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SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience. Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action. Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Sub-Series A. B. C. D. E.

Chemistry and Biology Physics and Biophysics Environmental Security Information and Communication Security Human and Societal Dynamics

Springer Science and Business Media Springer Science and Business Media Springer Science and Business Media IOS Press IOS Press

http://www.nato.int/science http://www.springer.com http://www.iospress.nl

Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 29

ISSN 1874-6276

Social and Psychological Effects of Radiological Terrorism

Edited by

Igor Khripunov Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USA

Leonid Bolshov Institute for Nuclear Safety, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

and

Dmitriy Nikonov Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USA

Amsterdam • Berlin • Oxford • Tokyo • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on Psychological Effects of Radiological Terrorism Bratislava, Slovakia 23–24 October 2006

© 2007 IOS Press. All rights reserved. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-58603-787-1 Library of Congress Control Number: 2007938420 Publisher IOS Press Nieuwe Hemweg 6B 1013 BG Amsterdam Netherlands fax: +31 20 687 0019 e-mail: [email protected] Distributor in the UK and Ireland Gazelle Books Services Ltd. White Cross Mills Hightown Lancaster LA1 4XS United Kingdom fax: +44 1524 63232 e-mail: [email protected]

Distributor in the USA and Canada IOS Press, Inc. 4502 Rachael Manor Drive Fairfax, VA 22032 USA fax: +1 703 323 3668 e-mail: [email protected]

LEGAL NOTICE The publisher is not responsible for the use which might be made of the following information. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

Social and Psychological Effects of Radiological Terrorism I. Khripunov et al. (Eds.) IOS Press, 2007 © 2007 IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Preface The threat of radiological terrorism has recently come to the attention of the international community, as it became clear that terrorist organizations are seeking nuclear and radiological material to manufacture and use improvised nuclear devices (IND) and “dirty bombs,” and/or commit acts of sabotage against nuclear power infrastructure. But while nuclear weapons and INDs, much deadlier and more destructive, still remain relatively secure from terrorist access, radiological material is more readily available in large quantities throughout the world. Also, radiological explosives or other dispersal devices are easier to manufacture and use. There is, therefore, a much higher probability that an act of terrorism with the use of radiological material rather than nuclear explosion may occur in the future. According to a survey of more than 100 top foreign policy experts released in June 2006, the probability of attack using dirty bombs was rated at 20 percent followed by attack on chemical or nuclear plant (11 percent), chemical weapon attack (10 percent), biological weapon attack (9 percent), and nuclear weapon attack (6 percent). Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) come in many shapes and sizes. A dirty bomb uses a conventional explosion to scatter radioactive material over an area whose actual size is determined by a multitude of variables and hard to predict in real time. Terrorists could launch an attack by placing a container of radioactive material in a public place and allowing the airflow from the ventilation system to distribute it. An airplane can easily disperse radioactive material as a powder or an aerosol. On a grand scale, a nuclear facility could become an RDD. Intentional damage done to a nuclear power plant or other site could release radiation, contaminating the immediate surroundings or even beyond. RDDs of any kind present a potent and effective terrorist weapon because they threaten to expose civilian populaces to radiation – engendering panic out of proportion to the modest number of casualties likely to result from limited doses of radiation. Coming to terms with the psychological and social dimensions of radiological attacks – areas that are inadequately studied and assessed – is thus a matter of considerable importance for those entrusted with national, and ultimately international, security.

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Acknowledgements The authors and editors would like to express their gratitude to NATO, U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration, Washington Group International, Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate, and European Commission’s Joint Research Centre for their support of the workshop. We also thank Mr. Christopher Tucker and Mr. Jeff Emmanuel, researchers at the Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, for their contribution to compiling and editing this volume.

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Contents Preface

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Acknowledgements

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Opening Panel

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Psychologically Immunizing the Public Against Radiological Terrorism: Facts Can Free Their Minds Charles D. Ferguson

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Radiological Terrorism: Threat, Priorities in Prevention, and Minimization of Consequences Rafael V. Arutyunian, Leonid A. Bolshov and Oleg A. Pavlovskiy

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Planning for a Radiological Emergency: Concepts, Requirements and Achievements in Germany Leopold Weil

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Countering Radiological Terrorism: Consequences of the Radiation Exposure Incident in Goiania (Brazil) Friedrich Steinhäusler

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Socioeconomic and Psychological Consequences of Large Radiation Accidents: Russian Experience R.V. Arutyunian, I.I. Linge and E.M. Melikhova

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Radiological Consequences of the Kyshtym Accident Oleg A. Pavlovskiy

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Looking at Radiological Terrorism Through the Eyes of the Public: The First Step in a Meaningful Government-Public Partnership Roz D. Lasker

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A Heuristic Interrogation of the Human Spirit: Cultural Crossroads in an Age of Modern Terrorism Michael D. Barnett

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What Can the Science and Technology Community Contribute? Bill Durodié Closing Panel. Radiological Terrorism: Public Response and the Search for Resilience James Holmes

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Appendices Appendix I: List of Participants

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Appendix II: Workshop Agenda Appendix III: Psychological Impact of Radiological Terrorism: Demystifying the Mystery. Background Paper for the NATO-Russia Advanced Research Workshop “Social and Psychological Effects of Radiological Terrorism” Igor Khripunov Author Index

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157

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Opening Panel Igor Khripunov The workshop was conceived by co-directors Dr. Leonid Bolshov and me as an interdisciplinary forum at the crossroads of security studies, physics, sociology, psychology, and disaster management, because apparently this may be the only effective way to respond to concerns regarding the human dimension of radiological terrorism and develop a practical strategy that can be implemented for the benefit of the people. Our concept is to get experts out of their professional boxes, put them together and create an environment that would be conducive to discussion among them. Most papers that I came across, as I did research on the subject over the last year or so, were written inside those boxes, but we can benefit a lot from working together and producing something really joint. If you look through the preliminary list of participants, you will realize that there are many people representing those isolated boxes that are very important on their own merits, but that their contribution can be even more important when working together. My initial intention was to let you introduce yourself and speak about your background, so that all would understand where you came from, etc., but I am afraid that that may take a lot of time, and that we may lose our momentum at the very beginning of our workshop, so I urge you as you start your presentations, or as you offer comments for the first time, to give a brief indication as to your background. Whether you come from psychiatry, security studies or sociology, making your background known may facilitate interaction with the rest of the people. My next point is that we really are on the cutting edge of research. Thus, we have a lot of responsibility to come up with tangible results for our workshop. Let me give you three examples: Out of the five missions listed in the Global Initiative against Nuclear Terrorism which was adopted by Bush and Putin last July, one is to respond to and mitigate the consequences of nuclear terrorism. This global initiative is a rare example of a high-level document in which nuclear terrorism is put together with radiological terrorism, so it is clear that in terms of human consequences we are dealing with a threat no less devastating than manufacturing improvised nuclear devices or acquiring nuclear bombs. Given the availability of radioactive substances and low-tech requirements, radiological terrorism is more likely than most other acts of unconventional terrorism. The second document that I want to refer you to is the new White House strategy to combat terrorism that was released just before the past anniversary of September 11th. There is an entire paragraph in that document which speaks of a culture of preparedness involving all stakeholders - the government at all levels, private industry, and the public - and we here are involved in just that: developing this culture of preparedness in discussing and focusing on the public. The third document that is consistent with our workshop and our work is the most recent UN document and UN strategy that was released on behalf of the secretary general of the United Nations in April 2006. This

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Opening Panel

document urges governments to put systems in place to identify victims of terrorism and to facilitate their transition back to dignified and fruitful lives. My next comment is regarding our procedure. We have three keynote speakers after this introductory session, as well as seven panels; you have the most recent updated agenda in your folders. For your information, prepared presentations are for attribution. Comment and discussion is not for attribution; if we have media people in this hall, you can be assured that our debates will not be attributed to you personally. I will give twenty minutes to speakers and leave at least twenty to half an hour for a panel to conduct freewheeling discussion. I think contributing to the discussion is very important. At the luncheons, Leopold Weil and Rafael Arutyunian will speak regarding Germany and Russia’s preparedness, as well as on how our countries react and plan their strategies. Our last session will be about what kind of document we can produce on the basis of our debate. Dr. Jim Holmes will be sitting through all of the sessions collecting thoughts, and will share these thoughts with you at the very last session, which he will chair. We are trying to produce a preliminary report of our proceedings to be shared later with NATO, governments, international organizations, etc. After we develop the draft, we will share it via email with all participants for comments, and then will produce a draft report that will also be emailed to potential recipients. After that, we will compile a final report with more details. I can identify two useful recipients of our report. In November - at least according to the schedule of G8 activity from 2006 - there will be a G8 conference in Moscow on the role of private industry and government in combating terrorism, so we will submit our report through Dr. Bolshov in Moscow. The second recipient will be the German government, as Germany will be hosting the G-8 summit next year, and hopefully our report covering social and psychological facts regarding terrorism will be used in preparing the agenda for the next G-8 summit. I do not think our workshop is an end in itself. I hope that some of our guests will continue working on these issues and establish a core group of professionals to push forward with this interdisciplinary approach and understanding, I would appreciate it if you have ideas in this regard to share. We will break and then see if our keynote speakers are prepared. Marta Žiaková and Simon Wessely are here. Simon Wessely was the chairman of the first NATO workshop on the psychological effects of WMD, held back in 2002. We are all looking forward to his remarks that may give us chance to understand how the situation has changed since 2002, and what is new on the scene and what we have to be alerted to.

Marta Žiaková I would like to express that it is an honor as the Chairperson of the Slovak Republic Nuclear Regulatory Authority and member of the organizing committee to welcome you to this workshop and to Slovakia. We are very pleased with, and appreciate, this occasion offered by Dr. Igor Khripunov, associate director of the Center for International Trade and Security. I regret to inform you that Dr. Leonid Bolshov could not join us today; however, he is represented by his deputy, Dr. Rafael Arutyunian. I would also like to recognize Dr. Fernando Carvalho Rodriguez, Director of the Public Policy Division of NATO,

Opening Panel

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and commend him for supporting this workshop. I believe this workshop will allow experts to plan common action in dealing with radiological threat of international terrorism, share methodologies, avoid duplication of effort, and deal with consequences. In discussion with other colleagues, sharing of information with the general public is an important way by which multinational corporations can operate under the national security framework. The participants at this workshop will treat transnational threats and risks with new strategies, experiences, and expertise. As representative of the host country, I would like to thank those organizing the workshop. I hope that your stay in Slovakia hopes you better know our people and that you enjoy Bratislava.

Simon Wessely I am the professor of psychiatry at King’s College in London and an epidemiologist, and I do a lot of work with the UK Armed Forces on the health of the armed forces after the Gulf War and War in Iraq. I deal with nuclear and chemical preparedness in the UK. I am most glad to be here, as it is the first time I have been to Bratislava, and it is the town that my father was born in. In 2002, Fernando Rodriguez landed me in it by asking me in a matter of six to eight weeks to organize the first NATO-Russia workshop on the psychological and social consequences of terrorism at that time. Back then, the first thing we did was look at a series of case histories of what we would call “notorious examples” such as Chernobyl, Tokyo sarin attacks, Goiania and so forth. Since then, we have been lucky that there have been no new CBN incidents to study. The threat to us has shown thus far to be mostly of a conventional nature, such as those in London, Madrid, and Bombay, and the planned attacks of August 2006 on the aircraft crossing the Atlantic. Our threats remain conventional. In 2002, one of the talks we heard was from Tom Glass, who looked at short-term behaviors on how people behave in disasters, terrorist disasters, and so forth. He came up with at the time what seemed like a challenging proposition, and he noted that we had greatly underestimated individuals’ and groups’ efforts to come together and perform rescues in the event of an acute emergency. In the history of my country, the authorities assumed panic in the streets and collapse of civic society during World War II, something that did not happen. Tom Glass looked at the evacuation of the World Trade Center and showed how people came together during that incident, as opposed to falling apart. It seems clear that actually in these terrible events, although anxiety is almost universal, panic and disorganized behavior is exceptionally rare. A great deal of rescuing and crisis relief is done in the moment by the population itself and not our emergency services. The long-term concerns, however, continue. Back in 2002, we spent a great deal of time discussing Gulf War syndrome, the strange illnesses that had afflicted a large proportion of the armed forces of the US, British, and others. We did so because it was becoming clear that the main cause of that was fear of chemical warfare and radiation as expressed through fear of weapons such as depleted uranium. You know, as nuclear physicists, that this is not a radioactive source, but the population does not. The word uranium itself can cause a great deal of anxiety in many of the armed forces. Nearly half of all the U.S. forces, nearly 350 thousand people, believe they were exposed to chemical weapons during the Gulf War, although they were not.

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Opening Panel

It has become clear that our fear of these weapons, and our beliefs that we may have been poisoned by them, are far more important than the actual exposures themselves. This next war in that region has given us a chance to see if that situation has repeated itself. We attempted to discover if British forces had been afflicted with a new Gulf War syndrome and our studies have shown that, so far, they have not. Yet, there have been other long-term impacts of terrorism that have not been completely studied yet. The rate of distress in New York City has gone down greatly in recent years, and studies of normal Londoners showed the same thing in that after 6 months, distress greatly decreased. However, new research shows that rates of distress are going up again and that half of those studied in Manhattan have post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Why? One of the reasons is that we can mismanage social consequences of disasters with our own responses. Some of the psychological treatments that we do for people after terrorist incidents not only do not work but can make people worse. The way in which we have asked people immediately after a disaster how they are feeling and give them education, or psychological debriefing, on how to cope, has been showed by new studies to be a waste of time and money but can also increase the rate of psychological disorder by getting in the way of resilience, social networks, and natural coping. The enormous successful response in places like New York has led to an increase in psychological departments’ getting in the way of people’s normal coping mechanisms like talking with families, colleagues, priests, i.e. people in their lives and not mental health professionals. One of the things that has become clearer in 2002 is the way we can score our own goals in our own responses and impede natural recovery. We also heard from an enthusiastic Texan psychologist about communication, especially how people communicate with each other after a disaster. Communicating after disasters has become clearer in its importance. After the London bombings, we showed that people who were able to make contact quickly with their families had much lower psychological distress than those who did not. That, coupled with similar work in the US and Israel, showed that an important part of resilience is communication after a disaster. It is too easy for authorities to switch off mobile phone networks during a disaster, which is wrong; allowing people to talk quickly in short messages to ensure their own safety and that of their family decreases the psychological impact of disasters and terrorism. Communication with populations, risk communication, and talking to the population after disasters. Everyone knew after 2002 that it was important, yet few people knew how to do it well. Rudy Giuliani and Tony Blair could do it well. Dick Cheney and those who communicated over the Washington Sniper could not do it. What is it that some people do right and others do wrong? Actions must back up words. You cannot tell people to go about their business and tell people everyone will be okay at the same time as you, the Vice President of the United States, are hiding in an undisclosed location. Giving people information is just as important as giving people actions; you cannot let people be passive victims; you must give people active participation and roles to play and things that they can do. Back in 2002, we were worried that no one had spent any time preparing these messages because we heard that the window of opportunity to get your message across after a terrorist disaster is less than 60 minutes. However, now, a lot has gone into preparing messages in advance so that people know what to say. That 60-minute window is now less than 15 minutes with mobile phone technology. People send images direct to the news desks long before the government and emergency preparedness has its acts together.

Opening Panel

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We also talked about the evidence of studies that people have little information about chemical, bio, and radiological risks. That has not changed much; most of the population in the UK is remarkably ignorant in these matters, despite information leaflets sent to every household in the country on these issues. Half of the population denied ever receiving the leaflet, a quarter received and didn’t read, another quarter read it but couldn’t remember anything in it; virtually nobody could remember anything in it. But does that matter? Probably not. We also know from work in Israel in 2003 that when the government decided it needed to know about civilian preparedness on chemical weapons, the knowledge level went up from 20 to 90 percent in 10 days with their running opinion poll, once people decided they needed the information, they got it and remembered it. There are many sources of very good information and detection that are there, and I think that’s probably enough; when people feel the threat is high, they will access that information. We also looked at interventions and what you do, and showed psychological management was a mess, none of the interventions we did were useful. However, we have made some progress in treating the small amount of people that have been affected by terrorism, and are trying to move toward a public health policy in the UK to concentrate resources on the small amount of people that need help, and not waste it on the large amount that do not. After a terrorist incident, there will be many upset people; let’s not treat those that don’t need help for psychological problems, and pick up people that do. What has been the biggest change since 2002? It’s the shift in emphasis from seeing populations as vulnerable to seeing populations as resilient. One of our jobs is to promote resilience and to realize that they have more resources than we think and one of our jobs is to allow people to access those resources with better communication among themselves. The second biggest change since 2002 is the realization that the way we managed radiological and chemical risk in a time of low risk has been very flawed, and that the constant emphasis on precaution and strategy used in UK and other countries has had an unfortunate side effect of making people more anxious, more riskaverse, more frightened of chemicals and radiation, and has acted as a force multiplier increasing anxiety. If there is a major attack, we will find people more fearful and more anxious due to our own risk management in peacetime. That is the biggest challenge we face. I think that, although a large amount of people accept this, it’s difficult to change policy in that direction to make people more tolerant and less scared.

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Psychologically Immunizing the Public against Radiological Terrorism: Facts can Free Their Minds Charles D. FERGUSON Fellow for Science and Technology Council on Foreign Relations Abstract. A successful campaign to educate the public about radiological terrorism must begin with scientifically credible and easily understood information about the potential threats. This paper provides the foundational information needed to understand radiological terrorism. In particular, the paper defines the different types of radiological attacks: dispersing radiation through using radiological dispersal devices or radiation emission devices or releasing radiation through attacks or sabotage of nuclear facilities such as nuclear power plants or plutonium reprocessing sites. Also, the paper examines the physical and psychological barriers terrorists confront when deciding whether to perpetrate an act of radiological terrorism. To date, few terrorist groups have expressed interest in radiological terrorism; however, it is important to understand that terrorist motivations are dynamic. Groups could become more or less attracted to radiological terrorism depending on internal and external influences, including the threat perceptions authorities broadcast to the public and terrorists.

1.

Understanding Radiological Terrorism

What is wrong with saying: “nuclear dirty bomb” or “dirty nuclear bomb”? The answer is that such terms conflate nuclear bombs with dirty bombs. This sloppy language confuses the public and misleads people into believing that a weapon of mass destruction – a nuclear bomb – is comparable to a weapon of mass disruption – a dirty bomb. Even professionals in the field of security studies have slipped at times and used these misnomers. An important lesson for the news media, academic experts, policymakers, and political leaders is that words matter. Contrary to the children’s nursery rhyme about the harm done by sticks and stones in comparison to words, the terms used to describe something, especially a weapon, can have a lasting and damaging psychological effect. The term “dirty bomb” also represents a misleading concept in certain respects, conjuring up such images as that of a stick of dynamite strapped to some radioactive material. In general, the term makes people think of conventional explosives coupled to a radioactive substance. Both the news media and the public have seized on the term dirty bomb. Using Lexis-Nexis, an authoritative news archival search service, one finds a plethora of press references to “dirty bomb,” but very few mentions of the more wonkish term “radiation dispersal device” or “radiological dispersal device” (RDD). While a radiation dispersal device can, of course, take the crude form of dynamite strapped to a radioactive source, radiation or radiological weapons can use dispersal methods other than conventional explosives to spread radioactivity. Depending on the chemical composition of the radioactive source, non-explosive methods could result in

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C.D. Ferguson / Psychologically Immunizing the Public Against Radiological Terrorism

more effective dispersal than explosive methods. For example, technically-skilled terrorists could spray radioactive materials from crop dusters or introduce such materials in food or water supplies.1 However, engineering crop dusters to disperse micron-sized aerosols of radioactive material can pose daunting technical challenges. Concerning water supplies, even radioactive sources containing large amounts of water-soluble radioactive materials would not typically possess enough material to significantly contaminate public water supplies. Radiation weapons can also act “passively” in that the material emitting the radiation is not dispersed, but instead remains stationary while it emits radiation to the surrounding environment. This passive radiation weapon is sometimes termed a radiation emission device (RED). A terrorist group could, for example, place an RED in a crowded location such as an urban train station. Moreover, fire produced by incendiary materials could disperse radioactive substances. This radiation incendiary device (RID) could greatly complicate the work of firefighters and other emergency responders in combating fires and rescuing people from burning and radioactively contaminated buildings. To combat this, firefighters can and should be trained to understand that wearing protective gear can mitigate the radiation hazard so as to not seriously impede firefighting and other life-saving activities.2 Most radioactive materials are not easily dispersed by any mechanism, be it fire, explosives, etc. The relatively common radioactive material cesium-137 and its typical chemical form illustrate the ease of dispersing certain types of radioactive substances without using conventional explosives. In commercially available radioactive sources, Cesium-137 is usually found in the chemical compound cesium chloride (a talcum powder-like substance). Like talc, this material can easily be carried by wind and air currents, unlike talc, though, widespread contamination would result if the sealed source containing the material is breached. Such an accident happened in 1987 in Goiania, Brazil. Looking for scrap metal, scavengers broke into an abandoned medical clinic. They found a teletherapy cancer treatment machine that contained a sealed source of cesium chloride. The source contained a relatively large amount of radioactivity. Not knowing they were handling a radioactive substance, the scavengers breached the source’s seal, causing cesium chloride, a glittery blue substance, to be released. Enticed by the carnival-type glitter, a girl covered parts of her body with the substance. She and three others died from radiation sickness, and several square kilometers of Goiania were contaminated because of this incident. More than 100,000 people believed they were contaminated (although only a very small fraction – a little more than one hundred – of this group were), and this “worried well” demanded medical treatment and needlessly complicated health services. Lax or nonexistent controls over radioactive materials, combined with an easily dispersible substance, resulted in one of the world’s worst radiation accidents. After extensive decontamination efforts, almost all of the radioactive material was removed and safely stored. So far, with no terrorist RDDs having been used, this event is the best example we have of what could happen in a radiological attack. The Goiania accident underscores an important concept for almost all radiological attacks. Unlike a nuclear bomb, an RDD is not a weapon of mass destruction. Instead, 1

Peter D. Zimmerman with Cheryl Loeb, “Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited,” Defense Horizons 38, January 2004. 2 Joseph W. Pfeifer, Chief, Counterterrorism and Emergency Preparedness, New York City Fire Department, presentation to the Council on Foreign Relations, September 8, 2006.


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experts call an RDD a weapon of mass disruption because, while few if any people would die soon after exposure to the ionizing radiation from a radiation weapon, the radioactive contamination could cause massive social and psychological disruption. The Goiania accident also indicates that decontamination, although expensive, can be successful. However, the stigma Goiania has associated with it to this day because of the radiological event shows that the psychological burden can last for many years. The psychological and physical health effects from an RDD are a result of people’s emotional and physiological reactions to ionizing radiation. Ionizing radiation consists of very energetic charged particles such as high-speed helium nuclei (alpha radiation), fast-moving electrons (beta radiation), or extremely energetic packets of light (x-rays and gamma radiation). Alpha radiation can be blocked by a piece of paper or the dead outer layer of skin. Beta radiation is more penetrating than alpha radiation, but a thin piece of aluminum, for example, can stop beta particles. Gamma radiation is even more penetrating than alpha or beta radiation and requires lead sheets or thick concrete, for example, to block it. These forms of radiation can knock electrons off of atoms, which then form ions. If too many of these ions are formed inside living tissue, the body struggles or sometimes fails to repair the damage. At high doses of radiation exposure, radiation sickness can occur. At very high doses, death can happen. Low doses would not likely result in noticeable health effects in the near term, but even small amounts of radiation raise the probability of developing cancer over a period of several years. Deterministic health effects such as nausea and hair loss arise from large doses of radiation exposure and are called “deterministic” because they have a direct causal relationship between the amount of radiation received and the harm to health experienced. A healthy person would usually have to absorb at least 0.5 sieverts (50 rem) radiation over a short period of time to begin to manifest deterministic health effects. 3 At higher exposures of 2.5 to 6 sieverts, death can occur in many of the exposed population. At even higher doses of 6 to 10 sieverts, death will happen in most, if not all, of the people exposed. While powerful unshielded radioactive sources used in some commercial applications could cause deterministic effects, including death, an RDD, by its very nature, would usually not result in such harm for many, if any, people. This is because an RDD is designed to spread radioactive materials, and the act of spreading dilutes the effects of the radioactive source. Therefore, an RDD would expose people in the surrounding vicinity of the attack to relatively low doses of ionizing radiation. Such doses could cause stochastic effects, such as cancer. The term “stochastic” refers to the random or probabilistic nature of the exposure, almost like rolling dice. The vast majority of people exposed to low doses of radiation from an RDD would not develop cancer (for them, the dice would land in a winning position). Unfortunately, a small fraction of people are predicted to develop cancer - in other words, the dice for them would land in a losing position. A complicating factor for policymakers and health

3 The amount of radiation energy absorbed by a target material, such as living tissue, per unit mass is referred to as the absorbed dose and is measured in grays, where one gray equals one joule of energy deposited per kilogram of the absorber. The older unit of absorbed dose, which is still widely used in the United States, is the rad, where 100 rad = 1 gray. The does equivalent equals a quality factor times the absorbed dose. The quality factor for alpha particles is 20, and it is 1 for beta particles and gamma rays. Internationally, the scientific unit for dose equivalent is the sievert. In the United States, the unit for dose equivalent is the rem, where 100 rem = 1 sievert.

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professionals is that it is impossible to predict what particular individuals will develop cancer from the exposure. Another complicating consideration is that the statistical prediction of what fraction of the exposed population will develop cancer is also in doubt. Currently, public health policy subscribes to the linear-no-threshold (LNT) model. The LNT model predicts that there is no threshold below which a radiation dose does not lead to cancer and that even very low doses can cause cancer with the probability of cancer development rising linearly as a function of dose. Many health physicists, though, subscribe to a threshold theory, which says that the body can always successfully repair radiation damage caused by exposure below the threshold amount.4 While radiation specialists and health professionals work to sort out this controversy, the conservative approach of applying the LNT model has been taken. The LNT model would predict a risk of cancer of about 0.05 per sievert-person of exposure. Very few people, if any, would be immediately exposed to as much as one sievert in a typical RDD attack. If a dirty bomb were detonated, the immediate risk of injury would come from the conventional bomb blast. People near the detonation site should avoid inhaling radioactive dust. Doing so would protect them from the primary radiation hazard. While an N95-rated particulate filter is ideal to cover the nose and mouth, hardly any people will have such protection available. Even a cloth shirt, though, would provide useful protection. Next, people should seek shelter. These simple steps, if communicated to people in advance of the attack, could significantly reduce the potential harm resulting from the detonation of an RDD.5 The secondary radiation hazard results from residual radiation for those remaining in the contaminated area for a long time. If the RDD released large amounts of radioactivity, if decontamination efforts were not successful, and if people continued to live in the contaminated area for decades, a relatively large portion of that population could experience a cumulative amount of exposure that could increase their risk of developing cancer. (Background radiation varies from region to region, but most people will be exposed to 0.15 or more Sieverts from background radiation over their lifetimes.) Under the scenario of a powerful RDD that cannot be adequately decontaminated, perhaps about a hundred persons out of a population of 10,000 could develop cancer, based on the LNT prediction, over many years of exposure. In comparison, it is predicted that at least 20 percent or 2,000 out of a population of 10,000 people will die from all causes of cancer. Convincing an individual member of the public that his or her cancer did not develop as a result of an RDD attack would be a very challenging task. What is needed is to develop an effective means of communicating the actual risk to the public before an attack takes place, and to develop more effective means of decontamination to mitigate the long-term health risks and short-term economic effects. The vast majority of radioactive materials would not cause this level of predicted effects if used in an RDD. While millions of radioactive sources are used worldwide, only a small fraction of those sources could fuel potent RDDs. Nonetheless, this small fraction still contains thousands of sources. Potent commercial sources, found at hospitals, universities, and industrial sites, usually include radioactive isotopes such as americium-241, californium-252, cesium-137, cobalt-60, iridium-192, radium-226, 4

Health Physics Society, “Radiation Risk in Perspective,” Position Statement, Revised August 2004. For more details about what people should do in the event of an RDD attack, see Lynn E. Davis, Tom LaTourette, David E. Mosher, Lois M. Davis, and David R. Howell, “Individual Preparedness and Response to Chemical Radiological, Nuclear, and Biological Attacks: A Quick Guide,” RAND, 2003. 5


11

strontium-90, and plutonium-238. Except for naturally occurring radium-226, all of these isotopes are produced in nuclear reactors for bulk quantity commercial production. (Though californium-252 and plutonium-238 are now rarely used, many disused sources still contain the latter.) See table 1 for a listing of the properties of these radioisotopes. These eight radioisotopes fall into two classes of concern. The first class, containing isotopes that emit alpha radiation or relatively low energy gamma radiation, may cause internal health problems if ingested or inhaled in amounts that can do harm to living tissues. These four internal health hazard radioisotopes are americium-241, californium-252, plutonium-238, and radium-226. The second class of radioisotopes emits high-energy gamma radiation or high-energy beta radiation. The four radioisotopes in this class, which can pose both internal and external health hazards, are cesium-137, cobalt-60, iridium-192, and strontium-90. The last isotope listed is primarily an internal hazard because it does not emit high-energy gamma radiation, though it does emit high-energy beta radiation, which can damage unprotected eyes. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), radioactive sources fall into five categories.6 Table 2 lists the types of radioactive sources that could fuel relatively potent RDDs. The IAEA categorization described here generally follows the safety risk of a source - that is, what harm to health an unshielded source can cause. Security risk in general tends to track the safety risk, but these risk assessments can differ depending on the consideration of other risk factors (such as whether a source is portable, or whether it is located in a place accessible to terrorists). Category 1 sources could cause permanent injury in a few minutes, or death in several minutes to an hour, if the subject of radiation is near an unshielded source. These sources include radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs), food irradiation sources, research and blood irradiators, and teletherapy machines. Category 2 sources, which include industrial gamma radiography devices and high and medium dose rate brachytherapy sources, could cause permanent injury in several minutes to an hour or death in few hours to days if near an unshielded source. Category 3 sources, which include level gauges, well logging sources, and low dose rate brachytherapy sources, could cause permanent injury in days to weeks but are unlikely to be fatal if a person is near an unshielded source. Finally, categories 4 and 5 sources are extremely unlikely to cause permanent injury or death. These sources include diagnostic medical and medical research sources, smoke detectors, and other detectors such as aerosol and chemical agent detectors.

6 International Atomic Energy Agency, “Categorization of Radioactive Sources,” IAEA-TECDOC-1344, July 2003.

12


433 years

Table 1: Radioisotopes of concern Specific Activity High Energy GBq/g (Ci/g) Alpha Emissions 125.8 (3.4) Yes

High Energy Beta Emissions No

High Energy Gamma Emissions Low energy

2.7 years

19,832 (536)

Yes

No

Low energy

88 years

636.4 (17.2)

Yes

No

Low energy

1,600 years

37 (1)

Yes

No

Low energy

30 years [2.6 min]

3,256 [19,980 million] (88 [540 million])

N/A

Low energy [Low energy]

N/A [Yes]

5.3 years

40,700 (1,100)

N/A

Low energy

Yes

74 days

>16,650 (>450) std >37,000 (>1,000) high 5,180 [20.35 million] (140 [550,000])

N/A

Yes

Yes

N/A

Yes [Yes]

N/A [Low energy]

Radioisotope

Half-life

Americium241 (Am-241) Californium252 (Cf-252) Plutonium-238 (Pu-238) Radium-226 (Ra-226) Cesium-137 (Cs-137) [Barium-137m (Ba-137m)] Cobalt-60 (Co-60) Iridium-192 (Ir-192)

Strontium-90 (Sr-90) [Yttrium-90 (Y-90)]

29 years [64 hours]

Category 1 and 2 sources are considered by all experts to be the highest risk categories because of their clear potential threat to human health. Experts disagree, though, about whether to consider category 3 sources as high risk. One point of disagreement is whether or not to include stochastic health effects in assessing the consequences from a radioactive source used in an RDD. The IAEA categorization document specifically excludes stochastic effects from consideration in the categorization criteria because “the deterministic effects resulting from an accident or malicious act are likely to overshadow any increased stochastic risk in the short term.”7 Nonetheless, concerns about stochastic effects (e.g., increased risk of cancer) would add to people’s psychological burden in the aftermath of an RDD. In terms of reducing the immediate threat to health, though, governmental and inter-governmental security efforts on the top two categories of sources is the correct first-order of business. Type of Source or Application Sterilization and food irradiation

Radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) Research and irradiators

7

Ibid, p. 4.

blood

Table 2: High-risk radioactive sources Radioisotope Typical Radioactivity Level GBq (Ci) Cobalt-60 148 million (Up to 4 million) Cesium-137 111 million (Up to 3 million) Strontium-90 740,000 (20,000) Plutonium-238 10,360 (280) Cobalt-60 88,800-925,000 (2,400-25,000)

Source Categorization 1

1

1

C.D. Ferguson / Psychologically Immunizing the Public Against Radiological Terrorism Cesium-137 Single-beam teletherapy

Cobalt-60

259,000-555,000 (7,000-15,000) 148,000 (4,000) 18,500 (500) 259,000 (7,000) 2,220 (60)

Iridium-192

3,700 (100)

Cobalt-60 Cesium-137 Iridium-192 Cesium-137 Americium241/Beryllium Californium-252 (rare use) Cobalt-60

370 (10) 111 (3) 222 (6) 0.74-74 (0.02-2) 0.74-74 (0.02-2)

Cesium-137

0.74-74 (0.02-2)

Cobalt-60 Cesium-137

Multi-beam teletherapy (gamma knife, e.g.) Industrial radiography

High- and medium-dose brachytherapy Well logging

Level and gauges

conveyor

Cobalt-60

13

1

1 2

2

3

37 (1) 0.74-74 (0.02-2)

3

Another point of disagreement hinges on the extent to which social, psychological, and economic factors should be considered when ranking the potential harm from a radioactive source used in an RDD. The IAEA categorization guidance explicitly excludes “socio-economic consequences” because “the methodology to quantify and compare these effects, especially on an international basis, is not yet fully developed.”8 While the guidance acknowledges that category 3 sources dispersed in an RDD would require decontamination “in accordance with international standards,” the contaminated area “would probably not exceed a small fraction of a square kilometer.”9 The message appears to be: while there is no international basis to measure socio-economic effects, cleanup of radioactive material should meet international standards. The IAEA categorization guidance, though recently revised in 2003, shows that more international work is required to understand, measure, and account for socio-economic effects. Consequences such as deterministic and stochastic health effects, while vitally important, are only part of assessing the risk from an RDD. Understanding risk also requires determining how likely it is that a radioactive source will end up in an RDD. The radioactivity content of a source affects consequences and likelihood of use in an RDD. The more radioactivity a source has, the greater the consequences from its dispersal in an RDD. On the other hand, sources with large amounts of radioactivity can themselves present a barrier to acquisition by terrorists or other malicious persons. Even suicidal terrorists could quickly receive a lethal dose from large amounts of radioactivity if they did not take adequate safety precautions. For this reason, many (if not almost all) terrorists would avoid very highly radioactive materials. For example, spent nuclear fuel storage sites at nuclear power plants contain thousands of tons of highly radioactive material. But this material is typically too heavy and too radioactive for terrorists to remove safely. Thus, it is more likely that terrorists planning radiological attacks would acquire relatively portable commercial radioactive sources

8 9

Ibid, p. 4. Ibid, p. 28.

14


containing significant quantities of radioactivity, but in amounts that can be handled without producing a lethal dose within minutes of exposure. Some of the commercial radioactive sources in category 1, such as food irradiation sources, are also heavy and very highly radioactive. Terrorists would tend to shy away from handling those sources, but they could consider attacks against food irradiation facilities. While such an attack would probably not lead to a significant release of ionizing radiation outside of the facility (if any were released at all), it could spark alarm in the surrounding community. Other category 1 sources, such as RTGs, blood irradiators, and research irradiators, also contain large quantities of radioactivity, but are more portable than spent nuclear fuel from commercial power plants or even food irradiation sources (unless smaller pieces of spent fuel or food irradiation sources are separated from their larger components). Portability can increase the security risk of a radioactive source because it can be more easily moved by malicious persons. Most RTGs and research and blood irradiators are relatively heavy devices, with many weighing hundreds of kilograms. However, not all of these devices are that heavy. For example, just a few months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, three woodsmen in the Republic of Georgia discovered an orphaned RTG which was portable enough to be carried. Likewise, if thieves or terrorists have access to the proper tools, they could conceivably dismantle RTGs or irradiators to extract the potent radioactive sources. Still, the large quantities of radiation emitted by category 1 sources could deter terrorists. Terrorist groups wanting to commit radiological attacks might reason that RDDs would not cause massive destruction and would at best result in massive disruption. Consequently, these groups could seek to minimize the chances of suffering lethal doses by not handling category 1 sources. Instead, they could try to obtain category 2 or 3 sources, which still have significant amounts of radioactivity but could be handled for a relatively long period of time before causing deterministic health effects. Most types of category 2 and 3 sources are also relatively portable, thereby raising the security risk level. Another important security factor is where the source is typically used or stored. Radioactive materials are located in many settings, from relatively accessible commonplace facilities, such as hospitals, universities, and oil well sites, to not-soaccessible places, such as nuclear power plants, spent nuclear fuel storage sites, and nuclear research reactor facilities. Hospitals and universities are relatively open places with ready access to the public. Security measures such as locked doors and guards can provide protection in these settings, but the level of protection would usually not match that found at sites containing fissile materials such as plutonium or highly enriched uranium that could power nuclear bombs. Oil well logging sources are used in the oil prospecting industry and can typically be found at relatively remote sites. However, guarding these places against intruders can be difficult; in recent years, for example, such sources have been stolen from oil well sites in Nigeria. Not only could terrorist groups could try to steal or buy radioactive sources, but they could also find abandoned sources (also known as “orphan sources”). An orphan source is defined as any source that is outside of regulatory control. The exact number of orphan sources is unknown, but estimates of the number of high risk orphan sources range from hundreds to thousands worldwide. While governmental regulatory agencies have been trying to tighten controls on radioactive sources, many countries still have relatively weak regulations in this area. Even in countries where the controls have been strengthened, there are concerns that terrorists could pose as legitimate users and buy sources using phony licensing documents. For example, in early 2006, the U.S.


15

Government Accountability Office reported that its investigators were able to use phony documents to bring radioactive sources from Canada and Mexico into the United States.10 Faced with increased security concerns, major manufacturers of radioactive sources have begun to discuss ways of reducing the likelihood of their sources being used in radiological attacks. Only a handful of countries produce most of the commercial radioactive sources and include Argentina, Britain, Canada, France, Russia, and the United States. 11 Most of these nations are members of the Group of Eight (G8) industrialized counties. Consequently, government action focused first on the G8 level can rapidly implement new controls and regulations over radioactive sources. In order for the worldwide radioactive materials control system to be strengthened, new rules at the G8 level must also quickly propagate to the thousands of consumers around the globe. In recent years, the G8 has focused more attention on radioactive source security and, in particular, has moved to strengthen export controls on radioactive sources. Governmental and industrial efforts to improve security over radioactive sources should encompass the entire life cycle of sources from creation of a radioisotope in a nuclear reactor to use of that isotope in a source to disposal or recycling of a disused source. This holistic approach should also protect against the insider threat including licensing fraud and use of the Internet to purchase sources in an attempt to bypass regulatory controls.

2.

Attacks on or Sabotage against Nuclear Facilities

In addition to radiological weapons, radiological terrorism could involve attacks on or sabotage against nuclear facilities. To date, the terrorist-related incidents and attacks against nuclear facilities have resulted in relatively minor damage with no release of radioactive material into the environment. Terrorists who want to maximize the damage from an attack on a nuclear facility would target those facilities containing large inventories of radioactive materials. Such facilities include operating nuclear power plants, spent fuel storage pools (usually located on nuclear power plant sites), plutonium separation or reprocessing plants (along with associated facilities for spent fuel storage, liquid high-level radioactive waste storage, and liquid high-level radioactive waste processing), and research reactor sites (but these facilities tend to contain much less radioactivity than commercial power plant reactor sites). 12 About 440 commercial nuclear power plants are currently operating in 31 countries; most power plants have one or more spent fuel storage pools; about 280 research reactors are running in 56 countries; civilian reprocessing plants are operating in France, Britain, India, Russia, and Japan; and military reprocessing plants are found in India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea. The totality of these facilities presents a relatively targetrich environment for terrorists. 10

U.S. Government Accountability Office, Border Security: Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation’s Borders at Two Locations, GAO-06-583T, March 28, 2006. 11 Charles D. Ferguson, Tahseen Kazi, and Judith Perera, Commercial Radioactive Sources: Surveying the Security Risks, Monterey Institute Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Occasional Paper No. 11, January 2003, pp. 25-44. 12 For a more detailed examination of this threat, see chapter 5 in Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector, and Fred L. Wehling, The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, (Routledge, 2005).

16


While there has never been a release of radiation from a terrorist attack on a nuclear power plant (NPP) or other nuclear facility, Mohamed Atta, one of the leaders of the 9/11 terrorists, considered crashing an airplane into a U.S. NPP but thought preparing for such an attack would be difficult because of the restricted airspace around nuclear facilities.13 Since 9/11, there have been other reported incidents of terrorists’ interest in targeting nuclear power plants. For example, in March 2003, an alert was issued that the Palo Verde Nuclear Power Plant in Arizona in the United States was in potential danger from terrorists or saboteurs.14 Then in August 2003, police in Toronto, Canada, detained 19 Pakistani-born men on charges that they were involved in surveillance of a nuclear power plant.15 Terrorists tend not to attack well-defended and hardened targets. Most nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities, such as spent fuel storage sites and reprocessing plants, use defense-in-depth security systems. Consequently, terrorists would have to breach multiple layers of security if they were to launch a ground-based attack. However, these facilities are typically not hardened to withstand a crash of a large airplane, and some sites may have vulnerabilities to attack by water routes. Although the American nuclear industry is quick to point out that all U.S. nuclear power plants use strong containment structures around nuclear reactors as the last line of defense to prevent a release of radiation in the event of an accident, containments were typically not designed to prevent breaching in a premeditated attack, such as suicidal terrorists piloting a large airliner. Nonetheless, smashing a large, fast-moving commercial airplane into a containment building is extremely challenging. Assuming that terrorists could, in a post-9/11 world, seize control of such a plane, they would need the ability to direct the plane onto a relatively small area to try to breach a containment structure. Terrorists could conceivably smash an airplane into the softer auxiliary buildings at an NPP, though, thereby causing major economic damage but perhaps not resulting in a release of radiation. However, not all commercial nuclear reactors use containment structures. For instance, Britain operates several MAGNOX reactors, and Russia has eleven RBMK, or Chernobyl-type, reactors without containments. Although research reactors typically contain much less radioactivity than commercial reactors, they can present other security risks. For instance, many research reactors are located at universities or scientific centers, which are usually not as well defended as industrial reactor or military sites (although some research reactors are sited in the military sector or the national laboratory complex, and could have relatively strong defenses around them.) Many research reactors do not have containment structures, and if they do, the containments are not as strong as those of commercial reactors. To guard against accidents, research reactor containments do not need to be as strong as commercial reactor containments; however, weaker containments are more vulnerable to breaching by airplanes. Research reactors also tend to have radioactive sources on site that could potentially fuel RDDs. A related concern involves spent nuclear fuel at these locations. Unlike commercial spent nuclear fuel, which is usually lethally radioactive for a long period of time, research reactor spent fuel is often lightly irradiated and thus may not have a strong inherent protective barrier against theft. This 13 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W. W. Norton, authorized edition, 2004), p. 245. 14 Gary Fields, Ann Davis, and Jacob M. Schlesinger, “U.S. is Pressed to Boost Role in Private-Sector Security,” Wall Street Journal, March 21, 2003, p. A4. 15 DeNeen L. Brown, “Canada Arrests 19 as Security Threats,” Washington Post, August 23, 2003, p. A20.


17

lightly irradiated spent fuel could sometimes contain highly enriched uranium, which would be useful for making improvised nuclear explosives. Nonetheless, even without highly enriched uranium, research reactor spent fuel could pose a radiological terror concern. A successful attack against nuclear facilities that released large amounts of radioactivity could result in an immediate loss of dozens of lives and, although perhaps thousands could develop cancer over a period of several years to decades as a result of radiation exposure, this immediate loss pales in comparison to the tens of thousands that a nuclear explosion could kill within a few seconds. Thus, nuclear terrorists wanting to cause massive numbers of immediate deaths would be less inclined to attack nuclear power plants or related nuclear facilities, but those terrorists wanting to harm a nation’s economy could consider attacking many types of nuclear facilities. Even with additional layers of security, nuclear power plants and other nuclear facilities will remain potent symbols of a country’s industrial might and thus will likely continue to interest some terrorist groups in possible attacks.

3.

The Chain of Causation

What would terrorists have to do to launch a radiological attack? Simply acquiring radioactive materials or identifying a vulnerable nuclear facility is not enough. Terrorists face psychological and motivational barriers. They also confront technical challenges. In general, terrorists would have to surmount the following barriers to carry out an act of radiological terror. Keep in mind that terrorists can choose from many conventional options of attack and have chosen in the past to repeatedly used those well-proven methods. 1. 2.

3. 4. 5. 6.

4.

A terrorist group must feel strongly motivated to disperse radioactive materials or to release radiation in an act of terrorism. These terrorists must then decide either to obtain radioactive sources to make a radiological weapon, or to attack or sabotage a nuclear facility to release radiation. They must next gain access to the radiological or nuclear assets. They must acquire the requisite technical and organizational skills needed to build RDDs or to breach the defenses at a nuclear facility. They must carry out this planning without being detected. Finally, they must be able to deliver an RDD or RDDs to selected targets or to attack a chosen nuclear facility or facilities.

Terrorist Motivations and Constraints16

Mirror-imaging can lead to a fundamental misunderstanding of an opponent; in other words, an enemy may or may not act like you think you would in his place. Understanding the motivations of terrorists is especially daunting. Jerrold Post, a 16 This section was adapted from a forthcoming book chapter: Charles D. Ferguson, “Nuclear Terrorism: Myths, Monoliths, and Reality,” in Michael Flynn, editor, The Second Nuclear Age (University of Kentucky Press, 2007).

18


renowned expert on the psychology of terrorism, has warned that “we are in the paradoxical position of having a clearer understanding of the interior of the atom than we do of the interior of the mind of the terrorist.”17 He has pointed out an additional motivational paradox: “On the one hand, to be motivated to carry out an act of mass destruction suggests profound psychological distortions usually found only in severely disturbed individuals, such as paranoid psychotics. On the other hand, to implement an act of nuclear terrorism requires not only organizational skills but also the ability to work cooperatively with a small team.”18 He and other experts in terrorist psychology have uncovered few terrorist organizations that would want to carry out radiological or nuclear attacks. Soon after September 11, 2001, Dr. Post reiterated this point by cautioning that those “who study terrorist motivation and decision making” are “underwhelmed by the probability of such an event [nuclear or radiological terrorism] for most – but not all – terrorist groups.”19 The political, religious, and nationalist inclinations of a terrorist group strongly influence its tendency to conduct nuclear terrorism. Let’s examine the motivations influencing various political, religious, and nationalist terrorist organizations. Social revolutionary organizations, such as the Japanese Red Army, the Sendero Luminosa (the Shining Path), and the Movement Revolutionaire Tupac Amaru, want to transform a particular society and would therefore not be inclined to cause indiscriminate harm to large numbers of people in their constituency. Consequently, they would probably refrain from trying to use nuclear explosives. However, they might target high-profile government owned or operated facilities such as nuclear power plants for the symbolic value. Because these groups would most likely not want to kill or injure many people, they would probably attack or sabotage the nuclear facility when it was in the process of being built (or in an otherwise inoperable condition) to eliminate or minimize the chances of releasing harmful radiation. For example, in January 1982, the Pacifist Ecological Committee fired five anti-tank rockets at the Creys-Malville Superphoenix breeder reactor in Lyon, France, while the reactor was still being built.20 In December 1982, Rodney Wilkinson, a young white South African who was a member of the African National Congress, detonated four bombs at South Africa’s Koeberg nuclear power station before the plant became operational. 21 The latter example involved a group that wanted to overthrow the oppressive apartheid system – and thus transform South African society – and had nationalist ambitions to bring black majority rule to South Africa. Nationalist and national-separatist groups share similar constraints with social revolutionaries. Because they want to establish a new political rule or to form a separate state, these groups seek solidarity within their national constituency (which is comprised of those people who are subjugated by the dominant power) and within the international community to win support for their cause. Thus, they would seek to 17

Jerrold M. Post, “Prospects for Nuclear Terrorism: Psychological Motivations and Constraints,” in Yonah Alexander and Paul A. Leventhal, eds., Preventing Nuclear Terrorism: The Report and Papers of the International Task Force on Prevention of Nuclear Terrorism (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987), p. 91. 18 Ibid, p. 92. 19 Jerrold M. Post, “Differentiating the Threat of Radiological/Nuclear Terrorism: Motivations and Constraints,” op. cit. 20 Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) Terrorism Database; for information on accessing this database, see: http://cns.miis.edu/research/terror.htm#db 21 Joseph Lelyveld, “Bombs Damage Atom Plant Site in South Africa,” New York Times, December 20, 1982, p. A1; David Beresford, “Man Who Spiked Apartheid’s Bomb,” Guardian (London), January 2, 1996, p. 9


19

confine their attacks to being against the oppressive power structure, and would not want to create massive harm against their constituency or sympathetic outsiders. Moreover, a weapon of mass destruction - such as a nuclear explosive - used by this group against the dominant power would probably backfire by providing justification for the power to launch retaliatory strikes against the group’s constituents. Nonetheless, the group may try to demonstrate the capability to inflict nuclear or radiological mayhem through manipulation of the news media. Today, the Chechen rebels provide an outstanding example of a national-separatist group. In 1995, Chechen rebel field commander Shamil Basayev told the Russian Independent Television Network (NTV) that his group had placed a container of cesium-137 in Izmailovsky Park in Moscow, but the Chechens did not detonate or disperse the radioactive material. In the late 1990s, there were at least two other known incidents in which the Chechen rebels demonstrated possession of radioactive materials without using an RDD.22 In contrast to the previous two groups, religious extremists have been more indiscriminant in their targeting of people not directly associated with a dominant power structure. In general, they have also distinguished themselves by favoring spectacular mass casualty attacks. An apocalyptic cult - a type of religious extremist organization - could turn toward terrorism, as well. For example, the Japanese apocalyptic cult Aum Shinrikyo sought weapons of mass destruction. The group made chemical and biological weapons. While their biological attacks failed, they achieved limited success with chemical weapons. Most infamously, cult members released sarin gas in five Tokyo subway cars on March 20, 1995. Although the delivery mechanism – puncturing sarin-filled polyethylene pouches with sharpened umbrella tips – was crude, twelve people died and thousands were injured. With a more potent concoction of sarin and a more effective delivery system, the cult could have killed thousands in this attack. Police pressure in 1995 and 1996 stopped Aum before it could launch more devastating chemical and biological attacks.23 Shoko Asahara, Aum’s leader, had an even more grandiose plan. Wanting to bring on the apocalypse, he invested in producing nuclear weapons. He hired nuclear scientists and bought land in Australia containing uranium deposits. In addition, his cult tried to buy nuclear warheads in Russia, but the attempt was unsuccessful. In 1995, the group had tens of thousands of members, and assets worth $1.4 billion.24 In 2000, Aum Shinrikyo renamed itself Aleph in an attempt to change its negative image. 25 On February 27, 2004, a Tokyo court sentenced Asahara to death for his crimes. Political-religious terrorists are religious extremists that may also commit acts of nuclear terror. During the past few decades, the advent of Hezbollah, al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups affiliated with Islam has galvanized much of the world’s attention on Islamic extremists. Nonetheless, these groups do not all share the same goals, or always employ the same tactics. From the perspective of nuclear and radiological terrorism, al Qaeda stands out among the other Islamic extremist groups. The September 11 events clearly demonstrated that this organization can inflict mass fatalities and massive damage to symbolic and financially valuable property. Although 22

CNS WMD Terrorism Database Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp60-65. 24 Staff Report, U.S. Senate, Hearings on Global Proliferation of WMD, November 1, 1995. 25 Tim Hornyak, “10 Years After Aum Sarin Attacks, Pseudo-Religions Thriving in Japan,” Japan Today, March 13, 2005, available at http://www.japantoday.com/e/?content=feature&id=871, accessed on March 14, 2005. 23

20


al Qaeda has not used nuclear or radiological weapons or attacked nuclear facilities, it has expressed strong interest in acquiring this capability. Dating back to at least the early 1990s, al Qaeda operatives have sought to obtain nuclear materials. In 1998, Bin Laden declared that it was a “religious duty” of al Qaeda to acquire weapons of mass destruction.26 More recently, in May 2003, Shaykh Nasir bin Hamid al-Fahd, a young Saudi cleric, wrote the religious paper “A Treatise on the Legal Status of Using Weapons of Mass Destruction” to try to justify Muslims’ use of such weapons in the defense of the Umma, the Islamic community. 27 Furthermore, Bin Laden has made several references to Hiroshima in his speeches “because he wants to do to American foreign policy what the United States did to Japanese imperial surrender policy.”28 This combination of rhetoric and religious decree is designed to lay the moral and political justification for al Qaeda’s use of weapons of mass destruction. But is al Qaeda interested in weapons of mass disruption, such as radiological weapons? In June 2002, the U.S. government announced that it had apprehended José Padilla, a.k.a., Abdullah Al-Mujahir, in May 2002. The government charged that Padilla wanted to build a dirty bomb. The more information that has surfaced about Padilla, the more doubts have arisen about his intellectual and technical abilities to carry out this alleged act. A former gang member, Padilla became a convert to a radical form of Islam in prison. Subsequent trips to the Middle East introduced him to al Qaeda leaders who reportedly asked him to undertake a scouting mission to the United States, where he was arrested at Chicago’s O’Hare airport.29 Apparently, Padilla contemplated using uranium to make a dirty bomb 30 though uranium is very weakly radioactive compared to other more readily accessible and more potent radioactive elements. Another al Qaeda-related dirty bomb story came from British investigations in Afghanistan. In January 2003, British officials reported that al Qaeda may have built an RDD near Heart, Afghanistan. An unnamed American official, though, stated to the Associated Press that the report was unsubstantiated. 31 In sum, open source press reporting does not conclusively show technically sophisticated radiological capabilities within al Qaeda. According to the CIA, al Qaeda remains high on the radiological threat assessment. The CIA has assessed, “Construction of an RDD is well within [al Qaeda’s] capabilities as radiological materials are relatively easy to acquire from industrial or medical sources. Osama Bin Laden’s operatives may try to launch conventional attacks against the nuclear industrial infrastructure of the United States in a bid to cause contamination, disruption, and terror.”32 Perhaps al Qaeda-affiliated groups would carry out radiological attacks. A recent disturbing trend is the melding of Islamic extremists with national-separatists in their campaign to break Chechnya apart from Russia. The Chechen rebels belong to an 26 Anonymous, Through Our Enemies’ Eyes: Osama bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America, (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002), p. 66, and references therein. 27 Anonymous, Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2004), pp. 154-158, and references therein. Since publication of that book, anonymous has been revealed to be Michael Scheur, a former CIA analyst. 28 Steve Coll, “What Bin Laden Sees in Hiroshima,” Washington Post, February 6, 2005, p. B1. 29 Lewis Z. Koch, “Dirty Bomber? Dirty Justice,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2004. 30 Charles J. Hanley, “Much Less to Padilla ‘Dirty Bomb’ Than Meets Feds’ Eyes, Scientists Say,” Associated Press, June 9, 2004. 31 Associated Press, “BBC Says al Qaeda Produced a ‘Dirty Bomb’ in Afghanistan,” New York Times, January 31, 2003. 32 Directorate of Intelligence, “Terrorist CBRN: Materials and Effects (U),” Central Intelligence Agency, May 2003.


21

ethnic group steeped in Islamic culture and influence. In the early years of the separatist campaign, many of the movement’s leaders mainly focused their attacks on the Russian military and other symbols of Russian authority. In contrast, the Chechen rebels have, in recent years, been widening their attacks to include targeting more civilians - as attested by the takeover of a Moscow theater in October 2002 and the school siege in Beslan in September 2004, which resulted in 330 deaths, many of them children. Although the Russian authorities declared a major success in killing rebel leader Aslan Maskhadov on March 8, 2005, they may have inadvertently fueled the flames for more tragedy. Maskhadov was a relatively moderate leader, who had indicated that he was open to negotiations. After his death, Shamil Basayev, an Islamic fundamentalist who had shown that he was capable of mass casualty attacks, took charge. Notably, he had claimed responsibility for the Beslan school siege and engineered the 1995 cesium-137 incident in Moscow. On July 10, 2006, Basayev was killed; however, his demise does not necessarily mean the end of the potential for increasing radicalization of the Chechen rebels. The rise to power of Ramzan Kadyrov could spur the rebels to use devastating unconventional attacks. Kadyrov had befriended Basayev before turning away from the rebel movement in the late 1990s. Known for his ruthlessness toward the civilian population, Kadyrov is backed by the Kremlin to become president of Chechnya.33 In October 2006, al Qaeda’s deputy leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, announced that al Qaeda had joined forces with the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. This new partnership would expand the Algerian terrorist group’s reach beyond a focus on the Algerian government. On September 1, 2006, France’s Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit declared that this group is “one of the most serious threats currently facing France.”34 The group has ties to extremists throughout Europe. In late September 2006, the leader of al-Qaeda-in-Iraq called for nuclear scientists and explosives experts to provide their expertise to his group. In particular, he said, “The field of jihad can satisfy your scientific ambitions, and the large American bases are good places to test your unconventional weapons, whether biological or dirty, as they call them.”35 The July 2005 U.S.-India nuclear deal has apparently increased security threats against Indian nuclear facilities. Until April 23, 2006, neither bin Laden nor his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri had directly criticized India. On that date, bin Laden, in a video aired by the Al Jazeera TV channel, spoke about India’s involvement in Kashmir and referred to an alleged Crusader-Zionist-Hindu war against the Muslims. A prominent South Asian terrorism analyst believes that the bin Laden message was provoked in part by President Bush’s visits to India and Pakistan in early March 2006.36 Soon after the July 2006 Mumbai bombings, the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi issued a warning about possible terrorist attacks against Indian government facilities, including nuclear sites. In response, New Delhi enhanced security at its nuclear complex by early August.37 However, in late August, villagers near the Kakrapar nuclear facility reported 33

Michael Mainville, “Chechen Strongman Kayrov Comes of Age,” Washington Times, October 4, 2006. Craig Whitlock, “Al-Qaeda’s Far-Reaching New Partner: Salafist Group Finds Limited Appeal in its Native Algeria,” Washington Post, October 5, 2006, p. A1. 35 Associated Press, “Zarqawi Successor Exhorts Scientists: Tape Urges Experts to Join Fight in Iraq,” Washington Post, September 29, 2006, p. A15. 36 B. Raman, “Bin Laden Targets India,” Paper No. 1776, South Asia Analysis Group, April 25, 2006. 37 “India’s N-Plants Turned into Fortresses after U.S. Alert,” Islamic Republic News Agency, August 14, 2006. 34

22


seeing two men armed with automatic weapons inside a prohibited area (though still outside the most sensitive area of the facility).38 Al Qaeda and its affiliated groups have clearly caught the recent attention of policymakers in the United States and Russia as well as other Western or Westernoriented nations. In the United States especially, the government appears almost exclusively focused on the threat from al Qaeda and al Qaeda-like groups. While recognizing the problems posed by this type of organization, it is important to not treat terrorism in general, or radiological and nuclear terrorism in particular, as a monolithic threat.39 Another group of religious or ethnic extremists has not received as much recent public attention in the United States. In a U.S. government planning document projecting to the year 2011, DHS notably excluded right-wing terrorists from the list of adversaries threatening the United States but continued to include left-wing domestic groups, such as animal rights groups and ecology militants.40 Right-wing extremists, however, have not gone away since April 19, 1995, when Timothy McVeigh detonated a powerful fertilizer bomb packed inside a Ryder rental truck. The resulting explosion destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma, City, and killed 168 people. As a homegrown terrorist, McVeigh found inspiration in The Turner Diaries, a novel filled with racist propaganda and a call for white supremacists to overthrow the U.S. government and establish White Aryan rule. Considered a “bible” for many rightwing extremists, The Turner Diaries contains several scenes in which white supremacists use nuclear and radiological weapons. In particular, one fictional attack involves combining two aspects of nuclear terrorism - that is, the terrorists use dirty bombs to attack a nuclear power plant.41 In a 1986 assessment of nuclear terror threats against the United States, RAND terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman concluded: Of the terrorist organizations active in this country, the right-wing extremists appear to pose the most serious threat to U.S. nuclear weapons facilities… The neo-Nazis, anti-Semites, racists, and survivalists who comprise this movement are well-trained, and adept at guerilla warfare techniques… In terms of their potential threat to nuclear facilities, two characteristics of right-wing terrorist groups are particularly important: 1. 2.

They have an apocalyptic vision of an impending Armageddon. They have a visceral hatred of Jews, and the announced goal of some elements is to destroy Israel with nuclear weapons.42

Concerning particular right-wing extremist groups, Hoffman assessed, “The Order, because of its close identification with its fictitious namesake in The Turner Diaries, is 38

“India Nuclear Plant Combed for Armed Intruders,” Gulf Daily News, August 23, 2006. Nicholas D. Kristof, “Homegrown Osamas,” New York Times, March 9, 2005. 40 Justin Rood, “Animal Rights Groups and Ecology Militants Make DHS Terrorist List, Right-Wing Vigilantes Omitted,” CQ Homeland Security, March 25, 2005. 41 Andrew MacDonald, The Turner Diaries (Fort Lee, New Jersey: Barricade Books, second edition, 1996), p. 202. MacDonald is a pseudonym; the real author is William Pierce. 42 Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism in the United States and the Potential Threat to Nuclear Facilities, RAND, R3351-DOE, January 1986, p. 51. 39


23

probably the group most likely to attack a nuclear facility. Its [sic] has demonstrated its organizational and logistical capacity, its planning skills, and the firepower at its disposal.”43 He also noted, “The CSA [the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord], with its obsession with commando warfare and survivalist training and its avowed belief in the coming Armageddon, has a motive, and perhaps the means, to attack a nuclear weapons facility.” 44 “The CSA journal describes the impending apocalypse as a limited nuclear war launched against the United States by ‘Russia and possibly China and Japan.’”45 Eleven years after the Oklahoma City bombing, domestic right-wing groups are not as prominent and appear to have become weaker. Some terrorism experts have mainly attributed this weakening to a leadership void. For instance, William Pierce, the author of The Turner Diaries, died in 2002, and several other leaders of the White Aryan movement have also died. Other terrorism experts, though, warn that a leadership void can create a power vacuum, which can result in further radicalization and extreme acts of violence to maintain the viability of the movement.46 Though it might be difficult to admit, terrorists are human, and like the rest of us, they face psychological barriers in deciding whether to handle radioactive substances. Ionizing radiation is invisible. Humans tend to fear what they cannot see. Even if terrorists were motivated to climb the escalation ladder to extreme violence involving nuclear or radiological attacks, most terrorist organizations would find the other prerequisites too technically demanding. Terrorists tend toward conservatism in their methods, usually preferring well-proven techniques. “Six basic tactics have accounted for 95% of all terrorist incidents: bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, kidnappings, hijackings, and barricade and hostage incidents. Looking at it another way: Terrorists blow up things, kill people, or seize hostages.” 47 While al Qaeda, for example, has expressed strong interest in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism, it has relied mainly on conventional methods. The 9/11 attacks that employed airplanes as human-piloted missiles were an unconventional application of the conventional techniques of hijacking and suicide bombing. Nuclear or radiological attacks would require access to materials and skills not usually associated with terrorist groups. Even a relatively technically sophisticated terrorist group such as al Qaeda has demonstrated a somewhat naïve understanding of nuclear and radiological weapons. Many of the seized al Qaeda documents have shown a rudimentary level of knowledge about these weapons.48 Analysts should guard against assuming that terrorists cannot acquire the requisite expertise, and assessments should take into account the technical barriers to unconventional terrorism.

43

Ibid, p. 51. Ibid, p. 51. 45 Ibid, p. 46. 46 Lois Romano, “Domestic Extremist Groups Weaker but Still Worrisome,” Washington Post, April 19, 2005, p. A3. 47 Brian Michael Jenkins, “The Future Course of International Terrorism,” The Futurist, July-August 1987. 48 David Ruppe, “Little Indication Seen of Al-Qaeda Nuke Progress,” Global Security Newswire, May 18, 2005. 44

24


5.

Conclusion

Understanding the true nature of the radiological terror threat is the first order of business for both policymakers and the public. Communicating that knowledge to the public is challenging. The news media presents a communications conundrum. On the one hand, the news media at its best can serve to bring credible, scientifically-based information to citizens. Documentaries about radiological terrorism on the BBC and American public television have usually served the public well on the information provided. On the other hand, the daily news media business thrives on getting scoops, and daily reporters are in a hurry to meet deadlines. Even the best-trained science reporters face pressure from editors, as well as length restrictions on columns. The result of this rushed reporting is that the public is often provided with a too simplistic or sensationalistic picture of the radiological threat. Although governments have been providing some information to the public about this threat, a more detailed and systematic public education campaign could help psychologically immunize citizens against radiological terror. 49 This education campaign must begin before a radiological attack occurs. After an attack, governments would tend to be in public relations damage control mode. We should not treat lightly the difficulties in creating a credible public education campaign designed to teach the public about radiological threats. Educators face a very difficult task when dealing with deep-seated misconceptions. It would be best to educate people before they form misconceptions about a subject. Thus, an important element of a public education campaign is to reach out to students at the high school level and even earlier grade levels. The campaign would inform the public that only a small fraction of radioactive sources are truly high risk. The public would also need to know about deterministic and stochastic health effects and that there are simple straightforward steps that can save lives during a dirty bomb attack. An education campaign would also convey that most nuclear facilities have been strengthened against many modes of attack, but that more can be done to further strengthen defenses at nuclear facilities. Concerning whether terrorists would actually commit acts of radiological terrorism, the public should know that very few groups would be inclined to do so. A government-sponsored information campaign should also target the terrorists. Terrorists observe our fears and can design their attacks to trigger what frightens us. If they see that we are overly worried about radiological attacks, they could decide to carry out those types of attack. A credible public campaign would also convey to the terrorists that we are prepared and have taken adequate steps to enhance the security of high-risk radioactive materials and nuclear facilities. For the campaign to be credible, though, we must ensure that we are serious about creating a sustainable security culture to guard against radiological terrorism.

49

Terrorism expert Gary Ackerman developed the term “psychological immunization.”


25

Radiological Terrorism: Threat, Priorities in Prevention, and Minimization of Consequences Rafael V.ARUTYUNIAN, Leonid A. BOLSHOV, Oleg A. PAVLOVSKIY Nuclear Safety Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences Abstract. In this report, the authors present the main results of a systematic analysis of the factors predetermining potential threats and possible damage from radiological terrorism. The interplay of the factors, including technical, administrative, organizational, legal, radiological, social and economic, is considered extremely important in prioritizing preventive measures and response tasks. Examples of assessments of consequences scales under different scenarios of radiological terrorist attacks and social conditions are given.

When we speak of radiological terrorism and the threat connected with the use of radioactive materials by terrorists, we have to bear in mind the wide range of problems connected to the unauthorized use of any kind of radioactive materials, including the sealed and not sealed radionuclide sources, radioactive waste, and any other radioactive material, which may become available for unauthorized use. Radionuclide sources are widely used in various branches of industry, including nuclear power engineering, metallurgy, geology, mining, chemical and oil-refining industry, medicine, and agriculture. Powerful sources were manufactured in the 1970-1980s to be Fig.1. Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) used as power supplies for the navigation systems (Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators, RTGs), especially in the Arctic Ocean (fig.1). The nominal activity of these sources was as high as several hundred thousands of curie. Very powerful sources are used for sterilization and processing of foodstuff and agricultural products. Other equipment utilizing the sources includes radiotherapy equipment, instrumentation for nondestructive check, defectoscopy equipment, instruments for technological monitoring, etc. How high is the current level of physical security required for radionuclide sources and radioactive materials from the point of view of preventing unauthorized access? How effective are the national accounting and control systems, especially in nonnuclear industries?

26

R.V. Arutyunian et al. / Radiological Terrorism Table 1. Recurrence of radiological incidents involving ionizing radiation sources at the Russian facilities (except Minatom facilities) in 1997-2001. 1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

Damage of the source (loss of airtightness)

8

3

6

10

17

Theft of source

13

22

3

6

6

Orphan sources found

14

16

5

1

2

Damage of source capsules in the wells during geophysical surveys

9

10

14

18

24

Loss of sources transportation

-

5

1

2

1

-

2

-

-

-

Incident Type

during

their

Intentional depressurization of the sources

Table 1 lists various incidents in Russia connected with either damage or theft of the sources, as well as the number of orphan sources found between 1997 and 2001. According to Gossanepidnadzor data, four powerful sources were found in scrap metal in Primorsky Krai in 2002. Another incident also occurred in Primorsky Krai in 2005, when the Sr-90 source used in density meters was found at the port of Vladivostok in scrap metal intended for shipment to China. The dose rate of this source was 300ȝR/hour. Such situations are not limited to Russia. For example, at the IAEA Conference on the issues of nuclear and radiation safety provision (London, September 30, 2002), John Bolton reported that "only in the USA, an average of 375 radioactive sources are lost or stolen every year”. It should be noted that alpha- and beta-sources are more difficult to detect than gamma-sources; as a result, they are easier to conceal and to transport. Given this, the question arises whether it is easier for perpetrators to obtain a single powerful source or get a dozen small ones. Examples exist when a facility uses several hundred sources of the activity of the ten-curie level. It is obvious that the efforts aimed at secure ionizing radiation sources need to take all of these factors into account. In future, the radioactive material and waste accounting/ control system should probably become similar to the nuclear material control system with regard to provision of physical control over the sources and their safety. Within the framework of Russian-American cooperation, Rosatom and the US Department of Energy are conducting joint activities to monitor the situation surrounding the safe management, and overall safety, of radiation-producing equipment. In particular, work related to the topic “Development of Recommendations Aimed to Reduce Unauthorized Use of Ionizing Radiation Sources (IRS), Proceeding from Analysis of Available IRS Data” was arranged. The Brookhaven National Laboratory requested this research within the scope of its contract with the US Department of Energy, and as a result, 678 facilities in 20 regions of Russia and 676 entities pertaining to 11 departments have been inspected during the first milestone of the activities. Table 2 contains data on the prevalence of radioactive sources in some regions. The total number of Sealed Radioactive Sources (SRS) in the regions may range from a handful to several thousand, though their number may be significantly higher in single regions (for instance, in Moscow or Saint Petersburg). The bulk of the sources have activity in the vicinity of several curies (see Fig.2). On the one hand, this fact reduces

R.V. Arutyunian et al. / Radiological Terrorism

27

the potential radiological threat of their using as a damaging component of a terrorist device; on the other hand, it could lead to a situation in which physical control over such sources of radiation could become more lax. At the same time, the social and economic damage from their unauthorized use may be quite significant, as low activity sources are more vulnerable to unauthorized withdrawal, concealed transportation, and accumulation. Table 2. Number of radioactive sources managed in some regions of Russia.

Regions Archangelsk Region Saint Petersburg Kemerovo Region Samara Region Saratov Region Khabarovsk Krai Chelyabinsk Region

Quantity 3556 18,973 697 483 1,118 722 5,118

Total activity, Bq 6.15E+16 3.93E+16 3.57E+15 1.24E+15 8.04E+14 9.84E+14 9.13E+15

For several years, IBRAE experts, in cooperation with those from various Russian ministries/agencies, have been analyzing the potential consequences of the unauthorized use of radioactive material and IRS. The most important task in such analysis is to identify the approaches by which to establish actual priorities for actions aimed to prevent radiological attacks, as well as to mitigate their consequences. It should be noted that current approaches to the development of measures/ priorities are

28


usually based on the independent analysis of single factors. These factors are defined by the assigned design of a dispersion device (DD) or its "radiological" component; a limited set of transportation scenarios for DD or its components; ways of their delivery to the place of launching a radiological terrorist attack, as well as by the extent of potential involvement of individuals or urban infrastructure in the attack consequences. Unfortunately, such assessments do not fully take into account the interaction of health effects, the scope of social and economic consequences, the DD design, and the terrorist attack scenario. For example, if we limit our analysis to one criterion - the activity of the source and the extent of a radiological threat of its radionuclides - it is possible to develop a scale for potential hazard of the sources (Fig. 3). However, it would be more correct to speak of the integral potential hazard which takes into account the accessibility of the sources, the convenience of their management, their easy dispersion in the environment, the efficiency of their detection by current or potential monitoring instruments, the potential damage in case of various scenarios for launching radiological terrorist attacks, and the efficiency of the response system. When developing the scenario, it should be taken into account that a potential radiological terrorist attack involving a specific type of radioactive material (RM) is defined by the following: • •

Source availability and the extent of their protection from their unauthorized (illegal) withdrawal; Ways of source transportation to the intended place of a radiological terrorist attack;

Categorization of Radiation Sources

IAEA General Conference, 10 July 2000, GOV/2000/34GOV/2000/34-GC(44)/7 Fig. 3. The IAEA scale for potential hazard of radioactive sources (July 2000)


• •

29

Availability/efficiency of the equipment for detection of RM/DD or its components at different stages of their transportation/delivery, taking into account potential disguise measures; Efficiency of measures aimed to reveal or prevent the arrangements for radiological terrorist attacks.

Large cities, social and economic centers, crucial infrastructure facilities (airports, railway stations, and subways), public places, or water supply sources are the likely targets of radiological terrorism. Intentional contamination of foodstuff, clothes, agricultural lands, residential/ industrial buildings, or transport communications also may be possible. Radioactive material or IRS also may be hidden in public places. Radioactive substances may be dispersed by way of explosion or due to a thermal or chemical impact. Dispersion of radioactive liquids, dissolution or use of other ways of contaminating the water also is possible. From the standpoint of easy implementation of a specific scenario, it is important to underline that radioactive material containing, for example, in a “dirty bomb” and weighing only several grams or even fractions of a gram for varied isotopes will require the measures of public protection at the distance of at least 100 m from the blasting point. The public literature has already described quite a lot of relevant scenarios. Can these scenarios be prevented? What consequences can be expected if they are actually realized? If we speak of RM dispersion in public places, for instance on a subway station, the activities that may entail excess public exposure are not so high as they seem to be. Strontium dispersed in a respirable fraction can serve as an example. A lot of ways of RM delivery, including the primitive ones, exist to launch such terrorist

30


attacks. Unfortunately, tracking the radioactivity transfer to crucial sites, including

Fig.5. Dynamics for change of 241Am concentration in the air in the case of blasting of the explosive device with a radioactive content under urban conditions, relative units.

large cities, is also a problem. Forecasting on all potential scenarios of RM use with the aim to harm both individuals and the public appears to be a very complicated task. However, we can narrow the scope of potential problems within each scenario, including potential health effects or consequences for the public. The ICRP Recommendations (Publication No. 96) on the issue of radiological terrorism describe briefly several potential scenarios containing the use of both radioactive and nuclear material, including special fissile substances, such as 235U and 239Pu, to develop, construct and utilize a self-made nuclear device. Another example is the report of Dr. Henry Kelly, President of the Federation of American Scientists, made on March 6, 2002 to the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. The report that was widely discussed by the media afterwards represented several scenarios of potential radiological terrorist attacks in the US major cities, such as New York and Washington, involving “dirty bombs” stuffed with the radiation sources containing 137Cs, 60Co or 241Am (Fig.4). Such scenarios may lead to significant health effects or to huge economic losses for urban infrastructure or to significant consequences both for the region and the entire country. The IBRAE RAS applies various estimate models to assess potential consequences of unauthorized use of radiation sources in urban conditions. The assessments have been made for potential effects resulting from various scenarios of terrorist attacks discussed in literature and used in anti-terrorist exercises. The blasting of a dirty bomb in the street of a large city is one such scenario. It should be noted that, while current methods or computer codes do quite well at describing the contaminant behavior in the vicinity of an emergency release in an open site or in rough terrain, they cannot be effective for urban areas, large industrial facilities or major transport nodes. Therefore, 3D aerodynamic simulation has been


31

utilized to more adequately describe the admixture dispersion under complex urban

Fig.6. Integral 241Am concentration in the air in the case of blasting of the explosive device with a radioactive content under urban conditions, relative units

conditions, and to identify stagnant areas or sites with abnormally high contamination levels. Examples of the estimates made under one of such computer programs being presently developed by the IBRAE RAS, are given in Fig. 5 and 6. Such an incident could lead to contamination of up to 1 km of urban territory. The area will feature very high gradients of radioactive concentration in the air, depending on the actual structure of urban development or the weather conditions. According to our estimates, nearly 90 out of the 5,000 people being in the streets at the moment of blasting may be subject to lung exposure in doses able to lead to unfavorable health effects (Table 3). Table 3. Forecasted absorbed doses for human lungs as a result of the blasting of a "dirty bomb" with 241 Am content. Dose for the lungs People in open air People in premises < 0.05 mSv 622 82 0.05 – 0.5 mSv 150 23 0.5 – 5 mSv 171 21 5 – 50 mSv 283 17 50 – 500 mSv 249 13 0.5 – 5 Sv 464 1 5 – 50 Sv 86 0 > 50 Sv 0 0 total 2023 158

Another scenario described in literature is the spraying a certain quantity of 137Cs over urban territory. The two 137Cs sources of low and medium activity have been considered. The contaminant is dispersed at an altitude of 100 or 200 m (the latter value

32


is only for the medium-activity source) by blasting either a small-scale explosive device, or by any other effective mode of radioactive dispersion. The estimates were carried out using the Monte-Carlo method for statistical tests. The urban territory was set at 10 km in length by 10 km in width (i.e. of the 100 km2 area), and an average public density of 10,000 people per 1 km2 was assumed to be subject to potential contamination along the path of the radioactive cloud. The results of the estimates for a medium-level source are given in Table 4. The values characterize the potential area of the urban territory contaminated by the levels indicated above. Table 4. Percentage of the urban territory of various contamination levels as a result of dispersion of the 137Cs medium-activity source at the 100 m altitude. Surface contamination density by 137Cs, Ci/km2

Weather category

Average wind speed, m/s

Total estimated area, km2

100

A

3

100

41.3

12.6

20.2

18.6

6.69

0.49

0.01

B

4

100

55.0

8.9

13.3

14.8

7.29

0.65

0.00

C

5

100

66.9

5.8

8.9

11.0

6.68

0.68

0.01

D

5

100

75.3

3.9

5.5

8.1

6.15

1.08

0.00

E

3

100

75.3

3.9

4.7

7.9

6.55

1.68

0.03

F

1.5

100

79.8

2.9

3.3

4.2

6.07

3.50

0.21

G

0.8

100

86.3

1.9

2.1

3.0

3.84

2.80

0.22

With regard to the scenario involving 137Cs dispersion over the urban territory, the possibility exists that the levels of contamination by this radionuclide will turn out to be higher than 1 Ci/km2 within the area of 1 to 10 km2. We should bear in mind that when assessing Chernobyl consequences, a 137Cs soil contamination of the level of 1 Ci/km2 or higher used to be a criterion for referring the area to the zone of privileged social and economic status. Also, everybody perceived it as a fact acknowledged by the state that it was harmful for people to reside in such area. The standards used or proposed for use define the dimensions of the areas where certain protective measures are performed. We have taken the evacuation criteria recommended by IAEA/ ICRP, the US Environment Protection Agency’s criteria for site remediation, the Russian radiation safety standards, and the sanitary regulations, including those for clothes contamination by beta-particles. Table 5 represents the estimated values of radioactive areas of excess contamination level resulting from the scenario with the 137Cs dispersion described above. Table 5. Urban areas featuring radiation factor values exceeding the recommended criteria for the population in the case of dispersion of a 137Cs medium activity source at the 100 m altitude. Area of contaminated Information source Recommended standard area, depending on the weather, km2 Sheltering, 10 mSv for 2 days 0.0 – 2.0 ICRP recommendations No. 96 Temporary evacuation, 50 mSv on radiological terrorism 0 for 7 days

33


ICRP Publication No. 82 EPA Recommendations

Radiation Safety Standards, NRB-99, Russia

OSPORB Sanitary Rules, Russia

Practical values applied after the Chernobyl accident Current levels of soil contamination due to 137ɋs global fallouts

Standards for permissible contamination of surfaces for the population residing within the Chernobyl area

Relocation, 0.1 Sv for the first year 10 mSv for the year 20 mSv for the year 5 mGy for 10 days – Level A for sheltering 50 mGy for 10 days – Level B for sheltering or Level A for evacuation 500 mGy for 10 days – Level B for evacuation 10 μSv/year – public exposure dose monitoring area 100 μSv/year – protective measures optimization area 1 mSv/year – poblic exposure dose reduction area 1 Ci/km2 50% addition to fallout density Double increase of global fallouts 200 beta-particles/(min*cm2) – vehicle contamination 100 beta-particles/(min*cm2) – contamination of clothes or internal surfaces of buildings 10 beta-particles/(min*cm2) – contamination of skin, underwear or bed linen

0.1 – 3.3 3.1 - 11 1.3 – 8.5 0.0 – 2.0 0

0 37 - 99 27 - 58 18 -24 20-38 37 -103 55 - 235 22 - 41 25 - 51

35 - 91

If we use the criteria given by ICRP recommendations No. 96, the maximum area for sheltering or temporary relocation may range from 0 to 3 km2. However, if we use the Russian OSPORB sanitary rules, the area requiring countermeasures may reach 100 km2. Assuming a public density of 10,000 people/km2 in the city, hundreds of thousands of people may happen to live in areas whose radioactive contamination exceed various sanitary, hygienic or dose criteria. Potential losses of residential or nonresidential buildings of the city due to the need to deactivate sites/constructions could present a grave problem. The assessments indicate that deactivation may be required for 0.2-2 million m2 of residential buildings or for 0.1-1 million m2 of non-residential ones. Analysis of the situation demonstrates that the scale of threats or potential damage is first defined by the criteria and the intervention levels chosen from the current set of standards, which differ from the dose factor by several orders of magnitude. If we select one option, we may have no problem areas, while in the other case we will face huge problems in tens or hundreds square meters of urban areas due to regulations/criteria which prescribe certain measures, or due to the fact that the public will think that we took them out of necessity, rather than because of the level of radiation risk. At the same time, when radiological risks are low (or even negligible), the overwhelming majority of social and economic damage will relate to low radioactive contamination of large and critical infrastructure facilities, though there is an wide variation of sanitary standards established for normal conditions. The solution to this problem will also be stipulated by a high heterogeneity of radiation status

34


parameters, as well as by an increased perception of those with excess background radiation.

Another scenario dealt with the placement of a 60ɋɨ low-activity radioactive source (used in various calibration instruments) in a subway car. The 60ɋɨ source was assumed to be in the middle of the car. Apart from that, actual data on the passenger traffic in the Moscow subway were taken into account. Estimates indicated that the majority of the passengers (nearly 98%) could have external exposure doses below 100 mSv (see Fig.7). More than 140 passengers could have external radiation sickness symptoms (the overall dose above 0.1 Sv accompanied by quick reaction of the organism, such as dry mouth, headache, nausea, and vomit). The possibility of death from radiation sickness exists for 14 people who happened to be close to the source and were exposed to maximum doses. A considerable number of passengers who were in the vicinity of the source in the subway car may have high skin exposure doses. In this context, the question arises about the expediency of some sites of the subway lines being equipped with dose monitoring systems, which would allow for quick detection of gamma radiation sources placed in the subway. The fourth scenario covered the blasting of a “dirty bomb” at the subway station. The bomb, containing a 90Sr low-level radioactive source and detonated by a low-level (TNT equivalent) explosive device, was assumed to have occurred in the central part of the subway platform. The total number of passengers on the platform at the time of explosion was set at 1300 people.

35


Table 6. Initial data and assessment of radiological consequences resulted from the "dirty bomb" blasting at the platform of a subway station Parameter

Zone 1

Zone 2

Zone 3

Total

0.1 160 2 320 22.2 0.32 5.2 0.64

0.3 480 1 480 11.1 0.054 0.86 0.11

0.6 960 0.5 480 3.7 0.009 0.14 0.018

1.0 1,600 1,280 37 -

Percentage of platform area, relative units Floor area, m2 Passenger density, people/m2 Number of passengers within the zone, people Quantity of 90Sr in the air of the zone, GBq Maximum doses of skin exposure, Sv Maximum doses of lungs exposure, Sv Maximum effective doses of overall body exposure. Sv

As a result of the attack, a portion of the 300 passengers who happened to be a small distance from the explosion (zone 1) could have serious health problems connected with the radiation impact. Maximum lung exposure doses could exceed 5 Sv for these passengers (see Table 6), especially when the time of evacuation from the contamination area is taken into account. It is highly probable that the internal lungs exposure of the 5 Sv level would entail detectable effects of lung radiolesion. The potential for deterministic effects was low for the individuals with the lungs exposure of 1-1.5 Sv; however, adverse health effects are quite possible for those with poor lung health. Further, this passenger group could be at risk of morbidity or mortality caused by lung cancer. The indirect consequences from the terrorist attack would be: • • •

Radioactive contamination of the subway station and the adjoining areas due to spread of radioactive substances; Inability for the public to use the station or even a subway line for a considerable period of time. Simultaneous closure of several stations or interchange terminals will lead to great transport problems in a large city; Additional problems could include indemnification of the losses of contaminated property for the individuals affected by contamination, as well as arrangements for long-term medical service of a large group of people directly involved in the incident or involved in the elimination of its consequences. Table 7. Potential levels of 137Cs radioactive contamination and the exposure doses. Parameter 2

Density of floor contamination, GBq/m Gamma-radiation dose rate, mR/hour Density of surface contamination, mln. beta-part./cm2 per min Inhaled activity, MBq Total contamination of the skin of an adult, MBq Total contamination of clothes of an adult, MBq Activity taken by 1 human out of the cinema, MBq Maximum doses of skin exposure, Sv Maximum doses of lungs exposure, Sv Maximum effective doses of overall body exposure, Sv Maximum doses of overall body external exposure, Sv

Zone 1

Zone 2

Zone 3

1.4 160 1.7 6.6 20 65 91 1.8 0.23 0.25 0.0032

0.24 70 0.28 1.1 3.3 11 15 0.30 0.039 0.042 0.0014

0.025 25 0.03 0.2 035 1.2 1.6 0.032 0.004 0.004 0.0005

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The fifth scenario entailed the dispersal of 137Cs aerosols in the air of a large venue. A typical cinema, with one large hall for 900 spectators, was chosen as the model. The estimated values for 137Cs contamination of the floor, skin and clothes, as well as the inhaled activity are given in Table 7. The main area of vulnerability to radiation for the individuals in this scenario is the exposure of unprotected skin areas, which may reach 2 Sv or more. External human exposure is not high – even in the areas with the highest contamination density – and is not dangerous for the health. The lungs and the overall body exposure could lead to an increased risk of oncology diseases, due to the inhalation of radioactive cesium. The main problem in this scenario is the uncontrolled spread of radioactivity in residential areas, as well as the problems of dealing with the removal of the contaminated clothes and personal belongings of affected people; further depilation of some individuals; panic in the city; and the associated social and economic issues. It should be stressed that public places, due to the potential for tens of thousands of people to be affected by radioactive contamination, present a more difficult problem with regard to quick, effective decision-making. Strict logic is required, and the decision-making process must take into account the consequences of certain actions. If acute radiation injuries occur, several dozen people will be affected, and remote exposure effects will be forecast for several hundreds of people. However, these are the direct radiological consequences. The doses for the rest of the affected individuals will be much less than the practical threshold for adverse radiation impact. Nevertheless, these individuals will perceive the situation dealing with radioactive contamination as hazardous. Accordingly, the public will try to avoid the contaminated areas while the authorities have no remedies for the situation. No required tools, nor any regulatory basis, exist for demonstrating that the level of radiation is safe. Therefore, the following indirect consequences of such an attack should be mentioned: • • •

Inability for the public to use the station or even a subway line for a considerable period of time. Simultaneous closure of several stations or interchange terminals will lead to great transport problems in a large city; Indemnification of the losses for the individuals who have lost their property as a result of radioactive contamination; Arrangements for long-term medical service for a large group of people directly involved in the incident or involved in the elimination of its consequences.

Another scenario dealt with contamination of a road surface. Contamination of the pavement site (spill of the 137Cs low-level solution) took place before a highway entry point, and the contaminated section was set at 20 m long by 9 m wide. The estimate results, with a Moscow district as an example, are given in Fig. 8. The analysis showed that, by 15 minutes after the moment of contamination, over 100m of road will be contaminated to a density of 100 Ci/km2. After a day and a half, the overall section of road presented in the Figure will be contaminated to the level of 10,000 Ci/km2. It is natural that minor roads will also be contaminated. Several days after the initial contamination, the total length of urban road network contaminated above 10 Ci/km2 could reach dozens of kilometers. One of the obvious conclusions resulting from the analysis of the scenarios reviewed is that new, advanced methods are needed for estimating, simulating, measuring, and analyzing the parameters of radioactive contamination in major cities.


37

Apart from that, the development of operative and highly effective decision-making support systems, based on up-to-date communications and monitoring equipment, is a matter of the utmost importance in the densely populated cities.

0 min

15 min

3h

36 h

Fig.8. Dynamics for change in the road surface contamination with the time elapsed from contamination of the road site, Ci/km2

Therefore, the world’s incorrect perception of the radiation risk, as well as the lack of availability of advanced and accessible devices for detecting an increased radiation background (γ and β radiation), lead to enormous indirect damage, even when the actual impact on human health and the environment is minimal (or even negligible). The direct damage associated with radiation effects is understood to be a loss of human life/health; relevant economic damage (compensations, medical costs); loss of industrial capacities or economic facilities; and the cost of intervention measures

38


(evacuation, environmental remediation for large areas), including unjustified countermeasures. These indirect losses include: • • • • • • •

Production drop in several sectors of economy; Disrupted social, industrial or economic links; Estate devaluation; Drop in economic activity in the contaminated area and in the neighboring areas (due to the loss of business ties); Loss of income from tourism, sports or cultural events, etc.; Compensation for devaluated property; Hidden costs due to an increased negative attitude toward radiation and, in particular, toward nuclear industry.

The existence of an inadequate perception of radiation risk is not limited to the common mind. Prejudice against radiation exists in nearly all professional, social, and economic groups of society, including the representatives of legislative and executive power involved in the legislation of public and environmental protection. When speaking about the causes of such an acute perception of radiation, we should remember the nuclear arms race, the bombing of Hiroshima/Nagasaki, and the constant reality of balancing on the edge of nuclear war all the way into the 1960s. Certain feature films made the topic the focus of attention, thus contributing to the issue. These films have reappeared as a reminder of accidents on nuclear submarines, or of the reason for their decommissioning. Education also needs to be mentioned; an analysis of the schoolbooks and higher education training aids currently being used in Russia and in the CIS countries has shown that they are one of the sources of distorted ideas about radiation and its hazards. The level of inadequacy in the public’s perception of radiation threats can be demonstrated by the results of polls taken among a fairly literate portion of the public, including students specializing in the natural sciences. Estimates made with respect to the consequences of the Hiroshima/Nagasaki bombings, from the standpoint of the number of fatalities which resulted from nuclear explosion, are usually fairly accurate. However, as soon as we speak of remote radiological effects, the estimates exceed the actual data by thousands of times. The data from Japanese records, which describes 450 fatal cancer cases among 86 thousand people exposed as a result of nuclear bombing, seems to be easy to access. However, other figures – including those claiming millions of deaths from remote radiation effects – have remained in people’s heads. The same issue exists with regard to Chernobyl. The actual data show that 31 people died during the catastrophe, and 19 emergency workers who obtained high exposure doses died following the accident. Experts believe that cancer, especially thyroid cancer, might develop among several tens of people as a result of overexposure; however, the public seems to think that tens or hundreds of thousands of people died as a result of the Chernobyl radiation (Fig.9).

39


Inadequate perception of radiation risk What do you know of victims of A-bomb and Chernobyl?

Actual death-roll, persons

Students’ estimates (average)

Death in 2 months

Hiroshima

210 000

270 000

Long-term effects in suvivors (86572 pers.) 421

750 000

Death in 3 months

Chernobyl

31

Long-term effects in liquidators ≈ 60 – 80 and Children in BO

40 000

253 000

Fig. 9. The results of the mini-poll run by IBRAE RAS in 2004

The level of knowledge is approximately the same in practically all public, social and professional groups. The above issue is especially grave, as it deals with the entire public system in light of public protection from the threat of radiological terrorism. Public vulnerability to radiological attack is predefined by the fact that not only the public, but also the decision-makers responsible for public protection at various levels, has the same distorted perception of radiation risks. However, there is another serious factor which contributes to this vulnerability, and which, consequently, predetermines potentially negative effects of radiological terrorism. There are very strict standards in the field of radiation safety; these, though, never seem to be a hindrance. Rather, the problem is one of willingness, on the part of industry and society, to pay the extra cost of risk reduction. The current radiation safety regulations, standards, criteria, and approaches, though – and the present tendency to make them stricter – has led to a situation in which society is extremely vulnerable to even the smallest radiation impact, or to any attempts in that vein. Thus, it stands to reason that enormous social and economic damage can be predicted as a result of radiological terrorist attacks. As of today, there is a limit on new nuclear power plants of 10 ȝSv/year for radioactive releases or discharges. This means that doses of a level equivalent to 0.001 of natural background variations are subject to regulation. The Chernobyl law introduced the concept of the area with cesium contamination density of 1 Ci/km2. The exposure dose in such areas is 0.1 mSv/year. To compare, variations of the natural background make up several tens of mSv, while emergency intervention criteria operate with totally different figures. For example, the level at which evacuation is recommended is between 50-500 mSv (i.e. if the dose is less than 50 mSv, the

40


evacuation is not at all necessary). If the dose exceeds 500 mSv, then evacuation is obligatory. We tried to illustrate this complicated situation in Fig.10. How can this be related to the subject of radiological terrorism? Is monitoring nuclear-hazard facilities not a separate task? The radiation safety standards establish 1 mSv as the annual permissible public dose obtained from the man-made sources. That dose is hundreds of times lower than the level at which adverse health effects are possible. The risk connected with exposure to 1 mSv/year is 10-6- 10-5 below the admissible level. At the same time, the risk associated with the chemicals present in the industrial areas of large cities is around the 10-4 - 10-3level, this risk is, in fact, simply a part of our everyday life. A point which deserves consideration is the difference in standards between the nuclear industry and other branches. In demonstration of this fact, Table 8 shows Russia’s carcinogenic risk values in terms of the maximum permissible concentrations (MPC) for water contamination and air pollution, as well as for contamination of the working area. A risk level above 10-3 corresponds to 30% of the regulated substances in water, 22% of aerial pollutants, and over 80% of the contaminants monitored in the working environments. At the same time, the public exposure risks in relation to radiation standards currently in force make up 5·10-5 (or 10-3) for professionals, and are even lower in real life. Risk >10-2 10-2-10-3 10-3-10-4 10-4-10-5 6 Gray/hour)57 and contacted the Atomic Energy Agency of Brazil in Rio de Janeiro. 2.2 Regaining control 2.2.1 Triage The news about the radioactive contamination of Goiania residents spread quickly across the city and its approximately one million inhabitants. In order to regain control, the authorities identified those who were most likely to have been contaminated and directed them to the Olympic Stadium for radiation screening and triage. By February 56 Proceedings International Conference Goiania – 10 Years Later (Ed.: International Atomic Energy Agency, Department of Nuclear Safety, Doc. No. IAEA-GOCP, A-1400 Vienna, Austria (1998). 57 Gray (Gy) is the SI-unit for the radiation dose equivalent; 1 Gy = 100 rad.

F. Steinhäusler / Countering Radiological Terrorism

57

1988, the total number of persons measured exceeded 125,000. Subsequently, the authorities had to provide three different facilities for the 260 persons suspected or confirmed as being contaminated: • • •

Persons with high contamination levels were isolated in the General Hospital; Intermediate contamination victims were cared for in a lodging house; Low contamination victims became residents of a dedicated house. Uncontaminated residents evacuated from contaminated dwellings were housed in this building as well.

Of this cohort, 70 percent had skin contamination and 30 percent had only slightly contaminated clothes or shoes. Of the latter group (183 cases), about 32 percent (59 cases) had minor external contamination only and were released after decontamination. The remaining 68 percent (124 cases) were decontaminated externally. After a medical examination, external radiation monitoring, and laboratory analysis of these persons, the 14 most serious cases were transferred to the centre for radiation accident casualties of the Marcilio Dias Naval Hospital in Rio de Janeiro. This transfer of victims to Rio de Janeiro resembled a war-type operation, because each individual represented a source of radiation, potentially contaminating anyone in close proximity. Four of these persons died in October 1987, their whole body dose ranging from 4.5 to 6 Gy. 2.2.2 Surveys In order to establish the extent of the contamination of the city and its surrounding areas, search teams were equipped with different types of radiation detectors. They investigated the whole of the city, including the identification of contaminated cars passing by on the highway. The operators and their detectors had to withstand high humidity and hot conditions (temperatures above 30°C). In addition, aerial surveys were carried out over 67 km². This revealed that in Goiania city seven main areas were contaminated with dose rate values up to 2 Sievert/hour measured at 1 m distance. Two of these areas had to be evacuated. Due to the length of time before the incident was discovered, the radioactive contamination spread to multiple sectors of society: • • • • • •

58

42 houses required decontamination; 50 000 rolls of toilet paper (total activity: 0.67 TBq) had become contaminated; Some banknotes had a dose rate of 0.8 mGy/hour each;58 Three buses, 14 cars and five pigs were found to be contaminated; Travelers spread the contamination to the nearby townships up to 100 km from Goiania, such as Anapolis, Aparecida, Trindade, and Goias; Transfer of contaminated products via trade added to complex task of delineating the contaminated areas: contaminated paper in Sao Paulo and highly contaminated lead in Goias Velho were recovered at distances up to 830 km from Goiania.

1 Milligray (mGy) = 1/1000 Gy.

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2.2.3 Public services Authorities responded both actively and passively in an attempt to regain control over the situation in a variety of ways, ranging from setting up physical barriers at the borders of the State of Goias to hinder cars from leaving the state, to providing 8000 residents with an official certificate stating that they were not contaminated. In order to improve communication with the public, authorities established a Telephone Hotline, where almost 2,000 calls/day were received. Print- and electronic media were used to provide additional information for the public. Nevertheless, members of the public complained about significant deficiencies in the information policy and unduly complicated organizational decisions. Altogether, it took the authorities six months to decontaminate Goiania and its environs.

3.

Consequences for Professionals

3.1 Crisis management It took three days after the discovery of the incident for the professionals of the Brazilian National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) to address the most urgent radiation contamination, public health, and medical needs. Subsequently, the attention of the expert community from CNEN and several other organizations was focused on monitoring the population, clean up operations, and long term consequences resulting from the incident. Initially, there was a high level of panic among the residents: a few days after the official disclosure of the Telephone Hotline, at least five percent of the public claimed to have symptoms of contamination. Therefore, it was necessary to establish reliable methods by which to identify actual radiation victims. To this end, the radiometric investigations were supplemented by cytogenetic dosimetry on persons who did not display any radiation syndromes, but who had become potential victims. Unfortunately, this procedure is comparatively slow (for example, a chromosome aberration assay requires in excess of three days). Added complications arose from the intense fear of residents who lived in the area of the accident. Many of these people showed symptoms which resembled acute radiation syndrome, but were actually caused by chronic stress. Local radiation injury due to the deposition of radionuclides on skin and mucosa or direct contact with the radiation source was an additional clinical problem. In order to best gauge the radiation exposure, several dosimetric methods were combined: •

•

External doses: At the early stage, clinical findings and simple blood cell counts provided the first data. Since the reduction of lymphocytes is rapid after high doses, this turned out to be the best early bio-indicator, if obtained as soon as possible after the exposure (i.e., within the first 2-3 days) and repeated once or twice at intervals of approximately six hours; Internal doses: The evaluation of internal doses is only possible, if radiation monitoring is organized properly.

The most difficult challenges resulted from either the development of a superinfection due to an immune deficiency, or the attempt to combine adequate decontamination with wound management. It is important to note that of the four fatal casualties, three were the results of significant deficiencies in medical management and


59

prophylactic measures, such as: poor aseptic environment; multiple evacuation of patients; inadequate antibacterial therapy; lack of experience of the medical staff. 3.2 Problems encountered by emergency responders CNEN staff had extensive theoretical knowledge, but no practical experience with real radiation victims. This expressed itself in frequently observed first shock upon encountering radiation dermatitis. Generally, radiation protection experts were strongly affected by the radiation-induced injuries, afraid that patients would die. Excessive stress was experienced by overworked experts who had to deal with the organization of services, procedures, coordination, and the division of tasks, while wearing protective clothing and masks for extended periods. In particular the monitoring of autopsies was found to be unbearable. Due to the lack of regular trained hospital personnel, radiation protection experts also had to assume the role of nurses and guards, and thus had to cope with patients screaming and wanting to escape from the ward by throwing themselves out of windows. This lead to psychosomatic disturbances among staff, such as: insomnia, gastric problems, and weeping freely away from patients and co-workers. After two weeks of excess work and emotional stress, the radiation protection team was completely exhausted, with the first group suffering most because of inadequate knowledge of what had happened. 3.3 Problems encountered by the medical profession Medical care for radiation victims met several obstacles. The Hospital personnel lacked preparation for treating radiation injuries and showed fear, with some of them leaving the victims unattended and going on strike instead. Also, the lack of response from the Goianian medical community is to be noted, despite of the appeals made by physicians. Generally, there was a noticeable lack of medical staff, nurses, paramedical workers, and cleaning personnel in the hospital services. Furthermore, the significant deficiency of laboratory support to perform clinical analyses, inadequate laundry, and the unsuitable system of collecting hospital- and decontamination waste added to the difficulties. Post-mortem procedures on the four bodies of diseased patients also represented a challenge. The contaminated bodies were placed in double plastic bags, specially designed for the transport of corpses, in order to avoid contaminating the morgue. Dry autopsy was selected to minimize the generation of liquid waste and the spread of contamination by splashing. A control area was set up, where every person, object and material leaving the control area was monitored. Individual dosimetry was conducted for each person involved. All surfaces in the autopsy room were covered by plastic sheets. Body fluids were absorbed with foam. Instruments in contact with tissues, organs and fluids underwent a decontamination procedure. At the end of the autopsy the radioactive corpses were packed, covered with a lead sheet, and placed in coffins for their transport to the funeral in Goiania.59

59

Maximum gamma exposure rate was measured in the liver (7,800 Nanocoulomb/kg.h); maximum beta exposure rate was determined in the Fallopian tubes (990 Microgray/h).

60

4.


Consequences for the Public

4.1. Contaminated residents Victims of the incident suffered from rigid radiation protection rules and from daily painful medical procedures. The first deaths, together with the observation of bodily deterioration and the occurrence of opportunistic infections, caused severe psychological effects among victims, such as depression and even suicidal wishes. After the discharge from the hospital they often faced discrimination and had difficulties in finding jobs as a result of stigmatization. 4.2 Uncontaminated residents Also uncontaminated citizens of Goiania experienced a significant impact on their lives due to the radiological incident: (a) Inside Goiania: Whole areas of the city were isolated and interdicted; hundreds of inhabitants were removed from homes, having to leave all their belongings behind; all conventions in hotels were cancelled; (b) Outside Goiania: Agricultural products from Goiania were boycotted; hotels in Brazil refused Guiana residents to register as guests; airline pilots refused to fly an aircraft with Goiania residents on board; bus drivers refused Goiania residents on their buses; passengers of several automobiles with Goiania license plates were stoned. Some residents living near the contaminated areas displayed severe distrust in the authorities and the official assessment of the situation. Therefore, they resorted to offering water, juice, coffee and fruits to the technicians of the Brazilian CNEN in an attempt to identify rejections, which would indicate possible contamination.

5.

Countering the Attack

A radiological terror attack scenario can be preplanned, and table-top and field exercises conducted, but real-life intervention is likely to differ because of the large number of variables characterizing the geographical location, climatic conditions at the time of the attack, contamination vectors, and the social classes involved – all of which determining the resulting impact on man and the environment (Table 1). Table 1: Parameters determining the impact of a radiological terror attack on society Parameter

Variable

Source of radioactive material deployed in the RDD

Power reactor, isotope production reactor, research reactor, defense reactor, industrial irradiator, medical facility, industrial plant Radioactive waste, spent fuel, single isotope Activity, amount, isotopic properties, physical/chemical status after its dispersal Sidewalks, roads, buildings outdoors and indoors (roofs, walls, windows, rooms, attic, heating- and ventilation system), parks and other recreational areas TNT, C4, ANFO, or incendiary device

Type of radioactive material used in the RDD Characteristics of the radioactive material released Type of area contaminated

Details of the explosive device

F. Steinhäusler / Countering Radiological Terrorism Meteorological conditions at the time of the dispersal of the radioactive material Data on buildings near the site of RDD deployment Type of area designated for cleanup Category material to be decontaminated

61

Direction and speed of wind, type and amount of precipitation, temperature inversion, other weather conditions Height, size, roughness of surfaces Residential, commercial, recreational, rural Asphalt, concrete, steel, glass, marble, limestone, plaster, soil, grass

Initial response phase: During the initial phase after such a radiological attack decision makers are likely to have only access to insufficient information. While on the basis of radiation protection principles it would be possible to introduce intervention levels, social and psychological factors are likely to impede severely on such an approach relying heavily on a risk-cost-benefit analysis. Lack of knowledge of the size of the area affected by the attack, the actual number of victims, and the type of contaminating radioactive material make it impossible for a single institution to possess all the means necessary for a far-reaching intervention at this stage. Therefore, a unified command (federal, state, city) is needed from the outset. This unified command should stay in the area for the complete intervention process. Within the unified command it is essential that a lead agency be designated in order to: (a) prioritize lifesaving actions and actions to secure the area over radiological/dosimetric considerations; (b) immediately initiate the classification of victims, sites and rescue teams; (c) prioritize decontamination tasks, specifying which techniques to be applied in which situation; (d) designate an official messenger to communicate with the affected population, taking into account trustworthiness and media preference as perceived by members of the public.60 Professional public affairs advice should be taken in developing means and details of how to convey appropriate messages and information to the public on decommissioning. An RDD attack in a densely populated urban area will involve large groups of people who do not have the necessary knowledge to handle the situation. This will result in a significant disparity between the number of people involved in the incident (typically several thousand), the number exposed to doses above the threshold for early radiation effects (typically tens) and early lethal injuries (single-digit numbers, if any). Since the provisional readiness of medical facilities and the level of qualification of medical staff determine the fate of the victims, the relatively small number of people having received a significant dose must be quickly sorted out so that they can receive medical and prophylactic attention. Intermediate response phase: Countermeasures have a beneficial effect on the psychological and social health of many people because they are interpreted as being cared for. However, the community under attack is likely to have to implement exceptional procedures, which go beyond its routine operations and procedures, such as: acquisition and import of materials/equipment needed for treatment of victims, survey and search operations; hiring of expert services unavailable in the area; disposal of contaminated materials; customs barriers to be waived; legislative power granted to isolate contaminated areas; 60

Typically trustworthiness: HIGH - national food control agencies, radiation protection authorities; LOW food industry, politicians, journalists. Typical media preference: HIGH - TV, labels on food packaging; LOW – magazines, community meetings.

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enforcement of evacuation rules; retrieval of contaminated goods; demolishing of buildings; selection of areas to store waste temporarily; setup and coordination of relief for the victims. A contentious issue with members of the public will be the management of the waste during clean-up operations, since this more a public perception problem than an engineering challenge. As soon as decontamination starts, it produces a large amount of waste to be removed immediately. Therefore the choice of a nearby site for temporary storage (and eventual permanent storage) is important in order to avoid moving the waste several times. Radioactive waste volume reduction is essential, i.e. mixing of clean and contaminated waste streams should be avoided; for example, the Goianian incident, caused by 100 g CsCl2, resulted in over 5,000 m³ of waste. A particularly difficult task is the management of hazardous material, which may also be radioactive (e.g., asbestos, PCB) because of public fear and the associated NIMBY syndrome.61 It is important at this stage to develop an information strategy for the public which communicates, in non-scientific language understood by the public, a scientifically sound basis for all future actions to be taken in managing the radiological aftermath of the terror attack. Such a basis could be the procedures developed by the international radiation protection community for situations in which the source of exposure or the pathways leading to the doses in individuals can be controlled. 62 This approach emphasizes common sense in combination with a cost-benefit analysis or multiattribute analysis and rests on three basic components of protection: (1) radiation exposure follows a linear no-threshold dose response, i.e., no dose is low enough to be regarded as completely safe, but it may be small enough that all concerned agree to disregard it from a practical point of view; (2) dose limits cannot delineate dangerous from safe but they are efficient tools to limit radiation risks; (3) the actual application of dose limits is subject to an optimization process, requiring that the individual dose and the number of exposed individuals should be kept as low as reasonably achievable, economic, and social factors being taken into account. Long-term phase: A major decision must be made concerning the establishment of socially acceptable and practically applicable clearance levels for the large amounts of material resulting from the clean-up operations with low levels of residual radioactivity:63 • •

The radiation risk to individuals caused by cleared material must be sufficiently low as not to be of any further regulatory concern The collective radiological impact of the clearance policy must be sufficiently low as not to warrant regulatory control.

In practice this means that individual-related dose limits for members of the public must not exceed an effective individual dose of 1mSv per year.

61

NIMBY = not in my backyard, i.e. people acknowledging the need for hazardous waste deposit site but refusing such a site in their community. International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP), Recommendation no. 60. 63 Clearance of buildings for any purpose (reuse or demolition), clearance for demolition only, and clearance for building rubble 62


6.

63

Lessons Learned

The Goiania incident, which happened without any criminal intent of dispersing radioactive material, surprised the local and federal authorities of Brazil, as well as the international nuclear community. Neither the magnitude of the radioactive contamination, nor the impact on health and the environment, was foreseen. In the case of a terror attack with the objective of causing the maximum possible detrimental impact on the targeted society, it is safe to assume that the consequences will be at least as severe. Despite several shortcomings in managing the aftermath of the Goiania incident, it can be used for some practically applicable Lessons Learned: •

•

•

•

•

•

Decision making criteria need to be defined for the early-, intermediate-, and long-term phase of managing the post-attack period, balancing radiation-psychosis, radiation doses, associated health risks, monetary costs and benefits. The targeted population need to be informed early and in a comprehensible manner about clean-up criteria and site restoration concepts, such as exemption, clearance, authorized release, release for restricted use, and optimization in order to assist in calming public radiation fear Proactive planning for an optimized, cost-effective post-attack management is essential, since many countries are insufficiently prepared for integrating treatment of radiation psychosis with a postattack dose minimization management Trust-building measures among the inhabitants of the contaminated areas are essential from the onset of managing the aftermath of a radiological terror attack. The population living outside the RDDaffected area needs to be assured that the situation is truly under control by the authorities, e.g., with an adequate quality assurance program for the clean-up and restoration program Authorized groups that can issue certificates of integrity of products and services should be created, thereby reducing the psychological impact of RDD-related terror attacks. Specialized people should be on standby to issue correct press releases, before reporters arrive on the scene if possible. Some of these issues warrant further study. Therefore, it is proposed to consider the creation of an international “Centre of Excellence,” e.g., under the auspices of NATO, where short- and long-term effects of radiological terrorism on society can be subject of a coordinated R&D effort. Topics to be addressed range from effects of radiological terrorism on business, real estate and agriculture, to behaviour of the public (e.g., refusal to return to decontaminated areas, radiation phobia). Such a centre cold also develop models and algorithms; for example, cost models for clean-up operations (procurement of general equipment and material, dismantling of contaminated sites, waste treatment and disposal, security, surveillance and maintenance, site clean-up and landscaping, project management, engineering and site

64


support, fuel, other costs). The ultimate goal should be the provision of science-based advice on the best allocation of limited resources in order to enable the targeted population to return to a level of normalcy in the shortest possible time.


65

Socioeconomic and Psychological Consequences of Large Radiation Accidents: Russian Experience R.V. ARUTYUNIAN, I.I. LINGE, E.M. MELIKHOVA Nuclear Safety Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences Russia Abstract. For the almost 60 years that nuclear power has been used, three large-scale accidents with significant radioactive releases into the environment have occurred in the USSR and Russia. These include the accident at the industrial site of the Mayak facility in the South Urals in 1957, the Chernobyl accident in 1986, and the much less significant radiation incident at the Siberian chemical complex (Tomsk-7) in 1993. Apart from these, a radiation emergency developed in the South Urals during 1949-1952 due to discharges of liquid radioactive waste from the Mayak facility into the Techa River. Owing to this experience with these accidents, plenty of vital lessons have been learnt, including those concerning the consequences for the community. Socioeconomic and psychological aspects of past accidents have been investigated far less than radiological ones, though, and no serious scientific research has been conducted with regard to them. Nevertheless, it is possible to assert that the economic damage associated with public response to radioactive contamination is always of a much greater scale than the losses from contamination itself and the intervention costs. Let us consider the experience of the above-mentioned accidents from this standpoint.

1.

Radiation Incident on the Techa River

Authorized discharges by the Mayak facility of low-level and intermediate-level liquid radioactive waste (LRW) into the Techa River at the initial stage of activity during 1949-1951 caused contamination of the river bed and creation of a heavily contaminated coastal strip of 1 km width and approximately of 80 km length along the entire stream, and caused radiation protection for the public to be required. In 1951, basic discharges of radiochemical waste were redirected from the Techa River to closed Karachai Lake. Afterwards, eight special industrial reservoirs located in the sanitary zone of the Mayak facility were used for technological needs of the production. The intervention measures, such as relocation or restrictions on economic and household use of the river, appeared to be delayed. As a result, the average accumulated dose reached 1.4-2.3 Sv (on the bone surface) in various localities in the upper river. During the first 5-6 years, single symptoms of chronic radiation sickness developed among 940 people, while 66 persons were diagnosed to have a complete symptom complex. Apart from it, a rise in the non-specific morbidity and mortality was fixed among the residents from coastal settlements. The number of leucosis increased, namely: from 1950 through 1982, 37 cases of leucosis were registered among the irradiated residents, that being 23 cases more than the expected number in a control group.

66 R.V. Arutyunian et al. / Socioeconomic & Psychological Consequences of Large Radiation Accidents

In 1956-1959, full relocation was performed for 8,300 residents from 24 villages along the shores of the Techa River. 21,400 people from 15 localities on the middle and lower stream of the river were not relocated. Social Aspects. The information on the accident was top secret until 1989, and no news was published in the central press. Not only the local public, but also local regional authorities were kept unaware of the Mayak’s activity nature. The restrictive measures put in place, such as the creation of a sanitary zone, ban on fishing, mowing and cattle grazing in coastal pastures, etc., led to the infringement of a traditional way of life. Local residents, being unaware of a true reason for banning the use of river water, went on using the river. The resources spent to create new sources of water consumption did not have a serious impact. Unauthorized use of the lands in the sanitary zone increased with time. As a result, long-lived cesium and strontium radionuclides continued to penetrate into the output from individual farms, though with a lesser intensity. Extra soil contamination occurred in personal plots, as well. The ban on agricultural use of the flood-lands caused a decrease in the volumes of agricultural production in the coastal area. A lag in the rates of economic development still remains, as local authorities view the “radioactive areas” as having no future. By current assessments, the total damage cost associated with radioactive contamination of the Techa river, its coastal area, and relocation of its residents makes up 150-250 million USD, without taking into account the costs on water consumption recovery. By 1960, the main activities on exposure restrictions had been completed and the focus on the issue on the part of central and local authorities weakened. No great public concern was observed at that period. In the early 1990s, though, after the material on Chernobyl was declassified, the data on the status of the Techa River and the 1957 accident was published.

2.

The 1957 Accident

On September 29, 1957, an explosion occurred in one of the tanks of the radioactive waste repository at the Mayak facility. A considerable amount of radioactive substance was deposited on the territory of the facility, and some of that was spread over the vast area where about 270,000 people were living. Owing to a relocation of people from the most contaminated lands which was far better executed than that in the Techa River case, the maximum accumulated doses experienced by the 1,380 people evacuated during the first 5-10 days of the crisis turned out to be close to 0.5 Sv. The accumulated

R.V. Arutyunian et al. / Socioeconomic & Psychological Consequences of Large Radiation Accidents 67

doses of those who were relocated in the following two years (nearly 11,000 people) ranged within 230-450 mSv. Only two cases of acute radiation sickness were registered among 40,000 employees of the facility and the military men who had been involved in mitigation of the accident consequences. No cases of the abovementioned disease were diagnosed among the public, although the mortality from all causes rose among the evacuees in the first 5 years. The lack of immunity among infants and the aged led to a rise in mortality from infectious diseases, and was in many respects caused by infringement of an accustomed way of life, heavy stress, loss of personal property or destruction of domestic animals. 5-7 years later, the negative effects were no longer appearing. Among the main intervention measures enacted were restrictions to the area’s accessibility (with a sanitary zone of 400 m²), decontamination, control and quality inspection of foodstuffs/forage, actions in the agricultural sector, and medical examination of the public. The accident and the intervention measures resulted in migration (and, therefore, a decrease in population), disappearance of “nonperspective” localities, and economic degradation of the agricultural sector, which had been the basis for the public’s economic activity. In 1961, an agricultural recovery began. It was practically completed by 1978, having made up for the economic damage caused by the accident. At the same time, though, the restrictive measures for the public remained in place without proper compensation being paid until 1980. The total damage from the accident is assessed as being worth approximately 9.5 billion USD (by the 1995 rate), without taking into consideration the social content. In total, nearly 350,000 people from 832 localities and 5 cities were affected by the consequences of the 1957 accident in the region of the Techa and Isetj rivers. By the early 1990s, the volume of agricultural output and level of public income on the contaminated lands were approximately by 30% lower and the unemployment level by 30% higher than on average throughout the region. The coastal area of the Techa River still remains excluded from being used for economic or personal purposes.

3.

Public Response after 40 Years

In the early 1990s, public and local concern rose in the South Urals due to the impact of the political response necessitated by the Chernobyl accident. In 1993, the federal government had to enact legislation providing benefits and compensation to residents


of contaminated areas. The state program for remedying the contamination of the Ural region had to be developed and implemented. Between 1992 and 1995, approximately 2.5 billion USD (by the 1995 rate) was allotted to help mitigate the consequences of the contamination of the Techa River, as was 800 million USD for public compensation and benefits. Therefore after 40 years, there was a plan to spend much more money on socioeconomic remediation and “calming” the public as there was on mitigating the accident’s consequences and fixing the damage caused by contamination and countermeasures. The local population believed that the state program would help to improve their quality of life and provide state-sponsored support. In actuality, though, the program measures were less than 10% funded. The failure to execute that and other programs combined with an actual decrease in the standard of living in the 1990s yo intensify social tension in the region. As the next decade progressed, the children and grandchildren of those who had suffered from emergency irradiation fifty years ago spoke out to the authorities at every opportunity, demanding indemnification for the damage caused by the radioactive contamination. Muslyumovo, a settlement located 78 km downstream from the site of LRW discharges into the Techa river may, is an example of this. The principal decision to relocate was made in 1954, when the average doses were about 150 mSv/year (or several times higher among those who did not adhere to the restrictions). The original plan was to provide the relocated people with benefits and compensation. Afterward, though, the relocation plans were cut down, and only the residents from the houses submerged during the flood season were relocated. As a result, the Muslyumovo settlement was not subject to relocation. In 1970s, the doses shrank to 5 mSv/year, and, in recent years, the average current dose has been less than 1 mSv/year (with the critical group averaging 1.5 mSv/year - an amount which exceeds the admissible level, but is less than natural variations of exposure to the natural background). This year, more than 50 years after the first decision on relocation was made, Rosatom decided to resettle the residents from Muslyumovo to reduce the socioecological tension which remained from the incident at the Mayak facility. 40 million USD was secured for the construction of new dwellings and associated infrastructure. Rosatom’s decision set a precedent for the residents of neighboring settlements. According to sanitary inspection organs, the annual doses among the critical groups from the Novogorny and Khudaiberdinsk settlements – those nearest to the Mayak facility - are around 1.2 mSv. At the same time, their individual annual risk does not exceed 5·10-5. On the other hand, as the result of a complex chemical load, residents from the neighboring cities are exposed to a carcinogenic risk of 3·10-4 ÷ 3·10-3. The conclusion arises in this


connection that decisions on the use of serious intervention measures should be made on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of long-term consequences for the society.

4.

The Chernobyl Accident

If the situation on the Techa River was characterized by a considerable heaviness of the medical effects of radiation, the Chernobyl accident is unprecedented from the standpoint of the scale of radioactive contamination and collective doses. The scale of medical effects associated with exposure is relatively low, as hundreds of emergency personnel, including firemen, were immediately affected by high-dose irradiation. As for the public, no “specific” radiogenic pathology, except for thyroid tumors in some children, has been revealed on the contaminated lands for the 20-year period of observation. The protective measures implemented in the first years following the accident helped to solve objectives of unprecedented complexity. These included: • • •

Barring from exceeding the annual dose limits for public exposure established by the Ministry of Health; Avoiding catastrophic losses in the field of agriculture and forestry; Stabilizing to a certain extent the socioeconomic situation on contaminated lands.

Looking back on the 20-year experience, it is possible to state that many social consequences of the Chernobyl accident were made “by hands,” so to speak – especially those that covered wide public segments. It was hardly possible to prevent the death or overexposure of the operators and firemen who worked at the site during the accident. The issue of liquidators, though, grew to its present scale (600,000 liquidators in the CIS countries, including 200,000 in Russia) as a result of a political directive from the country’s top authorities to eliminate the accident as quickly as possible, by any means necessary. Relocation of the people from heavily contaminated areas was inevitable; however, political considerations outweighed expert recommendations when selecting the criteria for implementing the countermeasures. This led to unjustified territorial scaling of the relocation issue. In the Russian Federation in 1986, for example, 186 people from the four localities in the Bryansk region were resettled due to the emergency criteria, rather than due to valid ones. In 1989, scale relocation began, and terms such as “zones of obligatory relocation” (>15 Ci/km² by Cs) and “zones for residence with a right to relocate” (5-15 Ci/km²) were introduced. As a result, 52,000 people were relocated or left the area of one’s own accord. In Russia, the number of people exposed to extra irradiation in doses higher than the “safe” limit of 1mSv/year (as established by legislation) does not exceed 100,000 people. However, due to the facts that political considerations have outweighed expert recommendations and that legislation has fixed the incorrect value of 1 Ci/ km², nearly 2.7 million Russians now believe themselves to be sufferers from the Chernobyl radiation who are indemnified by the state. Taking into account international recommendations on the intervention levels, the Chernobyl issue might be presently measured through the following parameters: social


issues of the evacuees (120,000 -130,000 people), dosimetry and medical support for 30,000-50,000 participants in mitigation of the accident consequences, and social protection and remediation of the areas (less than 100,000 people). Thyroid cancer among children, one of the saddest consequence of the accident, also might be averted through simple and effective measures of iodine prophylaxis, if top authorities were not afraid to make public the nature or scale of the accident. Finally, a psychological stress which, as physicians admit, is the most serious accident consequence for the public, resulted directly from underestimate by top authorities of operative and trustworthy information provided to the public, as well as drastic changes in the strategy of state information policy. A victim complex has formed among the residents from contaminated areas, owing to the improperly considered compensation and benefits system. Nine percent of the population from the affected areas are diagnosed to have a Post-Traumatic Syndrome (PTS), and almost 50% of people under examination enter the risk group (i.e. they have single symptoms of the above disease). The frequency of PTS occurrence among the liquidators corresponds to that observed among the participants in military events (20-25%). The initial causes for multiple scaling of the accident consequences were inaccurate decision-making, the imperfect normative and legal basis, and the improperly considered legislative criteria for social protection. Zoning based on particular environmental characteristics, such as the density of Cs-137 soil contamination, was the gravest error. Experts know that soil contamination density after an accident is less and less associated with exposure doses with time. Apart from that, internal exposure doses may differ by tens or hundreds times in the areas with varied landscapes and biogeochemical characteristics at same soil contamination density. From the economic standpoint, introduction of that criterion into the legislative field in 1991 meant unwarranted alienation of large agricultural lands, degradation of many important domestic and economic complexes, and unjustified material losses and financial costs. From the socio-psychological standpoint, public concern rose in the contaminated areas due to the fact that the state acknowledged the residents’ rights to benefits and compensations 5-6 years after the accident (an act that was equal to an admission of the damage caused). Consideration of socioeconomic interests of different public groups entailed further “blotting” of contamination areas, as well as a rise in the number of people involved. Nearly 20% of the affected population obtained their status by socioeconomic reasons (for instance, the working residents or those who often visited the more contaminated neighboring areas, etc.). The law also easily solved the question social guarantees for those involved in mitigating the accident’s consequences. The status of liquidator was obtained by every person who had spent at least one day in the 30-km zone prior to 1990. Evident simplification of the criteria led the state to suffer significant economic damage, and resulted in the development of a number of negative social processes among the liquidators. According to the data provided by the Russian State Dosimetry and Medical Register, only the 1986-1987 liquidators belong to the increased risk group. However, by the law starting in 1991, all liquidators had to be provided with free medical service, places in sanatoriums, free public transport, preferential grants for housing accommodation, monthly payments of the two minimum wages, etc., all from the federal budget.


Under conditions of heavy economic crisis, the benefits and privileges provided to liquidators were so inviting that such benefits provoked a rapid growth in the group’s disability indices. In 1997, for example, the disability index for this group was almost 3.7 times that of the general public. In the vast majority of cases, disability was associated with diseases that could not be induced directly by radiation. The socially dependent nature of the rise in disability/morbidity among liquidators confirms the analysis of more objective mortality indices for the liquidator cohort that do not exceed the levels of control public groups. It is difficult to correct the mistakes made regarding social protection and compensation of the affected population. This in not to say that attempts were not made, though. In 1995, understanding that there was no way out of the situation, the Russian Scientific Commission on Radiological Protection developed a dose conception approved by the RF Government. According to the conception, zoning is based solely on the dose. Residence and economic activity of the public should not be limited by the radiation factor in the localities where the average annual effective dose does not exceed 1mSv. In spite of considerable efforts, though, this dose conception has failed to be implemented in practice. The current status of zoning is defined by the 1997 Decree, which significantly reduced the number of localities qualifying as zones of radioactive contamination. This was mainly accomplished through stricter adherence to the criterion of contamination density. Observance of that simplified principle, though, has provoked a considerable number of conflicts regarding payment of, and eligibility for, benefits and compensations. This conditional and (in principle) regulated criterion has become the subject of legal action challenging the exclusion and inclusion of particular localities from/into the zones of radioactive contamination. The court judgments pronounced in 2005 were tough enough to change the zone status for 64 localities, and to include 70 settlements. In total, as of January 1, 2006, over 4,413 localities were included in the established radioactive contamination zones. Radiation levels have decreased by hundreds of times in practically all localities compared to the initial post-accident period, due to both natural purification and the protective actions performed. At present, radiation relates neither to the number of significant risk factors for public health nor the main source of exposure.


Socioeconomic Development of Contaminated Areas Agricultural areas southwest of the Bryansk region happened to be the most affected by the accident in the Russian Federation. Low productivity of agricultural production on poor soils and difficulties in getting the pure output without use of special protective measures were the objective reasons for the region and its residents to find themselves in an unfavorable economic situation. Until 1993, the state supported the preservation of the production potential of collective and state farms through implementation of scale protective actions in agriculture. While considerable investments restrained to a certain extent the production downswing that occurred in the country’s economy in the early 1990s, though, after 1994, investment in federal remediation programs began to decrease gradually. While in 1992 the Bryansk region obtained greater funds under the state programs than the regional budget was, the present state grants do not exceed 2%. Due to the drastic reduction in funds, normal agricultural output became much more difficult to maintain in the contaminated areas than in other regions. Effects of this included 40% lower wages and 15% higher unemployment within the radiocontaminated area than in the rest of the region. Likewise, asset investments and volumes of retail commodity circulation per capita fell to nearly two times lower than the regional indices–and today, the situation remains largely the same. Direct losses and indirect damages incurred by Byelorussia, Russia and Ukraine as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe have been estimated as being in the tens or hundreds of billions USD in the 15 years since the accident. The cost efficiency of protective measures, which were taken under public pressure and which were meant to calm people, was extremely low from a radiological standpoint. After 1989, the cost of relocating 1man/Sv was 500,000 USD. Though, those measures have not fully solved the social task set. The measures taken after the accident in the countries of Northern Europe were not always economically effective, either, especially if one proceeds from the criterion of 100,000 USD for one averted man/Sv of the exposure dose. Public doses obtained during the first year following the accident ranged between 0.05 – 0.8 mSv. However, the governments of many countries took systematic efforts to soften acute public response to radioactive contamination. For instance, Great Britain imposed restrictions on the movement and slaughter of 4.25 million sheep after the accident occurred. 8 years later, the restrictions were still valid for 438,000 sheep. In another case, the Swedish government paid about 200 million USD to deer farmers from Lapland, a region 1,500 km from the Chernobyl NPP, because the deer meat in the area was considered contaminated and unfit for eating. The countermeasures taken in Northern Europe included compensation payments and the costs for information provision. Table 1. Economic Losses of Byelorussia/ Russia/ Ukraine from the Chernobyl Accident Country Types of Damage, billion USD Costs, billion USD USSR64, Direct damage and costs for mitigation of the accident consequences 12.6 1986-1989 Byelorussia, Direct costs for mitigation of the accident consequences; 6.7 1992-2000 Direct and indirect losses (exclusion of assests, objects of social 29.6 purpose, dwellings, and natural resources) 64 The data was formally represented by the delegations from the USSR/ Byelorussia/ Ukraine at the UN Socioeconomic Council (Letter No.Ⱥ/45/342, ȿ/1990/102 dt. July 6, 1990 addressed to the UN General Secretary).

R.V. Arutyunian et al. / Socioeconomic & Psychological Consequences of Large Radiation Accidents 73 Russia, 1992-2000 Ukraine, 1992-2000

5.

Federal Target Program (56%) + compensation and benefit payments (44%) Direct costs for mitigation of the accident consequences

>3 5.4

Accident at the Siberian Chemical Complex

On April 6, 1993, an explosion occurred at the radiochemical plant in the Tomsk-7 town (now Seversk). The accident was a level 3 on the INES international scale, which means that it was a severe incident, but did not involve irradiation of personnel. Uranium and plutonium isotopes entered the environment, but only the Georghievka village, which was 16 km from the Siberian Chemical Complex (SCC), turned out to be within the radioactive trace. 73 people were living there at the time. When the accident occurred, the Chernobyl catastrophe and the Ural accident were still the focus of public attention. Both the authorities and the public were informed, and the local administration obtained detailed information at a meeting held by the head of the Tomsk region only five hours after the accident. The public became aware of the news only two hours later. By the next day, it was clear that the expected doses in Georghievka were significantly lower than the level requiring intervention, with maximum doses below 0.4 mSv for the first year and below 0.2 mSv for the second. However, the incident caused worry among the local authorities and the public, so the decision was made to undertake a number of activities which would help to reduce social and psychological intensity. The temporary evacuation of children (18 people under 17 years) and decontamination of the village were the basic protective measures. When decontaminating the settlement (Photo 6), irradiation of personnel involved in the activities happened to be somewhat higher than the averted dose for the public. To provide “pure” foodstuffs, local meat output was purchased, vegetables were delivered to the residents, and agricultural work was suspended. None of the measures were justified from the radiological standpoint, as the above costs amounted on average to 46 million USD per 1 man.·Sv. The measures not only seemed insufficient to the local public, but also caused suspicion that contamination was very hazardous. Many residents from Georghievka left their houses and moved to the neigbouring village of Naumovka. The involvement of EMERCOM in the rescue activities made the residents of neighboring settlements fear that the passing transport would spread radioactive contamination, and their fears were reinforced by the statements of some officials.


In the following years, the residents of Georghievka, Naumovka and the Black River settlements, supported by environmental rights defenders, brought suits for indemnification of moral and material damage. In 2001, the court resolved that the SCC management should pay 20 residents from Georghievka 800 USD as compensation for moral damage caused by the accident. The total amount of the SCC plant’s costs on the first-priority measures outside the industrial site was relatively small only about 200,000 USD. Bearing in mind the scale of funds for the Chernobyl and Urals programs, the administration of the Tomsk region developed a program for mitigation of the accident consequences in Tomsk-7 of the amount of several millions USD. However, the government did not approve the program. The accident at the SCC did not receive a great deal of attention at the national level, remaining an event of only regional significance. Part of the reason for this may be the fact that there was nothing sensational about this accident, other than the fact of its occurrence. Nobody died, the contamination affected only one village, nobody was relocated, and the information on the accident was easily accessible to the media. As a result, the federal government did not dramatize the situation regarding contamination, and did not secure millions of rubles for mitigation of the accident’s consequences. 6.

Conclusions

The problem of how to quantify the non-radiological factors involved in a radiation accident has not yet been solved. However, based on the specifically known public perception of radiation described below, we can attempt to project the potential social amplification of the actual risk involved. Intervention will be required in all cases when the standards established for normal (non-emergency) conditions are exceeded. For the overwhelming majority of the population, this will mean low exposure doses; however, people greatly fear radiation regardless of the dose. The existence of an invisible threat causes public concern. The mass media and anti-nuclear activists dramatize the event. The “hot” subject becomes the focus of attention of political leaders of all levels, and scientists/ ecologists express their concerns, as well. The public’s incorrect perception of the radiation hazard leads to a situation where officials, in an attempt to “play it safe,” try to protect people to the maximum. Excessive and unwarranted countermeasures confuse people as, in their opinion, the danger must be great if the authorities are taking such serious measures. Therefore, both fear and expectation of radiation disease increase. If the intervention measures cover large public groups, then a society may respond to radioactive contamination as it would to a national catastrophe. The “critical mass” required for this perception seems to make up tens or hundreds of thousands of people meaning that radioactive contamination in a metropolitan area would be fraught with heavy societal destabilization. Experience with past radiation accidents has revealed the following: One of the main reasons for inadequate public response to radiation accidents in the long term is the lack, due to scientific dualism in the field of the low-dose effects, of a precise “legal” scheme for selecting the intervention levels with regard to low-dose radioactive contamination. Incorrect public perception of a radiation hazard and the intervention measures appropriate to this perception may result in the following:


• •

•

• •

Deterioration of socioeconomic tension not only in the highly contaminated areas but also on large lands where insignificant changes in the radiological status may be registered but can cause no negative effects; Outflow of youth and working-age people, as well as losses of working and human potential in the region. Frightened people from the “contaminated areas” will be eager to leave and take their children with them. Decontamination of the localities does not solve the issue. On the contrary, the measure will reinforce the wish of people to leave for a safer place. Costs for exclusion of part of the contaminated areas from the economic activity; possible closure of agricultural and industrial enterprises producing the contaminated output; and a decrease in interest in the output produced in radioactive areas; Devaluation of real estates in the contaminated areas; lost profits in trade/ tourism, etc., and a decrease in economic attractiveness of the regions; Latent costs stipulated by publicly increased negative response to radiation in general, and to nuclear power in particular.

Socio-environmental tension in contaminated areas aggravates available social problems. Apart from it, new social groups may emerge, like mass public associations of sufferers from radiation effects, and express their specific interests. The conflicts of these social groups with official medical science leads to forced expenditures on mass epidemiological research, multiple medical examinations of those who have obtained low and sub-low doses, and the programs humanitarian assistance. More work is done on the normative, legal and legislative basis on radiation protection, etc. As the economic damage associated with public response to radioactive contamination is always of much greater scale than the losses from contamination itself and the costs for the intervention measures, generation of more adequate perception of a radiological risk among all social and professional groups of the society, including administrators, is the most effective measure to reduce indirect losses from radiological terrorism.

References 1. 2. 3.

Alexakhin R.M., Buldakov L.A., Iljin L.A. et al. Large Radiation Accidents: Consequences and Protective Countermeasures, Moscow, IzdAt, 2001, p.752. Russian National Reports on Chernobyl Published in 1996, 2001 and 2006 (http://www.ibrae.ac.ru) The Human Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident. A Strategy for Recovery. // A Report Commissioned by UNDP and UNICEF with the Support of UN-OCHA and WHO. Chernobyl Report-Final-240102.



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Radiological Consequences of the Kyshtym Accident Oleg. A. PAVLOVSKIY Nuclear Safety Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia Abstract. This short paper discusses the little-known 1957 radiological incident in Kyshtym (USSR), which caused significant release of high-level radioactive waste into the environment, and necessitated protective measures for the public. Concealment of the event by the government from the general public between 1957 and 1989 resulted in a public outcry and an institution of a special federal program of remediation.

On September 29, 1957, at 16:22 local time, a radiation accident occurred at the Production Association “Mayak,” the first facility used to produce arms-grade plutonium in the former USSR. Accompanied by a large radioactive release into the atmosphere [1, 2], the accident’s consequences turned out to be serious, and required the implementation of large-scale mitigation measures, as well as radiation protection for the public. According to the international grading of radiation incidents/accidents (the INES scale), the above-mentioned accident can be categorized as severe, with consequences that have entailed the use of local measures for radiation protection of the public. By current assessments, it can be graded as a level 6-7 accident by the INES scale [3]. Since the accident took place in the vicinity of the district center Kyshtym in the Chelyabinsk region, it is referred to as the “Kyshtym accident.” The accident included an explosion of high-level liquid radioactive waste (from radiochemical production), though the direct factors that initiated the explosion of solid residue still remain unknown [3]. Proceeding from the factual data represented in the works [1, 2] and in a number of other publications [4-11] with regard to the radiation status in the contaminated area during the first days following the accident, it is possible to state these facts: •

•

The explosion occurred in capacity tank No.14 of the waste storage complex of the radiochemical plant. The tank was 6 m in height, with an outer diameter of 8 m, a wall thickness of 13-mm, and a full interior volume of 300 m3. At the time of the accident, it held 256 m3 of waste (representing a total activity of nearly 20 million Ci (7.4*1017 Bq)). Failures in the cooling system of the tank resulted in a rise in the temperature of the tank contents and, consequently, water evaporation from the liquid saline solutions (up to the point at which dry salts were deposited). According the analysis of accident causes, the volume of exploded dry salts in tank No. 14 was 70-80 t (a level equivalent to 25-29 t of TNT). The current assessments [2] based on the explosion characteristics of destroyed buildings/constructions on the territory of the industrial site indicate that the observed destruction might correspond to an explosion of the TNT ranging from 8-16 to 120-170 t.

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O.A. Pavlovskiy / Radiological Consequences of the Kyshtym Accident

At the moment of the accident, a southwest gusty wind of 5 m/s speed was blowing in the area at a height of 10-12 m, and the wind speed exceeded 10 m/s at altitudes above 500 m. 6-8 hours after the accident, the radioactive cloud had reached a distance of 345 km from the site of explosion, and the density of local contamination on the trace axis was 0.1 Ci/km2 by 90Sr. The maximum levels of local contamination reached 150.000 Ci/ km2 (measured by total beta activity) and 4.000 Ci/ km2 (measured by 90Sr). Proceeding from these measurements, it was calculated that γ-radiant144Ce, 95Zr, and 106Ru made up the basic portion of activity, with a relatively small contribution of long-lived 90Sr. The radionuclide content of the release as determined afterwards is given in Table 1. Table 1. Radionuclide Content of the Kyshtym Accident Release

The radioactive trace axis passed near the localities Berdenish (210 people; 12.5 km from the explosion’s epicenter), Saltykovo (160 people; 18 km from the epicenter), Galikayevo (220 people; 23 km from the epicenter), and Russian Karabolka (420 people; 35 km from the epicenter). It formed the so-called East-Ural Radioactive Trace (EURT), covering the areas of the Chelyabinsk/Sverdlovsk/Tumen regions (See Figure 1).

Fig.1. Map of the East-Ural Radioactive Trace.


79

The areas of 0.1 Ci/ km2 density of contamination by Sr-90 made up nearly 23,000 km , comprising 217 localities containing 272,000 people. The area breakup by the population and the levels of local radioactive contamination are given in Table 2. 2

Table 2. Area Breakup by Population and Levels of Radioactive Contamination Initial Contamination Density, Number of Residents at the Moment of Area, km2 Ci/km2 by 90Sr Accident, thous. people ≥0.1 (15-23)⋅103 ∼270 *) 1000 11.2 ≥2 230 2.0 ≥12 120 0.75 ≥50 50 0.55 ≥200 16 ≥800 8 ≥2000 *) Approximate Value

The gamma-ҏradiation dose rate and the radioactive contamination density measurements have proven that contamination levels are so high that areas as far as several tens of kilometers from the site of accident are no longer good for living and agriculture (Table 3). Table 3. Gamma-radiation Dose Rate at 1 m Height above Surface in Some Localities in First 24 hours after the Kyshtym Accident Locality Distance from the Site of Release, km Dose Rate, R/sec Berdenish 12.5 400 Saltykovo 18 300 Galikayevo 23 170 Russian Karabolka 35 25 Yugo-Konevo 55 6 Bagaryak 75 4 3 Ust-Kamegorsk 105

As the overwhelming portion of local radioactive contamination was made up of relatively short-lived nuclides, a significant decrease in the gamma-radiation dose rate above the contaminated areas was observed in the first days and months following the accident (See Table 4). Table 4. Outdoor Exposure Dose Rate of γ-radiation in Localities in First Four Months, μR/s Locality Time Following the Accident, days 1 16 30 120 Berdenish 400 190 150 120 Saltykovo 310 80 70 50 Galikayevo 170 125 110 85 Russian Karabolka 25 3.0 2.4 1.0 Yugo-Konevo 6.0 1.5 0.70 0.10 Bagaryak 4.0 1.2 0.10 0.05 Kamensk-Uralsky 3.0 0.80 -

More than 5,000 people were irradiated by doses of up to 1 Gy at the industrial site of the PA “Mayak” in the first hours following the accident before they were evacuated. Soldiers from the military unit on guard during the accident obtained the total-body exposure dose of 1 Gy. No acute radiation sickness was found among the 153 military men under observation during the first month after the accident. At the same time, the morphology of peripheral blood of many of them showed a reduced number of

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leucocytes and lymphocytes. During mitigation activities from 1957 through 1959, about 30,000 employees from the Mayak facility, the building and assembly organizations, and the military construction units obtained dose rates above 0.25 Gy. The radioactive substances that entered cow organisms in the first days after the accident were evaluated at a level of 1-5 Ci in the localities of Berdenish, Saltykovo, and Galikayevo, where the local radioactive contamination density by total beta activity ranged from 20 to 30,000 Ci/km2. 9-12 days after the accident, agricultural animals being grazed in pastures began to die. Their death was accompanied by phenomena typical of acute radiation sickness, such as increased bleeding of mucous tunics, bloody flux, and leukopenia. Estimates of the external gamma-radiation doses in the open air in the localities of Berdenysh, Saltykovo, and Galikayevo for the first 10 days following the accident made up 260, 160, and 130 cGy respectively. Taking into account the protective properties of local buildings and the emergency countermeasures performed, the effective dose of external and internal exposure for the residents of these localities is assessed as 0.5-1 Sv. For more detailed information as to the situation in some settlements in the area of radioactive contamination, see Table 5. Table 5. Some Data on Radiation Parameters in Three Localities within the Kyshtym Accident Trace Parameter Berdenish Russian Bagaryak Karabolka 25 4.0 400 Dose Rate, R/sec “D” + 1 1.2 190 3.0 “D” + 16 0.1 150 2.4 “D” + 30 0.05 120 1.0 “D” + 120 External exposure in the Open Air, R 0 –10 days 260 12 2.2 0 – 20 days 400 15 2.7 1 month 500 17 2.8 2 months 810 27 3.4 3 months 1.050 36 4.5 38 6.3 4 months 1.240 6 months 1.500 51 8.4 1 year 1.700 58 9.5 Internal Dose in Red Marrow due to Inhalation, rem 1.5 0.35 0.1 Public Exposure, rem Total body 17 GI tract 150 Bone Surface 1.6 Effective Dose 52 44 Dose to 1990 2.4 1.8 Internal Dose in GI Tract due to Ingestion, rem 90 13 0.45 Collective External Dose, men*rem Before Evacuation 10.080 3.860 25 years 1.460 Total -activity of Nuclides in Air on the Ground Level at the Time of Cloud Passage, nCi/l 34 4.4 0.6 30,000 4,500 150 Total activity on the 20th Day: Ground, Ci/km 2 Grass, Ci/kg 9.7 0.7 0.27 Sr-90 Surface Contamination Density, Ci/km2 650 65 1.8 Contamination of Dwellings and Household Utensils, 106 fissions/min in an area of 150 cm2 Floor 2-3 0.1 0.2 – 0.04 Clothes 1.5 0.1 0.15 – 0.02 Shoes 2.5 0.1 – 0.08 0.09 – 0.03 Total activity on the 20th Day in Food and Drinking Water, Ci/kg(l):

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O.A. Pavlovskiy / Radiological Consequences of the Kyshtym Accident Corn Milk Meat Water Total activity in Cow Organs on the 11th Day, Ci/kg: Muscles Lung Liver Kidney Bone GI Tract

19 2.6 1.6 1.44

3.0 0.64 0.16 0.15

1.2 0.12 0.003

0.52 4.1 10 5.3

0.39 0.19 0.22 0.34 -

< 0.04 < 0.04 < 0.04 < 0.04 < 0.04 < 0.04

Subsequent analysis of the radiation status in the accident area showed that the Kaslin, Kunashak, and Argayash districts of the Chelyabinsk region were the most contaminated. 10,200 people from those lands were relocated after the accident. Another 500 people were resettled from the contaminated areas of the Sverdlovsk region. In all, a total of 22 rural localities were evacuated. To bar non-evacuees from entering the contaminated zone, a buffer area with a special restrictive routine was established within a territory limited by an isoline of 4 Ci/km2 by 90Sr. Initially, the buffer area made up about 700 km2; at present, it is roughly ¼ that size. The initial part of the 30 km radioactive trace had either fully dead or partly damaged forestry. The pine turned out to be least stable out of the two basic breeds of tree in the area (the other being the birch). Pine trees died at sites where the absorbed dose accumulated by needles was above 50 Gy. No signs of forest affection were revealed at the 1 Gy level. 2,055 people (1,023 adults and 1,032 children) from the mostly contaminated localities, including those settlements from where the residents were evacuated in the first 7-10 days following the accident, were examined during the first nine months. No cases of acute, sub-acute, or chronic radiation sickness were diagnosed. In approximately 20% of the cases, changes not so vividly expressed in the cellular content of peripheral blood were revealed - namely, leukocytosis, leukopenia and thrombopenia. The rate of death from neoplasms of lymphatic or blood-forming tissues for the residents from the Berdenish, Saltykovo, and Galikayevo localities was 13.2*10-5 – as opposed to 4.7*10-5 among the rest of the local public which was also affected by radiation, but in lesser doses. No reliable distinctions in oncological mortality from other cancer forms among the irradiated public and control groups were revealed. There were some indications of increased mortality from gullet cancer among the residents from the above-mentioned settlements (26.5*10-5 versus 12.1*10-5 under control), but this rise is not statistically reliable. It is important to mention that subsequent observations of the health status, sickness rate and mortality of the public affected by emergency radiation impacts resulted from the Kyshtym accident did not reveal the deviations from similar indices among the non-radiated people. The Soviet society became aware of the 1957 radiation accident in the South Urals only three years after Chernobyl. At the July 18, 1989 hearings in the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee, some data on the accident that had occurred 32 years before that, as well as on its effects for the population, were first presented in public. Afterwards, basic material on the accident was published in the domestic and foreign press. It is also of importance that in the case of the Kyshtym accident, as compared to Chernobyl, the lack of negative impact on the public of non-objective or often deliberately false

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data presented by mass media with regard to possible effects of radiation led to a situation, even when no reliable changes in the health of the local public were revealed (although, the actual doses of the persons from among the public affected by the Kyshtym accident turned out to be significantly higher than those of the irradiated people in the case of Chernobyl). However after the information on the 1957 accident and the incident on the Techa River was published, public response was quite acute and required the approval of a special federal program for remediation of the contaminated areas.

References 1.

2. 3. 4.

5.

6.

7. 8.

9.

Burnazyn, A.I. (ed.) Results of Studies and Experience in Elimination of the Consequences of Accidental Contamination of a Territory with the Products of Uranium Fission, Energoatomizdat, Moscow, 1990 (in Russian). Alexakhin R.M., Buldakov L.A., Iljin L.A. et al. Large Radiation Accidents: Consequences and Protective Countermeasures, Moscow, IzdAt, 2001. THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENT SCALE (INES). USER’S MANUAL 2001 EDITION IAEA, VIENNA, 2001. IAEA-INES-2001 Akleev, A.V., P.V. Goloschapov, M.O. Degteva et al. Radioactive Contamination of the Environment in the Southern Urals Region and Its Impact on the Health of the Population. Central Institute for Atomic Science and Technology, Moscow, 1991 (in Russian). Buldakov, L.A., S.N. Demin, V.A. Kostyuchenko et al. Medical Consequences of the Radiation Accident in the Southern Urals in 1957, pp.419-431. In: Proceedings of Symposium on Recovery Operations in the Event of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. STI/PUB/826. IAEA, Vienna (1990). Kostyuchenko, V.A., L.Yu. Krestinina. Long-term Irradiation Effects in the Population Evacuated from the East-Urals Radioactive Trace Area. The Science of the Total Environment 142 (1994), pp. 119-125. Creation of the First Nuclear Bomb, Moscow, Energoatomizdat Publishing House, 1995. Nikipelov, B.V., E.I. Mikerin, G.N. Romanov et al. The Radiation Accident in the Southern Urals in 1957 and the Cleanup Measures Implemented, pp.373-403, In: Proceedings of a Symposium on Recovery Operations in the Event of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency. STI/PUB/826. IAEA, Vienna (1990). Nikipelov, B.V., G.N. Romanov, L.A. Buldakov et al. The Radiation Accident in the Southern Urals in 1957, Sov. J. Atomic Energy, pp. 6-7: 74-80, 1989.


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Looking at Radiological Terrorism Through the Eyes of the Public: the First Step in a Meaningful Government-Public Partnership Roz D. LASKER, M.D. Center for the Advancement of Collaborative Strategies in Health Division of Public Health The New York Academy of Medicine United States Abstract. Governments and experts seeking to mitigate the social and psychological effects of radiological terrorism are working at a distinct disadvantage. While the public is the object of their concern, governmental strategies and plans are being developed without directly involving the public. Lacking that voice, do we really know what matters to people in this type of situation and what can be done to address the problems they would face? Do we fully appreciate the role that the public can play in contributing to response and recovery? Recent efforts enabling the American people to speak for themselves reveal that we don’t. This paper presents findings from the Redefining Readiness Study, which gave the American people their first opportunity to describe what they would face in trying to protect themselves in a dirty bomb explosion. It also presents the experiences of four American communities that are actively engaging their residents in developing and implementing strategies to respond to emergencies like a dirty bomb explosion. Both the study and the demonstrations uncover important differences in the way planners and the public think about radiological emergencies. Equally importantly, they document that community residents have valuable and practical insights which may hold the key to protecting as many people as possible should a radiological event occur. Building on new community engagement methods developed by the Redefining Readiness demonstration sites, the paper describes how governments and communities can give the public a more active and meaningful role in emergency preparedness efforts. By giving the public an opportunity to think about emergencies in advance – and to put their own problem-solving abilities to use – this engagement process can help community residents build the resilience they need to cope with radiological terrorism and other emergencies. By enabling the general public, experts, and people from public and private organizations to combine what they know and can do, the process can help communities create conditions that minimize psychological damage and social disruption in emergencies. By enabling communities to identify and address the full range of risks that people face trying to protect themselves in emergencies, the process can lead to the development of preparedness plans that justify the public’s trust and confidence. Key words: community engagement, public participation, government-public partnership, emergency preparedness

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R.D. Lasker / Looking at Radiological Terrorism Through the Eyes of the Public

1. Potential flaws in the current government-public relationship Government officials and experts seeking to mitigate the social and psychological effects of radiological terrorism focus considerable attention on the public. They are also engaged in a relationship with the public, which can influence the extent of the psychological damage and social disruption they want to prevent. Consider the way the public is currently involved in community efforts to respond to radiological attacks and other kinds of emergencies. While the public is the object of government’s concern, governmental strategies and plans are being developed without directly involving the public. Government officials and experts spend a lot of time thinking about particular kinds of emergencies and deciding what the public needs to know and do should such an event occur. Their focus then turns to communicating, educating, and conditioning the public so that people in communities will do what officials and experts believe they ought to do. Research and practical experience with public participation in community problem solving suggests that the public’s passive role in this relationship is cause for concern.65 Specifically, the limited involvement of the public can undermine the ability of communities to mitigate the psychological and social effects of emergencies in two ways: • •

by denying community residents critical opportunities for building resilience; and by denying community planners the “real-life” knowledge they need to prevent unnecessary death, suffering, and social disruption from occurring.

People are more resilient (i.e., better able to deal with life’s difficulties) when they have opportunities to think about challenging situations in advance, identify the problems they would face, and figure out what can be done to address those problems. Doing so makes people familiar with disruptive situations that may occur in the future and enables them to prepare to deal with these situations if they do occur. It also gives people a sense of confidence in their own problem-solving abilities, which they can put to use in other kinds of challenging situations, as well. In community efforts to prepare for radiological emergencies and other disasters, government officials and experts engage in this kind of activity frequently – in workshops, table-top exercises, and drills – but such opportunities are not currently available to the general public. In the current government-public relationship, community members also lack opportunities to contribute their knowledge and perspectives to community-level emergency preparedness planning. Consequently, government officials and experts have to rely on their own assumptions about what matters to the public and how the public will behave. But what if some of those assumptions are incorrect? What if people face barriers and risks that the officials and experts have not considered? What will be the extent of death, suffering, and social disruption under such conditions? This issue is important not only because government officials and experts have an obligation to try to protect as many people as possible in emergency situations, but also because the psychological burden of any emergency depends, in part, on how much death and suffering is inevitable and how much is preventable. Even when large 65

Lasker RD and Weiss ES. Broadening Participation in Community Problem Solving: A Multidisciplinary Model to Support Collaborative Practice and Research. Journal of Urban Health 80:14-47, 2003.


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numbers of people die in a disaster, those who survive experience the situation very differently when they are confident that everything possible has been done to respond to the event than when it is evident that many people who could have been protected were not. These conditions can also influence the level of the public’s trust in government.

2. Evidence that public involvement matters: The Redefining Readiness Study Clearly, there are potentially serious flaws in the current government-public relationship. But does the public’s passive role actually compromise emergency preparedness planning - and, if so, to what extent? In 2004, the Center for the Advancement of Collaborative Strategies in Health at The New York Academy of Medicine reported the findings of a study that was designed to answer these questions. The Redefining Readiness Study 66 gave the American people their first opportunity to describe what they would face in two kinds of terrorist attacks – a smallpox outbreak and a dirty bomb explosion. Both comprehensive and rigorous, the study involved in-depth conversations with government and private-sector planners, 14 group discussions with diverse community residents around the country, and a telephone survey of 2,545 randomly selected adults in the continental United States. To capture perspectives that would otherwise be under-represented, the survey was conducted in English and Spanish and oversampled African Americans and people in the cities that experienced the 9/11 attacks (New York City and Washington, D.C.). Rather than asking people to think about terrorist attacks in the abstract or to give their opinions about plans or policies, the study used scenarios that put people in specific and realistic terrorist attack situations at a place and time they would be likely to hear about the attack and be told what to do. The study’s smallpox scenario explored how people would react to instructions to go to a public site to be vaccinated if some residents in their community and people in other parts of the country became sick with smallpox after having been exposed to the virus in an attack at a major airport. The dirty bomb scenario explored how people would react to instructions to stay inside a building other than their own home if a dirty bomb exploded a mile from where they were and a cloud containing radioactive dust were moving in their direction.67 The study found that plans to respond to these situations won’t work because people will not react the way planners want them to. In a smallpox outbreak, only 43% of the population said they would follow instructions to go to a public site to be vaccinated. In a dirty bomb explosion, only 59% of the population said they would stay inside the building they were in for as long as officials told them. These findings predict that the effectiveness of current plans will fall far short of expectations. If three-fifths of the American people do not follow instructions in a smallpox outbreak, the protection of large-scale vaccination will not be achieved, even if planners work out all of the challenging logistics involved in dispensing the vaccine. 66

Lasker RD. Redefining Readiness: Terrorism Planning Through the Eyes of the Public. New York, NY: The New York Academy of Medicine, 2004. The study report, instruments, and comprehensive bibliography are available at www.redefiningreadiness.net. 67 The scenarios were very realistic to participants, but, as documented in post-discussion questionnaires and post-interview debriefings, thinking about these emergency situations was not a frightening or anxietyprovoking experience for them.

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If two-fifths of the population does not shelter in place in a dirty bomb explosion, many people will be unnecessarily exposed to dangerous dust and radiation and first responders will face excess traffic and congestion in getting to the scene of the explosion. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the study found that people’s reluctance to follow instructions is not due to ignorance, recalcitrance, or panic. Quite the opposite; most people have solid, common-sense reasons for their behavior. Because current plans have been developed without the direct involvement of the public, they don’t account for all of the risks people would face. As a result, the plans make it unnecessarily difficult for many people to decide on the best course of action to protect themselves and their family. Even worse, the plans inadvertently create serious and unnecessary risks for millions of Americans. Instructions to go to a public vaccination site in a smallpox outbreak are very dangerous for 50 million Americans who are at risk of developing life-threatening complications if they either get the smallpox vaccine or come into contact with someone who has recently been vaccinated. At-risk groups include pregnant women, babies under the age of one, people who have ever had skin diseases like eczema, people taking medications like prednisone that suppress their immune system, people undergoing chemotherapy or radiation for cancer, and people with HIV/AIDS. The current strategy is for these people to find out about their risk at a public vaccination site. That means they will be told to leave the safety of their own home – a place that the study found most Americans want to be in a deadly contagious disease outbreak – and go to a place that exposes them to many people who have just been vaccinated and, potentially, to people with smallpox. A major problem with current dirty bomb response plans is that little has been done to create the conditions that make it possible for people to protect themselves by sheltering in place. Many people are likely to be away from home and separated from other family members – at work, in school, or shopping – when a dirty bomb explosion occurs. The Redefining Readiness Study documents that millions of Americans would not follow instructions to stay inside the building they are in unless they are sure that they and their children and spouses are in places that have prepared in advance to take good care of them during the crisis. Unfortunately, very few places in the United States have prepared to function as safe havens should the need arise and even fewer places know the kinds of preparations that would actually make people feel safe.

3. Evidence that public involvement matters: Hurricane Katrina In 2004, the Redefining Readiness Study predicted that large numbers of people would suffer and die unnecessarily if response strategies are not based on what people will actually face when a disaster strikes. Less than one year later, Hurricane Katrina proved that prediction to be correct. Consider what happened in New Orleans. Everyone in the city was told to evacuate, but many could not do so on their own because they or other family members lacked transportation, didn’t have enough money for gas and lodging, had impaired mobility, or had serious health problems. Quite a few of these people died. Those who sought shelter in the Super Dome experienced atrocious conditions, which compounded their psychological and physical suffering. Many of those who were eventually evacuated


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were separated from other members of their family and from their friends, which deprived them of the human supports that people need to deal with crisis situations. If the problems people face in an evacuation had been identified and addressed in advance, the outcome would have been very different. School buses (which ended up rusting under water) and military planes (which came in after the fact) could have been mobilized before the storm hit to evacuate disabled residents and those without cars. Debit cards could have been pre-issued to poor residents to use in the event of a disaster. Shelters could have been prepared that would actually keep people safe. Evacuation plans could have been developed to keep families and social networks together. The psychological damage and social disruption of the hurricane would have been considerably less under such circumstances.

4. Impact of the public’s passive role on confidence and trust The nature and consequences of the public’s lack of involvement in emergency preparedness planning may account, in part, for their discouraging perceptions about current planning efforts. The Redefining Readiness Study found that: • • • •

55% of Americans believe their community isn’t prepared to deal with biological or radiological terrorist attacks; 44% believe that planners don’t know about their concerns; 41% believe that people like them can’t influence the plans that are being developed; and 47% believe that neither they nor the people they care about will receive the help they need when they need it.

The study also found that 41% of the American people are seriously worried about what government officials say or do in terrorist attack situations. The survey hasn’t been repeated since Hurricane Katrina, but it is likely that trust and confidence levels are even lower after that experience. On a positive note, the study documents that the American people are far from apathetic about terrorism preparedness planning, in spite of their negative perceptions about government officials and the current planning process. Even in communities that have never experienced a terrorist attack, one-half of the people said they were extremely or very interested in learning more about terrorism response plans, and onethird said they were extremely or very interested in personally helping government agencies or other community organizations develop terrorism response plans.

5. Moving toward a more meaningful government-public partnership The evidence presented above demonstrates that the current relationship between government and the public is not working in the best interest of either party: government or the public. The relationship is not helping to protect as many people as possible in the event of radiological terrorism (or any other kind of disaster); it is not helping to mitigate the psychological damage and social disruption of disasters; and it is not helping to build a confident and resilient society.

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How does the relationship need to change and what do government officials and experts need to do to make that happen? One change has to do with mindset. In addition to seeing the public as the object of their concern, government officials and experts need to view the public as a valuable and knowledgeable resource in preparing communities to respond to radiological terrorism and other emergencies. The people who live and work in communities are the only ones who really know what they would face in these kinds of situations. Without their knowledge, government officials and experts can’t possibly be aware of the barriers and risks that different groups of people would face in emergencies or what could be done to address those problems. The other changes have to do with process. The public needs opportunities to think about emergency situations in advance, in a way that is meaningful to them, and to contribute their knowledge to community preparedness efforts. The public also needs opportunities to work with other people and organizations in the community – including experts and government officials – to develop and take actions to address preparedness issues.

6. The Redefining Readiness community engagement process This type of public engagement process is currently being instituted – for the first time in the United States – by the four communities in the Redefining Readiness demonstrations.68 Involving urban and rural communities with diverse populations, the sites include: the City of Carlsbad and South Eddy County, New Mexico; the Humboldt Park neighborhood on the near northwest side of Chicago, Illinois; the Benjamin Van Clark, Dixon Park, Live Oak, and Eastside Concerned Citizens neighborhoods in Savannah, Georgia; and Choctaw, McCurtain, and Pushmataha Counties in southeast Oklahoma. Working with each other and with a support team organized by the Center for the Advancement of Collaborative Strategies in Health, the sites have been developing and implementing a three-step community engagement process involving: • • •

small group discussions with the people who live and work in each of the demonstration communities; larger interactive gatherings with as many people as possible in each community; and action teams that bring community residents, experts, and people from public and private organizations together.

The small group discussions, which were completed in August 2006, are the foundation of the engagement process. They were designed to: (1) tap into the public’s common-sense knowledge to find out what the community needs to do to protect as many people as possible if certain kinds of emergencies occur; and (2) build resilience by giving the public an opportunity to think about those situations in advance.

68 More information about the Redefining Readiness Local Demonstrations, including reports of the small group discussion findings and practical tools to help households, work places, schools, and governments prepare to respond more effectively to shelter-in-place emergencies are available at www.redefiningreadiness.net.


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To achieve these objectives, the discussions were organized very differently than traditional focus groups, public deliberations, or town hall meetings. Rather than asking people to think about emergency preparedness in the abstract or to provide input about plans or policy options that have already been developed by experts, the discussions used specific and realistic scenarios that enabled participants to think about emergencies in a frame of reference that was meaningful to them. Over the course of two hours, ten people discussed two emergency scenarios. The discussion about each scenario started by exploring the particular problems the participants would face trying to protect themselves in that situation. Then the group explored the kinds of actions that they and others in the community could take to address the problems they had identified. Although only ten individuals were involved in each discussion, a large and representative group of people participated overall. In the four sites, almost 2000 people participated in over 200 discussions. A comparison with census data shows that the participants in the discussions closely resemble the people who live in each community, according to their age (18 and over), gender, race, ethnicity, education, income, household size, and access to telephone service. Consequently, the discussions provided an opportunity for people from diverse backgrounds and walks of life to think about emergencies and to speak for themselves and their families. To achieve such broad participation, the discussions were held at convenient times and in places like community centers, churches, and resident’s homes where people felt comfortable. Transportation, child care, and refreshments were provided. Discussions were held in Spanish as well as English. To the greatest extent possible, the discussions were facilitated by people who were very similar to the participants themselves. To make sure that participants could express what really mattered to them, the discussions were unconstrained – focusing on whatever problems and actions were raised by each group – and no value judgments were made about anything that people said. Care was also taken to make sure that the participants, and the community as a whole, have a complete and accurate record of the discussions. The recorders wrote down exactly what each person said on flip charts. No one’s ideas were reinterpreted or eliminated. Participants received a timely record of their own discussion. The combined findings from all of the discussions are now being shared not only with the people who participated, but also with the broader community.

7. What we can learn from the public about protection in a dirty bomb explosion One of the scenarios in the small group discussions explored the problems people would face if they tried to follow instructions to protect themselves by sheltering in place in a dirty bomb explosion. The discussion findings, which are available at www.redefiningreadiness.net, challenge some expert assumptions about the public, identify a range of serious and unanticipated problems that people face when they try to shelter in place, and show how individuals and organizations in communities can make sheltering in place a safer and more feasible protective strategy. One assumption that the findings call into question concerns “radiophobia”: an irrational fear of radiation that is disproportionate to the real health risks involved and that trumps other, more familiar dangers. Originally observed in military units during tests in the 1940’s and 1950’s, it is assumed that radiophobia will be very prevalent

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among civilians in an act of radiological terrorism, contributing substantially to the psychological damage and social disruption that are caused by the attack.69 Looking at a dirty bomb explosion from the public’s perspective, however, reveals that radiation is not the only – or even the most important – risk that people face. The small group discussions show that people want to avoid being exposed to the dust and radiation outside, and they are concerned about dust and radiation coming into the building they are in (through the ventilation system, broken windows, or open doors). But there are other risks people face staying inside a building that would compel them to go outside and expose themselves to radiation. These risks include: • • • • • •

not having medications or supplies for their chronic medical conditions with them; not having food, water, working bathroom facilities, or a place to lie down and sleep; being excessively hot or cold; not having access to substances they depend on (such as caffeine, nicotine, or alcohol); being in overcrowded conditions with too many people; or being with unruly or violent people.

Even if people feel it is safe for them to stay inside the building, many would still feel compelled to leave – exposing themselves to radiation in the process – in order to avoid endangering others who depend on them, such as children or disabled family members, or pets who are home alone. Others would need to leave to avoid losing their home, possessions, or livelihood (for example, if they believe that someone may break into their home or if they can’t show up for work while they are sheltering in another building). Considering all of these risks, a dirty bomb explosion puts many people in an untenable psychological bind. They are looking for a way to protect themselves and the other people, animals, and things they care about. But under current conditions, many people see no way of doing that because the strategy designed to protect them from the radiation (i.e., sheltering in place) exposes them or their family members to other serious and previously unrecognized dangers. The discussions reveal that much of what people are currently being told to do in the United States does little to help and sometimes makes matters worse. For example: •

•

69

People are currently being instructed to keep a three-day supply of food and water in their homes, and most people keep their medications there as well. But in a dirty bomb explosion, many people will need to take shelter in a building other than their home, so any food, water, or medicines that they have at home won’t be available to them. Americans are being told to identify places for family members to meet in the event of an emergency. But in a dirty bomb explosion, going to such a place can put family members in harm’s way if they have to go through or into the contaminated zone in order to get there.

Radiological Terrorism: Public Response and the Search for Resilience. Center for International Trade and Security; University of Georgia. November 17, 2006.


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•

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Building and work site managers are being told to designate people to be in charge during emergency situations. But since these people are human too, some of them will leave to take care of their own children or other family members. If critical information about the building is not available – as is often the case – no one else will know where things are or what to do. Building and work site managers are also being told to identify “safe rooms” where people can go to be protected from toxic substances outside. But many of these interior, windowless rooms aren’t large enough to accommodate the number of people who are likely to need shelter (which, in shops and public buildings, is considerably more than the number of employees). Some don’t provide people with enough space to move around or lie down. And some don’t provide people with safe access to communications, supplies, and bathroom facilities. As the discussions show, safe rooms like this will not only fail to meet people’s basic needs, they can also create conditions that provoke people to become unruly or violent.

Once the participants in the small group discussions identified the problems they would face trying to protect themselves by sheltering in place in situations like a dirty bomb explosion, they were in a good position to think about ways to address those problems. Collectively, their ideas demonstrate that communities can make sheltering in place a feasible protective strategy for most people – a strategy that keeps individuals safe without endangering the people and animals they care about who aren’t with them at the time and without putting their home or livelihood at risk. Many people and organizations are part of the solution – not just government – and practical tools based on the understanding and ideas generated through the small group discussions provide them with a useful road map for getting started. A number of community residents involved in the small group discussions have already started taking action, since thinking about the situation revealed many things they can do on their own to protect themselves and their loved ones. For example: •

•

•

Community residents are discussing this kind of emergency with family members, making sure that everyone in the household will stay where they are so they don’t put themselves in danger by trying to find each other or by going to a pre-arranged meeting place. They are also making plans with babysitters, schools, and day care centers about how their child will be cared for during this kind of emergency. Community residents are making sure that everyone in their household stocks up on their medications and keeps at least a three-day supply with them at all times. They are storing critical supplies at work – not just at home – including items like hygiene products, extra clothes, a blanket and pillow, instant tea or coffee (if they need caffeine), and nicotine gum (if they smoke). They are also preparing and storing emergency kits for their child at school or day care and making sure that the school or day care center has a supply of their child’s medications and authorization to administer those medications in the event of an emergency. Community residents are arranging alternate providers of care for people and animals who depend on them, with multiple back-ups so they can be sure that their own caretaker responsibilities will be fulfilled in an emergency.

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For the most part, the participants in the small group discussions identified actions that they and nongovernmental organizations in the community can take to make it feasible and safe for people to shelter in work sites, schools, shops, and other places. As the participants observed, there are good reasons for individuals and organizations to take these actions, since sheltering in place can be an important protective strategy not only in dirty bomb explosions, but also in other emergencies (e.g., toxic explosions and chemical spills) and nonemergency situations (e.g., snowstorms and electrical blackouts). The role that discussion participants saw for government was limited, focusing primarily on supporting the actions of community residents and nongovernmental organizations and creating incentives for those actions to occur.

8. Conclusion The way that governments and communities prepare to respond to emergencies creates conditions that influence how the public will behave and the extent of psychological damage and social disruption that will occur. When the public has a limited and passive role in emergency preparedness efforts – as is currently the case – it is not possible to create conditions that will achieve desired outcomes. Without opportunities to think about emergency situations in advance, community residents have no way to identify the problems they would face trying to protect themselves. Consequently, they can’t begin to act individually to address those problems. Without opportunities to look at emergencies from the public’s point of view, planners have no way to learn about the barriers and risks that different groups of people would face. As a result, they inadvertently develop instructions that aren’t feasible or safe for some people to follow. Without opportunities to work together, community residents, experts, and people from public and private organizations have no way to combine what they know and can do to protect the maximum number of people in emergency situations. Preparedness efforts like these – which hinder the development of resilience and make it unnecessarily difficult for people to protect themselves and their families – create conditions that exacerbate suffering, death, fear, and social disruption in emergencies. Government officials and experts seeking to mitigate the social and psychological effects of radiological terrorism can enhance their effectiveness by developing a more reciprocal relationship with the public. In radiological terrorist attacks, the primary concern of most people is to take actions that will protect themselves and the other people, animals, and things they care about. Experts in radiological terrorism can be a valuable resource to the public by describing how people in different circumstances can best protect themselves from one of the risks they would face in such an emergency: radiation. For example, in scenarios in which radioactive substances are dispersed through different means, what is the best thing for people to do who are outdoors, indoors, and in different locations around the community? Once that information is available, the public can be a valuable resource to experts and community planners by describing the barriers and risks they would face trying to follow those instructions and by identifying the kinds of actions that they and others could take to address the problems that people would face. The Redefining Readiness demonstration sites are learning how to engage the public in this way. By doing so, they are showing how community residents can build the resilience they need to cope with radiological terrorism and other emergencies by putting their own problem-


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solving abilities to use. The sites are also showing how individuals and organizations in communities can organize in advance to make it feasible and safe for as many people as possible to protect themselves in these kinds of emergencies. When a community develops instructions and plans that effectively address the full range of risks that people face trying to protect themselves in emergencies, the public can justifiably have confidence in the plans and trust in the government officials who give them instructions.



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A Heuristic Interrogation of the Human Spirit: Cultural Crossroads in an Age of Modern Terrorism Michael D. BARNETT, M.D. Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences George Washington University Medical Center Washington, DC USA Abstract. This paper describes a threatening and insidious process occurring in Western societies like the United States, a process accelerated by the attacks of September 11, 2001. We are not only thinking less “outside the box” in finding new answers and solutions to our questions and problems, but the metaphorical box is shrinking as we further convince one another that man’s salvation from adversities lies squarely in the furtherance of techniques and the technical management of the human condition where an excess of power is wielded by an ill-defined cadre of individuals commonly referred to as “experts.” The rest of us in turn often blindly comply with their recommendations in hopes that the human experience will improve without checking that power and influence with thoughtful independent thinking. This paper reflects a talk the author delivered at a NATO Advanced Research Workshop held in Bratislava, Slovakia in October 2006. An international audience discussing the psychological and social dimensions of radiological terrorism attended the conference, which the organizers hope to use as a launching pad to conduct further research into this facet of modern terrorism. Please note, any views or opinions presented in this paper are solely those of the author and should not be considered the views and opinions of anyone else unless explicitly stated as such.

1.

Introduction

In 1599, William Shakespeare wrote, “The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves, that we are underlings.” What was true then remains true today. For the approximately 200,000 years since the dawn of humanity, the human experience has been filled with great triumphs as well as sobering tragedies. All in all, we must sit back and marvel at the fact that, within such a period of time, Homo sapiens has not only survived living amongst competitive animals that are faster, larger, stronger, and have better eye sight, hearing, and sense of smell than us, but we have also thrived to such a degree that we control enormous parts of the global landscape. How do we begin to put together the myriad facets of human history into a clear, cohesive picture which can accurately reflect who we are as a species? This may be an impossible task, as our understanding of us and our place in the world is in flux through time, and is interpreted differently depending on whom you ask, where you ask, and when in history you ask. Given the events of the past century, it would be easy to

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M.D. Barnett / A Heuristic Interrogation of the Human Spirit

believe those who say humanity is on the decline, as we have gone from infested trenches on the Western front of World War I, to the Nazi gas chambers, to the nuclear age and a cold war, to the killing fields of Cambodia, to Rwanda, to 9/11 and the age of modern terrorism. While it is easy for the cynic to say: “I told you so,” it takes real, conscious effort to fully grasp the magnitude of the work we have completed in the past two hundred millennia, and what we have together overcome in order to succeed. Whether it was the first fire, the invention of the wheel, the first farming communities, or the 1969 moon landing, every accomplishment in human history was not only made possible through human capabilities, but was accomplished despite the omnipresence of human faults, frailties, and deficits; in other words, we possess the means to succeed in spite of ourselves. In a puzzle where nine dots are drawn in a box of three rows of three, players are asked to connect all the dots with four lines without taking their pencil off the paper. Often, players will start by drawing around the perimeter, leaving the center dot unconnected. I have seen few people succeed in solving this puzzle, as the solution requires a player to literally “think outside the box”. In order to connect all nine dots with four lines without lifting the pencil, a player must extend at least one line outside the box created by the dots. When the solution is demonstrated to a frustrated player, a typical reply is, “You never told me I could draw outside the box.” My reply is always the same: “I never said you couldn’t.” This paper describes what I believe to be a threatening and insidious process occurring in Western societies like the United States, a process accelerated by the attacks of September 11, 2001. We are not only thinking less “outside the box” in finding new answers and solutions to our questions and problems, but the metaphorical box is shrinking as we further convince one another that man’s salvation from adversities lies squarely in the furtherance of techniques and the technical management of the human condition where an excess of power is wielded by an ill-defined cadre of individuals commonly referred to as “experts.” The rest of us in turn often blindly comply with their recommendations in hopes that the human experience will improve without checking that power and influence with thoughtful independent thinking. For decades now, we have been losing sight of what humanizes us and where we are in history. We have been too eager to blindly accept technique and technology as something that is automatically good. We have become too eager to allow others to technically manage our lives, and too fearful to accept our faults and shortcomings by considering the elements of instinct, intuition, and passion to be suspect before anything else. We are headed down this road because we have slowly moved away from our humanity since the beginning of the modern era, a process described in Stephen Toulmin’s (1990) Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity. We have accepted the idea that the seemingly endless universal axioms espoused by “experts,” juxtaposed on a background of prevailing intellectual dogma steeped in Newtonian-like certitude, will somehow be our salvation as a species; it is a reverie that has trumped what is uniquely human and to which we are asked to pay for with obedient consent. It is the admiration of the emperor’s new clothes in the face of the naked truth baring itself before us. Through our silent obedience we ignore the human experience and fail to become fully conscious of our dimensions, instead accepting that we should contort ourselves to fit into pre-formed, “scientifically-derived” models of human existence. We “snap into


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place” at the command of “experts” who insist it is for our own good while ignoring the overall social and historic contexts that shape these natural dimensions. Ultimately, the answer to the question, “Who are we?” is not one of reductionism, but one of transcendence. Disasters have been in the spotlight since 9/11, with governments scrambling to find best practices to prepare for, respond to, recover from, and mitigate against their future occurrences. Little thought, however, has been given to the idea that disasters do not occur on a simple static landscape which is best addressed through technical means, but are, in fact, experienced by human beings within a highly complex social architecture. This fact means that not only technical know-how, but also social awareness, is required when crafting policies. This paper reflects a talk the author delivered at a NATO Advanced Research Workshop held in Bratislava, Slovakia in October 2006. An international audience discussing the psychological and social dimensions of radiological terrorism attended the conference, which the organizers hope to use as a launching pad to conduct further research into this facet of modern terrorism. Much has been written over the years regarding the psychological and social effects of terrorism. A founder and the executive director of the Institute for Counter Terrorism in Israel, Dr. Boaz Ganor, wrote one of the more seminal works on the subject (Ganor 2002). According to Dr. Ganor, the goals of terrorists are political in nature, and the means to those ends is by instilling irrational fear and anxiety into the targeted population to the point where citizens force their political leaders to capitulate to the demands of the terrorists. Critical to carrying this through, terrorists find weaknesses in their target and exploit them. Ganor writes: Modern terror organizations invest much time and effort, as well as extensive resources into methods of psychological warfare. They carefully observe their target population to find weaknesses and cracks in the society which can be widened or exploited. The terrorists study the target country’s media to learn how best to get their threats across and how to magnify the fears of the population and stimulate or amplify criticism of the government and its policies (Ganor 2002). In this paper, I try to present new ideas and perspectives possibly not otherwise considered by the reader regarding how we in the West provide terrorists with social weaknesses ripe for exploitation. Although this paper is intended for an international audience, I concentrate on life and events within the United States as an example of the greater life experienced by those living in other Western democracies. By examining the intersections of culture, language, justice, and authority, I hope to describe some of the critical structural underpinnings of our social architecture. Doing so allows us to rotate the kaleidoscopic lens so that we can view our ourselves and our place in history differently, with new patterns and fresh perspectives emerging in our consciousness, giving rise to new understandings of who we are, what our values are, and in which direction our collective existence is headed. By doing so, we can reduce the effectiveness of modern terrorism while improving the quality of life in NATO-member nations.

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2.


The Individual in Society

Having witnessed the failure of democracy in his native country, Alexis de Tocqueville set out to study a stable and prosperous democracy to learn how one works. Seeing a stable, prosperous nation in the United States, Tocqueville came to America to determine what were its strengths and weaknesses. He believed developing this understanding would eventually lead to governments supporting democracy’s strengths while addressing its weaknesses. His research ultimately led him to conclude that democracy and social justice were universal phenomena that would inevitably expand and could not be stopped (Murphy and Carm). Tocqueville concluded that most of the problems with America’s democracy were not in its constructed institutions as much as in the societal attitudes and tendencies of its citizens. In his influential work Democracy in America, Alexis de Tocqueville (1945) describes his concerns about individualism and how it can become a force of destruction working against the development and preservation of a civil society. He defines individualism as a calm and considered feeling disposing citizens to isolate themselves from their fellow citizens and withdraw into the closed circle of their families and friends. Tocqueville writes: As social conditions become more equal, the numbers of persons increases who, although they are neither rich nor powerful enough to exercise any great influence over their fellows, have nevertheless acquired or retained sufficient education and fortune to satisfy their own wants. They owe nothing to any man, they expect nothing from any man; they acquire the habit of always considering themselves standing alone, and they are apt to imagine their whole destiny is in their hands. Thus not only does democracy make every man forget his ancestors, but it hides his descendants and separates his contemporaries from him; it throws him back forever upon himself alone and threatens in the end to confine him entirely within the solitude of his own heart. Tocqueville believed America’s obsession with economic growth could potentially drive the public to turn their backs on public involvement and civic duties, and that the exercise of freedoms would result in citizens being ruled, due to abdication and necessity, by an authority that would ensure an orderly society and continued economic prosperity. He did, however, believe that there were features of American society that would offset the effects of individualism and our isolation from one another. First, Tocqueville observed that Americans are a people who like to voluntarily join civic organizations in order to effect perceived necessary changes within their communities. The second factor that protected Americans from social withdrawal was religion. Tocqueville saw American participation in religion as a training ground providing citizens with the necessary tools to actively engage in a larger civic life. Third, Tocqueville saw the American family, which he referred to as the strongest family in the world, as moderating our tendency toward social withdrawal. Since there appeared to be potent forces capable of moving citizens of democracies towards isolation, the forces countering such an ill effect were vital for long-term well being. There is a very important concept transmitted in John Donne’s idiom, “No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the main.” No


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matter how much a person may consider him or herself to be an island, or a separate, self-contained, autonomous individual, in the end we are all inevitably part of a larger human ecosystem where our actions affect others and other persons’ actions affect us, regardless of whether we give that idea conscious consideration or not. If we consider this concept of inevitable human interdependence, we can gain a clearer understanding of the degree to which our existence is as least as much dependent on others as it is on our own self-agency. In his book, The Company of Strangers: A Natural History of Economic Life, Paul Seabright (2004) describes how even the simple routine gesture of purchasing a shirt is an example of the impressive degree to which our self agency is dependent on other human beings’ actions. Seabright writes that when he went to purchase his shirt, which perhaps 20 million other people did that same day; it required the coordinated actions of innumerable people around the globe. The cotton was grown in India from genetically engineered seeds developed in the United States. The artificial fiber in the thread came from Portugal, the dyes were synthesized in at least six other countries, the collar linings came from Brazil, the machines for weaving, cutting, and sewing were made in Germany, and the shirt itself was put together in Malaysia. Despite the myriad people involved in the manufacture of Seabright’s shirt, there are still many more who were involved in the shipping of the shirt from overseas, the dockworkers who unloaded the shipping containers, as well as the distributors. Also, if Seabright ordered his shirt online with a credit card, even more people must be considered from those who maintain the integrity of the Internet, to the people who keep the banking system working effectively, to the US Postal Service, which did the final delivery. Despite this level of interdependence, Western culture, as Tocqueville warned, can too often leads us to think of ourselves as isolated - a fact which is having profound effects on our ability to be resilient in a time of modern terrorism. According to Markus and Kitayama (1991), people from different cultures have different ideas about what an individual is. Western culture tends to move people into believing, and therefore ultimately acting, as independent, self-contained autonomous beings. Not surprisingly a commonly heard phrase in the West is “the squeaky wheel gets the oil.” In the United States, there are few (if any) cultural imperatives requiring consideration of how many other human beings are instrumental in allowing an individual to achieve their personal ambitions, an idea acknowledged by Isaac Newton (who said his achievements were made possible by standing on the shoulders of giants). Instead, the individual is viewed as comprising a unique configuration of internal attributes, such as traits, abilities, motives, and values, and behaves primarily as a consequence of these personal attributes. They suggest that both the significance and the exact functional role that a person assigns to the other when defining the self depend on culturally shared assumptions about the separation or connectedness between the self and others. The independent construal of self in the West is one that separates the individual from the greater social context, imploring individuals to be unique, to express themselves, to actualize internal attributes, to promote their own personal goals, and to be direct by saying what’s on their mind. Numerous cultures outside the West, however, do not accept the Western understanding of the self as an entity containing a unique set of internal attributes detached from context. Rather, the self is better defined as being interdependent with the surrounding context, and it is “others,” or the “self-in-relation-to-other,” that is the focus of the individual experience.

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3.


Culture

To many anthropologists, the idea of culture represents a view of humanity that sees human beings as products of particular social and environmental circumstances and influences, which opposes the idea that human beings are predetermined entities. The concept of culture provides an alternative to the idea of “human nature,” which implies that Homo sapiens have fixed characteristics that manifest themselves regardless of the context in which it is happening. These two concepts - culture and human nature - represent both ends of a spectrum of existence, with a wide field in between which is ripe for endless debates. The important aspects of culture, though, are: 1. Human beings are both the products of their respected culture and contributors to its never-ending vicissitudes, 2. While genetics represent the foundation of biological heredity, culture represents the foundation of social heredity, and 3. Culture is learned, it is shared, and it is not idiosyncratic, which means that culture is socially transmittable (and therefore requires language). This last point cannot be overemphasized, as culture is rare within the animal kingdom and may, in fact, be exclusive to human beings. According to anthropologist Richard Perry (2003), the ability of Homo sapiens to develop language, or symbolic meaning, allows us to communicate abstract information to one another. This provides an enormous leap forward beyond other species, as we can efficiently communicate information about nearly everything without having to demonstrate a concrete example of the subject at hand. This phenomenon allows information to accumulate over time and allows us to conceive of ideas, not just perceive them. Anthropologists have often spoken of cultures as emergent phenomena, or phenomena that develop different perspectives under differing conditions. Water, for example, changes state when exposed to different environmental conditions. It can exist as either a liquid, solid or gas, depending on temperature and pressure. But in the end, H2O remains the subject; it is just viewed and experienced differently, depending on the specific environment it is exposed to at any given time. Another example is a colorful sunset. Viewed by a scientist looking to understand this phenomenon, it can be correctly defined as the interaction of air, light, and dust. When examined from this perspective, sunsets do not sound very interesting or of any significant value. If, however, two lovers atop a hill view a sunset on a warm summer’s night, the same sunset seen by the scientist becomes something much more than the sum of its individual components, as it has now taken on meaning. Culture is everywhere. We are all born into it, we will eventually die within it, and we live our lives saturated with it. Culture is so deeply learned and ingrained in our psyche that most of us go about our daily business without ever giving it any conscious attention. We become so habituated to the learned behaviors supported by our culture that our own actions often go unquestioned and unexamined, as those behaviors come to be seen as the “natural,” “normal,” or “correct” way of going about whatever it is that we are doing. One of the more difficult tasks for contrarians, iconoclasts, and others that want to hold up ideas and actions for scrutiny and interrogation is getting beyond the “conventional wisdom” and public inertia, which is often manifested as indifference or knee-jerk dismissal. We will learn later why the “expert culture” that is so dominant in the West often goes unscrutinized.


4.

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Language

The study of linguistics was revolutionized by the teachings of Ferdinand de Saussure (1972) at the University of Geneva between 1907 and 1911. The Cours de linguistique générale, or the Course in General Linguistics, is a text that stands as one of the landmarks in the intellectual history of modern times. It was put together from his students’ notes after Saussure’s death in 1913, and founded modern linguistic theory, while also providing the foundation for the broader twentieth century movement known as “structuralism.” Saussure’s work and insights led to a new approach to the understanding of language as symbols, an idea which was subsequently utilized by other theorists in such diverse fields as art, architecture, philosophy, literary criticism, anthropology, sociology, economics, and folklore. Saussure thought that words, as symbols, were not on the mere periphery of reality, but, instead, that reality itself came to be seen as revolving around the social use of language. Words are not vocalizations we create that ultimately come to be attached to pre-existing objects or preconceived concepts already grasped independently in the human mind. Rather, language is viewed as the collective ratification of signifiers and their corresponding concepts; concepts that have ascribed meaning and thus an entity greater than the sum of the word or words used to describe them. This understanding provides a framework for our analysis of reality and, how we come to develop meaning. The concepts we hold, and the meanings they convey, are the products of the language we use and the way we utilize them. This structuralist idea of language helps us to understand why language is vital not only in conceiving and socially transmitting abstract ideas, but also in forging perceived reality as ideas form beliefs (the key to influencing human behavior as human agency flows downstream on a course originally set by embraced perspectives). The power of perspectives must be appreciated, as our lives revolve around them. In every successful regime in modern history, for example, the language utilized and messages formed have been carefully crafted with words used as tools to create an understanding of reality which provides perspectives and the means to gain and maintain political power; an idea well understood and written about by dystopianfiction writers George Orwell and Aldous Huxley. In recent American political times, we have had notable examples of this careful use of language in attempting to forge perceived realities designed to sell programs to the general public under the guise “you need this for your own protection.” For example, the MX missile was dubbed the “Peacekeeper” by its supporters in the 1980’s in order to inspire an acceptance that its officially designated name, LGM-118A, could never achieve, as well as to obfuscate the fact that it was an intercontinental ballistic missile with ten re-entry vehicles armed with warheads twenty-five times as powerful as the bomb dropped on Hiroshima during World War II. More recently, the muchdebated legislation seen by many as an over-reaching and dangerous encroachment on American civil liberties, the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, has a title that uses language to help create a reality that tries to justify the need for its own existence. This title is an important example of not only how names can become successful selling points by touching upon publicly held fear and anxiety, but its acronym, USA PATRIOT Act, serves to deter its detractors by wrapping the bill in a red, white, and blue motif.

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5.


The Language of Disasters

The 2004 World Disaster Report of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2006) begins, “In the hours after sudden disaster strikes, most lives are saved by the courage and resourcefulness of friends and neighbors.” This statement, while true (as demonstrated and supported by over half a century of social science research), is nevertheless a foreign idea not widely held by the general public, and a contradiction to the officially-embraced emergency management paradigm of top-down command-and-control. This discordance is an example of how the repeated use of questionable language (words that have lost their true meaning, are vague or ill-defined, or are misnomers) can reinforce falsehoods and create perceptions and perspectives, which provide the framework for an understanding of complex phenomena including terrorism and disasters. Several important words which have been used repeatedly by public officials, the media, and the general public since the attacks of September 11, 2001, serve not only to create and reinforce a skewed perception of the public’s role in disasters, but, more importantly, hide the strength and potency citizens posses in building communities, living their lives without irrational fear, and freeing themselves from a sense of dependency on government. First Responders: According to Dr. Russell Dynes of the Disaster Research Center at the University of Delaware (1994), the roots of our current emergency management system began at the start of the Cold War, when a system of civil defense was created to effectively meet the challenges of an anticipated “enemy attack. ” The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 assigned responsibility for development of an organizational structure for civil defense was to the Secretary of Defense, who subsequently assigned emergency responsibilities to the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. This initiative coincided with the military demobilization period following World War II, and it was assumed that those with previous military experience would be the best choice to run this new civilian agency. Over the following years, as the threat of a communist-launched attack on the United States declined, many civil defense officials became more interested and involved in local community disasters, and used their “military” assumptions to plan for future catastrophes. Subsequently, legislative efforts moved away from an anticipated “enemy attack” model and moved toward the community disaster model with the Disaster Relief Act of 1970. Finally, the major shift toward local disasters occurred during the Carter Administration, when numerous disparate agencies were amalgamated to form the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which was subsequently subsumed by the creation of the Department of Homeland Security following the attacks of September 11, 2001. Throughout this fifty-year evolution, the dominant planning model has remained the same - namely, the “triple C’s,” which best characterizes the still standing “military” model of emergency planning. In an emergency, assumed Chaos is best managed and eliminated by Command and Control. When disaster planning was eventually done on the local level, responsibility for it was turned over to police and fire departments (the “first responders”), as these paramilitary organizations have the rank and authority structures to continue with and maintain command and control. Dynes writes that the assumptions, or myths, that remain the philosophical scaffolding for the top-down, command-control model are as follows:


• • • •

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While the pre-emergency period is characterized by some notion of “normalcy,” the emergency period is characterized by social chaos and disorganization. The general public panicking in the face of adversity heralds chaos. Panic and anti-social behavior develop because traditional social control mechanisms have lost their effectiveness, which requires extraordinary measures to put them back in place. These extraordinary measures are themselves based on the assumptions that individuals and the social bonds between them are weak, and that establishing command over the chaos, and control over the inevitable social disorganization that follows are the necessary prerequisites for a return to the social status quo, which will mark the end of the emergency.

The term ‘first responders” is, therefore, a term that conveys the traditional “military-esque” vision and message that police, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel are the first to respond to a disaster, as the general public is too preoccupied to respond as they are panicking and drifting into social chaos. Nothing, however, could be further from the truth as elucidated by over half a century of social science research (Quarantelli and Dynes 1972, Dynes 1992, Clark 2002, Glass and SchochSpana 2002, Schoc-Spana 2003, Tierney 2003). Utilizing this important research in drafting his landmark disaster legislation, The Ready, Willing, and Able Act (RWAA) of 2005 (U.S. House of Representatives 2005), Congressman Patrick J. Kennedy (D-RI) marked a turning point in the United States Congress’ acceptance in the wisdom and the effectiveness of the traditional top-down, command-and-control model, as the ‘Findings” section of the bill contradicted the idea that the general public does not have the wherewithal and resilience to act with meaningful self-organizing, pro-social behaviors when confronted with adversity. This July, 2005 shift in Congress was timely, as four weeks after the introduction of the bill Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast of the United States, exposing the inherent failures of our emergency response systems and organizations, as well as in the assumptions they were founded on and the myths they sustain. Based on decades of research, the RWAA provides numerous poignant examples of how the public reacts in crises and why average citizens are also first responders in disasters: •

•

During disasters, people rarely panic, turn against their neighbors, or suddenly forget personal ties and moral commitments. Instead, the more consistent pattern is for people in disasters to bind and work together to help one another. For example, on September 11th, people successfully evacuated from lower Manhattan in one of the largest waterborne evacuations in history. Barges, fishing boats, ferries, and pleasure boats spontaneously and collectively supported the Coast Guard and harbor pilots in moving hundreds of thousands of people away from danger, as well as transporting emergency personnel and equipment to docks near “Ground Zero.” Rather than panicking, members of the public typically converge en masse to help when disasters strike. Numerous studies document the fact that individuals and groups in the immediate impact area of a disaster help manage evacuations, perform rescues, locate and dig out victims who are trapped,

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•

transport them to emergency care providers, and repeatedly put themselves in danger to ensure that others are safe. For example, in the immediate wake of the World Trade Center's collapse, numerous ordinary citizens acted swiftly and collectively in supporting search and rescue activities despite the obvious hazards and uncertainty about additional attacks. Despite the fact that people may feel terrified in disaster situations, even to the point of feeling that their own lives are in imminent danger, individualistic, competitive behavior is rare. Instead, social bonds remain intact, and the sense of responsibility to family members, friends, fellow workers, neighbors, and even total strangers remains strong. For example, there are numerous accounts of healthy office workers delaying their evacuation in order to help injured and disabled colleagues down the stairwells of the World Trade Center.

According to the RWAA, not only do individuals show a tremendous capacity to meet the needs of an extraordinary moment, but civil society organizations also rise to the occasion demonstrating the ability to self organize in the most difficult of times. As per the RWAA: •

•

Members of the Independence Plaza North Tenants' Association in lower Manhattan effectively directed streams of people to safety and away from the World Trade Center complex; they organized `urgent needs' crews to canvass the area around “Ground Zero” looking for homebound residents who required assistance; and they acted as volunteers for local businesses when paid employees could not get to the area. The Seamen's Church Institute of New York and New Jersey, headquartered in lower Manhattan, dedicated its cooking facilities to feeding rescue and recovery workers; members of the Episcopal churches in the area took turns staffing the kitchen.

In the language of disasters, when we use the term ‘first responders’ as it currently stands in our vernacular, we do a disservice to ourselves, as a reality cast in myths and falsehoods of who we are as citizens is supported at the expense of the truth; a truth where the general public could otherwise find comfort and a greater sense of being in control of their lives. Through the use of this language, however, popular culture continues to suggest that the average citizen must become dependent on others in a disaster, and must mindlessly follow instructions from a faceless bureaucrat lest he or she be plunged into some social abyss. This will be a self-fulfilling prophecy if we do not change the way we think and speak of ourselves. We would do well to distinguish the uniformed personnel who respond to disasters from civilian responders by using more accurate language such as ‘professional’ and ‘non-professional’ responders. Panic: The word ‘panic’ comes from the Greek mythological God Pan, who watched over shepherds and their flocks. Legend has it that Pan was not only known for having the figure of a human being with the hindquarters, legs, and horns of a goat, but he was also well known for his playing of the flute, which would cause animals to stampede. Thus, panic means to stampede; in human terms, this means competitive flight. Despite the number of times the public has been described as “panicking” in a disaster, one of the most enduring social science findings on human behavior during extreme events has to do with the rarity of panic responses, even under the most


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dangerous of conditions. True panic consists of an automatic, visceral, asocial, individualistic response to a threat in which those involved think only of their own safety discounting the well being of others, says Dr. Kathleen Tierney of the Natural Hazards Center at the University of Colorado. A true panic or stampede, when it does happen, typically lasts for only a few seconds and is almost never seen in emergency situations because of the robustness of the social bonds that exist between people. During emergencies, people rarely panic and turn against family, neighbors, friends, co-workers, or even total strangers. Social bonds remain strong and the public’s commitment to safety is typical. This finding has been demonstrated throughout a range of natural, technical, and willful disasters including terrorist attacks like the 1993 and 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center towers, the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway, and more recently in the London mass transit bombings of 2005 (Kathleen Tierney, public presentation, July 21, 2005). We do ourselves a disservice by convincing one another that often-seen rational responses to disasters by groups and individuals are evidence that the general public easily panics and cannot be relied upon as an equal partner in disaster management. For example, during the 2001 anthrax attacks despite the general public displaying a temperate reaction, the media described members of the public as panicking because so many citizens called their physicians about the advisability of using ciprofloxacin, or engaged in other forms of information seeking to find out how best to protect themselves and their loved ones (Kathleen Tierney, public presentation, July 21, 2005). Through the language of ‘panic’ and the interpretation of reality it spawns, citizens are unwittingly coerced into believing that they are not an asset, but a liability that cannot be trusted to make reasonable judgments, and are incapable of self-organization and self-regulation. Despite the obvious adaptive nature of information seeking, fleeing from danger, and questioning authorities during emergency events in reports by officials, the media, as well as in popular culture. These behaviors are too often equated to panic. This has led some within the disaster community to conclude that the illegitimate use of the word ‘panic’ is a euphemism used by governments in describing the inconvenience of the public’s interest during an emergency (Mike Granatt, personal communication, May 9, 2006). Disasters are by nature highly political. 9/11, for example, represented a sudden, near-total failure of centralized authority requiring those in power to re-establish their dominance (Solnit 2005). This means the public must be purposefully sidelined as much as possible, and stereotypes re-enforced lest the resilience and aptitude demonstrated compete with attempts by government to re-establish its control over the population. An example is found in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s “Citizens’ guide to the Homeland Security Advisory System,” developed with input from the American Red Cross. If the United States is under attack and the color-coded warning is raised to ‘Red,’ citizens are advised and encouraged to “provide volunteer services only as requested.” Attempts by government to “manage” an emergency through topdown, command-control policies, as well as by increasing the militarization of disasters (which is subsequently couched as a necessary component of government’s fiduciary responsibility to its citizens), is, in fact, driven by the need to maintain political power at all costs by not allowing the public to bear witness to its own role as a key asset. Also, given the pace at which governments typically operate, a swift and vibrant public response will only highlight any slowness or disorganization by officials.

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Following the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, somewhere between 2.2 and 2.4 million people, largely working class and poor males between 18 and 24 years old, were involved in providing emergency assistance to fellow victims in the first two weeks. The contrast between the public’s self-organizing and effective volunteer efforts with the slow response of the Mexican government was one of the factors that helped undermine the power of the PRI and ushered in an era of greater political pluralism in Mexican society (Kathleen Tierney, public presentation, July 21, 2005).

6.

Social Justice

It is fair to say that respect, justice, and fairness are necessary to the establishment and maintenance of human civilization. In almost any schoolyard in America you can hear children yelling out “It’s not fair!” when the ball bounces on the line but takes a turn not in favor of the child crying out those words. The ultimatum game is an experimental economics game in which two anonymous parties interact on a one-time basis to divide a pre-determined amount of money between them (Smith 2003, Surowiecki 2004). The first player, the “proposer”, is handed a fixed amount of money - say $10 - and it is his responsibility to propose a division of that money (without interference or coercion) between himself and the “responder.” The responder, in turn, can either accept this division (in which case each party walks away with their respective sum of money as determined by the proposer). If he does not like the offer, he can reject the proposal (in which case the experimenter gets his $10 back and each party leaves the game with no more than what they originally came in with). The proposer must give consideration to the fact that the responder can scuttle the deal if he wishes; therefore, he must come up with a split that, at a minimum, satisfies some need of the responder’s, while maximizing his own profit from this venture. Given this take-it-or-leave-it scenario, it would behoove the responder to accept any deal offered by the proposer, because not doing so means he leaves the game without any monetary gain. One could argue that any offer rejected by the responder would be a bad decision. Even with a 9:1 proposed split of the money, the responder, if he is truly looking after his own self interest (as classical Adam Smith economics describes), would accept such a deal lest he lose an opportunity to further his financial situation (albeit by a small amount), particularly in comparison to the proposer’s gain. But, nevertheless, this is free money, which does not grow on trees. So why would any responder say “no” to such a deal? The proposer is a stranger; who cares if a stranger makes $9 and I make $1? Certainly, a one-dollar profit is infinitely better than no profit at all. In practice, any offers less than $2 are routinely rejected. What this says is not that human beings are typically irrational, but that human nature, whether that be through hard-wired instincts or acculturation, is that people will go out of their way to correct a perceived social injustice, even at the expense of furthering their own selfinterest. By rejecting the lowball proposal, the responder is in essence cutting his nose to spite the face of the proposer. He is saying: “This offer is unfair, and to punish you for this transgression I will reject your offer so that you get nothing.” Petty? One could make that argument, but it is not germane to the larger lesson…that the existence of civilization was only possible through the evolution of human cooperation and an aversion to social inequities.


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Social justice and righting perceived social wrongs are at the very heart of the human experience. While I may not know the person who is reading these words right now, I am willing to guess that more than 90% of your complaints in life, personal or otherwise, can be distilled into the words “It is not fair.” Whether your significant other cheated on you, you were passed up for the big promotion, the coach sat out your son in the big game, taxes are going up, etc. The critical importance of social justice exists in every social aspect of our lives We are taught through many domains at a very early age that few things deserve more of our attention and require our sacrifice than righting perceived social injustices. Whether they are arguments found in our Declaration of Independence, the canonization of George Washington and his soldiers at Valley Forge, the sacrifices made by Dr. King and other civil rights activists to end Jim Crow, or even in fiction with Willy Wonka’s desperate need to give away his chocolate factory but initially refusing to allow a good kid like Charlie Bucket to have it because he stole a sip of Wonka’s Fizzy Lifting Drink; we are constantly reminded that justice trumps even our own self interest. In the end, while children in the playground are at times screaming and crying about the unfairness of some social situations, we adults do the same things at home, in Congress, or in the boardroom, but we do it in a way that has at least a thin veneer of maturity… underneath, however, the rage can be palpable. We are not alone in our intense focus on social justice, as other primates also appear to place a great deal of time and energy into it also, even at the expense of selfinterest. In the journal Nature, Sarah F. Brosnan and Frans B. M. de Waal (2003) describe the aversion of capuchin monkeys to perceived inequities. In their experiment, a barter system was established where each of two monkeys would receive a slice of cucumber in exchange for a token - in this case a granite pebble. The monkeys readily traded their pebbles for food until one monkey was no longer given a cucumber slice for a pebble, but, instead, was given a higher-valued food - a grape - in exchange for a granite pebble. The monkey that felt put out by this, seeing her neighbor getting more (a grape) than she was getting (a cucumber slice) for the same price (one granite pebble) stopped trading. By not trading, the cucumber-receiving monkey was saying a lot in her refusal to participate in the emerging social inequity between herself and her grape-eating companion. The lesson we learn from our behavior, as well as from our fellow primates, is that the righting of perceived social injustices is paramount in our day-to-day social interactions, even if at times it is at the expense of our own self-interest. It is also important to remember, however, that the social architecture, or context in which an event is put up for our scrutiny of the deference accorded to us, is critical in reaching a conclusion. There are no axiomatic answers to questions of how respect, or lack thereof is experienced. It is determined by the event in question vís-a vís the social context in which it takes place, along with the meaning that a person or (persons) take away from it. For example, I could be walking alone on a deserted sidewalk and stumble upon a one dollar bill lying in front of me. Few people would refuse to pick it up because they were angry that it was not a five, ten, or twenty-dollar bill. I would guess most people would pocket it, count themselves lucky, and move on with the rest of their day. If we would be willing to do that, then why would any of us turn down the one-dollar profit in the ultimatum game? The amount of free money is the same; the only difference is how the particular social context influenced our experience in gaining that extra buck.

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If we change the social context in which we play the ultimatum game, we get different results (Smith 2003, Surowiecki 2004). We take an anonymous pair, and instead of designating one player as the proposer in an obvious arbitrary fashion, we administer to the players a general knowledge test and inform them whoever scores highest will be the proposer. The experimenter subsequently takes their answer sheets, goes into a room where neither player can see him, and tears them up without ever looking at them. He comes out and says that player A scored higher, so she will be the proposer. In these cases, where we have changed the context by creating a social hierarchy by planting the idea that player A earned her position, player B eventually accepts all proposed splits regardless of how low the offers go. In other words, player A was set up as a sort of “authority figure” in the mind of player B, who believed that he was outperformed on the test. With this social context as the backdrop for the game, player B agreed with player A’s division of the money, as the creation of an authoritysubordinate duality alters human behavior considerably. 7.

Authority and Obedience

This variation of the ultimatum game demonstrates exemplifies our social norms, as well as possibly another facet of the evolution of human cooperation; namely, greater deference is afforded to those who we believe have earned a higher social status than us, and they are viewed as authority figures. In the example above the experimenter gives the players the perception of earned position through the manipulation of their environment. The proposer did not earn her position any more than the responder did. The person conducting the experiment manipulated the players’ interpretation of the social context, and the players acted accordingly. Human behavior is not made up of a random set of moves and counter-moves; rather, it follows norms, or socially-enforced rules. As we learn over the years, we are punished for violating these rules, and we ultimately change our behavior to avoid future punishments. If you are speaking with someone and get too close to him or her, that person will often back away. If you do this enough times to enough people, then you will find yourself alone, as you have violated others’ personal space and are being punished for it. If you learn your lesson and give people their space, then people may again be willing to speak with you. Our behavior is modified to a very large extent by the collective will of others enforcing explicit and implicit social rules, with us ultimately conforming to those rules. This is another example of how our lives are intimately entangled with those around us. This public, or group-based, behavior modification system molds our behaviors by molding our beliefs through influencing how we interpret our environment. There have been numerous papers, for example, discussing ‘group pressure’ where many individuals find it difficult, if not impossible, to stand up for their beliefs if they disagree with the group at large. The group takes on the role of governing authority, and it often takes a courageous and spirited soul to come out and disagree with the views of the majority. In the early 1950’s, the Asch experiments were published demonstrating the power of group pressure (Asch 1951). In these experiments, led by Solomon Asch, a group of individuals was asked to perform a ‘vision test.’ All but one of the participants in any tested group was working for the experimenter. The study was, in fact, focused on the behavior of that one naïve individual, and on how he or she would react to the actions of the experimenter’s confederates. The participants were asked to look at a set of lines and determine which


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line was longer than the others. The confederates had been advised to give incorrect answers to see if that influenced the judgment of the real subject. While most of the real subjects gave correct answers to the question, many showed distress in providing an answer that differed from the judgment of the group. In fact, approximately one-third of the subjects conformed and agreed with the erroneous majority view, even though the majority said that a line several inches shorter than another was actually the longer of the two lines. Control subjects who were kept separate from any group showed no difficulty in determining which line was longer. This brings up an important question: how much do we collectively challenge commonly held social beliefs, particularly those that are held by a majority of people, are long-standing, and/or repeatedly reinforced collectively through our language - such as the myth of panic? What is the price we pay for holding on to beliefs without giving them our critical independent thoughtfulness? What would happen if no one challenged beliefs due to fear, or blindly accepted them by saying, “It’s always been this way”, or, “That’s just the way it is, accept it.” How many opportunities to improve the human experience have been lost because of those declarations of resignation? How many people reading this paper have been in the position of wanting to challenge a prevailing idea, but felt intimidated because the idea to be challenged was espoused by an “expert” or others seen as an authority figure? What is the price to pay socially for being a contrarian or iconoclast? How many times have we praised the Emperor for his new clothes despite knowing he is walking through the streets naked? Is it possible that others out there are purposefully marketing themselves as “experts” or as authorities in order to change the public’s interpretation of the world, so as to create followers who will be obedient and not challenge their espoused beliefs and recommendations? To begin to answer some of these important questions, we turn to one of the most provocative sets of psychological experiments ever conducted. In 1961, Dr. Stanley Migram set up a series of experiments to see how obedient people would be to an authority figure, even if they were asked to perform an act in direct conflict with their conscience (like purposefully inflicting pain on others). In his book, Obedience to Authority, Milgram (1975) describes his experiment when two people, a designated “learner” and “teacher”, come to a psychological laboratory to take part in a study on memory and the effects of punishment on learning. The learner is taken to a room, seated, and strapped in a chair with electrodes attached to his wrist. He is told he must learn a list of word pairs and any errors will result in him receiving electric shocks of progressively increasing intensity. The true focus of the experiment is on the teacher, however. After watching the learner be strapped to the chair and electrodes placed on his body, the teacher is taken to a separate room and seated in front of a shock generator with thirty switches ranging from 15 volts to 450 volts, in 15-volt increments. The teacher is instructed to administer the learning test and, when the learner responds with an incorrect answer, he is to deliver an electric shock. The level of shock steadily rises by 15 volts with each subsequent incorrect answer. The learner is actually an actor who receives no shocks at all, but plays the role of someone being injured with complaints of protest, screams of agony, and hitting the wall pleading to be let loose from the torturous experience of being shocked. The teacher is, however, genuinely naïve about the fact that he is the true subject in this experiment, the ultimate goal of which is to see how far a person will proceed when he is ordered to inflict increasing pain on a protesting victim, and when and how people would defy authority in the face of a clear moral imperative. Milgram writes:

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Subjects have learned from childhood that it is a fundamental breach of moral conduct to hurt another person against his will. Yet, almost half the subjects abandon this tenet in following the instructions of the authority [the experimenter] who has no special powers to enforce his commands. To disobey would bring no material loss or punishment. It is clear from the remarks and behavior of many participants that in punishing the victim they were often acting against their own values. Subjects often expressed disapproval of shocking a man in the face of his objections, and others denounced it as stupid and senseless. Yet many followed the experimental commands.But the results were also unexpected to people who observed the experiment in progress through one-way mirrors. Observers often expressed disbelief upon seeing a subject administer more and more powerful shocks to the victim; even persons fully acquainted with the details of the situation consistently underestimated the amount of obedience subjects would display. In order to explain this, Milgram argues that there are important adjustments, or shifts in the subject’s thinking, which consequently undermine his resolve to break with authority. These adjustments serve the dual purposes of helping the subject maintain his relationship with the experimenter, and of lowering the subjective feeling of distress brought about by the obvious conflict that arises within the subject when told to shock a protesting victim. One such shift is for subjects to become overly absorbed in the narrow technical aspects of the task at hand, and thus to lose sight of the broader consequences of their actions. The subject gets caught up in the articulation of the words and the way in which he flips the switches, at the expense of giving greater thought to the morality of his conduct. Another important shift that occurs is the abrogation of responsibility. The subject puts his faith in the belief that this higher power of authority has put the necessary thoughtfulness into the crafting of the experimental method, as well as into assessing its moral implications. It was the obedient subject who no longer saw himself as responsible for his own actions. He no longer saw himself as an individual with free will acting in a way that would require him to be held morally accountable for his conduct; instead, he saw himself as an agent of a legitimate external authority - the experimenter. Milgram writes that the typical reply of an obedient subject during the post-experiment debriefing was, “I wouldn’t have done it myself. I was just doing what I was told.” If this response sounds familiar, the reason is because Nazis on trial for crimes against humanity said something similar in explaining their roles in the organized mass extermination of other human beings. In her controversial book, Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt (1994) writes that Adolf Eichmann claimed he was simply doing his job in taking part in the Nazis’ systematic destruction of European Jewry. At the Wannsee Conference in January 1942, Eichmann played only a minor role, but witnessed the rank-and-file of the German civil service back Reinhardt Heydrich’s program of genocide. Upon seeing so many people he respected endorse such a plan, Eichmann felt his moral accountability in any role he would have in such an endeavor would be minimal or nonexistent. In court, Eichmann claimed he tried to live his life in keeping with Kant’s categorical imperative, but was forced to abandon it when charged with carrying out the Final Solution, and that therefore he bore no responsibility for his participation in the killing of so many innocent people, as he was merely following


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orders given to him by higher authorities. It should be noted that numerous psychologists examined him while he was in prison awaiting trial, but none found any evidence of mental illness, and at least one examiner described his attitude toward other people as highly desirable, saying that Eichmann could best be described as having been an average fellow who was psychologically normal. Within the context of a perceived social hierarchy, the common thread that weaves through the behaviors of the responder in the ultimatum game, the naïve subject in the Asch experiments, the teacher in the Milgram experiments, and Adolf Eichmann alike is what Milgram referred to as an agentic shift in thinking. Milgram analyzed how people could psychologically move from a functionally independent state to a functional position within a social hierarchy. While there could very well be biochemical changes that help facilitate this agentic shift, the phenomenological expression of this shift is what is accessible to us for examination. Milgram writes: The critical shift in functioning is reflected in an alteration of attitude. Specifically, the person entering an authority system no longer views himself as acting out of his own purposes but rather comes to see himself as an agent for executing the wishes of another person. Once an individual conceives his action in this light, profound alterations occur in his behavior and his internal functioning. These are so pronounced that one may say that this altered attitude places the individual in a different state from the one he was in prior to integration into the hierarch.From a subjective standpoint, a person is in a state of agency when he defines himself in a social situation in a manner that renders him open to regulation by a person of a higher status. In this condition the individual no longer views himself as responsible for his own actions but defines himself as an instrument for carrying out the wishes of others. Milgram’s great contribution to our understanding of human behavior is his conclusion that obedience is the putting aside of one’s own critical independent thinking for the abrogation of how we ascribe meaning to situations and events to an authority. Because the subordinate accepts the authority’s definition of a situation, his actions follow accordingly. Milgram remarks that the most far-reaching consequence of the agentic shift is that a person feels no responsibility for the content of his actions that the authority prescribes, but instead feels responsible to the authority directing him. In the end, the subordinate feels either shame or pride, depending on how adequately he has performed the actions called for by the authority. As we shall see, it is this position, the position of authority, that so many strive for as a means for increasing their influence in society, which can result in unintended consequences which adversely affect the greater social well being. 8.

Losing a Sense of Community

Due to forces that exist today in countries like the United States, the service sector of the economy now dwarfs the manufacturing sector. Therefore, for economic growth to continue, the universe which service providers (such as professionals) work within, and their sphere of influence, must grow. Consequently, this gives rise to the expansion of

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perceived “unmet human needs,” and the magnification of human deficits (McKnight 1995). Despite 200,000 years of collective human experience in coping with death sans a professional, the professionalization and commodification of our grief has blossomed over the past decade. Where there once was respected long-standing human traditions of bringing together a community of mourners lending support to one another within an informal setting, such as “sitting Shiva,” there is now a slow erosion of time-honored practices spearheaded by the formality of professionals juxtaposed on a modern intellectual background reflecting the certitude of Newtonian mechanics, armed with certificates, trained in the sterile techniques of counseling, administering psychological balm developed and purified within the boundaries of “scientific rigor,” and vigilantly watched over by groups such as the American Academy of Grief Counseling to give us: 1. The misguided sense that we are impotent in facing adversity, and thus require the expertise of a professional to guide us lest we fall apart, and 2. A sense that grief counseling is a necessity in our lives and, at least as far as tragic death is concerned, that, unlike a community of mourners, bereavement counselors are an authority on the subject. Once the bereavement counseling industry has marketed itself to the point where enough people deem it to be a worthwhile value-added therapeutic modality to meet perceived unmet human needs, the stage will be set for more people to jump onto this bandwagon, giving it an air of growing importance. This paves the way for its growth in perpetuity, with the unintended consequence that the particular human need in question is also perceived to be growing, and citizens and their communities are subtly pressured into believing they are incapable of self-efficacy. What is going on here is the tail wagging the dog. Professionals and their societies work hard to advertise themselves, and market their services to gain greater acceptance and prestige, thus setting the stage for growth. But in order for them to be successful at it, the rest of us have to agree with their vision of magnified human deficits and inadequacies. The reason this strategy is so successful is because of their effectiveness in establishing authority–subordinate relationships. When professionals are seen as the authorities on various subjects (bereavement, mental health, physical well being, the law, etc.), a “Milgram-esque” agentic shift takes place in the minds of the population. For example, as lawyers are perceived to be the authority in understanding legal liability, if a lawyer advises me that I should sue McDonald’s because they were negligent in serving a cup of hot coffee without warning me it could burn my skin if it should spill, then that is what I ought to do; the subordinate accepts the authority’s definition of a situation, and his actions follow accordingly. The plaintiff, as a subordinate to the perceived authority of the attorney, often feels no responsibility for the content of his actions that the authority has prescribed and, consequently, insufficient regard for the long-term affects his lawsuit has on greater society. In effect, when the plaintiff experiences an agentic shift and becomes the attorney’s subordinate, he has, to a certain extent, put aside his responsibility as a member of society with his transformation into a client. This paradigm has led to an explosion in litigiousness in America at an enormous cost to our sense of community and our sense of personal responsibility. According to Catherine Crier (2002), a former district attorney, judge, and host of Court TV, the growth in the influence of lawyers has been highly detrimental to American society. Within the scathing narratives of her book, The Case Against


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Lawyers, Crier tells story after story of a legal system run amok and its effect on the human spirit in the United States: I resent the insidious manipulations by those entrusted with such authority [our legal system], but even more, I despise our deliberate ignorance and passive acceptance of these shackles on the American spirit…The omnipotence of the rule of law has altered our very mindset. The image of ourselves that we export, that of the frontier-minded, self-reliant, and free-spirited American, is all show. For every problem there is someone or something else responsible. As our abrogation of personal responsibility to one another and to our community grows, so does our perceived inability to effectively solve our own problems, as well as our aversion to risk. As the sense of community dwindles and the espirit de corps decays, more professionals are asked to step in to help us cope with the increasing psychological stress, to teach us about defensive medicine and provide risk management services, to advise us to close our recreation areas and parks to save children from potential injury, to insist that warning labels be pasted on hammers and other common tools lest someone use them for purposes other than what they were intended for - and so the cycle continues indefinitely. Before long, our aversion to risk becomes integrated as part of our cultural values with fear and anxiety compelling us to put aside a large part of our humanity so rational thinking, the product of the mathematical application of reason, can rule over reasonableness, the product of the synthesis of common-sense wisdom, experiential knowledge, and values (Toulmin 2003). The formal techniques and technologies of “experts” are now our security blanket, overriding human instincts, intuition, and commonsense reason; in effect, they protect us from our own over-magnified perceptions of human deficits, frailties, and external threats. Risk in its active form (as in ‘taking a risk’) once meant leveraging human agency to turn one’s predicaments into one’s personal triumphs. Now, it is being increasingly used in its passive form, as in ‘being at risk.’ This has led to a widely-felt sense of impotence across society, with many now believing that human interventions can only defend against risk (Durodié 2005). Boldness, resilience, and adventure are slowly being replaced by a socially disengaging ‘cover your backside’ mentality. Before long, we will suddenly find ourselves living lives centered around fear of the unknown and of what the future might hold for us, requiring not only our continued subordination to the authority of “experts,” but also to our government, which must now step in to take greater responsibility, as citizenship has been operationally replaced by clienthood. In the end, many of us are left with a gnawing sense of ineptitude, social isolation, resentment, and cynicism, as well as a painful existential crisis. The emergence of the top-down, command-control policies discussed earlier was not a strange and unpredictable anomaly, but a natural outcropping of the weakened social and spiritual state we have created for ourselves. In his book, The Careless Society, John McKnight (1995), Professor of Education and Social Policy and Co-Director of the Asset-Based Community Development Institute at Northwestern University, writes: The most significant development transforming America since the end of World War II has been the growth of a powerful service economy and its pervasive serving institutions. Those institutions have

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commodified the care of community and called that institution a service. As citizens have seen the professionalized service commodity invade their communities, they have grown doubtful of their common capacity to care, and so it is that we have become a careless society, populated by impotent citizens and ineffectual communities dependent on the counterfeit of care called human services. Service systems can never be reformed so they will “produce” care. Care is the consenting communities of citizens to one another. Care cannot be produced, provided, managed, organized, administered or commodified. Care is the only thing a system cannot produce. Every institutional effort to replace the real thing is counterfeit. At Fort A. P. Hill in Virginia, in July 2005, at the National Boy Scout’s jamboree, four adult scout leaders from Alaska were accidentally electrocuted and killed while helping to erect a large tent. The Associated Press reported that, in the wake of this tragedy, the youths of the Alaska troops - 80 scouts between the ages of 13-15 - were segregated from the other thousands of boy scouts and adult scout leaders attending the event with them, and taken to an army barracks where, grief counselors were made available for their healing (O’Dell 2005). What could this handful of professionals (outsiders) armed with distant, formal, and sterile “counseling” techniques possibly provide for these boys that the familiar warmth of their friends, neighbors, scout leaders, and kindred spirits could not provide? McKnight writes: Into the prairie community the bereavement counselor arrives with the new grief technology. The counselor calls the invention a service and assures the prairie folk of its effectiveness and superiority by invoking the name of the great university while displaying a diploma and license. At first, we can imagine that the local people will be puzzled by the bereavement counselor’s claims. However, the counselor will tell a few of them that the new technique is merely to assist the bereaved’s community at the time of death. To some other prairie folk who are isolated or forgotten, the counselor will offer help in grief processing. These lonely souls will accept the intervention, mistaking the counselor for a friend…. It will be only one generation between the time the bereavement counselor arrives and the disappearance of the community of mourners. The counselor’s new tool will cut through the social fabric, throwing aside kinship, care, neighborly obligations, and community ways of coming together and going on. While there is a place in society for professionals and the services they provide, the growth-orientation of their industries are making the formality of technique and technology not supplements to enhance day-to-day living, but the focus of our lives. This creates self-doubt in ourselves, thereby isolating us from one another. As we will see, this isolation, or anonymity, has far-reaching consequences. 9.

Social Proximity, Distance, and Reciprocity

What differentiates a group of people living together from a society? Social proximity – as defined as the degree to which people believe that reciprocity exists within their social interactions (Hoffman et al 1996).


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In terms of the social health of any given society, it is ultimately the measure of the degree to which people believe reciprocity exists that determines that society’s vitality. As we previously discussed, the growth-oriented creation of formalized authoritysubordinate relationships has the unintended consequence of creating a social atomization with growing numbers of people feeling socially isolated. The inverse relationship between social distance and reciprocity is clearly borne out in the experiments of Elizabeth Hoffman et al (1996). In a variation of the ultimatum game called the dictator game, the proposer is dubbed the “dictator” because the responder cannot refuse the division of money offered. In the Hoffman experiments, it was not the social distance between the dictator and responder that was measured, as the responder was immaterial to the experiment. What was important is how isolated the dictator was, or was not, to the experimenter when deciding how to divide the money. By varying the degree of anonymity in the dictator-experimenter relationship, these experiments ultimately demonstrated that, as social isolation increases, there is a further shift toward lower offers. In one set of experiments where $10 was to be divided, in situations where the dictator’s complete social isolation from the experimenter was guaranteed, 64 percent of the offers were $0 with only 8 percent offering $4 or more. Knowledge of the relationship between social distance or isolation and reciprocity can go a long way toward providing us with a better understanding of such antisocial phenomena as “road rage,” as well as of the typical crass discourse often found on the internet. Social isolation not only erodes reciprocity and the fundamental bonds that keep a society together, but it also creates a positive feedback loop on itself. As more people further engage in developing formal relationships at the expense of important and durable informal relationships found in healthy communities, it results in both a greater sense of social isolation and a greater sense of overall distrust within the population, necessitating even more formal relationships with the subsequent compounding effect of a greater sense of isolation and suspiciousness regarding our neighbors. According to Dr. Elizabeth Hoffman, in all the research she has conducted there is no substitute for face-to-face communication in maximizing reciprocity and cooperative behavior amongst members of a community (Elizabeth Hoffman, personal communication, April 2, 2007). This is a priori true from our own personal experiences and leads us to give strong consideration as to the possible quality of life we will have in Western civilization in the future if current trends continue. In 2006, McPherson et al published their findings on social isolation in America. According to the authors, the number of people who have someone to talk to about matters that are important to them declined dramatically over the past two decades. They write: The American population has lost discussion partners [people we may ask for help, probe for information, or just use as a sounding board for important decisions] from both kin and outside the family. The largest losses, however, have come from the ties that bind us to community and neighborhood. The general image is one of an already densely connected, close, heterogeneous set of ties slowly closing in on itself becoming smaller, more tightly interconnected, more focused on the very strong bonds of the nuclear family (spouses, partners, and parents).

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The authors contend that the various bridging ties that connect us to community and neighborhood, the very ties discussed in Tocqueville’s America, have withered significantly since 1985, as those we choose as confidantes have shrunk to a small core group. While this phenomenon can be partly explained through the further development of new technologies (e.g., cell phones and internet), the fact remains that the quality of social relationships are best on a personal, face-to-face basis. I may have the power within the privacy of my home to electronically connect with thousands of people around the world tonight, but that is a poor substitute for building meaningful social bonds of the type that can be achieved when working with my neighbors in our local community garden.

10. Value There is nothing in this world that has intrinsic worth, including the earth itself, as well as the animals that inhabit it. Human beings also fall into this category of intrinsic worthlessness. Within the human realm, value does not come about until a person, persons, or institution declares an object to have value (which paradoxically implies that the person, persons, or institution itself has already been declared to have value and is generally thought of as being valuable). Even then, however, a declaration of value, although necessary, is not sufficient to create real or true value. The declared value must be subsequently operationalized in order to actualize that which was previously declared. The paper on which fiat money is printed has no intrinsic value. Only when the government issuing the money declares something to the effect that this paper is legal tender for all debts public and private does the note have the potential to take on real value. The declaration of value, however, is insufficient to give the note true value, which can only come about when a critical mass act in a way that is consistent with the notes having value. The value is not intrinsic, but is declared and subsequently actualized by human behavior. In terms of paper money, the German mark of the 1920s and the Russian ruble of the mid 1990s attest to the fact that the true value of money does not ultimately come about through declarative statements, but is, instead, derived from the desire to consume goods and services through the normal process of reciprocity in ongoing exchange (Hoffman et al 1996). People accept paper money because of their expectation that other people are going to want it for their own consumption of goods and services. When this expectation wanes, so does the value of money. If my friend invites me out to dinner at a restaurant, I meet her with plenty of confidence that I will get a great meal as my friend has the money to pay for it. The reality is, however, that my level of confidence does not ultimately hinge on the fact that she has a wad of cash with her, but in my certainty that the restaurant owner wants my friend’s cash so she in turn can purchase goods and services for herself. When I meet my friend and I see her holding a pig, a chicken, and two goats, instead of a wad of bills, and she tells me these animals are for payment, my confidence declines rapidly as I have little-to-no expectation and confidence that the restaurant owner can use barnyard animals to further her consumerism. While my friend has declared that these animals are of equal value to the meals we hope to consume, only the restaurant owner herself can actualize that declared value by accepting the animals as sufficient payment for our order. If the owner says “no”, at least in terms of this


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particular restaurant, the animals are of no value, regardless of my friend’s insistence to the contrary. All of this, again, underscores not only how intertwined we all are with one another, but also the importance of mutual expectations. I do not need to personally know the restaurant owner in question within the context described above, but I do require confidence in knowing that she wants that which my friend has to offer in order for declared value to become actualized as real value, whether that be in cash, chickens, pigs, or goats. If we move away from objects and focus our attention on humanity, we need to ask the important question, ‘If nothing in this world has intrinsic worth, then how can human beings be valuable?’ First, we need to declare ourselves as having value and subsequently behave in a manner that operationalizes that declared value through the furthering of reciprocity within human societies. For thousands of years religious institutions have been seen as the institution that best provides that declaration for the value of humanity. This declaration was further ratified through the establishment of democratic institutions and the ascendance of the rights of man within Western civilization. As we have seen, however, in order for declared value to take on real or true value it must be operationalized through human activity. There is near unanimity of opinion amongst all religions that each person should treat others in a respectful manner. This ethic of reciprocity is a common thread that is woven throughout all major theistic and non-theistic religions as some reference to it can be found in each of their holy texts: • • • • • • • • • • •

Christianity: “So in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the Law and the Prophets.” (Matthew 7:12) Judaism: “What is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbor: that is the whole Torah; all the rest of it is commentary." (Talmud, Shabbat 31a) Islam: "Hurt no one so that no one may hurt you." (Muhammad’s Farewell Sermon) Hinduism: "This is the sum of the Dharma: Do naught unto others which would cause you pain if done to you." (Mahabharata 5:15:17) Buddhism: "Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful." (Udana-Varga 5:18) Sikhism: "As you see yourself, see others as well; only then will you become a partner in heaven." (Bhagat Kabir GGS 480) Confucianism: "What you do not wish upon yourself, extend not to others." (Analects of Confucius, Chapter 15, Verse 23) Baha’i: “Ascribe not to any soul that which thou wouldst not have ascribed to thee, and say not that which thou doest not. Blessed is he who prefers his brother before himself.” (Baha’u’llah Tablets of Baha’u’llah 6.71) Jainism: "A man should wander about treating all creatures as he himself would be treated.” (Sutrakritanga 1.11.33) Taoism: “Regard your neighbor's gain as your own gain, and your neighbor's loss as your own loss." (T'ai Shang Kan Ying P'ien) Zoroastrianism: “That nature alone is good which refrains from doing unto another whatsoever is not good for itself." (Dadistan-i-dinik 94:5)

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Similar to fiat money, it is not the declarations of priests, rabbis, ministers, imams, or shamans and their holy texts that ultimately bring about the value and high esteem we hold (or should be holding) humanity in, but the confidence held by members of communities in their expectation that others they interact with will treat them with a similar level of deference. As the ultimatum game demonstrates, deference, or respect, or a sense of fairness and justice, is at the very heart of human social interactions, and it shapes our behaviors and attitudes towards one another providing the cornerstone for the quality of life we seek.

11. Conclusion A spiral effect occurs socially when increasing numbers of people embrace the ethic of reciprocity. We experience an exponential growth in the overall quality of civil discourse and behavior, as opposed to its exponential decline when reciprocity erodes. We remember the experience of the heightened sense of social cohesiveness we found in the days and weeks after the attacks on 9/11. It felt to many that the United States had turned a corner as a result of not what the terrorists had accomplished, but what our responses to it were on the local and community level. There was a visceral sense of community solidarity when we walked in suffering together. Neighbors were helping neighbors despite the uncertainty and fear of further attacks. Strangers were willing to lend aid to other strangers in distress for no reason other than the sense of responsibility people genuinely felt they had toward one another coupled with an opportunity to express that good will in an historic and meaningful manner. The reciprocity demonstrated was at an unprecedented level not experienced in America at any time recently. As we moved further away from the events of 9/11, and slowly put greater distance between our human condition and our suffering, our modern framework, which lionizes “experts” and professionalizes so many aspect of our dayto-day existence returned with a resumption of the status quo. The newly found strength and aptitude so many Americans discovered in the wreckage of the terrorist attacks eventually faded away only to be replaced by a sense of disillusionment with the return of “business as usual”. This enhanced level of social capital brought about through reciprocity is the proverbial silver lining around the dark clouds of tragedy. Despite our desires and best efforts to end them, disasters will always be a part of our collective experience and they can be viewed as nature’s way of ensuring that humanity will always be reminded of the importance of treating others, as we would like to be treated. Despite the wear and tear of our social fabric, disasters have a peculiar way of repairing what was previously damaged, at least until the return of the status quo. Public policies should, therefore, be crafted to promote reciprocity. The authority-subordinate paradigm promoted by topdown, command-control policies, which brings about a sense of dependence and the abrogation of personal responsibility does little-to-nothing in leveraging or enhancing reciprocity to bring about solutions to our most vexing social challenges. While “experts” and professionals have their place in society, the growthorientation of their industries and their authority-like social status are damaging. We cannot afford to allow the majority of the population to feel subordinate to the authority of a small group of individuals and tolerate the management of the human experience. Tocqueville believed America’s obsession with economic growth could potentially drive the public to turn their backs on public involvement and civic duties leading to


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the emergence of an authority that would ensure an orderly society and continued economic prosperity. It appears that this nineteenth century warning is coming true in the twenty-first century. The capacity of the human spirit has no known limitations and we should take this opportunity to fully explore it, to gain refreshing perspectives on our lives, our place in history, as well as a reassessment of the natural strength and resilience we are endowed with. Opportunities to change the ruling social structures of a society come rarely and we should not squander them through reckless behavior and meaningless rhetoric at the intersection of cultural crossroads. After 9/11, instead of standing on a fallen steel girder telling the world we will exact our revenge on those who did this to us, we could have taken a different road, a similar road followed by President Lincoln in the wreckage of the American Civil War. With 703 words, Lincoln changed the meaning of suffering brought about by the Civil War in his second inaugural address (White 2002). Instead of revenge, Lincoln offered reconciliation; instead of pointing the finger of blame at the South for the institution of slavery, he placed that responsibility on the shoulders of all Americans for “wringing their bread from the sweat of other men’s faces”; and instead of delivering a speech that would appease the Northern-sympathizing crowd on hand, he moved beyond his reframing of the collective suffering experienced over the previous four years to offer a greater purpose for our nation based on mutual respect and simple humanistic duty: With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation’s wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan – to do all which may achieve and cherish a just, and a lasting peace, among ourselves, and with all nations. (Abraham Lincoln, March 4, 1865) We may not be able to control the behavior of terrorists, but we do have control over our own behavior and reactions. If the goals of modern terrorism are political in nature requiring the development of irrational fear and a sense of social isolation amongst members of the target population, then we are, in fact, here in the West, doing the work of the terrorists for them in two important ways: 1. The resilience manifested by an individual, or a group, approximates the level of resilience that that person or persons’ culture expects of them (Bill Durodié, personal communication, October 22, 2006), and 2. The sense of isolation that accompanies a breakdown in community cohesiveness. We have already discussed the important ramifications of losing a sense of community. As far as resilience, here in the United States, as well as in other NATOmember nations, our cultural expectations of resilience is low, which is due to numerous factors including the vested interest many professionals and “experts” have in keeping it down. This lack of cultural expectations in being strong in the face of adversity coupled with a rising sense of social isolation makes Western democracies tempting targets for terrorists attempting to instill irrational fear. With that said, it is too easy, as well as a distraction, for us to use terrorism as an excuse when we betray our principles, ignore our current social maladies, and allow the social fabric of our societies to fray. In the end, the timing, means, and development of a terrorist attack teach us a lot about the terrorists. On the other hand, our responses to those attacks teach us far more about ourselves (Durodié 2005).

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Our nations, or at least those beliefs, traditions, and principles we embrace and claim to hold so dear can never be destroyed by terrorists. We hold the key to our own future and it is imperative that we not only speak about the value of that which we hold in such high regard, but it is imperative that we renew our commitment to one another through our actions; actions that reflect that which we profess. Despite disasters and the prospect of future terrorist attacks at home, radiological or otherwise, we must remember that we can still find meaning in life even if we were confronted by the extremes of a hopeless situation. What matters is to bear witness to our unique potential as human beings, which is to turn one’s predicament into one’s personal triumph (Frankl 1984). The only way we can do this, however, is to unshackle and cultivate the human spirit by allowing it to explore and thrive. If we fail to do this because we are too afraid to think outside the box we are trained to think within, or because we find an over abundance of comfort in the familiar, then ultimately the fault, dear Brutus, is not in the stars but in ourselves.

References • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Arendt, H. (1994). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: Penguin Group. Asch S. E. (1951). Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of Judgement. In H. Guetzkow (ed.) Groups, Leadership and Men. Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Press. Brosnan S.F., de Waal F.B.M. (2003). Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay. Nature.425, 297-9. Clarke L. (2002). Panic: Myth or Reality? Contexts Fall, 21-6. Crier, C. (2002). The Case Against Lawyers. New York: Broadway Books. de Saussure, F. (1972). Course in General Linguistics. Chicago: Open Court Publishing. de Tocqueville, A. (1945). Democracy in America, vol 2. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Durodié B. (2005). The Limitations of Risk Management in Dealing with Disaster and Building Social Resilience. Politik. 8, 14-21. Dynes R.R. (1992). FEMA: Disaster Relief or Plain Disaster? The World and I. 110-5. Dynes R.R. (1994). Community Emergency Planning: False Assumptions and Inappropriate Analogies. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters. 12, 141-58. Frankl, V.E. (1984). Man’s Search for Meaning. New York: Simon & Schuster. Ganor, B. (2002). Terror as a Strategy of Psychological Warfare. Retrieved April 8, 2007, from http://www.ict.org.il/apage/8672.php Glass T.A., Schoch-Spana M. (2002). Bioterrorism and the People: How to Vaccinate a City against Panic. Clinical Infectious Diseases. 34, 217-23. Hoffman E., McCabe K., Smith V.L. (1996). Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games. The American Economic Review. 86, 653-60. Marcus H.R., Kitayama S. (1991). Culture and the Self: Implications for Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation. Psychological Review. 98, 224-53. McKnight, J. (1995). The Careless Society: Community and its Counterfeits. New


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York: Basic Books. McPherson M., Brashears M.E., Smith-Lovin L. (2006). Social Isolation in America: Changes in Core discussion Networks over Two Decades. American Sociological Review. 71, 353-75. Milgram, S. (1975). Obedience to Authority. New York: Harper & Row. Murphy, T., Carm, O. An Angel and a Brute: Self-Interest and Individualism in Tocqueville’s America. Retrieved October 6, 2006, from http://www.brtom.org/sjc/sjc4.html O’Dell, L. (2005, July 25). Scout Jamboree Closes for Day of Mourning. The Guardian. Retrieved April 8, 2007, from http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/fnews/1451048/posts Perry, R.J. (2003). Five Key Concepts in Anthropological Thinking. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. Quarantelli E., Dynes R.R. (1972, February). When Disaster Strikes (It isn’t much like what you’ve heard and read about). Psychology Today. 5, 66-70. Schoch-Spana M. (2003). Educating, Informing and Mobilizing the Public. In B. Levy and V. Sidel (eds). Terrorism and Public Health (pp. 118-135). New York: Oxford University Press. Seabright, P. (2004). The Company of Strangers: A Natural History of Economic Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Smith V.L. (2003). Constructivist and Ecological Rationality in Economics. The American Economic Review. 93, 465-508. Solnit R. (2005, October). The Uses of Disaster. Harper’s. 311, 31-7. Surowiecki, J. (2004). The Wisdom of Crowds. New York: Anchor Books. The 2004 World Disaster Report of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Retrieved November 21, 2006, from http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/wdr2004/index.asp Tierney K. (2003). Disaster Beliefs and Institutional Interests: Recycling Disaster Myths in the Aftermath of 9-11. In L. Clarke (ed.) Terrorism and Disaster: New Threats, New Ideas, Research in Social Problems and Public Policies (pp.33-51). New York: Elsevier Science Ltd. Toulmin, S. (1990). Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Toulmin, S. (2003). Return to Reason. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. U. S. Department of Homeland Security. Citizen Guidance on the Homeland Security Advisory System. Retrieved December 19, 2006, from http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CitizenGuidanceHSAS2.pdf U.S. House of Representatives. (2005). The Ready, Willing, and Able Act (H.R. 3565). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. White, R.C. (2002) Lincoln’s Greatest Speech. New York: Simon & Schuster.



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What Can the Science and Technology Community Contribute? Bill DURODIÉ Cranfield University, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom Abstract. This Chapter explores the role attributed to science and technology in combating the global war on terror in an age when social bonds have been eroded and our sense of the need for social solutions diminished accordingly. One consequence of this is the exaggeration of risks presented by science and by terrorists to the point of ignoring the more mundane and probable threats that confront us. Prioritising technical means to build social resilience over cultural change is also likely to be counter-productive by further fragmenting the ordinary human bonds that actually make society truly resilient. A political debate over societal values is required if we are to re-engage the public and deal appropriately with all-manner of disasters, including terrorist attacks.

1.

Introduction

Science and engineering have always played a part in war. The advent of new technologies has only increased this potential role. The global war on terror is no different to other wars in that regards. Many proposed options for dealing with terrorism have an explicit technological angle. These include, the need for better intelligence and surveillance, the development of new instruments for detecting chemical, biological and radiological agents, specialist clothing and equipment for emergency responders, and computer models for predicting behaviour or orchestrating responses. It is understandable, even commendable, that well-meaning experts and professionals should wish to get involved. Further, a significant amount of social resources are being diverted to tackling the problems raised. Accordingly, those with an eye on sources of funding to explore new areas of inquiry are likely to be interested. Indeed, beyond the explicit development of technical capabilities, the war raises numerous implicit issues for scientists and engineers to deal with. Who has access to the technologies they develop? And, how much should be made available in the public domain? Before diving in off the deep end, however, those of a more critical disposition as any true scientist should be - would do well to examine the broader context within which these events and issues have occurred and how they have been framed. Things are rarely as they seem. The primary task of all concerned ought to be to grasp the underlying essence of what is going on. Failing to do so could lead to the development of proposed solutions that, at best, merely contain perceived threats, at worst, exacerbate them significantly, not least by undermining our own capabilities to be resilient in the long run. Many perceived problems in the world today are driven more by their social context than by their scientific content. Scientists and engineers need to be alert to this,

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B. Durodié / What Can the Science and Technology Community Contribute?

not least because science occupies a peculiar position in contemporary life. A diminished sense of the significance of, as well as the desire and ability to shape, social forces, has led to an increased focus on the importance and impact of science upon our lives. In response to this elevation and exaggeration of science, society has increasingly become preoccupied with science as a potential source of new risks. This has led to the highlighting and fetishisation of purported scientific and technological solutions to what remain essentially social problems, as well as a concomitant and distorted perception of threat from anything remotely scientific in content. A recent publication from the Royal Society, the United Kingdom’s leading scientific institution, is quite apposite in this regards [1]. The report; Making the UK Safer: Detecting and Decontaminating Chemical and Biological Agents, is undoubtedly rigorous in scope and methodology. However, it is the unquestioning acceptance of the social context that needs examining. In it, some of the UK’s leading scientists take at face value the notion that; “Recent global events have given greater prominence to the threat of chemical and biological agents being used malevolently against civil targets”, and further that; “Science, engineering and technology are central to reducing this threat”. Both of these assumptions would benefit from interrogation. Indeed, questioning the axioms of a debate ought to be the first step in making it truly objective. Otherwise we may be left with a technically competent, but ultimately unscientific report. It is not just the job of social scientists, but scientists too, to question whether this purported “greater prominence” is real. Assuming that it is, scientists true to their tradition would then start by asking what this fact represents. Whether this is a media construct, or a more deeply held social concern, across different layers of society. If it is the latter, it ought to be considered that such a concern may have little relation to the actual probability of the threat they fear. The fact that something is possible, may cause alarm, but is the best way of assuaging this to assume those fears to be real and then seek to mitigate their outcomes, or alternatively, to interrogate those fears? Ultimately, the Royal Society report may be of use to a highly limited number of technical specialists who, in the extremely unlikely eventuality of such a situation arising, would be charged with dealing with it. However, it is not obvious what its use is beyond that, in the public domain. Surely, publication of the report itself could now serve to confirm people’s exaggerated perceptions of threat? It has certainly contributed to the “greater prominence’ that it originally sought to address. People might assume that if the UK’s leading scientists are investigating such matters then their presumptions are more likely to be true.

2. Science and Society The emphasis often given as to the importance of science for effecting social change is one-sided. Science can transform society, but it is also a product of society. Its advances and remit, as well as being shaped by material reality, are circumscribed by the nature and values of the society within which it develops. The ambition and imagination of that society – or lack of these – is important here. Hence, whilst the world of antiquity yielded many intellectual insights, constrained by its social structures, these proved to be of little practical consequence [2]. It was only when the largely static feudal order dissolved, through the development of trade, that new demands were raised on individuals and society. A


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marriage of intellectual activity with practical needs encouraged innovation and, through the accumulation of wealth, challenged the old social order. As well as delivering remarkable achievements, social and scientific developments raised expectations as to what was possible [3]. This was about more than simply an advance in scientific knowledge – it was part of a wider shift in attitudes and beliefs. The aspiration for social progress gave humanity confidence in the power of its own reason – a factor that then proved of significant importance to the development of science. The Scientific Revolution represented the triumph of rationality and experimentation over the superstition, speculation, diktat and domination that had gone before. It was a practical battering-ram with which to challenge perception, prejudice and power. But science was merely the product of a broader social dynamism, as well as becoming an essential contributor to it. Just as the initial dynamic behind science was social change, so social change, or more particularly the lack of it, could circumscribe it too. Initially this came from the vociferous rejection of the old religious and monarchical orders it had supplanted. Then the advent of positivism consciously sought to restore order by decoupling science from wider political aspirations to transform society [4]. This reflected the inherent limitations and world view of the new industrial elite who derived their wealth and influence from simple mechanical processes linking cause and effect by uniform rules. However, over the course of the twentieth century a wider layer of society lost its faith in the progressive capabilities of scientific transformation. Two world wars separated by a depression and followed by continuing poverty and conflict in the developing world generated doubts as to the possibility of universal human progress [5]. Radicals, who had traditionally championed the liberating potential of scientific advance, now came to view it with increased suspicion. They also associated the Manhattan project and the Apollo programme with American militarism. Some now argued that aspiration itself – rather than its failure as evidenced in the collapse of confidence in social progress – was dangerous [6]. Science was seen as the amoral steamroller of a dispassionate new modernity that crushed communities and tradition. What is so poignant about the modern disenchantment with science, is that it has emerged at a time when its achievements are without precedent. Behind the current crisis of faith in science, however, lies a collapse of confidence in humanity, and hence in the desirability and possibility of social transformation [7]. The defeat of the old Left externally, symbolised by the disintegration of the former Soviet Union and its satellite states, and the taming of the Left internally, symbolised in the UK through a series of political defeats over the course of the 1980s, now led it to make new alliances, including with the environmental movement – traditionally the preserve of the romantic Right – in order to boost its numbers, and leading it to shape a new, more individual or consumer-oriented agenda. At the same time, the diminished sense of the possibility of shaping social factors also made science appear to play a more important role in determining things.

3. Social Erosion In parallel with the gradual disillusionment of society with science, has come an equally significant process of disengagement of society from politics. For the vast majority of ordinary citizens this has been exacerbated by a growing sense of social disconnection. At both the formal and informal levels of social engagement, social

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bonds have been severely eroded over the last decade or so. The resultant sense of isolation and insecurity across society has become the key element shaping perceptions of risk. At the formal level, people in advanced Western societies are increasingly unlikely to participate in the political process. This effect is most striking among younger age groups. Electoral turnouts are at an all-time low and in the few instances where these are high, emotion appears to rule over reason. Few are active, or even passive, members of political parties or trade unions as their forebears were, and there is little attempt to engage in, or raise the standard of, debate. When people do vote, it is often on a negative basis – against an incumbent, rather than for a replacement. At the informal level, the changes are even more striking. Many have commented on the growing pressures faced by communities, neighbourhoods and families. In his book on this theme, “Bowling Alone”, the American academic Robert Putnam also pointed to the demise of informal clubs and associations [8]. Meeting up with friends, occurs less frequently than previously too. In other words, people are not just politically disengaged but also, increasingly socially disconnected. This loss of social capital has occurred and been experienced within a generation. Not so long ago, for example, it was still possible across most urban centres, to send children to school on their own, assuming that other adults would act in loco parentis – chastising them if they were misbehaving and helping them if they were in trouble. Today, such a straightforward social arrangement can no longer be taken for granted. None of us ever signed a contract saying that we would look after other people’s children. It was simply an unstated and self-evident social good. This loss of a social sense of responsibility makes the individual task of parenting harder [9]. In a similar way, ordinary communities, at the turn of the last century, invested a great deal of effort in establishing and running their own institutions. These took a wide variety of forms from churches, to working men’s clubs, schools and trade unions. It is almost impossible to find a similar process at work within society today. This is not to suggest some kind of golden-age of community activism. Clearly, past societies were also associated with a wide manner of activities we are quite glad to have seen the back of. However, the resulting erosion of social connectedness is significant. Being less connected, leaves people less corrected. It allows their subjective impression of reality to go unmediated or unmoderated through membership of a wider group, association or trusted community. Without a sense of the possibility of social solutions, personal obsessions grow into all-consuming worldviews that are rarely open to reasoned interrogation or debate. In part, it is this that explains our recent proclivity to emphasise or exaggerate all of the so-called risks that are held to confront us [10]. Rather than the world changing any faster today than in the past, or becoming a more dangerous, unpredictable or complex place, it may be our diminished, and more isolated, sense of self that has altered our confidence to deal with change and the problems it gives rise to [11]. Those who talk of a “Runaway World” [12], would be hard pressed to show how the pace of change today is any greater than say, over the sixty-five year period two centuries ago between the creation of Richard Trevithick’s first steam locomotive and the advent of transcontinental railroads across the United States of America. Alternatively, note the pace of change over the same period a century ago between the Wright brothers first powered flight and man walking on the moon. If anything, change today appears somewhat attenuated.


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Much of the focus recently has been on the largely undelivered promises of biotechnology – a technology now passed its fiftieth anniversary – and the potential of the internet. But whilst the latter may have led us to being more networked virtually, it has not driven much change in the real world. Radically overhauling existing transport networks, a transformation not currently envisaged, would most likely have greater social and scientific consequences. In our technically networked world, we may be more aware – but we are also easier to scare, than previously. Being more isolated leaves us more self-centred, as well as risk averse. In turn, these developments reduce the likelihood of our acting for some greater common good and end up making us less resilient, both as individuals and as a society. From BSE to GMOs; from mobile phones to MMR, all new developments are now viewed through the prism of a heightened and individuated consciousness of risk. Nor are our fears restricted to the realms of science and technology. Age-old activities and processes have been reinterpreted to fit our new sense of isolation and fear. Bullying, sun-bathing and even sex have joined an ever-growing panoply of concerns, along with maverick doctors, crime, food and paedophiles. Worse, this state of affairs has been exacerbated by the various authorities themselves, who suffer from their own existential crisis of isolation and insecurity. As we no longer vote, so ruling parties appear increasingly illegitimate and divorced from everyday concerns. A less than 50% turnout when split two or three ways produces governments with at best a 20-25% mandate. The real figure as reflected by demographics, negative voting and actual local election results is often well below this, languishing around the 10-15% mark. This crisis of legitimacy has been further accentuated by a certain lack of purpose that has set in since the dissolution of the old Cold War divide. Then, an ideological divide separated a supposedly socialist Left from the free-market Right. Far from the demise of the Left revealing the “End of History” [13], it actually exposed the Right’s own lack of ideas and dynamism. In an age when social change has been problematised, the pursuit of profit through innovation no longer bestows moral authority as easily. Now all parties fight for the centre ground and desperately seek issues that mitigate change and will re-connect with voters. Latching on to the general climate of fear and insecurity, politicians have learnt to repackage themselves as societal risk managers around issues such as security, health and the environment. They pose as the people who will protect us from our fears and regulate the world accordingly. But the petty lifestyle concerns they focus on, as reflected in incessant debates about smoking, smacking, eating and drinking are unlikely to inspire and engage a new generation of voters. Nor will doom-laden predictions relating to terrorism and global warming. Indeed, the more such concerns are highlighted, the more it becomes impossible for the authorities to satiate the insecurities they create. Hence, alongside disengagement and alienation, has come a concomitant disillusionment and mistrust in all forms of authority, whether political, corporate, or scientific. Healthy scepticism has increasingly been replaced by unthinking cynicism. In many situations today, the public tend to assume the worst and presume a cover-up. Rumour and myth abound over evidence and reason.

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4. Creating Fears At a recent forum in London, a member of the security service informed an audience of bankers that, whist it was true that the probability of a chemical, biological, radiological and even nuclear terrorist attack was low, this could not be ruled out. It was suggested that groups such as Al Qa’ida may have relatively poor capabilities in such techniques but their intention to develop these was clear, and if they did the consequences might be devastating. This, in essence, captures the logic of our times; “Never mind the evidence, just focus on the possibility”. It is a logic that allows entirely vacuous statements such as that of an official after the supposed discovery of the chemical agent ricin at a flat in North London, who was reported as saying; “There is a very serious threat out there still that chemicals that have not been found may be used by people who have not yet been identified” [14]. Yet undiscovered threats from unidentified quarters have allowed an all-too-real reorganisation of everyday life. The US government has provided $3 billion to enhance bioterrorism preparedness [15]. Developed nations across the globe have felt obliged to stockpile smallpox vaccines following a process, akin to knocking over a line of dominoes, whereby one speculative “What if?” type question, regarding the possibility of terrorists acquiring the virus, led to others regarding their ability to deploy it, and so on. Health advisories to help GPs spot the early signs of tularemia and viral haemorrahagic fever have cascaded through the UK’s urgent alert system. Homes across the land have received the government’s considered message for such incidents; “Go in, stay in, tune in” [16]. Like all social fears, there is a rational kernel behind these concerns. Yet this is distorted by our contemporary cultural proclivity to assume the worst. It is the fear of bioterrorism that is truly contagious, and it is a fear that distracts us from more plausible sources of danger, diverting social resources accordingly, and exposing us all to greater risk [17]. It is also a fear that has bred a cynical industry of security advisors and consultants, out to make a fast buck by exploiting public concerns, and thereby driving those concerns still further. There is a long history of bioterrorism incidents of which the anthrax attacks on politicians and the media in the U.S. in 2001 were but the latest [18]. Corpses infected with bubonic plague were thrown over the walls of Kaffa by the Black Sea in the midfourteenth century. At best, these are tactical devices with limited consequence, but not strategic weapons. It is the advent of biotechnology and the more recent, if overstated, possibility of genetically engineering agents to target biological systems at a molecular level, that is now held to pose a new challenge [19]. Few commentators point to the difficulties in developing, producing and deploying biological agents. This is evidenced by the failures of the Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, in this regards only a decade ago. It was this that led them to settle for the rather more limited impact produced by the chemical agent sarin, despite their resources and scientific capabilities [20]. The Tokyo subway attack that ensued had rather more impact upon our fevered imagination, than in reality. As with the anthrax attacks, this incident suggested that bioterrorism is more likely to originate amongst malcontents at home, due to greater access and capabilities in developing, such weapons there. Advanced economies are also better placed to deal with the consequences of bioterrorism, a fact that significantly undermines their


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purpose, especially to outsiders. Nevertheless, suicidal foreign malefactors bent on undermining western democracies continue to be presented as the greater threat. Recognising the extremely low probability and limited consequences of such incidents, some scientists point to the longer-term psychological impacts as being the more important [21]. There is an element of truth to this. Psychological casualties are a real phenomenon. In certain emergencies these can rapidly overwhelm existing healthcare resources and thereby undermine the treatment of those more directly affected [22]. Yet they can also become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Indeed, by increasingly framing social problems through the prism of individual emotions, people have been encouraged to feel powerless and ill [23]. The arrival of television cameras or emergency workers wearing decontamination suits act as powerful confirming triggers for the spread of mass psychogenic illness [24]. So too can psychosocial interventions, such as debriefing subsequent to an incident [25]. These can undermine constructive, pro-social and rational responses, including the expression of strong emotions such as anger [26]. Hence, despite good intentions, psychiatrists can become complicit in shaping social ills. This is because few are prepared to question the dominant cultural script emphasising social and individual vulnerability, and the need for professional intervention and support. Rather than critically questioning the framing of the debate, many, like the scientists of the Royal Society mentioned earlier, now simply accept the possibility of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism as a given. There is little understanding of how our exaggerated sense of risk is both historically contingent, predating 2001 quite significantly, and culturally determining, giving shape to and driving much of the agenda. One medical historian and epidemiologist, has noted that “experts were using the threat of novel diseases” as a rationale for change long before any recent incident, and that contemporary responses draw on “a repertoire of metaphors, images and values” [27]. He suggests that “American concerns about global social change are refracted through the lens of infectious disease”. This coincides with the view of others who see bioterrorism as providing a powerful metaphor for elite fears of social corrosion from within [28]. Despite incidents since 2001 pointing to the preferred use of car bombs, high explosives and poorly deployed surface-to-air missiles, the authorities have, through their pronouncements, encouraged the media to hype weapons of mass destruction. This is despite any terrorist’s capabilities being pathetic compared to our own and the consequences being more likely to devastate them than us. We have stockpiled smallpox vaccines, but notably, have run out of influenza jabs. In the extremely unlikely eventuality of an incident occurring, we assume that the public will panic and be unable to cope without long-term therapeutic counselling. In an age readily gripped by morbid fantasies and poisonous nightmares, few surpass the pathological projection of our own isolation much better than the fear of bioterrorism. All of this rather begs the question as to who is corrupting civilisation the most. The fantasy bombers or the worst-case speculators?

5. Cultural Responses In fact, how we, as individuals and as a society, define and respond to disasters, is only partly dependent upon causal agents and scale. Historically evolving cultural attitudes

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and outlooks, as well as other social factors, play a far greater role. In objective terms, risk may be defined as a function of hazard and probability, but that some product or event is perceived of as a risk, or is treated as a disaster, depends on subjective factors. This human element is missing from mechanistic risk calculus and technical solutions. Technical definitions of risk and resilience not only omit key elements of understanding and response - such as our degree of trust in authority, in other human beings and in ourselves - but may also serve to further undermine such factors, which are crucial in responding effectively. The contemporary cultural proclivity to speculate wildly as to the likelihood of adverse events and to demand high-profile responses and capabilities based on worstcase scenarios may, in the end, only serve to distract attention and divert social resources in a way that is not warranted by a more pragmatic assessment and prioritisation of all of the risks that we face. Technique and technology certainly help in the face of disaster. Ultimately, however, the fact that particular societies both choose and have the capacity to prioritise such elements, is also socially determined. More broadly, it is possible to say that resilience – loosely defined as the ability of individuals and society to keep going after a shock – is most definitely a function of cultural attitude or outlook. It is not an item that can readily be purchased. Cultural values point to why it is that, at certain times and in certain societies, a widespread loss of life fails to be a point of discussion, whilst at other times or in a different society, even a very limited loss can become a key cultural reference point. This evolving context and framework of cultural meanings explains such variations as our widespread indifference to the daily loss of life upon our roads, as opposed to, for instance, the shock and national mourning that ensued from the loss of just seven lives aboard the Challenger spacecraft in 1986. The loss of Challenger represented a low-point in our cultural assessment of our own technological capabilities. It was a blow to our assumption of steady scientific and technological progress that no number of everyday car accidents could replicate. It fed into and drove a debate that continues to this day regarding our relationship with nature and a presumed human arrogance in seeking to pursue goals beyond ourselves. Hence, emergencies and disasters, including terrorist attacks, take on a different role dependent upon what they represent to particular societies at particular times, rather than solely on the basis of objective indicators, such as real costs and lives lost. In this sense, our response to terrorist incidents, such as that which occurred on September 11th 2001, teaches us far more about ourselves than about the terrorists [29]. On the whole, the history of human responses to disaster, including terrorist attacks, is quite heartening. People tend to be at their most co-operative and focused at such times. There are very few instances of panic [30]. The recent earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean serve as a salutary reminder of this. Amidst the tales of devastation and woe, numerous individual and collective acts of bravery and sacrifice stand out, reminding us of the ordinary courage and conviction that are part of the human condition. People often come together in an emergency in new, and largely unexpected ways, re-affirming core social bonds and their common humanity. Research reveals communities that were considered to be better off through having had to cope with adversity or a crisis [31]. Rather than being psychologically scarred, it appears equally possible to emerge enhanced. In other words, whilst a disaster, including a terrorist


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attack, destroys physical and economic capital, it has the potential to serve as a rare opportunity in contemporary society to build-up social capital. Of course, terrorists hope that their acts will lead to a breakdown in social cohesion. Whether this is so, is up to us. Civilians are the true first responders and first line of defence at such times. Their support prior to, and their reactions subsequent to any incident, are crucial. Disasters act as one of the best indicators of the strength of pre-existing social bonds across a community. Societies that are together, pull together – those that are apart, are more likely to fall apart. Whilst there is much empirical evidence pointing to the positive elements of ordinary human responses to disaster, it is usually after the immediate danger has subsided that the real values of society as a whole come to the fore. It is then that the cultural outlook and impact of social leaders and their responses begins to hold sway. These determine whether the focus is on reconstruction and the future, or on retribution and the past. A more recent development has been the trend to encourage mass outpourings of public grief, minutes of silence or some other symbols of “conspicuous compassion”. Sadly, despite the variety of ways in which it is possible to interpret and respond to different emergencies, the onus today seems to veer away from a celebration of human spirit and societal resilience, towards a focus on compensation and individual vulnerability. In large part this is driven by a narrowly technical view of risk and resilience.

6. Technical Resilience Since September 11th 2001 much focus has been placed upon the concept of resilience, understood as the ability to withstand or recover from adverse conditions or disruptive challenges. Politicians, emergency planners and others, talk of the need to “build”, “engender”, “improve” or “enhance” resilience in society [32]. Unfortunately, much of this debate is framed in the fashionable, but limited, language of risk management and risk communication. Senior officials regularly point to the central role they attribute to risk reduction. This is understood in narrowly technical terms as consisting of horizon scanning, investment in equipment, training, business continuity planning, new legislation and the like [33]. This outlook itself reveals the absence of purpose and direction in society at large. After all, risk reduction is a means, not an end. In the past, society was not so much focused on reducing risk as upon enhancing capabilities towards some wider goal. Risk reduction was a by-product of such broader purposes and activities. Presumably, people were prepared to risk their lives fighting fires or fighting a war, not so that their children could, in their turn, grow up to fight fires and fight wars, but because they believed that there was something more important to life worth fighting for. It is the catastrophic absence of any discussion as to what that something more important is, that leaves us fundamentally unarmed in the face of adversity today. In that regards, risk management is both insufficient as an approach, as well as being fundamentally unambitious. It is also worth noting, that in recent times, the concept of risk itself has gradually altered from one that captured possibility and engagement in the active sense of “taking a risk”, to one that increasingly reflects our growing sense of doom and distance, as

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evidenced in growing reference to the passive phrase of “being at risk”. Risk used to be a verb. Now it has become a noun. This is a reflection of the wider passive disengagement across society at large and further drives this by gradually removing our sense of will and agency from the equation. Risks are now conceived as being entities in their own right, only minimally subject to human intervention [34]. They are inherently and implacably out there, coming our way. The best we can do is to identify them and prepare to deal with them. Even when discussing prevention, the assumption is that we are merely anticipating and building capacity for “inevitable” challenges [35]. In the words of some senior officials, it is “only a matter of time”, or “when, not if”, a terrorist atrocity will occur in the United Kingdom using some kind of crude chemical, biological or radiological device [36]. The notion that it may be possible to shape conditions, or set the agenda, with a view to obtaining more desirable outcomes or altering our social mindset, independently of external forces, is rarely entertained. Unfortunately, much of the rhetoric regarding the war on terror, far from being robust and resolute, reveals an almost resigned fatalism towards future events. There is no sense of changing how people will respond, simply a sense of preparing them to respond. This defensive responsiveness in turn can only further encourage, not just terrorists, but a whole host of other malcontents, loners, hoaxers and cranks in their activities. At best, our strategy is one of re-acting to the presumed actions of others. They drive - we follow, or mitigate. Despite occasional references to the need to “defend our way of life” or “our values” [37], very little effort has been put into identifying what these might be. They tend to be assumed, or glossed over, in some cursory fashion. At best, tolerance, which is the passive virtue of putting up with other people’s values, gets misconstrued as an active value. No doubt, because societal aims and cultural values are deeply contested and debating these might appear to be divisive at a time when we need to act in unison, it is easier to face the other way. Yet this flagrant lack of clarification as to who we are, what we believe in and where we are heading as a society, fundamentally undermines any technical attempt to be resilient. Real resilience, at a deeper social level, depends upon identifying what we are for, not just what we are against. That way we can orientate society and seek to build upon it, not just anticipate what is coming and seek to respond. It is precisely by establishing our aims and values and then pursuing these, that we stand the most chance of winning hearts and minds, not just at home but also amongst the disaffected abroad. This is not to deny the need for a small layer of highly-trained professionals in society to deal with the problem of terrorism in the here-and-now. Yet the debate about who we are and what we are for is not some abstract philosophical issue waiting for present hostilities to be over. It is most urgent and necessary right now. Without an eye on the ends, just as much as on the means, we may take decisions that drive us further from our goals than we appreciate. What we do in the present, including the science and technology we develop, is inevitably shaped by our existing values, as well as the form of society we seek to create. There are already many signs that some of the actions that have been taken thus far have served to further exacerbate the deep mistrust and cynicism in government and authority that is already quite widely felt. Worse, despite good intentions, encouraging people to be “alert”, rather than alarmed, may well further erode the very social bonds


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of ordinary human trust we need to depend upon if we are truly to be resilient as a society. As identified earlier, the usual list of measures taken to enhance social resilience since September 11th 2001 consists amongst others of the need for better surveillance and intelligence, more effective models for predicting behaviour, new detection equipment and protective clothing, alternative modes for imparting information through “trusted” sources, as well as new structures of government and integrated response systems. None of these serve to shore up ordinary social bonds and hence human and societal resilience. By encouraging the dominant paradigm of risk management in our understanding both of terrorism, as well as how to respond to it, we are encouraging a suspicion of others that effectively pushes people further apart and accentuates existing trends towards social atomisation. We have created a new bureaucracy but, as the figures show, we have failed to address the underlying insecurities [38]. Above all we have focused solely upon the form that terrorism now takes in the modern world – that relating in some increasingly tangential way, to Al Qa’ida – and largely ignored its content – a vehement anti-Americanism that rejects modernity and progress. This reveals the real complacency of the dominant responses. One hardly needs to leave the West, to discover a whole host of other voices also expressing a hatred for America and progressive enlightenment values. This division is internal rather than external. Islamist terror is merely its most visible manifestation. Once “Stupid White Men” had become a best-seller on both sides of the Atlantic we should have been alert to a certain degree of cultural self-loathing at home [39]. Timothy McVeigh and the Aum Shinrikyo cult, pointed to our ability to create home-grown nihilist terrorism. It is well worth reminding ourselves that the 19 hijackers from September 11th 2001 had themselves all spent considerable time in the West, imbuing our values – or lack of them – and had largely been educated here. Terrorism in every age reflects the dominant values of the most advanced societies. In the age when Western countries advanced and defended the sovereign rights of independent nation states, terrorists fought national liberation struggles. Today, in an age when it is not so clear what we truly believe in, we find terrorists that declare no aims and profess no responsibility for the carnage they create. Maybe it is time we examined ourselves more deeply rather than the final outcome of such values. Cultural confusion as to who we are, what we are for and where we are going will undermine our attempts at instituting social resilience. Society today is less coherent than it was a generation or more ago, it is also less compliant, but above all it is less confident as to its aims and purposes. This will not be resolved by training ourselves to respond to disasters, but by a much broader level of debate and engagement in society, not just relating to terrorism and other crises, but to far broader social issues.

7. Social Solutions Historical comparisons of disaster, such as responses to the Second World War “Blitz”, or to past episodes of flooding and epidemic disease, reveal a number of important lessons for today. Not least, is the extent and depth of social bonds and engagement at those times. During the war, there was a clear sense of the need to carry-on with normal life and everyday roles and responsibilities, rather than developing some kind of

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“shelter-mentality” [40], as is now encouraged through talk of stocking-up on batteries and fresh water. However, the most striking change over the last fifty years has been in how we assume that ordinary human beings will react in a crisis. Beyond the grossly distorted belief in the likelihood of panic lies a more subtle, yet unspoken shift in cultural assumptions, that in itself undermines our capacity to be strong. That is, that in the past, the assumption was – on the whole borne out by actual human behaviour – that people were resilient and would seek to cope in adverse circumstances. Today, there is a widespread presumption of human vulnerability that influences both our discussion of disasters well before they have occurred, and that seeks to influence our responses to them long after. A new army of therapeutic counsellors and other assorted professionals are there to “help” people recover [41]. This presupposes our inability to do so unaided. Indeed, the belief that we can cope, and are robust, is often presented as outdated and misguided, or as an instance of being ”in denial”’. In some ways, this latter element, more than any other, best exemplifies and clarifies some of the existing confusions and struggles that lie ahead. If self-reliance is old fashioned and help-seeking actively promoted, for whatever well-intended reason, then we are unlikely to see a truly resilient society emerge. This cultural shift is reflected in the figures that show that whereas in the United Kingdom, in the period of trade union militancy and unrest known as the “Winter of Discontent” of 1979, there were 29.5 million days lost through strikes, in 2002 there were 33 million days lost through stress [42]. We have shifted from being active agents of history to becoming passive subjects of it. This may suit social leaders lacking a clear agenda or direction. It may indeed be easier to manage the sick than those who struggle. Yet it also precludes the possibility of encouraging and establishing real resilience, resolve and purpose across society. The standard way of dealing with disaster today is one that prioritises pushing the public out beyond the yellow-tape perimeter put up by the authorities [43]. At best the public are merely exhorted to display their support and to trust the professionals. Effectively, we deny people any role, responsibility or even insight into their own situation at such times. Yet, despite this, ordinary human beings are at their most social and rational in a crisis. It is this that should be supported, rather than subsumed or even subverted. Handling social concerns as to the possibility of a terrorist attack is no easy feat. In part, this is because social fears today have little to do with the actuality, or even possibility, of the presumed threats that confront us. Rather, they are an expression of social isolation and mistrust, combined with an absence of direction and an elite crisis of confidence. Debates about the accessibility of technology and the reporting of science in the public domain have to be understood in this context, rather than being accepted and deliberated upon in their own terms. The starting point to establishing real resilience and truly effective solutions will be to put the actual threat posed into an appropriate context. This means being honest as to the objective evidence, as well as being able to clarify the social basis of subjective fears. Engaging the public in a political debate over societal values may be a longer-term goal than dealing with any imminent terrorist threat, but it is necessary to inform our approach as a society. The incessant debate as to the possibility and consequences of an attack using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons, is a case in point [44]. Whilst Western societies have debated such nightmare scenarios as if they were real, terrorists


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have continued to display their proficiency in, and proclivity to use, conventional weapons, such as high explosives, car bombs and surface-to-air missiles. Above-all, if as a society, we are to ascribe an appropriate cultural meaning to the events of September 11th 2001 – one that does not enhance domestic concerns and encourage us to become ever-more dependent on a limited number of “expert” professionals who will tell the public how to lead their lives at such times – then we need to promote a far more significant political debate as to our aims and purposes as a society. Changing our cultural outlook is certainly a daunting task. It requires people in positions of authority to clarify and agree on a common direction and then to win others to it. The reluctance to engage in this fundamentally political process and the clear preference to concentrate instead upon more limited, technical goals, leaves us profoundly ill-equipped for the future. It speaks volumes as to our existing state of resilience and may serve to make matters worse. Bizarrely, few of the authorities concerned consider it to be their responsibility to lead in this matter. Nor do they believe such cultural change to be a realistic possibility. Yet, in the eventuality of a major civil emergency, they hope that the public will pay attention to the risk warnings they provide and alter their behaviour accordingly. By then it will be too late.

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[36] Manningham-Buller E. The oversight of intelligence and security. Speech to the Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall, London; 17 June 2003, [37] Blair T. Speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, Whitehall, London, 11 November 2002. [38] Durodié B. Panic in the streets? New Humanist 2004; 119:3: 18-19. [39] Moore M. Stupid White Men … and Other Sorry Excuses for the State of the Nation. New York: Harper Collins; 2001. [40] Jones E, Woolven R, Durodié B, Wessely S. Civilian morale during the Second World War: responses to air raids re-examined. Social History of Medicine 2004; 17:3: 463-479. [41] Furedi F. Therapy Culture: Cultivating Vulnerability in an Anxious Age. London: Routledge; 2003. [42] Marsden C, Hyland J Britain: 20 years since the year-long miners’ strike. World Socialist Web Site, 5 March 2004. Available at; http://www.wsws.org/articles/ 2004/mar2004/mine-m05.shtml [43] Glass T, Schoch-Spana M. Bioterrorism and the people: how to vaccinate a city against panic. Clinical Infectious Diseases 2002; 34:2: 217-223. [44] Durodié B. Facing the possibility of bioterrorism. Current Opinion in Biotechnology 2004; 15:3: 264-268.



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Closing Panel Radiological Terrorism: Public Response and the Search for Resilience A Preliminary Report on the NATO-Russia Advanced Research Workshop “Social and Psychological Effects of Radiological Terrorism” James HOLMES University of Georgia, United States

Introduction On October 23-24, 2006, the University of Georgia’s Center for International Trade and Security (CITS) and the Institute of Nuclear Safety under the Russian Academy of Sciences (IBRAE) convened a NATO-Russia Advanced Research Workshop in Bratislava, Slovakia. Entitled “Social and Psychological Effects of Radiological Terrorism,” the event enjoyed sponsorship from the NATO Science Program and the NATO-Russia Council, the U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate (SKI), the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, and Washington Group International. The Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic acted as co-host for the event. Two workshop co-directors, CITS Associate Director Dr. Igor Khripunov and IBRAE Director Dr. Leonid Bolshov, were in charge of organizing the workshop. The rationale for the workshop was straightforward: in recent years it has been shown that terrorist organizations are seeking radioactive materials to construct radiological dispersal devices (RDD), or “dirty” bombs, which use conventional explosives or other means of dispersal to contaminate urban areas with radiation. These types of devices threaten to induce physical harm on the targeted population, and to wreak economic devastation. Also possible are acts of sabotage against nuclear power plants or other nuclear infrastructure elements. If deliberately damaged, a nuclear installation could become a dispersal device on a grand scale. While nuclear weapons are far deadlier than radiological devices, the materials needed to build them are reasonably secure and the technical challenges facing the terrorists are enormous. By contrast, the makings of dirty bombs are available in bulk throughout the world. These low-tech weapons are easy to manufacture and to use. Early research into atomic weaponry focused on radiological dispersion, while images from Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Bikini Atoll inscribed on the collective consciousness the hazards of radiation—with little distinction made in the public’s mind about whether that radiation emanated from a nuclear blast or from something

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J. Holmes / Closing Panel. Radiological Terrorism

more modest, such as a rudimentary RDD. As a result, ordinary citizens tend to incorrectly conflate RDDs with nuclear weapons. This perceptual ambiguity can be exploited by terrorists to bring about social and psychological damage comparable to that of a small nuclear blast more cheaply and with far less effort. In theory, any release of radioactive substances would give rise to social and psychological consequences on a scale disproportionate to the actual casualties inflicted or physical harm done. Accordingly, many experts now predict that dirty-bomb attacks are far more likely than nuclear terrorist attacks. One recent poll showed that foreign-policy experts rate a deliberate, low-level release of radiation among the unconventional tactics most likely to be used by terrorist groups, and a nuclear blast among the least likely. Exaggerated fears of radioactive contaminants, then, could allow terrorists to achieve their aims of intimidating the public, inflicting economic turmoil as people flee business and residential districts, and keeping vast numbers of the population in a state of stressful suspense. Government officials, as well as the public, are likely to overreact to radiation threats because of the persistent lack of clarity, if not confusion, as to the levels of allowable radiation doses. How can we cope with this situation? In the opinion of many scholars, enlisting the public as a major ally can be one obvious solution. Policymakers, practitioners, and academics have increasingly come to view ordinary citizens and civic groups as key partners in the effort to defeat or to fight through acts of radiological terrorism. Accordingly, the need to identify a mechanism contributing to public “resilience” – helping citizens put the actual dangers of radiological attack in perspective and react calmly – has been increasingly regarded as a matter of real and growing importance to governments, international bodies, and the experts who advise them. The NATO-Russia Advanced Research Workshop appraised the effects of radiological terrorism on civilian populations, debated various strategies to mitigate these effects, and discussed how to protect the public against this new mode of potential terrorist action. History offered a point of reference, and participants paid special attention to the lessons learned about the short and long term social and psychological consequences of past incidents involving radiation, such as Three Mile Island (USA), Chernobyl (Ukraine), Goiania (Brazil) and others. While these incidents were not the result of deliberate action, and thus were not directly comparable to dirtybomb attacks, they do furnish important insights for officials and scholars today. The delegates’ overall aim was to generate recommendations to help officials enact policies, laws, strategies, and tactics that would better prepare their citizens and societies to cope with radiological terrorism. The Bratislava workshop supported the just-unveiled U.S. National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, several initiatives taken by the Group of Eight (G-8), and nuclear security arrangements announced by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin following their February 2005 summit in Bratislava and July 2006 summit in Moscow. On October 30-31, 2006 in Rabat, Morocco, several partner countries pledged support for The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which was adopted by presidents Bush and Putin during their July 2006 meeting in Moscow. Scheduled just after the world marked the fifth anniversary of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the NATO- Russia workshop was timely. If the participants can sustain the interdisciplinary exchange of views begun at Bratislava, formulate a unified set of recommendations for government officials, and craft an effective way to


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approach governments and international institutions, then they can succeed in enhancing international security.

Strategic Thought Is at a Premium Strategic thinking is at a premium as governments, international bodies, and scholars grapple with the social and psychological consequences of radiological terrorism. This is true in two senses. First, those charged with preparing for, attempting to mitigate, and responding to terrorist acts involving radiological dispersal devices must intelligently match up available resources with policy aims, and they must do so while keeping in mind that their efforts can affect public resilience for better or for worse. Because ordinary citizens readily merge radiological weapons with nuclear weapons, there is a great risk for overreaction to radiological attacks, giving rise to outsized social and psychological responses and unwittingly furthering the objectives of the attackers. Second, those who advise the authorities must forge a coherent strategy of their own if they are to render wise counsel. Crafting an effective outreach program will be a challenge of a high order, and will require a genuinely interdisciplinary approach. Political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, and nuclear physicists and engineers— that is, representatives of fields with distinctly different perspectives on the challenges posed by radiological terrorism—assembled in Bratislava to start developing multidimensional solutions to these complex problems. Narrowing the differences in perspective among these disciplines is a necessary precursor to readying our countries for such acts—and the NATO-Russia workshop represented a major step in the right direction. Once experts reach a common view of the threat and of the proper ways to meet that threat, they will be better equipped to formulate a cohesive strategy, and to communicate that strategy to policymakers, practitioners, and the public. While considering how to cope with deliberate releases of radioactive substances in urban centers, we should bear in mind the following analytical questions: • •

• •

What are the potential social and psychological effects of radiological terrorism? Can these effects be clearly defined or quantified? What causes these effects? Given that terrorism is ultimately a type of psychological warfare primarily aimed at civilians with the goal of creating the maximum psychological distress for the purpose of achieving the desired political aims of the terror group, how would terrorist groups deploy radiological dispersal devices to maximum psychological (and in the end, political) effect? How can government officials, emergency responders, medical communities, and international institutions effectively interact to address these effects – especially in an urban environment? How will the strategies adopted by government bodies affect the resilience of rank-and-file citizens faced with radiological terrorism? Have the public’s views been adequately factored into the strategymaking process?

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• •

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How can we improve our risk communication techniques, and what is the best way to explain the facts about radiological terror to nonspecialist audiences? Can the public be involved as a partner in the fight against radiological terrorism? If so, how? What traits lend themselves to resilience, and what traits enable citizens to take an active role in their government’s defense and recovery efforts? How can any damaging effects of the government’s preparations for or response to radiological terrorism attacks on public resilience be ameliorated? What are the social obstacles that interfere with the public manifestation of resilience?

This report represents an initial attempt to lay out the scope and characteristics of the challenge confronting the world community, to summarize some key findings from the Bratislava Advanced Research Workshop, and to chart a way ahead in the effort to combat radiological terrorism and to mitigate its consequences. We make no claim that this is the last word on the subject, but we hope it is a thought-provoking first word in a productive debate.

Findings, Common Themes, and Matters for Future Debate The papers presented at the Bratislava workshop will be published in the postconference proceedings, allowing the workshop participants to present their sometimesdivergent views in full. The purpose of this report is to identify central topics of discussion from the gathering, emphasizing areas in which consensus seemed more or less solid and areas in which consensus eluded the participants. The report will serve as a guide to future action. Specific matters of debate include: •

How Likely a Threat? Threat analysis involves estimating the capabilities and intentions of likely adversaries. Some sharp disagreements emerged from the Bratislava proceedings with regard to the intentions of terrorist groups. Some participants portrayed radiological terrorism as a clear and present danger to the civilized world, pointing to the relative ease of manufacturing and deploying RDDs and to the outsized political responses terrorists can expect to reap from such unconventional assaults. Others, noting that conventional explosives have been terrorists’ weapon of choice for years—and that radiological attacks have never actually taken place, while bomb attacks are commonplace—forecast that al Qaeda and kindred groups will stay with their proven, conventional mode of operation, their threats to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction notwithstanding. While the drift of opinion seemed to favor those who believed that terrorists would indeed use radiological devices given the opportunity—one participant declared that the threat could not simply be wished away—the Bratislava workshop adjourned without reaching a clear consensus on terrorists’ intentions. Capabilities were another matter. Workshop participants representing the natural sciences made a convincing case that terrorist groups would be able to inflict harmful, perhaps even lethal radiation doses on urban populations using RDDs or other explosive devices. The figure for absorbed dose cited by the


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Russian participants in Bratislava for several possible scenarios was as high as 5 grays (500 rads), depending on the location of the victims, wind direction, and other environmental factors. Such a relatively large amount of absorbed dose could produce deterministic health effects. This represents a threat which governments and the Atlantic Alliance must take seriously. What still eludes us, though, is an understanding of the potential damage done to the psychological health of the population – both short and long-term – even if these doses were eventually determined to be much less. Several participants, moreover, recalled that the International Atomic Energy Agency, an authoritative source of information and analysis on radiation-related matters, has gone on record depicting attacks involving Category 3 RDDs as “absolutely plausible.” However, these participants also observed that little expert consensus has emerged on how to conduct threat assessments of radiological incidents, and they pointed to the inadequacy of legal and regulatory frameworks in many countries. Clearly, much work remains to be done to forge a shared view of the threat and of the best ways to counteract it—both within the expert community and within the policy community. What Are the Social and Psychological Effects of Radiological Terrorism? Few participants at the Bratislava workshop seemed to dispute the basic facts about the impact of terrorist acts involving radiation on civilian populaces. “Radiophobia” is a malady that dates from the late 1940s, when the U.S. Defense Department began researching what it called “Rad War.” During a series of tests extending into the 1950s, Defense Department researchers found that, while releasing radiation into the atmosphere could not yield the same destructive power as nuclear weapons, it could inspire disproportionate fear in exposed military units—hampering battlefield operations as soldiers worried more about unseen radioactive contaminants than about carrying out their military mission. Indeed, radiation trumped other, more familiar dangers confronting combat troops, such as conventional weaponry. Clearly, then, radiation imposes stress disproportionate to the actual damage or number of casualties it inflicts. What was true of trained soldiers— presumably the most resilient segment of any population—is doubly true of civilians, most of whom have neither undergone military training nor experienced warfare. Such individuals would presumably flee not only afflicted areas, but adjoining areas as well, thereby multiplying the effects of an attack. They would worry about friends and loved ones until they could reestablish contact. Fears of future ailments or genetic damage to their offspring would haunt many of them well beyond the time of the actual terrorist incident. Unless the authorities were seen to handle the response capably and to communicate forthrightly about hazards and countermeasures, citizens would be left mistrustful of their officials, impairing possible preparations for the next such incident. Two critical points bear highlighting. First, public fears of radiation stem less from fact or rigorous analysis than from hearsay, memories of the Cold War, or past reactor accidents such as Three Mile Island or Chernobyl. Even popular culture can fan misgivings. The movies On the Beach, The China Syndrome, and The Day After, for instance, all helped form—or malform— popular conceptions of radiation. Second, non-specialists tend to confuse

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radiological with nuclear events, equating the perils of radiological attack with the devastation wrought by nuclear explosions. This overlooks the facts that massive blast, shock, and heat are the primary immediate destructive effects of nuclear weapons, and that these effects are absent from radiological incidents. Both nuclear explosives and RDDs generate radiological effects; However, the radioactive contamination from a nuclear detonation (mainly in the form of fallout) is much greater and far more devastating than the radioactive contamination produced by an RDD. Determined efforts by experts, government spokesmen, etc., to separate the two modes of attack in the minds of the public by describing their distinctly different effects would pay off in terms of societal resilience. Finally, any evolution of the social and psychological impact of radiation must be based on the understanding of a wide array of national cultures that lead to divergent risk perception among the public. How Naturally Resilient Are Civilian Populations? Bearing in mind the characteristics of radiological attacks and the likelihood of radiophobia, the attendees in Bratislava seemed to agree that building up and sustaining public fortitude is a commonsense way to offset the social and psychological harm from such acts. A resilient populace in theory would prove resistant to panic and could make a useful ally in the fight against radiological terrorism. Whether managing public resilience is possible over the long term was a matter of some dispute at the workshop. Much discussion surrounded the questions of whether populations are intrinsically resilient and do demonstrate this capability on their own in emergency situations, whether the traits that make a population resilient fluctuate over time, and how malleable these traits are for government policymakers. First, principles figured into these discussions. How an observer is predisposed to view human nature and the nature of society has considerable policy implications. An “optimistic” view, supported by disaster and terrorism research, seems to hold that people will band together for the common good when faced with terrorism, other manmade disasters, or natural cataclysms. An unspoken corollary is that society progresses toward greater enlightenment, evolving more or less in linear fashion. Given this view, building up public fortitude is a relatively simple challenge, which involves crafting an effective message about natural and manmade disasters, framing this message in everyday language, and getting it out to a wide enough swath of the populace, including civic groups and individual citizens. A public-private alliance against radiological terror is a thinkable strategy. One participant suggested referring to previous research that the way governments and communities plan to respond to acts of radiological terrorism creates conditions that influence how the public will behave and the extent of psychological damage and social disruption that will occur. Outcomes are far worse when planners don’t look at emergencies from the public’s point of view, since they inadvertently create conditions that make it unnecessarily difficult for people to protect themselves and their families. A “pessimistic” view, on the other hand, tends to depict the evolution of society in darker terms. Progress toward enlightenment is fitful, and societal decay is possible if not probable. Indeed, one participant at the Bratislava workshop contended that Western societies have lost their sense of common


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purpose, in particular since World War II. This loss of purpose, he maintained, manifests itself in signs of self-centeredness, even among society’s heroic defenders, making society an easy prey to terrorists. A disheartened public, in this view, cannot be trusted to spontaneously self-organize to cope with disaster; instead, individuals will be more prone to look out for themselves. Such a populace may not be a reliable partner for the government in times of peril. If this is the case, wise government officials would be better off concentrating their attention and energies on preparations and planning that do not depend on rank-and-file citizens. Resilience would take a lesser place in the hierarchy of priorities than it would under the optimistic view. Devising plans that did not worsen public anxieties—further sapping public resources needed to deal with a radiological event—would be the primary goal of a policy informed by the pessimistic view of society. On balance, the workshop participants seemed to support the optimistic outlook, indicating that efforts to encourage popular resilience are worthwhile. And there was some common ground. Both optimists and pessimists agreed that citizens have tended to band temporarily after past disasters, as in the hours and days immediately following the September 11, 2001 attacks on Washington and New York, the March 11, 2004 attacks on Madrid, the Beslan atrocity, or the July 7, 2005 bombings on the London public transport. However, there was disagreement on what happens later. One claim was that social cohesion frays as time passes after a traumatic incident. This could enfeeble the public in future prolonged crises. Others questioned this claim, defending (for example) the emergency responders who have sought compensation for health hazards they underwent while responding to the World Trade Center strikes as a way to make themselves and others more motivated to take risks in future incidents. In this view, resilience begets more resilience when society recognizes the contribution of those who are the front line and are risking their health and lives. One issue that received little attention at the Bratislava workshop was whether (and how) public resilience varies from country to country. The history, social context, and past and current experiences of a society with its government is crucial to understanding its potential responses to terrorism. For example, in the former Soviet Union there was likely to be strong suspicion of the government following the Chernobyl debacle, whereas in the United States citizens tend to be less cynical of their government’s claims and statements than perhaps Europeans are. This can already be seen, e.g., in differences between how Italians and Germans responded to their governments’ claims about avian flu, or about the safety of buying poultry products, with Germans believing their government and continuing to buy and Italians showing distrust, which resulted in a drop in purchasing. No one-size-fits-all strategy against radiological terrorism is likely to apply in all cases. The question of how universal resilience is and how strategies should be tailored to each country, regime type, or region merits additional study. How Can Policymakers Enhance Public Resilience? The participants agreed that advance planning for radiological terror attacks was crucial. The lessons of past radiological accidents and incidents show, for example, that planners must set decision-making parameters for the post-attack period ahead of time, focusing on the immediate aftermath of the attack, an intermediate period, and

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the long term. They should take into account factors such as radiation psychosis, the absorbed dose among various segments of the population, and the health dangers associated with this dose, all while balancing monetary and resource costs and benefits. Many governments, observed one participant, cannot adequately deal with radiophobia without revising the allowable radiation standards that were established long ago and for different purposes, and which are not consistent with the current understanding of actual radiation effects. One participant encouraged making the public an integral partner in government advanced planning measures because it is the public who know whether or not advice given by the government is likely (or even possible) to be carried out. Neglecting the concerns of ordinary citizens and families – such as the need to care for dependents, loved ones, and even pets, or the necessity of having medications or daily comforts – leads to policies that are likely to have low compliance rates, whereas involving the public in the planning stage will likely greatly enhance the quality of emergency plans. Communication is also a crucial factor in building resilience, as the needs of citizenry are sometimes divergent from those of the government. One lesson of the Iraq war, for instance, is that terrorists are skilled at using portable electronic devices to detonate explosives—including, potentially, dirty bombs—remotely. Despite this, though, emergency responders must keep in mind that their usual tactic—shutting down cell-phone networks—will also keep individuals from contacting their families. Thus there are costs, measured in psychological stress, to even the most rational post-attack strategy. These costs must be factored into the strategic planning effort to avoid imposing needless stress on the populace. Taking public reactions into account during national and multinational exercises, such as the maneuver held under the NATO-Russia Council in October 2006, represents one way to estimate the public impact of various response and recovery measures. One concept that received surprisingly little attention at the Bratislava workshop was the “all-hazard approach” to disaster management and recovery. The all-hazard approach is founded on the notion that all disasters, natural and manmade, have certain features in common. Rather than diffusing effort and resources by preparing for each type of disaster separately, an across-theboard strategy attempts to build up capacity for various contingencies while taking advantage of the economies of a unified approach. Whether merging acts of radiological terror with, say, hurricanes or tornadoes in the minds of ordinary citizens would demystify radiation—and help quell radiophobia—is a question worth studying. What Kind of Public Communications Strategy Works Best? One participant pointed out that any effective campaign to educate the public about radiological terrorism must begin with factual, scientifically credible, and readily intelligible information about potential threats. Particularly when dealing with an “invisible” threat, the public will benefit from being able to break down and compare scientific information with commonly understood and acceptable risks, such as flying in an airplane or undergoing an X-ray procedure. Trust, others noted, is easily lost but difficult to regain. As a result, candor on the part of officials is a must. A risk communication strategy must convey to the public certain fundamental information about radiological terror


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and make them aware that while the terrorists’ goal is to increase fear, the public can and should partner with the government to try to reduce the possibility of the terrorists achieving that objective. First, radiological attacks could take numerous forms, including dirty bombs, radiation emission devices left in public places, or assaults on nuclear power facilities. None of these modes of attack is likely to create anything like the destruction left by a nuclear blast. Second, terrorist groups face assorted technical, physical, and psychological impediments to this mode of operation. While radiological terror attacks are certainly plausible, media accounts tend to exaggerate the ease of using radiation as a weapon. Third and finally, conventional weapons and explosives remain the primary tool for most terrorist groups. Explaining the motives and objectives of terror groups would help alleviate public worries about radiological attack, allowing a targeted population to react calmly should such an attack transpire. Frank communication, then, can be an effective way to stiffen public resolve and mitigate radiophobia. The nature of modern media also occasioned considerable debate at the Bratislava workshop. Terrorists rely on the media to amplify the fear-inducing effects of their strikes: if a radiological attack were to occur, they would most certainly make use of the media in this manner. While terrorists need only to create confusion and fear, official spokesmen must respond to an event within minutes if they are to preempt readily available “experts,” some with uncertain credentials, who take to the airwaves and fan irrational fears. The participants agreed that the expert and government communities must formulate an accurate, consistent message in advance of a radiological terror attack in order to blunt the social and psychological effects of such an event. Whether it is realistic to hope to get a unified message out within minutes of an incident, given the constraints on government’s ability to gather, process, and analyze information, is a question that was left unanswered. Additionally, one participant suggested that the effort to devise and broadcast a prepackaged, unified message—drowning out bogus commentators—could lead to groupthink among those charged with prosecuting the response. Beware of “Expert Culture.” Several attendees warned the workshop against the dangers of “expert culture,” or the tendency to assume that “the public” is some sort of abstract factor, readily manipulated by experts or officials wielding cost/benefit analyses and other instruments of rational decisionmaking. People are not so plastic. Indeed, noted one participant, experts are a subset of the public, with families, friends, and homes of their own. Policymakers and experts should keep that clearly in view as they help draft legislation, regulations, strategies, and tactics, lest their efforts become estranged from daily realities and alienate fellow citizens. All of that being said, though, experts in an interdisciplinary endeavor such as radiological counterterrorism do need to form a common culture—a common picture of the problem and likely solutions—but it would be unhealthy for them to forget that they are part of the larger society.

However productive the NATO-Russia Advanced Research Workshop was, it is important not to let the workshop be a one-time affair. Many questions were left unanswered. These areas warrant further scrutiny and expert debate if government

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officials and responders are to enjoy the best counsel. More importantly, governments do not overhaul their capabilities or educate their constituents overnight. Readying the countries of the world community for unconventional terrorist attack promises to be a long-term enterprise, demanding long-term effort by experts and officials.

Future Endeavors for CITS and Its Partners Having successfully organized and administered a NATO-Russia Advanced Research Workshop on the social and psychological dimensions of radiological terrorism, the two organizing institutions intend to follow up with a series of cooperative activities, possibly involving other institutions, designed to further refine expert analysis and official capabilities in this area. As discussed at the Bratislava workshop, we intend to establish a “Bratislava Core Group” to prosecute our collaborative efforts in the area of radiological terrorism. Our endeavors will continue to have an intensively multidisciplinary character to them. We hope to recruit Bratislava workshop participants and other experts for the Core Group and to integrate our efforts with the existing network of experts who in 2002 held a similar NATO ARW on psychological effects of WMD across-the-board. Our interdisciplinary approach and their focus on socio-cultural psychological effects would be mutually complementary. Our immediate objectives, aside from publishing and distributing this report, are to: •

Publish and distribute the workshop proceedings, including the transcripts of the sessions and papers submitted by the workshop participants. The proceedings are under contract through IOS Press, Amsterdam. • Form a Core Group to sustain the dialogue initiated in Bratislava. Seeking out funding sources to sustain the Core Group’s work will be the main objective of the group over the near term. • Court new audiences for our recommendations and outreach. We intend to publicize the Core Group’s work through the CITS WMD Security Policy Program website (http://www.uga.edu/cits/programs/wmdsecurity.html), which will serve as a clearinghouse for information and exchanges of views. • The Core Group’s endeavors will be designed to support and complement the programs and objectives of the NATO Science Program, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and individual governments throughout the Atlantic community and beyond. Members will be invited to take part in the group’s activities in an informal capacity and in keeping with their preferences and skills. The CITS team will plan, guide, and manage the efforts of the Core Group while coordinating fundraising through CG members and outside sources. Alongside the collective activities of the Core Group, the CITS team will: • Maintain and improve its dedicated WMD Security website as a tool for information exchange and networking. • Contribute information, analysis, and articles to a wide range of publications. • Provide internship, research, and training opportunities to U.S., Russian, and European students and officials interested in radiological terrorism.


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Conduct joint research with the NATO Science Program, the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, the Russian Academy of Sciences, the U.S. DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration, and other institutions, piloting our training and outreach programs and materials before key officials and audiences.


Appendices


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Appendix I List of Participants Name

Country

Affiliation

1.

Amlôt, Richard

UK

Health Protection Agency

2.

Arutyunian, Rafael

Russia

Institute of Nuclear Safety/RAN

3.

Barnett, Michael

USA

U.S. Congress

4.

Behan, Christopher

International

IAEA

5.

Berthou, Veronique

Italy

JRC-Ispra

6.

Carvalho Rodrigues, Fernando

International

NATO Public Diplomacy Division

7.

Chase, Aaron

USA

8.

Djaloeis, Azhar

Indonesia

U.S. Embassy, Bratislava Nuclear Regulatory Agency (BEPETEN)

9.

Durodié, William

UK

Cranfield University

10. Ferguson, Charles

USA

Council on Foreign Relations

11. Goltsov, Vladimir

Russia

Committee on Security, State Duma

12. Holmes, James

USA

CITS

13. Khripunov, Igor

USA

CITS

14. Kirchsteiger, Christian

Netherlands

DG-JRC, Institute of Energy

15. Kornelyuk, Vladimir

Russia

Atomenergo Institute

16. Lasker, Roz

USA

The New York Academy of Medicine

17. Leivesley, Sally

UK

NewRisk Management

18. Lodding, Linda

International

IAEA

19. Melikhova, Elena

Russia


20. Moskowitz, Paul

USA

Mele Associates

21. Nikonov, Dmitriy

USA

CITS

22. Pavlovsky, Oleg

Russia


23. Rogers, Brooke

UK

King's College

24. Shalabi, Ahmed

Canada

Permanent Mission to International Organizations in Vienna

25. Soo Hoo, Mark

USA

Sandia National Laboratories

26. Speckhard, Anne

USA

Free University of Brussels

27. Steinhäusler, Friedrich

Austria

University of Salzburg

28. Stern, Warren

International

IAEA

154

Appendix I. List of Participants

29. Tichy, Milan

Slovakia

Nuclear Regulatory Authority

30. Tirone, Jonathan

Austria

Bloomberg News

31. Tucker, Chris

USA

CITS

32. Turner, Mikulas

Slovakia

Nuclear Regulatory Authority

33. Van Dassen, Lars

Sweden

34. Weil, Leopold

Germany

35. Wessely, Simon

UK

SKI Federal Office for Radiation Protection King's College


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Appendix II Workshop Agenda October 23-24, 2006 Holiday Inn Bratislava, Slovakia

Welcoming remarks by a host country representative and co-sponsors • Dr. Marta Žiaková, Chairperson, Slovak Nuclear Regulatory Authority • Fernando Carvalho Rodrigues, Program Director, NATO Public Diplomacy Division Co-directors welcoming remarks and workshop outline • NATO Co-director Dr. Igor Khripunov (CITS/UGA, USA) • Russia Co-director Dr. Leonid Bolshov (INS/RAN, Russia) Keynote speakers • Dr. Anita Nilsson, Director, Office of Nuclear Security, IAEA • Dr. Simon Wessely, King’s College, United Kingdom Panel I + Q&A (Radiological Terrorism: Origin, Concept, Definition, Likelihood, Availability of Material, Nuclear Power Infrastructure Safety and Security) Speakers: • Dr. Charles Ferguson, Council on Foreign Relations, USA • Dr. Rafael Arutyunian, Institute of Nuclear Safety, Russia • Dr. Vladimir Korneluk, Atomenergo Institute, Russia Discussant: • Mr. Paul Moskowitz, MELE Associates, United States Luncheon Speaker • Dr. Leopold Weil, Federal Office for Radiation Protection, Germany Panel II + Q&A (Lessons from Past Accidents: Goiania (Brazil), PO Mayak/Techa River Radiation Contamination (Russia), Chernobyl (Ukraine)) Speakers: • Dr. Friedrich Steinhaeusler, University of Salzburg, Austria • Dr. Elena Melikhova, Institute of Nuclear Safety, Russia • Dr. Oleg Pavlovsky, Institute of Nuclear Safety, Russia

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Appendix II. Workshop Agenda

Panel III + Q&A (Psychological and Medical Effects of Radiological Terrorism: Distress Responses, Behaviour Changes, Psychiatric Disorders, Stress-Related Physiological Diseases, Cost Estimate of Psychological Impact) Speakers: • Dr. Simon Wessely, King’s College, UK • Dr. Anne Speckhard, Free University of Brussels, Belgium Discussant: • Dr. Michael Barnett, Moderated discussion Panel IV + Q&A (Societal Strengths and Vulnerabilities: Radiophobia; Risk Perception; Economic, Environmental and Other Impact) Speakers: • Dr. Oleg Pavlovskiy, Institute of Nuclear Safety, Russia • Dr. Brooke Rogers, King’s College, UK Discussant: • Dr. Sally Leivesley, NewRisk Management, UK Panel V + Q&A (Societal Strengths and Vulnerabilities: Population Diversity and Differentiated Needs; Government/Public Partnership; Role of the Private Sector; Legislative Input; Role of the Media) Speakers: • Dr. Michael Barnett, U.S. Congress • Dr. Roz Lasker, The New York Academy of Medicine, United States • Mr. Jonathan Tirone, Bloomberg News, Austria • Mr. Milan Tichy, Slovak Nuclear Regulatory Authority, Slovakia • Dr. Rafael Arutyunian, Deputy Director, Institute for Nuclear Safety, Russia Panel VI + Q&A (International Approaches: International Cooperation and Programs) Speakers: • Mr. Christopher Behan, IAEA • Mr. Warren Stern, IAEA Discussant: • Mr. Lars Van Dassen, Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate Panel VII + Q&A (Preventing and Mitigating Psychological Effects: Risk Communication, All-Hazards Approach, Resilience, and Long-Term Care) Speakers: • Dr. Christian Kirchsteiger, DG JRC-IE, The Netherlands • Dr. William Durodié, Cranfield University, Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, UK Discussant: • Mr. Mark Soo Hoo, Sandia National Laboratories, USA Conclusions and Recommendations


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Appendix III Psychological Impact of Radiological Terrorism: Demystifying the Mystery Background Paper for the NATO-Russia Advanced Research Workshop “Social and Psychological Effects of Radiological Terrorism” Dr. Igor KHRIPUNOV70 University of Georgia Abstract:

Acts of radiological terrorism represent perhaps the most effective, readilyavailable tool terrorist groups can use to cause panic, disrupt vital societal institutions, and inflict psychological damage on the public. The psychological effects of radiological terrorism would dwarf those created by most other potential terrorist weaponry because of radiophobia, lack of public involvement and awareness, and prevailing misconceptions. The psychological reaction to an act of radiological terrorism breaks down into three main categories: distress responses, behavioral changes, and psychiatric illnesses. One way to condition the public to the adversity of radiological terrorism is to provide more information, get it involved in preparedness programs, and to develop resilient culture. Resilient people bend rather than break during stressful conditions, and they return to their normal psychological and social functioning following misfortune.

The problem with radiation exposure, real or perceived, is that it is colorless, odorless, and tasteless, making it impossible to detect without special instrumentation and skills. Its elusive nature stimulates worst-case fantasies and scenarios among the general public. Radiation exposure, moreover, may not manifest itself immediately, leaving the people in affected—or potentially affected—areas in a stressful state of anticipation and dread. The potential impact of exposure not only on those exposed but also on their descendants can leave the victims feeling guilty and depressed. Those who have been exposed or anticipate being exposed to radiation may experience not only panic but also a sense of vulnerability and of being out of control of their lives. Few if any deaths will result promptly from radiation exposure in an attack with the use of a radiological dispersal device (RDD), since spreading small amounts of radiological material has no 70 Dr. Igor Khripunov is Associate Director of the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia in Athens, USA

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I. Khripunov / Appendix III. Psychological Impact of Radiological Terrorism

immediate substantial effect other than to instill public fear and panic. Instead, the major challenge will be long-term consequence mitigation, involving cleanup, relocation of residents away from heavily contaminated areas, and psychological care.

Legacy of the Cold War Radiological weapons have at least a half-century-long history, but they take quite a different form today than they did in the early stages of the Cold War. They were preceded by large-scale projects involving thousands of scientists on both sides. The objective of such projects was to derive a war-fighting advantage from the radioactive contamination yielded by nuclear explosions. Proponents of this military application of radioactive contamination often intentionally exaggerated the effectiveness of such tactics for a variety of reasons, ranging from budgetary considerations to the desire to intimidate adversaries. The result was a distinct fear of radioactive exposure that deepened into what is now known as radiophobia—the irrational belief that any level of ionizing radiation is highly dangerous, if not immediately deadly. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings impressed upon the public the horrifying symptoms of acute radiation exposure syndrome: vomiting, hair loss, alterations in blood cells, and eventual death. Atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons and the radioactive fallout from these tests heightened the stigma attached to radiation. In 1954, a Japanese fishing boat, the Lucky Dragon, was accidentally showered with fallout from an American hydrogen bomb test, The incident precipitated a political movement, first in Japan, then in the United States and Europe, that aimed to halt the arms race in general and to halt atmospheric testing in specific. Signed in August 1963, the Partial Test Ban Treaty was greeted as a landmark event that would curb radioactive pollution from atmospheric tests and reduce the health hazards associated with nuclear fallout. The ferocious nuclear arms race in the post World War II period, imprinted on the public mind the deadly and devastating force of radiation and nuclear explosions, now somewhat wrongfully associated with RDDs as a tool of terrorism. This radiophobia is also a major reason why the psychosocial impact of radiological terrorism is so difficult to diagnose, assess, and deal with in each individual situation.

Uncertainties Uncertainty is the hallmark of any event involving a release of radiation, whether from a terrorist RDD or through some other means. It worsens the psychological injury done to the public, giving rise to fears that are not reasonable but driven by uncertainty, ambiguity, fragmented information, hype, and miscommunication. If we are unable to ameliorate our uncertainty through a reasoned assessment of risk, we grow more and more afraid, caught up in a cycle of worry. One way to manage uncertainty is to work toward a common level of risk acceptance that derives not only from expert judgment but also from the cultural and individual values of non-experts. The public, however, tends to base its views of risk on personal experience, but the nature and consequences of a radiological event are unique. Few individuals have experienced anything that can provide meaningful clues or guidance.


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The factors that shape the overall psychological impact of an event also vary, both from community to community and within each community. These factors include the perceived magnitude of the consequences; proximity to the radiation release; ignorance about the nature of the hazard; how long the stressor persists; the degree of physical harm that comes to oneself or fellow citizens; exposure to grotesque scenes of injury or death, especially when children are involved; the suddenness of the event; and distrust of the institutions attempting to manage the hazard. In order to mitigate or overcome these uncertainties, the authorities must keep the public adequately informed, looking on citizens not merely as helpless attack victims or a panicked mob but as a proactive, knowledgeable player with much to contribute at all stages of a radiological event. Keeping the public abreast of the latest thinking about the hazards of radiation will help the authorities make the populace an ally during times of crisis. What drives the public’s radiophobia, exacerbating public uncertainties, is the long-running debate about the linear no-threshold model (LNT). Though the debate is technical and mostly among specialists, advocacy groups have been closely following it and shared its highlights with the public. The model assumes that the detrimental effects of radiation are proportional to the dose and that there is no dose at which the effects of radiation are not detrimental. Supporters of the linear model, including the Environmental Protection Agency, believe that this model should be used in the absence definitive experimental evidence, since it is the more cautious model. Opponents of the linear model, including professional associations such as the Health Physics Society, believe that it overstates the health risk—meaning that there is a threshold below which minimal, or no, ill effects occur from radiation exposure. Another example of uncertainties that mislead and confuse the intellectual segment of the general public is the persistent disagreement among scientists about the radiation effects of the 1986 Chernobyl accident in Ukraine. Authoritative surveys periodically carried out in the Chernobyl environs contravene doomsday predictions vis-à-vis the survival of the affected population, painting a surprisingly optimistic picture. The authors of the latest report Chernobyl’s Legacy: Health, Environmental and Socioeconomic Impacts, released in the fall of 2005, concluded that there were no profound negative health effects on most of the population in surrounding areas. Nor did they discover widespread, lingering contamination outside the exclusion zone that continues to pose a substantial threat to human health. While up to 4,000 people may eventually die early of radiation exposure—fewer than 50 deaths had been attributed to radiation from the disaster as of mid-2005—the report labeled the mental health impact of Chernobyl as “the largest public health problem created by the accident,” attributing the damaging psychological impact in large part to the government’s failure to supply timely, accurate information. The report was immediately challenged by other experts, who claim that the latency period for many forms of cancer is 20 years or more, while the half-life of cesium-137, the most widespread cancer-causing isotope dispersed at Chernobyl, is 30 years—meaning that a sharp increase in cancer and leukemia could occur in the next 10 years, or even beyond.

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Vulnerabilities Since terror groups want to use radiological weapons to pursue their larger goal— presumably the psychological unraveling of Western society—a review of some societal vulnerabilities would be helpful in assessing their chances to succeed. A Challenge of Differentiated Care for Target Groups. Several categories of the population are likely to experience more serious psychological effects from radiological terrorism than others. People belonging to these categories will require specialized care in the pre- and post-event stages if they are to avoid long-term, often irreversible consequences. They include children, ethnic groups, pregnant women, older adults, adults with serious mental illness, primary care providers, disaster response workers, and members of the armed forces who happen to be involved in postevent operations. Each segment of the population has its own unique vulnerabilities that demand special skills from responders. Unless these vulnerabilities are understood and taken care of, society as a whole will be in jeopardy. Although risk exposure to terrorism is ostensibly the same for all age groups, the physical and psychological attributes of children increase their vulnerability to such events, raising the prospect of long-term behavioral disturbances. Their inexperience, their incapacity to assess and respond appropriately to sudden danger, and their slow reaction times render them even more vulnerable than most other groups. Mature adults are on the average more resilient than most other groups because they are experienced at coping with crisis, which lends them a sense of personal mastery. This age group also tends to have a positive outlook and in most cases a rich social network of friends and families. On the other hand, adults in a more advanced age group have a weak immune system and are more vulnerable to psychological shock. Another group, adults with serious mental illness, may be more vulnerable to the stress of traumatic events like radiological terrorism because they are already struggling with high levels of trauma and usually lack support systems. First responders and rescue workers are at risk of adverse psychological outcomes, largely because of direct, extended exposure to the perils that follow a terrorist attack. The same is true of members of the armed forces involved in post-event operations. The experience of treating civilian casualties, particularly children, exposed to an RDD could markedly increase the psychological impact on soldiers. Inadequate Partnership with the Public. Leadership, especially at the local level, is one of the most important elements that can help prevent societal institutions from unraveling and mitigate the psychological impact of a catastrophic terrorist attack. High moral standards and a sense of purpose are an indispensable adjunct to traditional lawenforcement measures. Leaders will fail in their fundamental task if they do not reach out to their constituents in anticipation of the mental stresses these constituents will experience during and after a radiological attack. Such an attack will pose an even more serious challenge than most other acts of terrorism, because its effect is still mystified and misunderstood. Because local communities do not always play a significant role in developing antiterrorist plans in the United States, the public, according to a report of the New York Academy of Medicine, doubts the efficiency of local officials and is reluctant to follow their lead in times of crisis. The report documents that only one-tenth of Americans think that their community is well prepared to deal with emergencies like


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dirty-bomb explosions. Only one-fifth think that planners know very much about their concerns and their information needs. Only three-tenths think they have a lot of influence on the plans that are being developed. These are clear signs of alienation and division. Partnership with the public is the best vehicle for leaders to work toward teamwork, in an attempt to avoid and alleviate disruptive psychological experiences. Under a closer partnership, the affected public would be able to: (a) gain the facts it needs to protect it from projected and actual dangers; (b) make well-informed decisions using all available information; (c) take an active, participatory role in the response and recovery; (d) act as a watchdog over public resources; and (e) preserve or restore wellbeing and normalcy, including economic security, in the community.

Psychological and Behavioral Reaction Radiological terrorism manifests itself in direct efforts to intimidate and instill fear in communities, across the nation, and in the international community. The stress arising from the direct impact and the lingering threat of radiological terrorism can spawn serious psychological and physiological consequences. Adding to radiation-related stress is the fear of being stigmatized. A case of semi-voluntary stigmatization is illustrated by the pattern of behavior among the Japanese who experienced the bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They reportedly tried to marry each other and to maintain lower socioeconomic status because they perceived themselves as undesirable for marriage, child-bearing, and employment. The number of people who need professional assistance, then, will go beyond those who are in close proximity to an RDD attack or otherwise suffer direct effects. Among those who are indirectly affected but might still need assistance are people who witness the event through the media; those who suffer secondary effects such as an economic downturn; and relatives or friends of those killed or wounded during a terrorist event. The psychological repercussions may be extended, albeit at significantly lower intensity, by sporadic reminders through media and government channels that another terrorist attack may occur. The psychological responses to an act of radiological terrorism break down into three main categories: distress responses, behavioral changes, and psychiatric illness. Distress following a radiation release, actual or perceived, will be common, manifesting itself in sadness, fear, insomnia, a sense of vulnerability, impaired concentration, a loss of trust, survival guilt, and fear for the future. Psychological distress after a radiological event may also manifest itself in somatic complaints for which no diagnosis can be found. Such elusive maladies are often referred to as Multiple Idiopathic Physical Symptoms (MIPS). The aftermath of the Chernobyl accident abounded in MIPS-type cases of non-cancer effects that do not result directly from irradiation, but from the stresses that have accumulated since the accident. Behavior changes include fears of travel, a desire to stay home, increased smoking and alcohol use, and compulsive use of prescription or non-prescription medication. For the vast majority of people, behavioral symptoms related to the traumatic exposure will diminish over time. At the height of a panic, however, people’s irrational behavior puts their lives and the lives of others at risk.

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Psychiatric illness in the wake of a radiological attack may include post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), acute stress disorder (ASD), or severe depression. PTSD is common after a variety of natural disasters and industrial accidents and should be expected after the shock of a radiological attack. Sufferers of PTSD continue to live in the emotional environment that accompanied the traumatic event, with prolonged vigilance for and sensitivity to external factors, particularly, in the case of a radiological attack, those associated with anything nuclear. They demonstrate persistent startle responses and irritability, a proclivity to react explosively, a fixation on the trauma, and an atypical dream life. Long-term depressive reactions have been reported after traumatic events, including acts of terrorism. Depression is one of the prominent symptoms observed in soldiers during the extreme stresses of combat. Acute depression characterized much of the Hiroshima population for a period of time after the bombing. Depression was clearly a consequence of the 1979 accident at the Three Mile Island for most vulnerable groups. It is clear that expected psychological injuries from an act of radiological terrorism risk to overwhelm first responders, destabilize the situation, and heavily burden the medical services. Health providers’ offices, medical clinics, and hospitals will be deluged with symptomatic and asymptomatic patients seeking evaluation and care for possible contamination following a radiological event. Some of these patients will be diagnosed as having acute radiation sickness, others will have diagnosable conditions unrelated to radiation, and a large number will be found to have symptoms for which no etiology can be identified. In a longer-term perspective, the health care system will have to deal with an expanded incidence of mental disorders.

Resilience It is impossible to accurately quantify the sum of the physical, mental, and emotional strains or tensions on a person directly or indirectly affected by a radiological event. Feelings of stress in humans stem from specific interactions between persons and their environment that are perceived as straining or exceeding their adaptive capacities and threatening their well-being. One way to condition the public to these hardships is to build up resilience. Resilience is usually defined as the ability to handle disruptive challenges, characterized as emergencies that can lead to or result in crisis. Accordingly, resilience is an interactive product of beliefs, attitudes, approaches, behaviors, and physiology that helps people fare better during adversity. The aim of building resilience among the public would be to reduce susceptibility to challenges by reducing the probability of the likely effects of a radiological attack, responding effectively to such effects as do occur, and building institutions and structures in a way as to minimize the possible effects of disruption upon them. Real resilience requires bringing people together by engaging them with a common, well-understood, and worthy purpose. Technical solutions and competence can contribute to resilience, but ultimately real resilience is about attitude, motivation, and will. Engendering such attitudes requires cultural change and more focus on the mindset of people. Effective and durable resilience must be built on three tiers: social, organizational, and personal. The social tier would integrate the public in local community planning, provide relevant information, and solicit public input to make the arrangements as


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effective and palatable as possible. As a result, the public will regard community-wide antiterrorist and emergency plans as a shared product rather than a diktat imposed from above. At its best, social resilience makes society more coherent and cohesive but, above all, more confident in its objectives, values, and fundamental principles. The organizational tier must reassure the public that the federal government has been doing everything possible to counter terrorism. Some measures that build technical resilience: introducing better surveillance and intelligence capacity, modern radiation detection equipment and protective clothing, better border controls, more effective models for predicting behavior, and continued adjustment of federal agencies to respond to emerging threats. Also included under technical resilience are state-of-the art technical means and personnel to facilitate first aid, sheltering and, if necessary, the evacuation of community residents. On the personal level, people can start to build resilience at any time, including before, during, and after a radiological event. Reaching out can build resilience, and there are a number of ways to make connections: strengthening close relationships; accepting help and support from those who care; offering help and support to others; and becoming involved in civic, faith-based, or other local groups to gain social support. Developing confidence in their ability to face life’s challenges, to solve problems, and to rely on their own instincts can all help people build resilience. As the focus shifts to the community level, the apparent nucleus of disaster management, there is an apparent need to streamline efforts in the face of an openended list of possible emergencies, disasters, and catastrophes, of which a radiological attack is just one. These can include infrastructure disruption (power, water, gas, transport, telecommunications); natural calamities (earthquake, flooding, tsunami); extreme weather events (heat waves, cold waves, drought); chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear events; public health threats (HIV/AIDS, TB, avian flu, footand-mouth disease); and various impacts of climate change. The model of the “all hazards” approach is increasingly accepted worldwide and emphasizes some commonality among these events. The model integrates the three general categories: natural disasters, human-caused accidents (unintentional), and human-caused events (intentional, e.g., terrorism). Our emerging vulnerabilities (increased density of the population close to industrial facilities, human settlements on lowlands susceptible to flooding, increasing population of elderly people, growing dependence of all age groups on medication, etc.) tend to blur the dividing lines between these categories. The upshot: despite the obvious and important differences among these three categories, disasters require certain measures in common at the community level throughout the preparedness, emergency response, and post-disaster periods. The rationale behind this move from the past, agent-specific approach to the generic approach is that there are more individual and organizational behavioral similarities than differences across all disasters. Including radiological terrorism in this aggregate model yields several important benefits. One of them, perhaps most important for this paper, is placing radiation and the associated fears on the same level as other life-threatening, but more easily intelligible risks. Also, this option would be more cost-efficient in terms of time, effort, money, and other resources because it would mobilize a wider range of disaster planning groups and create a more powerful single constituency for the process. This would demystify radiological terrorist weapons, reduce the stress, and, in the bargain,

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prepare the public physically and psychologically to take up its share of the disaster relief effort.

Conclusion Compared to other types of conventional and unconventional terrorism, acts of radiological terrorism represent perhaps the most effective, readily-available tool terrorist groups can use to cause panic, disrupt vital societal institutions, and inflict psychological damage on the public, both in the immediate vicinity where they take place and well beyond. In all likelihood, the psychological effects of radiological terrorism would dwarf those created by other potential terrorist weaponry—including chemical and biological devices—because of radiophobia, prevailing misconceptions, and the other factors. While terrorist actions such as attacks on chemical and biological production and research facilities could easily claim a higher human toll than radiological attacks, they fit familiar patterns, and thus would not give rise to the same psychological traumas or require special help. Chemical substances, including highly toxic ones, are an everyday part of our households; pharmaceuticals and other substances help us combat dangerous diseases and pandemics, including the yet-to-arrive bird flu. Radioactive substances have no such offsetting benefits in the public mind. Indeed, terrorists covet radiological weapons precisely because of their resemblance to nuclear weapons. Thus radiological terrorism is an awesome and destabilizing weapon for terrorists intent on intimidating and coercing citizens and their governments. The major question is how soon terrorist groups will decide to cross the conventional threshold of conventional terrorism and carry out unconventional acts such as those involving radiological devices. Harvard University professor Graham Allison calls this a great puzzle and believes we should all be very thankful it has not happened already.71 Similarly, the Department of State’s April 2006 issue of Country Reports on Terrorism warms gloomily that we “will probably go through several more cycles of action/reaction” before the outcome of the global counterterrorist campaign “is no longer in doubt.”72 Could a dirty bomb be smuggled into the United States? Probably so. Two teams of government investigators using fake documents were able to enter the United States in December 2005 with enough radioactive sources to make two dirty bombs. According to a Government Accountability Office report, the investigators purchased a “small quantity” of radioactive materials from a commercial source and brought it through checkpoints on the northern and southern borders.73 Numerous attempts have been made to estimate the overall damage likely to result from different types of terrorism. The American Academy of Actuaries, for example, estimated potential insured losses from a medium-sized radiological attack on Washington, DC at $106.6 billion. An attack on San Francisco of similar magnitude would result in losses of $92.2 billion. The Academy’s estimates factored in 71 Marvin Olasky, “Nuke Nightmare,” World Magazine, February 25, 2006, . 72 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, April 2006), p. 15. 73 U.S. Government Accountability Office, “Border Security: Investigators Successfully Transported Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation’s Borders at Selected Locations,” GAO 06-545R, March 28, 2006.


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automobile, commercial property, residential property, workers’ compensation, general liability, and group life insurance. 74 What remains elusive and poorly understood is “indirect damage,” the category into which most psychological traumas and disorders would fall. Many such ailments will remain undiagnosed, untreated, and ignored, possibly leading to serious physiological dysfunctions, failed professional careers, broken families, and low educational standards. The mental health of survivors is as important as their physical well-being. It is heartening that UN Secretary General Kofi Annan made comprehensive care for victims of terrorism a priority in his recent (April 2006) report on global counterterrorist strategy. The report urged governments to put systems in place to assist victims of terrorism and to do everything possible to facilitate their transition back to dignified, fruitful lives.75 Industrial countries and, above all, the United States must take the lead, not only by developing comprehensive victim care systems in their own countries but also by helping other countries do the same, as the UN report recommended. In this pioneering endeavor, an important coordinating role belongs to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the World Health Organization (WHO) as two global institutions which have successfully worked together on several interdisciplinary problems. The global challenge of terrorism demands a global response, as compassionate to victims as it is resolute in seeking out and defeating perpetrators. Public resilience and partnership among all stakeholders will help deny terrorists their goals.

74 President’s Working Group on Financial Markets: Terrorism Risk Insurance Analysis, American Academy of Actuaries, Washington, DC, April 21, 2006, p. 30. 75 United Nations, “Uniting Against Terrorism: Recommendations for a Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” Report of the Secretary General, A/60/825, April 27, 2006, p. 4.


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Author Index Arutyunian, R.V. Barnett, M.D. Bolshov, L.A. Durodié, B. Ferguson, C.D. Holmes, J. Khripunov, I.

25, 65 95 25 123 7 139 157

Lasker, R.D. Linge, I.I. Melikhova, E.M. Pavlovskiy, O.A. Steinhäusler, F. Weil, L.

83 65 65 25, 77 53 47


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Social and Psychological Effects of Radiological Terrorism: Volume 29 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Science ... Series: Human and Societal Dynamics)

Building Terrorism Resistant Communities: Together Against Terrorism, Volume 55 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human and Societal Dynamics ... Security, E: Human and Societal Dynamics)

Understanding and Responding to Terrorism: Volume 19 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Security Through Science)

The Media: The Terrorists' Battlefield - Volume 17 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Security Through Science Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics)

Transportation Security Against Terrorism - Volume 54 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human and Societal Dynamics

Promoting the Psych Well Being of Children Following War and Terrorism: Volume 4 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics ... Science, Human and Societal Dynamics)

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Hypermedia Seduction for Terrorist Recruiting - Volume 25 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series: Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Science for Peace and Security)

Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism, Volume 11 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Security Through Science)

Modelling Cyber Security: Approaches, Methodology, Strategies - Volume 59 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human and Societal Dynamics

Suicide as a Weapon: Volume 30 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - Human and Societal Dynamics

Complexity and Security (Nato Science for Peace and Series) (Nato Science for Peace and Series)

Psychological Responses to the New Terrorism: A NATO-Russia Dialogue (Nato Security Through Science Series E: Human Societal Dynamics)

Invisible Threats: Financial and Information Technology Crimes and National Security, Volume 10 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Security Through Science)

Science Education: Models and Networking of Student Research Training under 21 - Volume 16 NATO Security t Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Security Throught Science)

Activating Psychosocial Local Resources in Territories Affected by War and Terrorism: Volume 57 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human ... Security, E: Humans and Societal Dynamics)

Understanding Terrorism: Analysis of Sociological and Psychological Aspects (NATO Security Through Science Series. E: Human and Societal)

Countering Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series B: Physics and Biophysics)

Kondratieff Waves, Warfare and World Security: Volume 5 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Security Through Science)

The Fight Against Terrorism and Crisis Management in the Western Balkans: Volume 32 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series: Human and Societal Dynamics ... Series: Human and Societal Dynamics)

Commercial and Pre-Commercial Cell Detection Technologies for Defence against Bioterror:Technology, Market and Society (Nato Science for Peace and Security Series: Human and Societal Dynamics)

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