Militarist Peace in South America: Conditions for War and Peace

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MILITARIST PEACE IN SOUTH AMERICA

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MILITARIST PEACE IN SOUTH AMERICA CONDITIONS FOR WAR AND PEACE

Félix E. Martín


© Félix E. Martín, 2006. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles or reviews. First published 2006 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN™ 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 and Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, England RG21 6XS Companies and representatives throughout the world. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN-13: 978–1–4039–7312–2 ISBN-10: 1–4039–7312–1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Martín, Félix E. Militarist peace in South America : conditions for war and peace / by Félix E. Martín. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1–4039–7312–1 (alk. paper) 1. South America—Foreign relations. 2. Peace. 3. Military government—South America. I. Title. JZ5584.S63M37 2006 327.8—dc22 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Design by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd., Chennai, India. First edition: July 2006 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America.

2006041673

To Ariel


CONTENTS

List of Figures

ix

List of Tables

xi

Acknowledgments Abstract

xiii xv

Introduction: Absence of War or Enduring Peace?

1

Chapter 1 Peace in South America: Norm, Anomaly, or Historical Paradox?

7

Chapter 2 Political Realism: Peace through Power?

25

Chapter 3 Balance of Power, Empirical Findings, and Peace

49

Chapter 4 U.S. Hegemony, Empirical Findings, and Peace

79

Chapter 5 International Liberalism: Peace through Principles?

101

Chapter 6 Democracy, Trade, Diplomacy, and Peace: Empirical Findings

117

Chapter 7 The Military, External Peace, and Internal Violence

149

Summary and Conclusions: Power, Principles, or Militarist Peace?

177

Notes

183

Bibliography

223

Index

247


LIST OF FIGURES

1.1 Normal and Anomalous Nature of War and Peace 6.1 Bolivia’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) 6.2 Paraguay’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) 6.3 Chile’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) 6.4 Peru’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) 6.5 Colombia’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) 6.6 Venezuela’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) 6.7 Ecuador’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) 6.8 Argentina’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) 6.9 Brazil’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) 6.10 Uruguay’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade)

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LIST OF TABLES

3.1 Annual Values for the Computed Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) Score of the National Material Capabilities of South American States in Five-Year Intervals, 1850–1930 3.2 Annual Values for the Computed Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) Score of the National Material Capabilities of South American States in Selected-Year Intervals, 1932–2001 3.3 Polar Classification of the South American Subsystem According to Schweller’s Polarity Index 3.4 Polar Classification of the South American Subsystem According to Wayman’s Polarity Index 3.5 Polarity and Intraregional Interstate Outcome of the South American Subsystem in Selected-Year Intervals, 1850–2001 3.6 Dyadic Balance of Military and Overall National Material Capabilities between Argentina and Brazil, 1935–2001 3.7 Dyadic Balance of Military and Overall National Material Capabilities between Argentina and Chile, 1935–2001 3.8 Dyadic Balance of Military and Overall National Material Capabilities between Bolivia and Chile, 1935–2001 3.9 Dyadic Balance of Military and Overall National Material Capabilities between Colombia and Peru, 1935–2001 3.10 Dyadic Balance of Military and Overall National Material Capabilities between Colombia and Venezuela, 1935–2001 3.11 Dyadic Balance of Military and Overall National Material Capabilities between Chile and Peru, 1935–2001 3.12 Dyadic Balance of Military and Overall National Material Capabilities between Ecuador and Peru, 1935–2001 3.13 Dyadic Balance of Military and Overall National Material Capabilities between Guyana and Venezuela, 1935–2001

53

54 55 56

58 63 65 67

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72 74

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LIST OF TABLES

3.14 Synoptic Chart of the Results of the Analysis of Dyadic Deterrence in South America, 1935–2001 4.1 United States Overt Military Interventions Abroad, 1945–1991 6.1 Classification of Political Regimes in South America, 1935–2005 6.2 Classification of Political Regimes in South America, 1935–2005 6.3 Bolivia’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) 6.4 Paraguay’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) 6.5 Chile’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) 6.6 Peru’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) 6.7 Colombia’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) 6.8 Venezuela’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) 6.9 Ecuador’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) 6.10 Argentina’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) 6.11 Brazil’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) 6.12 Uruguay’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) 7.1 Observation of Military Socialization in South America, 1935–2005

77 99 120 121

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142 165

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

am grateful to many individuals who in different ways made this book a reality. My intellectual debt to Richard Betts, Robert Jervis, and Jack Snyder at Columbia University is significant. I hope my analysis of negative peace in South America lives up to their rigorous and high scholarly standards. My Florida International University colleagues and friends, John Clark, Damián Fernández, Lisa Prugl, Eduardo Gamarra, and Astrid Arrarás helped me and supported me in different ways to accomplish this project. Also, Vicente Medina, Enrique Pumar, Sebastián Royo, Carlos Ripoll, Carlos Seiglie, Manuel Tellechea, and Pablo Toral were important sources of encouragement. Several of my graduate students at FIU contributed to this study. I am particularly grateful to Gustavo de las Casas who generously volunteered his time to organize and supervise two different groups of students in data collection. Also, I am most appreciative of the assistance from my teaching assistants in the last several years, Eloisa López and Linda Tomlinson. I would like to express my gratitude to various institutional sources of support that in various degrees made possible this project: Florida International University, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, the Dorothy Danforth Compton Fellowship, the Fulbright Commission, and the Universidad of Alcalá de Henares. In October 2004 I prematurely lost my close friend, Pedro F. Ceballos Moreno in Spain. He was a brilliant man and a voracious reader who never had the opportunity to pursue a formal academic program under the regime of Francisco Franco. I owe Pedro my initial interest in political philosophy and world politics. To a degree, this book owes its conception to my long-lasting debates with him. Thus, I am certain that if he would have been able to review it, it would have turned out to be a much better product. I will dearly miss him. I could not have written this book without the unfailing love and support from my entire family. I express to them my immense gratitude. My wife, María, has been my fervent supporter and emotional pillar over these years. My parents have been an unfailing source of encouragement and support—even when they don’t fully grasp what writing a book entails. They always have found the most simple and tender way to remind me of the most important things in life. My son, Ariel, has grown big and tall while I have been working on this project, but he has never stopped giving me a child’s proud smile and his tender love. Since he is nature’s gift to me and a source of pride and inspiration, I dedicate this book to him.

I


ABSTRACT

espite the presence of enduring bilateral rivalries, recurrent militarized interstate disputes, and notoriously violent internal political processes, South American states have paradoxically avoided a major intraregional war since the end of the Chaco War in 1935 between Bolivia and Paraguay. Contending that realist and liberal explanations are inconclusive, this monograph advances an alternative explanation: the “militarist peace” hypothesis. This proposition centers on the sociopolitical role of the military institution at both national and regional levels. It is argued that through an evolutionary, social process, the military of the region developed common socioeconomic values, beliefs, principles, and objectives. This fostered the armed forces’ increasing identification with the interest, progress, and success of the transnational and national dimensions of the military institution in South America. The increasingly transnational identity of the military transformed their traditional mission as protectors of the state from external threats to national political players and guardians of the state from internal political foes in their respective polities. The direct consequence of this evolutionary dynamic is the “external-peace-and-internal-violence paradox” in South America.

D


INTRODUCTION: ABSENCE OF WAR OR ENDURING PEACE?

ubsequent to 1945 most interstate wars have occurred between neighboring countries in the periphery.1 As a direct result of these armed conflicts over 17 million people have perished—a large number compared to World War I.2 Moreover, as it has been evident by events in Africa, in the Persian Gulf, in the Balkans, and in the former Soviet republics, the transformation of the international order in the 1990s has not changed or abated this trend. While most scholars in international relations and in other social sciences focus on explaining the causes of war as a way to prevent it, scant attention is devoted to the prevalence of peace among potential adversaries. This serious theoretical neglect in the study of international relations was addressed by John Gaddis when he classified the period from 1946 to 1989 in U.S.–Soviet relations as The Long Peace. His purpose was to draw attention to the theoretical and historical significance of the absence of any major armed conflict between these archrivals. A parallel is drawn here and the lack of major intra-regional war in South America since the end of the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay in 1935 is underscored as a significant case for understanding interstate relations among countries in the periphery. It is important to emphasize some similarities between the two cases and the causes for the more enduring character of the South American long peace.3 War and peace are two intermittent outcomes of the continuous and dynamic nature of social interactions in the international system. It is reasonable to affirm, in this sense, that the genesis of war is conceived and nurtured during peace time. It is crucial, therefore, to understand and explain the conditions and dynamics preventing the outbreak of war among potential enemies. For this purpose, both the Long Peace between the Soviets and the Americans and the longer period of peace or absence of war in South America serve as model cases for interstate peace in the periphery as well as test cases for some of the hypotheses on the causes of war and peace. The history of South American states is replete with instances of internal political violence, ranging from military interventions to civil wars and revolutions. Less evident, however, is the fact that these countries have avoided paradoxically large-scale intraregional war. In a period of 189 years (1816–2005), these nationstates have experienced 5 major “interstate wars” and none since the end of the Chaco War in 1935. The term interstate wars in this work refers to wars between

S

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neighboring countries sharing a common border. Hence, the 1982 South Atlantic conflict is not included in this sample because it involves the participation of an extra-continental state actor.4 The absence of major intraregional interstate war in South America contrasts sharply with the evidence of at least fifteen different dyads, each involving one or several serious incident(s).5 Thus, given the potentiality for crisis and war demonstrated by the severity and number of militarized interstate disputes in the area, it is important to analyze why many more of these episodes did not erupt into war and how the South American republics managed to coexist in a state of relative peace. To understand the seventy-year period of relative peace in South America, this book seeks to accomplish three basic goals: first, to explain why and how the South American countries have avoided large-scale intraregional interstate war despite the evidence of potential conditions for war; second, to analyze and test several established realist and liberal hypotheses on the causes of war and peace against the South American case; and third, to advance an alternative explanation of the impact of the militaries on the outbreak, evolution, and permanence of intraregional interstate peace in South America. Significance of the South America’s Long Peace Before deciphering the historical puzzle in South America and illuminating new theoretical implications for the study and understanding of the causes of war and peace in the world’s periphery, this work examines various international political processes (e.g., arms race, balance of power, dyadic deterrence, diplomacy, free trade, protectionism, and militarism) and their individual and collective impact on either the abatement or exacerbation of interstate armed conflict in the international system. Ultimately, it is hoped that the findings of this study may help decision makers grappling with the daunting task of promoting and preserving peace and stability in the periphery. The original content of this book is derived primarily from the explanation of factors preventing the outbreak of war among potential adversaries. Rather than testing theories on the causes of war against actual cases of conflict, this approach, in an effort to uncover new causal paths to peace and security in the periphery, analyzes the explanatory adequacy of these theories against a nonevent, that is, the absence of major intraregional interstate war among potential adversaries.6 Also, this methodological strategy addresses one of the three problems Robert Jervis discusses in relation to the implementation of the comparative method and the analysis of the causes of war.7 This study establishes the significance of South America’s long peace. This is a major phenomenon largely ignored by those who have attempted to explain and popularize the absence of war in the developed world and in the former Soviet–American rivalry.8 Moreover, this historical anomaly appears to defy the logic and explanatory power of the two most prominent schools of thought in international relations: Political Realism and International Liberalism. Expressed succinctly, the causes of war presupposed in realism were present in South America, yet interstate war did not erupt. Conversely, the causes of peace assumed in liberalism were absent, but interstate peace has prevailed in this subregion.

INTRODUCTION

3

Theoretical Framework and Analytical Tools In seeking an explanation for the South American peace, this book examines and tests two sets of hypotheses on the causes of war and peace. This approach will reveal whether one or a combination of several of these theoretical perspectives may be sufficient conditions to understand, explain, and ultimately promote peace and stability among potentially hostile neighboring states in the periphery. In addition, this work advances and examines the causal effect of the South American military on the inception, development, and endurance of interstate peace in the region. The dependent variable in this work, absence of a major intraregional interstate war among potential adversaries, is differentiated from the generic concept of peace. This book defines war as the actual outbreak of hostilities between nations and the absence of war as peace, even when nations are involved in war preparations. Hence, this study parts company with Thomas Hobbes’s conception of war when he defines it as not consisting of battle only, “or the act of fighting; but in a tract of time, wherein the will to contend by battle is sufficiently known . . .”9 Rather, the notion of war used in this book concurs with John Gaddis’s assertion that “war is an exceptional event in international relations; despite the frequency with which it has occurred, it is always a departure from the normal state of affairs . . .”10 The concept of peace, it will be argued, encompasses two related but distinct connotations. First, in the narrow sense, the lack or cessation of hostilities is both a necessary and sufficient condition for peace. Second, in the broad sense, the lack or cessation of hostilities is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the evolution of various degrees of peace among neighboring countries. Different states exhibit greater or lesser disposition for war than others. Therefore, peaceful relations among countries are categorized into various degrees and the causal factors that are sufficient conditions for the development of peaceful coexistence (i.e., the absence of interstate war) among potential adversaries are analyzed. According to realists, in a purely spontaneous anarchic environment every nation is a “potential adversary,” but that is not necessarily the case in a mediated, institutionalized anarchic condition. In the latter environment, norms, institutions, and mechanisms exist to ameliorate the confrontational character of a purely anarchic international setting. Therefore, in such context the lack of hostilities among certain nations can be arranged on a continuum, given the presence or absence of basic conditions for conflict, from normal to anomalous. Hence, some regional and bilateral relations can be classified as normally peaceful or normally warlike, while others as anomalously peaceful (as it is the case of South America) or anomalously warlike. For example, the type of relationship between countries such as Sweden and Norway, and Canada and the United States should not be classified together with that between the former Soviet Union and the United States during the cold war, between Greece and Turkey after 1974, and that between some pairs of countries in South America such as Argentina and Chile, Ecuador and Peru, and Venezuela and Colombia.

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Political Realism The first line of inquiry posits the causal variables within the realist paradigm. The realist paradigm incorporates many theories and hypotheses, some of them even contradict each other’s logic and prediction, therefore only those that appear to be more germane to the scope of this study have been selected for analysis. This school of thought stresses conflict of interests among sovereign states as an inevitable consequence of the anarchic nature of the international system and the ensuing competition for power. The first proposition postulates that U.S. power preponderance or “hegemonic” role in South America is the principal cause of the “hegemonic peace” in this region.11 Although this hypothesis is advanced by major realists, it contradicts the central realist assumption of the anarchical nature of the international system. In brief, it appears that the international system is anarchical only for great powers, not for small and middle powers.12 This thesis is premised on the presupposition that a hegemonic power causes peace and stability within its sphere of influence by structuring and mediating interactions among its satellites. Thus, the argument is grounded in the logic of the “coercive” strand of hegemonic stability theory. It explains the provision and maintenance of international economic regimes in the post–World War II economic order. The reasoning extrapolated here is basically the same as in the economic realm, except that peace and stability in the region are viewed as goods provided by a security regime.13 Such a regime is created and unilaterally maintained by the hegemon through sheer preponderance of power, inducement, intimidation, and outright coercion. Also, this angle is similar to the second result of the four discussed by Richard K. Betts, whereas the semblance of a collective security regime was achieved principally by utter “preponderance of power . . . imposed by the United States.”14 A second hypothesis, grounded in the debate regarding the relative degree of stability or proneness of war produced by different polar configurations, postulates that bipolarity is more stable and secure than multipolarity. This is attributed to the lack of peripheries, the high degree of transparency, and low degree of interdependence between the two major adversaries.15 For example, Waltz defines systemic stability, first, as continuity in the organizing principle of the structure (i.e., anarchy) and, second, as “no consequential variation . . . in the number of principal parties that constitute the system.”16 Furthermore, while discussing the possibility of tripolarity, he acknowledges that stability means the avoidance of war between the poles. He notes that “[a]lthough second-strike may perpetuate a stalemate among more than two powers, one has to accept more doubts about who will help whom, and more uncertainty about who has second- and who has first-strike capabilities, and then bet that the system would remain peaceful and stable despite the greater difficulties.”17 Third, the contraposition is that multipolarity is more stable and peaceful. “As the system moves away from bipolarity toward multipolarity, the frequency and intensity of war should be expected to diminish.”18 Three arguments are offered in support of this proposition: first, the increased number of dyadic relationships or “interaction opportunities” reduces the danger of mutually reinforcing antagonism between two states;19 second, a greater amount of poles diminishes the share of individual attention toward other

INTRODUCTION

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independent states;20 and, third, multipolarity has a dampening effect upon arms races.21 South America has been both structurally and behaviorally an international subsystem.22 Accordingly, this part of the analysis will evaluate whether peace in South America can be explained by the logic of these hypotheses. Finally, one of the cornerstones of the realist paradigm is the balance of power theory.23 Although this is essentially a systemic theory, one of its strands deals specifically with dyadic balance of power processes or “internal balancing.”24 That is, it focuses on questions of the nature of military balance and its deterrent capacity.25 Evidently, deterrence, in addition to a psychological component, incorporates a military instrument in order for the defender to gain credibility with a potential aggressor.26 Consequently, a fourth hypothesis rooted in the dyadic balance of power theory evinces that military superiority deters potential revisionist states from initiating a war.27 A fifth proposition, emphasizing uncertainty and miscalculation of the balance of forces in a dyadic relationship, explains war or peace as direct consequences of the agreement or disagreement between two actors’ estimates of their respective relative power. Thus, if two actors agree (i.e., perceive) that there exists military parity in their relationship, the result is peace. Conversely, if they disagree, the result is war.28 International Liberalism The second line of inquiry in this book places the independent variables within the liberal paradigm. This school of thought emphasizes that interstate peace is the result of harmony of interests among states. Consequently, in international relations, liberalism is often viewed in terms of what Robert O. Keohane calls “republican and commercial liberalism.”29 The first strand postulates that states with similar liberal democratic political institutions do not fight each other. Thus, the increase of democratic governments in a region causes interstate peace.30 The second strand presupposes that free trade and the ensuing harmony of commercial interests produces peace and, conversely, protectionism stimulates war.31 Related to the issue of democratic principles and institutional forms, a third proposition postulates that international organizations promote peace and defuse international conflicts. In addition to informal institutions like conventions and international regimes, neoliberal institutionalism emphasizes the importance of international organizations in mediating armed conflicts and promoting peace.32 The Militarist Peace Hypothesis The third line of inquiry focuses on the military organization as the explanatory variable for the absence of intraregional interstate war in South America. The analytical rationale for concentrating on the military is its marked degree of political autonomy vis à vis civil authorities and its nearly absolute control over the war-making decision process in these polities. Based on these factors, it must be assumed that the regional militaries would have been unhampered internally to use force in order to seek any external objective that they deemed strategically important.

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It is the thesis of this book that given the individual and institutional socioeconomic and political objectives of the military sectors in the region, they have lacked the motivations and interests to seek economic, political, and strategic gains via the international use force. The militaries’ evident aversion to intraregional interstate war stems from an evolutionary sociopolitical process that has generated closer ties, has increased transparency, and has reduced conflict of interests among the militaries. Ultimately, this evolutionary social process has progressively led the military establishments in the region to view one another as members of a supranational regional organization who have more threatening political enemies within their own individual polities than across interstate lines. Accordingly, this explains the paradoxical phenomenon of internal violence and external peace in South America. Methodology Since this book aims at explaining a nonevent (i.e., the absence of major intraregional interstate wars that were “potentially” bound to erupt), it establishes, first, the anomalous and intriguing character of peace in South America. This will be done from four different angles. First, a brief historical review will demonstrate the incidence of war in the past and, most importantly, the evidence of continued minor clashes and crises over lingering territorial disputes in the region. Second, based on an analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions for peace, it will be posited that the peace in South America is an anomalous development. Third, a typology will be developed, via a two-by-two matrix, of the normal and anomalous incidence of international war and peace, and within this typology an effort will be made to determine whether the South American peace is an anomaly. Finally, the literature on the outbreak of interstate peace among previous or potential adversaries will be examined to assess if even within this body of literature peace in South America still emerges as a paradoxical development. To facilitate an explanation of peace in South America there will follow, in the second and fifth chapters of this work, a critical examination of the assumptions and internal logic of the relevant propositions from Political Realism and International Liberalism respectively. Chapters 3, 4, and 6 will present an evaluation of how each of these theoretical positions fare when confronted with the empirical evidence. For historical evidence, the focus will be on those dyadic relationships involving at least one of the following conditions for conflict: a historical political rivalry, a territorial dispute, a conflict over natural resources and waterways, nationalism, and population pressure. In this framework, peace in South America comprises empirical material from several cases:33 first, Venezuela’s territorial disputes with both Colombia and Guyana; second, the central Andean region encompassing the Ecuadorian–Peruvian rivalry and the conflicts among Peru, Bolivia, and Chile; and, third, the Southern Cone, which includes the Argentine–Chilean dispute and the Argentine–Brazilian rivalry. Chapter 7 will advance an alternative explanation on the political influence of the military in South America and their impact on the evolution of intraregional interstate peace. Finally, a concluding chapter summarizes the main findings and implications of this work for the study of world politics.

CHAPTER 1

PEACE IN SOUTH AMERICA: NORM, ANOMALY, OR HISTORICAL PARADOX?

nterstate relations in South America have been comparatively more peaceful than in any other world region since 1935. The evolution and permanence of regional peace is particularly intriguing in the midst of enduring conditions for war and the actual outbreak of several militarized interstate disputes and diplomatic crises over the years. For some, the South American peace is just a normal historical development—product of the relative degree of satisfaction with the territorial status quo among these strong, independent states.1 For others, it represents an unusual phenomenon, because it defies objective regional empirical conditions, normally linked to the outbreak of war in other world regions.2 Still a third position espoused by this study considers paradoxical the contrast between the level of internal political violence in individual polities and the incidence of relative intraregional interstate peace in South America over a seventy-year period.3 Even states with long democratic traditions have experienced internal political violence. For example, Colombia experienced La Violencia, a period of intense political violence from 1946 to 1964 that caused over 200,000 deaths. Presently, the country faces a thirty-year-old internal insurgency. In 1973 Chile went through the most brutal and violent military coup in South American history. The political repression produced close to 2,000 dead and hundreds who mysteriously disappeared from jail due to the military. Also, the military coup ended four decades of internal political peace and uninterrupted democratic rule.4 Finally, Venezuela’s democratic experience since 1958 was shaken several times by intense political violence and insurgency. The internal peace was disturbed by El Caracazo, the intense street protests in Caracas in February 1989, the foiled coup attempt against President Carlos Andres Pérez in February 1992, and the street protests and the brief military coup against President Hugo Chávez Frías in April 2002 produced many fatalities and bitter political division and antagonism. Based on the severity of national political violence and the prevalence of conditions for armed conflict in South America, the purpose of this chapter is to ascertain whether intraregional interstate peace is a normal, an anomalous, or a

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paradoxical political development. Accordingly, the first part of this chapter scrutinizes the record of warlike situations, militarized disputes, and diplomatic crises in the region. Second, two different conceptions of interstate peace are evaluated in order to establish which of these is more productive for classifying the nature of the South American peace. Third, to further specify and clarify the character of this case, a typology is presented, based on a two-by-two matrix on the conditions for interstate conflict, to classify the normal or anomalous nature of war and peace in interstate relations. Finally, a sample of the literature on the outbreak of peace among potential adversaries is examined to determine whether or not insights from that research program help elucidate the incidence of intraregional peace in South America. The Record of Interstate Armed Conflict in South America Drawing on the classification advanced by Melvin Small and J. David Singer, an intraregional interstate war is defined here as any armed conflict between countries that either share a common border or are situated in the same geographic subsystem.5 Hence, the 1982 South Atlantic conflict is not included in the sample of this study because it involves the participation of an extra-subsystemic actor. Aside from this case, the region has not been historically immune to the ravages of wars. Prior to the outbreak of the Chaco War in 1932 between Bolivia and Paraguay, South American countries were involved in six major intraregional interstate wars and several minor warlike conflicts.6 From 1825 to 1828, Brazil fought against the provinces of the Rio de la Plata. Colombia and Peru waged a war between 1828 and 1829. In 1836 and 1839 Chile and Argentina battled the Peru-Bolivian Confederation. “La Guerra Grande” or La Plata War involved the Argentine Confederation, Uruguay, antigovernment factions in each of these nations, and Brazil from 1836 to 1852. The Paraguayan War or the Triple Alliance War from 1865 to 1870 engaged Paraguay against a coalition of Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay. Finally, Chile fought Peru and Bolivia for a second time in the War of the Pacific from 1879 to 1884. Also, in the nineteenth century, there were several minor, undeclared armed engagements in the region. In 1841 Peruvian forces battled those of Bolivia at Ingavi. Again, Peru landed troops in Ecuador in 1859. Finally, in 1862 and 1863 Ecuador and Colombia invaded each other’s territory. This study utilizes the Small and Singer criterion that classifies a major war as any clash between two states that causes at least one thousand battlefield fatalities.7 Hence, the Chaco War figures as the only major intraregional interstate war in the twentieth century. Although it was considerably more peaceful than the nineteenth century, the specter of interstate war loomed ominous in the background of intraregional relations in South America. There were several militarized interstate incidents and diplomatic standoffs that were resolved short of a major war.8 During the “Letícia incident” in 1932, Peru seized Colombia’s Amazonian port for a couple of months. Subsequent to the Chaco War, Ecuador lost territory in the Amazon to Peru as the result of the “Marañón dispute” of 1941. Again in 1981 and January 1995, Ecuador and Peru clashed over disputed territory in the Amazon

PEACE IN SOUTH AMERICA

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jungle, believed to be rich in oil deposits. Finally, in 1978 Argentina and Chile were at the brink of war over disputed islands in the Beagle Channel. And in 1987, Colombia challenged Venezuela’s claim over parts of the Gulf of Venezuela by stationing a warship in Venezuelan territorial waters. In all, crises were defused, and casualties and war were avoided in South America. The comparison of warlike situations in South America with other world regions evinces a lower rate of interstate wars in South America. To be precise, in a forty-five-year period (1825–1870) subsequent to national independence, South American countries were involved in only three interstate wars, or .06 percent wars per year. In contrast, African countries experienced four interstate wars in a thirty-three-year period (1957–1990) since the process of national independence began, or .12 percent wars per year. The nations in the Indian subcontinent waged four interstate wars in a forty-five-year period (1945–1990), or .08 percent wars per year. Finally, states in both the Middle East and East Asia clashed nine times, or .2 percent wars per year respectively. Evidently, the intraregional interstate relations of South America are considerably more peaceful than those in any other peripheral region in the world, both in the immediate post-national-independence period and during the cold war years.9 In line with this conclusion, Kalevi J. Holsti affirmed that “[e]xcept for North America, South America has been the most peaceful area in the world in the twentieth century.”10 Although the region is historically more peaceful than other peripheral world regions, the potential for interstate armed conflict has been present. First, South American countries have waged war against each other in the past; and, in most cases, the immediate causes of those conflicts lingered for a while.11 Second, there have been numerous border clashes and bilateral disputes that have brought some of these countries to the brink of war in the last half century. Third, these countries have maintained substantially large armed forces, far exceeding their respective normal requirements for internal security.12 Consequently, the formal absence of intraregional wars in South American, subsequent to the Chaco War, should not lead one to conclude that peace has been the norm of interstate relations in the region. Inherent conflicts of interests among South American states have been ubiquitous over a seven-decade period, and these could have caused a severe crisis and its escalation to war. Precisely, it is the potentiality for interstate armed conflict in the region that renders the post–Chaco War period a paradoxical and anomalous historical development. Two Conceptions of Interstate Peace Peace is the antonym of war. Usually, students of International Relations define peace as the absence of war. For example, when the meaning of war is established as an act of violence or force to compel the enemy to do one’s will,13 peace is defined as the “suspension of violent modes of rivalry between political units.”14 In this sense the definition of war is used at prima facie as the semantic basis to define peace. Traditionally, thus, peace and war have been treated as mutually exclusive concepts or state of affairs. One implies violence; the other nonviolence. The termination of one is the beginning of the other and vice versa. In all, the study of

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complex processes and conditions preserving the peace have not been examined as integral elements of the peace system. Instead, they have been analyzed solely as part of the dynamic of the war system. Such subtle analytical bias obscures other possible nuances of the concept of peace and overlooks the prevalence of complex cases of peace between nation-states. Johan Galtung was one of the first scholars who identified the problem and tried to move away from the dichotomous and oversimplified notion of peace and war. He disaggregated the concept of peace and expanded the analysis of the evolution and maintenance of complex cases of relative peace in interstate relations. Accordingly, he explained that the concept of peace involves both positive and negative aspects, arguing that “negative peace is the absence of violence and war and positive peace is the integration of human society.”15 This attempt identified peace with other possible social state of affairs in international relations, besides the traditional way of defining peace only in relation to war. Subsequently, Galtung himself would proceed to refine further and define more precisely the notions of “negative” and “positive” peace. He elaborated that “an extended concept of violence leads to an extended concept of peace.”16 Thus, he linked personal violence or bodily harm unto others to negative peace, and structural violence or social inequalities to positive peace. Further, in a note to clarify his reasoning, he admits the following: Of course, I am very much aware of changes in my own presentation of these concepts . . . whereas “negative peace” remains fairly constant, meaning “absence of violence”; . . . “positive peace” is constantly changing. I used to see it in terms of cooperation and integration . . . I would now identify “positive peace” mainly with “social justice” . . .17

Clearly, while Galtung expanded and specified the concept of positive peace, he left unchanged the concept of negative peace. He did not explore the international conditions, events, and processes that may lead to the absence of war or negative peace among potential adversaries in the international system. In this respect, Galtung did not advance much from the traditional ways to define interstate peace among potential enemies in the international system. Kenneth E. Boulding elaborated the distinction between positive and negative peace. He affirmed that the first aspect signifies “a condition of good management, orderly resolution of conflict, harmony associated with mature relationships, gentleness, and love.” The negative angle of peace is conceived as “the absence of something—the absence of turmoil, tension, conflict, and war.”18 He stated at the outset of his study that he would focus on peace in a “narrower sense,” or primarily “as the absence of war.”19 Also, he clarified that “both war and peace are positively definable states of a system, each with a characteristic set of properties. Neither is merely the absence of the other.”20 He affirmed that human activity is divided between conflict and nonconflict. He specified that “all non-conflict is peace, but conflict can be divided into war and peace, depending on the nature of the taboos involved.”21 This admission underscores the existence of interstate relations where conflict is a central element, yet it does not escalate to open hostility and war.


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Boulding argued that in the international state system the self-image of states as potential war makers is widespread, yet there are some “interesting exceptions” such as the bilateral relations between Canada and the United States or between the latter and Great Britain where, in the minds of their decision makers, “the idea of a military invasion is so far below the mental horizon as to be almost, though not quite, nonexistent.” He elaborated that when countries develop compatible self-images of nonviolence, then “stable peace” emerges and interstate conflicts are resolved through other nonviolent modalities.22 The refinement of the concept of peace by Boulding is important for two reasons. First, it explains how some nation-states manage to coexist in stable peace, where organized violence does not enter into the mental equation of their respective national psyches and the minds of the decision makers. Second, it distinguishes stable from “unstable” peace. The latter is a situation where two states “may spy on each other, impose various restrictions, have tariffs on each other’s goods, have arms race, prepare plan for each other’s destruction, but as long as they are at peace they do not carry out these plans.”23 While Boulding’s refinements of the concept and study of peace are significant, they fail to address why and how some countries coexist in a state of “unstable” or “negative” peace. In this sense, his attempt remained at the point where Galtung and others left off. He overlooked the inner conditions of the concept of unstable or negative peace that may or may not lead to a state of relative peace among potential adversaries. Thus, it is important to specify and study the necessary and sufficient conditions leading to peace among adversaries.24 In Boulding’s own words, it is important to explain that tract of human activity when conflict is not war but peace. As established by traditionalists and other scholars of world politics, the basic notion of interstate peace denotes in its most limited and narrow sense either a cessation of hostilities among previously belligerent actors or the absence of war between nation-states. A more inclusive and precise definition of this concept, though, is the connotation of various gradations of peaceful relations in the international system. That is, the basic concept of peace encompasses two related but distinct meanings. First, in the simple and narrow view, the cessation or lack of hostilities is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of peace. Second, in the complex and broad view, the termination or absence of war is only a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the prevalence of various degrees of international peace. Both conceptions of interstate peace are important in their own right. The simple and narrow view is a valuable concept to describe a general state of affairs, lacking any form of interstate hostility. Also, it unambiguously distinguishes war from peace in the international system. Beyond these positive aspects, however, this notion is too restrictive and unproductive, theoretically speaking. It neglects the subtleties and nuances of complex interstate relations, and it focuses on the most obvious and commonsensical conditions for interstate peace. In other words, by stressing the absence of armed conflict as the fundamental prerequisite for peace, it reveals the superficial cause and it overlooks antecedent, primary factors that may be ultimately responsible for the lack of interstate war.

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Since the absence of interstate armed conflict is both a necessary and sufficient condition for this notion of interstate peace, then there is nothing unusual or anomalous about the peace between two nations, even when these are classified as potential enemies. To put it differently, under this conception, whenever two or more states are not engaged in any type of bellicose activity, they are considered to be at peace. This view is not concerned with degrees of peace, or the factors preventing the outbreak of war between potential adversaries. Its purpose is to establish a simple and basic dichotomous distinction between war and peace in the relations among nation-states. Hence, it is consistent with this conception to classify the post–Chaco War period in intraregional relations in South America as a normal case of interstate peace. The complex and broad view of interstate peace overcomes the simplistic and commonsensical condition of the narrow view. Furthermore, by focusing on other dimensions beyond those included in the basic definition, it elevates the study of peaceful coexistence among potential adversaries to the rank of important international phenomena. This category of international issues also includes questions on the causes of international wars, management and organization of international life, and the development of international cooperation among nation-states in the military and economic realms. First of all, the broad view takes as a given, or as a fundamental precondition for the realization of interstate peace, the absence of any form of open hostility. Second, it disaggregates the concept of interstate peace into various degrees along a continuum of peaceful relations. The assumption is that different groups of countries, depending upon the variety and intensity of their opposing interests, exhibit greater or lesser predisposition and motivation for war than others. Accordingly, the broad view categorizes peaceful relations among countries in a scale ranging from normal to anomalous. For example, along this continuum of interstate peace, the relations among the Scandinavian countries, Canada and the United States, and France and Spain to name a few represent a different degree from that characterizing the relations between the former Soviet Union and the United States during the cold war, Greece and Turkey after 1974, India and Pakistan, and that among some countries in South America. In the first group of countries, interstate relations are classified as normally peaceful, while those in the second group are anomalously peaceful. Why is that the case? What criteria are utilized to differentiate normal from anomalous peaceful interstate relations? To respond to these queries, it is necessary to explain the third positive feature of this broad conception of interstate peace. By classifying some cases of interstate peace as anomalies, it is assumed that some dyads in the international system involve sufficient conditions for the break-out war, yet interstate peace prevails. In such instances, peace depends on other causal factors. For example, interstate peace may be the result of structural and idiosyncratic factors. Among the structural factors can be listed the balance of terror, or Mutual Assured Destruction, between the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war. Other structural dynamics may be conventional deterrence, hegemonic control, and management of regional conflicts, and compatible domestic political structures or regime types. The idiosyncratic aspects include the aversion of national leaders to war, ideological


13

affinity, and similarity of belief and value systems to name a few. Clearly, idiosyncratic factors are fortuitous developments and the structural processes listed are not intended to promote amicable relations. Instead, their primary objective is to keep an adversary in check or at bay and peace results as an unintended consequence. Thus, in the third part of this chapter a typology is developed to classify interstate relations as normally peaceful or conflictual and abnormally peaceful or conflictual. Precisely, the significance of the broad conception of interstate peace is its sensitivity to the importance of other factors inhibiting the outbreak of war. In other words, this view recognizes that the development of peaceful coexistence among potential adversaries is one of the many facets of interstate peace that cannot be sufficiently explained by the general absence of hostilities. Accordingly, this notion enables the analyst to inquire into the origin of this serendipitous and anomalous type of interstate peace. As discussed above, the potentiality for interstate armed conflict in the midst of a seventy-year period of relative peace in South America warrants classifying this development as an anomaly or as a paradox. Accordingly, given the stipulations of both conceptions of interstate peace, it appears to be theoretically and methodologically productive to analyze such historical development as a case study of the complex and broad view of interstate peace. Hereafter, the use of the concept “interstate peace” or simply “peace” in connection with the post–Chaco War period in the South American political history will denote the broader notion of the concept. Moreover, the broader definition of the concept of peace throughout this book will be strictly concerned with the refinement and precision of negative peace, or the lack of international violence as the unintended consequence of unstable international political processes like balance of power and transnational militarism. War and Peace in International Politics: Norm, Anomaly, or Paradox? War and peace are alternating byproducts of the continuous and dynamic nature of international social interactions. But this seemingly deterministic and automatic social process is neither an inevitable nor an unalterable course of reality, which presages a future war to nations presently at peace and augurs peace to nations currently at war. On the contrary, the evolution of interstate peace and war are two very erratic international political developments. A war is always preceded by an international crisis. As Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing reminded us several years ago, “it is useful to conceive of a crisis as an intermediate zone between peace and war.”25 In turn, a crisis eventuates from a clash of interests between nations over certain specific stakes or issues. Or as Carl von Clausewitz would put it, “war is a clash between major interests, which is resolved by bloodshed—that is the only way in which it differs from other conflicts.”26 Stated differently, the transition from peace to war derives from a basic incompatibility of objectives between two or more nation-states over specific stakes like a territorial dispute, access to raw materials and trade routes, status, ideology, religion, nationalism, and others.

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In sum, international crises and wars do not just happen. Their inception derives from disputed issues, deemed sufficiently important by decision makers in nation-states that are willing to fight wars over them. Accordingly, issues denote in this study exactly the same as the definition advanced by Paul Diehl: An issue can be conceived as “a disputed point or question, the subject of a conflict or controversy.” An issue may be tangible, such as control over a piece of territory, or intangible, such as racial supremacy. It is not required that an issue be stated by the parties. Yet one should not imply that any correlate of war (e.g., arms race) is an issue. Rather, an issue is what states choose to fight over, not the conditions that led to the choice of military force as the means.27

As previously noted, the presence of contentious interests in the relations between countries does not always lead to a crisis, let alone to a war. It is, therefore, extremely important for theories on the causes of war and peace to heed the question of why do potential adversaries or rivals remain at peace with each other, despite the existence of conflicting issues in their relations? This query has been overshadowed by the greater emphasis in the field on explaining why hostilities break out between nation-states (i.e., how and why countries cross the threshold from a crisis situation into war). Such neglect stems primarily from the failure to discriminate between cases where war is almost an inevitable outcome due to the presence of overwhelming conditions for armed conflict and cases where peace prevails despite the existence of some conditions for war.28 The first instance represents situations where a conflict of interests has been exacerbated to the point of a very virulent international crisis and where three outcomes are only possible: war, outright capitulation by one side, or negotiated or tacit compromise.29 The second instance is made up of situations where peace is perilously preserved on the basis of unstable factors like transnational confraternity among military establishments for their respective national political gains, balance of power and threats, and lack of motivation and power to wage war. Discussing the failure of international relations theories (behavioral, structural, and evolutionary) to forecast the end of cold war, John Gaddis, referring specifically to the behavioral approach in world politics, asserts the following: Despite the self-chosen association of many behavioralists with the field of “peace studies,” the data bases they have assembled have concerned themselves, to a striking degree, with the subject of war. Their focus has been on conflict, escalation, deterrence, crisis management, and crisis decision-making. They have shown more interest in the circumstances that cause peace to break down than with those that cause it to break out.30

Gaddis identifies a problem that reveals the theoretical rigidity in the field of International Relations when it comes to explaining complex cases of international peace. That is, the efforts to explain the outbreak of peace with the same theoretical tools with which experts explicate the onset of wars. Simply scholars assume that if X leads to war; its absence will lead to peace. Representative of this position, Geoffrey Blainey affirms that “to examine the causes of peace is essentially to turn


15

the causes of war upside down.”31 Superficially, this seems to be an obvious and commonsensical conclusion, but in reality, this is not the case; because, as it was argued in the previous section, interstate peace is a broader concept than just simply the absence of overt hostility. Alternatively, this work shares the view of Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr in their analysis of the causes of peace among the OECD countries since 1945. As they maintain that “the question ‘what are the causes of peace?’ is not simply the opposite side of the common question, ‘what are the causes of war?’ ”32 The latter position underscores the complexity of interstate peace and its intrinsic difference from dynamics of war. Thus, peace requires to be classified more accurately, given the presence or absence of certain conditions closely associated with the outbreak of war. Once this classificatory scheme is in place, this study will be in the position to advance the analysis of the causes of peace and war. In sum, it is problematic to use the same theoretical lenses to explain both outcomes, without first discerning their normal or anomalous characters. Sensitive to the shortcoming in the literature on the causes of peace and war, a typology is presented subsequently to classify normal or anomalous nature of the incidence of international war and peace. This organizational scheme presupposes that three integral elements constitute the peace-war cycle in world politics: conditions, processes, and events. Also, it is assumed that, antecedent to the immediate causes of crisis and war, there are basic stakes or issues that set in motion international social processes (i.e., security dilemmas, militarism, balance of power, arms races, misperception, etc.). In turn, these exacerbate the conditions for crisis and war. It is in this kind of charged social milieu that a specific event (e.g., the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne by a Serbian nationalist on June 28, 1914) ultimately unleashes a virulent crisis that may either escalate to war, or be resolved through negotiation, cooperation, or unilateral capitulation.33 In a critical review of the theoretical literature on the causes of war and peace, Jack Levy notes the importance of exploring the question of whether conflicts occur as a result of clashes over “real” issues such as territory and resources, or “other processes” like security dilemmas. He complains that, with the exception of few analysts, “relatively little attention has been given to the actual issues involved in the processes leading to war.” Furthermore, he recognizes “that some interests and some issues are more vital than others and more likely to lead to war than are conflicts over other issues.” Nevertheless, he laments that “analysts have not been successful in identifying an objective hierarchy of interests applicable to all states . . .”34 This gap in the literature identified by Levy has been independently addressed by Kalevi Holsti in a study that, among other aspects of international peace and war, examines the question of the frequency and ranking of conflict-producing issues over which individuals and nations fight wars. He found that, in descending order, the most important and frequent issues are territory, nation-state creation, ideology, economic factors (i.e., access to natural resources, monopolies over trade routes, access to waterways and potable water, protection of the lives, property, and investment of nationals abroad), protection of ethnic and religious confreres, and predation (i.e., the attempt to destroy a regime or dismember, partition, or liquidate a sovereign state).35


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Based on Holsti’s findings, the subsequent matrix (figure 1.1) will define as conditions for conflict all those issues that he evaluated and ranked in his investigation. In addition, under this category are included other items such as trade disputes, overpopulation or population pressures, and pollution or environmental aggressions. The vertical side of the matrix is defined as either war or peace, two dichotomous and mutually exclusive outcomes in the international system. Given the case of only these two possible results, and the absence or presence of the conditions for armed conflict and war, the matrix reveals four different combinations or types of cases concerning the occurrence of international peace and war. The first quadrant discloses an anomaly. This type of case is nonexistent and, under the specified parameters, ostensibly illogical. It is inconceivable to have war without previous conditions for conflict. Such a conflict would only be possible through a capricious decision by an absolute autocrat (and this would immediately become a condition) to attack any target of opportunity or any country at random. This case would be analogous to that of an individual who is suddenly assaulted by another person, with no other apparent motive or reason than as a whimsical and random act. Such an incident may be conceivable in domestic society, but in the international system it is unquestionably a far-fetched possibility. The second quadrant displays a normal type of international war that is customarily studied and theorized about in International Relations. In fact, a perusal of the theoretical literature on the causes of war reveals that most of the cases selected for testing these theories are those where conditions for conflict have been present or where social processes, as those described above, were operating. Such practice has deleterious effects on the theoretical understanding and development of the nature of war and peace. First, it compromises the theory-building endeavor by predisposing analysts to construct theories that conform closely to an a priori historical understanding of actual cases of war. Second, it limits the number of cases for comparative analysis, circumscribing the testing of theories to only easy cases, where either a crisis or a war has ensued. Commenting on this last point, Robert Jervis affirms that “historians and political scientists are drawn to the study of conflict more often than to the analysis of peaceful interactions.”36 This is one of three methodological problems he examines in relation with the implementation of the comparative method of analysis in determining the influence of misperception on war. CONDITIONS FOR CONFLICT Absent O U T C O M E

Figure 1.1

Present

War

1 ANOMALOUS Occurrence of War

2 NORMAL Occurrence of War

Peace

3 NORMAL Occurrence of Peace

4 ANOMALOUS Occurrence of Peace

Normal and Anomalous Nature of War and Peace


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The third quadrant reflects a normal type of interstate peace because there is no single condition for conflict between state actors. The relationship between pairs of countries like the United States and Canada, Norway and Sweden, Switzerland and Austria, Argentina and Nepal, Paraguay and Rwanda, and so on are a few illustrations of the type of peace classified within this quadrant. For this type of cases the simple and narrow view of peace will suffice. The fourth quadrant evinces an anomalous type of international peace. In this type of case, states’ interactions contain at least one of the conditions for conflict, yet peace prevails. The peace between the United States and the former Soviet Union from 1946 to 1989 is the best known case of this type of anomalous peace. The most salient conditions for conflict, affecting the relations between the two superpowers over these years, were status, ideology, and predation. In addition to this case, there were several others in South America, involving at least one of the conditions for conflict. Territory and resources are the most prominent issues, affecting the relations among South American countries. For instance, conditions for conflict have existed for years between Colombia and Venezuela over disputed territory and resources in the Gulf of Venezuela, and between the latter and Guyana over the Essequibo territory. Furthermore, there have been conditions for conflict between Ecuador and Peru over the Oriente-Mainas; between the latter and Chile over Tacna-Arica. Chile and Argentina were even at the brink of war over islands in the Beagle Channel. In addition to territorial disputes between several pairs of countries in South America, any of the states involved also share common borders with several other nations, yet they have remained at peace with each other. The commonality of borders and the prevalence of peace in this region challenge the findings of one study that uses borders and alliances to measure the spread of war through “infectious diffusion.” The study reveals that “the probability of war diffusion is substantially increased as opportunities and willingness increase, particularly when such geographic (borders) and political factors (alliances) are combined.”37 In 1982, during the South Atlantic Islands armed conflict, war did not spread to Brazil or Chile, two of Argentina’s historical rivals. In sum, it is possible to list several other areas in South America involving conditions for conflict, but those mentioned above seem sufficient to convey the point that the state of relative peace in South America has indeed been an anomaly.38 The Literature on the Outbreak of Peace and Its Relevance for South America In reviewing the literature on the outbreak of peace among previously belligerent actors and among potential adversaries, it is useful to focus only on works whose aim is to explain negative peace or unstable peace. This review will ascertain if and how insights from each of these works can help explain the absence of intraregional interstate wars in South America. A useful starting point is to organize peace studies according to the distinction of peace advanced by Kenneth Boulding. He differentiates “stable peace” from “unstable peace.” The first identifies “a situation in which the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations of the people involved.”


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The second defines “the condition in which peace is regarded as the norm and war is regarded as a breakdown of peace, which will be restored when the war is over.”39 Expounding further on this categorization, Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr assert that the central distinction between stable peace under conditions that are basically acceptable to both sides and a situation of non-war [unstable peace] maintained only by threats (whether unilateral or reciprocated) is clear enough. It corresponds roughly to the Arabic terms salaam, which means an enduring peaceful relationship based on mutual respect, and sulah, which means only the end of hostilities or a truce.40

Following this refinement, works that can be included in the “stable peace” category will be examined first and then those that can be classified under “unstable peace.” Stable Peace Karl W. Deutsch and a group of associates conducted a pioneering study on the conditions and processes of peace.41 They found motivation for this endeavor in reaction to the dearth of “thorough investigation into the ways in which certain areas of the world have, in the past, ‘permanently’ eliminated war.” Accordingly, their purpose was “to explain how and why certain groups have permanently stopped warring.”42 They conceptualize an area where peace is expected or, as they state, where there is “real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically”43 as a security community. They elaborate the following: A SECURITY COMMUNITY is a group of people which has become “integrated.” By INTEGRATION we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a “long” time, dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population. By SENSE OF COMMUNITY we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change.” By PEACEFUL CHANGE we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force.44

Evidently, the crux of this approach is the degree of “integration” among a group of people. Integration, either through a process of amalgamation or pluralism, signifies the capacity and disposition of the members of a political community to harmonize their interests and resolve their differences via institutionalized and peaceful channels. Therefore, Deutsch and colleagues positively correlate increments in the degree of international integration with a greater prospect to achieve security communities. In an effort to understand and explain how and why certain regions in the world have “permanently” renounced violence for the resolution of conflict, they


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proceed to test fourteen conditions, linked to the process of integration and, consequently, to the establishment of a security community.45 A security community can be attained by way of two distinct processes: “amalgamation,” that is, the formal merger of two or more previously independent units into a single large unit, with some type of common government after completion of the process; and “pluralism,” that is, when two or more separate units come closer together but retain their legal independence and separate governments.46 The United States represents an instance of the amalgamated type, while pairs of countries like Norway and Sweden since 1907, Canada and United States since the 1870s, Great Britain and the United States since the end of the century, and so on are examples of the pluralistic type. Deutsch’s analysis centers on the North Atlantic area, comprising nineteen countries: two in North America and seventeen in Western Europe. In this group of countries, there are former adversaries, who now form a “pluralistic security community,” and there are others that are simply involved in a process of integration, but have yet to achieve the status of a “security community.”47 Deutsch’s findings may be summarized in three points. First, integration and the establishment of a security community are the most effective options “to eliminate all expectations of warfare among the North Atlantic countries, together with all specific preparations for it.”48 Second, out of the two processes to achieve integration, the most stable and efficacious to promote peace for the international community is pluralism and the preservation of national sovereignty.49 In other words, although people may often fight a central government, there is a greater tendency for them to live in peace as separate countries. Finally, the North Atlantic area was not yet integrated, but it was well on its way toward becoming so. It rated high in eight of the fourteen conditions that they find either essential or helpful to integration.50 The purpose here is not to criticize exhaustively the logic and theoretical underpinnings of the approach taken by Deutsch et al. but, rather, to assess if and how insights from their analysis can elucidate the nature of relative peace in South America. Accordingly, two relevant aspects of the study must be evaluated in light of the South American case. First, the choice of dependent variable (i.e., interstate peace within a particular area) in Deutsch’s study and in the present work appears to be identical. But a closer scrutiny reveals a subtle and crucial difference between the foci of both studies. To make a case for integration as the most probable cause of peace among the North Atlantic area, Deutsch et al. establish several conditions that can be met only by pairs and groups of nations that have either achieved, or are well advanced in the process of establishing a “pluralistic security community.”51 It means countries whose bilateral relations do not involve a conflict of interests over basic stakes like territory, resources, status, ideology, and so on. Therefore, countries whose relations include contention over such issues are automatically excluded from the integrationist approach. Thus, it is not surprising to learn that pairs of countries such as Canada and the United States, Sweden and Norway, and so on have been more successful in “permanently eliminating war.”52 Restating this in terms of the matrix developed in the section above, integration explains only the type of normal

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peace disclosed by the third quadrant in that matrix, but the objective of the present analysis is to explain the type of anomalous peace revealed in the fourth quadrant in that same matrix. Second, ignoring the difference explained above for the sake of argument, and accepting at face value the proposition that, indeed, the absence or the probability of eliminating interstate warfare is directly correlated with a higher degree of international integration, one could conceivably measure how nations in South America rank according to the fourteen conditions or indicators specified by Deutsch et al in their analysis. It is clear, short of a very lengthy and involved empirical analysis that the countries in South America would perform poorly in terms of those conditions. For example, one of the essential conditions for integration, “compatibility of main values,”53 includes constitutionalism, democracy, and free enterprise economy. A review of the history of South America since 1935 reveals great incompatibility of these values among the units concerned. Countries in the region have constantly alternated, at different intervals of time, between constitutionalism and authoritarianism, between democracy and dictatorship, and between corporatism and free enterprise. Another essential condition is “mutual responsiveness,”54 which means mutual loyalties; “we-feeling” and trust; identification of self-images and interests; ability to predict each other’s behavior and act in accordance with that prediction. Again, none of these elements appear to hold against the test of history in South America. Nationalism, “us-against-them-feeling,” distrust and divergent interests have been rampant in the region over the last seventy years. In short, South America has been and still is at best at an infant stage of intraregional integration; yet intraregional interstate peace has endured for longer than in the entire North Atlantic area. Another effort to explain interstate peace is that conducted by Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, analyzing the “development and maintenance” of peace subsystems in Scandinavia and the Netherlands.55 Their analysis incorporates the basic logic and assumptions of their later work on “lateral pressure” theory of international conflict.56 Since they claim that “peace systems represent a variant of this basic model,” they hypothesize that peace systems will develop when “modes of international behavior generated by internal demands and pressures” will avoid the creation and protection of spheres of influence and military competition.57 Choucri and North proceed to compare the dynamics of these systems with those of the 1870–1914 “war-prone Great Power system.”58 They find that the linkages between domestic variables (population growth, technological development, and resources) and processes of colonial expansion, arms races, and violent conflicts were very strong for the six Great Powers prior to World War I, but weak for Scandinavia and the Netherlands for the period in question. They also find that international commercial activities have not produced international military involvements or war. Despite the Choucri and North empirical findings, it is not entirely clear if the weak linkages between variables are what cause these nations to engage in nonviolent modes of international behavior, or whether it is simply, as they reiterate twice in the study, that “the Scandinavian countries . . . have consciously


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endeavored not to become involved in ongoing global conflicts nor to engage in international warfare.”59 At one point they assert the following: Essentially, the Scandinavian countries “opted out” of ongoing conflict and war-prone systems long ago and as a result of internal and external transformations have substantially modified the patterning of their international relations.60

If the latter is true, then peace is the result of a “civilized” social process, rather than lateral pressures, created by the dynamic interaction of domestic variables. Nonetheless, it appears plausible to argue that the “conscious” decision to “opt out” of the war-prone system and to pursue nonviolent modes of external behavior is more the effect of external constraints than internal demands and needs. In fact at one point they admit to this when they write, “An obvious consideration might involve their position as Small Powers hemmed in by Major Powers such as Russia, Germany, Great Britain, and, to a lesser extent, France.” But they dismiss this explanation, without providing evidence, and retorting that “other countries perceiving themselves as ‘surrounded’ have built up their military capabilities, sometimes at the expense of domestic benefactors, and have enhanced their positions further by allying themselves with Great Powers or with coalitions of Lesser Powers.”61 In this sense the choice of peaceful mode of international relations would appear to be less the result of an enlightened and civilized decision than a practical imperative to survive. Explaining the peace in Scandinavia and the Netherlands as a long historical process in which these countries made a “conscious” decision to “opt out” of global competition offers no major clue as to how and why there has been peace in South America for over seventy years. Choucri and North seem to think that the most important cause of international war is the rivalry over the establishment and defense of colonies and spheres of influence. This is just one of many different issues over which nations (especially Great Powers) fight wars. There are others (e.g., territorial disputes, religion, etc.) that may involve more specific and immediate stakes in the relations of Lesser Powers, which can cause war too. Evidently, the Nordic countries “consciously” ceased to compete over spheres of influence, because they lacked the capabilities to emulate the Great European powers surrounding them. Furthermore, they developed an intraregional peace subsystem because their relations did not include any conflict of interests over basic stakes. Unlike these countries, South American nation-states are not “hemmed in by Great Powers,” nor are they exempted from the pressures of population growth, need for basic natural resources, and conflict of interests with their neighbors over basic stakes, yet they have remained at relative peace with each other for over seven decades. Unstable Peace The focus shifts now to works whose main objective is to explain how and why countries (chiefly Great Powers), which harbor latent tensions, conflicts of interest, and animosities, are able to coexist in a state of relative peace. One such attempt is

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by Stephen R. Rock, who examines how and why some Great Powers (e.g., the United States and England, and the latter and France), at the turn of the century, were able to reach a rapprochement subsequent to a major crisis.62 He compares these successful cases of great power reconciliation to other cases (e.g., Great Britain and Germany, and the latter and the United Sates), where war erupted eventually. Rock’s main contention is that the “emergence of amicable relations among formerly hostile powers” is the result of a two-stage process: first, when it is decided that “armed conflict is not an acceptable mechanism for settling their differences”; and, second, when they act upon “this determination and outstanding disputes are liquidated and an expectation of nonviolence develops.” He claims that the second stage is a logical consequence of the first; therefore, his study concentrates on “identifying” factors that cause states “to decide that armed conflict is not an appropriate method for resolving their disagreements.”63 Three major categories of factors, he argues, determine whether nations choose violent or nonviolent means to settle bilateral disputes. He defines “motivating factors” as those that provide states with positive inducements to pursue amicable relations. This category includes: (1) the need to balance against an adversary or adversaries constituting a more serious threat; (2) the desire to preserve vital economic connections; and (3) the wish to avoid a fratricidal or civil war. The “facilitating factors” are those that enable states to act upon these incentives. This group of factors include: (1) a sufficiently low level of geopolitical competition to allow for compromise and the resolution of major issues; (2) the absence of economic rivalry; and (3) ideological compatibility or, alternatively, the absence of ideological disaffection. Finally, a “catalytic factor,” that is, the role of an acute crisis is necessary to set the process of reconciliation in motion.64 Accordingly, he highlights four different hypotheses, which he proceeds to test against four different historical cases mentioned above.65 Essentially, these hypotheses amount to defining whether there is complementarity (i.e., heterogeneity), or conflict (i.e., homogeneity) of interests between states in three basic realms: geopolitics, economics, and societal and ideological attitudes. He finds that three “conditions are conducive to great power rapprochement: heterogeneity in the exercise of national power, heterogeneity of economic activities, and homogeneity of societal attitudes.” He adds that if two states are in a “sufficiently favorable” position vis à vis these conditions, “then a catalytic crisis may set the process of reconciliation in motion.”66 These are the reasons, according to Rock, that rapprochement was possible between the United States and England, and between the latter and France, but impossible between Germany and England, and between the former and the United States. Again, the purpose here is to expose the reasons for why this analysis may or may not serve as a guide to explain the South American case. In this regard, several comments are in order. First, in contrasting Rock’s findings with the historical experience in South America, it is important to underscore the intraregional peace in the area, despite the existence of several dyads, characterized by “homogeneous” geopolitical and economic objectives. Second, as noted above, he assigns a paramount role to a “catalytic crisis” in the process of reconciliation between two


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states. Yet, in South America there are historical instances (e.g., the negotiations between Venezuela and Colombia over the disputed Gulf of Venezuela) when two nations might have reached that stage short of a major crisis. Finally, this study reveals that “homogeneity of societal attitudes” (i.e., language, ideology, form of government, and broad culture) is one of three “conducive conditions” for a peaceful resolution of a crisis. This variable surfaced before in Karl Deutsch’s work, but it needs to be specified further in order to be useful for the analysis of the South American case. In its present state, it involves very broad categories that should be studied separately. Nevertheless, it is an angle that will be pursued in another part (chapter 7 on militarism) of this work. This book was inspired in part by the analysis of another case of interstate peace, variously referred to as the Long Peace, or “the greatest nonevent in human history.” Therefore, it is only fitting to reflect on the relevance or irrelevance of the work done in this area for the South American peace. When Gaddis coined the phrase the “Long Peace” to rename the “cold war,” he essentially argued that the post–World War II arrangement “paradoxically” lasted despite the acrimony characterizing superpower relations since 1946.67 Three fundamental factors, according to Gaddis, are responsible for this unintended result: (1) nuclear deterrence; (2) the reconnaissance regime; and (3) the moderation of ideologies in both countries.68 In spite of this multicausal explanation, it is evident that “what has really made the difference in inducing this unaccustomed caution has been the workings of the nuclear deterrent.”69 To further stress this argument, he affirms that “nuclear deterrence is the most important behavioral mechanism that has sustained the post–World War II international system . . .”70 It is utterly clear that these conditions, especially nuclear deterrence, are not useful to explain the case of intraregional interstate peace in South America. Even Kenneth Waltz’s argument of nuclear proliferation as a source of peace and stability in the international system does not apply to the case at hand.71 Only Argentina and Brazil have experience with nuclear technology. In recent history, development of nuclear technology was very high on the political agenda of both countries; but, since the advent of democracy to these countries and economic crises, Argentina publicly cancelled its nuclear program. On the other hand, Brazil claims to be developing the technology only for peaceful and civilian purposes, and that it does not have a military nuclear program. John Mueller explains “the greatest nonevent in human history” as the culmination of a long historical process in which “war” has come to be perceived as costly, unwise, debasing, repulsive, and futile.72 Contrary to Gaddis’s interpretation, he argues that nuclear weapons have not had an impact on the relative peace that has prevailed among the developed countries in the international system. In part, peace has evolved, according to Mueller, because these countries have reached standards of living that would make war counterproductive. The cost of war is an angle he employs to partially explain why war, among the developed countries, is dwindling, and why it has persisted in the developing world. In fact, he affirms, “As countries raise their standard of living, perhaps they will find the prospect of war to be decreasingly attractive because they will have more to lose.”73 Evidently, this is an argument easily confounded by European

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history. In the twentieth century Europe was more catastrophically warlike than in the nineteeth century, when the economies there were immensely less developed. Nonetheless, taking Muller’s argument at face value for the sake of analysis, it pales when tested against the history of Latin America. Obviously, neither the region in general nor South America in particular approximate the level of wealth and growth existent in the developed world in the twentieth century and in the new millennium, yet this region has remained at peace for over seventy years. Faced with this historical anomaly, Muller explains it by arguing that the dozens of boundary disputes in Latin America have been settled (which was not true up until 1995 when Ecuador and Peru finally settled their territorial dispute); and because “Latin American countries are generally better off than their counterparts in Asia and Africa.”74 This comparison may explain why Latin America has been more peaceful than other third world areas; but, certainly, it does not explain why it ranks better than the developed world in the same time period. The most important conclusion of this chapter is that, indeed, the South American peace is an anomaly. This question was tackled from different angles and it was repeatedly demonstrated that the interstate peace in this region is a historical paradox and that it has not been closely analyzed. By way of a review of the literature on the outbreak of peace, it was shown that insights from these studies were context-dependent and difficult to generalize. Hence, it appears that, since studies on cases similar to the one at hand are not suggestive for this endeavor, it is only logical to attack the puzzle from an opposite perspective, namely, the onset of war. Therefore, probing two sets of general hypotheses, derived from realism and liberalism, will be the next objective of this book. Accordingly, in the following five chapters the theoretical assumptions of both schools will be examined and specific hypotheses will be formulated, operationalized, and tested.

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL REALISM: PEACE THROUGH POWER?

olitical realism and its contemporary derivative, neorealism, constitute one of the most influential analytical traditions in world politics. E. H. Carr places the origin of this school of thought “far behind utopianism and by way of reaction from it.” He affirms, nonetheless, that “the thesis that ‘justice is the right of the stronger’ was, indeed, familiar in the Hellenic world.”1 While Carr traces the inception of realist ideas to ancient Greece, Robert Gilpin is more specific and asserts that “the classic history of Thucydides is as meaningful a guide to the behavior of states today as when it was written in the fifth century B.C.”2 Such expressions are common among many contemporary realists who claim that Thucydides’s analysis of the Peloponnesian War and his focus on the concept of relative power are fundamental pillars of political realism. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that one of realism’s primary concerns has been the investigation of the causes of war and peace in interstate relations. Given the focus of this book, it will evaluate the causal relationship between the most relevant realist propositions and the prevalence of peace in South America. Various realist strands often yield contradictory propositions on the causes of war and peace. Nevertheless, the decision has been made to present realism in consistent and parsimonious terms, because it is treated frequently that way in the international relations literature. Clearly, unless such contradictions are identified and tested against specific cases, there cannot be much theoretical progress in that part of the field of International Relations, nor can realism be called a paradigm. The alternative to the approach taken in this study is to remain operating according to a number of loosely connected propositions that yield contradictory explanations of critical questions in world politics. This chapter reviews the fundamental assumptions and central propositions of the basic realist model and, then, proceeds to deduce from various specific theories grounded in the realist paradigm the most germane hypotheses to the purpose and scope of this work.3 The explanatory value of these propositions will be briefly assessed by evaluating the correspondence between their individual theoretical content and the empirical reality in South America.4 Theoretical correspondence with empirical reality is one of two ways, according to Imre Lakatos, to ascertain

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the validity of a theory.5 Subsequently, the variables will be operationalized and the methodology will be explained to test these propositions against the history of peace in South America. The Basic Realist Model Political realism from Thucydides to Waltz is a mode of analysis and theorizing about interstate relations. Accordingly, this intellectual tradition is distinctively referred to as a “conceptual framework,” as a “paradigm,” or as a “scientific research programme.”6 Such characterizations underscore primarily the epistemological unity of a basic set of concepts, assumptions, and axioms spawning an array of specific theoretical analyses in international politics. Several seminal works in political philosophy have provided contemporary realism with its intellectual foundations and its basic normative content.7 In The History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides attributed the cause of that conflict to “the growth of the power of Athens,” and the “alarm which it inspired” among other city-states, principally Sparta.8 From his analysis of the war and the affects of the growth of power on the relations between city-states, contemporary realists have adopted the concept of relative power as a central element in their theories and analyses. Niccolò Machiavelli, in his quest to prescribe a solution to the political problems that plagued the Italian peninsula in the sixteenth century, wrote The Prince.9 Retrospectively, this seemingly simple, little manual on statecraft made two profound and lasting impacts on the intellectual evolution of realism. First, it helped removed absolute and religious moral considerations from the sphere of politics, particularly in the relations among principalities. Since Machiavelli’s normative argument emphasized that the ultimate standard of right, wrong, and obligation in the political sphere was the principle of utility or beneficence rather than love and benevolence, contemporary realists have framed their studies from a utilitarian perspective.10 The Prince also moved political analysis, including interstate affairs, away from the mysticism that was characteristic of the Middle Ages to the realism of the Renaissance. For example, on this point Machiavelli explained that his purpose was to write something useful for whoever understands it, it seemed to me more appropriate to pursue the effectual truth of the matter rather than its imagined one. And many have imagined republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist in reality; for there is such a gap between how one lives and how one should live that he who neglects what is being done for what should be done will learn his destruction rather than his preservation: for a man who wishes to profess goodness at all times must fall to ruin among so many who are not good. Whereby it is necessary for a prince, who wishes to maintain his position to learn how not to be good, and to use it or not according to necessity.11

Finally, Thomas Hobbes in the Leviathan12 theorized how self-interested individuals seeking protection from each other came to form the state. For heuristic

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purpose, he likened the international system to a hypothetical state of nature where “there is always war of every one against every one.” Yet, he insisted that because kings and “persons of sovereign authority” (meaning nation-states in contemporary parlance) were more powerful than individuals, there would never be an international sovereign “to keep them all in awe”;13 Therefore a state of war would prevail where “nothing is unjust.”14 Although Thucydides and Machiavelli anticipated some of these notions in their respective works, Hobbes furnished realism with its fundamental concept of international anarchy (i.e., the absence of an overarching central government). He identified the importance of political power to differentiate individual from state behavior. And, finally, he stressed the amoral and conflictual nature of interstate affairs as a logical consequence of the clash among self-interested, sovereign actors. From these early intellectual roots to the time when Hans J. Morgenthau coined the name “political realism” in the first edition of Politics Among Nations in 1948,15 other analysts (e.g., Frederick L. Schuman, Harold Nicolson, Edward Hallett Carr, Reinhold Niebuhr, George Schwarzenberger, Nicholas J. Spykman, and Martin Wight)16 continued utilizing a basic realist reasoning and conceptualization in their analyses, thereby, advancing further the development of political realism as a school of thought in international relations. Notwithstanding the intellectual and practical accomplishment of their efforts, there was no systematic attempt to formulate and develop a general theory of international politics prior to 1948. It is Morgenthau,17 in his influential textbook, who finally claimed “to present a theory of international politics.”18 This work initiated a theoretical revolution in the field of international relations that touched the work of many other observers such as Arnold Wolfers, George F. Kennan, John H. Herz, Raymond Aron, and Henry A. Kissinger.19 Writing on the intellectual history of international relations, Stanley Hoffmann affirms that if the discipline of international relations “has any founding father, it is Morgenthau.”20 He laid down the foundations of a “science of international politics”21 in six principles of political realism.22 Three important and basic conceptions permeate Morgenthau’s theory. First, he assumes the reduction of all international politics to a continuous struggle for power, understood only by assuming “that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power.”23 Second, he underscores the importance of rationality as to provide both guidance and discipline to the practice and analysis of foreign policy.24 Third, he underlines “that the balance of power and policies aiming at its preservation are not only inevitable but are an essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations.”25 The latest version of political realism spearheaded by Morgenthau came to the fore in 1979 with the publication of Kenneth N. Waltz’s Theory of International Politics.26 While Waltz presents his approach as a divergence from Morgenthau and not an evolution from him, it can be plausibly argued that both represent a sequential progression within the same intellectual current. They base their theories on similar assumptions, and both share a preoccupation with theory building within the realist paradigm. Like Morgenthau, Waltz indicates that one of the purposes of his book is “to construct a theory of international politics. . . .”27 The result of his endeavor is a structural theory of international affairs, subsequently dubbed

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“neorealism” or “structural realism.”28 Discussing this label and trying to develop further the theoretical content of this school of thought, Barry Buzan et al. argued that while “ ‘[n]eorealism’ emphasizes backward-looking links to ‘Classical’ antecedents: it bespeaks simply a new, or renewed, Realism. The term ‘Structural Realism’ more accurately emphasizes the method that lies at the heart of the new theory.”29 The position adopted in this book concurs with this distinction, but for the sake of clarity we will refer to Waltz’s version consistently as neorealism. Waltz’s version adopts essentially the same basic concepts and assumptions of classical political realism, yet it departs from the latter in several important aspects. First, Waltz maintains that “the idea that international politics can be thought of as a system with a precisely defined structure is neorealism’s fundamental departure from traditional realism.” Second, he elaborates that “neorealism departs from traditional realism in the following additional ways: Neorealism produces a shift in causal relations, offers a different interpretation of power, and treats the unit level differently.”30 In addition, while Morgenthau and other classical realists “attributed egoism and power politics primarily to human nature,” Waltz and subsequent neorealists emphasize “anarchy’s causal powers” in world politics.31 Third, Waltz shifts the focus of the theory from a unit level to a system level of analysis (i.e., from interstate processes to systemic constraints).32 Finally, and most importantly, he incorporates a structural conception of international politics into his theory. Thus, he maintains that the international system is a social structure (i.e., an intellectual construct) constituted by three different attributes: an organizing principle (i.e., anarchy); the functional character of the units (i.e., sovereignty); and the distribution of capabilities (i.e., national power).33 Changes in these structural elements will determine the configuration of the international system and, in turn, how this will mediate and constrain the behavior of the units.34 Although many analysts are loosely subsumed under the realist rubric, it is only Morgenthau and Waltz who deliberately embarked on the construction of a comprehensive theory of international politics from a strictly realist perspective. Therefore, the following section will draw mostly from their works in an effort to extrapolate and illustrate the core and ancillary assumptions constituting the realist paradigm in international relations. Core Theoretical Assumptions Clearly, realism à la Waltz is a departure from realism à la Morgenthau. Nonetheless, as one scholar recognizes, Waltz’s Theory of International Politics could not be “fully understood without some comprehension of Morgenthau’s attempt to construct a theory of international politics.”35 Such a statement implies a sense of intellectual pedigree, progression, and growth, which is only intelligible if one is prepared to accept the possibility of a single realist paradigm spawning various theories, all sharing fundamental assumptions and normative concerns while simultaneously focusing on different international processes, levels of inquiry, and units of analysis. In this vein, Morgenthau and Waltz are two different exponents of a single, integrated paradigm. The consensus among those who have closely analyzed realist and neorealist epistemology is that these two theoretical versions are part of the same analytic

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tradition, because they rest on three common core assumptions and several other ancillary suppositions.36 First, political realism is state-centric. It assumes that the key actors in modern interstate politics are sovereign states, not social classes, sectors, or other non-state actors.37 Hence, to understand the dynamics of international politics one has to study the impact of sovereign states on both international processes and the structure of the system. Morgenthau’s theory focuses on the process level (i.e., foreign policy) and Waltz’s theory centers on the structure of the system and how this, in turn, constrains and mediates external behavior of states. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that Waltz conceives the interaction between processes and international structure as a two-way process in which the units of the system impact the international structure, especially through the distribution of capabilities. Second, the context within which sovereign states interact is anarchical.38 It lacks central governing institutions to maintain order and to protect states from other international, self-interested actors. Third, in the absence of an international sovereign, security and survival become the primary concerns of states. Therefore, they must provide for their own welfare through the accumulation and application of military and economic power in a system populated by other egoists. At this point it is important to underscore that, unless otherwise specified, this work utilizes the concept of power in terms of tangible means. The debate on the nature of social power is intricate and extensive. Some analysts emphasize the tangible sources (i.e., military and economic strength, endowment of natural resources territory, population, etc.) of power and treat these as causal factors in a power relationship. This side of the debate is known as the first face of power. Other scholars focus on the intangible sources (i.e., reputation, status, proselytizing abilities, etc.) of power. For this group, the structure within which a relationship evolves and the position of the players in it will be the determining factors in a power relationship. This other side of the debate is known as the second and third faces of power.39 Ancillary Theoretical Assumptions Based on the primacy of the state and its struggle for power and survival in an anarchical environment, other subsidiary assumptions complete the realist paradigm. First, states are assumed to be rational unitary actors with well-defined interests.40 Rationality implies that states have a preference ordering and derive from it a utility function, which they seek to maximize. Further, states are assumed to have purpose and direction. At a minimum, they will struggle for survival and at a maximum they are expected to expand their power resources. The depiction of this reasoning corresponds closely with Arnold Wolfers’s two analogies of the “house on fire” and the “horse race.” In one, individuals flee the house for fear of losing their lives. In the other, individuals rush to gain a better spot in the audience when the opportunity arises.41 Unitary means that states are characterized as “closed, impermeable and sovereign” entities that can act and make decisions single handedly. Again, to adopt another of Wolfers’s analogies of the international system, the internal dynamics and characteristics of these “billiard balls” have no effect on their external behavior.42

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In a world of clashing interests, where survival and security are the most cherished state possessions, economic and military power are the primary means to obtain and preserve these. It is, therefore, assumed that power is fungible. It can be utilized to promote a state’s national interests across different issue-areas in the international arena. Finally, realism assumes that external compulsion, motivated by greed and competition for power and status among self-interested sovereign actors, is more important than domestic variables in determining state behavior in the international arena. Two General Propositions of the Realist Model Two general propositions derive logically from the assumptions discussed above. First, the distribution of capabilities or balance of power in the international system constrains the external behavior of states. In its original form, this proposition lacks empirical content and simply establishes a very broad necessary condition affecting state behavior. Therefore, in order to specify further its explanatory power concerning the incidence of interstate war and peace, it is important to precisely define the character of the international system and the nature of state power. First, from a systemic perspective, balance of power implies that based on the polar configuration of the system, states with different sizes and capabilities will confront quite different sets of constraints. Thus, different numbers of great powers in the system will generate distinct dynamics regarding processes of alignment, arms control, spiral, competition for peripheries, and ultimately war. Similarly, within the sphere of influence of any great power, small- and middle-size states will experience various degrees of external autonomy vis à vis the direct control and influence of the great power. This includes the freedom to prepare for and wage war against a neighboring state within the same sphere of influence. Balance of power evinces a second implication regarding the nature of power in the international system. According to this, in any type of dyadic relation (i.e., between great powers, between lesser powers, or between any possible combination of actors thereof ), shifts in the power inventory of any of the two actors will inevitably influence the other actor’s foreign policies. In sum, while the second implication pertains to international processes (i.e., dyadic deterrence, arms race, security dilemma, etc.), and the first one refers to systemic constraints (i.e., polarity, systemic stability and international change), both are, ultimately, directly relevant to the question of the outbreak of war and peace in the periphery. A second general realist proposition postulates that the anarchical nature of the international system is conducive to frequent interstate wars. This is premised on the presupposition that international politics evolve in a self-help system, which rewards egoism and promotes distrust and uncertainty among state actors.43 Moreover, the absence of an international sovereign prevents “states satisfied with the status quo” from arriving at mutually advantageous goals.44 Starting from the assumption of anarchy and keeping in mind the egoism of the actors, several analysts have offered different mechanisms and strategies to develop cooperation among independent states. For instance, Thomas C. Schelling considers the game of chicken and suggests building “confidence” among the players by allowing

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“conventions and tradition to grow.”45 Moreover, Robert Jervis likens the “security dilemma” to a prisoners’ dilemma game in international relations. He argues that in order to move players to cooperate, the payoff structure of the game must be changed. Such is accomplished by differentiating defensive from offensive weapons and the advantage of either offensive or defensive strategies.46 Also, Kenneth A. Oye maintains that the international system resembles a prisoners’ dilemma game and cooperation can be achieved by enlarging “the shadow of the future,” altering or changing the payoff structure of the game, and by reducing the number of players in the game.47 Other strategies for cooperation include tit-for-tat (i.e., reciprocity), GRIT (i.e., graduated reciprocation in tension reduction), and institutions (e.g., international regimes).48 Despite these possible tools and strategies, the lack of an overarching authority makes interstate cooperation (especially on matters of national security and sovereignty) extremely difficult and rare. From this reasoning it follows that all states, regardless of their status and capabilities, are exposed to the same vagaries of international anarchy. Consequently, since anarchy is conceived to be a constant variable in interstate affairs, then it is important to investigate why war or peace is more frequent and prevalent in some regions than in others? And, similarly, why are some states more peaceful or war-prone than others? Evidently, in their original form these two general propositions and their respective implications simply establish very broad necessary conditions for influencing or determining state behavior. In essence, their explanatory power is tantamount to noting that oxygen sustains human, animal, and plant life, or that the balance of mineral nutrients and moisture in the soil determines the degree of ground fertility. Obviously, their level of generality limits their explanatory value and utility. Consequently, based on sufficient conditions, scholars working within the realist paradigm have generated specific theories on the causes of interstate war and peace. Accordingly, the task of the following section is to derive from theories on balance of power, systemic and hegemonic stability, and dyadic deterrence the most relevant testable hypotheses for the South American peace. Realism and Peace in South America Although realism is conceived to be a comprehensive theoretical framework to study the external interactions of all state actors, most of the works and propositions informed in this theoretical tradition focus primarily on explaining the external behavior of only the most important actors in the system.49 Also, along these lines Kalevi J. Holsti asserts the existence of two different international systems as defined by the “etiologies and profiles of their conflicts.” He criticizes realism and neorealism for fashioning structural factors and the struggle for power as determinants of interstate conflicts. He recognizes that these may be causes of war for an older European state system, but they may certainly not be for a newer system of states in the periphery where internal cleavages and external threats represent an assault on statehood and regime.50 The Eurocentric, realist practice criticized by Holsti was inconsequential prior to 1945, when only a small number of independent actors outside the European

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state system existed. But that situation, evidently, changed drastically in the post–World War II period and, certainly, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since these watersheds, a burgeoning number of independent states have emerged in the periphery and concurrently a greater incidence of interstate conflict has been recorded in these regions. In light of these developments, it is important, both from a practical and theoretical perspective, to test several realist propositions relevant to the analysis of war and peace beyond the Eurocentric world. For that purpose, the experience of South America is particularly appropriate. The region is part of the periphery in world affairs, has been independent for over one hundred and eighty years, and has been free of major interstate wars since 1935. Polarity and Peace in the International System Based on the assumption that distribution of capabilities constrains the external behavior of states, distinct theoretical positions within realism attribute the causes of interstate war and peace to structural differences among various possible polar configurations of the interstate system.51 It is customary to define polarity according to how capabilities or power resources are distributed and measured in the international system as well as in a regional subsystem. Traditionally, polarity has been defined according to the number of great powers in the international system or of significantly powerful actors within a regional subsystem.52 Other scholars, however, have distinguished polarity as the measure of the power configuration of the system from the number of leading states, as the factor defining the size of the system.53 Despite these nuances about polarity, a system may be classified as unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar. Unipolarity or hegemony is a condition in which one single state enjoys superiority of power or dominance over the aggregate power resources of any possible combination or alignment of states in the international system.54 Bipolarity is a situation when two roughly equal states possess overwhelming power superiority over the rest of the states in a system or subsystem, and a potential military coalition of the latter with one of the two major poles cannot disrupt the systemic bilateral balance.55 Finally, multipolarity is when capabilities are more evenly distributed among several preponderant units that are, in turn, set apart from weaker states in a system or subsystem. Moreover, the potential alliance flexibility afforded to great powers in a multipolar environment may either disrupt or stabilize the international balance of power. Regarding the question of which polar configuration is the most peaceful and stable, consensus breaks down among realists. While the oldest and most traditional realist version maintains that multipolarity is more conducive to a stable and peaceful world, neorealism stresses that bipolarity curtails drastically the war-proneness of interstate affairs. Though the essence of the debate is about these two international structures, most realists would concur that a system approximating a total hegemony or unipolarity, which would exclude the possibility of a challenging or rising hegemon, is the least war-prone, most stable and, definitely, the rarest to develop among all possible polar configurations. Since this debate is central to a realist explanation of the South American peace, this work examines the logic supporting the peaceful and stable effects associated with each of these polar configurations.

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Multipolarity and Peace One relevant realist proposition posits that multipolarity is more stable and peaceful than any other polar structure. This hypothesis stems from the debate about the relationship between different polarities and the relative degree of peace, war, and stability in the interstate system. For example, Deutsch and Singer affirm that “as the system moves away from bipolarity toward multipolarity, the frequency and intensity of war should be expected to diminish.”56 Clearly, these authors are pessimistic about the stability of a tight bipolar system whose two rival states are not “likely to be moderate and cautious in their policy initiatives and responses.” Similarly, they are not overly optimistic about the long-term prospect for international peace in a multipolar system. In fact, they conclude that “multipolar systems operating under the rules of balance-of-power policies are shown to be selfdestroying, but both in the short and the long run the instability of tight bipolar systems appears to be substantially greater.”57 Thus, they offer three arguments supporting the greater stability, security, and peacefulness of a multipolar configuration. First, the increased number of dyadic relationships or “interaction opportunities” reduces the danger of mutually reinforcing antagonism between two states. Second, a greater amount of poles diminishes the share of individual attention toward other independent states. Last, they argue that multipolarity has a dampening effect upon arms races.58 More traditional arguments supporting the causal link between multipolarity and international peace and stability stem from balance of power theory. First, Morgenthau and other realists maintain that the “alliance flexibility” factor afforded to independent actors in a balance-of-power system promotes a greater degree of peace and stability in a multipolar structure.59 Analyzing three structural changes produced by the “new balance of power” that emerged subsequent to World War II, Morgenthau asserts that “[a]s a result, the flexibility of the balance of power and, with it, its restraining influence upon the power aspirations of the main protagonists on the international scene have disappeared.”60 According to this position, military alliances, nonaggression pacts, and military cooperation agreements are all conscious efforts to manually preserve peace and stability in the international system. Two expected outcomes are implicit in this reasoning: first, the expectation that a potential aggressor may be deterred by the greater number of possible military alignments and by uncertainty about which of these it may have to confront; second, that multipolarity permits the existence of an unaligned state, or “balancer” that deters war by threatening to shift its decisive political, economic, and military power against the strongest coalition. Finally, implicit in balance-of-power theory is the presupposition that small armed conflicts are frequent events that help to correct the systemic balance and prevent the outbreak of major wars. In sum, the positive elements for peace and stability in a multipolar system are the following: first, the greater number of significant states diffuses the attention of any one actor, preventing the escalation of virulent dyadic conflicts; second, flexible alliance opportunities facilitate deliberate efforts to deter potential aggressors and preserve the international equilibrium; and, third, small frequent wars supplant large, systemic, or general wars.

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Bipolarity and Peace Stemming from the opposite position in the polarity debate, a second realist hypothesis posits that bipolarity is more stable and peaceful than multipolarity.61 Waltz defines systemic stability, first, as continuity in the organizing principle of the structure (i.e., anarchy) and, second, as “no consequential variation . . . in the number of principal parties that constitute the system.”62 Furthermore, while discussing the possibility of tripolarity, he acknowledges that stability means the avoidance of war between the poles. He notes the following: [A]lthough second-strike may perpetuate a stalemate among more than two powers, one has to accept more doubts about who will help whom, and more uncertainty about who has second- and who has first-strike capabilities, and then bet that the system would remain peaceful and stable despite the greater difficulties.63

In sum, the logic supporting the stability and peace of bipolarity stresses that the lack of peripheries, the high degree of transparency, and low degree of military and economic interdependence between the two major adversaries renders the outbreak of war quite unlikely and difficult. The peaceful effect adduced to bipolarity derives primarily from the security independence of the two main actors, which precludes the possibility of an accidental outbreak of war due to uncertainty, miscalculations, shifting alliances, and/or power imbalances.64 Multipolar and Bipolar Implications for Peace in South America Notwithstanding the systemic focus of the debate on international polarity, it can be assumed that polar configuration has as much theoretical relevance for the analysis of regional politics as it has for systemic or world politics. Its basic logic can be applied to geographic areas containing several independent actors whose interactions constitute a subsystem. The term “subsystem” is used here as a subset of the general international system. Accordingly, this subset must meet the same conditions that distinguish a system: “first, one cannot infer outcomes from the attributes and behavior of the actors and, second, interconnections are present with the result that changes in some parts of the system produce changes in other parts.”65 Also, the use of the term “subsystem” is consistent with Morgenthau’s notion of “dependent systems” or “local balance-of-power systems.” He argues that the system of international politics is “composed of a number of subsystems that are interrelated with each other, but that maintain within themselves a balance of power of their own.”66 South America has been, both, structurally and behaviorally an international subsystem.67 Has it been unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar? Before answering this question, it is important to specify that the aim of this part of the analysis is not to settle, once and for all, the theoretical controversy concerning the degree of stability and war-proneness associated with unipolarity, bipolarity, and multipolarity. Much work and debate remain in this area. Rather, the objective here is to ascertain simply whether one particular polar configuration

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is a superior causal variable to other alternative explanations for the South American peace. Returning to the question posed above, Kenneth Waltz defines a bipolar system as one “in which no third power is able to challenge the top two.”68 He elaborates that “states are not placed in the top rank because they excel in one way or another. Their rank depends on how they score on all of the following items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.”69 By the same logic, a multipolar system is one in which several actors possess roughly the same magnitude of power. Consistent with these two definitions, it can be reasonably surmised that South America has been a bipolar subsystem, at least, since the end of the Chaco War. As it will be demonstrated subsequently in chapter 3, Argentina and Brazil have ranked historically very closely to each other in terms of all principal power resources categories. In fact, they appear to be in a class of their own, quite apart from the rest of the countries in the region. Therefore, the relative peace in South America since 1935 does not appear to derive from the logic of regional multipolarity. Rather than simply discarding this argument in broad strokes, it is theoretically and methodologically important to examine its specific implication in South America. For heuristic purposes the following question can be posed: Does peace in South America derive from local multipolarity? Examining specifically the causal relation between polarity and subsystem stability (i.e., peace) and instability (i.e., war), two separate empirical studies conclude that, indeed, subsystem multipolarity is more conducive to wars than a bipolar or unipolar subsystem.70 A second analysis contains similar findings and even introduces a puzzling and unsubstantiated claim when the authors write the following: “In conclusion, a manifest disparity (i.e., meaning power levels) presently exists in Latin America. . . . What is striking is that conflict is greatest in the cores with greatest disparity (with the exception of the U.S.-dominated Latin American core).”71 Thus, assuming that multipolarity was the cause of the peace in South America, then, one must be able to find evidence of formal and/or informal intraregional military alliances, friendship treaties, nonaggression pacts, and military cooperation agreements. The prevalence of these international arrangements would be a key piece of evidence to corroborate the validity of the hypothesis linking multipolarity and interstate peace. Though this question will be examined in greater detail in chapter 3, a crude and preliminary analysis reveals that the South American states have refrained from practices associated with stability and peace in a multipolar balance-of-power system. Other than the 1947 Rio Pact Treaty, which has had no other purpose than to send a signal to the former Soviet Union, South America has lacked intraregional alliances or nonaggression pact agreements, aiming to restrain or counterbalance the growth of power of any of the actors integrating this regional system. In an empirical study on the distribution of formal alliances among the members of the interstate system, Singer and Small classify alliances into (1) defense pacts; (2) neutrality and nonaggression pacts; and (3) ententes. A defense pact is when the signatories obligate themselves to intervene militarily on behalf of one another if either is attacked. In the neutrality pact, the commitment is to remain

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militarily neutral if the partner is attacked. And in the entente, the only obligation is to consult with, or cooperate, in such a military contingency. Based on this classification, except for an entente from 1936 to 1947 among Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Costa Rica, South American states have not been part of any formal military alliance whose target has been another regional state.72 Unipolarity, Hegemony, and Peace Unipolarity is the third realist position causally linking the international structure and the level of stability and peace in the system. And it has been defined distinctly in the literature as hegemony, primacy, power supremacy, hierarchy, empire, and world government. For example, Geoffrey Blainey, writing on this causal relation, affirms that “a lopsided balance of power . . . can serve as an explanation of peace.”73 Another theoretical expression of this proposition is the theory of hegemonic stability, albeit its close relation to international political economy.74 In its simple form, it posits that concentration of power in one dominant state promotes order and cooperation among all subordinate states in the system. Inversely, diffusion of power causes disorder and conflict among all states. Similar to this position, power preponderance theorists maintain that wars are less frequent when power is clearly concentrated in one or few major powers. First, the overwhelming power of a single state serves as a strong deterrent against revisionist states. Second, a dominant state can use its power to exact concessions from weaker states without waging war. Finally, a paramount state can utilize its power to pacify smaller states.75 Both hegemonic stability and power preponderance theories presuppose a strong link between the power of the hegemon and its national interest and purpose. For instance, if the decision makers of a hegemonic power deem free trade, or peace and stability in a particular region to be in the best national interest of the state, they will utilize all available power to pursue those objectives. But hegemonic stability theory is more complex. It contains two different strands.76 First, “benevolent” hegemony stresses the capability and willingness of a hegemon to provide unilaterally certain collective, common, or public goods necessary for a stable and orderly international system.77 Second, the “coercive” strand emphasizes the coercive and manipulative capacity of the hegemon to force other state actors to abide by the rules and norms set by the hegemon. According to John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, this version of the theory involves, first, the manipulation of “material incentives” using threats of punishment or promises of reward and, second, the transformation of “substantive beliefs” of leaders in other nations through a process of “hegemonic socialization.” Such control emerges when “foreign elites buy into the hegemon’s vision of international order and accept it as their own . . .”78 The latter version (coercive) of the theory stresses the connection between preponderance of power and hegemonic self-interest, thus, it leaves aside the whole notion of the unilateral provision of a public good. In other words, a hegemonic power will utilize its power supremacy to structure interactions for its own advantage within a particular issue-area.79 Depending upon the nature of the issue-area, hegemonic-induced cooperation involves different policy options and means. It is conceivable, for example, that in

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the economic realm the hegemon will play a more “benevolent” role by implementing liberal economic policies while other actors are exercising economic nationalism or protectionism—that is, free riding. But fundamental differences between security and other issue-areas exist. Robert Jervis, in his discussion of the applicability of the regime perspective to the security realm, examines the mediating role of international regimes between outcomes and national power; he notes that it is more difficult to build an international regime in the security realm than in other non-security areas. He attributes this: [T]o the primacy of security, its competitive nature, the unforgiving nature of the arena, and the uncertainty of how much security the state needs and has, all compound the prisoners’ dilemma and make it sharper than the problems that arise in most other areas. Furthermore, decision makers usually react by relying on unilateral and competitive modes of behavior rather than by seeking cooperative solutions. The result is that security regimes, with their call for mutual restraint and limitations on unilateral actions, rarely seem attractive to decision makers.80

Since the nature of issues in the security sphere is more “competitive and unforgiving,” the hegemon will have to opt for more “coercive” and direct measures like the threat of a military intervention or an arms embargo to maintain peace and stability in a region. Although hegemonic stability theory was originally devised to explain the provision, maintenance, and change of international economic regimes in the post–World War II economic order, one can adapt its basic logic to explain different phenomena in the security realm as well. The reasoning is basically the same as in the economic domain, except that peace and stability in a region are viewed as public goods provided by a security regime. Such a regime is created and maintained unilaterally by the hegemon through its sheer preponderance of military power. This view conforms closely with the logic of the “coercive” strand of hegemonic stability theory, which assumes that issue-areas are organized hierarchically and that the hegemon has a vested national interest in providing order within these.81 Many observers attribute the peace in South America to U.S. hegemony.82 Even hard-core realist scholars, ignoring or contradicting the international anarchy assumption in realism, have classified the absence of interstate armed conflict in South America as a “hegemonic peace.”83 Also, Morgenthau affirms that “of all the local balance-of-power systems only the South American system has retained a certain measure of autonomy, protected as it is by the predominance of the United States.”84 The position taken by Aron and Morgenthau clearly contradicts the anarchic tenet of political realism. In brief, it appears as if the international system would be decentralized only for great powers, not for small- and middle-size states. Accordingly, the third proposition to be tested and evaluated here is premised on the presupposition that a hegemonic power causes peace and stability within its sphere of influence by structuring and mediating interactions among its satellites. This is similar to the second of the four results discussed by Richard K. Betts, whereas the semblance of a collective security regime was achieved principally by

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utter “preponderance of power . . . imposed by the United States.”85 Such hypothesis posits U.S. preponderance of power and hegemonic role in the Western Hemisphere as the principal cause of relative peace in South America. Implications of Hegemony for Peace Hegemony conveys two implications for the South American peace. First, from the hegemon’s foreign policy perspective, it entails either an explicitly stated goal, defining U.S. disposition to utilize its power preponderance to promote and maintain intraregional interstate peace in South America, or at least behavior that in fact manages and controls strategic relationships among the locals. As explained above, hegemonic stability theory and realists who characterize the state of affairs in South America as a “hegemonic peace,” assume a direct link between hegemonic power, interest, and behavior. Stated differently, sheer preponderance of power, apart from interest and purpose, does not cause interstate peace in a region. Hence, if peace is a direct effect of U.S. power preponderance and leadership, then one should expect to find throughout the post-1935 history of Inter-American Affairs either repeated official statements enunciating such U.S. purpose and interest (it could be camouflaged rhetorical hints to that effect), or diplomatic initiatives to control the course of events. Second, evidence of U.S. policy priority and intent toward South America would include, first, an active U.S. role in organizing and maintaining institutional mechanisms to mediate intraregional disputes and to deter potential revisionist states in the region. Further, whenever crises erupt, one should expect to find an active and forceful U.S. involvement to prevent the outbreak of war. Finally, one should be able to detect systematic U.S. efforts in South America to thwart great power military influence both in terms of military doctrine and equipment. This should provide the United States with a monopolistic control over the war-making capacity of the South American states. In addition, one would expect to find greater U.S. involvement in South America than in other regions (e.g., Africa, South East Asia, the Middle East, Europe) where it was not assumed to enjoy clear and uncontested hegemony. Undoubtedly, the overwhelming economic and military strength of the United States, coupled with its record of overt and covert interventions in Latin America in general, would appear at first glance to make it a robust and straightforward explanatory variable for the absence of intraregional interstate armed conflict in the South America proper. Nevertheless, a close scrutiny of this causal relation reveals historical evidence challenging the explanatory power of this hypothesis. First, notwithstanding the record of U.S. overt and covert interventions in all of Latin America, it is crucial to distinguish South America from Central America and the Caribbean Basin where all overt U.S. military interventions have taken place in the twentieth century. Of course, the exceptions are the not so covertly 1903 U.S. involvement in Colombia to help sever the province of Panama from Colombia and its more recent advisory military involvement in that country through Plan Colombia. Second, even when covert United States operations have taken place in South America (e.g., Brazil in 1964, Bolivia 1968, Chile in 1973 during Salvador

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Allende’s election), as there were everywhere in the world, it is significant to note that none escalated to become an overt U.S. military intervention. In fact, while there is no evidence that the United States was more involved in covert operations in South America than anywhere else in the world, there is ample evidence that the United States intervened militarily much more in other geographical regions. Perhaps the success of covert operations may account for that, but it is still remarkable that in spite of many serious threats to its interests in South America, the United States never intervened militarily in this region. Third, international diplomatic tools like the 1947 Rio Pact Treaty are “empty shells” with a symbolic effect only during the rivalry between the United States and the former Soviet Union. Evidence supporting this assertion is, for example, that the provisions of this treaty were neither implemented during the 1982 South Atlantic conflict to punish the aggressor (Argentina), nor to prevent an extracontinental power (Great Britain) from military involvement against a signatory member of the treaty. This is, of course, an armed conflict excluded from the sample of this work because it involves an extra-regional actor and the focus here is intraregional interstate wars. Nevertheless, the case is instructive regarding the overall applicability and usefulness of the international diplomatic tools to prevent the outbreak of war. Fourth, the United States has been either unwilling or unsuccessful in preventing the outbreak of war in Latin America in general. In the northern part of Latin America, where U.S. hegemony was stronger and involvement greater, interstate war occurred; in the southern part, where U.S. hegemony was weaker and direct military involvement nonexistent, an intraregional interstate war did not occur. It is significant to note here that Morgenthau, discussing three goals of imperialism, affirms that the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 permitted the United States to erect a “protective shield” behind which it was able to establish “its predominance” in the Western Hemisphere. Further, he specifies that within these geographic limits, however, American policy was not always uniformly imperialistic. Toward the Central American republics and certain countries in South America it was at times frankly imperialistic, but in its dealings with some other countries, such as Argentina and Brazil, it sought only to maintain the existing superiority of the United States, which was the result of a kind of natural process rather than of a deliberate American policy. Even though the United States has had the power to impose its superiority upon these countries in the form of actual hegemony, it chose not to do so.86

Clearly, the United States was either unwilling or unable to prevent the Football War of 1969 between El Salvador and Honduras. Again, in 1982 the Americans were either unwilling or unable to dissuade the Argentine military from invading the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. Similarly, the United States has been either unwilling or unable to prevent interstate wars in other regions (e.g., Greece and Turkey in 1974, India and Pakistan in 1971, and the more recent war in the former Yugoslavia) certainly more strategically important than South America and, arguably, where it exerts similar or greater hegemonic influence. A fifth piece of evidence challenging the “hegemonic peace” thesis is precisely the poor track record of U.S. mediating efforts in South America proper. For

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example, in the 1978 Beagle Channel dispute the Vatican mediation was more successful than that of the so-called hegemon.87 Also, the diplomatic mediation during the 1981 and 1995 Ecuadorian-Peruvian militarized disputes included the United States as one among equals in the group of guarantors of the Rio Protocol. This will be analyzed later in detail but there is no evidence to indicate that the United States played a more influential and active role than any of the other three guarantors. One final point contradicting the hegemonic argument is that the origin of the peace in South America precedes the advent and apogee of U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Indeed, the peaceful trend in intraregional affairs in South America dates back to the end of the War of the Pacific in 1884 and does not appear to have been ushered in by the advent of U.S. hegemony. At this juncture of the analysis, it suffices to list only these points without further elaboration, because in chapter 4 the data will be evaluated in light of the “hegemonic peace” hypothesis. A second implication, this time from the receiving end of the hegemonic power relation, entails compliance with the hegemon’s mandate in South America. One should expect to find close coordination between the foreign military policies and objectives of the United States and the South American nations. In general terms, Latin American states have followed the U.S. leadership in some foreign policy issues like opposing the Axis powers during World War II, preventing Soviet involvement in the Western Hemisphere, and hindering the spread of communist ideology in the Americas. Yet, when it comes to specific questions of national interest, security, and survival, South American states have not hesitated to proceed quite independently from the tutelage of the United States. For instance, past territorial disputes between Ecuador and Peru, Argentina and Chile, and Venezuela and Colombia have often led to intraregional militarized crises which are not in the so-called best interest of the United States in South America. Similarly, some key South American states (e.g., Argentina, Chile, and Peru) have procured military materiel from suppliers other than the United Sates, seriously diminishing U.S. leverage in this region. Some of these countries have even been imbued with military doctrines from several European powers. Further, Argentina and Brazil, which constitute the most notorious rivalry in South America, developed indigenous weapons industry, including nuclear technology. In fact, they did not suspend their nuclear weapons research in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the United States was pressing a nonproliferation policy, but Argentina did so at a later date based on its own domestic reasons. In sum, these are only indications that South American nation-states are not ready to dispense with issues pertaining to their respective security and independence, even if they do not coincide with U.S. hegemonic interest in South America. Balance of Power and Peace International anarchy encourages states simultaneously to seek power and to balance any external threat posed by the growth of power in another state. In this sense, one of the cornerstones of the realist paradigm is balance-of-power theory.88 This study, however, adopts Stephen Walt’s distinction between balance of threats

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and balance of power.89 This is useful because the focus here is on the interactions of nation-states, with none or limited power projection capacity outside their immediate geographical area. Thus, for a country like Colombia it is immensely more threatening to learn that Venezuela has increased the quantity and improved the quality of its armed forces than to discover that Pakistan, Israel, or Chile has exponentially increased its offensive capacity or developed nuclear weapons. Although balance of power is essentially a systemic theory, one of its strands deals specifically with dyadic balance of power processes or “internal balancing.”90 That is, it addresses questions on the nature of bilateral military balance and its concomitant deterrent capacity.91 As an extension of the concept of dyadic balance of power, the process of deterrence has evolved within the realist paradigm to become one of the most important concepts in the theories of international relations. Deterrence is defined comprehensively as the process by which a defender, actor A, “dissuades” or “induces” an actual or potential challenger, actor B, that the “perceived” or “expected” benefits it might derive from a particular course of action are substantially less than the costs and/or risks involved.92 A further refinement of this definition classifies this process into “general” and “immediate” deterrence.93 General deterrence implies a long-term policy stance of “regulating an adversarial relationship” between two states through maintenance of a satisfactory level of forces. Most of the time, in such a situation, adversaries do not regard war as imminent, and, therefore, military forces are not mobilized and put in a higher state of alert, nor threatened to be put. On the other hand, immediate deterrence implies a specific situation in which one side is seriously considering launching an attack, whereas the other side is preparing a threat of retaliation in order to prevent it, and both sides are fully aware of the strategic dynamic in progress. Commenting on the distinction between general and immediate deterrence, Paul Huth and Bruce Russett affirm that “immediate deterrence crises often arise from failures of general deterrence.”94 Evidently, deterrence incorporates a “psychological relationship.”95 For example, Robert Jervis asserts that the central argument of deterrence is that great dangers arise if an aggressor believes that the status quo powers are weak in capability or resolve. This belief will lead the former to test its opponents, usually starting with a small and apparently unimportant issue. If the status quo powers retreat, they will not only lose the specific value at stake but, more important in the long run, will encourage the aggressor to press harder. Even if the defenders later recognize their plight and are willing to pay a higher price to prevent further retreats, they will find it increasingly difficult to convince the aggressor of their new found resolve. The choice will then be between continuing to retreat and thereby sacrificing basic values or fight . . . to avoid this disastrous situation, the state must display the ability and willingness to wage war.96

In addition to the psychological aspect, deterrence entails a military and technological component that grants a defender the ability to retaliate and to deny a stake to an aggressor.97 In short, the relative military and technological balance in a dyad can either enhance or lessen the defender’s objective credibility in the calculus of a potential revisionist state. Accordingly, deterrence theory has developed along

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these two separate but interrelated tenets.98 On the one hand, those who focus on the psychological aspect of deterrence underline the explanatory power of the decision makers’ emotions, beliefs, formative experiences, perceptions, calculations, and resolve. From this angle, deterrence success and failure are the functions of the cognitive process of key decision makers embroiled in a deterrent situation.99 The psychological model of deterrence is important to analyze and explain cases whereas the objective balance of forces is clearly in favor of the defender (e.g., Japan’s attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the Somali invasion of the Ogaden region in 1978), yet the challenger “decides” to launch an attack despite the seemingly unfavorable ratio of benefits to costs/risks. On the other hand, those who stress the relative balance of military forces and technology in a dyadic relation underscore the explanatory power associated with the magnitude of an actor’s objective ability to defeat or punish an aggressor and the probability of deterrence success or failure. From this perspective, deterrence success or failure depends on a challenger’s rational calculation of the costs and benefits involved in the initiation of a militarized dispute.100 Based on deterrence theory, two relevant additional hypotheses can be derived as sufficient explanations for the relative peace in South America. One of the propositions stresses uncertainty and miscalculation of the balance of forces in a dyadic relationship. It explains the advent of war or peace as direct consequences of the agreement or disagreement between two actors’ estimates of their respective relative power. Thus, if two actors agree (i.e., perceive or think in similar terms regarding their respective strength) on the relative distribution of their relative military power, then peace will ensue. Conversely, if they disagree, then war will result. Geoffrey Blainey maintains that historically an “agreed preponderance of power tends to foster peace.” Nonetheless, pointing out the difficulties involved in measuring objectively the relative military power of two actors, he leans toward an interpretation of the basic cause of war and peace based on how nations or national leaders think about the relative distribution of power.101 A second proposition, emphasizing the rational calculations of the actors, postulates that military superiority or, at least, parity deters potential revisionist states from initiating a war.102 Implications of Dyadic Deterrence for Peace If the implicit or explicit threat of military retaliation, coupled with the objective military ability to deny a particular stake to a potential challenger have indeed prevented war in South America, then the prevalence of peace is by definition an instance of multiple deterrence successes. Since South American states have dispensed with complex intraregional alliance systems since the end of the War of the Pacific in 1884, the concept of deterrence in this book denotes basic deterrence or type 1. That is, direct threats to the homelands of two adversaries. Extended deterrence or type 2 refers to an actor’s ability to “dissuade” another actor from mounting or threatening an attack against an ally of the defender.103 Consistent with the definitions and specifications of deterrence expounded above, the case of the peace in South America must be classified and studied as an instance of successful general deterrence. Even “enduring interstate rivalries” like those between

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Chile and Argentina, and Ecuador and Peru have been categorized in a recent study by Huth and Russett as cases of general deterrence.104 As demonstrated in the first chapter of this work, in South America there have been several adversarial dyads over the years concerning disputed territory, yet only the EcuadorianPeruvian rivalry appears to have approximated a case of immediate deterrence. The other several dyads have crossed the threshold separating general direct deterrence from immediate direct deterrence. Can this be attributed to the actors’ accurate readings of the relative balance of forces in each of the dyads that prevailed in South America for seven decades? The analysis of successful deterrence has always been difficult, because it “involves a nonevent.”105 It entails proving convincingly why something did not happen. Suggestive of this complexity is a phrase that reads: “Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable.”106 In this vein, two commentators ask rhetorically, “Can we be certain, for example, that the Cuban Missile Crisis did not lead to war because nuclear deterrence was successful in that case?”107 Obviously, they have in mind cases of “immediate deterrence,” which are considerably easier to explain than cases of “general deterrence.” The first instance involves a military/diplomatic crisis, which may or may not erupt into war. The second case comprises a dispute over a specific stake, where the actors maintain a sufficient level of military forces, but there is neither a sense of urgency nor an active threat of military action. The problem involved in analyzing successful instances of general deterrence is compounded when one attempts to explain several cases in the same region over an extended period of time. Crucial explanatory variables—for example, military and technological balance, the impact of key decision makers, and domestic politics—change over time. This makes a controlled comparison very difficult or impossible. Referring specifically to the analysis of successful general deterrence, two other analysts have classified it as “a dog that didn’t bark in the night.” They add that “it is hard to distinguish challenges that are truly deterred from those in which the reputed ‘challenger’ in fact had no intention of mounting a challenge anyway or those for which the adversary’s military capabilities and resolve to use them . . . were essentially irrelevant.”108 Although it is not evident that the absence of wars in South America is indeed a case of successful general deterrence, it is assumed that it is for the sake of argument. Accordingly, the attention of the analysis shifts from defining the dependent variable to testing the explanatory power of two relevant causal variables. Grounded in the theory of deterrence, the two hypotheses outlined above share a common emphasis on the relative level of military forces and its concomitant deterrent capacity in a dyadic relation. They differ, nevertheless, on the implications they draw for the success or failure of deterrence. The first proposition emphasizes the cognitive processes of key decision makers for the challenger. It makes peace or successful deterrence contingent upon the challenger’s accurate reading and interpretation of the defender’s military capacity. As it is informed in the cognitive or psychological model of deterrence theory, is this proposition a robust explanation for the peace in South America? While the cognitive approach is important to explain “counterintuitive cases” such as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the Somali invasion of the Ogaden

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region in Ethiopia, it does not appear to be a very promising line of inquiry into the causes of interstate peace in South America. Suggestive of this point, Robert Jervis notes the following: [I]f threats usually produce the desired result, we want to know what distinguishes cases in which this is true from ones in which it is not. If it is true that when two status quo powers rely on policies of threats toward one another the usual result is a spiral of greater tensions and hostility, we will want to know what distinguishes these cases from ones in which the same general starting conditions are present but the outcomes are different.109

The psychological model is context-dependent. It can explain why specific key decision makers behaved as they did in a particular situation. Further, it can even generalize an explanation of why different key decision makers, facing similar situations, decide and choose differently. Nonetheless, in South America there are multiple cases with the same outcome, yet decision makers with different personalities, values, beliefs, formative experiences, perceptions, and political persuasions have come and left the scene. Therefore, continued successful deterrence in multiple dyadic relations over a seventy-year period does not seem to be caused by the accurate perceptions of a few key decision makers. The second deterrence hypothesis stresses the economic or rational calculation of the challenger. It posits that given the relative capabilities of the defender, the potential attacker will select the option that will net it the greater expected utility.110 In other words, if the challenger estimates that the expected benefits from a particular military operation are greater than the costs/risks involved, then it will try to change the status quo. Conversely, if the costs/risks outweigh the expected benefits, then the challenger will refrain from mounting an attack. In the first case, the decision to challenge the status quo signifies a deterrence failure and war. In the second instance, the decision to respect the status quo means successful deterrence and peace. Rational deterrence theory is parsimonious, rigorous, and generalizable to a broad spectrum of cases in world politics. Notwithstanding these positive characteristics, it fails to provide a suitable explanation for some “crucial cases.”111 To clarify this assertion, it is important to recall an axiom inherent in rational deterrence theory: whenever egoists are given the “opportunity” to maximize their utility, they will proceed to do so. Historically, in South America there have been instances of unfavorable balance of forces for the defender, yet the potential challenger has not seized the opportunity offered by these “windows of vulnerability.”112 First, in the dispute over the Essequibo territory between Venezuela and Guyana, the former has clearly had the military superiority to reclaim that area at minimum cost, yet it has refrained from pursuing it by force. Similarly, during the heat of the Beagle Channel crisis in December 1978, the bulk of the Chilean armed forces were deployed in the west and south of its border with Argentina, yet Peru did not take advantage of Chile’s weak military posture in order to retake its lost territory in the War of the Pacific. Finally, in April 1982 when the Argentine armed forces were occupied fighting the

POLITICAL REALISM

45

British in the South Atlantic and internal political problems mounted for the Argentine military, the Chilean armed forces could have reclaimed various pieces of precious real estate at acceptable cost. Again, as in the previous two cases, the challenger chose not to exploit the military vulnerability of the defender. Clearly, these three cases demonstrate that in an adversarial relation, even when the potential challenger enjoys military superiority, general deterrence failure or war is not imminent. This is an indication that other factors may be at work. In sum, the peace in South America does not appear to be the consequence of the relative balance of power in multiple dyadic relations in the region. Method of Analysis Utilizing a method of “structured, focused comparison,”113 the hypotheses expounded above will be examined in light of the post–Chaco War peaceful period in South American political history. Since these propositions were presented in the form of “causal relations,”114 this work will test for causal direction and covariation between each explanatory variable in question and the dependent variable. Second, it will aim to establish, ceteris paribus conditions while analyzing each independent variable and its impact on the outcome. This procedure will help illuminate the existence, if there is any, of multivariable causation and spuriousness.115 Finally, given the methodological concerns outlined above, it is required to “scale”116 the variables. For that purpose, it is necessary to operationalize each of the independent variables contained in all five hypothesized explanations. Second, since the dependent variable (i.e., absence of interstate armed conflict or negative peace) has remained constant throughout the period in question, it is also necessary to vary its value or outcome. For that purpose, comparative references to an earlier, more war-prone period in South American political history will prove useful. Testable Realist Hypotheses Hypothesis No. 1: Multipolarity, Bipolarity, and Unipolarity Propositions ●

Multipolarity causes peace and stability.

If the international system is multipolar, then peace and stability is more likely than in any other type of polar configuration. ●

Bipolarity causes peace and stability.

If the international system is bipolar, then peace and stability is more likely than in any other type of polar configuration. The independent variables in hypotheses 1 and 2 will be determined according to the number of local powers or poles in South America. These actors will have to meet a minimum level of power, which, in turn, will be measured according to such indicators as economic output, military strength, population, territory, and natural resources endowment. Second, once a particular “local” polar configuration


46

(i.e., bipolar or multipolar) has been demonstrated to prevail in different periods, then it will be ascertained if and how well the local poles behave and interact according to the prescribed peaceful practices associated with both multipolarity and bipolarity. ●

Unipolarity causes peace and stability.

1. Concentration of power in one dominant state promotes peace and stability among all subordinate states in the system. 2. A hegemonic power causes peace and stability within its sphere of influence by structuring and mediating interactions among its satellites. 3. If a hegemon controls the international system, then peace and stability among subordinate states will be more likely than in any other type of polar configuration. American power preponderance or hegemonic role in South America is the principal cause of peace. These three statements denote, in a descending order of generality, the same basic causal relation. However, this relationship is problematic if power and purpose are not linked. In other words, sheer preponderance of power, apart from the hegemon’s specific interests toward the affairs of a region, does not cause interstate peace. Hence, the independent variable in this hypothesis has to be measured and classified, first, according to the relative level of power of the hegemon in different periods and, second, to evidence of involvement by the hegemonic power in trying to control crises among regional states. Conversely, the levels of compliance of subordinate states with the hegemon’s mandate have to be classified as low, imperceptible, or high. Hypothesis No. 2: Balance of Power Proposition Peace results from the agreement between two actors’ estimates of their relative power. ●

If two actors agree (i.e., perceive) that there exists military imbalance, that is, that one of them is clearly superior, in their relationship, then peace will ensue. Conversely, if they disagree, then war will result.

To classify the challenger’s estimate of the defender’s relative level of military strength, it will be instructive to examine situations in which a country has publicly claimed a specific stake in dispute but refrains from seeking that objective through military means. Often, the challenger will express the desire to avoid costly and bloody engagements with a well-equipped opponent and it will profess its faith in the viability of political/diplomatic solutions. In short, these evasive statements, coupled with the defender’s actual relative level of military strength, will be taken as indicators of the challenger’s apprehensive estimate of the defender’s level of military power. ●

Emphasizing the rational calculations of the actors, military superiority, or, at least, parity deters potential revisionist states from initiating a war.

POLITICAL REALISM

47

The dependent variable in this proposition will be measured by estimating the actual level and quality of the armed forces of various countries in South America that have been involved in disputes over specific stakes with other countries in the region. Once the military ratio in various dyads has been established, it will be possible to ascertain if and how strong military parity and/or superiority has deterred a potential challenger and, accordingly, prevented the outbreak of interstate armed conflict in South America.


CHAPTER 3

BALANCE OF POWER, EMPIRICAL FINDINGS, AND PEACE

he previous chapter identified and discussed the theoretical foundations and implications of the most relevant realist hypotheses for an explanation of peace in South America. Chapters 3 and 4 will present an empirical evaluation of their explanatory value in order to determine if indeed they constitute sufficient conditions for the uncharacteristic lack of major interstate wars in the region. The data that will be presented and analyzed in these two chapters will not follow a strict chronological pattern, nor will they be treated as a series of separate case studies. Rather, the evidence will be culled selectively across time and regional space, depending on the type of data needed to corroborate or falsify the causal relation posited by the propositions expounded previously. For example, when dealing with the hypothesis on the deterrent capacity effected by a clear military superiority of one of the actors in a dyad, simultaneous references will be made to the military capabilities of all the contenders involved in several unconnected cases like the long-standing dispute between Colombia and Venezuela over the Gulf of Venezuela, the three Ecuadorian-Peruvian militarized disputes over territory in the Amazon, and the 1978 Argentine-Chilean dispute over the three islands in the Beagle Channel.

T

Polarity and Interstate Peace in South America World politics theorists, who maintain that a system or subsystem is more stable and peaceful under conditions of multipolarity than of bipolarity would argue that the lack of intraregional interstate wars in South America since 1935 up until 2005 is unequivocally a direct consequence of regional multipolarity. Similarly, those who espouse a bipolar argument would support the peaceful and stable characteristics of subsystemic bipolarity in South America. Given the evident discrepancy within political realism, it is, therefore, necessary in this section to establish, first, if indeed South America has been consistently either a multipolar or a bipolar subsystem. Second, once the polarity of the subsystem has been established, it will be ascertained whether there exists a general structural pattern correlating a particular subsystem configuration with the outbreak and permanence of interstate peace. Third, it will

50


be established whether the main actors in the region have behaved according to the norms of action prescribed by either a stable and peaceful multipolar or bipolar environment. Operationalization of Polarity The prevalent methodological diversity among realist scholars prompts them to define the structural configuration (i.e., multipolarity, bipolarity, or unipolarity) of the international system, or of any regional subsystem according to three different features. While some analysts count the number of poles or significant states,1 others, assuming that military coalitions behave identically to sovereign states in the external environment, tally the number of alliance clusters in order to define polarity.2 These two opposite views cause considerable confusion and debate in the theoretical literature. Hence, scholars routinely distinguish between “polarization,” that is, the pattern of military alliance clusters in the system, and “polarity,” that is, the number of leading, sovereign states in the system.3 Still a third group of researchers establishes the stratification of a system by measuring the concentration of capabilities or level of power inequality among the leading states in the environment.4 This book will define the structure of the South American subsystem according to the number of poles or significant state-actors in that setting. It will refrain from utilizing the number of military alliance clusters as an indicator of polarity for two reasons. First, the hypotheses that will be tested are grounded in structural theories that define most frequently the structure of the system in terms of polarity, rather than polarization. Second, as James Lee Ray argues elsewhere, “[t]here is a serious problem with concentrating on this indicator alone . . . as many states, including many highly important ones, go along for many years without belonging to any alliances.”5 Precisely, this underlines the problem inherent in analyzing the South American subsystem. Even if this study’s analytical preference would lead us to define the stratification of this region in terms of the number of military alliance clusters, it would be an impossible task due to the total dearth of formal and/or informal intraregional military coalitions in South America since the end of the Chaco War up until 2005. For example, in a systematic and quantitative description of all formal alliances, their membership, duration, and type, Small and Singer find that in the period from 1816 to 1965, South American states were part of three different “defense pacts” and one single “entente.” All three defense pacts began and ended in the nineteenth century: Ecuador and Peru joined in a defense pact from 1860 until 1861; Colombia and Ecuador formed another defense pact between 1864 and 1865; and Bolivia and Peru were united in a defense pact from 1873 to 1883. In the post–Chaco War period covered by this study, there is no entry indicating any type of formal intraregional military coalition. The only entry is an entente involving Caribbean, Central and South American countries, and the United States.6 Ranking States: Poles or Non-poles? The decision to define the polarity of the South American subsystem according to the distribution of capabilities among a particular number of leading states or poles

BALANCE OF POWER, EMPIRICAL FINDINGS, PEACE

51

presents yet another operational obstacle, which needs to be overcome prior to the analysis of the data. The issue is as follows: what states should be counted as polar actors? Or, put it in a different way, how is it possible to know which countries can be ranked as poles? The selection of the most “significant states” of any structural context is a task that, despite recent efforts to refine and statistically advance the scientific ranking of poles, has been conducted in a purely empirical and impressionistic manner. Writing on this subject, Kenneth Waltz maintains that to classify states “[w]e need only rank them roughly by capability.” He elaborates that “[h]istorically one finds general agreement about who the great powers of a period are, with occasional doubt about marginal cases.” He concludes that the difficulty of counting great powers is not due to “problems of measurement” but to the “confusion about how polarities should be defined.” He adds that “[t]he question [of who is a polar actor] is an empirical one, and common sense can answer it.”7 In the passage just quoted, Waltz seems to be arguing that if one rigorously and precisely defines polarity, the ranking and selection of one, two, or many poles, which in turn establishes the structural configuration of a system, is a straightforward and commonsensical task that needs not puzzle a researcher. This is problematic. While it may be clear that one, two, or more than two overwhelmingly, preponderant actors in a system may define the structure of that context as either unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar respectively, it is not entirely clear, however, at what level of material capabilities a state may be ranked as a significant actor. Moreover, considering that one may be able to rank more than two roughly equal states as significant actors, it is not evident from Waltz’s argument how much more powerful a hegemon or the two leading states have to be over the rest of the state-actors in order for that system to be defined as either unipolar or bipolar respectively.8 To circumvent the pitfalls discussed above, the South American states will be ranked utilizing a hybrid approach. Randall L. Schweller establishes that for any state to be classified as a pole it “must have greater than half the resources of the most powerful state in the system.”9 There seems to be a couple of problems with his criterion. First, requiring such a high percentage share, he significantly and disproportionately increases (evidently, as he wanted to demonstrate in his case study) the probability of systemic tripolarity. Second, his prerequisite is excessively restrictive to the point of almost precluding the possibility of international equilibrium as the result of alliance formation. Mindful of these two problems, this study will deliberately adopt Schweller’s criterion to distinguish poles from non-poles in the South American subsystem. Thus, it will be counted as a pole any nation-state in South America whose averaged percentage share of the total material capabilities is greater than half of the total resources of the most powerful state in the system. Other states who do not meet this requirement will be classified as nonpolar actors and, thereby, will be inconsequential for defining the polarity of the subsystem. Once the total number of poles or “significant states” in South America has been established, this work will draw on Frank W. Wayman’s polarity index to corroborate the polar configuration of the subsystem. As Wayman focuses on the relative concentration of power (i.e., level of power inequality) among the poles, he defines a bipolar system as one in which the two largest major powers control over

52


half of the aggregate major-power capabilities, and a multipolar system as one in which the two largest major powers control less than half of these capabilities. Consistent with this criterion, this work will gauge when the two largest South American states control either more than, or less than half of the subsystem’s total power capabilities instead of the “aggregate major-power capabilities.”10 Since, both the bipolar and the multipolar arguments examined in this work rest on the assumption that changes in the polar configuration of the system are caused by shifts in the distribution of capabilities, it is necessary to explain, prior to any analysis of the data, how power is defined and measured here. First, power is the material capacity of any nation-state to influence the management of the international system and to cause the involuntary change of another country’s foreign policy. As discussed in the previous chapter, this study recognizes the problems associated with this basic model or first face of power argument. Nevertheless, it will use it because the two alternative models or faces of power theses are too intangible for the successful analysis of international politics. Second, this work will establish the power potential of sovereign states in the international system by measuring the level of tangible capabilities or material power resources. That is, it will focus on national military, economic, and population measures. The Source: COW’s National Material Capability Data Set The empirical source for the analysis of the structural polarity of the South American subsystem is the National Material Capability Data Set, which is part of the Correlates of War Project (COW) at the University of Michigan. This database contains measures for three indicators of national power resources: military, industrial, and demographic. In turn, each of these three indicators is measured according to two different variables. First, the distribution of military power is measured by the total size of the armed forces in thousands of men and by total military or defense expenditures in thousand of current year British Pounds for 1816–1913 and in thousands of current year U.S. Dollars for 1914–2001. Second, industrial capacity is measured by the total energy consumption in thousands of coal-ton equivalent and by the magnitude of national iron and steel production in thousands of tons. Third, the demographic capacity of states is measured according to urban population in thousands (i.e., population living in cities with population greater than one hundred thousand) and the total population in thousands.11 The composite power index is the sum of each state’s mean score for the six variables as a percentage of all scores within the South American subsystem. Analysis of the Data Applying Randall Schweller’s classificatory criterion to the data reported on tables 3.1 and 3.2 reveals several interesting results. First, as presented in table 3.3, the South American subsystem has never been a multipolar subsystem. Second, from 1850 to the most recent data entry in 2001, Brazil has been consistently the leading state in South America, except, of course, in 1880, the first year of the War of the Pacific, when Peru was the leading state followed by Brazil. Third, the South

Table 3.1 Annual Values for the Computed Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) Score of the National Material Capabilities of South American States in Five-Year Intervals, 1850–1930 Year

Arg.

Bol.

Bra.

Col.

Chi.

Ecu.

Guy.

Par.

Per.

Sur.

Uru.

1850 1855 1860 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930

5.84 5.13 7.45 9.42 10.30 9.88 7.93 13.54 11.78 13.44 15.77 20.12 19.15 21.63 24.31 28.18 29.78

15.41 13.71 4.53 3.56 3.61 5.16 5.33 4.12 3.27 2.93 3.88 3.07 2.62 3.76 3.10 1.96 2.40

37.33 40.20 38.05 34.03 51.98 41.09 29.29 38.18 39.67 41.58 33.03 34.41 37.57 34.56 30.88 36.99 34.22

9.56 7.48 6.74 6.58 6.69 6.67 6.50 7.69 10.46 8.74 10.63 6.12 6.08 5.89 6.58 4.34 5.07

6.21 6.72 7.22 5.55 6.58 8.10 6.41 12.16 12.25 10.48 15.01 14.99 15.42 13.92 14.79 12.26 11.69

N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.11 3.88 2.59 6.16 4.59 3.73 3.60 3.52 3.10 4.49 2.46 N/A 2.13

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

7.11 6.75 7.65 18.65 1.74 N/A 0.84 1.27 1.32 1.63 1.61 N/A 1.49 1.35 1.11 N/A 1.02

14.40 13.77 14.05 12.42 10.08 13.32 32.74 8.74 7.99 8.07 6.28 6.09 5.03 6.07 5.87 6.08 6.09

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.41 3.52 2.75 3.32 4.41 4.40 N/A 6.29 4.81 4.47

Ven. N/A N/A 12.00 7.52 5.90 11.89 8.38 4.47 5.15 6.65 6.87 6.20 5.13 4.98 4.61 2.99 3.13

Source: Compiled using the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities Data Set (v3.01) available at http://cow2.la.psu.edu/. Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965.” In Bruce Russett (ed.), Peace, War, and Numbers. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, pp. 19–48; and Singer, J. David. (1987). “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985.” International Interactions 14:115–132. For the complete presentation of the data on which these overall results are based, see appendix A at http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/felix_book/Appendixes.htm

53

54 Table 3.2 Annual Values for the Computed Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) Score of the National Material Capabilities of South American States in Selected-Year Intervals, 1932–2001 Year

Arg.

Bol.

Bra.

Col.

Chi.

Ecu.

Guy.

Par.

Per.

Sur.

Uru.

Ven.

1932 1935 1939 1946 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001

29.00 26.68 27.30 28.03 25.91 29.26 23.28 21.74 20.66 17.38 20.24 17.64 13.53 12.31 12.48

2.26 8.56 2.80 1.91 1.73 1.56 1.36 1.62 1.70 2.09 1.90 2.04 2.48 1.62 1.64

37.21 33.27 37.99 37.14 40.35 32.70 37.77 36.70 39.43 40.43 37.04 38.51 35.69 48.32 47.29

5.11 5.60 9.11 6.92 6.82 8.63 8.03 10.19 9.60 8.70 8.21 8.43 12.79 9.46 10.50

9.75 8.77 7.98 8.86 8.61 8.97 7.52 7.30 7.46 7.08 8.38 7.69 7.57 6.32 8.17

1.90 1.88 2.48 2.19 2.07 2.62 2.38 2.18 2.23 2.56 3.00 3.45 4.25 3.08 3.04

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.38 0.44 0.18 0.16 0.12

1.08 2.13 1.11 0.84 0.99 1.03 0.94 1.15 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.95 1.13 0.81 0.85

5.89 6.04 5.50 6.52 5.86 6.17 6.18 6.89 7.13 8.19 8.41 8.69 8.55 6.09 5.88

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.24 0.58 0.10 0.13

3.83 3.21 N/A 2.56 2.14 N/A 1.85 2.44 N/A 1.98 2.03 1.76 1.91 1.14 1.10

3.96 3.86 3.54 5.03 5.52 7.09 10.70 9.79 9.22 10.16 9.28 10.15 11.34 11.04 10.32

Source: Compiled using the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities Data Set (v3.01) available at http://cow2.la.psu.edu/. Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965.” In Bruce Russett (ed.), Peace, War, and Numbers. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, pp. 19–48; and Singer, J. David. (1987). “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985.” International Interactions 14:115–132. For the complete presentation of the data on which these overall results are based, see appendix A at URL listed table 3.1, p. 153 at http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/ felix_book/Appendixes.htm


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Table 3.3 Polar Classification of the South American Subsystem According to Schweller’s Polarity Index Year

Subsystem’s Polarity

Polar Actors in Subsystem

1850 1855 1860 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1932 1935 1939 1946 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001

Unipolar Unipolar Unipolar Bipolar Unipolar Unipolar Bipolar Unipolar Unipolar Unipolar Unipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Unipolar Bipolar Unipolar Unipolar Unipolar Unipolar

Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil and Paraguay Brazil Brazil Peru and Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil Brazil and Argentina Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil

Source: Félix E. Martín.

American subsystem has been bipolar eighteen times out of thirty-two intervals. Fourth, only at the beginning of the Triple Alliance War, in 1865 also known as the Paraguayan War, and during the War of the Pacific in 1880, did Brazil share its leading role in the South American subsystem with Paraguay and Peru respectively. The rest of the years from 1850 up until 1900, Brazil was the sole, undisputed intraregional leading polar actor in South America. Fifth, starting in 1905 and ending roughly after the 1982 South Atlantic War, Argentina climbed steadily in all material power indicators to position itself as the second most powerful state in the region, ushering in an eighty-year period of subsystemic bipolarity in South America. Interestingly enough, this long period of subsystemic bipolarity preceded, coalesced,


56

Table 3.4 Polar Classification of the South American Subsystem According to Wayman’s Polarity Index Year

Subsystem’s Polarity

Polar Actors in Subsystem

1850 1855 1860 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1932 1935 1939 1946 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001

Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Unipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Multipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Tripolar Bipolar Bipolar

Brazil and Bolivia Brazil and Peru Brazil and Peru Brazil and Paraguay Brazil Brazil and Peru Peru and Brazil Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Chile Brazil and Argentina Brazil/Argentina/Chile Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina Brazil/Argentina/Colombia Brazil and Argentina Brazil and Argentina

Source: Félix E. Martín.

and continued long after the end of the Chaco War in 1935. In sum, utilizing Schweller’s criterion, one surmises that South America has been a historically consistent bipolar subsystem for a lot more years than those comprising the period of the South American peace from 1935 to 2005. Also, first, as disclosed in table 3.4, the application of Frank W. Wayman’s classificatory scheme to the data in tables 3.1 and 3.2 evinces that the South American subsystem has been consistently and historically bipolar. Only the distribution of capabilities of the five-year periods ending in 1900 and 2001 respectively project the region as multipolar. Incidentally, the same two periods are unipolar under Schweller’s classification. Second, under Wayman’s criterion, Brazil is also the


57

leading state throughout the length of the data, except during the War of the Pacific in 1880 when it was second to Peru. Third, Wayman’s scheme discloses that 1885 is the inception of a century of consistent Brazilian and Argentine regional bipolarity. Schweller’s and Wayman’s polarity indexes complement and corroborate each other. Comparing the results of their separate applications to the data set, one concludes, first, that the South America has unquestionably been a bipolar subsystem for most of its history. Second, subsystemic structural bipolarity precedes the outbreak of the Chaco War and the inception of the long period of peace in South America. Finally, Argentina and Brazil have been in a class by themselves; since they rank comfortably as the most powerful countries in the region. These two nation-states have led by a wide margin in all military, economic, and demographic indicators throughout most of the 151 years covered by data presented here. Regional Bipolarity and Peace: A Causal Nexus? At this point of the analysis, one can affirm unequivocally that the long period of peace in South America coincided with a subsystemic bipolar configuration. Therefore, a second, more important question is in order: is there evidence of a causal link between regional bipolarity and the prevalence of interstate peace in South America since 1935? In seeking an answer to this question, the data will be analyzed for general patterns, linking consistently bipolarity and interstate peace. For a purely heuristic purpose, a hypothetical causal implication of multipolarity on the long period of peace in South America was examined and the determination was made that, even if the regional subsystem would have been multipolar, the absence of interstate wars in this region could not be explained satisfactorily by this structural configuration. The fundamental reason for this conclusion is, essentially, that the behavior of regional state-actors did not conform to the prescribed norms of action of a peaceful and stable multipolar environment.12 Second, it will be examined here whether the two poles in South America have behaved historically according to the prescribed norms of action of a stable and peaceful bipolar environment. In an effort to find a robust causal pattern, linking system configuration or polarity with either interstate peace or war, the analysis of the data has been extended to several years prior to the outbreak of the long period of peace in South America in 1935. The objective is to increase the number of observations for a more rigorous comparison and analysis of this causal argument. In essence, two separate periods will be compared: one that stretches from 1850 to 1935 and a second one from 1935 to 2005. As reported in table 3.5, the first period comprises the end of La Plata War (1836–1852), the Triple Alliance War (1865–1870), the War of the Pacific (1879–1884), and the Chaco War from (1932–1935). The first three major interstate wars occurred within a thirty-year period from 1850 to 1880, and the Chaco War immediately followed a forty-five year interlude of regional peace. The second period comprises the inception and duration of the long period of peace from 1935 to 2005.


58

Table 3.5 Polarity and Intraregional Interstate Outcome of the South American Subsystem in Selected-Year Intervals, 1850–2001 Year

Wayman’s Classification

Schweller’s Classification

Intraregional Interstate Outcome

1850 1855 1860 1865 1870 1875 1880 1885 1890 1895 1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1939 1946 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001

Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Unipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Multipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Multipolar Bipolar Bipolar

Unipolar Unipolar Unipolar Bipolar Unipolar Unipolar Bipolar Unipolar Unipolar Unipolar Unipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Bipolar Unipolar Bipolar Unipolar Unipolar Unipolar Unipolar

La Plata War, 1836–1852 Peace Peace The Triple Alliance War, 1865–1870 The Triple Alliance War, 1865–1870 Peace The War of the Pacific, 1879–1884 Peace Peace Peace Peace Peace Peace Peace Peace Peace Peace Chaco War, 1932–1935 Peace Peace Peace Peace Peace Peace Peace Peace Peace Peace Peace Peace Peace

Several points about the data are important to note here. First, the nineteenthcentury wars, with the exception of La Plata War for which there is no consistent data to classify the polarity of the subsystem during 1836, the year of its inception, all erupted at a time when South America was bipolar according to both Wayman’s and Schweller’s polarity indexes. Second, except for the Chaco War that ended during a period of bipolarity, the rest of the interstate wars concluded at a point when the subsystem was unipolar according to Schweller’s index. This correlation is less evident in Wayman’s classification, because, as per his index, only the Triple Alliance War ended at a period of regional unipolarity. Finally, the fact that the Chaco War represents a short interruption in what would have amounted to a


59

forty-eight-year extension (1884–1932) of the long period of peace in South America must not be overlooked. Comparing the pre- and post-Chaco War periods, one comes away with the conclusion that bipolarity does not appear to prevent the outbreak of interstate wars. As presented in table 3.5, the outbreaks of both interstate wars and peace have occurred equally in a bipolar South American subsystem. During the more volatile and violent nineteenth century, wars erupted in a bipolar environment. Similarly, the peaceful interlude prior to 1932, the Chaco War itself, and the long period of peace have all occurred in a bipolar subsystem. In sum, while the causal variable (i.e., bipolarity) has remained constant, international outcomes (i.e., interstate peace and war) have varied periodically. The lack of covariation between cause and effect leads to the conclusion that, at least for South America, a bipolar structure is not the cause of the outbreak and permanence of negative peace. Having found no consistent correlation between bipolarity and interstate peace in South America, this work now examines whether the behavior of Argentina and Brazil was consistent with the properties of a stable and peaceful bipolar subsystem. As previously expounded in chapter 2, lack of peripheries, high degree of transparency, and low levels of military and economic interdependence are the three main attributes of bipolarity that are claimed to prevent wars and foster interstate peace and stability. Since the bipolar properties listed above stem primarily from the experience of the cold war, one has to adjust them somewhat in order to make them more applicable to a subsystemic level of analysis. In this sense, the parameters defining “peripheries” in Kenneth Waltz’s systemic theory of world politics have to be scaled down from “acting on a world scale”13 to, perhaps, being able to get involved indirectly in a border dispute between two neighboring states. On this score, the behaviors of Brazil and Argentina have been inconsistent with this prescribed norm of action of a peaceful and stable bipolar structure. The record shows that in the several border disputes and militarized crises, even those directly involving one of the two poles, in South America since 1935, the mere involvement of one of the poles has not compelled the other to participate either directly or indirectly. Generally, their roles have been circumscribed, first, to advocating, in international organizations, such elusive and open-ended ideals as peaceful resolution of disputes, and, second, to stressing the fraternal bonds among all Latin American countries. It is evident, however, that neither Brazil nor Argentina have ever felt compelled to get directly implicated in a militarized dispute in the region to counterbalance the purported influence or involvement of the other.14 In sum, rather than lack of peripheries among the two poles, bipolarity in South America incorporates the existence of peripheries as embodied by the rest of the countries in the region. On the issue of transparency, it is clear that Argentina and Brazil are fully aware of who is each other’s main competitor in the region. Evidence of this awareness is the fact that, while Argentina and Brazil have had other long-running disputes with third states in the region, they have opted to emulate and compete against each other’s military posture and levels of military preparedness. For example, Brazil has always been the leading state in the region, while Argentina has kept a

60


consistent pace with it in terms of levels of military personnel, military expenditure (see appendix A at the following URL: http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/ felix_book/Appendixes.htm), and modernization of its armed forces. Furthermore, they have mirrored each other’s capacity to manufacture military equipment and have also mirrored each other’s nuclear energy development programs. Low levels of economic and military interdependence are, yet, another of the three properties of bipolarity consistent with the behavior of Argentina and Brazil. First, it is a fact that until recently intraregional economic interdependence was very low among these poles.15 Traditionally, their main trading partners have been Germany, Great Britain, France, and the United States. Second, Argentina and Brazil have relied customarily on internal means to balance each other’s power. The absence of either formal or informal military arrangements between one of the poles and other South American states attests to that conclusion. What is the causal nexus between regional bipolarity and the prevalence of peace in South America? None. This is the short answer to the main question in this section. Nonetheless, this finding will be subsequently elaborated upon. First, this work uncovered the fact that subsystemic bipolarity affects only the bilateral relations between Argentina and Brazil and that it may have been instrumental in preventing the outbreak of hostilities between them. While the presence of peripheries in South America could have provoked several military confrontations between the two poles, a high degree of transparency and low levels of economic and military interdependence simplified their bilateral relations. Accordingly, being able to identify each other’s main opponent and to judge its capability tempered an enduring Argentine-Brazilian rivalry. However, the positive effect of bipolarity on Argentine-Brazilian relations has not translated uniformly to all dyads in South America. Hence, uncertainty and miscalculation may have been factors in bringing Argentina and Chile, Peru and Chile, and Ecuador and Peru to the brink of war in more than one occasion in this century. Second, no direct correlation has been found between polarity and the permanence of intraregional interstate peace. When the analysis is expanded to other more violent years in the South American subsystem and compared to the same causal factor with different outcomes, it is determined that all interstate wars as well as the long post–Chaco War period of peace have erupted and persisted invariably during periods of bipolarity in South America. In sum, while there is a correlation between bipolarity and interstate peace, there appears to be no significant causation. Correlation is not sufficient to establish causation. This is particularly evident if it is kept in mind that there has been, also, correlation between periods of bipolarity and the outbreak wars in South America prior to 1935. Similarly, when several instances of multipolarity and unipolarity have occurred the effect has been interstate peace. In brief, it is an obvious conclusion that, at least in South America, there is no strong evidence to link a structural variable like polarity with the incidence of interstate peace and war. Hence, it is necessary to look elsewhere for other alternative explanations of intraregional interstate peace in South America. One possibility is the positive effect of dyadic deterrence. Thus, this work turns to the analysis of dyadic deterrence and its impact on South America’s intraregional affairs.


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Dyadic Deterrence and Interstate Peace in South America Despite the absence of major intraregional interstate wars since 1935, the South American subsystem endured at least eight different adversarial relationships. Their nature and intensity vary greatly one from the other, but it is still reasonable to argue that, given the military and political circumstances in the region, it has been a surprisingly positive and paradoxical historical development. Deterrence theory offers a second set of explanatory variables that may be at work behind the peace in South America. Deterrence theory incorporates two strands: (1) a cognitive approach and (2) an economistic or rational tack. In a world of imperfect information, perhaps, the best analytical method is the cognitive approach, where the perceptions of key decision makers in different states ultimately determine whether a deterrent process succeeds or fails. However, given the nature of the case at hand and the type of data available, it proves more efficacious to concentrate only on a hypothesis whose origin stems from the economistic or rational aspect of deterrence theory.16 Working from this perspective, some deterrence theorists would postulate that the lack of a major intraregional interstate war in South America is the consequence of the challenger’s objective and rational reading of the defender’s level of military capabilities and the costs involved in changing the status quo in its favor.

General or Immediate Deterrence: Operationalization It will be assumed, for the sake of methodological expediency, that the long period of peace is indeed a case of general deterrence. In this sense, instead of analyzing if a particular factor causes deterrence failure or success, the dependent variable will be controlled and the analysis will focus on whether or not the required or necessary objective material factors for a successful case of deterrence (i.e., interstate peace) have been present in each of the dyadic relationships encompassing the entire period of peace in South America. In the course of analyzing several dyads in South America, a brief historical background of the cases will be provided, and an attempt will be made to define the general structure of deterrence in each specific dyad and to identify the defender from the challenger and their respective motives. Subsequently, a discussion of the level of military and national material capabilities of each player in a dyad will follow to ascertain whether or not the defender’s capabilities are a sufficient deterrent to the challenger’s objectives. The measurement of the defender’s deterrent capacity will be determined according to data extracted from the Correlates of War Data Set and presented in separate tables for each of the dyads. The criterion that will be used to evaluate the defender’s deterrent capacity will be based on an amount equivalent to or greater than a simple two-to-one ratio of the defender’s military and averaged percentage share of all national material capabilities over the challenger’s. Finally, it will be ascertained whether or not the causal reasoning of general deterrence theory succeeds in explaining the absence of a major war in each dyad. The transformation of general deterrence to a situation of immediate deterrence

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will signify the inapplicability of the deterrence causal argument to South American peace; nevertheless, this work will identify and analyze the success or failure of those cases that have degenerated from situations of general to immediate deterrence. Dyadic Deterrence: Irrelevant Factor or the Cause of Peace? The Argentine-Brazilian Dyad The Argentine-Brazilian rivalry is one of the most important dyads in South America. Its inception dates back to the nineteenth century when Argentina fought imperial Brazil (1824–1828) over territory on its eastern boundary with Brazil, or what later became the buffer state of Uruguay. Their rivalry flared up again during La Plata War (1836–1852) when Argentine rebels, allied with Brazil and Uruguay, fought against the dictatorship of Juan Manuel de Rosa (the violent caudillo who ruled Argentina from 1829 to 1852) in Argentina. In the twentieth century the rivalry has manifested itself through the support of Argentina and Brazil for opposite sides in the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay. Also, in World War II while Brazil was an early and committed supporter of the Allied powers, Argentina followed an independent course of action, leaning toward the Axis powers up to the end of the war.17 More contemporary manifestations of the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry include competition for the Paraguayan hydroelectric energy and for Bolivian oil and natural gas. Moreover, since both countries developed an indigenous weapons- and aircraft-manufacturing capacity, they competed intensely for the intraregional market of these goods. A further reflection of the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry was their mirrored rush to develop nuclear energy in the 1970s and early 1980s. An additional manifestation of their rivalry occurred during the 1982 South Atlantic conflict between Argentina and Great Britain. At that juncture, not only did Brazil refuse to side politically with Argentina but, more importantly, it also refused to sell the latter weapons.18 In the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry it is not entirely clear which state is either the defender or the challenger. During the post–Chaco War period there has not been any tangible stake over which these two countries have clashed directly and hence it is impossible to identify their respective roles in the general structure of deterrence. They have taken different positions throughout the years, alternating roles based on the issue at hand. However, since Argentina has been the most revisionist and assertive state in the southern cone, it will be assumed for the sake of argument that Argentina has been the challenger in this dyad for a major portion of time. Nevertheless, one thing is evident about this rivalry: their competition is about political influence, international status, and reputation in South America. As reported in table 3.6, Argentina and Brazil have maintained a roughly consistent pace with each other’s level of military and overall national material capabilities. However, it is clear that, except for the year 1955, Brazil has enjoyed either parity with or superiority over Argentina in terms of all three indicators (mentioned earlier) throughout the post–Chaco War period. This trend changed dramatically after the South Atlantic conflict between Argentina and Great Britain in 1982 and after the beginning of the democratization process in Argentina in 1984.

Table 3.6 Dyadic Balance of Military and Overall National Material Capabilities between Argentina and Brazil, 1935–2001 MILPER Years

Argentina

1935 1939 1946 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001

44.00 61.00 62.00 62.00 148.00 130.00 132.00 144.00 130.00 140.00 108.00 83.00 65.00 70.00

CINC

MILEX

Brazil

Ratio

Argentina

97.00 93.00 119.00 231.00 107.00 241.00 200.00 225.00 250.00 273.00 276.00 297.00 297.00 288.00

2:1 2:1 2:1 4:1 1:1 2:1 2:1 2:1 2:1 2:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1

45183.00 58984.00 255555.00 320525.00 411867.00 288613.00 428781.00 514286.00 628415.00 3060636.00 1889000.00 770980.00 2080000.00 4408000.00

Brazil 48576.00 63495.00 309848.00 336538.00 234210.00 268931.00 501622.00 802800.00 1380583.00 2019334.00 1242000.00 1180000.00 9824000.00 10511000.00

Ratio 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 2:1 1:1 1:1 2:1 2:1 2:1 2:1 2:1 5:1 2:1

Argentina

Brazil

Ratio

26.68 27.30 28.03 25.91 29.26 23.28 21.74 20.66 17.38 20.24 17.64 13.53 9.22 12.48

33.27 37.99 37.14 40.35 32.70 37.77 36.70 39.43 40.43 37.04 38.51 35.69 41.64 47.29

1:1 1:1 1:1 2:1 1:1 2:1 2:1 2:1 2:1 2:1 2:1 3:1 5:1 4:1

Notes: MILPER denotes the total of military personnel in thousands. MILEX is the military expenditures in thousands of current year U.S. Dollars. CINC Annual values for the computed Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) measure is generally computed by summing all observations on each of the six capability components for a given year, including MILPER and MILEX, of national material capabilities of South American countries in five-year intervals. The numbers in this column are extracted from table 3.2 in this chapter. The ratios are rounded off to the next digit. Source: Compiled using the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities Data Set (v3.01) available at http://cow2.la.psu.edu/. Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965.” In Bruce Russett (ed.), Peace, War, and Numbers. Beverly Hills: Sage publications, pp. 19–48; and Singer, J. David. (1987). “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985.” International Interactions 14:115–132. For the complete presentation of the data on which these overall results are based, see appendix A at the following URL: http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/ inrfaculty/felix_book/ Appendixes.htm

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Subsequent to 1985, the differential ratio between the two countries jumps more than threefold in favor of Brazil in all three capability measures. Based on this simple quantitative analysis, it can be concluded that for most of the post–Chaco War period a process of general deterrence was at work in preserving peace and stability in the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry. The Argentine-Chilean Dyad Argentina and Chile constitute another important dyad in South America. Since 1881, when Argentina and Chile negotiated a treaty that gave the Patagonia region to Argentina and Tierra del Fuego to Chile, these two countries have quarreled over many territorial claims along their 2,500–mile boundary.19 The most intense competition between these two states has centered on the demarcation and control of the Beagle Channel in the Tierra del Fuego region. In 1967 Chile invoked unilaterally a 1902 treaty calling for resolution of bilateral disputes through arbitration by the British crown. Then, on July 22, 1971 Argentina and Chile signed an agreement formally submitting the Beagle Channel dispute to binding arbitration under the auspices of the British crown. Finally, Argentina repudiates the British arbital award of May 2, 1977 that granted Picton, Nueva, and Lennox Islands to Chile. This was the precipitating event that led to Beagle Channel dispute. Since early on in the twentieth century the overarching objective of Argentina has been to gain control of three islands in the Beagle Channel. Its motive has been to have sole possession of all deep-water port facilities in the South Atlantic and to control the strategic waterway linking the Pacific and Atlantic oceans. In addition the Argentine invasion of the Malvinas or Falkland Islands in April 1982 should be seen as part of this same strategic interest. In the Beagle Channel crisis, for example, the Argentine military junta intimidated Chile to negotiate the fate of the islands and the control of the link between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. In the South Atlantic Islands, the Argentine military aimed to force Great Britain to accept Argentina’s control over the islands and its naval and military preponderance in the South Atlantic Ocean. To accomplish its aim, Argentina repeatedly repudiated several multilaterally negotiated agreements that reaffirmed Chile’s jurisdiction over the three islands in the Beagle Channel. Instead, it insisted on settling bilaterally the controversy with Chile. Finally, its adamant and assertive position regarding this issue forced Chile to acquiesce to direct negotiations and to set November 2, 1978 as the deadline for reaching a final bilateral agreement. The inability of Argentina and Chile to compromise by the scheduled date pushed them to the brink of a major war. Argentina threatened to take the islands by force and Chile prepared, in the midst of further diplomatic efforts on its part, to confront any attack or incursion into the Beagle Channel Islands or along its border. Although one cannot classify this dyad as a classic situation of general dyadic deterrence, given the superior distribution of capabilities in favor of the challenger, the ensuing crisis represented a definite transition to a condition of immediate deterrence. In this dyad the clear challenger was historically Argentina, while Chile was the defender of the status quo. Was the defender able to deter the challenger? Despite the successful tradition of the Chilean armed forces, and its high ratings in terms of

Table 3.7 Dyadic Balance of Military and Overall National Material Capabilities between Argentina and Chile, 1935–2001 MILPER

CINC

MILEX

Years

Argentina

Chile

Ratio

Argentina

1935 1939 1946 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001

44.00 61.00 62.00 62.00 148.00 130.00 132.00 144.00 130.00 140.00 108.00 83.00 71.00 70.00

24.00 24.00 34.00 39.00 42.00 41.00 45.00 64.00 74.00 88.00 101.00 95.00 92.00 88.00

2:1 3:1 2:1 2:1 4:1 3:1 3:1 2:1 2:1 2:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1

45183.00 58984.00 255555.00 320525.00 411867.00 288613.00 428781.00 514286.00 628415.00 3060636.00 1889000.00 770980.00 2080000.00 4408000.00

Chile 14707.00 17336.00 56849.00 119355.00 168966.00 103514.00 136667.00 165731.00 332112.00 1455820.00 760000.00 541410.00 1000000.00 2841000.00

Ratio 3:1 3:1 4:1 3:1 2:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 2:1 2:1 2:1 1:1 2:1 2:1

Argentina 26.68 27.30 28.03 25.91 29.26 23.28 21.74 20.66 17.38 20.24 17.64 13.53 9.22 12.48

Chile

Ratio

8.77 7.98 8.86 8.61 8.97 7.52 7.30 7.46 7.08 8.38 7.69 7.57 7.18 8.17

3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 2:1 2:1 2:1 2:1 1:1 2:1

Notes: MILPER denotes the total of military personnel in thousands. MILEX is the military expenditures in thousands of current year U.S. Dollars. CINC Annual values for the computed Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) measure is generally computed by summing all observations on each of the six capability components for a given year, including MILPER and MILEX, of national material capabilities of South American countries in five-year intervals. The numbers in this column are extracted from table 3.2 in this chapter. The ratios are rounded off to the next digit. Source: Compiled using the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities Data Set (v3.01) available at http://cow2.la.psu.edu/. Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965.” In Bruce Russett (ed.), Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, pp. 19–48; and Singer, J. David. (1987). “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985.” International Interactions 14:115–132. For the complete presentation of the data on which these overall results are based, see appendix A at the following URL: http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/felix_book/ Appendixes.htm

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technical and personnel sophistication, the evidence presented in table 3.7 demonstrates that, based on tangible measures of its military and overall national material capabilities, Chile was objectively incapable of deterring Argentina. In the time period (half century) from 1935 to 1985, Argentina was clearly the dominant power in the dyad. This situation raises an interesting question regarding rational general deterrence: why did Argentina not maximize its utilities at the expense of Chile’s weaker position? The satisfactory answer to the query in the previous paragraph would probably require a separate work analyzing fifty years of Argentine-Chilean relations. Nevertheless, the question highlights one important lesson from this case: that is, in an adversarial relation, even when the challenger possesses the upper hand in terms of objective military and overall material national capabilities, general deterrence failure or war is not imminent. Assuming that, indeed, in December 1978 the Argentine-Chilean dyad degenerated from general to immediate deterrence, Argentina’s favorable balance of power was not a sufficient condition for the outbreak of hostilities between these two neighboring republics in the southern cone. In this sense, the Argentine-Chilean case contradicts the reasoning of the rational deterrence hypothesis. The Bolivian-Chilean Dyad A third dyad in South America, albeit its attenuated nature in the twentieth century, is that involving Bolivia and Chile. During the War of the Pacific (1879–1884) Bolivia not only lost the Antofagasta region in the Atacama Desert to Chile but, more importantly, was deprived of its only outlet to the sea.20 This outcome has never been accepted fully by Bolivia that continues to press the issue of its outlet to the Pacific Ocean in all international fora. Moreover, between July and August 1991 and as recent as late 2004 there was renewed tension along the Bolivian-Chilean border. Bolivia insisted that Chile had “usurped” about 25 kilometers of its territory along their common border. Consequently, in 1991 Bolivia increased its military presence in the area and used the opportunity to raise the question of its exit to the sea one more time.21 Given Bolivia’s continued insistence on having a national territorial access to the Pacific Ocean, it is not at all unreasonable to assume that had this country been more prosperous and economically developed, it would have tried to regain its exit to the sea and even, probably, all its lost territory to Chile. In this vein, it is reasonable to argue that in the Bolivian-Chilean dyad the undisputed challenger of the status quo since the end of the War of the Pacific has been Bolivia. Their adversarial bilateral relationship is a case, par excellence, of successful general deterrence. As documented in table 3.8, with the exception of the year 1935, when Bolivia was negotiating the end of the Chaco War and the data projects its huge military buildup, Chile has enjoyed an overwhelming deterrent capacity against Bolivia. Therefore, one can surmise that Chile’s favorable balance of power has kept the peace in the region by deterring Bolivia from utilizing military force in pursuit of its territorial aims.

Table 3.8 Dyadic Balance of Military and Overall National Material Capabilities between Bolivia and Chile, 1935–2001 MILEX

MILPER

CINC

Years

Bolivia

Chile

Ratio

Bolivia

Chile

Ratio

Bolivia

Chile

Ratio

1935 1939 1946 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001

42.00 10.00 9.00 9.00 12.00 12.00 15.00 17.00 27.00 24.00 28.00 28.00 34.00 32.00

24.00 24.00 34.00 39.00 42.00 41.00 45.00 64.00 74.00 88.00 101.00 95.00 92.00 88.00

2:1 2:1 4:1 4:1 4:1 3:1 3:1 4:1 3:1 4:1 4:1 3:1 3:1 3:1

38760.00 2961.00 7052.00 13325.00 1103.00 4114.00 14983.00 19192.00 57850.00 139996.00 129160.00 187052.00 122210.00 135000.00

14707.00 17336.00 56849.00 119355.00 168966.00 103514.00 136667.00 165731.00 332112.00 1455820.00 760000.00 541410.00 1000000.00 2841000.00

3:1 6:1 8:1 9:1 153:1 25:1 9:1 9:1 6:1 10:1 6:1 3:1 8:1 21:1

8.56 2.80 1.91 1.73 1.56 1.36 1.62 1.70 2.09 1.90 2.04 2.48 3.13 1.64

8.77 7.98 8.86 8.61 8.97 7.52 7.30 7.46 7.08 8.38 7.69 7.57 7.18 8.17

1:1 3:1 5:1 5:1 6:1 6:1 5:1 4:1 3:1 4:1 4:1 3:1 2:1 5:1


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Table 3.9 Dyadic Balance of Military and Overall National Material Capabilities between Colombia and Peru, 1935–2001 MILEX

MILPER

CINC

Years

Colombia

Peru

Ratio

Colombia

Peru

Ratio

Colombia

Peru

Ratio

1935 1939 1946 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001

13.00 15.00 17.00 17.00 12.00 18.00 60.00 55.00 64.00 66.00 66.00 134.00 140.00 158.00

17.00 15.00 38.00 31.00 37.00 42.00 50.00 50.00 56.00 96.00 128.00 105.00 115.00 100.00

1:1 1:1 2:1 2:1 3:1 2:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 2:1 1:1 1:1 2:1

4697.00 23070.00 16331.00 41327.00 108367.00 49531.00 135333.00 167206.00 130072.00 301170.00 274050.00 904060.00 1230000.00 2861000.00

7266.00 7373.00 26446.00 26874.00 32526.00 48375.00 122520.00 179845.00 490749.00 865330.00 640550.00 641940.00 874000.00 896000.00

2:1 3:1 2:1 2:1 3:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 4:1 3:1 2:1 1:1 1:1 3:1

5.60 9.11 6.92 6.82 8.63 8.03 10.19 9.60 8.70 8.21 8.43 12.79 13.01 10.50

6.04 5.50 6.52 5.86 6.17 6.18 6.89 7.13 8.19 8.41 8.69 8.55 9.81 5.88

1:1 2:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 2:1



69

The Colombian-Peruvian Dyad Although diplomacy and a resounding military defeat during the Letícia incident in 1932 forced Peru to accept its fate and curtail its quest over Amazonian territory near its boundary with Colombia, it continued to nurture an intense national competition with its neighboring state throughout most of the post–Chaco War period. In fact, some area specialists maintain that part of the reason that Peru attacked Ecuador in July 1941 was to reassert, in an easy manner, its international reputation and national honor in the region.22 Arguably, Colombia and Peru constitute the fourth dyad in South America. Moreover, one can argue that between the two states, Colombia is the more satisfied with the status quo. Given Peru’s jurisdiction over the Marañón river and other tributaries of the Amazon within its territory, control over the riverport town of Letícia would have given it absolute paramountcy in the eastern Amazonian region and the river system draining the area. Therefore, one can assume that given the opportunity, Peru would have acted to take control of Letícia and its surroundings. Why has not this occurred? Based on the capability profile of these two states, as disclosed in table 3.9, they have either shared parity or alternated in the lead of some of the indicators throughout the years. Since this is an inconclusive picture with respect to an absolute overpowering actor, it is surmised that, at least, Colombia was able to maintain a minimum sufficient level of deterrent capacity against Peru’s design. In sum, this potential source of war and regional instability appears to have been kept in check via a successful process of dyadic general deterrence. The Colombian-Venezuelan Dyad Colombia and Venezuela compose one of the most complex dyads in South America. As it is discussed in detail in chapter 4, these two countries have quarreled for many years over the submarine and territorial waters in the Gulf of Venezuela and around the Los Monjes archipelago.23 The main stake in the controversy is access to and control over territory thought to be rich in oil and other natural resources. Venezuelan dissatisfaction with the terms of the 1939 treaty, its numerous diplomatic efforts to change the status quo established by that treaty, and its eventual decision to abrogate the agreement with Colombia in 1981 makes Venezuela the clear challenger and Colombia the defender in this dyad. There is, however, a role reversal in their relationship after 1982, when Colombia tries to force Venezuela to return to the bargaining table. Its failure to convince Venezuela led Colombia in 1987 to a strategy of military muscle flexing during the Caldas incident in the Gulf of Venezuela. The Colombian-Venezuelan dyad from 1935 to 1982 can be classified as a case of successful general deterrence. It is evident from the data presented in table 3.10 that, throughout this period, Colombia outnumbered and outspent Venezuela in the military sector. Accordingly, it can be argued that in spite of Venezuela’s revisionist attitude, Colombia possessed enough military capability to deter Venezuela

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Table 3.10 Dyadic Balance of Military and Overall National Material Capabilities between Colombia and Venezuela, 1935–2001 MILPER

CINC

MILEX

Years

Colombia

Venezuela

Ratio

Colombia

Venezuela

Ratio

Colombia

Venezuela

1935 1939 1946 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001

13.00 15.00 17.00 17.00 12.00 18.00 60.00 55.00 64.00 66.00 66.00 134.00 140.00 158.00

2.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 23.00 30.00 31.00 44.00 41.00 49.00 75.00 75.00 82.00

7:1 8:1 9:1 4:1 6:1 1:1 2:1 2:1 1:1 2:1 1:1 2:1 2:1 2:1

4697.00 23070.00 16331.00 41327.00 108367.00 49531.00 135333.00 167206.00 130072.00 301170.00 274050.00 904060.00 1230000.00 2861000.00

10395.00 12515.00 16597.00 54328.00 100896.00 161194.00 163111.00 200222.00 569428.00 800254.00 682000.00 519190.00 826630.00 1896000.00

2:1 2:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 3:1 1:1 1:1 4:1 3:1 2:1 2:1 1:1 2:1

5.60 9.11 6.92 6.82 8.63 8.03 10.19 9.60 8.70 8.21 8.43 12.79 13.01 10.50

3.86 3.54 5.03 5.52 7.09 10.70 9.79 9.22 10.16 9.28 10.15 11.34 7.38 10.32

Ratio 1:1 3:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 2:1 1:1



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from seeking its territorial aims through military means. This situation began to change in 1982 and reached its climax in August 1987 during the Caldas incident, when their adversarial relation was transformed from a condition of general to immediate deterrence. The militarized crisis in the Gulf of Venezuela made Colombia the challenger in the dyad and Venezuela the defender of a specific stake. Faced with a perceived violation of its sovereignty, Venezuela mobilized its armed forces and threatened to evict the intruder from its territorial waters. A tense situation remained for several days until, finally, Colombia backed down, asserting that its war vessel “had to be replaced because it had to refuel.”24 In sum, while a successful situation of general deterrence prevailed throughout most the period in question; it degenerated eventually into a condition of immediate deterrence. Thus, the former challenger became a successful defender of a specific stake. In this sense, one can conclude that general dyadic deterrence is the partial cause of the absence of intraregional wars between Colombia and Venezuela. The Chilean-Peruvian Dyad The War of the Pacific not only left Bolivia and Chile in an adversarial relationship but, also, led to the perpetuation of the Chilean-Peruvian dyad. Like Bolivia, Peru lost to Chile considerable territory in the Atacama Desert. At the end of the war, Peru was deprived of the present-day, northern Chilean regions of Arica and Tarapacá. The 1883 Treaty of Ancón settled the war by awarding the Peruvian province of Tarapacá and the Bolivian province of Antofagasta to Chile. Then, in 1929 the Washington Protocol awarded to Chile the Peruvian province of Arica. While these two agreements legally sealed Peru’s defeat in the war, they did not abate its yearning to recoup its lost territories in the future. In this vein, Peru’s longing has been a quite important, albeit latent, variable in its bilateral relations with Chile. It has influenced the calculations and politico-military missions of their respective diplomatic corps and armed forces. Based on the magnitude of Peru’s territorial loses, its intrinsic national refusal to accept them as irreversible, and its assertive behavior toward other territorial disputes with other neighboring states, it is reasonable to argue that if Peru had been given the opportunity to regain its lands through intimidation and coercion, it would have done it long ago. Peru is the aggrieved party in this dyad. It entered into an agreement under duress: it was occupied and governed by the Chilean army until 1884. Therefore, one can surmise that Peru has been the challenger of the status quo and Chile has been the defender. Why has not Peru tried to actively change its situation with Chile? Part of the explanation for Peru’s military inaction with respect to its lost territory stems from its unfavorable power position. It is important to underline that while Peru has been one of the most powerful states in the region by South American standards, it has been part of two other dyads. As reported in table 3.11, Chile has maintained rough parity with Peru. In itself this factor is a minimum sufficient condition to deter a potential revisionist state. Peru’s problems, however, have been compounded by Ecuador’s unrelenting diplomatic and military efforts to satisfy its

MILEX

MILPER Years

Chile

Peru

Ratio

Chile

1935 1939 1946 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001

24.00 24.00 34.00 39.00 42.00 41.00 45.00 64.00 74.00 88.00 101.00 95.00 92.00 88.00

17.00 15.00 38.00 31.00 37.00 42.00 50.00 50.00 56.00 96.00 128.00 105.00 115.00 100.00

1:1 2:1 1:1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1:1

14707.00 17336.00 56849.00 119355.00 168966.00 103514.00 136667.000 165731.000 332112.00 1455820.00 760000.00 541410.00 1000000.00 2841000.00

Peru 7266.00 7373.00 26446.00 26874.00 32526.00 48375.00 122520.0 179845.0 490749.00 865330.00 640550.00 641940.00 874000.00 896000.00

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Table 3.11 Dyadic Balance of Military and Overall National Material Capabilities between Chile and Peru, 1935–2001 CINC Ratio

Chile

Peru

Ratio

2:1 2:1 2:1 4:1 5:1 2:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 2:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 3:1

8.77 7.98 8.86 8.61 8.97 7.52 7.30 7.46 7.08 8.38 7.69 7.57 7.18 8.17

6.04 5.50 6.52 5.86 6.17 6.18 6.89 7.13 8.19 8.41 8.69 8.55 9.81 5.88

1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1 1:1



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territorial claims in the border with Peru. Furthermore, Colombia, with rough parity, has represented over the years an important balancing factor against Peru. In sum, it appears that given Peru’s capabilities, it would have been in a disadvantageous position if it would have tried to regain by force the territory lost to Chile. In this case, the conclusion must be that in the Chilean-Peruvian dyad a minimum sufficient level of Chilean capabilities has generated a process of successful general deterrence and, consequently, the maintenance of intraregional interstate peace and stability. The Ecuadorian-Peruvian Dyad Ecuador and Peru constitute the most active and notorious dyad in South America in the post–Chaco War period. On three separate occasions in the last seventy years hostilities have flared up between these two states.25 The source of contention has been their conflicting claims to a small area along the Pacific Ocean and to a large track of territory east of the Andes and between the Equator and the Marañón River. Since Ecuador gained independence in 1830, its single and most important national objective has been to be an Amazonian nation. This means having control over territory with access to the Amazon and the river system draining the region. Pertaining to the territorial dispute east of the Andes and adjacent to the Amazon, Ecuador has historically been the obvious challenger of the status quo in its relations with Peru. Notwithstanding the clear separation of roles in this dyad, it is not useful to frame it in terms of a case of general dyadic deterrence. As reported in table 3.12, Peru’s consistent and overwhelmingly favorable balance of capabilities would have made it relatively easy to deter Ecuador. Yet, in three different instances Ecuador has not heeded to Peru’s warnings and has encroached inch by inch into what has been termed in various international agreements to be Peruvian territory. Each time Peru has retaliated militarily, transforming this case from a potential situation of general to immediate deterrence. As one baffled newspaper reporter asks rhetorically, “Why would Ecuador, a country the size of Colorado, regularly pick a fight with Peru, a country the size of Texas and California combined?”26 The answer to this query is intricate and, probably, is enmeshed in the political culture and national psyche of the Ecuadorian people. One thing is evident, though: a process of dyadic general deterrence did not operate successfully because it never existed. If it did, it degenerated thrice to a condition of immediate deterrence. Therefore, dyadic general deterrence is either irrelevant or a poor explanatory variable for the absence of a major war between Ecuador and Peru in the post–Chaco War period. The Guyanan-Venezuelan Dyad The final and least recognized dyad in South America is made up of Guyana and Venezuela. Acquiring independence from Great Britain in 1966, Guyana inherited from the British metropolis a long-running territorial dispute with Venezuela over an extensive track of territory in the Essequibo region. Since the nineteenth century Venezuela has claimed that the Essequibo should be part of its territory.27

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Table 3.12 Dyadic Balance of Military and Overall National Material Capabilities between Ecuador and Peru, 1935–2001 MILPER

CINC

MILEX

Years

Ecuador

Peru

Ratio

Ecuador

Peru

Ratio

Ecuador

Peru

Ratio

1935 1939 1946 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001

8.00 8.00 12.00 12.00 20.00 18.00 19.00 17.00 22.00 39.00 43.00 58.00 58.00 61.00

17.00 15.00 38.00 31.00 37.00 42.00 50.00 50.00 56.00 96.00 128.00 105.00 115.00 100.00

2:1 2:1 3:1 3:1 2:1 2:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 2:1 3:1 2:1 2:1 2:1

1448.00 1914.00 4657.00 8933.00 19472.00 22178.00 23542.00 42189.00 100880.00 194100.00 245850.00 251380.00 530000.00 507000.00

7266.00 7373.00 26446.00 26874.00 32526.00 48375.00 122520.00 179845.00 490749.00 865330.00 640550.00 641940.00 874000.00 896000.00

5:1 4:1 6:1 3:1 2:1 2:1 5:1 4:1 5:1 4:1 3:1 3:1 2:1 2:1

1.88 2.48 2.19 2.07 2.62 2.38 2.18 2.23 2.56 3.00 3.45 4.25 4.89 3.04

5.60 9.11 6.92 6.82 8.63 8.03 10.19 9.60 8.70 8.21 8.43 12.79 9.81 5.88

3:1 4:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 3:1 5:1 4:1 3:1 3:1 2:1 3:1 2:1 2:1


Table 3.13 Dyadic Balance of Military and Overall National Material Capabilities between Guyana and Venezuela, 1935–2001 MILPER

CINC

MILEX

Years

Guyana

Venezuela

Ratio

Guyana

Venezuela

Ratio

Guyana

Venezuela

RATIO

1935 1939 1946 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2001

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.00 2.00 7.00 7.00 2.00 2.00 2.00

2.00 2.00 2.00 4.00 2.00 23.00 30.00 31.00 44.00 41.00 49.00 75.00 75.00 82.00

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 31:1 22:1 6:1 7:1 38:1 38:1 41:1

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 1000.00 8000.00 17000.00 44870.00 6542.00 7000.00 6000.00

10395.00 12515.00 16597.00 54328.00 100896.00 161194.00 163111.00 200222.00 569428.00 800254.00 682000.00 519190.00 826630.00 1896000.00

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 200:1 71:1 47:1 15:1 79:1 118:1 316:1

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ⫺0.38 ⫺0.44 ⫺0.18 ⫺0.16 ⫺0.12

3.86 3.54 5.03 5.52 7.09 10.70 9.79 9.22 10.16 9.28 10.15 11.34 11.04 10.32

N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 24:1 23:1 63:1 69:1 86:1

Notes: MILPER denotes the total of military personnel in thousands. MILEX is the military expenditures in thousands of current year U.S. Dollars. CINC Annual values for the computed Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) measure is generally computed by summing all observations on each of the six capability components for a given year, including MILPER and MILEX, of national material capabilities of South American countries in five-year intervals. The numbers in this column are extracted from table 3.2 in this chapter. The ratios are rounded off to the next digit. Source: Compiled using the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities Data Set (v3.01) available at http://cow2.la.psu.edu/. Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey. (1972). “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965.” In Bruce Russett (ed.), Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, pp. 19–48; and Singer, J. David. (1987). “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985.” International Interactions 14:115–132. For the complete presentation of the data on which these overall results are based, see appendix A http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/felix_book/Appendixes.htm

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Therefore, the incontrovertible challenger in this situation has been Venezuela and the defender of the status quo was, first, Great Britain and, then, Guyana. Given the direct participation of an extraregional actor in the Essequibo controversy prior to 1966, the focus in this study is only on the last forty years of this adversarial relation. During that period, Venezuela has continued to demand the possession of the Essequibo territory. In 1982 Venezuela suspended further negotiations with Guyana and the latter accused the former of military incursions into its national territory. Evidently, Guyana refuses to give up the Essequibo and Venezuela covets to control it. Therefore, in light of the diplomatic failures, why has Venezuela not militarily occupied the Essequibo? The answer to this question may ultimately be ensconced in the political national environment of Venezuela since the mid-1960s. It is evident, however, that a process of dyadic general deterrence has not been at work in this dyad. Table 3.13 depicts a situation in which Venezuela enjoys a preposterously massive balance of capabilities in its favor in all categories. It is obvious that Guyana’s meager military and material national capabilities have not been a factor in deterring Venezuela from militarily occupying the Essequibo. Therefore, dyadic general deterrence is an irrelevant causal variable for this case. Based on the separate analyses of these eight different dyads in South America, it can be concluded that dyadic general deterrence represents a partial explanation of the peace. As synopsized in table 3.14, four out of the eight cases studied are clear instances of a successful process of dyadic general deterrence. Only two of these, the Argentine-Brazilian case and Bolivian-Chilean dyad, are easy cases. That is, the defender, given its superior objective material capabilities, can clearly deter the challenger. In the Colombian-Peruvian dyad as well as in the Chilean-Peruvian case, dyadic general deterrence appeared to hold with a minimum sufficient level of capabilities or parity. This makes the cases borderline instances of successful dyadic general deterrence. The Colombian-Venezuelan dyad can be partially explained as a successful case of dyadic general deterrence. It appears that the challenger, Venezuela, refrained from pursuing its objective militarily due to the defender’s favorable balance of power prior to 1987. Subsequently, the situation degenerated for a brief period of time into a case of dyadic immediate deterrence in which the former defender became the new challenger and the former challenger became the new successful defender during the Caldas incident in August 1987. The last three cases are anomalies. First, in the Argentine-Chilean dyad it does not appear that power imbalance in favor of the challenger entices it to take advantage of the defender’s vulnerability and grab by force its territorial objectives. Similarly, in the Guyanan-Venezuelan case an overwhelmingly favorable balance of power does not appear to influence the lack of Venezuelan initiative to gain control of the Essequibo. Finally, the Ecuadorian-Peruvian dyad seems to be a case of national masochism. This is a situation in which the challenger possessed infinitively inferior capabilities, yet it kept picking a fight periodically with a much more powerful defender, who repeatedly whipped him into line. In sum, while deterrence theory provides a partial explanation of some of the cases constituting the long period of negative peace, others remain unexplained. Thus, it remains for this work to analyze the impact of U.S. hegemony on regional peace.

Table 3.14 Synoptic Chart of the Results of the Analysis of Dyadic Deterrence in South America, 1935–2001

Argentina and Brazil Argentina and Chile Bolivia and Chile Colombia and Peru Colombia and Venezuela Chile and Peru Ecuador and Peru Guyana and Venezuela

Challenger State

Defender State

Was Defender Capable to Deter Challenger?

Situation of General Deterrence Prevailed?

Degeneration from General to Immediate Deterrence?

Argentina

Brazil

Yes

Yes

Argentina Bolivia Peru

Chile Chile Colombia

No Yes Parity

No Yes Yes

Venezuela Peru Ecuador

Colombia Chile Peru

Yes Parity Yes

Partly Yes No

No Yes Beagle Channel Crisis (November to December 1978) No No Yes The Caldas Incident (August 1987) No Yes Cóndor Mt. Crises (January 1981 and 1995)

Venezuela

Guyana

No

No

No

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CHAPTER 4

U.S. HEGEMONY, EMPIRICAL FINDINGS, AND PEACE

dward D. Mansfield examines the relationship among the international distribution of power, trade, and war. He concludes that “like all interstate wars, non-major-power wars begin more frequently during periods of hegemony than during non-hegemonic periods . . .”1 A salient implication of this assertion is that hegemony does not automatically lead to interstate order, stability, and peace. In particular, Mansfield’s general claim stands in sharp contrast with the view held by many mainstream realists, as well as that of several area specialists, who maintain that interstate peace in South America as well as in the rest of Latin America is a direct consequence of U.S. hegemony.2 At this juncture this study evaluates the explanatory value of the “hegemonic peace hypothesis” that causally links U.S. hegemony with the provision and preservation of intraregional peace in South America.

E

Hegemony and Peace: Operationalization of a Power Relation Scholars who support the proposition of the hegemonic peace in Latin America presuppose that U.S. capabilities and interests constraint the behavior of regional actors. This causal relationship entails two elements: the power source and the power target. Hence, for the purpose of appraising the explanatory value of this hypothesis from the power source, it is assumed the undisputed hegemonic role of the United States and the subordinate role of regional states. Also, it identifies the U.S. national interest with respect to the promotion and maintenance of intraregional peace in Latin America in general and in South America in particular. For this purpose, this work identifies the publicly stated policy goals of the United States and contrasts them with the extent of its tangible commitments. Then, U.S. behavior in South America is contrasted with that in other regions of the world. The goal is to determine how resolute, assertive, and successful the U.S. has been in promoting the peace in South America. Specifically, the work focuses on several cases of militarized interstate crises, where, presumably, an authoritative U.S. response could have averted escalation and guaranteed intraregional peace through hegemonic management.

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From the power target angle, the degree of South American compliance with U.S. objectives and directives regarding intraregional peace and security is ascertained. Hence, this work establishes the original demands of individual disputants. Then, it contrasts these with their latest negotiating positions or the final outcome of the dispute. The intention is to establish how much the contenders have compromised their original demands to comply with U.S. hegemonic directives for intraregional peace and stability. According to realist precepts, the primary interest of any nation-state is to ensure its own security and survival. Thus, countries implement foreign policies to accomplish these goals. The United States is no exception. Since one of its foremost interests has been the exclusion of extra-continental rivals from the Western Hemisphere,3 the hegemonic peace hypothesis ostensibly presupposes that the United States has promoted intraregional stability and peace in South America to forestall involvement opportunities to Great Power rivals in the region. Prior to the Spanish-American War of 1898, the U.S. policy toward Latin America was characterized by a “benign neglect.”4 Except for the MexicanAmerican War of 1846, the United States did not display a marked interest in the internal or intraregional affairs of Latin American countries. Still engaged in the process of nation building, economically and militarily weak, and totally surrounded by ideologically and militarily hostile European powers, the United States opted for a cautious position by turning its diplomatic attention to Europe. This was a tactic implemented to gain European support for the democratic experiment at home.5 Since 1898, the Latin American policy of the United States oscillated between interventionist and noninterventionist periods. During interventionist periods, the United States undertook an active role in preventing political instability and the penetration of extra-hemispheric influences in the region. To accomplish these objectives, the United States militarily intervened in the internal affairs of several countries and undermined governments through economic and political means. The intensity of the interventionist policy varied considerably over time and space. For example, while direct and overt U.S. military interventions were routine in Central America and the Caribbean Basin, none took place in South America. On the other hand, the noninterventionist periods were characterized by the fulfillment of U.S. interests in Latin America via friendly, cooperative diplomatic negotiations, based on mutual respect. Despite periodic oscillations, the United States pursued consistently the exclusion of rival Powers from the Western Hemisphere, and the support of friendly regimes capable of safeguarding its national interests. The Monroe Doctrine is the earliest public manifestation of U.S. interests in Latin America. On June 19, 1822 Gran Colombia became the first Latin American state to receive diplomatic recognition from the United States,6 and on December 2, 1823, President James Monroe issued a warning to the European powers against trying to recolonize the region.7 President Monroe acknowledged the essential differences between the political systems of the European powers and the United States. More importantly, he warned the Europeans that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. . . . We could not view any

U.S. HEGEMONY, EMPIRICAL FINDINGS, PEACE

81

interposition for the purpose of oppressing [newly independent states], or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.8

In four subsequent instances, the spirit and application of the Monroe Doctrine was reaffirmed and expanded, underscoring the interest of the United States to exclude extra-continental powers from the Western Hemisphere. First, in the midst of a bitter civil war between the Spanish population and Indians of Mayan descent on the peninsula of Yucatan, Yucatan officials appealed for aid concurrently from the United States, Great Britain, and Spain. Concerned that European powers could regain control of Mexican territory, President James K. Polk addressed the two houses of U.S. Congress on April 1848. In his appeal for aid for the leaders of Yucatan, he exhorted Congress to adopt measures “to prevent Yucatan from becoming a colony of any European Power, which, in no event, could be permitted by the United States; and, at the same time, to rescue the white race from extermination or expulsion from their country.”9 The spirit of the Monroe Doctrine was further strengthened on July 20, 1895, when the United States, demonstrating a marked degree of assertiveness, defied Great Britain in its dispute with Venezuela over the boundary with British Guyana. On that occasion, President Grover Cleveland ordered his secretary of state, Richard Olney, to dispatch an aggressive note to the British government discussing the dispute, condemning British policy, and insisting upon impartial arbitration. For our purpose, however, the most revealing aspects of Olney’s Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine are the reaffirmation of U.S. intent to prevent European meddling in the Americas and the public declaration of U.S. hegemony in this region. Olney stated the following: The states of America, South as well as North . . . are friends and allies . . . of the United States. To allow the subjugation of any of them by a European power is, of course, to completely reverse that situation and signifies the loss of all the advantages incident to their natural relations to us. . . . Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? . . . It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers. All the advantages of this superiority are at once imperiled if the principle be admitted that European powers may convert American states into colonies or provinces of their own. The principle would be eagerly availed of, and every power doing so would immediately acquire a base of military operations against us. What one power was permitted to do could not be denied to another, and it is not inconceivable that the struggle now going on for the acquisition of Africa might be transferred to South America. . . . The disastrous consequences to the United States of such a condition of things are obvious. The loss of prestige, of authority, and of weight in the councils of the family of nations, would be among the least of them. Our only real rivals in peace as well as enemies in war would be found located at our very doors.10

On December 6, 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt promulgated the third and broadest extension of the Monroe Doctrine. Prior to the unveiling of

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Roosevelt’s Corollary, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy had blockaded Venezuela to enforce their financial claims. These were subsequently settled in 1895 in favor of the European powers at the Hague Court of Arbitration. Then, again, in 1904, when European powers threatened to use force against the Dominican Republic to collect defaulted debts, and mindful that a precedent for the use of force in the collection of national debts was set, President Roosevelt explained to the U.S. Congress that All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly, and prosperous. . . . Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.11

Finally, in 1912 rumors circulated that Japanese investors were considering the purchase from a U.S. company of a large strip of land near Magdalena Bay in Mexican Baja California. Since policy makers assumed that such an acquisition by a Japanese firm would threaten U.S. national security, the U.S. Department of State ordered the American company to stop negotiations with the Japanese investors because they violated the Monroe Doctrine. This was the situation when Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, introduced a resolution stating that the Government of the United States could not see without grave concern the possession of such harbor or other place by any corporation or association which has such a relation to another Government, not American, as to give that Government practical power of control for national purposes.12

While this resolution received Senate approval, it was never endorsed by the administration of President William Howard Taft. Nonetheless, the passage of this resolution reaffirmed the significance for U.S. interests to prevent the involvement of rivals in the Western Hemisphere. The Monroe Doctrine, together with Polk’s, Olney’s, Roosevelt’s, and Lodge’s corollaries, clearly established three basic principles regarding U.S. foreign policy interests in Latin America: First, they demonstrated the primary interest of the United States to prevent extra-continental rivals from gaining influence in the Americas. Second, they revealed U.S. disposition to intervene in the internal affairs of Latin American countries to thwart Great European Power interference in the Western Hemisphere. Third, the United States began to consider itself a regional hegemon, with the authority and capabilities to lead Latin America. With respect to the issue of intraregional, interstate armed conflict and war, the Monroe Doctrine and the four corollaries discussed above remained silent. Interestingly enough, though, this aspect of Inter-American Affairs was dealt differently from the issues of European and Japanese involvement in the Americas, and of domestic political turmoil in the Latin American republics. While U.S. policy


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was forceful regarding these two points, it was, on the other hand, accommodating on the issue of interstate militarized disputes in Latin America in general and South America in particular. Since the early inception of Inter-American Affairs the United States has chosen to remain nonauthoritative, politically neutral, and noncommittal regarding the use of military power as a conflict-settling mechanism. Favoring neutrality and the bargaining table over authoritative policies and the use of force, the United States tried to nudge the real and potential belligerents toward diplomatic negotiations and peaceful settlements of crises and wars. In fact, there is little evidence that the United States ever exerted authoritative pressure to compel peaceful resolution of intraregional, interstate disputes. For example, when in the course of the first South American intraregional conflict, Argentina inquired whether its war with imperial Brazil (1824–1828) was not a violation of Monroe’s Doctrine on the part of Brazil; Secretary of State Henry Clay replied that such a purely American war did not bear the “remotest analogy to the case which President Monroe’s message deprecates.”13 This sent a clear signal to the newly independent republics in South America: the United States would not intervene militarily or authoritatively in intraregional, interstate conflicts, either to coerce belligerents into peaceful coexistence or to deter potential local revisionist states.14 Also, the United States maintained a distance from South America during the La Plata War (1836–1852) and then, again, during the War of the Triple Alliance (1864–1870). It was not until the 1880s that the United States opted for a more direct approach to the question of interstate militarized conflict and war in South America. Upon becoming secretary of state in President James A. Garfield’s administration, James G. Blaine implemented a new policy toward Latin America. As explained by diplomatic historian Alexander DeConde, Blaine’s policy toward Latin America had two main objectives: promotion of peace and increased trade. . . . Peace, he believed . . . called for an effort on his part to try to end turbulence and wars then sweeping over parts of Latin America.15

The first opportunity to promote peace came in June 1881. At the request of Guatemala, Secretary of State Blaine offered his country’s good offices for arbitration in a boundary dispute between Guatemala and Mexico. The result was detrimental to U.S. objectives because Mexico, believing that the United States sided with Guatemala, refused Blaine’s offer. This caused the failure of his peacekeeping attempt and the temporary interruption of U.S.-Mexican trade relations.16 Secretary Blaine had a second opportunity to advance his peace policy during the War of the Pacific (1879–1884). The immediate cause of this war was Chilean expansion into an area rich in guano and nitrates. Alarmed by Chile’s action, Bolivia and Peru signed a secret treaty of alliance against Chile. Thereafter, when Bolivia declared war on Chile in 1879, because the latter refused to pay a heavy tax on exported nitrates from Bolivian territory, Peru immediately honored its treaty obligations with Bolivia and joined the war against Chile.17 By the time Blaine took office in March 1881, Chile had defeated Bolivia and controlled most of the Peruvian territory, including its besieged capital, Lima.

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Concerned with the precarious balance of power in South America and the prospect of a more generalized war in the region, Secretary Blaine took an active role to end the one-sided war. His position was specified in a stern note that he sent to the Chilean government through the U.S. minister to Chile, William H. Trescot. Secretary Blaine stated the following: We cannot regard with unconcern the destruction of Peruvian nationality. If our good offices are rejected, and this policy of the absorption of an independent state be persisted in, this government will consider itself discharged from any further obligation to be influenced in its action by the position which Chile has assumed, and will hold itself free to appeal to the other republics of this continent to join it in an effort to avert consequences which cannot be confined to Chile and Peru, but which threaten with extreme danger the political institutions, the peaceful progress, and the liberal civilization of all America.18

Secretary Blaine’s peacemaking effort failed for two fundamental reasons. First, since Chile was steadfastly determined to keep Peru’s nitrate deposits as an indemnity for its victory, there was no latitude for compromise and peaceful settlement. Second, President Garfield’s assassination in July 1881 and Blaine’s impromptu departure from the U.S. State Department prevented him from carrying out his public threat to call for a multinational force to stop Chile’s action in Peru. Subsequent to Blaine’s departure, Frederick Frelinghuysen became secretary of state in the new administration of President Chester A. Arthur. Unfortunately for Peru, the new secretary came with no plans to either unilaterally force Chile to acquiesce to U.S. demands or to organize a multilateral, hemispheric approach to resolve the War of the Pacific. Therefore, Chile did not accede to a conciliatory peace and kept all the victor’s spoils at the end of the war. Notwithstanding Secretary Blaine’s failure to exert moral pressure on Chile through Inter-American cooperation, this idea became the kernel of the Pan-American movement a decade later. In May 1888, Congress passed a resolution asking President Grover Cleveland to call a conference of American states. It stated that the purpose of this conference was to promote uniform trade regulations, free trade, and regional peace. The culmination of this request was the First International Conference of American States held in Washington from October 2, 1889 to April 19, 1890.19 The significance of the First Inter-American Conference was that it gave institutional form to U.S. policy interest on the issue of intraregional war in the Americas. In this gathering the United States made explicit its desire to pursue the peaceful resolution of interstate conflict through arbitration and diplomatic negotiations.20 No allusion was ever made to the possibility of a unilateral coercive and/or authoritative effort on the part of the United States to resolve any dispute. This reaffirms the long-running practice of the United States to remain impartial and to favor diplomatic means for the prevention and resolution of intraregional conflicts in Latin America. From the closing of the First Inter-American Conference in Washington in 1890 to the introduction of the Good Neighbor Policy on March 4, 1933 by


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President Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. policy toward Latin America followed a somewhat dichotomous approach. On the one hand, the United States intervened repeatedly in the internal affairs of some of the Caribbean and Central American states. Based on the presumption that U.S. national security demanded control of areas that other Great Powers might utilize as footholds in the Western Hemisphere, the administrations of presidents Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson gradually instituted a system of “protectorates” in the Caribbean Basin and Central America. Between 1901 and 1933, Cuba, Panama, Mexico, Nicaragua, Honduras, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic experienced recurrent U.S. military interventions and political control.21 While the United States was routinely engaged, on the one hand, in an interventionist policy in the Caribbean Basin and Central America, it continued to pursue, on the other hand, a diplomatic approach to the peaceful settlement of interstate disputes in South America. It consistently condemned the use of force by South American states. As Bryce Wood explains, “The United States rarely undertook to enforce peace between states in the Americas, but it did feel a deep sense of responsibility to assist morally, ceremonially, and institutionally in the maintenance of peace.”22 No other issue in Inter-American Affairs demonstrates more accurately the sharp contrast in U.S. interest and policy toward Middle and South America than its mediating role in intraregional, interstate armed conflicts. Three different cases prior to 1935 clearly illustrate the U.S. position and level of commitment to the maintenance of interstate peace in these two separate subregions. First, in 1921 an acrimonious boundary dispute between Panama and Costa Rica made war appear imminent. Although this conflict was settled when Panama yielded to a decision arbitrated by the United States, it was only after the latter dispatched a battleship to the area, 400 marines, and an ultimatum that it would not tolerate a resumption of the clashes that had been taking place along the border.23 Contrasting sharply with this assertive position in the Panamanian-Costa Rican case, a more conciliatory United States worked arduously toward the peaceful resolution of two different crises taking place concurrently in South America. First, the United States tried to mediate the 1928 Paraguayan-Bolivian dispute over the Chaco Boreal territory. This crisis eventually evolved into the Chaco War.24 Second, the Letícia dispute, simmering since 1922, broke into fighting on August 31, 1932, when around three hundred armed Peruvian civilians took control of the hamlet of Letícia in Colombian territory.25 In both cases the United States demonstrated a relentless commitment to the peaceful prevention and resolution of these crises. At no time during the long negotiating process, however, did the United States try to compel the belligerents toward a negotiated settlement, utilizing intimidation, coercion, or any other form of punitive or authoritative action. As historian Bryce Wood affirms “. . . the government of the U.S. did not find it possible to take the lead in the adoption of measures firm enough to prevent warfare in South America.”26 Undoubtedly, the United States preferred interstate peace in South America, but it was not prepared to enforce and manage it. In fact, reflecting on the U.S. course of action regarding these two territorial disputes in the 1930s, Secretary of State Cordell Hull writes in his memoirs that after extensive

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consultations with President Roosevelt, the decision was made to cooperate with and acquiesce in the assumption of jurisdiction by the League of Nations Advisory Committee handling these disputes in the heart of the Western Hemisphere. He elaborates further that [o]ur acceptance signified our willingness to cooperate with other nations in the settlement of Latin American questions. Unilateral action on our part was now in the discard. We began to apply a principle to which we adhered in the years to follow. This was to refrain from acting until after having consulted with all the other interested nations. Only in this way could we work from under the deep-seated resentment engendered in Latin America by previous one-sided actions of our country.27

The handling of the Chaco and Letícia crises demonstrate that, in spite of U.S. resolute commitment to the peaceful settlement of these disputes, they evolved contrary to the publicly expressed objectives of the United States in the region. While the Letícia conflict was limited to few casualties and small-scale fighting, the Chaco dispute escalated into the only major South American war in the twentieth century.28 Thus, one infers from these outcomes that, at least prior to 1935, the power and diplomatic leadership of the United States could neither deter hostile neighbors from fighting nor lead them to peaceful resolution of their militarized conflicts. When the Chaco War ended in 1935, the Roosevelt administration was concerned principally with the growth and diffusion of fascist regimes in Europe and their increased activities in Latin America. Consequently, the United States assembled a cooperative hemispheric security system to counteract these developments in the late 1930s. Besides aiming to stymie the spread of fascist influence to the Western Hemisphere, the United States sought to establish an institutional mechanism to settle intraregional, interstate conflicts and to provide mutual security to its members. The Inter-American security system that emerged in the late 1930s, and strengthened during and after World War II, was in part an extension of the First International Conference of American States held in Washington in 1889. In this gathering, as in subsequent International Conferences of American States and Special Conferences, the United States continued to profess its absolute commitment to the peaceful settlement of intraregional disputes in the Americas.29 Ultimately, the Rio de Janeiro Special Conference of 1947 produced the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. To the extent that this treaty reflects the position and diplomatic leadership of the United States in the post– World War II period, it is an unequivocal statement, delineating U.S. interest and policy on the issue of interstate militarized disputes in the Americas. The Rio Treaty clearly stipulates the following in Article 2: [T]he High Contracting Parties undertake to submit every controversy which may arise between them to methods of peaceful settlement and to endeavor to settle any such controversy among themselves by means of the procedures in force in the InterAmerican System before referring it to the General Assembly or the Security Council of the United Nations.30


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Furthermore, Article 3 introduces the concept of collective security into the Inter-American system. It specifies the following: [A]n armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense.31

In sum, the Rio Treaty embodies the publicly stated interests of the United States in Latin America and, more importantly, it has served as the main legal/institutional framework for dealing with the prevention and/or resolution of interstate armed conflicts in the Americas. The preceding analysis demonstrates U.S. commitment to the promotion and maintenance of interstate peace in Latin America. It also documents how instrumental the United States was in organizing institutional mechanisms for the promotion of interstate peace. Clearly, it favored diplomatic over military and authoritative options to prevent or resolve militarized crises in South America prior to 1935. Thus, given its evident power and demonstrated interest in preventing the outbreak of war in the Americas, this study next explores whether or not the absence of a major war in South America since 1935 is a direct consequence of U.S. hegemony. Is U.S. hegemony the Cause of Intraregional Peace? While the end of the Chaco War ushered in the longest period of interstate peace in South America, the region has not been immune from recurrent territorial disputes and militarized interstate crises. Several dyads involving conflicting claims remained active until 1995: namely, the Ecuadorian-Peruvian dispute over territory in the Amazon; the Argentine-Chilean quarrel over the islands in the Beagle Channel; and the Colombian-Venezuelan controversy over the Gulf of Venezuela. Since none of these disputes escalated into a major war and were resolved through diplomatic means, various analysts attribute the absence of war to the pacifying effect of U.S. hegemony. The explanatory value of the hegemonic peace hypothesis will be examined in light of evidence from several cases of militarized interstate disputes from the three dyads listed above. In the analysis of the case studies, first, a brief background to each crisis will be presented, the aim being to outline the origin of the dispute, the stake in question, and the claims of the disputants. Second, the position of the United States in each case and its efforts to prevent war will be examined. Third, either the final outcome, or most recent status of the controversy, will be explained. Finally, the study will appraise whether or not the position of the United States ultimately prevailed, influencing the outcome of the crisis and, thus, corroborating the hegemonic peace claim in South America. The Ecuadorian-Peruvian Dyad The Ecuadorian-Peruvian territorial dispute was the most enduring and virulent controversy in South America since 1935. These countries clashed over the limits

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of their territory in 1830. The stakes of this quarrel involved a small area in the Pacific Ocean and some 120,000 square miles of territory east of the Andes and between the Equator and the Marañón River. Ecuador aimed at gaining control over parts of the Amazon jungle and the river system draining this area.32 On the other hand, Peru’s objective was to prevent Ecuador from expanding its territory eastward, particularly after Peru’s defeat in the 1932 Letícia dispute with Colombia. Ecuador and Peru were at the brink of a major war over disputed territory in 1941, 1981, and 1995. First, on July 5, 1941 hostilities broke out when an Ecuadorian army patrol encountered a group of Peruvian agricultural workers and civil guards near the Zarumilla River, inside Ecuador’s borders. While in Quito it was reported that the Peruvians opened fire against the patrol, in Lima, the foreign ministry issued a statement explaining that Ecuadorian soldiers attacked Peruvian positions and were defeated.33 Before both countries finally negotiated the Talara truce on October 2, 1941, they mobilized about 18,000 troops, and sustained enormous material losses and approximately 600 combat casualties.34 Peru, the victor in the conflict, prevented Ecuadorian expansion in the Amazon, gained military control over the province of El Oro in Ecuador, and threatened to overtake Guayaquil. Ecuador and Peru signed the Protocol of Rio de Janeiro on January 29, 1942 as the result of considerable diplomatic maneuvering by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States. The treaty ended the fighting along the Ecuadorian-Peruvian border in the 1940s and specified the boundary line between the two countries. Moreover, it stipulated that Peru would withdraw its troops from Ecuadorian territory, and it granted Ecuador freedom of navigation on rivers controlled by Peru. Finally, the treaty designated Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States as guarantors of the peace.35 In this capacity the United States continued to be involved in the territorial dispute as a mediator rather than as a hegemonic enforcer of interstate peace in the Americas. The position of the United States in 1941 as a neutral mediator was consistent with events dating back to the war scare of 1910 between Ecuador and Peru and throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The Marañón conflict of 1941 was the culmination of an arduous diplomatic process that began on August 1, 1887, when the foreign ministers of Ecuador and Peru signed an arbitration accord. They agreed to submit the territorial question to the decision of the king of Spain. The decision was delayed over twenty years and, finally, in 1910 King Alfonso XIII of Spain declined to emit a verdict because a partial and premature disclosure of unfavorable terms of the award for Ecuador created a public outcry in that country.36 Mutual recriminations in Quito and Lima led to a general military mobilization in both countries. But under strong diplomatic pressure from Argentina, Brazil, and the United States, the war scare of 1910 ceased immediately. The three countries offered to act as mediators and declared that it was “unthinkable that Ecuador and Peru should go to war over a boundary dispute which both, by solemn agreement, submitted to arbitration.”37 Again, the U.S. effort to maintain its role as an impartial mediator, and its commitment to a peaceful settlement of the Ecuadorian-Peruvian dispute were


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revealed in a cogent exchange of letters between the president of Ecuador, Federico Páez, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt. On May 7, 1936, President Páez wrote to President Roosevelt requesting him to pressure Peru to accede to move the Ecuadorian-Peruvian Peace Conference from Lima to Washington. This petition was accompanied by yet another reference to Ecuador’s inevitable recourse “to defend by arms her vital interests.”38 President Roosevelt responded, But I feel confident that Your Excellency will recognize that the arbitrator of an international dispute . . . must refrain from taking any action which would appear to imply the bringing of any pressure, even in the form of moral influence, upon either of the parties to the dispute. If . . . I were now to take any action, even action in the nature of a friendly and informal request, which might be construed by the Government of Peru as being beyond the limits of complete judicial impartiality, the confidence of the Peruvian Government in the arbitrator might be shaken.39

President Roosevelt’s statement clarified to all South American states that the new policy of the United States was to participate as another state among equals, and that it was unwilling to exert unilateral pressure on any one party to a dispute in the region.40 From the war scare of 1910 to the 1936 Washington conference between the delegations of Ecuador and Peru, the bilateral relations of these states were plagued by multiple border incidents and failed diplomatic initiatives to solve the territorial dispute. The Washington conference of 1936 proved to be no different from other diplomatic efforts. It was broken off in 1938, without having achieved a negotiated settlement.41 Notwithstanding its immediate failure, the conference in Washington is an important element for an analysis of the U.S. role in the Amazonian dispute. Throughout these negotiations, U.S. diplomats adhered firmly to a position of impartiality, refusing to lead negotiations on a compromise boundary line.42 The reaction of undersecretary of state, Sumner Welles, to the possibility of Ecuador resorting to force in June 1937 illustrates this position. Overtly concerned with Ecuador’s posture, Welles asked Ecuador’s envoy, Colón Eloy Alfaro the following: [I]f he would not consider it peculiarly deplorable . . . for his Government to consider breaking off negotiations or even to contemplate hostilities. . . . how would it be possible for the Government of Ecuador, after the peace treaties which it had signed at the Buenos Aires Conference and in view of the unanimous desire on the part of all of the American Republics there expressed always to resort to peaceful means of adjudicating disputes, now to contemplate hostilities when no act of aggression had been committed against Ecuador by Peru.43

Ecuador did not resort to war at the time. Instead, it responded by proposing arbitration of the whole controversy by the U.S. president. The proposal was accompanied by an outline of Ecuador’s position on the boundary line and by another reference to war as “our only recourse.”44 Further illustration of the role played by the United States and its self-perception during the Ecuadorian-Peruvian Conference of 1936 in Washington can be

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intuited from Secretary Welles’s reply to Ecuador’s proposal of August 26, 1937. He responded that while this Government was acting as host to the two delegations, it did not possess the functions of mediator nor of intermediary and that, while I was prepared and had been prepared to do everything I could to facilitate the successful termination of the negotiations, I did not feel authorized by either of the two Governments involved to suggest specific solutions or methods of procedure.45

The collapse of the Ecuadorian-Peruvian Conference on September 29, 1938 effectively ended for two years any sustained effort by third parties to settle their dispute. It was only in the December 1938 conference of American states in Lima that U.S. officials made several unofficial attempts to resolve the controversy.46 At this gathering, secretary of state, Cordell Hull, discussed with Peru’s foreign minister, Carlos Concha, the Ecuadorian-Peruvian situation. In his report to Undersecretary Welles of his conversation with Concha, Hull wrote the following: I told him that the world situation requires that the peace of the Americas be maintained; that the public sentiment in the Americas is unanimous in its insistence that there be peace on this hemisphere; that the Ecuador-Peru boundary dispute is the only major blight on the peace of the Americas; that because of its resources, strength and experience Peru should take the initiative although Ecuador of course should do its full part; and after complimenting Dr. Concha for his handling of the Conference, appealed to him to take upon his shoulders the responsibility for removing the last major obstacle towards peace in the Americas. Dr. Concha has assured me that the President [Manuel Prado Ugarteche] is genuinely desirous of a settlement of the dispute and I believe that Dr. Concha was impressed by my personal appeal to him to take the initiative and endeavor to find a solution. . . . Under the circumstances, I believe I have done all that I possibly can.47

Again, this exchange with Concha is indicative of U.S. circumspection, limitations, and/or inability to act as an authoritative enforcer of interstate peace in South America. This is particularly evident when the U.S. secretary of state confides to one of his undersecretaries, as Hull does, that he has done all he can, omitting all references to any sort of authoritative U.S. action to settle the dispute. In fact, Hull makes no mention of this territorial dispute in his memoirs.48 The role of the United States just prior to the Ecuadorian-Peruvian dispute of 1941 is revealed in two other instances. First, in receipt of a tepid acceptance message from Peru to a mediation proposal made by Argentina, Brazil, and the United States, Secretary Cordell Hull, showing reticence to apply pressure on the disputants, suggested to the other mediators that the course of action should be to consider the messages of acceptance from Peru and Ecuador as “satisfactory.” He “feared” that if any attempt was made by the three governments to elicit a more favorable response from Peru, the latter would claim that “pressure was being exercised upon it which was not consonant with its national sovereignty and dignity.”49


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Second, when Oswaldo Aranha, the Brazilian minister for Foreign Affairs, tried to include Chile as a mediator and future guarantor of the Ecuador-Peru peace accord, Secretary Hull confided candidly to the U.S. ambassador in Lima that. this Government had no prior knowledge of the renewed initiative with regard to the inclusion of Chile until it was informed that Foreign Minister Aranha in the course of his visit to Santiago had agreed with the Chilean Foreign Minister with regard thereto and had thereafter agreed with the Foreign Minister of Argentina as to the desirability of this step.50

Such an uneventful episode, nevertheless, demonstrates U.S. detachment from the thrust of diplomatic maneuvering in the aftermath of the outbreak of hostilities between Ecuador and Peru in July 1941. The evidence presented above indicates, on the one hand, that the United States was publicly committed to help bring about a peaceful settlement between Ecuador and Peru. But, on the other hand, the record discloses that in the years prior to the 1941 Marañón crisis, the United States was unwilling either to force or to lead an authoritative unilateral territorial arrangement in South America. First, it was Secretary Welles’s statements of impartiality and his refusal to impose a unilateral settlement on Ecuador and Peru. More importantly, however, it was President Roosevelt’s refusal to exert any type of pressure on both disputants, and Secretary Hull’s candid admission that he had done all he could to convince Peru to take the diplomatic initiative toward a peaceful solution of the controversy. In the final analysis, all the peace conferences, negotiations, and diplomatic efforts orchestrated by the United States, in conjunction with several other South American states, did not prevent the outbreak of a militarized crisis between Ecuador and Peru in July 1941. Hence, it is concluded that in this particular instance the United States failed to prevent the outbreak of hostilities and promote a peaceful and long-lasting settlement in South America as maintained by the hegemonic peace argument. Due to Ecuador’s military weakness in the 1941 Marañón conflict, to the reluctance of the United States to intervene authoritatively in favor of Ecuador, to U.S. concerns with the war in Europe, and to the haste of the other South American states to close a violent chapter in the Ecuador-Peru territorial dispute, Ecuador was effectively compelled to accept the 1942 Protocol of Rio de Janeiro. This treaty shattered Ecuador’s sovereign objective in the Amazon. Dissatisfied with the Rio Protocol and claiming that it had signed the treaty under duress, Ecuador invoked the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the 1947 Rio Treaty) in 1955. It argued that Peru was preparing to invade again. At this juncture, the Organization of American States organized a peace-observing team of military attachés stationed in Lima. The military observers found no evidence of Peruvian military preparation for a possible invasion of Ecuador. Despite this setback in the 1950s, Ecuador was able to keep alive the territorial dispute with Peru due to certain legal, cartographic, and geographic technicalities. Finally, in 1960 Ecuador formally declared the 1942 Rio de Janeiro Protocol null and void. Peru rejected this unilateral action. It claimed that the

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territorial dispute with Ecuador had been settled permanently at the 1942 Rio de Janeiro Conference.51 Ecuador and Peru clashed militarily for a second time on January 28, 1981. This time the area involved was a poorly demarcated 48-mile stretch of border in the Cóndor Mountains, believed to be rich in gold and oil. In 1942, when the Rio Protocol specified the border between the two states, the cartographers were unaware of the existence of the Cenepa River. Since the discovery of this river, Ecuador claimed jurisdiction over 130 square miles west of the Cenepa watershed. The immediate source of the 1981 militarized crisis was Peru’s claim that Ecuador had occupied three abandoned Peruvian military outposts in the Cóndor Mountains. Consequently, Peru launched a surprise attack against Ecuadorian forces allegedly stationed there.52 Both nations sustained heavy material losses and some combat casualties53 before February 2, 1981, when they accepted cease-fire appeals from Pope John Paul II, the United Sates, and other Latin American states, including the three Rio Treaty guarantors. The fact that the 1981 militarized crisis lasted only five days, and that it was prevented from escalating, is the result of the quick and decisive action of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States. On January 29, 1981 the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States (OAS) convened in Washington and urged Ecuador and Peru to accept the creation of a commission to investigate the border clashes. Ecuador agreed immediately to this proposal but Peru rejected it, arguing that only the Rio Protocol guarantors were competent to mediate the latest crisis.54 On the heels of the OAS mediation failure, the four guarantors, together with representatives from Ecuador and Peru, gathered in Brasilia on January 31 to negotiate a peaceful settlement. After these discussions, the two warring parties finally agreed to terminate hostilities on February 2 and to continue negotiating a peaceful solution. In the 1981 crisis, as in the previous border clash between Ecuador and Peru, the official position of the United States was to remain neutral and to urge the warring parties to negotiate a peaceful solution to their century-old territorial controversy. Despite press reports indicating that U.S. officials were “working behind the scene to help minimize the damage,”55 no official evidence of an authoritative management effort on the part of the United States has been found to prevent further military encounters in South America.56 In fact, the boldest U.S. action toward this end came on February 7, 1977 when the Carter administration blocked Israel from selling to Ecuador 24 Kfir aircrafts. U.S. officials maintained that, since the General Electric J-79 engines of those airplanes were U.S.-made, the United Sates government had the right to veto the transaction. Instead, Ecuador purchased 18 advanced French Mirage F-1 aircrafts.57 It appears that the United States had a similar role as that of the three Latin American guarantors in the 1981 Ecuadorian-Peruvian conflict. Even when the United States acted to defuse tension between the disputants, as was the case with the blocked sale of Israeli Kfir combat aircrafts to Ecuador in 1977, Ecuador and Peru, as well as other South American countries were able to circumvent U.S. restrictions on arms supplies by procuring weapons from other sources. In the end, the four Rio Protocol guarantors equally share both the blame for the failure to


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prevent the outbreak of hostilities along the Ecuadorian-Peruvian border and the credit for quickly terminating the military clash. Subsequent to the cease-fire agreement that ended the 1981 conflict, Ecuador and Peru were unable to settle peacefully their territorial dispute. Ecuador remained adamant about its “sovereign right” to be an Amazonian state and continued to press the issue on its right to have access to the Amazon and the river system draining this region. It insisted that the discovery of the Cenepa River, a tributary of the Marañón River, strengthened its claim over parts of the Cóndor Mountains between the Zamora and Santiago rivers. In the midst of this tense and volatile relationship, Peru and Ecuador clashed for the third time on January 27, 1995.58 Again, the immediate cause of this incident was Peru’s claim that Ecuador had occupied Peruvian territory in the remote Andean region of the Cóndor Mountains. In response, Peru launched an attack to dislodge Ecuadorian soldiers from two border posts within the disputed area. Meanwhile, Ecuador’s president, Sixto Durán Ballén vowed that “Ecuador will not back off from the positions that it maintains in the border.” He added, “[I]f we back down, we are convinced that Peru will continue to invade our land.”59 The January 1995 militarized interstate dispute between Ecuador and Peru proved to be the most costly crisis in South America since the 1941 Marañón conflict. The estimated human toll on both sides fluctuates between as few as 47 casualties to as many as 300 soldiers killed.60 Several estimates put the cost of the military campaign for each side at $10 million per day.61 Despite these heavy loses, the territorial dispute still remained unsettled until 1996. And the cease-fire agreement that went into effect on February 17, 1995 did not deal with the basic problems that originally caused this latest military conflict between Ecuador and Peru.62 The available documents show no evidence indicating that the United States played a more significant mediating role than did any of the other three South American guarantors.63 In fact, in one of the few official statements uncovered discussing the role of the United States in the 1995 Ecuadorian-Peruvian crisis, assistant secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Alexander Watson, explains that the guarantors’ job “was not to resolve the underlying dispute by any means, but to try to end the current fighting, stop the bloodshed, and, if we could, set up a mechanism by which the underlying dispute could be addressed in an effective way.” He further elaborates that “the . . . Rio Protocol does not give to the guarantor countries authority to determine or impose a solution.” Moreover, he discloses that “the Brazilians are the leaders of the guarantor group.” He also indicates that “[the United States] will be fully committed and prepared to work intensely with Peru and Ecuador as may be required.”64 When the first cease-fire attempt failed on Thursday, February 2, President Bill Clinton wrote to presidents Fujimori and Durán Ballén urging both to accept a cease-fire. The next day, Michael D. McCurry, the White House spokesman, said, “The United States is prepared to participate in a mission to observe a cease-fire once one is in place.”65 These efforts pale in light of those made by South American diplomats and heads of states, and next to the level of U.S. involvement in Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. For instance, President Carlos Ménem of Argentina admitted on one

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occasion that throughout the conflict he talked on the telephone seven or eight times with his counterparts in Ecuador and Peru, urging both to cease fighting.66 The turning point in this crisis came after seven days of high-level negotiations in Brasilia, when Peru declared a unilateral truce on Tuesday, February 14, 1995.67 Shortly thereafter, Ecuador accepted that offer and the cease-fire went into effect officially on Friday, February 17, 1995. The record demonstrates that the January 1995 Ecuadorian-Peruvian conflict, as the previous two crises in 1941 and 1981, was neither prevented nor successfully solved by the U.S. hegemony in South America. These crises generated out of their own complex dynamics. Despite the poor and militarily weak conditions of the belligerents, it seems that there was little the United States and other regional powers could do, short of outright coercion, to prevent them from fighting. International coercion is a tool of statecraft that the United States seemed reluctant to utilize in South America to prevent intraregional, interstate armed conflict. Hence, the role of the United States was limited to be a mediator rather than an enforcer of peace. In this vein, the United States and other regional states played a part in bringing the two disputants to the bargaining table whenever hostilities flared up. The negotiations that began after the 1995 militarized crisis finally netted a permanent, peaceful settlement in October 26, 1998, when presidents Jamil Mahuad of Ecuador and Alberto Fujimori of Peru signed an accord in Brasilia, ending the most acrimonious and virulent enmity in the Western Hemisphere since the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay in the 1930s.68 The Argentinean-Chilean Dyad Relations between Argentina and Chile have been affected historically by as many as 25 different territorial disputes along their 2,500-mile border.69 Since the 1870s, their boundary question has involved three distinct geographical areas: the interAndean plateaus between the eastern and western heights of the Andes, the Patagonia region, and the Strait of Magellan and Tierra del Fuego. Among these, the latter zone has been the most salient and difficult to settle and demarcate. Argentina was less interested than Chile in controlling the Strait of Magellan and Tierra del Fuego in its early years as an independent state. In the late 1870s, however, Argentina changed its foreign policy objective and decided to challenge Chile’s claim over this region. The ensuing controversy was initially settled after Argentina and Chile, with the help of the U.S. mediation, negotiated and signed a boundary treaty on July 23, 1881. This agreement stipulated that Chile would give up its claim to Patagonia in exchange for Argentina’s acceptance of Chilean sovereignty over the entire Strait of Magellan. Moreover, Chile accepted neutralization of the strait, and Argentina agreed never to block the Atlantic access to and egress from the strait. Finally, a provision was made for the division of Tierra del Fuego between them and for the arbitration of disputes arising over interpretation of the treaty’s terms.70 While Argentina and Chile solved all pending twenty-four territorial disputes between 1984 and 1998, the issue of how to divide Tierra del Fuego and define


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the line between the South Atlantic and South Pacific proved to be intractable. At the center of this controversy figured three small islands (Nueva, Pictón, and Lennox) at the eastern entrance to the Beagle Channel. Since neither the limits of this channel, nor the ownership of these islands were ever clearly defined in the boundary treaty of 1881, Argentina challenged the easternmost point of Chilean sovereignty involving the possession of these three islands. In a series of boundary treaties, known as Pactos de Mayo, signed on May 28, 1902, Argentina succeeded in obtaining from Chile the concession that the islands were negotiable and should be submitted to arbitration by the British Crown.71 This was the inception of the so-called Beagle Channel dispute, which brought Argentina and Chile to the brink of war in late 1978.72 Except for the signing on June 28, 1915 of a protocol, reiterating the submission for arbitration of the ownership of the islands in the Beagle Channel, the matter remained dormant until May 3, 1938. On that occasion, the foreign ministers of Argentina and Chile informed the U.S. ambassador in Chile, Norman Armour, that they had agreed to resubmit to arbitration the question of the islands at the eastern end of the Beagle Channel. They agreed to rely on a sole arbitrator and they chose for that position the chief justice of the United States. However, when Chief Justice Hughes excused himself, the two states requested the services of the U.S. attorney general, Homer Cummings.73 Subsequent to Cummings’s failed mediation attempt in the 1940s, the British Crown took up the matter again in 1971. Wary of British neutrality, Argentina insisted that the arbitration arrangement be changed so that the actual judgment would be made by an impartial panel of five members of the International Court of Justice at the Hague. In early 1977, the British Crown announced a ruling confirming Chile’s sovereign right over the disputed islands. Then, in December 1977, Argentina threatened to declare the arbitration not binding and stated that it would pursue the matter in bilateral negotiations with Chile.74 Bilateral negotiations between Argentina and Chile began on January 14, 1978 when General Manuel Contreras Sepúlveda, former director of Chile’s intelligence agency, delivered a proposal from President Augusto Pinochet to President Jorge Rafael Videla of Argentina.75 The two military presidents met privately for five hours on January 19.76 Five days later, on January 25, Argentina officially “repudiated” the international arbitration decision.77 During the first half of 1978, the rhetoric coming out of Argentina and Chile became increasingly bellicose. By August, bilateral negotiations had reached an impasse, and the negotiators fixed November 2, 1978 as the final date to arrive at an agreement.78 In September and October of 1978 the tempo of acrimonious allegations picked up, with both sides accusing each other of troop movements and illegal incursions.79 When the November 2 deadline came, the negotiators for both countries announced that they had not been able to work out an agreement but that they would urge their respective governments to seek a peaceful solution.80 While Argentina increased pressure on Chile by demanding a “total accord as soon as possible,” Chile proposed that the two countries should submit the dispute to a friendly nation, like Spain, for arbitration. Argentina rejected this proposal, asserting that “direct negotiations [were] the suitable way to resolve disputes.”81

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Belligerent statements from both governments, deployment of armored forces along the border, naval maneuvers near the Beagle Channel, and troop movements led both countries “to be four hours away” from a major military conflagration on December 23, 1978.82 War was only narrowly averted when Pope John Paul II agreed to arbitrate the dispute and Argentina accepted his mediating role.83 Finally, on January 23, 1984 the Vatican announced that Argentina and Chile had reached an agreement regarding the Beagle Channel dispute.84 The role of the United States throughout the time leading up to the Beagle Channel crisis and during the six weeks of tense relations was consistent with its previous posture in other disputes in South America since 1935. The Carter administration urged both governments to avoid war and to find a peaceful solution to their territorial dispute. It asked the Organization of American States to intervene. But the U.S. efforts were to no avail in settling this crisis.85 The evidence shows no indication that the U.S. government leaned heavily on either of the two disputants to prevent or solve the Beagle Channel controversy. In fact, it appears that the U.S. government kept a distance from this imbroglio. For instance, when Argentine and Chilean negotiators were trying to settle their territorial dispute, President Jimmy Carter, addressing the OAS General Assembly, recalled the coming centennial anniversary of the War of the Pacific between Chile and Peru, and pledged to view this occasion “as an opportunity to reaffirm our commitment to harmony in this hemisphere and to avoid conflict.” While he mentioned that other disputes (i.e., Bolivia’s access to the sea, the Honduras-El Salvador border dispute, and the future of Belize) in the Western Hemisphere could “be settled peacefully,” he avoided even to allude to the ongoing discussions between Argentina and Chile over the disputed Beagle Channel.86 Similarly, at the height of this crisis on December 14, 1978, in a major U.S. policy address to the Pan American Society of the United States in New York, assistant secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Viron P. Vaky did not mention the failed negotiations.87 In sum, the only allusion to the Beagle Channel crisis and the successful mediation by Pope John Paul II in late 1978 was U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s expression of appreciation to the Holy See “for undertaking to mediate the long-standing and troubling differences between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel.”88 As is evident from this discussion, it was the Vatican’s—not the U.S.’s—diplomacy that prevented the outbreak of hostilities between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel. Thus, it can be surmised from this case that U.S. hegemonic management had very little to do with maintaining interstate peace in South America. The Colombian-Venezuelan Dyad Venezuela has been involved in territorial disputes with both Colombia and Guyana. Out of these two dyads, the most threatening to intraregional peace has been the long-running, low intensity feud with Colombia over the Gulf of Venezuela, the Los Monjes archipelago, and the Guajira Peninsula.89 This dispute


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stems from opposing claims over the line dividing the seabed and territorial waters in these three areas. In 1939, Venezuela and Colombia signed the Treaty of Non-Aggression, Conciliation, Arbitration, and Judicial Settlement of Border Demarcation and Navigation. The agreement was intended to settle all territorial disputes between them, but many influential Venezuelans, including members of the military, disavowed the treaty as overly “generous” to Colombia and as a “treasonous mutilation of Venezuelan sovereignty.”90 Consequently, in March 1981 the Venezuelan Supreme Court accepted a plea to abrogate the 1939 treaty with Colombia. The Venezuelan Supreme Court decision on the 1939 treaty was viewed in Colombia as an indication that Venezuela was becoming more aggressive and less open to compromise. In the 1970s and early 1980s, the bargaining position of both countries hardened and a settlement became increasingly difficult to achieve. The matter came to an impasse on the evening of Wednesday, August 5, 1987, when the Venezuelan Ambassador to Colombia, Luis La Corte, handed to President Virgilio Barco Vargas the official Venezuelan rejection of the Colombian proposal to rejoin the Permanent Conciliation Commission and settle the territorial differences between the two countries.91 The territorial dispute between Colombia and Venezuela reached a serious standoff that Sunday, August 9, when Colombia tried to force the issue by flexing its military muscle. On that occasion, the Colombian Navy stationed the corvette, A. R. C. Caldas less than a mile south of the Castilletes parallel, inside of what Venezuela defines as its territorial waters in the Gulf of Venezuela. This navy vessel remained in that location until Tuesday, August 18.92 The Caldas incident, as known in Colombia and Venezuela, caused a national uproar in Venezuela. Not only ultra-nationalist elements, but all segments of Venezuelan society called for a military response to Colombia’s provocation. Acceding to public demands, President Jaime Lusinchi ordered the Venezuelan armed forces on full alert along the Colombian border, and sent a stern message to his Colombian counterpart demanding the relocation of the corvette to Colombian territorial waters. Also, he requested an official explanation of the incident and the resumption of direct diplomatic negotiations between the two countries as soon as possible.93 Colombia acceded and moved the naval vessel back inside its territorial waters.94 Then, both countries pledged to continue negotiations toward a long-lasting peaceful settlement of this controversy. Notwithstanding the absence of a final solution to the territorial dispute between Colombia and Venezuela,95 the crisis was solved peacefully through short-term bilateral negotiations, and without the mediation of any international actor. The Caldas crisis illustrates the potential for interstate conflict that prevailed in South America until the end of the twentieth century. Further, it reveals that peace was maintained through means other than outright U.S. hegemonic management in the region. This analysis found no evidence indicating any type of U.S. involvement to prevent or settle this dispute.96 Moreover, the Caldas incident was temporarily settled without the mediating efforts of a plethora of state actors as were the previous cases examined above.

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South American Compliance with U.S. Hegemonic Management In the final analysis, the peacemaking and/or peacekeeping impact of the United States on the South American peace appears tenuous. Despite its public commitment to the prevention and resolution of armed conflict in South America, several militarized interstate crises erupted in the post–Chaco War period. These incidents evince the inability of the United States to manage events unilaterally in South America, especially the maintenance of interstate peace and stability. The evidence of several militarized interstate disputes, also, reveals that when nations decide to use violence and military force to achieve their national interests, the U.S. government will do or can do little to prevent it. Short of a costly unilateral military intervention to enforce peace, which did not appear to be the U.S. policy choice, this country possessed no more diplomatic leverage than any large South American state. Further, the record demonstrates that the United States was reluctant to intervene militarily in South America, even when disputes involved its own strategic interests or when it would have been relatively simple to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. For example, it showed no inclination to intervene authoritatively and prevent the outbreak of hostilities between El Salvador and Honduras in the Soccer War of 1969 and between the United Kingdom and Argentina in the South Atlantic in 1982. In neither case did the United States choose to coerce the belligerents to sue for peace and avoid war at all costs. This is circumstantial evidence that, despite what some experts claim as the direct responsibility of the United States to maintain intraregional peace in South America, the role of the United States in this endeavor is tenuous and inconclusive. This study demonstrates that the absence of major wars or the prevalence of negative peace in South America since 1935 is not a direct result of U.S. hegemonic management. The causal relation between U.S. hegemony and intraregional, interstate peace in South America appears even weaker when we compare the frequency of U.S. political and military interventions in this region and in other major world regions. As demonstrated above, since late in the nineteenth century the United States has been active in promoting peace and security in South America as a way to advance its global strategic objectives by preventing involvement opportunities to other Great Power rivals. Such a goal has guided U.S. foreign policy, particularly since 1945, in every other major region of the world from Africa to the Middle East. Specifically in South America, the United States sought that objective through a combination of diplomatic and covert political involvements in all intraregional conflicts and militarized disputes. The evidence shows that, since 1935, the United States intervened politically and militarily more frequently and with greater force in interstate conflicts and militarized disputes in Africa, Asia, Central America, the Caribbean Basin, and the Middle East than in South America. Yet, these other regions experienced more intraregional, interstate violence since 1935 than South America. Clearly, this is another piece of evidence that debunks the hegemonic peace hypothesis. As is evident from table 4.1, the United States intervened abroad militarily thirty times: thirteen times in Asia, eight times in the Middle East, including the 2003 Iraq war, seven times in the Central American-Caribbean Basin


Table 4.1

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United States Overt Military Interventions Abroad, 1945–1991

Target Territory

Beginning

Ending

Name of Intervention

South Korea People’s Republic of China South Korea North Korea Trieste Republic of China Lebanon Panama Canal Zone South Vietnam South Korea Panama Laos North Vietnam Dominican Republic

09/08/45 09/30/45 06/27/50 06/30/50 11/06/53 02/07/55 07/15/58 11/03/59 03/22/62 07/29/63 01/09/64 06/08/64 08/04/64 04/28/65

08/15/48 09/06/46 07/27/53 07/27/53 11/06/53 02/11/55 10/25/58 11/30/59 01/27/73 11/03/63 01/16/64 08/15/73 01/27/73 09/21/66

South Korea Cambodia South Vietnam Vietnam Iran Lebanon Grenada Libya Virgin Islands Panama Kuwait Liberia Panama Somalia Iraq Saudi Arabia

11/18/65 09/20/66 04/28/75 05/14/75 04/24/80 08/25/82 10/25/83 03/24/86 09/21/89 12/20/89 01/17/90 08/05/90 12/05/90 01/05/91 01/17/91 01/29/91

10/18/69 08/15/73 04/29/75 05/15/75 04/25/80 03/26/84 12/15/83 04/15/86 10/31/89 04/30/90 02/28/91 08/19/90 12/05/90 01/05/91 07/15/91 01/30/91

Korean Occupation American Guard Duties Korean War Korean War Trieste Riots Tachens Evacuation Lebanese Civil War Panama Demonstrations Vietnamese War Korean Conflict Panama Flag Riots Vietnamese Civil War Vietnamese Civil War Dominican Republic Civil War Korean Conflict Vietnamese War Saigon Evacuations Mayaguez Incident Tehran Rescue Mission Multilateral Force Operation Urgent Fury Libya Raids St. Croix Disaster Panama Invasion Gulf War Monrovia Evacuation Herrera’s Mutiny Somalia Evacuation Desert Storm Khafji Defense

Source: Herbert K. Tillema, “Foreign Overt Military Interventions, September 2, 1945-December 31, 1991.” Department of Political Science, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, March 31, 1997.

regions, twice in Europe, including the 1996 Bosnian war, and thrice in Africa. While most of these U.S. military interventions did not aim to preserve intraregional, interstate peace in other regions, the much greater degree of U.S. military muscle flexing in regions other than South America renders, at least, as exaggerated, if not preposterous, the claim that the South American peace is the direct consequence of U.S. hegemonic management.


CHAPTER 5

INTERNATIONAL LIBERALISM: PEACE THROUGH PRINCIPLES?

iberalism is not a specific and straightforward prescription for the promotion and maintenance of international peace. In fact, its main focus was originally the political and economic organization of domestic society for the realization and protection of the liberty of the individual. Nonetheless, several of its original and basic principles have been extended to the analysis and explanation of the outbreak, evolution, and permanence of peace in the interstate system. Since the primary concern of this book is the investigation of the fundamental determinants of the long period of negative peace in South America, it warrants a thorough analysis of the possible causal connection between this phenomenon and several relevant propositions grounded in the liberal paradigm of international relations. Accordingly, it is necessary to discuss, first, the definition and basic elements of the liberal research program and how these have come to influence important liberal tenets on interstate peace. Then, these principles will be placed within specific liberal theories in international relations, specifying testable hypotheses and their implications for the history of the South American peace. Finally, once the independent variables of these propositions are fully operationalized, it will follow an explanation of the methodology to be utilized in the interpretation of the empirical evidence presented in chapter 6.

L

The Basic Liberal Model Liberalism is a rich tradition in political philosophy that involves a complex and sometimes controversial set of principles and assumptions concerning social interactions and the organization of domestic society.1 Both as a political ideology and as an analytical perspective, it has engendered several passionate debates about issues ranging from negative versus positive aspects of liberty to laissez-faire versus social democratic liberalism.2 These points and others omitted deliberately here are very important philosophical questions, requiring an extensive analysis beyond the scope of this study.3 Therefore, this work will circumvent a detailed philosophical discussion and an intellectual history of the various debates and developments of liberalism as a doctrine of individual liberty. Instead, the focus will be on liberalism

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as an analytical “approach” to the study of international relations.4 Accordingly, the discussion will concentrate only on the most relevant liberal principles and assumptions for world affairs and, in particular, for the concern on interstate peace attending this study.5 As a direct consequence of liberalism’s primary analytical concern with the liberty of the individual in the domestic arena, many of its propositions on the causality of different international events are highly conditioned by the very same moral and normative principles aiming to advance individual freedom. Consequently, many analysts customarily define as part of the international liberal paradigm any causal relation whose explanatory variable is somehow related to issues of liberty, individual rights, institutions, constitutional government, free trade, social construction and learning, and civilized progress. The result of this practice is a hydra-headed international liberal paradigm, lacking a core set of assumptions and internal logical consistency. Therefore, to clarify and structure the theoretical background of the liberal hypotheses to be evaluated here, it will follow an examination of the evolution of liberalism from a doctrine of individual liberty to a major approach in international relations, leading to several liberal analytical variants. To elucidate this angle, it is useful to briefly specify liberalism’s historical origin and the relation to its normative content. Classical liberalism stems in part from a reaction against both the monarchical and mercantile systems in Europe during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which interfered with the political and economic interests of an emerging middle-class society.6 Hence, one dimension of liberalism “deals with political freedom—freedom for the citizen from state oppression,” and from this position, as Giovanni Sartori affirms, its core concern is “the juridical defense, through the constitutional state, of individual political freedom, of individual liberty.”7 Also, liberalism deals with economic freedom—freedom from the state meddling in the economic pursuits of individuals. This aspect of liberalism stresses that the individual can be relied on, without state control, to advance the interests and welfare of the community as a whole.8 Although similarly aiming to enhance and protect individual liberty in society, these twin liberal dimensions have prompted students of liberalism to differentiate between politics and economics as “separable and autonomous spheres of activities.”9 To illustrate this point with a statement from a liberal international relations scholar, let us hear from Edward L. Morse, who argues that “one of the core assumptions in the Westphalia system was the tight relationship between—if not the equation of—economic and political goods. This notion was viewed by liberal philosophy as fundamentally wrong.” He concludes that “the development of individual liberty for the individual and the development of individual and social wealth rested upon the separation of economic and political factors.”10 Coinciding with this notion, Joseph A. Schumpeter distinguishes between “political liberalism” and “economic liberalism.” By political liberalism he means individual freedom from arbitrary authority and the rights of individuals to political participation, to private property, and to equal opportunities under the law. This conception of liberalism is associated with the views of John Locke, Charles Louis de Montesquieu, and Benjamin Constant. On the other hand, economic liberalism is identified with the

INTERNATIONAL LIBERALISM

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views of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, J. Stuart Mill, and other classical economists who claim that the most efficient and expeditious manner to promote economic development and general welfare is by removing all fetters from a market economy.11 Also, Giovanni Sartori distinguishes between “liberism as an economic system from liberalism as a political system.” He further asserts that “economic liberalism . . . is not political liberalism.”12 In short, it will be assumed that from its early manifestations liberalism’s normative content involved both an economic and a political component. A second logical step in analyzing liberalism’s impact on world politics is to expound how the political and economic dimensions of liberalism have influenced specifically the conduct and analysis of international relations. On this point there are opposing views in the literature. Some observers maintain that liberalism is incompatible with the realities and necessities of an anarchical international environment. For example, Stanley Hoffmann asserts that international affairs have been the nemesis of liberalism. The essence of liberalism is self-restraint, moderation, compromise, and peace. The state must be kept within its sphere; government can use its powers only on the ways set by law; groups and individuals must avoid trespassing and curtailing each other’s freedom. Conflicts, the stuff of social life, have to be settled by reason—through negotiated deals or by resort to freely established authorities—not by violence. The essence of international politics is exactly the opposite: troubled peace, at best, or the state of war. The ever-present risk of war makes of military power, traditionally, the most important yardstick in the measurement of power; restraint, when it occurs, usually results from deterrence, from the fear or the crush of greater force. Compromises happen and cooperation develops, but both have a way of collapsing when the parties’ interests change and when power shifts.13

Yet others, admitting the diversity of liberal theories, argue that liberalism is an important and useful analytic approach in international relations.14 Evidently, several liberal tenets have significantly influenced the theory and practice of world politics in the twentieth century. Therefore, short of attempting to settle this debate here, liberalism will be treated as one of the main paradigms in world politics.15 Premised on the political and economic aspects of liberalism, several perspectives have permeated the field of international relations, generating a distinct approach to the study and analysis of international politics. This is especially evident regarding the question of interstate peace, which has been the central concern of the liberal paradigm since the time when President Woodrow Wilson unveiled his “programme of the world’s peace.”16 Therefore it is instructive at this juncture to examine Wilson’s program and its most important propositions. Possibly influenced by the liberal ideals of Rousseau, Kant, Smith, Ricardo, Cobden, Bentham, and the Abbé Saint-Pierre, Wilson set out to institutionalize the peaceful conduct of international politics.17 In his “Fourteen Points” address to the U.S. Congress on January 8, 1918, he advanced several ideas that have come to be regarded as the credo of the liberal paradigm in international relations.18 Particularly, four themes of the Wilsonian program are directly relevant to the

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purpose of this work; therefore, it is important to summarize those here. First, he advanced the proposition that democracies promote peace. He noted that making the world safe for democracy would make “the world fit and safe to live in.” Second, he equated the “removal . . . of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations” with the “maintenance” of international peace. Third, he advocated interstate peace by fostering confidence among all nations and multilateral respect for international law. Finally, he championed the development and preservation of interstate peace by institutionalizing the practice of international politics. With that objective in mind, he proposed the creation of the League of Nations, armed with mechanisms and principles such as collective security, arms control agreements, and respect for national self-determination and sovereignty. To foster international moderation, compromise, and peace, Wilson presented these propositions in a single package, neglecting, in this manner, the fact that they derived from different liberal assumptions and interpretations of international politics. For example, while the promotion of interstate peace via the mediating role of international organizations rests on a high degree of centralization and governance of international life, international peace through economic interdependence, free trade, and commerce depends on minimum international centralization and governance. Michael W. Doyle identifies an additional dilemma in liberalism that it is also present in Wilson’s program. In the domestic arena, liberalism represents, according to Doyle, “a commitment to a threefold set of rights.” These include freedom from arbitrary authority or, as it is also known, “negative freedom”; second, rights to protect and promote the capacity and opportunity for freedom, the “positive freedoms”; and, third, democratic participation or representation to guarantee the other two. According to Doyle “the dilemma within liberalism is how to reconcile the three sets of liberal rights.” As an illustration of the meaning of his previous assertion, he affirms that “the right to private property can conflict with equality of opportunity and both rights can be violated by democratic legislation.”19 While this and similar tensions in liberalism and in Wilson’s program, perhaps, had little practical effect on world politics, it is almost certain that they influenced various theoretical strands of the liberal paradigm in international politics. Subsequent to Wilson’s program, the theoretical and practical manifestations of liberalism in international politics underscored five fundamental conceptions. First, it is the belief that the nature of a country’s political system determines to a great extent its external behavior. Second, the conviction that unimpeded economic transactions between individuals and groups foster the peaceful resolution of conflicting claims over scarce resources and this is, indeed, beneficial to the interests of the general public. Third, the conception that since individuals have been able to wrest national governance from the hands of the powerful few and make government a just and equitable enterprise of the many, then, too, international politics can be managed by international governing institutions whose members represent all the international actors. Fourth, the notion of enlightened and rational social progression, which posits that the discovery and learning of new ways and means of achieving material and social goals discourages even egoistic individuals


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and groups from violent behavior potentially deleterious to their own interests. Finally, the previous assumptions presuppose that international politics is the result of a multiplicity of transactions between various kinds of international actors including, but not limited to, states. Normative friction among those basic assumptions outlined above and the ensuing doctrinal diversity within the liberal paradigm in international relations prompted Robert O. Keohane to identify and classify four major liberal causal arguments. First, republican liberalism stresses the pacific effects of republican or democratic governments. Second, commercial liberalism emphasizes the pacific effects of free trade and commerce. Third, regulatory liberalism asserts the importance of rules and institutions in affecting the development of peaceful relations among nations. Fourth, sophisticated liberalism affirms that conditions of economic openness within the framework of rules and institutions provide incentives for peaceful rather than aggressive expansion.20 Having outlined briefly the transformation of liberalism from a doctrine of individual liberty to a major paradigm in international relations, and having summarized its basic tenets on interstate peace, it is necessary at this juncture to examine the theoretical ramifications of each of these causal strands. For that purpose, and following Keohane’s organizational scheme, the focus henceforth will be on those specific liberal theories and their respective relevant hypotheses, which share the same basic causal reasoning as the four individual themes summarized above. Liberalism and Peace in South America This section and chapter 6 will analyze whether the long period of negative peace in South America is indeed the effect of one, or a combination of various pacifying factors traditionally emphasized in liberal thought. More specifically, it will examine the possible causal link between interstate peace in South America and such explanatory variables as democracy, trade and economic interdependence, international institutions, and the community of enlightened interests and values shared by regional state actors. The Pacific Nature of Democratic Regimes Democracy fosters peace. This is one of the main liberal tenets linking a domesticlevel variable with the evolution and maintenance of interstate peace. According to this perspective, peace among two or more countries depends on the type of political regime governing these nation-states. From this angle, if the makeup of a group of countries is either a mixture of democratic and autocratic political systems or simply a totality of dictatorships, then the outbreak and endurance of long-term interstate peace will be unlikely. On the other hand, if the same set of nation-states is made up entirely of liberal democracies, then long-term interstate peace is highly possible and, given the record of relative peace among liberal democratic states, perhaps, almost a certainty. In sum, the predominance of liberal democracy in countries that are part of either a dyad or of a cluster of contiguous states will guarantee the long-term prevalence of peace.

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The normative foundations of these propositions stem primarily from the work of Immanuel Kant. In the essay “Perpetual Peace,” written in 1795, he is the first to advance the notion that republican governments (read in contemporary parlance as pluralistic or liberal democracies) are more pacific than autocratic governments. In discussing the virtues of the republican form of government for civil society, Kant asks rhetorically, “does it also provide the only foundation for perpetual peace?” He responds that in addition to the purity of its origin, a purity whose source is the pure concept of right, the republican constitution also provides for this desirable result, namely, perpetual peace. By contrast, under a nonrepublican constitution, where subjects are not citizens, the easiest thing in the world to do is to declare war.21

His reasoning is that republicanism is predicated, first, on respect for individual liberties, second, on the recognition of a single, legitimate source of juridical rights for all individuals in society, and third, on legal equality for all citizens in a polity. Republicanism, in Kant’s words, first, “accords with the principles of the freedom of the members of a society (as men), second, it accords with the principles of the dependence of everyone on a single, common [source of] legislation (as subjects), and third, it accords with the law of the equality of them all (as citizens).22 Hence, nation-states founded on these norms are expected to exercise moral restraint and respect the rights of individuals and states beyond their borders. Also, from a more utilitarian angle, Kant argues that in republican states, where the government represents the well-being of individual citizens and the people themselves are the sovereign lawmakers, war would appear as detrimental to their material interests. Therefore, he asserts that [i]f (as must inevitably be the case, given this form of constitution) the consent of the citizenry is required in order to determine whether or not there will be war, it is natural that they consider all its calamities before committing themselves to so risky a game. (Among these are doing the fighting themselves, paying the costs of war from their own resources, having to repair at great sacrifice the war’s devastation, and, finally, the ultimate evil that would make peace itself better, never being able—because of new and constant wars—to expunge the burden of debt.) By contrast, under a non-republican constitution, where subjects are not citizens, the easiest thing in the world to do is to declare war. Here the ruler is not a fellow citizen, but the nation’s owner, and war does not affect his table, his hunt, his places of pleasure, his court festivals, and so on. Thus, he can decide to go to war for the most meaningless of reasons, as if it were a kind of pleasure party, and he can blithely leave its justification (which decency requires) to his diplomatic corps, who are always prepared for such exercise.23

Michael Doyle makes a similar argument, emphasizing that “once the aggressive interests of absolutist monarchies are tamed and once the habit of respect for individual rights is engrained by republican government, wars would appear as the disaster to the people’s welfare.”24 Starting from the basic notion of the inherently pacific nature of republican governments, Kant accomplishes three tasks in his work on international


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peace: first, he predicts the progressive pacification of a league of peace (foedus pacificum)25 among republican or democratic states; second, he explains the internal pacification of this league; and, third, he suggests why democratic governments may not be peaceful in their relations with autocratic states.26 His general argument consists of three parts: first, states must adopt a republican form of government; second, republics will establish peace among themselves by respecting or signing on to a figurative “contract” whose objective is to end not just one war, but all wars;27 and, third, a cosmopolitan right of hospitality that promotes commerce and reduces the material incentives for international plunder and war.28 In sum, based on this three-part normative argument, it is evident that, in Kant’s view, international stable peace is only possible among liberal states constituted on the principles of republicanism outlined above. Building on this reasoning, Michael Doyle explains why the relations between liberal and non-liberal states are problematic and the prospect for long-lasting peace between these two types of states is difficult, perhaps, almost impossible. He argues that there are essentially two separate international environments that operate according to two different sets of norms and principles. One international environment is characterized as a civilized and institutionalized setting in which order and peace is achieved through mutual moral and constitutional self-restraints. This appears to be what Kant had in mind when he explains that a man (or a people) who is merely in the state of nature denies me this security and injures me merely by being in this state. For although he does not actively (facto) injure me, he does so by virtue of the lawlessness of his state (statu iniusto), by which he constantly threatens me, and I can require him either to enter with me into a state of civil law or to remove himself from my surroundings. Thus, the postulate on which all the following articles rest is: “All men who can mutually influence one another must accept some civil constitution.”29

The second international environment is anarchical, resembling the Hobbesian state of nature, in which order and peace is the result of balance of power and “prudent strategic calculations.” While liberal nation-states have a separate peace, they also interact with non-liberal states in an environment where “conflict and wars are a natural outcome of struggles for resources, prestige, and security,” and where there is no “reliable law or organization.”30 Three implications follow from the general argument expounded above. The first implication stipulates that nation-states are bound to be at peace with each other as long as they abide by international liberal principles and norms. The second inference stems from the stipulation that since liberal nation-states and members of the non-liberal world operate on two totally different sets of principles and norms, interstate conflict and war is almost inevitable between countries with opposite types of political regimes. Barring a transition to democracy, the third implication is that autocracies have no other option but to live outside the “pacific union.” Consequently, they are more likely than democracies to be involved in conflict and war. It is instructive at this point to review Doyle’s discussion of three common failures of liberalism in guiding the foreign policy of democracies outside the liberal

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world and how they can influence the outbreak of conflict and war against autocracies. He affirms that the first two failings put liberal nation-states in a collision course with non-liberal states. He identifies, first, “imprudent vehemence,” which raises conflicts of interest into crusades. Consequently, liberal nation-states often intervene in the internal affairs of other countries to protect individual rights and promote democracy. Second, he identifies “a careless and supine complaisance” in which declining or partially risen liberal nation-states behave too timidly toward other strategically and economically important countries. This attitude projects an image of easy pray and opportunity due to weakness and lack of resolve. Third, the political uncertainty is introduced by the moral ambiguity of liberal principles regarding the international distribution of property.31 In addition to the normative foundations discussed above, democracy as the cause of interstate peace is also founded on an empirical argument. During Kant’s lifetime, a “perpetual peace” among liberal nation-states was merely a normative theory without empirical referent and based only on moral precepts on the right and just behavior of states. Nowadays, however, the pacific nature of democratic regimes is axiomatic, and the “pacific union” or “democratic peace”32 is an undeniable empirical fact of international life. In fact, one contemporary observer of world politics has even asserted that the “absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.”33 Similarly, Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett independently confirm and support such assertion by noting that this empirical regularity “is probably one of the most significant nontrivial products of the scientific study of world politics.”34 In an earlier account, Bruce M. Russett makes the same exact point about the “democratic peace.” There he writes that this “is one of the strongest nontrivial or nontautological generalizations that can be made about international relations.”35 Underscoring a similar point, several scholars note that “as an empirical statement about dyadic relations, the proposition that democracies are generally at peace with each other is strongly supported.”36 The empirical corroboration of the “democratic peace” has added credibility to the hypothesis postulating the causal relation between democracy and the prospect for enduring interstate peace. In analyzing various aspects of this relationship, most studies normally begin by defining and operationalizing, according to several basic criteria, what constitutes a liberal democratic regime or a participatory polity. Usually the indicators mentioned as measurements of democracy and participatory societies are the following: scheduled elections; enfranchisement of a minimum percentage of adult population in a country; legislative control or oversight over the executive branch of government; a civilian government sovereign over military and foreign affairs; governmental political stability for a minimum of three to six years; the existence of a market and private property economy; and citizens with juridical rights.37 In a study directly related to the empirical test of the democratic-peace hypothesis, Russett distinguishes between democratic and nondemocratic ethnographic societies according to the degree of political participation. That is, the higher the level of political participation, the greater the degree of democracy in that society.38 Once a workable definition of democracy is achieved, the analysts usually proceed to examine the historical record of all possible cases of interstate war dating


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back to the end of the Napoleonic era. Other than the Spanish-American War of 1898, the “easily explained exception” of Finland fighting alongside the Axis powers during World War II, and the brief border skirmishes between Ecuador and Peru in 1981 and 1995,39 the historical evidence strongly supports the proposition that democracies rarely fight each other.40 Undoubtedly, the “democratic peace” has been confirmed empirically as it is articulated in statements like “democracies never go to war with each other” or “democracies rarely fight each other.” Such a robust finding is tempered, nevertheless, by other available evidence indicating that democracies are just as war-prone as autocracies in terms of the frequency of war initiation and war involvement. For instance, Quincy Wright concludes that the statistical data did not show “that democracies have been less often involved in war than autocracies.”41 Such observation raises the question of what causes the war-proneness of liberal democratic regimes. Although there is no definitive answer to that query, it appears that most of the theoretical works explaining why democracies almost never fight each other share an ever stronger conviction attributing the root causes of general international violence and of the war-proneness of democracies to the behavior of nondemocratic regimes in the interstate system. For example, Immanuel Kant and Michael Doyle explain the democratic peace as a direct consequence of the moral restraint exercised by liberal states toward each other. Another normative theory on the democratic peace is that advanced by Bruce Russett. He argues that peace among liberal democracies is a result of “norms of compromise and cooperation.”42 Small and Singer explain this phenomenon according to the geographical distance between democracies.43 Still another work maintains that “universal democratic norms for reconciling competing values and interests” enable democratic states locked in international disputes to be “better equipped” than others to diffuse conflict situations at an early stage before they can escalate to military violence. Based on this logic, the study postulates that “disputes between democracies are more amenable than are other disputes to peaceful settlements.”44 Finally, David Lake explains, based on a theory of the rent-seeking state, that rent seeking creates an imperialist bias in a country’s foreign policy. He claims that this bias is smallest in democracies and greatest in autocracies. He concludes that as a result of this bias, autocracies will be more expansionists and war-prone.45 Democracy causes interstate peace.46 This proposition is reinforced further by combining the assumption on the violent and aggressive nature of nondemocratic regimes with the normative arguments for the peaceful disposition of democratic regimes, and the empirical corroboration of the “democratic peace.” In all, it seems as if the presence of nondemocratic states in the international system is not only the fundamental cause of the war-proneness of liberal democracies, but, even more generally, of all forms of armed conflict and war in the interstate system. Implications of Liberal Democracy for Peace If students of liberalism postulate in general terms that democracy causes stable interstate peace, then, at a particular level, they should presuppose that peace in South America is the product of constitutional and ideological factors too. Based

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on this hypothesized causality, therefore, one should find that many countries in South America have been ruled simultaneously since 1935 by some type of liberal democratic government. Short of this finding, one should detect, at a minimum, that if some nation-states have been governed by some form of autocratic regime, it must have been a very mild and benign autocratic type. That is, a kind of civil authoritarian regime or party bureacracy à la Mexico that has not behaved aggressively externally and has not abused its citizenry too blatantly or systematically. Such is a perfect formula for an autocracy to avoid raising the wrath of neighboring liberal democratic governments. In South America, liberal democratic governments (either presidential or parliamentary systems) have been the exception rather than the standard since the Chaco War to the advent of the wave of democratization in the mid-1980s. In addition, very brutal and despotic regimes have coexisted with the rare cases and periods of democratic governments in this region. Yet, the presence of dictatorial regimes never provoked the principled and ideologically motivated fury of the few and rare cases of South American democracies. In sum, the long period of peace in South America appears to be the result of neither a democratic peace among South American states, nor of the absence of aggressive and provocative external behavior normally associated with military and autocratic regimes. Liberal Economic Determinants of Peace Economic liberalism underscores the influence of system-level variables on the outbreak, evolution, and maintenance of interstate peace. Thus, a second key liberal tenet posits that international trade and economic interdependence foster mutual prosperity, stability, and international peace.47 This causal connection is established unequivocally by an early liberal thinker who affirms that [p]eace is the natural effect of trade. Two nations who traffic with each other become reciprocally dependent; for if one has an interest in buying, the other has an interest in selling; and thus their union is founded on their mutual necessities.48

Such a simple reasoning has molded the intellectual and practical projections of a great number of both analysts and practitioners of world politics. It is, therefore, important at this juncture to examine this liberal argument: its assumptions, evolution, and implications for interstate peace. Two prevailing views pervade the analysis of foreign trade and economic interdependence as key determinants of interstate peace.49 On the one hand, the mercantilist conception emphasizes the adverse effects on interstate relations of trade and economic interdependence. The basic contention of mercantilism is that national security and survival depend on national power, and this, in turn, derives in great part from accumulated wealth and national economic prowess. It views foreign trade as a zero-sum game, because, according to its logic, imports weaken the economic base of the state and foment dependence of vital resources and goods on foreign sources. Moreover, national reliance on wealth from exports encourages product specialization, underdevelopment of many national economic sectors, and dependence on foreign markets. All told, although mercantilists have not stated it


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unequivocally, one can extrapolate from their basic reasoning the following proposition: a weak state invites international predation and war, while a strong nationstate induces international restraint and peace. Since mercantilism endorses a policy of economic nationalism in order to keep the nation strong and independent, then one can infer from it that it regards both free trade and economic interdependence as sources of international conflict and war. Gilpin corroborates this argument when he affirms that economic nationalists (i.e., mercantilists) regard international commerce as “basically conflictual,” and economic interdependence as “never symmetrical,” constituting a “source of continuous conflict and insecurity.”50 The liberal conception, on the other hand, emphasizes the benign effects of foreign trade and economic interdependence on international politics. From the time Adam Smith revolutionized economic thinking to present-day neoclassical thought, liberals have believed that a natural harmony of interests between states can be accomplished through a policy of free trade and interdependence. First, Smith argued against mercantilist trade restrictions on grounds that they limited the functioning of the market, raising prices and interfering with the international division of labor. A century later, David Ricardo introduced the law of comparative advantage, demonstrating that two countries can gain from international trade by specializing in the production of those goods and services in which they are relatively more productive. And logically, though not historically, one may finally distinguish the thought succession of Montesquieu, Kant, J. S. Mill, Bentham, and Cobden who decisively advanced the notion that free trade and interdependence lend a positive influence to the development and maintenance of interstate peace. Although Kant had asserted in 1795 that “the spirit of trade cannot coexist with war, and sooner or later this spirit dominates every people,”51 it is John Stuart Mill, in his defense of international trade, who affirms in a straightforward manner that [b]efore, the patriot, unless sufficiently advanced in culture to feel the world his country, wished all countries weak, poor, and ill-governed, but his own: he now sees in their wealth and progress a direct source of wealth and progress to his own country. It is commerce which is rapidly rendering war obsolete, by strengthening and multiplying the personal interests which are in natural opposition to it. And it may be said without exaggeration that the great extent and rapid increase of international trade, in being the principal guarantee of the peace of the world, is the great permanent security for the uninterrupted progress of the ideas, the institutions, and the character of the human race.52

According to this line of argument, war is obviated because international trade, even if it is not perfectly competitive and free, enables nation-states to acquire needed resources and goods. The underlying assumption of this reasoning is that states, if prevented from satisfying their basic demands and needs through trade, will fight each other over scarce goods and over resource-rich territory. Consistent with this premise, U.S. planning for the post–World War II international order was infused with the following slogan: “If goods can’t cross borders, soldiers will.” The reasoning was clearly articulated much earlier by Cordell Hull, one of the chief architects of the postwar world order, when he became convinced that “unhampered trade dovetailed with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers, and unfair economic competition, with war.”53

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Based on the reasoning expounded above, the existence of a market mechanism permitting and facilitating unimpeded access across international boundaries will, first, significantly diminish the amount of contentious objectives whose quest may cause states to resort to war. And, second, interstate relations founded on commercial interests will underscore the mutual dependence of nation-states on key imports and exports. Complex interdependence, as Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have defined such situations, will help maintain interstate peace, because it incorporates mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of international conflicts; and because interdependent states across a range of issues will deem the use of force, on purely self-interesting grounds, totally harmful and counterproductive. This point is the same as the mutual vulnerability argument developed in the literature on complex interdependence. As Keohane and Nye assert, “employing force on one issue against an independent state with which one has a variety of relationships is likely to rupture mutually profitable relations on other issues. In other words, the use of force often has costly effects on non-security goals.”54 The causal link between liberal trade and economic interdependence, on the one hand, and interstate peace, on the other, has been found to be theoretically deficient.55 Also, history has discredited somewhat the liberal claim coupling liberal trade and peace. For example, World War I is frequently cited as a case when neither high trade volume, nor economic interdependence was able to prevent the outbreak of war. Similarly, the long peace between the superpowers from 1945 to 1989 is often used as a counterargument to the liberal case connecting peace, trade, and economic interdependence. Notwithstanding these theoretical and historical shortcomings, many contemporary liberal scholars continue to insist that, indeed, trade and economic interdependence have a pacific and beneficial effect on interstate relations. For instance, analysts like Richard Rosecrance, utilizing an impressionistic and historical approach, contend that nation-states can operate either within a military-political world or within a trading world. Their choice is determined by the costs and benefits involved in operating in either system. Rosecrance affirms that while the norms of the military-political system have dominated interstate relations for the most part since 1648, the trading system is ascending. Fundamentally, this is because war is too costly, and countries have learned to avoid it and concentrate on trade as an alternate strategy to maximize material gains.56 Still others like Mark Gasiorowski and Salomon Polachek, using sophisticated econometric techniques, find a positive correlation between high trade volume and the permanence of interstate peace.57 Therefore, since this causal relation appears to have withstood the general tests of history and econometrics, it is useful to analyze whether it holds, also, as a robust explanation for the long peace in South America. Implications of Economic Liberalism for Peace Economic liberalism posits that free trade, based on comparative advantage and on an international division of labor, creates economic interdependence. Accordingly, countries mutually dependent on trade, this variant of the liberal paradigm maintains, will interact peacefully since they will gain more from foreign trade than from


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interstate war. Following this line of reasoning, one can surmise that economically interdependent nation-states, as measured by the concentration and volume of their foreign trade, should interact in peace. In other words, if this argument holds, there should be a negative correlation between trade volume among two regional nationstates and the incidence and severity of armed conflict and war among them. Proceeding from the effect side of the causal relation borne out by economic liberalism, one should find that the post–Chaco War peace in South America is the effect of a great concentration and volume of intraregional trade and economic interdependence among these regional state-actors. For the moment, at least, it appears that the long period of peace in South America is the product of factors other than trade and interdependence. Particularly, since intraregional trade is historically negligible, perhaps, almost insignificant compared to the total trade volume of individual South American states with their main trading partners in Europe and North America. International Institutions: Regulators of Conflict A third variant of the liberal paradigm advances the notion that both formal and informal international institutions58 mediate and modify interstate relations, making them less violent and more amenable to peaceful and civilized settlements whenever interstate disputes arise. Consistent with this liberal tenet, international institutions are depicted in the international relations literature as either independent agents, with their own set of interests and goals, interacting with other actors in the international arena, or as structures within which the interactions among member states are mediated and constrained by the set of norms, rules, and principles governing that particular institution. Either as agents or as structures, it is evident that international institutions are essential elements in the analyses of many world politics students. Hugo Grotius was the first to stress the importance and determinant impact of rules and institutions in interstate relations.59 The Grotian tradition, as it is known in contemporary liberal thought, maintains that international politics is conducted within a society of states or international society. And since societies in general are ordered according to specific norms, rules, and institutions that constrain the behavior and interactions of its constitutive members, hence, this tradition posits that states are limited in their conflict with one another by common rules and institutions of the international society they constitute.60 Neoliberal institutionalism is a contemporary offspring of the Grotian tradition. While this new version recognizes the decentralized and anarchical nature of the international system, still it maintains that world politics is institutionalized,61 because, as Robert Keohane affirms, “much behavior is recognized by participants as reflecting established rules, norms, and conventions, and its meaning is interpreted in light of these understandings.”62 Accordingly, many contemporary exponents of the institutionalist approach believe that both formal and informal organizations facilitate international coordination and cooperation, making world politics more peaceful and civilized. Contemporary institutionalism defines institutions as “persistent and connected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.” Based on this definition, Robert Keohane maintains that

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we can think of three forms of international institutions: conventions; international regimes; and governmental and nongovernmental international organizations.63 Since both conventions and international security regimes appear to have had a minor impact, if at all, on the outbreak and evolution of intraregional interstate peace in South America,64 it is sufficient to examine only if and how formal international organizations have contributed to the peace in South America. The primary impetus motivating the foundation of international organizations is the desire to prevent international violence and the outbreak of interstate war.65 To achieve that particular purpose, formal international organizations avail themselves of several diplomatic mechanisms and approaches.66 Among these, judicial settlement of international disputes, arms control agreements, and collective security are the most relevant items for the task of this work. Consequently, when one examines in chapter 6 how, and to what extent international organizations have been the cause of peace in South America, one will be focusing only on these three basic mechanisms and their respective impact on the evolution of interstate peace in South America. Liberal Institutional Implications for Peace One aspect of the institutionalist perspective postulates that international organizations, through a variety of techniques, mediate disputes and prevent the outbreak of interstate violence and war. In South America, neither arms control agreements nor collective security appear to have had any direct impact on the evolution of interstate peace in this region. First, there is no evidence of any formal arms control agreement among any two pairs of nation-states in South America. Short of the 1967 Tlateloco Treaty, prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America, there is no other treaty limiting arms procurement in the region. Second, although the charter of the Organization of American States can function both as a collective security system against an aggressor within the region and as an alliance against a state outside the region, punitive action has never been undertaken against a South American state, even when it has been blatantly the aggressor, as in the cases of Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru. Of the three techniques outlined above, only adjudicated peaceful settlement of interstate disputes seems to have a more positive and direct impact on the evolution of intraregional peace in South America. Over the years, many territorial claims have been settled through legal means in this area. This method, however, does not appear to be overwhelmingly successful, nor does it seem to have a greater rate of success in South America than in other regions of the world.67 In sum, while it is evident that international organizations have had some positive impact on the evolution of peace in South America, it would be exaggerated, even preposterous, to argue that peace in this region is solely the result of international organization mediation in interstate affairs. Testable Liberal Hypotheses Hypothesis No. 1 The first liberal proposition posits that democratic states will deal with each other peacefully, while autocratic governments are the root cause of interstate conflict


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and war. Therefore, if a region is populated simultaneously by a large number of democracies, then an enduring interstate peace is more likely to evolve. On the other hand, if a region is cohabited by at least one dictatorial regime and democracies, then interstate peace is difficult to be preserved on a long-term basis. Hypothesis No. 2 A second liberal proposition posits that international commerce and economic interdependence foster mutual links and interests that make war difficult and costly. Hence, nations that trade with each other and are economically interdependent will have lesser incentives to fight wars and, consequently, will be at peace on a permanent basis. Hypothesis No. 3 Neoliberal institutionalism advances the notion that international organizations mediate international disputes and modify interstate relations in a positive way. Through the implementation of different techniques and approaches like collective security, arms control agreements, and peaceful settlements, international organizations directly influence the outbreak and evolution of international peace. Hence, if a region has been historically under the direct influence of international organizations that dispense these peace-making and peace-keeping mechanisms, then the outbreak and evolution of an enduring interstate peace is possible. Method of Analysis First, in order to test the democratic peace hypothesis, a working definition of democratic and autocratic political regimes will be used in order to operationalize its causal variable. Based on this definition, there exists already in the literature a classification of political regimes in South America. This study will extend the scope of the historical data and will classify political regimes in South America from 1935 to the inception in 1950 of the existent classification in the literature. Subsequently, it will be examined whether the presence of democratic regimes correlates with the period of interstate peace in South America. Second, the liberal economic hypothesis, linking volume of trade and peace, will be measured and statistical values will demonstrate whether significantly high volumes of interstate trade and economic interdependence may have caused the peace in South America. Third, in order to test the institutionalist hypothesis, this work will ascertain the war-prevention success or failure of formal international organizations as it pertains to the promotion of judicial settlements and arms control agreements, and to the application of collective security measures against actual or potential aggressors. Close attention will be paid to the most important intraregional interstate disputes in South America from 1935 to 1998.


CHAPTER 6

DEMOCRACY, TRADE, DIPLOMACY, AND PEACE: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

his chapter empirically evaluates the explanatory value of the three alternative liberal explanations that link democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations with the prevalence of peace in South America. The goal is to determine if one or a combination of these alternative propositions constitutes a sufficient condition for the absence of major intraregional interstate war in the region. For this purpose three different types of data will be presented and analyzed subsequently. First, the causal nexus between democracy and interstate peace requires the examination of evidence pertaining to regime classification in South America from 1935 to 2005. In the course of this analysis an attempt is made to establish if, indeed, there is a consistent causal correlation between a particular regime type and intraregional interstate outcomes. Second, the causal relation between trade, economic interdependence, and peace demands the analysis of the volume and geographic distribution of trade data of individual South American states. The purpose of this exegesis is to establish in relative terms if large volumes of intraregional bilateral commerce prevented the outbreak of a major intraregional war and affected the evolution and permanence of peace. Finally, the study examines qualitative historical data regarding the role of international institutions in intraregional interstate disputes. This section establishes if the Organization of American States and/or the United Nations have been instrumental in maintaining peace and stability in the region since the Chaco War. Similar in method to the type of empirical analyses conducted in chapters 3 and 4, the data in the present chapter will not follow a strict chronological pattern, nor will they be treated as a series of separate cases.

T

Democracy and Interstate Peace Based on both normative reasoning and empirical observations, many students of world politics posit as axiomatic the causal link between democracy and interstate

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peace. Thus, three inferences derive from this proposition. First, democracies are less war-prone than autocracies. Second, democracies rarely, if ever, fight each other. And, proceeding from these two, a third inference posits that the diffusion of democracies causes and expands the democratic peace among nation-states. Underpinning these assumptions is the belief that the war-proneness of dictatorial regimes is the principal cause of international violence. Hence, it is evidently paradoxical to find a seven-decade period of intraregional interstate peace in South America that coincides with the overwhelming presence and permanence of many dictatorships within the same region. To determine whether peace in South America has been caused by functioning democracies in the region, it is important, first, to establish certain criteria by which one will be able to classify the type of political regime (i.e., the independent variable) in different countries throughout the duration of the period in question. Once the regime classification is completed, it will be possible to ascertain whether the lack of variation in the dependent variable (i.e., intraregional interstate peace or the absence of war) has been caused by a consistent type of political regime. If no clear covariation is found, then the focus will be shifted to those dyads in which there has been at least one militarized interstate crisis. The aim will be to gauge whether democracies or autocracies have been more prone to crisis initiation and involvement. In following this testing strategy this work will be exposing the independent variable to more difficult cases where, in fact, there has been a militarized interstate dispute. Democracy and Dictatorship: Operationalization The first step to operationalize the independent variable is to define it. For that purpose, this work relies on the minimalist criteria of democracy and dictatorship advanced by Adam Przeworski et al. in Democracy and Development.1 They focus on “contestation” as the fundamental criterion to distinguish democracy from dictatorship. They differentiate between “regimes that allow some, even if limited, regularized competition among conflicting visions and interests and regimes in which some values and interests enjoy monopoly buttressed by the threat or the actual use of force.”2 Thus, they define democracy as a “regime in which government offices are filled by contested elections.”3 Admittedly, they treat dictatorship as a “residual category” better denominated as “not democracy,” because their chief purpose is “to establish rules that will disqualify a particular regime as democratic.”4 Nevertheless, they claim that a dictatorship (autocracy or authoritarian regime as they use these terms interchangeably with dictatorship) is a regime that contains at least one of the following conditions:5 1. 2. 3. 4.

The chief executive is not elected. The legislature is not elected. There is no more than one party. There has not being “alternation” in government for more than two terms.

Since Przeworski’s dictum that “democracy is a system in which [incumbent] parties lose elections”6 is fundamental for the definition, they specify three features

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defining contestation: (1) ex ante uncertainty means that there is some probability that an incumbent can lose in an election; (2) ex post irreversibility implies that the outcomes of elections are irreversible even if the opposition wins; and (3) repeatability signifies that elections must be expected to be repeated.7 Furthermore, Przeworski et al. maintain that in no regime all governmental offices (e.g., military generals and some judges) are filled by elections, hence, they insist as essential to their definition of democracy that, at a minimum, the chief executive office and the seats in the effective legislative body of a country get filled as the result of either a direct or indirect contested electoral process. In short, any political system that meets these criteria is classified as a democracy; those that do not are considered dictatorships. Finally, in their classification of all political regimes in the world from 1950 to 1990, they have a timing rule. That is, they code the regime type that “prevailed at the end of the year, even if it came to power on December 31.”8 While Przeworski et al. subclassify democracies into three other categories: presidential, parliamentary, and mixed, and dictatorships into bureaucratic and autocratic.9 This work will circumvent this level of specificity in its analysis. Instead, it will utilize their basic dichotomous and minimalist classification of democracy and dictatorship. Accordingly, the present study will narrow down to these two generic types their classification of political regimes from 1950 to 1990 that appears in Appendix 1.2 in their study.10 Also, utilizing Przeworski’s criteria, this work will expand the classification for South American states from 1935 to 1950 and from 1990 to 2005. This expansion of the data is combined with their regime classification and presented together in tables 6.1 and 6.2 below. Analysis of the Data Despite several militarized interstate disputes and border skirmishes, South America has been spared from the calamities of a major intraregional war. In other words, seventy years of intraregional interstate peace represents invariably a single form of international outcome. Such historical fact presents an interesting and important challenge to the democratic peace experts. Based on the classification of political regimes in South America from 1935 to 2005, presented in tables 6.1 and 6.2, South American countries have been ruled alternatively by democratic and autocratic regimes. Excluding Guyana up until 1999 and Surinam from 1990 to 1991, at no other time during the duration of the long period of peace have all South American states been democracies. On the contrary, for large blocks of time since 1935, the majority of South American nation-states have been dictatorships. This evidence leads to the conclusion that, at least in South America, changes in regime type (i.e., in the independent variable of the democratic peace hypothesis) have not had any direct effect on the peace and stability of the region. Moreover, the data demonstrate that the coexistence of dictatorships and democracies in South America has not produced the violent and deleterious effect postulated by the causal argument linking democracy and peace. To sum up, it appears that democracy is not the cause of the South American peace.

120 Table 6.1 Classification of Political Regimes in South America, 1935–2005 Country

Regime Type

Entry Year

Exit Year

Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina Argentina Bolivia Bolivia Bolivia Bolivia Brazil Brazil Brazil Brazil Chile Chile Chile Colombia Colombia Colombia Ecuador Ecuador Ecuador Ecuador Ecuador

Dictatorship Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Democracy Dictatorship Democracy

1935 1946 1955 1958 1962 1963 1966 1973 1976 1983 1935 1979 1980 1982 1935 1945 1964 1979 1935 1973 1990 1935 1948 1958 1935 1938 1948 1963 1979

1945 1954 1957 1961 1962 1965 1972 1975 1982 2005 1978 1979 1981 2005 1944 1963 1978 2005 1972 1989 2005 1947 1957 2005 1937 1947 1962 1978 2005

Note: Since the classification for most of the countries in South America in the Przeworski et al. database comprises only the years 1950–1990, the table was extended from 1935 to 1950 and from 1990 to 2005. The extension of the data in this work followed the strict criteria of Przeworski et al. for the regime classification database. Also the extension is based on the political chronology of South America, 1930–1950 presented in appendix B at the following URL: http://www.fiu.edu/ ~intlrel/inrfaculty/felix_book/Appendixes.htm Source: Adam Przeworski et al. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2000, Appendix 1.2, “Classification of Political Regimes, 1950–1990,” pp. 59–69.

121 Table 6.2 Classification of Political Regimes in South America, 1935–2005 Country

Regime Type

Entry Year

Exit Year

Guyana Guyana Paraguay Paraguay Paraguay Peru Peru Peru Peru Peru Peru Peru Peru Peru Peru Peru Surinam Surinam Surinam Surinam Surinam Uruguay Uruguay Uruguay Uruguay Venezuela Venezuela Venezuela Venezuela

Dictatorship Democracy Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Dictatorship Democracy Dictatorship Democracy

1966 2000 1935 1936 1993 1935 1936 1939 1948 1956 1962 1963 1968 1980 1990 1995 1975 1980 1988 1990 1991 1935 1938 1973 1985 1935 1946 1948 1959

1999 2005 1935 1992 2005 1935 1938 1947 1955 1961 1962 1967 1979 1989 1994 2005 1979 1987 1989 1991 2005 1937 1972 1984 2005 1945 1947 1958 2005

Note: Since the classification for most of the countries in South America in the Przeworski et al. database comprises only the years 1950–1990, the table was extended from 1935 to 1950 and from 1990 to 2005. The extension of the data in this work followed the strict criteria of Przeworski et al. for the regime classification database. Also the extension is based on the political chronology of South America, 1930–1950 presented in appendix B at the following URL: http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/felix_book/ Appendixes.htm Source: Adam Przeworski et al. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2000, Appendix 1.2, “Classification of Political Regimes, 1950–1990,” pp. 59–69.

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The second part of this analysis relaxes the democratic peace hypothesis. Rather than attempting to explain the entire period, the scope of the test is narrowed down and only the potential, preventive effect of democratic governments might have had on instances of dyadic militarized crisis in South America is examined subsequently. Even under this less demanding test no noticeable correlation between dictatorships and a greater incidence of militarized crises is found. In fact, the three Ecuadorian-Peruvian militarized crises in 1941, 1981, and 1995 respectively occurred at periods when both countries were governed by democracies. This is also the case during the 1987 Caldas incident in the Gulf of Venezuela between Colombia and Venezuela. Only the Beagle Channel crisis in late 1978 occurred during a period when both Argentina and Chile were ruled by military dictatorships. Finally, the long-running dispute over the Essequibo territory became more acute in 1982 while Venezuela was a democracy and Guyana a dictatorship. The incidence of militarized interstate disputes at times when either both countries have been governed by democracies or dictatorships points clearly to the absence of a consistent causal nexus between democracy and peace, or between dictatorship and interstate violence in South America. Further, that the four most serious militarized interstate disputes occurred when both governments were formal democracies, according to the criteria established earlier, reveals democracy’s lack of dampening effect on violence in South America. The absence of a consistent causal pattern between democracy and intraregional interstate peace in South America generates two basic questions regarding the democratic peace theory. First, it is empirically important to address why this “lawlike” thesis, causally linking democratic governments and interstate peace, does not seem to apply to South America during the period 1935–2005 as well as it seems to apply elsewhere in the world. Moreover, from a theoretical perspective, it is crucial to examine if and how the South American peace represents either a total or partial refutation of the more general and normative foundation of the democratic peace theory. To consider the applicability of the democratic peace proposition to different parts of the world compels us to think comparatively about these regions. Accordingly, we must begin by establishing the fact that to a great extent this is an inductive argument whose empirical foundation and origin stems primarily from the post–World War II experience of the intercontinental North Atlantic community of states. This grouping comprises Canada, the United States, and Western Europe, including Greece, Portugal, and Spain in their respective post-authoritarian periods since the 1970s. Although to a lesser extent, part of the empirical referent of this argument also includes the peaceful relations among Japan, Western Europe, Canada, and the United States since 1946. In sum, what it is currently recognized in the literature as the “democratic peace” is primarily the pacific, post-1946 relations among a group of states in Western Europe, North America, and Japan. Similar to the peace in South America, the inception of the democratic peace came in the aftermath of a major war. But here the similarities stop and the differences between the two cases begin. In the aftermath of the 1935 Chaco War, there was no extra-regional effort to reorganize the economic and political systems in these societies, nor was there any concerted effort to mitigate the socioeconomic


123

hardships in this region. While it is plausible to argue that in 1935 the United States and Great Britain faced formidable threats and increasing international competition from imperial Japan, the fascist states in Europe, and the ascent of the Soviet Union, they chose to do almost nothing to help the South American nation-states to strengthen their economic and political institutions. Anglo-American assistance in these realms could have prevented their international rivals, particularly Nazi Germany, from exploiting potential involvement opportunities and gaining a position of influence in the region. In this sense, given the insufficient level of Anglo-American guidance and support, the long period of peace began and evolved spontaneously amidst a mixture of regional democratic and dictatorial regimes, and in the shadow of an ominous world clash among fascist, communist, and liberal powers. Moreover, the South American peace has endured the threat of major national political violence, illegitimate governments, ill-equipped political and socioeconomic institutions, and militarized interstate disputes in several occasions throughout its duration. The democratic peace among Japan, Western Europe, and North America in the post–World War II period is radically different from the South American case in terms of their inception, evolution, and endurance. Granted, World War II was far worse and more important to the very existence and survival of mankind than the Chaco War. Yet, since the inception of the democratic peace, there was a design to follow and the leadership, resources, and activism of the United States available to contribute in every stage of its development and ultimately achieve its realization. In light of intense international competition and a mounting threat from the Soviet Union, the United States pursued as a top priority the reconstruction of the political and socioeconomic institutions in Western Europe and Japan. It helped the defeated states to build democratic institutions and set up liberal market economies. Throughout the years, it has taken a direct and leading role in solving intraregional disputes and in securing the stability and independence of these states. It has even encouraged the economic and political unification of Europe as an added measure to guarantee the permanence of the democratic peace. If one were pressed to identify an instance of an actual “hegemonic peace” in the world, the North Atlantic democratic peace would be closer to that ideal type than the peace in South America. It is clear from these normative and empirical reflections that “democratic peace” is not only the absence of conflict and war, but it is the realization that war must be unthinkable among states whose sociopolitical institutions are built on similar democratic principles and norms.11 In this sense, the long period of peace in South America is neither a case of democratic peace, nor is it a case of an autocratic and militaristic interstate violence. The analysis of the South American peace conducted in this section not only demonstrates how the democratic peace argument does not explain the South American case as well as it does elsewhere but, more importantly, represents its partial refutal. The findings discussed above contradict some of the basic normative and theoretical precepts sustaining the democratic peace theory. First, while one of its fundamental assumptions maintains that republican governments or pluralistic liberal democracies are more pacific than autocratic governments, the South American case reveals that democratic governments have been engaged among

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themselves in more militarized interstate disputes than have dictatorial regimes. This empirical finding casts a serious doubt on the theorized moral restraint that democratic states are bound to exercise regarding the use of military force as an instrument to settle international disputes and crises. Based on fundamental normative principles such as a professed respect for individual liberties and the legal equality of individual’s and state’s rights in liberal democratic societies, another aspect of the democratic peace argument advances the notion that governments sharing this code of conduct will carry their relations in a progressively peaceful manner. Moreover, this line of reasoning predicts that relations between liberal and non-liberal states will not only be problematic, but that long-lasting peace between these two types of political regimes will be difficult, if not impossible. Evidently, our analysis demonstrates that in South America, relations between democratic and autocratic governments have been progressively peaceful. The success and endurance of this intraregional interstate peace has permitted the political transformation of these regimes to a point that in 2005 all the states in the region were governed by democratically elected administrations. The evidence of the long period of peace not only refutes the theoretical predictions of the democratic peace argument but, more importantly, demonstrates that other causal factors may be more fundamental in preventing the outbreak of war among potentially hostile neighbors. Trade, Economic Interdependence, and Interstate Peace Liberal economic theory establishes that countries derive mutually advantageous gains from trade. Moreover, the theory posits that these gains are expected to be positively related to the volume of trade. Based on these presumptions, many experts on interstate relations have maintained that exponentially increasing levels of interstate commerce and economic interdependence lead unavoidably to greater degrees of national prosperity, regional stability, and interstate peace. Although the causal direction between trade and interstate peace is the subject of much debate in the literature, because it is not entirely clear whether it is peace that promotes trade or vice versa; this work analyzes only the probable, independent causal effect of interstate trade and economic interdependence on the absence of interstate wars in South America. This liberal tenet, also much in accord with neoclassical economic theory, postulates that interstate commerce and economic interdependence harmonizes the national interests of territorial states and, ultimately, causes interstate peace. Operationalization of Trade and Economic Interdependence Prior to the outbreak of most militarized crises and wars between pairs of countries in the world, there has been always some level, however small, of commerce and economic interdependence. It is clear, therefore, that not all volumes of trade have a mitigating effect on the prevention of interstate armed conflict. It is also evident that the opportunity cost of losing some trade does not solely deter states from engaging in militarized interstate conflicts.


125

As the potential for a major intraregional interstate war has not materialized in South America in the last seventy years, it is important to determine whether there exists a pattern in which particularly significant levels of intraregional bilateral trade and economic interdependence may have fostered intraregional interstate cooperation and peace. Consistent with the logic of the liberal hypothesis expounded above, one should expect to find that seven decades of intraregional interstate peace in South America must have been predicated on significant levels of intraregional bilateral trade. For that purpose, it will be useful to measure and classify the volume of trade to ascertain whether there is a positive correlation between significantly high levels of trade and the absence of wars in South America. In order to eliminate from the data low or insignificant levels of intraregional bilateral trade, the focus will be only on those countries that figure as important trading partners. Since in the economics literature there is no commonly accepted criterion, benchmark, or particular percentage level of trade, which can be utilized to classify other than the top three main trading partners of a country, it is necessary to establish a criterion to sort out other important trading partners. By definition in this study a significant trading partner is any state whose volume of bilateral trade with an individual South American country exceeds at least one-third of the total share of each year’s top partner in the group comprising the principal world and adjacent intraregional trading partners for that particular nation-state. Furthermore, this work defines the degree of economic interdependence between two countries according to the level of economic activity between them. The Data: A Caveat on the Compilation of Trade Statistics Prior to an analysis of the data, several points on its collection and presentation need clarification. First, the data utilized for the analysis here are derived entirely from the United Nations Yearbook of International Trade Statistics. (The actual monetary figures are presented in appendix C in this book at the following URL: http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/felix_book/Appendixes.htm) Second, the data reflects only the bilateral trade of South American nation-states with their main world trading partners in order to facilitate comparison and provide some comparative meaning to the amount of commerce between intraregional contiguous countries in South America. Third, the data are originally reported in separate figures for exports and imports. Since this work is interested only in the total volume of bilateral trade, the amounts of imports and exports with each country have been added and the total reported as the volume of bilateral trade in appendix C and in tables 6.3 to 6.12 in the text. Fourth, even when the data is reported in the same type of currency, there are some discrepancies in some figures for the same two countries that are reported under their respective country data tables. In such cases the figures have been left as originally reported under each individual country. Fifth, the percentage of bilateral trade, presented in tables 6.3 to 6.12, was computed by dividing the amount of trade between two countries by the total of each country’s world trade per year. Finally, when figures for exports and imports were not reported, the symbol n/a has been inserted to denote unavailability of data. In cases with zero trade, that is exactly what the original source reports.

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Having operationalized the independent variable and clarified the collection and presentation of the data, one is now in position to turn to a discussion and analysis of the data and its relation to the prevalence of peace. Analysis of the Causal Link between Trade and Peace Based on the information disclosed in tables 6.3 through 6.12 in the text, the most important general pattern revealed by the data is that the volume of intraregional bilateral trade among pairs of South American nation-states tends to be below the threshold distinguishing a significant from and an insignificant trading partner. This general pattern is represented graphically in each of the charts corresponding to each table. As shown in figures 6.1 to 6.10, the curve in solid bold represents the highest percentage for each year’s top trading partner, and the dotted bold curve denotes one-third of the highest percentage benchmark for each year’s top trading partner of each South American country in question. Trade between rival countries that have avoided war remained low consistently throughout the period of peace in South America. First, as tables 6.3 and 6.4 disclose, commerce between Bolivia and Paraguay, the most virulent rivals in the twentieth century, never climbed above 0.43 percent for any of the years for which data was available. This is graphically represented in figures 6.1 and 6.2. Second, as for Bolivia’s trade with Chile, this reached only significant proportions in 1990 when it rose to 7.52 percent of Bolivia’s total trade. By the same token, as table 6.5 discloses, the Bolivian share of Chile’s total commerce was never more than a meager 2.87 percent as was the case in 1985, an amount considerably lower than the one-third-of-the-highest-percentage-for-each-year’s-top-trading-partner classificatory threshold shown in figure 6.3 (hereafter referred only as the one-third classificatory threshold). Third, Chile’s trade with Peru reached a high of 6.43 percent in 1948 (see table 6.5 below), still considerably below the one-third classificatory threshold depicted in figure 6.3. It oscillated thereafter between a high of 3.78 percent in 1955 and a low of 2.50 percent in 2001. The same pattern occurred for the Chilean share of Peru’s total trade. Table 6.6 reveals that Chile’s commerce with Peru represented 10.94 percent of Peru’s total trade in 1948, just a bit lower than the 13.21 percent share defining the one-third classificatory threshold for this particular year shown in figure 6.4. Subsequently, Chile’s trade with Peru fluctuated between a high of 6.99 percent in 1955 to a low of 1.07 percent in 1970. In 2001 it increased to 5.02 percent. Thus, it never approached remotely the one-third classificatory threshold. Fourth, trade between Colombia and Venezuela remained consistently well below the one-third classificatory threshold since 1938 as depicted in figures 6.5 and 6.6. It is important to note in table 6.7 that from 1938 to 1970, the Venezuelan share of Colombia’s total trade was an insignificant average share of 0.44 percent. This average share jumped dramatically to 5.57 percent between 1975 and 1990. In 1995 and 2001, trade increased to 9.60 percent and 10.07 percent respectively. Still, this substantial increase did not approach the average share of 10.21 percent representing the one-third classificatory threshold for the same years.12 Such a

Table 6.3 Bolivia’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) Trading Partners

1938

1948

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1984

1990

1995

2001

United States United Kingdom Germany France Spain Italy Japan Argentina Brazil Chile Paraguay Peru Uruguay Total Percentage

13.61 37.37 7.99 0.65 0.00 0.43 3.02 6.26 1.08 1.94 N/A 5.40 0.22 77.97

57.49 24.17 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.33 0.06 6.99 1.21 2.26 N/A 3.91 0.22 96.82

49.89 21.42 4.86 0.82 0.05 0.22 0.11 4.59 1.04 0.71 N/A 3.01 0.49 87.21

33.45 29.15 8.90 0.57 0.07 1.58 4.81 5.89 3.30 2.08 0.43 1.94 0.14 92.31

43.17 24.76 8.05 0.64 0.19 0.79 7.64 3.09 1.28 0.90 0.00 0.72 0.04 91.27

31.97 24.50 6.64 0.62 1.50 0.65 12.30 6.98 1.01 1.11 0.03 2.12 0.05 89.48

28.06 6.50 5.64 1.21 0.00 1.16 9.89 19.43 9.13 1.51 0.08 1.49 0.43 84.53

27.72 6.65 5.99 3.12 0.53 0.59 4.12 18.65 6.61 3.96 0.04 3.07 0.09 81.14

19.08 4.18 4.62 1.14 0.38 0.31 3.02 37.75 7.89 1.74 0.11 2.28 0.14 82.64

20.93 7.63 5.52 1.63 0.71 1.81 4.48 19.18 12.12 7.52 0.39 4.66 0.28 86.86

24.40 9.56 4.13 1.34 2.28 1.28 6.92 12.73 9.07 5.45 0.34 0.72 0.22 78.44

15.39 2.79 1.39 0.92 1.07 1.38 1.96 11.66 18.83 5.74 0.90 5.72 0.43 68.17

Source: United Nations. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix C at the following URL: http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/felix_book/Appendixes.htm

127

128

Table 6.4 Paraguay’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) Trading Partners

1938

1948

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1984

1990

1995

2001

United States United Kingdom Germany France Spain Italy Japan Argentina Bolivia Brazil Total Percentage

10.42 11.11 11.81 1.39 0.00 0.69 7.64 29.86 N/A 0.69 73.61

13.17 9.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.21 N/A 2.67 58.78

16.22 8.27 4.68 3.12 1.40 0.94 0.00 44.62 N/A 0.16 79.41

25.08 8.59 8.25 1.01 4.88 1.01 3.54 25.42 0.17 0.67 78.62

23.80 8.60 10.23 2.29 3.63 1.91 3.15 23.42 0.10 1.53 78.66

18.86 8.05 10.58 3.79 2.92 1.42 4.18 24.55 0.08 2.29 76.72

10.45 9.54 10.12 2.90 1.63 0.80 3.45 22.91 0.14 11.83 73.77

8.27 3.70 8.69 2.05 1.25 1.29 6.44 21.83 0.07 21.84 75.43

7.41 2.61 6.22 4.14 1.63 1.04 8.85 15.09 0.01 25.57 72.57

9.18 2.34 4.73 2.09 0.89 2.23 9.15 9.88 0.27 23.17 63.93

12.05 2.86 2.67 1.46 0.61 1.59 8.49 12.73 0.22 24.23 66.91

4.99 1.24 2.12 0.88 1.06 2.20 3.41 18.51 0.86 27.76 63.03


129 70.00% 60.00% 50.00% 40.00% 30.00% 20.00% 10.00% 0.00% 1938

1948

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1984

1990

1995

2001

Highest Percentage for Each Year's Top Trading Partner

One Third of the Highest Percentage for Each Year’s Top Trading Partner

Chile

Paraguay

Figure 6.1 Bolivia’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) Source: United Nations. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix C at the following URL: http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/ felix_book/ Appendixes.htm 50.00% 45.00% 40.00% 35.00% 30.00% 25.00% 20.00% 15.00% 10.00% 5.00% 0.00% 1938

1948

1955

1960

1965

1970


1975

1980

1984

1990

1995

2001

One Third of the Highest Percentage for Each Year's Top Trading Partner

Bolivia

Figure 6.2 Paraguay’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) Source: United Nations. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix C at the following URL: http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/felix_book/ Appendixes.htm

130

Table 6.5 Chile’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) Trading Partners

1938

1948

United States United Kingdom Germany France Spain Italy Japan Argentina Bolivia Peru Total Percentage

20.85 16.86 16.68 3.44 0.18 3.47 1.95 2.69 0.32 2.88 69.32

48.11 7.28 0.43 4.91 0.97 3.11 0.04 6.61 0.45 6.43 78.34

1955 42.67 11.82 10.65 1.45 1.67 3.96 0.34 9.92 0.17 3.78 86.43

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2001

42.55 12.33 13.54 2.71 0.67 2.58 2.09 5.81 0.20 2.58 85.06

34.86 8.96 11.94 2.59 1.16 2.93 6.45 6.01 0.12 2.21 77.23

24.11 9.81 11.57 4.64 2.36 5.41 8.20 7.94 0.11 2.27 76.42

20.72 6.43 10.35 3.12 3.06 3.00 8.22 13.86 1.17 1.44 71.37

20.38 3.91 8.52 3.69 2.61 3.73 10.43 4.93 0.77 1.30 60.27

22.46 5.29 8.95 3.40 2.78 3.82 8.97 2.91 2.87 1.33 62.78

17.72 4.40 9.30 4.50 2.82 3.92 12.65 4.02 0.62 0.81 60.76

19.94 3.55 5.40 3.61 2.66 3.40 12.37 5.96 0.89 1.42 59.20

18.52 4.12 3.53 3.42 2.35 3.63 8.20 10.59 0.47 2.50 57.33



131

60.00%

50.00%

40.00%

30.00%

20.00%

10.00%

0.00% 1938

1948

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2001



Argentina

Peru

Bolivia

Figure 6.3 Chile’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) Source: United Nations. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix C at the following URL: http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/ felix_book/Appendixes.htm

trend contrasts sharply with the Colombian share of Venezuela’s total trade presented in table 6.8. Although it remained high by its own historical standards in 1938, 1948, and 1955, the Colombian share of Venezuela’s total trade plummeted by 1960 to a low of 0.09 percent and did not recover again until 1995 when it rose to 5.25 percent. Similarly, as table 6.8 also discloses, trade between Venezuela and Guyana has never been above an insignificant 0.11 percent share of Venezuela’s total trade. Finally, following the trade pattern of other South American dyads, bilateral trade between Ecuador and Peru did not even remotely approximate the one-third classificatory threshold shown in figures 6.7 and 6.4. As one can observe in table 6.9, the Peruvian share of Ecuador’s total trade oscillated between a high of 4.46 percent in 1938 to a low of 0.64 percent in 1965. This represents an average share of 2.29 percent throughout the duration of the long period of peace. This is an average share quite short of the one-third classificatory threshold. The Ecuadorian share of Peru’s total trade is even smaller. As table 6.6 indicates, from 1938 to 2001, the Ecuadorian share of Peru’s total trade has been as low as 0.42 percent in 1984 and as high as 2.77 percent in 1990 and 3.31 percent in 2001. This is an average share of 1.39 percent in 63 years of Ecuadorian-Peruvian economic relations.

132 Table 6.6 Peru’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) Trading Partners

1938

1948

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1984

1990

1995

2001

United States United Kingdom Germany France Spain Italy Japan Bolivia Brazil Chile Ecuador Total Percentage

30.03 15.72 14.76 4.78 N/A 1.25 1.78 0.71 1.15 4.30 0.78 75.26

39.63 11.45 0.19 1.02 N/A 1.29 0.95 1.89 0.48 10.94 1.17 69.01

43.42 9.48 7.95 2.62 N/A 1.32 2.68 1.12 0.12 6.99 0.72 76.42

39.77 7.38 10.70 2.04 0.18 2.05 4.85 0.39 0.33 2.46 0.57 70.72

40.82 3.75 12.17 1.93 1.21 3.18 8.57 0.10 0.65 1.48 0.43 74.29

32.69 3.19 13.96 1.85 1.95 2.59 11.45 0.16 0.80 1.07 0.52 70.23

30.83 4.00 9.34 2.45 1.18 2.78 9.02 0.39 2.26 2.84 2.12 67.21

34.33 3.65 6.79 1.48 1.21 3.60 9.50 1.81 3.45 1.84 1.65 69.31

39.90 3.11 4.89 1.94 2.02 2.11 9.24 0.67 3.42 2.13 0.42 69.85

24.79 2.95 6.40 1.04 1.08 3.29 6.59 0.96 4.55 2.48 2.77 56.90

25.88 2.58 4.90 1.68 1.37 3.11 8.22 1.44 5.12 3.03 2.25 59.58

23.94 7.17 3.05 1.45 2.67 1.93 5.74 1.05 3.92 5.02 3.31 59.25



133

50.00% 45.00% 40.00% 35.00% 30.00% 25.00% 20.00% 15.00% 10.00% 5.00% 0.00% 1938

1948

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1984

1990

1995

2001



Chile

Ecuador

Figure 6.4 Peru’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) Source: United Nations. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix C at the following URL: http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/ felix_ book/Appendixes.htm

Three exceptions break the general pattern of low volumes of intraregional bilateral trade in South America. First, as tables 6.10 and 6.11 indicate the trend toward greater commerce and economic cooperation between Argentina and Brazil has been increasing consistently and continuously since 1948 up until 2001. It is curious to note, however, that while Brazil’s share of trade is very important for Argentina (see figure 6.8), the percentage of Argentina’s commerce with Brazil appears to be insignificant for the latter (see figure 6.9). In our judgment, this is only a “statistical mirage” caused by the fact that Brazil’s trade is overwhelmingly concentrated with the United States, while Argentina’s commerce is more evenly distributed among several major trading partners. Consequently, in the case of Brazil, states ranking as second, third, or fourth among its main trading partners do not classify as “significant trading partners,” because the one-third classificatory threshold, as shown in figure 6.9, is set too high by a skewed concentration of trade between the United States and Brazil. Second, as tables 6.10 and 6.5 reveal commerce between Argentina and Chile is significant for both countries in 1975 and 2001 only. This is an interesting

134 80.00% 70.00% 60.00% 50.00% 40.00% 30.00% 20.00% 10.00% 0.00% 1938

1948

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2001



Peru

Venezuela

Figure 6.5 Colombia’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) Source: United Nations. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix C at the following URL: http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/felix_book/ Appendixes.htm

60.00%

50.00%

40.00%

30.00%

20.00%

10.00%

0.00% 1938

1948

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1983

1990

1995

2001



Brazil

Guyana

Colombia

Figure 6.6 Venezuela’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) Source: United Nations. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix C at the following URL: http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/felix_book/ Appendixes.htm

Table 6.7 Colombia’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) Trading Partners

1938

1948

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2001

United States United Kingdom Germany France Spain Italy Japan Brazil Ecuador Peru Venezuela Total Percentage

51.96 6.72 16.00 3.98 0.03 1.25 0.13 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.46 80.69

75.95 3.26 0.09 1.00 0.05 0.85 0.00 0.82 0.60 1.58 0.41 84.61

67.93 2.68 8.65 1.87 0.72 0.84 0.70 0.04 0.59 0.30 0.26 84.58

60.41 5.17 10.98 1.85 0.39 1.15 1.83 N/A 0.27 0.44 0.32 82.81

46.74 4.41 11.53 1.04 3.62 1.45 1.96 1.54 1.05 1.00 0.35 74.69

41.90 3.24 11.24 1.57 5.24 1.76 5.07 0.43 1.75 2.45 0.88 75.53

6.18 3.31 12.03 3.48 3.15 2.63 5.59 1.07 1.94 1.74 3.68 44.80

33.79 1.79 12.49 2.59 3.42 2.14 6.76 1.58 1.80 1.47 5.53 73.36

34.13 2.67 10.94 2.75 2.68 2.17 7.53 1.76 1.79 1.83 4.78 73.03

40.35 2.71 8.48 2.77 1.92 1.56 6.11 1.75 0.97 1.54 4.25 72.41

36.38 1.86 6.59 2.04 2.00 2.24 7.71 2.99 2.37 1.74 9.60 75.52

38.96 1.86 3.89 1.95 1.54 2.38 2.88 2.98 4.05 1.10 10.07 71.66


135

136

Table 6.8 Venezuela’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) Trading Partners

1938

1948

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1983

1990

1995

2001

United States United Kingdom Germany France Spain Italy Japan Brazil Colombia Guyana Total Percentage

24.45 4.24 5.48 1.71 0.23 0.78 0.51 0.05 4.48 N/A 41.93

49.66 3.29 0.16 1.64 0.34 0.93 0.02 0.82 6.50 N/A 63.36

44.68 5.14 3.33 1.54 0.62 1.29 0.60 2.61 11.36 N/A 71.17

46.21 7.09 3.35 1.85 0.80 2.32 1.07 2.39 0.09 N/A 65.17

39.52 6.92 3.67 2.20 1.28 2.03 2.24 2.06 0.10 N/A 60.02

39.96 4.94 4.20 2.07 1.37 2.56 3.21 1.40 0.33 0.01 60.05

43.02 3.77 4.11 1.61 1.55 3.00 3.35 1.48 0.72 0.03 62.64

34.75 1.68 2.97 2.16 3.23 5.06 5.17 3.00 1.53 0.11 59.66

36.71 1.88 4.26 2.23 1.68 5.43 3.63 4.28 1.87 0.08 62.05

50.28 1.49 5.33 1.60 1.16 2.08 3.08 2.48 2.13 0.05 69.68

52.01 1.38 3.68 1.47 1.07 2.27 4.13 2.95 5.25 0.06 74.27

47.56 1.29 1.90 1.26 2.10 1.75 2.13 3.95 5.18 0.07 67.19



137

60.00%

50.00%

40.00%

30.00%

20.00%

10.00%

0.00% 1938

1948

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1984

1990

1995

2001



Colombia

Peru

Figure 6.7 Ecuador’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) Source: United Nations. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix C at the following URL: http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/ felix_ book/Appendixes.htm

finding that correlates nicely with the economic and political isolation that these countries experienced in the mid-1970s and the renewed spirit of economic interdependence in the new millennium. During the 1970s, the military governments in Argentina and Chile appeared to have increased their economic, political, and military cooperation as a bilateral response to the mounting violent domestic opposition and their heightened international isolation. In the year 2001 trade appears to have increased as the result of improved economic relations between Chile and Mercosur, the trade bloc among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Finally, Uruguay’s trade with Argentina, as shown in table 6.12, is significant from 1970 to 2001, and with Brazil in 1955 and, then, again from 1970 to 2001. By the same token, Uruguay’s share of trade with both Argentina and Brazil, as revealed in tables 6.10 and 6.11, is negligible for the latter two countries. This is a finding that should not even surprise a casual observer of South American political history. As it is well known, Uruguay is a small country, created as a buffer state between these two South American giants, hence its external economic and political environment is made up mostly by its relations with Argentina and Brazil. Thus, as depicted in figure 6.10, Argentina and Brazil are significant trade partners of Uruguay.

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Table 6.9 Ecuador’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) Trading Partners

1938

1948

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1984

1990

1995

2001

United States United Kingdom Germany France Spain Italy Japan Colombia Peru Total Percentage

36.16 6.25 20.54 6.25 0.45 2.23 4.91 0.89 4.46 82.14

57.00 3.56 0.13 0.64 0.00 2.93 0.00 3.18 2.80 70.24

56.65 3.41 10.00 1.79 0.50 2.63 0.67 3.85 1.84 81.34

55.31 3.20 11.78 2.04 0.10 2.44 2.13 1.50 0.82 79.32

49.48 2.74 13.31 2.60 0.39 2.63 4.17 3.67 0.64 79.63

42.63 0.11 3.96 0.77 0.23 1.42 13.02 4.03 1.94 68.11

43.60 2.10 6.62 1.42 0.99 2.14 7.20 3.15 3.96 71.18

35.52 1.38 4.13 0.98 1.16 4.16 13.02 3.35 1.95 65.65

50.79 0.93 3.69 0.74 1.05 1.13 6.03 2.01 0.85 67.22

44.83 0.95 4.86 1.31 2.50 3.10 4.90 1.99 3.71 68.15

40.25 0.74 4.36 1.90 4.42 4.00 7.03 2.96 2.31 67.97

30.19 0.85 3.61 0.89 1.75 3.10 4.98 10.86 4.33 60.56


Table 6.10 Argentina’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938– 2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) Trading Partners

1938

1948

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2001

United States United Kingdom Germany France Spain Italy Japan Bolivia Brazil Chile Paraguay Uruguay Total Percentage

15.35 27.08 12.31 5.17 0.49 4.12 1.69 0.34 4.48 0.56 0.40 0.42 72.41

23.72 20.67 1.34 3.18 3.89 8.49 0.13 0.32 6.50 1.18 0.58 0.64 70.64

12.97 13.21 5.85 4.84 0.05 6.48 4.50 0.45 11.36 3.75 1.61 0.05 65.12

18.00 14.36 10.21 4.17 0.20 5.48 2.92 0.30 6.28 2.62 0.76 0.64 65.94

13.68 8.39 7.79 3.79 2.67 11.84 2.84 0.33 10.01 3.07 1.12 0.49 66.02

16.73 6.22 8.39 3.85 3.43 11.34 5.63 0.78 9.37 4.82 1.01 1.01 72.58

12.17 3.12 7.97 3.14 2.89 7.00 9.12 2.82 8.29 4.20 1.27 0.91 62.90

16.68 2.95 7.50 3.02 3.16 5.91 6.40 2.08 9.90 2.54 1.48 1.78 63.40

14.10 0.02 5.68 2.70 2.30 4.38 5.13 3.70 9.07 1.60 0.76 1.35 50.79

15.33 1.42 6.17 2.49 2.74 4.50 3.51 1.84 13.01 3.39 1.14 2.08 57.62

17.18 1.41 5.52 3.17 3.39 4.97 3.80 0.79 21.36 4.33 1.44 0.49 67.85

14.24 1.49 3.23 2.12 3.86 3.60 2.41 0.57 24.47 7.15 1.71 2.29 67.14


139

140

Table 6.11 Brazil’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) Trading Partners

1938

1948

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1983

1990

1995

2001

United States United Kingdom Germany France Spain Italy Japan Argentina Bolivia Colombia Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Total Percentage

29.22 9.58 22.05 4.79 0.08 1.96 2.94 8.21 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.06 0.02 79.91

47.48 9.76 0.58 2.46 1.43 2.27 0.04 8.32 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1.18 0.77 74.29

33.35 2.86 7.05 4.49 2.05 3.53 3.71 9.22 N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.27 3.42 71.95

36.87 4.24 8.27 4.09 1.31 2.82 2.52 5.54 0.17 N/A 0.01 0.11 0.63 4.24 70.82

31.41 3.43 8.83 3.33 1.16 4.11 2.48 10.14 0.07 0.14 0.10 0.90 0.72 3.17 69.99

28.55 5.16 10.65 3.56 2.50 4.33 5.78 6.61 0.14 0.16 0.23 0.32 0.76 1.20 69.95

21.21 3.14 9.71 2.80 2.16 4.42 8.67 2.86 0.44 0.14 0.66 0.63 0.70 1.01 58.55

18.02 2.29 6.81 3.42 1.64 3.09 5.38 4.29 0.50 0.30 1.13 0.58 1.14 1.84 50.43

19.85 2.51 4.87 3.57 1.56 3.12 5.30 2.66 0.33 N/A 0.69 0.35 0.62 2.55 47.98

22.72 2.61 6.69 2.86 1.75 4.36 7.35 4.01 0.34 0.37 1.33 0.53 1.65 1.23 57.80

21.86 2.56 6.37 2.31 1.40 3.49 5.99 9.74 0.65 0.66 1.86 0.90 1.83 1.20 60.82

23.99 2.88 6.48 3.08 1.95 3.32 4.13 6.69 0.38 0.58 0.86 0.00 0.83 1.34 56.51



141

30.00%

25.00%

20.00%

15.00%

10.00%

5.00%

0.00% 1938

1948

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2001

The Highest Percentage for Each Year’s Top Trading Partner


Brazil

Chile

Figure 6.8 Argentina’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) Source: United Nations. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix C at the following URL: http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/ felix_ book/Appendixes.htm 50.00% 45.00% 40.00% 35.00% 30.00% 25.00% 20.00% 15.00% 10.00% 5.00% 0.00% 1938

1948

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1983

1990

1995

2001



Argentina

Venezuela

Figure 6.9 Brazil’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) Source: United Nations. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix C at the following URL: http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/ felix_ book/Appendixes.htm

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Table 6.12 Uruguay’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) Trading Partners

1938

1948

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

United States United Kingdom Germany France Spain Italy Japan Argentina Brazil Total Percentage

7.42 23.59 20.44 5.14 0.23 4.32 3.04 7.36 5.43 76.97

31.28 15.22 1.18 3.02 0.24 4.84 0.24 5.44 7.78 69.24

14.65 12.11 6.03 5.15 0.24 6.48 1.39 0.32 15.75 62.12

22.84 13.33 7.95 4.14 0.86 3.06 0.30 3.28 4.19 59.95

15.40 13.32 9.89 4.98 4.57 6.00 0.70 3.48 5.53 63.87

10.73 7.64 12.04 2.28 2.47 6.18 1.09 7.47 10.20 60.10

9.00 4.78 9.73 2.12 1.90 3.85 1.90 8.06 13.62 54.96

8.99 3.93 9.16 1.62 0.97 3.42 2.85 11.67 17.61 60.22

11.75 3.39 7.40 1.69 1.12 2.41 2.15 9.57 17.25 56.73

9.66 3.63 7.17 3.01 1.20 4.00 2.12 9.68 26.88 67.35

9.08 2.51 4.67 2.55 1.80 7.22 3.52 18.07 24.75 74.17

2001 8.79 2.03 3.72 2.84 3.22 3.34 1.21 19.97 20.84 65.96



143

35.00%

30.00%

25.00%

20.00%

15.00%

10.00%

5.00%

0.00% 1938

1948

1955

1960

1965

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2001



Argentina

Brazil

Figure 6.10 Uruguay’s Bilateral Trade with Its Principal World and Adjacent Intraregional Trading Partners, 1938–2001 (Value as Percentage of Total Trade) Source: United Nations. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics (New York: Statistical Office of the United Nations). Appendix C at the following URL: http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/ felix_ book/Appendixes.htm

Trade and Interstate Peace: A Causal Nexus? An analysis of the commercial relations between the most conflict-prone dyads in South America in the last seventy years demonstrates that if these countries did not go to war during this period, it was not because the loss of high volumes of trade and economic interdependence would have represented an unbearable cost to their respective national economies. As it is now clear from the above discussion and the data in the tables following the text, trade was not significant in most cases and, therefore, should not be considered as a sufficient condition explaining the origin, evolution, and permanence of peace in South America. Except for the bilateral trade between Argentina and Brazil and between Argentina and Chile in the mid1970s only, trade volumes between the rest of all actual and potential conflictual dyads in the region is marginal. Even considering the high volume of Argentinean-Brazilian trade over the years as a possible sufficient condition for the absence of war in this bilateral rivalry the fact still remains that other dyads, spared from war, lack a significant volume of trade. In essence, even taking into account the variations in trade volumes among different dyads (i.e., the independent variable), intraregional peace has been a constant outcome in South America since the end of the Chaco War in 1935. In

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sum, the absence of a significant causal variable coupled with the lack of covariation lead to conclude that, at least in South America, interstate peace does not appear to be caused by high volumes of trade and economic interdependence among potential adversaries. International Institutions and Interstate Peace In this century, particularly since the end of World War II, there has been a tremendous increase in the number and size of formal international governmental institutions. The biggest growth has been in the security area, specifically regarding the dispensation of the peace-keeping and war-preventing functions. Encouraged and supported by this historical fact, many liberal scholars have found it reasonable to postulate that international organizations, through a variety of diplomatic techniques, have the capacity to prevent wars and directly influence the outbreak and evolution of interstate peace. It is this third variant of the liberal paradigm that this work now sets to test against the background of the period of peace in South America. Operationalization of Terms As discussed in the previous chapter, formal international governmental institutions possess a number of diplomatic techniques to carry out its war-preventing and peace-keeping functions in the international arena. Judicial settlement of disputes, arms control agreements, and collective security are only three of the most widely used international mechanisms relevant to our case in South America. Therefore, the degree of success or failure of international organizations in their war-preventing function in South America will be ascertained by assessing the overt impact of these three diplomatic techniques on the political history of peace. At this point, it is methodologically important to specify what constitutes each diplomatic device and its respective definition of success or failure in the prevention of interstate wars. First, a judicial settlement is any situation in which “states parties to a dispute may seek a solution by submitting the dispute to a pre-constituted international court or tribunal composed of independent judges whose tasks are to settle claims on the basis of international law and render decisions which are binding upon the parties.”13 The extent to which the application of this mechanism prevents the outbreak of hostilities between two disputants, and definitively settles the issue(s) that originated the dispute, determines the degree of success or failure of this diplomatic device. Second, an arms control agreement is either a bilateral or multilateral formal treaty aimed at reducing tension and building confidence among actual or potential adversaries. It is preferred in this work to operate with a narrow definition of the concept of “arms control.” Josef Goldblat, on the other hand, offers a broader definition of this concept as any measure intended to freeze, limit, reduce or abolish specific categories of weapons; to prevent certain military activities; to proscribe transfer of militarily important items; to reduce the risk of war; to constrain or prohibit the use of certain arms in


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war; or to build up confidence among states through greater openness in the military field.14

These twin tasks are achieved via treaty specifications and controls of the parameters that limit the types and amounts of arms reductions and acquisitions by states who are party to the treaty. The promotion and implementation of such treaties by international institutions, coupled with the reduction and/or elimination of bilateral disputes in a specific region, will indicate success. The lack of these treaties and the permanence of simmering interstate disputes will reveal failure. Collective security is an international governing principle that aims at preventing aggression and war by threatening to punish aggressors and renegade countries in the system with military action by an overwhelming force assembled among all the other member states.15 This principle was embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and has also found its place in the United Nations charter and in the charter of the Organization of American States as a provision of the 1947 Rio Pact Treaty between the United States and the Latin American countries. The success of this mechanism is determined by whether its implementation has either prevented or reversed an act of aggression. Failure of this device signifies the absence of a collective response in light of an act of aggression by any member state. At the end of the World War II, the United Nations was created to maintain and promote interstate peace, security, and the betterment of humanity. Its charter empowers the UN Security Council to utilize pacific means and enforcement mechanisms to prevent the escalation of interstate conflicts and preserve international peace. Furthermore, the International Court of Justice was instituted to adjudicate interstate disputes within a legal framework.16 The Organization of American States possesses similar war-preventive capabilities as the United Nations. As a successor to the Pan-American Union, the OAS has a history that predates the United Nations. Nevertheless, it was created as a regional extension of the UN system and its charter and structure were designed to guarantee peace and security in the Inter-American system. The OAS charter incorporates a provision for collective security as well as a legal body to render judicial settlements of interstate disputes in the Americas.17 Given the overlapping political purpose of this organization and the United Nations, only interstate disputes referred to either, or both simultaneously, will be considered in detail. War Prevention: An International Institutional Success? Perhaps, except for the Argentinean-Brazilian rivalry, whose fundamental etiology is their competition for regional supremacy, regional leadership and international reputation and status, all other dyads in South America stem primarily from bilateral disputes over territory, natural resources, and waterways. Since the early days of South America’s independence from Spain, several of these conflicts have been resolved through either the mediation and/or arbitration of third parties (i.e., prominent individuals, state mediation, and international nongovernmental organizations like the Catholic Church),18 or via judicial settlement within international governmental organizations.

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Notwithstanding a measured degree of success prior to 1945 some of the most intractable, dangerous, and acrimonious disputes remained unsolved for most of the duration of the long period of peace. Undoubtedly, it is these cases that have posed the biggest threat to the permanence of interstate peace in South America. Therefore, in light of these cases, the war-prevention and peace-preserving functions of international institutions will be assessed. For instance, prior to the outbreak of the South Atlantic conflict in April 1982, out of approximately thirty different interstate disputes in the Americas, submitted to international institutions, only two were confined to South America proper; the rest occurred in the Caribbean and Central American region. First, on September 8, 1955 Ecuador requested the OAS Council to convoke a Meeting of Foreign Ministers to consider its charge that Peru was endangering Ecuadorian territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence by heavy concentration of forces on the boundary between the two countries and the stationing of vessels of the Peruvian navy in the vicinity of Ecuador’s coastline.19 Since Ecuador had submitted its complaint simultaneously to the four guarantor states of the 1942 Rio Protocol (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States), the OAS Council of Ministers decided not to apply the Rio Treaty provisions to the Ecuadorian-Peruvian dispute. Subsequently, Ecuador withdrew its request, and in 1960 unilaterally abrogated the 1942 Rio Protocol. This dispute flared up again in January 1981 and in January 1995. In both occasions the United Nations and the Permanent Council of the OAS tried to mediate, but their efforts failed. Peru rejected twice their mediation in favor of that by the four guarantor states. In April 1962, a dispute between Bolivia and Chile came before the OAS Council of Ministers. This conflict centered on the use of the waters of the Lauca River that flows from Chile into Bolivia. The Bolivian government requested the convocation of the Organ of Consultation to consider what it termed as Chilean aggression. The OAS Council appealed to both countries to adopt one available Inter-American peace procedure, but Chile declared that this was a legal issue that should be dealt with by arbitration or the International Court of Justice. After withdrawing temporarily from the activities of the OAS, on June 17, 1963 Bolivia announced its permanent withdrawal from the OAS Council because of the latter’s failure to settle the Lauca River waters dispute. Since that time Bolivia has returned as a member of the OAS.20 Although the South Atlantic conflict of 1982 involved an extra-continental state actor, one must not pass the opportunity without noting the evident failure of both the United Nations and the Organization of American States to abate this conflict through judicial settlement. Furthermore, the trend in conflict management in South America’s regional affairs appears to be heading toward more bilateral negotiations and less multilateral and/or third party mediations. For example, since Guyana requested in 1982 the mediation of the United Nations in its dispute with Venezuela, these two states have continued to negotiate on a bilateral basis outside the UN system. Other disputes exhibit a similar tendency for bilateral negotiations. This is the case in recent disputes between Colombia and Venezuela in 1987; between Brazil and Venezuela in 1991–1992; and between Argentina and Chile in 1995. The last important peaceful settlements in South America, mediated


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by a third party, were the Argentinean-Chilean agreement on the Beagle Channel dispute that was negotiated from 1979 to 1984 by the Vatican, and the peace accord between Ecuador and Peru, brokered by the four state guarantors of the Rio Protocol, on October 26, 1998 in Brasilia. Although, initially, judicial settlement of interstate disputes in South America appeared as a promising diplomatic mechanism to prevent armed conflict and war, under closer scrutiny, the evidence demonstrates that it has had limited impact on the preservation and evolution of peace. Since 1945 the South American states appear to have preferred bilateral negotiations, mediation by the Catholic Church, or mediation by other regional states as the means to settle territorial disputes peacefully. Nonetheless, international organizations have been partly successful in preserving interstate peace in South America. Accordingly, their role should not be neglected when discussing the causes of peace in South America. Arms control and disarmament policies have received a great deal of attention throughout the duration of the long period of peace. For example, between 1935 and 1948 South American countries pledged to solve conflicts peacefully and to limit arms in the region. In the 1936 Conference on Peace Consolidation, all South American states adopted a recommendation urging the limitation of the arms race. In both, the Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty of 1947 and in the 1948 Bogota Pact South American states committed themselves to avoid the use of armed forces in Inter-American conflicts. In 1967 the Tlatelolco Treaty, proscribing nuclear weapons in Latin America, was signed by most Latin American states. In 1974 the Declaration of Ayacucho, signed by the heads of state from Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela, pledged, among other things, to work toward the limitation of arms in Latin America and to end the acquisition of offensive weapons by Latin American states. Finally, it must be pointed out that from 1959 to 1985 there have been many other calls and proposals for the total disarmament of Latin America.21 While the list of declarations, exhortations, and proposals for arms control agreements and total disarmament in Latin America is long and impressive in ideals and aspirations, the fact of the matter is that national and multilateral efforts to promote arms control agreements and disarmament as a mechanisms to reduce or eradicate interstate conflict and war in South America appear to have had a minor impact on the evolution of peace. As Augusto Varas, an expert on the military and arms procurement policies of the South American states, has discovered that while the rest of Latin American states have remained distant, despite their public pledges to the contrary, from disarmament and arms control initiatives, only Brazil and Mexico, with Argentina as an occasional supporter, have been active agents in arms limitation proposals. He adds that even countries like Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, which have supported general and complete disarmament in the region, have historically been the main forces fueling the regional arms race.22 Finally, collective security is the third diplomatic technique available to both the United Nations and the Organization of American States to deter intraregional aggression and prevent the escalation of armed conflict and war. The implementation of this mechanism has a very poor track record. Three times during the long period of peace the undisputed aggressor has been a South American state, yet no

148


effort has been made to organize a collective military response against the attacker. Twice, in 1981 and in 1995, Peru has been the unquestionable aggressor against Ecuador, yet all South American states have stopped short of calling for a collective military response against Peru. Similarly, the Argentinean invasion of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands did not elicit a collective military response from the United Nations. These three instances are clear evidence that the principle of collective security is a poor mechanism to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict and wars.

CHAPTER 7

THE MILITARY, EXTERNAL PEACE, AND INTERNAL VIOLENCE

he preceding chapters identified and discussed the theoretical foundations and implications of the most germane realist and liberal hypotheses for an explanation of the long period of peace in South America. Upon the empirical testing of these propositions, it became evident that only dyadic general deterrence is a partial explanation for the absence of war among some pairs of countries in this region. Also, it was established that among the three diplomatic techniques most often used by international organizations to manage and mediate crises and prevent war in the region, only peaceful judicial settlement had a greater, albeit limited, impact on keeping regional peace in South America. Other alternative realist and liberal explanations did not explain well the absence of war or the permanence of interstate peace. Several cases and situations defied the explanatory logic of the two main paradigms in world politics. Thus, having found no appropriate specific explanation for the paradoxical evolution and endurance of peace for most cases, this chapter advances and tests the militarist peace hypothesis. This is an alternative explanation that may prove particularly useful in explaining some of those intractable cases and the general pattern of internal violence and external peace in the region. Morris Janowitz recommended focusing on the voluntaristic efforts and calculations of the elites within each country as a potential explanatory variable for the evolution of interstate peace and war. According to Janowitz, “these considerations lead to the analysis of the organization and perspectives of political and military elites as a crucial mechanism in the analysis of war and war-making.”1 Just as Janowitz theorizes about the military’s crucial role in the analysis of war and warmaking, the present work assumes the military’s equally vital input into the explanation of the absence of war and peacemaking. Extrapolating from this reasoning, thus, this study identifies the military institution and its elitist calculations in South American polities as central elements in an explanation of the paradoxical pattern of internal violence and external regional peace. In this sense, the militarist peace proposition evolves from and builds on the observation that military elites have played a pivotal and autonomous political role

T

150


in South American societies. Starting from the basic contention that the military have been traditionally at the center (or the gatekeepers) of the war-making decision process in each polity, this book posits that they have had the authority to decide unilaterally whether or not to pursue national political objectives via the intraregional, external use of force. But, as argued in chapter 4, power and authority can produce a desired outcome, in this case interstate peace, only if the actor or the political elite in a position of authority has the interests and/or the motives to pursue such a specific objective. It is the contention of this work that, given the military’s individual and institutional socioeconomic and political objectives during the post–Chaco War period in South America, the armed forces have lacked the motivations and interests to wage external, intraregional wars. Consequently, based on the theorized political power, interests and motives of the military, and on the evidence of no major intraregional interstate war in over seventy years, this study postulates that the military institution has been, for the most part, a formidable and robust force for intraregional interstate peace. Had it not been for the central and autonomous political role of the military and their socioeconomic and political motivations, there would have been, probably, an eruption and escalation of major intraregional wars during this period. The above hypothesized explanation rests on the presupposition that the military elites have been powerful political actors in control of the war-making decision process in South American nation-states since 1935. Thus, it is necessary to discuss subsequently the foundations for such an assumption. Once the theoretical underpinnings for this proposition have been established, this work will discuss the institutional rationale of the military for potentially opting against waging external, intraregional wars. As the motivations of the military for opting against external violence are examined, a simultaneous attempt will be made to empirically evaluate the independent causal value of this analytical perspective on the evolution and permanence of the period of internal political violence and intraregional peace. Departing from the analytical method followed previously in this work, the chapter 7 will intersperse the theoretical argument with relevant historical data and implications. Such an approach will help to illustrate concurrently the theoretical argument and demonstrate its explanatory significance for the case at hand. Political Autonomy of the Military in South America What is the political autonomy of the military? The short answer is that political autonomy stems from the capacity of the military institution, based on its superior organizational strength and relative political power with respect to other national socioeconomic and political sectors and institutions, to influence the governing process and make independent decisions, including the war-making decision, with little or no accountability to the people and to the civil governmental authorities. The political autonomy of the military in South America is generally accepted by area specialists.2 But it is instructive for this study to identify the sources of that political autonomy in theoretical terms. The work of S. E. Finer directly addresses

MILITARY, EXTERNAL PEACE, INTERNAL VIOLENCE

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the sources of this authority and power. He maintains that the general strengths of the military vis à vis civilian sectors of society stem primarily from three basic factors: “a marked superiority in organization, a highly emotionalized symbolic status, and a monopoly of arms.”3 Further he affirms that the military are not only the most highly organized association in the state. They are a continuing corporation with an intense sentiment of solidarity, enjoying, in many cases, considerable favour. This formidable corporate body is more lethally and heavily armed than any other organization in the state, and indeed enjoys a near-monopoly of all effective weapons.4

Generally in Latin America and particularly in South America, the militaries have enjoyed considerable leeway in each of these areas outlined by Finer. While the definition of political autonomy presented above is not intended for comparative purpose, some experts may question why would that situation be more possible in South America than elsewhere in the world? To answer this query, it would entail, first, a lengthy comparative analysis to demonstrate that the military in South America are truly more politically autonomous than their counterparts elsewhere. Then, it would have to be explained why this is more true in South America than in any other region of the world. To accomplish the first task, it would be essential to specify variables and measure them with data from several regions. Obviously, this is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, given the conditions Finer specified above, it will be assumed, for the sake of argument, the greater political autonomy of the military in South America over the years and their possible effect on the war and peace-making decision process. Before presenting the analysis, a caveat is in order. First, this work covers a long historical period and there are certainly many variations of the political landscape in South America and the international environment over space and time. Therefore, this argument must remain general and avoid particular national experiences. Second, the individual national development of the military institution and its specific political role vary from one South American state to the other. Still, it is possible to discern an extra-regional homogeneity amid the intraregional heterogeneity. That is, despite their diverse domestic political experiences, South American societies present a common underlying theme regarding the etiology of military political autonomy. Consequently, this theme will be drawn upon to demonstrate why the degree of political autonomy of the military may be greater in South America than elsewhere in the world. Finally, it must be made explicit that no attempt will be made to provide an explanation for the frequency of military governments in the political history of the region. In South America, more than in any other region of the world, several historical factors may have contributed to a greater degree of political autonomy for the military: the Spanish heritage; the modality and timing of the process of national independence; and the process of state building. First, Spain’s heritage and tradition was a decisive influence over the state-building process in Latin America. Greater than any other European state engaged in colonizing other parts of the world, Spain’s origin as a unified country owes a great deal to the military. As the Moors

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were being evicted from southern Spain in 1492, the conquest and appropriation of colonies in the New World was underway. In this sense, the Spanish colonization of Latin America was essentially a continuation of the successful military campaigns against the Moors. Given these successes, the military, both as a profession and as a governing mechanism, became very important and well esteemed in Spain. Thus, when the conquistadors came to take control of the colonies, they brought with them, and passed on to the colonies the traditional Spanish respect of and dependence on the military. Consequently, during colonization, throughout the process of independence, and in the republican period, the military profession played the pivotal role in the political development of the region. The manner in which the Spanish colonies gained national independence from Spain is another factor that may have contributed to the political autonomy and prominence of the military in South America. In contrast to the British colonies, which had autonomous governments capable of declaring independence and organizing the fight for it, in Latin America there was barely any local self-government to organize the struggle for independence. Consequently, the fight for independence in the Spanish colonies had to be carried out by armies without any kind of civilian control. Hence, once independence was achieved the leading generals became the new rulers. And while republicanism was the objective, the newly independent states resembled military dictatorships more than republican governments. Certainly, it is problematic to explain the political experience of South America in the last seventy years based on evidence from centuries ago. Nonetheless, the modality and timing of the struggle for independence in Latin America can be quite relevant in explaining the political autonomy of the military, particularly if compared with the African and Asian experiences. While Latin American countries won their freedom fighting in the nineteenth century, most of the countries in Africa and Asia gained their independence after World War II and as a direct result of the process of decolonization. With some notable exceptions such as Algeria and Vietnam, independence came to most countries in Africa and Asia via a relatively peaceful and voluntary process. This permitted some international guidance and support. Also, it allowed for institutional planning of the new governments and the organization and evolution of independent political parties and other civilian sectors and institutions. During the period immediately after independence in Africa and Asia, many of the military institutions in the newly independent countries became very powerful and, in some cases, the substitutes and guardians of the metropolises’ interests and their political practices in the former colonies. Yet, in most instances civilian institutions, particularly political parties, remained stronger than their counterparts in the former Spanish colonies. Based on the general difference in manner and timing of independence, it is plausible to argue that the autonomy of the military in South America may be attributed to the considerable weakness of civilian institutions or lack thereof when compared to those in African and Asian countries. In addition, it is pertinent to point out that South American states became independent over a century earlier than did most countries in Africa and Asia. Throughout this period there was little or no international pressure to undertake democratic reforms and bring the military under civilian control. Ultimately, this may have contributed to the slow and weak development of other civilian institutions, and to the more


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prominent political role of the military in the state-building process in South American states. By comparing and contrasting the capabilities of the military and that of other socioeconomic and political sectors and institutions in South American societies, the above definitional criteria of political autonomy incorporates an assumption regarding a particular state structure that allows for other domestic actors to coexist with the military and compete against it for influence and control over the national political process. However, other state structures are far more restrictive and exclude the participation and, even, the institutional organization of other sectors. In other words, the degree of political autonomy, as measured by the relative political power, organizational prowess, and direct influence of the military over the governing and decision-making processes, depends on the type of state structure prevailing in a country. It is, therefore, necessary to identify the state structures that have prevailed in South America during the period in question. For that purpose, subsequently, this study discusses two ideal state structure forms and ascertains the degree of political autonomy associated with each. The State: Two Ideal Types In this work the “state” is conceptualized as two distinct ideal types.5 First, the monist model, characteristic of all autocratic, absolutist, totalitarian, and authoritarian political systems, is distinguished by the control of both the government and civil society by an ideologically homogeneous or monolithic socioeconomic and political elite. For the sake of illustration and simplicity of analysis, all these forms of dictatorial regimes have been lumped together as examples of a monist state structure. However, it is recognized in this study that these forms of autocracies differ considerably among them in terms of the degree of authoritarianism, that is, the extent to which each regime controls the state and civil society. On a continuum of authoritarianism one can place these regimes from a mild personalistic autocracy to an extreme monist or totalitarian political regime.6 Since in the monist type public contestation for control of the government is minimal or nonexistent, and the political opposition is coerced and silenced, then national decision making, particularly the war-making decision process, is shielded from any form of societal influence coming from other national socioeconomic and political sectors. The second ideal type is the pluralist model. This type is characterized by different degrees of political competition (or public contestation) for control of the national government and the decision-making process among an array of sectoral interests. Along a continuum of popular control and governmental decentralization (i.e., “democraticness”), in its purest ideal form, this model approximates a “polyarchy” as conceptualized by Robert A. Dahl.7 At the opposite end of the spectrum of this ideal model figures the presidential system, very typical of Latin American societies.8 The parliamentary and presidential systems of Western Europe and the United States figure between these two extreme poles of the continuum and in a decreasing degree of democracy. Latin American presidentialism is distinguished in this study as an extreme opposite to a polyarchy, because power tends to be concentrated in the chief executive who

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is practically exempt from popular, legislative, and judicial checks and balances. Guillermo O’Donnell defined this feature of the presidential systems in the region as “delegative democracies” and distinguished these from “representative democracies” (i.e., those prevalent in the United States and Western Europe). He argued that the essential features of delegative democracies include the following: (1) the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency “governs as he or she sees fit”; (2) the president embodies the nation and the main custodian and definer of its interests; (3) the president presents himself as being “above” both political parties and organized interests; (4) institutions such as the legislature and the judiciary are viewed as “a nuisances” that come with the fact of being a democratically elected president, with accountability to them considered a mere impediment to the full authority delegated to the president; (5) a president and his trusted advisors who are the alpha and the omega of politics; and (6) a president who isolates himself from most existing political institutions and organized interests and bears sole responsibility for the successes and failures of “his” policies. In this sense, the type of presidential system traditionally instituted, and making a comeback since the mid-1980s, in South America shares the basic defining features of delegative democracies.9 Yet, the South American presidential systems are classified more broadly in the present study as part of the pluralist model, because these regimes fundamentally refrain from gaining total and absolute control of the state and civil society at the expense of annihilating all political opposition and other important social actors. Despite the inherent tendency of South American presidential systems to monopolize political power in the executive and to be unaccountable to other political institutions, they have an inherent legitimizing need to differentiate themselves from outright civilian and military dictatorships. Hence, in order to legitimize the democratic character and difference from dictatorial regimes, they allow political opposition, the articulation of rival socioeconomic and political interests, and some degree of public contestation for the executive and legislative branches. For these reasons other politically significant sectors remain relatively organized and politically active, representing an important influence on the national governing and decision-making processes. This is particularly evident in Argentina where labor unions and business associations were strong and well organized, and in Chile where the main political parties were also very influential and well organized.10 Based on the above conceptualization of the state, South American states since 1935 are classified as predominantly pluralist. Nevertheless, this classification must be understood with some reservation, because these same “pluralist” countries have reversed intermittently to some form of monist state throughout their national political history. Judging from the data on regime classification, presented in tables 6.1 and 6.2 in chapter 6, and supported by historical evidence in appendix B, most South American countries were ruled by some form of presidential system, albeit the ubiquitous military presence in the background, for better than an aggregate 60.98 percent of the years comprising the period classified here as the South American peace. In fact, out of an aggregate, cross-national 769 years of regime classification from 1935 to 2005 in South America, “democracies” governed the countries of the region in 469 aggregate years, and the same countries were ruled by some form of dictatorships in the remaining 300 aggregate years. Since in the


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remaining 39.02 percent balance of the cross-national-aggregate years comprising the period of intraregional peace, South American nation-states were ruled by some form of autocratic government, one concludes that, during this portion of the time period under consideration, the war-making decision process rested unquestionably within the military institution. Hence, the prevalence of intraregional interstate peace, at least, during this part of the data can be attributed directly and without reservations to the pivotal political role of the military. In a pluralist state system such as in the United States it is far more complex than in a monist state to ascertain who influences and controls the war-making decision process, and who is ultimately responsible for preventing the outbreak of war. Thus, it is pertinent to argue, however, that even during periods in which a degree of pluralism has prevailed in South American countries, the decision-making process, particularly the war-making decision, has not been exempt from the heavy-handed influence of the military sector. Regarding this point, it is instructive to note that, in descending order, Chile, Uruguay, and Colombia are traditionally the three most pluralist states in the region since independence. They have enjoyed the longest successive history of civilian governments, with greater control over the military institution. Yet, even in Chile which prior to the 1973 military coup enjoyed the longest uninterrupted succession of democratically elected civilian governments in South America, the military felt traditionally empowered and capable of influencing the national governing process. Projecting this confidence in a public address, remembering the September 11, 1973 coup d’ètat that ousted President Salvador Allende, General Augusto Pinochet stated that “nobody can tell me that I acted for the greed of power, because I have always had power and the military have [political] power since we begin our service in the institution.”11 An analysis of the political history of South America over the last seventy years reveals that the military institution has indeed been quite capable of independent political decisions and actions, particularly the war-making decision. Two factors have accorded the military sector such a degree of political autonomy and prominence in the decision-making processes of South American states. First, internal political instability and turmoil made the political history of these countries quite fractious. Relative to the prowess of the military institution, this factor has rendered most political actors institutionally disorganized and weak. Second, governmental institutions under democratic regimes have been traditionally fragile and without a widespread consensus on the appropriate rules to process internal conflict. Thus, the institutional weakness made South American polities ill equipped to deal with the political demands of the times. To illustrate this political phenomenon, it is instructive to reproduce here how Guillermo O’Donnell explains the process leading to the military coups and the establishment of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Brazil in 1964 and in Argentina in 1973. He writes the following: The political “game” became, on the one hand, broader, in that more demands, brought forth by more political actors, were focused on governmental decisions. On the other hand, the “game” became more unconstrained, in that formally prescribed political behavior was less and less important vis-à-vis naked power strategies, both among political actors and against the governments. Political institutions in both

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countries (parties, parliament), which had never been particularly strong, were even further weakened, and the executive became the primary focus of glut of political demands. In this situation, the pre-coup Argentine and Brazilian governments were victimized by, and collaborated in, praetorianism. . . . [A]fter a praetorian period the tendency is to define the situation as one requiring the placement of severe constraints on the political activities of those who are outside the winning coalition. The tendency, thus, was toward a highly authoritarian political system.12

Also Guillermo O’Donnell, analyzing a number of factors that might have contributed to the long-standing tradition of military coups and intense participation in Argentinean national politics, identified military professionalization as the basis for the predominant internal political role of the military in relation to other sociopolitical sectors. O’Donnell’s impression was that [a]s the military officer saw it, they had resolved “their” problem while the civil sectors and the government continued in a state of total crisis. This feeling of organizational accomplishment led to the belief, however illogical, that the military possessed superior capacity to confront the social problems which the civil authorities evidently could not solve.13

Based on these elements, the military institution has been left as the only sector with the organization and institutional strength to deal with the socioeconomic and political instability of the period. This situation made the military inward looking regarding the security of the state. It is clear from these passages that they were more concerned with internal adversaries for political control and power than with external rivals who could potentially threaten national sovereignty.14 It is informative at this juncture to reproduce here two passages from two different studies discussing and supporting the conclusions listed above. First, in an analysis of the political role and influence of the military in Latin America during the years 1936–1960, Edwin Lieuwen affirms that the reemergence of the armed forces upon the Latin American political scene . . . was a consequence of the progressive crumbling of the traditional order during the twentieth century. In the resulting political chaos, the armed forces were provoked to intervene against newly articulate groups who were threatening the status quo.15

He elaborates that three factors contributed to the “political dominance” of the armed forces after the 1930s. First, controlling the means of violence made the armed forces more “confident of their superiority over civilian elements and less hesitant to use that power for political purposes.” Second, the absence of international wars availed the newly modernized armies with time and resources to pursue political objectives. Finally, the development and spread of Nazism, fascism, and Francoism “had a definite impact upon the area’s armed forces in the 1930s.”16 Echoing this assessment several years later, two other authors maintained that [i]n the 1960s and 1970s professional military officers in Latin America scanned the panorama of Latin American history and blamed the ineptitude and corruption of


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civilian politicians as well as the imported institutions of liberal democracy for the wretched conditions in Latin America. In much of Latin America, professional military officers concluded that only an end to “politics” and the establishment of long-term military rule could provide the basis for modernization, economic development, and political stability. This determination, strengthened by events in Brazil after 1964, led to explicitly antipolitical military regimes in most of Latin America.17

Following this line of reasoning, Kalevi Holsti discusses the traditional role of the South American militias and concludes that historically the military in South America have been institutions of politics and governance rather than armed forces trained primarily for fighting Clausewitzian-type wars against external enemies. The military have traditionally taken a paternalistic view of their relationship to society and the state. They typically see themselves as protectors of the constitution, guarantors of social order, and engines of national moral (patriotic), economic and technological development. In brief, their roles are primarily internal, not external.18

Clearly, these passages corroborate this work’s conclusions on the political autonomy and influence of the military institution in South America. Out of several possible choices, these two fragments are selected because they refer specifically to those decades comprising the years between 1936 and 1980. In this sense the bulk of the long period of peace is characterized by military political autonomy. Starting with the 1964 military coup in Brazil, most South American states in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s came under direct military rule. This period of authoritarianism in the region led to a new, more institutionalized form of military government that came to be known in comparative politics literature as bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. The transition of these regimes to some form of civilian government is referred in the literature as “redemocratization.” This new wave of redemocratization in South America started early in the 1980s and by the mid-1990s all countries in the region were governed again by democratically elected presidents.19 With the exception of a foiled military coup in Venezuela in the early 1990s and a short-lived coup in April 2002, a minor military revolt in Argentina, and the “self-coup” of President Alberto K. Fujimori in Peru, these nation-states have remained increasingly democratic and politically stable as compared to previous decades. Nonetheless, the political influence of the military institution in most South American countries since 1990 has remained relatively strong. If any lingering doubt remains regarding the political power of the military in South American societies, consider the crucial military role in the resolution of the presidential crises in Ecuador during the first two weeks in February 1997 and again in April 2005, and the reinstatement of President Hugo Chávez Frías in Venezuela by the National Armed Forces (FAN) in April 2002. Now that the notion of political autonomy of the military has been explained and its theoretical and empirical foundations have been established and corroborated, it is important to examine how this concept has been dealt with in the literature on civil-military relations in South America. Establishing whether or not the political autonomy of the military is an accepted and common tenet in the study of

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civil-military relations in Latin America will further corroborate a basic assumption of the present study. Political Power and Autonomy in Civil-Military Relations The political power of the military and their capacity to influence the governing and decision-making processes in South American societies have been corroborated over the years by several comparative works on civil-military relations in the region. For instance, in describing the content of Part One of his book, Edwin Lieuwen affirms that in that section “the analysis of the role of the military shows how long and how deeply, in all but a few countries of Latin America, the activities of the armed forces have permeated the national life.” He adds that the military controlled “politics either directly or by assuming an Olympian role as arbiter among the civilian contestants.”20 Another author maintains that the influence of the military has penetrated virtually all individual and social relationships, and that civilians have been unable to devise a formula to keep the military subordinate to their rule. This civilian failure stems, according to this analyst, from the military powers that have proved “too strong for the feeble social, economic, and political institutions of the various countries.”21 Accordingly, in his inquiry into the position taken by the military in major national sociopolitical issues like public education, industrialization, nationalism, and agrarian reform, he takes for granted that “the armed forces, either directly or indirectly, are constantly affecting decision-making at the national level in nearly all of the republics.”22 Twenty two years later, and echoing the foregoing analysis by John J. Johnson, another student of civil-military relations in Latin America writes that “the armed forces are probably the most important and certainly the strongest single locus of power in Latin America.” He considers that in this region, as in the rest of the third world, the political power of the military comes naturally, because [p]olitical parties are commonly weak, corrupt, and personalistic; trade unions are narrow and unrepresentative; the press is feeble and venal; business organizations are seldom capable of looking beyond their immediate interests; democratic institutions, constitutions, and legality in general are shallow. The military remains not only the possessor of force but the most coherent sector and, in the view of some, the body most expressive of the nation and possibly an effective modernizer.23

It should be evident by now that the assumption of national political power of the military, as projected by their degree of political autonomy in Latin American societies, has been a basic tenet in the study and understanding of civil-military relations in the region. But if the above presentation would not be sufficiently convincing, it is instructive to add to this discussion the views on the subject of a South American student of the military establishments in the region. In an edited volume, aiming to examine the political role of the military and their linkages with local socioeconomic and political structures and institutions in Latin American states in the late 1980s, Augusto Varas summarizes in its preface that


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[t]he individual studies within each nation all point to the increasing process of military autonomy vis-à-vis the state and society. The research shows that this very same institutional autonomy has allowed the military to develop as independent political actors within the different countries. This process seems to be common to all Latin American societies, although there are differences in intensity according to different local conditions. The research has demonstrated how the military diversify themselves when acquiring higher degrees of institutional autonomy.24

Military Motivations and Peace in South America It has been established that the military institution has enjoyed political autonomy and considerable control over the national governing and decision-making processes (and by extension over the war-making decision process) in South America for most of the period comprising the long period of peace. The next task in this exegesis is to examine why would the military establishments in the region would opt against fighting intraregional interstate wars, even in circumstances where potential benefits to their respective countries could have clearly outweighed the costs of war, or in situations when military imbalances have favored a potential revisionist state? In other words, what sort of socioeconomic and political factors have influenced the motivations and interests of the military establishments against waging external intraregional wars? The Record of Militarized Crises during the Long Period of Peace Before expounding the argument as to why the military in South America may have opted for interstate peace, it is important to set correctly the record of the causal relationship between military regimes and the incidence of intraregional interstate militarized disputes during the period in question. As discussed elsewhere in this work, several bilateral militarized crises have taken place since 1935.25 With the exception of the 1978 Beagle Channel militarized interstate dispute between Argentina and Chile, when both countries were clearly ruled by military dictatorships, and the 1982 Guyanan-Venezuelan diplomatic crisis over the Essequibo territory, at a time when Guyana was governed by a civic-military elite; the rest of the seven militarized interstate crises during the South American peace have occurred at times when democratically elected civilian governments have been in control of both countries involved in the bilateral dispute.26 The fact that 71 percent of all militarized crises in South America since 1935 have occurred among formal democracies not only casts serious doubt on the validity of the democratic peace hypothesis, but, more importantly, it challenges the whole notion that military dictatorships are more prompt to initiate and escalate interstate violence. Clearly, based on the evidence, and assuming that the political autonomy of the military and their influence over the decision-making process decrease when democratically elected civilian governments are in power, it can be inferred that any minor reduction of military control over the war-making decision process increases the probability of the outbreak of militarized interstate crises. This inference, taken together with the evidence of a sole case of a militarized interstate

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crisis when the military have been fully in charge of the government in both countries involved, considerably strengthens the argument of this work explaining the absence of regional wars on the basis of the military’s lack of motivations and interests to fight their regional counterparts. Another pertinent observation regarding the relation between the military and interstate militarized crises is that the latter have been scattered throughout the entire region. Also, they have not been provoked by the aggressive regional policy of a pariah state. In fact, with the exception of Uruguay and the more recently independent Suriname, every single nation-state in South America, starting with the warring parties in the Chaco War, has been involved in some sort of intraregional, bilateral militarized dispute over the last seventy years. Essentially, every military establishment in South America has confronted, at one point or another, the threat of an intraregional interstate armed conflict. The fact that they have refrained from further escalation reinforces the thesis of this study, linking a regional lack of military interest in waging external war to the evidence of a preserved intraregional interstate peace. Socialization and Politicization Processes of the Military Pacifism is not a human condition unique to military personnel in South America since 1935; nor is it that by joining the military institution, potentially violent individuals are instantly metamorphosed into pacifists who strive arduously to avoid and prevent regional interstate armed conflicts. As the track record of military involvements in the often violent national political process of individual polities attests, the armed forces in these countries are, at a minimum, as violent as the rest of the institutions and individuals constituting these societies. Yet, the military establishments have exhibited a marked degree of aversion to engage in intraregional interstate armed conflicts against their counterparts. It is conceivable that military personnel, cognizant of the dangers of war and given their instinct for physical self-preservation, may be more averse to engage in interstate war than civilians. The military’s aversion to external armed conflict is an important theme of civil-military relations that has been explored extensively by Samuel Huntington and corroborated empirically by other civil-military relations experts. For example, Huntington explains that the greater military aversion to crisis and war is the result of their sense of self-preservation and their perception of being “the perennial victim of civilian warmongering.”27 In a study that indirectly lends empirical support to the Huntingtonian thesis on the military, Richard K. Betts analyzes the proportion of military influence, relative to that of civilian advisers, on the use of force in U.S. foreign policy since World War II. He finds that the record of the postwar era indicates that the military chiefs’ influence on force has been the most notable when they tried to block it, and least when they promoted it. On decisions as crucial as war and peace, the relative influence of military officials is likely to be modest in any case. On balance, however, anti-interventionist presidents will be pushed unwillingly into military action by belligerent generals much less easily than belligerent presidents will be pushed toward passivity by anti-interventionist generals.28


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Notwithstanding Huntington’s argument and Betts’ empirical findings regarding U.S. military policy, the marked difference between the violent national behavior of South American militaries and their peaceful intraregional disposition remains a puzzling and paradoxical historical development. This work argues that the difference between the military’s behavior at the regional and national levels is primarily the effect of their changed mindset. As the evolutionary social process continued to transform gradually the armed forces’ set of preferences, motivations, and interests, South America moved inexorably from a more violent pre–Chaco War subsystem to a period of relative intraregional peace and increased national political violence. Also, the evolutionary social process redirected the focus of the military mission from protecting the state against external threats to seeking internal security and political control of the government. Ultimately, this pattern generated a universal disinterest among the military establishments in South America to pursue political and strategic objectives via the external use of force. Accordingly, the principal byproduct of this evolutionary social process is, and has been, the outbreak, evolution, and continued existence of the militarist peace in South America. Causal Sequence of the Argument Donald P. Warwick explains that “socialization refers to the process by which individuals acquire the knowledge, motives, feelings, skills, and other traits expected in the groups of which they are or seek to become members.”29 Akin to this definition, a long-evolving, and unpremeditated process of socialization among the various military establishments in the region can be identified. Based on hindsight knowledge of socioeconomic and political events in South America, it is argued that the development of this process generated closer political and professional ties among the military. Consequently, the evolution of a greater degree of transparency in their relations has led the military sectors to perceive each other progressively as members of a supranational intraregional social group or a sort of loose overarching regional organization. For example, discussing the professionalization of the Chilean armed forces, which Frederick M. Nunn asserts developed similarly in other South American armies during the same period, Nunn explains that “[m]ilitary men were loyal to the state, but they were also imbued with a sense of self-interest which led them to think that they belonged to a separate class and to believe that the state had certain responsibilities to them.”30 It is instructive to note at this juncture too that in 1932 the German political philosopher, Carl Schmitt explained the origin of wars on the notion of friend-and-enemy groupings. In his treatise, he advances the notion of politics or “the concept of the political” on the basis of friend-and-enemy groupings, that is, “an enemy exits only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity.” He emphasizes that “the political is the most intense and extreme antagonism, and every concrete antagonism becomes that much more political the closer it approaches the most extreme point, that of the friend-enemy grouping.” He specifies further that “[interstate] war is armed combat between organized political entities; civil war is armed combat within an organized unit.”

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Also, he concedes that “war follows from enmity. War is the existential negation of the enemy.” Thus, without claiming to do justice to the many complex philosophical ramifications and implications in Schmitt’s work, it appears that his notion regarding the distinction between friend and enemy and the possibility of war between them illustrates the causal sequence explained here. Since the military establishments in South America, due to their convergence of socioeconomic, political, and occupational interests, have been increasingly amalgamated into a single grouping, the possibility of war appears to have been extricated from their relations, while increasing the level of violence between them and other civilian sectors within their individual countries.31 This work argues that by sharing analogous socioeconomic and political occupational concerns across societies, and facing a similar political environment at both the national and international levels, the regional military sectors have harmonized increasingly their interests and have come to identify themselves as “friends” whose “enemies” are not the other intraregional national armies but, rather, other civilian sectors within their own nation-state’s boundaries. The evolution of this spontaneous and informal socioeconomic and political association process among the military establishments in the region has reduced and softened the number and nature of conflicts of interests among them; and it has decreased the possibility of intraregional interstate crisis and war. Again, as the objectives of the military mission shifted gradually from external protection of the state to internal security and domestic political competition, there has been a corresponding dearth of intraregional interstate wars and an abundance of internal political violence in South American polities since the end of the Chaco War of 1935. The causal sequence of this argument emphasizes the military’s greater aversion to wage war than their civilian counterparts. Also, it underscores the armed forces’ acute awareness of personal and institutional dangers associated with the waging of interstate war and, thus, their developed instinct for physical self-preservation. Notwithstanding the plausibility of this reasoning, it does not explain the military’s often violent political behavior at home and their peaceful disposition toward neighboring countries. One possible explanation of the South American military’s ostensible schizophrenic behavior may be related to Stanislav Andreski’s argument on the external peaceful disposition of military dictators. Andreski hypothesizes generally that military dictators “have been notably pacific in external relations” because “the more often the armed forces are used internally, the less capable they become of waging a war.”32 It is important to clarify that the causal argument of the militarist peace hypothesis can be considered a partial unfolding of Andreski’s thesis. Yet his proposition falls short of the argument advanced in this work. Andreski’s argument is a simple description of a basic trade-off in military readiness and capabilities when military dictators use and abuse the armed forces’ services for the sake of personal and political survival. On the other hand, the militarist peace hypothesis incorporates the notion that the armed forces cannot be simultaneously effective as a coercive force at home and as a deterrent factor against external threats. In addition, the militarist peace thesis expounds how and why the militaries of the region develop an institutional aversion to external war and a predilection for political participation at home.


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While Andreski’s argument narrowly focuses on how military dictators affect the mission and capabilities of the armed forces, the militarist peace proposition centers on the socialization process and on the transnationalization of the military identity and interest in South America. Further, it underscores how these twin processes have transformed the mission and role of the military in South America, leading to the historical evolution of the external-peace-and-internal-violence paradox. The core of the militarist peace hypothesis is the institution itself and how its sociopolitical evolution has transformed the mission of the military and their selfperception vis-à-vis other institutional sectors in their respective polities. Further, this thesis maintains that the lesser disposition of the South American militaries for international operations and military campaigns is not predicated only on their use by military dictators. Undoubtedly, there are some cases in the region when this pattern occurred and military dictators have used and abused the armed forces for personal political purposes. But the militarist peace hypothesis is not based on this reasoning. Rather, it is rooted in the notion that the changed self-perception and social role of the South American military have instilled the institution with a sense of transnational identity and solidarity. In turn, such a social pattern has rendered the military institution more inward looking and less concerned with external threats and foreign adventures. Andreski theorizes specifically on how the military role in support of military dictatorships reduces their capabilities and diminishes their potential for external operations and involvements. The militarist peace hypothesis, on the other hand, centers on the transnational evolutionary process of military institutional identity and solidarity. It maintains that the socialization of the military and the transnationalization of its identity—irrespective of who rules each individual country— have considerably reduced its disposition for external war while increasing its internal political role. In sum, the independent variable in Andreski’s thesis is the use of the armed forces by military dictators and the concomitant reduction of their capabilities cause the military to be more pacific in the international arena. The independent variable of the militarist peace hypothesis, on the other hand, is the evolutionary transnational identity and solidarity of the military institution and its increased national role cause the external-peace-and-internal-violence paradox. Indication of a Transnational Military Confraternity Clearly, to demonstrate the existence and operation of a supranational confraternity or transnational professional identity and solidarity among the military in South America, the best type of evidence is a record of direct and candid statements by different top-ranking officers from the various military establishments throughout seven decades of peace. To be compelling, their testimony must acknowledge frankly and unequivocally the presence of such loosely organized supranational institution throughout the duration of the post–Chaco War period of peace in the region and their affiliation to it. This type of empirical information is nonexistent in official public records. It would be politically deleterious for any of the region’s military to admit to this. Also, it is important to keep in mind that, while in theory

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the legitimacy and bureaucratic justification for the existence of the armed forces in South America is its mission to protect the sovereignty of the nation-state from external threats, the most manifest purpose of the military since the mid-1930s has increasingly been the protection and advancement of their institutional and political interests in their respective polities. The attainment of this objective has entailed a progressively internal political role for the armed forces in South American societies. As one observer of Latin American civil-military affairs attests, In other parts of the world the main purpose of the armed forces is to defend the country against external attack. In Latin America there have been few foreign wars and, certainly in the latter part of the 20th century, the preservation of national security was internal, not external.33

There seems to be a fundamental contradiction between the philosophy and practice of the military institution in South America. As the armed forces emphasize the defense of the nation-state against external threats as their primary existential and nationally legitimizing purpose, their actual institutional interests and internal political role in their respective societies appear to take center stage in their functions. Given this dichotomy and the absence of corroborating testimonial evidence from the military leadership throughout the duration of the militarist peace, it is reasonable and necessary to extrapolate causality from other indicators and discreet measures to verify or falsify the theorized existence and operation of a regional process of socialization, solidarity, and transnational identity among the military. Five different indicators have been devised in this study to corroborate the existence of an evolutionary process of transnational socialization and identity among the military. The quantification of these variables generates compelling measures and evidence of institutional military exchanges in both absolute terms and in relative proportions to the level of interstate civilian interactions. Table 7.1 presents data in relative terms on the ratio of military to civilian leadership interactions over the course of seven decades. Based on the available data per decade, this ratio is tabulated on an annual average basis. Also, the second indicator is designed to show the ratio of joint military planning to interstate civilian coordinating activities. Again, the ratio of this indicator is calculated on an annual average basis of the data available in each decade. The third variable is formulated to quantify in absolute terms the frequency of joint military exercises and training between nation-states involved in different dyads. Similarly, the fourth and fifth indicators demonstrate in absolute figures the frequency of cross-national military training in intraregional and international war colleges and the number of joint military production projects in the region, respectively. Also, since peace was threatened most seriously by the prevalence of several enduring dyads over the seventy-year period, the available data derive from the observation of these exchanges between countries that were directly involved in the most intense dyads during the history of the militarist peace in South America. Hence, the empirical evidence originates generally from Venezuela’s territorial disputes with both Colombia and Guyana; second, from the Central Andean region, comprising the Ecuadorian-Peruvian rivalry and the conflict among Peru,


Table 7.1

Observation of Military Socialization in South America, 1935–2005 (1) Ratio of military to civilian leadership interactions

DECADE 1935–1945 1946–1955 1956–1965 1966–1975 1976–1985 1986–1995 1996–2005

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1 3 4 7 7 3 2

: : : : : : :

1 1 1 2 1 2 3

(2) Ratio of joint military planning to civilian coordinating interstate activities 2 3 3 3 5 3 1

: : : : : : :

1 1 1 1 1 2 2

(3) Frequency of joint military exercises and training

N/A 2 2 3 2 2 1

(4) (5) Frequency of Number of joint joint military military training in production regional and projects in the international region war colleges N/A 3 4 7 9 7 3

1 2 1 2 4 1 1

Source: Data compiled by the author. See appendix D of this text for sources of data at the following URL: http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/felix_book/Appendixes.htm

Bolivia, and Chile; and, third, the Southern Cone, which includes the ArgentineChilean dispute and the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry. The information synopsized in table 7.1 reveals a strong pattern of close military links and transnational collaboration. First, the ratio of military to civilian leadership interactions appears to increase steadily from a point of parity in the first decade after the Chaco War to a height of seven to one interactions per year during the 1976–1985 decade. Also, the ratio of joint military planning to civilian coordinating interstate activities mirrored this trend. The increases of these two indicators coincided with the peak years of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes that ruled most of South America. Then, the trend of these indicators began to wane, reaching eventually a low point where interstate civilian interactions have become more frequent than those among the military. For example, since 1935 to the mid-1980s there were on average twice as many yearly military delegations visiting and participating in regional fora and bilateral discussions in South America as there were diplomatic and professional contingents in political and civilian gatherings. This conclusion is based on a random tabulation of intraregional interstate diplomatic, civilian, and military exchanges at different intervals during the South American peace. The intent for this compilation is simply to get a general drift, not an exact count, of the number and occupational origin of transnational contacts in the region over a seventy-year period. With this objective in mind, the only criterion to tally a datum of exchange is that it must be mentioned in the text and/or be listed in either the table of contents or the index of subjects of one of the works listed in appendix D (located at the URL http://www.fiu.edu/~intlrel/inrfaculty/felix_book/Appendixes.htm) or specifically examined for this purpose.34 To underscore the ratio of military to civilian interactions and coordinating activities, it is illuminating to note here that while high-ranking military officers from

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Ecuador and Peru, the two most virulent rivals in the region, visited their counterparts in each other’s capitals over five decades, no civilian president from either country paid an official visit to the other until 1992, when President Alberto K. Fujimori went to Ecuador and became the first Peruvian president ever to visit that country. In a statement to the media in Lima, on April 3, 1995, President Alberto K. Fujimori affirms that “his rapprochement with Ecuador in 1992, when he became the first Peruvian president to visit Ecuador, was the result of a strategy to avert an alleged act of aggression during difficult times.”35 The ostensible implication of these historical facts is that the military appear to be institutionally unconstrained and politically secure to engage in direct conversations with their counterparts in their respective countries. On the other hand, civilian politicians in Ecuador and Peru, perhaps, concluded that it was politically inexpedient to pay an official visit to the other country. Historically, it is quite possible that the presidents and their respective political advisors from either country have assumed that a presidential visit could be perceived by their respective constituencies as a lack of political resolve and national character. Thus, official presidential visits between Ecuador and Peru may have been determined to be a political liability rather than an asset to the career and policy agenda of any governing president in either country in the last forty years. Although the number of joint military production projects in the region remained relatively insignificant throughout the period of the militarist peace, the trend of both the frequency of joint military exercises and training, and the rate of military training and instruction in intraregional and international war colleges paralleled the pattern of the ratios establishing a comparison of military to civilian intraregional interactions. For example, besides Argentina, Brazil, and Chile since the late 1960s, there is no other country in the region that actually engaged in the manufacturing of military materiel. Thus, this indicator is a poor measure of the process of transnational military collaboration and socialization. Only Argentina and Brazil had one or two minor joint military production programs in each decade. On the other hand, the South American militaries engaged more meaningfully in joint military exercises, training, and instructions in both intraregional sites and international schools. Here the U.S. role was initially important in bringing the region’s military together after the organization of the post–World War II defense treaty. First, the United States set up the School of the Americas (currently known as Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation), where the Latin American military received military and political instructions. Also, the United States organized UNITAS. This is a large, multinational naval operation in the Southern Hemisphere that brings together the U.S. and the South American navies. This operation has been held each year in June since 1959 and its primary goal is “to strengthen defense in support of U.S. policy of engagement in South America.”36 Despite these facilitating conditions, it is interesting to note that when the administration of President Jimmy Carter embargoed the sale of armaments to military regimes in South America, the rate of bilateral military training, exercises, and instructions in intraregional war schools increased significantly as revealed in table 7.1. This is partial indication that the region’s military were capable of maintaining strong sociopolitical and professional links in the absence of U.S. influence and promotion of regional cooperation.


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Other discreet measures and Indications of Military Transnational Identity and solidarity Another partial manifestation of a transnational military confraternity in South America is the evidence of past collusion among the military regimes in the Southern Cone in the so-called Operation Condor in the 1970s.37 This operation brought together the military regimes of various countries to fight collectively against their respective internal political foes. One reporter claims that documents found in 1993 in Paraguay confirm the existence of this arrangement and describe it as a “collaboration network set up by the military regimes which ruled Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Paraguay in the 1970s and 1980s.” According to the same report, “dissidents from other countries were captured and returned without trial or court order.”38 It is clear that this secret multinational agreement among the military regimes in the Southern Cone reveals the propensity and eagerness of the military to collaborate to protect their institutional and political interest against internal foes. Another salient and convincing clue of the existence of a loose overarching regional organization is a recent plan, proposed by the Argentine Department of Defense, to organize and integrate an unified military force among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and possibly Chile as well. Known in Spanish as Sistema de Seguridad Común (Common Security System), the proposed project calls for the consolidation of a “single defense mechanism to prevent and fight outbursts of national violence, consequence of indigenism, peasant problems, subversion, terrorism, and narcotraffic.”39 The first meeting of such defense arrangement took place on July 25 and 26, 1997.40 For the sake of extrapolating and inferring causality from the evidence available, it is important to note the evident urgency of a reporter to emphasize the overtone of a possible military initiative behind the entire project. In describing and situating the type of locality where the meeting took place, she writes, “Exactly at 70 kilometers from Rio de Janeiro, at an inexpugnable hotel complex of the Brazilian Army in the town of Itaipava, began yesterday the first official meeting of the Argentine-Brazilian Committee of Consultation and Cooperation on Security and Defense Matters.”41 In other words, from the outset of her article this reporter connects emphatically the militarized environs with the nature and content of the plan for a Common Security System. Evidently, the mere existence of a plan for a Common Security System represents the first piece of concrete evidence of what up to that period was in theory only a discrete and unpremeditated evolutionary process of regional military socialization. It is intriguing, however, that such an overt manifestation of transnational military identification in South America occurred at a time when civilian and democratically elected governments were politically stronger than in yesteryears, and the overall political power and autonomy of the military appeared to be declining across the region. One possible explanation for such paradoxical development is the possibility that the military sectors were putting pressure on civilian governments to respect their political turf and make concessions in exchange for their acquiescence to reductions in their size, resources, budget, and overall national political role. Moreover, it is quite revealing that, in light of the retirement of Augusto Pinochet as head of the Chilean Armed Forces in March 1998, President Carlos

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Menem of Argentina, accompanied by Martín Balza, chief of the Argentine military, visited Chile exactly a week after the plan for a Common Security System was presented to Brazilian civilian and military officials. As reported in the press in Argentina and Chile, both Pinochet and Balza were very “evasive” when asked directly about the project for a Common Security System, the possibility of Chile joining this arrangement, and the announcement of joint Argentine-Chilean military maneuvers.42 The reticence of both military men may be interpreted as an attempt to conceal the actual degree of military involvement and influence in devising, formulating, and implementing the Common Security System, a plan aimed directly at curbing internal social political disturbances via the coordination and cooperation of the unified regional military establishments. The Possibility of a Military “Epistemic Community” The spontaneous convergence of socioeconomic, political, and occupational interests among the military establishments in South America may lead some world politics experts to interpret this transnational development as some sort of “epistemic community.” Hence, it is important to discuss this approach and its applicability to the case at hand before we engage in the empirical identification and explanation of the process of socialization among the military. As Peter M. Haas explains it, between constraining systemic conditions and domestic pressures, there is still a great deal of latitude for state action. That is, how states identify their interests and recognize their range of policy options within specific issue-areas are functions conceived to be greatly dependent on human agency. And, in turn, policy makers’ decisions are further constrained by knowledge and/or information. In other words, how policy makers identify interests, and devise policies to attain and protect them is a direct function of the manner they understand them, or is presented to them by those experts to whom they turn for advice under conditions of uncertainty. In this sense, the epistemic community approach to the study and analysis of international political events focuses on “the role that networks of knowledge-based experts play in articulating the cause-andeffect relationships of complex problems, helping states identify their interests, framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient points for negotiation.” In sum, he identifies an epistemic community as a “network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”43 Certainly, the military in South America may claim an authoritative expertise on the question of how to protect, via military means, the state and its people from catastrophic events like militarized crises, wars, and natural disasters. However, the concern here is to explain how the convergence of interests among the various military establishments in South America has caused a protracted absence of intraregional interstate wars. As the causal argument presented above maintains, the military have opted against fighting intraregional interstate wars and have formed a loosely organized supranational professional identity as a consequence of their national political interests


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and competition for power against other significant national political actors in South American societies. In no manner does the argument point toward the integration and influence of a transnational group, or epistemic community of military experts on the issue of strategies for regional peace. To be sure, the military have directly been the decision makers in most South American states for most of the time during the last seventy years. In this regard, their aversion to external war and supranational professional solidarity derives from their focus on domestic politics, and their mutual empathy derives from fighting similar domestic political rivals over the years in their respective countries. In sum, the epistemic community approach is not a useful tool to analyze and explain the peace in South America. This is the case because the socioeconomic and political development evolved principally as an unintended consequence of the shift in the mission of the military in South America. Evolution of the Process of Socialization Among the Military The discussion that follows is intended to only be a general map of the most salient sequence of historical and socioeconomic and political factors that may have influenced and contributed to the evolution of the socialization process, which ultimately transformed the preferences, motivations, and interests of the military in South America. In the course of this analysis will be discussed, first, how the professionalization of the armed forces in South America may have played a role in this process. Second, the potential impact on the military mind of the lessons learned from the Chaco War will be examined. Third, the effort of the United States to organize a hemispheric defense pact in the region after World War II will be analyzed and how its more direct involvement in the training and supply of these armies may have boosted the already close ties among the militaries in South America increased their level of politicization, and shifted the focus of their national mission. Finally, this work will explore how the 1948 Costa Rican Civil War, the Cuban Revolution of 1959, and the closer ties of the new Cuban leadership with the former Soviet Union further politicized and polarized closer together the military in South America. Professionalization of the Armed Forces, 1886–1940 Samuel Huntington differentiates between professional soldiers and warriors according to differences in their formal training, discipline, organization, and political activity in their own societies. In Huntington’s ideal classification, while a professional soldier is formally trained, disciplined, and uninvolved in the domestic political process, a warrior is not. He asserts that “professionalism distinguishes the military officer of today from the warriors of previous ages.”44 More specifically, by professionalization of the armed forces, he means that since modern warfare “was no longer a simple, uncomplicated affair,” it became almost impossible for the military to master the new skills needed “while still remaining competent in many other fields.” He adds that, particularly, “it became impossible to be an expert in the management of violence for external defense and at the same time to be skilled

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in either politics and statecraft or the use of force for the maintenance of internal order. The functions of the officers became distinct from those of the politician and policeman.”45 Huntington considers depoliticization of the armed forces and civilian control of the military as two basic elements of military professionalism. He discusses “subjective” and “objective” forms of civilian control over the military, and concludes that the latter minimizes military power “by professionalizing the military, by rendering them politically sterile and neutral.”46 While for Huntington, yesterday’s warriors are those individuals who engaged in warfare since the earliest recorded history to the beginning of the Napoleonic Wars, a similar distinction also applies to South America. Prior to the advent of the European military missions to South America at the end of the nineteenth century, the institutional organization, training, supply, and political discipline of the armed forces in this region were precarious. In most countries a variety of organized armed bands served the interests of local caudillos or of different political factions. The officer corps of the time were constituted by warriors, who lacked the most sophisticated and modern forms of military tactics, training, and discipline.47 In fact, only the Chilean and Brazilian armies were not the anachronistic products of the independence movements.48 These conditions began to change in 1885 when Emil Körner, a career officer in the Kaiser’s army was commissioned by the Chilean government to teach military science, history, and tactics. On September 9, 1886 he formally inaugurated the Academia de Guerra in Santiago de Chile, beginning, in this manner, the process of professionalization of the military in South America.49 After German, French, and a second generation of Prussianized Chilean and Argentine military instructors began to teach military science and discipline to all regional armed forces in the mid-1890s and early 1900s, important changes occurred in the social composition, discipline, and organization of the officer corps. First, service in the recently professionalized armed forces began to attract to the officer corps “better educated and less adventurous” individuals, who shared the socioeconomic values of the incipient middle class in South America. As John J. Johnson points out the new generation of cadets was quite different from earlier ones: They came from families that accepted the traditional value systems, but the cadets themselves, by inclination and training, thought more in national and technological terms than did either their parents or their superiors in the armed forces. The thinking of the new cadets made them far better prepared to accommodate themselves to the social-political consequences of economic change than were the landholding elements.50

Second, discipline and the organization of the armed forces ceased to be based on the ad hoc personal whim and designs of local military leaders and caudillos. Instead, a code of conduct was instituted in most countries and the organization and administration of the armed forces became bureaucratized and directed by a general staff, or the Estado Mayor of the armed forces.51 The further professional advancement of the armed forces in South America in the 1930s and 1940s eliminated from the military institution most, if not all, vestiges


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of the old oligarchic and aristocratic elements, so influential and conflict-prone in the postindependence period up until the War of the Pacific, 1879–1884 and prior to World War I. During this period, and for the duration of the long period of peace, most of the officers and many of the soldiers proceeded, in general terms, from a similar socioeconomic stratum. Alfred Stepan writes that he was “especially fortunate” to meet a commandant of the General Staff School who permitted him to have access to the Brazilian military personnel files. From his analysis of the data, it becomes evident that, in comparing the periods 1941–1943 and 1962–1966, the Brazilian army officer corps was overwhelmingly drawn from the middle classes. One case in the selected years does not support the general contention about the rest of the countries in South America; nonetheless, Stepan’s findings are cited because it is certain that given the access to the files, similar studies of the other countries in the region would reveal comparable results. Such results would only strengthen the argument regarding the link between analogous socioeconomic and political belief and value systems among military officers with similar social origins, and their marked aversion to intraregional interstate war since the process of professionalization took roots in South America at the end of the nineteenth century.52 The analogous socioeconomic and political background of these individuals contributed to the evolution of common attitudes, outlooks, beliefs, values, and political principles regarding their profession and organization across and within societies.53 As an expert on the Latin American military institution affirms “. . . more than being reformist or conservative, the armed forces are disposed to look to their own interests. It is a highly self-regarding profession, whose members, like members of a religious order, are strongly socialized to their discipline.”54 Such affinity among the various military establishments has only helped ease, propel, and maintain mutual understanding and respect among the military sectors in the region. In short, this social-historical development has contributed to foster and preserve interstate peace in South America. As the passages quoted above from Huntington’s work on the professionalization of the armed forces illustrate, the underlying assumption of his argument is that military professionalism entails the apolitical development of specific skills for the conduct of conventional war against foreign armies. Contrary to this prediction, the process of professionalization in South America did not reduce the political participation of the military in the national political process. In fact, Guillermo O’Donnell affirms that as a result of “their professionalism, not in spite of it, professionalized armed forces take upon themselves the responsibility for overcoming recurring civil-military crises by way of the installation of a new political regime.” He elaborates further that the military “consider the potential militarization of all salient social problems and their resolution . . . as ideologically justified.”55 While the process of military professionalization dramatically reduced the level of intraregional interstate violence prevalent prior to 1886, it increased the level of intranational conflict and war. Based on these empirical observations, one concludes that military professionalization contributed to the evolution of interstate peace, because it shifted the military mission and focus from interstate conflict to internal war. Supporting directly this conclusion, Edwin Lieuwen

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writes that [t]he growth of truly national, professional armies was undoubtedly an important factor in helping to produce international as well as domestic calm. In South America, for example, five wars were fought in the period 1825 to 1883, but after the latter date none occurred until the Chaco War broke out in 1932. Peace was at least partly a product of the decline in militarism and the rise in professionalism. Ambitious regional military chieftains who had previously provoked boundary squabbles were now held at bay.56

Although presumably contradicting the earlier thesis proposed by Huntington, the above conclusion, on the shift of the military focus and mission as a factor influencing the evolution of the South American peace, is actually consistent with Huntington’s later writings on civil-military relations and patterns of violence in world politics. He distinguishes between interstate conflicts and domestic wars, and he asserts that if the focus of the military shifts from one to the other (as appears to have been the case after the inception and evolution of the professionalization period of the South American armed forces) it will encourage a different form of civil-military relations. As he explains, [T]he more a state achieves a system of objective civilian control the more effective it is in providing for its external security and in conducting foreign wars. Domestic war, on the other hand, demands subjective civilian control. . . . In domestic war the political and military roles of the principal actors are merged on both sides, and political and military means become indistinguishable. In a coup d’ètat generals play political roles and governmental leaders, if they are able, exercise military command. In domestic war, moreover, the targets of both contestants are political institutions, social groups, and the general population. . . . Thus the military forces which are employed and the nature of the leadership, on both sides, tend to be directly opposed to that required for interstate wars. . . . [T]he change in function from interstate to domestic conflict may have drastic effect upon the attitudes of military officers toward their government and upon their amenability to the traditional forms of objective civilian control.57

Recognizing this qualification in Huntington’s argument enabled Alfred Stepan to establish, subsequently, the differences between the “old professionalism of external warfare” and “the new professionalism of internal security and national development.” As Stepan explains, the success of revolutionary warfare against conventional armies in the 1950s and 1960s led the military in many developed and underdeveloped areas to focus on devising military and political strategies to combat or prevent domestic revolutionary warfare. The new professionalism called for intense schooling for officers to acquire added expertise in internal security issues involving all matters of social, economic, and political life.58 In the final analysis, the “new professionalism” of the South American armed forces is only the culmination of a long process that made the military institution better equipped overall to compete in the national political process of these societies. The influx of better educated cadets and officers, with similar socioeconomic and political attitudes and values, harmonized the interests and relations among the military sectors in the region. As a result, the level of intraregional interstate


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violence considerably decreased while domestic violence and military politicization increased amidst the process of the “new” professionalization. In fact, it is also plausible to argue that the increased politicization and military attention to domestic political issues may have exhausted the military of any residual energy or interest to contend against a neighbor for any type of stake. Lessons from the Chaco War The “fratricidal” Chaco War stands as the turning point in the collective mentality and attitude of the military in South America. While prior intraregional interstate wars in the nineteenth century were fought between unprofessional caudillo armies, remnants of the wars of independence, local militia bands, adventurers, and soldier-statesmen, the war between Bolivia and Paraguay was the first and only major conflict since the professionalization of the armed forces began in South America in the late nineteenth century. It is true that, compared to the level of professionalization of the armed forces of the larger countries in the region, the Bolivian and Paraguayan forces in the early 1930s have to be classified at most as two incipient professional armies in South America. The process of professionalization in both countries began roughly after the end of the World War I in 1919 when German, British, and French military missions arrived in both countries. Nonetheless, military professionalization had taken root in other countries and they all looked at the Bolivian-Paraguayan conflict with great apprehension and empathy. In this sense the high number of casualties, and the material and moral costs sustained by both military establishments were the first clear evidence for all South American militaries that at times of war officers and soldiers will bear the brunt of the suffering.59 However important these may be, the most significant lesson from the war for the military mind was to witness the political discredit to the military institutions in both countries for permitting foreign commercial interests to manipulate them and drive them to war.60 The lessons learned from the Chaco War awakened and sensitized the military to the institutional, socioeconomic and political, and human costs of intraregional interstate wars. Within two years from the end of the war, Bolivia and Paraguay experienced social revolutions, succession of governments, and social unrests. Possibly, the war taught the military in South America that they did not need an external war to increase their political power and role within the domestic societies and, perhaps, made them realize that war would not only be very costly, but it could eventually lead to domestic unrest and loss of political power. Half a century later, the Argentine military relearned this lesson the hard way. Their failure to regain by force control of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic from the British proved to be very costly. Less than two years after the Anglo-Argentine conflict, the military not only had to surrender control of the government to civilian authorities, but, more importantly, many of them lost their individual freedom when they were incarcerated at home and sought abroad by other country’s justice system for abuses committed while in power.61 In addition to the political and human costs, the military institution in Argentina was reduced considerably (e.g., reduction in budget, equipment, personnel, and political role) by successive civilian governments since 1984.62

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Post–World War II Defense Pact and Political Polarization The process of socialization continued its course and acquired added strength during and after the World War II. The effort of the United States to organize a hemispheric defense pact against an extra-continental power at the end of the war brought all South American military closer together.63 Participation in this hemispheric defense coalition signified that the officers would attend together several layers of military training school; they would attend several periodic conferences and social-political functions which would make them more familiar with each other and intermingle in a more relaxed social setting than from their respective governmental positions in their home countries.64 Also, the end of World War II ushered in a period in South American regional politics in which the military became quite politicized. It was at this juncture when the armed forces actually began to perceive one another as members of a loosely organized supranational structure engaged mostly in political competition for control of the government in their respective states. Consequently, they began to see other socioeconomic and political groups and organizations in their own home states as increasingly their true enemies and not other armies across the borders. A wave of democratization between 1940 and 1948 swept the military from government in most South American states. Moreover, increasing socioeconomic and political problems like the strengthening of communist movements, labor unrest for higher wages, and better working conditions, and generalized social discontent threatened the stability of nations and, in particular, the very existence of the military institution and its way of life in the event of a social revolution. This situation, coupled with the incapacity of civilian governments to deal with these and many other problems, prompted the military back into politics via military coups. Thus, a rash of military regimes took control of most of the South American states in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In sum, the direct participation of the military in the national political process of these societies in the postwar years contributed to further the shift of the military mission from external protection of the state to internal security and political competition. Partial evidence for this pattern is the sharp reduction in the nature and frequency of intraregional interstate militarized disputes. In fact, since the 1941 Ecuadorian-Peruvian conflict, no other militarized dispute took place in the region until the 1978 Argentine-Chilean dispute over the Beagle Channel. Coupling the increased military focus on the internal political process of their countries and the absence of external militarized disputes leads to the conclusion that the South American militaries not only learned to live in peace with one another, but that they began to perceive domestic socioeconomic and political conditions as their most immediate threats.

Revolutions and Their Impact on the Military Mind The process of politicization and the gradual amalgamation of all military sectors in South America into an overarching regional socioeconomic and political institution gained further momentum in the aftermaths of the 1948 Costa Rican Civil War,


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and the 1959 Cuban Revolution and its subsequent radicalization. The immediate and permanent dissolution of the armed forces of Costa Rica after the 1948 civil war,65 and the overthrow of Fulgencio Batista’s military dictatorship demonstrated to all military sectors in the region that socioeconomic and political discontent at home, properly channeled by urban political opposition groups and a band of armed guerrillas in the countryside, could seriously undermine the socioeconomic and political and institutional interests of the military in any country. The absolute dismantling of the old military institution in Costa Rica and Cuba, the subsequent turn toward the Soviet orbit by the new Cuban leadership, and Cuba’s active promotion and support of leftist guerrilla foci in South America during the 1960s instilled great fear and distrust in the mental state of the military.66 It became clear to them that they had to stand together and address the economic needs and socioeconomic and political discontent of the people. Their response was a twopronged approach: first, to engage actively in economic development projects and, second, to control, even if forcefully, all national socioeconomic and political groups and organizations in their respective countries. This military response to the socioeconomic and political problems of the 1960s and 1970s was articulated in the new doctrine of “national security and development.” The basic tenets of this doctrine included the following: (1) that in addition to the traditional aim of preparing for foreign war, the local armed forces needed to prepare for internal warfare against subversive agents; (2) that since the enemy was multifaceted internal warfare was ideological, economic, and political; (3) that an unclear definition of the enemy required the combat experience of the armed forces and their special preparation for warfare to properly identify the enemy and devise the most effective strategy; and (4) victory in this war meant the achievement of a satisfactory state of national security in which vital national interests (i.e., development and sovereignty) would be safeguarded against internal or external disturbances.67 The implementation of this doctrine eventually led to the spread of a new type of military regime—the bureaucratic authoritarian systems—in South America in the mid-1960s and 1970s, which produced a great deal of political collaboration and cooperation among the military in the region, particularly in the Southern Cone. As discussed above, there is evidence that in the mid-1970s military regimes in this region developed a formidable repressive apparatus outside their borders to eradicate all armed and political opposition. Their operations included the kidnapping and disappearance of key political opposition leaders living in exile in adjacent countries; the signing of counter insurgency intelligence treaties among Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay; and free supply of arms to Paraguay and Uruguay, aimed at achieving “a real and effective integration of Latin American countries.” Also, a multilateral agreement known as the Operation Condor among the military regimes in the Southern Cone provided for the exchange of political prisoners in order to exterminate all political opposition in this region.68 As discussed above, the process of professionalization, the lessons drawn from the Chaco War, the political polarization in the post–World War II period, and the impact of two social revolutions on the regional military institutions constitute a sequence of historical and socioeconomic and political factors that influenced

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decisively the evolution of the socialization process of the military in South America. In turn, this process of socialization transformed and harmonized the regional military preferences, motivations, and interests. One such common military interest in the 1970s was the counterinsurgency campaign in the Southern Cone of South America. As the causal sequence of the argument presented in this chapter posits, if the transformed disposition of the military is coupled with their traditional political power and autonomy in their own societies, then it can be understood why the military sectors in the region have avoided another major war in this century. The four factors discussed above aided the process of military socialization and the shift in the focus and mission of the military from external to internal protection of the state. In this sense, the South American peace was a consequence, not a cause, of the process of military socialization in South America. Accordingly, it is possible to conclude that while the military factor was one of the major culprits of much internal political violence and abuses, it remains as a plausible explanation for the absence of war in South America over seven decades.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: POWER, PRINCIPLES, OR MILITARIST PEACE?

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the main arguments and findings from the three-part investigation of the evolution of peace or the absence of war in South America. The analysis demonstrates that this is an anomalous historical development whose fundamental etiology is not apparent. Moreover, the long period of peace proves to be a formidable challenge to the theoretical precepts and explanatory tools of political realism and international liberalism. As established at the beginning of this study, the absence of a major intraregional interstate war since 1935 is an anomaly given the presence of enduring conditions necessary for conflict and war. Despite the constant potential for interstate conflict and war, South American states enjoyed a protracted period of intraregional interstate peace. More importantly, however, this work reveals that established international relations theories on the causes of war and peace fail to provide a general and compelling explanation of the origin and evolution of this paradoxical political development. It is demonstrated that, while the conditions for the outbreak of war, assumed by realists, have been present throughout the duration of the long period of peace in South America, realist hypotheses accounted for only a partial explanation of this case. Conversely, it is, also, confirmed that the absence of objective, independent conditions for interstate peace, posited by several international liberal propositions, did not prevent the outbreak and evolution of interstate peace. Faced with the theoretical paradox outlined above, this work concentrated on the analysis of the political role of the military in South American states and its potential effect on the outbreak and evolution of the South American peace. Benefiting from hindsight understanding of social and political events in this region, the political influence of the military institution at both the domestic and regional levels was identified as the most plausible and constant historical variable, with potential causal effect that links domestic-level sources with international outcomes. Thus, this work analyzed how the political power and decision-making autonomy of the military in South American polities, coupled with a change in their interests, motivations, and mission, due to a long-evolving process of

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socialization, contributed simultaneously to the intensification of national political violence and to the evolution of the peace. More specifically, this work establishes at the outset the anomalous nature of the long period of peace in South America. First, although the region was historically more peaceful than other peripheral world regions, the potential for a major interstate war was present throughout the period in question. This conclusion was based on the history of previous interstate wars, militarized border clashes, the training and arming of the region’s armed forces, and some lingering bilateral territorial disputes that have been resolved now. Second, this work introduces a two-by-two matrix on the normal or anomalous nature of interstate peace in the international system. One of four possibilities in this matrix, given the presence of objective conditions for conflict and the absence of war, is an anomalous outbreak of interstate peace. The long period of peace is identified as an instance of such a case. Finally, a literature review of works on the outbreak of both “stable” and “unstable” interstate peace established the peculiarity of the South American peace. Based on this literature exegesis, it is concluded that the absence of major war in seven decades is a direct instance of “unstable peace” that defies conventional causal arguments advanced by works on the outbreak and evolution of interstate peace. Having established that the South American peace is indeed an anomaly the investigation tests different alternative explanations or sufficient conditions for the evolution and permanence of intraregional interstate peace in South America. At this point the study examines the theoretical foundations and implications of several realist hypotheses on the causes of international war and peace. Based on relevant empirical evidence from the seven-decade peace, the explanatory value of these propositions is evaluated in chapters 3 and 4. In the analysis of the data it has been uncovered, first, that the South American subsystem has been bipolar for most of the time comprising the seven-decade peace and that bipolarity appears to have no direct effect on the outbreak and evolution of interstate peace. Second, the impact of dyadic deterrence on the prevention of interstate war is analyzed in eight different intraregional dyads. It is concluded from this analysis that dyadic general deterrence is a partial explanation for the absence of war among some pairs of countries in South America. Finally, it is established that, in spite of United States hegemonic power in Latin America in general, the impact of this country’s might on the evolution and permanence of the South American peace is inconclusive. It is observed that, short of a unilateral military intervention to enforce peace, the United States was either uninterested in taking a direct mediating role or had limited leverage on the South American states in times of crisis. Even in relatively simpler cases like the 1969 war between El Salvador and Honduras, or in cases affecting its systemic strategic interests like the 1982 South Atlantic conflict between Argentina and Great Britain, the United States was reluctant to flex its military muscle to coerce belligerents to sue for peace and avoid war. Having found no conclusive explanation among the realist hypotheses for the evolution and permanence of interstate peace in South America, this work proceeded to examine several alternative explanations from the international liberal paradigm. In chapter 5, the theoretical foundations and implications of economic

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and political liberalism for interstate peace in South America are examined. In chapter 6, the causal arguments of three liberal hypotheses are tested against the political and economic history of intraregional interstate relations during the long period of peace. The conclusion from the analysis of data on regime type, on intraregional trade and economic interdependence, and on conflict management by formal international governmental organizations in South America is, first, that peace was not a form of democratic peace. Throughout this period, South American countries were ruled alternatively by democratic and dictatorial regimes without causing any degree of variation on the level of intraregional interstate violence. Moreover, even when the scope of the test is narrowed to the potential, preventive effect of democratic governments on dyadic militarized crises, there is no noticeable positive correlation between an increased number of dictatorships and a greater incidence of militarized interstate disputes. The analysis of data on intraregional bilateral trade and economic interdependence demonstrates that levels of commerce between rival countries remained consistently low throughout the period in question. This finding leads to the conclusion that, at least in the South American case, interstate peace was not triggered by high or significant volumes of bilateral trade and economic interdependence. Finally, this study finds that, among the three diplomatic techniques most often used by international institutions to manage and mediate conflict and crises in South America, only peaceful judicial settlement had a greater, albeit limited, impact on preventing the outbreak of war. With the principle of collective security never implemented whenever there was an opportunity, arms control and disarmament remained the second most popular diplomatic technique to prevent war in the region. Nevertheless, the tendency among South American states was to be publicly supportive in words of these grandiose proposals, but privately uncommitted in deeds toward arms control and disarmament. Based on this finding it seems plausible to conclude that, even with the most popular diplomatic mechanisms, international governmental institutions had a minor impact on the origin and evolution of peace in South America. This work spawns several important historical, methodological, and theoretical contributions for the analysis of international politics, particularly on the question of war and peace. From a historical perspective, the focus of this work on the absence of major intraregional interstate war underscores and clarifies several important points and misconceptions about the political history of South America. First, it distinguishes the violent pre-1935 time from the more peaceful post–Chaco War period, which evolved amidst frequent and often severe bouts of political violence in South American polities. Second, given lingering territorial disputes and numerous militarized crises, it emphasizes the anomalous historical nature of peace and highlights the historical and theoretical importance of an academically neglected political development. Third, it debunks the popular notion that peace and war in South America were determined by the regional design of the United States. Fourth, it specifies the historical paradox between an enduring intraregional interstate peace amidst recurring and catastrophic outbursts of national political violence in regional states. Finally, it identifies the evolution

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and socialization of the military institution as a major contributing factor to both domestic political violence and to the outbreak and evolution of regional interstate peace. The study demonstrates the methodological utility of a nonevent case study for testing established theories on the causes of war and peace, and for advancing new theoretical perspectives and alternative explanations. By concentrating on the question of what prevented, rather than on what caused a war among either potential or actual adversaries, it is necessary to emphasize certain points, and analyze the data from a somewhat different standpoint. Since it is one of the most compelling realist explanations for the case at hand, it is convenient for illustrative purposes to discuss briefly the hegemonic role of the United States in the evolution of peace in South America. Operating from the assumption that hegemony is one of the causes of interstate peace in the periphery, the U.S. hegemony in South America is assumed and this work proceeds to examine the relationship between purpose and behavior. In other words, rather than engaging in the measurement of U.S. hegemonic power over a seventy-year period and its effect on peace and security, the focus of the research question makes it necessary to inquire into whether or not U.S. behavior in South America was historically consistent with its stated interests of peace and security in the region. By pursuing this line of inquiry the work is able to determine that most often the behavior of the United States did not conform to its publicly stated goals. It is established that in several crisis situations the United States was either unable or unwilling to participate actively as a mediator. This finding is interpreted as clear evidence that, despite its hegemonic power, the United States was not directly responsible for preventing the outbreak of war in South America. The focus of this work is different from other analyses in international relations that concentrate on this question: what caused the outbreak of a war in the periphery. First, since in such instance war is assumed to be outright detrimental to the national interest and purpose of the hegemon, then it is expected that it will do its utmost to prevent it. Thus, the incidence of a war will most certainly indicate that hegemony is irrelevant and cannot be selected as one of the competing explanations for the analysis. Second, if the decision is made to test and apply the explanatory value of the proposition that hegemony causes peace in the periphery, then it will most likely guide the research toward an analysis of whether or not an absence of, or a decline in, hegemonic power in the region caused the outbreak of war. In studies aimed at explaining what caused a war, the purpose and behavior of the hegemon are assumed to be consistent. They build on the presupposition that a hegemon will utilize its power to prevent war among regional subordinate states. Therefore, it is necessary to establish, first, the prevalence of a hegemon and, second, determine whether or not there has been a recent decline in its hegemonic power. For these specific objectives it is necessary to gather and measure data on the relative power of the potential hegemon. In the event that no significant power shift is found and the cause of the war cannot be traced to the absence of, or to a decline in, hegemonic power, then hegemony is discarded in favor of an alternative explanation. In such a scenario, the research would leave unexplored the causal relation between interest and behavior. In other words, the analysis would fail to notice the

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possibility that the purpose and degree of hegemonic commitment did not rise to a level sufficiently significant to warrant its direct involvement in preventing the outbreak of war. The results stemming from the systematic testing and analysis of several realist and liberal propositions on the causes of war and peace demonstrate their explanatory shortcomings regarding peace in South America. The inadequacy of these hypotheses indicated the need to search for an alternative explanation that would elucidate the absence of intraregional interstate war amidst recurring bouts of national political violence over a seven-decade period. One single variable appeared to be historically constant, transnationally homogeneous in composition and behavior, and politically powerful to directly and simultaneously impact political events at both the national and regional levels. It is apparent that only the military, as both a national and supranational institution, fulfilled these requirements. The precise theoretical contribution of this work for the study of war and peace stems primarily from the formulation and analysis of a proposition that centers on the military institution as a crucial causal variable in the outbreak and evolution of unstable interstate peace in the periphery. This work establishes the benefit of advancing an evolutionary and dynamic analysis that combines domestic and international variables. By adopting this analytical position, it is possible to demonstrate how international political events (i.e., the Chaco War, the transgenerational process of military professionalization, the aftermath of World War II, and revolutions in Costa Rica and Cuba) contributed to the evolution of a transnational confraternity among the military in South America. This development, combined with the increasing political power and autonomy of the military in their respective societies, gave the military control over the war-making decision and progressively changed their mission from external to internal protection of the state. With an ever increasing stake in the national political process, the military became confrontational at home and peaceful toward the other regional national armies. In general terms, the militarist peace argument in this work advances the notion that individuals, by virtue of being members of the armed forces, tend to develop over time similar values, beliefs, and principles that foster an increasing identification with the interest, progress, and success of the military institution in their respective countries. In societies lacking effective civilian control over the armed forces and where the military plays a direct role in the national political process, the military institution behaves as an organized and disciplined national political actor. Accordingly, the military’s increasing stake in the national political process makes the armed forces inward-looking and more concerned with internal threats to their socioeconomic and political interests. In a region such as South America where this phenomenon became generalized over a seventy-year period, the military of the region developed a sense of transnational identity or regional confraternity that enhanced the prospect for interstate peace. Unfortunately, the price for the long period of peace in terms of human rights violations, political persecution, disappearance of political prisoners, and generalized coercion is too steep for any polity to bear. The evolution of the militarist peace is not a blanket formula for the advancement of peace and security in the periphery. It is, thus, an inappropriate prescription at this stage. The findings of this analysis

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indicate, nonetheless, that a sense of transnational military identity—one not fueled by the specter of national political competition and internal threats to the interests of the military institution, but rather encouraged by respect for individual liberties, human rights, and the proper role of the military institution in a strictly democratically governed society—may prove valuable for preventing war and achieving peace in the international system.

NOTES

Introduction: Absence of War or Enduring Peace? 1. Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648–1989 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 304; Steven R. David, “Why the Third World Still Matters,” International Security, vol. 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992–1993), p. 131; Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” World Politics, vol. 43, no. 2 (January 1991), pp. 253–255; Evan Luard, War in International Society: A Study in International Sociology (London: I. B. Tauris, 1986), p. 77; and for a list of wars in the third world, see Guy Arnold, Wars in the Third World Since 1945 (London: Cassell Publishers, 1991). 2. Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1987–1988 (Washington, DC: World Priorities, 1987), pp. 28–31. 3. For those who have been attracted to long periods of peace among Great Powers, see John L. Gaddis, The Long Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 215–247. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., The Long Postwar Peace (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991); John E. Muller, Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989); and Stephen R. Rock, Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989). Examples of works devoted to the study of the long periods of peace in Latin America in general or South America in particular, see Michael Desch, “Why Latin America May Miss the Cold War: The United States and the Future of Inter-American Security Relations,” in Jorge I. Domínguez, ed., International Security and Democracy (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998), pp. 245–265; Arie M. Kacowicz, Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998); David R. Mares, Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Jorge I. Domínguez et. al., “Why So Little Warfare?” in Jorge I. Domínguez, Boundary Disputes in Latin America, Peaceworks 50 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2000), pp. 20–25; and David McIntyre, “The Longest Peace: Why Are There So Few Interstate Wars in South America?” PhD dissertation, The University of Chicago, December 1995. 4. This study follows the classification advanced by Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 82–99. Other compilers, utilizing less stringent criteria, have counted seven and eleven wars respectively. See Robert N. Burr, By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830–1905 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p. 1; and Luard, War in International Society.

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NOTES

5. Jack Child, “Conflicts in Latin America: Present and Potential,” research paper (Stockholm: SIPRI, 1980); Jorge I. Domínguez, “Ghosts From the Past: War, Territorial and Boundary Disputes in Mainland Central and South America Since 1960,” unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, May 1977 as cited by Gregory F. Treverton, “Interstate Conflict in Latin America,” in Kevin J. Middlebrook and Carlos Rico, The United States and Latin America in the 1980s (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986), pp. 565–591; Jorge I. Domínguez, “Los Conflictos Internacionales en América Latina y la Amenaza de Guerra,” Foro Internacional, vol. 25, no. 97 (July 1984), pp. 1–13; Wolf Grabendorff, “Interstate Conflict Behavior and Regional Potential for Conflict in Latin America,” Working Papers, no. 116, Latin American Program (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 1982); and Kenneth Nolde, “Arms and Security in South America: Towards an Alternate View,” PhD dissertation, University of Miami, 1980, pp. 285–287. 6. For the methodological significance of this strategy, see James D. Fearon, “Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science,” World Politics, vol. 43, no. 2 (January 1991), pp. 169–195, specifically see pp. 183–184. 7. Robert Jervis, “War and Misperception,” in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 106. 8. For those who have examined the absence of war in the Soviet-American rivalry, see those listed in foot note 3 and the literature on crisis management and prevention Alexander L. George, ed., Managing U.S.-Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983); Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallin, eds., U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); and Alexander L. George, ed., Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991). For works on the absence of war in the developed world, see Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1969); Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, “In Search of Peace Systems: Scandinavia and the Netherlands, 1870–1970,” in Bruce M. Russett, ed., Peace, War, and Numbers (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), pp. 239–274; Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 12, nos. 3 and 4 (Summer/Fall 1983), pp. 205–235 and 323–353; Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review, vol. 80, no. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151–1169; and Bruce M. Russett, “The Politics of An Alternative Security System: Toward a More Democratic and Therefore More Peaceful World,” in Burns Weston, ed., Alternatives to Nuclear Deterrence (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989). 9. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott (New York: Collier Books, A Division of Macmillan, 1962), pp. 98–102. 10. John L. Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” International Security, vol. 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992–1993), p. 25. Emphasis added. 11. Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson Press, 1966), pp. 150–155; and Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 221. 12. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391–425.

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13. Robert G. Gilpin attempts to integrate HST (Hegemonic Stability Theory) into the realm of security, Robert G. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). For background literature on the origin and evolution of hegemonic stability theory, see Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Robert G. Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Stephen D. Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics, vol. 28, no. 3 (April 1976), pp. 317–347; Robert O. Keohane, “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967–1977,” in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George, eds., Change in the International System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 131–162, specifically p. 136; Duncan Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization, vol. 39, no. 4 (Autumn 1985), pp. 579–614; Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), especially pp. 31–46; and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), especially pp. 40–48. For an analysis of the application of the international regime perspective to the security realm, see Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 357–378. 14. Richard K. Betts, “Systems for Peace or Causes of War?: Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe,” International Security, vol. 17, no. 1 (Summer 1992), p. 26. 15. Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959) and Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), chapters 7 and 8. 16. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 161–162. 17. Ibid., p. 202. Also, see Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus, vol. 93, no. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 881–909 and Kenneth N. Waltz, “International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of World Power,” in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 304–314. 18. Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability,” World Politics, vol. 26, no. 3 (April 1964), p. 390. 19. Ibid., pp. 393–396. 20. Ibid., pp. 396–400. 21. Ibid., pp. 401–403. 22. On the definition of regional or international subsystems, see Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach (Englewood, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 607; William R. Thompson, “The Regional Subsystem: A conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 1 (March 1973), p. 93; Michael Banks, “Systems Analysis and the Study of Regions,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 4 (December 1969), p. 357; and Michael Haas, “International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity,” The American Political Science Review, vol. 64, no. 1 (March 1970), pp. 100–101. For a discussion of balance of power in subsystems, see Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 218–220. 23. Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962); and R. Harrison Wagner, “The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power,” World Politics, vol. 38, no. 4 (July 1986), pp. 546–576.

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NOTES

24. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 118–120 and 168. 25. For an extended discussion of this point, see Jack S. Levy, “The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence,” in Philip E. Tetlock et al., eds., Behavior, Society and Nuclear War, vol. II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 240–243. 26. John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983). For overviews of deterrence theory, see Robert Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” World Politics, vol. 31, no. 2 (January 1979), pp. 289–324; Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, 2nd ed. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1983). On the psychological dimension of deterrence, see Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985). See Christopher H. Achen et al., “The Rational Deterrence Debate: A Symposium,” World Politics, vol. 41, no. 2 (January 1989), pp. 143–239. 27. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, pp. 27–28; Erich Weede, “Overwhelming Preponderance As a Pacifying Condition Among Asian Dyads, 1950–1969,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 20, no. 3 (1976), pp. 395–411; David C. Garnham, “Dyadic International War, 1816–1965,” Western Political Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 1 (1976), pp. 231–242; David C. Garnham, “Power Parity and Lethal International Violence, 1969–1973,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 20, no. 3 (1976), pp. 379–394; and A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1980). 28. Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988), pp. 112–114, 181, and 293. 29. Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 11 and Robert O. Keohane, “International Liberalism Reconsidered,” in John Dunn, ed., Economic Limits to Modern Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1989). 30. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” pp. 205–235 and 323–353; Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” pp. 1151–1169; Melvin Small and J. David Singer, “The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816–1965,” The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, vol. 1, no. 4 (Summer 1976), pp. 50–69; Dean V. Babst, “A Force for Peace,” Industrial Research, no. 14 (April 1972), pp. 55–58; Rudolph J. Rummel, “Libertarianism and International Violence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 27, no. 1 (March 1983), pp. 27–71; Erich Weede, “Democracy and War Involvement,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 28, no. 4 (December 1984), pp. 649–664; Steve Chan, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . . Are the Freer Countries More Pacific?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 28, no. 4 (December 1984), pp. 617–647; Harvey Starr, “Democracy and War: Choice, Learning and Security Communities,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 29, no. 2 (1992), pp. 207–213; Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, “Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816–1976,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 33, no. 1 (March 1989), pp. 3–35; Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Politics and War,” in Rotberg and Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, pp. 84–88 (see note 7); David A. Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” American Political Science Review, vol. 86, no. 1 (March 1992), pp. 24–37; Randall L. Schweller, “Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?” World Politics, vol. 44, no. 2 (January 1992), pp. 235–269; Carol R. Ember, Melvin Ember, and Bruce M. Russett, “Peace Between Participatory Polities: A

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Cross-Cultural Test of the ‘Democracies Rarely Fight Each Other’ Hypothesis,” World Politics, vol. 44, no. 4 (July 1992), pp. 573–599. 31. Richard N. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986), p. ix; Lord Robbins, Money, Trade and International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1971), especially chapters 9–10 for overview and critique of the liberal position linking free trade to peace. For a critique of the connection between liberalism and the benign use of military power, see Barry Buzan, “Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case,” International Organization, vol. 38, no. 4 (Autumn 1984), p. 624. Also, for the intellectual history of liberalism and its relation to free trade and peace, see F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), chapters 5 and 6. 32. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, p. 14. For a historical and analytical overview of the impact of international organizations on the peaceful settlement of disputes, see Inis Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plow Shares: The Problem and Progress of International Organization, 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1984), pp. 215–244. 33. For a selected list of empirical works dealing with conflict in South America, see John B. Allcock et al., Border and Territorial Disputes, 3rd ed. (London, England: Longman Group UK Limited, 1992), pp. 547–611; Gordon Ireland, Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in South America, (New York: Octagon Books, 1971); Alan J. Day, Border and Territorial Disputes (Detroit, MI: Gale Research, 1982); Andrés Fontana, “Percepción de Amenazas y Adquisición de Armamentos: Argentina 1960–1989,” Documentos CEDES, no. 48 (1990), Buenos Aires, Argentina; Michael A. Morris and Victor Millán, Controlling Latin America Conflicts: Ten Approaches (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983); José Thiago Cintra, “Regional Conflicts: Trends in a Period of Transition,” Adelphi Paper, no. 237, Spring 1989 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies 1989), pp. 94–126; Virginia GambaStonehouse, Strategy in the Southern Oceans: A South American View (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1989); Philip Kelly and Jack Child, Geopolitics of the Southern Cone and Antarctica (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988); Philip Kelly, “Geopolitical Tension Areas in South America: The Question of the Brazilian Territorial Expansion,” in Robert E. Biles, ed., Inter-American Relations: The Latin American Perspective (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 190–209; Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985); Lester D. Langley, The Banana Wars: An Inner History of American Empire, 1900–1934 (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1983); William R. Garner, The Chaco Dispute: A Study of Prestige Diplomacy (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1966); Michael J. Kryzanek, U.S.-Latin American Relations, 2nd. ed. (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1990); Bryce Wood, The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932–1942 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966); Richard J. Bloomfield and Gregory F. Treverton, eds., Alternative to Intervention: A New U.S.-Latin American Security Relationship (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); Pope G. Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System, 2nd. ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989); Diego Abente, “The War of the Triple Alliance: Three Explanatory Models,” Latin American Research Review, vol. 22, no. 2 (1987), pp. 47–69; and James L. Garrett, “The Beagle Channel Dispute: Confrontation and Negotiation in the Southern Cone,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 27, no. 2 (Fall 1985), pp. 81–109.

188

NOTES

Chapter 1 Peace in South America: Norm, Anomaly, or Historical Paradox? 1. Arie M. Kacowicz, Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), pp. 67–124. 2. Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996 [repr. 2004]), pp. 150–182. 3. Miguel A. Centeno, Blood and War: War and the Nation-State in Latin America (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002). 4. Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America, 6th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 130–132 and 240–243; Harry E. Vanden and Gary Prevost, Politics of Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 453–454; and Robert Jones Shafer, A History of Latin America (Lexington: D. C. Heath and Company, 1978), pp. 597–599. 5. Melvin Small and J. David Singer, Resort To Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982), pp. 46–54. 6. Robert N. Burr, By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830–1905 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p. 1. He lists all interstate armed conflicts in South America, therefore the incidence of war is higher (seven conflicts). However, it should be noted that in the study conducted by Melvin Small and J. David Singer, using more restrictive criteria to classify wars, they put the number at five in a one-hundred-and-fifty-six-year period. 7. Small and Singer, Resort To Arms, pp. 50, 55–57. 8. Information scattered in various studies reveals fifteen different conflictual dyads, each involving one or several serious incidents. For more details, see Jack Child, “Conflicts in Latin America: Present and Potential,” research paper (Stockholm: SIPRI [Stockholm International Research Institute], 1980); Jorge I. Domínguez, “Ghosts From the Past: War, Territorial and Boundary Disputes in Mainland Central and South America Since 1960,” unpublished manuscript, Harvard University, May 1977 as cited by both Gregory F. Treverton, “Interstate Conflict in Latin America,” in Kevin J. Middlebrook and Carlos Rico, eds., The United States and Latin America in the 1980s (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1986), pp. 565–591 and Wolf Grabendorff, “Interstate Conflict Behavior and Regional Potential for Conflict in Latin America,” Working Papers, no. 116, Latin American Program (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 1982); and Kenneth Nolde, “Arms and Security in South America: Towards an Alternate View,” PhD dissertation, University of Miami, 1980, pp. 285–287. 9. The data for this comparative historical analysis was tabulated from the study on international and civil wars conducted by Small and Singer, Resort To Arms, pp. 82–99. 10. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War, p. 155. 11. See Grabendorff, “Interstate Conflict Behavior and Regional Potential for Conflict in Latin America,” p. 18 for complete list of the conflicts he considers. 12. Both, for a relative and an absolute analysis of the composition and capabilities of the South American armed forces, see Adrian J. English, Armed Forces of Latin America: Their Histories, Development, Present Strength and Military Potential (New York: Jane’s Publishing, 1984). 13. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 75. Note that while this translation refers to war as an “an act of force,” others

NOTES

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

25.

26. 27.

28.

29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

189

refer to it as “an act of violence.” For the latter, see Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson Press, 1966), p. 21. Idid., p. 151. Johan Galtung, “Editorial,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 1, no. 1 (1964), p. 2. Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace and Peace Research,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 6, no. 3 (1969), p. 183. Ibid., p. 190, n. 31. Kenneth E. Boulding, Stable Peace (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1978), p. 3. Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. 8. Ibid., p. 10. Ibid., pp. 16–17. Ibid., p. 19. For further details on the debate on the appropriate definition of peace, see Robert Pickus, “New Approaches,” in W. Scott Thompson and Kenneth M. Jensen, eds., Approaches to Peace: An Intellectual Map (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1991), especially pp. 230–233. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 10. Also, it is suggestive that Richard Ned Lebow’s study on international crisis is titled Between Peace and War, see Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984). Clausewitz, On War, p. 149. Paul F. Diehl, “What Are They Fighting For? The Importance of Issues in International Conflict Research,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 29, no. 3 (August 1992), p. 333. For summary and analysis of the conditions and causes of war, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Man the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988); Bernard Brodie, “Some Theories On the Causes of War,” in War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 276–340; Michael Howard, The Causes of War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984); Jack S. Levy, “The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence,” in Philip E. Tetlock et al., eds., Behavior, Society and Nuclear War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), vol. I, pp. 209–333; and Stephen W. Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Root of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). For further details on these three possible outcomes of a crisis situation, see Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, pp. 14–15. John L. Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” International Security, vol. 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992–1993), p. 25. Blainey, The Causes of War, p. x. Bruce M. Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1989), p. 411. For further details on this conclusion, see the model of crisis phases developed by Snyder and Diesing, Conflict Among Nations, pp. 6–15. Emphasis in original, see Levy, “The Causes of War,” p. 227. Other analysts have also stressed the importance of primary issues as the leading causes of war, see

NOTES

190

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

R. W. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez, In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm for Global Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp. 28–68. These authors suggest that the focus should be changed “from the issue of power to the power of issues.” Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648–1989 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 306–325. Although religion is included in his hierarchy of issues, many analysts consider that to be a dubious element at best in the modern state system. For an analysis of religion as a potential cause for conflict, see Roger Williamson, “Why Is Religion Still a Factor in Armed Conflict?” Bulletin of Peace Proposals, vol. 21, no. 3 (September 1990), pp. 243–253. Robert Jervis, “War and Misperception,” in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 106. Randolph M. Siverson and Harvey Starr, “Opportunity, Willingness, and The Diffusion of War,” American Political Science Review, vol. 84, no. 1 (March 1990), p. 63. For other sources, analyzing the centrality of territorial dispute in interstate armed conflict, see Paul F. Diehl and Gary Goertz, “Interstate Conflict Over Exchanges of Homeland Territory, 1816–1980,” Political Geography Quarterly, vol. 10, no. 4 (October 1991), pp. 342–355; and Robert Mandel, “Roots of Modern Interstate Border Disputes,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 24, no. 3 (September 1980), pp. 427–454. For further details on these and other areas, involving conditions for conflict in South America over territory and resources, see John B. Allcock et al., Border and Territorial Disputes, 3rd ed. (London, England: Longman Group UK Limited, 1992), pp. 547–611; and Gordon Ireland, Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in South America (New York: Octagon Books, 1971). Boulding, Stable Peace, pp. 12–13. For an alternative typology, organizing various approaches to the study of international peace, see Kenneth M. Jensen and W. Scott Thompson, “The United States Institute of Peace and the Intellectual Map Project,” in Thompson and Jensen, Approaches to Peace, especially pp. xiii–xviii (see note 24). Russett and Starr, World Politics: The Menu for Choice, p. 412. Karl W. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1969). Ibid., pp. 4–5. Ibid., p. 5. Ibid., 5. Emphasis is in original version. These are: main values (i.e., constitutionalism, democracy, and noncommunist economies); mutual responsiveness (i.e., constant communication); distinctive way of life; the capability of core areas; superior economic growth; expectation of joint economic reward; wide range of mutual transactions; broadening elites; links of social communication; greater personal mobility; reluctance to wage fratricidal war; the existence of an outside military threat; strong economic ties; and ethnic and linguistic assimilations.Ibid., pp. 129–159. Ibid., p. 6. Ibid., p. 118. Ibid., p. 200. Ibid., p. 201. Ibid., p. 199.

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51. These conditions seem to grow out of the type of peace that Deutsch is trying to explain, therefore, they can not be taken as independent variables to explain other cases of interstate peace (e.g., South America). 52. Deutsch et al., Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, pp. 199–200. 53. Ibid., pp. 123–129. 54. Ibid., pp. 129–133. 55. Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, “In Search of Peace Systems: Scandinavia and the Netherlands; 1870–1970,” in Bruce M. Russett, ed., Peace, War, and Numbers (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), pp. 239–274. 56. The basic tenet of this theory is that population growth and technological development generate increasing domestic demands for resources. Unsatisfied demands and needs for resources create “lateral pressure” for access to raw materials beyond national boundaries. Usually, lateral pressures have led to “colonial-type wars” against the colonized people and/or against other expansionist rivals. This dynamic is what leads to a “war-prone system.” Nazli Choucri and Robert C. North, Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1975). 57. Choucri and North, “In Search of Peace Systems,” p. 242. 58. Ibid., pp. 254–261. 59. Emphasis added. Ibid., p. 245. 60. Ibid., p. 246. 61. Ibid., p. 248. 62. Stephen R. Rock, Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989). 63. Ibid., p. 5. Emphasis is in original. 64. Ibid., pp. 11–12 and 17–18. 65. “Hypothesis 1: A state of peace is most likely to emerge among states that are heterogeneous in the exercise of national power. Hypothesis 2: A state of peace is most likely to emerge among states that are heterogeneous in their economic activities. Hypothesis 3: A state of peace is most likely to emerge among states that are homogeneous in their societal attributes. Hypothesis 4: Even if the exercise of power, economic activities, and societal attributes favor pacific relations, some catalytic event may be required to set the process of reconciliation in motion. The most probable candidate for this role is an acute crisis between the two states.” Ibid., pp. 12–17. 66. Ibid., p. 148. 67. John L. Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 215–245. This work inspired several other studies, which were subsequently published as chapters of two separate editions, see Charles W. Kegley, ed., The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991) and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, ed., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1991). 68. Gaddis, The Long Peace, pp. 230–237. 69. Ibid., p. 230. 70. Gaddis, The Long Peace, p. 232. Other analyses concur on this point, see, e.g., Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 26–34 and 150–157; Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. ix, 7, 8–13, and especially pp. 23–24; and Michael Mandelbaum,

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71.

72. 73. 74.

The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better,” Adelphi Paper, no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). John Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1989). Ibid., p. 252. Ibid., p. 253.

Chapter 2

Political Realism: Peace through Power?

1. E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), p. 63. 2. For a view challenging the characterization of Thucydides as the father of realism or neorealism, see Daniel Garst, “Thucydides and Neorealism,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 1 (March 1989), pp. 3–27. 3. The definition of paradigm employed throughout is that advanced by Robert K. Merton. He defines a paradigm as “a systematic statement of the basic assumptions, concepts, and propositions employed by a school of analysis.” See Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 69–72. In the field of international relations, Robert O. Keohane defined a paradigm “as a set of beliefs defining an area for study and identifying the crucial questions that should be asked about it . . .” Robert O. Keohane, “The Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in Ada Finifter, ed., Political Science: The State of the Discipline (Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1983), p. 503. Finally, from the philosophy of science, Thomas S. Kuhn, who has offered twenty-one different definitions, asserts that “a paradigm is what the members of a scientific community share, and, conversely, a scientific community consists of men who share a paradigm.” See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 176. John A. Vasquez has argued that realism can be viewed as a dominant paradigm in international relations. See John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: An Empirical Evaluation of the Scientific Study of International Relations (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1981), especially chapters 2 and 3. Also, Kalvi J. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp. 7–10. 4. In addition to prediction and description, explanation is one of the aims of science and theory. Accordingly, John L. Gaddis asserts that “one way to confirm the validity of theories is to see how successfully they perform each of the tasks expected of them. The failure to accomplish a particular task would not necessarily invalidate an entire theory, but it should raise questions in our minds. It would be a warning signal, suggesting the need to rethink underlying assumptions.” John L. Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War,” International Security, vol. 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992–1993), p. 10. In contrast to Gaddis, who focuses on the predictive or forecasting power of various theories, this study tests the explanatory power of several hypotheses in order to ascertain their theoretical validity. For a view of a philosopher of science favoring explanation over forecasting and prediction, see Stephen Toulmin, Foresight and Understanding: An Enquiry Into the Aims of Science (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963), especially pp. 21–43.

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5. Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs,” in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), particularly pp. 116–122. 6. For example, Robert O. Keohane, “The Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond,” in Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), especially pp. 160 and 163–182; Jack S. Levy, “The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence,” in Philip E. Tetlock et al., eds., Behavior Society and Nuclear War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 224; Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, especially chapters 2, 3, and 4; and Stanley Hoffmann, “An American Social Science: International Relations,” in Stanley Hoffmann, ed., Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), p. 15. 7. Since the purpose here is not to rewrite an exhaustive intellectual history of Political Realism, it is recommended for that purpose James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1981), pp. 84–133. 8. Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Sir Richard Livingstone (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 46. See also book 1 and 2, pp. 33–141. 9. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Mark Musa (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1964). 10. For an extended discussion of this topic, see William K. Frankena, “Utilitarianism and Justice,” in William K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 29–46, particularly pp. 29 and 37. 11. Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 127. For another view stressing the immoral and irreligious character of The Prince, see Leo Strauss, Thoughts On Machiavelli (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 12 and 174–223, passim. See also Harvey C. Mansfield, Machiavelli’s Virtue (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). 12. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Michael Oakeshott (New York: Collier Books, A Division of Macmillan, 1962). 13. Ibid., p. 100. 14. Ibid., p. 101. 15. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 4. All my references throughout will be to this latest edition. 16. Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933); Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy (London: Oxford University Press, 1939); Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939; Reinhold Niebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics (New York: Charles Scribner’s and Sons, 1940); George Schwarzenberger, Power Politics (New York: Praeger, 1941); Nicholas J. Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1942); Martin Wight, Power Politics, pamphlet no. 8 (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946). 17. For an analysis of Morgenthau’s work and paramount influence in the field of international relations, see Stanley Hoffmann, “Hans Morgenthau: The Limits and Influence of ‘Realism,’ ” in Hoffmann, Janus and Minerva, pp. 70–81 (see note 6); Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 22–28; and

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18. 19.

20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28.

29. 30. 31.

Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 10 and 163. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 3. These authors have been grouped together before under the realist rubric. See, Robert O. Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics,” in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, p. 9 (see note 17); Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations, pp. 94–124; and Trevor Taylor, “Power Politics,” in Trevor Taylor, ed., Approaches and Theory in International Relations (New York: Longman, 1986), pp. 122–123. Stanley Hoffmann, “An American Social Science: International Relations,” Daedalus, vol. 106, no. 3 (Summer 1977), p. 44. See the title of chapter 2 in Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 18. Ibid., pp. 4–14. Ibid., p. 5. He points out that “the intention of this book, which is to present not an indiscriminate description of political reality, but a rational theory of international politics.” Ibid., p. 10. Ibid., p. 187. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). Ibid., p. 1. Robert W. Cox is credited with coining the name “neorealism” or “American realism,” see his “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory,” in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics, p. 211 (see note 17). To corroborate this assertion, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Neorealism and Neoliberalism,” World Politics, vol. 40, no. 2 (January 1988), p. 241. For other names of this school of thought, see Robert G. Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” International Organization, vol. 38, no. 2 (Spring 1984), p. 287. Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 9. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory,” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 44, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1990), pp. 30 and 32. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), p. 395. Prior to the advent of neorealism, Robert Jervis distinguished realism à la Morgenthau from another version preoccupied with the structure of the situation leading to the security dilemma. Reacting to an assertion made by Herbert Butterfield, he notes: “From this perspective, the central theme of international relations is not evil but tragedy. States often share a common interest, but the structure of the situation prevents them from bringing about the mutually desired situation. This view contrasts with the school of realism represented by Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr, which sees the drive for power as a product of man’s instinctive will to dominate others.” Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 66. For a view that does not distinguish between realism and neorealism, especially as it pertains to the meaning of anarchy and its effects on states, see Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organization, vol. 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988), p. 485, n. 1.

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32. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 60–67. 33. Ibid., pp. 88–99. 34. For a review and internal critique of Kenneth N. Waltz’s structural conception, see John Gerard Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis,” World Politics, vol. 35, no. 2 (January 1983), pp. 261–285. 35. Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics,” in Neorealism and Its Critics, p. 10 (see note 17). 36. For example, see Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), pp. 23–24; Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics, chapters 2 and 3; ibid., pp. 7 and 163–164; Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism,” pp. 290–291; Robert G. Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 42–43; Levy, “The Causes of War,” pp. 224–225; and Trevor Taylor, “Power Politics,” in Taylor, Approaches and Theories in International Relations, pp. 127–129. (See note 19.) 37. For a distinction of the principles of international separation or segmentation prior and subsequent to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, see Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity,” p. 274. 38. For different critiques of the anarchy assumption in political realism, see Charles R. Beitz, “International Relations As a State of Nature,” in Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 35–50; Helen Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique,” Review of International Studies, vol. 17, no. 1 (January 1991), pp. 67–85; Nicholas Onuf and Frank F. Klink, “Anarchy, Authority, Rule,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 2 (June 1989), pp. 149–173; and Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” pp. 391–425. 39. For works emphasizing the first face of power, see Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1950); Robert A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power” Behavioral Science, vol. 2 (June 1957), pp. 201–215; Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis, 4th ed. (Englewood Cliff, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984); Robert A. Dahl, “Power,” International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1968), vol. 12, pp. 405–415. For illustrations of the first face of power in international relations, see Stephen B. Jones, “The Power Inventory and National Strategy,” World Politics, vol. 6, no. 4 (July 1954), pp. 421–453; Robert Art, “To What Ends Military Power,” International Security vol. 4, no. 4 (Spring 1980), pp. 3–35; David Baldwin, “The Power of Positive Sanctions,” World Politics, vol. 24, no. 1 (October 1971), pp. 19–38; David Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends Versus Old Tendencies,” World Politics, vol. 31, no. 2 (January 1979), pp. 161–194. For studies concentrating on the second and third faces of power, see Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” The American Political Science Review, vol. 56, no. 4 (December 1962), pp. 947–952; Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz, “Decisions and Non-decisions: An Analytical Framework,” The American Political Science Review, vol. 57, no. 3 (September 1963), pp. 632–642; Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974); and Jeffrey C. Isaac, Power and Marxist Theory: A Realist View (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987). For an illustration of the third face in international relations, see Frederick V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decision, On

NOTES

196

40. 41.

42. 43.

44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

49. 50. 51.

52.

53.

the Condition of Practical and Legal Reasoning in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” International Organization, vol. 44, no. 3 (Summer 1990), pp. 283–315. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 28–32. Arnold Wolfers, “The Actors in International Politics,” in Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 13–14. Wolfers, “The Actors in International Politics,” pp. 19–20. For definition of “self-help,” see Roger D. Masters, “World Politics As a Primitive Political System,” World Politics, vol. 16, no. 4 (July 1964), pp. 595–619, especially pp. 600–605. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, vol. 30, no. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 123. Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” pp. 186–206. Kenneth A. Oye, “Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,” World Politics, vol. 38, no. 1 (October 1985), pp. 1–24. For respective works explaining these solutions, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basics Books, 1984), especially chapter 2; Robert O. Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations,” International Organization, vol. 40, no. 1 (Winter 1986), pp. 1–27; Charles E. Osgood, Alternative to War or Surrender (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 85–134; and Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). For similar comments, see Levy, “The Causes of War,” p. 231. Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648–1989 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 282–284 and 329–332. For several views representing both sides of this debate, see Manus I. Midlarsky, The Onset of World War (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), chapters 3 and 4; Manus I. Midlarsky, “Hierarchical Equilibria and the Long-Run Instability of Multipolar Systems,” in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed. Handbook of War Studies (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989); and, from an opposite angle, Ted Hopf, “Polarity, the OffenseDefense Balance, and War,” American Political Science Review, vol. 85, no. 2 (June 1991), pp. 475–493. For an exchange of views, see Manus I. Midlarsky and Ted Hopf, “Polarity and International Stability,” American Political Science Review, vol. 87, no. 1 (March 1993), pp. 173–181. See, e.g., John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Inis L. Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962); Klaus Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966); Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations; Richard N. Rosecrance, “Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and the Future,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 10, no. 3 (1966), pp. 314–327; Stanley Hoffmann, Gulliver’s Troubles (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968); and Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), especially pp. 61–65. See, e.g., Jack S. Levy, “The Polarity of the System and International Stability: An Empirical Analysis,” in Alan Ned Sabrosky, ed., Polarity and War: The Changing

NOTES

54.

55. 56. 57. 58. 59.

60. 61.

62. 63. 64. 65.

66. 67.

197

Structure of International Conflict (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 47. For recent refinements of the manner to classify alternative polar configurations, see Edward D. Mansfield, “Concentration, Polarity, and the Distribution of Power,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 1 (March 1993), pp. 105–128; and Randall L. Schweller, “Tripolarity and the Second World War,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 1 (March 1993), pp. 73–103. For a similar definition, see Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security, vol. 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 5. Also, see the definition of “primacy” in Robert Jervis, “International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?” International Security, vol. 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 52–53 and in Samuel P. Huntington, “Why International Primacy Matters,” International Security, vol. 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 68. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 170–176. Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer, “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability,” World Politics, vol. 26, no. 3 (April 1964), p. 390. Ibid., pp. 404 and 406. Ibid., pp. 393–403. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. Also, see Kaplan’s discussion of the fourth and fifth rules, pertaining to the number of essential national actors and the flexibility of alliances opportunities for the stability of the “Balance of Power” system. Morton A. Kaplan, Systems and Process in International Politics (Huntington, NY: Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1975), pp. 21–36, but particularly, pp. 24, 27, 30, and 34–35; and Edward Vose Gulick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power (New York: W. W. Norton, 1955), pp. 94–95. For a critique of use of the concept of “balance of power” as a system, see Claude, Jr., Power and International Relations, pp. 40–93. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 363. The principal exposition of this hypothesis is found in Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Stability of a Bipolar World,” Daedalus, vol. 93, no. 3 (Summer 1964), pp. 881–909; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, chapters 7 and 8 and Kenneth N. Waltz, “International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of World Power,” in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press, 1969), pp. 304–314. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 161–162. Ibid., p. 202. Ibid., pp. 168–176. Robert Jervis, “Systems Theories and Diplomatic History,” in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1979), p. 212. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 218 and 220–221. On the definition of regional or international subsystems, see Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, “The International Politics of Regions: A Comparative Approach to Five Subordinate Systems,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 4 (December 1969), pp. 361–362; William R. Thompson, “The Regional Subsystem: A conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 1 (March 1973), p. 93; Michael Banks, “Systems Analysis and the Study of Regions,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 13, no. 4 (December 1969), 357; and Michael Haas, “International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity,” The American Political Science Review, vol. 64, no. 1 (March 1970), pp. 100–101. For a discussion of balance of power in subsystems, see ibid.,

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68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

73. 74.

75.

76.

pp. 218–220. Also, see the Barry Buzan’s “security complexes” concept in Barry Buzan, People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), particularly pp. 105–115 and n. 33. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 98. Ibid., p. 131. Michael Haas, “International Subsystems,” pp. 120–121. Cantori and Spiegel, “The International Politics of Regions,” pp. 368. For details see, J. David Singer and Melvin Small, “Formal Alliances, 1815–1939: A Quantitative Description,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 3, no. 1 (1966), pp. 1–32 and Melvin Small and J. David Singer, “Formal Alliances, 1816–1965: An Extension of the Basic Data,” in J. David Singer and Paul F. Diehl, eds., Measuring the Correlates of War (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), pp. 159–190. Also, no evidence of intraregional military alliances in South America from 1935 to 2003 was found in a search of the following dataset on the world’s military alliances, see Brett Ashley Leeds, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long, “Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions Project (ATOP),” Department of Political Science, Rice University, 2005, http://atop.rice.edu/search and http://atop.rice.edu/data and Brett Ashley Leeds, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long, “Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815–1944,” International Interactions, vol. 28, pp. 237–260. Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1988), p. 109. For background literature on the origin and evolution of hegemonic stability theory, see Charles P. Kindleberger, The World in Depression, 1929–1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974); Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Stephen D. Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics, vol. 28, no. 3 (April 1976), pp. 317–347; Robert O. Keohane, “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes, 1967–1977,” in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alexander L. George, eds., Change in the International System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 131–162, specifically p. 136; and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990), especially pp. 40–48. For the nucleus of the power preponderance theory, see A. F. K. Organski, World Politics (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1958); A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); George Modelski, “The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation State,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 20, no. 2 (April 1978), pp. 214–235; William R. Thompson, “Cycles, Capabilities, and War: An Ecumenical View,” in William R. Thompson, ed., Contending Approaches to World System Analysis (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983) and William R. Thompson, On Global War: HistoricalStructural Approaches to World Politics (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988). See Duncan Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization, vol. 39, no. 4 (Autumn 1985), pp. 579–614; and Scott C. James and David A. Lake, “The Second Face of Hegemony: Britain’s Repeal of the Corn Laws and the American Walker Tariff of 1846,” International Organization, vol. 43, no. 1 (Winter 1989), pp. 1–29, especially, pp. 3–9.

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77. This strand of the theory is best represented by Charles Kindleberger, “Systems of International Economic Organization,” in David Calleo, ed., Money and the Coming World Order (New York: New York University Press, 1976); Charles Kindleberger, “Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 2 (June 1981), pp. 242–254; and Keohane, After Hegemony, especially pp. 31–46. 78. Ikenberry and Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” pp. 283–315, especially pp. 285–294. 79. The “coercive” strand of the theory is best represented by Krasner, “State Power and the Structure of International Trade,” pp. 317–347 and Robert G. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 80. Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 359–360. 81. Snidal, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” pp. 589–590 and 596–597. 82. For area study specialists who support this tenet, see Wolf Grabendorff, “Interstate Conflict Behavior and Regional Potential for Conflict in Latin America,” Working Papers no. 116, Latin American Program (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 1982), pp. 4 and 16; Jerome Slater, The OAS and U.S. Foreign Policy (Columbia, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1967); Tom J. Farer, “Limiting Intraregional Violence: The Costs of Regional Peacekeeping,” in Tom J. Farer, ed., The Future of the Inter-American System (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979); and for an observer who limits this causal relationship to Central America and the Caribbean Basin, see Jorge I. Domínguez, “Los Conflictos Internacionales en América Latina y la Amenaza de Guerra,” Foro Internacional, vol. 25, no. 97 (July 1984), p. 3. 83. Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson Press, 1966), pp. 150–155. 84. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 221. 85. Richard K. Betts, “Systems for Peace or Causes of War?: Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe,” International Security, vol. 17, no. 1 (Summer 1992), p. 26. 86. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 70. 87. See Eric O. Hanson, The Catholic Church in World Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 70 and 340. 88. Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, chapters 11 and 12; and R. Harrison Wagner, “The Theory of Games and the Balance of Power,” World Politics, vol. 38, no. 4 ( July 1986), pp. 546–576. 89. See Stephen M. Walt, The Origin of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), especially pp. 5 and 21–28. 90. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 118–120 and 168. Also, see Morgenthau’s discussion of “the pattern of direct opposition” in his analysis of balance of power as a mechanism to limit the national power of states. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 192–194. 91. For an extended discussion of this point, see Levy, “The Causes of War,” pp. 240–243. 92. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 11; John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 14; Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,” World Politics, vol. 41, no. 2 (January 1989),

NOTES

200

93.

94.

95. 96. 97.

98.

99.

100.

101. 102.

103.

104. 105. 106. 107. 108.

pp. 150–151. For a critique of the application of the rationality assumption in the model of rational deterrence, see Frank C. Zagare, “Rationality and Deterrence,” World Politics, vol. 42, no. 2 (January 1990), pp. 238–260. For a detailed elaboration of the concepts of “general” and “immediate” deterrence, see Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, 2nd ed. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1983), pp. 28–43. For a five-stage typology illustrating and explaining a dynamic process from general deterrence initiation to immediate deterrence failure, see Paul Huth and Bruce M. Russett, “General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models,” American Political Science Review, vol. 87, no. 1 (March 1993), p. 62. Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), p. 1. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 58. Emphasis added. For the distinction between deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment, see Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). For overviews of deterrence theory, see Robert Jervis, “Deterrence Theory Revisited,” World Politics, vol. 31, no. 2 (January 1979), pp. 289–324. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis. For examples of the cognitive model of deterrence, see Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein, Psychology and Deterrence; and Deborah Larson, Origins of Containment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). For examples of the rational model of deterrence, see Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960); and Achen and Snidal, “Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies,” pp. 143–169. See Blainey, The Causes of War, pp. 112–114, 181, and 293. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, pp. 27–28; Erich Weede, “Overwhelming Preponderance As a Pacifying Condition Among Asian Dyads, 1950–1969,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 20, no. 3 (September 1976), pp. 395–411; Erich Weede, “Dyadic International War, 1816–1965,” Western Political Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 2 (June 1976), pp. 231–242; David C. Garnham, “Power Parity and Lethal International Violence, 1969–1973,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 20, no. 3 (September 1976), pp. 379–394; and Organski and Kugler, The War Ledger. For a brief description of these two types of deterrence processes and background sources for this important distinction, See Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987), p. 10. For an illustration of type I, albeit its focus on superpowers, see Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 37, no. 2 (January 1959), pp. 211–234. For an example of type II, see Schelling, Arms and Influence, pp. 35–91. See Huth and Russett, “General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals,” p. 63. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations, p. 377. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable,” World Politics, vol. 42, no. 3 (April 1990), pp. 336–369. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations, p. 377. Huth and Russett, “General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals,” pp. 62–63.

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201

109. Robert Jervis, “Models and Cases in the Study of International Conflict,” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 44, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1990), p. 87. 110. For a formulation of the rational deterrence model, see Paul Huth and Bruce M. Russett, “Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference,” World Politics, vol. 42, no. 4 (July 1990), pp. 469–472. 111. For definition of “crucial case,” see Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and Theory in Political Science,” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science: Macropolitical Theory, vol. 7 (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 113–123, but more specifically pp. 118–119. 112. For an explanation of the outbreak of war as a result of “windows” of opportunity and vulnerability dynamic, see Stephen W. Van Evera, “The Causes of War,” PhD dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1984, pp. 61–71. 113. Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison,” in Lauren, Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, pp. 43–68 (see note 65). 114. See Janet Buttolph Johnson and Richard A. Joslyn, Political Science Research Methods, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991), pp. 47–48. 115. For detailed explanation of these methodological problems, see Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), pp. 15–56; and Julian L. Simon, Basic Research Methods in Social Sciences (New York: Random House, 1985), especially chapters 11, 20, 22, and 26. 116. According to Julian L. Simon variables may be scaled either qualitatively through “classification,” or quantitatively through “measurement.” See ibid., p. 292.

Chapter 3

Balance of Power, Empirical Findings, and Peace

1. See, for purpose of illustration, the works of Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), especially pp. 28–31; Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979); and Jack S. Levy, “The Polarity of the System and International Stability: An Empirical Analysis,” in Alan Ned Sabrosky, ed., Polarity and War: The Changing Structure of International Conflict (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), specifically p. 47. 2. For a sample of those who define polarity according to the number of alliance clusters, see J. David Singer and Melvin Small, “Alliance Aggregation and the Onset of Wars, 1816–1945,” in J. David Singer, ed., Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 247–286; Michael Haas, “International Subsystems: Stability and Polarity,” American Political Science Review, vol. 64, no. 1 (March 1970), pp. 98–123; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Measuring Systemic Polarity,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 19, no. 2 (1975), pp. 187–216. 3. For a sample of those who distinguish between “polarization” and “polarity,” see Joseph L. Nogee, “Polarity: An Ambiguous Concept,” Orbis, vol. 18, no. 4 (Winter 1975), pp. 1193–1225; William D. Jackson, “Polarity in International Systems: A Conceptual Note,” International Interactions, vol. 4, no. 1 (1977), pp. 87–95; David P. Rapkin and William R. Thompson with Jon A. Christopherson, “Bipolarity and Bipolarization in the Cold War Era: Conceptualization, Measurement, and Validation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution,

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4.

5.

6.

7. 8. 9.

10. 11.

12. 13. 14.

15. 16.

17.

vol. 23, no. 2 (June 1979), pp. 261–295; Frank Whelon Wayman, “Bipolarity and War: The Role of Capability Concentration and Alliance Patterns Among Major Powers, 1816–1965,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 21, no. 1 (1984), pp. 61–78; Jefferey A. Hart, “Power and Polarity in the International System,” in Sabrosky, Polarity and War, pp. 25–40 (see note 1); Levy, “The Polarity of the System and International Stability,” pp. 41–66; and R. Harrison Wagner, “What Was Bipolarity?” International Organization, vol. 47, no. 1 (Winter 1993), pp. 77–106. For example, see the works of J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965,” in Bruce Russett, ed., Peace, War, and Numbers (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972), pp. 19–49; Wayman, “Bipolarity and War,” pp. 61–78; Richard J. Stoll, “Bloc Concentration and the Balance of Power,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 28, no. 2 (March 1984), pp. 25–50; and Edward D. Mansfield, Power, Trade, and War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). James Lee Ray, “The Measurement of System Structure,” in J. David Singer and Paul F. Diehl, eds., Measuring the Correlates of War (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1990), p. 106. Melvin Small and J. David Singer, “Formal Alliances, 1816–1965: An Extension of the Basic Data,” in Singer and Diehl, Measuring the Correlates of War, pp. 159–190 (see note 5). Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 131. For a similar criticism, see Wagner, “What Was Bipolarity?” p. 85. For a full discussion of Schweller’s argument, see Randall L. Schweller, “Tripolarity and the Second World War,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 1 (March 1993), particularly p. 75. For a complete discussion of the polarity index, see Wayman, “Bipolarity and War,” pp. 61–78. For a detailed discussion and presentation of this data set, its indicators, and its variables, see J. David Singer, “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Data Set on Material Capabilities of States, 1816–1985,” in Singer and Diehl, Measuring the Correlates of War, pp. 53–71 (see note 5); Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965,” pp. 19–48. For the complete version of this argument, see chapter 2, pp. 33–36. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 171. To corroborate this conclusion, e.g., see these works analyzing the nature of interstate armed conflict and peace in South America Weston H. Agor, “Latin American Interstate Politics: Patterns of Cooperation and Conflict,” Inter-American Economic Affairs, vol. 26 (Autumn 1972), pp. 19–33; Peter Calvert, Latin America: Internal Conflict and International Peace (New York: San Martin’s Press, 1969); and Norman V. Walbek and Sidney Weintraub, Conflict, Order, and Peace in the Americas, parts I and II (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1978). This aspect is dealt with in detail in chapter 6 in an analysis of free trade and economic interdependence as one of the hypotheses of liberalism. For a complete discussion of the virtues and failures of the two approaches of deterrence theory, and their respective applicability and relevance to the peace in South America, see chapter 2, pp. 40–45. For the historical background to the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry in the nineteenth century, see the following works. For the war of 1824 to 1828 between Argentina

NOTES

18.

19.

20. 21.

22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.

203

and imperial Brazil, see J. Amadeo Baldrich, Historia de la Guerra del Brazil (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Imprenta La Harlem, 1905); Isais José Garcia Enciso, La Gesta de Patagones (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1972), pp. 36–46; David Carneiro, História da Guerra Cisplantina (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Companhia Editora Nacional, 1946); and Felix Best, Historia de las Guerras Argentinas (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones Peuser, 1960), vol. II, pp. 119–161. For background on La Plata War or La Guerra Grande between 1836 and 1852, see Luis Alberto de Herrera, Origenes de la Guerra Grande, Vols. I and II (Montevideo, Uruguay: Editorial “Por la Patria,” 1979); David McLean, War, Diplomacy and Informal Empire: Britain and the Republics of La Plata, 1836–1853 (London: British Academic Press, 1995), pp. 177–189; and Best, Historia de las Guerras Argentinas, vol. I, pp. 393–487. For the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry in the twentieth century, see Alberto Concil Paz and Gustavo Ferrari, Argentina’s Foreign Policy, 1930–1962 (University of Notre Dame Press, 1966), particularly pp. 50–136; and Wayne A. Selcher, “Recent Strategic Developments in South America’s Southern Cone,” in Heraldo Muñoz and Joseph S. Tulchin, eds., Latin American Nations in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), particularly pp. 108–117. Dealing with these issues in the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry in the twentieth century, see Hélio Jaguaribe, “Brazil-Argentina: Breve Análisis de las Relaciones de Conflicto y Cooperación,” Estudios Internacionales, vol. 15, no. 57 (January–March 1982), pp. 9–27. For the issue of Argentine-Brazilian nuclear rivalry, see Stephen M. Gorman, “Security, Influence, and Nuclear Weapons: The Case of Argentina and Brazil,” Parameters, vol. 9, no. 1 (March 1979), pp. 52–65; and William H. Courtnet, “Nuclear Choices for Friendly Rivals,” in Joseph A. Yager, ed., Nonproliferation and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1980), pp. 241–279. For a discussion of Brazil’s position regarding the 1982 South Atlantic conflict between Argentina and Great Britain, see Susan Kaufman Purcell, “War and Debt in South America,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 61, no. 3 (1982), pp. 664–665; and Wayne A. Selcher, “Brazilian-Argentine Relations in the 1980s: From Wary Rivalry to Friendly Competition,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 27, no. 2 (Summer 1985), pp. 29–31. The inception and historical background of the Argentine-Chilean dyad is documented and discussed in detail in chapter 4, therefore this one will concentrate on the discussion of the structure of general deterrence between these two states. In chapter 4, see pp. 83–84. “Tensión y Consultas Entre Bolivia, Argentina, y Chile por los Límites,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, Wednesday, July 31, 1991, p. 3; “Cancilleria no Tiene Capacidad para Resolver Problemas Limítrofe con Chile,” Presencia, La Paz, Bolivia, Wednesday, August 28, 1991, p. 5; and “Cancilleria Acusada de Falta de Interés en Tema Limítrofe,” Presencia, La Paz, Bolivia, Thursday, August 29, 1991, p. 5. For more background on the Letícia incident, see chapter 4 of this book, n. 25. For more background information, see in chapter 4. EFE (Madrid) in Spanish, Monday, August 17, 1987 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), vol. 87, no. 159, Tuesday, August 18, 1987, p. O 1. For background on the Ecuadorean-Peruvian crises, see in chapter 4, pp. 87–94. James Brooke, “On Peru Border, Strife is Yearly Event,” The New York Times, Wednesday, February 1, 1995, p. 3. For more background on this territorial dispute, see in chapter 4, pp. 96–97.

204

NOTES

Chapter 4 U.S. Hegemony, Empirical Findings, and Peace 1. Edward D. Mansfield, Power, Trade, and War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 97 and 108. 2. Jorge I. Domínguez et al., “Boundary Disputes in Latin America,” Peaceworks (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace), p. 20; Jorge I. Domínguez et al., “Los Conflictos Internacionales en América Latina y la Amenaza de Guerra,” Foro Internacional, vol. 25, no. 97 (July 1984), p. 3; Wolf Grabendorff, “Interstate Conflict Behavior and Regional Potential for Conflict in Latin America,” Working Papers, Latin American Program (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 1982), pp. 4 and 16; Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), pp. 150–155; and Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power Peace, 6th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 221. 3. R. Harrison Wagner, United States Policy Toward Latin America: A Study in Domestic and International Politics (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 11–43; and Kenneth M. Coleman, “The Political Mythology of the Monroe Doctrine: Reflections on the Social Psychology of Hegemony,” in John D. Martz and Lars Schoultz, eds., Latin America, the United States, and the Inter-American System (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 95–114. 4. Pope G. Atkins, Latin America in the International Political System, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 37. 5. Michael J. Kryzanek, U.S.-Latin American Relations, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990), p. 21. 6. Federico G. Gil, Latin American-United States Relations (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971), pp. 22–24; and William Spencer Robertson, Hispanic American Relations with the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1923), pp. 26–42. 7. Edwin Lieuwen, U.S. Policy in Latin America: A Short History (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965), pp. 3–20. 8. Thomas L. Karnes, ed., Readings in the Latin American Policy of the United States (Tucson, Arizona: The University of Arizona Press, 1972), pp. 37–40. 9. Ibid., pp. 106–107. 10. Ruhl J. Bartlett, ed., The Record of American Diplomacy: Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign Relations, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), pp. 344–345. 11. Ibid., p. 539. 12. Karnes, Readings, p. 208. 13. Ibid., p. 104. 14. William R. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World: An International History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984). 15. Alexander DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, 3rd ed. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1978), vol. I, p. 268. 16. Ibid., pp. 268–269. 17. Diego Barros Arana, Historia de la Guerra del Pacífico, 1879–1881 (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Andres Bello, 1979); and Tomás Caivano, Historia de la Guerra de America Entre Chile, Perú, and Bolivia (Lima, Perú: Editorial Científica, 1979). 18. Karnes, Readings, pp. 129–130. Emphasis added. 19. Samuel Guy Inman, Inter-American Conferences, 1826–1954: History and Problems (Washington, DC: The University Press, 1965), pp. 33–40, and 45–46; and DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, vol. I, pp. 269–271.

NOTES

205

20. Conferencia Internacional Americana, Dictámenes de las Comisiones Permanentes y Debates a que Dieron Lugar, tomo II (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1890), pp. 995–1201. 21. Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 54–62. 22. Bryce Wood, The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932–1942 (Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 2. 23. Gil, Latin American-United States Relations, pp. 131–133. 24. David H. Zook, Jr., The Conduct of the Chaco War (New Haven: Bookman Associates, 1960); Rogelio Ayala Moreira, Por Qué no Ganamos la Guerra del Chaco (La Paz: Talleres Gráficos Bolivianos, 1959); and Silvio Macias, La Guerra de Chaco (Asunción: Ediciones La Tribuna, 1942). 25. Fabio Lozano y Lozano, El Punto de Vista Colombiano en la Cuestión de Letícia (Mexico, DF: A. Mijares y Hermanos, 1933); and Robert L. Scheina, Latin America: A Naval History, 1810–1987 (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1987), pp. 121–122. 26. Wood, The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932–1942, p. 14. 27. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York: Macmillan, 1948), vol. I, pp. 310–311. 28. The casualty count in the Letícia dispute was 50 and the estimate for the Chaco War is close to 90,000. See Micheal Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1992), pp. 700 and 703. 29. Atkins, Latin America, pp. 202–236. 30. Bartlett, The Record of American Diplomacy, p. 730. For a full text of the 1947 Rio Treaty, see pp. 730. 31. Ibid., pp. 730–731. 32. John B. Allcock et al., Border and Territorial Disputes, 3rd ed. (London, England: Longman Group UK Limited, 1992), pp. 586–591; Gordon Ireland, Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in South America (New York: Octagon Books, 1971), pp. 219–230; David H. Zook, Jr., Zarumilla-Marañón: The Ecuador-Peru Dispute (New York: Bookman Associates, 1964); and Georg Maier, “EcuadorianPeruvian Boundary Dispute,” American Journal of International Law, vol. 63 (January 1969), pp. 28–46. 33. Julio Donoso Tobar, La Invasión Peruana y el Protocolo de Río (Quito: Ediciones Ecuatorianas, 1945), pp. 174–175; and Wood, The United Status and Latin American Wars, p. 278. 34. Ibid., pp. 255–344; and Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, p. 705. 35. Leland M. Goodrich, ed. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1941–1942, July 1941–June 1942 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1942), vol. IV, pp. 433–435; and U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, vol. VI, February 28,1942, pp. 195–196. 36. Allcock, et al., Border and Territorial Disputes, pp. 586–591; and Ireland, Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in South America, pp. 221–226. 37. Wood, The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932–1942, p. 256. 38. Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1936 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), vol. V, p. 110. 39. Ibid., p. 113. 40. Assistant Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, clarified that the United States. “is merely that of a friendly and conciliatory host.” Ibid., p. 119. 41. Bryce Wood, Aggression and History: The Case of Ecuador and Peru (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1978), pp. 5, 55–59, and 116–117.

206

NOTES

42. Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1937 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954), vol. V (1937), pp. 46–56; Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1937, vol. V (1938), pp. 217–245; and Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1937, vol. V (1939), pp. 141–147. 43. For a memorandum of the conversation on June 10, 1937, see ibid., vol. V, pp. 49–52. 44. Ibid., p. 55. 45. Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1938, vol. V, pp. 217–218. 46. Wood, Aggression and History, p. 266. 47. Telegram 74, from Lima, Peru, December 27, 1938. Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1938, p. 244. 48. Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, pp. 601–611. 49. Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1941 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), vol. V (1941), p. 226. 50. Emphasis added. Ibid., p. 244. 51. Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985), pp. 92–98. 52. The Christian Science Monitor, January 29, 1981, p. 2; The Christian Science Monitor, February 2, 1981, p. 6; The New York Times, January 24, 1981, p. 2; The New York Times, January 29, 1981, p. 8; The New York Times, January 30, p. 6; The New York Times, January 31, p. 6; The New York Times, February 1, 1981, p. 3; and Edward Schumacher, “Behind Ecuador War, Long-Smoldering Resentment,” The New York Times, February 10, 1981, p. 2. 53. Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, p. 1190 and The New York Times, February 8, 1981, section IV, p. 4. 54. Latin America Weekly Report, Friday, February 6, 1981, pp. 1–2. 55. Edward Schumacher, “Behind Ecuador War, Long-Smoldering Resentment,” The New York Times, Tuesday, February 10, 1981, p. 2. 56. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980 and 1981), vols. 80 and 81, nos. 2034 to 2057 (January 1980–December 1981). 57. Graham Hovey, “U.S. Blocks Sale of Israeli Planes to Ecuadorians,” The New York Times, Tuesday, February 8, 1977, pp. 1 and 4; Bernard Weinraub, “U.S. Again Blocks Israeli Sale of Jets to Ecuador,” The New York Times, Thursday, July 7, 1977, p. 4. For a report of the sale to Ecuador of French Dassault-Breguet Mirage F-1 planes, see Latin American Political Report, vol. XI, no. 6, February 11, 1977, p. 47. 58. The New York Times, Saturday, January 28, 1995, p. 2; and El Tiempo, Santa Fe de Bogotá, Colombia, Saturday, January 28, 1995, pp. 1, 9 and 10. 59. The New York Times, Sunday, January 29, 1995, p. 6. 60. The New York Times, Sunday, February 12, 1995, p. 16; and Juan Jesús Aznárez, “Perú y Ecuador Ponen Fin a Su Guerra Fronteriza,” El País Internacional, Spain, Monday, February 20, 1995, p. 3. 61. The New York Times, Thursday, February 9, 1995, p. 6; and Luis Salas, “Espíritu de Combate,” Cambio 16, Spain, no. 1213, February 20, 1995, pp. 46–47. 62. James Brooke, “Peru and Ecuador Halt Fighting Along Border, Claiming Victory,” The New York Times, Wednesday, February 15, 1995, p. 6; and El País Internacional, Spain, Monday, February 20, 1995, p. 3. 63. For a discussion of the implications of this armed conflict for U.S. policy interest in Latin America, see Gabriel Marcella, “War and Peace in the Amazon: Strategic

NOTES

64.

65. 66. 67. 68.

69.

70.

71. 72.

73. 74.

75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

80. 81.

207

Implications for the United States and Latin America of the 1995 Ecuador-Peru War,” (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Department of National Security and Strategy, November 24, 1995). http://131.84.1.34/doctrine/jel/ research_pubs/amazon.pdf. U.S. Department of State, Dispatch (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), vol. 6, no. 7 (February 13, 1995), pp. 24–26. In another official U.S. policy statement towards the Americas in 1995, Assistant Secretary for InterAmerican Affairs, Alexander Watson, acknowledges once again the importance of “Brazil’s leadership within the Group of Guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador Protocol of Rio,” and characterises the roles of the United States., Argentina, and Chile as those of “energetically” contributing partners. See U.S. Department of State, Dispatch, vol. 6, no. 21 (May 22, 1995), p. 41. Also, see remarks by Thomas F. McLarty III in U.S. Department of State, Dispatch, vol. 6, no. 22 (May 29, 1995), p. 46. James Brooke, “Peru and Ecuador Wage Guerrilla War as Talks Break Off,” The New York Times, Monday, February 6, 1995, p. 5. James Brooke, “Fighting Intensifies Along Peru-Ecuador Border,” The New York Times, Friday, February 3, 1995, p. 8. The New York Times, Tuesday, February 14, 1995, p. 8. Beth A. Simmons, “Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution: The Case of Ecuador and Peru,” Peaceworks (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1999). Allcock et al., Border and Territorial Disputes, pp. 548–549; Ireland, Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in South America, pp. 17–27; and El Universal Caracas, Venezuela, Wednesday, July 31, 1991, p. 3. Robert N. Burr, By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balance of Power in South America, 1830–1905 (Berkley: University of California Press, 1965), pp. 111–113, 124–126, 132–135, 144–146, 155–156, 184–186, and 206; and Bonifacio del Carril, La Cuestión con Chile (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Emecé Editores, 1984), pp. 54–64. Burr, By Reason or Force, pp. 247–256. Alfredo Rizzo Romano, La Cuestión de Límites con Chile en la Zona del Beagle (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Pleamar, 1968); Rafael Santibáñez Escobar, Los Derechos de Chile en el Beagle (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1969); and F. V., “The Beagle Channel Affair,” American Journal of International Law, no. 71 (October 1977), pp. 733–740. Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers 1938, pp. 210–217. César Caviedes, The Southern Cone: Realities of the Authoritarian State in South America (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1984), pp. 155–156; and Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America, pp. 80–81; The New York Times, Sunday, January 15, 1978, p. 9. The New York Times, Thursday, January 19, 1978, p. 2. The New York Times, Friday, January 20, 1978, p. 2. Juan de Onís, “Argentina Rejects Ruling on 3 Islands,” The New York Times, Thursday, January 26, 1978, p. 6. The New York Times, Supplementary Material, August 29, 1978, p. 118. The New York Times, Supplementary Material, September 27, 1978, p. 57; The New York Times, Supplementary Material, October 17, 1978, p. 39; and The New York Times, Supplementary Material, October 25, 1978, p. 65. The New York Times, Supplementary Material, November 3, 1978, p. 26. The New York Times, Supplementary Material, November 4, 1978, p. 48.

208

NOTES

82. Scheina, Latin America: A Naval History, 1810–1987, p. 187; Juan de Onís, “Argentina and Chile Break Off Talks Over Rejects Islands,” The New York Times, Thursday, December 14, 1978, p. 3; and Juan de Onís, “Argentina, Chile Feud Masks Other Troubles,” The New York Times, Sunday, December 31, 1978, section IV, p. 3. 83. Juan de Onís, “Argentina and Chile Accept Papal Effort in Dispute,” The New York Times, Sunday, December 24, 1978, p. 6; and “Keeping the Peace Around Cape Horn,” The New York Times, Thursday, December 28, 1978, p. 16. 84. The New York Times, Tuesday, January 24, 1984, p. 3. A final treaty ending the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile was signed in the Vatican on November 29, 1984, see The New York Times, Friday, November 30, 1984, p. 5; and Fabio Vio Valdivieso, La Mediación de S.S. El Papa Juan Pablo II en el Conflicto Chileno-Argentino Sobre Delimitación de Juridicciones Marítimas en la Zona Austral (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Aconcagua, 1984). 85. The New York Times, Wednesday, December 13, 1978, p. 6; and The New York Times, Saturday, December 16, 1978, p. 7. 86. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), vol. 78, no. 2018, pp. 54–57. 87. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. 79, no. 2024, pp. 64–67. 88. U.S. Secretary of States Cyrus Vance address to the ninth regular session of the General Assembly of the Organisation of American States in La Paz, Bolivia, October 23, 1979. This is reprinted in U.S. Department of State, Bulletin (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), vol. 79, no. 2033, p. 65. 89. José Curiel, Venezuela Mutilada (Caracas, Venezuela: Libreria Historia, 1981); Alfredo Vázquez Carrizosa, Las relaciones de Colombia y Venezuela: La Historia Atormentada de Dos Naciones (Bogotá, Colombia: Ediciones Tercer Mundo, 1983); Alberto Zalamea, Catálogo de Errores: La Crisis Colombo-Venezolana (Bogotá, Colombia: Oveja Negra, 1987); Jesus Antonio Aguilera Las Fronteras de Venezuela (Caracas, Venezuela: Ediciones del Congreso de la República de Venezuela, 1988); and Alfredo Toro Hardy, La Maldición de Sisifo: Quince Años de Política Externa Venezolana (Caracas, Venezuela: Editorial Panapo, 1991), pp. 9–30. 90. Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America, pp. 153–155. 91. El Tiempo, Santa Fe de Bogotá, Colombia, Friday, August 14, 1987, pp. 1 and 8. 92. Bogotá Inravisión, Televisión Cadena 1 in Spanish, Sunday, August 16, 1987 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-LAT-87–158), Monday, August 17, 1987, p. O 3; El Tiempo, Santa Fe de Bogotá, Colombia, Wednesday, August 19, 1987, p. 1; and Alan Riding, “Two Claims of Territory Roil Waters in Gulf of Venezuela,” The New York Times, Friday, August 28, 1987, p. 2. 93. AFP in Spanish (Paris), Thursday, August 13, 1987 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-LAT-87–157), Friday, August 14, 1987, p. T 1. 94. AFP in Spanish (Paris), Tuesday, August 18, 1987 in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-LAT-87–159), Monday, August 17, 1987, p. O 7; and El Tiempo, Santa Fe de Bogotá, Colombia, Tuesday, August 18, 1987, pp. 1 and 9-C. 95. El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, Wednesday, July 31, 1991, p. 1 and 14. 96. U.S. Department of State, Bulletin (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1987), vol. 87, nos. 2124–2129. Also, see The New York Times, Friday, August 28, 1987, p. 2.

NOTES

Chapter 5

209

International Liberalism: Peace through Principles?

1. For general analyses and intellectual histories of liberalism, see Guido de Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism, trans. R. G. Collingwood (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927); Maurice Cranston, Freedom: A New Analysis (London: Longman Press, 1954); J. S. Schapiro, Liberalism: Its Meaning and History (Princeton: Van Nostrand Press, 1958); Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Knowledge and Politics (New York: Free Press, 1984); David John Manning, Liberalism (London: Dent Press, 1976); and for a survey of nineteenth and twentieth-century American liberalism, see Harry K. Girvetz, The Evolution of Liberalism, rev. ed. (New York: Collier Books, 1966). 2. For an introduction explaining various versions of liberalism and their concomitant debates concerning an array of philosophical issues, see Maurice Cranston, “Liberalism,” in Paul Edwards, eds., The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vols. 3 and 4 (New York: Macmillan, and Free Press, 1967), pp. 458–461; and David G. Smith, “Liberalism,” in David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, and Free Press, 1968), vol. 9, pp. 276–282. 3. For a sample of works focusing on different debated aspects of liberalism, see Charles W. Anderson, Pragmatic Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990); William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues, and Diversity in the Liberal State (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Stephen L. Newman, Liberalism at Wits’ End: The Libertarian Revolt Against the Modern State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984). 4. This strategy is borrowed from the works of E. H. Carr and Robert O. Keohane. See E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), pp. 11–62; and Robert O. Keohane, “International Liberalism Reconsidered,” in John Dunn, ed., The Economic Limits to Modern Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 174. 5. For extended discussion of liberalism and international affairs, see Michael W. Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), pp. 205–314. 6. For an elaboration of this point, which is indeed a partial view of the origin of classical liberalism, see Edward L. Morse, Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations (New York: Free Press, 1976), pp. 50–51. 7. Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1987), vol. 2, p. 380. Italics in original. 8. This summary is drawn from Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939, pp. 43–46. 9. Robert Gilpin, U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (New York: Basic Books, 1975), p. 25. 10. Morse, Modernization and the Transformation of International Relations, pp. 51–52. Italics are in original. 11. Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis, 11th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 394. A parallel classification is offered by ibid., pp. 50–59. 12. Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, vol. 2, pp. 376 and 379. Italics are in original. 13. Stanley Hoffmann, “Liberalism and International Affairs,” in Stanley Hoffman, Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics (Boulder,

NOTES

210

14.

15.

16.

17. 18.

19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26.

27. 28.

CO: Westview Press, 1987), p. 396 and in pp. 396–405. Also, see Carr’s criticism of the application of some liberal principles to the conduct of international politics in the interwars period. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939, pp. 27–40. For example, see Keohane, “International Liberalism Reconsidered”; and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., “The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies? Realist Myths and the New International Realities,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 2 (June 1993), pp. 131–146. Other labels like “utopianism,” “pacifism,” and “idealism” have been utilized interchangeably with “liberalism”. To avoid confusion and to be consistent throughout, “liberalism” will be used to refer to those concepts, assumptions, and principles in international relations theory often included in the above-mentioned schools. For a sample of works alluding to liberalism with other names, see Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939; John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1951); and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., “Neo-Idealism: A Practical Matter,” Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 2 (1988), pp. 173–197. Woodrow Wilson, “The Fourteen Points Address,” reprinted in Ruhl J. Bartlett, ed., The Record of American Diplomacy: Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign Relations, 3rd ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), pp. 459–461. For a summary and analysis of the points outlined by Wilson in his speech, see Alexander DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, 3rd ed. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1978), vol. II, pp. 60–61. For an account explaining the intellectual roots of the Wilsonian program, see Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939, pp. 22–31. To extrapolate and outline the basic liberal tenets contained in the “Fourteen Points Address” by President Woodrow Wilson, this study draws on Kegley’s analysis of said document, see Kegley, Jr., “The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies?” pp. 135–138. Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 12, no. 3 (Summer 1983), pp. 206–207. Keohane, “International Liberalism Reconsidered,” pp. 176–185. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indiana: Hackett Publishing), p. 113. Ibid., p. 112. Italics are in original. Ibid., p. 113. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I,” p. 229. This term has been translated as “pacific union,” and “pacific federation,” or, as it is used here, “league of peace.” For usage of the first two forms, see ibid., p. 228; Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review, vol. 80, no. 4 (December 1986), p. 1158. The second form is utilized in the translation of Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 117. This summary of this interpretation is borrowed from the work of Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I” p. 225 and Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” p. 1157. Kant, Perpetual Peace, pp. 115–118. To understand Kant’s argument, in addition to the work of Michael Doyle cited before, this study have benefited greatly from the work of Karl Friedrich, Inevitable Peace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948); F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), chapter 4; W. B. Gallie, Philosophers of Peace and War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

NOTES

29. 30.

31. 32. 33.

34.

35. 36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

211

Press, 1978), chapter 1; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Kant, Liberalism, and War,” The American Political Science Review, vol. 56, no. 2 (June 1962), pp. 331–340; and Pierre Hassner, “Immanuel Kant,” in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, eds., History of Political Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1972), pp. 554–593. Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 112. For the kernel of Doyle’s argument, see Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I” pp. 232–235; and Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part II,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, vol. 12, no. 4 (Fall 1983), pp. 323–326. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part II,” pp. 323–353. Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Politics and War,” in Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 88. Zeev Maoz and Bruce M. Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986,” American Political Science Review, vol. 87, no. 3 (September 1993), p. 624. Bruce M. Russett, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 123. Carol R. Ember, Melvin Ember, and Bruce M. Russett, “Peace Between Participatory Polities: A Cross-Cultural Test of the ‘Democracies Rarely Fight Each Other’ Hypothesis,” World Politics, vol. 44, no. 4 (July 1992), p. 574. For these criteria, see Melvin Small and J. David Singer, “The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816–1965,” The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, vol. 1, no. 4 (Summer 1976), pp. 54–55; and Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs Part I,” p. 212. Ember, Ember, and Russett, “Peace Between Participatory Polities,” p. 579. For a succinct summary of these criteria, see Randall L. Schweller, “Domestic Structure and Preventive War: Are Democracies More Pacific?” World Politics, vol. 44, no. 2 (January 1992), p. 240. The first two exceptions are listed in David A. Lake, “Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War,” American Political Science Review, vol. 86, no. 1 (March 1992), p. 28. The third exception is discussed in Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs, Part I,” p. 213, n. 7. For more cases, which he totally dismisses as not being bona fide instances of war between democracies, see Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, pp. 16–23. For works supporting this empirical conclusion, see Dean V. Babst, “A Force for Peace,” Industrial Research, vol. 14 (April 1972), pp. 55–58; Small and Singer, “The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816–1965,” pp. 50–69; Rudolph J. Rummel, “The Freedom Factor,” Reason, vol. 15 (July 1983), pp. 32–38; Rudolph J. Rummel, Understanding Conflict and War, 2 vols. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976); Rudolph J. Rummel, “Libertarianism and International Violence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 27, no. 1 (March 1983), pp. 27–71; and Harvey Starr, “Democracy and War: Choice, Learning and Security Communities,” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 29, no. 2 (1992), pp. 207–213. Quincy Wright, Study of War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), p. 841. For other, more contemporary studies demonstrating a similar degree of war-proneness for both democratic and autocratic regimes, see Small and Singer,

NOTES

212

42. 43. 44.

45. 46.

47.

48.

49.

“The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816–1965,” pp. 67–68; Steve Chan, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall . . . Are The Freer Countries More Pacific?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 28, no. 4 (December 1984), pp. 641–644; Erich Weede, “Democracy and War Involvement,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 28, no. 4 (December 1984), p. 660; and Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolali, “Regime Types and International Conflict, 1816–1976,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 33, no. 1 (March 1989), pp. 31–32. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, pp. 30–38; and Maoz and Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986,” pp. 624–625. See Small and Singer, “The War-Proneness of Democratic Regimes, 1816–1965,” p. 67. William J. Dixon, “Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict,” American Political Science Review, vol. 88, no. 1 (March 1994), pp. 14–32. For other works discussing other alternative explanations for the prevalence of a “democratic peace,” see Ember, Ember, and Russett, “Peace Between Participatory Polities,” pp. 573–599; and T. Clifton Morgan and Sally Howard Campbell, “Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 35, no. 2 (June 1991), pp. 187–211. See Lake, “Powerful Pacifists,” pp. 24–37. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part I,” pp. 205–235; Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part II,” pp. 323–353; Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” pp. 1151–1169. For essentially two versions of the same study analyzing and modeling the opposite causal direction, that is, the effect of international political relations on foreign trade flows, see Brian M. Pollins, “Does Trade Still Follow the Flag,” American Political Science Review, vol. 83, no. 2 (June 1989), pp. 465–480 and Brian M. Pollins, “Conflict, Cooperation, and Commerce: The Effect of International Political Interactions on Bilateral Trade Flows,” American Journal of Political Science, vol. 33, no. 3 (August 1989), pp. 737–761. Baron de Montesquieu, trans. Thomas Nugent The Spirit of the Laws (New York: Hafner Press, A Division of Macmillan, 1949), book XX, chapter II, p. 316. The original text in French is more direct in establishing the connection between commerce and interstate peace; hence it is included it here: “L’effet naturel du commerce est de porter à la paix. Deux nations qui négocient ensemble se rendent réciproquement dépendantes: si l’une a intérêt d’acheter, l’autre a intérêt de vendre; et toutes les unions sont fondées sur des besoins mutuels,” Baron de Montesquieu, De l’Esprit des Lois (Paris: Editions Garnier Frères, 1956), vol. II, book XX, chapter II, pp. 8–9. To understand, both, the mercantilist and liberal positions on foreign trade and economic interdependence, this work has benefited from the following works. J. B. Condliffe, The Commerce of Nations (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950); Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987); Robert Gilpin, Global Political Economy: Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, expanded ed. (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1980); Jacob Viner, Studies in the Theory of International Trade (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1937); Jacob Viner, International Trade and Economic Development (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1952); Jacob Viner, The Long View and The Short One: Studies in Economic Theory and Policy (New York: Free Press, 1958); Jacob Viner, “Power Versus Plenty As

NOTES

50. 51. 52.

53. 54.

55.

56. 57.

58.

59. 60.

61.

213

Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries,” World Politics, vol. I, no. 1 (October 1948), pp. 1–29; and Charles Wilson, Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars (New York: Longmans, Green, 1957). Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations, p. 34. Kant, Perpetual Peace, p. 125. John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy with Some of their Applications to Social Philosophy, from the 5th London ed. (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1864), vol. II, book III, chapter XVII, p. 136. Emphasis added. Quoted by Richard N. Garner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy: The Origins and Prospects of Our International Economic Order (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), pp. 8–9. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), pp. 24–29 for entire argument, and p. 29 for quotation. See, for an example of a theoretical critique, Barry Buzan, “Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case,” International Organization, vol. 38, no. 4 (Autumn 1984), pp. 597–624. Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World (New York: Basic Books, 1986). Salomon W. Polachek, “Conflict and Trade,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 24, no. 1 (March 1980), pp. 55–78; Salomon W. Polachek, “Conflict and Trade: An Economics Approach to Political International Interactions,” in Walter Isard and C. Anderton, eds., Economics of Arms Reduction and the Peace Process (Amsterdant: NorthHolland, 1992), pp. 89–120; Mark Gasiorowski and Salomon W. Polachek, “Conflict and Interdependence: East-West Trade and Linkages in the Era of Detente,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 26, no. 4 (December 1982), pp. 709–729. The concept of international institution is used instead of international organization(s) because in singular the latter refers to the overall organization of the international system and in plural, unless otherwise specified, is customarily used to signify formal international governmental and nongovernmental organizations (i.e., IGO’s and INGO’s). Having to distinguish constantly is tedious and when one differentiates between the two meanings, the concept becomes too restrictive. Hence, the concept international institutions is used throughout, because it encompasses both formal and informal organizations and it denotes specifically international organizations as either actors or stages (i.e., as either agents or structures), without having to specify their institutional origin and social purpose. Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, trans. Louise R. Pacis (Roslyn, NY: Walter J. Black, 1949). This summary of the Grotian tradition has benefited from Hedley Bull’s discussion of the three views of international society. See Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 26–27. For a more exhaustive analysis of the Grotian conception of international life, see Hedley Bull, “The Grotian Conception of International Society,” in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., Diplomatic Investigations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 51–73. It should be specified that among those contemporary international relations scholars who, like Grotius, emphasize the importance of norms, rules, and institutions in interstate relations, there is a further distinction between those who see institutions as a “pervasive characteristic of the international system,” and the so-called modified structuralists who accept some basic analytic assumptions of structural realism,

NOTES

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62. 63. 64.

65.

66.

67.

but maintain that under certain conditions institutions have an impact on the anarchic nature of the international system. For this refinement of the institutionalist approach, see Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes As Intervening Variables,” International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 185–186. Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 1. Ibid., pp. 3–4 and 162–166. The exclusion of security regimes analysis is based on the lack of evidence substantiating its existence. Robert Jervis demonstrates that the Concert of Europe from 1815 to 1823 is really the only identifiable instance in history when an international arrangement of this nature has kept the peace. See Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” International Organization, vol. 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 357–378. Challenging this assertion, a more recent study argues that the Iroquois League was a stronger security regime than the Concert of Europe. It endured and kept the peace among six native American nations for a much longer period of time. Neta C. Crawford, “A Security Regime Among Democracies: Cooperation Among Iroquois Nations,” International Organization, vol. 48, no. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 345–385. On the other hand, the exclusion of conventions from this work is mainly a methodological decision. As is known, conventions are informal institutions which shape actors’ expectations, facilitate understanding among them, and promote international coordination whenever it is to everyone’s interest to behave in a particular way. Based on this definition it is difficult to corroborate how informal norms and rules can prevent two or several potential adversaries from going to war when there exist among them a serious conflict of interest. See ibid., pp. 4–5. See Harold K. Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence: International Organizations and the Global Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 206 and Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The Problem and Process of International Organization, 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 1984), p. 216. For a thorough discussion of all mechanisms and approaches utilized by international organizations to prevent international violence and war, see Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares, pp. 215–408. For information and analysis of all interstate disputes, from 1945 to 1970, referred for judicial settlement to the United Nations and other regional international organizations, see Ernst B. Haas, Robert L. Butterworth, and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Conflict Management by International Organizations (Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1972), pp. 48–61. For data covering the period 1971 to 1987, see Ernst B. Haas, “The Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945–1984,” in United Nations Institute for Training and Research, ed., The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), pp. 3–70.

Chapter 6

Democracy, Trade, Diplomacy, and Peace: Empirical Findings

1. Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Wellbeing in the World, 1950–1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 2. Ibid., p. 15. 3. Ibid., p. 19.

NOTES

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4. Ibid., p. 18. 5. Ibid., pp. 28–29. 6. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 10. 7. For full discussion of the meaning of these three rules, see Przeworski et al. Democracy and Development, pp. 16–18. 8. For the timing rule, see ibid., p. 32. 9. For a discussion of the democratic and dictatorial subcategories, see ibid., pp. 30–32. 10. For that part of Appendix 1.2 pertaining only to South American states, see ibid., pp. 64–65. 11. John E. Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major Wars (New York: Basic Books). 12. This work establishes the “average share” by adding yearly shares, in this case of Venezuela’s trade with Colombia, and dividing the total by the number of data entries. Similarly, the “average share of the one-third classificatory threshold” for several years is computed by finding, first, the percentage establishing one-third of the total of each year’s top trading partner. Then, all these yearly one-third shares are added and their sum divided by the number of yearly entries. 13. United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States (New York: United Nations Publication, 1992), p. 66. 14. Josef Goldblat, “The Role of the United Nations in Arms Control: An Assessment,” in United Nations Institute for Training and Research, ed., The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), p. 385. 15. For background discussions of this concept, see G. F. Hudson, “Collective Security and Military Alliances,” in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., Diplomatic Investigations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 175–176; Kenneth W. Thompson, “Collective Security,” International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 565–566; and Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), pp. 183–184. 16. For an analysis of the general track record of the United Nations regarding its warpreventive function, see Henry Wiseman, “The United Nations and International Peacekeeping: A Comparative Analysis,” in United Nations Institute for Training and Research, The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, pp. 263–333 (see note 15). 17. A discussion of the formation and evolution of the Organization of American States appears in Gordon Connell-Smith, The Inter-American System (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 189–219. 18. For a detailed inventory and description of all interstate disputes and peaceful settlements in South America prior to 1937, see Gordon Ireland, Boundaries, Possessions, and Conflicts in South America (New York: Octagon Books, 1971), pp. 3–245. 19. For background information on this dispute and others taking place in South America and the Caribbean Basin post 1945, this work relied on Connell-Smith, The Inter-American System, pp. 224–264; and Wiseman, “The United Nations and International Peacekeeping,” pp. 309–311. 20. See Connell-Smith, The Inter-American System, pp. 254–255. 21. For a detailed inventory and description of all arms control agreements, declarations, and proposals, see Hugo Palma, America Latina: Limitación de Armamentos y

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Desarme en la Región (Lima, Peru: Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales, 1986), pp. 51–74; and Nicholas Rengger, ed., Treaties and Alliances of the World, 5th ed. (London: Longman Group UK Limited, 1990), pp. 431–491. 22. For further elaboration of this topic and data supporting his findings, see Augusto Varas, Militarization and the International Arms Race in Latin America (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), particularly pp. 92–97. A similar argument and data appear in Augusto Varas, “Controlling Conflict in South America: National Approaches,” in Michael A. Morris and Victor Millán, eds., Controlling Latin American Conflicts: Ten Approaches (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 71–87.

Chapter 7

The Military, External Peace, and Internal Violence

1. Morris Janowitz, Military Conflict: Essays in Institutional Analysis of War and Peace (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1975), p. 57. 2. Linda Alexander Rodríguez, ed., Rank and Privilege: The Military and Society in Latin America (Wilmington, DE: Jaguar Books on Latin America, 1994). In the introduction to her edited book, Alexander Rodríguez traces the major historical factors that have contributed to the politicization and “significant autonomy” of the military in most Latin American countries. While many students of Latin American politics assume and assert the political autonomy of the military or, put differently, the lack of civilian control over the armed forces, Alfred Stepan advances a list of criteria to classify this variable. The definition of political autonomy of the military in this study attempts to be consistent with Stepan’s criteria. See Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 93–97. 3. S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1976), p. 5. 4. Ibid., p. 11. 5. For background literature on state classification, see Joseph Nettl, “The State as a Conceptual Variable,” World Politics vol. 20, no. 4 (July 1968), pp. 559–592. 6. For a discussion of this distinction, see Juan J. Linz, “Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes,” in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science: Macropolitical Theory, vol. 3 (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 175–411. 7. For this conceptualization, see Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). 8. For a discussion of the presidential systems in South America, see Scott Mainwaring, “Presidentialism in Latin America,” Latin America Research Review, vol. 25, no. 1 (1990), pp. 157–179; Arturo Valenzuela, “Presidentialism in Crisis,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 4, no. 4 (October 1993), pp. 15–32; and Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America, vol. 2 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994). 9. For a discussion of the distinctions between delegative and representative democracies, and the classification of presidential systems in Latin America as delegative democracy, see Guillermo A. O’Donnell, “Delegative Democracy,” Journal of Democracy, vol. 5, no. 1 (January 1994), pp. 55–69. 10. For a discussion of the strength of labor unions and business associations in Argentina, see David Rock, Argentina 1516–1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Juan J. López, “Social

NOTES

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16. 17.

18. 19.

217

Conflict, Political Institutions and Economic Performance in Argentina,” PhD dissertation, University of Chicago Press, 1994, pp. 6–10; and Paul W. Drake, Labor Movements and Dictatorships: The Southern Cone in Comparative Perspective (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). For a discussion of political parties in Chile, see Arturo Valenzuela, “Chile,” in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), esp. pp. 3–21. Author’s translation. For the original Spanish version, see “Pinochet Desmiente Ambición en Golpe Militar,” Diario de Las Américas (Miami, FL), Thursday, November 28, 1996, p. 2 A. Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), Politics of Modernization Series, no. 9, pp. 77–78. Guillermo A. O’Donnell, “Modernization and Military Coups: Theory, Comparisons, and the Argentine Case,” in Abraham E. Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch, eds., Armies and Politics in Latin America (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1986), p. 105. For a similar argument explaining military intervention in modernizing states, see Samuel P. Huntington, “Praetorianism and Political Decay,” in Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 192–263. According to Huntington, “[p]olitical systems with low levels of institutionalization and high levels of participation . . . are appropriately called praetorian polities,” p. 80. He discusses how the military and other social sectors intervene in the political process of these polities. He explains, “In all societies specialized social groups engage in politics. What makes such groups seem more ‘politicized’ in a praetorian society is the absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political action. In a praetorian system social forces confront each other nakedly; no political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders are recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict. Equally important, no agreement exists among the groups as to the legitimate and authoritative methods for solving conflicts. . . . In a praetorian society, however, not only are the actors varied, but so also are the methods used to decide upon office and policy. Each group employs means which reflect its peculiar nature and capabilities. The wealthy bribe; students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military coup,” p. 196. Edwin Lieuwen, “Militarism and Politics in Latin America,” in John J. Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 132. Ibid., p. 133. Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davis, Jr., eds., The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America, 2nd ed. (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), p. 3. Kalevi J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996 [repr. 2004]), p. 168. For background literature on the breakdown of democracies and the emergence of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in South America, see Linz and Stepan, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes; Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism; James M. Malloy, ed., Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977); and David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton

NOTES

218

20. 21. 22. 23.

24.

25. 26. 27.

28. 29.

30.

31. 32. 33.

34.

University Press, 1979). For literature on the transition from authoritarianism to civilian governments in the 1980s in South America, see Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transition From Authoritarian Rule: Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); James M. Malloy and Mitchell A. Seligson, eds., Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987); and Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics. Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, 2nd ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1961), p. 9. John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America (Stanford: University of Stanford Press, 1964), p. 3. Ibid., p. 134. Robert Wesson, ed., The Latin American Military Institution (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986), for this passage and the citation immediately above, see p. ix, and for more details on the political role of the military in Latin America, see pp. 157–211. Augusto Varas, Democracy Under Siege: New Military Power in Latin America (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), p. vii. He also discusses three factors leading to the growing military autonomy in the late 1980s in Latin America. For that argument, see pp. 158–159 in this volume. Also, Varas had advanced before a similar argument on the autonomy of the military, see Augusto Varas, La Política de las Armas en América Latina (Santiago de Chile: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 1988), p. 14. For other works that assume and defend the political role and institutional autonomy of the military in Latin America, see Lowenthal and Fitch, Armies and Politics in Latin America; and Alain Rouquiè, The Military and the State in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987). For a historical presentation and analysis of all militarized interstate crises in South America from 1935 to 2005, see chapter 3. For a more elaborate discussion of this causal relationship, see chapter 5, pp. 105–110. For a formulation explaining why the military may be more averse than civilians to crisis and war, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (1957; repr., Cambridge, MA: Belnap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 68–70. See Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), p. 236. Donald P. Warwick, “Transnational Participation and International Peace,” in Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 306. Frederick M. Nunn, The Military in Chilean History: Essays on CivilMilitary Relations, 1810–1973 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976), p. 85. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), for specific citations, see pp. 28, 29, 32, and 33. Stanislav Andreski, “On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships,” Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 3, no. 3 (December 1980), pp. 3–10. P. A. R. Calvert, “Democratization in Latin America,” in South America, Central America and the Caribbean, 1997, 6th ed. (London, England: Europa Publications, 1997), p. 11. In addition to the empirical sources listed in appendix D, this observation are based on the following historical surveys of Latin America: Peter Calvert, ed., Political

NOTES

35.

36. 37.

38. 39.

40.

41. 42.

219

and Economic Encyclopedia of South America and the Caribbean (London, England: Longman Group UK Limited, 1991); Thomas E. Skidmore and Peter H. Smith, Modern Latin America, 6th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Robert Jones Shafer, A History of Latin America (Lexington: D. C. Heath and Company, 1978). This remark was transcribed by the British Broadcasting Corporation, London, England, April 6, 1995. President Fujimori visited Ecuador for a second time during the IX Rio Group Summit in Ecuador, September 4–7, 1995. On this occasion he talked privately with Ecuador’s President, Sixto Durán Ballén. For a report of the second presidential exchange ever between Ecuador and Peru, see “Fujimori in Quito for Regional Summit: Visit Keeps Countries on Fast Track to Peace,” Latin America Weekly Report, WR-95–35, September 14, 1997, p. 418. http://www.cusns.navy.mil/operations.htm For reports asserting the existence and functioning of this type cooperation among the military regimes in the Southern Cone of South America in the 1970s and 1980s, see William R. Long, “Missing Chilean Scientist Raises Ghost of Military Rule,” Los Angeles Times, June 19, 1993, part A, p. 1; The New York Times, July 20, 1993, section A, p. 2; Nathaniel C. Nash, “Spy Network Inflaming UruguayChile Tension,” The New York Times, July 20, 1993, section A, p. 7; Malcolm Coad, “Missing Chilean Reawakens Fears of DINA Secret Police,” The Guardian, London, England, June 11, 1993, p. 12; Mary McGrory, “A G-Man the Left Can Love,” The Washington Post, September 24, 1989, p. 1; Peter R. Kornblush, “Certifying Chile on Rights is Wrong,” The New York Times, March 23, 1982, p. 27; and Peter R. Kornblush, The Pinochet file: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New York: New Press, 2004). Also, it is important to note here that, while bearing the same exact code name, this operation must be distinguished from a multinational initiative, conceived and encouraged by the United States in the mid-1980s, to fight against drug traffic in Latin America. Jan Rocha, “Archives Yield Clue to Fate of Paraguay’s Disappeared,” The Guardian, London, England, February 19, 1993, p. 11. For the original report of the Common Security System of Mercosur, see Luis Garasino, “Proyecto de Sistema de Seguridad del Mercosur,” Clarín, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 28, 1997, p. 1. For reports on the debate provoked by the disclosure of this military plan in Argentina and Brazil, see Luis Garasino, “El Proyecto de Seguridad: Propuesta de Defensa para el Mercosur,” Clarín, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 29, 1997, p. 1; Oscar Raul Cardoso, “Coordinación Argentino-Brasileña,” Clarín, Buenos Aires, Argentina, July 31, 1997, p. 1; “Argentina Quer Militar Nas Ruas,” Jornal Do Brasil, Rio de Janeiro, Brasil, July 29, 1997, pp. 1 and 13; María O’Donnell, “La Argentina y Brazil Buscan la Cooperación Militar,” La Nación, Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 1, 1997, p. 9; and María O’Donnell, “Las FF. AA. No Actuaran en Conflictos Sociales,” La Nación, Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 2, 1997, pp. 1 and 6. Eleonora Gosman, “Encuentro Argentino Brasileño: Avances en una Alianza Militar,” Clarín, Buenos Aires, Argentina, August 1, 1997, p. 1. Emphasis added. See the article “Balza, Evasivo, Estuvo a Solas con Pinochet,” La Nación, Buenos Aires, August 8, 1997, p. 6. For a news analysis of President Carlos Menem visit to Chile, see María O’Donnell, “Nuevo Avance en la Relación con Chile,” La Nación, Buenos Aires, August 9, 1997, pp. 1 and 10. From the Chilean side, see El Mercurio, Santiago de Chile, August 7, 1997, pp. 1 and 10; and El Mercurio,

NOTES

220

43.

44. 45. 46. 47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

Santiago de Chile, August 8, 1997, pp. 1, 13, C 3, and C 5. Also, as an added way to convey and strengthen the argument presented here, it is illustrative to juxtapose and contrast the published images of President Carlos Menem politely greeting Augusto Pinochet, Chief of the Chilean Armed Forces, and Martín Balza, the Argentine Army Chief, effusively and warmly embracing his Chilean counterpart. The photographic depictions appeared two days apart in the major newspapers of Argentina and Chile. See El Mercurio, Santiago de Chile, August 8, 1997, p. 1; and La Nación, Buenos Aires, August 9, 1997, p. 1. Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International Organization, vol. 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 2–3. For more discussions and applications of the epistemic community approach to international political issues, see the rest of the articles in this special issue. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 7. Ibid., p. 32. Ibid., p. 84. For historical analyses of the ideology, social composition, organization, and socioeconomic and political role of the military in South America prior to 1890, see Genaro Arriagada Herrera, El Pensamiento Político de los Militares (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Aconcagua, 1986); Rouquiè, The Military and the State in Latin America, pp. 39–71; Loveman and Davis, Jr., The Politics of Antipolitics, pp. 17–33; Augusto Varas, Militarization and the International Arms Race in Latin America (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), pp. 5–15; and John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America, pp. 13–69. To support this assertion, see the information provided by Nunn, The Military in Chilean History, p. 309, fn. 3. For the inception of the professionalization of other armed forces in South America, see Frederick M. Nunn, Yesterday’s Soldiers (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), pp. 2–3; J. Mark Ruhl, “Colombia: Armed Forces and Society,” Foreign and Comparative Studies/Latin American Series I (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1980), p. 19; and Efraín Cobas, Fuerza Armada, Misiones Militares y Dependencia en el Peru (Lima, Peru: Editorial Horizonte, 1982), pp. 21–23. For a biographical background of Emil Körner and an analysis of the Prussian influence on the Chilean army, see Nunn, The Military in Chilean History, pp. 72–79. John J. Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America, pp. 78–79. Similar points are made by Nunn, Yesterday’s Soldiers, pp. 41–42; and Victor Alba, “The Stages of Militarism in Latin America,” in Johnson, The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, pp. 172–174 (see note 15). For a discussion of these developments, see John J. Johnson, “The Latin-American Military as a Politically Competing Group in Transitional Society,” in Johnson, The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, pp. 107–114 (see note 15). For the data on the social origin of the Brazilian military, see Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton: University of Princeton Press, 1971), pp. 30–56. For a sample of works analyzing socioeconomic origins of the military in Latin America as determinant of political behavior, see Johnson The Military and Society in Latin America, pp. 105–107 and 250–251; ibid., pp. 42–48; José Nun, “The Middle-Class Military Coup,” in Claudio Véliz, ed., The Politics of Conformity in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 66–118; and in the context of Ecuador, John S. Fitch, “Toward a Model of Coups D’ètat as a Political

NOTES

54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

59.

60.

61.

62.

63.

221

Process in Latin America: Ecuador, 1948–1966,” PhD dissertation, Yale University, 1973, pp. 331–332. He argues that the officers’ “strong corporate selfidentification with the military institution, rather than their peripheral identification as members of the middle class,” may account best for their political position. Another analyst simply asserts that the “Latin American armed forces are rather similar in regard to the origins of officers. Most come from the middle or lowermiddle classes, few from the affluent sectors, and few from the poorer strata.” For this quote, see Wesson, The Latin American Military Institution, p. 19. Ibid., p. 20. Guillermo A. O’Donnell, “Modernization and Military Coups,” p. 120. See Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America, p. 34. Samuel P. Huntington, Changing Patterns of Military Politics (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 22. Alfred Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion,” in Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future (1973; repr., New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 47–65. For sources on the military campaigns of the Chaco War and the human and material costs to the military and the general population of both countries, see Bruce W. Farcau, The Chaco War: Bolivia and Paraguay, 1932–1935 (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1996); Roberto Querejazu Calvo, Historia de la Guerra del Chaco (La Paz, Bolivia: Libreria Editorial Juventud, 1990); Félix Paiva Alcorta, La Paz del Chaco (Asunción, Paraguay: El Lector, 1983); Jorge Antezana Villagrán, La Guerra del Chaco: Análisis y Crítica sobre su Conducción, vols. I and II (La Paz, Bolivia: Editorial Mundy Color, 1979); and David H. Zook, Jr., The Conduct of the Chaco War (New Haven, CT: Bookman Associates, 1960). One argument explains the cause of the Chaco War as the manipulation of both countries by foreign corporations, particularly oil companies, interested in exploiting the natural resources suspected to be in the Chaco Boreal region. For a work supporting this view, see Julio José Chiavenato, A Guerra do Chaco (leia-se petróleo) (Sao Paulo, Brazil: Editora Brasiliense, 1980). For a study analyzing the role oil played in the bilateral conflict, see Alfredo M. Seiferheld, Economía y Petróleo Durante la Guerra del Chaco: Apuntes Para una Historia Económica del Conflicto Paraguayo-Boliviano (Asunción, Paraguay: El Lector, 1983). It is illustrative to note the judicial process in progress in Spain for abuses committed against Spanish nationals by the Argentine military during the “dirty war” in the 1970s. For details on this judicial process, see The New York Time, Saturday, October 11, 1997, p. 3. For works dealing with the adverse political consequences from the Malvinas/Falklands War for the individual officers and the military institution in Argentina, see Aldo C. Vacs, “Authoritarian Breakdown and Redemocratization in Argentina,” in Malloy and Seligson, Authoritarians and Democrats, pp. 15–42 (see note 19); and Carlos H. Acuña, “Politics and Economics in the Argentina of the Nineties (Or, Why The Future No Longer Is What it Used to Be),” in William C. Smith, Carlos H. Acuña, and Eduardo A. Gamarra, eds., Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America (Miami, FL: University of Miami, North-South Center, 1994). For two comprehensive analyses of U.S.-Latin American relations and regional socioeconomic and political events at the end and immediately after World War II, see Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, “The Postwar Conjuncture in Latin America: Democracy, Labor, and the Left,” in Leslie Bethell and Ian Roxborough, eds.,

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64.

65.

66.

67. 68.

Latin America Between the Second World War and The Cold War, 1944–1948 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1–32; and David Rock, “War and Postwar Intersections: Latin America and the United States,” in David Rock, ed., Latin America in the 1940s: War and Postwar Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 15–40. John Child, Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System, 1938–1978 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980); John S. Fitch, “The Political Impact of U.S. Military Aid to Latin America: Institutional and Individual Effects,” Armed Forces and Society, vol. 5, no. 3 (1979), pp. 360–386; and L. Veneroni, Estados Unidos y las Fuerzas Armadas de América Latina (Buenos Aires, Argentina: Ediciones Periferia, 1971). On the 1948 Costa Rican Civil War and the decision to disband permanently the armed forces, see John P. Bell, “Crisis in Costa Rica: The 1948 Revolution,” Latin American Monographs, University of Texas at Austin, Institute of Latin American Studies, no. 24; and Constantino Urcuyo, “Civil-Military Relations in Costa Rica: Militarization or Adaptation to New Circumstances?” in Louis W. Goodman, Johanna S. R. Mendelson, and Juan Rial, eds., The Military and Democracy: The Future of Civil-Military Relations in Latin America (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), particularly pp. 238–242. For a sample of works that have discussed the impact of the Cuban Revolution on the military mind and the redefinition of the armed forces role in Latin America, see Liisa North, Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and Peru (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); W. Barber and N. Ronning, Internal Security and Military Power (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966); and Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism, pp. 72–73. These points are summarized these from Guillermo A. O’Donnell, “Modernization and Military Coups,” pp. 104–105. For a detailed discussion of these forms of cooperation among the military regimes in the Southern Cone in the mid-1970s, see Alejandro Dabat, Argentina: The Malvinas and the End of Military Rule (Thetford, Norfolk, Great Britain: Thetford Press, 1983), pp. 82 and 182. Also, see the discussion in this chapter, pp. 167–168.

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245


INDEX

adjudicated peaceful settlement, 114 Afghanistan, 93 aggression, 89, 145, 166 aggressor, 5, 33, 39, 114–115, 145, 148 Allende, Salvador, 155 alliance, 33–36 clusters, 50–51 flexibility, 33–35 Amazon jungle, 88 anarchy, 4, 27–28, 31, 34, 37, 41 Andreski, Stanislav, 162–163 Anglo-American assistance, 123 anomalously peaceful, 3 12, 178 warlike, 3 Aranha, Oswaldo, 91 arbitration, 64, 81–84, 88, 94–95, 97, 146 by British Crown, 64, 95 Argentina, 3, 8–9, 17, 23, 35–36, 39–40, 43–44, 55–61, 88, 90 Argentine Confederation, 8 Argentine-Brazilian dyad, 60, 62–64, 165 Argentine-Chilean dyad, 49, 64–66, 76, 94–96, 174 Armour, Norman, 95 arms control agreement, 104, 114–115, 141, 141, 147 embargo, 37 limitation proposals, 148 procurement policies, 148 race, 2, 5, 11, 14–15, 20, 30, 33, 147–148 Aron, Raymond, 27, 37 Arthur, Chester A., 84 authoritarianism, 20, 153, 157 degree of, 153 authority, 31, 81–82, 93, 102, 104, 150–151, 154

autocracy, 107–110, 118, 153 autocratic governments, 106, 114, 123–124 balance of forces, 5, 42–44 balance of power, 2, 13–15, 27, 30–37, 40, 42, 45–46, 49, 66, 76, 107 balancer, 33 dyadic, 5, 41 in South America, 84 theory, 55, 33, 40 balance of threats, 40 Balza, Martín, 168 belligerents, 83, 85, 94, 98, 179 Betts, Richard K., 4, 37, 160–161 bilateral negotiations, 95, 97, 147 bipolar, 32–33, 45–46, 49–52, 58 subsystem, 35, 49, 55–57, 59, 178 bipolarity, 4, 32–35, 45–46, 49–50, 55–60, 178 Blaine, James G., 83–84 Blainey, Geoffrey, 14, 36, 42 Bogotá Pact, 147 Bolivia, 1, 6, 8, 36, 38, 50, 56, 62, 71, 77, 83, 94, 120, 126, 146, 173 Bolivian-Chilean dyad, 66–67, 76 border disputes (see militarized crises), 59 Boulding, Kenneth E., 10–11, 17 boundary treaty, 94–95 brink of war, 9, 17, 60, 95 British Guyana, 81 Buenos Aires Conference, 89 bureaucratic authoritarian regimes, 155, 157, 165 Buzan, Barry, 28 Caldas, A.R.C., 97 incident, 69, 71, 76–77, 97, 122 Canada, 3, 11–12, 17, 19, 122 Caribbean Basin, 38, 80, 85, 98

248

INDEX

Carr, Edward Hallet, 25, 27 Carter, Jimmy (administration), 92, 96, 166 catalytic crisis, 22 Catholic Church, 145–147 caudillos, 170 causal relation, 25, 28, 35–36, 38, 45–46, 49, 79, 98, 102, 108, 112–113, 117, 159, 180 causal variable, 4, 35, 43, 59, 76, 115, 144, 181 causation, 45, 60 causes of war and peace, 1–3, 14–16, 25, 31, 147, 177, 180–181 of international violence, 118 cease-fire agreement, 93 Cenepa River, 92–93 Central America, 38–39, 80, 85, 98, 146 Chaco Boreal territory, 85 Chaco War, 1, 8, 57–58, 85, 94, 172 Chile, 3, 6–9, 17, 36, 38, 40, 43–44, 60, 83–84, 87, 91, 120, 126, 133, 141, 146, 153–159, 167 Chaco War (lessons learned from the), 169, 173 challenger, 41–47 Charter of the Organization of American States, 114, 145 Chávez Frías, Hugo, 7, 157 Chilean-Peruvian dyad, 71–73 Choucri, Nazli, 20 civilian control of the military (subjective and objective), 170 civilian institutions (weakness of), 152 Clausewitz, Carl von, 13, 157 Clay, Henry, 83 Cleveland, Grover, 81, 84 Clinton, Bill, 93 coercion, 4, 71, 85, 94, 181 Cold War, 3, 9, 12, 14, 23, 59 Colombia, 3, 6–9, 17, 23, 36, 38, 40–41, 49 collective security, 4, 37, 87, 104, 114–115, 144, 148, 179 collection of national debts, 82 collective military response, 145, 148 Colombian-Peruvian dyad, 69–70, 76, 88 Colombian-Venezuelan dyad, 70–71, 76, 86, 96–97, 122, 126, 146 Colón, Eloy Alfaro, 89

Common Security System (Sistema de Seguridad Común), 167–168 comparative method of analysis, 16 Concha, Carlos, 90 conflict management, 146, 179 conflict or clash or of interests, 4, 6, 13–14, 19, 21 conflict-prone, 143, 171 Constant, Benjamin, 102 constitutionalism, 20 contested election, 118 Contreras Sepúlveda, Manuel, 95 controlled comparison, 43 conventions, 113–114 cooperation, 12, 15 strategies for), 30–33, 35, 103, 109, 113, 125 hegemonic-induced, 36–37, 84, 166 economic, 125, 133 military, 35, 137, 166–168, 175 cooperative hemispheric security system, 86 coordination, (as compliance with hegemonic role), 40 and international organizations, 113 military, 168 corporatism, 20 Correlates of War Project (COW), 52 correlation, 58–60, 112–113, 117, 122, 125, 179 cost of war, 23 Costa Rica, 36, 85, 169, 174–175, 181 covariation, 45, 59, 118, 144 Covenant of the League of Nations, 145 crisis, 2, 9, 13–15, 22, (militarized interstate), 118 crisis initiation, 118 criterion to sort out other important trading partners, 125 Cuba, 43, 85, 169, 175, 181 Cummings, Homer, 95 Dahl, Robert A., 153 De Rosa, Juan Manuel, 62 Declaration of Ayacucho, 147 decolonization, 152 DeConde, Alexander, 83 defender, 5, 41–42, 44–46, 61, 62, 64, 69, 71, 76–77 defense pact, 35, 50, 169, 174

INDEX

democracy, 20, 23, 104, 105, 107, 108–109, 115, 122,155 definition of, 117–119 degree of democracy, 153 delegative democracies, 154 diffusion of, 118 liberal, 105, 109, 157 pacific nature of, 105, 108–109 polyarchy, 153 promotion of peace by, 104 representative, 154 democratic peace, 108, analysis of, 159 operationalization of, 115, 117, 119, 122 democratization, 62, 110, 157, 174 dependent variable (in this book), 3, 19, 45 operationalization of, 61, 118 deterrence, 2 conventional, 12 definition of, 5, 41–42 distrust, 20, 30, 175 dyadic, 31, 41 expected benefit or utility, 41, 44 extended, 42 failure, 44, 45, 61, 66 general, 43 immediate, 41, 43, 61–62, 64, 66, 71, 73, 76 nuclear, 23, 30 success, 42 deterrent capacity, 5, 41, 43, 49, 61, 66, 69 Deutsch, Karl W., 18–20, 23, 33 dictatorship, 20, 62, 105, 152, 154, 179 analysis of, 120–122 military, 159, 163, 175 operationalization of, 118–119 Diehl, Paul, 14 Diesing, Paul, 13 diplomacy, 2, 69, 96 diplomatic negotiations, 80, 83–84, 97: leverage, 98; mechanisms, 114, 179; techniques, 144, 149, 179 disarmament of Latin America, 147 distribution of capabilities, 28–30, 32, 50, 52, 56, 64 doctrine of individual liberty, 101–102, 105 Dominican Republic, 82, 85, 99 Doyle, Micheal W., 104, 106–107, 109 Durán Ballén, Sixto, 93 dyadic relation, 30, 33, 43

249

East Asia, 9, 38 economic nationalism, 37,111 Ecuador, 3, 8, 24, 43, 50, 60, 71, 114 Ecuadorian-Peruvian dyad, 6, 17, 73, 76, 87–94, 131–133, 164–166 Ecuadorian-Peruvian militarizad dispute, 40, 49, 69, 109, 122, 145–147, 174 egoism, 28, 30 egoist, 29, 44, 104 El Caracazo, 7 empire, 36 ententes, 35 epistemic community, 168–169 Essequibo territory, 17, 44, 76, 122, 159 Europe, 19, 21, 23, 31, 38, 40, 80–82, 86, 88, 91, 99, 102, 113, 122, 151 European military missions in South America, 170 evolutionary social process, 6, 161 external-peace-and-internal-violence paradox, 163 Finer, S. E., 150–151 Football or Soccer War, 39, 98 foreign policy, 27, 29, 52, 94, 107, 109 Fourteen Points Address, 103 France, 12, 21, 22, 60 free riding, 37 free trade, 2, 5, 36, 84, 102, 104–105, 111–112 Frelinghuysen, Frederick, 84 friend and enemy grouping, 161 Fujimori, Alberto, 93–94, 157, 166 Gaddis, John, 1, 3, 14, 23 Galtung, Johan, 10, 11 Garfield, James A., 83–84 Gasiorowski, Mark, 112 geopolitical competition, 22 Germany, 21–22, 60, 82, 123 Gilpin, Robert, 25, 111 Goldblat, Josef, 144 Good Neighbor Policy, 84 governance of international life, 104 Gran Colombia, 80 Great Britain, 11, 19, 21–22, 39, 60, 62, 64, 73, 76, 81–82, 123, 178 Great European power interference, 82

250

INDEX

great powers, 4, 20 22, 30, 32, 37, 51, 80, 85, 98 Greece, 3, 12, 25, 39, 122 Grotius, Hugo, 113 Guajira Peninsula, 96 guarantors of the peace, 40, 88, 92–93, 146, 157 Guatemala, 83 Gulf of Venezuela, 9, 17, 23, 49, 69, 71, 87, 96–97, 122 Guyana, 6, 119 Guyanan-Venezuelan dyad, 17, 44, 73–77, 81, 96–97, 119, 122, 131, 146, 159, 164 Haas, Peter M., 168 Haiti, 85, 93 hegemon, 4, 32, 36–38, 40, 46, 51, 82, 180 U.S. as a regional, 32, 36, 82 hegemonic peace hypothesis, 40, 79–80, 87, 98 management, 79, 96–99 socialization, 36 hegemonic stability theory, 4, 36–38 benevolent strand, 36–37 coercive strand, 36–37 hegemonic power, 4, 36, 38, 40, 46, 178, 180 Herz, John H., 27 heterogeneity, 22, 151 heuristic purpose, 35, 57 historical anomaly, 2, 24 historical paradox, 24, 179 Hobbes, Thomas, 3, 26–27, 107 Hoffman, Stanley, 27, 103 Holsti, Kalevi J., 9, 15–16, 31, 157 Honduras, 35, 89, 95, 98, 178 Hull, Cordell, 85, 90–91, 111 human nature, 28 Huntington, Samuel, 160–161, 169–172 Huth, Paul, 41, 43 ideology, 13, 15, 17, 19, 23, 40, 101, 122 idiosyncratic factors, 12, 13 Ikenberry, John, 36 imprudent vehemence, 108 independent variables, 5, 45, 101 India, 9, 12, 39, 81 inducement, 4, 22 inductive argument, 122

institutional mechanism, 38, 86–87 institutional weakness, 155 institutionalism (neoliberal), 5, 113, 115 institutionalist hypothesis, 115 integration, 10, 18–20, 169, 175 interaction opportunities, 4, 33 Inter-American Affairs, 38, 82–83, 85, 93, 96 cooperation, 84 security system, 86 system, 87, 45 Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty, 147 interdependence (Complex), 112 economic, 34, 59–60, 104–105, 110–117, 124–125, 137, 143–144, 179: degree of economic, 125 interests, 4–6, 9, 12–15, 18–22, 29–30, 46, 80, 89, 102–106, 109, 111–113, 115, 118, 124, 150, 152, 153 harmony of, 5, 111 of the military, 158–162, 164, 168–173, 175–182 of the U.S, 39, 79–80, 82–87, 98 internal adversaries, 156 internal balancing, 5, 41 internal political instability, 156 internal political violence, 1, 7, 150, 162, 176 International Conference of American States, 84, 86 International Court of Justice, 95, 145–146 international division of labor, 111, 112 international economic regimes, 4, 37 international institutions, 105, 113–114, 117, 144–146, 179 international organizations, 5, 59, 104, 114, 115, 117, 145, 146, 147, 149 international isolation, 137 international law, 104, 144 international political processes, 2, 13 international predation, 111 international regimes, 5, 31, 37, 114 international society, 113 international trade, 110–111, 124–125 international violence, see war, 13, 109, 114, 118 interstate violence, 98, 114, 122, 159, 171, 179

INDEX

251

intraregional bilateral commerce or trade, 117, 125–126 involvement opportunities, 80, 98, 123 Iraq, 93, 98 Israel, 41, 92 Italy, 82

long peace, 1–2, 23, 112 long period of negative peace, 76, 101, 105 in South America, 57, 59, 110, 113, 123, 149, 177–178 Los Monjes archipelago, 69, 96 Lusinchi, Jaime, 97

Janowitz, Morris, 149 Jervis, Robert, 2, 16, 31, 37, 41, 44 Johnson, John J., 158, 170 judicial settlement, 97, 114–115, 144–149, 179

Machiavelli, Niccolo, 26–27 Mahuad, Jamil, 94 major crisis, 22–23 Malvinas\Falkland Islands, 39, 64, 148, 173 Mansfield, Edward D., 79 Maoz, Zeev, 108 Marañón conflict, 88, 91, 93 material power resources, 52 McCurry, Micheal D., 93 mediation (successful), 96 mediation and/or arbitration of third parties, 145 Menem, Carlos, 168 mercantilism, 110–111 MERCOSUR, 137 methodology, 6, 26, 101 Mexican-American War, 80 Mexico, 83, 85, 110, 148 Middle East, 9, 38, 98 militarism, 2, 13, 15, 23, 172 militarist peace hypothesis, 5–6, 149, 162–163 military, 160–180 as gatekeepers, 150 aversion to external conflict, crisis, and war, 6, 12, 119, 122–124, 160, 162, 169, 171, 179 balance, 5, 41 competition, 20 cooperation agreement, 33, 35 coups, 155–156, 174 doctrine, 38, 40 elites, 149–150 governments, 137, 151 intervention, 1, 37–39, 80, 85, 98, 178 institution, 151–152, 155–157, 159–160, 163–160, 170–175, 177, 180–182 mind, 169, 173 motivations, 6, 150, 159–161, 169, 176–177 organization, 5 parity, 5, 47 political autonomy, 5, 150–157

Kant, Immanuel, 103, 106–111 Kennan, George F., 27 Keohane, Robert O., 5, 105, 112–113 Kfir combat aircrafts, 92 King Alfonso XIII, 88 Kissinger, Henry A., 27 Körner, Emil, 170 Kupchan, Charles A., 36 La Plata War or La Guerra Grande, 8, 57, 62, 83 La Violencia, 7 Lakatos, Imre, 25 Lake, David, 109 lateral pressure theory, 20 Lauca River waters dispute, 146 law of comparative advantage, 111 League of Nations, 86, 104, 145 Advisory Committee, 86 Levy, Jack, 15 liberal paradigm, 5, 101–105, 112–113, 144, 178 economic theory, 124 economic hypothesis, 115 liberalism, 2, 6, 24, 177 classical liberalism, 102 evolution of, 102; as a doctrine of individual liberty, 101; economic, 5, 102–103, 105, 110, 112–113; regulatory, 105; republican, 102–103, 105, 179; social democratic, 101; sophisticated, 105 liberty, 101–102, 105 Lieuwen, Edwin, 156, 158, 171 limitation of arms in Latin America, 147 Locke, John, 102 Lodge, Henry Cabot, 82

252

INDEX

politicization of the, 160, 169–173 preparedness, 59 professionalism (new and old), 169–172: professionalization, 156, 171, 173, 181 ratio, 47 retaliation, 42 superiority, 5, 42, 44–46, 49 transnational confraternity among, 14, 181 transnational identity, 163–164, 167, 181 vulnerability, 45 militarized interstate disputes or crises, 2, 7, 79, 87, 98, 159 Mill, John Stuart, 103, 111 minimalist criteria of democracy and dictatorship, 118 miscalculation, 5, 34, 42, 60 misperception, 15–16 monist model of the state, 153–155 Monroe Doctrine, 39, 80–82 Monroe, James, 80, 83 Montesquieu, Charles Louis de, 102, 111 moral consideration, 26 restraint, 106, 109, 124 Morgenthau, Hans J., 27–29, 33–34, 37, 39 Morse, Edward L., 102 Mueller, John, 23 multipolar, 4–5, 32–35, 45–52–57, 80 mutual assured destruction, 12 national interest, 30, 36–37, 40, 79–80, 98, 124, 175, 180 National Material Capability Data Set, 52 National Security Doctrine, 175 nation-state creation, 15 nationalism, 5, 13, 20, 37, 111, 158 naval maneuvers, 96 Nazi Germany, 123 necessary and sufficient condition, 3, 6, 11–12 negotiation, 15, 23, 64, 76, 80, 82–84, 89–91, 94, 146–147, 168 neorealism, 25, 28, 31–32 neutrality pact, 35 Nicaragua, 85 Nicolson, Harold, 27 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 27 nonaggression pact, 33, 35 normative argument, 26, 107, 109 North America, 19, 113, 122–123

North, Robert C., 20–21 nuclear proliferation, 23 nonproliferation policy, 40 Nunn, Fedrick M., 161 Nye, Joseph, 112 O’Donnell, Guillermo, 154–155, 171 Olney’s Corollary, 81–82 Operation Condor, 167–175 Organization of American States (OAS), 91–92, 96, 114, 117, 145–146 organizations (formal and informal), 5, 59, 104, 113–115, 117, 144, 174–179 Oriente-Mainas, 17 Oye, Kenneth A., 31 pacific union, 107–108 Pactos de Mayo, 95 Páez, Federico, 89 Pakistan, 12, 39, 41 Pan American Society of the U.S. in New York, 96 Panama, 38, 85, 147 Pan-American movement, 84 Pan-American Union, 145 Paraguay, 1, 8, 17, 55, 62, 85, 94, 126, 137, 139, 167, 173, 175 Paraguayan or Triple Alliance War, 8, 55 Paraguayan-Bolivian dispute, 85 peace (definition of), 1, 3, 9 -17 complex cases of, 10, 14: continuum of peaceful relations, 12 positive and negative, 10–13, 17, 45, 59, 76, 98, 101, 105 prevalence of, 1, 17, 25, 42, 57, 60, 105, 117, 126 regional, 22, 57 stable and unstable, 11, 17–18, 21, 107, 178 studies, 14, 17 system, 10, 20–21 peaceful coexistence, 3, 12–13, 83 peace-keeping, 115, 144 peace-making, 115, 151 peace-war cycle, 15 Peloponnesian War, 25–26 Pérez, Carlos Andres, 7 Perpetual Peace, 106, 108 Peru, 3, 6, 8, 16–17, 24, 40–44, 49, 50, 52, 55, 60, 69

INDEX

Pinochet, Augusto, 95, 155, 167–168 pluralism, 18–19, 155 pluralist model of the state, 153–154 pluralistic security community, 19 Polachek, Salomon, 112 polar configuration, 4, 30, 32–34, 45–46, 51–52, 57 polarity (definition), 30, 32, 50 index, 51 polarization, 50 political (concept of the), 161 political freedom, 102 political violence, 7, 123, 150, 161–162, 176, 178–182 Polk, James K., 81–82 Pope John Paul II, 92, 96 power (concept of), 27–29 competition for, 4, 30, 169 concentration of, 36, 46, 51 diffusion of, 36 fungible characteristic, 30 imbalances, 34 inequality, 50–51 preponderance theory, 36, 38 relative concentration of, 51 relative, 5, 25–26, 42, 46, 180 source, 79 supremacy, 36 target, 79–80 protectionism, 2, 5, 37 praetorianism, 156 predation, 15, 17, 111 presidentialism, 153 primacy (see hegemony), 36 prisoners’ dilemma game, 31, 37 professionalization of the armed forces, 169, 171, 173 Protocol of Rio de Janeiro, 88, 91 Przeworski, Adam, 118–121 public goods, 36–37 Quito, 88 rapprochement, 22, 166 rational deterrence theory, 44 rational unitary actor, 29 rationality, 27, 29 Ray, James Lee, 50 realism or political realism, 2, 6, 24–31 redemocratization, 157

253

regime classification, 117–121, 154 regime type, 105, 118 relations bilateral, 3, 11, 19, 60, 66, 71, 89 religion, 13, 21 rent-seeking state, 109 republicanism, 106–107, 152 revolution, 174–176 Ricardo, David, 103 and 111 Rio de Janeiro Special Conference, 86 Rio Pact Treaty, 35, 39, 145 Rio Protocol, 40, 90–93, 146–147 Rock, Stephen R., 22 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 85, 89–91 Roosevelt, Theodore, 81–82, 85–86 Roosevelt’s Corollary, 82 Rosecrance, Richard, 112 Russett, Bruce, 15, 18, 41, 43, 108–109 Russia, 21 Sartori, Giovanni, 102–102 Scandinavia, 12, 20–21 Schelling, Thomas C., 30 Schmitt, Carl, 161–162 School of the Americas, 166 Schuman, Frederick L., 27 Schumpeter, Joseph A., 102 Schwarzenberger, George, 27 Schweller, Randall L., 51–52, 56–58 security community, 17–19 Security Council of the United Nations, 86 security dilemma, 15, 30–31 security independence, 34 security regime, 4, 37, 114 self-determination, 104 self-help system, 30 Singer, J. David, 8 Small, Melvin, 8 Smith, Adam, 103, 111 Snyder, Glenn, 13 social justice, 10 societal attitudes, 22–23 South American compliance, 80, 98–99 South American long peace, 1 Southern Cone, 6, 62, 66, 165, 167, 175,–176 sovereignty, 19, 28, 31, 71, 90, 94–95, 97, 104, 146, 156, 164, 175 Soviet Union, 3, 12, 17, 32, 35, 39, 123, 169

254 Soviet-American rivalry, 2, 12, 17 Spain, 12, 81, 88, 95, 122, 150–152 Spanish American War, 80, 109 Spanish colonization, 152 Spanish heritage, 151 Spykman, Nicholas J., 27 stability, 4 stakes, 15, 19, 21 Starr, Harvey, 15, 18 state of nature, 27, 107 state of war, 2, 11, 17, 21 state structure, 153 state-building process, 151, 153 state-centric assumption, 29 Stepan, Alfred, 171–172 Strait of Magellan, 94 structural differences, 32 structural factors, 12, 31 structural polarity, 52 structural realism or neorealism, 28 structural violence, 10 structure and neorealism, 4, 12, 28–29 structured, focused comparison, 45 struggle for independence, 152 struggle for power, 27, 29, 31 Stuart, Mill, J., 103, 111 subsystem, 5, 8, 32, 34–35, 49, 50–52 supranational intraregional social group, 6, 161 Sweden, 3, 17, 19, 20 Switzerland, 17 system level, 28, 110 Tacna-Arica region, 17 Taft, William H., 82, 85 Talara Truce, 88 tangible capabilities, 52 tangible commitments, 79 territorial disputes, 6, 17, 21, 40, 71, 85, 87, 94, 97, 164, 178–179 territorial waters, 9, 79, 91, 97 theory-building, 16 Thucydides, 25–27 Tierra del Fuego, 64, 94 tight bipolar system, 33 Tlateloco Treaty, 114 transnational militarism, 13 transparency, 4, 6, 34, 59–60, 161 Trescot, William H., 84 tripolarity, 4, 34, 51

INDEX

troop movements, 95–96 typology, 6, 8, 13, 15 U.S. authoritative action to settle the dispute, 90 U.S. authoritative policies, 83 U.S. behavior in South America, 79, 180 U.S. capabilities and interests, 79 U.S. Congress, 81–82, 103 U.S. foreign policy, 38, 40, 82, 98, 160 benign neglect of Latin America, 80 corollaries, 82 national security, 82, 85 policy choice, 98 U.S. hegemony, 37, 39–40, 76, 79, 81, 87, 94, 98, 180 enforcer of peace, 85, 98, 178 hegemonic directives, 80 management, 96–99 U.S. interventionist policy in Latin America, 80, 85 U.S. involvement, 38, 93, 97 U.S. leadership, 40 U.S. military interventions, 38, 80, 85, 99 U.S. national interest, 79 U.S. policy, 38, 80, 82, 84–85, 96, 98, 166 policy objectives (compliance with), 40, 46, 80, 98 U.S. role (as mediator), 88, 90–91, 94, 180 U.S. strategic interests, 98, 178 Ugarteche, Manuel Prado, 90 unilateral capitulation, 15 unilateral military intervention, 98, 178 unintended consequence, 13, 169 unipolar, 32–35 UNITAS (Naval Exercises), 166 United Kingdom, 98 United Nations, 86, 117, 125, 145–148 General Assembly, 86 Security Council, 86, 145 Uruguay, 8, 62, 137, 155, 160, 167, 175 Vaky, Viron P., 96 Vance, Cyrus, 96 Varas, Augusto, 147, 158 Vargas, Virgilio Barco, 97 Vatican Mediation, 40, 96, 147 Venezuela, 3, 6, 7, 9, 17, 23, 40–41, 44, 49, 69–71, 73–77, 81–82, 87, 96–97, 122, 126, 131, 146–148, 157, 159, 164

INDEX

Venezuelan Supreme Court, 97 Videla, Jorge Rafeal, 95 Walt, Stephen, 40 Waltz, Kenneth N., 23, 35, 51, 59 war (definition of), 1–3, 7, 9–17 absence of, or negative peace, 3, 9–11, 177 diffusion, 17 major, 8–9 making decision process, 5, 150, 153, 155, 159 onset of, 14, 24 preventing, 144, 145 proneness (of democracies and autocracies), 109, 118 War of the Pacific, 8, 40, 42, 44, 52, 55, 57, 66, 71, 83–84, 96, 171 War Scare of 1910, 88–89 war-prone system, 21, 31–32 Warwick, Donald P., 161 Washington (First Inter-American Conference held in), 84, 86 Washington conference of 1936, 89 Washington protocol, 71

255

Watson, Alexander, 93 Wayman, Frank W., 51, 56–58 Welles, Sumner, 89–91 Western Europe, 19, 122- 123, 153–154 Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, 166 Western Hemisphere, 38–40, 80–82, 85–84, 94, 96, 166 Wight, Martin, 27 Wilson, Woodrow, 85, 103 windows of vulnerability, 44 Wolfers, Arnold, 27, 29 Wolfers’ analogies, 29 Wood, Bryce, 85 world government (see also hegemony, primacy, and empire), 36 World War I, 1, 20, 112, 171 World War II, 4, 23, 32–33, 37, 40, 62, 86, 108, 111, 122, 144, 145, 152, 160, 166, 169, 174, 175, 181 Wright, Quincy, 109 Zamora and Santiago rivers, 93 Zarumilla River, 88

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