Security Sector Transformation in Southeastern Europe and the Middle East (Nato Science for Peace and Security Series. Human and Societal Dynamics)

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SECURITY SECTOR TRANSFORMATION IN SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience. Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action. Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Sub-Series A. B. C. D. E.

Chemistry and Biology Physics and Biophysics Environmental Security Information and Communication Security Human and Societal Dynamics

Springer Science and Business Media Springer Science and Business Media Springer Science and Business Media IOS Press IOS Press

http://www.nato.int/science http://www.springer.com http://www.iospress.nl

Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 24

ISSN 1874-6276

Security Sector Transformation in Southeastern Europe and the Middle East

Edited by

Thanos Dokos Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens, Greece

Amsterdam • Berlin • Oxford • Tokyo • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshops on (a) Security Sector Transformation in SEE Tirana, Albania 27–29 February 2004 (b) Security Sector Transformation in the Mediterranean Halki, Greece 8–12 September 2005

© 2007 IOS Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-58603-757-4 Library of Congress Control Number: 2007930110 Publisher IOS Press Nieuwe Hemweg 6B 1013 BG Amsterdam Netherlands fax: +31 20 687 0019 e-mail: [email protected] Distributor in the UK and Ireland Gazelle Books Services Ltd. White Cross Mills Hightown Lancaster LA1 4XS United Kingdom fax: +44 1524 63232 e-mail: [email protected]

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LEGAL NOTICE The publisher is not responsible for the use which might be made of the following information. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

Security Sector Transformation in Southeastern Europe and the Middle East T. Dokos (Ed.) IOS Press, 2007 © 2007 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Introduction For most countries, security today is primarily measured in non-military terms and threats to security are non-military in nature. These threats include incompetent government, corruption, organized crime, insecure borders, smuggling [weapons, drugs, contraband, people], illegal migration, ethnic and religious conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, shortage of natural resources [e.g., water] and, of course, terrorism.1 As security is no longer just a military concern, it is no longer just the preserve of MODs and MFAs which have, to date, been the main ministries involved in security cooperation. It is no longer possible to draw a clear distinction between external security and internal security. Security henceforth requires the coordination of the ‘external’ ministries [i.e., MOD and MFA] and their agencies [armed forces, intelligence services] with those of the ‘interior’ ministries: internal affairs, education, finance, overseas development, transport, environment; health, etc., with their agencies [policing forces, security services, disaster relief agencies, etc.]. Security today takes in social development and demands the involvement of all elements of society in a way which security in the Cold War days did not. Meeting these new security requirements demands fundamental reform of national structures, patterns of investment, and systems of government. Likewise it demands the evolution of international institutions on a truly radical scale. The security sector of a state may be defined broadly as encompassing those elements granted a legitimate and exclusive role in the exercise of coercive power in society to deal with external and internal threats to the security of the state and its citizens. 2 As such, security sector reform (SSR) encompasses all those organizations that have the authority to use, or order the use of force, or the threat of force, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management. The organizations concerned include: military and paramilitary forces, intelligence services, police forces, both na-

1 In the case of the Middle East, to cope with the new type of security challenge, Arab countries are under domestic and international pressure to develop a wide range of new skills and capabilities. These include establishing and training anti-terrorist units and rapid intervention troops, extended surveillance, improving communication and liaison both between various segments of the security sector and with foreign intelligence services, enhancing cooperation between different internal intelligence services, control of money flows and monitoring of activities undertaken by charity organizations. (Luethold, p. 3) 2 According to International Alert, the security sector can be viewed as forming three pillars: (a) Groups with a mandate to wield the instruments of violence – military, paramilitaries and police forces; (b) Institutions with a role in managing and monitoring the security sector – civilian ministries, parliaments and NGOs; and (c) Bodies responsible for guaranteeing the rule of law – the judiciary, the penal system, human rights ombudsmen and, where these bodies are particularly weak, the international community. (International Alert, Towards a better practice framework in security sector reform. Broadening the debate, p. 1)

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tional and local, together with border guards and customs services, judicial and penal systems,3 and the civil authorities mandated to oversee these agencies.4 The overall aim of SSR is the transformation of security institutions so that they play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for their citizens. Institutional reform focuses upon building up their capacities in line with the standards assumed appropriate to the democratic political context.5 Transformation of the security sector requires broad consultation and includes goals such as strengthening civilian control and oversight of the security sector, 6 professionalisation of the security forces, demilitarization and peace-building; and strengthening the rule of law. 7 SSR is therefore about much more than the internal structure of security forces; it promotes the strengthening of norms in relation to the proper relationship between the security sector and society at large.8 To implement such changes in a civil-military partnership requires, among other, a civilian body of experts knowledgeable enough to address defence and security issues with credibility and confidence. Without such civilian expertise, decision-makers cannot take hard decisions which are opposed by the entrenched and conservative military

3 Attention is given increasingly to building the capacity of judicial and penal systems, and working to ensure their political independence and accountability through training and support to judges, lawyers, human rights activists and other NGO representatives. (Chanaa, p. 30) 4 Jane Chanaa, Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects, Adelphi Paper 344, IISS, London, 2002, p. 7. 5 According to Hanggi and Tanner, SSR is “aimed at the efficient and effective provision of state and human security within a framework of democratic governance. Although SSR is still an evolving and therefore contested concept, and lessons learned from practical experience are still rather scarce, it increasingly shapes international programmes for development assistance, security cooperation and the promotion of democracy. This process is driven by the understanding that an unreformed security sector represents a decisive obstacle to the promotion of sustainable peace, development and democracy.” According to the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD, “SSR is another term used to describe the transformation of the security system –which includes all the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions—working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance and this contributes to a well-functioning security framework.” (Hanggi & Tanner, p. 16–17) 6 Strengthening civilian control and oversight of the security sector implies the reform of the relevant governmental and non-governmental civilian institutions to enhance their capacity for the oversight, management and control of the security sector to make sure security institutions exist and function in accordance with their role in a democratic society. This includes: • Reforming and professionalising ministries of defence and internal affairs; independent ombudsmen offices; civilian review boards; legislatures; budget offices; audit units; and finance ministries. • Capacity-building of NGOs, professional associations, research and advocacy institutes, and universities. • Supporting efforts at building trust within the military that civilian institutions are able to successfully and efficiently evaluate security requirements or take responsibility for security-related decisions. (International Alert, p. 3) 7 International Alert, p. 1–2. From an institutional perspective, democratic governance of the security sector would include: (a) a constitutional and legal framework which enshrines the separation of powers (b) civilian control and management of the security sector by government (c) parliamentary control and oversight of the security sector (d) judicial control in the sense that the security sector is subject to the civilian justice system (e) “public control” of the security sector through the existence of a security community representing civil society. (Hanggi & Tanner, p.11) 8 Chanaa, p. 29.

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staff. Building such an expert civilian security community is the sine qua non of defence and security sector reform. The volume at hand is the outcome of two seminars organized by ELIAMEP in Tirana (27–29 February 2004) and Halki (7–11 September 2005)9 with the support of NATO’s Science Programme. ELIAMEP would like to express its gratitude to Professor Fernando Carvalho Rodrigues, Scientific Director of NATO’s Science Programme for his support of our SSR activities during the past few years. I would also like to thank our partners in the two seminars: the Institute for Contemporary Studies in Tirana and the Albanian Media Institute for the Tirana seminar and the Jordanian Center for Strategic Studies, and especially Dr. Nawaff Tell, for the Halki seminar. Finally, I would like to emphasize ELIAMEP’s continuing commitment to the issue of Security Sector Reform, through new workshops in the context of the Halki International Seminars, or other meetings with our counterparts in Southeastern Europe, the Black Sea, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, as well as our close cooperation with the Arab Reform Initiative (ARI), and the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCO). Thanos Dokos Director-General, Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens

9 There may have been some SSR-related developments that are not covered by the respective country chapters because of the usual in academic circles delay between a seminar/workshop and the eventual publication of the proceedings.

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About the Authors Aldo Bumçi, Research Director, Albanian Institute for International Studies Ümit Cizre, Department of Political Science Bilkent University, Ankara Eden Cole, Outreach Coordinator, The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Obaida el-Dandarawy, Third Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo, Ph.D. student, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Boston Thanos Dokos, Director-General, Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Athens Chris Donnelly, Director, UK Defence Academy’s Advanced Research and Assessment Group Philipp H. Fluri, Deputy Director, The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Roland Friedrich, Adviser with the Middle East North Africa Programme, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Peter Gill, Reader in Politics and Security, Liverpool John Moores University Derek Lutterbeck, Programme Coordinator, Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP) Liviu Muresan, founding member and Executive President of the European Institute for Risk, Security and Communication (EURISC) Management Foundation, Bucharest Bill Park, Senior Lecturer at the Defence Studies Department, King’s College, London Fred Tanner, Director, Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP) Jan Arveds Trapans, Former Minister of Defence of Latvia; Former Latvian Ambassador to NATO; Expert, DCAF, Geneva Willem van Eekelen, former Secretary-General, Western European Union

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Contents Introduction Thanos Dokos

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The Challenge of Transformation in the Security Landscape of Today Chris Donnelly

1

Developing a National Security Concept: Assessing New Threats to Security Bill Park

13

The Parliamentary Dimension of Security Sector Reform Willem van Eekelen

21

Intelligence Services in the Post 9/11 Era: The Dilemma Between Efficiency and Democratic Control Peter Gill

31

The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations and Progress in Greek Security Sector Reform Thanos Dokos

39

The Romanian Experience with Democratic Control of the Security Sector Liviu Muresan

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Security Sector Reform in Albania: An Overview Aldo Bumçi

71

Government Reform and Internal Cooperation: A Study of Albania Jan Arveds Trapans

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The Civil-Military Power Balance Under the Justice and Development Party Government in Turkey Ümit Cizre Civil-Military Relations in Egypt: An Overview Obaida El-Dandarawy

101 113

Civil-Military Relations and Security Sector Reform in the Arab World: The Experience of Palestine Roland Friedrich

121

Looking East and South: Promoting Security Sector Reform in the EU’s Neighbourhood Fred Tanner and Derek Lutterbeck

133

Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe – A Brief Study in Norms Transfer Philipp H. Fluri and Eden Cole

145

ELIAMEP’s Halki International Seminars 2005: Executive Summary

173

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Appendix Security Sector Reform: Courses and an Institutional Assessment Framework Kees Homan

183

Author Index

193


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The Challenge of Transformation in the Security Landscape of Today Chris DONNELLY

Fifteen years after the end of the cold war there is still a need to discuss security sector reform. In the early 1990’s, when this was a hot issue, it was expected to take 5–6 years to restructure national armies, police and intelligence services to take account of the new circumstances facing Central & Eastern European countries. Today, many countries seem to be as far away from having the armed and security forces they need as they were a decade ago, and the need to reform faces not just post-communist countries but all the countries of what, in Cold War terms, we used to call the Western World. Efforts to reform our national and international defence and security institutions, however heroic, have constantly been overtaken by changing events in the international security system. Security Sector reform has become the major issue in many countries. The need for this reform in so many countries affects the very nature of society. Responsible ministries (MOD, Interior, etc.) are under more and more pressure from current crises and have less time for long term thinking and less time to plan and implement reform in response to new threats, risks and challenges. In many countries the gap between the world of think tanks and academia on the one hand, and policy makers on the other has so widened that these two groups, once closely linked and interactive, now hardly communicate. Policy makers and decision takers are operating in a security environment which they were never educated to understand. The realization is gradually dawning that national and international institutions (ministries, alliances, armies, etc.), set up everywhere to meet Cold War needs, no longer suffice. They will perforce need to be changed, and changed radically, if they are not to become more of a liability than they already are.

The Revolution in the Nature of Conflict The events of September 11th, 2001 caused a rapid acceleration in the processes of change which had been ongoing in the international defence and security system since the end of the Cold War. These changes have not only been military and technological, but also social, political and economic. They have now achieved such a pace, breadth and extent that their effect on the nature of conflict is no longer simply evolutionary, but can justifiably be considered revolutionary. Note that this is not a revolution in the nature of battle, which continues to evolve, but in the wider aspects of conflict. Similar “revolutions” have occurred in and around 1648, 1789, and 1914. It is the extent, intensity, and speed, but above all the ongoing nature of these changes in the defence and security environment that force us to reconsider our response, and therefore how we reform our defence and security institutions to implement that response.

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C. Donnelly / The Challenge of Transformation in the Security Landscape of Today

Trends in the Development of Military and Security Operations It is not yet possible to determine the final outcome of the changes and developments currently underway. However, experience over the last few years has allowed us to identify certain distinct trends that are useful indicators of the issues we must now confront when planning security sector reform. These trends are as follows: 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

The traditional distinctions which used to exist between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security are rapidly disappearing. One example of this is that the conduct of military action in distant countries can have an immediate and drastic impact on the attitudes and behaviour of significant elements of the population at home. The relationship between the defence component and the other constituent elements that make up national security is changing radically. National security has always depended on more than just defence, but in the past the interaction between the military component and other components (e.g. diplomacy, societal stability, resilience, public order, the economy, etc.) has been overwhelmingly at the national political or strategic level. Today, this interaction occurs at operational and tactical levels, as well. To be useful, defence and security forces (armed forces in particular, but also to some extent elements of police forces, border guards and other security sector agencies) will need to be (a) deployed: i.e. sent to where the problem originates, rather than waiting for the problem to come to them; (b) employed, i.e. to fight, to reconstruct countries, and to act in a wide variety of roles in quick succession; and (c) sustained; i.e. maintained abroad for long periods to create a security environment in which political, social and economic efforts can create a lasting peace. Future operations will not only be joint, they must also be integrated. As a matter of course, Armed Forces will need to interact at the tactical level with forces and entities from other ministries and agencies (e.g. police, border guards, intelligence, etc.), with non-governmental bodies, with public organisations and with commercial companies. For most countries, future defence and security operations are unlikely to stand alone, but be undertaken as part of a coalition (i.e. with the US, NATO, EU, UN, or ad hoc). The structure and nature of such coalitions are unpredictable and likely to be highly variable. Future defence and security operations may well be in areas of the world where we have little or no recent experience, and no existing coalition or alliance infrastructure to support operations. As expert knowledge of all likely deployment areas overseas cannot be assumed, officers will need to be able at short notice to learn about, and understand in depth, the special conditions of the host region. In future conflicts, our Armed Forces and other security forces such as police, and NGO’s and commercial companies deployed into war zones and post conflict zones will increasingly have to deal at the tactical level with the cultural and behavioural aspects of the opponent, seriously taking into account their societal norms. It will be essential in future conflicts for officials and officers (in armies, police forces, NGOs, etc.) at the tactical level to ensure that their strategies link


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into and support higher strategic and political objectives. Soldiers and policemen will need to understand that what may appear to be a military success at the tactical level can be a disaster at the strategic level. 9. Future conflicts will require new intelligence systems and intelligence will play an ever more important role than before, with significant implications for command and control. Personnel at the tactical level may have a better grasp of strategically significant information than their higher military commanders or political leaders. They will need not only the appropriate machinery and procedures, but also strength of character to impress their views upon a less well-informed superior. 10. In all future conflicts, the media will no longer be simply an important aspect, it will be an all-encompassing uncontrollable environment. Media considerations will become as significant and determining a factor in political and military appreciations as traditional factors such as the ground and the enemy.

Obstacles to Security Sector Reform The wisdom of hindsight enables us to define the shape of the revolution in the nature of conflict, and to identify the requirements that this poses to those who must now plan the transformation of national security sectors. The current revolution has come upon us quietly. Had the dramatic changes been accompanied by more violence in Europe, it would have been easier to recognise them for the revolution they were. As it is, their cumulative revolutionary effect has only lately become apparent. Although we like to pin a date on them (1648, 1789, 9/11/2001), revolutions actually take years to work out and only change certain things, not everything. The key to surviving a revolution and emerging on top is to identify exactly what will change and what will not. The biggest problem for reform, and the greatest argument used by those who resist it is that some things will remain unchanged. It is not clear what sort of armed forces and security forces will be needed because we cannot see the future. Also, because of the fundamental change in the nature of the security environment, corresponding fundamental changes are needed to our security sectors if they are to transform adequately. Until we recognise and acknowledge the extent of this revolution, we will not be able to cope with it properly. Events have changed the very definition of the term ‘national security’; nowhere, not even in the US, have the full implications of the changes and their complex interactions been realised. At the start of the 1990s this term was virtually synonymous with ‘defence,’ particularly in Central and Eastern European (C&EE) countries. Now it is recognised that ‘defence’ is only a small element of ‘security,’ although there is no agreed boundary on what the term ‘security’ should encompass. Equally, the term ‘deterrence’ now needs re-definition. In the Cold War this was by conventional forces backed up by nuclear weapons – both for NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Today, there is no agreement as to what constitutes deterrence against the new threats that the fundamental change in the nature of conflict has ushered in. The current deterrent role of the military may be expressed by pre-emption or by guarantee of drastic retribution. These are radically different functions for armed forces to perform than ‘national defence,’ and demand very different kinds of military and societal organisation (and equipment and training) to support.

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It is this factor, the change in the nature of conflict itself, which has been the major cause of the growing gap between the US and many European countries. The roots of this gap are both conceptual and practical. Most mainland European countries have, within living memory, learned by bitter experience not to put their trust in military might to ensure national security. These countries (starting half a century ago with the core of the EEC), concluded that only political and economic integration would protect them from one another. Under the umbrella of a US nuclear guarantee, this allowed them to reduce defence preparations and expenditure to what amounted in practice to a third rate governmental activity, and to concentrate instead on economic and political integration. Defence became something that could be taken for granted; the defence portfolio in government was rarely a route to promotion; defence expenditure became more an element of social security – jobs and profit – than of national security. Just as this was true of many European NATO members, so it was also true of many Central European countries in the Warsaw Pact, although for rather different reasons. Deprived as these countries were of true national control over their armed forces, their populations came to see them, at least in some measure, as agents of Russification or as an external imposition. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, ‘defence’ has been a third rate concern in most Central European countries, too. The defence institutions of most European countries, East and West, are now proving too weak and inflexible to respond to the dramatic new challenges they face today. The experiences of the US, the UK, Russia, and Turkey in regard to the utility of military power has been very different. These countries in the 20th century owed their creation, survival or position in the world to military power, and the general level of respect in which their Armies came to be held by their populations reflected this (the US post-Vietnam experience was a temporary phenomenon). The readiness of these countries today to use force, compared to the reticence of mainland European countries (with the occasional exception of France) in similar circumstances to do the same, is already posing a problem. This is likely to be an even greater cause of friction in the future, as it is at odds with the instincts of most of mainland Europe. The practical result of this is that many European countries, both Eastern and Western, have been unwilling or unable to pursue defence reform as far or as fast as either logic or US/NATO pressure has dictated. In the face of the new security threats which most, if not all, European nations today acknowledge, it would make sense for most countries to move away from armies based on territorial defence towards armies (and policing forces, intelligence services, etc.) which are able to go to where the threat is to be found and neutralise it there. This requires armed forces and other security agencies to be capable of being deployed, employed and sustained. Many countries have concluded that this requires a regular professional force instead of a conscript one, although in fact there has been little or no investigation of alternative reserve systems that could allow nations with good geographical or historical reasons for not putting their faith in small, regular forces to hedge their bets. However much it might ‘make sense,’ such a course of action has not been followed. Indeed, for many European countries this has created a dilemma and has left them in an exceptionally difficult situation, resulting in the stalling of defence reform processes in many places. Many C&EE countries have found it difficult to convince their populations to abandon conscript territorial forces. When combined with a military establishment wedded to maintaining a large cold war conscript-based infrastructure (which, although worthless, is nevertheless frequently very profitable), it allows


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reform to be halted completely. Smaller countries in Central Europe have found moving from a conscript force to a regular force to be so expensive that, were they to follow this course, they could no longer maintain a force capable of fulfilling the whole range of military activity desirable for the Armed Forces of a sovereign country. This last conclusion has been so shocking for some C&EE countries that they have shied away from it. Giving up national territorial defence is difficult for armed forces brought up to understand only this concept of force generation. It is also difficult for national populations of countries that history and geography have condemned to be close to a big neighbour which they do not fully trust – as they do not yet fully trust (or even fully understand the complex nature of) the Alliance which many of them have recently joined. For C&EE countries that have recently regained their sovereignty, the idea of surrendering part of it by sharing military systems is still difficult to swallow. It has not helped matters that some of these countries have received contradictory advice from the different countries helping them. Some of these have continued to advocate universal conscription and territorial defence as the basis for defence. Others have advised the opposite – to adopt small, professional armies. Trying to do both at once in a small country has proved impossible and has caused much confusion. NATO (and the EU) do not yet have an answer to this problem. NATO asks for deliverable military capabilities and a minimum defence expenditure of 2% of GNP. But NATO as of yet has no mechanisms to broker the sharing of force capabilities in a way which would ensure the guaranteed delivery of a balanced force structure from a variety of different national components. A few C&EE nations are tentatively exploring the idea of joint forces on the lines of the Belgian-Netherlands model of a combined Navy, but this process is just beginning. Another approach open to small C&EE countries is to try for ‘niche capabilities’ where nations offer a small specialist military capability to a multi-national force or coalition. Unfortunately, this runs the risk of also being an excuse for not pushing for wider defence reform. On the whole, therefore, Central and Eastern European countries are still maintaining fully national armed forces which copy all the poor economies of scale that have dominated Western Europe for decades. Like many Western Armies today, only a tiny fraction of their current forces are useable in the context of any new security threat as these are currently envisaged. ‘Lots of bucks, but not much bang,’ sums up the result.

The Technological Revolution A further factor which compounds the transformation problem is the pace of technological innovation. This means that the cost of an item of equipment is constantly rising relative to the whole defence budget, because the equipment is becoming more complex and technologically sophisticated. For example, the purchase cost of a new aircraft rises in real terms by about 12–15% per year, and associated training and maintenance costs rise even faster. Therefore, if a defence budget is pegged at a given level, rising only by the rate of inflation, then each year the force that can be maintained for this budget must either become smaller or more obsolete. In practice, C&EE countries have all become both smaller and more obsolete as they have struggled to maintain capabilities that they cannot afford. Many are now faced with the problem of how to generate an effective military ethos for a force base which is so small that it cannot maintain effective combat capability. “We cannot recruit soldiers just to be logisticians,” one

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C&EE ChoD recently complained. It is hard not to sympathise with this sentiment. This strikes at the very essence of traditional military practices. Only some really radical new ideas, and a very powerful political motive to implement them, will resolve this dilemma. The problem of national defence industries in C&EE further compounds the difficulties of defence reform. The Warsaw Pact and the Soviet System rationalised defence production, allocating national (and in the USSR regional) specialisations and concentrating R&D mostly in the Russian homeland. The break-up of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact often fragmented this coherent industrial system, rendering most of the constituent parts non-viable. The linkage to Soviet production standards, the collapse of demand in world arms markets, and the absence of domestic markets have all reduced the C&EE defence industrial base to a fraction of its former self. Reform has proved impossible. Closure seems to be the only option for all but a small slice of the industry. Where factories have been subsidised or artificially converted (i.e. with no sound economic basis – quite a common situation in Russia) the result more resembles a day-care centre for the unemployed rather than a serious viable enterprise. This industrial factor contributes to the overall drastic fall in European military capabilities that the post decade and a half have witnessed. When this is compared to the potential for a rise in capability that the proliferation of technology (coupled with the cleverness in using it) has provided to new ‘enemies’ – i.e. the likely sources of (asymmetric) threats that Europe will face in the next decade – the failure of security sector reform in Europe is all the more striking.

The Interdependency of Security Sector Reform and Societal Reform Of all the obstacles to security sector reform that European countries have had to face, the greatest has been the truly fundamental nature of the social, political and economic changes that are needed if security sector reform is to be possible. What is demanded is nothing less than a total change in the relationship between Armed Forces and Security Forces and their societies. Recruitment, funding, management and leadership, civilmilitary relations and democratic control – all the core business of an army or a police force – have had to change completely. Attempts at reform – many of which failed – have improved understanding of the interactive nature of the relationship between Army and society. It is now clear, for example, that countries such as Norway and Germany cannot institute such radical military reform as they perceive they need without a correspondingly great reform of their social systems. If Germany abandons conscription in favour of professional regular forces, the national health-care system would be in danger of collapse, so much does it rely on the virtually free labour provided by young men who opt for civilian service rather than military conscription. Norway has so integrated its military role into its national social infrastructure – for very good historical reasons based on its unhappy experiences in 1940 – that to seriously reform its army would require a massive programme of social change and alternative mechanisms to support the national civilian infrastructure of this large, thinly populated country. The failure of repeated reform efforts in many countries has reminded us that military and security sector reform goes hand in hand with social, economic and political reform. We cannot have one without the other, and this is not just a problem for C&EE. Perhaps the most


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extreme and evident example is Russia, where time and again military reform efforts have come to nothing because society itself has not found adequate new political, social and economic mechanisms. Russia, moreover, is also a good example of the fact that the greater role an Army plays in national life, the more its failure to reform hinders national reform in general. Because of their resistance to change, the Russian armed forces and security forces themselves are one of the major obstacles to societal reform. There has been plenty of change in the Russian Army, but precious little reform.

Spreading the Lessons of Transformation We have so far been basing our comments mainly in a context of security sector reform in Europe, but it is now clear that many countries of the Middle East and North Africa face similar problems of reform in the face of new security threats. When we look at the problems European (and especially Central and Eastern European) countries have faced, and the path reform has taken, there is a remarkably high degree of similarity between different countries, even when there are marked differences in size, location, and economic or social circumstances. ‘Local colour,’of course, gives different values to the common factors in this complex equation. But what at first appear to be very evident differences are usually quantitative rather than qualitative, and more apparent than real. Establishing this ‘common path’ provides us an alternative means of evaluation – one which should allow general lessons to be drawn. Because each country going through the painful process of defence and security sector reform likes to think of itself as ‘special,’ there is a tendency to believe that all problems are unique. If the country is not yet fully integrated into the international security community (i.e. within NATO or the EU), it may not be aware that the experience of others can be of great help in coming to terms with this challenge. Local circumstances will always ensure that there will never be an exact model that can be entirely copied. But studying elements of other nations’ experience can be of enormous value and save much time, effort and heartbreak. The value of tracing the pattern of security sector reform in C&EE and identifying, if only tentatively, the various stages of the process could be of real use to countries (for example in North Africa) which are now just beginning to face up to the problem of restructuring the relationship between their armed and security forces and their society or government. In other words, having evaluated as best we can the progress of reform against the objective demands of the new security situation, it is useful to set the balance by looking realistically at how countries have generally coped in such circumstances. This will give a much kinder evaluation because it recognises the extreme difficulties that any government has coping with such deep seated and multi-faceted changes. It is at this point that the special value of exploiting the experience of Security Sector Reform in South Eastern Europe becomes apparent. First, many countries in South Eastern Europe are only today undergoing reform processes which countries further north underwent a decade ago. The experience is fresher, and lessons are still being learned. Interaction between the countries and, and for example, countries of North Africa and Iraq, will therefore be more meaningful and at the same time easier.

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Secondly, again unlike other areas in Central Europe, South Eastern Europe has been rife with conflict. The problems of security sector reform are exacerbated by exceptionally painful experiences of recent conflict. Other countries which have experienced – and are still experiencing – conflict and violence will recognise more readily the similarity of problems or opportunity for a fruitful sharing of experience. Thirdly, South Eastern Europe has a mixed cultural and religious heritage which, although it has been at the root of recent problems and strife, has also provided experience showing how to overcome such difficulties and how to reach cross-cultural and cross-confessional agreement. This is highly apposite to problems in Iraq today. The fourth point concerns the link between different elements of the security sector. It is an unhappy fact that, of new security threats facing Europe today, those such as organised crime and terrorism, which once were clearly distant and separate, are now no longer so. A clear nexus has developed between organised crime and terrorism; both are facilitated by the same failures in security sector reform; both share the same interest in having incompetent police and border regimes, in fostering corruption, in perpetuating weak states, and obscure legislation. It is in this area that the main challenge of security sector reform now lies. These problems are most acute in South Eastern Europe. It is for this, as for the other reasons given above, that South Eastern Europe should now be the main focus for our study of security sector reform – both to be able to deal with Europe’s own problems and to be able to provide help and support to other countries in this regard, especially those of the Mediterranean dialogue and Iraq.

Education as a Crucial Factor in Security Sector Transformation Education is perhaps the most important factor enabling a national defence and security sector to change to meet the challenges of the new security landscape; yet in almost all countries this receives the least attention. Indeed in many countries resistance to reform is greatest within the educational system of the armed forces, police and so on. The problem is that in the security sector – in war, in policing, in intelligence and so on – so much depends on practice rather than on theory that education tends to be developed mainly on this basis. Young officers are taught on the basis of past action, i.e. on the basis of experience. At a time of revolution (rather than evolution), excessive reliance on experience can be fatal. Teaching done on the basis of ‘what worked last time’ can be dangerously counter productive. Furthermore, such teaching very soon moves from being education to training, and therein lays the problem. If, overall, the main characteristics of future conflict are unpredictability, its breadth and depth, its variety, and the short notice at which it occurs, then these characteristics force us today to face the issues of training and education when planning the professional development of security sector officers and NGOs. The essence of training is to extract best practice from past experience and to instil this as a basis or model for planning future operations. The assumption is that all future problems will simply be new iterations of past problems and that experience is our best asset in solving such problems. The scope and breadth of future military and security operations are now likely to be so great that it is simply not possible to train officers, NCOs and officials to be ready to tackle every problem that they may face. The pace of change is so rapid that it


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has become impossible to predict likely forms of future conflict and even its probable geographical locations. Consequently, training alone is no longer a reliable basis even for junior officer and NCO professional development. For all elements of the security sector, it is important that a greater and greater amount of time is spent on education. Education (from the latin “e duco” – I lead out) implies the need to teach an understanding of basic principles rather than rehearsing models or templates. It means imparting not only knowledge but also a deep understanding of a wide variety of essential factors – military, social, and political. It requires the cultivation of an ability to apply mature consideration and judgement, to include a great many unforeseeable variables, into decisionmaking. It needs officers to be exercised in the practice of applying their knowledge, expertise, analytical capability, and judgement, so that they become competent at using the intellectual tools with which the teaching process has provided them. Without this last factor, their knowledge will remain theoretical. They will have been taught, but they will not have been educated to bring out their abilities to solve new problems. Education, of course, is altogether more demanding of both staff and students. It has serious implications for the traditional practices of command, and for the whole structure of our career development processes. However, the changes in the defence and security landscape now force us to address this issue of reform in particular.

Prerequisites for Successful Security Sector Reform The foregoing has been an exploration of the problem. The following chapters of this volume address paths towards the solution. There is, of course, no one model for security sector reform. Each country must develop its own unique solution reflecting social, political, historical and financial realities as well as perceived threats. Just as there is no single model, so also there is no perfection. There will always be tension when essentially disciplined and non-democratic institutions are embedded within democracies, and there will never be sufficient resources in a balanced market economy to do everything that a security specialist might want to do to guarantee national safety. That said, there are certain common factors that are essential if successful security sector transformation is to be achieved. The first is knowledge. There can be no successful fundamental reform if the civilian government does not have an independent basis of knowledge of defence and security sector issues available. This essential ‘strategic community’ of civil servants, journalists, academics, parliamentarians and even businessmen need not be big, but it must be trusted as well as trustworthy. It can be built, and it can grow of its own accord, but without reform, it will be limited to a matter of detail. An expert civilian community is essential to developing that relationship of mutual respect between armed and security forces and government which is necessary for both a healthy society and effective security forces. The second feature essential to success is a realistic threat assessment. Without this, how can a country know what sort of armed forces or security forces it needs? This seems so obvious, yet it is surprising how often it is missing, and how often the real drivers in the reform process are such things as finance, vested interest, power struggles, or ideological conviction. Some countries find it difficult to make a real threat assessment for political reasons – fear of offending a neighbour, for example.

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These countries are in an impossible situation unless they have a national consensus that allows the threat to never be openly voiced. Political will to respond to the threat is the third sine qua non. Without political will, it is impossible to drive through the very difficult radical changes that fundamental reform requires. Without political will a population will not be persuaded to find the necessary resources for reform. ‘Political will’ does not only denote a ruthless politician, it means having an effective political system that permits policy to be turned into action when the will is there, gaining the support of voters that is essential in a democracy. It is a measure of a country’s political maturity. It also requires that the political leadership recognise the reality of a security threat and the need to deal with it. The fourth essential is closely linked to the third; a country undertaking serious reform needs allies, and assistance. Certainly under some circumstances countries have pursued defence and security sector reform alone. But this is not an option for many countries today, when new security threats have created such new conditions. Only with friends one can trust is it possible for a country to let down its guard – reduce its security capabilities – whilst it reforms its structures. The smaller and poorer a country is, the more this is so. Help – and the ability and preparedness to accept it – will also ensure that a country can learn from the mistakes of others. For many reasons it has proved easier for countries to accept help for reform of armed forces than for reform of interior forces and police. It is in this latter area that reform is now arguably more important, given the nature of today’s threats.

Conclusion The security architecture of the Cold War allowed most Western European countries to reduce expenditure on national security to a level so low it is historically unprecedented. Two generations have grown up with this sense of security, which EU and NATO membership have now extended to much of Central and Eastern Europe. This stability has encouraged the thinking that defence expenditure is a waste, and a low government priority. The focus of the world’s military power has shifted from Europe to the Far East. Assessments as to what constitutes the new security threats differ from country to country. Where they do not differ, there is frequently a difference in the way countries think it appropriate to respond. No one in Europe save the NATO Secretary General seems to think it scandalous that so little useable military power is generated by Europe, despite the enormous amount of money spent on defence. Even the US cannot be complacent; huge though her defence and security budget is, her forces are already stretched. It cannot be satisfied that it will be able to continue to increase spending to handle new threats. Nor can it be satisfied that it is getting a good return for its investment when measured against the tiny costs borne by the opponent in the asymmetrical conflict of today. What is now needed is a serious and concentrated intellectual effort to better understand the nature of today’s security threats and the challenges of responding to those threats. This improved compound understanding must be transmitted to governments in a way that will enable them to develop appropriate policies more effectively. This is the task which faces the academic and scientific communities now – not only to conduct their analysis but to deliver it to the policy makers in a timely and useable manner. This


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means working with the policy maker, rebuilding the bridges between the think tank and policy communities in Europe which worked well during the Cold War but collapsed during the last decade. In reaching out to other countries, particularly those in North Africa, the Middle East, and now Iraq and Afghanistan, it would be best to help them learn by pointing out European failings and mistakes. There is plenty of material.

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Developing a National Security Concept: Assessing New Threats to Security Bill PARK

‘Security’ was a term once used with confidence, with a clear meaning. Certainly this was so in Europe, a region of the world heavily associated historically with the existence of strong, heavily militarised states and with violent conflict between them. ‘Security’ was close in meaning to ‘defence,’ related to territorial defence, was largely state-centric (notwithstanding the existence of generally ad hoc alliances), and had to do with the procurement and maintenance of armed forces to deter and, if necessary, fight. This inclination to closely equate the concept of security to military preparation by sovereign states in part reflected both the likelihood of armed conflict between states, and the potential scale and destructiveness of wars between industrialised and highly mobilised economies. However, it also reflected a set of perceptions, a world view, a kind of paradigm. In this world view, states – and sometimes the state-based ideologies associated with them – were competitive; military prowess was a major dimension of this competitiveness; and there were important state objectives that could be attained, or averted, by a readiness to resort to military force. Some of these objectives were physical and tangible – territory, markets, trade routes, or empires – and some more abstract and intangible – prestige and identity. Taken together, these arrangements and perceptions coincide with what is often referred to as ‘realism’ in international politics, and is similar to what we now refer to as ‘hard’ security. With the end of the Cold War, and the removal of the physical military threat posed to NATO by the Warsaw Pact, and vice versa, European states no longer face a comparable threat of military attack against their territories by the armed forces of neighbouring states. Perhaps only Greek-Turkish relations, and some residual fear of Russia in parts of central Europe, bear traces of Europe’s warlike past. As a consequence, defence spending, and the size of military establishments, has been and is still being reduced throughout Europe. This process is helped along by the collapse of the Soviet Union itself, but also of Russia as a militarily serious external actor. In fact, the Cold War in Europe, and between the superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union, was associated with the deterrence provided by the nuclear capabilities and invulnerable delivery systems of each side. It was assumed that ‘cold war’ didn’t spill over into ‘hot war’ because of the risks of annihilation that appeared to accompany any act of aggression or even miscalculation. However, it cannot be definitively proved that either side would have risked a major attack on its adversary even in the absence of nuclear weapons. The First and Second World Wars had been enormously destructive, which the initiators lost and in which even the victors suffered unprecedented damage. For many Europeans, major war had been largely discredited as a means to achieve a state’s objectives or national security. In Europe, this sentiment was perhaps at its strongest in, but by no means confined to, Germany. Given their experi-

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B. Park / Developing a National Security Concept: Assessing New Threats to Security

ences in the first half of the twentieth century, it seems doubtful that Soviet citizens entertained many illusions about the benefits major conflict might bring. Beyond Europe, Japan, too was notable for its disinclination to focus heavily on military preparedness. Nuclear deterrence and the American security umbrella undoubtedly enabled and even encouraged such thinking. However, in at least some parts of the world a sea of change had taken place in how national security was perceived even before the Cold War had finally ended.

‘Hard’ and ‘Soft’ Security To equate the term ‘security policy’ as closely to the term ‘defence policy’ as we did during the Cold War and earlier, always involved hijacking the very meaning of the word ‘security.’ ‘Security’ is a word we have long used in many different contexts – security in the home, social security, economic security. The demise of the Cold War has freed Europeans and others to more explicitly expand our understanding and use of the term in political contexts to include all sorts of things that make us insecure, or make us feel insecure (not always the same thing). In our current discourse, we have ‘securitized’ our approach to problems that may have long existed (although they might now be or appear more threatening than they were), but that were treated under different headings. Thus, taking our cue from Buzan’s work, we now typically talk of ‘environmental,’ ‘societal,’ ‘political,’ or ‘economic’ security, as well as ‘military’ security. The melting of the ice caps and the state of civilian as well as military nuclear facilities and installations in the former Soviet bloc, trans-national trafficking in drugs and in human beings, social exclusion or the activities of extremist or millennial groups within our domestic societies, the secure maintenance of jobs in a globalized economy or reliable access to affordable energy on which our economies and societies depend – these are all now incorporated under the rubric of broadly defined ‘security issues.’ This rich mix of factors is often termed ‘soft’ security. For some states around the globe, ‘security threats’ are still primarily military in nature, or at least more so than in Europe, and security policies and doctrines are chiefly focused on addressing them, and at state level. This observation might be true of say, India and Pakistan, or of the states most directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in the Middle East and Gulf region more generally, on the Korean Peninsula, and Taiwan. Indeed, some regions of the world could be on the verge of entering eras that might come to resemble the international relationships of Europe during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – of arms races, balance of power politics, competitive influence-building, atavistic nationalisms, and frequent armed conflicts that run the risk of escalating into major and perhaps unpredictable and barely controllable conflagrations. These are the regions into which weapons of mass destruction, and particularly nuclear capabilities, are being, or could in the near future be introduced. They might offer a better test of the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons specifically and large military establishments generally than that provided by the Cold War in Europe, for such regions might consist of dissatisfied rather than cautious states, as yet lacking national traumas comparable to those experienced in Europe, with real territorial objectives at stake, lacking the political and technological control over their military capabilities that


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US and Soviet authorities were able to exercise, and fired by intense nationalisms and hatreds. It is the possible combination of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) with contexts in which they might be used that makes WMD proliferation appear to be such a threat to global well being. In addition, for the world’s so-called ‘hyperpower’, the United States – or at least in its present, post 9/11 mood and under its present government – ‘security policy’ continues to have a strong military dimension and extends to what we might call ‘global security management’ (some might prefer to call it neo-imperialism). It can incorporate such diverse and wide-ranging objectives as keeping maritime trade routes free, combating the proliferation of WMD, securing cheap and reliable supplies of energy, cornering and even removing rogue regimes, democratizing the Middle East, and containment policies aimed at curbing or constraining any potential challengers to US supremacy. It is quite common for major actors in the world to take it upon themselves to ‘police’ the system in this way, and to adopt far-reaching, wide-ranging and interventionist ‘security’ policies. In this respect, the British, or Roman Empires were little different in their time than the US is today. Of course, small but developed countries such as, say, Denmark or Greece, or even many countries in the developing world, are no less dependent on secure energy supplies or freedom to trade, and might be just as affected by WMD proliferation as the US. However, small states do not devote the same kind of energy as the US can to combat them directly. Furthermore, states that lack the capacities of the major powers might even be inclined to adopt more benign views of the threats that confront them. ‘Rogue states’ can be engaged with rather than confronted; WMD programmes can be slowed or halted by inspections and sanctions (or lived with should they bear fruit); confidence-building measures might reduce the scope for conflict; trade and aid agreements might help assure economic security; multilateral diplomacy can achieve worthwhile effects, and so on.

Differentiating Threats and Security This dichotomy in approach leads to the first key observation about the development of national security concepts, which is that ‘hard’ national security concepts and policies are not always addressed to all the threats that can conceivably be identified; often they are addressed only to those threats that the state is capable of addressing. Of course, US allies might also take on global policing missions, and might participate in multilateral military actions abroad. These might be justified by the pursuit of ‘higher,’ more ethical, goals. Great Britain, which likes to present itself as a ‘force for good,’ is the prime example of this phenomenon. Washington’s European and other allies have participated in US-led military actions in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and against Iraq. Of course, this interventionism has a flip side. For Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosovic, the Sudanese government, and for the warlords of Somalia and Sierra Leone, global intervention in the cause of a better world can represent major security threats to national sovereignty, territorial integrity, physical security, and regime survival. The relative power of the developed world, and the activism of the US and its partners more particularly, can be seen by many states as one of their most pressing security threats.

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In turn, the rich countries of the West tend to regard ‘security threats,’ even under the post-Cold War definition, as stemming largely from ‘outside,’ from the world beyond their own security zone. There are two main reasons for this. First, the West is relatively rich, politically stable, and free. Perhaps it is also complacent. Internally, or indigenously, there appear to be few serious challenges to the existing order. Here, Internally’ can refer both to the domestic circumstances of individual states, and to interstate relationships within the developed world. There are few direct threats to security emanating from within the West because most have too much to lose. Second, although the West largely created, and is seen to rely upon and benefits from, the phenomenon we call ‘globalisation,’ the flip side of this development is that it makes the rich world vulnerable to other people’s capacity to spread disease, drugs, terrorism, refugees and asylum seekers, and to engage in wars, develop WMD, and engage in global terrorism. The freedom of trade, the movement of capital, and the technology transfer that underpins so much of what we call globalisation also requires open societies and porous borders.

Security and Small States International institutions and regimes of global governance, and the fact of interdependence and globalisation, do of course enable even small states to contribute to the management of a global order that ultimately impinges, directly or indirectly, on the security of individual states. In today’s world, small states can be security contributors as well as security consumers. Properly understood, active participation at the United Nations, in peacekeeping activities, at trade talks, at environmental conferences, in regional fora, in intelligence cooperation, and so on, can all contribute to the creation of a world in which national security can be enhanced. Scandinavian states are amongst those that have carved out something of a security niche for themselves in this way. In a multilateral and globalized world, ‘good citizenship’ and active participation in collective security arrangements can and should form part of a nations’ security concept, for the small nation no less, and perhaps more so, than for the powerful. This is not because such cooperative and multilateral diplomacy is assured of success in achieving total security either for the individual state or for the international system as a whole. Rather, such channels and activities offer scope to enhance positive trends in the international system – transparency, confidence building, interdependence and interlocking relationships – and to discredit or defeat more negative phenomena – mutual threat perception and misperception, atavistic nationalism, and zero sum approaches to relationships with other states. Such multilateral diplomacy offers an opportunity to break out of the so-called ‘security dilemma,’ in which the individual measures states take to ensure their national security is interpreted by other states as threatening, thus prompting counter-measures and provoking downward spirals of security perception. It represents an effort to shift from a Hobbesian world of perpetual conflict and all-against-all, towards a Kantian world of cooperation, reason, and mutuality. Furthermore, small and weak states do not readily have the capacity to take it upon themselves to act against threats whose source lies distant from their own borders. Unilateralism is a luxury best engaged in only by the strong, and perhaps not even then.


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European Security Such trends towards transparency, cooperativeness, and interdependency, are at their most developed in today’s Europe. This is paradoxical, both because it contrasts so greatly with the ways in which international relations and security policies have so often been conducted in Europe’s past, and also because these trends are a direct consequence of that past. During the Cold War years, the West, and Western Europeans in particular, created a so-called ‘Security Community.’ This has a number of characteristics. It has seen both the emergence of generally inclusive multilateral institutions such as NATO and the EU, and also the widespread adoption of shared values and norms such as democracy, the rule of law, and open economies. The institutionalisation of intra-western security allowed a framework in which purely national security policies could be reduced, and in which security policies generally might be ‘de-militarised.’ Armed conflict between western European states became unthinkable, and its place was taken by political, social and economic openness and interdependence, and by shared values. Until 1945, much of Western Europe – Italy and Germany, for example – had hitherto enjoyed only the most intermittent or imperfect acquaintance with such phenomena, and for some parts of the region – the Iberian Peninsula, for example – such developments remained elusive for a few more decades. Overall, the result of Western Europe’s pursuit of de-militarised and cooperative security policies in their mutual relationships has been to create out of a formerly war-prone and conflict-ridden region, one that expands the freedom and material well being of its peoples and in which war between its members is unthinkable. The security objective of the post-Cold War era in Europe is to spread this Security Community eastwards, ultimately to incorporate the whole of the continent, and even beyond, into the Security Community informally defined. This means more than institutional membership; in fact, that is in some ways the least important part of it. Norway’s non-membership of the EU, or Ireland’s of NATO, does not mean these countries are beyond the Security Community. The US certainly, and even Japan, too, might plausibly be regarded as members of the community. Rather, the task is to convert those European countries that are perceived in some sense as a problem by the members of the Security Community, as an external source of threat to their comfortable way of life – however unfair that perception might sometimes be – or as ‘outsiders,’ into fully integrated members. This has already meant that the majority of the former communist states of central Europe, including the Baltic States, have been institutionally incorporated into what were the West’s security institutions. Romania, Bulgaria, and perhaps Turkey are soon to follow them into the EU, as the ‘security community’ seeps outwards to transform and incorporate – to some extent, simultaneously – Europe’s more troubled zones. It is widely expected that in time, the rest of the Balkans will be brought in, too. Russia, the Ukraine, and other more questionably European parts of the former Soviet Union offer difficulties of a different order. For aspirant states – and for the present this mainly means Balkan states such as Albania – security policy in part means acquiring the values and practices of good governance, the rule of law, democracy, open economies, and civil liberties. This is what

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the EU’s Copenhagen criteria for membership aims to encourage. It also means active and constructive engagement with Europe’s, and the world’s multilateralism, aimed at common approaches to common problems, and at the creation of collective and common security, rather than risk falling into – or, for much of the Balkans still, remaining in – the trap of the security dilemma. This is the strategy, and NATO’s and the EU’s outreach programmes (and those of Europe’s other multilateral institutions) – not just their membership enlargements – are designed to achieve it. They might not always seem fair, or efficient, or they might seem to impose tough requirements. They certainly don’t offer a quick fix. And ultimately, in Europe, it has been and is for the countries outside the Security Community, chiefly but not exclusively former communist ruled states, to decide whether their approach to security will be compatible and cooperative with those of the existing members of the Security Community, or not. Albania is one such state.

Security and Governance For many countries and societies around the world, there is little security to be had, and thus little security to be threatened. Poverty, hunger, disease, unemployment, repression, violent conflict, economic dislocation, and abuse constitute routine circumstances for many people. Often associated with such phenomena – whether primarily as cause or effect is a contested issue – are problems of governance. For ‘governments’- government officials and warlords alike- such a chaotic world is a world of opportunity. There are drugs, people, weapons and precious materials and products to be smuggled. There are state funds and foreign aid programmes to be siphoned off and commercial contracts to be milked. Where governance is poor, national security policies and concepts might barely exist in any form that would be recognisable in the developed world. Alternatively, national security policies either might not address the real problems of insecurity that citizens face, or might be undermined by problems of implementation. In such states, human insecurity largely might be a creation of government, or of forces associated with them. The ‘security’ forces of such states might direct more of their attention to internal repression than to external threats to the state and her citizens. Examples of populations that are threatened more by their own governments and societies than by external forces might be the people of southern Sudan, the Kurds of Iraq, the Bosniaks of former Yugoslavia, and the woman of Columbia. Often, security in such countries can only be addressed from the outside – by aid programmes, the provision of incentives and mechanisms encouraging better governance, through more favourable trade arrangements, and so on. Such measures are generally insufficient to cope adequately with the scale of the problem, and in any case could take decades or even generations before they bear fruit. Economic, social and political development, and good governance, cannot be generated overnight. For the foreseeable future, the prevailing circumstance of many millions of the world’s population will continue to be individual and social insecurity, often at the hands of their own governments. What does it mean to talk of ‘national security concepts’ for such states, and who is charged with the identification of new or old threats to security?


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National Security? It can be difficult to pin down our discussion of ‘national security,’ and of what threatens it, when we are at liberty to regard almost everything as potentially part of our remit. Does, or should, ‘national security’ necessarily be equated with ‘state security’? What if the state is itself the prime, or a major contributor to the insecurity of the people that live within her boundaries? How far should we stretch our understanding of ‘national security’ to incorporate the non-military, ‘soft’ threats to security? Security – what it includes, what is to be secured, who determines it, and how it is best achieved – is a highly contested concept. Perceptions and interests play as much a part as any more objective attempt to identify ‘national security’ and its absence. It helps to acknowledge that security threats are not the same for all people and states. This is an observation that brings us to another central plank of these arguments, which is that the governments, states and people of the world are not all facing the same threats to the same degree, nor do they perceive threats in the same way. Therefore, ‘national’ security concepts are going to have a degree of uniqueness. What national security is, and how it might best be achieved, depends so much on perception that it can even be argued that ‘national’ security concepts and policies might, on occasion, undermine rather than enhance the security of the government, state, or people. It is hard to judge, since we cannot know the future consequences of our present actions, and we cannot know what the world might have looked like if we had adopted different security postures. Furthermore, can we be sure that meeting the challenge posed by various threats to national security will necessarily lead to consistent policies? To take Iraq for illustrative purposes, was Saddam Hussein’s regime a serious threat to security? To whose security and to what degree? Would the world have been a safer place if the sanctions on Iraq had continued, or if they had been softened or lifted, as some on the UN Security Council and beyond wanted? Or is it safer now that he has been removed? Are the US and the UK more, or less, secure now than they were before Saddam Hussein was removed from power? Even if we can agree that regime overthrow in Iraq has removed a serious threat to security, has it enhanced the terrorist threat emanating from an inflamed Arab, or Islamic, world? Will the Middle East region prove to be more, or less, stable as a consequence of the US-led invasion of Iraq? Will post-Saddam Iraq prove to be more or less amenable, more or less stable, in the near and the not-so-near future? A great deal of heat is generated by questions such as these, but little light. So it is with the development of ‘national security concepts’ and with the identification and assessment of ‘new threats’ to security, although usually the circumstances are less dramatic and the issues less contested than is the case with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime. For a state to develop its national security concept it must identify which security threats are domestic and which are external; those that are close to hand and those that are global and structural in their origins; those that can be reasonably addressed unilaterally and those that must be left to others, or addressed via multilateral frameworks and agencies. Each state should also recognise what hard security analysts sometimes refer to as the ‘security dilemma’ – that actions taken to address one’s own security often make it worse by undermining the security of others, causing a negative reaction. In a world in which multilateral approaches to security are commonplace, and characterised as much

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or more by ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ security threats, something similar applies, although here the emphasis might be on the inaction of governments rather than their action. Thus, poor governance at home destabilises neighbours, and may cause them to close ranks and borders. Poor governance abroad may disrupt our sense of security. The closing of ranks and borders, in order to keep out threats, may contribute to poor governance and thus generate a greater threat. Unilateral behaviour might discourage or undermine the more constructive multilateralism of others. Exclusive or excessive reliance on multilateralism, especially where the slowest and most reluctant set the pace, might frustrate those that most keenly feel threats, and lead to a destabilising unilateralism that a more proactive multilateralism might have avoided. In other words, we can contribute to our own security problems and generate threats to ourselves just as easily as we can contribute to their solution or evaporation. Both the actions, and the inaction of states, can make a difference. At least in Europe, a context has evolved within which the opportunities for states and societies to achieve unprecedented levels of security, of both the ‘hard’ and the ‘soft’ varieties, are in place. Good governance at home, combined with multilateralism, transparency and cooperativeness abroad, offer the prospect of freedom both from war with neighbouring states, and from poverty and oppression at home.


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The Parliamentary Dimension of Security Sector Reform Willem van EEKELEN

After the end of the Cold War, the notion of security sector reform rapidly became an international priority. However, it remained more a notion than a concept, because its application varies according to the historical, political and economic specifics of a county or region. Andrej Karkoszka has traced its origins in the sphere of economic and social development. The Human Development Report of UNDP in 2002 enumerated five large groups as constituent element of the security sector: organisations authorised to use force, civil management and oversight bodies, justice and law enforcement institutions, non-statutory security forces, and civil society groups. Karkoszka adopted the definition of the functional scope of security sector reform as “the provision of security within the state in an effective and efficient manner, and in the framework of democratic civilian control.”1 The reform of the security sector does not stand alone and is intimately connected with the overall process of democratisation; its completion often is the final chapter of this process. Transparency, accountability and affordability are key elements, which mean the primacy of political control by elected representatives and the creation of institutions which are able to honour the various government claims in a balanced manner, free from corruption and organised crime. Defence and security must be financed from a transparent state budget, which does not hide behind presumed needs of secrecy. Only a minority of the current membership of the United Nations – 82 out of some 200 – meet the criteria of a well developed democratic system, including a democratically controlled security sector. Obviously reform is of particular importance in states which are transitioning from authoritarian to democratic regimes. As such, most states of South Eastern Europe, as well as other countries of Eastern Europe and the republics evolving from the former Soviet Union had to adjust to new standards and a different security environment. Even Greece, though much earlier, after the colonel’s regime had to adapt the security sector, while Turkey still tries to find an acceptable form of civil-military relations. Democracy takes many forms, especially in the security sphere, and even in some established democracies parliamentary control is far from perfect. There is a spectrum of measures and practices, which, taken together, allow a prudent evaluation of the state of affairs. Laws alone are an insufficient base for a judgement, so regulations must relate to practical implementation. To become engrained in civil society, democracy has to be more than periodic elections; respect for human rights by the executive and judiciary, and adequate complaint procedures are necessary components. More generally, the executive should be willing to reveal, explain, and justify, and parliamentarians should ensure that this happens in practice.

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W. van Eekelen / The Parliamentary Dimension of Security Sector Reform

The Changing Security Environment A bird’s eye view of Europe reveals many differences and a major paradox. The enlargement of both NATO and the European Union is a major contribution to peace and stability and future prosperity for the entire continent. In former Yugoslavia, the armed forces still focus on the dual role of defence against their neighbours and internal support for the government. Within NATO, the old members no longer see a threat to their independence or territorial integrity and are restructuring their armies to be able to participate in peacekeeping and enforcement action outside of their own countries. The new members, with their recent history of Soviet domination, also recognise the need for peace support actions but still stress the collective defence function of the Alliance. This difference has an immediate effect on the formulation of national strategies and on the structure and equipment of the armed forces. Both NATO and the EU are moving towards multinational formations at the level of brigades or battle groups, which underpin political solidarity and joint responsibility in pursing common political objectives. Such cooperation has a great practical impact on training, operating procedures and hopefully on equipment standardization. Secretary-General of the Western European Union, Willem van Eekelen devised two pieces of advice. The first was the need to do more for and with all the countries of Europe, not necessarily the same thing. This allowed a differentiated approach, responding to the progress made in individual countries. The other was “security through participation” which meant giving all non-EU members of NATO and all candidatemembers of the EU a seat at the table of the regular WEU-Council, allowing them to propose items for the agenda, to make their security concerns known, and to see the full members reactions. In this respect, the WEU was ahead of NATO and the EU, where new members were only admitted to meetings of the Council after signing a treaty of accession. This dimension of participation unfortunately was lost when the functions of the WEU were transferred to the EU and the WEU Council no longer had a function in the security debate. It was continued at the parliamentary level in the WEU Assembly and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, but no longer between government representatives. Moreover, the WEU Assembly, though continuing to be a forum for the drafting of reports and consensus building, which parliamentarians could benefit from in their national debates, no longer had a discussion with the Council as a necessary counterpart. This drawback was also felt by the full members who lacked a forum which covered the parliamentary side of intergovernmental co-operation. The problem continues up to the present as the Convention on the Future of Europe did not manage to solve it. The report of the working group on defence did not go further than recommending periodic meetings of members of national defence committees, which would fall short of the consensus building effect of joint work on reports and resolutions. Meeting colleagues is fine, but common activities are better. Apart from former Yugoslavia and Moldova and the “frozen conflict” between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the transition towards democracy and new national identity did not lead to conflicts with neighbours or internal strife. The toppling of Ceaucesu in Romania was bloody, but only at the top. Predictions about problems between Romania and Hungary or between the Baltic States and their Russian inhabitants fortunately failed to materialise, thanks to responsible leadership and careful NATO and EU oversight. Both organisations had made it clear not to allow membership to countries which had not done their utmost in resolving problems with their neighbours. In NATO, the Partnership for Peace, and later the Membership Action Plan were examples of promot-


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ing security through participation, while for the EU, the Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe aimed at linking economic development, human rights, and security into a single framework. The prospect of membership made the candidate countries eager to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria, which referred to democratic institutions, human rights and a functioning market economy able to accept the EU ‘acquis’ and to withstand competition. By and large their efforts have been impressive and as a result, the EU has enlarged by 10 countries to a membership of 25 and NATO with 7 to 26. Membership of the two organisations does not fully overlap as the four ‘neutral’ EU members are not in NATO, Denmark is not participating in the EU security and defence policy, and Norway, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania are not (yet) in the EU. The next step for EU enlargement, for which in the meantime Croatia and Macedonia also have applied, will greatly depend on the experience with the current batch of applicants. If too many problems arise and the European Commission must impose safeguard procedures in the internal market, the enthusiasm for another enlargement in 2007 would be very limited. The new members have made great efforts and have great expectations. They understand the need for reform in the security sector and work must continue, particularly through implementation of their new legislative framework. In the security field, the downsizing of armed forces is not yet complete and many questions remain concerning future structures. One of them is the professionalisation of the military. For peace support missions it is difficult to use conscripts, unless they are grouped in units of volunteers. In some cases the term of service will be too short for acquiring the necessary skills. The future service man and woman will need to be a jack of all trades, a “guardian soldier” to use the term coined by the Swiss officer Gustav Däniker, able to cope with escalation of a conflict situation, but also to act as mediator, diplomat, or mayor and to participate in development work and the repair of infrastructure. In many ways he is performing a function internationally, which at home is carried out by the police: to deter by his presence, but, if necessary, able and willing to act decisively. The downside of a professional army is the lack of a broad base in society and the risk of an introverted cadre which communicates insufficiently with political supervisors. Civil-military relations will be confronted by situations in which the civilian side is weighing military advice without accepting it unquestioningly. Excessive secrecy might make that relationship even more difficult. Therefore, in the young democracies particular attention must be paid to the training of officers and soldiers in the primacy of politics and modern patterns of democratic behaviour. They will have to accept that their views of the security needs of the state might not prevail and that the part of the national budget devoted to defence will be less than thought necessary. Obviously, the flip side of the relationship is that the responsibility for the state of a nation’s defence rests squarely with the politicians. One important limitation of democratic control of the armed forces should be that serving military officers should not be members of parliament. It is not possible to control the military and at the same time be part of it. This current trend in the Russian Duma should be rejected. More generally, countries should have a clear list of functions that are compatible with the status of Member of Parliament. A frequent criticism of parliamentarians is their lack of expertise in judging complicated security problems, a point which might be valid also for other areas of democratic scrutiny. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that there are usually few votes to be gained by being a spokesperson for defence. Security in the streets interests most citizens a great deal more, particularly when they are less concerned about threats to

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their national independence and territorial integrity. So, if the criticism is justified, parliamentarians must beef up their knowledge by seeking advice from party committees, non-governmental organisations and think-tanks. Parliamentary work is carried out in plenary sessions and in committees. Serious scrutiny needs serious committees with a professional staff and access to information. Their activities should range from screening the budget to exercising control over the executive by policy debates, topical questions to ministers and, when necessary, interpellations. In NATO countries, parliamentary practice varies greatly. In France, foreign affairs and defence are the reserved domain of the president of the republic, in the UK, the executive is headed by a powerful prime minister and has considerable leeway (and can count on the support of his majority party). Germany is an example of influential parliamentary committees, not only in budget matters, but also in policy decisions, including the participation in peace support operations. On the constitutional side, the powers and procedures of the President, Prime minister and Ministers of Defence and the Interior must be clear. The need for a civilian minister of defence has been widely recognised, but in too many cases he is a lonely civilian in a military environment with no antenna for the mood of parliament and civil society. In Turkey, civil-military relations are hampered by the order of precedence in which the chief of the general staff is above the minister of defence. In some other countries this might also apply to his influence, even if it is not formally true. The relationship between the minister and the chief of defence is always sensitive. The primacy of politics is beyond doubt, but politicians will have to weigh military advice carefully and refrain from micro management. The issue comes to a head when the ChoD and the service chiefs honestly feel that the security of the state is in danger if the plans of the minister of defence on behalf of the cabinet are carried out. In the UK, the service chiefs have access to the Prime Minister, bypassing the Secretary of State for Defence. The Prime Minister will then need to take full responsibility for the possible consequences; the military cannot be blamed for inadequate policies. An interesting but reversed extension of this practice occurred during the Iraq crisis when the British ChoD asked the Prime Minister to give assurances that the action was in conformity with international law so that the commanders could not be prosecuted for conducting the operation. The Prime Minister then requested advice from the Attorney General, who stated that he saw no legal objections because Iraq had not acted in conformity with UN Security Council resolutions.

Democratic Control of Defence Policy Democratic control applies to both the legislative and executive functions of government. The ‘trias politica’ of Montesquieu seldom is found in practice in a clear and true form. In many countries, ministers sit in parliament and thus carry out both legislative and executive functions. The role of parliament in legislative matters generally is admitted but their powers in overseeing policy vary greatly. Therefore, in each case it is necessary to examine the extent of authority on a range of issues, such as: − −

How detailed is their role in approving the budget and expenditure? Do they have a role in determining personnel policy? This is one of the few areas where legislation applies to defence questions. In general, defence and foreign affairs don’t have much legislative business.


− − − −

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What is their role in approving international agreements and the dispatch of defence forces outside the country? Is their agreement necessary before the executive commits the country to important acquisitions of equipment and do they oversee the arms trade? What is their role with regard to intelligence and special services? How do they oversee policy implementation and deal with topical questions. Do they have the right to ask written or oral questions, discuss annual reports, conduct inquiries, and organise hearings?

Most governments periodically present white papers or defence reviews setting out defence policy for the next ten years or so. In the light of rapid developments, most of them needed to be adopted earlier, which posed particular problems for orderly restructuring. Before one change had been implemented, it was already overtaken by new modifications. This is particularly costly on the procurement side, where long lead times cannot keep pace with downsizing or reorientation of missions. The white papers state the strategic concept, military doctrine, composition of the forces and their missions, and present a budgetary plan future in relation to the expected growth of the GDP of the country. Ideally, multi-annual budgeting is used, but in most cases only the first year contains a firm commitment. In several countries, like Denmark, a defence agreement is made in parliament which indicates a budgetary ceiling for the period till the next election. At present, when transparency, accountability and affordability are key notions in democratic defence planning, the defence budget must have considerable detail and the powers of the executive to change expenditure to another budget line without parliamentary approval should be limited. In the Soviet Union and most Warsaw Pact countries, budgets were very brief and non-informative as they contained only three lump sums: for personnel, operations, and procurement. Now budgets have hundreds of pages and are monitored by equally detailed audit reports. This requires parliamentarians to dig deep into the information provided, which can only be done if they are assisted by professional staff, informed media and an active civil society. Parliamentary scrutiny involves an assessment of whether the funds made available will be sufficient for the projects proposed and whether the priorities are right in realising coherent armed forces. This work is likely to raise difficult and sensitive questions concerning alternative spending. In the transition from orientation on collective defence to peace support missions, all European countries experienced considerable difficulties in coping with this issue. In most cases it has become very difficult to quantify military needs and a nation’s defence posture has become a measure of its ambition, sense of responsibility for stability in the wider world, and its willingness to enter into multinational commitments. When embarking on security sector reform programmes, every country became aware of the fact that reshaping military formations and transforming the entire defence organisation were two different things. The first is a technical adaptation to new contingencies, the second deals with a wide spectrum ranging from democratic procedures to modern personnel management. The case of Romania is illustrative, but by no means unique. The first cycle of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for NATO membership exposed serious dysfunctional features: planning was unrealistic with a great discrepancy between objectives and available resources, co-ordination between departments and services was lacking, and the personnel pyramid was inverted by large numbers of officers remaining in spite of considerable downsizing in the lower ranks.

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In subsequent cycles, these shortcomings were redressed and the Armed Forces Restructuring Plan, of May 2004, covered a list of immediate priorities for the completion of reforms, in accordance with a precise timetable: 2 1.

2.

3.

4. 5. 6. 7.

8. 9.

Defence planning in the context of a Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System (PPBES) aimed at completion of the Strategic Defence Review on the basis of a 2004 defence budget of 2.38 percent of GDP and growing in real terms. Approximately 25–35 percent would be earmarked for modernisation that would improve interoperability, combat effectiveness, deployability, sustainability and survivability of the forces earmarked for NATO missions; Participation in the full spectrum of NATO-led operations and in the international fight against terrorism. A concept for the establishment of a Special Forces battalion was ready for implementation; Force restructuring. Like many other countries, Romania went through several phases of downsizing. For 2003, originally a force was envisaged of 112,000 military and 28,000 civilians, but the current Objective Force 2007 formulated a leaner, modern, well equipped and trained and more affordable force with a ceiling of 75,000 military and 15,000 civilians; Host nation support through improved infrastructure facilities for the reception and onward movement of allied forces; Airspace management and air defence; Personnel training and development focused on English language training and NATO staff procedures; Personnel management, using the Military Career Guide as the main instrument for achieving a pyramidal personnel structure. At the same time, compensatory packages and re-conversion programmes should be provided for discharged personnel; Procurement in the short to medium term. Emphasis was ensuring NATO standard communications and communication security; Disposal of excess equipment and infrastructure through a Sales Agency.

Romania is quite unique in having – in addition to a separate delegate minister for relations with parliament – deputy under-secretaries in every government department with this responsibility. Since January 2004, the Ministry of National Defence has had a directorate for legislation and legal assistance, which inter alia prepares answers to parliamentary questions, but also assists parliamentary initiatives and gives advice on emergency legislation.

Police and Intelligence Services To the individual citizen, the behaviour of the police and the functioning of the judiciary usually are of more direct importance than democratic control of the armed forces. Even in communist systems the army was under political control, but it was far from democratic. Violation of human rights, torture, authoritarian behaviour and corruption were frequently practised by police and internal security forces. Controlling them is also a question of training and surveillance, but even more important is the institution of a complaint procedure, like individual access to an Ombudsman or similar body in


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cases of unauthorised behaviour. Equally, an independent and honest judiciary is an indispensable element of the rule of law in a democratic system. Civil security often depends on how much a judge is paid. Similarly, police jobs should not be up for sale, but allotted to objective criteria for qualifications and training. These questions are getting increased attention now that standards for defence reform are being recognised in the Partnership for Peace programme and the Membership Action Plans of NATO. Their importance was underlined in the ELIAMEP seminar in Tirana in February 2004, as participants remarked that the Albanian army never had exerted a role in the politics of the country. The Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Groningen Centre for European Security Studies (CESS) have recognised this in their joint study “Transparency and Accountability of Police Forces, Security Services and Intelligence Agencies.”3 The study contains seven country oversight profiles covering Bulgaria, France, Italy, Poland, Sweden, the UK and the USA. The conclusions are sobering. At the end of the twentieth century, public confidence in the police was at an all-time low. Following the yardstick that governments have a duty to show, and citizens the right to view, how official business is conducted, much remained to be desired. None of the countries examined had fully solved the dilemmas of dealing with unlawful behaviour by insisting on methods which would not infringe fundamental human rights and restricting basic personal freedoms, and of gathering evidence about offences without unwarranted intrusion on privacy. After 9/11, the dilemma of security versus individual freedom has become even more acute. Democratic control of the police and intelligence services is more complicated than over the military, because usually their involvement in day-to-day events in society is more intensive. Moreover, many police forces are locally managed and locally accountable, which means that the minister of the interior often cannot be held responsible for individual cases of conduct by police officers. Yet, increasingly the public questions the traditional monopoly of the police itself to determine through internal procedures whether its officers had been treating citizens correctly. The theme of ‘integrity’ is gaining prominence in training programmes and codes of conduct attempt to provide guidance. Personal integrity sits between the ears and is very difficult to insert if it is not already there. In the Netherlands, it is furthered by detailed discussions with trainees of cases where the borderline between proper and improper conduct is not always clear, particularly when accepting favours or presents. For example, a police commissioner needs a screened firm to install safety equipment in his house. Would it be proper to ask the same firm to renovate his kitchen even if he gets a separate bill and pays for it out of his own pocket? Better not, but what if no other firm fulfils the screening criteria? In France and the UK, no administrative organ is directly responsible to elected representatives. In Poland and the UK, parliamentary committees to oversee nonmilitary security-sector organisations did not come into existence until the first half of the 1990’s. The picture is different regarding accountability before the courts. In France, the courts are key instruments of operational accountability; every complaint levelled at the police is examined by the public prosecutor and can lead to a criminal procedure. In the UK, the courts are excluded from dealing with security institutions and hence play virtually no role in effecting accountability. In the United States, an important role is played by the courts in ensuring that the intelligence agencies are subject to the rule of law. They have access to classified information. The US also lead in accepting parliamentary oversight. In other countries it was little more than nominal. In

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the US, policing is a regional – and city – level competence with corresponding oversight by elected representatives. The Central Intelligence Agency is subject to two congressional committees – one in the House and one in the Senate. Congress as a whole votes to authorise the activities of intelligence agencies, their budget and the creation of new ones. In its yearly appropriations it can define the exact purposes for which money may be spent (and prohibit spending for other purposes). It must confirm the President’s nominations for top appointments and has the power to investigate the Intelligence Committees and discuss classified information in closed session, but their reports and legislation will be public. The terrorist attacks of September 2001 have led to various degrees of new legislation. In the US, more than 20 federal agencies were reorganised under the Department of Homeland Security, following an announcement by President Bush in June 2002. It includes the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, previously under the Department of Justice, collecting information on visitors and immigrants. The UK passed a huge statute, the Anti-Terrorism and Security Act of 2001, covering a wide field of measures ranging from money laundering to authorising information sharing between government bodies and allowing detention without trial for foreigners suspected of terrorism, who could not be deported because of the restrictions imposed by the European Convention on Human Rights.

Conclusions The foregoing analyses can be summed up as twelve elements that ensure that the military and security services play their proper role in a democratic society: 4 a)

b)

c) d)

e) f) g)

h) i)

The existence of proper constitutional and legislative structures with clearly defined responsibilities for the executive and legislative branches and a system of checks and balances; Co-ordination between foreign and security policy-making structures and processes, the primary role being played by the former in formulating a country’s external policies; A clear political primacy in the ministry of defence, the military being ultimately accountable to the democratically elected representatives of the public; Substantive parliamentary oversight involving members of parliament trained in the techniques for and the responsibilities of holding the military and police authorities accountable; The presence of expert professional staff in national parliaments to keep the members fully informed on key security issues and related data; The development of a cadre of security policy experts in the public domain, specialising in a range of security issues in order to generate public debate; Statutory audit structures to prevent corruption, fraud, abuse and neglect of public resources by the military and police, which remain unknown to the public because of military confidentiality; Transparency in the defence budget-making process in order to prevent the military’s threat perceptions being driven by interest groups; Training and education in the armed forces and the police about their role in democratic society, including respect for human and civil rights;


j) k) l)

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A fair and effective military justice system that enforces established standards of conduct and discipline and contains complaint procedures; An open and informed national debate preceding major decisions on national security and military matters; The commitment of armed forces outside national borders should require broad endorsement by elected representatives.

What a Parliamentarian Can Do to Make a Difference? 5 In the debate on the national security policy, a parliamentarian should obtain clarity about the threats and risks society should be protected from, make sure that there is a logical link between this policy and operational doctrines, defence plans and budgetary demands, and form an opinion on the question ‘How much security is enough?’ and how much the taxpayer can reasonably be asked to contribute. A credible audit system is essential for assuring that money has been spent for the intended purposes. When conducting international negotiations, make sure that the outcome is consistent with the principles of the UN Charter and the OSCE and with established national policy. If necessary and possible the parliamentarian should insist on reservations or interpretative clauses. On the role of civil society and the media, a ‘freedom of information act’ or other mechanisms (e.g. hearings) enabling parliament to benefit from inputs from think tanks, non governmental organisations and free media. On gender perspective, request statistical data about the proportion of women in the security services and their functions. The Report of the UN Secretary General on Women, Peace and Security of October 16, 2002 recommended women’s participation in peace missions and portconflict reconstruction. The functions of the military and other security services should be well defined in laws and regulations and parliaments should be involved in deciding on reform programmes. The UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (adopted by General Assembly resolution 34/169 of December 17, 1979) and the OSCE Code of Conduct for Politico-Military Aspects of Security of 1994 should be known and observed in training and practice. Parliament should have committees for defence and security and for intelligence, able to scrutinise a transparent budget and to obtain supplementary information on topical issues. This works only if the responsibilities of the President, Prime Minister or Minister of Defence can be held responsible for the security services and are accountable to parliament. These responsibilities can be subdivided in general powers (initiation and amendment of legislation, the right to summon ministers to answer questions and to carry out parliamentary inquiries), concepts of security policy, crisis management, force structure and doctrine, budget control, deployment abroad, procurement, and personnel policy including clarity on how the highest military officers are appointed. Make sure that adequate mechanisms exist for internal inspection and external complaint procedures, such as an Ombudsman, either with a general competence or specific for the armed services (as in Australia, Canada and Norway). In a democracy it is important that the constitution or laws define the different states of exception, because these directly affect the freedom of the citizens. Exceptions should automatically lapse if they are not renewed by a parliamentary vote within a specific period. The increased relationship between internal and external security as a

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result of terrorist activity has widened the scope of parliamentary activity. Parliaments are involved in at least three different actions: anti-terrorist measures by making the public, buildings and key infrastructure less vulnerable, counter-terrorist measures preventing terrorists from attacking by identifying and stopping them, and enhanced crisis management enabling rapid action in case of emergencies, possibly with international assistance, and stabilising the situation as well as possible. Terrorism presents new and multiple challenges for governments and parliaments alike, because its unpredictable character makes setting priorities for civil protection very difficult. Nevertheless, it must be done in such a way that the prime objective of terrorists – spreading fear and uncertainty – cannot materialise.

1 In “Security Sector Reform: its Relevance for Conflict Prevention Peace Building, and Development.” A compilation of presentations at a joint seminar of UNDG and DCAF on 21 January 2003 in Geneva, p. 10. The definition is from Timothy Edmunds. 2 Tudor Munteanu “Romania: Reform and Parliamentary Relations” in CESS Harmonie Paper 17, SecuritySector Reform and Transparency-Building. Needs and options for Ukraine and Moldova, 2004, p. 62. 3 Greenwood, David and Sander Huisman, ed. “Transparency and Accountability of Police Forces, Security Services and Intelligence Agencies.” Sofia: 2004. 4 The author acknowledges the important SIPRI publication “Arms Procurement Decision Making. Volume II,” edited by Ravinder Pal Singh, Oxford University Press, 2000, containing many of these points, which are of wider application than the armaments sector alone. 5 The following points are drawn from the Handbook for Parliamentarians No. 5 (2003) dealing with parliamentary oversight of the security sector. Principles, mechanism and practices, published by DCAF in cooperation with the Inter Parliamentary Union and translated into many languages.


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Intelligence Services in the Post 9/11 Era: The Dilemma Between Efficiency and Democratic Control Dr. Peter GILL

The path to the democratisation of intelligence has not been entirely painless even in old democracies such as the United States and the United Kingdom, but in countries currently seeking democracy from a recent past of authoritarianism and internal political conflict, it is a massive challenge. There are no simple solutions to the crime, insecurity and corruption that have characterised police and security intelligence services as part of broader problems of establishing a state that is both democratic and has some effective control over the country. I do want to make some observations about security and intelligence issues including post-9/11 developments that raise crucial issues of human rights that should be at the very centre of all our endeavours. It is very tempting to assume that the efficiency of security enforcement is the only thing that matters and the democratic ‘niceties’ of law and rights must wait for calmer times. But this is dangerous: the adoption of human rights standards will enable states to gain the very legitimacy upon which, in the longer term, security and safety depend.

1. The Recent History of the Democratisation of Intelligence In the late twentieth century, democratisation of intelligence took place in North America, Latin America, Australasia and Europe. The context differed, especially between the ‘old’ democracies, where reform took place mainly because of scandals, and ‘new’ democracies, where intelligence reform came as part of the transition from authoritarian regimes. The reaction to scandal and authoritarianism centred on increasing the control and oversight of agencies with a view to increasing the propriety of their actions and reducing their abuse of rights. Some in the US argue that the increased oversight and legal rules for intelligence agencies hindered their operations and contributed to the ‘failure’ of 9/11, but there is no general evidence that democratisation had this effect.

2. The Reaction to 11 September 2001: Efficiency Versus Democratic Control? There are many reasons for the ‘intelligence failure’ of September 11, 2001, but the reaction to it has been overwhelmingly concerned with the efficacy of agencies and

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P. Gill / Intelligence Services in the Post 9/11 Era

subsequent legal, organisational, and doctrinal shifts have sought to increase their power, especially with regard to information gathering and the right to act preemptively. Arguably, this is based on a central error: that propriety and efficacy exist in a ‘zero sum’ relationship. There is actually little evidence that more effectiveness in establishing security can be achieved by reducing the legality and propriety with which security intelligence is conducted. Rather, there are two broad justifications for placing human rights and freedoms at the centre of security intelligence; it is right in principle as enshrined in the UN Charter and European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR); also, it is right on a pragmatic level: states cannot achieve long term democratic legitimacy unless they respect human rights and freedoms. Of course, in the short term, this raises major difficulties for police and security officials who might feel overwhelmed by the extent of, for example, organised trafficking of arms, drugs and people. But, to take an example of a serious security issue within the UK – organised political violence or ‘terrorism’ as it occurred in Northern Ireland – it was the very denial of rights to equality that triggered the violence in the late 1960s. Therefore, it is necessary to examine critically some of these shifts and their implications for rights. 3. Legal Developments Since 9/11 Throughout North America and Western Europe, legislation was passed in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 that sought, in general, to empower intelligence agencies to gather information and to reduce the restrictions that, it was argued, hindered the ‘war on terror.’ For example, the USA PATRIOT Act dismantled the so-called ‘firewall’ that was built in the 1970s between information gathered for law enforcement as opposed to intelligence purposes. Non-citizens certified as presenting a threat of terrorism can be detained indefinitely, police and security agencies can gain easier access to electronic communications data, and the US Treasury is empowered further to obtain financial information from banks. In the UK, although a comprehensive Terrorism Act had been passed in 2000 and codified the various measures that had grown piecemeal since 1974 when the first Prevention of Terrorism Act was passed; the government still passed the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act of 2001. Again, this further enhances the availability of ‘special powers’ for the gathering of information via stop and search, but also provides for the unlimited detention without trial of foreigners deemed to be a threat. 1 This latter provision required the Government to enter derogation from the ECHR. This is allowed under Article 15 in cases of emergencies ‘threatening the life of the nation’ – it should be noted that the UK alone among European countries has found it necessary to do this but while the UK clearly faces some threat from terrorist action, it is absurd to characterise it as a threat of this magnitude. Germany, France, Italy, Spain and other countries have also strengthened their statutory schemes for counter-terrorism. 2 4. Doctrinal Developments since 9/11 The new laws do not exhaust the post-9/11 changes – there have also been assertions of new executive power, including some that previously understood laws (and rights) do not apply in new circumstances.


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Prior to democratisation in authoritarian states, security intelligence was seen as a pre-emptive weapon to be deployed against dissenters. This has been summed up in the idea of ‘counter-intelligence states.’ ‘Political policing’ in liberal democracies was sometimes carried out in similar ways, for example, COINTELPRO by the FBI in 1950–60s against communists, black, and anti-Vietnam War protesters, but this was not so extensive as in former communist regimes. Broadly, intelligence in liberal democracies has been seen more as seeking ‘defensive’ rather than ‘offensive’ security. There has been a general shift since 9/11 from ‘national security’ as essentially defensive to ‘pre-emptive.’ Threats must be countered and suppressed before they are imminent. This raises many difficult issues but a central point is that the role of intelligence becomes, if anything, more important. The current controversies in the US and UK regarding the quality of intelligence regarding Iraq prior to the invasion in 2003 demonstrates how crucial the relation of intelligence and policy has become. Of course, these techniques were deployed before 9/11, for example, the use of ‘targeted assassinations’ by the IDF against Palestinians suspected of terrorism. In the US also, the 1975 prohibition on US agencies engaging in assassinations has been interpreted since 1990 as not applying to ‘terrorists,’ but since 9/11, the CIA has been specifically authorised to kill what are described as ‘high value targets’ in the al-Qaeda leadership such as the operation in Yemen in November of 2002.3 With particular respect to internal security, these tendencies also pre-date 9/11 but have been reinforced since then. For example, governments characterise problems such as drug-trafficking, crime, and terrorism as ‘wars’ in order to drum up public support and legitimise greater use of pre-emptive means. That, and the ‘costs’ of law enforcement (financial, time, uncertain outcome), have led to an increase in the use of disruptive tactics that obviate the need for lengthy procedures through the criminal justice process. This has had impacts on intelligence, for example, aggravating the traditional tension between developing information through surveillance in order to gain improved knowledge and the desire to act. But the avoidance of due process guarantees, by the increased use of disruption or pre-emption, negative implications for rights.

5. Organisational Developments since 9/11 There is a strong perception in the US that a contributing factor to 9/11 was a lack of co-ordination and information-sharing both between different US agencies and transnationally. Attempts made to improve co-ordination since 9/11 include: •

•

Organisational integration, for example, in the US various agencies such as immigration and the coastguard have been merged into the Department of Homeland Security that will have its own intelligence division for ‘Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection’; Establishment of multiagency intelligence centres: Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) in the US and Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) in the UK. Whether it is possible to co-ordinate the highly fragmented security and intelligence ‘community’ in the US is highly questionable, for example, the FBI and CIA remain independent, while certain aspects of their counterterrorist work are being merged into TTIC;

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•

Co-ordination between agencies, especially across borders, is very difficult because different agencies have varying mandates, powers, etc. However, this is a problem everywhere: the Albanian State Police are part of a Joint Border Co-operation meeting process with UNMiK that OSCE seeks to extend to other border areas.4

6. Targeting and Profiling If agencies share more information with each other post-9/11 and make use of the integrated databases being developed, then there is a danger that they will simply become more swamped with information than they were before. More efficient targeting is the potential solution to this problem: to identify and concentrate surveillance and analysis upon those individuals and groups who pose the most immediate threat. This is sensible, but one of the main techniques being increasingly deployed – profiling – constitutes a major risk to rights. Profiles are constructed on the basis that there are certain ‘categories’ of suspicion – these may be based on behaviour (e.g. as with airline security systems such as CAPPS II – discussed below) association (with particular groups, religions) or ethnicity. This may be inevitable, but it does have profound implications for rights when people are treated as a threat because of their membership to some category. Here, the threat is not just to individual privacy rights but is also to whole groups who may be excluded from equal participation in rights to move, to find jobs, accommodation, etc.

7. Gathering Information Post-9/11 The two main dimensions of information-gathering are technical and human: TECHINT and HUMINT TECHINT: Major efforts are being exerted to increase the possibility of intercepting current communications via the Internet and to obtain past communications data from ISPs. Again, some of these measures pre-date 9/11, e.g., the UK Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act of 2000 (RIPA) by which ISPs are required to retain data and to provide it to police, security and a range of other authorities. These developments clearly constitute greater intrusion into personal communications that could be abused if not closely regulated. One ‘big idea’ since 9/11 is the construction of ‘data warehouses’ through linking public and private databases (e.g. CAPPS II being developed by airlines and government bodies.). There are major technical problems with the operations of such warehouses5 but even if they can be solved, we must beware of faith in the ‘technological fix,’ the idea that very sophisticated communications and information technologies (CIT) can solve highly complex analytical problems. We must remember the old adage of the computer world: GIGO – ‘garbage in, garbage out.’ There is massive corporate pressure on governments to purchase ever-more sophisticated hard- and software for security purposes. CIT cannot solve and may actually aggravate the problem of false ‘positives.’ Profiling is dangerous for intelligence in other respects, too, the dangers of false negatives.


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HUMINT: Since 9/11, the mismatch between the resources for TECHINT in the US compared with HUMINT has been scrutinized.6 Much of the post-9/11 effort to investigate the attacks and to pre-empt further ones has sought to increase HUMINT. This has clearly resulted in serious rights abuses, for example, the situation in Guantanamo Bay where over 600 men are still detained primarily for information gathering purposes which was described recently by a UK House of Lords judge as ‘a monstrous failure of justice.’7 Torture is being ‘sub-contracted,’ for example, Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen, was arrested at JFK airport and sent to Syria for 12 months where he was tortured before being returned to Canada. Furthermore, the US military coroner determined that two detainees at Bagram air base were murdered.8 The UK is also complicit in this; the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) ruled recently that evidence obtained via torture will not necessarily be deemed inadmissible. 9 There has been a major increase in attempts to recruit ‘human sources’ that reminds us of the problems that go to the very centre of security intelligence work and its propriety, that is, those who are most likely to be useful providers of information are those who are involved in crime and possibly human rights abuses. Recruiting sources can be very difficult: one method that has been reinforced by the strengthening of post 9/11 immigration and asylum procedures is recruitment through the manipulation of immigration and asylum regulations.

8. Analysis Intelligence work is bedevilled by the ‘empirical fallacy’ – that problems can be solved by gathering ever more ‘facts.’ Too much US discussion since 9/11 has centred on the search for pieces of information that may have enabled the 9/11 attacks to be predicted and then prevented: If not the search for the ‘smoking gun,’ then perhaps the search for the ‘smouldering datum’! Given what is known about the modus operandi of those carrying out the attacks, it is extremely unlikely that such a piece of information could realistically have been gathered. Nor was it just a case of the system failing ‘to connect the dots’ between pieces of data so that warning could have been provided, though this starts to get closer to the real failure of US intelligence: the failure of process and analysis.10 Analysts have always been the poor relations of gatherers within intelligence communities: they enjoy neither the reputation for ‘derring-do’ associated with HUMINT, nor the capacity to generate large profits for equipment suppliers associated with TECHINT. Certainly there were failures in gathering prior to 9/11, for example, the failure of the FBI and CIA to develop human sources at home and abroad. But the US intelligence ‘community’ was already awash with data and it is far from clear that increasing the flow will enhance the ability to prevent further ‘failures’. The analytical process is fraught with structural problems that cannot be explored in detail here, for example, ‘groupthink,’ and ‘mirror-imaging.’ Another significant issue that has emerged in the run-up to the war in Iraq has been the politicisation of analysis. For example, the Office of Special Plans was established inside the Pentagon in 2001 with the task of re-sifting information in the search for the elusive intelligence ‘proving’ a link between the 9/11 attacks and Iraq.11 The growing furore in the US and UK continues over the nature of the intelligence regarding the Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction (or not) and new inquiries were established earlier this

36


month by both governments who are increasingly mistrusted on the issue by their respective publics.12

9. Dissemination Clearly, increased information sharing facilitates improved intelligence but it does not guarantee it; indeed, intelligence agencies may be wary of sharing information for very good reasons: loss of control, fear of being ‘burnt,’ compromise of sources, etc. Also, recipients must beware that they are not being used or misled by the donor agency. The legislation referred to earlier has sought to remove restrictions on sharing information and the data protection principle that information obtained for one purpose should not be used for others rapidly breaking down. With dissemination, there is a loss of privacy and citizen control over the information about them; oversight bodies must seek to ensure that infringements of rights are proportional to the threat involved. Another aspect of this issue is if and when governments choose to make selective use of intelligence in order to justify their policies to the public, great care must be taken that it is accurate (or, given the ambiguity of much intelligence, not actually misleading!).13

10. Conclusion: Democratic Oversight In the post-9/11 climate, the task of those responsible for oversight has been made more difficult because of the generally heightened sense of insecurity and criticisms that they hinder the task of Services and the re-assertion of secrecy by political executives. I have already indicated a number of areas where oversight bodies must be very vigilant – yes, there are serious security problems facing all countries and ‘terrorism’ is not the only one. But, if we have learned anything from the disastrous history of human security in the twentieth century, it must be that ignoring human rights in the name of national security is an extremely dangerous doctrine. Rather, human rights must be placed at the centre of security intelligence mandates, training, regulations and practice. There is a particularly important role for the media; many of those in government and the public receive very little information about security intelligence structures and processes. They remain largely a mystery, in part for the very good reason that intelligence cannot work openly but the ubiquitous secrecy can also provide fertile ground for corruption, ignorance, mistrust and paranoia. Governments, politicians, officials and the media all have a responsibility to seek to improve public education about this core state function that can be, literally, a matter of life and death. Finally, the task of oversight is not to strive for some unobtainable ‘balance’ between security and rights; rather it is to ‘keep services honest’ and to ensure that such infractions of human rights and freedoms that do occur inevitably in the course of security intelligence operations are authorised, necessary, and proportionate.


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1 Both the 2000 and 2001 Acts are comprehensively discussed in Walker C., Blackstone’s Guider to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation, Oxford U.P., 2002. 2 DCAF Intelligence Working Group, Intelligence Practice and Democratic Oversight – a Practitioner’s View, Geneva: DCAF, July 2003, p. 71. 3 New York Times, December 15, 2002. 4 Lipponen O., OSCE Presence in Albania: Report to the Permanent Council, November 20, 2003, p. 8. 5 Constructing warehouses has been made technically possible by XML (Extended Markup Language) software that enables previously separate databases to be ‘merged’ via a universal language. 6 For example, see Baer R., See No Evil, New York: Crown Publishers, 2002. 7 Steyn J., ‘Guantanamo Bay: the Legal Black Hole,’ 27th F.A. Mann Lecture, November 25, 2003. Accessed at www.statewatch.org. 8 Independent, March 7 2003. 9 The Guardian, October 30, 2003. 10 Whitaker R., ‘A Poor Bargain,’ New Scientist 174, June 29, 2002, p. 26. 11 Hersh S., ‘Selective Intelligence,’ The New Yorker, May 12, 2003. 12 Even after the Hutton Report apparently cleared the British Government of charges that it had exaggerated the threat from Iraq, 54% of people in a NOP poll said they believed Tony Blair had lied to the country (Independent, February 7, 2004). In a Washington Post-ABC News poll in the US, 54% said they thought Bush had exaggerated or lied about prewar intelligence (Washington Post, February 13, 2004). 13 Gill, P., ‘The Politicisation of Intelligence: Lessons from the Invasion of Iraq,’ in Born H. et al., (eds.) Watching the Spies: Maintaining Accountability Over the World’s Secret Intelligence Agencies, forthcoming.



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The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations and Progress in Greek Security Sector Reform Dr. Thanos P. DOKOS

The changes in the international security environment brought into focus first by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union, subsequently by the civil war in former Yugoslavia, and most recently by the events of 11th September 2001 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, present countries in Southeastern Europe (SEE), the Black Sea region, the Mediterranean and the wider Middle East 1 with an urgent need to reform their entire defence and national security establishment. The need for reform is particularly acute in countries wishing to join eventually the EU or NATO, transition countries, former failed states that are currently under reconstruction or countries facing serious internal challenges. In some of those countries, a degree of attention has been given to the reform of defence and the democratic control of armed forces, but very little attention has been drawn to other sectors of the security environment. However, in dealing with new threats to security and the war on terrorism, those non-military elements are becoming more important. There is also a strong feeling that these different security agencies (MOD, General Staff, Intelligence Services, Ministry of Interior, Police, Border Guards, Customs, Judiciary) do not communicate between themselves – a fatal flaw in today’s new security environment. There is a great need to generate ideas, stimulate thinking and debate on all aspects of security reform, to break down boundaries between different elements of the security establishment and to expand the frontiers of what is considered ‘security.’ There is an equal need to increase the strength of the ‘security community’ – the body of military and especially of civilian personnel competent in the new security issues and capable [a] of filling posts in national and international institutions; and [b] educating the population to understand the new needs of security to ensure their support through the democratic process. Greece is in a good position to contribute to efforts of countries in its wider neighbourhood to reform their security sectors because of its historical experience. In the course of the 20th century, the military intervened four times in Greece’s domestic politics. The military dictatorship of 1967–74 is a painful experience that most Greeks have not yet forgotten. After an extensive programme of reforms regarding the civilian control of the armed forces had been implemented, Greece enjoyed a solid democratic regime for the past 32 years. The current system is designed to guarantee civilian control over the armed forces, an issue of great significance following the 1967 coup d’etat and the ensuing sevenyear military dictatorship. The military plays a significant role in the procurement process, as it is the agency that heavily influences threat assessment and, on the basis

40 T.P. Dokos / The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations and Progress in Greek Security Sector Reform

of this assessment, defines national defence needs and requirements while also making suggestions for the acquisition of necessary weapon systems. However, the government (and more specifically the Governmental Council on Foreign Affairs and Defence-KYSEA) has the ultimate responsibility for preparing the threat assessment and national security policy. Greece also suffered the catastrophic political, economic and social impact of a civil war. As a result, the police was, for more than two decades, more of a tool for the close surveillance and occasional oppression of competing political ideologies rather than an institution for maintaining public order. Again, an extensive reform programme was necessary after the restoration of democratic rule in 1974. Greece’s intelligence agency played a similar role as a result of both the civil war and the military dictatorship, spending more resources on domestic activities rather than the protection of Greece’s national security from threats originating abroad. The same process of reform for democratic control, transparency and accountability described in previous paragraphs was necessary in this case, too. Finally, Greece’s size, geographic position, good historical ties and its continuously improving and evolving multi-level relationship with its northern neighbours constitute Greece an acceptable partner for neighboring countries in an experience-sharing, mutual-learning process. There are no blueprints for carrying out SSR, since this is specific to the context of individual countries. There is also no one model of which areas should be targeted by SSR activities. It is vital therefore that donors conduct a thorough country assessment prior to any engagement in order to understand the context and local realities.2 Whatever the intentions of external assistance, experience has shown that security will be determined largely by the society itself. If there exists a way in which external supporters of reform can support (yet not dominate) locally-led processes of fundamental political change, then this can be a first step towards a process of sustainable SSR. If reformers seek to impose SSR in an inhospitable local environment, however, there are likely to be few, if any, returns.3 Political will for reform is a key element of any reform process and it is important to understand the factors that strengthen or weaken political will on reform issues. One possible way of strengthening local political will for reform is if the reform programme and external engagement is able to bring about a durable change in the attitudes of a wide range of stakeholders.4 Also, corruption (especially within a culture that accepts it) can have a very negative impact and can be a key impediment on efforts to reform the security sector.5

The Evolution of Greece’s National Security Concept Given its strategic location in the Mediterranean and the Balkans, Greece throughout the 20th century had been subject to the competing bids for great power penetration.6 Its near total exposure by sea, placed the country under the direct influence of whatever Great Power exercised naval control in the Mediterranean (Great Britain before 1947 and the United States after that time). In the area of Greek-great power relations, political scientists classified Greece among those states with penetrated (dependent) political systems.7 The year 1974 is the gate connecting two different eras in the history of 20th century Greece. In the period 1903–1974 the small and strategically located country ex-

T.P. Dokos / The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations and Progress in Greek Security Sector Reform 41

perienced considerable turbulence in external and internal relations. Economically, it was classified in the category of poor, agrarian, raw material-producing, tradedependent and externally indebted, in short, underdeveloped. Politically, it was polarized, functioning with personalistic and clientelistic political parties whose main purpose was to distribute the largesse controlled by a hypertrophic state-sector. Deep schisms – pitting Royalists against Republicans and Communists against Nationalists – marked the years from 1915 to 1974, resulting in frequent military interventions in politics. Accordingly, dictatorial rule was imposed in 1925–6, 1936–41 and 1967–74. A bloody, destructive and socially traumatic civil war in 1946–49, deeply scarred the body politic and the society of the country. Given the instability and fragility of its democratic institutions – constantly challenged by competing models of monarchical authoritarianism and communist totalitarianism – Greece during this long period was classified by political scientists in the “praetorian zone” together with states such as Spain, Portugal and Turkey as well as countries in Central and South America.8 Constantinos Karamanlis in mid-1974 returning from political exile and possessing strong political instincts and considerable foresight, presided over a remarkably smooth transition process that led to the establishment and consolidation of durable and, with the passage of time, adequately tested democratic institutions. Τhe handling of “dejuntification” in 1974–5, confined primarily to coup leaders and those responsible for the ordering and the practice of torture, prevented the upsurge of a new schism between the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs,’ thus putting an end to the long cycles of mutual revanchism in the Greek political arena, while reducing the opportunities (as well as removing the causes) of patron-client relationships between warring political parties (or coalitions) within Greece and competing for influence through local clients Great Powers.9 In order for Greece to qualify for entry into the Community, she (like France, Germany and others) needed to abandon concepts and policies such as ultra-nationalism, irredentism or other forms of territorial revisionism and to accept instead the challenges of functional integration and economic inter-dependence which were at the heart of the grand European experiment. Despite the spirited debate that had preceded Greece’s entry into the EC in the years 1976–79 (PASOK, the Greek Socialist Party, had been at that time heavily opposed to Greek membership), in the fourteen years that have elapsed since formal accession in January of 1981, the EU (European Union) has become nearly universally accepted by the full range of political parties as the centerpiece of Greece’s external relationships. It is well beyond the scope of this chapter to assess the deep impact of EC membership on nearly every aspect of Greek economic, political and social expression. In the long term, it is safe to assume, that the comprehensive impact will probably prove to be of monumental proportions in nearly every walk of Greek life, including civil-military relations.10 Membership to NATO also had a certain “modernizing” impact on the officers corps, especially after 1974. Simultaneously, the EU has functioned also as a restraining instrument. Membership in an elaborate structure that is highly institutionalized required the abandonment of some of the trappings of undiluted sovereignty and national independence. Both with respect to Turkey (as we suggested above) and also in its relations with its northern neighbors (especially FYROM), Greece has found itself, like Odysseus, tied to a European Union mast permitting it to resist the siren songs of atavistic nationalism and irredentism.11


Today, global structures are in a state of flux. Analysts and policy makers in small countries are attempting to identify and to predict trends as well as to recommend policies of adjustment to emerging global patterns.12 In the early 21st century, Greece is faced with what she considers as a major security threat and a number of risks: the threat still emanates from her eastern neighbour (Turkey) and the risks are seen as resulting from Balkan and Mediterranean instability, including some of the so-called transnational threats. Indeed, after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Greek officials have being re-assessing to a certain extent their security priorities and upgrading the significance of the so-called “new asymmetric threats.” Issues of high concern include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, theater and “national” missile defence, terrorism (both conventional and new forms: NBC and cyber-terrorism) and the resulting need for increased bilateral and multilateral intelligence and police cooperation, transnational organized crime, with special emphasis on drug trafficking, religious extremism, pollution of the environment, and illegal migration.13

The National Defence Establishment The current system is designed to guarantee the civilian control of the armed forces, an issue of great importance after the 1967 coup d’etat and the seven-year military dictatorship that followed. According to the Greek Constitution (which was partially revised in 1985), the President of the Republic is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, but his powers have a largely symbolic character. Decisions are taken by the Prime Minister and the government. The Government Council on Foreign Affairs and Defence (KYSEA), which convenes on an ad-hoc basis, appoints the Chief of HNDGS and the Chiefs of Staff. The Chief of HNDGS is the Supreme Military Commander of the Armed Forces in times of crisis or war. In peacetime, the Chiefs of Staff of the three branches report directly to the Minister of Defence. The post of the Chief of Hellenic National Defence General Staff alternates (on an almost regular basis) between officers of the three branches every two years. The Chiefs of Staff of the three branches serve for a two-year term, although this can be extended if deemed necessary. The role and influence of the officer corps had traditionally been quite significant. One could hardly disagree with the conclusions of Peter Kassander that “officers have enjoyed a unique status in Greek society,” to a certain extent forming a separate caste. As mentioned in a previous section of this chapter, the military had repeatedly intervened in Greek political life during this century, on three occasions establishing a dictatorship (in 1925, 1936 and 1967). After the restoration of democracy and the trial and incarceration of the leaders of the 1967 coup d’etat, officers have consistently refrained from intervening in political life. Also the officer corps, especially before 1967, viewed itself as “embodying the national ideals of Greece and equated the goals of the armed forces with those of the nation.” Furthermore, “the self-perception of the military as an indispensable instrument of progress and modernization stemmed in part from the variety of social programs and economic development projects in which the armed forces had been employed since 1945.”14


Civil-Military Relations in 20th Century Greece The current system is designed to guarantee civilian control over the armed forces, an issue of great significance following the 1967 coup d’etat and the ensuing seven-year military dictatorship. After the restoration of democratic rule in 1974 and the limited purge in the Hellenic Armed Forces, civil control over the military has never been in question. The role of the military has been scrupulously limited to defence matters and all significant decisions concerning national security issues are made by the government.15 However, there still is some distrust of the officer corps by some older politicians. According to Thanos Veremis, “during the years of conservative rule (1974–81) the officer corps was treated with caution by the press while an effort was made by the state to re-educate young officers… Furthermore, ever since 1974, governments have made a conscious effort to extract the military from their institutional isolation and incorporate them in civil society. Because entrance examinations for military academies do not differ from university examinations, some deplore the loss of the “heroic” element in the selection and education of officers. But others point out that the bureaucrat-officer can also improve his skills as a technocrat once he transcends the barrack mentality. Be that as it may, the “civilianisation” of officers made them more prone to involvement in party politics to improve their career opportunities.”16 According to the Greek Constitution (partially revised in 1985), the President of the Republic is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, but his powers have a largely symbolic character. Decisions are taken by the Prime Minister and the government. The Government Council on Foreign Affairs and Defence (KYSEA),17 which usually convenes on an ad hoc basis, appoints the Chief of Hellenic National Defence General Staff (HNDGS) and the Chiefs of Staff and makes important decisions on procurement. The Chief of HNDGS is the Supreme Military Commander of the Armed Forces and the post rotates on a 2-1-1 basis between Army, Navy and Air Force. The Chiefs of Staff of the HNDGS and the three branches serve for a two-year term, although this can be extended for another year.18 Law 660 of August 1977, reshaping the command structure in the armed forces, did away with the experimentations of the junta. By this law, the government (the civilian authority) alone was responsible for national defence. Eighteen years after the 1977 law, which gave the army, navy and air force latitude in special fields of decision-making and allowed them a measure of autonomy in relation to the HNDGS, the latter resumed some of its old authority. The 1995 law, however, gave the Minister of Defence the final say on all military matters. Not only is the entire chain of command accountable to him, but he has also acquired his own civilian advisers on questions that cover the whole spectrum from procurement to strategy (the Minister’s Staff/ EPYETHA).19 The government (and more specifically the Governmental Council on Foreign Affairs and Defence-KYSEA) has the ultimate responsibility for preparing the threat assessment and national security policy. On the basis of those, the Ministry of National Defence (mainly through the proposals of the military leadership) prepares the annual defence budget and the five-year procurement plan (EMPAE) that are then submitted to KYSEA for approval. Implementation of EMPAE is the responsibility of the Ministry of National Defence (General Secretariat for Economic Planning and Armaments and General Staffs for the three Services). The final decision for awarding a major contract to a specific company is made by KYSEA on the basis of the recommendations of technical committees that evaluate the offers of various candidates. The priorities of


the government are mainly the cost/limitations of the defence budget and the military capabilities of weapon systems. Accountability and transparency in the procurement process are also taken into consideration (as demonstrated by public tenders, evaluation committees composed of uniformed and – occasionally – civilian experts, oral briefings and written reports to the Parliament, etc.) but do not weigh as heavily as the former criteria. The military plays a significant role in the procurement process, as it is the agency that heavily influences threat assessment and, on the basis of this assessment, defines national defence needs and requirements while also making suggestions for the acquisition of necessary weapon systems. It is not surprising that the military’s priorities are the military capabilities of weapon systems and the fastest possible delivery. Particular criteria, such as the limited size of the defence budget and the accountability and transparency in the procurement process are also considered, but do not weigh as heavily as the former issues. Although military officers understand the need for greater accountability and transparency, they consider this a responsibility mainly for politicians. Because of strict political control after 1974, military bureaucracies have had an important role in allocating the budget’s share for each branch of the Armed Forces, but little involvement in political decisions. In democratic regimes, parliamentary oversight of the security and defence sector is quite important in the general context of checks and balances. In the case of Greece, the role of politicians (opposition parties) is rather limited, mainly because of the relative consensus between major Greek political parties (with the exception of the Communist Party) in defining and assessing the national security threats and the basic directions of national defence policy. In addition, the role and authority of the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence is very limited. Although Parliamentary Committees generally do not possess any real power, the specific Committee lacks any real authority. Its activities are limited to briefings by the Foreign and Defence Ministers and the holding of hearings on various defence and foreign policy issues. However, it lacks any decision-making authority. The effectiveness of the inquiry, hearings and question procedures is at best limited and, as already mentioned, highly symbolic. The blame for this should be put on the general tendency of the executive branch in Greek politics to ‘allocate’ a ‘ratifying/legitimizing, ’and to a large extent, highly symbolic role to the legislative branch, thus limiting its authority and power.20 Consequently, it is an imperative need to upgrade the role of this Committee – and the Parliament in general, by providing specialized support staff and giving it a more substantial role in the decision-making process on issues of defence and procurement. The democratic oversight and control of the intelligence and security agencies in Greece has been an important issue for Greece during most of the post-World War II era. Greece suffered the catastrophic political, economic and social impact of a civil war in 1946–49. As a result, the police were, for more than three decades, more of a tool for the close surveillance and occasional oppression of rival political ideologies than an institution for maintaining public order. An extensive reform programme was necessary after the restoration of democratic rule in 1974. As a result of its past record, the police’s image in the eyes of Greek public opinion has only recently started to be restored and its popularity has been slowly increasing. Greece’s intelligence agency played a similar role as that of the police as a result of both the civil war and military dictatorship, spending more resources on domestic


activities rather than the protection of Greece’s national security from threats originating abroad. The same process of reform for democratic control, transparency and accountability described in previous paragraphs for the Police and the Armed Forces was necessary in this case, too. In the 1980s and 1990s, the National Intelligence Agency was an inward-looking, rather inefficient bureaucracy, exposed to partisan interference. It was pretty capable in the collection and assessment of military information, but weak in the “civilian” intelligence sector (terrorism, organized crime, etc.). After the Ocalan “fiasco” of March 1999, the Greek government finally realized that reform was urgently needed in the intelligence sector. An [active duty] Ambassador was appointed as the new Director, breaking a tradition of retired military officers filling this post. The Agency’s range of responsibilities has been recently expanded to include financial crime, terrorism, organized crime, and illegal migration. There will be less emphasis on military information. New Directorates for International Terrorism and Organized Crime and for International Cooperation (with foreign agencies) have been established. There is increased emphasis on training and an ongoing effort to upgrade existing equipment (both hardware and software), although there are serious budgetary constraints (the annual budget is approximately 35 million euros, 90% of which are personnel expenses). The Agency is reducing the number of military personnel and increasing the number of civilian employees, including the recruitment of highly qualified personnel in various fields, with special emphasis on the knowledge of foreign languages (currently the Agency’s personnel includes 1,200 civilians, 300–350 police officers and 40–50 military officers). An Analysis Centre and Scientific Council are about to be created. It remains to be seen, however, whether the ‘new spirit’ at the top of the agency will manage to overcome the considerable bureaucratic inertia and transform this agency to an efficient mechanism to address the security challenges of the 21st century. Another issue that must be examined is the role of civil society and the security sector and the relationship of NGO experts as policy advisers to policy-makers in the government and to the parliament of Greece. Civil society initiatives are increasing in Greece, although the country lags behind most of its EU partners. Think-tanks, other NGOs or independent analysts are neither a sizable, nor an influential pressure group in Greece. The role and influence of analysts (in most cases university professors) and think-tanks (such as the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy/ELIAMEP, the Defence Analyses Institute/IAA, the Institute of International Relations/IDIS, etc.) is usually limited to the publication of monographs or op-ed articles in various newspapers or appearing on television or radio shows. The role and capability of the media to analyze security and defence issues should also be addressed. The Greek mass media may occasionally play a role in promoting transparency and accountability by revealing possible wrong-doings and by criticizing specific procurement decisions. However, such criticisms are seldom based on a sound knowledge of the military capabilities of specific weapon systems. Such analyses can be found in specialized defence journals, which are, however, addressed to a rather small audience. The general public’s role and influence in defence decision-making and procurement is very limited. Because of the relative consensus between major Greek political parties (with the exception of the Communist Party) in defining and assessing the national security threats and the basic directions of national defence policy, the average


citizen cannot express his personal views on those issues by voting against the governing party, as the opposition is following more or less the same line in defence issues. As for other professional pressure groups, there are several middlemen representing large foreign defence firms, who are exerting some pressure (on occasion using their connections, as well as offering bribes to key people) in order to win various tenders. However, their influence should not be overstated. Because the majority of Greek defence firms are state-owned, their role as pressure groups is quite limited. The requirements of accountability and transparency only became an issue in Greece in the last few years (roughly from 1987–88, with the procurement of 80 thirdgeneration fighter aircraft, 40 F-16s and 40 Mirage 2000). The actors that have a strong interest in promoting more accountability and transparency are the politicians, the media and, of course, the general public. However, only the former two are playing a more active role in seeking more accountability and transparency in defence procurement. As mentioned above, the general public’s role and influence in defence decisionmaking and procurement, as well as accountability and transparency, is quite limited. As for the mass media, they may occasionally play a role in promoting transparency and accountability by revealing possible wrong-doings and by criticising specific procurement decisions. For the military, accountability and transparency are not insignificant but clearly constitute a lower priority than the military capabilities of weapon systems and the fastest possible delivery. Although it will be argued in this study that there is only room for modest improvements in the field of transparency in the Greek arms procurement system, this is not necessarily the case with accountability. Specific measures for increasing accountability include the annual publication of “The White Bible” by the Ministry of Defence (the White Bible was first published in May 1996 and again in 1997, 1999, 2001 and 2004) which aims at informing both decision makers (especially members of Parliament), the mass media and the general public and the Annual Defence Report to Parliament (prepared annually by the Ministry of Defence since 1996). Another suggestion would be the upgrading of the Parliamentary Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs – and the Parliament in general, by – as already mentioned – providing specialized support staff and giving it a more substantial role in the decision-making process on issues of defence procurement (and possibly a veto-power over specific decisions).

Prospects for the Future In the 1980s, the perception of many western governments and foreign analysts was that “reactionary” policies, unreliability and unpredictability were the dominant characteristics of Greek foreign policy. In the last five years, as Greece has moved considerably closer to the core of European integration (both politically and economically), its views and positions on a number of foreign policy and security issues have converged considerably with those of its EU partners. Greece has moved towards the “centre” on a number of other issues, fully normalizing relations with Israel, as well as considerably improving its relations with Turkey. In the 1990s and early 21st century there is little doubt that the pattern has been for a more pragmatic, reliable, rational, multidimensional foreign policy, placing emphasis on multilateral diplomacy.


The Greek security sector will face a number of important challenges: developing and maintaining a ‘critical mass’ of highly trained and motivated officers; increasing professionalism throughout its ranks, resolving problems of inter-agency cooperation and the slow pace of security sector reform, due to the rather low level of awareness about the new security threats 21 among the general public, and the traditional weaknesses of the Greek public administration system; and, last but not least, developing a security culture. The latter should be achieved by increasing the number of civilian experts, but also through improving the professional education system and, importantly, making the mental leap in order to adapt to a new security environment where Greece is a full member of the developed and ‘privileged’ West and, therefore, a possible target of non-state actors. As for civil-military relations in Greece, there do not appear to be any serious problems of “good governance” of the security and defence sectors in Greece. By the end of 1975, the parliamentary regime was safe from military challenges – a state of affairs that persists today.22 The democratic oversight and control of the armed forces and the security agencies is at a satisfactory level. There is an increasing supervisory role for the parliament regarding the security and intelligence services, which are also coming under regular scrutiny from independent authorities for the protection of personal information. Of course, there is always room for improvement. The most pressing need is the upgrading of Parliament and more specifically the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, whose role and authority should be expanded and its support mechanism significantly strengthened. Finally, Greece is no exception to the rule that in democratic societies there is a continuing competition between national security and transparency. Although the former is of extreme importance, a functioning system of checks and balances guarantees that there is a relative balance between national security and transparency. Finally, like most countries in the world today, Greece still needs to improve its domestic response, particularly in terms of training, equipment, and informationsharing on issues such as money-laundering, cyber-terrorism and cyber-crime, and prevention and consequence management of NBC terrorist attacks. The considerable resources – trained personnel, organisation, equipment, planning and experience – that were used for the security of the 2004 Athens Olympic Games should be fully exploited now that the Games are over. Indeed, the systems developed for the Games will constitute an important post-Olympic legacy, leaving Greece with a high quality infrastructure in terms of equipment and trained personnel, one that will be, in many respects, more sophisticated than in many western European and American metropolitan areas.

1 The Greater Mediterranean is one of the regions in the world with the largest democratic deficit. As a consequence, there are several deficiencies in the defence sectors if countries in the region. These include: limited civilian participation in and oversight of security policy-making; limited separation of police and military force, high levels of defence spending (Heiner Hanggi & Fred Tanner, Promoting Security Sector Governance in the EU’s Neighbourhood, Chaillot Paper no. 80, EU-ISS, Paris, July 2005, pp. 67–68), poor and expensive management, and absence of effective legislative oversight (Arnold Luethold, Security Sector Reform in the Arab Middle East: A Nascent Debate. In Bryden, Alan & Heiner Hänggi eds. Reform and


Reconstruction of the Security Sector. Lit Verlag, Munster, October 2004, pp. 10–14). The Middle East, it appears, has still not absorbed, less assimilated, the SSR concept. So far, there have been no serious efforts in any of the countries of the Arab Middle East towards good governance of the security sector, as implied by the concept of SSR. However, several factors interact to exert pressure from within the security apparatus. These are: • The shift from external to internal security challenges; • The search for interoperability with US forces and regional cooperation; • The need to reduce military expenditures; • The need for force reduction, demobilization strategies and modernization; • The privatization of security. (Luethold, pp. 2–3 & 22). 2 Clingendael-International Alert-Saferworld, Towards a Better Practice Framework in Security Sector Reform, Occasional SSR paper 1, August 2002, p. 5. 3 Jane Chaana, Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects, Adelphi Paper 344, DCAF & Oxford University Press for International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, June, 2002, p. 76. 4 Local ownership and will for reform can greatly enhance the sustainability and legitimacy of reform processes, but can be difficult to achieve. Capacity-building within government and civil society can also enhance local ownership. (Clingendael-International Alert-Saferworld Alert, pp. 6 & 8) 5 Clingendael-International Alert-Saferworld, p. 7; Chanaa, p. 72. 6 See, for example, T.A. Couloumbis, J.A. Petropoulos, H.J. Psomiades, Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: An Historical Perspective, New York, Pella Publishing Company, 1976. 7 See, for example, Adamandia Pollis, “United States Foreign Policy Toward Authoritarian Regimes in the Mediterranean,” Millenium, vol. 4, no. 1, Springer 1975, pp. 28–51. 8 The literature on “praetorian states” was sparked by the book of Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968. 9 On the subject of consolidation of democratic institutions in Greece since 1974, see P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, “Regime Change and the Prospects for Democracy in Greece: 1974–1983,” in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Southern Europe (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1986), pp. 138–164; see also Theodore A. Couloumbis and Prodromos M. Yannas, “The Stability Quotient of Greece’s Post-1974 Democratic Institutions,” Journal of Modern Greek Studies, vol. 1, no. 2, 1983, pp. 359–372. 10 See Panos Kazakos and Panayotis Ioakimidis (eds.), Greece and EC Membership Evaluated, London, Pinter, 1994. 11 I would like to thank Prof. Theodore Couloumbis for this comment. 12 According to a RAND Corporation study (Ian Lesser, Stephen F. Larrabee, Michele Zanini and Katia Vlachos-Dengler, Greece’s New Geopolitics (RAND, National Security Research Division, Santa Monica, 2001), Greek strategic space is wide encompassing Europe, Eurasia, the Middle East and the Mediterranean, as well as transatlantic relations. At the broadest level, Greece will also be affected by the complex of trends described as «globalization». The contemporary strategic environment is characterized by a series of functional issues that cut across traditional geographic lines, leading to a greater degree of regional interdependence (although this is true more for the Mediterranean that for the Balkans). The strategic environment around Greece is being shaped by the development of new lines of communication for energy, and other nonenergy infrastructure projects. 13 Thanos Dokos, “Greece in a Changing Strategic Setting,” in T. Couloumbis, T. Kariotis & F. Bellou (eds.), Greece in the 20th Century. Lessons and Challenges, Frank Cass Publishers, London 2003. 14 For an illuminating analysis of the social and geographical background of the Greek officer corps, see Peter Kassander, “National Security,” in Greece. A Country Study, Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 1989, pp. 292–293. However, according to Thanos Veremis, “The vital task of modernization –a major source of pride for the military in certain developing societies—was not one for which the Greek military was well suited. Greek officers have more often been identified with political turmoil than with orderly change and social innovation, while their declining position in the social order generated a sense of isolation which before 1967 contributed to hostility towards the ruling political elite, and reinforced their desire for social acceptance.” (Veremis, p. 169). 15 The transformation of civil-military relations in Greece during the last decades cannot be explained wholly by political factors. Since the 1960s, the social fabric has changed rapidly. The rise of per capita income, the widening of professional options, the incorporation of the military academies into the system of university entrance examinations and finally the prodigious growth of urban centres have changed the social


background and the value system of the officer corps between 1974 and today. (Thanos Veremis, The Military in Greek Politics. From Independence to Democracy, Hurst & Company, London, 1997, p. 185) 16 There was a limited tradition of appointing retired officers to ministerial positions, which is no longer the case. Furthermore, from 34 deputies with military background in the parliament in 1952, the number had fallen to eight in 1993. (Veremis, p. 179 & 181) 17 Composition of the Government Council on Foreign Affairs and Defence (KYSEA): Prime Minister, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, National Economy, Finance, Interior, Environment, Energy, Public Order and the Chief of the General Staff. Other Ministers may participate on an ad hoc basis. 18 Thanos Dokos & Panayotis Tsakonas, The Formation of Greek Procurement Policy: Problems and Prospects, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), mimeo, 1998. 19 Veremis, p. 180. See also: Nikos Alivizatos, The Constitutional Position of the Armed Forces (2 vols), Athens, 1987 & 1992; Gerassimos Karambelias, The Role of the Armed Forces in the Political Life of Turkey and Greece, Athens, 1998; Theodoros Stathis, National Defence, Athens, 1992. 20 To be approved, security and defence budgets must be voted by a majority in the Parliament, a rather symbolic process in which all political parties, with the exception of the Greek Communist Party, vote in favour of the defence budget. 21 As senior Greek government officials acknowledge, there is considerable concern about the nexus between transnational organized crime, in the Balkans, the Middle East and adjacent regions – especially trafficking of narcotic substances and women – and international terrorism. Because of its geographic location, Greece is a transit point for such illegal activities, in the context of organized crime and terrorist networks. 22 The other side of the re-integration of the military in civil society was the gradual involvement of party politics in promotions and retirements. (Veremis, p. 178)



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The Romanian Experience with Democratic Control of the Security Sector Dr. Liviu MURESAN

Starting with the legal framework, parliamentary oversight as well as civil society monitoring over the security sector, the democratic control is an important component of the reform undertaken in Romania. After years of experience, it is time to speak about the difficulties and success stories of this complex endeavor. The two experiences, one related to the parliamentary dimension and the second to the overall “security culture” could be of interest for other countries. With conclusions and recommendations the author hopes to strengthen expertise in the field of democratic control over the security sector. The dramatic changes after December 1989 offered the Romanian people the chance to build a new democratic society. One of the most important priorities was the reform of the security sector in general, and the preparation for future NATO and European Union membership in particular. The first Parliament (elected in June, 1990) drafted the new Constitution as well as the new laws regulating the activities of the security sector components. The international experience of democratic control over this sector was instrumental for the Romanian Parliament. Over the last 15 years, the quality of the democratic and mainly parliamentary control has permanently improved.1 Several training sessions were organized in Romania as well as abroad for the members of the Parliament and the staffers working in the Defence Committees of the House of Deputies and Senate as well as for those working in the specialized committees for the control of the intelligence services. The preparation for NATO membership, the debates about the Kosovo crises and the participation in the “war on terrorism” brought new impulses for the parliamentary control over the security sector as well as for the Romanian contribution to the Peace Support Operations. Members of the Romanian Parliament also had the chance to improve their knowledge of foreign and security affairs through their participation in the sessions of the North Atlantic PA, WEU PA, and OSCE PA. At the same time, the Romanian NGO’s succeeded in participating in projects at national and international level improving their expertise in democratic control of the security sector.2 The activities of the Euro Atlantic Council of Romania (with the founding members Casa NATO, EURISC Foundation, George C. Marshall Association and Manfred Wormer Association) within the framework of ATA set new standards in this respect. The mass media played an important role in the democratic control of the security sector by organizing debates, talk shows, publishing interviews, offering special analysis, or supplements dedicated to specific topics. The newspaper ZIUA, the REALITATEA TV channel or the NATIONAL BROADCAST RADIO ROMANIA ACTUALITATI can be considered among the most active. As part of the general concern about the democratic deficit both at national and international levels, the public debate in Romania remains quite superficial, sporadic and

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L. Muresan / The Romanian Experience with Democratic Control of the Security Sector

less efficient. The change of the political spectrum in the general elections of 2004 brought into power a Parliament and Executive with a clear determination for change, and for fighting corruption, but not efficient enough from the perspective of the 2007 EU membership of Romania and so drew criticism from Traian Basescu, President of Romania. In a challenging international security environment, with new threats and changing priorities for national security, the members of the Parliament have a difficult task to accomplish. They must improve their general knowledge about the security sector as well as the national and international experience in implementing the parliamentary control over this sector. In what follows, we want to present the overall framework of democratic control in Romania, followed by some new experiences, as well as conclusions and proposals for the improvement of this specific activity.

1. Democratic Control of the Security Sector in Romania 1.1. The Legal Framework Establishing a legal framework for Romania for the democratic control over the security sector in general, and armed forces in particular was a subject of special interest after the events/revolution of December 1989. The legal support of democratic control over the armed forces is based on the new Constitution from December 1991 and the Law for National Defence nr. 45/1994. Articles 110 and 117 of the Romanian Constitution are considered the framework of democratic control over the armed forces.3 Art. 110: (1) The Government and other agencies of Public Administration shall, within the Parliamentary control over their activity, be bound to present any information and documents requested by the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate, or the Parliamentary Committees, through their respective Presidents. In case a legislative initiative involves an amendment of provisions regarding the State Budget or the State social security budget, the request for information shall be compulsory. Art. 117: (1) The Army shall be exclusively subordinated to the will of the people, to guarantee the sovereignty, independence and unity of the State, the Country’s territorial integrity, and Constitutional democracy. (2) The structure of the national defence system, the organization of the Army, the preparation of the population, economy and territory for defense, as well as the status of the military shall be regulated by an organic law. (3) Provisions under paragraphs (1) and (2) shall apply accordingly to the police and security services of the State, as well as to other components of the Armed Forces. (4) The organization of military or paramilitary activities outside a State authority is prohibited. The legal framework for the security sector is more complex and derives from the Constitution, laws, Emergency Ordinance, and Government Decisions.4


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1.2. Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector The democratic oversight over the national security system exercised by the Parliament and civil society is essential for good governance, for ensuring the efficiency in the security sector, and for protection of the citizen’s rights and liberties. In transitional societies, such as in Romania, the democratic oversight of the security sector is necessarily due to the interconnection with the improvement of the state of law and taking into account that the political reforms must precede the reforms in the defence and security sectors. Inevitably, the success or failure of one process influences developments in the other. The parliamentary oversight is in accordance with the prerogatives of the Parliament conferred by the Constitution. The Parliament is “the representative authority of the Romanian people and the only legislative authority” (The Constitution, art. 61). The representation of the sovereign will of the people elected through direct voting justifies the pre-eminence of the Parliament in the oversight of the security sector, compared to other institutions which also hold such responsibilities: the Presidency, the Government, and the Supreme Council of National Defence, including courts, the Constitutional Court, the Account Courts, and the People’s Advocate. The mandate granted through universal, free and equal voting represents the basis of oversight of the Romanian Parliament and of its relations with public authorities and is a desideratum of a democratic state, as a consequence of the principle of separation of powers, as stated in art.1 of the Romanian Constitution: “The state is organized according to the principle of separation and balance of powers – legislative, executive and judiciary – in the framework of constitutional democracy.” 5 The institution of parliamentary oversight is ensured by the Constitution: “the Government and other authorities of public administration, within the parliamentary oversight of their activity, are compelled to present information and documents requested by the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate or the parliamentary committees through their presidents” (art. 111). Parliamentary oversight of the security sector is conditioned by the power of the Parliament in relation to the Government and the security services. The capacity of the Parliament to influence the options and behaviour of the Government, to enforce policies, legislation, decisions and budget, such as they were approved by the legislator, is the real power. The Romanian Parliament is responsible for defining, formulating and enforcing national security interests and policies, by exercising its basic functions: • • •

Citizens’ representation – the Parliament as the liaison institution between the citizens and political decisions and its role to legitimise the governmental activities and policies; Defining the national legislative framework – the pro-active function of the Parliament, setting the guidelines of future policies and activities of the executive; Exercise the parliamentary oversight – the reactive instrument by which the Parliament monitors the activities and policies already enforced.

The Romanian Parliament expresses the political will of reforming the national defence and security system by law, when needed, and adopts fundamental political documents, such as the National Security Strategy and the White Book of Security and National Defence. The concrete means through which the Romanian Parliament exercises control are:

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• • • • • •

Reports – at the request of parliamentarians or according to legal provisions – on the activity of executive authorities, central and local; Questions – requesting the executive to explain concrete aspects of its activity; Interpellations – which summons compels the executive to justify its policy in particular fields; Parliamentary investigations – by which the executive is being investigated on concrete issues; Simple motions – stating the position of the Parliament on an internal or foreign policy issue; Censorship motions – through which a general debate is initiated on the policy of Government that can end up in withdrawing the vote of confidence granted to the Executive.6

According to the new constitutional provisions, the bicameral structure of the Parliament of Romania equally legitimises the two Chambers and allocates to them different responsibilities. The Romanian Parliament carries out its activity both through meetings in the plenary of the two Chambers and, most of the time, through standing committees, in which the political parties in Parliament are proportionally represented. This working method offers the MPs the possibility to concentrate professional experience and knowledge and to control, in detail, the way in which the laws and governmental policies are enforced. Before being adopted in the plenary of the Parliament, all bills are debated and approved by the standing committees. According to the Internal Regulations of the two Chambers, there are four parliamentary committees with legislative and oversight competencies of the security sector: the Committees for Defence, Public Order and National Security of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, the Joint Standing Committee of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate for the exercise of parliamentary control over the activity of the Romanian Intelligence Service, and the Joint Standing Committee of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate for the parliamentary control over the activity of the Foreign Intelligence Service.These specialized committees exercise the parliamentary oversight over all institutions with responsibilities in the security sector, and over reform processes within the national security system. Parliamentarians with many years of experience, focus on the following aspects: − − −

authority – the formal power to hold the government accountable, ability – resources staff and expertise needed, attitude – the willingness to hold the government accountable.7

In addition to these, they pay special attention to transparency and the role of supportive infrastructure.8 In the case of transparency, parliamentary debates and reports increase public knowledge on defence and security issues. We must also add the role of building public consensus for supporting the international missions imposed by the integration in NATO and the European Union. A good communication record in the spirit of transparency can contribute in the security culture of the citizens in case of normality and prepare for the worse. Also, the supportive infrastructure makes parliamentary involvement in control over the security sector effective. Staffers, both civil and military, offer qualified advice. The years of experience in the security sector must be combined


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with the permanent improvement of knowledge of the newest developments in the security environment, mainly with trainers with international experience or by trainings abroad. Information departments in the Parliament’s structure and the access to independent research capacities are bringing professional and alternative analysis. This aspect is also of paramount importance in the future activities of the Romanian Parliament. A critical and well-informed mass media can assure a healthy pressure both on parliamentarians and on members of the Defence committees. A special role is built into the network of external supportive infrastructures as the PA of NATO, European Parliament, PA of WEU, PA of OSCE for dialogue, information, education, and transfer of experience. The legislative function may be considered the a priori instrument of control over the activity of institutions in the security sector. Parliamentary committees have wide competences to initiate and amend laws. Regulations of functioning of the two Chambers state that an amendment to a law project cannot be debated in the plenary unless it has been previously discussed in the specialized committee and enclosed in its report. This provision generates debates that result in essential information both for the legislator and for the executive, but more than that, ensures ab initio control over the activity of institutions in this sector. The legislative competencies of the specialized committees allow them to regulate the aspects relating to the national security by means of organic and ordinary laws, depending on the importance of the regulated aspects. When debating a bill, the committees have to take into consideration the quality of the first chamber or the decisional chamber. Voting a law does not end the competences and responsibilities of Parliament; adoption must be followed by enforcement. The control activities carried out by committees can have regular or reactive aspects (imposed by special situations raising unexpected problems): approval of the budget of institutions from the security system, requesting periodical reports from these institutions or reports on concrete issues, information and documentation visits at the institution’s headquarters, debates with representatives of institutions and other experts, initiation and carrying out of parliamentary investigations, and hearings of persons involved in the decision-making process. The Law of the State Budget is considered to be the strongest instrument of parliamentary control, because it offers the possibility to ensure that public resources are being allocated and spent efficiently, in accordance with national objectives, and in a transparent and responsible manner. This law grants the Parliament a decisive role in ensuring the balance between the resources allocated to defence and those allocated to other sectors, as well as in the development of military capabilities suitable to national security interests. The Law of the State Budget is followed by the monitoring of the expenses of public institutions, which can sometimes lead to the re-allocation of resources. Informing the parliamentarians, the authorities of either central or local public administration, is the main condition for exerting a real and efficient parliamentary oversight. Moreover, the information provided by the executive is also useful for the legislative process, in order to finalize or initiate bills. One efficient tool of parliamentary oversight is the presentation of activity reports, on a periodical basis or at the request of the commissions. By their own initiative or in response to complaints from the civil society, the specialized commissions often request detailed information on par-

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ticular issues from the institutions under their control. The information and documentation visits have an important role in parliamentary oversight, as they give MPs direct contact with the specific activity of these institutions and the possibility to understand, in a practical manner, the reality of a security system undergoing a process of transformation and adaptation. Another important instrument of the parliamentary oversight often used by the commissions, is the hearings. The members of the commissions can request, at any time, their presence at the workings of the commissions, of Government representatives or of Armed Forces. The hearings can be concerned with the degree to which the institutions’ activity complies with legal work stipulations, the assessment of the institutional reform, the investigation of complaints brought forward in petitions, parliamentary debates or media, public procurement plans and programs. At the hearings performed by the commissions for the oversight of intelligence services, a representative of these institutions must always be present as a reporter. 1.3. Civil Society Oversight of the Security Sector Civil society, as referred to in this study, includes the mass media, research institutions, NGOs and any other associative form which represent the interests of the citizens in relation to the institutions of the State, including the Government. While the Parliament is the one institution legitimated through elections to represent the will and interests of the citizens through exertion of legislative and control attributions, the civil society takes on this responsibility and that of representation, out of its own initiative and usually based on an ethical code. As proven by the impressive number of citizens’ associations with various objects of activity in established Western democracies, the existence of a strong civil society is an extra warrant of democracy. The pro-active involvement in monitoring the activity of governmental institutions, the realization of a competing, independent evaluation of their functioning represents the essence of the contribution civil society can bring to democratic oversight.9 Monitoring the security sector requires a certain level of expertise, and the civil society constitutes an alternative and completion of parliamentary oversight. The Romanian public opinion is much too concerned with daily problems and gives little attention to issues related to the politics of defence and control of the security sector. Consequently, the organisations that form the civil society must take over the responsibility of democratic oversight, in terms of time, effort and expertise. This does not mean neglecting the education of the citizen in problems related to security, which is necessary for diminishing and eliminating prejudice and suspicion towards the security sector in general and the intelligence services in particular. Yet it is the civil society, through its organised forms of activity that ensures the capabilities needed for a permanent and valuable civil oversight of this sector. The adoption of Law no. 544/2001 on the free access to information of public interest contributes decisively to the consolidation of civil democratic oversight. Enforcing this law led to the creation of public relations departments in most institutions involved in the exercise, making it easier to provide information to the representatives of civil society on the activity of these institutions.10 Both the representatives of the institutions and of the civil society have noticed certain shortcomings. On one hand, the media and the NGOs have complained about the way their requests have been addressed by the institutions. In turn, the institutions point to the lack of expertise of jour-


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nalists in security issues. Therefore, a positive step was taken towards improving the dialogue when journalists were invited to attend the courses of the National Defence College and of the Superior College for National Security, as well as their participation in other relevant courses, such as the Course for War correspondents and the courses on Forensics issues. Also, other events were specifically organised for journalists with the support of international projects. The initiative of the Centre for Information on Security Culture (CICS) to organize a series of courses on security topics and democratic oversight, anticipates the need to extend the dialogue between the institutions and the representatives of civil society beyond the narrow framework of the law. An excellent experience was gained by the cooperation with the Centre for Civil Military Relations/Naval Post-Graduate School, Monterey, California-USA. In Romania, the actors of civil society are affected by the surprisingly low public interest in the democratic oversight of the security sector. This lack of interest diminishes the media coverage of these issues by that part of mass media counting on audience to survive financially: private newspapers, television and broadcast stations, and publishing houses. In this context, the Romanian NGOs must take the lead, despite the lack of financial resources, which makes this venture slightly more difficult. The relation of the institutions in the security sector with the different organizations of civil society can be summarized, as follows: • • •

•

with NGOs – sporadic. Some of the institutions included in the monitoring exercise were at their first contact with representatives of NGOs; with international organizations and experts, specialized in the security field – numerous productive institutions have benefited from analyses, expertise or other forms of assistance; with the academic world – mostly restricted to presentations of institutions, participation in courses in specialized education establishments, and less collaboration on research in the security sector; recently, some institutions have launched internships for students; with the mass-media – the image is quite complex; some of the institutions have signalled either inadequate and tendentious reporting of their activity, or ill-willed use of Law no. 544/2001; on the other hand, cases of corruption and abuse reported in the mass-media have often been investigated by the parliamentary commissions.

Oversight of the security sector by the civil society must be strengthened, since it is still in an incipient phase. Moving beyond this requires the consolidation of the expertise of civil society so that it represents a real partner for dialogue with the security institutions. That is why civil education in this field, targeting citizens and especially organizations, is of crucial importance.11

2. The Romanian Success Stories 2.1. The Monitoring Exercise on Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in Romania Starting from the assumption that there is no single, universal model of parliamentary oversight, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and the Geneva Center for the Democ-

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ratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) proposed a practical guide in this domain. “The Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector- Principles, Mechanisms and Practices – Handbook for Parliamentarians No 5 – 2003,” was published and then translated into several foreign languages, including Romanian. The Romanian version – published by “ZIUA” Publishing House with the support of DCAF Geneva – was a success and it became a real working document for the parliamentarians, staffers, mass media, and academia. Based on this “tool kit,” EURISC Foundation took the initiative and together with the Committee for Defence, Public Order and National Security, the House of Deputies worked out a “Monitoring Exercise of instruments and mechanisms for parliamentary oversight of the Security Sector in Romania in 2004.” The participants in the monitoring exercise included a team of experts from the Romanian Parliament as well from various institutions and nongovernmental organization with expertise in national security, human rights, etc. Parliamentary experts from the Defence Committee both of the Chamber and the Senate, the special Committees for control of the Romanian Intelligence Service and the Foreign Intelligence Service, worked together for several months for this monitoring exercise, together with experts from EURISC Foundation, the Information Center for Security Culture (CICS), the Casa NATO (NATO House) and Pro-Democratic Association. This monitoring exercise marked an absolute premiere in Romania – that institutions in the security sector opened the doors to the leadership and their civil and military experts had discussions with the NGO’s and Parliament staffers, and together embarked on assessing the relationship between these institutions, parliamentary committees, and representatives of the civil society. The exercise also offered an excellent framework for inter-institutional communication and for the promotion of security culture. As a result of the 9/11 events and the other terrorist attacks in Europe and other part of the world, the concern of the Romanian citizens regarding their own security, the need to be better informed by the authorities and the mass media, and the increased transparency of the institutions became part of the new “security culture” to the benefit of both authorities and civil society. The exercise resolved to assess the Romanian standards and parliamentary practice of parliamentary oversight, using as a benchmark the mechanisms and instruments presented in the DCAF handbook on Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector. To set the procedures of carrying out the exercise, a working meeting was organized by the EURISC Foundation with representatives of the above-mentioned institutions, from 7–9 May 2004, in Sinaia. The monitoring team was set up during this meeting. During this first working session, a series of aspects were agreed upon: the institutions from the security sector that would be invited to participate, the program of the exercise, including the date of the release of the final report, and a questionnaire was drawn up12 to provide the guidelines for gathering the field data. The questionnaire was considered useful not only for establishing the topics of discussions with representatives of the institutions, but also for structuring information that was included in the final report, ensuring the comparability of the observations made by the participants and facilitating the drawing of conclusions. All 14 institutions involved in the exercise, both controllers13 and controlled,14 responded to the request for dialogue with the monitoring team at their headquarters. There were written answers to the questionnaires, and several supplementary meetings were used to clarify additional issues. The final report, drawn up jointly by the repre-


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sentatives of the NGOs involved and the parliamentary experts, has been circulated among all participants, including institutions from the security sector. The report was made available in Romanian and English, both in printed and electronic format, on the sites of the participants to the exercise and the site of DCAF, making it possible for everyone to access information on the security sector in Romania as well as on mechanisms and tools of parliamentary oversight. The monitoring exercise was not meant to be a simple enumeration of the legal instruments at the disposal of the Parliament in its oversight activity. The objective of this program was to draw an overall image of the oversight practices in Romania in the security sector and to formulate recommendations for improving the efficiency of parliamentary oversight, including proposals for implementing new mechanisms and practices to correct deficiencies and to enhance the impact of parliamentary oversight. This synthesis is based on data obtained from questionnaires as well as information supplied by the institutions during interviews at their headquarters. The main points of interest of the analysis were: • •

to review the functioning of the control mechanism, focusing on: the composition of the commissions, their expertise, instruments of parliamentary oversight and the particular fields of interest; to assess the collaboration between the parliamentary commissions and the institutions under control, including the presentation of the main effects of the oversight activity over the functioning of the controlled institutions.

The variety and complexity of the activities of institutions in the security sector required a wide range of instruments; the predominance of certain types of control mechanisms was partly due to the specifics of the institution, but also to the objectives and problems placed under control. The final report of the monitoring exercise highlighted that beside the activity of the parliamentary commissions, the control instrument most frequently used by the MPs were the questions and interpellations, since it was considered that these offered the possibility of prompt and permanent monitoring of governmental policies and the enforcement of laws. However, institutions have mentioned cases in which the questions addressed to institutions of the executive were not in line with the purpose and objectives parliamentary activity was supposed to follow; for instance, some of the parliamentarians have tried to involve the security institutions in political disputes. Intelligence services, the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Interior are, as usual, the most visible institutions in the security sector, often present in parliamentary debates and mass-media. Subsequently, the parliamentary commissions paid them particular attention; they were often asked for thematic or general reports on their activity, to answer interpellations and questions, and were subject to hearings or inquiries. Unlike these, other institutions, with a more restricted area of competence were less visible and thus less monitored.15 The main topics of parliamentary control were observance of legal and constitutional provisions in carrying out specific activities, implementation of the general principles found in the National Security Strategy, the budgetary execution, the plans and programs of public procurement, the institutional reform of the security sector, the management of human resources, and cases of corruption or abuse. In the human resources policy of the institutions in the security sector, the Romanian Parliament has had limited control, concerning only the enforcement of the National Security Strategy

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and the White Paper on National Security, as far as these fundamental documents contain references to the structure of forces, human and material resources in ensuring national security. The ability of the Romanian Parliament to monitor the budgetary execution and other specific aspects was limited by the complexity of the defence planning process that required specialized knowledge and expertise, especially since the analysis was based on the information given by the beneficiary of the budgetary allocation – the institution under control. Another aspect shown by the monitoring exercise was that even in consolidated democracies, parliamentary oversight was confronted with a new challenge: the control over the new missions of the armed forces and over the defence and security policies adopted at a supranational level. Peacekeeping operations have become one of the most important activities of the armed forces, and an essential instrument for implementing peace and stability in the international community. The decision to take part in such missions was political. In this context, it is worth mentioning the effect of Romania’s accession to NATO on the attributions of Parliament in the security sector. Prior to the coming into force of Law no. 42/2004 on the participation of armed forces in missions outside the country, Parliament had the final say concerning the participation of the army in international missions. According to the provisions of the new law, the President of the country has the authority to make decisions in what concerns the participation of the army in international missions. He approves the participation of armed forces in operations of collective defence; operations of peace support, humanitarian assistance and coalition military operations, informing the Parliament after the decisions are made. The prior approval of Parliament is only necessary for operations of peace support and coalition military operations which do not occur within the framework of any international treaty to which Romania is a signatory (non-article 5 operations). The possibility of MPs to visit the places where the peacekeeping operations occur offers a means to monitor the way in which they are being carried out. The adoption of this law was justified by the necessity to speed up the decisionmaking mechanism in situations when Romania decides, or is asked to take part in military missions within NATO. From the perspective of Romania’s NATO membership, the final purpose of parliamentary oversight is to inform the members of the commissions, and then, when the information is not restricted to security certificate holders, to pass it on to all interested parliamentarians and to the civil society: massmedia, research institutions, NGOs. On most occasions, however, the information obtained remains within the commissions or the Parliament, mainly because of a low interest of the public opinion towards these aspects. When, at the request of a parliamentary commission, the institutions provide information which falls under the competence of executive structures (judicial courts, executive control organisms, ministries, etc.), the information is forwarded to them; So the role of the Parliament cannot exceed its legal attributions and cannot interfere with competences of other state authorities. Any special interest of MPs in the commissions for a particular case can lead to malicious interpretation. However, a general practice of following the cases forwarded to executive structures through to their solution could prove useful in terms of drawing conclusions and highlighting the final results of the oversight activity. The experience accumulated by MPs in the course of exercising their mandate in the commissions is restarted again every four years, when elections take place and the membership of commissions change. Also, some of the institutions have noticed that the political orientation of the parliamentarians sometimes influences the conclusions


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they reach in control activity. The numerical majority of MPs belonging to the governing party may have negative consequences on their vigilance and availability to point out wrongdoings or insufficiencies of the executive power; they may, thus, be less eager to actually use the control powers they have been given. Based on the information gathered, the monitoring group has recorded deficiencies in the exercise of specific attributions of parliamentary control. The present institutional scheme and the legal levers can be improved so as to render democratic control more efficient. For example, regarding the activity of the intelligence services, this is regulated on the legislative level by the Defence Committees, but the actual control is exercised by the Special Commissions for the democratic oversight of the Romanian Intelligence Service and Foreign Intelligence Service. Thus, there is an unnecessary difference between the legislative debate and regulation on the one hand, and monitoring of the enforcement of legal provisions, on the other. Although the defence committees manage the legislative framework that governs the activity of the intelligence services, they do not have the authority to either control them or directly access information related to their activity.16 However, in their actual structure, the specialized commissions for the oversight of the intelligence services are an interface between these institutions and the civil society, and a filter and promoter of legal initiatives useful to these services, thus contributing to the change of perception and image of institutions perceived as being closed. Another malfunctioning identified is the lack of coordination between the specialized permanent commissions. There is only a limited number of instances in which the defence committees work together, in common sessions: the hearing of nominees candidate for top management positions in institutions with military personnel, approving the state budget for the institutions in the security sector and approving the National Security Strategy. For all other activities, the committees do not coordinate with each other and thus there is a risk of overlapping control of some institutions while at the same time paying lower attention to others. The monitoring exercise also mentions that the parliamentary oversight of the security sector has been regarded with increased interest by the members of committees and increased openness by the institutions placed under control. Another sensitive subject of the exercise was the access of MPs to classified information, debated in Romania after the adoption (in April 2002) of the Law on the protection of classified information, which has important effects on the efficiency of control over the security sector. In a young democracy, with a political class still maturing, a security certificate is necessary to allow access to classified information, some of the members of the commissions have volunteered to be subject to verification for obtaining one. Others considered that only those named in certain positions should get a security certificate in order to have access to information; the elected ones, invested with the trust of the electorate for representing them in Parliament, have the needed legitimacy to obtain access to classified information and, therefore, do not need to undergo verification by the intelligence services to obtain such a certificate. Consequently, there emerged differences between MPs: some members of the specialized commissions hold a security certificate, others were denied a certificate and others have not even applied for it; certain actions of parliamentary control are being undertaken only by those parliamentarians who hold these certificates. How will this situation be resolved in the future is still to be seen: the political parties may decide that the security certificate is a compulsory criterion for establishing

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the structure of the commissions; or the access to classified information may be automatically granted with the parliamentary mandate, and in case of subsequent problems with the management of classified information by a MP, the Romanian Intelligence Service can start checking procedures and necessary measures for the protection of the information. Unfortunately, some of the institutions used to refuse access to information invoking the need to protect classified information, have very reluctantly changed attitude even towards the MPs who had obtained security certificates, thus showing lack of trust and transparency. They tend to overstate their security needs, by classifying more aspects of their activity than necessary, thus giving rise to suspicion within public opinion. The institutions subject to parliamentary oversight considered that it had positive effects on their activity, improving their public image and enhancing the transparency of their function. Parliamentary control has brought some extra credibility. Obviously, the enforcement of Law no. 544/2001 on free access to information of public interest has greatly contributed to this opening, as it led to the creation of a special department for public relations in most of the organizations visited. 2.2. The Center for Information on Security Culture (CISC) The Center for Information on Security Culture (CICS) was inaugurated on September 30th, 2003 by the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI) – the Department for Liaison with the Public Authorities and Non-Governmental Organizations. This inauguration was a result of the mission to promote the security education stated in the Annual National Plan for Preparation for Romania’s NATO Membership (Chapter IV-Security Issues) and of the common initiative with the EURISC Foundation following the Conference on Education for Security and Defense – Atlantic Treaty Assembly Bucharest 24–27 July 2003. From the very beginning, this initiative benefited from the interest of the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. For maintaining interest of the specialists and the think tanks on a long-term basis, CICS ensures the sharing of expertise from the North-Atlantic Alliance, the European Union and the United Nations in the field of security and common defense policy. It achieves this by creating a database of studies, research, reports drawn up by national and international organizations, available to the public and discussion groups within the Center, as well as by providing a framework for young researchers in the field to carry out studies and obtain consultancy from experts. The “Security Culture” is a regional pilot project of the CISC with EURISC Foundation – European Institute for Risk, Security and Communication Management. This project aims to encourage the civil society in order to become aware of the global changing reality that reconfigures the national, regional and global security agenda. CISC sustains dialogue debates, round tables, conferences, seminars, think tank meetings, training sessions, and competitions in order to outline a realistic answer and an attitude adapted to the values of national, regional, European, and Euro-Atlantic security policies. The target publics of the project are independent civil experts, nongovernmental organizations, journalists, students, and master students, and international experts, representatives of the civil society interested in promoting the security culture and the European and Euro-Atlantic security values. Among the topics of the events hosted by CICS we can mention European and Romanian research projects on security, fighting SALW trafficking, security strategy for Black Sea Region, fighting terrorism and organized crime, critical infrastructure protection and the homeland secu-


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rity, regulating the private security activities, security sector reform in Southeastern Europe. According to the decision of the Supreme Council for National Defense of Romania,17 the draft of the National Doctrine of Security Intelligence was presented to the public debate. The EURISC Foundation was formally asked to support the debates organized with the participation of different representatives of the civil society. This document addressed the legislative and executive agencies, the national security system, the public authorities, private law organizations, NGO’s, as well as other associations of the civil society involved in achieving national security.

3. Conclusions and Recommendations The Romanian experience of Democratic Control of the Security Sector has strengthened its expertise and professionalism, but improvements are still needed. The suggestions that follow are meant to enhance the efficiency of democratic oversight in Romania. First of all, the Presidency, the Parliament, the Executive, and civil society at large should become fully aware of the new responsibilities derived from Romania’s status of NATO member, and future member of the EU. All actors should co-operate to increase the professionalism, operability and flexibility in the accomplishment of their new tasks. Promoting public debate in the civil society on critical documents regarding security matters, such as the National Security Strategy, National Doctrine of Security Intelligence, and the National Intelligence Community is an important step ahead. The analysis of this topic should not be restricted to the specialized commissions of the two Chambers. Furthermore, the Parliament has the duty to consider the suggestions arising from public debate. The Supreme Council for National Defence (CSAT) must benefit from the support of a large civil-military, governmental-nongovernmental and national–international expertise. The Supreme Council for National Defence should also present thematic reports to the Parliament and public debate, not only the annual report stipulated in the law of its functioning and organization. For example, inviting the presidents of the specialized commissions of the Parliament to some meetings of the Supreme Council could contribute to more transparency in a lack of an efficient Parliamentary control. A way of rendering the parliamentary oversight of the intelligence services more efficient could be the creation of an intelligence community that would coordinate their activity and that of the other specialized departments functioning in different ministries. The Intelligence Community should integrate the results of the intelligence activities into recommendations and lines of action presented to the Supreme Council for National Defence. The entire Intelligence Community could then be controlled by a single parliamentary commission that would take over the control attributions currently held by the two distinct commissions controlling the activity of the Romanian Intelligence Service and the Foreign Intelligence Service. The introduction by the Parliament Committees of consultations with NGO’s and academics specialized in security matters regarding the creation of an Intelligence Community in Romania could be a positive development (June – July 2005). The importance of the private security sector and the need for its rigorous control must be brought to the attention of the legislative and the executive. Despite the fact that private security firms are also, in practical terms, part of the security sector, their

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activity does not yet fall under the control of the legislature. This can have serious consequences on the transparency and responsibility of the private companies of the security sector. These private entities dispose of considerable funding, compared with the limited budget of some state institutions; consequently they can acquire state-of-the-art equipment and hire highly qualified personnel. Offering services to whoever can afford them, without clear ethical considerations, they have the potential to become an obvious danger, as a result of insufficient control over the activities of such companies. For years after the Revolution, these companies functioned without proper regulation. Now, the legislation requires them to be licensed by the Romanian Intelligence Service and the Ministry of Administration and Interior (the activity of these firms is monitored by both RIS and MAI). These are positive evolutions. However, the present trends of guard and protection services and specialized civilian structures increasing involvement not only in domestic, but in international missions, requires more careful monitoring of these companies. Once becoming a full member of the North Atlantic Alliance and after 2007 as a member of the European Union, the security sector reform and the democratic control must be continued and improved. Three generations of reform have occurred in Romania. The first one started in the early 1990s, the second introduced after 9/11 and fullfledged after the full membership of Romania in NATO. The third generation of security sector reform will be the result of the challenges and opportunities of the new international security environment and an important contribution to the good governance of the country.

References Born, Hans, Flury, H. Philipp, and Lunn, Simon (eds.) (2003): Oversight and Guidance: The Relevance of Parliamentary Oversight for the Security Sector and its Reform, DCAF Document No 4, Brussels/ Geneva, pp. 34. Born, Hans and Hanggi, Heiner (2005): “Governing the use of force under international auspices: deficits in parliamentary accountability,” SIPRI YEARBOOK 2005, Oxford University Press. Bruce, George (1999): “Parliament and National Security,” paper presented at the conference on Redefining Society-Military Relations from Vancouver to Vladivostok, Birmingham. Buzan, Barry, Waever, Ole, and Wilde Jaap de (1998): Security – a New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London. Dolghin, Nicolae and Macovei, Alina (2003): “Democratic and Civilian Control of Defence,” in Trapans, A. Jan and Fluri, H. Philipp (ed.) Defense and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives, vol. II, Geneva/Beograd, pp. 315–326. Ionescu, Razvan and Muresan, Liviu (coordinators) (2004): Monitoring Exercise of Instruments and Mechanisms for Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector in Romania, Bucharest. Munteanu, Tudor (2004): “Romania: Reform and Parliamentary Relations,” Security-Sector Reform and Transparency Building: Needs and Options for Ukraine and Moldova, Harmonies Papers, Groningen. Muresan, Liviu (2003) “Institutes, Media, Information Policy and Civil Society,” in Trapans, A. Jan and Fluri, H. Philipp (ed.) Defense and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives, vol. II, DCAF, Geneva/Beograd, pp. 393–402. Muresan, Liviu (2003): “Security Sector in Romania,” in Trapans, A. Jan and Fluri, H. Philipp (ed.) Defense and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives, vol. II, Geneva/Beograd, pp. 303–312. Muresan, Liviu (2004): “Security Sector Reform in Romania,” in Hans J. Giessmann (ed.) Security Handbook 2004, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden Baden. Van Eekelen, F. Wim (2002): Democratic Control of Armed Forces: The National and International Parliamentary Dimension, DCAF, Geneva. Watts, Larry (ed.) (2002): Romanian Military Reform and NATO Integration, Center for Romanian Studies, Iasi-Oxford-Palm Beach-Portland.


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Watts, Larry (2003): Control and Oversight of Security Intelligence in Romania, DCAF, Geneva. Watts, Larry (2003): Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector. Principles, mechanisms and practices, Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Handbook for parliamentarians No 5, Geneva. Watts, Larry (2003): Promoting Legislative oversight of the Security Sector in SEE-Documenting the DEMCON-SEE Experience so far, Center for European Security Studies (CESS), Groningen. Watts, Larry (2004): The Center for Information on Security Culture (brochure), Romanian Intelligence Service (ed.), Bucharest. Watts, Larry (2004): The National Doctrine of Security Intelligence, The Supreme Council for National Defense (edited by the Romanian Intelligence Service), Bucharest. Watts, Larry (2004): The Security Culture within the civilian society, in Romanian Intelligence Service (ed.) Profil (revue), 2nd year, 5th issue, Bucharest. Watts, Larry (2005): SIPRY YEARBOOK 2005 – Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford University Press.

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Annex 1 The Romanian Constitution (adopted in October 2003 through national referendum); Law 415/2002 on the organization and functioning of the Supreme Council of National Defence, and the Rules on the functioning of the Supreme Council of National Defence; Law 51/1991 on the National Security of Romania; Law 45/1994 on the National Defence of Romania; Law 63/2000 on Defence planning and the National Security Strategy; Law 389/2001on the organization and functioning of the Ministry of National Defence; The Government Decision 725/2003 on the organizational structure and personnel of the Ministry of Administration and the Interior; The Emergency Ordinance 63/2003 on the organization and functioning of the Ministry of Administration and the Interior; Law 218/2002 on the organization and functioning of the Romanian Police; Law 360/2002 on the Status of the policeman and the demilitarisation of the Police; Law 116/05.06.1998 on the organisation and functioning of the Romanian Gendarmerie; Government Decision 637/2004 on the functioning and responsibilities of the General Division for Protection and Anticorruption within the Ministry of Justice; Law 14/1992 on the Organization and Functioning of the Romanian Intelligence Service; Law 92/1996 on Special Telecommunications Service, revised and completed by Government Emergency Ordinance 7/2002; Law 1/1998 on the Organization and Operation of Foreign Intelligence Service, revised and completed by Government Emergency Ordinance 154/2001; Law 191/1998 on the Organization and Functioning of the Service for Protection and Guard; Government Decision 111/2004 on the organisation and functioning of the Central Public Office for Special Problems; Law 477/2003 on the preparation of the national economy and territory for defence; Law 46/1996 on preparing the population for defence; Law 106/1996 on civil protection; Law 132/1997 on goods requisition and public utilities performing; Government Decision 414/2004 on approving the Regulation of the system of priorities and allocation of resources for defence; Government Decision 845/2002 on the organization and functioning of the National Registry Office for Classified Information; Law 182/2002 on the protection of classified information; Government Decision 585/2002 on the approval of national standards regarding the protection of classified information in Romania; Government Decision 353/2002 on the approval of Norms regarding the protection of NATO classified information in Romania; Law 544/2001 regarding free access to information of public interest, concerning transparency of decision in public administration states.


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Annex 2 Non-Governmental and Specialized Organizations Participating in the Exercise The EURISC Foundation The EURISC Foundation (The European Institute for Risk, Security and Communication Management) is an independent Think Tank, founded in 1995 as a not-profit organization, with the objective of researching and promoting issues related to risk, security and communication. Areas of interests: • • • • • •

risk, security and communication management in the process of European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Romania; transborder organized crime, terrorism and corruption; security culture; risk and vulnerability of strategic infrastructures; stability and cooperation in South-Eastern Europe; a new geopolitical axis: the Caspian Sea – the Black Sea – the Mediterranean Sea.

The Information Centre for Security Culture (CICS) Founded on September 30, 2003, the Centre provides an organized framework for debate and an information centre on national and global security issues. The project is open to cooperation with experts in non-governmental organizations, independent specialists, students, university lecturers in the specialized network of security education and press. The objectives of the Centre are: •

• •

to promote the security values of the North-Atlantic Alliance, the European Union and the United Nations Organization by becoming a partner in the process of educating and raising awareness in the civil society over the need to know the new security environment. to create and consolidate a separate segment of civil society focused on the dimension of security culture; to support and encourage students and candidates to a Master degrees to participate in the national security education.

The NATO House (Casa NATO) The NATO House is an independent, not-profit organization that intends to play the role of a catalyst of the Romanian civil society, working to enhance awareness, encourage dialogue and develop cooperation and partnership in supporting Romania’s integration efforts and the promotion of the Euro-Atlantic values and institutions. The goals of the Organization are:

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• • • • •

to further support Romania’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic community; to contribute to creating an active Romanian civil society; to forge genuine partnerships between the private and public sectors; to promote the Atlantic values among the Romanian youth and the future political leaders; to facilitate the access to scholarly debates and publications for the government, the business community and the civil society.

The Pro Democracy Association The Pro Democracy Association (APD) is a non-governmental, not-for-profit association, founded in 1990. The structure of the APD currently includes 28 centres, where more than over 1000 citizens (members and volunteers) work. The goal of the Pro Democracy Association is to strengthen democracy in Romania by encouraging civic participation. The APD’s main areas of interest are: • • • • • •

Strengthening the relation between the electorate and the elected representatives; Correctness of the electoral process; Civic education; Citizens’ participation in the process of mapping out public policies; Transparency of public institutions and their monitoring by the civic society; The respect of human rights.

1 In April 1992, Dr. Liviu Muresan participated for one week in the US Congress, both in the House of Representatives and the Senate, to the parliamentary activities for control over armed forces, intelligence services, at hearings, discussions with civil and military experts, staffers, analysts working with the Library of Congress as part of a one month USIA-VIP program. The documents offered on this occasion by the American parliamentarians served as first documentation for the new Commissions of Defense, Control of intelligence services of the Romanian Parliament. 2 E.g. EURISC Foundation with the national and regional projects with CESS (Center for European Security Studies – Netherlands), DCAF (Geneva Center for Democratic Control of the Armed Forces – Switzerland), Hans Seidel Foundation. 3 See also, Promoting Legislative oversight of the Security Sector in SEE-Documenting the DEMCON-SEE Experience so far, Center for European Security Studies (CESS), Groningen, August 2003, p. 32 ff. 4 See annex 1. 5 Ionescu, Razvan and Muresan, Liviu, (coordinators) (2004): Monitoring Exercise of the Instruments and Mechanisms for Parliamentary Oversight of the Romanian Security Sector, EURISC Foundation, The Committee for Defense, Public Order and National Security House of Deputies, Parliament of Romania with the support of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Bucharest, p.20. 6 Ionescu R. and Muresan L., Op. cit., p.21. 7 Bruce George, former president of the PA of OSCE and member of the British House of Commons, in George B. and Morgan J., Parliament and National Security (paper presented at the conference on “Redefining Society-Military Relations from Vancouver to Vladivostok”), Birmingham 16–18 August, 1999. 8 Born Hans, Philipp H. Fluri, and Simon Lunn (eds.), Oversight and Guidance: The Relevance of Parliamentary Oversight for the Security Sector and its Reform, DCAF Document No. 4, Brussels/Geneva, 2003, p. 34 ff. 9 Ionescu R. and Muresan L., Op. cit., p. 25 ff.


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10 Muresan Liviu, “Institutes, Media, Information Policy and Civil Society,” in Trapans, A. Jan and Fluri, H. Philipp (ed.) Defense and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives, vol. II, DCAF, Geneva/Beograd, 2003, p. 393–402. 11 See also, Promoting Legislative oversight of the Security Sector in SEE-Documenting the DEMCONSEE Experience so far, Center for European Security Studies (CESS), Groningen, August 2003. 12 See Annex no. 2. 13 Committees for Defense, Public Order and National Security from the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, Joint Standing Committee of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate for the exercise of parliamentary control over the activity of the Romanian Intelligence Service, Joint Standing Committee of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate for the exercise of parliamentary control over the activity of the Foreign Intelligence Service. 14 Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Administration and Interior, Romanian Intelligence Service, Foreign Intelligence Service, Protection and Guard Service, Special Telecommunications Service, Central State Office for Special Problems, General Directorate for Protection and Anticorruption within the Justice Ministry, Supreme Council of National Defense. 15 The Guard and Protection Service, the Central Office for Special Problems, the National Agency for State Reserves has posed no major problems. 16 Some of the participants in the exercise suggested that the two control commissions could merge into the defence committees, a solution eased by the fact that the members of the commission for the control of the Foreign Intelligence Service are at the same time members of one of the two defence committees. 17 The National Doctrine of Security Intelligence, The Supreme Council for National Defense (edited by the Romanian Intelligence Service), Bucharest, 23 June 2004.



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Security Sector Reform in Albania: An Overview Aldo BUMÇI

The prospect of NATO accession and participation in Partnership for Peace has sparked research into recent security reforms of the former Soviet Block. The research focuses on military development while neglecting the important reorganization occurring within the police and intelligence agencies. The focus of this paper is the security sector reform that has been undertaken in Albania. While we would be looking at the whole transition period special attention will be given to the measures taken in the recent years. The reform implemented in the Police and Intelligence Service constitutes our main research interests. The inherently secretive nature of intelligence services also complicates attempts to reform and even to analyze these agencies.1 Analysis of Albanian Security reform has similarly focused on democratic control of armed forces rather than effective control and supervision of the other security forces. In line with tradition, the Albanian army has not shown any praetorian tendencies since the beginning of the democratic transformation of the last decade. This is not the result of proper establishment and function of democratic institutions. The inclination of the military to intervene in politics is only one side of civil-military relations. The other side is the tendency of those in power to control state institutions by staffing them with their own supporters, blurring the distinction between the state and the party in power. The new military has not escaped this. After coming to power in 1997, the left wing coalition purged 1,500 officers from the armed forces, among them around 400 officers who had received education and training in the West.2 However, we should qualify the way the political forces have used the military by comparing it with the other security sector agencies. The Albanian experience has shown that the opposition has always criticized the government for the way it has used the intelligence service and the police against political opponents. The harshest criticism has been directed at the intelligence service, while the police have also been criticized for interfering with elections. However, those in power have refrained from using the army to intervene in elections, probably because it is too cumbersome to use the armed forces to rig an election. There are two important aspects of security sector reform. During Communist control, the security sector agencies were highly politicized and represented the main instruments through which the communist party maintained control over the country. Repression and instilling fear among the populations was paramount to maintaining power. One crucial reform was the establishment of proper democratic oversight of the agencies. The other major reform objective was to increase the effectiveness of security sector staff and of the agencies in general. Democratization takes precedence, not only because of the totalitarian nature of the previous regime, but also because lack of democratization interferes with the efficiency of the security sector. 3 Staffing these agen-

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A. Bumçi / Security Sector Reform in Albania: An Overview

cies with clear party supporters and politicians works against professionalism and reduces the legitimacy of these important state institutions in the eyes of the public. In the emerging democracies of the former Soviet bloc, the only acceptable security reforms are those that uphold and expand democratic standards. As Christopher Hill points out, though on foreign policy, “in a modern constitutional state there is always a tension between the requirements of efficiency and those of democracy…. Probably we would be better off by including the need for democratic legitimacy in our definition of efficiency and rationality in the first place.”4 The Milieu in Which the Reforms Are Taking Place Before looking at the police and intelligence service reform, it is important to provide the context within which the reform is taking place. Simply enumerating the measures taken would make it difficult to develop an understanding of the state of affairs and differentiate between countries. Reform of the Albanian security sector has been envisaged in the following way: After the collapse of the communist system, the democratically elected leadership will undertake the reform of the security sector agencies that were highly repressive instruments of the Communist party. The legal, organizational and work practices of these agencies are defined as the problem, which is true, but only one part of a complex problem. It should not be assumed that the political leadership that should implement the reform can be completely committed to that reform. The problem of corruption is not just administrative, the technical side, but also state capture. Except for the parliamentary elections of 1992, Albania has not yet passed the test of free and fair elections, a democratic benchmark promoted by the European Union. The continuous emphasis of the EU on the need to conduct free and fair parliamentary elections in June 2005 illustrate this. In general, Albanian politics have been polarized and confrontational. Weak institutions are the result of highly contested elections. One example of close elections leading to unstable institutions is the turnover of the General Custom Director; since the government has changed five different men have held the position of General Custom Director, each instituting their own changes. Police Reform The law on the Police of 1991 was the beginning of Albanian police reform.5 The law was drafted at a time when the Communist Party still controlled the majority of seats in the Parliament and a coalition government was created between the Communist party and the Democratic Party, the first opposition party. The first article of the law states that the police are part of the armed forces under the authority of the Ministry of Public Order; this remained so until the adoption of the State Police law in 1999. The Police Directorate at the Ministry of Public Order and the District Police composed the Albanian police force. The General Police Director is appointed by the Council of Ministers. The Minister of Public Order can create specific police structures, which should be approved by the Council of Ministers. The law established criteria for appointment and dismissal of police and officers as well as the relevant commissions. The high positions are filled by appointed police officers that have worked for the force for 5–10 years.


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These and other provisions of the law relating to personnel management, appointment and career criteria meant that the police force would continue to be staffed by personnel that had made their career during the communist period. After the Democratic Party came to power in 1992, further legal and structural changes were introduced. The Border Police were brought back under the authority of the Ministry of Public Order, after they were transferred in 1991 to the Ministry of Defense. Additionally, the intelligence service was separated from the Ministry of Public Order. The main priority of the new Democratic government was to immediately restore law and order following the chaos and anarchy that occurred following the collapse of the communist system and emergency police rule. Between 1992 and 1996, the Minister of Interior enjoyed greater executive powers and the Director General of the Police was promoted to deputy Minister. The police forces were purged following changes made to the personnel aspects of the 1991 law. In addition to the politicization of the police structures, regular police work during the communist period, such as detention and prevention of crime, was secondary to the maintenance of state security. 6 Because of the nature of the system, the police were not prepared to face the type of criminal activity that emerged after the collapse of communism.7 During this period, new police units were created to deal with border issues such as drugs. Western assistance in this period focused more on training. A significant number of police personnel received training both in western countries and Albania. While police reform progressed during this period, the forces remained political. Police forces interfered in the 1996 parliamentary elections 8 by intimidating opposition candidates and used excessive force in subsequent protests. The collapse of financial pyramid schemes in 1997 brought the collapse of the Albanian state structures, including the police. Army depots were looted and a large number of weapons fell into civilian hands. A sizeable number of police stations were destroyed and a considerable number of police forces walked away from their duty. The Socialist Party controlled the new government, and had difficulty establishing law and order throughout the country. Following the collapse of the Albanian state, police forces demonstrated continued loyalty to the previous party in power, which provided further reason for the new government to undertake sweeping purges in the police structure, as well as the other security sector agencies. The Strategy for the Reform of the Police identifies weaknesses of the efforts made in the 1992–96 period to reform the police: “The previous efforts were not led by a clear strategy. There were frequent changes of structures and personnel without abiding to the professional criteria. The results of this were: The police functioned as a military structure; there was no clear division between senior political and administrative positions; lack of stability in the police institutions; weakened professionalisation and increase of corruption; politization of police and their transformation into a political instrument. This proves the failure of the so-called police reform undertaken in this period.”9 The State Police 10 law of 1999 is the foundation of the police reform undertaken since 1998. This law defines the police as a public administration service; this police status remains unchanged even during extraordinary, state of emergency, and war situations. For the first time the law for the State Police stipulates the division of the leading political and the senior administrative positions. The General Police Director is the highest position in the police force, under whose authority is the technical and administrative aspect of the work. The position of the General Police Director enjoys legal protection in terms of appointment and dismissal procedures in order to protect this posi-

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tion from politicization and to avoid unfounded changes. The Council of Ministers appoints one of the candidates presented by the Minister of Public Order. He is chosen among the high-ranking police officials. The same procedure is followed for the deputy general director. The law stipulates the structural composition of the police, so frequent structural changes are avoided.11 The police is organized on two levels; the central, General Police Directorate, and the local level, the County Police Directorates. The General Police Directorate consists of: Directorate of Public Order Police, Criminal Police, Border Police, Traffic Police, and Special Forces, as well as other sustaining structures. The twelve County Police Directorates have similar functions as the General Directorate, but are confined within their region. The police stations are the operating units, which are under the jurisdiction of county directorates. The adoption of the constitution in 1998, and the separation of the police from the military forces necessitated the provision of new recruitment and human management procedures. A special article of the law focuses on, training and professional qualifications of the police, as well as standards for recruitment and dismissal. Police are recruited through competitive examination and those who are selected take qualification courses. The level of required qualification is decided by the Council of Ministers. There are two institutions that provide education and training – the Police Academy, which provides education for the middle and high police categories in a three years programme, and the Police Institute, which provides one-year courses for the basic functions of police. However, a number of police take just three-month courses. The law for Police Ranking defines the hierarchy of police roles as follows: the basic functions role, the middle role, the high role, and the major role. The head of the County Police Directorate appoints and dismisses police at the first level. The appointment and dismissal of the police at the middle level is the competence of the General Police Director. The appointment and dismissal of police at the high level is done by the Minister of Public Order with the proposal of the General Police Director. A specific law regulates the system of hierarchical ranking in the police structures. 12 The rank system creates better opportunities for career advancement. Another novelty is the difference between the rank systems of the police and military forces. The General Police Director approves the procedures and the composition of the commission, which is chaired by the County Police Director for the ranks of the basic function police role, while for the middle and high roles, the Minister of Public Order approves the procedures and the commissions for assigning the ranks. For the first time there are provisions in the law that stipulate basic principles of the relationship between the police and the public. Police are expected to support civil society grass-root initiatives that help to enhance public order. The police cooperate with the local government while respecting the independence of each institution, and the unitary and central character of the Police forces. One area of cooperation is related to legal acts passed by the local government that should be executed or implemented by the police. The police should constantly provide information to the appropriate local and county level authorities. The opinion of the local government bodies is considered when appointing directors of the county police forces. A mid-term strategy was drafted for the period 2000–2003.13 The strategy acknowledges as major challenges that the reformers would confront when implementing the strategy the following: the lack of support and trust by the public and the political elite toward the police; the weak discipline among police forces could influence nega-


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tively in the implementation of the strategy; corruption among police would divert the reform from the desired objectives; political interference through ways other than institutional ones would slow down the implementation of the reform or contribute to the achievement of lower results; lack of sufficient administrative capacity in the senior police positions; and the level of financial support such as low salaries. Creating a police force that serves the community and has regained the trust of the public is identified as one of the main strategy goals. Other objectives are the completion of a legal framework to provide the police with a solid legal base, the increase of police capacity and authority, and the drafting of new internal codes of procedure. The strategy’s goal is that at the end of the reform the ratio should be 1 policeman per 300 inhabitants, a decrease from the current 1 policeman per 265 inhabitants. At the end of this strategy there should be 10,500 police personnel, 12,000 including the civilian personnel working for with the police. The strategy section on cooperation with the community highlights the following principles: creating transparent relations with the community, respecting human rights and dignity, increasing cooperation with civil society organizations, as well as increased contacts with education institutions, and the creation of structures to protect trafficked women and children. Every complaint of inaction by the police will be taken seriously and investigated. Currently, the General Police Directorate is at the final stages of preparing the Strategy on Community Policing. Acknowledging the importance of cooperation with local community structures, the strategy foresees that the police would undertake all the necessary legal, organizational, and operational changes to enhance the level and quality of cooperation with the local government structures, while maintaining a centralized character. In terms of budget, the new law and organizational structure necessitate that the police have their own separate budget and not as part of the Ministry of Public Order, which has many structures under its authority. As international pressure increases, special attention has been given to Albanian border police reform. The Strategy on Border Control and its Integrated Management, 14 approved in February 2003, follows the measures taken by the Albanian Government to strengthen border security and reform border police structures. The introduction of the strategy states, “This becomes more indispensable at the time when Albania is entering the Association and Stabilization process.” Integrated Border Management (IBM) addresses border related issues of the EU toward the Western Balkans as it is reflected in the CARDS program. According to the strategy, IBM means improved cooperation between agencies within the country that deal with different aspects of border control such as Border Police, Customs, Intelligence Service, etc., and cooperation with neighboring and EU member countries. In order to achieve this, the Border Police, one of the most important agencies responsible for providing border security, must undergo a process of transformation. The strategy, which covers the period 2003–06, is divided into two main phases, the first one until the end of 2003, and the second running until 2006. In terms of structural changes, there are two main alternatives for the border police: the first separates the border police from the state police and creates new structures under the authority of the Minister of Public Order, whereas the second possibility preserves the Border Police as part of the State Police. The experience of other countries, both EU member states and Central and Eastern European countries in the restructuring of the border police does not provide any clear model to follow 15 and

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both models have their advantages and disadvantages. However, the most likely scenario seems the adoption of the second version, since the first version is very costly and requires the creation of a separate structure. In terms of personnel, the Border Police has 1,682 effectives. The density of border police per border-km with neighboring countries is as follows: Montenegro 0.86

Kosovo 1.85

Macedonia 1.26

Greece 1.41

An important component of the strategy is the acquisition of necessary equipment for enhanced border control. Lack of infrastructure and logistics has been a salient characteristic of Albanian police structure. The pace of change in terms of legal measures that should be adopted, organizational and human resource reform that should be implemented, as well as the cost of purchasing new equipment and upgrading the logistical capabilities of police in general and border police in particular, are such that they cannot be achieved without significant international support. A number of international donors have provided significant support in this respect; the US government has channeled its assistance through the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), which has been operating since 1998. The EC has provided considerable assistance to enhancing the capacities of police and border security, through different programs and projects. The assistance provided to Justice and Home Affairs accounts for almost 50 percent of the total funds allocated for the period 2002–04, in the CARDS program. 16 The EC assistance is also provided through the presence of two agencies in Albania – the Police Assistance Mission of the European Commission (PAMECA), and Custom Assistance Mission to Albania (CAM-A), which has a new Organized Crime Initiative. Considerable assistance has also been provided by the Italian Interforca Mission, which has operated in Albania since 1997. The United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNDOC) has provided assistance in the area of anti-drug trafficking. In order to avoid duplication of work and coordinate assistance to the Albanian police, the international donors have created an International Consortium, which brings together all international actors involved in assisting police structures in Albania. It is difficult to measure the degree to which police reform has increased effectiveness and professionalization, however, focusing on the following indicators provides the best possible way to measure change: the personnel policy, police results in the fight against crime and different types of trafficking, public perceptions of police work, and the perceived spread of corruption among police forces, and lastly, the degree of politization. Significant progress has been achieved in terms of laws and regulations in place to ensure efficient human resource management, through the establishment of the rank system and clear rules for career advancement. However, there are still serious problems regarding personnel policy. Since the Socialist led coalition came to power in 1997, the General Police Director has changed 16 times, which means that on average, a General Police Director has stayed in office less than six months. This volatility is reflected in all police structures, as there is in general a high turnover rate of personnel. International experts working for different international agencies dealing with police,

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also point to this phenomenon as one of the big weaknesses. Police are either frequently transferred to work positions that have no relation with their previous training or are dismissed.17 In 2003 and 2004, the Ministry of Public Order has made sweeping dismissals among the police. The need to fight corruption is given as justification for these moves, however, in many cases the courts have turned down the charges, yet those dismissed cannot return to their previous jobs.18 The problem is endemic and weakens any effort to establish an effective police force, while also wasting resources. Moreover, changes were made to the law on State Police, increasing the competences of the minister concerning the creation of new police structures. While this is in line with the practice in other West European countries, some argue that it is premature for Albania and it will increase volatility of structures and concentrate power. 19 A national survey conducted in 2003 was designed to measure human security in Albania; the following results regard public perceptions of police and personal security.20 When asked “how safe from violence and crime do you feel when you are alone at home?” 45 percent responded very safe; 35 percent rather safe; 14 percent rather unsafe and 5 percent felt very unsafe. When asked “how safe from violence and crime do you feel when you are alone on the street?” 27 percent declared very safe; 46 percent rather safe; 20 percent rather unsafe; 6 percent very unsafe. The following table shows perceptions about the rate of occurrence of bribery in police: on a scale ranging from 1 being less corrupted to 5 being most corrupted. 1 16%

Police Bribery

2 24.2%

3 24.4%

4 11.2%

5 6.9%

N/A 17.3%

Regarding police performance in terms of serving the public, the following results appear: 9 percent respond that they are very satisfied, 41.5 percent somewhat satisfied, 26.3 percent a little satisfied, and 11.4 percent not at all satisfied. In terms of results in the fight against human and drug trafficking the situation is as follows: Annual data on the number of clandestines, departing from Albania and landing on the coast of Puglia, indicates that there has been a drastic decline in this phenomenon. The table below provides data on the number of Albanian clandestines and the total number of clandestines (Albanian and foreigners) that have landed on the coast of Puglia. Year Clandest Albanian Nationals Total: Alb + Others

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

4 559

7 156

5 772

4 017

1 247

37

0

18 565

46 481

18 990

8 646

3 155

58

0

Source: Italian Liaison Office in Tirana

The significant reduction in the illegal trafficking/smuggling across the Adriatic is confirmed by various reports such as the 2004 US State Department Report on Trafficking in Human Beings and Regional Clearing Point report for the Balkans.21 Regarding drugs, the situation is as follows: the results of the Italian Police in drug seizures smuggled via Albania are important to show the degree of effectiveness of Albanian structures in this fight. The results of drug seizures are compared in the table below. All seizures are in KG, unless otherwise specified.22

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Year Drugs Heroin Cocaine Marijuana Cultivation of Cannabis

2001 Albanian Seizures 4,525 266 gr. 6,915.79 281,730 plants destroyed

2002 Italian Albanian Seizures Seizures 700,728 71,713 4,900 5.7 gr. 5,847.940 13,717 484,958 plants destroyed

2003 Italian Albanian Seizures Seizures 1.110,001 114,475 4,900 1,285 9.258,782 7,647.406 168,298 plants destroyed

2004 (till 30 June) Italian Albanian Seizures Seizures 700,891 101,745 1,068 1,0165 796 1,626.335 11,106 plants destroyed

The results in the fight against drug trafficking are low, even though they have improved in certain areas as it is shown by the partial results of 2004 compared to the previous years. The Italian drug seizures show that considerable amounts of drugs are still trafficked through Albania. Lastly, in terms of depolitization, frequent changes show that the degree of politicization of senior positions is unavoidable. The practice of police interfering in elections continued in the 2001 parliamentary elections.23 However, there were no complaints regarding police behavior for local elections held in October 2003, although prior to the elections a substantial part of the debate between political parties focused on the role of police during the election day. Intelligence Service Reform The secret police, known as Sigurimi in Albania, were the most important instrument through which the Communist Party maintained its power. The role and importance of the Sigurimi to the communist regime cannot be overstated and was un-comparable to the other security instruments – the police and military, which were under the surveillance of the Sigurimi. Thus reform of the secret police was very important in order to break with the past. Similar to the police reform, the legal reform of the intelligence service started in 1991. The law stated that the National Intelligence Service (NIS) is a depoliticized institution, even though at this stage those working in the Service were still the same personnel as during the Communist period. This law provided the legal base that regulated the functioning of the NIS until 1998. The first article of the law defined the scope of work of NIS. The NIS is a depoliticized institution under the authority of the Council of Ministers and it reports about the security situation and the way it has used the financial and material resources at its disposal. For any operation that infringes upon human rights, the NIS should get permission from the General Prosecutor. The General Prosecutor may check whether the activity of NIS is conducted within the bounds of this law. The NIS cannot conduct its activity in Parliament, the President’s Office, the Council of Ministers, Political Parties, or their branches. Members of parliament, Council of Ministers or heads of political parties cannot be objects of NIS activity unless special permission is provided from the Head of the Parliament, President, and Prime Minister. The organization of NIS is based on the administrative division of the country. The head of NIS is appointed and dismissed by the President at the proposal of the Prime Minister. The deputy head is appointed and dismissed by the Council of Ministers. Other NIS personnel are appointed by the head of the service. The head of NIS and the directors of the NIS branches are responsible for the activity of the service. The structural organization of NIS is the competence of the head of service.24


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Within the first few months following the Democratic Party’s ascent to power in 1992, two-thirds of the NIS personnel were dismissed. Considering the high level of politicization of this institution and the fact that it was the embodiment of the former communist system, these measures were taken to achieve depoliticization, which in fact meant de-communization of the institution. There was criticism from the left that the reform had also purged people that were specialists and that had not committed human rights violations in the past, thus weakening the force. However, de-communization and depolitization are not identical things. Achieving the first does not mean that you have achieved the latter. As events showed, NIS turned into an instrument of the party in power. NIS was used to keep members of the opposition under surveillance, exercising pressure on political opponents and dissenting media.25 After the parliamentary elections of 1997, the Socialist-led coalition brought people into NIS that had been dismissed in 1992. In 1998, parliament passed a new law that made the following changes to NIS. In addition to the director, the deputy director is now also appointed and dismissed by the President with the proposal of Prime Minister, while in the previous law it was within the competence of the Council of Ministers. The status of the head of the service, for economic reasons, is similar to that of a Minister. The activity of NIS is based on the regulations prepared by the head of the service and approved by the General Prosecutor, who has the right to control the application of these procedures. The law made some changes concerning accountability and oversight mechanisms. The activity of the NIS is controlled by the Parliament through a permanent subcommission. The head of NIS reports to the Commission at least once a year. The head of NIS reports to the Council of Ministers as decided by the Prime Minister. The subcommission and the government have the right to control the use of funds earmarked for specific activities, which are otherwise not allowed to be audited by other institutions. The Council of Ministers appoints a General Inspector to oversee the activity of NIS. He reports directly to the Prime Minister, however, the head of NIS could stop the general inspector from undertaking an inspection if this could harm national interests and should inform the Prime Minister in such a situation.26 The positions reversed, the Democratic Party, now in opposition, accused the government of using the intelligence services to weaken and intimidate the opposition. In fact, all Socialist Prime Ministers had demanded the dismissal of the Head of NIS, however, the President turned down these requests. The election of the new President in 2002, led to the dismissal of the Head of the National Intelligence Service. At the same time, a parliamentary investigative commission was initiated to examine the constitutionality and legitimacy of NIS activity. The investigation focused on the eavesdropping and surveillance with regard to opposition and involvement of NIS into the murder of opposition MP Azem Hajdari, as well as claims of fund abuse. The case was taken afterwards to the General Prosecutor on embezzlement charges, which eventually where turned down by the court. After the appointment of the new head of the NIS, there have been no more accusations by the opposition against the intelligence services. The appointment of the new head of intelligence service happened at a time when the two main parties, the governing Socialist Party and the opposing Democratic Party, were in a consensual political climate demonstrated by the agreement reached in the election of the President. While this is a very positive development, it is still early to judge whether the history of the intelligence service being used as an instrument against political opponents has ended

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in Albania. While the opposition has not voiced such accusation anymore, the former Socialist Prime Minister Ilir Meta, who split from the Socialist Party with a group of deputies and created a new party, has accused the government and NIS of interference and of threatening him.27 Regarding the intelligence service, the removal of the head of the intelligence service has often been followed by the dismissals of those people considered to be closest to the former chief. Defense Sector Reform Since the main focus is on the police and intelligence service, a very brief overview of defense sector reform would be provided here. The aspiration for NATO membership provides a strong motivation for defense reform as well as the requirements that should be fulfilled to achieve interoperability in terms of organizational structure, work procedures in military headquarters, military doctrine, etc. In 2002, the Parliament approved the Military Strategy, which was based on the military review that started in 2000. The strategy consists of a transitional platform for the transformation of the Albanian armed forces until 2010. The essence of the military reform is the establishment of a force with a western orientation that is based on professionalism. This means that the peacetime active military units will be mostly based on a professional force and only a few of them will contain conscripts. The national defense concept will be based on flexible defense and the peacetime forces should develop towards the model of rapid reaction forces. The Albanian armed forces will develop a peacetime active force of approximately 16,500 compared to the current 31,000. Special attention will be given to the joint operations of two or three forces. In order to achieve this, the government will need to increase the defense budget by 0.1 percent every year so that by 2010 the military budget will reach two percent of the GDP.28 Another important component of the defense sector reform is the civilianization of the Ministry of Defense administration. The aim is to increase the number of civilians from the current 25 percent to 75 percent. The problem of expertise among the civilian administration is important. Hasty moves toward civilianization could result in lower professional standards and harm civil-military relations in the Ministry of Defense. Oversight Mechanism Oversight is crucial to hold state and elected officials accountable and to provide incentives for reform and improvement. Relying on multiple oversight mechanisms, both internal and external, is the most effective way to ensure accountability. 29 The Parliament has a number of instruments to conduct oversight of the executive. Permanent committees are the most effective parliamentary mechanism. In the 1992–96 legislature there was only one permanent committee for all three agencies – defence, public order and intelligence service. In the subsequent legislature, separate committees were created for defense and public order, while within the latter a permanent sub-commission focusing on intelligence services was created. The functions performed by the committees could be grouped in three main areas: debating the draft budget for the respective ministries and institutions and to oversee the implementation of the budget allocated to these institutions; to examine any lawmaking initiative and


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normative decrees; and lastly, to oversee the general conduct of the activity of the institution whether it complies with the law and general expectations and to initiate inquiries. The budget is one of the most important functions performed by the Committees, mainly the Committee on Public Order and Intelligence. The time allocated to the Committees for discussing the budget is around four weeks, during which the Committee can convene eight meetings. The limited period of time combined with the lack of supportive staff in terms of research and expertise makes it very difficult for the Committees to have an informed discussion on the budget.30 The Committees often lobby for more funds for their respective Ministries. 31 The Committees lack the services of a research staff that would provide them with analyses – there is only one adviser and a secretary attached to the committees, and not all parliamentarians participating in the Public Order and Intelligence or Defense Committees have expertise on security issues to compensate for the lack of research staff. Due to lack of funds, the parliamentarians do not have access to independent researchers. The Committee of Public Order recommends amendments to the budget, which are sent to the Committee of Finance, which does most of the work concerning the budget. However, cooperation between committees is not regulated by specific rules and regulations.32 The Committee of Public Order and Intelligence Service has increased last year’s budget for the Ministry of Public Order. In terms of overseeing the implementation of last year’s budget, the Committee relies mainly on the work and results of the High State Audit. The committees themselves can conduct financial scrutiny; however, there is an asymmetrical relationship in the relations between the Committee and the Ministry of Public Order. The committee relies on the information provided by the ministry and lacks the expertise that is present in the ministry’s administration to be able to perform proper oversight.33 Another area of work for the Committee is amendments to the draft laws brought by the executive. In this area too, there is more will for cooperation between government and opposition representatives. There are many instances when the representatives of the majority have accepted proposed amendments by the opposition.34 The differences between the opposition and government MPs become obvious on issues when the committee tries to control the work of the executive on controversial issues that have been raised by the public. The last area of Committee oversight function reveals two main work practices: for some issues the committee has a planned agenda that identifies issues that the Committee will deal with in the course of the year. This could be considered a proactive approach. For example, border security has been one of the issues that the Committee has focused on this year. In addition to other work, field trips were organized to different border crossing points, and round tables were organized to discuss different aspects of the problem. However, this work practice does not represent the main way the committee discharges its duties. Most of the time the Committee deals with concerns that have been raised by the media and different actors.35 One such issue the committee has dealt with this year is the campaign of dismissals among police forces that was undertaken by the Minister of Public Order. The Committee had asked for explanations from the Ministry of Public Order to justify the measures taken. It is exactly in such cases when the Committee is trying to hold the executive accountable that the difference between the majority and opposition representatives becomes obvious and the executive is less responsive, even though in many cases the court turned down the charges brought against these officials. However, even in such cases when the role of the committee

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seems paralyzed, the very fact that the Minister is asked to provide explanations by the opposition representatives in the presence of the media has an impact.36 In addition to the permanent committees, there is also what is known as investigative committees, which are set up to investigate specific questions. As mentioned above, such a committee was created to investigate the activity of the National Intelligence Service. This is a new experience for the Albanian parliamentary tradition. According to the Constitution and the supporting legislation, the Parliament is obliged to set up an investigatory committee if one-fourth of its members request it. Other provisions of the law provide opportunities for the opposition to conduct its investigation – the committee agrees to a request for collection of evidence without resorting to voting and the opposition’s opinion is always attached to the final document. The findings of such committees are not binding on a court of law. However, there are certain elements missing in the law. Although the committee is not a court of law, certain procedures should be similar to a court. For example, the law does not specify any action if the witness chooses not to appear before the committee, or there are no sanctions if one makes false testimony. In practice, the work of the investigatory committee could be stalled in many ways – the most important is by withholding information. During the workings of the investigatory committee on the management of assets left from the financial pyramid schemes, the respective institution had refused to provide information, even though the case was made known to the prosecutor office no measures were taken.37 Concerning the investigatory committee on the conduct of intelligence service, the issue became very politicized due to the political importance of its findings. The committee did not act as one body but it was clearly divided along party lines. At the end of the mandate, the investigatory committee submitted two opposing reports to the Parliament; however, the work of the investigatory committee attracted a lot of attention and interest by the media and public, which was a positive development and contributed to the development of the parliamentary tradition.38 In addition to the Parliament, there are a number of other institutions that provide oversight of the security sector. The Ministry of Public Order, similar to other Ministries, has its own internal mechanisms of control, such as the Internal Control Service and Inspection Department. Internal mechanisms are very important because they can provide thorough inspection and do not focus just on dramatic and visible problems as parliamentary committees do.39 While these mechanisms are formally in place, in practice they are weak and many decisions are not thoughtful or serve narrow interests. 40 The High State Audit, mentioned above, is a constitutional institution whose task is to review and produce reports on the way government institutions have spent their allocated funds. The High State Audit work focuses mainly on the legality of the money spent and not so much on the effectiveness of the investments, although the latter dimension will become more important in the future. The Head of the High State Audit reports to the parliament twice a year and whenever requested. The reports produced by this institution are important for the work of the Committee on financial matters. In terms of financial management, the security sector agencies do not perform differently from other government ministries.41 Another institution that provides oversight of the public administration is the Ombudsman. Complaints addressing the Ministry of Public Order and Police behavior constitute important aspects of the Ombudsman’s Office work. In the 2003 report it says that besides achievements, the police continue to have among their ranks police personnel that are not prepared professionally,


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that are not informed in terms of human rights, and are corrupt. In 2003, the Office received 240 complaints, requests and notices concerning police, whereas the total number of complaints and requests received by Ombudsman for 2003 was 2160. While a large number of complaints lodged against the Police and Ministry of Public Order were not justified, or outside jurisdiction of the office, the Ombudsman has been able to positively address 25 percent of complaints. The Ministry of Public Order has taken measures following Ombudsman’s notification and 18 disciplinary measures were taken against the police and police officers. The issue of police personnel dismissals mentioned above has constituted another dimension of the Ombudsman’s work with the Police.42 Finally, civil society actors and media are important in terms of holding the elected officials accountable. A proper analysis of this topic would require some prior examination of the Albanian civil society actors and media in itself and then in relation to the security sector, however, there is no space for that. In general, expertise and interests among the media on defense and security affairs has been limited. Information on these issues is limited and there are no qualified people working in the media to analyze it. Usually there are more articles and news pieces focusing on police and the Ministry of Public Order rather than the military or intelligence service. Regarding civil society organizations, they have focused on a range of other issues and strictly speaking defense and security issues have been peripheral at best. However, recently a number of institutes have conducted projects that focus on the police forces, such as their interaction with the greater community, or monitoring police conduct.

1

Timothy Edmunds, “Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation,” DCAF Working Paper, No. 86, October 2002 pp. 15–16. 2 Elmas Leci, Eliminimi i Lidershipit Ushtarak, Instituti i Sigurimit dhe Mbrojtjes, Tiranë, 2002, pp. 463–470. 3 Timothy Edmunds, “Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation,” DCAF Working Paper, No. 86, 2002; Marina Caparini and Grahan Day, “Democratic Control of the Police and Police Reform in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia,” DCAF Working Paper No. 2, March 2002. 4 Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 101. 5 Law No. 7504, date 30 July 1991. 6 Eva Kresztes Dimovne, “Hungarian Police Reform,” in Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin (eds.) Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europe, Lit Verlag, Münster, April 2004 at http://www.dcaf.ch/news/ thisweek_index.html. 7 Interview with senior officials of the Ministry of Public Order, serving during 1992–96. 8 ODIHR, Observation of Parliamentary Elections Held in Albania, at http://www.osce.org/odihr/index. php?page=elections&div=reports&country=al. 9 Strategjia e Reformes ne Polici at http://www.mpo.gov.al/mpo/ligjet/strategjia_e_refor.htm. 10 Law no. 8553 on State Police, date 25 November 1999. 11 Albert Dervishi and Arjan Selita, E Drejta e Policisë, Tiranë 2004, p. 53. 12 Law no. 8643 Per Gradad ne Policine e Shtetit, date 20 July 2000. 13 Strategjia e Reformes ne Polici at http://www.mpo.gov.al/mpo/ligjet/strategjia_e_refor.htm. 14 Republic of Albania, Ministry of Public Order, Strategy on Border Control and its Integrated Management 2003–06, February 2003. 15 Valsamis Mitsilegas, “The Implementation of the EU Acquis by the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe: Challenges and Contradictions,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4, October 2002, p. 677. 16 European Community, CARDS Program, Albania Country Strategy Paper 2002–2006, November 2001. 17 This point was raised in many interviews conducted with international experts working for different International agencies in Albania.

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18 Avokati i Popullit, Raporti 1 Janar 2003 – 31 Dhjetor 2003, Botim i Kuvendi i Republikes se Shqiperise, 2004, pp. 109–113. 19 Interview with Mr. Aleksander Garruli, member of the Parliamentary Committee of Public Order and Intelligence Service. Interview with Mr. Bashkim Abazi, Center for the Study of Organized Crime. 20 Survey conducted by the Albanian Institute for International Studies in summer 2003 supported by the United Nations Development Program Office in Albania. 21 US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report 2004; Regional Clearing Point, First Annual Report on Victims of Trafficking in South Easters Europe, IOM, Stability Pact, ICMC, pp. 33–46. 22 Source, Albanian Ministry of Public Order, Italian Liaison Office Tirana. 23 ODIHR Report at http://www.osce.org/odihr/index.php?page=elections&div=reports&country=al. 24 Law no. 7495 on The Organization of the National Intelligence Service, date 2 July 1991. 25 Elez Biberaj, Albania in Transition, The Rocky Road to Democracy, Westview Press 1998, p. 161. 26 Law no. 8391 date 28 October 1998. 27 “Meta: SHISH organizoi anti-miting ne Peze,” Shekulli, 19 August 2003; “Letra e Metes do te shqyrtohet ne Kuvend,” Shekulli, 6 February 2004. 28 Igli Totozani, “Civilian and Military in Defense Planning,” in Jan Trapans and Philip Fluri (eds.), Defense and Security Sector Governance and reform in Southeast Europe, Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, 2003, pp. 69–73. 29 Christopher E. Stone and Heather H. Ward, “Democratic Policing: A Framework for Action,” Policing & Society, Vol. 10, Issue 1, April 2000, p. 5; Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin “Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europe” in Marina Caparini and Otwin Marenin (eds.) Transforming Police in Central and Eastern Europe, Lit Verlag, Münster, April 2004 at http://www.dcaf.ch/news/thisweek_index.html. 30 Viktor Gumi, “The Parliament and the Security Sector” in Jan Trapans and Philip Fluri (eds.), Defense and Security Sector Governance and reform in Southeast Europe, Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, 2003, p. 63. 31 Interview with Mr. Aleksander Garruli, Member of the Committee on Public Order and Intelligence Service. 32 Blendi Kajsiu, “Transparency and Accountability in Governance,” in Jan Trapans and Philip Fluri (eds.), Defense and Security Sector Governance and Reform in Southeast Europe, Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, 2003, pp. 110–111. 33 Viktor Gumi, “The Parliament and the Security Sector,” p. 64; and Blendi Kajsiu, “Transparency and Accountability in Governance,” in Jan Trapans and Philip Fluri (eds.), Defense and Security Sector Governance and reform in Southeast Europe, Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, 2003, p. 111. 34 Interview with Mr. Shaban Memia, Member of the Committee on Public Order and Defense. Interview with Mr. Aleksander Garruli, Member of the Committee on Public Order and Defense. 35 Interview with Mr. Aleksander Garruli, Member of the Committee on Public Order and Defense. 36 Interview with Mr. Shaban Memia, Member of the Committee on Public Order and Defense. 37 Interview with Mr. Arben Imami, Member of Parliament. 38 Sokol Berberi, “Democratic Control of the Intelligence Service,” in Jan Trapans and Philip Fluri (eds.), Defense and Security Sector Governance and Reform in Southeast Europe, Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces, 2003, pp. 86–88. 39 Christopher E. Stone and Heather H. Ward, “Democratic Policing: A Framework for Action,” Policing & Society, Vol. 10, Issue 1, April 2000, p. 6. 40 Interview with Mr. Bashkim Abazi, Center for the Study of Organized Crime. 41 Interview with officials working at High State Audit. 42 Avokati i Popullit, Raporti 1 Janar 2003 – 31 Dhjetor 2003, Botim i Kuvendi i Republikes se Shqiperise, 2004, pp. 20, 99–111.


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Government Reform and Internal Cooperation: A Study of Albania Dr. Jan Arveds TRAPANS

Reform requires reformers. In order to change Albania’s political system and economic structure, to provide itself with security, and to move toward Europe (where the overarching aim is getting into NATO and the EU), Albania is attempting to carry out many reforms, which add up to a complete transformation of its Government and society. Albania must democratize its Government and change its structure. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe, those who have joined NATO and those who intend to do so soon, have organised (and reorganised) their Ministries repeatedly. This paper looks at the ‘how’ of what is being done, not the ‘why’. For example, the paper mentions the development of Albania’s National Security Strategy of 2000, the ensuing Defence Policy and the Military Review of 2002. It does not consider their content. It asks the questions: Who wrote it? What roles, respectively, did the military and the civilians have? What did the Parliament do? It could be argued that a group of Western experts, versed in Albania’s security situation, might write a well-considered national security strategy for Albania, and perhaps more quickly than the Albanians. Perhaps, but the important thing is that the Albanian institutions write it themselves, although the process could be slower and awkward. More and more Ministries and governmental bodies get involved in defence and security affairs. If one would draw two organisation charts, one for the year 1994 and the other for 2004, of the Ministries, Presidential offices, and Parliamentary Committees concerned with defence and security issues, the chart for 1994 would be simpler than the one made for the year 2004. During the last ten years, new departments and units have appeared in Albanian Ministries and other bodies. If we indicate each one with a box, as is done in organisational charts, and connect them with lines, we would see a proliferation of boxes and many new lines. The lines indicate ‘channels of interagency co-ordination.’ Civilians and sometimes the military move through them. They are burdened with documents – policy papers, planning papers, and financial papers. The topic of ‘inter-agency co-ordination’ and the difficulties of civil servitude is not an intellectually exciting one.1 Nonetheless, Albania must consider how the interdepartmental connections could be made easier to negotiate, the burden lightened, and the still-small corpus of reformers strengthened, because reform requires reformers. How policy is determined, who in the Government is involved, and how is the Government structured to co-ordinate and implement policy? Albania’s great policy goal is ‘Euro-Atlantic integration’ which, as far as the Albanians are concerned, first of all means joining NATO and the EU. As the two international organisations move East and South, they are changing their purpose, strategy, and structures. The notion of security and stability in Europe has changed over the last decade, not in the least because

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J.A. Trapans / Government Reform and Internal Cooperation: A Study of Albania

of events in South East Europe itself. Traditionally, Foreign Ministries, Defence Ministries and General Staffs have been responsible for external policy and security. Today, other Ministries and institutions are becoming involved as well. Security is no longer limited to military concerns; it is no longer the domain of Defence Ministries backed by Foreign Affairs. Security now requires the coordination of the ‘external’ ministries and their agencies (the armed forces, and intelligence services) with those of the ‘internal’ ministries: internal affairs, education, finance, overseas development, transport, environment, health, and their agencies (police forces, security services, disaster relief agencies, and so forth). All this needs to be done even as the sheer number of requirements, large and small, generated in Brussels (meaning NATO and the EU) is rapidly increasing.2 Albania is attempting to fulfil major objectives. It will continue to improve public order and the market economy, giving special attention to the fight against corruption. It will encourage and develop the respect for human rights, including minority rights. It will strengthen democratic institutions and their role in society and establish an efficient public administration. It will bolster civilian democratic control over the Albanian Armed Forces. It will uphold the results attained through economic reforms, particularly in the field of privatization. It will continue the policies of good relations with neighbouring states, particularly in the context of the situations after Kosovo events, making use of regional programs of Stability Pact. It will adapt legislation to make it more compatible with NATO standards. And it will be fully engaged in an internal control of weapons and disarmament. These eight obligations are taken from a list that Albania drew up for NATO. Each requirement could appear on a document prepared for the EU. NATO – like the EU – wants to strengthen efficient public administration, democratic institutions, and civil society. The EU – like NATO – wants a good neighbourhood, particularly in the context of the situations after Kosovo.3 In order to co-ordinate its integration policy, Albania created a number of special Government bodies. There is an Inter-ministerial Committee for European Integration, the topmost one, chaired by the Prime Minister and composed of Ministers and senior officials. There is the Ministry of European Integration with directorates, sections, and negotiation teams. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a General Directorate for EuroAtlantic Cooperation and the Defence Ministry has a Defence and Integration Policies Directorate responsible for analyzing and implementing all defence and integration policies in the framework of international cooperation. It meets every three months with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Parliament has a Commission for the EU, which works with the Ministry of European Integration.4 The National Security Council is an advisory body to the President. The council discusses and gives opinions on matters of defence policy, arms control and all security and defence matters. The ‘advisory’ concept is new in comparison to the previous Constitutional provisions, in which the National Security Council was seen as a decisionmaking body. The Council is composed of the highest state and governmental authorities: the President, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence, Minister of Public Order, Minister of Transportation and Minister of Health, Chief of Staff and Chief of the National Intelligence Service. Others are also invited to participate according to the issues that are being addressed, such as the heads of Parliamentary Committees on security issues and the commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Force.5


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Albania is putting into place the components of a multi-layered structure for the multifarious business of Euro-Atlantic integration. We can look at the experience of other countries in Albania’s situation after the Washington Summit. They erected similar structures. Slovakia introduced a ‘Preparation for NATO Membership’ system that had co-ordination and review meetings with the Cabinet. The Romanian National Commission for NATO Integration met monthly at both the working level and quarterly State Secretary level to provide co-ordination, evaluation, and policy proposals to the Supreme National Defence Council. Latvia established a NATO Integration Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, with the Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Transportation and Finance as members. The Commander of the Armed Forces participated, as required, as did representatives from other Ministries. Latvia’s Defence Ministry created a position of a NATO Executive Secretary and a separate NATO Integration Department.6 All this is similar to what Albania is doing now. The experience of these countries can provide some ‘lessons learned.’ The new structure needs skilled staff to pull its efforts together. It should support the work of Albania’s Inter-Ministerial Committee for Integration, the ICI. Staff should be able to work formally and with counterparts in Ministries and Directorates. These shared staffs must do more than perform routine tasks, like arranging the appropriate documents for ministerial meetings. As required, they should offer analysis and policy options. Furthermore, within the Government, reform requires appointing reform-minded officials and providing them with the highlevel political support needed to pursue difficult reform programmes. Otherwise, while the Government seemingly agrees on an integrated strategy, it would not be effectively implemented. There is another area of Albania’s Government work where inter-agency cooperation is important – the development and approval of a National Security Strategy. Strategy defines the relationship between political objectives and security capabilities. The present-day Western approach to strategy assumes that the security of the nation includes defence but is not based solely on military strength. It is an attempt to achieve a balance between defence requirements, foreign policy objectives, and economic capabilities. It also recognises the need to consult people and to consider the attitude of neighbouring states. Strategies are not imposed from above and they should not be developed solely, or largely, by the military. The civilians have the leading role. The core issue for this study on Albania is in the following questions: Who made strategy and meaning? What roles did the civilians and the military have in developing the concepts? How did various political institutions work together to assess and approve it?7 The Albanian National Security Strategy was formulated in January 2000 and the Defence Policy was approved shortly thereafter. The National Security Strategy was prepared by an inter-ministerial body composed of the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Public Order, Intelligence Service, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Local Government, and the Ministry of Health and Environment. The draft document was presented to the Parliament for approval. The Military Strategy, finished in 2002, came from a comprehensive Military Review. The General Staff prepared the Military Strategy, the Ministry of Defence presented it to the Government and then the draft project was given to the Parliament for approval. The Governmental, inter-agency processes, and the work of the civilians and the military, were generally in accord with Western practice.8

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But the political part of the process faltered and folded in Albania’s Parliament. The National Security Strategy was adopted without any proper Parliamentary debate. The opposition did not participate in the debate or vote; at the time, its political strategy was to boycott parliamentary proceedings. Subsequently, as the adoption of the Military Strategy in 2002 showed, parliamentary discussion was perfunctory, even though this time the opposition was present. With regard to the public involvement, defence issues are even less debated in the society at large. This could be said to be the result of a number of factors. On the one hand, there is a remnant of an authoritarian past, where the Government was in charge of security. On the other, the people are overwhelmed by domestic economic, political and social problems.9 We have described the development of Albania’s National Security Strategy in the context of planning carried out by Governmental bodies, by civilians and the military, with attention to the role and responsibilities of the Parliament. We now turn to the defence content of national security. As far as the Defence Ministry and the Armed Forces are concerned, there are two parts to it: the planning aspect and the economic part. The two cannot be put in separate compartments; however, we shall simplify matters somewhat and discuss first the planning part and then the economic part. Both, as we shall see, require considerable inter-agency collaboration. The standard Western planning sequence is generally accepted as follows. Successively, there is a threat and risk analysis, a national security strategy (or concept), a defence concept, and a national strategy (or military strategy). Defence planners work on mission capability and force structure of the armed forces and draw up a force development plan. Albania’s current national military strategy was based on a risk and threat analysis, the state of the Armed Forces, economic realities, and criteria for NATO membership. The current authorized active strength level of its Armed Forces will be reduced from 31,000 to 16,500 by 2010. The Armed Forces will be remade entirely: professional, not volunteer, and a new, smaller force structure with new missions. Faced with no immediate external threats, Armed Forces are to complete their internal transformation even with a constrained budget over the next ten years and still meet Albania’s National Security Strategy requirements.10 With the new Military Strategy, Albania has reached the point where force development plans must be closely related to the available economic resources. The direction in which Albania will move as it builds its new Armed Forces has been generally agreed upon. The speed with which Albania can build them depends upon the level of financial support that they receive and how efficiently the funds are used. The level will be determined, directly, by civilian policy makers and, indirectly, by the rate of the country’s economic growth. As far as Albania’s Defence Minister is concerned, the important thing is to be certain that the Ministry will get the amount of money promised in the annual budget although there can be some alterations, provided that they are not severe. In order to use the funds effectively, Albania must acquire a wellfunctioning resource management system. It is just as important as having realistic plans for the force structure; in fact, it is inextricably connected to plans which can be effectively implemented. National economy and defence are more closely connected than other areas of governmental operations. Defence plans must be closely linked to the economic and demographic resources that a society has available. Albania’s economy is small, as is its population. Therefore, a careful approach to its defence resource management is imperative. There is more to economy and defence than the amount of money avail-


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able. First, Defence Ministries, unlike some other Ministries, by necessity have to make long-term plans, in Albania’s case, up to 2010. Those who have been involved in this combined resource and force planning know that it is a demanding business with longrange horizons and complex analyses. Second, the entire conceptual framework of defence planning in the former socialist countries is entirely novel for them. They must use a ‘free market approach’ in defence economics, closely bound to the ‘democratic, political’ one. As the new democracies move haltingly towards a free market economy, defence requirements must be estimated for the Government’s budget, stated in money terms, sent to the Parliament for approval and, after the ‘political masters’ have made their decisions, translated from money terms to support for personnel, weapons, equipment, supplies, training, and so forth. Defence Ministries in Central and Eastern Europe have had great difficulties with implementing effective budgetary, resource management, and planning systems.11 After many decades of a command economy, the former socialist countries do not have functioning methods of defence management. Even as the defence planners are reorienting themselves to work in a new political environment, they must assimilate new methods of resource management. The difficulty extends beyond the lack of trained accountants and effective accounting procedures as has been suggested. Albania’s Defence Ministry must implement new, comprehensive, and effective planning, management, and budget systems. Western governments have developed a planning, programming, and budgeting system, commonly abbreviated to PPBS. Developed in the United States, simplified for European conditions, NATO has helped to introduce in Central and Eastern Europe. PPBS divided in short, medium, and long terms, sometimes in one, five, and ten-year segments. The short, one-year segment is for the budget provided by the Parliament; the medium term is programming, and the long term is planning. However, the Parliament and relevant Government agencies must be continuously appraised of tangible progress, updated computations and priorities, and amended estimates of medium and long term requirements. The NATO-Albanian Membership Action Plan recognizes that defence reforms will have significant resource implications. It requests Albania’s defence community – civilians and the military – to introduce economic planning that will complement the military side of planning and use management systems which follow NATO methodology. With the help of an American company (SAIC), specialising in army reform in all countries aspiring to become NATO members, the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff are undergoing organisational reform.12 The project on the reorganisation of the Armed Forces and Defence Ministry has been presented to the Prime Minister. In the Baltic experience, force structure planning and resource management went hand-in-hand. The Defence Ministries implemented the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System as the basic resource management tool to ensure the effective utilization of available resources with proper authority, responsibility, and accountability at all levels of the defence establishment. Latvia’s Defence Ministry knew that it did not have the expertise to introduce PPBS on its own and sought outside assistance. The following objectives were identified: a revised financial management structure delineating roles and responsibilities, updating and implementing financial procedures such as financial control and financial scrutiny, investment appraisal, and a new system of management information. A clear budgetary chain was established with management boards at appropriate levels and a Senior Management Board, chaired by the Minister of Defence.13

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Even relatively straightforward actions, such as putting together the Ministry’s annual budget, need considerable inter-agency co-ordination. A useful illustration is given by the Latvian Ministry’s work agenda for preparing it, a gestation period of approximately nine months, before the Cabinet presents it to the Parliament. What takes place is depicted in the scheme below. Without going into every aspect of what takes place, we see that it is a repetitive process, with considerable back-and forth between the General Staff and the Ministry, then between the Ministries of Defence, Finance, and Economy, followed by more than one Cabinet review. Here we have, one more time, close inter-agency work. All of this takes place before the budget goes to the Parliament. Once Albania’s Defence Ministry acquires an effective method of resource management, it will not be enough if it only functions internally, for the Ministry’s own utility. Resource management information must be an integral part of the working relations with other sectors of the Government and the Parliament. Key Ministries, like Finance and Economy, and Parliamentary Commissions dealing with defence affairs, must understand it. In particular, this is important for a Parliamentary staff, for two reasons. First, although the Parliament considers the annual defence budget, it must understand how annual requirements fit into the larger design of medium and long term defence development which, for Albania, leads to the year 2010. Second, Members of a Parliament are elected – and some might serve only for one term. A Parliamentary staff functions as an ‘institutional memory,’ both for the Parliament itself and for interagency work. Staff members need not master all the intricacies of PPBS methodology, but they must have a grasp of its basic elements. Democracies have control over the armed forces and much of it is in the hands of their Parliaments because they decide how much money the Government will get and how much of it can be spent on defence. The Parliament’s ‘power of the purse’ provides it with the ability to ask the Government for how much it needs, how it is being spent, and if it was spent honestly. These are the essentials for transparency and accountability. If they are in place, upon them the mechanism of parliamentary control can be assembled: the organisation and function of Committees, the conduct of Hearings, questions to the Minister, and so forth. The Constitution should establish a hierarchy of civilian control over the military, delineating the authority of the Head of the State, the Head of the Government, the senior civilian responsible for military affairs – the Defence Minister, and Armed Forces, headed by a General Staff. The ultimate approval of policy belongs to the Parliament. Article 80 of Albania’s Constitution states the obligations of the Government. The Prime Minister and other members of the Council of Ministers have to answer questions of the deputies. A member of the Council of Ministers has the right to take part in meetings of the Assembly or of its Committees; he is given the floor whenever he requests it. Senior civil servants, on request of the parliamentary committees, give explanations and inform on specific issues of their activity to the extent that law permits. The Defence Policy, a law passed by the Parliament in January 2000, states that transparency in the defence planning process and civil democratic supervision of the Armed Forces are among the main principles underlying policy. The Constitution has three articles on the internal work of the Parliament; Article 75 says that the Assembly is organized and functions according to regulations approved by the majority of all the members; Article 76 says that the Chairman chairs debates and directs its work, that the a General Secretary is its highest civil employee, and that other services necessary are


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carried out by other employees ‘as is specified in the internal regulations’; Article 77 says that the Parliament elects standing Committees, it may establish special Committees, and it may designate special investigatory Committees. The Parliament has set up Committees, written Rules of Procedure and internal regulations, and acquired employees for the ‘other services necessary.’14 The Constitution promulgated in 1998 was written with Western assistance. Hence, it is a ‘Western Constitution’; it presents principles and essentials. It is concise but it can be cryptic. A study on transparency and accountability in South East Europe, in the section on Albania, comments on some legal gaps. There is no clear call in the Constitution, laws, or normative acts for the Government to ‘reveal, explain and justify’ what it is doing or intends to do. It does not explicitly oblige the authorities to inform and consult elected representatives in the course of the security and defence policy planning and implementation. Thus the lawmakers must content themselves with ex post facto policy accountability. The text of the Defence Policy of 2000 states that transparency in the defence planning process and the civil democratic control of the Armed Forces are among the main principles underlying policy. But it does not say what this involves in practice.15 For Albania’s circumstances, the legal provisions are not always sufficiently detailed. Members of the Parliament have little experience in conducting their business. Their Western peers rely just as much on experience, precedent, and tradition accumulated over the centuries as on Constitutions and laws. On the one hand, countries like Albania should possess a body of legislation which, with well-considered detail, can take the place of missing experience and practice. On the other hand, even then, properly constructed Constitutions and explicit Parliamentary rules are not enough to establish effective relations. We shall survey the connection between the Government and the Parliament looking at defence affairs. What other Albanian Ministries do is not necessarily less important. Nonetheless, there are particular features of defence that require well structured and continuing relations between the Defence Ministry and the Parliament. The Committee on Defence, the Committee on Public Order and Security, and the Finance Committee are the most important for the purposes of this study. The Defence Committee is expected to oversee the implementation of the defence budget; to check and assess the efficacy of existing laws and to recommend changes if necessary, to examine reports, to ask for explanations by the Minister of Defence or other officials, and suggest measures to be taken by Parliament or the Council of Ministers. The Rules of Procedure establish how Committees work, how the budget is approved, and how defence requirements are assessed. In everyday practice, the two bodies responsible for security policy, the Committee on Defence and the Committee on Public Order and Security, do little effective work. Partly this is because they have little time for deliberations. The time available depends on when the Government submits the budget to the Parliament, allowing only some four weeks for its consideration and approval. Even experienced Committees would be hard-pressed to comment on defence and security issues, let alone the entire budget. In the circumstances, the two Committees have abdicated much of their responsibility, which has been assumed by the Finance Committee. In any event, most of the process is consumed by general debate on the floor, often unrelated to the budget but to political squabbling among parties.16 Even if the Government and the Parliament would mutually observe their responsibilities, this does not necessarily bring about effective common work. There are few

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parliamentarians in any country today—not many in the old democracies, few in Albania—who have sufficient expertise to deal, on their own, with defence affairs. This is no disparagement of their abilities. Western Parliamentarians have expert staff, for committees and for individual Members, civil servants who have the knowledge, skills, and tools to support the elected representatives so that they can hold defence officials and the military accountable in affairs. Parliaments in the transition countries do not have such assets. Staff expertise is a prime requirement and few Parliaments in the new democracies have developed it. Albania’s Defence Committee has one staff member and so does the Finance Committee. The political determination of the parliamentarians to hold the government accountable is indispensable in order to ensure parliamentary oversight.17 Essential to long-range defence planning is a sound estimate of funding the Defence Ministry can expect over a number of years. This requires the defence establishment to work with the Parliament, first to make its case for the annual budget and second (but equally importantly) to inform, explain, and justify its mid-term programmes and the long-term plans. So that the Minister is ready to meet the Parliament, for Committee hearings or Parliamentary questions, the Ministry must have an organisational structure. Without responsibility in the Parliament as well as in the Defence Ministry, without a knowledgeable civil service staff in both, without continuous collaboration between the staffs in the two institutions, there can be no proper exercise of power in the Parliament or effective planning in the Ministry. It does not matter how effective in theory the democratic structures for control are if there are no competent civilians in the Ministry of Defence who can talk to the military on equal terms. There can be no real understanding in the Parliament of the Armed Forces’ justifiable needs as long as it has no competent staff to deal with civil servants in the Ministries. The work of building a political bridge which defence officials cross to meet parliamentarians can start at the Ministry; it need not be initiated by and for the Parliament. ‘Democratic control brings a responsibility for the military to educate civilians in the government, parliament and media on military affairs, and it is incumbent upon civilian officials to be prepared to learn, so that civilians and the military can collaborate effectively.’18 Albania’s Defence Ministry needs a well-staffed department, dedicated to parliamentary liaison so that principles, mechanisms, and practices work as they should. In fact, Albania’s Ministry of Defence is creating a ‘special staff’ that will administer its relations with the Parliament, composed of senior civilian experts and military personnel from the Defence Ministry and the General Staff. Moreover, providing information on a regular basis would establish good relations between the Ministry, the Defence Committee, and the Parliament as a whole. The Defence Ministry intended to prepare and present a defence White Paper by the end of 2002. However, no such document has been issued so far. In 2000, Latvia’s Defence Ministry began a periodic Report of the Minister of Defence to the Parliament, informally called the White Paper. There is no legal requirement that requests the Minister to prepare a Report; the Ministry decided that it would be a good thing. The Report gives a detailed presentation of the Ministry’s activities in defence reform: priorities and planning methods, force structure and force development plans, defence budget forecasts, international and regional co-operation, assessment by foreign experts, and relationship between the Armed Forces and society. It certainly has been an excellent means for the Ministry to present its case. The Report is also disseminated to other Ministries, to society at large, and to international institutions.19


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Parliamentary cooperation is a matter of international concern. The NATO Membership Action has much to say about Albania’s reorganization of national defence and security establishment into a democratically controlled and effective organization. Through MAP, Albania is engaged to fulfil the following eight major objectives and of these, three are in the area of parliamentary and democratic control of the armed forces. Albania will strengthen democratic institutions and their role in society, establish an efficient public administration, strengthen civilian democratic control in the Armed Forces, and adapt legislation to make it more compatible with NATO. There can be no democratic control as long as a Parliament is ineffective. Concerning the politics of defence reform, Christopher Donnelly has written that ‘for example, it is no good claiming that “we have good democratic control” if the country has an army which is in shambles; no one in the government really knows how many hospital beds are the equivalent of the cost of a battalion of tanks, or if the (parliamentarians) cannot identify how many tanks are required to defend the country…. The decision must be a mutual balance of responsibility between politicians and the [defence] specialists.’20 In the future, Albania’s Defence Ministry might submit all the planning documents, budget papers, and other information to the Parliament which Western Ministries submit, thus apparently fulfilling the requirements of transparency. Nonetheless, as long as the Parliament does not have the capability to comprehend what resources are required and how they are utilised, there can be neither transparency nor accountability. As things stand in Albania, the balance of responsibility is tilted toward the Government and the military specialists, not toward the parliamentarians. This needs to be redressed. What society thinks about the country’s security and defence will have an effect on decisions made by policy makers. Societal views might not have an immediate influence, but in the long run they cannot be ignored. A recent publication on security reform in the former socialist states concludes with an observation: ‘A shrewd [Government] information policy will aim not to suppress information, but to create trust.’21 In this case, ‘astute’ and ‘perceptive’ are appropriate synonyms for ‘shrewd.’ A similar comment is made in a study of Albania’s security sector expert formation, describing innovative courses in Albania’s Defence Academy for civilians and the military which are aimed at ‘ensuring military prestige, trustworthiness, and accountability through an active outreach programme to the nation’s citizenry. Such a programme must receive strong backup from political leaders and should include local, as well as nation-wide initiatives.’22 In this account, we have dealt with activities within the Government. We will now consider relations of Governmental bodies with ‘society,’ particularly with ‘civil society.’23 This somewhat amorphous phrase embraces the media, non-governmental organisations, the academia, and other entities. A generalised, benevolent characterisation of ‘civil society’ could be as follows: ‘That part of society which is interested in public affairs, public welfare, and makes its opinions known to all, to the nation’s citizenry and to political leaders, in order to change the course of events for the better.’ Obviously, not every non-governmental institution concerns itself with defence and security issues; the ones which do usually are called ‘public policy’ institutions. Albania has a handful of such institutions, still small, usually working in concert with their large peer organisations in the West. The media, on the whole, pays sporadic attention to defence matters and, when it does, tends to do so along the lines of political polemics. Most academics have narrow professional interests. Nonetheless, although the behaviour of

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‘civil society’ must be taken into account, it is the Government that is at the centre of our attention. What are the legal provisions for freedom of information? What does the Government do to disseminate it? How serious and effective are its efforts? Article 22 of the Albanian Constitution guarantees the freedom of expression, press, radio and television and prohibits prior censorship. Article 23 ensures the right to information and that everyone, in compliance with law, can get information about the activity of state bodies, as well as of persons who exercise state functions. In 1998, the Parliament approved a succinct law that says: ‘The press is free.’ The Law ‘On the Right of Information on Official Documents’ provides that: ‘Everyone has the right to request information on official documents related to the activity of state structures and individuals who exercise state functions, without the need to provide a motivation for the request. Public authorities are required to release all information related to an official document, except when the law states otherwise.’ In principle, media and civil society organisations have legal access to all political documents and public administration documents, except those classified as secret in accordance with the law on state secrets.24 The everyday reality is different. Although legally possible to have access to documents on defence and security not classified as secret, the exercise of this right is hindered by various obstacles. According to a recent study, ‘contact with press or information offices is easy, but that does not mean that one can retrieve the useful information easily, even if that information is not classified as a state secret.’ 25 Senior officials are reluctant to release information. Their staffs hesitates to act on its own, thinking that without authorisation from above, it lacks the right to be open to the public. Finally, governmental offices are inefficiently organised and their information technology is backward. Even when the goodwill is there, as it sometimes is, it is difficult and at times not possible to acquire the requested information. The main Governmental institutions – the President’s Office, the Parliament, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence have established information and public relation departments. Similar offices and departments are being introduced in other governmental institutions, at both central and local levels. Their existence indicates an understanding that public relations are not only a legal requirement for transparent governing, but also a means through which their work is better publicised. From the topmost institutional level, the Ministries, most immediately accessible information comes through electronic dissemination. It is available in Albanian and in English and therefore utilised by external researchers. Moreover, Albania forwards documents on defence reform to NATO Headquarters read by all NATO member-states, concerning Partnership for Peace activities and the Annual National Programmes of the Membership Action Plan. Thereby, directly and indirectly, defence information is available. A fair estimate of the Albanian efforts can be made by comparing them with what is done in other South East European countries. Various websites can provide important documents and detailed information – or sometimes they give little more than general political statements, pictures of the top leadership, and the Minister’s most recent speeches. In this broad range, Albania hovers somewhere around an estimated mid-mark on a provisional scale. Allowing private individuals to have access to government documents is the first step, a passive measure; putting important strategic documents before the public is the next, active one. Albania published the National Security Strategy and Defence Policy in 2000 and the Defence Strategy in 2002. The Defence Ministry publishes the annual


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military budget. Some of the countries in Albania’s vicinity are yet to make such security documents publicly available. The Defence Strategy of 2002 acknowledges the need for the participation of civil society and public opinion in the discussion and drafting of new defence and security policies. ‘The role of public opinion, the media, and civil society in drafting, discussing, and implementing the strategy on national defence and security policies, is necessary.’26 An aversion to information sharing significantly affects the ability of defence officials to establish relationships with other government agencies, the media, and with society at large. The public relations and information offices of various Ministries, in addition to their everyday tasks, should pursue well-conceived long-term activities. Here we will refer again to experience of other countries. To improve public information, a Public Relations and Information Office was established in Latvia’s Defence Ministry and a public relations strategy was formulated with the following long-term objectives. It would gain public understanding of the resources required and expended, the priorities in defence development, and eliminate existing problems. It would build public trust and confidence and raise the prestige of the Armed Forces. It would strengthen democratic development in society through an open access to defence information and through understanding the concept of civilian control of the Armed Forces. It would engage the national government, as well as the local governments and non governmental organizations, in a debate over society’s need for defence, its costs, and responsibilities. All this would bolster the necessary psychological development required by defence in a democratic society. And it worked. An energetic public relations programme shaped public attitudes and opinion polls indicated growing support for the armed forces and defence budgets.27 There are external as well as domestic reasons for this, the expectations and requirements of ‘the Euro-Atlantic organisations’ Albania wants to join. When NATO appraised the accomplishments of those countries which hoped to be admitted to the Alliance in its second expansion round, the relationship between society and defence policy makers was an area of considerable interest. The Dutch Foreign Ministry commissioned an inquiry Assessing the Aspirants for NATO Membership. Concerning Latvia, the inquiry concluded that its Defence Ministry provided ‘more than sufficient information’ and that ‘a huge amount of [official] documents were available on its website’ which was evaluated as the most transparent and complete of all Baltic defence and foreign ministries.28 Albania’s Defence Ministry should explain defence requirements and defence policy to society. Open access to defence information strengthens ties with society. Each Ministry should devise a far reaching information and public relations plan. It should disseminate documents to government offices, to the Parliament, to the media, and to society, in print and electronically. In order that policy makers may be able to follow the development of policy and understand its objectives, every Ministry must provide a continuous stream of information. In the case of defence affairs, it would include documents such as national security concepts, defence concepts, military doctrines and force structure plan, documents on international policy, such as NATO integration strategies, and many others. Transparency benefits the defence establishment because a well-informed public will understand and support the efforts of the Ministry and the Armed Forces. It is entirely in their interests to foster and participate in public debate. Albania is still at an early stage of development of the concept of public relations in state institutions. So are other countries in Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe.

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Their defunct socialist, authoritarian regimes left a heritage that hinders progress, and ingrained habits of conformity, not initiative, control, not delegation, compartmentalisation, not co-operation, and secrecy, not transparency. It is the psychological residue of a governmental culture where inter-agency and inter-ministerial channels of communication were small and seldom-used, where directives flowed downward and long, obscure documentation upward, where, at the uppermost level, top bureaucrats procrastinated. Thus this concept is nearer to the older mentality of propaganda than to the new mentality, which aims at better publicising the work and activity of a given institution or a given Government official. ‘Albania has definitely parted with the secrecy psychosis but it still has a long road to ensure that transparency becomes part of the culture and the behaviour in institutional practice.’ However, it is perceptibly moving in the right direction in ‘making transparency part of the culture and behaviour of the nation.’29 In the introduction of this chapter, we wrote of a new defence community, composed of civilians and the military. There has been a limited national governmental capacity in defence policy, planning, and implementation in Albania. The Parliament has recognized all its power and does not efficiently use what it possesses now. Neither the civilians, nor the military involved in defence management had experience in democratic, free market systems. The combined political-economic conundrum affects defence affairs more than any other Governmental activity. This difficulty confronted all Central and Eastern European societies. In South Eastern Europe, it was particularly acute. Externally, the security environment has been unstable and threatening; internally, radical political changes came together with drastic economic changes. In the study ‘Security Sector Expert Formation: Achievements and Needs in Albania,’ Zija Bahja writes that: ‘The presence of a mature defence bureaucracy would help alleviate many difficulties as ministerial officials attempt to grasp the intricacies of defence policy making, planning and force development. Trained and experienced defence specialists, supported by military professionals experienced in working with civilians, would provide the institutional knowledge and continuity to ensure smooth transitions during changes in senior leadership. Equally significant for civilian oversight is the expansion of the nascent interagency process of the Inter-ministerial Committee for European Integration to all defence policy-making and planning to include coordination of the national military strategy.’30 The ability to carry out work competently comes from experience and education. In Albania’s situation, much emphasis must be placed on education because experience accumulates slowly. In democratic systems, the civilian sphere of activities in defence affairs has increased. But the soldiers have moved across a demarcation line which once separated military and civilian responsibilities. The present-day professional officer participates in administrative work, helps prepare documents for the cabinet, is involved in developing the budget, and could be asked to appear before a parliamentary committee. Because of NATO (and the EU and OSCE), a military professional must be prepared for international organisations, interagency stratagems, and the procedures of multinational bureaucracies. Just like the civilians, the military requires a new set of skills: political and managerial, domestic and international. Defence education has been offered by Western institutions. NATO has been the most active institution in providing defence education programmes. NATO schools were established for the military, although some civilians are admitted to them. Officers have attended staff colleges in many Western countries. Some institutions have


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developed excellent security education and management programmes; lately, more attention has been directed toward the civilian community. Nonetheless, over the last decade, the military received the major share of Western attention. Albania’s Defence Ministry has bilateral relations with twenty-one countries, based on agreements and protocols of co-operation, which, among other projects, provide education in defence affairs. However, only six of the twenty-one bilateral agreements mention education, and of these, only two for civilians. Romania offers ‘short-term qualifications for military and civilian personnel,’ and Switzerland offers courses in qualification of personnel and devices for media and public relations, education and ‘qualification of military and civil personnel on defence and security policy issues.’31 We should not assess the depth and breadth of education opportunities outside Albania from one summary document; nonetheless, it indicates that the military is the first in line for education programs. The Baltic Defence Ministries recognised that their own system did not provide the breadth of education necessary for the modern military professional who needed to be a military commander, a military administrator and a military diplomat. Western institutions provided good education, but it was meant for states with large military establishments and for Armed Forces with divisions and corps, not battalions and brigades. Together, they established a Baltic Defence College.32 The students learn missionoriented command, the role of armed forces in a democratic society, national defence plans, and planning related to a small nation’s economic and social resources. In a similar fashion, civilians in the Baltic defence community had some education abroad and various courses and seminars at home. By the second half of the 1990s, they were ‘functioning with growing confidence and effectiveness,’ according to Western observers.33 To increase their still-small number, the Baltic Defence College introduced a special course and concise training seminars for civilians. Albania’s Defence Academy has conducted courses for civilians, military experts, parliamentarians and journalists. Developed with help from Germany, they emphasise effective democratic oversight and management of the military; the roles of the President and the cabinet, control of the defence budget, as well as the role of the Parliament. Albania’s Defence Academy plans to start a new 18-month-long course, called ‘Master of Defence Administration’ for both civilians and military experts in managing the defence matters in the Defence Ministry. Zija Bahja’s study concludes that primarily civilians, in the Defence Ministry, other national security agencies, and working for the Parliament would benefit from international educational opportunities in order to become more knowledgeable in defence-related matters. The Defence Academy can offer good opportunities for future training and learning for civilian and military leaders together. There is a problem, however, because there are only two or three teachers qualified to teach these subjects.34 There are no non-governmental organisations devoted to research in this domain. There is a need to educate many of the civilian and military staff on a wide variety of specific subjects, but the Defence Academy offers long-term courses and in-depth, high-level expertise. The Albanian Parliament and OSCE are developing ‘Presence in Albania,’ a longterm project for reinforcing and consolidating the research capabilities within the Parliament. The Embassy of The Netherlands and other missions are working to improve the Parliament’s ability to scrutinise defence. The United Nations Development Programme is active in democratic reform. Other Western organisations working in South East Europe are paying attention to Parliament responsibilities. The Geneva Centre for

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the Democratic Control of Armed Forces has published a Handbook for Parliamentarians: Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms, and Practices meant for use in the new democracies.35 The Handbook describes how Parliaments conduct their work and the relationship with the Defence Ministries. It can be as useful for a Ministry as for a Parliament. All of these programs, large or small, can be beneficial. But they do not form a coherent whole, and an appropriate strategic development plan could not be drawn up in Brussels or in the capital of some Western state.36 Tirana must do that. Albania requires a comprehensive plan to educate and develop a new defence community. Of course, this is easier said than done. Nonetheless, it must be planned and done in Albania. Albania has public policy institutes concerned with parliamentary issues, and they should be involved. The subject of this study could be called ‘Good Governance in Albania.’ Good governance is a contemporary, popular, and extensively used phrase. It embraces the functioning of the governmental structures, their efficiency and accountability, the degree of citizen concern and informed public opinion. In this regard, political, economic, and security reforms in South East Europe and in Albania have progressed with difficulty. We have listed some of the problems to be solved. Behind the specific, there is ‘the heritage of the past,’ large, deep, and still present – although, by now, in places, smaller and shallower. But, given all the difficulties, not everything should be described with the colours of gloom. In a study on defence transformation in the new democracies, Christopher Donnelly has written that the new democracies ‘really needed a long period of readjustment; time to think out their new national security situation; time and money to plan at a measured pace…. But in the real world, everything has had to be done at once, with no clear vision of the future, and with strictly limited money.’ 37 Considering the lack of experience, the lack of money, and, most of all, the lack of time, Albania has not done badly.

1 Though there have been a few publications and conferences on the topic. For Albania, see the studies by Zija Bahja, ‘Security Sector Expert Formation: Achievements and Needs in Albania,’ and ‘Civil-Military and Inter-Agency Cooperation in the Security Sector of Albania,’ at http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/SSR-book. 2 Chris Donnelly, ‘Security in the 21st Century: New Challenges and Responses,’ NATO Review (SummerAutumn 2000), pp. 28–31; and Aldo Bumci, ‘Security Sector Reform in Albania.’ in Jan Trapans and Philipp Fluri, eds., Defence and Security Sector Governance in South East Europe: Insights and Perspectives, Vol. I, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia (Geneva: DCAF, 2003), pp. 3–26. 3 Albania. Ministry of Defence. ‘NATO Integration.’ www.mod.gov.al. For the EU, see ‘The European Commission Plan for Albania for 2002–2006, http://www.europa-eu-un.org. 4 Valbona Kuko, ‘Stabilization and Association Process in Albania and Institutional Framework,’ www.acit-al.org/publications. 5 Albanian Constitution Approved by the Parliament on 21 October 1998. Part Fifteen, Article 168; and Bumci, ‘Security Sector Reform,’ pp. 9–10. 6 A good presentation of the process and problems of Euro-Atlantic integration is provided in two studies by James Greene. Although written for Ukraine, they put the issue in a clear context and repay careful reading. Ukrainian Democratic Development and Euro-Atlantic Integration, DCAF Working Paper No. 134 (March 2004); and NATO Membership is a Realistic Goal if Ukraine Shows Courage and Resolve, DCAF Working Paper No. 135 (March 2004). For Latvia, see Ministry of Defense. Report of the Minister of Defense to the Parliament (Saeima) on State Defence Policy and the Armed Forces for the Year 2000, Chapter III. “Latvia and NATO’. www.lv.gov.mod. 7 For a summary on national security concepts, see Jan Arveds Trapans, “National Security Concepts in Central and Eastern Europe,’ NATO Review (November-December 1997).


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8 Igli Totozani, “Civilians and Military in Defence Planning: From a National Security Concept to a Force Development Plan,’ Defence and Security Sector Governance, pp. 58–71. For a Western assessment of Albania’s security environment in 2000, see M.A. Smith, Albania 1999–2000, Conflict Studies Research Centre (May 2000). 9 Viktor Gumi, “The Parliament and Security Sector,” Defence and Security Sector Governance, pp. 45–57; and Totozani, “Civilians and Military”, ibid, pp. 58–62. 10 Totozani, pp. 63–66; and Sander Leshi and Aldo Bumci, ‘Good Governance in Civil-Military Relations,’ Defence and Security Sector Governance, pp. 87–103. 11 Chris Donnelly, ‘Military Matters; Reform Realities,’ NATO Review (Autumn 2001), p. 14. 12 Mentor Nazarko, ‘Civilian and Democratic Control of the Armed Forces,’ Defence and Security Sector Governance, p. 40. 13 Latvia. Ministry of Defense. Report of the Minister of Defense, p. 56. 14 Albanian Constitution. Section III. Articles 74–80. 15 David Greenwood, ed., Transparency and Accountability in South-East European Defence (Sofia: DCAF and George C. Marshall Association, 2003), p. 6. 16 Gumi, ‘The Parliament and Security Sector,’ pp. 52–53. 17 Gumi, pp. 54–55. 18 Chris Donnelly, “Defence Transformation in the New Democracies: A Framework for Tackling the Problem,” NATO Review (1997; I), p. 14. 19 Ministry of Defense. Report of the Minister of Defence to the Parliament already mentioned. This far, three Reports have been published, in 2000, 2001, and 2003. 20 Donnelly, ‘Defence Transformation,’ p. 14. 21 Peter Volten and David Greenwood, ‘Agenda for Ukraine,’ Security Sector Reform and Transparency Building (Groningen: Centre for European Security Studies, 2003), p. 165. 22 Bahja, ‘Security Sector Expert Formation,’ p. 25. 23 See Henri Cili, ‘Security and Defence—Civil Society and the Media,’ Defence and Security Sector Governance, pp. 121–135. 24 Albanian Constitution. Articles 22–23. 25 Cili, ‘Civil Society and Media,’ p. 125. 26 Bumci, ‘Security Sector Reform,’ p. 26. 27 Latvia, Ministry of Defence, Report (2000), Part IV. National Armed Forces and Society. 28 Centre for European Security Studies, Assessing the Aspirants for NATO Membership. Final Report of a Study on the Membership Action Plan (MAP) States and ‘Second Wave’ of NATO Enlargement (Groningen: Centre for European Security Studies (July 2001), p. 37. 29 Sokol Berberi, ‘Democratic Control of the Intelligence Service,’ Defence and Security Sector Governance, p. 86. 30 Bahja, ‘Security Sector Expert Formation,’ p. 27. 31 Albania. Ministry of Defence. “Bilateral Relations.’ www.mod.gov.al. 32 Baltic Defence College, ‘General Information,’ http://www.bdcol.ee. 33 International Defence Advisory Board to the Baltic States, Final Report (February 1999), p. 6. 34 Bahja, ‘Security Sector Expert Formation,’ p. 27. 35 Hans Born, Philipp Fluri, and Anders Johannson, eds., Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms, and Practices. A Handbook for Parliamentarians Geneva: DCAF and IPU, 2003). 36 As to the help, and some problems, of external assistance in defence education, see Brigadier General Michael H. Clemmesen, ‘Supporting States Advice and Defence Development,’ Baltic Defence Review (2000 No. 4), pp. 7–12. 37 Chris Donnelly, Defense Transformation in the New Democracies,’ NATO Review (1996: VI), p. 16.



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The Civil-Military Power Balance Under the Justice and Development Party Government in Turkey Prof. Ümit CIZRE Abstract. This essay critically examines the motives behind the Justice and Development Party government’s attempts to alter a balance of power that has served to sustain the military’s self-ordained guardianship role by analyzing the government’s strategic power calculus and the nature of the military’s response to it. It is argued that the primary catalyst for the realignment of the civil-military has been the impact of broader foreign policy changes, notably the usefulness of the government’s Islamic and democratic credentials for the Western alliance and the entry requirements of the EU, which include the democratic control of the armed forces. The internal factor that has had a significant effect on the civil-military balance is the government’s deliberate steps to circumscribe the military’s sphere of political influence. The combination of internal and international forces has brought about an increase in the secure space within which the government can maneuver without drawing a reaction from the military.

In November 2002, Turkey’s Islam-sensitive Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi – henceforth in its Turkish acronym AKP) won a landslide victory opening up the possibility of a dramatic change in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies. Significantly, as part of the democratic requirements of entry into the European Union (EU), the government has included in its reform agenda the resetting of the civilmilitary balance in favor of constitutionally elected organs. This paper assesses the international and domestic forces that lie behind the AKP’s attempts to restructure the balance of power that has sustained the military’s self-ordained ‘guardian’ role in Turkish public life. Three arguments in combination provide an analytical framework for explaining the changing character and trajectories of government-military interaction since 2002. First, new thinking in the ‘old’ Civil-Military Relations (CMRs) theory has evolved in the post-Cold War era in the western hemisphere; this new thinking focuses on the appropriate role of the military and its relationship with overseeing agents.1 As membership in the EU has now become conditional on this new form of CMRs, the complications and failures in the reform agenda regarding the political role of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) should be analyzed in relation to these new principles and perspectives. Secondly, the process of change that the government has set in motion should be understood within the context of a major shift in the regional and international power balance. The paper investigates the ‘strategic power calculi’ which this shift has effected in the ruling party’s choices and the military’s response to the concerted effort to reduce its political prerogatives and remove it from policy areas which have traditionally been its prerogative. Finally, the ‘good lessons’ to be drawn from

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Ankara’s attempts since 2002 to hang onto an ambitious agenda of correcting Civil – Military Balance (CMB) in conditions where the guardianship mission/profile of the Turkish military has been more prominent than at any time in the last decade.

New Thinking on Democratic Control of the Armed Forces Ever since the 1999 Helsinki Summit extended candidate status to Turkey, both the ‘political criteria’ inscribed in the Accession Partnership Document (drawn up by the EU in 2000), and the Annual Reports have suggested the need for structural changes2 in the organization of civil-military relations so as to enhance civilian control in line with EU standards. A typical section on CMB in a typical annual report reads as follows: ‘The basic features of a democratic system exist in Turkey, but a number of fundamental issues, such as civilian control over the military, remain to be effectively addressed.’3 Despite the progress made to align Turkey’s laws with the EU4 and despite the fact that Ankara received the green light to start accession talks with the EU on October 3 this year, the latest Annual Report notes that ‘since 2002, Turkey has made good progress in reforming CMRS… but the armed forces continue to exercise significant political influence5… and Turkey should work towards greater accountability and transparency in the conduct of security affairs in line with member states’ ‘best practices.” 6 This characterization shows that there are serious complications underscoring the reform of the civil-military interface in Turkey; these can only be understood by going beyond the logic of legal/institutional reform and making connections with the ‘new conceptual focus in CMRs’7 which I believe underlies both the EU’s accession conditions and the Copenhagen Criteria – if not in words, in spirit. Turkey’s secular establishment tries to bypass this ‘essence’ or spirit which is also engrained in the notion that the ‘enlargement of the EU is a special kind of security policy’ 8 or a ‘security policy by other means’9 in the sense that the EU secures its security by non-conventional methods prioritizing new norms of democracy. In line with the new conceptualization and regarding the civil-military equation, Turkey’s policy-makers’ thinking must be modified around three foci: the key concern is centered on the need to alter ‘threat’ perceptions and ‘security policy responses’ to it; not only the concepts, but also the decision-makers must be changed. The second perspective is a redefinition and expansion of what is understood by civilian ‘control’; and the final focus dwells on civilian ‘empowerment’ as the fundamental prerequisite for establishing a workable/healthy/normal balance between civilians and the military.

Overhauling the System of Threat Perception and Formulating Security Responses The Turkish military’s ‘guardian’ role requires that it retains primary responsibility for defining threats and formulating security policy responses to them. This is in conflict with the underlying implication of the EU’s entry criteria that definition and development of defence and security policy should be under ‘the control of democratic authorities, and that the military should confine itself to implementing decisions made by those authorities.’10 Moreover, Turkey’s traditional notion of threats and security are

Ü. Cizre / The Civil-Military Power Balance Under the Justice and Development Party Government 103

considered to be too broadly defined;11 too much centered around the protection of the state from external and internal threats. As these threats are defined by the state bureaucracy, they are heavily dominated by the military, so much so that sometimes human rights are bypassed. There is a growing body of literature around the notion of ‘shared responsibility in civil-military relations’12 which places threat perception, security and defence issues at the center of CMRs and creates a model in which civilian and military sides speak in the same vernacular and in the same political and technical terms. The theory of a shared relationship, however, raises the question of how civilian oversight of the armed forces can be achieved when they usually lack the necessary skills, knowledge and expertise to understand defence and security issues. Even in advanced western democracies, ‘asymmetry of knowledge’ is a big problem in establishing national policy and budgetary frameworks of control by elected civilian authorities. One way out of this dilemma is already visible: the concept of security has shifted from being centered exclusively on the protection of state to the protection of the life, liberty, and welfare of the small man in the street. For this reason, civilian control agents have gained extra significance and weight. The EU Commission’s Regular Report of 2004 and Progress Report of 2005 suggests that Turkey’s civilians should start to take a more active role in the formulation of national security strategy. This implies that security ceases to be a ‘control’ of the society problem, 13 and security policymaking turns into a democratic process whereby representatives of the people start to debate the precepts that shape national security policies. This development denotes a significant step towards democratizing the country’s military-oriented reading of perceived threats. One obvious prerequisite is the diffusion of knowledge relating to the security and defence to the parliament, the civil bureaucracy, and civil society. More importantly, less secrecy and greater participation is required during the preparations of the National Security Policy Document, a document which is considered to be ‘the secret constitution’ of the country. Professor Christopher Dandeker argues that for a democratic yet effective system of management of post-Cold War defence and security issues, it is crucial to build up “an effective strategic community, encompassing academics and other interest groups who can provide a dynamic debate on security and defence issues to the benefit of the armed services and the wider public.”14 There is still colossal work to be done by the government, the media, and more significantly, the civil societal organizations to increase expertise among civil, political and economic society. Academic bodies, think-tanks and interested NGOs can create a new venue for the discussion of defence and security policy issues through conferences and workshops and publications like the one by TESEV-Inter-Parliamentary UnionGeneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces Consortium which was launched in May 2004 in an international workshop on the Handbook for deputies called Guvenlik Sektorunun Parlamenter Gozetimi: Ilkeler, Mekanizmalar, Uygulamalar (Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms and Practices). Turkey’s security-based public policy line and the dramatic increase during the last decade in the level of military involvement in defining threats and formulating responses do not blend well with the new thinking on demystifying and opening up national security to civilian participation. True enough, the Kurdish issue and the growth of political Islam bear a large responsibility for the high command’s constitutional engagement in politics at both micro and macro levels. Nonetheless, in the 1990s, the


TAF has made and removed governments, issued public demands and warnings to civilians, engineered the transfer to a new premiership, structured new bills through its own research units and departments, and impinged on the day-to-day operations of the elected government. Like its Latin American counterparts, national security-oriented policy making in Turkey has served to usher in a ‘strong democracy’ rather than a liberal one.15 There has been a repeated emphasis on the ‘specificity of the Turkish system,’ and on its location – ‘directly in the middle of a region full of risks and challenges such as ultra-nationalism, religious fundamentalism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and ethnic conflicts which emerged following the Cold War period and intensified in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East.’ 16 The TAF is adamant about not relinquishing its guardianship role even after the 1999 Helsinki Summit which gave a green light to Turkey’s candidacy for the EU: it continues to stress the geostrategic uniqueness of the country underlined by the ‘fear’ that the EU has ulterior motives in weakening Turkey. The September 11 attacks also introduced a conserve bias in the general staff’s position regarding the fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria. The post-Cold War definition of security in Turkey and other countries has targeted threats from ethnic separation and religious radicalism. The military high command has defended the view that the expansion of freedoms in Turkey would represent a threat to the unity of the country and the secular principle – considered an existentialist one; they see this price as too high to pay in order to be accepted into the European fold. The high-command has long been of the opinion that the EU displays a negative bias towards Turkey and will therefore not let her in.17 The central argument of this discourse has been the accusation that the Accession Partnership Document aims at ‘breaking up our country’ in the name of ‘cultural rights,’ ‘broadcasting in mother tongues,’ and ‘educational rights.’18

Reconceptualizing Civilian Control The second focus entails a revision in the understanding of the concept of civilian ‘control’ over the military. While the ‘old’ school of CMRs theory focused on ‘civilian’ rather than ‘democratic’ control of the military by the parliament and the executive through formal political and legal mechanisms, the ‘new’ concept of civilian control revolves around setting up procedures of ‘democratic accountability’ which transcend the bureaucratic mechanisms of oversight and adopts a more inclusive approach that promotes the participation of wider sectors of civil society in the debate on defence and security. The cardinal principle to remember is that civilian control is not always democratic: non-democratic regimes achieve excellent control over their militaries. But all democratic control is civilian. Control, in this approach, is not to be conceptualized within the context of a binary split between the armed forces and civilian authorities. Rather, it involves more civilian input in the process of threat perception and security policy formulation. 19 In addition, the diffusion of knowledge encourages the democratization/reform process in this country where secrecy and taboos are automatically identified with security and defence issues. Control no longer means zero-sum domination by constitutionally elected civilian bodies over a unified military structure, but includes a decentralized and diffused strategy involving civil society, think-tanks, universities and a community of


interested and informed civilians. The media play an important part in diffusing information, and in questioning and debating defence, security, and strategy issues. The move from the classic but deficient concept of ‘civil-military relations’ (which implies perfect and equal distribution of knowledge and power between the two sides) to ‘democratic governance of civil-military affairs’ indicates a move from a structural and institutional build-up to ‘second-generation issues dealing with the consolidation of democratic norms and procedures… internalization of democratic values and practices at both political and societal levels.’20

Empowerment of Civilians Institutional procedures and mechanisms for oversight are necessary but not sufficient; civilians must also have the capacity to enforce their will. 21 The new CMRs debate links capacity and democratization 22; there is a consensus that effective control of the military requires civil society and the political class to increase their own capacity for control. Empowerment of the political, civil and economic society is seen as the essential stage in the process of improving government performance and creating a political climate where the military considers control/oversight by the civilian authority as the only justified course of action. In other words, displaying a ‘strong’ performance in office increases the chances of achieving the goal of democratic civilian superiority. In countries like Turkey where the military continues its tradition of retaining the self-assigned task of ‘guarding’ the national interest, there is another dimension to civilian empowerment vis a vis the military: If we accept Professor Finch’s claim that ‘the military policy is always conditioned by political factors outside the civil-military relations,’23 then building civilian capacity to reset the civil-military balance depends on whether a government is politically secure, if not from the threat of a military intervention, then from the threat that the military leaders will publicly disrupt the effectiveness of civilian policies or challenge the elected authorities. The safer the government feels from a show of political muscle by the military, ‘the greater is (its)their potential margin to attempt reforms even at the cost of antagonizing the armed forces.’24 The present government has made significant strides in this direction; it has embraced the EU issue as a window of opportunity to gain a margin of safety against a crippling reaction from the military. However, since its latitude depends on strong performance in office, any slip in policy delivery will cause the AKP government to lose the margin of freedom necessary to resist the constraints imposed by the military. The danger is that once the government demonstrates a loss of vigor and determination in its approach to the EU for example, its capacity to take issue with the powerful military might be lost; and it may resort to a policy of ‘entente’ with the highcommand, as it has on many previous issues.

The Paradoxical Existence of the TAF and the ‘Strategic Choice’ Perspective I will frame the paper around the “paradoxical position” of the Turkish military and explain the factors shaping this paradoxical existence. The political role of Turkey’s prominent military has been simultaneously provoked and cut back since 2002. It is


this contradictory framework of the TAF that explains its ambiguous position with regard to many issues. The global reshaping of the world after the Cold War has had two contradictory policy implications for CMB in this country. Firstly, the implosion of internal security threats has encouraged the tendency for more security, less democracy, and more vigilance and guardianship by the TAF. There has been an increase in laws pertaining to internal security, anti-terrorism, and the maintenance of public order. These laws criminalize certain political activities, constrain public debate, and expand military jurisdiction over civilians. However, at the same time, an impressive movement toward internalization of European political values has dramatically increased the costs of ‘more security.’ This represents the reform aspect, or the scaling down of the political influence of the TAF. The TAF is provoked into upholding its ‘guardianship’ mission because it has continued to perceive the government’s discourse from the point of view of ‘radical doubt’25 with regard to its true intentions. The AKP’s landslide victory in November 2002, rather than alleviating the perception of political Islam as an internal security threat has in fact reaffirmed it in the eyes of the military. But the paradox starts here: the government which the establishment profoundly distrusts, has included in its political reform agenda the alteration of the existing system of CMB in favour of civilians. Of the democratic reforms that Turkey has undertaken, none is more important and controversial than those related to the Turkish military’s power and autonomy. The democratic package of July 2003, which was formally put into effect on 7 August 2004, shows that current CMB in Turkey is characterized by greater dynamism than the historical-cultural continuity frame allows for. The package contained an amendment to some Articles of the Act on the National Security Council (NSC) and the General Secretariat of the NSC which tipped the CMB in the civilians’ favour. The package also repealed the NSC’s executive powers which overlapped or sometimes exceeded the executive branch. August 2003 legislation turned the NSC into an advisory body and increased civilian membership to a majority voting position. The previous reform packages legislated by the AKP in October 2002 and June 2003 expanded freedom of expression, allowed education and broadcasting in Kurdish, abolished anti-terrorism provisions that authorized punishment for propaganda against the unity of state, and established retrial rights for citizens whose court decisions are overthrown by the European Court of Human Rights. All these reforms were put in place to increase the chances of membership talks with the EU after the European Council’s meeting in December 2004. The August 2003 package, however, is a distinct legislative accomplishment by Turkey’s historic standards as the political role of the military has been based on the NSC, an institution that was considered by the government members themselves to be ‘the shadow government.’26 From many perspectives, the August 2003 Package, called the 7th Harmonization Package, makes a clean break with the past and has compelling political and theoretical significance for the civil-military power equation. By converting the NSC into an advisory body that has little effective influence over national policy, the AKP government knowingly took the risk of a confrontation with the military leadership. This shows that it now feels that it is in a secure enough position to try and establish civilian supremacy. The 8th Harmonization Package, passed on 21 May 2004, further increased civilian oversight over the defense budget and removed military representatives from the Council on Higher Education (Yüksek Ögretim Kurumu –


YÖK) and the Supreme Board of Radio and Television (Radyo Televizyon Ust Kurumu – RTÜK). It also abolished State Security Courts which try crimes against the state; these were a legacy of the period after the 1980 military coup.27 Finally, the amendments narrowed the right of military courts to try civilians for criticizing the military. The government is also planning to spend more energy in 2006 to increase the parliamentary oversight of defense spending and has taken assertive steps in delaying the issuance of the National Security Policy Document. All these do not signal a total retreat of the military from politics even along with the by-law of 8 January 2005 that made the NSC’s operation non-secret. But the most important platform through which the military’s influence is exercised and reproduced has definitely been pushed back since July 2003. The objective conditions and subjective considerations on both sides have shaped the strategic calculus underlying the emergence of a new pattern of CMB in Turkey.

Strategic Choices of the TAF Once the civilian authority has a sufficient margin of comfort to resist the constraints imposed by the military, even if this is sometimes accompanied by a policy of accommodation with military interests, the military establishment also needed to engage in a ‘strategic action perspective,’28 or ‘calculus approach.’29 They will need to determine when to define ‘military assertiveness as too costly and outweighing the potential benefits.’30 For most of the politically active militaries in the world, the ‘benefits’ revolve around some core issues of survival or corporate well-being which amount to the maintenance of ‘underlying interests, goals and strengths,’31 and ‘unity and cohesiveness, protection of budget share, preservation of organizational autonomy of the military’ 32 or, as has been the case with Latin American armies, an extraction of a promise to abstain from revanchismo for the military’s past human rights violations.33 A close analysis of government and military interactions in the last year, suggests that the high command now realizes that to continue its traditional pattern of political influence might damage its own corporate interests. There is a certain degree of survival instinct at play and that is perhaps the best explanation for their not contesting civil-military reforms. The TAF’s restraint in countering the reforms is also due to the fissures that exist within the officer corps. The Turkish military’s impressive unity, which had previously helped it keep a distance from civilian control seems to be under strain. The current chief of staff, General Ozkok is surrounded by some force commanders, with strong support from ‘young officers,’ who wish him to be more assertive against the AKP government.34 Therefore, the main line of division within the military is between those former and active duty officers who consider the government to be a ‘sinister assault(s) against the secular republic,’35 and some generals led by General Ozkok himself. These officers subscribe to democratic norms and are more willing to engage with civilian reforms to democratize civil-military relations. Thus, the civilian political class and/or the military may sometimes settle for suboptimal outcomes compared to the past; the perceived threat to their long-term wellbeing prompts them to prudently accept some changes that might be contrary to their narrower short-term interests.36 ‘A military organization would incur great risk and cost in taking forceful measures against a solid popular backing’37 that sustains a civilian government.


Some combinations of internal changes and global opportunities have reduced the choices available to the TAF. They are caught between two pairs of alternatives: either accept a shift in the power equation away from the military, i.e., some curtailment of its power as part of the conditions for EU entry, or confront the government and a by and large pro-EU society. This latter path would involve the military in some risk of losing its credibility as the self-appointed pinnacle of Turkey’s intellectual and social elite, responsible for fulfilling Ataturk’s dream of ‘raising Turkey to the level of civilization’ of the West. In order to preserve its power base and corporate interest, without which it cannot preserve its political preeminence, it has opted for the first choice.

The AKP’s Cost-Benefit Calculus The AKP government’s overall approach to TAF relies on a strategy of avoiding confrontation. This approach has been used to dispel fears in the civil and military bureaucracy that the government will inject Islamism into the bloodstream of the secular system in Turkey. The government’s strategy is understandable given the 1997 collision between the NSC and the AKP’s predecessor, the Welfare Party. On the other hand, The AKP leadership has not confined itself to simple inaction on matters of national security and on foreign policy matters such as the EU, Iraq and Cyprus. While predecessors of the same ideological ilk were intimidated into inaction by the expansion of military prerogatives in national security during the 1990s, the AKP leadership follows a deliberate strategy of trying to increase its leverage over national security and foreign policy. At this juncture, two windows of opportunity have changed the ‘strategic calculus’ of the AKP and the TAF; these have had a knock-on effect on the CMB. The first is the AKP’s embrace of the EU, and thereby the Cyprus question; the second is the implications of the war in Iraq and changing international strategy trends. I will not deal with these in detail, but will refer to how these issues have created a momentum for change in the AKP’s policies — in some instances autonomous from the will and actions of the party. Changes in the international strategy came as a glorious window of opportunity in the aftermath of the military campaign against Saddam Hussein. The international tide turned in favour of Turkey’s ruling party as the Transatlantic alliance looked for a security partner that it could hold up as an example of the compatibility of Islam and democracy. This international sympathy and support for the government reduced the military high command’s ability to challenge the government.38 The party leadership’s appropriation of a new wave of Europeanization was , in part, strategic choice: the government’s focus on EU accession has helped the Party and the Movement shed its anti-Western and reactionary image. However, as it is a matter of enlightened self-interest, the government’s commitment to the EU accession is pretty genuine and solid. In addition, the democratic changes that were encouraged by the EU preconditions also helped reduce the establishment’s role in the system and dramatically altered the political power balance that had sustained the military’s political influence. At the same time, correcting the civil-military imbalance in favour of constitutionally elected organs has helped the AKP to break the traditional powerlessness of civilian politicians. The promise of ‘effective governance’ became the AKP’s election – winning narrative. This


government has taken pains to convey the image that it is not one of those weak governments floating over the society, unable to solve any of its problems. For the new government, the priority placed on entry into the EU coupled with reformist policies at home have served to present it as a problem-solving government. Moreover, the AKP’s earnest attempts to alter the balance of power that sustains the “guardian” role of the military by taking over the latter’s “vanguard” role, has caused embarrassment for the TAF. European Union membership was to be the intended endpoint of the republic’s vision of generating sufficient modernization to eliminate the Islamist threat. That also explains why the party’s appropriation of the military’s vanguard mission has produced moderation on the part of the high command on the EU issue, despite initial resistance.

Conclusions Although the reform packages represent a major move towards weakening the military’s role in politics, it would be misleading to suggest that the TAF’s political role has automatically degraded. Clearly, a reduced military influence in politics is not equivalent to democratic control over the armed forces. Turkey’s situation hovers in a gray area as there are still provisions for the military to enjoy a degree of autonomy under legal and administrative structures which are not accountable to civilian structures. Traditional notions of security encompass the protection of the state from external and internal threats and the guardian mission of the TAF; these concepts persist in the minds and deeds of the officer corps. Thus, Turkey since 2002 has demonstrated that a combination of external and internal political changes can facilitate the civilian capacity to challenge a tutelary pattern of civil-military relations. Thus, even in contexts where the “guardian” role of the military traditionally encourages a powerful political role for the armed forces and where the status quo appears to be deeply entrenched, there can be substantive changes in the distribution of power between elected civilians and the military. These changes arise from a new strategic context created by external circumstances and by the momentum generated from the deliberate policies of a popularly-backed government. The engagement of Turkey’s Islam-sensitive ruling party with a democratic reform agenda in order to integrate with the European Union provides evidence that time-tested institutional balances in a system are not automatically resilient. The broader lesson is that in creating greater strategic flexibility in the entrenched power balances, neither the genesis of a ruling party, nor the ideological motivations of the institutions of an establishment that is opposed to it, may necessarily determine their subsequent patterns of action. Finally, the crucial problem is not just the implementation of civilian oversight or control, but the larger one of ‘civilian empowerment.’ It is important that civilian governments be able to take democratic control over not only the military universe, but also the life of the country: the economy, the political process, the institutional makeup, the justice system, and foreign relations.


1 Four comprehensive sources on the new theorizing/thinking in civil-military relations are: Forster, A., Edmunds, T. and Cottey, A. (2001): Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe: Guarding the Guards, Basingstoke: Palgrave; Forster, A., Edmunds, T. and Cottey, A. (1999): Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe: A Framework for Understanding Civil-Military relations in Post-Communist Europe, ESRC Working Paper 1/99, Sussex: University of Sussex; Born, H., Haltiner, K. and Malesic, M. (eds.) (2004): Renaissance of Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Contemporary Societies, Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft; Born, H., Caparini, M. and Fluri, P. (eds.) (2002): Security Sector Reform and Democracy in Transitional Societies, Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. 2 To sum up, there are four strictly institutional areas that have been targeted for reform: the position of the chief of general staff, the role of the National Security Council, the composition and jurisdiction of the State Security Courts, and emergency rule in the South-east. 3 Regular Report 2001, from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession. Brussels: Commission of the European Community, p. 97. The issues are: 1) Articles 35, and 2) 85/1 of the TAF Internal Service Code which define the duties of the Armed Forces as the protection of territorial integrity and secularism of the republic; 3) Article 2 a of the Law on National Security Council Secretariat which defines national security in such broad terms that it could, if necessary, be interpreted as covering almost all aspects of policy; 4) the inability of civilian authorities to fully exercise their supervisory functions over the formulation of national security strategy; 5) lack of full control over the defense budget. 4 Through two major constitutional reforms made in 2001 and 2004 and 8 legislative packages passed between February 2002 and July 2004 three areas of structural issues of reform as indicated by the EU except the position of the chief of general staff (he is still responsible to the prime minister rather than the defence minister) have been tackled. 5 In addition to the first 3 provisions cited in footnote 3, this ‘improper’ influence is assumed to be exerted through the inability of civilian authorities to fully exercise their supervisory functions over the formulation of national security strategy and lack of full control over the defense budget. 6 European Commission, Turkey 2005 Progress Report Brussels, 9 November 2005, p. 14. 7 On the new thinking in civil-military relations, four comprehensive sources would be: Forster, A., Edmunds, T. and Cottey, A. (2001): Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe: Guarding the Guards, Basingstoke: Palgrave; Forster, A., Edmunds, T. and Cottey, A. (1999): Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe: A Framework for Understanding Civil-Military relations in Post-Communist Europe, ESRC Working paper 1/99, Sussex: University of Sussex.; Born, H., Haltiner, K. and Malesic, M. (Eds.) (2004) Renaissance of Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Contemporary Societies, Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. ; Born, H., Caparini, M. and Fluri, P. (eds.) (2002): Security Sector Reform and Democracy in Transitional Societies, Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. 8 Missiroli, A. (2004–2005): “Central Europe between the EU and NATO,” Survival 45, p. 121. 9 Ibid, p.132. 10 Edmunds, T., Cottey, A. and Forster, A. (1999): “Rethinking Civil-Military Relations and Democracy: Lessons from Central and Eastern Europe,” A Working Paper produced as part of The Transformation of Civil-Military relations in Comparative Context. Online address: http://civil-military.dsd.kcl.ac.uk/. 11 See Article 2A of the National Security Council Law which defines security as pertaining to political, social, cultural, economic interests, internal and external threats. 12 The most prominent researcher in this genre is Douglas L. Bland. See: Bland, Douglas L. (Fall 1999): “A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations,” Armed Forces and Society 26, pp. 7–26; and, Bland, Douglas L. (2004): “Your Obedient Servant: The Military’s Role in the Civil Control of Armed Forces,” in H.Born, K.Haltiner and M. Malesic (eds.), Renaissance of Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Contemporary Societies, Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 25–36. 13 Cizre, Ü. (Spring 2003): “Demythologizing the National Security Concept: the Case of Turkey,” Middle East Journal 57, pp. 213–229. 14 Dandeker, C. (2003): “Military and Society: The Problem, the Challenges and Possible Answers,” in A. Bryden and P. Fluri (eds.), Security Sector Reform: Institutions, Society and Good Governance, Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, p. 149. 15 Stepan, A. (1988): Rethinking Military Politics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 53. 16 White Paper – Defence 1998, p. 12; Beyaz Kitap 2000 (White Paper – Defence 2000), p. 6. 17 Statements of the high command to that effect abound. Tuncer Kilinc, the former secretary general of the NSC, expressed his opinion in early March 2002 that “… the EU will never accept Turkey... Thus, Turkey needs new allies, and it would be useful if Turkey engages in a search that would include Russia and Iran.


See: Gorvett, J. (May 2002): “Turkish Military Fires Warning Shots over EU Membership”, The Middle East 323, pp. 57–82. 18 Taken from a speech by Brigadier General Halil Simsek, the then Commander of the Armed Forces Academy. See, “Brigadier General Halil Simsek: Accession Partnership Document Divides Us,” NTVMSNBC News, Internet, January 2001. 19 Forster, A. “New Civil-Military Relations and Its Research Agenda.” Online: http://www.dcaf.ch/ news/past_2001/ev_geneva_01121314_forsterCMR.pdf, p. 9. 20 Edmunds, T. (2002): “Promoting Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Central and Eastern Europe: Lessons Learnt and Future Research Agendas,” in H. Born, M. Caparini and P. Fluri (eds.) Security Sector Reform and Democracy in Transitional Societies , Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, p. 102. 21 Anthony Forster, New Civil-Military Relations and Its Research Agenda, p. 6. 22 Ibid. 23 Finch, J. Samuel (1998): The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America, Baltimore and London: the Johns Hopkins Press, p. 162. 24 Ibid. 25 I borrow the term from Anthony Giddens who uses it as a paradoxical notion entailed by the Enlightenment’s claims to certainty. See Giddens, A.(1994) “Living in a Post-Traditional Society,” in U. Beck, A. Giddens and S. Lash (eds), Reflexive Modernization,Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 56–61. 26 Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul used the term in a speech he made in New York. See “MGK Golge Hukumetti,” (NSC Was the Shadow Government), Milliyet, 29 September 2004. 27 Established in 1982 and commencing operations in 1984, the State Security Courts have been civilianized since June 1999 after the European Court of Human Rights passed a verdict in 1998 that its composition of one military judge with two civilians was against the European conventions. To prevent criticism of the trial of Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader, the military judge sitting on the bench was removed and replaced with a civilian one. The EU Commission’s Regular Reports have repeatedly specified that the powers and proceedings of these courts be brought more in line with EU standards. The first round of democratization reforms passed by parliament on 6 February 2002 dealt with the issue only procedurally by reducing the custody period for crimes tried in the State Security Courts. The scope of its functions are transferred to the Heavy Crimes Courts that are being set up. 28 Pion-Berlin, D. (2001): “Introduction,” in D. Pion-Berlin (ed.), Civil Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, Chapel Hill, London: University of North Carolina Press, pp. 1–35. 29 Vink, M. (Autumn 2003) “What Is Europeanization and Other Questions on a New Research Agenda”, European Political Science 3, p. 68. 30 Finch, J. Samuel, The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America, p. 147. 31 Pion-Berlin, Introduction, p. 20. 32 Desch, Michael C. (1999): “Civilian Control of the Military, The Changing Security Environment,” Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 13. 33 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics-Brazil and the Southern Cone, p. 65. 34 Strategic Survey 2002/2003, p. 139. 35 From the speech by commander of the 1st Army, General Cetin Dogan, on the occasion of his retirement. “Dogan: Saldirilar Suruyor,” (Dogan: The Assaults Continue) Radikal, 21 August 2003. 36 Pion-Berlin, Introduction, p. 19. 37 Hunter, W. (1997): Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, Politicians against Soldiers, Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, p. 12. 38 In February and March 2005, international criticism of the government escalated on the grounds that it failed to act expeditiously on the reforms needed by October 3, 2005 to get a start-date for negotiations. There was also criticism that the AKP had allowed the Islamist agenda to creep into the amendments to the Penal Code in September-October 2004 and in June 2005.38 At the same time, the State Department and the Pentagon expressed their displeasure with the resurgence of anti-American sentiments and policies in Ankara which they believed had begun souring the relationship between the two countries. This reversal of international support for the government triggered the establishment to sharpen its attempt to reshape the public discourse.



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Civil-Military Relations in Egypt: An Overview Obaida EL-DANDARAWY 1

Defense considerations have always been of great significance in Egypt, whether historically or in more recent times. As such, the primacy of the military in the affairs of the state and the involvement of the military in shaping certain government decisions has always existed, albeit to varying degrees. As early as 1882 and the failed Orabi Revolution led by the officer corps against the ruling Ottoman Khedive, such involvement was often combined with nationalist sentiments that were echoed by the general population. Direct military interference in civilian affairs, however, was greatly accentuated after the 1952 Coup. This brought the military into government affairs, and for all intents, merged both establishments at the highest executive level with the creation of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which was essentially comprised of the officers leading the coup and headed initially by General Mohamed Naguib and then Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser. Events since 1952 however, and especially following the 1979 Camp David Accords, have consistently eroded the military establishment’s direct control of the civilian government, and the military for the most part has acquiesced to such a process while retaining overall control over its resources and minimizing accountability to the civilian branches of government.

1. Pre 1952: The Conditions Leading to the Military Assuming Power in Egypt By the early 1950’s, the military was perhaps the only institution in Egypt that was not subject to intense public criticism. In an era when political disputes within civilian establishments were prevalent, primarily between the King and the political parties (often represented by the longstanding Wafd opposition party) (Abdalla 1987, 2) the army, unlike other governmental forces, had rarely been used to quell domestic riots and was perceived to be non-partisan. Furthermore, the army as a national establishment, had not been tainted with rumors of allegiance to Britain. In fact, the army’s defeat in the 1948 War against Israel greatly elevated public sympathy for the armed forces as an institution, and the young officer corps in particular. The Egyptian defeat in 1948 portrayed the army as a victim of the corruption of the King and his collusion with the British occupiers. The public strongly believed that the Palace was responsible for providing the armed forces with the defective weapons that helped cause the defeat and that the army had to pay in blood for the disregard the foreign occupiers had for the citizens of the country. The army also shared this view and exonerated itself from the defeat, laying blame squarely upon the Palace.

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O. El-Dandarawy / Civil-Military Relations in Egypt: An Overview

Abdel Nasser himself often cited his experiences in the 1948 War, particularly his company’s besiegement and resilience in Fallujah, as a defining moment in the events leading up to the 1952 Coup against the monarchy. The reception hosted by the Egyptian diva and Arab icon Om Kolthoum for the troops returning from Fallujah supported this popular belief. Despite being carried out against the will of the Palace, this reception nonetheless enjoyed widespread public support and illustrated the strong rift between the armed forces and the people on the one hand, and the Palace and the British on the other. The 1948 war undeniably helped set the stage and pave the road for the seminal turning point in the modern history of civil-military relations in Egypt: the 1952 Coup. This was accomplished by bringing to ripeness several factors that led to the military behaving more politically and consequently to its direct engagement in government. Finer, in his classic work The Man On Horseback, discusses such factors at great length, and reaches the conclusion that two variables, namely ‘disposition (motive and mood)’ and ‘occasion/opportunity’, are key to the military having (or not having) a political posture (Finer 1962, 23). As far as ‘disposition’ is concerned, the military in Egypt prior to the 1952 Coup had clear motives to intervene in civilian life. Discontent within the officer corps was widespread (and shared by the public), and perhaps more critically, civil supremacy (viewed as the critical premise by Finer) (Ibid, 23–32) was seriously compromised and a recognition by the military that civilian authority is supreme no longer existed. Additionally, the Palace was viewed as a direct threat to the group (corporate) interests of the military and the military was now in a far stronger position to plead national interests then ever before and realize their ‘manifest destiny as national heroes and saviors’ (Ibid, 32–60). This was especially important considering that the King was not an Egyptian and his foreign (Ottoman) heritage further strengthened the perception that he was merely an extension of foreign occupation. But the British had further inflamed national sentiments when they earlier forced the King to replace a popularly elected Wafdist government in 1942 by surrounding the Palace with British tanks, thus not only reaffirming that foreigners in fact ruled Egypt, but illustrating that force of arms was an effective tool of political change. While many of those motives had been brewing over the earlier years, the defeat of the Egyptian army in 1948 was the spark that brought about intervention by transforming the existing motives into emotions and action. Finer argues that, amongst other factors, this ‘will to act’ can be induced by humiliation or defeat of the armed forces, anger, and frustration or a rebuff to its pride (Ibid, 71). Clearly, 1948 provided just that. Finer also points out that ‘opportunity’ variables exist that enhance the likelihood of a military’s engagement in politics, such as when there are domestic conditions of crisis or there is a power vacuum, and when the military enjoys widespread popularity (Ibid, 72–80). By 1952, Egypt was ready for the military to assume power – it was in fact viewed as a desirable outcome and a preferred solution to the existing political situation. However, as Finer noted, public support for the military’s role in government can often be erratic and difficult to maintain or predict, and this indeed applied to Egypt.


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2. 1952–1979: The Transition Years of Abdelnasser and Elsadat The state of affairs singled out the armed forces as the force to do the job. The situation demanded the existence of a force set in one cohesive framework, far removed from the conflict between individual and classes, and drawn from the heart of the people: a force composed of men able to trust each other, a force with enough material support at its disposal to guarantee swift and decisive action. These conditions could be met only in the army (Abdel Nasser 1955, 42–43). This quote by Abdel Nasser in his explanation of why the army undertook the 1952 coup d’etat in Egypt best exemplifies the unique structure and ability of the armed forces. This description of the military is supported by Finer’s analysis. He describes it as being a ‘purposive instrument’ that comes into existence by fiat, with a primary objective of fighting and winning wars and as such its features as an organization flow from this central objective (Finer 1962, 7). While the July Revolution of 1952 per se was a coup, it is undeniable that it indeed ushered in a revolution in all aspects of Egyptian life, whether social, economic or political and, at least in the beginning, the officers who conducted it were hailed as the heroes and liberators of Egypt from royal corruption and foreign control. The military was credited by the public with having restored pride to the Egyptian nation at a time when political parties and civilian officials were divided by infighting and bickering that rendered them incapable of unified decisive action. Abdel Nasser in his ‘Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution’ expressed his dismay at such divisions and how it became an impossibility for the military to return to its barracks after the coup for lack of a credible alternative that could govern effectively (AbdelNasser 1955). Regardless of the veracity of such claims, the public shared the same view, and dissenting voices within the RCC that argued for relinquishing authority to a civilian government were effectively sidelined. Although military establishments in general often possess organizational structures superior to any other civilian group, the military, more often than not, also has a limited technical ability to administer complex communities. In the modern state, once law and order are established, and security provided, the resources and strength of the military are sometimes used to provide basic needs of citizens, such as communication, sanitation and restoration of certain public utilities. More complex matters, however, such as education, health care, political revival, trade and commerce are often beyond the scope of the military, and as societies grow more complex, the military’s ability to govern them lags further and further behind (Finer 1962, 14). Abdel Nasser soon realized that there was a critical need for the inclusion of capable civilian elements within the Government that would entail that the military would need to relinquish control of certain positions they had acquired. Marshal AbdelHakim Amer, for example, was both the Minister of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as being Chairman of the Higher Council for Public Enterprise (Abdalla 1987, 3). The military establishment resisted any such transition, and what helped stifle the debate was that the country was still in a state of war and as such the military was still the main guarantor of national security. According to Rousseau: “If force creates right, the effect changes with the cause. Every force that is greater succeeds to its right. As soon as it is possible to disobey with impunity disobe-

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dience is legitimate; and the strongest being always in the right, the only thing that matters is to act so as to become the strongest.” (Rousseau, Chapter 3) In many contexts, the military lacks a moral title to effectively rule a whole country. Military regimes that attain power therefore often seek to legitimize their rule in order to achieve such moral authority and for the practical need to label other contenders for power as rebels or subversives. Yet there is another urgency as well to seek such legitimacy; it is more cost effective to govern through recognition than through coercion (Finer 1962, 18). Having circumvented normal constitutional channels, the military in post-1952 Egypt became the main tool from which Abdel Nasser’s Government derived its popular legitimacy and the primary vehicle upon which it relied to achieve his goals and export and protect the principles of the revolution; namely Pan-Arabism and Anti-Colonialism. As such, the role of the army in Egyptian politics became pivotal as it assumed the responsibility for the successes and failures of the revolution and the fortunes of the Egyptian people and Arab Nation. And since the issue of Palestinian occupation lay at the very core of Arab anti-colonial struggle, confrontation with Israel formed the cornerstone of Egyptian foreign policy for the years following the revolution. This further reaffirmed the dominant role of the military in domestic affairs, and shaped Egypt as a country at war for almost 30 years after the 1952 Coup. A popular slogan during those years can be loosely translated into ‘there is no calling higher than the calling of battle.’ This essentially meant that all resources of the nation were geared towards supporting and supplying the military, and the demands of the military received immediate and automatic priority. In effect, the slogan reflected the belief that, ‘there is no voice louder than the voice of the military.’ This indicated that the public at large was supportive of the military and that such a preeminent role for the military had become accepted. Egyptians, for the most part, believed that meeting the demands of the military was a matter of paramount national importance. Therefore, the catastrophic defeat of the Egyptian army in the 1967 war did much to damage the reputation and standing of the military in domestic affairs, open the door for public criticism of the armed forces, the government, and its economic programs, and strengthen the voice of those calling for a civilian government. The defeat also illustrated that an army heavily involved in domestic politics seriously compromises its professionalism and fighting ability. The resulting 1968 demonstrations and the death of Amer helped usher in a gradual civilianization process of the government with greater civilian representation in the cabinet and the selection of officers with a technocratic background (Abdalla 1987, 3–4). This underscored the fact that the military’s style of decision-making without long strategic policy foresight makes the establishment ill suited to tackle the persistent problems of governance, which often leads to dangerous fractionalization within the officer corps and a crippling of its professional ability. Such problems are accentuated by the fact that most militaries come to power without having settled major ideological policy issues and national directions before hand (Nordlinger 1977, 142–145). By the time Anwar ElSadat – himself formerly an RCC officer – came to power, the process of demilitarization of the Egyptian government was well underway with the inclusion of greater numbers of civilians in office (Abdalla 1987, 4). However, the preeminence of the military as an establishment was also well protected, seeing as Egypt was preparing for the 1973 War, which guaranteed that the demands of the military were the paramount national priority. This was enhanced by the fact that the military’s


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standing within society had regained some of its former glory following improved performance during the War of Attrition (Ibid, 3). The military was increasingly sidelined, however, from active and public domestic government following the May 1971 Corrective Revolution that saw ElSadat and his supporters triumphant over opponents within the armed forces. This event should not be considered as a triumph of a civilian government over a military one, but rather as one group of officers over another. What it did do was help coalesce greater powers within the hands of the President. His practice of dismissing top military officers who disagreed with his policies also prevented the rise of any opposition figures from the military and made the corps subordinate to the President (Harb 2003, 282). Furthermore, the preparations for the 1973 October War enhanced the professionalism of the armed forces by giving them a purely external focus, which was reflected in recruitment, equipment acquisition, and training (Ibid). It was the October War successes that gave El-Sadat his legitimacy, both on a public level and within the armed forces, securing and cementing his control of the military institution. This was reaffirmed in the 1977 Bread Riots when aggressive demonstrations broke out following the announcement by the government, based upon IMF recommendations, of the cutting of certain essential subsidies, which overwhelmed the police forces and forced El-Sadat to call in military elements to control the situation. The army, upon doing so, returned without incident to their barracks. Even more so, the army’s acceptance of the re-introduction of multi-party politics in 1976 and their nonobjecting position vis-à-vis the controversial 1979 Camp David Accords and Peace Treaty with Israel also clearly illustrated the obedience of the military to the decisions of the government (Ibid, 283), which by then could be said to have been extensively civilianized. The death of 14 generals of the armed forces high command, including the defense minister, in a 1981 helicopter crash also did much to leave a power-vacuum at the higher echelons of the military institution. The top executive position, however, was still rooted in the military. While El-Sadat was assassinated in 1981 at the hands of members of the armed forces, his assassination was not attributed to the military establishment, but rather to Islamist extremist, elements of which had infiltrated the military.

3. Post 1979: Camp David and Beyond The Camp David Accords were a watershed in modern Egyptian history. Excluding relatively minor involvements and cross-border skirmishes, Egypt by then had fought five wars since the Israel War of 1948.2 Almost all of those wars were not distant and unpopular but fought on Egyptian soil and with overwhelming public support, directly and tangibly affecting the lives of the vast majority of Egyptians. The crucial importance attached to defense considerations was thus understandable given the regional environment within which Egypt existed. Perhaps it was that knowledge and the conditions of war that helped make the military’s involvement in civil affairs far more palatable to the general population at large than would otherwise have been the case. Therefore, despite the success of the 1973 War, the Camp David Accords ushered in a period of no-war, if not peace, which challenged the military’s traditionally accepted involvement in civilian affairs. While the majority largely accepted such involvement in politics in the years prior to the peace treaty as necessary, their continued role in govern-

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ment in the years following 1979 was and still is contested by an ever-growing segment of Egyptian society. In more recent times, Hosni Mubarak’s presidency can be credited with having ushered in a period of national stability, which allowed the military to function within society and relate to the government under conditions of peace and normalcy. This led to the development of a more professional military institution that had less direct involvement in government affairs, but also created a far more independent military institution than what would otherwise be accepted in a classic civil-controlled government scenario (Harb 2003, 285). The military is also a strong socializing tool, with national conscription for males providing the military with a wide social base. However the effects of this conscription policy on the standing of the military vis-à-vis society needs to be further studied since it cannot all be considered positive, and at times presents the military in a less than ideal light to society. By contrast, there is overwhelming demand for applications to the various military colleges, with the ‘officer’ still being a highly desirable and attractive career path. The military still plays a critical economic role in Egypt, with defense industries so vast and diverse that there is a separate Minister of State for Military Production (a position which may however, be considered to have subordination links with the Minister of Defense). The military produces a range of products from household goods and pharmaceuticals (washing machines, heaters, microscopes,) to military hardware (tanks, armored personnel carriers and aircrafts). The military also exports many of its products on a regional level. Estimates put the military contribution to the GDP at about US $500 million/year.3 However the true independence of the military is derived from Law 32 of 1979, which gives the military financial and institutional independence from the government budget. In effect, what the military makes in terms of profit reverts into its own accounts and is for all purposes ‘off-budget’ with no governmental oversight (Harb 2003, 285). It should also be noted that the military, with its vast labor resources, is tax-exempt, and thus its role in the overall economy may be seen as detrimental to private sector competitors (Ibid, 286). With such resources at its disposal and its institutional independence all but guaranteed, the military has functioned in a highly professional manner vis-à-vis domestic politics. This was further reinforced during the Mubarak era in 1986 when it was called in to quell riots by the government’s own Central Security Forces and again in 1997 to aid the Interior Ministry in combating terrorist attacks. On both occasions, the military performed its duty and returned immediately to its barracks upon completion of the tasks assigned to it by the government (Ibid, 287).

Conclusions Welch and Smith in their work Military Role and Rule highlighted several variations that exist in the relationship between the armed forces and the government, which they classified into the following three categories: Influence: Where the armed forces act as a powerful and influential political group, even under stable civilian control. Participation: Where the military can indirectly veto certain policy choices or directly oust certain political candidates.


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Control: Where the military is in fact the one that effectively governs the state, or chooses who governs it and how (praetorian societies) (Welch and Smith 1974, 6). It can be argued that Egypt in the years from 1952–1979 witnessed a transition from a situation where the military directly controlled the government (indeed the RCC was the government), to one where it enjoys a high degree of influence. It is important to note that the military still retained former officers as President, albeit increasingly civilianized, and managed to maintain their own institutional autonomy. Since politics deal with the distribution of values and power, it is highly unlikely that any armed force, in its need for resources, can remain completely separate from politics (Ibid, 5). Yet certain factors unique to each state can enhance or undermine participation in political decision-making. In Egypt, a balance has been achieved in which the regime protects the interests of the military while the military acts as the main pillar of support to the regime (Harb 2003, 287). It is apparent that the military in Egypt is now subordinate to the civilian government, however the government in Egypt is also clearly dominated by the Executive branch, embodied in the President, who himself is of a military background. However, having a President from a military background does not automatically mean that the military is in control of the government since many prominent liberal democracies with a strong tradition of civil-control have, at various times, had Presidents with a military background. In the case of Egypt, what will be interesting to note is whether the successor of Mubarak will also be a former officer or not and how the military will react if not. In its process of becoming more professional as an institution, the military in Egypt has come a very long way from the days of the RCC, and under extremely difficult circumstances of occupation and wars. There is still a good deal more to do, however, in order to ensure complete civil control of the armed forces.

References Abdalla, Ahmed (1988) “The Armed Forces and the Democratic Process in Egypt”, Third World Quarterly. Abdalla, Ahmed (1990) Al Gaysh wa Al Democrateya fi Misr [The Army and Democracy in Egypt] Sinai Publishing. AbdelNasser, Gamal, (1955) Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy Of The Revolution, Public Affairs Press, Cairo. Bellin, Eva (2004) “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: the Exceptionalsim in Comparative Perspective”, Comparative Politics, pp. 139–157. Beyly, Ahmed (1993) Al Safwa Al Askareya wa Al Binaa Al Siyassy fi Misr [Military Might and Political Building in Egypt] The General Egyptian Book Authority. Finer, S.E. (1962) The Man On Horseback: The Role Of The Military In Politics, Pall Mall. Harb, Imad (2003) “The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?”, Middle East Journal 57/2, pp. 269–285. Nordlinger, Eric A. (1977) Soldiers In Politics; Military Coups & Governments, Prentice Hall. Rousseau, J.J., The Social Contract, Book I, Chapter 3. Springborg, Robert (1987) “The President and the Field Marshal: Civil Military Relations in Egypt Today”, Middle East Report 0/147, pp. 5–42. Welch, Claude E. Jr., Arthur K. Smith (1974) Military Role and Rule, Duxbury Press.

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1 “The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of any official organization or institution with whom the author may be affiliated.” 2 1956 Tripartite Aggression, 1962–1967 Yemen Civil-War, 1967 Six Day War, 1969–1971 War of Attrition, 1973 October War. 3 Egypt’s overall nominal GDP/year is estimated at about 75–80$ billion.


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Civil-Military Relations and Security Sector Reform in the Arab World: The Experience of Palestine∗ Roland FRIEDRICH Abstract. Palestinian Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a process that has only very recently begun. Following the death of Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and strong international and domestic pressure, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in 2005, for the first time undertook serious efforts to reform its security architecture. However, the PNA security sector carries heavy institutional legacies that make quick progress in SSR unlikely, notwithstanding massive involvement by the International Community. At the same time, the internal security situation in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) is deteriorating dramatically, with the Palestinian population bearing the consequences in the form of lawlessness, crime and economic decline. This chapter argues that if Palestinian SSR is to be successful, a comprehensive and long-term reform approach is needed which works parallely on the political, normative-institutional and organisational front.

The current process of political transition in the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt) presents daring challenges across the whole spectrum of Palestinian governance. The symptoms of this process, the struggle between Fatah and Hamas, bitter feuds within Fatah itself and a heightened level of internal violence, have become widely visible since the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004. The Palestinian transition process is, however, by no means a new phenomenon propelled by political, economic, social and generational factors that have been at work since the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in 1994. It is against this backdrop that Palestinian security governance, and particularly Palestinian security sector reform (SSR), have become the key issues for all domestic and international actors involved in the Israeli-Palestinian arena. Four years of violence and armed conflict have shattered the Palestinian security infrastructure. The political and organisational task faced by the PNA is most aptly described as security sector reconstruction. Security sector reconstruction, namely security sector reform in a post-conflict or conflict setting, is understood here as the rebuilding and transformation of security institutions and mechanisms so that they play an effective and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for both the state and its citizens. In other words, security sector reconstruction aims at the effective and efficient provision of state and human security in the framework of democratic governance.

∗

This chapter is based on the author’s forthcoming DCAF Policy Paper‚ The Next Steps for Palestinian SSR.

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R. Friedrich / Civil-Military Relations and Security Sector Reform in the Arab World

Reconstructing the security sector under post-conflict conditions, or even ‘under fire,’ is a difficult undertaking. This is even more so in the Palestinian context where there is no state framework for security governance. The oPt is a unique setting for SSR, given that the PNA is in substance a limited self-governance regime with restricted security, administrative, and legislative powers over Gaza and limited areas in West Bank.1

The Need for Palestinian SSR The need for a thorough overhaul of the PNA security sector springs from a variety of domestic and external factors. Effective Palestinian security governance is widely seen by regional and international actors as the sine qua non for any political progress in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A strong PNA security system is a key concern for Israel, in particular with regard to the prevention of Palestinian violence and the disarmament of Palestinian insurgent groups and militias. The Israeli government has made it clear on various occasions that the resumption of a substantial political dialogue would depend on a clampdown by the PNA on the armed Palestinian opposition. The international community, represented by the Quartet (US, EU, Russia, UN), has acknowledged the critical function of Palestinian security governance for the peace process and made comprehensive PNA security reforms a core obligation under Phase I of the Road Map. Security sector reform is even more urgent for the Palestinians themselves. The internal situation in the oPt is characterised by a severe lack of human security. Palestinians suffer from increasing lawlessness, crime and economic deterioration, as Gaza and parts of the West Bank have slid into a virtual state of anarchy. For the first time since the beginning of the intifada in 2000, the number of Palestinians killed in 2005 by internal violence surpassed the number of those killed by Israel.2 Comprehensive security reforms are therefore demanded by Palestinians all across the spectrum. 3 The creation of a democratically accountable, effective and efficient PNA security sector is also crucial for the viability of the PNA as a political regime. Many PNA security organisations are plagued by institutional deficiencies, such as rampant corruption, human rights violations and low professional morale. They also lack the necessary training, equipment and infrastructure to fulfil their duties. In combination, the lack of human security for the Palestinians and the PNA’s deficient security sector – compounded by the seeming inability of the Palestinian leadership to efficiently govern evacuated Gaza – slowly erode the legitimacy of the Authority vis-a-vis the Islamist opposition, especially Hamas. According to a recent poll by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the Graduate Institute for Development Studies of the University of Geneva, militia groups such as Hamas’ Izzedin alQassem Brigades and Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades enjoy a significantly higher level of trust by the Palestinian citizenry than most PNA security agencies. 4

PNA Security Governance Under Arafat For the duration of Yasser Arafat’s presidency (1994–2004), the PNA exhibited a centralised system of decision-making with strong authoritarian and neo-patrimonial traits. Arafat was the unrivalled linchpin of this system, relying on a combination of political


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co-optation, financial accommodation, and micro-management to secure his rule; this technique enabled him to maintain control over the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organisation) for the previous decades. A central element of Arafat’s power structure was his direct and total control over the various newly created PNA security agencies, which he governed according to the principle of ‘divide et impera.’ This strategy was predicated on the creation of different security organisations with overlapping or parallel functions and the constant instigation of competition between their commanders, who would refer to the ‘rais’ himself as the final arbiter. Against this backdrop, the PNA security sector witnessed an explosion of security organisations. Soon after its establishment in 1994, the PNA had ten security agencies under its command: Civil Police, Civil Defence (emergency and rescue services), Preventive Security (internal intelligence), National Security Forces (Palestinian ‘protoarmy’), Naval Police (Palestinian ‘proto-navy’), Aerial Police (Palestinian ‘proto-air force’), Military Liaison (responsible for security coordination with Israel), Military Intelligence, Presidential Security (responsible for the protection of Arafat), and General Intelligence (external intelligence).5 Based largely on PLO military units from the Palestinian Diaspora, these agencies were official PNA security organisations, in the sense that they were explicitly or implicitly (Aerial Police, Military Liaison and Military Intelligence) mentioned in the Oslo Agreements I (1993) and II (1995). In addition to that, Arafat over the years created new internal intelligence organisations that were not provided for in the Agreements, such as the Special Security and the Special Forces, bringing the number of different bodies up to twelve. Many agencies operated autonomous West Bank and Gaza branches, which meant that the number of independent security organisations was in reality even higher. The result was a drastic inflation of personnel: By 1996, the PNA had more than 35,000 security officers on the payroll – tacitly accepted by Israel under the proviso of ‘combating terror,’ although the Oslo II Agreement had put the limit for Palestinian police at 30,000. These developments had obvious consequences. The work of the PNA security forces was often marred by confusion over remits and responsibilities, inefficiency and sometimes open confrontation between different agencies. Various organisations, in particular those with intelligence functions, engaged in the repression of domestic opposition and became feared and distrusted for their use of torture and their thriving corruption. The complete lack of a legal framework for security governance and very weak parliamentary oversight over the security sector meant that security personnel could not be held accountable for the mistreatment of citizens and other infringements on human rights. With the outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000, and the almost complete destruction of the PNA’s security infrastructure by Israel in 2002, the picture became even more complicated. Non-statutory security actors increasingly entered the scene as the PNA’s administrative structure disintegrated rapidly, leaving it unable to deliver security to its citizens. Established militias such as the Al-Qassem Brigades and the Islamic Jihad’s Al-Quds Battalions combined their paramilitary activities with law and order functions and thus significantly extended their political leverage. Simultaneously new groups emerged such as the Al-Aqsa Brigades, an umbrella structure for a variety of Fatah-affiliated militias which are partly insurgency groups, partly gang-like outfits. In the face of the PNA’s apparent inability to provide human security for the population, Palestinian reform politicians and academics began to call for reforms in the

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security sector. In 1999, for instance, the Independent Task Force on Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions published a report that clearly laid out the shortcomings of the PNA’s performance in the security domain.6 However, it took four years, the Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank and considerable external pressure for Arafat to take up some of that criticism. In April 2002, the ‘rais’ announced a ‘100 Days Plan’ for administrative and security reforms, based on proposals by members of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and some reform-minded Fatah officials. Key elements of the reform were the re-activation of the dormant Higher Council for National Security (HCNS) and the unification of three internal security organisations – Civil Police, Preventive Security and Civil Defence – under a restructured Ministry of Interior which was to be headed by an empowered minister. Combined with the subsequent appointment of a prime minister, the reform was envisaged by its proponents to centralise command and control in the cabinet and remove Arafat’s grip on the internal agencies. Reality turned out to be quite different. The three internal organisations were indeed merged with the Ministry of Interior in late 2002, and a Minister of Interior and Prime Minister were appointed subsequently. Yet, all the reforms remained merely cosmetic as the respective individuals never enjoyed any effective authority in their positions. Although cited by Arafat as genuine reforms, the ‘100 Days Plan’ and its security-related elements were in fact a pre-emptive step by the ‘rais’ to secure his power position. And quite a successful one: Arafat managed to block any serious reform efforts in the security domain until the end of his life.

Security Sector Reconstruction Under the New Palestinian Leadership The new Palestinian leadership under President Mahmoud Abbas has undertaken some efforts to break with the heavy legacy of Yasser Arafat’s governance system. Abbas, elected on a platform of ‘one law, one authority, one gun’ by a solid majority in January 2005, has made the re-establishment of the PNA’s monopoly on force his priority task. However, Abbas’ room of manoeuvre has been limited severely by various parameters, primarily the rising strength of Hamas, power struggles within his own Fatah party, and Israel’s on-going control of the West Bank and ‘post-disengagement’ Gaza. With these constraints in mind, Abbas has embarked on a two-prong strategy of political accommodation and institutional/organisational reforms in the security domain. On the political front, Abbas has sought to co-opt Palestinian opposition factions through dialogue and consensus. This is partly because he fears that a clamp down on Hamas would spark a civil war among the Palestinians; partly it is because the PNA simply lacks the means to confront the armed groups, which are better equipped than its own security forces. On 16 March 2005, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and eleven smaller factions agreed with the PNA in Cairo on a ‘period of calm’ (tahdiya), a ceasefire conditioned upon Israeli reciprocality. In exchange, Hamas and Islamic Jihad were promised by Mahmoud Abbas to become part of a politically and organisationally recalibrated PLO. This approach has borne some fruit. Although the Islamist groups, especially the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, did not fully adhere to the calm, and continued armed operations in response to perceived Israeli violations of the calm, the tahdiya led to a significant decrease of violence and tension in 2005. The Palestinian factions also showed


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remarkable military restraint for the duration of Israel’s ‘disengagement’ from Gaza, which enabled the Israeli government to successfully carry out the withdrawal. Moreover, Hamas made a historic decision to participate in the Palestinian legislative elections set for January 2006 and successfully fielded its candidates in the various round of municipal elections held in 2004 and 2005. In preparation for the legislative elections, President Abbas obtained a pledge from the factions in September 2005 to end the display of weapons on the streets and in public. Progress with regard to the PNA security architecture itself, however, has been less impressive. Many reform activities undertaken in 2005 were dictated by short-term security needs in the context of the Israeli ‘disengagement,’ such as enabling the PNA security forces to take over the evacuated areas and to manage the Rafah border crossing, at the expense of long-term SSR. In fact, the creation of a proper institutional framework for the security sector and the remaking of its organisational set-up have proceeded at a snail’s pace and met with considerable resistance from within the security establishment. Reform activities have focused on four areas. First, the PNA began a rationalisation of its security architecture and in April 2005 officially merged its different agencies into three main bodies: Internal Security Forces (Civil Police, Preventive Security, Civil Defence), National Security Forces (National Security Forces, Naval Police, Presidential Security, Military Intelligence, Military Liaison)7, and General Intelligence Organisation. In the new command and control structure, the Internal and National Security Forces are placed under the sole authority of the Minister of Interior and National Security (MoINS), General Nasser Yussef, while the General Intelligence Organisation remains under the command of the President.8 President Abbas also disbanded the Special Forces and the Special Security and re-activated the long defunct National Security Council (NSC), which is set to become the highest decision-making and coordinating body in security matters. Furthermore, the MoINS issued a decree to establish inter-service Joint Operations Centres (JOC) in Ramallah and Gaza. Although some results in reforming command and control were achieved, as evidenced by the successful deployment of PNA security forces during the Israeli evacuation of Gaza, the new structure to a large degree exists only on paper. Many security organisations have been unwilling to integrate under the control of the MoINS and still work independent of each other, with individual commanders trying to preserve their power position in relation to the Ministry. Second, the PNA introduced a legislative framework for security governance, something which had never existed under Arafat. In June 2005, a ‘Law on Service in the Palestinian Security Forces’ was enacted in order to regulate appointment mechanisms and rights and duties of employees in an organised manner for all security organisations. Work has also been under way to enact a Palestinian ‘Basic Security Law’ which lays out the basic institutional set-up of the security sector and the responsibilities of its various elements. Also, laws to regulate the work of the individual agencies were approved or have been in the making. Yet, the lack of a coordinating body for the drafting of legislation resulted in the duplication of work and political interference in the process by powerful individuals.9 In addition to that, some of the approved laws contain provisions that are not easily commensurate with civil-democratic standards, especially in terms of budgetary oversight and accountability. Thirdly, the PNA, with the help of the European Union (EU), has started to work on Civil Police reform. To this effect, the EU has deployed a police advisory mission

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(EUPOL-COPPS) which cooperates with the PNA on improving its law enforcement capacity. The central task of EUPOL-COPPS are two-fold: To assist the MoINS with the implementation of an operational plan in order to strengthen the Civil Police’s public order and anti-crime capacities and to advise on the long-term transformation of the organisation in order to bring it into line with civil-democratic policing.10 Finally, the PNA has embarked on a tentative DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration) process with regard to the Al-Aqsa Brigades. After President Abbas in early 2005 ordered the Brigades to become part of the official security forces, various schemes were introduced to deal with the re-integration of Fatah gunmen in the West Bank cities and in Gaza. By October 2005, only some 600 members of the Brigades had been incorporated, notwithstanding the fact that many of the gunmen had been previously working in the security forces. DDR is compounded by the dire economic prospects in the oPt, the power structure of Fatah which makes it difficult for Al-Aqsa leaders to change into politics, and the Israeli policy of targeted assassinations. The results of the decision to integrate all 2,500 individuals affiliated with the Brigades into security forces, announced by the PNA and Al Aqsa-leaders in November 2005, 11 remain to be seen.

Challenges and Obstacles More than a year after Arafat’s death, Palestinian SSR is still at an embryonic stage, with serious reform efforts in the security domain only recently being made. The factors working against the reform process are mostly political. The Palestinian polity is undergoing a painful transition from external rule to some form of statehood whereby the final outcome is far from clear. Many challenges faced by those who want genuine democratic reform of the PNA security sector are, in fact a direct outcome of the uncertain Palestinian state-building process. Clearly Israel’s on-going occupation of the West Bank and its tight control over Gaza’s external perimeter pose a significant obstacle to SSR. In a physical sense, the Israeli system of closures makes it very difficult for Palestinian security officials, legislators and civil servants to move about freely and work. In a political sense, the Israeli policy of geographical fragmentation – including settlement expansion and the construction of the separation fence/wall in the West Bank – undermines Palestinian hopes for a just and peaceful settlement. Both policies weaken the viability and legitimacy of the moderate PNA leadership. On the domestic front, the slow progress of SSR has been partly the result of a prolonged power struggle between President Abbas and Prime Minister Ahmed Qurei. The Prime Minister, nominally responsible for upholding law and order, blocked many of the changes which Abbas tried to implement in the security domain. Abbas also had to deal with the influence of powerful ex-security chiefs such as Minister for Civil Affairs Muhammad Dahlan and National Security Adviser Jibril Rajoub. At the same time, Hamas’ increasing influence forced Abbas to spend much political capital on negotiations with the Islamic opposition, leaving less energy for following up on the organisational side of the security file. Yet, resistance against security reforms has a deeper cause than just personal rivalries or institutional inertia, namely the domination of the Authority and its institutions by the Fatah movement. Almost all higher security officials are members of Fatah and


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hold positions in the party hierarchy, which has lead to the massive politicisation of the security leadership. Likewise, the bulk of the rank-and-file are members of Fatah’s grass-roots organisation, the Tanzim, or affiliated to the party in some other way. Some of the PNA security organisations, such as the Preventive Security, have in fact acquired the character of a ‘party militia.’ Fatah members have also long dominated the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), one reason for the rather poor record of the Palestinian parliament in terms of civil-democratic oversight.12 The problem of the security sector’s partisan character is compounded by the fact that many security commanders pursue individual interests – be it political or financial or, as is usually the case, both – and use their organisations as personal power bases. Running their agencies like fiefdoms, these commanders secure the loyalties of their officers by networks of financial patronage. The resulting patterns of patron-client relations and nepotism have led to a ‘feudalisation of institutions.’13 Attempts by President Abbas to cut through these networks have not been particularly successful. Plans to retire some 1,000 security officials over the age of 60, announced by Abbas in April 2005, were suspended for lack of funds after some influential commanders were removed. Also, the majority of the ‘new’ commanders are former deputies of their organisations and continue to use the same channels of patronage to secure the support of their employees. In order to curb the influence of individual commanders and depoliticise the security forces, President Abbas in October 2005, prohibited security officials to run in the internal Fatah elections.14 If the death of various influential security figures in late 2005 has made depoliticisation easier for Abbas remains to be seen. A grave consequence of all these factors has been the lack of involvement of civil society in SSR. Although, as indicated, Palestinian support for security sector reform is widespread, the public is commonly not aware of the on-going SSR activities, let alone their contents and objectives. Social support mechanisms, a key precondition for the sustainability of SSR, are therefore still missing in the oPt.

The Role of the International Community (IC) Although primarily an issue of Palestinian concern and demand, SSR in the oPt has seen massive involvement of external actors, reflecting a long record of outside intervention in the Palestinian political system. Palestinian security reforms first became an issue for the International Community following the Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank in April 2002. Although SSR – or more precisely, security reforms – appeared quite late on the agenda of the IC, very soon different actors from within and outside the region began to press the PNA for security reforms. After the election of Mahmoud Abbas, the number of donors engaged in the security domain increased again sharply. The US in March 2005, deployed a ‘security coordinator’ (USSC) to the region with the mandate to supervise the international security reconstruction efforts and facilitate security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinians. However, the focus of the ‘Ward Mission’ – named after the first envoy, General William Ward, and mainly comprised of US military personnel – has been much more on the security related aspects of ‘disengagement’and the smooth implementation of the Israeli withdrawal rather than on long-term SSR. Although General Ward played an important role in providing the PNA with vehicles and communications equipment – especially vis-a-vis the

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Israeli government –, the ‘Ward Mission’ was criticised by many Palestinians for its lack of success in providing the PNA forces with weapons and ammunition. As to Washington’s more-long term involvement, USAID has devised a two-year SSR programme to work on community-based policing and strengthening the MoINS in its civilian management and oversight capacities. Since the successful implementation of the ‘disengagement,’ Europe has significantly stepped up its engagement in the security domain. EUPOL-COPPS, which evolved out of the 7-strong EU Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS) established in early 2005, is set to last three years and is composed of 33 senior police officers from Europe. In November 2005, the EU also agreed to monitor PNA security and customs officials at the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and Egypt in its first-ever decision to take on direct security tasks in the region. The ‘EUBAM (Border Assistance Mission) at the Rafah Crossing Point on the Gaza-Egypt border’ is comprised of 70 police officers from Germany, Italy and the UK and led by an Italian major-general of the Carabinieri. EU members and other governments have also become active on an individual basis. The United Kingdom, apart from its leading role in the EU police mission, in 2004 and 2005 assisted the Palestinian Security Forces with the establishment of two operation rooms in order to combat ‘terrorism,’ in continuation of the direct support that the British government gave to the Special Forces in 2004. Further donors that provide material and training assistance include Canada, China, Russia, and Turkey. Naturally, regional actors have also developed strong interests in Palestinian SSR. Egypt, given its leading geopolitical role and its historical ties to Gaza, has taken an active role in mediating between the Palestinian factions in order to establish and uphold the tahdiya. Cairo in summer 2005, also sent a 40-strong high-level security assistance team to Gaza and has a continuous presence of intelligence personal on the ground. Likewise, there is a Jordanian intelligence and military presence in the West Bank; moreover, Jordanian Special Forces trained the PLA’s (Palestine Liberation Army) Jordan-based Badr Brigade, the deployment of which to the oPt has been called for by some Palestinians in order to bolster the PNA’s law enforcement capacities.

Palestinian Perception of External Involvement Given the multiplicity of external actors involved and their different strategic outlooks on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it is no wonder that Palestinian SSR has come to be a multi-layered subject, with different actors having different understandings of the contents and objectives of security reforms. External involvement in Palestinian SSR is thus a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it is clear that there will be no effective, efficient and democratically accountable PNA security sector without continuous international support in terms of equipment, funding and expertise. On the other hand, there is clear tension between Palestinian needs and concerns and the policy goals and objectives of external actors. Although in the short-term Palestinian and external interests may overlap – especially with respect to the re-assertion of the PNA’s monopoly on force and the rebuilding of security capacities – this is clearly not the case with regard to the long-term strategic objectives. The Palestinians’ ultimate aim is to gain statehood and sovereignty including a fully developed security sector; the main goal for external


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actors, especially Israel and the US, is to establish a strong security system in the oPt that addresses Israeli security concerns and prevents Palestinian violence. It is against this background that Palestinians acknowledge their dependence on international support but carefully differentiate between different external actors and their agendas, especially in the sensitive area of security. Palestinians welcome external engagement that comes as support but reject involvement which is perceived as interfering with Palestinian internal affairs. Attitudes towards donor involvement in security matters naturally vary across the Palestinian field. Material assistance, financial support and technical advice are strongly welcomed across the PNA, the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and civil society. The security establishment also views donor aid favourably, both those who aim at genuine democratic transformation of the security sector and those who aim to preserve their privileges and positions. Some donors, however, are clearly preferred to others. The US and also the UK are generally viewed more critically than the EU for their perceived bias towards Israel, especially by the Islamist opposition and the groups affiliated with the Al-Aqsa Brigades.15 Palestinians remember US efforts to topple Yasser Arafat under the guise of institutional reforms at the height of the second intifada. Also, any intervention by Egypt, especially in Gaza, will be watched with suspicion, given that many Palestinians are aware of Cairo’s 20-year administration of the Strip (1948–1967) and its repressive policy towards the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

Conclusion – The Next Steps for Palestinian SSR In order to have a sustainable Palestinian SSR process, domestic and international reform activities must be based strictly on Palestinian needs and concerns. Local ownership is the sine qua non for any SSR process that aspires to be successful. The key objective of SSR must be to establish and guarantee the safety and security of the Palestinian population in accordance with human security. The uniqueness of the Palestinian political setting – SSR under military occupation and in the absence of statehood – also means that SSR experiences from other contexts must be carefully adopted to the Palestinian arena. From this follows the need for a comprehensive and long-term SSR approach that works parallely on three fronts: political, normative-institutional, and organisational.

Creating and Maintaining the Political Context for Reform Palestinian SSR is primarily a political task. Prospects for real civil-democratic change in the PNA security sector depend on the broader dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and a favourable security environment. In order to create a political context conducive to reform, both Palestinians and Israelis must take certain steps. Effective third-party pressure and a permanent political third-party presence on the ground, preferably in the form of a Quartet envoy, are imperative to this effect. Palestinians must ensure the continuation of the current calm and work towards the establishment of a long-term ceasefire (hudna) with Israel, based on the Cairo Agreement of March 2005. The PNA should continue its efforts to accommodate and integrate the Islamic opposition into the political system, foremost through elections and

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power-sharing arrangements, but wherever possible also through the inclusion of Islamic militants into the PNA security system. Likewise, efforts to disarm and reintegrate members of the Al-Aqsa Brigades should proceed. In this regard, a thorough organisational overhaul and rejuvenation of the Fatah movement will be crucial. The Fatah primaries of late 2005, held in preparation for the Palestinian legislative elections, were an encouraging step in this direction, even if the poll had been marred by irregularities and partly cancelled. Another important challenge for the PNA will be to enhance its legitimacy among the Palestinian people to regain their trust. Effective anticrime and anti-corruption strategies must be devised and implemented. Israeli policies will be a crucial factor for the viability of Palestinian SSR. In order to facilitate the process, the Government of Israel (GoI) should stop all military action in the oPt, especially its targeted assassinations, and significantly ease restrictions on Palestinian freedom of movement. Israel will also need to allow the effective establishment of a link between the West Bank and Gaza as stipulated in the Agreement on Movement and Access between the PNA and the GoI, which was concluded on 15 November 2005 under US mediation. To build confidence, Israel should meet its commitments under the Sharm al-Sheikh Agreement of February 2005 and the Road Map. This includes the transfer of all five West Bank cities to Palestinian security control, the freeze of settlement construction and the evacuation of illegal outposts. Further steps should include the release of Palestinian prisoners, the freeze of the construction of the separation fence/wall and the establishment of a confidence building dialogue with the Palestinian side. Finally, Israel should commit itself not to militarily target the PNA security infrastructure again, such as during the intifada between 2001 and 2003. The International Community’s help for creating and maintaining the right political context is indispensable. The IC should exert pressure on the GoI to ensure that it abides by its commitments in the Sharm Al-Sheikh Agreement and the Road Map. At the same time, the International Community would be well advised to support Palestinian efforts to integrate the Islamic opposition movements into the political system. Given the large number of external actors currently engaged in the Palestinian security domain, a helpful international role must also include the close coordination of support between the donors in order to avoid duplication and organisational overload on the Palestinian side.

Establishing Civil-Democratic Security Governance The provision of human security for the Palestinians will ultimately depend on the creation of effective, efficient and democratically accountable oversight and management structures in the security domain. This will also reduce the danger of a unified PNA security apparatus becoming a tool of authoritarian rule in the future. On the normative level, this requires the PNA to devise a provisional but comprehensive National Security Policy as the conceptual framework for future security governance. This should be done via an inclusive process which involves all stakeholders in the security domain, namely the security forces, the relevant PNA institutions, the Islamic opposition, and, crucially, Palestinian civil society. Secondly, the PNA must establish a strong legal framework for the security sector that reflects the principle of civil-democratic control and unmistakably defines the remits of the different security institutions.


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In addition to the establishment of a strong normative framework, emphasis should be strengthening the PNA institutions which would ideally put this framework into practice. Here, the dormant National Security Council should be revived and made the central decision-making and coordination body in the security domain, a step which would also create a clear institutional address for the donor community. At the same time, the PNA should work on enforcing executive control, especially by the MoINS, and legislative oversight over the security forces. Capacities of the PLC must be further improved by continuous training of members of parliament and staff, while the relevant parliamentary committees should be empowered to fulfil their functions. Similarly, the Palestinian ombudsman PICCR (Palestinian Independent Commission on Citizens’ Rights) should be endowed with a clear legal basis and instruments to enforce the compliance of the security forces when following up on complaints of the citizens. Judicial oversight over the security sector must be bolstered; this means neatly delineating judicial responsibilities and authorities in the security domain and closely coordinating SSR with the on-going judicial reform efforts. Finally, bringing civil society into the process is essential for the success of SSR. Much more energy should be spent on strengthening the oversight capacities of civil society organisations such as human rights NGOs, think tanks, research institutes and the media. A comprehensive public awareness and education programme is an important tool to sensitise the Palestinian citizenry and increase public involvement in security governance.

Rebuilding the Capabilities of the PNA Security Forces On the forces level, the PNA security forces must undergo a thorough organisational reconstruction and transformation. In terms of structure, the rationalisation of security organisations into three main functional bodies and the unification of command and control must be pushed ahead. This means especially to separate in practice law enforcement and intelligence function and to ensure that the MoINS has the political and administrative capacity to enforce its directives. In terms of physical capabilities, current efforts to re-equip the security forces with vehicles, arms, ammunition, and communication systems must continue so that the PNA security forces are able to do their work. This refers also to the reconstruction and refurbishment of security headquarters, police stations, barracks and correctional centres. Finally, the PNA should think about a strategy to gradually downsize its security forces. The number of security personnel stands currently at some 57,000, and given the need to further integrate members of the Al-Aqsa Brigades and possibly the Islamist groups, it is unrealistic to except a massive right-sizing of forces for the time being. However, the PNA could, with the help of donor funding, implement its April 2005 plan to retire 1,000 security officers above the age of 60. The PNA could also start working conceptually on how its forces structure and manpower should look in the future and how such a force goal could be reached. Joint planning efforts between the MoINS and the Ministries of Economy, Finance, and Planning would be certainly helpful in this regard.

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1 In the absence of many parameters of statehood, it is merely the PNA’s right to exercise force in order to maintain social order that provides it with some-state like quality. See Roland Friedrich, Security Sector Reform in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Jerusalem, 2004, p. 2. 2 ‘More Palestinians killed in internal strife this year,’ Haaretz, 13 October 2005. 3 Riccardo Bocco, Luigi de Martino, Arnold Luethold, Palestinian Public Perceptions of Security Sector Governance – Summary Report (14 October 2005), Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)/Graduate Institute of Development Studies (IUED), University of Geneva, p. 11. When asked to rate the importance of eleven concrete security sector reform measures, a sweeping majority of respondents (82 to 97 percent) considered all proposed measures either ‘very important’ or ‘rather important.’ 4 Bocco/Martino/Luethold, pp. 9f. The poll finds that 32% of the interviewees place high trust in the AlQassem Brigades and 27% in the Al-Aqsa Brigades, compared with 19% for the Civil Police. Similarly results were obtained with regard to the PNA’s judiciary: 50% and 37% of the interviewees say the have high trust in Sharia Courts and the Palestinian clan-based customary law respectively, compared with 26% who said this about official PNA court system. 5 For a more detailed analysis, see Roland Friedrich, ‘The Palestinian Predicament – Security Governance in the Absence of Statehood,’ in: Rami Khoury/Arnold Luethold (eds.), Challenges of Security Sector Governance in the Middle East, 2006 (forthcoming). 6 Independent Task Force Report, Strengthening Palestinian Public Institutions, Yezid Sayigh/Khalil Shikaki, Principal Authors, New York 1999, pp. 73–78. 7 The Aerial Police became defunct after Israel destroyed its small fleet of helicopters in 2001 and 2002. 8 For the duration of the re-organisation process however, the General Intelligence Organisation has been put under the MoINS as well. 9 For instance, the legal texts on the individual security agencies were partly drafted by members of these very organisations and contain provisions that clash with other legal texts or even the Palestinian Basic Law. 10 EUCOPPS/PNA Ministry of Interior, Palestinian Civil Police Development Programme, Transformational and Operational Plans 2005–2008. 11 See ‘PA to Absorb 2,500 AMB Activists into its Security Services,’ Palestine Info Net, 29 November 2005 (http://www.palestine-info.co.uk/am/publish/article_15588.shtml). 12 Much of the internal violence witnessed in the oPt in 2005 is directly related to in-fighting in Fatah. For instance, many Al-Aqsa factions operate under the patronage of some Fatah strongmen who use these grouping to exercise controlled violence in order to advance their own political agendas. 13 For a more detailed analysis, see DCAF/PASSIA, Summary Report Workshop ‘Security Sector Reform in Palestinian Territories: Challenges and Prospects,’ 30 July 2005, Ramallah, pp. 5–8. 14 ‘Abbas Bans PA Security Officials from Running in Fatah Primaries,’ Haaretz, 31 October 2005. 15 See for example, ‘AMB Warn Against Dissolving them in Response to American and Israeli Demands,’ Palestine Info Net, 16 October 2005 (http://www.palestine-info.co.uk/am/publish/article_14915.shtml); ‘Islamic Jihad: Rice’s Demand Recipe for Palestinian Civil War,’ Palestine Info Net, 15 November 2005 (http://www.palestine-info.co.uk/am/publish/article_15351.shtml); ‘Haneyya: Protecting Resistance Option Best Means to Deal with Current Crisis,’ Palestine Info Net, 27 October 2005 (http://www.palestine-info. co.uk/am/publish/article_15101.shtml).


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Looking East and South: Promoting Security Sector Reform in the EU’s Neighbourhood Dr. Fred TANNER and Dr. Derek LUTTERBECK Introduction1 Over recent years, the European Union (EU) has been showing growing interest in the promotion of security sector reform (SSR) in countries in its neighbourhood and beyond. While the EU still lacks an overall strategy or concept in this area, a number of EU policies and important policy documents adopted testify to the increasing importance of SSR as an EU foreign policy tool. The EU security strategy of December 2003 mentions SSR, and institution-building more generally, as one possible focus of ESDP operations.2 In 2005, the EU Council adopted a concept on the integration of SSR in ESDP missions, which is the first official EU document outlining a definition of SSR and its potential relevance for ESDP operations.3 Finally, in May 2006, the Commission issued a key document establishing general principles for EC support to SSR in a number of policy areas, such as development cooperation, enlargement, conflict prevention, or democracy and human rights promotion.4 Taken together, these documents could provide the basis for a comprehensive future EU strategy on SSR. This article provides a brief overview of the EU’s SSR-related activities in its neighbourhood, focusing on South Eastern Europe (SEE), Turkey and the southern Mediterranean. Needless to say that these regions differ considerably both in terms of their record regarding democratic governance—of the security sectors as well as more generally—and with respect to their relationship with the EU. All of the countries of SEE have undergone a profound political transformation over the last 15 years from authoritarian to democratic forms of governance, even though in at least some of them this transformation is still incomplete. Important reforms of these countries security and defence sectors have been part of this transformation. Moreover, all of the countries of the region aspire to join or at least strengthen their ties with main multilateral security institutions in Europe, i.e. the EU and NATO. The countries of the southern Mediterranean, by contrast, are characterised by significant deficits in terms of security governance, as well as democratic governance more generally. According to the ratings of Freedom House, the Middle East and North Africa is the region of the world which contains the highest percentage (61%) of countries which are qualified as ‘not free’ in terms of political and civil liberties. 5 This general lack of democratic governance and accountability is also manifest in these countries’ security and defence sectors: there is only limited if any civilian participation in

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F. Tanner and D. Lutterbeck / Looking East and South: Promoting Security Sector Reform

and oversight over security policy-making, which largely remains the preserve of the regimes in powers and military establishments. Moreover, with the exception of Turkey, none of the countries of the southern Mediterranean have the prospect of joining the EU, at least not in the foreseeable future. The EU’s engagement in terms of SSR assistance in these two regions, too, has differed considerably. In SEE the EU, together with NATO, has been a key actor in providing external support to SSR, mainly in the context of the EU accession process, the stabilisation and association process, and ESDP missions. With regard to its southern neighbours, by contrast, the EU has so far been rather reluctant to become involved in SSR activities. With the exception of Turkey, where the EU has made the country’s EU membership contingent on significant reforms of its security sector, and in particular of the once powerful National Security Council, the EU has so far largely failed to address the issue of security sector governance with its southern neighbours, despite the fact that the EU would have several instruments at its disposal to do so.

Promoting SSR in South-Eastern Europe In both Bulgaria and Romania, the more advanced Eastern Balkan countries, the EU has been promoting r security sector reforms in the framework of the EU accession process (both countries are expected to join the EU in 2007). However, in both cases, the EU’s push for reforms pertaining to the security sector has been confined to the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) chapter of the acquis communautaire. In contrast to the countries of the Western Balkans and Turkey (which are discussed below), the EU has made no reference to security sector governance under the political criteria for EU membership, which in the former cases includes defence sector reform. This area has been covered by NATO, which has been a key player in providing assistance to defence reform and the strengthening of democratic oversight of these countries’ armed forces. NATO’s main policy instruments in this regard have been the PfP programme and subsequently the Membership Action Plan (MAP). While JHA chapter of the acquis covers a broad range of issues pertaining to internal security services, a core concern of the EU with regard to Bulgaria and Romania has been the improvement of border security in order to more effectively combat illegal immigration and cross-border crime. As a consequence, one main focus of the preaccession financial assistance that the two countries have been receiving through the PHARE programme has been on the establishment of effective border control services in these countries. The most recent EU progress reports on Bulgaria and Romania in fulfilling accession criteria note significant progress in this area, while at the same time expressing ‘serious concerns’ in relation to these countries’ ability to fulfil the Schengen external border requirements. In particular, the reports point to the need for improvement of operational risk analysis and surveillance capacities at these countries’ external borders.6 With regard to the Western Balkans, external assistance to security sector reform has always been part of the EU and NATO approach to the region in the aftermath of the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s – ranging from crisis management and post-conflict stabilisation to partnership, association and more recently even pre-accession programmes. In the 1990s, the EU’s involvement in the region focused on crisis management, humanitarian relief and reconstruction, reflecting the countries’ emergency needs


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at that time. However, as the region emerged from this immediate post-crisis period, the EU shifted towards a more long-term approach to the Western Balkans in the form of the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which was launched in 1999. In two cases, Croatia and Macedonia, Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) have been signed to underpin the process. The EU has incorporated a number of commitments into these agreements which pertain to the justice and home affairs dimension of security sector governance, particularly the need for judicial reform. The EU’s main instrument in supporting the Western Balkans countries in the stabilisation and association process has been the CARDS assistance programme, which was launched in 2001. In the Western Balkans, in particular, the EU has put strong emphasis on the strengthening of border security in the region, a reflection of EU countries’ growing concern with illegal immigration and illicit trafficking of people and drugs along the so-called Balkan route. In fact, almost two thirds of the CARDS regional budget for 2002–2004 – a total of 117 million EUR – has been attributed to border security projects in the region.7 EU assistance for border security in the Western Balkans has taken the operational form of providing policy advice and equipment, upgrading infrastructure and promoting training. An important example in this respect has been Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the EU has played an important role in the creation of the State Border Service (SBS). Another area of EU activity in the Western Balkans has been police reform. The most important EU police reform projects in the Western region have been those carried out in the framework of EUPM in Bosnia and EUPOL Proxima in Macedonia. One could also mention the EU’s assistance for the Kosovo Police Force under UNMIK’s supervision and the Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE), which was carried out under the auspices of the WEU in Albania after the crisis in 1997. What these operations have in common is that they were, and in some cases still are, part of postconflict reconstruction efforts under international auspices. Apart from this, the EU has been supporting police reforms in Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro in the framework of the CARDS programme. The main objective of these reform activities has been to de-politicize, rebuild and transform the numerous police forces, whose main mission should be to safeguard the rights of the citizens, and which should operate according to democratic standards and the principles of ‘community policing’. Noteworthy is, finally, that in contrast to the cases of Bulgaria and Romania, the EU has also been taking more ownership of the defence and military dimension of security sector reform with respect to the Western Balkans countries. In its annual stabilization and association reports, the armed forces are mentioned as part of the assessment of democratic institutions in these countries. These reports comprise a number of demands pertaining to the defence sector including the strengthening of civilian control of the armed forces and the defence industry, military reforms and the downsizing of the army, safeguards for civilian leadership in crisis management, demilitarization of border control, and even intelligence reform, generally one of the most sensitive aspects of security sector reform.8

The EU and Turkey: Pushing for Civilian and Democratic Control of the Military While the EU, as the following sections will argue, has generally shown only very limited engagement in SSR-related activities in the countries of its southern neighbour-

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hood, there has been one exception to this rule: Turkey. In this case, the EU has used the carrot of EU accession in order to push for significant reforms of Turkey’s security and defence sectors, and in particular of the National Security Council, even though the EU has not been operationally involved in reforms of the Turkish armed forces. This has not been an easy or self-evident task, as the Turkish military establishment has traditionally played an important political role and practically had a droit de regard over national politics. In fact, as recently as 1997, the Turkish military removed politicians from power and overthrew a democratically elected government. Moreover, even though Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952, there has always been great reluctance within the Alliance to raise the issue of democratic governance of the Turkish armed forces. Turkey’s aspiration to join the EU – it formally submitted its application in 1987 – and the pre-accession process have been key factors behind reforms of the country’s security sector over recent years. In order to meet the political conditionalities contained in the Copenhagen criteria, Turkey undertook to implement a number of rather far-reaching reforms of its security sector, including both its armed and internal security forces. While the security sector is not mentioned explicitly in the Copenhagen criteria, the EU has identified a number of specific reform objectives which have been of relevance for the country’s security sector. These have included in particular the removal of the ‘guardianship’ role of the military in Turkish politics and the powers of the National Security Council (NSC), but also ensuring respect for human rights, eliminating the use of torture by Turkish security forces, preventing arbitrary detention, and the abolition of the death penalty. For the EU, a core concern has always been the important political role and lack of civilian control of the armed forces in Turkey. However, until rather recently, the EU shied away from demanding comprehensive reforms from Turkey in the area of civilmilitary relations, and limited itself largely to one specific institution, namely the NSC. Thus, subsequent to the Helsinki summit in 1999, where Turkey was formally recognised as an EU candidate country, the specific requirements for Turkey to join the EU were outlined in the Accession Partnership Document of 2000, which sets out a number of short – and medium term reform objectives. Among the 17 short term ‘priority areas’ that are listed in this document there is no explicit reference to reforms of the security sector.9 Possibly as a matter of convenience, the EU largely reduced the complex issue of SSR or civil-military relations to the question of the NSC. Here, the EU called upon Turkey to ‘align the constitutional role of the National Security Council as an advisory body to the Government in accordance with the practice of EU Member States’. The document also demanded that Turkey take all necessary measures to fight against torture practices, bring detention conditions into line with international standards, strengthen respect for human rights by Turkish authorities, and improve the accountability of the police.10 Since 2005, however, the EU has been adopting a considerably broader approach to SSR and civil-military relations in Turkey. The 2005 progress report of the Commission for the first time contains an entire section on ‘civil-military relations’ in Turkey, whereas previous reports focused almost exclusively on the NSC. Reforms of the NSC remain a key concern of the EU, but the EU is now also calling for reforms with regard to a number of other aspects of civil-military relations in Turkey, such as enhancing the expertise of parliamentarian in security matters, ensuring civilian participation in the


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drafting of Turkey’s National Security Policy Document, or strengthening civilian control over the (paramilitary) Gendarmerie.11 In Turkey, its official recognition as a ‘EU candidate’ did spark a gradual but nevertheless far-reaching reform process which involved in particular the political role of the NSC as well as parts of the country’s internal security services. It is noteworthy in this regard that these reforms only began in earnest once Turkey was formally recognised as a ‘candidate country’. Earlier calls for reform by the EU had not been heeded by the government in power, as they were considered by many domestic actors within Turkey as too costly to enact solely to please the EU.12 Major reforms of the NSC were initiated as part of the final legislative package on democratic reform in 2003, in order to bring Turkey into line with EU requirements. The main elements of these have been to strip the NSC of its executive powers and to transform it into a mere ‘advisory’ body, and to increase the number of civilian members, which are now in the majority.13 In August 2004, the first civilian Secretary General of the NSC was appointed. There has also been an effort to increase the NSC’s transparency: in late 2004 the NSC for the first time organised press briefing at its headquarters, which was attended by some 200 Turkish and foreign journalists. Moreover, budget transparency has been enhanced by authorising the Court of Auditors to audit defence expenditures on behalf of Parliament.14 Regarding the country’s internal security agencies, important reforms over recent years have been enacted mainly through amendments of the country’s Penal Code, the Anti-Terror Act, and the Law on Political Parties. Inter alia this has involved the abolition of the death penalty, an increase in penalties for torture-related crimes, and the strengthening of a number of basic freedoms, such as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and gender equality. Similarly, at the procedural level, retrial rights have been established for individuals in cases that have been in conflict with rulings of the European Court of Human Rights. In addition, the infamous State Security Courts have been abolished. In order to ensure effective implementation of this new legislation, human rights boards have been set up in major towns and cities which are responsible for adjudicating human rights complaints. An important focus of EU accession-driven police reforms has been to enhance the country’s police forces (National Police and Gendarmerie) in the fight against organised crime and drug trafficking through capacity-building and training programmes.15 However, despite Turkey’s progress in the field of SSR, the EU remains generally sceptical about, and vigilant over, the implementation of these reform packages, and the extent to which changes in legislation actually have an impact on political and social life in Turkey. Thus, in its 2004 Regular Report, the European Commission, while welcoming the reforms of the NSC and observing that ‘civil-military relations are evolving towards European standards’, also expresses concern about the various ‘informal mechanisms’ though which the NSC continues to influence political life in Turkey.16 Similarly, the 2005 progress report notes Turkey’s ‘good progress in reforming civil-military relations’ while at the same time pointing out that ‘military members of the NSC as well as other senior members of the armed forces have continued to regularly express their opinion on domestic and foreign policy issues via public speeches and press briefings.’17 It is evident that EU conditionalities alone have not been sufficient to push Turkey ahead with reforms that re-distribute the political control of military power within Turkish society. Rather, the reform process needed to be sustained from within the se-

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curity system. Such support mainly came from General Hilmi Ozkök, the Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces and member of the NSC. By putting himself behind these reforms, General Ozkök clashed with the euro-sceptics within the Turkish armed forces as well as with the land army, army intelligence units, and the corps of the gendarmes ‘that oppose such reforms, which they find excessively constraining’.18 One main obstacle to sustained reform is that the Turkish army continues to use international or national crises such as Cyprus or the fight against Kurdish insurgents in southeast Turkey to reassert its standing in domestic politics. The army’s main argument against reform has been that national security and unity needed to take precedence over democratisation. For Turkey to consolidate its rapprochement to the EU, these reform processes will need to reach a degree of irreversibility. To achieve this objective the EU should use the Accession Process to make sure that all reform measures are fully implemented. This is a long-term objective and will require a new generation of General Staff and commanding officers. Finally, the transformation of the ‘mindset’, political culture and attitude within Turkish society with regards to civil-military relations needs to be proactively supported. A great challenge for the EU will be to better coordinate and eventually combine in a common framework the policy approach of both the efforts on defence reform and internal security reform.

EU Policies Towards the Southern Mediterranean In contrast to Turkey, where the EU has placed the transformation of the country’s security sector—in particular reforms of the NSC—high on the bilateral agenda, the EU has thus far largely neglected this issue in its relationship with (other) southern Mediterranean countries. Nowadays, the EU pursues its security policy towards the southern Mediterranean through a number of instruments, including the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) or Barcelona Process, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and the ESDP, on which a dialogue has been established since the Naples EuroMediterranean Conference in December 2003. In view of the critical developments in Iraq and also Iran in 2003, the EU made the decision to create a regional stability strategy for what could be defined as the ‘Mediterranean and the Wider Middle East’. This strategy or ‘line of action’ would supplement the EU relations with the Mediterranean partners. In June 2004, the EU proposed in a report to combine these two strategies into an ‘EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East’. 19

The Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is a framework for developing a ‘zone of peace and stability’. It includes a politico-security dialogue, economic relations that should lead to a free trade zone, and social-cultural relations. This multilateral framework is underpinned by a network of Association Agreements that regulate the bilateral relations between the EU and individual partner states. With the EU membership of Malta and Cyprus and Turkey as an accession country, the remaining Mediterranean partners comprise only the Mediterranean Arab countries, the Palestinian Authority and Israel. However, there has been little progress in the domain of security cooperation in the


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Euro-Mediterranean framework. Efforts of norm setting on comprehensive security have been blocked ever since 1999, when the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Security proposed by the EU was rejected by some Arab states. As a consequence, the Charter has been watered down from a blueprint for a comprehensive ‘Stability Pact’ to an arrangement that does not go much beyond the commitments contained in the Political and Security Chapter of the Barcelona Declaration. After 10 years of existence, the lack of visible results in the political and security chapter of the EMP has given rise to considerable criticism, both by government officials and policy analysts. This long-term structural approach cannot in itself enable the EU to act as a security actor in the Mediterranean region. The new European Neighbourhood Policy claims to promote political, economic and social reforms with the objective of providing the Partner states access to the EU’s four freedoms (free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital). It is conceived as an instrument of conflict prevention and security building with the post-enlargement neighbourhood. While democratic governance and human rights are an integral part of the policy, it stops short of measures pertaining to the democratic governance of the security sector. Nevertheless, given that the ENP Action Plans which have been adopted thus far for southern Mediterranean countries contain references to a dialogue on ESDP, crisis management, the judicial system and democracy and human rights, they could also have a certain impact on security sector governance in the region. 20 In general, neither the EU nor southern Mediterranean states thus formally embrace the concept of SSR or democratic governance of the security sector in their EMP/ENP discourse. There are, however, a number of specific policy areas where the EU has been involved in activities which are, or could be, relevant for SSR in the countries of the southern Mediterranean. These include its democracy and human rights promotion programmes, and judicial and police reform projects. The (few) EUsponsored activities in these areas are, however, linked to security sector reform only by approximation and not by design.

Democracy and Human Rights Promotion Programmes The EU’s policy on human rights and democratisation in the Mediterranean has been ‘presented by the EU as a strategic, not merely ethical imperative’.21 However, human rights and democratisation have been low on the EMP agenda, ‘despite the fact that the EU does have a range of tools at its disposal to exercise pressure for the respect for human rights and democracy in the Mediterranean’.22 The policy instruments for promoting democratic reform include the Association Agreements and the European Neighbourhood Action Plans. According to the Presidency Conclusions of the EuroMediterranean Ministerial meeting of 2004, the Mediterranean partners agreed to work within the framework of these arrangements ‘towards the implementation of political reforms, and welcomed a structured dialogue, based on joint ownership, on cooperation on human rights and democratisation including support for civil society’.23 The EU’s main funding instruments for its democracy and human rights activities in the region include the MEDA programme and the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). However, as pointed out by Richard Youngs, overall funding for human rights and democracy promotion projects under MEDA has traditionally been rather limited. Moreover, these projects have thus far not been directed at

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the security sector; most of the available e funds have been devoted to ‘soft’ projects, such as support for NGOs in the fields of development assistance and environmental protection.24 Another core focus of MEDA aid has been to improve ‘good governance’ in the region, but projects in this field have concentrated mainly on technical or regulatory aspects, in particular the harmonisation with the EU’s single market rules.25

JHA Cooperation and Judicial and Police Reforms More directly related to SSR have been the EU’s activities in the field of JHA in the Mediterranean region. Noteworthy in this context is that over recent years, the EU has generally been devoting more attention to internal security or JHA cooperation with EMP partner countries, reflecting not only deepening integration among EU countries in this area but also growing concerns with internal security challenges such as illegal immigration, drug trafficking and organised crime in the Mediterranean region. From early 2001 onward, JHA has generally become a priority area within the EMP, with regular meetings of senior officials of interior ministries in parallel to meetings on political and security matters.26 In the aftermath of 9/11, these efforts also increasingly focused on terrorism in addition to illegal migration, drug trafficking and organised crime. A framework document on a regional cooperation programme on JHA issues was adopted at the Valencia conference of 2002. The development of this programme has resulted in regional and bilateral co-operation in the area of justice, freedom and security.27 At the EU level, several relatively large projects on judicial reform have subsequently been launched in Algeria (EUR 15 million), Morocco (EUR 28 million) and Tunisia (EUR 30 million). Moreover, in Algeria, a police reform project (which was initiated already in 2000) has been carried out in the framework of the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy. The main objective of this project has been to professionalize Algerian police forces, and to enhance respect for human rights and the rule of law. In addition, an important goal of the EU has been to improve the capacity of the Algerian police to manage migratory flows. A total of EUR 10 million has thus far been allocated for this project.28 The official view within the EU is that enhanced security cooperation with Arab EMP partner countries is consistent and indeed supportive of its objective of promoting democracy and ‘good governance’ in the region.29 It is however often pointed out that the EU’s enhanced focus on counter-terrorism has actually been detrimental in terms of improving accountability of and respect for human rights by security forces of Arab EMP countries. Morocco, for example, has been criticized by human rights organizations for its anti-terror legislation and policies adopted in the aftermath of the Casablanca bombings in 2003. According to Human Rights Watch, for instance, Morocco’s campaign against Islamist militants, which has also involved fast-track convictions, has been undermining the considerable progress made by Morocco in this field over recent years.30 Moreover, it seems clear that the EU as well as individual EU countries have tended to devote resources mainly to enhancing the efficiency of (internal) security forces of Southern Mediterranean countries in preventing undocumented migration across the Mediterranean and less to actual reforms. In October 2002, for example, the EU allocated EUR 40 million to Morocco for the construction of a coast-control system


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along the country’s northern shores aimed at preventing migration and drug trafficking across the Straits of Gibraltar.31 In order to supply Libya with military equipment to beef up its border controls, Italy has also been pushing to lift the arms embargo imposed on Libya since 1986. In late 2004, the EU agreed to end these sanctions against Libya, thus paving the way for the provision of this assistance. The EU also recently set up a EUR 250 million fund for assisting third countries in preventing irregular migration towards the EU, and in 2004 a project by the European Police College was carried out aimed at training police forces of Southern Mediterranean countries in fighting terrorism and human trafficking.32 Overall, with regard to the EU’s policies in this area, it can be argued that operative aspects and short-term security concerns with illegal migration, drug trafficking and terrorism have taken precedence over institutional reform objectives, such as enhancing respect for human rights, accountability and civilian oversight over security forces of Southern Mediterranean countries.

Reforming the Security Sector of the Palestinian Authority (PA) A final SSR-related project of the EU in the southern Mediterranean worth mentioning is the recently launched EU police mission in the Occupied Territories. In June 2004, the European Council, aware of the growing need for effective policing after the Israeli pullout from Gaza and parts of the West Bank, declared its ‘readiness to support the Palestinian Authority in taking responsibility for law and order, and in particular in improving its civil police and law enforcement capacity’.33 Subsequently, the EU set up an EU Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support (EU COPPS), which consists of four EU police experts and is based in East Jerusalem and Ramallah. Its objectives include both immediate operational elements, in particular the delivery of technical equipment, as well as longer-term transformation of the Palestinian police forces, such as the reform of management structures and the development of proper accountability mechanisms.34 In January 2006, these efforts have been further stepped up when the EU launched European Policy Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOLCOPPS). This mission is to comprise 33 unarmed personnel and aims at supporting the PA in establishing sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian ownership in line with international standards.35

Conclusions: The EU as International Actor in Promoting SSR Although the EU does not yet pursue a comprehensive and explicit policy in promoting SSR, the preceding has shown that the EU has at least implicitly become an increasingly important international actor in this field. Throughout its Eastern and Southern neighbourhood, the EU has increasingly been involved in assisting the reform of police forces, border guards and judicial systems as well as the oversight structures that govern these security institutions – albeit to extents that differ from region to region and with a certain bias in favour of enhancing the efficiency of security institutions as opposed to improving their oversight and accountability. In SEE, and in the Western Balkans in particular, as argued above, the EU is increasingly assuming responsibility for SSR assistance through its stabilisation and as-

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sociation process and the deployment of ESDP missions. With regard to the Southern Mediterranean, by contrast, the EU has thus far been largely unwilling or unable to address the issue of SSR. To a large extent this is, of course, due to the fact that SSR, at least when it involves the strengthening of democratic control of security forces, implies a re-distribution of political power away from the executive powers and military establishments towards civilian institutions—a transformation which few if any of the southern Mediterranean countries are currently willing to contemplate. Moreover, given that the countries of the southern Mediterranean do not have the prospect of joining the EU, it holds only limited leverage over these countries. The importance of the carrot of EU membership in pushing for reforms of the security sector is also underscored by the case of Turkey, where the EU has been able to elicit significant reforms of the country’s security, including its defence, sectors over recent years. The EU’s approach to Turkey is also indicative of a certain learning curve on the part of the EU in the field of security sector reform and civil-military relations. Long focusing almost exclusively on the reform of one institution—National Security Council—the EU has been adopting an increasingly broad approach to the transformation of civil-military relations in Turkey. Under the UK and Austrian presidencies in 2005/2006, the EU has begun to move beyond its traditionally piecemeal policy towards a more explicit and comprehensive approach to SSR within the broad framework of development cooperation, democracy and human rights promotion as well as conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-building.36 This will requires further work in mainstreaming SSR into all relevant policy areas and taking it up in specific policy instruments such as the revised Association Agreements, annual accession and association assessment reports, EMP and ENP action plans, country strategy papers, political dialogues, particularly in the context of counter-terrorism, and last but not least the new financial instruments for the delivery of external assistance. Unlike any other international actor, the EU would be in a position to promote SSR in a holistic way – covering both non-military and military security domains as well as activities aimed at both restructuring security institutions and improving their democratic accountability. The EU’s liberal-democratic identity, its comprehensive mandate, as well as its evolving activities in the area of SSR, do not only permit but indeed call for such an approach.

1 This article contains material previously published in Heiner Hännggi and Fred Tanner, Promoting Security Sector Governance in the EU’s Neighborhood, Chaillot Paper No. 80, July 2005. 2 A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 22. 3 Council of the European Union, EU Concept for ESDP support to Security Sector Reform (SSR), Brussels, 12566/05, Rev 4., 13 October 2005. 4 Commission of the European Communities, A concept for European Community Support for Security Sector Reform, COM (2006) 253 final, Brussels, 24.5.2006. 5 Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2006. Selected Data from the Freedom House’s Annual Global Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties’, available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/pdf/ Charts2006.pdf (accessed September 2006). 6 Bulgaria 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report, COM (2005) 534 final, pp. 63–69; Romania 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report, COM (2005) 534 final, pp. 66–72. 7 CARDS Assistance Programme to the Western Balkans, Regional Strategy Paper 2002–2006, pp. 26–36. 8 See, for example, Commission Staff Working Papers SEC (2004) 376 [Albania], SEC (2004) 373 [Macedonia], SEC (2004) 374/2 [Albania], SEC (2004) 375 [Serbia and Montenegro].


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9 Council Decision of 8 March 2001 on the principles, priorities, immediate objectives and conditions contained in the Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey, Official Journal of the European Communities, 24 March 2001. 10 Ibid. 11 European Commission, Turkey 2005 Progress Report, COM (2005) 561 final, Brussels, 9 November 2005, pp. 12–15. 12 Nathalie Tocci, ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy: Responding to the EU’s Post-Enlargement Challenges’, Document IAI, 2004, p. 7. 13 Umit Cizre, The Catalysts, Directions and Focus on Turkey’s Agenda for Security Sector Reform in the 21st Century, DCAF Working Paper no. 148 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2004), p. 16. 14 Commission of the European Communities, Turkey 2005 Progress Report, COM (2005) 561 final, 9 November 2005, p. 13. 15 Cizre, op. bit. p. 19. 16 Commission of the European Communities, Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession, COM (2004) 656 final, 6 October 2004, p. 23. 17 Commission of the European Communities, Turkey 2005 Progress Report, COM (2005) 561 final, 9 November 2005, p. 14. 18 David L. Phillips, Turkey’s Dream of Accession, Foreign Affairs, vol. 83, no. 5 (Sept/Oct 2004), pp. 92–93. 19 EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, Final Report, Euromed Report no. 78, 23 June 2004. 20 As of September 2006, ENP Action Plans have been adopted for Israel, Jordan, Morocco, the PA and Tunisia, see: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm. 21 Richard Youngs, ‘European Approaches to Security in the Mediterranean’, Middle East Journal, vol. 57, no. 3, Summer 2003, p. 416. 22 Rosa Balfour, ‘Rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean political and security dialogue’, Occasional Papers no 52, Institute for Security Studies, May 2004, p. 20. 23 Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions for the Euro-Mediterranean meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, The Hague, 29–30 November 2004, p. 7. 24 Richard Youngs, ‘Ten Years of the Barcelona Process: A Model for Supporting Arab Reform?’, FRIDE Working Paper no. 2, January 2005, p. 2. 25 Youngs, op. cit, p. 3. 26 Richard Gillespie, ‘Reshaping the Agenda? The Internal Politics of the Barcelona Process in the Aftermath of September 11’, Mediterranean Politics, vol. 8, 2003, p. 27. 27 See Regional and bilateral MEDA co-operation in the area of justice, freedom and security, Euromed Report no. 86, 1 March 2005, at http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/publication/2005/ report_86.pdf. 28 Euro-Med Partnership, National Indicative Programmes for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, 2005–2006. 29 See the conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean Conferences in Naples, Dublin and The Hague. 30 Human Rights Watch, Morocco: Human Rights at a Crossroads, October 2004. 31 El Pais, 6 October 2002. 32 Youngs, op. cit., p. 8. 33 Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council, 17 and 18 June 2004 (10679/2/04 REV 2), p. 25. 34 EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, ‘EU assistance to the Palestinian civil police, 25 February 2005. 35 EU Council Secretariat Factsheet, ‘European Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOLCOPPS), 9 January 2006. 36 See notes 3 and 4.



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Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe – A Brief Study in Norms Transfer Philipp H. FLURI and Eden COLE

This chapter addresses four subjects: (1) (2) (3) (4)

the contemporary discourse on ‘norms transfer’ in social science Security Sector Reform as (a vehicle of) norms transfer whether norms transfer to South East Europe works what we can learn for future Security Sector Reform initiatives

In this chapter, security sector means ‘all state services and agencies that have the legitimate authority to use force, to order force or to threaten to use force,’ including the military, police, paramilitary units (like military police), border guards services, and intelligence services.1 Security Sector Reform (SSR) is the reform structured, planned and assisted effort to adapt domestic Security Sector Governance (SSG) to the international norms as spelled in membership action plans and other association and membership facilitating documents. By norm we will understand a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity.2

Norms Transfer in Contemporary Social Science A norm can be defined as a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity3. The diffusion of international norms into domestic practices has been conceived as a socialisation process defined as “the induction of new members…into the ways of behaviour that are preferred in a society.”4 Such socialisation presupposes an ‘International Society’ which has a set of specific collective understandings about the appropriate behaviour of its members’ norms, even if differentiated across political, economic, and legal regimes. To become recognised members of International Society, states must accept and internalise these collective understandings.5 Norms transfer can be characterised as a three stage process – over time, norms emerge, cascade, and are internalised by actors.6 Whilst a number of related conceptual issues still cause confusion and debate (principally distinguishing the applicability of norm(s) in individual or collective (institutional) contexts), this does not preclude a synthesis of the schools of thought, nor does it preclude the utility of the norm debate when considering the epistemic exchange of ideas across borders, polities, social, communal and institutional boundaries. As Finnemore and Sikkink argued:

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Used carefully… norm language can help to steer scholars toward looking inside social institutions and considering the components of social institutions as well as the way these elements are renegotiated into new arrangements over time to create new patterns of politics.7 In sum, international norms serve as a means of understanding the complex interrelation and interaction of contemporary polities at all levels. The explanatory value of international norms in the context of International Relations derives from their position at the apex of a series of norms throughout the international system itself. Norms at the state and international levels are essentially defined by each other: In the modern world system ‘constitutive’ norms of sovereignty define what counts as statehood, while regulative norms that either constrain or enable specify how sovereign states ought to conduct themselves… International norms influence behaviour by shaping state identities, by providing ‘inference warrants’ from which governments officials can draw conclusions about whether a class of actions is required, forbidden, or allowed.8 This interlinking blurs state boundaries but asserts, at the same time, the commonality of interests across states which have ultimately led to the emergence of such norms. Such a contention presupposes a capacity for international norms to initiate action: they are thought of as sources of action in three ways: a) b) c)

Constitutive in the sense that they define what counts as a certain activity, Constraining in that they enjoin an actor from behaving in a particular way, or Enabling by allowing specific actions.9

Common forms of accepted practice enable the inter-relation of multiple actors, and a greater level of understanding manifested in improved speed of interaction at multiple levels. Norms delineate boundaries, serve as signposts, routine many facets of transnational relations (especially in commerce and finance), and can perform a tripwire function.10 Hedley Bull’s original suggestion that a system of states share a set of common core values and that as such they constitute an international society 11 is a useful point of departure. Adam Watson sustained this idea arguing that ‘no system has existed without rules and conventions of some kind, and it is difficult to see how one could.’ 12 Justin Rosenberg’s contention of an ‘Empire of Civil Society’ threading across politico-socio-economic state boundaries took the idea further.13 Finally, the awareness of ‘epistemic’ communities and the interrelation of regimes at a global level, even when applied solely to state interests, arguably underpinned an idea of a international society. The epistemic concept annealed the perception of accepted conventions and an international division of expertise on any issue (and the concomitant possibility of expert formation) relating to managing the formal interrelationships of states. A wider latitude for state action as existed because:


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How states identify their interests and recognise the latitude of actions deemed appropriate in specific issue-areas of policy making are functions of the manner in which the problems are understood by the policymakers or are represented by those to whom they turn for advice under conditions of uncertainty.14 Thus, the ability to inter-relate concepts as wide as arms control, environmental issues and financial regulation, by ‘recognising that human agency lies at the interstices between systemic conditions, knowledge, and national actions’15 allows: an approach that examines the role that networks of knowledge based experts – epistemic communities – play in articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problem, helping states identify their interests, framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient points for negotiation.16 The consensus on the ‘limits of (absolute) sovereignty’ produced an environment accepting the importance of the exchange, promotion, and acceptance of ideas, regimes, and values throughout international society and thus conducive to discussing the importance of international norms. The idea that common features underpinned international society galvanised three debates with inter-related trajectories during the 1990s: the ‘governance’ and ‘global governance’ debates became the focus of increased interest with the advent of the perceived ‘liberal peace’ and ‘globalisation’ debates of the post Cold War era. International norms themselves arguably provided a rationale of the inter- and intra- dependence presupposed in each debate. The touchstone provided by advocates of the ‘Liberal Peace,’17 arguing that democratic states did not go to war with each other, suggested a unique type of inter-relation between similarly constituted states. To David Held, the very development of liberal democracy and its freedoms predicated an inherently ambiguous relationship between polity and the state with repercussions for the interactions of states themselves.18 The contemporaneous emergence of the ‘governance’ debate which posited that considerable degrees of spontaneous or regulated forms of order ‘already existed among states across many fields and thus managed change and everyday exchange,19 suggested such inter-relations extended across international society as well, but were most concretely embedded within the foreign relations of democratic nations themselves.20 ‘Globalisation’ underscored these developing themes while integrating the loosening of political boundaries in an interconnected and intra-dependent global politico-economic climate. The activities of international organizations with (among others) transnational actors of all kinds, the availability of global travel, and the huge surges in telecommunication capacities, financial market activity, segmented economies, the emergence of the ‘virtual’ corporation with globally dispersed production means for global market ends, and the emergence of global media created: a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions –

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assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating trans-continental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power.21 The democratic peace debate underlined the emergent intra-dependence and the lack of boundaries, but not of regulations per se, needed to allow the free flow globalized means. Within the narrower remit of International Relations studies, ‘global governance’ emerged as a debate as international organizations, including NGOs, assumed an increasing cross-border function in affecting decision-making and state and non-state actors’ behaviour in their prescribed sphere of operation: International Organizations are neither irrelevant nor omnipotent in global politics. They play important roles in international relations, but their influence varies according to the issue area and situation confronted.22 As an analogue of the governance debate, it is possible to locate the implications for understanding conflict management in this context, too. During the post-Cold War era, the role of international organizations as a platform for substantive action in the security field became embedded in the global governance context.23 While each could be viewed separately, the spatio-temporal accelerations suggested by ‘globalisation’ emphasised the ‘governance’ and ‘global governance’ agendas’ premise that mutually beneficial standards of behaviour and relevant frameworks interlaced international society; moreover, that they could be mobilised effectively and with unprecedented efficiency. Tentative efforts to synthesise these macro-debates are just beginning to emerge.24 Hence, the increased value and importance of norms not only as an explanatory conceptual tool but as a way of creating increased stability as a substantive stabilising tool in the international system, specifically through the proliferation of democratic platforms, is as inherent as the importance of those norms governing states’ interaction in other politico-socio-economic veins, too. Advocates of globalisation could point to the growth of international organizations and common standards 25 in tandem with the history of the modern nation state and world order at the same time as multilayered governance across human rights regimes, rules of warfare, international and cosmopolitan law, and regions contemporaneously emerged.26 As transitional states sought to integrate themselves into normative patterns of accelerated exchanges with the international community the importance of understanding such norms is even more critical. To expand: the norm standard determines, regulates, or conditions the actual or anticipated interactive behaviour between a multitude of actors on a given issue or issues; and the conglomeration of a set of norms across inter-related fields leads to a broader set of norms shaping and making more predictable (and, in an international context, necessarily transparent) the behavioural characteristics of international organizations and governments operating within a given set of international frameworks. The shaping of internal aspects of polities to facilitate interaction with their external antagonists adds to the conception of a variegated international society, variegated across security, legislative, commercial, and social axes, constituting the international system rather than an atomised and solely security-focused set of units. Norms, in sum, provide a way of seeing that ‘although the international system may lack a central gov-


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erning body to enjoin those with felt grievances from resorting to self help, [the abstract] anarchy [of the international system] is not anomie.’27 In the security realm, the ability of such anomie to suddenly emerge can profoundly (and disproportionately) effect the relation of a polity with the international community from the individual human to ‘grand’ state levels.

Security Sector Reform as (a Vehicle for) Norms Transfer In an environment of proliferated global governance, international norms in the security sector have substantive meaning – they can be used to affect and consolidate positive micro- and macro- societal change. But why does Security Sector Reform (SSR) matter as a norm? How is it defined and what elements benefit from the ideational suppositions of norms transfer and international society? The idea of SSR coalesced in the 1990s as the critical importance of the security sector in determining the stability and ultimate success of a state’s transition process was acknowledged. Most conspicuously, poorer nations shared a variety of characteristics with security problems at their heart: dependent on aid, gripped by armed conflict or protracted security problems, weak and unstable governments, and the lack of any real strategic significance for the industrialised states.28 Factoring in the western military interventions in South Eastern Europe between 1995 and 1999, the realisation that the first three conditions and an additional characteristic of inter-relation with transnational criminal networks were prevalent in areas closer to home, the security sector reform agenda was broadened even further.29 The establishment of a security sector reform norm could entrench the democratic transition of states by: • • • • • •

Providing a template for stages of reform and objectives, Stabilising internal politics, Protecting reforming states from internal and external antagonists whose interests were compromised by increased transparency and stability, Outlining and creating the mechanisms needed for substantive oversight of, and transparency in the security sector not only by legitimate authorities but civil society and individuals, Removing the security sector as a contentious factor in reconciliation processes, Providing a platform for increased international involvement in the consolidation of reform programmes such as demobilisation and retraining, expert training, and formation of security and civilians across domestic institutions.

In this way, one norm could serve the multiple purposes of security providers and, by virtue of the transparency involved, act as a catalyst to create a critical mass of international involvement. The SSR literature has progressed to the discussion of SSR as an international norm. The academic body of literature has grown to systematically articulate the inter-relation of SSR and norms through treating SSR as a transitional problematic,30 relating the experience of SSR so far to identifying the challenges and tailoring future responses as necessary 31 and critiquing the SSR process to refine the managerial variables applied at the international level.32 The narrower issue of civil

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military relations as part of an SSR norm have also been gradually addressed. The literature on norms applied in a civil-military context 33 and the potential for a formal discursive fusion between SSR norms with the human rights norms debate as predicated on human security has become increasingly clear.34 These debates have cumulatively lead to the first identification and preliminary assessment of a set of international SSR norms in a regional context, focused primarily on the democratic control of armed forces with democratic and individual liberties.35 Even in the absence of a definitive text, the mobilisation of resources as the ideational aspects of SSR permeated the international security discourse has already had substantive results in terms of global governance. International donors – both governments 36 and organizations 37 – have already begun to conceive of SSR as a framework for assistance. The systematic guidance materials written by Nicole Ball serve both as policy statement and conceptual framework for facilitating substantive assistance. To return to the specific elaboration of an SSR norm, a first attempt has been made in a South Eastern European and a pan-European international organizational context in Germann and Edmunds’ work on a ‘Framework for Assessing SSR.’38 Whilst the emphasis on democratic control of armed forces and the European norms framework locates the work specifically in a regional context,39 it is possible to extrapolate the identification and systematic exposition of the SSR problematic in terms of an SSR in the contexts of developing and transitional nations not only on Western European littoral, but into Eurasia. The international norms elaborated by the EU, NATO, and OSCE offer a clear framework for SSR norm influence. Geographical and geo-political proximities resulted in the specified SSR norms interlinking, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, as states sought NATO and ultimately EU accession, whilst seeking to support the wider OSCE Framework of a mutual security architecture. The ‘EU’ SSR norm began with the elaboration of the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ by the European Council in 1993, which offered the prospect of EU membership to Central and Eastern European nations 40 with the ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities.’41 The European Parliament’s endorsement of the Copenhagen criteria in its ‘Agenda 2000’ resolution provided further guidelines for EU accession, stressing the need to establish ‘the legal accountability of police, military and secret services…and acceptance of the principle of conscientious objection to military service.’42 In this vein, the centrality of democratic control of armed forces as a critical SSR goal for transitioning countries was underscored in the articulation of NATO and OSCE SSR norms. For NATO, participation in PfP programmes remains dependent on adherence to the shared values of the Alliance including ‘the protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy’43 connected to five commitments including the specified development of the democratic control of armed forces: facilitation of transparency in national defence planning and budgeting processes, ensuring democratic control of defence forces, maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE [now OSCE], the development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to


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strengthen their ability to undertake mission in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed, and the development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.44 The conditionality of SSR reform to NATO accession candidacy remained entrenched in enlargement criteria. The NATO Study on Enlargement examining the conditions and modalities for NATO accession analysed the interrelation of civilian politics and armed forces and the need to shape reforms in applicant states to Western norms and practices. The Study stated that encouragement and support of democratic reforms ‘including civilian and democratic control over the military’ contributed to ‘enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, 45 and that the required conformity with basic principles regarding ‘the safeguarding of the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of all Alliance members and their people, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.’46 The document proceeded to elaborate PfP’s value as a source of assistance to implement democratic control of armed forces as part of the creation of stable and operational democratic institutions. PfP Cooperation would play an essential role in helping partners to further develop democratic control of their armed forces and transparency in defence planning and budgeting processes, although this will largely depend on these countries’ own efforts, and enhancing the network of military and defence-related cooperation to provide effective support to partners in adapting their defence arrangements to the new security environment.47 In particular, such cooperation could facilitate NATO membership preparations of transition countries as: PfP helps partners undertake necessary defence management reforms as they establish the processes and mechanisms necessary to run a democratically controlled military organization, in areas such as: transparent national defence planning; resource allocation and budgeting [and] PfP will assist possible new members to develop well-established democratic accountability and practices and to demonstrate their commitment to internationally-accepted norms of behaviour.48 Hence, the final set of political condition applicants were expected to meet in preparation for NATO membership, stipulated in Chapter V, centred on democratic control of armed forces, were consistent with the preamble’s concern for civil and democratic liberties: commitment to and respect for OSCE norms and principles, commitment to promoting stability and well-being by economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility, establish appropriate democratic and civilian control of their defence force, and undertake a commitment to ensure the adequate resource to the above mentioned objectives.49 The centrality of the OSCE SSR norm, with its particular emphasis on democratic control of armed forces, is unsurprising as the OSCE’s comparatively pan-European membership added an apolitical legitimacy to the intent of membership that mollified the potentially contentious membership of former Warsaw Pact members in NATO. The OSCE norm grew from the original Helsinki Baskets and most notably the Charter

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of Paris in 1990 which laid the foundations for the then CSCE in the post-Iron Curtain European landscape by stressing human rights, democracy and the rule of law, democracy with a representative and pluralist character, and friendly relations among participating states.50 In sum: Democracy with its representative and pluralist character, entails accountability to the electorate, the obligation of public authorities to comply with the law and justice administered impartially. No one will be above the law … Our States will co-operate and support each other with the aim of making democratic gains irreversible.51 And democracy became located firmly in the security/stability debate, reflecting the wider acknowledgement of international society in academic discourses. ‘Friendly Relations among Participating States’ stated objectives: To uphold and promote democracy, peace and unity in Europe, we solemnly pledge our full commitment to the Ten Principles of the Helsinki Final Act. Our relations will rest on our common adherence to democratic values and to human rights and fundamental freedoms. We are convinced that in order to strengthen peace and security among our States, the advancement of democracy, and respect for and effective exercise of human rights, are indispensable.52 The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security became a benchmark for defining democratic control of the security sector within democracies, and represented the culmination of the emergent sources of security and objective consensus as elaborated in the Charter of Paris. Adopted in 1994, it became the critical document specifying the SSR norms thereafter.53 Sections VII and VIII elaborated the essential characteristics of democratic control of armed forces and crucially expanded the definition to include all the coercive means/agencies at the disposal of a state. The most critical elements of Section VII elaborated the conditions, not least transparency, for which the instruments of democratic oversight and governance have been developed.54 Once the Enlargement process became a matter of priority for NATO, basic principles and general guidelines needed to be laid out (Study on NATO Enlargement, 1995). This did, however, not yet amount to the establishment of formal criteria for the acceptance of new members.55 The Partnership for Peace Program and the Planning and Review Process were introduced as instruments of assistance to partner countries. After the first three applicant countries (Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland) were accepted into NATO, NATO stated at the Washington Summit in April, 1999 that it would not announce further invitations until 2002. The concept of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) was introduced as an important symbol of NATO’s commitment to possible further enlargement, but also as an instrument to assist the remaining (and possible new) applicants in developing capabilities and structures that would operate with NATO under its new Operative Capabilities Concept. MAP is, however, not just a checklist for applicants. It is ‘self-differentiating’ in the sense that it is left to the appli-


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cant countries themselves whether and how to match this program with their national priorities.56 The MAP Process does not make the Partnership for Peace process obsolete.57 The reason why the recent enlargement rounds have brought standardization issues to the fore – rather a departure from time-honoured NATO principles – is the specific nature of the new member states’ relationship with the late Warsaw Pact: Almost all the new applicants and recent new members were previously part of the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact Organization system. This system was centralized and standardized to a very high degree, not only in technical military aspects, but also in all industrial aspects and even to a high degree in social and political issues. There was a near-total standardization of tactics and training, enforced by Soviet military doctrine. The standardization of equipment was maintained by the rigid application of Soviet State industrial standards. The standardization of the political mechanism of the state, including control of the armed forces and the civil-military relationship, was ensured by communist party decrees enforced from Moscow and monitored by the organs of state security. It was only natural therefore for the new applicants to make the mistaken assumptions that NATO also applied standards in this way, that NATO standards would be different from those of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Organization, that they would have to adopt these standards, and that their access to and adoption of NATO standards was the key to membership.58 NATO had never applied standards and standardization this way, though arguably standardisation leads to better prospects for military efficiency. New applicants were slow to realize that NATO is not a military coalition, but a political alliance. Nor is its policy dictated by a single authority in Brussels, or, for that matter, in D.C. NATO itself may have been slow to realize that new applicants were indeed expecting standardized guidance from NATO officials (and freelancing lobbyists from NATO member states), often mistaking well-meant ad hoc comments for expressions of a common, yet still opaque and arcane, standardized background shared by all NATO member states and their representatives. The Alliance then traditionally restricted itself to encouraging and recommending rather than requiring and coercing nations to choose a pre-set path. Diversity and lack of standardization is particularly evident in the democratic oversight of armed forces and democratic civil-military relations. The 1999 accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland had, however, made it clear how difficult it was to integrate armed forces still largely organized along Warsaw Pact lines. The MAP process was created to accommodate such adaptations before a country actually becomes a member state. The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was the first long-term and comprehensive strategy of the international community to replace previous crisis-intervention instruments by a long-term comprehensive conflict prevention and peace- and prosperity-building instrument. As stipulated by the June 10, 1999 Cologne document, more than 40 partner countries and organizations 59 have undertaken efforts to foster peace,

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democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region.’60 The Stability Pact seeks to engender a sense of regional ownership by applying participative strategies: representatives of South Eastern European countries are, for the first time, on an equal footing with those of international organizations and financial institutions in advising on the future of their region and in setting priorities concerning the content of all three working areas.61 It departs from the so-called ‘European Perspective’ implying eventual full membership if conditions defined by Council on 29 April 1997 on democratic, economic and institutional reforms are met. To accommodate Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia (FYROM), Serbia and the new state of Montenegro,62 the EU set up a new generation of Stabilisation and Association Agreements (signed with FYR Macedonia and Croatia in 2001, negotiations with Albania started in 2002) with the intention to increase economic, political, and social cooperation between EU and said countries through Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Democratisation and Stabilisation (CARDS).63 The Stability Pact is thus complementary to SAP and accession processes and covers South Eastern European candidate countries, the Western Balkans, and the Republic of Moldova. The OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (CoC) serves not only as an instrument of guidance for inter-state (and therefore of confidence- and stability-building), but also for intra-state relations, touching the very sanctum of state power- the armed forces. It further ‘establishes a direct linkage between armed forces, political stability, security and democracy.’64 However, though the Code of Conduct is per se a formidable instrument for exactly the tasks invoked by Professor Ghebbali with a potential that reaches far beyond Europe’s narrow confines, there is little space for application in today’s South Eastern Europe, apart from its educational implications for military training as the OSCE has failed to show its aptness to provide security in South East Europe when it was most direly needed and the Code’s operational consequences have been integrated into the Action Plans of other organizations. Every democratic society has its own elaborate set of formal and informal norms. Looking within the European Union, the OSCE or OECD area for a ‘harmonized’ set (possibly a lowest common denominator set) of norms in democratic oversight and reform of the security sector will yield few results.65 Nevertheless, the 1993 ‘Copenhagen Criteria on Democracy’ have been referred to as a set of criteria to be fulfilled by associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe in order to be considered for EU membership. As such, they became the declared basis for the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. It is important to the state that the Copenhagen Criteria are not specific; they provide the framework and basis to negotiate specific bilateral agreements which include important measures to improve democracy and the human rights situation in partner countries. Agreements with Albania and FYROM then, foresee to improve access to justice and police practices, and accountability before the law. As Owen Greene observes (op. cit.), donor countries in the OECD ‘have gradually developed shared understanding through the OECD Development Assistance Committee on the role of assistance with security sector reform in the context of development aid programs.’ Some countries including Canada, Denmark, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the USA, have taken a lead in developing


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programmes relating to SSR issues (military, border management, and law-enforcement). Some of these countries have been pressing the IMF and the World Bank to include support for capacity-building assistance. The Council of Europe stands in its own interpretation for pluralist parliamentary democracy, indivisibility and universality of human rights, rule of law, and common cultural heritage enriched by diversity. All countries of the region are eligible for membership and involvement in the Council’s collective effort to bring about ‘democratic security,’ but each of them must demonstrate willingness to join and prove its capability to comply with membership requirements.66 All countries in the region, and in particular candidate countries, are partners in specific Council of Europe cooperation and assistance programmes on matters relevant to their membership qualification. The Council of Europe seeks to promote security through cooperation.67 Members and candidates are expected to participate fully and in good faith in the different cooperation structures of the Council of Europe.68 The Council of Europe proposes a set of instruments to help countries of South East Europe in this endeavour:69 •

• • •

Standards and common objectives embodied in international treaties (European Conventions) on minority protection, minority languages, trans-border cooperation, local self-government, etc. with specific monitoring mechanisms and follow-up cooperation programmes; Assistance for legislative changes (e.g. for non-discrimination), institution building, intergovernmental contacts and the preparation of bilateral agreements; Surveillance and checking of intolerance and racism, and recommendations for preventive or corrective measures; Support for confidence-building measures and programmes for cooperation between people from different origins and with different identities (‘LinkDiversity’ project).

If Security Sector Reform is a transfer of norms, then it is not to be mistaken for a rigid system of rules aimed at homogenizing a nation’s values in order to better integrate and control it. Rather than imposing strict, pre-fabricated standards, the international community seeks to suggest agenda items, or rather: the agenda, for reforms. Security Sector Reform as such is a norm then, to which individual states are invited to subscribe. How they are going to meet the requirements of the norm is largely left to themselves, as long as they stay within the statistical field of good practice. The decision to embark on Security Sector Reform, in cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic community and with an objective to ultimately join at least some of its institutions and organizations, is itself the acceptance of a norm.

Does Norms Transfer to South East Europe Work? Security sector reform aims to improve security institutions and security-providing services by changing the culture of security. What is at stake is a shift from the culture

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of state security to a culture of cooperative security, embedded in the Euro-Atlantic system. This implies not only a process of insightful adaptation to Euro-Atlantic standards, norms and procedures, it also implies a process of un-learning of the past. Accountability – the construction of transparent lines of responsibility for each individual regardless of their position in government – will need to replace the expectation of collective responsibility. Parliamentary and public democratic oversight of the security budgets and personnel will need to replace the expectation that state security comes before individual security, and that budgets are therefore best kept secret, and security-providing services best kept out of reach of parliamentary and public control. Civil-military relations with a strong accent on civilian political leadership structures within the Ministries of Defence and the successful integration of the general staff within the Defence Ministries will need to replace the expectation that the military form a state within the state. Civil Society organizations will develop independent security sector governance competence and expertise and replace the para-state or para-party organizations destined to disseminate enthusiasm and friendship, or their opposite. Collective cooperative security as provided by an alliance of sovereign states will replace the expectation of a rigid system of artificially homogenized and integrated states and their military or Darwinian battles of nation against nation. The concept of human security will replace the concept of security for one’s nation. The states of the Western Balkans differ from other transitional democracies in South Eastern Europe and Central Europe in important ways which affect the conditions and challenges for security sector reform.70 In their transition from state socialism and authoritarian rule, the Western Balkan societies also bear the lingering material and psychological effects of recent armed conflict and ethnic cleansing. The problems of refugee return, resettlement and reintegration of IDPs, and return of property remain unresolved in key areas. Individuals and communities continue to be scarred by the psychological traumas inflicted by war and extreme nationalism. 71 Findings of a multi-year Self-Assessment Exercise co-ordinated by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces on behalf of Stability Pact Table III and the SEEGROUP on a Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs mandate 72 would permit us to come to the following conclusions.

Democratic Politics and Reforms All six countries under self-scrutiny had addressed the task of downsizing and reforming the Armed Forces with enthusiasm and success. As might have been imagined, the reform and downsizing of the army created discontent. The demobilised officers had to face the difficulties of integrating themselves into civilian life at a time when all countries were going through painful economic transition. In Albania during the 1997 crisis, military officers demobilised during the reform process played an important role in the rebellion that was sparked by the financial crisis caused by the collapse of pyramid schemes.73 But in none of the countries assessed have armed or other security forces shown any praetorian tendencies, which is in line with their tradition,74 and quite remarkable given that massive budget and personnel cuts were being implemented.


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In all countries under scrutiny, defence and security sector reform, together with the introduction of democratic institutions, have produced some convincing results – most of all in the Defence Ministries – but are far from having been accomplished. 75 The inclination of the military to intervene in politics is only one side of civil-military relations. The other side of the coin is the tendency of civilians to use the military, and it is in this field that problems have been seen. Thus institution-building in Albania was done in such a way as to allow the political forces in power to control the institutions by bringing in their own people and carrying out massive purges. The military institutions have not escaped this approach.76 The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (henceforth: Macedonia) had no experience of independent statehood so even the limited practice and skills gained under communism were of some significance in 1991 and for quite some time thereafter.77 In Moldova, the transformation of civil-military relations has received much less attention than larger issues of democratisation, and economic and social reform.78 Romania belongs with Bulgaria to the group of most advanced states (in terms of Security Sector Reform); like the latter, it has been concerned with immediate regional security challenges in the Balkans and in South Eastern Europe: the ‘NATO agenda’ is a very important part, but only one part, of the ‘security sector agenda.’79 Thus, while SSR norms have ‘cascaded’ in this segment, their full ‘internalisation’ remains an ongoing process region-wide but the bases are increasingly stable. On current lines, they can come closer to full ‘internalisation’ as the passage of time allows institutions and awareness to develop further.

The Constitutional and Legal Framework All six countries under scrutiny have succeeded in putting in place constitutional provisions and subsequent legal acts laying down explicitly or implicitly the legal framework that regulates civil-military relations and responsibilities in the security sector. In Albania, although the opposition boycotted the referendum on the new constitution and has not voted on a number of laws related to the democratic control of the army and documents on defence strategy, this is not considered a ‘lack of consensus between the political forces on civil-military relations.’80 In the Bulgarian Constitution of 1991, responsibility for security matters was distributed to the Parliament, President, Government, Judiciary, armed forces and citizens. There is no definition of the security sector as such. The communist-era character of the armed forces was seriously changed by subsequent laws on Defence and the Armed Forces (1995), on the Ministry of the Interior (1991), on the establishment of state companies to replace Transport troops, Construction troops and Telecommunications troops, as well as Decrees of the President and Government to establish a National Intelligence Service (1990), a National Protection Service (1992), a State Agency for Civil Protection (2001), registration in court of new defence companies separate from the ministries of defence and the interior (1990s), the privatisation of defence companies that were in the Ministry of the Economy (Industry), the restructuring of many commissions and committees on the military-industrial complex and mobilisation readiness, arms trade control and others.81

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Provisions of the National Security Concept (NSC) to establish a System for National Security and to have laws on all different elements of this system (elements of the security sector) have not yet been fully implemented. In Croatia, the Parliament enjoys a range of responsibilities in the field of national security, which, as a concept, does not differ greatly from the perception of national defence. In accordance with article 80 of the Constitution, the Croatian Parliament decides on war and peace, which is the main component of defence, but also adopts the Strategy of National Security and the Strategy of Defence. In FYROM, the constitutional arrangement of the separation of powers has not been clearly defined. Since 1991, Macedonia has been ‘wavering between its constitutional concept of parliamentary democracy and strong elements of a presidential system.’82 The new Law on Defence adopted during the crisis was expected to eliminate the ambiguities in the relationship between the President-Government-Minister of Defence-General Staff. It did not help overcome the problems in practice and soon the respective legal provisions were disputed before the Constitutional Court. Over the years of Moldova’s existence as an independent country, a legal division of authority between the state institutions responsible for national security has been gradually established. There have been efforts to ensure ‘transparency’ and raise public awareness concerning national defence planning and military budget approval. The prerequisite SSR norms, a comprehensive legislative framework defining the relation of coercive state agencies with the government, executive, parliament, and public has begun to cascade. An exception is FYROM. The mitigating circumstances and level of international involvement there are such that there is reason to believe a sustained international engagement on this problematic issue can generate the sufficient framework necessary as events continue to stabilise. Given the conflicts in the region during the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation, the introduction, cascading, and, most importantly, understanding of these issues is reason for optimism that the norm will continue to be influential.

The Responsibilities of the President All six countries have fought the temptation to create a strong presidency – but with inconclusive results for some. The new Albanian constitution has reduced the powers of the President, who no longer enjoys law-making authority, and has few appointment powers. The main competences of the Bulgarian president are his constitutional position as Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and his Chairmanship of the Consultative Council of National Security. The main problem of the Croatian executive is still the non-transparent allocation of powers between the Office of the President and the government, i.e. the Prime Minister. The Law on Defence (March, 2002) enumerates the duties of the Head of State, based on his constitutional role. This Law recognises the President of the Republic as the Commander-in-Chief but gives the President too many specific duties which should fall to the government, the Parliament, or be located within the system of defence itself. In FYROM, talk about defence and military reforms intensified in the crisis period of 2001. The peacetime ambiguity between the executive powers (President-Govern-


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ment-Defence Ministry and the Interior Ministry) and the disagreements that followed the formation of a government of National Unity upon the insistence of the international community resulted in a disorganized command over the security forces. In Moldova, there is a clear division of power and responsibility between different branches of central state powers. The President is assisted in his duties by the Supreme Council for Security, which functions as a consultative body with its activity regulated by presidential decree. The transparent separation and differentiation of powers between President and Parliament to create clear lines of responsibility and accountability over the security sector are increasingly well established. The attempt to delineate responsibility in Macedonia suggests the norm is now ‘internalised’ region wide; but further improvements can be made.

Republican Guards and Irregular Forces Albania still keeps a Republican Guard. The President of Albania, on the proposal of the Prime Minister, appoints and dismisses the Commander of the Republican Guard. A number of contradictions are embodied in the organization of the Republican Guard such as its dependence on the Ministry of Public Order, while at the same time it is composed of conscript soldiers, a defining element of the armed forces. Thus the Republican Guard is a hybrid structure in terms of composition that to a certain extent contradicts the Constitution with respect to the chain of command for the armed forces on the one hand, and the police on the other. Some of the six countries have security organizations that are only partly under government control. During the 2001 conflict, special paramilitary units appeared in Macedonia. The military, the police, and the Interior Ministry activated special units, boldly named “Wolves” “Tigers” and “Lions” for example. They were to be engaged as special reaction forces. The best known, if disreputable, unit was the “Lions,” activated in mid-2001 by Interior Minister Boskovski. While recent events have contained the units, their networks’ gradual elimination remains to be decisively proven. In this case, at least two anomalies challenge the SSR norm with varying degrees of latent threat: such hybrid forces allow the executive to autonomously use force outside military or police frameworks. Whilst the recent history of both countries may account for the units’ continued presence, the absence of similar formations in the other assessed countries suggests a greater diffusion of the norm The full ‘internalisation’ of the norm regionally would require further efforts by internal and external actors.

Parliamentary Oversight, the Authority of the Parliament and the Defence (Security) Committee All six countries – to varying degrees – recognize the important oversight role of the parliaments. The Albanian parliament, whose role has been enhanced in the new constitution, represents the main and most important institution concerning democratic control. The parliament is the key institution that performs not only democratic control

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functions but also aims at ensuring transparency and accountability. Ad hoc committees are created to examine specific and complex legislative acts as well as to prepare specific legislative proposals. The Bulgarian Parliament has the National Security Concept, Military Doctrine, Interior and Defence Ministry laws, as well as ratification of agreements with NATO, with the main NATO countries, and those on regional cooperation established a real environment for Security Sector Reform. However, a National Security Law is still needed. The Croatian Parliament is authorized to “supervise the work of the Government of the Republic of Croatia and other holders of public authority responsible to the Croatian Parliament, in conformity with the Constitution and Law.” This illustrates that the Croatian Parliament has significant authority in the field of national security. For Moldova’s parliament, the most important role in the field of national security and defence was the establishment at the beginning of the 1990s of the constitutional and legal framework, including civilian control of armed forces created from scratch, which is still functioning. Herein are several data sets indicating the ‘cascading’ and ‘internalisation’ of the democratic control of security sector law. The establishment of democratic control frameworks can be improved, but the concepts have been made real in legislative frameworks.

Parliamentary Oversight of the Intelligence Service All six countries acknowledge a parliamentary responsibility for the intelligence services, though legislation may not be a matter of discussion yet. This is an important area where the SSR norm has not been transparently ‘internalized’: the reticence on the issue suggests that the ‘cascading’ of the norm has also not truly occurred.

The International Environment All six country teams acknowledged and welcomed the agenda-setting role of the international community. Albania was among the first countries to join the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in June 1992, and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in February 1994. These steps were important in bringing Albania closer to the Alliance. The PfP programme based on the defence Planning and Review Process (PARP) has contributed to the restructuring of the Albanian military establishment and capabilities in conformity with NATO standards. Bulgaria has profited from British, German, French, Italian and Greek consultants in the Bulgarian Defence Ministry, the US Military Liaison Team (MLT), plus PfP coordinating and FMF coordinating officers, attached to the US embassy. The Croatian team acknowledged that international assistance, including conditionality and even some kinds of pressure, would facilitate the accomplishment of reforms in various sectors, including the security sector. Macedonia, as a result of a difficult post-Kosovo security situation, has hosted a number of international missions


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with different mandates for peace building and democracy promotion. They have all had an impact on SSR and security conditions in the country. Macedonia has not managed to build a consensus on national interests and national security strategy. International organizations were seen to ‘arrive with different and often contradictory advice concerning bilateral, multilateral or international arrangements.’83 In Moldova, external influence and the existence of an outside ‘agency of change’ is seen as a realistic solution for an otherwise lagging reform process. In Romania, Western assistance was essential in building democratic institutions, particularly a democratic civil-military pattern. But this can not yet be the end of the process, a coherent programme on assistance to foster the institutions, to help civil society grow and aid development of the mechanisms of civilian control must continue. Otherwise, the institutions will remain fragile and could fail due to political or economic failure. Among the numerous opportunities, the PfP is said to have been a good training school for making the Romanian Armed Forces (RAF) compatible with NATO forces. Bilateral military assistance programmes also played an important role in making the RAF more professional, in setting up a multi-year defence planning system and reorienting the Armed Forces towards regional security requirements. However, the systematic approach and inclusion of intelligence, police forces and defence industry in the assistance programmes came rather late and many things still need to be done in this respect. International actors have assisted in providing expert skills and other assistance to enable the ‘cascading’ and ‘internalisation’ of SSR norms. Yet, their broad remit for SSR-related action is unfinished as elements of the grander issues of SSR beyond the security sector itself remain fragile in comparison to the greater societal stability of the West. Systematic, long term engagement is still needed to make the societal ‘internalisation’ of the SSR norm irrevocable.

Transparency and Accountability All six countries have managed to put in place accountability and transparency-building mechanisms. Development of a transparency culture in the Bulgarian security sector started with the public debate on the Military Doctrine, Defence Reform Plan 2004, and Membership Action Plan 2004, a White Paper on Defence and Annual Reports on National Security, Defence and Armed Forces, hosted on the websites of the defence and interior ministries. Involvement of NGOs, the academic sector and business, as well as of foreign partners led to impressive results. In Croatia, the constitutional and statutory framework for political accountability is in place, but the substance available does not match the legal rights. In this arena, the norm has ‘cascaded’ and been ‘internalised’ across the region. The wherewithal of creating and publicising the tenets and perception of politico-military strategic needs enables the dissemination of the posture and policies advocated for the security sector by the government across society. Electronic means have been exploited, increasing the transparency of SSR norm adoption to foreigners.

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Peacekeeping, Crisis Management and Regional Security All six countries have been made efforts to create peacekeeping and crisis management capabilities. The Albanian Armed Forces have participated in the SFOR mission in Bosnia as part of the German-led contingent and has been deployed since 1996. Under an agreement between the Albanian and German Defence Ministries, the latter provides logistical support for the Albanian contingent participating in the IFOR mission and afterwards in the SFOR mission. Concerning the participation of the Albanian armed forces outside South Eastern Europe, this first occurred in 2002 when a special commando unit of 30 soldiers of the Albanian armed forces were dispatched to Afghanistan for six months to serve with the Turkish unit in the International Security Assistance Force. The Albanian armed forces contributed to the establishment of the South East Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG) under the auspices of the South East Europe Defence Ministerial (SEDM) in 1999. SEEBRIG was established in accordance with the Multinational Peace Force of South East Europe (MPFSEE) Agreement, which was signed in Skopje, FYROM on 26 September 1998. The participant states are Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, FUROM, Romania, and Turkey, while the US and Slovenia have observer status. Bulgaria’s National Security Concept, Military Doctrine and many decisions of the Parliament and government, stipulate security through cooperation and integration, which is expressed in regional cooperation in South East Europe (SEEDM, SEEGROUP, Stability Pact, 2+2 cooperation) and the Black Sea area (BLACKSEAFOR) as well as through the progress in NATO and EU integration. The active role of Bulgaria as a temporary member of the Security Council of the UN and upcoming chairmanship of the OSCE is an important dimension of this aspect of the SSR. Currently Bulgaria participates in SFOR, KFOR, and ISAF with military units and police contingents (KFOR). It can be argued that Romania does not have a coherent and integrated strategy and a national crisis management system that would take into consideration the characteristics, dimensions, and complex consequences of such risks, which are mainly non-military, multidirectional, and unpredictable. The Romanian Constitution recognises only a limited number of exceptional situations whose proclamation belongs strictly to the President. No other authority has the prerogative of declaring a state of crisis or civil emergency. The experience gained by the Romanian participation in peace support operations is being put to good use in all military units; more than 8,000 Romanian military personnel have participated in different theatres. This experience has permitted the adaptation of training programmes to the real operational conditions and to equip forces according to real needs. As with the Baltic States, the ‘internalisation’ of the SSR norm of contributing to collective security as a security provider, no matter the size of the contribution, has occurred across the region. Whilst FYROM is a prima facie exception as a result of its domestic situation, it acknowledges the principle of contributing to a regional contingent.


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Capacity-Building and the Role of Education in the Security Sector All six countries have stepped up their training and instruction efforts, especially in the military field, and have profited from offers made by the international community. Given the important role military and civilian, governmental and non-governmental expertise plays in Security Sector Reform, all six country teams criticized the insufficiencies of their own training and instruction capacities (especially for civilians and non-governmental experts), and/or the ignorance of applicable methods. Whilst the norm may arguably have ‘cascaded’ in so far as a region-wide series of experts acknowledged the deficiency of expertise and improvements to knowledge capacities, the local identification of the demand provides an opportunity for Western engagement to tailor appropriate solutions that may ensure systematic ‘internalisation.’

Society and the Military In all six countries, efforts to overcome negative imagery of military and societal interaction have had some success. This does not, however, imply that the information and media policy in all countries has come to full fruition, or that civilian and non-governmental experts participate in security sector reform. The new Defence Strategy, approved recently by the Albanian Parliament, acknowledges for the first time in an official document the need for the participation of civil society and public opinion in the discussion and drafting of new defence and security policies: ‘The role of public opinion, the media and civil society in drafting, discussing, and implementing the strategy on national defence and security policies, is necessary.’84 In Bulgaria, a coalition of NGOs, media specialists and academics actively participate in the monitoring and even preparation of Security Sector Reform. In Croatia there are encouraging signs but more from the part of media than from civil society, especially NGOs, and not so much from the defence establishment which still labours under post-war traumata. The ‘cascading’ of the norms of expert civilian knowledge and scrutiny of the security sector has proceeded unevenly. Some institutional resistance to such measures remains in place in the region. Yet the progress made, particularly in Albania, Bulgaria, and to a lesser degree in Croatia, suggests the ‘internalisation’ process is underway.

The Media, Civil Society – And Business The most advanced countries in SSR terms are also often the ones with the most competently engaged civil societies and media. The Bulgarian Defence Ministry has been very active in out-sourcing activities which belong in the defence economy sphere; a lot of experience has already been gained in NGO-Defence Ministry cooperation in the area of organising public discussion and debate on defence policy, defence reform and modernisation as well as the practical participation of NGOs in resettlement of demobilised soldiers and in information campaigns. The role of unions of retired military, veterans, alumni associations, and youth organizations are very prominent.

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Despite a limited tradition of NGOs and civil society in Croatia, citizens’ civil engagement for solving both individual and community problems has not been a common practice among the vast majority of citizens in Croatia. Most citizens still consider the government and state responsible for solving their problems, including the military area, making no distinction between defence and security. Civil society in Romania is relatively vibrant but still lacks resources. A section of the Romanian media has been privatised and is relatively independent. Even though Romania’s constitution guarantees access to information, government officials can hamper direct contact with ministerial officials. Many state institutions were reported not to apply Law 544/2001 regarding free access to public information, even though the law was introduced in December, 2001. The norms have ‘cascaded’ in the region and are being ‘internalised,’ but to differing degrees. The promotion of civil society and the media is another area where the norms have ‘cascaded’ and have resulted in action but not the wholesale ‘internalisation’ of the desired norm. Yet, the trajectories herein remain positive efforts towards further construction of appropriate practices and networks, rather than negative and deconstructive.

Conclusion Faced with European states that endured Communist rule based on the use of military and intelligence services as arbitrary instruments of social control, the capacity to change the security sector to accompany democratic aspirations and concomitant institution re-building was of great importance: not least as the acrimony resulting from ‘police state’ actions by such organizations had alienated the civilian population. Similarly, the transition process of old (pre-1991) and new (post-1991) states which had endured civil instability and state repression, often due to Cold War proxy wars and power politics, with the same end results of disillusionment and social discontent, meant that the formation of a stable security sector was at a premium for the consolidation of democratic processes worldwide. Furthermore, in the vacuum accompanying regime change, the degree of organization and coercive means in state security agencies relative to other institutions made them an obvious ally or creator of criminal organizations against the residual regulatory capacity of the state. Given the capacity of trans-national criminal networks to interact and market goods and services in a globalised era, such alliances could result in international isolation and civilian persecution within a polity either by design or by default. The critical problem became the modulation of civil-military and civil-security agency relations through the creation and consolidation of institutions which guaranteed the transparency and existence of necessary instruments for the normative management of the state’s coercive means. The programmes detailed in SEE vis-à-vis SSR indicate a practical reality both to the theoretical norms and the transfer process outlined and the hypothesised outcome of their three stage emergence. As stated in the sixth section on ‘Norms Transfer to SEE,’ the very act of NATO and imminent NATO and EU accession of several countries in Central and South Eastern Europe itself inductively suggests that articulated norms


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were transferred to the satisfaction of their creators; at the very least, in form if not substance, beyond the former boundary of the defunct Iron Curtain. The SEE process of promoting self analysis of the critical elements of SSR norm transfer, with varying but similar results, has allowed the ‘cascading’ and ‘internalisation’ of SSR norms. Degrees of ‘internalisation’ vary across space and time as inter-related factors such as population, economic means, governmental traditions, education, and societal structures are broached. It is critical that external agencies catalyse the gap between norm entrepreneurs’ arts of persuasion and the ‘norms cascade,’ wherein the principle actors are states and international organisations through the mobilisation of (primarily methodological) strategies and appropriate instruments. The disconnection between the ideal and reality, between spirit and letter, can be addressed in this way. Self assessment served as such a method. The very process of engagement and norm transfer between parties mutually reinforces this context. Analysis and constructive criticism allows the formulation of strategies to ‘internalise’ ever more substantively the full breadth of SSR norms across society: the very place where they are meant to matter. Furthermore, the conditionality of aid represents (and notably has represented) an expectation that a mutually accepted and valid norm can be implemented and integrated into a polity’s decision-making and institutional structure, heralding the fullest possible interaction with international society. In this way, SSR norm transfer is a facet of the global governance agenda and realities. Transparency in aims and means allows greater international organization participation, an accelerant to change. The ‘internalisation’ process is ongoing and ever-varying as formal accession to various institutions progresses, on the basis of NATO and EU accession so far, incrementally, the specific dynamic between international organisations’ and a particular states’ relations alters as time progresses. The trajectories are set towards a substantive aspiration to SSR region-wide. The very existence of international discourse on SSR indicates that a SSR norm exists in an epistemic sense. The applicability of Security Sector Reform as a conceptual norm is relatively recent, but derives its strength from its internal consistency with other norms such as civil society, transparency in political decision-making, and accountability. Authors who deplore the absence of a clear definition of Security Sector Reform and clear norms for its implementation fail to acknowledge its nature. To embark on Security Sector Reform is the norm, thus to join an open-ended, yet structured discourse in cooperation with the very organizations one intends to join is the norm. The distinction between ‘first’ and ‘second generation’ reform steps is ultimately misleading. It departs from the expectation of uni-linear development along given lines. In fact, the reference system (‘good practice’) is itself on the move, and is simultaneously an abstract statistical field. If Security Sector Reform is a transfer of norms, then it is not to be mistaken for a rigid system of rules aimed at homogenizing a nation’s values in order to better integrate and control it. Rather than imposing strict, pre-fabricated standards, the international community seeks to suggest agenda items, or rather, the agenda, for reforms. Security Sector Reform as such is then a norm, to which individual states are invited to subscribe. How they are going to meet the requirements of the norm is largely left to themselves, as long as they stay within the statistical field of good practice. The decision to embark on Security Sector Reform, in cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic

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community and with an objective to ultimately join at least some of its institutions and organizations, is itself the acceptance of a norm. Apart from the long list of different objectives which all governments claim to have in the implementation of reforms, they also have another thing in common: the absence of a well-defined assessment and reporting process on the implementation of the SSR programmes. Scholars and practitioners addressing the issue of success and failure of reforms and adequacy of reform plans thus often must rely on their own observations, interviews with officials they may know, and vague feelings in the population on whether things went ‘right’ or ‘wrong.’ The security sector is, and will remain, a politically sensitive area. This, however, is not to imply that only the organs directly dealing with the security sector and its reforms, the executive, ought to be involved in oversight. In mature democracies there is not only a separation of powers in implementation and oversight functions, but the civil society itself takes enlightened interest in security sector oversight and reform matters, for the security sector is no longer a state within the state, providing for itself and those illegitimately in power, but serves the human security interests of each and every citizen who considers it their own. The security sector and those in charge of it therefore have an interest to provide transparency.

1 See ‘Glossary’ in Hans Born, Philipp H. Fluri, and Simon Lunn (eds.), ‘Oversight and Guidance: The Relevance of Parliamentary Oversight for the Security Sector and its Reform; A Collection of Articles on Foundational Aspects of Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector,’ DCAF Document, No. 4, (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2003). Elements of this article were first published in Eden Cole, Timothy Donais, and Philipp Fluri, (eds.) Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe Self-Assessment Studies: Regional Perspectives, (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2004; and Eden Cole and Philipp H. Fluri, ‘Security Sector Reform in South East Europe: A Study in Norms Transfer,’ in Heiner Hänggi and Theodor H. Winkler (eds.), Challenges of Security Sector Governance, (Münster: LIT, 2003). 2 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,’ International Organization, 52, 4, Autumn 1998, p. 891. 3 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,’ International Organization, 52, 4, Autumn 1998, p. 891. 4 Thomas Risse, ‘International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behavior in the Human Rights Area,’ Politics and Society, Vol. 27, No. 4, December 1999, p. 529. 5 Ibid. 6 Finnemore and Sikkink, ‘International,’ p. 898. 7 Ibid, p. 891. 8 Gregory A. Raymond, ‘Problems and Prospects in the Study of International Norms,’ Mershon International Studies Review, No. 41. (1997), pp. 214. 9 John Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of Rules,’ Philosophical Review, No. 64, January 1955 pp. 3–32 and Randall L. Schweller and David Preiss, ‘A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions Debate,’ Mershon International Studies Review, No. 41, p. 3. in Raymond ‘Some Problems,’ p. 214. 10 Raymond, ‘Problems,’ pp. 215–216. 11 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, 1977. 12 Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis, (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 312. 13 Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations, (London: Verso, 1994). 14 Peter M. Haas (ed.), Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination, (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1997) p. 2. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid.


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17 For the original argument on the matter see: Michael Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12 (1983) pp. 205–235; and Michael Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part II,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13, (1983) pp. 323–353. For the most optimistic statement, arguably setting the public-policy making agenda of many western states and disseminating the idea in the media, see Francis Fukayama, The End of History and the Last Man, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992). 18 David Held, Models of Democracy, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999) (2nd ed.), pp. 335–358. 19 See, for example, James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (eds.), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: CUP, 1992). 20 Ernst-Otto Czempiel, ‘Governance and Democratization,’ in Czempiel and Rosenau, Governance, pp. 250–271. 21 David Held & Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt and Jonathan Perraton, Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999) p. 16. See also David Held, Political Theory and the Modern State, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989) and David Held, Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). 22 Paul F. Diehl (ed.), The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World, (London: Lynne Reiner, 2001) (2nd ed.) p. 3. 23 See, for example, for the detailed exposition of International Organisations’ roles in complex emergencies, peacekeeping, collective action, and UN frameworks: Andrew S. Natsios, ‘NGOs and the UN System in Complex Emergencies: Conflict or Cooperation,’ in Diehl, Politics, pp. 388–406; Joseph Lepgold, ‘NATO’s Post-Cold War Collective Action Problem,’ in Diehl, Politics, pp. 229–258; Lynn H. Miller, ‘The Idea and Reality of Collective Security,’ in Diehl, Politics, pp. 171–201; and Paul F. Diehl, ‘Forks in the Road: Theoretical and Policy Concerns for 21st Century Peacekeeping,’ in Diehl, Politics, pp. 202–208. 24 See, for example, Barry Buzan, From International Society to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation, (Cambridge: CUP, 2004). 25 Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, Perraton, Global Transformations, pp. 44–49. 26 Ibid pp. 62–77. 27 Raymond, ‘Problems,’ p. 206. 28 Dylan Hendrickson, ‘A Review of Security Sector Reform,’ The Conflict, Security and Development Group Working Papers, No. 1, September 1999. Available at: http://csdg.kcl.ac.uk/Publications/assets/PDF% 20files/Working%20paper%20number%201.pdf. 29 The renewed interest in the security sector after the Cold War was facilitated by the disappearance of purely military criteria for assessments and its replacement by human security in an interdependent world. Security Sector Reform research, approaches, objectives, and development assistance, became a platform for the substantive stabilisation of polities via managed international involvement. 30 Hans Born, Marina Caparini, Philipp Fluri (eds.), Security Sector Reform and Democracy in Transitional Societies, (Baden-Baden: NOMOS, 2002). 31 Jane Chanaa, ‘Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects,’ Adelphi Papers, No. 344, (Oxford: OUP for IISS, 2002). 32 Neil Cooper and Michael Pugh, ‘Security-Sector Transformation in Post-Conflict Societies,’ The Conflict, Security and Development Group Working Papers, No. 5, February 2002. http://csdg.kcl.ac.uk/Publications/assets/PDF%20files/Working%20paper%20number%205.pdf. 33 Theo Farrell, ‘Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland’s Professional Army,’ European Journal of International Relations, Vol.7, No. 1. 34 Thomas Risse, ‘International Norms and Domestic Change: Arguing and Communicative Behavior in the Human Rights Area,’ Politics and Society, Vol. 27, No. 4, December 1999. 35 Wilhelm Germann and Timothy Edmunds (eds.), Towards Security Sector Reform in Post Cold War Europe–A Framework for Assessment, (Baden-Baden: NOMOS for the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, November 2003). For an electronic version of the publication please see http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/publications2/electronic_versions.html. For the activities of the DCAF Working Group on the issue please see http://www.dcaf.ch/workingprogramme/wg_csf_home.htm. 36 Nicole Ball, Spreading Good Practices in Security Sector Reform: Policy Options for the British Government, (London: Saferworld, December 1998). 37 Nicole Ball, Enhancing Security Sector Governance: A Conceptual Framework for UNDP, (UNDP) October 9, 2002. 38 Wilhelm Germann and Timothy Edmunds (eds.), Towards Security Sector Reform in Post Cold War Europe – A Framework for Assessment, (Baden-Baden: NOMOS for the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces). For an electronic version of the publication please see http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/publications2/electronic_versions.html. For the activities of the DCAF working Group on the issue see http://www.dcaf.ch/workingprogramme/wg_csf_home.htm.

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39 See, in Germann and Edmunds, Towards: Gerhard Kümmel ‘Why Engage in Security Sector Reform Abroad? International Norms, External Democratization and the Role of Democratic Control of Armed Forces’; Dietrich Genschel, ‘Principles and Prerequisites of the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: Best Practices in Established Democracies’; Owen Greene, ‘ International Standards and Obligations: Norms and Criteria for Democratic Control in EU, OSCE and OECD’; Victor Yves Ghébali, ‘The Normative Contribution of the OSCE to the Democratic Control of Armed Forces: The Added-Value of the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security’; Willem Matser / Christopher Donnelly, ‘Security Sector Reform and NATO Enlargement: Success through Standardization of Standards?’. For preliminary notes on norms transfer in civil military terms as seen in Central Eastern Europe see Anthony Forster, Civil-Military and Security Sector Reform – West Looking East: Civil Military Relations Policy Transfer in Central and Eastern Europe, ISF Working Paper, Conference 2000, http://www.isn.ethz.ch/4isf/4/Papers/ISF_WS_III-4_ Forster.pdf. 40 Lea Biason, ‘A Collection of International Norms and Criteria: A Reference Tool’ in Germann and Edmunds, Towards. 41 Copenhagen European Council – 21–22 June 1993, Presidency Conclusions, Relations with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. http://www.europa.eu.int/enlargement/ec/cop_en.htm. These conditions also figure in the Treaty of Amsterdam which enshrines the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law as a constitutional principle common to all Member States (new article 6(1)). The Intergovernmental Conference has amended Article O (new Article 49) so that membership was conditional upon respect of Art. 6 (1). See Briefing No 20. Democracy and respect for human rights in the enlargement process of the European Union. http://www.europarl.eu.int/ enlargement/briefings/20a2_en.htm. Hereinafter ‘Briefing No. 20.’ 42 Agenda 2000, §9. In the resolution Agenda 2000, the European Parliament stated that “all applicant countries which do at present meet the criterion of a stable democratic order, respect for human rights and the protection of minorities laid down at Copenhagen, have the right to open the reinforced accession and negotiating process at the same time.” http://www.europarl.eu.int/. 43 Partnership for Peace Framework Document. 10 January 1994. http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/ b940110b.htm. 44 Ibid. 45 Purposes of Enlargement NATO Study on Enlargement. September 1995. Chapter 1 http://www.nato. int/docu/basictxt/enl-9502.htm. 46 Ibid Chapter X. 47 Ibid Chapter 4. 48 Ibid. 49 NATO Study on Enlargement. The 2004 NATO Istanbul Summit brought with it a reaffirmation of the EAPC’s Member States’ conviction of the importance of effective and efficient state defense institutions under civilian and democratic oversight and guidance for regional stability and international co-operation in the domains of defense and security. A Partnership Action Plan (PAP) on Defense Institution Building (DIB) was introduced which aims at the re-enforcement of Partners’ efforts to initiate and carry forward reform and restructuring of defense institutions in the light of their commitments undertaken in the context of such documents as the Partnership for Peace Framework Document and the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (see http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b040607e.htm). Given NATO’s special focus on the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as Moldova – and, as Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy Günther Altenburg put it at the 2005 PfP Symposium at Oberammergau ‘to pay due attention’ to the interests of these states, these Partners are especially invited to consider co-operation on PAP-DIB related issues. In the implementation of PAP-DIB objectives, Allies and Partners vowed to explore opportunities to co-operate with international organizations and institutions which share a commitment to and expertise in (assistance to) transition to democracy and democratic institution building (see also http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/epub/ekoment/2004/07/040701.htm). PAP-DIB, as an integral part of the Partnership for Peace, is focused on the implementation of the following aspects of democratic institution building in the defence and security sphere: • the development of effective and transparent democratic control of defence activities (including appropriate legislation); • the development of effective and transparent procedures to promote civilian participation in developing defence and security policy; • the development of effective and transparent legislative and judicial oversight of the defence sector; • the development of effective and transparent arrangements and procedures to assess security risks and national defence requirements; • the development of effective and transparent measures to optimise the management of defence ministries and agencies and force structures, including inter-agency co-operation;


•

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the development of effective and transparent arrangements and practices to ensure compliance with internationally accepted norms and practices established in the defence sector; • the development of effective and transparent personnel structures and human resource management practices in the defence forces; • the development of effective and transparent financial, planning, and resource allocation procedures in the defence area; • the development of effective, transparent and economically viable management of defence spending; • The development of effective and transparent arrangements to ensure effective international co-operation and good neighbourly relations in defence and security matters (ibid). For a first publication on PAP-DIB see Eden Cole and Philipp Fluri (Eds.) Defence Institution Building: Papers presented at the Conference on “2005 Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institutions Building (PAP-DIB) Regional Conference in the Caucasus,” (Vienna: Lavak, 2005). 50 Charter of Paris: A New Era of Democracy, Peace and Unity. CSCE Summit. 19–21 November 1990. http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/paris90e.htm. 51 Charter of Paris: A New Era of Democracy, Peace and Unity. CSCE Summit. 19–21 November 1990. http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/paris90e.htm. 52 Ibid. 53 Code of Conduct of Politico-Military Aspects of Security in Budapest Document. CSCE Summit. Budapest. 5–6 December 1994. §20. http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/buda94e.htm. 54 See, for example, Hans Born, Philipp H. Fluri and Simon Lunn (eds.), ‘Oversight and Guidance: The Relevance of Parliamentary Oversight for the Security Sector and its Reform; A Collection of Articles on Foundational Aspects of Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector,’ DCAF Document, No. 4, (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2003). 55 NATO stated, however, that applicant countries would be considered on the basis of their democratic credentials, market economy status and human rights record. All territorial disputes with their neighbouring countries needed to be solved, as well as internal ethnic disputes. Candidate countries were required to be able to contribute to NATO’s collective security and to have transparency in military matters, including democratic civilian control of the military and transparency of the defence budgets. 56 MAP has as its key elements the individual Annual National Plan (ANP), addressing political/economic, defence/military, resource, security and legal aspects (‘five chapters’); it serves as a feedback mechanism for periodical progress assessment and a clearinghouse capacity for ‘member to partner’ assistance coordination, a further key element is its enhanced planning and review capacity. NATO Membership Action Plans (MAPs) as a rule stress the crucially important role oversight of the defence sector by an informed and competently committed parliament plays for ‘democratic security.’ MAPs therefore seek to increase the role and accountability of parliaments. In concreto this means that in law the authority of the parliament to approve/disapprove nominations for Defence Minister, and Chief of General Staff, possibly also of the Ministers of the Interior, Foreign Affairs, Heads of the Security Services and Border Guards, as well as their deputies and assistant deputies needs to be established. The sub-committees of the Parliamentary Defence and Security Committee(s) need to be refined to correspond with the key competencies of the Defence Ministry. The legal and procedural basis for strong parliamentary oversight on defence and security budget issues must be established to increase democratic accountability and ensure that planning corresponds to available financing. The legal, procedural and structural basis for Parliament to conduct special investigations and inquiries in the defence and security area must be given. The division of responsibilities between President and Prime Minister/Cabinet for the defence and security sector in peacetime and times of war/national emergency must be defined in no unclear terms, including the terms on which a state of war or national emergency can be declared. On the defence policy side, MAPs seek the adaptation of defence concepts and doctrines. A system of coherent defence documents to support political, civilian and military officials in Strategic Planning, Operational Planning, Requirements Generation and Programming, Acquisition, Personnel and Training must be established in law and procedure. Institutions and processes to effectively develop defence and security policy, and to manage implementation need to be established: a modern ‘civilianised’ Ministry of Defence, focused on political-military issues with an integrated general staff to provide military advice. A Defence Resource Management Model needs to be introduced. Furthermore standardization and interoperability must be developed. Forces capable of supporting NATO missions (Article 5, Crisis Response, etc.) need to be established. 57 The author wishes to thank Mr. J. Greene, now with the Kiev Razumkov Centre, for his insightful comments on Membership Action Plans. 58 Willem Matser and Christopher Donnelly, ‘Security Sector Reform and NATO Enlargement: Success through Standardization or Standards?’ in: Edmunds/Germann, op.cit., forthcoming, passim. 59 These are the countries of the region: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, FYR of Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, the European Union Member States, and the European

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Commission, Non-EU members of the G-8 are the USA, Canada, Japan, and Russia, Other countries: Czech Republic, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Turkey, International Organisations: UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, UNHCR, NATO, OECD, IFIs: World Bank, International Monetary Fund, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank, Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), Regional Initiatives: Black-Sea Economic Co-operation, Central European Initiative, South East European Co-operative Initiative (SECI), South East Europe Co-operation Process (SEECP). For the document, see http://www.stabilitypact.org/stabilitypactcgi/catalog/cat_descr.cgi?prod_id=409. 60 Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Cologne document, June 10, 1999. 61 Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, 2003, p. 2. The Thessaloniki Regional Table endorsed as the SO’s main working platform 6 core objectives plus the overarching security issue: media (enhancing independent media and standards of journalism in SEE by bringing legislation in line with EU standards. etc.), Local Democracy and Cross-Border Cooperation (increase systematic co-operation of local governmental, civic and business actors, also across national borders; establish and strengthen EURO regions in SEE following agreed standards, legislation and training); interregional trade/investment Compact (further development of a liberal business environment, promoting business opportunities including implementation of a free trade area, identify and progressively reducing key non-tariff-barriers; open all negotiations with Moldova; integrate UNMIK/Kosovo into Trade Working Group; organise major business promotion events); Regional Infrastructure/Energy (extend existing regional approach to developing infrastructure in transport (roads, rail, air), to energy and telecommunications, launch regional gas initiative, implement electricity MoU signed in Athens 15 November 2002; secure agreed framework to determine priority electricity infrastructure investments), Organised Crime (SPOC, Regional Centre in Bucharest to reach full operationality), training Centre’s crime experts on EUROPOL standards). Formalise actions between Europol and Bucharest Crime Fighting Centre). Migration and Asylum/Refugees. 62 Romania and Bulgaria were admitted to full negotiations on membership at Helsinki 1999 summit. 63 An amount of 4.65bn Euros was allocated for the period of 2002–2006 to support reforms. 64 Ghebbali, ‘Normative,’ in Edmunds & Germann (eds.), op.cit. forthcoming: passim. 65 Greene, ‘International’, in Edmunds & Germann (eds.), op.cit. forthcoming: passim. 66 To complete the accession process – SiM and BiH are still in – Council (Parliamentary Assembly and Council of Ministers) must assess each candidate’s qualifications ‘on its own merits.’ 67 The performance of each country is subject to collective control. 68 Democratic security as the guarantee of stability and security between states and within states is seen as a specific Council of Europe contribution to the OSCE Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe for the 21st Century. The October 1997 Strasbourg Action Plan seeks to promote human rights and to strengthen pluralist democracy, social cohesion through promotion of social rights is an essential complement to the promotion of human rights and dignity; new dimensions of threats, role of culture and education in strengthening mutual understanding and confidence between people. The commitment to Greater Europe without dividing based on democratic institutions was reaffirmed in May, 1999. 69 H.P. Furrer, ‘Regional Security Issues in South Eastern Europe: A Council of Europe Perspective,’ in Gyarmati & Winkler, op. cit., 2002, pp. 63–19. 70 The term ‘security sector reform’ includes the reform of defence policies and forces as well as the reform of other actors in internal security, both governmental and non-governmental, for purposes of efficiency and good governance. See Hendrickson, D. and Karkoszka, A., ‘The Challenges of Security Sector Reform,’ SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2002), pp. 175–201; and Caparini, M., ‘Security Sector Reform and NATO and EU Enlargement,’ SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), pp. 237–60. 71 Caparini, M., ‘Security Sector Reform and NATO and EU Enlargement,’ SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), pp. 237–60. 72 Findings published in Philipp Fluri and Jan Trapans (eds.), Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: A Self-Assessment Study Volume I; Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, (Belgrade/ Geneva: CCMR for DCAF, 2003); Philipp Fluri and Jan Trapans (eds.), Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe: A Self-Assessment Study Volume II; FYR of Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, (Belgrade/Geneva: CCMR for DCAF, 2003); Timothy Donais and Philipp Fluri (eds.), Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South East Europe. Volume III, 2004. The paper does not comment on Serbia and Montenegro where Security Sector Reform is nascent, or Bosnia and Herzegovina which was not part of the project. 73 Aldo Bumçi, ‘Security Sector Reform in Albania,’ in Trapans & Fluri, Defence, Vol. 1., pp. 23–43; see also Besnik Mustafaj, Albanian Human Development Report 1998, (UNSECO 1998), pp. 78. 74 As Bumçi argues vis-à-vis Albania, it is remarkable that ‘during the democratic experiment of the last decade the army has clearly not shown any praetorian tendencies, which is in line with its tradition. And this is not the case because of the proper establishment and function of democratic institutions. On the contrary,


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the Albanian democratic experiment has been far from successful. Albania has not yet passed the test of free and fair elections. The conduct of all the parliamentary elections, except those of 1992, has been challenged by the losing party and has been below democratically-established standards. Contested election results have been accompanied by institution-building which has lacked legitimacy and consensus and has been politicised. Due to the polarised political atmosphere and the ongoing political struggle and insufficient economic resources, the Albanian state could very well be characterised as a weak state. However despite all this, the military has not been a factor in Albanian politics. Nor has the military used the exploding situation in Kosovo to demand greater support and a greater say in government.’ In Bumçi, ‘Security,’ p. 25. 75 Velizar Shalamanov, ‘Security Sector Reform in Bulgaria,’ in Philipp H. Fluri & Velizar Shalamanov, Does Security Sector Reform Work? (Sofia, 2003) pp. 173–191. There is a common perception in Croatia that the admission into the MAP is the confirmation of Croatia’s maturity in fulfilling the criteria and standards of behaviour of the Euro-Atlantic structures – NATO and the EU, which are not only military but also civil. See Mladen Staničić, ‘Security Sector Reform in Croatia,’ in Fluri and Trapans, Defence, Vol. I, pp. 333–347. 76 ‘After coming to power in 1997, the left wing coalition purged 1,500 officers from the armed forces, among them around 400 officers who had received education and training in the West.76 However, we should qualify the way the political forces have used the military by comparing it with the other security sector agencies – the police and intelligence service.’ See Bumçi, ‘Security,’ p. 25. 77 Biljana Vankovska, ‘Security Sector Reform in Macedonia,’ in Fluri and Trapans, Defence, Vol. II, pp. 13–35. 78 Nicolae Chirtoaca, ‘Security Sector Reform in Moldova,’ in Fluri and Trapans, Defence, Vol. II, p. 165. 79 Liviu Muresan, ‘Security Sector Reform in Romania,’ p. 304. 80 Bumçi ‘Security’ in Fluri & Trapans, Defence, Vol. 1, p. 26. 81 Shalamanov, ‘Civil Military and Inter-Agency Cooperation in the Security Sector in Bulgaria,’ in Fluri & Shalamanov, Does?, p. 83. In the past, the armed forces had covered all security/defence-related services up to the Central Committee of the BCP and its Politburo in extenso. See Shalamanov, ibid, pp. 83–84. 82 Vankovska, ‘Security,’ p. 32. 83 Biljana Vankovska, interview with members of OSCE mission in Macedonia, December 2002, cited in Vankovska, ‘Security,’ p. 31. 84 As argued by Henri Cili, ‘Security and Defence – Two Unfamiliar Issues for Media and Civil Society,’ in Fluri & Trapans, Defence, Vol. 1. p. 124.



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ELIAMEP’s Halki International Seminars 2005 Executive Summary For most countries, security today is primarily measured in non-military terms and threats to security are non-military in nature. These threats include – incompetent government, corruption, organized crime, insecure borders, smuggling [weapons, drugs, contraband, people], illegal migration, ethnic and religious conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, shortage of natural resources [e.g., water] and; of course, terrorism. As security is no longer just a military concern, it is no longer just the preserve of MODs and MFAs which have to date been the main ministries involved in security cooperation. It is no longer possible to draw a clear distinction between external security and internal security.1 Meeting these new security requirements demands a paradigm shift in our security thinking and the fundamental reform of national structures, patterns of investment, systems of government. Likewise it demands the evolution of international institutions on a truly radical scale. The overall aim of security sector reform (SSR) is the transformation of security institutions so that they play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for their citizens. Institutional reform focuses upon building up their capacities in line with the standards assumed appropriate to the democratic political context. The need for reform is particularly acute in countries wishing to join eventually the EU or NATO, transition countries, former failed states that are currently under reconstruction or countries facing serious internal challenges. The main objective of the 2005 Halki International Seminar was to analyze the lessons learned from SSR efforts in SEE and the Black Sea Region and discuss whether these lessons could be applied to the Mediterranean/M. East. Prominent among the several countries discussed was Turkey, where it was emphasized that the military has this special “guardianship” role, but there have been efforts, in the context of the 7 th Harmonization Package, to promote reforms such as removing military representatives 1 Security henceforth requires the coordination of the ‘external’ ministries [i.e., MOD and MFA] and their agencies [armed forces, intelligence services] with those of the ‘interior’ ministries: internal affairs; education; finance; overseas development; transport; environment; health; etc., with their agencies [policing forces, security services, disaster relief agencies, etc.].The security sector of a state may be defined broadly as encompassing those elements that have been granted a legitimate and exclusive role in the exercise of coercive power in society to deal with external and internal threats to the security of the state and its citizens. As such, security sector reform (SSR) encompasses all those organizations that have the authority to use, or order the use of force, or the threat of force, as well as those civil structures that are responsible for their management. The organizations concerned include: military and paramilitary forces; intelligence services; police forces, both national and local, together with border guards and customs services; judicial and penal systems; and the civil authorities mandated to control and oversee these agencies. It should be mentioned at this point that there are no blueprints for carrying out SSR, since this is specific to the context of individual countries. There is also no one model of which areas should be targeted by SSR activities.

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ELIAMEP’s Halki International Seminars 2005

from certain governmental bodies and bringing the defense budget under greater scrutiny by 2007 in front of the Parliament. The case of Russia was also discussed quite extensively. Russia is a rather unique case, as it lacks any clear external incentives for security sector reform. Unlike Central & Eastern Europe, where security reform has been strongly influenced by the strategic decision of those countries to join NATO, in Russia security sector reform has been profoundly based on how the Russian state, after the end of Cold War, enter a new capacity of an independent Russia, defined its security priorities and what resources Russia itself, without external support, actually could put forward to underpin those security sector reforms (including the demobilization of the Soviet army). Inhibiting factors include Russia’s involvement into the war in Chechnya, its traditional insecurity, the weak Parliament and civil society, the perceived role of the security sector as the guardian for Russia’s longer term and the fact that under President Putin, who came to power very much relying on the security sector, the military and particularly the security sector, particular the security service and the interior ministry have become part and parcel of the new Russia State, of the centralized state model. The existence of the petroleum state also clearly encourages much stronger control from the centralized security sector that is particularly true for police and the security service, and much more non transparent funds and resources being put into the security sector by passing the scrutiny of the Parliament, bypassing the scrutiny of the governments. Given the fact that there is a widespread view in Russia that the efficiency of the security sector is by far more important than democracy, it is very difficult to see how this guarantor of stability, the security sector, can actually reform itself, and this is a problem that a number of countries are facing. Despite the important remaining problems, countries in Southeastern Europe have promoted efforts for SSR. This has, unfortunately, not been the case so far in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), where in many cases there is a very deep and historic role of the military and other security agencies in state formation. There are states in the region which are often described as being armies with a state, rather than a state with an army. Furthermore, the war in terrorism increasingly is allowing local governments to disregard the security sector reform and governance issues. It was argued that some countries will find it quite easy or relatively easy to pursue security sector reform, particularly where the security and military have not been very heavily involved in politics and economic behavior. But in many other parts of the region, one should be thinking not in terms of reform but of the much more difficult task of restructuring the security sector.

The Next Steps for (SSR) in the Middle East and North Africa The prevalence of authoritarian politics in the region and the conflictual geo-strategic environment has long precluded the public discussion of security matters, let alone security reforms. In many MENA countries, the notion of ‘security’ is linked primarily to the stability and survival of a specific regime rather than to the protection of the citizenry. As a result, there is a strong tradition of secrecy in relation to the military and the security sector in general.


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Various developments over the last years have however led to a heightened interest in regional SSR by domestic and international actors. The publication of the first Arab Human Development Report in 2002 has paved the way for a widened debate in the region among intellectuals and members of civil society on the need for political and economic reforms and good governance. At the same time, the US Administration has identified the region’s deficit in terms of democracy as a root cause for ‘terrorism’ and made the democratic transformation of the Middle East a top foreign policy priority. The European Union, which is already involved in cooperative initiatives such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, also projects a more active engagement in regional democratisation efforts, especially since the adoption of the European Security Strategy in December 2003. Yet, whereas general calls for democracy and good governance have proliferated in the MENA over the last decade, the actual SSR debate is still at an incipient stage. Linkage of SSR and Democratisation Accepting that SSR can be understood as part of broader processes of democratisation, it was emphasised that processes of SSR, democratisation and socio-economic development are not separable in practice. Progress towards strengthening civil-democratic control of the security sector is conditional upon broader governance reforms and socio-economic support mechanisms; conversely, authoritarian defence, police and intelligence forces and a politicised security sector pose serious obstacles to democratisation and socio-economic reforms. Against this background, the Working Group recognised that the pitfalls of sequential reform approaches must be avoided: ‘SSR, democracy and development go hand in hand.’ Efforts must be taken to proceed on all three fronts simultaneously. SSR is difficult because processes of democratic change might initially lead to increasing instability and a higher demand for security, often at the expense of democratic security governance. In many reform contexts, the introduction of security reforms will therefore have to be gradual and take into account the needs and concerns of the local actors. Areas of Reform The need for SSR in the Middle East springs from challenges in four closely interlinked areas: the political domain, the economic domain, the institutional domain, and the realm of society. Therefore, SSR might be seen as a four-dimensional process. As to the political domain, the intervention in politics by security forces, especially by the military and the intelligence agencies, is a familiar pattern across the region. In many countries, the military and/or the intelligence services act as guardians or protectors of the regime and actively intervene in choosing or blocking political personnel. The security forces often also have a veto power on the direction, pace and sequencing of broader political reforms. Moreover, the security sector has direct influence on processes of defence budgeting and procurement. In addition to that, the security sector in the region also has a strong economic role (“entrepreneurial” armies). Security forces, in particular the military, consume a large share of the state budget, while at the same time engaging in business and other com-

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mercial activities. In various countries in the region, the military directly influences upon the direction, or even determines the feasibility of economic reforms and liberalisation. On the institutional level, the security sector in the MENA region is usually characterised by organisational deficiencies. In many countries, security agencies have proliferated under the proviso of ‘divide and rule’, a development which is often accompanied by the blurring of police, intelligence and defence functions. Individual agencies also lack the technical and operational capacities to effectively and efficiently provide security for the citizens. More often than not security forces are overstaffed, functioning at the same time as agencies of employment and security bodies. Furthermore, in some countries the monopoly on the use force has become contested or even privatised in the hands of non-state actors. Finally, security forces interfere in society in numerous ways. Often they engage in human-rights violations, thus becoming a source of insecurity rather than a provider of security. Reform Approaches and Measures Although the MENA countries share some characteristics in terms of security governance, namely a high degree of secretiveness, proliferation of security agencies and vast consumption of resources, the Working Group found it important to emphasise that each country presents a different reform context. The specific challenges for reform vary from state to state, depending on the political and social makeup of the country as well as the tradition and organisational setup of the security sector. In other words, there is no one-fits-all approach with regard to SSR in the Middle East and North Africa. These are, however, general policy guidelines which should be adapted to the specific reform contexts. Undertake a profound analysis of how security works in individual MENA countries: There is a general lack of knowledge in academia and civil society on how security actually works throughout the region. Information on the structure of the security sector, the budgets and the personnel in charge is often hard to obtain, making it difficult for parliaments and NGOs to oversee the security sector or find entry points for reform. Concerted efforts of ‘stock-taking’ should be undertaken by national and international reform agents in individual countries, with the objective of ‘mapping’ the respective security sector and the political, economic and social context. Often formal security governance mechanisms prescribed in the constitution and other laws are secondary to informal power structures. Raise public awareness through education: In the MENA region, parliamentarians, civil society and the broader public lack knowledge not only on their country’s security sector, but in many cases also on security matters in general. As one participant put it: ‘Political and institutional reforms are still not the issue of the people in the region.’ Thus efforts should be made to systematically raise public awareness on security. Equally important will be the enhancement of transparency in the security sector, especially with regard to areas such as budgeting, recruitment and promotion. Short-term steps recommended by the Working Group are the inclusion of a SSR chapter in the next Arab Human Development Report and the organisation of a regional high-profile event on SSR in order to attract the attention of the media to the issue.


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Strengthen the role of civil society in security matters: Although local NGOs themselves cannot implement SSR, they have a key function in channelling public pressure, initiating the SSR debate and shaping the security reform agenda. Furthermore, efforts should be made involve civil society actors in the formulation of national security policies and the drafting of security legislation whenever possible. Empower civil-democratic institutions: Capable democratic institutions are a key precondition for civil-democratic security governance. Yet, the situation in the MENA region is characterised by chronic institutional under-development, especially with regard to the legislature. Concerted efforts should be undertaken in order to make parliaments more responsive to public demands and strengthen their oversight functions, for instance by encouraging public hearings and enquiries. In addition to that, national human rights institutions and ombudsmen should be strengthened so that they can support the legislature in its oversight function and serve as linkage points between the government and society. It is important in this regard to put the emphasis on working with existing institutions rather than on creating them from scratch. New institutions often become equally ineffective and dependent on the regime as existing institutions and lead to the draining of expertise and personnel from other bodies. Strengthen the legal framework for security governance in accordance with democratic standards: In many countries in the region, the security sector has a flawed legal basis, if at all, with the consequence that security forces cannot be held accountable by the legislature and the judiciary. Equally imperative is the empowerment of courts and public prosecutors in order to enhance the rule of law. Focus initially on police and, where possible, internal intelligence reform: As is the case in many other countries, it is primarily the internal security services which are in constant contact with the citizens in the MENA region. Bad policing therefore infringes most directly on the citizens’ rights. In addition to that, reforming the military is likely be difficult in the short term because the army often functions as the central pillar which props up the regime. Emphasis should hence be put on police reform and the introduction of community-based policing schemes. Police and internal intelligence reform must be linked to reforms of the judiciary and the penal system, as organisational changes in law enforcement will have only limited impact in the absence of strong courts. Share international reform experiences: There is plenty of expertise on SSR in countries outside the region which have already undergone security and defence reform processes, often in the face of similar political, economic and social challenges. It will be useful for reform proponents from MENA countries to exchange experiences and best practices with parliamentarians, civil servants, security officials, researchers and NGOs from other countries, especially in Eastern and South Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa (and looking at the track record in Asia, for example, it is indeed impressive that SSR has been undertaken under similarly difficult conditions, political stress and conflict as in other parts of the world). Agents of Reform It was underlined that the initiative for security sector reform has to be a local one and must come from within the citizenry of a given country. In other words, SSR cannot be imposed from the outside. It was also acknowledged that there is increasing popular demand for security reforms throughout the MENA region, even if these demands are

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sometimes framed in terms of ‘democracy’ or ‘human rights’ rather than actual SSR. Given the tradition of fear associated with the security sector in many countries, it is also important to recognise that public reform demand is often issued rather tacitly than openly, for example in the form of criticism of the police or the corruption phenomenon. Local ownership is the key condition for sustainable SSR. Local actors, especially NGOs, research institutes, reform-minded parliamentarians, civil servants and security officials, will have to be the initial agents of reform. These actors will have to form a local ‘reform coalition’ that cuts across sectors and institutions in order to develop sufficient reform momentum. In the longer term, all national security stakeholders have to be included in the reform process, given that regimes use their own ‘reform discourse’ in order to deflect reform demands and strengthen their position vis-a-vis society. In the course of the SSR process, the linkage between top-down and bottom-up reform approaches and measures will be crucial. Efforts at the grassroots level, such as by NGOs and advocacy groups, should, whenever possible, be mirrored by and combined with reform steps on the elite level. Conceivably, elite support will be more difficult to obtain in many contexts, as elite members hold key positions in the security sector and are interested in preserving their power and privileges. In this regard, an indepth analysis of each country in the region will be helpful as to which actors are best suited to initiate and propel SSR. On the basis of such an ‘actor-coalition’ matrix, tailored strategies can be developed of how to make governments ‘buy into’ SSR and bring security actors on board. Increased regional cooperation will be another helpful avenue for the promotion of Security Sector Reform in the region, especially with view to enhancing acceptance of the SSR agenda by governments. The Arab League, the oldest and most comprehensive regional framework, would be an adequate forum for such discussion. Moreover, the Arab League could also be an avenue for the exchange of expertise and dissemination of norms and standards among governments. Likewise, networking between thinktanks, research institutes and practitioners throughout the MENA region will be crucial, as will be the development of an ‘epistemic community’ on SSR. In all of this, regular interaction on and between all levels – regional, national, societal – will be imperative. External support to SSR will be important. External actors can have a role specifically in providing conceptual expertise and technical assistance and facilitating collaboration between researchers and parliamentarians. Moreover, the International Community can empower local actors and might exert pressure on governments in order to push for the implementation of reforms. However, external political pressure is likely to work only in the context of political or economic leverage. In the absence of tangible ‘carrots’, external interference will be counterproductive, arouse nationalist sentiments and strengthen the hand of the ruling elites vis-à-vis reformers, as has been proven in the past. It was mentioned, however, that the West, broadly speaking, pursues contradictory policies and has not yet made security sector reform an important part of its policies in the region.Currently, the US have a rather bad public image in the region and are thus in a difficult position to deliver reform support. The EU is generally better posed to support SSR although it is largely perceived as lacking the necessary political clout. A possible avenue for future external support to SSR could be the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). However, it was agreed that in the light of the multiplicity of existing cooperation mechanisms – Barcelona Process/EMP, NATO Mediterranean Dia-


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logue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative – any duplication of reform initiatives should be avoided (as there is a degree of “initiative fatigue” and limited human resources in the countries concerned). Rather, institution-building within the framework of these initiatives should be made the priority.

Reform Approaches and Measures There is no one-fits-all approach with regard to SSR in the Middle East. Although the countries in the region have in some ways similar political, economic and social structures and also similar mechanisms of security governance, each country faces its own peculiar challenges. It has been suggested that a profound analysis of how security works in individual Middle Eastern countries, should be undertaken in terms of its structures, budgets and personnel. Dr. Thanos Dokos, Director-General, ELIAMEP2

2

I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Roland Friedrich in the preparation of this report.


Appendix



Security Sector Reform: Courses and an Institutional Assessment Framework Major General (ret) Kees Homan RNLMC Tirana, 28 February 2004

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K. Homan / Security Sector Reform: Courses and an Institutional Assessment Framework

The Political Dimension • Strengthening of government and parliament as decision-making, monitoring and control institutions • Creating a hierarchy of authority in which security-sector organizations are accountable both to elected civil authorities and to civil society and are non-partisan • Supporting and strengthening of NGO’s in their capacity as ‘watchdogs’

The Institutional Dimension • Modernizing and professionalizing the security forces • Developing new strategic concepts and mandates for the security actors • Training security forces in the respect for human rights • Improving capacity of judicial and penal system • Training security-sector organizations in operating in accordance with international law and domestic constitutional law


Objectives • Improving democratic governance of the security sector • Focus on governments (and partners) who intend to engage in security sector reform • Provide guidance on international good practice (ideal-type) • Provide a means for analysis, information sharing, dialogue and assessment • Promote strategy development • Promote collaboration between key actors

Figure 1. Framework for Developing a Security Sector Governance Strategy Government Vision

Government and Partners

Terms of Reference

• Rationale • Methods and Modalities • Identify Multidisciplinary Team of Independent Experts • Expected Outputs • Timeline

Government Multidisciplinary Team of Independent Experts

Mapping and Analysis • Rule of law • Policy development, planning and implementation • Professionalism • Oversight • Managing security sector expenditures

Assessment and Strategy Development

Workshop

Step 1: Prioritize core needs and challenges

• Begins process of dialogue

Step 2: Define constraints

• Convened by government • Facilitated by team of experts • Attended by all relevant stakeholders, local and international

Step 3: Explore opportunities for collaboration Step 4: Translating priorities into options Step 5: Choosing amongst options

Strategy

= critical decision point Report to Government Implement Strategy

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Develop Terms of Reference • SSR requires genuine partnership • Terms of reference should include: - Rationale - Methods and modalities - Identification of team of experts - Deliverables - Timeline

Mapping and Analysis • Requirements: - Multidisciplinary team of independent experts - Assessment of the political, economic, social and security environment - In-depth analysis of the five entry points . Deliverables: - Report for workshop


The Five Entry Points 1. Rule of the law 2. Policy development, planning and implementation 3. Professionalism 4. Oversight 5. Management of security sector expenditures

Assessment and Strategy Development • Five-step assessment process • For each step the framework provides a series of questions • Aims: - Assess and consider the most viable options - Develop strategy

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Five-Step Assessment Process 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Prioritize needs and challenges Define constraints Explore opportunities for collaboration Translate priorities in options Choose amongst options to develop strategy

Defining the Security Sector • Those organizations within society that are responsible for protecting the state and its citizens • The bodies responsible for management and oversight of the various security forces


The ‘Security Family’ • • • • • • • • • •

Defence forces Police forces Gendarmerie/paramilitary forces Informal security forces Intelligence services Customs enforcement Civil oversight bodies Financial management bodies Judicial and correctional system Civil and political society organizations

Security Sector Reform • Narrow objective: modernizing the military and the police and enhancing their efficiency • Broader objective: rebuilding and transforming the security sector

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Figure 9.1. Linking Priorities, Objectives, and Options Assessment Process Steps 1 and 2 • Prioritize core needs and challenges • Define constraints

National Objectives • Poverty reduction • Peaceful resolution of conflicts • Eradication of corruption

Security-Sector Objectives

• Professional security bodies Step 3 Priorities • Enhance efficient use of scarce resources throughout sector • Develop defence policy

• Democratic accountability of security bodies to civil authorities • High level of

community security

• Reduce crime levels

Options to reduce crime levels and increase community security

• Increase professionalism of police • Strengthen capacity of communities to resist crime • Ensure effective functioning of judiciary

Activities to implement the option of strengthening the capacity of communities to resist crime

• Support development of community watch activities [short term] • Integrate traditional law/custom and national law [medium term] • Develop community policing capacity [long term]

Figure 5.2. A Generic Policy Process (A) Analyzing the Security Environment • Evaluation of all risk factors (internal and external) based on policy guidance/economic framework from cabinet; • Broad national strategy defining government’s approach to these threats and tasks assigned to security bodies.

(B) Developing Policy Papers and Operational Plans • Policy framework for defence, justice/public security, and intelligence; • Operational strategies for individual security bodies; • Assessment of options and decisions/scrutiny by relevant executive/legislative bodies; • Concrete outputs, including policy papers; white papers; operational strategies; strategic reviews; implementing legislation; background papers.

(C) Execution of Policies and Plans • Mobilize/allocate resources; • Implement planned activities; •Evaluate/audit efficiency and effectiveness of activities/outcomes.

Consultation/Information Depending on the issue under consideration, input may be sought from: • Ministry of finance; • Other ministries not directly involved in the review process; • Legislators; • External expert review panels; • Armed forces; • Police; • Paramilitary forces; • Intelligence bodies; • Informal groups of experts from academia, industry, policy community, interest groups • Relevant civil society groups; • Members of the public.

Oversight • Internal, such as internal affairs offices,disciplinary units, inspectorsgeneral, military/police/intelligence auditors, MOD/Ministry of Interior auditors, military police/justice systems; • External, such as legislature, judiciary, police commission, human rights ombudsman, auditors-general.


Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (OSCE) (1) • Section VII: Democratic political control of the armed forces (including paramilitary forces, internal security forces, intelligence services and the police) • Submission to the political control of constitutional authorities at all times • Committed to comply with the requirements international humanitarian law • Committed to observe strict political neutrality in national life

Code of Conduct on PoliticoMilitary Aspects of Security (2) • Fundamental rights and duties of all personnel serving in armed forces • Restraint in national military expenditures and transparency and public access to information related to armed forces

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Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (3) • Section VIII: Democratic use of armed forces • Command, recruitment, training and procurement of armed forces, as well as military policies and doctrines subordinate to the requirements of international humanitarian law in time of peace and war • Internal security missions will be decided and executed under the effective control of constitutionally established authorities and subject to the rule of law

Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (4) • If recourse to force cannot be avoided, its use must commensurate with the needs for enforcement • The armed forces will take due care to avoid injury to civilians and their property • Prohibiting the use of armed forces to limit the peaceful and lawful exercise of their human rights by persons as individuals or as representatives of groups, nor to deprive them of their national, religious, cultural, linguistic, or ethnic identity


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Author Index Bumçi, A. Cizre, Ü. Cole, E. Dokos, T. Donnelly, C. El-Dandarawy, O. Fluri, P.H. Friedrich, R.

71 101 145 v, 39 1 113 145 121

Gill, P. Homan, K. Lutterbeck, D. Muresan, L. Park, B. Tanner, F. Trapans, J.A. van Eekelen, W.

31 183 133 51 13 133 85 21


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Stem Cells and Their Potential for Clinical Application (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series NATO Science for Peace and Security Series A: Chemistry and Biology)

Virus Diseases and Crop Biosecurity (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Nanomaterials: Risks and Benefits (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Kondratieff Waves, Warfare and World Security: Volume 5 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Security Through Science)

Nanotechnology - Toxicological Issues and Environmental Safety (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Promoting the Psych Well Being of Children Following War and Terrorism: Volume 4 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics ... Science, Human and Societal Dynamics)

Problems of High Altitude Medicine and Biology (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series NATO Science for Peace and Security Series A: Chemistry and Biology)

Extreme Man-Made and Natural Hazards in Dynamics of Structures (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Security Sector Transformation in Southeastern Europe and the Middle East (Nato Science for Peace and Security Series. Human and Societal Dynamics)

Social and Psychological Effects of Radiological Terrorism: Volume 29 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Science ... Series: Human and Societal Dynamics)

Complexity and Security (Nato Science for Peace and Series) (Nato Science for Peace and Series)

Hypermedia Seduction for Terrorist Recruiting - Volume 25 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series: Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Science for Peace and Security)

The Media: The Terrorists' Battlefield - Volume 17 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Security Through Science Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics)

Transportation Security Against Terrorism - Volume 54 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human and Societal Dynamics

Modelling Cyber Security: Approaches, Methodology, Strategies - Volume 59 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human and Societal Dynamics

Building Terrorism Resistant Communities: Together Against Terrorism, Volume 55 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human and Societal Dynamics ... Security, E: Human and Societal Dynamics)

Understanding and Responding to Terrorism: Volume 19 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Security Through Science)

Political Violence, Organized Crimes, Terrorism and Youth (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol 46)

Energy and Environmental Challenges to Security (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

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Suicide as a Weapon: Volume 30 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - Human and Societal Dynamics

Building and Using Datasets on Armed Conflicts (Nato Science for Peace and Security) (Nato Science for Peace and Security)

Nuclear Power and Energy Security (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series B: Physics and Biophysics)

Invisible Threats: Financial and Information Technology Crimes and National Security, Volume 10 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Security Through Science)

Quantum Communication and Security (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series: Information and Communication Security) (NATO Security Through Science Series. D: Information and Com)

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Activating Psychosocial Local Resources in Territories Affected by War and Terrorism: Volume 57 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human ... Security, E: Humans and Societal Dynamics)

Nanomaterials: Risks and Benefits (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Stem Cells and Their Potential for Clinical Application (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series NATO Science for Peace and Security Series A: Chemistry and Biology)

Virus Diseases and Crop Biosecurity (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Nanomaterials: Risks and Benefits (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Kondratieff Waves, Warfare and World Security: Volume 5 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Security Through Science)

Nanotechnology - Toxicological Issues and Environmental Safety (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Promoting the Psych Well Being of Children Following War and Terrorism: Volume 4 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics ... Science, Human and Societal Dynamics)

Problems of High Altitude Medicine and Biology (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series NATO Science for Peace and Security Series A: Chemistry and Biology)

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