This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
vith the Achaean cavalry (69. I) and not with the Megalopolitan chalcaspides; hence he carne under the command of the Macedonian Alexander (66. 7). Cf. Plut. Phil. 6. I, 'ljv p,tv iv Tots £7T7T€Vat p,€76. TWV iaVTofJ 1roAmov TETayp,Evos o 4JtAo"TTolp,7Jv. The present incident is also recounted by Plutarch (Phil. 6), drawing on P.'s biography. Tois 11'po€O"Twa~: they were, like Alexander, Macedonian; cf. Pint. Phil. 6. 3, €rf>pa~E TOtS fJa.c:nAtKot;;. 6. auvt00V1'11S TTJV TWV tvv~wv auwrrAOK~V: Philopoemen had attacked the Spartan cavalry, thus compelling the mercenaries to relinquish their attack on the Acarnanian rear and come to the rescue. In Plutarch (Phil. 6. 3) it is the mercenaries (called zjlt>.oi), not the cavalry, whom Philopoemen attacks. 7. 'TWV 'I.A.Aup~wv Ka.l. Ma.K€0ovwv tea.t 'TWV ••• vpoa~a.wovTwv: the Macedonians are the chalcaspides, 66. 5· But if Krornayer's reconstruction is correct these troops were farther up the gorge of Kourrneki, and it was the Acarnanians who were relieved by Philopoernen's action. Perhaps the Acarnanians and Epirotes (Cretans?) 283
IL 67. 7
EVENTS IN GREECE
come under the phrase TWII af-La TOVT0£5' 7Tpoaf3aw6vTwl!, On F.'s fusion on this question see 66. ron., 67. 2 n.
COD·
68. 1-2. Doson's praise of Pkilopoemen: cf. Plut. Phil. 6. 6-7 for the same anecdote. Ferrabino (Atti Ace. Tot"ino, I9I8-19, 756 ff.) argues that Antigonus was really holding back his centre till he had defeated the Spartan forces on the wings; then he would break through to cut off the Spartan retreat. Philopoemen's move may have helped the Acarnanians a little; but the Ill:yTians were safe from the mercenary attack, and would have overwhelmed Encleidas just the same, had Philopoemen made no move. Thus fundamentally his action was a minor incident, which P. seeks to exaggerate into a major feature of the battle. Doson's praise may be authentic; he could afford playful encouragement to a young and enthusiastic leader from a city with which Macedonian relations were especially close (65. 3 n.). The signal referred to (mJv87Jf-La) is the waving of the red cloak (66. n). 3. bpwvTES ••• 'T'ns am:(pa.s: i.e. of the Illyrians and chalcasp£des. But it was probably the Acarnanians whom Eucleidas saw first (67. 2 n.); the Illyrians will have remained unseen till they reached the brow of Euas (66. ro). 5. ,.c, Tou Ka8o'ITA~aJ.!ou ~ea.t 'T'fls auvTO.sews tliiw11a.: 'the peculiar advantage afforded by their arms and formation'; d. 3· 5 and 68. 9 for the weight of lllyrian arms. It is of the Illyrians rather than the Acarnanians that P. is thinking. 7. ~J.!EVOV ('!Tl, TWV nKpwv: this is true only of Eucleidas' extreme left; it is clear from 65. 9-10 and from Kromayer's analysis of the position (accepting the identification of Euas with Palaeogoulas) that Eucleidas' forces stretched down the shoulder of the hill to link up with the centre on the bottom slopes and the cavalry beside the river (BCH, I9IO, sr6-q). The 'steep and precipitous slope' is that into the valley of the Gorgylos (Kourmeki). 8. s~· a.uTfjs Tfjs ••• Kopu.f.fjs SLa.J.!6.xea8a.t: 'to fight along the very top of the hill'' i.e. along the ridge (cf. iii. 72· 9 for oui 'along and in front of'). 10. KPT'J!lVWST'J Kai SUaf!a'T'OV €xovTWV ••• T~V nva.xwpT'JO'LV: Sotcriades (BCH, 191o, 22: 19u, 94) argues that the southern slope of Palaeogoulas is smooth and gradual, and his photograph confirms this (BCH, 191 t, Pl. 1 facing p. 93). The correct conclusion from this is not, however, that Kromayer has sited the battle wrongly, but that F.'s description at this point has been artificially schematized to create 'balance'. Eucleidas' men retreat for a long way down a steep and precipitous slope because such was the fate they had planned for their opponents (§ 7); cf. § 8, awlf31J ••• TOvvavTlov. For similar schematization in P.'s account of the battles of Drepana and the 284
THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II.6g,6
Aegates Islands (perhaps derived in that case from Philinus) see CQ, I945. II. On Eucleidas' false tactics see Kromayer, AS, i. 236-7. 69. 1. 'ITEPL rfj~ aurwv EAEuOepia~: the Achaean slogan (42. 6). In fact, Achaean 'freedom' meant recognizing the hegemony of Doson, just as elsewhere the freedom of the Peloponnese in the fourth century is identified with the victory of Philip II (xviii. I4. 6; cf. CQ, I94J, 9 n. I, contrasting xviii. II. 4 and 6). Phylarchus naturally interpreted 'freedom' differently; cf. Iustin. xxviii. 4· z (drawing on Phylarchus), 'inter duas nobilissimas gentes bellum summis utrimque uiribus fuit, cum hi pro uetere Macedonum gloria, illi non solum pro inlibata libertate, sed etiam pro salute certarent'. 2. rov 1-'f.v L'lT'lTOV 'lTEuE"Lv 'lTATJy~vra Kmpiw refers to the formation allowing 6 ft. per man. The expression avp,fpaTTnv is also used of the interlocking of shields over the head in the Roman testudo (cf. x. I4. I2, xxviii. 11. 2); but here it clearly refers to the 3-ft. stance of the phalanx -rrvKvwats-. See Cornelius, 26-27; and on the phalanx Kromayer-Veith, Heerwesen, 1 35· XPTJO"nj.l£Vm T~ ••• Uiuilllo.T~: 'taking advantage of the peculiar formation of the double phalanx', cf. 66. 9· Paton's translation fails to distinguish the special feature of the double phalanx, which massed Io,ooo men behind a 3oo-yard line, and the normal procedure of I TTVKVWat.w6f'p{av of the Peloponnesian cities); Plut. Dem. 8 and Io (Athens); Flam. ro (Greeks); Syll. 434/S. 1. rs (decree leading to the Chremonidean War, referring to TJ5pavvo£ who subvert Tovs TE vofLovs Kai Tas 7TaTptovs JKC!.UTms 7TOALnias); Syll. 390, 1. rs (Island League honouring Ptolemy I). It was a propagandist phrase which did not necessarily imply a return to the previous constitution enjoyed before the 'tyranny'. E\1 oA(yals TJfJ-E:paLc;: cf. Plut. Cleom. 30. I, ~fLipq. TpiT[J. This more explicit version points to the use of a common source. TOUS 'IJ\A.upwus ••• -rrop8~;iv TYJV xwpav: cf. Plut. Cleom. 30· I, 7Top6f'i:u6aL T~V xdJpav V7TO TWV f3ap{3apwv. These will not be the Illyrians of Demetrius of Pharos, but rather rebellious tribes farther east, akin to their Dardanian neighbours (Fine, ]RS, 1936, 2s). There is no reason to think they were financed by Rome, as Droysen suggested (Tarn, CAH, vii. 843 n. r). 288
THE
ACHAEA~
LEAGUE; THE CLEO}fENEAN WAR II.70.5
2-3. The action of Tyche. P.'s comment here seems to be taken from Phylarchus (cf. 66. 4 n.); cf. Plut. Cleom. 27. 6, ~ TV Tbv Klv8uvov: cf. Plut. Cleom. JO. J, O.VTfj Tfj 7TEpi Triv aywvo. Kpo.vyfi. Plutarch attributes the story of Doson's rupturing a blood-vessel, encouraging his men, specifically to Phylarchus. ets atf..LOTOS 0.va.ycuy1)v Ka.l TLVO. TOLO.UT1']V 8ul.9eatv ~f..L'TI'EO'~lV: 'he took to vomiting blood and fell into the morbid condition which accompanies it.' aJp.o.Tos dva.ywy~ is a technical term for vomiting blood; d. Erasistratus in Galen, Libr. propr. (ed. Muller, Galeni scripta minora, ii. 91), I. Plutarch (Cleom. 30. 3), who here has the phrase TO awp.a. 7Tpoaa.vo.pp~[o.s, uses the words 7TAfjBos o.'tp.a.TOS' d.Yl]yaye in connexion with another version (from the rhetorical schools), that the haemorrhage was caused by Doson's shouting JJ KaM)s ~p.lpo.s after the victory. There was a persistent tradition that Doson was already consumptive; cf. Plut. Cleom. r6. 7, 30. 2. 8ta0wts is also a technical medical term; cf. 2o. 7 n. f.-LET' ob 'II'OAu ••• !J.t:TtJA>.a.~E: cf. Plut. Cleom. 30. 4, uuvTdvws ETEAnJTIJO'E. In reality Doson lived till about July (Walbank, Philip, 295-8) or even August 221 (if one follows Bickerman, Berytus, 1944, 73). During the year between his Illyrian victory and his death he appointed guardians for the new king (cf. iv. 87. 6), and sent the latter on a journey to the Peloponnese to make Aratus' acquaintance (Plut. Arat. 46. 2-3). Either now or earlier he appointed Taurion commander of his forces in the Peloponnese (iv. 6. 4). 8. T1)v ••• ~oatAElO.V U'TI'~>.t'TI'E 4>tAL'TI''TI''f T4> A"l!J."lTPfou: Philip V, son of Demetrius II (44. r-2} and the Epirote princess Phthia (Chryseis), was born in 238, and so was 17 upon his accession in 221 (d. iv. 5· 3, 24. r). Iustinus (xxviii. 4· r6, xxix. I. 2) makes him 14; but this figure may be ignored (cf. Fine, CQ, 1934, roo}. That Philip was never coregent with Doson (cf. Walbank, Philip, 19 n. 1) is now confirmed 290
THE ACHAEAN LEAGUE; THE CLEOMENEAN WAR II.71.7
by an inscription from Demetrias, containing the formula {3aatlt.£; .t1vny6vw[t] J Kat aKOVOV(T~ 1TpoeKTtBtf.vat (i.e. the 1Tpolx:()Em> is not invented by P., as Lorenz (99 n. 229) supposes). In xi. I a I-·5 P. states that i~vi originally possessed only Trpoypa; the reference here is to TrpoeKBE(TEL> of the contents of the separate books. 7. T~v Eg &.p.cf>oi:v E1TL(]'Ta.ow Ka.i 9Eav: 'a preliminary survey based on both' (Paton). Probably a hendiadys for JTfl(TTaaw ri]> 8las (Schweighaeuser). Ola corresponds to the concrete (Nap,a 'spectacle' in § 4· 8. T~V ••• Ka9oA.ov ••• ~p.cf>aaw KTA.: cf. i. I. s-6 n. 10. oaas ouSeas , •• ~v ta~ 1TEp~~Aa~E 8LaaT~p.aTL: on the magnitude and uniqueness of P.'s theme cf. i. r. 5, 4· 4, v. 31. 6, vi. 2. 3, xxxix. 8. 7· The TaTro:; appears in Thuc. i. I. 2, cf. 21. 2, and is common later (d. v. 33· r); see Dion. Hal. i. 2. 1-3; Josephus, AI, i. I-7; Herodian, i. I. 4; Lorenz, 99 n. 228. 11. TOLCLVOE TLVli. ••• T~V ecf>ooov Tf)S EST)YtlO'EWS: 'the following method of procedure in my exposition': for i!.cpooo:; in this sense cf. xxxi. 23. I. For the 14oth Olympiad cf. i. 3· r.
2. 1. TtLS ahLa.s: discussed in 6-33. 4· Laqueur's objection (220) that only the Saguntine apx~ came within the 14oth Olympiad is true but irrelevant, since P. nowhere undertakes not to go back above zzo. Hence his conclusions about an early stage of composition in which the Saguntine affair figured as an nlTla fall to the ground. 3. ci>'AL1T1Tos ••• OLC.l1ToAEp.~aa.s AtTwA.ois KTA,: cf. ii. 71. 7-10 n. for the Social War. The settlement follows the Peace of Naupactus (v. 103-5) in 217. On Philip's project for an alliance with Hannibal cf. V. IOL j-I02, I, 4. :tl.vT\oxos ••• Ka.t nToAE!-la.l:o~: cf. ii. 7I. 7-IO n. for the Fourth
Svrian War.
s: 'Po8Lo~ ••• KCI.t npovala.s ••• 1Tpos Bu~a.vT(ous: cf. iv. 38-sz. On the phrase £;> TOV II6VTov cf. iv. 44· 3--4 n. 6. Tov U1T~p TTJS 'Pw1-1alwv 1TOALTEfa.s ••• A.6yov: cf. i. I. 5, 64. 2, n8. n-r2, vi. 2. 3, x. r6. j, xxi. r3. u, xxxix. 8. 7· This account is in vi. The reconquest (ava~aaaOa.t) of Italy and Sicily was described in vli-xiv; the acquisition (1rpoaAa.f3etv) of Spain was partially effected during the Hannibalic War (d. viii. 38, ix. n, x. 2-zo, 34-40, xi. 20-33), and completed in the second century. P.'s account of the conquest of the Gauls, which had started after the Gallic Wars (ii. rS-35), but had to begin afresh after the defeat of Hannibal, has not survived. On the impetus given to Rome by her defeat of Hannibal to advance to world dominion cf. i. 3· 6, iii. 32. 7 n., v. Io4. 3, XV. 9• 2, IO. 2, 7. TTJV Ka.TnAucrw TTJ'> 'l~pwvos ••• Suva.crTEia.s: for Hieronymus' fall and the capture of Syracuse cf. vii. z-8, viii. 3-7, 37, Why P. describes 298
INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY PROPER III. 3· 6
this as occurring in a digression, Ka.Ta 1Ta.plx:{3a.utv, is not clear (Schweighaeuser). 8. Tas rrepi. TTJV A'LyurrTov -ra.pa.xus: Ptolemy IV's civil war in Upper Egypt (xiv. Iz. 4), the detailed account of which is lost. Errt S(cupkcm TTl'> ••• O.pxils: the plot to dismember Ptolemy V's dominions is discussed at xv. zo. I f. The words x:a.T' Ai'ya.tov are Niebuhr's emendation of the MSS. Ka.T' At)'V'l'I'Tov, Holleaux (Etudes, iii. jon. I; iv. I62 n. 3 BCH, 1907, III n. 2; REG, 1899, 37 n. 3} proposed x:a.Ta Ktov; for a full discussion see xv. 20. In. On the date of Philopator's death and Epiphanes' accession see xv. 25. 1-2. 3. 1. auyKe,Pa.A.a.u.>a6.f.I.EVm Ta-.wr't]v ~ .jleKr't]v yeyovevat vo11-urreov (cf. § I). The political action of P.'s contemporaries also, of course, rests upon a moral judgement. 10. ou8ets ••• 'II'AEi TU 'II'EAO.y"l xcipw TOU 1TEpmw9t}vo.L ..,.Ovov: perhaps proverbial (cf. Wunderer, i. I2J). P. reflects the normal classical attitude towards sea-travel, always dangerous and uncomfortable. OU 's E· TO.\; · E,....1tE:LpLO.~ · , • , "E\IEKO. TT)'li - Ei1TL rroi\tT€/as, TO TE Ka-\ov !((].' Td avp.rpti.pov. For the Stoic concepts of ~ at Carthage in the Third Punic War (Ziegler (RE, 'Polybios (r)', col. 1489) recalls the phrase crrJp.p.axos 'Pwp.alwv on the stele erected in P .' s honour at Megalopolis, Paus. viii. 30. 8) and xnp•aT~s in the settlement of Achaea. 30Z
INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY PROPER IlLs. r
o!ov 6.px~v 1TO~T)crajlEVOS aAATJV: this 'fresh start' applies, not to the
period after 167 (so Thommen, Hermes, 1885, 199; Susemihl, ii. 108 n. 104), but to the years of rapax~ Ka~ KiV"IJ<ns' (cf. § 13, 1nr€p 7}s-). Thus the additional years fall into two groups: (a) 168/7-c. ISI: pendant to the period of conquest; testing time for Rome, included to facilitate the judging of conqueror and conquered by contemporaries and posterity. (b) c. I5I-I45/4: rapax~ Ka~ KivYJm>; begun 'as if a new work' because of the extraordinary events and P.'s own part in them. But in practice the two are not rigidly distinguished (though xxxiv seems to act as a line of demarcation; cf. § 5· In.), for the events of the second group also serve in the passing of judgements.
5. 1. ~ 1TpoupTJjlEVTJ KivTJa~s: this chapter purports to summarize the events of the years of rapax~. just as z-3 summarize those of zzo-I68. But this fails to account for the years between I68 and the onset of the rapax~- ·when did P. regard this as beginning? Of events mentioned in this chapter the earliest is the expulsion of Ariarathes from Cappadocia (§ z) in I 58; the war between Attalus and Prusias was I56-I54, and the Celtiberian War began in 153 and lasted till I5I (§I). This would suggest that the rapax~ began in I58. But in fact P.'s scheme here is not easily reconciled with the more rigid system of his 'olympiad' chronology. There is no specific date dividing the 'pendant to the conquest' from the 'period of disturbance', but only a gradual increase in warfare as I 50 approached, and finally the culminating disasters in Carthage, Macedonia, and Greece. Hence, though P. here mentions events earlier than ISI, it seems likely that he intended the line of demarcation before the events distinguished by his own autopsy, collaboration, and direction, to be xxxiv, with its description of the oecumene. Similarly, vi served to separate the period up to Cannae from the period after, when events throughout the whole world became intertwined. Cf. Lorenz, 68 f. (who is not, however, to be followed in his conclusion that P. regarded the 'years of trouble' as a condemnation of the Roman imperium). Thus xxxiv provides a climax to vii-xxxiii, and 'insulates' them from the last books in which P. plays a more personal part. The present passage is an attempt to do two logically different things, to summarize the period I67-145, and to summarize the 'time of trouble' which is defined schematically, and with some violence to the arrangement by Olympiad years, as c. I5I-I45· 'Pwjla.'lol .•• 1rpos KEArif3lJpa.s Ka.L Oila.KKa.(ous: fragments on the Second Celtiberian War (I53-I5I) are preserved in xxxv. I-S· Ma.aa.wO.aa.v ~a.a~A£a. rwv Al~uwv: Carthage declared war on
III.s.
1
INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY PROPER
Masinissa in winter rsr/o; but the only surviving fragment on the differences between Carthage and Numidia (xxxi. 21) refers to r61. 2. 'AnaAo~ ••• Kal. npoua(a~: the war between Attalus II and Prusias II opened in rs6, and ended with Prusias' defeat in 154. Ct. xxxii. rs-r6, xxxiii. I. I-2, 12-IJ. :A.ptapci91'}~: Ariarathes V was expelled from Cappadocia in rs8 by his half-brother Orophernes, helped by Demetrius I of Syria (the son of Seleucus IV). Attalus II helped in his restoration in rs6. Cf. xxxii. ro, xxxiii. 6. 3. Al'}p-tiTpLOS: after reigning from 162 to rso, Demetrius I fell in battle against Alexander Balas, a pretender suborned by Attalus II and Ptolemy VI of Egypt (Twv CiM.wv Pam.>.€wv). Cf. xxxi. 2, u-rs (escape from Rome), xxxiii. s. r8. 8 f. For the hysteron proteron of TOV Pu5v Kat Tfj to avoid hiatus cf. ii. 2. 2 n. 4. a1TOKaTEO"TT)O"av ••• TOU~ "EAAT)Va~: the remnants of the thousand Achaeans, who were kept in Italy without trial after Pydna (xxx. 13. 6 ff., xxxi. 23. s), were allowed to return home in rsr (xxxv. 6). 5. Kapx11ooviot~: for the Third Punic War (149-146) see xxxvi. r-g, r6, xxxviii. 7-8, 19-22. 6. ot~ KaTaAAT)Aa: 'simultaneously' (cf. 32. 5, Td> KaTa.M~>.ov> Twv -rrpa[Ewv, 'contemporary events'), not, as Paton, 'close upon this'. The list of events in the era of Tapax~ does not follow a strictly chronological order. The Macedonian revolt under Andriscus was in 149/8; cf. xxxvi. 9-ro, 17. Trouble arose between Sparta and Achaea in rso, and in winter 149/8 the Senate authorized the independence of Sparta, which led to the outbreak of war between Achaea and Sparta, and so to the Achaean \Var with Rome; cf. xxxviii. r-6, 9-18, xxxix. r-6. all-a Ti]v apxf)v Ka~ TO TEAO~: for disaster was swift; cf. xxxviii. r8. 12, El flTJ Tax€w cf. i. r. 2, vi. 6. 7 n. 7-8. It is uncertain whether this paragraph is part of the first draft or of the additional material; the reference to long life is perhaps more likely to come from an older man, but not necessarily so. 8. 1TE1TE1a1-1-m !-LEv ycl.p, ••• : 'yet I am sure .. .' ; for this sense of yap, 'yet, jreilich' (ct. Stahl, Rh. Mus., 1902, r ff.), see Aristoph. Ran. 262, TOVrt;J yctp ov vtK~achwv TdS KelT' i6..vvt{3nv rrprtSElS: who are these historians of Hannibal who make the siege of Saguntum the first, and the crossing of the Ebro the second, cause of the war? Chiefly Silenus (cf. i. 3· 2 n.}, in the opinion of Hesselbarth (r3); but Arnold (Oorzaak, r8) suggests they are Chaereas and Sosylus (cf. i. 3· 2 n.), and perhaps Cato (to whom he mistakenly sees a reference in 20. I f.). However, pro-Carthaginian writers like Chaereas and Sosylus (cf. 2o. 5) will scarcely have given so anti-Barcine a version of the causes of the war; and P. is more likely to be thinking of the second-century senatorial historians at Rome (d. Tii.ubler, Vorgesch. 84, 86-87; Gelzer, Hermes, 1933, 159; McDonald, CR, 1940, 42), who concocted this version of Carthaginian responsibility, as it appears, for instance, in Zonaras (viii. 22). That Cato and Cassius Hemina had this version (Arnold's further suggestion) is possible, though it remains uncertain, and even unlikely, that the relevant books of Cato were accessible to P. before rso. Postumius Albinus may be meant, though Taubler's argument (Vorgesch. 87) that P. is hitting at his claim to write -rrpayp.anK~ [a,.opla (xxxix. 1. 4) rests on the false assumption that by this phrase P. means 'history dealing with cause and effect' (cf. i. 2. 7-8 n.; Walbank, CQ, r945. r6). In any case P. is probably referring not merely to writers on Hannibal, but also to historians who have covered the Second Punic War in the course of their work. 2. -rra.pcl. ,.Q.s auv8,t<ns: the Ebro treaty of 226 (ii. r3. 7 n.). 3 . .ipx&.s ••• nhlns: to Thucydides (i. 23. 6) ahlat, 'grievances' (and so proximate casus belli; cf. Adcock, CA. II, v. 481 n.), are distinguishable from the aA7]81iaTri.TTf -rrporpaa-,r;, 'the truest explanation' (cf. L. Pearson, TAPA, 1952, 205-23). P.'s usage is different. He uses ahta to describe such events as lead the individual to conceive a will to war; the pretext for war then given (which may or may not be genuine) is the -rrp&rpaa. The first action of the war itself (which is not necessarily fought by the person who conceived it; cf. xxii. r8. 9 ff.) is the dpxl). Clearly this is a more mechanical concept than that ofThucydides, for whom a war breaks out because of grievances, which are simply the form in which a deeper antagonism (the real cause or -rrporpaatr;) finds expression. It is, moreover, noteworthy that none of P.'s three terms covers the actual decis£ott to go to war; this, ~866
X
III. 6. 3
CAUSES A:ND PRELIMINARIES OF
an all-important stage in his sequence, is neither cause, pretext, nor beginning, but will fall in point of time between the al-rla and the -rrp6,Pafn-;;. P. draws the same distinctions in xxii. I8. 6; cf. iv. IJ. 6 for al-r{a, a.f>opf-t~, and apx~, iv. 56. I for apx~ and -rrpo.f>aut-;; ; for general emphasis on establishing causes see ii. 38. 5, iii. JI, vi. 2. 8, xi. I9 a I-J. Though he makes no reference to Thucydides' system, his silence spells criticism of it, for in 31. I2 f. he shows by reminiscence his familiarity with his predecessor. P. here regards the war as beginning with Hannibal's attack on Saguntum, not with the Roman declaration of war at Carthage; this is the Roman case (d. xv. 17. J, Scipio's accusation after Zama), and the (subsequent) reply to the clever tactics by which Hannibal forced them to take the responsibility for the formal outbreak. 4. -rl\v ~). e~civopou Sta~aow E~S -rl\v :A.a(av: his crossing of the Hellespont from Sestus to Abydus in 334, the beginning of the war against the Persian Empire of Darius Codomannus. (P. ignores the force which had been operating in Asia Minor under Parmenion since 336.) -rov Avnoxou Ka-rcirrXouv eis l:t..TJilTJTpLaOa: Antiochus III's crossing from Asia to Pteleum in Thessaly in autumn I92 (cf. Livy, xxxv. 43· I-6; below, xx. In.), an action which initiated the war with Rome. Since previous preparations were made for the crossings of both Alexander and Antiochus, these cannot, P. argues, in themselves be regarded as primary causes. 6. mn-;; together, because his immediate concern is not to distinguish between them, but to expose the cruder confusion of those who confound either of them with a totally different event, the first action of the war itself. -rrpo,Paat> is still 'pretext'; Paton's translation 'purpose' is misleading. 7. -ras rrpoKa9T)youf1€vas -rwv KpLaEwv Kat OtaXT)Ij!Ewv: 'the events which influence in advance our purposes and decisions' (Ta> -rrpoKaBTJyovf-tlvas is attracted into the gender of alTla-;;). In vi. 2. 8-10 a state's constitution is said to be the wylaTTJ alTla of success or failure in politics; that is because the constitution is the factor which above all others shapes political decisions. Paton here translates 'judgements and opinions'; but this misses the idea of 'decision to take action', present in both words and essential to P.'s argument. It is taken up in the verbs Kptval n Kat -rrpoBlaBm, 'to reach decisions and projects' (Paton). LSJ omits this sense of StJ)..TJtft>; cf., however, ii. 46. 5, iii. 89. 2, IOJ. 6, and passim. (P. does not always keep to this rigid definition of alTla; in 28. I it means 'justification', and in 28. 5 'guilt' (cf. Bung, Ion. I).) 10. T) -rwv flETa =:evowv-ros 'EXX~vwv •.• ~rrO.voSos: the march of the Io,ooo Greek mercenaries, who had gone against Artaxerxes under J06
THE IL\"!'l"NIBALIC WAR
III. 6. I3
Cyrus and Clearchus in 401, and after Cyrus' defeat and death at Cunaxa near Babylon, and the treacherous murder of Clearchus, had made their way north under the command of Xenophon, through Armenia to the Black Sea coast at Trapezus, and thence to Calchedon, which some half of them reached eventually in 4oo (Tarn, CAH, vi. 4-18). Xenophon recounted the story of the march in his Anabasis; and an absurdly exaggerated account of the achievement was given by !socrates in his Panegyricus (145-9) in 38o, and his Philippus (9o ff.) of 346, as an argument in favour of his programme of uniting Greece in a campaign against Persia. Philip will have welcomed !socrates' propaganda, but neither he nor Alexander is likely to have been directly influenced by it. However, they too must have drawn the obvious conclusions fromXenophon's exploit~the weakness of Persian infantry, and the indispensability of strong cavalry for any success in Asia. Subsequently it was natural that post hoc became propter hoc; and P. here gives an advanced version of the association of Alexander's expedition with that of the ro,ooo. Later Arrian, writing in the middle of the second century A.D., entitled his History of Alexander Anabasis in open imitation of Xenophon. By 'Asia' P. here means 'the Persian Empire'; cf. Lysias, ii. 21; Isoc. Panegyr., passim. 11. 1j Tou Ao.KE8cup.ov£wv f3o.mXEws ~y'l'la'M.ou 8~0.f3o.o-Ls: in 396 the Spartan king Agesilaus crossed to Asia with a force of 8,ooo Spartans and allies, and in 396 and 395 operated there against the satraps Tissaphernes, Pharnabazus, and Tithraustes. In the absence of a strong cavalry force and siege-train he could not do more than make a series of forays to protect the Greek towns; but P. fairly observes that 'he found no opposition of any moment'. His return was brought about by the so-called Corinthian War, which was precipitated in summer 395 by a Theban invasion of Phocis, the ally of Sparta, and soon developed into a coalition of Thebes, Athens, Corinth, and Argos against Sparta. Consequently in spring 394 the ephors recalled Agesilaus, who marched back through Macedonia and Thessaly. See Cary, CAH, vi. 40-47. Like Alexander after him, Agesilaus saw himself as a second Agamemnon re~enacting the destruction of Troy; before setting out he had tried to sacrifice at Aulis, but was driven off by the Boeotians (d. Niese, RE, 'Agesilaos (4)', cols. 796~7). But in making his expedition a 'cause' of Alexander's, P. seems again to be following !socrates, who asserted (Phitippus, 86-87) that he failed because he had not secured Greek unity, but had preferred to put his friends in charge of the cities; hence his recall Std T~v -rapax~v 'Tijv €v8ao€ (i.e. in Greece) y•yvo!LtV'ryv. F.'s remark on Agesilaus in ix. 23. 7 reveals the hostile tradition also to be found in Plutarch (Ages. 25) and Diodorus (xv. 19. 4). 13. eu9ews 11"poq.&ae\ XPWf-LEVOi [)or, 0'11"f.U0n ••• 11"0.pCI.VOf-LlO.V j cf. v. IO, 3
III. 6. 13
CAUSES AND PRELIMINARIES OF
(of Alexander), ~nafJd.s els rqv Autav fLtTE1TOp€V£7'0 rqv llepuwv aaefJ•tav f.ls -rovs "EI\i\7Jvas. a1T£6on, 'was eager', not 'it was his duty' (Paton). The idea of a national crusade against Persia recurs frequently in fourth-century Greek political thought, and it is supported by references to legend and history, to the Trojan War and the Persian invasion. Gorgias was the first to preach on the theme of homonoia and war against Persia, probably in 392 (Momigliano, Riv. fil., 1933, 478; Wilamowitz, Aristoteles und Athen, i (Berlin, 1893), 172 made it 408), shortly after the 'Homeric' expedition of Agesilaus (§ I I n.). In 388 Lysias advocated the same policy at Olympia, combining it with a campaign against Dionysius I in Sicily (his 'Oi\vfLmaK6s); and in 38o Gorgias' pupil, !socrates, produced his famous Panegyricus, in which he called on Athens and Sparta, especially Athens, to reconcile their differences, and to lead an anti-Persian crusade, which would win the wealth of Asia and avenge the King's Peace (i. 6. 2). In the years after 374 this programme was actively taken up by Jason of Pherae (lsoc. Phil. II9; Xen. Hell. vi. 1. u), who was a great admirer of Gorgias (Paus. vi. 17· 9) and a guest-friend of !socrates (Isoc. Epist. 6. 1), but it was cut short by his murder in 370. Finally, in 346 !socrates directly appealed to Philip II of Macedonia to lead the crusade, in hls Philippus, published that year. He was not alone; we hear of Delius (or Dias, Philostr. VS. i. 3· p. 485) of Ephesus giving similar counsel to both Phllip and Alexander (l'lut. Mor. nz6 n). That Philip was convinced by !socrates' pan-hellenic propaganda is unlikely; but Alexander's sacrifice at Ilium (cf. H. U. lnstinsky, Alexander der Grosse am Hellespont (Godesberg, 1949), 54 ff.; with my criticism, ]HS, rgso, 79-Br) showed that he, no less than his father, knew how to exploit it, and also that he could make a genuine response to its more romantic aspects. The 1rp6aa~s here mentioned, revenge for Xerxes' sacrilege, was part of the programme put forward at the conference of Greek states at Corinth in winter 338/7 (cf. Diod. xvi. 89. 2, 1\a{JEtv 1rap' athwv StKas {J1Tep -rijs els -rd. ifpa JlfVDfL~V7Js 1rapavoftlas) ; it does not appear in this form in !socrates, and was probably Philip's own idea (cf. Wilcken, Alexander, 47), though Plutarch (Per. q) records a similar scheme of Pericles. Wilcken also points out that the Kotvi} •lp~v7J set up at Corinth was designed to recapture the atmosphere of the years of resistance to the Persians, when a similar internal peace was in operation. 14. a.h(as ..• TJYTJTiov: viz. the anabasis of the ro,ooo and Agesilaus' invasion of Asia. These two events suggested the Macedonian expedition, and gave promise of its success; hence by leading Philip (and Alexander) to conceive the purpose of going to war, they are its 'causes', in the sense defined in § 3· The 1rp6aa~s is the progranune of avenging the wrongs of Hellas. For such a programme of action P. often uses the word 1TpoalpHttS (cf. 8. 4, 8. s, etc.). 308
THE HANNIBALIC WAR
III. 7· 7
7. 1-3. Cause of the Syrian War: here, too, P. distinguishes three events, (a) the anger of the Aetolians against Rome (3. 3-4 n.), which inspired their will to war; (b) the programme of liberating Greece, the 1rp6rpams (here undoubtedly 'pretext' in the bad sense; cf. § 3, d..\6yws Kal iftwows); (c) Antiochus' crossing into Europe, the apX1}. Here again the actual decision to invite Antiochus (with the readiness to 'do and suffer anything',§ 2) is excluded from the three categories. It is noteworthy that the Achaean historian makes the Aetolians responsible for the war, not because of their dpy?], but because they took the vital decision and carried out the subsequent action of bringing over Antiochus. He thus shows once more his superficial conception of historical causality, which would attribute the responsibility for a war to the 'unilateral' actions of one side. On the Aetolian propaganda of liberation see Livy, xxxv. 33· 8, 46. 6, 48.8 (based on P.); on Antiochus' crossing to Demetrias, 6. 4 n. 4-7. Importance of discovering causes: cf. 6. 3 n. and passages there quoted. The function of history is to give practical assistance, particularly to the statesman; cf. i. I. 2, ii. 35· 5-10, iii. 31, 118. 12, vii. n. 2 (and many passages which mention merely the utility of history without referring to the statesman, i. 4· II, ii. s6. 10-IZ, iii. 4. S7-S9. vi. 2. 8, vii. 7· 8, ix. 2, x. 21. 3, 47· 12-13, xi. 19 a 1-3, xii. 7· 3-6, zs b, 25 g, 25 i 4 ff., xv. 35· 7, 36. 3. xxxix. 8. 7). For the correction of ol rptAol'-a8oiJvn:s (§ 4, 'students of history') see i. 65. 9; cf. i. 13. 9, iii. 21. 9-10, 59· 4, vii. 7· 8, ix. z. s. xi. 19 a 2. 5. ,-[ yttp ilc!>~::Xoc; ta,-pou KTA.: P. is fond of medical comparisons, cf. xi. 25. z ff. (implied comparison between Scipio tackling a mutiny and a doctor treating an abscess), xii. z7. 8 (approval of Theopompus' comparison of statesmen, doctors, and pilots), xxix. 8. 8 (Eumenes like a bad physician), xxxiii. 17. 1-2 (Rhodians like sick men who turn from their physicians to the help of soothsayers, etc.), fg. 41, o~::i Touc; dp8ws {3ouA~::uol'-ivous 1Ttop1. TOii 1ToAil'-ou, Ka8am::p Kal TOV> lv Tats appwaTtats, 1'-TJOJv .ryTTOV TWV r!myt::VVTJ!LdTWV 1TOtt::'ia8m AOyov ~ TWV ig dpxfj> {J1ToKt::t!'-ivwv 1ra8wv. In xii. d medicine is compared to
zs
historical writing. This comparison is common to both the Socratic school and the Stoics. 6. au<J"TJ]aa.o6a.L Tac; TWY aWJ.LUTWY 9Epa.vEi.a.c;: 'to institute proper treatment for the body' rather than 'to recommend', etc. (Paton). 7. ouoEv ouTw c!>uAa.KTEov: 'there is nothing we ought to be more alive to' (Shuckburgh); for if a statesman acts in good time, he may prevent some disastrous event by remedying 'the initial impulses and decisions'. 309
III. 8.
I
CAUSES AND PRELIMINARIES OF
8. 1-9. 5. Criticism of Fabius' view on the causes of the war: on Fabius cf. i. 14. In. According toP. Fabius gave two causes for the war, (a) the outrage at Saguntum, i.e. Hannibal's seizure and sack, (b) Hasdrubal's 7TAWJ.!Egla Kai cpL>.apx!.a, which led him to govern Spain as an independent ruler (Diod. xxv. 12; App. Hisp. 4-13); so too Hannibal, who accordingly began the war \\ithout the approval of his government. P. has dealt with (a) in 6, and does not return to it. He refutes the picture of Hannibal's independence by showing the Carthaginians unwilling to surrender him in reply to the Roman ultimatum. Hasdrubal's 1TAEOJ.!Egla Kal cfo,}.,a.pxta are not specifically dealt with; but in 9· 6 P. takes the cause one step farther back by referring the war to the wrath of Hamilcar. Fabius' account calls for discussion in relation both to its origin and its truth. It seems likely that it came from the anti-Barcine party which, after the defeat, tried to lay the responsibility on Hannibal and his predecessor (DeSanctis, iii. 2. :z); cf. the behaviour of the Punic inter~ mediaries after the Hannibalic War (xv. I. 7-8, 17. 3; Livy, xxx. 16. 5--{) (Polybian), 22. 1-3.42. 12 (annalistic)). But why did Fabius accept it? Because, Gelzer argues (Hermes, 1933, 157 ff.), it was true. \Vhen the first Roman envoys went to Carthage from Spain in 220/19 {15. 12) they found the Carthaginian Senate in anti-Bardne hands and ready to disavow Hannibal. Reassured, they therefore took no steps to save Saguntum. But Hannibal's success in the siege strengthened his position {17. 7), and the Senate refused to disavow him. This version, says Gelzer, helps to explain how Rome seemed to have let down an allied state, Saguntum. The thesis is unconvincing. As Arnold (Oorzaak, 28) points out, Punic disavowal of Hannibal in 22ojrg could make no clifference to the Roman obligation to succour Saguntum; and it implies great clishonesty in P., if he hoped to refute Fabius' account of Hannibal's independent action by pointing to Punic support of Hannibal throughout the war, when (on Gelzer's theory) Fabius had recorded a change in the attitude of the Carthaginian Senate towards him between the two Roman embassies. The accusation of dishonesty is specifically made by P. Schnabel (Klio, 1926, ns~16), who here anticipated Gelzer. P., he supposes, deliberately suppressed the peaceable answer of the Carthaginian Senate because it clashed with his general picture. The version that Hannibal acted independently of the government is not supported by the annalistic traclition; this emphasizes the factional opposition to Hannibal (cf. Livy, xxi. 1o-u; App. Hisp. xo; Zon. viii. 21). and Appian even records the absurd story that he went to war to save his political supporters at home (Hann. 3), but the general impression is of a Senate giving him its support. P.'s evidence (r3. 4, ii. 36. 3 n.) points in the same direction. Equally unconvincing is Fabius' picture of an ambitious and 310
THE IIANNTBALIC WAR
III. 8. 5
power·loving Hasdrubal. Against it is the fact of the Ebro Frontier Treaty, sworn at a time when Rome was hard pressed and eager to prevent an alliance between Carthage and the Gauls (ii. 13. in.). This treaty was a concession to Carthage; but Hasdrubal's preference for a concession rather than a war is an argument against Fabius. More~ over, Hasdrubal's actions nowhere reveal a will to war; cf. 12. 4; Diod. xxv. rr. r, on ltuiipov{las ILafJ6w 1Tpa1CrtKWTipa11 o?iaa11 rijs {lias T~l1lmf£lKr£tal1, 1Tp0EKpi.V€ ~11 r:lp~V1]11TOV1TO/..€fLOl.!; Livy, XXi. 2. 5 (quoted, ii. 36. 2 n.). His pacific nature is firmly rooted in the tradition. In short, Fabius' version must be rejected. A more likely explanation of why he adopted it may be that it is to be connected with the agitation which led to Hannibal's expulsion from Carthage in 195 (Livy, xxxiii. 49· 6). In this the antiBarcine party was prominent; and their case for Hannibal's guilt would be useful propaganda in where otherwise the Roman policy towards him in 195 might have been regarded as rancorous. 8. 2. tLEYahTJV avfllhTJcp6TO. T~V SuvO.O'TE(o.v KTA.: 'having obtained a command of great importance' (or 'of vast extent'). Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 352) assumes Hasdrubal's supposed visit to Africa to have occurred immediately after he had succeeded Hamilcar, in which case 8uvauu{a is imperium, 'command' (cf. Taubler, Vorgesch. 68 n. II4) ; and Schweighaeuser translates T~v 3waaT.w, Tapaxal (§ 9) see i. 65. 2 n, 10. 1-6. Second cause: tlte unjust Roman annexation of Sardinia. This is the greatest cause(§ 4), since it contributed most towards Hamilcar's will to war. On the incident and its chronology d. i. 88. 8 n. 1. 1rpwTov ets 1rnv avyKa.TE~a.wov: 'first of all they were ready to negotiate on all points'. So Paton, correctly. Schweighaeuser and LSJ both take the meaning to be 'they were ready to consent to anything' (as in xxi. 15. n). But 'consenting to anything' would not enable the Carthaginians 'to conquer by the justice of their cause' (vtK~cr.::tv "Tots iiLKalo~s); nor would it differ from 'yielding to circumstances' (§ 3, dtaVTf;'> -rfi 1T..::p.ov) to the Carthaginians. They seek to argue the rights and wrongs (ds- miv fTIYJIKaTlf3awov), but the Romans demand a plain or 'no' (§ J, ovK &rp.::1rop.ivwv) ; 3I3
III.
10. I
CAUSES AND PRELIMINARIES OF
whereupon the Carthaginians accept the terms and so avert the threatened war. The interview thus parallels that of zr8 (d. 20. 62I. 8, 33· 1~4 (d. Taubler, Vorgesch. 23)), except that then the Carthaginians chose war. For a detailed comparison and fuller discussion see Walbank, CP, 1949, rs-r6. Ka.M'IT'Ep Ev Ta.~s 1Tpo Ta.UTT)S ~u~Ams 'ITEpl TouTwv SdiT)AWKa.!-lev: the Sardinian affair is discussed in i. 88, but nowhere in ii; hence the plural can only be explained on the assumption that P. is thinking of the two preliminary books as comprising a single block. Further, i. 88 makes no reference to the Carthaginian offer to negotiate; the immediate reaction to the Roman ultimatum is complete capitulation to the Roman terms {i. 88. 12). For a similar error in crossreferencing see 28. 4 n. 3. O'UVEXWPT)O'O.V o' daolae&v KTA.: cf. i. 88. 12. 5. O''II'OUSO.twv T(I.UTU xpi)anotlo.& 'ITC.pnaKEufi 1Tpos TOV KC.TU 'Pw ....a.lwv 'II'OAE!-Lov: a deduction by P. or his source (not Fabius); cf. 9· 6 n. 6. Third cause: Carthagt:nian success in Spain. This also contributes to the Carthaginian will to war. On the importance of Spanish manpower see ii. 13. 4 n. P.'s limited view of causation, which finds no place for mutual irritation, or a combination of causes on both sides, prevents his stressing the equally important fact that the success of the Barcas in Spain must have increased Roman suspicion. 7. TETEAEUTT)KW\l eTEa& Sk.cn 'll'poTEpov Tijs .ca.Tnpxfis n(JTou: i.e. in 229; d. ii. r. 7 n. Of the 'many proofs' of his complicity in the war neither P. nor any other source records any besides the story of Hannibal's oath.
11. 1-12. 6. Hannibal's oath. Despite the suspicions of some scholars Groag, 2o n. r; Arnold, Oorzaak, 24-25, so), there is no reason to question the authenticity of this anecdote, which goes back to a good source, Hannibal's own information to Antiochus. By what route the story reached P. is uncertain. Meltzer {ii. 399; cf. Bung, 12) thought it came through the oral traditions of the Scipionic circle; but this theory rests partly on the view that African us was a member of the Roman embassy to Antiochus (n. r), a view now discredited (DeSanctis, iv. r. 131 n. 47; Leuze, Hermes, 1923, 247-68). It is not impossible that P. had it from one of the Aetolian exiles in Italy, who had been in touch with Antiochus, such as Nicander of Trichonium (cf. Walbank, Philip, 279 n. 6); but it must soon have achieved wide circulation, and is found in the annalistic tradition (d. Livy, xxi. I, 4, xxxv. 19. 2 ff.; Nepos, Hann. 2. 4; Val. Max. ix. 3 ext. 3; App. Hann. 3; }fartiaJ, ix. 43· 9; Sil. It. i. 8r ff.; Oros. iv. 14· 3; Florus, i. 22. 2; auct. de uir. ill. 42; on the wording cf. II. 7 n.). There seems no good reason to think that P. had it through Silenus or Sosylus (so Klotz, Appians Darst-ellungen, 19). 314
THE HANNIBALIC WAR
III. 13
Assuming its genuineness, the story tells nothing, however, of Hamilcar's war plans, but only the indubitable fact that he hated Rome (Otto, HZ, 145, 1932,493; DeSanctis, Problemi, 172 ff.). Hatred, or even a resolve to be prepared for further Roman aggression, is by no means identical with a determination on war; but the story was so useful a confirmation of the Roman thesis of war-guilt that the conclusion was bound to be drawn. 11. 1. KMo.1ToAEt-L'118eis ••• TEAos ••• e~exwpl]CYE: in 195 (Livy, xxxiii. 47· 7; cf. Holleaux, REA, 1913, 1 ff.). Appian (Syr. 4; cf. Nepos, Hann. 1· 6) dates Hannibal's flight to r¢, and this is defended by DeSanctis (iv. 1. usn. 3); but Appian appears to have run together the events of 1¢ and 195· e~o.'II'EcrmAo.v 1Tpea~euTcl.s: in r93, in reply to the embassy of Menippus to Rome in 194/3. The legati were P. Sulpicius, P. Villius, and P. Aelius (Livy, xxxiv. 59· 4-8 (Polybian)); there is a full account of this embassy, based on P., in Livy, XXXV. rs. I-17. z. On Appian's inclusion of Scipio Africanus (Syr. 9) cf. n. 1-12. 6 n.; Walbank, Philip, 192 n. 1. 5. hfl 11ev ~xnv lvvea: cf. xv. 19. 3· The sources are unanimous on this figure. The year was 237 ; cf. ii. 1. 7 n. 8uovTos 5' aihou T(ii A'': probably to Balsamem (cf. Plaut. Poen. 1027) or Bee'Aad.p:rl''• the highest male deity at Carthage (De Sanctis, iii. r. 68-D9; Cumont, RE, 'Balsamem', cols. 2839-40). For the identification see Philo Bybl. (FHG, iii. 565 ff.), fg. z. 5, ToiJTov yap, ,Pr;al, 8€tJV Jv&p.t{ov p.ovov oupavofJ KVpwv, Bee'Auap.r;v KaAovvn;s, 0 Jrn~ 1Tapa g11'ElJ-11'0V Els TTJV 'PWlJ-TJV: these constant appeals are of uncertain date, but no doubt link up with conflicts inside Sagnntum between the pro-Roman and pro-Carthaginian parties (§ 7). Sagnntum was at this time allied with Rome (14. 9), perhaps since 231 (ii. 13. 3 n., IJ. 7 n. (d)); but in that case the pro-Roman elements must, since the Ebro treaty, have felt uncertain about their position and anxious to reinforce the Senate's commitments. The Senate, however, had hitherto proved reluctant to be committed (§ 2, 1TAEOJ8il o.?rrwv 1Tapa1..£~ YE 'II'OAE!-LtlCJ'ELY ~A'II'laav I(TA.: the dilatory Roman policy after Hannibal's attack on Saguntum is hardly reconcilaHe with a firm decision to fight, still less with a decision to fight in Spain from Saguntum. The real purpose of P.'s remark is to bridge the gap to the Second Illyrian War, which is here introduced as an operation to 'close the back door' before a long struggle (cf. r6. 6 rounding off the digression). 16. Causes of the Second lllyrian War. P. motivates this war as designed to secure the rear before the clash with Carthage, and this seems likely, even if the Romans were not so convinced of the inevitability of the Hannibalic War in spring 219 as he suggests (cf. rs. 12, 2o. I n.). Less convincing is the picture, common to both P. and the annalists, of an aggressive and reckless Demetrius. According to the annalistic tradition (cf. Gelzer, Hermes, I9JJ, 147 n. I) the expulsion of Demetrius (App. Ill. 8) was the sequel to an Adriatic policy which included two Roman expeditions (in 22r and zzo) to Istria, where Demetrius was said to have intrigued (cf. Zon. viii. zo; Livy, ep. zo; Eutrop. iii. 7· r; Oros. iv. IJ. I6). This allegation may well be part of an annalistic apologia for the war against him (Holleaux, 134 n. r; Badian, BSA, 1952, 84 n. 58), and deserve no credence. But when Holleaux argues further that because such an expedition must have deterred Demetrius from his outburst against Rome in 220, it is therefore apocryphal, he may be drawing the wrong conclusion (Badian, ibid.); it may well be that Demetrius' actions were less reckless and less clearly a defiance of Rome than P. would have us suppose. As Badian (op. cit. 8r ff.) points out, 220/19 was the very worst time for Demetrius to provoke the Romans. They were free of the trouble with the Gauls, and not yet involved in Spain; and Demetrius' ally, Antigonus Doson, had recently died leaving his kingdom to a boy (ii. 70. 8). On the other hand, Demetrius was perhaps an lllyrian, a member of a semi-barbarous people, and so liable to act with what would have been irresponsibility in a Greek or a Roman (Oost, 22). How far he was bound by Teuta's treaty may 324
THE SECO.ND ILLYRIAN WAR
III. I6 . .z
have been uncertain (16. 3 n.); and the reference (§ 3) to his 'sacking and destroying the Illyrian cities "Tas vTr6 'Pwf.Lalov,; "TaTTofL{vos' may be strongly coloured by the propaganda of its Roman source. But Radian (op. cit. 8r ff.) goes too far in his defence of Demetrius (cf. 16. 3 n.). The Romans only crossed over to close the back door because they feared what stood outside; and Demetrius will hardly have inspired such an action merely by installing his own supporters (who 'may well have been the pro-Roman parties' (Badian, op. cit. 85)) in the territory of the Parthini and Atintanes. Both Holleaux (r38 n. 2) and Gelzer (Hermes, 1933, 147) assume that P.'s source is Fabius; but if it is (and this view is contested by Bung, 19o-4). it is evidently contaminated both with information from a Greek source, and also with some family tradition of the Aemilii, which stresses the achievements of L. Aemilius Paullus, the grandfather of Scipio Aemilianus, to the exclusion of his colleague M. Livius Salinator (r8. 3-19. 6, 19. 12; cf. DeSanctis, iii. 2. 169-70). 2. ICilT' iKf-lvous To us 1ta1pous: a vague synchronism. Any senatorial decision following the return of the envoys from Carthage cannot be earlier than winter 220/19; but Demetrius sailed beyond Lissus into the Cyclades in summer 220 (cf. iv. r6. 6, r6. 11, 19. 7. synchronism with affairs at Cynactha). The order in which P. describes his actions might suggest that he attacked the Illyrian towns first, and that is the communis op£nio (cf. Holleaux, 134 n. 4). But the perfect infinitives TrmAe:vK€va£ and 7Turop8TJKI.vat must refer to acts earlier than those signified by the present infinitives 7ropfJefv and Ka"Ta•npbpmf1at (§ 3) ; the latter are mentioned first as weighing most with the Romans and nearest in date to 220/19 (cf. Hultsch, Die erziihlenden Zeitformen bei Polybios (Leipzig, 1891), i. rsz~3; iii. 87 (quoted by Holleaux, loc. cit.); Badian, BSA, 1952, 83 n. sz). Consequently the attack on the Roman protectorate followed the expedition in the Cyclades described in iv. 16. 6, 19. 7-8; so, correctly, BiittnerWobst, RE, Suppl.-ll. i, 'Demetrios (44 a)', coL 343· It was evidently in autumn zzo, and led to the capture of Dimale (r6. 3). Ayt~J-,;Tptov n]v tl>nplov: d. ii. 10. 8, n, 17, for his gains after the First Illyrian War. By 220 he has acquired control over the whole of the curtailed kingdom of Teuta, marrying Triteuta, the mother of Pinnes, Agron's son and heir (Dio, fg. 53); cf. ii. 4· 7 n. He may have gained confidence for an independent policy from seeing the Romans occupied until 222 with the Gallic tumzlltus; but Roman danger from Carthage is unlikely to have influenced Demetrius' calculations in early summer 220, several months before the first Roman embassy went to Saguntum (15. z). Had he in fact foreseen the Second Punic War, elementary prudence would have suggested waiting for its outbreak before challenging Rome. Cf. Ti:iubler, Vorgesch. 13; Holleaux, 133 n. r (underestimating the Celtic danger to Rome).
Ill. r6. 3
CAL:SES OF
3. 1racra.s ••• t>...rr£8a.s ev Tfi Ma.t<E8ovwv ohd'i!-: Demetrius' links with Doson probably go back to c. 225, the time of the Gallic tumultus (d. Holleaux, IJI-2). Our earliest specific evidence is for Demetrius' help at Sellasia (ii. 65. 4). The present passage is not evidence that Demetrius' moves now had the backing of Macedonia, where Philip had succeeded. TclS tea..rb. TT]v 'IA.Aup[8a. 'ITOAE~S ..• TO.TTop.Eva.s: the phrase lacks precision, for the Illyrian towns were very loosely under the protectorate of Rome (d. ii. II. s-12 n.; Holleaux,Etudes, iv. JOI n. J). The towns in question are south of Lissus in the territory of the Parthini, and may include Dimale {18. r) and the unidentified Eugenium and Bargullum (Livy, xxix. 12. 13}. Epidamnus is not mentioned, nor is there reason to suppose that Demetrius seized any other large towns in the protectorate. Appian's statement (Ill. 8} that he seized all southern Illyria including Atintania is probably a propagandist account designed to exaggerate the danger he constituted to Rome (Holleaux, 135 n. r). That P. also exaggerates is comincingly argued by Badian (BSA, 1952, 85}; but he goes too far in reducing the facts behind P.'s account to the mere installation of Demetrius' supporters in the towns (cf. 18. r). 'ITE'ITAEute~vo.L ••• '!To.pb. Tiis cruv&r\Ka.s: for this expedition, during the first part of which Demetrius was acting with Scerdila'idas (who contributed 40 lemhi to Demetrius' so) see iv. I6. 6-g, H). 7-9· The treaty (ii. Iz. 3} which forbade more than hvo Illyrian lemb£ to sail south of Lissus had been made with Teuta, not Demetrius, who was then a Roman ally. As Teuta's successor he probably inherited her obligations; but Badian (BSA, 1952, 85) argues (a) that Tenta cannot have spoken for every dynast in her kingdom, (b) that Demetrius, like Scerdila'idas, sailed with the ships of his private DtJJ'a.ar•da, not of the Illyrian kingdom. But the point is a fine one, and hardly likely to convince the Romans. At the most we can grant that Demetrius' obligations were perhaps not so clear as our Roman sources assume. 4. BEwpouvTEs O.vSouacw Tijv MaKEMvwv oit .,.vpyovs KaAovwra 11oAELs; and Livy (xliii. 2.3. 6), following P., mentions Parthinorum ... urbes.) These townships in which Demetrius now installed his party by a cmtp d'etat were evidently not within his direct control, otherwise his supporters would have been already in power; this action is the culmination of a policy of political infiltration (Badian, BSA, 195:2,86 n. 73). 8. T-i)v m)Aw: the city of Pharos, on the site of modern Starigrad (Civitavecchia), in a fertile plain at the head of a long gulf to the north-west of the island ; the identity is confirmed by inscriptions. R. L. Beaumont has argued that this site cannot be reconciled with P.'s account (]HS, 19.36, r88 n. zoo); and E. Polaschek (RE, 'Pharos (z)', col. r862) thinks that P.'s 1TOALS' suits the site of modern Hvar better than Starigrad, where there is no >..6cpos ~pup.v6s between town and harbour. Excavation may one day help to solve this problem; certainly P. was aware of only one mSAts-, and that Pharos (r9. 12). The attack on Issa recorded by Dio (fg. 5.3) may be rejected as a doublet from the liberation of Issa in the First Illyrian War (cf. ii. II. 12). 19. 5. ftvT~1Tecrav Tais am:(pats: 'fell upon their formations'. Paton, following Shuckburgh, translates 'formed their ranks and delivered ... a charge'; and this was Schweighaeuser's original interpretation. But in the note ad Joe., and in the Oxford edition, he 330
THE SECOND ILLYRIAN WAR
IlL
20. I
rendered 'in eorum manipulos irruunt'. Since the formation Ka'Ta !I'1T'dpa oiJn YEYEV7]!L€vas, d Te YEYOF<WtV, ouDEV oiJaas 7TpO!: O.lhov>) are not exclusive, but represent the alternative pleas common to legal contexts. The Carthaginian refusal to discuss the Ebro treaty implies that the Romans had brought it into discussion; and this is best explained on Hoffmann's assumption (Rh. Mus., 1951, 85) that when the embassy left Rome, news had already arrived of Hannibal's crossing of the Ebro. It is less easy to understand why the Romans raised it (and actually demanded the surrender of Hannibal) if the breach of the Ebro treaty was merely judged to be imminent (so Scullard, Rh. Mus., 1952, nz). The later Roman version, which pushed Saguntum into the centre of the picture, and eliminated the Roman delay in acting, solved its difficulties by assuming that the attack on Saguntum was itself a breach of the Ebro treaty (cf. ii. 13. 7 n. (e)); but this confusion was of later origin (zg. r). Many scholars have assumed that the Ebro treaty was not mentioned at all, as being irrelevant; but in that case the Carthaginians could not have explained their silence. (See Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 346 ff.; Hallward, C AH, viii. 29; Gelzer, Hermes, r933, 16o.) On the hypothesis accepted above, the Carthaginians refused to discuss it because it had in fact been broken by Hannibal's crossing of the Ebro. For other views see Otto, HZ, 145, 1932, 509 (d. Hesselbarth, 89; Drachmann, 14 f.; Schnabel, Klio, 1926, u6; Taeger, Phil. Woch., 1930, 353 ff.), viz. that the Carthaginians refused to discuss the Ebro treaty because it was an unwelcome limitation on their empire in Spain; Oertel, Rh. Mw;., 1932, 226-7, viz. that it was excluded from the discussion as too vague in its terms. For the view that the answers of the Carthaginians recorded here were really delivered a year earlier in nofrg see 15. IZ n. ws- ouTE YEYWTJJlGva.') KTA.: the treaty 'vas probably never ratified at Carthage; cf. ii. r3. 7 n. (b). 2. expwvTo S' E~ auTiilv 'Pw1-1a.£wv ••• 11'o.pnoely~J.a.T~: 'they followed in this a precedent of the Romans themselves' (cf. i. zo. rs) ; not (as Paton) 'they quoted a precedent, etc.' The words J.xpwVTO 3' ... yvdJ!L1J~ are a parenthesis inserted by P., which finds its full 335
III.
21. 2
THE TREATIES BETWEEN
explanation in 29. 2 f.;
brlE~ov
S.f (§ 3) then takes up the 1.dv of Tcts (§ I). On the change made in the
J.'-EV ovv 7rpo..oy{a..oylat (cf. ii. IJ. 7 n.). Cf. Taubler, 95 n. 2.
5.
ouK ovTas TOTE 'Pw~a.~wv uu~~axous:
taken up and answered in
29. 4· 1TapavEy(vwuKov ••• 1TAEovaKLS Tas uuvOT)Kas: 'they several times read aloud the terms of the treaty', not (as Paton) 'they read aloud extracts from the treaty'. The absence of a name from a treaty can only be demonstrated by reading the whole of it. From this passage Taubler (Vorgesch. 63 ff.) deduces convincingly that the list of allies on both sides was appended as an annexe to the treaty. 7. TO.UTT)S 0~ 1TapE0'1TOVOT)~EVT)S: conveniently ambiguous; cf. XV. 1. 7 (Punic admission that they had broken Tcts lt &.pxij> yEvop€var; avvii~Ka>); q. 3 (Scipio accuses the Carthaginians of enslaving the Saguntines Trapa Ta> uvv8~Ka>). Which treaty had been violated? The answer is rendered difficult by the Roman attempt to base their case on the attack on Saguntum rather than on the sounder ground of the crossing of the Ebro (d. 20. 6 n.); and as the two pretexts became increasingly confused in the polemics of the next seventy years, and falsifications were added (ii. 13. 7 n. (e)), a clear answer became increasingly hard to give. A similar ambiguity is found in the use of the same word in Hannibal's mouth in reference to Roman interference in Saguntum; see IS. 7 n. 9-10. Why P. proposes to survey all the treaties between Rome and Carthage. Since Mommsen (Rom. Chron. 320 ff.) it has been generally accepted that the Punic treaties came into prominence about I52 B.c., and were the object of lively discussion in the years before the Third Punic War (29. In.). P. admits that they had not been known long (26. 2), and Mommsen suggested that Cato drew attention to them and was indirectly responsible for P.'s knowledge of them. If so, they will have been translated and passed about in senatorial circles, and will have reached P. in this form; that they were included in Cato's Origines is improbable (Taubler, 257). On this hypothesis, P. added the details of the treaties (21. g--28. 5) to his text about ISO B.C. (d. DeSanctis, iii. 1. 204; below, 28. 4 n.), just before the publication of a substantial part of his work (I-5 n.), with a
336
ROME AND CARTHAGE
III. 22
view to enlightening a11d influencing politicians of his day, and giving to a wider public (especially Greeks; cf. von Scala, 289) information available only to a small group. 9. ots Ka.91}KEL .•. ro aa.<jl&>s El8~va.L KTA.: statesmen (elsewhere 1ToAtrwdfL"Vot, 1TpaKrLKo{, 1Tpayftar,Ko[) ; the other category are students (qnAofLa8ovvrEc;, cf. r. 6). (Strachan-Davidson, ad loc., wrongly takes the former group to be 'students and \\>Titers of history' and the latter 'the general public who are at the mercy of the historians'.) Both statesmen and students benefit from history; cf. uS. 12, vii. 7· 8 where q,,>.ofLa8ovVTE> to whom history is XPTf£1LfLWUpoc; are distinguished from the casual reader, cpLA~KooL, to whom it is merely ~Stwv; xi. 19 a. Here the distinction corresponds to the Aristotelian contrast between the 8£wpTJruaSc; and the 1ToAmKoc; {3{oc; (cf. Nic. Eth. i. 5· 1095 b 19). In his references to debates P. is probably thinking of those of the Senate in the critical years before the outbreak of the Third Punic War; the historians whose ignorance may mislead students can be exemplified by Philinus (cf. 26). 10. lwc; Eis Touc; Ka.O' ,;...,as Ka.Lpous: in effect, down to 218 B.c. The treaty after Zama is dealt with in the body of the work. 22-25. The earlier treaties. Their chronology, authenticity of text, and historical context and significance have all been widely discussed. Only a bare sketch of the problems and a suggested interpretation can be given here. (a) Chronology. P. records three treaties prior to the First Punic War, and dates the first (P.L: 22. 4-13) to the first year of the Republic, and the third (P.III: 25. 2-5) to Pyrrhus' crossing over to Italy; the second (P.II. 24. 3-13) is not dated. Further, Diodorus mentions two treaties; the first he dates to 347, but puts it under the consuls for 348 Varr. (Diod. xvi. 69. I, 1rpwrov uw81jKI.:tt JylvoVTo), the second he makes contemporary with the war with Pyrrhus (Diod. xxii. 7· 5). Livy (vii. 27. 2) records a treaty in 348, and (ix. 43· 26) states that in JOO a joedus was tertia renouatum; and somewhere in book xiii (ep. 13), under 279/8, he spoke of quarto joedus renouatum. Further, in ix. 19. 13 he speaks of Rome and Carthage being united, at the time of Alexander, foederibus uetustis, which suggests something more and something earlier than the treaty of 348; if he here understands a treaty in 509, it will have been tertio and quarto renouatum in 3o6 and 279/8. Since the time of Mommsen attempts have been made to correlate the treaties in P. and in Livy. Mommsen (Rom. Chron. 320 fi.) wished to reject P.'s date for P.I, and identify this with the Livian treaty of 348; P.Il was then dated 306 and equated with that which Livy described as tertio renouatum. Against this, Nissen (]ahrb., 1867, 321-32) accepted P.'s date for P.l and 348 for P.II, and took Livy's renewal of 3o6 to be the original of P.III 4856
z
337
III.
22
THE TREATIES BETWEEN
without the conditions of 25. 3-5. Later scholars have in the main followed one or other of these views. P.I is dated to the first year of the republic by Ed. Meyer, Altheim, Gelzer, Gsell, Strachan-Davidson, Lenschau, Last, Scullard, Sherwin-\Vhite, Beaumont, Wickert, and Scevola, and to 348 by DeSanctis, Kornemann, Taubler, Rosenberg, Kahrstedt, Cary, Hasebroek, Schachermeyr, .Meltzer, Unger, Soltau, Schur, and von Scala (bibliography below). To the writer P.'s date seems more likely to be right. For a defence of this view see H. Last, CAH, vii. 859-62. Attempts to find new and more decisive arguments by R. L. Beaumont (]RS, 1939, 74-86) and L. \Vickert (Klio, 1938, 349-64) are to some extent contradictory and cannot be adjudged successful. Detailed criticism is reserved to the commentary. (b) Text of the treaties. On P.'s probable source cf. 21. 9-10 n. In a detailed examination of the diplomatic form of the treaties Taubler (254-76) has shown that P.'s immediate source cannot have been oral; and he argues that we have the text from a written source in a fairly complete form. However, it must be remembered that (i) the originals were in Latin, and in the case of P.I, very old and difficult Latin. P. or his intermediary had to turn them into Greek and certain passages may well have been misunderstood; (ii) some parts P. only claims to summarize (e.g. 25. 2); (iii) the preliminaries are omitted; thus in 25. 6 ff. the oaths are retailed separately; (iv) in three places (23. 3, 23. 4, 24. r6) P.'s commentary implies something not included in his text. Consequently P.'s text may not be treated as anything like a verbatim record; yet it is much more than a summary (so Meltzer, i. 173 f., 520). For example, contrary to his usual practice (cf. Hultsch, Phil., 1859. 288-319; and works by Benseler, Brief, Blittner-Wobst, and Schlachter listed in Ziegler, RE, 'Polybios (r)', cols. rs71-2), P. in these documents allows himself hiatus. (c) Context and significance of the treaties. For the historical background see the detailed commentary. The first two are general treaties defining a modus vivendi between two states, of which one was mainly interested in commerce, the other primarily in her political relationship with Latium. See F. Altheim (Epochen, i. 99roo) for the significance of this distinction for the historical character of the two states. The third treaty contains a specifically political agreement relative to a common enemy, Pyrrhus. All three correspond to the relationship existing between the two states at the time of the compact. (d) Bibliography. The most important works are listed in C AH, vii (1928), 914, § 6; F. Schachermeyr, Rh. Mus., 1930, 350 n. r; and 338
ROME AND CARTHAGE
III.
22. I
F. Altheim, Epochen, i. 99 n. Ii; add R. L. Beaumont and L. Wickert (quoted under (a) above); W. Hoffmann, Rom und die griechische Welt im 4. ]ahrhundert (Phil. Suppl.-B. xxvii. r, 1935), r-r7; T. Frank, ES, i. 6-8, 35-37; E. Rupprecht, K!io, 1939, ro6--8, Maria Luisa Scevola, Athen., 1943, r22-4. The treaties are studied from the point of view of private law by M. David, .)ymbolae . .. van Oven dedicatae (Lei den, 1946), 231-so. 22. 1-3. Introduction to the first treaty. 1. Ka:ru Af!.uKtov 'louvLOv BpouTOv Kal. Map~' wv auve~1'1 Ka.lhepwOfrva.t l((l.t TO TOU Atos ~epov TOU Ka.vETwA(ou: the temple of Iuppiter Optimus Maximus (with luno and Minerva) lay on the southern summit of the Capitoline. lts foundation is ascribed almost universally to Tarquinius Priscus (Cic. de re pub. ii. 36; Livy, i. 38. 7. 55· 3; Dion. Hal. iii. 69, iv. 59, 6r; Plut. Pub/. 13; Tac. Hist. iii. 72), and its dedication to M. Horatius. Livy (ii. 8, vii. 3) and Plutarch (Publ. 14) agree ·with P. in ascribing its dedication to the first year of the Republic; but Tacitus (Hist. iii. 72) and Dionysius (v. 35· 3) date it to Horatius' second consulship, A.P.c. 247 = 507 B.c., when Valerius was again his colleague. The discrepancy can be explained from Pliny, who records that Cn. Flavius' dedicatory inscription on the temple of Concord (304 B.C. or, omitting the dictator year of 301, 303 B.c.) dated its construction ccii£ (ccciiii MS.) annis post Capitolinam dedicatam (xxxiii. 19 f.). Reckoning back from 303 gives 507 for Horatius' dedication, which was the first year of the Republic by F.'s reckoning (see next note); but the Varronian system made 509 the first year, hence the second consulship in 507 to overcome the discrepancy of two years. This confusion, and the uncertainty whether Horatius was consul or pontifex (cf. Cic. dom. 139: VaL Max. v. ro. 1; Sen. cons. ad Afarc. 13), suggest that Horatius' dedication (d. Dion. Hal. v. 35· J, T'?v /3' rl.vdpwatv ... Ka~ T'?v ~7TL· ypa~rJl' tAaf3e Mr5.pKoS 'OpaTws) recorded neither year nor office (d. Munzer, RE, 'Horatius (15}', col. :z-to4)· Brutus is nowhere else named as a dedicator of the temple; whence Villoison proposed emending v~· J.w to i¢/ Jiv, quibus CO'nsulibus. On the later history of the temple, culminating in the fire of 6 july 83 B.c., see Hiilsen, RE, 'Capitolium (r)', col. 1532· :ep~ou ~la.fJO.aews •.• TplaKovTa. ~Teal A.et'ITOIJO'l 8ueiv: though Xerxes crossed the Hellespont in spring 480, i.e. 01.
2. np6T£pa. Tf\s
74, 4, P. speaks of his crossing 'into Greece'; and when, as in Eratosthenes or the Parian Marble, Xerxes' crossing is used to give a date, 01. 75· r, the year of Salamis, always seems to be implied (cf. Dion. HaL ix. r; Diod. xi. r; Leuze, ]ahrzahlung, I48-9). Hence the first year of the republic will be equated v.-ith 01. 68, I soS/7. Mommsen (Rom. Chron. rz8) attributes this synchronism to Fabius; d. Beloch (RG, roo) and below, vi. II a 2 n. The Varronian system put the foundation of Rome in 754/3 and the institution of the republic 244 years later in sro/9. 3. ~vta. !LOAtS eg emaTacrews OlE!Jt cf. iv. 82. 5; similar expressions at iii. 24. 6, ix. 36. 12, xi. 34· ro, xv. 8. 7, 17. 3. etc. Some scholars have taken 1rpcJ'ith Pyrrhus, and the sending of help to Rome would not in itself involve her in a state of war with him (d. Bickerman, Approaches to World Peace {cd. Bryson, New 1944), zo7 f.); P. uses the term crvfl-11-axla, 'alliance' to describe any possible pact that might be made between Carthage and Pyrrhus, or (the real issue) Rome and Pyrrhus. Such an alliance was to contain a proviso, reserving the right to send aid to Carthage (or Rome, as the case may be), if attacked (by anyone) in its own territory (d. Thuc. v. 47· 3). Again, such help would not in itself involve committing the partner sending it to a state of war with the aggressor; and in any case the clause is merely permissive, l:va i~fj {Jor/h'iv. The words 1Totdcr1Jwcrav dwpon.pot have often been taken to mean 'let them both make it in common'. The sense is rather 'let either (or both, as the case may be) make it with the stipulation that .. .'; any apparent ambiguity springs from the use of a single sentence (deliberately) to cover the eventuality of a Roman or a Punic crVfLf.l-ax{a with Pyrrhus. iva is apparently used as the equivalent of (ita . . . ) ut, in a final sense. 1 The two remaining clauses (§ 4) concern the help to be given to the Romansthe bait which led them to discontinue treating with Pyrrhus. To both is added the normal proviso (cf. Taubler, 55, z66-7) that help shall be sent only as required the party attacked, here Rome. The advantage of this treaty to both sides is well summarized by Frank (CAH, vii. 649-50). Rome got money and ships; and if Pyrrhus left for Italy, she was committed to nothing, for she need send no help to Carthage unless she wished. Mago had scotched an immediate peace, and secured the inclusion in any subsequent compact with Pyrrhus of a clause likely to intimidate him, not least by its ominous hints at a secret clause committing the Romans to action in Sicily. 'The document reveals shrewd thinking on the part of both negotiators.' 4. eto; TTJV a.pooov; 'for the return journey'' so Reiske (and independently Wachsmuth) for the MS. elJ>o8ov, probably rightly since 'attack by sea cannot be meant, as the last section expressly deals with naval battles' (Biittner-Wobst, Klio, 1903, 166); Emivo8os (Klotz) is less easy, though it is P.'s usual word for 'return'. 5. -rei OE rrA!JpWj.lO.TO. ••• nKOUO'LWt;: a proviso to the previous sentence, not a separate clause. 6-9. The oaths. That P. gives these separately is proof that he has not reproduced the complete texts above. For the Carthaginian Bw~ 1Ta1pij;ot d. vii. 9· 2-3, where they are listed. The Roman oath by Llta l.t(Jov is discussed by C. Wunderer (Phil., 1897, 189-92), Kettleship (Essays, 35 n. r), Strachan-Davidson (n-8o). Reid (]RS, 1912, 49-52). 1 This use of iea is akin to that found in P. in place of a1rws with the optative to render c·urare ul, or the i'ea used by him after uerba imperandi e/ petendi; cf. Fassbaender, Quaestiones grammaticae ad P. pertinentes (Progr. Crefeld), 6-7.
351
III. 25. 6
THE TREATIES BETWEEN
Deubner (Jahrb., r9n, 334), E. Harrison (Ridge<e'ay Studies, 92-98), H. J. Rose (]RS, 19r3, 238), Wissowa (552). An oath of great solemnity by louem lapidem is known from Cicero (jam. vii. 12, z), Gellius (i. 21. 4), and Apuleius (de deo Soc. 5); but none of these passages describes the form of such an oath. On the other hand, the ceremony described by P. is also known from Plutarch (Sull. ro. 4) and Paulus (epit. Fest., p. roz L., s.v. 'lapidem'), and can be paralleled from many places and times; cf. Homer (/l. iii. 300), woE <J (with hiatus!) 8u:lpaaw Kat T~v) ZaKavOT)S' tt77aup.€vas the full sense is evidently 'woven together in an unbroken series'. F.'s forty books 359
III. 32. z
CAUSES AND PRELIM IN ARIES OF
resemble the threads of the warp, which lie side by side, KaTrt /L£Tov, and are woven together into a piece of fabric by the weft, here symbolized by the 'universal' aspect of P.'s theme. This seems better than taking KaTa /LlTov to mean 'by a single, continuous thread' (Schweighaeuser, Paton). lnro TWV Ka:n1 nuppav KTA.: cf. i. 5· I. The words Kat Tt/Lawv ..• €6-Jy~aEw>, which vary in detail in different MSS., are rightly bracketed as a gloss in B-W2 • 3. atrO TfjS KAEOJ.lEVOU') TOU ItrapnaTOU <J>uyfjs: i.e. from 222 (cf. ii. 69. u). As in xxxix. 8. 4-5 P. omits any reference to his account of the Cleomenean War (ii. 37-70); hence the theory of Laqueur, developed by Gelzer (Hermes, 1940, 27-37), that the 'Hellenic 7TpoKaTaaKw~' was composed late and inserted into the Histories late. Against this see ii. 37-70 n. Although P. also omits from both passages all reference to the careers of Hamilcar and Hasdrubal in Spain (ii. 1. 5-9. I3. I-], 36. I-2), no one has suggested that these are also a late insertion. On the battle at the Isthmus (r46} see xxxviii. I4. 3; in the main P.'s account of it has not survived. TovTwv O'UYTa€us: cf. i. 4· 3 n. The reference is vague and includes for instance those who wrote on Philip and Perseus (viii. 8. 5, xxii. rS. 5, and§ 8 below), the Hannibal-historians, etc., not merely the second-century Roman senatorial historians (McDonald, CR, 1940, 42), of whom he is thinking mainly in 6. 2. 5. Tac; Ka-raAAtjAouo; Twv trpa€ewv: cf. v. 3r. 5· LSJ gives the meaning of KaTaAATJAo> as 'one after the other, successive'; but, as so often, the truth is in Schweighaeuser, 'i.q. avyxpovoi. P.'s criticism of 'episodic' historians is threefold: (I} they give different versions of the same events, (2} being restricted to certain fields they cannot discuss parallel events elsewhere, (3) above all, they neglect causality. If LSJ is correct, (2) and (3) are identical, since it is in the succession of events that an historian finds the basis for investigating causes. P. is, however, thinking of the occurrence of events simultaneously in different parts of the world; cf. 5· 6, ot> KaTcD..ATJAa, 'at the same time' (see note there). On the significance of synchronisms as a mark of the working of Tyche see ii. 4r. I n. 0.AAoloTepas ••• SoKlJ.laO"Ias: 'a different estimation' and, P. implies, a juster one. 6. TU T, etrlYlVOJ.lEVC!. TOl') epyols KTA.: 'the consequences of events, the concomitant circumstances, and above all their causes' ; in these three categories of past., present, and future P. subsumes the various aspects of the cause nexus as it affects each historical event. By translating Trt naperr6w;va as 'the immediate consequences' Paton misses this point. 7. The cause nexus from the First Punic War to that with A ntiochus. ToP. these events are part of a single texture. How the Sicilian War, 360
THE HANNIBALIC WAR
III. 33· 5
and its pendant, the seizure of Sardinia, led to the Hannibalic War has been analysed at iii. 6 ff. In i. 3· 6 P. explains how, having defeated Hannibal and taken the first and hardest step 1rpos: ~~~ Twv oAwv £mf3oA~v, Rome was emboldened to reach out to Greece and Asia; for, as here, he treats the wars against Philip and Antioch us as acts of Roman expansion (in fulfilment of the purpose of Tyche, cf. naaas; •.• auvvwovaas; 1rp6s; T~V aVT~V {m6fJmw), following upon the war with Hannibal, which he sometimes regards as the first step in the Roman plan for world-dominion (i. 3· 6-9), and sometimes as the event which led them to conceive it (z. 6). 8. otov TOV) n€pCTlKOV 11 TOV lAlTnl'lKOV: perhaps such writers are meant as the Strato (of uncertain date) who dealt with these wars (Diog. Laert. v. 61), or the Poseidonius mentioned by Plutarch (Aem. Paul. rg), a contemporary of Perseus, cf. § 3 n.
: Hasdrubal was the eldest of Hannibal's younger brothers (ix. 22. z). 9. Troops sent to Africa. The Thersitae are othenvise unknown, and many scholars have followed Ursinus's emendation to T apa7Jl-ra~ (ct. 24. 4); E. Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 402) says 'Tartessier oder Turdetani'; and Schulten (RE. 'Tartessos', coL 2448) attributes the form to the Punic source. The M astiani were a tribe in Andalusia, with their capital at Mastia (see above, 24. 4 n.); as well as to Avienus they are known to Theopompus (FGii, us F zoo) and Hecataeus (FGH, I F 4o-41). They are the later BaaT1)Tavol (or Bastuli) who, according to Strabo (iii. 141), live between Gades and New Carthage. The Iberian Oretes are probably the same as the Orissi (or Orissae), fighting against whom Hamilcar Barca lost his life (ii. I. 7-8 n.). The Romans knew them as Oretani, and they dwelt south of the Carpetani (14, 2 n.), according to Strabo, who says they reached the sea near the Bastetani (Strabo, iii. 152, 156), together with whom they occupied as far as l\falaca (Strabo, iii. 163). Their territory probably lay on the Anas (Guadiana) and Baetis (Guadalquivir) around Castulo, and west of the Olcades (on whom see 13. 5 n.). The capital of the Oretes lay south-west of Ciudad Real and was called "fJp1J-rov FEpp.avwv (Ptol. Geog. ii. 6. 58; cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 25, Oretani quiet Germani cognominantur). Schulten (RE, 'Oretani', cols. roi8-19) suggests that the people included settlements of Germans who came in with the Celts about 6oo; see further P. Bosch-Gimpera, P BA, 1940, 96 ff. This distinction may explain P.'s use of the adjective • IfJ7JP"-" here. 11. Ba>.tapEis 0KTaK6aun £~Sop.1}ttovTn): cf. Livy, xxi. 21. I2,jundatores Baleares octingentos septuaginta. Livy here follows P.'s figures closely, and Gronovius's restoration is certain; wo' may have dropped out before ous. For Balearic mercenaries see i. 67. 7· oi'ls ~~:vp(ws p.f:v Ka~oGat ati>EvSov..]Ta.s: 'which is the name they properly give to slingers'; cf. ii. 22. r. ~ ytip >..i6> UVTTJ (sc. ra~a&-ro~) -roii-ro (i.e. mercenaries) U7Jp.aLvn Kuplw>. P. means that the word
7rot€ta8at, BEpLV~V o' dvaroA~v ~ laTJ!L"PtV~V Katvov. The cause of P.'s confusion is not far to seek. He is known to have believed the course of the Tanais to be north-east to south-west (xxxiv. 7· 10), a view which Strabo contests (ii. 107); similarly he asserted that the Straits at the Pillars of Heracles ran due west (xxxiv. 7· 9); and it was common knowledge that the Nile ran from south to north. Thus P. has confused the direction of the course of the Straits, the Nile, and the Tanais with the supposed direction of their mouths from an ideal spectator, situated perhaps in Greece. Cf. Class. et med., 1948, I67-8.
P.'s assertion that Asia and Libya 'considered generally' (§ 6) lie to the south of the Mediterranean may seem hard to reconcile with the statement that Asia stretches round to the Tanais 'in the northeast' (§ 4). P. expanded his view in a passage discussed by Strabo (ii. Io7 = P. xxxiv. 7· 8-ro, where the 'fragment' breaks off illogically), whence it is clear that he did not forget this section of Asia lying north of the prolongation eastward of the line of the Straits of Gibraltar, but indeed used it to justify his argument that Europe was shorter than Africa and Asia combined. Here, however, his scheme is drawn in the broadest outline. 8. T6 ji-Ev oAoaxepe rfj> • • • OtTJJ'11cu:ws-. 2. Twv ~LAa.tvov ~wfiwv: d. x. 40. 7, for the same definition of the Carthaginian empire in Africa. The Altars of Philaenus (or the Philaeni) lay in the Syrtes 6 km. inland from the promontory of Ras el-Aali, at Graret Gser el-Trab; this identification was confirmed by the 1951 campaign of the Map of Roman Libya Committee (d. R. G. Goodchild, ]RS, 1951, ; BSR, 1952, 94-no). For the legend connected with the Altars see Sallust, Iugurtha, 19· For the Punic empire at this date see i. ro. 5 n. 4. liws Tfjs pa.x(a.~, 8 1Tepa.s EO'Tt .•• opwv: P.'s source evidently calculated to the famous temple of Aphrodite Pyrenaea, which lay on the frontier between Narbonensis and Spain (Strabo, iv. q8, 181; Pliny, Nat. hist. iii. 22); payJa is 'promontory' (d. Thuc. iv. IO. s). Hannibal himself probably crossed the a little way inland by the Col du Perthus (Jullian, i. 458 n. z), since he descended at Elne (Iliberris), Livy, xxi. 24. r. 6. TP~O"XLAious: 357 m.p. = 2,97 5 stades, according to Cuntz's calculations (24) based on the Antonine Itinerary. Strabo (iii. 156) gives the distance as, reputedly, 2,2oo stades, probably his account on Poseidonius (Schulten, Hermes, I9Il, s87}. [T~v S£ Ka.wijv . , . K!lAouowJ: N€a Kapx·YJM>V is not used by P. (in xxxiv. 9· 8 the expression is Strabo's); and this sentence is rightly excluded as a gloss by Bi.ittner-Wobst. Cf. ii. 13. 1 n. i1rt ... Tov "I~T)pa. "'fOTD.fiOV: from New Carthage to the Ebro is 312 m.p. 2,6oo stades (Cuntz, 25), P.'s figure; Strabo (loc. cit.) makes it 2,2oo stades.
ro
372
HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY
IlL 39· 8
'EtJ.Trop~ov: to Emporiae (Ampurias, cf. Schulten, Hermes, 1925, 66-73) from the Ebro is 197 m.p. r,6.42 stades (Cuntz, 25); P. gives 1,6oo stades, and Strabo {loc. cit.) gives the same figure for
7. Eis
the distance from the Ebro to the Trophies of Pompey (near modern La Junquera; Sall. Hist. iii, fg. 89 M.). 8. EVTeu&ev brl. TTJV TOU 'PoSa.voG s~a.~a.ow: from Emporiae {see 59 n. on the arbitrary insertion (dm) o' 'Ep.1roplou ... e~aKoa{ov a.U-ra;; ••. O€Cuopiva;;. Philipp (Klio, rgii, 348) renders 'peczJ-liarly constructed', to suit his theory; but fna.~Ep6vTw;; never means this in P. 5. pu~ou~K.ouvT~<S: cf. i. 27. 9, 28. 2, for the towing of the horsetransports at Ecnomus. Philipp (ibid.) states that the boats were in mid-stream before the platform was covered with earth; neither P. nor Livy says anything like this. 47. 1. 'l!'pofjye TOUTOlS 6.'1!'oupa.ywv: though aTTovpa.yEij,! elsewhere takes a dative of advantage (d. 49· IJ, v. 7· II, vi. 40. 7), TOVTots here seems to be instrumental; 'he advanced with these as his rear-guard' (Paton). TOvTot;; refers to both cavalry and elephants, without any indication which came last. Jullian (i. 472) w-rites: 'les fantassins d'abord, puis les cavaliers, et, a l'arriere-garde, Hannibal et les elephants'; but 45· s-6 may suggest that the cavalry came at the rear. 'ITa. pel. Tov 'IToTa.~ov KT>-..: clearly the Rhone; d. Livy, xxi. 3r. 2, 'postero die profectus aduersa ripa Rhodani mediterranea Galliae petit'. Livy adds that Hannibal did this in order to avoid a clash with the Romans before he reached Italy. P. makes Scipio allege the same (64. 7), but without committing himself to the theory (as Kahrstedt thinks, iii. 182). Probably the detour was planned from the outset with the Allobroges, who will hardly have improvised the provisioning of Hannibal's army overnight (49· ro-rz; d. Viedebantt, Hermes, I9I9, J62). On the topography see 49· s-s6. 4 n. 2-5. Direction of the Rhone. Viedebantt (Hermes, 19r9, 346 ff.) argues 380
HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY
III. 47· 6
ws
that the phrase J.rrl. 7"~11 lw (§ r) comes from a tradition which made Hannibal ascend the Durance, and that P. has erroneously transferred its direction to the Rhone; and this he regards as at the root of P.'s schematic picture of the river and the Alps, as found in ii. 14-16 (the passage referred to in § 4). But Viedebantt's Durance theory is unconvincing (cf. 49· 4 n. (r)), and it is more probable that the schematization accounts the directions given here. Since toP. the Alps run east and west (ii. 14. 6-7), the Rhone, which flows parallel with and north of the range (§ 3), might be expected to flow in a westerly direction. In§ zit is said to have its source beyond the recess of the Adriatic, 1Tpos T~v ~cl1Tepav veuovaas: this Paton translates 'north-west of the head of the Adriatic' (cf. Cardona), but vEvnv 1Tpo;; means 'to face towards'. This phrase, taken with the reference to the ai\,\a)v of § 3, which clearly runs east and west, suggests that the Rhone flowed in a westerly direction; but this is modified in § 2, pEi St 1TpOs [ nh-] ovans- XE~p.epwd.s. In this the article has been omitted since Hultsch (Quaestiones Polybianae (Zwickauer Programm, r859), r8) pointed out that P. does not normally employ it with secondary compass directions. However, it is not easy to see why it should have crept in; and there is much to be said for the hypothesis of Cuntz (62; cf. Viedebantt, Hermes, 1919, 347) that P. inserted the word XELf.LEptvas later (or perhaps added it in the margin) on the basis of fresh information, when he learnt (not necessarily as a result of his own crossing of the Alps) that the course of the Rhone was not due east and west. 3. )\p8ues K~::XTot: not otherwise knov;•rt. The Celtic word ardu means 'high', and emendation to bring in a reference to the Aedui is uncalled for. 47. 6-48. 12. Earlier accounts of Hannibal's crossing of the Alps. Which of the Hannibal-historians P. is here attacking is uncertain; but they were clearly writers in the sensational fashion which he condemns in Timaeus and Phylarchus (cf. ii. r6. I4, s6. IO-I3; CQ, 1945. 8 ££.). Wunderer (ii. u) thinks ofChaereasandSosylus (cf. 20.5 n.), and both .Meyer (Kl. Sckr. ii. 374) and Hesselbarth (36) agree; others (e.g. Arnold, Oorzaak, 23; Cornelius, 81-82; Taubler, Jlcrgesck. 84 n. r49) see a reference to Silenus of Caleacte (i. 3· 2 n., iii. r3. s-r4. 8 n.), who was a source for Coelius and retailed the famous story of Hannibal's dream (Cic. de diu. i. 49; cf. .Meyer, Kl. Sckr. ii. 368 ff.). All three authors may be in P.'s mind. On the date of this digression see 48. r2 n. 47. 6. Suo Tel '!l"6.0""1S taTopla.s aAAoTpU~TO.TO.; for P.'s stress on truth see the passages quoted in i. 14· 5 n. ; for consistency see viii. 9 (criticism of Theopompus on this score). For 1TapEtaaynv (§ 7) cf. 20.3 n.
III. 47· 8
HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY
8. Ka.Ta.aTpoTftv: an end; but also the denouement of a dramatic plot, cf. 48. 8. 9. &eo~ i] TL~ fipw~: cf. 48. 9· ijpw> corresponds to (JdiJv 7TatDa> in § 8. See further, 48. 8 n.
48. 6. Ka.9ciwep TJIJ-EL~ .•• HIT!Awo-a.IJ-EV: d. ii. 2I. 5, 22. I ff. 8. 9eou Ka.l. 1-'-T!Xa.vfj~: a deus ex machina, by hendiadys. N. S. de Witt argues plausibly that this god was Heracles (TAP A, I94I, 6o-6I); part of the propaganda promoted on the Punic side, and in Greek (and suppressed by the Romans), associated Hannibal's march with that of Heracles (d. Livy, xxi. 21. 9, 37· 2). 1Tfimv is of course an exaggeration. For the expression ·nis 1rpwTas 1maeluet> iflwoel:s d. i. IS. 9 (on Philinus). 12. Twv wa.pa.TETeuxoTwv To'l~ Ka.Lpoi.p:Y]pWS' €l!> rtt m:p~ rov fl&oov 1T€Ola KaL 'TO 'TWV >lvu&p.fJpwv €1Jvo> (56. 3). On the other hand, P. elsewhere (xxxiv. ro. r8, Strabo) stated that Hannibal crossed a pass S,a Tavplvwv; and though the reference to Hannibal is not in all MSS. of Strabo, and has been impugned as non-Polybian, there seems no good reason to reject it (DeSanctis, iii. 2. 65). It is quite possible that in iii. 56. 3 P. is merely indicating a general direction; if Hannibal had already contacts with the Insubres, their territory may well have been his first important goal. According to Livy (quoted above, 44. 5 n.), his guides were Boii, but they may have included Insubres, since Boii and Insubres were at this time (d. 40. 8), as on several former occasions (cf. ii. 22 ff.), working closely together against the Romans. Moreover, Coelius' pass was not necessarily Silenus'; he may well have supplemented Silenus from other sources. On the other hand, the reference to the Insubres in P., taken together with Coelius' known support for the Little St. Bernard, and Livy's switch from a source of 1 Klotr. (Livius, 130) suggests that the confusion goes back to Coelius himself, who contaminated Silenus and Fabius; but this seems less likely.
cc
III. 49· 5
HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY
Polybian colour, in order to bring Hannibal over the Mt. Genevre into the Taurini, creates a strong case for anyone who cares to interpret P.'s account as one of a march through the Little St. Bernard; and this pass is adopted by Klotz (Livius, 105, IJo), who thinks that Coelius took the reference to the Cremonis iugum from Silenus, but also had the inconsistent mention of the Taurini (from Fabius). Summarizing, one may say that P.'s narrative of the approach to and crossing of the Alps can be reconciled with either this pass or one of the group debouching on the valley of Susa and Turin. It is, however, illegitimate to combine this version with Livy in the hope of gaining further details, since Livy has contaminated two traditions. 4· The Pass. Any final decision will depend on the relative weight assigned to the evidence quoted above. Despite P.'s reference to the Insubres in iii. 56. 3, Hannibal's first action in the Po valley was apparently the taking of the chief town of the Taurini (6o. 9), which Appian (Hann. s) calls Taurasia, and which is likely to have stood on the site of Turin (De Sanctis, iii. 2. 68); and Livy has recorded the strong consensus of opinion in favour of the view that Hannibal came down among the Taurini. Arguing against Viedebantt, Ed. Meyer (Kl. Schr. ii. 4rr n. r) has shown how unlikely it is that Hannibal, having come down the Dora Baltea, should then have lost time marching west to Turin, with Scipio at Placentia. Thus it seems very likely (though not certain) that Hannibal reached the Po valley via the Vaile di Susa, and so that he crossed by either the Mt. Genevre (or one of the passes from the Durance valley a little to its south) or the Mt. Cenis (Great or Little, or the subsidiary Col du Clapier). Those who accept Livy's reference to the Druentia as true and important evidence must choose the former. But if one neglects his secondary source (above (z)), then the details of Hannibal's march to the 'Island', and subsequently through the territory of the Allobroges (i.e. up the Isere valley), make it probable that his pass was one in the Mt. Cenis group, approached by way of the Isere and the Maurienne (the valley of the Arc). As has been pointed out, the Mt. Genevre can be reached from the junction of the Rhone and the I sere only by passing over two cols ; and the only reason for making Hannibal take so difficult a route is Livy's reference to the Druentia. The argument that the Mt. Cenis passes were not used in antiquity has been adequately refuted, most recently by Knoflach (Klio, 1932, 405-6) who emphasizes the effects of a built road over the Mt. Genevre in concentrating traffic through the western Alps. Thus, on balance, the evidence seems to favour one of this group of passes. However, a detailed identification of the various points of Hannibal's 386
HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY
III. 49· 7
march, asP. describes it, is not very feasible, for P., though drawing on a good source, is influenced to some extent by his schematic picture of an advance up a river Rhone which runs east to west, parallel to the Alps (cf. 47· 2-s. so. r). Such identifications have frequently been attempted but no two agree. This discussion is not intended to be exhaustive, but merely to indicate the general view of the sources on which the commentary is based; and detailed problems are reserved for treatment there. 49. 5. 1rpbs Tijv KaAou!LEV'IlV N1]aov: cf. Livy, xxi. 3r. 4, quartis castris ad Insulam peruenit. Presumably the Gaulish name had this meaning (d. de Beer, 23). In§ 6 P. reads -rj 8tjaKapas-; and Livy (xxi. 3r. 4) has ibi (s)arar. Editors generally emend to read fi 8' 'la&.pas and ibi [sara, perhaps without good reason (cf. Meyer, Kl. Schr. ii. 413 n. r); but undoubtedly, whatever name stood in the original source common toP. and Livy, the river indicated is the Isere. The Saone (Arar) lies far beyond Hannibal's likely line of march; and though it is sometimes argued that Liv'}''s reading is confirmed by the reference to the Arar in Silius Italicus (iii. 452), Silius is in fact not describing Hannibal's march to the 'Island', but giving a general account of the Rhone; and since Silius took his geographical embroideries from separate sources (cf. J. Nicol, The Historical and Geographical Sources used by Silius Italicus (Oxford, 1936), 129 ff.), and a reference to the Arar, its main tributary, was part of the regular description of the Rhone (cf. SiL It. xv. SOI), Silius may be left out of the discussion. In any case, the Saone would not correspond to the distance from the Rhone crossing. Comparison of 39· 9 (1,400 stades from the Rhone crossing 7rpos 'T~v &.vaf3oil~v n»v .tli\7Tewv) with so. I (8oo stades from the 'Island' to ~ Twv .tlAm;wv d.vaf3o,\1)) shows the 'Island' to have been about 6oo stades from the crossing (probably P. obtained his 1,400 stades by adding an attested 6oo stades up the Rhone valley to the 8oo calculated at the rate of 8o a day for the stretch from the Isere to the 'foot of the pass': cf. so. I n.). Six hundred stades (just under 70 miles) from Pont de l'Isere brings one to a point between Orange and Avignon, which seems likely enough for the crossing (cf. 42· 1 n.). This figure of 6oo stades is fatal to de Beer's identification (14-24, cf. 26) of the aKapas with the Aygues, which is only 39 miles north of his proposed crossing at Arles. Various other suggested identifications of the aKapa>, ranging from the Durance to the Saone, and including Wilkinson's Sorgue, accepted by Conway (see the app. crit. to the Oxford Livy ad loc.), cannot be dealt with here. For discussion see Viedebantt, Hermes, 1919, 353 n. I; DeSanctis, iii. z. 70; Jullian, i. 474 n. 3· Viedebantt (ibid.) suggests that P. has inserted the words 7Toilvoxllov Kat mT6opov by deduction from the fact that Hannibal refitted here (§§ II-12). 7. Comparison with the Nile Delta. Jullian (i. 474 n. 3) considers this 387
III. 49· 7
HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY
forced comparison (in which the rivers and an approximately triangular axfi!'-a form the only common feature) the work of one of the Hannibal-historians; but it may well be P.'s own contribution. The comparison Tcf 1'-"y.fBH is obviously absurd. The mountainsSva7Tpoao8a Kal 8va.ip.f3o>.a Kat axo;oov ws €t1TEtV &npocnm-will be the Grande-Chartreuse. The inconsistency between this description and the comments in 47· 9 (d. Reid, JRS, 1913, 195) is only apparent, for there P. was criticizing accounts which made the Alps as a whole inaccessible, but here he is speaking only of a single range. The phrase TI]v 1'-[av 7TAo:vpav •.• i7Tt~o:V,vvat reads oddly, and Schweighaeuser may well be right in suspecting that opt~"' has dropped out after 1rAwpav (d. ii. 14. 4, 14. 6). 8. SU' cHi€A4>ous ••• OTO.o~O.tovTO.S: Allobroges in Livy {xxi. 31. s-6) who calls the elder Braneus. P. appears {so. z) to distinguish oi KaTa ftEpos ~Y"ftoV£> nvv L4>.Aof3plywv from the f3apf3apm who accompanied Hannibal from the 'Island' ; whereas to Livy the attacking chiefs are simply Galli. Nevertheless, P.'s account is not inconsistent with an assumption that the two brothers in the 'Island' were Allobroges, and the attackers dissident chieftains of a people in a state of aTd.atsperhaps supporters of the younger brother. Livy may have substituted Galli, because he has meanwhile inserted 31. 9-12, taking Hannibal across country to the Durance (cf. 49· 5-56. 4 n. (z)). Livy represents Hannibal's aid as an act of solicited arbitration, P. as an alliance with one side. On P.'s statement that Hannibal's attackers were Allobroges Jullian's comment (i. 48o n. 3) is: 'il doit s'agir de Ia tribu ligure qui occupait Ia Basse Maurienne et dont Ia capitale (castellum ... caput regionis, T.-L. xxi. 33· n) etait non loin de Ia.' This is a good example of the fatal method of choosing a location and then forcing the sources into their Procrustean bed. 11. Twv ovAwv Tn va.Aa.~a. Ka.i Tli v€vOVTJK4ha.: but an extensive replacement with Gallic weapons would raise many problems (cf. Jullian, i. 475 n. 5), and probably it was a question merely of spears and javelins. Cf. Livy, xxi. 31. 8, 'ob id meritum commeatu copiaque rerum omnium, maxime uestis, est adiutus, quam infames frigoribus Alpes praeparari cogebant'.
50. 1. va.pci. Tov voTO.J.LOV: which river? To P. clearly the Rhone; cf. 39· 9· a7TO 0~ ri]> 8ta{3&.ao:ws TOV 'Po'f5avoii 7TOpEVOftlVots 7Tap' ath-ov TOV 7TOTaftOV ws l7T1 TaS 7T1)yas lws 7Tpos T~V avaf3o>.~v KT>.. But the reason is his false picture of the Rhone's direction and relation to the Alps (cf. 47· 2-5 n.), which would make Hannibal follow its bank up to the point when he turns right and begins the ascent of the Alps. In reality Hannibal must have left the 'Island' up the valley of the Isere (cf. 49· s-56. 4n. (4)). €is oKTa.Kooious oTa.Sious: this figure, about 92 miles, would bring 388
HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY
III. 5:1:. 3
Hannibal from Pont de l'Isere to Montmelian, at the confluence of the !sere and the Arc, and so to the bounds of Allobrogian territory (Jullian, i. 477). But P.'s source appears to record the days spent on the stages from the Rhone to the Po valley, but (from the 'Island' at least) to calculate the distances on the basis of 8o stades a day (cf. 39 n.). Here for instance ro days are spent on Soo stades; yet the distance over the Alps from here to the Po, which is 1,200 stades (39. Io), only occupied 15 days (56. 3). That Hannibal's daily average was the same in the Alps and in the Isere valley is manifestly absurd; and the distances for the stages from the 'Island' onwards are not to be taken at face value. See C. Torr, r-2. 2. €v Tois €'1Tm£fio~s: cf. Livy, xxi. 32. 6, 'Hannibal ab Druentia [sic] campestri maxime itinere ad Alpes cum bona pace incolentium ea loca Gallorum peruenit' (on the 'Druentia' cf. 49· 5-56. 4 n. {2); on the Galli cf. 49· 8 n.). 5. Ka.Ta.aTpa.To'll'iS.:uaa.s ••• E'II'E!-LEVE: cf. Livy, xxi. 32. 9, 'Hannibal consistere signa iussit'. Jullian's attempted localization at the mouth of the Maurienne (i. 48o) depends on the doubtful assumptions (a) that Livy's precision of detail is not mere rhetorical elaboration, and (b) that P.'s distances here are trustworthy. 6. TWV Ka.&TJYOUtUVWV a.C.Toi:!; r a.Aa.TWV: i.e. the Boii under Magilus (44. 5). Kahrstedt (iii. r8z) argues that they are here used as scouts because of their familiarity with the Alps; but that local men have been used as guides(§ 2), not the Boii, because Hannibal has taken a route different from that he originally intended. This is a non sequitur. P. never says that Magilus' services were dispensed with. The f3&.pf3a.pot from the 'Island' were protectors (49· 13), not guides (along the river-bank) ; and it was natural enough to use local guides for the hardest part (52. 7}, to supplement the limited knowledge of Boii from the Po valley. In short, there is no reason to doubt that Hannibal followed the route intended from the first (cf. 47· 1 n.). 7. et11 nva. 'll'a.pa.Kta.UvTJv 11'6Aw: a castellum in Livy, xxi. 33· n. Jullian (i. 48r) suggests 'Saint-Georges?'.
52. 2. TETa.pTa.ios wv ••• Ets tuvSUvous 'I!'O.f>€YEV€TO luyO.Aous: these are the events mentioned in§ 8, not the immediate meeting with the natives (§ 3) ; and T£Ta.pTatos is reckoned from leaving the 7ToA~s of 51. 10. 3. 9a.A~oos ••• Ka.t aT€cpavou!l: 8o)).o{ are often olive-branches, but hardly here in an Alpine valley (cf. Ju11ian, i. 483 n. 2). The custom is paralleled by the branches borne by the Roman fetiales {cf. Livy, i. 24. 6) and by suppliants generally (cf. Cic. V err. ii. 4· no). For the Greek ICI)p6Knov or 'rod of truce' see Herod. ix. roo. I ; Thuc. i. 53· I ; Dem. li. 13. A scholiast to Thucydides describes it as fJ.\ov dp96v < > 8 "..J. \ EXOll £1I
I
\
'
1
\
III. 52. 3
HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY
&.\A~.\ovs
t<et,.dvovs. It was used for communications between belligerents, and eventually became a general symbol for peace; but to call it aJvftrJp.a cpiAtas is loose writing. When it reached Rome, as the caduceus, is uncertain. See further R. Boetzkes, RE, 'Kerykeion', cols. 33o-42. 6. rrpoB~Aous ~gu rroAE!l(ous: cf. Livy, xxi. 34· 4, 'ne repudiati aperte hostes fierent'. Livy here adds a few details not in P. (e.g. the envoys were principes castellorum) and omits others. 53. 4. Tous 8' iK XE~pos ••• TtmTovns: 'striking down others at dose quarters'. For iK xetp6s, comminus (missed by Paton), see i. 76. 8, etc. 5. m;p( n AEiuK6rrnpov bxup6v: 'near a certain bare rock forming a strong point'. Jullian (i. 484 n. 3) mentions the white gypsum rocks of the Maurienne; but his attempt to identify the one referred to here is not very convincing. Ta0Ta 1-16A~S ~gEJLTJpUao.To: 'these extricated themselves with difficulty' or (d. 51. z) 'Hannibal extricated these' (cf. fig. 132). See Schweighaeuser, ad loc.
54. 1. Sui TO auvO.rrTU\1 -n;v TTJS n).u6.8os 86a~v: cf. Livy, xxi. 35· 6, 'niuis etiam casus, occidente iam sidere Vergiliarum, ingentem terrorem adiecit'. The 'morning-setting' (cf. i. 37. 5 n.) of the Pleiades is calculated as 7 November or 9 November (d. De Sanctis, iii. 2. 79; Strachan-Davidson, zo-ZI). But from the time of Hesiod (Op. 383 ff.), the setting of the Pleiades was an indication of the approach of winter (cf. Pliny, Nat. hist. ii. 125, 'Vergiliarum occasus hiemem incohat'); and the fact that new snow had just fallen suggests that Hannibal was on the summit about the third week in September (cf. Jullian, i. ¥7 n. 3; DeSanctis, iii. 2. 79), not late in October (as Kahrstedt, iii. 370 n. 2, 375 n. z; Dunbabin, CR, 193I, 122; de Beer, too-3). In 1947 the tirst snow was reported from Switzerland (2ft. on the Furka Pass, 7,990 ft.) on 24 September. 2. T~v TTJS 'ho.Mas Ev6.pyEiLO.v: d. Livy, xxi. 35· 8, where Hannibal advances in promunturio quodam. This story of the view of Italy (and the situation of Rome!) will be rhetorical embellishment (De Sanctis, iii. 2. 76), though it has been used to confirm or discredit various identifications of Hannibal's pass. Views of the plain are in fact to be had from the Mt. Cenis and Col du Clapier (De Sanctis, iii. 2. 77; Jullian, i. 488 n.; Knofiach, Klio, 1932, 411~13; Dunbabin, CR, 1931, 56-57), as also from the Col de la Traversette (de Beer, 68-D9). The striking comparison of the Alps to fortress walls was originally in Cato; cf. Servius ad Aen. x. 13 (= HRR, Cato, 85), 'Alpes ... quae secundum Catonem et Liuium muri uice tuebantur Italiam'. Cf. Herodian, ii. II. 8, Jv TElxovs ux:IJftaT£ rr~;plKEtTat Kat 7Tpof3'f3A7JTa£ 'haA.{as; Isid. Etym. xiv. 8. xS, 'Italiae murorum exhibent (sc. Alpes) uicem'. 390
HANNIBAL'S MARCH TO ITALY
III. s6. 3
7. T01Tov, Sv oCITE •.. SuvaT~IV ~v 1rapeX8e'iv: for the following incident cf. Livy (xxi. 36. 1-37. 6) who, however, follows a version which has misunderstood P. or his source in several places (e.g. 36. 2, 'natura locus iam ante praeceps recenti lapsu terrae in pedum mille admodum altitudinem abruptus erat' is a confused version of what P. describes in 54· 7) and contains such rhetorical elaboration as the use of fire and vinegar to break the rock (cf. De Sanctis, iii. 2. 77-78, deriving Livy's account from Coelius; Jullian, i. 489 n. 2). The spot is no longer identifiable, though many attempts have been made. 55. 1. rs~ov ••• Kat 1Tap,AAayp.evov: for this pointer to the sensational cf. ii. 28. n n. 56. 3-4. Statistics of the march. On the probable date of Hannibal's departure from New Carthage and arrival in the Po valley see 34· 6 n. and 54· 1 n. The figure of five months is also in Livy, xxi. 38. I, 'quinto mense a Carthagine Noua, ut quidam auctores sunt'; cf. Appian, Hann. 4, lKTitJ p.oAtr; •• . f:LYJ"l; Tzetzes, Hist. i. 27, L 748 (quoting Diodorus and Dio). How P. calculates the fifteen days spent on the crossing is not wholly clear. From the time Hannibal leaves the river his time-table appears to be as follows:
Day.
1. Hannibal encamps 7Tp6> mi> (J7T€p{3o:\at> (so. 5). On the basis of fresh information (so. 7) he moves nearer the enemy. (F.'s account might be taken to mean that this was still the first day (so De Sanctis, iii. 2. 82); but then one is a day short at the ninth day (q.v.). Further this is the second day in Livy, xxi. 32. 9 and ro.) 3· Battle and capture of 7TOAt> (51. 10); camp there (52. r). 4· Hannibal spends one day there (52. I). s. 6, and 7· (Three) days' safe advance (52. 2). On days 6 and 7 he had barbarian guides (52. 7-8). 8. On the fourth day after leaving the 7TOA"i (52. 2, T€TapTaior;) Hannibal, in danger, encamped 7T€p{ n AwK07T€Tpov (53· s). 9· Next day he regained his vanguard and reached the summit (53· 6), where lvaTai:oeis &.f.upLa-J3"1TouvTES: cf. 37. II, 38. 3· Who are these historians with controversial accounts of the Pillars, the Ocean, the tin-mines of Britain (here mentioned for the first time: cf. Collingwood in Frank, ES, iii. 46), and the Spanish gold- and silvermines? Almost certainly Dicaearchus, Eratosthenes, and Pytheas; cf. xxxiv. 5· 1-2. Pytheas' account of the Cornish tin-mines survives, via Timaeus, in Diodorus (v. 22); see Miillenhoff, i. 469 ff. The present passage suggests that Poseidonius' famous account of the Spanish mines (Diod. v. 35 ff.; Strabo, iii. 147) was based on earlier, extravagant stories; cf. Strabo (loc. cit.), ou yap a'/T~..o,Povs), viz. the Ticinus and its bridge (cf. 64. r), not the Po bridge (so Klotz, Livius, 132). Livy (xxi. 47. 2-3), who follows the same tradition, has been misled into imagining that Hannibal was checked at the Po, and omits any reference here to the Ticinus. Livy also mentions the capture of the 6oo Romans; but they are taken segniter ratem soluentes, for the Po bridge was a bridge of boats (whereas P.'s is made of planks; cf. § 4, Tas 11Ada-ras niJv aavLSwv w.:ll1Taafdvas (as in ii. 5· 5); Livy, xxi. 45· r (on the Ticinus bridge)). Not to have destroyed the Ticinus bridge would have been sheer folly (cf. Kromayer, AS, iii. 1. 58 n. z). 5. ~L£Ta.~a.M~L£Vos a.o8ls Ets Tuva.vT£a. KTA.: viz. Hannibal wheeled round and for two days (§ 6) marched westward up the left bank of the Po, looking for a convenient place to cross. Kromayer (loc. cit.) locates his crossing just below the confluence with the Tanaro; but this is necessarily hypothetical. Livy (xxi. 47· s-6) rejects Coelius' story that Hannibal forded the river with the elephants on his right to break the current in favour of the version of potiores auctores, which coincides with that of P. (cf. Klotz, Livius, Ios). 6. iA.a5pou~q,: cf. 93· 4, ol11£ nvv >..u;ovpy,wv T.:Tayp)vos, the officer in command of the service corps, mentioned elsewhere (ro2. 6, n4. 7, u6. 6; Livy, xxii. 46. 7); cf. Lenschau, RE, 'Hasdrubal (8)', cols. :2473-4 (inaccurate on this passage). tXPT)I!ant£ Tois ••• vp£o-~£uTa.is: cf. Livy, xxi. 47· 7, legationibus Gallomm audiendis moratus. Livy adds that Mago and the cavalry pressed straight on down stream, after crossing, and in a single day Placentiam ad hastes contendunt. For XPTJf.4aTt~nv, 'give audience to', d. P. Petr. iii. clxiv (the Gurob papyrus), col. iv, l. 24 (cf. Holleaux, Etudes, iii. 290). 9. O'Tpa.T01TE8t:UO'O.S vt:plvoAlV n>.o.KEVTlO.V: cf. Livy, xxi. 47· 3· 'prius Placentiam peruenere, quam satis sciret Hannibal ab Ticino profectos'. The site of this camp, Scipio's first after the cavalry skirmish, is a crucial point in the controversy about the subsequent battle. In the manceuvres which now followed, the Roman army twice crossed the Trebia, once in retirement after Gallic desertions (68. 4-5), and
BATTLE OF THE TREBIA
III. 66.
I I
again just before the battle (72. 4-5); hence the battle-site and this camp were on the same side of the Trebia, If Scipio's camp (and so by implication Hannibal's) was on the right bank (so Livy), it follows that after the Gallic desertions Scipio marched west across the Trebia and away from his base at Placentia-a highly improbable move, which would put the Trebia between himself and the approaching troops of Sempronius; cf. Kromayer, AS, iii. I. so ff. The likelihood is that Scipio camped west of the Trebia, and retired east to await Sempronius in the shelter of Placentia; which would imply that the battle was fought on the left bank. Kromayer (AS, iii. I. 59) identifies Scipio's camp with Stradella, a point 30 km. west of Placentia, where the spurs of the Apennines descend to within 3 km. of the Po, and possessing strategic advantages already noted by Napoleon I (Commentaires, i (Paris, x867), 126, quoted by Kromayer, AS, iii. I. 6o n. I). But Stradella lies nearer to Clastidium, and can hardly be described as 1r1:pl. 1r6Aw IIAa.KevTlav. Moreover, a retreat to the Trebia from Stradella in the face of Hannibal's cavalry superiority presents 'certain difficulties' (Hallward, C AH, viii. 709). It therefore seems safer to assume (cf. Kahrstedt, iii. 390 n. 2; Lehmann, HZ, n6, 1916, 107) that Scipio's camp was not far west of the Trebia, in some place such as Rottofreno, behind the R. Loggia and the rather larger R. Tidone. An ingenious hypothesis, which would remove most of the difficulties, is T. Frank's suggestion (]RS, 1919, 202-7; cf. U. Ewins, BSR, 1952, 55) that before its destruction in 2oo and refounding in 190 Placentia was situated at Stradella; Scipio's camp 1repl 1roAtv IIAa.KeVTlav would be there, and the contradictions in Livy and P. would be reconciled. But on this assumption there are no good grounds for Scipio's retreat to the right bank of the Trebia away from Placentia, after the Gallic desertion (68. 4) ; cf. Hallward, C AH, viii. 709. See further the arguments of R. Hanslik (RE, 'Placentia', cols. 18g8-9) on the relationship of the historical Placentia to the earlier Celtic road system. Hence without archaeological evidence Frank's hypothesis must be rejected. On the founding of Placentia. cf. 40. 5 n. 10-ll. va.po.y£v6ru;:vos 8EuTEpo.'ios ••• TU Tphn va.p~Ta.~E KTX.: cf. Livy, xxi. 47· 8, 'paucis post diebus sex milia a Placentia castra communiuit et postero die in conspectu hostium acie derecta potestatem pugnae fecit'. P. makes Hannibal encamp after Scipio rejects his challenge, Livy before-perhaps because he or his source attributed to Hannibal the Roman custom of encamping each night. P. (§ n) puts Hannibal's camp about so stades from the Roman, Livy (loc. cit.) 6 m.p. from Placentia. The distances tally, but Livy has WIOngly assumed Scipio's camp to be close to the city, whereas in fact it was some distance west of it. Dd
HANNIBAL IN THE PO VALLEY
III. 67. I
67. 1-3. The Gallic desertion- cf. Livy, xxi. 48. 1-2 (less detailed). Livy gives the same figures, but minimizes the caedes. 6. Tm)s Tpei:s O.vopas: cf. 40. 9, for these I I Iuiri coloniae deducendae. On the Boian hostages with the Romans (§ 7) cf. 40. 6 n., 40. 7, 40. Io.
8. hr~ T4i yeyovcm rrapaarrov8'1]..-a.TL: the Gallic massacre and desertion, as well as the Boian action. 9. ~myevo..-EVTJS Tfls vuKT6s: 'when night came on', evidently the next night, for the Gauls did not desert until the morning watch (§ 2); cf. Livy, xxi. 48. 4, quarta uigilia noctis insequentis projectus. (Paton, 'that same night', is misleading.) ws errt TOV Tpe~(av 1TOTO....OV KTA.: cf. Uvy, xxi. 48. 4. 'ad Trebiam fluuium iam in loca altiora collesque impeditiores equiti castra mouet'. On the hypothesis adopted (66. 9) Scipio retired south-east across the Trebia to the protection of the hills on the east bank, and of Placentia. Kromayer (AS, iii. I. 6z) calculates the time required for both sides to reach the Trebia, assuming Scipio's camp to have been at Stradella; but such calculations depend on many imponderables. Certainly a march of 25 km. to the Trebia (if Scipio kept to the foothills) would have been extremely hazardous in view of Hannibal's cavalry superiority; for even setting out before dawn Scipio had little start of Hannibal's Numidians. If Scipio's camp was nearer the Trebia, the risk was proportionately less. Beloch (HZ, II4, 1915, 3) regards the retreat to the Trebia as a doublet of that after the Ticinus skirmish, based on an annalistic account which attributed it to Gallic treachery rather than to Scipio's defeat; for a valid criticism of this radical treatment of the sources see Lehmann, HZ, II6, I9I6, I
101
ff.
) f ' "' ""' """ oxupOTTJT~ KO.L TOl'i rrapOtKOUCI"l TWV aup.~ p.6.xwv: Livy (loc. cit.) omits the second factor. The Gauls who con-
1T~O"Tfi.UWV
1 Ttl..., TE TWV T01TWV r
'Pwf.LTJ> refers only to the troops'; but, despite the singular auvao.jJaVTO •pwf.Lalwv 7rpoatp.!at:ws. (Paton, 'make a display of leniency', is inaccurate.) 4. ETLJl"lae J1EyaA.etws: 'he rewarded ... generously'; d. Xen. Cyrop. iii. 3· 6 for this sense of rtf.LB.v (and P. iii. 99· 6). Despite Livy, xxi. 48. 9, nee sane magno pretio, both honour and rewards are involved. 5-14. Sempronius assists the Gauls against Hannibal: cf. Livy, xxi. 52. On Livy's treatment of the incident cf. Sontheimer, Klio, 1934, 103 ff. 10. TaL'> ~cjleope(alS: 'with reserves', rather than 'from the garrison post' (Schweighaeuser). 70. Motives and objects of Sempronius, P. Scipio, and Hannibal: cf. Livy, xxi. 53, where similar considerations are worked up by the author (Sontheimer, Klio, 1934, 105-6).
HANNIBAL IN THE PO VALLEY
2. vpoaXa~ea9cu Ka.l TTJV ToO auv6.pxovTo~ yv&>iJ.TJV: 'to gain his colleague's consent as well'. 4. TTJV ••• Twv Klii'ATwv 6.9ea£a.v: 'the treacherous Gauls' ; cf. ii. 32. 8 n. 5. &.XYJ&~v.qv va.p€sEa8a\ xpdnv: on Scipio's wound cf. 66. 2. But this 'hope' is not historical, for Scipio must also have known that the new consuls would soon be there to relieve both himself and Sempronius (§ 7); cf. Beloch, HZ, II4, 1915, ro. P., however, following a pro-Scipionic tradition, makes Sempronius by contrast ambitious, full of false confidence, and jealous of both his colleague and his successors. This prejudice must be disallowed. 7. To us evLKn8taTal'€vous aTpaTTJyoos: 'the consuls designate' without any indication whether they were already elected or not (difficulties arise only if one accepts the emendation bnKafJ~;arapi.vov~ of Kondos, BCH, 1877, 63 f.). In fact, Sempronius probably returned to Rome after the battle to hold elections (for the battle was in late December, 72. 3); cf. 68. 12-13 n.; Livy, xxi. 57· 3-4. 71-74. The battle of the Trebia: cf. Livy, xxi. 54-56. 8. P. depends in the main on his pro-Carthaginian Greek source (probably Silenus); Livy is very close toP., and the likelihood is that he foiiows Silen us via Coelius (the detail of the elephants in s6. I may be from that source: it is not in P. ; cf. Kahrstedt, iii. r68). De Sanctis (iii. 2. 172, 177) argues that Livy's account goes 'Qack indirectly to P. himself, and that divergences have been introduced by an intermediate source. For a stylistic discussion of the two accounts see Sontheimer, Klio, 1934, 106 ff. 71. l. ey£veTo vpos T/il O'Tf>llTTJYEiv: 'he set himself to outmanreuvre'. The comments on ambushes in§§ 2-4 read like P.'s own. 4. nl. .•• ev£aTJiJ.O. Twv ovXwv: 'the blazoned shields'. 5. TOlS auv€8po's: cf. 20. 8 n. 8. 8€Ka ••• EKnaTov E'!T'LAEsal'evov: cf. Uvy, xxi. 54· 3, 'singuli uobis nouenos ex turmis manipulisque uestri similes eligite'. Livy is the more correct, for P. gives the total(§ 9) as r,ooo foot and r,ooo horse. 9. Ets TftV eve8pav: as the possible site of Mago's ambush Kromayer (AS, iii. r. 67-69) suggests the bed of the Rio Colomba or Rio Gerosa, small streams to the west of the Trebia, running north into that river: Delbri.ick (i. 303) and Beloch (HZ, n4, 1915, 9) reject the story of the ambush as Roman propaganda designed to mitigate the defeat; but P. was a serious judge of such matters, and is to be followed here.
72. 2. eis €saKwxLXlous: for the numbers on both sides see Kromayer, AS, iii. r. 94-98; DeSanctis, iii. 2. 88-V cnJj.tTTaY tgw TWV un:vwv &.rf>avw;; irf>Eop~vnv iKei\ Aa-rl"'Y}>) seems the most probable supplement. But this merely serves to emphasize a weakness of Nissen's theory, namely that Teanum, which lies within Campania, is common to both (a) and (b), so that the routes via the Savo and via Cales both 426
THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IN ITALY; TRASIMENE
III. gz. r
lead ultimately to either Latium or Samnium, and cannot therefore be distinguished by references to their ultimate origin (or goal). Further, as Kromayer observes (AS, iii. r. 222 n.), the route down the Volturnus from Beneventum can hardly be described as a?To Twv KaTa ToVs 'lp?Tlvovs T61rwv (cf. Livy, xxii. IJ. r). It therefore seems preferable to regard P.'s passes as the main strategic routes into the Campanian plain as a whole, viz. (a) the Via Appia coming down the Caudine Pass from Beneventum (dm) Tfjs I:avvtTtl5os), (b) the Via Latina from Venafrum, debouching in the plain via Teanum and Cales (..6fos- is apparently the mons Callicttla of Livy, xxii. 15. 3, r6. 5; neither name occurs elsewhere. (Pais-Bayet, 285 n. 105, suggest a connexion with Mte Ebano, north of Allifae; but this is impossible as the scene of Hannibal's break-out.) Kromayer (AS, iii. r. 226, with Karten 6 and 7) identifies the pass of the break-through as that of Borgo S. Antonio, and Callicula-'Ept{3tav6s- with the mountain behind Pietravairano, west of that pass. De Sanctis (iii. 2. 127) who accepts the position proposed by Nissen-a view already subjected to criticism by Kromayer (AS, iii. r. 224)-urges against the latter the fact that Hannibal had an easier escape west of the hill of Pietravairano, if he merely passed between it and the Rocca Monfina, along the route of the Via Latina. But Kromayer points out that if Fabius was stationed at Marzanello, at the south-west end of the hill he identifies with Callicula, he would have covered the Via Latina; and the further slopes of Rocca Monfina may well have been 427
-
Hannibal
ID:J -• Fabius 1. 2.
Posi~ion according
8.
to Krom01yer •• Nissen
CALLICULA.
Based on Kromayer.
:z.
THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IN ITALY; TRASIMENE
III. 93· 5
wooded. Against Nissen's location is the fact that his supposed pass between Cales and Teanum does not lead out of Campania at alL Kromayer's hypothesis is therefore the most probable. 1ra.pn Tov 1>.9upvov 1ToTnl-lov: this must clearly be the Volturnus, the only river which cuts the Campanian plain in two; d. Livy, xxii. 14. r, 'postquam ad Volturnum fiumen castra sunt posita'; 15. 4, 'Casilinum ... quae urbs Volturno fiumine dirempta Falernum a Campano agro diuidit'. Teuffel's attempt (Rh. Mus., r8so, 471 ff.) to identify the Athyrnus with a brook, the Turno, near Cerreto in Samnium, is wildly wrong. 5. Ecr1TEuBE Ka.l cruvu'II'EKp(vETo: 'made a pretence of showing the same eagerness'; d. Livy, x:xii. 14. 2. 11. Fabius' position. Livy records that Fabius early garrisoned Callicula (§ In.) and the Voltumus crossing at Casilinum (Livy, xxii. rs. 3} and sent Minucius to cover the pass above Tarracina, which might have given Hannibal access to districts nearer Rome (Livy, xxii. rs. n}. In taking up his main position Fabius was now joined by Minucius, who presumably left a force behind at Tarracina. The most likely view of Fabius' position is that of Kromayer (AS, iii. r. 225 ff.}; his camp lay at the south-west end of the hill of Vairano overlooking, on the west, a gap of 2·3 km. containing the Via Latina, and facing the slopes of Rocca Mon:fina. The 4,ooo men (§ w) were placed holding the pass to the east of the hill, that of Borgo S. Antonio. In this way Fabius covered both ways through into the Volturnus valley.
93. 1. Hannibal's position: d. Livy, xxii. 15. 12, duo inde milia hastes aberant. On Kromayer's thesis Hannibal lay under the hill of S. Felice directly opposite Borgo S. Antonio and Pietravairano. 93. 3-94. 6. The stratagem of the oxen: d. Livy, xxii. r6-18; Sil. It. vii. 272 ff.; Plut. Fab. 6-7; App. Hann. 14-15; Zon. viii. 26; Nepos, I!ann. 5· 2; Frontin. Strat. i. 5· 28; Polyaen. exc. 46. ro. The story, though fantastic, appears to be true; a similar ruse was employed during the war of 1914-18 when a herd of buffaloes was used to force a mined position on the Halo-Austrian front (De Sanctis, iii. 2. so n. 79). The source appears to be from the Carthaginian side (De Sanctis, iii. 2. 173}. On Hasdrubal (§ 4} cf. 66. 6 n. 93. 5. il'II'EpJ3oXT]v nva tJ-Em~u K£~l1Ev'I}V ••• crnvwv: the depression adjoining Pietravairano, on Kromayer's hypothesis (AS, iii. x. 228 ff., with photographs}. DeSanctis (iii. 2. 127), who recognizes the faults in Nissen's reconstruction at this point, himself suggests that the demonstration with the oxen was made on the far (i.e. north} side of his assumed pass between Cales and Teanum, towards Visciano; but this cannot be described as between Hannibal's camp and the pass, however far the former is moved 'a nord-est (DeSanctis \vrites 429
III. 93· 5
THE CAMPAIGN OF 217 IN ITALY; TRASIMENE
"nord-ovest") di quel che non sia collocato sulla carta del Kromayer'. 7. all-a. Se T~ KAiva.~ To TplTov llEpo~ Tfj~ vu~6Sov). The details in Frontinus and Dio (Zonaras) are suspect, however. See De Sanctis, iii. 2. 24I ff.; Thiel, 49 ff. The date of the Ebro battle is April or May (DeSanctis, iii. 2. 242 n. 6I). 95. 2. Tcl.s ••• TPLclKOVTO. vails: cf. 33· I4 for thirty-two quinqueremes manned in 218; P. here gives round figures (cf. Livy, xxii. I9. 2). By manning ten more Hasdrubal could outnumber the thirty-five Roman ships (§ 5). 430
THE EBRO NAVAL BATTLE
liL97·Z
:A.~.~-tXKav:
both Klotz (Livius, 143) and Thiel (49) prefer Livy's form (xxii. 19. 3, Himilco); for confusion between the two names cf. viii. I. 8 with Livy, xxiv. 35· 3· Lenschau (RE, 'Hamilkar', col. 2297) remarks on the common confusion, but accepts 'Hamilcar' here (ibid., col. 2308). 5. TI'EV1'E Kat 'l'pul.KOVTa vaGs: cf. s6. 5 n. This figure probably includes the Massaliote squadron implied in §§ 6-7 ; and if the twenty ships sent from Rome later this year (97· 1-2) still left the Spanish fleet at thirty-five (x. 17. 13). this is probably because they replaced a Massaliote squadron of that size; cf. Thiel, 40-42. ' TOVS ' 1Tt:p~' TOV ' "lr:l ' T01TOUS: ' .. 19. 5, 'd ecem E~S Cf . L'IVy, XXll. 1. o'!Jpa 1TOTaJLOV milia passuum distantem ab ostio Hiberi amnis'; this is P.'s 8o stades. 7. e:uyevws ••• KEKOivwv,Kaa~ 'PwJLa(oL dative after Jm{JoA~v, as if it were E1Tt{1£{JA'fJp.lvov, viz. 'the quota enjoined (by Hannibal) upon those in command of the commissariat in each detachment'; but so forced a meaning of €1r~{Jo>..~ with a dative is hardly tolerable. To take Tofs 1TpOK€X€tptap.lvot> in apposition to Tofs l8lots, both after dva¢lpHv, is possible but very forced; and it is even harder to make Toi:s 1TpoK€X€tpu:rp.lvots dative of the agent after TO.KT6v. For discussion see Schweighaeuser and B-Wz.
101. 3. KaA~V1]: Kromayer (AS, iii. I. 261) thinks of Mte Calvo on the left bank of the R. Fortore; but this is uncertain. The earlier identification with Casacalenda near Larino is undoubtedly to be rejected. 4. ~Kka.L8EKa Ko1 J-LETa.~oM}c;: cf. i. 76. 5· O.vaa7po4>~ means wheeling round to recover a former position after an Jma7po4>~, a turn through ninety degrees; J.Leraf3o'A7} is a right about turn (cf. Ael. Tact. 24). But here P. means nothing more than 'the normal wheeling evolutions' (Paton) of which these two (coupled together in x. 23. 2) are taken as examples. 5. KA£vovTec; u'l!'exwpouv Ei.s Tou'1!'£uw: Kromayer (AS, iii. r. 318 n. z) argues that if the Gauls and Spaniards in fact turned tail at the very outset of their withdrawal and were then driven back by the Romans as far as the level of the Libyans, such a flight would have spelt complete disaster; and he assumes a controlled withdrawal until the Romans were in a line with the Libyans, and then the turning-tail of the Gauls and Spaniards and the Roman breakthrough. De Sanctis (iii. z. 164-6) also admits a controlled retreat; but he translateS the WOrds OttfKo!fav rryv 'TWV VrT KTA.: the crescent-formation had brought the Roman centre into action before the wings were in contact >vith the enemy (§ 7); and this formation, gradually retiring, held long enough to draw the Romans on the wings towards the fighting. 446
THE CAMPAIGN OF 216 IN ITALY; CANNAE
III. n6.
II
This concentration prevented the maniples from ever coming properly into action, for the Roman line, already concentrated, was compressed into a solid body which began to pour into the Punic centre. 9-10. M anreuvre of the Libyans. Those on the right wing turned left (KMvaVT€S br' acnr£8a), SO that the file on the left became the front rank; and in this position they dressed ranks from the right, which was nearest the original battle line (T~v ~f-Lf3ol..~v EK 86paTos 1Tmotif-L€110t). Those on the left did the opposite. The technical term bn1Tapef-Lf3J.>.Aetv, 'to fall into straight line with the rest, to dress ranks', is here paraphrased. For the technical expressions ~7T1 86pv and E7T' aU1Tloa cf. vi. 40. 12; the corresponding terms for cavalry are J1rl o&pu and Jrf>' ~vlav (x. 23. 2). Schweighaeuser (ad loc.) seems to imply some kind of wheeling manceuvre; but this would be impossible in the melee, and KMvew is used of an individual facing. On the above interpretation two orders, 'Right (left) turn! Dress ranks on the left (right)!', were enough to bring the Libyans into a position to attack the Romans on the flank. The effect of the flank attack is described in § 12. It completely broke the maniple formation (KaT' G.v8pa Ka~ KaTd cnrdpas), and so destroyed the Roman advantage of superior numbers. 'Vereinzelt ist ein 1\Ianipel gegen eine Phalanx verloren' (Cornelius, 41). The fate of the fleeing Gauls and Spaniards is not recorded; but presumably with the Libyan attack and the checking of the Roman pursuit they recovered to share in the final encirclement. 11. Ka.Tii TTJV ~1Tt To us KEATous 1Ta.p6.1TTWaLv: 'owing to their excessive ardour in pursuit of the Gauls'. For 1Tapd7TTwats cf. xi. 11· 3, Ka.TV SoKEi: 1Todjaa.L ••• lt\a8pouJ3a.c;: clearly from a Carthaginian source. But the role of Hasdrubal's cavalry in the final encirclement may well have been part of Hannibal's original plan rather than an improvisation. The immense advantage of cavalry superiority comes out repeatedly; cf. no. 2, 111. 2, II7. 4-5. 9. 1TclvTa. Ta SLKcua TU1Ta.Tp(S, ••• 1To,,aa.s: for the formula, common in Hellenistic inscriptions (cf. Schulte, 52) see ii. 10. 5 (on Margus). 10. Ka.Ta Tas ~1TL4>a.ve£a.of1EVot: 'turning and presenting a front'. 11. MapKOS KO.l rvaLOS: cf. I09· I n. M. Atilius in fact lived to be triumuir mensarius in 216 (Livy, xxiii. 21. 6) and censor in 214 (Livy, xxiv. II. 6). For the formula avSpES .iyaOol Ka£ ••• tigw, YHO[-Lf.VO' cf. 447
III. n6.
II
THE CAMPAIGN OF 216 IN ITALY; CANNAE
44· 12, iv. 62. 4, viii. 26. 7, xi. 2. I, xv. 10. 2, xvi. 9· 2, xxi. 9· 3; it is also common in the language of the Hellenistic inscriptions; cf. Schulte, 49-50. 12. TouTwv: the Romans in general, not merely Marcus and Gnaeus. 13. Ouevoua[a.v: the Latin colony of Venusia in Apulia, which lay 30 miles south-west of the battlefield. O.vT)p a.taxpnv !J.EV Ti]v IJtuxi]v KTA.: this judgement on Varro is that of the Roman senatorial source, probably Fabius. In fact he maintained his popularity and continued to hold important military posts; he was proconsul in Picenum in 215-2I3 (Livy, xxiii. 25. n, 32. 19, xxiv. 10. 3· II. 3· 44· 5}. and held imperium pro praetore in Etruria in 2o8(7 (Livy, xxvii. 24. 1---9, 35· 2, 36. 13, xxviii. 10. II). 117. 2-3. Survivors: cf. 107-17 n. (c). Stax~>..wus TWV ••• bnrewv: these cavalry are not mentioned elsewhere, but can hardly be identified with the 2,ooo prisoners which Livy (xxii. 49· 13} records as having been taken at Cannae (so Judeich, HZ, I36, 1927, 8 n.). Added to the survivors of the Io,ooo infantry prisoners (n7. 3, 117. n) they restore the total to Io,ooo; but the statement in 117. 3 remains inaccurate.
12.
118. 2. Ti]s ••• AoL1Ti]S va.pa.>..ta.s: De Sanctis (iii. 2. 2u} prefers the marginal reading of the Augustan us (D) and Regius (E), 'lraJ.La;;; but 1TapaAla;; is well defended by Schweighaeuser, ad loc., and by Costanzi (Riv. fil., 1920, 346--8); cf. x. I. 4, Twv 'E>J..TJv{f.wv 1TOA£wv 'P~ywv KTA . .•. TUVTTJI' bd.xov<J~ r~v 7Tapa,\iav; Livy, xxii. 61. II f., 'defecere autem ad Poenos ... et Graecorum omnis ferme ora'. De Sanctis (ibid.} also proposes L'a.\a7Ti:vm for Tapavrivo~ since Tarentum did not revolt till 2I3 (viii. 24-34}, and Salapia, a town on the Apulian coast a few miles north of the Aufidus, was in Roman hands before 214 (Livy, xxiv. 20. 15}; on the other hand, Livy (xxii. 61. 12} lists the Tarentini among those revolting, and there is independent evidence for chronological compression in this chapter (§ 6 n.}. 6. wavep EV~!J.E"TpOUO'T)S Ka.~ auveva.ywv~~O!J.EVT)S ••• "Ti]S TUXT)S: 'as if Fortune in addition to what had happened were giving them overmeasure and joining in to stir up new contests against them'. TOV E~S Ti]v r a.Aa.TLO.V aTpO."TT)YOV O.voa"Ta.AEVTa.: L. Postumius Albinus; cf. ro6. 6; Livy, xxiii. 24. 6 ff.; Frontin. Strat. i. 6. 4; Zon. ix. 3· Livy and Zonaras state that Postumius was killed while consul designate for 215, while the Fast. Cap. give him as one of the consuls for 2I5, adding that 'in praetura in Gall. occis. est quod antequam ciretur ... '. De Sanctis (iii. 2. 327---9) has suggested that Postumius was in fact consul suffect~{S for Aemilius Paullus in 2I6, but that his death caused some confusion in the tradition so that both he and 1\L Claudius Marcellus (consul suffectus after him) were attached to 2I5 by error. 448
THE CAMPAIGN OF 216 IN ITALY; CANNAE
III. n8.n
But there was no need to elect a suffectus in Aemilius' place, even after the expiry of the dictatorship of M. Iunius Pera (d. Mommsen, St.·R. i. 29 n. 3; Broughton, i. 257); further, Livy's account is reasonable and consistent, and the reference to Postumius' death in praetura (in the Fasti) is against the hypothesis that he was consul sujfectus. It therefore looks as if Postumius' death was, as Livy says, shortly before his entry into office, at the end of winter zt6/I5, and not a few days after Cannae (cf. Scullard, Pol. 275-6). P. has brought it forward in order to complete the picture of unmitigated disaster which book iii was to give; and it is perhaps for the same reason that this book omits to record the compensating successes of the Scipios in Spain during :n6 (Uvy, :xxiii. 26. 1-29. 17); cf. Klotz,Livius, I 55· Two legions perished with Postumius (106. 6 n.), whose head was lodged, embossed with gold, in a temple of the Boii, where it served as a goblet for the priests (Livy, xxiii. 24. 12). That fg. 102 refers to Postumius is no more than a possibility. 7. 11 YE ouyKAt)TO'i ••• 'n'apEtt11AE~ ' • ' TOU'i 'n'OAAOU'i: the formulation suggests the use of Fabius. 9. Roman -recovery. In thus ending on the keynote of his history, P. leads up to the discussion in book vi (after the account of Greek and eastern Mediterranean affairs in iv and v) of the Roman constitution (-rii -rov '7TOAt-rEVJ.to.-ros lotr1T1)n) and Roman morale (T
.6yov : 'I shall give a separate account'. The purpose of this account is in part to assist -rots r/JMo~-ta8oucrt Ka.' rrpay~-ta.nKots; on the distinction cf. 21. 9 n., and for P.'s didactic purpose, vii. u. 2, 14. 6, ix. 9· 9·
449
BOOK IV 1-2. Introduction; Reasons for Beginning at Ol. r4o 1. 4. Tijs Ka.Ta.aKeuijs ••• 1repl. Twv 'E).),TJv~Kwv: i.e. ii. 37-70. Here, as in i. I3. 5, KaTaaKw~ is 'introductory sketch'; in ii. 37. 5 it is the main narrative, contrasted with the introduction. LSJ gives neither sense. 5-8. Achaean events: Tisamenus and Ogygus, ii. 41. 4; democratic constitution, ii. 38. 6, 41. 5; dissolution by the Macedonian kings, ii. 41. 9; League reformed, ii. 41. 11-12; principles and scheme for Peloponnesian unity, ii. 42. 3-7; survey, ii. 43-44; Cleomenean War, ii. 45-70. 9. auyKecf>a.Xa.uAJaaJ-Levo~: 'rounding off', cf. iii. 3· I n.; on the synchronism see ii. 71. 2. 1. TTJV :A..paTou auvTa.~LV: cf. i. 3· 2, for P. as Aratus' continuator. 2. Tous 1TL1TTOVTa.s C11ro TTJV .;IJlETepa.v taTop(a.v: cf. ii. I4. 7 n. on this phrase. The Greek conception of history is traditionally one covering a period for which oral communications or personal experiences are available; cf. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford, I946), 24, who contrasts the Roman tradition of a history ab urbe condita. 3. TO ••• &.vwTepw 1TpoaAa..... ~O.veLV Tois xpovo~s: 'to go farther back chronologically as well'; cf. 1TpoaavaTp~xHv, i. 5· 4, I2. 8. This use of 1TpoaAaJLf3avf;tv is not in LS J. OUTE Tas s~a.A-/jljle~s OUTE Tas &.1Tocf>O.ae~s: 'neither in my judgements nor in my assertions'. 4. KEKa.~vo1TO~TJKeva.~ 1ravTa. KTA.: for Tyche as a force favouring novelty cf. i. 4· s. 86. 7, ii. 37. 6, xxix. 21. 5 (Demetrius of Phalerum) ; CQ, I945, 6. The outward sign of Tyche's intentions is the synchronism in the change of rulers; cf. ii. 41. I n. 5. 4lLAL1T1TOS •.• b dTIJlTJTPLOU Ka.Ta cf>uaLV utos: cf. 25. 6. See ii. 70. 8, and for the phrase KaTa 4>vatv, i. 64. 6 n. He was 17; cf. 5· 3, 24. r. 6. :A..xa.~os: on the relationship of Achaeus, son of Andromachus, to Seleucus III Soter and Antiochus III see 48. 5 n.; for the events leading up to his assumption of the royal title west of Taurus see 48. 3-13, V. 40. 4 ff. 7. Meya.s ••• :A..vT(oxos: cf. ii. 71. 4, for Antiochus' accession, on the death of Seleucus III, in 223. Born in 242 or 241, he was 22 in 220 (cf. xx. 8. I, he was so in the early part of 191). The title M~ya> is confirmed epigraphically for Antiochus (cf. OGIS, 230 (from Soli; dedication by Ptolemy, son of Thraseas; cf. v. 65. 3 n.), OGIS, 746 = TAM, ii. 266 (dedication by Antiochus over one of the gates ofXanthus), OGIS, 237 (decree of Iasus in Antiochus' honour), OGIS,
450
INTRODUCTION; REASONS FOR BEGINNING AT OL. 140 IV. 3
240 (dedication from Pergamum, restored), IG, xi. 4· rnr (dedication to Antiochus by Menippus at Delos, restored), Welles, 64 (inscription from Nysa on the Maeander mentioning [J1vnJ6xou -roil p.eyc£\.ou)). The likelihood is that he took it in imitation of the Achaemenidae (Bevan, ]HS, 1902, 241 :ff.) on his return in 205 from his eastern expedition against Euthydemus of Bactria, when he crossed the Hindu Kush into the Kabul valley, and came back through Arachosia, Drangiana, and Carmania (d. xi. 34; App. Syr. r, cb6 -rouSe KA7J8e£r;); cf. Holleaux,Ebttdes, iii. 159-63 ( = BCH, 1908, 266-7o). The edict of Eriza, which, by its omission of the title p.l.ya> despite its supposed dating to 204, led Holleaux (EttJdes, iii. r6s-8r BCH, 1930, 245-62) in his republication of it to date Antiochus' assumption of the title to c. 2oo after Panium, has now, since the discovery of the Nehavend copy (Robert, Hellenica, 7, 1949, 5-22; cf. Clairmont, M~tJs. H elv., 1949, 218-26; A. G. Roos, lrfnem., r9so, 54-63; 1951, 70-72; Aymard, REA, 1949, 327-45), been dated with certainty to 193, and Bikerman's insistence (Seleucides, 193 n. 3) that no chronological conclusions concerning Antiochus' assumption of the title can be drawn from its omission from letters seems confirmed. Of the inscriptions with the title, listed above, those from Nysa and Pergamum are of uncertain date and the rest later than 205. 8. )\pLa.p6.91)'i: Ariarathes IV Eusebes inherited the throne of Cappadacia from his father in c. 220; cf. Diad. xxxi. 19. 6, V7J7TLI.f> 7Ta~·-re.\wr; ovn ~v ~AtKtav; Justin. xxix. r. 4· He married Antiochus' daughter and reigned until c. 163. 4>LAov6.'1'wp: on his accession see ii. 65-69 n. (a). 9. AuKoupyoo;;: for his accession, winter 22ojr9, see 35· 14 n. )\vv£f3a.v: cf. ii. 36. 3 for his appointment in 221. 10. 8 ... auv~J3'l yEvea&a.L: P. the contents of i. 3· r-2. On the occasional use of the phrase Jixatot . •• Kal. IP£.\t1T1Tos to describe the Symmachy (cf. 55· I, v. ros. 3) by the Achaean historian see Feyel, 142 n. S·
3-37. Origins ofihe Social War; its Course till Spring
2I9
3-6. Preliminaries. P. assigns the responsibility for the war to the Aetolian love of plunder; and for a state with an economy such as that of Aetolia this must have been a motive of some weight. But equally important was the new political constellation, since the Symmachy created by Doson hemmed in the Aetolians on all sides (ii. 54· 4 n.), and the Achaeans were trying to win over Messenia (Fine, A}P. 1940, rso ff.; Walbank, Philip, 24). Dorimachus' object in provoking trouble in Messenia was probably to create an incident which might be exploited to justify Aetolian intervention ; cf. Roebuck, 72 n. 26. For P.'s strictures on Aetolian character (3. r) 451
IV. 3
ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR
cf. ii. 43· 9, 45· I, 45· 3-4; and for his treatment of Aetolia generally cf. Brandstaeter, 257 ff. 3. 3. ~ea.Ta To 1Ta.Aa.tov ~9o~: for the early prevalence of piracy see Thuc. i. S· a.UToi~ :.\xa.toi~: 'the Achaeans now that they were alone'. 5. uto~ Nl~eoaTpaTou KTA.: cf. ix. 34· II, for the violation of the Pamboeotian truce; the plundering of the temple of Athena ltonia (25. 2) is part of the same incident, which evidently occurred when Boeotia was at peace with Aetolia, yet not protected by the Macedanian alliance of 224 (cf. xx. 6. 8), i.e. between 229 and 224 (Feyel, 137-8). Flaceliere (289) and Klaffenbach (IG, ix. i2 • xxv, 11. 6s ff.; DLZ, 1948, 98) date it to 220, but less probably. The Pamboeotia was held at the temple of Athena ltonia at Coronea (Strabo, ix. 4II; Paus. ix. 34· I), near the modern village of Mamoura. The temple possessed asylia (Plut. Ages. 19. 2). What little is known of this festival A. Plassart has assembled in BCH, 1926, 397-8; cf. Feyel, Epig. 58 ff. ; Flaceliere, 289 n. 2. EL~ TTJV Twv ~tya.Hwv 1TOAw: Phigaleia (modern Pavlitsa) lay in the western Peloponnese, north of Messene, £1rl JLE-rewpov Kai d1ro-roJLov (Paus. viii. 39· s); impressively situated above the gorge of the Neda (Meyer, RE, 'Phigaleia', cols. 2o67 ff.), it afforded an excellent stronghold for raids into Messenia. Phigaleia had been an Aetolian ally since c. 244, when the Aetolians appeared as allies of the Phigaleans in an agreement of lu01roAm:la between Phigaleia and Messenia (Syll. 472 = IG, v. 2. 419; cf. ]HS, 1936, 68 n. 30); this inscription records provisions for regulating frontier disputes with Messenia. On the expression UVJL1ToAt-rEVoJLivq, which probably here means no more than luo1roAt-reta, see ii. 46. 2 n. 8. TTJV ~eow~v t:tp~VTJV • • • auvTEAEa9E(aa.v: i.e. the general peace established after the war with Cleomenes. Kotvq £lf117v7J is not to be taken in a technical sense, as including all Greek states, among them Aetolia (Bickermann, Rev. phil., I93S· 70-71); it simply indicates a general state of peace in Greece, so that the Aetolians could not find belligerents against whom to practise the custom described in xviii. S· I-3· €t£LVUL 'TOLS' Al-rwAOLS' avEV KOtVOU SOyJLa'TOS' ..• TI]v xwpav ay£w ri]v dJLrpOTipwv. See Larsen, CP, 1937, 27 n. 34· 9. +t).wv ovTwv ~ea.l au11.W.xwv: cf. 6. II, IS. 10. How far the alliance still existed de facto is uncertain, since it was based on an antiSpartan interest which the Aetolians had abandoned some time ago. In IS· IO P. speaks as if it still existed after Caphyae (II-I2). See Fine, AJP, 1940, IS4·
4. 1. To Xupwvo~ Ka.AoOJlEvov E1Ta.UAlov: 'the farmstead known as Chyron's'; on £1ravAtov see Welles, p. 334· 2. EL~ Tn~ auva.px(a.s: 'magistrates' council'; the word designates a
ITS COURSE TILL SPRING 219
IV. 5·9
college of magistrates exercising certain functions in common, and is found in several states, both in Achaea (cf. xxvii. 2. u, xxxviii. 13. 4) and elsewhere; cf. Aymard, ACA, I7J n. I, 322. In Messenia at this date it probably indicates the board of ephors (d. 31. 2). 9. s~· a.UTO ToilTo ••• e€tKa.UaE TOV TOXEJ.10V: the responsibility for the war is to be attributed neither to so small a group as Dorimachus and his colleagues, nor to an incident so trivial as this insult; these are clearly excuses for a policy already decided. See Fine, A] P, 1940, I 57-8. 5. 1. aTpa.TIJyo~ ..• ~p(O"Twv: the chief annual magistrate of the Confederation, elected at an assembly held at Thermum each autumn (cf. Busolt-Swoboda, ii. 152o-1). Ariston was general for 22I/o; his relationship to Dorimachus and Scopas is unknown. On Scopas see Dumrese, RE, Suppl.-B. vii, 'Skopas (6)', cols. I2II-q. 5. To 8€ auv€xov Ti'j~ AhwXlKi'j~ 1rpoTpoTij~: 'the chief argument in his typically Aetolian exhortation'; cf. 3· s. v. 81. I, xviii. 4· I, for this use of the adjective. 7. oOK epEiv EyKAtJI..la.Ta. Toi~ ci.J.Luvo...,Evols: 'they would not (reasonably) lay complaints against them if they defended themselves'; the dative is similar to that found after lyKATJp.a. Aa.yxavm, (cf. Dem. xxxiv. 16), and lpetv though unparalleled in this phrase is probably to be retained. Dorimachus' arguments are probably of Polybian invention, for P. is unlikely to have had reliable information on what Dorimachus told Scopas. 8. ~xa.loi;- Ka~ Ma.KE86ow • • • rijs au...,._.,a.x(a.~: 'promising the Achaeans and Macedonians to join the alliance'. How far this had gone is uncertain; Fine (A}P, 1940, 156) exaggerates it, assuming that the Messenians had fought at Sellasia (Paus. iv. 29. 9; P. is silent). Perhaps there had been a definite move, which had foundered on the possession of Cyparissia and Pylos by Achaea (cf. 25. 4, xviii. 42. 7, Pylos; v. 92. s. xi. 18. 2, Cyparissia; Niese, ii. 4II n. I). 9. oGn I(Olvi}v TWV AhwXwv 1rpoa8E€Q....EV0l auvo&ov: 'without waiting for a general assembly of the Aetolians'. The Aetolians had two annual assemblies of the people, the Thermica held each autumn at Thermum, at which the annual elections took place (cf. v. 8. 5), and the Panaetolica, held at different towns each year, in late winter or early spring; these names apply strictly to festivals with which the assemblies were associated, but are conveniently used of the latter :as well. In addition special assemblies could be called (d. IS· 8). Recently, Kahrstedt has argued (RE, Evvlf>p,ov, I339-44) that the Aetolians possessed no primary assembly, and M. Mitsos (Hesp., 1947. :256--61} that they had more than two (and that of these none was called Thermica or Panaetolica) ; for a refutation of both these views see Larsen, TAPA, I952, 1~33, who also discusses the names applied to the assembly, and its powers and functioning (the latter 453
IV. 5· 9
ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR
vigorous, the former wide). See further Holleaux, fitudes, i. 219-27 (= BCH, 1905, 362-72), 229-30 Klio, 1907, 294-5); Swoboda, Klio, 19II, 456; Busolt-Swoboda, 1521-2. In the present passage P. is speaking quite generally of any assembly, regular or irregular. ollTE TOLS a'II"OKAl]To~s naSa. •.. vfiO"ov: cf. Strabo, viii. 342-3. Phea was the ancient port of Olympia, and lay at the foot of the promontory of Ichthys (Katikolo), on the seaward side; it was protected by the island P. mentions, and its remains form the foundation of the medieval fortress of Pondik6kastro. See Leake, Morea, i. 21; ii. I9I; Bolte, RE, 'Phea', cols. I909-I3 (who reads tP€&0a here: MS. if>l.uioa). Why P. gives the name Phea to the island rather than to the port is not clear; but vijuos cannot mean 'Kiistenplatz' (so Bursian, ii. 30I n. I). 10. 2. Achaean numbers: 3,ooo foot and 300 horse are the numbers of the Achaean brl/..o(rot at Sellasia (ii. 65. 3 n.); they appear again at v. 91. 6. Hence it seems likely that Aratus had dismissed the ordinary levy, and that the forces here mentioned are the briAeKrot; that some were later placed under an officer who was probably a mercenary captain (n. 6 n.) is not evidence for dilution of the force with mercenary troops (on this see Griffith, 106 n. 5). 11'poijyE TTJV i'II'L naTpa.s: evidently down the Alpheius valley to Heraea, and thence north through Psophis. Why he marched east to Cleitor (§ 6, II. 2) is not apparent. 4. 1rpos To 'P(ov: the low-lying Achaean promontory 5 miles northeast of Patrae; cf. xii. I2 a I-3 for the crossing of the Heraclidae by this route. The thought-sequence is complex. Dorimachus is actuated by two motiVeS, Tct p.Jv ~l£aywv£uaVT€S' , , , Tct 0€ U7TOVoa~OVT€S' (§ 3) ; and these are then taken up in the account of his own actions (§ 5. avrol}, the first (his fear) by ro p.~v np&rov J¢>-qop€vov, the second (his desire to provoke the Achaeans) by Jl-€Tct oJ raiiTa 1Tpofjyov KTA. Fine (AJP, I940, I6I n. I44) misses this, when he summarizes: 'Dorimachus, fearing lest the Achaeans should attack him while embarking, sent off his booty and then marched into Arcadia' ; once the booty was aboard, Dorimachus' fear was over, and henceforward he is actuated by quite different motives. 5. 1rpoijyov ..• ws i'll'' '0AUf..L11'la.s: P. appears to misinterpret the Aetolian plan. Presumably he had some authority for stating (§ 4) that the Aetolian fleet had been ordered to pick up Dorimachus at Rhium; hence we may reasonably assume that Dorimachus originally proposed to march through Achaea to Rhium, plundering and provoking war (§ 3). But the thoughts attributed to Dorimachus in 458
ITS COURSE TILL SPRING 219
IV. ro.
IO
§§ 7-9 are Polybian hypothesis, to be judged from their inherent plausibility and what the Aetolians actually did. (a) Dorimachus did in fact retire from Achaea via the Isthmus, not via Rhium, i.e. he changed his plans. (b) P. says (§ 6) that the knowledge that Taurion was at Cleitor caused this change of plan. This is plausible. Taurion is mentioned because the Aetolians were especially afraid of the Macedonians (cf. 19. 6). Had Dorimachus originally intended to march to Rhium through Psophis and Leontium, news that Taurion was at Cleitor would be an indication that he was likely to be cut off; hence the change of route. (c) Dorimachus' change of route took him east through the Langadia-Vytina gap (cf. Meyer, Pel. Wand. 31-47; Leake, Morea, iii. 125) to Methydrium. This suggests that he had now substituted the Isthmus for Rhium as his goal; if so, he hoped to avoid an encounter with Taurion. (d) In §§ 7-8 he is said to have planned to encounter Aratus. But Arates was with Taurion at Cleitor (ro. 2, n. 2), and Dorimachus had no reason to suppose that they would separate. Moreover, it was Aratus who attacked Dorimachus, not the reverse (rr. 5 ff.). Hence it would appear that Dorimachus was not seeking an encounter. His original plan was to plunder and return through Rhium; when faced with the risk of an encounter, he substituted a highland route through Methydrium, Orchomenus, and perhaps Phlius, Nemea, and the Isthmus (the diversion to Pellene, I3. s. was perhaps an afterthought after the victory at Caphyae}. (e) Three further conclusions emerge. First: the reference to Rhium in ro, 8 is to be ignored; for once Dorimachus learnt that the Achaean forces \\ith Aratus and Taurion were still at Cleitor, Rhium was no longer a feasible plan. Second: the Aetolian force at Caphyae was not very large, since it shunned battle with Aratus' depleted force . .Either P. has exaggerated the original numbers (6. 8 n.) or the bulk of the men had embarked at Phea (10. 4). Third: P.'s distinction between Taurion's forces (which Dorimachus feared} and Aratus' forces (which he wished to encounter) is confused and misleading. From ro. 2 and II. 2 it appears that Aratus and Taurion were together during the march from Megalopolis to Cleitor. That they subsequently separated is not stated; but it is possible, for Caphyae is always spoken of as a purely Achaean disaster. It does not seem profitable to discuss Ferrabino's reconstruction (r.v ff.) of these events, since it involves a complete departure from P. 's account. 6. T a.up£wva. j.LETd Tou .•. 1TAlj9ous: cf. 6. 4, Io. 2. 8. 1Tpo~ta.TilaOpllvns: 'ravaging the country ahead, far and wide'; Paton takes the prefix in a temporal sense. 10. 1TEpt MdoSplov Tfjs MEya.Ao1ToA£nSoc;: Methydrium lay about 459
IV.
IO. 10
ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR
3 miles south of modern Vytfna on the river of that name; its ruins, Palatia, stand a little to the north of the village of Nemnitsa. See Meyer, RE, 'Methydrion (I)', cols. I387-9I; Pel. Wand. 3I ff. (for the surrounding district). 11. 1. ol 6E TWll :.\xa~wll iJYEllOllt:S: in effect, Aratus. 2. allaOTpel(taliTES ••. ~K Ti}s K>.t:,Top£as: on the advance north from Megalopolis by Aratus and Taurion see Io. z n., Io. 5 n. (e). 'ITEpl Kacpvas: cf. ii. 52. 2. Caphyae lay at the north-west end of the northern plain of Orchomenus, near modern Kotussa; cf. von Geisau, RE, 'Kaphy(i)a(i)', cols. 1896-7. Aratus' route 'led down the narrow valley of the Aroanius to Tara [Dara], thence ... over Mt Kastania to Khotussa' (Leake, Morea, iii. I25). The Aetolians evidently came via the modern village of Bezeniko into the upper plain of Orchomenus, leaving Orchomenus itself well to the right. 3. TOll lh' a1hou (XoliTO. 'II'OTalloll: not easily identifiable. The western end of this plain was artificially drained (d. Paus. viii. 23. z; cf. § 4, -racfopm Ka.i -rrAElovs 8vafJa..as e'll'l TOll 'OMyupTOY: this is the hill north-east of the plain of Caphyae, modern Mt Skipieza; cf. 70. I, which shows that it lay between Caphyae and Stymphalus, which was presumably Dorimachus' immediate goal. The pass is that leading north-east past modern Kandyla (between Mt Skipieza and H. Konstantinos), and then north between Mt Skipieza and the ancient Apelauron (d. 6g. I n.) along the gorge called Lykorrhevma; cf. E. Meyer, RE, 'Oligyrtos', cols. 2477-9; Frazer, Pausanias, iv. 229-30. 6. Tit~ 'll'poaa.yopEUOllEY(f:l npo'!l'o!iL: Leake (Morea, iii. 129) identifies this with a hill near the entrance to the valley where Kandyla lies, and which leads to the Pass of Lykorrhevma; cf. Frazer, loc. cit. 'E'II'tOTpa.Tov emOT~aa.liTES Toll :.\~ea.pviiva: probably a mercenary captain ; see ro. 2 n. 8. 6l6. TE T0'\1 tca.8o'!I'Ati7!10Y tca.i T~ll OATj'\1 17UliTO.~l'\l: cf. xviii. 22, 5' and, for the comment in general, 8. ro-II (on Thessalians and Cretans). What was specifically noteworthy in the Aetolian KaBo'fTAtap.&s we do not know. In ii. 3· 4 they have the normal branches of an army; and the distinction in IG, ix2 • I. 3, ll. 39-40, between those with -rra.vo'fTAta or ~p.dJwpaKwv, and ,PLA.ol, is quite usual (Launey, i. 200 n. 2). 12. 3. ewpa.tc£TO.\;: 'cuirassed troops' ; evidently distinct from lightarmed (§§ I and 6, £v,wvo~, ,PLA.ol) and heavy-armed (§§ ro and Iz, •a fJa.pla <wv 0-n->..wv, if>a>.a.yyf;a,; cf. x. 29. 6) and probably something 460
ITS COURSE TILL SPRING 219
IV.
14. I
between. At the battle of Mantinea they are classed with the Illyrian mercenaries (xi. II. 4). bt ~: cf. 7-13 n. The Megalopolitan levy is of the whole people, an emergency measure. It does not follow that Megalopolitan reinforcements were part of the original Achaean strategy, nor yet that Aratus' 3,3oo troops (1o. 1-2) contained no Megalopolitans (despite the separate Megalopolitan contingent, over and above the brlAeK-rot, at Sellasia; ii. 65. 3 n.). T'fi Ka.TO. m~Sa.~ f).,_Epq.: from Megalopolis to Caphyae, via Methydrium, the route which must have been followed, is zs-JO miles. 2. !-'E9' tilv tQvTwv ••• TETEAEUTfJK6Ta. I -rwv d.lilKwv lpywv 2v
-ro lltKato-ra-rov).
8. SLci<Jlopov 1i Ka.Ta.aK€uciaj.La.Ta.: 'money or plate'. 9-10. 11'pot1yov ws E'II'L Aouawv: Lusi lay in the valley of Sudena between Cynaetha and Cleitor; its site on the north-west slopes of the hill H. Ilias was confirmed by Austrian excavations in I898---9. The temple of Artemis (cf. ix. 34· 9 for its plundering by Timaeus, probably in 24o) lay about a quarter of an hour's walk east of the town. The games associated with it, -ra 'HfL£paata, are known to us from several inscriptions, and its inviolability (aav.\ov ... vf:vofLLGTat) 464
ITS COURSE TJLL SPRJNG 219
IV.
20
was probably guaranteed by grants of asylia. For the Aetolian grant see IG, ix 2 • I. 135 (cf. F. Poulsen-K. Rhomaios,J. vorliiufiger Bericht uber die diinisch-griechischen A usgrabungen von Kalydon (Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, xiv, 1927, 3· 45)). There is no evidence for the continued existence of Lusi after about 200 B.c., and its territory was ultimately absorbed by Cleitor. For a map, and full discussion of the site, temple, and history see F. Bolte, RE, 'Lusoi', cols. 189-9· 10. Ta 8pi~~a.Ta. Ti]s 8eoG: sacred herds; they are often mentioned in connexion with sanctuaries, e.g. Syll. 407 (fifty oxen given by the coastal Lacedaemonian village of Tyrus to Delphi in 275), 636 (Delphic decree on sacred cattle in 178), 826 G {Amphictyonic decree on revenue therefrom in 117). 12. 1rpoaeo-rpa.T011'E8euaa.v Tfi Twv KXe~Toplwv 1roAe~: having gone via the Aroanios valley, turning west near the site of Maseika, or else west of H. Ilias and down the valley of the Karnesi (see BOlte's map, RE, 'Lusoi', cols. 1893-4). 19. 1. tca.TO. •.• To us tca.~pous TOOTous: here Aratus is said to be collecting the Achaean levy, whereas in 16. 6 the levy is already enrolled before Scerdilai:das' outbreak, the attack on Pylos, and the arrangement with the Aetolians. Clearly the synchronism cannot be pressed to date the Aetolian invasion to August, as the present passage, and the same details in 15. 6, suggest. 5. Eup~1rL8a.v: frequently figures as an Aetolian leader; cf. 59, 6o. 3, 68. 1-69. 2; etc. 8. s~t.. TOY TWV 'Po8lwv E1r' O.UTOV O.ve11'AOuv: since both Macedon and Egypt had abandoned their control of the Aegean, its policing had fallen to Rhodes; cf. 46. 2 n., Costanzi, Klio, 1911, 282-3; Tam, CAH, vii. 718, 752; Holleaux, CAH, viii. 143. 9. u1rep~a8~Laa.s: cf. v. 101. 4· Ships could be taken over the isthmus by means of the 8lo)ucos, a system of rollers for getting them across the 40 stades (5 miles) separating the two seas; cf. Strabo, viii. 335· 11. 1roA~T~KWTEpov ft o-rpO.TTJYlKWTepov: contrast xxii. 10. 4 of Diophanes, iivBpwTros crrpa.T1]ytK. By his action at Caphyae Aratus had weakened the Achaean position and the force of their complaints; now he was determined to have Aetolian provocation accepted as an act of war by the whole Symmachy (cf. 26. 4), and so made no move during this invasion (Ferrabino, 143-4; Walbank, Aratos, 122). 13. tlTUXTJKEva.~ 8Ltca.L6Ta.Ta.: for the oxymoron cf. 18. 7 n. 20-21. Music and Arcadia. P. here follows the theory which makes man's material environment primarily responsible for his character. First propounded by Hippocrates (On climates, waters, and places), it appeats frequently in later writers; cf. Ps.-Arist. Problem. 14. 1. 4866
Hh
465
V. zo
ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR
909 a, for the effects of excessive heat and cold on the temperament· An important part is played in the development of this milieutheory by Poseidonius who (cf. Cic. nat. de&r. ii. 42) also stressed the cultural effects of racial ~<pam> in the Mediterranean area, whereas the purer and more primitive races lived on the fringes of the oecumene. P. may owe his knowledge of the theory to the Stoics, but this has not been conclusively demonstrated. Hirzel (ii. 891 ff.) points out that Cicero (de Jato, 7) attributes it to Chrysippus; and in de diu. ii. 96 f. he attributes it to Panaetius (cf. Norden, Urgesch. 6z). But Hirzel also admits that it was familiar to Hippocrates, Plato, and Aristotle. von Scala (zo4-5) argues that avY£eofWwOa8at (21. r) is Stoic jargon; this is true, but the word is also found in Theophrastus, and in xxxi. 18. 4 P. uses it without any Stoic implications. See further R. Pohlmann, Hellenische Anschauungen iiber den Zusammetr,hang zwischen Natur und Geschichte (Leipzig, 1879), 12 ff.; K. Triidinger, Studien zur Geschichte der griechisck-romischen Ethnographie (Diss. Basel, 1918); Walbank, Class. et med., 1948, 179-81. 20. 3. cflua~KW5 auvTE8E(I)P'IIleva.: 'studied in their relation to natural conditions' (C'..apes). 4. Tt\v y' 6.ATJ8ws jlOUO"~Kt}v: 'significat, puto, se Musicae nomen nunc propria ac uulgari notione accipere ; non ilia latiore et augustiore, . . . qua humaniorum omnium literarum disciplina atque cultura eodem nomine designabatur' (Schweighaeuser); but F. Wehrli (Eumusia: Festgabe fiir Ernst Howald (ZUrich, 1947), 63 n. I) argues that poetry was also included. Stress on the effects of music is traditionaL Thus the valour of the Spartans was associated with their use of the Dorian mode; cf. Plato, Rep. iii. 398-9; Laches, r88 D; Arist. Pol. v (viii}. 7· 8. IJ42 a, d. 5· 24· I340 b, cpav£pov on SvYaTat 1rou>v Tt To T-ij> 1/Jvx-ii> ~8o> ~ p.ovaiJ(~ 1rapaaKwa''""· The theory may go back ultimately to the sophist Damon (d. Plato, Rep. iv. 424 c; von Jan, RE, 'Damon (I7)', cols. 2072-4). 5. ~5 "E,opos «fl'law ..• pi"'a.s: Ephorus of Cyme in Aeolis was the foremost fourth-century Greek historian. His main work, the •luTop[at, in thirty books, went down to the year 356/5· Of his personal life little is knmvn, but tradition made him a pupil of !socrates (d. Cic. de or. ii. 94). P. expresses considerable regard for his work as the first attempt at a universal history (v. 33· 2), and quotes him (ix. r. 4, xii. 2i. i) ; though elsewhere he criticizes him for misunderstanding the Cretan constitution (vi. 45· I, cf. 45-4i· 6 n.), and for having no conception of a land battle (xii. zs f 1). He several times defends him against Timaeus' criticism, and his geographical book (xxxiv) seems copied from the example of Ephorus, who devoted books iv and v to geography (cf. xxxiv. 1. 1-2). See in general Schwartz, RE, 'Ephoros', cols. I-I6; Laqueur, Hermes, 19II, r6r f., J2I f.; G. Barber, The Historian Ephorus (Cambridge, 1935); frag466
ITS COURSE TILL SPRING 219
IV.:o~.o.
9
ments in Jacoby, FGH, 70; commentary in vol. ii c. Each book of Ephorus had a separate introduction, and there was a preface to the work as a whole; cf. Barber, 68-74, who emphasizes the role of the preface as a vehicle of errtp.erpoiJv-rEs Myot (cf. xii. zB. Io). l'lf' a'!f6.11) tca.l. YO'lTE{C2- 'lf«pEtaijx9a.l TOLS &.v9pW'If0lS: 'introduced among (or by) men merely for the purpose of beguiling and bewitching'. Ephorus was probably contrasting p,ova£Krl and lo-ropla., the former, like tragedy, designed to thrill (cf. ii. s6. u), the latter to point a moral and instruct (dm1T7J : ci>,Pe>.da) ; d. Wunderer, ii. 14· P. on the contrary rejects a non-utilitarian view of music. Paton's translation 'for the purpose of deception and delusion' is not quite adequate; see Schweighaeuser's excellent note in Lex. Polyb. drrdT7J. and his translation 'non ad solam oblectationem et ad incantandos animos esse inuentam'. 6. a.uMv tca.l pu81-1ov: 'movement in time to the flute'. Cf. Herodian, iv. z. 9. rrvpp,x.l.Oot£V Ka~ p.~ ou1· r:J1Taa6d17 aV-rot:s ~ TJ.g,,, and later sources (Ps.-Arist. apud Aul. Gell. i. u. I7-I8; Cic. Tusc. ii. 37; Val. Max. ii. 6. 2; Plut. Lye. ;n) agree in making it a Spartan custom. But two proto-Corinthian vases of c. 65o-64o, the Chigi vase (Payne, Protokorinthische F asenmalerci (Berlin, 1933), pls. 28-29) and an aryballos represented in BSA, 1947,93, fig. 7, in an article by H. L. Lorimer on the hoplite phalanx (see aLso ibid. 82), show that the flute-player was also a Corinthian institution. On the Greek av>.os see now K. Schlesinger, The Greek A ulos (London, 1939). The ad.Amyg was primarily an instrument for giving signals like our bugle, and unsuited for marching in step. P.'s point is illustrated in a famous passage of Milton (Paradise Lost, i. 549). 8. tca.Td. vol'ous: ex legibus, Casaubon and Schweighaeuser in his translation, e.~ artis (musicae) legibus, Schweighaeuser in Lex. Polyb. vop.os. Subsequent commentators and translators have chosen one or the other. In view of i. 32. 7 (where the phrase means 'in accordance with military rules') and the usage in § 9, the second is the more likely; cf. Paton, 'in measure'. 9. ~LAo~c\vou Ka.1 T L!-lo9£ou: Philoxenus of Cythera, the dithyrambic poet (435-38o), flourished under Dionysius the younger of Syracuse (Diod. xiv. 46. 6); the story of his being thrown into the quarries for his outspokenness is often told (Diod. xv. 6. 3 ff.; Cic. ad A.tt. iv. 6. 2). Timotheus of Miletus, his contemporary (c. 450-36o), was famous for adding four new strings to the seven-stringed lyre. He was encouraged by Euripides who, Satyrus says (Vit. Eur., fg. 39, col. zz P. Ox. ix, no. u76, p. r67), perhaps correctly, wrote the prologue to the Persae, the famous dithyrambic poem, which was 467
IV.
20.9
ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR
discovered on a fourth-century papyrus (P. Berol. 9875, our oldest extant papyrus, edited by Wilamowitz, Timotheos, die Perser (Berlin, r9o3)) in 1902. Timotheus' authoritative position as a classic model for dithyramb and citharoedic composition, along with Philoxenus and Polyidon, is confirmed by a Teian inscription of about 2oo (Schwyzer, 190). See P. Maas, RE, 'Timotlieos (9)', cols. 1331-7 (who, however, inexplicably attributes this passage to Ephorus; it is dearly personal reminiscence). xopeuouaL ••• TO iS l.LOVUO'LaKOf:S a.lJA'!jT«iS •.• clywvas; 'they institute choral contests to the accompaniment of professional fluteplayers'. The .dwvvataKoi a?JATJTal are professional TexvL-rat organized in guilds (cf. vi. 47· 8, xvi. 21. 8, xxx. 22. 2); see Poland, RE (v A, 2, Nachtrage), 'Technitai', cols. 2473-558; Daux, 356-p. For the dative Reiske compares the phrase TpaycpSot~ Katvot~ in the spurious indictment in Dem. xviii. 54· For epigraphic evidence of these activities in Arcadia cf. Syll. 703, a Delphic inscription of c. n8 honouring two men of Pheneus who set poems to music and produced them with a boys' choir. 10. Tas &.ywyas ••• 11'oLouvTaL: 'they divert themselves'. dywyas appears here only for Staywyck ~1TEL0'0.KTWV clKpOC1j!0.Twv: 'hired musicians'. This sense of aKp6afLa, normal in P., passed into Latin; cf. Cic .. Sest. n6; Arch. 20. &.vel j!Epos (J.Sew AAA'I]AoLs 1TpoaT0.TTovTES: 'calling for a song from each in tum'. Athenaeus (xiv. 29) cites Philochorus for the Spartan custom, at supper, of singing one of Tyrtaeus' hymns in tum as a solo, the polemarch giving a prize of meat to the best. Something similar may be implied here; or P. may refer to the custom of singing alternate verses in an amoebean contest, as in Virgil (Eel. 1· 4), 'ambo florentes aetatibus, Arcades ambo I et can tare et responto the dere parati' (together with Eel. Io our earliest literary 'Arcadia'). T. Keightley, ad loc., attributes the invention to Virgil's acquaintance with P., a conjecture independently developed by B. Snell, Die Entdeckung des Geistes, ed. 2 (Hamburg, 1948), 268 ff. 12. Ejl~«T'I]pL«jlET' a.uAou Ka.i. TO.~ews claKouvTES: 'practising marching strains on the flute while on parade'. i~tf3aT~pta (sc. 4afLaTa or ~tt!AYJ) are v6~tot r.oAefLtKol, the rhythms to which soldiers march into battle; cf. Thuc. v. 70 (quoted in 20. 6 n.); Schweighaeuser quotes a scholiast to Hermogenes: AaKeOat~t6vwt r.po~ TOV i~tf3a~ptov TOV avAoO pvOfLoV KaTa r.o>te~tlwv Jxc.!Jpovv; Polyaen. i. ro; see further the note of I. A. Fabricius to Sex. Empiricus, adv. math. vi. 357· But Capes and Strachan-Davidson prefer to take i~tf3a~pta as 'marches', and it is possible that the sense 'marching to music' has developed out of 'music for marching'. This would certainly give a better contrast with dp~aets; and the absence of parallel examples is not a serious objection. If this meaning is accepted, JfLf3aT~pta and opx~aEtS Will 468
ITS COURSE TILL SPRING 219
IV,
22.
8
be the objects of lmodKvuvra£, as well as the accompanying participles; otherwise bn&lKvuvra£ is used absolutely, 'they make a display, show off'. 21. 1. TT)v ..• a.uToupy£a.v: cf. Thuc. i. 141. 3, aVTovpyol T£ ycip £la£ llcAoTToVll'fJato£.
2. KO.Ta TaS
~6V~KaS
Ka.l TaS OAOOXEPELS 8La.aTci.O'ELS: cf. XXXii. 4· 2,
Tas lfJv£Kas aUaTclO'€£S' Kat TGS o>..oaxcpci:S' 0£a~opas- TijS' olKOVfLEV!JS'·
Translate 'in accordance with our nationality and the distance we are separated from each other'; Strachan-Davidson renders ' ... or according to yet wider diversities' ; but o£ciaTaats- suggests a spatial interval (cf. i. r8. 4, xxxvi. 16. 8, lv omaTclm£), and geographical separation played a part in the milieu-theory (2o--21 n.). 3. To Ti}s cpoa£ws a.~6a.8es Ka.t aKAT)pov: 'the stubbornness and harshness of nature or of their natures' (cf. § 4, T6 T1j> ¢vxfls aTepa.fLvov). 8. TT)v !lEyaAT)V acpa.yf)v 'l!'oLt1aa.VTES: between the entry of Cynaetha into the Achaean Confederation c. 241/o (]HS, 1936, 71) and the events of 220 nothing is known of the internal history of the town beyond the remarks in 17· 4· The 'great massacre' is evidently one of those there referred to, and must have brought the pro-Spartan party into power; and since it is unlikely that this party would have been allowed to send envoys openly to Sparta through the cities of eastern Arcadia, once these were part of the Confederation, it is probable that the incident is to be dated between 241jo and the accession of Mantinea and Orchomenus to the Confederation (which was between 235 and 229: cf. ii. 46. 2 n.). The revulsion against the Cynaethans may have been partly political; but it also expressed the still powerful feelings about blood-guilt (d. § 9, KafJapfUSv). Purification from this involved a sacrifice ; cf. Eurip. Suppl. n96, GV OE TEfLVEW ad.yw XP1J a', aKoVE fLOU. For the purification of a whole community by human sacrifice cf. Herod. vii. 197. See Hamburg, RE, KafJapw)s, cols. 2513-19. 11. av 'II'OT' a.uTOtS 0 6eos eiS 8~: a proverbial expression, quoted by Aristotle (Nic. Eth. ix. 9· I. II69 b) from Eurip. Or. 667, lhav o' 0 oalfLWV €0 0£0tp, Tl Oei·l>..wv; 22. 4. 01ToAa.!l~C..vovTEs taov a.&Tois llneiva.L Tijs 'II'OALTELa.s: P.'s picture of the troubles at Sparta as the growing pains of a people unused to freedom is disingenuous and inadequate; the existence of a strong pro-Cleomenean faction was the real issue, as is evident from the fact that three ofthe five ephors chose theAetolianside (cf. q. 4-5 n.). 8. TO Tijs Xa.XK~oLKou TE!l£vos: the temple of Athena TToA£axos of the Brazen House (through a slip Paton says 'Artemis') was built by Gitiadas (Paus. iii. 17. z) about the middle of the sixth century (cf. Dickins, BSA, 1906/7, I3i ff.). Its remains were discovered by excavators from the British School in 1907 to the north of the 469
IV.
22.
8
ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR
acropolis, just above the theatre. It was famous for the starving to death of Pausanias (Thuc. i. 134 ff.) and for the asylum and betrayal of Agis (Plut. Agis, 16 ff.). Ferrabino (148 n. :i) argues that the Spartan mobilization preceded the Aetolian departure from the Peloponnese; but P. makes it clear that the object was not to collaborate with the Aetolians, but to carry out an internal coup. 11. TauT• civaKpouol:levou: 'beginning to speak in this fashion'. 23. 1. 5laT'lpei:v •.• rrcivTa Ta 5iKala Kal ~L)u'Jv8pwrra: the phraseology is that of the Hellenistic chancelleries; cf. Syll. 705 B, l. 49, O'I.IVT7)pfjuat Td lK 1TaAaLCUJJ xp6vwv 8£?iopha Tlp.ta Kat ,Ptl.av8pw1Ta. Similarly in § 2' for the wording aup.p.ltaww; ••. Ot~:Alx87Jaav aKoAovOws Tats lvToAai:;; (cf. ii. 48. 8, iv. 64. 2) there are parallels in OGIS, 751, 11. 2 ff.; Insch. Mag. 18, I. 12. Cf. Schulte, 70-71. 2. rrepi. TO nap8evlOV 5pos: :Mt. Parthenium lay between Tegea and Argos (modern H. Elias) ; Philip evidently came via Argos and Hysiae. 5. To Tou ~aalhews auv£5pLov: the King's Council consisted of his Friends, {>.ot; cf. v. 2. I n., and for a sitting of the Council, v. 41. 6 ff. (in Syria). It went back to the Argead kingdom, but possessed none but advisory powers. Sometimes it acted as a court in cases of high treason (d. v. 16. 5-8; cf. Arrian, A nab. i. 25. 5; Diod. xix. 46. 4); and a recently found inscription shows the ,Pl>.ot acting as judges in the distribution of booty (Roussel, Rev. arch. 3, 1934. 39 ff., col. iii). See Beloch, iv. 1. 383; Corradi, 318-43, especially 331 ; Mornigliano, A then., 1933, 136-41 ; Walbank, Philip, 2-3; Bikerman, Seleucides, 40 f.; Ferguson, Gnomon, 1935, 521. It is noteworthy that on this occasion Aratus, an Achaean, took part in the proceedings (24. 3l· 8. ovrre;p :c\A.£~av5pos expt}aaTO e'l~aloLs: cf. v. 10. 6, ix. 28. 8. In 335, on a rumour of Alexander's death, the Theban democrats assaulted the Cadrnea, and seemed likely to cause a revolt throughout Greece. Marching in fourteen days from Peliurn on the Illyrian frontier Alexander defeated the Thebans and seized the city. By a decision nominally of the League of Corinth the city was razed, except for Pindar's house, and many of the population enslaved (Arrian, A nab. i. 7--9; cf. Glotz-Cohen, iv. I. 48-49; Tarn, Alex. i. 6-8). 24. 1. Erri. rriiaLv: 'after all the rest'. Philip's age here is probably a repetition of the statement in 5· 3, where it referred to autumnwinter 221. Cf. 2. 5 n. and Philip, 295. 2. Ka.l. l:lciALaTa Twv 'l!'a.paKeLI:!Evwv: 'especially those very close to him'. P.'s distinction suggests that he is following a source which merely records Philip's decision, and that the attribution to Aratus is P .' s surmise. 4. Twv aul:ltJ.cixwv: this implies that Sparta is a member of the Syrnmachy; cf. 9· 6 n.
470
ITS COURSE TILL SPRING 219
IV. 25. 3
8. E1TLKUp6118£Laf]s . • • Tfjs yvw(-LT]S: a loose expression, since the Council could not ratify in any real sense, 23. 5 n. 'Aratus' motives were to try to win Sparta by clemency; mild punishment would drive her nearer to Aetolia, while annihilation, by altering the balance within the Peloponnese, might create internal problems within the Achaean League itself. There was always a potential rivalry between Achaea proper and Arcadia, and the disappearance of Sparta would have rendered Megalopolis less vulnerable and so more influential' (Philip, 31). Ferrabino's theory (149) of a 'deal' with the proAetolian party at Sparta at the expense of Messenia (postulating the return of the Ager Denthaliates to Sparta) is wholly fantasy. nnpa.'Lov Tc;>V a.uTou cJ!(Xwv : cf. V. I 7. 6. op1eous 1T£pL ..w9,;pofJs dcf>povp{)Tovs d.cf>opo>.oyryrovs, xpwp.lvovs To's lSlms 1TOA£T<Evp.a.cn ('one long tautology', Tam, Alex. ii. zos n. I, with a good discussion of a.i:rrovop.ta and i>.w9,;pla.), xv. 24. z; OGIS, 223 ( = Welles, 15), 228 (freedom from tribute); Diod. xix. 61. 3, Elva£ Tovs "EA>.11vas /1.1raVTas l>.,;v9lpovs d.cf>povp{)Tovs a{JTov6p.ovs. Cf. Jones, Greek City, IOI ff.; below, 27.4-7 n. 6-7. Claim on Aetolia. It is not clear whether§ 6 and§ 7 refer to two categories of territory or one. If the Symmachy is merely pledging itself to recover the independence of cities and lands annexed by Aetolia since 229, the scope of the resolution is small, and covers only: (a) Epirus: Ambracia and Amphilochia (d. Flaceliere, 252 n. x, 'soit avant, soit peu apres la mort de Demetrios'); perhaps too the town of Cassope (d. Insch. Mag. 32, 1. 51; for the date, Flaceliere, ibid., against Busolt-Swoboda, ii. 1476 n. 5, who make it adhere to Aetolia only in 206-202). See further, Beloch, iv. 2. 384-5. (b) Thessaly: Phthiotic Achaea, annexed on Doson's accession, and not recovered along with Phthiotis, Thessaliotis, and Hestiaeotis. Cf. v. 97· 5. 99· z (Melitaea and Phthiotic Thebes), ii. 45· 2 n.; Fine, TAPA, 1932, 133 ff.; Walbank, Philip, I I n. 3· In practice, however, the allies sought to recover territory annexed by Aetolia long before 229, and the second clause has an air 472
ITS COURSE TILL SPRING 219
IV.
26. 2
of being designed to give them a free hand for almost any territorial claims; for instance, the following territories might be regarded as forcibly annexed: (c) Acarnania: the areas west of the Achelous, where Aetolia held Stratus (63. 10), Oeniadae (65. 5), Metropolis (64. 4), and Phoetiae (63. 7) since her compact with Alexander of Epirus (on the date see ii. 45· 1 n.). (d) Phocis: western Phocis was still largely in Aetolian hands, perhaps since c. 258 (Flaceliere, 199); eastern Phocis had been seized c. 234-230 (Feyel, ro6), but had recovered its independence, probably in 228 (§ 2 n.). The Aetolians had now lost Anticyra, Ambrysus, and Daulis, along with everything east of Parnassus; but this decree would encourage the allies to attack the towns still held. (e) Eastern Locris: the district of Scarpheia and Thronium was Aetolian since before 262 (Flaceliere, 198), and remained so after Opuntian Locris detached itself c. 228 (Feyel, 125). Further, the second clause (§ 7) would serve as a slogan for the 'liberation' of any states in the Aetolian Confederation which, unlike the territories covered in§ 6, had no connexion with the members of the Symmachy. 8. auva.va.KOfU€ia9a.~ • .• To is 1>.f1ci>~KTuoaw ... Tous v611ous: throughout the third century from 290 or even 300 the Aetolians controlled Delphi (which was probably bound to the League by isopoliteia; Flaceliere, 369-70) and the Amphictyonic Council. The Council was controlled by exercising the votes of states forming part of the League, and though Macedon and Thessaly were not excluded they declined to appear on a council dominated by Aetolia. Beloch (iv. 2. 385 ff.) has established that the Aetolian-controlled vote rose in proportion to the territorial expansion of the Confederation (cf. Treves, Athen., 1934, 397). The rest of Greece never acquiesced in the Aetolian usurpation of the oracle, and the first text which testifies clearly to it, the ithyphallos sung by the Athenians at the Eleusinian festival of 291, describes Aetolia as a sphinx which has seized not only Thebes but the whole of Hellas, T~V o' ovx~ f97]{3Wv, ill' 6..\:i)s- ri]> 'E>.>.aoos- I ucf>tyya 7T€p,Kpa-rovuav . .. (d. A then. vi. 63 = Duris of Samos, FGH, 76 F 13); Flaceliere, 65, 372. By the present clause, the allies hoped to convert the war into a Sacred War for the liberation of Delphi.
26. 2. tva. . . . ~Kci>€pwa~ traVT€!; . . . TOV atro Ttl!> xwpa.s tr6A€f10V: cf. 30. 2, xxxix. 3· 8; 'that all might wage offensive war against the Aetolians'. Schweighaeuser is uncertain whether to translate -rdv d7Td Tfj> xwpas- 7TOA€fLOV 'warfare with full forces' or 'offensive warfare'. Strachan-Davidson prefers the former 'by public authority and with all the forces of each community'. But in Xenophon (A nab. iii. 4· 33) lK xwpas- OpfLB.V is 'to take the initiative from one's own position', 473
IV. 26.
2
ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR
contrasted with fighting an attacking enemy while one is on the march; and in general the sense 'offensive warfare' is to be preferred, cf. Feyel, I39 n. 2. The war-motion required separate ratification by each state. 3. ~'1Te111fe ... TOt9 AhwA.oi9 E'ITtaToA~v: that Philip still hoped to prevent war (so Holleaux, 149 n. I) is unlikely, since the programme framed at Corinth, especially in relation to the Amphictyonic Council, was designed to strengthen the Macedonian hold on Greece ; Walbank, Philip, 32. Perhaps the king hoped to postpone hostilities until spring 219, or merely to put the responsibility for the breach squarely on Aetolian shoulders. The contents of Philip's note may go back to a sound source, but the phraseology is P.'sown (cf. 4· 4, 17. 2). 6. 'IT PO Tfj9 •.• auvo8ou: the autumn meeting held at Thermum for the elections; cf. 5· 9 n., 27. I, 37. 2. 7. Et!; TI,v Ka.9T)Kouaa.v auvo8ov: the regular autumn Achaean assembly, evidently held towards the autumn equinox (Aymard, ACA, 264); cf. § 8, 27. 9, 29. I; also 27. I, 37· 2. See Larsen, 8r. TO A.cl.cjlupov E'ITEK~pu~a.v Ka.Ta Twv AhwA.wv : cf. 36. 6, after achievements by Lycurgus the Spartans E1TEK~pv~av To lvufwpov against the Achaeans, and Machatas 1Tapa7TA*na Alyo117'€.uCwOat, normally quoted (since Schweighaeuser) to illustrate the present passage, is in fact relevant only to pvata. 474
ITS COURSE TILL SPRING 219
IV. 27.4
8. npo~ T~v j3ouX~v iv Aly£1f:l: cf. ii. 46. 6. Here the flov/..1) is the League Council, which would normally be present on the occasion of a utivo8os-; cf. Larsen, 81. Ta npoiimi.pxovTa. cjnXO.v9pwna. • • • aVEvEwaa.vTo: a reference to Doson, Philip's only predecessor with whom friendly relations had previously existed; but Trp6yovot is used of a single person in Syll. 434-5 (Ptolemy I) and OGIS, 222 (Seleucus I), cf. Tarn, Bactria, 450 n. 3; Welles, 8I-82. Ta TrpoiiTrapxoVTa tPtitd.v8puma will include the renewal of the annual oath of loyalty to the king of Macedon (Livy, xxxii. 5· 4), the king's right to summon an Achaean assembly (85. 3, v. 1. 6), and the law forbidding the proposal of any measure contrary to the Macedonian alliance (Livy, xxxii. 22. 3).
27. 1. auvuljla.vTO~ TOU Tc7>V apxa.~pEaCII>v xpovou: cf. ii. 2. 8 n.; Strabo, x. 463 (Ephorus). ;,v Blppms- rii> AlTwAlas-, mrov TaS' ¥xatpw·lasTf0L£t(J'8at Trihptov attTOt> l(J"Tlv. On Scopas cf. 5· I ff. 4-7. Parallels to the Aetolian behaviour from Spartan history. For the seizure of the Cadmea in 382 see Xen. Hell. v. 2. 25 ff.; Diod. xv 20. Iff.; Plut. Pelop. 5; Nepos, Pelop. I. Phoebidas, the commander of a Spartan force en route for Chalcidice, was approached by Leontiadas, one of the Theban polemarchs, while encamped near the town, and by his help was able to seize the citadel during the siesta, at the time when this was occupied by a women's festival. Leontiadas then proceeded to Sparta and persuaded the authorities to recognize Phoebidas' action. According to one unreliable version (here .referred to) Phoebidas was fined; but the Spartans continued to maintain their garrison. On the Peace of Antalcidas (387/6) see i. 6. 2 n., vi. 49· 5 ; on the tautology of l/..w8£pla and a?n-ovop.la see Tarn, Alex. 203 ff. against Wilcken (5.-B. Berlin, I929, 292-3), who would distinguish them as freedom from outside domination, and the right to determine one's own constitution. The expulsion of the Mantineans took place a year later, when Agesipolis, the son of Pausanias, made a winter attack on the town, broke down the walls with the aid of a diverted river, and compelled surrender; the leaders of the democratic party were allowed to go into exile but the inhabitants were divided up among the original constituent villages, and these were given oligarchic governments (Xen. Hell. v. 2. Iff.; Diod. xv. 5; Plut. Pelop. 4; Paus. viii. 8. 7). These two incidents, drawn from a period of four years in the second decade of the fourth century, add nothing to the picture of Aetolian behaviour, but fall easily into association with the antiSpartan propaganda of 3I-33 (cf. 31. 3-33. 12 n.); indeed, like those chapters, they give the impression of a last-minute addition to his text made by P. about ISO, when Sparta was stirring up Roman feeling against Achaea. The verbal parallel between § 4 and Diod, 475
ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL WAR ~ , \ p.£V \ A. tP, 'T xv. 20. 2, aK£ol1.tf.WV£Ot ••• TOV ovot,..,£aav fi'>TJP.'waav XPTJp.a.a,, T~V Ot ppovpd.v OfJK ifijyov eK T(OV 8TJfJwv, is sufficiently close to suggest
IV. 27. 4
• o£ o£
~·A
j
j
a common source. It is generally agreed that Diodorus is here following Ephorus (cf. Schwartz, RE, 'Diodoros (37)', col. 679); and P. may be doing the same. On the other hand, 33 points to the use of Callisthenes, whose Helle1~ica began with the Peace of Antalcidas (33· 2 n.); and it seems established (Jacoby, RE, 'Kallisthenes (2)', coL 1706) that this work was one of Ephorus' sources for the thirty years 387/6-357/6. Hence there is a decided possibility that these last-minute additions in 27 and 31-33 were associated with the reading or re-reading of the appropriately anti-Spartan Hellenica of Callisthenes. 7. E:av TLtmioos bnroA~v (cf. v. I. I); on the elections see above. 8. KUTa ••• Tous uuTous tcaLpous: a loose synchronism. The war between Rhodes and Byzantium (see below) fell at any rate in part within the Olympiad year 220/19, for it took place in 220 (cf. 48. 3: Achaeus had recently assumed the royal title, and this was in summer 220 (v. 57· 5)). From 53· 1 it appears that peace was made before winter, since the Rhodian ships sailed on to Crete; Niese, ii. 383 n. 5· 38-52. Situation of Byzantium: War of Rhodes and Bithynia against her 38. 1-45. 8. This study of the situation of Byzantium, its complete control of the Pontus trade by sea, and its vulnerability by land, consists of two topographical sections and sandwiched between them (39· 7-42. 8) a hydrographical section, which arises out of the reference to the strong current through the Bosphorus (39· 7), and seeks to explain in detail the hydrography of the Pontus and Maeotis. For this central section P. probably drew on Strato of Lampsacus, tl tf>vu,Kos (cf. xii. 25 c 3 f.), Theophrastus' pupil, and head of the Peripatetic school from 287 to 269, who in turn drew on such Peripatetic teachings as are to be found in Arist. Meteor. i. 14. J5I a 19ff., ii. I. 353 a 32 ff. See von Scala, I89-2oo (not always convincing); Capelle, RE, 'Straton (13)', cols. 3oo--I (evidence linking P.'s account with that attributed by Strabo to Strato inadequate) ; C. M. Danov, Polybios und seine Nachrichten iiber den Ostbalkan (Sonderschrift des bulgarischen archaologischen Instituts, no. 2, Sofia, I942), 61-64 (German summary); Walbank, Robinson Studies, i. 470-4. That other accounts also existed, to which P. took exception, appears from 39· 11-4o. I, 40. 3, 42. 7; the polemical note here is typically Polybian, and not copied from Strato (so von Scala, I99-200). 486
SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM
IV. 38.6
The two 'geographical' sections (39· r--6 and 4.3· 1-44. 1o) are of a different character, and appear to draw on material derived from '"*'Pt'">.o,, marine handbooks containing lists of coastal towns and harbours, distances, names of capes and temples, and occasional mythological and historical information. P. probably goes back to this through some literary intermediary ; and though this might be Diophantus or Demetrius of Callatis, both of whom wrote on the Black Sea in the third century (Robinson Studies, i. 474 n. z6), there is no evidence which enables us to attach a name to it. That P. had himself visited Byzantium is assumed by Danov (op. cit. 6:z-63); but he does not say so either in 38. II-IJ or in 40. r-J, where one Inight reasonably have expected some such personal reference (cf. Thommen, Hermes, 1885, zr8), and his narrative nowhere requires such an assumption (for the suggestion of oral evidence in 40. 8 may well come from Strato : see ad loc.). Nor is there any reason to assume that this section was written later than the rest of iv {cf. 40. 2 n.). For fuller discussion see Robinson Studies, i. 469-79. 38. 1. Etnca.tpcha.Tov ••• TO'ITov: the splendid situation of Byzantium on its promontory between the Golden Horn, the Bosphorus, and the Propontis was recognized in the famous characterization of Calchedon as 'the city of the blind' (Herod. iv. r44; Strabo, vii. 320; Tac. Ann. xii. 63). P. has the fullest discussion of its site; see also Dio, lxxv. ro; Zosim. ii. 30. z; Procop. Aed. i. 5; and for modern bibliography Oberhummer, RE, 'Byzantion (1)', cols. ur6-27; E. Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, chapter r7; H. Merle, Die Geschichte der Stiidte Byzantion und Kalchedon, Diss. Kiel, 1916. 4. 9pip.p.a.Ta.: 'cattle'; this reading ofF is preferable to AR ~~pf-LaTa, for it goes better with 'slaves' (Beloch, iv. I. 292 against Wunderer); cf. 75· z. P. classes cattle and slaves equally as necessities, not as luxuries (7r€pwvala). ot ICO.TG TOV no\IT0\1 ••. TO'ITOt: the cities of the Euxine and the kingdom of Bosporus. For two centuries the Aegean world had imported Pontic fish, grain, honey, iron, flax, hides, hemp, wax, and slaves; and though the shift of the economic centre to the new monarchies had reduced the importance of the trade between Greece and the Euxine, it remained considerable. P.'s statement that the Black Sea now sometimes imported corn is confirmed by an early secondcentury inscription from Istrus'i(S. Lambrino, Dacia, 3-4, I927-32, 400 ff.), honouring a Carthaginian who imported grain and sold it in the city, grain probably grown at Carthage. See Rostovtzeff, SEHHW, sBs-6oz, I46z n. 20. 6. '!TOT~ p.Ev ra.l.cha.Ls ICTA.: see 45· Ioff. for the clash with Gauls and Thracians. The latter did not become a danger until after the period of which P. is here writing; cf. 46. 4·
IV. 38.
10
SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM
10. EUEpyho.L TrnVTWY uTrnpxovTES KTA.: apparently echoing a Byzantine source, containing the sort of claims which may well have been made by the embassies mentioned in 46. 5· But P. is also thinking of later barbarian attacks {cf. xxii. q. I2; App. Mac. xi. 1. 5; Livy, xlii. r3. 8). 39. 1. Circumference of the Pontus: 22,000 stades = 2,750 milia passuum = 2,567 English miles. This is a fair guess. Strabo (ii. r25) makes it 25,ooo stades; and modern estimates make the Black Sea about 63o miles from east to west (Burghaz to St. Nikolai) and 330 miles from north to south (Odessa to Melen Su), with an area of about 18o,ooo square miles (Black Sea Pilot 1 , 1920, 4). O'TOt'Q.TO. ••. lhTTcl KO.Tcl s~a.t'ETpov .•• KdJlEVa.! viz. the Thracian and Cimmerian Bosphori, which P. elsewhere reckons as soc milia passuum apart (xxxiv. r5. 5 Pliny, Nat. hist. iv. 77), an exaggerated figure. P. does not imply that these two mouths lie on the same meridian, but merely that they are at opposite ends of the sea (cf. Class. et med., 1948, 175 n. r, against R. Uhden, Phil., 1933, 303 f.; Thomson, 209). Circumference of the M aeotic Lake: S,ooo stades = r,ooo milia passuum = 933 English miles. Like all the ancients P. exaggerates its size (d. Herod. iv. 86, almost as big as the Pontus; Strabo (ii. 125, vii. 310) and Agathemerus (3. ro = GGM, ii. 474) make its circumference 9,ooo stades; and in Nat. hist. iv. 78 Pliny gives it 1,4o6 or 1,125 milia passuum). The length from the Egurcha mouth of the Don to the Tonka of Arabat in the extreme south-west is in fact c. 2oo miles (Black Sea Pilot', 1920, 5) and the total area 14,515 square miles. 2. nl" JlE" Ma.wnv O.va.TrA1]pOVJ1Ev1]V l'mo -Tou-Twv: a loose expression, for the Don is the only river of any size running into the Sea of Azov, though it had indeed (cf. iii. 37· 4) both a European and an Asiatic shore. On the rivers of Scythia see Herod. iv. 47 ff. 3. The Cimmerian Bosphorus: 30 stades = c. 3'5 miles. In fact, at its narrow point, between Cape Pavlovski and Tuzla Spit, the channel is not more than three-quarters of a mile wide. The length of the strait depends on the points selected for measuring. P.'s figure of 6o stades is reasonable for the region around Kerch, but the name Straits of Kerch is given to a channel 25 miles long and varying from 8 miles to three-quarters of a mile in breadth. As regards its depth, 'it is much encumbered with shallow banks, but a narrow channel has been dredged through V~.>ith a least depth of 24 ft. A depth of only 22ft. was reported in the Pavlovski channelin 1919' (when no doubt dredging had been neglected) (Black Sea Pilot1 , 1920, 318). 4-6. The Thracian Bosphorus: 120 stades 14 miles. This is the figure given by Herodotus (iv. 85) and Dionysius of Byzantium 488
SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM
IV. 39· 7
(p. z. 10 ed. Glingerich). Arrian (Peripl. M. Eux. q, 37 = GGlYI, i. 38o, 401) makes it 16o stades, adding in the section between the Hieron, which P. (§ 6) takes as the beginning of the strait, and the Black Sea proper. Modern calculations make the length zB·s km. in a straight line, and along the actual water course 31·7 km. (Oberhummer, RE, 'Bosporos (1 )', cols. 742-3); the Black Sea Pilot7 , 3, gives it as 17 miles, including windings. P. records the width at the Hieron and at the Byzantium-Calchedon crossing. The latter he reckons at 14 stades, but other authorities make it 7 (Dion. Byz., p. 3· 4 Giingerich; Pliny, Nat. hist. v. 150, quingenti passus-though it is mille passus in Nat. hist. ix. 51) or 12 (Schol. Dion. Per. 142); straight across from Byzantium it is in fact z·s km. (about 13·5 stades). The width at the Hieron was 7 stades according to Ps.Scylax, 67. Gillius (GGM, ii. 9· l. 15; 13, l. 7) assumes that Dionysius (p. 2. II Giingerich) is referring to the Hieron, when he makes the width at the narrowest point 4 stades; but it is more likely that Dionysius here refers to the crossing at the Hermaeum (cf. 43· 2). P. makes the Hieron crossing 12 stades, but he may be giving the actual distance between the two temples, as Gillius (GGM, ii. 9} suggests. The width of the strait at this point is about I km. P.'s higher figures may of course be due to the use of a different stade; but his figure for the length of the Bosphorus is against this hypothesis. 6. 'l'o KQ.AOIJp.Evov 'IEpov: cf. Dion. Byz., pp. 27. 2o, 29. 31-30. 21 {= Gillius); Oberhummer, RE, 'Bosporos (1}', cols. 752-3. This Hieron was dedicated to Zeus Oilp•os (Arr. Peripl. M. Eux. zs. 4; anon. Peripl. M. Eux. 90), and was traditionally built by Phrixus. It stood on the Asiatic shore near Anadoly Kawaghy, about 7-'0 km. from the mouth of the Pontus. Jason's sacrifice to the twelve gods is mentioned by Apollonius Rhodius (ii. 532). who, however, places it on the outward journey; a scholiast to Apollonius (ad loc.) associates it with this site. Diodorus (iv. 49· 1-2), following Dionysius Scytobrachion (cf. Diod. iii. 52. 3; Schwartz, RE, 'Diodoros (37)', cols. 673 ff.), has the same version asP. The precise date of Dionysius is uncertain, though it will be in the second century B.c., and P. may have known his Argonautica; but more probably he took this information from his general source for this section. For similar mythological derivations cf. 43· 6 (BoOs}, 59· 5 (T£fxos); from these two passages it seems clear that the implied subject of cpao-t here is ot p.fi8ot, 'legend has it that .... ' To KQ.'I'Q.V'I'ttcpu KElp.evov IQ.pQ.'Il'tE~ov: today Rumeli Kawaghy; Oberhummer, RE, loc. cit., col. 751. For the two temples cf. Strabo, vii. 319. 39.7-42. 8. The hydrography of the Pontus: see above, 38. I-45· 8 n., on the probable source.
IV. 39· 7
SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM
39. 7-10. Causes for the current from the Maeotic lake through the Pontus. P. gives two: (1) the overflow of water entering from the many rivers draining into these seas, (2) the overflow of water displaced by alluvial matter deposited by these rivers after heavy rains. Of these arguments the first is already found in Aristotle (Meteor. ii. I. 354 a 12 ff.), and something very like the second in Strato (cf. Strabo, i. so), who also recognized that the large number of rivers flowing into the Pontus and the Maeotis helped to account for the current in the Bosphorus (Strabo, i. 49). Strato differs from P. in that he combines the theory about silting-up with a curious error for which Strabo censures him; because, he argues, as a result of alluvial deposits the Pontus is shallower than the Propontis, there is naturally a flow of water from the one into the other-as if, Strabo comments, seas behaved like rivers. Berger (Die geographischen Fragmente des Eratosthenes (Leipzig, x88o), 61 ff.) argues that Strato cannot have committed this absurdity, and that he must have said, like P., that the current was caused by displacement; but in fact Strata's error is already in Aristotle, who describes the downward slope of the sea-bed from the Maeotis by successive stages to the Atlantic (Meteor. ii. I. 354 a 12 ff.), and like Strato attributes this slope to silting at the upper levels. P. accepts the argument about silting, but has nothing about the behaviour of seas running, like rivers, in the direction of the lowest sea-floor--either because he saw through it or because it was unnecessary in his own simplified account. This omission is not a strong argument against the view that Strata was P.'s source for this section. See, for fuller discussion, Walbank, Robinson Studies, i. 470-4. Modern research confirms P.'s thesis only in part. As a result of observations made by H.M.S. Shearwater, Commander W. J. C. Wharton, R.N., in August and October 1872, it was ascertained that the flow of water through the Bosphorus and Hellespont was considerable, and that it was due most probably to (r) the prevalence of north-east winds in the Black Sea, (2) the excess of water received from the large rivers over the amount lost by evaporation, and (3) the difference in specific gravity between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean ; and that of these the wind was the most important factor. Black Sea Pilot7 , 1920, 21-22 ..
7. t:ts vt:plypa.cpf]v O.yydwv ~ptO}LM.>v: 'into basins of limited circumference' (Paton). For dyy€fov, 'sea-bed', cf. Plato, Cr#ias, III A. u'D'a.pxouawv 8' i~epuat:wv: according to Eratosthenes, following Strato (cf. Strabo, i. 49), the Pontus had originally no outlet, but eventually the water piled up and forced a passage through at the Bosphorus (for a Samothracian legend about this cf. Diod. v. 47· 3-4); similarly at the Pillars of Hercules. P. omits this part of Strata's argument; but it was irrelevant to his point, and the omission (like 490
SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM
lV. 40.5
that of the argument about the sloping sea-bed: 7-ro n.) is not evidence against his use of Strato. 11. oOK E~ Et£1TOp~KWV ••• s~TJYTJI'a.Tio)\1: P. is evidently attacking some specific alternative version based on 'merchants' yarns' ; for his prejudice against merchants and disbelief in their stories see 42. 7; Class. et med., 1948, r6r-2, comparing P.'s attitude towards Pytheas. See Robinson Studies, i. 470 n. 5· ~K riJs KaTO. cpuow 6ewplas: 'from the principles of natural science'; Oewpla is used objectively to mean 'theory' elsewhere; cf. vi. 42. 6, -!] 1rep/, 'Ta crrpan:7TeOa Oewpta, 'military science, military theory'. 40. 1. tLvo8E~KT~Kfi , • • li~TJYYJUI!~: cf. ii. 37 • 3 n. 2. rs~ov ••• TWV vOv K (viz. to make a universal history possible). P. here refers to the same context of ideas; therefore despite the parallel with iii. 59· 3 (d.m:I.VTwv 1TAw'Twv Ka~ 7TOpEV'Twv yeyov6.,.wv), a passage inserted after 146, there is no reason to suppose that the present excursus is also late. 2. OOK ll.v ~T~ vprnov t:lTJ 1TO~T)TULS Ka.t t£U6oypacpo~s xpfjaea.~: this doctrine is at variance with P.'s own practice elsewhere; see especially his defence of Homer in xxxiv. 2 ff. against the scepticism of Eratosthenes (xxxiv. 4· 4), and xxxiv. II. 2o, .,.a f-Lu8woicrra'Tov 8ot~o-13TJTOUf1EVIoKEtV S€ Kav xwcrOfjvaL 'TOV Il6VTOV o>.ov El> vcrrepov, ilv f-LI.vwcnv at lmppvcrEt!> 'TOtai!rat; cf. P. fLEVOV<J7!> ye- 0~ rij> ailrij> .,.>:w~ 1repl 'ToOr; 'T07Tovs---'the existing local conditions' (Paton} -Kat 'TWV al-rlwv rijs tyxcfJaEW!> eve-pyOVVTWV Ka'Ta 'TO cruvexls'). 5. 0 ... xpovos &m~pos KT~.: cf. Arist.ltfeteor. i. 14.353 a 15, r/>avepov 'Tolvuv, Em:i 0 'TE. XJ'OVO!> otix I.17ToAebf;n Kai 'TO o>.ov ato,ov, o.,., oin-E 6 1
491
IV. 40. 5
SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM
Tdvais OW€ 0 N£'iAos cl€t €ppn, &>.>.' ..jv 1J'OT~ tYJpds 0 T01J'OS oBev piovaw. Here Aristotle is concerned particularly ;vith infinite time in the past; but, as his phrasing shows, he also regarded it as infinite in the future too (d. Phys. iv. r3. 222 a 29 ff., viii. r. 25r b 10 ff.; Meteor. i. r4. 352 b I7 ... J.LTJ p.b>ToL yivEaw Kal. ,PBopav, el1rep p.ivH -rd miv). von Scala (r9z) suggests that Aristotle was in fact replying to Anaxagoras who, according to Diog. Laert. ii. 3· ro, envisaged the possibility of time stopping; but when Anaxagoras replied to the question whether the mountains of Lampsacus would one day be sea with the words Uv yE o XP6vos p.7] im>.l7171, he was perhaps speaking ironically as of an dSJva-rov. The context in which P. uses this argument about time is so closely parallel to that in Aristotle as to confirm the view that his source is Peripatetic. His argument, like Aristotle's, requires that not only time but also the material universe shall be infinite in duration; and though the Stoics admitted the former (d. Stob. Anth. i. 8. 42 (W.-H. i. 105): Poseidonius said that some things are a1rnpa, ws o aJp.1ras xpovos; Chrysippus said that TOV xpovov m:fv-ra a1J'ELpov Elva~ J,P' €Kanpa), they denied the latter (d. Ps.-Philo, De aet. mundi, 23. 117 ff., recording arguments of Theophrastus (Zeller, Hermes, n, 1876, 422--9) or Critolaus (Diels, Dox. graec. 106 ff.), directed against those who denied the eternal duration of the world, and are, as Zeller (loc. cit.) shows, to be identified with the Stoics). To this extent P.'s argument is antiStoic. Strato, who is ex hypothesi P.'s source here, held different views on the definition of time from Aristotle (d. Robinson Studies, i. 472 n. r6), and von Scala (19off.) fails to show any detailedconnexion between those views and the present passage; but there is nothing in Strato to suggest that he did not accept Aristotle's views on the duration of time, which is the only relevant point here. Kliv To Tuxov d.a4>epT)Ta.~: 'even though the addition should be but trifling'. 6. Completion of any process affecting a finite quantity in infinite time. This is the basis of P. 's contention about the Pontus, and, as von Scala shows (192 ff.), it is Peripatetic; cf. Ps.-Philo, loc. cit.; Arist. Phys. iv. 13. 222 a-b; Eudemus, fg. 52 (FPhG, iii. zso), Jv 8€ -rip XPOV~ m:fv-ra ylvemt Kat ,PBetpe-rat; Ps.-Archytas in Simplic. in Arist. Categ. c. 9· (f. 89r; p. 352 Berlin), Phys. 'corollarium de tempore' (f. r86, p. 785 Berlin). Ct.§ 5 n. O.vayKTJ n:AELw61jva.L Ka.Ta ritv lTpo6Eow: 'the hypothesis requires that the process must be completed'. 8. Shallowness of the Afaeotis. This was widely known in ancient times. Cf. Arist. Afeteor. i. 14. 353 a, &>.>.a p.~v Kat -ra TT£pl ~v MatCmv >./p.v7)v €mS€SwK£ -rfj 1rpoaxli>an -rwv TTo-rap.wv -roaov-rov, wa-rE TToAAtfl €>.0.TTw p.eyi.Bn TTAota vvv ElaTTAE'iv 1rpos -r7]v €pyaaiav ~ €-ros €t7]Koa-rov.
P.'s calculations of an average depth of between 5 and 7 fathoms, 492
SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM
IV. 4L 3
i.e. 30-42 ft., are confirmed by modern soundings which make it only 48 ft. in the deepest part. 'By observations, it is said that from qo6 to the year r8o8 the depth of the gulf (of Taganrog) has diminished 3 ft. ; from the latter date to 1833 it has again diminished 3 ft. ; so that it has lost 6ft. depth in 127 years, but there appears to be some reason to doubt the accuracy of this decrease in depth. The sandbanks have also increased in extent and others have formed' (Black Sea Pilot7, 1920, 6). Shifting sandbanks would explain both Aristotle's statement and the soundings recorded (with such little confidence) in the Pilot. Danov (op. cit. (in 38. I-45· 8 n.), 63) suggests that P.'s information here goes back to someone who had sailed through the straits; but it may equally well come from Strata, who would be as likely as Aristotle to quote evidence of this kind. 9. 86.Aa.TTa. a6ppou 'reaching out to sea for a day's journey'. 2. Ka.Aoual 8' auTous ••• In1911: they were mentioned by Strato (cf. Strabo, i. so, 52) along with Salmydessus and the 'Scythian desert' as already covered with shoal waters, and so evidence for the future silting up of the whole sea. 493
IV. 41. 3
SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM
3-9. Why the silt does not accumulate near the shore. In i. 53 Strabo asks why the alluvium does not reach the open sea; the answer is that the refiuen t sea drives it back. He does not say that the question and answer are from Strato; but Strato has been mentioned and it is very probable. In that case, it may well be that Strato has concerned himself with the whole problem of the depositing of alluvial silt, and why it should reach the point it does; of his argument P. has reproduced one side, Strabo the other (cf. Robinson Studies, i. 473). 7. vpbs Aoyov ••. pEUJ.ul.Twv: 'the distance of each is proportionate to the force with which the streams flow in'. 9. TOV TuxlwTa. xnJ.Lappouv: 'an insignificant winter-torrent'. On XE•p.appot d. Curtius, S.-B. Berlin, r888, rzr4-I5. Here it seems to be the typical Greek beck, swollen in winter and dry in summer, contrasted with the rroTap.ol, awExws pl.ovrEs (42. r) of the Pontus area. 42. 3. rj Ma.LGJTLS yAuKUT,pa. KTA.: d. 40. 9 n. On the waters of the Pont us cf. Sallust, Hi st. iii, fg. 65 M. ; Arrian, Peripl. M. Eux. ro; Black Sea Pilot', 1920, 4: 'each square mile of its surface receives the drainage of si square miles, which will account for the small degree of saltness of its waters. The specific gravity of the surface compared with that of fresh water is as IOI4 to xooo.' P.'s source is probably Strato (cf. Strabo, i. so, quoted in 40. 9 n.). 4. ~s cilv 8i]"Aov KTA.: Schweighaeuser admitted that 'non satis expedio totam bane loquendi rationem' and suggested that rrp(ls n)v XP6vov is an intrusion. The sentence is certainly complicated by the placing of rrpos Tov xp6vov between ov and its antecedent t\6yov; but the phrase 7rpOs TOv XP6vov is essential to the sense: 'from this it is clear that when the time required to :fill the Palus Maeotis bears the same relation to the time (then> that the size of its basin bears to (that of> the basin (of the Pontus\ then the Pontus too will become, like the Palus :Maeotis, a sha11ow freshwater lake.' In the phrase 7rpos TOv xpovov the last word indicates the period of time up to (and measured by) the moment indicated by 6-rav. If, for the sake of the argument, we assume the basin of the Pontus to be three times the size of that of the Maeotis, and that it takes a thousand years from the beginning of the process to :fill the Maeotis, when that period of a thousand years bears the same relation to the time then (which will be three thousand years from the beginning of the process) that the size of its basin (1) bears to that of the basin of the Pontus (3), the Pontus will also become a freshwater marsh. Apart from the clumsiness of P.'s formulation, it contains a slight illogicality in as much as he does not distinguish between the complete :filling up of the basin and its becoming a freshwater marsh, though clearly these are successive stages and not the same stage in the process envisaged. 5. eaTToV 8i 'I"OUTOV U'II'OATJVTEOV: i.e. the process will be quicker than 494
SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM
IV. 43· 3
the formula given in the previous sentence allows, in so far as there are larger and more rivers flowing into the Pontus in addition to those flowing into the Maeotis. 7. Ti\s T&iv TAo'itoj.tEvwv \(Je:u5oll.oy£a.s: 'the lies of merchants', not 'sea-farers' (Paton); cf. 39· II; and, for TAl>t,EaBa,, commercium maritimum exercere (Schweighaeuser), ii. 8. I, iv. 47· 1, v. 88. 7, 89. 8, xxx. 8. 5· This sense is missed by LSJ. 43-44. Advantages of the situation of Byzantium. With ~1nivLp.€v (42. 8) P. reverts to the argument of 39· 6; 43· 1 resumes the information contained in 39· 4-6. 43. 2. ·epj.La.iov: 11'poox~ is found nowhere else; Strabo uses aKpW7'1}P'&.'w in this sense. The point referred to is Roumeli Hissar, which now bears the castle of Boghas Kessen, built by Mohammed II. Here Mandrocles of Samos fixed a bridge for Darius (Herod. iv. 85-88). The width is given as 4 stades by Herodotus (iv. 85, 87 f.), Strabo (ii. us). and Dionysius of Byzantium (p. 2. II Giingerich, 'at the narrowest point'; p. 24. 7 (Gillins); cf. 39· 4-6 n.); but Strabo (vii. 319) and Mela (i. 101) agree with P. in making it 5· Dionysius of Byzantium (p. 24. 3 Giingerich Gillius)) calls the spot Ilvpplas Kvwv. On Darius' crossing cf. i. 2. 2 n. 3-10. The current of the Bosphorus. See the comparable accounts in P. Gillins, De Bosporo Thracio, i. 4 (GGM, ii. 14-16), with Dionysius of Byzantium, p. 3· I f. Giingerich; Black Sea Pilot', 1920, 26-27; A. Moller and L. Merz, Hydrographische Untersuchungen in Bosporus und DardaneUen (Veroffentlichungen des Inst. fiir Meereskunde ... an der Universitat Berlin, N.F. Geog.-naturwissenschaftliche Reihe, Heft 18, 1928), 127 ff. The relevant passages are set out in tabular form in Robinson Studies, i. 476-7. Authorities are agreed that the current in fact rebounds twice before reaching the Hermaeum, once from the European shore at Dicaea Petra (near Kire9 Burnu), and once from the Asiatic coast, which it strikes at Glarium (Pa~a. Bah9e) and follows as far as Kanlica. 'Tertius in Europam contra Hermaeum promunturium' (Gillius); 'it there turns towards the European coast, and runs along Roumeli Hissar' (i.e. Hermaeum) (Black Sea Pilot). 'Quartus decursus fert in Asiae promunturium uulgo nominatum Moletrinum' (Gillius) ; this is the Kandili point of the Pilot and the Kandeli-Leuchtturm of Merz-Moller (which is mentioned next), and P.'s 'TOtS aV'Tl11'1ipa> rii> i!ala> 'T61I'OL> (§ 4). 'Quintus in Europam ad promunturium Hestias' (Gillins) ; 'the main stream strikes the western shore at Arnaut point' (Pilot). From here, according to Gillins, it is driven violently against the Asiatic shore, and flows along it past the two promontories which enclose Chrysoceramum and promunturium dictum Bouem siue Damalim; 'from Arnaut point the main current sets towards the Asiatic shore, along 495
IV. 43· 3
SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM
which it runs as far as Leander tower' (Pilot). From here a seventh recoil is made towards Byzantium; 'cuius mucrone discissus defluit in duas partes, quarum rapidior praecipitat in fretum ad Propontidem versus, altera debilior exsilit in sinum Cornu appellatum' (Gillius); cf. Dion. Byz. p. 3· S f. KaTd S' o~v p1Jyvup.€vov rrepl airrr1v Toil pevp.a'TOS 'TO fLEIJ 1TOAV Kat {3tawv w8et Ka'Td 'Tf}S' llpoTTOIJ'TiSOS', oaov Se rrpati Kat 8~pas lx8vwv aywyov, {moSexe'Tat 'Tip KaAovp.evtp Kepa'TL; 'the
main current, passing Leander tower, sets strongly on to Old Seraglio point, and divides into two branches; the southern and larger flows into the Sea of Marmara, and the western into the Golden Horn' (Pilot). Throughout Gillins has had P.'s account as well as that of Dionysius before him; but he appends many details which confirm his statement that he bases his own version on personal experience. The Black Sea Pilot is summarizing the Russian Black Sea Pilot but also gives modern details (e.g. that the current up the Golden Horn is frequently lost before reaching the first bridge) and facts about counter-currents contained in neither P. nor Gillius. Thus the later evidence offers independent confirmation of P.'s accuracy, at any rate for the part south of the Hermaeum. His statement that between the Pontus and the Hermaeum the current is uniform (§ 3) shows an ignorance on the part of his source of what happened at the northern end of the Straits, which is best explained by the hypothesis that this source was more especially concerned with the area around Byzantium, and indeed probably had access to information possessed by the fishermen of that city (cf. Robinson Studies, i. 47S n. 30). von Scala (i. 196) suggests that P.'s source was concerned with the tunny route from the Pontus (cf. Strabo, vii. 32o), and that P. adapted it to his own purpose, the advantages of the situation of Byzantium-a plausible suggestion (cf. xxxiv. 2. I4). P. shows no knowledge of the reverse under-water current running towards (though not in fact reaching) the Pontus; this is first mentioned by Macrobius (Sat. vii. I2. 34-37) and Procopius (de bell. viii. 6. 27-28); cf. Robinson Studies, i. 477-8. 5. Tn 1TEpl. Tn!; 'EaTLQ!; aKpa KQAOUiJ.EVa: cf. Dion. Byz., pp. 21. 823· 8 (Giingerich). This corresponds to the modern Arnautk6i. Its name is attested by Pliny (Nat. hist. v. ISo). Hesychius Illustris of Miletus (FGH, 390 F I, 22) also records the name A.varrAovs for this area; this is found in various authors (cf. Gi.ingerich, Dionysii Byzantini Anaplous, p. xlvi). The strength of the current at this point is mentioned by Gillins (GGM, ii. IS)· 6. TiJv Boilv KaAouiJ.EVT)v: cf. Dion. Byz. p. 34· I-, first celebrated in 197 or 196, (b) a penteteric festival, not panhellenic, but attended by representatives of neighbouring cities (including Cos), held in 189 after Magnesia, and again in 185, (c) a trieteric, panhellenic festival instituted in 181. This chronology was proposed by Segre (op. cit. II4 ff.) on the basis of his restoration of a Coan inscription recording a letter from Eumenes II to the city; he suggested that the name Nicephoros was first given to Athena after a postulated epiphany at the battle of Chios in 201. But this implies that the use of the word N~K:I)r/;6ptov as the name of the sacred enclosure ravaged by Philip in 201 before the battle of Chios (xvi. I. 6, cf. xviii. 2. 2, 6. 4) is an anachronism-'celui qui devint fameux plus tard, lorsque Eumene le reconstruisit' (Segre, op. cit. II9)-an unlikely hypothesis. Segre's reconstruction has been challenged by Klaffenbach (;.UDAl, 1950, 99-1o6), who offers alternative, and in many cases more convincing, restorations to the Coan inscription; and his article is criticized by L. Robert (Bull. ep., 1952, no. 127), who promises a full treatment of the question in his forthcoming Etudes pergameniennes ei attalides. It is established with certainty that Athena received the title of 'Nicephoros' after 223 (when it was not included in the dedications of the great trophy celebrating Attalus I's Galatian victories); and equally the existence of the Nicephorium in 201 dates it before the battle of Chios. On the other hand, a cult of Athena Nicephoros is not the same as a festival, and it is noteworthy that P. does not give Athena the title here. Hence, though Klaffenbach (op. cit. 1o6) returns to the view of Holleaux, it seems safer to conclude that P. is here referring to some different festival of Athena, such as the Panathenaea, a local festival known from OGIS, 267 ( Welles, 23), 1. 17 (a letter of Eumenes I to the people of Pergamum). P. does not imply that a new festival has been instituted. For earlier discussion of the Nicephoria see Kolbe, Hermes, 1933, 445 f.; S.-B. Heidelberg, 1942{3, I, 8 ff.; L. Robert, BCH, 1930, 332--6; Hansen, 99, 407-8. 'IwTl]p~a.: of the occasion for this festival, evidently instituted since Prusias' accession in 229/8, nothing is known. His defeat of the Gauls was later (v. III. 6-7); cf. Holleaux, REA, 1916, 171 n. 3 =Etudes, ii. 62 n. 4.
IV. 49· 4
SITUATION OF BYZANTIUM: WAR OF
4. Ka.Tn yi)v: i.e. on the Asiatic side where there were Byzantine possessions (so. 2-4). 50. 1. .,.ov T~f3oLTTJV •.• E1Ta.ya.yovT£S: Tiboetes (perhaps the same as Zipoetas, a well-attested Bithynian royal name) was a son of Nicomedes I, and, as younger half-brother of Prusias' father Ziaelas, he was Prusias' uncle (§ 9). When on Nicomedes' death Ziaelas seized the throne, Tiboetes was forced to flee the country. P. Treves (]HS, 1943, u8) has argued that his return from Macedon to Byzantium was engineered by Philip V to embarrass Rhodes; and indeed Rhodes is very soon afterwards intervening in the war in Crete on the side of Cnossus and the Aetolians against Gortyn and the alliance which enjoyed Macedonian and symmachic support (53· I, 55· Iff.). There may, therefore, have been some tension between Rhodes and Macedon now (see below, 53· 1 n.). On the other hand, Philip's policy towards Rhodes remained nominally friendly for a good many years after this, like that of Doson before him (d. v. 89. 6-j); see Holleaux, BCH, I90i, non. 2 =Etudes, iii. 69 n. I. Nor had he any reason to detain Tiboetes in Macedon if he chose to leave. Hence Treves' hypothesis must be regarded as unproved. 3. To •.. 'l.;:pov: cf. 39· 6 n. According to Dionysius of Byzantium (p. 30. 3 Giingerich), the Byzantines bought this strong point from Callimedes, Seleuci exercitus dux. Nothing further is known of this man; but exercitus dux will be aTpaTTJyos, and Bengtson (Strat. ii. n8) suggests he may have sold the Hieron to prevent its falling into hostile hands, as Ptolemaic generals later sold Caunus to the Rhodians (xxx. 31. 6). Which Seleucus is meant, and what date is to be assigned to the transaction, is not, however, clear, for P.'Kpots O.vwnpov xp6vots is an elastic phrase . .,.a.s a.o"Ti)s Ti)s 8a.>.cl..,.TTJs Epya.o-la.s: 'gain from the sea itself', i.e. from fishing. 4. xwpa.v ••• Ti)s Muo-la.s: it is clear from Strabo (xii. si6) that under the Roman empire Byzantium possessed territory south of the Propontis, and west of Prusa, near the lake of Dascylium (which has not been identified). But three Dorian inscriptions, two associated with the worship of Zeus Brontaios, and the third (which is dated by a hieromnemon) with that of Zeus Pratomysios, from the district of Yalova on the Gulf of Izmid, and dating to the Empire, are evidence that this area was associated with Mysia (as indeed may be deduced from Strabo, xii. 566 and from Ps.-Scylax, 93 (GGM, i. 68)), and that the name Mysia could be applied to the promontory between the Gulf of Nicomedeia (Gulf of Izmid) and the Gulf of Cius ; and further that this district belonged to Byzantium (d. 52. 4 n.). See the publication and discussion by L. Robert, Hellenica, "], 1949, 3o-44; as he points out (op. cit. 41 n. 2), it ~ill be this district near Y alova,
is
504
RHODES AND BITHYNIA AGAINST HER
IV. 52. 4
the coast of Arganthonios, which Prusia.'> now seized (cf. Ernst Meyer, Grenzen, IIJ). When the Byzantines had acquired this 'Peraea' is not known; but wo.\.\o~s if~ xpovovs is contrasted with p.tKpois O.vclrrEpov XPovots in § 3· Niese (ii. 81) suggests that the acquisition of the territories in Mysia followed the peace between Nicomedes of Bithynia (Byzantium was his ally) and Antiochus I about 276; but this is purely hypothetical. 5. va.ua.pxov ••• Eevoct>a.vrov: Xenophantus the son of Agestratus. To commemorate his successful return to Rhodes from this voyage a statue was set up to him by r6 'Epam8t:{wl• Kowciv and his own son VOO'TOV xapLv, according to the epigram beneath it (IG, xii. I. 40 = Hiller von Gaertringen, Hist. gr. Epig. 101); the statue was the work of Timocharis from Eleutherna in Crete. 9. oox fjTTov ••• Tl~OL'f11 Ka.9t}Kew: this claim was based on the fact that Nicomedes I had intended his children by Heptazeta (including Tiboetes) to succeed him rather than Ziaelas, his son by his first wife, Ditizele, and had made the people of Byzantium their joint guardians along with Ptolemy II, Antigonus Gonatas, and the peoples of Heracleia and Cius (Memnon, FGH, 434 F 14). But Ziaelas had established himself by force of arms, and Tiboetes' supporters might argue that neither he nor his son Prusias had a proper title to the throne. Cf. Arrian, Bithyn. 75 FGH, 156 F 29; Niese, ii. 136; Geyer, RE, 'Nikomedes (3)', col. 494· 51. 4. !.t\v8p6tuJ.XO'i ••• yuva.lKO'i: cf. 48. 5 n. for the probability of an error here and in viii. :zo. II; Seleucus II will have married the
sister of Achaeus, not of Andrornachus. How Andromachus carne to be imprisoned in Egypt is not recorded. Beloch has suggested (iv. r. 686 n. 3), with great plausibility, that Attalus took him in his war with Seleucus III, and lodged him for safety at Alexandria; this view is accepted by Tam (CAH, vii. 723) and Meloni (Rend. Line., 1949, 543 n. :z). Andromachus' liberation after Achaeus' revolt is some indication of the man: vlous;
but this is at variance with his better elucidation of the proverb as . A JI,auaa.vws, £1T£ Twv ap.a. 7Ta.pa.Kat\ouvrwv Kat G.1T££1\ouvref ernng, ws 't'TJ<Jt Twv, and Demon's explanation looks like a pseudo-historical incident invented to explain a fairly obvious image. See von Scala, 282 ; Wunderer, i. 33-34. On the KYJPVKetov cf. iii. 52. 3 n. Treaty of peace with Rhodes and Pmsias: probably autumn 220 (cf. 53· 1-2). P. seems to follow a Byzantine source with access to the documents, as the recording of the preamble shows; cf. too the hiatus in § 7 'TOV .ao£ are probably serfs tied to the soil (cf. Rostovtzeff, SEHHW, i. 591). For TToAEfLLKa Wilhelm (Wiener Eranos (Vienna, 1909), 131; cf. Wien. Anz., 1922, n defending his case against J. Tolkiehn, BPW, 1911, 995) suggests 1roAmK&; he compares Syll. 588, 11. 64 ff., and gives other epigraphic evidence for what is a very plausible emendation. 7TOAEfLtKd. ati>p.a,Ta, 'slaves taken from the enemy' or 'enemy persons', is difficult; a contrast to Aaous is needed, and this 7ToA~nKa uwfLa:ra gives. Ta ~ul.a l 1Tt:p~ 4ia£U'TOV ?T[o>..A]wv Tpavp.aniiv yt:vop.tfvwv Ka~ wuath-w> 1ro>..A[wv KL]vOvvEvuaVTwv Jv Tal.'> dpwU'TlaL> (i.e. the Gortynian epidemic; 53· 4 n.). This refers to the seizure of Phaestus
by the 'young' Gortynians. Phaestus lay south-west of Gortyn on a ridge between the plain of Messara and the coastal plain of Dibaki (cf. Kirsten, RE, 'Phaistos', cols. 15¢-I6os; Guarducci, /C, i, p. 268); its port of Matala lay about 8 km. to the south-west, and 8 km. north of Cape Lithines (Creutzburg, RE, 'Matalia', col. 2179). The harbour of Gortyn, Lebena, lay directly to the south, some 130 stades away (Strabo, x. 478); the exiles had never been expelled from here. P. does not record the further outcome of this struggle; but the war seems soon to have gone in favour of the Polyrrhenian group and so oftheGortynian 'Young men' (cf. vii. u. 9; Plut. Ar. 48. s. so. 7).
56. Mithridates of Po1ttus attacks Sinope; Rkodian Hetp (probably 220) Here, too (cf. 53-55 n.), a Rhodian source, perhaps Zeno, seems likely (d. §§ 2-3 n.). On Mithridates II of Pontus, who came to the throne about 250, see v. 43· 1~2 nn. His two daughters, both named Laodice, married Antiochus III and Achaeus (v. 43, 74· 5. viii. 20. u). P. records neither the cause nor the sequel of this attack; and J. de Foucault has argued (Rev. phil., 1952, 47-52) that the digression on the H.hodian earthquake (v. 88-9o n.) has been displaced from the present context, which is 'clearly mutilated'. His argument is unconvincing. P.'s account of events at Sinope is certainly incomplete, like that of events in Crete; but this is probably due to a deliberate policy of switching from one theatre to another (see the statement of principles in xxxviii. s-6, especially 6. 3), and the sequel may have appeared in the lost parts.
IV. 56.
I
MITHRIDATES OF PONT US ATTACKS SINOPE
56, 1. ofov apxft , , , ICQ.l 1Tpo<Jla.cns •.• Ti}S • • , aTUXLQ.S': 'this proved as it were the beginning and alleged cause of the miserable state (cf. 21. 7, xxiii. 9· 2) to which the Sinopeans were eventually brought.' P. refers to the later seizure of Sinope by Pharnaces of Pontus in 183 (xxiii. 9· 2; Livy, xl. 2. 6; Strabo, xii. 545). On dpx~ and rrporf>acM cf. iii. 6. 3 n. Here P. means that the attack was in a sense (otov) the first event in the ruin of Sinope, and also that it was alleged as a reason for Pharnaces' later, successful, assault. 2-3. i8ose To~s 'Poi'Ho~s KTA.: P. clearly has knowledge of the Rhodian decree, whether directly through access to the Rhodian prytaneum (cf. xvi. 15. 8)-so Ullrich, 27, 59, 7J; Schulte, indirectly through Zeno. On the Rhodian assistance see D. M. Robinson, A] P, 19o6, 250; Rostovtzeff, C AH, viii. 625; SEHHW, 677, 1485 n. 92. Its magnitude is some measure of the prosperity of Rhodes at this time; that she was so ready to respond to the appeal shows, like her intervention against Byzantium, a growing interest in the Pontus. The J,OOO gold staters (cf. 46. 3 n.) were probably a loan, not a gift; earlier Rhodian state loans are known, to Priene (Insch. Priene, 37, 11. 65 ff.; Syll. 363 and n. 4) in soc, for help against a tyrant (accompanied as here by arms), and, at an uncertain date, to Argos (W. Vollgraff,.Mnem., 1916, 219 ff.) a loan of x,ooo talents for improving the fortifications and the cavalry. For private loans by Rhodian citizens cf. Syll . .354 (to Ephesus. c. 3oo), 493 (to Histiaea, c. 2.30-22o). R. Herzog (AA in JDAI, 1903, 198; cf. AM, 1905, 182) reports a decree of Sinope found at Cos, which shows that Cos played a prominent part in negotiating the Rhodian assistance (Cos and Rhodes being closely alined at this time) ; but this inscription is unpublished. Spa.xf!-Wv OEKa.TETTa.pa.s f1up~uoa.s: silver drachmas and so worth £5 •.390 (cf. 46. 3 n.).
3. o'ivou Kepcl.f1La. f1UpLa: in case of siege. The Kfpap.tov, strictly a large wine-jar, was often given as the equivalent of the p.€-rprJnjs of 8 choai, and so equal to 21·75 litres (Viedebantt, RE, tcfpdp.wv, coL 254). Thus the Rhodian gift was equivalent to nearly 48,ooo gallons. On the importance of Rhodian wine exports see Rostovtzeff, SEHHW,
6n
TPLXOS Etpyaaf1EV11S ••• vEupwv ElpyaO'J.LEvWV: cf. v. 89. 9 for a gift of hair from Seleucus to Rhodes after the earthquake. Human hair and animals' sinews (except pigs') were the best material for torsion catapults, and hair was sold regularly by women of the poorer classes; cf. Tarn, HMN D, II4-15, quoting Hero, Bel. (ed. DielsSchramm, Abh. Berlin. Akad., 1918), p. no, c. 29; p. II2, c. 30. Three hundred talents were nearly eight tons, and there were in addition about two tons of prepared sinews. For vwpd, strand of a torsion catapult, cf. IG, ii2 • 554. 1. IS; P. here uses vevpov in this sense. 512
RHODIAN HELP
IV. 58.9
va.vo'lfMa.s XLALa.s: a Rhodian panoply is represented on a firstcentury funeral monument illustrated in Rostovtzeff, SEI!HW,
plate
LXXVIII. AL9o~opous -r~-r-ra.pa.s
Ka.i -roos A~£-ra.s -roo-roLs: more commonly called At8of36>.ot; cf. viii. S· :z, ix. 41. 8, 'stone-throwers'. On the principle of
these torsion-catapults, invented at Syracuse about 400 (Diod. xiv. 42. 1), see Schramm in Kromayer-Veith, Heerwesen, zz7 ff.; Tarn, I!MN D, 112 ff. The sending of dr/>emt is interesting evidence of the specialized working of these machines. 5. Site of Sinope (modem Sinub): cf. Strabo (xii. 546) for the good harbour facilities. It forms 'the safest anchorage between the Bosphorus and Batum' (Black Sea Pilot 7, 432). P.'s description does not imply personal acquaintance with the tov.n; Sva7Tpoa6pJLHTTov applies only to the sea face of the promontory. See D. M. Robinson, A] P, 1906, 125 f.; A] A, 1905, 294 ff.: Ruge, RE, 'Sinope', cols. 252-5. 8. Ti]S xeppovitO"ou • • • TO VYJO'Ltov: 'the sea-washed part of the promontory'.
57-87. The Social War: Events of ZI9 and the Following Winter 57. 1. A1f£1..i'lfa.l-'ev O.p-r' Tov O"UI-'1-'a.XLKOv 'lfOAEI-'ov: cf. 37. 7-8; the attack on Aegeira is thus dated to spring 219. 2. :AX~ga.vSpos • • . Ka.l Awp£1-'a.xos: this Alexander is unknown; for Dorimachus see 3· S· mo.v&eLa.v: modern Galaxidt on the Locrian coast, towards the southern end of the Crisaean Gulf (Bay of Itea). 'lf).oOv i-r~pouv: cf. § 6, i. 44· 2 n. 5. Situation of A egeira: see ii. 41. 7--s n. The river (§ 6) is the Garis, which runs to the west of the town. 7. :Apx£5a.....ov TOV na.v-ra.>.eoV'TO'ii: otherwise unknown. His father may be identifiable with IIavmMovn Ti[J 'TTAeiaTov AlTwAwv SwafLivcp (Plut. Ar. 33· 1), who is probably Ila.VTaJ\Iwv IlenV,ov II>.evpwvtos, five times general of the League between c. 242/r and 222/r, and honoured by the Delphians (Syll. 621 ; cf. Flaceliere, 242 n. I, 274-5; Klaffenbach, IG, ix. 1 2, p. l. On the Achaeo-Aetolian alliance arranged by Aratus and Pantaleon in 239 see ii. 44· r n. 8. S,a.Soc; 5L6. 'TLVO.a.JjoVTES A~oPI-'TJV ~KM..,.a.-ros: 'taking encouragement from their rout'; cf. i. 19. I I for ifyKAtp.a. Paton translates, 'who took advantage of their higher position'; but in the sense of 'slope' P. appears to use the plural TCL l.yKAtJLam (cf. v. 59· 9, ix. 26 a 8). 9. :Apx£sa...,.os: Casaubon corrected the MS. Llwplp.a;x.os, for Dorimachus appears frequently after this date. C866
Ll
IV. 59
THE SOCIAL WAR
59-60. Euripidas and the Eleans attack western Achaea. Ferrabino (157) argues that this attack, that of Lycurgus on the Athenaeum (37· 6), and the Aetolian attack on Aegeira (57-58) were all designed to secure strong strategic points in case Philip invaded the Peloponnese. But they can equally well have been directed simply against Achaea. Probably the Aetolian combination hoped to repeat the successes of the Cleomenean War; and if this brought Philip into the Peloponnese, at least it would divert him from attacking Aetolia. For Euripidas d. 19. 5 n. 59. I. n\v t..u!la.(wv . • • ~a.pa.Llwv • . • T ptTG.LEWV xwpa.v: for the topography see ii. 41. 7-B n. 2. U1TOO'TpnT'lYos wv: cf. v. 94· r, xxxviii. r8. 2; the scope and duties of this office are obscure; nor is it clear whether there were several or only one. See v. 92. 7 n. 4. T E'i:xos: on this fortress beside Cape Araxus (modern Kalogria), on the Achaeo~Elean frontier, see Duhn, Al\.f, 1878, 76-77 ; Frazer, Pausanias, iv. 112-13; E. Meyer, RE, 'Teichos', cols. 126-7. For the aetiological explanation cf. 39· 6, 43· 6; Wunderer, ii. 44-45. Heracles' attack on Elis followed on the refusal of Augeias, the king, to pay him the promised reward for cleaning the Augean stables ; there are several variants of the story; cf. Wernicke, RE, 'Augeias', cols. 2308-9. See 83. 3 n. 60. 1. 1rpos Tov aTpa.TTtyov: Aratus the younger: cf. § 2, 37. 3· 3. r 6pTuva.v TfjS T EA+oua!a.s : Reiske' s emendation for the incomprehensible yopyov of AR. An Arcadian Gortys is known (Paus. v. 7· r and elsewhere); it lay 5 km. north of the junction between the Gortynius and the Alpheius (Leake, Morea, ii. 24 ff.). But this is far from Telphusa, and a more likely emendation is Bursian's ETpaTov (ii. z6o); cf. 73- 2 n. Plassart (BCH, 1915, 6r) suggests Topllvv KO.'TEUKrnpc 1TaV ds e8a.4>os. Nothing further is known of the town; but Stergiopoulos's suggestion ('H dpx.ata. Al'TwAta (Athens, 1939), 104) that it contained a sanctuary of Apollo was anticipated by Schweighaeuser. No coins or inscriptions survive. 4. ds axES£as Ka.6ftp1'0~E ( KClt I.JUVEXWS Ka.rilyw a.uTcJ.s) Tc? '1TOTa.Jl4:i: Schweighaeuser has a long note on this intractable passage. The insertion of Biittner-Wobst solves many problems. But it remains obscure how or why the KEpap.os, 'tiling', was used in the construction of rafts; and such must be the meaning of 'Ta ~vAa. •.• ~ea87}pp.o~£. 519
IV. 65. 4
THE SOCIAL WAR
Paton prints, but does not translate, Hultsch. For the floating of timber on the Achelous hereabouts today cf. Bequignon, Guide bleu, Grece (Paris, nm). 458. 5. O.a~!lAu:rn~J-EVOL TE1x£aL KTA.: 'having secured themselves by means of walls and other defences' (not 'feeling themselves safe', etc., as Paton). The walls were built for the occasion. 6. "E.Aa.os: often placed in the marshland near the coast either at Mesolonghi (Kiepert) or east of this on a hill near Sesti (Lolling). But Woodhouse (144 f.), following Bazin, argues for a site on the Zygos range (Aracynthus), at H. Elias, south of Kerasovon, on the road from Pleuron (as shown on :Murray's map); \Voodhouse points out that P. makes no reference to the intervening territory of Pleuron, and suggests a typical detour to attack a fort in the more important district farther east. The liberality of Attalus I of Pergamum is interesting as evidence for relations with Aetolia already before 219; cf. Hansen, 46. The benefaction of a portico to Delphi (under Aetolian control) dating from a little earlier (Syll. 523; Flaceliere, 271) is less significant. 8-10. Position ofOeniadae. Usually the Corinthian Gulf was reckoned as starting at Rhium; but Strabo (viii 335) makes it begin at the R. Euenus in Aetolia and Cape Araxus, and knows of others who (like P. here) would make it begin with the Achelous. P. exaggerates the convenience of Oeniadae for crossing to the Peloponnese. It faces the Ionian Sea rather than Elis, and lies 140 stades (not 100) from Cape Araxus, and nearly 200 from Dyme. But it had the advantage over any shorter crossing farther east (such as Rhium, if Philip could have held Antirrhium) in that it was equally adapted for operations in either the Ambracian or the Corinthian Gulf. In short, Philip was interested in the permanent development of the westcoast route, and not merely in a quick crossing into the Peloponnese; cf. Philip, 41-42. 11. Fortification of Oeniadae: see Kirsten, RE, 'Oiniadai', cols. 222J-8. I, Separate fortification of the dtadel. The IJ.Kpa was in the southeast part of the town, and had already been given some fortifications by the Aetolians (§ s) ; Philip completed these to make the citadel a separate fortress. The remains include the foundations of walls and five towers which probably belong to these works. :2. Building of a cross-wall from the saddle containing the acropolis to the harbour. This, P. says, was merely planned (.b"f£Xf£{pEt); its beginnings can be traced on the terrain and are marked 'a' on Kirsten's plan (op. cit., cols. 22I7-18). \\'hen completed this wall would have run, not directly from the citadel, but across the city at its narrowest point (5oo m.). Kirsten (op. cit., col. 2226) argues that its non-completion was due to a change of plan which led to
EVENTS OF 219 AND THE FOLLOWING WINTER IV. 66. 7
the fortification of the whole town with the surrounding wall which can still be traced. 3· Harbour-fort and docks. On the north side of the town, facing the Lezini swamp (formerly a branch of the sea) are the remains of five ship-houses, 154 ft. by IJ4 ft., and 23 ft. high, hewn out of the rock. Despite the arguments of Leake (NG, iii. 568), these are evidently to be identified with Philip's v£d;pm; similarly the harbour fortifications of which traces exist are probably those built by Philip. Lehmann-Hartleben (So, uo n. 2, ns-18, diagrams on pp. n6 and II8) agrees that the ship-houses date to the third century, but makes them earlier than Philip's fortification. This is possible but not very likely. For two tiles inscribed 41 I A m~noY], which probably date to this fortification by Philip, see Powell, A] A, 1904· 170; for plans and reconstructions, ibid. 227 ff. But the fullest and most authoritative account is in Kirsten (loc. cit.), who argues that Oeniadae presents a remarkable example of later fortification which is precisely datable. 66. 4. va.pilv • • • .6."11-LtlTPLOS b cl>apLos: cf. iii. 19. 8. Philip sent Demetrius to Corinth, probably in order to secure his ship in a Macedonian port, and also perhaps in order to avoid advertising Demetrius' presence to the Romans, as he passed north through Epirus. E. Kirsten has suggested (RE, 'Pleuron', cols. 242-3) that the J7JfL~Tpto> AhwAu, against whose ravages the town of Pleuron was refounded and fortified (Strabo, x. 451), is a confused description of this Demetrius, and that his attack on Pleuron occurred on his voyage from the Gulf of Ambracia to Corinth. But it is unlikely that a solitary fugitive in a lembos would have created an impression sufficient to cause the removal of a town, and this is perhaps the least convincing suggestion as to the identity ofA7JfL~Tpto> AlTWALK6s. 6. nEA!..a.v: the Macedonian capital (cf. xxix. 4· 7, xxxiv. 12. 7), much strengthened by Philip II and Alexander. It lay on the north side of Lake Yenidja near H. Apostolos (Alaklisi). See NG, iii. 262 f.; and for an account of the ancient city, based on P., Livy, xliv. 46. s-7· va.pa 0p~Kwv TLvwv a.oToj.L6Awv: probably mercenaries (cf. v. 7· n); Griffith, 71 ; Launey (i. 378) is non-committal. 7. E-rri T~v Tfjs 6v6.lfHl.!; yelp cl.va:rra.verat 1T(JA€fLO> lv XHplJvL, Ka.t 'T~V 1Tpos aA:\7}:\ovs £Kt:XE>pla.v ayovaw, ovO' 1TOA€~A-LKd> frrr.rypEaia.> ,Plp€LV; but Philip II had practised it; cf. Dem. ix. so, ClLW1TW Olpos Ka.~ xeLr-wva., ~, ooSJv 8m,Plp€L, otiS' €uT~V €~a.lp€TO> wpa. 'TLS ~v 0LO.A€L1Tt:L. On Philip's
300 Cretans see 55· 5 n. Like Doson in 224 (ii. 52. 8) Philip had to come via Euboea to avoid Thermopylae. From Cynus his route probably lay through Opus, Orchomenus, and Thespiae, and along the road through the northern Megarid described by Hammond, BSA, 522
EVENTS OF 219 AND THE FOLLOWING
WI~nER
IV. 6g. 4
1954, ro3-zz. Whether Cynus, an Opuntian port, now belonged to Boeotia or to Philip himself is uncertain; see Klaffenbach, Klio, rgz6, 83; Beloch, iv. r. 63r; Tarn, CAH, vii. 744 (Boeotian); Feyel, 172 n. 2 (Macedonian). It does not follow from the fact that Boeotia gave Philip right of passage that she was a belligerent (rJ. 5 n.). 67. 6. xa.XKoo'II"IDa.s: see above, ii. 65. 3 n. 8. Tov crrpa.Tl}y6v: the younger Aratus (37· r), probably at Aegiurn. 9. Tfjs ¢1ALa.ai:a.s 11"tpt To .i).LoaKOIJpwv: the ruins of Phlius lie on the right bank of the Asopus, a little to the north-west of the village of H. Georgios (cf. A. G. Russell, Liv. Ann., r924, 37 ff.; Ernst Meyer, RE, 'Phleius', cols. 27r-9o). The cult of the Dioscuri is natural in a Doric town ; the Dioscuriurn probably stood on a small hill to the western end of the plain near Botsika, where there are said to be foundations of an ancient building with Doric pillars (Meyer, op. cit., col. 279). 68. 1. 'HX£(wv 5Uo Mxous: the size of a Mxos- varies; for the 7TetpamLl, Aetolian mercenaries, cf. 3· 8 ff.; Launey, i. r84. Euripidas evidently carne east into the upper Ladon valley, over the watershed between Mts Dourdouvana and Saita into the valley of Pheneus, and thence via the pass of Kastania (cf. Leake, Morea, iii. II4-I5) to Styrnphalus, and over Mt. Apelaururn via the Psari valley to (modern Botsika and) Phlius. This was the direct highland route from Psophis to Sicyon. See Hiller von Gaertringen, AM, I9IS, 83 f.; BOlte, RE, 'Stymphalos', cols. 448 f. 5. SLEK~a.Xc!iv Tijv ITuJ.l+aX{a.v: 'passing through the territory of Styrnphalus'. The 'rough country beyond' is the great mountain ridge running south from Cyllene and the high land west of it. Bolte (op. cit., cols. 448-9) suggests that Euripidas made up on to the hills west of the Phlius valley during the night, and reached the valley of Psari, hoping to cross Apelaururn (6g. r n.) before the Macedonians. 69. 1. T~v 011"Ep~oXTjv T~v '!I'Epl TO KaAOuJ.lEVOV ;6.11"Ehaupov: the hill south-east of Stymphalus, modem Ft86t=v8pa, which separates the Styrnphalus valley from the narrow valley of Psari, east of which, over a farther ridge, lies the plain of Phlius. Bolte (loc. cit.) suggests that the two forces clashed near Psari. Six inscriptions (IG, v. z. 351--6) refer to the ransoming of Elean prisoners taken in this battle (Hiller von Gaertringen, AM, I9I5, 84 ff.). For Apelaururn d. Livy, XX:Xiii. 14. IO.
4. ot xaAKGV: 'tO remain where they were', i.e. in the citadel. 5. auvayaywv To us 1Top6VTa.s TWV :4xa.Lwv: cf. § 7 rY)v lKKATJalav. They amounted to a little over 4,ooo (cf. 67. 6, 70. 2, 4,3oo in all; there were probably losses at Psophis). This assembly was most likely a syncletos, an army assembly acting as a reunion of the people; cf. 7· 5 n.; Aymard, ACA, 234 n. 3· 6. n1TEAoy£aaTo ••• T~v a.ipEaLv: 'he protested his affection'; cf. xxi. 3· 2, d7To.:\oyt~6p.EVDt T~V EVVOtav K-I. 3. 8uaa.s ••• T(j) 8E(j): a political gesture. When Agis tried to sacrifice, the Eleans prevented him (Xen. Hell. iii. 2. 22), Myov-rEs w> Kat TO apxafov EL'Y} OVT(J) v6fLtfLOII, /l.~ XP'YJO"T'Ijpta{~:oOa.l TOVS' "EAA'Y}VaS' lq/ 'EM~vwv TroAlfLtp' wO"TE d.8vTo.~oaKoopwv: the former is probably the shrine of Artemis Alpheiaea near Letrini (probably H. Ioannes, 3 miles west of Pyrgos) on the coast road to Elis; Paus. vi. 22. 8; cf. Frazer, Pausanias, iv. Ioo-I; Strabo, viii. 343· Philip would follow the road through the plain owing to the greater plunder there; and the shrine of the Dioscuri was probably on the road between here and Elis. 73. 6-74. 8. Digression on the wealth and neutrality of Elis. P. would urge a policy of neutrality upon Elis (74· 8), reviving its ancient and traditional asylia as a 'sacred land'. As Thommen saw (Hermes, 1885, ZI9) this appeal makes nonsense after 146, and so supports the view that book iv was composed before the Achaean War (iii. I-S n.). There is, however, reason to think that, like 30. sand 31. 333· u, this passage was inserted immediately before publication about ISo, to influence policy. Between 31. 3-33. rz, where P. warns Messenia of the dangers of excessive devotion to peace, and the present exhortation to the Eleans to consider the benefits of neutrality,
52 5
IV. 73· 6
THE SOCIAL WAR
there is an apparent inconsistency. But the paradox disappears if one considers the historical tradition of the two countries. In ISO the danger was of Spartan action against Achaea; and Livy (xlii. 37· B-9; cf. P. xxxviii. r6. 3) shows both Elis and Messenia disaffected. But whereas the tradition of military action in Messenia was anti-Spartan, for Elis that tradition was reversed; hence P. urges Messene to (anti-Spartan) action, Elis to peace and neutrality. This hypothesis finds confirmation in the tradition of the l€prk ptos (§§ g-ro). Tradition had it that after the expulsion of the Epeians by the Aetolians, when the Heracleidae returned accompanied by Oxylus, the Eleans were given a grant of immunity, which they maintained until, after the usurpation by Pheidon of Argos, they were helped by Sparta (who envied the prosperity which sprang from peace) and made an end of this asylia; cf. Strabo, viii. 333, 358 (= Ephorus, FGH, 70 F us); Phlegon, FGH, 257 F I, § 9 (quoting a Pythian oracle). This was in Ephorus; but another version, also in Ephorus, but derived from another source (Diod. xiv. 17), implied that Elis was inviolate until the Spartan invasion of 402/r (Diod. viii. I, which attributes the asylia to Spartan influence, is nonEphoran). Now P. here clearly dates the end of the asylia to the fourth century, for the contest with Arcadia over Lasion and Pisa belongs to that period (cf. Swoboda, RE, 'Elis', cols. 23. 73. 6. O'WJJ.chwv Ka.l. Ka.TO.O'KEUT\!>: 'slaves and farm-stock' (Paton). 7. Ets aXiav: 'at the law-court'; so Meineke (Phil., r857, 371) for AR ~A€la.v. Reiske, taking e1rL ••• yo€a> with lKavas, translated 'though they had sufficient goods to maintain themselves and two successive generations'; but Casaubon must be right, 'though men of sufficient substance, they have not gone ... for two or three generations'. Keeping the MS. reading, Woodhouse (Solon the Liberator, Oxford, I938, 2 n. 3) compares Peisistratus' local courts 526
EVENTS OF 219 AND THE FOLLOWING WINTER IV. 76
(Arist. A.P. 16. 5), which provide a good analogy for the policy here described; but he does not explain 1],\~it:tv, for P. nowhere else uses 'Hllela of the town of Elis. Meineke's emendation contrasts the central law-court at Elis with the local bench (,6 n UKawv azhots bri r6nov a•e~dy7]-ra£). On Elean government d. Paus. iv. z8. 4, EOvop.wrarat IIeAonoVV7]alwv. 9-10. s,o. 1'ov ••• ~epov J1£ov: cf. 73· 6-74. 8 n. for this fourth-century legend associated with the Olympic Games. 74. 1. 1'TJ'II !1\p~eO.Swv nJl+La~tlTfJClW TrEpt Aa.au';,vos Kal Tits n.a&n6os: this digression, which ostensibly arises out of the reference to the rich booty, in fact links up with Philip's restoration of Lasion to Achaea. For the details of the conflict of Elis and Arcadia for Lasion (and the other towns of the Acroreia), for Olympia (where Arcadia usurped the games for three years), and for Triphylia, see Swoboda, RE, 'Elis', cols. 2400 ff. Pisatis is the catchment area on the north bank of the Alpheus . .,.a.s 6.ywyC..s Twv J1!wv: 'their mode of life'; for this sense of aywy~ ct. Welles, 79. no. I5 l. rs. 3. The ideal of peace. For p.erd. roil atKalov Kat KafNJKovro
