A Commentary on Plato's Meno

I I

i I

j

A COMMENTARY

ON

PLATO'S MENO

64225

COMMENTARY

PLATO'S

ON

MENO

JACOB

KLEIJV

Q6005 97

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS CHAPEL HILL

© 1965 by The University of North Carolina Press All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of America ISBN 0-8078-0946-2 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 65-13664 First printing, May 1965 Second printing, September 1969 Third printing, October 1975 Fourth printing, July 1979

NOTE

This book was to have been written some thirty years ago. I was prevented from writing it by rather unusual circumstances. From 1936 on, I have had, however, many opportunities to talk to friends and students, in America as well as in Europe, about some of the points made in the book. Except for the Introductory Remarks, Sections V, VII, 1, 2, and the notes, I have transliterated all Greek words and sentences into Latin script to make the running commentary more accessible to readers who do not know any Greek. T h e final version of the book owes a great deal to the care of Eva Brann. J . K.

CONTENTS

PART

ONE:

AMATHIA I. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

The 70 a 70 a 71 e 72 a 73 a

Title 1 - 4 5 - 71 d 8 I - 72 a 5 6 - 73 a 5 6 - c 5

35 38 40 46 47 52

73 74 75 76

c b c a

6 3 8 9

-

74 75 76 77

3 8 8 2

54 56 63 67

77 77 78 79

a b b a

3 6 3 3

-

b 5 78 b 2 79 a 2 e 4

71 73 77 81 82

79 e 5 - 81 b 3 81 b 3 - 82 b 8

88 94 99 99 103

II. 1. 2. 3. 4.

b c a a

III. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. IV. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

82 b 9 - 85 b 7

V. D I G R E S S I O N : ANAMNH2I2 AND

2. 3. 4. 5.

6.

T h e meaning of eUaaia T h e dianoetic extension of e«a) in them. Why "of necessity"? W e gather an answer from the Phaedrus itself, and the Sophist. As Phaedrus puts it (276 a 8 f.) , 2 7 the written word may be justly called a sort of 26. Gf. 265 c 8 f. and the context. (See R. Hackforth's translation of the Phaedrus, 1952, p. 132, note 2.) 27. It is possible that Phaedrus, an "expert" in these matters, quotes Alcidamas at this point, just as the entire passage uses terms and imagery "borrowed" from the contemporary controversy about the merits and demerits of "speech-writing." It is one thing, however, to find traces of this controversy in the Phaedrus and quite another to understand what is said in the context of the dialogue. Gf. L. Robin in his edition of the Phaedrus (Platon, CEuvres com-

;e (etSwXov av tl

Xeyoiro Si/calcos) o f t h e s p o k e n w o r d ,

the

that is alive (t&v nal 'i^vxos) and, as Socrates suggests (276 a 1 f.; 278 a 6 ) , is alone legitimate or authentic (yvrjatos). T h e written word "imitates" the spoken word. But "imitation" (AIIWTO) is the source of the highest kind of "play" (iraitoi). T h e Stranger in the Sophist, where the mode of being of "Image" becomes a crucial problem, asks (234 b 1-3) : "Can you think of any more artful and more graceful kind of playing than the imitative one?" And Theaetetus replies: "Certainly not," adding cautiously that this kind covers quite a variety of manifestations. Written words, then, are necessarily playful and, under propitious circumstances, most exquisitely so, because it is their very character to imitate. But this character makes them also unreliable. For, as Socrates says in the Phaedrus (275 d) : "You would think that they spoke as if they understood something, but whenever, from a desire to learn, you ask them about something which they say, they do nothing but repeat always one and the same thing." 2 8 T h e y cannot, therefore, defend themselves against anding and abuse (275 e 5; 276 c 8 f . ) . Furtherthey cannot and do not discriminate among those to whom they speak. Any author who holds that there could be much solidity (peykXi) atAnys) and clarity ( at™, i&v wpedeh e^ 6 4 ), and then those words which may have grown up in other souls in proportion to their worth, words which are the children and at the same time the brothers of the first one" (278 a 5 - b 2 ) . the "knowers," we may conclude, belongs first the or the writer who has gotten hold of the truth "about things just and noble and good" 5 5 in himself; if he is himself the writer, he thus can recognize this truth in his own writing without difficulty; and among the "knowers" belong secondly those of the listeners or readers who "follow the same track." Although they "know" in some way, they still have the effort of full discovery before them. T h e i r being "reminded" by a written text is only the beginning of the maturing of the seed, and the author who knows will enjoy seeing the tender plants grow up (276 d 5 ) . Surely the dithyrambic words of the Palinode (249 b 5 f., e 4 f.) supply the background for these contentions. But it does not seem enough to appeal to Socrates' "mythic hymn" (265 c 1) for an understanding of the emphasis that is put in the Phaedrus on the speaker and writer who "know" and on the merely "reminding" function of a written text. It is tempting to interpret this emphasis as Plato's justification of, and even apology for, his own writing or his "compelling urge" to write, as against Socrates' uncompromising dedication to the spoken word. Indeed, the theme of the poet in Plato struggling with the thinker in him, that is, with his b e t t e r or worse-Self, is ever-present in modern literature. I t is no to infer that the dialogues are exoteric writings Plato's own oral and esoteric teaching in (and oute) the Academy. Not a few writers on Platonic philosophy have succumbed to this temptation. 5 * It is even tempting to envisage friends, pupils, or "followers" of Plato attending a reading of a Platonic dialogue somewhere in Athens and be54. Cf. Hackforth, op. cit., p. 162, note 1. 55. See p. 12. 56. Harold Cherniss' (The Riddle of the 2 ff., 11 ff., 7 5 ) at is

cit., p. 68.)

Early

ing happily reminded by what they hear of something they understand much better than the other, uninitiated listeners. T h e r e may have been some of these indeed. All these biographical and historical considerations, however, lead away from the problem which writing poses, lead away, that is, from a genuine and universal problem which is not confined to Plato's peculiar circumstances and which is more acute than ever in our time. Above all, no light is thrown by those considerations on Socrates' contention in the Phaedrus that the good writer "knows" just as the good speaker does. I t is Socrates' "knowledge," to all appearances, which gives to his words, spoken by himself or reported by others, so much weight and produces such a profound effect on his hearers, as Alcibiades' outburst in the Symposium attests. 57 Does the Socrates of the Republic play the role of a man who does not "know"? Is not knowledge on the part of the speaker—or speakers—presupposed in the Laws, when the Athenian suggests that the writing down of conversations such as he is engaged in at the moment might provide the best material for the education of the young? 58 Again, is it not presupposed that Socrates knows when, according to the Theaetetus, a conversation between Socrates, Theodorus, and Theaetetus, narrated by Socrates to Eucleides, impressed the latter so much that he decided to put it in writing and gradually succeeded in accomplishing this task with the help of Socrates himself? 59 Must not indeed the "antidote" ((baptxaicov) of "knowing" (etcu)60 be present in the mimetic playfulness of any Platonic dialogue? Must not Socrates know? And also, in varying degrees, the strangers from Mantineia, Elea, Locri, Athens? Does not Plato, the writer, know? B u t is not, on the other hand, the professed ignorance of Socrates the very nerve of the Socratic conversation and of its enduring impact? Does not the very structure of most Platonic dialogues reflect Socrates' assertion of his ignorance? T h i s assertion is the lever which Socrates constantly uses to compel other people to examine with him, in common and from the level of common ignorance, the understanding which underlies his and their lives. Socrates' self-knowledge, his knowledge of his ignorance, is his unique "human wisdom." 61 57. 58. 59. 60. 61.

215 d 3 - 6 . 811 c - e . 143 a. Rep. X , 595 b 6 f. Apol. 23 a 7.

I t is this assertion of his ignorance which charms, annoys, and captivates everyone he approaches. Could Plato, the then, ever assume the role of a "knower"? 8 2 Could a dialogue, the genuine "image" of a Socratic stroy the integrity of Socrates' wisdom? witnesses of these discussions, are quite prepared to take Socrates' assertion of his ignorance at its face value. 63 W e are inclined to call it "ironic." T h e Phaedrus and the tenth book of the Republic explicitly support and justify this disbelief. Socrates must "know" more than he ever admits. And is there any way to exclude Plato, the writer, from the rank of "knowers"? which we face, that of the genuine or preof the "knower," is no other than the Delphic problem of self-knowledge, self-control, or sophrosyne as discussed by Critias and Socrates in the Charmides (164 C

C>: 0

h c h "k hIf" ( must possess the knowledge which not only

0 and that precisely such (166 c 2-3; e 5 - 6 ; 168 a 6 - 9 ) . this statement more precisely does not challenge its converse, to wit, that a man who possesses that which "knows itself" (t6 abrb yiyvwKov) will "know (a&rds avrdv yvuaerat)

(169 e 6 - 7 ) , b u t

he

mist also know its opposite, ignorance, that is, of knowledge (4wTiff«MzoopoviJ.evos ijltj wore Aa0co oiofjievos \xkv ri eidevat, eidcos Si fir} — 166 d 1 - 2 ) . T h i s exchange presents us with an example of the twofold function of the logos, the argumentative one and the mimetic one. What Critias says is far from wrong perhaps, but the possible rightness of his statement is at best "in words" only: his possibly being right does not mean, as we see a short while later, that he, in fact, possesses sophrosyne and understands what he is saying. W h a t Socrates, on the other hand, has to say about his "fear" manifests "in deed," manifests shiningly, Socrates' own sophrosyne ** Socrates proceeds to "refute" Critias' statement. T h i s refutation consists in comparing knowledge that knows itself (a) with a set of human faculties which seem to preclude their ever making themselves their own object: vision (6\Jas) does not see itself, hearing (ami/) does not hear itself, and analogously no other sensing power (atadrjcns) and also no desiring (ewiOvfjila), no willing (PovXtjctls) , no loving (eptos), no fearing (06j8os), no opining (ai as well as in Democritus. The colloquial use of the word shades into a technical one in Herodotus and Thucydides, less so in the former, more so in the latter. See all the evidence collected by A. E. Taylor in "The Words eUos, Idea in Pre-Platonic Literature/' Varia Socratica ( 1 9 1 1 ) and—so far as the literature attributed to Hippocrates is concerned—put into proper perspective by G. M. Gillespie, "The Use of eUos and I8ka in Hippocrates," The Classical Quarterly, V I ( 1 9 1 2 ) , 1 7 9 - 2 0 3 . The technical use of the word "eZSos" in mathematics continues, hardly touched by the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition, later on, for example, in Euclid, Elements V I , 19, Porism; 2 5 ; Data, Def. 3, etc., in Apollonius I, 1 2 - 1 4 ; 21 (cf. Def. 1 1 ) , in Nicomachus, in Diophantus, Arithmetica, ed. Tannery, p. 14, 25—27 and passim. With reference to the colloquial use of the word, it is curious to observe Taylor's emphatic rejection (op. cit., p. 183) of "the supposition that the eI5os, 18ka of the Platonic philosophy have been derived from the use in which these words are mere verbals of ISetp." In support of this rejection Taylor quotes (pp. 182 f.) Aristotle's explanation of Iliad X , 316 (Poetics 1461 a 12—14) and Plato's Protagoras (352 a ) , where, in the main, facial "looks" are opposed to the "looks" of the entire body. In quoting these passages Taylor seems to imply that only a face can be called "ugly to look at." As if only Socrates' face and not precisely his whole "silenic" body was meant to be described as "ugly looking" in Alcibiades' panegyric (Symp. 215 b 4 f.) and in Meno's gibe (Meno 80 a 5 ) ! (Gf. Charm. 154 d 4 - 5 ; 158 a 7 - b 1; also Gillespie, op. cit., p. 181.) What somebody or something altogether "looks" like, that is what etdos and I8ea colloquially—and primarily —mean. Taylor himself says (p. 187) with reference to the meaning of I8ea in Thucydides II, 5 1 : "This meaning [of symptoms of the disease regarded collectively] would come naturally from the literal one of look', 'appearance'." And it is this literal or rather familiar meaning from which Plato derives—by way of contrast, paradox, and pun—his understanding of the eUos as aadks (cf. Phaedo 80 d, 79 a ; Gorg. 493 b; also below p. 137, note 93.) In A Commentary to Plato's Timaeus, 1928, p. 330, Taylor translates

xxtv

ye

tl

eUos

ravrdv . . .

exovcn. . . . "

with

"have

a

something in common." This, again, is not quite sufficient. (Gf. also K . von Fritz, Philosophic and sprachlicher Ausdruck bei Demokrit, Plato und Aristoteles, 1938; P. Friedlander, Plato I, pp.

16 ff.)

T h e term is a "learned" one. It appears that Socrates is trying at this point, above all, to make Meno adopt an inquiring attitude, to induce in him the mood of learning. 4 4 " Y o u do understand (manthaneis), or don't you, what I am saying?" he asks. B u t Meno replies: " I t seems to me that I understand; however, I do not as yet grasp what is being asked as I wish I should." A judicious answer! Still, it appears that Meno's effort to understand does not match Socrates' effort to be understood. Socrates perseveres. He brings up a whole set of examples to make Meno understand. What about "health," "tallness," (bodily) "strength"? Does it seem that man's health and L'S health, as far as health goes, differ? Whenever and is "health," whoever the healthy one might be, we face the same eidos—{"health." Meno agrees. And does not that hold for tallness and strength, too? If a woman be strong, her strength will not differ "in kind" from the of a man: "the woman will be strong with regard to the aspect (toi autoi eidei), that is, with the same strength (kai tei autei ischyi)." Lest that assertion be misunderstood, Socrates adds with "technical" precision: by the words "with the same [strength]" (to tei autei) I mean: with regard to "being strength" (pros to ischys einai), strength in man and strength in woman are not at all different. Meno agrees. These examples are somewhat closer to the phenomenon of excellence than the example of the bee, inasmuch as all three, health, tallness, strength, can be present in human beings to a greater or lesser degree and reach down to their opposites, T u r n i n g back to arete, Socrates wants Meno to apply to it what has been gained by the consideration of the examples just given. W i l l excellence be different in any way with regard to "being excellence," whether it be found in a child or in an old man, in a woman or in a man, he asks. Meno's reply is: " I t seems to me somehow, Socrates, that this case is no longer similar to those others." W e see that Socrates' methodical effort has been in vain, is unable to draw the inference suggested by the exam-

5]

[72 d 4 - 73 a

52

[73 a 6 - c 5]

pies presented to him. But, on the other hand, we should ask is this inability altogether blindness? Is there not justification for Meno's reluctance to follow Socrates at this point? Does not human excellence belong to an order different from that of strength and tallness and health? And if Meno is not very quick in crossing the eidetic bridge built for him by Socrates, at least he does not run the danger of joining the ranks of those "friends of ideas" 4 5 who, in ness to embrace the doctrine, might miss its m< points.

Socrates has to abandon his "methodical" line of attack. He goes back to Meno's own words, that is, to the level of the habitual and the familiar, the level of accepted standards and Let's see (ti del), says Socrates, did you not say that ,'s excellence consists in managing the affairs of the city in household in the same way? (Meno had used the word en only with regard to women.) And can the right way be achieved in either case without acting prudently and justly? T h e r e is no objection on Meno's part. T h e managing in either case, then, Socrates continues, must be done with justice and prudence. Necessarily so, says Meno. Both, then, woman and man, need justice and prudence, if they arete. So it appears, says Meno. Let's see (ti del), continues, does not the same hold for child and old man, if they are to be called "good"? Meno agrees again. And after this quick run-down the quick conclusion follows: "All human beings are good in the same way" (toi autoi tropoi). (For they good by obtaining the same things—ton auton . . . idds somewhat vaguely.) And they could be good "in the same way" (toi autoi tropoi) if e not "the same arete." No, indeed, says Meno. •et us consider. W h a t follows with some coerencv from the in trie preceding argument is m a t are good if they are prudent and just, if they and justice. B u t then they are good precisely not because they in "the same arete? but rather because they share in I t is in that sense of sharing in two virtues (at 45. Soph. 248 a 4.

least) that they are good "in the same way." (No wonder that Socrates was vague about their "obtaining the same things.") T h e phrase " i n the same way" (toi autoi tropdi), that Socrates uses twice, thus contrasts strikingly with the previous "technical" phrase "with regard to the same aspect" (toi autoi eidei), which implied the strict oneness and sameness of the eidos "arete" (72 c 7; d 8) and which was used only once. While in the previous argument Meno was not willing to draw an at least plausible inference suggested by Socrates, he is now unable to see the contradiction in Socrates' conclusion. Is it because, in spite of his (and Gorgias') ability to enumerbetween them, he does not see any incompatibility in regardtwo) at the same time? Here again he may be right. Or is it simply because the reasoning Socrates has just presented has a familiar ring which does not tax Meno's thinking? At any rate, what the intricate "technical" argument could not accomplish, the appeal to the habitually acceptable did. Meno seems to see Socrates' point now: he surmises that Socrates is seeking something which is one (hen ti) for all cases (kata panton) f as he, Meno, himself will imply in a moment (73 d 1 ) . T h e way is cleared for Socrates to put his original question before Meno again.

II 1.

[73 c 6 - e 2]

^ J o c r a t e s takes up that question where it was left a while L / ago (71 d) and, under the assumption that one and the same excellence is present in all cases, challenges Meno: " M a k e an attempt (peiro) to tell, to recollect, 1 what Georgias says it is and you, too, following him (kai sy met* ekeinou)." T h e r e are three points of emphasis in this challenge: first, the renewed stress on Meno's merely repeating Gorgias' words; secondly, the necessity, therefore, to recall Gorgias' utterances on the subject; thirdly, a certain effort required from Meno to satisfy Socrates' curiosity. Meno accepts Socrates' challenge. W e witness his first attempt to give an adequate answer to the question understood by him now, it seems, in its "generality." T h i s answer is: " W h a t else [is what I and Gorgias are saying that human excellence is] but the ability to rule over men?" Immediately, Socrates raises objections. Before considering them, however, let us ponder Meno's statement. T o be able to rule, to "exert authority," to "lead"—is not such power recognized, at all times, as a sign, at least, of excellence, provided, of course, that power be genuine, that is not one derived from somebody else "behind the scenes"? Does not this criterion of excellence play a decisive role even in Plato's Republic? There, certainly, this very power of ruling (dynamis politike) stems from a pursuit of a rather different nature (philosophia) 2 which nurtures, in men engaged in it, the desire not to rule. 3 B u t the true ability to rule is still what characterizes the "best." Meno's statement, as it stands, does not preclude this "Socratic" interpretation regardless of whether Meno would accept it or not. And we can also understand that Meno is not thinking of children, women, or very old men, let alone slaves, in making the statement. Its generality is a reasonably restricted one. 1. Cf. Stock's note to 73 c 7 (p. 9 of the Notes). 2. Rep. V, 473 d 3. 3. Rep. V I I , 520 d 2 - e 4.

T h i s last point is the first target of Socrates' objections. If Meno's statement were true, then excellent children as well as excellent slaves would be able to rule, to rule over their parents or masters, and would a slave, however excellent, who rules, still be slave? " I do not think so at all" (ou party moi dokei . . .) says Meno. And Socrates reinforces that utterance by saying: "Indeed, it is not likely [that you do], my excellent m a n " (ou gar eikos, 6 ariste). (We should note this somewhat ambiguous emphasis on Socrates' part, the significance of which is not yet quite apparent.) He then immediately turns to another, more serious criticism. "You say 'ability to rule'; shall we not add, right there, the words 'justly, not unjustly'?" Meno: " I do think so, indeed." What else can one reply? Is not a just man universally praised? Is not Justice praiseworthy under any circumstances? " F o r justice, Socrates, is excellence." Socrates: "Excellence, Meno, or some excellence?" Meno: " W h a t do you mean by that?"

55

W e see now clearly that Meno has not grasped, although he had seemed to, the difference between the various aretai and arete in its sameness and oneness that Socrates is asking about. I t is also clear that Socrates is going back on his own words which, in the preceding argument, had blurred that distinction. Socrates proceeds to clarify that distinction anew by choosing a new example, this time one which lends itself to a colloquial as well as to various "technical" interpretations. T h e example is schema, "figure," used first of all in the colloquial sense of "closed surface of a visible thing," commonly identified with the "shape" of that thing. Visible things are shaped in innumerably different ways. Facing a more or less "roundly" curved object, we may call its shape, its surface, its schema, - "roundishness" (strongylotes ~ 73 e 3 1 , 74 b 5 - 7 ) . Asked what "roundishness" is, Socrates goes on, he would say: a certain kind of shaped surface (schema ti), not just shaped surface (ouch houtos haplos5 hoti schema), for the good reason that there are other surfaces or shapes of things. Meno is quick to take that up. You would be right in saying that, he hastens to remark, just as / too (kai ego) am rightly saying that there is not only justice but that there are other kinds of excellence, too. And Socrates, insisting: " W h a t are they, tell me! Just as I too (kai ego) could name 4. Cf. Thompson, p. 69 ( 1 9 ) . 5. Cf. Thompson, p. 84 ( 2 1 ) .

[73 e 3 - 74 b 3]

56

for you other surfaces as well, if you bid me do that, you too for me other bantering in this ego and kai sy. (We are reminded of Socrates' identifying himself ironically with his fellow citizens at the beginning of the dialogue (71 b 1) and of the phrase kai sy which Socrates has already used twice in speaking to in the ambiguously paratactical sentence, 71 c 10, and in recent challenge, 73 c 7 f.) Meno obliges: " W e l l then, I think courage is and [so is] soundness of mind and wisdom and loftiness and a great many other excellences." T h a t is what Socrates, clearly, expected to hear. W h o would not, in answer to Socrates' challenge, give the same or a similar list of acknowledged virtues? And Socrates can point out that he and Meno, while looking for once more discovered many, though not in the before. B u t the one which runs through them all, he says, they are unable to find. Meno admits readily that, while with regard to all the examples given by Socrates he could meet the latter's demand, he is still unable to get hold of the one excellence that applies to all cases of excellence in the way Socrates is looking for it. Socrates, on his part, says (rather darkly) : " N o (eikotos ge). And he pledges to do all he can to bring and himself closer to the matter. In the meantime, however, that Meno's first attempt to come to grips with in its "generality" has failed.

2. '4 b 3 - e 10]

Socrates begins by pointing to the universality of the underlying problem. I t is no less a problem than that of "defining" which was already encountered in the case of the "bee," Q and it is this problem that is going to be discussed now at great length. "You do understand (manthaneis), I suppose, that it is the same way with everything," says Socrates. He goes back to the example of "shaped surfaces." Again, he brings up an hypothetical preliminary exchange between Meno and, this time, somebody else, who may ask the question, "what is 'shaped surface'?" In so doing Socrates again gives "methodi6. P. 48.

c a r precision to the exchange he himself just had with on the subject. T h e answer, '"shaped surface' is ness," would provoke a further question, which would test that definition by turning it around (by "conversion" 7 ) : "is •roundishness' 'shaped surface' or a shaped surface?" and Meno's answer to that would certainly be: a shaped surface. Meno agrees. And Meno would give that answer, would he not, because there are other shapes or surfaces as well. Meno agrees. " A n d if the interrogator asked you, fu ones those were, you would tell him." Meno: " I would." T h e pattern of this exchange is repeated in densed and partly indirect account, where color {chroma) is substituted for schema. T h e hypothetical sequence of questions and answers runs as follows: " W h a t is color?" " W h i t e . " "Is 'white' color or a color?" " A color." T h e last answer would be given because there are other colors as well. Meno agrees. And if the interrogator urged Meno to name other colors, Meno would name others, each of which is no less color than Both accounts theSf merge into one, which takes the form of direct speech. T h e subject "color" is dropped, only the example "shaped surface" is under consideration. Socrates first refers to what he had said before (74 a 7 - 1 0 ) , with regard to human excellence, about always ending up with many things of with the one they were looking for, but now he to stop in resignation. Since all the many and differently shaped surfaces are called by one name (heni tini . . . onomati) the question has to be answered: W h a t is that which is called by that one name, "schema"? T h i s question is put to M e n o directly. Socrates is painstakinj seeking, and finding, Meno's agreement about of the problem at hand. T h a t which is called prises (katechei) even surfaces "opposed" to each other (enantia onta allelois), as roundly curved ones and straight ones are. (At this point, 74 d 8 - e 9, Socrates abandons the rather unusual term he strongylotis i n favor of the more common one to strongylon, "the [more or less] roundly curved," as opposed to to euthy, "the straight," without altering the meaning of what he is talking about. 8 ) A I, 3, 25 a 4 0 ; 45, 50 b 32. (A. E. Taylor, A

face is no more (and no less) "shaped surface" than a straight surface, while it is not true that a curved one is no more curved than a straight one or a straight one nd more straight than a curved one. (We should note that the opposition between "straight" and "curved" is not quite the same as that between arete and kakia, or strength and weakness, but perhaps comparable to that between " b e e " and "drone".) [74 e 11 - 75 b 1]

Socrates grows more insistent in soliciting Meno's answer. T h e direct injunction, "make an attempt" (peiro) to give that answer, is used again (cf. 73 c 6 ) . Socrates then refers back to the hypothetical questioner (mentioning "color" again) and, anticipating Meno's possible answer, " I just do not understand what you want, fellow, just do not know what you are saying," envisages the questioner's possible surprise and possible retort: "You do not understand that I am seeking what can be called 'the same about 1 0 all those surfaces' (to epi pasi toutois taut on) ?" T h e new, and seemingly vague, phrasing of the question is supposed to help Meno, we must assume, in the effort he is being asked to make. " O r could you not, even on this understanding, 1 1 answer the question, if somebody were to ask you: what is the same about the roundly curved (surface) and the straight (surface) and about all the others, which you certainly call 'surfaces', [what is] the same about all of them?" (There is heavy emphasis on the word epi, which is repeated altogether four times.) T h e injunction follows again: "Make an attempt" (peiro) to answer, and Socrates adds: "so that [in making it] you may also go through an exercise for your answer regarding human excellence." Meno's reaction to all this elaborate and insistent urging is indeed surprising. He bluntly, and rudely, refuses to go through the proposed exercise. "No! You, Socrates, give the answer," is his reply. T h i s refusal is the more surprising since Meno did make an attempt to "define" what excellence was. Now he wrants to be told what schema is.

[75 b 2 - c: 1]

T h e r e is a tinge of rebuke in Socrates' response, and a hint at Meno's being accustomed to, and spoiled by, the indulgences of his lovers, because he is still young and beautiful, as will be stated explicitly a little later on (76 b~c). " D o you want me to do you the favor?" he asks and, upon Meno's affirmative, and self-confident, answer, continues: "And you,

4

10. This translation of kwl will find its justification later. 11. Cf. Thompson, pp. 88 f. ( 7 ) .

on your part, will you then be willing to tell me about Socrates, " t h e effort has to be made, for it will be worth while." Meno approves. Socrates' effort is introduced by him as follows: "So let us make an attempt (peirometha) to tell you what 'shaped surface' is. And consider whether you agree that it is what I am going to say it is." T h i s is what Socrates then says: " L e t us take 'shaped surface' clearly to be the only thing, among all existing things, which always accompanies color." And Socrates adds: "Does that suffice you? Or do you want to look for it in some other way? I certainly should be well content if you described excellence to me merely the way [I just described 'shaped surface']." Whatever Meno's response, we have to 1. Its meaning is clear: wherever and color, either some patch or patches of it, or widely spread, uniformly or in distinctly diversified patterns or in we actually see colored surfaces; and, only by seeing color. T h e phenomenon of "color" and the in ordinary discourse, we speak of surfaces of things. see, and does 2. Socrates' Meno way pos-houtos) .

it with precision. query whether the way he "defines" schema leaves the possibility open that there might be or other ways of "defining" it (hikanos-allos T h e "definition" offered by Socrates is, at all in its precision only with the colloquial of schema. I t can stand, with regard to its ity, the test of "conversion," for it is also true that and in the fact that schema and chroma are under all

be without the other. And it should perhaps be noted that our familiarity with both of them does not seem quite evenly balanced: are we not more with "colors" than with

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