Societal Peace and Ideal Citizenship for Turkey

SOCIETAL PEACE AND IDEAL CITIZENSHIP FOR TURKEY 11-213_Donmez.indb i 7/12/11 6:51 AM 11-213_Donmez.indb ii 7/12/11...

Author: Rasim Ösgür Dönmez | Pinar Enneli

33 downloads 2172 Views 1MB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

SOCIETAL PEACE AND IDEAL CITIZENSHIP FOR TURKEY

11-213_Donmez.indb i

7/12/11 6:51 AM

11-213_Donmez.indb ii

7/12/11 6:51 AM

SOCIETAL PEACE AND IDEAL CITIZENSHIP FOR TURKEY

Edited by Rasim Özgür Dönmez and Pınar Enneli

LEXINGTON BOOKS Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK

11-213_Donmez.indb iii

7/12/11 6:51 AM

Published by Lexington Books A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 www.lexingtonbooks.com Estover Road, Plymouth PL6 7PY, United Kingdom Copyright © 2011 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Societal peace and ideal citizenship for Turkey / edited by Rasim Özgür Dönmez and Pinar Enneli. p. cm. ISBN 978-0-7391-4920-1 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-7391-4922-5 (ebook) 1. Citizenship—Turkey. 2. Minorities—Civil rights—Turkey. 3. Turkey—Ethnic relations—Political aspects. 4. Turkey—Politics and government—1980– I. Dönmez, Rasim Özgür. II. Enneli, Pinar. JQ1809.A2S63 2011 324.609561—dc22 2011010146

™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. Printed in the United States of America

11-213_Donmez.indb iv

7/12/11 6:51 AM

Contents

Acknowledgments

vii

Introduction

ix

1

Beyond State-Led Nationalism: Ideal Citizenship for Turkey Rasim Özgür Dönmez

1

2

Citizenship and National Identity: A Comparative Analysis Elçin Aktoprak

27

3

The Making of Modern Turkey and the Structuring of Kurdish Identity: New Paradigms of Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century Maya Arakon

49

4

The Alevi Identity and Civil Rights in the Twenty-First Century Fazilet Ahu Özmen

71

5

Gypsies and Citizenship in Turkey Senem Kurt Topuz

95

6

Less than Citizens: The Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Question in Turkey Hakan Ataman

7

Turks of African Origin and Citizenship Esma Durugönül

125 159

—v—

11-213_Donmez.indb v

7/12/11 6:51 AM

vi

8

9

Contents

Gender and Citizenship in Turkey at the Crossroads of the Patriarchal State, Women, and Transnational Pressures Canan Aslan Akman and Fatma Tütüncü

179

The European Union and Turkey: Transformation of the State–Society Relationship Bahar Turhan Hurmi and Bülent Temel

207

10

Social Rights as Ideal Citizenship M. Kemal Öke

11

The Turkish Young People as Active Citizens: Equal Participation or Social Exclusion? Pınar Enneli

12

Environmental Citizenship and Struggle for Nature Feryal Turan

227

257 281

Conclusion

299

Index

303

About the Contributors

309

11-213_Donmez.indb vi

7/12/11 6:51 AM

Acknowledgments

Come, Come again ! Whatever you are . . . Whether you are infidel, idolater or fire worshipper. Whether you have broken your vows of repentance a hundred times This is not the gate of despair, This is the gate of hope. Come, come again —Mevlana Jelaleddin RUMI

M

EVLANA WAS NOT BORN in this soil, but blossomed here. His ideal is still alive here. So if there could be a possible societal peace in the world, we believe that this soil is a good starting point to try. In this adventure, we would like to thank the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) for sponsoring this book through the project of “Disadvantaged Young People’s Transition to Adulthood in the Metropolitan Areas: Being Part of the Problem or the Solution.” We also would like to thank Ayşe Kaya for her relentless assistance in the formation of this book.

— vii —

11-213_Donmez.indb vii

7/12/11 6:51 AM

11-213_Donmez.indb viii

7/12/11 6:51 AM

Introduction

I

in a society? This question led us to arrange a workshop on citizenship and societal peace at Turkey’s Abant İzzet Baysal University in Bolu on April 9, 2010, with the financial assistance of the Turkish Scientific Research Center (TUBITAK) on disadvantaged young people. This book is the result of that workshop and aims to understand the ways and means for ensuring societal peace by evaluating problems about citizenship in the Turkish regime. It also offers the ideal citizenship regime for Turkey in relation to various issues, such as the environment, gender, youth, and poverty. The Turkish state was built on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire, inheriting the empire’s transcendental and patriarchal nature and incorporating state-led nationalism to create the ideal Turkish citizens. This process can be deemed as the radical modernization of the Turkish elite in creating a new Turkish society,1 hampering the Ottoman past, and drawing the boundaries of ideal citizenship—as will be seen in sections of this book—patterned on specific elements, including heterosexuality, the middle class, males, Sunni Hanafi Islam, Turks, and so on. In recent years, the definition of citizenship through state-led nationalism, secularism, and a free market economy has created crises in politics and society. The implicit ideal of the citizenship envisioned by the state—namely, solely Turkish, Sunni-Hanafi, heterosexual, male-dominated, and free market believers—has been criticized by social movements, particularly after the 1980 military intervention. This ideal is especially criticized for not allowing S SOCIETAL PEACE ACHIEVABLE

— ix —

11-213_Donmez.indb ix

7/12/11 6:51 AM

x

Introduction

different ethnic, religious, and sexual identities to represent themselves in both the political and public spheres. Although some problems deriving from the existing Turkish citizenship regime are much more visible, such as the Kurdish and Alevi phenomena, others are less obvious but still have potentials to create foreseeable troubles. These include the use of male-dominated violence against women, crimes deriving from homophobia, discrimination against Gypsies and other ethnic and religious groups, and the building of industrial complexes and the hydroelectric barrel generators at the expense of the environment and citizens’ habitats. Meanwhile, Turkey’s integration into globalization and the European Union processes makes these political and social problems visible, forcing the current government—the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government—to take stock of the solution. Still, this process sometimes forces the state to preserve the orthodox form of the Turkish citizenship regime, thus turning a deaf ear to these demands. In other words, this crisis stems from the transformation of the classical nation-state (i.e., Westphalian) to the denationalization of the nation-state2 whose borders are more flexible and in which clashes between these controversial processes occur in the discussion of the citizenship regime. Therefore, the citizenship regime is a strong fault line for these discussions, and the state–society relationship continuously regenerates itself according to the position—namely, first or second—of the Turkish state to its society. Today, no single hegemonic power dominates the Turkish political and state spheres as social movements, interest groups, and civil society organizations have articulated their problems relatively freely and want to be free players in the political and public spheres. All the existing problems to a great extent reside in a citizenship regime that makes the subject one of the sole issues in the liberalization of politics and the provision of societal peace in the country. Managing these problems by developing a new constitution, while involving all political and social actors in this attempt, is appropriate for enhancing societal peace in the country. Therefore, this book attempts to understand the conflicting areas or subjects in the political and social spheres to offer solutions from the perspective of the citizenship regime. In this context, Rasim Özgür Dönmez evaluates the dynamics of the Turkish citizenship regime, tracing it back from the Ottoman period onward and trying to analyze the deficiencies of this regime in obstructing societal peace in the country. The writer offers that the new citizenship regime should be based on civic patriotism rather than state-led nationalism and should be approached solely in terms of nation-states (i.e., enacting laws without considering how international agreements lead to societal and political conflicts in society).

11-213_Donmez.indb x

7/12/11 6:51 AM

Introduction

xi

Elçin Aktoprak’s “Citizenship and National Identity: A Comparative Analysis” sheds light on the formation of national identities and minority nationalisms in Spain, Ireland, and Turkey as well as the relationship between the structure of the citizenship regime and national identities in providing peaceful settlements between national identities and minority identities. Meanwhile, Maya Arakon and Fazilet Ahu Özmen analyze the problematic relationship between Kurdish and Alevi identities and the official ideology and its citizenship regime, arguing that it is vital to provide constitutional democracy in integrating these identities successfully in the citizenship regime in Turkey. Maya Arakon’s chapter, “The Making of Modern Turkey and the Structuring of the Kurdish Identity: New Paradigms of Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century,” aims at analyzing the structuring of the Kurdish identity within the construction of modern Turkey and seeks for new paradigms of citizenship that can meet new claims of the twenty-first century. Fazilet Ahu Özmen tries to answer how the Alevis can have equal civil rights and what should be done for this by the society and the government. In her chapter, Senem Kurt Topuz focuses on Gypsies’ citizenship with reference to those in Edirne, where she conducted field research. She evaluates the perceptions of Gypsies on the citizenship regime in Turkey by underscoring their problems. Topuz claims that the government should make some social and economic arrangements to improve Gypsies’ life conditions and should enact specific laws to prevent prejudice against them in the society. For the writer, the constitutional democracy that abandons the constitution for ethnic, religious, cultural, and gender-based elements is an effective solution for removing this prejudice. In addition, Hakan Ataman evaluates the social injustices that lesbians, bisexuals, gays, and transsexuals face in society, stressing the importance of both reactive measures (e.g., adequate legal protections and provisions, regulations, an improved justice system, and the cessation of impunity as ensured by the government of Turkey) and proactive measures (e.g., social protection and cooperation, solidarity, education, the creation of a positive atmosphere for dialogue between different people, and empathy). Esma Durugönül focuses on the relationship between social exclusion and the Turkish citizenship regime through the Afro-Turkish community in Turkey. The writer analyzes how the Turkish citizenship regime makes the Afro-Turkish community invisible in society and its negative effects on this group such as poverty and prejudice against this group. Canan Aslan Akman and Fatma Tütüncü analyze the relationship between gender and citizenship regime in Turkey. Their chapter provides an overview of the determinants and the dynamics of the patriarchal construction of citizenship in Turkey from a historical perspective, and its major concern is

11-213_Donmez.indb xi

7/12/11 6:51 AM

xii

Introduction

with identifying the major cultural, political, and discursive forces preventing Turkish women from fully exercising their social, civil, and political citizenship rights. It highlights specific problem areas in women’s experiences of citizenship with a focus on women’s civil and social rights, and it underlines the impact of women’s groups and transnational influences in the improvement of citizenship. Lastly, the chapter underlines the discrepancy between egalitarian legal rights and their social applications in the era of religiously conservativism. Bahar Turhan Hurmi and Bülent Temel underline the positive effects of the European Union on the Turkish citizenship regime and their necessary engagement in the progression of social and political liberties in Turkey. The writers point out that one of these prominent changes has been a reformation of the state–citizen binary relationship and its impact on the empowerment of people against the state in their demands for ethnic or religious existence. While the writers argue that this denationalization process promises favorable contributions to a more democratic, diverse, stable, and content Turkish society, it also makes the country more prone to separatism. Unfettered democratization demands by the European Union from its associated countries may jeopardize sociopolitical stability in the European continent. Mustafa Kemal Öke analyzes the relationship between social inequalities, poverty, and the citizenship regime in Turkey, concluding that the government or state should provide equality and social justice by providing for citizens’ essential needs, such as education and accommodation. Pınar Enneli evaluates the relationship between the citizenship regime and young people in Turkey. The writer argues that the state in Turkey is not inclusive of young people, especially disadvantaged ones, and it does not allow them to be critically active in the political and social spheres. According to Enneli, there is a need to create a new citizenship regime to allow the young people with various backgrounds to involve themselves actively in the decision-making processes. Feryal Turan further points out the different facets of social injustice in environmental citizenship and their connection with the struggle of the local people suffering from the construction of hydroelectric power plants in Turkey against energy companies and the government. She comments on the importance of environmental citizenship, requiring active citizenship in eliminating social injustice derived from neoliberalism and improving sustainable development.

11-213_Donmez.indb xii

7/12/11 6:51 AM

Introduction

xiii

Notes 1. See Touraj Atabaki and Eric Jan Zürcher, Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah (London: IB Tauris, 2004). 2. Saskiye Sassen, “Towards Post-National and Denationalized Citizenship,” in Handbook of Citizenship Studies, edited by Engin Isin and Bryan Turner (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003), 285.

Bibliography Atabaki, Touraj, and Eric Jan Zürcher. Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah. London: IB Tauris, 2004. Heper, Metin. “The Strong State as a Problem for the Consolidation of Democracy: Turkey and Germany Compared.” Comparative Political Studies 25, no. 2 (1992): 169–94. Karaman, Lütfullah, and Bülent Aras. “The Crisis of Civil Society in Turkey.” Journal of Economic and Social Research 2, no. 2 (2000): 39–58. Sassen, Saskiye. “Towards Post-National and Denationalized Citizenship.” In Handbook of Citizenship Studies, edited by Engin Isin and Bryan Turner London, 277–93. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2003.

11-213_Donmez.indb xiii

7/12/11 6:51 AM

11-213_Donmez.indb xiv

7/12/11 6:51 AM

1 Beyond State-Led Nationalism: Ideal Citizenship for Turkey Rasim Özgür Dönmez

T

HE POST–COLD

WAR ERA led to a new phase in politics that has changed the interaction of domestic and international politics and state–civil society relationship. This new structure ultimately caused the deterioration of the classical nation-state relationship, leading to the prioritization of collective ethnic and ethnoreligious identities over nation-state identity or its trademark, citizenship. This identity-based politics makes citizenship a terrain on which to create antagonism against the state and its ideology. The efforts of Western Europe to integrate Muslim immigrants into its political and social systems or the rise and the demands of the radical rightist movements are some examples of this antagonism. Likewise, Turkey has also witnessed such a development, in that citizenship has become a fault line of this antagonism between the state and the collective identities. Therefore, citizenship has gained multidimensional features in the post–Cold War era and cannot simply be perceived as a legal status signifying the official relationship between the individual and the state. In this regard, citizenship has three important patterns. The first is the dynamic nature of citizenship. In regard to the changing structure of the political and social spheres, citizenship is not a static concept; rather, it is a dynamic, reproducible, and definable social and political identity. Thus, the concept does not have an ahistoric nature, but corresponds with a reconstructive identity patterned after historical, discursive, and institutional elements. To put it succinctly, the citizenship identity based on rights-freedom-responsibilities, which distinguishes it from all other identities, can be redefined according to

—1—

11-213_Donmez.indb 1

7/12/11 6:51 AM

2

Rasim Özgür Dönmez

time as well as changing needs and demands. Therefore, citizenship refers not only to a social identity but also a strong political identity by which making politics should be perceived as part of the citizenship.1 In other words, citizenship can be identified with Aristotle’s zoon politikon. In addition, the concept of citizenship is one of the sole instruments of “governmentality” for the state in managing society. Therefore, every state has a “citizenship regime” that is a signifier for the state in its approach to individuals, communities, and cultural identities. In this context, although some identities, cultures, or communities gain privileged positions, others may fall into a secondary position. Consequently, citizenship functions as an inclusion/exclusion mechanism that makes us think of it beyond its legal status.2 Finally, Ayşe Kadıoğlu’s notion of defining the late modern times as “the divorce of nation from state” indicates the culmination of identity politics; recognition of such demands makes the citizenship regime one of the cardinal “governance technologies” in solving these problems.3 In this regard, the citizenship regime may serve as political, social, and cultural terrain for collective identities in their recognition by the state and help form common language between them and the state. Based on these points, the identity recognition demands of Kurdish, Islamist, and Alevi movements and their sociopolitical protests, as well as drastic economic crises occurring since Turkey’s transformation of its economy to a free market economy in 1980, have weakened the state–citizen relationship. In particular, the focal point of this tension between the state and these identities is the citizenship regime in Turkey, thereby demonstrating how the concept of citizenship regime is paramount for Turkey in providing societal peace in the country. This study argues that the citizenship regime in Turkey, patterned on state-led nationalism and the state’s political monopoly in the public sphere, has not allowed the emergence of free political participation and active citizenship. In addition, liberalism, to a great extent without social welfare, alienated masses from a feeling of belonging to the Turkish state. Indeed, it has encouraged them to form or become involved in ethnic, religious, and somewhat primordial formations. In this sense, the polarization of the political sphere and society along Turkish–Kurdish, secular–conservative, and similar lines is not coincidental. As such, the Turkish citizenship regime should be repatterned on civic patriotism while the social welfare system should be enhanced in order to address the alienation of citizens to the state. In this regard, the first section focuses on how and why the concept of citizenship regime has been historically conceptualized by the state and evaluates its consequences. The second section offers a new paradigm beyond state-led nationalism and argues that civic patriotism can be a cure for providing societal peace in the country.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Beyond State-Led Nationalism

3

The State, the Public Sphere, and Citizenship in Turkey Citizenship in the Ottoman Empire The Ottoman Empire, unlike its counterparts in the West, adopted a monist governing system in which citizenship was viewed as the property of Sultan. In this context, the meaning of politics in Arabic, siyaset, which was used during the Ottoman period as well, etymologically refers to governing the ruling class rather than its Western counterpart (politics), which is derived from polis, indicating participation in the city’s problems.4 This noble example of a military and agricultural empire had two important features relating to this study: the overwhelming dominance of the state over society and the composition of society. Compared to European states, Ottoman politics did not consist of different players who could influence power, nor did society intend to challenge power, as did the bourgeois revolution in Europe.5 The Ottoman state structure can be categorized into two parts: the governors (askeriye) and the governed (reaya).6 Although intermediaries existed between these strata as well as a very complex bureaucracy, it is not unusual to categorize the two parts in this manner, as Ottoman wealth was based on agriculture (accounting for 90 percent of the population), which made the reaya as a whole an important player in economic sphere. Yet the reaya was to a great extent ineffective in the political sphere, in which it did not have any political rights.7 Thus, the relationship between these two sections formed an important part of Ottoman politics. A second important feature of the Ottoman Empire was its multicultural structure. The system, consisting of various communities—each with different laws and social systems—was called the “millet system.” These communities developed and practiced their own laws without state intervention; as such, in this respect, every community was autonomous. The leaders of these communities were responsible to the state for their communities. The Ottoman policy was to make these groups dependent on the state for two reasons: • To control these communities from the center • To close the distance between state and society A variety of communities, distinguished according to their religions, sects, and ethnic groups, such as the Armenians and Jews, formed the Ottoman society. The Sunni Muslim community was at the top of the hierarchy, with society constructed from various groups with their own educational systems, heritages, and other laws. These communities were only responsible to the state for taxation and military duty.8


7/12/11 6:51 AM

4


The citizenship regime can be divided into two periods during the Ottoman Empire. In the first period of the Ottoman Empire (1453–1839), the Ottoman ideology, or Ottomanism, was an elite and imperialistic ideology in which the state elite had different traditions; the society’s distinct elite languages strongly internalized this ideology. As previously discussed, the rest of the population—namely, the ruled class—was structured by the millet system, but these communities could not utilize the benefits of the system as the askeriye section of the state did. Although they and their communal freedoms were protected by the state in exchange for paying taxes and accepting the Ottoman borders, they were deprived of political rights and not allowed to engage in politics. The system perceived citizenry as objects of the system and patterned its citizenship regime on the concept of justice, but not equality. The state tried to be fair to its citizens, but it perceived itself as their owner, which did not lead it to open the public sphere as the arena for making politics.9 During the second period, starting with the 1939 Tanzimat Reforms, the public sphere was enriched with urban elites from various Muslim and non-Muslim communities. According to Faruk Birtek, the Ottomanism of the Tanzimat period was radically different from the first period. Tanzimat broadened Ottomanism to a larger population by putting further prominence on the urbanity of manners, style, and language.10 As Birtek remarked, “Thus, once more an imagined class emerged, but now much wider in scope and with full recognition of multiplicities—or better, of multiple layers of identity.”11 Urban elites having multiple identities indicated a citizenship that could negotiate among multiplicities of social spaces without dissolving their private/ communal features, albeit differences emerged in situating better positions for themselves in negotiations. In other words, the possibility of carrying multiple identities signified what it meant to be an Ottoman in this period.12 This process, resembling Habermasian deliberative democracy, led Ottomanism to be extended to relatively large sectors of society and helped find a common language in the name of an Ottoman identity in the public sphere.13 Unlike the first period, with the influence of the French Enlightenment, equality became as important as the principle of justice, and making politics became relatively normalized in urban elites. However, this process did not satisfy both Muslim and non-Muslim communities. For Christian communities, the idea of Ottomanism and the Ottoman Empire itself were no longer an attractive anchor to the Empire. These communities had a new ideal, which was to form their own new nation-states. Meanwhile, Muslim communities were afraid of losing their power against non-Muslim communities or minorities. The establishment and the strengthening of the vigilant paramilitary group Union and Progress, particularly within the military in this era, were no coincidence. This vigilante group


7/12/11 6:51 AM


5

would capture the power and—after the Balkan wars and the independence of Albania—begin to transform the state ideology of Ottomanism into Turkism. Hence, the group began to Turkify the empire, which did not lead to multiple identities.14 In addition, this new movement hegemonized the political sphere and did not allow the common person to engage in politics. This process escalated with the demolition of the Ottoman Empire and continued radically after the establishment of the Turkish Republic. The Citizenship Regime in the Turkish Republic: Secularism and the Unbearable Lightness of State-Led Nationalism The demolition of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the Turkish Republic paved the way for emerging traumatic nationalism, which had two paradoxical features. First, this nationalism was citizenship-based nationalism, which focused on erasing its Ottoman past in the name of bringing about radical modernity. In this context, it drew a sharp line between modern and nonmodern, the West and the East, and Turkish and non-Turkish. Second, and in contrast to the first feature, the new regime borrowed monist and societal engineering features of the Ottoman Empire, which did not lead to enabling civil society to engage in politics or promote equality for society.15 As such, the Ottoman legacy continued in the administration and political regime of the new Turkish Republic. These two points intersected in the public sphere and in the citizenship regime, which unfortunately created a fault line between the center and the periphery.16 The Kemalist establishment (i.e., the center) accepted the dominance and the priority of the West against the East and the modern against the not-modern. In this respect, although the establishment envisaged the public sphere as the terrain of modernity, it identified the private sphere with tradition. Therefore, ethnic and religious differences were not perceived as problems as long as they stayed in the private sphere. This perception resulted from the establishment’s ideal, which constructed a direct relationship between the creation of the modern citizenship and the modern nation-state by using the public sphere. Furthermore, this perspective paved the way for confining all the ethnic and religious discourses and symbols to the private sphere. The establishment thought to transform the subject of the Ottoman Empire to modern citizenship through secularism, rationalism, and Republicanism—also called nationbuilding—while excluding the ethnic, rural, and religious identities from the public sphere. In other words, the republican project created a “communitarian and regulatory” public sphere.17 Nationalism was the other prominent component of this sphere, and the political elite tried to define citizenship based on nationalism. Mustafa Kemal


7/12/11 6:51 AM

6


was influenced by Rennan’s understanding of nationalism, which prioritized common history and the will to live together. In other words, nationalism was identified with people living in the same land. However, this nationalism simultaneously consisted of ethnic features as the ideology of Islam was necessarily replaced by ethnic Turkish nationalism. This was done to a certain extent by inserting Islam into nationalism. Thus, ethnic nationalism was used to inculcate the population, which lacked a Turkish consciousness. These two kinds of nationalism—while strongly interlinked with one another— sometimes clashed with one another as well. However, in any case, these two nationalisms generally complemented one another while the ethnic nationalism feature of Turkish nationalism strongly determined the historical and cultural definition of the state ideology. Given that the minority right regime of the Ottoman Empire continued in the new Republic, Islam became a strong indicator in distinguishing Turks from minorities. Consequently, non-Turkish groups such as Kurds tried to assimilate into the system.18 This situation indicates the role of the state in society, where the state had paramount power over society. The establishment deliberately maintained a vague definition of the relationship between the state and society, in which a single party—namely, the Republican People’s Party—was purely engaged with the state’s bureaucracy. The Republican ideology, which accepted the undeniable role of the nation in providing the state’s legitimacy in principle, helped the party and the state become the sole actor in the public sphere and the sole representative of the nation. Two additional instruments fostered this role:19 the statism principle of the state’s ideology, which gave the state a paramount role in the economic sphere, and the state of emergency conditions set by the state. Claiming the vital importance of modernization in escaping the Ottoman past and the undeniable role of the state in this objective, the state of emergency conditions was used to create the concept of a citizenry that was in debt to its nation rather than having social and political rights.20 In other words, it tried to create the agent of the modernization project rather than the individual in liberal terms. Although this perspective led to the maintenance of the Ottoman patrimonial system, it simultaneously patterned the citizenship regime between the center–periphery, Islam–secularism, and Turk–non-Turk dichotomies. This citizenship regime made the state a separate community from society, using different codes and “habitus” to alienate large sectors of society. The uprisings against the reforms in the country from the East to the West of Turkey showed this alienation. In other words, the dominance of the state over the society did not allow the state to achieve its prospect of creating a homogenous society. The birth of the multiparty system in 1950 signified the clash between the liberal and authoritarian political tendencies. However, the political, eco-


7/12/11 6:51 AM


7

nomic, and social developments that occurred in this period left their mark after the 1970s. Two had a drastic effect on the citizenship regime—namely, the transformation to a multiparty system and the urban-to-rural migration, which culminated in three important results.21 First, the public sphere was pluralized, which opened the ground for mushrooming religious and ethnic identities, thereby setting the stage for identity recognition demands and identity-based conflicts that emerged in modern Turkish politics in the 1980s. Second, the strict control of the state over Islam weakened, resulting in the freeing of the circulation of the symbols of Islam in the public sphere. For example, the Islamic sects became visible in this period and became effective players in the political sphere, leading Islam to become one of the strong elements in the citizenship regime.22 Finally, the Turkish government chose to shift to the Western bloc and, in return, the Marshall Plan aid given by the United States to Ankara hindered the state’s control over the economy and formed the foundation of the free market economy.23 Parallel to the formation of the free market economy, citizens’ social rights were to a great extent ignored by the Democrat Party (DP) government because the system took working rights into consideration, not citizenship rights. For example, the social security of unemployed women was defined not by their citizenship status but through their husbands or fathers who were employed. Yet, with the large immigration flow from rural to urban areas, the informal working sectors became widespread. Unlike the first kind of citizenship, which involved working in formal working sectors and having social rights, those working in the informal sectors had no precise or clear definition of their relationship to the state. Hence, the government tried to connect the relationship with the latter during election times to win votes, implicitly leading them to establish informal ways of social solidarity (e.g., family, kinship, and ethnic and religious formations).24 This ultimately led to groupings of new urban settlers rather than a modern citizenship identity. This fundamental grouping subsequently led to the formation of communitarianism based on ethnic and religious kinship as well as fellow citizenship,25 resulting in these groups locating themselves antagonistically against one another in terms of accession to social and financial sources. These new settlers also formed a new hybrid culture synthesizing rural and urban values, which directly positioned them against the sectors of society having formal social rights culturally. In other words, the distance between the center and the periphery widened, despite the sectors moving closer to each other geographically.26 Therefore, membership in modern citizenship was blocked by sociological and political developments, which led to a new kind of millet system based on city fellowship (hemşehrilik) and ethnic and religious kinship.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

8


Nevertheless, the 1960 military intervention of the army against the DP government, which practiced authoritarian policies like its predecessor (i.e., the Republican People’s Party, or CHP), resulted in a new constitution in 1961. Although this constitution was comprised of liberal essences, such as giving autonomy to universities and social and syndicate rights to citizens, it paradoxically gave the military and the state elite power over the political elite.27 In particular, the military gained important exit guarantees that strengthened its role in a democratic regime. On the other hand, the constitution affected society in two ways.28 The liberal side displayed its effects in both the political sphere and civil society; the pluralization of social movements and the translation of many ideological sources began in this period. As a result, the 1961 constitution created active citizens.29 However, the 1961 constitution also polarized the right and left wings’ relationship with one another. University students and second-generation settlers participated in the clash of the Eastern Bloc and the West by supporting the first bloc. Meanwhile, the industrial bourgeoisie, military and civilian bureaucracy, and nationalist and conservative governments allied with each other against the discontent of modernization, liberalization in the society, and their side effects to form the left. They created common nationalist, populist discourse and bound it to Kemalist ideology, particularly its stateof-emergency discourse, which also demonstrated the military’s assertive power. The state elite, which had continued since the beginning of the republic, directly connected the citizenship regime and the state of emergency.30 This lead to the second phase: the authoritarian phase of the 1961 constitution’s effects. The state of emergency patterned on the discourse of the “communist threat and its collaborators” drew the framework of the citizenship regime and provided a means of disciplining the citizenship regime.31 Biriz Berksoy analyzed the discourse of the police force and its reflections on practice, drawing three conclusions about the perception by the police force of the citizenship regime during that period, thereby helping to embody this perception.32 The first was the role of the state in society. The state and society were perceived as the inseparable parts of an organism; the state was the concrete and explicit expression of the society. As in fascist regimes, the state was perceived first and foremost as the representative of the society. Second, the aim of the police was the continuation of nation-building and the homogenous, classless nation. According to Berksoy, the perception of citizenship had ethnic essences, and those outside the Turkish nation (i.e., non-Turks, Kurds, minorities, and socialists or communists) were seen as the enemy. People talking about the classes were also perceived as an enemy threatening the unity of the country. In other words, it is highly evident that the police force identified socialists or communists, centering the concept of class in its


7/12/11 6:51 AM


9

discourse, as one of its vital enemies. Finally, the police force stressed the vitality of the military within the state and its cardinal role in modernization and protection of the country. Hence, the military was shown as the head of the state and the society’s organic dependence on this institution was glorified.33 In short, during this period, the state tried to control society by some exit guarantees and the condition of a state of emergency. The state tried to suppress divergences in society by producing nationalism combined with the state of emergency. In this regard, the idea that the citizen was in debt to the state rather than having rights continued through this period. Pluralization of the Public Sphere in the 1980s and 1990s and the Struggle via Citizenship With the intensification of clashes between the left and the right in society, the military engaged in a coup d’état in 1980. During the aftermath of the military intervention, the 1982 constitution was enacted, which abolished many individual and social rights, such as the right to organize trade unions and universities’ autonomy. The 1982 constitution made society fully dependent on the state via state institutions such as the Council of Higher Education, which controlled all universities, and the National Security Council, which had an implicitly higher position than the Turkish National Assembly and comprised higher-ranking soldiers.34 This process radically cut the state and citizenship relationship and led to a power monopoly of the state in both political and public spheres against the citizens. The easing of the control of the military junta in the mid 1980s provided a relatively stable relationship within society. The transformation of the economic system from the import substitution model to a free market economy, coupled with the drastic migration flow from rural to urban centers, led to the pluralization of the public sphere and the relative reinforcement of the civil society during the late 1980s. On the other hand, the cultural antagonism vividly embodied in the center–periphery distinction in Turkish politics in the post-1980 era due to migration from rural areas to big cities, the rapid urbanization and modernization of Turkish society, and the integration of global economy and politics brought uncertainties to society. This situation particularly affected those along the periphery, who had migrated a decade or two earlier. This conservativism later met with not only Islamic networks but also ethnic and religious networks in the post-1980s and 1990s due to the impotency of the welfare regime in Turkey.35 Unlike the 1970s, the left and the right ideologies that covered ethnic, religious, and fellowship networks were demolished by the 1980 military intervention. Therefore, these identity-based groups became visible and began to struggle with the nation-state via citizenship regime,


7/12/11 6:51 AM

10


which tried to deconstruct and change the structure of it. Their criticism and actions focused on three points: • The modernization perspective—ignoring the grassroots and its reflection on the citizenship regime by perceiving the society as the organic compound of the state—was strongly criticized. • These groups tried to make their symbols visible in the public sphere, generally merging them with the symbols of the high culture and the state ideology. This impacted the strict nation-state understanding of the Kemalist elite, leading the nation-state into crisis. • Related to the previous point, these groups demanded to be represented in both the political and public spheres. This demand was controversial to both the state ideology and the structure of the state institutions, ultimately leading the state into crisis.36 The 1980s and 1990s witnessed the reinforcement of the identity recognition demands and the social movements in the country due to the European Union accession process, which made them visible in both public and political spheres. However, the relationship of the state with these groups was patterned on the security paradigm—particularly the state-of-emergency vision—rather than the perspective of democratization. The identity recognition demands of Islamists, Alevis, Kurds, and terrorist facilities of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Kurdish ethnonationalist movement, fostered the state’s security paradigm. PKK assistance from Russia, Greece, Iran, and Syria also accurately corresponded with the state-of-emergency paradigm of Turkey in terms of promoting the discourse of a domestic and international enemy. In addition, the acute economic crisis in the country, particularly the one in 1994, led people to lose confidence on the political and economic spheres. This situation appeared to weaken the political sphere by strengthening the state elite over the political elite. Therefore, the state elite continued to preserve the citizenship regime against the social movements with identity recognition demands using nationalism in the context of its state-of-emergency paradigm.37 On the other hand, Alevis, Kurds, and Islamists followed antagonistic politics both with the state and with each other. Hence, the citizenship regime became a battlefield for these movements. For example, Kurds demanded to be the other fundamental actor with the Turks in the constitution, while the Alevis demanded all the rights of Hanefi Sunni Muslims, such as opting out of the same status in the Presidency of Religious Affairs of the Republic of Turkey. In other words, these groups demanded not only justice but also equality from the state. However, the state cooperated with some of these groups against others in order to remain the sole hegemonic representative of


7/12/11 6:51 AM


11

the public and political spheres.38 Although this approach forced these groups to close in on themselves, it also made them follow antagonistic politics both against the state and with themselves. This situation escalated antagonisms among secularists and Islamists, center and periphery, and Turkish and Kurdish nationalists, whose roots could be traced back to the beginning of the Republic or before.39 Denationalization of Citizenship Regime and the Justice and Development Party: The Citizenship Regime between the Agonistic and Antagonistic Politics40 The February 27, 2007, military intervention carried out against Islamists in the country and the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, were two victories for the state elite. Although the activities of political Islam in the political sphere were to a great extent halted by the former, the PKK was taken over by the latter. By means of these actions—particularly the February 27 military intervention—the state continued its hegemony in both political and public spheres and strongly affected public opinion, which enabled it to preserve the existing citizenship regime. However, the end of the low-intensity conflict in the country and the abolition of the threat of political Islam diverted Ankara’s target to accession into the European Union. At the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, the efforts to fulfill the promised reforms within the National Program (March 2001) gained speed. In February, March, and April 2002, several changes were made in criminal and civil law. For example, the death sentence was abolished and converted to life sentence while the freedom to establish an association was expanded.41 The Article 26 amendment expanded the content of the “languages” with which people could express themselves in their daily lives. Freedom of expression was further broadened by the removal of wording from Article 28: “There can be no activities of publication in languages that are forbidden by law.” Additional changes in the freedom of expression occurred by opening up the possibility of broadcasting in radio and television in previously forbidden languages (March 26, 2002) as well as lifting the ban on the teaching and learning of different languages (August 3, 2002).42 The victory of the neoconservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the 2002 elections accelerated this Europeanization process. Amendments were made in Turkey concerning the law of foundations that facilitated the possibility of non-Muslim foundations to own property (January 2, 2003). A package of amendments that was passed on June 19, 2003, contained a change in construction law that made it easier to construct sites of religious prayer for all religions. There was also a change in legal codes that restricted


7/12/11 6:51 AM

12


the utilization of non-Turkish names. The constitutional amendments of 2004 comprised an addition to Article 90 of the constitution concerning the approval of international treaties. The addition stated that, whenever conflicts arise between international treaties pertaining to fundamental human rights and domestic laws, the articles of the international treaties should prevail. This opened the door to the possibility of implementing some of the articles promoting minority rights as contained within the Treaty of Lausanne (July 24, 1923). In addition to these constitutional amendments, various amendments of other legal codes were made, including amendments to the criminal code in order to make possible the incrimination of expressions that degrade minorities. There was also a change in legal codes that restricted the utilization of non-Turkish names.43 This liberalization and democratization process led to the “denationalization of citizenship regime” with reference to Ayşe Kadıoğlu, borrowing the terminology from Saskiye Sassen. The concept refers to the legitimate claims of Turkish citizens who are non-Muslims and who are not of Turkish descent regarding their different religious, linguistic, and cultural existences in the public realm within the territorial boundaries of the Turkish state.44 “The legitimation of such claims makes it possible for these ‘authorized yet unrecognized’ citizens to enjoy equal rights.” According to Sassen, denationalization and postnationalism represent two different trajectories, albeit not excluding each other. Denationalization “has to do with the transformation of the national, specifically under the impact of globalization and several other dynamics, and will tend to instantiate inside the national.” Postnationalism, on the other hand, makes references to new forms of citizenship such as European citizenship and city citizenship that are located outside of the national realm.45 This process broke the hegemony of the state elite in the public sphere. Therefore, the ex-Islamist but currently neoconservative AKP, which had problems receiving legitimacy from the West, followed two seemingly contradictory policies. The AKP began to engage in clashes for hegemonic dominance with the state—or Kemalist—elite over democratic and Western values. In doing so, it accelerated the denationalization process until 2004 and reformulated its liberal American perspective, which criticized state-centered nationalism having ethnic nationalist tunes. On the other hand, it raised civil society over the state, guaranteeing civic nationalism, at least in rhetoric. This idea corresponded with another idea of the liberal American perspective of secularism, which made the state approach all other religions from the same distance. This perspective was complemented with the party’s international relations approach embodied in its willingness to use soft power and zero problem policy in domestic and international relations.46 Therefore, these two


7/12/11 6:51 AM


13

perspectives and instruments abolished the state-of-emergency perspective of the state elite patterned on their international relations understanding of the international enemy and its domestic collaborators. Although these policies were the reflections of the new geopolitical conditions of the world, this policy compulsorily requires zero problem—at least in theory—in domestic politics. This fact normalizes politics, making politics the communitarian and fragmented structure of society. Radical efforts of the AKP in solving Kurdish and Alevi problems reflected this fact. The AKP, in its second main policy, has to some degree tried to democratize the public and political spheres, realizing civic integration in both terrains due to its neoconservative ideology and its clash with the state elite. In fact, it has focused efforts on conservatizing these terrains and the citizenship regime by controlling civil society and the public sphere through Islamic philanthropic associations and fundamental organizations such as Islamic sects with their media organs. The party also inculcates a conservative ideology among society through state institutions such as the Radio Television Supreme Council, which controls the contents of programs, and the National Ministry of Education. The AKP borrowed the political engineering perspective and hegemonic nature of the Kemalist elite, which inculcated Islam into society. The party followed a radical neoliberal perspective and ignored social welfare, trying to stick to the society by both Islam and economic aid to philanthropic associations.47 According to Soner Çağatay, the classical Turkish nationalistic identity is patterned on Turkish language, with its complementary Islam. However, the AKP has indicated a tension with this definition as it does not perceive Islam as an ordinary complementary identity, but rather it takes a true worshiping (i.e., orthopraxy) as the primary pattern of Turkish identity.48 In short, the AKP used popular Islam, merging it with liberalism, to create an instrument for arranging the citizenship regime. In this regard, although the AKP changed the content of the classical stateof-emergency paradigm of the state elite, it in fact continued it by otherizing the state elite in the name of “subversives of democracy” and others not internalizing traditional lifestyles (e.g., gays, transsexuals, people not obeying traditions such as people drinking alcohol). In other words, being Turkish began to be defined in terms of morality and to what extent individuals practiced their religion.49 On the contrary, the state elite defined positivism in the context of the statist and modernization perspective, which led to the emergence of the authoritarian state. The AKP has tried to deconstruct this paradigm and redefine the role of the state with reference to liberal and conservative values. This created strong opposition in certain sectors of Turkish society on the grounds that the party had been evolving the political system into civilian authoritarianism.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

14


However, we can say that the citizenship regime during this period evolved to some extent into liberalism and liberal values. It also had strong tendencies in the evaluation of the system to liberal conservative authoritarianism, prioritizing traditions and Islam while merging with Turkish nationalism.

The Need for a New Definition of Citizenship Regime: Civil Patriotism As previously discussed, three cardinal deficiencies existed in the Turkish citizenship regime. The first one is the hegemonic nature of the state in the public sphere and its monopoly of this sphere. Related to this is the lack of confidence in politics—which especially continued until the AKP—and the antagonistic perspective of the state elite to various social movements and their politics. Finally, politics has been defined via the state of emergency, which aimed to control both the public sphere and the citizenship regime. All three points anchored the citizenship regime on state-centered and ethnic-based nationalism owned by the majority and to a great extent excluded others from both the public and political spheres. In this section, we try to show why we need a new definition of citizenship regime by using field research as evidence. In recent years, two studies into citizenship in Turkey have demonstrated that the public’s understanding of citizenship is different than the state’s perspective of nationalism. These give important clues for this study in order to find the ideal citizenship regime for societal peace in Turkey. The first study was conducted by Konda, a famous research company in Turkey, in 2006. Entitled Who We Are, the research sought to reveal the demographic structure of Turkish society. It was carried out with 47,958 people using semistructured interviews in 12 regions as determined by the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS). Participants were asked about what is required to be Turkish citizens, including the fundamental factors for being a Turkish citizen: • • • •

Is it compulsory to love Turkey? Is it cardinal to say that I am from Turkey without regard for ethnicity? Is it fundamental to be Muslim? Is it compulsory to be ethnically Turkish?

The participants who most often chose the last two options had not completed high school and came from low strata of society in terms of education. As evident in Table 1.1, the ethnic and religious features of citizenship


7/12/11 6:51 AM


15

TABLE 1.1 How Do We Understand Turkish Citizenship? 82% 64% 54% 46%

It is compulsory to love Turkey in order to be a Turkish citizen. It is fundamental to say that I am from Turkey without regarding ethnicity in order to be a Turkish citizen. It is fundamental to be Muslim in order to be Turkish citizen. It is compulsory to be ethnically Turkish in order to be a Turkish citizen.

are not considered to be as significant as the first two options based on patriotic feelings.50 The second research study was carried out by Pınar Enneli, Rasim Özgür Dönmez, and others, focusing on disadvantaged young people in the Altındağ region of Ankara from 2008 to 2010.51 This region largely consists of slum areas and generally consists of cosmopolitan worldviews. The researchers carried out a survey with 619 people, executing semistructured interviews with 60 of these participants. In the semistructured interviews, the researcher asked participants, “Do you feel that you are in a life debt to the state or to the homeland?” Approximately 55 people answered that they were in debt to the homeland rather than the state. According to a 24-year-old Furkan high school graduate, “I do not have any life debt to the state. Has the state ever done a favor for me? No! . . . Of course, I can give my life for our homeland without a second thought.” As can be seen from the examples, the public’s perspectives are controversial with regard to the citizenship regime of the state, which has the strong potential to distort the societal peace in Turkey. Such understanding makes us think about what should be done in order to provide societal peace in Turkey. Before answering this question, we should consider four cardinal domestic and global facts: • Turkey, as an important player in the global capitalist system, is part of the solution and the problems of the global system. The political and state elites cannot think about their policies from solely a domestic perspective. • The world entered the postmodern period, according to Tuathail, during the post–Cold War era, where nation-states are no longer the sole players in international relations. Globalization, information, and developments in technology have transformed the space and time regime in world politics.52 These dynamics have created spatial transformations resulting in the profound erosion of the sovereignty of nation-states and blurring of internal and external boundaries, leading to a common global society. The current situation in the world can be termed a postmodern geopoliti-


7/12/11 6:51 AM

16


cal condition, shaped by the information and risk society. This process creates interconnections between places across the globe and alters the relationship among local, national, and global sectors. This situation has enabled ethnic and religious identities to produce themselves epistemologically and define their identities beyond the nation-state.53 • Turkey is a member in many supranational institutions, particularly Western supranational organizations such as the United Nations, the European Commission, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Consequently, Ankara cannot act in a solely state-centric way and produce merely state-centric discourses. Otherwise, its efforts to control the public sphere by nationalism, strict secularism, and the prevention of politics are meant to avoid universal, transnational values such as democracy and the rule of law. Thus, the Turkish state’s relationship may fall into crisis with domestic political actors, which often becomes transnational. • The state and the political elite’s definition of politics within the context of security and the state of emergency means the state is perceived as a community lacking links with the society in the eyes of ethnic, religious, and other ideological groups. This has two results. First, ethnic and religious identities close in on themselves and act antagonistically towards other communities and the state. Second, politics cannot transform from antagonistic politics to agonistic politics, leading to ethnic and religious tensions in the country.54 In considering these points, we should ask what kind of citizenship regime is convenient for Turkey. By recalling citizenship deficiencies in Turkey, we argue that civic patriotism, which can be categorized as liberal thinking, is the most convenient philosophy for the Turkish political system. According to Laborde, Civic patriotism is both more situated and more radical than neutralist constitutional patriotism: It emphasizes the motivational prerequisites of democratic governance, stresses the need to preserve existing co-operative ventures, and demands that existing political cultures be democratically scrutinized and reshaped in an inclusive direction. It promotes mainly political identity, whose political content makes it compatible with variety of practices and beliefs, but whose thin particularistic form justifies citizens’ commitment to specific institutions.55

Although both civic and constitutional patriotism are helpful for dismantling the dominance of one ethnic group in the citizenship regime in Turkey and provide societal peace within the unitarian structure of the country, civic patriotism criticizes the constitutional patriotism in the sense that it focuses merely on universal values such as democracy and freedom while isolating


7/12/11 6:51 AM


17

politics from culture. It also does not seriously consider the need for cultural mediations between citizens and their institutions. There is no room in this study to argue profoundly why some other kinds of citizenship (e.g., postnational citizenship, civic nationalism, or the ecological citizenship) are or are not convenient for Turkey. We pattern our thoughts on Cécile Laborde’s influential article entitled “From Constitutional to Civic Patriotism.”56 According to Laborde, it is essential to distinguish the difference between patriotism and nationalism. Whereas nationalism generally refers to locality, culture, and ethnicity, patriotism indicates constitutionalism, territory, and universality. Although the former has the strong potential to clash with universal values, the latter is suitable for interweaving with universal values. To reveal the difference clearly, the four layers of the national identity should be clearly identified: • Ethnic and fundamental links • Culture, language, customs, and the way of life of a particular community • Political culture as represented in political institutions, symbols, and ideological and rhetorical traditions • The abstract, universalist political ideals indicated in the form of general principles figured out in the constitution Nationalism to a great extent relies on the first two features in arranging the citizenship regime; civic patriotism mostly stresses the latter two by seriously considering the first two features.57 In the Turkish case, civic patriotism should be discussed in three topics: (1) the legitimacy perspective, (2) the social democratic perspective, and (3) the inclusiveness perspective.58 Legitimacy Perspective Today, many political actions or legal rules in Turkey cannot receive legitimacy from society. These laws or political matters are either not compatible with universal values or are so abstract that they are not able to be interwoven with local values, customs, or political culture. According to civic patriotism, democratic and universal values must be rooted not only in laws but also in mores. They should also be brought in as guiding ideals in “deliberations about particular public issues and applied interpretatively in the light of all the information relevant to the concrete context.”59 Therefore, the content of national identity in Turkey should be redefined, and freedom, democracy, and human rights should be inserted and interwoven with the current elements in Turkish national identity—namely, religion, history, language, and territory.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

18


Some patterns in the content of Turkish national identity can be replaced, such as freedom rather than security; human rights rather than the dominance of state over state. For example, when a terrorist attack is carried out in the country, the society should perceive this attack as an assault on the Turkish national identity as it threatens the freedom of Turkish society and Turkey’s human rights principle, not just an assault executed against the state. According to Lebord, for such an active citizenry, citizens must be educated in the habits of democratic self-government and civic education should be given to citizens in the process. As seen from the example, universal values such as human rights and freedoms merge with local ideas—namely, the Turkish national identity.60

The Social Democracy Perspective In an interesting study carried out by Sabancı University scholars Ersin Kalaycıoğlu and Ali Çarkoğlu focusing on societal inequality in Turkey, the authors gave strong clues about the Turkish people’s mindset regarding their confidence in the political and economic spheres. The scholars interviewed 1,569 households in 65 of Turkey’s 81 cities. According to the results, 70 percent of the participants believed that they earn less than they deserve and 92 percent did not think that there is social justice in the distribution of wealth and services throughout society. In addition, 90 percent did not believe in the utility of the free market and wanted state interference in the market. According to scholars, the participants did not believe in the benefits of the private sector for themselves. Rather, they believed in the benefits of the state actions for themselves in the economy.61 This brings us to the social democracy perspective of civic patriotism. National identity requires mutual trust in other citizens as well as solidarity and reconciliation with them, which necessities social justice, fair wealth distribution, and basic human rights for subsistence. As previously described, this is necessary to dismantle the communitarian structure—forming groups on the basis of fundamental ties—of society, thereby preventing societal peace in the country that emerges from the inability of the state to bring enough social justice to Turkey. However, social democracy itself cannot be realized only domestically. Thus, the state or government in Turkey should focus on transforming the international economic system through international economic institutions with reference to social democracy. Therefore, civic patriotism works to develop social democracy not only in Turkish political and economic spheres but also in its international economic system through supranational organizations.62


7/12/11 6:51 AM


19

The Inclusiveness Perspective63 In Turkey, nationalists always claim that the public sphere is neutral in its nature and everyone has the same access to resources. However, for civic patriots, this sphere is not neutral, as the majority often offends the minority through banal nationalism rather than leading them to feel that they are citizens. As such, the feeling of unity can be realized in two ways. The first is to open the public sphere to minorities for deliberation of their demands and their problems. Although this has been achieved by some identities in Turkey (e.g., Kurds and Alevis),64 it must be realized for all minorities, including non-Muslim groups. Here it is not important to realize all these demands in reality, but rather to take these demands and problems into serious consideration. Second, some ideological, ethnic, and religious movements clash with the majority; the state can generate democratic and universal discourses in order to find room in both the public and political spheres. It sometimes does this at the expense of some local institutional and ideological structures. Hence, civic patriotism perceives the public and political spheres as arenas for deliberation and attributes an important meaning to the concept of politics for providing agonistic politics. Therefore, civic patriotism takes all the discourses of these political groups into consideration and suggests borrowing democratic and universal discourses and policies from these groups. Furthermore, it offers to adapt them to the ideology and institutions of the majority while avoiding local and particularistic ones. For example, writing the names of streets in two or three languages in some municipalities in the eastern part of the country does not dismantle national unity; rather, it reinforces the feeling of solidarity among minorities. Finally, civic patriotism’s political culture and symbols should be open to reconstruction. Common mythos and symbols should be produced, and sometimes some parts of official ideology should be deconstructed for the integration of political groups into the system. It is important to know that a political culture itself does not have a historic nature; rather, it is changeable. Not only the political culture but culture itself can be reformulated by creating common myths, rewriting official ideology, and so forth. All these provide solidarity and a feeling of togetherness. Civic patriotism’s refining of the ethnic dominance of one group aims to provide solidarity in Turkey without distorting the unitarian structure of the country, which is an important means for providing peace in the country. In order to be realized, Turkey needs an active government and should make it state policy. Although it seems radical to realize this project, it is crucial to integrate others into the system to create a strong power in world politics.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

20


Conclusion Turkey’s citizenship regime to a great extent relied on the heritage of the first period of the Ottoman Empire to lead the state to become dominant over society in both the public and political spheres. The hegemonic nature of the state and the state elite’s lack of confidence in politics have excluded large sectors of society from both the political and public spheres. This fact was fostered by the state-of-emergency discourse, aiming to control both the public sphere and the citizenship regime. All three points anchored the citizenship regime in state-centered and ethnic-based nationalism owned by the majority. The rapid urbanization and migration flow from rural areas to cities starting in the 1950s created a new societal fact by changing the structure of society and the political sphere. These people, who were deemed as living along the periphery, began to organize along ethnic, religious, and historical groupings that vividly emerged after the dismantlement of the left and right wings during the 1980 coup d’état and demolition of the Soviet socialist bloc. One of the profound reasons behind this fact was the weak social welfare system of the country, which led these people to feel insecure. In addition, the position of the state against society acted as the sole representative of society and perceived society from the state-of-emergency perspective. This fact ultimately led the state to close in on itself. The grouping of the society along ethnic and religious terms for resource mobilization located these groups antagonistically to the state and to each other, thereby preventing people from feeling they were the real citizens of the Turkish nation-state by blocking that societal security in the country. In this regard, civic patriotism is an important tool for providing societal peace in Turkey, requiring a citizenship regime based not on the dominance of one ethnicity or an identity but rather on the equality of all identities. According to civic patriotism, democratic and universal values must be rooted not only in laws but also in mores. In regard to Turkey, the content of the Turkish constitution should be refined to eliminate any ethnic, gender-based, or religious elements. The content of national identity should be redefined, and freedom, democracy, and human rights should be inserted and interwoven into the current elements in Turkish national identity (i.e., religion, history, language, and territory). In addition, civic patriotism requires strong social welfare in the country by providing solidarity among citizens. Hence, it is almost impossible to think that governments and states think domestically; thus, social democracy is an important requisite for Turkey to provide solidarity among its citizens. However, the government cannot think about democracy while political and economic institutions focus solely on domestic issues. Instead, they should


7/12/11 6:51 AM


21

think globally. In other words, they should focus their efforts on changing the neoliberal system in global institutions. In terms of Turkey, the weak social welfare alienated individuals from the state and encouraged them to become involved in fundamental groups. The social democratic system will make them feel like members of the state rather than members of a community. Another factor is the inclusiveness perspective of civic patriotism. Deliberation in the public sphere should be free for all groups, and the majority should be open to adopting the symbols and discourses into consideration while suggesting the borrowing of democratic and universal discourses and policies from these groups. Furthermore, it should offer to acclimate them to the ideology and institutions of the majority by avoiding local and particularistic ones. In other words, the state monopoly in the public sphere should be lifted, and all ideas and symbols should be lifted from the state-of-emergency perspective of the state. Some discourses and symbols of social movements can be adapted to the political sphere while some can be avoided. In other words, the dominant political actors in Turkey should learn to play the game of politics rather than control politics. Notes 1. E. Fuat Keyman, “Kimlik, Vatandaşlık ve Demokratikleşme,” in Aydınlanma, Türkiye ve Vatandaşlık, ed. E. Fuat Keyman (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2008), 13–14. 2. Keyman, “Vatandaşlık ve Demokrasi,” 13–14. 3. Ayşe Kadıoğlu, “Denationalization of Citizenship? The Turkish Experience,” Citizenship Studies 11, no. 3 (July 2007): 283; Keyman, “Kimlik, Vatandaşlık,” 13. 4. Mümtazer Türköne, Siyaset (Ankara: Lotus Kitabevi, 2005). 5. Rasim Özgür Dönmez, Europeanization and Turkey (Exeter: University of Exeter, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 2003), 127–30; Taner Timur, Osmanli Toplumsal Duzeni (Ankara: Imge, 2001), 243. 6. Timur, Toplumsal Düzeni, 243; Dönmez, Europeanization and Turkey, 127. 7. Halil Inalcik, “Sivil Toplum and Neo-Patrimonyal Siyaset,” in Kuresellesme, Sivil Toplum ve Islam, eds. Emin Fuat Keyman and Ali Yaşar Saribay (Ankara: Vadi Yayinlari, 1998), 76. 8. Etyen Mahcupyan, Turkiye’de Merkeziyetci Zihniyet, Devlet ve Din (Istanbul: Patika, 1998), 59. 9. Teyfur Erdoğdu, “Osmanlılığın Evrimi Hakkında Bir Deneme: Bir Grup (Üst Düzey Yönetici) Kimliğinden Millet Yaratma Projesine,” Doğu Batı 11, no. 45 (May, June, July 2008): 20–26. 10. Faruk Birtek, “From Affiliation to Affinity: Citizenship in the Transition from Empire to the Nation State,” in Identities, Affiliations and Allegations, eds. Seyla Benhabib, Ian Shapiro, and Danilo Petranović (New York: Cambridge Press, 2008), 30.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

22


11. Birtek, “Nation State,” 37. 12. Birtek, “Nation State,” 38. 13. Jurgen Habermas, “Three Normative Models of Democracy,” Constellations 1, no. 1 (December 1994): 1–10. 14. Murat Belge, “Türkiye’de Zenofobi ve Milliyetçilik,” in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik, ed. Tanıl Bora (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 183–86. 15. Feyzi Baban, “Türkiye Cumhuriyet’inin Kuruluşunda Vatandaşlık ve Kamusal Kimlikler,” in Aydınlanma, Türkiye ve Vatandaşlık, ed. E. Fuat Keyman (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2008), 64–80. 16. To explain Turkish politics, several scholars used the center–periphery framework, which is an important tool that draws an organized state elite indicating nationalist, orientalist, and laicist characteristics against a periphery, including suburbanized classes and ethnic, religious, and regional groups that identify with traditional values. The central elite composed of military and bureaucratic officials—and business cycles—constructed a mechanism to control the selection and socialization of new elites—namely, the periphery. See Şaban Tanıyıcı, “Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey: Islamist Welfare Party and Pro-EU Turn,” Party Politics 9, no. 4 (2003): 468; Frank Tachau, Turkey, the Politics of Authority, Democracy and Development (New York: Praeger, 1984); Şerif Mardin, “Center Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?,” A Daedalus 102, no. 1 (1973): 169–91. 17. Baban, “Vatandaşlık ve Kamusal Kimlikler,” 70–75. 18. Baban, “Vatandaşlık ve Kamusal Kimlikler,” 75–77. According to the Lausanne Treaty signed on July 23, 1923, Turkey recognized only non-Muslims as constituting a minority. Non-Turkish groups who are Muslims, such as Kurds, were not accepted as a minority. 19. Baban, “Vatandaşlık ve Kamusal Kimlikler,” 77. 20. See Kaya Akyıldız, “Büyüyen Çöl: Vatan, Türklük ve Kalıcılaşmış Olağanüstü Hal,” Toplum ve Bilim 17 (2010): 19–41. 21. Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, The Rising Tide of Conservativism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 18. 22. Hakan Yavuz, Modernleşen Müslümanlar: Nurcular, Nakşiler, Milli Görüş ve AK Parti (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2005), 88–92. Unlike the first period, heterodox Islam came to be recognized by the state, which let followers act freely in the political and public spheres. In return, these sects were not to violate the borders of the state ideology. During this period, many religious leaders were sued for violation of the secularism principle of the state. 23. Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, The Rising Tide, 18–19. 24. Ayşe Buğra, “Sosyal Haklar ve Eşit Vatandaşlık Kavramı,” in Aydınlanma, Türkiye ve Vatandaşlık, ed. E. Fuat Keyman (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2008), 162–63. 25. Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, The Rising Tide, 24–25, 146–47. 26. Although these two sectors came to live in cities, they were isolated from each other culturally. The center began to perceive the periphery as posing a threat by distorting Western values.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


23

27. Nalan Soyarık Şentürk, “Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık: Anayasal ve Yasal Düzenlemeler Işığında Bir İnceleme,” in Aydınlanma, Türkiye ve Vatandaşlık, ed. E. Fuat Keyman (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2008), 30–31. 28. Ergün Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 106–8. 29. See Nadire Mater, Sokak Güzeldir: 68’de Ne Oldu? (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2009), 11–17. 30. Eric Jan Zürcher, Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993), 370–82. 31. Biriz Berksoy, “Devlet Stratejilerinin Bir Tezahürü Olarak Polis Alt-Kültürü,” Toplum ve Bilim 114 (2009): 104–13. 32. Biriz Berksoy, “Devlet Stratejilerinin,” 104–13. 33. Berksoy, “Devlet Stratejilerinin,” 105–13. 34. See Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics. 35. Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, The Rising Tide, 146. 36. Rasim Özgür Dönmez, “Kesişen ve Ayrışan Etnik ve Dini Toplumsal Hareketler,” in Türkiye’de Kesişen Çatışan Dinsel ve Etnik Kimlikler, eds. Rasim Özgür Dönmez, Pınnar Enneli, and Nezahat Altuntaş (İstanbul: Say Yayınları, 2010), 30–45. 37. Dönmez, Europeanization and Turkey, 152–81. 38. Although the state used Alevis against political Islam, it promoted some sectors of Islamists to prevent the rise of political Islam. 39. Dönmez, “Dini Toplumsal Hareketler,” 33; see also Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu, The Rising Tide. 40. According to Chantel Mouffe, while antagonism is a we/they relationship in which all players have emnities lacking any common ground, agonism indicates a we/ they relation in which conflicting parties recognize the legitimacy of their opponents. In the latter, players are adversaries, not enemies. Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (London: Routledge, 2005), 20. 41. Şentürk, “Yasal Düzenlemeler Işığında Bir İnceleme,” 34–35. 42. Kadıoğlu, “The Turkish Experience,” 292. 43. Kadıoğlu, “The Turkish Experience,” 292; see also Şentürk, “Yasal Düzenlemeler Işığında Bir İnceleme,” 34–35. 44. Kadıoğlu, “The Turkish Experience,” 284. 45. Saskiye Sassen, “Towards Post-National and Denationalized Citizenship,” in Handbook of Citizenship Studies, eds. Engin Isin and Bryan Turner (London: Sage, 2003), 285. 46. Rasim Özgür Dönmez, “The Justice and Development Party between Islam and Modernity,” Religion Compass 4, no. 6 (June 2010): 369–71. 47. Dönmez, “Islam and Modernity,” 361–72. 48. Hasan Bülent Kahraman, “Bayramda Baklava Yiyen Türktür,” Radikal Kitap, 5 March 2010, www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?aType=HaberYazdir&ArticleID=9 83530 (accessed September 8, 2010). 49. Rasim Özgür Dönmez, “The Re-Birth Pangs of New Turkey in the 21st Century,” SEER 13, no. 1 (June 2010): 65–66. For example, police officers imposed penalties on transsexuals walking in Beyoğlu, an important central square in Istanbul.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

24


50. “Biz Kimiz: Toplumsal Yapı Araştırması,” Milliyet Konda Araştırma, 2006, www.konda.com.tr/html/dosyalar/ttya_tr.pdf (accessed September 8, 2010): 35–37. 51. Pınar Enneli, Rasim Özgür Dönmez, Çağlar Enneli, Sibel Kalaycioğlu, Ayşe Kaya, and Sinem Teber, “Metropollerde Yaşayan Dezavantajlı Gençliğin Yetişkinliğe Geçiş Süreci: Sorun Ya da Çözümün Parçası Olmak,” unpublished research report, TUBITAK Project No. 107K456, 2010. 52. Gearoid O. Tuathail, “The Post-Modern Geopolitical Conditions: States, Statecraft, and Security at the Millennium,” Annals of the American Geographers 90, no. 1 (2000): 166. 53. Tuathail, “Security at the Millennium,” 166. 54. Dönmez, “Dini Toplumsal Hareketler,” 23–49. 55. Cécile Laborde, “From Constitutional to Civic Patriotism,” British Journal of Political Science 32 (2002): 592. 56. Cécile Laborde, “Civic Patriotism,” 591–612. 57. Cécile Laborde, “Civic Patriotism,” 597–9. 58. Cécile Laborde, “Civic Patriotism,” 599. 59. Cécile Laborde, “Civic Patriotism,” 602–3. 60. Cécile Laborde, “Civic Patriotism,” 602–3. 61. Cited in Sedat Ergin, “İki Akademisyenden Hükümet ve Muhalefete Altın Öğütler,” Hurriyet, (May 26, 2010), www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/14838174 .asp?yazarid=308&gid=61 (accessed September 8, 2010). 62. See Cécile Laborde, “Civic Patriotism,” 603–6. 63. For more details about inclusiveness, see Cécile Laborde, “Civic Patriotism,” 606–611. 64. Kurds and Alevis are not perceived as minorities for the Turkish citizenship regime. We mention them as minorities because they do not have the same access to certain resources as Turks (for Kurds) or Sunnis (for Alevis).

Bibliography “Biz Kimiz: Toplumsal Yapı Araştırması.” Milliyet Konda Araştırma (2006), www .konda.com.tr/html/dosyalar/ttya_tr.pdf (accessed September 8, 2010): 35–37. Ayşe Buğra, “Sosyal Haklar ve Eşit Vatandaşlık Kavramı,” in Aydınlanma, Türkiye ve Vatandaşlık, edited by E. Fuat Keyman. İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2008. Baban, Feyzi. “Türkiye Cumhuriyet’inin Kuruluşunda Vatandaşlık ve Kamusal Kimlikler.” In Aydınlanma, Türkiye ve Vatandaşlık, edited by E. Fuat Keyman, 64–83. İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2008. Belge, Murat. “Türkiye’de Zenofobi ve Milliyetçilik.” In Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik, edited by Tanıl Bora, 179–93. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002. Berksoy, Biriz. “Devlet Stratejilerinin Bir Tezahürü Olarak Polis Alt-Kültürü,” Toplum ve Bilim no. 114 (2009): 104–13.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


25

Birtek, Faruk. “From Affiliation to Affinity: Citizenship in the Transition from Empire to the Nation State.” In Identities, Affiliations and Allegations, edited by Seyla Benhabib, Ian Shapiro, and Danilo Petranović, 17–45. New York: Cambridge Press, 2008. Çarkoğlu, Ali and Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. The Rising Tide of Conservativism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Dönmez, Rasim Özgür. Europeanization and Turkey. Exeter, UK: University of Exeter, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 2003. ———. “The Justice and Development Party between Islam and Modernity.” Religion Compass 4, no. 6 (June 2010): 365–75. ———. “Kesişen ve Ayrışan Etnik ve Dini Toplumsal Hareketler.” In Türkiye’de Kesişen Çatışan Dinsel ve Etnik Kimlikler, edited by Rasim Özgür Dönmez, Pınar Enneli, and Nezahat Altuntaş, 30–45. İstanbul: Say Yayınları, 2010. ———. “The Re-birth Pangs of New Turkey in the 21st Century,” SEER 13, no. 1 (June 2010): 55–69. Erdoğdu, A. Teyfur. “Osmanlılığın Evrimi Hakkında Bir Deneme: Bir Grup (Üst Düzey Yönetici) Kimliğinden Millet Yaratma Projesine,” Doğu Batı 11, no. 45 (May, June, July 2008): 19–46. Ergin, Sedat. “İki Akademisyenden Hükümet ve Muhalefete Altın Öğütler.” Hurriyet (May 26, 2010), www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/14838174.asp?yazarid=308&gid=61 (September 8, 2010). Ergün Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 2000. Gearoid O, Tuathail. “The Post-Modern Geopolitical Conditions: States, Statecraft, and Security at the Millennium,” Annals of the American Geographers 90, no. 1 (2000): 166–78. Habermas, Jurgen. “Three Normative Models of Democracy,” Constellations 1, no. 1 (December 1994): 1–10. Halil Inalcik. “Sivil Toplum and Neo-Patrimonyal Siyaset.” In Küreselleşme, Sivil Toplum ve Islam, edited by Emin Fuat Keyman and Ali Yaşar Saribay, 74–87. Ankara: Vadi Yayınları, 1998. Kadıoğlu, Ayşe. “Denationalization of Citizenship? The Turkish Experience.” Citizenship Studies 11, no. 3 (July 2007): 283–299. Kahraman, Hasan Bülent. “Bayramda Baklava Yiyen Türktür,” Radikal Kitap (March 5, 2010), www.radikal.com.tr/Default.aspx?aType=HaberYazdir&ArticleID=9835 30 (accessed September 8, 2010). Kaya, Akyıldız. “Büyüyen Çöl: Vatan,Türklük ve Kalıcılaşmış Olağanüstü Hal,” Toplum ve Bilim 17 (2010): 19–41. Keyman, E. Fuat. “Kimlik, Vatandaşlık ve Demokratikleşme.” In Aydınlanma, Türkiye ve Vatandaşlık, edited by E. Fuat Keyman, 7–18. İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2008. Laborde, Cécile. “From Constitutional to Civic Patriotism.” British Journal of Political Science 32, (2002): 592. Mahcupyan, Etyen. Turkiye’de Merkeziyetci Zihniyet, Devlet ve Din. Istanbul: Patika, 1998.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

26


Mardin, Şerif. “Center Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?,” A Daedalus 102, no. 1 (1973): 169–91. Mater, Nadire. Sokak Güzeldir: 68’de Ne Oldu? İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2009. Mouffe, Chantal, On the Political. London and New York: Routledge, 2005. Sassen, Saskiye. “Towards Post-National and Denationalized Citizenship.” In Handbook of Citizenship Studies, edited by Engin Isin and Bryan Turner, 277–93. London, Thousand Oaks, and New Delhi: Sage, 2003. Şentürk, Nalan Soyarık, “Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık: Anayasal ve Yasal Düzenlemeler Işığında Bir İnceleme.” In Aydınlanma, Türkiye ve Vatandaşlık, edited by E. Fuat Keyman, 27–38. İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi, 2008. Tachau, Frank. Turkey, The Politics of Authority, Democracy and Development. New York: Praeger, 1984. Taner Timur, Osmanli Toplumsal Duzeni, 2nd ed. Ankara: Imge, 2001. Tanıyıcı, Şaban. “Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey: Islamist Welfare Party and Pro-EU Turn,” Party Politics 9, no. 4 (2003): 463–83. Türköne, Mümtazer. Siyaset. Ankara: Lotus Kitabevi, 2005. Yavuz, Hakan. Modernleşen Müslümanlar: Nurcular, Nakşiler, Milli Görüş ve AK Parti. İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2005. Zürcher, Eric Jan. Modernleşen Türkiye’nin Tarihi. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

2 Citizenship and National Identity: A Comparative Analysis Elçin Aktoprak

C

are two forms of identity that closely linked with the nation-state. Since 1789, they are the key terms determining access to state resources and patterns of solidarity.1 They have been interpreted as interdependent and interchangeable2 because they have common cultural and political meanings such as differentiating inhabitants and aliens. Both are critical elements in the formation of the nation-state as a political community. Nevertheless, unlike national identity, citizenship is also a legal status that names the official relationship between an individual and a state. Rights and obligations are the basic determinants of this relationship that define a legal equality between citizens. National identity is inseparable from this official meaning of citizenship. The distinction between civic versus ethnic nationalism and comparison of French and German nationalisms are ongoing debates in nationalism studies, which have focused on this close relationship between national identity and citizenship.3 A civic nation is defined as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values; France and the United States have been generally given as examples.4 On the other hand, an ethnic nation with the ethnic concept of membership views national identity as an inherent and unitary identity which is independent of one’s will. But the differentiation of these definitions is analytical and normative. They do not describe particular nationalisms, nor can they be used to trace the trajectory of nationalism in general. For even the most “civic” and “political” nationalisms often turn out on closer inspection to be also “ethnic.”5 However, the aim of this study is not to contribute to this ongoing debate on nationalism studies but to highlight the ITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

— 27 —


7/12/11 6:51 AM

28

Elçin Aktoprak

importance of national identity formation for comprehending the recent debates on the relationship between citizenship and national identity, especially during the conflict resolution processes about national minority issues. Therefore, national identity will be the key concept of this paper. However, contrary to the widespread usage of the concept of national identity, here it will not be equated with the supra-identity of the state. In order to emphasize the double meaning of the national identity concept, the terms supra-identity and sub-identity will be delineated. Supra-identity is the identity of a state which cannot be directly equated with national identity.6 For example, Ottoman identity was a supra-identity but not a national identity in the seventeenth century. However, particularly after the nineteenth century, nearly all supra-identities—whether they are nation-states or not—have begun to be identified as national identities both in theory and practice. Therefore, the states sought for identification of national identity and citizenship and, in cases that these two did not overlap, the states have used their power to realize this idealized situation which in turn deeply influenced the position and perception of sub-identities in these countries. Sub-identity is the identity of a group that an individual is born into (various ethnic, religious, and other groups).7 The repressive policies may vary from one country to another depending on the various national(ist) discourses and instruments of states; but it is particularly the national minorities that have been subjects of this oppression because of their contending identity definitions. National minorities are cultural autochthonous groups that think of themselves as nations within a larger state since the nineteenth century,8 such as the Irish, Basques, and Kurds. They usually have distinct culture, language, and traditions from the dominant nation, and with their self-identity definition they challenge the national identity discourse of states. Their demands, such as cultural rights, autonomy, and/or secession, challenge the state-defined political community; conflicting national identities within a state deeply affects other identity forms, including citizenship. In this context, the two forms of national identity will be examined by comparing Britain, Spain, and Turkey with reference to their national minority issues, the Northern Ireland, Basque, and Kurdish problems. Taking into consideration the ongoing discussions on democratization in Turkey, a comparison of different cases might contribute to the redefinition of political community in Turkey.

Structural and Historical Similarities For comparing three different countries and three different national minority groups, it is first of all necessary to draw the lines of our frame of refer-


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Citizenship and National Identity

29

ence. The capitalist evolution of the world system will be the main structural signifier here. As Wallerstein puts it, a capitalist world-economy came into existence in the sixteenth century and has established its dominance for over four centuries not only in economic but also in social and political structures. In this chapter, it will be argued that the history of nationalism is embedded in the history of capitalism. Although the emergence of nationalism is closely linked with the rise of capitalism, nationalism would appear at the later stages of capitalist development in the nineteenth century. The emergence of new economic conditions in this period led to the formation of the nation-state, and the nation-state led to the formation of nationalism, as will be explained below. According to the transformation of economics, national identities have been formed and revived in every new phase of the world-economy. In this paper, these periods will be basically categorized as the nineteenth century, the welfare state of the post–Second World War period, and the neoliberal era. National identity formations will be analyzed in this framework. The second structural signifier is the center–periphery relation. Here, following Hechter, the center is used as the region in which the dominant cultural group has been living and where the political and administrative forces have been centered in a country; the periphery denotes the regions which have culturally different population from the center and are not determinants in the political and administrative structure of the country. The level of economic development in the periphery will not be taken as the main characteristic of the peripheral regions. The regional inequalities could be stemming from the developed economy of the center which is reinforced by the political and military advantages; but this argument cannot explain the case of the Basque Country, which is one of the wealthiest regions of Spain. In this case, another factor comes into existence: different modernization processes of the center and periphery.9 Interestingly, regions like the Basque provinces and Catalonia have integrated into the capitalist world-economy earlier than the center, and their modernization processes have differentiated them from the center, but by political and military power central authority has protected its central pose. In this context, political, military, and administrative forces of the central authority gain importance in analyzing center–periphery relations. But surely, the roots and contents of the center–periphery relationship and the evolution of capitalism vary from country to country. Nevertheless, the center–periphery relationship in the scope of the capitalist world-economy provides significant clues to analyze some common paths that various groups have followed, especially after the nineteenth century in which the nation-state has emerged. However, for following these paths we should also look at their history before the nation-state was formed.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

30

Elçin Aktoprak

Before the nineteenth century, despite the geographical, socioeconomic, and cultural differences, indirect rule was the basic common principle that formed the center–periphery relationship in Britain, Spain, and the Ottoman Empire. The peripheral regions in these countries were under the political control of the central authorities, but there was no pressure from there to build a culturally homogenous “national” society as would be experienced during and after the nineteenth century. The peripheral regions were able to preserve their regional identities in an economic, social, and cultural sense while enjoying a large degree of autonomy in the respected administrative structures. The linguistic differences, different modes of production, and/or self-directed political institutions supported the different composition of the central and peripheral regions. Ireland in the history of Britain, the Basque provinces in Spain, and Kurdish regions in the Ottoman Empire were clear examples of these kinds of peripheral regions. Ireland was a peripheral region of Britain, with its distinct regional identity relying on its different linguistic, religious (Catholic), and economic structure. It was invaded in the twelfth century, but the British monarchy did not achieve the complete subjugation of Ireland until the sixteenth century. There was an Irish Parliament that was formally founded at the end of the thirteenth century, but the Crown remained the sole, overarching political authority. Its power was weak or nonexistent, and settler and native lordships were left largely to their own devices. However this policy broke down by the end of the sixteenth century, and a policy of coercion and displacement took its place.10 In 1609, the British government invited settlers (Protestants) to take up offers of land in the northern part of the Ireland. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries these new settlers did not integrate with the local Irish. The land settlements were in favor of these new-coming Protestants against the Catholic Irish people as part of the British strategy. The composition of the Irish Parliament also altered as Protestants began to hold a majority of the seats in the Parliament. The position of the Catholics in Ireland changed, and they were increasingly treated as second-class citizens.11 These religious, political, and economic differentiations planted the conflict between the center and periphery and reproduced sectarian patterns of the conflict through time in changing conditions. Before the nineteenth century the Ottoman Empire also embraced indirect rule. The administrative system consisted of two components: the central government and the provincial administrations. In the provincial administration, administrative flexibility was the norm. The frontier regions enjoyed greater autonomy than the ones that lay closer to the Ottoman center.12 Kurdistan, as a frontier region, enjoyed this kind of autonomy until the nineteenth century, and Kurds were able to protect their regional identities without interference


7/12/11 6:51 AM


31

by the central authority. There was a loose connection among the Kurdish tribes and between the center and the subregional system of this borderland between the Persian and Ottoman Empires.13 We also have to mention the statute of the Kurds under the millet system in the Ottoman Empire. The millet system was not based on an ethnic hierarchy but on a religious one. Muslims were at the top of this hierarchy, and the term millet (nation) denoted the religious, not the ethnic, community. As Muslims, Kurds were also parts of this ascendancy.14 The caliphate was the symbol of the unity of Muslims as a faith-based community and allowed space for diverse loyalties and local autonomy for the periphery.15 The Basque provinces enjoyed a similar kind of autonomy under the name of the foral system, in which the local laws and economic privileges had been maintained against the central authority until they were replaced in the nineteenth century. By the end of the eighteenth century, Spain was a composite of very diverse territories united under the monarchy. Many of these territories kept not only their languages but also very distinct customary laws and legal codes. And, in some cases, such as the Basque provinces and Navarre, they retained political institutions of their own, such as governing assemblies and collective territorial privileges. In the Basque provinces these privileges also exempted the local population from both military service and taxation while allowing the provincial assemblies the right to veto royal edicts.16 In sum, it is possible to argue that in Britain, Spain, and the Ottoman Empire, central authorities were compelled to rely on indirect rule to control their far-flung territories in order not to lose their political control over them before the nineteenth century.17 However, in the face of the new capitalist development it has gradually become necessary to transform the indirect rule, and once indirect rule is undermined a potential for nationalism exists.18 Capitalism is a process of capital accumulation which is open to structural changes,19 and nationalism, as a closely linked ideology with the capitalist world-economy, has gained different characteristics at different levels of capital accumulation. Nationalism has emerged in the European scene when the capitalist world-economy was in need of a more regular market, common legal bindings, clear frontiers, and a compromise between capital and coercion. This process was accompanied by rising nationalism and the nation-state. Monopolization of the means of coercion was in the hands of the state until the sixteenth century, but from the end of the eighteenth century the state has also taken over the monopoly of administration and jurisdiction.20 The nation-state has emerged as the new main actor of the new world system. State-building nationalism was embodied in the attempt to assimilate or incorporate culturally distinctive territories in a given state. It was the result of the conscious efforts of central rulers to make a multicultural population


7/12/11 6:51 AM

32

Elçin Aktoprak

culturally homogeneous. Peripheral nationalism is spurred by these efforts of state-building nationalism.21 These states imagined their own communities on behalf of the others, and the relationships between these conflicted communities have basically transformed during the three phases of the capitalist accumulation that will be mentioned below. The nation-state formation has taken different forms in different regions. The same goes for the British, Spanish, and Turkish cases as well. However, the transformation of the center–periphery relations in each of these cases followed similar paths with different contents. The growing pressure of the central authority on peripheral regions was conspicuous. Consequently, the peripheral regions not only lost their administrative autonomies; they were also under the threat of losing their different cultural identities under the expanding national identity construction of the state. While Ireland directly became part of the United Kingdom in 1801,22 Kurds23 and Basques24 also lost their autonomies in the nineteenth century. Although they have different places in the capitalist world-economy, in terms of defining their identities Britain, Spain, and the Ottoman Empire were going through a similar transformation. Since then, supra-identities have merged with the national identity discourses of the state. Located in the European geography, while the British and Spanish supra-identities have turned into national identities, Turkish national identity had to be built both as national and supra-identity at the same time during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and foundation of the Turkish Republic. Under these circumstances, the peripheral regions sought ways to organize resistance against the center by redefining their regional sub-identities as national identities. Therefore, two contentious nationalist discourses, one from the top (the state) and one from the bottom (the minority) had begun to clash at the end of the nineteenth century. Peripheral nationalisms were outcomes of the tension between the forces of homogenization and the struggle to maintain cultural and local autonomy. This tension is at the core of the politicization of the Kurdish, Irish, and Basque cultures.25 Looking closely at the peripheral regions, one can observe similar cultural awakening experiences in Ireland, the Basque provinces, and the Kurdish regions. These experiences have been a cultural base for nationalist risings against the center in these territories. During the cultural awakening era, the Irish, Basques, and Kurds rediscovered their regional differences like language, history, and culture through nationalist lenses. With the help of newly established associations, sport clubs, and/or newspapers, they had begun to imagine their own community against Britishness, Spanishness, or Turkishness. The Nation, the first Irish nationalist weekly newspaper, was founded in 1842. It set out to awaken a national consciousness in the mass of


7/12/11 6:51 AM


33

the Irish people and to make them aware of their cultural heritage, which had been trampled by centuries of British domination.26 In 1892, Sabino Arana, the father of Basque nationalism, published his first political writing, Bizkaya por su independencia, in which he articulated a narrative of how Basques had lost their ancient independence and noble freedom.27 The first Kurdish newspaper, Kürdistan, which was published in 1898, was a very significant source in determining the perception of Kurdish identity at the turn of the century. Another newspaper, Jin, which was published in 1918, represented a broad spectrum of Kurdish rhetoric.28 It is in this period that Irish, Basque, and Kurdish societies were formed and legally functioned in Britain, Spain, and the Ottoman Empire. The first nationalist political parties also had been founded during the same periods: 1895, PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco); 1905, Sinn Fein; and 1908, Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Kurdish Society for Cooperation and Progress). They were the leading voices of nationalists in their own communities. These similarities have exposed themselves during the next phase of the capitalist economy, the welfare state period. After the Second World War the new welfare state “consensus” had many diverse sources—the communist threat included—and a new institutional order adopted at Bretton Woods, with its restrictions on capital flows and free trade, contributed to a stable trade regime. The confidence that the welfare state was affordable and even functional to the needs of the economy was surely among the reasons for the “consensus.”29 Macroeconomic planning of the state and its reflections on political and social life was the major fact of this new capitalist phase. The national identity discourses in the center and periphery were revived under this new orientation. The first dynamic was closely linked with the regulatory role of the state in public and private areas. While the state had turned into a major actor in economic life, it still maintained its critical position in defining national identity through the renewed discourse of citizenship. With this new capitalist turn, with varying degrees of civil, political, and social citizenship, the states began to legitimate themselves in terms of “the people.”30 The development of the welfare state meant a “social citizenship” whereby national social programs brought citizens together through common sets of rights, responsibilities, and values. In other words, social policy was integrated into, and fed, national identity as a supra-identity.31 It was probably the most striking period for observing the interchangeable meaning of the national identity and citizenship. The developing social rights and relatively increasing incomes have expanded middle classes under the control of the welfare system. It has succeeded in creating higher levels of education, social security, remuneration, and employment. The peripheral regions were—relatively—part of this


7/12/11 6:51 AM

34

Elçin Aktoprak

development. But while the level of education and incomes were on the rise in these regions as part of macro-level planning, as was the case in Northern Ireland, in the Basque provinces and Kurdish regions the political oppression did not cease to exist. In the 1940s, the welfare state in Northern Ireland undoubtedly benefited one of the poorest regions of the Britain. Among the social and economic improvements made, those concerning education must be highlighted, since they made it possible for increasing numbers of Catholics to attend university, which in turn led to a substantial improvement in life conditions. The welfare politics created a relatively more prosperous, well-educated, and socially ambitious Catholic middle class. But despite these improvements, Catholics continued to be underrepresented in sectors such as the civil service, local government, or the judiciary, having a greater presence in unskilled work.32 The most important reaction against this situation was the peaceful Civil Rights Movement which began in 1963. With the support of the working classes, a newly expanded Catholic middle class and students were at the front of this struggle and demanded equal citizenship rights as British citizens. But the reaction of the local and central governments against this unarmed movement was harsh. In 1968 armed conflict between the Catholics and Protestants increased and replaced the peaceful demonstrations. It was the outbreak of “the Troubles,” which lasted till 1998. The dictatorship of Franco in Spain also deepened the conflict between the center and periphery. Between 1939 and 1975, any expression of Basque culture, in particular the language, was severely oppressed. At school, in the post offices, and the town halls the use of Euskera was heavily sanctioned. The Francoist civil servants and the hated Guardia Civil removed the language from the public domain through ruthless repression.33 On the other hand, in the 1950s the Basque economy was booming.34 The PNV, the leading political party of the Basque provinces, was largely middle class and reformist. It supported a vaguely specified expansion of the public. However, the young generation was not satisfied with the ineffective strategies of the PNV against the cultural oppression of the Franco regime. Like in Northern Ireland, the university students especially led a new movement, and the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) was founded in 1959. By gaining a wide-based support from the Basque provinces it dethroned the PNV and became the symbol of Basque nationalism until 1978. The leading role of the university students and newly expanded middle class could also be observed in the Kurdish issue in Turkey during the same time period. The separate existence of Kurds had been denied by the Turkish nationalist discourse for many decades after the foundation of the Turkish Republic. As a part of the nation-building reforms, Kurdish traditional


7/12/11 6:51 AM


35

notions of identity and culture were constructed as “reactionary,” “tribal,” and an outcome of regional “backwardness.” After crushing a long series of Kurdish revolts in 1938, Ankara concentrated its assimilation program. Until 1961, Kurdish nationalist activity in Turkey appeared largely dormant. However, with the spread of universal education and sociopolitical liberalization as a result of the 1961 constitution a new phase began for Kurds in Turkey. The Kurdish language and any other cultural representation of Kurdishness were still forbidden; the oppression on Kurds did not soften. However, the 1961 constitution created an opening for freedom of expression in any way, and new modern intellectuals rather than tribal and religious leaders started to shape Kurdish identity in this atmosphere. In 1960s, Kurdish identity found a place for itself within the framework of the broader leftist movement in Turkey.35 Kurdish students were active members of the socialist movements like Revolutionary Youth (DEV-GENC). Öcalan was a member of DEV-GENC; but in 1974 he begun to organize his own political group; the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) was formally founded in 1978. On the other side, there was Revolutionary Cultural Associations of the East (DDKO), which was founded in 1969 and closed in 1970. It advocated political, civil, and economic rights for the people in the East and played an important role in reviving the modern Kurdish movement in Turkey in that short period.36 During this Kurdish reawakening the demands were primarily concerned with civic and social rights at the beginning, as in the Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland. They focused around issues such as being recognized as full citizens by the state and being given the same rights as other citizens.37 The Third World movement of the 1960s was an inspiring second dynamic in this period that particularly affected the peripheral nationalisms. The concept of “internal colonization,”38 which was developed during the anticolonial struggles in Asia and Africa, inspired the peripheral nationalist movements in Europe. The term was not just a commentary on the structure of territorial politics, but a critique of how modernizing forces of the central authority in the form of industrialization, urbanization, mass consumption, and mass education lead to integration of regional communities into homogenous societies.39 Kurdish and Irish nationalists were using “internal colonialism” for legitimating their newly organized movements, and even Basques were in favor of it to blame the Franco regime.40 Besides the internal colonization term, the liberation wars in Asia and Africa also gave motivation to the new peripheral nationalist movements for using force against the central authority and for legitimating it in the eyes of public opinion. The rebirth of the IRA in Northern Ireland and the founding of ETA and PKK in Spain and Turkey could also be interpreted within this context.41


7/12/11 6:51 AM

36

Elçin Aktoprak

The third dynamic in this period was the 1968 movement, which shook the established political movements and institutions with its critical discourse and action-oriented disposition. The rising human rights activism and civil rights and antiwar movements in almost all the Western countries encouraged new nationalist movements as mentioned above. The appealing socialist ideas of the time had their influence on these movements, and as a reflection of the prevalent ideas nationalist movements in the peripheral regions acquired a class element. As a corollary, the nationalist rhetoric has been shaped not only against the center, but also against the capitalist mode of production. Ironically, nationalism has gained a new dimension in the hands of peripheral nationalists despite its roots that are embedded in the capitalist worldeconomy. Therefore neither the cooperation between the Turkish socialist factions and Kurdish movement nor the socialist debates in the IRA and ETA were exceptional.42 The alliance between nationalist and socialist movements would last until the end of the Cold War. The third and the last phase of structural and historical similarities between the three cases that are analyzed here is the neoliberal era, which started during the late 1970s. This neoliberal turn in the capitalist world-economy was not just an economic recipe to its last crisis but was also a political path which genuinely transformed the classical meaning of the nation-state and sovereignty concepts, especially in the EU for member states. Surely, state institutions, both domestic and geopolitical, still have causal efficacy because they, too, (like economic, ideological, and military institutions) provide necessary conditions for social existence.43 However, on the other side, as a new economic project on new conditions, neoliberalism also committed itself to further liberalization and deregulation in many areas; to the privatization of most of what remained of the state-owned sector; and to the extension of market forces into what remained of the public and social services at national, regional, and local levels as well as to the spread of market forces into the provision of such services in Europe and elsewhere in the world.44 While strengthening the subnational and transnational economic and political networks, it began to decentralize the nation-state and, in this context, the nation-state has been reorganized on territorial and functional levels. The transformation of the nation-state has deeply influenced the center–periphery relations and therefore majority–minority relations. The state, under the deregulatory pressures of the neoliberal turn, not only lost some of its critical functions in economic life but also began to lose much of its capacity to define limits of different identities in its borders. The identities that hitherto were subjected to the homogenizing efforts of the state were able to raise their voices and reclaim their rights under the new conditions


7/12/11 6:51 AM


37

because identity politics as well as the sanctity of free markets and privatization emerged as the most salient outcome the neoliberal transformation. The expansion of the public sphere of civil society and the privatization of the media played important roles in breaking the state’s monopoly over information and deliberation on identity issues.45 In addition, two other developments also enhanced the rise of identity politics during the neoliberal era. First is the growing attention to the minority rights in Europe after the collapse of the USSR and disintegration of Yugoslavia. There was an extensive diffusion and institutionalization of minority rights culture in Europe, and a minority rights regime has stemmed from the EU, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The development of this rights regime has involved the construction of a rights culture, which has put peripheral nationalist movements on stronger normative footing.46 Second is the new regional policy of the EU, which aims to reduce the development levels of the various regions and also supports decentralization in economic and administrative structures in member states. European market integration has provided new opportunities for autonomy and self-government, although one constrained by the needs of economic competition.47 The region has become a more or less autonomous agent within the broader market, and peripheral nationalists have redefined their regional interests according to this new orientation. A new political space has emerged for them in which they have found a chance to represent themselves. Under these new conditions, the peripheral nationalisms in Western Europe have effected reconciliation with the new order. As has been the case for Sinn Fein/IRA or the PKK, the peripheral nationalist movements that had a socialist past have ruptured their socialist ties and begun to draw a more compatible portrait with the EU. Their demands (cultural rights and/or autonomy) have been reshaped according to this settlement. Contrary to the nineteenth century and welfare state period, the neoliberal system has supported their political demands unless they do not persist on armed struggle. In this sense, neither the Northern Ireland peace process48 nor the diminishing support for ETA in the Basque Country is surprising.49 The “Kurdish opening” in Turkey can also be regarded as a corollary50 as it was initiated by the government under the intersection of the external and internal dynamics in Turkey. However, despite the basic structural and historical similarities in line with the evolution of the capitalist world-economy, there are also significant differences between Britain, Spain, and Turkey and between peripheral regions which have differentiated the conflict resolution processes in these countries.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

38

Elçin Aktoprak

National and Regional Differences Although the world system analysis provides a general framework which allows us to draw common historical and structural patterns among the identity issues, the internal dynamics have definitely played a crucial role in terms of identity politics. As argued above, nationalism and national identity construction, both in the center and periphery, are a product of the nineteenth century, and this process has reproduced itself during the welfare system and neoliberal era. However, looking closely, each case represents different identity formation processes that affect both citizenship policies and conflict resolution mechanisms in the peripheral regions. The first significant difference that could be examined between Britain, Spain, and Turkey are the etymologic roots of the supra-identity and the construction process of the supra-identity as a national identity. When Britishness and Spanishness are compared with Turkishness, it can be seen that while the first two identities refer to a territory, the latter refers to an ethnic identity. The British national identity especially is not only different from Turkey but also from other countries in continental Europe because, unlike most of other supra-identity constructions, British supra-identity as a national identity has been built as a multinational identity from the beginning, without abandoning an imperial mentality.51 “Unity in Difference” has never been a new slogan for Britain. For understanding the exception of the British national identity, we should look at the history of early capitalism in Britain, in which the British bourgeoisie, unlike its French or Spanish counterparts, did not have to fight against the monarchy and aristocracy by instrumentalizing “the nation” against them. It transformed the regime as it desired by forging a coalition with the aristocracy against the ruling monarchy, and a stable parliamentary regime could be built in the seventeenth century.52 In the nineteenth century, the British monarchy and parliament have turned into the symbols of a British national identity, but as mentioned above, it was an identity that did not ignore the Scottish, Gaelic, or Irish identity. In this context Britain has never been a typical nation-state, and British policies against its peripheral regions have never been shaped by an intense English nationalism; instead Britain, as the leading imperial power, had imperial concerns, and it approached its peripheral regions through a strategic thinking. Therefore, London has recognized the different cultures and distinct identities in the peripheral regions: the Irish are Irish; he or she has never been called English. London has enforced centralization, but British centralization policies have been based on parliamentary sovereignty rather than national sovereignty with homogenizing efforts. Thus, the effects of the British centralization policies on identity politics have been quite soft when compared with Spanish and Turkish cases.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


39

However, the situation was very different in the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the nineteenth century. While the British Empire was at the peak of its power, the Ottoman Empire was in the process of breaking up, and the Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism was not able to prevent it from failing. Interestingly, the non-Muslim minorities, mostly living in the Balkans, had encountered nationalism before the Ottoman Turks, who were the ruling majority. However, towards the end of the nineteenth century, Turkish nationalism also emerged among some intellectuals, and in 1908, after the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) seized power from the Ottoman sultan, it has become the main ideology of the new government. The CUP elites saw Turkish nationalism as a recipe for delaying the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, instead of saving, they accelerated the fall and disintegration of the Empire, and Turkish nationalism was the founding ideology of a new state, the Turkish Republic, in 1923. The new regime continued to pursue and even strengthen this ideological approach, and, among the many other ethnic identities in the ex-Ottoman territories, chose “Turkishness” as the supraidentity of the nation with an aim to create a homogeneous society, which led to assimilating and suppressing other ethnic identities in Turkey. Therefore, Turkishness has never had a plural content as has Britishness. Spanish national identity as a supra-identity has also been built in a very different way than Turkish national identity. Spanishness has been defined as a national identity since the nineteenth century; however the internal political conflicts between political parties and early formation of peripheral nationalist movements in the Basque provinces and in Catalonia have averted the development of a strong supra-identity in Spain.53 The national minorities were subject to centralization during the nineteenth century, but the first authoritarian regime that they faced was the era of General de Rivera (1923–1930). The cultural representation of their identities were limited and nationalist and regionalist political activities were forbidden in this period. However, the Franco period (1939–1975) was much worse than that. The regional and cultural differences were violently oppressed, and Spanishness lost its plural meaning to Spanish nationalism. These practices under authoritarian regimes have strengthened Basque nationalism and led to the establishment of new underground organizations like ETA. But, even in these periods, the existence of a separate Basque identity has never been denied as with the denial of Kurdish identity in Turkey. Despite all the authoritarian experiences of the twentieth century, a historical mentality that acknowledges Spanish identity as a plural identity has been retained in the minds of Spaniards even in the Franco period. This legacy would be effective in the democratization process of Spain after Franco’s death in 1975. The constitution of 1978 has revised the Spanish identity on this plural


7/12/11 6:51 AM

40

Elçin Aktoprak

understanding and created a new political stage for the national minorities like Basques and Catalans by granting them regional autonomies.54 Therefore, during the conflict resolution processes in Northern Ireland and in the Basque Country, the redefinition of the supra-identity has never been an issue of debate like it is in Turkey. The territorial references of British and Spanish identities have been inclusive of the subidentities. On the other hand, when initiatives for a reconciliation of the Kurdish issue were started by the government in Turkey, the first issue raised was about renaming the supra-identity. Instead of Turkish or Turk, Türkiyelilik has been suggested by some intellectuals.55 However, not only the nationalist Turks but also some prominent Kurdish figures have rejected this new definition, which made the supra-identity reach a stalemate. The Turkish experience in identity politics is also different from the British and Spanish cases in terms of its integration to the neoliberal accumulation regime. Unlike Britain and Spain, Turkey has integrated this new phase by a coup d’état in 1980, and this fact has generated some basic dissimilarities between the Northern Ireland, Basque, and Kurdish issues. The repressive policies of the central authorities and security forces, violations of human rights, and torture in prisons were widespread before the 1980s in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. The IRA and ETA were defensive armed groups against the antidemocratic politics of the British and Spanish governments in the eyes of local and international public opinion. But, during the neoliberal era, as the democratic conditions improved and new political options have emerged, the IRA and ETA have begun to lose their legitimacy for armed struggle, and British and Spanish governments have adapted to new conditions and changed their approaches towards these regions. However, this was not the case in Turkey. The Kurds in Turkey have undergone similar kinds of violations as Catholics and Basques have experienced during the same period; but while the level of repression began to decline in the two other cases after the 1980s, the oppression of Kurds increased heavily after the 1980 coup d’état. It was under these conditions that, unlike the IRA and ETA, the PKK began its armed struggle and found grassroots support at the beginning of the neoliberal age. The Turkish authorities have adopted severe policies that British and Spanish authorities have begun to give up, such as treating all Kurds as suspected terrorists, banning all kinds of cultural expression, and jailing many Kurdish activists. This oppression has only made the PKK more popular. It must also be stressed that Turkey was and is not an EU member like two others, and economic, social, and regional policies of the EU were not effective in Turkey as they were in Britain and Spain. While the EU played a positive role during the peace processes in Northern Ireland and the Basque


7/12/11 6:51 AM


41

Country, Turkish nationalists have begun to regard the EU as protector of the Kurdish nationalist movement. In this context, the third difference that should be taken into consideration is geographical location. It is obvious that the Northern Ireland and Basque issues are national minority issues within Europe. However, the Kurdish issue is an issue in the Middle East, although the EU has been interested in the Kurdish issue in Turkey and has urged Turkish governments to transform the legal procedure of minority policies and improve the implementation. The Kurds are an autochthonous people spread to four countries, namely Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Therefore, Kurds as a whole do not take advantage of the EU conditionally like the Catholics in Northern Ireland or the Basques in Spain. Their fate is closely linked to developments in the broader Middle East. But for those Kurds living in Turkey, the EU accession process is also as significant as the developments in the Middle East. The leading Kurdish politicians in Turkey clearly declared their support for Turkey’s EU bid, in the anticipation that the EU conditionally would help transform Turkish state society relations and increase pressure for more democratization, including human and minority rights. The last difference that should be underlined is that not only Britain, Spain, and Turkey but also the peripheral regions represent geographical, historical, social, cultural, and economic differences which consequently affected the conflict resolution processes. Northern Ireland is a peripheral region which was formed after the division of Ireland in 1921. When examined from a center–periphery perspective, it can be argued that it has never been a subject of British nationalism, but that the main problem was between the Protestant majority, which has been supported by Britain since the seventeenth century, and the suppressed Catholic minority. Therefore, the problem in Northern Ireland had always two interdependent dimensions: the first was a conflict between the center and periphery revolving around the demands for an independent Ireland, which then turned into a dispute of unification of Northern Ireland with Ireland. The second was a conflict of two communities within the periphery between Catholics and Protestants. However, this second dimension of the conflict have been more determinant in the Northern Ireland conflict, especially after Britain accepted the consent of the majority in 1973.56 As of the 1990s, while the conflict between the center (Britain) and the periphery (Northern Ireland) had already lost its momentum, the conflict between the communities there could not be solved until the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. However, neither in the Basque provinces nor in the Kurdish regions do intercommunal conflict exist. Therefore the Good Friday Agreement is a significant step in finding a solution to a 100-year-long identity conflict, but


7/12/11 6:51 AM

42

Elçin Aktoprak

it works only as a source of inspiration, not a role model to be followed, for the solution of conflicts in the two other regions. In a search for a solution, the Basque model is much more appropriate as a model for the Kurdish issue than the Northern Ireland model. The Basque Country, contrary to the least-developed Kurdish regions in Turkey, is one of the most developed parts of Spain;57 however, except for this significant difference, the center–periphery conflict in each of them is more similar than that of Northern Ireland.58 The 1978 Spanish constitution, which granted autonomy to the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia and has paved the way for a solution of the Basque problem by marginalizing the ETA,59 should be analyzed not only for finding a solution for the Kurdish issue but also to realize the democratization steps in Turkey.

Conclusion This chapter tries to develop a novel approach to majority–minority relations through the perspective of center–periphery relations within the framework of the capitalist world-economy. It tries to reveal common global dynamics to observe the similar political discourses and actions during the national identity formations in the center and periphery. Despite the apparent internal and local differences, these commonalities have the potential to provide a broader outlook to analyze the transformation of the national identity concept in general. In this framework, both the “Kurdish Opening” of the JDP government and the efforts at the reconstruction of the political community in Turkey fits into this global context.

Notes 1. Damin Tambini, “Post-National Citizenship,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 24, no. 2 (March 2001): 195. 2. Jean Leca, “Nationalité et citoyenneté dans l’Europe des immigrations,” in Logiques d’Etat et immigration en Europe, edited by J. Costa-Lascoux and P. Weil (Paris: Kimé, 1992), from Riva Kastoryano, “Citizenship, Nationhood, and NonTerritoriality: Transnational Participation in Europe,” Political Science and Politics 38, no. 4 (October 2005): 693. 3. For further reading, see Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1992); Anthony Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism (London: Routledge, 1998); and Michael Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (Toronto: Penguin Group, 1993). 4. Ignatieff, Blood and Belonging, 6.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


43

5. Smith, Nationalism and Modernism, 126. 6. Baskın Oran, Türkiye’de Azınlıklar, Kavramlar, Teori, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004), 27. 7. Oran, Türkiye’de Azınlıklar, 27. 8. Will Kymlicka and Christine Straehle, “Cosmopolitanism, Nation-States, and Minority Nationalism: A Critical Review of Recent Literature,” European Journal of Philosophy 7, no, 1(1999): 66. 9. Raphael Zariski, “Ethnic Extremism among Ethnoterritorial Minorities in Western Europe: Dimensions, Causes, and Institutional Responses,” Comparative Politics 21, no, 3 (April 1989): 257, 260. 10. Jennifer Todd, The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict and Emancipation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 18–19. 11. John Tomaney, “End of the Empire State? New Labour and Devolution in the United Kingdom,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 24, no, 3 (September 2000): 676; Mari Fitzduff, Beyond Violence: Conflict Resolution Process in Northern Ireland (New York: United Nations University Press, 2002), 1–2; Todd, The Dynamics of Conflict, 20. 12. Hakan Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries (New York: State University of New York Press, 2004), 51, 53. 13. Hakan Yavuz, “Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 7, no. 3 (2001): 4. 14. Mesut Yeğen, “The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse,” Journal of Contemporary History 34, no. 4 (1999): 557. 15. Yavuz, “Five Stages,” 7. 16. Xosé-Manoel Núñez, “The Region as Essence of the Fatherland: Regionalist Variants of Spanish Nationalism (1840–1936),” European History Quarterly 31 (October 2001): 487; Daniele Conversi, The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation (London: Hurst and Company, 1997), 45. 17. Michael Hechter, Tuna Kuyucu, and Audrey Sacks, “Nationalism and Indirect Rule,” http://faculty.washington.edu/hechter/Nationalism.pdf (2008), 4. For further details on this mutual dependency in Kurdish case see Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables. 18. Hechter, Kuyucu, and Sacks, “Nationalism and Indirect Rule,” 5. 19. Bob Jessop, “Capitalism and Its Future: Remarks on Regulation, Government and Governance,” Review of International Political Economy 4, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 561–581. 20. Bkz. Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990–1992 (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1990); Cem Eroğul, Devlet Nedir? (Ankara: İmge, 1990), 54. 21. Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 15–17. 22. Great Britain was created with the Act of Union with Scotland in 1707, but the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland was formally begun at the beginning of the nineteenth century after the Act of Union with Ireland. The centralization of Britain was based on parliamentary sovereignty, and, despite the acknowledgement of different regions and their cultures, Westminster was the head of the Union. Tomaney, “End of the Empire State,” 676; Richard Kiely, David McCrone, and Frank


7/12/11 6:51 AM

44

Elçin Aktoprak

Bechhofer, “Whither Britishness? English and Scottish People in Scotland,” Nations and Nationalism 11, no. 1 (2005): 80. 23. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the modernization and Westernization process had started in the Ottoman state for coping with the West. The central authority had gone through a process of administrative restructuring throughout the empire, including in Kurdistan. Therefore, Kurds began to lose their autonomy in the nineteenth century while the Ottoman state was transforming itself to a nation-state, the Turkish Republic. 24. Basques lost all their foral privileges in 1876. As the century ends, the Basque provinces seemed closely linked to Madrid both politically and administratively. Robert P. Clark, The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond (Nevada: University of Nevada Press, 1979), 31. 25. For Kurdish nationalism, see Yavuz, “Five Stages,” 3. 26. Priscilla Metscher, “‘Ireland Her Own’: Radical Movements in NineteenthCentury Ireland,” The Republic 2 (Spring/Summer 2001): 59. 27. Diego Muro, “The Politics of War Memory in Radical Basque Nationalism,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 32, no. 4 (May 2009): 670. 28. Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables, 163. 29. John Callaghan, “Social Democracy and Globalisation: The Limits of Social Democracy in Historical Perspective,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 4, no. 3 (October 2002): 437. 30. Michael Mann, “Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nationstate?,” Review of International Political Economy 4, no. 3 (1997): 476. 31. André Lecours, Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State (Reno and Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press, 2007), 137. 32. Rogelio Alenso, The IRA and Armed Struggle (London: Routledge, 2007), 57; Jeremy Smith, Making the Peace in Ireland (London: Longman, 2002), 65. 33. Hans van Amersfoort and Jan Mansvelt Beck, “Institutional Plurality: A Way Out of the Basque Conflict?” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 26, no. 3 (2000): 450. 34. Lécours, Basque Nationalism, 75. 35. Yavuz, “Five Stages,” 2, 9; David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 120. 36. Michael M. Gunter, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds (Oxford, UK: The Scarecrow Press, 2004), 41. 37. Hamit Bozarslan, “Political Aspects of the Kurdish Problem in Contemporary Turkey,” in The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, edited by Philip G.Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl (London: Routledge, 2005), 77. 38. For further reading, see Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 39. Mike Marinotto, “The Settlement and Process of Devolution: Territorial Politics and Governance under the Welsh Assembly,” Political Studies 49, no. 2 (2001): 308. 40. Alenso, The IRA, 16; Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 38; Ludger Mees, Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 173.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


45

41. The IRA was born from its ashes during the Troubles in Northern Ireland against the British army and security forces. The ETA was founded in 1953 and began armed operations in 1968. The PKK was also founded in 1977, but despite the IRA and ETA, it started armed struggle in 1984. 42. For more information, see Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of IRA (Oxford: Macmillan, 2003), 115–120; Conversi, The Basques, 91–98; Mees, Nationalism, Violence, 25. 43. Mann, “Has Globalization Ended,” 474. 44. Bob Jessop, “From Thatcherism to New Labour: Neo-Liberalism, Workfarism, and Labour Market Regulation,” published by the department of sociology, Lancaster University, www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/soc131rj.pdf (March 2009), 6. 45. Betigül Ercan Argun, “Universal Citizenship Rights and Turkey’s Kurdish Question,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 19, no. 1 (1999): 85. 46. Lécours, Basque Nationalism, 174–175. 47. Michael Keating, Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a PostSovereignty Era (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001), 151. 48. The peace process in Northern Ireland has gained ground in the 1990s, and the 1998 Good Friday Agreement has been a sign of this process. In 2005 the IRA gave up arms, and in 2007 a devolved government of Northern Ireland was formed. 49. Asked for their personal “opinion or attitude towards ETA in this moment,” between 1981 and 1996 the percentage of Basque citizens who expressed their “total support” for the ETA came down from 8 to 1 percent. Mees, Nationalism, Violence, 98. 50. In 2009 the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government publicized a new initiative to give more rights and freedoms to Kurdish citizens of Turkey. It has been interpreted as a new positive step for finding a peaceful solution for the Kurdish issue. However, it has paused because of the governments’ paradoxical actions and because of the restart of PKK operations. 51. For further reading, see Tom Nairn, “The Twilight of the British State,” New Left Review I, no. 101–102 (January–April 1977): 3–62; Ben Wellings, “EmpireNation: National and Imperial Discourses in England,” Nations and Nationalism 8, no. 1 (2002): 95–109. 52. For details, see Barrington Moore, Jr., Diktatörlüğün ve Demokrasinin Toplumsal Kökenleri: Çağdaş Dünyanın Yaratılmasında Soylunun ve Köylünün Rolü (Ankara: İmge, 2003). 53. The Spanish state also could not rely on an effective education system. Politics revolved around clientelism rather than mass mobilization, and the political elite was reluctant to change this comfortable situation. Lecours, Basque Nationalism, 20. 54. For the 1978 Spanish constitution, see www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/sp00000_.html. 55. The leading examples are Professor Baskın Oran and Professor İbraim Kaboğlu, who prepared the minority report in 2004 for the subcommittee of the Prime Ministry’s Advisory Board on Human Rights. They suggested that the foundations of the population must be based on Türkiyelilik—the idea of belonging to Turkey—in this report. However, Oran and Kaboğlu have become public targets after being prosecuted under Article 301 for allegedly denigrating the Turkish state because they had put forward the concept of “Türkiyelik.” To read the full text of the report, see Basbakanlık Insan Hakları Danısma Kurulu, “Azınlık Hakları ve Kültürel Haklar Calısma Grubu” raporu


7/12/11 6:51 AM

46

Elçin Aktoprak

(Ekim, 2004), http://baskinoran.com/belge/IHDKAzinliklarRaporu-MakamaTakdim _Ekim2004_.pdf (2008). 56. By the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement, both Britain’s and Ireland’s governments have recognized that Northern Ireland’s status could depend on majority consent. This has also been acknowledged by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. 57. 1973 Sunningdale Agreement Article 5: “The Irish Government fully accepted and solemnly declared that there could be no change in the status of Northern Ireland until a majority of the people of Northern Ireland desired a change in that status. The British Government solemnly declared that it was, and would remain, their policy to support the wishes of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The present status of Northern Ireland is that it is part of the United Kingdom. If in the future the majority of the people of Northern Ireland should indicate a wish to become part of a united Ireland, the British Government would support that wish.” http://cain.ulst .ac.uk/events/sunningdale/agreement.htm. 58. 1998 Good Friday Agreement, Constitutional Issues, Article 1(i): “1. The participants endorse the commitment made by the British and Irish Governments that, in a new British-Irish Agreement replacing the Anglo-Irish Agreement, they will: (i) recognise the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of Northern Ireland with regard to its status, whether they prefer to continue to support the Union with Great Britain or a sovereign united Ireland.” http://news.bbc .co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/07_12_04_ni_agreement_01.pdf. 59. Regional resources per capita in the Basque Country are 60 percent higher than the average of the rest of the regions in Spain. José Ignacio Martínez Churiaque, “The Economic Situation in the Basque Country: A Powerful Financial Tool: The Economic Agreement State Government–Basque authorities,” www.paralalibertad .org/descargas/InformeLaberinto/M_Churiaque_Ingles.pdf (April 2010).

Bibliography 1973 Sunningdale Agreement. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/sunningdale/agreement.htm. 1978 Spanish Constitution. www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/sp00000_.html. 1998 Good Friday Agreement. http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/07_12_04_ ni_agreement_01.pdf. Alenso, Rogelio. The IRA and Armed Struggle. London: Routledge, 2007. Baban, Feyzi. “Community, Citizenship and Identity in Turkey.” TIPEC Working Paper 04/4, www.trentu.ca/tipec/4baban4.pdf (March 2010). Basbakanlık Insan Hakları Danısma Kurulu. “Azınlık Hakları ve Kültürel Haklar Calısma Grubu.” raporu (Ekim 2004). http://baskinoran.com/belge/IHDKAzinliklar Raporu-MakamaTakdim_Ekim2004_.pdf (2008). Bozarslan, Hamit. “Political Aspects of the Kurdish Problem in Contemporary Turkey,” in The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, edited by Philip G. Kreyenbroek and Stefan Sperl, 74–89. London: Routledge, 2005. Brubaker, Rogers. Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Boston: Harvard University Press, 1992.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


47

Callaghan, John. “Social Democracy and Globalisation: The Limits of Social Democracy in Historical Perspective.” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 4, no. 3 (October 2002): 429–451. Churiaque, José Ignacio Martínez. “The Economic Situation in the Basque Country: A Powerful Financial Tool: The Economic Agreement State Government–Basque Authorities.” www.paralalibertad.org/descargas/InformeLaberinto/M_Churiaque_ Ingles.pdf (April 2010). Clark, Robert P. The Basques: The Franco Years and Beyond. Nevada: University of Nevada Press, 1979. Conversi, Daniele. The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation. London: Hurst and Company, 1997. English, Richard. Armed Struggle: The History of IRA. Oxford, UK: Macmillan, 2003. Ercan Argun, Betigül. “Universal Citizenship Rights and Turkey’s Kurdish Question.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 19, no. 1 (1999): 85–103. Eroğul, Cem. Devlet Nedir? Ankara: İmge, 1990. Fitzduff, Mari. Beyond Violence: Conflict Resolution Process in Northern Ireland. New York: United Nations University Press, 2002. Gunter, Michael M. Historical Dictionary of the Kurds. Oxford, UK: The Scarecrow Press, 2004. Hechter, Michael. Containing Nationalism. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Hechter, Michael, Tuna Kuyucu, and Audrey Sacks. “Nationalism and Indirect Rule.” http://faculty.washington.edu/hechter/Nationalism.pdf (2008). Ignatieff, Michael. Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism. Toronto: Penguin Group, 1993. Jessop, Bob. “Capitalism and Its Future: Remarks on Regulation, Government and Governance.” Review of International Political Economy 4, no. 3 (Autumn 1997): 561–581. ———. “From Thatcherism to New Labour: Neo-Liberalism, Workfarism, and Labour Market Regulation.” UK: Department of Sociology, Lancaster University. www .comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/soc131rj.pdf (March 2009). Kastoryano, Riva. “Citizenship, Nationhood, and Non-Territoriality: Transnational Participation in Europe.” Political Science and Politics 38, no. 4 (October 2005): 693–696. Keating, Michael. Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2001. Kiely, Richard, David McCrone, and Frank Bechhofer. “Whither Britishness? English and Scottish people in Scotland.” Nations and Nationalism 11, no. 1 (2005): 65–82. Marcus, Aliza. Blood and Belief: The PKK and the Kurdish Fight for Independence. New York: New York University Press, 2007. Mann, Michael. “Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?” Review of International Political Economy 4, no. 3 (1997): 472–496. Marinotto, Mike. “The Settlement and Process of Devolution: Territorial Politics and Governance under the Welsh Assembly.” Political Studies 49, no. 2 (2001): 306–322.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

48

Elçin Aktoprak

Mees, Ludger. Nationalism, Violence and Democracy: The Basque Clash of Identities. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Metscher, Priscilla. “‘Ireland Her Own’: Radical Movements in Nineteenth-Century Ireland.” The Republic 2 (Spring/Summer 2001): 59–71. Moore, Barrington, Jr. Diktatörlüğün ve Demokrasinin Toplumsal Kökenleri: Çağdaş Dünyanın Yaratılmasında Soylunun ve Köylünün Rolü. Ankara: İmge, 2003. Muro, Diego. “The Politics of War Memory in Radical Basque Nationalism.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 32, no. 4 (May 2009): 659–678. Nairn, Tom. “The Twilight of the British State.” New Left Review 1, no. 101–102 (January–April 1977): 3–62. Núñez, Xosé-Manoel. “The Region as Essence of the Fatherland: Regionalist Variants of Spanish Nationalism (1840–1936).” European History Quarterly 31 (October 2001): 483–518. Oran, Baskın. Türkiye’de Azınlıklar, Kavramlar, Teori, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama. İstanbul: İletişim, 2004. Özoğlu, Hakan. Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities, Competing Loyalties,and Shifting Boundaries. New York: State University of New York Press, 2004. Romano, David. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization, and Identity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Smith, Anthony D. Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism. London: Routledge, 1998. Smith, Jeremy. Making the Peace in Ireland. London: Longman, 2002. Tambini, Damin. “Post-National Citizenship.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 24, no. 2 (March 2001): 195–217. Tilly, Charles. Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990–1992. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1990. Todd, Jennifer. The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict and Emancipation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Tomaney, John. “End of the Empire State? New Labour and Devolution in the United Kingdom.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 24, no. 3 (September 2000): 675–688. van Amersfoort, Hans, and Jan Mansvelt Beck. “Institutional Plurality: A Way Out of the Basque Conflict?” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 26, no. 3 (2000): 449–467. Wellings, Ben. “Empire-Nation: National and Imperial Discourses in England.” Nations and Nationalism 8, no. 1 (2002): 95–109. Yavuz, Hakan. “Five Stages of the Construction of Kurdish Nationalism in Turkey.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 7, no. 3 (2001): 1–24. Yeğen, Mesut. “The Kurdish Question in Turkish State Discourse.” Journal of Contemporary History 34, no. 4 (1999): 555–568. Zariski, Raphael. “Ethnic Extremism among Ethnoterritorial Minorities in Western Europe: Dimensions, Causes, and Institutional Responses.” Comparative Politics 21, no. 3 (April 1989): 253–272.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

3 The Making of Modern Turkey and the Structuring of Kurdish Identity: New Paradigms of Citizenship in the Twenty-First Century Maya Arakon

T

KURDISH QUESTION IN TURKEY mainly started after the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 but turned into ethnonationalist terrorism in the mid 1980s. After the military coup of 1980, Kurds and leftists of Turkey had to flee the country, and those who remained faced severe pressure on the part of the military government. In those years was born the Kurdish resurgent movement, which claimed the recognition of its cultural and linguistic identity and which afterwards turned to terrorist violence because of the violent pressure with which the government suppressed the demands. Thus, the terrorism problem that Turkey has been facing since then has its roots in the conflicting aspects of two major identities in Turkey: the Turkishness, which lies in the very founding principles of the Republic and which was fortified especially after the coup of 1980, and the Kurdishness, which is a different ethnic identity and was suppressed mostly with violence and spreading fear. This particular ethnic and cultural identity (mainly linguistic) became over the last decades the basis of a new nation-building process, in Turkey, but also in northern Iraq and western Iran. Except for the period of struggle for independence between 1919 and 1923, Kurdishness has never been accepted by the founding elites of the republic as a different entity, who saw in it a danger of breaking the newly unified state. Yet, during the war of independence between 1919 and 1920, Kemalists, the founding elites, promised autonomy to the Kurds and received Kurdish tribes’ assistance. As an autochthonous people of Anatolia, Kurds have lived in the ancient region of Mesopotamia; their societal structure was feudal, with landlords and sheiks who did not conceive of themselves as under the HE

— 49 —


7/12/11 6:51 AM

50

Maya Arakon

authority of the Ottoman sultan nor the new Turkish Republic, of which one of the founding principles was the centralization of the administration and the political authority. The Turkish state’s coercive policies to assimilate or to “Turkify” the Kurdish people began at the period that followed the foundation of the republic, and the repressive measures since then resulted in a struggle which dragged the country into bloodshed for almost 30 years. During this time, Kurds have started to claim their equal cultural rights. The concept of citizenship in Turkey is problematic. Three different interpretations are used to identify who is a Turk. The first is purely technical: a Turk is a citizen of Turkey. But the social perception of Turkishness and also the application of the official rules consider Turkishness as belonging to the Turkish ethnic group and especially to Turkish speakers. Finally, there is a religious interpretation, which accepts in this Turkishness all Muslims groups having lived under the Ottoman rule. In this confusing configuration, most of the Kurds—Turkish citizens, Muslims, but not ethnically Turks—have never felt entirely “citizens” of the state where they live. The problem became undeniable in the twenty-first century, when the founding concept of citizenship has remained insufficient to meet the claims of the Kurds. Some Kurds happen to believe that they cannot fully benefit from citizenship and demand more political, social, cultural, and linguistic rights. Under these circumstances, and especially since the beginning of the 2000s, a need to redefine Turkish citizenship and to find new paradigms has developed. This chapter aims to analyze the structure of the Kurdish identity within the construction of modern Turkey and to seek for new paradigms of citizenship that can meet the new claims of the twenty-first century. In the first part, the concept of nationalism and the historical background of the Kurdish question will be examined. In the second part, the chapter will try to analyze the Kurdish identity and the question of citizenship in Turkey and to find an answer to the very question of “why do we need a new paradigm of citizenship for the twenty-first century?”

Nationalism and the Historical Background of the Kurdish Question Since the end of the Cold War, nationalism has experienced a revival by being unleashed from its long-suppressed status under the bipolar system. The awakening of nationalist feelings across Europe went hand in hand with the growing strength of the EU institutions. There was the emergence of a new system in which the supranational bodies came to fulfil the functions for-


7/12/11 6:51 AM

The Making of Modern Turkey and the Structuring of Kurdish Identity

51

merly provided by the state. In this new system, which allowed the minorities in Europe to express their identities more freely, some groups such as the Catalans, Basques, Corsicans, Irish, and Scots sought greater autonomy within their state territories.1 So why did the minorities begin to claim autonomy or independence after the end of the Cold War? What was the new impetus or the trigger for the revival of nationalism in Europe? In order to answer these questions, we should first understand what nationalism is in a broad sense. What Is Nationalism? Nationalism is an ideology that merges two separate entities, the first one being purely administrative—the state—and the second being purely emotive—the nation. The state provides goods and services to its citizens as well as economic prosperity,2 whereas the nation provides a sense of belonging and community to its members3 and thus brings forth a common political identity among a specified population. This common identity is grounded in a common and shared ethnicity, lineage, language, culture, religion, and/or citizenship. By generating shared historical experiences and myths, nationalism commands popular loyalty and elevates the nation-state to a place of primacy. It is vital to the transformation of disparate and politically weak ethnic and cultural groupings into modern states,4 and it transforms the administrative state into the sentimental nation. The nation can be defined as a political community that is capable of extracting further devotion from its members due to its emotional appeal. Hence it is not erroneous to assert that nationalism is about identity and that the nation-state serves as a defining element of political identification. In recent years, scholars have defined nationalism in several different ways. In his influential study entitled Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson5 argues that nationalism is a process of imagining nations, or political communities that have offered secular continuity and meaning to life after a radical change in the apprehension of time and space have transformed the way in which people conceptualized the world. Anthony D. Smith calls nationalism an ideological movement that extends and intensifies the meaning and scope of historic ethnic groups as communities whose members share ancestral myths, histories, cultures, and a sense of solidarity.6 Finally, Ernest Gellner defines nationalism as a theory of political legitimacy based on the correspondence of ethnic and state boundaries.7 Analyzing nationalism is guided by two assumptions. First, nationalism and the concept of nationality were and continue to be socially and politically constructed, and the nation-state is prevalent because it still provides security, economic welfare, and a sense of belonging to its members. Hence


7/12/11 6:51 AM

52

Maya Arakon

nationalism should not be treated as an essentialist value; it is malleable and its trajectory is susceptible to influence through policy instruments. The underlying social and economic conditions affect the course of nationalism within a given polity.8 Second, nationalism has stabilizing and destabilizing effects on the international system. It has been and continues to be a key ingredient of both domestic and international orders. All forms of nationalism embrace symbols that help define a unique and distinctive national grouping. These symbols may be either ethnic or civic in character. Ethnic nationalism defines nationhood as sharing some characteristics, including physical traits, culture, religion, language, and a common ancestry. For this reason, citizens of different ethnic origins, even if they live and share the soil of a common territory and state, do not become part of the national grouping. And in reverse, the ethnic groupings do not need states in order to become nations.9 Civic nationalism defines nationhood in terms of citizenship and political values rather than in terms of ethnicity. It is thus more inclusive than ethnic nationalism. A citizen is a national without taking into consideration ethnicity or common ancestry.10 This is why civic nationalism is sometimes able to erase ethnic and racial dividing lines. Ethnic nationalism is in a way the basis for a solid nation-state when the latter is formed around an ethnically homogeneous population. In today’s international system, however, ethnic nationalism might become violent and cause the breakup of existing multiethnic states, as we have seen in the case of the former Yugoslavia, or demand separatist action, as is the case in Spain, Turkey, and France. As an ethnic group inside a multiethnic state becomes mobilized, it passes through three main stages of national identification. First, it claims group distinctiveness and sets itself apart from the political and cultural mainstream. During this stage, ethnic identity may coexist with civic notions of nationhood, but ethnic affiliation becomes an important determinant of political affiliation, as was the case for the Bretons in France. Second, the ethnic grouping claims group autonomy and seeks to separate itself from central political institutions and establish its political autonomy. This means a distant affiliation with the nation-state. This was the case with the Catalans and the Basques in Spain. The third is the group secession stage. The ethnic community claims to establish its own nation-state, and ethnicity becomes the dominant factor of political identity.11 Kurds in Turkey, Corsicans in France, and Basques in Spain are examples in that respect. At this stage, the members of the ethnic groups show great devotion to the nation-state and sacrifice themselves on behalf of it if necessary. They even form armed organizations and fight for their own state-building process. This is the case with the Euskadi Ta Askata-


7/12/11 6:51 AM


53

suna (ETA) in Spain, Front de Libération National Corse (FLNC) in France, and Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK) in Turkey. In order to understand the incentives of the self-sacrifice of Kurdish people by forming the PKK in Turkey, we need to take a look at the historical background of the Kurdish question and understand why the Kurdish people turned to violence. Was it merely an ethnic claim on the part of the Kurdish people to found their own nation-state, or were there some other reasons which made them revolt against the authority of Turkish state? The Kurdish Question: A Historical Background The Kurdish question has certainly been one of the most important political problems of Turkey throughout the twentieth century. Although this was a problem that emerged in 1840 when the Ottoman Empire attempted to centralize the Kurdish emirates of the southeast part of the country, which led to a conflict between the central government and the Kurdish emirates in 1848,12 the question gained new dimensions with the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The Ottoman system was based on the concept of millet, which referred to religious and ethnoreligious groups. The homogenization of the Anatolian population started at the end of the nineteenth century with the immigration of the Balkan Muslim populations and the emigration and massacre of nonMuslim populations. In order to cut off its links with the Ottoman legacy and to build a new and “modern” nation, the founder elites of modern Turkey, led by Mustafa Kemal, attempted to homogenize the population either by erasing religious differences by the exchange of population between Greece and Turkey or by ignoring ethnolinguistic differences. The new state had to be formed out of a single nation unified around the same language, the same culture, the same collective memory, and the same religious belonging. The Turkish state had two objectives: to create a society without any social, ethnic, and religious distinctions and to construct a nation based upon an individual and juridical affiliation and not upon the conglomeration of the ethnoconfessional communities.13 The Kurds, at the time of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, were divided between the territories of four different countries: Turkey, Syria (under French control), Iraq (under British control), and Iran. In time, the Kurdish problem has gained both an intrastate dimension within and an interstate dimension between these countries.14 The Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 did not recognize any groups other than non-Muslims as a minority.15 Thus, the new Republic rejected the existence of the Kurds. Furthermore, the societal structure of the Kurds who were living in the rural areas of southeast Turkey was not compatible with the project of


7/12/11 6:51 AM

54

Maya Arakon

modern Turkey since it was still a feudal system dating back to the Ottoman Empire. The Kurdish societal structure was then archaic and conservative; hence the new and modern Turkish state had to cut off its links with this old system which was against the rationale of the new republic.16 Before the independence war, Mustafa Kemal offered Kurdish tribal leaders future autonomy in exchange for their help during the independence movement, but that commitment faded as the founding elite started their nation-building after the liberation, and rebellion in the Kurdish region was used to justify repression nationwide.17 By the late 1920s, state historians and social scientists began to build a new ancestry for the Kurds, stating that they had descended from Turkmen tribes and thus really were Turks, but “Mountain Turks.”18 Towards the mid 1920s, coercive measures of the government started to rise. Speaking Kurdish was progressively banned, and the juridical practices were followed by military ones, culminating in the Kurdish revolt of 1925. It was the first Kurdish revolt of the new republic and, as the Kurds “did not exist” any more, those who resisted the new regime were not presented as Kurds with an ethnopolitical cause, but as tribes and bandits threatened by the dissemination of modern state power in the region. By the 1930s, with the rise of fascism in Europe, the Turkish governments also displayed nationalist sentiments under a single-party system. Within time, oppressive practices and assimilating policies increased to the extent that there has been a policy of “Turkification” in every aspect of life, from education to culture and even to the economy.19 The Settlement Law of 1934, a privileged text of Turkish nationalism of the 1930s, constitutes an example in this respect. After two large-scale Kurdish rebellions in 1925 and 1930, respectively the Sheik Said Rebellion and the Ağrı Rebellion, the new regime embarked on solving the Kurdish question by the means of an extensive settlement law. Despite highlighting that the ultimate aim of the law was the Turkification (assimilation) of non-Turks, the text produces the impression that those intended to be assimilated were tribal people with no ethnic identity.20 The Turkish state thus initiated a struggle against those who would not identify themselves as Turks. This practice went as far as emptying Kurdish villages to fill them with Turkish-speaking populations and changing the Kurdish names of the villages into Turkish ones.21, 22 Turning Kurds into Turks was a civilizing mission to eradicate tribalism and feudalism. During the republican period, there were many revolts against the new state. But the state always met resistance with violence. In 1925 the Sheikh Said Rebellion was crushed and the Independence Tribunals brought back its leaders for prosecution. Other revolts broke out from 1926 to 1930 in the southeast of the country, and in Dersim (now Tunceli) in 1937. Between


7/12/11 6:51 AM


55

1925 and 1938, tens of thousands of Kurds and Alevis23 were deported to Western Turkey.24 Parts of the area were under continuous martial law from 1925 until 1946. With the transition to a multiparty system in 1946, the Kurds could finally find some political means to express their identities. They started to form some modest political movements, and from the 1960s on, also thanks to the rural exodus to the big cities, a Kurdish intellectual elite started to emerge. Nevertheless, they were perceived as a threat to the secular and modern Republic, and thus their existence were constantly denied. With the military coups of 1971 and especially of 1980, the Kurds and their newly expressed demands for identity were harshly oppressed by the military junta, under which some Kurdish militants had to flee from Turkey. Under these circumstances, the cultural and linguistic claims of the Kurds turned into separatist, violent, and autonomous actions. Those who fled from the country became organized in Europe, gained cultural consciousness abroad, and started to express stronger demands for identity. An armed opposition led by the PKK—Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers’ Party)—was established in 1978 and lasted for 25 years, leading to approximately 40 thousand casualties. By the early 1990s, the militants numbered a few thousand. They eventually adopted a more conventional guerrilla style of violence, but tactical use of terrorism also persisted over time.25 In the 1990s, the armed struggle of the PKK went together with an eager discontent of the Kurdish masses. This indicated that the alienation between the Kurds and the state increased in the 1990s.26

Kurdish Identity and the Question of Citizenship in Turkey: Why Do We Need a New Paradigm? John Rawls defines citizenship as tangential to the concepts of equality and freedom, which are assumed to engage issues of justice, moreover the political one.27 Political justice should then be more direct and equitable. In most contemporary political theories, the citizen is conceptualized as a competent adult who can work and organize his or her life and formulate some vision of his or her personal good.28 So the political citizen should possess all the requisite capacities for self-government, should be politically active, and must be able to voice his or her discontent or assent.29 T. H. Marshall denotes that the meaning of citizenship has evolved from one tied to rights of property and liberty to one including rights of political participation and finally to one that comprises rights of welfare.30 The concept of citizenship in Turkey has been problematic since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. From its inception, the machinery of the state


7/12/11 6:51 AM

56

Maya Arakon

has been dedicated to homogenizing a diverse populace. Religion, for example, has been nationalized. Minority cultural expressions have been discouraged. The only explicit minority rights that exist in Turkey are the negative and positive rights “given” to the non-Muslims in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, which codified the status of modern Turkey in international law.31 Even these minority rights have not been accorded correctly. The Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, or CHP), which was established by Mustafa Kemal and ruled Turkey as single-party state until 1946, proclaimed that the Turkish nation was a “social and political whole formed by citizens that are united by a common language, culture and objective.”32 In the early years of the Republic, Ankara reined in right-wing Türk Ocakları, which was the first body to define an ethnic Turkish nationalism. Thus, an organic Turkish identity was constructed in the 1920s and 1930s, rich in ancestral myths, national memories, and ethnic symbolism. Afet Inan, one of the architects of the new history, wrote that “Turkish children will learn that they are part of an Aryan, civilized and creative people descended from a high race who have existed for tens of thousands years.”33 The result was that, from Eastern Thrace to Kurdistan, “Turks were a people like the peoples of Europe . . . (and) had more historic right to Turkey than did anyone else.”34 The main references of Turkish nationalism have evolved from religious themes (1919–1923) to secularism (1924–1929) and finally to ethnocultural motifs (1929–1938).35 Within these boundaries, Turkish history has started to be rewritten to promote nationalist historiography, and Greek, Armenian, and Syriac contributions to the history have been obscured.36 By the way, all Muslims were considered members of the majority, the “Turkish nation.” In fact, demographers estimate that there are perhaps 50 different ethnic groups in the country.37 For the first 70 years of the Republic, the denial of the Kurdish identity was official. In 1991, then Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel lifted the ban on the Kurdish language, only for “nonpolitical” communications, and acknowledged, as he put it, “the Kurdish reality.”38 Yet, as Michael Hechter puts it, economic relations between core and periphery within a country incite peripheral nationalism.39 Ankara preferred to see the Kurdish question as an economic problem rather than an ethnic one.40 However, for many, Kurdish nationalism is the result of modern identity politics of the new republic, since many Turks consider Kurdishness as a latter-day political construct rather than an authentic ethnicity, and activists for Kurdish rights are cast as “terrorist and enemies of the nation.”41 With the Turkification of the southeast, the Kurdish language was banned and registrars refused to record Kurdish names on birth certificates.42 The Special Commission for


7/12/11 6:51 AM


57

Name Change, established in 1956, rebaptized thousands of Kurdish villages with new Turkish names.43 After the outbreak of the PKK violence, Kurdish rights entered a deep freeze. Kurdish cultural and historical representations were banned. Kurdish-leaning newspapers, publishing houses, charitable organizations, and NGOs were shuttered. Books about Kurds, Kurdistan, and Kurdish nationalism were seized.44 In August 2002, Parliament ended the ban on Kurdishlanguage broadcasting and legalized private Kurdish language lessons, and in June 2004, the state-run TRT television and radio began broadcasts in Kurmanci, the most widespread Kurdish dialect in Turkey. Yet Kurdish language–teaching institutions face frequent bureaucratic obstacles; censors still seize Kurdish pop music; in the past, the government criminalized the letters “x,” “q,” and “w,” which are proper to the Kurdish alphabet but do not exist in the Turkish alphabet, and plenty of prosecutions were mounted over spelling;45 in the “poster crisis” of 2003 a lower court ruled that a campaign of posters reading “Peace will prevail” in Turkish and Kurdish threatened national unity; and police nationwide were ordered to take off and remove similar kind of placards.46 In 2009, the Constitutional Court decided to ban the legal Kurdish party, Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP), the only one which represented the majority of the Kurdish population living in the southeast of the country, by reason of its allegedly close ties with the Kurdish terrorist organization PKK. The closing of the DTP was the last step in a series of closings of Kurdish parties that sought a political representation within the Turkish state system. In fact, since its foundation, the Constitutional Court has decided to ban 24 political parties, and most of them were Kurdish. Thus, before DTP, six other Kurdish parties have been banned by the Constitutional Court during the 1990s, and another one which saw the same fate coming along dissolved itself.47 As is seen from the above mentioned examples, Turkey presents a vigorous case of civic nationalism strongly connected to ethnicity and culture. From its very foundation, the Turkish republic became a coercive state that put ethnoreligious state policies at the heart of national identity, state-building, and the division of public resources.48 Kurds, who were banned from their cultural rights, were also banned from their political rights collectively, because the threshold for the general elections has been—and still is—10 percent for overall, and the Kurdish legal parties could not pass it as they did not get enough votes from the western parts of Turkey. This situation created an obstacle to the representation of most of the southeastern Kurdish people in the Turkish Parliament. The traditional concept of citizen necessitates for political citizenship to possess all the requisite capacities for self-government,


7/12/11 6:51 AM

58

Maya Arakon

and since the political citizen should be politically active and must be able to voice his or her discontent or assent and must participate in the political representation, according to T. H. Marshall, it is then possible to affirm that the Kurds, being kept from fulfilling their citizenship rights because of all the facts enumerated above, could in practice not be considered as—at least—full citizens of the Turkish republic. In this respect, Turkey needs a new definition, even a new paradigm of citizenship for the twenty-first century in order to make the Kurds feel at an equal level of citizenship with Turks. At the foundation of the Turkish republic, citizenship was considered as a societal project to create a modern, national, Turkish identity. Thus, the structural characteristics of universal citizenship have been described as rationality, progression, modern nationhood, and secularism whereas ethnic identities, religion, and traditional societal relations have been driven to the private sphere.49 Yet, in modern societies, citizenship has entered a process of “divorcing the nation-state,” and differences such as race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and language have begun to require their “legitimate” existence in the public area. In our days, citizenship is no more just belonging to the nation-state.50 It is also recognizing racial, linguistic, cultural, religious, and ethnic differences of the citizens. The concept of modern citizenship includes not only human rights but also identity politics. In this context, after the end of the Cold War and with the awakening of nationalist feelings in the 1990s, identities that once had been driven to the private sphere started to come out in the public arena, and the absolute, homogeneous, and inclusive category of Turkish citizenship has started to be questioned.51 The concept of “constitutional citizenship” was the main subject of discussion of this period, and some began to call themselves “to be from Turkey” instead of “to be Turkish.”52 When the then president, Süleyman Demirel, used the term in one of his speeches, he referred to an umbrella concept that bestowed on citizenship an identity without regard to ethnic, religious, or gender differences. The concept was appropriated from the German context, where the difference between citizenship as membership of a nation (Volk) and citizenship as membership of a state had paved the way to a critical debate. The notion of “constitutional patriotism” was initially suggested by Jürgen Habermas in 1992. By this notion, Habermas referred to a posttraditional citizenship that involved membership in the state.53 From that date on, the discussion around the recognition of Kurdish identity in Turkey has involved some arguments referring to the Spanish constitution of 1978, which gave some autonomous rights to regional ethnic groups such as the Basques and the Catalans. In fact, those who defended Kurdish autonomy or at least required the recognizing of the Kurdish identity, includ-


7/12/11 6:51 AM


59

ing political, social, cultural, and linguistic rights, pointed at some articles of the Spanish constitution. The preamble of the Spanish constitution, refers to the “protection of all Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercise of human rights, of their culture and traditions, languages and institutions.” Section 2 of the Preliminary Part stipulates that “the Constitution recognizes and guarantees the right to self-government of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed and the solidarity among them all.” Clause 2 of Section 3 states that Castilian is the official language, but stipulates that “the other Spanish languages shall also be official in the respective Self-governing Communities in accordance with their Statutes,” while Clause 3 recognizes “the wealth of the different linguistic forms of Spain (as) a cultural heritage which shall be especially respected and protected.” Section 4 makes it clear that “the Statutes may recognize flags and ensigns of the Self-governing Communities. These shall be used together with the flag of Spain on their public buildings and in their official ceremonies.” Recent discussions about the Kurdish identity in Turkey and its official recognition by the state turn around these articles, and the defenders of the Kurdish cause often give the Spanish constitution as an example for the resolution of the Kurdish question. Especially the demands of the Kurds in Turkey for identity-based political activities are shaped around this thesis. The Kurdish question placed the concept of ethnicity in the heart of the politics in Turkey in a very efficient way. Yet, as the Kemalist political system did not allow the Kurdish reality to express its political identity in an ethnic motif, legal Kurdish political parties have been banned by the Constitutional Court, especially after the coup of 1980. In fact, the Constitutional Court in Turkey has given the judgment to close 24 political parties. Since the 1990s, the majority of the closing decisions have been given for the parties having the resolution of the Kurdish question as a political issue on their agenda. Within this framework, Halkin Emek Partisi (Popular Labor Party) was banned in 1993, Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi (Freedom and Democracy Party) in 1993, Demokrasi Partisi (Democracy Party) in 1994, Demokratik Degisim Partisi (Democratic Change Party) in 1996, Demokratik Kitle Partisi (Democratic Mass Party) in 1999, and Halkin Demokrasi Partisi (Democratic Party of the People) in 2003, all being Kurdish parties. Demokratik Halk Partisi (Democratic People Party), which was founded instead of Halkin Demokrasi Partisi, abolished itself just before the decision of the Constitutional Court about its closure came to a conclusion.54 The only Kurdish political party which was representing the majority of the Kurdish vote of southeast Turkey, Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party), was closed in 2009 by another decision of


7/12/11 6:51 AM

60

Maya Arakon

the Constitutional Court, and most of its dominant leaders have been banned from political activities. Moreover, most of the elected Kurdish mayors of the region have been jailed under accusation of being in close ties with the PKK, the Kurdish armed separatist organization. In recent years, and especially after the 2009 initiative of “democratic opening” of the ruling Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP), Kurdish political leaders have formulated a proposal of constitutional amendments. The “Declaration of the Workshop for the Constitutional Priorities of the Kurdish Question,” issued in October 2009 by Kurdish political, economic, and civil leaders of the southeast as well as members of the Bars of the region, of human rights associations, and some scholars, put forward some concrete proposals.55 First, two articles of the proposal declaration emphasized the cultural richness of Turkey with its ethnic differences and stipulated that everyone is equal within this richness. It underlines the importance of peace, the state of law, freedom, and equality in the society and makes it clear that the Kurds of Turkey want to live peacefully within the borders of the Turkish Republic. This article can be considered as a response to those who insist that Kurds want a separate and independent state of their own.56 The Declaration requests some amendments to the Constitution and sets forth changes, especially in articles stipulating issues such as official language, right to education in the mother tongue, autonomous municipal administrations, gender equality in the political participation, and legislative immunity. It also brings up two important proposals on the citizenship rights. The first one states that citizenship is a fundamental right and there should not be any religious, linguistic, racial, or ethnic discrimination in getting citizenship in the Turkish Republic. No one should be deprived of his or her nationality without his or her consent. The second proposal of the amendment concerning citizenship rights stipulates that anyone who is bound to the Turkish Republic is a citizen of Turkey without any religious, linguistic, racial, ethnic, gender, or cultural discrimination. Here as well, the emphasis is on the equal citizenship of Turks and Kurds, and it is possible to denote that there is a conscious refusal of using words which refer to the ethnic identity, such as “Turk.” In fact, a constitution based in equal citizenship such as the model proposed by Habermas would not refer to an ethnic identity or religious belonging, and the Declaration proposes a new paradigm based on this very model. In this context, what should be done to find a resolution to the Kurdish question in order to achieve a peaceful and equitable solution to the problem? First of all, a new definition for citizenship should be found in order to make the Kurds feel equal to Turks. Therefore, Article 66 of the Turkish Constitu-


7/12/11 6:51 AM


61

tion, which stipulates that “everyone bound to the Turkish State through the bond of citizenship is a Turk”57 should be amended. This article, which binds the citizenship to an ethnic identity, is seen as a discriminatory or even a racist statement by the Kurds. Secondly, the Kurdish question, which is often stated as a geopolitical or economic underdevelopment problem by Turkish officers or governors, should be recognized not as above but as an ethnic identity political problem. This is also a question of the government of those who describe themselves as Kurds of Turkish Republic.58 Another step for the solution should be that Turkey discover that it can protect its long-term interests by adopting new cultural paradigms and political pluralism.59 The Kurdish question can then be resolved by reconstructing the relations between state and society on the basis of cultural and political pluralism.60 This idea of pluralism has been put into practice with the entry of the Kurdish party into the Turkish Parliament but remained deficient and incomplete because of its closure by the Constitutional Court. Yet the lack of multiculturalism or political pluralism affects Turkey not only on the national scene but also in the international arena, for it makes Turkey vulnerable in its relations with its neighbors. It also affects Turkey’s image on the international level because Turkey commits many human rights violations or antidemocratic practices in its fight against Kurdish separatism. Here, of course, one should not ignore that the terrorism problem in Turkey has not been seen by the governors as a fact caused by the Kurdish problem but as a merely economic and contextual question. Government leaders and the Turkish state have denied recognizing the problem as about identity and equal citizenship rights. Within this framework, the PKK action is solely seen as violence in itself, without having any relation to the identity claims of Kurdish people. The PKK violence has served those who believed and made the people of Turkey believe that Kurds wanted to split and to build their own independent state. Discussions were essentially based on two main, contradictory ideas: (1) the Kurdish problem is a question of democracy in Turkey, and therefore more democracy would resolve the problem; and (2) this is not a question of democracy; too much democracy would harm Turkey; and the Turkish people are not ready for more democracy.61 Some scholars argue that the solution lies in associating the identity claims to citizenship rights in Turkey. In doing so, pluralism and multiculturalism would contribute to the reconstruction of a modern society and thus would transform the Kurdish question into a citizenship claim for individual and cultural rights. In this way, identity claims would be distinguished from ethnic nationalism and would be dealt within the context of citizenship rights.62


7/12/11 6:51 AM

62

Maya Arakon

Conclusion As we have seen above, the debate about the resolution of the Kurdish question turns around the ways to find a new paradigm of citizenship in Turkey, and those who suggest a new model of civic rights emphasize rights such as nondiscrimination on religious, linguistic, cultural, and political levels. They also demand the rights to education in the mother tongue or freedom of expression in Kurdish, right to speak Kurdish without any practical obstacle—since speaking Kurdish is legally authorized—and so forth. They want to be full citizens of Turkey with full political, cultural, economic, and social rights. The theoretical approaches as well as the arguments mentioned in this chapter give the possibility to affirm that Kurds in Turkey cannot use their citizenship rights fully for many political and societal reasons. So the problem needs to be first resolved from a point of restructuring citizenship in the mind of the Turkish state, and there is a great need to bring a new model of citizenship which can respond to the claims of the twenty-first century. Fortunately, recently, those who consider the Kurdish problem as a citizenship one began to raise their voice. After Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK, announced in 1999 the renunciation of the idea of an independent state,63 and with the general elections of 2002 when Kurdish deputies could enter the Turkish Parliament for the first time as representatives of the Kurdish people in southeastern Turkey, the debate started to turn around the democratic claims of Kurds, and mainly their demands for an equal citizenship in which their ethnic identity would be recognized officially. But the closure of the Kurdish Democratic Society Party and the imprisonment of the elected mayors of the region awoke an important level of dissent within the Kurdish people of the southeast. Following the decision of closure by the Constitutional Court, unrest broke out throughout the country, and even some violent events occurred in the western cities of Turkey. The decision to close DTP triggered violence again, and the PKK restarted its actions as of the beginning of the year 2010. This process has served the defenders of democracy and a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question. They started to call for more civic rights for Kurds in Turkey. The Kurds have already been the center of all attention since the ruling Justice and Development Party’s “democratic opening” project of summer 2009—a project that divided the public opinion into two: those who saw it as a betrayal of the state and those who take it as a democratic step. The project, which in fact was not a clear one for the peoples of Turkey, who never knew the outlines, resulted in failure, and the hope of Kurds for a peaceful democratic solution turned into disappointment.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


63

Today there is an emotional distance and societal rupture between Turks and Kurds in Turkey. Although Kurds declare themselves to have given up their separatist claims of the 1980s and 1990s and to actually demand cultural and identity rights,64 Turks have been turning against them for a long time, since many perceive them as those who seek to divide Turkey to create their own country, Kurdistan. A concrete political solution is still not under way, and a societal solution seems even more urgent than a political one. To start negotiations, there are some prerequisites, and both sides, the Turkish state and Kurdish authorities, are not ready to fulfill them yet. But the main problem lies in the governmental and state perception of the question. All the governmental and state leaders continue to take the problem not as a civic one or a question of citizenship rights in a democratic perspective but as a problem of economic deficiency and terrorism. Thus, the question remains unfortunately unsolvable without a new paradigm of citizenship.

Notes 1. Charles A. Kupchan, “Nationalism Resurgent,” in Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe, edited by C. A. Kupchan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 2. 2. Jack Snyder, “Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State,” in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, edited by M. E. Brown (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 79–101. 3. Charles A. Kupchan, “Nationalism Resurgent,” 2. 4. Ibid. 5. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New York: Verso, 1983). 6. Anthony Smith, “The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism,” in Ethnic Conflict and International Security, edited by M. E. Brown (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993). 7. Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalisms (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983). Some scholars, including Charles Kupchan, argue that this definition is inadequate since it is important to draw a clear distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism. He argues that “disparate ethnic groups can and do unify around a common notion of nationality when nationhood is defined in terms of citizenship, not common ethnicity or culture. The nation-state can very comfortably cut across ethnic and cultural boundaries as long as national sentiments and identities do so as well. Defining nationality in terms of identity rather than in terms of ethnicity or culture resolves this problem.” See Charles Kupchan, “Nationalism Resurgent,” 194. 8. Charles Kupchan, “Nationalism Resurgent,” 3. 9. For example, the Palestinians today are accepted as a national grouping despite the fact that they do not have a state. See Charles Kupchan, “Nationalism Resurgent,” 4.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

64

Maya Arakon

10. Charles Kupchan, “Nationalism Resurgent,” 3. 11. Ibid., 6. 12. Interview with Kendal Nezan, director of the Kurdish Institute of Paris, Paris, August 3, 2009. See also Hamit Bozarslan, “Conflit kurde. Le brasier oublié du Moyen-Orient,” Autrement, Paris, 2009. 13. Samim Akgönül, “Les Kurdes forment-ils une minorité en Turquie?” Diplomatie 30 (2008): 70. 14. Bahar Şahin, “Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği Uyum Süreci Bağlamında Kürt Sorunu: Açılımlar ve Sınırlar,” in Türkiye’de Çoğunluk ve Azınlık Politikaları: AB Sürecinde Yurttaşlık Tartışmaları, edited by A. Kaya and T. Tarhanlı (İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2005), 123. 15. Samim Akgönül, “Les Kurdes,” 70. 16. Bahar Şahin, “Türkiye’nin Avrupa,” 125. 17. David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (I. B. Tauris, 1997), 186–189. 18. Christopher Houston, Islam, Kurds and the Turkish Nation State (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2001), 99–101. 19. Ayhan Aktar, Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları (İstanbul: İletişim, 2000), 78. 20. Mesut Yeğen, “Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish question,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 30, no. 1 (2007): 130. 21. Saygı Öztürk, İsmet Paşa’nın Kürt Raporu (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008) 37. 22. Samim Akgönül denotes that there have been three toponymic waves of change: the first one between 1930 and 1934, the second between 1956 and 1964, and the third between 1982 and 1990. For more details see Samim Akgönül, De la nomination en turc actuel: appartenances, perceptions, croyances (Istanbul: Isis, 2007), 94–97. 23. A religious community in Turkey which constitutes a branch of Shi’a Islam. 24. Houston, Islam, Kurds and the Turkish Nation State, 125. 25. Fernando Reinares, “Nationalist Separatism and Terrorism in Comparative Perspective,” in Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward, edited by T. Bjorgo (New York: Routledge, 2005), 121. 26. Gülistan Gürbey, “The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey since the 1980s,” in The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s, edited by R. Olson (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1996), 7–37; Mesut Yeğen, “Turkish Nationalism,” 136. 27. John Rawls, “The Basic Liberties and Their Priority,” in The Tanner Lectures on Human Value III, edited by Sterling McMurrin (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 14. 28. Monique Lanoix, “The Citizen in Question,” Hypatia, 22 no. 4 (Fall 2007): 114. 29. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 29–35. 30. Thomas Humphrey Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1950), 67.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


65

31. Thomas W. Smith, “Civic Nationalism and Ethnocultural Justice in Turkey,” Human Rights Quarterly 27 (2005): 437. 32. Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict (London, 1997): 97. See also their statement in Turkish Daily News, March 11, 1995. 33. Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic (New York: NYU Press, 1997), 108. 34. Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Peoples and the End of Empire (Hodder Arnold, 2001), 213. 35. Ayşe Kadıoğlu, “Türkiye’de Vatandaşlığın Anatomisi,” in Küreselleşme, Avrupalılaşma ve Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık,” edited by Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversityesi Yayınları, 2009), 119. 36. David Kushner, The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876-1908 (London: Franc Cass, 1977), 8–10. 37. Servet Mutlu, “Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study,” Middle East Studies 28, no. 4 (1996): 517. 38. Dogu Ergil, “The Kurdish Question in Turkey,” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 3 (2000): 130. 39. Michael Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966 (University of California Press, 1975), 7–9. 40. Incomes in the Kurdish southeast are roughly one-tenth of those in the industrial swathe of Western Turkey. 41. Heinz Kramer, A Changing Turkey: Challenges to Europe and the U.S. (Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 39. 42. In July 2003, Parliament removed language from the Census Law that had prohibited the use of names contrary to the “national culture.” See U.S. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Turkey: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2003. 43. Kerem Öktem, “Creating the Turk’s Homeland: Modernization, Nationalism and Geography in Southeast Turkey in the Late 19th and 20th Centuries.” Paper for the Socrates Kokkalis Graduate Workshop, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (2003), 9. 44. Thomas W. Smith, “Civic Nationalism,” 467. 45. See Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, Country of Origin Research: Turkey, TUR42658.E (2004), 189. 46. Ebru Doğan, “Kurds Wait for Turkish Sea Change,” BBC News (December 19, 2003). 47. “Kapatılan Yedinci Kürt Partisi DTP Oldu,” Haber ve Saire (November 12, 2009) www.habervesaire.com/haber/1661/. 48. Thomas W. Smith, “Civic Nationalism,” 470. 49. Feyzi Baban, “Türkiye’de Cemaat, Vatandaşlık ve Kimlik,” in Küreselleşme, Avrupalılaşma ve Türkiye’de vatandaşlık, edited by Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2009), 64. 50. Ayşe Kadıoğlu, “Türkiye’de Vatandaşlığın Anatomisi,” 111. 51. Ibid., 115.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

66

Maya Arakon

52. Türkiyeli olmak instead of Türk olmak. For a broad definition of the concept, see Baskin Oran, Türkiye’de Azınlıklar, 4th ed. (Istanbul: İletişim, 2008), 171–181. 53. Ibid., 118. For more details on Habermas’ concept of constitutional citizenship, see Jürgen Habermas, “Yet Again: German Identity—A Unified Nation of Angry DM Burghers?” New German Critic 91 (1992): 84–102. 54. For more details see www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay &link=141728, www.merip.org/mero/mero080410.html, and http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/europe/66468.stm. 55. “Kürt Meselesinde Anayasal Öncelikler Çalıştayı Sonuç Bildirgesi,” (Diyarbakır: October 1–2, 2009). 56. See “Kürt Meselesinde Anayasal Öncelikler Çalıştayı Sonuç Bildirgesi,” issued by the Bar of Diyarbakir (October 2009). 57. See www.constitution.org/cons/turkey/part2.htm for the entire constitution. 58. Fuat Keyman, “Vatandaşlık ve Kimliği Eklemlemek: Türkiye’de ‘Kürt Sorunu,’” in Küreselleşme, Avrupalılaşma ve Türkiye’de vatandaşlık, edited by Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversityesi Yayınları, 2009), 351. 59. Van Bruinessen, Martin, Kurdish Ethno-nationalism versus Nation-Building States (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2000). 108. 60. Fuat Keyman, “Vatandaşlık ve Kimliği,” 353. 61. Baskın Oran, Türkiye’de Azınlıklar. Kavramlar, Teori, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama (Istanbul: Iletişim, 2008), 227. 62. Fuat Keyman, “Vatandaşlık ve Kimliği,” 354–355. 63. Maya Arakon, “Le PKK: Un groupe terroriste comme un autre?” Diplomatie no. 30 (January–February 2008): 77. 64. Milliyet, “Interview of Hasan Cemal with Murat Karayılan, the Current Leader of PKK” (May 2–10, 2009).

Bibliography Akgönül, Samim. De la nomination en turc actuel: appartenances, perceptions, croyances. Istanbul: Isis, 2007. ———. “Les Kurdes forment-ils une minorité en Turquie?” Diplomatie 30 (2008): 70–73. Aktar, Ayhan. Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları. İstanbul: İletişim, 2000. Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New York: Verso, 1983. Arakon, Maya. “Le PKK: Un groupe terroriste comme un autre?” Diplomatie 30 (January–February 2008): 74–78. Baban, Feyzi. “Türkiye’de Cemaat, Vatandaşlık ve Kimlik.” In Küreselleşme, Avrupalılaşma ve Türkiye’de vatandaşlık, edited by Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversityesi Yayınları, 2009.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


67

Bozarslan, Hamit. Conflit Kurde. Paris: Autrement, 2009. ———. “Türkiye’de Kürt Milliyetçiliği: Zımni Sözleşmeden Ayaklanmaya 1919– 1925.” In Türkiye’de Etnik Çatışma, edited by E. J. Zürcher (ed.), İstanbul: İletişim, 2005. Brown, Michael E. “Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict.” In Ethnic Conflict and International Security, edited by M. E. Brown. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993. Doğan, Ebru. “Kurds Wait for Turkish Sea Change.” BBC News, December 19, 2003. Ergil, Dogu. “The Kurdish Question in Turkey.” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 3 (2000): 122–135. Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalisms. New York: Cornell University Press, 1983. Gürbey, Gülistan, “The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey since the 1980s.” In The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s, edited by R. Olson. Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1996. Habermas, Jürgen. “Yet Again: German Identity—A Unified Nation of Angry DM Burghers?” New German Critic (1992): 91. Hechter, Michael. Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536–1966. University of California Press, 1975. Houston, Christopher. Islam, Kurds and the Turkish Nation State. Oxford: Berg, 2001. Kadıoğlu, Ayşe. “Can We Envision Turkish Citizenship as Non-Membership?” In Citizenship in a Global World: European Questions and Turkish Experiences, 105–124 London: Routledge, 2005. ———. “Türkiye’de Vatandaşlığın Anatomisi.” In Küreselleşme, Avrupalılaşma ve Türkiye’de vatandaşlık, edited by Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversityesi Yayınları, 2009. Keyman, Fuat. “Vatandaşlık ve Kimliği Eklemlemek: Türkiye’de ‘Kürt Sorunu.’” In Küreselleşme, Avrupalılaşma ve Türkiye’de vatandaşlık, edited by Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversityesi Yayınları, 2009. Kirişçi, Kemal and Gareth M. Winrow. The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict, 97. London: Routledge, 1997. Kramer, Heinz. A Changing Turkey: Challenges to Europe and the U.S. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. Kupchan, Charles A. “Nationalism Resurgent.” In Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe, edited by C. A. Kupchan. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995. Kushner, David. The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876–1908. London: Franc Cass, 1977. Lanoix, Monique, “The Citizen in Question.” Hypatia 22, no. 4 (Fall 2007): 113–129. Marshall, Thomas Humphrey. Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1950. McCarthy, Justin. The Ottoman Peoples and the End of Empire. Oxford: Hodder Arnold, 2001. McDowall, David. A Modern History of the Kurds. London: I. B. Tauris, 1997.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

68

Maya Arakon

Mutlu, Servet. “Ethnic Kurds in Turkey: A Demographic Study.” Middle East Studies 28, no. 4 (1996). Newland, Kathleen. “Ethnic Conflict and Refugees.” Global Politics and Strategy 35, no. 1 (1993): 81–101. Oran, Baskın. Türkiye’de Azınlıklar. Kavramlar, Teori, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama. Istanbul: Iletişim, 2008. Öktem, Kerem. “Creating the Turk’s Homeland: Modernization, Nationalism and Geography in Southeast Turkey in the Late 19th and 20th Centuries.” Paper for the Socrates Kokkalis Graduate Workshop, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2003. Öztürk, Saygı. İsmet Paşa’nın Kürt Raporu. İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2008. Poulton, Hugh. Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic. New York : NYU Press, 1997. Rawls, John. “The Basic Liberties and Their Priority.” In The Tanner Lectures on Human Value III, edited by Sterling McMurrin. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982. ———. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. Reinares Fernando. “Nationalist Separatism and Terrorism in Comparative Perspective.” In Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward, edited by T. Bjorgo. New York: Routledge, 2005. Ross, Marc Howard. “Good Enough Isn’t So Bad: Thinking about Success and Failure in Ethnic Conflict Management.” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 6, no. 1 (2000): 27–47. Smith, Anthony. “The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism.” In Ethnic Conflict and International Security, edited by M. E. Brown. New Jersey : Princeton University Press, 1993. Smith, Thomas W. “Civic Nationalism and Ethnocultural Justice in Turkey.” Human Rights Quarterly 27 (2005): 436–470. Snyder, Jack. “Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State.” In Ethnic Conflict and International Security, edited by M. E. Brown. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993. Şahin, Bahar. “Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği Uyum Süreci Bağlamında Kürt Sorunu: Açılımlar ve Sınırlar.” In Türkiye’de Çoğunluk ve Azınlık Politikaları: AB Sürecinde Yurttaşlık Tartışmaları, edited by A. Kaya and T. Tarhanlı. İstanbul: TESEV Yayınları, 2005. Van Bruinessen, Martin. Kurdish Ethno-nationalism versus Nation-Building States. Istanbul: Isis Press, 2000. Yeğen, Mesut. “Turkish Nationalism and the Kurdish Question.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 30, no. 1 (2007): 119–151. Yıldız, Ahmet. Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene—Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları 1919–1938. İstanbul: İletişim, 2001.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


69

Newspapers and Electronic Sources BBC: www.bbc.co.uk Encyclopedia Qanda: www.qanda.encyclopedia.com Haber ve Saire: www.habervesaire.com Middle East Report Online: www.merip.org Milliyet: www.milliyet.com.tr Official website of the European Union. europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/subsidiarity_ en.htm Radikal: www.radikal.com.tr Sansursuz: www.sansursuz.com Smithsonnian: www.smithsonnian.com Taraf: www.taraf.com.tr Today’s Zaman: www.todayszaman.com Turkish Daily News: www.hurriyetdailynews.com


7/12/11 6:51 AM


7/12/11 6:51 AM

4 The Alevi Identity and Civil Rights in the Twenty-First Century Fazilet Ahu Özmen

T

that develop and transform with globalization have a significant influence on today’s formation. In this context, identities and cultures are eroding and keeping up with the state of play. The erosion in question can be explained as the search for identity of various religious and ethnic groups in the society. As is well known, Turkish society has a cosmopolitan structure. This cosmopolitanism results from the presence of diverse cultural groups. Among these cultural groups, the Kurds and the Alevis are the majority, and both these groups have been in a search of identity since the Ottoman period. The Kurds and the Alevis, who were able to express their presence to some extent with the establishment of the Republic, were exposed to severe political and social suppressions until the 1980s. Still today, they cannot convey their identities freely, and they are still face-to-face with similar restraints. These communities, which struggle for their rights by establishing political parties and by taking charge in various departments of the government, express on all occasions that they do not have equitable and equal civil rights with the population comprising the majority of the society. These communities are supposed to have the right to lead their cultures comfortably in terms of religion, culture, and ethnicity in the Republic of Turkey, where a multicultural structure exists. However, the structure of the existing government still rejects multiculturalism today and maintains the consolidating Sunni–Turkish synthesis that emerged in the coup of 1980. The Turkish–Sunni Islam conception, which arose out of especially Islamic movements, once more acquired currency with the coup in 1980 and became the political symbol of the Turkish republic. HE VALUES AND PRINCIPLES

— 71 —


7/12/11 6:51 AM

72

Fazilet Ahu Özmen

If that’s so, then what should be done for these discrete cultural groups to benefit from equal civil rights? Although the government of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP) has been trying to find solutions to these problems through “expansions” (opening), the projects in question have been inadequate. The subject we are going to address is how the Alevis can have equal civil rights, and what should be done for this by society and the government. In order to understand the civil rights Alevis are supposed to have, we should first refer to the development and the qualities of the Alevi identity. After apprehending the process of identity, we will touch upon the issue of the kind of citizenship notion to be discussed and even established. We can briefly define Alevism as an ethnic and religious community.1 Several writers and researchers claim that Alevis are a minority group and therefore they should have different rights. However, Alevis have stood up for the policy that they are Muslims and have repeatedly shared with the public the fact that they are not a minority group and that the status of minority is given only to non-Muslims. On the basis of our presentation, we will first refer to the definition of Alevism, then to the development of the Alevi identity, and finally discuss how the Alevis view the concept and principles of citizenship.

The Definition of Alevism Alevism is a concept that has embraced various definitions. For some, it is designated as a religion, for others a sect, a culture, or even a lifestyle. It is even considered as a cult by some parts of the society. This conceptual plurality or even confusion has also led to disunity among the Alevis. For this reason, Alevis have not been able to compose a homogeneous community for centuries. Before we refer to this heterogeneity, we will briefly refer to some different descriptions of Alevism and some religious and mystic movements Alevism has been influenced by. Looking at the studies done on Alevism, it can be seen that this concept has been interpreted through various definitions. The concept of Alevism was first used for the supporters of Prophet Ali during the caliph discussions after Prophet Mohammed’s death. However, in the course of time, it gained various meanings in different regions and countries. The surmise about Turkish Alevism, also called Anatolian Alevism, is that it appeared as a result of the Turkmen’s accepting Islam and integrating their beliefs and traditions within it. The beliefs that these societies had are known as shamanism, Manichaeism, and Buddhism. As they led a nomadic lifestyle, the Turkmen were


7/12/11 6:51 AM

The Alevi Identity and Civil Rights in the Twenty-First Century

73

influenced by different belief systems everywhere they went. The Turkmen who were eventually influenced by Islam in Anatolian lands were engaged in a diverse religion together with their own beliefs. For this reason, we can define Alevism as a “diverse phenomenon.” That is to say, Alevism is a body of beliefs that has gained a diverse structure affected by various beliefs and cultures and that emerged with a rather Islamic image. The word Alevism is used for the connotation “belonging to Ali” in Arabic. According to denominational history and the philosophy of mysticism, it means “to love and respect Ali and to be faithful to him.” The person who loves and respects Ali and who is loyal to him is called “Alevi.” Besides, after Mohammed’s death, the caliphate would be taken over by his nephew and son-in-law Ali, as Mohammed had desired. Nevertheless, the caliphate was taken over by Ebu Bekir, and this instance separated Muslims into two groups. The supporters of Ali were named the group of “Shia,” and this movement brought forth “Shi’ism,” an important branch of Islam. Islam was separated into two branches called Sunnism and Shi’ism. That’s why the word Shia is used as a synonym for Alevism by some authors. Concurrently, people who were on Ali’s side were called “Alevi” for their loyalty to him. The relevance of Alevism to Shi’ism is, in fact, indefinite. Alevism is not Shi’ism, but has been affected by Shi’ism. Now, it might be useful to have a look at various definitions of Alevism. As we have already mentioned, Alevism arose as a movement and religion that was nourished by thought patterns exclusive of Sunnism, based on religious reasons and rebellious to the Sunni religious view, which is dominant in societies complying with Islam. In this respect, Alevism gained numerous meanings in terms of geographical regions, ethnic roots, and cultural structure. For example, the concept of “Alevi” is used for the connotation “Ismaili” in Pakistan, “Caferi” in Iran, “Zeydi” in Egypt and Yemen, “Nusayri” in Syria, and the Durzi sects in Lebanon. As for the perception of Alevism of the Turkish society, Alevism is a religious thought pattern embellished by some beliefs influential on the Anatolian lands for some period, such as shamanism, Buddhism, and Manichaeism, and later integrated with Sunni Islam. For this reason, we can say that Turkish Alevism, in other words Anatolian Alevism, emerged as the nomadic Turkmen and Turkish clans accepted Islam and combined Sunni Islam with some of their already existing religious and mystic beliefs and traditions. This composition, which was developed by the Sufi societies, was brought to Anatolia with the immigrations that started in the eleventh century and became varied by adding partly Hurufi and Shia elements in its structure.2 Alevis, who were formerly called Kızılbash (“Red Heads”), belonged to the Turkmen clans who were the supporters of Sheikhs Cüneyd, Haydar, and


7/12/11 6:51 AM

74

Fazilet Ahu Özmen

Ismail, the first Safevis3 in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. They were called Kızılbash or Red Heads because they wear a red headgear. However, the concept of Kızılbash was later associated with the connotations “heathenrebel” or “deviant” along with the religious–social rebellions known as the Celali Riots. As a consequence, the concept of Kızılbash was replaced by Alevism.4 It is known that the concept of Alevism has been used to define a nonconformist and heterodox religious structure.5 As we have mentioned earlier, there are several definitions of the concept of Alevism. It will be useful to explain these definitions through the interpretations of some authors. According to Mehmet Eröz, who is an important Alevi author, the Alevis, who were mostly comprised of uneducated Turkmen, have preserved the religious beliefs they had brought from Middle Asia under the name of Alevism with an Islamic image.6 In this context, Alevism has become a belief system described as heterodox and was defined as a nonconformist public Islam by the societies who started to lead a sedentary lifestyle while maintaining their nomadic practices. Rıza Selyut, on the contrary, claims that Alevism is bound by the concepts Allah (God)–Mohammed–Ali from the beginning till the end, and therefore takes place right within Islam, and even makes up the core of Islam. According to Zelyut, people who are willing to see Alevism exclusive of Islam are either the Shari defenders or some researchers or authors who are not informed about Alevism.7 Alevism is also a social movement that covers life in all aspects and tries to set up a better system. This social movement seeks what is right, good, and just in the name of God and expresses this request disguised by religion. On the other hand, according to Cemal Şener, who is another Alevi author, Alevism is a unique lifestyle.8 It is a culture and an identity. The Shia movement, which was society based, yet also a religious opposition trend at the beginning, later turned into a philosophy of life and an opposition movement that is preponderant more in social rather than religious or racial aspects. This conception, as a matter of fact, reflects reality. Alevis have always responded to the religious movements born and still existing in the Turkish Republic in an opposing manner. Alevis, who have always supported the Republic and have been the guardians of secularism, have criticized conservative movements and have been the protectors of the “Atatürk’s Turkey.” On the other side of the coin, this philosophy is a worldview that has established love of Ali and Ehl-i Beyt, fraternity, just distribution, equality, freedom, and standing against any kind of injustice as its missions.9 This philosophy is what actually lies beneath the Alevis’ tendency towards the leftwing movements. At the same time, Şener states that it is impossible to define


7/12/11 6:51 AM


75

Alevism without relating it to the history of Islam. Nonetheless, Alevism has turned out to be a minority group or a religious phenomenon exposed to injustice. Yet this religious structure is an egalitarian, liberal, and secular religious structure.10 The most significant religious feature that separates Alevis from Sunnis is their loyalty to secularism. As we can see, views and thoughts about Alevism are varied. However, this concept has actually been examined through two main points. The first point is to predicate Alevism on pre-Islamic beliefs, especially early Turkish beliefs, and the second point is to evaluate Alevism within Islam and to emphasize the fact that Alevism completely originates from Islam and that it is the soul of Islam itself.11 This diversity, as we will mention later, prevents Alevis from gathering under the same roof and leads to separations within the community. Every individual interprets Alevism in respect to his or her own lifestyle or ethnic roots, and this results in serious problems among Alevis. Ahmet Yaşar Ocak claims that the only right way to clear away this chaos of thoughts is by examining Alevism under the light of a historical perspective. According to Ocak, this historical process should be examined within two periods, pre-Safavi and post-Safavi. The first period is the duration between the tenth century and the end of the fifteenth century when Islam started to spread among the Turkish groups in Middle Asia. This period brought the Turks residing in Anatolia face to face with a situation in which the Islamic conception was incompatible with the holy book interpretations of Islam, old beliefs and traditions were predominant, and a superficial Islam percept prevailed. In other words, the Turks living in that period were not able to integrate Islam completely into their lives and continued to remain under the influence of religious structures such as shamanism and Manicheism. Along with the Safavi propaganda in the second period, covering the period following the fifteenth century, today’s Alevism, which puts Ali in the center regarding the fundamentals of 12-Imam Shi’ism, emerged. Thus, the heterodox Islamic conception, which has existed in Turkey since the thirteenth century, brought forth an Islamic conception that resembles neither Sunnism nor Shi’ism, is not orthodox, and may be defined as heterodox, in the sixteenth century and assured its survival up to today.12 Briefly, Alevism is a diverse religious and cultural structure that emerged as the Turkish people accepted Islam in the beginning of the tenth century. Alevism, with its unique religious and cultural qualities, is also defined as a minority group without a status by Hamit Bozarslan. The status of minority, which is given only to non-Muslims in the Republic of Turkey, does not involve the Kurds and the Alevis. However, all their religious, cultural, and ethnic structures implant minority qualities in these two communities. Now, it will be useful to have a look at the current political and social structuring


7/12/11 6:51 AM

76

Fazilet Ahu Özmen

and acts of the Alevis in Turkey in order to highlight the civil rights Alevis believe they are supposed to have.

Alevis and the Republic As we have formerly mentioned, Alevis used to present an opposing community and attitude towards the official ideology during the Ottoman period. They were excluded by the Sunnis and the supreme power due to their styles of belief and worship, and they also suffered a lot during the Safevi and Babai Riots. However, as soon as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established the Turkish Republic, they were able to get through being repressed to some extent, and they took significant roles in the new constitution. Perhaps for the first time since the Ottoman Period, Alevis started to express their identities freely and take part in politics. Alevis started to support the Republic after Atatürk visited the tomb (mausoleum) of Hacı Bektaş Veli. Atatürk asked for support from the Alevis during the Turkish War of Independence and declared that Alevis would be given freedom of religion and worship in the new regime he would establish. However, the Alevis were disappointed as the Presidency of Religious Affairs was established soon after the Republic, and this formed a handicap for their religious demands. In fact, the aim of the team establishing the Republic was to transform the Islamic connection within the society to a national connection. For this reason, the executed reforms mainly targeted the Orthodox Sunni Islam. As the tekkes, small dervish lodges and sects, were abolished, Alevis also got their share of religious restrictions. Sects and congregational organizations were considered to pose an obstacle for the intended homogeneous nation and therefore were prohibited. Tekkes were abolished with the thought that such organizations would be incongruous with the “secular” state being established, and thus any kind of religious organization was averted and the element of religion was purified from government policies. During the single political party period, covering the years between 1923 and 1950, the type of citizen required for the desired homogeneous nation was designated, and this citizenship symbolized an individual who was not only modern, secular, patriotic, and nationalist, but also who embraced Muslimism purified from Islam.13 In brief, the social structure of the Republic should be secular. However, in order to operate this transformation process properly, the government planned to take control of the religious field and established the Department of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlıgı, DİB) in 1924. By setting up


7/12/11 6:51 AM


77

this division, the government intended to take control of the religious transformation the society experienced after the change of regime and desired to prevent congregational gatherings of various groups by using Islam. As Murat Okan states, this instance shows that the government used Islam again to achieve the transformation to a nation freed from religion, in other words Islam.14 The DİB has developed a lot since the day it was established and has reached an organizational level resembling a ministry. During the process of secularization, the establishment of DİB formed an obstacle in terms of Islamic values, and as a matter of fact its role in the government and society has progressed dramatically. Looking at the purpose of the establishment of DİB (stabilizing religion within the government), it is quite obvious that it will not allow for any belief except Sunnism, especially for Alevism, which possesses an opposing tradition. Alevi authors and the majority of the Alevis gave support to the war of independence and the Republican regime following it, and they have had the need to frequently recall the fact that they are the defenders and the guardians of secularism; underneath all these lies the feeling of being disregarded during the period of the establishment of the Turkish Republic and even today. The fact that an organization endowed with religious elements such as DİB conducts its existence in a consistent way leads to consolidation of Sunnism and disregarding of the Alevis in Turkey. In this context, equal civil rights are discussed. In a secular government structure, caring for and defending the rights of the individuals belonging to Sunni Islam specially puts Alevis, who make up 25 percent of the society, into the position of second-class citizens. Alevis, who express in every platform that they are Muslims, strongly condemn the fact that the sect of the Alevism is not represented by DİB. Besides, a considerable part of the majority emphasizes that DİB is against secularism and that it should be abolished. No matter how much Alevis were disturbed by the establishment of a department such as DİB along with the Republic, Alevis have always been the defenders of a secular Turkish republic and they have never given up being Atatürkist and Kemalist. Alevis, who were far from the center during the Ottoman period, became the defenders of the modern state and secularism along with the Turkish Republic. We can say that there are two main reasons for Alevis supporting the republic. The first reason, as we have already mentioned, is the religious and cultural structure of Alevism. In other words, we can say that it originates from its secular structure. The second reason is that along with the secular reforms, Turkish society, dominated by Sunni Islam, has modernized. Alevis, who were targeted as “the others” by the Sunnis for centuries, especially during the Ottoman period, were able to emphasize their existence comfortably for the first time after the secular reforms of the Republic, and greatly


7/12/11 6:51 AM

78

Fazilet Ahu Özmen

defected from the Sunni suppression. However, as the multiple political party period started, Alevis have once more become the target.

Political Development of the Alevi Identity On May 14, 1950, the Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti—DP), which was established under the chairmanship of Adnan Menderes, came into power polling 53.3 percent of the votes. Government by the Democratic Party, which was a fresh and significant period for Turkey, was also important for Alevis. The agricultural policy the subject party had promised mostly influenced the Alevis, who resided in rural areas in that period. On the other hand, during the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi—CHP) period, when the Alevis supported DP, abolishment of the Alevi tekkes and representation of Sunni Islam alone drew Alevis away from CHP. Harald Schüler refers to this issue broadly in the light of statistics in his book. For instance, in the city of Sivas where the majority is Alevi, the percentage of the votes for DP was quite high. Although the vast majority of the Alevi votes were for DP in the general elections in 1950, the manner in the general elections in 1957 was different. Alevis moved their votes towards the CHP again, and once more expressed the fact that they are the protectors of the principle of secularism and the Kemalist values. The main reason for this maneuver is, without any doubt, the DP putting Sunni-oriented religion policies in the foreground. Reciting of the azan in Arabic, opening of the Religious Vocational Schools (İmam Hatip), and attaching too much importance to the Qur’an classes were the most specific indications that the DP’s policies were predominantly religious.15 The secular part of the society, especially Alevis, argued that this political arena posed a huge threat for the Republic and that it was a coup against the revolutions of Atatürk. The DP government, covering the years between 1950 and 1960, led to dramatic changes in terms of religion, and this period came to an end with the May 27, 1960 coup. The coup was welcomed with delight by Alevis and was designated as the salvation of Kemalism. After this painful experience, secularism has been the key element determining Alevis’ political tendencies.16 After the coup in 1960, a new political formation opened in Turkey. Leftwing movements, which were basically emergent in Europe, penetrated into Turkey before long. It was in this period that the Alevi youngsters were acquainted with socialism and got actively involved in political formations. Before we address the Alevi youngsters’ connection to the left wing, it will be more appropriate to refer to the characteristics of the Alevi mobilization that was generated after the coup.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


79

President of the period Cemal Gürsel announced to the public that it was crucial to represent the sects other than Sunni within the DİB and launched a project in order to get the opinion of Alevi leaders about this issue. Religious and conservative populations argued that there were no Shi’ites in Turkey and severely protested against this project and underlined that Alevis would not be recognized as a separate sect. In response to this attitude of the conservative population, about 50 Alevi youngsters published two declarations comprising the religious and cultural rights of the Alevis, and by means of these declarations they shared the concept of Alevism with the public for the first time. In the first declaration, the Alevi youngsters expressed their connection to the principles of the Turkish Republic, their loyalty to the national values, and the importance they gave to human freedom and strongly condemned the discrimination against the Alevis. They explained that Alevism is the core of Islam and that they were Muslims themselves and should be represented as a separate sect by the DİB just like the Sunnis. As for the second declaration, the youngsters expressed their loyalty to secularism more broadly and urged the president of the DİB of the period to resign because of the discriminations he allowed for.17 As a matter of fact, through these two declarations, Alevis were able to express their desire for equal civil rights clearly for the first time. They pointed out that they are also citizens of the Republic of Turkey and that they are not different from the Sunnis who make up the majority of the society in terms of Muslimism, that they fulfill the requirements of Islam as much as Sunnis, but that they are different in terms of sect. They have repeatedly highlighted that they are against any kind of discrimination and that every individual should have equal rights regardless of his or her religion or sect. After these two declarations were published, Alevis started to become organized for the first time in the history of the Republic. The first Alevi associations were founded, and the ritual of Cem organized by “Hacı Bektaş Tanıtma Derneği” took place in Ankara in 1963. Parallel to the associations, the Alevi press began to develop. The first Alevi journals and newspapers were established in that period and became the means of calling out to the nation and the public for the Alevis. Thus, an Alevi identity began to form, and this revindication of identity went on consistently until the 1970s. Again during the same years, the waves of immigration from villages to cities influenced the social structure of the Alevis as well. Rustic Alevis who immigrated to cities integrated the universities in that period and adopted the intensely increasing left-wing movements in and around the universities. Both their cultural structure and lifestyle kept Alevis away from right-wing societies endowed with religious and nationalist trends. On the other side of the coin, as is well known, waves of immigration resulted in “squatting” in


7/12/11 6:51 AM

80

Fazilet Ahu Özmen

big cities, and these recently composed slums turned into propaganda centers for socialistic youngsters. Şükrü Aslan states that slums were set up with the contributions of socialistic groups.18 Thence, a bond of solidarity was formed between the Alevis residing in these slums and the left-wing groups, and Alevi youngsters were seriously involved in left-wing movements. The aforementioned mobilization took place as a result of urbanization and mass education. Intellectuals, university students, laborers, and all the working population became aware of the dissimilarities in big cities and the discrimination against themselves. Universities and the unions which were established at that period also had a great influence on this awareness. In these circumstances, Alevis concluded that they should politicize themselves, and on October 17, 1966, they established the Turkish Party of Great Union (Türkiye Büyük Birlik Partisi—TBP) under the leadership of Hasan Tahsin Berkman. The addressing of the party to the Alevis was quite obvious in its logo: the lion surrounded by 12 stars, symbolizing Ali and the 12 Imams, clearly stands for Alevism and its philosophy. The purpose of the party was, as Paul Dumont mentions in his article, to call all the citizens of the Turkish Republic to unity, to maintain the national unity of the Republic of Turkey in a cycle of one nation and one language, and to preserve the values Atatürk built, such as secularism and democracy.19 The program of the party was to emphasize that freedom of thought and religion should be protected, and as long as secular principles were preserved, the religious beliefs and services of any individual would not be restricted by any force. TBP also stressed that economic growth based on a planned economy and agriculture was essential and clearly expressed its progressivist ruling. The party focused on religion during the period it was active and came up against law number 89 involving the closure of the political parties. Nevertheless, the party was not closed for the reason that it did not pose a hazard for Turkey owing to both its discourses and the peaceful and egalitarian policy it set forth. Yet it did not manage to poll enough votes either in the elections in 1968 (2.8 percent), in 1973 (1.1 percent), or in 1977 (0.4 percent), and it was not represented sufficiently in the parliament.20 Only in the elections of 1968 was it able to be represented by eight members of parliament, and these members were returned in the cities where Alevis mostly lived, such as Amasya, Çorum, Malatya, Sivas, and Tokat. The main reason for the loss of votes of the party in 1977 can be explained by the left wing–inclined discourses of Bülent Ecevit, leader of CHP in that period, and the fact that it had similar purposes with TBP in terms of social aspects. In fact, TBP was set up in order to prevent the Alevi youngsters from alienating from their traditions, prepossessed by Marxist movements, but it could not achieve this goal. The party was not able to organize Alevis and did not manage to fight against


7/12/11 6:51 AM


81

the dominant left-wing movements of the period; it was eventually closed down with the coup on September 12, 1980, and withdrew from the political arena completely. In the meantime, with the influence of TBP, Alevis became organized long before Sunnis, and perhaps this organization later led to the organization of Sunnis.21 After the defeat of TBP, Alevis mostly turned towards left-wing movements supporting CHP and even got closer to extreme left-wing trends. We can understand the reason why the Alevis easily integrated socialistic and Marxist movements into their constitution when we look at their process of formation and their myths.22 The Turkmen and Kızılbash riots, which took place in the sixteenth century, were considered as protocommunist movements, and even the Marxists who were not Alevis were deeply affected by these. The hero behind these movements, Pir Sultan Abdal, rebelled against the central government and became the leader of the oppressed. Looking at today, the archenemy of the Alevis is Sunni Islam, and the DİB, which supports the Sunnis, has been the major concern for the Alevis. And as long as the government supports Sunni policies, it alienates Alevis, and they have taken a dislike towards the government. And in this very context, the citizenship struggle of the Alevis emerged once more. Alevis, who think they have been repeatedly excluded, have called for solutions in the light of Atatürk’s principles. Alevis, who have been fighting for equality and more freedom, thought that they would find solutions to their problems through left-wing trends. The encounter of Alevis with the populist trend actually dates back to the period of the Republic, and they have been the most welcoming population for Atatürk’s revolutions. Establishment of the modern state and the principle of secularism becoming the foundation of the government were the main reasons Alevis supported the Republic, and these also provided the basis for their connection to the CHP, which was set up under the leadership of Atatürk. As a matter of fact, secularism is where we will find the answer to the source of the expression “Alevis are leftists.” As Murat Belge explains, secularism, as well as being leftist, stands for a broad definition comprising many other conducts such as being “against Islamic revivalist,” “progressivist,” “modern,” “democratic,” “intellectual,” and “revolutionist.”23 The main reason for most Alevis’ supporting the CHP is that the CHP has been associated with secularism. In brief, beyond being leftists, a majority of the Alevis have pursued a rather “statist” conduct. Even though Alevis were estranged from the CHP and voted for the DP in the single-party period, their connection to the CHP has never changed. Especially in the 1960s, the policies in favor of religion influenced them to connect fully to the CHP. Alevi youngsters, influenced by the populist policies of the CHP, implemented


7/12/11 6:51 AM

82

Fazilet Ahu Özmen

their leftist trends within the scope of the CHP and became one of the most active youth movements of the period. During the period between 1960 and 1980 when the left-wing trends were quite extensive in Turkey, the Alevi society began to participate in socialistic movements and voted mostly for left-wing and even extreme leftist parties. For instance, in the elections of 1965, the Turkish Party of Labor (Türkiye İşçi Partisi—TİP) was represented by 15 members of parliament polling about 300,000 votes, and it was stated that they owed this success to the middle class in İstanbul and the Kurdish and Alevi votes in rural areas.24 Reha Çamuroğlu also explains that Alevis have rapidly converged towards the left wing since 1960 and lists the most influential factors for this inclination, such as the success of the TİP in 1965, the proliferation of youth organizations like the FKF (Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu, or Federation of Thought Clubs), Dev-Genç, and Ecevit, rallying with the motto “Ecevit, our hope.”25 As for Rıza Zelyut’s point of view, Alevi youngsters’ affiliation with the left-wing trends is defined as a search of identity.26 Alevis have been excluded for ages by the Sunnis because of their belief and culture and have found an identity among the left-wing trends. So, Alevis have found a place in the society by concealing their religion and integrating the leftwing trends. Leftism has been associated with Alevis’ lifestyle and has become an element of their identity. Consequently, there has been a serious integration between socialism and Alevism. The fact that the essence of the Alevi belief is not “God” but “human” has made the integration easier and has been quite effective in this process. In brief, in the 1960s, Alevis found the humanistic and egalitarian values comprising the basis of their culture and secularism, which is their everlasting protector, inside the left-wing trends along with the establishment of the Republic, and thereby imposed an identity on themselves. On the other hand, the tragic events that occurred between 1970 and 1980 targeted Alevis once more and caused them to retreat from the political platform until the 1990s. In the elections of 1975 and later in 1977, the Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP) entered the parliament and started the “idealist” movement, and this caused foul repercussions for the leftists. The party, supported especially by Sunnis and Nationalists, targeted the Kurds and Alevis and led the attacks carried out against Alevis in 1978 in Malatya, Sivas, Kahramanmaraş, and Çorum, where Alevis mostly lived, and in other cities in 1980. These years, named “the years of violence” in the political history of Turkey, ended with the death of thousands of Alevi and Kurdish youngsters and, along with the coup on September 12, 1980, following these, all the leftists were found guilty of all these events; starting with the CHP, all the political parties of the period were closed down.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


83

Along with the coup in 1980, the political atmosphere in Turkey completely changed and a Turkish–Islamic synthesis–oriented system of governance was implemented. As we have already mentioned, leftists were held responsible for the “years of violence” and were subjected to severe conducts. According to statistics, 400,000 left-wing militants were dispelled, over 600,000 people were in custody, and 85,000 people were imprisoned for several years.27 At the same time universities were evacuated and thousands of university students had to prorogue or give up education. The military regime prohibited any kind of ideology except for Kemalism and began to apply a Turkish–Islamic system of governance. At the same time, the military coup accused any Alevi organization established after 1961 of discrimination and blamed Alevis for the tragic events. Consequently, Alevi culture and customs were targeted, and any kind of organizations were put to an end. Underneath the Alevi mobilization that started in the 1990s lies this chain of exclusion and prohibitions. According to Hobsbawm’s explanation, movements of identity intervene when customs are endangered or stopped.28 As a consequence, the Alevi mobilization emerged in such an atmosphere. The reasons for Alevis to form into organizational groups can be explained by several factors and events. As we have formerly mentioned, Alevis were deeply affected by the negative political and economic context after 1980. Communism was banned, and the state doctrine was based on Sunnism and Turkishness. The synthesis in question shows that national culture was built on Islam and Turkishness, and the aim was to gather the Turkish society around this ideology and to prevent any kind of ideological cleavage. This new doctrine also changed the system of education in Turkey dramatically; with the constitution of 1982, religion classes were made compulsory in primary education, and once more Alevis were seriously agitated by this instance. The religion classes mentioned are entirely focused on Sunnism and do not allow for Alevism in any way. This way the DİB grew stronger, and in a short period of time the number of mosques, especially in Alevi villages, increased, and imams were sent to Alevi villages. Even though Turkey opened out globally and applied neoliberal policies in the 1980s, this economic progress in 1980 did not affect every segment of the society in the same way. Alevis, who had started to live in cities then, got their share of the situation. In the years 1980 and 1990, they experienced a recession in the economic field as well as the political and social fields. Probably, this marginalization led to the mobilization of Alevis.29 According to Anthony Obershall, the most important factor that caused the mobilization was the degree of vertical integration of the social group in question. The further a group and its elites are from the center of authority, the more excluded


7/12/11 6:51 AM

84

Fazilet Ahu Özmen

they feel, and therefore they become mobilized.30 It is true that other social and cultural groups beside the Alevis also felt exposed to discrimination in the 1980s. The poor population in the cities who were involved in right-wing and left-wing movements in the 1970s also went into a search of identity in the years 1980 and 1990. These pursuits of identity were the manifestations of the dissatisfaction felt due to the inequalities and the homogenized cultural and religious structure. Thus, a communitarian, identity-based revindication and mobilization commenced. As the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) came into power under the leadership of Turgut Özal in 1983, associations were allowed to be established once more and religious and ethnic groups started to express themselves more comfortably. Moreover, in 1991, Turgut Özal abolished the law comprising the prohibition of languages except Turkish and announced that the Kurds were an ethnic group and could express their cultural rights. The aforementioned mobilization and search for identity was even supported by a political party established with the support of Alevi elites in 1995. On September 1, 1995, the Democratic Peace Movement (Demokratik Bariş Hareketi (DBH), which was an Alevi political party, was established under the leadership of Ali Haydar Veziroglu. This party, which was set in about 40 provinces and 200 towns and announced its objectives clearly through newspapers to the public, could not get the support of the Alevis. Alevis, who thought that the establishment of a political party based on sect or cult would be prejudicial in terms of politics, did not support the DBH and preferred to vote for mass political parties. However, the establishment of an Alevi political party was, without any doubt, an indication of how important and intense Alevi mobilization was. Another factor influencing the Alevi mobilization was the rise of Islamic activities in the 1980s. Alevis, who considered this activism as a threat, began to organize. Again in the 1980s, the rise of the Kurdish mobilization along with the PKK and the Kurdish fight for the independence of land posed a threat especially for the Kurdish-origin Alevis and accelerated the process of mobilization. The process of organization which started in Turkey correspondingly began to take place in Europe as well. This process of organization, beginning particularly in Germany, may well be the reason for the Alevis to make up with their own culture after all the suppressions and exclusions for several decades. Concurrently with this process of organization, Alevis published the Alevi Declaration (Alevi Bildirgesi) in Cumhuriyet Gazetesi on May 15, 1990, and by means of this declaration, the whole public was confronted with the reality of Alevism and became aware of the Alevis’ expectations from the government and society. In this declaration, the Alevis’ main request was


7/12/11 6:51 AM


85

the recognition of their religious freedom (the fact that Alevism is a sect of Islam) and the acceptance of the Alevi reality by the government agencies. As the declaration—which was signed by intellectuals such as Muharrem Naci Orhan (Alevi senior dervish), Nejat Birdogan (Alevi author), Cemal Özbey (one of the founders of the BP, or Birlik Partisi), and leftist Alevi author Rıza Zelyut—was published, Alevism came into prominence and began to be discussed, and several books and articles on Alevism were written. Thereby, in the beginning of 1990s, several Alevi associations were established and Cem rituals began to be carried out. As a result, Alevis began to organize against the danger of assimilation and the rising Islamic mobilization and returned to their beliefs, traditions, and rituals by means of these associations. This period, which is defined as the return to identity and culture, is called the “Alevi Renaissance,” and this renaissance once more highlighted the Alevi reality. In fact, the only wish of the Alevis is to practice their beliefs freely and to lead their lives without being excluded and discriminated by the Sunnis and the government. Nevertheless, this burst of identity was harmed by the Sivas events in 1993 and the Gazi Mahallesi events following them in 1995,31 and Alevis once more suffered from discriminations and attacks because of their beliefs. Although Alevis had established their presence and had been purified with their culture as the number of associations and foundations increased, they still had to lead a communitarian lifestyle, and their expectations from the government diminished until the beginning of the 2000s. Yet they became hopeful again with the Alevi Expansion Project of the AKP, and from then on they began to expect to attain equal civil rights.

Alevism and “Multicultural Citizenship” Since 1990, Alevis have been in search of a new identity. Alevis, affected by the political and social changes, have executed social and political maneuvers and have required identity- and culture-oriented rights. We have to highlight the fact that the Alevi Declaration published in Cumhuriyet has, without a shadow of a doubt, had a great significance for this formation of identity. From that day forward, Alevi foundations and associations whose names we hear rather frequently today have been established. The Alevis and intellectuals have named the beginning of this period the “Alevi Renaissance.” Together with this renaissance, Alevis have started to state their identities comfortably. However, their main purpose and desire is to improve their superstructure with the state and to have equal rights with the Sunni Muslims who make up the majority of the society.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

86

Fazilet Ahu Özmen

The AKP, ruling the government since 2003, has launched two projects under the name of “expansion” with the aim of finding solutions to the cultural and political problems of the Alevis and the Kurds. These are the Kurdish expansion and the Alevi expansion, which were later given the name “democratic expansion.” Expansions have stepped in with the aim of helping to find solutions to the demands of the Kurds and the Alevis and to form a platform where political, social, and cultural rights of these two groups—who on all occasions state that although they are not minority groups, they are treated like minority groups—can be discussed. The demands of Alevis from the state and the government that started the expansion are as follows: • Alevism must be accepted as an association of belief and must be secured against discrimination in all areas by the laws. • Compulsory religion classes must be abolished (the fact that the lessons are only Sunni Islam–oriented in this country poses a problem for the Alevis). • Cem houses must be recognized as official places of worship. • The religion section of the identification cards must be removed. • Actual equality must be obtained by the laws and law enforcement. • “Religion and ethics” classes must be excluded from compulsory classes and must be established as elective courses. • Building of mosques in Alevi settlements must be put to an end. • Tekkes must be taken from the Ministry of Tourism and must be assigned to the management of Alevi foundations. • The Presidency of Religious Affairs must be closed down or must integrated the Division of Religious Affairs of Alevism. • The Sivas Madımak Hotel must be made into a museum. These demands are the demands that the Alevis have expressed for years. The “expansion” has given hope to the Alevis and has inspired them with expectation for the fulfillment of these requests. Since 2009, 16 workshops consisting of various foundations and institutions have been congregated up till now. These workshops have been constituted with the aim of discussing the demands of the Alevis in detail and conveying precise and objective information to the government, within the framework of the government’s Democratic Expansion process. However, the Alevis have not been satisfied with the results, and most of the Alevi population has found the efforts of the government insincere. The only reconciliation which seems to be achieved is the religious affairs issue. There has been consensus on the issues of the DİB maintaining its existence, constituting independent foundations that will also represent the Alevis within, and giving a share to the Alevis from the budget.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


87

Above all, achieving and maintaining the principle of civil equality were the most important subjects discussed. Traditionally, it is a well-known fact that the Alevis and the Bektashis have always been deeply loyal to the principle of civil equality. Equality, fraternity, and fellowship are the most important fundamentals of the Alevis. The Alevis, who were involved in the left-wing movement in the 1960s and 1970s, have actually been defenders of these principles through their political views. As Fuat Keyman states, if equality is defined as treating every individual equally in every kind of practice viable for all the foundations that make up the whole society, as we have formerly highlighted, the Alevis have demanded to receive the same treatment as the Sunnis in all foundations of the government.32 Since the Ottoman period, it has been emphasized several times that the Alevis have often been excluded from the society and from some specific foundations of the government up to now due to their belief. As a result of being excluded and not being represented properly, Alevis have taken an opposing attitude and have been against some of the foundations of the government and some specific Sunni sections. Expressions and actions such as regarding of the Cem houses as “entertainment houses” or even disregarding them, teaching Sunnism to Alevi students and imposing the idea that real Islam is Sunni Islam, forcing people who do not fast to fast, and verbalizing inappropriate expressions for the Alevis are all attitudes and conducts against the principle of “civil equality.” These expressions are even used as a policy for some authorities. The subject of the Alevis’ benefiting from the civil rights connected to social, judicial, democratic, and human rights that are stated in the constitution forms a significant issue. In the 1990s, a main purpose of the Alevi associations and foundations that had an influence on the formation of the Alevi Renaissance was for the Alevis to have freedom of religion and conscience and to have equal rights with the Sunni Muslims who comprise the majority of the society. The 10th provision of the Turkish constitution emphasizes that no individual can be granted a privilege for his or her belief, race, sect, or religion.33 However, Alevis have been excluded from the society due to their belief structure and therefore have experienced discrimination among people.

What Should Be Done for the Alevis in Terms of Citizenship? The principle of “constitutional citizenship,” which stresses on the recognition of differences, was first touched upon by Süleyman Demirel in the General Assembly of the International Press Institute in Budapest in 1992. In


7/12/11 6:51 AM

88

Fazilet Ahu Özmen

fact, it is the process of globalization that has conveyed a new meaning for the principle of citizenship and has influenced the whole world. This concept, which is expressed as the notion of “constitutional citizenship, has provided the reestablishment of social stratification, the reinforcement of social mobility, and the increase in the political and social demands of ethnic, religious, and gender-related identities.34 Hereby, the definition of “multicultural constitutional citizenship” by Fuat Keyman emerges.35 If the civil platform in Turkey can turn into a democratic and multicultural platform, and the existing civil regime is reestablished in an exclusive, equal, and universal manner, expanding the cultural identity and political participation rights, and on the basis of a multicultural identity providing a constitutional guarantee, an effective solution can be found to the demand for identification. What is emphasized here is to find democracy-based, but not identity-based, solutions to the problem of identity. In this context, the concept of “multicultural constitutional citizenship” can be an important model and even be the best solution in terms of implementing rights and freedom for all segments of the society equally and the globalization of the values. Here, the main idea is that solutions should not be sought in the concept of “Turkish citizenship” as Baskın Oran expresses but in the democratization of the notion of citizenship. It is strongly emphasized that only a new citizenship regulation can solve the problem of identity and assure equality. In this context, changing the conception of citizenship can be seen as a solution for the identity problem of the Alevis.

Conclusion Alevis, who form a significant social and cultural identity for the Republic of Turkey, have been in an ongoing search for identity and a struggle for survival for several years, as we have mentioned above. Alevis, who have been alienated as the “other,” especially by the Sunnis who make up the majority of the Turkish society, have been excluded from the society because of their distinct religious and cultural structure, and as a result of this exclusion, they have taken an opposing stand. Alevis, who have supported the political parties which they hoped would cater their demands, have established their own political parties at certain periods, and who claim to be the guardians of secularism, still have not been able to resume their cultural autonomy completely today. Alevis have stated that they do not have equal citizenship rights with the Sunnis, have firstly established associations and then have intensely appeared in politics in the society since 1990s; yet they have not been able to get the rewards of their efforts. The fact that some Alevi elites have integrated


7/12/11 6:51 AM


89

into the AKP and have been elected as members of parliament has been a vital factor and has activated the government. Alevis, who have demanded that Alevism be recognized as a separate sect especially by the DİB, and that Alevism also be taught in religion classes at schools, have regarded the “Alevi expansion” project as a sign of hope and have supported it. However, during the period when Alevis started to organize, it appeared that the Alevi society actually has a heterogeneous structure, and there are distinct ideas and organizations in the society. These distinctions have been a significant element in Alevis’ defining Alevism. For instance, while the Pir Sultan Abdal Association (Pir Sultan Abdal Dernegi) defines Alevism as a lifestyle and culture, the Cem Foundation (Cem Vakfı) argues that Alevism is a religion or sect. This manner pulls the Cem Foundation towards the right-wing tendencies while bringing the Pir Sultan Abdal Association closer to the fractions of the left wing. This heterogeneity, without any doubt, makes it harder for the Alevis to gather under one roof and breaks down their demands. In field research we have done to study the political and cultural identity of the Alevis, we have discovered these distinctions at a close range and have personally witnessed how disunited the Alevis are. Alevis define Alevism through the incidents they have experienced, their history, and the places they have immigrated to, and get organized according to these definitions. For example, for a Kurdish Alevi, Alevism is a culture or a lifestyle, whereas for an Anatolian Alevi Alevism might express a sect or a cult. Ethnic roots or regional settlements are important agents when defining Alevism However, Alevis have compromised on one point no matter what ethnic root or definition of Alevism they have, and no matter what age or gender they are, and that point is their loyalty to the principle of secularism and Kemalism; in spite of the fact that they seemed to have adopted a supportive manner towards the AKP, Alevis think that the AKP executes a policy based on religion, and they do not find their discourses sincere. Another point which should be highlighted is that the demands of the Alevis are in fact parallel with the search of “equal citizenship.” As we have formerly mentioned, the concept of citizenship has changed along with the establishment of the republic. The new concept of citizenship led to a new citizenship concept which is “modern, secular, patriotic and nationalistic.” Through this engineering of nation and citizenship, Islam was carefully avoided, and the creation of a nation and citizenship culture composed of a single identity, not multiple identities, was aimed for. As a result of the changes that took place in the years between 1950 and 1980, the identity of citizenship also changed. The primary change was that Islam started to become a part of this identity, and the second of these changes is that a more liberal definition of citizenship emerged along


7/12/11 6:51 AM

90

Fazilet Ahu Özmen

with the constitution of 1961. The concept of citizenship, which is shaped according to the political and social changes in Turkey, has evolved especially after the 1980s along with the globalization and various pursuits of ethnic and religious identity created by globalization. The concept of citizenship which began to develop after the 1980s was based on distinctions and later formed the concept of constitutional citizenship. What is this constitutional citizenship? Vahap Coşkun referred to this issue in detail in his article published in a newspaper on September 2, 2007.36 Coşkun stated that the only way to accept distinctions and give them equal rights is through the concept of citizenship, that it should be understood that it is impossible to go any further with the citizenship regulations of today, and that it is an inevitable and an urgent need for Turkey to form a new citizenship regulation that does not suppress existences, lets them exist as themselves, and entitles them the right to maintain their presence. Sociologist Emre Kongar claims the concept of constitutional citizenship is an understanding that combines the political identity of the country and citizenship based on equal rights, rather than combining the national state with cultural identities such as religion, language, or race coming from history or geography.37 Kongar, who suggests that the concept of constitutional citizenship has emerged as a “soft,” “unifying,” “cultural identity,” underlines constitutional citizenship as a principle in which all individuals and different groups that constitute the society are treated equally by the state regardless of their religion, tongue, ethnicity, or origin; equally benefit from the public rights and resources of the state; and, as a result, identify with the state of which he or she is a member. In this respect, this conception of citizenship can be seen as a solution to the recognition of differences and problems of cultural identities. Change in the actual principle of citizenship and its reconstruction under the notion of constitutional citizenship can be a solution for Alevis, Kurds, and all other religious and ethnic groups to benefit from equal rights. On the other hand, besides acting as a factor unifying Alevis, who are divided due to the differences in their views and beliefs, a new conception of citizenship can also be seen as the most suitable solution to the recognition and formation of all cultural rights. Notes 1. Dominique Schnapper, “Le sens de l’ethnico-religieux,” Revue des Archives des Sciences Sociales,(January–March 1993): 149–163. 2. Ilyas Üzüm, Günümüz Aleviliği (Istanbul: Isam Yayınları, 2000), 1. 3. Safevis, besides being the first dynasty that formed a unique political structure in the sixteenth century after the state of Sasani was demolished by the Arab–Muslim


7/12/11 6:51 AM


91

attacks in the Iranian lands ruled by Arabic, Turkish, and Mongolian dynasties in the seventh century, have also exhibited Iranian identity along with the union they established in the Alevi and geographical centerline. 4. Irène Mélikoff, Uyur Idik Uyardılar (Istanbul: Cem Yayınları, 1994), 33. 5. Mélikoff, Uyur Idik Uyardılar, 53. 6. Mehmet Eröz, Türkiye’de Alevilik ve Bektaşilik (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1990), 89–90. 7. Rıza Zelyut, Aleviler Ne Yapmalı: Şehirlerdeki Alevilerin Sorunları ve Çözümleri (Istanbul: Yön Yayınları, 1993), 121–124. 8. Cemal Şener, Alevilik Olayı (Istanbul: Etik, 2002). 9. Şener, Alevilik Olayı, 105. 10. Cemal Şener, Aleviler Ne Yapmalı (Istanbul: Ant, 1998), 127–129. 11. Nail Yılmaz, Kentin Alevileri (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2005), 36. 12. Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, “Aleviliği Nasıl Anlamalı,” Köprü (Spring 1998): 62. 13. Ahmet İçduygu and Fuat Keyman, “Globalleşme, Anayasallık ve Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık Tartışması,” Doğu-Batı no. 5, (1998–1999): 143–155. 14. Murat Okan, Türkiye’de Alevilik (Istanbul: Imge, 2005), 89. 15. Şaban Sitembölükbaşı, Türkiye’de İslamın Yeniden İnkişafı (1950–1960) (Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1995). 16. Murat Okan, Türkiye’de Alevilik, 95. 17. CEM Dergisi no. 1 (July 1966), 23–24. 18. Şükrü Aslan, 1 Mayıs, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005). 19. Paul Dumont, “Le poids de l’Alévisme dans la Turquie d’aujourd’hui,” Turcica 21–23 (1991), 165–167. 20. Elise Massicard, L’Autre Turquie, Le mouvement aléviste et ses territoires (Paris: PUF, 2005), 43–44. 21. Massicard, L’Autre Turquie, 43. 22. Thierry Zarcone, La Turquie Moderne et l’Islam (Paris: Flammarion, 2004), 187. 23. Murat Belge, “Sol,” in Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye, edited by İrvin Cemil Schick and Ahmet Tonak, translated by Nail Satlıgan (Istanbul: Belge, 1992), 159–189. 24. Belge, “Sol,” 159–189. 25. Reha Çamuroglu, Günümüz Aleviliğinin Sorunları (Istanbul: Ant, 1994), 78. 26. Rıza Zelyut, Aleviler Ne Yapmalı, 99–103. 27. Hamit Bozarslan, Histoire de la Turquie Contemporaine (Paris: La Découverte, 2004), 66. 28. Hamit Bozarslan, Histoire de la Turquie Contemporaine, 66. 29. Elise Massicard, L’Autre Turquie, 59. 30. Anthony Obershall, Social Conflicts and Social Movements (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973). 31. The Sivas and Istanbul Gazi Mahallesi (District) incidents are the most severe and painful of the attacks that were carried out against the Alevis. The Sivas Genocide, or Madimak Incidents in other words, were incidents which took place during the Pir Sultan Abdal Festivities organized by the Pir Sultan Abdal Association on July 2, 1993, when 33 authors, poets, and philosophers and two hotel employees were


7/12/11 6:51 AM

92

Fazilet Ahu Özmen

killed by the fire or choked by the smoke. Thirty-five people lost their lives by getting burnt and choked in this incident, which is considered a genocide. The Istanbul Gazi incidents took place on March 12, 1995, during the night hours, when three coffee houses and one shop in Istanbul’s Gazi District, where Alevis mostly live, were simultaneously subjected to gunfire by unknown persons firing from a taxi. As a result of the attacks, a citizen was dead and 25 people were injured, five of whom were severely injured. It was understood that the attackers killed the taxi driver and set the taxi on fire after leaving the venue. After the event, many Alevi citizens gathered in the Gazi District and marched to the police station, asserting that the security forces intervened in the incident. The policie opened fire, and as a result a citizen named Mehmet Gündüz lost his life and many others were injured. 32. Fuat Keyman, “Çokkültürlü Anayasal Vatandaşlık,” Radikal (November 21, 2004). 33. Item 10 of the Constitution: “Every individual is equal before the law regardless of language, race, color, gender, political view, belief, religion, sect and other reasons.” 34. Nail Yılmaz, Kentin Alevileri. 35. Fuat Keyman, “Çokkültürlü Anayasal Vatandaşlık.” 36. Vahap Coşkun, “Anayasal Vatandaşlık,” Radikal (September 2, 2007). 37. Emre Kongar, “Küreselleşme, Mikro Milliyetçilik, Çok Kültürlülük, Anayasal Vatandaşlık,” www.emrekongar.org.

Bibliography Aslan, Şükrü. 1 Mayıs. Istanbul: Iletişim, 2005. Belge, Murat. “Sol.” In Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye, edited by İrvin Cemil Schick and Ahmet Tonak, translated by Nail Satlıgan, 159–89. Istanbul: Belge, 1992. Bozarslan, Hamit. Histoire de la Turquie Contemporaine. Paris: La Découverte, 2004. Cem Review, no. 1 (July 1966) : 23–24. Coşkun, Vahap. “Anayasal Vatandaşlık.” Radikal (September2, 2007). Çamuroglu, Reha. Günümüz Aleviliğinin Sorunları. Istanbul: Ant, 1994. Dumont, Paul. “Le poids de l’Alévisme dans la Turquie d’aujourd’hui.” Turcica 21–23, (1991), 165–167. Eröz, Mehmet. Türkiye’de Alevilik ve Bektaşilik. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1990. İçduygu, Ahmet and Keyman Fuat. “Globalleşme, Anayasallık ve Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık Tartışması.” Doğu-Batı no. 5 (1998–1999): 143–155. Keyman, Fuat. “Çokkültürlü Anayasal Vatandaşlık.” Radikal (November 21, 2004). Kongar, Emre. “Küreselleşme, Mikro Milliyetçilik, Çok Kültürlülük, Anayasal Vatandaşlık.” www.emrekongar.org. Massicard, Elise. L’Autre Turquie, Le mouvement aléviste et ses territoires, Paris: PUF, 2005. Mélikoff, Irène. Uyur Idik Uyardılar. Istanbul: Cem, 1994.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


93

Obershall, Anthony. Social Conflicts and Social Movements. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1973. Ocak, Ahmet Yaşar. “Aleviliği Nasıl Anlamalı.” Köprü (Spring 1998). Okan, Murat. Türkiye’de Alevilik. Istanbul: Imge, 2005. Schnapper, Dominique. “Le sens de l’ethnico-religieux.” Revue des Archives des Sciences Sociales (January–March 1993): 149–163. Sitembölükbaşı, Şaban. Türkiye’de İslamın Yeniden İnkişafı (1950–1960). Ankara: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1995. Şener, Cemal. Aleviler Ne Yapmalı. Istanbul: Ant, 1998. ———. Alevilik Olayı. Istanbul: Etik, 2002. Üzüm Ilyas. Günümüz Aleviliği. Istanbul: Isam, 2000. Zarcone, Thierry. La Turquie moderne et l’Islam. Paris: Flammarion, 2004. Zelyut, Rıza. Aleviler Ne Yapmalı: Şehirlerdeki Alevilerin Sorunları ve Çözümleri. Istanbul: Yön, 1993.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


7/12/11 6:51 AM

5 Gypsies and Citizenship in Turkey Senem Kurt Topuz

C

a legal status that establishes a bond between the state and individual and is defined on a basis of rights or freedoms and duties. Despite its legal status, it also stands as an independent identity and expresses the individual’s belonging to a political community. In other words, citizenship is a form of “sociopolitical identity” and points out the legal bond between the state and the individual.1 The nation state was mostly regarded as the universal form of political community during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. However, modern politics is shaped by the idea that people can only exist as a citizen of a nation state. Individuals are then able to benefit from the rights of citizenship as long as they are bound with a citizenship bond to a nation state.2 In the nation state, the citizen is defined above his or her whole tangible and distinctive features as an insulated individual.3 These tangible features may be economic, ethnic, religious, and cultural as well as biological. Thus, in the context of belonging to the state, the definition of citizenship is that citizens are people who have different ethnic or cultural and religious bonds but share common rights and duties within the same nation state.4 The essential argument at the center of this definition is that citizens are regarded as equal since they have the same rights and duties before all else.5 Thus, all the citizens are regarded as equal members of the state in terms of the rights they have and the duties they are obliged to fulfill. Then, the question of de jure and de facto equality of citizenship comes to the fore.6 The question of whether the citizens’ de jure equality is based on de facto equality or whether it triggers the cause for it is in the center of these discussions. In fact, it ITIZENSHIP IS FUNDAMENTALLY

— 95 —


7/12/11 6:51 AM

96

Senem Kurt Topuz

does not mean that the citizens are equal in practice as they hold the same rights and duties because the society which is the source of the legitimate political decisions of the state varies based on the preferences determined by economic, cultural, ideological, or simply different lifestyles, and what is important in practice is whether the citizens of such a society that shows great variation have sufficient material and cultural resources in order to make a choice between “different activity styles.”7 In other words, it should be identified, for example, “whether citizenship is allowed to be turned into a reality between genders, employers and employees, social classes or between the black, the white, or among other ethnic groups”8 in citizen communities that show variation based on preferences determined by economic, cultural, ideological, or different lifestyles, and necessary regulations should be made accordingly. There is no doubt that the state not only affects and shapes these relationships but also has a crucial role in maintaining equality in practice among its citizens—especially as a part of utilizing citizenship rights—and thus in turning the concept of citizenship into reality. Therefore, mere declaration of citizens’ equality with regard to rights and freedoms in the texts of law is not sufficient. These abstract legal articles should be supported with tangible precautions and contributions.9 What really matters in this respect is whether the citizens benefit from the citizenship rights equally and thus whether all of them have the same opportunity to access citizenship rights, as the obstacles or constraints and breaches in accessing these rights may lead to marginalization and isolation of individuals from the social life.10 Gypsies, who are the focus of this study, are regarded as a marginal group and live as such both in Turkey and in many countries worldwide where they have citizenship.11 It is claimed in many studies conducted on Gypsies that Gypsies encounter a number of difficulties in accessing and benefiting from equal citizenship rights even though their rights are ensured in the constitution in Turkey.12 However, the case is not unique to Turkey. Gypsies usually have low education levels and maintain their life under unhealthy housing conditions and below decent living standards. Many scholars studying Gypsies13 state that Gypsies were exposed to segregationist policies and exclusion for many reasons for centuries and are one of the most oppressed communities in Europe and that gypsies demonstrate the characteristics of a marginal ethnic group in many respects. According to the third report of the Council of Europe–European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) on Turkey issued in 2005, Gypsies in Turkey, defined as a group in a vulnerable position, encounter difficulties arising from their complete exclusion from social life and are subject to discrimination in terms of benefiting from the rights of employment, accommodation, and the public sphere. According to ECRI (2005), Gypsies


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Gypsies and Citizenship in Turkey

97

in Turkey maintain their lives under harsh conditions in temporarily allocated units on being expelled from their residences by force without being presented any alternative residential options most of the time. There is inequality of opportunity in terms of benefiting from health and employment services; however, there is also inequality in benefiting from education services as the parents are too poor to send their children to school. Therefore, like the report issued in 2001, ECRI suggested in its third report that the Turkish authorities evaluate the condition of Gypsies, accepted as one of the vulnerable groups, in Turkey and carry out research to determine the problems the Gypsies might encounter especially about intolerance and discrimination in various spheres of social life. Moreover, when we look at the social dimension of the issue it is seen that Gypsies are exposed to discriminatory treatments unlike the rest of the society by those who are prejudiced against them. As a matter of fact, the meanings such as humiliation, insult, and accusation the word “Gypsy” conveys in Turkish results in avoidance of the use of the word. Another issue that must be discussed specifically in the context of Turkey is the debates on citizenship. The ethnic content of citizenship lies at the heart of these debates. There are two different commentaries with reference to the issue. The first one argues that the concept of “being a Turk” which marks the citizenship is an umbrella concept that includes all the people, independent of ethnic origin and race, “bounded with citizenship” to the state of the Republic of Turkey.14 The second perspective claims that the concept of “being a Turk” may have functioned as an umbrella term or have been used for that purpose during the establishment period of the Republic; however, its comprehensive feature is lost due to several regulations directly connected to the idea of “from the Turkish race.” This perspective argues that definition of being a Turkish citizen does not carry a neutral meaning.15 When we look at the issue from this perspective, it can be said that it affects the way the state treats its citizens.16 Therefore, when we look at the status of Gypsy citizens it is seen that they are subject to some discrimination in the regulations made by the state. The regulations discussed in detail under this chapter’s section titled “Citizenship Status of Gypsies in Turkey” and the discriminatory expressions that existed for many years or still exist in those regulations certainly disturb Gypsy citizens and cause them to lose their faith in equal citizenship. In addition, low status and limited opportunities and resources of Gypsy citizens as compared to the rest of the society deepen such a feeling. The general purpose of this study is to analyze the relationship between the state and Gypsy citizens within the framework of the Gypsies’ rights arising from being citizens of the Republic of Turkey. Thus, through firsthand data collection, the study aimed at finding out the views, in other words the perceptions, of Gypsy citizens on to what extent the rights declared in the


7/12/11 6:51 AM

98

Senem Kurt Topuz

constitution are actually realized17 and whether Gypsy citizens encounter any discriminatory attitudes while benefiting from these rights. In addition, the survey tried to reveal whether the present citizenship regime in Turkey cause discrimination against Gypsy citizens, if they are subject to any. Gypsy citizens living in Edirne were the focus of this study. Edirne is a city in the northwest of Turkey with a population of approximately 400,000. There are a number of reasons for carrying out the study in Edirne. First of all, Edirne is one of the most important cities of Turkey historically and is its gate to Europe. Hosting various cultures within its borders, the city was the capital of the Ottoman Empire for a long time. It let in Gypsy immigrants during that period of time and allowed a substantial number of them from Balkan countries again after World War I according to the Treaty of Lausanne.18 Some of the Gypsy population that immigrated from the Balkans moved to different cities of Anatolia in the following years. Gypsies in Turkey are most densely populated in Edirne when compared to the other cities. Edirne is also considerably preferred by Gypsies/Romanies settled in the city because they are able to keep their culture alive and preserve their identities. The Kakava Festival, which is held annually in Edirne, is a significant indicator of the case. Moreover, the Accessible Life Association and Edirne Research and Development of Gypsy Culture and Solidarity and Assistance Association organized the International Romani Symposium in 2005 during the festival. Another example is the “Gypsy Chief Elections” that took place in May 2008. Gypsy citizens living in Edirne elected a new Gypsy chief as the successor of the one who had served for 18 years.19 Another significant factor why Edirne was chosen as the site of the study is the fact that Gypsies are more organized in the city as one of the few associations of preserving and developing Gypsy/Romani culture active in Turkey is in Edirne. The process of founding associations which started with the Edirne Romani Association (EDROM) led the way for Gypsies living in other cities, and thus Gypsy/Romani associations were founded in many other cities. In February 2006, a few Gypsy/Romani associations were united and established the Federation of Romani Associations (ROMDEF) in Edirne, which was chosen as the center, and started carrying out its activities in the city. Therefore, the high level of organization and organized activities of Gypsies in Edirne is another important factor which contributed to the success of the study. In this study, a face-to-face, in-depth interview technique was used for collecting primary data. Interviews were held in the districts called Menzilahır (Kemikçiler-Çadırcılar), Umurbey (Küçükpazar-Çalgıcılar), Çavuşbey (Gazimihal-Süpürgeciler-Papazoğlu), and Yıldırım (Kum District-Yıldırım Beyazıd) from May to June in 2009. The relationship between Gypsy citizens and the state was analyzed using the data in the form of in-depth interviews


7/12/11 6:51 AM


99

with 26 individuals. As is generally accepted, there is no standard research method to determine the number of interviewees for an in-depth interview technique as the technique is qualitative in nature. When the amount of data collected is satisfactory and/or the number of interviews sufficient to represent the target universe is reached, the interviews can be discontinued in this method. Thus, it is believed that the 26 interviews conducted were satisfactory for achieving the general purpose of the study. A purposeful sampling method was used to the select the interviewees. According to this method, participants are comprised of individuals who the researcher thinks would provide answers to the research questions. In other words, the interviewees are not selected randomly, but the criterion for the selection is the researcher’s judgment. Still, the age, gender, occupation, education, and neighborhood differences among the 26 interviewees were taken into consideration as much as possible. Interviews were recorded after consent was given by the participants. In cases where the participant did not consent for recording, the researcher took detailed notes. The duration of the interviews ranged from 30 to 120 minutes. In the following section, the history of gypsies living in Turkey is briefly presented and then the citizenship status of Gypsies living in Turkey is discussed. Next, the findings of the study conducted in Edirne are presented, and whether the present citizenship regime in Turkey is the reason behind the Gypsies’ exposure to discrimination is discussed. In the final section, a general evaluation of the findings of the study is evaluated.

Gypsies in Turkey Gypsies, whose existence in Anatolia goes far back, are known to have passed through Anatolia after they had left India and chose Anatolia as a site to settle down.20 However, there is no clear evidence of when Gypsies first settled in Anatolia. A significant number of Gypsies who immigrated stayed and then settled down in Anatolia while some others migrated to the Balkan states through Istanbul in the following centuries. Some of these Gypsies immigrating to Balkan states settled there while others scattered around European countries at the end of the fourteenth century and the beginning of the fifteenth century.21 The number of Gypsies living almost in every region of Turkey is still a matter of debate today since official data of the number of ethnic groups are not recorded. Since 1960s, there have not been any questions related to ethnic origin in the population census. Yet, commonly used numbers regarding the Gypsy population living in Turkey range from nearly 500,000 to 600,000.22


7/12/11 6:51 AM

100

Senem Kurt Topuz

The concepts to define Gypsies living in Turkey differ from one region to the other: Gypsies in Turkey are called Poşa (in Erzurum, Artvin, Erzincan, Bayburt, and Sivas), Mutrib (in Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, and the south part of Van), Arabacı (in the Mediterranean region and most parts of Anatolia), Elekçi (in Central Anatolia), Sepetçi (in Mediterranean and Aegean regions), and Cono (in Adana and nearby districts). The idiom Brunette citizen is generally used in formal language and is also used by people in different regions as well. The word Kıpti is used commonly in the country too.23 Kıpti means “Egyptian” in Turkish. Gypsies were called çingane in the Ottoman period, but they were also named Kıpti24 since they were thought to have come from Egypt. Consequently, this idiom has lived up to the present.25 The word Haymantos is used for Gypsies who came from Bulgaria and settled in Kayseri, Osmaniye, Adana, Sakarya, and Çorum provinces. While a group living within the borders of Erzurum is called Şıhbızınlı, those who came from the European countries such as Yugoslavia, Greece, and Bulgaria and settled in the Thrace region are called Roman.26 Moreover, there are many subgroups defined based on occupations among Turkish Gypsies who share common cultural, linguistic, and economic characteristics with the European Gypsies.27 Turkey’s Gypsy population, living in different regions of Turkey, is comprised of groups called Rom, Dom, and Lom, which also comprise three main linguistic groups.28 Each of these groups keeps different cultures alive and maintains traditional occupations and handicrafts, some of which are almost extinct now.29 It is essential to point out that the Gypsy population in Turkey comprises three subgroups that include various cultures, occupations, and traditions; however, most Gypsies living in Turkey have had citizenship status since the Ottoman Empire and have developed a relationship with the state in terms of citizenship. Therefore, it is crucial to discuss the citizenship status of Gypsies in Turkey starting from the Ottoman Empire.

The Citizenship Status of Gypsies in Turkey Generally, the clearest answer to the question of what kind of a citizenship status Gypsies had under the rule of the Ottoman Empire is that Gypsies had the same rights and were free like the rest of the citizens of the Empire who were not Turkish. It is believed that Gypsies were free in their actions except for rare attempts to change their nomadic lives.30 In the eighteenth century, unlike those in Christian Europe, the Ottoman Gypsies were not exposed to oppression or persecution persistently either


7/12/11 6:51 AM


101

by the central government or the society surrounding them. The existence of Gypsies was seen as a part of the mosaic of Ottoman society.31 According to Oprişan, “among the Gypsies who lived within the same time period, the status of Gypsies in the Ottoman Empire is certainly superior to those in Europe.”32 However, during the nineteenth century, the general conditions of Gypsies got worse with the spread of Europeans’ negative thoughts about Gypsies and the development of Ottoman orientalism’s own discourse of “the other.”33 In the new era which began with the foundation of the Republic (1923), the modern Turkish citizenship presented a more reliable environment for the Gypsies after the totalitarian regimes of Bulgaria and Romania, and thus mass immigrations to the new nation state increased.34 However, despite the use of radical expressions towards Gypsies from time to time, very sharp othering was not an issue in question for certain social groups in the early ideology of Republic.35 As a matter of fact, the mild approach in the early period of the Republic came to an end with the adoption of Article 4 of the Settlement Law enacted in 1934, which states that people who are not bound to Turkish culture, anarchists, nomadic Gypsies, spies, and deportees cannot be regarded as “emigrants.”36 Another discriminatory law about Gypsies which was enacted in 1950 is the law of Residence and Travel of Foreigners in Turkey. Its Article 21 states that “the Ministry of Interior is authorized for deporting Gypsies who are stateless or citizens of a foreign country and foreign emigrants who are not related to the Turkish culture.” Thus, it was once more shown that the moderate approach of the Republic towards the Gypsy citizens was altered. When the social dimension of the issue is examined together with the regulations made during the first years of the Republic, it is observed that Gypsies in Turkey are subject to discriminatory treatments in a prejudiced manner by the entire society. Arayıcı states that “naming and calling Gypsies as brunette citizens is one of the most clear examples of discriminatory treatments towards gypsies during the Adnan Menderes period in 1950s.”37 Perception of Gypsies in Turkish society places them to the lowest level of the social hierarchy. The society has very little knowledge about Gypsies in Turkey but has prejudiced thoughts.38 Therefore, the meanings such as humiliation, insult, and accusation the word “Gypsy” conveys in Turkish results in avoidance of the use of the word. Based on the findings of his study, Kolukırık expresses that there are many very negative prejudgments against Gypsies in Turkish society. Kolukırık states the fundamental problem:39 The oppression on Gypsy identity and image because of the attributes, yarns, and jokes, which are the results of prejudiced mechanisms, affects the communication


7/12/11 6:51 AM

102

Senem Kurt Topuz

between Gypsy and non-gypsy. From a general perspective, main characteristics of negative images and prejudices against Gypsy mostly point to their differences from the society they live in. In the historical context, common point of these images and prejudices is the introduction of Gypsies as aliens.

According to Strand, the humiliating and mocking words used against Gypsies are stressed extensively through negative descriptions by the media.40 On the other hand, common problems which the Gypsies share with many people who are not Gypsies appear on a socioeconomic basis, such as unemployment and poverty. The situation reflects the fact that Gypsies are almost always among the poorest groups and stand at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Kolukırık and Toktaş also state that “Gypsies in Turkey have low socioeconomic status along with low income and low level of education and stay as the subject of negative attitudes and unequal treatments in all periods of their life.”41 However, Arayıcı asserts that even if they have a low social status and a relatively negative image in Turkey, Gypsies have never been the victim of any (racist) assaults, unlike in the rest of Europe.42 Both discriminatory expressions that have existed for a long time in the legal regulations and the general point of view of the society against Gypsies disturb Gypsy citizens and thus hurt their belief in equal citizenship. Their relative lower status and limited opportunities, as compared to other parts of the society, deepens such feeling. In the introductory section of this study, the reports of the ECRI on the Gypsies living in Turkey have been mentioned. There are other interesting and significant reports published on the conditions of Gypsies living in Turkey like the ECRI reports. Among those, there are two reports published by the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) that need to be stressed. In a report of the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) concerning Gypsy rights in Turkey, it is emphasized that Gypsies in Turkey (like other groups except for religious minorities) are not recognized as a minority group by the Turkish government.43 According to ERRC, Gypsies are exposed to physical violence and ill treatment by the state authorities.44 In another report of ERRC, it is expressed that Gypsies in Turkey face serious challenges stemming from total social exclusion. According to the report, Gypsies are subject to discrimination in terms of benefiting from employment opportunities and public sphere. The Gypsies are not even served at the restaurants in many cities.45 Moreover, it is stated by ERRC that approximately 600 Gypsies living in certain districts of Istanbul do not have identification cards.46


7/12/11 6:51 AM


103

Discussion of Findings The general purpose of this study is to analyze the relationships of Gypsy citizens with the state in terms of citizenship rights. For that, the perceptions of Gypsy citizens on to what extent each right—titled under the headings of civil rights, political rights, and social and economic rights—stated in the constitution of Turkish Republic is actually ensured in practice for them was determined through an in-depth interview technique. The study also tried to reveal whether Gypsy citizens are subject to any discriminatory treatment in utilizing these rights. It was observed in this study that most of the Gypsy citizens living in Edirne have low education levels, and the number of illiterate Gypsy citizens is quite high. Considering the fact that there is a bidirectional relationship between the level of education and amount of income, it can be said that one of the main reasons for the low education level among Gypsy citizens living in Edirne is that they do not have regular income or have low levels of income. It can thus be stated that most of the Gypsies living in Edirne do not have regular income, which can be explained as Gypsy citizens facing an extensive unemployment problem. According to the interviews and observations, it can be easily claimed that most of the Gypsy citizens living in Edirne are unemployed. There are also many Gypsy citizens who work in the informal sector. Another result of the high level of unemployment and low level of income among Gypsy citizens living in Edirne is that the rate of people who have a green card is extremely high. As a result of the field research conducted, another issue that should be stated here is that a few of the Gypsy citizens living in Edirne know at least one of their rights ensured in the constitution, but most of them have no idea of what their rights are. It is crucially important to examine this case. Individuals who do not know their rights will certainly have some trouble using these rights and will act timidly when claiming their rights. According to the interviews and observations, it should be stated that most of the Gypsy citizens living in Edirne actually do not have a clear idea of what citizenship is or who a citizen is. In this sense, the opinions of interviewees named K. K. and R. T. about who a citizen is are affirmative of this finding: Citizen, richness comes to the mind first. Rich people are citizens but poor people are not. Are we citizens? We are the people who belly dance. Citizens get high salary, they can easily provide any food, but the whole burden is on the


7/12/11 6:51 AM

104

Senem Kurt Topuz

shoulders of poor people. If [the state] provided these rights for the poor people as well as citizens, I would be a citizen too. (K. K.) We all are Muslims, citizenship is like a brotherhood, we all live under the single flag. (R. T.)

Therefore, it should be accepted as normal that Gypsy citizens lack knowledge of rights they have as citizens, and it should be admitted that people who do not know their rights cannot use or claim them. Thus, it is essential to raise the awareness of Gypsy citizens about citizenship rights. However, it must be noted that this case is not an issue only for Gypsy citizens but also for all citizens that should be handled and supported with solid suggestions. The fundamental question of this study conducted in Edirne is the perception of Gypsy citizens about whether the state provides them with their rights or not. In this sense, it is found that Gypsy citizens living in Edirne have negative perceptions related to the right of labor (Articles 48 and 49 of the Constitution). 47 The results show that Gypsy citizens encounter a serious unemployment problem. Although an economic crisis and the employment conditions in Edirne are regarded as factors, the decrease in the demand for occupations generally done by Gypsy citizens such as forging, doing scrapiron business, working as street porters, and working on farms seasonally can be regarded as the main factor in this case. For instance, K. E. explains it during the interview as follows: There are four reasons for unemployment in our neighborhood (Gazimihal). One of these is opening of the peripheral highway. All of the domestic and foreign tourists coming from Bulgaria had to pass through Edirne in the past; thus, they would pass through our neighborhood. Our people would sell trinkets, souvenirs, and water for three months and meet their winter needs. Second reason for unemployment is the decrease of the number of or total disappearance of Romani people working on farms due to increased use of machines. Third reason is that Romanis who sell fruits and vegetables on pushcarts and stands have lost their jobs because of the supermarkets and the use of credit cards. Fourth reason is that Romani people who used to work as street porters in the past for loading and dumping tractor trailers and trucks when they are checked for security at the Customs Gate have lost their jobs because of the use of X-Ray devices for controlling today. (K. E.)

It is no doubt that unemployment is a common problem not only for Gypsy citizens but also for all Turkish citizens, and the unemployment rate is higher than many European countries. However, what is noteworthy here is that the challenges faced by Gypsy citizens in finding jobs are caused extensively because of the neighborhood they live in, their low education levels, and social


7/12/11 6:51 AM


105

prejudices. The negative prejudice held by the most society members against the neighborhoods where Gypsy citizens densely reside and that are called “Gypsy districts” by the public matches with some of the preconceived ideas of employers such as “lazy” and “unreliable” about the Gypsy citizens. The statements of C. İ., one of the participants, summarize the situation: Employers consider us as thieves, when we say we are called “Kemikçiler” they behave in a prejudiced way. A few years ago, I found a job in a computer shop where web-designs were done. We agreed on everything. The first day of work, the boss asked for a photocopy of my identification card for official procedures. When he saw that my birthplace is “Menzilahır,” he made up several excuses and told me that he would call me later but he never did. However, when mutual confidence is established, prejudices may disappear. Employers try us out first. After they figure out that we are trustworthy people, they treat us well. A person who is fired is a person who is devastated. (C. İ.)

There is no doubt that the low education level among Gypsy citizens poses a problem in terms of finding a job as well. One of the main problems of Gypsy citizens concerning the issue is that the state does not provide job opportunities suitable for their education levels. Therefore, as also affirmed by Gypsy citizens, they always have to work in unqualified jobs and do certain professions. For instance, the remarks of M. K., one of the interviewees, reflect this problem of Gypsy citizens as follows: When I look for a job I cannot find any. I cannot find a job because I only went to primary school. . . . Being a Romani has never been a problem for me when I look for a job. The state does not create any job opportunities. There are many young people; each person should be able to find a job according to his qualities. What will happen to these people? (M. K.)

Therefore, it is essential to improve the employment skills they have and to create job opportunities suitable for their education levels. Creating job opportunities will not only provide Gypsy citizens with a regular income and proper living standards but also decrease the use of green cards and thus make a significant financial contribution to the state. The right to enter public service, which is another problematic area for Gypsy citizens, can be discussed in the light of Article 70 of the Constitution.48 The perception of Gypsy citizens concerning the issue is that they cannot do so. There is no doubt that the low possibility of entering public service is one of the most common problems for many citizens. Although the appointment procedure practiced in recent years is based on a central test system and thus presents an objective criterion, it is clear that some problems


7/12/11 6:51 AM

106

Senem Kurt Topuz

were experienced regarding the objectivity of the process in the last years. Thus, many of the Gypsy citizens expressed that the reason for not being able to enter public service is that they do not have any contacts. One of the interviewees, K. A., expressed his opinions about this issue as follows: If you do not have any contacts, you do not have any chance in state institutions. I was able to find contacts so that I could get my three children to work at the Municipality. But my elder son was not satisfied with his salary and gave up. He opened a small grocery. Today, you do not need to have a diploma but you have to know someone very influential to get a job. There are lots of bagel sellers on the streets who have diplomas. (K. A.)

Such a perception leads to the deterioration of the concept of equality that the state certainly provides or has to provide among its citizens. Other factors concerning their low rate of entering public service are stated by Gypsy citizens as the lack of education and prejudices that they believe exist against them. Interviewees Ö. E. and E. B. expressed their opinions about the issue as follows: You cannot get a job at a state institution if you do not have any contacts. Lack of having contacts is more of a problem than being a Romani, but the ability to speak well and level of education are also very important. (Ö. E.) There are no legal obstacles but there are still negative opinions present today. Even the district one lives in is important [for entering public service]. (E. B.)

Although the Gypsy citizens interviewed expressed that it is possible to enter public service as long as one has sufficient education and passes the required tests, it might still be impossible because of the criminal records of the family members. It certainly causes young Gypsies to believe that they will not be able to work in qualified jobs even if they have the necessary education because of their ethnic origin, negative preconceptions of the society, and the history of families which fail to meet criteria for security investigations. Therefore, young Gypsies lose their enthusiasm to attend school. Other problematic areas for Gypsy citizens living in Edirne are the right to accommodation (Article 57 of the Constitution)49 and the right to live in a healthy environment (Article 56 of the Constitution).50 Most of the Gypsy citizens in Edirne do not live in proper houses. Almost all the interviewees, like K. Y. and M. O., expressed that the state does not fulfill its duty: We do not have real property deeds; we do not have electricity (we use electricity from our friends who have them). We just have one toilet and single room. It is like we live in a cave. (K. Y.)


7/12/11 6:51 AM


107

I do not have a bathroom for 26 years. I have been bathing in a plastic washtub. I do not have even any roof tiles on my house. Since my dad is sick, I cannot ask him to go out when I want to bath. (M. O.)

Moreover, Gypsies cannot even benefit from the government’s housing opportunities for low-income families. The most significant reason is that they do not have regular income and thus are not able to make monthly payments. On the other hand, most of the Gypsies prefer detached houses to apartments because of the traditional jobs of nomadic life they have been doing such as scrap-iron dealer and horse carriage driver. The remarks of M. C. and D. A. can be given as clear examples of the issue: You have to struggle to live in the government’s public housing residences. First of all, you need to have a job. You have to have regular income so that you can make monthly payments. If you cannot, there will be no chance to sit and live in those houses. Since our people do not have jobs, they could not benefit from this opportunity. (M. C.) I live in a single room. The toilet is outside and we bath in the corner of the room where I closed with a curtain. My son, my husband, and I share the same room to sleep and we eat in the same room. We rented the place. Even if TOKİ [Turkish Housing Development Administration] provides a house for me, I cannot live in an apartment. I must live in a house with a garden. I would sit down with my neighbors, drink tea with them, and chat. I would feel depressed in an apartment. (D. A.)

Therefore, Gypsies’ level of income, their lifestyles, and their preferences should be taken into consideration in housing projects planned for them. The conditions of Gypsies who generally do not live in a healthy environment should be improved properly through discussions and cooperation. Houses that are built outside the city center will not only add extra transportation costs for Gypsies who already have low income but also make them feel isolated from the rest of the society and cause them to become more marginalized. Moreover, it should be pointed out that Gypsies living in Edirne do not live in a healthy environment generally, and such a right is not provided for them as stated by themselves. Ç. F., who is one of the interviewees, points to the matter as follows: I do not think that we live in a healthy environment. The garbage of the whole city is recently started to be dumped in an area close to our neighborhood. It smells terrible in the evenings. Municipality workers sometimes incinerate dumps. We are people who like to spend our time at the streets. Thus, the smell bothers us a lot. It is very hazardous for our future. (Ç. F.)


7/12/11 6:51 AM

108

Senem Kurt Topuz

Another problematic area for Gypsies living in Edirne is the right to education (Article 42 of the Constitution).51 Gypsy citizens living in Edirne marked that the state does not provide all of the opportunities for education, and thus they experience difficulties concerning this matter. Interviewees K. E. and A. İ. İ. clearly picture the case as follows: When I was a student, the school was a mixture of [different ethnic groups] but now there are only Romani students at school in our neighborhood. I do not think school’s positions now are better than in the past. There is obvious discrimination among people of this generation. Others do not want to send their children to the schools in our neighborhood. (K. E.) I had no chance to go to school. I did not have any financial opportunities to go to school as well. My wife and I could not benefit from anything in terms of education. I have worries about how I can provide education for my child and how I can benefit from the rights to education. Although there is a primary school in our neighborhood, children’s parents have financial troubles. These financial troubles eventually affect children. Even if the child goes to school, he could not understand what is taught as he cannot concentrate on his lessons. He could not benefit from the education opportunities properly. Are there problems regarding education? I would say yes. There is a shortage of technological equipment at schools in our neighborhood. . . . Children could not be educated well and are left behind in education. The schools only are not sufficient for education. A student at second grade can not even write Atatürk. The problem is not only connected to the teachers but also to families. As the parents themselves are not educated, they are not concerned enough about their children. (A. İ. İ.)

In fact, most of the problems Gypsies encounter may be connected directly or indirectly to their education level. Therefore, increasing their children’s interest in school, meeting the needs of the schools where Gypsy children densely attend, and appointing experienced teachers to those schools who will be able to strengthen the bond between the school and the student will significantly contribute to the solution of this problem. Another point that should be stressed here is that Gypsies believe that even if they are well educated they cannot find a job because of their ethnicity—which causes them to lose their interest in schooling and education. Thus, creating role models will considerably contribute to the elimination of the prejudice against education. Except for the rights mentioned above, the perception of Gypsy citizens living in Edirne is positive about each right in the constitution. In other words, they believe that these rights are provided by the state. Yet Gypsy citizens living in Edirne face several challenges in everyday life while enjoying the rights provided by the state. For example, the right to accommodation


7/12/11 6:51 AM


109

is restricted because of the prejudices of the society. The statement of interviewee C. İ. summarizes the case: When you moved to another district, your new neighbors would judge you. They would act in a prejudiced way. They would say that “we should not leave our shoes, towels etc. outside, because our neighbors are Romani, they might steal them.” They would be afraid of talking to us as they think we would beat them. These might be the problems first. My landlord warned me not to steal or drink alcohol when I moved in. He is in fact a Romani from Küçükpazar district but he is prejudiced against us as he lives in a different district. When you first move in, you experience prejudices but breaking these prejudices later depends on you. Everybody is afraid of people who are illiterate and knows nothing. They threat people that they would disturb or hurt them. They do not realize that they would be the ones who would be harmed, the ones to go to jail. (C. İ.)

Besides, Gypsies face some challenges when using their right to be elected as the political party administrations approach them negatively, society presses them down, and they are afraid of being misunderstood or not being able to express themselves freely as they believe they lack such awareness. The statements of two interviewees concerning the issue are as follows: They accept us to the party. They make us members. They use us during the elections but they do not make us candidates as they consider us as second class [citizens]. (K. Ş.) I cannot express my opinions freely. I feel intimidated. I do not know what I say is an offense or not. (A. İ. İ.)

Therefore, the obstacles that prevent the use of these rights should be eliminated apart from Gypsies’ positive perceptions. One of the obstacles that should be specifically dealt with is the prejudices of the society against Gypsies. Moreover, Gypsies living in Edirne also asserted that they cannot take part in political decisions that are directly connected to them and are only remembered during elections. Thus, necessary mechanisms should be developed to get Gypsy citizens to participate in political decisions so that they will not feel that they are only remembered during elections and valued just because of their votes. Thereby, it will be provided that Gypsies consider themselves as citizens who care about social and political problems. Another question that we seek to answer in this study is whether Gypsy citizens in Edirne are exposed to any discrimination or ill treatment in utilizing their constitutional rights. In the light of observations and interviews, it can be claimed that most of the Gypsies living in Edirne are exposed to


7/12/11 6:51 AM

110

Senem Kurt Topuz

discrimination only because they are Gypsies. Although almost all the interviewees shared their experiences related with discrimination, two examples are quoted as follows: You are exposed to discrimination. I know people who experienced discrimination. My son had to stay at the hospital once. They had him stay in a room where just Romani children were staying although other rooms were empty. Because my wife is brown-skinned. They usually have them [Romani children] rest in the same room. Place them in other rooms so that they can [meet different people]. (C. İ.) I fulfilled my military service in Çorlu. My sergeant asked me where I am from. He beat me three times a day because I said I live in Gazimihal in Edirne, because I am a Romani. But I did not file a complaint. To whom could I complain about him! There is certainly discrimination against us. (K. Ş.)

Besides the discrimination Gypsies face just because of their ethnicity, discrimination due to their clothing exists as well. Gypsies are also exposed to discrimination because of poverty, the neighborhood they live in, and being illiterate. The statements of M. C. and K. E. are quite explanatory of the case: I applied for a job in a factory. They asked my permanent address. When I wrote “Menzilahır,” they never called me again. I would get the job if I had contacts like a governor or senator but I do not have any. When I say “KıyıkMenzilahır,” I cannot get the job even if I am qualified. . . . I graduated from Fevzi Paşa primary school. There was no discrimination between Romani and Gadje at that time. There are only Romani [children] at schools for 3–4 years. We used to have many friends from different neighborhoods. Opportunities are of course different in a kindergarten in Fevzi Paşa compared to the one in Binevler. . . . There is an officer who is only a primary school graduate. There are 4,000 people in this neighborhood, but only 4 people are civil servants. (M. C.) Romanies do not have adequate education and proper living conditions. If you do not care about yourself, you are of course isolated [from the rest of the society]. Discrimination is closely connected to clothing, being clean. The issue of discrimination is totally personal. (K. E.)

However, another point that should be emphasized here is the discriminatory behaviors against Gypsy citizens and ill treatment stemming from negative prejudgments about them in the society. M. O., D. A., and K. Ş.’s statements about these discriminatory actions summarize the situation as follows:


7/12/11 6:51 AM


111

There is discrimination in the society. Yet, there is not any discrimination in state institutions; the state does not discriminate. The society does. The state tries to prevent such discrimination. When it is asked where we are from and when we say Menzilahır, then we face discrimination. They do not do it obviously but you can tell from their actions and attitudes. I don’t look like a gypsy because of my skin and my clothes. They don’t believe in me when I say I am a gypsy. This is what disturbs me. (M. O.) I sell trinkets at the train station. Turkish people who live in Germany see us there and say “run away, gypsies came, thieves came.” Although there is a wire fence between us, they ran away. There is respect for migrants coming from Europe, but there is no respect for Romani living in Turkey. (D. A.) For example, one comes to think of “thief” first when the word “gypsy” is pronounced. People frighten their children by saying “gypsies will come and kidnap you.” We hear that. This is the most obvious indication of discrimination. (K. Ş.)

There is no doubt that the source of prejudice against Gypsies in the society is the society itself rather than the state. However, the state should approach the issue sensitively and take certain steps to eliminate prejudices in the society. It is also essential that discriminatory expressions that are targeted at Gypsies and exist in the regulations of the state should be eliminated because the perceptions of the society about Gypsies are certainly influenced by the state’s attitudes towards its Gypsy citizens. It is the responsibility of the state to prevent discrimination against Gypsies and to take certain steps to eliminate prejudices against them. In this respect, it is crucial to determine whether the current citizenship regime in Turkey causes discrimination against Gypsy citizens in the state and governmental institutions and in the society. This requirement plays a key role in the solution of the problem.

The Citizenship Regime in Turkey and Situation of Gypsies According to the fourth chapter of the current constitution, “Political Rights and Duties,” it is said under the regulation concerning Turkish citizenship that “everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is Turkish. A child of a Turkish father or mother is Turkish. Citizenship is gained based on the conditions stated in law and lost merely under the conditions declared by law. No Turkish citizen can be denationalized unless they carry out an action incompatible with loyalty to the country. Legal


7/12/11 6:51 AM

112

Senem Kurt Topuz

proceedings concerning the denationalization decisions and procedures cannot be prevented.” As seen in the abovementioned constitutional clause, jus sanguineous (consanguinity) is essential to gain Turkish citizenship—not the place where one was born. First of all, it should be stated that one of the most important issues discussed related to the current citizenship regime in Turkey is the ethnic content of Turkish citizenship. In other words, the main emphasis of Turkish citizenship is whether it is defined on the basis of kindredship or on the basis of land or political unity. Those who argue that being a Turk is defined on the basis of land or political unity consider Turkish citizenship as a legal and political status granted to every citizen no matter whether they are of Turkish descent or not. Therefore, being a Turk accepted as a political and legal status is not related to any real or assumed ethnic origin.52 In other words, those who accept that being a Turk is a political and legal status believe that Turkish citizenship does not infer any religious or racial bond but points only to a geographical bond.53 Thus, everybody who lives within the national borders are accepted as a Turk regardless of his or her religious and ethnic origin according to the principle, “Happy is the one who says I am a Turk.”54 In this sense, it is claimed that Turkish citizenship, following the French model, is open and inclusive, contrary to being closed or discriminatory.55 On the other hand, it should be stated that this common judgment is not always evident. Indeed, the studies on Turkish citizenship show that although modern Turkish citizenship is defined ideally as an inclusive and unifying identity, it has also become a means of assimilative, discriminatory, and even outcasting political actions during the history of the Republic. Thereby, the fundamental essence of modern Turkish citizenship is actually “the dilemma or contradiction that exists between its theoretical definition and political practice.”56 Bora describes this dilemma as a definition of identity, which is a political and legal identity determined by citizenship and bond to the land on the one hand and an essentialist identity sanctified through its uniqueness on the other hand.57 It is no doubt that being a Turk, which represented citizenship as a political superordinate identity during the first years of the Republic, was not based on the idea of denying the existence of lower identities. However, the concept of being a Turk considered as a superordinate identity over cultural differences has usually found its real meaning in its existence as a lower identity in practice; the constitutional Turkish concept has been replaced by a homogeneous, coherent, and undifferentiated lower identity of Turkishness.58 For instance, the Settlement Act enacted in 1934 stipulated different regulations for the ones who are of Turkish race and for refugees and immigrants who are not; it was also seen during the single-party era that being a citizen of the Republic of Turkey and being a Turk of Turkish race


7/12/11 6:51 AM


113

are mentioned independently in accepting students to military schools and in announcements for personnel recruitment.59 According to the current Settlement Act no. 5543, which is in force now, immigrants are those who are of Turkish race and bound to the Turkish culture coming to Turkey alone or in groups to settle and accepted to the country according to this act. Free immigrants are the ones who are of Turkish race and bound to the Turkish culture coming to Turkey alone or in groups to settle and are accepted to the country on the condition that they will not demand the state to place them. Foreigners who are not of Turkish race and bound to the Turkish culture and the ones who are of Turkish race and bound to the Turkish culture but were deported and those who are not allowed to enter the country due to security reasons are not accepted as immigrants. It is stated in the law that indication and determination of belonging to Turkish race and of being bound to the Turkish culture for those who are to be accepted as immigrants is enacted by the decision of the Council of Ministers upon receiving the proposal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs based on the opinions of concerned ministries. Article 24 of the Special Education Institutions Act no. 625 proposes that the principals of private schools established by foreigners and carrying out education in a language other than Turkish must suggest someone who is qualified for teaching Turkish or Turkish culture and who knows the language of education at the school as Turkish vice principal to the Ministry of Education to issue a working permit. It is also proposed that teachers of Turkish descent or Turkish nationality who have field-specific education in the language of the school can be appointed to the position if there are no Turkish or Turkish-culture teachers. In the light of the regulations stated above, it can be claimed that the definition of citizenship of Turkey is not neutral. In fact, according to Kadıoğlu, “a Turkish citizen has religious (alevi/sunni), linguistic (Turkish), and cultural features.”60 In addition, it is required to accept the existence of all the identities present and to leave none of the identity features behind when all the lower identities are ignored for the citizenship as a superordinate identity to function inclusively. However, it has been attempted to eliminate all the lower identities within the superordinate identity, and through time by some of the political practices this superordinate identity is “grounded on the Turkish race in terms of ethnic origin, on secularized Islam in terms of religion, and on Sunni belief in terms of sect, and even on Hanafism within the Sunni sect.”61 There is no doubt that this affects the way the state treats its citizens. In fact, it seen that Gypsy citizens are often subject to discriminatory expressions in legal regulations. For example, Article 4 of the Statement Act enacted in 1934 states that individuals who are not bound to the Turkish culture, anarchists,


7/12/11 6:51 AM

114

Senem Kurt Topuz

nomadic Gypsies, spies, and the ones who were deported from the country are not accepted to Turkey as refugees. Act 2510, which had been in force until September 2006, also stresses that nomadic and traveling Gypsies be settled down in areas found suitable by the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Labor and Social Security after getting consent from the Ministry of Interior.62 In addition, “Gypsies who do not have a proper job” was defined as one of the suspect categories subject to preventive measures in the 134/B7a/5 article of the regulation concerning the “Role of the Police during Ceremonies and Meetings and the Organization of Police Stations” which was in force until 2006. It is also stated in Article 21 of the act regarding “Residence and Travel Freedom of Foreigners that the Ministry of Interior” is authorized to deport Gypsies who are stateless or belong to a foreign nationality and foreign immigrants who are not bound to the Turkish culture. Although some of the discriminatory expressions used against Gypsies in the regulations mentioned above were repealed, these expressions that have existed for years or still exist are clearly an indication of the discriminatory attitude developed by the state against its Gypsy citizens because the way the state treats its citizens will certainly differ where citizenship is grounded on the Turkish race in terms of ethnic origin and on secularized Islam in terms of religion, and the citizens excluded by this definition will be subject to some preventive measures—like what happens to Gypsies—in the regulations of the state by being isolated from the rest of the society. Another point that has to be emphasized here is that among the reasons why Gypsy citizens face discrimination are not only the legal regulations but also the negative attitudes and treatments of the society generally practiced against Gypsy citizens. Thus, it is hard to say that the state’s discriminatory and isolating attitude does not affect society’s general perception considering the fact that there is a mutual effect. As a matter of fact, as shared by the participants during the interviews, while utilizing their citizenship rights Gypsy citizens experience discrimination and are treated differently in state institutions because of their race, dressing style, accent, and the neighborhood they live in. As known, the citizens interrelate with state institutions63 at some point to enjoy their constitutional rights. The state institutions and civil servants working at these institutions are the face of the state. Thus, the negative perception of Gypsy citizens about the discrimination against themselves while benefiting from public services at state institutions makes them believe that the state itself has a discriminatory attitude against them, contrary to the equal citizenship principle, and causes a practical discrimination in daily life. Moreover, there are no legal regulations against discrimination apart from Article 10 of the Constitution, which states, “Every-


7/12/11 6:51 AM


115

one, regardless of language, race, color, gender, political thought, philosophical belief, religion, sect, and the like is equal before the law.” In this sense, a “constitutional citizenship” model may be suggested to be effective not only for eliminating discriminatory expressions of the regulations of the state and but also for decreasing negative attitudes and behaviors of the society against Gypsy citizens. Above all, the term citizenship should be cleared of any ethnic, religious, or cultural references by an improved constitutional citizenship regime because in constitutional citizenship the definition of citizenship with reference to any ethnic, religious, or cultural identity, and thus making a choice in favor of the one(s) over the other(s) among the differences that exist in the society’s pluralist structure, cannot even be mentioned. In this sense, the constitution embodies pluralistic values and remains at equal distance to all groups comprising the society. Moreover, public authorities should be prohibited from shaping differences and following hidden or obvious policies to assimilate citizens. Thus, citizenship cannot be considered as a means of homogenizing the society. On the contrary, citizenship becomes a protective shield which provides legal security for the citizens.64

Conclusion Based on the findings of this study, it can be claimed that the equality among citizens stated in law is not actually practiced in daily life and that Gypsy citizens are extensively affected by such inequality. It is quite natural in a citizenship regime grounded on Turkish race that the treatment of the state towards its citizens differs and thus causes inequality. In addition, it should be stressed that this inequality triggers discrimination in practice. In fact, Gypsy citizens not only are isolated from the rest of the society by being subject to preventive measures in some regulations of the state, and thus face discrimination and different treatments while enjoying their citizenship rights at state institutions, but also experience ill treatment because of the negative prejudgments that exist against them in the society. It is no doubt that it stems from the society’s negative prejudices against Gypsies as well as the discriminatory attitude of the state against those citizens. At this point, it should be emphasized once more that the attitude of the state and the perception of the society are in mutual interaction. In this respect, a “constitutional citizenship” model might be effective not only for eliminating discriminatory expressions of the regulations of the state but also for decreasing negative attitudes and behaviors of the society against Gypsy citizens.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

116

Senem Kurt Topuz

However, one point that should be seriously emphasized here is that different citizenship conceptualizations or regulations may not be effective or answer the problems especially of Gypsy citizens if their socioeconomic problems, which lie beneath the reason they face discrimination, are not solved first. At the root of these problems lie Gypsy citizens’ low socioeconomic status, inadequate education levels, and thus their not being totally aware of their citizenship rights. The fundamental mechanism to the solution of these problems is that the state functions truly as a welfare state and thus provides its Gypsy citizens with the minimum standards of a decent life and makes and implements political decisions that will realize social justice.

Notes 1. Derek Heater, Yurttaşlığın Kısa Tarihi, translated by Meral Delikara Üst (Ankara: İmge Publishing, 2007), 10–11. 2. Mesut Yeğen, “Yurttaşlık ve Türklük,” Toplum ve Bilim 93 (Summer, 2002): 201. 3. Dominique Schnapper, Yurttaşlar Cemaati-Modern Ulus Fikrine Dair, translated by Özlem Okur (Istanbul: Kesit Publishing, 1995), 11. 4. Ahmet İçduygu, “Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık Kavramı Üzerine Tartışmaların Arkaplanı,” Diyalog 1, (1996/1): 142. 5. Artun Üsal, “Yurttaşlık Anlayışının Gelişimi,” in 75 Yılda Tebaadan Yurttaşa Doğru (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1998), 4; Thomas Faist, “Avrupa Birliği İçinde Toplumsal Yurttaşlık,” in Uluslararası İlişkilerde Sınır Tanımayan Sorunlar, translated by Özgür Bal and Pelin Ünsal, edited by Ayhan Kaya, Günay Gökdoğan, and Göksu Gökdoğan (Istanbul: Bağlam Publishing, 2003), 194. 6. Füsün Üstel, Yurttaşlık ve Demokrasi (Ankara: Dost Publishing House, 1999), 94. 7. Levent Köker, “Çokkültürlülük ve Demokratik Meşruluk Sorunu,” in Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik, edited by Nuri Bilgin (Istanbul: Bağlam Publishing, 1997), 43. 8. Stuart Hall and David Held, “Yurttaşlar ve Yurttaşlık,” in Yeni Zamanlar1990’larda Politikanın Değişen Çehresi, translated by Abdullah Yılmaz, edited by Stuart Hall and Martin Jacgues (Istanbul: Ayrıntı Publishing, 1995), 175. 9. Rona Aybay, “‘Teba-i Osmani’ den ‘T.C Yurttaşı’na Geçişin Neresindeyiz?” in 75 Yılda Tebaadan Yurttaşa Doğru (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1998), 38. 10. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, “Vatandaşın Dönüşü: Vatandaşlık Kuramındaki Yeni Çalışmalar Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme,” Vatandaşlığın Dönüşümü Üyelikten Haklara, translated by Can Cemgil, edited by Ayşe Kadıoğlu (Istanbul: Metis Publishing, 2008), 188. 11. Irena Baclija and Miro Haček, “Limited Opportunities for Political Participation: A Case-Study of Roma Local Councillors in Slovenia,” Romani Studies 5, no. 17 (2007/2): 155–180.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


117

12. Zoltan Barany, “Ethnic Mobilization without Prerequisites: The East European Gypsies,” World Politics 54 (April, 2002/3): 277–307; Denis Goulet and Marco Walshok, “Values among Underdeveloped Marginals: The Case of Spanish Gypsies,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 13 (October 1971/4): 451–472. 13. Selin Ceyhan, A Case Study of Gypsy/Roma Identity Construction in Edirne, Master’s thesis, METU, 2003; Tara Bedard, Roma in Turkey, http://lists.errc.org/ rr_nr4_2003/field1.shtml (June 16, 1997), 1–4; Anita Danka, “Türkiye’de Roman Hakları ve Hukuki Çerçeve,” in Biz Buradayız! Türkiye’de Romanlar, Ayrımcı Uygulamalar ve Hak Mücadelesi, edited by E. Uzpeder, S. Danova/Roussinova, S. Özçelik, and S. Gökçen (Ankara: EDROM, ERRC, and hYd, 2008), 29–51. 14. Peter Vermeersch, “Marginality, Advocacy, and the Ambiguities of Multiculturalism: Notes on Romani Activism in Central Europe,” Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 12 (October–December 2005): 451–478; Doğa Aydoğan, “Yabancı Çingenelerin Türkiye’ye Giriş, İkamet, Seyahat Özgürlükleri İle Türkiye’den Sınır Dışı Edilmeleri,” A.Ü Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 56 (2007/1): 3–50. 15. Nevzat Güldiken, “Ulus, Ulus Devlet ve Uluslaşma Kavramlarına İlişkin Tartışmalar ve Türkiye,” C.Ü. İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi 7 (2006/2): 157–168.; Ece Göztepe, “Yurttaşlığın Kamusal ve Ulusüstü Boyutu: Avrupa Yurttaşlığı ve ‘Göçmen Forumu’ Örnekleri,” A.Ü Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 52 (2003/4): 229–248; Anıl Çeçen, “Türkiye’de Cumhuriyet Kimliği,” Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik, edited by Nuri Bilgin (Istanbul: Bağlam Publishing, 1997), 165–170; Süleyman Seyfi Öğün, “Türk Milliyetçiliğinde Hakim Millet Kodunun Dönüşümü,” Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik, edited by Nuri Bilgin (Istanbul: Bağlam Publishing, 1997), 207–230. 16. Özlem Kaygusuz, “Modern Türk Vatandaşlığı Kavramının Erken Öncülleri: Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde Ulusal Vatandaşlığın Kuruluşu,” Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi 60 (2005/2): 195–217; Tanıl Bora, “Cumhuriyetin İlk Döneminde Milli Kimlik,” in Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik, edited by Nuri Bilgin (Istanbul: Bağlam Publishing, 1997), 53–62; Mahzar Bağlı and Ertan Özensel, Çokkültürlü Vatandaşlık Kanadalı Türklerin Aidiyet Çabaları ve Değer Yapıları (Konya: Çizgi Publishing House, 2005).; Ayşe Kadıoğlu, “Vatandaşlığın Ulustan Arındırılması: Türkiye Örneği,” in Vatandaşlığın Dönüşümü-Üyelikten Haklara, edited by Ayşe Kadıoğlu (Istanbul: Metis Publishing, 2008b), 31–54. 17. Haldun Gülalp, Vatandaşlık ve Etnik Çatışma–Ulus Devletin Sorgulanması (Istanbul: Metis Publishing, 2007), 12. 18. The rights in the current constitution: (1) Social and Economic Rights: right to education, right to social security, right to health service and protection of environment, right to accommodation, right to employment. (2) Political Rights: right to elect and to be elected, right to engage in political activity, right to public service, right to petition. (3) Civil Rights: personal immunity, protection of individual’s physical and psychological well-being, personal freedom and security, privacy and protection of private life, freedom of thought and conviction, freedom of religion, right to legal remedies, freedom of accommodation and travel, freedom of association. 19. Ali Arayıcı, Avrupa’nın Vatansızları Çingeneler (Istanbul: Kalkedon Publishing, 2008). 20. Hürriyet (May 5, 2008), www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/8861774.asp?m=1.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

118

Senem Kurt Topuz

21. Suat Kolukırık, “Türkiye’de Rom, Dom Ve Lom Gruplarının Görünümü,” Hacettepe Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi 5 (2008/8): 146. 22. According to Hancock, Islam, which spread to Balkan states after the conquest of Istanbul by the Ottoman Empire, was also an effective factor in their immigration to Europe. Ian Hancock, We Are the Romani People (Hatfield, UK: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2002), 1; and Ian Hancock, “On Romani Origins and Identity: Question for Discussion,” in Gypsies and the Problem of Identities—Contextual, Constructed, and Contested, edited by Adrian Marsh and Elin Strand, 69–92 (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, Transactions 17, 2006), 85. 23. Adrian Marsh, “Etnisite ve Kimlik: Çingenelerin Kökeni,” in Biz Buradayız! Türkiye’de Romanlar, Ayrımcı Uygulamalar ve Hak Mücadelesi, edited by E. Uzpeder, S. Danova/Roussinova, S. Özçelik, and S. Gökçen (Istanbul: EDROM, ERRC, and hYd, 2008), 21. 24. Ali Rafet Özkan, Türkiye Çingeneleri (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı 2456, 2000), 4; Ana Oprisan, “Overview on the Roma in Turkey,” KURI—An Online Journal of the Dom Research Journal 1 (Fall/Winter 2002/7). 25. Faika Çelik, Exploring Marginality in the Ottoman Empire: Gypsies or People of Malice (Ehl-i Fesad) as Viewed by the Ottomans, EUI Working Paper, RSCAS No. 2004/39, 1. 26. Ali Rafet Özkan, Türkiye Çingeneleri, 31. 27. Adrian Marsh, “Etnisite ve Kimlik: Çingenelerin Kökeni,” 22. 28. There is certainly a mutual relationship between the subgroups and their dialects in Gypsy society. Naturally, the language and the dialect they always use distinguishes them from the other Gypsy groups and presents a unique definition for their own identities. Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Çingeneler- Balkan Tarihinde Bir Katkı, translated by Bahar Tırnakçı (Istanbul: Homer Publishing House, 2006), 424. 29. Adrian Marsh, “Türkiye Çingenelerinin Tarihi Hakkında,” in Biz Buradayız! Türkiye’de Romanlar, Ayrımcı Uygulamalar ve Hak Mücadelesi, edited by E. Uzpeder, S. Danova/Roussinova, S. Özçelik, S. Gökçen (Istanbul: EDROM, ERRC, and hYd, 2008), 18. 30. Angus Fraser, Avrupa Halkları—Çingeneler, translated by İlkin İnanç (Istanbul: Homer Publishing House, 2005), 156–157. 31. Eyal Ginio, “Neither Muslims nor Zimmis: The Gypsies (Roma) in the Ottoman State,” Romani Studies 5, 14 (2004/2): 141. 32. Ana Oprisan, “Overview on the Roma in Turkey,” KURI—An Online Journal of the Dom Research Journal 1, no. 7 (Fall/Winter 2002). 33. Adrian Marsh, “Türkiye Çingenelerinin Tarihi Hakkında,” 14. 34. Adrian Marsh, “ Türkiye Çingenelerinin Tarihi Hakkında,” 15. 35. M. Ersin Altın, Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Mimarlığında “Öteki” Sorunu (1923–1950), Master’s thesis, Yıldız Teknik Üniversitesi, 2003, 1. 36. This law was abrogated in 2006 when the new Settlement Law was enacted. 37. Ali Arayıcı, Avrupa’nın Vatansızları Çingeneler (Istanbul: Kalkedon Publishing, 2008), 244. 38. Sinan Gökçen and Sezin Öney, “Türkiye’de Romanlar ve Milliyetçilik,” in Biz Buradayız! Türkiye’de Romanlar, Ayrımcı Uygulamalar ve Hak Mücadelesi, edited


7/12/11 6:51 AM


119

by E .Uzpeder, S. Danova/Roussinova, S. Özçelik, S. Gökçen (Istanbul: EDROM, ERRC, and hYd, 2008), 130. 39. Suat Kolukırık, “Türk Toplumunda Çingene İmgesi ve Önyargısı,” Sosyoloji Araştırmaları Dergisi 8 (Fall 2005/2): 67. 40. Elin Strand, “Romanlar and Ethno-Religious Identity in Turkey: A Comparative Perspective,” in Gypsies and the Problem of Identities—Contextual, Constructed and Contested, edited by Adrian Marsh and Elin Strand (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, Transactions Vol. 17, 2006), 101. 41. Suat Kolukırık and Şule Toktaş, “Turkey’s Roma: Political Participation and Organization,” Middle Eastern Studies 43 (September 2007/5): 762. 42. Ali Arayıcı, Avrupa’nın Vatansızları Çingeneler, 234. 43. ERRC, “Issues Brief: Roma Rights in Turkey,” www.errc.org/cikk .php?cikk=2254&archiv=1 (November 30, 2009). It is important to note here that Gypsy citizens living in Turkey do not claim any minority rights according to the findings of this study and previous research, unlike stated in the report by ERRC. 44. There is no detailed legal regulations apart from Article 10 of the Constitution, which is against discrimination. ERRC, “Issues Brief: Roma Rights in Turkey,” www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=2254&archiv=1 (November 30, 2009). 45. ERRC (2009b) “In Turkey, Roma Face Discrimination,” www.errc.org/cikk .php?cikk=1113&archiv=1, Erisim: 30.11.2009. 46. According to Kolukırık and Toktaş, approximately 100,000 among 1 million Gypsies living in Turkey do not have a Turkish Republic identification card. Suat Kolukırık and Şule Toktaş, “Turkey’s Roma: Political Participation and Organization,” Middle Eastern Studies 43, no. 5 (September 2007): 761–777. 47. Articles 48 and 49 of the 1982 constitution refer to the freedom of labor and contract and freedom of labor rights and duties. According to Article 48 of the Constitution, “Everybody has freedom of labor and contract. To establish a private enterprise is allowed.” According to Article 49 of the Constitution, “All citizens have the right and duty to work. The state takes required measures to increase the level of living standards of employees, to improve their working standards and protect unemployed citizens, to support labor, to create sufficient economic conditions to prevent unemployment, and to establish peace at work.” 48. Article 72 of the 1982 constitution refers the right to enter public service. According to this article, “Every Turk has right to enter public service. No criteria other than the qualifications for the office concerned shall be taken into consideration for recruitment into public service.” 49. Article 57 of the Constitution refers to the right to housing: “The state shall take measures to meet the need for housing within the framework of a plan which takes into account the characteristics of cities and environmental conditions and supports community housing projects.” However, the right to housing not only requires the state to provide a residence for people but also requires the residences to be in good condition to live in. Good condition refers certainly to essential standards of a proper life like having a toilet, a bathroom, a kitchen, and bedrooms for parents and children. 50. Article 56 of the Constitution, titled “Health Services and Conservation of the Environment,” states, “Everyone has right to live in a healthy and balanced environment.” In addition, it says, “It is the duty of the state and citizens to improve the


7/12/11 6:51 AM

120

Senem Kurt Topuz

natural environment, and to prevent environmental pollution. To ensure that everyone leads their lives in conditions of physical and mental health and to secure cooperation in terms of human and material resources through economy and increased productivity, the state shall regulate central planning and functioning of the health services. The state shall fulfill this task by utilizing and supervising the health and social assistance institutions, in both the public and private sectors. In order to establish widespread health services general health insurance may be introduced by law.” 51. Article 42 of the Constitution refers to the right and duty of training and education. According to this article, “No one shall be deprived of the right of learning and education. Primary education is compulsory for all citizens of both sexes and is free of charge in state schools. The state shall provide scholarships and other means of assistance to enable students of merit lacking financial means to continue their education. The state shall take necessary measures to rehabilitate those in need of special training so as to render such people useful to society. Training, education, research, and study are the only activities that shall be pursued at institutions of training and education. These activities shall not be obstructed in any way. No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training or education.” 52. Mesut Yeğen, “Yurttaşlık ve Türklük,” 206. 53. Nevzat Güldiken, “Ulus, Ulus Devlet ve Uluslaşma Kavramlarına İlişkin Tartışmalar ve Türkiye,” 162. 54. Anıl Çeçen, “Türkiye’de Cumhuriyet Kimliği,” 167. 55. Mesut Yeğen, “Yurttaşlık ve Türklük,” 206. 56. Özlem Kaygusuz, “Modern Türk Vatandaşlığı Kavramının Erken Öncülleri: Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde Ulusal Vatandaşlığın Kuruluşu,” 196–197. 57. Tanıl Bora, “Cumhuriyetin İlk Döneminde Milli Kimlik,” 53. 58. Mahzar Bağlı and Ertan Özensel, Çokkültürlü Vatandaşlık Kanadalı Türklerin Aidiyet Çabaları ve Değer Yapıları, 30–31. 59. Ahmet Yıldız, Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin EtnoSeküler Sınırları (1919–1938) (Istanbul: İletişim Publishing, 2007). 60. Ayşe Kadıoğlu, “Vatandaşlığın Ulustan Arındırılması: Türkiye Örneği,” in Vatandaşlığın Dönüşümü: Üyelikten Haklara, edited by Ayşe Kadıoğlu (Istanbul: Metis Publishing, 2008), 34. 61. Mahzar Bağlı and Ertan Özensel, Çokkültürlü Vatandaşlık Kanadalı Türklerin Aidiyet Çabaları ve Değer Yapıları, 29–30. 62. Adrian Marsh, “Türkiye Çingenelerinin Tarihi Hakkında,” 16. 63. According to Yeatman, the subject of citizenship is the individual. This individual is the combined self of organic and personal life. Citizenship is also the public face of individuality and citizenship is established and preserved by the state institutions. Anna Yeatman, “The Subject of Citizenship,” Citizenship Studies 11, no. 1 (February 2007): 105. 64. Nevzat Coşkun, “Romanlar ve Antalya Zeytinköy Romanlarının Toplumsal Bütünleşmeleri,” Master’s thesis, Sakarya University, 1998.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


121

Bibliography Altın, Mimar Ersin. Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Mimarlığında “Öteki” Sorunu (1923–1950). Master’s thesis, YTU, 2003. Altınöz, İsmail. “XVI. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Devlet Yönetimi İçerisinde Çingeneler.” In Yeryüzünün Yabancıları Çingeneler, edited by Suat Kolukırık, 13–31. Istanbul: Simurg Publishing, 2007. Arayıcı, Ali. Avrupa’nın Vatansızları Çingeneler. Istanbul: Kalkedon Publishing, 2008. Aybay, Rona. “‘Teba-i Osmani’ den ‘T.C Yurttaşı’na Geçişin Neresindeyiz?” In 75 Yılda Tebaadan Yurttaşa Doğru, 37–42. Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1998. Aydoğan, Doğa. “Yabancı Çingenelerin Türkiye’ye Giriş, İkamet, Seyahat Özgürlükleri İle Türkiye’den Sınır Dışı Edilmeleri.” AÜ Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 56, no. 1 (2007): 3–50. Baclija, Irena and Miro Haček. “Limited Opportunities for Political Participation: A Case-Study of Roma Local Councillors in Slovenia.” Romani Studies 5, Vol. 17, no. 2 (2007): 155–180. Bağlı, Mahzar and Ertan Özensel. Çokkültürlü Vatandaşlık –Kanadalı Türklerin Aidiyet Çabaları ve Değer Yapıları. Konya: Çizgi Publishing House, 2005. Barany, Zoltan. “Ethnic Mobilization without Prerequisites: The East European Gypsies.” World Politics 54, No. 3 (April 2002): 277–307. Bedard, Tara. “Roma in Turkey.” http://lists.errc.org/rr_nr4_2003/field1.shtml (June 16, 2007). Bora, Tanıl. “Cumhuriyetin İlk Döneminde Milli Kimlik.” In Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik, edited by Nuri Bilgin, 53–62. Istanbul: Bağlam Publishing, 1997. Ceyhan, Selin. A Case Study of Gypsy/Roma Identity Construction in Edirne. Master’s thesis, METU, 2003. Coşkun, Nevzat. Romanlar ve Antalya Zeytinköy Romanlarının Toplumsal Bütünleşmeleri. Master’s thesis, Sakarya University, 1998. Çeçen, Anıl. “Türkiye’de Cumhuriyet Kimliği.” In Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik, edited by Nuri Bilgin, 165–70. Istanbul: Bağlam Publishing, 1997. Çelik, Faika. Exploring Marginality in the Ottoman Empire: Gypsies or People of Malice (Ehl-i Fesad) as Viewed by the Ottomans. EUI Working Paper, RSCAS, No. 2004/39. Danka, Anita. “Türkiye’de Roman Hakları ve Hukuki Çerçeve.” In Biz Buradayız! Türkiye’de Romanlar, Ayrımcı Uygulamalar ve Hak Mücadelesi, edited by E. Uzpeder, S. Danova/Roussinova, S. Özçelik, S. Gökçen, 29–51. Istanbul: EDROM, ERRC, and hYd, 2008. ERRC (2009a). “Issues Brief: Roma Rights in Turkey.” www.errc.org/cikk.php ?cikk=2254&archiv=1, (30 Nov. 2009). ERRC (2009b) “In Turkey, Roma Face Discrimination,” www.errc.org/cikk.php ?cikk=1113&archiv=1, Erisim: 30.11.2009. Faist, Thomas. “Avrupa Birliği İçinde Toplumsal Yurttaşlık,” translated by Özgür Bal and Pelin Ünsal. In Uluslararası İlişkilerde Sınır Tanımayan Sorunlar, edited by


7/12/11 6:51 AM

122

Senem Kurt Topuz

Ayhan Kaya, Günay Gökdoğan, and Göksu Gökdoğan, 191–218. Istanbul: Bağlam Publishing, 2003. Fraser, Angus. Avrupa Halkları: Çingeneler, translated by İlkin İnanç. Istanbul: Homer Publishing House, 2005. Ginio, Eyal. “Neither Muslims nor Zimmis: The Gypsies (Roma) in the Ottoman State.” Romani Studies 5, vol. 14, no. 2 (2004): 117–144. Goulet, Denis and Marco Walshok. “Values among Underdeveloped Marginals: The Case of Spanish Gypsies.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 13, no. 4 (October 1971): 451–472. Gökçen, Sinan and Sezin Öney. “Türkiye’de Romanlar ve Milliyetçilik.” In Biz Buradayız! Türkiye’de Romanlar, Ayrımcı Uygulamalar ve Hak Mücadelesi, edited by E. Uzpeder, S. Danova/Roussinova, S. Özçelik, and S. Gökçen, 129–135. Istanbul: EDROM, ERRC, and hYd, 2008. Göztepe, Ece. “Yurttaşlığın Kamusal ve Ulusüstü Boyutu: Avrupa Yurttaşlığı ve “Göçmen Forumu” Örnekleri.” A.Ü Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 52, no. 4 (2003): 229–248. Gülalp, Haldun, ed. Vatandaşlık ve Etnik Çatışma: Ulus Devletin Sorgulanması. Istanbul: Metis Publishing, 2007. Güldiken, Nevzat. “Ulus, Ulus Devlet ve Uluslaşma Kavramlarına İlişkin Tartışmalar ve Türkiye.” C.Ü. İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi 7, no. 2 (2006): 157–168. Hall, Stuart and David Held. “Yurttaşlar ve Yurttaşlık.” In Yeni Zamanlar-1990’larda Politikanın Değişen Çehresi, edited by Stuart Hall andMartin Jacgues, translated by Abdullah Yılmaz, 169–185. Istanbul: Ayrıntı Publishing, 1995. Hancock, Ian. “On Romani Origins and Identity: Question for Discussion.” In Gypsies and the Problem of Identities—Contextual, Constructed and Contested, edited by Adrian Marsh and Elin Strand, 69–92. Istanbul: Swedish Research Institiute, Transactions 17, 2006. ———. We Are the Romani People. Hatfield, UK: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2002. Heater, Derek. Yurttaşlığın Kısa Tarihi, translated by Meral Delikara Üst. Ankara: İmge Publishing House, 2007. Hürriyet (August 5, 2008). www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/8861774.asp?m=1. İçduygu, Ahmet. “Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık Kavramı Üzerine Tartışmaların Arkaplanı.” Diyalog 1 (1996): 134–147. Kadıoğlu, Ayşe. “Vatandaşlığın Ulustan Arındırılması: Türkiye Örneği.” In Vatandaşlığın Dönüşümü: Üyelikten Haklara, edited by Ayşe Kadıoğlu, 31–54. Istanbul: Metis Publishing, 2008. Kaygusuz, Özlem. “Modern Türk Vatandaşlığı Kavramının Erken Öncülleri: Milli Mücadele Dönemi’nde Ulusal Vatandaşlığın Kuruluşu.” Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi 60, no. 2 (2005): 195–217. Köker, Levent. “Çokkültürlülük ve Demokratik Meşruluk Sorunu.” In Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik, edited by Nuri Bilgin, 41–50. Istanbul: Bağlam Publishing, 1997. Kolukırık, Suat. “Türkiye’de Rom, Dom Ve Lom Gruplarının Görünümü.” Hacettepe Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları Dergisi 5, no. 8 (2008): 143–153. ———. “Türk Toplumunda Çingene İmgesi ve Önyargısı.” Sosyoloji Araştırmaları Dergisi 8, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 52–71.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


123

Kolukırık, Suat and Şule Toktaş. “Turkey’s Roma: Political Participation and Organization.” Middle Eastern Studies 43, no. 5 (September 2007): 761–777. Kymlıcka, Will and Wayne Norman. “Vatandaşın Dönüşü: Vatandaşlık Kuramındaki Yeni Çalışmalar Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme,” translated by Can Cemgil. In Vatandaşlığın Dönüşümü: Üyelikten Haklara, edited by Ayşe Kadıoğlu, 185–217. Istanbul: Metis Publishing, 2008. Marsh, Adrian. “Etnisite ve Kimlik: Çingenelerin Kökeni.” In Biz Buradayız! Türkiye’de Romanlar, Ayrımcı Uygulamalar ve Hak Mücadelesi, edited by E. Uzpeder, S. Danova/Roussinova, S. Özçelik, and S. Gökçen, 19–27. Istanbul: EDROM, ERRC, and hYd, 2008. ———. “Türkiye Çingenelerinin Tarihi Hakkında.” In Biz Buradayız! Türkiye’de Romanlar, Ayrımcı Uygulamalar ve Hak Mücadelesi, edited by E. Uzpeder, S. Danova/Roussinova, S. Özçelik, and S. Gökçen, 5–19. Istanbul: EDROM, ERRC, and hYd, 2008. Marushiakova, Elena and Vesselin Popov. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Çingeneler: Balkan Tarihinde Bir Katkı, translated by Bahar Tırnakçı. Istanbul: Homer Publishing House, 2006. Oprisan, Ana. “Overview on the Roma in Turkey.” KURI—An Online Journal of the Dom Research Journal 1, no. 7, Fall/Winter 2002. Öğün, Süleyman Seyfi. “Türk Milliyetçiliğinde Hakim Millet Kodunun Dönüşümü.” In Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi ve Kimlik, edited by Nuri Bilgin, 207–230. Istanbul: Bağlam Publishing, 1997. Özkan, Ali Rafet. Türkiye Çingeneleri. Kültür Bakanlığı Publishing/2456, 2000. Schnapper, Dominique. Yurttaşlar Cemaati: Modern Ulus Fikrine Dair, translated by Özlem Okur. Istanbul: Kesit Publishing, 1995. Strand, Elin. “Romanlar and Ethno-Religious Identity in Turkey: A Comparative Perspective.” In Gypsies and the Problem of Identities—Contextual, Constructed and Contested, edited by Adrian Marsh and Elin Strand, 97–104. Istanbul: Swedish Research Institiute, Transactions 17, 2006. Ünsal, Artun. “Yurttaşlık Anlayışının Gelişimi.” In 75 Yılda Tebaadan Yurttaşa Doğru, 4–11. Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1998. Üstel, Füsün. Yurttaşlık ve Demokrasi. Dost Publishing House, 1999. Vermeersch, Peter. “Marginality, Advocacy, and the Ambiguities of Multiculturalism: Notes on Romani Activism in Central Europe.” Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 12, no. 4 (October–December 2005): 451–478. Yeatman, Anna. “The Subject of Citizenship.” Citizenship Studies 11, no. 1 (February 2007): 105–115. Yeğen, Mesut. “Yurttaşlık ve Türklük.” Toplum ve Bilim 93 (Summer 2002): 200–217. Yıldız, Ahmet. Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları (1919–1938). Istanbul: İletişim Publishing, 2007.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


7/12/11 6:51 AM

6 Less than Citizens: The Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Question in Turkey Hakan Ataman

T

of discussion on citizenship in Turkey. Naturally, these arguments have focused on the Turkish modernization which was organized by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. As the founder of the modern Republic of Turkey and its first president, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk subsequently introduced a wide range of prompt, extensive, and radical reforms addressing the political, social, legal, economic, educational, and cultural spheres, not limited only to public life but including private life, for 15 years, until his death on November 10, 1938. These reforms, with the aim of founding a new secular republic from the remnants of the former Ottoman Empire, also required a new citizenship identity, which is defined as Turkishness (Türklük). This new citizenship identity was declared by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s most famous expression “How happy is the one who calls himself a Turk!”1 The new notion of citizenship has been also reflected by Turkish constitutions. HERE HAS BEEN A LOT

Turkish Citizenship ARTICLE 66. (As amended on October 17, 2001) Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk. The child of a Turkish father or a Turkish mother is a Turk.2

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) was established on April 23, 1920. The first Turkish Constitution (Teşkilât-ı Esasiye) was adopted by TBMM on January 20, 1921. The first constitution of Turkey — 125 —


7/12/11 6:51 AM

126

Hakan Ataman

remained until the adoption of the second constitution on April 20, 1924. Then the 1961 and 1982 constitutions were adopted during the military rule.3 The military intervention took place in 1980 and was followed by the 1982 constitution, which was altered seventeen times, in 1987, 1993, 1995, 1999 (two times: June and August), 2001 (two times: October and November), 2002, 2004, 2005 (two times: June and October), 2006, 2007 (three times in total: two times in May and one time in October), 2008 and again in 2010. The most comprehensive constitutional changes took place in 1995, 2001, and 2004, which were associated with negotiations with the European Union. The last comprehensive constitutional amending in 2010 was inline with AKP Government’s policy rather than being an element of harmonization to EU standards. However, the sentence that defines Turkish citizenship has remained the same in different articles for 87 years. The new constitutional amendment package of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has also kept the same provision.4 If we return now to the definition of citizenship identity defined by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, we can say that the Turkish citizenship identity of the Republic of Turkey is based on Atatürk’s ideology, known as Kemalism. One dimension of Atatürk’s legacy is his ideology, Kemalism, which is also known as the “Six Arrows,” including republicanism, populism, laicism (secularism), revolutionism, nationalism, and statism.5 These basic principles also contain some complementary principles such as national sovereignty, national independence, national unity, and so forth. There are many explanations of the six arrows, but these explanations are interpretations which have been made by Kemalists or anti-Kemalists. In general, these interpretations are based on Atatürk’s speeches, statements, and other utterances. The quote from Atatürk’s speech below explains the six arrows plainly. The main points which are considered important to remind the nation of again today are as follows: 1. The republican, nationalist, laic and revolutionist characteristics of the Republican People’s Party are its inalterable qualifications. These characteristics/this composition are explained by the following points: a. Being faithful to the national ideal b. Using the will and sovereignty of the nation in order to provide full realization of the duty of state to the citizen and vice versa, reciprocally. c. Based on individual work and activity, to render the state de facto concerned and active in the activities related to the nation’s common and best interests in order to enable the nation to improve its welfare and to make the country more developed and prosperous.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Less than Citizens

127

Our main principle is not to consider Turkish Society as being composed of different classes but to see it as a community divided into various professional experts based on the division of labour in personal social life: a. b. c. d. e. f. g.

Peasants Handicraftsmen and artisans Unskilled workers and workers The self-employed Industrialists Merchants State officials are the main working groups representing Turkish community6

In Turkey, there are many intellectuals, academicians, politicians, columnists, activists, and also ordinary citizens who are in favour of Kemalism. They think that this ideology is the most appropriate political model for Turkey, having connotations such as antimonarchism, anti-imperialism, modernism, secularism, and Westernization. They suggest that Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, being a hero, is the most ideal citizen, so that he is the ideal model for citizenship. He led not only the Turkish nation to full independence but also the uprising of oppressed nations under the yoke of imperialist powers. Therefore, he was also a freedom fighter.7 On the other hand, there are some strong arguments against Kemalism being the most appropriate political model for Turkey, and therefore for citizenship, because of the authoritarian state and the unified, indivisible, homogenized nation it promised. Some critics suggest that Kemalism has become an official ideology in Turkey, where democracy is not possible to achieve under such an ideology. Therefore, differences in identities—which include ethnicity, religious and philosophical beliefs, political ideologies, and others as well as sexualities—have been not considered by Kemalism. As a result of this, there has been an increase in criticisms made by the people having these identities that are excluded from the Kemalist understanding of citizenship and consequently an increase in demands to redefine the notion of Turkish citizenship in the Republic of Turkey.8 As a non-Kemalist, my position is close to the critiques of Kemalism. In my point of view, there can be no official ideology or official religion in a democratic state that respects the rule of law and the human rights that are enshrined in and expressed by universal values and accepted and guaranteed by international law. Therefore, I am referring to universal values and perspectives rather than Kemalist postulates. In the course of the past decades, there has been a growing sense of ethnic and cultural consciousness among many Kurds, Alevis, minorities, Roma people, and other groups. In addition to this ethnic and cultural consciousness,


7/12/11 6:51 AM

128

Hakan Ataman

a women’s movement and feminist literature has contributed to the redefinition of the notion of citizenship in terms of gender issues in Turkey. It is obvious that where there is no democracy, human rights, or the rule of law citizenship is at risk for all or any part of the population. Therefore, I think that the reforms as part of the harmonization process with the European Union (EU) that are related to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law have also contributed to current debates on citizenship in Turkey. However, there are a few discussions on sexual citizenship related to sexual orientation and gender identity9 that particularly point out lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people. In Turkey, perceived and treated as less than citizens, LGBT people have been subjected to direct and indirect discrimination by state and society. As they are considered as other’s other, they have also suffered from reflexive discrimination by the others. In this chapter, I will examine the question of sexual citizenship in terms of LGBT people who live without adequate protection and are denied their rights in Turkey. Firstly, I would like to explain briefly the historical background of the LGBT question. Secondly, I want to continue by outlining the laws and regulations related to LGBT people in Turkey. After that I will attempt to analyze daily life and societal peace with regard to the LGBT question in Turkey. Finally, I will try to formulate recommendations for the elimination of obstacles and difficulties to finding a solution to the LGBT question and for positive change.

Historical Background Historically, sexual orientation and gender identity have been an integral part of our civilization. However, these kinds of sexuality have always been considered as a moral offense since divine religion appeared in the world.10 In 2007, on the occasion of the antihomophobia day, former secretary general of the Council of Europe Terry Davis wrote a powerful article, “Hate, Hypocrites and Human Rights.” In his article, Mr. Davis explained the Nazi concentration camps and the current situation of the social and state homophobia in Europe: In 1936 the SS Reichsfürer Heinrich Himmler created the Gestapo’s Central Office for the Combating of Homosexuality and Abortion. As a result, an estimated 100,000 men were arrested as homosexuals, and some 50,000 of these men were sentenced. Some spent time in regular prisons, some were forcefully castrated as an alternative to incarceration, and thousands were sent to Nazi concentration camps. Men with pink triangles11 were often treated particularly severely by guards and other inmates alike. Some homosexuals were also victims of cruel medical


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Less than Citizens

129

experiments, designed to change them into heterosexuals. Estimates are that more than half were executed or died from disease and malnutrition, but for those who survived, the liberation from the Nazi concentration camps did not end the suffering and humiliation.12

Following this article, Terry Davis reminded us again of Nazi persecution and the homophobic attitudes around Europe in 2009. He stated, “It is unacceptable that some people in positions of official or moral authority in Europe still behave as if the European Convention on Human Rights does not apply to homosexuals. People who discriminate often invoke morality to justify their attitude. They are making a relevant point, but they are getting it wrong. It is not the homosexuals who are immoral. It is the homophobes.”13 Turkey is an example of one of the worst cases in Europe as mentioned by Terry Davis. LGBT people were not visible until the 1990s in Turkey,14 apart from some famous singers such as Bülent Ersoy, who is the first transgender person—through a sex reassignment surgery—to be a Turkish citizen. Bülent Ersoy had a sex reassignment surgery in 1981 in the United Kingdom because there was not any regulation related to the issue in Turkey until 1988 when Law 3444, which include an additional paragraph 2 to Article 29 of the Turkish Civil Code, was adopted. The Turkish Civil Code was accepted on February 17, 1926, and it replaced the Sharia. The Turkish Civil Code has played an important role in sexuality- and gender-related issues in Turkey even since the first stage of the new republic. As stated by Nilüfer Göle, women as “the touchstone of westernisation” in Turkey were the “vector of civilisation” as the Turkish Civil Code of 1926 was translated and adapted from the Swiss Civil Code: It is clear that Kemalism encouraged physical changes (removes of the veil and charshaf), urban and public exposure (companionship of men and women in the same space), visibility of women, as well as the recognition of their citizenship rights (equal political rights). Beyond these it provided a legitimate, judicial base for these transformations. The new Civil Law is an example of this. Principle of secularism, that is, the regulation of the relationship between men and women on the basis of a contemporary legal scheme rather than of the Sharia, as well as the establishment of egalitarian relationships between the sexes, were all ensured by the new Civil Law with the advent of the Turkish Republic. Kemalism remains a unique example among all political movements, for it is only one that interfered with family law, the sphere most resistant to Westernisation.15

Despite the authoritarian practices of the new Turkish Republic in the axis of Kemalism, the Civil Code provided some women’s human rights which included equality between men and women, autonomy, and visibility in the public sphere such as the rights to work, education, and so forth. These rights


7/12/11 6:51 AM

130

Hakan Ataman

were also created in order to serve Atatürk’s modernization project. But the new regulations regarding women contained limits to equality and autonomy: While women who did their share in the Kemalist project of modernity could seek to be equal to men in the public realm, there were clear limits to women’s autonomy. (During the authoritarian single-party era, many men, too, could not act autonomously in the public realm.) Women’s activism was circumscribed by dictates of an autocratic Westernizing state.16

In 1934, women’s suffrage was accepted, and in 1935 eighteen women were elected to Parliament.17 However, this development in 1935 can be misleading because of the difference between figures and facts. Serpil Çakır explains the situation as follows: Women who partook in the modernizing project wanted to be treated as equals in the public sphere. On the one hand women were urged to show up in the public sphere, importance was given to their education, obstacles to certain professions were eliminated but on the other hand their actions could be inspected and limited by the state due to a fear of disorder. A good example is banning of Women’s People’s Party. Right after the foundation of the Republic, in June 1923, women started a struggle for their political rights. Nezihe Muhittin, who worked for this with the journal she published Kadın Yolu [Woman’s Way] and her friends also founded a political party named Kadın Halk Fırkası (The Women’s People’s Party). But due to an article in the Constitution that only allowed men to vote and be elected, the party was banned. Türk Kadınlar Birliği (Turkish Women’s Association) founded right after the softening of the principles of the Party could not avoid the same fate and was banned during the Single Party Period after it hosted the 12th Congress of the International Women’s Union in 1935.18

According to Şirin Tekeli, Kemalism has a Jacobin character, and Atatürk’s reforms for women were simply instruments to achieve his ideals. In reality, the women’s movement was suppressed by the single-party regime in Turkey.19 Apart from these specific reforms, women’s status was quite terrible by the end of this period: The intransigent Jacobin—like Republicans legislated these radical changes in women’s status by shaking—and also in order to shake—the foundations of traditional Turkish culture and society. But they knew very well that no more than a handful of women would actually take advantage of their newly-granted rights. These few women were of bourgeois (civil servant) origins and were concentrated in urban areas. . . . They considered themselves the representatives of the period’s state feminism and experienced so passionately the excitement


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Less than Citizens

131

of being the pioneers of modernisation that they did not realize that their circumstances were not representative of the average Turkish woman’s situation. Thus, they were led into a tragic, schizophrenic illusion; their identity was not one that they had chosen themselves. Rather, it was ascribed by state. In a sense, the Ottoman heritage was still alive.20

The Kemalist view of the role of women in the Westernization and secularization of Turkey required eliminating the difference between men and women in public life. However, this approach to equality between men and women by Kemalism appeared problematic in light of contemporary gender and sexuality perspectives: Although, there were limitations to women’s autonomous public activism, the Kemalist discourse nevertheless provided legitimacy for women’s claim to equality with men in the public realm. Those who had access to that realm could benefit from this privileged equality. Yet the Kemalist understanding of equality was based on an assumption of sameness between men and women that could, in the public realm, be created artificially. This particular understanding of equality was transformed into a hierarchical relationship between men and women when their differences had to be acknowledged in the private domain. . . . The Kemalist project of modernity legitimized male-female equality as it denied male-female difference. Equality was conceived of as irreconcilable with difference. Within this discourse, women’s equality to men in the public realm necessitated a denial of difference between men and women. To the extent that difference was acknowledged in the private realm, it precipitated hierarchy.21

What does the above mean related to women’s status and gender equality in Turkey? And what is its relation to my theme in this essay? I think that the Kemalist understanding of citizenship’s relation to gender and sexuality is limited to heterosexuality between healthy men and healthy women who are able to have healthy Turkish children. Healthy, educated, secular, Turk, modernist, and also heterosexual is also the way later generations of Kemalists have understood citizenship. In other words, “The Great Turkish Nation” of Atatürk’s 1933 speech at the 10th Anniversary of the Republic of Turkey must go on terrifically under any circumstances. It means that the Kemalist understanding of gender and sexuality is heterosexist as a form of discrimination. Heterosexism is “the system by which heterosexuality is assumed to be the only acceptable and viable life option.”22 The Kemalist perception of citizenship therefore excludes LGBT people in Turkey. Numerous articles of the Turkish Civil Code were revised in the 1990s.23 Then the Turkish Civil Code was amended in 2002 in the context of the extensive changes to adapt it to EU standards, which include various positive


7/12/11 6:51 AM

132

Hakan Ataman

steps to reach gender equality, and Article 40 of the Civil Code regulating sex reassignment became as follows:24 A person who wants their sex reassigned can demand permission from the court for the reassignment of the sex by applying to the court in person. However, for the permission, the person should be above the age of eighteen, [and] not married. Furthermore the person should have a transsexual nature and the person must document this with a formal report issued by a health council at an educational and research hospital stating that the sex reassignment is necessary for the spiritual health and that the person must have a permanent loss of reproductive capacity. When the sex reassignment operation is proved to have taken place with permission [from the court] and conducted in accordance with the aim and medical methods, the court makes the decision to make necessary corrections in the population record.

At the first stage, this change seems like a progressive step. However, this provision means forced divorce and forced sterilization, as discussed by the state commissioner for human rights of the Council of Europe, Thomas Hammarberg: Even more common are provisions which demand impossible choices, such as the “forced divorce” and the “forced sterilisation” requirements. This means that only unmarried or divorced transgender persons who have undergone surgery and become irreversibly infertile have the right to change their entry in the birth register. In reality, this means that the state prescribes medical treatment for legal purposes, a requirement which clearly runs against the principles of human rights and human dignity.25

The Turkish LGBT human rights movement became more visible during the 1990s. The most notable event was an attempt to organize an LGBT pride conference in Istanbul in 1993. The LGBT pride conference was banned at the last minute by the governor of Istanbul, apparently on the grounds that it would be contrary to Turkey’s traditions and moral values and that it might disturb the peace. Foreign delegates and participants were detained and subjected to inhuman and degrading treatments by police officers.26 Then Lambda İstanbul was formed by a group of gays and lesbians right after the governor of Istanbul banned the LGBT pride conference, which was attempted to be held in July 1993.27 KAOS GL was founded in September 1994 to unite Turkey’s homosexuals in the struggle against discrimination. The group’s underlying philosophy is that the liberation of homosexuals will also free heterosexuals.28 Following the establishment of


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Less than Citizens

133

LGBT organizations in Istanbul and Ankara, new organizations began to appear in other cities, including Izmir, Antalya, Eskisehir, and Diyarbakir. The Pink Life, which is the first transgender association in Turkey, was established on June 30, 2006. In the same year, Lambda İstanbul registered as an association in the summer of 2006. Then, the Black Pink Triangle LGBT Association was founded on February 22, 2009, on the occasion of the murder of Baki Koşar.29 However, these LGBT associations faced threats of closure by the government because of their activities aimed at advocating for the rights of persons with diverse sexual orientations and gender identities. Therefore, we can say that visibility has not been in favour of LGBT people and has led to government repression in Turkey.

Laws and Regulations In 2008, the İstanbul MP Sabahat Tuncel30 posed a written parliamentary question about discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in Turkey to the presidency of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. According to the parliamentary question, “there have been some pressures and attacks against LGBT citizens recently. These negative perceptions and practises towards LGBT citizens, at level of the social perception and the administrative units have caused biggest blocking the expression of different gender identities and sexual orientations express themselves.”31 MP Sabahat Tuncel requested Mehmet Ali Şahin,32 who is the former Turkish minister of justice, to give a written answer to the following questions: 1. Have you initiated any work to take legislative measures in order to ensure lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender citizens access to the right to work, to the right to adequate housing, to the right to exist at all level of life without discrimination? 2. Are you planning to make any regulations on your agenda in order to change negative perception and discriminatory practices which includes intentional killing in social sphere against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender citizens? 3. What steps have you taken in order to eliminate the reduction of sentence arising from the existence of extenuating circumstances which is used by persons who commit violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender citizens?

The former Turkish minister of justice of the neoconservative Justice and Development Party, Mehmet Ali Şahin, in his written response to the


7/12/11 6:51 AM

134

Hakan Ataman

parliamentary question about discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity in Turkey posed by İstabul MP Sabahat Tuncel, stated: X. Equality before the Law (As amended on May 22, 2004: The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey) ARTICLE 10. All individuals are equal without any discrimination before the law, irrespective of language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations. Men and women have equal rights and the State is responsible to implement these rights. No privilege shall be granted to any individual, family, group or class. State organs and administrative authorities shall act in compliance with the principle of equality before the law in all their proceedings. Equality before Justice and Law (Art. 3/2 of Turkish Penal Code) In the implementation of the Criminal Code, discrimination is not allowed between people on the basis of race, language, religion, sect, nationality, colour, gender, political and other opinion, philosophical belief, national or social origin, birth, economic and social status. Other Offences Against Humanity (Article 77 of Turkish Penal Code) (1) The systematic performance of an act, described below, against a part of society and in accordance with a plan with a political, philosophical, racial or religious motive shall constitute a crime against humanity: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h.

Intentional killing; Intentional injury; Torture or inhuman treatment or slavery; Depriving one from his/her liberty; The subjecting of persons to biological experiments; Sexual assault; sexual abuse of children; Impregnation by force; Forced prostitution.

(2) Where the act described in section one subsection (a) is committed the offender shall be sentenced to a penalty of aggravated life imprisonment. Where an act described in any other paragraph is committed then a penalty of imprisonment for a term of not less than eight years shall be imposed. However, for the acts of intentional killing and intentional injury defined in section one, subsections (a) and (b) respectively there shall be an actual aggregation of the offences, in accordance with the number of victims identified. (3) Legal entities shall be subject to security measures in respect of these offences. (4) There shall be no limitation period in respect of these offences. In the framework of written provisions above, everyone is equal without any discrimination before the law, irrespective of language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Less than Citizens

135

As all forms of discrimination are banned by these provisions, the Ministry of Justice did not initiate any specific work in relation to parliamentary question at this stage.33

Sexual orientation and gender identity have not been a criminal offense in Turkey. However, laws and regulations do not provide adequate protection for LGBT people. Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution, ensuring equality before the law, states that all individuals are equal before the law and makes a special reference to equality of gender. However, it has no provision for the people who are not citizens of the Turkish Republic and no provisions on ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, or gender identity. In addition, Article 10 of the Constitution and Article 3 of the Turkish Penal Code (TPC; Law No. 5237) only state that no privileges shall be granted to any person or group. However these articles do not ban discrimination. Article 122 of the TPC (Law No. 5237) bans discrimination. Article 122 of the TPC (Law No. 5237) left out forms of discrimination such as ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, and gender identity and does not provide for any sanction related to these types of discrimination. There are not any cases before the courts that are also related to Article 77 of TPC (Law No. 5237). Article 5 of Labour Law 4857 bans discrimination in employment. But this provision does not cover discrimination that can occur during the job application, in which discrimination against LGBT people does exist in practice. Apart from these, some laws and regulations have been applied against LGBT people discriminatorily. For example, transvestite and transsexual individuals generally conduct sex work to earn their living because they cannot have other jobs. However, the Law on Public Disgrace or Misdemeanours Law (Law No. 5326; Kabahatler Kanunu) entered into force in March 2005, which “aims to protect public order, general morality, general health, the environment, and the economic order,”34 has given police additional powers to arrest people based on perception or prejudice. The Misdemeanour Law has been imposed on sex workers by both police and lawmakers, and since 2006 transvestite and transsexual individuals who work as sex workers in Turkey have been arbitrarily subjected to physical violence. Transvestite and transsexual individuals, wherever they were detected, were taken into custody arbitrarily and were left in a dumping place or outside the city after they were beaten by bludgeons and kicked, slapped, and punched.35 On the other hand, Article 29 of TPC (Law No. 5237) establishes sentence reductions on the basis of provocation, and this results in impunity for perpetrators. The local courts in İstanbul, Ankara, and İzmir have ordered the closure cases of the LGBT associations, including Kaos GL, Lambda İstanbul, Black Pink Triangle, and Pink Life, during the last five years. The original ruling followed complaints by the governors’ offices in these cities that LGBT


7/12/11 6:51 AM

136

Hakan Ataman

associations’ objectives were against Turkish “moral values and family structure.”36 The Supreme Court of Appeals rejected the decisions of the local courts on the grounds that reference to LGBT people in the name and the statute of the associations did not constitute opposition to Turkish moral values. The Court’s judgments also recognized the right of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals to form associations. In 2007, at some universities and cafes, Internet access to the websites of LGBT associations was prohibited. When patrons attempted to connect to these websites, they saw warnings of “gay, lesbian, bisexual interest” or “adult content” together with the statement “access to this site is blocked.”37 Although there are the case laws of the European Courts of Human Rights that relate to Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination), there are also some discriminatory practices in the Turkish armed forces such as the compulsory military services in Turkey. The appendix of the health regulation of the Turkish armed forces, namely the list of diseases, has included “psychosexual disorders” and “high level psychosexual disorders,”38 which are generally interpreted by the Turkish military Services as homosexuality, transsexuality, and transvestism. In October 2009 the report of the EU Commission on Enlargement stated, “Conscripts who declare their homosexuality have to provide photographic proof. A small number have had to undergo humiliating medical examinations.”39 There was a positive development in the trial of four people charged with participation in the attacks on transvestites and transsexuals in Ankara Eryaman between April 7 and 12, 2006, following attacks on transvestites and transsexuals in the Esat and Kurtuluş quarters of Ankara.40 It is possible to interpret the verdict of Ankara Heavy Penal Court No. 11 in terms of hate crime. The defendants were sentenced to imprisonment, and the sentences were not suspended. In the reasoned verdict of October 17, 2008, Ankara Heavy Penal Court No. 11 stated, “The defendants felt that the plaintiffs living in their environment and defining themselves as transsexuals had awakened their and their neighbours prejudices and carried out intense and constant attacks against the plaintiffs according to a certain plan and forced them to leave the area they lived in.”41 However, the human rights situation related to LGBT people as citizens in Turkey has already gone one step forward, two steps back. Despite the decision of Ankara Heavy Penal Court No. 11 which is mentioned above, several transgender women have been murdered within the past three years.42 There are no legal or social protections. At the end of 2009, the AKP government sent the “Draft Law Proposal on Combating Discrimination and Equality Committee,” which was promised to be regulated as one of the steps of


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Less than Citizens

137

“Democratic Opening,” to bar associations, academic circles, and NGOs, including LGBT organizations, through the Ministry of Interior. In the third article of the draft law, named “Equality Principle, Anti-Discrimination and Discrimination Types within the Scope of Ban,” the clause “discrimination is prohibited on the grounds of sex, race, colour, language, belief, ethnicity, sexual identity (sexual orientation and gender identity), philosophical and political views, social status, . . . and similar grounds” existed. Nevertheless, according to a press release made by the LGBT Organisation on February 2, 2011,43 the AKP government removed the “sexual identity” phrase from the Draft Law on Combating Discrimination and Equality Committee.

Daily Life and Societal Peace LGBT people living in Turkey continue to face homophobia and transphobia in their daily lives. The social research conducted in Turkey during the last three years shows that discrimination and intolerance is permanently on the rise. In a survey Professor Yılmaz Esmer carried out in 2009, 1,715 participants in 34 provinces were asked a question on tolerance posed as “who do you not want as a neighbour?” and homosexuality was ranked one with 87 percent; answers were listed as: “homosexuals” (87%), “people not believing in God” (75%), “drinking alcohol” (72%), “unmarried couples” (67%), “not having any religion” (66%), “Jews” (64%), “Christians” (52%), “extreme right/left wing” (48%), “an American family” (43%), “daughters wearing minis” (36%), and “different race or colour” (26%).44 According to the latest Eurobarometer survey on discrimination in the European Union in 2009, 37 percent of respondents who live in Turkey stated that discrimination based on sexual orientation is very widespread in the country.45 Another research that is related to identities was carried out by Professor Hakan Yılmaz in 2010, titled “‘We,’ ‘Others,’ Othering, and Discrimination in Turkey: Perceptions and Trends in the Public Opinion.” This project aimed at uncovering processes of othering and discrimination in Turkey. For this purpose, some 40 in-depth interviews were conducted in 2009, and a nationwide opinion poll was taken between February 15 and April 15, 2010, with a sample of around 1,800 respondents. One of the main questions of research is “who can not freely reveal their identities?” and sexual orientation and gender identity were ranked as number one, with 72 percent, in answers listed as follows: sexual orientations and gender identities such as homosexuality (72%); atheist persons (59%); non-Muslims (28%); persons who have a discredited job in society (23%); Muslim people being members of different sects (21%); persons with different ethnic origins


7/12/11 6:51 AM

138

Hakan Ataman

other than Turkishness (19%); poor people (18%); Muslims who are religious (11%); and persons who are secularist (7%).46 Sexual orientation and gender identity are one of the biggest taboos in Turkey. Therefore, many LGBT people who make the decision to reveal their sexual orientation or gender identity have generally faced prejudice and discrimination from their family, friends, and also from the wider society in Turkey. Negative attitudes towards LGBT people, known as homophobia and/ or transphobia, have caused extreme harm and disruption to people’s lives in general. Many LGBT people have become homeless or have lost their life as a result of being rejected by their families after revealing their sexual orientation or gender identity. For example, in July 2008, Ahmet Yıldız (26 years old) was shot dead outside his apartment in Istanbul in what was suspected to be a gay “honor” crime. He had made a criminal complaint to prosecutors about threats made against him by relatives. Yahya Yıldız, who is the prime suspect and father of Ahmet Yıldız, stands accused of having killed his son because of his homosexuality. The British newspaper the Independent was the first to announce his killing to the world with the headline “Was Ahmet Yildiz the victim of honour killing in Turkey?”47 Before being murdered, in his last article in the magazine Beargi,48 Ahmet Yıldız, under the nickname “Blackbeary,” wrote, I listened to most of my friends experiences with their families. I can say that I’m theoretically experienced. And my experiences told me that my family was not the kind to come out to. Both my father and mother are from Kurdish origin from eastern Turkey. Besides, they have a conservative (Islamic) way of living. They don’t like men with earrings or consider women in mini skirts as faithless. When I was just a child, I was caught by my family while I was having activities of discovering my sexual identity. My family always wanted to know more about me: asking questions, putting pressure and exploring anything about me. Things came to such a point that I felt that I had to come out.49

The case of Ahmet Yıldız as the “other of other” is also one of the examples of reflexive discrimination as well as traditional family values, conservative tendencies, and religious concerns in Turkey. According to Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, “reflexive discrimination is possible. It is possible for discriminators to be members of the group members of which they discriminate against.”50 In 1973, homosexuality was removed by the American Psychiatric Association from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSMII) classification of mental disorders after reviewing the evidence that it was not a mental disorder.51 Homosexuality was also removed by the Word Health Organisation (WHO) on May 17, 1990, which was declared Antihomophobia


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Less than Citizens

139

Day.52 The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has ruled against the criminalization of homosexuality and has also found that states are required to legally recognize the gender change of postoperative transsexuals.53 Although there is a progress in scientific works and in international human rights, sexual orientation and gender identity are still perceived as a psychological illness or biological disorder in Turkish society. According to a field study that was conducted by the Lambda İstanbul LGBT Civil Society Initiative (Lambda İstanbul) between April and August 2005, a total number of 65 questions were applied to 393 LGBT people, who included 151 women and 242 men. The participants of the questionnaire were asked “the reactions they received when they came out”; answers were listed as follows: met with questions “Did you have many problems in childhood?” (43%), “Have you suffered sexual abuse in childhood?” (44%), “Are you sure?” (66%); met with the suggestion or coercion “See a psychiatrist/psychologist” (55%); and received the comment “You do not look like them at all” (75%).54 Another example is Selma Aliye Kavaf, the minister of state in Turkey from the AKP. Selma Aliye Kavaf, who is responsible for the affairs of women and families, declared that she believes that gay people are sick in March 2010: “I believe homosexuality is a biological disorder, a disease,” she said in an interview with the daily Hürriyet’s Sunday supplement. She also said that “I believe [homosexuality] is something that needs to be treated. Therefore I do not have a positive opinion of gay marriage.”55 As in the example of Kavaf, institutional and personal hostility towards LGBT people is a fact in Turkey. At the cultural and social level sexual orientation and gender identity remains stigmatized through institutional policies.56 Homophobic and transphobic attitudes and behaviours can be affected by different factors, which include strong religious beliefs that disapprove of sex and/or sexual orientation and gender identity; having little or no social contact with LGBT people; traditional family values and conservative tendencies; having little or no personal or public awareness of sexual orientation and gender identity or false consciousness; and extreme right- and left-wing political ideologies such as racism, ultranationalism, orthodox Marxist movements, and so forth. However, it is not possible to identify exactly what causes homophobic and transphobic attitudes and behaviours, as many different factors affect personal and social attitudes. Different people grow up being exposed to similar beliefs and social environments about sexuality but form quite different attitudes towards LGBT people.57 In my opinion, homophobic and transphobic attitudes and behaviour in Turkey have significantly been motivated by Turkish nationalism, traditional family values, culture and conservatism, all divine religions, prejudices because of the lack of awareness, and also inequality in economic and social level. I may safely assert that


7/12/11 6:51 AM

140

Hakan Ataman

there is a combination among these in Turkey. In 2001, former İstanbul MP Mehmet Gül, who is a member of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), during an interview said that “I would have appreciated him more if he were not a homosexual” regarding Tarkan, who is the most famous pop star of Turkey.58 Ultranationalist Mehmet Gül is remembered for the case of four students who were killed and 41 wounded after a bomb was thrown at leftleaning students at İstanbul University on March 16, 1978, when he claimed to be defending “conservative values.”59 According to Melek Göregenli, as an ideology of intergroup relations and discrimination, homophobia is influenced by more individual processes (personality, self-concept, cognitive structures, etc.) of homosexuals as an external group, and is accompanied by certain stereotypes; homophobic ideology does not appear by itself as personal trait but forms within a certain sociocultural context: Despite all its roots linked to cultural context and individual conditions and processes, many social psychologist think that homophobia can be understood within its connections to racism and sexism. In this respect, homophobia is an important weapon of sexism. Violence against people with sexual orientation other than heterosexuality becomes a mechanism of manhood, and in one sense, in sexist terms, of “protection and control of humanity.” On the one hand, the findings of many empirical studies lead to our assumption that prejudice and negative stereotypes, under the blessing of ideologies, are realised with violence of varying forms and content against ostracized groups, and that ideologies which celebrate discrimination are a new kind of “conservatism” feeding on traditional values. Although we know that worldviews that are generally termed as “rightist” are closer to values that nurture discrimination, it can be thought that a new kind of fascism forms the background for “symbolical fascism” and this worldview includes not only “rightist” ideologies. Beliefs such as that hierarchy between people or group is natural, that some groups are almost naturally superior to others orientation to social superiority—nurture symbolical fascism.60

According to Doğu Perinçek, an important figure in left-wing Kemalism, former Maoist, Ergenekon case suspect, and head of the Workers Party in Turkey, “homosexuality is a kind of alienation.”61 However, socialist movements that are not Kemalist and/or orthodox Marxist have generally supported LGBT movements and peoples in Turkey.62 Traditional family values and culture are also another important factor related to homophobia in Turkey. At this stage, let me remind you of the case of Ahmet Yıldız again. Also, do not forget that Selma Aliye Kavaf, who is mentioned above, has no ordinary responsibility; she is responsible for family affairs as one of the ministers of the conservative AKP government in Turkey. In the study of Lambda İstanbul, when interviewers asked about “people from whom they


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Less than Citizens

141

have hidden their sexual orientation,” answers were listed as follows: fathers (73%), mothers (65%), the whole of their own family (39%), and all or some of their relatives (89%).63 And as in other countries around the world, divine religions in Turkey contribute to homophobia. As Tarık Bereket stated, “It is through reference to the Biblical story of Lot that appears in the Koran, and the interpretation of it in the Hadith, that the harsh prohibition against homosexuality is founded.”64 The LGBT question in Turkey is also related closely to social inequities. The situation of transgender people (transsexuals and transvestites) in Turkey is especially affected by economic and social inequalities. Muhtar Çokar from the Human Resource Development Foundation wrote in an evaluation of the condition of sex workers conducted by his organization that transgender sex workers are one of the most vulnerable groups among illegal sex workers: Transgender sex workers are adversely affected both by the unfavourable condition in their sector and community’s pressure against their sexual practises. The majority of the populations is prejudiced against homosexuality, as well as transgender people, and therefore discriminate against these groups. Although, some men engage in homosexual activity, they do not consider themselves as “homosexual,” as long as they are in “the active position” during intercourse. There is a demand for the transgender groups in the commercial sector. Transgender, who decide to become sex workers, mainly come from low social income families with low educational backgrounds. Therefore, they find it hard to find regular job, which leads them to get into the commercial sex business.65

Negative attitudes and behaviors in Turkey against LGBT people such as prejudice, discrimination, stereotyping, and stigmatization are also caused by lack of awareness. During her time as a visiting professor at Oregon State University’s School of Education in Oregon, USA, in 1994 and 1995, Figen Çok of Ankara University’s Faculty of Educational Science came across a lot of information on LGBT people. She decided to share this knowledge with students in her faculty at Ankara University. She narrated her experience as follows: I included information as a part of my “adolescent development” courses content also “development and learning” which is a mandatory course for all teacher candidates, stıdents learnt what it meant with sexual orientation however I don’t think I was totally successful in term of changing their attitudes to the positive. My students were part of the society and were grown up with misinformation and negative attitudes for GLB (Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual) people so even a teacher says “being GLB is a part of being human and natural, most continue to think as they used to.” Finally in the year 2001, I started to teach “sexual health education” course for three undergraduate groups. It was a change to talk about sexual orientation


7/12/11 6:51 AM

142

Hakan Ataman

in detail. Later I asked help from Kaos GL and invited representatives who were ready to share what they experienced as gay or lesbian. Some of my students (who would be teacher soon) confessed that was first time in their life that met a gay person. All the gays they met so far were from media whose life was unusual or quite exaggerated in their perspective. I found this experience in my class so important because it is usually teachers who notice the kid is different than the other kids in many ways. This implies teachers need to be informed about various across people including sexual orientation. I believe discrimination towards others could, not keeping people away from others.66

Maybe we need a new approach to eradicate homophobia and transphobia, as Gregory M. Herek has already said in his essay: More than 30 years have passed since George Weinberg first defined homophobia in his essay, “Words for the New Culture.” We owe him a great debt for creating the term and helping to push society to recognize the problem of antigay hostility and oppression. Yet, it is now time for researchers and theorists to move beyond homophobia. After three decades, the culture whose language Weinberg helped to create is no longer new. It has matured and evolved in ways not imagined in the 1960s. In the new millennium, social and behavioral scientists are creating a scholarship that endeavors to explain hostility toward gay, lesbian, and bisexual people in its many individual and cultural manifestations. For this project to advance, we must reexamine our language and move beyond homophobia in defining the foci of our inquiry. Sexual stigma, heterosexism, sexual prejudice, and other terms we may adopt are unlikely to equal homophobia in their impact on society. What is important, however, is that the words for our new scholarship enable us to understand hostility and oppression based on sexual orientation and, ultimately, eradicate it.67

Towards Full Citizenship and Societal Peace These abuses which are mentioned above in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity are not only vertical abuses that have happened between state and individuals or groups but also horizontal ones that have occurred among citizens. We have faced multidimensional problems blocking out societal peace and full citizenship, towards which there is no one-way solution in Turkey. Therefore, I think what we need are both reactive and nonreactive measures to deal with homophobia and transphobia as well as other phobias such as xenophobia in Turkey. Reactive measures, which include adequate legal protections and provisions, regulations, improving the justice system, and ending impunity, should be ensured by the government of Turkey. How-


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Less than Citizens

143

ever, reactive measures are not adequate towards full citizenship and societal peace. Therefore, we need also nonreactive measures, which include proactive measures such as social protection and cooperation, solidarity, and education as well as the creation of a positive atmosphere for dialogue between different people and empathy. It seems that social justice is needed as well as legal justice. In conclusion, our task is hard rather than being impossible. Therefore, we should take positive steps towards full citizenship rights and societal peace for LGBT persons in Turkey. Following the recommendations is a bibliography of reports, articles, legal opinions, experiences, studies, and documents detailing human rights standards as they apply to sexual orientation and gender identity.68 First of all, lessons for sexual health that include sexual orientation and gender identity, prepared in light of the works of international scientific, educational, and human rights organizations such as the World Health Organization, World Medical Association, and others, should be part of the curriculum at all educational levels in Turkey. The materials of textbooks should not include misleading information about LGBT people. Additionally, the related governmental institutions, in collaboration with LGBT and human rights organizations, should undertake campaigns to raise awareness directed at the general public as well as actual and potential perpetrators of violence in order to combat the prejudices that underlie violence related to sexual orientation and gender identity. There should be specific educational programs, developed by the governmental institutions in cooperation with scientific, educational, and civil society organizations, on sexual orientation and gender identity that target state officers, including teachers, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, social workers, and medical professionals. The government of Turkey should work to end violence and discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity by taking all necessary legislative measures, including enacting a comprehensive nondiscrimination law providing specific protections against unequal treatment and passing a hate crimes law that enforces appropriate criminal penalties for violence, threats of violence, incitement to violence, and related harassment when these are based on the sexual orientation and gender identity of any person or group of persons, in all spheres of life, including the family and the workplace. The restrictive legal requirements for sex reassignment surgery should be replaced with efficient and easily understandable procedures for changing one’s name and gender on official documents, in accordance with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Related governmental institutions in Turkey should also amend or review laws and regulations in order to eliminate vague crimes such as “exhibitionism” and “offenses against public morality” and clarify some definitions


7/12/11 6:51 AM

144

Hakan Ataman

such as “obscenity” and “misdemeanour” that lead to subjective interpretations and can be used to harass and persecute people (especially transgender individuals) based on their sexual orientation and gender identity. All necessary legislative and administrative measures should be taken to ensure that a victim’s sexual orientation or the gender identity of the victim may not be offered to justify or excuse violence against LGBT people or to mitigate the punishment of perpetrators. These legislative measures and governmental policy should also ensure that violence against LGBT people in Turkey is rigorously investigated; that, where appropriate evidence is found, those responsible are prosecuted, tried, and duly punished; and that victims are provided with appropriate remedies and redress, including compensation. The military policy of Turkey should be also changed to admit homosexuals into the armed forces, to allow conscientious objection if compulsory military service is deemed necessary, and to end all humiliating medical examinations to determine whether an individual is homosexual. Related governmental institutions should develop programs for transgender people that will open employment possibilities outside the sex work trade and help to ease the discrimination they are facing. Social services that support LGBT people should also be established and regulated. Professional associations such as bar associations and medical or health associations should develop specific programs and policies aimed at the prevention of discrimination and violence against and harassment of LGBT people. Bar associations could establish offices that provide legal assistance to LGBT people and to the general public on other issues related to sexuality. Health professionals, including mental health workers, should oppose any psychiatric treatment, such as reparative or conversion therapy, which is based upon the assumption that homosexuality is per se a mental disorder or based upon the a priori assumption that the patient should change his or her sexual orientation. Health professionals should also oppose the “forced sterilization” requirement in respect to sex reassignment surgery. These organizations should urge their members to take the lead in removing the stigma of mental illness or biological disorder that has long been associated with nonheterosexual sexual orientations and gender identity. Media professionals can also play an extremely important role in ending the stigmatization of and prejudice against LGBT people. These professionals and their organizations should encourage media organs to eliminate from their programming rhetoric that contributes to the stigmatization of and prejudices against LGBT people.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Less than Citizens

145

Conclusion From the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 up to today, human rights rhetoric has become widespread, the content of the human rights concept has expanded, and the human rights conventions, regulations, and protection mechanisms have grown in diversity and number. Despite all these, human rights violations continue everywhere in the world. The consequence of the increase in human rights abuses is the increase in the number of conventions and mechanisms aimed at protecting human rights. When one examines the basic human rights conventions one sees that they deal with those persons who are most subjected to human rights violations. Among those who intensely face human right abuses are those who are in the minority within their societies, such as homosexuals and transsexuals, who are minorities in terms of their sexual orientation and of their social gender. The most significant step towards the recognition of homosexual rights at the international level is the World Health Organization’s resolution dated May 17, 1990, in which the WHO declared that homosexuality was no longer deemed to be in the list of mental illnesses. The second important development occurred at the meeting of human rights experts held in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, on November 6 through 9, 2006, where the issues of discrimination and human rights abuses on the bases of sexual orientation and social gender identity were discussed. In the aftermath of this meeting, the Yogyakarta Principles on the application of international human rights law in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity were accepted. This declaration, which forms the draft of a new human rights convention, was submitted to the Human Rights Council in Geneva in March 2007. There is a serious gap between these developments in international human rights law and the situation in Turkey. Recently there has been a increase in torture and ill-treatment cases, and those victims are frequently LGBT people, who are particularly vulnerable. LGBT people in detention are subjected to torture and ill treatment. In large cities there has been a significant increase in the number of homicides on the bases of homophobia and transphobia. Additionally, security forces carry out regular raids on the homes and associations of LGBT people. LGBT associations have been confronted with closure. LGBT people are being fined on the basis of the Misdemeanour Law. Internet censorship is another problem. The laws and regulations in Turkey are not sufficient to prevent discrimination and violence against LGBT people. There is no social protection mechanism. In conclusion, the LGBT question in Turkey is a deep problem still waiting for a solution.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

146

Hakan Ataman

Notes 1. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, “Atatürk’s 1933 Speech at the 10th Anniversary of the Republic of Turkey,” Turkish Times, News (November 1–15, 2002), www.theturkish times.com/archive/02/11_01/f_speech.html (accessed July 2, 2010). 2. Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey, The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (1982), Chapter Four, Political Rights and Duties, www.anayasa.gov.tr/ index.php?l=template&id=210&lang=1&c=1 (accessed August 18, 2006). 3. The Turkish Armed Forces had previously carried out coups d’etat four times, in 1960, 1971, 1980, and the “soft coup” in 1997. 4. The New Draft Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasa Önerisi), Chapter Three: Political Rights and Duties, Ctizenship, Article 35, Alternative 2, available at http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/419859.asp (accessed July 4, 2010). The new draft of the constitution was prepared by a commission which includes Professors Ergun Özbudun (Chief of Commission), Zühtü Arslan, Yavuz Atar, Fazıl Hüsnü Erdem, and Levent Köker and Assistant Professor. Serap Yazıcı. It was prepared upon the request of the prime minister of Turkey and the head of AKP government, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, on June 8, 2007. The constitutional amendment package was approved by Turkish voters on September 12, 2010. 5. The Six Arrows were adopted by the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi—CHP) during two different general assemblies after the foundation of the new Turkish Republic on October 29, 1923. CHP accepted the four principles of republicanism, populism, nationalism, and laicism (secularism) during the second general assembly on October 15, 1927. Revolutionism and statism were adopted by the third general assembly of CHP on May 10, 1931. In 1937, these principles also became a part of Article 2 of the Turkish Constitution, as follows: “The Turkish State is Republican, Nationalist, Populist, Statist, Secularist, and Revolutionary-Reformist.” Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP), CHP Tarihi, www.chp.org.tr/Zaman-Tuneli.aspx (accessed September 1, 2010); Belge Net, CHP Kurultayları, 2000, www.belgenet .com/parti/chpkurultay.html (accessed September 1, 2010). 6. Atatürk, Seçim Dolayısı ile Millete Beyanname (20.IV.1931), Taha Parla, Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları Cilt 2, Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri (Istanbul: Deniz Yay, 2008), 196. 7. Enver Ziya Karal, “The Principles of Kemalism,” in Ataturk, Founder of a Modern State, edited by Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Ozbudun (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), 11–19; Ergun Ozbudun, “The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime,” in Kazancıgil and Ozbudun, eds., 87–89; Toktamış Ateş, Biz Devrimi Çok Seviyoruz, (Istanbul: Der Yay, 1998), 97–130; Toktamış Ateş, “Kemalizm ve Özgünlüğü,” in Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Kemalizm, Cilt 2, edited by Ahment İnsel (Istanbul: İletişim, 2002), 317–322; Afet İnan, Atatürk Hakkında Hatıralar ve Belgeler, Haz. Arı İnan (Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yay, 2009), 331–361; İsmet Giritli, Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılapçılığa Dair, Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi, Sayı 37, Cilt. XIII, (March 1997), www.atam.gov.tr/index.php? Page=Print&DergiIcerikNo=691&Yer=DergiIcerik (accessed September 1, 2010); Yılmaz Altuğ, Atatürk and Building of a Modern Nation State, Atatürk Araştırma


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Less than Citizens

147

Merkezi Dergisi, Sayı 7, Cilt, III (November 1986), www.atam.gov.tr/index.php?P age=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=966 (accessed September 1, 2010). 8. See Levent Köker, “Kemalizm/Atatürkçülük: Modernleşme, Devlet ve Demokrasi,” 97–112; Nuray Mert, “Cumhuriyet Türkiye’sinde Laiklik ve Karşı Laikliğin Düşünsel Boyutu,” 197–209; Ahmet Yıldız, “Kemalist Milliyetçilik,” 210–234; Ali Kazancıgil, “Anti-Emperyalist Bağımsızlık İdeolojisi ve Üçüncü Dünya Ulusçuluğu Olarak Kemalizm,” 235–246; Taha Parla, “Kemalizm Türk Aydınlanması mı?” 313–319; Ayşe Saktanberg, “Kemalist Kadın Söylemi,” 323–333; Barış Karacası, “‘Mavi Kemalizm’ Türk Hümanizmi ve Anadoluculuk,” 334–343; all in Ahmet İnsel, ed., Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Kemalizm, Cilt 2, edited by Ahmet İnsel (Istanbul: İletişim, 2002). See also Levent Köker, “Sol Çağdaşlaşma Adına Kemalizmi Hep Onayladı,” 25–42; Kürşat Bumin, “Yanlız Başına Bağımsızlıkla Demokrasi Olmaz,” 55–75; Asaf Savaş Akat, “1923–1950 Arası Sağ Bir Diktatörlüktür,” 76–92; Şirin Tekeli, “Tek Parti Döneminde Kadın Hareketi Basıtırıldı,” 93–107; and Seyfi Öngider, “Kemalizme En Büyük Darbeyi Son Dönemde Kürt Hareketi Vurdu,” 142–156; all in Sol Kemalizme Bakıyor, edited by Levant Cinemre and Ruşen Çakır (Istanbul: Metis Yay, 1991); and Taha Parla and Andrew Davison, Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order? (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004), 68–142; Fikret Başkaya, Pradigmanın İflası (Istanbul: Doz Yay, 1996), 143–176, 199–224; Mesut Yeğen, Müstakbel Türk’ten Sözde Vatandaşa Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler (Istanbul: İletişim Yay, 2006), 47–116. 9. A distinguished group of human rights experts has drafted, developed, discussed, and refined the Yogyakarta Principles. Following an experts’ meeting held at Gadjah Mada University in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, from November 6 to 9, 2006, 29 distinguished experts from 25 countries with diverse backgrounds and expertise relevant to issues of human rights law unanimously adopted the Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. The Yogyakarta Principles were launched on March 26, 2007, in Geneva. According to the Yogyakarta Principles, Sexual orientation is understood to refer to each person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a different gender or the same gender or more than one gender. Gender identity is understood to refer to each person’s deeply felt internal and individual experience of gender, which may or may not correspond with the sex assigned at birth, including the personal sense of the body (which may involve, if freely chosen, modification of bodily appearance or function by medical, surgical or other means) and other expressions of gender, including dress, speech and mannerisms.

Please see for more details “The Yogyakarta Principles,” www.yogyakarta principles.org/index.html (accessed July 1, 2010). 10. Louis Crompton, Homosexuality and Civilization (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003): xi, xii, 1, 33, 362, 529. 11. Under Nazi Germany every prisoner had to wear a concentration camp badge on their jacket, the colour of which categorized them into groups. The pink triangle (German: Rosa Winkel) was one of the Nazi concentration camp badges, used to


7/12/11 6:51 AM

148

Hakan Ataman

identify homosexual men. Heinz Heger, The Men with the Pink Triangle: The True Life-and-Death Story of Homosexuals in the Nazi Death Camps, translated by David Fernbach (London: Alyson Publications, 1994), 12. See also “The History of the Gay Male and Lesbian Experience during World War II,” Symbols, www.pink-triangle. org/ (accessed September 1, 2010) 12. “LGBT people were not acknowledged as victims of Nazi persecution, and compensation was refused. Some homosexuals liberated from the concentration camps were even forced to serve out their terms of imprisonment. Sixty years later, no one has apologised for this tragic and shameful treatment of camp survivors. Regrettably, the wall of prejudice, discrimination and hypocrisy has not yet disappeared and Europe is often more tolerant of homophobes than their victims.” Terry Davis, “Hate, Hypocrites and Human Rights,” The Council of Europe, May 2007, www .coe.int/t/secretarygeneral/sg/Oped/2007/Hate_hypocrisy_and_human_rights_ EN.asp (accessed July 2, 2010). 13. Terry Davis, “International Day against Homophobia, 17 May,” press release 395 (2009), The Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France, April 15, 2009, wcd.coe.int/ ViewDoc.jsp?id=1445137&Site=DC (accessed July 7, 2010). 14. Kaos GL, “Turkey’s LGBT History,” http://news.kaosgl.com/turkey_lgbt_ history.php (accessed July 2, 2010). 15. Nilüfer Göle, The Forbidden Modern: Civilisation and Veiling (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 73–74. 16. Yeşim Arat, “The Project of Modernity and Women in Turkey,” in Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, edited by Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 101. 17. “As a percentage, they accounted for 4.5% of all the seats in the Assembly, one of the highest proportions in the world at that time.” Şirin Tekeli, “The Turkish Women’s Movement: A Brief History of Success,” European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), www.iemed.org/publicacions/quaderns/7/193_Tekeli.pdf (accessed September 1, 2010); see also Şirin Tekeli, “Women in Turkish Politics,” in Women in Turkish Society, edited by Nermin Abadan-Unat (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981), 293–310. 18. Serpil Çakır, “Women’s Movement in Turkey: Historical Process and Changing Paradigms,” Seventh European Social Science History Conference, February 26–March 1, 2008, www2.iisg.nl/esshc/programme.asp?selyear=9&pap=5654 (accessed September 1, 2010); see also Yeşim Arat, “The Project of Modernity and Women in Turkey,” 101. 19. Şirin Tekeli, “Tek Parti Döneminde Kadın Hareketi Bastırıldı,” in Sol Kemalizme Bakıyor edited by Levent Cinemre and Ruşen Çakır (Istanbul: Metis Yay, 1991), 93–107. 20. Şirin Tekeli, “Meaning and Limits of Feminist Ideology in Turkey,” in Women, Family and Social Change in Turkey, edited by Ferhunde Ozbay (Bangkok: UNESCO, 1990), 145. 21. Yeşim Arat, “The Project of Modernity and Women in Turkey,” 101–102. 22. Warren J. Blumenfeld and Diane Raymond, “Prejudice and Discrimination,” in Reading for Diversity and Social Justice, edited by Maurianne Adams, Warren J. Bluemfeld, Rosie Castañeda, Heather W. Hackman, Madeline L. Peters, and


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Less than Citizens

149

Ximena Zúñiga (New York: Routledge, 2000), 25. See also “Heterosexism,” in Reading for Diversity and Social Justice, 261–295; Bernard E. Whitley, Jr., and Mary E. Kite, The Psychology of Prejudice and Discrimination (Canada: ThomsonWadsworth, 2006), 364–373; Scott Plous, ed., Understanding Prejudice and Discrimination (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003), 375–424. 23. Zuhal Yeşilyurt Gündüz, “The Women’s Movement in Turkey: From Tazminat towards European Union Membership,” Perception, Journal of International Affairs 9 (March–May 2004): 123. 24. Ayça Kurtoğlu, “Sex Reassignment, Biological Reproduction and Sexual Citizenship in Turkey,” Fe Dergi 1, no. 2 (2009): 84. The translation of Article 40 was also made by Ayça Kurtuoğlu. 25. Thomas Hammarberg, “Forced Divorce and Sterilisation—A Reality for Many Transgender Persons,” The Council of Europe, (August 31, 2010), http://commis sioner.cws.coe.int/tiki-view_blog.php?blogId=1&date_min=1280613600&date_ max=1283291999 (accessed September 1, 2010). 26. Kaos GL, “Turkey’s LGBT History.” 27. Lambda İstanbul LGBT Solidarity Association, “Lambdaistanbul,” September 6, 2006, www.lambdaistanbul.org/php/main.php?menuID=26&altMenuID=56&iceri kID=710 (accessed July 2, 2010). 28. “What Is KAOS GL?” Kaos GL, http://news.kaosgl.com/item/39 (accessed July 2, 2010). 29. Please see the report of Human Rights Watch for more details about the murder of Baki Koşar and also violence and human rights abuses based on sexual orientation and gender identity in Turkey. Human Rights Watch, “We Need a Law for Liberation” (March 21, 2008), www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/turkey 0508webwcover.pdf (accessed July 2, 2010). 30. When this parliamentary question was posed by Sabahat Tuncel in 2008, she was one of the members of parliament of the Democratic Society Party (DTP), which is a pro-Kurdish Party. But DTP was closed by the decision of the Constitutional Court on December 11, 2009. Recently, Sabahat Tuncel is one of the member of parliament of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), which is the successor of DTP. 31. Sabahat Tuncel, “Written Parliamentary Question,” Grand National Assembly of Turkey (April 16, 2008), www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d23/7/7-3103s.pdf (accessed July 4, 2010). 32. Recently, Mehmet Ali Şahin is the speaker of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. 33. Mehmet Ali Şahin, “The Written Response to Sabahat Tuncel,” Grand National Assembly of Turkey (June 6, 2008), www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d23/7/7-3103c.pdf (accessed July 4, 2010). 34. Misdemeanour Law (Kabahatler Kanunu), Article 1, Law No. 5326 (2005), www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/1460.html (June 25, 2010). 35. Buse Kılıçkaya, “Misdemeanour!” LGBT Rights Platform News Letter (February 2009), www.kaosgl.com/resim/KaosGL/Yayinlar/lgbt_bireylerin_insan_haklari_ bulteni_subat_2009.pdf (accessed July 12, 2010). 36. Amnesty International, “Turkey Urged to End Discriminatory Clampdown on Gay Rights Groups” (February 10, 2010), www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/


7/12/11 6:51 AM

150

Hakan Ataman

news/turkey-urged-end-discriminatory-clampdown-gay-rights-groups-20100210 (accessed July 4, 2010). 37. LGBTT Bireylerin İnsan Haklarını İzleme ve Hukuk Komisyonu, İnternet Sansürü, (LGBTT Bireylerin İnsan Hakları Raporu, 2007), 101–105. 38. Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Sağlık Yeteneği Yönetmeliği Ek (Hastalık ve Arızalar Listesi), Madde 17,B.3, D.4, (Bakanlar Kurulu Karar Tarihi, No. 08/10/1986—86/11092; Dayandığı Kanunlar Tarihi, No. 21/07/1927—1111; 27/07/1967—926; 04/01/1961— 211; 24/06/1965—635 ; 18/03/1986—3269 ; 16/06/1927—1076; Yayımlandığı Resmi Gazete Tarihi - No: 24/11/1986 – 19291), www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/20176.html (accessed July 4, 2010). 39. Commission of the European Communities, Turkey 2009 Progress Report, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009–2010, SEC(2009)1334, (October 14, 2009), 29, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/tr_rapport_2009_ en.pdf (accessed July 1, 2010). 40. Senem Doganoglu, “Interview by Close Up,” Execution Chronicles, Tamouz Media, www.executionchronicles.org/close-up16-hayat.htm (accessed July 4, 2010). 41. Hakan Ataman and Orhan Kemal Cengiz, “Hate Crimes in Turkey,” (Human Rights Agenda Association, 2009), 5. 42. BIA News Centre, “Transgender Murder in Istanbul” (March 11, 2009), bianet.org/english/english/113081-transgender-murder-in-istanbul (accessed February 1, 2011); Human Rights Watch, “Turkey: Transgender Activist Murdered, Government Should Prosecute Violence, Prohibit Discrimination” (March 12, 2009), www .hrw.org/en/news/2009/03/12/turkey-transgender-activist-murdered (accessed February 1, 2011); Pembe Hayat LGBTT Dayanışma Derneği, “Eşcinsel ve Transeksüeller sizin Vatandaşınız Değil mi?” (February 10, 2010), www.pembehayat.org/detay .php?cat=3&id=185 (accessed February 1, 2011); Human Rights Watch, “Letter to Turkish Government on Violence and Murders Targeting Transgender People” (February 22, 2010), www.hrw.org/node/88678 (accessed February 1, 2011). 43. Press release from LGBT organizations in Turkey by e-mail, “On that Justice and Development Party (AKP) Government removed ‘sexual identity’ phrase from the Draft Law on Combating Discrimination and Equality Committee,” (February 2, 2011). Signatory LGBT organizations: Çukurova Eşcinsel İnisiyatifi, Hevjîn Diyarbakır LGBTT Oluşumu, İstanbul-LGBTT Dayanışma Derneği, Kadın Kapısı, Kaos GL Derneği, Lambdaistanbul LGBTT Dayanışma Derneği, MorEL Eskişehir LGBTT Oluşumu, Pembe Hayat LGBTT Dayanışma Derneği, Siyah Pembe Üçgen İzmir LGBTT Derneği, Voltrans Trans Erkek İnisiyatifi. 44. Can Dündar, “Türkiye Radikalleşiyor Mu?” NEDEN? TV program by Can Dündar on ntvmsnbc (May 31, 2009) www.candundar.com.tr/index.php?Did=9896 (accessed June 18, 2010). 45. The Report of Eurobarometer, Discrimination in the EU in 2009, (November 2009), 85, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_317_en.pdf (accessed July 4, 2010). 46. Hakan Yılmaz, “‘We,’ ‘Others,’ Othering, and Discrimination in Turkey: Perceptions and Trends in the Public Opinion,” research project supported by a grant from the Open Society Foundation (Grant No: 2009001) and Bogazici University


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Less than Citizens

151

(Grant No: 07K120620), date of completion: June 2010, http://hakanyilmaz.info/ yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/HYilmaz-Otekilestirme-02-%C4%B0%C3%A7erikse lRapor.188160919.pdf (accessed July 4, 2010); for a short summary of the findings in English, please see http://hakanyilmaz.info/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/HYilmaz -Otekilestirme-05-Ingilizce-Ozet.188161937.pdf (accessed July 4, 2010). 47. Nicholas Birch, “Was Ahmet Yildiz the Victim of Turkey’s First Gay Honour Killing?” The Independent (July 19, 2008), www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ europe/was-ahmet-yildiz-the-victim-of-turkeys-first-gay-honour-killing-871822.html (accessed July 4, 2010). 48. The Newspaper of Turkish Bears Group, one of the LGBT communities in Turkey. 49. Şermin Terzi, “Ahmet, Töre Cinayetine Mi Kurban Gitti?” Hürriyet Gazetesi (February 1, 2009), www.hurriyet.com.tr/pazar/10900920.asp (accessed June 4, 2010). 50. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, “The Badness of Discrimination,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9, (March 8, 2006): 173. 51. The Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO serves as the regional office of the World Health Organization), “Latin American Countries Launch Programs to Improve Health Care for Sexual Minorities,” Washington, D.C. (May 15, 2008), www.paho.org/english/dd/pin/pr080515.htm (accessed September 1, 2010). 52. The American Psychiatric Association, “Therapies Focused on Attempts to Change Sexual Orientation (Reparative or Conversion Therapies),” Position Statement (March–May 2009), www.psych.org/Departments/EDU/Library/APAOfficialDocu mentsandRelated/PositionStatements/200001.aspx (accessed December 10, 2008). 53. Thomas Hammarberg, “Gay Pride Marches Should Be Allowed—and Protected,” Council of Europe (July 24, 2006), www.coe.int/t/commissioner/View points/060724_en.asp (September 1, 2010); “Discrimination against Transgender Persons Must No Longer Be Tolerated,” Council of Europe (January 5, 2009), www .coe.int/t/commissioner/Viewpoints/090105_en.asp (accessed September 1, 2010). 54. Lambda İstanbul Sivil Toplum İnisiyatifi (Lambda İstanbul), Bir Alan Araştırması: Eşcinsel ve Biseksüellerin Sorunları (Istanbul: Lambda İstanbul, 2006), 82–96. 55. Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review, “‘Homosexuality Is a Disease’ says Turkish Minister,” Hurriyet (March 7, 2010), www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n .php?n=8216homosexuality-is-a-disease8217-says-minister-2010-03-07 (accessed April 2, 2010). 56. Gregory M. Herek, “Stigma, Prejudice and Violence against Lesbians and Gay Men,” in Homosexuality: Research Implications for Public Policy, edited by John C. Gonsiorek and James D. Weinrich (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991), 60–80. 57. AVERT, “Homophobia, Prejudice & Attitudes to Gay Men and Lesbians,” www.avert.org/homophobia.htm (accessed July 12, 2010). 58. Ali Eyüboğlu, “Tarkan: Gül Haddini Aştı,” Milliyet Gazetesi (April 15, 2001), www.milliyet.com.tr/2001/04/15/yasam/ayas.html (accessed September 1, 2010); Sema Denker, “Hatırlı Kişiler Devrede,” Hürriyet Gazetesi (April 19, 2001), webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2001/04/19/320967.asp (accessed September 1, 2010). 59. Nadire Mater, “Pop Stars Sexuality Sparks Debate,” İstanbul Interpress Service (January 17, 2002), http://bianet.org/english/politics/3379-pop-stars-sexuality-sparks


7/12/11 6:51 AM

152

Hakan Ataman

-debate (accessed September 1, 2010). According to indictments, Mehmet Gül was one of the perpetrators of the bombing attack in 1978: Hakan Ataman. 60. Melek Göregenli, “Homophobia as an Ideology of Inter-Group Relations and Discrimination,” in LGBT in Turkey (Ankara: Kaos GL, 2006), 28–29. 61. Doğu Perinçek, “Eşcinsellik ve Yabancılaşma,” www.doguperincek.info/ escinsellik-ve-yabancilasma.htm (accessed September 1,. 2010). 62. Remzi Altunpolat, “Sol ve LGBTT,” Kaos GL (September 13, 2010), kaosgl .org/icerik/sol_ve_lgbtt (accessed September 13, 2010). 63. Lambda İstanbul, Bir Alan Araştırması (2006), 78–79. 64. Tarık Bereket, “Islam & Men: Homosexuality in Turkey,” in LGBT in Turkey (Ankara: Kaos GL, 2006), 60. 65. Muhtar Çokar, “The Human Resource Development Foundation’s Experience with Sex Workers,” in LGBT in Turkey (Ankara: Kaos GL, 2006), 53–54. 66. Figen Çok, “Sexual Orientation in Teacher Education: Personal Experience,” in LGBT in Turkey (Ankara: Kaos GL, 2006), 24. 67. Gregory M. Herek, “Beyond “Homophobia: Thinking about Sexual Prejudice and Stigma in the Twenty-First Century,” Journal of NSRC1, no. 2 (April 2004), 20. 68. Please see for useful recommendations: Sema Buz, “The Social Work about LGBT Individuals,” and Hakan Geçim, “LGBT Movement in Turkey and European Union,” in LGBT in Turkey (Ankara: Kaos GL, 2006), 35, 43; Human Rights Watch, “We Need a Law for Liberation,” Gender, Sexuality, and Human Rights in a Changing Turkey (Chicago: HRW, 2008), 103–108, www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/turkey0508web wcover.pdf (accessed September 1, 2010); Thomas Hammarberg, “Forced Divorce and Sterilisation—A Reality for Many Transgender Persons,” Council of Europe (August 31, 2010), http://commissioner.cws.coe.int/tiki-view_blog.php?blogId=1&date_ min=1280613600&date_max=1283291999 (accessed September 1, 2010); “Time to Recognise That Human Rights Principles Apply Also to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity,” Council of Europe (May 14, 2008), www.coe.int/t/commissioner/ Viewpoints/080514_en.asp (accessed September 1, 2010); “Homophobic Policies Are Slow to Disappear,” Council of Europe (May 16, 2007), www.coe.int/t/commis sioner/Viewpoints/070516_en.asp (accessed September 1, 2010).

Bibliography Akat, Asaf Savaş. “1923–1950 Arası Sağ Bir Diktatörlüktür.” In Sol Kemalizme Bakıyor, edited by Levan Cinemre and Ruşen Çakır (Istanbul: Metis Yay, 1991), 76–92. Altuğ, Yılmaz. “Atatürk and Building of a Modern Nation State.” Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi, Sayı 7, Cilt III (November 1986). www.atam.gov.tr/index.php ?Page=DergiIcerik&IcerikNo=966 (accessed September 1, 2010). Altunpolat, Remzi. “Sol ve LGBTT.” Kaos GL (September 2010). kaosgl.org/icerik/ sol_ve_lgbtt (accessed September 13, 2010). The American Psychological Association. “Fact and Information Sheet about American Psychological Association Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Concerns Policy State-


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Less than Citizens

153

ments.” www.jmu.edu/safezone/wm_library/APA%20Policy%20Statements%20 Fact%20Sheet.pdf (accessed July 4, 2010). The American Psychiatric Association. “Therapies Focused on Attempts to Change Sexual Orientation (Reparative or Conversion Therapies).” Position Statement, March–May 2009. www.psych.org/Departments/EDU/Library/APAOfficialDocu mentsandRelated/PositionStatements/200001.aspx (accessed December 10, 2008). Amnesty International. “Turkey Urged to End Discriminatory Clampdown on Gay Rights Groups.” February 10, 2010. www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/ news/turkey-urged-end-discriminatory-clampdown-gay-rights-groups-20100210 (accessed July 4, 2010). Arat, Yeşim. “The Project of Modernity and Women in Turkey.” In Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey, edited by Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba, 101. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997. Ataman, Hakan and Orhan Kemal Cengiz. “Hate Crimes in Turkey.” Human Rights Agenda Association, 2009, 5. Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal. “Atatürk’s 1933 Speech at the 10th Anniversary of the Republic of Turkey.” Turkish Times (November 1–15, 2002). ———. “Atatürk Declares! Turkish Women and Their Rights.” Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, 2005. www.kultur.gov.tr/EN/Genel/ BelgeGoster.aspx?17A16AE30572D313AC8287D72AD903BED47E923BC03 0BA43 (accessed September 1, 2010). ———. “Seçim Dolayısı ile Millete Beyanname” (20.IV.1931), Taha Parla, Türkiye’de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları Cilt 2, Atatürk’ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, 196. Deniz Yay, 2008. Ateş, Toktamış. Biz Devrimi Çok Seviyoruz. Istanbul: Der Yay, 1998. ———. “Kemalizm ve Özgünlüğü.” In Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Kemalizm, Cilt 2, edited by Ahmet İnsel, 317–322. Istanbul: İletişim, 2002. Avert. “Homophobia, Prejudice & Attitudes to Gay Men and Lesbians.” www.avert .org/homophobia.htm (accessed July 12, 2010). Başkaya, Fikret. Pradigmanın İflası. Istanbul: Doz Yay, 1996. Belge Net. CHP Kurultayları. 2000. www.belgenet.com/parti/chpkurultay.html (September 1, 2010). Bereket, Tarık. “Islam & Men: Homosexuality in Turkey.” In LGBT in Turkey, 60. Ankara: Kaos GL, 2006. Birch, Nicholas. “Was Ahmet Yildiz the Victim of Turkey’s First Gay Honour Lilling?” The Independent, July 19, 2008. www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ europe/was-ahmet-yildiz-the-victim-of-turkeys-first-gay-honour-killing-871822 .html (accessed July 4, 2010). Bumin, Kürşat. “Yanlız Başına Bağımsızlıkla Demokrasi Olmaz.” In Sol Kemalizme Bakıyor, edited by Levent Cinemre and Ruşen Çakır, 55–75. Istanbul: Metis Yay, 1991. Buz, Sema. “The Social Work About LGBT Individuals.” In LGBT in Turkey, 35. Ankara: Kaos GL, 2006. The Commission of the European Communities. Turkey 2009 Progress Report, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009–2010. SEC(2009)1334, (October 14,


7/12/11 6:51 AM

154

Hakan Ataman

2009). http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2009/tr_rapport_2009_ en.pdf (accessed July 1, 2010). Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey. The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (1982), Chapter Four, Political Rights and Duties. www.anayasa.gov.tr/ index.php?l=template&id=210&lang=1&c=1 (accessed August 18, 2006). Crompton, Louis. Homosexuality and Civilization. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003. Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP). CHP Tarihi. www.chp.org.tr/Zaman-Tuneli.aspx (accessed September 1, 2010). Çakır, Serpil. “Women’s Movement in Turkey: Historical Process and Changing Paradigms.” Seventh European Social Science History Conference, February 26–March 1, 2008. www2.iisg.nl/esshc/programme.asp?selyear=9&pap=5654 (accessed September 1, 2010). Çok, Figen. “Sexual Orientation in Teacher Education: Personal Experience.” In LGBT in Turkey, 24. Ankara: Kaos GL, 2006. Çokar, Muhtar. “The Human Resource Development Foundation’s Experience with Sex Workers.” In LGBT in Turkey, 53–54. Ankara: Kaos GL, 2006. Davis, Terry. “Hate, Hypocrites and Human Rights.” The Council of Europe, May 2007. www.coe.int/t/secretarygeneral/sg/Oped/2007/Hate_hypocrisy_and_ human_rights_EN.asp (accessed July 2, 2010). ———. “International Day against Homophobia, 17 May.” Press release 395(2009), The Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France, May 15, 2009. wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc .jsp?id=1445137&Site=DC (accessed July, 2010). Denker, Sema. “Hatırlı Kişiler Devrede.” Hürriyet Gazetesi, April 19, 2001. http:// webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2001/04/19/320967.asp (accessed September 1, 2010). Doganoglu, Senem. “Interview by Close Up.” Execution Chronicles, Tamouz Media. www.executionchronicles.org/close-up16-hayat.htm (accessed July 4, 2010). Dündar, Can. “Türkiye Radikalleşiyor Mu?” NEDEN? TV program by Can Dündar on ntvmsnbc, May 31, 2009. www.candundar.com.tr/index.php?Did=9896 (accessed June 18, 2010). Eurobarometer. Discrimination in the EU in 2009. November 2009. http://ec.europa .eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_317_en.pdf (accessed July 4, 2010). Geçim, Hakan. “LGBT Movement in Turkey and European Union.” In LGBT in Turkey, 43. Ankara: Kaos GL, 2006. Giritli, İsmet. “Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılapçılığa Dair.” Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi, Sayı 37, Cilt XIII (March 1997). www.atam.gov.tr/index.php?Page=Print &DergiIcerikNo=691&Yer=DergiIcerik (accessed September 1, 2010). Göle, Nilüfer. The Forbidden Modern: Civilisation and Veiling. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996. Göregenli, Melek. “Homophobia as an Ideology of Inter-Group Relations and Discrimination.” In LGBT in Turkey, 28–29. Ankara: Kaos GL, 2006. Gündüz, Zuhal Yeşilyurt. “The Women’s Movement in Turkey: From Tazminat towards European Union Membership.” Perception, Journal of International Affairs 9 (March–May 2004): 123.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Less than Citizens

155

———. “Discrimination Against Transgender Persons Must No Longer Be Tolerated.” Council of Europe, January 5, 2009. www.coe.int/t/commissioner/View points/090105_en.asp (accessed September 1, 2010). ———. “Forced Divorce and Sterilisation—A Reality for Many Transgender Persons.” Council of Europe, August 31, 2010. commissioner.cws.coe.int/tiki-view_ blog.php?blogId=1&date_min=1280613600&date_max=1283291999 (accessed September 1, 2010). Hammarberg, Thomas. “Gay Pride Marches Should Be Allowed—and Protected.” Council of Europe, July 24, 2006. www.coe.int/t/commissioner/View points/060724_en.asp (accessed September 1 2010). ———. “Homophobic Policies Are Slow to Disappear.” Council of Europe,May 16, 2007. www.coe.int/t/commissioner/Viewpoints/070516_en.asp (accessed September 1, 2010). ———. “Time to Recognise That Human Rights Principles Apply Also to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity.” Council of Europe, May 14, 2008. www.coe.int/t/ commissioner/Viewpoints/080514_en.asp (accessed September 1, 2010). Heger, Heinz. The Men with the Pink Triangle: The True Life-and-Death Story of Homosexuals in the Nazi Death Camps. Translated by David Fernbach. London: Alyson Publications, 1994. ———. “Beyond ‘Homophobia’: Thinking about Sexual Prejudice and Stigma in the Twenty-First Century.” Journal of NSRC 1, no. 2 (April 2004): 20. Herek, Gregory M. “Stigma, Prejudice and Violence against Lesbians and Gay Men.” In Homosexuality: Research Implications for Public Policy, edited by John C. Gonsiorek and James D. Weinrich, 60–80. Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1991. “The History of the Gay Male and Lesbian Experience during World War II.” Symbols. www.pink-triangle.org/ (accessed September 1, 2010). Human Rights Watch. “We Need a Law for Liberation.” March 21. 2008. www.hrw .org/sites/default/files/reports/turkey0508webwcover.pdf (accessed July 2, 2010). Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review. “‘Homosexuality Is a Disease’ Says Turkish Minister.” Hurriyet, March 7, 2010. www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n .php?n=8216homosexuality-is-a-disease8217-says-minister-2010-03-07 (accessed April 2, 2010). İnan, Afet. Atatürk Hakkında Hatıralar ve Belgeler, Haz. Arı İnan. Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yay, 2009. Kaos-GL. “Turkey’s LGBT History.” http://news.kaosgl.com/turkey_lgbt_history.php (accessed July 2, 2010). ———. “What Is KAOS GL?” http://news.kaosgl.com/item/39 (accessed July 2, 2010). Karacası, Barış. “‘Mavi Kemalizm’ Türk Hümanizmi ve Anadoluculuk.” In Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Kemalizm, Cilt 2, edited by Ahmet İnsel, 334–343. Istanbul: İletişim, 2002. Karal, Enver Ziya. “The Principles of Kemalism. In Ataturk, Founder of a Modern State, edited by Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Ozbudun, 11–19. London: Hurst & Company, 1997.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

156

Hakan Ataman

Kazancıgil, Ali. “Anti-Emperyalist Bağımsızlık İdeolojisi ve Üçüncü Dünya Ulusçuluğu Olarak Kemalizm.” In Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Kemalizm, Cilt 2, edited by Ahmet İnsel, 235–246. Istanbul: İletişim, 2002. Kılıçkaya, Buse. “Misdemeanour!” LGBT Rights Platform News Letter, February 2009. www.kaosgl.com/resim/KaosGL/Yayinlar/lgbt_bireylerin_insan_haklari_ bulteni_subat_2009.pdf (accessed July 12, 2010). ———. “Kemalizm/Atatürkçülük: Modernleşme, Devlet ve Demokrasi.” In Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Kemalizm, Cilt 2, edited by Ahmet İnsel, 97–112. Istanbul: İletişim, 2002. Köker. Levent. “Sol Çağdaşlaşma Adına Kemalizmi Hep Onayladı.” In Sol Kemalizme Bakıyor, edited by Levent Cinemre and Ruşen Çakır, 25–42. Istanbul: Metis Yay, 1991. Kurtoğlu, Ayça. “Sex Reassignment, Biological Reproduction and Sexual Citizenship in Turkey.” Fe Dergi 1, no. 2 (2009): 84. Lambda İstanbul Sivil Toplum İnisiyatifi (Lambda İstanbul). Bir Alan Araştırması: Eşcinsel ve Biseksüellerin Sorunları. Istanbul: Lambda İstanbul, 2006. Lambdaistanbul LGBT Solidarity Association. Lambdaistanbul, September 6, 2006. www.lambdaistanbul.org/php/main.php?menuID=26&altMenuID=56&iceri kID=710 (accessed July 2, 2010). Misdemeanour Law (Kabahatler Kanunu), Article 1, Law No. 5326 (2005). www .mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/1460.html (accessed June 25, 2010). The New Draft Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasa Önerisi). Chapter Three: Political Rights and Duties, Citizenship, Article 35, Alternative 2. http://ntvmsnbc.arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/419859.asp (accessed July 4, 2010). Ozbudun, Ergun. “The Nature of the Kemalist Political Regime.” In Ataturk, Founder of a Modern State, edited by Ali Kazancıgil and Ergun Ozbudun, 87–89. Hurst and Company, 1997. Öngider, Seyfi. “Kemalizme En Büyük Darbeyi Son Dönemde Kürt Hareketi Vurdu.” In Sol Kemalizme Bakıyor, edited by Levent Cinemre and Ruşen Çakır, 142–156. Istanbul: Metis Yay, 1991. Pan American Health Organization. “Latin American Countries Launch Programs to Improve Health Care for Sexual Minorities.” Washington, D.C.: PAHO, May 15, 2008. www.paho.org/english/dd/pin/pr080515.htm (accessed September 1, 2010). Parla, Taha. “Kemalizm Türk Aydınlanması mı?” In Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Kemalizm, Cilt 2, edited by Ahmet İnsel, 313–319. Istanbul: İletişim, 2002. Parla, Taha and Andrew Davison. Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey: Progress or Order? New York: Syracuse University Press, 2004. Perinçek, Doğu. “Eşcinsellik ve Yabancılaşma.” www.doguperincek.info/escinsellik -ve-yabancilasma.htm (accessed September 1, 2010). Rasmussen, Kasper Lippert. “The Badness of Discrimination.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 9 (March 8, 2006): 173. Saktanberg, Ayşe. “Kemalist Kadın Söylemi.” In Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Kemalizm, Cilt 2, edited by Ahmet İnsel, 323–333. Istanbul: İletişim, 2002.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Less than Citizens

157

Şahin, Mehmet Ali. “The Written Response to Sabahat Tuncel.” Grand National Assembly of Turkey June 6, 2008. www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d23/7/7-3103c.pdf (accessed July 4, 2010). ———. “Meaning and Limits of Feminist Ideology in Turkey.” In Women, Family and Social Change in Turkey, edited by Ferhunde Ozbay, 145. Bangkok: UNESCO, 1990. Tekeli, Şirin. “Tek Parti Döneminde Kadın Hareketi Bastırıldı.” InSol Kemalizme Bakıyor, edited by Levent Cinemre and Ruşen Çakır, 93–107. Istanbul: Metis Yay, 1991. ———. “The Turkish Women’s Movement: A Brief History of Success.” European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed). www.iemed.org/publicacions/quaderns/7/193_ Tekeli.pdf (accessed September 1, 2010). ———. “Women in Turkish Politics.” In Women in Turkish Society, edited by Nermin Abadan-Unat, 293–310. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981. Terzi, Şermin. “Ahmet, Töre Cinayetine mi Kurban Gitti?” Hürriyet Gazetesi, February 1, 2009. www.hurriyet.com.tr/pazar/10900920.asp (accessed June 4, 2010). Tuncel, Sabahat. “Written Parliamentary Question.” Grand National Assembly of Turkey, April 16, 2008. www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d23/7/7-3103s.pdf (accessed July 4, 2010). Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri Sağlık Yeteneği Yönetmeliği Ek (Hastalık ve Arızalar Listesi). Madde 17,B.3, D.4. (Bakanlar Kurulu Karar Tarihi: No. 08/10/1986— 86/11092; Dayandığı Kanunlar Tarihi: No: 21/07/1927—1111; 27/07/1967—926; 04/01/1961—211; 24/06/1965—635; 18/03/1986—3269; 16/06/1927—1076; Yayımlandığı Resmi Gazete Tarihi: No. 24/11/1986). Yeğen, Mesut. Müstakbel Türk’ten Sözde Vatandaşa Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler. Istanbul: İletişim Yay, 2006. Yıldız, Ahmet. “Kemalist Milliyetçilik.” In Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce, Kemalizm, Cilt 2, edited by Ahmet İnsel, 210–234. Istanbul: İletişim, 2002. Yılmaz, Hakan. “‘We,’ ‘Others,’ Othering, and Discrimination in Turkey: Perceptions and Trends in the Public Opinion.” Research project supported by a grant from the Open Society Foundation (Grant No: 2009001) and Bogazici University (Grant No: 07K120620). Date of completion: June 2010. hakanyilmaz.info/ yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/HYilmaz-Otekilestirme-02-%C4%B0%C3%A7erik selRapor.188160919.pdf (accessed July 4, 2010). The Yogyakarta Principles. The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. Geneva, March 26, 2007. www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/index.html (accessed July 1, 2010).


7/12/11 6:51 AM


7/12/11 6:51 AM

7 Turks of African Origin and Citizenship Esma Durugönül

S

1980S and especially during the 1990s, in Turkey and elsewhere in the world, one of the most important aspects of political, economical, and cultural life has been the emergence of demands and conflicts concerning cultural identity.* Similar developments have been witnessed in recent years in the context of Turks of African origin. In 2005 Mustafa Olpak’s book1 was published. In November 2006 the African Culture Solidarity and Cooperation Association2 was founded by Mustafa Olpak, a marble worker living in Ayvalık, Western Turkey, whose maternal family originated from Africa. The History Foundation in Istanbul and UNESCO supported an oral history project undertaken along the western coast of Turkey in order to record what information could be obtained from elderly people of African ancestry.3 In February 2007 a documentary on Ottoman slavery was broadcast on one of the state television channels.4 Since 2007, the traditional Calf Festival (Dana Bayramı), has been celebrated in May each year by Afro-Turks in Izmir. The celebration has been organized by the African Culture Solidarity and Cooperation Association to revitalize one of their oldest traditions. According to Deniz Yükseker, “Dana Bayramı” was celebrated from 1880 until the end of the 1920s. Yükseker adds that, “Leaders of the Afro-Turk community, known as ‘godya,’ used to collect money in order to buy a cow. On the first Saturday in May, they sacrificed this cow. Failing to make this sacrifice would cause draughts, according INCE THE

∗I would like to express my gratitude to the Akdeniz University Scientific Research Projects Administration Unit, which has supported the research on African Turks in the region of Antalya. I also owe thanks to Professor Dr. Ehud R. Toledano for his ongoing encouragement and support over the years.

— 159 —


7/12/11 6:51 AM

160

Esma Durugönül

to popular folklore.” Dana Bayramı was celebrated in İzmir for three weeks, according to Yükseker.5 The feast, celebrated for the first time in many years in 2007, now lasts two days.6 In July 2008 the results of the above-mentioned oral history project were presented at a meeting in Izmir, along with papers by other scholars working on the topic. In October 2010 a documentary entitled “I am Black, I am African, I am Turkish” (Siyahım Afrikalıyım Türküm) was broadcast by the state television corporation, TRT. What are the reasons for this newfound interest in Afro-Turk identity? Why is a group of people whose existence has been little known to Turkish society trying to make their voice heard today? Who are they? How and why did Turkish citizens of African origin come to this part of the world? Under what circumstances do they live? What problems do they experience? Are they discriminated against? What implications are there for citizenship in Turkey?

The Historical and Contemporary Sources Apart from two recent studies of Turks of African origin living in Antalya7 and in Izmir,8 there are few sources of historical or contemporary information about Turks of African origin. Unfortunately, sources on Ottoman slavery are very scarce. Additionally, in Turkey and Southwest Asia there is no large, conscious, and sociopolitically active community of people who consider themselves descendants of enslaved people or slaveholders such as exists in the United States of America or South America. It seems that the account of people of African origin in Turkey has, without vocal demand for the investigation of their past, been ignored, which prevents Turkish society as a whole from coming to terms with its past. Very few referable, scholarly works exist in Turkish. However, researchers have turned to a few novels published after the foundation of the Turkish Republic wherein people of African ancestry appear as child minders and domestic servants.9 The Russian scholar Nikolai Dobronravin, for example, investigated Reşat Nuri Gültekin’s novel entitled Gökyüzü (Heaven), wherein the character Asude, a child minder, appears. Dobronravin was able to identify plausible references to Asude’s knowledge of Hausa10 folklore when compared to an anthology of Hausa culture edited by Frank Edgar, particularly the story “Labarin ‘Mamayad-duniya,’ da uwatai, da ubanai” (“Mamayad-Duniya, His Mother and His Father”).11


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Turks of African Origin and Citizenship

161

Nevertheless, as Toledano notes, since the end of the 1980s there is an increasing willingness among Turkish scholars to investigate Ottoman slavery. For example, Y. Hakan Erdem’s doctoral thesis, completed in 1993, is a study on “Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise 1800–1909.”12 This was followed by the Turkish translation of Ehud R. Toledano’s valuable study on the nineteenth-century Ottoman slave trade in 1994.13 Sagaster’s work on the changing image of slaves in the works of Turkish authors of the late Ottoman Empire is another notable example of recent investigation.14 Evaluation of literature confirms that little research has been done on the African Diaspora in Turkey. In Antalya, which is home to a sizable population of African Turks, no previous studies are known.

Historical Facts In the Ottoman Empire slavery was a “natural” phenomenon and enshrined in law as an integral part of the social structure. The slave trade flourished from the fifteenth century until the Ottoman Empire collapsed during the First World War.15 Various forms of slavery were traditionally practiced in Ottoman society and had their origins in common, socially accepted practices associated with the rise of the Ottoman state in the thirteenth century.16 Y. Hakan Erdem notes that in the Ottoman Empire slaves attained high positions and made up half of the administrative class; however, they never acted to seize power or to transform the state as witnessed in the Mamluk sultanate in Egypt.17 According to Lewis, the Russian conquest of the Caucasus in the early years of the nineteenth century led to a reduction in the supply of slaves to the Ottoman Empire but not to the termination of the trade. As Lewis argues, the Ottomans, who were deprived of most of their sources of white, Slavic slaves, turned increasingly to Africa, which during the nineteenth century provided the vast majority of slaves used in Muslim countries from Morocco to Asia.18 Erdem agrees with Lewis on this matter but adds, however, that the change in source had much to do with changes in the African market, which began to offer more favourable terms and proximity to the slave entrepôts areas. After Egypt conquered the Sudan the number of slaves in the Egyptian markets increased, and some of these slaves would continue their journey northwards, reaching Anatolian19 cities. Erdem further argues that similarly, as Tripoli was reconquered in 1835, its relations with the center became stronger, and the slave exports from this city increased to Anatolia. The Tripoli market traded in slaves from areas such as Bornu, Bagirmi, and


7/12/11 6:51 AM

162

Esma Durugönül

Waday. Erdem argues that the migration of Circassians, which increased the number of white slaves in the Empire, also coincided with an increase in the number of black slaves. He therefore rejects the idea that these two sources of slaves were mutually exclusive and adds that such interpretations are based on pre-1881 assessments of the Ottoman Empire when there were significantly fewer black slaves.20 Erdem notes, in this context, that due to the patriarchal structure of the Ottoman Empire, all those in state service, except for the judges (kadı) who belonged to the class of ulema21 were regarded as the kuls of the sultan. He adds that, in fact, not all members of the “kul institution”22 were of slave origin. In the course of time increasing use was made of the term kul for freeborn Muslims of nonslave origin as well.23 According to Toledano, in Ottoman society by the late 1830s (the Tanzimat period)24 “the ‘real slave’ population consisted of female and male, African and white, domestic and kul/harem slaves” and “the overwhelming majority of Ottoman slaves were female, African and domestic; males, white females and kul/harem slaves were only a small minority.”25 Toledano adds that “although cruelty by slave traders and ill-usage by slave owners were repudiated, both traffic and slaveholding were legal, socially acceptable and a matter over which no serious moral question arose until late in the nineteenth century.”26 The availability of imported slaves appears to have been a critical requisite for the perpetuity of Ottoman slavery. Practices such as “early manumission, the free status accorded to the offspring of master-slave unions, and the mandatory liberation of such bonded mothers after the master’s death,” which were all based upon Islamic and ethical regulations, brought about the decline of the slave population.27 Toledano continues by noting that slave reproduction was not practiced in Ottoman society, and it was required, for social and legal reasons, to replenish its slave population through conquest, forced recruitment, or trade. He adds that for the households of the Ottoman elite of the nineteenth century, the slavetrading network had become the only source of slaves.28 Toledano notes that African slaves were drawn from Central Africa (Waday, Bornu, Bagirmi) and the Sudan (the White and Blue Nile basins, Kordofan and Darfur); Ethiopian slaves were imported from western Ethiopia, mainly from the Galla/Oromo, Sidamo, and Gurage principalities; and Circassian and Georgian slaves reached the empire from the Caucasus. From Africa, slaves were run via the trans-Sahara desert routes, the Ethiopian plateau, the Nile Valley, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the pilgrimage routes to and from Arabia. . . . The number of slaves imported into the empire varied greatly from route to route and from period to period for the same route according to changing economic conditions in both the source region and the importing Ottoman province.29


7/12/11 6:51 AM


163

Toledano argues that “the average number of slaves imported into the empire every year during much of the first seventy years of the nineteenth century ranged from 16,000 to 18,000” and adds that “the rise in the slave trade to the East coincided with the decline of the Atlantic traffic.” With the decline of the Atlantic market, the price of slaves fell, and according to Toledano many more slaves were subsequently traded on the African market and for export to the East. At the same time the demand for slave labor in the Ottoman Middle East and North Africa increased due to economic growth in the first half of the nineteenth century. Toledano mentions that, consequently, the slave trade was diverted from the West to the East,30 and he speaks of “three slave markets in Africa during the nineteenth century: the European export market, intended mainly for the Americas (including the Caribbean); the Muslim market, intended for the Ottoman (including Arab), Moroccan, Iranian and Indian markets; and the internal African market” and continues by noting that “the last was the largest and consisted mostly of women and children, whereas the European and the Muslim markets were roughly comparable in size, the Muslim being slightly smaller.”31 According to Sharia Muslim law, there exist no class distinctions among slaves; therefore they are rather regarded as one legal category. Toledano points out, however, that a clear hierarchy, which was apparent in price, employment, and social standing, was observed among Ottoman slaves that resulted from the prevailing social conditions and cultural attitudes. Slaves of Circassian and Georgian origin were the most favored in contrast to the Africans (with some internal differentiation favoring the Ethiopians). Toledano mentions that “almost all African slaves served in menial jobs along with a fair number of white slaves” and further that “many white female slaves and a certain number of Ethiopian ones became concubines and often wives to their masters.”32 Forced migration from Africa to the Ottoman territories during the nineteenth century is estimated33 as follows: from the Swahili Coasts to the Ottoman Middle East and India, 313,000; across the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, 492,000; into Ottoman Egypt, 362,000; and into Ottoman North Africa (Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya), 350,000. Excluding those sent to India, this constitutes an estimated mass population movement of 1.3 million people. Toledano proceeds with the statement that the number of enslaved Africans coerced into domestic African and Ottoman markets swelled in the midnineteenth century due to the shrinking Atlantic traffic and adds that although these figures should have resulted in a fairly noticeable African Diaspora into both Turkey and the successor Arab states of the Middle East and North Africa and even into the Balkans, only scattered traces can be found of persons of African descent in these regions.34


7/12/11 6:51 AM

164

Esma Durugönül

Today in Turkey, several African-origin, agricultural communities exist in western Anatolian towns such as Torbalı, Söke, Ödemiş, Tire, and Akhisar; in the province of Aydın near Izmir; and in the Antalya region. Toledano notes, in Izmir, where the largest African population in the Ottoman Empire lived at the end of the nineteenth century, the estimated number of 2,000 African residents in the first half of the twentieth century is disputed as too high. Since African Ottomans and African Turks were considered Muslims and Turks, they are virtually statistically nonexistent.35 After pointing out that people of African lineage were found in greater numbers in the post-Ottoman Levant, in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and North Africa, among the various Bedouin tribes in the desert areas, and in settled villages bordering on desert areas, Toledano adds that Africans of slave origins seem to have a larger presence in Egypt than elsewhere in the Middle East and further that only a small fraction of the descendants of enslaved Africans remain in the post-Ottoman Mediterranean region. He continues by asking what happened to them and mentions several explanations that have been put forward: The most common is that many enslaved persons perished because they were not used to the cold weather and because they suffered from contagious pulmonary diseases. The life expectancy of survivors was also quite low. In addition, Islamic law and Ottoman social norms sanctioned concubinage and subsequent absorption into the host societies. An enslaved woman impregnated by her owner could not be sold, her offspring were considered free, and she herself was freed upon the death of her master. Thus the passage of several generations ensured not only the social absorption of such free children but also their visible disappearance.36

The Present Situation of Afro-Turks The preliminary results of a study on the “Afro-Turks in the Region of Antalya and the Question of Identity,”37 undertaken in the region of Antalya in 2003, and the results of the project entitled “Voices from a Silent Past: The Yesterday and Today of Being of African Origin,” which was conducted in the western Aegean region by the History Foundation in Istanbul with the aim of recording the experiences of citizens of African origin in order to contribute to their visibility, may help to inform conclusions concerning the citizenship of Afro-Turks. The research project was undertaken around Izmir; it was initiated on October 1, 2007, and continued for 11 months. Data were collected in two ways. Primarily written, visual, and audible sources were examined, evaluated, and brought together in a database by a team consisting of volunteers and profes-


7/12/11 6:51 AM


165

sionals. The other part of the research data was compiled by an oral history field research team consisting of members of the Africans Solidarity, Culture, and Cooperation Association, founded in 2006, and professionals.38 Audiovisual recordings were made of the life stories of 100 persons39 from different socioeconomic positions whose narratives included being brought or kidnapped from Africa during the Ottoman period. The interviewees were determined according to sex, age, profession, and the region where they live.40 Today, most African Turks live in the western Aegean region, primarily the provinces Izmir, Aydın, and Muğla. They can also be found in small towns and villages in the provinces of Antalya41 and Adana along the Mediterranean coast.42 The study conducted in Antalya investigated the current circumstances of the grandchildren of African slaves. Keeping in mind that identity, according to the classical works of identity research by Mead, Berger, and Luckmann, is a product of interaction and communication, the study also attempted to investigate these people’s perceptions of themselves and their process of identity construction.43 The study sought to establish how these people differentiate between themselves and “other” Turks, that is, their perception of themselves and the perception of their social environment towards them. The study also investigates how Afro-Turks contribute to Turkish culture and how they are influenced by Turkish culture. A further important hypothesis of the study is that, while constructing identities in the diaspora, the position of the “homeland” in the context of the world stratification system plays an important role. The study also sets out the hypothesis that while constructing their identities, given their ancestors’ being slaves, the Afro-Turks being grandchildren of slaves, and the position of African countries in the world, study participants might initially reject being identified as of African origin. The only way to obtain information on African Turks, especially those living around Antalya, was the collection of data through empirical methods, particularly from elderly persons with firsthand experiences concerning their past. Following up on a lead44 that people who were originally brought from Africa currently reside in the Kundu region of Antalya, visits were paid to the region and this information was verified. Subsequently, people living in other villages were reached through contacts with people living in Kundu. Historical sources offer some information that partly illuminates the reasons why African Turks were brought to the western Aegean region. According to written sources a great number of slaves were brought from Africa to work on tobacco and cotton fields as a result of increasing foreign investments especially in the western Aegean in the second half of the nineteenth century.45


7/12/11 6:51 AM

166

Esma Durugönül

During the search for persons who had at least one African parent and whose family had been living in the western Aegean region for at least four generations, it was found significant that they reside in settlements located in the plains of western Anatolia or in areas very close to the Aegean coast from the north to the south.46 The narratives of the life stories of African Turks living in urban or rural parts of the western Aegean region for four generations indicate that they do not consider themselves to have experienced segregation from different social or cultural groups due to their skin color. The determining factor concerning the neighborhood where they live is the socioeconomic situation of their families rather than social and cultural qualities.47 As in Antalya, it was determined that participants residing in the western Aegean are assimilated into the society they are living in and further that they do not consider themselves to constitute a different social category. According to another result of the Izmir Project, it is important to note that the mobility patterns of families of African origin around Izmir are similar to the dynamics of internal migration in Turkey in general.48 In the past those who lived in cities around the Izmir province were afforded greater educational opportunities than those living in small settlements. In a few villages around Izmir49 the generation of people of 70 years of age was not able to attend school as there were no schools in proximity. Similar findings were noted for villages around Söke, Bafa, Milas, and Köyceğiz. The elder generation in Ayvalık and the northern Aegean area were able to attend primary and secondary school, but they had to go to Izmir or Balıkesir for high school. Many others in the Aegean region had to go to Izmir or Denizli for high school in the 1960s and 1970s. Among the elder generation of African Turks very few, apart from children of some wealthy families in Izmir, were able to attend university. At the time of the research it was recorded that children of nomadic, Bosnian, or African origin in the villages of Torbalı near Izmir were not able to attend school. The reason for this was given as the lack of transport facilities in the area. Generally, the research found that Afro-Turks over 20 years of age living in villages had not been able to attend high school due to a lack of transport facilities, whereas those under 20 years of age were able to attend high school because of improved transport services. Afro-Turks around the age of 20 were found to experience problems when they go to cities other than Izmir, Istanbul, and Ankara for university education, as people regard them as strangers due to a lack of knowledge of the existence of African Turks in society.50 Agriculture is the most important economic activity in the western Aegean region today. Turks of African origin over the age of 70 living in rural areas are either waged agricultural workers or work on their own farms. Those edu-


7/12/11 6:51 AM


167

cated and socioeconomically better situated and living in cities are generally teachers, technicians, or noncommissioned officers. There are also carpenters and fishermen. Those who migrated from villages to cities in the Izmir province in the 1970s were employed as workers in factories and are retired today. Many of those aged 40 to 50 years at the time of the research had worked in the tourism sector, which began to flourish since the beginning of the 1990s in the western Aegean, as waiters, drivers, or barkeepers. In the 2000s the main area of employment for African Turks is in tourism, the private security sector, or furniture and replacement part production. Further, Afro-Turks who are high school graduates are also employed as cashiers, salespersons, or sales representatives in big shopping malls in Izmir, Kuşadası, or Marmaris. Those employed in the security sector are confronted with problems due to their skin color while those working in the tourism sector report that their skin color is an advantage as it is of interest to foreign tourists.51 In this respect there are similarities between the Afro-Turks in the Aegean and Antalya regions. As mentioned before, according to written sources a great number of slaves were brought from Africa to work on tobacco and cotton fields as a result of increasing foreign investments especially in the western Aegean in the second half of the nineteenth century. Among the 100 persons who were interviewed, a relationship with slavery could be established only in the narratives of 21. Others refused using terms like “slave,” “slavery,” and so forth and mentioned their dislike of the use of these terms. The elder generation defines itself as “Arab,” “Muslim,” or “Arab-MuslimTurkish,” while the urban young generation indicates being of African origin. This description is closely affiliated with the level of education and whether the subjects lived in urban or rural areas. The elder generation mentioned that they used to define themselves as “Arab” or “Negro” and that being defined as African is a new fashion. The younger generation define themselves as “Muslim-Arab,” “Afro-Turk,” or “Turk of African origin.” Several different narratives were found concerning origin. Some interrelated their origin to Ottoman slavery and others to stories of kidnap by rich families during the pilgrimage to Mecca. Those who mentioned that their family roots originate from Sudan live in and around Izmir, while some of those living in Izmir and those living in Balıkesir and Ayvalık said they came from Crete due to the population exchange between Turkey and Greece in the early 1920s, and their ancestors had come to Crete from Eastern Africa. Further south in Aydın and Muğla, some did not know from where their grandparents came to Anatolia, while some mentioned Sudan. Afro-Turks in Milas, Dalaman, and Ortaca mentioned people being brought in order to work in Dalaman on the farm of the Khedive Abbas Hilmi of Egypt and mentioned Sudanese and “old” Arabs.52


7/12/11 6:51 AM

168

Esma Durugönül

The Afro-Turks who were interviewed in the villages in the region of Antalya defined themselves as Turks, and some, particularly those of younger age, rejected having any connection with Africa. Such denial of African origin is thought to arise where subjects are unwilling to identify themselves with their slave heritage, possibly due to perceptions about the current problems associated with many African countries. Further, the older ones who were conscious of their African origins and knew that their grandparents were brought from Africa did not possess any information on the places where their ancestors were brought from. Asked where their ancestors came from they answered Egypt, Sudan, and Arabia. Although they lack clear information on the precise places their ancestors originated, they expressed curiosity and interest in those places. Only a minority among the elderly rejected being of African origin. Although they are conscious of being the grandchildren of people brought from a different place by force, they regard themselves as one of the local ethnic groups of the region, and they expressed that they are of Turkish nationality and Muslims. Thus, both the Aegean and Antalya research indicate that African origins continue to have a key role in the identity formation of Afro-Turks. Today the descendants of the slaves who were brought from Africa to work on tobacco and cotton fields live in important agricultural centers of western Anatolia; notably, those who live in villages of Torbalı with a mainly black population53 do the same work as their ancestors did, as producers employed or affiliated with the Tariş Cotton Association.54 At the end of the last century Izmir was one of the cities with the largest African populations in Anatolia. Slaves were manumitted after the abolition of slavery at the end of the nineteenth century, and they were accommodated in guesthouses provided by the state and later were given land to cultivate and settle. In the 1890s the state placed freed men in primary schools, in the navy, and in military bands. Women were placed in Muslim houses as domestic servants and given a salary by the state. Those who came from Africa were further encouraged to get married and settle on the lands given to them.55 It may be argued that in Turkey racial segregation did not occur along American lines due to different historical, religious, economic, and social conditions. Nevertheless, according to the results of the Izmir project, persons of different age and educational niveau with at least one African parent have experienced verbal assault in daily life at least once in their life. Further, those who do not report such an experience in their life live in villages, while the number of urban people who have experienced verbal or nonverbal assaults at least once cannot be underestimated. It is significant that those who mentioned having problems due to their color at work or during their


7/12/11 6:51 AM


169

educational life were urban and between at the ages of 20 and 35. Especially those from this age group who left the western Aegean region for educational or employment reasons stated that they were mistaken for foreigners, that people were surprised when they spoke Turkish, and that they were named after popular black people abroad and in Turkey by those around them.56 In Antalya it was interesting that the interview participants did not have a notion of race or racism. While it can be claimed that they do not experience differentiation between races, they report that differentiation is made on the basis of color. The Afro-Turks around Antalya, who argued that there exists no solidarity in their group, seem to be confronted, even if seldom, with latent racism but not with overt racism. Consequently, it can be claimed that both investigations came to the same result: that racism does not exist to the same extent as in Western societies. The language spoken by people of African descent is Turkish. There are some who speak another language as well, but no African languages are spoken. Turkish is their mother tongue and the language spoken in the social environment of Afro-Turks. Because they do not perceive any group as closer to themselves than others, their distance to all groups around them is equal. They are not against intermarriage with members of other groups. Regardless of the fact that they in a way identified with the local poor and despite their curiosity, a few said they did not prefer going to Africa because they feared being hurt by witnessing the poverty and feeling sad and that they would prefer to know “black”57 people in America. It became obvious during the interviews that especially some of the AfroTurks possess some knowledge on the situation of African countries today and have sympathy for the peoples of those countries. While talking about the pain their ancestors had to suffer due to the color of their skin and their poverty, there were some among them who complained about their color and claimed that their color was the reason for their own poverty. The fact that those who expressed that they would prefer their children to marry “whites” were the majority probably has to do with their belief that the probability of their grandchildren’s leading a better life is closely intertwined with their having a lighter complexion. No difference concerning diet, religion, belief in magic, dancing, music, social organization, agricultural practices, and cultural themes could be determined from those of Turks of non-African descent in the Antalya area. Therefore, it may be claimed that there is no identifiable African influence in their social or cultural practices any more due to the developments described above as well as Turkish national policies.58


7/12/11 6:51 AM

170

Esma Durugönül

During our interviews it also became obvious that mass media contribute significantly to the image of Africans and blacks and that this image is generally not positive. This is not a surprising consequence as in Turkish society— which is not well informed on Africa, Africans, or African culture—especially news programs and documentary programs about Africa on TV, as well as American films that usually present a certain image of “blacks,” contribute a great deal to the construction of the image of “blacks.” Finally it should be noted that the population of Turkey was 73 million in 2009, but official or scholarly sources on what portion of people are of African origin and the regions where they live are nonexistent.59 It should be noted that Afro-Turks are “invisible” citizens of the society whose existence the writer of this chapter wants to demonstrate in this book.

Concluding Remarks: Demands and Aims of Afro-Turks as Citizens Now that some recent information has been obtained about their history and current circumstances, we are in a better position to consider why Afro-Turks are trying to make their voices heard today. According to the modern ideas of citizenship, all members of society are embraced equally without discrimination for reasons of race, religion, sex, age, and class.60 However, problems associated with unemployment and poverty have increasingly led to groups of people facing “social exclusion.” This trend is particularly identified with Western countries where it has become impossible for such groups, also called “subaltern,” to exercise their political rights. Clearly, the marginalization of such groups presents a deficiency of democracy. Even in states with liberal regulations concerning inclusion to citizenship there exist informal mechanisms like racism, xenophobia, hate, violence, and prejudice against minorities like the disabled, the poor, or LGBTT persons that impact the process of the majority’s excluding them in spite of juridical and administrative regulations.61 Economic and social rights declare a state duty to provide all citizens with education, health, and basic needs. Citizens are consequently empowered to engage in collectively assuring their civil and political rights. Wage justice, the right of labor and social security, the right to strike and the right to organize a union, and regulations concerning children and youth labor are fields covered by social rights concerning work life. Other key economic and social rights are the right to accommodation, health, and education.62 Citizenship and the legal rights associated with it are valid for persons or groups experiencing social exclusion, but there are significant differences in utilization and participation. Lipset defines the citizen in a categorical man-


7/12/11 6:51 AM


171

ner by noting that everyone who has political participation rights within the borders of a state is a citizen, whereas Marshall defines citizenship through certain rights. Ultimately citizenship is a form of relationship consisting of rights and duties between the state and the citizen. Even though liberal democracies are proponents of the idea of “citizens’ equality before law,” in practice factors such as class, sex, age, race, ethnicity, religion, and disability determine the “capability” of being a citizen.63 Amartya Sen’s capability approach emphasizes functional capabilities, that is “substantive freedoms,” such as the ability to live to old age, engage in economic transactions, or participate in political activities. These are construed in terms of the substantive freedoms people have reason to value, instead of utility or access to resources. Poverty is understood as capability deprivation. It is noteworthy that the emphasis is not only on how human beings actually function but also on their having the capability, which is a practical choice, to function in important ways if they so wish. Someone could be deprived of such capabilities in many ways, such as by ignorance, oppression by the state, lack of financial resources, or false consciousness. The capabilities approach focuses on positive liberty,64 a person’s actual ability to be or do something, rather than on negative freedom approaches, which are common in economics and simply focus on noninterference.65 When we recall the conditions under which Afro-Turks live, and keeping theoretical approaches in mind, we may assume that the reasons for their attempts to be heard may be characterized as endeavors to be recognized, which again may be identified as the struggle of a group of citizens for their social rights as they do or do not possess the “capability of citizenship” due to their socioeconomic conditions. It is no wonder that they belong to the deprived groups in society when we bear in mind that their ancestors were brought to the lands where they themselves live today as slaves and thus did not have any possessions. Although the Turkish state supported them after manumission, most of them preferred to stay at the homes of their masters and continued working there as servants, which in fact was in a way the continuation of slavery in a different form. Access to education has never been easy for them. Consequently, Afro-Turks are today still denied access to all kind of rights that are considered to be part of broader economic and social rights, although it should be noted that progress has been made. The current position of Afro-Turks in society may be illuminated by taking a brief look at the phenomenon of social exclusion in the context of “new poverty.” The concept of social exclusion implies that poverty does not relate solely to income but also to the incapability of full and meaningful participation in social life and to being excluded from society. Prejudice towards and stigmatization of marginalized groups are recognized as key drivers of social


7/12/11 6:51 AM

172

Esma Durugönül

exclusion.66 Social exclusion may be observed in general categories such as age, that is, the elderly, youth, or children, or in the category of sex, for example, women. However, a much more severe form of social exclusion is associated with categories relating to ethnic identity, sexual orientation, or disability. Groups or individuals associated with severe exclusion are segregated against by the majority or by groups considered as “normal.” In this context Fraser underlines the importance of the recognition of identities and notes that this should be an approach implying recognition and the redistribution of income. Cultural and economic inequalities increase their impact mutually; therefore all individuals in society should be able to interact with each other as persons possessing the same rights, and all social positions should be offered to all under equal possibilities, and, further, cultural values that are necessary for the occurrence of equal respect should be institutionalized.67 Thinking of citizenship nowadays, it is necessary to take, in Fraser’s words, “class and identity politics” into consideration as it is not possible for democratic citizenship to be realized without providing justice and opening mechanisms of participation for everyone, or in other words, these two approaches need to be considered together: redistribution and recognition. As seen also in the case of Afro-Turks, equality for all differences like class, sex, and race should be recognized, and the politics of recognition should be realized over identities like being a women, being black, or being lesbian, which are not subject to recognition. Further, the concept “politics of difference” should be used instead of “politics of identity”68 as otherwise groups experiencing social exclusion, or in Bohman’s words subaltern classes, cannot develop their capabilities under conditions of deprivation. According to Bohman, democracy is necessary for providing the subaltern groups with equality, but in order to facilitate this the existing democracy has to be fair,69 as the subaltern can hardly find the possibility to express themselves, as noted by Gayatri Spivak in her much debated article “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988). A fair society should go further than providing everyone with equal rights. It should be concerned with the extent to which these rights turn into real capabilities. Economic and social rights should open the way for all socially excluded groups, like the Afro-Turks, to benefit from their other rights of citizenship. For this reason the issue of how to enable equal citizenship is seen as central to breaking the cycle of circumscribed democracy. The statements of Afro-Turk participants interviewed in both of the studies and in Olpak’s70 words seem to be evidence of these arguments: “The aim of the African Culture Solidarity and Cooperation Association is to investigate the traditions and customs of a culture in our near past which is subject to


7/12/11 6:51 AM


173

oblivion and sharing it with society. On the other side it aims to help and to promote solidarity with these people who constitute the poorest segment in society. I would like intellectuals, universities and other institutions in Turkey and abroad to support our efforts.” Citizenship in Turkey is determined by statute, and many believe or claim therefore that non-Muslims and Kurds are not confronted with discrimination, as if all citizens were equal by decree. However, citizenship is also about rights and, as demonstrated through the example of Afro-Turks, some citizens of the Turkish Republic lack the capability to exercise certain of their rights.71 Another study illustrates that a community of citizens does not constitute a homogenous entity; rather there exists potential for serious stratification between first- and second-class citizens in Turkey.72 Thus providing all citizens with equal rights constitutes an important part of Turkey’s agenda. Adequate citizenship education will also be a significant instrument for advancing the goal of a democratic society wherein all constituent parts are able to exercise their rights in full.73

Notes 1. Olpak, Mustafa, Kenya-Girit-İstanbul: Köle Kıyısından İnsan Biyografileri (İstanbul: Ozan Yayıncılık, 2005). 2. www.afro-turk.org/. 3. www.tarihvakfi.org.tr/haberbultenayrinti.asp?ID=659. 4. www.trt.net.tr/wwwtrt/progdetay.aspx?tur=TV&proid=4773. 5. Gökhan Akçura mentions Malik Aksel, painter and writer (1903–1987), who wrote that the same feast was celebrated in other parts of the country as well and described the feast in Istanbul. www.stargazete.com/pazar/dana-bayrami-100261.htm, accessed May 4, 2008. 6. Today’s Zaman Online, May 11, 2008. 7. A city on the Mediterranean coast of southwestern Turkey. 8. A city in western Anatolia on the eastern shoreline of the Aegean Sea and Turkey’s second largest port city after Istanbul. 9. Güntekin, Reşat Nuri, Gökyüzü, İnkilap Yayınevi, İstanbul; Güntekin, Reşat Nuri, Miskinler Tekkesi, İnkilap Yayınevi, İstanbul. 10. Hausa belongs to the Chadic languages group, which in turn is part of the Afro-Asiatic language family spoken in African countries like Cameroon, Ghana, and Sudan. 11. Dobronravin, Nikolai, “West African Languages and Folklore in Turkey: A Turkish ‘Arap’ Song,” unpublished paper. I am grateful to the author for sending me a copy of the paper and for all the information he shared with me.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

174

Esma Durugönül

12. Boratav, Pertev Naili, “Türk Folklorunda Zenciler ve Türkiye’de Zenci Folkloru Üzerine,” Folklor ve Edebiyat II (İstanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1982); Erdem, Y. Hakan, Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise 1800–1909 (London: Macmillan Press, 1996); Güneş, Günver, “İzmir’de Zenciler ve Zenci Folkloru,” Toplumsal Tarih (February 1999): 4–10. 13. Toledano, Ehud R., Osmanlı Köle Ticareti 1840–1890, translated by Y. Hakan Erdem (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1994). 14. Recently the Turkish translation of Ehud R. Toledano’s work titled As If Silent and Absent: Bonds of Enslavement in the Islamic Middle East (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007) has been published. 15. Toledano, Ehud R. Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998) 3. 16. Ibid., 4. 17. Erdem, Y. Hakan, Osmanlı’da Köleliğin Sonu 1800-1909 (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2004), 14. 18. Lewis, Bernard, Race and Slavery in the Middle East (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). 19. Anatolia is a geographic and historical term denoting the western part of Asia, comprising the Republic of Turkey. 20. Erdem, Osmanlı’da Köleliğin Sonu, 79. 21. Muslim theologians and scholars. 22. Military–administrative servitude. 23. Erdem, Osmanlı’da Köleliğin Sonu, 20. 24. The Tanzimat, meaning reorganization (of the Ottoman Empire), was a period of reformation that began in 1839 and ended with the First Constitutional Era in 1876. 25. Toledano, Slavery, 6–7. 26. Ibid., 7. 27. Ibid., 7. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid., 7–8. 30. Ibid., 8. 31. Ibid., 9. 32. Ibid., 13–14. 33. Austen, Ralph, “The 19th Century Islamic Slave Trade from East Africa (Swahili and Red Sea Coasts): A Tentative Census,” in The Economics of the Indian Ocean Slave Trade in the Nineteenth Century, edited by William Gervase Clarence-Smith, special issue of Slavery and Abolition 9, no. 3 (1988): 21–44; and “The Mediterranean Islamic Slave Trade Out of Africa: A Tentative Census,” Slavery and Abolition 13, no. 1 (1992): 214–248, cited by Toledano, As If Silent and Absent, 10. 34. Toledano, As If Silent and Absent, 11. 35. On Ottoman citizenship see Karpat, Kemal, Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Etnik Yapılanma ve Göçler (Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2010), 54. 36. Toledano, As If Silent and Absent, 11–12. 37. I have been working on this topic since 2003. This study is a cross-section survey with 50 interview partners. An important and surprising development has forced


7/12/11 6:51 AM


175

us to change the dimension of the study, that is, increase the number of our interview partners from 50 to 100 and the number of scanned areas from three to six. 38. Tarih Vakfı, Sessiz Bir Geçmişten Sesler: Afrika Kökenli “Türk” Olmanın Dünü ve Bugünü (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi History Foundation, 2008), 7. 39. 53 men and 47 women, of whom 62 live in cities and 38 in villages. 40. Tarih Vakfı, Sessiz Bir Geçmişten Sesler, 8. 41. The ethnic composition of Antalya is one of the most diverse in Turkey. See Durugönül, Esma, “The Invisibility of Turks of African Origin and the Construction of Turkish Cultural Identity: The Need for a New Historiography,” Journal of Black Studies 33, no. 3 (January 2003): 281–94. 42. Tarih Vakfı, Sessiz Bir Geçmişten Sesler, 9. 43. Vogt, Ludgera, “Identität und Kapital,” in Identitäten in der Modernen Welt, edited by R. Hettlage and L. Vogt (Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2000), 77–78. 44. Andrews, Peter and Rüdiger Benninghaus, Türkiye’de Etnik Gruplar (Istanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1992); Planhol, Xavier de, De la plaine Pamphylienne aux lacs Pisidiens: Nomadisme et vie paysanne (Paris: Librarie Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1958). 45. See Erdem, Y. Hakan, Osmanlı’da Köleliğin Sonu 1800–1909 (Istanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2004) [Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise 1800–1909 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996)]; Planhol, Xavier de, De la plaine Pamphylienne aux lacs Pisidiens: Nomadisme et vie paysanne (Paris: Librarie Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1958); Toledano, Ehud R., Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998); Toledano, Ehud R., Osmanlı’da Köle Ticareti 1840–1890 (Istanbul, 1994) [Originally The Ottoman Slave Trade and Its Suppression, 1840–1890 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982)]. 46. The trip, which began in Izmir/Torbalı, Bayındır, and Tire, reached Balıkesir/ Ayvalık in the north, Manisa/Gölmarmara in the east, Aydın/Germencik, Söke, Bağarası in the south, and Muğla/Bafa, Milas, Ula, Köyceğiz, Ortaca, Dalyan, and Dalaman in the further south. 47. Tarih Vakfı, Sessiz Bir Geçmişten Sesler, 11. 48. Ibid., 11. 49. The villages Naime, Yeniçiftlik, Çırpı, and so forth, of Torbalı/Izmir. See Tarih Vakfi, Sessiz, 9. 50. Ibid., 23–27. 51. Ibid., 27–28. 52. Ibid., 38. 53. Some of those villages are Subaşı, Naima, Kırba, Hasköy, Yeniçiftlik. Tarih Vakfı, Sessiz Bir Geçmişten Sesler, 45.. 54. Tariş is the first and the biggest union of agricultural sales cooperative in Turkey, founded in 1915, and carries on its activities with fig, raisin, cotton, and oil seeds agricultural sales cooperatives. Tarih Vakfı, Sessiz Bir Geçmişten Sesler, 45. 55. Ibid., 45. 56. Ibid., 41. 57. The Afro-Turks name themselves as “kara,” which means “black” in Turkish. 58. See Durugönül, “The Invisibility of Turks.”


7/12/11 6:51 AM

176

Esma Durugönül

59. According to Andrews, Peter, Etnik Gruplar, 148, and according to the population census of 1965, 5,000 persons. 60. Kartal, Filiz, “Dışlayıcı Bir Kurum Olarak Yurttaşlığın Evrimi: Polis’ten Küresel Düzene,” in Yurttaşlık Tartışmaları, edited by Filiz Kartal, TODAIE Insan Hakları ve Vatandaşlık Çalışmaları Merkezi Yayın No. 21 (Ankara: TODAIE Yayınları No. 355, 2010), 11. 61. Kartal, Filiz, “Dışlayıcı Bir Kurum,” 46–47. 62. Uyan-Semerci, Pınar, “Demokratik ve Hakkaniyetli bir Toplum İdeali: Ekonomik-sosyal Haklar ve ‘Yurttaş Olabilme,’” in Filiz Kartal, ed., Yurttaşlık Tartışmaları, 58. 63. Lipset, Martin, Political Man (Garden City, NY: Double Day, 1960), cited by Uyan-Semerci, “Demokratik ve Hakkaniyetli,” 59. 64. Positive liberty is defined as the power and resources to act to fulfill one’s own potential (this may include freedom from internal constraints), as opposed to negative liberty, which is freedom from external restraint. Berlin, Isaiah, Four Essays on Liberty, 1969, cited in Uyan-Semerci, “Demokratik ve Hakkaniyetli,” 62. 65. Sen Amartya, “Functionings and Capability,” in Inequality Reexamined (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1992), cited in Uyan-Semerci, “Demokratik ve Hakkaniyetli,” 59. 66. Silver, Hilary, “Social Exclusion and Social Solidarity: Three Paradigms,” International Labour Review 133 (5–6): 531–578, cited in Uyan-Semerci, “Demokratik ve Hakkaniyetli,” 68–69. 67. Fraser, N., “Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition and Participation,” in Redistribution of Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange, edited by N. Fraser and A. Honneth, 9 (London: Verso, 2003), cited in Uyan-Semerci, “Demokratik ve Hakkaniyetli,” 72. 68. Young, Iris, “Ruling Norms and the Politics of Difference: A Comment on Seyla Benhabib,” The Yale Journal of Criticism 12, no. 2 (1999): 416, cited in UyanSemerci, “Demokratik ve Hakkaniyetli,” 72. 69. Bohman, James, “Beyond Distributive Justice and Struggles for Recognition: Freedom, Democracy and Critical Theory,” European Journal of Political Theory 6 (2007): 267–76, cited in Uyan-Semerci, Demokratik ve Hakkaniyetli,” 75. 70. Founder and leader of the African Solidarity and Culture Association, founded in 2006 in Ayvalık and moved to İzmir later on. 71. Kadıoğlu, Ayşe, “Türkiye’de Vatandaşlığın Anatomisi,” in Küreselleşme, Avrupalılaşma ve Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık, edited by Fuat E. Keyman and Ahmet Içduygu (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Yayınları 249, 2009), 115. 72. Caymaz, Birol, Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık: Resmi Ideoloji ve Yansımaları (Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları 156, 2008). 73. Marshall, Thomas H., “Yurttaşlık ve Sosyal Sınıf,” in Sosyal Politika Yazıları, edited by Ayşe Buğra and Çağlar Keyder (İstanbul: İletişim 2006), 25–26.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


177

Bibliography Andrews, Peter, and Rüdiger Benninghaus. Türkiye’de Etnik Gruplar. Istanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1992. [Originally Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey. Weisbaden: Ludwig Reichart Verlag, 1989. (Beihefte zum Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients. Reihe B: Geisteswissenschaften, Nr. 60.)] Boratav, Pertev Naili. “Türk Folklorunda Zenciler ve Türkiye’de Zenci Folkloru Üzerine.” Folklor ve Edebiyat II, İstanbul: Adam Yayınları, 1982. Caymaz, Birol. Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık. Resmi Ideoloji ve Yansımaları. Istanbul: Istanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları 156, 2008. Durugönül, Esma. “The Invisibility of Turks of African Origin and the Construction of Turkish Cultural Identity: The Need for a New Historiography.” Journal of Black Studies 33, no. 3 (January 2003): 281–294. Erdem, Y. Hakan. Osmanlı’da Köleliğin Sonu 1800–1909. Istanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2004. [Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and Its Demise 1800–1909. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996.] Finkelman, Paul and Joseph C. Miller, eds. Macmillan Encyclopedia of World Slavery, Vol. 2. New York: Simon & Schuster Macmillan, 1998, S. 660–663. Güneş, Günver. “Kölelikten Özgürlüğe: Izmir’de Zenciler ve Zenci Folkloru.” Toplumsal Tarih, II/62. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1999. Kadıoğlu, Ayşe. “Türkiye’de Vatandaşlığın Anatomisi.” In Küreselleşme, Avrupalılaşma ve Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık, edited by E. Fuat Keyman and Ahmet Içduygu. Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Yayınları 249, 2009. [Originally Citizenship in a Global World. Routledge, 2005.] Karpat, Kemal. Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Etnik Yapılanma ve Göçler. Istanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2010. Kartal, Filiz. “Dışlayıcı Bir Kurum Olarak Yurttaşlığın Evrimi: Polis’ten Küresel Düzene.” In Yurttaşlık Tartışmaları, edited by Filiz Kartal. TODAIE Insan Hakları ve Vatandaşlık Çalışmaları Merkezi Yayın No. 21. Ankara: TODAIE Yayınları No. 355, 2010. Keyman, E. Fuat. “Sistem Kurucu ve Sistem Dönüştürücü Bir Toplumsal Gerçeklik Olarak Kültürel Kimlik Olgusunu Yeniden Düşünmek.” In Kimlikler Lütfen: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Kültürel Kimlik Arayışı ve Temsili, edited by Gönül Pultar. Ankara: ODTÜ Yayıncılık, 2009. Lewis, Bernard. Race and Slavery in the Middle East. Oxford University Press, 1994. Marshall, Thomas H. “Yurttaşlık ve Sosyal Sınıf.” In Sosyal Politika Yazıları, edited by Ayşe Buğra and Çağlar Keyder. İstanbul: İletişim, 2006. Martal, Abdullah. “Afrikadan İzmir’e: İzmir’de Bir Köle Misafirhanesi.” Kebikeç 10 (2000): 171–186. Olpak, Mustafa. Kenya-Girit-İstanbul: Köle Kıyısından İnsan Biyografileri. Istanbul: Ozan Yayıncılık, 2005.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

178

Esma Durugönül

Planhol, Xavier de. De la plaine Pamphylienne aux lacs Pisidiens. Nomadisme et vie paysanne. Paris: Librarie Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1958. Tarih Vakfı, Sessiz Bir Geçmişten Sesler: Afrika Kökenli “Türk” Olmanın Dünü ve Bugünü. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 2008. Toledano, Ehud R. Osmanlı’da Köle Ticareti 1840–1890 Istanbul, 1994. [Originally The Ottoman Slave Trade and Its Suppression, 1840–1890. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982.] ———. As If Silent and Absent: Bonds of Enslavement in the Islamic Middle East. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007. ———. Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1998. Uyan-Semerci, Pınar. “Demokratik ve Hakkaniyetli bir Toplum İdeali: Ekonomiksosyal Haklar ve ‘Yurttaş Olabilme.’” In Yurttaşlık Tartışmaları, edited by Filiz Kartal. TODAIE Insan Hakları ve Vatandaşlık Çalışmaları Merkezi Yayın No. 21. Ankara: TODAIE Yayınları No. 355, 2010.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

8 Gender and Citizenship in Turkey at the Crossroads of the Patriarchal State, Women, and Transnational Pressures Canan Aslan Akman and Fatma Tütüncü

T

is threefold. First, it provides an overview of the determinants and the dynamics of the patriarchal construction of citizenship in Turkey from a historical perspective. Its major concern is with identifying the major cultural, political, and discursive forces preventing Turkish women from fully exercising their social, civil, and political citizenship rights. Second, it highlights specific problem areas in women’s experiences of citizenship with a focus on women’s civil and social rights, and it underlines the impact of women’s groups and transnational influences in the improvement of citizenship. Third, it takes issue with the discrepancy between egalitarian legal rights and their social applications in the era of religiously conservative AKP government and concludes by underlining the importance of a more inclusive and gender-neutral citizenship in private and public in the process of democratization. The notion of citizenship implies rights and responsibilities shared by the male and female members of a community stemming from their common attachment to the same political community. In Turkey, citizenship emerged as a consequence of the Westernization processes imposed from above by the ruling elites since the Ottoman modernization. In contrast to the Western experience of the development of citizenship rights through the transformation of capitalism and the expression of class activism, state-led reactive modernization in the Ottoman–Turkish polity resulted in a top-down model of citizenship.1 The Turkish experience has borne commonalities with statebuilding processes in the Middle East which maintained patriarchal interests HE THREAD OF THIS ARTICLE

— 179 —


7/12/11 6:51 AM

180

Canan Aslan Akman and Fatma Tütüncü

and practices through the “fluidity of boundaries between the governmental, non-governmental and kinship.”2 In the West, political citizenship proved to be essential for women to attain social and citizenship rights. Civil citizenship (rights to individual freedom such as the liberty of the person, freedom of speech, freedom to own property, and the right to justice) came gradually through the interaction of the state and the feminist movements.3 The identification of women with the private sphere so central to the liberal discourses and practices of democracy was challenged also by successive waves of feminist movements. However, a process of “transition from private to public patriarchy” took place after the introduction of women’s political rights.4 Legal commitment to substantive equality has not enabled most women to gain full access into resources or ability to influence public policy or to participate in civic and political life. The ideal of substantive equality between men and women has not transformed gendered inequalities across racial, class, ethnic, regional, and generational categories dividing women.5 Feminist scholarship on gender and citizenship challenged the liberal approaches for failing to consider the masculinist bias in the existing structures that constrain women’s capacity to fully enjoy these rights.6 A universalistic and rights-based approach focusing on formal legal rights proved to be inadequate to capture the unequal nature of citizenship as rights for women and ignored its consequences for women’s status in the society and in the family.7 The fact that Kemalist–Republican reforms extending equal citizenship for both genders have not led to women’s full liberation from patriarchal restrictions is a widely shared contention among feminist social scientists in Turkey.8 At the same time, changing dynamics of state–society relations with globalization and Turkey’s increased exposure to transnational forces to comply with the international human rights regimes have led to crucial reforms broadening women’s citizenship. As is emphasized in this essay, patriarchal assumptions underlying the laws which confined women to the private sphere and legitimized the control of women’s bodies and sexuality to promote public order and morality have been weakened. However, a gender regime based on a legal framework that does not recognize women’s particular needs and the prevailing conservative social and political construction of women in the private sphere remain as the major problems overshadowing the prospect of reconstituting women as citizens in Turkey.

An Overview of the Historical–Ideological Formation of the Gendered Citizenship in the Turkish Context The Turkish Civil Code of 1926, adopted from the Swiss Civil Code (after two years of parliamentary debates), was a milestone in making women


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Gender and Citizenship in Turkey at the Crossroads

181

equal citizens with men by providing them with equal civil rights in marriage, divorce, and inheritance. The Code was the major instrument in the secularization project of the new regime to emancipate women from tradition and religion.9 With the introduction of civil marriage polygamy was abolished and women gained equal rights with men in divorce, in inheritance, and in child custody. The law also introduced a minimum age for marriage to prevent child marriages in the countryside. The introduction of suffrage for women in 1934 endowed women citizens with equal political rights. Reforms of gender equality spearheaded by the liberal-minded, male political elite evolved into a mode of “state feminism” in the early decades of the Republic to Westernize Turkey.10 This process was similar to the patterns of state–society interaction in the postcolonial and postindependence contexts, which promoted women’s public visibility through various forms of social engineering supervised by a vanguard elite. As Kandiyoti emphasized, nation-building projects and the process of state consolidation in the Islamic Middle East involved “cultural nationalisms” that both expanded women’s citizenship rights and regarded them as “the privileged custodians of national values.”11 In the Republican nation-building project women were also entrusted with the mission of guarding the tradition and of raising the future generations. Citizenship was gender neutral in the new citizenship education for men and women; both were united in their duties and respect for the highest ideals of the state and the nation.12 However, the Republican pedagogy upheld a gendered division of labor within the family.13 Kemalist modernization constructed the ideal woman as “pure, honourable, and unreachable” in a secluded private sphere as self-sacrificing mothers and wives.14 In the public sphere they walked side by side with men.15 Kemalist historiography held that Turkish women had gained these rights without any struggle thanks to the enlightened male elite in advance of their sisters in the West. This discourse made it possible for the state to coopt any autonomous claims raised by women’s groups demanding the expansion of legal citizenship into substantive citizenship by challenging male-dominated notions of equality underlying the legal system and its endorsement.16 It can be contended that after the 1950s the rise of conservative populism, with its specific social and political projects claiming to integrate peripheral demands in national politics, perpetuated the subordination and marginalization of Turkish women in the public sphere. The strength of patriarchal norms and traditional values and the resilience of structural factors (socioeconomic inequalities and lack of a sizable industrial and working class) meant that the emancipatory potential of the laws was relevant mostly for urban middleand upper-class women.17 In the rural areas and the provincial towns, pillars of social conservatism, marriages under the legal age, polygyny based on religious marriages, and male-dominated family relations that denied women


7/12/11 6:51 AM

182


equal voice in divorce and inheritance were commonplace. Meanwhile, the ideology of Republican state feminism and its positivist mentality accounted for the striking proportions of Turkish women in the professional careers in the 1970s, in stark contrast to the situation in many Western countries.18 However, overall in Turkey, masses of women remained unpaid family workers in agriculture without access to formal education. In the post-1960 era, in which the Turkish state was defined as a social state by the 1961 constitution, women citizen’s social rights were largely constructed on the basis of their mothering roles defined as a social duty; social rights were turned into the right to receive social aid (through the provisions of legal maternal leave and the prohibition of women’s work in mining and night shifts).19 Competitive party politics also led to the shrinking of women’s political recruitment in national politics and their marginalization among the political elite due to the male-dominated political parties and structures and their resistance to affirmative action and positive discrimination policies.20 In terms of macro indicators of gender equality, women constitute 84 percent of the total illiterate population; one in five women are still illiterate.21 This implies that the ever-present gender gap in schooling22 has not yet closed among girls and boys although currently 43 percent of those who are attending university are females. In terms of labor force participation, women make up 22.2 percent of the economically active population while 47 percent of the female population in Turkey are homemakers, which leaves them without any social security benefits and protection.23 Research also indicates that women’s lesser educational attainment is not the real culprit for women’s significantly lower labor force participation in Turkey; rather the structure of the labor market and the state policies towards women’s employment accounts for constraints on female employment.24 Beyond these macro indicators conditioning women’s access to social, civil, and political rights, recent research has also documented women’s subordinate position within the family, their exposure to domestic violence,25 lingering sexism in the political system, the education system, and the labor market, and the social control of women’s sexuality and its regulation through patriarchal norms. The tragedy of being deprived of basic citizenship rights (such as the right to practice civil marriage, monogamy, and access to equal inheritance and education rights) due to the lack of birth registration for many women in the Eastern regions continues.26 The Civil Code served to institutionalize women’s social and economic dependence on men. The male-dominated, traditional notion of the family with the male breadwinner in the specific provisions went against the spirit of the equality provision of the Constitution. It stipulated the husband’s domination in the choice of the family residence, in guardianship of children and in the wife’s


7/12/11 6:51 AM


183

employment, and other matters. As the legal framework of “Republican patriarchy”27 the law openly held the wife responsible for taking care of the house. In cases of divorce the legal property regime of the separation of property favored the husband in practice owing to the fact that men rather than women had the highest share of wealth in marriages. The Civil Code also originally maintained the significance of virginity’s and women’s chastity in the unity of the family, making the annulment of marriage possible if the wife’s assumed virginity turned out to be absent and granting the husband the right to initiate divorce if the wife was raped.28 Progressive changes were slow to come. Through amendments in various provisions of the Civil Code in the 1980s and the 1990s, grounds for divorce were relaxed (1998) and the requirement for permission of the husband to get a job was repealed (1991). In 1997 another revision to the Code made it possible for married women to use their maiden names beside the husband’s surname by applying to the court.29

Women Challenging the Boundaries of Citizenship and the Impact of Transnational Influences The feminist movement that flourished during the military regime in Turkey (1980–1983) politicized many issues of gender-based discriminations in the 1990s (such as domestic violence and sexism in the public sphere, education system, and legal system),30 thereby paving the way for dealing with them in the context of a redefinition of citizenship in Turkey. The government accepted international monitoring of the women’s human rights situation in Turkey through ratification of CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Kinds of Discrimination Against Women) in 1986. This provided significant leverage for various women’s groups to push for progressive changes in the legal system and for their enforcement. In October 1990 the Directorate General on the Status and Problems of Women (KSSGM) was established under the state ministry responsible for women and family (and attached to the prime ministry) to serve as the national machinery to fulfil the requirements of the CEDAW.31 Another, equally important societal pressure and challenge for the expansion of women’s citizenship emerged from the ranks of urban women of Islamist orientations. In the new veiling movement Islamist women demanded that their rights to education and work be recognized with their religious identity expressed by their headscarves32 as they regarded the headscarf ban as a violation of their human rights as pious women interfering with their right to education and work.33 They challenged the Kemalist construction of citizenship on its exclusion of the Islamic identity in the public sphere and


7/12/11 6:51 AM

184


on its association of modernity with women’s bodies (in Western dresses).34 Organized Islamist women carried their demands to international platforms, for example by appealing the CEDAW committee at the UN. The status of deadlock on the headscarf question today along the Islamist–secular cleavage is indicative of the extent to which diverse women’s groups’ quest for full citizenship and their predicament have been shaped by continuing interactions and negotiations between masculinist ideologies of Islam and Kemalism. Another such terrain of conflict in Turkey that has led to the rise of the Kurdish women’s demands for recognition of their problems is the Kurdish conflict. Organized Kurdish women in the East politicized their subjection to feudal and patriarchal pressures, especially domestic violence, unjust treatment in the hands of the security forces, and their suffering as mothers during the state’s fight with the separatist guerrillas.35 Today, both the Islamist and Kurdish women’s demands continue to pose crucial challenges to the homogenous construction of citizenship and its particular negotiations with patriarchy. The EU accession process was perhaps the most important factor paving the way for the constitutional amendment in 2004 that changed Article 10 to stipulate openly the equality of male and female citizens and, most importantly, assigned the state with the task of taking necessary measures to materialize gender equality. Article 90 was also amended to have international human rights treaties supersede Turkish laws in case of conflict.36 The Civil Code reform was realized in 2001, two years after the Turkish government withdrew its reservations on CEDAW under intense pressure from women’s organizations during the EU process. Men and women became equal within the family and the husband lost his status as the head of the family. Spouses share equal responsibility for children and the running of the household. The law also raised the minimum age for marriage to 18 for men and women.37 Marriage and family were reconceptualized as a union of equal rights between man and woman. One of the most important novelties introduced by the reform, especially significant for women’s social citizenship, was the change in the property regime in case of divorce. Women gained the right to share equally the property obtained during the marriage. However, as emphasized in the Progress Report of the European Commission, the practical endorsement of the equality in property regime remained limited.38 Discrimination against women in employment and in the workplace was outlawed by the new Labour Code of March 2003. However, to effectively eradicate and outlaw discriminatory practices by the employer, further changes remain to be realized in the laws as envisioned in the EU legislation and the European Social Act.39


7/12/11 6:51 AM


185

The issue of domestic violence had been addressed by the Law on the Protection of the Family before the Penal Code reform in 1998.40 The revolutionary aspect of the law stems from its being the first law to address the protection of violence against women and to require the state to act to protect women from human rights abuses by family members. Finally, the right to justice is a basic civil right, restricted, however, by patriarchal norms legitimizing the control of women’s bodies and providing impunity for male violence against women. Various provisions of the original Penal Code were discriminating against women and favoring men on the basis of the notions of chastity, honor, and morality. As part of the sixth democratization reform package in 2003, the notorious provision which decreased the penalty for the perpetuators of “honor crimes” had been abrogated. The new Penal Code41 introduced marital rape and sexual harassment in the workplace as bases for punishable crimes. It also criminalized domestic violence. Sexual offenses ceased to be treated under the category of “crimes committed against society, public morality, and family” and came to be defined as “crimes against individuals.” The law no longer allowed the use of “provocation” as an excuse for decreased sentences in the murder of women in the name of honor. In the introduction of the new code the distinction was made between the marital status of women (woman and girl), which had implications for the definitions of crimes on the basis of the sexuality of female citizens.

The Marriage of Religious Conservatism and Neoliberalism under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) Government In the discourse of the current AKP government—through legal and constitutional changes passed before it came to power in 2002 and through specific policy measures (such as training programs to educate the judiciary and the security forces on violations of women’s human rights, especially on domestic violence, and support for nationwide campaigns to close the gender gap in education)—a “silent revolution” was realized in the realm of gender equality. Since its inception, the AKP claimed to make a complete break with its Islamic past represented by the National View Tradition, and following the 2002 elections successfully placed itself at the political center by moderating its discourse and following catchall strategies to appeal to a cross-section of the electorate.42 In terms of the implementation of the neoliberal policies the AKP also meant a continuity rather than a reversal or revision of these policies. Besides its transformation from being an Islamist force, the party retained many elements from the Islamic


7/12/11 6:51 AM

186


identity politics. It is in the context of these twin forces of neoliberalism and religious conservatism that the paradoxical nature of the AKP policies and discourse towards women’s social, political, and civil rights should be comprehended. The AKP’s conservatism constructs women’s citizenship locating them within the family as the locus of tradition prioritizing their mothering and homemaking roles.43 As the shrinking of social services and government expenditures devoted to them restricted women’s social rights recently (through, for example, the new social security law of 2006),44 party leaders emphasize that women should maximize their reproductive capacity (by giving birth to three children at least, as advised by the prime minister on all occasions). In the precarious, crisis-ridden economic situation and unfavourable market structure for women’s entrance into employment, this perspective seriously endangers the likelihood of many women to make use of their social, civil, and political rights of citizenship. As reflected in Prime Minister Erdoğan’s recent comments, this mentality considers complementarity, not equality, between the sexes as the basis of public policies.45 Hence, the government has attached special importance to the legal reforms to protect the family and equality policies in line with the liberal notion of the equality of opportunity. For example, the long-awaited parliamentary commission on gender equality was formed as the “Equal Opportunities Commission,” in contrast to its original drafting as the “commission of equality between men and women.” In 2007 in the government’s draft constitution women were treated along with other disadvantaged groups such as children and the handicapped.46 Contradicting the government’s position disapproving of positive discrimination policies for women, in particular on the introduction of the quota in national elections to promote gender parity in parliamentary representation,47 the latest constitutional amendments of May 2010 opened the way for positive discrimination policies for disadvantaged groups in the society. It remains to be seen how a party constructing women’s citizenship on the basis of their traditional identity in the male-dominated private sphere will act to realize the promised and much-needed positive discrimination policies. Arat48 has rightly highlighted the gendered implications of “a democratic paradox” that became more relevant in Turkey under the AKP government through the growing visibility of the Islamist discourses. These discourses threaten gender equality and women’s equal citizenship prospects. Accordingly the following section looks at the sexual dimensions of gendered citizenship by focusing on the debate over the abortive adultery bill. The adultery debate was launched by the AKP in the fall of 2004 and led to an outcry from women’s groups, liberal sections, and the EU. The concept of adultery connoted different meanings for secular, religious, and feminist groups, and the


7/12/11 6:51 AM


187

debate over adultery produced and connected to a rich discourse on legitimate and illegitimate sexualities including same-sex, religious, and civil marriages as well as the ideal familial union. The following debate indicates the difficulty of filling the gap between the equal rights of Turkish citizens, women and men alike, and their social and discursive application in daily life.

The Debates on Sexualities: Gay Marriage, Adultery, and Religious versus Civil Marriage The legal as well as moral regulation of sexual relations has been one of the most significant aspects of gender regime in any country. In Muslimmajority societies, Islam has constituted a fundamental source of judicial and normative regulation in religiopolitical and secular–liberal settings. Many Muslim people worldwide, regardless of being defined as devout, moderate, or nonpracticing, regularly or occasionally need religious guidance for their mundane practices. Sexualities have been the most challenging practices, intersecting politicolegal, religiomoral, and romantic and conjugal aspects of human relations. The regulation of sexualities through the marriage institution and the problem of adultery as an out-of-wedlock sexuality have been the subject of legal and moral debates that shape gender regimes and gendered citizenship in both secular and religious societies. The rise of the religiously conservative AKP to governmental power and the acceleration of the European Union integration process have ignited significant debates amongst Islamist, Kemalist, and feminist groups concerning the question of gender and equality in Turkey. In legal terms, particularly after recent amendments of the Turkish civil and penal codes, Turkish citizens enjoy an egalitarian gender regime. However, the discrepancy between the egalitarian gender regime and its social and discursive application became obvious during the amendment of the Civil Code, when one seemingly insignificant article exposed the homophobic anxieties among religiously conservative groups in society. The elimination of pejorative concepts such as wife (karı) and husband (koca) with the valuefree and egalitarian concept “partner” (eş) evoked the fear of gay marriages particularly among religious conservatives. The minister of justice assured the nation that the aim had nothing to do with legalizing gay marriages when incorporating gender-neutral concepts into marital law, but bringing about a consummate equality in the financial, linguistic, and political sense in the new Turkish family. The fear indeed arises from Turkey’s integration into the European Union, where some countries have legalized gay marriages. With that fear in mind, Islamist intellectuals and scholars have problematized


7/12/11 6:51 AM

188


homosexuality, gay marriages, and the reason behind their emergence and spread. The sexual freedoms in the West have been one of the main targets of the Islamists, particularly when they attack the women’s movement and gender-egalitarian, secular reforms. And gay marriages have been one of the most fruitful “extremes” that Islamists can base their “fair” arguments on the serious conclusions of the unrestricted sexual culture of the West. The legalization of gay marriages in certain Western liberal democracies has produced much stronger reactions. After noting the long-lasting struggle of the gays and lesbians in terms of legal rights in the West, Ali Bulaç, a cultural Islamist intellectual and writer of the pro-AKP daily Zaman, objected to the most recent and “extreme” form of legal achievements by stating, “A man can marry to another man and they even adopt children.”49 According to many Islamist intellectuals such as Bulaç, marriage is a sexual contract of two opposite sexes: a man and a woman; the main social aim of marriage is procreation of human generation. The right of marriage given to gays then seems paradoxical: it would be a pseudomarriage, not a genuine one. In his mind, gay marriage lacks coherence, legitimacy, and integrity in a moral and logical sense. Since same-sex sexual intercourse is outside of the marriage institution and oppositional to the sexual intercourse of a man and a woman, Bulaç argues, gays and lesbians abuse the marriage institution. Gays and lesbians see marriage as a means to enlarge their visibility in the legal as well as the social system, while essentially being against marriage and family. For most Islamists, the increasing rights, visibility, and power of homosexuals in the West is incomprehensible given the discrimination against Muslims, especially against veiled women, whose appearance in the public sphere creates endless problems. Bulaç claims that in societies where homosexuality is normalized, gays and lesbians do not lose their rights in the public sphere because of their different sexual choice and lifestyle. By asking “Is the identity of a [Muslim] believer more dangerous than that of a homosexual?” Bulaç argues that the very meaning of “believer” requires acting justly, scrupulously, productively, impartially, and carefully while working. That is, he underlines implicitly that homosexuals are dangerous and Muslim believers are not dangerous; on the contrary, their Islamic values guarantee their work ethic. In comparing the homosexual and the headscarved, Bulaç further argues that homosexuals’ cultural and legal integration in the West does not mean that all social groups approve homosexuality in society. “Why,” he then asks, “do the headscarved women need a total social consensus in order to use their fundamental rights?” As a result, Bulaç comes to the conclusion that even if a full-fledged social consensus does not exist, the laws can protect and guarantee the rights and powers of the headscarved women as is done for the homosexuals. As a matter of fact, Ali Bulaç’s interpretations of


7/12/11 6:51 AM


189

the rights of gays and lesbians are very indicative in terms of the pragmatic mentality of many Islamists, who seem to incorporate the Western liberal democratic rights and freedoms. Accordingly, the religiously conservative AKP’s and other Islamist groups’ support for Turkey’s integration into the EU process has been an interest-based, pragmatic, and paradoxical political relocation in a staunchly secular order, where politicized religious demands have been considered irrational at best and destructive at worst. The liberal democratic consolidation of the political order through the EU norms and procedures has been considered as a way out from the secular public sphere for religious people and their invisible rituals and practices. However, since the pluralistic character of liberal democracies takes up a large umbrella of freedoms along with religious freedoms, and since pluralism and pluralistic demands are subjected to the test of reasonability and comprehensiveness, Islamist groups have frequently expressed reluctance and disappointment such as in the case of sexual freedoms and the conjugal rights of gays and lesbians. Bulaç argues that in the process of the EU integration, religious and morally upright groups struggle for rights and freedoms; however, eventually marginal groups benefit from that struggle, while the majority is marginalized; their lifestyles become groundless and illegal.50 In an article titled “Enemy of the Pious, Friend of the Homosexual,” Hayreddin Karaman, a well-respected scholar of Islamic jurisprudence and a writer of the pro-AKP daily Yeni Şafak, takes issue with the enlarged rights of homosexuals and the discrimination against the pious, claiming that religious people, scholars of religion, headscarved women, and Islamists have been subjected to negative campaigns and they are discriminated against if they try to learn and live their religion within the boundary of a religious community or a religious sect. That is, he believes, religious people are treated as noncitizens or as if they had no human rights, whereas homosexuals are treated positively (their rights are protected exclusively).51 Adultery is a significant challenge for the AKP and Islamic groups who aim at integrating liberal democratic values with Islamic ways of living in a political and social sense. Adultery was a criminal act until 1996, when the Turkish Constitutional Court annulled the related articles—which deemed men adulterous if they had a longterm out-of-wedlock relation, but women were deemed adulterous if they had an out-of-wedlock relation only once— because penalizing women more than men is opposed to the principle of equality. In 2004, the AKP attempted to recriminalize adultery when significant legal reforms were being made in line with meeting EU membership criteria. The clause proposed by the AKP to make adultery a crime was greeted with dismay by women’s groups, who organized a rally to protest the AKP. The EU authorities as well criticized the adultery clause, which


7/12/11 6:51 AM

190


was eventually withdrawn.52 However, Prime Minister Erdoğan questioned women activists by stating, “There were even those who marched to Ankara, carrying placards that do not suit the Turkish woman. I cannot applaud behaviour that does not suit our moral values (ahlak) and traditions. . . . A marginal group cannot represent the Turkish woman.”53 Interestingly enough, the AKP’s attempt for recriminalization of adultery has been justified not as legitimate religious or conservative demands, but as a demand of the majority of Turkish women, in a way, as a feminist demand if feminism is loosely defined as a reflection of women’s demands and interests. The president of the parliamentary subcommission for the Penal Code mentioned the letters of Turkish women who demand punishment for their unfaithful husbands. Opposition party members objected to the criminalization of adultery on the ground that the real problem is not adultery but the antisecular demands of the AKP and religiously conservative groups.54 The debate on adultery interacts with secular and Islamic jurisprudence and more importantly with the notions of liberal privacy and Islamic intimacy. Many religiously conservative groups and Islamists acknowledge the importance of privacies in liberal democratic societies, and simultaneously they try to find a niche for Islamic intimacies in liberal democratic contexts. The liberal public/private split as well as the critique of this split in theoretical literature become useful sources for Islamic groups to voice their demands for Islamic intimacy in the public and the private spheres of secular Turkey. The meaning of protecting the private is quite different in terms of liberalism and Islam. Some scholars of Islam such as Ali Bulaç argue that the protection of private life, which is the most conceited principle of the contemporary Western societies, had been carefully taken up in the early years of Islam. Yet the Islamic understanding and the Western liberal understanding of the private life are not the same. According to Islamic creeds, it is argued, the offenses made by individuals in their private and intimate life are not subject to interrogation as soon as these deeds do not harm the life, property, and honor (namus) of others and the security and well-being of the community or the society in general.55 This understanding is considered as divinely, morally, and legally applied, binding individuals by drawing conclusions in the afterlife and in the communal life as well as in politicolegal and public life. That is, if an individual commits adultery in his or her home without being seen by others, this does not mean that invisible adultery is legitimate, although no moral or legal consequences can be applied. However, since adultery is religiously forbidden (haram), it is illegitimate in public and in private alike because Islamic creeds oblige believers to know that God sees, knows, and hears everything: one may escape from worldly punishment and moral sanctions, but eventu-


7/12/11 6:51 AM


191

ally she or he cannot escape from the divine judgment in the afterlife. The Islamic understanding of the protection of the private life and intimacies is based upon such a multifaceted understanding of individual believers. Without a complicated knowledge of this-worldly and otherworldly life concerning intimacies, private life is not something to be appreciated in terms of Islam because an uncontrolled and unobserved private sphere may turn into a sphere of sin, conquered by the desires and passions of the nefs.56 Despite the divine, social, and judicial dimensions of the privacies, if the nefs deceives an individual believer and leads her or him to sinful deeds in the private, then she or he should keep sins secret and refrain from exposing them in public because publicity of the sinful deeds is not useful for anyone; on the contrary, it may harm the community and society by normalizing the sin. More importantly, in terms of the relationship between God and human beings, God may forgive the misdeed of a believer as soon as it is confined to the private life. God would forgive his subjects if they do not harm the rights of others. However, the exposition of a sinful deed, its confession, and its circulation may make many people witnesses of the sins. The exposition of the sin is disadvantageous to the sinner. A Muslim who committed a major sinful deed, regardless of whether this deed happens in private or public, has to repent and never repeat the same deed.57 On the other hand, as many religious conservative groups and intellectuals believe, Western liberal democracy requires that nobody intervene in another’s private life. Whatever happens in private is secret. If a deed is done in private, it becomes legitimate regardless of its character. Nobody is subjected to criticism or condemnation by others. Especially if the deed is within the boundaries of individual freedoms, others have no right to make even individual moral comments. All good deeds as well as all crimes and sinful acts happen thanks to the use of individual freedom. In Western societies, some Islamists argue, the boundary distinguishing individual freedom, sexual freedom, and adultery is not well-established, if not blurred deliberately. However, in reality, “almost all human beings agree that adultery is one of the ugliest crimes done by human beings.”58 In their arguments, except for degenerate moral viewpoints, there is no society on earth that tolerates adultery, which means there is nothing extraordinary because adultery is forbidden and harshly punished in Islam. What is most significant, however, is that adultery is a crime against humanity and that it is related to saving or not saving the human existence.59 Many Islamists observe a negative correlation between adultery and humanity: if adultery spreads, humanity is ruined; if adultery decreases, humanity flourishes. Since adultery is seen as a matter of life and death, its content and boundaries must properly be understood.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

192


According to Islamic jurisprudence, as Ahmet Taşgetiren, a pro-AKP writer contributing to Islamic weekly Aksiyon and daily Birgün explains, zina (adultery) is defined as out-of-wedlock sexual intercourse of a woman and a man. Zani is the adulterer and zaniye is the adulteress. The women and men are accepted as adulterers whether they are married or not married; however, in Islamic jurisprudence, the punishment given to the married adulterers is heavier.60 In secular Turkey, however, the word zina in legal and common usage does not cover all kinds of sexual intercourses; only married couples’ out-of-wedlock intercourses are defined as adultery. Cohabitations and statecontrolled sexual intercourses in the brothel houses disturb Islamists like Taşgetiren as a sign of the commonality of adultery in a Muslim society. In the West, it is claimed, the concept of adultery is out of usage, because the dominant form of sexual interactions is out-of-wedlock intercourses, or adultery. The result then is just as anticipated by Islam: the end of family institutions, the end of marriage institutions, a decline of the population, an aging society, abnormal sexual choices, and the like.61 The Islamic prohibition on adultery is not stated as “Do not commit adultery” but as “Do not come closer to adultery,” which underlines the potential danger of adultery against humanity. Accordingly then, one hadith of the Prophet becomes crucial to define the complicated dimensions of adultery in Islam: there is adultery of the eye, of the ear, of the tongue, of the hand, and of the foot.62 And as marriage is seen as the best way to refrain from adultery in its various forms, delay in marriage caused by secular laws as well as some secular conditions such as the requirement of education, military service, jobs, furniture, and so forth are disadvantageous to maintaining decency and advantageous to adultery. Given the importance of marriage as the unique institution to protect humanity from adultery, religously conservative groups and Islamists try to find out the most proper way to keep Muslims modesty and escape from degeneration, especially in liberal democratic societies, where sexual freedoms are widespread and familial and marital questions are seen as individual concerns rather than communal, social, and humane concerns. The Islamic groups who seem to incorporate liberal democratic values and commit themselves to adopting liberal diversity still highlight the centrality of Islam as the source of legitimacy for their deeds and misdeeds in society. As Karaman puts it, Regardless of the regime type, Muslims refer to Sharia (Islamic jurisprudence) in judging their legal deeds and the legal requirements applied to them. If their deeds and the required regulations are proper to Islam, then they obey the rule of the current regime, if there are defects, they re-organize their deeds and contracts in accordance with Islam.63


7/12/11 6:51 AM


193

As the statement indicates, pious Muslims are allowed to use liberal democratic and secular institutions because the liberal and secular characters do not directly mean an anti-Islamic character of the deeds, registers, and contracts done by means of these institutions. As soon as the deeds and contracts are in convergence with Islam, then they become valid and legitimate. This statement also paves the way for the religiously legitimate marriage in liberal, secular societies. In the Turkish legal structure religious marriage, which is popularly known as imam marriage, is not permitted if there is no civil marriage among the partners. Most married people have both civil and religious marriages. Secular and feminist objection to the validity of religious marriage arises from the fear of polygamy, which is an Islamic permission for Muslim men to marry four wives at once. Religious scholars and Islamists have different interpretations of polygamy and religious marriage. Some argue that God’s intention is monogamy because it is very hard to do justly for all four wives; others state that it is a grave sin to make haram what is actually made helal by God. Some argue that there is no such thing as religious marriage in Islam; others equate civil marriage with adultery. An in-between interpretation comes from Karaman, who informs pious Muslims who want to live in liberal democratic system without negotiating religiously legitimate sexualities. Karaman clarifies the proper Islamic marriage as follows: a Muslim has one marriage, which is legitimate, proper, and contains well-defined elements and conditions in terms of religion. Among these elements and conditions, there is no imam. The performance of an imam in a marriage contract is only a tradition. The reason behind the establishment of such a tradition is that there should not be any fault, any defect, or any sinful act in the establishment of such an important institution as marriage. In Islam, there is no imam marriage; there is a valid or invalid marriage contract.64 Although Karaman does not refuse the validity of imam marriage and criticizes those seculars who equate imam marriage with adultery, which he believes means an outrageous insult to Muslim believers whose legitimate religious marriages are attempted to be invalidated by some “narrow-minded and intolerant anti-religious people.” He insists that in Islamic fiqh, nikah (the marriage contract) is not classified as worship but is classified within the regulations concerning worldly life.65 In this sense, nikah is not different from rental or business contracts. That is why the marriage contract is made by two parties: the contract is established through the will and consent of a man and a woman whose marriage is permitted in Islamic rule. Also, witnesses are required. The existence of an imam as the performer of the nikah is not a necessary condition for the legitimacy of the marriage; the imam’s only job is


7/12/11 6:51 AM

194


steering the contractual act. Yet still the role of the imam is complicated for the Muslims all over the world. In one case, Kecia Ali, a Muslim scholar who authored a book about sexual ethics and Islam from a feminist perspective by reflecting on the Koran, hadith, and Islamic jurisprudence, explained the difficulty of officiating a Muslim marriage as a woman, despite her academic specialization in Islamic marriage law and that there is no legal obstacle to her officiating at the marriage.66 In line with Karaman’s argument, Ali underlines that Muslim marriage depends on the words of bride and groom (or their representatives); that the role of imam is “ceremonial rather than sacerdotal”; and that the performance of an imam, “while recommended and customary,” is not a requirement for a religiously valid marriage.67 In the Turkish context, which is shaped by secular laws, civil marriage or the state ceremony seems more proper to Karaman because it protects and guarantees the rights arising from marriage. However, for different reasons Muslim believers resort to religious marriage rather than civil marriage. Some of these reasons arise from deep pious anxiety, while others happen because of an instrumental strategy to legitimize temporal sexual desires in religious terms. Essentially all these marriages are practical attempts to reconcile secular, liberal conditions with Islamic requirements and to satisfy sexual lust without committing grave sins that threaten the whole of humanity as well as one’s own afterlife. These debates show us the way Islamic incorporation of liberal democratic values creates paradoxical and pragmatic moves. Many religiously conservative groups and scholars consider Islamic boundaries on legitimate sexualities and familial life as ideal, where complementarity rather than equality is sought for as the basis of the marriage and family. Islamic groups particularly criticize feminist demands and egalitarian “obsessions” concerning familial life. Karaman among others deciphers the “ideal feminist family” as follows: the companionship of two loving individuals with a very insignificant contract. . . . Two lovers decide to live together and have children if they want. The companionship has two fundamental elements: equality and freedom. Each partner is absolutely equal to another; there is no difference between them in terms of gender roles. If possible biological differences between sexes must be eliminated. . . . The only tie between partners is love, which is shallow and spiritually weak and based upon sexual lust, and whenever love disappears, companionship must be abolished. In the meantime, each partner is able to have sexual relations with third parties, extra marital affairs should not be problem.68

As the quotation indicates, equality, love, freedom, and individual choice as the basis of marriage and family are considered as weak foundations that lack spiritual and moral dimension, which is temporary and irresponsible. A


7/12/11 6:51 AM


195

more conservative, if not Islamic, regulation of sexualities is defended; however, the egalitarian secular regulations and laws are eventually respected. In their discursive struggle, religiously conservative groups who incorporate liberal democratic values and institutions still underline that liberal societies’ history, culture, and values are different from those of Turkish society. Western individuals live as they wish in terms of their individuals choices because they are free from customs, traditions, and moral and religious values. However, in Turkey, they struggle against the demands of “marginal groups” such as feminists whose ideals should not be effective in the lawmaking process. As these debates and discursive struggles over sexualities highlight, in the last decade liberal democracy has gained an unexpected ascendancy among religiously conservative groups, Islamist intellectuals, and politicians, who actively take part in the public debate on the consolidation of democracy and the establishment of liberal values revolving around diversity and difference. However, gender equality and sexual freedoms seem very hard to incorporate as the values of liberal democratic societies where all citizens are deemed morally and politically equal individuals. This section exposes the religiously conservative resistance to an egalitarian gender regime in public and private and shows that without embracing an egalitarian gender regime the incorporation of the notion of liberal democratic equality within the Islamist discourse cannot contribute to the establishment of a genuine democracy.

The Challenge of Reconstituting Women’s Citizenship in the Context of Constitution-Making in Turkey In a somewhat parallel dynamic to the early Republican project of secularization reforms, the EU accession process has over the last two decades acted as a powerful influence on the reforms undertaken to expand women’s citizenship status and to enable women to make use of their citizenship rights. Part of this process has overlapped with the debate over the constitution-making in Turkey, which has also involved the reconstitution of citizenship in Turkey through the recognition of different identities. In this context, reimagining identities in Turkey and promoting the milieu for forging a new societal and political consensus for constitutional reform have significant implications for the prospect of the expansion of women’s citizenship in Turkey. Currently, however, in spite of the fact that significant progress was made in the struggle against existing gender discriminations in the legal system, Turkey’s male-dominated political structures maintain and legitimize the essentially sexist approaches to gender equality through subtle mechanisms of women’s control by men in the public and private spheres. The state agents also refrain


7/12/11 6:51 AM

196


from forging effective and genuine strategies with societal actors to struggle against patriarchal forms of control over women’s bodies and sexuality. The major predicament for women today regarding citizenship does not lie in the realm of formal (legal) right. Moreover, constitutional guarantees for prohibiting discrimination on the basis of (among other identities) gender do not bear much significance in the reformulation of constitutional citizenship. This was, indeed, the major point raised by women’s groups in Turkey following the publicization of the previous constitution draft of September 2007 prepared on the initiative of the government. This draft represented a step backwards as far as the necessary changes to complement the most recent reforms in the Civil Code and the Penal Code, with the objective of promoting women’s exercise of citizenship rights.69 The constitutional amendment of May 2004 had stipulated equality between men and women and assigned the state to take those necessary measures to materialize this equality. The draft of 2007 also stipulated that the special measures taken to protect “disadvantaged sectors such as women, children, the elderly and the handicapped” could not be considered as violating the equality principle. This draft provision was severely criticized by women’s groups and feminist legal experts because of its failure to take women as a categoric group whose capacity to enjoy their formal citizenship rights was often grasped due to their gender but not due to a commonality with the other disadvantaged groups.70 While the disadvantages of the other groups could be dealt with by the policy measures of the welfare state, which need constitutional protection, in reality, as feminist research demonstrated, the welfare state assumptions have made women more dependent on the male-dominated state. Women’s roles in the private sphere as mothers and caregivers constrain their potential to realize equal citizenship. Feminist analyses have long emphasized that women’s different nature embedded in the private sphere (their maternal roles, in particular) need to be carried into the public sphere in the construction of citizenship. The draft of 2007 had maintained the emphasis on the family as the foundation of the state; however, the right of women to be protected from domestic violence, for example, was not extended any guarantee. Those social rights subsumed under social assistance and services need to be extended to all women, including homemakers, and this right should be expanded to include women’s right to reproductive health. In the debates on constitution in Turkey, the need for equal human rights protection for both genders by laws and the state has not been approached with the emphasis on individual honor and identity, which are problematic particularly for women citizens, whose bodies, reproductive capacities, and sexuality are exploited within patriarchal structures and norms. Women’s civil citizenship calls for provisions and measures to protect their identities as individual mothers, laborers, consum-


7/12/11 6:51 AM


197

ers, taxpayers, and so forth and to protect them against any intrusions from masculinist practices and laws that have so far constructed them as “(male) citizens with specific disadvantages because of their sex.”71 In the most recent constitutional amendment, passed by the Parliament in May 2010 and then approved by popular vote in the referendum on September 12, 2010, women were not cited among those groups “in need of special protection.” The amendments retained the provision (from the 2007 draft) that measures taken with regard to gender quality would not be interpreted as violating the constitutional principle of equality. Gender equality policies constitute a crucial aspect of dismantling the gendered model of citizenship to enable women to use their constitutional rights on an equal basis with men. However, a vision of constitutional citizenship also needs to specify the realms for which special (and temporary) measures would be necessary to eradicate social, economic, and political obstacles for engendering de facto “equality of opportunity” for genders. Related to that, constitutional engineering needs also to stipulate gender parity in the formation of public and political bodies. In the Turkish case, it seems necessary to stipulate explicitly that positive discrimination policies (such as quotas in the elections) would be part of these mechanisms to bridge the prevailing gender gap in representative bodies.

Suggestions for a More Inclusive and Gender-Neutral Citizenship Put briefly, reformulating an inclusionary notion of citizenship requires integrating diversities as a crucial part of the constitutional citizenship project. This reformulation accordingly requires “regendering citizenship,” which would permeate all laws and practices by “transforming culturally constructed categories on gender.”72 Hence, rather than excluding differences, discriminations exposed by “different” groups need to be recognized as equal citizens. Needless to state, such a vision would be an integral part of a new constitution that would embody a participatory spirit protecting individual rights and freedoms vis á vis the state. What is more crucial, however, is creating a shift of focus from constitutional citizenship to societal citizenship. Here constitutional citizenship, which is foundational and inalienable, refers to the debates and accomplishments within the framework of legal structure, constitution-making, and democratic consolidation of the laws. On the other hand, societal citizenship indicates the way citizenship is actualized in social life by different social actors. The actually lived citizenship has to be traced beyond the citizenship written in the laws on the ground that inequalities and discriminations become less visible in the course of daily life, where social


7/12/11 6:51 AM

198


and religious conservatism as well as different sorts of biased discourses on minorities and disadvantageous groups are dominant. This observation is particularly significant when it comes to the gendered dimension of the citizenship question. Gender-based inequalities, discriminations, and violation of rights are so pervasive that they are internalized and normalized in social life and in social discourses and that they damage the idea of equal citizenship of women and sexual minorities, leading to estrangement from power positions, positive recognition, and self-respect demands. The egalitarian and inclusive spirit of the law, which is a great accomplishment in a legal sense, has to be disseminated in every sphere of societal life. That is to say, while the state is in charge of realization of equal opportunity for women, which requires action in economic and political positions as well, a more crucial action is required to eliminate gender-based hate speech, insult, and discursive disrespect that violates societal peace and respect in family, school, neighborhood, religious worship places, and so on. Societal citizenship pictures the compelling task of unlearning a deep-seated hatred and insult mentality among social groups arising from gender, sexuality, ethnicity, faith-based, and economic differences and learning the diversity of equal citizen fellows who share a livable life with human dignity in a livable and peaceful country of equals.

Notes 1. Birol Caymaz, Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık: Resmi İdeoloji ve Yansımaları (Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2007), 158. 2. Suad Joseph, “Gendering Citizenship in the Middle East,” in Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, edited by S. Joseph (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000), 9. 3. Sylvia Walby, Gender Transformations (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 175. 4. Walby, Gender Transformations, 178. 5. Amanda Gouws, “Introduction: Constituting Women as Citizens,” in (Un)thinking Citizenship: Feminist Debates in Contemporary South Africa, edited by A. Gouws, 3–4 (Aldershot: Ahgate Publishing, 2005). 6. Ruth Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives (London: Macmillan, 1997). 7. Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988); Ursula Vogel, “Is Citizenship Gender-Specific?” in The Frontiers of Citizenship, edited by U. Vogel and M. Moran (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991); Berthe Siim, Gender and Citizenship: Politics and Agency in France, Britain and Denmark (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Anne Phillips, Democracy and Difference, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993); Petra Meier and Emanuela Lombardo, “Concepts of Citizenship Underlying EU Gender Equality Policies,” Citizenship Studies 12, no. 5 (October 2008): 483.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


199

8. Yeşim Arat, “Gender and Citizenship: Considerations on the Turkish Experience,” in Women and Power in the Middle East, edited by Suad Joseph and S. Sylomovicz (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylania Press, 2001), 159–165; Deniz Kandiyoti, “Emancipated but Unliberated? Reflections on the Turkish Case,” Feminist Studies 13, no. 2: 317–338; Şirin Tekeli, Women in the Turkish Society (London: Zed Books, 1995); Meltem Müftüler-Baç, “Turkish Women’s Predicament,” Women’s Studies International Forum 22, no. 3: 303–315. 9. Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), 471. 10. Şirin Tekeli, “The Rise and Change in the New Women’s Movement: Emergence of the New Feminist Movement in Turkey,” in The New Women’s Movement: Feminism and Political Power in the Europe and the USA, edited by Drude Dahlerup (London: Sage, 1986), 185. 11. Kandiyoti, Deniz, “The Politics of Gender and the Conundrums of Citizenship,” in Women and Power in the Middle East (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), 54–55. 12. Füsun Üstel, “Makbul Vatandaşın” Peşinde: II. Meşrutiyetten Bugüne Vatandaşlık Eğitimi (Istanbul: İletişim, 2004); Caymaz, Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık, 24. 13. Üstel, Makbul Vatandaşın Peşinde, 269; Firdevs Gümüşoğlu, “Ders Kitaplarında Toplumsal Cinsiyet,” Toplum ve Demokrasi 2, no. 4 (September–December, 2008), 42–43. 14. Jennny B. White, “State, Feminism, Modernization and the Turkish Women,” NWSA Journal 15, no. 3 (Fall 2003), 147. 15. Zehra F. Arat, “Turkish Women and the Republican Construction of Tradition,” in Reconstructing Gender in the Middle East, edited by Fatma M. Göcek and Balaghi Shiva (New York: Colombia University Press, 1994), 60. 16. Yıldız Ecevit, “Women’s Rights, Women’s Organizations and the State,” in Human Rights in Turkey, edited by Zehra F. Arat (Philedalphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), 187. 17. Zehra F. Arat, “Turkish Women and the Republican Construction of Tradition,” 58. 18. Ayşe Öncü, “Turkish Women in Professions: Why So Many?” in Women in Turkish Society, edited by Nermin Abadan-Unat (Leiden: Brill, 1981), 187. 19. Ayşe Dericioğulları-Ergun, “Sosyal Güvenlik Reformunun Öteki Yüzü: Kadınların Eşitliği(!)” Toplum ve Demokrasi 2, no. 4 (September–December 2008), 216. 20. During the single-party period women candidates were handpicked just like men by the Republican People’s elite. In the (noncompetitive) elections of 1935, 18 women entered the Parliament. In the post-1950 period this number was never achieved until the most recent election of 2007, raising the percentage of female deputies to 8.7, ironically again through the highly centralized and male-dominated candidate selection procedures in most Turkish parties. 21. The number of illiterate women is currently 4,740,000. BETAM Reseach note, Bahcesehir University, Centre for Econ and Social Research, data based on 2008 TUIK (Turkish Statistics Institution) data on household labor force. 80.4 percent of women are literate as of 2007. http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc/com.news/474466.asp?cp1=18 (accessed September 26, 2010).


7/12/11 6:51 AM

200


22. Fatma Gök and Deniz Ilgaz, “The Rights to Education,” in Human Rights in Turkey, 136. 23. Data from the Turkish Statistics Institute, www.tuik.gov.tr. 24. İpek İlkkaracan, “Who Pays for the Care of Children, the Sick, the Handicapped and the Elderly?”Amargi 7 (Winter 2007): 46. 25. Ayse Gül Altınay and Yeşim Arat, Türkiye’de Kadına Yönelik Şiddet (Istanbul: Punto, 2007). 26. Ayşe Gündüz-Hoşgör, “Kadın Vatandaşlık Haklarındaki En Temel Sorun: Nüfus Cüzdanım Yok ki,” Toplum ve Bilim 2 no. 4 (September–December 2008): 27–38. 27. Yesim Arat, The Patriarchal Paradox: Women Politicans in Turkey (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1989), 33–34. 28. Zehra F. Arat, “Turkish Women and Reconstruction of Tradition,” 64. 29. Constitutional Court Decision No.1990/31. The Court referred to the equality clauses in the CEDAW in this decision. The latest changes in the law made use of this right more accessible through the expression of will at the time of the marriage act. But married women cannot use their maiden name only, which is contrary to Turkey’s international committments. 30. Tekeli, “The Rise and Change in the New Women’s Movement,” 195–197. 31. Yeşim Arat, “Women’s Rights as Human Rights: The Turkish Case,” Human Rights Review 3, no. 1 (2001): 31; Yasemin Çelik-Levin, “The Effect of CEDAW on Women’s Rights,” in Human Rights in Turkey, 203. 32. Hidayet Şefkatli-Tuksal, “The Disqualification of Women Wearing the Headscarf,” Turkish Policy Quarterly (Spring 2007), 67–71. 33. AK-DER (Association of Women’s Rights against Discrimination), The General Situation of Women in Turkey and the Impact of the Headscarf Ban on Gender Equality (report) (Istanbul, 2008). 34. Yakın Erturk, “Turkey’s Modern Paradoxes: Identity Politics, Women’s Agency and Universal Rights,” in Global Feminism: Transnational Women’s Activism, Organizing and Human Rights, edited by Myra Marx Ferree and Aili Mari Tripp (New York: New York University Press, 2006), 94–97. 35. Çağla Diner And Şule Toktaş, “Women of Feminism in Turkey: Kemalist, Islamist and Kurdish Women’s Movements in an Era of Globalization,” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 12, no. 1 (March 2010): 48; Nebahat Akkoç, “Imagining a New World,” Turkish Policy Quarterly (Spring 2007), 73–76. 36. Ergun Özbudun and Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey (Budapest, Central European University Press, 2009), 66. 37. Yeşim Arat, “Women’s Rights and Islam in Turkish Politics: The Civil Code Amendment,” Middle East Journal 40, no. 2 (Spring 2010), 235. 38. The Report of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession into the EU (Ankara, 2003). 39. Ibid. 40. Law No. 4320. The law stipulates that the perpetuators of violence should be removed from their homes for a certain period of time. In case of violation of the law again by the same person a jail sentence is imposed.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


201

41. Law No 5237/2004, which was adopted by the Parliament in September 2004 and went into effect on April 1, 2005; What Does the New Penal Code Bring for Women? (Ankara, 2005). 42. Ergun Özbudun and William Hale, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 20–29. 43. Zana Çıtak and Özlem Tür, “Women between Tradition and Change: The Justice and Development Party Experience in Turkey,” Middle East Studies 44, no. 3 (May 2008): 463. 44. Dericioğulları-Ergun, “Sosyal Güvenlik Reformunun” 211–218; “Women Civil Servants: Daycare, Not Three Children,” Milliyet Daily, August 29, 2010. 45. www.gazetevatan.com/haber/kadinla-erkek-esit-olamaz/318006/9/Siyaset (retrieved September 26, 2010). 46. Özbudun and Genckaya, Democratization, 104. 47. “Erdogan: Don’t Come with Quota, but through Struggle” (“Erdogan: Kotayla Degil Kopara Kopara Gelin”) Miliyet Daily, August 9, 2008; Ayşe GüneşAyata and Fatma Tütüncü, “Party Politics of the AKP, 2002–2007 and the Predicaments of Women at the Intersection of the Westernist, Islamist and Feminist Discourses in Turkey,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 35, no. 3 (December 2008), 363–384. 48. Yeşim Arat, “Religion, Politics and Gender Equality in Turkey: Implications of a Democratic Paradox?” Third World Quarterly 31, no. 6 (September 2010), 869. 49. Ali Bulaç,“Eşcinseller, Evlilik ve Başörtüsü” (“Homosexuals, Marriage and the Headscarf”), Zaman, June 1, 2005. 50. Ali Bulaç, “Eşcinseller Üzerine” (“On Homosexuals”), Zaman, May 30, 2005. 51. Hayreddin Karaman, “Dindara Düşman, Eşcinsele Dost” (“Enemy of the Pious, Friend of the Homosexual”), Yenişafak,May 17, 2009. 52. Pınar, İlkkaracan. “How Adultery Almost Derailed Turkey’s Aspiration to Join the European Union,” in Sex Politics: Reports from the Front Lines, edited by Richard Parker et al., 248 (Sexuality Policy Watch, no date). 53. Ibid., 248. 54. “Zinaya Ceza Verilmesini Anadolu Kadını Istiyor,” Hurriyet, August 28, 2004. 55. Ali Bulaç, “Özel Hayat Ne Kadar Masun?” Zaman, May 15, 2010. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. “Zinanın Basamakları,” Milli Gazete, April 14, 2009. 59. Ibid. 60. Ahmet Taşgetiren, “Zina Tartışması” (“Adultery Debate”), Hurriyet, September 13, 2004. 61. Ibid. 62. “Zinanın Basamakları.” 63. Hayreddin Karaman, Laik Düzende Dini Yaşamak 1 (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2005). 64. Hayreddin Karaman, Laik Düzende Dini Yaşamak 3 (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2007). 65. Hayreddin Karaman, Yeni Şafak, September 5, 2004.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

202


66. Kecia Ali, “Acting on a Frontier of Religious Ceremony.” Harvard Divinity Bulletin 32, no. 4 (2004): 8. 67. As she acknowledges, however, a woman’s officiating a marriage, with a woman’s performance replacing an imam’s performance, is complicated because it is about reconstructing the “paradigm of Islamic religious authority.” 68. Hayreddin Karaman, Laik Düzende Dini Yaşamak 1, 155. 69. “The Women’s Constitution Platform Was established for a Constitution without Moustache,” http://bianet.org/bianet/bianet/102093-biyiksiz-anayasa-icin -kadin-platformu-kuruldu. 70. “Demands of the Women’s Constitution Platform for a Democratic, Liberal and Egalitarian Constitution,” http://eski.bianet.org/.../anayasa_onerileri_kadin_plat formu_071204.doc. 71. Luce Irıgaray, “Women’s Citizenship,” Amargi 7 (2007), 32–33. 72. Nuran Erol Işık, “Gender and Citizenship: An Enlightening Linkage towards Emancipation of Women,” Alternative Politics 2, no. 1 (April 2010): 18–36.

Bibliography AK-DER (Association of Women’s Rights against Discrimination). The General Situation of Women in Turkey and the Impact of the Headscarf Ban on Gender Equality (report). Istanbul, 2008. Akkoç, Nebahat. “Imagining a New World.” Turkish Policy Quarterly (Spring 2007): 73–76. Ali, Kecia. “Acting on a Frontier of Religious Ceremony.” Harvard Divinity Bulletin 32, no. 4 (Fall/Winter 2004): 8–9. Altınay, Ayşegül and Yeşim Arat. Türkiye’de Kadına Yönelik Şiddet. Istanbul: Punto, 2007. “Anatolian Women Demand Criminalization of Adultery” (“Zinaya Ceza Verilmesini Anadolu Kadını Istiyor”) Hurriyet, August 28, 2004. Arat, Yeşim. “Gender and Citizenship: Considerations on the Turkish Experience.” In Women and Power in the Middle East, edited by Suad Joseph and S. Sylomovicz, 259–65. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylania Press, 2001. ———. The Patriarchal Paradox: Women Politicans in Turkey. Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1989. ———. “Religion, Politics and Gender Equality in Turkey: Implications of a Democratic Paradox?” Third World Quarterly 31, no. 6 (September 2010): 869–84. ———. “Women’s Rights and Islam in Turkish Politics: The Civil Code Amendment.” Middle East Journal 40, no.2, (spring, 2010): 235–251. ———. “Women’s Rights as Human Rights: The Turkish Case.” Human Rights Review 3, no. 1 (2001): 235–51. Arat, Zehra F. “Turkish Women and the Republican Construction of Tradition.” In Reconstructing Gender in the Middle East, edited by Fatma M. Göçek and B. Shiva, 57–78. New York: Colombia University Press, 1994.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


203

Berkes, Niyazi. The Development of Secularism in Turkey. Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964. BETAM. Research note. Istanbul: Bahcesehir University, Centre for Econ and Social Research, 2010. Bulaç, Ali. “Eşcinseller, Evlilik ve Başörtüsü” (“Homosexuals, Marriage and the Headscarf”). Zaman, June 1, 2005. ———. “Eşcinseller Üzerine” (“On Homosexuals”). Zaman, May 30, 2005. ———. “Özel Hayat Ne Kadar Masun?” (“To What Extent Is the Private Life Protected?”). Zaman, May 15, 2010. Caymaz, Birol. Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık: Resmi İdeoloji ve Yansımaları. Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2007. Çelik-Levin, Yasemin. “The Effect of CEDAW on Women’s Rights.” In Human Rights in Turkey, edited by Zehra F. Arat, 201–212. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007. Çıtak, Zana and Özlem Tür. “Women between Tradition and Change: The Justice and Development Party Experience in Turkey.” Middle East Studies 44, no. 3 (May 2008): 255–469. “Demands of the Women’s Constitution Platform for a Democratic, Liberal and Egalitarian Constitution.” http://eski.bianet.org/.../a. Dericioğulları-Ergun, Ayşe. “Sosyal Güvenlik Reformunun Öteki Yüzü: Kadınların Eşitliği(!)” Toplum ve Demokrasi 2, no. 4 (September–December 2008): 211–218. Diner, Çağla and Şule Toktaş. “Women of Feminism in Turkey: Kemalist, Islamist and Kurdish Women’s Movements in an Era of Globalization.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies 12, no. 1 (March 2010): 41–57. Ecevit,Yıldız. “Women’s Rights, Women’s Organizations and the State.” In Human Rights in Turkey, edited by Zehra F. Arat, 187–201. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007. “Erdoğan: Don’t Come with Quota, but through Struggle” (“Erdogan: Kotayla Degil Kopara Kopara Gelin”) Miliyet Daily, August 9, 2008. Erol Işık, Nuran. “Gender and Citizenship: An Enlightening Linkage towards Emancipation of Women.” Alternative Politics 2, no. 1 (April 2010): 18–36. Ertürk, Yakın. “Turkey’s Modern Paradoxes: Identity Politics, Women’s Agency and Universal Rights.” In Global Feminism: Transnational Women’s Activism, Organizing and Human Rights, edited by Myra Marx Ferree and Aili Mari Tripp, 79–109. New York: New York University Press, 2006. Gouws, Amanda. “Introduction: Constituting Women as Citizens.” In (Un)thinking Citizenship: Feminist Debates in Contemporary South Africa, edited by A. Gouws, 21–53. Aldershot: Ahgate Publishing, 2005. Gök, Fatma and Deniz Ilgaz. “The Rights to Education.” In Human Rights in Turkey edited by Zehra F. Arat, 123–136. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007. Gümüşoğlu, Firdevs. “Ders Kitaplarında Toplumsal Cinsiyet.” Toplum ve Demokras 2, no. 4 (September–December 2008): 39–50. Gündüz-Hoşgör, Ayşe. “Kadın Vatandaşlık Haklarındaki En Temel Sorun: Nüfus Cüzdanım Yok ki.” Toplum ve Bilim 2, no. 4 (September–December 2008): 27–38.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

204


Güneş-Ayata, Ayşe and Fatma Tütüncü. “Party Politics of the AKP, 2002–2007 and the Predicaments of Women at the Intersection of the Westernist, Islamist and Feminist Discourses in Turkey.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 35, no. 3 (December 2008): 363–384. Irigaray, Luce. “Women’s Citizenship.” Amargi 7 (Winter 2007): 32–33. İlkkaracan, İpek. “Who Pays for the Care of Children, the Sick, the Handicapped and the Elderly?”Amargi 7 (Winter 2007): 46–49. İlkkaracan, Pınar. “How Adultery Almost Derailed Turkey’s Aspiration to Join the European Union.” In Sex Politics: Reports from the Front Lines, edited by Richard Parker et al. Sexuality Policy Watch, no date. Joseph, Suad. “Gendering Citizenship in the Middle East.” In Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, edited by S. Joseph, 3–30. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000. Kandiyoti, Deniz. “Emancipated but Unliberated? Reflections on the Turkish Case.” Feminist Studies 13, no. 2–3: 17–338. ———. “The Politics of Gender and the Conundrums of Citizenship.” In Women and Power in the Middle East, edited by Suad Joseph and Sylomovicz, 52–58. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001. Karaman, Hayreddin. “Dindara Düşman, Eşcinsele Dost” (“Enemy of the Pious, Friend of the Homosexual”). Yenişafak, May 17, 2009. ———. Laik Düzende Dini Yaşamak 1. İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2005. ———. Laik Düzende Dini Yaşamak 3, İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2007. Lister, Ruth. Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives. London: Macmillan, 1997. Meier, Petra and Emanuela Lombardo. “Concepts of Citizenship Underlying EU Gender Equality Policies.” Citizenship Studies 12, no. 5 (October 2008): 481–493. Müftüler-Baç, Meltem. “Turkish Women’s Predicament.” Women’s Studies International Forum 22, no. 3: 303–315. Öncü, Ayşe. “Turkish Women in Professions: Why So Many?” In Women in Turkish Society, edited by Nermin Abadan-Unat. Leiden: Brill, 1981. Özbudun, Ergun and Ömer Faruk Gençkaya. Democratization and the Politics of Constitution-Making in Turkey. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009. Özbudun, Ergun and William Hale. Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP. London and New York: Routledge, 2010. Pateman, Carole. The Sexual Contract. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988. Phillips, Anne. Democracy and Difference. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993. The Report of the European Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession into the EU. Ankara, 2003. Siim, Berthe. Gender and Citizenship: Politics and Agency in France, Britain and Denmark. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Şefkatli-Tuksal, Hidayet. “The Disqualification of Women Wearing the Headscarf.” Turkish Policy Quarterly (Spring 2007): 67–71. Taşgetiren, Ahmet. “Zina Tartışmaları” (“Adultery Debate”). Hurriyet, September 13, 2004.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


205

Tekeli, Şirin. “The Rise and Change in the New Women’s Movement: Emergence of the New Feminist Movement in Turkey.” In The New Women’s Movement: Feminism and Political Power in the Europe and the USA, edited by Drude Dahlerup, 179–199. London: Sage, 1986. Tekeli, Şirin. Women in the Turkish Society. London: Zed Books, 1995. Üstel, Füsun. “Makbul Vatandaşın” Peşinde: II. Meşrutiyetten Bugüne Vatandaşlık Eğitimi. Istanbul: İletişim, 2004. Vogel, Ursula. “Is Citizenship Gender-Specific?” In The Frontiers of Citizenship, edited by U. Vogel and M. Moran. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991. Walby, Sylvia. Gender Transformations. London and New York: Routledge, 1997. What Does the New Penal Code Bring for Women? Ankara, 2005. White, Jenny B. “State, Feminism, Modernization and the Turkish Women.” NWSA Journal 15, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 145–160. “Women Civil Servants: Daycare, Not Three Children.” Milliyet Daily, August 29, 2010. www.gazetevatan.com/haber/kadinla-erkek-esit-olamaz/318006/9/Siyaset (retrieved September 26, 2010). “The Women’s Constitution Platform Was Established for a Constitution without Moustache.” http://bianet.org/bianet/bianet/102093-biyiksiz-anayasa-icin-kadin-plat formu-kuruldu.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


7/12/11 6:51 AM

9 The European Union and Turkey: Transformation of the State–Society Relationship Bahar Turhan Hurmi and Bülent Temel

T

URKEY’S BID TO JOIN

the European Union has been a long and thrilling journey. European leaders, who recognized Turkey as an “associate member” and its prospects to be a full member with the 1963 Ankara Agreement, granted it the “candidate” status for full membership in 1999. Nevertheless, negotiations for full membership, which started five years later, have been a valuable road map for Turkey on its way to the EU. Despite the privative rhetoric that occasionally takes hold on mainstream views on both sides, Turkey’s aspiration to join the EU has been greatly beneficial for the country. Since 2004, when Turkey began accession negotiations and 10 other Eastern European countries became full members to the union, Turkey experienced faster progress than those countries in three of the five areas it expects to improve with an EU membership: economic growth, macroeconomic stability, and governance.1 Of the two remaining areas, employment is a macroeconomic matter related more to domestic politics and sociological factors than to the EU (such as policies to attract job-creating foreign direct investment [FDI] or high rate of population growth), and identity is an abstract phenomenon about which different observers conclude differently.2 Negotiations with the EU have been a catalyst of development for the country. As in most developing nations, conventional priorities and practices that are strongly embedded in the very fabric of the society undermine modernization efforts in Turkey. As the world’s only model that oxymoronically blends Islam with secularity, the Middle East with democracy, and traditions with modernity, the Turkish Republic often finds itself in the midst of conflict.

— 207 —


7/12/11 6:51 AM

208

Bahar Turhan Hurmi and Bülent Temel

Most of the major developments in Turkey’s political history, from military coups to ever-changing perceptions of the West, from perceived theocratic threats to Kurdish separatist terror, contained some elements of a fractionized society with a leadership deficit. Turkey’s agenda is often created by heated debates amongst a myriad of opinion makers and interest groups who have different priorities but identical hold on power in the country. Albeit positive from a democratic viewpoint, this homogenous distribution of power also translates into a lack of consensus on the direction, which slows down the country’s progress. A major benefit of Turkey’s European ideal is the EU’s role as a source of confidence for the Turkish people. As a national goal that finds its philosophical underpinnings in the foundation of the Republic in 1923, Europeanization presents a loud and clear direction for Turkey: democracy, freedom, secularity, capitalism, individualism, rationality, and pragmatism should be the priorities of the Turkish country. Since 2004, when the EU has become a more real and present ideal for Turkey, political leaders have met with minimal resistance in promoting and implementing their modernization programs. Significant updates have been made in the institutions and mechanisms of the government and economy in an effort to join the EU. Administrations competently used the EU as an inspiration and bureaucracy-cutting tool. Policies such as turning the Central Bank to be politically independent, refraining from election economics, transforming the state towards more transparency, reducing the military’s administrative position in the National Security Council to a purely advisory role, and amending the Constitution with a more social tone passed the parliament rather smoothly with the help of the EU fervor. The objective of this study is to underline the positive spillovers of the European Union candidacy on the sociopolitical climate in Turkey and to point out the necessity of a proactive EU that provides a protective legal framework in support of a mutually beneficial relationship. In the following section, we will present a historical trajectory of the kul norm in the Turkish government tradition—its emergence as a religiocultural concept and establishment as a norm—and its debris in the social reflexes of the present-day Turkish people. In the second section, an overview of the development of the state–citizen relationship in Europe alongside the rise of democracy will be given. The third part will unravel the correlation between Turkey’s EU fervor and the conspicuous enthusiasm of its conservative leadership to democratize the sociopolitical institutions of the country. Lastly, territorial integrity concerns will be put forth as a major obstacle in Turkey’s Western transformation, and legislation in the EU of the right to self-determination will be offered as a policy proposal to counter this challenge.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

The European Union and Turkey

209

A Concept from Turkish State Tradition: Kul A substantial, if less visible, impact of the EU on Turkey is its reforming of the centuries-old relationship between the state and the people. In the Turkish state tradition, which traces back to the Great Seljuk Empire in the early eleventh century, government is considered as a protective, fair, and enabling almighty that represents the power and pride of its nation. People’s role in this picture is rather limited to that of “servants” of the state whose main obligation is to cherish and commit to the state’s authority and to be willing to subordinate the self for the sake of the government. A lower level of political consciousness and citizen confidence, a history that lacks democratic touchstones like the Renaissance, and a regional culture of machismo that cherishes masculine authoritarianism have been some of the factors that contributed to this mentality. Resemblance of the kul norm with the teachings of monotheistic faiths is not coincidental. Precedents of the modern Turkish state, the Seljuk and Ottoman Empires were states that were administered under considerable influence of the clergy. Throughout the millennium they took a place in the world’s political history, the role of religion in these empires took various forms. A higher authority that grants permissions, an active participant in administrative matters of the state, a symbolic leader of the world’s Sunnis, and a government organ of social engineering were a few of them. The outcome regardless of the clergy’s role was the establishment of an image in which the “individual” is subordinated to more supreme causes such as the community in the social front or the state in the political one.3 As Günay observes, the “heritage of the Ottoman state, which was after all a ‘Muslim’ state and the last ‘Islamic empire’ . . . continues to live in the form of ‘residuals’ or even ‘derivatives’ . . . in the events, phenomena and processes of the Turkish people as well as the global community.”4 In modern-day Turkey, the nickname “fatherly” can still be heard as an adjective for the government (devlet baba in Turkish) to affectionately imply the state’s selfless superiority over its citizens. Downplaying the place of the individual in the society was an inevitable outcome of the expansionary policies of the Seljuks and the Ottomans. In contrast to the notion of nation-state, imperial powers prior to the nineteenth century conquered foreign territories and dominated their native peoples. Much like the British, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian Empires, the Ottomans established a vast empire, which was consequently composed of highly diverse demographics. While the Ottoman rulers were generous in acknowledging the cultural freedoms of their dominions, they also were equally


7/12/11 6:51 AM

210


strict in enforcing the duties of citizenship. From Algerians to Yugoslavians, Sudanese to Azeris, all nations (millet in Ottoman Turkish) that made up the empire were obliged to pay their taxes and remain loyal to their Ottoman rulers in order to continue their traditional lifestyle, speak their native language, worship in their churches or synagogues, and educate their children. In this sociopolitical framework, the state (empire) came first, nation (millet) second, and the individual last.5 When the state is kept above everything else, all other components of a society can be subordinated in order to protect the state’s unity and integrity. This prioritization turned problematic when the wave of nationalization, which spread worldwide with the French Revolution of 1789, took effect in the nineteenth century. As economic misjudgments such as ineffectiveness of central coordination in a spacious empire that sat on three continents, failure to convert an agriculture and conquest-based economy to an industrial system, and engagements in unfeasible wars increasingly weakened the empire throughout the nineteenth century, Ottoman dominions began looking for opportunities to dissociate from their ruler. Yugoslavian, Balkan, Arab, and Soviet nations fought bloody wars and broke out of the Ottoman Empire one after another. Armenian separatism, which led to their controversial deportation in 1915 and 1916, and the Kurdish struggle for independence since 1978 continue to challenge the nation-state Turks established after the collapse of the Ottoman state in 1923.6 The Turkish War of Independence (1919–1922) at the end of World War I was an episode during which Ottomans of all ethnicities, religions, races, and colors—with the exception of Armenians—united against the occupying forces. Although the sacrifices shown by Kurds, Syrians, or Circassians for the homeland stimulated the feelings of national and territorial unity, the fact that they fought the bloody war with no reference to their cultural identity led the new Turkish state to adopt a public policy that, later on, turned out to be problematic. In the country’s foundational documents, the word “Turkish” was chosen to refer to the people of Turkey. The first constitution (1924) defined “Turkishness” solely on a geographical basis rather than a racial or religious one,7 and the founder of the country, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, defined the “Turkish nation” as “the people of Turkey who established the Republic of Turkey.” Article 66 of the current constitution, which reads that a “Turk” is any person who is “bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship,” carries on the same tradition.8 Güldiken points out that the underlying motivation here was analogous to that of Jacques Bainuille when he wrote that “French republic is more than a race, it is a nation.”9 This conceptualization was parallel to Schnapper’s


7/12/11 6:51 AM


211

distinction between political nation and cultural nation. A political nation is a “political, individualistic, rationalist and voluntarist” entity whereas a cultural nation is an “ethnic [group] based on a community of original people sharing the same ancestry, . . . culture and . . . past.”10 The problem, however, was that the international agreement that acknowledged the establishment of the new Turkish republic, the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, mentioned Greeks, Armenians, and Jews as the “minorities” in the new Turkish country. Although the treaty was simply a political recognition of the largest minorities and their rights in the Turkish society at the time, it also created confusion for other minorities like the Kurds and Alawites who were neither recognized as minorities nor comfortable with the idea of assimilation for the sake of recognition in the society.11 Lessons from its Ottoman predecessor were influential in Turkey’s nation-building effort. The new Turkish state was established as a republic in order to expand people’s power over their political leaders. A democratic constitution was adopted from the Swiss model so the authoritative tendency of the Turkish state tradition would be controlled, and the institution of caliphate (leadership of the world’s Sunni Muslims) was abolished in order to secularize the state. The principle of statism (a major role of the state in the economy) positively led to a social democratic version of capitalism, which simultaneously continued the higher status of the state over the people. Güldiken sees these changes as “steps towards the elimination of segments that regulated and implemented social, economic and political structures and organization prior to nationalization.”12 In an effort to prevent ethnic tension in the future, the new Turkish nation was homogenized with a population exchange with Greece in 1923 and a government approach that treated Kurds as a type of Turkish ethnicity rather than a distinct one. Major political events in Turkey’s 87-year history were correlated to the Turkish people’s refusal to continue the authoritarian state tradition inherited from the Ottoman Empire.13 Execution of political leaders, persecution and mistreatment of divergent elements, and political interventions of the military were all, in different degrees, linked to a suppressive governmental mindset that is too willing to violate the civil rights of individuals for the sake of what it sees as a higher cause for the country. In its sociological core, these struggles were democratic reactions of the Turkish people to a power dynamic that perceived the people as kuls. Güldiken argues that “throughout the evolvement of nation and nation-state [in Turkey], a transformation from servant to citizen, local to national, religiosity to secularity, a feudal society to a capitalist one has been experienced. Economic and social change are surrounded with political organization.”14


7/12/11 6:51 AM

212


The State–Citizen Relationship in the European Tradition The state–citizen relationship in the Western world evolved over a long history of struggles between government and people. In America, Puritans and pilgrims who escaped from the oppression of the church in England and later revolted against the economic exploitation of the British government (with, e.g., the Boston Tea Party) went on to establish a sovereign state whose primary function was to protect people’s liberties. The United States Declaration of Independence (1776)—which mentioned government only in its last paragraph solely as a necessary institution for people’s selfgovernance—introduced the idea of a government that serves rather than controls a nation.15 As a civil response to absolute state power on the other side of the Atlantic, the French Revolution in 1789 declared that the rights to be free and sovereign, to be treated equally, and to be protected are some of the inalienable rights of citizenship. The current constitution of France, which became effective in 1958, submits to the revolution’s principle that the government is of the people, by the people, and for the people. Terrifying experiences of World War II led some Western intellectuals to reduce the ideal function of state to a level of inefficacy: “There is no such thing as the state,” wrote British-American poet Wystan Auden; “we must love one another, or die.”16 Among the leading nations in Western Europe, there is a plurality in the extent to which people are bound to their state. The state–society relation is described as “organic” in Germany, Russia, and Scandinavia, but “pluralistic” in the United Kingdom and “antagonistic” in France.17 In 1993, the European Union initiated a legal concept that elevated the role of people in the state–citizen binary to an unprecedented level. “European Union citizenship” was introduced as a new legal status, and it granted civil rights in addition to the citizenship rights in the EU countries. With the legislation, a citizen of an EU member country would be allowed to vote in the elections of another member country, migrate to any EU country and work there without any restrictions, or even receive protection from diplomatic missions of another member country—if his or her native country does not have representation there.18 Van Wageningen writes that these rights of EU citizenship generates a “community law . . . [that] confers upon them rights which become part of their legal heritage.”19 “European citizenship fundamentally upsets—by its historical trajectory and its legal substance—the existing theoretical frameworks developed with reference to nation-state citizenship.” 20 In this respect, Europeanization is a process of departure from the traditional identification of a citizen based solely on his or her attachment to one preeminent state. This is a process that is highly transformative yet equally restricted in its consequences. Yves Dé-


7/12/11 6:51 AM


213

loye argues that “any change of social configuration which European citizenship may bring about remains dependent on the social and historical struggles by which it is constituted. It . . . cannot simply be confined to the annals of scholarly debate. It places us in the presence of questions concerning the very structure and nature of political life itself.”21 Neoliberal capitalism has been contributing to the transformation of the state–citizen binary in Europe. Pressures and appeals of an unfettered market economy turned a once socially conscious electorate into a bunch that is a myopic and selfish beneficiary of the government. “From the standpoint of political economy,” writes John Clarke, “the shift from citizen to consumer marks a phase in the rolling back of social democratic incursions into the subjugation of everyday life to the logics and processes of capitalism.22 Needham adds, this process has profound implications for the relationship between government and citizen. It restricts citizens to a passive consumption of politics, excluding them from playing a creative and productive role in civic life. An individualized and commodified form of citizenship is taking hold in which communal and discursive elements are lost. . . . There is a more fundamental question to be asked about the extent to which people do in fact expect government and public services to relate to them in the same way as private sector businesses. The danger is that by encouraging this read across, government may itself be eliding a crucial distinction between the public and private domains without which public engagement with democratic processes, and support for public provision, is ultimately bound to be undermined.23

The EU’s Impact on Citizenship in Turkey Turkey’s engagement with the EU necessitated a reorganization of its government and a new legislation of its duties and restrictions. In accordance with the Copenhagen criteria, which lay out the terms and conditions of eligibility for membership in the union, the Turkish state was reformed to view its citizens as the beneficiaries of its existence. The constitution has been amended seven times since the Helsinki Summit of 1999 during which Turkey’s eligibility for EU candidacy was officially recognized by the EU. More than 30 articles of the constitution were changed in an effort to further democratize the Turkish government.24 On September 12, 2010, a proposal to change 26 more articles of the constitution was sent to a referendum, and 57.9 percent of the voters passed the bill. Amendments in 2001, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, and 2008 contained provisions that widened the scope of fundamental rights and freedoms, unrestricted


7/12/11 6:51 AM

214


the languages in which people can express themselves, and superiorized international laws over the local ones pertaining to fundamental rights in case of a clash. Oran interprets this last change as realization of the minority rights granted by the Lausanne Treaty of 1923.25 With the amendmends, degrading minorities was criminalized, teaching and learning in languages other than Turkish was legalized, constructing places of worship was made easier for all faiths, and restrictions on using non-Turkish names were lifted.26 As recognition of peculiar cultural characteristics of minorities and their right to coexist in the Turkish society in a distinct way, the government opened a television network that broadcasts in the Kurdish language. This was a significant shift of paradigm towards the country’s Kurdish minority, which had been associated with separatist terror that took the lives of 37,000 civilians (on both sides) since 1984. Favorable movements towards the country’s Kurdish minority led to demands of similar privileges and civil rights by other minorities, such as the Alawites, a minority of 5 million people who observe a denomination of Islam. Democratic pursuits of ethnic minorities in Turkey are an overdue reconciliation of pluralist democracy in a nation-state. Miller highlights that liberalization of the criminal code was one of the major changes in Turkish jurisprudence.27 In 2004, Turkish leadership adopted a new code that shifted the government’s approach to issues like corruption, immigrant smuggling, torture, adultery, and rape. Even though it was a political “spectacle geared toward moving Turkey one step closer to European Union membership” and a “representative of a twenty-first century collapse of law into ideology and a . . . variation on the primacy of the sovereign decision in jurisprudence,” the legislation “rearticulated and liberalized the state-citizen relationship in Turkey.”28 This was a “wholeheartedly liberal redefinition of crime in a country with a century-long tradition of authoritarianism and exceptionalism.”29 The Europeanization process presents tremendous opportunity as well as challenges for the state–citizen relationship in Turkey. It can transform the Turkish state to become a more democratic, transparent, and libertarian state that appreciates people as “patrons” just as it may turn it into a leviathan that is less tolerant, accountable, and cooperative. The direction the Turkish state will head can be determined by the EU. European policymakers need to take a proactive approach and look for ways to create synergy with their Turkish counterparts. They should play out the fine balance between two legal concepts that are likely to surface throughout the period of Europeanization: denationalization and self-determination.30 Denationalization is a sociopolitical process that refers to the pluralization of what is “national” in a society. According to Sassen, it “has to do with the transformation of the national, specifically under the impact of globalization


7/12/11 6:51 AM


215

and several other dynamics, [which] tend to instantiate inside the national.”31 On the other hand is postnationalism,32 which refers to a new dimension of self-identification that is outside of the original engagement such as citizenship in the EU or in a city (as in the Netherlands).33 Although denationalization is still connected to the national, such a distinction of denationalization from the postnational paves the way to democratization within the national realm by engaging “the global from within the national and through national institutional channels.”34 In the Turkish context, denationalization began in the 1990s and gained momentum in 2004 with the opening of accession negotiations between the Turkish government and the EU.35 The process promises to diversify a singular image of the “Turkish nation” and to involve higher demands of political and social participation by Kurds, Alawites,36 Lazes, Georgians, Circassians, Jews,37 Greeks,38 and Armenians in the society. The current debate as to whether these minorities, most of whom speak Turkish but identify another language as their native language, should be given public education in their native languages is a significant step in the denationalization experience of Turkey.39

Challenges and Policy Proposals An obstacle policymakers in Europe and Turkey may encounter in their democratization agenda in Turkey would be a social-psychological resistance by the Turkish majority to the notion of nationalization. With a common memory made partly by the failure of diversity in the Ottoman experience, partly by the regrettable Armenian episode that still haunts the nation, and partly by the separatist Kurdish terror that claimed 37,000 lives in the last quarter century, the reluctance of the majority to accept fragmentation of Turkish society would be predictable. For the EU to continue to effectively promote democratization reforms in Turkey, European leaders have to work proactively and enact legislation that would assure EU-associated governments that denationalization as a result of democratization reforms towards the EU does not promote secessionist threats in these countries. In the Turkish context, it is essential for the EU to appreciate the fragility of the modern experiment with denationalization. We suggest the EU demonstrate that it will refrain from being a reason to jeopardize associated countries’ territorial integrity with a new legislation. If the EU adopts a body of law that protects member and candidate states in a potential territorial integrity/self-determination right tradeoff, Turkey’s EU pursuit would be more enthusiastic and substantial.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

216


This proposal is extra important at a time when questions in regards to the international community’s role in intercommunal conflicts arose after the controversial case of Kosovo. When, on the February 17, 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence from the government of Serbia, the governments of the United States, Turkey, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, and China responded within a few days to support the declaration. Even though the United Nations and the European Union have not yet acknowledged Kosovo’s independence, positions of their leading members suggest that their recognition in the future is not unlikely. Such a development can potentially compromise global stability since the government of Serbia claims that Kosovo is a UN-governed autonomous province within its sovereign territory. If the EU recognizes Kosovo some day and welcomes it as a member, it will—from the Serbians’ perspective—have functioned as a political entity that challenged Serbia’s territorial unity, which would bring the union with all its members to the brink of war with Serbia and its allies. Turkey’s endorsement of the idea of an independent Kosovo was a rather hasty and myopic decision given its potential political ramifications. Unilateral declaration of independence of an ethnic minority with the support of international community has been the primal concern of the Turkish government on the matter of Kurdish separatism. Since the 1980s, when the separatist terror organization PKK (Partiya Karkêren Kurdistan, or Kurdistan Workers’ Party) began its attacks against Turkish civilians and government, the Turkish state dedicated an estimated $120 to 130 billion to counter the violent insurgency.40 Analyzing the case of Kosovo under the light of the Kurdish question, it is hard to escape from some similarities between the two cases. Albanians in Kosovo have been a vast majority (88 percent),41 just as the Kurds in the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey are (between 64 percent and 79 percent).42 Kosovo was a border region in Serbia, much like Turkey’s eastern and southeastern regions that overlook Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Both campaigns are supported by the international community, if varyingly. Albanians’ sovereignty claim has largely been substantiated by announcements of support from various major powers, and the PKK has openly been endorsed by Danish, Greece, German, French, and Greek Cypriot governments by means of allowing propaganda offices, airing a TV network, or traveling freely.43 In order to avoid being a reason to promote separatism as a result of democratic reforms, the European Union needs to lay out the conditions under which the right to self-determination can be allowed to justify secessionist pursuits.44 Considering Turkey’s ongoing struggle with its Kurdish minority, we argue that these conditions should be fourfold: Firstly, the group that seeks to break out as an independent nation must have been


7/12/11 6:51 AM


217

mistreated by the rest of the society or the state. A pursuit of independence would be construed as legitimate only if the subject group is a target in a debasement campaign such as religious persecution, ethnic discrimination, racial segregation, or sexual harassment. The idea that the secession right would be a stability hazard for the global community in the absence of any conditions of mistreatment is parallel to the words of Allen Buchanan who writes that “collective rights to indigenous peoples . . . are needed as special protections for [their] distinctive interests . . . as a result of historical injustices perpetrated against them.” 45 Secondly, a campaign to declare independence must be executed in peaceful ways. Except for some rare occasions in which the persecuted group resorts to violence solely as self-defense with no offensive purpose whatsoever, violence in pursuit of secession must disqualify the mission to be a legitimate one. The Quebec Party’s pursuit of independence from Canada exemplifies peaceful exercise of the right to self-determination with its predominantly intellectual and political content. Mahatma Gandhi’s seminal leadership in pursuing his nation’s independence from the British colonizers was an epic story that demonstrated that international conflicts do not necessarily have to be resolved with arms. While it is a fact of life in politics that violence is often resorted to out of a frustration of inability to achieve desired outcomes from political means, international laws can only be imagined to favor a secession demand that exploited all peaceful options within the realm of possibilities. Thirdly, for the right to self-determination to justify a secession demand, the independence-seeking group must have resided in the subject area for a significant portion of its history. This would prevent stateless communities from migrating to a country in war, taking advantage of the country’s turmoil, and declaring independence as a sovereign government. The last condition we propose is the majority approval of the secession. A separatist campaign should be considered legitimate only when it relies on the will of the majority it aspires to free itself from. This would provide incentives, if imperfect, for proseparationists to pursue their goal in the political front— an option that, for instance, has never been checked out by the Kurdish separatists in Turkey. So, as stated before, promotion of democracy in Turkey lies in EU awareness of these four important points. The EU should not underestimate the dangers of denationalization and also should not promote separatism as a result of democratic reforms but rather should consider Turkey’s struggle with its Kurdish minority. Only in this way would the EU be more attractive for Turkey in terms of democratization.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

218


Conclusion The European Union has been a remarkable influence in Turkey’s democratic transformation since 1999 when Turkey was officially acknowledged as a candidate. One of these changes has been reformation of the state– citizen binary and its impact on the empowerment of people against the state in their demands for ethnic or religious existence. While this denationalization process promises favorable contributions to a more democratic, diverse, stable, and content Turkish society, it also makes the country more prone to separatism. Unfettered democratization demands by the European Union from its associated countries may jeopardize sociopolitical stability in the European continent. Policymakers in the EU should take a proactive approach and bring legislative safeguards to protect the territorial integrity of the EU member and candidate states that are going through a fast democratization process as a part of their EU experience. The Constitutional Treaty of the EU needs to be enhanced with a new set of laws that lays out the conditions under which the EU recognizes the right to secession. We suggest that the self-determination right should be allowed to justify the secession right only when a peaceful group that has lived in the area as long as the rest of the society is mistreated by them or the state. These “peacefulness,” “history,” and “mistreatment” tests promise to help European leaders find the difficult balance between democratic denationalization and destabilizing secession. In Turkey, the bourgeoisie and urbanization may have emerged after the emergence of the consciousness of citizenship,46 but for Turkish people that learned to be citizens before learning to be individuals now have no choice but to make themselves the central focus of their government with the help of the EU.47

Appendix: Amendments to the Turkish Constitution (2001–2008) Date of legislation: October 3, 2001. New provision(s): • An arrested person will see a judge in no later than 48 hours after the arrest (four days in a collectively committed crime). • A person or an entity can enter another person’s property only if he, she, or it has a warrant. • A person or an entity can restrict or monitor another person’s communication only if he, she, or it has a warrant. • Everyone can express him or herself in the language of his or her choice. • Everyone can join or unjoin an association.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


219

• A person or an entity does not have to gain permission from the state in order to organize political demonstrations or meetings. • Evidence collected unlawfully will not be used in the court of law. • Government will pay the real value of an asset that has been expropriated, and interest will be charged in the case of late payment. • State is obliged to protect the unemployed in addition to the employed. Minimum wage will be calculated by considering the living conditions in the country. • Changes made in the election laws will be effective at least a year after their legislation. • A political party can be closed only if it is the center of illegal acts defined in Article 68/4. Monetary fines are introduced as a penalty. • Foreign nationals are permitted to petition to the Turkish Parliament in addition to Turkish citizens. Date of legislation: August 3, 2002. New provision(s): • Death penalty was outlawed. Date of legislation: December 26, 2002. New provision(s): • Participation IN ideological and anarchic events was discontinued as a reason to disqualify a person to be a parliamentarian. Date of legislation: May 7, 2004. New provision(s): • Women and men have the same rights. • In fundamental rights, international laws are accepted to be superior to local laws in case of a clash between the two. • There will no longer be a representative of the military at the Higher Education Council (YÖK). • Military assets will be inspected by the parliament openly.

Date of legislation: October 13, 2006. New provision(s): • Minimum age to be elected to the parliament brought down to 25 from 30. Date of legislation: May 31, 2007. New provision(s): • Parliamentary elections will be conducted every four years instead of five. • President will be elected by the people.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

220


Date of legislation: February 9, 2008. New provision(s): • Headscarves are permitted in higher education. Source: “82 Anayasası’nda Bugüne Kadar Yapılan Değişiklikler (Amendments to the 1982 Constitution),” Cumhuriyet, May 7, 2010, www.cumhuriyet.com .tr/?hn=137908 (accessed December 12, 2010).

Notes 1. Bülent Temel, “Turkey and the European Union: Is Turkey Better Off Remaining as a Candidate than Becoming a Member?” Master’s thesis, Harvard University, 2008. 2. For instance, the Turkish government’s increased political and commercial ties with several Middle Eastern countries in recent years led some observers to welcome it as an improvement of Turkey’s leadership role in the wider region (Cengiz Çandar, “Turkey’s ‘Soft Power’ Strategy: A New Vision for a Multi-Polar World,” SETA Brief No. 38, 2009). Others argue that the Turkish administration’s orientation signifies its shift of axis from the West towards the East, which is a troubling trend (Nick Danforth, “How the West Lost Turkey,” Foreign Policy (December 25, 2009), www .foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/11/25/how_the_west_lost_turkey). 3. Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba (eds.), Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1997). 4. Ünver Günay, “XV. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Toplumunda Sosyo-Kültürel Yapı, Din ve Değişme” (“Socio-Cultural Structure, Religion and Change in the 15th Century Ottoman Society”), Journal of Social Sciences Institute at Erciyes University 14 (2003): 24. 5. Ali Coşkun, Osmanlı’da Din Sosyolojisi (“Sociology of Religion in the Ottoman Empire”) (İstanbul: İz, 2004). 6. Mustafa Saatçi, “Nation-states and Ethnic Boundaries: Modern Turkish Identity and Turkish-Kurdish Conflict,” Nations and Nationalism 8 (2002): 549–564. 7. Nevzat Güldiken, “Ulus, Ulus-Devlet ve Uluslaşma Kavramlarına İlişkin Tartışmalar ve Türkiye” (“Discourse on the Concepts of Nation, Nation-State and Nationalization, and Turkey”), Cumhuriyet University Journal of Economic and Administrative Sciences 7, no. 2 (2006): 162. 8. Constitution of Turkey, available at www.anayasa.gov.tr/images/loaded/ pdf_dosyalari/THE_CONSTITUTION_OF_THE_REPUBLIC_OF_TURKEY.pdf 9. Güldiken, Uluslasma Kavramlarina Iliskin Tartismalar ve Turkiye, 157. 10. Dominique Schnapper, La Communauté des Citoyens: Sur l’idée moderne de nation (“The Community of Citizens: On the Modern Idea of Nation”) (Paris: Gallimard Press, 1994), 162, 178, as cited in A. C. van Wageningen, “The Building of the European Nation: An Institutional Approach to European Citizenship” (paper presented at the Fourth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Riga, Latvia, September 26, 2008).


7/12/11 6:51 AM


221

11. Güneş Murat Tezcür, “Kurdish Nationalism and Identity in Turkey: A Conceptual Reinterpretation,” European Journal of Turkish Studies 10 (2009), http://ejts .revues.org/index4008.html. 12. Güldiken, Uluslasma Kavramlarina Iliskin Tartismalar ve Turkiye, 162. 13. Some recent examples of these events are the ongoing public outcry to lift the ban on Islamic headscarves, the election of Abdullah Gül as president in spite of ultimatums by the military, and the referendum of 2010 in which the electorate approved constitutional changes to readjust the balance of power within the Turkish state. Roger Hardy, “Turkey: Battle of the Headscarf,” BBC, July 22, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/in_depth/world/2002/islamic_world/2144316.stm; Annette Grossbongardt, “A Test of Turkey’s Maturity: Gül Elected President in Ankara,” Spiegel, August 28, 2007, www .spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,502563,00.html; Marc Champion and Joe Parkinson, “Turks Pass Constitutional Changes,” Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703897204575487281815955878.html. 14. Güldiken, Uluslasma Kavramlarina Iliskin Tartismalar ve Turkiye, 160. 15. The United States National Archives; full text available at www.archives.gov/ exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html. 16. W. H. Auden cited in Paul W. Kahn, “Evil and European Humanism,” Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series 319 (2008), http://digitalcommons.law.yale. edu/fss_papers/319. 17. Ole Nørgaard and Signe Skovbakke Winding, “Administrative Traditions and EU-Accession: A Comparative Analysis of the Baltic States” (paper prepared for Nordic Political Science Association (NOPSA) Conference, Reykjavik, Iceland, August 11–13, 2005), 3. 18. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, a consolidated text available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083 :0047:0200:EN.pdf. 19. A. C. van Wageningen, “Consumerism and the Remaking of State-Citizen Relationships” (paper prepared for ESPAnet conference, Oxford, September 9–11, 2004), 4. 20. Dominique Schnapper, “The European Debate on Citizenship,” Daedalus 126, no. 3 (1997): 199–222 as cited in Yves Déloy, “Exploring the Concept of European Citizenship: A Socio-historical Approach,” in The Yearbook of European Studies 14 (2000): 197–219. 21. Yves Déloy, “Exploring the Concept of European Citizenship: A Socio-Historical Approach,” in The Yearbook of European Studies 14 (2000): 217. 22. John Clarke, “The Building of the European Nation: An Institutional Approach to European Citizenship” (paper presented at the Fourth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Riga, Latvia, September 26, 2008), 3. 23. Catherine Needham, “Citizen-Consumers: New Labour’s Marketplace Democracy,” London: The Catalyst Forum 8 (2003) 28, as cited in Clarke, 3. 24. See Appendix:Amendments to the Turkish Constitution (2001–2008). 25. Baskın Oran, Türkiye’de Azınlıklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama (Minorities in Turkey: Concepts, Lausanne, Domestic Regulations, Interpretations, Implementation) (İstanbul: TESEV, 2004), 97.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

222


26. “82 Anayasası’nda Bugüne Kadar Yapılan Değişiklikler (Amendments to the 1982 Constitution),” Cumhuriyet, May 7, 2010. www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/?hn=137908 (accessed January 6, 2011). 27. Ruth A. Miller, “Rape and the Exception in Turkish and International Law,” Washington and Lee Law Review 64, no. 4 (Winter 2008). 28. Miller, “Rape and the Exception,” 1349. 29. Miller, “Rape and the Exception,” 1361. 30. Michael Zürn, “Globalization and Global Governance: From Societal to Political Denationalization,” European Review 11 (2003): 341–364. 31. Saskia Sassen, “Towards Post-National and Denationalised Citizenship,” in Handbook of Citizenship Studies, edited by Engin F. Işın and Bryan S. Turner (London: Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage, 2003), 286. 32. Yasemin N. Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Post-National Membership in Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 33. Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 34. Sassen, “Towards Post-National and Denationalised Citizenship,” 287–288. 35. Ayşe Kadıoğlu, “Denationalisation of Citizenship? The Turkish Experience,” Citizenship Studies 11, no. 3 (July 2007): 285. 36. Andreas Gorzewski, “Turkish Alevis Demand Recognition,” German Qantara portal, January 17, 2008, www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr-911/ i.html. 37. “Erdogan Meets with Religious Minorities,” Asparez, August 17, 2009, asbarez.com/69451/erdogan-meets-with-religious-minorities/. 38. “Turkey Considering Demand to Reopen Orthodox Seminary,” Hürriyet Daily News, January 3, 2011, www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-considers -reopening-orthodox-seminary-2011-01-03. 39. Kadıoğlu, “Denationalisation,” 285. 40. Kasım Varol, “Terörizmin Türkiye’nin Kalkınmasına Etkisi (Impact of Terrorism on Turkey’s Development),” Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü Terörle Mücadele Dairesi Başkanlığı, www.egm.gov.tr/temuh/terorizm10_makale4.htm. 41. CIA World Factbook 2009, available at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the -world-factbook/geos/kv.html#People (accessed January 7, 2001). 42. Cengiz Çandar, “Türkiye’de Kürtler: Asimilasyon İflasından Reentegrasyona (Kurds in Turkey: From the Failure of Assimilation to Reintegration),” Radikal, August, 23, 2009. 43. Sedat Laçiner, “The PKK: A Priviledged Terrorist Organization?” International Strategic Research Organization, October 30, 2008, available at www.usak.org .tr/EN/makale.asp?id=612. 44. We perceive the right to secession as a type, but not a synonym, of the right to self-determination. 45. Allen Buchanan as cited in Cindy Holder, “Self-Determination as a Universal Human Right,” Human Rights Review (July–September 2006): 7. 46. Ayşe Kadıoğlu, Cumhuriyet İradesi, Demokrasi Mahkemesi (Republican Will, Democratic Reason) (İstanbul: Metis, 1999).


7/12/11 6:51 AM


223

47. Derek Heater, Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education (London and New York: Longman, 1990), 21.

Bibliography “82 Anayasası’nda Bugüne Kadar Yapılan Değişiklikler (Amendments to the 1982 Constitution).” Cumhuriyet, May 7, 2010. Benhabib, Seyla. The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Bozdoğan, Sibel and Reşat Kasaba, eds. Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997. Candar, Cengiz. “Türkiye’de Kürtler: Asimilasyon İflasından Reentegrasyona (Kurds in Turkey: From the Failure of Assimilation to Reintegration).” Radikal, August, 23, 2009. ———. “Turkey’s ‘Soft Power’ Strategy: A New Vision for a Multi-Polar World.” SETA Brief No. 38, 2009. Champion, Marc and Joe Parkinson. “Turks Pass Constitutional Changes.” Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2010. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052 748703897204575487281815955878.html. CIA World Factbook 2009. www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ geos/kv.html#People (accessed January 7, 2001). Clarke, John. “The Building of the European Nation: An Institutional Approach to European Citizenship.” Paper presented at the Fourth Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, Riga, Latvia, September 26, 2008. Constitution of Turkey. www.anayasa.gov.tr. Coşkun, Ali. Osmanlı’da Din Sosyolojisi (Sociology of Religion in the Ottoman Empire). İstanbul: İz, 2004. Danforth, Nick. “How the West Lost Turkey.” Foreign Policy (December 25, 2009). Déloy, Yves. “Exploring the Concept of European Citizenship: A Socio-Historical Approach.” The Yearbook of European Studies 14 (2000): 197–219. “Erdogan Meets with Religious Minorities,” Asparez, August 17, 2009. http:// asbarez.com/69451/erdogan-meets-with-religious-minorities/. Gorzewski, Andreas. “Turkish Alevis Demand Recognition.” German Qantara portal, January 17, 2008. www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr -911/i.html. Grossbongardt, Annette. “A Test of Turkey’s Maturity: Gül Elected President in Ankara.” Spiegel, August 28, 2007. www.spiegel.de/international/ world/0,1518,502563,00.html. Güldiken, Nevzat. “Ulus, Ulus-Devlet ve Uluslaşma Kavramlarına İlişkin Tartışmalar ve Türkiye” (“Discourse on the Concepts of Nation, Nation-State and Nationalization, and Turkey”). Cumhuriyet University Journal of Economic and Administrative Sciences 7, no. 2 (2006). Günay, Ünver. “XV. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Toplumunda Sosyo-Kültürel Yapı, Din ve Değişme” (“Socio-Cultural Structure, Religion and Change in the 15th Century


7/12/11 6:51 AM

224


Ottoman Society”). Journal of Social Sciences Institute at Erciyes University 14 (2003). Hardy, Roger. “Turkey: Battle of the Headscarf.” BBC, July 22, 2002. http://news .bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/world/2002/islamic_world/2144316.stm. Heater, Derek. Citizenship: The Civic Ideal in World History, Politics and Education. London and New York: Longman, 1990. Hill, Evan. “Major Reforms Cast as a Power Grab.” Al Jazeera Briefing, comment posted September 13, 2010. Hiz, Koşar and Zafer Durdu, “Türkiye’de Sosyolojinin Kimliği” (“Identity of Sociology in Turkey”), Journal of Sociology at Muğla University 12–13 (2004). Holder, Cindy. “Self-Determination as a Universal Human Right.” Human Rights Review (July–September 2006). Kadıoğlu, Ayşe. Cumhuriyet İradesi, Demokrasi Mahkemesi (Republican Will, Democratic Reason). İstanbul: Metis, 1999. ———. “Denationalisation of Citizenship? The Turkish Experience.” Citizenship Studies 11, no. 3 (July 2007). Kahn, Paul W. “Evil and European Humanism.” Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series 319 (2008). http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/319. Laçiner, Sedat. “The PKK: A Priviledged Terrorist Organization?” International Strategic Research Organization, October 30, 2008. www.usak.org.tr/EN/makale .asp?id=612. Miller, Ruth A. “Rape and the Exception in Turkish and International Law.” Washington and Lee Law Review 64, no. 4 (Winter 2008). Needham, Catherine. “Citizen-Consumers: New Labour’s Marketplace Democracy.” London: The Catalyst Forum 8 (2003): 28. Nørgaard, Ole and Signe S. Winding. “Administrative Traditions and EU-Accession: A Comparative Analysis of the Baltic States.” Paper prepared for Nordic Political Science Association (NOPSA) Conference, Reykjavik, Iceland, August 11–13, 2005. Oran, Baskın. Türkiye’de Azınlıklar: Kavramlar, Lozan, İç Mevzuat, İçtihat, Uygulama (Minorities in Turkey: Concepts, Lausanne, Domestic Regulations, Interpretations, Implementation). İstanbul: TESEV, 2004. Saatçi, Mustafa. “Nation-States and Ethnic Boundaries: Modern Turkish Identity and Turkish-Kurdish Conflict.” Nations and Nationalism 8 (2002): 549–564. Sassen, Saskia. “Towards Post-National and Denationalised Citizenship.” In Handbook of Citizenship Studies, edited by Engin F. Işın and Bryan S. Turner. London: Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage, 2003. Schnapper, Dominique. “The European Debate on Citizenship.” Daedalus 126, no. 3 (1997). ———. La Communauté des Citoyens: Sur l’idée moderne de nation (The Community of Citizens: On the Modern Idea of Nation). Paris: Gallimard Press, 1994. Soysal, Yasemin. Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Post-National Membership in Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994. Temel, Bülent. “Turkey and the European Union: Is Turkey Better Off Remaining as a Candidate than Becoming a Member?” Master’s thesis, Harvard University, 2008.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


225

Tezcür, Güneş Murat. “Kurdish Nationalism and Identity in Turkey: A Conceptual Reinterpretation.” European Journal of Turkish Studies 10 (2009). http://ejts.revues .org/index4008.html. The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. http://eurlex.europa.eu/Lex UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:EN.pdf. “Turkey Considering Demand to Reopen Orthodox Seminary,” Hürriyet Daily News, January 3, 2011. www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-considers-reopening -orthodox-seminary-2011-01-03. The United States National Archives. www.archives.gov. Uz, Abdullah. “Teori ve Uygulamada Self-Determinasyon Hakkı” (“The Right to Self-Determination in Theory and Practice”). Journal of International Law and Politics 3, no. 9 (2007). van Wageningen, A. C. “Consumerism and the Remaking of State-Citizen Relationships.” Paper prepared for ESPAnet conference, Oxford, September 9–11, 2004. Varol, Kasım. “Terörizmin Türkiye’nin Kalkınmasına Etkisi (Impact of Terrorism on Turkey’s Development).” Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü Terörle Mücadele Dairesi Başkanlığı. www.egm.gov.tr/temuh/terorizm10_makale4.htm.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


7/12/11 6:51 AM

10 Social Rights as Ideal Citizenship M. Kemal Öke

D

URING THE LAST THREE DECADES,

welfare regimes throughout the world, including Turkey, have faced a series of challenges stemming from the forces of globalization.1 Trade unions are still one of the most important voices promoting the extension of the welfare state as a labor organization. However, as the old paradigms of labor structuring and organization dissolve, so new forms are developed; hence, a new strategy, a new agenda, is unavoidable in order to prevent the disappearance of the welfare state. This chapter tries to conceptualize social rights as the rights limiting the commodity character of labor and analyzes the relations between social policy and citizenship as a repudiation of the individualism of the French Revolution and of the liberalism of English utilitarian philosophers. In this context, citizenship is a status that is conferred on those people who are fully entitled members of a community. Everyone possessing this status is equal with respect to the rights and duties conferred by such status, as developed by Marshall.2 The purpose of the chapter is to examine the deepening of the social rights in Turkey for citizens and elaborate how citizens are eligible for having and using social rights on the basis of the right to work, right to organize, right to social security, and so forth. Finally, it expands on the explanations of eligibility of social rights in practice and makes some comparisons. This examination of the literature will be supported with empirical findings and observations. In this chapter, after an introduction, the historical background will be demonstrated first. Next, a theoretical framework will be elaborated and the connection between social rights and citizenship in the theory and practices of the Western countries will be demonstrated. Then the evaluation and — 227 —


7/12/11 6:51 AM

228

M. Kemal Öke

critiques that take place in the official documents issued by the Turkish government and EU Commission will be highlighted. In the final sections the quality of social rights, in other words the current situation in Turkey, will be examined. The chapter will be finalized with some recommendations for the future and conclusions.

Historical Background Following the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, social rights have been placed under pressure at every stage in different forms and for varying reasons. At the beginning of the republican age, a liberal approach to policy was implemented in order to facilitate an economic lift-off. All of the attempts and goodwill ended, however, with disappointment in the 1920s. The main reasons were the lack of culture and the lack of capital to underpin sufficient accumulation. In the 1930s, public policy replaced liberal policy, and the private sector was replaced by the public sector as the driving sector for the process of industrialization. At this stage public corporations operated, and this led to a very important development in the industrialization process in Turkey. Gradually, this process resulted in the emergence of industrial infrastructure, public employment, and an industrial essence and culture. In this period, the progress of the realization of social rights was, unfortunately, very limited, even in the Keynesian age. In contrast, in Europe, especially during the Keynesian age, social rights operated at a very comprehensive and very satisfactory level in the daily lives of citizens. In Turkey at the beginning, due to the huge economic and social problems and later some political problems, almost every government preferred to ignore the social rights of citizens, such as in the fields of education, health, and social security. Nevertheless, the 1960s were a positive and distinguished period in the field of economic and social rights because of the new constitution which was enacted in 1961. The foundations of industrial relations in Turkey in the modern sense were laid by the constitution of 1961, which recognized not only the right of both workers and employers to organize but also the right to bargain collectively and to engage in strikes and lock outs. The Law on Unions, No. 274, and the Law on Collective Agreements, Strikes and Lock Outs, No. 275, issued in 1963 pursuant to the guidelines of the 1961 constitution, fostered a system of democratic industrial relations. This period shaped a complete separation in the area of social rights in citizens’ ordinary lives. Not only economic and social rights but also fundamental rights took a crucial role in society as a concept of public service


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Social Rights as Ideal Citizenship

229

for citizens. This perception dominated the whole of economic and social life. Meanwhile, the public sector and public employment saw to it that the prestige and the role of trade unions increased significantly across the whole of society. In fact, this was a short and remarkable period for Turkey prior to the later storms. The first shock was realized in 1971, when some of the social rights were limited due to memorandum; the second in the late 1970s, when macroeconomic policies were shifted towards an export-oriented policy due to reaching of the end of Keynesian policy. In summary, however, this prior period was a very optimistic one in the field of economic and social rights, even if it was not comparable with developed countries. It has been demonstrated that the main philosophy of the social welfare state was replaced with that of a liberal economy via the catastrophic economic stabilization program that was launched on January 24, 1980. Afterwards, a military coup came into effect following September 12, 1980. The coup d’état focused on labor unions as one of its primary targets. Strikes were prohibited, collective bargaining was stopped, and certain labor unions were banned while the activities of the rest were suspended. This Structural Adjustment Program contained two important pillars. The first one was financial liberalization, and the second was to downgrade the state. In fact, the state was small in Turkey. For instance, average public expenditure in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries amounts to about 50 percent of gross national product (GNP), but to just 28 percent in Turkey. Even so, some vital public expenditure, especially social expenditure, was cut back in order to downgrade the state. Finally, with this discourse, a drastic stabilization program was implemented in the 1980s.3 During the 1980s, neoliberal policies resulted in almost all social policies being destroyed, financial policies liberalized, and the labor market deregulated in order to become more competitive on the global market. The establishment of competition was perceived as a primary aim and the protection of labor replaced with the protection of enterprise. Reducing labor costs through more flexible working relations and a downsizing of the state, as a requirement of the fundamental philosophy underpinning the neoliberal concept, are among the main components of the policies that have been pursued in particular as a means of undermining social rights. The essence of the neoliberal paradigm is that it adopts the market economy as the main principle, not only in the area of economics but also in the organization of the state and of society, which goes beyond a sanctification of the market as a realm of freedom in view of economic freedoms. Ensuring that the spirit of the market economy penetrates the political and social area, and making the necessary economic, legal, and institutional changes and arrangements that will restructure the state and society in a way that will serve this purpose, is the core of


7/12/11 6:51 AM

230

M. Kemal Öke

the globalization strategy that is identified in accordance with this paradigm. The radical recession in the area of social rights is on the agenda as a result of these structural characteristics of the dominant paradigm and strategy.4 Here, the neoliberal global agenda has been implemented with a vengeance, and its social impact was immediate. The trade union movement has sought to mitigate the effects of economic liberalization, but it has not been able to prevent a decline in union membership. Munck has said that global competitiveness spells domestic social exclusion.5

Theoretical Framework During the course of the twentieth century, as Crouch has said, mass citizenship came to include various forms of social policy in which people were either protected from misfortunes that can, in the absence of collective risk bearing, only be managed through extensive personal wealth, or were otherwise enabled to take advantage of what became defined as “essential” services. Social policy was, therefore, one of the ways in which people in industrial societies became protected from the full implications of the risks of the capitalist industrial economy and the inequalities of its distribution of income and wealth on which their societies otherwise depended. A frequent aim of social policy has been to enable families to sustain their joint lives. This may mean protecting them from the poverty and insecurity that can undermine them, as in the early plans for the British and Swedish welfare states.6 In the midcentury model, this was likely in much continental European welfare policy, as well as in Beveridge’s original UK formulation,7 to mean a sustaining of the male breadwinner of the family. Welfare citizenship has, therefore, a prominent place in the midcentury model of society. It is one of the institutions softening the impact of the capitalist market and mediating between industrial society and the traditional institutions. Also, inequalities stemming from the market can be limited by the taxation needed to fund the welfare state, attenuating social cleavages.8 Cella elaborates the issue as a solidarity right of citizens, saying, “Speaking of citizenship through work means speaking of something which stands out from the individualistic tradition which has characterised bourgeois society since the time of its revolutions, the one which introduced the market, and the one which gave shape to political life.” If trade unions are one of the typical players in this citizenship, we can understand the words written with a certain emphasis by Frank Tannenbaum in a provocative contribution of more than 40 years ago: “Trade unionism is a repudiation of the individualism of the French revolution and of the liberalism of English utilitarian philosophers.”


7/12/11 6:51 AM


231

Why does it stand out, at times in open contrast? Because work calls for groups and not for individuals. Because it calls for particular forms of social belonging, halfway between the individual and the state. Because it creates a solidarity for which no provision is made and which, perhaps, is not possible within the setup of the individualistic market. It is also for this reason that the third principle of the French Revolution has proved so difficult historically and in terms of political thought. In revolutionary bourgeois thinking, the only form it took was the principle of national fraternity, a nation of equal citizens that kept in check more specific forms of solidarity, such as that of work. But it has proven difficult also because citizenship is a status and, as the great social theoretician Maine reminded us more than a century ago, modern society is born out of the shift from status to the contract. And again, it is difficult because the citizen is one thing, citizenship is another. The latter calls for social rights that are in profound contrast with the nature of individualistic bourgeois society.9 T. H. Marshall perceives social rights as the basis of citizenship. An obligatory and well-known starting point is Marshall’s definition: “citizenship is a status which is conferred on those people who are fully entitled members of a community. Everyone possessing this status is equal with respect to the rights and duties conferred by such a status.”10 Citizenship calls for equality even if, when lacking qualifying adjectives, it can form the basis of a profound inequality. In fact, the equality of citizens vis-à-vis the market lies at the basis of the inequalities that derive from the free play of market capacities. Not only this, it is precisely the status of equal citizenship that has the effect of legitimizing the growing inequality of the system of social classes. On the basis of Marshall’s definition, citizenship comes into being as the fruit of a gradual process of construction. This applies even more to industrial citizenship. Here, the status of the citizen is not born for once and for all, but grows with the development of industrial society and is exposed, as is anything else, to every kind of relapse. It is no accident that, in the 1980s, the neoliberal forces of the time tried to take the rights of citizenship back to the structure they had at the start of bourgeois society. Social rights call for the rights of protection, safety, social advance, and membership in a developing society. Their reference framework is again civil society, but they herald the arrival of criteria based on allocation and regulation, which are alternatives to those of the market. The typical institutions supporting social rights are the apparatus of the welfare state, the educational system, and the systems of industrial relations.11 In societies that begin to be regulated by the principles of industrial citizenship, work and its qualitative and quantitative features remains a criterion— more or less decisive, depending on the country in question—for the enjoyment of services and the benefits deriving from social rights. Better and better-paid


7/12/11 6:51 AM

232

M. Kemal Öke

work brings with it the right to more extensive and, at times, qualitatively better benefits and services. This is the ethically less acceptable face of industrial citizenship. But, beginning with the Second World War and with the spread, in different forms, to different extents, and with a different timing, of universal welfare schemes, the link between employment and social rights has tended to be reduced, if not to disappear entirely. Part of industrial citizenship, or rather the protective component formed of the right to security and social protection, tends to become detached from work and to depend on citizenship alone. Concerning this citizenship, work constitutes the absolutely fundamental component, in particular due to its qualitative aspects. At the peak point of the development of European welfare states, many services and benefits, as mentioned above, had become more attached to the rights of citizenship than to the fact of having a job.12 As underlined above, the social welfare state consists of citizens equal in their overall life at every stage, not only having decent work or the right to organize and have social security but also living together in a sense of solidarity and feeling the happiness of citizenship.

A Glance at Social Rights in the EU Membership Process in Turkey This section will focus on the entitlement to social rights as defined in the official documents. Accession Partnership with Turkey The documents of the EU, the International Labor Organization (ILO), and the European Council are good indicators of social rights in Turkey. In this field, one of the cornerstone documents is the Accession Partnership with Turkey. This document was approved by the Council of the European Union in 2003. The document (2003/398/EC) declared some of the steps that needed to be taken in the field of social policy as follows: Transpose and implement EU legislation in the fields of labour law, equal treatment for women and men, occupational health and safety, public health including the communicable disease surveillance and control system and the fight against discrimination; strengthen the related administrative and enforcement structures. Take measures to promote access to and the quality of health care and to improve the health status of the population. Ensure effective implementation and enforcement of the social policy and employment acquis.

The European Commission anticipates the preparation of a national employment strategy with a view to later participation in the European Employment Strategy, including the preparation and implementation of a joint


7/12/11 6:51 AM


233

employment policy review and the development of a capacity to monitor the labor market and social developments. Additionally, a national strategy on social inclusion needs to be prepared in line with EU practice, while a social protection and social security system should also be developed. As the document indicates, the main pillars of social policy are insufficient and need to be completed. National Program The other major document outlining government commitments is the National Program, which aligns the priorities as follows: Harmonisation of Turkish labour law with EU legislation. This includes individual and collective labour law, health and safety at work, social dialogue, gender equality and combating discrimination. A second priority is “Alignment with the EU acquis in the field of public health and participation in the relevant Community action programme.” This also includes participation. A third priority is “Development of social protection and social inclusion,” including development of the social security system and improvements in social benefits, the maintenance, improvement and extension of employment, assistance in combating unemployment and the implementation of unemployment insurance services.

The National Program confirmed the insufficiency of social policy not only in legislation but also in practice and in the alignment of priorities such as in other documents. Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession The European Commission’s “Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession” declared the performance of Turkey as follows: Regarding trade union rights, a law on “Trade Unions of Public Employees” entered into force on 12 July 2001. This provides for some basic trade union rights such as the right to organise. It does not include the right to bargain collectively or the right to strike. As regards social dialogue, a bill on public servants’ trade unions is not in line with the Community acquis and the relevant ILO conventions that Turkey has ratified. No further transposition can be noted in the area of health and safety at work. In the field of health and safety at work, Turkey should transpose and implement the acquis. The administrative capacity to implement and enforce legislation needs to be strengthened. The reform process in the public health care system has to be continued. Turkey needs to ensure that public expenditure is sufficient to meet needs and that the provision of services is improved. Despite reforms in progress, the situation of the public health care system could not be improved compared to the previous reporting


7/12/11 6:51 AM

234

M. Kemal Öke

period. Public expenditure is still insufficient and the distribution of services in general has not improved, despite reforms in progress. The scope of collective bargaining should be improved and Turkey should take steps to promote workers’ participation and information/consultation at the company level.

Additionally, the fight against social exclusion, as laid down in Article 136 of the Treaty, is part of the objectives of EU social policy. It was decided at the Lisbon and Nice European Councils that policies to combat social exclusion combine commonly agreed objectives at the EU level with national action plans. The Gothenburg European Council in June 2001 invited candidate countries to include the Union’s objectives of promoting social inclusion into their national policies. In Turkey, an Economic and Social Council has been formally established. However, it is only a step towards the kind of social dialogue mechanisms customary in the EU. The Economic and Social Council provides a useful forum for consulting a great variety of economic and social actors; however, in its current form it is not sufficient as an autonomous, tripartite social dialogue platform. Regarding autonomous social dialogue, restrictions continue to exist on the signing of collective agreements at the company level, which seriously limits the extent of collective bargaining and social dialogue. Overall Assessment Very similar topics are criticized by the commission in every consecutive Regular Progress Report. From the first to the most recent Regular Progress Report, only limited progress can be recorded in these social policy areas. Unfortunately, much work remains to be done in order to bring Turkish legislation into line with the relevant acquis. This process has suffered from the deepening of the economic crisis, which has severely affected the employment and social situation, causing hardship. In the framework of constitutional reform, amendments have been made with respect to social rights. These will be implemented by further legislation. Some other steps have been taken in this field but, in different cases, the Community acquis has insufficiently been taken into account. Furthermore, there are many things to be done in the field of social protection. The Other Commitments of Turkey Related to Social Rights One of the documents that indicates the commitments of Turkey is the Preliminary Development Plan, which covered 2004 through 2006. According


7/12/11 6:51 AM


235

to the Preliminary Development Plan, the main objective of macroeconomic policy during the 2004 through 2006 period was to increase social welfare. In this direction, strengthening macroeconomic stability and improving the resources available for social policy implementation were the primary aims. One of the main objectives, based on the medium-term strategy set forth in the Eighth Five-Year Development Plan, was high and sustainable economic growth alongside the development of human resources and increasing employment. This entailed providing the labor force with the skills needed by the economy, improving the link between vocational training and the labor market, and increasing women’s participation in the development process.13 Improvements in the quality of education would be brought about by means of information and communication technologies. The plan also aimed further to harmonize labor legislation with international norms and standards, particularly with those of the ILO and the EU. The Preliminary Development Plan stipulated active labor market policies as a priority, with a view to increasing labor market efficiency, while encouraging entrepreneurship and ensuring equal employment opportunities. The plan also envisaged support for the employment of disadvantaged groups and reductions in the risk of unemployment for the low skilled. It also aimed to promote employment among young people. Another overriding aim was to promote the adaptation of all groups, including employers, to changing market conditions.14 In this context, the commitments of the Turkish government took place not only in the area of the labor market and employment, but also in that of social dialogue and other social policies. The Eighth Five-Year Development Plan described the aims concerning civil organizations as follows: The role and importance of non-governmental organisations will gradually increase as a third sector besides the public and the private sectors in national development efforts. Their role in activating national and international resources and encouraging participation are becoming increasingly widespread. Basic objectives include the development of democracy and the effective participation of all sectors of society in economic, social and cultural development. Internal and external capabilities of NGOs, such as resource management, service provision, revenue generation and undertaking responsibilities, as well as problem solving, shall be strengthened.15

As indicated above, the plan intended very challenging targets in the field of economic and social rights for citizens. Official documents, commitments, and discussions have demonstrated the performance of Turkey thus far. Have these targets been achieved? In other words, how far does Turkey remain behind the current situation with EU countries?


7/12/11 6:51 AM

236

M. Kemal Öke

The Quality of Social Rights After the 1980s and 1990s, macroeconomic policies and social policies have been reversed by consecutive economic crises. The share of labor in gross domestic product (GDP) has decreased significantly; public employment has been downsized by conservatives; the role of unions has been diminished in society; poverty has significantly increased; atypical employment has taken root in the labor market; collective bargaining coverage has shrunk; real wages have been rolled backwards; and an “easy hire and easy fire” philosophy has come to dominate the labor market. Following this process, Turkey’s prospective EU membership at the beginning of the new century led to a very optimistic climate for everyone in Turkey. Gradually, the expectations of Turkish people on the resolution of economic and social problems, and a return to a welfare state, grew very large. However, it has been stated by the European Commission that the labor code in Turkey currently fails to conform to ILO norms, while areas in which there is a need for specific improvements are also cited. Yet, this concern of the EU authorities, expressed both at bilateral meetings and in press conferences, concentrates mainly on political and religious rights rather than social and economic ones. The performance of the EU in such fields as expanding employment and preserving social and economic rights, gained mainly through the “welfare state,” is following a downward trend, especially since the 1990s. The technical studies of the EU, while touching upon ILO norms and labor-friendly themes, expressly back up, rather than criticize, the neoliberal policies that have further triggered unemployment, poverty, and inequality in Turkey.16 On the other hand, in European countries organized labor has had an important social role as a corporate partner alongside capital and the state. The existence of various form of corporatism has been instrumental in determining the response of trade unions to the process of neoliberal restructuring. This has emerged in various forms such as “concession bargaining” or “social partnership.”17 The fundamental ILO Convention concerning Freedom of Association (No. 87) was ratified by Turkey in 1948; the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention (No. 98) was approved in 1949; and the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention (No. 151) was approved in 1978. However, all of these core regulations were put into force via the legislation in a late and limited way. In 1997, Parliament promulgated an act which raised compulsory primary education from five to eight years, which will contribute considerably to the elimination of child labor and also of indirect discrimination against young women. Nobody denies the positive correlation


7/12/11 6:51 AM


237

between participation and educational attainment. Therefore, this is a very important step that has been taken. On the one side, there is the elimination of child labor, on which issue the ILO’s Ankara Office has launched an international project (IPEC) in some cities in Turkey; on the other, there are millions of young people in the category of “invisible youth” in Turkey. These include women who are neither in education nor work, numbering about 2.2 million; those who are physically impaired, numbering some 650,000; young people who have given up all hope and stopped seeking work, totalling 300,000; juvenile delinquents, who number some 22,000; and street children and young people living on the streets, internally displaced or victims of human trafficking, and others who rarely get noticed or mentioned in survey studies or who are in the media-invisible group. The term “youth” is mostly associated with “boys,” and so young women are not usually a focal point of studies into young people. A group described as “house girls,” composed of young women who stay at home and who remain isolated from social activities, the labor market, and education, are as a result excluded from much of social life. Some of these women choose this way of life, and they have the right to do so; but many are forced into it either before they become conscious of alternatives or when they migrate to large cities without the skills required by the urban labor market.18 Low family income means exclusion from social and economic life for many young people, as well as limited opportunities for raising their living standards and social mobility. Young people aged 15 to 24 in Turkey face many problems on which support is required: seeking further education, finding a job, starting work and a career, building an independent identity, finding a place to live, and perhaps establishing a family. All these create the need for support from the community and the state, yet existing services have important gaps. Tools for Social Rights Social Dialogue Currently, social dialogue mechanisms operate on several platforms, such as the Labour Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Tripartite Consultation Board, the Minimum Wage Committee, the Supreme Arbitration Board, and the general congresses and managing boards of the Turkish Employment Organization, the Social Insurance Institution, the Vocational Qualifications Authority, and other groups. However, these mechanisms have shortcomings in terms of ensuring genuine social dialogue. First, the lack of a culture of cooperation between


7/12/11 6:51 AM

238

M. Kemal Öke

the government and the social partners does not allow for compromises to be reached in a smooth manner. Second, there are several cases in which decisions have not been taken on the basis of a bottom-up approach, due to a tendency towards centralized decision making.19 Under this circumstance, some steps have been taken in the last decade in the field of tripartite social dialogue mechanisms in Turkey: the Turkish Economic and Social Council (ESC) was set up in 2001 at the national level, and Turkey ratified ILO Convention No. 144 on tripartite consultation to promote the implementation of ILO standards in 1993. The ESC is one of the main multiparty social dialogue mechanisms that exist between various social groups and the government in Turkey. Previously, irregular meetings had been held since 1995, via decrees issued by various governments to satisfy the need for broad-based social dialogue. In the field of bipartite social dialogue mechanisms in Turkey, there is no such platform existing at the national level other than collective bargaining. At the sectoral level, bipartite consultation practices have been launched by workers and employer organizations in the metal, textile, construction, and cement sectors in the form of joint activities and primarily in the field of vocational training, although they are not common. In the field of enterprise-level social dialogue mechanisms, ILO Convention No. 135 on workers’ representatives was ratified in 1971. European Works Councils and workers’ representatives are not regulated by Turkish legislation. However, consultation does take place on certain issues between employers and representatives of trade unions authorized to bargain collectively. Additionally, occupational health and safety (OHS) councils operate on a bipartite basis at the workplace level and are consulted on OHS issues. When we compare this topic with European countries, forms of information and consultation in the workplace have, in contrast to Turkey, been legally established and formally installed in most EU countries. This form of workplace representation can be organized by works councils or trade union representatives. An extreme form of indirect participation is board-level representation. Laws in many European countries distinguish between three levels of influence: (1) information; (2) consultation; and (3) joint decisionmaking, or codetermination. In the majority of EU countries, there is a legal obligation to inform and consult with these institutionalized bodies on a range of matters. In the United Kingdom and Ireland, this kind of employee participation existed, but on a voluntary basis.20 In recent years, however, several EU15 states have revised their institutional arrangements for employee information and consultation rights in the workplace, in which processes new EU directives have played a stimulatory role (especially in the United Kingdom).


7/12/11 6:51 AM


239

These directives are also a major incentive for accession countries to set up forms of workplace representation. Indirect participation, or employee representation, is traditionally associated with trade unions. However, the involvement of union representatives is not the only channel of indirect participation. Other forms of indirect participation exist in a number of European countries, notably works councils. There is no employee participation body or council established in Turkey at the workplace or company level on the basis of a works council, nor are there European Works Councils (EWCs) established at the EU level in the 100 multinational companies operating in Turkey. The annual vocation committee and the occupational health and safety committee are found in Turkish undertakings, but these rights are not equal to EU regulations.21 The weakest dimension of industrial relations in Turkey is participation. In contrast to EU members today, there is a limited single-tier, or unitary board, system of employee participation in Turkey. In the absence of a bipartite employee participation system, collective bargaining seems to serve as the only platform for the limited participation of employees. The nonexistence of employee participation in most private enterprises is likely to hinder the proper implementation of EU directives at the enterprise level. A useful development for employee participation in Turkey would be the extension of the scope of rights to allow a system of works councils, covering wider issues such as training, productivity, quality, job enrichment, and work organization.22 Social Expenditures After the 1989 decision to deregulate capital accounts and to fully liberalize financial markets, Turkey opened its domestic markets to the speculation of international finance capital. In this structure, the Central Bank lost its control over money markets and has been deprived of its ability to affect the exchange rate and the interest rate, which actually became an exogenous variable, totally dependent on the decisions of international arbiters. This financial structure has trapped the Turkish economy in a policy of overvalued exchange rates and very high real interest rates.23 All of these have meant a heavy toll on the necessary public investment in health, education, and public infrastructure. Within total expenditures, the share of public investment has fallen from 12.9 percent in 1990 to 5.1 percent in 2003. In ratio to GNP, public investment stands at less than 2 percent currently; in 2003, interest expenditure reached 7.4 times the level of public investment. The burden of interest costs on public funds is immense and needs acute attention. On the


7/12/11 6:51 AM

240

M. Kemal Öke

other hand, total social expenditures took a 25.5 percent share of the 1990 budget, but this has steadily decreased to 14 percent in subsequent years. Labor Markets: Declining Real Wage Incomes, Rising Open Unemployment Real Wages The traumatic result of this economic policy is not only decreasing social expenditure but also a persistence of the second pillar of unemployment. The rate of unemployment has been one of the most persistent problems on the Turkish growth path since 2003. The enigma of this “jobless growth” is one of the hardest aspects to model. The Turkish economy has been characterized by both a fall in real wage costs as well as a rise in productivity growth (Table 10.1). Under these conditions, the persistence of unemployment is a real puzzle, suggesting either an inconsistency in the official statistics or a conjectural bottleneck for which we cannot account for the time being. TABLE 10.1 Unit Wage Index in Private Manufacturing Industry (1988/1 = 100)

Years 1988-I 1989-I 1990-I 1991-I 1992-I 1993-I 1994-I 1995-I 1996-I 1997-I 1998-I 1999.I 2000.I 2001.I 2002.I 2003.I 2004.I 2005.I 2006.I 2007.1 2008.1

Employment

Production

Productivity

Real Wages

Exchange Rate

Unit Wage Costs in US$

100 93.1 95.6 85.4 74.3 74.0 76.5 76.3 83.3 90.9 95.3 87.3 82.7 80.8 76.2 80.8 82.7 84.5 82.7 85.0 86.4

100.0 94.1 111.1 104.7 120.7 122.5 129.5 131.9 146.9 166.9 185.7 162.4 175.2 171.8 175.3 196.4 222.7 240.2 249.0 268.3 284.4

100.0 101.1 116.2 122.5 162.6 165.6 169.3 172.9 176.4 183.6 194.8 186.0 211.9 212.6 230.2 243.0 269.4 284.2 301.2 315.7 329.2

100.0 125.1 100.1 143.0 133.5 153.2 142.0 108.0 106.2 115.9 111.1 127.5 121.4 112.9 99.2 100.9 109.5 115.0 119.9 117.2 116.2

100.0 167.5 209.6 282.5 498.8 794.0 1565.1 3590.4 5626.5 10371.1 19552.4 29935.9 49360.9 69462.4 119073.9 144396.5 116721.9 116071.2 116416.4 123295.7 104782.8

100.0 114.9 150.8 250.0 178.3 199.5 161.1 115.0 126.7 127.8 120.6 155.2 132.2 119.6 93.5 94.5 124.0 134.0 142.2 138.8 169.5

Source: Erinç Yeldan, Bilkent University, Ankara.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


241

Yeldan has demonstrated that a third pillar is declining real wages. Yeldan indicates that the reason for this result is that the transfer of financial surpluses, through the very high real interest rates offered to the financial system, does, no doubt, have repercussions for the primary categories of income distribution. It is clear that the creation of such a financial surplus would, in general, directly necessitate a squeeze of the wage fund and a transfer of the surplus away from waged labor towards capital incomes. It is possible to find evidence of the extent of this surplus transfer in the trend in real wages in private manufacturing. According to Yeldan’s calculation, real wages contracted severely after the February 2001 crisis, while this downward trend continued throughout the 2000s. Table 10.1 explains that, within 20 years, employment decreased by about 15 percent; the level of production increased almost threefold while productivity increased by more than threefold; yet real wages increased by only 16 percent, which means it had reached the level of 1997 in the manufacturing sector in Turkey in the period between 1988 and 2008.24 A final word is the indication from Table 10.1 and OECD labor force statistics (2002) that the share of wages in GDP in some member countries of the OECD and the EU reaches an average of 49.9 (in the EU) while the OECD average is 47.8; in Turkey, it is 25.8—a statistic that is a sufficient indicator of the suppression of wages in Turkey. Employment: The Right to Work During the 2000s, despite rapid growth and a significant surge in exports, the Turkish economy was not able to generate jobs at the desired rate. The open unemployment rate, which stood at 6.5 percent in 2000, jumped to 10.3 percent in 2002 in the aftermath of the February 2001 financial crisis. Subsequently, Turkish GDP has increased by a cumulative 30 percent in real terms. Yet the employment generation capacity of this rapid growth has been dismal, and the open unemployment rate was not brought down below 9 percent before the end of 2007, just before the eruption of the current global economic crisis.25 Despite the rapid expansion of production in many sectors, civilian employment increased sluggishly at best, and labor participation has remained below the levels observed during the 1990s. Currently (as of September 2009), the open unemployment rate stands at 13.4 percent, one of the highest among OECD countries.26 Open unemployment is acute among young people. As of September 2009, youth unemployment (aged 15 to 24) stands at 24.5 percent; in the urban centers, this figure reaches 27.3 percent. The labor participation rate is also


7/12/11 6:51 AM

242

M. Kemal Öke

severely low, with a current average of 46.5 percent. This rate is especially low among urban women, where it is just 22.8 percent.27 The significance of this issue is represented by the serious gap between demographic pressure and the generation of jobs. Every year, hundreds of thousands of people reach 15 years old, that is, are of working age and desiring employment, but the increase in employment lags behind. Every year, a huge mass of worker potential is slowly being wasted in unemployment. In other words, many people are being added to the stock of unemployment. This is especially serious for young people, especially educated young people. In fact, at the beginning of the new millennium, 29 percent of the Turkish population is aged between 1 and 14; 64 percent between 15 and 64; while just 7 percent is older than 64. This picture indicates that such a youthful and advantageous population structure could represent an opportunity, if channelled in a proper manner. All of these observations underscore the argument that labor-enhancing policies will not be successful unless complemented by an employmentfriendly vision being both designed and implemented in the overall macroeconomic policy environment. The growing amount of informal employment, along with the growing unemployment, means an expansion in the number deprived of security in the future. Those in informal employment and, as a rule, those who are unemployed do not have the opportunity to join trade unions nor gain access to the possibility of taking advantage of economic and social gains, that is, the social experiences and social development opportunities that can be realized within a unionized structure. Growing unemployment and informal employment also create severe problems that challenge the development of unionization and heavily compromise the union movement. This narrows the potential member base of unions, undermines the collective bargaining power of the organized segment of the labor market, adversely affects employment security and wage levels, and restricts the area of freedom of unions in all respects.28 In this sense, the result of an accumulation regime that has increased open unemployment and informal employment, along with dispossession and poverty, is that the level of employment and job insecurity of wage earners has grown deeper, while real wages have slipped downwards. Legislative amendments in the area of labor and social security law, the individualization and commercialization of the public through extensive privatizations, the proliferation of free trade zones which nullify existing labor rights, the shrinkage of public investment and public employment, and the increased pressure on unionization and the collective bargaining system all have accelerated the deterioration in the working conditions of wage earners.29 The enforced flex-


7/12/11 6:51 AM


243

ibility of labor and the spread of job insecurity are increasing the numbers of low-paid, unprotected jobs. Job insecurity is worst among more vulnerable groups such as women, who have entered the labor force in large numbers, but usually in part-time jobs which are paid even worse than those of men. Women have also been affected by a downgrading of the status of some socalled “threatened feminized” professions, like teaching and, more recently, law and medicine. And with the loss of status has come lower pay. Women also predominate in groups exemplified by exclusion and poverty: they account for 55 percent of the long-term unemployed, 90 percent of single parents, and 80 percent of the socially assisted elderly. It can be reasonably said that insecurity and poverty are becoming feminized. Young people are also particularly hard hit by unemployment, especially long-term unemployment. Companies can be reluctant to invest in training to familiarize young people with the way that business is run. Training is an essential element of career development, while businesses demand a highly specialized but also highly mobile workforce. False starts and career changes are unacceptable, as may be witnessed by the type of job vacancy advertisement which calls for applicants “under 30 with at least 5 years experience in the industry.” There is no social responsibility in the field of achieving the up-skilling of young people through vocational training. In short, to find work you should ideally be between 30 and 40, with no family ties, in peak physical condition, and with extensive experience. Any younger, and you are too young and cost the firm too much in training time. Any older, and you are too old, cannot meet market demands, and your experience costs the firm too much.30 Finally in Turkey, despite the presence of social rights in legislation, there are plenty of obstacles, barriers, and difficulties in practice; in other words, the current platform is not suited to the use of social rights concretely in daily life. This situation is much more serious and harmful for young people and for women as well as handicapped people in the society. Unionization and Collective Bargaining: The Right to Organize Labor statistics indicate union density at 58 percent and the number of unionized workers as standing at 2.9 million; in fact, properly unionized workers covered by collective agreements number fewer than 1 million, and union density is about 10 percent. These real figures are accepted by both union and labor sides; only the labor ministry denies the truth and insists on publishing fictitious figures. Some unions are happy with this attitude, because they are seen as being much stronger than they are. Unfortunately, there is no practical instrument with which to extend similar collective agreements to nonunionized workers and workplaces. Therefore,


7/12/11 6:51 AM

244

M. Kemal Öke

collective bargaining coverage is about the same as union density. In fact, in some European countries, in contrast to union density, collective bargaining coverage might reach almost 90 percent of those in employment. For instance, union density in France is less than 9 percent, but collective agreement coverage nears 80 to 90 percent. There is an instrument in the legislation by which a collective agreement could be extended to nonunionized workplaces, but in practice it is not implemented by the government. Consequently, only limited collective agreements exist in the Turkish industrial relations system. In Turkey, about 2,000 collective agreements are concluded each year, but in Germany some 7,000 to 9,000 collective agreements are concluded each year and in total there are about 40,000 collective agreements operating at some level.31 Social Security Attempts to dismantle the social security system, as a means of promoting a private pension and social security system, have taken place under pressure from politicians and are intended to undermine the current system. Private and public sector workers are covered by the social security system, which is financed by workers’ and employers’ contributions, but the funds of the workers’ Social Security Institute have been used as a source of cheap credit to finance budget deficits, and the Institute has been mismanaged by governments through widespread nepotism. In the 1990s, governments attempted to privatize both the hospitals of the Social Insurance Institute and state-run ones, while Jose Piñera, Pinochet’s former minister of labour and an international marketer for multinationals, came to Turkey to sell the idea of a Chilean-type private pensions system.32 By the end of this period of mismanagement, the “active-passive ratio” across the whole of the insurance system had decreased from 2.77 in 1990 to 1.83 in 2002. Over the same period, this ratio had evolved from 2.39 to 1.69 for SSK (Social Security Institution for workers); from 4.75 to 2.38 for BK (Social Security Institution for artisans); and from 1.85 to 1.68 for ES (Social Security Institution for public servants). The aging of the population does not yet constitute a serious threat to the sustainability of the Social Security System (SSS) in Turkey, but other factors, such as the low level of compliance of employers with pensions laws and the poor enforcement of this legislation by the authorities, as well as the informalization of economic activity, tend towards an increase in the aforementioned ratio. Indeed, an increasing number of unregistered workers, whatever the cause of this phenomenon, will substantially diminish the number of formal wage earners who pay social security contributions.33 The employment of an undeclared workforce by em-


7/12/11 6:51 AM


245

ployers in the formal sector, or the underreporting of the wages and salaries of workers in order to reduce contributions, are two faces of the phenomenon of the informalization of the formal sector, which tend to have similar negative effects on the revenues of the social security institutions. Low late transfer penalties, where employers have withheld these contributions, do not provide sufficient incentive to respect pensions laws. Irrational management of the resources of these institutions by governments, in accordance only with their short-term objectives and without taking into account actuarial constraints, have exerted a negative impact on the revenues of the SSS. In other words, there are problems with the collection of social security contributions as well as with the administration and management of the funds collected by the SSS in Turkey, and they all add to problems with the sustainability of this system.34 Social Assistance It is not unusual that public spending may aggravate inequality in those countries where a corporatist social security system exists, in the absence of social assistance schemes directed at the population at large and independent of their work status. In such contexts, the livelihood of the individual who has no formal employment status significantly depends on family and kinship ties and other informal reciprocal relationships, which can also involve clientelist relations with political authorities. This is the case with the Turkish welfare regime, in which a number of largely unstructured and often traditionally rooted institutional arrangements define the area of social assistance. Many of these arrangements either came into being or gained importance after the second half of the 1990s, when the problem of poverty, with its widening scope and changing nature, became impossible to overlook. These newly significant mechanisms are far from reflective of a universal, rights-based approach to social policy, but they do nevertheless constitute a response to the challenge of the new poverty. This phenomenon of new poverty is, in itself, a clear indicator of the failure and unsustainability of the traditional welfare regime and also calls for a new social policy orientation.35 The existing mechanism was implemented in order to combat the reach of poverty, to advance social integration, and to put up barriers to social exclusion. It looks inspired by the traditional ethos of Ottoman charity, and it was clearly hoped that it would reflect a fundamental characteristic of the Ottoman charitable foundations. The most concrete and significant mechanism is the Social Cooperation and Solidarity Fund, which was established in 1986. The fund consists of hundreds of local foundations managed by representatives of the central


7/12/11 6:51 AM

246

M. Kemal Öke

government at district level. In 2004, the General Directorate of Social Cooperation and Solidarity was established in order to advance social inclusion across society. The fund maintains the bulk of services, such as the health care allowance, allowance for people with impairments, education allowance, education materials allowance, transportation service, free book service, family allowance, food assistance, heating assistance, housing and free food service, social support for inhabitants of rural areas, and so forth. It represents a “conditional cash transfer” program for poor families by way of allocations to pregnant women, to preschoolers, and to children attending compulsory schooling. The fund, however, does seem to be a more permanent feature of social assistance. After 2001, the supports provided for health and education have become the most important categories of assistance: health expenditure constituted the largest item in this budget—38.59 percent in 2003. These expenditures complemented the “Green Card” program, which had been introduced in 1992 to provide health services to poor people not covered by any social assistance program either as direct contributors or as dependants.36 According to a liberal understanding, this kind of social assistance should be conditional on participation in productive activity. The government authorities in Turkey have expressed the concern that this allocation of unconditional grants entails a danger of fostering “dependency.”37 In fact, thousands of people are not participating in productive agricultural activity in rural areas while benefiting from social assistance. Additionally, many urban inhabitants are using the Green Card dishonestly. In March 2009, almost 16 million people were benefiting from the Green Card, according to the Minister of Health, but in fact only 9 million people were actively benefiting, with the remainder being passive card holders. Opposition parties and the media insist on a great volume of misuse in the distribution of Green Cards.38 According to the media, some Green Card holders are owners of apartments or Mercedes cars and other luxuries. The result of this misuse is that the government has cancelled about 7 million Green Cards. The ministry has not denied the cancellation but has expressed that the reason was not misuse but having visa problems.

Industrial Relations and Social Rights At the same time, results concerning the right to organize seem to be positive. In the field of trade union rights and freedoms, Turkey has formally ratified the seven core ILO conventions: No. 87, Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize; No. 98, Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining; No. 29, Forced Labor; No. 105, Abolition of Forced Labor; No. 100, Equal Remuneration; No. 111, Discrimination; and No. 138, Minimum


7/12/11 6:51 AM


247

Age. Turkey has also ratified other significant ILO conventions in recent years, including No. 151, Labor Relations in the Public Sector; No. 158, Termination of Employment; and others. However, in practice, restrictions on trade unions’ rights in Turkey remain. For example, public workers are employed under three sets of legal status: civil servants, contracted personnel, and workers. Civil servants have not yet been given the right to bargain collectively or to strike; the law concerning this issue allows only for collective negotiations and excludes the right to strike. The law also stipulates the elimination of the trade union rights of certain categories of civil servant. Meanwhile, contracted personnel do not have trade union rights. Public workers do have trade union rights and collective bargaining rights, but strike action is banned in some sectors, including banking, urban transport, and energy. Solidarity strikes, general strikes, and go-slow forms of industrial action are banned. In practice, the level of recognition depends on a very damaging and lengthy procedure both before it is reached in the first place and then in being maintained. Public employees do have some legal and de facto protection against unfair dismissal, but in the private sector antiunion discrimination is widespread. Employers can be fined for antiunion discrimination, but the fines are ineffective, and in addition the worker is required to prove discrimination. ILO Convention No. 158 has been reflected in the national legislation, but it is ineffective and insufficient. In the field of the right to work, low employment generation, combined with the rapidly rising population between 1980 and 2004, has led to a significant decline in the employment rate. Owing to the weak level of job creation, the employment rate in 2004, at 46 percent, was far from the Lisbon target for 2010 of 70 percent. The two special Lisbon targets for women and older workers represent the most dominant reasons why Turkey lags so far behind the overall 70 percent standard (see Table 10.2). Without major improveTABLE 10.2 Employment Rates in 2004 Relative to the Lisbon Targets: Turkey, EU Members, Bulgaria, and Romania

Employment Rate 2004 Turkey EU-15 EU-10 Bulgaria Romania

Overall employment (15–64 years)

Female employment (15–64 years)

Older workers (55–64 years)

2010: 70% 2005: 67%

2010: 67% 2005: 57%

2010: 55%

46.1 64.8 60.5 54.2 57.7

24.3 57.0 53.3 50.6 52.1

33.1 41.9 32.3 32.5 36.9

Source: SIS HLFS, Eurostat.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

248

M. Kemal Öke

ments in the participation and employment rates of these groups, this target will remain far above Turkey’s actual performance. The unemployment rate was 10.6 percent in 2004, but this does not capture the substantial level of underemployment within the large informal sector.39 In the field of the deregulation of the labor market, temporary employment, seasonal employment, fixed-term contracts, part-time work, labor subcontracting, home working, and other types of atypical employment are on the increase. In the public sector, contracting out has usually led to the use of precarious forms of labor. The Preliminary National Development Plan, which covers 2004 to 2006, supports the young population and gives importance to improving the education system in order to meet the qualified manpower needs of the economy. Meanwhile, the plan focuses on restructuring in an integral manner on the basis of life-long learning. According to the plan, education levels of women shall be increased in order to expand their role in society and to ensure that they can enjoy equal opportunities.

What Is to Be Done Apparently very radical steps should be taken in order to make reforms for economic and social policies that have been implemented for many years in the society. Everybody believes that it is a very difficult task for political parties to break themselves of a habit. Three concrete recommendations for the near future can be made. The first one is put in practice the acquis communautaire as a commitment of Turkey to national legislation. This is an essential step but not enough because, as with ratification of ILO conventions by the Turkish government, it should be put in practice in order to be usable. In other words there must not be a gap between practice and legislation. In this philosophy Turkey should try to maintain the rights to decent work and wages, and to have career for citizens. Secondly, all obstacles and barriers for rights to organize should be destroyed. Especially being a member of a union and benefiting from collective agreements should be part of daily life in an easy way. Meanwhile, the level of collective agreement should be upgraded from the level of enterprise to the sector level. This is the only way protect to real wages for employees. Thirdly, Turkey should maintain social security rights for all citizens in every part of daily life. Social assistance is an unavoidable component of social security rights. but in practice misuse should be destroyed in order for citizens to be entitled to assistance. In fact, social security rights should be available for everyone, such as the family allowance that takes place in


7/12/11 6:51 AM


249

ILO conventions but does not exist in the Turkish social security system. Afterward, social assistance should be used as a supplementary technique apart from political favoritism. Contrary to the current system, social security rights lag behind the developed countries; meanwhile, social assistance takes a serious amount in the budget due to favoritism apart from the productive measures. Apparently, main economic policies are determinant in the society: on one hand, social policies depend on economic policies; on the other hand, they depend on preferences of the government. If the government’s perception changes to put on priority on social rights as citizen rights, naturally social policies capacity must be deeper and more comprehensive; if not, it remains as merely cosmetic. So radical changes are available for social rights after economic policy changes. As a final word on Turkey, the consensus in which everybody participates, based on strong economic growth but weaker levels of human development, dominates our times, ages, and policies. In fact, if the public institutions at various levels of government simply do not respond to citizens’ demands and expectations, then their adequate funding by taxes on citizens will not be forthcoming. Why would individuals pay their taxes if they think that these funds will be wasted by bureaucrats either because of inefficiency, cronyism, or for political gain? Consequently, to ensure adequate participation at all levels, citizens should see that their administration acts responsibly and can be held accountable for the policies followed, monies spent, and taxes collected.40

Conclusion After 30 years of liberal policies, the balance of payments problems and budget deficits stand as one of the major problems of the Turkish economy: almost 40 percent of the budget goes to the payment of interest on domestic and foreign debt. In consequence, the share of education and health expenditures—in other words, social expenditures—has been decreasing. In some cases, even if it is sufficient, it is not sufficiently effective. Gradually, this will affect the quality of social rights for citizens. There are growing fears that the postindustrial society will produce a new class of permanent losers. The single greatest challenge to the welfare state today lies in the need to rethink its classical assumptions about work, the family, and social risk.41 Bourdieu said that globalization stands out, in the sense of terminology, as the hegemonic concept of the neoliberal ideology, reflecting one of the main items on the current political economy agenda. This buzzword seems to


7/12/11 6:51 AM

250

M. Kemal Öke

have a spiritual power in its own right as it provides a central force directing our daily discourse on economic, social, political, and cultural relations. The concept is mostly revealed as part of a modern project on citizenship, along with references to such slogans as “being a citizen of the globalized village” and “adjusting to the needs of global markets.” In this sense, the term itself carries a dual conceptual meaning: a definition and a policy recipe. As a definition, the term refers to the increased integration of the world’s commodity and financial markets and its cultural and social values. Within the context of this definition, the liberalization of commodity trade and financial flows yield only the narrowest economic implications of the globalization process. At a more general level, this process entails a program for destroying collective structures that may impede pure market logic.42 In final summary, it is necessary to reconstruct the tolls and mechanisms of the Keynesian welfare state; but, in order to reach this target, everyone needs to remember collective values. In the achievement of this, we still need the strong voices and solidarity of trade unions, as we indicated at the beginning of this article. This is very difficult; based on traditional ways, it is almost impossible. It is time to research new methods and strategies and different types of union perception in order to return once more to the welfare state.

Notes 1. Ayşe Buğra and Çağlar Keyder, “The Turkish Welfare Regime in Transformation,” Journal of European Social Policy 16, no. 3 (2006): 211–28. 2. T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 65–122 3. M. Kemal Öke, “Neo-Liberal Attack on Labour and the Way Out for Unions in Turkey” (paper presented at the SEER Symposium, Potsdam, November 2001), 3–6. www.boeckler.de/SEER. 4. N. Mütevellioğlu and R. B. Çizel, “Social Rights and the Decommodification of Labour,” South East Europe Review 12, no. 4 (April 2010): 493–511. 5. R. Munck, “Labour Dilemmas and Labour Futures,” in Labour Worldwide in the Era of Globalisation: Alternative Union Models in the New World Order, edited by Peter Waterman and Ronaldo Munck (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 5–10. 6. W. Beveridge, Full Employment in a Free Society: A Report (London: HMSO, 1942), 287–93; G. Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944), 69–91. 7. J. Lewis, “Women and Social Policies in Europe: Work, Family and the State,” Journal of European Social Policy 2, no. 3 (August 1992): 159–73. 8. Colin Crouch, Social Change in Western Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 368.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


251

9. Gian Primo Cella, “Work and Social Protection: The Transformation or Decline of Industrial Citizenship,” Transfer 2, no. 4 (November 1996), 563. 10. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development, 65–122. 11. Cella, “Work and Social Protection,” 565. 12. Ibid., 566. 13. İ. Tunalı, Background Study on Labour Market and Employment in Turkey (EU: European Training Foundation, 2003), 60–79. 14. M. Kemal Öke, “Employment and Social Dialogue in Turkey from the Perspective of EU integration. The Dualistic Labour Market: Labour Aristocracy alongside Informalised/Marginalised Labour,” in The Enlargement of Social Europe: The Role of the Social Partners in the European Employment Strategy, Part II, edited by Céline Lafoucriere and Lars Magnusson (Brussels: European Trade Union Institute for Research, Education and Health and Safety, 2005), 239–67. 15. State Planning Organization, Uzun Vadeli Strateji ve Sekizinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı 2001–2005 (Long-Term Strategy and the Eighth Five Year Development Plan 2001–2005) (Ankara: State Planning Organization, 2000). 16. BSB, “On Economic and Social Life in Turkey in Early 2005,” Independent Social Scientists’ Alliance (July 2010), www.bagimsizsosyalbilimciler.org. 17. G. Taylor and A. Mathers, “Social Partner or Social Movement? European Integration and Trade Union Renewal in Europe,” Labour Studies Journal 27, no. 1 (Spring 2002), 93–108. 18. United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report Turkey 2008: Youth in Turkey (Ankara: UNDP, 2008), 45–55. 19. M. Kemal Öke and M. Güray, Capacity Building for Social Dialogue at Sectoral and Company Level in Turkey (Dublin, Ireland: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2007), www.eurofound.europa.eu/ pubdocs/2007/2214/en/1/ef072214 en.pdf. 20. G. V. Gyes, T. Vandenbrande, S. Lehndorff, G. Schilling, S. Schief, and H. Kohl, “Industrial Relations in the Member States of the European Union: A Basic Comparison of 25 National Systems,” paper presented at European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions Conference, February 2–3, 2006. 21. G. Özcüre, H. Demirkaya, N. Eryiğit, and G. Yüce, “The Influence of the European Union Employee Participation System and Related Acquis on Companies Operating in Turkey,” South East Europe Review 12, no. 1 (August 2009): 95–114. 22. T. Dereli, “21.Yüzyıla Girerken Batıdaki Gelişmeler Karşısında Türk Endüstri İlişkileri Sistemi: Karşılaştırmalı Bir Değerlendirme,” in İktisat Fakültesi Sosyal Siyaset Konferansları 45. Kitap (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003), 3–23. 23. E. Yeldan, Turkey 2001–2004: IMF Strangulation, Tightening Debt Trap and Lopsided Recovery (Ankara: Bilkent University, 2004), 5–9. www.bilkent.edu .tr/~yeldane. 24. K. Boratav and E. Yeldan, Turkey, 1980–2000: Financial Liberalization, Macroeconomıc (In)-Stability, and Patterns of Distribution (Ankara: Faculty of Political Science, Department of Economics, Ankara University, Bilkent University, 2001), 30–37. www.bilkent.edu.tr/~yeldane.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

252

M. Kemal Öke

25. Ç. Telli, E. Voyoda, and E. Yeldan, “Modeling General Equilibrium for Socially Responsible Macroeconomics: Seeking for the Alternatives to Fight Jobless Growth in Turkey” Ankara: Bilkent University (March 2006): 6–8. 26. OECD, “OECD in Figures: Statistics on the Member Countries,” OECD Observer (2002, Supplement 1). www1.oecd.org/publications/e-book/0102071E.PDF. 27. ILO, G-20 Country Report: Turkey’s Response to the Global Crisis, draft report (2009), 1–9. 28. Mütevellioğlu and Çizel, “Social Rights,” 493–511. 29. Mütevellioğlu and Çizel, “Social Rights,” 493–511. 30. H. M. André and A. Meunier, “Anti-Unemployment and Anti-Exclusion Policies: Really Inclusive or Just Widening the Gap?” Transfer 2, no. 4 (November 1996): 602–14. 31. M. K. Öke, “The Effectiveness and Effıciency of Trade Unions in the Labour Market of Turkey,” İşGüç, Industrial Relations and Human Resources Journal 11, no. 6 (October 2009): 42–52. 32. O. Topak, “Sosyal Güvenlik ve Yeniden Yapılanma” (“Social Security and Restructure”), Toplum ve Hekim 15, no. 6 (November 2000): 464–70. 33. O. Topak, “Şili: Neoliberalizmin Örnek Ülkesi” (“Model Country of Neoliberalism: Chile”) Sendikal Bakış Dergisi no. 2 (1999). 34. T. Pamukcu and E. Yeldan, Country Profile: Turkey Public Sector and Fiscal Policy Issues (Ankara: Bilkent University, 2005), www.bilkent.edu.tr/~yeldane. 35. Buğra and Keyder, “Turkish Welfare Regime,” 211–28. 36. Activity Report 2009 (Başbakanlık Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Genel Müdürlüğü Faaliyet Raporu) (Ankara: Prime Ministry, General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity, April 2010). 37. Buğra and Keyder, “Turkish Welfare Regime,” 211–28. 38. O. Oyan, “Krizin Gölgesinde Sosyal Polikalar” (“Social Policies in the Shadow of Economic Crises”), Mülkiye Dergisi 34, no. 263 (2009): 89–105. 39. World Bank, “Turkey Country Economic Memorandum Promoting Sustained Growth and Convergence with the European Union,” Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Europe and Central Asia Region 2006, Report No. 33549TR, 41–45. 40. UNDP, Human Development Report Turkey, 45–55. 41. G. Esping-Andersen, “Equality or Employment? The Interaction of Wages, Welfare States and Family Change,” Transfer 2, no. 4 (1996): 616–17. 42. P. Bourdieu, “The Essence of Neoliberalism,” Le Monde Diplomatique 114–115 (September and December 1996), especially the introduction,; “et crise du politique” (“Work Crisis and Political Crisis), Le Monde Diplomatique 114: 3–4.

Bibliography Accession Partnership with Turkey (2003/398/EC). Council of the European Union, June 12, 2003. Official Journal of the European Union.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


253

Activity Report, 2009 (Başbakanlık Sosyal Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Genel Müdürlüğü Faaliyet Raporu). Ankara: Prime Ministry, General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity, April 2010. André, H. M. and Meunier, A. “Anti-Unemployment and Anti-Exclusion Policies: Really Inclusive or Just Widening the Gap?” Transfer 2, no. 4 (November 1996): 602–14. Beveridge, W. Full Employment in a Free Society: A Report. London: HMSO, 1942. Boratav, K. and Yeldan, E. Turkey, 1980–2000: Financial Liberalization, Macroeconomıc (In)-Stability, and Patterns of Distribution. Ankara: Faculty of Political Science, Department of Economics, Ankara University, Bilkent University, 2001, 30–37. www.bilkent.edu.tr/~yeldane. Bourdieu, P. “The Essence of Neoliberalism.” Le Monde Diplomatique 114–15 (September and December 1996), especially the introduction “et crise du politique” (“Work Crisis and Political Crisis”), Le Monde Diplomatique 114: 3–4. BSB. “On Economic and Social Life in Turkey in Early 2005.” Independent Social Scientists’ Alliance (July 2010). www.bagimsizsosyalbilimciler.org/. Buğra, Ayşe and Çağlar Keyder. “The Turkish Welfare Regime in Transformation.” Journal of European Social Policy 16, no. 3 (2006): 211–28. Cella, Gian Primo. “Work and Social Protection: The Transformation or Decline of Industrial Citizenship.” Transfer 2, no. 4 (November 1996): 559–73. Crouch, Colin. Social Change in Western Europe. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, . Dereli, T. “21.Yüzyıla Girerken Batıdaki Gelişmeler Karşısında Türk Endüstri İlişkileri Sistemi: Karşılaştırmalı Bir Değerlendirme.” In İktisat Fakültesi Sosyal Siyaset Konferansları 45. Kitap, 3–23. İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003. Esping-Anderson, G. E. “Equality or Employment? The Interaction of Wages, Welfare States and Family Change.” Transfer 2, no. 4 (1996): 616–17. ———. Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. ———. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Gyes, G. V., T. Vandenbrande, S. Lehndorff, G. Schilling, S, Schief, and H. Kohl. “Industrial Relations in the Member States of the European Union: A Basic Comparison of 25 National Systems.” Paper presented at European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions conference, February 2–3, 2006). ILO. G-20 Country Report: Turkey’s Response to the Global Crisis (Draft Report). ILO: 2009. Kohl, H. Social Dialogue Indicators (SDI) Strengthening Social Dialogue for Innovation and Change in Turkey Ankara (2007) ( Karl Feldengut, Erling Have, M.Kemal Öke, Oğuz Karadeniz, Hakan Ercan ile birlikte). EU Commission and Ministry of Labour and Social Security of Turkey. Lewis, J. “Women and Social Policies in Europe: Work, Family and the State.” Journal of European Social Policy 2, no. 3 (August 1992): 159–73.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

254

M. Kemal Öke

Marshall, T. H. Class, Citizenship and Social Development. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). www.journals.uchicago.edu. Munck, R. “Labour Dilemmas and Labour Futures.” In Labour Worldwide in the Era of Globalisation: Alternative Union Models in the New World Order, edited by Peter Waterman and Ronaldo Munck, 5–10. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999. Mütevellioğlu, N. and R. B. Çizel. “Social Rights and the Decommodification of Labour.” South East Europe Review 12, no. 4 (April 2010): 493–511. Myrdal, G. An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944. OECD. “OECD in Figures: Statistics on the Member Countries.” OECD Observer (2002), supplement 1. www1.oecd.org/publications/e-book/0102071E.pdf. Oyan, O. “Krizin Gölgesinde Sosyal Polikalar” (“Social Policies in the Shadow of Economic Crises”). Mülkiye Dergisi 34, no. 263 (2009): 89–105. Öke, M. Kemal. “The Effectiveness and Efficiency of Trade Unions in the Labour Market of Turkey.” İşGüç, Industrial Relations and Human Resources Journal 11, no. 6 (October 2009): 42–52. ———. “Employment and Social Dialogue in Turkey from the Perspective of EU Integration. The Dualistic Labour Market: Labour Aristocracy alongside Informalised/Marginalised Labour.” In The Enlargement of Social Europe: The Role of the Social Partners in the European Employment Strategy, Part II, edited by Céline Lafoucriere and Lars Magnusson, 239–67. Brussels: European Trade Union Institute for Research, Education and Health and Safety, 2005. ———. “Neo-Liberal Attack on Labour and Way Out for Unions in Turkey.” Paper presented at the SEER Symposium, Potsdam, November 2001. www.boeckler.de/ SEER. Öke, M. Kemal, and M. Güray. “Capacity Building for Social Dialogue at Sectoral and Company Level in Turkey.” Dublin, Ireland: European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2007.www.eurofound.europa.eu/ pubdocs/2007/2214/en/1/ef072214 en.pdf. Özcüre, G., H. Demirkaya, N. Eryiğit, and G. Yüce. “The Influence of the European Union Employee Participation System and Related Acquis on the Companies Operating in Turkey.” South East Europe Review 12, no. 1 (August 2009): 95–114. Pamukcu, T. and E. Yeldan, E.. Country Profile: Turkey Public Sector and Fiscal Policy Issues. Ankara: Bilkent University, 2005. www.bilkent.edu.tr/~yeldane. Regular Report on Turkey’s Progress towards Accession. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, November 13, 2001. SEC(2001) 1756. State Planning Organization. Uzun Vadeli Strateji ve Sekizinci Beş Yıllık Kalkınma Planı 2001–2005 (Long-Term Strategy and the Eighth Five-Year Development Plan 2001–2005). Ankara: SPO, 2000. www.dpt.gov.tr. ———. Preliminary Development Plan, 2004–2006 (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı). Ankara: SPO, 2003. www.dpt.gov.tr. Taylor, G., and A. Mathers. “Social Partner or Social Movement? European Integration and Trade Union Renewal in Europe.” Labour Studies Journal 27, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 93–108.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


255

Telli, Ç., E. Voyoda, and E. Yeldan. “Modeling General Equilibrium for Socially Responsible Macroeconomics: Seeking for the Alternatives to Fight Jobless Growth in Turkey”; Ankara, March 2006. Topak, O. “Sosyal Güvenlik ve Yeniden Yapılanma” (“Social Security and Restructure”). Toplum ve Hekim 16, no. 6 (November–December 2000): 464–70. ———. “Şili: Neoliberalizmin Örnek Ülkesi” (“Model Country of Neoliberalism: Chile”). Sendikal Bakış Dergis 2 (1999). Tunalı, İ. Background Study on Labour Market and Employment in Turkey. Dublin, Ireland: EU European Training Foundation Publication, 2003. TÜİK. Labor Statistics 2009. Ankara: State Institute of Statistics Press, Printing Division, 2009. ———. Labor Statistics 2010. Ankara: State Institute of Statistics Press, Printing Division, 2010. United Nations Development Program. Human Development Report Turkey 2008: Youth in Turkey. Ankara: UNDP, 2008. World Bank. “Turkey Country Economic Memorandum Promoting Sustained Growth and Convergence with the European Union.” Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Europe and Central Asia Region, 2006. Report No. 33549-TR, 41–45. Yeldan, E. Turkey 2001–2004: IMF Strangulation, Tightening Debt Trap and Lopsided Recovery. Ankara: Bilkent University, 2004. www.bilkent.edu.tr/~yeldane.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


7/12/11 6:51 AM

11 The Turkish Young People as Active Citizens: Equal Participation or Social Exclusion? Pınar Enneli

I

N RECENT YEARS,

issues around the young people such as education, employment, crimes, and so forth are increasingly discussed within the context of citizenship, while the early theories of young people concentrated on transition to adulthood. In these early theories, citizenship, if ever mentioned, was seen as an indirect result of this transition. In fact, a healthy transition to adulthood was assumed to bring well-adjusted citizens. In this context, citizenship was understood within the narrow boundaries of the rights and duties of “adult” citizens. On the other hand, in today’s society, citizenship has gone beyond this boundary, and the theorists have started to talk about new dimensions by using terms like “social citizenship” or “active citizenship.” This development has not been only the of result of a changing understanding of youth as a transitional period to adulthood, but also the changing nature of the citizenship. After the neoliberal policies and remodeling of the welfare state, the issue of rights and obligations of not only young people but all the people is reconceptualized. The Western states and policymakers started to expect active political participation of the people, including young people, as citizens into every decision-making process. In practice, the active participation of the young people means helping the neediest people in the society, making one’s voice heard, and in a direct way, voting in elections as a sign of conventional citizenship duty. In Turkey, the young people have also been treated as active citizens since the beginning of the 2000s, so this is a relatively new phenomenon. Indeed, after the 1980s military coup, for a long time the Turkish state has wanted

— 257 —


7/12/11 6:51 AM

258

Pınar Enneli

the young people, like all other citizens, to be under strict control. In that period, the ideal youth was apolitical, passive, and obedient to the rules. This understanding has been changed since the beginning of the 2000s under the influence of the European Union accession talks. Nowadays, there are several studies to analyze the ways to increase the young people’s involvement in political processes through NGOs or political parties. In fact, since the beginning of the Turkish Republic, there have been three periods during which the young people as citizens have been engaged in politics. The first one started with the beginning of the Republic and was interrupted by the military coup in 1980. The young people in this period were engaged in political activities, and during the late 1970s some of their activities were labelled as radical. This period finished in the 1980s, and it paved the way to the new era, which is labeled by apolitical youth. Finally, in the last period, starting in the 2000s, the young people have been conceptualized in the context of active citizenship. So, in this chapter, we are going to examine all these issues in detail. The chapter includes three parts. First of all, we are going to discuss the changing nature of citizenship in relation to the young people by referring to existing theoretical discussions. Then, in the second part, we are going to analyze the first and the second phases of young people’s citizenship in Turkey. And finally, we are going to focus on the active citizenship discussions since the beginning of the 2000s in Turkey. Throughout the chapter, the main argument is that citizenship in various changing forms and understandings over time has been a privileged asset for educated young people with high socioeconomic backgrounds. However, even the privileged young citizens have not been allowed to challenge the system. In that sense, the state has no intention to change this fact in the final phase of young citizenship, which seems more inclusive in the first place. In that sense, the critical engagement of the young people could be a more inclusive and challenging citizenship model for the young people as long as the state prepared the necessary economic, social, and democratic adjustments.

From Citizens in the Making to Active Citizens Like most of the ideas, the idea of belonging to a nation as a citizen originated in the modern Western world. Yet, not only was the citizenship ideal exported to the rest of the world, but also the boundaries and meaning of being a child and young person today are also influenced by Western ideals.1 This is also true for Turkey, while the number of youth and children studies is not as great as in the Western countries. Yet at least the active citizenship discussions in


7/12/11 6:51 AM

The Turkish Young People as Active Citizens

259

relation to the young people have been heard both in the West and in Turkey simultaneously.2 That is why we are going to analyze the position of the young people in relation to the citizenship concept of the modern world prior to discussion about the young people in Turkey. Marshall cited the young people as “citizens in the making.”3 For a long time citizenship has been related to being an adult.4 That is why the studies of the young people have been concentrated on the transition period to adulthood.5 The young people were assumed to be in the process of growing up into adults entitled to rights and obliged to follow the rules.6 The main concern of these studies was usually the transition from school to employment.7 In fact, having a job was to be an important aspect of being adult.8 Indeed, the young people’s rights as citizens have been discussed in relation to employment.9 In that sense, educational achievement, lifetime learning programs, alternative vocational training education, and in-job support programs were discussed thoroughly.10 On the other hand, in recent years, the young people’s citizenship has been discussed from a different angle.11 For instance, Conway stated that “Citizenship as a process of ‘becoming,’ and not of ‘being,’ limits and confines young people to inequality and subordination as compared to adults/citizens.”12 In a sense, it is true that the young people should be treated as equal with any other members of a particular society and should not wait to get whole rights until they reach a certain age. However, the young people’s citizenship discussions are not usually based on rights. Indeed, it is argued that the employment right as the important part of citizenship is no longer a necessary condition in relation to the young people: “If young people are to be recognised as citizens, a broader understanding of citizenship is needed beyond an employment-oriented model as this model tends to exclude some young people.”13 In this context, the theorists introduced the active citizenship concept in the youth studies. It is the case that the young people are no longer in a transition process to citizenship but are already becoming a part of the existing community as citizens, since they have learned and experienced being a part of the community through their everyday life engagements.14 By “young people’s active citizenship,” the theorists usually refer to volunteering for community services as a means to promote citizenship, particularly among young people. The active citizen is someone who is active in their local community, often in voluntary roles such as school governor or scout leader.15 In this sense, active citizens have a moral obligation to look after the environment in which they are living, provide for the welfare of the most vulnerable, such as the old people, and make their places safe and secure to live in.16


7/12/11 6:51 AM

260

Pınar Enneli

These involvements of the young people have been shown as an alternative to the conventional political engagements of citizens such as voting in elections, since most of the theorists agree on the dislike of the young people for conventional politics.17 Hoikkala stated, The organizational commitments of today’s portfolio generation have a much more individualistic nature, and acting together means a different thing in the 21st century than it did in the 1970s. The forms of communality and the social bonds offered to the members of today’s societies are in many ways completely different from those of the societies of the 1970s.18

Some of the theorists believe that in the end the active participation in community affairs could also increase the young people’s interests in conventional politics, most importantly voting in the elections.19 In this context, the civic education issues are addressed very often in order to increase the awareness of young people and children about the problems of their communities and to create responsible and democratic citizens.20 On the other hand, some theorists argued that the active citizenship discussions are the product of the neoliberal structuring of the society.21 In fact, the idea of citizens actively involved in politics was initiated in the United States by center-right politicians quite some time ago. In the 1960s, community action programs initiated in deprived inner-city areas encouraged the active engagement of the poor in the provision of social services with the aim of reducing their dependency on the state and, by doing this, reducing the welfare expenditures.22 The past 20 years have witnessed similar application in the European continent, especially in Britain, and these policies were praised as empowering the citizens and enabling the state to govern more effectively.23 According to Phillips, active citizenship in the mind of official circles emphasizes almost exclusively responsibilities and refers to activities in the social rather than political realm.24 As she continues, “Despite the grandiose title, the ‘active citizen’ then becomes a bit of a busybody keeping the neighbours in line, or a self-appointed social worker who does the work for free (or rather, for the moral self-gratification).”25 Indeed, defining citizenship in terms of citizen duty might be a circumscribed definition of the active citizen; these norms encourage electoral participation but do not carry over to other forms of action and actually discourage participation in protest.26 On the other hand, there are also alternative versions of active participation. For instance, El-Haj introduces the critical involvement concept, which means a set of critical practices—practices that give young people the tools to understand structural inequalities and work for social change within and across the boundaries of nation-states.27 Through


7/12/11 6:51 AM


261

this critical engagement and participation, active young citizens might work for a more just and peaceful future.28 On the other hand, there seem to be some structural barriers in front of young people’s active participation (critical or uncritical). For many young people, complex needs such as problems with their mental health, drug and alcohol problems, or their experience of homelessness often mean that taking action or participating in civic activities is not a priority.29 Indeed, the research conducted among the unemployed people in 10 different European countries, found that long-term unemployment experiences lead the young people to be politically passivist as well as irregular activists.30 Even the United Nations World Youth Report admitted the importance of human development opportunities such as education, health, and opportunities for productive employment and poverty alleviation in order to ensure that the young people have the skills needed to participate in society in their capacity as individuals and citizens.31 Besides, according to the research conducted in 26 countries, noninstitutionalized forms of participation like demonstrations, petitions, or political consumerism increased inequalities based on education among the young people:32 Research has demonstrated quite convincingly that the highly-educated have distinct political preferences in comparison to lowly-educated groups in society. If these highly-educated groups are more active in getting their voices heard in politics, it is more likely that their interests and preferences will receive more weight in the political decision making process.33

Throughout this part, we have analyzed how the citizenship of young people is understood and constructed. In these discussions, there are a few points that have been raised. Citizenship can no longer be tied with being adult. So, young people’s active citizenship might provide a more inclusive understanding of their citizenship. However, active citizenship should be treated not only within the narrow boundaries of participating in elections or involvement in community affairs (in other words within the boundaries of duties) but it also needs to include the young people’s involvement in the decision-making process. In order to achieve this, the structural barriers such as lack of education or unemployment should be dealt with by some policies which refer to the classical understanding of citizenship based on rights. In Turkey, it could be argued that citizenship has never been understood in the context of rights throughout the Republic. The state was never thought to have a full responsibility to the young people such as providing employment for a successful adulthood and so forth, which was the case before neoliberalism appeared in the West. The state gave various roles to the youth in certain


7/12/11 6:51 AM

262

Pınar Enneli

stages of the history of the Republic. In a sense, Turkish citizenship has been identified more with duties than rights. Even in this one-sided understanding, citizenship seemed to include only a small number of educated young people. Since 2000, the active citizenship discussions have had an influence on the policymakers in Turkey, while the structural barriers such as unemployment and poverty seem to have negative effects on the involvement of the disadvantaged young people in politics. In fact, it seems that the Turkish government does not have any intention to take the young people’s opinions, especially challenging ones, into account in a meaningful way. In this context, the following parts are going to focus on the Turkish young people’s positions as citizens.

From the Radical Youth of the 1970s to the Obedient Youth of the 1980s: First and Second Phases of Young Citizenship Atatürk, the father of modern Turkey, trusted the young people with the future of the young nation. He gave a brave mission to the Turkish youth in his famous speech at the 10-year anniversary of the Republic: “Turkish Youth! Your first duty is forever to preserve and to defend the Turkish independence and the Turkish republic. This is the very foundation of your existence and your future. This foundation is your most precious treasure.”34 Within this context, the ambitious young teachers, doctors, and engineers spread all over the country to enlighten the rest of the population with the fresh and modern republican ideas. In this area, the educated youth were expected to be an impulsive force behind progress, and their incongruous ideas were tolerated. They were the ideal youth of the new republican secular elite.35 The new republic did not accept and even tolerate any divisions based on class, ideology, religion, or race alike in the society. There were people who were part of the same progressive ideas. In that sense, the young people engaged in the political activities under the strict control and understanding of the new state. Deviance would not be tolerated.36 This idealistic understanding of the youth at the beginning of the new Republic has been worn away in time. The subsequent governments have been less and less tolerant of political activism of the young people. After the 1950s multiparty system, the civil democracy was interrupted three times by the military coups in 1960, 1971, and finally 1980. In all this time, the young people were usually on the front line of the political activities, so they were punished often, especially in the 1971 and 1980 interventions.37 Among all, the September 12, 1980, military intervention was the most harsh and the bloodiest. In the five years after 1980, 650,000 people were


7/12/11 6:51 AM


263

arrested, and 250,000 were charged. Fifteen thousand people were found guilty for their political engagements; 517 people were sentenced to death, and 49 of them were hanged. Officially, 172 people were reported to have died under the torture. Twenty-four thousand nongovernmental organizations were banned.38 Mavioglu called these years the years of “Yes Sir Justice.”39 Indeed, youth studies are relatively a new phenomena in Turkey, while the youth problem or problem youth have been on the table especially since the 1980s. In that period, the state actively engaged in controlling the young people, especially university students. The youth seemed the source of the political protests and challenges to the system. Especially during the 1970s, the country was divided into two camps (left and right) and the young people were in the middle of the conflict.40 In the period prior to the 1980s, although the young people engaged in political activities, the movements were not as inclusive as they should have been. Indeed, the university students, some high school attendees, and professional job holders such as teachers were usually on the front lines of the activities. However, according to the state official statistics of arrested “terrorists” after 1980, one-fifth of those young people were categorized as unemployed prior to their arrest.41 Sayari argued that most of those young people had little or no educational qualification and were from low socioeconomic backgrounds.42 Sayari called this phenomenon as “generational changes,” referring to the socioeconomic differences between the terrorists in the early 1970s, who were exclusively from upper-class backgrounds with university degrees, and the ones in the late 1970s, who came from new shanty towns around the big cities.43 Although it could be true that over the years the political movements might be able to reach different segments of the young population, it seems a little bit premature to call these movements all-inclusive just for the reason that one-fifth of the youth were identified as unemployed. Indeed, most of the activists in the late 1970s seemed to be university students whose families’ socioeconomic backgrounds might be slightly lower than those of the previous generation activists,44 since these later-generation young people were usually the children of new migrants living in shanty towns. Yet this does not change the fact that the main character of the political movements of the period prior to the 1980s is the heavy involvement of the university students. So it might be argued that there was not much participation of working young people, uneducated young people, and so on. On the other hand, it should be noted that the post-1980 political atmosphere was suspicious of the young regardless of socioeconomic background or age. For instance, in December 1995, 16 young people aged between 14 and 17 were arrested in an Aegean city called Manisa for being members of a leftist terrorist


7/12/11 6:51 AM

264

Pınar Enneli

organization. They rejected any terrorist involvement, but insisted that they just sang and read poems.45 Yet what put these young people on the front pages is not the nature of the accusations against them but their torture claims while under custody against the police officers. Later they were cleared of all the charges against them after long years of legal actions.46 Their torture claims were proved later, and the Turkish government was ordered to pay large sums of compensation money to the young people by the European Court.47 The 1980s military regime not only brought strict antidemocratic political control but also made some drastic changes in the economic structure towards liberal policies. In most cases, these policies worked against the interests of working and disadvantaged people. In 1979, total health, social security, and education spending were 18.7 percent of the state budget, while this decreased to less than 14 percent in 1981. In the same year, real employee wages were reduced to the level of 1963. In the 1980s, the richest fifth of the population took 60 percent of the GDP, while the poorest fifth only shared 2.63 percent. Turkey became the sixth among the countries having the most unequal income distribution.48 The liberalization policies in the economic sphere together with the strict controls of the 1980s constitution affected the young people’s worldviews and how they saw politics. Under the strict control of the military regime, intellectuals have talked about the depoliticization process of the young people.49 Although all the people were restricted from organizing any political activity, the young people took all the blame. So in one sense they were criticized by both the state officials and the democratic intellectuals. The most repeated question of these years for a long time was “where is the 68s generation?”50 However, the political engagement of the youth was probably at a middle point between not involved and totally involved. For instance, according to Inanır, there were young people interested in politics after 1980 but not in the conventional right–left axis; rather they came together on identity issues such as headscarves, ethnicity, and so forth.51 Indeed, in relation to the political apathy of the young people, Aktan rightly points out that the young people’s relation with politics is not so much different from the rest of the population.52 In any case, according to Lüküslü,53 most of the young people choose to be apolitical because they do not believe in themselves to be able to change the wrongdoings of the political system by engaging in any political activities such as party membership or street protests. Instead, they choose to adapt a tactical and necessary conformism in their daily lives. As a result, in the first phase of citizenship of the young people, the politically engaged youth with high ideals of the new republic were crushed especially by the military era of the 1980s. This paved the way to the second phase


7/12/11 6:51 AM


265

of the citizenship of the young people. In this phase, the young people were encouraged to be politically inactive. But in all these years, mostly educated young people were involved in politics, and they had been moved from being the carriers of the republican ideals to the challengers of the system and finally out of politics. The following part focuses on the new conceptualization of the youth from the 2000s as a final phase of young citizenship in Turkey.

Young People as Active Citizens since the Beginning of 2000: The Final Phase of Young Citizenship The youth citizenship adventure entered its final phase by the European Union accession talks in the early 2000s. In this chapter, we are not going to discuss Turkey and European Union relations, since the chapter by Bahar Hurmi and Bülent Temel does that in detail. But the European Union recommended all member and candidate countries to encourage the people, young or old, women or men, to involve themselves actively in the political process. In this respect, the EU has launched many programs.54 For instance, the budget of a recent program called Youth in Action is 885 million Euros for the period between 2007 and 2013. The program aims to support solidarity among young people and develop young people’s sense of initiative, creativeness, and entrepreneurial spirit.55 The active participation of the young people is also encouraged by the United Nations. In the World Youth Report, young people’s involvement in decision-making processes indicated a situation in which young people are no longer seen as passive recipients of national resources or the root cause of society’s problems; instead they are regarded as vital participants in society who can make an important contribution to their countries’ development and whose involvement must therefore be appropriately nurtured and cultivated.56

Like the Western examples mentioned in the first part, the active participation concept in relation to young people’s citizenship in Turkey goes hand-inhand with neoliberal politics. In their analysis of the neoliberal restructuring of Turkey’s social security system, Cosar and Yegenoglu point out that since the neoliberal policies have been initiated, the state transformed itself into the regulatory state model, and then later even this model was dismantled by the new social security law in the early 2000s, which proposed private insurance schemes, and a new labor law in 2003, which legally consolidated the priority of workfare over welfare. In that sense, the neoliberal social security policies exclude social security from the rights of citizens.57


7/12/11 6:51 AM

266

Pınar Enneli

The main implication of this economic deterioration is to harm the basic welfare state applications, especially the free and equal education for all, and in the long run this damages the equal opportunity ideal. According to the United Nations 2010 Human Development Index, Turkey is ranked 83 out of 169 countries.58 The United Nation has published this index since 1990 and gives an alternative measure of national development by introducing three basic dimensions of human development: health, education, and income. In that sense, it could be argued that the majority of the young people in Turkey have faced various structural disadvantages brought by the neoliberal welfare cuts. In Turkey, there are more than 12 million young people aged between 15 and 24; this is 17 percent of the whole population.59 Fourteen percent of these young people are unemployed.60 According to the UNDP report, 40 percent of the young people are in the NEET category (neither in education, employment, or training).61 Only 44 percent of the employed ones are protected by a social security contract. In other words, only one of every two young working persons is covered by the social security system.62 Most of them received only basic education. More than half of the young people received only compulsory education.63 In other words, most of the Turkish young people are especially vulnerable to exclusion. The active citizenship discussions have been carried on by several researchers in this atmosphere. For instance, Nemutlu and Kurtaran emphasized the importance of the young people’s participation in the decision-making process.64 Similarly, Nemutlu emphasized the importance of the young people being the subject of research and policies at every stage and actively involved in the matters related to them.65 However, the active citizenship discussion in Turkey differentiated itself from its Western examples in two points. First, unlike their counterparts in the Western democracies, the youth citizenship studies in Turkey do not emphasize the young people’s apathy with conventional politics such as voting in the elections, since this is not the case. In Turkey, voting rates among the voting-age population, young and old alike, are relatively high. For instance, since the beginning of the multiparty elections in 1950, the participation rate never fell to 65 percent, and in the last election, in 2007, it was 82.4 percent.66 Second, the discussions in the West emphasized the young people’s enthusiastic search for alternative political engagement such as signing petitions or being members of NGOs or a political organization, while the research in Turkey discussed ways to increase the young people’s participation into these unconventional politics. In other words, the Western research describes the existing situation, while the Turkish ones discuss a possible desirable alternative. For example, a recent study on young people aged between 18 and 25 and living in Istanbul found out that the young people, regardless of


7/12/11 6:51 AM


267

their socioeconomic background, show little interests in active politics such as clubs, organizations, or party memberships.67 In another study on political participation of 946 young people aged between 15 and 24 living in southeastern Anatolia, it seemed that nearly 72 percent of the voting-aged young people cast their vote in the 2007 elections, while only 4.4 percent were members of a political party and only 2.2 percent were involved in an NGO.68 On that point, it needs to be mentioned that active participation in politics is low not only among the young people. In fact, most Turkish people, old or young alike, show similar patterns of political participation. According to a recent Gallup poll, only 11 percent of the young people aged 15 to 24 volunteer their time, while this is 8 and 10 percent for those aged 25 to 34 and 35 to 49 respectively. The percentages of the people who voiced opinions to public officials are 13 percent for the 15 to 24 age group, 13 percent for the 25 to 34 age group, and 10 percent for the 35 to 49 age group. The percentage of young people who are actively involved in an environmental group is 12 percent, compared to 13 percent of those aged 25 to 34 and 15 percent of those aged 35 and 49.69 Apart from these differences from the Western examples, the active involvement of the Turkish young people shows a similar pattern in that the actively involved young people, like their counterparts in the West, are mostly from privileged socioeconomic backgrounds. It seems that the most disadvantaged young people, like the homeless, unemployed, school dropouts, and females, have a danger of being excluded from the active involvement process. For example, in a small-scale research on three main parties’ youth divisions, Caymaz argued that all of these young people shaped their political thoughts during the high school or university years, so these young people were educated.70 Similarly, another study conducted in Istanbul with 1,014 young people aged between 15 and 24 showed that the members of any NGOs were usually coming from high socioeconomic backgrounds, with their own bank accounts, credit cards, and home Internet facilities, though only 14 percent of the total 1,014 young people were members of such organizations.71 Indeed, a research study of the disadvantaged young people in Altındag, Ankara, found out that the young people are not involved in any NGO activity or political parties; the only political activity they have is voting in the elections.72 Indeed, it seems to be a fact that in order to encourage the most disadvantaged young people, like the unemployed, to be independent citizens, employment is almost a necessary condition.73 Moreover, research on the unemployed or socially excluded young people advised the active participation of those young people in the decision-making process in order to provide effective solutions to their problems.74 The common suggestion is critical


7/12/11 6:51 AM

268

Pınar Enneli

engagement of the all the young people in the decision-making process. As mentioned in the first part of the chapter, this is offered as a valuable alternative to the existing active participation discussions as it has the potential to involve all the young people, especially disadvantaged ones. Ironically, Boratav insists that in the twenty-first century, the state should be an “active state.” By “active state,” he meant that the state should produce if necessary, spend, regulate, determine strategic targets, and invest.75 In fact, the role of the Turkish state in terms of active citizenship might be a bit cynical. On the one hand, it encouraged young people to participate, probably under the influence of the European Union accession talks. For instance, citizenship education is introduced in the eighth and final years of the compulsory curriculum for 14-year-old students to increase awareness and participation of young people in political affairs.76 The National Education Ministry advises teachers to make the students conscious of their rights, respect other people’s rights, and at the same time protect those rights.77 On the other hand, the state has punished harshly any sign of young people’s involvements. In December 2010, a group of university students protested PM Erdogan’s meeting with the university chancellors in Istanbul. It seemed a peaceful demonstration until the police intervention. In this incident, several students were seriously injured.78 Then, these students were criticized very harshly by top government officials, including the prime minister himself. The prime minister called the students unwanted and uninvited guests, while his deputy called the students militants.79 In the same month, a university chancellor threatened the protesting students, who declared themselves as guardians of the republic inspired by Atatürk as mentioned in the previous part, to throw them out of the university. He told the students that he did not order them to defend the Republic.80 Dogan argued that the police’s heavy actions were based on an antidemocratic 1983 law that regulates demonstrations and marches. This law has not been changed since then. According to Dogan, since that date 27 so-called democratic governments have done nothing to change this law, since they need this antidemocratic law to keep the young people under control.81 In a sense, the existing government seems to want a controlled involvement of the young people like the ones in the famous Gulen movement. According to Aras and Caha, Gulen has sympathizers ranging from between 200,000 and 4 million people (known as Fethullahcilar or “the followers of Fethullah”).82 This movement owns and runs about 100 schools in Turkey, and conservative values are taught there.83 The young people in these schools are taught to respect to their families, their nation, and humanity.84 Besides, the state as a complementary and important part of the citizenship should actively engage in this process through comprehensive legislation,


7/12/11 6:51 AM


269

initiatives, and so forth, in order to be inclusive of all people regardless of their backgrounds, and the state should provide a democratic environment in order to create a safe environment for all citizens to express themselves and talk about their problems freely. On the contrary, the state’s policies since the beginning of the neoliberal policies in the 1980s have not been encouraging to this condition. According to Cam, in order to develop and maintain a neoliberal market economy in Turkey since the 1980s, the democratic rights of large segments of the population, especially poor people, have been restricted. In that sense, the “democracy campaign” of various elites, including businesspeople, for EU accession since 2002 has been obscured by their growing dependency on oppressive practices towards the working class.85 As a result, it is obvious that there is a difference between the policymakers and the theorists on the meaning of active citizenship. The state wants the young people to be involved in politics without critically challenging the existing structure, while the theorists promote a critical involvement of the young people with various backgrounds. Moreover, the privileged socioeconomic backgrounds of the actively involved young people might be interpreted as the continuation of the basic characteristics of the young people’s citizenship from the Republican era to the present day. As mentioned at the previous part, politics seemed to be for the educated young people, except during the second phase of youth citizenship. In that period, the young people’s engagements into politics were discouraged regardless of their backgrounds. In a sense, this final phase of youth citizenship, namely active citizenship, looks like a combination of the previous two. Like the first phase, the educated young people are in politics, though with small numbers, and like the second phase, the state seems not very encouraging of young people’s involvement in politics.

Concluding Remarks: Young People’s Struggle with Citizenship: Actively Involved in Preserving or Challenging the Political System? When the Turkish Republic was born, the educated young people were given the mission of preserving the Republic and enlightening the ordinary people, young and old alike, with the ideals of the young state. On the other hand, at least in the mind of the Republican elite, the young people were not supposed to challenge the existing system or to introduce alternatives. Yet the young people took the mission seriously, especially in the 1960s and the 1970s, when they started to take radical positions both on the right and the left of the political spectrum to alter the republican state in the way which they thought


7/12/11 6:51 AM

270

Pınar Enneli

best for the future of the country. In the chapter, we called these years a first phase of young citizens in Turkey. By the 1980 military intervention, the young people’s citizenship discussions entered into a second phase. In this period, the state wanted the young people away from any political activities and referred to the previous young generation as terrorists. There is one common characteristic of these two eras. In both periods, the young people were educated and reached the age of 18 and were legally recognized adults. So they are not young people accepted as citizens; rather they are young citizens. In this respect, the final period starting in the 2000s seems to be radically different, at least on the surface. In this period, the policymakers started to talk about active involvement of all the young people, regardless of their age and their educational status, in politics as citizens. For the first time, the state seems to be ready to hear the voices of the young people from various backgrounds. But in reality the privileged ones are required to be obedient and not challenge the system, while the rest of the young people, especially disadvantaged ones, are excluded from the political sphere. Of course, it is a respectable attempt to include the young people in citizenship ideals one way or another. In that sense, active involvement should not be thrown away prematurely from the table. On the contrary, all the young people from various socioeconomic backgrounds should be encouraged to make meaningful contributions to the social policies as active citizens. They need to be a part of the solution and need to feel that their contributions are appreciated. On the other hand, it is important that we recognize young people as a diverse group with different needs and interests, and realize that they are not only in the process of making the transition to “adult citizen” but also have a lived experience of citizenship that shapes their feelings of belonging and membership in the society. So there should be substantial policies developed to promote the inclusion of different young people and increase their participation as active citizens if the political system wants to reach out more successfully to these groups. As a result, without addressing all these questions, active citizenship will be a privileged right for some young people within the safe water of conformism and an exclusionary mechanism for others. Notes 1. Nicola Ansell, Children, Youth and Development (London: Routledge, 2005), 8–36. 2. Pinar Enneli, “Türkiye’de Toplumsal Bir Kategori Olarak Yoksul Gençlik,” Antropoloji 23 (2010): 41–67.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


271

3. T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950), 25. 4. Samantha Ratnam, “The Globalisation of Citizenship: Exploring the Relevance of ‘Citizenship’ for Young People,” in Learning Democracy by Doing: Alternative Practices in Citizenship Education and Participatory Democracy, edited by Katherine Daly, Daniel Schugurensky, and Krista Lopes (Toronto: Transformative Learning Centre, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, 2009), 749–59. 5. Cynthia B. Lloyd, Growing Up Global: The Changing Transition to Adulthood in Developing Countries (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2005), 17–31. 6. Lloyd, Growing Up Global, 346–415. 7. Herwig Reiter and Gary Craig, “Youth in the Labour Market: Citizenship or Exclusion?” in Young People in Europe: Labour Market and Citizenship, edited by Harriet Bradley and Jacques van Hoof (Bristol: Policy Press, 2005), 15–39. 8. Lloyd, Growing Up Global, 265–66; Harriet Bradley and Ranji Devadason, “Fractured Transitions: Young Adults’ Pathways into Contemporary Labour Markets,” Sociology 42, no. 1 (2008): 119–36. 9. Jan Carle and Torild Hammer, “Activation or Alienation: Youth Unemployment within Different European Welfare Communities,” in Young People in Europe: Labour Market and Citizenship, edited by Harriet Bradley and Jacques van Hoof (Bristol: Policy Press, 2005), 161–81. 10. Jacques van Hoff, “Vocational Education and the Integration of Young People in the Labour Market: The case of the Netherlands” in Young People in Europe: Labour Market and Citizenship, edited by Harriet Bradley and Jacques van Hoof (Bristol: Policy Press, 2005), 185–204. 11. For a detailed historical overview of citizenship discussions in relation to young people, please see Tom Hall, Howard Williamson, and Amanda Coffey, “Conceptualizing Citizenship: Young People and the Transition to Adulthood,” Journal of Education Policy 13, no. 3 (1998): 301–15. 12. Megan Conway, “Students, Bricks, and Mortar: Examining the Interrelationships,” in Learning Democracy by Doing: Alternative Practices in Citizenship Education and Participatory Democracy, edited by Katherine Daly, Daniel Schugurensky, and Krista Lopes (Toronto: Transformative Learning Centre, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, 2009), 153. 13. Noel Smith, Ruth Lister, Sue Middleton, and Lynne Cox, “Young People as Real Citizens: Towards an Inclusionary Understanding of Citizenship,” Journal of Youth Studies 8, no. 4 (December 2005): 441. 14. Gert Biesta, Robert Lawy, and Narcie Kelly, “Understanding Young People’s Citizenship Learning in Everyday Life: The Role of Contexts, Relationships and Dispositions,” Education, Citizenship and Social Justice 4, no. 5 (2009): 5–24. 15. Kirsten Holmes, “Contemporary Policy Debates Volunteering, Citizenship and Social Capital: A Review of UK Government Policy,” Journal of Policy Research in Tourism, Leisure and Events 1, no. 3 (November 2009): 265–69. 16. Tom Hall, Howard Williamson, and Amanda Coffey, “Conceptualizing Citizenship,” 308.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

272

Pınar Enneli

17. Tommi Hoikkala, “The Diversity of Youth Citizenships in the European Union,” Young 17, no. 5 (2009): 5–24. 18. Tommi Hoikkala, “The Diversity of Youth Citizenships,” 16. 19. Jonathan Tonge and Andrew Mycock, “Citizenship and Political Engagement among Young People: The Workings and Findings of the Youth Citizenship Commission,” Parliamentary Affairs 8 (December 2009): 1–19. 20. Rebecca Janzen, “If I Were President: Using Popular Education as a Tool for Building a Democratic Society,” in Learning Democracy by Doing: Alternative Practices in Citizenship Education and Participatory Democracy, edited by Katherine Daly, Daniel Schugurensky, and Krista Lopes (Toronto: Transformative Learning Centre, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, 2009), 404. 21. For the theoretical and historical evaluation of citizenship in the modern context, please see Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner, “Investigating Citizenship: An Agenda for Citizenship Studies,” Citizenship Studies 11, no. 1 (February 2007): 5–17. 22. Michael Marinetto, “Who Wants To Be an Active Citizen? The Politics and Practice of Community Involvement,” Sociology 37 (2003): 110. 23. For detailed information on the application of active citizenship policies in Britain, please see Michael Marinetto, “Active Citizen,” 103–120. 24. Anne Phillips, “Citizensip and Feminist Theory,” in Citizenship, edited by Geoff Andrews (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1991), 77. 25. Anne Phillips, “Citizenship,” 77. 26. Russell J. Dalton, “Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation,” Political Studies 56 (2008): 88. 27. Thea Renda Abu El-Haj, “Becoming Citizens in an Era of Globalization and Transnational Migration: Re-Imagining Citizenship as Critical Practice,” Theory Into Practice 48, no. 4 (2009): 275. 28. Thea Renda Abu El-Haj, “Becoming Citizens,” 281. 29. Michelle Blanchard, Atari Metcalf, and Dr. Jane Burns, Bridging the Digital Divide: Young People’s Perspectives on Taking Action, Research Report Number 2, October 2008. Research conducted by the Inspire Foundation and ORYGEN Youth Health Research Centre. 30. Jan Carle and Torild Hammer, “Activation or Alienation,” 178. 31. United Nations, World Youth Report 2007, 245. 32. Sofie Mariën, Marc Hooghe, and Ellen Quintelier, “Inequalities in NonInstitutionalized Forms of Political Participation: A Multilevel Analysis for 26 Countries,” Political Studies (2009): 1–12. 33. Sofie Mariën, Marc Hooghe, and Ellen Quintelier, “Inequalities,” 9. 34. www.turkiyecumhuriyetidevleti.com/ (accessed December 30, 2010). 35. Serif Mardin, “Youth and Violence in Turkey,” European Journal of Sociology 19 (1978): 229–54. 36. Leyla Neyzi, “Object or Subject? The Paradox of ‘Youth’ in Turkey,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 33 (2001): 416–18. 37. Leyla Neyzi, “The Paradox of ‘Youth,’” 419.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


273

38. Bilgi Portal, “1980 Darbesi,” Eski İşçi Demokrasisi no. 8 (September 1998), www.bilgiportal.com/v1/idx/54/1779/Tarih/makale/1980-Darbesi.html (accessed January 2, 2011). 39. Ertugrul Mavioglu, Apoletli Adalet: Bir 12 Eylül Hesaplaşması II (Istanbul: Babil Yayınları, 2005), 22. 40. Ayça Alemdaroğlu, “Bir ‘İmkan’ Olarak Gençlik,” Birikim 196 (August 2005): 23. 41. Sabri Sayari, “Generational Changes in Terrorist Movements: The Turkish Case,” Rand Paper Series (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1985), 10. www .rand.org/pubs/papers/2005/P7124.pdf (accessed December 30, 2010). 42. Sayari, “Terrorist Movements: The Turkish Case,” 11. 43. Sayari, “Terrorist Movements: The Turkish Case,” 12–15. 44. Leyla Neyzi, “The Paradox of ‘Youth,’” 421. 45. “Manisalı Gençler: Eylem Yapmadık; Türkü Söyledik,” Hurriyet, October 27, 1997, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=-275650 (accessed December 29, 2010). 46. “Manisalı Gençler Davası Yeniden,” Hürriyet, July 19,2001, http://hurarsiv .hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=5032 (accessed December 29, 2010). 47. “Manisalı Gençler AIHM’den 295 Milyar Tazminat Aldı,” Hürriyet, February 9, 2002, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=53500 (accessed December 29, 2010). 48. Bilgi Portal, “1980 Darbesi.” 49. Birol Caymaz, “Siyasi Partilerin Gençlik Kolları,” in Türkiye’de Gençlik Çalışması ve Politikaları, edited by Nurhan Yentürk, Yörük Kurtaran, and Gülesin Nemutlu (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008), 301. 50. Leyla Neyzi, “The Paradox of ‘Youth,’” 420. 51. Samet İnanır, “Bildiğimiz Gençliğin Sonu,” Birikim 196 (August 2005): 43. 52. Hamza Aktan, “Olmaya ‘Gençlik’ Cihanda,” Birikim 196 (August 2005): 54. 53. G. Demet Lüküslü, “Günümüz Türkiye Gençliği: Ne Kayıp Bir Kuşak Ne de Ülkenin Aydınlık Geleceği,” in Türkiye’de Gençlik Çalışması ve Politikaları, edited by Nurhan Yentürk, Yörük Kurtaran, and Gülesin Nemutlu (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008), 293–95. 54. Sofia Laine and Anu Gretschel, “The EU Youth Policy from Their Own Points of View: Case of the EU Presidency Youth—Whose Arena Is the EU Youth Policy?: Young Participants’ Involvement and Influence in Event in Hyvinkää, Finland,” Young 17 (2009): 191–215. 55. Portal on EU Funding 2007–2013, “Youth in Action,” www.2007-2013.eu/ by_scope_youth.php (accessed January 6, 2011). 56. United Nations, World Youth Report 2007: Young People’s Transition to Adulthood: Progress and Challenges (New York: United Nations, 2007), 245. 57. Simten Coşar and Metin Yeğenoğlu, “The Neoliberal Restructuring of Turkey’s Social Security System,” Monthly Review (April 2009), www.monthlyreview .org/090420-cosar-yegenoglu.php#fn7b. 58. United Nations Development Program, “International Human Development Indicators, Turkey,” http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TUR.html.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

274

Pınar Enneli

59. TUIK, Belirtilen Eğitim Düzeyi, Cinsiyet ve Yaş Grubuna Göre Nüfus (2009), http://report.tuik.gov.tr/reports/rwservlet?adnksdb2=&report=turkiye_cinsiyet_ yasgrp_egitim_top.RDF&p_xkod=egitim_kod&p_yil=2009&p_dil=1&desformat= pdf&ENVID=adnksdb2Env (accessed January 10, 2010). 60. TUIK, Eğitim Durumuna Göre İşsizler-Türkiye (2009), http://tuikrapor .tuik.gov.tr/reports/rwservlet?isgucudb2=&ENVID=isgucudb2Env&report=is siz_web_tur_top_2000_x.RDF&desformat=pdf&p_tur=1&p_kod=2&p_yas=15&p_ yas1=24&p_x=egitim&p_x0=0&p_x1=1&p_x2=2&p_x3=3&p_x4=4&p_x5=5&p_ x6=6&p_x7=7&p_x8=8&p_x9=9&p_x10=10&p_x11=11&p_x12=12&p_ x13=13&p_x14=14&p_YIL1E=2009 (accessed January 10, 2010). 61. United Nations Development Program, Türkiye 2008 İnsani Gelişme Raporu: Türkiye’de Gençlik (UNDP, 2008), 16, www.undp.org.tr/publicationsdocuments/ NHDR_tr.pdf (accessed January 10, 2011). 62. TUIK, Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumuna Kayıtlılık Durumuna Göre Istihdam Edilenler-2009. tuikrapor.tuik.gov.tr/reports/rwservlet?isgucudb2=&ENVID =isgucudb2Env&report=ist_web_tur_top_2000_x.RDF&desformat=pdf&p_ tur=1&p_kod=2&p_yas=15&p_yas1=999&p_x=kendi_kayitli_kod&p_x0=0&p_ x1=1&p_x2=2&p_x3=3&p_x4=4&p_x5=5&p_x6=6&p_x7=7&p_x8=8&p_ x9=9&p_x10=10&p_x11=11&p_x12=12&p_x13=13&p_x14=14&p_YIL1E=2009 (accessed January 10, 2011). 63. TUIK, Belirtilen Eğitim Düzeyi. 64. Gülesin Nemutlu and Yörük Kurtaran, “Gençlik Çalışmaları Temelinde Gençlik Politikaları Önerileri,” in Türkiye’de Gençlik Çalışması ve Politikaları, edited by Nurhan Yentürk, Yörük Kurtaran, and Gülesin Nemutlu (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008), 21–45. 65. Gülesin Nemutlu, “Gençlik Çalışması Özne-Özel Sınıflandırma Modeli,” in Türkiye’de Gençlik Çalışması ve Politikaları, edited by Nurhan Yentürk, Yörük Kurtaran, and Gülesin Nemutlu (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008), 83–101. 66. Turkish Statistical Institute, “Number of Registered Voters and Actual Voters by the Election Year, 1950–2007,” www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTabloArama.do. 67. Nevin Yurdsever Ateş, “İstanbul Gençliğinin Siyasal Değerleri,” in İstanbul Gençliği: Gençlik Değerleri Araştırması, edited by Gülten Kazgan (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006), 85–151. 68. Caner Özdemir, “Youth Political Participation in South-Eastern Anatolia Region of Turkey,” www.social-policy.org.uk/lincoln/Ozdemir.pdf, 16. 69. Gallup, World View 2010, http://worldview.gallup.com/default.aspx. 70. Birol Caymaz, “Siyasi Partilerin Gençlik Kolları,” 305. 71. Nurhan Yentürk, Yörük Kurtaran, Şaylan Uran, Laden Yurttagüler, Alper Akyüz, and Gülesin Nemutlu, “İstanbul Gençliği: STK Üyeliği Bir Fark Yaratıyor mu?” in Türkiye’de Gençlik Çalışması ve Politikaları, edited by Nurhan Yentürk, Yörük Kurtaran, and Gülesin Nemutlu (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008), 331–43. 72. Pınar Enneli, Rasim Özgür Dönmez, Çağlar Enneli, Sibel Kalaycioğlu, Ayşe Kaya, and Sinem Teber, “Metropollerde Yaşayan Dezavantajlı Gençliğin Yetişkinliğe Geçiş Süreci: Sorun Ya da Çözümün Parçası Olmak,” unpublished research report, TUBITAK Project No. 107K456, 2010.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


275

73. Sibel Kalaycıoğlu and Kezban Çelik, “Genç İnsanın Vatandaş Olma ve Tanınma Hakkı,” İnsan Hakları Yıllığı 26 (2008): 41–57. 74. For detailed discussions of the policy suggestions for the excluded young people, please see Laden Yurttagüler, “Sosyal Dışlama ve Gençlik,” in Türkiye’de Gençlik Çalışması ve Politikaları, edited by Nurhan Yentürk, Yörük Kurtaran, and Gülesin Nemutlu (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008), 379–99; Pinar Enneli and Ayşe Kaya, “Exclusion and Education of Disadvantaged Young People: The Case of Turkish Disadvantaged Young People,” International Journal of Diversity in Organizations, Communities and Nations 10, no. 3 (2010): 205–18; UNDP, Türkiye 2008 İnsani Gelişme Raporu. 75. Korkut Boratav, “Aktif Devlet, Gerekiyorsa Üreten, Harcayan, Denetleyen ve Stratejik Hedefleri Olması Gereken Yatırımcı Bir Devlettir,” İşletme ve Finans no. 106 (January 1995): 5, http://bütün makalenin sayfası 4–9, www.iif.com.tr/index.php/ iif/article/download/iif.1995.106.0896/4403. 76. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, “Vatandaşlik Ve Demokrasi Eğitimi Dersi Pilot Uygulamasi,” Talim ve Terbiye Kurulu Başkanlığı, 2010, http://ttkb.meb.gov.tr/ vatandaslikvedemokrasi/vatandaslikvedemokrasi.htm. 77. http://ttkb.meb.gov.tr/indir/ttkb/programlar/ozegok/VatandaslikInsanHaklari .pdf, (accessed January 10, 2010), 164. 78. Durmuş Sevíndík and Gürkay Gündogan, “Silah Tutmuyoruz Koyun da Değiliz,” Hürriyet, December 11, 2010, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew .aspx?id=16506164 (accessed January 10, 2011). 79. Turan Türenç, “Demokratik Bir Ülkede Yer Yerinden Oynardı,” Hurriyet, December 8, 2010, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16477558 (accessed January 10, 2011). 80. Mehmed Hakkı Özbayır and İlker Kılıçaslan, “Rektörle Öğrenciler Arasında Tartışma,” Hürriyet, December 24, 2010, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ ShowNew.aspx?id=16609235 (accessed January 10, 2011). 81. Yalçın Doğan, “Öğrenci Olaylarında İki Erdoğan,” Hürriyet, December 8, 2010, http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16477560 (accessed January 10, 2011). 82. Bulent Aras and Omer Caha, “Fethullah Gulen and His Liberal ‘Turkish Islam’ Movement,” Middle East Review of International Affairs 4, no. 4 (December 2000): 33, 12. 83. Bulent Aras and Omer Caha, “Fethullah Gulen,” 34. 84. Serif Ali Tekalan, “A Movement of Volunteers,” 3. 85. Surhan Cam, Institutional Oppression and Neo-Liberalism in Turkey, Cardiff University, School of Social Sciences, working paper 81, 2006, www.cardiff.ac.uk/ socsi/resources/wrkgpaper-81.pdf.

Bibliography Aktan, Hamza. “Olmaya ‘Gençlik’ Cihanda.” Birikim 196 (August 2005): 52–54. Alemdaroğlu, Ayça. “Bir ‘İmkan’ Olarak Gençlik.” Birikim 196 (August 2005): 21–29. Ansell, Nicola. Children, Youth and Development. London: Routledge, 2005.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

276

Pınar Enneli

Aras, Bulent, and Omer Caha. “Fethullah Gulen and His Liberal ‘Turkish Islam’ Movement.” Middle East Review of International Affairs 4, no. 4 (December 2000). http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2000/issue4/jv4n4a4.html. Ateş, Nevin Yurdsever. “İstanbul Gençliğinin Siyasal Değerleri.” In İstanbul Gençliği: Gençlik Değerleri Araştırması, edited by Gülten Kazgan, 85–151. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2006. Biesta, Gert, Robert Lawy, and Narcie Kelly. “Understanding Young People’s Citizenship Learning in Everyday Life: The Role of Contexts, Relationships and Dispositions.” Education, Citizenship and Social Justice 4, no. 5 (2009): 5–24. Bilgi Portal. “1980 Darbesi.” Eski İşçi Demokrasisi no. 8 (September 1998). www .bilgiportal.com/v1/idx/54/1779/Tarih/makale/1980-Darbesi.html (accessed January 2, 2011). Blanchard, Michelle, Atari Metcalf, and Jane Burns. Bridging the Digital Divide: Young people’s Perspectives on Taking Action. Inspire Foundation and ORYGEN Youth Health Research Center, Research Report Number 2, October 2008. unpan1 .un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan036072.pdf (accessed January 14, 2011). Boratav, Korkut. “Aktif Devlet, Gerekiyorsa Üreten, Harcayan, Denetleyen ve Stratejik Hedefleri Olması Gereken Yatırımcı Bir Devlettir.” İşletme ve Finans 106 (January 1995): 4–9. www.iif.com.tr/index.php/iif/article/download/ iif.1995.106.0896/4403 (accessed January 10, 2011). Bradley, Harriet, and Ranji Devadason. “Fractured Transitions: Young Adults’ Pathways into Contemporary Labour Markets.” Sociology 42, no. 1 (2008): 119–136. Cam, Surhan. “Institutional Oppression and Neo-Liberalism in Turkey.” Working Paper 81, Cardiff University, School of Social Sciences, 2006. www.cardiff.ac.uk/ socsi/resources/wrkgpaper-81.pdf (accessed January 10, 2011). Carle, Jan, and Torild Hammer. “Activation or Alienation: Youth Unemployment within Different European Welfare Communities.” In Young People in Europe: Labour Market and Citizenship, edited by Harriet Bradley and Jacques van Hoof, 161–81. Bristol: Policy Press, 2005. Caymaz, Birol. “Siyasi Partilerin Gençlik Kolları.” In Türkiye’de Gençlik Çalışması ve Politikaları, edited by Nurhan Yentürk, Yörük Kurtaran, and Gülesin Nemutlu, 299–330. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008. Conway, Megan. “Students, Bricks, and Mortar: Examining the Inter-Relationships.” In Learning Democracy by Doing: Alternative Practices in Citizenship Education and Participatory Democracy, edited by Katherine Daly, Daniel Schugurensky, and Krista Lopes, 147–56. Toronto: Transformative Learning Centre, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, 2009. http://legacy.oise.utoronto.ca/ research/tlcentre/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/ldd-proceedings-master -document-23-july-09.pdf (accessed January 14, 2011). Coşar, Simten, and Metin Yeğenoğlu. “The Neoliberal Restructuring of Turkey’s Social Security System.” Monthly Review (April 2009). www.monthlyreview .org/090420-cosar-yegenoglu.php#fn7b (accessed January 10, 2011). Dalton, Russell J. “Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation.” Political Studies 56 (2008): 76–98.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


277

Doğan, Yalçın. “Öğrenci Olaylarında İki Erdoğan.” Hürriyet, December 8, 2010. http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16477560 (accessed January 10, 2011). El-Haj, Thea Renda Abu. “Becoming Citizens in an Era of Globalization and Transnational Migration: Re-Imagining Citizenship as Critical Practice.” Theory Into Practice 48, no. 4 (2009): 274–82. Enneli Pinar. “Türkiye’de Toplumsal Bir Kategori Olarak Yoksul Gençlik.” Antropoloji 23 (2010): 41–67. Enneli, Pinar, and Ayşe Kaya. “Exclusion and Education of Disadvantaged Young People: The Case of Turkish Disadvantaged Young People.” International Journal of Diversity in Organizations, Communities and Nations 10, no. 3 (2010): 205–18. Enneli, Pınar, Rasim Özgür Dönmez, Çağlar Enneli, Sibel Kalaycioğlu, Ayşe Kaya, and Sinem Teber. “Metropollerde Yaşayan Dezavantajlı Gençliğin Yetişkinliğe Geçiş Süreci: Sorun Ya da Çözümün Parçası Olmak.” Unpublished research report, TUBITAK Project No. 107K456, 2010. Gallup. “World View 2010.” 2010. http://worldview.gallup.com/default.aspx (accessed January 10, 2011). Hall, Tom, Howard Williamson, and Amanda Coffey. “Conceptualizing Citizenship: Young People and the Transition to Adulthood.” Journal of Education Policy 13, no. 3 (1998): 301–15. van Hoof, Jacques. “Vocational Education and the Integration of Young People in the Labour Market: The Case of the Netherlands.” In Young People in Europe: Labour Market and Citizenship, edited by Harriet Bradley and Jacques van Hoof, 185–204. Bristol: Policy Press, 2005. Hoikkala, Tommi. “The Diversity of Youth Citizenships in the European Union.” Young 17, no. 5 (2009): 5–24. Holmes, Kirsten. “Contemporary Policy Debates Volunteering, Citizenship and Social Capital: A Review of UK Government Policy.” Journal of Policy Research in Tourism, Leisure and Events 1, no. 3 (November 2009): 265–69. Hurriyet. “Manisalı Gençler AIHM’den 295 Milyar Tazminat Aldı.” February 9, 2002. http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=53500 (accessed December 29, 2010). ———. “Manisalı Gençler Davası Yeniden.” July 19, 2001. http://hurarsiv.hurriyet .com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=5032 (accessed December 29, 2010). ———. “Manisalı Gençler: Eylem Yapmadık; Türkü Söyledik.” October 27, 1997. http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=-275650 (accessed December 29, 2010). İnanır, Samet. “Bildiğimiz Gençliğin Sonu.” Birikim 196 (August 2005): 37–51. Isin, Engin F., and Bryan S. Turner. “Investigating Citizenship: An Agenda for Citizenship Studies.” Citizenship Studies 11, no. 1 (February 2007): 5–17. Janzen, Rebecca. “If I Were President: Using Popular Education as a Tool for Building a Democratic Society.” In Learning Democracy by Doing: Alternative Practices in Citizenship Education and Participatory Democracy, edited by Katherine Daly, Daniel Schugurensky, and Krista Lopes, 400–407. Toronto: Transformative Learning Centre, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, 2009. http://


7/12/11 6:51 AM

278

Pınar Enneli

legacy.oise.utoronto.ca/research/tlcentre/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/ ldd-proceedings-master-document-23-july-09.pdf (accessed January 14, 2011). Kalaycıoğlu, Sibel, and Kezban Çelik. “Genç İnsanın Vatandaş Olma ve Tanınma Hakkı.” İnsan Hakları Yıllığı 26 (2008): 41–57. Laine, Sofia, and Anu Gretschel. “The EU Youth Policy from Their Own Points of View: Case of the EU Presidency Youth—Whose Arena Is the EU Youth Policy? Young Participants’ Involvement and Influence in Event in Hyvinkää, Finland.” Young 17, (2009): 191–215. Lloyd, Cynthia B. Growing Up Global: The Changing Transition to Adulthood in Developing Countries. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2005. Lüküslü, G. Demet. “Günümüz Türkiye Gençliği: Ne Kayıp Bir Kuşak Ne de Ülkenin Aydınlık Geleceği.” In Türkiye’de Gençlik Çalışması ve Politikaları, edited by Nurhan Yentürk, Yörük Kurtaran, and Gülesin Nemutlu, 287–97. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008. Mardin, Serif. “Youth and Violence in Turkey.” European Journal of Sociology 19 (1978): 229–54. Mariën, Sofie, Marc Hooghe, and Ellen Quintelier. “Inequalities in Non-Institutionalized Forms of Political Participation: A Multilevel Analysis for 26 Countries.” Political Studies (2009): 1–12. Marinetto, Michael. “Who Wants To Be an Active Citizen? The Politics and Practice of Community Involvement.” Sociology 37 (2003): 103–120. Marshall, T. H. Citizenship and Social Class and Other Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950. Mavioglu, Ertugrul. Apoletli Adalet: Bir 12 Eylül Hesaplaşması II. Istanbul: Babil Yayınları, 2005. Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı. “Vatandaşlik Ve Demokrasi Eğitimi Dersi Pilot Uygulamasi.” Talim ve Terbiye Kurulu Başkanlığı, 2010. http://ttkb.meb.gov.tr/vatandaslikve demokrasi/vatandaslikvedemokrasi.htm (accessed January 10, 2011). Nemutlu, Gülesin. “Gençlik Çalışması Özne-Özel Sınıflandırma Modeli.” In Türkiye’de Gençlik Çalışması ve Politikaları, edited by Nurhan Yentürk, Yörük Kurtaran, and Gülesin Nemutlu 83–101. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008. Nemutlu, Gülesin, and Yörük Kurtaran. “Gençlik Çalışmaları Temelinde Gençlik Politikaları Önerileri.” In Türkiye’de Gençlik Çalışması ve Politikaları, edited by Nurhan Yentürk, Yörük Kurtaran, and Gülesin Nemutlu, 21–45. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008. Neyzi, Leyla. “Object or Subject? The Paradox of ‘Youth’ in Turkey.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 33 (2001): 416–18. Özbayır, Mehmed Hakkı, and İlker Kılıçaslan. “Rektörle Öğrenciler Arasında Tartışma.” Hürriyet, December 24, 2010. http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/Show New.aspx?id=16609235 (accessed January 10, 2011). Özdemir, Caner. “Youth Political Participation in South-Eastern Anatolia Region of Turkey.” Paper presented at Social Policy Association Conference, University of Lincoln, July 2010. www.social-policy.org.uk/lincoln/Ozdemir.pdf (accessed January 10, 2011).


7/12/11 6:51 AM


279

Phillips, Anne. “Citizensip and Feminist Theory.” In Citizenship, edited by Geoff Andrews, 76–88. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1991. Portal on EU Funding. “2007–2013 Youth in Action.” www.2007-2013.eu/by_ scope_youth.php (accessed January 6, 2011). Ratnam, Samantha. “The Globalisation of Citizenship: Exploring the Relevance of ‘Citizenship’ for Young People.” In Learning Democracy by Doing: Alternative Practices in Citizenship Education and Participatory Democracy, edited by Katherine Daly, Daniel Schugurensky, and Krista Lopes, 749–59. Toronto: Transformative Learning Centre, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, 2009. http://legacy.oise.utoronto.ca/research/tlcentre/wordpress/wp -content/uploads/2009/07/ldd-proceedings-master-document-23-july-09.pdf (accessed January 14, 2011). Reiter, Herwig, and Gary Craig. “Youth in the Labour Market: Citizenship or Exclusion?” In Young People in Europe: Labour Market and Citizenship, edited by Harriet Bradley and Jacques van Hoof, 15–39. Bristol: Policy Press, 2005. Sayari, Sabri. “Generational Changes in Terrorist Movements: The Turkish Case.” Rand Paper Series. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1985. www.rand.org/ pubs/papers/2005/P7124.pdf (accessed December 30, 2010). Sevindik, Durmuş, and Gürkay Gündogan. “Silah Tutmuyoruz Koyun da Değiliz.” Hürriyet, December 11, 2010. http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew .aspx?id=16506164 (accessed January 10, 2011). Smith, Noel, Ruth Lister, Sue Middleton, and Lynne Cox. “Young People as Real Citizens: Towards an Inclusionary Understanding of Citizenship.” Journal of Youth Studies 8, no. 4 (December 2005): 425–43. Tekalan, Serif Ali. “A Movement of Volunteers: Islam in the Contemporary World: The Fethullah Gulen Movement in Thought and Practice.” Houston, TX: Rice University (2005): 1–9. http://gulenconference.net/files/Rice/SATekalan.pdf (accessed Jan 14, 2011). Tonge, Jonathan, and Andrew Mycock. “Citizenship and Political Engagement among Young People: The Workings and Findings of the Youth Citizenship Commission.” Parliamentary Affairs 8 (December 2009): 1–19. TUIK. “Belirtilen Eğitim Düzeyi, Cinsiyet ve Yaş Grubuna Göre Nüfus.” 2009. http:// report.tuik.gov.tr/reports/rwservlet?adnksdb2=&report=turkiye_cinsiyet_yasgrp_ egitim_top.RDF&p_xkod=egitim_kod&p_yil=2009&p_dil=1&desformat=pdf& ENVID=adnksdb2Env (accessed January 10, 2011). ———. “Eğitim Durumuna Göre İşsizler-Türkiye.” 2009. http://tuikrapor.tuik .gov.tr/reports/rwservlet?isgucudb2=&ENVID=isgucudb2Env&report=is siz_web_tur_top_2000_x.RDF&desformat=pdf&p_tur=1&p_kod=2&p_ yas=15&p_yas1=24&p_x=egitim&p_x0=0&p_x1=1&p_x2=2&p_x3=3&p_ x4=4&p_x5=5&p_x6=6&p_x7=7&p_x8=8&p_x9=9&p_x10=10&p_x11=11&p_ x12=12&p_x13=13&p_x14=14&p_YIL1E=2009 (accessed January 10, 2011). ———. “Number of Registered Voters and Actual Voters by the Election Year, 1950–2007.” www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTabloArama.do (accessed January 10, 2011). ———. “Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumuna Kayıtlılık Durumuna Göre Istihdam Edilenler.” 2009. http://tuikrapor.tuik.gov.tr/reports/rwservlet?isgucudb2=&ENVID=isg


7/12/11 6:51 AM

280

Pınar Enneli

ucudb2Env&report=ist_web_tur_top_2000_x.RDF&desformat=pdf&p_tur=1&p_ kod=2&p_yas=15&p_yas1=999&p_x=kendi_kayitli_kod&p_x0=0&p_x1=1&p_ x2=2&p_x3=3&p_x4=4&p_x5=5&p_x6=6&p_x7=7&p_x8=8&p_x9=9&p_ x10=10&p_x11=11&p_x12=12&p_x13=13&p_x14=14&p_YIL1E=2009 (accessed January 10, 2011). Turenç, Turan. “Demokratik Bir Ülkede Yer Yerinden Oynardı.” Hurriyet, December 8, 2010. http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=16477558 (accessed January 10, 2011). United Nations. World Youth Report 2007: Young People’s Transition to Adulthood: Progress and Challenges. New York: United Nations, 2007. United Nations Development Program. “International Human Development Indicators, Turkey.” 2010. http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TUR.html (accessed January 10, 2011). ———. “Türkiye 2008 İnsani Gelişme Raporu: Türkiye’de Gençlik.” 2008. www .undp.org.tr/publicationsdocuments/NHDR_tr.pdf (accessed January 10, 2011). www.turkiyecumhuriyetidevleti.com/ (accessed December 30, 2010). Yentürk, Nurhan, Yörük Kurtaran, Şaylan Uran, Laden Yurttagüler, Alper Akyüz, and Gülesin Nemutlu. “İstanbul Gençliği: STK Üyeliği Bir Fark Yaratıyor mu?” In Türkiye’de Gençlik Çalışması ve Politikaları, edited by Nurhan Yentürk, Yörük Kurtaran, and Gülesin Nemutlu, 331–43. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008. Yurttagüler, Laden. “Sosyal Dışlama ve Gençlik.” In Türkiye’de Gençlik Çalışması ve Politikaları, edited by Nurhan Yentürk, Yörük Kurtaran, and Gülesin Nemutlu, 379–99. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2008.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

12 Environmental Citizenship and Struggle for Nature Feryal Turan

I

has often been defined by membership in a given political community and often conceived in narrow terms of national territory and the corresponding entitlements and obligations. However, since the 1990s, citizenship has been fundamentally redefined in terms of some different rights and obligations. New sets of human rights (e.g., clean air and water and access to them) and duties (e.g., one’s consumption habits) have been taken into consideration. While classic liberalism focuses on democratic participation, environmentalists have broadened the concept to include future generations and other species. It can be argued that neoliberal policy aims to reduce the costs of environmental regulation and increase the flexibility of capital to appropriate labor and natural resources in the most profitable way for capital. In this way, tension or conflict between social rights of citizenship and private property rights of owners occurs. In other words, the rights of citizens to clean air, water, and other elements of nature are subject to conflicts. The discussion has brought out the importance of ecological citizenship. What is more, by definition, environmental citizenship requires the active participation of citizens for sustainable development. Participatory democracy, decentralization, and social justice can be accepted as essential component for sustainable development.1 Based on these discussions and tensions, this chapter examines the case of a conflict over hydroelectric development projects in Turkey. The construction of dams is accepted as the state policy in Turkey, and many large- and small-scale dams have been built in various places in the country after the 1950s. In recent years, hydro power plants (HPPs) have started to be built in T IS KNOWN THAT CITIZENSHIP

— 281 —


7/12/11 6:51 AM

282

Feryal Turan

many regions of the country, mainly in the Black Sea region. The local people living in the project areas and many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have protested these projects and do not want them to be built because of the environmental and social consequences and costs of these projects. However, emphasizing the energy deficiency, the government authorities claimed that these projects would make contributions in overcoming the energy deficiency. The government authorities stated that the current water potential of Turkey was not utilized, and thus Turkey had to import more energy from abroad. This research is confined to a focus on how nature is constructed by the dominant citizenship in Turkey and seeks to find the insurgent voice of environmental citizenship in the case of dam projects. This perspective requires an analysis of relationships among the state, the NGOs, and various local people in regard to defining the rights and responsibilities of citizenship. It is in the light of these relationships that this chapter will describe how the water development project in Turkey was created, the ways in which its effects have been incorporated into public discourse and policy, and the relevant interests, defined as either hostile or supportive of the project as a whole. The arguments are based on information gathered through interviews with NGO representatives, headmen, local leaders, people in the villages, and representatives of state officials and reviews of websites, newspapers, and other documents relevant to dam policy in Turkey. Thirty-five semistructured interviews were carried out in Artvin and Erzurum during May and January 2010. Although this research relies largely on the use of secondary data sources, the field study provided an opportunity to verify information that existed in the official reports and other publications and to understand microlevel details. I also had a chance to visit some project areas many times during the last three years, and I had firsthand observation and interacted with the local people directly. The first part of the study provides a theoretical overview of environmental citizenship. The second part is descriptive and is designed to provide the background for the discussion of the hydro power plants in Turkey. The following part presents an evaluation of citizenship, resistance, justice, and struggle for nature in the case of the HPPs, and the last part of the study consists of the evaluation of all discussions.

Environmental Citizenship The concept of environmental (ecological) citizenship has attracted growing interest amongst theorists such as J. Barry, Bell, Dobson, A. Dobson and R. Eckersley, P. A. Latte, and N. Garcide.2 The concept of “environmental


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Environmental Citizenship and Struggle for Nature

283

citizenship” that has been discussed by academics tries to find a connection between environmental values and political rights and obligations. As A. Latte stated, “common concepts of environmental citizenship focus on how the environment is (or might be) included in the rights and obligations shared by citizens within existing political communities. While providing a useful starting point, this frame of reference leaves out the concepts of inclusion and recognition.”3 Van Steenbergen tries to integrate citizenship and the environment and stated that “current discussions seem to concern ‘two cultures’: one dealing with citizenship problems and the other with environmental problems, and so far these two cultures have not met. . . . I shall try to bring these two cultures together by raising the issue of the possible meaning (or, better, meanings) of ecological or environmental citizenship.”4 It is possible to distinguish two contrasting frameworks related to environmental citizenship. While the liberal model emphasizes civil, political, and social rights, the republican model focuses on the public duties, virtues, and practices of citizenship. Additionally, the liberal approach argues for extending the social rights to include such items as a clean and healthy environment.5 On the other hand, the republican tradition emphasizes virtue, duty, self-governance, and community and ecological concerns are debated in terms of the appropriate virtues and responsibilities of citizenship.6 For example, Dobson point out that “one of ecological citizenship’s most crucial contributions to contemporary theorizing is its focus on the duties and obligations that attend citizenship.”7 It can be safely said that one of the contributions of environmental citizenship to the larger body of citizenship studies is to enlarge the scope of citizen obligation and responsibilities. Based on these facts, Smith and Pangsapa pinpoint the substantial issue:8 the environmental citizenship concept challenges the basic assumptions as it brings a different dimension to the current citizenship concepts in civil citizenship, political citizenship, and social citizenship. First of all, there is a clear differentiation in the conceptualization of government and civil society (and thereby the private and public areas). It is stated that environmental citizenship is the combination of public and private areas based on a combined strategy, and therefore a change is required. Engaging in activities to preserve an ecosystem or making the government make clear decisions on the environment can be given as the activities about public areas, and this kind of activity is required for environmental citizenship. However, an environmental citizen knows that his or her private activities will have public effects, and therefore he or she is aware of the environmental effects of the energy and food consumed in his or her private life. “Each of these apparently ‘private’ decisions has public environmental implications, so environmental citizenship is a citizenship of the private sphere as well as the public sphere.”9


7/12/11 6:51 AM

284

Feryal Turan

Thus, the citizenship appears in a relationship between the citizen and the institutions (including the state) in social, political, and economic areas in certain times. According to Delanty, the citizenship is a multidimensional concept including rights, responsibilities, participation, and identity as well.10 While citizenship is a concept discussed within itself, environmental citizenship contributes to the ongoing debates in many ways. Environmental citizenship is discussed with concepts like participatory democracy, right, responsibility, and entitlement. Agyeman and Evans go further in stating that environmental citizenship should be associated with environmental justice in general, and in a wide perspective it should firstly be associated with sustainability and then with a management framework.11 As this strong tie suggests, the literature of environmental citizenship and environmental justice has some common characteristics. The natural outcome of this discussion gives rise to careful examination of the relation between socioecological exclusion and inequities. As Latta pointed out, “who is marginalized from environmental citizenship due to racism, sexism, economic inequality, arbitrary state borders, or by not yet being born? These kinds of questions explore the limitations of existing forms of citizenship to deal with ecological matter—limitations, some argue, that could be addressed by linking citizenship with social justice.”12 It is possible to say that the benefits and costs of any project are rarely distributed equally. If some groups are subject to social and environmental threats arising from pollution or any project, if some groups pay the negative social and environmental costs of any project, these costs are related to environmental justice. Environmental justice activists argue that people of color and people of low income bear a disproportionate burden of the negative impacts of any project and also claim that fundamental civil rights should include the right to a clean, healthy environment.13 That is, the concept of environmental citizenship requires a redistribution of the burdens of pollution among different groups. Another important point on this issue is that the rights and responsibilities are international. According to Dobson, “rights and responsibilities transcend national boundaries. We have seen that we all have a right to roughly equal environmental space, and a corresponding responsibility to make sure we do not occupy an unjust amount of it. These rights and responsibilities are genuinely international.”14 Based on this ongoing debate, environmental citizenship will also provide the basis for an evaluation of the relationship between the political economy of hydropower and the struggle over rights, nature, and identity in Turkey. In this regard, it is arguable that the assessment of rights has come to depend upon definitions that are only consistent with evolutionary schemes appropriate to those sectors of society whose practical interests directly depend upon the inte-


7/12/11 6:51 AM


285

gration of capitalist development. The meaning of citizenship and the way it is defined determine whose benefits will be taken into consideration. It is debated whether the rights of the excluded groups, like those local or indigenous to an area, and ecosystems besides human beings in these areas will be taken into consideration or not. It is of great importance how much the ecosystem, which is important for the future, affects the decisions and policies. If it is taken into account that the rights and responsibilities of citizenship are products of Western liberal democracy based on private ownership, what is owned and which rights are possessed are defined based on private ownership.

Background of the Study Turkey’s energy needs have been growing rapidly with its industrialization, population growth, and urbanization. However, Turkey does not have rich resources and must rely on imports for much of its energy needs. The most important factor of Turkey’s energy policy is the gap between the supply and demand. Turkey imports 60 percent of its energy needs. Energy imports will rise to 70 percent in 2010 and to 80 percent in 2020.15 The Turkish government aims to utilize all its indigenous hard coal, lignite reserves, and hydro and other renewable resources such as wind and solar energy to meet the growing demand. While the Turkish government has begun a domestic energy resource development program, it stresses the importance of hydropower. The main objective of the project is to utilize the water resources to provide cheap energy for the country in order to reduce Turkey’s energy deficit. The Electrical Power Resources Survey and Development Administration (EIE) has initialized a study for developing the unexploited part of the hydropower potential in 26 river basins in Turkey and has continued to carry on feasibility studies in the remaining 9 river basins. Therefore, exploration and production activities are also being intensified. During 2008, 16 hydroelectric power plants (354,285 MWe) were approved and 16 hydroelectric plants (327,093 MWe) were provisionally accepted, and commissioning permits were given by the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources.16 The State Hydraulic Works (DSI), which is the agency in Turkey responsible for designing and carrying out hydropower projects, has completed many water development projects and has still others under construction or in the planning stage. DSİ indicates that it plans to construct a total of 1,738 hydroelectric power plants (including the ones under construction, in planning, and in operation) in Turkey.17 HPPs are planned to be built in many places in Turkey, which has brought about various arguments. The related parties—local people, government institutions which have decided on the construction of these dams/HPPs and


7/12/11 6:51 AM

286

Feryal Turan

the non-governmental organizations have different ideas and demands. The official discourse claims that the implementation of the HPPs does not cause any significant negative social and environmental impacts. It is claimed that the project is the only viable solution to Turkey’s energy problems. In contrast to official state assertions, the NGOs and local people say that the project is causing massive ecological destruction, social misery and impoverishment and marginalization of the locals. On the whole, these arguments center on how natural resources will be used and who the decision-maker will be. The local people in Şavşat, Rize, İkizdere, Kastaomu, Burdur, etc., claim that it is them who has the right to decide on matters about the valleys, rivers that they have been living on and benefiting from for centuries while the government officials claim the right to decide on how to use these resources belongs to them. It is obvious that this will bring about new discussions and conflicts about the rights of citizens. Put it differently, the struggle over the nature are struggle over the rights, the shape of the local communities and for social and ecological justice. These discussion can be understood in terms of economic development, energy policy and political engagement in Turkey. Better understanding of the current tension requires us to get insight about its origin, in which all developments concerning the issue were set into motion. Turkey initiated neoliberal reforms in 1980 with the liberalization of trade and flexibilization of the labor markets.18 The aim of these policies, which are still in place today, was to give an active role to the private sector in promoting exports, although the new policy has not, in fact, reduced state intervention in the economy.19 In this transformation, the state plays an important role in facilitating capital accumulation on behalf of the capitalist class, which is the main beneficiary of state policy.20 This is particularly true with regard to energy development. To provide the power needed to fuel the transition to export-oriented industrialization, state investment during the period from 1980 through the1990s was mainly in hydropower plants to improve the country’s energy supply. Law No. 5346, “Utilization of Renewable Energy Resources with the Purpose of Electricity Generation,” has increased the interest of the private-sector companies and facilitated their making investments for the small-scale HPPs. Economically feasible potential could also be further developed by the potential of the small rivers and creeks through the use of small- and microscale HPPs. The recent economic meltdown and export-oriented industrialization (EOI) model of development in Turkey has come at the expense of social inequity and environmental degradation. Economic policies, including trade liberalization, fiscal restraint, and pricing stability, have bearing on social and environmental quality. They not only determine the configuration of class power, finance, credit, and technology but also the supply and use of raw materials.21


7/12/11 6:51 AM


287

Citizenship and Struggle for Nature As pointed out before, the main objective of the HPPs is to utilize the water resources to provide cheap energy for the country in order to reduce Turkey’s energy deficit. However, there are some unintended social and ecological consequences and costs of these project, such as the extinction or endangerment of species, overexploitation of water resources, landscape destruction, destruction of upstream and downstream ecosystems, and social and cultural impoverishment of local people, to name a few. While the government and state officials claim that these projects are useful and sustainable, the opponents argue that the negative costs of the projects are not taken into consideration by the government and project planners.22 Evaluation of these different arguments provides an opportunity to understand development ideology and how nature is seen as a resource for development. The main objectives of energy policy in Turkey force government to promote the production of reliable, low-cost energy and to encourage private investment. The government has tried to encourage foreign and private domestic capital investments by implementing the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), Build-Operate (BO), and Transfer of Operating Rights (TOR) models. The Minister of Energy and Natural Resource stated the government’s energy policy as follows: We adopt a policy that places emphasis on domestic resources for meeting energy needs. By mobilizing idle energy resources, we try to leave behind a picture whereby Turkey is condemned to use of imported energy in increasing amounts. Within this framework, nuclear energy has a special place for us. We are systematically developing the legal, technical and scientific infrastructure required for nuclear energy. In this framework, I am proud to inform you that significant progress is secured in our government’s activities for providing the needed energy by making more rational use of natural resources and diversifying energy production through new technologies, and ensuring use of alternative energy sources.”23

As a natural conclusion of these concerns the construction of dams was adopted as a national energy policy in Turkey. For example, President Suleyman Demirel is known as “the king of dams.” Policymakers and project planners who have devoted themselves to constructing dams and HPPs throughout the country think that hydraulic energy is clean and safe. For example, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resource explains why HPPs are preferred as follows: Among various sources of energy, hydroelectric power plants are preferred because they are environment-friendly and have a low potential risk. Hydroelectric


7/12/11 6:51 AM

288

Feryal Turan

power plants are an environment-friendly, clean, renewable, lasting and efficient domestic resource with low operational costs and no fuel cost, which is not externally dependent and also serve as a fuse for energy prices.24

The state officials, based on this national policy, began to think that development requires energy consumption and Turkey should use all its resources to ensure progress. If these natural resources are not used for energy production, it is considered that they are wasted. For example, the chairman of the Small and Medium-Scaled Enterprises Union (KOBİDER), Nurettin Özgenç, complained about the people against the energy investments on the grounds that nature is destroyed. He explained his ideas as follows: The groups protesting the increasing number of hydroelectric plants (HPPs) and dam projects in the Eastern Black Sea do not care about the flows of the rivers but the flows (benefits) towards themselves. Remember those days when we criticized the government harshly for the electricity cuts. There is a contradiction in opposing electricity production saying “Do not touch my valley, my rivers” and then being provided with heating and light through this electricity. One of the significant resources of the world is water, the other is electricity. The increase in the development of countries boost the demand for electricity and thus problems in meeting this demand emerge. All countries develop policies of their own to prevent this problem and implement them. Turkey adopted same policy to solve energy related problems.25

Local people and some NGOs have different opinion about the HPPs and their social and ecological costs. Recently the locals have been getting organized against these projects in many areas like Hopa, Tortum, İkizdere, Şavşat, and Munzur. The people come together under platforms like Derelerin Kardeşliği Platformu (“The Brotherhood of Rivers”), Su Meclisi (“Water Assembly”), Karadeniz İsyandadır (“The Black Sea Revolts”), and Antalyaİsparta-Burdur Dereleri Gönlünce Aksın (“Let the Antalya-Isparta-Burdur Rivers Flow Free”) and struggle to protect their rights. First of all, the opponents of dams and HPPs think that the ecological costs of the projects are high and they cause massive ecological destruction. Activists claim that the real and potential social and ecological costs of these HPPs include the extinction or endangerment of species, reduced flow, less fish, loss of biodiversity, reduced fish migration, lower groundwater level, landscape destruction, destruction of upstream and downstream ecosystems, loss of history, social and cultural impoverishment of local people, and displacement, to name a few. For example the opponents of dams and HPPs express the problems that will be caused by dams built on the Munzur Valley as follows:


7/12/11 6:51 AM


289

What will happen in Munzur? If the Munzur Dams Project is realized, 37.3% of the region’s annual water potential will be kept in the dam reservoirs. The Mercan, Pülümür and Munzur Valleys will turn into lakes and the climate balance of Munzur will turn upside down. In the winter it will snow less and consequently the underground water resources will not be fed and the resources will dry up. The Munzur Mountains host 1,518 known plant species. 43 of these are endemic species that can only be found in Munzur. The natural areas of these plants will change and the majority will become extinct. Curved horned mountain goat and bezoar goat, ür partridge and truite fario, which only live in the Munzur springs will become extinct. The local economy which relies on agriculture and livestock breeding will be devastated completely. More than 60 villages will be covered with water and 84 villages will have to immigrate to other places. The people of Munzur will be separated from the Munzur River and their roots which form their legends and cultures.26

For the activists, the rulers of the country give priority to the privatization of these natural resources and selling and presenting them to energy companies rather than planning the development in a way that is suitable and compatible with this wild nature. One expresses his ideas as follows: Artvin is only viewed as a “city of energy.” The prior investment strategy for Artvin is energy production. In this strategy the needs and benefits of the energy companies are prioritized and nature, sources of income, and the future are given secondary roles. In short, Artvin and Artvin’s future is ignored so that the energy companies completely settle in this area and earn more and more.27

The local activists think that they are responsible for stopping the project and leave a clean environment for future generations.28 The members of Şavşat Derelerin Kardeşliği Platformu (“Brotherhood of Şavşat Rivers Platform”) and Ardanuç Derelerin Kardeşliği Platformu (“Brotherhood of Ardanuç Rivers Platform”) state that Artvin has been accepted as one of the 25 regions under threat with its high mountains, deep valleys, old-growth forests, more than 1,500 plant species, wildlife, rivers full of trout, lakes, plateaus full of oxygen, cool water sources, four languages, and the culture of each of these, and it has to be protected. Despite this fact acknowledged in international agreements, the managers and the institutions responsible for protecting nature unfortunately do not view Artvin in this way and do not adopt a sustainable approach. Moreover, the region’s indescribable beauties, the wild nature, and the fact that it will be less affected by global warming, not polluted by industrial and chemical waste, is an invaluable asset for the local people and their future. Therefore, the protection of nature is an obligation that must be adhered to.29


7/12/11 6:51 AM

290

Feryal Turan

The arguments about HPPs are viewed as the public’s fight for “taking responsibility for their own lives” against the global powers. The locals claim that they live on that land and they have the right to use the water there. Nevertheless, others argue that “water flowing for no purpose” is not within the country’s benefits and the resources have to be exploited. As is known, water is an important resource for the locals living in these valleys. The households in the project areas rely heavily on natural resources for their subsistence. Therefore, any form of environmental degradation has an economic, social, and demographic impact on these villages. It is in response to this situation that some people from these villages brought together under some association decided to carry out actions against the degradation of ecosystems and raise public awareness of environmental deterioration. The objective of these people is to preserve the cultural and natural resources of the villages as well as defend the interest of local communities. The environmentalists now frequently emphasize the fact that citizenship must be defined not only by political rights but also by the rights related to the use of natural resources. It can be said that there is now a strong demand to extend citizenship rights to include environmental rights in Turkey. Local people, who have not participated in decision making or whose interests have not been taken into consideration, demand some rights to protect their environment, their culture, and their social life. Therefore they reject the idea of a single common good as presented by the nation discourse. In this context it is important to understand the role of the state and the meaning of “common good” in terms of development policy in Turkey. As Baban pointed out, “the Turkish Republic based its legal framework on positive law, where all citizens are equal before the law, while establishing a modern bureaucracy to provide services to all citizens. The principle of populism proposed that no difference exist among citizens, refusing ‘preferential’ treatment to any group, class, family or individual.”30 Although the state tries to be neutral, this does not mean that the state always takes into account all groups or class interests equally.31 In the case of HPPs, it is reasonable to assert that these projects are a response to a specific development ideology and class interest. These water projects typically transfer access and control over natural sources from popular classes at the local level to the state or private companies. As a result, the state and private companies have assumed greater power in determining how the local natural resources will be utilized and by whom. Therefore, the use of natural resources and rights of citizens are determined by private ownership. It can be said that the opponents of HPPs in Turkey focus on the undemocratic and capitalist nature of the development project and claim that this project is likely to benefit big companies rather than local people. Related to the environmental citizenship debate they want to have the right to make


7/12/11 6:51 AM


291

decisions about natural resources and to have responsible citizenship to protect the environment.

Anti-HPP Movement: Resistance and Justice The common characteristics of those against the dams and HPPs can be listed as the protection of nature, taking responsibility for the future, and having the right to decide regarding the rivers. For instance, the following ideas were presented in the call of the people who organized a meeting on June 6, 2010, to protest the dam project and the submersion of places like Munzur, Yusufeli, and Hasankeyf: Neither Allianoi Nor Yusufeli Neither Munzur Nor Hasankeyf! Neither Fırtına Nor Fındıklı, Neither Aksu Nor Çağlayan . . . We Are Determined To Carry Our Past To The Future! . . . Water . . . Culture . . . Conscience And Justice, Science And Rights! . . . Hands In Hand.32

The local people express doubts about the legitimacy of the project. They claim that information about the project is not provided them and the public does not have much opportunity to participate in the decision process. As Latte pointed out, “With regard to citizenship, it is important to distinguish between substantive and procedural rights. Where substantive rights uphold minimum standards of environmental quality, procedural rights address citizen access to environmental decision making.”33 In the case of HPPs, the local people do not have substantive or procedural rights to determine their future. The local people expect to be integrated in this scenario, and they will be asked to approve of it. The local communities want to obtain the necessary resources to meet their ecological, social, and cultural needs challenged by the HPPs. They claim that they should be a part of the use of water, and they claim that a way should be found to use the water to promote a new local development dynamic. Naturally, the benefit and costs of the HPPs are not distributed equally among different groups and classes. As pointed out earlier, if some groups are subject to social and environmental threats arising from pollution or any project, if some groups pay the negative social and environmental costs of any project, these costs are related to environmental justice. When the HPPs were initiated based on the dominant development model based on a capitalist economy, this model development made some classes and groups more vulnerable than others. The existing inequalities based on gender, class, and ethnicity determine who will benefit from the project and who will pay the


7/12/11 6:51 AM

292

Feryal Turan

price of development. Barbara Johnston describes this process as “selective victimization,” which is “a product of cultural notions (e.g., racism, sexism, and ethnocentrism) as well as political economic relationships and histories (of colonialism, imperialism, ethnocide, and genocide).”34 In the case of HPPs, the local people, particularly the poor, landless, and people whose living depend on these natural resources, bear the social and ecological costs of the project. In this way, it is possible to say that the HPPs serve the dominant fraction of capital rather than interest of local people.

Conclusion In this study, it was discussed how the problems about environmental citizenship became a current issue and how this situation was associated with environmental justice and sustainability in the framework of HPPs in Turkey. As pointed out before, the scholars who are interested in the discussion of environmental citizenship try to find a connection between environmental values and political rights and obligation. One of the contributions of environmental citizenship to the larger body of citizenship studies is to enlarge the scope of citizen obligation and responsibilities. In the case of Turkey the people who are against these projects question the dominant development ideology, the citizen rights, and the environmental management. First of all, they want to stop these projects, but they demand rights, participation, and sustainable development. When concepts like citizenship, sustainability, and justice were taken into consideration in HPPs projects it could be primarily claimed that the worries of the local people were not taken into account in the current political structure; they were excluded in the decision-making process, and they were not given importance by the bureaucrats and decision makers. When the demands of local people were examined in terms of the rights and responsibilities which were the requirements of environmental citizenship, they were observed not to have environmental responsibility. Local people mentioned in their statements that they objected to the ecological destruction and they were responsible towards the next generations. However, it could clearly be seen that the local knowledge and experiences of local people were not taken into account. In this context, they defined themselves as active and responsible citizens who fight for the sustainable development and protection of the environment. While they accomplished their duties as responsible citizens and they wished a sustainable life and environmental justice, it was clear that there were some problems about the rights. In the statements of the opposite sides, it was mentioned that the natural resources should be used efficiently. It was a common issue that they


7/12/11 6:51 AM


293

also attempted to protect the environment, but these people reacted against these projects as they were misguided. Government authorities claimed that the water flowing for nothing was against the benefits of the country and it was required to use these resources for the benefits of the country. When the situations of both sides were taken into consideration, there were some differences. Local people and the nongovernmental organizations sharing the same views expressed their demands; however, they had no legal rights to implement these. They tried to fulfill their wishes through petition drives, demonstrations, and resorting to the courts. Another group, especially decision-maker institutions, had legal rights to fulfill their wishes. In this context, the fight of the local people indicated that it was necessary to review the rights and responsibilities in the citizenship concept. As in Dobson’s definition, environmental citizenship requires rights and responsible behaviors, and this was requested on the basis of sustainable development. However, here the rights issue became important, and it had to be recognized as a right to demand a cleaner and more protected environment. Although responsible behavior and sustainability were available, there were some situations in which these were not accepted as rights. This fight required the reevaluation of the citizenship concept and the rights issue besides only the protection of environment. One of the important issues in making decisions about the environment is how these decisions are made and the power relations determining this. Current class and power relations determine which benefits will be taken into account. İkizdere is a good example of this. The Trabzon Cultural and Natural Properties Protection Commission announced İkizdere Valley as a natural protected area. Twenty-two HPPs that had been planned to be established in the İkizdere, Anzer, and Ovit regions were announced not to be established. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attended the opening ceremony of Enerjisa Bandırma Natural Gas Conversion Central. In the speech he made in the ceremony, he stated that “they had no luxury not to react doing nothing.” Erdoğan, who also mentioned the announcement of İkizdere Valley as a protected area by the Trabzon Cultural and Natural Properties Protection Commission, stated, We have always approached to water with the logic “Water flows, the Turks watches” in this country; but we do not want to approach in this way from now on. We started to say “Water flows, the Turks makes” and now we are blocked. These waters should not flow to the seas for nothing. We all benefit from them. I do not say that we would take this as a populist approach but Allah (God) gives us the logic, science, knowledge and research. We should produce the knowledge. We should do these. We should produce the knowledge. We, surely, do not drain our rivers while we are benefiting from all waters on which we work.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

294

Feryal Turan

We will work on these as well and these are parallel and equal works. We have also stepped forward in issues from employment to evaluation of these waters in that region and we still are.”35

As it can be seen in this example, the government and decision makers have a view instead of being objective. The energy deficiency is determinant in this issue. Although it was stated that the environment would be protected, the negative sides were not mentioned in previous examples. HPPs have been accepted to be built in these regions, which are among the most important ecological regions of the world. In this context, no matter how responsible the local people are, the one who determines this issue will be the government. As a matter of fact, it was decided that the decisions about the protected areas would be made not by the state institutions in these regions but by a committee in Ankara. In this context, the fight for protecting the environment should also be associated with environmental rights. In the anti-HPP movement observed in Turkey, it was seen that local people and nongovernmental organizations mentioned the protection of the environment and the benefits of community rather than exhibiting a political presence. Local activists tried to prevent the negative effects of the projects and manage to protect the environment through solidarity in their fights. Notes 1. John S. Dryzek, “Political and Ecological Communication,” in Ecology and Democracy, edited by Feraya Mathews (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 1996), 13–29; Andrew Dobson, “Citizenship,” in Political Theory and the Ecological Challenge, edited by Andrew Dobson and Robyn Eckersley (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 216–31. 2. John Barry, Rethinking Green Politics: Nature, Virtue and Progress (London: Sage, 1999), Derek D. Bell, “Liberal environmental citizenship,” Environmental Politics 14, no.2 (2005); 179–94; Andrew Dobson, Citizenship and the Environment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Andrew Dobson and Derek Bell, Environmental Citizenship (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006); Alex P. Latta and Nick Garside, “Perspectives on Ecological Citizenship: an Introduction,” Environments 33, no. 3 (December, 2005): 1–8. 3. Alex P. Latta, “Environmental Citizenship: A Model Linking Ecology with Social Justice Could Lead to a More Equitable Future,” Alternatives Journal 33 no. 1 (2007): 18. 4. Bart van Steenbergen, “Towards a Global Ecological Citizen,” in The Condition of Citizenship, edited by Bart van Steenbergen (London: Sage, 1994), 142. 5. Hartley Dean, “Green Citizenship,” Social Policy & Administration 35, no. 5 (2001): 490–505. 6. Bart van Steenbergen, “Towards a Global Ecological Citizen,” The Condition of Citizenship, edited by Bart van Steenbergen, (London: Sage, 1994), 141–52; Hartley


7/12/11 6:51 AM


295

Dean, “Green citizenship,” Social Policy & Administration 35, no. 5 (2001): 490– 505; Mark J. Smith, Ecologism, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998). 7. Andrew Dobson, “Ecological Citizenship: A Disruptive Influence?” www .vedegylet.hu/okopolitika/Dobson%20-%20Ecological%20Citizenship.pdf (accessed June 7, 2010). 8. Mark J. Smith and Piya Pangsapa, Environment and Citizenship: Integrating Justice, Responsibility and Civic Engagement (London and New York: Zed Books, 2008). 9. Andrew Dobson, “Environmental Citizenship: Towards Sustainable Development,” Sustainable Development 15, no. 5 (September–October 2007): 282. 10. Gerard Delanty, “Models of Citizenship: Defining European Identity and Citizenship,” Citizenship Studies 1 no. 3 (1997): 285–303. 11. Julian Agyeman and Bob Evans, “Justice, Governance, and Sustainability: Perspectives on Environmental Citizenship from North America and Europe,” in Environmental Citizenship, edited by Andrew Dobson and Derek Bell (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 185–206. 12. Alex P. Latta, “Environmental Citizenship,” 18. 13. Edwardo L. Phodes, Environmental Justice in America: A New Paradigm (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003); Nicholas Low and Brendan Gleeson, Justice, Society and Nature: An Exploration of Political Ecology (London and New York: Routledge, 1998); Ronald Sandler and Phaedra C. Pezzullo, eds., Environmental Justice and Environmentalism: The Social Justice Challenge to the Environmental Movement (Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press, 2007). 14. Andrew Dobson, “Environmental Citizenship,” 282. 15. “Energy: Through Great Cooperation, Not the ‘Great Game,’” PULSE of Turkey, no. 3 (May 13, 1998), www.turkpulse.com/energy.htm, (accessed July 10, 2010) cited in Selma Stern, Turkey’s Energy Industry and Her International Relations (July 10, 2010). 16. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Strategy Development Unit, 2008 Annual Report (April 2009). 17. Devlet Su İşleri, “Enerji,” www.dsi.gov.tr/hizmet/enerji.htm. (accessed September 2010). 18. Atilla Eralp, M. Muharrem Tunay, and Birol Yesilada, “Introduction,” in The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey, edited by Atilla Eralp, Muharrem Tunay, and Birol Yesilada (Wesport, CT, and London: Praeger, 1993): 1–10; Ümit Cizre and E. Yeldan, “The Turkish Encounter with Neo-Liberalism: Economics and Politics in the 2000/2001 Crises,” Review of International Political Economy 12, no. 3 (2005): 387–408. 19. Çağlar Keyder, State and Class in Turkey (London & New York: Verso, 1987). 20. Haldun Gulalp, “Patterns of Capitalist Accumulation and State-Society Relation in Turkey,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 15, no. 3 (1985): 329–49. 21. Feryal Turan, Drowning the Poor: The Social and Ecological Costs of Water Development in Turkey (Germany: Verlag, 2009). 22. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Strategy Development Unit, 2008 Annual Report (April 2009); Karadeniz Isyandadır, ”Interview with State Officials and Local People in Erzurum and Artvin,” June 15, 2010, www .karadenizisyandadır.org, (accessed July 2010).


7/12/11 6:51 AM

296

Feryal Turan

23. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Strategy Development Unit, 2008 Annual Report, Minister’s Introduction (April 2009): 3. 24. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, “Hydraulic,” www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=en&sf=webpages&b=hidrolik_EN& bn=232&hn=&nm=40717&id=40737 (accessed September 10, 2010). 25. Hes Kobíder, “Karşıtları Derelerin Akarını Değil Kendi Akarlarını Düşünüyorlar,” www.kobider.org.tr/haberdetay.asp?haberid=415 (accessed October 15, 2010). KOBİDER, “HES Karşıtları Derelerin Akarını Değil Kendi Akarlarını Düşünüyorlar,” www.kobider.org.tr/haberdetay.asp?haberid=415 (accessed October 15, 2010). 26. “Munzur’da Yapılan Barajlara Hayır,” www.sosyomat.com/etiket/munzurda -barajlara-hay%C4%B1r (accessed October 15, 2010). 27. http://artvin.biz/artvin-haber/635-meydani-hese-dar-ettiler-haberi/ (accessed August 5, 2010). 28. Interview with local people and representatives of NGOs (July, Erzurum); see also http://artvin.biz/artvin-haber/635-meydani-hese-dar-ettiler-haberi/; www.karadenizisy andadir.org; www.facebook.com/pages/Karadeniz-isyandadir/211851863121; www .kazete.com.tr/haber_detay.php?hid=7625 (accessedAugust 10, 2010). 29. http://artvin.biz/artvin-haber/635-meydani-hese-dar-ettiler-haberi/ (accessed August 5, 2010). 30. Feyzi Baban, “Community, Citizenship and Identity in Turkey,” TIPEC Working Paper 04/4, www.trentu.ca/org/tipec/4baban4.pdf (accessed September 5, 2010). 31. Feryal Turan, Drowning the Poor: The Social and Ecological Costs of Water Development in Turkey (Germany: Verlag, 2009). 32. “Tarih, Doğa ve Kültürel Miras Kıyımına Karşı Yürüyüş ve Miting Gerçekleşti,” www.78liler.org/78web/yazdir.asp?hid=298 (accessed September 15, 2010). 33. Alex Latta, “Environmental Citizenship,” 18. 34. Barbara R. Johnston, “Environmental Degradation and Human Right Abuse,” in Who Pays the Price? Sociocultural Context of Environmental Crisis, edited by Barbara R. Johnston (Washington, D.C., and Covelo, CA: Island Press, 1994), 11. 35. Nethaber, www.nethaber.com/Politika/166091/Tayyip-Erdogan-22-hidroelek trik-santralinin (accessed September30, 2010).

Bibliography Agyeman, Julian and Bob Evans. “Justice, Governance, and Sustainability: Perspectives on Environmental Citizenship from North America and Europe.” In Environmental Citizenship, edited by Andrew Dobson and Derek Bell, 185–206. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006. http://artvin.biz/artvin-haber/635-meydani-hese-dar-ettiler-haberi/ (accessed August 5, 2010). Baban, Feyzi. “Community, Citizenship and Identity in Turkey.” TIPEC Working Paper 04/4. www.trentu.ca/org/tipec/4baban4.pdf (accessed September 5, 2010). Barry, John. Rethinking Green Politics: Nature, Virtue and Progress. London: Sage, 1999.

11_213_Ch12.indd 296

7/14/11 6:37 AM


297

Bell, Derek. “Liberal Environmental Citizenship.” Environmental Politics 14, no. 2 (2005): 179–94. Dean, Hartley. “Green Citizenship.” Social Policy & Administration 35, no. 5 (2001): 490–505. Delanty, Gerard. “Models of Citizenship: Defining European Identity and Citizenship.” Citizenship Studies 1, no. 3 (1997): 285–303. Devlet Su İşleri, “Enerji,” www.dsi.gov.tr/hizmet/enerji.htm. ———. “Citizenship.” In Political Theory and the Ecological Challenge, edited by Andrew Dobson and Robyn Eckersley, 216–31. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. ———. Citizenship and the Environment. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. ———. “Ecological Citizenship: A Disruptive Influence?” www.vedegylet.hu/okopoli tika/Dobson%20-%20Ecological%20Citizenship.pdf (accessed June 7, 2010). Dobson, Andrew. “Environmental Citizenship: Towards Sustainable Development.” Sustainable Development 15, no. 5 (September–October 2007), 276–85. Dobson, Andrew and Derek Bell. Environmental Citizenship. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006. Dryzek, John S. “Political and Ecological Communication.” In Ecology and Democracy, edited by Feraya Mathews, 13–29. London and Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1996. “Energy: Through Great Cooperation, Not the ‘Great Game.’” PULSE of Turkey, no. 3 (May 13, 1998). www.turkpulse. com/energy.htm (accessed July 10, 2010). Eralp, Atilla, M. Muharrem Tunay, and Birol Yesilada. “Introduction.” In The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey, edited by Atilla Eralp, Muharrem Tunay, and Birol Yesilada, 1–10. Westport, CT, and London: Praeger, 1993. Gulalp, Haldun. “Patterns of Capitalist Accumulation and State-Society Relations in Turkey.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 15, no. 3 (1985): 329–49. HES Karşıtı Ateş Hopa’dan Yakıldı. www.kazete.com.tr/haber_detay.php?hid=7625 (accessed October 15, 2010). Johnston, Barbara R. “Environmental Degradation and Human Right Abuse.” In Who Pays the Price? Sociocultural Context of Environmental Crisis, edited by Barbara R. Johnston. Washington, D.C., and Covelo, CA: Island Press, 1994. Karadeniz Isyandadır. www.karadenizisyandadır.org (accessed July 2010). Keyder, Çağlar. State and Class in Turkey. London and New York: Verso, 1987. Kobider, Hes. “HES Karşıtları Derelerin Akarını Değil Kendi Akarlarını Düşünüyorlar.” www.kobider.org.tr/haberdetay.asp?haberid=415 (accessed October 15, 2010). Latta, Alex P. “Environmental Citizenship: A Model Linking Ecology with Social Justice Could Lead to a More Equitable Future.” Alternatives Journal 33, no. 1 (2007): 18–19. Latta, Alex P. and Nick Garside. “Perspectives on Ecological Citizenship: An Introduction.” Environments 33, no. 3 (December 2005): 1–8. Low, Nicholas and Brendan Gleeson. Justice, Society and Nature: An Exploration of Political Ecology. London and New York: Routledge, 1998. “Munzurda Yapılan Barajlara Hayır.” www.sosyomat.com/etiket/munzurda-barajlara -hay%C4%B1r (accessed October 15, 2010).


7/12/11 6:51 AM

298

Feryal Turan

Nethaber. www.nethaber.com/Politika/166091/Tayyip-Erdogan-22-hidroelektrik -santralinin (accessed September 30, 2010). Phodes, Edwardo L. Environmental Justice in America: A New Paradigm. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, Strategy Development Unit. 2008 Annual Report. April 2009. Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources. “Hydraulic.” www .enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=en&sf=webpages&b=hidrolik_EN&bn=232& hn=&nm=40717&id=40737 (accessed September 10, 2010). Sandler, Ronald and Phaedra C. Pezzullo, eds. Environmental Justice and Environmentalism: The Social Justice Challenge to the Environmental Movement. Cambridge, MA, and London: MIT Press, 2007. Smith, Mark J. Ecologism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998. Smith, Mark J. and Piya Pangsapa. Environment and Citizenship: Integrating Justice, Responsibility and Civic Engagement. London and New York: Zed Books, 2008. “Tarih, Doğa ve Kültürel Miras Kıyımına Karşı Yürüyüş ve Miting Gerçekleşti.” www.78liler.org/78web/yazdir.asp?hid=298 (accessed September 2010). Turan, Feryal. Drowning the Poor: The Social and Ecological Costs of Water Development in Turkey. Germany: Verlag, 2009. van Steenbergen, Bart. “Towards a Global Ecological Citizen.” In The Condition of Citizenship, edited by Bart van Steenbergen, 141–52. London: Sage, 1994.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Conclusion

T

of Turkish citizenship inherited a strong state tradition but passive citizenship understanding from the Ottoman Empire. However, this understanding is no longer sustainable for Turkish society. The definition of citizenship through state-led nationalism, secularism, and a free market economy creates crises in politics and society. The formerly Islamist but currently neoconservative Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) victory in the 2003 national elections and its policies since then are a milestone for Turkish politics. The prominent elites of the AKP, coming from the Islamist social movement National View Movement (Milli Görüş Hareketi), for the first time in Republican history brought about the political monopoly of the state elite, particularly in the military, and expanded the freedom of the public sphere to receive support from the periphery as well as international recognition from the Western world. The party’s attempts to solve the Kurdish and Alevi problems as well as the restriction of the military’s role in the political and public spheres are remarkable efforts in the democratization of Turkish politics and in changing the content of the “ideal understanding of Turkish citizenship” regime. However, the party is simultaneously reluctant to recognize the problem of alternative sexual identities in addition to poverty and social problems. At the same time, it is also not keen on active citizenship, particularly the active citizenship of young people, socially excluded people, and other marginal groups. It is not wrong to say that the AKP is not keen on direct democracy and wants to control the political sphere like the statist elite. Although some of its perspectives derived from its neoconservative ideology, others prove that the party inherited the HE TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDING

— 299 —


7/12/11 6:51 AM

300

Conclusion

same reflexes from its predecessor, the statist elite. Nevertheless, the perspective of the party could also create societal problems in the foreseeable future. What the ideal citizenship regime for Turkey should be is a question that culminated in this book, which points out four important points about the ideal citizenship for Turkey. The first one is to end state-led nationalism and to minimize ethnic and religious components from the Turkish citizenship identity in order to end the hegemony of the Turkish ethnicity and the Sunni Hanafi sect. The state should keep equal distance to every religious and ethnic identity, including the dominant Turkish and Sunni ones. In other words the state should guarantee to be ethnically and religiously blind. This will help ethnic and religious groups feel equal with the dominant group. Constitutional democracy and its derivative civic patriotism are concrete solutions to fulfill this objective; civic education is another instrument for inculcating citizens with the idea of the existence of others living in society, such as ethnic minorities and sexual minorities. Second, active citizenship should be promoted, and the conditions of democratic participation should be provided by the state. Citizens should participate in decision-making processes and be aware of the part of solution offered to their exclusion. Otherwise, they will become passive consumers of politics that political elites can easily manipulate according to their needs, which can readily create tension in society, while not being active can force them to participate in some unconventional political and social groups. Third, the negative effects of the free market economy should be prevented, and strong social reforms should be enhanced to provide citizens’ basic needs, such as food and shelter, in order for them to be active citizens. This is the sine qua non of being an active citizen and participating in the conventional political sphere and civil society. Finally, the national–international (i.e., local–global) boundaries have weakened, changing the definition of citizenship. Citizenship does not only mean being a member of a nation; it also means being a member of the global world. Therefore, the patterns of Turkish citizenship should be reinterpreted and readopted according to international agreements. In this respect, continuing to participate in the Europeanization process is a stimulus mechanism for Turkey in adapting its citizenship regime to the global world. In terms of not only adapting laws to international society but also citizens’ participation, Turkey’s government should be aware that the national is global and vice versa. In this sense, participating in international and supranational organizations and focusing on addressing them from these four points are essential for reinforcing the legitimacy of governments and civil society in Turkey both domestically and internationally.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Conclusion

301

In this regard, governments should allow civil society and social movements to engage in politics and create conditions for a democratic public sphere. Governments should not perceive politics and these actors in the context of a security perspective. Rather, they should perceive democracy and democratic citizenship as the primary security mechanism for itself. In other words, governments should understand that societal peace should be enhanced through a democratic, civic, and active citizenship regime rather than applying security approaches.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Index

active citizenship, xii, 2, 8, 18, 257–62, 265–66, 268–70, 299–300 active participation, 257, 260–61, 265, 267–68, 281 Adana, 165 adultery (zina), 186–87, 189–93, 201n52, 201n60 African, 159–70, 172–73 African Culture Solidarity and Cooperation Association, 159, 165, 172 Afro-Turks, 159–60, 164–73 AKP. See Justice and the Development Party Alevi Bildirgesi, 84. See also Alevi Declaration Alevi Declaration, 84, 90, 99 Alevi Expansion (Opening), 72, 85, 86, 89 Alevi Renaissance, 85 ANAP. See Motherland Party Anatolia, 166, 168 ancestry, 159–60 Antalya, 160–61, 164–69 antihomophobia, 128, 138

Ataturk, 74, 76–78, 80–81, 108, 125–27, 130–31, 210, 262, 268 Bagirmi, 161–62 Basque Country, 29, 37, 40, 42, 46n59 Basques, 28, 32–33, 35, 40, 41, 43n16, 44n24, 45n42, 51, 52, 58 BDP (Peace and Democracy Party), 149n30 Beargi, 138 Bereket, Tarık, 141, 152n64 bisexual, 125, 128, 133, 136, 141–42, 156 Bornu, 161–62 Britain, 28–30, 31–34, 37, 38, 40, 41, 43n22, 46n56, 198n7, 260 Caucasus, 161 CEDAW, 183–84, 200n29, 200n31 Cem Foundation (Cem Vakfi), 89 CHP. See Republican People’s Party Circassians, 162 civic patriotism, 2, 10, 16–21, 24n54, 300 civil citizenship, 180, 196, 283

— 303 —


7/12/11 6:51 AM

304

Index

The Civil Code, 129, 180, 182–84, 187, 196, 200n37 commodity character, 227 conflict(s), x, 7, 11–12, 23n40, 28, 30, 32, 34, 37–42, 53, 159, 184, 207, 216–17, 263, 281, 286 constitution, 182, 184–86, 189, 195–97, 200n29, 200n36, 202n69 Council of Europe (CoE), 128, 132 Council of Higher Education, 9 Crete, 167 Dana Bayramı, 159–60 Darfur, 162 Democratic Peace Movement (DBH), 83, 84 democratization, 10, 12, 28, 39, 41, 42, 88, 179, 185, 215, 217, 218, 299 Democrat Party (DP), 78, 81 denationalization, x, 112, 214, 215, 217, 218 descent, 12, 112–13, 163,169 Diaspora, 161, 163, 165, 306 DİB. See Presidency of Religious Affairs discrimination, x, 60, 62, 79–80, 83–87, 96–99, 102–3, 108, 110–11, 114–16, 128, 131–38, 140–45, 148n12, 170, 173, 182–84, 186, 188–89, 195–98, 217, 232–33, 236, 246–47 Dobronravin, Nikolai, 160 domestic violence, 182–85, 196 downsizing of the state, 229 economic stabilization, 229 Egypt, 161, 167–68 elite(s), ix, 4–5, 8, 10–16, 20, 22n16, 39, 45n53, 49, 53–55, 83–84, 88, 162, 179, 181–82, 199n20, 262, 269, 299–300 environmental citizenship, xii, 281, 282–84, 290, 292, 293, 294n3, 295n9, 295n11 environmental justice, 284, 291, 292, 295n13


equal citizens, 34, 60–62, 88, 89, 96, 97, 102, 115, 172, 180, 181, 186, 196, 197, 198, 231 Ethiopia, 162 ethnicity, 14, 15, 17, 20, 51, 52, 56–60, 63n7, 71, 90, 108–10, 127, 135, 137, 171, 198, 211, 264, 291, 300 EU accession, 184, 195 Eurobarometer, 137, 157n35 European Commission, 16, 96, 102, 136, 184, 200n38, 232, 233, 236 Europeanization, 11, 21n5, 208, 212, 214, 300 European Union Citizenship, 212 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), 34–37, 39, 40, 42, 42n2, 45n41, 53 fascist regimes, 8 foral system, 31 free market economy, ix, 2, 7, 9, 299, 300 Galla, 162 gay, 125, 128, 133, 136, 138, 139, 141, 142, 156 gay marriage, 187–88 gender, 179–88, 194–97, 198n2, 198n3, 198n4, 198n6, 198n11, 199n15, 200n33, 201n48, 202n72 gendered citizenship, 180, 186–87 gender equality, 181–82, 184–86, 195, 197, 198n7, 200n33, 201n48 Georgian, 162 Gulf States, 164 Gültekin, Reşat Nuri, 160 Gurage, 162 headscarf, 183–84, 200n32, 200n33, 201n49 Helsinki Summit, 11, 213 heterosexism, 131, 142 Himmler, Heinrich, 128 honor crimes, 185 house girls, 237 hydro power plant (HPP), 281, 282, 308

7/12/11 6:51 AM

Index

inequality, 18, 97, 102, 115, 139, 176n66, 231, 236, 245, 259, 284 IRA (Irish Republican Army), 35, 36, 37 Islamist women, 183–84 Islamist intellectual, 187–88, 195 Jin, 33 job insecurity, 242, 243 Justice and the Development Party (AKP), 72, 85, 86, 89, 179, 185–90, 192, 201n42, 201n47 KAOS GL, 14, 26, 28, 35, 132, 135, 142, 149n28, 150n43 Kemalism, 78, 83, 89, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131, 140, 184 Kemalist, 5, 8, 10, 12–13, 49, 59, 77–78, 126–27, 130–31, 140, 147, 180–81, 183, 187 Keynesian age, 228 Keynesian policy, 229 Keynesian welfare state, 250 Kızılbash. See Red Head Kordofan, 162 Kurdish identity, xi, 33, 35, 39, 49, 50, 55–56, 58–59 Kurdish nationalism, 56–57 Kurdish nationalists, 11, 35, 41 Kurdish question, 49–50, 53–54, 56, 59–62, 216 Kurdistan, 30, 33, 44n23, 56, 57, 63 Kurdistan Workers Party, 10, 35 Kurds, 6, 8, 10, 19, 24n63, 28, 30–32, 34–35, 40–41, 44n23, 49–50, 52–55, 57–63, 71, 75, 82, 84, 86, 90, 127, 173, 210–11, 215–16 labor force participation, 182, 241 labor market, 182, 229, 233, 235, 236, 237, 240, 242, 248, 286; deregulated, 229 lesbian, 125, 128, 132, 133, 136, 141, 142, 147n11, 151n56 Levant, 164 Lewis, Bernard, 161


305

LGBT, 128–29, 132–33, 135–41, 144, 145 liberal democracy, 191, 195, 285 liberalism, 2, 13, 14, 190, 227, 230, 281 liberalization, x, 8, 12, 35, 36, 214, 229, 230, 250, 264, 286 liberty, 55, 134, 171, 180 Lipset, Martin, 170 marginalization, 83, 96, 170, 181–82, 286 Marshall, Thomas H., 55, 58, 171, 227, 231, 259 Mediterranean, 100, 164–65 MHP. See Nationalist Movement Party Middle East, 41, 163–64, 179, 181, 207, 220n2 migration, 7, 9, 20, 53, 73, 79, 101, 118n22, 162, 163, 166 Milas, 166–67, 175n47 military, ix, 3, 4, 8, 9, 11, 29, 31, 36, 49, 54, 55, 83, 110, 113, 136, 144, 168, 183, 192, 208, 211, 219, 221n13, 229, 257, 258, 262, 264, 299 minority rights, 12, 37, 41, 56, 119n43, 214 minority right regime, 6, 37 Misdemeanours Law, 135, 144, 145, 149n34 Morocco, 161 Motherland Party (ANAP), 84 Muğla, 165, 167, 175n47 multiculturalism, 3, 31, 61, 71, 85, 88 Muslims, 1, 3–4, 10, 14–15, 31, 50, 53, 56, 72–73, 76–77, 79, 85, 87, 90n3, 104, 137–38, 161–64, 167–68, 187–88, 191–94, 209, 211 National Security Council, 9, 208 national identity, xi, 17–18, 20, 27–29, 32–33, 38–39, 42, 57 nationalism, ix, x, xi, 1–2, 5–6, 9–10, 12, 14, 16–17, 19–20, 27, 29, 31–39, 41, 50–52, 56–57, 61, 63n7, 126, 139, 146n5, 181, 215, 299, 300

7/12/11 6:51 AM

306

Index

Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), 82, 140 nation-state(s), x, 1, 4–5, 10, 15–16, 20, 27–29, 31–32, 36, 38, 44n23, 51–53, 58, 63n7, 95, 101, 209–12, 214, 260 neo-liberalism, xii, 13, 21, 29, 36, 37, 38, 40, 83, 185, 186, 213, 229, 230, 231, 236, 249, 257, 260, 261, 265, 266, 269, 281, 286 NGOs, 57, 137, 235, 258, 263, 266–67, 282, 286, 288, 293, 294 non-Muslims, 4, 11–12, 19, 39, 53, 56, 72, 75, 137, 173 Northern Ireland, 28, 34, 35, 37, 40, 41, 42, 45n41, 45n48, 46n56, 46n57, 46n58 Olpak, Mustafa, 159, 172 Oromo,162 Ortaca, 167 Ottoman, ix, x, 3–6, 28, 30, 39, 44n23, 50, 53, 71, 76–77, 87, 100–101, 131, 159, 160–65, 167, 174n36, 179, 209–11, 215, 245 Ottoman Empire, ix, 3–6, 20, 30–33, 39, 53–54, 98, 100–101, 118n22, 125, 161–62, 164, 174n25, 209–11, 299 Ottomanism, 4, 5, 39

participation, 2–3, 55, 60, 88, 136, 170– 72, 182, 215, 219, 232–35, 237–39, 241, 246, 248–49, 257, 260–61, 263, 265–68, 270, 281, 284, 292, 300 Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK), 53, 55, 216 patriarchy, 180, 183–84 Penal Code, 134, 135, 143, 185, 187, 190, 196, 201n41 permanent losers, 249 pink triangles, 128, 147n11 Pir Sultan Abdal Association (Pir Sultan Abdal Dernegi), 89, 91n31


political participation, 2, 55, 60, 88, 171, 215, 267 positive discrimination, 182, 186, 197 poverty, ix, xi, xii, 102, 110, 169–71, 230, 236, 242–43, 245, 261–62, 299 Presidency of Religious Affairs (DİB), 10, 76, 77, 79, 81, 83, 86, 89 private sphere, 5, 58, 180–81, 186, 190–91, 195–96, 283 public sphere, x, 2–7, 9–14, 16, 19–21, 22n22, 37, 96, 102–3, 129–30, 181, 183, 188–89, 196, 283, 299, 301 Red Head, 73, 74, 81 republicanism, 5–6, 54, 77, 126, 130, 146n5, 180–83, 195, 199n15, 199n17, 199n20, 228, 262, 265, 269, 283, 299 Republican People’s Party (CHP), 6, 8, 56, 78, 126, 146n5 religious community, 31, 72, 189 religious conservatism, 185–86, 198 religious differences, 5, 30, 53, 58 religious formations, 7 religious groups, x, 53, 71, 300 religious identity, x, 1, 5, 7, 16, 88, 90, 115, 183, 300 religiously conservative, 179, 187, 189, 190, 194, 195 religious marriage, 181, 193–94 religious movements, 19, 72, 74 religious rights, 79, 236 religious structure, 74–75, 84

self-determination, 208, 214–18 Sen, Amartya, 171 separatism, xii, 61, 210, 216–18 sex reassignment, 129, 132, 143, 144, 149n24, 155 social democracy, 18, 20 solidarity, xi, 7, 18–20, 27, 51, 59, 80, 98, 143, 159, 165, 169, 172–73, 230–32, 245–47, 250, 265, 294

7/12/11 6:51 AM

Index

slavery, 159–62, 167 slaves, 161–65, 167–68, 171 social exclusion, xi, 103, 170–72, 230, 234, 245, 257 social inclusion, 233–34, 246 social policy, 33, 227, 229–30, 232–36, 245, 248–49, 270 social welfare, 2, 13, 20, 21, 229, 232, 235 Spain, xi, 28–35, 37–42, 46n59, 52–53, 59 Spivak, Gayatri, 172 state-led nationalism, ix, x, 1–2, 5, 299–300 status to the contract, 231 Structural Adjustment Program, 229 sub-identity, 28 supra-identity, 28, 32–33, 38–40 sustainable development, xii, 281, 292–93 sustainable economic growth, 235 terrorism, 49, 55, 61, 63 transgender, 125, 128, 129, 132, 133, 136, 141, 142, 144, 156 Turkification, 54, 56 Turkish Identity, 13, 56, 58


307

Turkish Party of Great Union (TBP), 80–81 Turkish Party of Labor (TİP), 82 Union and Progress, 4, 39 United Nations, 16, 145, 216, 261, 265, 266 United Nations World Youth Report, 261, 265 virginity, 183 voting age, 266, 267 voting in elections, 257, 260, 266, 267 Waday, 162 welfare state, 29, 33, 34, 37, 116, 196, 227, 229, 230, 231, 232, 236, 249, 250, 257, 266 westernization, 44n23, 127, 131, 179 young people, vii, ix, xii, 15, 105, 235, 237, 241–43, 257–70, 299 youth, ix, 35, 82, 170, 172, 237, 241, 257–59, 261–67, 269 zina. See adultery

7/12/11 6:51 AM


7/12/11 6:51 AM


Canan Aslan Akman graduated from the Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara and holds her MPhil in Women’s Studies from Trinity College–Dublin (1992). She received her PhD in political science from McGill University (2001) in Canada. She has been working as a assistant professor of political science at the Department of Public Administration and Political Science at METU since 2002. Her research interests are the dynamics of democratization, civil society and political parties in Turkey, and gender issues and women’s political participation from a comparative perspective. Currently, she has been working on the politics of democratization reforms in Turkey. Elçin Aktoprak is an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations, Ankara University. She specializes in nationalism, minority issues, and conflict resolution. Maya Arakon was born in Istanbul, Turkey. After having finished Notre Dame de Sion French College, she received her BA degree from Marmara University in Istanbul, in the French Department of Political Science and Administration, and her MA degrees from Marmara University European Union Institute (1997) as well as Robert Schuman University, Institut d’Etudes Politiques, in Strasbourg, France (1999). She received her PhD from Strasbourg University on terrorism and security strategies. Her postdoctoral work, which she accomplished in Paris University at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques (Paris Sciences Po), has been published by Bilgi University Press in Turkey. — 309 —


7/12/11 6:51 AM

310


Her work is mainly focused on terrorism and violence, security studies, the Kurdish issue in Turkey, identity, citizenship, minority rights, and the European Union issues. Maya Arakon is still working as associate professor at the Political Science and International Relations Department of Yeditepe University in Istanbul. Hakan Ataman was born in 1970 in Istanbul, Turkey. He has a BA degree in philosophy from Aegean University in Izmir. Mr. Ataman, as a human rights defender and an activist, has worked with different nongovernmental organizations. He is an experienced trainer and consultant and has run workshops on topics related to human rights. He is one of the founding members of the Amnesty International Turkey and Human Rights Agenda Association. He is the writer of several books and articles related to human rights. His fields of interest include nondiscrimination, equality, hate crimes, and human rights education. Rasim Özgür Dönmez graduated from the Political Science Department of Bilkent University in Ankara in 1997 and holds his master’s degree from the Political Science Department of Hacettepe University (2000). He finished his MPhil and PhD in the Politics Department of the University of Exeter, UK, in 2004. He is an associate professor in international relations at Abant İzzet Baysal University. His current research interests are identity politics, political violence, civil society, and peace and conflict studies Esma Durugönül studied sociology, political science, and Spanish philology and received her MA in 1985 and her PhD in 1993 from the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität Bonn/Federal Republic of Germany. She is currently an associate professor in the Department of Sociology of the Faculty of Arts at Akdeniz University, Antalya/Turkey. Her research interests include identity, culture, migration, the African Diaspora, racism, nationalism, ethnocentrism, homophobia, and social movements. Pınar Enneli graduated from the Middle East Technical University (METÜ) in Ankara. Pınar Enneli received her MPhil in 1996 and PhD in 2001 from the Sociology Department of Bristol University, UK. She is working in the Department of Sociology at Abant Izzet Baysal University as an assistant professor. Her general interests are ethnic minorities, with specific reference to the Turkish-speaking communities in Europe, and young people’s economic and social integration and exclusion. She recently finished a research project on disadvantaged young people in metropolitan areas.


7/12/11 6:51 AM


311

Bahar Turhan Hurmi is an assistant professor at Atılım University, Ankara, Turkey. Dr. Hurmi graduated from the Department of International Relations, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey, in 1997, and went on to finish her MA and PhD at Leicester University, UK. Her areas of interest are the European Union’s politics and institutions, the EU’s foreign policy, Turkey–EU relations, Turkish foreign policy, and Turkish–American relations. Mustafa Kemal Öke is a professor of social policy in the Department of Public Administration at Abant İzzet Baysal University, Bolu, Turkey. He has also worked as the advisor of prominent trade unions of Turkey. His academic research interests are social dialogue, labor law, trade unions, and social policy in the European Union and Turkey. Fazilet Ahu Özmen was born in Istanbul, Turkey. After having finished Pierre Loti French College (Lycée Français Pierre Loti), she had her BA degrees from Marc Bloch University in Strasbourg, Department of Sociology and Department of International Relations, and her MA degree from the same university in the domain of social sciences (2003). She also had her PhD from Strasbourg University in October 2009. Her doctorate thesis is on contemporary Alevi youth and their social and political development of identity, and the thesis analyzes the question “Is Alevi youth a pluralistic, traditional and postmodernist youth?” Since 2005, she has given several conferences and published papers and articles on an international basis in several European countries and Turkey. She works on various themes and domains like political science and social sciences such as sociological theories, political sociology, sociology of identity, and sociology of religion. Fazilet Ahu Özmen is still working as assistant professor at the French Political Science and International Relations Department of Yeditepe University in Istanbul, and she also gives lectures in various universities in Istanbul. Bülent Temel is a lecturer in international relations at Atilim University in Ankara, Turkey. He holds a master’s degree from Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and is a PhD candidate in political economy at Atilim University. Before joining academia, he worked as a financier and economist at Edward Jones Investments and Army & Air Force Exchange Service in California, Massachusetts, and Texas for eight years. His fields of interest are political economy, game theory, and psychoeconomics. Senem Kurt Topuz received her doctoral degree in 2010 from the Political Science and Social Studies Department, Gazi University, Ankara, Turkey with her study on Gypsies in Edirne, Turkey. She has been working as an


7/12/11 6:51 AM

312


instructor in the Public Administration and Political Science Department, Abant İzzet Baysal University, Bolu, Turkey, since June 2010. She is currently doing her postdoctoral studies at Manchester University, UK. She has publications on citizenship, disadvantaged groups, and social politics. Feryal Turan is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology at Ankara University, Turkey. She received her PhD from Northeastern University. Her research interests are environmental sociology, social change, underdevelopment, and natural resource management. Recent publications include research on resettlement, economic crisis, and the social impacts of hydro power plants in Turkey. Fatma Tütüncü (Asst. Prof. Dr) teaches politics in the Department of Public Administration at Abant İzzet Baysal University, Bolu, Turkey. Her academic research interests are secularism, Islamism, morality, and gender and politics. She is a former visiting scholar at the University of Michigan and in the program of Women, Gender, and Sexuality at Harvard University, with a research project on the Islamist life coaches in Turkey. Her recent publications appeared in the journals Parliamentary Affairs, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, and Middle Eastern Studies.


7/12/11 6:51 AM

Societal Peace and Ideal Citizenship for Turkey

Citizenship: A Reality Far From Ideal

Turkey

Education for Citizenship

Prospects for Citizenship

Hypermedia Seduction for Terrorist Recruiting - Volume 25 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series: Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Science for Peace and Security)

Citizenship and the Nation State in Greece and Turkey (Social and Historical Studies on Greece and Turkey)

Turkey: The Quest for Identity

Information Technology and Societal Development

Turkey: The Quest for Identity

Citizenship in A Global World: Comparing Citizenship Rights for Aliens (Migration, Minorities and Citizenship)

Social and Psychological Effects of Radiological Terrorism: Volume 29 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Science ... Series: Human and Societal Dynamics)

Militarist Peace in South America: Conditions for War and Peace

At War for Peace

Fighting For Peace

Searching for peace

Building Terrorism Resistant Communities: Together Against Terrorism, Volume 55 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human and Societal Dynamics ... Security, E: Human and Societal Dynamics)

Peace, Conflict, and Violence. Peace Psychology for the 21st Century

A Time for Peace

Battle for Peace

A Time for Peace

Ideal knots

Ideal War

Pareja Ideal

The Ideal

The Ideal

Complexity and Security (Nato Science for Peace and Series) (Nato Science for Peace and Series)

Political Violence, Organized Crimes, Terrorism and Youth (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol 46)

Ideal knots

Ideal theory

Societal Peace and Ideal Citizenship for Turkey

Citizenship: A Reality Far From Ideal

Turkey

Education for Citizenship

Prospects for Citizenship

Hypermedia Seduction for Terrorist Recruiting - Volume 25 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series: Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Science for Peace and Security)

Citizenship and the Nation State in Greece and Turkey (Social and Historical Studies on Greece and Turkey)

Turkey: The Quest for Identity

Information Technology and Societal Development

Turkey: The Quest for Identity

Citizenship in A Global World: Comparing Citizenship Rights for Aliens (Migration, Minorities and Citizenship)

Social and Psychological Effects of Radiological Terrorism: Volume 29 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Science ... Series: Human and Societal Dynamics)

Militarist Peace in South America: Conditions for War and Peace

At War for Peace

Fighting For Peace

Searching for peace

Building Terrorism Resistant Communities: Together Against Terrorism, Volume 55 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human and Societal Dynamics ... Security, E: Human and Societal Dynamics)

Peace, Conflict, and Violence. Peace Psychology for the 21st Century

A Time for Peace

Battle for Peace

A Time for Peace

Ideal knots

Ideal War

Pareja Ideal

The Ideal

The Ideal

Complexity and Security (Nato Science for Peace and Series) (Nato Science for Peace and Series)

Political Violence, Organized Crimes, Terrorism and Youth (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol 46)

Ideal knots

Ideal theory

Recommend Documents