Corregidor in Peace and War

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Author: Charles M. Hubbard | Collis H. Davis Jr.

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Corregidor in Peace and War

To view the complete page image, please refer to the printed version of this work.

Corregidor in Peace and War Charles M. Hubbard and Collis H. Davis, Jr.

U N I V E R S I T Y O F M I S S O U R I P R E S S Columbia and London

Corregidor in Peace and War Charles M. Hubbard and Collis H. Davis, Jr. University of Missouri Press Columbia and London Copyright © 2006 by The Curators of the University of Missouri University of Missouri Press, Columbia, Missouri 65201 Printed and bound in China All rights reserved 5 4 3 2 1 10 09 08 07 06

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hubbard, Charles M., 1939– Corregidor in peace and war / Charles M. Hubbard and Collis H. Davis, Jr. p. cm. Summary: “Around 1898, the American military began to arm and fortify ‘the Rock,’ an island located at the entrance of Manila Bay. Heavily illustrated with historic and current photographs, Corregidor in Peace and War documents island life before WWII, and then records its loss and recapture during the struggle with Japan”—Provided by publisher. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8262-1712-7 (alk. paper) 1. Corregidor Island (Philippines)—History. 2. Corregidor Island (Philippines)—Pictorial works. I. Davis, Collis H. II. Title. DS688.C65H83 2007 358'.167095991—dc22 2006037607

This paper meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, Z39.48, 1984. Design and Composition: Kristie Lee Printer and binder: Everbest Printing Company through Four Colour Imports, Louisville, Ky. Typefaces: Berkeley and Bodoni Front matter photographs: page ii: North view of Mariveles Harbor, Bataan, from Topside, Corregidor; page viii: The Pacific War Memorial, Topside, Corregidor; page xii: Pockmarked barrel of a twelve-inch cannon at Battery Hearn vividly shows the effects of hot shrapnel. (Collis Davis Collection)

For all those who hallowed the ground

Preface

Contents

1 2 3 4 5 6

ix

An Island of Myths, Legends, and Faraway Places

The Yanks Are Coming

The Calm before the Storm

Winds of War

The Return

104

149

Shrine of Peace

Notes

187

Index

191

168

38

73

1


Preface This book is about an island in the Philippines called Corregidor. We first thought of this book in 2001 when we were both recipients of Fulbright Fellowships to work and teach at De La Salle University in Manila. We quickly became fascinated by the natural beauty, rich culture, and history of the Republic of the Philippines. After several visits, we realized that the history of Corregidor paralleled, in many ways, the modern history of the Philippines. By telling the story of this exciting place, we hope to encourage further study of this remarkable island nation. Originally, we thought the most effective way to tell the story was with a history in pictures, accompanied by expanded captions. However, our research into the existing literature demonstrated a need for a clear, concise historical narrative. A number of scholars, journalists, and popular historians have written very good accounts of specific events or activities that

involved the island. For example, there are military histories recounting the attack of the Japanese and subsequent recapture of the island by the Americans. While these provide invaluable information, they remain narrowly focused. Other recent works provide excellent details on the aptly named “big guns” and the fortifications constructed on the island. We have drawn extensively from this growing body of scholarly work. Despite this large volume of literature, there is no succinct overview or history of Corregidor. We hope this book will begin to fill that void. We were determined not to completely abandon our original idea of a history in pictures. With that in mind, we searched through the vast photographic collection at the National Archives, the United States Army Military History Institute, and several private collections. We selected photographs that illustrate the dramatic changes in the landscape

ix

of the island. Many of the photographs chosen have never been published. Thanks to Dr. John R. Baumgardner, we located a number of World War II photographs taken by the Japanese while they occupied the island. The pictures were found in 1945 on a street in Manila, and we selected a few for this book. Another source that provided invaluable photos is the American Historical Collection at the Ateneo de Manila University. This extraordinary collection of photographs, documents, and memorabilia has never been fully utilized by historians and scholars seeking to explain the role of the island fortress. To tell the story of “The Rock,” we called upon the Corregidor Foundation for assistance. The tour guides and other members of the staff including the chief of security, Rolando Bernadero, were extremely accommodating. Not only did they open their archives to us, but also guided us on our numerous visits to the island. Their special expertise helped us to see the island as it appears today in all of its beauty and serenity. We wanted to understand how and why it developed as it did, so we traversed the island from one end to the other, taking numerous photographs and asking many questions. This book is a biography of a place, Corregidor Island. The concept of a history of a place presents challenging

x Preface

opportunities. Human events play out against the backdrop of a specific and well-defined geographical place. While time does change the look and feel of a physical place, the dynamics are not the same as with the human experience. We wanted to use pictures to focus attention on the actual ground and use the narrative to relate the actions of the people. The actions of people dramatically affect the physical environment where they live and work. However, the place remains constant. There is no doubt that the surface of Corregidor is a very different place today, but nevertheless, it remains a “Rock” transformed by man. Historians, journalists, and commentators are challenged to present a balanced narrative that does justice to all aspects of the subjects they seek to chronicle or amplify. The ethnic, political, and social influences of very different cultures collide at various times in the history of Corregidor. We have presented the facts and hope that others, after further investigation, will develop new perspectives. The hallowed ground of Corregidor witnessed the supreme sacrifice of so many and deserves the respect of current and future generations. The staff of the Corregidor Foundation understands and accepts its role as caretaker of this historic site and maintains a reverence and respect as its members go

about their day-to-day activities. The foundation has been faithful in its efforts to preserve, maintain, and carefully police the island. With so many visitors arriving daily, this is not an easy task. Their commitment to maintaining the integrity of the island will benefit future generations. It is impossible to research and write a history book without a great deal of help. We benefited from the encouragement of Leslie Ann Murray of the Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce and the contribution by Robert Lane of the Silahis Center, Intramuros, Manila. The personal involvement of Colonel Artemio Matibag of the Corregidor Foundation was invaluable. Any reliable history is dependent on archives and historical records. We are grateful to Waldette Cueto of the American Historical Collection and the librarians of the United States Army Military History Institute (Carlisle, Pennsylvania), NavSource Photo Archive, Instituto Cervantes

(Manila), the Lopez Memorial Museum Collection, and the Filipinas Heritage Library for their assistance. Benji Tota provided invaluable assistance and allowed us to use his superb laboratory, Studio 58. The Japanese language translations accompanying images from wartime propaganda publications were by Katsuharu Saito, Naic, Cavite, Philippines. Lisa Barrick and Amy Lane worked tirelessly typing and proofing the manuscript, while Violy Hughes-Davis edited it. We sincerely appreciate the efforts of all these people and many others who contributed to this effort. We hope this book reflects the experience of both a place and a people that deserve a prominent place in history. Charles M. Hubbard Collis H. Davis, Jr.

Preface xi


Corregidor in Peace and War

An Island of Myths, Legends, and Faraway Places

1

Corregidor Island sits at the mouth of Manila Bay as depicted in this antique map, “La Baie de Manille,” a rare copperplate engraved map by Pierre Van der Aa from the Voyages celebres et remarquables faits de Perse aux Indes orientales, by Sr. Jean-Albert de Mandelso (Amsterdam, 1727, 435–36). (Courtesy of Leslie Ann Murray, Corregidor Foundation, and Chang Rong Antique Gallery, Silahis Center, Intramuros, Manila)


2 Corregidor in Peace and War

C

O R R E G I D O R , A L O N G W I T H three other small islands, is located in Manila Bay, where it stands sentinel over the sea routes into the legendary port city of Manila. The old trading city is a sprawling metropolis located twenty-six miles across the bay from Corregidor. From the fifteenth to the early part of the twentieth century, the Spaniards, and later the Americans, assigned to Corregidor the role of defending Manila and fortified it accordingly. The fortifications were meant not only to discourage ambitious Western colonial powers and greedy Asian pirates and bandits, but also to safeguard the commercial shipping passing in and out of the harbor. However, modern weapons and air power now render the island’s traditional armor unnecessary. Because of its strategic location, Manila continues to be an important transportation and trading center. This ancient city has evolved into a unique blend of the old and the new, where the modern business district of Makati dominates the skyline with its soaring glass and steel office towers and its modern condominiums and residences—it is in striking contrast to the heavy old fortifications of Intramuros, the Walled City of the Spanish era. Today, although its role has changed, Corregidor retains its spectacular beauty featuring sweeping vistas of the open sea and the calm waters of Manila Bay. The sounds of bugles play

ing reveille, parade, and taps no longer disrupt the soft sounds of lapping waves and tropical breezes in the tranquil atmosphere of today’s Corregidor. The huge artillery pieces are silent and unmanned, and the old concrete fortifications that reflect the island’s violent past provide homes for monkeys and for gulls and other seabirds. The story of Fortress Corregidor is one of legend and myth combined with the reality of modern war. The strategic position of the Philippines made the small island a valuable prize for centuries. The islands of the Philippines divide the South China Sea from the Pacific Ocean and are vital to trade routes into Southeast Asia and northward to Japan. On March 16, 1521, the Spanish explorer Ferdinand Magellan first claimed the Philippines for King Charles of Spain. When Magellan placed his wooden cross on the island of Cebu in the central Philippines, he proclaimed a double victory for both Christianity and the Spanish crown. From that significant moment, Spain embarked on a mission that spanned three centuries and made the Philippines the only Christian nation in Asia. On November 1, 1542, another Spanish explorer, Ruy Lopez de Villalobos, sailed from New Spain, today’s Acapulco, with orders to secure the trade routes and create a trading post on Mindanao. Even though he was forced to turn back and failed

An Island of Myths, Legends, and Faraway Places 3

Spanish map of the Philippines, circa 1898, showing Manila Bay (red arrow) and the island of Corregidor guarding its entrance. (Collis Davis Collection)



A map of Manila Bay created by Rafael Cerero in 1888 reveals both the surface and bottom topography of the bay itself. (Servicio Geográfico del Ejército, Spain; courtesy of Instituto Cervantes)



This 1871 Spanish map created by Eduardo Caballero foreshadows the coastal artillery fields of fire later established by the United States around the key islands of (clockwise) Corregidor, Caballo, El Fraile, and Carabao at the entrance to Manila Bay. (Servicio Histórico Militar, Spain; courtesy of Instituto Cervantes)




Looking north from a position in the South China Sea, Corregidor’s topographic profile is clearly revealed. (Servicio Histórico Militar, Spain; courtesy of Instituto Cervantes)


to complete his mission or find the Spice Islands, he left an indelible mark on the Philippines, for it was Villalobos who named the islands Filipinas, or the Philippines, in honor of Philip II, the Spanish Crown Prince, whom King Charles had just appointed as his regent. In due course, the Spanish claimed the entire archipelago as its possession and moved north to Luzon with its trading center of Manila. With the arrival of the Spanish in Manila Bay, this part of Asia became vitally important to the commercial interests of Spain. The need to defend the bay from their archrivals, the Portuguese, increased the strategic value of Corregidor. The beautiful island soon lost any expectation of a role other than that of a military fortress, and its obvious strategic location determined the island’s destiny for the next three and one-half centuries. However, Corregidor was not always known as a military fortress. Corregidor is the largest in a group of five islands that includes Caballo, Carabao, El Fraile, and La Monja, which all look like giant boulders protruding from the sea. Corregidor is a sturdy formation of jagged rock four miles long and about half a mile wide at its broadest point, and it is characterized by approximately three square miles of stony, undulating plateaus and mountains. About ten miles away on the oppo-


site side of the bay lies the province of Cavite. The peninsula of Bataan and the Mariveles Mountains are located on the other side of the island, across a narrow stretch of water. Many legends and myths are woven around these mountains, and the fog shrouding them often gives Corregidor a ghostly and eerie appearance when viewed from Bataan or the Mariveles Mountains. One legend involves a prominent Spanish family by the name of Velez that migrated to Manila from Mexico during the eighteenth century. The Velez family had a very beautiful daughter named Maria. As legends often are, this one is about the forbidden romance of Maria and the handsome, upright young man she fell in love with and of whom her parents did not approve. Maria’s father opposed the romance so strongly that the couple decided to elope. They fled to the isolation of the coast of Bataan, planning to board a Spanish galleon that was scheduled to leave Manila for Mexico. However, the girl’s wealthy and influential family sought the help of the authorities and requested that the runaways be apprehended and returned to face the consequences of their actions. A group of men led by an alderman named Corregidor pursued the couple and caught up with them in Bataan. Maria was astride a horse, a caballo, and the young man was on a

Model of a Spanish galleon that operated out of Manila. (Mariners’ Museum, Newport News, Va.)



From the vantage point of the lighthouse on Topside, Mariveles Mountain can been seen on the Bataan Peninsula separated by the North Channel entrance to Manila Bay. In the foreground is the parachute-like dome of the Pacific War Memorial, and in the distance is the shell of the Mile-Long Barracks. (Collis Davis Collection)



water buffalo, a carabao. The intervention of the family and the authorities prevented the couple from marrying. As a result, the couple vowed perpetual celibacy, thus forsaking their romance and marrying the church. Maria became La Monja, “the nun.” Her boyfriend became El Fraile, “the monk.” For a long time the mountains of Bataan were called Maria Velez in her memory, until the name was corrupted into Mariveles many years later. And so the five islands received their names from the characters of this legend. This is at least one plausible story associated with the names of the three small islands.1 Two versions of the origin of the word Corregidor exist. One suggestion is that the name derived from the early practice of Spanish administrators having ships entering Manila Bay stop at the island to have their papers checked or corrected if needed. The island was thus called Isla del Corregidor for the “Island of the Corrector,” from the Spanish word corregir, or “correct.” Another version suggests that the island was originally used as a prison or an isle of correction. Either version suggests that Corregidor is a derivative of “correction” or “corrector.”


Turn-of-the-century Barrio San José situated at the base of the hill later known as Topside. (U.S. National Archives)


A reverse-angle view of the Barrio San José at the water’s edge, later known as the North Dock, with Malinta Mountain in the background. (Harper’s Weekly, from Lopez Memorial Museum)



In pre-Spanish times, the Philippines were notorious as a hideout for pirates who assaulted and captured ships passing from the South China Sea to the Pacific. Using extremely fast and maneuverable outrigger dugouts, these pirates not only menaced the seas, but also often swept down on the coastal towns to rape and plunder. When the Spanish arrived, they recognized the obvious need to fortify the approaches to Manila Bay and to limit the terror of the pirates. They understood the strategic value of Corregidor and in 1795 began construction of a dockyard on the island. The Spanish Navy used the docking facilities on Corregidor to repair their warships and to store large quantities of naval supplies. They constructed a hospital and, later, a signal station to warn Manila of approaching enemy ships. However, they also discovered a serious problem that limited the use of Corregidor as an effective fortress: The island had no source of suitable drinking water. This meant that drinkable water had to be transported from Bataan or Cavite, a situation that required future occupants of the fortress to develop alternative sources of fresh water. The Spanish recognized Corregidor’s potential as a defensive position for Manila and took early steps to fortify and protect its naval station and the ships that plied the waters of

the bay. In 1836, they built a lighthouse on the island with a light that was visible up to thirty-three miles away. The importance of the lighthouse to guide ships into the appropriate channel through fog and inclement weather justified many renovations and improvements. This lighthouse was completely demolished and rebuilt in 1897. It remained in use until it was destroyed during the Pacific War, when it was bombarded by the Japanese in 1942 and the Americans in 1945. After the war, a modern lighthouse was carefully reconstructed from the stones and the rubble that remained. During their period of occupation, the Spanish employed native Filipinos to work in their docking facilities and as domestic servants. Two small settlements of Filipinos sprang up on the island during this time. By the late eighteenth century, Corregidor enjoyed the presence of a small church in the Filipino community. The church was known for its beauty and people would often travel from the larger islands to Corregidor for weddings and special religious events. During the late Spanish period, Corregidor reflected a paradox of violence and peace. The Christian message of peace, hope, and salvation appears contradictory when delivered in the shadow of huge guns and within an island community devoted to the potential violence of war.


Plans drawn up for a lighthouse on Corregidor by Mariano de Goicoechea in 1830 indicate the importance the Spaniards attributed to the island. (Servicio Histórico Militar, Spain; courtesy of the Instituto Cervantes)



The Spanish fortified the island with three ten-inch guns, each with a range of at least one mile. In addition, they set up two batteries along the shoreline of Cavite. These, along with batteries on El Fraile and Carabao islands, covered the approach to Manila through the South Channel, the Boca Grande. Other batteries were set up on the coast of Bataan to cover the North Channel, the Boca Chica. The Spanish continued to gradually improve their fortifications around Manila Bay, placing twenty-six guns at six different positions around the entrance into the harbor. Of these, only eight were modern breech-loading weapons; four of these were located on Corregidor Island, two on El Fraile, and two at the Luneta in Manila. These, when combined with the shore batteries, proved adequate protection throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries but would prove ineffective against the modern fleet of Commodore George Dewey in May 1898.2 During the decade before the outbreak of the SpanishAmerican War, the Great Powers of Europe, the United States, and Japan began emphasizing their naval power. A strong navy was necessary to protect the commercial trading interests of many nations throughout the world. The concept of commercial imperialism began to supplement traditional colonialism and resulted in the need to establish and fortify strategic


U.S. refurbished lighthouse seen on Topside in 1901. (U.S. National Archives)


Below, Barrio San José, which predated the arrival of the Americans. (Lopez Memorial Museum)



harbors both at home and abroad. The huge cost of large battleships and cruisers to protect an ever-growing merchant marine created a need to protect and shelter these capital ships. If harbors and important coastlines were protected by shore-based artillery, a hostile or invading nation would be forced to pursue a protracted land campaign, by marching an army overland to assault harbors and ports. Delaying the outsiders allowed defenders to strengthen their forces and strike at favorable times while requiring the invading force to overcome strong, formidable defensive positions. The prevailing military wisdom suggested that strong harbor defenses and shore batteries could cause so much damage to an invading fleet that the hostile force would resort to long and costly infantry and land campaigns. The gradual decision of the United States to join the imperial surge had a dramatic impact on Corregidor and the Philippines. The Americans soon recognized the need for naval support bases in the Pacific that they could control. The United States wanted to resist further conquest by the established powers in the Pacific. Ultimately, the Philippines became the place of confrontation in the Pacific.3

During the last decades of the nineteenth century, the United States increased its commitment to build new ships and modernize the navy. Simultaneously, the army recognized the need to fortify the American coastline and designed and constructed larger and more powerful weapons for coastal defenses. Many of these weapons were larger caliber, breech-loading rifle cannons. The rifling enabled the projectile to travel very long distances and dramatically improved accuracy. These modern weapons gradually replaced outmoded shore batteries along the American coast. Many of these old weapons dated back to the American Civil War (1861–1865). Some of the ordnance and much of the technology resulting from the Civil War’s surge of development found its way to the Philippines.4 Earlier, during the administration of Grover Cleveland, a joint army, navy, and civilian board was created to evaluate proposed new defensive weapons. Secretary of War William C. Endicott was chairman of this committee, which soon became known informally at the Endicott Committee. In 1886, the committee issued a report and made funding available to begin construction of modern weapons and fortifications in 1890. The entire construction project was placed


The eight-inch breech-loading cannon aboard the Baltimore boasted greater range and accuracy than similar-bore weapons of the Spaniards. (Image 58A008, Dean Worcester Collection, Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan)



under the direction of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The major change resulting from the Endicott report was to shift large gun emplacements from a single, concentrated and well-fortified position to several positions with longer distances in between. Concentrating artillery in the forts or along parapets, the old concept that prevailed throughout most of the nineteenth century, gave way to the new concept of a dugout position fortified with large amounts of earth, steel, and concrete. Frequently, the ammunition magazines were encased in concrete and steel for protection. The effect of this modernization of coastal defenses and naval warfare soon affected Corregidor and other U.S. possessions. Another innovation of this period was the large naval mortar that could drop a high-arching shell through the lightly armored deck of a ship. Most of these mortars could rotate 360 degrees, enabling them to fire in a complete circle when necessary. The new concept of naval defense focused on longrange artillery supported by the mortars at closer range, rather than the old concept of concentrating maximum fire in the sea channel. The tactic was to strike the enemy with long-range, accurate artillery fire before the ships could come within


A Spanish Honatoria nine-inch breech-loader used on Corregidor and at the Luneta in Manila. (Filipinas Heritage Library Auth. 01–011905)



Indicative of the last decade of the nineteenth century, the Americans did not want to be left out of the European and Japanese “big power” naval arms race as reflected in this dreadnought anchored in Hong Kong harbor. (Image 59B014, Dean Worcester Collection, Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan)

A twelve-inch breech-loading mortar at Battery Way in 2005. (Collis Davis Collection) 20 Corregidor in Peace and War




President William McKinley, 1843–1901.


range of the shore batteries. Recently developed electronic sea mines further protected the channels to the harbor. The electronic mechanism to detonate the mines was extremely sophisticated for its day and required reconstruction of facilities sufficient for storing and installing the mines in different locations.5 When, on April 19, 1898, President William McKinley asked Congress for a declaration of war against Spain, the effect on the Philippines was instantaneous and dramatic. This made the Spanish colony vulnerable to attack from U.S. forces stationed in Asia. Even before the declaration of war, Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt, during the absence of Secretary John Long, had ordered Admiral George Dewey to “coal up” and prepare for an attack on the Spanish navy and Spanish possessions in the Pacific. Acting on this alert, Dewey supplied his fleet and took on sufficient coal to engage the Spanish navy stationed in the Philippines. Within three days of the declaration of war on April 22, the governor of the British colony of Hong Kong, with some reluctance, ordered Dewey and the U.S. fleet to leave the British colony. Britain’s declaration of neutrality in the Spanish-American conflict required him to do so—effectively removing himself and Great

Britain from the coming conflict. Dewey immediately cabled Washington for instructions. Secretary of the Navy Long, after consultation with President McKinley, responded, “PROCEED AT ONCE TO THE PHILIPPINES. COMMENCE OPERATIONS

The forward five-inch guns of the Olympia. (Lopez Memorial Museum)

AGAINST THE SPANISH SQUADRON. YOU MUST CAPTURE OR DESTROY. USE UTMOST ENDEAVORS.” Because he had expected

the eventual order and operating on his initiative, Dewey had already set his course and was sailing toward Manila Bay.6 Some years later, the New York Times noted the irony that the first engagement of the war justified by Spain’s repressive actions on the small island of Cuba in the South Atlantic, off the coast of North America, would be fought over a group of islands on the other side of the world. Despite this initial action, Cuba played an important role in the war. Dewey fully expected to be significantly outnumbered by the Spanish navy stationed in and around the Philippines. To his surprise, as he testified to a Senate Committee in 1902, the approximately forty naval vessels available to the Spanish were for the most part gunboats and other small craft and were generally ineffective against a modern U.S. fleet of larger warships. However, Dewey indicated in earlier correspondence to his son that his major concern was from the Spanish shore batteries on Cor-




The cruiser Olympia, one of Admiral George Dewey’s fleet of dreadnoughts that attacked the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, May 1, 1898. (Image 58A002, Dean Worcester Collection, Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan)


The Baltimore, a state-of-the-art cruiser in 1898, was representative of Dewey’s modern naval force against which the Spaniards were no match. (Image 58A005, Dean Worcester Collection, Museum of Anthropology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan)

Admiral George Dewey. (Lopez Memorial Museum)




These non-breech-loading weapons were typical of the Spaniards’ shore batteries. (J. D. Givens, from Lopez Memorial Museum)


regidor and Cavite: “There is no question that these Spanish shore batteries could disable our ships.” As a seasoned naval officer, Dewey prudently decided to proceed and assess the situation before launching an attack.7 Despite his orders to “proceed at once to the Philippines,” Dewey sailed to Mirs Bay, a small inlet located in Chinese territory, a few miles north of Hong Kong. Disregarding the fact that China had also declared its neutrality, Dewey put in at the calm waters of the inlet. Actually, he was waiting for the arrival of the American minister to the Philippines, Oscar Williams. When Williams arrived, he informed Dewey that the Spanish fleet had left Manila Bay and was currently holed up in Subic Bay in the northern part of the Bataan Peninsula. Armed with this information and believing that the Spanish fleet was not a viable threat, Dewey immediately departed for Manila. But he was still concerned about the shore batteries and the guns on Corregidor, as well as the other fortified islands defending the approaches to Manila. Admiral Patricio Montojo y Pasarón, the Spanish commander, shifted his fleet to Subic Bay at the first signs of American activity. When the admiral arrived at Subic, he was appalled by the deficiencies and the absence of any powerful


Cavite-based shore batteries of the Spaniards that were initially feared by Dewey while he was still anchored in Hong Kong, were easily overcome by Dewey. In the background lies the sunken Reina-Cristina. (J. D. Givens, from Lopez Memorial Museum)


shore batteries to support his ships. His own armada comprised six vessels, some of which had not undertaken sea duty in years. At least one, the Castilla, had a wooden hull and was taking on too much water to even make headway; it actually had to be towed into position for battle. The Spanish governor of the Philippines residing in Manila, General Basilio Agustin Davila, knowing that Dewey had left Hong Kong and was en route to attack Manila, ordered Montojo to return immediately to defend Manila Bay with his entire fleet. The Spanish admiral protested this order and suggested that a more effective alternative might be to station his ships at various defensible locations throughout the archipelago to harass the U.S. fleet and thus avoid a direct confrontation against the more modern American ships. The governor, believing the fall of Manila would effectively end Spanish control of the Philippines, stood by his original order. Montojo had no other choice. Returning to Manila Bay as ordered, and after consultations with the governor, he decided to station his fleet along the Cavite Littoral on the southwest edge of the bay. By positioning the Spanish fleet in such a battle line, the city of Manila would be protected from the collateral damage associated with a naval battle so close to shore. However, the major disadvantage was that the Spanish fleet was too far


Admiral Patricio Montojo y Pasarón, commander of the Spanish naval fleet. (Lopez Memorial Museum) 28 Corregidor in Peace and War

away to benefit from the covering fire of the only modern shore guns located along Manila’s seaside and on the island of Corregidor. While the Spanish considered their shore batteries to be modern, they in fact could not be classified with the most sophisticated naval weapons of the period.8 Word reached the Spanish authorities on April 30 that two ships from Dewey’s fleet had reconnoitered Subic Bay around three o’clock in the afternoon. This meant that Dewey was only a short distance from Manila. Governor Davila wired Madrid that he was “completely defenseless and the situation was critical.” The Spanish were confronted with threats not only from the sea, but also from the Filipinos, who took advantage of Montojo’s predicament to rise up against Spanish authority in Manila. Davila’s cable to Madrid continued, “I have no ships, no forces, no resources to resist . . . such powerful enemies acting together.” However, he assured Madrid that he would sternly defend both country and honor despite being outgunned. Following this communication, he published an appeal to anyone loyal to Spain to “prepare for the struggle! Let us resist with Christian resolve and the patriotic cry, Viva España!” This brave commitment to legendary Spanish honor, while laudable, proved ineffective in a modern war.9

When Commodore Dewey received word that Subic Bay was clear, he announced to his captains, “Now we have them!” meaning that the Spanish fleet could be found and bottled up in Manila Bay. He issued orders to proceed at once with all speed toward the enemy. When one of his officers suggested that a container ship with a skeleton crew be sent into the two channels to detonate mines before the main body proceeded to run past the guns on Corregidor, the American commander responded, “I’ve waited 60 years for this opportunity. Mines or no mines, I am leading the squadron myself.” Dewey’s response brings to mind the words of Admiral Farragut at Mobile Bay when he commanded the fleet, “Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead!”10 Shortly after midnight on May 1, the American fleet entered Manila Bay. Dewey’s decision to enter by night through the Boca Grande, to the south of Corregidor, proved to be a wise one. For some unknown reason, the Spanish failed to fire their heavy guns mounted on Corregidor as the squadron passed by, although they did fire several salvos after Dewey’s ships had passed through the channel. The barrage was short and ineffective and it is not clear whether the Spanish opened fire late to protect their weapons from the powerful guns of Dewey’s fleet, or because they were taken com-


pletely by surprise. It is hard to believe the Spanish gunners on Corregidor were unaware of the presence of the American warships and their mission. After moving carefully and unimpeded beyond Corregidor’s guns, Dewey steamed directly toward Manila expecting to find the Spanish fleet there. As dawn began to break across the bay, Dewey spotted the Spanish fleet along the coast of Cavite and turned toward them with his flagship in the lead. By 7:30 A.M., Montojo had lost his flagship, and Dewey ordered a brief withdrawal to assess his supply of ammunition and to allow his crew to eat breakfast. The battle resumed after a three-and-a-half-hour delay when the American cruiser Baltimore, under heavy fire from the Spanish batteries on Cavite, fired into the Spanish fortifications, disabling the most effective of their batteries. At 12:30 P.M., the Spanish fleet hoisted the white flag with only one Spanish ship still afloat. The guns of Corregidor remained mysteriously quiet throughout the battle. It is doubtful that these guns could have exacted any significant toll as the American ships passed under cover of darkness into the bay. However, the result of their failure to open fire meant they had avoided any serious damage that the American ships might have caused. Spanish


expectations and the fears of Admiral Dewey that Corregidor and the fortified islands at the mouth of the bay would prove formidable were baseless. Modern military technology and tactics appeared to have negated the strategic position of Corregidor. It was to the Americans’ misfortune that the lessons from this brief naval engagement went unheeded by the new possessors of the Philippines. Dewey’s victory over the Spanish fleet and the American occupation of the Philippines dramatically increased American influence in Asia. The Spanish-American War brought an end to Spanish authority in the Philippines, and the Treaty of Paris, signed on December 10, 1898, transferred possession of the islands to the United States. In 1902, the Americans designated Corregidor as an American military reservation. A year later, they decided to construct a hospital on the island just as the Spanish had done prior to the arrival of the Americans. The peaceful and beautiful island seemed a natural place for the sick and injured to convalesce. It is ironic that Corregidor could be at once a place of peace and tranquility for a hospital, and a place for some of the most powerful and formidable military fortifications ever constructed.11

Spanish governor of the Philippines, General Basilio Agustin Davila. (Lopez Memorial Museum)





The Reina-Cristina, a Spanish cruiser of the first class, as it was artistically rendered circa 1898. (French illustration, from the collection of Gallery of Prints, RLI Gallery Systems, Inc., Manila, Philippines)

Battle of Manila Bay, May 1, 1898. (Lopez Memorial Museum)




The remains of the Spaniards’ flagship, the Reina-Cristina, shown sunken offshore of Cavite City in Manila Bay. (Lopez Memorial Museum)


The mast of the ReinaCristina was removed from the hulk before it was salvaged for scrap metal and placed on Corregidor’s Topside. The cruiser’s mast remains there to this day as the island’s flagpole and serves as a symbol of Dewey’s victory. (Collis Davis Collection)


This illustration shows the aftermath of the naval Battle of Manila. (French illustration, from the collection of Gallery of Prints, RLI Gallery Systems, Inc., Manila, Philippines)




Photograph shows the destroyed Spanish batteries in Cavite overlooking the South Channel through which Dewey’s fleet entered Manila Bay. (Library of Congress)

A turn-of the-century illustration by W. A. Rogers depicting U.S. expansionism into the Philippines as symbolized by Uncle Sam riding a carabao. (Courtesy of the Rodulfo Leitz Collection)



2

The Yanks Are Coming

The view from Corregidor’s Topside looking southeast toward Carite with Malinta Mountain shown in the left foreground. (Collis Davis Collection)


M

U C H L I K E T H E S PA N I S H settlers before them, the Americans were awed by the remarkable beauty of Corregidor. The four-milelong rock formation is shaped like a tadpole with its head turned westward toward the China Sea, while its tail curves around and points in the same direction. The island appeared to the Americans as one of nature’s glories. American soldiers from the Philippine-American War, who were convalescing in the hospital, were further protected by the surrounding waters of Manila Bay. They often wrote letters home describing the spectacular scenery afforded them from the hospital windows. Corregidor is indeed a brilliant tapestry woven of land, sea, sky, forests, mountains, and wildlife. The Filipinos who settled on the island came from throughout the archipelago and provided a unique cultural blending of customs that reflected the diverse population of the islands. For the Americans, many of whom had grown up in landlocked Kansas or Nebraska, the island was so dazzling and diverse that it seemed almost unreal. Corregidor’s topography is a quilt of contrasts. The spectacular scenery allows verdant views that stretch out against a horizon of jungle-clad mountains. Jagged coral reefs enclose placid lagoons and the soft tropical waves bathe beaches of


fine, white sand. Elsewhere, as the rugged cliffs plunge to the sea, the waves pound against outcroppings of coral. At no place on the island is one far from the sea with its wondrous and captivating appeal. However, the island is not always tranquil, and it often endures strong tropical winds, storms, and the annual monsoon rains. Extremes of tropical heat and smothering humidity also presented unique problems for the recently arrived Americans. Throughout the year, Corregidor is ablaze with colorful flora. Although the huge mahogany trees are now gone, the fields of rattan, bamboo, and exotic fruit trees in dozens of varieties have returned and flourished since World War II. The landscape is covered with gorgeous tropical flowers, including over a hundred varieties of orchids that bloom everywhere around the island. Wildlife is abundant, and families of monkeys can often be seen frolicking beside the road; there are also a number of reptiles, including large iguanas and other lizards. A wide assortment of tropical birds inhabits the island, and even today scientists struggle to classify the thousands of species of brightly colored butterflies that thrive there. The waters around the island abound with tunas, sharks, and other fish.

The “Beach Club” area on the southeast side of the island, prior to World War II. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)


The Yanks Are Coming 41


Corregidor’s defense batteries seen within the context of the Manila Bay vicinity. (Charles S. Small materials, Leslie Ann Murray Collection)


The “Beach Club” as it is today, from a distance. (Collis Davis Collection)



The first of four mortars already in position at Battery Way. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)


Although the newly arrived Americans recognized and appreciated the beauty and peaceful atmosphere on Corregidor, they soon grasped the strategic military value of the rock islands that guarded the approaches to Manila. They took for granted the accepted military strategy of the day that an attack would likely come from the sea. The easy destruction of the Spanish fleet by Dewey and the weak resistance provided by Spanish gun emplacements strongly suggested to the Americans the need to fortify the approaches to Manila, especially Corregidor. At the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, the European powers constructed massive battleships that could be used both for mobile defense and aggressive, imperialistic ambitions. The United States, caught up in this imperial surge, joined the naval arms race. The best military minds of this era, before the invention of airplanes and air power, expected to rely on these powerful ships to protect and assault island possessions like the Philippines. For these reasons, the Americans decided to fortify the island while maintaining the hospital and convalescent facilities on Corregidor. The Philippines soon became part of the new frontier, and men seeking a military career sought assignment to the islands.


Battery Way and its twelve-inch mortars under construction, April 3, 1908. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)


In June 1903, Arthur Douglas MacArthur, who in 1944 would attain the rank of general of the army, graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Army Corps of Engineers. This brilliant young man finished at the top of his class and had the highest scholastic average of any graduate of West Point in the twenty-five years before him. MacArthur requested the Philippines as his first posting. When the U.S. Army granted his request, a remarkable fifty-year relationship began between this outstanding military and political strategist and a newly developing nation. General Arthur MacArthur, Douglas’s father, had commanded troops during the Philippine-American War and developed a genuine respect and affection for the Philippines and its people. Despite his oftencondescending and paternalistic attitude toward Filipinos, General Arthur MacArthur understood the potential and strategic value of the Philippines to the United States. Moreover, he encouraged his son Douglas, through long conversations and correspondence, to request his posting to the Philippines. The younger MacArthur shared many of his father’s prejudices and elitist views. However, his preconceived notions did not prevent him from developing a warm and sincere affection for the people of the archipelago.1



Arthur MacArthur (1845–1912) was commissioned in 1898 as a brigadier general of the U.S. Volunteers and took part in the capture of Manila. After the war, President William McKinley named him military governor of the Philippines (1900–1901). (Filipinas Heritage Library Auth. 01–011905)

Lieutenant MacArthur’s first tour of duty to the Philippines was for only one year. During that time he concentrated on building up fortifications on Corregidor and harbor improvements in Manila Bay. He also worked on plans to improve the roads and railroad network that traversed the jungles of the islands. This year of construction gave him an understanding of the topography and the strategic value of the natural strong points throughout the islands. He certainly understood the value of Corregidor as a defensive fortress, and later, after the island was fortified, he would refer to it as “impregnable.” Even though MacArthur and other engineers worked on plans to fortify Corregidor and the coastal regions of Bataan, it was not until 1908 that a regular army post was established on Corregidor. The first army post on Corregidor was named Fort Mills, after Brigadier General Samuel M. Mills, who was the chief of artillery in 1905–1906. The development and construction on the island began in earnest in 1909, when “H” Company of the Second Battalion of the Corps of Engineers was assigned to the island. Shortly thereafter, work began on the fortifications. The army laid out roads and began preliminary construction of a complex network that would enable rapid movement throughout the island, connecting the concrete emplacements and bombproof shelters yet to be


Lieutenant Douglas MacArthur as a young engineer in 1903. (Courtesy of the MacArthur Museum Collection, Norfolk, Va.)



A twelve-inch disappearing gun, with a carriage that allows the weapon to drop out of sight from the recoil after firing. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)



A twelve-inch nondisappearing gun being testfired during the 1930s. Its fixed carriage does not allow the weapon to drop out of sight after firing. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)



This map detail shows the locations of the fortified islands, all within the South Channel of Manila Bay. (Base map courtesy of the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority, DENR, Philippines; additional artwork by Collis Davis)


built. Before the company of engineers left on March 15, 1912, they had laid the groundwork to make Corregidor a great military bastion. As the winds of the First World War blew across Europe, the United States had spent over $150 million fortifying Corregidor and its three sister islands.2 The modernization of American coastal defenses on the mainland was well underway by the outbreak of the SpanishAmerican War. At the end of the war with Spain, which lasted only six months, it became obvious that there was a need to fortify the territories acquired from Spain. The government decided that, like the coastal defenses of Hawaii and Guam, those of Cuba and the Philippines needed to be strengthened. By 1905 many of the defenses planned for the United States were completed, and President Theodore Roosevelt convened another board to review the situation and to recommend seacoast fortifications and projects for these territories. William Taft, the secretary of war, chaired this committee. A number of the recommendations of the Taft Committee addressed technical improvements of all fortifications, both in the United States and abroad. For example, they recommended improved searchlights and telephone communications between bunkers and fortified artillery positions, and a central headquarters. For the Philippines and Corregidor, the most important rec-

ommendation was to fortify key harbor strong points, which would protect coaling yards and naval stations as well as facilitate trade and economic development by protecting American business interests in the region.3 By the time the recommendation of the Taft Committee was being implemented, progress had already begun in the Philippines at Manila Bay. On April 11, 1902, the U.S. government declared that Manila Bay, including Corregidor and the other small islands at the opening of the harbor, should become the Manila Bay Defense Reservation. The Corps of Engineers was immediately assigned to survey these islands and to begin construction on the first batteries on Corregidor. These preparations took until September 1904 to complete and for construction to begin on the first batteries. Many lessons learned from the earlier construction on the mainland defenses in the United States contributed to the construction of very modern and formidable defensive positions on Corregidor. The new defenses were designed to include larger-caliber guns (fourteen inches) and smaller numbers of secondary weapons that were used earlier in the United States. Thousands of workers, both contract and convict laborers, were brought to the island to construct this vast array of concrete and steel fortifications. Between 1904 and 1910, Corregidor was literally transformed

into a fortress, with nine major batteries mounting twenty-five coast artillery weapons. Fort Mills, on Corregidor Island, became the headquarters for the defenses of Manila Bay, providing support for the construction of fortifications on the other islands. It later became the command and communications center for the harbor defenses. In 1908, the construction of fortifications and armaments began on Carabao Island, closest to Cavite. The U.S. Army designated these fortifications as Fort Frank, for Brigadier General Royal T. Frank. Fort Hughes was constructed between 1911 and 1919 on Caballo Island, the island nearest Corregidor. However, it remained for the smallest island, El Fraile, to receive the most unusual attention from the Corps of Engineers. First, the island was leveled to the waterline; then, a massive reinforced concrete structure was built on top. Between 1909 and 1918, specially designed turreted guns were built for the massive bunker. Although the concrete-and-steel-encased island was formally named Fort Drum (after Brigadier General Richard C. Drum), it became known locally as the “concrete battleship.” From the air it resembled a battleship because of its shape and gun turrets. Fort Drum, located on the Cavite side of the South Channel, presented a formidable appearance to any approaching antagonists. To help cope with the intense


Construction site, 1908–1909, of Batteries Greer and Koehler on the island of Carabao, with the former consisting of one fourteen-inch disappearing gun, and the latter (foreground) having four twelve-inch mortars. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)



heat inside the steel-and-concrete walls, the crew constructed temporary wooden barracks on the top surface of the concrete monster. The two-story building contained a dining room, kitchen, and sleeping quarters on the second floor. But even with wind blowing through the windows and with fans on the roof, the heat at midday was almost unbearable.4 As the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers completed each construction project, the U.S. Ordnance Department had the responsibility of providing and installing the armaments and weapons. Once this task was completed, the U.S. Army Coast Artillery Corps took over the operation and staffing of the forts. The army was responsible for both the coastal defense and the defense of naval installations and anchorages in the Philippines. For the U.S. Navy, the shallow waters of Manila Bay presented a problem. It sought the deeper and more secure waters of Subic Bay, where it established a naval station that would later become the largest naval station in Asia. To supplement the seacoast artillery, the U.S. Navy planted minefields in both channel approaches through the harbor. These were controlled mines and were part of a complex combination of electronic and contact mines. Several guns were positioned to shell hostile ships entangled in the mine-

fields. The guns were also designed to protect against any enemy minesweepers attempting to clear a path through the minefield.5 On Corregidor, the primary artillery consisted of fourteeninch and ten-inch breech-loading rifle cannons mounted mainly on disappearing carriages. For almost thirty years, the Buffington-Crocier Disappearing Carriage was a standard for the U.S. Army. The disappearing carriage allowed the recoil produced from firing the cannon to supply the power to recess the weapon behind strongly fortified walls. This technique protected the crew and the weapon from shellfire while it was reloaded and returned to firing position. A counterweight was used to return the weapon to firing position. Most batteries on Corregidor contained two such weapons. The topography on Corregidor provided natural fortifications for most of the batteries, and the arrangement was dictated by each battery’s location. Reinforced concrete that protected magazines, power-generation rooms, and a shell hoist were built on the lower levels of the battery. The weakness of this type of battery is found in the open top—it had to remain uncovered to allow the weapon to rise above the parapet to fire. As a result, the battery was vulnerable to high-arching mortar and artillery



Fort Drum, pictured here in 1933, took nine years to construct on the former El Fraile Island. Its armament consisted of two fourteen-inch batteries (Wilson and Marshall) and two batteries of six-inch guns on two sides of the fortress. (U.S. National Archives)


fire or air assault. Another primary weapon employed in the defense of Manila Bay and located on Corregidor was the twelve-inch mortar, a short-barreled, breech-loading mortar designed to fire projectiles in a high, arching direction to plunge through the lightly armored decks of warships. Ironically, this weapon would later prove the most effective weapon against the Japanese infantry assaulting Corregidor. All of these defenses were coordinated to provide interlocking fire patterns that, when combined with seacoast searchlights and lighter weapons, could produce both long-range and shorter fire patterns to protect the sea-lanes into Manila. More than eighty-five gun emplacements defended Manila Bay, and most were located on Corregidor.6 Most of Corregidor’s weapons were built at several private and government foundries in the United States and shipped to Sandy Hook Proving Grounds in New Jersey for assembly and testing before they were disassembled, loaded onto ships, and transported to the Philippines, where they were installed in the structures specifically designed for them. The most complex construction was at Fort Drum on El Fraile Island. It had two custom-built fourteen-inch guns and four six-inch casement guns. The concrete battleship was a reinforced concrete structure with walls 18 feet thick, and it was 350 feet by 144


Every bit the “concrete battleship,” Fort Drum as it appears today continues to extend a forbidding welcome to seagoing vessels entering Manila Bay today. An incoming tide at the time this photograph was made gives the fortress an illusion of movement. (Collis Davis Collection)


feet and was 40 feet high. Unlike the batteries on Corregidor, Fort Drum had a deck made of concrete with steel plate. Right below the waterline, at a lower level, was a complete engine room, fuel tank, water tank, and plotting room. Each gun turret contained two specially built 1909 wire-wound fourteen-inch guns. Fort Drum proved formidable and was never destroyed by hostile fire. Many of its walls and concrete chambers, though long abandoned, still exist today.7 As the impressive fortifications and weapons were put in position, the army decided to develop land defenses for the island to protect it from attacks originating from Bataan or Cavite. Funding for the construction of a series of defenses on Corregidor, Caballo, and Carabao became available in 1911. The beach defenses included three two-inch and six-pound field guns, later replaced by 77 mm cannons, and numerous machine-gun positions supported by reinforced trenches containing personnel pathways. Most of the land and beach defenses were finished in 1920. Many of the weapons had either been used or were the same models tested in combat in World War I, and these were transferred to the Philippines. Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, after 1920, these defenses and weapons were not updated or properly maintained, producing major deficiencies by the time of the Japanese attack in 1942.


Fort Mills on Corregidor would be the last to receive any major armaments during 1921, when the last batteries of two twelveinch guns were installed. The signing of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 prevented further improvements on the islands.8 The Manila Bay defenses were state-of-the-art for the period in which they were constructed. They were primarily designed to repulse naval attacks by capital ships. This was consistent with the thinking of most military planners at the turn of the century. However, by 1919, several countries had developed battleships with guns that could outrange any harbor defense weapon the United States placed on Corregidor. The ability to outrange U.S. harbor defenses, combined with the highfiring angles of naval guns, nullified the protective advantages of the earthen and concrete emplacements of the disappearing guns. In addition, the emergence of airplanes as an offensive weapon further exposed the U.S. artillery emplacements to aerial bombardment. By 1922, with the possible exception of Fort Drum, the weapons and fortifications of Manila Bay were clearly obsolete. U.S. military planners provided up-to-date weapons and fortifications consistent with the dominant military philosophy of the turn of the century, but they failed to take advantage of technological improvements in artillery and air defense construction. When combined with other frustrat-


Shrouded in jungle overgrowth, one of two six-inch disappearing guns at Battery Morrison as it appeared in 1980. This weapon’s installation was completed in 1910 and is one the few guns situated on the north side of Corregidor along with Battery Grubbs located slightly west of this battery with two ten-inch disappearing guns. Like most batteries on Topside, Morrison was serviced by steam-engine freight cars instead of the electric- or cable-powered streetcars. Battery James, located below Morrison Battery and equipped with three-inch guns, required cable-assisted rail service. See page 100 for a map showing battery locations in relation to the railway system. (Charles S. Small materials, Leslie Ann Murray Collection)


ing problems, such as the downsized budget and, later, the restrictions of Article 19 of the Washington Naval Treaty, the failure to utilize technological advances in artillery and shipbuilding would prove disastrous in 1942. In the post–World War I era, a series of Republican administrations in Washington concentrated on reducing military expenditures. The army garrisoned at Corregidor was hit hard, particularly by reductions in personnel. Budget slashes on top of budget slashes left no funds to pay and maintain officers and men, causing the authorized strength of 280,000 men for the entire army to be reduced to 125,000. On Corregidor, the peak garrison of 4,000 men dwindled rapidly as the army implemented its policy of sending no replacements. With no crews to police the area and to prevent thievery, scavengers began to remove pieces of the fortifications, particularly the steel counterweights used for the larger guns, to sell on the scrap market in Manila. By 1925, even Fort Drum, with its complicated machinery that required constant expert attention to keep it serviceable, was placed in mothball status. The concrete battleship received one visit per year from a crew that fired a service practice from one gun in each turret and performed deferred maintenance.


By 1922, the manpower shortage had created major problems for the Americans in the Philippines. Major General Erasmus Weaver, commander of the coastal artillery, took an extraordinary step in 1922 when he added artillery units to the Philippine Scouts. The Scouts, originally organized as an infantry unit during the Philippine-American War, were now reorganized to include crews for permanent artillery emplacements on Corregidor. The new organization resulted in an original complement of 1,600 Philippine Scouts supplemented by approximately 800 Americans to fortify Corregidor and the adjacent islands in Manila Bay. Military commanders were forced to this option because they could maintain one Philippine Scout for half the cost of an American soldier. Originally, American commanders had reservations about the ability of Filipinos to fire and service complicated weapons like those of Corregidor, but the Filipinos had proved themselves superb infantry troops and soon mastered their role as artillerymen. The U.S. High Command did not begin sending additional troops to the Philippines until 1940, finally doubling the force in July 1941. Unfortunately, these additional troop deployments did not bring the garrison to the designated full strength. December 8, 1941, found the American


Philippine Scouts, members of the 91st or 92nd Regiments of the Coastal Artillery of Corregidor. First Lieutenant Harry Julian, unit commander, is seated in the middle of the first row. He was later captured on Corregidor and died when the Arisan Maru was sunk en route to Japan. (Selma Harrison Calmes, M.D., Collection)


Practice-firing a disappearing cannon during the 1930s. The tremendous recoil from firing the gun causes it to drop below its bunker wall for reloading. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)




Practice-firing a fixed cannon during the 1930s. Unlike the disappearing cannons, this type of gun is more exposed to enemy surface fire. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)


A nondisappearing cannon conducting a practice fire out into the South China Sea during the 1930s. Notice the large platform atop the gun that is used for sighting the weapon. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)

This 1927 aerial photograph includes the Topside Barracks (the Mile-Long Barracks), the hospital, located behind the Topside Barracks, and the parade ground situated in front of the Topside Barracks. (U.S. National Archives)



garrison on Corregidor dramatically understrength.9 Throughout the decade leading to World War II, several U.S. commanders struggled with the shortages of both money and personnel. However, each of these commanders developed techniques and strategies to cope with the shortages, and most proved very creative and resourceful in their efforts to maintain fighting strength. One of these men, Charles E. Kilbourne, arrived to take command of Fort Mills in 1929. As a young man, Kilbourne had fired the first shells from Battery Wheeler, and for many years he had sought to return to Corregidor. He now returned as a brigadier-general and was determined to do his best to fortify the defenses of Corregidor. On his own initiative and without orders from Washington, and despite the frustrations caused by budgetary constraints and Article 19 of the Washington Naval Treaty, General Kilbourne decided to make dramatic improvements at the island fortress, using the manpower he commanded. To complete a number of projects, he paid for most of the needed supplies by using the post’s maintenance allowance. First, he sought to repair and widen the extensive network of approximately fifty miles of roads crisscrossing the island to improve transportation and communications. With funds from the Officers’ Club, he built recreational facilities, including a saltwater swimming

pool. To further stretch the limits of Article 19, in 1931, he completed the small tunnel near Battery Wheeler for storing reserve seacoast ammunition using two thousand dollars of his annual maintenance fund. All of these improvements were well publicized and received compliments, except for the tunnel, which received no compliments or recognition from high-placed officials in Washington. Kilbourne felt the Japanese were violating Article 19 by fortifying Saipan and other islands where no one was allowed to visit. Based on this assumption, the Corregidor commander decided to push the limits of the treaty even further. In 1931, again without orders from Washington, he renewed efforts to construct a tunnel under Malinta Mountain, a project begun by his predecessor, Richard B. Davis. He informed Washington that he would begin construction on the “tunnel road” through Malinta Mountain because the streetcar line to Kindley Field needed protection from landslides and rock falls, particularly during the typhoon season. The creation of a rock quarry using stone from Malinta Mountain, he explained, would enable the project to pay for itself in ten years. Furthermore, he assured Washington that he had enough in his post-maintenance allowance to finance the project. Satisfied with this flimsy cost analysis, Washington authorized Kilbourne to proceed.10



Roadways of Corregidor, which General Kilbourne improved during his tenure. (Artwork by Collis Davis)

The general simply failed to mention that he intended to adapt the tunnel as a bombproof and bulletproof shelter, and to extend the laterals to store ammunition and food supplies. Peripherally, the tunnel could be used as a secure wartime headquarters and hospital. When official inquiries were made, the commander simply explained that Article 19 and the nonfortification clause were not violated by a mere road and rock quarry. Roads paved with stone from the quarry could in no way be identified as an increase in fortifications. Kilbourne undoubtedly had the acquiescence of several highly placed


people in Washington who accepted his explanations. One of these men was his close friend and former roommate, Brigadier General Stanley D. Embick, who would later replace him as harbor defense commander and would complete the tunnel. The only order that Washington handed down was that he keep the cost down and use his own budgeted funds. After all, the country was in the middle of the Great Depression. The actual construction of the tunnel was no minor project. Malinta Mountain is solid volcanic rock covered with a thin crust of earth where trees and plants somehow grow on the poor, rocky soil. To assist in their planning, American army engineers visited the gold mine region around Baguio in northern Luzon in order to study and inquire about the methods and equipment used by American miners in that area. Based on their study, the engineers adopted a simple strategy: blast a lead tunnel with explosives and then gradually enlarge the tunnel to a size that would accommodate the highway and streetcar line. The project would certainly be labor-intensive. To address the labor problem, Kilbourne obtained permission from the Philippine Commonwealth government to use several hundred civilian convicts from all parts of the islands. These prisoners were referred to as “bilibids,” after the name of the prison in Manila where they were normally held. The


Philippine Scouts, members of the 91st and 92nd Regiments of the Coastal Artillery of Corregidor, ram home a shell in a breech-loading twelve-inch disappearing cannon during the 1930s. (U.S. National Archives)


Philippine government was pleased to have the prisoners digging rock on Corregidor, provided the American army would feed and house them. Unfortunately, many of these prisoners were incarcerated for violent crimes. Because there was no capital punishment in the Philippines, many of these men were murderers serving life sentences. There was every expectation that some of these men, particularly the Moros, might rise up and murder their guards. Except for these concerns, the prisoners proved to be hard-working and provided the necessary manpower to construct the tunnel at a cost well within the budget.11 The main tunnel was wide and high enough to contain a double-tracked streetcar line running down the middle. It was 831 feet up a 4 percent grade from west to east through the hill. Over the years, the army engineers fashioned twentytwo laterals bored on either side of the main shaft to offer completely safe storage for ammunition, gasoline, and other supplies. Kilbourne arranged for his successor, Embick, to excavate two more tunnel systems to the north and south of the main tunnel laterals to contain, respectively, the post hospital and quartermaster siege reserve. When construction began, the engineers surveyed the mountain carefully and decided to begin constructing a tunnel


from both sides of the mountain. Lieutenant Paschal N. Strong, who began to set charges, instructed his sergeant to set explosives with time fuses to detonate at midnight on both ends of the tunnel. Unfortunately, Lieutenant Strong and his sergeant forgot to notify Kilbourne’s headquarters, and the ripping blast, which sounded as if Japanese battleships were opening up on the Rock, caused dozens of alarms to go off. Searchlight crews on the island dashed to their posts, switched on the lights, and began to sweep the South China Sea for the intruders. Soldiers in all stages of dress and undress ran to their posts to confront the surprise attack. The activities did not amuse General Kilbourne. Lieutenant Strong later described the general’s response as “very, very loud.”12 Under the direction of a strong and tough Irish American sergeant, progress on the tunnel was consistent, and the bilibids and engineers removed four to four and a half square yards of rock during an average six-hour workday. Unfortunately, on one occasion, the sergeant was too demanding, and one of the Moro prisoners shattered the sergeant’s skull with a pickax, almost killing him. Work on the tunnels slowed for a few days until his return, his head swathed in bandages. Undoubtedly the sergeant’s demeanor was milder after this incident; the fate of his attacker remains unknown.

Bilibid prison, Manila.



Bilibid prisoners work detail, Corregidor. (Charles S. Small materials, Leslie Ann Murray Collection)




The Malinta Tunnel, General Kilbourne’s pet project, as it appeared in 1938. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)

General Charles E. Kilbourne received the Medal of Honor for his heroism at Paco Bridge, Philippine Islands, February 5, 1899. (Virginia Military Institute Archives)




Lieutenant Strong and his engineers were so confident that the tunnel would meet somewhere under the mountain that they took bets. They bet even money with the artillery officers that the ends would link up as planned. When the two lead tunnels came within inches of each other, Strong declared a victory for the engineers and was delighted to collect the proceeds of the wager. Unfortunately, Strong was presented with a new problem when the roof began to cave in. Volcanic rock began splintering off the sides and the top, demonstrating a clear need for shoring and reinforcement. Strong wished to use concrete and cement to line the tunnel instead of the traditional wooden planks and sandbags. When he requested money to purchase the cement, Washington quickly informed him that no funds were available for such purposes. He continued to pursue his goals using lumber and wood from old boxes, but without cement. His friend Stanley Embick, who was by this time the harbor defense commander, finally came to his rescue. In April 1933, Embick told Washington that he needed $24,000 to line the tunnel with a cement liner, and said that he had managed to save $10,000 from barracks and quartermaster’s

The present-day north entrance to Malinta Tunnel, where General Douglas MacArthur and Philippine President Manuel Quezon sought refuge during the Japanese attack on the Philippines. (Collis Davis Collection)

funds to make a start. He received a grudging approval to begin using his special funds and was able to purchase cement very cheaply in Japan. Eventually, Embick got the rest of the money and completed the reinforcing and lining of the main shafts and laterals. Embick now turned his attention to the north and south extensions, the hospital and quartermaster’s supply areas. The engineers and miners encountered little difficulty with the north shaft where the rock was firm. However, Embick and his crew faced a challenge in the south system, where the vibrations from the blast caused the roof to collapse in the main shaft. After clearing away the debris from the shaft, they shifted the direction slightly eastward and continued work until the project was completed. Meanwhile, the War Department in Washington treated Kilbourne and Embick’s tunnel project as an open secret; the substantial progress on the tunnel prevented any serious efforts to shut it down. While not discussing it openly, Washington carefully followed and monitored the progress of the Corregidor engineers. By 1938, the tunnel system was substantially complete. The north system contained a total



A diagram of the Malinta Tunnel complex that was utilized during World War II. (Corregidor Foundation signage; Collis Davis Collection photo)

of twelve laterals, including the two that would later be used as a post headquarters. The south system consisted of eleven laterals filled mostly with rations and stores to be used in case of a siege. Both the north and south systems had separate


entrances. The north entrance was in a ravine on the North Shore road, while the entrance to the south complex was at a point not far from the South Dock. As the tunnel was nearing completion, the American lookouts on Corregidor began noticing large numbers of Japanese fishing boats continually running in close to the island. The so-called fishing craft were equipped with unconventional gear for fishing. Some of these boats had spotting telescopes and the “fishermen” were often seen with powerful binoculars observing activities on Corregidor. General Kilbourne’s response was to send out Lieutenant Albert C. Wedemeyer, his aide and the beach defense officer, to intercept and bring the Japanese crews to Corregidor for a stern warning. Not surprisingly, the Japanese crews were sullen and uncooperative, but always observing their surroundings. The Americans allowed the Japanese to see just enough of the tunnel complex from a distance to lead them to believe that the Americans had dug tunnels all over Corregidor and possibly Bataan. When the Japanese assaulted the Philippines in 1941, they were not surprised when the Rock became the stronghold of the defenders.13

The Calm before the Storm

3


A

S T H E F I R S T W O R L D WA R raged in Europe, the established European powers concentrated their military efforts within the European theater, forcing them to retreat from their aggressive policies in Asia. While European powers did not abandon their colonies, neither did they provide adequate resources to continue an acquisitive colonial policy in the East. The Philippines was essentially left out of the conflict, but when the Americans eventually entered the war, they continued fortifying Corregidor Island. As their Spanish predecessors had believed, the Americans expected an attack on Manila to come from the South China Sea. Following this accepted premise, they aimed their big guns toward the approaches leading into Manila Bay. This decision would have severe consequences later, in 1942, when the Japanese assaulted the island with troops departing from the area around Cavite. For the time being, the fortifications on Corregidor performed up to expectations by preventing a naval assault from the South China Sea. Corregidor received its new nickname, “the Rock,” because of its virtually impregnable defenses and forbidding appearance.

The Mile-Long Barracks, situated on Corregidor’s Topside, housed the enlisted men. (Collis Davis Collection)


Looking north toward Bataan, this view of the Topside residential community scarcely looks like the fortress Corregidor became by the late 1930s. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)

The Calm before the Storm 75


An aerial photograph with a southwestern orientation made April 16, 1927, shows the high ground of Topside. (U.S. National Archives)


Whether as part of a specific strategy or a gradual commitment to the defenses of Corregidor, the Americans constructed the facilities there to accommodate a permanent military force. To accomplish this, they mapped out the island in order to designate specific areas for living quarters. Roads were needed to access strong points that were identified and utilized as gun emplacements. In general, the island was divided into four areas. The northwestern portion of the island consists of a massive body of rock jutting into the air five hundred feet above the sea. This area was determined to be inaccessible from the sea, because the high ground can only be accessed from a narrow, rocky beach below. There are only two ravines that wind precariously upward to the summit, providing limited access from the beach. Huge volcanic rock flattens out into two plateaus, the northwest and the south sections. Because it is a bit higher, the northwestern side was appropriately called “Topside” by the Americans, and it eventually became the nerve center of activity on the island. Here the army located its post headquarters, along with the barracks for enlisted personnel. The officers’ quarters were adjacent to the parade ground and created a circular effect around the traditional


This map depicts the state of Corregidor’s battery emplacements, roads, and structural features as they are today. (Corregidor Foundation)


A twelve-inch M1895A2 fixed gun at Battery Hearn has a range of 27,600 yards (25.2 km or 15.7 miles). See page 147 for the victory photo of Japanese troops posed on this gun after defeating USAFE forces at Corregidor. (Collis Davis Collection)




flagpole. In this general area were built the underground ordnance storage facilities as well as various shops necessary for support. The hospital was enlarged and schools were built to accommodate the families of troops garrisoned on the Rock. A four-story concrete building, the barracks for enlisted men— which, when completed, stretched for over a mile—was aptly called the “Mile-Long Barracks.” The second area of the island is the smaller south plateau, christened “Bottomside.” It connects the narrow end of the island to the larger, broader plateau to the northwest. This flat stretch is only a few feet above sea level and forms a narrow

In the background are the Mile-Long Barracks on Topside during the 1930s, in the middle ground is the movie theater, Ciné Corregidor, and in the foreground are the rooftops of the officers’ quarters. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)

cut through the center of the island. Here the Americans constructed two wharves. One, the “Army Dock” on the north side, had three large piers, and the other, on the south, had one large, L-shaped pier operated by the navy. The third area consisted of the civilian town of San José, which had been the center of activity during the Spanish period and is located just south of Bottomside. San José soon developed into an American-style community with paved streets and housing for the Philippine Scouts, native Filipinos who would later constitute the bulk of the Corregidor garrison. The fourth distinct area mapped out by the Americans was



Bottomside, part of the barrio of San José. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)


Photographed from the west side of the Mile-Long Barracks is the headquarters building (left) of Fort Mills at Topside. An officers’ quarters (right) has a chimney. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)

Middleside barracks for enlisted personnel as they are today. (Collis Davis Collection)



southeast of Bottomside, around Malinta Mountain. This steep mountain runs toward the island’s southernmost tip and forms the spine of the island; it is the site of the famous Malinta Tunnels. The lower of the two plateaus to the northeast, on the high ground, was called “Middleside.” Here the Americans constructed more enlisted men’s barracks, another hospital, the quarters for noncommissioned officers, and a service club. Later, as the Philippine Scouts garrisoned the island in significant numbers, a schoolhouse was built here for their children and another for American children. The final area to be mapped out was the southwestern part of the island. An airfield operated by the army and a hydroplane hangar for the navy were located here. The airfield was called Kindley Field in honor of an early hero of the U.S. Army Air Corps. Construction began in 1920, but the airstrip remained rough and the runway short. These conditions limited its use, and there was little expectation that any fighting aircraft would be stationed at Kindley Field. American military planners, learning bitter lessons from World War I, realized that Corregidor would be vulnerable to an air assault. Disregarding or ignoring this reality, however, they did not update the batteries and other equipment, late-


nineteenth-century weapons that had been placed on the island during the period preceding the passage of the Washington Naval Treaty in 1922. Most of the so-called big guns were installed before the Washington Naval Treaty and the Americans identified these guns by giving each battery a name. Two batteries, “Wheeler” and “Cheney,” had two twelve-inch guns each, while battery “Crockett” boasted two ten-inch guns. Batteries “Smith” and “Hearn” consisted of one twelve-inch gun each. Battery “Grubbs” had two ten-inch guns. Other large weapons consisted of twelve-inch mortars. Battery Craighill, located at Fort Hughes, had four twelve-inch guns. These mortars would be the most effective weapons in the Corregidor arsenal when the Japanese attacked. Battery “Geary,” with its awesome ten-ton, twelve-inch mortars, along with battery “Way,” were the only emplacements equipped with antipersonnel firepower. They were capable of rotating 360 degrees, thus covering every direction. This flexibility made it possible for them to fire at land targets on Bataan, when the Japanese concentrated their forces for the assault on Corregidor in 1942. There was also a wide array of smallercaliber weapons installed to support the big gun batteries.1 Batteries Wheeler, Cheney, and Crockett, with their massive twelve-inch guns, had a range of 12,000 yards. Unfortunately

Twelve-inch mortars at Battery Geary. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)




Twelve-inch disappearing gun at Battery Crockett. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)


for the Americans, at the time these weapons were needed, they were on fixed, permanent mounts and were incapable of hitting targets other than those in the South China Sea. They were essentially useless during the Japanese siege, but they served their purpose to deter a naval assault from the open sea. To the dismay of the American forces manning these batteries, they became tempting targets for Japanese bombers. After World War I and with new leadership in Washington, the country returned to a mode of isolationism, refusing to ratify the Treaty of Versailles at the conclusion of the war and limiting itself to an associate membership in the League of Nations. The idea of limiting expenditures on arms led to the Washington Naval Treaty, the first significant attempt at arms limitation by the imperial powers. The United States seemed to wish for a continued presence in the international community through its participation in the treaty, while responding to the desire of the American electorate to reduce military expenditures. President Warren Harding and, later, President Calvin Coolidge, joined by the Republicans in Washington, resisted military spending. The United States reduced or was reluctant to commit further resources to the military, in general, and to the Philippines and Corregidor, in particular.

Article XIX, re: Fortifications of the “Washington Treaty,” from Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1922, 1:247–66. Treaty Series No. 671, 252–53. (U.S. National Archives)



Despite the changed thinking in Washington, the military at Corregidor continued to improve the fortifications during 1920 and 1921. The final blow to fortifying and improving armaments came on February 6, 1922, when United States, Japan, Great Britain, France, and Italy signed a treaty on naval limitation, negotiated in Washington, and therefore referred to as the “Washington Treaty.” The five powers agreed to accept limitations on the number of warships each country possessed. The ratio of battleships and aircraft carriers agreed to by the big three was Great Britain, five; the United States, five; and Japan, three. The article that dramatically affected Corregidor was the nonfortification clause specifying that there should be no increase in American seacoast installations beyond the 180th parallel. For Corregidor, this meant that no new howitzers, no antiaircraft guns, and no bombproof shelters could be obtained or constructed. In effect, the Rock’s armaments were frozen until the treaty’s expiration on December 31, 1937.2 The effect of the Washington Treaty is dramatized in the actions of the U.S. Army transport Wheaton. On February 20, 1922, the Wheaton was en route from San Francisco to Manila, a trip it made every three months. The Wheaton’s assignment was to transport military personnel, equipment,


weapons, and other supplies to American units operating in the Philippines, including Corregidor Island. On this fateful February morning, without warning and to the surprise of its passengers and most of its crew, the ship altered course and returned to port. The announcement made to the puzzled passengers and crew was that a new course had been set for Oahu, Hawaii, instead of Manila. It did not take long for the passengers to learn that the Wheaton had been ordered to Honolulu to off-load a portion of its cargo. In the holds of the ship were twelve 203 mm (9.4-inch) howitzers designed to bolster Corregidor’s defenses against attack from Bataan. The Wheaton also carried fourteen three-inch antiaircraft guns intended to further protect the fortress from air attack. However, the War Department had issued orders that nothing beyond the essentials currently required should be transported to Corregidor. The War Department’s decision signaled the beginning of an elaborate program initiated by the U.S. commanders in the Philippines to remedy the deficiencies in the islands’ defenses. The failure to deliver the Wheaton’s cargo that would have specifically addressed two of the island’s most vulnerable areas caused much concern for those responsible for defending the fortified island, and it required them to use a variety of alternative strategies.3


The U.S. Army transport vessel Wheaton, later renamed the Alaskan, pictured above on July 14, 1942, unloaded its weapons cargo in Hawaii on February 20, 1922, instead of proceeding to Corregidor and Bataan, Philippines. The Wheaton was built in 1918 at Sparrows Point, Maryland, and owned by the American Hawaiian Steamship Company. (U.S. Coast Guard photo, Mariners’ Museum, Newport News, Va.)

The insignia of the U.S. Army Transport Service, circa 1918.


Corregidor’s commander, Brigadier General Richmond P. Davis, requested a copy of the treaty and commentary from the War Department on Article 19, which outlined the restrictions. After carefully reviewing the treaty and the nonfortification clause, the general decided to address certain deficiencies that would not violate the letter of the treaty or the specific orders of the War Department. World War I demonstrated the devastating effect of poison gas when used in battle, so Davis hoped to construct a gasproof tunnel complex under Malinta Mountain. In addition, he planned to install gastight doors and ventilation fans at all batteries located around the island. Army engineers had already begun construction of a smaller tunnel close to Battery Wheeler that could serve as a bomband gasproof harbor defense headquarters. Unfortunately for future American defenders of the Rock, Davis was ordered to discontinue the projects. Many of these facilities were later used as a command post inside the Malinta Tunnels during the Japanese invasion. Before the Wheaton was forced to return and unload its 203 mm howitzers, some measures had already been taken to withstand an attack from the beaches of Bataan. A considerable number of war-surplus heavy field guns (155 mm), of French design, were put in position to support the beach


defenses. At this point, there were only four antiaircraft guns on Topside while fourteen empty pads had been prepared and waited for new guns to arrive. Corregidor remained virtually defenseless against bombers and fighter aircraft until the Japanese ended the Washington Treaty in 1937. In addition to the frustrating problems caused by budgetary constraints and Article 19 of the Washington Treaty, the Tydings-McDuffie Act, passed by Congress in 1934, produced other complications. The Tydings-McDuffie Act provided for commonwealth status for the Philippines and created a Filipino government that could supervise the transition to its promised independence in 1946. By the mid-1930s, military planners had to consider the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines, while also seeking to ensure the security of its former colony and expected future ally. American strategists firmly believed that the Philippines would be a strong ally against the looming threat posed by Japan, with whom American relations had been strained at best since 1907. For American strategists, Japan represented the greatest threat to U.S. influence in the Pacific. Throughout the four decades leading to the eventual war with Japan, the U.S. War Department developed plans and strategies, assuming Japan to be the aggressive nation. War games and exercises built


French 155 mm C mle 1917 Howitzer. The soundness of the design was demonstrated when the Americans adapted it for its expeditionary army in Europe—their copy was called M1917A1. It was still in both French and American service at the beginning of the Second World War. (Peter Kempf Collection)


Signing of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, March 23, 1935, Washington, D.C. Seated, left to right: U.S. Secretary of War George H. Dern, President of the United States Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the Philippine Senate Manuel L. Quezon. (Philippine Collection, U.S. National Archives)



around these plans involved both army and navy participation and, by the 1920s, the Philippine Scouts.4 Despite these difficulties, Corregidor, during the two decades of peace between the world wars, was one of the army’s better postings. Fort Mills was downright comfortable despite the year-round heat because cooling breezes from the South China Sea made even the hot rainy season bearable. Fort Mills provided a number of amenities and diversions that created a sociable and pleasant atmosphere. Topside boasted a nine-hole golf course that was impeccably maintained as well as the officers’ and noncommissioned officers’ clubs. The “army brats,” as the children were known, enjoyed the saltwater swimming pool. On Middleside, sporting events conducted on three large athletic fields provided the primary entertainment. The stable was also located close by on Middleside. Both the enlisted men’s and the officers’ bathing beaches on Bottomside offered excellent, safe shores for bathing in the warm waters of Manila Bay, protected by sturdy shark nets. Below the hill, located between Malinta Mountain and Engineering Point, was the larger of the two beaches, which was reserved for enlisted men and their families. The smaller, officers’ beach, which lay farther down the trail between Artillery and Infantry Points, boasted cabanas. The


First Lieutenant Harry J. Harrison, mineplanter commander, appearing in “dress whites” with Catherine Carswell, daughter of stockade commander Colonel R. M. Carswell, before their marriage. They are in front of her father’s quarters at Stockade Level, 1937 or 1938. (Selma Harrison Calmes, M.D., Collection)



A prewar view of the Officers’ Club on Topside. (Photo by Annabel Carswell Julian [now Annabel Audet]; Selma Harrison Calmes, M.D., Collection)


tropical climate allowed year-round beach bathing, unknown to most Americans originating from cooler and landlocked areas of the United States. Fishing, boating, and sailing were also very popular with the Americans stationed on the island. General Kilbourne was an avid hiker and encouraged his troops to hike on the scenic island trails for a double purpose. He wanted his men to be fit and in good shape, and he wanted his officers and troops to be familiar with every part of the small island they were charged to defend. An evening in the tropics at Corregidor included the strict observance of formalities. The senior officers insisted on observing the traditional social amenities while the enlisted men followed a less formal pattern that was equally traditional. At dinner, officers dressed in whites with mess jacket and cummerbund; the ladies donned evening dresses for dinner at the officers’ club. Weekends were often devoted to dancing, bridge games, and neighborly visits to watch the children play. The post theater usually attracted enthusiastic and large crowds with its first-run motion pictures, shown twice every night. Philippine Scouts had a theater where they showed Filipino movies in Tagalog. If an American wandered into the Filipino theater by accident, he had no difficulty understanding the plot. Most Philippine movies of the time revolved


Bruce Carswell, at about age twelve, son of Colonel R. M. Carswell, standing by the saltwater swimming pool, 1937 or 1938. (Selma Harrison Calmes, M.D., Collection)



South Beach and Barrio San José in the foreground, circa 1935. See page 173 for a present-day view from the same angle. (Filipinas Heritage Library Auth. 01–011905)


around the familiar plot of boy-meets-girl, boy-loses-girl, boy-wins-girl, and all live happily ever after.5 For the young single officers and soldiers, there were frequent trips aboard the harbor boats Hyde and Miley into Manila where they found all of the “mysteries of the Orient.” Enlisted men frequented the cabarets and hotels that dotted the main thoroughfares along the harbor. The officers were well served at the large Army-Navy Club on Dewey Boulevard. Of course, everyone attended the annual Army-Navy football game at the Army-Navy Club, which soon became the event of the year for the Americans in the Philippines. Surely the old slogan, “Join the navy and see the world,” could be applied to the army’s Coast Artillery as well.6 Corregidor ended the Americans’ love affair with the automobile, even for the more affluent soldiers on the island. The steep grade leading to Topside proved to be a challenge for the best of cars. And the sea air quickly rusted the undercarriages of the finest and best-maintained autos. The American dream of auto ownership quietly faded on the island. Corregidor’s streetcars fulfilled the transportation needs for those living on the island. They ran almost everywhere one wished to go. Providing easy access to all parts of the island, streetcars transported people from their quarters to work, to recreation and

A view of “Ciné Corregidor” in 2003. (Collis Davis Collection)



Ferry Miley plied the waters of Manila Bay each day during the 1920s and 1930s carrying Corregidor’s personnel to and from Manila for furloughs and business. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)



The Army-Navy Club of Manila depicted on a postcard during the prewar period. (Selma Harrison Calmes, M.D., Collection)


The North Dock at Bottomside was where the ferries met the streetcars of Corregidor. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)


Streetcars provided the principal means of transportation on Corregidor besides bicycling or walking. (American Historical Collection, Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines)



social events, and back again. The efficiency of the streetcars validated the foresight of Leonard Wood, Frederick Abbot, and Stanley Embick and their decision to provide a means of transportation throughout the island. Besides transporting personnel, the streetcar was also invaluable in transporting supplies and war matériel about the island. The streetcars ran from 6 A.M. until about midnight, with the longest run, from Topside to the Bottomside station, taking about one hour each way. They ran at a regular speed of about twelve miles an hour, and the speed limit was strictly enforced after several early mishaps and accidents. Passengers were charged no fares, but priority seating was strictly enforced. Officers and their families rode in the “first class” section behind the motorman. These were the bench seats running the full length of the operator’s platform and could be moved to accommodate the change of direction when the car reached the end of the run. Filipino and enlisted men had the next priority, and finally Filipino civilians with passes took the remaining seats when available. If the passenger cars filled to capacity, it was the conductor’s unpleasant duty to remove passengers with lower priorities to make room for those with higher ranks. One former army conductor recalled, however, that “children and pretty girls were seldom removed.”7


Streetcars converge at a Middleside station. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)


A 1911 map of the streetcar system on Topside shows stretches serviced by electric power, cable assistance, and by steam engine. (Charles S. Small materials, Leslie Ann Murray Collection)



The double track that carried the streetcar ended about 150 yards below the Topside station. A simple “blocking” system was used to indicate to the operator that the single track of the main line was in use. After leaving Topside station, a streetcar went past the Topside cinema and the post telephone exchange on its way to the end of the line at the officers’ club. When the streetcar arrived at the end of the line, the motorman and the conductor simply switched to the other end of the car. While the motorman activated his controls, the conductor reversed the trolley pole, and the streetcar was ready for the return trip. Manufactured by the Brill Construction Company, the cars were designed and engineered well and operated very efficiently, particularly for the situations and terrain that they were required to accommodate. In addition to ferrying passengers, the railroad tracks supported freight transportation. These operations usually began about 5:30 A.M., with the exception of the “beef runs,” which had to be completed before the temperature rose to prevent spoilage. The heavier the car, the more the motorman was required to use his hand brake. The hand brake was always applied before the cars began their downhill run. All of the personnel who operated the freight and passenger cars were from the 59th Coast Artillery Regiment, which provided

a superintendent, a foreman of operations, a yardmaster, and all the noncommissioned officers including the dispatchers. The freight cars, called “power cars,” were motorized, heavy-duty flat cars with controls on both ends and a bridge that spanned a center for freight and housed the air tanks, circuit breaker, and air compressor. For lighter loads, a huge concrete block was placed next to the housing to provide ballast. The trolley pole extended from the top of the bridge housing. The Corregidor railroad possessed nine heavy-duty freight cars. Of the nine, only four were rigged for heavy-duty loads. The railroad also possessed a gas-electric locomotive to be used in the event of prolonged power failure. According to one observer, “she was of little use. When the gasoline engine wasn’t acting up, she could pull her own weight up the hill. But most of the time she consumed about five gallons to a mile going uphill.”8 The grades on the main line varied anywhere from 2 to 6 percent, and some of the spurs were even steeper. During heavy rainstorms the tracks could become treacherous and slippery, especially for heavy loads. In such situations, the loads were usually split into smaller ones and a “pushing” engine was added to assist the pulling engine. Strict rules were applied when trains arrived at a crossing.



Photograph shows model No. 2 streetcar manufactured in Philadelphia by the J. G. Brill company before its shipment to Corregidor. (Charles S. Small materials, Leslie Ann Murray Collection)


Loaded freight cars received priority while all empty freights were required to stop to allow both passenger and loaded freight to pass through the grade stops. There were also a number of pedestrian and road crossings where motorists, truck drivers, teamsters, and pedestrians often failed to observe the rules and would dash through the crossing as the train approached. Amazingly, these actions resulted in only one terrible accident. It should be remembered that even the best-designed and maintained machine is still a machine and dependent on even its smallest parts to operate correctly. For Corregidor’s streetcars, the failure of a very small part caused the largest single peacetime disaster for the garrison at Corregidor. On February 20, 1925, the 7 A.M. streetcar departed from Topside to connect with the morning boat to Manila. The trolley functioned as expected until it left the Middleside station. Shortly after departing the station, a cotter pin sheared and disabled the streetcar’s heavy-duty brake assembly.

The streetcar was racing at better than fifty miles an hour as it lurched into the final curve and sideswiped an iron pole and overturned. The streetcar slid some distance on its right side, killing eight people and seriously injuring sixteen other passengers. Brigadier General Campbell King, the harbor defense commander, convened a board of inquiry, but the board found no one personally at fault. The board judged the whole affair to have been an accident caused by mechanical failure and commended the quick thinking of Captain Foster and the efforts of Privates Fagan and Coley to control the trolley. It recommended a careful study to overhaul the streetcars and provide safety procedures for future operations. As a result, barriers and blocks were built along the track, and all working parts had to be replaced as part of routine maintenance. There were no more streetcar accidents, and no streetcar ever ran out of control on Corregidor again.9


4

Winds of War

In a view taken from the mouth of Manila Bay, the clouds of war hang ominously over Corregidor as weapons experts prepare the island for the eventual attack by the Japanese. (Navy photo, U.S. National Archives)


Winds of War 105

I

N 1 9 3 5 , D O U G L A S M A C A R T H U R retired from active duty to become the military advisor to the Philippine Commonwealth. His objective was to help the newly configured government create an army capable of defending its sovereignty, once it was achieved in 1946. MacArthur supported the idea that the Philippines could be defended from attack. Unfortunately, scarce financial resources and political infighting slowed the creation of an effective Philippine army. Nevertheless, with strong rhetoric, MacArthur continued to reassure the Philippine government that the task would be accomplished. By the end of the 1930s, the officers assigned the responsibility of defending Manila had few illusions about their fate in the event of a war with Japan. Nevertheless, most of the officers associated with the defenses on Corregidor were confident that they could repel any attack by the Japanese from the sea. The consensus was that the Philippine forces would have to stop the Japanese on the beaches of Luzon in order to hold out for any length of time against a superior, coordinated Japanese army-navy operation. With this challenge before him, MacArthur worked toward organizing and training the Philippine Army.1 With these considerations in mind, the U.S. strategists in Washington, planning for an all-out attack against the United


States by the Japanese in the Pacific, developed a defense strategy for the Philippines. Part of the strategy required the United States to reinforce Guam and Hawaii. The prevailing military wisdom in Washington dictated that the Philippines hold until reinforcements could arrive from Guam, Hawaii, and the U.S. West Coast. The original plan became known as plan “Orange,” but it was revised and updated from time to time. Later, it was included in the larger U.S. strategy for the war in the Pacific in 1932 and was known officially as plan “Brown.”2 In 1937, Japan revoked the Washington Treaty, thereby eliminating the constraints of Article 19 on the United States. Shortly after the lifting of the restrictions, the United States sent several 155 mm GPF tractor-drawn guns and eight eightinch railway-mounted guns to the Philippines. The 155 mm guns were introduced immediately into the defenses, but the eight-inch guns were stored. In 1940, the biggest changes in the defenses occurred when the United States began to react to the war in Europe and the Japanese aggression in China. Congress passed the Selective Service Act and allocated additional funding for military weapons and naval construction. In June 1940, Corregidor was upgraded to “active” status, but despite this increased at-


Two ranking U.S. generals at the outbreak of the Pacific war, Jonathan M. Wainwright and Douglas MacArthur, taken October 10, 1941. (Filipinas Heritage Library Auth. 01–011905; Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines [Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953], 66)

Winds of War 107

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt signs the declaration of war against Japan, December 8, 1941. (Library of Congress)



tention, the defenses of the Philippines remained a low priority. A year later, in July 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt mobilized the Philippine Army into federal service and simultaneously appointed General Douglas MacArthur to command the newly formed U.S. Armed Forces in the Far East. The War Department sent airplanes and thousands of American soldiers to strengthen the defenses in the Manila Bay area. Many of these new recruits were draftees or men joining the military seeking a more favorable situation than draftees received. MacArthur quickly encountered difficulties with integrating the Philippine Army into the overall U.S. command. Language and cultural differences produced personal conflicts and frequently frustrated efforts at forming proper military units.3 As the war raged in Europe and threatened to involve the United States, President Roosevelt emphasized a buildup in American defense forces. The effect on Corregidor was dramatic. A commitment to update the harbor defenses of Manila replaced the old policies of “make-do with what you have.” Nearly all of the guns were brought back into service by mid1941. In July of that year, the army received and deployed mines across the channel entrances to the harbor; by the fall of 1941, the beach defenses were improved and the new 75 mm and 150 mm guns were deployed. The four coastal ar-

tillery regiments were brought up to full strength, and barbedwire obstacles were strewn along the beaches believed most likely to be assaulted. The antiaircraft units on Corregidor received the most modern weapons available at the time, and the old ammunition was gradually replaced with up-to-date, state-of-the-art cartridges. Unfortunately for the defenders, the antiaircraft ammunition upgrades were insufficient by the time of the Japanese attack. Washington ordered that all forces on Corregidor be brought to full fighting strength. January 1941 brought an increased pace in training for new recruits. The orders were underscored by the increase in tensions evident in the Pacific between the United States and Japan.4 When the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, crippling the American Pacific fleet, everything changed militarily for the Philippines. Plan Orange and Plan Brown, developed by Major Dwight D. Eisenhower when he was MacArthur’s chief of staff, depended on reinforcements of both men and matériel from the mainland, Hawaii, and Guam in order to succeed. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor sank 18 warships, destroyed or damaged 188 aircraft, and killed 2,403 American servicemen. The first priority for American forces in the Pacific was to defend Hawaii, Alaska, and the Panama perimeter.

Winds of War 109


The U.S. Army mineplanter USAMP Harrison, docked at North Dock, its usual location. (Selma Harrison Calmes, M.D., Collection)


Both the U.S. Army and Navy constructed minefields across the North and South Channels of Manila Bay as shown in 1941. (Base map from the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority, DENR, Philippines; additional art by Collis Davis)


A rare photo taken by First Lieutenant Harry J. Harrison during practice mine-laying. (Selma Harrison Calmes, M.D., Collection)

A 1942 photo of the young Japanese Zero pilot Saburo Sakai, who, with the aviators of 108 Japanese bombers and 84 Zero fighters, bombed Clark Field on December 8, 1941. They were surprised to see the American enemy bombers and fighters neatly parked along the airfield runways. (Filipinas Heritage Library Auth. 01–011905; the Ricardo T. Jose Collection, Quezon City, Philippines)


Cover of The Expeditionary Force to the Philippines, a Japanese government publication of 1943, edited by Watari Shudan, Press Section.

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A squadron of twin-engine Japanese bombers that hit military targets at Clark Field and the Cavite City naval base in Manila Bay. This image is from a Japanese wartime propaganda publication; the original photo caption reads: “To achieve brilliant results by our war planes, all efforts are exerted to assist them.” (The Expeditionary Force to the Philippines, ed. Watari Shudan, Press Section, Japanese Government, 1943)



It soon became apparent that relief would not be coming to the Philippines in time to prevent the Japanese from occupying the entire archipelago. The strategy now called for the defenders to hold out as long as possible and delay the Japanese advance in the Pacific. Within a few hours of the air strike at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese began to bomb the Philippines. The U.S. Army Air Corps was caught by surprise with planes on the ground at Clark Field and Subic Bay. By sundown on December 8, 1941, the Japanese had destroyed any chance of effective air resistance in the Philippines, and the loss of most of the American fighters and bombers left Corregidor exposed and vulnerable to air attack. Without air cover, Corregidor would need to rely on its antiaircraft batteries for any defense against Japanese attacks.5 General MacArthur, who earlier had expressed confidence that the Philippines could be defended, was suddenly forced to face the challenge posed by a well-equipped and welltrained military force. Even under MacArthur’s command, the Philippine Army was certainly not ready for the task of defending the island of Luzon without significant U.S. support. The Japanese army planned a swift, fifty-day campaign to secure Luzon and the rest of the Philippines. Under the

command of Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma, the 14th Imperial Japanese Army began initial landings in northern Luzon on December 10. Then, his main force landed at Lingayen Gulf on December 22. The two forces quickly linked up and scattered the Philippine-American defense forces arrayed against them. With no hope of stopping the Japanese, General MacArthur fell back on Plan Orange and ordered a strategic withdrawal of American and Philippine forces to the peninsula of Bataan. Plan Orange was designed to concentrate and defend the Bataan Peninsula, supported by fortress Corregidor to the rear, thus enabling relief forces to arrive and expel the enemy. Unfortunately for the Americans and Filipinos defending Bataan, the promised relief was not forthcoming. Questions surrounding MacArthur’s decision to rely on Plan Orange and concentrate his troops were raised at the time and continue to be debated by military historians. The logic of concentrating the force where they could be surrounded and battered at will by the Japanese, instead of dispersing them throughout the island to continue resistance and prevent the Japanese from concentrating on the main body, remains the central question of the debate. In MacArthur’s defense, the plan was designed with the expectation that reinforcements would come to support the beachhead.6

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Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma, the 14th Imperial Japanese Army. (The Expeditionary Force to the Philippines, ed. Watari Shudan, Press Section, Japanese Government, 1943)




President of the Philippines Manuel Luis Quezon (center), is shown with (left to right) Chief Justice Jose P. Laurel, Executive Secretary Jorge Vargas, General Douglas MacArthur, Mrs. Quezon, Major Manuel A. Roxas, and an American aide at Quezon’s rest house in Mariquina, December 17, 1941. (Filipinas Heritage Library Auth. 01–011905)

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The harbor defenses of Manila Bay fulfilled the mission assigned them. Their mission was to defend against a naval assault, and the Japanese made no attempt to force their way past the fortified islands guarding the entrance to Manila. Japanese intelligence, although somewhat inaccurate, expected heavy losses should any attempt be made to pass the islands. Even though many of the weapons dated back to World War I, the coastal artillery forces, under the command of Major General George F. Moore, would inflict heavy damage on any ships concentrated at the mouth of the harbor and attempting to force the narrow channels. Moore’s command consisted of the 59th, 91st, and 92nd Philippine Scouts, and one antiaircraft unit, the 60th. These units comprised approximately 5,700 men. The forces on the Rock were divided into four basic units: the Seaward Artillery Fire Command, under Colonel Paul D. Bunker; the Anti-Aircraft Command, under Colonel Theodore M. Chase; and the Beach Defense and the In-Shore Patrol, both commanded by Captain Kenneth M. Hoeffel. The other forts within the Philippine Harbor Defense were under separate commands. Fort Frank had a garrison of about 200 men, while 800 men guarded Fort Hughes. Two hundred men maintained the formidable concrete battleship of Fort Drum. As other units were


forced to retreat or leave their positions to the Japanese and move to Corregidor, the population on the island swelled dramatically. On December 24, the survivors of Subic Bay were ordered to retreat to Corregidor, followed shortly by the U.S. naval station at Cavite. MacArthur established his headquarters on Corregidor on December 25, 1941. The government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, with its President Manuel Quezon, also sought the protection of the Rock.7 Two Japanese columns met little opposition as they neared Manila in the last few days of 1941. On New Year’s Day, Japanese messengers entered the city and gave notice to Philippine officials that they intended to enter the city the next day. Between 9 and 10 A.M. of January 2, 1942, the forces of the emperor of Japan slipped into the city of Soliman and Lakandula. Manila’s citizens witnessed an awesome display of military power as Japanese tanks and artillery rolled through the streets of their beloved city. General MacArthur and President Quezon had earlier declared Manila an open city when they called for Philippine and American troops to retreat to Bataan. The decision was made primarily to spare the city from the death and destruction brought about by military operations. A “safe zone” that included the outlying areas of the city was declared. Jorge S. Vargas, formerly President

U.S. and Filipino military staff operating within the security of the Malinta Tunnels. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)


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The Japanese Imperial Army as it drives through Tayabas, Quezon Province, toward Manila. (The Expeditionary Force to the Philippines, ed. Watari Shudan, Press Section, Japanese Government, 1943)



Quezon’s executive secretary, who was appointed mayor of the greater city of Manila, assumed the unpleasant duty of handing over the city to the Japanese. The efforts of President Quezon and General MacArthur to prevent the unnecessary destruction of Manila were only partially successful, because the Japanese continued to bomb the city until the formal notification of its surrender and occupation. Secure in the Malinta Tunnels on Corregidor, President Quezon received word that his church, the Old Santo Domingo, had been destroyed. His alma mater, San Juan de Letran College, and the offices and plant of the Philippine Herald, his newspaper, also received extensive damage. This sad news further depressed the president, who was suffering from tuberculosis and required constant medical care. On January 28, 1942, Radio Tokyo announced the establishment of a commission government that pledged its support and allegiance to Japan’s Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Policy. The broadcast suggested to many on Bataan and Corregidor that the Filipinos were betraying the legitimate government of President Quezon. On the other hand, Filipinos believed the failure of the United States to send reinforcements to expel the Japanese was an act of abandonment. The idea that America possessed the resources and would not


A bomb over the City of Manila in the vicinity of the Pasig River. (National Library Photo Collection, Filipinas Heritage Library Auth. 01–011905)

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President Manuel Quezon (left) on the radio, in the Malinta Tunnels. (National Library Photo Collection, Filipinas Heritage Library Auth. 01–011905)



The mayor of Manila, Jorge S. Vargas, greets General Masaharu Homma. (The Expeditionary Force to the Philippines, ed. Watari Shudan, Press Section, Japanese Government, 1943)


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commit them to the protection of the Philippines, as expressed in the Tydings-McDuffie Act, inflamed anti-American sentiment in the colony. To rally support for the soon-to-be-exiled government of President Quezon, General MacArthur asked the Philippine president to issue a statement repudiating the action of Filipino leaders who accepted positions in the new puppet government and warning them that reprisals might follow. Quezon’s response was brief, curt, and to the point: “I would not make such a statement, first, because I am sure of my men; second, because it seems to me ridiculous that in my powerless situation, I should adopt a threatening role.” Quezon had known most of these men for a long time and was certain of their loyalty. He understood that the rest of the world was not familiar with the situation in the Philippines and might condemn the actions of his men following the Tokyo broadcast. Instead, he penned a lengthy letter to General MacArthur requesting that it be forwarded to Washington and published in American newspapers and read on radio broadcasts. Quezon received a prompt response to his request from President Roosevelt that read in part, “those parts of your message to General MacArthur which you request be brought to the attention to [sic] the world at-large are being broadcast from Washing-


ton. Your speech and your actions will encourage not only your fellow countrymen—but all those throughout the world who are partners in the battle for democratic ideals and liberty, in the right of self-government.” Under the circumstances, President Roosevelt could do little else for the Filipinos except to express the gratitude of the American people for their valiant stand.8 Shortly after receiving Roosevelt’s letter, Quezon heard the American president’s words announcing the American commitment to the early conclusion to the war in Europe. This news, coupled with the growing belief that the promised relief would not be forthcoming, sent the Philippine president into a greater depression. In his despair, Quezon commented to a colleague, “How American, to writhe in anguish at the fate of a distant cousin, while a daughter is being raped in the back room!” Quezon was so desperate that he considered surrendering to the Japanese, thereby becoming a martyr and a rallying point for the Philippine people, even at the cost of his life. General MacArthur convinced Quezon that he should not surrender and that his personal surrender would be misinterpreted by the world. Only after MacArthur argued this logical point of view did Quezon agree to remain as president.9 On February 16, Quezon informed President Roosevelt,

through MacArthur, of his intention to transfer the seat of the Philippine government from Corregidor, where he had sought protection from the Japanese, to the Visayas in the south, between the larger islands of Luzon and Mindanao. This area had not been invaded or occupied by the Japanese, and Quezon believed he could procure supplies and provide needed support to the forces still holding out on Bataan and Corregidor. Another reason Quezon wished to move from Corregidor was his advancing tuberculosis. The stale air and dampness in the Malinta Tunnels exacerbated his respiratory difficulties. About 11 P.M. on February 20, 1942, Quezon and his party slipped off the Rock aboard the submarine USS Swordfish, commanded by Chester C. Smith. General MacArthur and other top U.S. personnel walked with the president to the dock to wave farewell and watched as the Swordfish disappeared into the night. After leaving President Quezon and his party on Negros Island in the Visayas, the Swordfish returned to patrol duty. It continued to assail Japanese ships until it was sunk off the coast of Formosa in January 1945. On December 29, 1941, the Japanese began systematically bombing Corregidor and its sister islands in Manila Bay. The ferocious bombing continued for eight consecutive days before bad weather grounded the Japanese planes for two days,


General Douglas MacArthur with the ailing president Manuel Quezon in Corregidor, 1942. (Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences [New York: Da Capo Press, 1964], 264f, via Filipinas Heritage Library Auth. 01–011905)

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The USS Swordfish (SS-193) conveyed President Manuel Quezon from Corregidor to the island of Negros. (Official U.S. Navy photograph, from the collections of the Naval Historical Center, NH 99586)



but when weather permitted, they quickly resumed the heavy bombing. While the dogged defenders of Bataan and Corregidor were disrupting General Homma’s fifty-day timetable, the Japanese bombers met no resistance from the remaining U.S. Air Force. The few remaining planes not destroyed in the assault by the Japanese on December 8 were dispersed to scattered airfields to the south and were ordered, if possible, to avoid combat for their own protection. American pilots flew numerous rescue missions and ferried in desperately needed supplies to the Philippine and American defenders. Corregidor’s antiaircraft defenses were presented with two problems. First, the antiaircraft batteries were located on the island, and that island was the target of the bombers. Because of their location on the target, they were unable to open fire until the bombers and the fighters were in position. The second problem was that the ammunition used by the American batteries was designed for lower-altitude defense and could not reach the high-flying bombers. The Japanese pilots soon understood that they could fly above Corregidor’s antiaircraft power. However, the American and Philippine gunners were able to put up a defense against low-level strafing by fighters until the island’s surrender.


Japanese Ki-21 twin-engine bombers poised to bomb Corregidor, foreground. In the background is the island of Caballo, its fourteen-inch guns impotent to defend against aerial attacks. (The Expeditionary Force to the Philippines, ed. Watari Shudan, Press Section, Japanese Government, 1943)

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Battery Way’s mortars still intact after withstanding repeated bombing sorties waged by Japanese pilots. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)




Situation map documents war developments until the surrender of Corregidor. (U.S. National Archives)

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The saturation bombings of late December and early January did little damage to the big guns or the emplacements on Corregidor, and the gun crews quickly repaired most of the damage. However, the buildings and other improvements on the surface of the island received extensive damage and were rendered useless. All of the houses and barracks were hit, and the electric train system was disabled. Wooden houses and any wooden portions of buildings burned, requiring the troops to dig in and go underground for shelter. They constructed an array of tunnels and makeshift air-raid shelters that proved very effective. By the end of January, the troops on the island were reduced to half-rations to conserve the dwindling supply of food. One of the most serious problems caused by the bombing was the destruction of the waterdistribution system. Corregidor and its sister islands had no independent source of fresh water, so the water shortages soon posed serious problems in the tropical heat. Particularly, the wounded in the hospital suffered because of the limited supply of water. General Homma began an all-out assault on the American forces defending Bataan on January 7, and by the end of the month, reports began to arrive on Corregidor that the Japanese were placing artillery on the heights of Cavite Province,


opposite Forts Drum and Frank. On February 5, the Japanese opened fire on Corregidor with 105 mm and 155 mm guns. Corrigidor’s weapons, sighted to defend against sea attack, could not direct fire against an attack from the rear. However, a few weapons could be brought to bear on the Cavite Heights. The twelve-inch mortars of Fort Frank, Fort Hughes, and Fort Mills joined the fourteen-inch turrets of Fort Drum to respond to the Japanese gunners. The American gunners had difficulty, however, in locating the Japanese targets because of the dense foliage and the bright sun that, throughout most of the day, was behind the Japanese positions. The Japanese ceased firing at night to prevent the Americans from sighting in on their positions. Another problem that confronted the Americans was the nature of the mortars’ ammunition. The most effective weapon against the Japanese was the twelve-inch mortar, but the ammunition was designed and fused for use against ships and was less effective against ground positions. For two months, the artillery duel continued. The biggest blow struck by the Japanese artillery was the destruction of Fort Frank’s freshwater pipeline from Calumpan on February 16. American engineers attempted to repair and restore the pipe without success, and Fort Frank’s garrison was forced to rely on its distillation plant, which could pro-

In February 1942, the Japanese began pounding Corregidor with large-caliber weapons from the high ground of Cavite. (The Expeditionary Force to the Philippines, ed. Watari Shudan, Press Section, Japanese Government, 1943)


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duce only a very limited supply of fresh water. By early March, the Japanese had managed to reinforce and fortify their existing artillery positions on Cavite. This enabled them to bring up the much larger 240 mm howitzers with the idea of pounding Fort Drum and Fort Frank into submission. Frank O. Hough, the official historian of the U.S. Marines in World War II, points out that the movement by the Japanese of artillery to positions opposite Forts Drum and Frank was in part to cover and protect the transfer of landing craft from Subic Bay to staging areas in preparation for an amphibious assault on Corregidor. Only a few of the Japanese landing craft at a time could be moved under cover of darkness. The Japanese also hoped to dupe the Americans on Corregidor into believing the first Japanese assault would be on Fort Drum or Fort Frank. Hough reports, however, that everyone on the Rock “expected an attack on Corregidor.” Their only questions were, when would the attack come, and how long could they hold out without resupply?10 When news reached Washington of Corregidor’s position, the American command decided that it could ill-afford to lose its high-profile commanding officer to the Japanese. President Roosevelt ordered General MacArthur to leave the Philippines


on the night of March 10. MacArthur, with his family, along with his staff, boarded four PT boats commanded by Lieutenant John D. Bulkeley, en route to Cagayan Island in the Sulu Sea. It took one day and two nights to make the run to the isolated island located between Palauan and the larger island of Mindanao. The boats, split up into different groups to avoid detection by the Japanese ships and airplanes, arrived about 7 A.M. on Friday, March 13, 1942. General MacArthur and his party took off from the landing strip of the small island bound for Australia. Upon his arrival in Australia, MacArthur issued his famous statement, “I shall return.”11 Lieutenant Bulkeley returned to visit Corregidor in August 1977; by that time, he was Rear Admiral Bulkeley, a decorated World War II hero, having received the Medal of Honor. On that visit, Bulkeley recalled that the evening General MacArthur boarded his boat, he looked “very tired and gaunt.” Bulkeley further recalled that “the general was also sad and told me that he had been ordered out by President Roosevelt.” After the passengers were on board and before the moon rose, Bulkeley and his small flotilla left Corregidor about 8 P.M. and began the dangerous passage through the minefield. PT-41, with the general on board, followed another


Lieutenant John D. Bulkeley, PT boat commander. (Courtesy of Captain Peter Bulkeley)

General Douglas MacArthur and staff aboard a patrol torpedo boat, PT-41, as they cross from the island of Negros to Iloilo in February 1942. (U.S. Army Collection, Washington, D.C. 1971, Filipinas Heritage Library Auth. 01–011905)

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boat through the minefield, as was the procedure. After passing through the minefield, Bulkeley’s boat took the lead with MacArthur standing, facing the bow. Admiral Bulkeley remembered in 1977 that after he had safely transported MacArthur and his party, he still had one major task. He returned to hostile territory to evacuate President Quezon and the members of the Philippine Commonwealth Government. When the final mission was accomplished, Lieutenant Bulkeley and his crew returned to harass Japanese shipping for a few weeks. But with his squadron reduced to two boats and without fuel or ammunition, he was ordered to beach his boats and destroy them. He and two other officers left the Philippines by air to Australia, leaving behind many of the brave sailors of his PT boat squadron.12 The population on Corregidor swelled to over 15,000 by early April 1942, with more men arriving every day. Life throughout the island fortress was driven underground. The U.S. Army command and officers of the Philippine government, along with most of the civilians, were housed in the Malinta Tunnels. An incredible array of individuals—Philippine and American government officials, officers, servicemen of all ranks, nurses, medical doctors, war correspondents,


and wounded soldiers—lived under siege and managed to survive. All of these groups were mixed together and shared the last days of resistance to the Japanese. They managed to hang on to some form of civilized society. There was a barbershop and a canteen with music that served as a recreational area underground. When the Americans showed no signs of surrendering Corregidor, General Homma planned an all-out assault against the fortress. What Homma did not appreciate was that the overcrowding was aggravating a severely damaged sanitation, water, and communications system. The forces on Corregidor were reduced to half-rations and very little water. The announcement came from the U.S. high command that supplies could last for only six to eight weeks at the most. General Homma had his problems, too, when an outbreak of malaria crippled his army and he needed additional time to bring landing craft from northern Luzon to Manila Bay. It was necessary for the landing craft to be transported part of the way overland, but most slipped past the guns by keeping close to the Cavite coastline. The Japanese believed Corregidor would prove formidable against any operation from the open sea and expected the island defenders to fight to the last man.

Japanese propaganda photos of American and Filipino forces on Corregidor having a meal while on a regimen of half-rations and ever-increasing water shortages. (The Expeditionary Force to the Philippines, ed. Watari Shudan, Press Section, Japanese Government, 1943)


Sleeping quarters within the Malinta Tunnel complex. (The Expeditionary Force to the Philippines, ed. Watari Shudan, Press Section, Japanese Government, 1943)

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In the meantime, the Japanese established heavy artillery emplacements above Mariveles and along the shore at Cabcaben. About eighteen batteries, consisting of 116 artillery pieces, were arranged on both sides of the channel and quickly began to shell the fortified islands. Most of Corregidor’s guns were still operational at this time. By April 12, most of the Japanese batteries were in place, and the bombardment of the islands began in earnest. “One night of shelling,” remarked one survivor, “did more damage than all the bombing put together.”13 The heavy artillery of the Japanese consisted of 240 mm, 150 mm, and 105 mm howitzers that continued to pound the reinforced concrete structures around the fixed batteries. The sheer volume began to chip away at the defensive structures. Finally, on April 24, Battery Crockett was put out of commission. Most of its guns suffered direct hits, and most of the supply sections were consumed by fire. Two 240 mm shells exploded near the entrance of the Malinta Tunnels, killing thirteen and wounding fifty. This devastating blow demonstrated the need to stay underground to avoid being exposed to danger from the Japanese shelling. The most effective American return fire came from the mortars, and the Japanese soon concentrated their firepower on batteries Geary and Way.


The remaining water filtration system and supply depots on the surface were destroyed; rations were cut down to a quarter per day and water was reduced to one canteen per person per day. The hopelessness of the situation was evident to every person on the island. Miraculously, morale remained high throughout the ranks during the month of April.14 Any hope that the defenders of Corregidor had of holding out against an all-out Japanese assault depended on the Philippine-American force holding Bataan. The security provided by the Malinta Tunnels and other heavily fortified bunker positions could not last long when cut off from avenues of resupply. The Philippine-American forces on Bataan were extremely concentrated. While this provided advantages for the defenders, it also provided opportunities for Japanese bombers and artillery to shell with devastating effect the concentrated troop areas. Steady bombardment from both air and land caused heavy casualties among the defenders with little respite from the harassment. !

!

!

Occasionally, a forty-eight-hour pass would be granted to selected personnel in order for them to go to Corregidor for some rest away from the constant bombardment.


Dr. John Baumgardner. (Courtesy of John Baumgardner, M.D.)

One survivor of Bataan and the subsequent prison camps, Dr. John Baumgardner, gives a personal account of his visit to Corregidor on a forty-eight-hour pass in January 1942. At that time, Captain Baumgardner was the attending physician at General Hospital Number 2 on Bataan, where he attended casualties twenty-four hours a day. There was little opportunity for sleep as the wounded spilled over into the jungle areas of the makeshift hospital because the tents were overflowing. Doctors and nurses worked steadily to relieve the suffering of their patients until they themselves became exhausted. Finally, Dr. Baumgardner and a colleague were given a forty-eighthour pass to Corregidor for some rest and recovery. On their arrival at the Malinta Tunnels, the two physicians were rewarded with a wonderful delicacy: Each was presented with one egg. They hastened to prepare their delicious meal of eggs and canned Spam, washed down with water they had brought from Bataan because the water on Corregidor was “not very tasty.” Unfortunately, before the two doctors could complete a leisurely meal, they were given operating gowns and sent to the hospital lateral in the Malinta Tunnels to attend to casualties. After working out their forty-eight-hour pass, they returned to Bataan, where Dr. Baumgardner resumed attending his patients until they were ordered to surrender to the Japa-

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Hospital within the laterals of the Malinta Tunnels. (The Expeditionary Force to the Philippines, ed. Watari Shudan, Press Section, Japanese Government, 1943)


A Japanese propaganda leaflet dropped on Corregidor. (USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)


nese. He faithfully attended his patients as best he could throughout the infamous Bataan Death March and during imprisonment at Cabanatuan and later in Hokkaido, Japan. He still remembers his delicious one egg, Spam, and water on Corregidor.15 After his release from the Japanese prison camp, Dr. Baumgardner returned to the United States, married his childhood sweetheart, and, after extended treatment in the hospital for tuberculosis, began to practice medicine in Greensboro, North Carolina. Until only recently Dr. Baumgardner maintained an active speaking schedule to tell the story of the brutality and horror suffered by the American POWs in the camps, in order to prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future. The Japanese forced the defenders of Bataan back toward the sea, and the perimeter grew smaller. Units were transferred with their equipment to Corregidor. On April 8, after a horrendous two weeks of saturation bombing of Bataan and Corregidor, orders were issued for withdrawal to Corregidor of the 2nd Battalion of the 60th Coast Artillery Anti-Aircraft. The 2nd Battalion, with its antiaircraft batteries, had been supporting the defensive efforts on Bataan, and it arrived on the evening of April 8, unfortunately without its irreplaceable equipment and ammunition. Parts of several other units ar-

rived on the island during the day and into the evening. Throughout the night of April 8, Corregidor’s guns—the ones that were still operational and could fire at the Japanese on Bataan—fired to support their comrades as they sought to escape the inevitable chaos of defeat. Major General Jonathan M. Wainwright tempered his fire for fear of inflicting additional casualities on American and Filipino personnel who had surrendered and were in concentrated staging areas close to Japanese positions. Nonetheless, Herbert Markland, a member of Battery Geary’s crew, said, “We fired until the Bataan line fell back to where we were masked by our own casement hill. This was well after midnight. Battery Smith fired longer than we did, but I guess they had a better field of fire for their shoot.”16 The following day, April 9, the remaining forces on Bataan surrendered. General Wainwright ordered all artillery fire directed at Bataan to halt for fear of hitting Americans in the process of moving along the roads of Bataan. Corregidor was now isolated and without hope. On May 1, the Japanese began to concentrate the bombardment on potential landing sites. The defenders now knew that the Japanese were preparing for an infantry assault. The entire north shore of Corregidor was systematically shelled, along

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with Malinta Mountain. About 10:30 A.M., a 240 mm shell hit battery Geary’s magazine, detonating the ammunition. It rocked the entire island and completely destroyed the huge ten-ton mortars. The explosion permanently disabled all eight mortars, thus nullifying the most effective long-range weapon against the Japanese. General Homma decided to begin the assault on the island with two waves. The first wave departed on the evening of May 5 and intended to land at Infantry Point, toward the center of the tail of the island. However, shifting currents and navigational problems caused by the darkness, before the moon came up, forced them farther south toward North Point and Kindley Field. The Japanese landed in a state of confusion and disorganization and met stiff resistance from the American defenders on the shore. The defenders managed to sink several of the landing boats and inflict heavy casualties on the attackers. The main units that confronted the Japanese at North Point were from the reconstructed 4th Marine Regiment. This unit now consisted of a variety of personnel from the navy, army, and headquarters command, who were all assigned to the Marines and even given unit identities. These units are specifi-



Major General Jonathan M. Wainwright in a prewar photograph. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)


Operational map of Corregidor. (The Expeditionary Force to the Philippines, ed. Watari Shudan, Press Section, Japanese Government,

General Homma’s troops hit Corregidor the evening of May 5, 1942. Thwarted at first by swift currents, the assault relocated farther south near Kindley Airfield. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)

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Corregidor forces surrender to the Japanese Army, May 6, 1942. (The Expeditionary Force to the Philippines, ed. Watari Shudan, Press Section, Japanese Government, 1943)



cally identified by military historian Hanson W. Baldwin. The reconstructed 4th Marines, now reorganized to include men from other units whose duties were no longer needed, would bear the brunt of the Japanese assault on Corregidor.17 As the second wave of attackers approached, a bright moon illuminated the boats and the Americans were able to open up with a devastating fire, using the fourteen-inch guns of Fort Drum and the remaining mortars of batteries Way and Craighill. Despite the appalling losses, the Japanese managed to land and establish a beachhead. By the early morning hours of May 6, they had taken the high ground around Kindley Field. The Americans fell back and established a strong line of defense just south of Infantry Point. From this strong defensive position, they launched several counterattacks at the Japanese, and the seesaw battle continued throughout the early morning hours of May 6. With the approaching daylight, the Japanese landed three small tanks to support their troops. About 10 A.M. on May 6, the Japanese tanks approached the entrance to the Malinta Tunnels, took up positions within a few hundred yards of the tunnel, and prepared to open fire. The tank could fire at point-blank range into the tunnel entrance. With no weapon to counter the tanks, and concerned

about the devastation they would cause in the crowded tunnel system, General Wainwright decided under the circumstances to surrender. He ordered his men to destroy their weapons and sent a message to the Japanese that he was ready to meet with their commander to talk terms. The Americans destroyed their remaining operational weapons and laid down their arms. Thus, the first of the fortified islands in Manila Bay surrendered, followed by Fort Frank and Fort Drum. It was a devastating defeat for the Americans and Filipinos. Many wept as they destroyed the weapons they had worked so hard to keep operational. Even though the situation was hopeless, they had fought valiantly and held out much longer than anyone had expected. In the immediate aftermath of the Philippine-American surrender, the Japanese were disorganized and the prisoners were moved around the island. The large number of prisoners surprised the Japanese. Accounts of the number of prisoners on Corregidor vary and range from 13,000 to 14,700. The official records indicate that 13,193 Americans and Filipinos surrendered to the Japanese. This number consisted of 4,492 U.S. Army, 1,028 Philippine Scouts, 1,742 Philippine Army, 1,715 U.S Navy and Marines, 400 Philippine Navy, and 2,302 civil-

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General Wainwright, commander of the U.S. forces in the Philippines, and Brigadier General Edward King, commander of the Luzon force, pose with three Japanese officers on board a landing barge after the surrender of the Filipino-American forces in Bataan and Corregidor, May 1942. (Japanese Propaganda Corps)

The “Beach Club” was crowded and conditions were deplorable. (The Expeditionary Force to the Philippines, ed. Watari Shudan, Press Section, Japanese Government, 1943)

This beach facing the South China Sea came to be called the “Beach Club” by American prisoners of war. The moniker has stuck until the present day. (Collis Davis Collection) 142 Corregidor in Peace and War


ian personnel. The total figure probably does not include the senior officers and some civilian personnel who were removed by the Japanese from the island in the first two days after the surrender.18 By May 8, most of the approximately twelve thousand military personnel still left on Corregidor were rounded up and placed behind barbed-wire enclosures that were hastily thrown together by the Japanese on Bottomside. On May 10, most of the prisoners were moved around Malinta Mountain to the southeast side of the island. They were confined to an area extending approximately one hundred yards inland from the water’s edge and about two hundred yards along the beach, an area the prisoners came to call the “Beach Club.” Most of the prisoners had brought all of the rations they could carry with them and managed fairly well despite the refusal of the Japanese to provide any food during their fourteen-day stay at this compound. The major problem, however, was the lack of fresh water. Each day, the Japanese guards allowed 200–250 prisoners to take their canteens and any tin cans they could carry to the entrance of the Malinta Tunnels, where running water was still available. It was impossible for these meager water supplies to sustain the needs of such a large number of prisoners, and dehydration became a significant


concern within the compound. The tropical sun beat down on prisoners, who were provided with little or no shelter during the day. On May 24, the prisoners were ordered to board two transport ships to carry them across the bay to Manila. General Wainwright and his senior staff were moved from the island the day after the official surrender papers were signed and wound up confined to the University Club on Dewey Boulevard. It was from the windows of the University Club that General Wainwright watched his pathetic, emaciated, and defeated army marched off Japanese transport ships onto docks at Manila Bay and through the streets to Bilibid prison. The Americans called this humiliation of the prisoners “the gloat march.”19 This was the last time General Wainwright saw Corregidor Island. After a brief internment at Bilibid Prison, most of the Americans and Filipino Scouts marched to the train station and were packed into boxcars to be transported north to prison camps at Camp O’Donnell and Cabanatuan. The prisoners who survived the deplorable, crowded, and unsanitary conditions aboard the trains were removed to the small station at Capas, Tarlac. From there they were marched to Camp O’Donnell, where most of the Philippine Scouts remained


A recovered Japanese flag inscribed with names of the owner’s friends and relatives. Such flags were common souvenirs among Japanese servicemen leaving for the front and were kept as good luck tokens. (U.S. Army file)

confined. Most of the Americans were marched overland from Camp O’Donnell to Cabanatuan. There they joined the survivors of the infamous Bataan death march. The Japanese were not prepared for such a large number of prisoners and provided little food or water and almost no medicine for the already weakened prisoners. Although the march from Camp O’Donnell was a shorter distance than the long march up the Bataan Peninsula, many of the wounded, sick, and weakened prisoners died. Both groups of American prisoners soon realized that their Japanese captors demanded “march or die” and brutally treated those prisoners who were unable to keep up. The Japanese established a permanent camp on Corregidor with one reinforced company of roughly three hundred soldiers. About five hundred American prisoners were kept on the island to help the Japanese reconstruct and restore its defenses. Many of the men who stayed behind were technicians familiar with the operation of the infrastructure and ordnance on the island. They restored the power and repaired the pumping equipment, but most of them were assigned to clean up debris and to build living quarters for their captors. Shortly after the technicians finished their work of repairing the equipment that was salvageable, they were assigned to collect scrap metal from around the island and to haul them to

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the docks for shipment to Japan. Most of the prisoners left on Corregidor remained there until just before the return of the Americans in 1945, when they were transported to Japan. The number of Japanese casualties sustained in the defeat of the Philippine-American troops on Bataan and Corregidor remains unclear. Military historians also question the strategic value of Bataan and Corregidor to the overall Japanese objectives in the war in the Pacific. There is no question that the Japanese needed to control the Philippines for a number of reasons. First, the Philippines provided an advance base for their foray into the Dutch East Indies and the subsequent protection of its oil and rubber resources. Another compelling reason was to provide naval and air bases to protect sea-lanes to and from the home islands. Finally, the Japanese needed to strike a final blow that would destroy the American will to fight in the Pacific. A quick and decisive victory for the Japanese, it was believed, in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor could effectively end American resistance. The tactics used by the Japanese to achieve the occupation and control of the Philippines elicited different opinions within General Homma’s staff. General Masami Maeda, Homma’s chief of staff, suggested in January 1942 that the defense forces on Bataan and Corregidor be surrounded and left to perish from 146 Corregidor in Peace and War


The Stars and Stripes is lowered by victorious Japanese soldiers, May 6, 1942. (The Expeditionary Force to the Philippines, ed. Watari Shudan, Press Section, Japanese Government, 1943)


Japanese troops claim victory at Battery Hearn. The gun as it appears today is shown on page 78. (The Expeditionary Force to the Philippines, ed. Watari Shudan, Press Section, Japanese Government, 1943)

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exposure and starvation. He believed that the troops required to capture Bataan and reduce the fortress Corregidor could best be utilized to take control of the rest of the Philippine Islands. General Homma brushed aside Maeda’s recommendations and pointed out that a true samurai did not avoid confrontation and abandon an enemy to the elements. The humiliation of such an act was beyond Homma’s imagination. Another situation that has raised questions and debate by military historians studying the Japanese campaign occurred in the early morning hours of May 6, 1942. General Homma, from his command headquarters, even as General Wainwright was attempting to surrender, was preparing another attack on Corregidor to support the troops already engaged. The problem was that sixty-one Japanese boats had been sunk or dam-


aged and put out of commission in the first assault. The Japanese had only twenty-one boats still in operation, and Homma made the decision to call off the attack scheduled for the evening of May 6. While considering his next move, news arrived that the white flag of truce was flying over the Rock. At first, Homma could not believe the report, particularly in the light of his high casualties. He had expected the defenders on Corregidor to fight to the death. The Japanese perceived the Americans as a strange mixture of brave and determined fighting men who for some reason refused to fight to the death. To what extent these opinions and the Japanese warrior mentality affected the treatment of American and Filipino prisoners remains debatable. The Japanese treated their prisoners of war with brutal disdain.20


The Return

5

F

R O M E A R LY 1 9 4 2 into the spring of 1945, the Japanese occupied the Philippines. Most of the Japanese troops stationed in the islands were from the 14th Army, commanded by General Tomoyuki Yamashita. However, the responsibility for garrisoning and defending Corregidor was assigned primarily to the Japanese Navy and Marines. By the time the Americans returned to the Philippines in January 1945, the naval forces defending Manila and Corregidor were under the command of Admiral Sanji Iwabuchi. The admiral planned to defend the city of Manila and was relying heavily on the fortified islands in the bay. Even though American prisoners had cleaned up the islands and restored most of the vital services, the Japanese were able to repair only a few of the American weapons. The Imperial Japanese Naval Command sent additional artillery and antiaircraft guns to Corregidor and stationed about 5,000 men on the island. In addition to this substantial force, Carabao Island had 370 men, while Caballo Island had 400. Mighty Fort Drum received a complement of 65 naval gunners. As the American forces moved ever closer to the Philippines and an assault appeared imminent, the Japanese began storing provisions and ammunition on Corregidor. However, most of the

Soldiers of the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment, behind enemy lines on the island of Mindoro, plan their drops onto Corregidor. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)

ammunition was for smaller weapons, and little ammunition would be available for the heavier artillery pieces.1 General Yamashita’s battle plan called for a strategic withdrawal of his army from the areas around Manila into the mountainous areas of northern Luzon. There, he expected to capitalize on the rugged terrain to assist in a final stand. The Japanese tactic that had become evident by 1945 was to fight to the death of the last man. The Americans had every expectation that the Japanese, both army and navy, remained committed to sacrifice themselves for the honor and defense of the emperor. However, the Americans developed effective tactics in their campaign to take back many of the islands in the Pacific. The Americans relied on satchel charges and flamethrowers to either kill the defenders or force them out into the open. Although the cost in American casualties was high, nevertheless it proved effective. On January 9, 1945, elements of the American 6th Army, under the command of General Walter Krueger, landed and established a beachhead at Lingayen Bay. Krueger’s troops reached the outskirts of Manila by the end of January. At first it appeared that the Americans would meet early success in taking back the city, but the Japanese began to dig in around

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Corregidor is bombarded prior to the planned 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment deployment and sea-based assault. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)


General Douglas MacArthur, center, flanked on the left by Philippine president Sergio Osmeña, come ashore in Leyte, upholding his promise to the Philippines, “I shall return.” (U.S. Library of Congress)

First Sergeant Albert Baldwin (with cigar) and soldiers of the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment en route to Corregidor in a C-47 aircraft. Moments after this photograph was made, this aircraft was hit by Japanese gunfire and ditched into the sea. These soldiers arrived at Corregidor the next day to join the action. (American Historical Collection, Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines)


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Malate and Ermita in south Manila. The fighting was bitter. It took the Americans well into March to take the city. Manila was ravaged from aerial bombings and artillery fire by the Americans. Moreover, the murderous pillaging and rampaging by Japanese troops further contributed to the destruction of the city and its population. The Japanese murdered more than eighty thousand Filipinos during three weeks in February. Most were killed in the streets of the city. The Japanese were true to their commitment and those assigned to defend the city made a suicidal stand.2 While the battle raged for the control of Manila, the U.S. Army planned to take the fortified islands in the bay. Questions about the strategic value of the islands were raised by members of General MacArthur’s staff. Manila was effectively in American hands, and the main body of Yamashita’s troops was withdrawing to the north, consistent with his original strategy. However, for MacArthur, there was never a question that Corregidor must be assaulted and retaken. The Americans needed easy access to and from the bay of Manila for resupply. It was also a matter of American pride. Certainly, MacArthur remembered his promise to return to the islands and to Corregidor, in particular. For different reasons, the Americans made the same decisions the Japanese had made in 1942 to


attack Corregidor rather than isolate and bypass the fortress island. The American assault on Corregidor consisted of two attacks. One was a parachute drop and the second, an amphibious landing. The 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment was assigned the responsibility of dropping onto the only flat spot large enough for them to land, at Topside. The drop zone was essentially the old parade ground and the surrounding area that, before the war, consisted of the movie theater, post exchange, officers’ quarters, and other facilities. The amphibious landing was to be carried out by a reinforced battalion of the 34th Infantry Regiment stationed at Mariveles. They would take a circuitous route around the west end of Corregidor in their twenty-five landing craft. They landed on South Beach about 10:30 A.M. on February 16, 1945, in the area that was known as San José, previously occupied by Philippine Scouts and their families. The first elements of the American paratroopers had arrived from Mindoro early in the morning expecting to surprise a Japanese garrison of only eight hundred men. Their objective was to secure the parade ground for the second wave of paratroopers to drop. Their early estimates appeared to be correct, and the first paratroopers met only light resistance, primarily


Action patch awarded to members of the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment.

from small weapons and some machine-gun fire. However, only a few of the thousands of Japanese were in position to resist their landing. American intelligence grossly underestimated the number of Japanese on the island, yet by 10 A.M. the parade ground and the area surrounding it was secure and ready for the second wave of American paratroopers. The ob-

jective of the paratroopers was to hold the high ground at Topside and provide supporting fire for the amphibious landing. Unfortunately for the attackers, many of the paratroopers in the second wave missed the drop zone and landed in trees or on other obstacles and sustained numerous injuries. The American amphibious landing consisted of five assault waves. The first four landed with surprisingly little resistance, but the fifth was hit with murderous machine-gun fire from the Japanese positions. As the American vehicles landed and moved ashore, they found themselves in the midst of a minefield. A number of vehicles were severely damaged or destroyed, and progress slowed accordingly. Despite these obstacles and the fierce resistance, the 34th Infantry moved ahead and secured the top of Malinta Mountain by 11 A.M. The Americans did achieve one of their goals with the parachute drop when they surprised the Japanese. However, their gross underestimate of the number of actual defenders proved costly.3 Although the Japanese had many more than eight hundred fighting men on the island, the Americans killed many of the Japanese early during the first parachute drop. The Japanese found themselves leaderless when their navy garrison commander on Corregidor, Captain Itagaki, was killed in the very

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In an unusual view, a C-47 drops paratroops onto the golf course below. (American Historical Collection, Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines)


U.S. amphibious assault on Corregidor commences early on February 16, 1945. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)



The Parade Ground on Topside, adjacent to the devastated remains of the Mile-Long Barracks and the hospital (middle left side), is strewn with discarded parachutes of the 503rd soldiers. Other structures that ring the Parade Ground include the movie theater, the Fort Mills Headquarters, and the officer residences. Smoke billows from action on Malinta Mountain in the background. (American Historical Collection, Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines)

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early fighting. In a bizarre incident, the kind that often occurs in the fog of battle, about twenty-five American paratroopers were blown by a thirty-five mile-per-hour wind from their intended landing zone. They landed on top of a Japanese observation bunker and a firefight immediately ensued. Itagaki had been called to a bunker to observe the beach landing. Both the Japanese and the American paratroopers were completely surprised, but the Americans soon took the position, killing Itagaki. This was a twofold blow to the Japanese because the loss of their commander not only left them leaderless, but shattered their morale as well.4 When the second wave of paratroopers dropped, at about 12:40 P.M., they quickly pushed from Topside toward the base of Malinta Mountain. They soon discovered that the Japanese had strong defenses to the west and south of their drop zones. Because of these strongholds, the commanders of the paratroops on the ground sent word that additional drops would be too costly and recommended that reinforcements be brought ashore by landing craft. The “Rock Force,” as the unit was code named, was commanded by Colonel George M. Jones of the 503rd. They quickly began to systematically destroy Japanese positions— first, by softening up each position with air and naval bom-


bardment, and finishing with a small-unit infantry attack. Small pieces of artillery, hand grenades, and flamethrowers were used in close support. From time to time, the Japanese launched counterattacks; often these were reckless and uncoordinated frontal assaults called “banzai charges.” These oftensuicidal charges did little damage to the Americans, but they decimated the ranks of the Japanese. The western half of the island was completely secured by February 23. Once the Americans controlled the larger end of the island, they turned their attention to Malinta Mountain. Because they had secured the top of the hill in the initial landings, the Americans coordinated their efforts to clear out Bottomside and Middleside, linking up with the paratroopers on Topside over the next few days. Once the linkup was accomplished, they could establish positions to watch the entrances of the Malinta Tunnels. They built strong firing positions aimed at the tunnel entrance. On the night of February 21, shortly after dark, a tremendous explosion rocked the island as the Japanese detonated a stockpile of ammunition inside the tunnel. Throughout the next two nights, the Rock shook with a series of explosions that killed most of the Japanese inside the tunnel. The most ferocious fighting occurred during the effort to clear the remaining area east of Malinta Mountain. Several

The 503rd paratroops landing on the golf course, precariously close to the cliffs of the western side of Topside. (American Historical Collection, Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines)


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firefights occurred between February 21 and 26. Japanese resistance ended only when the Japanese exploded another stockpile of ammunition in an underground arsenal on Monkey Point, along the high bluff on the eastern side of the island, just as the Americans were overrunning their position. Both sides suffered heavy casualties. The Japanese fought tenaciously and refused to surrender. The official record placed 5,670 Japanese soldiers and marines on Corregidor. Of that number, only thirty-five surrendered. The rest were killed or committed suicide.5


Private John Banks firing his Browning automatic rifle at a Japanese position. (American Historical Collection, Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines)

On March 2, the island was declared secure, and General MacArthur returned to Corregidor. A flag-raising ceremony was scheduled for Topside at the old garrison flagpole on the parade ground. Miraculously, the flagpole had survived the intense bombardment and fighting. Colonel Jones stepped forward, saluted MacArthur, and reported, “Sir, I present to you the fortress of Corregidor.” MacArthur was moved by Colonel Jones’s pointed but powerful words, and he proceeded to announce to Jones and his assembled men his intentions to decorate Colonel Jones and the unit.6


On March 2, 1945, Corregidor was declared secure, and General Douglas MacArthur returned to the island for a flag raising and awards ceremony. The general noted that “the old flagpole still stands,” referring to the flagpole recovered from the Spaniards’ Reina-Cristina in 1898. See page 34 for a present-day view of the flagpole. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)

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As the flag was raised, General MacArthur saluted and said, “The capture of Corregidor is one of the most brilliant operations in military history. Outnumbered two-to-one, our command, by its unfaltering courage, its invincible determination and its professional skill, overcame all obstacles and annihilated the enemy. I have cited to the order of the day all units involved, and I take great pride in awarding you as their commander, the Distinguished Service Cross as a symbol of the fortitude, the devotion and the bravery with which you have fought. I see the old flagpole still stands. Have your troops hoist the colors to its peak and let no enemy ever haul them down.”7 All that remained for the Americans to accomplish was the retaking of Caballo Island, Carabao Island, and Fort Drum. The sea routes through the bay to Manila had been safe since the very first assault on Corregidor. The Japanese remaining on the three fortified islands had no effective artillery or heavy weapons, but they did harass vessels that came too close with machine-gun and small-arms fire. After a reconnaissance on March 19, the Americans decided to attack the Japanese defensive position on Caballo Island. A small assault team was ordered on March 27 to take the Japanese position located on the highest ground on the small island. Units of the second


battalion of the 101st Infantry Regiment came ashore after the Japanese position had been bombed and shelled by both air and naval forces. The Americans met little resistance. The next target for the Americans was El Fraile Island, now Fort Drum. The Americans soon found out that point-blank naval barrages and air bombardment did little more damage in 1945 to the concrete and steel fortress than the Japanese bombardment had in 1942. Fort Drum was only accessible through its “sally port” entrances, hatches that could be closed and secured during an attack. The Americans decided to place troops on the top of the fortification so they could pour fuel and demolition charges down through the ventilator shafts. Army engineers rigged a drawbridge ramp on the conning tower of a landing craft, and on the morning of April 13, a company of the 151st Infantry dashed onto the top of Fort Drum. While the infantry covered the openings to prevent the Japanese from escaping, the engineers pumped some three thousand gallons of high-octane fuel into open vents; then, a demolition charge with a thirty-minute delay fuse was lowered into the shaft. The men then raced back onto the waiting boat and moved a good distance away. The initial explosions occurred at about 10:30 A.M., but apparently they did not complete the job. While the Americans were preparing to re-


General Douglas MacArthur stands in the rubble of his first home in Corregidor with a group of officers who include those who left the island with him in February 1942. Left to right: Brigadier General Legrande A. Diller, Major General Charles A. Willoughby, Major General Spencer B. Akin, Lieutenant General Richard K. Sutherland, General MacArthur, Major General Richard J. Marshall, Major General Hugh J. Casey, Colonel Sydney L. Huff, Major General William F. Marquat, and Lieutenant Colonel Joseph R. McMicking, March 2, 1945. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)

Colonel George M. Jones was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross as commander of the 503rd Parachute Infantry Regiment. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)

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Soldiers secure the “deck” of Fort Drum so that others could pour high-octane gasoline into the interior and set explosives to destroy holdout Japanese soldiers who refused to surrender. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)


U.S. soldiers use a makeshift gangplank to board Fort Drum. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)

Soldiers prepare satchel charges to ignite three thousand gallons of fuel that had been poured into the lower levels of Fort Drum where sixty-nine Japanese soldiers were still hiding. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)


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A thirty-minute timer set off the charges and gasoline once U.S. soldiers vacated Fort Drum. The bodies of the Japanese holdouts were found when G.I.s inspected the premises after the detonation. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)



peat the procedure, great clouds of smoke and flame erupted from the fortress, caused when the fires ignited the powder in the battery’s magazine. Much of the old ordnance left by the Americans was still in storage. The explosion sent steel and concrete debris flying into the bay, and the smoke cloud lifted high into the sky. Smoke and flames poured from the vents, gun ports, and sally port entrances. Fires and smaller explosions continued until well into the afternoon. Fort Drum burned for two days, preventing any reconnaissance or assessment of the damage until April 18. That afternoon, American troops returned to Fort Drum and counted sixty-nine dead bodies. Many of the Japanese soldiers were found stuck to the

walls by the intense heat. One American soldier said that “the Japanese were like wall paper on the walls.”8 Finally, the Americans scheduled an assault of Carabao Island after a heavy bombardment. Elements of the 154th Infantry landed on April 16 and discovered no opposition. The Americans had expected a fight, particularly from the Fort Frank emplacements and tunnels. They discovered the Japanese garrison had abandoned the island, and a thorough search of the tunnels and other fortifications produced only one living inhabitant: a badly shaken and emaciated pig. The Americans now possessed all of the fortified islands of Manila Bay.9

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6

Shrine of Peace

A northwest view of the Corregidor War Memorial grounds on Topside. The U.S. Bataan-Corregidor Memorial Commission created in 1953 received funding in 1962, and the American memorial was completed in 1968. (Collis Davis Collection)

I

N 1 9 4 6 , T H E U N I T E D S TA T E S granted the Philippines its independence, and the Republic of the Philippines was officially established on October 17, 1947. Shortly thereafter, the Philippine government declared Corregidor Island a national war shrine. Unfortunately, for many years, the fortified islands of Manila Bay were neglected and ravaged by scrap-iron looters. Many Filipino fishermen subsidized their meager incomes by removing the iron and steel from the old fortifications and selling it to dealers in Manila. In some cases, these scavengers used acetylene torches to cut the barrels of the guns and their steel carriages into smaller pieces for easy transport. On occasion, dynamite was used to blast the concrete fortifications into rubble, exposing the steel supports of the frame so they could be more easily cut off, the steel salvaged and transported for sale in Manila. The jungle also took its toll, and many of the old fortifications and bunker installations were soon overgrown with vines and other vegetation. Many of the roads were made impassable from debris caused by heavy rains and downed trees. Gradually the pavement eroded, and most of the remaining structures collapsed. In 1953, the U.S. Bataan-Corregidor Memorial Commission was formed to build a war memorial on Corregidor. The com-


mission received funding in 1962, and the American memorial was completed in 1968. The memorial expanded over the years to include markers and other memorials to the Filipinos who fought and died in defense of Bataan and Corregidor. Today, flags of the Republic of the Philippines and the United States surround the war memorial. The Philippine government, in an effort to preserve Corregidor’s historic sites and protect them from complete destruction, formed the Corregidor Foundation, Inc., in 1989. This foundation is responsible for the management of the island and the promotion of tourism. It has built resorts and expanded a number of tourist attractions for visitors to Corregidor. The island now has both a Philippine and a Japanese war memorial, and most of the people who visit the island are from those countries whose relatives and fellow countrymen served and died in the battles for the island. The foundation rebuilt parts of the island’s road system, restored its airfield, and continues to keep large areas free from jungle growth. A new Corregidor Inn operates on the island to provide facilities for overnight guests. The dock has been modernized, and a commercial ferry brings visitors from Manila to the island daily.1 The Corregidor Foundation is very careful to respect the hallowed ground that saw so much bloodshed, and it has

Following the war, Corregidor was abandoned to the metal scrappers who managed to dismantle parts of many batteries with welding torches. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)


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Captain Samuel G. Kelly, executive director of the U.S. CorregidorBataan Memorial Commission, discusses the proposed $1.5 million memorial. From left are Dr. Eufronio Alip, deputy chair of the Philippine National Shrine Commission; Lawrence Halprin, a wellknown landscape architect; and Perry B. Johanson, an architectural engineer, October 14, 1964. (American Historical Collection, Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines)

The official flag-raising ceremony marking the establishment of the Republic of the Philippines, October 17, 1947. (Photo Collection, USAMHI, Carlisle, Pa.)



South Beach as it appeared in 2003. See page 94 for a 1930s view. (Collis Davis Collection)

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The Corregidor Inn offers dining and sleeping accommodations for today’s visitors. (Collis Davis Collection)


cooperated with various veterans’ and nongovernmental organizations to establish and maintain appropriate memorials and shrines. The most recent of these to be completed is the Japanese Garden of Peace, which was dedicated on May 29, 1992. The Garden of Peace is located on the site of the original Japanese Cemetery. Shortly after the U.S. surrender on Corregidor in the first week of May 1942, the Japanese had created a military cemetery. For the most part, the Americans ignored the cemetery when they returned to the island. In fact, after securing Corregidor, they abandoned the island on May 16, 1945, and moved to Negros Island in preparation for further actions against the Japanese. During March and April 1987, a Japanese veterans’ organization supported by the Japanese government, in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Defense and the Philippine Veterans Administration, exhumed the remains of some of the Japanese soldiers buried in the long-neglected cemetery. The exhumed remains were returned to Japan for a formal memorial ceremony. Only certain bones of each body, such as parts of the spine and the kneecap, were returned to Japan, and the remains were reinterred. Shortly after the process was

With its Buddhist and Christian motifs, the Goddess of Peace in Corregidor’s Japanese Garden represents the reconciliation that exists today between the nations involved in the Pacific War. (Collis Davis Collection)


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The Pacific War Museum maintains a permanent exhibition of photographs, weapons, memorabilia, and domestic artifacts. (Collis Davis Collection)


completed, the Japanese Southern Pacific Memorial Association, Inc., decided to build the garden and shrine of peace on the exact site of the military cemetery. The same Japanese organization has built similar memorials on Saipan and in other places in the South Pacific to honor the Japanese soldiers who fought in the Pacific War. The Corregidor Museum also has a number of specific items associated with the Japanese presence on Corregidor from 1942 until 1945 that especially interests Japanese visitors. The Goddess of Peace at the Japanese garden was dedicated in May 1992. It combines both Buddhist and Christian symbols and was selected in deference to the Philippines and its Christian population. The Madonna image is patterned after the Virgin Mary that was introduced into Japanese culture by Christians during the feudal era when Christianity was outlawed. Japanese Christians accepted the image of the Buddha holding the Christ Child into their underground religion, and eventually, the image became part of the larger Japanese religious symbolism. At the dedication, the Japanese expressed regret for their part in the devastation of the Philippines earlier in the century. The Goddess of Peace, with its Christian connotation, represents the reconciliation that exists today between the nations involved in the Pacific War.2


Insignia of the USS Trout.

Another special attraction for Japanese visitors is the symbol of victory at Battery Hearn. It was here that a Japanese photographer took pictures of Japanese soldiers raising their arms and waving the Japanese flag on May 6, 1942. This photograph captured the symbolic banzai victory celebration that followed the capture of the island fortress. For the Japanese, this celebration was a high point in the Japanese occupation of the Philippines.

Corregidor continues to be shrouded in myth, legend, and rumor. One modern rumor involves the mysterious disappearance of the gold and silver coin reserves of the Philippine Commonwealth. When President Quezon transferred his government to Corregidor in the desperate days of January 1942, the Philippine treasury was loaded on board two submarines and transferred to Corregidor. As the Japanese pressed ever closer, the order was given to remove all the gold and as many silver pesos as possible for transport to a more secure location. Over three million dollars’ worth of gold and $360,000 in silver pesos were loaded into the ballast tanks of the USS Trout. The submarine slipped out under cover of darkness with its valuable cargo. Other submarines that had managed to run past the enemy were ordered to take on a more valuable cargo of people, instead of the remaining silver. Over seventeen million dollars in silver coins remained sealed in the vaults of Corregidor awaiting another hiding place. In the last days before the Americans surrendered the island fortress, the order went out for the wooden crates containing the silver to be dumped into Caballo Bay, between the tail of Corregidor and Caballo Island. A work party of divers and support personnel was formed to “deep six” the silver in over 120 feet of water. The divers spread out the crates in the

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The USS Trout removed almost $3.3 million in gold bullion and silver coins from the Philippines Treasury in January 1942. Like the USS Swordfish, the Trout disappeared two years later on its sixth mission. (Official U.S. Navy Photograph, from the collections of the Naval Historical Center, NH 99586)


American soldiers dump Philippine silver coins into a waiting military truck after their retrieval from Manila Bay in 1945. General Wainwright ordered the sinking of highly negotiable silver worth $17,000,000 at a point between Corregidor and Fort Hughes before the fall of the “Rock” three years earlier. (Filipinas Heritage Library Auth. 01-011905)



The USS Trout’s second mission was most unusual. She delivered ammunition from Pearl Harbor to Corregidor in January 1942. To compensate for the weight of ammunition delivered, she brought back as ballast twenty tons of gold, silver coins, and securities in March 1942 (shown being unloaded from the Trout in Pearl Harbor), from whence it was taken to Washington, D.C., for safekeeping. (U.S. Naval Historical Center, 80-G-45971)

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bottom of the bay so that recovery attempts would be more difficult. Lieutenant Commander George C. Harrison, of the submarine rescue ship Pigeon, was put in charge of the project. On May 4, 1942, just two days before the surrender, Harrison ordered the Pigeon scuttled. He and his crew of divers surrendered. The divers hoped to keep their silver dumping a secret. The chief diver, Virgil “Jughead” Sauers, and his fellow divers were sent to Cabanatuan with most of the Americans captured by the Japanese. By November 1942, the Japanese recruited Sauers and the other divers ostensibly to clear Manila Bay of wreckage and other debris. The real reason was to recover the silver. The Americans managed to delay and limit the recovery, but in order to survive under the Japanese, they recovered a substantial number of coins. Several months later, after bringing in more American divers, the Japanese decided to abandon the effort. As a result, much of the silver remained buried in the waters of Caballo Bay. Today, when a large tropical storm passes over Corregidor, beachcombers find silver pesos washed up on the beach. Most of the silver located by the Japanese was recovered and returned to the Philippine Treasury when the Americans returned in 1945.3 Another historical question surrounds the so-called Suicide


Cliffs, a solemn site often visited by Japanese coming to Corregidor. According to legend, about three hundred Japanese soldiers—rather than surrender to the U.S. troops—leaped to their deaths from the sheer cliffs just a few yards from Wheeler Point. This long-accepted explanation of how the remains of these Japanese soldiers came to rest on the rugged terrain below the cliff is contradicted by personal accounts of American soldiers who participated in a vicious firefight on the evening of February 18–19, 1945. The American soldiers of Company D had dug and fortified positions along Wheeler Point. Machine guns were quickly put in position during the late afternoon of February 18. After dark, approximately three hundred Japanese marines charged the American positions in an all-out assault that threatened to overrun the Americans. A vicious fight ensued, and the Americans cut down huge numbers of Japanese with a deadly machine-gun crossfire. As the moon came up, it illuminated a horrific scene of carnage and death. Hundreds of Japanese bodies were strewn in front of the American position; the Japanese soldiers who were still alive staggered forward from time to time toward the Americans, only to be cut down. At daybreak on February 19, a small group of U.S. soldiers of Company D had survived the battle. These men were ordered to dispose of the Japanese

The Suicide Cliffs of Wheeler Point, located directly above the leftmost rocky formation that intrudes into the water, was the scene of numerous Japanese deaths in the closing moments of the U.S. siege of Corregidor. (U.S. National Archives)


Shrine of Peace 181

bodies. According to one account, “There was no way the Company, probably less than 70 able-bodied men, could have shoveled in the hard ground to bury the corpses.” Instead, according to John Lindgren of Company D, 503rd PRCT, “we simply carried the dead Japanese marines and dropped them over the cliff, ten meters south of Wheeler Point.” If this account is correct, it provides an alternative explanation for the location of over three hundred bodies below the cliff.4 Another member of Company D, 503rd PRCT, Tony Sierra, corroborates Lindgren’s explanation for the “Suicide Cliffs” story: “I was one of the most active of troopers in the so-called two platoons who were assigned to heave the bodies of the killed Japanese soldiers early on the morning after February 19th. I never saw a single Japanese ‘leap’ over the cliff or any sign that any had done so during the night attack. Any of them that ended up on the beach either fell during the attack (which is pure speculation) or were thrown over after they were killed.” Sierra continues, “One of us would grab the feet and another, the arms, and swing them over as far as we could. I believe this was done to reduce the smell of decaying bodies in that tropical setting, if that was ever possible. We were so desperate to get this chore over with that I can’t even


recall any of us worrying in the least with searching their bodies for souvenirs or even military information.”5 A combination of both the traditional and the eyewitness accounts of the situation could explain the bodies. Lindgren and Sierra are consistent with their testimony and remain convinced that there were no suicides. However, according to a third witness, Robert J. Flynn, a number of the Japanese were still alive when he arrived at the bottom of the cliff to inspect the carnage. He says, “I examined the general appearance of some of the bodies and noted that some were wearing clean, white socks and were not armed; nor were they wearing any ammo belts. They were, for a combat operation, rather clean, almost as if they had participated in a ceremonial activity of washing and preparing to die.”6 Based on these eyewitness accounts and the long tradition surrounding the Suicide Cliffs, it is reasonable to believe that the Japanese corpses found at the bottom of the cliff resulted from both suicide and combat casualties. It appears that, rather than suffer the disgrace of being taken prisoner by the enemy, the Japanese marines died in a suicidal frontal assault or jumped to their deaths. In either case, it was an honorable death for a Japanese warrior. In 1987, the Corregidor Foundation contracted with the firm of Francisco Mañosa and Partners to design and plan a


development program for Corregidor. The plan called for the island to be divided into two zones: a memorial zone and a tourist zone. The memorial zone consists primarily of areas on Topside and Bottomside where most of the historic ruins are located. The Pacific War Memorial is also located in this zone. To protect the integrity of this area, the foundation has restricted modifications to the area and prohibits any new construction. Workers in this area are committed to maintaining the integrity and solemnity of the site. The tourist zone is located partly on Bottomside, around the entrance to the Malinta Tunnels. The tunnels themselves have undergone major restoration: many of the laterals have been reinforced and most of the debris has been cleared. Tourists can take a guided tour of the tunnel that includes a light and sound presentation. Corregidor Island is one of the most-visited places in the Philippines. Visitors want to see the island that, over the years, has received so much attention. It is a place where men of three nations made the ultimate sacrifice for what they believed was right and just. Today, the island provides an opportunity for people to honor the past and to reflect on the costs of war and the benefits of peace.

Lieutenant Colonel Artemio Matibag, executive director of the Corregidor Foundation, shares a moment in 2004 with Leslie Ann Murray, executive director of the Filipino American Memorial Endowment (FAME). (Collis Davis Collection) Shrine of Peace 183


Foreign and Filipino tourists seen on a full-day tour at the Pacific War Memorial, Topside, one of many sites visited on Corregidor. (Collis Davis Collection)

The Philippine War Memorial on the south side of Corregidor Island commemorates Filipino soldiers: “Dedicated to the Filipino who knows how to die for love of freedom and liberty.” (Collis Davis Collection)



Corregidor’s lighthouse as it appeared in 2003, serving as a functioning maritime beacon as well as a hopeful symbol of humanity’s enlightenment in the aftermath of war. (Collis Davis Collection)

Shrine of Peace 185

Notes 1. An Island of Myths, Legends, and Faraway Places 1. Alphonso Aluit, Corregidor (Manila: Galleon Publications, 1998), 3–4. 2. Terrance McGovern and Mark Berhow, American Defenses of Corregidor in Manila Bay, 1898–1945 (Oxford, U.K.: Osprey, 2003), 6. 3. Robert Seager, Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Man and His Letter (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute, 1977), 168. 4. Emmanuel Raymond Lewis, Seacoast Fortifications of the United States: An Introductory History (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute, 1970), 44–46. 5. Ibid., 51–53. 6. Cablegram, April 20, 1898, National Archives, Papers of Secretary of the Navy, John Long, Washington, D.C. 7. New York Times, February 24, 1922, 1. 8. Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines (New York: Ballantine Books, 1989), 103. 9. Ibid., 115. 10. Ibid., 114.

11. Thomas Schoonover, Uncle Sam’s War of 1898 and the Origins of Globalism (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2003), 6–9; Richard O’Connor, Pacific Destiny: An Informal History of the U.S. in the Far East (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), 259–61.

2. The Yanks Are Coming 1. Carol Morris Petillo, Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine Years (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981), 36–37. 2. Lewis, Seacoast Fortifications, 99. 3. Ibid., 103. 4. McGovern and Berhow, American Defenses, 9, 13, 19. 5. Lewis, Seacoast Fortifications, 101. 6. McGovern and Berhow, American Defenses, 59. 7. Lewis, Seacoast Fortifications, 117. 8. Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy: A History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), 513. 9. W. M. Bellote, “The Rock in the Tween War Years” (Bulletin of the American Historical Collection 19, no. 1 [January–March 1991]: 26–43).

187

10. Ibid., 26–43. 11. McGovern and Berhow, American Defenses, 19. 12. Bellote, “Rock in the Tween War Years,” 26–43. 13. Ibid.

3. The Calm before the Storm 1. H. W. Brands, Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 141–43. 2. Ferrell, American Diplomacy, 518–23; Robert D. Schulzinger, U.S. Diplomacy since 1900 (London: Oxford University Press, 1998), 134. 3. New York Times, February 24, 1922, 1; Donald Lamb, “Corregidor’s Railroad: The Best Little Railroad in the World,” (Bulletin of the American Historical Collection 23, no. 1 [January–March 1995]: 60–71). 4. Brands, Bound to Empire, 156. 5. Karnow, In Our Image, 261–65. 6. Bellote, “Rock in the Tween War Years.” 7. Lamb, “Corregidor’s Railroad.” 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid.

4. Winds of War 1. Petillo, Douglas MacArthur, 159–61. 2. The National Archives—Records of the Adjunct: Archives II University of Maryland, Box 87 “Plan Orange” 1924, Box 92 “Plan Brown” 1932; Reinforcement for Plan Orange, Commanding General of Hawaiian Department, National Archives II, Record Group 1423, Box 87 and 88.

188 Notes

3. Schulzinger, U.S. Diplomacy since 1900, 134. 4. Aluit, Corregidor, 31; A. Russell Buchanan, The United States and World War II, vol. 1 (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 91–104. 5. Albert C. Smith, The United States Army in World War II (Washington, D.C.: Department of Army, 1955), 5. 6. Brands, Bound to Empire, 194–97. 7. Aluit, Corregidor, 33; Karnow, In Our Image, 292–94. 8. Petillo, Douglas MacArthur, 63. 9. Aluit, Corregidor, 28. 10. Frank O. Hough, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal: History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II, vol. 1 (Historical Branch, G-3 Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, 1958), 76. 11. Charles A. Willoughby and John Chamberland, MacArthur, 1941–1951 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1954), 64; Hough, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal, 71–73. 12. E. A. Sharp, “Corregidor Revisited” (Bulletin of the American Historical Collection 6, no. 1 [January–March 1978]: 25–29). 13. Quoted in Frank Taylor, Bataan and Corregidor (Manila: Topside Press, 1992), 90; Karnow, In Our Image, 300–302. 14. Ibid., 11 15. Dr. John Baumgardner, interview with the author, October 19, 2003, Greensboro, N.C. 16. Herbert Markland quoted in McGovern and Berhow, American Defenses, 32. 17. Frank O. Hoagh, Pearl Harbor to Guadalcanal: History of the U.S. Marine Corps (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), 1:200–202. 18. National Archives II, Record 15541, Box 22 and 23. This docu-

ment provides a list of personnel surrendered to Japan but states that it is only a personnel list completed before the battle and may not be completely accurate. 19. Leslie Ann Murray, interview with the author, September 7–19, 2004. Ms. Murray heard this from her father, who was a survivor of the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Ms. Murray was born during the Japanese period and still resides in the Philippines. 20. Robert R. Smith, U.S. Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific (Washington, D.C.: Office of Chief Military History, Department of Army, 1963), 335–50.

5. The Return 1. Buchanan, The United States and World War II, 1:104. 2. Timothy Maga, Judgment at Tokyo: The Japanese War Crimes Trials (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2001), 25–27; Karnow, In Our Image, 321. 3. Brands, Bound to Empire, 206–8. 4. Aluit, Corregidor, 133. 5. Appendix H-2, Official Records of the Sixth Army, G-2 Headquarters, Corregidor, March 8, 1945, National Archives II. College Park, Maryland.

6. Willoughby and Chamberland, MacArthur, 1941–1951, 280–83. 7. Ibid., 268 69. 8. McGovern and Berhow, American Defenses, 42. 9. Brands, Bound to Empire, 209.

6. Shrine of Peace 1. Charter and related documents of the Corregidor Foundation, Inc., Corregidor Island Museum, Republic of the Philippines. 2. Copy of Japanese dedication speech, Corregidor Foundation, Inc., Corregidor Island Museum, Republic of the Philippines. 3. Bill Endicott, “33rd Infantry Division Finds Cache of Silver Pesos” (Military 21, no. 5 [October 2004]: 6–10). 4. Letter from John Lindgren to Corregidor Foundation, Inc., Corregidor Island Museum, Republic of the Philippines. John Lindgren recalls that members of Company D referred to the place as “Banzai Cliff.” 5. Tony Sierra to John Lindgren, Corregidor Island Museum archives. 6. Robert J. Flynn to Colonel Artemio Matibag of Corregidor Foundation, February 19, 1993, Corregidor Island Museum archives.

Notes 189


Index Abbot, Frederick, 99 Air assaults: Corregidor not getting antiaircraft guns for, 86, 88; Japanese, against Corregidor, 84, 113, 125; against U.S.Philippine Army on Bataan, 134; vulnerability of Corregidor to, 53, 56, 82 Aircraft, Japanese, 112, 125 Aircraft, U.S.: en route to Corregidor, 152, 156; Japanese bombing, 109, 113 Air Force, U.S., 125 Akin, Spencer B., 163 Alaska, as U.S. defense priority, 109 Alaskan (Wheaton), USS, 86, 88 Alip, Eufronio, 172 Ammunition, 179; for antiaircraft guns, 109, 125; explosions of, 138, 167; Japanese detonating, 158, 160; storage on Corregidor, 63, 64, 66, 71, 79, 151; U.S. mortars, 128; war supplies and, 99, 101–3, 151

Arisan Maru, 59 Army, Japanese, 132; in Tayabas, Quezon, 118. See also Japan/Japanese Army, Philippine: development of, 106, 113; in Malinta Tunnels, 133; as prisoners of war, 141–44; under U.S. command, 109. See also Philippine Scouts Army, U.S.: Air Corps, 113; amenities for personnel, 63, 79, 82, 91–94, 95; amphibious landing on Corregidor, 154–55, 156, 158; effects of defense budget cuts on, 58, 63–66; headquarters at Topside, 76–79, 80; headquarters in Malinta Tunnels, 64, 72, 88, 132; improvements on Corregidor by, 71–72; living in Malinta Tunnels, 132, 133; minefields by, 109, 110; passes from Bataan to Corregidor, 134–35; as prisoners of war, 141–44; resisting Japanese invasion, 116, 141; retaking Corregidor, 150, 162, 182;

retreating to Corregidor, 116, 137; service on Corregidor, 47, 94, 116; troop strength of, 58, 109, 116; units serving on Corregidor, 109, 116. See also Coast Artillery Corps, U.S.; Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army; names of forts; United States Army, U.S.-Philippine: holding out on Bataan and Corregidor, 123, 134; surrender of Bataan, 137; surrender of Corregidor, 140; withdrawal to Bataan, 113, 116; working from Malinta Tunnel, 117 Army Dock, 79 Asia: European powers and, 75; U.S. and, 22, 30 Australia, 130–32 Baldwin, Albert, 153 Baldwin, Hanson W., 141 Baltimore, USS, 18, 24, 30

191

Banzai charges, Japanese, 158 Barrio San José, 12, 16 Bataan Death March, 137, 145 Bataan peninsula, 82; Corregidor defenses against attack from, 82, 86, 88; Japanese assault on, 128; location of, 8; Spanish batteries on, 15; U.S. fortification of, 47; U.S.Philippine Army holding out on, 123, 134–35; U.S.-Philippine surrender of, 137; U.S.-Philippine withdrawal to, 113, 116 Batteries on Corregidor, Spanish, 29–30 Batteries on Corregidor, U.S., 45, 51, 76; aimed seaward, 128, 141; antiaircraft, 109, 113, 125; damage to, 126, 128, 138; defense, 43; disappearing guns in, 57; effects of howitzers on, 134; immovability of, 82–84; land defenses, 56; map, 77; names for, 82; sophistication of, 29. See also Guns Baumgardner, John, 135, 135–37 “Beach Club,” 41-42, 142, 143 Beach defenses, on Corregidor, 26, 88, 109 Beaches, 91–92, 94 Bilibid prison, 64–66; prisoners of war at, 144 Boca Chica. See North Channel (Boca Chica) Boca Grande. See South Channel (Boca Grande) Bottomside, Corregidor: amenities on, 91–92;

192 Index

Americans taking back, 158; in memorial zone, 183; prisoners of war held at, 144; tourist zone on, 183; wharves on, 79 Bulkeley, John D., 130–32, 131 Bunker, Paul D., 116 Caballo Bay: Philippine silver sunk in, 177–80 Caballo Island, 8–11; fortification of, 51; Japanese bombing, 125; Japanese troops on, 151; in map of artillery fields, 6; U.S. retaking, 162. See also Manila Bay islands Cabanatuan, prisoners of war at, 144–45, 180 Cabcaben: Japanese heavy artillery along, 134 Camp O’Donnell, 144 Carabao Island, 8–11; batteries on, 15, 52; Japanese and, 151, 167; in map of artillery fields, 6; U.S. fortification of, 51. See also Fort Frank; Manila Bay islands Cars, Corregidor not conducive to, 94 Carswell, Bruce, 93 Carswell, Catherine, 91 Carswell, R. M., family of, 91, 93 Casey, Hugh J., 163 Castilla (Spanish), 28 Casualties: Japanese: at Bataan, 146; at Corregidor, 146, 155–58, 160; at Fort Drum, 166–67; at Monkey Point, 160; at Suicide Cliff, 180–82; in Japanese banzai charges,

158; of streetcar accident, 103; U.S., 151; at Monkey Point, 160; at Pearl Harbor, 109; U.S.-Philippine: among prisoners of war, 145; at Bataan and Corregidor, 134 Cavite: Japanese and, 129, 130, 132; shore defenses on, 27; Spanish and, 30, 34, 36; U.S. naval station at, 112, 112, 116 Cavite Littoral, 28 Cavite province, 8, 128 Cebu, 3 Cemetery, Japanese military, 174–76 Cerero, Rafael, 5 Charles, King (Spain), 3, 8 Chase, Theodore M., 116 China, 26, 106 Christianity, in Philippines, 3, 13 Church, Filipino, on Corregidor, 13 “Ciné Corregidor,” 79, 95 Civilians: Japanese killing in Manila, 154; living on Corregidor, 79, 132; as prisoners of war, 141–44; prisoners working on Malinta Tunnel, 64–66, 68 Civil War, U.S., 17 Clark Field, Philippines, 111, 112, 113 Coast Artillery Corps, U.S., 53, 58 Coin reserves, Philippine government’s, 177–80, 179 Coley, Private, 103

Commercial imperialism, 15–17 Commonwealth status, for Philippines, 88; signing constitution for, 90 Coolidge, Calvin, 84 Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, 19; fortifying Corregidor, 46–53; Malinta Tunnels by, 64, 66, 71, 88 Corregidor, 105; aerial photos of, 62, 76; beauty of, 40; climate of, 94; food and water shortages on, 132–37; lacking water source, 13, 128; location of, 3; map, 2; in map of artillery fields, 6; map of streetcar system, 100; name of, 11, 75; plants and animals of, 40; population of, 132; postwar development, 170, 183; situation map, 127; on Spanish map of Philippines, 4; strategic value of, 8, 13, 30, 44, 154; topography of, 7, 8, 40, 53, 76–82; vulnerabilities of, 13, 53, 82, 134 Corregidor Foundation, 170–74, 182–83 Corregidor Inn, 170, 174 Corregidor Museum, 176 Corregidor War Memorial, 169 Cuba, 23, 50 Davila, Basilio Agustin, 28–29, 31 Davis, Richard B., 63 Davis, Richmond P., 88

Defenses, of Corregidor: for attack from Bataan, 86, 88; batteries, 43; land, 56; against poison gas, 88; restrictions of Washington Treaty and, 88. See also Batteries on Corregidor; Fortifications of Corregidor Dern, George H., 90 Dewey, George, 15, 22–30, 25; ships of, 24 Diller, Legrande A., 163 Dockyard, Spanish, 13 Dreadnoughts, 20, 24 Drum, Richard C., 51 Dutch East Indies, 146 Eisenhower, Dwight, 109 El Fraile, 8–11; in map of artillery fields, 6; Spanish batteries on, 15; U.S. fortification of, 51–53. See also Fort Drum Embick, Stanley D., 64, 71, 99 Endicott, Bill, 180 Endicott, William, 17 Endicott Committee, 17–19 Europe: naval arms race of, 15, 20; WWI in, 75; WWII in, 106 Expeditionary Force to the Philippines, The (Japanese government), 111, 112 Fagan, Private, 103 Ferries: streetcars meeting at North Dock, 97;

taking personnel into Manila, 94, 96; taking tourists to Corregidor, 170 Filipino American Memorial Endowment (FAME), 183 Filipinos, 46; feeling abandoned by U.S., 119–22; honored by war memorials, 170, 184; living on Corregidor, 13, 40, 79; rising up against Spanish, 29; taking scrap metal from islands, 170, 171. See also Philippine Scouts Flags: around Corregidor War Memorial, 170; Japanese, 145, 177; raising at establishment of Republic of the Philippines, 172; U.S., 146, 160–62, 161 Flynn, Robert J., 182 Fort Drum, 54, 55; batteries of, 54–56; firing on Japanese from, 128, 141; garrisons of, 116, 151; Japanese firing on, 128, 130; location of, 50; mothballed, 58; U.S. assault on, 162–67, 164-66; U.S. surrender of, 141. See also El Fraile; Manila Bay islands Fort Frank, 167; Japanese firing on, 128, 130; location of, 50; U.S. holding, 116, 128, 141; water line destroyed, 128–30. See also Carabao Island; Manila Bay islands Fort Hughes, 51, 116, 128; location of, 50. See also Caballo Island Fortifications of Corregidor, 3; effects of

Index 193

Washington Treaty on, 86; Spain’s, 15; U.S., 44, 45, 46–53, 63, 86; weaknesses of, 53 Fort Mills, 47, 56, 63, 91, 128; headquarters for Manila Bay defense at, 51, 80; location of, 50. See also Army, U.S.; Corregidor Foster, Captain, 103 Frank, Royal T., 51 Galleons, Spanish, 9 Goddess of Peace, in Japanese Garden of Peace, 175, 176 Goicoechea, Mariano de, 14 Great Britain, 22–23, 86 Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Policy, 119 Guam, 50, 106, 109 Guns, Japanese: artillery firing on Corregidor, 128, 129; heavy artillery, 134, 151; heavy artillery (howitzers), 130, 134; on Manila Bay islands, 151, 162 Guns, Spanish, 29; at Cavite, 36; on Corregidor, 15, 19; breech-loader, 19 Guns, U.S.: adaptation of French Howitzer, 89; antiaircraft, 86, 88, 109, 113; artillery, 53; on Corregidor, 56, 82–84, 137, 141; Corregidor’s big guns, 51, 128; disappearing cannon, 48, 52–53, 57, 60, 65, 84; for

194 Index

domestic coastal defense, 17; Filipinos selling scrap metal from, 170, 171; fixed cannons, 61, 78; for Fort Drum, 51, 54–56; limitations of Corregidor’s, 56, 82–84, 125; for Manila Bay defenses, 53, 109; manufacture of, 54; mortars, 44, 54, 83, 126, 128, 134, 138; naval, 18, 19–22, 23; nondisappearing cannon, 49, 62; for Philippines defense, 56, 106; rifle cannons, 17; shipment turned back from Corregidor, 86, 87; tractor-drawn and railway mounted, 106 Halprin, Lawrence, 172 Harding, Warren, 84 Harrison, George C., 180 Harrison, Harry J., 91, 110 Harrison (U.S.), 110 Hawaii: defending as U.S. priority, 50, 106, 109; Japanese attack on, 109 Hoeffel, Kenneth M., 116 Homma, Masaharu, 114, 121; assault on Philippines by, 113, 128, 132; strategy against Philippines criticized, 146–48 Hong Kong, 22 Hospitals: on Bataan, 135; on Corregidor, 30, 40, 44, 62, 79, 82, 128, 157; in Malinta Tunnels, 66, 71, 135, 136 Hough, Frank O., 130

Huff, Sydney L., 163 Imperial powers, 75, 84. See also specific countries; Washington Naval Treaty Intramuros (Walled City) of Manila, 3 Isolationism, U.S., 84 Itagaki, Captain, 155–58 Iwabuchi, S., 151 Japan/Japanese: aggression against China, 106; artillery firing on Corregidor, 128, 129; artillery of, 129, 130, 134; assault on Corregidor, 129; all-out, 132; amphibious landing on, 130; infantry, 137–41; operational map of, 139; attack on Pearl Harbor, 109; banzai charges by, 158; Bataan and, 82, 128; bombing Clark Field, 111, 113; bombing Corregidor, 123–25, 125, 128; bombing Manila City, 119, 119; detonating ammunition, 158, 160; entering Manila City, 116–19; Filipino silver and, 180; flag of, 145; infantry assault on Corregidor, 137–41, 139; killed in Fort Drum, 166–67; Manila Bay islands and, 123–25, 125, 162, 167; military cemetery of, 174–76; in naval arms race, 20; need to control Philippines, 3, 146; occupation of Corregidor, 145, 147, 154–55, 177; occupation of Philippines,

113, 151; prisoners of war and, 142, 144, 146, 148; propaganda leaflet, 136; refusal to surrender, 151, 160, 166–67; return of soldiers’ remains to, 174–76; strategy against Corregidor, 146–48; strategy against the Philippines, 72, 113; surrender of Corregidor to, 140; U.S. declaration of war against, 108; U.S. defensive strategies against, 88, 106, 109–13; U.S. retaking Corregidor from, 180–82; war memorial on Corregidor, 170; Washington Naval Treaty and, 63, 86, 88, 106 Japanese Garden of Peace, 174–76; Goddess of Peace statue in, 175 Johansen, Perry B., 172 Jones, George M., 158, 160–62, 163 Julian, Harry, 59 Kelly, Samuel G., 172 Kilbourne, Charles E., 63–66, 69, 92 Kindley Field, 63, 82, 139, 141 King, Campbell, 103 King, Edward, 142 Krueger, Walter, 151 La Monja, 8–11 Laurel, Jose P., 115 Leyte, U.S. landing at, 155

Lighthouses, on Corregidor, 13, 14, 15, 185 Lindgren, John, 182 Lingayen Gulf, 113, 151 Long, John, 22–23 Luzon: Japanese and, 113, 151; Philippine Army to defend, 106, 113 MacArthur, Arthur Douglas, 46 MacArthur, Douglas, 46, 47, 107, 115; concentrating of forces questioned, 113; evacuated from Corregidor, 130–32, 131; headquarters at Corregidor, 71, 116; Philippine Army and, 106, 109; Quezon and, 122, 123; return to Corregidor, 160–62, 163; return to Philippines, 152 Maeda, M., 146–48 Magellan, 3 Makati (business district of Manila), 3 Malinta Mountain, 12, 82; tunnel through, 63–66; U.S. securing, 155, 157, 158; viewed from Topside, 39. See also Malinta Tunnels Malinta Tunnels, 69, 70; completion of, 71–72; construction of, 63–66, 71, 88; diagram of, 72; entrances to, 72, 134, 183; hospitals in, 64, 66, 71, 135, 136; Japanese and, 144, 158; Japanese attack on, 134, 141; life and society in, 132, 133; Quezon

working from, 120, 123; restorations of, 144, 183; staffs and civilians working and living in, 64, 117, 132; storage areas in, 66, 71–72, 158 Manila, Battle of (Spanish-American War), 29–30, 33, 35 Manila Bay: Corregidor in, 3; defenses of, 6, 43, 56–58, 109; fortifications around, 15, 50; harbor defenses of, 116; harbor improvements in, 47; Japanese bombing area, 112; maps of, 2, 4, 6; minefields in, 110; situation, 127; topographical, 5; minefields in, 22, 29, 53, 109, 110, 155; North Channel of, 10; Philippine silver in, 177–80, 178; shore defenses around, 26, 109; Spain and, 4, 13, 28; U.S. Navy and, 29, 53 Manila Bay Defense Reservation, 51 Manila Bay islands, 8–11; Filipinos selling scrap metal from fortifications of, 170, 171; Japanese bombing, 123–25, 125; Japanese shelling of, 134; Japanese troops on, 151; strategic value of, 154; U.S. retaking, 162 Manila City, 3; Army-Navy Club of, 94, 97; bombing of, 119, 119, 154; defenses of, 75; ferries to and from, 94, 96, 97, 170; Japanese conquest of, 116–19; Japanese defense of, 151–54; prisoners of war held in, 144; Spanish in, 9, 15, 26, 28–29

Index 195

Marines, Japanese, 151, 180–82 Marines, U.S., 137–44 Mariveles Mountain, 8, 10, 11, 134 Markland, Herbert, 137 Marquat, William F., 163 Marshall, Richard J., 163 Matibag, Artemio, 183 McKinley, William, 22, 22–23, 46 McMicking, Joseph R., 163 Middleside, Corregidor, 81, 82, 91, 99, 158 Mile-Long Barracks, 79, 79, 80; ruins of, 10, 74, 157 Miley (ferry), 96 Mills, Samuel M., 47 Minefields, in Manila Bay: Japanese, 155; Spanish, 29; U.S., 22, 53, 109, 110 Montojo y Pasarón, Patricio, 26–27, 28, 30 Moore, George F., 116 Morrow, Edward R., 120 Murray, Leslie Ann, 183 Navies: arms race among, 20, 44, 56; defense and, 17, 19–22; Great Powers’ focus on, 15–17. See also navies of specific countries; Washington Naval Treaty Navy, Japanese, 151 Navy, Philippines, 141–44 Navy, Spanish: U.S. ships superior to, 24, 28;

196 Index

U.S. versus, 22, 26–28, 30; uses of Corregidor, 13 Navy, U.S., 180; dock on Corregidor, 79; expansion of, 17; minefields by, 110; Pearl Harbor attack on, 109; as prisoners of war, 141–44; station at Subic Bay, 53 Negros Island, 123, 174 North Channel (Boca Chica), 15 North Dock, 12, 97, 110 Olympia, USS, 23, 24 Ordnance Department, U.S., 53 Osmeña, Serguo, 152 Pacific Ocean: U.S. defensive strategy for, 106, 109–13; U.S.-Japanese rivalry in, 17, 88, 146 Pacific War: Japanese honoring dead from, 176; reconciliation of nations in, 175–76. See also World War II Pacific War Memorial, 10, 183, 184 Pacific War Museum, 176 Panama perimeter, defending as U.S. priority, 109 Philip II, Prince (of Spain), 8 Philippines: climate of, 91–92; commonwealth status for, 88, 90; considered frontier by U.S. military, 44, 46; defenses of,

50–51; independence for, 170, 172; Japanese occupation of, 113, 151, 177; Japanese strategy in, 146–48; location of, 3; MacArthur and, 46, 106, 152; as only Christian nation in Asia, 3; pirates in, 3, 13; prisoners of war on, 144–45; during Spanish-American War, 22–30; Spanish map of, 4; strategic value of, 46, 146; tourism to, 183; U.S. occupation of, 30, 37, 84, 106; Villalobos naming, 8 — government of: coin reserves from, 177–80, 179; evacuation of, 122–23, 132; Japanese propaganda about, 119, 122; retreating to Corregidor, 116, 132; tourism on Corregidor and, 170 Philippine Scouts, 58–63, 59, 65; living on Corregidor, 79, 82, 92; in Moore’s coastal artillery, 116; as prisoners of war, 141–44 Philippine War Memorial, 184 Pigeon, USS, 180 Pirates, 3, 13 Plan Brown, U.S., 106, 109 Plan Orange, U.S., 106, 109, 113 Poison gas, defenses against, 88 Portugal, 8 Prisoners of war, American and Filipino, 145, 180; Japanese treatment of, 137, 148; numbers of, 141–44

Prisons/prisoners: Bilibid, 64–66, 67, 144; on Corregidor, 11 Quezon, Manuel L., 90, 115, 119, 123; evacuation of government and, 122–23, 132; headquarters in Malinta Tunnels, 71, 120; illness of, 119, 123; Japanese propaganda about government of, 119, 122; Philippine coin reserves and, 177 Quezon, Mrs. Manuel L., 115 Reina-Cristina (Spanish), 27, 32, 34; mast of, 34, 161 Republic of the Philippines, flag raising for, 172 Roads, on Corregidor, 76, 170; map, 64, 77; U.S. army building, 47, 63–64 Rogers, W. A., 37 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 90, 108, 109, 122–23, 130 Roosevelt, Theodore, 50 Roxas, Manuel A., 115 Saipan, Japanese fortifying, 63 Sakai, S., 111 San José, 79, 80, 94 Sauers, Virgil “Jughead,” 180 Schools, on Corregidor, 79, 82

Shipping, commercial, 3, 11, 15–17 Ships: in Battle of Manila, 24, 33, 35; improvements on, 44, 56; pirates, 13; shells designed to plunge through, 54; Washington Treaty limiting warships, 86. See also Navies Ships, Japanese landing craft, 130, 132, 148 Ships, Spanish: galleons, 9; Reina-Cristina, 32, 34 Ships, U.S.: lost at Pearl Harbor, 109; mineplanters, 110; PT-41, 130–32, 131; submarines, 123, 124, 177–80 Sierra, Tony, 182 Smith, Chester C., 123 South Beach, 94, 154–55, 173 South Channel (Boca Grande), 29; Spanish batteries protecting, 15, 36; U.S. fortifications defending, 50 South China Sea, 75, 84 Southeast Asia, trade routes to, 3 Spain, 11; claiming Philippines, 3, 8; fortifications by, 13, 15; in Manila, 3, 13; U.S. weapons superior to, 18 Spanish-American War, 22–30 Streetcars, on Corregidor, 94–99, 97, 98, 99, 102; map of system, 100; through Malinta Tunnel, 63–66; transporting ammo and war supplies, 99, 101–3

Strong, Paschal N., 66, 71 Subic Bay, Philippines: Japanese and, 113, 130; Spanish fleet in, 26–28; survivors of retreating, 113, 116; U.S. Navy in, 29, 53 Suicide Cliff, 180–82, 181 Sutherland, Richard K., 163 Swordfish, USS, 123, 124 Taft, William, 50 Taft Committee, 50–51 Tayabas, Quezon, 118 Topside, Corregidor, 11, 76; amenities on, 91, 92; batteries on, 57; as center of U.S. activities, 76–79; lighthouse on, 15; memorial zone on, 168, 183; Mile-Long Barracks on, 75, 79; Reina-Cristina mast on, 34; residential community on, 75; tourist zone on, 184; U.S. paratroops landing on, 154–58, 157, 159; view from, 10, 39 Topside Barracks. See Mile-Long Barracks Tourism, on Corregidor, 170–74, 174, 183, 184 Trade routes, 3 Transport Service, U.S. Army: insignia of, 87 Treaty of Paris, 30 Trout, USS, 178; insignia of, 177; transporting Philippine coin reserve, 177–80, 179, 180 Tunnels: near Battery Wheeler, 63–64, 88;

Index 197

U.S. digging after Japanese bombings, 128. See also Malinta Tunnels Tydings-McDuffie Act (1934), 88, 122 United States: abandoning Corregidor after recapture, 174; assault on Corregidor, 150, 154–60; assault on Fort Drum, 162–67; bombing Corregidor, 152; bombing Manila, 154; coastal defenses of, 17, 51; declaration of war against Japan, 108; defense buildup by, 109; expansionism of, 17, 37; isolationism of, 84; Japanese opinion of, 146, 148; lighthouse built by, 13, 15; in Manila, 3; military spending by, 58, 84; in naval arms race, 44, 86; occupation of Corregidor, 76, 84; occupation of Philippines, 30; Pacific strategy of, 17, 106–13; paratroops landing on Corregidor, 150, 154–58, 156, 157, 158, 159; relations with Philippines, 88,

198 Index

119–22, 170; retaking Corregidor, 154–60; weapons development of, 17–22. See also Army, U.S. U.S. Bataan-Corregidor Memorial Commission, 168, 170, 172 U.S.-Philippine Army: holding out on Corregidor, 123; surrender of Corregidor, 140 Vargas, Jorge S., 115, 116–19, 121 Velez family, 8–11 Villalobos, Ruy Lopez de, 3–8 Visayas, Philippine government in, 122–23 Wainwright, Jonathan M., 107, 137, 138, 178; after surrender, 142, 144; surrender by, 141, 148 War memorials, on Corregidor, 170 Washington Naval Treaty (1922), 56, 58; effects on Corregidor, 63–64, 86, 88; excerpt

from, 85; Japanese ending, 88, 106; Japanese violating, 63; motives behind, 84 Weaver, Erasmus, 58 Wedemeyer, Albert C., 72 Wharves, Corregidor: Army Dock, 79; North Dock, 97, 110 Wheaton, USS, 86, 87 Wheeler Point, 180, 181 Williams, Oscar, 26 Willoughby, Charles A., 163 Wood, Leonard, 99 World War I, 75; U.S. isolationism after, 84; weapons of, 56, 88 World War II, 89; reconciliation of nations after, 175–76; U.S. reacting to, 106, 109, 146. See also Japan/Japanese; Pacific War; United States Yamashita, T., 151, 154

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