Sartre's Existentialism and Early Buddhism: A Comparative Study of Selflessness Theories

SARTRE'S EXISTENTIALISM AND EARLY BUDDHISM

SARTRE'S EXISTENTIALISM AND EARLY BUDDHISM A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SELFLESSNESS THEORIES

Phra Medhidhammaporn (Prayoon Mererk)

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~UDDIlADIWIIIIA

1O!JPW.4.TlON BAl'lGIOI 11l\JLIJrID

First Published 1988 in Bangkok Thailand Second Edition 1995 All rights © by the Author ISB~974-7890-43-7

Publishers: Buddhadhamma Foundation, 87f126 Tesabahl Songkroh Rd., Lad Yao, Chatuchak, BANGKOK THAILAND Tel.: (66) (2) 589-9012 Fax: (66) (2) 954·4791

PREFACE

T

he present work is a revised version of my doctoral thesis entitled A Comparative Study of the Non-egologicaf Treatments 0/ COnsciOU51leSS ÜI Sartre's Philosophyalld tarly Buddhism , which was subrnitted at the University of Delhi, India, in September 1985. The purpose of this study is to compare and contrast Sartre's doctrine of non-egology with the theory of selflessness (analta) in Early (Theravlida) Buddhism. Since I embarked on this thesis I have entertained the wish that it would stirnulate more interest in the comparative study of Buddhism and existentialism, and that my thesis would serve as a starting point for further research . This thesis would not have been completed had it not been for the contribution and assistance of innumerable individuals. Although aU of them cannot be acknowledged here, my sincere

appreciation for their part is registered on these pages. I would like to acknowledge with gratitude my indebtedness to Professor Margaret Chatterjee, Director of Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Simla, India, and Professor Mahesh Tiwary, University of Delhi, Delhi, India, for their noble guidance and invaluable suggestions at various stages of preparing the thesis. I take this opportunity of making full acknowledgment of my gratitude to the Most Venerable Phra Thammahaviranuvat, Abbot of Wat Raikhing, Nakhorn Pathom, for granting me the scholarship to carry out this research project. I would also like to thank the Buddhadhamma Foundation for taking on the republication of the work. Phra Medhidhammaporn

Abbreviations A.

Anguttara-Nika.ya Anguttara·Nikaya Althakath3 Abhs. Abhidhammatthasangaha BN. Being and Nothingness BPS. Buddhist Publication Society B",. BrhadaraQyaka s to ilsclf.l a In the case of sclf-col1sciousness, cnnsciousness does not posit itseH as an objet' l; the s ubj ec t-obje ct duality does not arise he re . The non-positional consciousness arrives at itself without recourse In discu rsive thoughl . Self consciou sncss should not b e confu sed with the refl ccti vc consciousness w hich takes the reflecled consciousness as its obj cct. All consciousness is non -positümal consciousness o f itse lf in the very process o f be ing co nsciOli S of something. That is, it is consciousness of itself as consciou sncss of some thing, oe is aware of bcing aw arc. In this sense, selfconsciousness and consciousness of something ar e mutu a Hy d epend cnt. Apa rt fro m consciou sness of som ething, self-consci ousness is impo~ si blc. "Consciousness is aware of itsel( in so tar as it is consci ousncss of a transcendent objecL"l\J This, howevc r, does nol imply thai consciousness o f something contains self-consciou sness as its qu ality. This is becausc consciousncss is no t a thing which we may quali fy with "self-conscious" as we mi ght q ualify Cl flow cr with "red. " Consciowmess of s(J mething : of thl' plJenomenoll , although coextensive with the phenommo", Cll1lt1ot be subjed 10 Ihe pllenomenal condilion whid, is 10 exist o1l1y in S() far as il revea ls itsel[--and tlw l con sequrntly ir su rpasses Ih r knowledge which we !lave of it and provides the basis for ~mch klZOwledge. ".14

46

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I.

THE SARTREAN CONCErTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

It should be noted here that HusseTl takes the being of th e .

known obJect 10 be wholly de pendent on the acts of the knowing subject, Le., the transcendenta l ego. According to hirn, the esse of a noema consists exclusive ly in Hs percipi,:li ,"'rom Sartre's viewpoint, Husserl has red uced thc being of the object 10 a series of meanings. 3to In contras t with Husserl's pos ition, Sarlre maintains thai "thc esse of th c phenomenon cannot be its percipi."l1 By asserting that the beiog of the übjec! is not subjcct to the phenomena J condition, Sarl'rc has prop(}sed an approa ch not just different from but diametrically opposed 10 Husscrl's. Instead of reducing beiog to Cl series of meanings, Sarlre explains knowledge and meanings in terms of being, insisling th at being i5 "the seH-evident irreduci ble" and thcrefore any attempt at reducing it to something el~, and thus tryin g to go beyond it, is impossible.'8 TWO TYPES OF BEING

Sartre, therefore, makcs the distinction between consciousness and its object. He insis ts that these are two different types of being. "That there are two types of cx b ten ce, as thing-in-thcworld and as consciousness, is an ontological law."l" The being of thc object i5 ca lled being-in-itscij (l 'etre-ell-soi), and the being of consciousness is ca lled beillg-j or-iiseJj (J'eire-pour-soi).~ Since the being of the object is revea led through the phenom enologi cal description of consdou sness, Sartre's ontology is ca ll ed "phenomenologicalontology."41 Being -in-ilse/fis the non-conscious being of the object of consciousness .~l It is pure exishmce as such, existentia. It cannot be a thing or an ensemble o f th ings. Neither cao il bc hidd cn behind things in thc manner of the noumcnon . lt i5 the being of phenomena; that is, the pure "aUlt it is" ofthings. This is SClrtrc's reappropriation of Heidcgger' s assertion that " Being is the transcendens pu re and simpl e. "u The in-itself is plenitude cr fullness characterized by impermeability an d infinit e density. lt is so fu ll of itself that it d oes not admit any change or beco ming. "Transition, becoming, any-

47

l Sflrlre's Existetltiaiism find Early Bllddhism

thing which permits us to say that being is not yet what it will be and that it is already what it is not-all Ih at is forbidden on principle." u Thc in-itself is also ' uncreated/ ' no t s ubject to tempürality,' and ' undifferentia ted.' I! is neith er possible nor necessary, but rather 'contingent.' It is wholly independent or Se[bständ(~. 1t is thus absolutely non-referenti aL Lacking differentiating predicates, it can only be said to be. "Heing iso Being is in-itself. Being is what it is ." ·~ BeinK-for-itself is Ihe being o f conscious ness whieh is a ' revea ling intuition ' of the being-in-itse lf . For SaTtre, being-for-it self (relre-paur soi), consciousness (Ta conscience) and human reCllity (La rlialiti humane)- all mean the same and h e u ses them indisc riminately. The for-itself is d efinl'd as "being what it is not, ami not being what il iS."4<J lt is a negation of the in-itself whieh is "what it is." (f the in-itself is il fullness, then the fo ritself is il lack, " total emptiness" (Ulf vide 101al).47 What the for-itself lacks is the being-in-itself.4!I Thc for -itself is thu s the absence of being; "it is a hole in being at the heart of being,"4Q and because uf this hole a trcmendous uphcava l happens to the in-itse lf, and this uphcaval i~ the appearance of the world. 50 Oue 10 the pre~n ce of the for -itself to the in-itself, the worl d is (ons tituled, no t in the sense of idea lis ticall y creating, but in the sense o f organizing or manifcsting. "World liness, spatialit y, quantit y, instrumentality, temporality- all come into being because I am the negation of being."51 Without the for-itself thcre would exist no world but merely "the undifferentiated totality of being." 52 Moreover, Ihe for-itself is not a person; thai is, it is not " the totality of the human being" but rather "the in4- It i5 freed orn which causes our place to appea r as a resistance by positing its end. B. My Pa st My past is what I have been. In so far as I exist, I cannot lack having a past. The for-itself "co mes into the world with a past."I~ "Dur 3cls," says the proverb, " foll ow after us." Does this rnean that the past determines my action? It appears to the determinists that man is not free because his present existence is determined and influenced by his past. This view is not acceptable to Sartre. According to hirn, the past is perpetually 'in suspense,' because I can freely give a new meaning to it. And the meaning I give depends upon my present proiect. " By projecting myself towa rds my ends, I preserve the past with me, and by action I decide its meaning." I66 Hence it is my choice of the future goal that deci des the meaning of my past. And it is within the compass of my project that the past is manifested as the motivation of my present action. As Sartre has pointed out: "Thus like place, the paSI is inlegraled will, lI,e sitllQt ;011 when Ihe for-itself by ils choice 01 future conlr.rs on its past facticity a va/ue in terms olwhieh this fa eticity motivates the aet and eonduct of Ihe foritself. "167

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Snrlre's Existentialism lind ElIrly Bllddhism

C. My Environment

My environments (elltours) are n ot the place which I occu py but the instrumental th ings which surround m e with their coefficients of adversity and utilily. They are tools w hich h .. vc th eir value and resis tance. The syntheti c orga nization of the lools cons titutes the unity of my Umwelt , and this Umwelt ca n bc reveaJ ed onl y within the limits of a fr ee projectY''l A tool is in ilsclf indiffere nt; it offers n ei ther help nor resista nce. It is only within my project thai the tool becomes my ad versily or utiJity. Suppose I wish 10 arrive at the next town as qu ickly as possible und 1 plan to go there by bicycle. Si ncc the bicycle ha s a nat tire, it offen, rcsistan ce. Thi s bicyde is revealed as resistance beeause J havc chosen il for a tide; il is included in my project. This ilIus Inltion sh ows that "the adversity of things and their potentialities in general are illuminated by thc end chosen ."16~ Thu s Sartfc's positi on regarding environments is thc sa m e as that oI place; bOl h are neutral, it is my fr ee project which m akes th em an
th~ \Ian'5cende"~a\

ego can F>ur\l\\lC a iter death .

If the ego were immortal, its immortality wou ld not be proved by phen omen ological rcdu ction . So it i:; s till doubtful whether the transcendental ego is immortal or n ot. Kant says that as far as thc im morta lity o f thc soul is concerned, he has no theoretical proof of it; yet he has to ' postulate' the immortality in o rder 10 ma ke mora lity possibl e. T his kind of p os tula te is avoided by Husserl w ho wanls to do a presuppositi on!ess philosophy. Th e concl u sion that wc ca n draw from the foregoing com· parisons 1S that Mman in the Up ani:?ads 1S something like wh at H usscrl 's transcend ental ego wou ld be if il were endowed w ilh imm o rt a li ty a od id e ntit y w ith the ult im a te reality. Th c Upa n i~adic thinkers ass u me that dtman is immor tal and identi· cal w ith Brah man beca use they want to justify th eir quest for Mok;;a or liberation. Their religious life w ou ld be meaningless without the postulate of immortality of the self. THE BUDDHA'S REJECTION OF THE PERMANENT EGO All kinds of permanent se lf- be they called tltman or transcendental ego-are rejected by the Buddhis t:

100

THE BUDDHIsrs REJECTION OF THE SELF

"Whatever be the theories about the ätman held by the various thinkers during the time of the Buddha and thereafter, the Buddhist doctrine of anatU, as preserved in the Theravada tradition, contradicts them all in all-embracing sweep. "49 We shall now turn to consider the Buddhist's arguments against the self theory. The conception of the permanent seH or tUman described above was known to Buddhism. 50 By the seH the Buddhist understands that permanent, substantial ego-entity which is the principle of thoughts and actions. In brief, the seH is viewed as the subject of experience:

"Whatever is the self for me that speaks, that experiences and knows, that experiences now here, now there, the functian of deeds that are love1y and that are depraved, it is this self far me that is permanent, stable, etemal, not subject to change, that will stand firm like unto the etemal. "51 The seH is said to possess bliss and autonomy. These notions of the self are not acceptable to the Buddhist. The Buddha flatly denies that there exists in man an ego-entity which is permanent, blissful and autonomous. His arguments against the self are analytical because they are based on the analysis of the personality.

FIVE AGGREGATES The person (puggala), when analyzed, is found to consist of five aggregates (Pali, Khandha = Sanskrit, Skandha). These aggregates neither singly nor collectively constitute any permanent seIl, nor is there to be found a self apart from them. The live aggregates are those of corporeality (rupa), feeling (vedana), perception (saiifill), mental formations (sankhllra) and consciousness (viftiilll)a).52 The following is abrief description of these aggregates: 1. The aggregate of corporeality comprises the material coo-

101

Sartrr'$ [xiste.,tialism and Early

Buddhi~m

st ilu ents of the individual. The body belongs to this aggregate. In the aggregatcof cOfllOreality a re included the traditional Four Prim ary Elements (mahdbhata -rüpa), namely, solidity, fluidity, heat and motion, and also the Derivatives of the Four Primary Elements (upadaya-riipa ).53 In the Derivatives are included our five material sense-organs, Le., eye, ear, nase, tangue and body, and their corresponding objects in the external world., Le., visible form, sound, odor, taste, and tangible things, and also some physical components of the body . Thus the whole realm of matter, both internal and external, is induded in the aggregate of corporea lity . 2. The aggregate of feeling as one of the four n o nmaterial groups is the affective aspect of mental activities. It has the characteristic of enjoying the "taste" of an object. 54 The Commentary of the Dhammasanganl describes the nature of feeling with a metaphor:

"As regards enjoying file laste o[ al1 object, the remainin8 associatcd states enjoy it only partiafly. Of con/act Illere is Olle fUllctiOtl oft mere touclling, of perceptioll tlle mere lIotillg or perceivillg, of volitiofl I/Je: mere coordinating (the Qssociated stQtes of exerting or beillg active), oj consciouslIess the mere cognizing. But feeling atolle. through governance, proficiency, mastery, enjoys the taste of an object. For feelil1g is like the king, the remainillg states are like the cook. "55 Th~re

are three kinds of feeling: pleasant, painful ; thai is, it turns the mind agains t thc truth so that one sees "the self in what is n o t-s ~ lf. " m Unwis e attention gives rise to dis tortions (v ipallnsa) o f perception, thought and view. A m an of unwise attention perceives, thin ks an d views pcrmane nl.' e in what is essentially impermanent, bliss in what subject to suffering, self in what i5 not-self, and deligh t in wha! is essenti ally repulsive and disgusting. 1I 1 ln other words, he faUs 10 see things as they really are (yathabhatatfl). Thus the id ea of the seIt is a false idea caused by unwise attention. Th e selftess ness of thin gs is difficult 10 d etect beea use il i.s hidden by comp ac tnc s~.

"The cf/ßracterisl ic oj 1/01-s('// dOt's nol become appnrf'ut beclIllse, when resolution infO file var iollS elements is not give)l att ention , it is hiddell by compaclnr:ss ... Wlle/1 file YI~50I!l 1 io/! 0/ fi,e comt,act (ghanavinibbhoga) is ('! fee t cd by resolving it info its elemeJlts, tlll.'

cllQrackristic 0/ 1Iot-sdf bl.~co m es npf'arwi

j)l it ~

true )ll/ ture. "114

THREE KINDS OF DES IRE Sartre, as w c have seen, m aintains that the self is cons titutcd by impure refl eetion . m In this respeet, his position i5 similar to the Buddh(l's. The Buddha, Iike Sartre, thinks tha t the seH is eons tituted by unwise attention and becadic literatures, conccntration meditation is kn own as Yoga . As m entioned ea rlier, the Upani ~ ildic thinkers regard Yoga as a method which enables them to realize iil/JIlln . lJ.I Cuncentralion con~ i s ts of diff~rent d egrees, the highest of whi ch is a mysti c state, within which a mystic intuition of tif mall takes place. The Budd ha, before his Enlightenmcnt, s tudied Yosa under different tcachers and attaincd th e highes t mystic s tate; but he was not satisfied with it because it did not give completc emancipahon. In the m ys tic stales such as ' the Sphere of N othingness' u r ' the Spherc of Neither -Perccption No r- Non-Perccption,' there is only emptiness; no atman is found . Here is the point where the Huddha departs from the Up ani ~adic thinkers: while the latter consider Yoga as the method fo r d cvelopin g insight whi ch realizes atmmz, the former conside rs lt as the m ethod that en ab les olle to find only emptiness. For the Buddha, YoXa does no t lead us to the attainmcnt of comple le cmancipalion as the Upanit>adic thinkers claim. He considered the mystic sta te

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Snrlfl"S F.xisll"!fialism und fArly Buddhism

of Yoga only as 'happy living in this existence' or 'peacerulliving' (saulnvihnra) and nothing more. 135 The Buddha later discovered a method that cnablea hirn to attain the complete cessation of s uffering. He call ed it vipassanl1 or insight m editation. It is a mcthod unique to Buddhism. For practising vipassanl1 meditation, a certain degrce of concentration is required. Concentralio n has two degrccs o f development: (J) 'Neighborh ood conccntrati on' (uparllra-samlldhi), which approaches the first 'trance' (jht1ua) w ithoul altaining it; (2 ) 'Att ainment concen lrati on' (appaml -samiidhi), which is the conccntration present in the four 'trances' (jlu7.na), These 'trances' are mental states b eyond the ren baum, P., NReligion i n Ihe Trad ition of Phc nomenology", in Relig ioll in Philosop lücal lw d ClIlt liral Prrspecliv/', cd. by ]. C. Feaner 3nd W. H oro~;L. D. Van No~tra nd Com pany Ine., 1%7, p . 1B7. Oe Si!va, L. A., The Problem of Ihe Seif irr Bllddhism arjd Chrislia nity, The Stlldy Centrc for Religion and Socicty, 1975, p. 25. Ja Yllt iJI eke, K. N., Eorly ßuddhist T/leory 0/ Knowlcdgr, Motilal ßa na rsida ~:iI, Delhi, 1980 p . 65. M .l. B. D. 11. 307. S. XXII. 56. Vism. e h . XIV, p. % 0. Budd haghosa, Th~ ExposiloT (AllhrN1finf), Ir. by Pe Mau ng Tin, Ox ford

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THE BUDDHIST'S RE/ECTION OF THE SELF

University P ress, London, 1958, p. 145.

56

S. XXXVI. 1.

57

S. X. 11. Sfl.

58 59

M.1. 2Y3. Rhys D Now we sh all consider h ow Ihe theory of subconsciousness is rclated to the theories of karma and rcbirth. REBIRTH OF CONSCIOUSNESS '[tlwards the end of the preced ing chapt er we re marked that on(' of thc ma in problems for the Bud d his t is to reconcile thc d octrine uf armtll1 with thc beliefs in kanna and re bi rth. They have to answer this ques tion: If there is no "elf, wh a t is it that is rcborI1 and expericnces the rcsults oE karma? A s T. W. Rhys Davids has po intcd o ul : " Wc ha ve thus ar rived at i't d cadloek: 10 savc what it hords to bc a psycbologieal truth Buddh ism rejects the notion (l f a soul; tu save wh at it hold s 10 be the n ecessity oE jus lice, it rctains the be lief in trans migration ."Tl The word transmi g ra tion is mi s lea d ing. The Buddhis t d oc trinc o f rebirlh shllUld be distingu ished from th e U pani ~a di c theo ry of a transrnigrating se lf Of soul. In Buddhism there is no permanent self which trans migrates fro m one Ii fc 10 another. In Bud d haghosa's word s, " there is no entit y, no self, no elements of be ing transmig mted frorn thc last existcnce inl o the prescnt one. "7S lf there is no trans migrating selE, what is reborn into the next cx istence (b/Ulva)? To this question, the Buddhis t replies that co,,:-cious fless (v i iiiidtla ) is rebon!. 79 In the M aJu1niddlla - Su tta , the Buddha sa ys that w ere consci ou sness not to descend into th e m other's w o mb, nam e-and-form of a new life would not ca me

144

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SARTRE'S REJECTION OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL EGO

to birth .!j(J Thus "the effective medium of rebirth is vjFii!a~za , consciou sness."tll N everthclcss this should no t mi slcad u s ioto thinking thaI il is onc and the same conscio usness that trans migrates fro m onc cxis tenctc' 10 another. A mo nk ca lied Säti is said to havc belit'ved that anc ;md the same conscio usness is feborn into the nex t existcnce. Sa ti, when asked by the Buddha 10 explain what he understands by consciousness, gives this answ er: Hit is this, Lo rd, that s pea ks, that fee ls, tha t t:xperiences now here, now the re, the function o f dceds thai a re lovely and thai are d eprived ." lI2 lt ShOllld be noted here tba l S~ li ' s definition o f con sc i ousnt' s ~ is similar 10 the Upani$a d ic d efinition of scH (t1fman ) . H e is, therefore, accu scd by the Buddha or distorti ng the Mas ler's tcaching. Thc Buddha says: " Bllf to wl/Om,jool islJ mall , d0 .l/0ll utUJerslal/d tllr: dhamma wns tnught by me tlII/S? Has not consciuuslIc'SS gellemlcd by co f/tlitiolls been sl'okerz of in ma lly a figurc by me, sayillg: Apa rt f rom condiliCIH lhere is 110 originatioll of cO ll sciou s ness? "/I·~

A s m en tioncd earlier, consciousness is mo mcntary; it never remains the sa me for any two consecutive mo ments. The s trea m o f cons cious ncss nows on because of the rapid su ccession o f consciou s mo ments. When one conscious