KANT-STUDIEN Philosophische Zeitschrift der Kant-Gesellschaft /
90. Jahrgang · Heft 4 - 1999 Unter Mitwirkung von H.E.AIIison, Boston · G.Bird, Manchester · R.Brandt, Marburg · G. G. Brittan, Bozeman/Montana · M. Caimi, Buenos Aires · W. Carl, Göttingen · D.RDryer, Toronto · K. Düsing, Köln · J. Ferrari, Dijon · H.-G. Gadamer, Heidelberg · V. Gerhardt, Berlin · N. Hinske, Trier · L. Honnefelder, Bonn · W. Kersting, Kiel · R. Klibansky, Montreal · J. Kopper, Mainz · K. Mainzer, Augsburg · R. Meerbote, Rochester · 0. O'Neill, Cambridge · E. W. Orth, Trier · E. Ortigues, Rennes · R Ricoeur, Paris · P. Rohs, Münster · G. Schrader, New Haven · J.R.Silber, Boston · B.Tuschling, Marburg · J.Vuillemin, Paris · H.Wagner, Bonn · A. W. Wood, Stanford herausgegeben von
Gerhard Funke, Manfred Baum Bernd Dörflinger, Thomas M. Seebohm w G DE
Walter de Gruyter · Berlin · New York
Herausgeber: Prof. Dr. Gerhard Funke, Viktoriastraße 5, 76646 Bruchsal; Prof. Dr. Manfred Baum, Beethovenstraße l, 42115 Wuppertal; PD Dr. Bernd Dörflinger, Friedrich-Kaiser-Str. 12, 55270 Ober-Olm; Prof. Dr. Thomas M. Seebohm, Germanenstraße 12, 53175 Bonn. Redaktion: Kant-Studien-Redaktion, Universität Mainz, Colonel-KleinmannWeg 2, 55128 Mainz. E-Mail:
[email protected] Wir bitten, Manuskripte (zwei Exemplare) und Rezensionsexemplare für die Kant-Studien an die Anschrift der Redaktion zu senden. Für nicht angeforderte Rezensionsexemplare kann die Redaktion keine Haftung übernehmen. Die Zeitschrift erscheint vierteljährlich, je 4 Hefte bilden einen Band mit einem Gesamtumfang von ca. 520 Seiten. Das Jahresabonnement kostet z. Z. DM 190,— zuzüglich Porto. The frequency of issue is quarterly. The United States subscription price is $122.00 postage extra. Periodicals postage paid at Rahway NJ.
Attention before copying: — Authorization to copy items for internal or personal use, or for the internal or personal use by specific clients is granted by Walter de Gruyter, for libraries and other users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC) Transactional Reporting Service, provided that the base fee of US $3.— per copy is paid to CCC, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. 0022-8877/99. © by Walter de Gruyter &; Co. · Berlin · New York
ISSN: 0022-8877 © Copyright 1999 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, D-10785 Berlin. All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this Journal may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any Information storage or retrieval System, without permission in writing from the publisher. Printed in Germany Typesetting and Printing: Arthur Collignon GmbH, 10785 Berlin Binding: Lüderitz & Bauer, 10963 Berlin
KANT-STUDIEN Begründet von Hans Vaihinger; neubegründet von Paul Menzer und Gottfried Martin 90. J A H R G A N G
HEFT 4
1999
Abhandlungen L. Krasnoff, Charleston/South Carolina: How Kantian is Constructivism?
385
J. Vahland, Kiel: Entzauberung. Max Weber und seine Interpreten
410
S. Marcucci, Pisa: "Moral Friendship" in Kant
434
Bibliographie M. Ruffing, Mainz:
Kant-Bibliographie 1997
442
Buchbesprechungen A. Esser: Kunst als Symbol. Die Struktur ästhetischer Reflexion in Kants Theorie des Schönen (S. Weller) 474 M. Gawlina: Das Medusenhaupt der Kritik. Die Kontroverse zwischen Immanuel Kant und Johann August Eberhard (R. Hiltscher) 477 P. Baumanns: Kants Philosophie der Erkenntnis. Durchgehender Kommentar zu den Hauptkapiteln der „Kritik der reinen Vernunft" (R. Wahsner) . . . 484 I. Kant: Qu'est-ce qu'un livre? (R. Pozzo)
489
Th. W. Adorno: Kants „Kritik der reinen Vernunft" (A. Hutter)
490
G. Löhrer: Menschliche Würde. Wissenschaftliche Geltung und metaphorische Grenze der praktischen Philosophie Kants (G. Geismann) 494 P. Kleingeld: Fortschritt und Vernunft: Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Kants (Th. M. Schmidt) 499 B. Timmermans: La resolution des problemes de Descartes a Kant (P. Kerszberg) 502 R. Pozzo: El giro kantiano (M. Vazquez Lobeiras)
504
S. Turro: Tränsito de la naturaleza a la historia en la filosofia de Kant. (D. Leserre) -
507
Mitteilungen Kants letztes Manuskript in der Berliner Staatsbibliothek
510
Kant-Stipendium für Nachwuchswissenschaftler aus Kaliningrad und St. Petersburg 512
KANT-STUDIEN Begründet von Hans Vaihinger; neubegründet von Paul Menzer und Gottfried Martin 90. J A H R G A N G
H E F T 1-4
1999
Abhandlungen V. Bryushinkin, Kaliningrad: Kant, Frege and the Problem of Psychologism
59
N. Fischer, Eichstätt: Zur Kritik der Vernunfterkenntnis bei Kant und Levinas. Die Idee des transzendentalen Ideals und das Problem der Totalität 168 M. Gammon, Stanford/California: Parerga and Pulchritudo adhaerens: A Reading of the Third Moment of the "Analytic of the Beautiful" 148 A. Grau, Berlin: "No Entity without Identity" — Schellings Identitätsbegriff im Lichte analytischen Denkens
75
D. James, Norfolk/Virginia: Suicide and Stoic Ethics in the Doctrine of Virtue
40
M. Koßler, Mainz: Der transzendentale Schein in den Paralogismen der reinen Vernunft nach der ersten Auflage der Kritik der reinen Vernunft L. Krasnoff, Charleston/South Carolina: How Kantian is Constructivism?
l 385
D. Lindstedt, Hilliard/Ohio: Kant: Progress in Universal History äs a Postulate of Practical Reason . . . 129 S. Marcucci, Pisa: "Moral Friendship" in Kant
434
K. Mosser, Daytön/Ohio: Kant and Feminism
322
U. Pardey, Bochum: Über Kants ,Widerlegung des Mendelssohnschen Beweises der Beharrlichkeit der Seele' 257 M. Savadogo, Ouagadougou/Burkina Faso: Kant et la politique · D. Sherry, Flagstaff/Arizona: Construction and Reductio Proof
306 23
J. Vahland, Kiel: Entzauberung. Max Weber und seine Interpreten
410
E.-J. Wit, Chicago: Kant and the Limits of Civil Obedience
285
Berichte und Diskussionen R. Brandt, Marburg: Immanuel Kant: „Über die Heilung des Körpers, soweit sie Sache des Philosophen ist." Und: Woran starb Moses Mendelssohn? 354 R. F. Galvin: Fort Worth/Texas: Slavery and Universalizability
191
W. Lütterfelds, Passau: Nagels „Blick von nirgendwo" — Eine aporetische Rehabilitierung der Transzendentalphilosophie? 204 P. Steinberger, Portland/Oregon: The Standard View of the Categorical Imperative
91
T. Sturm, Marburg: Zustand und Zukunft der Akademie-Ausgabe von Immanuel Kants Gesammelten Schriften 100 Bibliographie M. Ruffing, Mainz: Kant-Bibliographie 1997
442
Buchbesprechungen Th. W. Adorno: Kants „Kritik der reinen Vernunft" (A. Hutter)
490
P. Baumanns: Kants Philosophie der Erkenntnis. Durchgehender Kommentar zu den Hauptkapiteln der „Kritik der reinen Vernunft" (R. Wahsner) . . . 484 A. Brook: Kant and the Mind (M. C. Altman)
117
CD-ROM-Ausgaben Kants Gesammelte Schriften und Kant im Kontext (T. Sturm) 107 U. Eco: Kant e l'ornitorinco (R. Brandt)
232
A. Esser: Kunst als Symbol. Die Struktur ästhetischer Reflexion in Kants Theorie des Schönen 474 M. Gawlina: Das Medusenhaupt der Kritik. Die Kontroverse zwischen Immanuel Kant und Johann August Eberhard (R. Hiltscher) 477 D. M. Granja Castro (Hrsg.): Kant: de la Critica a la filosofia de la religion (J. E. Dotti) . 223 H. Hudson: Kant's Compatibilism (W. Ertl)
371
I. Kant: Schriften zur Ästhetik und Naturphilosophie. Werke III, hrsg. v. M. Frank und V. Zanetti (G. Böhme) 243
L Kant: Qu'est-ce qu'un livre? (R. Pozzo)
489
P. Kleingeld: Fortschritt und Vernunft: Zur Geschichtsphilosophie Kants (Th. M. Schmidt) 499 J. Kohnen (Hrsg.): Königsberg. Beiträge zu einem besonderen Kapitel der deutschen Geistesgeschichte (J. Fehr) 124 G. Löhrer: Menschliche Würde. Wissenschaftliche Geltung und metaphorische Grenze der praktischen Philosophie Kants (G. Geismann) 494 S. Marcucci: Kant in Europa (R. Pozzo)
128
W. Meyer: Das Kantbild Schopenhauers (J. Aul)
227
R. D. Morrison: Science, Theology and the Transcendental Horizon: Einstein, Kant and Tillich (S. Palmquist) 243 R. Pester: Hermann Lotze — Wege seines Denkens und Forschens (H.-M. Gerlach) 228 C. J. Posy (Hrsg.): Kant's Philosophy of Mathematics (R. Noske)
252
R. Pozzo: El giro kantiano (M. Vazquez Lobeiras)
504
E. Scribano: L'esistenza di Dio. Storia della prova ontologica da Descartes a Kant (R. Pozzo) 126 S. M. Shell: The Embodiment of Reason: Kant on Spirit, Generation and Community (P. Rossi) 114 C. M. Stadier: Transzendentale Deduktion zwischen Theorie und Praxis. Vorüberlegungen zu einer Staatstheorie nach Kant (A. Riebel) 110 B. Timmermans: La resolution des problemes de Descartes a Kant (P. Kerszberg) 502 G. Tonelli: Kant's Critique of Pure Reason within the Tradition of Modern Logic (M. Kuehn) 238 S. Turro: Transito de la naturaleza a la historia en la filosofia de Kant. (D. Leserre) 507 ? Literaturhinweise
367
Mitteilungen Mitgliederversammlung der Kant-Gesellschaft 1999
255
IX. Internationaler Kant-Kongreß
255
Anmeldung zum IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongreß
256
Kants letztes Manuskript in der Berliner Staatsbibliothek
510
Kant-Stipendium für Nachwuchswissenschaftler aus Kaliningrad und St. Petersburg *
Nietzsche Briefwechsel Kritische Gesamtausgabe BEGRÜNDET UND HERAUSGEGEBEN VON GIORGIO COLLI UND MAZZINO MONTINARI WEITERGEFÜHRT VON NORBERT MILLER UND ANNEMARIE PIEPER
Abteilung II, Band 7/1: Nachbericht zur II. Abteilung Briefe von und an Friedrich Nietzsche ApriM869-Mai1872 HERAUSGEGEBEN VON NORBERT MILLER UND ANNEMARIE PIEPER BEARBEITET VON RENATE MÜLLER-BUCK 1998. 22 15 cm. X, 678 Seiten. Leinen. DM 298-/5S 2175,-/sFr 265Serienpreis DM 260,-/öS 1898,-/sFr 231• ISBN 3-11-015182-0 Dieser Nachberichtsband enthält auch bisher noch unveröffentlichte Briefwechsel aus den Jahren 1869-1872. Im Kommentar wird aus Briefen über Nietzsche, Lebenserinnerungen von Zeitgenossen, Nietzsches Semesterberichten und sonstigen biographisch relevanten Quellen ausfuhrlich zitiert. Der nächste Nachbericht wird Ende 1999 publiziert. Das kommentierte Briefpartnerverzeichnis, Bibliographie und Register erscheinen in einem späteren Band. Preisänderungen vorbehalten
Nietzsche-Studien
Internationales Jahrbuch für die Nietzsche-Forschung Begründet von Mazzino Montinari, Wolfgang Müller-Lauter und Heinz Wenzel Herausgegeben von Günter Abel, Jörg Salaquarda (t) und Josef Simon
Bd. 27(1998) 1999. 24 17 cm. XIV, 630 Seiten. Leinen. DM 348,-/EUR 177,93/öS 2540,-/sFr 310,• ISBN 3-11-015686-5
*,v&~vfc-.ijL03
"*&·'·"" •iT'.T·"0·^^?
\ I t
j l \
Aus dem Inhalt/From the Content Beiträge: I. Beiträge zu Ehren von Ernst Behler. E. Behler, Nietzsches Studium der griechischen Rhetorik nach der KGW · P. Heller, Why translate all of Nietzsche? · J. Le Rider, Ernst Behler und die französischsprachige Kultur · A. Venturelli, Das Grablied. Zur Entwicklung des jungen Nietzsche · W. Müller-Lauter, Nietzsche und Heidegger als nihilistische Denker. Zu Gianni Vattimos 'postmodernistischer' Deutung. II. G. Visser, Der unendlich kleine Augenblick · D. L. Couprie, "Hätte die Welt ein Ziel, [...] so wäre es [...] mit allem Werden längst zu Ende". Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte einer Argumentation · D. Otto, (Kon-) Figurationen der Philosophie. Eine metaphorologische Lektüre von Nietzsches Darstellungen der vorplatonischen Philosophen · J. I. Porter, Unconscious Agency in Nietzsche · Chr. Niemeyer, "Nichts ist wahr, alles ist erlaubt." Die Wahrheitstheorie Nietzsches in ihrer Bedeutung für seine späte Bildungsphilosophie · M. Planckh, Scham als Thema im Denken Friedrich Nietzsches. III. H. J. Perez Lopez, Shakespeare jenseits des Dramas. Zur frühen Shakespeare-Rezeption Nietzsches (1869 - 1872) · M. Riedel, Nietzsches Gedicht Sils-Mar'm. Entstehungsgeschichte und Deutung · R. W. Müller Farguell, Vorreden der Zukunft. Nietzsches Rhetorik einer kommenden Philosophie · Th. H. Brobjer, The Absence of Political Ideals in Nietzsche's Writings. The Gase of the Laws of Manu and the Associated Gäste-Society · M. Kornberger, Zur Genealogie des "Ecce homo". TV. L. Markotic, Transformative Consequences. Lou Andreas-Salome's Interpretation of Nietzsches Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence · J. Le Rider, Nietzsche und Frankreich: Der Meinungswandel Elisabeth FörsterNietzsches und Henri Lichtenbergers · Th. Gutmann, Nietzsches "Wille zur Macht" im Werk Michel Foucaults · D. Schoeller-Reisch, Die Demut Zarathustras. Ein Versuch zu Nietzsche mit Meister Eckhart. Miszellen: H. G. Hödl, Der alte Ortlepp war es übrigens nicht... Philologie für Spurenleser · Th. H. Brobjer, An Undiscovered Short Published Autobiographical Presentation by Nietzsche from 1872. Diskussionen:}. T. Wilcox, That Exegesis of an Aphorism in Genealogy III: Reflections on the Scholarship · G. Gödde, Eine neue Interpretation von Freuds Verhältnis zu Nietzsche · M. Deppermann, Nietzsche in der Sowjetunion. "Den begrabenen Nietzsche ausgraben". Berichte: H. Treiber, Nachträge zu Paul Ree · Th. Pfeiffer, Nietzsche in Nizza · W. Stephan, Der Zugriff der sowjetischen MilitärAdministration auf Nietzsches Nachlaß 1946 und seine Retter. Preisänderung vorbehalten
Anschriften der Verfasser Dr. Manfred Gawlina, Institut für Philosophie, Universität München, GeschwisterScholl-Platz l, D-80539 München Prof. Dr. Georg Geismann, Dorsoduro, 671 (C. po S. Vio), 30123 Venezia, Italien Priv. Doz. Dr. Reinhard Hiltscher, Philosophisches Institut der Technischen Universität Dresden, Mommsenstr. 13, D-01062 Dresden Dr. Axel Hutter, Institut für Philosophie/Hegel-Archiv, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, D-44780 Bochum Prof. Pierre Kerszberg, Department of Philosophy, The Penn State University, 240 Sparks Building, University Park, PA 16802-5201, U.S.A. Prof. Larry Krasnoff, Philosophy Department, College of Charleston, Charleston SC 29424, U.S.A. Dr. Daniel Leserre, Aisina 2028 6° I, 1090 Buenos Aires, Argentinien Prof. Silvestro Marcucci, Studi Kantiani, Dip. di Filosofia, Universita degli Studi di Pisa, Piazza Toricelli 2, 56100 Pisa, Italien Prof. Dr. Riccardo Pozzo, School of Philosophy, Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C. 20064, U.S.A. Margit Ruffing, M. A., Lilienstr. 6, D-65207 Wiesbaden Dr. Thomas M. Schmidt, Institut für Philosophie und Geschichtswissenschaften, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, Dantestr. 4—6, D-60054 Frankfurt Dr. Joachim Vahland, Beseler Allee 37, D-24105 Kiel Dr. Maria Jesus Vazques Lobeiraz, Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, Facultade de Humanidades, Campus Universitario, 72002 Lugo, Spanien Prof. Dr. Renate Wahsner, MPI für Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Wilhelmstr. 44, D-10117 Berlin Silke Weller, Faust-von-Strombergstr. 41, D-91056 Erlangen
Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert Herausgegeben von Jan A. Aertsen und Andreas Speer 1999. 24 X 17 cm. Ca. 672 Seiten: Leinen. ISBN 3-11-016608-9 (Miscellanea Medieavalia 27) Das 13. Jahrhundert steht häufig stellvertretend für das Mittelalter überhaupt. Der vorliegende Band will neue Perspektiven zur Erforschung dieses Jahrhunderts aufzeigen. Schwerpunkte des Bandes sind Fragen aus dem Bereich der theoretischen und praktischen Philosophie, der Theologie, der Institutionengeschichte, Problemstellungen aus Literatur, Kunst, Bildung und Erziehung sowie das Aufeinandertreffen der Kulturwelten. Jan A. Aertsen ist Direktor des Thomas-Instituts der Universität zu Köln und Ordinarius für Philosophie, Andreas Speer ist Professor für Philosophie an der Universität zu Köln. Preisänderung vorbehalten
Walter de Gruyter
W DE
G
Berlin · New York
FRIEDRICH DANIEL ERNST SCHLEIERMACHER
Kritische Gesamtausgabe Zweite Abteilung (Vorlesungen)
Band 8: Vorlesungen über die Lehre vom Staat Herausgegeben von Walter Jaeschke 1998. 24 16 cm. LXIII, 968 Seiten. Leinen. DM 458-/öS 3343,-/sFr 408,-/approx. US$ 269.00
•ISBN3-11-015644-X Ans dem Inhalt: Erster Teil: Manuskripte Schleiermachers · Frühe'Aphorismen · Fragmente zur Politik · Die Lehre vom Staat 1829-1833 · Notizen zum Kolleg 1822 Zweiter Teil: Vorlesungsnachschriften · Kolleg 1817 (Nachschrift Varnhagen) - Kolleg 1817/18 (Nachschrift Goetsch) - Kolleg 1829 (Nachschrift Heß und Willich) - Kolleg 1833 (Nachschrift Waitz). From the Contents: Part One: Manuscripts of Schleiermacher - Early aphorisms · Fragments on politics - Doctrine ofthe state, 1829-1833 · Notes on the course of lectures, 1822. Part Two: Transcripts of lectures · 1817 course of lectures (Varnhagen transcript) - 1817/1818 course of lectures (Goetsch transcript) · 1829 course of lectures (Heß and Willich transcript) - 1833 course of lectures (Waitz transcript). Prof. Dr. Walter Jaeschke ist wissenschaftlicher Angestellter der BerlinBrandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Preisänderung vorbehalten
How Kantian is Constructivism? by Larry Krasnoff, Charleston/South Carolina
Constructivism is said to be a new possibility in ethical and political theory, a possibility that is said to have its origins in Kant's practical philosophy. l But since John Rawls introduced the term in his 1980 Dewey Lectures, there has been little agreement about vvhat "constructivism" even means. If it is exemplified by Rawls' theory of justice, what features of that theory make it constructivist? Is "constructivist" simply a synonym for "Kantian," or is constructivism a particular, and particularly controversial, Interpretation of Kant's practical philosophy? In what sense, if any, was Kant a constructivist? Most of the discussions of constructivism in the secondary literature begin by regretting that neither Rawls nor anyone eise has provided clear answers to these questions.2 The present paper seeks to remedy this lack, but I must caution at the outset that decisive answers are almost certainly unavailable here. Providing them would require stipulating which of the many competing senses of constructivism should count äs a definition. Since this sort of stipulation could have little effect, I propose instead simply to sort out the literature on constructivism for some possible definitions. What will emerge is not what constructivism must mean, but some more coherent pictures of what it might mean. Having sketched these pictures, we can then turn to the question of whether Kant should count äs a constructivist. The paper has six sections. In the first two, I suggest that constructivism has been understood in two important ways. On the first construal, constructivism is 1
2
John Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980), pp. 515—575 (hereafter simply KC). Lecture III of Political Liheralism (Columbia University Press, 1993; hereafter PL) is a revised version of the Dewey Lectures. In this paper I discuss only constructivism in moral and political theory, avoiding any discussion of constructivism in mathematics. Rawls has generally resisted connecting the two, but PL does attempt a very brief discussion; see pp. 102—103. None of the other accounts of moral and political constructivism that I will be discussing here even mentions constructivism in mathematics. Sometimes constructivism is used to describe what is more commonly called "social constructionism": the view that scientific, ethical or other beliefs are the products of socialization rather than any sort of reasoning. This idea does have some relation to the ideas that I will be discussing, and I try to suggest the connection in section II. See Brian Barry, Theories of Justice (University of California Press, 1991), p. 266, and David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 305 f. Rawls himself notes the variety of senses of constructivism in the literature in PL, pp. 90—91 n. Most of the works Rawls cites in this footnote are discussed in the present paper and its footnotes.
Kant-Studien 90. Jahrg., S. 385-409 © Walter de Gruyter 1999 ISSN 0022-8877
386
Larry Krasnoff
a type of normative theory that emphasizes a constructive "procedure" like the original position. On the second construal, however, constructivism is a view about how normative theories are to be justified, a claim that such justification is ultimately practical rather than theoretical. Only the first conception of constructivism has been fully endorsed by Rawls himself, though his theory does seem to imply the second conception äs well. In the third section of the paper, I note the ways in which both conceptions have been taken to imply alternatives to moral realism, despite Rawls' warnings against this. In the fourth section, I try to show that these conceptions of constructivism (and of its meta-ethical consequences) are distinct, though they may be related under a kind of publicity condition that Rawls does in fact accept. Finally, in the last two sections of the paper, I suggest that Kant's moral and political theories correspond to the two conceptions of constructivism in only a weak way, because Kant accepts Rawls' publicity condition in only a weak way. In all of this I will emphasize clarification over positive argumentation. Though my own views will occasionally and necessarily emerge, my aim here is not to argue for or against any version of constructivism, but simply to explain what such arguments are likely to be about. This is a modest goal, perhaps, but it is also one that has yet to be reached in the literature.
In the Dewey Lectures Rawls comes closest to a definition when he writes that constructivism "specifies a particular conception of the person äs an element in a reasonable procedure of construction, the outcome of which determines the content of the cfirst principles of justice.' "3 Three features of this claim seem crucial. First, there is the emphasis on a Substantive conception of the person. Rawls repeatedly contrasts constructivism with rational intuitionism, a view he attributes to such diverse figures äs Plato, Leibniz, Sidgwick and G. E. Moore.4 This view, says Rawls, requires only a sparse view of the person äs knower; a rational intuitionist holds that we can have access to an objective moral order that exists independently of any view about human agency or about the social role of morality. In other words, no specifically moral or practical interests are built into the rational intuitionist's conception of the person. On this view, we are able to approach morality and apprehend its truths from the outside, äs detached observers. By contrast, constructivism requires that we specify a thick, practical conception of the person äs an agent, laden with practical interests and goals. For instance, Rawls' own version of constructivism specifies a conception of persons äs both rational and 3 4
Rawls, KC, p. 516. See Rawls, KC, pp. 557-560; "Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy," in Eckart Förster (ed.), Kant s Transcendental Deductions (Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 95-98· and PL pp. 91-92.
How Kantian is Constructivism?
387
reasonable, äs possessing both a particular conception of the good and a sense of justice. 5 Second, there is the appeal to a particular procedure by which the specified persons "construct" moral or political principles. I take the key idea here to be that the constructive procedure must do some real work that takes us beyond the specified conception of the person. To understand this point, imagine a theory that emphasized a particular conception of the person, say, äs autonomous. One could then hold the view that morality was about promoting those conditions under which persons could develop, maintain and exercise their autonomy. Such a view, however plausible, would not be constructivist. To get to constructivism we have to specify a procedure or mechanism in which the autonomous persons themselves selected the principles or institutions that would count äs morally justified. Constructivism is thus not about promoting or realizing a conception of the person, but about using that conception, in Rawls' terms, äs an "element" of a procedure in which persons construct a moral or political doctrine. To the conception of the person there must be added a particular procedure of construction, and this procedure must take us beyond the conception of the person to the content of the theory. Finally, there is the claim that the outcome of the procedure is to be regarded äs morally justified; indeed, the claim of constructivism is that what is morally justified is just whatever is constructed in the procedure. In the Dewey Lectures Rawls overstates this point by saying, "Apart from the procedure of constructing the principles of justice, there are no moral facts."6 This is an overstatement because there are clearly moral considerations that support Rawls' conception of the person äs rational and reasonable, äs well äs his design of the original position äs a constructive procedure. It could not be that these moral facts are constructed by the original position.7 Indeed, the thought that the constructive procedure generates morally justified outcomes demands that we defend the privilege that this particular procedure enjoys. Such a defense will obviously require normative premises, but its point is precisely to defend the constructive procedure äs uniquely suited for moral or political deliberation. For Rawls, nothing should count äs a just political principle unless we could show that it would be chosen in the original position. The original position is intended äs the sole framework for public deliberation about justice. As Rawls later puts it, rather than saying that moral facts are constructed, we should say that "a constructivist procedure provides principles and precepts that specify which facts about persons, institutions, and actions, and the world generally, are relevant in moral deliberation. Those norms specify which facts are to count äs reasons."8 5
6
7 8
See especially PL, pp. 48-54.
KC, p. 519. Rawls has made this point several times since KC. See "Themes," pp. 99, 101 — 102 and PL, pp. 103-104, 109, 121-125. Rawls, "Themes," p. 101.
388
Larry Krasnoff
Putting these three ideas together, we could say that constructivism is the view that justified ethical or political principles are simply those that would be chosen or agreed to by a specified set of persons under a specified set of conditions. On this understanding, it has been suggested, constructivism can be described äs a kind of hypothetical proceduralism. 9 This is the view of constructivism that has been proposed by Brian Barry, and that Rawls seems recently to have endorsed.10 As Barry has also noted, this view tends to identify constructivism with contractarianism. None of the classical proponents of the doctrine of the social contract saw the contract äs any sort of actual agreement; all understood it äs what human beings would have agreed to if understood their Situation in the right way (i. e. if they thought of themselves in a suitably characterized state of nature). So in this sense the classical social contract theorists were all hypothetical proceduralists and hence constructivists. And Rawls' theory is constructivist in the sense that it is a version of social contract theory. One advantage of this Interpretation is that it can make sense of Rawls' Suggestion that there could be variant forms of constructivism.11 If constructivism holds that what is good or right is what would be chosen by certain persons under certain conditions, we can get different versions of constructivism if we specify different sorts of persons choosing under different conditions. Barry offers a number of familiär options: we can specify a set of isolated individuals motivated only by selfinterest (Hobbes), a set of identical individuals motivated by self-interest but situated behind a veil of ignorance (Rawls), or perhaps a set of actual individuals motivated not by self-interest but by reaching an agreement that all can accept (versions of which have been proposed by Habermas, Scanion and Barry himself).12 The question would then be which of these hypothetical procedures, if any, can capture what occurs in moral and political reasoning. One disadvantage of this Interpretation, however, is that it fails to specify any new meaning for constructivism. If constructivism is merely social contract theory l
9
See Steven Darwall, Allan Gibbard and Peter Railton, "Toward Fin de Siede Ethics: Some Trends," Philosophical Review 101 (1992), pp. 139-140. The term "hypothetical proceduralism" is theirs, but they specifically introduce it to describe Barry's understanding of constructivism (see the next footnote). 10 See Barry, Theories of Justice, pp. 264-271, especially p. 268: "Constructivism in general, I shall say, the doctrine that what would be agreed on in some specified Situation constitutes justice." Rawls' endorsement of Barry's usage comes in PL, pp. 90—91 n.; he claims that of all the writers who have discussed constructivism, only Barry and T. M. Scanion understand it in the sense that he (Rawls) does. (Scanion does not use the term "constructivism;" the essay of Scanlon's to which Rawls refers speaks only. of "contractarianism." I note the connection between contractarianism and Barry's sense of constructivism below). Rawls' footnote clearly implies that Ronald Dworkin's and David Brink's understandings of constructivism are not his; this will become important for my discussion in sections II—IV. 11 See Rawls, KC, p. 515. 12 See Barry, Theories of Justice, pp. 269—271.
How Kantian is Constructivism?
389
äs conceived not only by Rawls but also by Hobbes and Locke, what if anything is gained by introducing this nevv term? In what sense did Rawls (or at least some of his readers) think that constructivism was a new and distinct possibility in ethical and political theory? To understand this we have to turn to a second sense of constructivism, one that is distinct from hypothetical proceduralism.
Another way of capturing the distinctiveness of constructivism is to emphasize the idea that ethical truths are made, not found. This thought can be traced back beyond the Dewey Lectures to Ronald Dworkin's influential review of A Theory of Justice that appeared in 1973, an essay that may well have prompted Rawls to begin using the term "constructivism." 13 But the feature of Rawls' theory that Dworkin identifies äs "constructive" is not, äs it is for Barry, the original position. What interests Dworkin is Rawls' method of reflective equilibrium: the idea that we move back and forth between particular intuitions and general principles, discarding bits and pieces of each until we have arrived at the most coherent theory, the theory that best shows how our particular intuitions can be subsumed under general principles. For Dworkin, the method of reflective equilibrium represents a decisive break with traditional moral and political theorizing. Dworkin calls Rawls' method a "constructive" model of theorizing, and he seeks to distinguish it from the more traditional view, which he calls the "natural" model. On the natural model, our particular intuitions about justice are treated äs evidence of a more general moral truth; the task of the theorist is to find this truth. On the constructive model, by contrast, the role of the theorist is not to discover the truth about justice, but to specify the general and publicly articulable conception of justice that best coheres with our particular intuitions. Dworkin illustrates this contrast with a somewhat peculiar analogy.14 The natural model, he suggests, sees the theorist like a natural historian confronting a pile of old bones; her task is to use the evidence of the few available bones to reconstruct the entire animal äs it truly was. The constructive theorist, however, treats the available bones äs if she were a sculptor; the task is to create the most attractive animal shape she can. With this awkward analogy Dworkin places great weight on the thought that a theory of justice like Rawls' is supposed to play a practical rather than a theoretical or ex13
14
"Justice and Rights," in Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 150—205, especially pp. 159—168. This essay first appeared in the University of Chicago Law Review in 1973. Rawls' footnote in PL (pp. 90—91) notes that Dworkin was the first to describe A Theory of Justice äs "constructive," though Rawls adds that Dworkin's sense of constructivism differs from his own. Just how it differs Rawls does not say. Dworkin, "Justice and Rights," p. 160.
390
Larry Krasnoff
,
t
planatory role.15 Rather than explaining why we have the particular moral and political convictions that we have, or why we ought to have others, a constructive theory attempts to summarize our convictions in a way that can be publicly stated and understood.16 The general theory thus serves äs a public framework for moral and political justification: citizens and legislators can appeal to its logic when criticizing or defending specific policies. Such a framework thus guides public discussion and reduces the potential for social confljct. Clearly Dworkin is thinking not just of Rawls' theory of justice but also of his own theory of judicial practice. On Dworkin's view, judges are not simply observing what the law says and then reporting how it applies to the case at hand. Such a view does not, for Dworkin, capture what occurs in hard cases where judges are not obviously guided by the letter of a Statute of by the intentions of its legislators. In such cases Dworkin holds that judges should (and do) Interpret the law by formulating general moral and political principles that would best justify the particular provisions of the Statute.17 It does not matter that the Statute does not state the general principles; nor does it matter that the principles would lead to particular results that were never intended (or even that were explicitly opposed) by the authors of the Statute. The judge's role is not to discover the principles but to construct them so that the law can appear in a publicly justifiable light. 15
16 17
The analogy is awkward because it implies a contrast between truth and art that is supposed to be clear but most assuredly is not. Dworkin says that the sculptor's Job is "to carve the animal that best fits a pile of bones." Clearly the sculptor is not supposed to worry about whether the animal she creates really existed. But does this mean that she is free from the constraint of truth? She is still required to create an animal. What does this mean? Does it have to resemble an animal that does exist? In what way? Could the work be criticized because no such animal could really exist? What do we even mean by "could" here? Presumably the requirement of animality places some constraint of correspondence to reality on the sculptor. Yet is very difficult to say what the requirement entails. The best (i. e. most aesthetically satisfying) sculpture might well succeed by self-consciously refusing or mocking this truth requirement, at least in a selective way. Even if we somehow managed to resolve these issues in the aesthetic context, we would still be left with the question of whether any of this could be applied to the practical context of public justification. Dworkin's analogy is supposed to go like this: just äs the sculptor is concerned not with truth but with art, so the constructivist is concerned not with truth but with creating the best framework for public justification. But what does "the best" mean here? The simplest? The most likely to reduce social conflict? Now, or over the long term? The one that can be invoked by the largest set of citizens? Many answers are possible here, and it seems difficult to choose among them, and to see how the analogy with art helps guide this choice. For a different criticism of Dworkin's analogy, see Barry, Theories of Justice, pp. 275-282. See Dworkin, "Justice and Rights,", p. 163. This view has been defended in various guises throughout all of Dworkin's writings. Recently Dworkin has called his view "law äs integrity;" see especially Law's Empire (Harvard University Press, 1986), chapters 6 and 7. And he has even more recently argued that it implies a "moral reading" of the American constitution; see Preedom's Law (Harvard University Press, 1995).
How Kantian is Constructivism?
391
This view of judicial Interpretation again places great weight on the practical role that theory-construction can play. As Dworkin emphasizes, judicial behavior in hard cases is not dictated solely by theoretical constraints that dictate how Statutes are to be understood. Hard cases are precisely those in which the statute's meaning has run out. The judge can proceed only because she takes on the practical task of attempting to publicly justify the law. This feature of Dworkin's theory has been intensely criticized: many have argued that judges in hard cases ought to interpret Statutes extremely narrowly, thus deferring to democratically elected legislators.18 For our purposes the key point is that what is at stake in this debate is the practical role that judges should play. Against his critics, Dworkin is arguing that for the law to be understood äs authoritative, judges must Interpret it äs subsumable under a set of publicly articulable moral and political principles. If we had such a set of principles, Dworkin is suggesting, we would have achieved a Rawlsian reflective equilibrium between established legal norms and our basic moral judgments. Indeed, Dworkin's account is meant to explain why Rawls could understand reflective equilibrium äs a goal of normative theorizing. Once this equilibrium was achieved, Dworkin takes Rawls to be saying, we would have everything we needed for legal and political purposes: a shared framework for public justification. And beyond these practical purposes, there is nothing more we can ask from our theorizing. On this view, if a theory can perform the practical task of subsuming our particular convictions under a scheine of general principles, no further question of truth need arise.19 Constructivism in Dworkin's sense, then, is the thesis that the sole task of moral and political theory is to provide a public framework for justification. We could put this point in two different ways. On the one hand, we could say that Constructivism seeks to perform just this practical task, leaving the theoretical question of truth aside. This seems to be the force of Dworkin's original analogy. If the sculptor can make an attractive animal out of the bones, it does not matter whether the bones really belonged to such an animal — though the natural historian is perfectly free to investigate this further question. On this view, Constructivism is agnostic in theory, caring only about practice. But, on the pther hand, if we can so easily leave theory aside, if we hold that practice is the only relevant test, are we not committed to the claim that this test is what determines the truth of a moral or political theory? If we accept this further claim, we could say that Constructivism is the view that the truth of such a theory is determined solely by its ability to perform the practical task. On the first construal, the constructivist is neutral about questions of realism in ethics; she leaves these questions aside to pursue a practical 18
19
See most notoriously Robert Bork, The Tetnpting of America: The Political Sedttction of the Law (Macmillan, 1990). There are, of course, many questions about how we would go about interpreting Statutes "narrowly," There are, once again, many unanswered questions about what it would mean for a theory to perform this practical task. See note 15 above.
392
Larry Krasnoff