Rabat, in hopes of finding work in new industries. Many higher class communities were under construction in the suburbs, often near the seats of the industries, areas that became ridden with illegal activities. In addition, the area’s living conditions were deplorable, having no pipelines, sewers, electricity, or water services. Undoubtedly, these areas were at great risk of becoming shanty townsnot an ideal or attractive place to live by any means [3]. Casablanca and Rabat could not accommodate the overwhelming population influx, as, for example, in the shanty town of Casablanca’s Sidi Moumen, 170,000 people lived in an area covering 6.2 square miles and housing 30,000 families. Furthermore, other problems including sexual promiscuity, lack of safety, unemployment, and inadequate school structures continued to appear at the forefront. Under these conditions, the presence of drugs, petty crimes, organized crime, and an increasing influence of the extremist Islamic movements contributed to a feeling of discontent, thus leading to rebellion. There were also an insufficient number of law enforcement forces that were unable to control these rebellious behaviours [4]. In this climate, the May of 2003 terrorist attempts in Casablanca were planned and organized in the shanty town of Sidi Moumen, where 12 of the suicide bombers originated from the area of Almassira, the poorest part of Sidi Moumen. In an attempt to destroy these uncontrollable suburbs and to transfer the inhabitants into new districts, the Moroccan government implemented a new policy. In 2005, the government spent almost 363 million Euros trying to eliminate the shanty towns remaining in Casablanca, or 30% of all Moroccan shanty towns and the home to 47,000 families. These projects involved most of the district of Sakouila. There was another 30 million Euros designated for the region of Rabat, Salè and Tamara and for destruction of the shanty town of Sidi Yahia Zaher where almost 4,000 families lived. Yet, these interventions were carried out without cooperation from the inhabitants. The majority simply did not want to leave their homes, a place where they knew everyone and where they had their rules and “protectors.” They considered that being


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ordered to leave their homes constituted an injustice and abuse of power, and often reacted with violence or engaged in conflict with the police. Furthermore, more times than not, the new houses were not completed, thus requiring the inhabitants to finish, often including building a roof or buying doors and windows. Without having the necessary funds to afford these construction projects, they remained in an unstable situation just like the previous shanty town they came from. Moreover, the new living areas were not too different from the shanty towns previously occupied. The houses were constructed with cement, they remained isolated, almost confined, and the social problems were not solved. The inhabitants tended to recreate their previous living conditions, and nothing was done to drive out the drugs, crime or corruption. Although the new districts were basically better looking than the shanty towns, they were not, however, made up only of buildings but also by people who resided in those districts. As will become apparent, the difficulties connected with the situation of life in the shanty towns not only created a good climate for extremist Islam but also for the drug market and organized crime. Unless the Moroccan government decides to implement a new recovery program and look to the population’s cooperation and approval, shanty towns will remain full of corruption, crime and terrorists.

4. Morocco and Islamic Extremism Up until a few years ago, Islamic extremism appeared to be extraneous to the Moroccan society. The strong religious and traditional role of the monarchy granted religious unity and moderation among the population, unifying the Moroccan citizens in the pride of being ruled by a direct descendant of the Prophet.b Beginning in the late 90s, extremist ideas and feelings began to spread through Morocco, stemming from the universities. Moreover, the difficult conditions faced by students exposed them to the influence of extremist preachers, who were the only ones to grant them economical help, food, books and accommodations, in the name of the Islamic solidarity [5]. This different climate was perceived by the Moroccan Hebrew community that made up 0.4 percent of the total population and has since decreased to 0.2 percent in the last 40 years, with a large portion of the decrease taking place over the past few years. Currently, there are approximately 5,000 Moroccan Hebrews residing in Morocco, all of whom live in the Casablanca metropolitan area. Their position is becoming more difficult daily, due largely to the political attacks they have suffered since 2002 and 2003. The Moroccan Hebrews actually live almost a restricted life, trying to dissimulate their religious beliefs and avoid every kind of contrast and confrontation within the Islamic population. But how could the violent Islamic extremists spread through the Moroccan society? First we must acknowledge the fact that these terrorist groups are well-organized and operate with well-rehearsed protocol to target and entice prospective members [6]. b

The King of Morocco is believed to be a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed without interruption in the dynastic line. Owing to his origin, the King is called “The Lord of the believers.”

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The more well-known groups are known as Assirat al Mustaqim (The Right Way) and Attakfir Wal Hijra (Excommunication and Exile). In the Sidi Moumen, there are at least five different extremist groups. Former members of these groups described the system’s ability to attract these individuals into such movements. Extremist leaders would invite young men who were involved in criminal activities and those who had no hope for themselvesc to come to their place of worship,d promising spiritual peace, deep beliefs, and a new life. When the new recruit was present in the mosque for the first time, the leaders would begin the lessons and pray to rid the recruit from desperation and hopelessness. At the beginning, the topics were all about religion and nothing was mentioned about violence or terrorism. If the recruit continued to attend the mosque, the “brothers” would begin to take care of him and his family: money for marriage, funerals, food, medicine, and so forth would be provided. More importantly to note, to begin the assimilation of the new extremist ideas, they would only offer help to those who attended daily lessons and demonstrated interest and participation. After one or two years, the third phase of the recruitment process would begin: projection of videos exalting “martyrs,” the Afghan, Chechen and Palestinian terrorists. Simply stated, this was their training of life and violent death. After making it to this point, leaving the group is practically impossible. Similar to the inner city gang systems found in America, disassociation with the group or faction is all but non-existent. Once the terrorist group’s true agenda has been revealed, a recruit’s only choice is to flee or face most certain death. Results from this type of recruitment began to appear in 2002, when the Moroccan authorities dismantled a terrorist organization directed by Mohammed al Tubaiti, a Saudi Arabian citizen living in Morocco who was preparing a series of attacks in Morocco. In 1999, Al Tubaiti was given the responsibility to organize a “mission of martyrdom” in Morocco that included actively visiting the Moroccan shanty towns and suburbs. Through this mission, he managed to locate a sufficient number of young recruits disposable to realize the suicidal attempts; however, he was but stopped by the authorities just in time. In 2002, the Moroccan police arrested five individuals suspected to be members of an Al Qaeda organization. This group was caught organizing suicide attempts against NATO vessels in the Strait of Gibraltar. In addition, the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla were breeding grounds for young North African terrorists wanting to defend Islam and “liberate” the enclaves from “colonial” Spain. Algeria’s Islamic insurgency that has been ongoing over the last decade provided young militants for the movements in 1996, when Spain was ordered to leave the territories of the two cities, thus menacing violent attacks. The Spanish Guardia Civil recently reported that Ceuta and Melilla were “being used by individuals linked with violent Islamism to carry out tasks of recruitment and/or indoctrination.” Their document highlighted the creation of a hostile anti– Spanish climate in the two autonomous cities that could favour the radical aspirations of Salafist groups in both Morocco and Algeria. The list reported various regions of c

The high unemployment rate, most of all in the shanty towns, create large groups of young men passing their days just hanging around and consuming drugs, most of all hashish; the lack of social structures, for example, public sporting clubs, forces these men to remain all day in the streets or in the little public “café” with nothing to do, exposed to the solicitations of the extremist preachers. d Since 2000, extremist preachers took control on some mosques and, in many cases, on private ones.


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Spain consisting of were large North African populations and the likely existence of terrorist groups that were not fighting at the moment, but planned to attack if they were given the order to do so. In March of 2005, a Spanish judge ordered the detention for the alleged terrorist of Moroccan, Redouane Ben Fraima, already serving a prison sentence in Ceuta. Fraima was charged with the involvement in terrorist acts, in that he had a detailed plan of a ferry that plied between Algeciras and Ceuta, and other important documents in Arabic, French and Spanish. Redouane Ben Fraima was suspected to be a member of Takfir Wa Hijra, a terrorist organization planning attacks all over the world.

5. The Attempts in Casablanca in 2003 During the evenings of May 16 and 17, 2003, a dramatic terrorist attempt upset the Kingdom of Morocco: 41 citizens died and at least 100 were injured in suicide attacks carried out by 14 suicide bombers in Casablanca. Eleven of the terrorists who were connected with the Al Qaeda organization died in the attack. The suicide bombers were organized in teams; one team “exploded” near the Casa de Espagna, a Casablanca Spanish cultural club consisting of very popular restaurants that were crowded at all times. Other bombs exploded in front of the Consulate of Belgium, at the Safir Hotel and the club of the Hebrew Alliance, all places frequented predominately by foreigners. All suicide terrorists were Moroccan citizens, of which 12 came from the shanty town of Sidi Moumen, in particular, the Almassira area. Moreover, this group was supported by the extremist Jamaat Sirat al Mustaqim and Salafia Jihadia. These attacks changed the Moroccan attitude towards Islamic terrorism. For example, the hazards and dangers were near; the enemies were among the population, in the streets, markets, and in the schools where they lived, worked, and played on a daily basis. The Moroccan authorities had a strong reaction. There were over 700 individuals prosecuted and put on trial in July of 2003, due to their suspected involvement in the attempts. In August of 2003, a penal court in Casablanca sentenced three of the bombers to death as well as an Islamic extremist, all members of Salafia Jihadia. Another 83 suspects were sentenced ten years to life in prison. In September, a penal court in Kenitra sentenced 27 Islamic extremists, also all members of Salafia Jihadia, from six months to 15 years for their involvement in the Casablanca attempts. Pierre Robert, a French extremist known as Abu Abderrahman, and three other members of Salafia Jihadia were sentenced to a life sentence, while another 22 received sentences ranging from 10 to 30 years. As a result, although the reaction was strong and quick, yet, it was a repressive solution with massive imprisonments and powerful and publicized trials. Even if the suspects around Sidi Moumen and other shanty towns increased after these attempts, no measures were adopted to prevent the diffusion of Islamic violence in these areas. Moreover, very little was accomplished in trying to understand the links between the Moroccan suicide bombers and the international terrorist organizations. There was little attempt to realize the various systems used to finance this attempt, and more importantly, very little attention was dedicated to the Informal Value Transfer Systems (IVTS) used to obtain the money necessary for the bombings [7].

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IVTS, and particularly Hawala, were regularly used for money transfers from one country to another as well as being the preferred instruments used by immigrants to send money to their home country. Based on trust and informal passages of money, these systems, however, have been subjected to abuses. For instance, they have been used by organized crime groups and organizations for money laundering activities and by terrorist organizations to transfer money to the cell that organizes attacks. In fact, in addition to money coming from criminal activities kidnappings, armed robberies, human smuggling, and drugs and various organizations, “state sponsorship” governments and political parties, the IVTS was absolutely fundamental for terrorist groups to obtain the necessary economic resources to carry out these heinous acts [8]. The IVTS can be utilized in any network that is used to transferring funds from one place to another, either without leaving a formal paper trail of the transaction or without going through regulated financial institutions. They are also used for many types of transnational criminal activities, namely, tax evasion, human smuggling, drugs, and stolen works of art trafficking. One must acknowledge, however, that funds may be perfectly clean at the beginning, for example, money from state agencies, charities, businesses, and so forth. In fact, we can have two different kinds of money sources: legal contributions and illegal contributions. Legal sources include funds from charities, the use of commercial entities, dues from local institutions, cultural events, fundraising, contributions from the wealthy, and contributions from state agencies. Illegal contributions include acts of drug trafficking, kidnapping, robberies, extortions, cigarette smuggling, credit card fraud, welfare frauds, and the sale of counterfeit or stolen goods such as works of art, to name only some. In Arabic, “hawala” means “transfer” and in Hindi, the term means “reference.” Hawala simply involves the transfer of money and values from place to place; there is often a type of “security code,” or “reference,” to ensure that the rightful recipients receive the transferred funds. This is important because this reiterates the fact that in its relevant development, this economic instrument of convenience was perfectly legal. The use of IVTS is an old method used for trade and remittances to the extended family in the global South, especially South Asia, and has traditionally been based on trust. Populations are served with no banking or other alternatives near to their place of residency. Money or valuables reach their beneficiaries within minutes or hours at a very good exchange rate without hassle or trouble, and even if Hawala is not by definition criminal, it is very vulnerable to abuse. There are two main aspects in Hawala: (1) sending or payment of funds (relationship between hawaladar and his or her client) and (2) the settlement process (relationship among intermediaries). Each hawaladar makes payments for other clients; in this way, funds do not have to move across borders because hawaladars send payment instructions via fax, e-mail or telephone. Because of the terrorists’ abuses of the IVTS, however, governments have put a stop to its use that places regular citizens in the hands of extremist and terrorist groups in order to use this system. Moreover, because of government regulations, hinders relatives’ financial assistance to victims of terrorist attacks and other crime victims are hindered. IVTS also obtain money from the black market and other currency exchange networks, courier services, or physical transfer methods, which include smuggling, correspondent bank accounts, gifts, money transfer overseas services via special vouchers and Internet web sites, Internet based payments or transfers, stored values


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such as pre–paid telephone cards, and debit and credit cards used by multiple individuals. It is not an easy task to control the IVTS, especially for a country such as Morocco that has been gaining a substantial amount of its national wellness from the money transfers made by immigrants. With that said, we know that the funds used to organize the attempts in Casablanca arrived to the terrorist cell through one, or more, of these systems. But, to date, we can not discuss in detail how the money actually arrived into the shanty town. In many Western countries, in an attempt to intercept money destined to terrorist movements, many controls and restrictions have been imposed to the “official” hawala system. However, this was not a solution, because the illegal money was still transferred using the “unofficial,” and almost impossible to control hawaladar, and these controls only increased the mistrust in Western financial systems by people legitimately using the hawala system. In fact, many strongly believed that the restrictions were imposed only to force them to use the Western banking system. The most effective way to obtain real control on the IVTS, primarily on the hawala system, is to use the same web of trust and cooperation that supports the systems themselves. If it is true that the terrorists, as well as other criminals, are exploiting the human and personal links and relationships to transfer their funds safely, it is also true that the majority of people involved clients or operators in these financial mechanisms are law abiding citizens, honest and, in many cases, willing to cooperate against the illegal involvements in the IVTS systems. It is possible to obtain their cooperation against the illegal use of these system simply by asking them for help (and not deletion!) in procuring information about “non clear” transfers and situations and offering them support and acceptance for their traditional financial systems. In fact, this is a fundamental issue: the IVTS are not only traditional, accepted and serious “banking” instruments for many people and many countries, but, in many cases, they are also the only systems that can be used to transfer money to isolated villages or poor areas. Completely stopping the use of this tool would end the only financial support system for many families and would dangerously intervene in the global economy of many countries where money sent home by migrants is one of the primary economical resources. This type of measure would destabilize countries and governments and increase the appeal of extremist movements that would present themselves as the defendants of local religion, history and tradition.

6. Activities Abroad and the Attempts on New York and Madrid Owing to the monarchy’s present strong and firm influence on the religious assets of the country and their moderate attitude towards Islam, many Moroccan extremist groups organized their activity abroad, actively cooperating with the organization and realizing that some of the worst attempts against Western targets have occurred in the last few years. Among these groups, probably the stronger and most dangerous was Takfir Wa Hijra, alias Martyrs for Morocco, believed to be an off–shoot of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM). This group has maintained bases of operation in Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Lebanon, Spain and the United Kingdom. Takfir Wa

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Hijra, whose name means “Rejection of Sins and Exodus” in English, is regarded as one of the most fundamental groups operating in Islamic culture today. Claims differ as to its origin; however, official Dutch government reports claim that Hijra is now under the guidance of a U.K.-based Palestinian, “Caliph” Abdallah al-Rifai. In fact, the groups have members who are not only Moroccan citizens, but also Egyptians, Palestinians, Lebanese, Syrians and other people coming from all over the Arab and Muslim world. To date, Takfir Wa Hijra is best analysed as a plan, an Islamic religious sect or cult, whose membership allegedly includes Al Qaeda deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri and Iraqi terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, rather than an organized terrorist group. Their members, who reportedly can never leave the group once joining, attempted to assassinate Osama bin Laden in 1995 in Sudan for his “liberal” views. Recently, Takfir Wa Hijra has been linked to the November 2004 murder of Dutch film-maker Theo Van Gogh. Moreover, Moroccan sources have asserted that Takfir members in Morocco have formed an operational alliance with the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in neighbouring Algeria. Samir Azzouz, a young Moroccan Muslim suspected of plotting attacks against several targets in the Netherlands, belonged to Takfir. Azzouz was put on trial in Rotterdam after being arrested in the Netherlands following the discovery in his house of plans, maps and other detailed information of concrete targets, including the nuclear reactor located at the southwestern town of Borssele, home to the Parliament House and the headquarters of the AIVD secret service at Leidschendam. The group also included Mohammed Achraf, an Algerian arrested in Switzerland in 2004, and the Moroccan citizen Abdelakim Akoudad, arrested in Spain for his involvement in the May 2003 attacks in Casablanca. Mohammed Achraf led a cell, part of Takfir Wa Hijra, that planned to detonate a truck loaded with 1,100 pounds of explosives near Spain’s Supreme Court, whose judges were leading a series of hearings regarding Islamic militants, including the Madrid train bombings in March 2004 that killed 191 people. The new attacks in Madrid, dismantled by Spanish Judge Baltasar Garzon, were planned for March 11, 2005. Among the potential targets were two train stations, the Picasso office tower, Real Madrid football stadium, the headquarters of the main opposition Partido Popular and, as previously mentioned, the Supreme Court building. Achraf, who was extradited from Switzerland to Spain in April 2005, is believed to be by Moroccan authorities, Abderrahmane Tahiri, a dangerous extremist who was expelled from France in 1995. Beyond Achraf, 30 other men have been accused of belonging to the cell that was originally formed in jail. The most recent “emir” or spiritual leader is Mustapha Maimouni who was arrested in Morocco and linked to the May 2003 Casablanca attacks. Two of those men were ready to serve as suicide bombers. The cell dismantled by Judge Baltasar Garzon was firmly connected with Mohammed Atta, one of the suicide bombers in the New York 9/11 attacks. In fact, while his permanence was to Spain in 2001, Atta was hosted and helped by Imad Eddin Barakat Yarkas, alias Abu Dahdah, now formally charged with mass murder for the September 11 attacks, who recruited Mustapha Maimouni and placed him in the Spanish cell. We tried to briefly recreate the web of connections and cooperation that links some of the most dramatic terrorist attacks of the last few years all over the world to Takfir Wa Hijra and its members. As we can observe, not only the attempts in New York, Casablanca and Madrid are linked, but also many other dismantled cells and avoided


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attempts are connected to the same terrorist web and the same subjects who are actively organizing terrorist activities and attempts even while incarcerated. Morocco is, somehow, involved in this web of terror. Some Moroccan citizens are members of Takfir Wa Hijra, and many of their contacts and relatives pass through the Moroccan territory using chances offered by the particular situation of Ceuta and Melilla. More than the internal terrorist menace, Morocco tolerates a more dangerous international scheme in which key elements include offering shelter, criminal resources and recruits to the large terrorist web of which Al Qaeda is considered to a part.

7. The Future The monarchy in which the King is believed to be a direct descendant of the Prophet is a good instrument to protect the Kingdom of Morocco from Islamic extremism. The deep religious beliefs of the population are directed in a collective, uniform and moderate direction that unify religious beliefs and social behaviours, consolidating both around the King, his family and entourage. For many years, however, Islamic extremism has made its appearance in Morocco, starting from the universities, the shanty towns and then spreading to the poorest parts of society. The extremists managed to get to the university population through their basic needs by providing food, medicine, jobs, housing, or offering the students all services that the universities were unable to provide; that is, free books for indigents, paper and pens, assistance in learning proper French, indispensable to study the scientific disciplines, and so forth. The influence and ideas of the more extremist part of Islam are now becoming stronger among the population and recruiting the youngest to become a part of the terrorist movements. Even if the Moroccan society as a whole resists the invitations to use terrorist violence, there are many other Moroccan citizens that were involved in terrorist attempts, especially in the worse ones over the last few years. In fact, it has been proven that there was an active involvement of Moroccan citizens in the New York 9/11 attacks, in the Madrid 3/11 attempts and in the last dramatic attempt in London on July 7, 2005. Moreover, the attempts in Casablanca in May of 2003 were all organized and known by Moroccan citizens to have come from the shanty towns of Sidi Mounem and Almassira. Investigations conducted by international police, the United States, British and Spanish authorities demonstrated that organized Moroccan terrorist groups were installed in many Western countries. Spain, Belgium and The Netherlands were at the forefront where groups were organizing and managing attempts all over the world. The fact that some Moroccan citizens migrated abroad has been spreading through Islamic extremism in Europe, and with the cooperation and participation in some of the main attacks toward the Western nations, created a climate of suspect around Morocco and its migrants. In fact, following 9/11 and particularly 3/11, in which Moroccan Islamists orchestrated the attacks, large portions of the Spanish society together with the government have become increasingly suspicious of North African immigrants. The concern and reaction of the Spanish authorities are certainly not disproportionate to the threat that faces their country. Salafi groups have operated in Algeria, Tunisia and

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Morocco for many years. These groups could potentially reach out to “compatriots” in Spain and execute attacks in that country and other European countries. These facts, connected to the great flow of illegal migrants passing through the Moroccan borders [9] continue to create difficulties for the Moroccan government. Even if the policies about migrations continued not to be as strictly defined in each country, the government still strives to obtain more trust of the Western government. This is an attempt to show active participation in the fight against trafficking and smuggling humans as the first step in recovering control over the Moroccan migrations. These actions are not as easy for the Moroccan government, and if they are capable of obtaining the approval and consent of Western government, serious conditions of social and economic instability in the country could be created at the same time. There are varying causes that contribute to Morocco becoming a good shelter for terrorist groups. The lack of cooperation on border issues between Morocco and Algeria has been useful for terrorists who use unpatrolled areas to obtain shelter. In this situation, Oujda, a Moroccan city near the border with Algeria, became a sort of “no man’s land,” where it is possible to traffic drugs, humans, weapons, and other illegal goods without difficulty which was used by many terrorists as a shelter among various final destinations. Additionally, the geographical position of Morocco located near to the European coasts and to Gibraltar is absolutely perfect to organize attempts, provide every kind of needed material, such as explosives, and then transport the goods to Spain, Italy, France, or Gibraltar and then return to Morocco after the attempt and “disappear” in a favourable shanty town [10]. Situations are not simple for the Moroccan government due to a direct policy against all the Islamic extremisms that could potentially create great discontent and delusion in the country, thus pushing the population towards extremist positions and creating opposition to the government and monarchy and a climate of instability. Morocco needs a defined policy against terrorism in cooperation with international institutions and with other countries, and most importantly, with European countries. The efforts made in recent years are encouraging, but still remain far from a definitive solution. However, the situation regarding terrorism in Morocco appears to be less serious for this country than other critical issues, namely drug trafficking and organized crime. In fact, the use of the Moroccan territory as a shelter, training camp most of all in the Western Sahara territory and in the areas near Algeria’s border and a “market” in which money can be exchanged increases income to pay the expenses connected to terrorist attempts. To date, the biggest problem regarding this topic derives from the Moroccan government’s international pressure more than from the terrorist organizations.

8. Summary and Conclusion This paper provided a brief overview of the various critical issues that aid in the development of violent religious movements in Morocco and provides an analysis of the origin of the people’s involvement in these groups who live in the shanty towns.


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The poverty, isolation, low level of education, high level of unemployment rate, and strong prejudices are some of the factors that keep these areas separated from other parts of Moroccan cities as well as from the “stronger” parts of Moroccan society. The solutions proposed were adopted and brought forth to assist the local population. However, the citizens did not consider these solutions as real support and help, but only as a way to control them and to move in other areas, thus not solving their real problems. In many cases, we can state that these solutions were also aimed to break the very strong social and human links between the people living in the shanty towns as is happening in many other parts of the world as well (for example, Brazil). These kinds of interventions made the links stronger through increasing the communities’ isolation and pushing them firmly into the arms of crime and extremisms that are the only resources remaining for the inhabitants living in shanty towns. But these solid links, through the strong presence of mutual support, find that the relationships are not only elements that contribute to the isolation of the communities, but could also be instruments in stopping the development of violent movements, creating “virtuous” social environments and a strong web to support the victims involved in terrorist attacks. Although many government reforms and interventions are required to begin and serve as an easy first step in an attempt to obtain these results, it is fundamental to:

work in cooperation with the community itself, not imposing solutions but proposing them, debating with the people belonging to the community and paying attention to their needs and desires; break the isolation of many communities, primarily the poorest; reintroduce isolated communities and neighbourhoods into the normal “life” of the city, thus increasing the infrastructure and involving the inhabitants in the common public life; stimulate the creation of local offices and structures devoted to social support; connect these structures with hospitals, law enforcement agencies, and so forth to develop a stable web for support to the victims of terrorist crimes; train people to work in these structures in order to provide medical, psychological, juridical, and economical support for victims of terrorist attacks; and use the web of support to spread information as a kind of “social enforcement” against extremist and violent ideologies.

If we really listen to the needs of these types of communities and try to cooperate with them, reintroduce them to a civil life and break their isolation, we could not only help them to support and protect the victims of terrorist attacks, but at the same time (and using the same structures and webs) end the spreading of extremist ideology and the recruitment of new members to terrorist groups.

References [1] Smith M.J and Tilley N. (2005). Crime Science, Cullompton (U.K.): Willan Publishing. [2] Griset P. and Mahan S. (2003). Terrorism in perspective. London: Sage Publications Inc.

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Hope T. and Sparks R. (2000). Crime, risk and insecurity. London: Routledge. Karstedt S. and Bussmann K.D. (2000). Social dynamics of crime and control. Oxford: Hart Publishing. Ronczkowski M.R. (2004). Terrorism and organized hate crime, Boca Raton (Florida), CRC Press. Makarenko T. (2003). “The ties that bind”: uncovering the relationship between organised crime and terrorism, in Siegel D., Van de Bunt H. and Zaith D. (eds.), (2003), Global Organized Crime–Trends and developments. Dordrecht (The Netherlands): Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 159 – 173. [7] Martin G. (2003). Understanding terrorism, London: Sage Publications Inc. [8] Perlmutter D. (2004). Investigating religious terrorism and ritualistic crimes. Boca Raton (Florida), CRC Press. [9] Finckenauer J.O. (1998). Migration and organized crime: the Russian connection, in Migration and Crime, proceedings of the International Conference on Migration and Crime.Global and Regional Problems and Responses, Courmayeur Mont Blanc, Italy, 5 – 8 October 1996, pp. 155 – 169, ISPAC. [10] Siegel D., Van de Bunt H. and Zaith D. (2003). Global Organized Crime–Trends and developments. Dordrecht (The Netherlands): Kluwer Academic Publishers. [3] [4] [5] [6]


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Instrumental Express Control of Toxic Substances in the Environment and Ways for its Rapid Decontamination as a Barrier for the Action of Bioterrorists Nickolaj F. STARODUB A.V. Palladin Institute of Biochemistry of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, T. Shevchenko Kiev National University, Kiev, Ukraine

Abstract. Biosensors for the express control of the total toxicity of environmental objects, revealing of group toxic elements and individual toxins among them are presented. Among the individual toxins, primary attention is paid to mycotoxins, in particular, fumasine, atrazine and T2. T2 is considered as a potential specimen for bioterrorists’ activities. Ways to decontaminate polluted environmental objects from different types of low molecular weight toxins are presented. More especially, the possibility of using some calyx [4] resorcinol arenas for specific binding of the number of mycotoxins and pesticides is discussed. This possibility is analyzed from two points of view: the application of calix [4] resorcinol arenas for the removal of toxic substances and the creation of the artificial sensitive layer of sensors revealed by the instrumental analytical devices in the express and on line regime. Both approaches provide practices demanded for the prevention of non-desirable consequences from bioterrorists’ activities. Keywords. biosensors, control pollution, environmental objects low molecular weight toxins, express determination, T2 and other mycotoxins, ways of decontamination

Introduction Today we live in a world with the very real and frightening concern of protecting our environment from bioterrorists who use biological warfare agents (BWAs) that are not only practical for solving local conflicts but also with the purpose of psychological terror aimed to inflict panic among people and to create permanent terror. The information gleaned from researchers throughout countries who have worked at biological weapon programs has been presented earlier [1]. Their investigations were directed toward the induction of acute diseases among people and animals, destroying sex status, prevention of antibiotic effects and others. BWAs are divided into three main groups: toxins, viruses and bacteria. Toxins are biochemicals of various origin and chemical structure, and mycotoxins may serve as one example of BWA. These substances are characterized by having more than 300 individual toxins produced by various fungi strains [2]. T2, aflatoxins, searelenone, patulin, and others are widespread and characterized by the high level of toxicity. For example, T2 mycotoxin has 400 times more toxic effect than mustard gas and lewisite and may be very simply

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N.F. Starodub / Instrumental Express Control of Toxic Substances in the Environment

prepared. Both circumstances and simplicity in obtaining and high level of toxicity present an extremely serious problem, because these toxic elements may be used as a weapon by bioterrorists. Out of necessity, it is important to mention that generally the use of toxins from among other BWA groups is the most probable choice of bioterrorists since viruses and bacteria present a bigger danger that also sacrifices the executors of terrorist acts as well. Appropriate services offered by simple, very selective and sensitive methods that reveal the components of BWA in one’s environment is an important task, among others, directed toward preventing serious consequences. Unfo rtunately, to analyze the low molecular weight toxins, using instrumental approaches such as a highperformance liquid or gas chromatography with mass spectroscopy or liquid chromatography with mass spectroscopy are required. Due to the extreme complication and exorbitant cost of analysis involved in these methods, the development of innovative approaches, namely immune analysis and particular chemo- and biosensors, is very urgent [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. In this review, primary attention will be given to groups of toxins known as endocrine disrupting factors; for example, mycotoxins, heavy metal ions (HMI), nonylphenol (NPh), surface active substances (SAS), and some pesticides. The analysis will be conducted by using modern approaches based on the principles of biosensorics. This aspect will be considered from two points of view: by analyzing the efficiency of our developed biosensors with the standard solution and comparing the obtained results with those received after the application of biosensors under real conditions. The type of biosensors, their peculiarities in design and details of the accomplished analysis will then be presented. Working in the field of developing biosensors involves basic research, creation of working prototypes and development of different elements of technology. A fundamental aspect includes the selection of types of transducers, or physical surface, and physical-chemical signals for registering the interaction of biological molecules as well as selecting sensitive biological material and developing effective methods for the oriented immobilization of this material. Working prototypes of biosensors are used in the area of human and veterinary medicine ecology and biotechnology. After examination of the biosensor work under real conditions, elements of biosensor technology production are worked out. Our investigations in field of development of biosensors and their application include the following steps: (1) control of the total toxicity of environmental objects by use of bioluminescent bacteria with an optical signal registration and determination of the intensity of Daphnia exometabolites through chemiluminescent; (2) revealing the groups of toxic elements by the electrochemical and thermo metrical biosensors with the sensitive elements presented by special micro organisms and enzymes; and (3) determination of the concrete toxic elements by the electrochemical and optical biosensors based on the enzyme and immune components as the selective structures from one side and the different types of transducers including surface plasmon resonance (SPR), porous silicon (PS), electrolyte-insulator structures (EIS) from the other side.


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1. Instrumental Analytical Approaches for the Determination of the Total Toxicity of Environmental Objects Usually different living organisms, Crustacea, fish, algae, fungi, some vegetables, and others are used to control total toxicity of environmental objects. International standards exist on the basis of determining indexes of Daphnia immobilization (ISO 6341:1996(E) [9]. This is a very routine procedure. Other approaches that obtain the practical applications are based on the control of oxygen consumption by microorganisms or determination of their luminescence [10]. 1.1. Method with the Use of Daphnia as a Sensitive Object We propose the principal new approach based on the determination of the chemiluminescence (ChL) level of a Daphnia living medium. The differences of measuring cell signals before and after introducing Daphnia in the solution to be analyzed are registered. In the experiments, Daphnia magna St. (Cladocera) was used that was kept in the medium according to the international standard rules [9]. In preliminary experiments, it was shown that only 1-5 of Daphnia’s are sufficient for the experiments [11]. The exited ChL of the medium was registered in the presence of luminol and H2O2, and the optimal concentrations of the above numerated chemicals were preliminary established in special experiments. Stationary, semi-portable and portable devices supplied by optrods, a high sensitive photomultiplier, or photo resistors were created for the determination of the intensity of ChL [12, 13, 14, 15]. Figure 1 presents the developed portable luminometer based on the photo resistors.

2 1

Figure 1. Portable chemiluminometer based on photoresistors. 1 – electronic part, 2 – reactor block.

Depending on the source of toxic substances, we obtained deviations of ChL values from the initial levels that were in compliance with the toxic effect’s intensity. In comparing the standard method with immobilization of Daphnia the results were accomplished. Potassium dichromate was used as the standard chemical solution and its toxicity was checked by the generally accepted method (according to the index of

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Daphnia immobilization), and was biosensor based on the determination of its level of ChL Daphnia living medium. Generally stated, the accepted method allows 0.1 mg/L of potassium dichromate as a minimal level. At the same time, the sensitivity of the proposed biosensor approach was almost two orders higher [16]. It is necessary to mention that the overall time of analysis was very different in both cases (about 24 hours and 30 minutes, respectively, for the generally accepted and biosensor methods). Sensitivity of Daphnia to mycotoxins of T2 and patulin was demonstrated [17, 18, 19]. Diapason of the measurements of T2 mycotoxin by the generally accepted method was in a frame of concentration of 0.01 – 0.1mg/L. At the same time, in the case of using the biosensor method, this frame was from 0.001 to 1mg/L. Moreover, the level of sensitivity did not depend on the time that Daphnia incubation was in the solution to be analyzed. As for patulin, there was the possibility for it to be in a quantitative determination by the biosensor method frame of 0.001–1 mg/L. 1.2. Method with the Use of Bioluminescent Bacteria as a Sensitive Object In this case Photobacterium phosphoreum K3 (IMB B-7071), Vibrio fischeri F1 (IMB B-7070) and Vibrio fischeri Sh1 purified from the Black Sea and Sea of Azov were used. The level of bioluminescence (BL) was measured by the devices mentioned above in section of 1.1. The samples contained 0.8 ml of the tested substance in 2.5% solution of NaCl, 0,1 ml of 0.5 M phosphate (pH 7.0) or phosphate citrate (pH 5.5) buffers and 0.2 ml of bioluminescent bacterial suspension including 5x105 cells/ml. In the other case, bioluminescent bacteria (105 cells) were immobilized in sepharose gel (about 0.1 ml) deposited at the end of fiber optics. In both cases, the BL intensity (I) was registered through 30-120 min. The level of toxicity was presented as the concentration which caused a 50% decrease of the intensity of BL (EC50). In the case of analysis of mycotoxin T2, the value of EC50 oscillated in the range of 7-19 mg/L depending on the time of bacteria incubation in the solution to be analyzed. It is necessary to underline that the sensitivity of V. fischeri F1 to micotoxin T1 is much higher in comparison with the sensitivity of Ph phosphoreum Sq3 [20]. As for increasing the patulin concentration from 0.63 to 40 mg/L by the influence on Ph.phosphoreum Sq3 during 12 to 60 minutes, it caused sufficient decreasing of the BL intensity. The value of EC50 for patulin was in the frame of 0.63-1.25 mg/L [20]. The dose-effect of patulin at a low concentration (low as 1 mg/L) may be confidently registered in the case of three repeated measurements. In this case, the toxic effect of patulin to bioluminescent bacteria may be revealed at a concentration less than 0.15 mg/L. Moreover with the prolongation of the influence time (up to 90 minutes) the toxic effect of patulin increased and the value of EC50 was in the frame of 0.15-0.63mg/L. By decreasing pH from the medium to the lower physiological limit (5-5.5), the sensitivity increased up to one order. The value of EC50 is analogous with semi lethal doses intended for animals, and it correlates with other indexes of toxicity (cytotoxicity, irritation of mucouses, e.a.) [21]. It is necessary to mention that the intestinal barrier in animals is destroyed at a patulin concentration of about 1 mg/L [22]. Taken into consideration of this fact, the above indicated data testify that the proposed biosensor analysis with the use of bioluminescent bacteria may be effective at the screening of water, juice, foods and other environmental samples. In studying the influence of different types of SAS on bioluminescence’s intensity of bacteria (Ph. phosphoreum K3 (IMB B-7071), V. fischeri F1 (IMB B-7070) and V.


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fischeri Sh1), it was revealed that the main part of the investigated substances act as inhibitors in this process. At first, the cationic and anionic SAS had similar kinetics of inhibition. Second, nonionic SAS has an additional stage in which the inhibition is absent or some activation of bioluminescence is observed. Therefore, for revealing toxicity of this group of SAS, it is necessary to incubate these substances with bacteria for a long time [23].

2. Biosensors for the Determination of Groups of the Toxic Elements To determine group specific toxic substances, for example, phosphororganics, chlororganics, cyanides and others, we have developed multi-biosensors based on EIS structures. The principles of design and work of biosensors were presented in [24, 25]. Since the number of enzymes that have serine residuum in the active centre (first of all, butyrylcholine esterase – BChE, acetylcholine esterase – AChE and total choline esterase – ChE) are very sensitive to phosphororganic pesticides (PhOrPe) and others (urease), when the thiol groups react with HMI, there is a possibility to simultaneous determine these classes of toxic elements [26]. The sensitivity of HMI and PhOrPe determination depends essentially on the incubation time of the enzyme membranes in the medium of samples. Two different approaches: (1) registration of the sensor output signal in the mixture of a substrate and an analysis, (2) separation of the inhibition reaction from the following measurement of the residual enzyme activity. In the last case, the threshold sensitivity of toxin analysis was about 10 times higher. The time of incubation, chosen experimentally, was 15 minutes. The concentration of HMI that could be determined by the urease channel of the sensor array lay within a range from 10-4 to 10-7 M, depending on the type of metal used. The range of linear detection covered 2 to 3 orders of the concentration change. The effects of both pesticides are very similar. The detection limit of pesticides indicated above was 10-7 M, and the range of the linear response was from 10-5 to 10-7 M. At the same time, the sensitivity of BChE to HMI was substantially lower than that of urease. The maximum sensitivity of BChE to HMI was for concentrations of more than 10-4 M. Activity of glucose oxidase (GOD) depends on the presence of HMI for concentrations above 10-4 M. GOD was used as a reference enzyme which has a minimal reaction in respect of both types of toxin groups. This type of device is able to work as the multi-immune biosensor. In these experiments, the simazine conjugates and antiserum to simazine and 2,4dichlorophenoxyacetic acid (2,4-D) were used. Specific antibodies to herbicides were immobilised through the Staphylococcal protein A. The analysis was accomplished by the sequential saturation way in which when antibodies are left unbound after their exposure to native herbicides in the investigated sample, then they have interacted with the labelled herbicide. The sensitivity of the sensor based on the EIS structures simazine the horse radish peroxidase (HRP) and when conjugates were used, they were approximately 5 µg/L. The linear plot of the sensor response lay in the range of concentrations from 5 to 150 µg/L. This sensitivity of the sensor based on the EIS structures towards both herbicides was lower than requested in practice. We tried to elucidate the main reasons for such a situation. One may be connected with difficulties to register sensor output due to the formation of air bulbs that appear as a result of high activity of the HRP. Use of high concentrations of ascorbic acid may be another reason for the lower sensitivity of this sensor. We changed the HRP label to the GOD one and

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obtained sensitivity of the analysis approximately 5 times higher. The linear plots for simazine and 2,4-D were in the range of 1.0-150 and 0.25-150 µg/L, respectively [27, 28]. An immune biosensor based on the EIS structures attracts attention because of a simple procedure of the analysis and existing possibility to accomplish multiparametrical control of the environment. For the repeated analysis, replaceable membranes are very suitable. The overall time of the analysis is about 40 minutes. Therefore, the immune sensor based on EIS structures may be used for wide screening of the environment for the presence of herbicides. This gives the possibility to perform an analysis of 8 to 10 samples simultaneously and is suitable for a wide screening of not only herbicides but also other types of toxicants. For verification, the results of analysis may be used by other types of biosensors; for example, based on the ionsensitive field effect transistors, sensitivity determined for the above mentioned herbicides is at the level of 0.1µg/L and less (up to 0.05 µg/L) that corresponds to practice demands [27, 28]. We believe that the sensitivity of the immune sensor based on EIS structures can still be increased. One of the prospective ways to do this can be the development of special suitable membranes. It is necessary to provide a very high density of the immobilized specific antibodies on the membrane surface. Moreover, it would be very effective if these antibodies were immobilized not only on the membrane surface but also in its large-scale pores, which would be accessible for large molecules of conjugates of herbicides with enzymes. In our opinion, synthetic biologically compatible polymers that can be prepared in a simple way with different levels of density and porosity may serve as a prospective material for such membranes [29, 30, 31, 32]. Of course, to increase the sensitivity of the analysis, it would also be very efficient to use monoclonal antibodies with a high level of affinity to analytes, choose enzyme labels with a high turnover of the activity and provide preservation of the enzyme activity during preparation of the conjugate. If the membranes are prepared in advance, the duration of the analysis may be shortened up to 10 minutes. Membranes are simple to prepare, are very inexpensive and they can be stored for a long time in the refrigerator.

3. Biosensors for the Determination of Individual Toxins For this purpose we apply SPR, TRIE and calorimetric based biosensors. 3.1. Analysis by SPR and TIRE Based Optical Immune Biosensors

The measuring part of the SPR device was made at the Institute of Semiconductor Physics of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and the principles of its construction and main algorithm of analysis are described in [33]. In special experiments, SPR was chosen as the optimal condition of the analysis accomplished. As a rule, we have analyzed in detail the number of main variants of approach: (a) specific antibodies from antiserum was immobilised on the gold surface of the SPR transducer through an intermediate layer from Staphylococcal protein A or some lectin and free analyte was in solution to be analyzed (direct way of analysis); (b) conjugate (NP, simazine, 2,4-D or T2 mycotoxine) with some protein – bovine serum


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albumine (BSA), or soybean tripsin inhibitor (STI), or ovalbumin (Ova) was directly immobilized on the gold surface of the SPR transducer and free analyte when an appropriate antiserum was in solution (competitive way with the immobilized conjugate); (c) the specific antibodies from antiserum were immobilised as in “a” and free analyte and its conjugate with some protein were in solution to be analysed (competitive way with the immobilized antibodies); and (d) immobilized and oriented as in “c” antibodies react with free analyte and then with an appropriate conjugate (approach with saturation of active binding sites on the surface). As stated, orientation antibodies on the surface are more effective with the help of protein A in comparison with the use of lectins. Maybe it is connected with the possibility of the presence of some carbohydrates not in the Fc-fragment of antibodies only but in Fab-fragments too. As can be seen, the sensitivity of 2,4-D analysis by direct way is about 5-10 µg/L, which is not high. Such a low level of sensitivity at the direct way of analysis is observed in the case of determining other low weight substances, for example: T2 mycotoxin, NPh. Much more sensitive was the analysis was accomplished by the ways appointed above as “b”-“d.” Biosensors based on the TIRE allows mycotoxin T2 up to 0.15 ng/ml [34, 35, 36]. Both optical immune biosensors can provide sensitivity of analysis that is needed for practice. Overall, the time of analysis is about 5 to 10 minutes if the transducer surface is preliminarily prepared. There is a necessity to mention that the immune biosensor based on the SPR is simpler then the TIRE biosensor. In addition, one must first be realized as a portable device. 3.2. Analysis by Calorimetric Immune Biosensor This biosensor was designed in two different forms: micro calorimeter and thermistor based devices. Efficiency of the immune biosensor in determining low molecular substances will be demonstrated by the results obtained in the experiments with NPh [37, 38]. The portable biosensor based on the microcolorimeter and thermistors are shown in Figures 2 and 3. For successful development of the calorimetrical biosensor, first it was necessary to set the optimal concentration of antiserum (for example, antiserum to NPh). For this purpose, 150 µl antiserums in different concentrations was brought in a measuring cell and incubated for 15 minutes to establish a baseline (this time the temperature was set in a barn at an optimum level). Then a 50 µl solution of NPh in concentrations of 1; 5 and 10 µg/ml were brought into the cell. Therefore, it was set so the optimum concentration of antiserum was about 5 mg of protein in 1 ml. To determine the NPh in solutions with the help of a thermal biosensor, it was necessary to build up a corresponding calibration curve. For this purpose, 150 µl of antiserum (concentrated in 5 µg of protein in 1 ml) was brought into a measuring cell and then 50 µl of NPh in a range of concentration from 0.5 up to 10 µg/ml was pumped into the measuring cell. Thus, an opportunity of “direct” detection of NPh by calorimetrical biosensor was demonstrated with a sensitivity of about 1 µg/ml. The overall time of analysis is about 20 to 30 minutes. Certainly, the sensitivity of NPh as determined by the thermal immune biosensor is much less than in the case of applying a SPR or TIRE biosensor, but it is necessary to mention the simplicity of accomplishing measurement. Maybe thermal biosensors could be used for the screening of toxic elements in environmental objects with the next verification of the analysis results by optical immune biosensors.

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1

3

2

Figure 2. Thermal biosensor system based on the principle of the measurement of the heat transferring and the solid phase electrolyte thermistors. 1- thermal sensitive unit; 2 – interface with the registration unit; 3 – laptop.

Figure 3. Biosensor is based on thermistors. Registering device (right) and separate thermistors (lings and below)


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4. Novel Multi-Parametrical Electronic Biosensors The measurement of one parameter at the complicated and multifactor characters of biochemical processes could not, in principal, be allowed to provide the creation of biosensors that would correspond to fully complex the practice demands, including selectivity, sensitivity and stability, in general, and to contaminated substances, repetition of results, needed functioning time, and others. To achieve this purpose, a microelectronic enzymatic biosensor was created that gives possibility to register a number of parameters, namely: the determination of glucose, sucrose and lactose in the case of controlling technological processes at the sucrose production or the estimation of glucose, insulin (I) and anti-insulin antibody (anti-I Ab) levels at controlling the diabetic and autoimmune state development. Such integral biosensor contains two separate channels simultaneously: amperometrical and thermometrical. These measurements were carried out in combination with those that were accomplished by the optical biosensor based on the SPR effect [39, 40]. The concentration glucose, sucrose and lactose were measured by the enzymatic amperometrical and thermometrical biosensors. At the same time, the level of I and anti-I Ab were determined by SPR and thermomethrical immune biosensors as well as by amperometrical immune enzymatic biosensors. The obtained results were compared in two aspects: providing of the analysis sensitivity and receiving objective information regarding the investigated biochemical parameters. Amperometrical channel includes a whole line of planar microelectrodes with the help of which the current one was registered. As a rule, the average value of three microelectrodes was preceded. Thermometrical channel is represented by a thin layer of sensors that work in differential regimes. Output integral biosensor signals are processed by a special electronic block. Thin layer temperature sensors were prepared in two ways: on the basis of platinum or oxide cerium. These sensors, together with the platinum working electrodes and reference electrode (AgCl) for the amperometrical measuring, were situated on the common solid phase. Three working electrodes were taken for increasing the accuracy of measurements. Thermometrical channel contents are also working and reference thermistors which have a weaving form. The concrete realization of microelectronic chips for multi-parametrical simultaneous determination in some biochemical quantities is shown in Figure 4. Thermometrical channel contents are also working and reference thermistors which have a weaving form. The manufacture technology of such chips includes: (a) chemical cleaning of the plate; (b) resistive forming of platinum film by evaporation pressure in a 5x10-6 mm box of mercury and the temperature of the evaporator and plate is 1800 and 200 0С, respectively during 4 minutes; (c) photolithography of resistors and electrodes with the use of mixture: ; (d) resistive evaporation of the 2 Pt + 4 HNO 3 + 12 HCl = 3 PtCl 4 + 4 NO + 8 H 2 O

silver layer at a temperature of 900 0С; (e) formation of contacts and reference electrode by photolithography with the application of mixture of 10% solutions of ferricyanic potassium and sodium phosphate (1:1) for silver; (f) preparation of the AgCl layer by electrolytic etching; (g) evaporation of protective Al 2O3 layer at the following conditions: pressure in box – 5x10-6 мм mercury, temperature of plate – 200 0 С, IE –120 mА, U –12кV, time ~ 3 min; (h) deposition of sensitive biochemical layer. The sensitive layer was formed in three steps: deposition of polyvinylchloride, mixture

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of one enzyme, or insulin, or anti-insulin specific antibodies with glutaraldehyde and, at last, nitrocellulose. It was demonstrated that thermometry allows control of concentrations in a frame of 0.002-25; 0.005-100; 0.1-10 mM and sensitivity about 2.35; 0.45 and 0.85 rel. units/mM for glucose, sucrose and lactate, correspondingly. From the other side, amperometry was characterized by values of controlled concentrations in a frame of 0.5-50; 0.1-80; 0.1-200 mM and sensitivity on the level of 4.3; 3.3; 3.3 nA/mM for above mentioned substances, correspondingly. In general, it is necessary to mention that these values correspond to the practice demand in respect to the sensitivity from one side, and from other one the obtained values have been conformed by special biochemical experiments. It is very important to underline that the total time of analysis is very short, and, in addition there is a possibility to obtain irrespective data about the level of a parameter by different approaches. The sensitivity of determining I and anti-I Ab in blood serum of patients with diabetics is highest at the application of immune enzymatic amperometric biosensors, among others. Unfortunately, we did not have the possibility of measuring the concentration of I with a needed sensitivity by thermometrical a biosensor. Maybe, there is a necessity to optimize the type and concentration of buffer systems. The SPR immune biosensor is the most simple among the other ones and can provide an analysis of anti-I Ab but not I in the blood.

Figure 4. Scheme of microelectronic chip (with the concrete materials and structure dimensions).

5. Way for the Decontamination of Polluted Environmental Objects As a rule, the decontamination of polluted environmental objects from low molecular substances is a very complicated procedure connected with the application of specific chemicals that may produce an additional non-desirable effect on living organisms. In our opinion, there are different existing ways to achieve such a procedure with the most


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effective one being the use of chemicals that are able to select binding toxins and their inactivation. In this respect, we have examined the efficiency of some calix[4]arens for the selective binding of simasine, atrazine and T2 mycotoxin [41, 42]. Calix[4]arens are as macro cyclic crater form compounds that can be prepared by acid catalyzed condensation of resorcinol with different aldehydes [43]. Calix[4]resorcinol arenas have the stabilized intermolecular interstice by four hydrogen bounds between the nearest hydroxyl groups of the neighbour’s rings (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Structural view of calix[4]resorcinol arenas and their transitions.

Thus, they are very important building blocks for the creation of hollow receptors [44]. It possible to select some calyx[4]arenas that have the most selectivity to concrete low weight chemical structures. So, it was demonstrated by a different selectivity in some calyx[4]arenas to 2,4-D, atrazine and T2 mycotoxin (Table 1). We consider that both discussed approaches, namely, express control of the presence of toxins and their simple and rapid removal from polluted objects are very effective ways to prevent nondesirable and dangerous consequences for living organisms. Table 1. Constants (Kа) of “host-guest” complexes at the interaction of 2,4-D, atrazine and T2-mycotoxin with calix[4]arenas. „Guest” 2,4 D Atrasine T2mycotoxin

CCalixarenas x 10-4 M 1 2 3 365 772 507 7 7 678 251 648 5 3 3 550 885 102 0 0

Moreover, it was stated that some calyx[4]resorcinol arenas as artificial receptors may be used for the direct creation of the nanostructure complexes on SPR’s sensitive surface for the binding of T2 mycotoxin according to the guest-host principle. In this case, it was shown that the use of the dodecanthiol as an intermediate layer increases the density of calyx[4]arenas receptors on the transducer surface and allows having a

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high sensitivity of sensor analysis of T2 mycotoxin up to 10 ng/mL. The structured selective sites on the basis calyx[4] arenas with the intermediate layer on transducer surface is demonstrated in Figure 6.

Figure 6. Structured calix[4]arenas on the gold transducer surface.

6. Conclusion The developed complex of the instrumental analytical devices based on the biosensorics principle can provide all practice demands with respect to the express, sensitive and simple monitoring of different environmental objects that reveal the presence of toxic substances. Among them, mycotoxins, in particular, mycotoxin in general, and T2 mycotoxin, especially, are substances that may be used as objects for bioterrorist activity. The strategy of any monitoring is based first on the determination of total toxicity and then, in case of positive results, the next steps will follow which are connected with the discovery of group toxic elements and their concrete specimens. Biosensors may cover all of these aspects of analysis. To effectively remove low molecular weight toxins from polluted environmental objects, there are prospective chemical substances, namely different forms of calyx[4]resorcinol arenas. Moreover, they may serve as selective structures that are capable for artificial modelling of binding sites the chemical way.

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[2] C.J. Mirocha, R.A. Pawlosky, Chatterjee K. S. Watson, W. Hayes, Analysis for Fusarium toxins in various samples implicated in biological warfare in Southeast Asia. J Assoc Anal Chem, 66 (1983), 1485-1499. [3] J.H. Rittenburg (ed.), Development and Application of Immunoassay for Food Analysis, London/NY, Elsevier Applied Science; 1990. [4] S.S. Iqbal, M.W. Mayo, J.G. Bruno, B.V. Bronk, C.A. Batt and J.P. Chambers, A review of molecular recognition technologies for detection of biological threat agents. Biosensors & Bioelectronics,15 (2000), 549-578. [5] A.V. Nabok, A. Tsargorodskaya, A.K. Hassan, N.F. Starodub, Total internal reflection ellipsometry and SPR detection of low molecular weight environmental toxins. Appl Surface Sci, 246 (2005), 381-386. [6] N.F. Starodub, A.V. Nabok, A. Tsargorodskaya, O.A. Gojster, G.O. Khmel’nitsky, Control of T2 mycotoxin in solutions and foods by biosensors based on SPR and TIRE. In: Proc Intern Conf “Sensor+Test 2006”, Nuremberg, Germany, 2006, p. 87-92. [7] N.F. Starodub, V.I. Nazarenko, S.P. Ivashkevich, V.V. Goncharuk, N. A. Klimenko, Principles of express instrumental control of total toxicity of environmental objects and their realization in space conditions. In: Proc Soc Automotive Eng (SAE) Norfolk VA, USA, 2006. [8] N.F. Starodub, V.G. Mel’nik, O.M. Shmireva, Instrumental approaches and peculiarities of design of stationary and portable analytical devices for determination of bio- and chemi-luminescence. In: Proc Soc Automotive Eng (SAE) Norfolk VA, USA, 2006. [9] ISO 6341:1996(E), Water quality – Determination of the mobility of Daphnia magna Straus (Cladocera, Crustacea) – Acute toxicity test. [10] N.F. Starodub, V.M. Starodub, Biosensors and control of pesticides in water and foods. Chem. Technol. Water, 6 (2001), 612-638. [11] S.P. Ivashkevich, S.P. Levkovetz, V.I. Nazarenko, N.F. Starodub, Chemiluminescence of medium Daphnia cultivation and optimization of conditions of it determination. Ukr Biochem J, 74 (2002), 9397. [12] N. Starodub, Express instrumental control of environment by new generation of biosensors. In: Abstract Book of 7-th International Conference “Gas in Marine Sediments”, October 7-12, Geology Institute, Baku, 2002, p. 170-173. [13] V.G. Mel’nik, O.M. Shmyryva, N.F. Starodub, Luminescent biosensor complexes based on uniformed impedancemetry systems. Physical-technical characteristics. Sensor Electronics and Microsystem Technologies, (2007), 1, 50-61. [14] V.G. Mel’nik, V.I. Nazarenko, N.F. Starodub, N.V. Maksimchuk, O.M. Shmireva, Electronic bioluminescent device for the determination of toxic substances. In Proc.: Electronic and Connection. Thematic issue: “Problems of electronics”, part 2, Medical devices and systems. 2008, p. 110-114. [15] N.F. Starodub, V.G. Melnyk, O.D. Vasylenko, O.M. Shmyriyva, M.V. Bogoljubov, Development and investigation of luminescent impedancemetric biosensor system. Proceeding of 13th International Conference “Sensor 2007”, Nuremberg, Germany, 22-24 May 2007, 1, p. 334-338. [16] І.А. Levkovetz, S.P. Ivashkevich, V.І. Nazarenko, N.F. Starodub, Application of chemiluminescent method for the determination of sensitivity Daphnia magna to different toxic substances. Ukr. Biochem. J., 74 (2002), 120-124. [17] O.S. Gojster, N.F. Starodub, G.A. Chmel’nitskij, Determination of Т2 mycotoxin by chemiluminescent method with the use of Daphnia. Hydrobiol J, 5 (2003), 85-91. [18] L.N. Pilipenko, A.V. Egorova, I.V. Pilipenko, N.F.Starodub, M.I. Kanjuk, S.P. Ivashkevich, Investigation of toxic effect of patulin with the help of biosensorics systems. Food Sciences and Technology, (2007), 1, 35-38. [19] N.F. Starodub, M.I. Kanjuk, S.P. Ivashkevich, L.N. Pilipenko, A.V. Egorova, I.V. Pilipenko Patulin toxicity and determination of this toxin in environmental objects by optical biosensor systems. Abstracts Book of 3-th International Scientific-technical Conf. “Sensors electronics and micrisystems technologies” (SEMST-3), Ukraine, Odessa, 2-6 June, 2008, p. 237-348. [20] А.М. Katzev, O.S. Gojster, N.F. Starodub, Influence of T2 mycotoxin on the intensity of bacterial bioluminescence. Ukr Bioch J, 75 (2003), 99-103. [21] M.T. Elnabarawy, R.R. Robideau, S.A. Beach, Comparison of three rapid toxicity test procedures: Microtox, Polytox and activated sludge respiration inhibition. Toxicity Assess, 3 (1988), 361-370. [22] R. Manfoud, M. Maresca, N. Garmy, J. Fantini, The mycotoxin patulin alters the barrier function of the intestinal epithelium: mechanism of action of the toxin and protective effects of glutathione. Toxicol. Appl. Pharmacol, 181 (2002), 209-218. [23] N.F. Starodub, V.M. Starodub, N.I. Kanjuk, A.L. Kukla, Yu.M. Shirshov, Biological sensor array for express determination of a number of biochemical quantities. In: Proc. of 2nd EUREL Workshop “European Advanced Robotic System Development. Medical Robotics”, 23-24 Sept. 1999, Piza, Italy, 1999, p. 57-64.

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[24] N.F. Starodub, M.I. Kanjuk, A.L. Kukla, Y.M. Shirshov, Multi-enzymatic electrochemical sensor: field measurements and their optimization. Anal. Chim. Acta, 385 (1999), 461-466. [25] N.F. Starodub, V.M. Starodub, Immune sensors: origins, achievements and perspectives. Ukr Biochem. J., 72 (2000), 147-163. [26] Y.M. Shirshov, N.F. Starodub, A.L. Kukla, N.I. Kanjuk, A.V. Prokopovich, R. Merker, Creation of the multi-enzymatic sensor for simultaneous determination of phosphororganic pesticides and heavy metal ions in solutions. In: Proc. of the 11th European Conference on Solid-State Transducers. Eurosensors XI. September 21-24, 1997, Warsaw, Poland; 1997, p.727-730. [27] V.M. Starodub, N.F. Starodub, Electrochemical immune sensor based on the ion-selective field effect transistor for the determination of the level of myoglobin. In: Proc. of the 13th European Conference on Solid-State Transducers, September 12-15, 1999, The Hague, the Netherlands, 1999, p.185-188. [28] N.F. Starodub, B.B. Dzantiev, V.M. Starodub, A.V. Zherdev, Immunosensor for the determination of the herbicide simazine based on an ion-selective field effect transistor. Anal. Chim. Acta, 424 (2000), 37-43. [29] А.V. Rebrijev, N.F. Starodub, A.F. Masljuk, Optimization of conditions of immobilization of enzymes in a photopolymeric membrane. Ukr. Biochem. J., 74 (2002), 82-87. [30] A.V. Rebrijev, N.F. Starodub, Photopolymers as immobilization matrix in biosensors. Ukr Biochem J., 73 (2001), 5-16. [31] N.F. Starodub, A.V. Rebriev Liquid photopolymerizable compositions as immobilized matrix of biosensors. Bioelectrochemistry, 71 (2007), 1, 29-32. [32] N.F. Starodub, W. Torbicz, D Pijanowska, V.M. Starodub, M.I. Kanjuk, M., Dawgul, Optimization methods of enzyme integration with transducers for analysis of irreversible inhibitors. In: Proc. of the XII European Conference on Solid-State Transducers and the IX UK Conference on Sensors and their Applications, Sept. 13-16, 1998, Southampton, UK. Edited by White, N.M. Bristol: Inst. of Physics., 1998, v.1, p. 837-840. [33] N.F. Starodub, T.L. Dibrova, Y.M. Shirshov, K.V. Kostioukevich, Development of sensor based on the surface plasmon resonance for control of biospecific interaction. In: Proc. of the 11th European Conference on Solid-State Transducers. Eurosensors XI. September 21-24, 1997, Warsaw, Poland, 1997, p. 1429-1432. [34] V.M. Starodub, N.F. Starodub, Optical immune sensors for the monitoring protein substances in the air. In: Eurosensor XII. The 13th European conference on solid-state transducers September 12-15 1999. The Hague. The Netherlands, 1999, p. 181-184. [35] A.V. Nabok, A. Tsargorodskaya, A. Holloway, N.F. Starodub, O. Gojster, Registration of T2mycotoxin with total internal reflection ellipsometry and QCM impedance methods. Biosensors and Bioelectronics, 22 (2007), 885-890. [36] N. F. Starodub, A.V. Nabok, Immune biosensors for the express determination of some endocrine disrupting factors in environment. In Book of Abstracts: Europtrode IX, Ninth European Conference on Optical Chemical Sensors and Biosensors, Dublin, March 30-April2, 2008, p. 241. [37] A.V. Demchenko, V.G. Mel’nik, N.F. Starodub Thermal biosensor for detecting nonylphenol in the environment. Ukr. Biochem. J., 79 (2007), 5, 173-176. [38] A. V. Demchenko, N. F. Starodub Modification of immune SPR biosensor surface at nonylphenol analysis. Biopolymers and Cell, 23 (2007), 2, 143-147. [39] N.F. Starodub, O.M. Shmireva, L.M. Shuliak, V.G. Mel’nik Multi-parametrical microelectronic biosensors. Abstracts Book of 3-th International Scientific-technical Conf. “Sensors electronics and micrisystems technologies” (SEMST-3), Ukraine, Odessa, 2-6 June, 2008, p. 10-11. [40] N.F. Starodub, A.V. Demchenko, N.V. Piven’, A.V. Goncharik Development of optical biosensor for express control of anti-insulin antibodies level in blood of diabetics. Proceeding of 13th International Conference “Sensor 2007”, Nuremberg, Germany, 22-24 May 2007, v. 1, p.439-444. [41] O.I. Kalchenko, A.V. Solovyov, S.A. Cherenok, N.F. Starodub, V.I. Kalchenko, Complexation of Calix[4]arenephosphonous acids with 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid and atrazine in water. J. Inclusion Phenomena and Microcyclic Chemistry, 46 (2003), 19-25. [42] N.F. Starodub, O.S. Gojster, O.M. Shivanjuk, V.I. Kal’chenko, Modelling specific sites for the determination of endocrine disrupting factors by chemical sensors. Abstracts Book of 3-th International Scientific-technical Conf. “Sensors electronics and micrisystems technologies” (SEMST-3), Ukraine, Odessa, 2-6 June, 2008, p. 82-83. [43] L. M. Tunstad, J. A. Tucker, E. Dalcanale, J. Weiser, J. A. Bryant, J. C. Sherman, R. C. Helgeson, C. B. Knobler, D. J. Cram, Host-guest complexation. 48. Octol building blocks for cavitands and carcerands. J. Org. Chem., 54 (1989), 6, 1305-1312. [44] O..M. Shivanjuk Functional calyx[4]arenas and calyx[4]resorcinol arenas in self organization and molecular recognition. Thesis of Dr. Sci., Institute of Organic Chemistry of NAS of Ukraine, 2005.


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The Impact of Law Enforcement Practices on Terrorism Ahmet EKICIa and Orhan ERDEMb a,b Turkish National Police b Malatya Junior Police College Abstract. Law enforcement response to terrorism is argued to be defining the factor in that will be successful -the terrorist organizations or law enforcement agencies. This study used a sample of confitents in Turkey, examined law enforcement practices, focusing on militaristic and traditional policing methods, in responding to terrorism in order assess the impact on the individual’s decisions to join a terrorist organization. The study also looked into participants’ perceptions about Community Oriented Policing (COP); and if it implemented in Turkey, how it would affect the individuals’ decisions to join terrorist organizations. More than 25% of the respondents reported the influence of law enforcement practices on their decision to join the organizations. A significant relationship was found to exist between brutality and law enforcement’s influence and reliance on militaristic tactics in an individual’s decision to join a terrorist organization. Keywords. law enforcement, counter-terrorism, Community Oriented Policing, PKK, law enforcement practices.

Introduction When terrorism hits a country, the first response comes from the law enforcement. When looking at the countries that have experienced terrorism, it can be observed that most countries apply identical or similar responses. The most common responses are the deployment of military in rural areas with the duty to search, find and eliminate or at least suppress the terrorist group. In urban areas, more traditional policing tactics are used, or more power is given to police for searches, seizures, arrests, eavesdropping and questioning. During this process the rights of innocent people are diminished by law, and in many instances are violated by law enforcement and other institutions. This is just what the terrorist organizations want and aim for. The more the public is dissatisfied with the government organizations, the more arguments the terrorist organizations have against the government and its representatives. A community that is dissatisfied with its law enforcement also gives the terrorist organizations a very large pool and a handy tool for recruitment. The question then becomes whether law enforcement organizations are actually fighting terrorism or supporting their cause? Fromkin [1] points out that the success of Algerian National Liberation Front was mainly because of the harsh response from the French government. Likewise Baynard [2] and Ron [3] argue that the terrorist organization Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) gained public support because the Peruvian government responded with classic and harsh methods. Turkey’s response in the early

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A. Ekici and O. Erdem / The Impact of Law Enforcement Practices on Terrorism

stages to the actions of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was no exception; Durna and Hancerli [4] indicate similar response tactics. On the other hand community policing has been proposed as a philosophy that can be applied in all community problems. The threat of terrorism is certainly a community problem, because in many cases the target is the community; sometimes for recruitment purposes and sometimes to cause chaos and fear in the community for the achievement of the terrorist organizations goal. In times when terrorism strikes, which policing tactics would be more effective for law enforcement: militaristic and classic policing tactics or community based policing methods? This study used responses from confitents (individuals who used to be a member of a terrorist organization and (a) had engaged in operations of the organization but have changed their mind and surrendered, (b) were captured and decided to provide information about the organization and its operations, and are serving their sentence in Turkish prisons) located in different prisons in Turkey assessed the impact of law enforcement practices on the decisions of individuals’ to join terrorist organizations. Since the main response tactics consisted of military responses and traditional policing tactics, those were assessed. Respondents were also asked to indicate whether their initial response would have been different if law enforcement had applied community policing methods in their fight against terrorism and in service delivery. The respondents were made up of 59 PKK members, 24 Turkish Hezbollah (TH) members, and 8 other group members.

1. Purpose of the Study Turkish law enforcement agencies, along with their counterparts all over the world, try to fight terrorism with all means they have and all methods they know. However, especially during the initial phases of terrorism, because of mistakes in methods and tactics, the populace from time to time has stopped supporting the law enforcement and even shown sympathy and to support to terrorist organizations. For a long time law enforcement agencies did not practice community based policing methods which focus largely on the identification of the root causes of problems within the community. Finding possible solutions, applying them with the involvement of the community, and preserving the democratic rights of the individual are central to the community policing model. Where applied to the problem of terrorism the community policing philosophy emphasizes winning the hearts and minds of the public. If this can be achieved the recruitment arguments by a terrorist organization can be minimized, and the counterterrorism can be maximized. As Gozubenli and Akbas [5] argue, “for police agencies to successfully implement effective antiterrorism strategies they must focus on long term strategies, rather than policing practices that only provide temporary or reactive responses” (p. 208). Past studies have focused on the many aspects of terrorism, but the role of law enforcement and their behavior, their actions or inactions, their relationships with the public, and their service policies, have been important considerations that are not well researched. The determination of which police practices may cause individuals to side with terrorist organizations and which practices may contribute to siding with law enforcement will be useful information for all countries and law enforcement decision makers that face the threat of terrorism. This study focuses on the effects of law enforcement practices and their impact on the decision making process of individuals


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to join terrorist organizations. In short, this study looks into past law enforcement practices to identify what, if any, law enforcement practices, strategies, methods and policies influence the decision making process of individuals who become terrorists.

2. Brief History of the Problem: Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers’ Party-PKK) The PKK, known also as the Congress for Freedom and Democracy in Kurdistan (KADEK) or Kurdistan People’s Congress (KONGRA-GEL), or under any other alias is recognized by the European Union (E.U.) and the United States (U.S.) as a terrorist organization [6]. The history of the organization can be summarized in parallel with its imprisoned leader: Abdullah Ocalan. While attending Ankara University’s College of Political Science, he was arrested for handing out fliers and served seven months in prison. After his release from prison in 1973, he created the Kurdish Revolutionists with those who shared Marxist-Leninist theory/ideology. In 1976 the group expanded their recruitment efforts to the South East provinces of Turkey. It was only after their first congress in 1978 that the organization took the name Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK). Abdullah Ocalan took the responsibility of writing the Foundation Statement of the PKK [7] where he made reference to the liberation of Kurds scattered in Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, and the formation of a Greater Kurdistan [8]. Just before the military coup, Ocalan fled to Syria in 1979 and got a camp in Bekaa Valley from the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) [7]. For about six years the organization continued its recruitment and training in secrecy but also contacted other states for support which they received. After its second congress in Syria in 1982, the organization started its armed campaign and the first attack took place in 1984. The attacks continued in urban areas with bombings, suicide attacks, and mines on roads and in the countryside. The attacks also targeted international relations, interests and the global image of Turkey; the PKK kidnapped foreign tourists, attacked Turkish diplomats in Europe, and assaulted symbolic representatives such as teachers in the Southeast of Turkey [8]. Radu [9] states that the PKK had a Marxist-Leninist ideology while claiming to be fighting for the rights of the Kurds and Kurdish Nationalism. Toward this effort the sole leader without question, Abdullah Ocalan, surprisingly did not speak Kurdish but Turkish. In 1985, the organization created the Kurdish National Liberation Front, which was mainly responsible for propaganda and recruitment. Another effort to increase recruitment and propaganda was the creation of MEDTV, a TV station for broadcasting. In 1986, the Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulus Ordusu (ARGK [Kurdish National Liberation Army]) was created [10]. One other important decision was to send suicide bombers to every province in Turkey [11]. And, a cease fire declared by Ocalan in 1990 soon came to an end an attack killing 33 soldiers in 1993when the organization realized that they were losing power. The organization used all means and methods to achieve its goals: legal political parties were created followed by organizing so called peace meetings and celebrations. The peace meetings were so called because the organization never ceased its armed attacks. After the capture of its leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999, the organization changed its arguments again and declared the goal as reaching

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“Democratic Republic and Peace”, arguing for democratic change within Turkey as a solution to the Kurdish problem. The changes in tactics continued with the decision to get rid of a “terrorist organization image” during the congress in 2002. Accordingly, the organization changed its name to Kongreya Azad zˇ Demokrasiya Kurdistan (KADEK). Until 2004 there were no major attacks; however, starting in 2004, attacks took place targeting law enforcement and governmental buildings in Turkey, especially along the Iraqi border. One main reason for an increase in the attacks was shown as the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq and the unwillingness to allow the Turkish military to strike against the PKK bases in Northern Iraq. In 2007, following an increase in terrorist attacks inside Turkey, including an ambush by PKK where 13 Turkish soldiers were killed, followed by another ambush which killed 12 more soldiers and captured another 8, the Turkish military attacked PKK camps in Northern Iraq on December 16, 2007. The PKK never stopped using violence against civilians, law enforcement, and other governmental representatives. Kule [12] states that: The PKK combined violence and terror with political organization. The village guards were the top priority target of the PKK for many years [13]. Many school teachers and civil servants were killed; schools and other public institutions were burned to reduce the existence of the Turkish state in Southeast Turkey. Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, once stated that ‘the violence alternative may be difficult and painful, but it provides results.’ Alkan [14] writes that terrorist organizations have to maintain violence because it serves their goals to provide propaganda, to announce their existence, to provide morale to their members, to scare those who are not supporters, to shake the authority of the government, to force the government and its representatives to use coercion and oppression against the public, to train their members, and finally to create chaos. 2.1. PKK’s Recruitment Methods Aktan and Koknar [15] report that the ordinary Turkish terrorist is of average intelligence, not very perceptive of his/her environment, an introvert, and easily manipulated. Dire economic conditions, religious sensitivities, ethnic consciousness, and pressure from the feudal social structures push young Turkish people into the arms of terrorist organizations. Ocalan’s dictate was that “in order for the revolution to be accepted by the public, the idea of revolution had to be extended to especially educated part of society and larger groups had to be included in the action” (as quoted in Pirim and Ortulu, [7]). The educated groups were those in the universities. Some associations were formed by the organization for recruitment purposes. Existing associations formed for other reasons (e.g. cultural associations, aid and cooperation associations, and beautifying associations) were used for meeting and recruitment purposes of the organization [7] as well. In past practice, prisons in Turkey were organized in dormitory style rather than isolated cells; unfortunately, the captured terrorists were placed in this system, offering a recruitment venue in that even if the individual was not a hard core terrorist he/she would receive political and ideological training, as well as close combat


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training [15]. As there were many protests, hunger strikes, resistance and riots causing the deaths of 30 inmates and 2 Gendarmerie officers, in 2000 one and two person cells were introduced. One other method the PKK used was the so called military law of the PKK developed in 1986. Based on this law, the organization used children as young as 15 as soldiers; the majority of these children were taken by force and kidnapped from their families [15]. The children feared that their families would be hurt if they did not obey while the families feared for their children. Esentur [16], states that of those children that had joined the terrorist organization, 86% reported that they had joined the organization to support their family income but argued that the promise was not kept by the organization. The main reason for not leaving the organization was stated as fear of reprisal to them or their families. Once recruited, individuals were kept within the organization through repression and fear of reprisal. The terrorist organization used a double edge knife. The PKK also established a network of sympathizers who would supply funds, food, and when needed, sanctuary and also recruited foreigners from Iran, Iraq, Syria, Armenia, Lebanon, Greece, and Germany. Although tribalism still exists in the East and Southeast regions of Turkey, most of the tribal leaders were not supportive of the terrorist organization. The organization, in order to gain the support of tribal leaders, used threat, oppression, and attacks on villages and forced people to take sides. Turkish military uniforms were used in order to focus villager anger towards the Turkish military and law enforcement, thereby achieving one of the main goals of alienation and creation of distrust of the government. Of course the actions of the PKK also led to repressive measures by law enforcement as well. Singer [17] points out that losing a loved one for the cause may fill the rest of the family members with pride and may encourage them to join the organization as well. When pride is insufficient, suffering and the desire for revenge may lead to the same outcome. Pedahzur [18] reports that some Chechen women became suicide bombers after losing a loved one. Although not verified it is claimed that Ocalan gave an order that there had to be at least one martyr in every household, and if not caused by combat with law enforcement, the organization would do it and blame the Turkish military. “In an environment where there are economic difficulties, poverty, lack of education, employment, and a constant threat from a terrorist organization and lack of trust for government representatives, individuals may feel pushed to join with the terrorist organization because they argue for equality, better conditions, and employment and blame all sufferings on the existing government” [19]. Kule [12] argues that it is through peer, friend, relative, or school relations where individuals learn about the terrorist organizations and that it is a socialization process of learning terrorism. Alkan [14], who makes similar arguments, identifies the use of social and psychological methods in recruitment by terrorist organizations. He identifies social methods as friendship relations, family members and fellow countryman or citizenry. Organizing social and cultural events or arranging meetings to discuss religious views are also social methods to identify possible recruits. The last social method is identified as ethnic identity; thus, if you are a Kurd it is your obligation to join them. Motivation and group dynamism are identified as the two psychological methods [14].

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3. Problems with Law Enforcement Practices against Terrorism Throughout the world many countries have experienced the pain of terrorism, some more than others. Turkey has been of those who suffered more than others; in the last three decades, around 40 thousand people have lost their lives in the fight against terrorism while 100 billions of very hard needed dollars that could be spent on development of the country had to be spent on military operations against the terrorist organizations [20]. Although Turkey has been fighting terrorism since its existence in 1923, [21] it has been the last three decades that has had the highest impact. After the military coup of 1980, most terrorist organizations seized but the PKK continued its existence and became even more powerful and active. The TH was the second notorious terrorist organization that became active. Unfortunately these organizations became more powerful because there were nations that gave all sorts of support to these organizations [22]. When it comes to reacting, the response of the Turkish government and law enforcement has been similar to other countries. The military was assigned to find and capture the terrorists. The military, also including the gendarme, employed tactics that they were most familiar with. The government initiated martial law while the military conducted operations in many areas including outside the borders of Turkey. Inside the borders, decisions were taken to restrict movement in areas which the military officials considered possible areas for terrorist activities. The military had all authority to fight the terrorists and in many instances the civilian police, although legally not required, became subordinate to the military in small residential areas. Because of the constant threat the police also made use of similar tactics as of the military. The classic policing tactics were applied in the fight against terrorism while delivery of all other services was dropped, safety and security was emphasized more than everything; even the rights of the civilians. The law enforcement response, especially in the early stages of the threat, was more reactive rather than proactive. In some regions law enforcement treated all residents as possible terrorists because terrorist activities were high in these regions and the terrorist groups could easily recruit manpower. The laws gave extra power to the law enforcement agencies, which unfortunately was abused by some officials. The law enforcement response focused on fighting the terrorist organizations but little or no attention was given to the cause of the problem; research was lacking to look into why some individuals joined the terrorist organizations and most importantly whether the practices of law enforcement agencies were actually successful. Law enforcement agencies assumed that the fight had to rely on weapons, military tactics, and classic policing methods. Because of this, communication and relations with the populace was weak, which also caused a dearth of good intelligence. In many examples, the idea was that for the safety and security of the state and people, some democratic rights of the populace could be sacrificed. “Law enforcement tactics and methods, supported by laws and conditions, has led to intimidation of civilians, reduction in the quality of life, distrust of law enforcement, and sympathy towards terrorist organizations” [19]. The “criminal justice” model and the “war” model are two models identified by Crelinsten [23] for responding to terrorism. In the criminal justice model it is the civilian police force that is the main responding agency that makes use of minimum force while maintaining democratic methods and tactics. On the other hand, in war model, the main responding agency is the military, with the means and methods at


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hand, which may require war standards, use of maximum power and restrictions in some democratic rights for the sake of fighting terrorism. Turkey was not totally inexperienced in fighting terrorism prior to the emergence of the PKK. Since its establishment, the Turkish State has had to deal with some form of terrorist group; some are religiously motivated, others ideologically, nationalistically, or ethnically motivated. Still it can be argued that the responses to the PKK threat were not totally proper. The responses of Turkey to terrorism can be categorized under four main headings: 1-Law enforcement responses, 2- Economic policies, 3- Laws and regulations, and 4- International policies. 3.1. Law Enforcement Responses Law enforcement responses consist of military operations within national borders, outside national borders, the enactment of martial law and later on a state of emergency, the creation of temporary village guards and the creation of Special Forces in military and in civilian police. Radu (1998) states that in the first years of PKK operations, Turkey did not realize the real threat and the response was not adequate to stop the organization’s growth. Aktan and Koknar [15] note that Turkey did not take seriously the “people’s war rhetoric of Ocalan.” As in previous counter terrorism actions, Turkey did not comply and did not even consider the demands of terrorist organizations. After the initial attacks of PKK, the military conducted numerous small and large scale operations in the mountainous areas of East and South East Anatolia. Of course, these were not sufficient because in many cases the attacks were planned and coordinated from Iraq and thus the military initiated incursions in to Iraqi soil. Between 1983 and 1999 a total of 24 military operations were launched in to Iraq. Of course these operations were based on the self defense doctrine as well as on bilateral agreements. Because of the brutal terrorist campaigns during the late 1970’s, Turkey had limited some civil rights; after the military coup in 1984, martial law was declared in nine Eastern and Southeastern provinces. This martial law was replaced by a “state of emergency” in 1987 which lasted until 2002. Although the military used strategies to cover as much area as possible, most of the attacks were against villages in remote and mountainous areas. The scattered settlements made it impossible to provide military force in each and every village. As argued by Radu [9], one of the most effective measures taken by Turkey was a community-based response. With the proposal of the military and based on a law enacted in 1985, the Village Guard was created. Volunteer villagers were enlisted as village guards. This provided recognition and pride to the villagers as well as economic benefit because the government paid the village guards. On the other hand, the PKK denounced the villages with village guards as traitors and collaborators and ordered punitive strikes, followed by brutal attacks to villages where entire families or villages were wiped out. This earned Ocalan the nickname of “baby killer” [15]. Using one of the main methods of most terrorist groups, the PKK moved in small groups through the mountainous areas of Southeastern Turkey. From time to time, the small groups came together and conducted their attacks but never remained in large groups. In contrast, the military acted in larger numbers and were easily detected by the terrorist groups. The large numbers also made movement from one spot to another more difficult and took more time. The police as well as the military decided to create

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new Special Operation Forces and trained them in unconventional counterinsurgency tactics. Supplied with the most up to date technical and specially developed operational equipment and training, these units achieved great success, especially in rural areas [24]. The police had about 6,200 men in these Special Forces and conducted operations in urban areas as well as joining the military in rural areas. Meanwhile, the military created a professional corps that consisted of noncommissioned officers who had already served their military service [15]. 3.2. Economic Policies Research has shown that one of the main reasons for individuals to join terrorist organizations is poverty, usually as a result of a lack of employment and poor economic conditions in a region [25]. Koseli [22] maintains that poverty has had an effect on Turkey’s terrorism problem; if the government wants to solve the problem it should focus more on improving economic conditions. The government provided income to many families with the introduction of Village Guards, but this only covered a small proportion of the people who were unemployed. Because of terrorism, there was not much industry in the affected regions and farming did not provide sufficient income. However, one of the world’s biggest projects has been the Southeastern Anatolian Project (Ataturk Dam, GAP). The project estimation was $32 billion but current numbers show it has exceeded that. Radu [9] reports that between 1983 and 1992, the investment per capita in the region was twice that of other regions. When finished, it will provide sustainable development in the region. In order to attract investment in the region, the government offered incentives such as no taxes, energy at reduced prices, and deductions in health and social security payments for employees. 3.3. Laws and Regulations Although most laws enacted, restricted the democratic rights and free movement of the people, they all were aimed at providing more safety and security. In addition, specific laws were enacted that targeted the individuals that were already members of a terrorist organization. The Repentant law was one of the most influential laws -but enacted and applied differently several times- that led many members of the terrorist organization to surrender to Turkish authorities, provide information, and cooperate with law enforcement against the organization. The law was enacted in 1980, 1985, 1988, and 1999 [26]. The next bill with a similar goal was “The Returning Home Bill” (or “The Win Back to Society Bill”) and was enacted in 2003. Both of these laws offered a sort of pardon to terrorists that were forced to join the organization and wanted to leave but feared punishment by the government. The individuals could surrender or be captured; either way, they could petition to have the law applied to their case [27]. Other laws aimed to improve the democratic conditions in the country, especially towards the most affected regions. As of 2002, the government TV channels have been required to air at least some shows in Kurdish. Permission to teach courses in the Kurdish language was granted on October 3, 2001, however these programs are now closing due to a lack of demand [28].


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3.4. International Policies Although the E.U., the U.S., and most other countries identified the PKK as a terrorist organization, when it came to fighting them and supporting Turkey or at least not aiding the terrorist organization, there was much hesitation. Turkey saw the PKK as an internal problem and never accepted international pressure which aimed to have the PKK be recognized as a political party and apply the Geneva Convention regulations towards PKK members. Turkey successfully resisted this pressure and initiated international diplomatic efforts against PKK. The law enforcement and Turkish intelligence agencies cooperated with other international agencies. This cooperation led to the arrest and extradition of many PKK members from countries such as Syria, Iraq, Iran, Russia, Germany and other European nations. The biggest example of this was the collaboration between the U.S., Israel, and Turkey during the capture of Ocalan in Kenya; U.S. support made it possible that no country opened its doors to Ocalan [9]. Another diplomatic effort resulted in the listing of the PKK as a terrorist organization under any alias. In order to get rid of its terrorist image and avoid being listed by countries a terrorist organization, the PKK changed its name several times, however, because of these diplomatic efforts and policies it was to no avail. Turkey made it clear with diplomatic messages and stances that it would not tolerate support of the PKK by its neighbors. As Radu [9] puts it, Ankara also pursued other policies that greatly enhanced its position vis-àvis Ocalan's rebels. As noted above, it’s increasingly assertive regional diplomacy, backed by credible threats of force, led Syria to expel Ocalan and close down PKK camps on its territory and in Lebanon. Syria and Iran have banned PKK activities, but in Iraq, because of the current post-U.S. invasion conditions, and an absence of a strong political power in the area, the PKK is able to continue its activities. Unfortunately, until recently the law enforcement made almost no use of community based policing methods in their service delivery as well as in their fight against terrorism. Afacan [29] asserts that terror is used as a means to “gain political, economic, psychological, and even military goals” (p. 253); terror becomes a tool and a method to achieve this objective. With terror, fear increases and the groups gain control over the populace. “According to the methods and tactics they choose, terrorists intensify the emotional state within the movement and among supporters outside the movement while disorientating and confusing civil authorities” (p. 253). In many instances the confusion leads law enforcement to become repressive of the public causing the “infraction of civil liberties and isolation of individuals from their society” (p.253). In order to prevent this, Afacan [29] argues for community policing methods in the fight against terrorism because terrorism is a community problem.

4. Data For this study, a self administered survey was used. Since the confitents are located in various prisons throughout Turkey, the General Directorate of Corrections was contacted for information and permission. Because it was felt that hard core terrorists

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would provide biased or no information at all, confitents were chosen for the study. The directorate confirmed that the majority of confitents were located in nine institutions found in eight cities throughout Turkey. A total of 132 confitents were identified; 95 of them filled out the survey but only 91 of the completed surveys were useable. Since the data was collected through a questionnaire, the general limitations of surveying apply to this study as well. In addition, although the majority of confitents has been reported in the nine institutions, the actual total number in Turkey is not known which might be an issue of sampling bias and generalizability. It may also be argued that the confitents might have felt compelled to respond in a manner that would favor law enforcement. 5. Results The data indicated that approximately 65% of the respondents were members of the PKK, 26% were of TH and 9% belonged to other terrorist organizations (Table 1). Table 1 Membership PKK Turkish Hezbollah Others

Frequency

Percent

59 24 8

64.8 26.4 8.8

The majority of the respondents were militia (68%); only 35 (3%) were in leadership positions (See Figure 1). Figure 1 Highest Position in Organization.

As seen in Table 2, around 70% of respondents were in the organization for less than 10 years.


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Table 2 Years in Organization Frequency

Percent

Less than 5 years

33

36.3

5 to 10 years

30

33.0

10 to 15 years

10

11.0

15 to 20 years

5

5.5

No answer

13

14.3

Again, it can be seen in Table 3 out of 91 respondents 44 % of respondents had attempted to finish elementary school, while another 29% had attempted to finish high school. Table 3 Highest Education Level Attempted Frequency Elementary 40

Percent 44.0

High School

26

28.6

College

17

18.7

Illiterate

8

8.8

The most striking result of the study can be seen in Table 4: 27.5% of respondents indicate that law enforcement had an impact in their decision to join the terrorist organization. Table 4 Impact of Law Enforcement in Joining Terrorist Organization Law Enforcement Not Impacted

Frequency 25 66

Percent 27.5 72.5

Another important finding indicates that almost 65% of respondents did not see law enforcement practices and methods as reasonable. (See Table 5) Table 5 Perceptions About Law Enforcement Practices and Methods Frequency Percent No 59 64.8 Maybe 17 18.7 Yes 15 16.5

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When respondents were asked to indicate what they viewed as unreasonable among law enforcement practices, Figure 2 shows that rudeness, discrimination, not respecting local norms and values, and relying on military tactics were identified as the most objectionable. Figure 2 Law Enforcement Practices and Methods seen as Unreasonable.

p

60

53

50 42 40 30 30

24 19

20

21

18

18

15

17

14

13

7

10 0 0

2

1

3

1

17

3

7 6

14

12 13 7

7 8

11

0 Rude

Discriminate Don't respect Military Don't respect Violate laws Crime No trust in Not gaining Reactive not norms/values tactics rights fighters/no public public proactive service support Highly Unreasonable

Moderately Unreasonable

Tolerable

As reported in the literature, when responding to terrorism, law enforcement agencies occasionally employ more force than necessary. Tables 6 and 7 show that being subjected to brutality or having a family member subjected to brutality significantly influences individuals’ decisions to join a terrorist organization. The Chi square test indicated that a significant relationship between the use of brutality by law enforcement and a respondent’s decision to join a terrorist organization: X2(1, N=91) = 13.825, p

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