The syntax and semantics of split constructions: a comparative study

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The Syntax and Semantics of Split Constructions

10.1057/9780230501607 - The Syntax and Semantics of Split Constructions, Alastair Butler and Eric Mathieu



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A Comparative Study Alastair Butler and

Eric Mathieu




© Alastair Butler and Eric Mathieu 2004

No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The authors have asserted their rights to be identified as the authors of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2004 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin's Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 1-4039-2112-1 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Butler, Alastair, 1975The syntax and semantics of split constructions : a comparative study / Alastair Butler & Eric Mathieu. p. cm Includes bibliographical references and indexes. ISBN 1-4039-2112-1 1. Grammar, Comparative and general—Syntax. 2. Semantics. 3. Pragmatics. I. Mathieu, Eric, 1967- II. Title. P295.B88 2004 415—dc22 2004042730 10 13

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9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 11 10 09 08 07 06 05

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Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne



All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission.



For Elise and Florian




Preface

xi

1

1 1 6 10 10 21 23 27 30

Introduction 1.1 Background 1.2 The Central Problem 1.3 Previous Approaches 1.3.1 Syntactic Views 1.3.2 Pragmatic Views 1.3.3 Semantic Views 1.4 Our Proposal: needing visible usage information 1.5 Overview of the Book

2 W H Constructions 2.1 Introduction 2.2 French WH-in-situ 2.2.1 Why French WH-in-situ are Split Constructions 2.2.2 Previous Accounts 2.2.3 Summary 2.3 WH-in-situ in Other Languages with Intervention Effects 2.3.1 Korean 2.3.2 German 2.3.3 Summary 2.4 WH-adjuncts and Other WH-phrases with Restricted Scope 2.5 Partial WH Constructions in German 2.6 Summary

33 33 33 34 38 47 47 47 50 52 53 55 59

vn 10.1057/9780230501607 - The Syntax and Semantics of Split Constructions, Alastair Butler and Eric Mathieu


Contents

Contents Negative Constructions 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The Phenomena 3.3 Previous Accounts 3.3.1 Semantic/Pragmatic Views 3.3.2 Syntactic Views 3.4 French N-words: what are they? 3.5 Towards a Split Construction Analysis 3.6 Summary

61 61 61 66 66 72 81 87 89

Interfacing Syntax and Semantics 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Logical Tools 4.2.1 Propositional Logic 4.2.2 Predicate Logic 4.2.3 Predicate Logic with Anaphora 4.2.4 Predicate Logic with Barriers 4.3 PLB and Constraints on Syntactic Dependencies 4.3.1 A Word on Notation 4.3.2 A(rgument) Movement 4.3.3 Binding Dependencies 4.3.4 A-Movement 4.3.5 Strong Crossover 4.4 Summary

91 91 92 93 95 99 105 113 114 115 119 121 126 128

The Account 129 5.1 Introduction 129 5.2 Additions to PLB 129 5.2.1 Usage Information 130 131 5.2.2 PPIs 5.2.3 A Neg(ation) Operator with Domain Widening 132 5.2.4 A Q(uestion) Operator 133 5.3 Deploying Neg and wid 134 5.3.1 French N-words 135 5.3.2 NPIs 139 5.4 Deploying Q and wh 144 5.4.1 Combien Constructions 144 5.4.2 French WH-in-situ 150 5.4.3 Korean 153 5.4.4 German Multiple WH Questions 154 5.4.5 French Multiple WH Questions 155



viii

IX

English Chinese WH-adjuncts and Other Scope Restricted WHphrases 5.4.9 German Partial WH Constructions 5.4.10 Summary Summary

156 158

5.4.6 5.4.7 5.4.8

5.5

160 163 166 166

Appendix

169

Notes

173

Bibliography

195

Language Index

211

N a m e Index

213

Subject Index

217



Contents




This book is about split constructions. It is an attempt to give a principled account of the intervention effects they exhibit. More generally, the proposal is that all constructions sensitive to weak islands are really split constructions. The book offers an analysis in semantic terms, but one that does not obliterate the role of syntax. It strives to be comparative in that data from many languages are systematically measured up. Another aim was to provide a comprehensive view of what has been proposed before. An appendix gathers together the definitions of the predicate logic system used for the semantic account. In the hope of making the book more user friendly, we adopted the convention of using references that look like §3.3.2/72, which refers to text on page 72 that is part of section 3.3.2. The first time a major idea is explained, we mention it in bold type to make it easy to find and to call the reader's attention to it as an important point. For their help and support, we would like to thank the following people. From Amsterdam: Maria Aloni, Kata Balogh, Balder ten Cate, Paul Dekker, Darrin Hindsill, Roelant Ossewaarde, Anna Pilatova, Robert van Rooy, Marie Safafova and Henk Zeevat. We would like to give Paul special thanks for all the ideas he contributed and for his encouragement. From University College London: Hans van de Koot, Ad Neeleman and Neil Smith. Special thanks to Hans for his on-going support. From elsewhere: David Adger, Noel BurtonRoberts, Hamida Demirdache, Kook-Hee Gill, Kleanthes Grohmann, Sophie Heyd, Paul Rowlett, Ioanna Sitaridou, George Tsoulas, and our colleagues in Cyprus, Nancy, and Nantes. Thanks also to the publishing team, especially Paula Kennedy and Jill Lake, and the anonymous reviewer for valuable comments on the manuscript. Parts of this work in one form or another have been presented at conferences and workshops in Amsterdam, Chicago, Durham, Geneva, Girona, XI



Preface

Preface

Konstanz, Liverpool, Manchester, MIT, Newcastle, Nijmegen, Oxford, Paris, Pecs, Reading, Szklarska Poreba, Thessaloniki, Tbilisi, Tilburg, Utrecht, York and Zaragoza. We thank the audiences for their perspicacious comments. Financial support for the first author came from the NWO Vernieuwingsimpuls project "Formal Language Games." Alastair Butler, Amsterdam Eric Mathieu, London

December 2003



xii

Introduction 1.1

Background

The assumption made in many theories of grammar is that the format for quantification in natural language has the tripartite form in (1). (1) Op Restriction Matrix Here an operator Op and its semantic restriction are adjacent, and both are located outside the matrix (cf. Barwise and Cooper, 1981; Heim, 1982; Partee, 1995, among others). We will often refer to the semantic restriction as the noun restrictor to emphasize that it concerns restriction material that is manifested lexically. An alternative to (1) is to have a bare operator as defined in (2). (2) A bare operator Op is an operator which is structurally detached from its noun restrictor. This gives a situation where the operator is not adjacent to its semantic restriction which lies inside the matrix as illustrated in (3). 1 (3) Op [Matrix ••• Restriction ... ] Constructions displaying the configuration of (3) will be referred to as split constructions: 2 (4) A split construction is a construction with a bare operator. 1 10.1057/9780230501607 - The Syntax and Semantics of Split Constructions, Alastair Butler and Eric Mathieu


Chapter 1

2


(5) [CP Combieni as-tu lu [DP ei d e livres]]? how many have-you read of books 'How many books have you read?' Here, the operator combien 'how many' moves on its own and leaves behind the noun restrictor livres 'books'. A counterpart where combien de livres 'how many books' moves as a whole is also possible, as illustrated in (6). (6) [CP [DP C o m b i e n de livres] i as-tu lus ei]? how many of books have-you read-AGR 'How many books have you read?' In French, such DP-splitting extends to many other cases, including the WH-phrase types of (7) and (8), and the negative operators of (9) and (10) (cf. Obenauer, 1976, 1983). (7) a.

[CP [DP Qui d'interessant]i a-t-il rencontre ei]? who of-interesting has-he met b. [CP Quiii a-t-il rencontre [DP ei d'interessant]]? who has-he met of-interesting 'Who has he met that was interesting?'

(8) a. b.

[CP [DP Qui d'autre]i a-t-il vu ej? who of-else has-he seen [CP Qîi a-t-il vu [DP ei d'autre]]? who has-he seen of-other 'Who else has he seen?'

[NegP [DP R i e n d'extraordinaire]! n'est arrive ej. nothing of-extraordinary NE-is happened b. [NegP Rieni n'est arrive [DP ei d'extraordinaire]]. nothing NE-is happened of-extraordinary 'Nothing special has happened.'

(9) a.

(10) a. b.

[NegP [DP P e r s o n n e d e connujj n'est entre ej. no one of famous NE-is come in [NegP Personnel n'est entre [DP ei de connu]]? no one NE-is come in of famous 'No one famous has come in.'



While the form of a quantified sentence often matches the schema in (1), a quick survey of only a few languages shows that the structure in (3) is often equally possible. One such case, first discussed in Obenauer (1976), is the French example in (5). 3

3

Note that in (9a) and (10a) the whole negation constituent including the noun restrictor has moved to a scope position (i.e. Spec-NegP, cf. Pollock, 1989; Zanuttini, 1991; Haegeman, 1995), whereas only the negative operator has raised in (9b) and (10b), stranding the noun restrictor. Other examples of the format illustrated in (3) include the Dutch wat voor construction in (lib) and its German equivalent: the was fur construction in (12b). Just as in the French cases, a bare operator is placed in a scope position having left its semantic restriction in-situ. (11) a.

[CP [DP W a t voor boeken]i heb jij ei gelezen]? what for books have you read b. [CP Wati heb jij [DP ei voor boeken gelezen]]? what have you for books read 'What kind of books have you read?' (de Swart, 1992, 389)

(12) a.

[CP [DP W a s fur ein Werkzeugji sucht er ei]? what for a tool look he b. [CP Wasi sucht er [DP ei fur ein Werkzeug]]? what look he for a tool 'What kind of tool is he looking for?' (de Swart, 1992, 389)

Similarly, which-DPs are able to split in Polish (13b), Mohawk (14b), 4 and some colloquial registers of Italian (15b). 5 (13) a. b.

[CP [DP J a k i numerjj wykregiles ej? which number dial-2SG [CP Jakii wykregiles [DP ©i numer]]? which dial-2SG number 'Which number did you dial?' (Corver, 1990, 330)

(14) a.

[CP [DP K a nikayA ka'sere]i i-hs-her-e' which car 0.2SG-think-lMPF a-hs-hninu-' ei]? OPT.2SG-buy-PUNC b. [cp K a nikayAi i-hs-her-e' a-hs-hninu-' which 0.2SG-think-lMPF OPT.2SG-buy-PUNC [DP ci ne ka'sere]]? NE car 'Which car do you want to buy?' (Baker, 1996, 158-159)

(15) a.

[cp [DP Quali libri]i hai letto ei]? which-MAS.PL books-MAS.PL have-2SG had



Introduction

The Syntax and Semantics of Split Constructions b.

[CP Qualii hai letto [DP ei di libri]]? which-MAS.PL have-2SG read of book-MAS.PL 'Which books have you read?' (Moro, 2000, 51)

Cross-linguistically, extraction of WH-possessor elements is common. Examples include Hungarian (16), Tzotzil (17), Chamorro (18), Greek (19), Russian (20), and Latin (21).6 (16) cp Ki-neki ismer-te-tek [DP ei a vendeg-e-O-t]]? wh-DAT know-PAST.2PL the guest-POSS.3SG.ACC Whose guest did you know?' (Gavruseva, 2000, 744) (17) cp Buch'ui av-il-be [DP s-tot ei]]? who A2-see-lO A3-father Whose father did you see?' (Gavruseva, 2000, 752) (18) CP Hayii un-yuland [DP munika-fia ei]]? who iNFL(2c)-break doll-AGR.3SG Whose doll did you break?' (Gavruseva, 2000, 754) (19) cp Tinosi eferes [DP to vivlio ej]? whose bring-PAST.2SG the book Whose book did you bring?' (Androutsopoulou, 1997, 1) (20) CP Cjui ty citajes [DP knigu ei]]? whose you read book Whose book are you reading.'

(Ross, 1967, 1986)

(21) cp Cuiusi legis [DP librum ei]]? whose read-2SG book Whose book are you reading?'

(Ross, 1967, 1986)

In contrast, it is a P P that raises in such constructions in French (22) and German (23). 7 (22) [cp D e quij as-tu lu [DP le livre ei]]? of who have-you read the book 'Whose book have you read?' (23) [CP Von wenii hat sie [DP das Bild ei] gesehen]? of who-DAT has she the picture seen 'Whose picture has she seen?' (Gavruseva, 2000, 768) In addition, degree expressions can split in Italian (24) and Spanish (25).



4

Introduction

(Moro, 2000, 56)

(25) [CP Comoi dices que es [DP ei d e inteligente]]? how say-2SG that is of intelligent 'How intelligent do you say she/he is?' (Corver, 1990, 186) Finally, Mohawk has relatives where the operator is adjacent to the DP as in (26a), and a split alternative (26b). In the split version, the operator is in its scope position, while the DP has remained internal to the relative. (26) a.

Sak ra-niihwe'-s [DP ne a t h e r e [CP tsi nikayAi I: Sak MAS.SG-like-HAB NE basket which me k-iini-s]]. lSG-make-HAB b. Sak ra-niihwe'-s [DP [CP tsi nikayAi I: Sak MAS.SG-like-HAB which me k-iini-s ne athere]]. lSG-make-HAB NE basket 'Sak likes the kind of baskets that I make.' (Baker, 1996, 163)

Other examples of such internally headed relatives include (27) from Imbabura Quechua and (28b) from Japanese. (27) [DP [CP Wambra [DP wagra-ta] randishka]] ali wagra-mi. boy cow-ACC bought good COW-EVID 'The cow that the boy bought is a good cow.' (Cole and Hermon, 1994, 248) (28) a. Yoko-wa [DP [CP Taro-ga sara-no ue-ni e\ oita] Yoko-TOP Taro-NOM plate-EN on-LOC put keekii]-o tabeta. cake-ACC ate b. Yoko-wa [DP [CP Taro-ga sara-no ue-ni keeki-o Yoko-TOP Taro-NOM plate-GEN on-LOC cake-ACC oita]-no]-o tabeta. put-NM-ACC ate 'Yoko ate a piece of cake which Taro put on a plate.' (Shimoyama, 1999, 147)



(24) [CP Quantoi sono [DP Ci alti]]? how many are tall 'How tall are they?'

5


Even in English, there is a case for supposing that a sub-type of relatives, namely so-called degree relatives like in (29), are internally headed, forming split constructions (for details see Carlson, 1977; Grosu, 1994; Grosu and Landman, 1998; Butler, 2001). For example, Grosu (1994) notes that, while the coordinate restrictive relatives in (30a) may be construed as purporting to identify a single set of boys all of whom both sang and danced, the coordinate degree relative clauses in (30b) do not purport to identify the same set of people. (29) That's all there is. (30) a. The boys who sang and who danced ... b. The people that there were at Bill's party and that there had been at Mary's party ...

1.2

The Central Problem

The main concern of this book is the fact that strings exhibiting splitting are more restricted than their full movement counterparts. Notably, scopal elements can block the licensing of an operator once split from its noun restrictor. Many of the split constructions introduced earlier are subject to these so-called intervention effects (cf. Obenauer, 1976, 1983; Rizzi, 1990; de Swart, 1992). Examples with negation as the scopal element/intervener are given in (31)(36):8 (31) a.

[CP [DP C o m b i e n d e livres]i n'as-tu pas how many of books NE-have-you not b. *[CP Combieni n'as-tu pas hi [DP ei d e how many NE-have-you not read of 'How many books have you not read?'

lus ei]? read-AGR livres]]? books

(32) a.

[CP [DP C o m b i e n d e livres] i as-tu beaucoup how many of books have-you a-lot lus ei]? read-AGR b. *[CP Combieni as-tu beaucoup lu [DP e\ d e livres]]? how many have-you a-lot read of books 'How many books have you read a lot?'

(33) a.

[CP [DP Qui d'interessantji n'a-t-il pas rencontre ei]? who of-interesting NE-has-he not met



6

Introduction

7

b. *[CP Quii n'a-t-il pas rencontre [DP Q[ d'interessant]]? who NE-has-he not met of-interesting 'Who has he not met that was interesting?' [CP [DP Qui d'autre]* n'a-t-il pas vu ej? who of-else NE-has-he not seen b. *[CP Quii n'a-t-il pas vu [DP Ci d'autre]]? who NE-has-he not seen of-other 'Who else has he not seen?'

(35) a.

[CP [DP W a t voor boeken]i heeft niemand e\ what for books has no one b. *[CP Wati heeft niemand [DP ei voor boeken] what has no one for books 'What kind of books has no one read?'

gelezen]? read gelezen]? read

(36) a.

[CP [DP W a s fur ein Werkzeugji sucht niemand ei]? what for a tool looks no one b. *[CP Wasi sucht niemand [DP ei fur ein Werkzeug]]? what looks no one for a tool 'What kind of tools is no one looking for?'

Such facts give our central problem: why should the relation between the in-situ restriction and the raised operator be so constrained when raising both operator and restriction leads to a well-formed structure? 9 The current consensus is that such effects can be linked to weak islands (see §1.3/10) and thus receive a common analysis. We keep to this view, but with a novel take on the link: we argue that all constructions exhibiting weak islands are really split constructions as defined in (4). For example, for a typical weak island like the nontensed WH-island in (37), we argue that adjunct extraction is blocked by the embedded question operator (a scopal element/intervener) because an adjunct's restrictor must scope in-situ (Williams, 1994). (37)*[CP

Howi did you wonder whether to repair the car ei]?

Thus, adjunct extraction is taken to actually form a split construction as (38) illustrates, with its bare operator separate from its restrictor. (38)*[CP

H—i did you wonder whether to repair the car ei ow]?

The other major claims of this book are that structures such as (39)-(41) can also be assimilated to split constructions. Our methodology thus groups a number of disparate seeming constructions into a natural class.



(34) a.

8


(40) Je n'ai vu personne. I NE-have seen no one 'I haven't seen anyone.' (41) [cPi Was glaubt Inge [cp2 wen Gunther gesehen hat]]? what believes Inge who Gunther seen has 'Who does Inge believe that Gunther has seen?' (39) will be assimilated to a split construction with the assumption that a null interrogative operator is base generated in Spec-CP, as in (42). The null operator, like other such operators, has its range fixed by coindexation with the in-situ nominal. 10 This is justified by, among other things, the observation that the interrogative operator in French is not morphologically marked. 11 The morpheme qu- in French interrogative words marks indefiniteness rather than interrogation, being also found in words such as quelqu'un 'someone' and quelque chose 'something'. 12 (42) [CP O p Tu fais quoi ce soir]? you do what this evening 'What are you doing tonight?' (40) will be assimilated to a split construction with the assumption that a phonologically null negative operator raises to a scope position while the semantic restriction is stranded, as in (43). 13 Again the role performed by the null operator in question is not morphologically realized. It will be argued in §3.4/82 that ne is neither necessary nor sufficient to mark sentential negation (Rowlett, 1998). Also, pas 'not' is incompatible with the presence of a (local) occurrence of personne 'no one'; and while a word like personne appears to be inherently negative (see §3.4/81), it contains no overt morpheme that stands for negation. 14 (43) Je n'ai [NegP Opi vu [DP ei personne]]. I NE-have seen no one 'I haven't seen anyone.' (41) will be assimilated to a split construction by assuming the WHphrase in Spec-CPi licenses a bare operator separate from its noun restriction, the latter having remained in the Spec-CP2 position. The



(39) Tu fais quoi ce soir? you do what this evening 'What are you doing tonight?'

Introduction

9

O p Tu ne fais pas quoi ce soir]? you NE do not what this evening 'What aren't you doing tonight?'

(44)*[CP

(45)*Jean n'a [NegP Opi toujours vu [DP ei personne]]. Jean NE-has always seen no one 15 *'Jean hasn't always seen anyone.' W a s glaubst du nicht [CP 2 [DP niit wem]i Gunther ei what believe you not with whom Gunther gesprochen hat]]? spoken with 'Who don't you believe that Gunther has spoken to?'

(46)*[CP X

In addition to intervention effects, the above constructions also exhibit clause-bound effects. In French, a WH-phrase in-situ does not sit comfortably in an embedded clause, as (47) shows (cf. Boskovic, 1998, 2000). 16 Similarly, personne 'no one' cannot be interpreted from its embedded position in (48). Finally, we note that (49) is ungrammatical unless an extra was is added in the intermediate SpecCP2 position (an observation that goes back to Van Riemsdijk, 1982; see also McDaniel, 1989; Simpson, 2000). (47)*[cPi O p Jean a dit [CP 2 que tu avais fait quoi]]? Jean has said that you had done what 'What has Jean said that you had done?' (48)*[cPi Jean n'a [NegP Opi dit [CP 2 que tu avais vu [DP Jean NE-has said that you had seen ei personne]]]]. no one *'Jean has not said that you had seen anyone.' W a s glaubst du [CP 2 d a s s Inge meint [cp 3 [DP niit what believe you that Inge thinks with wem]i Gunther e{ gesprochen hat]]]? whom Gunther spoken has 'With whom do you believe that Inge thinks Gunther spoke?'

(49)*[CP X



contention that partial WH constructions are split constructions was made explicit in Honcoop (1998) and Cheng (2000). Convergent evidence for the suggestion that (39)-(41) are split constructions comes from the fact that they all exhibit intervention effects, as shown in (44)-(46).

10


dit [CP 2 qu'il avait lu [DP &i (50) [cPi Conibieni as-tu how many have-you said that-he had read de livres]]]? of books 'How many books have you said that he had read?' Before we go on to outline our analysis of intervention effects in split constructions, we introduce previous approaches to the problem. We aim in particular to highlight connections and dissimilarities which can be drawn when we turn to our own account.

1.3

Previous Approaches

As mentioned in the last section, intervention effects can be linked to weak islands on which there is now a rich literature spanning the range of linguistic theorizing: pragmatics, semantics and syntax. In this section we look at representatives from this literature. But first some background: weak islands involve constituents that seem to behave with respect to syntactic movement partly like non-islands (because they permit some movements) and partly like islands (because many constituent types extractable from "normal" non-islands have their movement prohibited). Alternative names include selective islands, unlocked islands (Postal, 1998), and long WH movement (as opposed to successive cyclic movement). Names of subclasses include: WH-islands (Huang, 1982), negative islands (Williams, 1974; Rullmann, 1995) or inner islands (Ross, 1984), factive islands (Cinque, 1990), VP-adverb islands (Obenauer, 1983), and scope islands (Kiss, 1992; de Swart, 1992).17

1.3.1

Syntactic Views

E C P and WH-island Bulk WH-islands were the first kind of weak islands to be studied in any detail. They arise when an embedded interrogative lacks tense as in (51).



For completeness, we note that split combien constructions do not exhibit clause-bound effects, as (50) illustrates. This suggests that the structures in (39)-(41) should not be so closely related to splitDP constructions after all. §5.4.1/148 shows why such a conclusion would be premature.

Introduction

11

(51) Whati did you wonder [how to repair ei]?

(52)*Whati did you wonder [how I repaired ei]? Huang (1982) observed that the WH-phrase extracted from a WHisland has to be an argument. If it is an adjunct, the result is ungrammatical, hence the weak island status. For example, (51) contrasts with (53). (53) *HOWJ do you wonder [whati to repair ei ej]? Note that apparently unbounded extraction of adjuncts is possible without the presence of a weak or strong island, as (54) shows. Grammaticality follows from the presence of intermediate "ei" 's which form so-called escape hatches for the moved element (cf. §4.3.4/121). (54) a. Howi do you repair it ei? b. Howi do you believe [ei John repairs it ei]? c. Howi do you believe [ei Mary said [ei John repairs it ei]]? To account for the violation in (53), Huang (also Lasnik and Saito, 1984; Chomsky, 1986) used the Empty Category Principle (ECP) of (55) and the assumption that the bulk of a WH-island, having had its escape hatch filled, blocks antecedent government. (55) The Empty Category Principle All traces must be either: (i) antecedent governed (governed by the moved category), or (ii) lexically governed (that is, governed by a lexical head, which happens if in an argument position). With these assumptions, (53) is out because "ej" cannot be governed: "ej" can neither be antecedent governed (because of the WH-island), nor lexically governed (it is not in an argument position). Also note that the option of using an escape hatch as in (54) (which would create an antecedent chain) is unavailable: what fills up the embedded Spec-CP, blocking the creation of an intermediate "ej." In contrast, (51) is okay, since despite lacking an escape hatch and hence antecedent government, "ei" is nevertheless governed, being lexically governed from its argument position.



This allows WH-phrases to be extracted in contrast to the embedded interrogative with tense in (52) which constitutes a strong island, that is, an island blocking all extractions (see §4.3.4/122).


Note that this account is purely syntactic: the extraction of a phrase is sensitive to weak islands simply because it originates in a non-argument position. Placing aside the fact that empirical coverage is limited to WH-islands, the approach has a bigger problem: the concept of government has been abandoned in mainstream theories of grammar (Chomsky, 1995) and so the ECP in original form can no longer be stated. Nevertheless, we think the approach we offer is related, since our account can be thought to provide a semantic based implementation of antecedent government. The main difference is that the government relation is reversed, with the antecedent licensed by the "visibility" of the trace position.

Relativized Minimality In this section we outline Rizzi's (1990) Relativized Minimality. This offers an alternative syntax based account that is accompanied by a large extension in empirical coverage. According to Rizzi the argument/adjunct distinction does not result from syntactic position, but rather it is a matter of variable type, of which there are two: referential and non-referential. Motivation for this comes from the idea that referential expressions refer to participants in the event described by the verb, whereas non-referential expressions qualify the event, or involve compositionality (measure, manner, etc.) or form idiom chunks. Thus an argument comes with a referential index while an adjunct typically does not. For example, how and why are non-referential. Where and when are like argument WH-phrases in being referential (e.g., they can appear in-situ). Under Relativized Minimality, referential variables can be connected to their operators by binding (c-command with coindexation), a relation that is unaffected by barriers, while non-referential variables cannot. Instead, non-referential variables must be connected by the local relation of antecedent government, a relation that gets blocked by an intervening barrier. So far this is much like the account of the previous section. The innovation comes in the form of what counts as a barrier. In the case of A-movement this is taken to be a filled A-specifier. For example, the trace of how in (53), repeated as (56), gets ruled out by the existence of the intervening what which blocks the required antecedent government relation. (56)*HOWJ

do you wonder [whati to repair e\ ej]?



12

Introduction

13

This not only works as an account for WH-islands, but also serves as an account for negative islands like in (57).

The negative element not is taken to be the head of a negative phrase whose specifier is occupied by a null negative operator (in (57), not has cliticized onto so-called dummy do). The specifier position filled by the null negative operator is an A-position and it is the existence of this that is taken to block the relation between how and its trace. For such cases, it is not possible to appeal to the idea that a potential escape hatch has been filled (as was the case with WH-islands), since the WH-phrase does not/cannot pass through Spec-NegP. This is held to show that the relevant notion for barrierhood is that of being an A-specifier. Relativized Minimality also accounts for split constructions. For example, in (31b), repeated as (58), the A-specifier filled by the negative operator pas 'not' blocks the relation between combien 'how many' and its trace. This works because bare combien leaves behind a non-referential trace. Combieni nj'as-tu [NegP pas Neg ej lu how many NE-have-you not read livres]]]? books 'How many books have you not read?'

(58)*[CP

[DP

ei d e of

In contrast, (31a), repeated as (59), is okay since an argument raises to Spec-CP. Hence the trace of combien de livres, unlike the trace of combien, being referential, need not be antecedent governed. (59) [CP [DP Combien de livres] i nj'as-tu [NegP pas Neg ej how many of books NE-have-you not lu ej]]? read 'How many books have you not read?' However, it turns out that to account for intervention effects (and weak islands in general), having A-specifiers as barriers is neither necessary nor sufficient. This was first demonstrated in de Swart (1992).18 First, although the adverb beaucoup 'a lot' creates a blocking effect (as in (32b)), other adverbs like attentivement 'carefully' in (60b) and frequency adverbs like toujours 'always' in (61b) do not. 19



(57)*Howi didn't you say that John repaired the car ei?

14

The Syntax and Semantics of Split Constructions [CP Combien de livres] i as-tu attentivement how many of books have-you carefully consultes ei]? consulted-AGR b. [CP Combieni as-tu attentivement consulte [DP Ci how many have-you carefully consulted de livres]]? of books 'How many books have you carefully consulted?' (cf. Obenauer, 1994; Laenzlinger, 1998)

(61) a.

[CP [DP Combien d'enfantsji as-tu toujours voulu how many of-children have-you always wanted avoir ei]? have-iNF b. [CP Combieni as-tu toujours voulu avoir [DP ei how many have-you always wanted have-iNF d'enfants]]? of-children 'How many children have you always wanted to have?' (de Swart, 1992, 404)

Since Rizzi (1990) assumes that all adverbs occupy an A-position, (60b) and (61b) are falsely predicted to be ungrammatical. Second, in split constructions, scope interaction with universal quantifiers is limited. De Swart (1992) notes that the non-split (62) has two distinct readings in which (i) the universal scopes over the WH-phrase, and (ii) the WH-phrase scopes over the universal. Reading (i) asks for all persons how many books they have read. This is the so-called pair-list reading: 'John read 3, Mary read 5, Peter read 7.' Reading (ii) asks for a single number, i.e. 'how many books are such that everyone has read them.' This is the so-called individual reading. tous lus ei]? (62) [CP [DP Combien de livres]i ont-ils how many of books have-they all read-AGR 'How many books have they all read?' (de Swart, 1992, 403) In contrast, the split construction equivalent (63) has only reading (i), that is, the pair-list reading. De Swart dubbed this a scope island: the WH-phrase is incapable of taking wide scope. 20



(60) a.

Introduction

15

Under Rizzi's account, (63) should allow the same interpretations as (62), since according to him (and May, 1977, 1985), universal quantifiers move to IP-adjoined positions, which are not A-specifier positions. Further evidence for the claim that weak islands are scope related comes from the fact that they block pair-list readings (Longobardi, 1985; Cinque, 1990). The basic observation is that while (64a) has readings where the WH-phrase takes either wide or narrow scope, (64b,c) have only readings where the WH-phrase takes wide scope. Thus, (64a) can be answered either by: (i) 'John read Barriers, Mary read Syntactic Structures, Peter read Aspects'; or (ii) 'John, Mary and Peter read Barriers'. In contrast, (64b,c) receive only type (ii) readings. It seems that, for type (i) readings, the WH-phrase must reconstruct. This is blocked because of the intervening scopal element, negation in the case of (64b) and the embedded question act in the case of (64c). (64) a. Whati did each student read ei? b. Whati don't you think each student read ei? c. Whati do you wonder whether each student read ei? It is not clear how these contrasts can be accounted for under Relativized Minimality. What is an argument, and it should thus leave a referential trace behind in (64b,c), ensuring the absence of blocking effects. However, this is not the case. Rather WH-phrases on their pair-list interpretation behave like the adjuncts in (65) in being unable to take scope out of weak islands. Note that the examples with adjuncts in (65) are completely ungrammatical. We will argue in §5.4.8/160 that this holds because, contrary to arguments, adjuncts cannot take wide scope. (65) a. *Howi don't you think each student arrived ei? b. *Howi does John wonder whether each student behaved ei? In a revised version of Relativized Minimality, Rizzi (2004) has recently conceded that not all intervening A-specifiers trigger a minimality effect on A-chains, appealing instead to a finer typology. Roughly, he distinguishes beaucoup 'a lot', an adverb that acts as an intervener, from attentivement 'carefully', an adverb that does



(63) [CP Combieni ont-ils tous lu [DP ei d e livres]]? how many have-they all read of books 'How many books have they all read?' (de Swart, 1992, 403)


not, in the following terms: beaucoup is both quantificational and modificational, whereas attentivement is only modificational, that is, it does not interact with the raised WH-phrase. This solves the problem of attentivement. However, the problem of toujours 'always' remains. Clearly, frequency adverbs like toujours are quantificational. For example, they can quantify over times (or events) and even over individuals, as (66) shows (cf. Lewis, 1975). (66) Un triangle isocele a toujours deux cotes egaux. a triangle isoceles has always two sides equals 'Always, x is an isoceles triangle, x has two congruent sides.' As for the problem concerning universals (they bring about scope islands), Rizzi chooses to ignore this. Perhaps a solution can be found in terms of feature checking accounts of quantificational structures (cf. Beghelli and Stowell, 1997). But, as Szabolcsi and den Dikken (1999) note, Beghelli and Stowell's setup cannot derive correct Relativized Minimality results: universal quantifiers and modified numerals (e.g., exactly three books) cannot be united under a single heading, yet both are weak island inducers. Minimalist Revisions of Relativized M i n i m a l i t y There have been a number of Minimalist reworkings of Relativized Minimality: the Minimal Link Condition and Attract Closest (Chomsky, 1995), the Phase Impenetrability Constraint of Chomsky (2001), the Minimal Match Condition of Aoun and Li (2003), etc. Although these account well for the traditional islands subsumed under subjacency, that is, strong islands (subject, complex NP, left branch, adjunct) and WH-islands, such approaches face two notable problems. First, provided there are no interveners (e.g., negation, universal quantification, etc.), extraction of bare operators is possible in many languages (French, Russian, Polish, Dutch, etc.) and thus needs an analysis. Second, empirical coverage is limited: the majority of weak islands (negative, quantificational adverbs, focus, factive) fall outside their scope. For example, negation clearly does not have the same featural make-up as a WH-element: WH-elements are not attracted to the positions of negation, nor vice-versa. In other words, Minimalist approaches to locality effects are too weak. This is no problem by itself: perhaps semantics or pragmatics fills in the gaps. Alternatively, a syntactic solution might be found in terms of a finer-grained notion of what counts as an intervener under Rela-



16

17

tivized Minimality (Starke, 2001; Boeckx and Jeong, 2003). But we go beyond such views and argue that Relativized Minimality even with reworking is unnecessary. Instead, we develop a view of locality effects as being generally semantic in nature. 21 This is cashed out in §4.3/113 with a discussion of the locality properties of A-movement, A-movement, Control and binding dependencies.

Scopal E C P In recent years, alternatives to the problematic relation of antecedent government have been given. One example is the Scopal ECP of Williams (1994). Williams gets to discard government altogether by reversing the ECP. As given in (55), the ECP is a condition that restricts scope possibilities by constraining the movement of scopetaking elements. 22 It does this by constraining the licensing of traces. Instead, Williams proposes that the ECP should actually restrict movement possibilities through the theory of scope. 23 He justifies this by arguing that while scope reconstruction is not obligatory for WH-moved arguments, it is obligatory for WH-moved adjuncts. He suggests that this difference is a consequence of the fact that arguments enter into both a scope relation and a theta-theoretic relation with the sentence they occur in, while adjuncts have only a scope relation. This lack of a relation beyond scope has the effect of limiting an adjunct's scope to the scope of its sister as (67) illustrates, else it would be the adjunct of another projection. (67)

YP XP

YP

The scope of XP is YP.

For example, in (68) always modifies tell, not think That is, always cannot be construed as having scope over the matrix clause to yield the interpretation in (69). (68) John thinks that Mary [VP always [VP tells funny jokes]]. (69) Every time is such that John thinks that Mary at that time tells funny jokes. In contrast, the scope of an argument is more flexible. In (70) someone can have both wide and narrow scope with respect to everyone.



Introduction

18

The Syntax and Semantics of Split

Constructions

Taking this, Williams proposes a scopal version of the ECP. This is given in (71), and relies on the Nested Scope Constraint of (72). (71) Scopal ECP a. If the movement of a phrase and its scope coincide, then its trace is licensed (the analogue of lexical government). b. If the movement of a phrase and the scope assigned to it do not coincide, then the phrase must be connected to its trace in accordance with the Nested Scope Constraint (the analogue of antecedent government). (72) Nested Scope Constraint In (73), ei must depend on YPj. (73) XP scope? YP j scope Alternatively put, the Nested Scope Constraint says that a dependent element cannot move to a position preceding an item on which it cannot depend. We can see the Scopal ECP at work with (74) and (75). Both examples contain a weak island, having a WH-element in Spec-CP 2. In (74), what, being an argument, takes matrix C as its scope. This coincides with its movement, and so (74) is okay by (71a). In contrast, in (75) the scope of the adjunct how is restricted to the embedded VP. This brings about the scope configuration of (73). As a result, (75) cannot be sanctioned by (71a). Moreover, how cannot be dependent on the embedded what, and so (75) fails the Nested Scope Constraint. Hence (75) is predicted to be ungrammatical, since it cannot be sanctioned by (71b) either. scope of whaU

H

H

(74) [cPi Whati C do you wonder [cp 2 how C [VP to repair ei]]]?



(70) Everyone loves someone. (i) For every person x, there is a person y, such that x loves y. (ii) There is a person y such that every person loves y.

Introduction

19

scope of howi Howi C do you wonder

[CP 2

what C [vp to repair ei]]]?

Identical reasoning carries over to examples like the split combien construction of (58), with negation acting as the intervening scopal operator on which the adjunct combien cannot depend. In addition to blocking examples like (58) and (75), the Nested Scope Constraint opens up the possibility of licensing adjuncts that can depend on the intervening operator. Williams implements this in terms of entering into a skolem dependency. To illustrate with universal quantifiers, (76) can receive a pair-list interpretation according to which different boys arrived via different methods ('John arrived by car; Michael, by train; Peter, by plane.'). This is exactly the reading expected given that how must enter into a skolem dependency with every. (76) [CP Howi [IP did every boy [vp arrive ei]]]? On the other hand, (76) cannot receive a wide-scope reading (that is, unless it is presupposed that there is one method of arrival common to all boys, see Kiss 1992, Szabolcsi and Zwarts 1993). But then this is exactly as predicted, since the skolem dependency the Nested Scope Constraint enforces on (76) is incompatible with a wide scope reading. For our account, we will adopt the idea that adjuncts have fixed in-situ scope. However, we will not assume Williams' Scopal ECP and in particular the Nested Scope Constraint, since the notion of dependency that it relies on is ad-hoc: that some scopal elements should introduce a skolem dependency, while others do not, is purely stipulative.

Conditions on LF Another alternative to antecedent government is the Intervention Effect Condition of Pesetsky (2000) as stated in (77). (77) The Intervention Effect Condition (Pesetsky) A semantic restriction on a quantifier (including WH) may not be separated from that quantifier by a scope-bearing element.



(75)*[CPI


This has been applied to at least two domains: WH-structures and constructions with negative polarity items (for the latter, see the discussion of Guerzoni, 2004, in §3.3.2/77). An advantage is that it does not rely on the concept of an A-specifier, enabling it to subsume the intervention effects that escape Relativized Minimality and its Minimalist versions. A problem is that it remains ad-hoc: we would like to understand why it holds. Moreover, the syntactic system that Pesetsky assumes to underpin (77) is inconsistent with Minimalism insofar as it requires two types of "covert" movement: phrasal LF movement and feature (LF) movement (see §3.3.2/77 for details). Since Minimalism has only the one cycle, this is impossible. The work that inspired Pesetsky (2000), namely Beck (1996a,b), faces similar problems. According to Beck (1996a,b) (also Beck and Kim, 1997), intervention effects follow from the island condition (78) on traces that are left behind by covert movement. Specifically, a trace created by LF movement cannot be related to its antecedent across a "Quantifier-Induced Barrier" as defined in (79). (78) Minimal Quantified Structure Constraint (Beck) If an LF trace {3 is dominated by a Quantifier-Induced Barrier a, then the binder of /3 must also be dominated by a. (Beck, 1996a, 39) (79) The first node that dominates a quantifier, its restriction, and its nuclear scope is a Quantifier-Induced Barrier. Beside the fact that (78) does not seem to follow from anything and thus only amounts to a restatement of the facts, the proposal is inconsistent with Minimalism. In the Minimalist Program, "covert" movement is feature movement (or Agree in more recent versions) while "overt" movement is feature movement/Agree + phonological piedpiping. Hence, any condition at LF will also apply pre-Spell-Out, a view formulated as the Uniformity Principle in (80) (cf. Chomsky, 1995).24 (80) The Uniformity Principle The derivation from the Numeration to LF is uniform. While technical details of the Minimalist enterprise have changed over the years (sometimes dramatically), the theme that conditions cannot be postulated at LF has remained consistently relevant. In fact, postulating constraints at LF is counterintuitive, since we expect LF to be somehow "freer" than overt syntax, an assumption which



20

Introduction

21

was widely held in the 1980's, and only questioned in the 1990's after the discovery of scope islands.

Pragmatic Views

A number of researchers have observed that extracting a WH-phrase out of a weak island leads to well-formed results when the extracted WH-phrase is referential/presuppositional. For example, drawing on work by Kroch (1989) and Comorovski (1989), Cinque (1990) refines Rizzi's (1990) syntax based referential versus non-referential distinction. According to Cinque, in addition to having a referential thetarole, a referential WH-phrase should be D(iscourse)-linked in Pesetsky's (1987) sense, that is, drawn from a pre-established set. The insight is that almost any WH-phrase (except perhaps why) can be immune to weak islands if D-linked. The contrast in (81) illustrates this with a WH-island: the good example involves a contextually established set of books. (81) a. *[How many articlesji are you wondering whether to publish ei next year? b. [How many articles on the list] i are you wondering whether to publish ei next year? The same effect, only with a negative island, is illustrated in (82). (82) a. *[How much]i didn't you pay ei? b. [How much]i didn't you pay that you were supposed to ei? (Kroch, 1989, 19) As Kroch notes, the extraposed relative clause modifying how much in (82b) serves to introduce a plausible unique amount into the existential presupposition of the question, which might be stated as in (83). (83) There was a sum that you were supposed to pay that you didn't pay. In contrast, without a carefully chosen context of utterance, (82a) can at best presuppose (84). (84) There was a sum that you didn't pay. While semantically well formed, (84) is odd in its stating that there could be a specific sum of money, say twenty euro, that could be



1.3.2


uniquely identified in the discourse as having the property that you didn't pay it, since this property would also apply to any amount larger than twenty euro. Such reasoning suggests that (82a) is not so much ungrammatical, but rather unusable in most discourse contexts. In the same vein, according to Comorovski (1996), a question in which a non-D-linked WH-phrase is fronted over negation violates the requirement that questions should be answerable. For example, in answering (85a) we form the set of individuals that John saw and list its members. In answering (85b) we form the complement of this set. To form such a complement we must have knowledge of the entire set of individuals that who ranges over. Thus, for (85b), knowledge of the membership of who ensures the D-linking of who. (85) a. Who did John see? b. Who didn't John see? Finally, Kiss (1992) proposes the scope principle in (86). This says that extracting WH-phrases over negative islands leads to wellformed results just in case the extracted WH-phrase is specific. The sense of "specific" is that of Eng's (1991), which is closely related to D-linking (cf. Rizzi, 2001). Thus, Kiss' (1992) analysis can be grouped with Cinque (1990), Kroch (1989) and Comorovski (1996). (86) The Scope Principle (Kiss) If Opi has scope over Opj and binds a variable in the scope of Opj, Opi must be specific. While these pragmatic accounts are persuasive, Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1990, 1993) (henceforth, S&Z) argue that D-linking cannot be the correct discriminating factor. They note that such approaches predict that it should not be possible to extract WH-the-hell out of a weak island, since this WH-phrase is "aggressively non-D-linked," in the words of Pesetsky (1987). While it is difficult to extract WHthe-hell from weak islands, S&Z argue that this is due to an independent requirement for unquestionable evidence. Thus, unless (87) is interpreted as a rhetorical question, it is felicitous only if we have unquestionable evidence that someone saw John and merely wish to identify the person. Such a requirement is often difficult to fulfil in the complex situations described by weak island violations like (88). (87) Who the hell saw John? (88) ??Who the helli are you wondering whether to invite ei?



22

Introduction

23

Notably, when such evidence is available, a weak island violation by WH-the-hell is acceptable. For example, seeing someone rifling through a dictionary, we may felicitously ask (89).

Also, we should note that in this book we defend a view of intervention effects and weak islands as being one and the same phenomena. But the pragmatic accounts considered here cannot be used in accounts of intervention as there are clear counterexamples. Consider the contrast in (90), attributed to Kiss by Pesetsky (2000). (90) a. *Which book didn't which person read ei? b. Which book did which person read ei? Thus, (90a) shows that D-linking is not enough to overcome an intervention effect, with (90b) indicating that the form of (90a) is otherwise okay. In fact, in (90a), D-linking is arguably responsible for creating the circumstances whereby the intervention effect can arise (see §5.4.6/156). It follows that, if collapsing intervention effects with weak islands is correct, the pragmatic accounts of this section are wrong.

1.3.3

Semantic Views

Here we review Szabolcsi and Zwarts (1993, 1997) (S&Z) and Honcoop (1998, 1999). S&Z comes as an implementation of Kiss' (86). Honcoop builds on de Swart's (1992) related (91). (91) The Scope Hypothesis (de Swart) An operator Opi can only separate an operator Opj from its restrictive material if Opi takes wide scope over Opj. While both scope principles are useful descriptive generalizations, they suffer from having no explanatory content. What gives the semantic viewpoints of S&Z and Honcoop their bite is that they provide principled reasons for why (86) and (91) should hold. Boolean operations on impoverished domains S&Z argue that weak-island effects arise because, in contrast to the trace left by arguments, the trace left by adjuncts does not range over discrete individuals. Rather, the trace left by an adjunct ranges



(89) What the hell do you still not know how to spell ei?


over a partially ordered domain. Certain Boolean operations, such as complement and meet (negation corresponds to taking Boolean complement; universal quantification corresponds to taking Boolean meet), cannot be performed on impoverished domains such as the ones corresponding to adjuncts. When an expression E scopes over some operator Op, the operations that define Op need to be performed in £"s denotation domain. For example, in calculating the denotation of (92), one takes the complement of the set of those whom one saw. This is possible because who ranges over individuals, and individuals form sets on which complementation can be performed. (92) Who didn't you see? S&Z argue that, by contrast, the denotation domains of weak-island sensitive items (manners, methods, etc.) do not lend themselves to complementation and/or intersection. Thus, they cannot scope over negation or universal quantifiers, as (93) shows. (93) a. *How didn't you see Mary? b. How did everyone arrive?

(*WH > V)

According to S&Z, they can, however, scope over existentials as in (94a) (whose definition is in terms of union) or intensional verbs like want in (94b) (whose semantic contribution is not Boolean in nature). (94) a. How did a child see the movie? b. How did you want me to see John? In sum, S&Z propose that weak-island violations are semantically incoherent, in much the same way as *six airs is, where a numeral is applied to a mass term. The problem with this approach is that it cannot account for why the same weak island effects occur with split combien constructions (cf. (31b)), in-situ WH questions (cf. (39)) and partial WH constructions (cf. (41)). This is because these have full movement alternatives that escape the weak island effect. Hence, we cannot attribute the weak island sensitivity of such split/in-situ/partial constructions to any special algebraic properties of the denotation domain of the WH operator. To quote Honcoop (1998, 147): "for then, by parity of reasoning, we would expect its non-split variant [...] to be sensitive to [weak islands] as well."



24

Introduction

25

We now turn to consider Honcoop's analysis which relies on a dynamic semantics. For a long time the dynamic semantics literature was taken to contain two opposing camps: - the Lewis (1975) /Kamp (1981)/Heim (1982) approach which was characterized as offering an outlook upon indefinites as free variables, and - the dynamic approaches of e.g. Barwise (1987) and Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991) which kept to the classical analysis of indefinites as (existentially) bound variables. But really the two camps are basically equivalent: the Lewis/Kamp/ Heim approach favours an (existential) closure of all indefinites at some level of analysis, while existentially bound variables in systems of dynamic semantics are still free in some sense. The latter result was established by Dekker (1993) who showed that dynamic existentially bound variables can be (re-)bound by other quantifiers using a technique called existential disclosure. The observation goes: if x is bound by a dynamic existential quantifier in ip, then it turns out to be universally quantified in (95). (95) Vyty Ax = y) Thus, if ^ = 3xP(x), then (95) is (fully) equivalent to \ft/P(y). 25 Honcoop uses the technique of existential disclosure as the basis for an analysis of the following constructions: 26 - split combien constructions, - factive islands, - constructions with NPIs, and - partial WH constructions. He argues that such constructions instantiate a split configuration in which an operator Op is related to an embedded indefinite in the same way that the universal quantifier in (95) relates to a dynamic existential quantifier that binds x in ip. The significance of this idea is that without any further stipulation it derives the fact that intervening operators have the potential to impede the dependency between Op and the indefinite.27 For example, if if) = -izlxP(x) then (95) becomes V?/(->ztaP(ic) A y = x) which is not equivalent to ^/y-^Viy), with the occurrence of x outside the scope of if) left free. With this in hand, weak/scope island effects are predicted to occur with the class of expressions that create inaccessible domains for dy-



Dynamic Semantics and Splitting

26


(96) a. b. c. d. e. f.

*John doesn't have a car^ Iti is too expensive. *No student has a cari. Iti is too expensive. *Exactly five students have a car^ Iti is quite expensive. *Most students have a cari. Iti is quite expensive. *Every student has a car^ Iti is quite expensive. *John wonders whether this shop has a bikei. He saw iti last week. g. *John often bought a new cari. Iti was very expensive.

Honcoop's analysis is very appealing. However, it is not without problems. One problem is that it is not clear how it can be used to account for the weak-island sensitivity of how. It seems difficult to make a case for how's movement bringing about a split construction under existential disclosure terms, since it seems unlikely that there would be an indefinite remnant for how to bind (this argument is made by Szabolcsi and Zwarts, 1997). Thus, it is difficult (at least, at first) to imagine adjuncts involving splitting. Honcoop's theory thus accounts for weak islands of a certain kind, those basically introduced by Rizzi (1990), but not for traditional weak islands. However, in this book, we will argue that WH-raising with adjuncts does in fact lead to a configuration akin to a split construction. This is because the scope of an adjunct gets fixed to where it is merged (cf. Williams, 1994). Hence while the WH-part of a phrase like how moves to the C domain, its restriction which signals its scopal whereabouts is either required to remain in-situ or reconstruct. 28 As a consequence, there is no way for this part of the WH-phrase to be outside the scope of an intervener at LF. It is in this sense that we will claim how brings about a split construction and so is made vulnerable to weak islands. We are big fans of a Honcoop style analysis and it could be charged that the advantages of our approach over Honcoop's are largely implementational. On the other hand, our account is very different. The existential disclosure trick is dispensed with, along with the need for an indefinite in the remnant position. Also our approach is shown to generalize more readily and so cover a much wider range of data, while in addition providing a much cleaner and more motivated link with syntax. And with this, we turn to outlining our proposal.



namic anaphora, that is, those that block cross-sentential anaphora. Such operators are illustrated in (96) (a-e are from page 17 of Honcoop, 1998, f is from page 200). As predicted they are indeed weakisland inducing operators.

Introduction

Our Proposal: needing visible usage information

Like Honcoop we take the dynamic semantics stance on interpretation as our starting point. This is basically the observation that, for a discourse to be interpretable, information pertaining to the discourse itself is needed. We will call this usage information. An archetypal example is the contrast between (97) and (98) (due to B. Partee). (97) I dropped ten marbles and found all of them, except for one. It is probably under the sofa. (98) I dropped ten marbles and found only nine of them. ??It is probably under the sofa. The first sentences in (97) and (98) are truthconditionally equivalent: they provide the same information about the world. But unlike (97), the first sentence of (98) does not give sufficient usage information to allow for the resolution of the anaphoric link. We will adopt the perspective on usage information developed by Dekker (2002a, 2003b) that sees it as providing information as to the possibly intended referents that support an utterance. 29 Dekker shows how adding such general pragmatic information to a classical, referentially based notion of meaning has the effect of deriving a dynamic semantics (and this without any shift in the notion of meaning). For example, the occurrence of one in the first sentence of (97) comes with an 3 usage instruction and so is assumed to make available an "intentionally present" individual (i.e. the lost marble) that the pronoun in the second sentence can take as its referent. In contrast, (98) is bad because there is no such intentionally present individual. Note that the referential intentions associated with the use of indefinites like one in (97) are to be attributed to the speaker, who is supposed to be able to support what she says. The hearer has no such requirements, and so can generally take an 3 occurrence to introduce a new subject of discussion. Now consider the speaker's support for (99). (99) There isn't a person in sight. This can be characterized as a ban on an update of her state with (100). (100) A person is in sight.



1.4

27


Consequently, the requirement of referential intentions is replaced by the requirement to have evidence that she, as a hearer, bans any update with (100), no matter who, with whatever intentions, would try to attempt to bring about such an update. This situation arises because the 3 usage instruction a person makes available is assumed to only be visible from within the scope of the negation. From outside negation's scope, 3 is opaque, accounting for the absence of referential intentions, which in turn accounts for the absence of any potential anaphoric pick up. From this perspective, we argue that there is a related visibility requirement on the C domain for interrogative sentences to meet. We propose that this arises because cross-linguistically interrogatives come with a bare interrogative operator Q base generated as the highest element. Thus all interrogatives give rise to split configurations. To have values under question to impart to variables, Q is taken to rely on the presence of "wh" usage instructions. Whenever WH-phrases carry wh, they must be in a visible relation with the C domain, in the sense of not falling underneath a scopal operator, for Q to function as a binder of WH variables. This explains why (101) and (102) are okay. (101) O p Quii' est-ce que tu n'as pas vu ei? Q wh is-this that you NE-have scopal-op seen Q x you_did_not_see(x) (102) O p Tu as vu qui? Q you have seen wh Q x you_saw(x) It also explains why (103) is bad, with Q left to ask a question without the support required to bind any variables. (103)*OpTu n'as pas vu qui? Q you NE-have scopal-op seen wh Q you_didjiot_see(x) That is, (103) is incoherent. On the one hand, because of the intervening scopal operator, it fails to show any wh usage information, and thus no values under question are introduced (hence the plain Q in the interpret able representation), and on the other hand, it really does have a WH-phrase primed to receive values under question (the free x). The approach generalizes as in (104).



28

Introduction ( 1 0 4 ) O p [Matrix ». ( * s c o p a l - o p ) [ ... [Restriction -

29

usage-instruction

... ] ... ] ... ]

( 1 0 5 ) O p x [ M a t r i x ... (*SCOpal-Op)[ ... [Restriction ••• 3y ... ) ... ] ...

and x equals dynamically bound y] Under this perspective, a usage instruction equates approximately to the function of a dynamic existential quantifier, that is, it ensures that a new value will be present in the evaluation. We will show that the basic lines of the account sketched here extend to the range of locality effects covered by the descriptive principles of Pesetsky (77), Beck (78), Kiss (86) and de Swart (91). More specifically, our domain of enquiry will focus on the locality effects of the following items: - N-words (§5.3.1/135) - negative polarity items (§5.3.2/139) - split combien DPs (§5.4.1/147) - WH-in-situ (French §5.4.2/150, Korean §5.4.3/153, German §5.4.4/154, English §5.4.6/156, Chinese §5.4.7/158) - WH-adjuncts (§5.4.8/160) - WH out of scope restricting contexts (§5.4.8/161) - WH in partial WH constructions (§5.4.9/163) A key advantage is that all this is achieved without disrupting Minimalist assumptions. Hence our account can be taken to fill the gap in empirical coverage left by Minimalism, while remaining consistent with the approach: we can rely on a unique cycle from the Numeration to LF (contra Pesetsky), and we do not have to postulate ad hoc constraints on covert movement that violate the Uniformity Principle (80) (contra Beck). Moreover, we will see in the course of the book that our account has other more general consequences, providing along the way a suggestive account of the following phenomena: - constraints on A-movement (clause boundedness) (§4.3.2/115) - control (§4.3.2/115) - constraints on binding dependencies (that anaphors must, and pronouns can, be bound) (§4.3.2/119)



Stated thus, the approach is close to a re-working of Honcoop's (1998) insight which can be pictured as in (105).

30


- constraints on A-movement (subjacency and strong island effects) (§4.3.4/121) - strong crossover effects (§4.3.5/126)

1.5

Overview of the Book

Chapter 2 first introduces WH-in-situ constructions in French and other languages. It develops the hypothesis that French WH-in-situ constructions are split constructions: a (phonologically null) bare interrogative operator is base generated separately from its noun restriction. We then note how the same approach accounts for properties of all WH contexts in Korean and specifically multiple WH contexts in German. After the syntax of WH-in-situ has been introduced, we look at questions with WH-adjuncts and more generally at WH scope potential. We argue that contexts that restrict the scope taking potential of a WH-phrase create split configurations. Finally, we argue that the partial WH construction in German also gives rise to a split configuration. Continuing our basic methodology of grouping seeming disparate constructions into a natural class, chapter 3 examines the behaviour of negative constructions. Recently constructions involving negative polarity items and N-words have come under much scrutiny since they too exhibit intervention effects. Our analysis of these constructions basically follows the line of the preceding chapter: constructions with negative expressions are further cases of split constructions. In such environments, a negative operator is separate from its noun restrictor. In preparation for the account of intervention effects to be given in chapter 5, we spend chapter 4 introducing a family of logical tools: Propositional Logic, Predicate Logic, Predicate Logic with Anaphora, and Predicate Logic with Barriers. The latter is linked to a Minimalist syntax with a standard conception of an interface between syntax and semantics: syntax generates syntactic Logical Form representations which semantics can evaluate. We also show how the logic system developed, in particular its barrier operator, can account for the locality effects of both A- and A-movements, as well as the locality properties of dependencies that do not involve movement: control dependencies, binding dependencies and strong crossover effects. Chapter 5 extends the logical tools of chapter 4 to cover domain widening and provide the beginnings of a question semantics. It then



- positive polarity items (§5.2.2/131)

Introduction

31


goes on to give a step by step analysis of the most relevant examples introduced in this book. We see that the resulting theory is wideranging and economical in that it is built on few assumptions. The book ends with a summary of findings.





W H Constructions 2.1

Introduction

In this chapter we consider a range of WH constructions that give rise to intervention effects. We argue that such constructions are split constructions. To do this, in §2.2 we focus on the distributional and discourse properties of French single WH-in-situ constructions. Such constructions share the same range of intervention effects as split combien constructions. Then in §2.3 we turn to single and multiple WH-in-situ constructions in two other languages that exhibit intervention effects: Korean and German. §2.4 looks at interrogatives with WH-adjuncts and at interrogatives that question out of scope restricting contexts, both of which we argue bring about split constructions cross-linguistically. §2.5 looks at partial WH constructions, focusing on German, and again the observation is that split constructions are created. §2.6 gives a summary of findings.

2.2

French WH-in-situ

In this section we argue rather than assume that French WH-insitu structures are split constructions. Then we review a number of previous accounts that conflict with such an analysis. The data is limited to questions with a single WH-phrase, since, in French, only questions of this type display intervention effects. Thus, (1) shows that scopal elements such as negation are freely able to scope over a WH-phrase in-situ in a multiple WH question. We will ignore this 33 10.1057/9780230501607 - The Syntax and Semantics of Split Constructions, Alastair Butler and Eric Mathieu


Chapter 2

34


(1) Qui n'a pas fait quoi? who NE-has not done what 1 Who hasn't done what?'

2.2.1

Why French WH-in-situ are Split Constructions

In questions with a single WH-phrase, French can either leave the WH-phrase in-situ as in (2a), or front it as in (2b). 30 (2) a. Tu vois qui ce soir? you see who this evening b. Quii' est-ce que tu vois ei ce soir? who is-this that you see this evening 'Who are you seeing tonight?' In non-standard forms of the language, the in-situ alternative is also possible in indirect questions, as (3) shows. However, this is more limited, as the ungrammatically of (4a) shows. (3) a. Je sais pas c'est oil. I know not it-is where b. Je sais pas oii c'est. I know not where it-is 'I don't know where it is.' (4) a. *Je me I myself b. Je me I myself 'I wonder

demande il a fait ask he has done demande ce qu'il ask this that-he what he has done.'

quoi. what a fait. has done

Aoun, Hornstein, and Sportiche (1981) and Lasnik and Saito (1992) account for this optionality by suggesting that French has a "mixed" system with regard to the formation of WH-interrogatives. On this view, French is like Chinese in that the WH-phrase can remain in-situ, but also like English in that the WH-phrase can move overtly to Spec-CP. However, it was noticed recently that whereas the distribution of argumental WH-in-situ in Chinese single WH interrogatives is not restricted, the distribution of French argumental WH-in-



fact until §5.4.5/155, when we incorporate such "saving" behaviour into our analysis.

35

situ in the same environment is very limited (Chang, 1997; Boskovic, 1998, 2000; Mathieu, 1999, 2004; Cheng and Rooryck, 2000; Boeckx, 2003). In particular, such questions display intervention effects with a whole range of scopal elements. These effects are systematically absent from the movement alternative. For example, negation blocks the licensing of the WH-phrase in-situ in (5a), but leaves the licensing of the moved WH-phrase in (5b) unhindered (6) gives another illustration of the same contrast. (5) a. *I1 ne voit pas qui? he NE sees not who b. Quii'est-ce qu'il ne voit pas ej? who is-this that-he NE sees not 'Who doesn't he see?' (6) a. *Tu ne fais pas quoi ce soir? you Neg do not what this evening b. Qui' est-ce que tu ne fais pas ei ce soir? what is-this that you NE do not this evening 'What aren't you doing tonight?' It is not only heads that block the licensing of WH-in-situ in French, but also XPs. 3 1 For example, negative quantificational subjects block the licensing of French WH-in-situ in (7). (7) a. *Aucun etudiant a lu quoi? no student has read what b. Qui' est-ce qu'aucun etudiant a lu ei? what is-this that-no student has read 'What did no student read?' In addition, as was first noticed in Mathieu (1999), focus markers such as seulement 'only' and mime 'even' and the DPs with which they are associated create intervention effects, as illustrated in (8a) and (9a). (8) a. *Seulement Jean fait quoi? only Jean does what b. Qui' est-ce que seulement Jean fait ei? what is-this that only Jean does 'What does only JEAN do?' (9) a. *Meme Jean fait quoi? even Jean does what



WH Constructions

36


So-called iterative adverbs, such as beaucoup 'a lot', peu 'little' and trop 'too much', also block the licensing of French WH-in-situ, as (10)-(12) illustrate. (10) a. *I1 a beaucoup lu quoi? he has a-lot read what b. Qui' est-ce qu'il a beaucoup lu ei? what is-this that-he has a-lot read 'What has he often read?' (11) a. *I1 a peu lu quoi? he has little read what b. Qui' est-ce qu'il a peu lu ei? what is-this that-he has little read 'What has he seldom read?' (12) a. *I1 a trop lu quoi? he has too-much read what b. Qui' est-ce qu'il a trop lu ei? what is-this that-he has too-much read 'What has he read too much?' All this differs from Chinese. For example, bu/mei 'not', meiyouren 'nobody', and zhi 'only' fail to act as interveners. This is shown in (13), with examples involving shenme 'what' and shei 'who' (examples from Soh, 1998). (13) a. Ta mai-le shenme? he buy-PERF what 'What did he buy?' b. Ta mei chi shenme? he not eat what 'What didn't he eat?' c. Meiyouren gan gen shei dajia? nobody dare with who fight 'Who will nobody dare fight?' d. Ta zhi mai shenme? he only sell what 'What does he only sell?'



b. Qui' est-ce que meme Jean fait ei? what is-this that even Jean does 'What does even JEAN do?'

WH Constructions

37

WH-adjuncts like weishenme 'why' form an exception. These are blocked by intervening scopal elements, as (14) illustrates (examples from Soh, 1998). Ni renwei Lisi weishenme cizhi? you think Lisi why resign 'Why do you think Lisi resigned?' b. *Ni bu renwei Lisi weishenme cizhi? you not think Lisi why resign 'Why don't you think Lisi resigned?' c. *Meiyouren weishenme cizhi? nobody why resign 'Why did nobody resign?' d. *Ni zhi renwei Lisi weishenme cizhi? you only think Lisi why resign 'Why do you only think Lisi resigned?'

An additional difference is that while a French WH-phrase in-situ does not sit comfortably in an embedded clause, as the contrast of (15) shows (noted by Boskovic, 1998, 2000), Chinese WH-phrases have no such problem, as (16) demonstrates. (15) a. *Jean a dit que tu avais fait quoi? Jean has said that you had done what b. Qui' est-ce que Jean a dit que tu avais fait ei? what is-this that Jean has said that you had done 'What has Jean said that you had done?' (16) Ta renwei [CP ni maile shenme]? he think you bought what 'What does he think you bought?'

(Ouhalla, 1996, 678)

On the basis of these facts, we conclude that it is impossible to claim that French has a "mixed" system with regard to the formation of WH questions. Something is special about French WH-in-situ. We will argue that the kind of intervention effects seen follow from: (i) a split configuration, and (ii) the semantic and discourse properties of the WH-phrase in-situ. The key idea is that, contrary to appearances, a French WH-in-situ example like (2a) gives rise to a configuration that is much like the configuration found with a split-DP construction: it has a phonologically null bare operator base generated as the topmost element of the clause and thus separate from the WH-phrase in-situ that counts as its semantic restriction, as in (17).



(14) a.

38


On the other hand, in Chinese, the idea is that no such split structure is yielded (except in the case of WH-adjuncts).

2.2.2

Previous Accounts

For a long time, French WH-in-situ was not studied: it was rarely reported probably because it is very much part of the spoken language. However, recently it has inspired considerable interest. In this section we introduce three accounts that we take to be representative of current views: Cheng and Rooryck (2000), Boeckx (1999) and Zubizarreta and Vergnaud (2002). These share as a basic assumption Chang's (1997) claim that WH-in-situ are necessarily presuppositional, and so we introduce this first. At the close of the section we criticize Chang's view. By itself, this undermines all previous work on the topic. French WH-in-situ and presuppositions Chang (1997) claims that the French in-situ option and the raised alternative invoke different readings. That there is a subtle meaning difference is probably correct, but Chang's claim is more specific: French WH-in-situ questions are associated with a "strongly presupposed context," while the raised counterpart is non-presuppositional.32 The presuppositional constraint Chang claims for WH-in-situ is not reducible to the more common notion of D-linking. The idea is that (18Q) is only felicitous if the speaker assumes the event of Marie's buying something. On this view, the interpretation of WHin-situ interrogatives seeks "details on an already established (or presupposed) situation" (Chang, 1997, 45). The presupposition crucial for WH-in-situ thus involves the entire VP. That is, (18Q) asks for details of the purchase (i.e., 'What exactly did Marie buy?'). According to Chang, this is why it is odd to answer (18Q) with (18A). In contrast, (19A) is perfectly legitimate as an answer to (19Q). (18) Q: Marie a achete quoi? Marie has bought what 'What did Marie buy?'



(17) [CP O p Tu vois qui ce soir]? you see who this evening 'Who are you seeing tonight?'

WH Constructions

39

(19) Q: Qu'est-ce que Marie a achete? what-is-this that Marie has bought A: Rien. 'Nothing.' Obenauer (1994) shares pretty much the same idea, claiming that in-situ WH-phrases are associated with a presupposed context, asking for details linked to the context. He gives the minimal pair in (20), with the claim that the in-situ variant (20b) is not right in an ordinary context: it requires a rich context, for example, a visit to a friend in hospital. In such a context, Obenauer claims that (20b) is interpret able only like an interrogative asking for the health condition of the addressee. (20) a.

Salut! Comment tu vas? hi how you go 'Hi! How are you?' b. Alors, tu vas c o m m e n t ? so, you go how 'So, how are you?'

French WH-in-situ and a Yes-No Question Operator Cheng and Rooryck (2000) (henceforth, C&R) base their account on the claim that (21) and (22) have related intonation, namely, a rising contour. 33 (21) Marie a achete quoi? Marie has bought what 'What did Marie buy?' (22) Jean a achete un livre? Jean has bought a book 'Has Jean bought a book?' The idea is that WH-phrases in-situ are licensed by the yes-no question operator. 34 Chinese is claimed to have essentially the same strategy, with the one difference that French requires WH-feature movement to set the value of the Q morpheme to Q/WH. This is argued to create an operator-indefinite configuration, as shown in (23), from



A:*Rien. 'Nothing.'

40


which intervention effects are expected, following Honcoop's (1998) account (see §1.3.3/25 and §3.3.1/71). 35

C&R arrive at Chang's (1997) presupposition judgements with the claim that yes-no questions marked only by intonation likewise require presupposed contexts. Thus while (24a) can be uttered as a neutral question, (24b) cannot. Rather, in uttering (24b), the speaker presupposes that the hearer is cooking in the evening, and so expects a positive answer. C&R suggest further that this presuppositional property of the intonation can be made explicit to the extent that (24b), but not (24a), can be followed by tags such as I take it or i" assume. (24) a. Are you cooking tonight? b. You're cooking tonight? A problem with this approach is that it is not clear that a question with a tag necessarily requires a special (namely, rising) intonation. Also, it is not clear that a negative answer for (24b) is impossible (e.g., 'No, I'm not, it's YOUR turn.'). Thus, while there may be a special intonation associated with French WH-in-situ in the dialect/register that C&R describe, it may have nothing to do with triggering presuppositions. French WH-in-situ Constructions as Cleft Structures Boeckx (1999, 2003) argues that French questions with WH-in-situ have a (covert) cleft structure. According to him, (25) is similar to the cleft question (26Q), which likewise cannot be answered by rien 'nothing'. (25) Tu as vu quoi? you have seen what 'What did you see?' (26) Q: C'est quoi que tu as vu? that-is what that you have seen 'What is it that you have seen?' A: *Rien. 'Nothing.' The idea is that French WH-phrases in-situ, like clefts, involve con-



(23) [Q : whj] il admire toujours ti-indefinite[qui]

41

trastive focus and thus entail uniqueness and exhaustivity. Following Percus (1997), Boeckx argues that exhaustivity and uniqueness come about in clefts as a result of the presence of a covert definite description. This gives a cleft sentence the same presuppositions as a sentence containing the definite description "the individual that has property P." Boeckx carries this analysis over to French WH-in-situ with the claim that French WH-phrases in-situ, unlike their preposed counterparts, are headed by an empty D. It is the null D head that makes the WH-phrase in-situ presuppositional. Thus Boeckx captures the putative presuppositional effect of WH-in-situ by appealing to strong contrastive focus: fronted French WH-questions involve informational focus (weak focus), whereas WH-in-situ questions involve contrastive focus (strong focus). However, this would seem to be inconsistent with Chang's (1997) claim that French WH-phrases in-situ are non-D-linked. When D-linked, questions ask for answers in which the individuals that replace the WH-phrases are drawn from a set that is presumed to be salient both to speaker and hearer. French WH-in-situ questions are not associated with a presupposed answer set (this appears to be the case in all dialects). If French WH-phrases in-situ are contrastively focused, as Boeckx claims, then a set of alternatives must be considered, which entails a restricted set of some kind. 36 Another problem is related to the issue of intervention effects. We can observe that negation does not block anything in a focus cleft, as (27a) shows. Hence the intervention effect in (27b) must be caused by something besides the mechanisms of strong focus. (27) a.

Ce n'est pas le livre que j'ai achete. it NE-is not the book that I-have bought 'It is not the book that I bought (it's the magazine).' b. *Ce n'est pas quoi que tu as achete? it NE-is not what that you have bought 'What is it not that you have bought?'

Boeckx (2003) accounts for intervention effects in terms of focus. The proposal is that interveners are focused and the blocking effect is a kind of Relativized Minimality effect because of the focused status of the WH-phrase in-situ. But note that (28), the raised counterpart of (27b), is also ungrammatical (for similar examples see Rizzi, 1994). This is unexpected, since a fronted WH-phrase is not supposed to be associated with strong focus in these cases.



WH Constructions

42


An additional problem for Boeckx's (2003) account concerns the focus status of pas 'not'. We deal with this point in the next section. French WH-in-situ and (Contrastive) Focus Zubizarreta and Vergnaud (2002) (henceforth, Z&V) follow Boeckx in arguing that French WH-in-situ constructions are cases of contrastive focus (like cleft-constructions), while the fronted WH construction involves informational focus. With this in hand, Z&V argue that the elements responsible for intervention effects act as interveners because they themselves are contrastively focused elements. This is of course adequate for cases involving focus markers like only (cf. (8a)). However, this means that universal quantifiers and iterative adverbs must be considered focused, which is unlikely. In English, universals are typically interpreted as topics. It is only when stress is added that they receive a focused interpretation. This is seen with the contrast between (29) and (30) (from Krifka, 2001). That is, when a universal is stressed (indicated by capitals) and in scopal interaction with a WH-phrase as in (29), the pair-list reading (where every male guest liked a possibly different person) is unavailable. As (30) shows, a p>air-list reading is otherwise available. (29) Which person did EVERY male guest like? a. Doris. b. His partner at table. c. *A1 liked Doris, Bill, Erika, and Carl, Francis. (30) Which person did every male guest like? a. Doris. b. His partner at table. c. Al liked Doris, Bill, Erika, and Carl, Francis. The same is true for French. In (31) the universal chaque invite 'each guest' is focused and the pair-list reading is unavailable. In (32) it is topicalized and the pair-list reading is available. (31) Quelle personne est-ce que CHAQUE invite a aime? which person is-it that each guest has liked 'Which person did each guest like?'



(28)*Qui'est-ce que ce n'est pas que tu as achete? what-is-this that it NE-is not that you have bought 'What is it not that you have bought?'

WH Constructions

43

(32) Quelle personne est-ce que chaque invite a aime? which person is-it that each guest has liked 'Which person did each guest like?' a. Doris. b. Son conjoint, his partner c. Al a aime Doris, Bill, Erika, et Carl, Francis. Al has liked Doris, Bill, Erika, and Carl, Francis These facts indicate that French universals are not inherently focused. Like in English, their default interpretation is that of topicalization. They only become focused when heavily stressed, with the effect that the pair-list reading disappears. The effect is thus very different from what happens with split constructions. As noted in §1.3.1/14, de Swart (1992) observes that a non-split construction has two distinct readings, while the split alternative has only one. To illustrate, consider the example in (33) which has two distinct interpretations: (i) the universal scopes over the WH-phrase, and (ii) the WH-phrase scopes over the universal. Reading (i) is the pair-list reading: it asks for each linguist how many books they have read, e.g., 'John read 3, Mary read 5, Peter read 7.' Reading (ii) asks for a single number, i.e. 'how many books are such that every linguist has read them?' (33) [CP [DP C o m b i e n de livres] i chaque linguiste a-t-il how many of books each linguist has-he lus ej]]? read-AGR 'How many books has each linguist read?' On the other hand, the split construction equivalent of (33) is missing the individual reading. This intervention effect has nothing to do with the intervener being focused, since it is not focused, with it being the pair-list reading that is available, not the individual reading. (34) [CP Combieni chaque linguiste a-t-il lu [DP ei d e livres]]? how many each linguist has-he read of books 'How many books has each linguist read?'



a. Doris. b. Son conjoint, his partner c. *A1 a aime Doris, Bill, Erika, et Carl, Francis. Al has liked Doris, Bill, Erika, and Carl, Francis

44


(35) [CP Combieni ont-ils tous lu [DP ei d e livres]]? how many have-they all read of books 'How many books have they all read?' (de Swart, 1992, 403) The same scope trapping effects can be seen in French WH-insitu constructions, as (36) illustrates. Again it is only the pair-list reading that is available. On the wide scope interpretation of the WH-phrase, the sentence has a strong echoic flavour and therefore does not amount to a real question. (36) [CP Chaque linguiste a lu quoi]? each linguist has read what 'What has each linguist read?' Note that full movement restores the individual reading. Thus (37) is ambiguous. It could be answered by: (i) 'Jean has read Barriers, Marie has read Syntactic Structures, Pascal has read The Minimalist Program' or (ii) 'They have all read Barriers'. (37) [CP QUJ'est-ce que chaque linguiste a lu ei]? what is-this that each linguist has read 'What has each linguist read?' If we try with a floating quantifier, the effect is the same, which adds to the contention that intervention effects have nothing to do with focus. Thus (38a) is ambiguous between a pair-list and an individual reading, while both (38b) and (38c) yield only a pair-list reading. (38) a.

[CP Qui'est-ce que tous les linguistes ont lu ei]? what is-this that all the linguists have read b. [CP TOUS les linguistes ont lu quoi]? all the linguists have read what quoi]? c. [CP Les linguistes ont tous lu the linguists have all read what 'What have all the linguists read?'

Note that the individual interpretation that one might get with (38b)



Note that in de Swart's original example the quantifier used is focused, since it is floating. In French, when tous 'all' floats it is pronounced differently (the 's' can be heard) and it is thus "heavy" phonologically. The pair-list reading is nevertheless available, while the individual reading is missing.

45

and (38c) is an illusion. This wide scope effect has to do with the fact that the WH-phrase is interpreted echoically. In this case, the WHphrase has independent scope, that is, it does not interact scopally with the quantifier. On Z&V's proposal, negative elements must also be considered as focused. Arguably this works well for negative polarity items (NPIs). For example, pragmatic accounts like Krifka (1995) in §3.3.1/66 rely on a set of alternatives being yielded by focus. Hence, Z&V's analysis can account for intervention effects like in (39). However, they will not fare so well with (40), since it cannot be said that pas 'not' is a focused NPI. Rather pas is the real negator in the sentence; in §3.4/82 we argue that ne is a scope marker with no negative import. (39)*Personne (n')a vu qui N-word NE-has seen who 'Who has no one seen?' (40)*I1 n'a pas vu qui? he NE-has not seen who 'Who hasn't he seen?' Also, we should note that this account relies on a treatment of French N-words, like personne 'no one' in (39), as being focused indefinites, rather than being inherently negative. In §3.4/81, we argue that this is incorrect.

French WH-in-situ, Presuppositional or N o t ? In the dialect/register described in this book, WH-phrases in-situ are not associated with presuppositions. 37 Instead, they behave much like the in-situ de-phrase of a split combien construction. Obenauer (1994) notes that nominals of in-situ de-phrases are not interpreted referentially, but rather receive cardinal/quantity readings. This is seen with (41), where the de-phrase occurs inside an existential construction. (41) Combien est-ce qu'il y a de films c'soir a la how many is-this that-there-is of films this-evening at the tele? telly 'How many films are there on TV tonight?'



WH Constructions


As Milsark (1977), Heim (1987), Keenan (1987), Lumsden (1988), McNally (1992), Blutner (1993) among others, show, so-called strong/ definite quantifiers cannot combine with the existential predicate, as the existential there constructions of (42) illustrate. In contrast weak/indefinite quantifiers that introduce a novel individual into the discourse are okay. (42) a. b. c. d.

*There *There There There

is is is is

every book on the table. the book on the table. some book on the table. a book on the table.

Notably, WH-phrases in-situ in the dialect/register described here behave just like the weak/indefinite quantifiers of (42c,d) and the insitu de-phrase of (41) in licensing the existential construction, as (43) shows. (43) II y a/Y'a quoi c'soir a la tele? there-is/there-is what this-evening at the telly 'What's on TV tonight?' Additional evidence for the non-presuppositional nature of WHphrases in-situ comes from the fact that they are unable to sit comfortably in the embedded clause of a factive verb, as (44) shows. As is well-known, the content of the complement clause of a factive verb needs to be presupposed. (44) a.?*Tu regrettes quoi? you regret what 'What do you regret?' b.?*Tu as perdu quoi? you have lost what 'What have you lost?' Both examples in (44) are possible with an echoic reading. But it may well be that there is dialectal variation here. For speakers that have presuppositions associated with WH-phrases in-situ, the examples in (44) are expected to be well-formed, while (43) is expected to be ungrammatical.



46

WH Constructions

Summary

To summarize, French WH-in-situ phrases are not contrastively focused and do not necessarily involve presuppositions. Rather, they can be interpreted as informationally focused elements that introduce a novel variable. In this respect, they are exactly like their moved counterparts. The major difference between the in-situ option and the raising alternative is with regard to intervention effects. Using the fact that split combien constructions exhibit the same locality effects, we argued that the case was strong for analyzing French WHin-situ structures as being split constructions too: they have a null interrogative operator base generated in Spec-CP in addition to the WH-phrase in-situ. As far as we are aware, an account of this sort has not been proposed for French before in the literature. But while this gives us a characterization of the syntactic properties of French WH-in-situ, it says nothing about semantic properties. In chapter 5 we reach a position where we are able to give a full account of these properties as well, and it is this that will furnish an explanation for why intervention effects arise.

2.3

WH-in-situ in Other Languages with Intervention Effects

In this section we look at WH-in-situ in two other languages that display intervention effects: Korean and German. In doing so, we find it profitable to enlarge the data set to include WH-in-situ in multiple WH contexts.

2.3.1

Korean

Korean does not have obligatory WH-movement, but optional scrambling of WH-phrases. (45a) is a normal WH-question in the unmarked word order with the subject preceding the direct object. In (45b) the WH-phrase is scrambled. Both options are grammatical. (45) a. Suna-ka muos-ul sa-ss-ni? Sun-NOM what-CC buy-PAST-Q b. Muos-uli Suna-ka ei sa-ss-ni? what-ACC Suna-NOM buy-PAST-Q 'What did Suna buy?' (Beck and Kim, 1997, 339)



2.2.3

47

48


(46) a. *Amuto muos-ul sa-chi anh-ass-ni? anyone what-ACC buy-COMP NEG-do-PAST-Q b. Muos-uli amuto ei sa-chi anh-ass-ni? what-ACC anyone buy-COMP NEG-do-PAST-Q 'What did no one buy?' (Beck and Kim, 1997, 339) Note that, unlike in English, subject NPIs are allowed in Korean. For example, in (47) the NPI amuto 'anybody' is okay as a subject. (48) illustrates the minimal alternative without a negative licenser, which is ungrammatical. (47) Amuto chayk-ul ilk-ci ani ha-ess-ta anybody book-ACC read-ci NEG do-PAST-DECL 'Nobody read the book' (cf. *'Anybody didn't read the book.') (48)*Amuto chayk-ul ilk-ess-ta anybody book-ACC read-PAST-DECL *'Anybody read the book.' In a multiple question, all WH-phrases have to be scrambled across any NPI, as the permutations in (49) illustrate. manna-chi anh-ass-ni? (49) a. *Amuto nuku-lul oti-eso anyone who-ACC where-LOC meet-CHI NEG-do-PAST-Q b. *Nuku-liil amuto oti-eso manna-chi anh-ass-ni? who-ACC anyone where-LOC meet-CHI NEG-do-PAST-Q c. *Oti-eso amuto nuku-lul manna-chi anh-ass-ni? where-LOC anyone who-ACC meet-CRT NEG-do-PAST-Q amuto manna-chi anh-ass-ni? d. Nuku-lul oti-eso who-acc where-LOC anyone meet-CHI NEG-do-PAST-Q e. Oti-eso nuku-liil amuto manna-chi anh-ass-ni? where-LOC who-ACC anyone meet-CHI NEG-do-PAST-Q 'Where did no one meet whom?' (Beck and Kim, 1997, 340) The generalization seems to be that overt syntactic forms corresponding to (50) are ungrammatical: all WH-phrases are required to scramble across any NPI.



As (46) shows, this changes when the subject is an NPL The sentence in the unmarked word order (46a) is made ungrammatical, while the scrambled version (46b) is well-formed.

WH Constructions

49

With the NPI occurrence signalling the scope of negation, the data in (46) and (49) have the form of typical intervention effects with negation. Given that the WH-phrase is nothing more than a WHrestriction and that ni is the overt realization of a bare interrogative operator, we have exactly the structure of a split construction from which we expect intervention effects. That the NPI does indeed signal the scope of negation follows from a requirement that the NPI be in the immediate scope of negation. We can see that this requirement holds from the following contrasts. First we note that subjects and objects can have either wide or narrow scope with respect to negation. Thus, (51) is ambiguous: notably the quantified object motun haksayng-eykey 'every student' can have wide or narrow scope with respect to negation. (51) John-un motun haksayng-eykey chayk-ul cwuci ani John-TOP every student-TO book-ACC give not hayssta. did 'John gave a book to no student.' (V > ->) 'John gave books to some of the students.' (-> > V) Now, if we change chayk-ul 'books' to an NPI amwu chayk-to 'any book', the ambiguity disappears. In (52), where the universal quantifier precedes the NPI, the quantifier can only have a wide scope over negation. In (53) where it follows the NPI, it can only have a narrow scope. (52) John-un motun haksayng-eykey amwu chayk-to cwuci John-TOP every student-TO any book-ACC give ani hayssta. not did 'John gave a book to no student.' (V > -•) (53) John-un amwu chayk-to motun haksayng-eykey cwuci John-TOP any book-ACC every student-TO give ani hayssta. not did 'John gave no books to every student.' (-• > V) Finally we note that in Korean, a direct object or indirect object can be scrambled to the left of the subject. Even in such cases, the



(50)*[ ... NPI [ ... WH-phrase ... ] ... Q]

50


(54) a. Manhun chayk-ulj amwueykeytoi John-i ei ej cwuci many book-ACC to anyone John-NOM give ani hayssta. not did 'John didn't give many books to anyone.' (many > neg) b. Amwueykeytoi manhun chayk-ulj John-i ei ej cwuci to anyone many book-ACC John-NOM give ani hayssta. not did 'John didn't give many books to anyone.' (neg > many) (Sohn, 1995, 154)

2.3.2

German

In German, a single WH-word must be overtly moved to Spec-CP, that is, to the position where the WH-phrase takes scope. As (55b) shows, a WH-phrase in-situ in a single WH interrogative is ungrammatical. (55) a. Wasi hat Hans ei gekauft? what has Hans bought 'What did Hans buy?' b. *Hans hat was gekauft? Hans has what bought Thus German effectively circumvents all intervention effects in single WH interrogatives. But interestingly, German does have intervention effects in multiple WH interrogatives. That is, German does not let scopal interveners like negation scope over WH-phrases left in-situ as a result of another WH-phrase moving to Spec-CP. This is the opposite of French (e.g., (1)). Consider (56) and (57) from Beck (1996b). These give instances of multiple questions in which the nominative WH-phrase has undergone overt WH-movement and the accusative WH-phrase has been left in-situ. In (56), the dative NP that c-commands the in-situ accusative WH-phrase is the non-scope bearing NP dem Karl: the sentence is well-formed. But in (57), the dative NP is a negative quantifier niemandem 'nobody': the result is unacceptable. 38



position of the NPI signals the scope of negation: in (54a), the NPI follows the quantifier, and negation takes narrow scope; whereas in (54b), the NPI precedes the quantifier, and negation takes wide scope.

WH Constructions

51

(57)*/?Welche Kinder haben niemandem welche which children-NOM have nobody-DAT which Bilder zeigen wollen? pictures-ACC show wanted 'Which children wanted to show nobody which pictures?' The scrambling in (58) eliminates the violation by lifting the accusative WH-phrase out of the scope of the negative quantifier. (58) Welche Kinder haben welche Bilder niemandem zeigen which children have which pictures nobody show wollen? wanted 'Which children wanted to show which pictures to nobody?' Further intervention effects are illustrated in (59) and (60), with sehr wenigen 'very few' and nur 'only' respectively. Beck (1996a) gives a wealth of additional data. (59)*/?Welche Kinder haben sehr wenigen Lehrern which children-NOM have very few teachers-DAT welche Bilder zeigen wollen? which pictures-ACC show wanted 'Which children wanted to show very few teachers which pictures?' (60)*/?Wer hat nur dem Karl welche Biicher who-NOM has only the Karl-DAT which books-ACC gegeben? given 'Who gave only Karl which books?' Hence we see that German supports the same generalization as Korean, namely (61), where any WH-phrase positioned below an intervener in overt structure leads to ungrammaticality. As we noted for Korean, (61) is essentially a split configuration. (61) *[Q ... intervener] ... WH-phrase ... ] ... ]



(56) Welche Kinder haben dem Karl welche Bilder which children-NOM have the Karl-DAT which pictures-ACC zeigen wollen? show wanted 'Which children wanted to show Karl which pictures?'

52


2.3.3

Summary

This closes our short cross-linguistic tour of WH-in-situ in languages with intervention effects. The table in (62) gives an overview of the data discussed so far in this chapter.

Language Korean German French English Chinese

Intervention effects with WH arguments single multiple WH WH-in-situ yes yes n/a yes yes no n/a no no no

This suggests that there are three different language types: 1. languages like Korean and German that display the generalization in (61); 2. languages like French that are able to circumvent intervention effects in multiple WH contexts (in §5.4.6/156 we argue that English is of this type: English never displays intervention effects in questions with a single argument WH-phrase because one WH-phrase is always fronted); and 3. languages like Chinese that circumvent intervention effects with all argument WH-phrases. This cut in the data will be reflected in the details of our analysis in §5.4/144. We should emphasize that the findings of this section are limited to questions involving argument WH-phrases. The next section introduces data from questions with WH-adjuncts. As we are about to discover, these always give rise to intervention effects cross-linguistically.



This seems to leave French (1) without an account (and English, which in this respect behaves just like French). But in §5.4.5/155 we will see that an explanation is forthcoming.

WH Constructions

WH-adjuncts and Other WH-phrases with Restricted Scope

We noted with (13) that Chinese is a WH-in-situ language which does not normally display intervention effects. However, we also saw with (14) that WH-adjuncts behave exceptionally, in that they give rise to intervention effects. English displays the same contrast, as shown by the WH-island data in (63) and the negative island data in (64). The okay (a) examples involve an argument WH, while the ungrammatical (b) examples involve an adjunct WH. (63) a. Whati do you wonder [whether to fix ei]? b. *Whyi do you wonder [whether to fix the car ei]? (64) a. Whoi [don't you think that John talked to ei]? b. *Whyi [don't you think that John talked to Mary ei]? We also saw that languages that display intervention effects with arguments also display intervention effects with WH-adjuncts (e.g., Korean (49)). On this basis we conclude that WH-adjuncts invoke intervention effects cross-linguistically. To account for this generalization, we will employ an assumption that formed a central part of Williams' (1994) Scopal ECP account, namely, that scope reconstruction is obligatory for WH-moved adjuncts. In contrast, scope reconstruction is not obligatory for WHmoved arguments. Recall from §1.3.1/17 that Williams suggests that this difference in scope potential is a consequence of the fact that adjuncts have only a scope relation with the sentence they occur in, while arguments have both a scope relation and a theta-theoretic relation. This lack of any relation beyond scope on the part of an adjunct has the effect of limiting its scope to the scope of the location into which it is merged, that is, its sister's scope. As an outcome we get Williams' condition of (65). (65)

YP XP

YP

The scope of XP is YP.

With the scope of the WH-phrase limited to where it was originally merged, we can think of the examples involving WH-adjuncts in (14), (63) and (64) as giving rise to an LF split configuration with the form of (61), which is repeated as (66), from which intervention effects will be shown to follow in §5.4.8/160.



2.4

53

54


This perspective gains support from a consideration of other contexts that require an extracted WH-phrase to take an in-situ scope in the way we suppose for WH-adjuncts. Such a context is provided by the existential there construction. 39 The first thing to note is an absence of wide scope readings for DPs in the postcopular position of (67) (from Heim, 1987) and (68) (from Williams, 1984). (67) a. Ralph believes that believe > someone; b. Ralph believes that believe > someone;

someone is spying on him. someone > believes there is someone spying on him. *someone > believes

(68) a. Many people must have arrived. must > many; many > must b. There must have arrived many people, must > many; *many > must The second thing to note is that a sentence involving how many like (69) is ambiguous between an outer reading that presupposes the existence of certain people (answerable with 'John, Mary, and Peter'), and an inner reading that is not associated with any such presupposition, making it purely a question about a number (answerable with 'three people'). (69) How many peoplei do you think I should talk to ei? a. For what n: there are n-many people x, such that you think I should talk to x. (outer reading) b. For what n: you think I should talk to n-many people. (inner reading) The third thing to note is that because wide scope readings are prohibited in (67) and (68), DPs extracted from the postcopular position of an existential there construction are predicted to necessarily undergo scope reconstruction. This is borne out: (70), when interpreted existentially, is not ambiguous with respect to the relative scope orderings between how many people and need. The reading (70a), where how many people takes wide scope over need is unavailable.



(66) *[Q ... intervener [ ... WH-phrase . . . ] . . . ]

WH Constructions

55

The fourth thing to note is that inner readings (non-presuppositional) disappear with interveners, as (71) and (72) show. 40 (71) How many peoplei do you wonder whether I should talk to ei ?

a. For what n: there are n-many people x, such that you wonder whether I should talk to x. (outer reading) b. *For what n: you wonder whether I should talk to n-many people. (inner reading; not available) (72) Wieviele Hundei hat Karl nicht gefuttert ei? how many dogs has Karl not fed a. For which n: there are n dogs that Karl didn't feed. (outer reading) b. *For which n: it is not the case that Karl fed n dogs. (inner reading; not available) With this background, we note that a weak island context like in (71) and (72) has the opposite properties of a context provided by an existential there construction like in (67), (68) and (70). Consequently, as Frampton (1991) was first to note (see also Rullmann 1993 and Cresti 1995), and as (73) and (74) show, extraction across a weak island and out of an existential there construction will be uniformally impossible, since the former environment disallows exactly what the latter environment requires, and vice versa. This supports (66). (73)*How many peoplei do you wonder whether (I think) there were ei at the meeting? (74)*How many peoplei don't you think there were ei at the meeting?

2.5

Partial W H Constructions in German

For questioning out of an embedded clause, German offers a choice: either raise a standard WH-phrase to the matrix Spec-CP as in (75), or form a partial WH construction as in (76). 41



(70) How many peoplei do you need there to be ei at the meeting? a. *For what n: there are n people x such that you need x to be at the meeting. (outer reading; not available) b. For what n: you need there to be n people at the meeting. (inner reading)

56


(76) [CPI Was glaubt Uta [cp2 weni Karl ei gesehen hat]]? what believes Uta whom Karl seen hat 'Who does Uta believe that Karl saw?' There is clear evidence that partial WH constructions involve one question rather than two. First, the second clause has verb-final word order, indicating that it is a subordinate clause (McDaniel, 1989). Second, there is no intonation break between the clauses. Third, it is possible for a quantifier in the first clause to bind a pronoun in the second. This would be excluded if partial WH constructions consisted of two sequential questions, since as (77) illustrates, a pronoun cannot be bound across sentences by a universal, which is the case in (78). (77)*Every studenti came in. He* was late. (78) Was glaubt jeder Studenti wo er ihni treffen kann? what believes every student where he him meet can 'Where does every student believe that he can meet him?' In (76) and (78), a contentive WH-phrase is left in an intermediate A-position, while an expletive WH-word appears in matrix Spec-CP. To be grammatical, the contentive WH-phrase must have raised to a Spec-CP subjacent with the matrix Spec-CP, and not to the specifier of just any lower CP. Thus, while (79a) is okay, (79b) is out. 42 It follows that whatever the nature of the relationship between the noncontentive WH-element and the contentive WH-phrase, it requires locality. [CPI Was glaubst du [CP 2 niit wemi Hans meint [CP 3 what believe you with whom Hans thinks ei' dass Jakob ei gesprochen hat]]]? that Jakob spoken has b. *[CPI Was glaubst du [CP 2 dass Hans meint [CP 3 mit what believe you that Hans thinks with wemi Jakob ei gesprochen hat]]]? whom Jakob spoken has 'With whom do you believe that Hans thinks that Jakob spoke?' (Simpson, 1995, 106)

(79) a.



(75) [CPX Weni glaubt Uta [CP 2 e i ' dass Karl ei gesehen hat]]? whom believes Uta that Karl seen has 'Who does Uta believe that Karl saw?'

WH Constructions

57

(80) [cPi Was glaubst du [CP 2 was Hans meint [CP 3 mit what believe you what Hans thinks with wemi Jakob ei gesprochen hat]]]? whom Jakob spoken has 'With whom do you believe that Hans thinks that Jakob spoke?' Further evidence for the claim that the relation between the noncontentive WH-element and the contentive WH-phrase is local comes from examples involving negation. Full movement across negation is possible, as in (81a) and (82a). However, if a negative expression intervenes between the expletive WH-element and the contentive WH-phrase, the sentence is ungrammatical, as in (81b) and (82b). (81) a.

[CPX Mit wemi glaubst du nicht [CP 2 ei' dass Hans ei with whom believe you not that Hans gesprochen hat]]? spoken has b. *[cPi Was glaubst du nicht [CP 2 mit wemi Hans ei what believe you not with whom Hans gesprochen hat]]? spoken has 'Who don't you believe that Hans has spoken to?' (Beck, 1996b, 3)

(82) a.

[CPX Weni glaubt niemand [CP 2 ei' dass Karl ei gesehen who believes nobody that Karl seen hat]]? has b. *[cPi Was glaubt niemand [CP 2 weni Karl ei gesehen what believes nobody whom Karl seen hat]]? has 'Who(m) does nobody believe that Karl saw?' (Beck, 1996b, 5)

Besides negation, factive verbs like bedauerte 'regretted' also create blocking effects (Fanselow, 2000), as (83b) illustrates.



Interestingly, (79b) becomes grammatical if another non-contentive WH-element is inserted in the intermediate position as in (80) (an observation that goes back to Riemsdijk, 1982).

58

The Syntax and Semantics of Split Constructions [cpx Wenj bedauerte Fritz [CP 2 ei' dass sie ei liebt]]? who regretted Fritz that she loves b.?*[cPi W a s bedauerte Fritz [cp2 weni sie ei liebt]]? what regretted Fritz who she loves 'Who(m) did Fritz regret that she loves?'

The intervention of certain types of volitional verbs like mochtest 'want' and hoffst 'hope' also leads to ungrammaticality (Fanselow and Mahajan, 1996; Reis, 1996), as (84b) and (85b) illustrate. (84) a.

[CP.X Weni mochtest du [CP 2 ei' dass sie ei liebt]]? who want you that she loves b. *[cPi Was mochtest du [CP 2 weni sie ei liebt]]? what want you who she loves 'Who(m) do you want her to love?'

(85) a.

[cPi-Weni hoffst du [CP 2 ei' dass sie ei liebt]]? who hope you that she loves b. *[cPi W a s hoffst du [CP 2 weni sie ei liebt]]? what hope you who she loves 'Who(m) do you hope that she loves?'

In addition, partial WH constructions in German exhibit WH-island effects, as (86) shows. W a s fragt sie sich [cp2 warumj Hans ej glaubt what wonders she herself why Hans believes [CP 3 weni Jakob ei gelobt hat]]]? who Jakob praised has 'Who(m) does she wonder why Hans thinks Jakob praised?'

(86)*[CPI

Thus partial WH constructions in German exhibit intervention effects, suggesting they too involve splitting of the kind described in previous sections: a bare operator is split from the restriction with which it is associated (the contentive WH-phrase left in an intermediate A-position). This gives a configuration for partial WH constructions that is similar to that described by Honcoop (1998) and Cheng (2000). (87) Op [ ... semantic restriction ... ]



(83) a.

WH Constructions

Summary

This chapter reviewed a number of languages with varying question formation strategies. We concentrated on the syntax of such constructions and saw a repeated pattern: WH-phrases in lowly in-situ or intermediate positions are susceptible to intervention effects. We took this as evidence that a split construction was instantiated. The reason why a split construction should lead to a situation where intervention effects start occurring remains to be established. This is the task of the final chapter. Before we get to this, we want to achieve two things. First, we want to broaden our corpus and group together more constructions under the heading "split constructions." Second, we need to introduce the logical tools that we will use to explain away intervention effects. In the next chapter, we introduce a range of negative constructions.



2.6

59




Negative Constructions 3-1

Introduction

The present chapter analyzes constructions involving negative elements, specifically, Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) and so-called Nwords. We argue that these provide further cases of split constructions. Motivation for this claim comes from the fact that such constructions exhibit intervention effects. Since the scopal elements responsible for the blocking effects in negative constructions turn out to be the same elements responsible for intervention effects in interrogatives, as seen in the last chapter, a unified analysis is called for. It is known independently that negative and interrogative sentences share certain properties (Klima, 1964; Lasnik, 1974; Haegeman, 1995). The present chapter can thus be seen as further motivation for supposing that the two sentence types are related. It is structured as follows: §3.2 introduces the phenomena; §3.3 reviews the literature on NPIs and intervention effects; §3.4 considers what N-words really are; §3.5 introduces our split construction proposal; §3.6 summarizes.

3.2

The Phenomena

In French, there are at least two negative series. First, there are the so-called N-words illustrated in (l). 4 3 (1) a.

Je n'ai vu p e r s o n n e . I NE-have seen N-word 'I have seen no one.' 61



Chapter 3

62


The second French series includes words such as qui que ce soit 'anyone' and quoi que ce soit 'anything' illustrated in (2). 44 (2) a.

Je n'ai pas vu qui que ce soit. I NE-have not seen anyone 'I haven't seen anyone.' b. Je n'ai pas fait quoi que ce soit. I NE-have not done anything 'I haven't done anything.'

Since these are equivalent to words such as anyone in English, it seems they are the real NPIs of French. However, N-words also appear to share NPI properties. The key concern is whether or not N-words are inherently negative. We argue in §3.4/81 that they are inherently negative and are thus distinct from NPIs. But presently we want to concentrate on what N-words and NPIs have in common: their locality requirements. N-words and NPIs exhibit similarities with regard to superordinate negation and they both show intervention effects. Starting with the first distributional fact, an N-word like personne cannot appear in an embedded context if its licenser is in a higher clause, as (3) shows (ne marks the scope of negation). (3)*[cPi Jean n'a dit [cp2 que tu avais vu personne]]. Jean NE-has said that you had seen N-word *'Jean said that you had seen no one.' (matrix scope for 'no one,' giving interpretation (4)) (4) 'It is not the case that there is a person that Jean has said that you had seen.' For related examples with qui que ce soit, there is much speaker variation. The same goes for English counterparts. That is, it is not always easy for speakers to judge whether or not French (5) or its English translation are grammatical. We claim this is because the so-called free choice interpretation gets in the way of the targeted judgements. In addition to being NPIs, the qui que ce soit series also have a free choice function (cf. Haspelmath, 2000, 261). It seems to be that if/when (5) is grammatical, qui que ce soit 'anyone' must receive



b. Je n'ai rien fait. I NE-have N-word done 'I did nothing.'

Negative Constructions

63

(5)?[cPi Jean n'a pas dit [CP 2 que tu avais vu Jean NE-has not said that you had seen qui que ce soit]]. anyone ?'Jean has not said that you had seen anyone.' The second common property between N-words and NPIs is that they both exhibit intervention effects. We first consider English data, then French. Honcoop (1998, 116) illustrates intervention effects with (6). This shows a range of scopal elements, at most, fewer than, less than three, at least, more, most and every, acting as interveners. In contrast (7) shows that indefinites do not create blocking effects. (6) a. *Nobody gave at most/fewer than/less than three beggars anything. b. *Nobody gave exactly/precisely three beggars anything. c. *Nobody gave at least/more than three beggars anything. d. *Nobody gave most beggars anything. e. *Nobody gave every beggar anything. (7) N o b o d y gave a beggar anything. A related set of data showing that NPIs are sensitive to intervening scopal material comes from Linebarger (1987). For example, while (8a) is ambiguous, (8b) is not. 45 (8a) has readings where either negation scopes over the universal (perhaps the most natural) or where the universal scopes over negation. In contrast, (8b) has only the reading where the universal scopes over negation (marginally for some speakers). As Ladusaw (1996) notes, (8b) is striking, since it is the reading in harmony with the surface structure c-command relation that is unavailable. (8) a. Mary didn't give everyone a gift. (i) 'For everyone it is not the case that there is a gift such that Mary gave it to them.' every > -» (ii) 'It is not the case that for everyone there is a gift such that Mary gave it to them.' -i > every



a free choice interpretation, as opposed to an NPI interpretation. The same goes for anyone in the English translation. Therefore, we will rely on the assumption that (5) and its English equivalent are ungrammatical and hence starred on the interpretation in (4).

64


Constructions

Linebarger (1987) also notes that because clauses give a scope island effect.46 With its indefinite, (9a) is ambiguous, having readings where: (i) because scopes over negation, and (ii) negation scopes over because. Under (i), (9a) can be used when 'I didn't call a policeman because I was scared of getting beaten up.' Under (ii), (9a) can be used when 'I didn't call a policeman because I was scared, but because my neighbour was screaming.' In contrast, having an NPI, (9b) has only reading (i), that is, negation cannot scope over because. (9) a. I didn't call a policeman because I was scared. (i) 'It is because I was scared that I didn't call a policeman.' because > -i (ii) 'It is not because I was scared that I called a policeman.' -i > because b. I didn't call anyone because I was scared. (i) 'It is because I was scared that I didn't call anyone.' because > -« (ii) *'It is not because I was scared that I called anyone.' *-» > because Other examples of intervention effects with NPIs involve frequency adverbs. As (10) shows, such sentences are ungrammatical, much like the examples in (6). (10)*I haven't always seen anyone. The examples just reviewed can be repeated for French. Thus while the (a) examples of (11) and (12) are ambiguous, the (b) and (c) examples, involving N-words and NPIs respectively, are unambiguous. (11) a.

Marie n'a pas donne un cadeau a tout le monde. Marie NE-has not given a gift to all the world (i) 'For everyone it is not the case that there is a gift such that Mary gave it to them.' tout le monde > -i (ii) 'It is not the case that for everyone there is a gift such that Mary gave it to them.' -• > tout le monde



b. Mary didn't give everyone any gift. (i) 'For everyone it is not the case that there is a gift such that Mary gave any to them.' every > -i (ii) *'It is not the case that for everyone there is a gift such that Mary gave any to them.' *-> > every

65

b. Marie n'a donne aucun cadeau a tout le monde. Marie NE-has given no gift to all the world (i) 'For everyone it is not the case that there is a gift such that Mary gave any to them.' tout le monde > -• (ii) *'It is not the case that for everyone there is a gift such that Mary gave any to them.' *-* > tout le monde c. Marie n'a pas donne quoi que ce soit a tout le Marie NE-has not given anything to all the monde. world (i) 'For everyone it is not the case that there is something such that Mary gave it to them.' tout le monde > -1 (ii) *'It is not the case that for everyone there is something such that Mary gave it to them.' *-< > tout le monde (12) a.

Je n'ai pas appele un policier parce que j'avais I NE-have not called a policeman because I-had peur. fear (i) 'It is because I was scared that I didn't call a policeman.' because > -• (ii) 'It is not because I was scared that I called a policeman.' -i > because b. Je n'ai appele p e r s o n n e parce que j'avais peur I NE-have called N-word because I-had fear (i) 'It is because I was scared that I didn't call anyone.' because > -> (ii) *Tt is not because I was scared that I called anyone.' *-> > because c. Je n'ai pas appele qui que ce soit parce que j'avais I NE-have not called anyone because I-had peur. fear (i) 'It is because I was scared that I didn't call anyone.' because > -i (ii) *'It is not because I was scared that I called the anyone.' *-i > because

Also, like in English, French frequency adverbs cause a sentence to be ungrammatical if they intervene between an N-word/NPI and its licenser, as (13) shows.





(13) a. *Je I b. *Je I

n'ai toujours NE-have always n'ai toujours NE-have always

vu seen vu seen

personne. N-word qui que ce soit. anyone

To sum up, we have seen that NPIs and French N-words share locality properties: both exhibit clause-bound effects and intervention effects. But a word of caution is in order: NPIs and French Nwords also have diverging properties, as will become clear in §3.4/81. That such differences exist leads us to question accounts that capture intervention effects solely for NPIs. It is to previous accounts that we turn next.

3.3

Previous Accounts

In this section we introduce previous accounts of intervention effects with NPIs. There is at present a booming literature on the subject. We select only a few approaches, but we think these are nevertheless representative of current views. Broadly speaking, the approaches fall into two camps: semantic/pragmatic views and syntactic views.

3.3.1

Semantic/Pragmatic Views

Licensed under the Negation of Stronger Alternatives While enlightening, the discovery by Ladusaw (1979) and others that NPIs are typically only licensed in downward entailing contexts is not explanatory: it does not say why this holds. In this section we outline the explanation offered by Krifka (1995, 2003). This crucially involves (i) the motivated introduction of alternatives; (ii) an implicature of negating stronger alternatives and (iii) the meaning of NPIs. We then see how Krifka applies this to account for the intervention effect data. The motivated introduction of alternatives is given by the principle in (14), which is inspired by the alternative semantics of Hamblin (1973) and Rooth (1985).



66

67

(14) The Principle of Motivated Introduction of Alternatives If an assertion [... a ...] is made, where a comes with an alternative set A, and hence [...a ...] comes with alternative assertions [... a' ...] for o/ G A, then the speaker must have reasons: (i) to introduce the alternative assertions [... a' ...], and (ii) not to assert any alternative assertion [... a' ...]. For example, this applies to instances of Focus, like in (15A). (15) Q: Who did John give the necklace? A: John gave MARY the necklace. Alternatives: John gave Sue the necklace, John gave Jill the necklace, ... Motivation for introducing alternative assertions comes from maintaining coherence with (15Q). The reason not to assert these alternative assertions is that the speaker knows them to be false.47 Principle (14) can be used as the basis for an account of how scalar implicatures work. For example, given the motivation that the speaker wishes to indicate she is aware of being able to make stronger or weaker claims, (16) gives the alternative assertions of (17), with the alternative set made up of number words from a Horn scale (cf. Horn, 1972, 1973). (16) John ate three eggs. (17) ..., John ate two eggs, John ate three eggs, John ate four eggs, Notably, the alternatives of (17) stand in the logical relationship of (18). (18) John ate four eggs => John ate three eggs => John ate two eggs Reasons are now required for why the alternatives are not made. Krifka offers the following Gricean motivation: - For weaker assertions: they are not the strongest defendable claims (Grice's first submaxim of Quantity). - For stronger assertions: the speaker lacks evidence for their truth (Grice's maxim of Quality). This has not yet derived the scalar implicature effect. For this, Krifka (1995) introduces an operator, ScalAssert. Its triggering condition is that the proposition asserted and the alternative assertions are




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(19) Implicature of Negating Stronger Alternatives If a speaker introduces stronger claims as alternatives but explicitly does not assert them, it can be assumed that she considers them to be false. Since alternative assertions are motivated and informationally ordered for (16), ScalAssert applies. This returns (20), which, together with the assertion of (16), has the derived effect of a scalar implicature. (20) - J o h n ate four eggs, - J o h n ate five eggs, - J o h n ate six eggs, ... The third crucial component of Krifka's account is the meaning of polarity items. Following Fauconnier (1975a,b), NPIs get associated with ordered alternatives ("scales") and denote the minimal elements. For example, a drop is associated with amounts of liquid, ordered by size, and denotes the minimal amount of liquid. Importantly, a negated proposition concerning a minimal element of a scale will entail negated propositions concerning non-minimal elements. For example, (21) holds. (21) John didn't drink a drop of alcohol => John didn't drink a quantity x of alcohol (for any quantities of alcohol x). Everything is now in place to give Krifka's explanation for why NPIs are okay in downward entailing contexts. NPIs get associated with ordered alternatives, giving rise to a set of alternative assertions. The motivation comes from the idea that in using an NPI the speaker wishes to indicate that she is aware of being able to make stronger or weaker claims. 48 For example, (22) gets the associated set of alternatives in (23). (22) John didn't eat anything. (23) John didn't eat eggs, John didn't eat ham, John didn't eat eggs and ham, ... Since NPIs get associated with ordered alternatives and denote the minimal element, the alternative assertions stand in a logical relation-



informationally ordered with respect to each other. Its semantic impact is that all propositions that are semantically stronger than the proposition made are negated. In Krifka (2003) this has the status of being a conversational implicature, namely (19).


69

ship to (at least) the assertion made. For example, the relationships of (24) hold for the alternatives of (23).

Reasons are now required for why the alternatives are not asserted. This follows from the fact that they are all weaker: they are not the strongest defendable claims. Now since alternatives are introduced and they are informationally ordered, an instance of ScalAssert is triggered. However, since there are no stronger alternative assertions, the application of ScalAssert returns no negated assertions. In other words, the implicature of (19) is (trivially) consistent, and so the NPI is licensed. Identical reasoning gets the fact that NPIs are not licensed in upward entailing contexts. Thus (25) is associated with the assertion of (26) and gives rise to the set of alternatives in (27), under the motivation that the speaker indicates awareness of being able to make stronger or weaker claims. (25)*John ate anything. (26) John ate something. (27) John ate eggs, John ate ham, John ate eggs and ham, ... The alternatives of (27) stand in a logical relationship to (at least) the assertion made, as (28) illustrates. (28) John ate eggs and ham => John ate eggs => John ate something That is, the alternatives are all stronger than (26) and so will not be asserted since, standardly, the speaker will have considered them false. Now since alternatives are introduced and they are informationally ordered, an instance of ScalAssert is triggered. This returns (29). (29) - J o h n ate eggs, - J o h n ate ham, - J o h n ate eggs and ham, ... The problem with (29) is that it systematically contradicts (26). In other words, the implicature of (19) is inconsistent, and so the NPI is not licensed. To sum up the discussion so far, Krifka's account assumes along Gricean lines that in most situations the speaker should, or wants to, express the strongest claim she can make. This gives rise to the



(24) John didn't eat anything => John didn't eat eggs => John didn't eat eggs and ham


(scalar) implicature that any sentence resulting from the substitution of the NPI by an alternative of the scale is false. If the NPI is in a downward entailing environment, the implicature is (trivially) consistent. If the NPI is in an upward entailing environment, the implicature is inconsistent. Krifka argues that the same explanation can be used as the basis for an account of why intervention effects arise in NPI constructions. He implements this by placing the ScalAssert operator into LF structures. Importantly, interveners are claimed to "act as a locus of exploitation for polarity items." Consequently the assertability conditions of a ScalAssert triggered by the presence of an NPI will be calculated with respect to the nuclear scope of the most local intervener (or globally should an intervener not exist). For example, this gives a treatment of the scope island data in (8b), repeated as (30). (30) Mary didn't give every child any gift. (i) 'For every child it is not the case that there is a gift such that Mary gave any to them.' every > -i (ii)*'It is not the case that for every child there is a gift such that Mary gave any to them.' *-> > every Since the scopal orderings of negation and the universal quantifier illustrated by (30i,ii) are in principle possible (which is shown by (8a)), it follows that we get the semantic representations of (31). (31) (i) Not [every c h i l d x] ScalAssert [any g i f t y~\ mary_gave (x, y) (ii) [every c h i l d x] ScalAssert Not [any g i f t y] mary_gave(x,2/) Notably, (i) is bad, as the proposition in the scope of ScalAssert leads to an implicature that contradicts the assertion, just like the sentence Mary gave John any gift would do. In contrast, (ii) is good, as it yields a proposition that satisfies the felicity conditions of ScalAssert, just like the sentence Mary didn't give John any gift would do. This analysis is additionally strengthened by the fact that the nuclear scope of the universal quantifier in (32) provides an okay "locus of exploitation" for the Positive Polarity Item (PPI) tons of money. This is expected given that PPIs are the polar opposites of NPIs.



70


71

However, as Guerzoni (2004) observes, problems arise when this analysis of intervention effects is carried over to scalar expressions. First we need to note that if (16) is placed into a downward entailing environment, its scalar implicature is lost, as (33) illustrates. (33) I don't think that John ate three eggs. With ScalAssert being introduced locally, as it would be with the presence of an intervener, it is incorrectly predicted that, provided the local environment to ScalAssert is upward entailing, scalar implicatures will be able to arise, no matter what the monotonicity properties of the whole sentence turn out to be. For example, (34) parallels (30), having a universal that intervenes between the scalar expression and negation. Since a ScalAssert is inserted locally to the universal in (30), it should also be inserted locally to the universal in (34). It follows that for (34) we get the semantic representations of (35). (34) Mary didn't give every child three eggs. (35) (i) Not [every c h i l d x] ScalAssert [ t h r e e eggs y~] mary_gave(x,y) (ii) [every c h i l d x] ScalAssert Not [ t h r e e eggs y] mary_gave(a;,2/) Notably the existence of (i) predicts that a scalar implicature reading should be possible, just like it is for the sentence Mary gave John three eggs. This is false: (34) behaves just like (36) in lacking a scalar implicature. (36) Mary didn't give John three eggs. Another problem for the analysis is that it cannot be used to account for the intervention effects that occur with French N-words. As we establish in §3.4/81, French N-words are specified for negation. Krifka's account works on the basis that NPIs are taken to be simple indefinites with no syntactic features related to negation. Licensing via Existential Disclosure In §1.3.3/25 we introduced Honcoop (1998). This work reduced the explanation of weak/scope island effects to that of cross-sentential



(32) Mary didn't give every child t o n s of money.


anaphora. This followed Honcoop's observation that the class of expressions that induce weak/scope islands coincides with the class of expressions that create inaccessible domains for dynamic binding/anaphora. To get the connection with dynamic anaphora, Honcoop assumes that constructions that give rise to weak/scope islands manifest Dekker's (1993) existential disclosure, that is, have the form in (37). (37) Opx[ M atrix -

(*SCOpal-Op)[ ... [Restriction -

3 # ••• ] ... ] ...

and x equals dynamically bound y] This involves an existential/indefinite internal to the restriction of the construction dynamically binding a variable outside the restriction, which, in turn, is equated to the value of another variable bound by Op. Notably, the dynamic binding relied on can only occur given the absence of scopal operators that create inaccessible domains. Honcoop applies this split-construction oriented analysis to NPIs by-claiming that the NPI is the internal indefinite, while an external NPI licensing process acts as Op. Under such a view NPIs are not specified for negation. Rather they are marked by focus to undergo a licensing process that works by computing entailment relations between alternative propositions generated by substituting alternative values for the NPI (see Zeevat 1994 for an earlier implementation of basically the same "exhaustification" process). While attractive, this analysis shares with Krifka's the problem of being unable to account for intervention effects with French N-words, since French N-words are specified for negation, as §3.4/81 shows.

3.3.2

Syntactic Views

Before we focus on syntax based accounts from the literature, let us sketch in more detail the syntactic properties of NPIs. What needs to be established is whether or not NPIs enter into a syntactic relation with their negative licenser. To begin with: while N-words are themselves negative elements (as §3.4/81 will show), this is much less obvious for NPIs. NPIs cannot appear pre- or post verbally without the presence of a negative marker, as the French examples (38) and (39) illustrate. (38) a. *Qui que ce soit est arrive. anyone is arrived *'Anyone has arrived.'



72


73

(39) a. *J'ai vu qui que ce soit. I-have seen anyone *'I have anyone.' b. *J'ai vu quoi que ce soit. I-have seen anything * 'I have seen anything.' NPIs thus differ from Germanic negative quantifiers (henceforth NQs), since they cannot contribute to negative meaning in isolation. Compare (38) and (39) with English (40a), Dutch (40b) and German (40c). (40) a. John saw no one. b. Remke heeft niemand gezien. Remke has N-word seen 'Remke hasn't seen anyone.' c. Carina hat niemanden gesehen. Carina has N-word seen 'Carina hasn't seen anyone.' That NPIs are not inherently negative is further confirmed by the fact that they cannot be used as answers to questions, as (41) shows. 49 (41) Q: Qui as-tu vu? who have-you seen 'Who have you seen?' A: *Qui que ce soit. *'Anyone.' Third, as (42) shows, NPIs cannot be modified by adverbs such as almost and practically. This matches existential quantifier behaviour, as in (43). In contrast, universals and NQs can be modified by such adverbs, as (44) illustrates. (42)*Jean n'a pas fait presque/pratiquement Jean NE-has not done almost/practically quoi que ce soit. anything *' John didn't do almost/practically anything.



b. *Quoi que ce soit s'est passe, anything REFL-is happened *'Anything has happened.'

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(43) *John did almost something.

Fourth, the interpretation that comes to mind with statements involving one NQ and one NPI is a negative concord reading rather than a double-negation reading. Thus (45) has reading (45i) rather than (45ii). (45) Personne (n)'a dit quoi que ce soit. noone NE-has said anything 'No one has said anything.' (i) 'There are no (x, y) such that person x said thing t/.' (ii)*'There is no person x for which there is no thing y such that x said y.' There is nevertheless evidence to suggest that the negative licenser and the NPI form a configurational dependency. For example, as Klima (1964) noticed, the antecedent must be in a c-commanding position (although the term and the exact definition of c-command came much later). Thus (46b) is out since the NPI scopes over its licenser. More interestingly, in (47a) the NPI is c-commanded by the NQ, while in (46b) the NQ is too embedded and so cannot c-command the NPI in matrix object position. (46) a. None of us could do anything. b. *Any of us did not go. (47) a.

[No book [that John wanted to buy]] was on offer in any shop. b. *[The book [that no one wanted to buy]] was on offer in any shop.

The fact that NPIs cannot be topicalized, as (48) shows, provides a further illustration of this c-command requirement. (48)*Any problems, nobody mentioned. With this much background, we now turn to outline the syntactic proposal of Progovac (1994).



(44) a. John did almost everything, b. John did almost nothing.


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Progovac (1994) uses Binding Theory to account for the licensing of NPIs. The basic insight is that NPIs behave like anaphors: they must be bound by a local licenser. A key difference is that while anaphors are A-bound, NPIs will have to be A-bound. This works under Aoun's (1986) Generalized Binding, where A-binding is possible in addition to the usual A-binding. Progovac's theory also gives a take on PPIs such as someone and already as being subject to Principle B: they must be A-bound from outside the minimal clause. Although not discussed by Progovac, her theory makes welcome predictions when it comes to properties of Korean NPIs (seen in §2.3.1/48) and French N-words. We focus on this data in what follows. In Korean a negative element in a matrix clause cannot license an NPI in an embedded clause, as (49a) shows. Notably, amuto 'anybody' has no free choice interpretation, hence the star. In contrast, negation licenses an NPI in the same clause, as (49b) shows. Both facts follow from Progovac's theory: an NPI being subject to Principle A must be A-bound in its local governing category. (49) a.*?[cPx Na-nun [CP 2 Chelswu-ka amuto I-TOP Chelswu-NOM anybody ttaly-ess-ta-ko] malha-ci ani ha-ess-ta]. hit-PAST.DCL.COMP say-CI NEG do-PAST.DCL 'I did not say that Chelswu hit anybody.' b. [CPI Na-nun [cp2 Chelswu-ka amuto ttaly-ci ani I-TOP Chelswu-NOM anybody hit-ci NEG ha-ess-ta-ko] malha-ess-ta]. do-PAST.DCL.COMP say-PAST.DCL 'I said that Chelswu did not hit anybody.' A striking fact is that (49a) can be improved if the NPI is scrambled out of the embedded clause, as in (50). Such scrambling appears to lift the NPI into the appropriate binding domain. (50) [CPI Amutoi na-nun [CP 2 Chelswu-ka ei anybody I-TOP Chelswu-NOM ttaly-ess-ta-ko] malha-ci ani ha-ess-ta]. hit-PAST.DCL.COMP say-CI NEG do-PAST.DCL 'I did not say that Chelswu hit anybody.' Progovac's view is yet further supported by the fact that NPIs in



N P I s and Binding Theory

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(51) Mary-ka amuto hayngpokhata-ko mitci ani hanta. Mary-NOM anybody happy-COMP believe not do 'Mary does not believe anybody to be happy.' (ECM complement) Moreover, Lee (1994, 350) observes with (52) and (53) that an NPI in a matrix subject position is licensed by the embedded negation in a raising construction or in a passive+raising construction. Such constructions again widen the binding domain to include a higher clause (see §4.3.2/191). We saw in §2.3.1/49 that Korean negation was able to take up different scope positions in licensing NPIs. What (52) and (53) seem to show is that Korean negation is free to take up the scope position of its licensee anywhere within its binding category. (52) AmutOi Mary-eykey-nun [e\ ttokttokhaci ani han-kes] anyone Mary-DAT-CONTRA clever not do-KES kathta. seem (*'Anybody seems to Mary not to be clever.') (raising) (53) Amutoi John-eyuyhay [ei ttokttokhaci ani hatako] anyone John-by clever not did sayngkaktoyessta. be-believed (*'Anybody was believed by John not to be clever.') (passive+raising) French adds further weight to Progovac's line of reasoning. French N-words like personne in (54) and NPIs like qui que ce soit in (55) are clause-bound (see §3.2/62). (54)*Jean n'a dit que Marie avait vu p e r s o n n e . Jean NE-has said that Marie had seen N-word 'Jean didn't say that Marie had seen anyone.' (55)*Jean n'a pas dit que Marie avait vu qui que ce soit. Jean NE-has not said that Marie had seen anyone 'Jean didn't say that Marie had seen anyone.'



an embedded clause can be licensed by the matrix negation in cases of exceptional case marking (henceforth ECM). This is expected, as ECM constructions widen the binding domain to include the higher clause. 50


77

(56) Marie ne croit rien regretter. Marie NE believes nothing regret-iNF 'Marie doesn't believe regretting anything.' Following Progovac, French N-words and NPIs are thus subject to Principle A: they must be A-bound in their governing category. In summary, the clause-bound behaviour of both NPIs and Nwords can be derived from Binding Theory (on the assumption that binding applies, not only to A-, but also to A-relations). However, Progovac's approach relies heavily on Binding Theory as originally designed, that is, in syntactic terms with the notion of government at its core. Under Minimalism, this is no longer a tenable account. Also Progovac has nothing to say about our main concern, namely, intervention effects. Nevertheless, we think that Progovac's viewpoint on the clause-bound nature of NPIs is essentially correct and this will be incorporated into our own account, only with the (Minimalist friendly) theory of binding introduced in §4.3.3/119.

N P I s and Feature Movement Here we introduce Guerzoni (2004), a theory that addresses head on intervention effects in N-word/NPI constructions. The proposal is in terms of feature checking: the negative head in English and in negative concord languages (ne in French, non in Italian, etc.) comes with a negative feature that needs to be checked at LF. NPIs and N-words, have a matching feature. In addition, Guerzoni adopts the framework of Pesetsky (2000) (see §1.3.1/19) where two kinds of covert movement co-occur: the usual post-Spell-Out phrasal movement and feature movement. This gives two options for the licensing of NPIs, which gives the heart of Guerzoni's proposal, namely (57). (57) There are two kinds of NPI-licensing: a. Via phrasal movement b. Via feature movement Phrasal movement can be diagnosed by island constraints (Ross, 1967). Pesetsky offers the diagnostics of (58) for feature movement.



And as (56) shows, French N-words in an embedded clause can be licensed by the matrix negation in cases of ECM.

78


Constructions

Pesetsky derives these diagnostics from the universal constraint in (59). (59) The Intervention Effect Condition (Pesetsky) A semantic restriction on a quantifier (including WH) may not be separated from that quantifier by a scope-bearing element. This gives the properties of feature movement rather than phrasal movement, since feature movement is held to leave a restriction inside the clause, while phrasal movement pied-pipes a whole phrase, including its restriction. Pesetsky (2000) uses feature movement to account for apparent violations of superiority and the sensitivity of such superiority violations to intervention effects (cf. §5.4.6/157). Thus, in (60a), which student is claimed to have already undergone feature movement to C [ + W H ] , and so which book does not actually cross over which student when overtly phrasal moved. Hence, there is no superiority violation. 51 In (60b), which book undergoes phrasal movement, which can cross negation and other quantificational elements. In (60c), feature movement cannot cross negation (a scope-bearing element) and so feature movement of which student to C [ + W H ] is blocked. This gives a real superiority violation, causing ungrammaticality. (60) a. Which booki did which s t u d e n t read ei? b. Which booki didn't John give ei to which s t u d e n t ? c. *Which booki didn't which s t u d e n t read ei? With the diagnostics in place, we can supplement (57) for (61). (61) There are two kinds of NPI-licensing: a. Via phrasal movement: cannot be across an island, but is not subject to intervention. b. Via feature movement: can cross islands, but is subject to intervention. It follows that cases where NPIs are grammatical will be cases where at least one set of conditions is obeyed, while ungrammatical occur-



(58) a. Feature movement, but not phrasal movement, is sensitive to intervention effects triggered by a class of quantificational and negative operators, b. Feature movement has no effect on scopal relations, while phrasal movement effects scope.

79

rences will violate some condition from both sets. This predicts that NPIs licensed in contexts where phrasal movement is ungrammatical are expected to be sensitive to intervention effects, since intervention effects are a characteristic property of feature movement. Likewise, when feature movement is impossible (because of an intervening quantifier) typical properties of phrasal movement are expected to be observed. To test out these ideas, Guerzoni starts with Ross' (1967) observation that a complex NP acts as a strong island, that is, it blocks (overt) phrasal movement (see §4.3.4/123). The absence of an inverse scope reading in (62) indicates that covert phrasal movement also gets blocked. (62) Mary met a professor who gave Bill every book. (3 > V, *V > 3) Nevertheless, an NPI like any located in a complex NP is arguably licensable, as (63) shows. 52 (63) Mary didn't meet a professor who gave Bill any book. Since the checking requirement of the NPI cannot have been satisfied via (covert) phrasal movement in (63), it must have been satisfied via feature movement. Hence, cases of this sort are suitable for testing feature movement properties, that is, they are expected to be sensitive to intervention effects. The examples in (64) confirm this prediction, with every acting as intervener. 53 (64) a. *Mary didn't meet a professor who gave every student any book. b. *Mary didn't tell everybody that she met a student who gave Bill any book. (Guerzoni, 2004, 11) A second case in which Guerzoni argues feature movement properties can be isolated is in the licensing of NPIs in the subject position of an embedded finite clause. In these contexts checking via phrasal movement is unavailable, since extraction from such positions is not possible, at least in English. Sensitivity to intervention effects is thus expected, as (65b) confirms. (65) a. The secretary didn't tell me that anybody called. b. *The secretary didn't tell everybody that anybody called.




80


(66) a.

John must be meeting some student at the department. (3 > must, must > 3) b. There must be some student in the department right now. (*3 > must, must > 3)

Sensitivity to intervention effects is thus expected, as (67b) confirms. (66c) shows another of Guerzoni's predictions, namely that, whenever phrasal movement is possible, intervention effects do not lead to ungrammaticality. 54 (67) a. I didn't tell Mary that there was any food in the fridge. (feature movement licenses the NPI, since phrasal movement is not possible) b. *I didn't tell everyone that there was any food in the fridge. (the feature movement needed for NPI-licensing is blocked by the intervening everyone) c. I didn't tell everybody that you had any food in the fridge, (phrasal movement is taken to be possible here, so the intervening everyone does not lead to ungrammaticality) Guerzoni's proposal is interesting and not without bite, but it also has problems. First, the account is inconsistent with a view of the grammar as having a unique cycle (cf. the Uniformity Principle). Second, the idea that intervention effects stem from the Intervention Effect Condition is nothing more than a descriptive statement. As promised in §1.4/29, an aim of this book is to rationalize the intervention effect generalizations of Pesetsky/Beck (see §1.3.1/19 for further details). Third, it requires that N-words and NPIs are feature marked for negation. While this is motivated for French N-words (see §3.4/81), NPIs do not fare so well. NPIs can be licensed in contexts where negation is not present, e.g., NPIs are found in both rhetorical questions and information questions (Borkin, 1971; Krifka, 1995; Van Rooy, 2003). Fourth, the account fails to capture the clause-bound effects detailed in §3.2/62 and §3.3.2/75.



A third case where phrasal movement seems to be unavailable is the postcopular position of an existential there construction. Hence the absence of a wide scope reading for the DP in the postcopular position of (66b), which contrasts with (66a) (see also §2.4/54).


French N-words: what are they?

N-words have been analysed as being: - pure variables/indefinites without quantificational force (Ladusaw, 1992; Acquaviva, 1993, 1999; Giannakidou and Quer, 1995,1997; Giannakidou, 1997; Deprez, 1997, 2000; Ouhalla, 1997); - NPIs (Bosque, 1980; Laka, 1990; Suher, 1995); - negative elements (Haegeman and Zanuttini, 1991; Haegeman, 1995, 1997; Mathieu, 2001); - ambiguous between negative elements and NPIs (Rizzi, 1982; Van den Wouden and Zwarts, 1993; Dowty, 1994; Herburger, 2001). In this section, we present data showing that, in French, N-words are not pure variables, nor NPIs. Rather we show that they are inherently negative elements. First, we note that N-words can appear in sentences where they are the only elements able to contribute negation. For example, they can appear pre- or postverbally without the Neg head ne, as in (68) and (69). (68) a.

Personne est venu. N-word is come 'Nobody came.' b. Rien est arrive. N-word is happened 'Nothing has happened.'

(69) a.

Je vois personne. I see N-word 'I do not see anyone.' b. Je vois rien. I see N-word 'I do not see anything.'

Moreover, a negative statement with ne and an N-word cannot receive a double-negation reading. Thus, reading (70ii) is not possible. (70) Marie (n') a vu personne. Marie NE has seen N-word 'Marie didn't see anybody.'



3.4

81

82


This suggests that the Neg head ne itself has no negative content. Confirmation for this comes from the fact that ne is neither necessary nor sufficient to mark sentential negation, as (71) shows (Rowlett, 1998, is one of the few reports on French studies in the Principles and Parameters framework to acknowledge this). 55 (71) a. Je fume pas. I smoke not 'I do not smoke.' b. *Je ne fume. I NE smoke 'I do not smoke.' From this perspective, French N-words behave like Germanic negative quantifiers (NQs). The second piece of evidence for the claim that French N-words manifest an inherent negative specification comes from elliptical contexts. French N-words can be used as answers to questions, as (72) illustrates. (72) a.

Qui as-tu vu? who have-you seen 'Who have you seen?' b. Personne. N-word 'No one.'

Third, French N-word constructions exhibit strong island effects, as (73) shows. (73)*Jean n'a engage Marie [pour licencier personne]. Jean NE-has hired Marie for fire-lNF N-word 'Jean hasn't hired Marie in order to fire anyone.' French N-words behave much like NQs in this respect: NQs cannot take wide scope when embedded in a strong island (Moritz and Valois, 1994). For example, the NQ in (74) cannot negate the matrix predicate. (74) John hired Mary in order to fire no one. #'There is no person that John hired Mary in order to fire.'



(i) 'There is no person that Marie saw.' (ii) # ' I t is not the case that there is no person that Marie saw.'


83

Fourth, French N-words exhibit weak island effects, as (75) shows.

Notably, (75) is a genuine weak island example, since French N-words cannot be licensed in interrogatives (see (83a)). 56 Fifth, French N-words are possible in constituent negation contexts, as (76) shows. (76) Je travaille pour personne. I work for N-word 'I work for no one (i.e. I am self-employed).' Also N-words can be used in non-sentential coordination (Zanuttini, 1991), as (77) shows. (77) Ils ont invite Jean et Marie et personne d'autre. they have invited Jean and Marie and N-word of-else 'They have invited Jean and Marie and no one/*anyone else.' Sixth, French N-words can be used in disjunctive constituents without the presence of a negative antecedent, as (78) shows. (78) Paris ou rien! Paris or nothing 'Paris or nothing! (for the holiday)/*Paris or anything.' 57 Seventh, as Zanuttini (1991) was first to show with examples like (79), French N-words can be modified by certain adverbs, such as presque 'almost' and pratiquement 'practically.' Recall from our discussion of (43) and (44) that such adverbs can modify both universal and negative quantifiers, but not existential quantifiers. (79) Jean (n')a presque/pratiquement rien fait. Jean NE-has almost/practically N-word done 'Jean did almost/practically nothing.' Eighth, as Corblin (1994, 1996) (also Larrivee, 1995) was first to note with examples like (80), negative statements with multiple N-words are ambiguous between a negative concord reading and a double-negation interpretation.



(75)*Tu ne te demandes quand voir personne. you NE yourself ask when see-lNF N-word 'You do not wonder when to see anyone.' (Deprez, 1997, 57)


(80) Personne a rien dit. N-word has N-word said 'No one said anything.' (i) 'There are no (x, y) such that person x said thing ?/.' (ii) 'There is no person x for which there is no thing y such that x said y.1 Speakers are often reported to prefer the negative concord reading over the double negation reading (cf. de Swart and Sag, 2002). The double negation reading appears to be most natural when the speaker denies a denial of the previous speaker. At any rate, since double negation is possible, French N-words clearly have negative potential. In this respect, their behaviour resembles Germanic NQs, as in (81). (81) N o one said nothing. (i) *'There are no (x,y) such that person x said thing y.' (ii) 'There is no person x for which there is no thing y such that x said y.' Ninth, English NPIs can occur in many non-negative polarity environments while NQs cannot, as the data in (82) shows. 58 (82) a. b. c. d. e. f.

Has anyone/*no one called? (yes-no question) When did you call anyone/*no one? (WH question) If you see anyone/*no one, let me know. (conditional) I doubt anyone/*no one will come. (adversative) I am surprised that he knows anyone/*no one. (factive) Everyone who knows anything/*nothing about this knows it's dangerous. (universal quantifier) g. Only John saw anything/*nothing. (only) h. John is richer than anyone/*no one. (comparative) i. It's the dumbest idea anyone/*no one has had. (superlative)

While Italian and Spanish N-words exhibit some quantificational variability (Laka, 1990), French N-words behave very much like NQs in that they cannot be licensed in any context other than negation, as the data in (83) illustrates (* indicates "ungrammatical under an NPI reading"). 59 (83) a. *Quand as-tu telephone a personne? when have-you called to N-word 'When did you call anyone?'

(WH question)



84

85

b. *Si tu vois personne, fais-le-moi savoir. if you see N-word, let-it-me know 'If you see anyone, let me know.' (conditional) c. *Je doute que personne (ne) vienne. I doubt that N-word EXP come-SUBJ 'I doubt anyone will come.' (adversative) d. *Je suis surpris qu'il connaisse personne. I am surprised that-he know-SUBJ N-word 'I am surprised that he knows anyone.' (factive) e. *Tout le monde qui connait rien a propos de ga all the people who knows N-word about this sait que c'est dangereux. knows that it-is dangerous 'Everyone who knows anything about this knows it's dangerous.' (universal quantifier) f. *Seulement JEAN a rien vu. only Jean has N-word seen 'Only JEAN saw anything.' (only) g. *Jean est plus riche que personne. Jean is more rich than N-word 'John is richer than anyone.' (comparative) h. *C'est l'idee la plus stupide que personne ait it-is the-idea the most stupid that N-word have-SUBJ eu. had 'It's the dumbest idea anyone has had.' (superlative) In contrast to N-words, the data in (84) shows that French NPIs, such as qui que ce soit 'anyone', replicate the quantificational variability of (82). (84) a.

Quand as-tu telephone a qui que ce soit? when have-you called to anyone 'When did you call anyone?' (WH question) b. Si tu vois qui que ce soit, fais-le-moi savoir. if you see anyone, let-it-me know 'If you see anyone, let me know.' (conditional) c. Je doute que qui que ce soit vienne. I doubt that anyone come-SUBJ 'I doubt anyone will come.' (adversative)




The Syntax and Semantics of Split Constructions d. Je suis surpris qu'il connaisse qui que ce soit. I am surprised that-he know-SUBJ anyone 'I am surprised that he knows anyone.' (factive) e. Tout le monde qui connait quoi que ce soit all the people who knows anyone a propos de ga sait que c'est dangereux. about this knows that it-is dangerous 'Everyone who knows anything about this knows it's dangerous.' (universal quantifier) f. Seulement JEAN a vu quoi que ce soit. only Jean has seen aynone 'Only JEAN saw anything.' (only) g. Jean est plus riche que qui que ce soit. Jean is more rich than anyone 'John is richer than anyone.' (comparative) h. C'est l'idee la plus stupide que qui que ce soit it-is the-idea the most stupid that anyone ait eu. have-SUBJ had 'It's the dumbest idea anyone has had.' (superlative)

Finally, another relevant fact about French N-words is that intervention effects do not yield ungrammaticality if a pas is inserted locally to ne, as in (85). This is interesting because pas is usually incompatible with the presence of N-words, but it becomes necessary when a quantifier intervenes between the scope marker ne and the N-word. Je n'ai (*pas) donne le livre a personne. I NE-have not given the book to N-word 'I didn't give the book to anyone.' b. Je n'ai *(pas) donne chaque livre / tous les livres a I NE-have not given each book / all the books to personne. N-word 'I didn't give each/every book to anyone.' (Guerzoni, 2004, 55) To sum up, in this section we have presented data showing that French N-words are inherently negative. Although pure variable and NPI proposals might be suitable for Italian and other Romance languages like Spanish and Catalan, they were shown to be completely inadequate for French. Note also that, since French has its own set of (85) a.



86

87

NPIs (the qui que ce soit series), the thesis that N-words are ambiguous between being negative elements and NPIs is seriously weakened. We can also conclude from this discussion that intervention effects do not arise solely with non-inherent negative elements like NPIs, which weakens the semantic/pragmatic views of Krifka (§3.3.1/66) and Honcoop (§3.3.1/71), since it proves intervention effects to be a wider phenomenon than these accounts are able to capture.

3.5

Towards a Split Construction Analysis

To account for the intervention effects exhibited by negative constructions with N-words/NPIs, we will argue that these constitute split constructions. That is, a configuration in which a bare operator is separate from its noun restrictor is instantiated. As we said when giving essentially the same analysis in the last chapter (but to very different phenomena), such a syntactic characterization of the contexts which give rise to intervention effects does not say why intervention effects arise. But we continue to delay this part of the story until chapter 5, after which we will have the mechanics in place that our interpretation based explanation needs. For the time being we will concentrate on outlining further details of the syntax. We will analyze N-words as projecting a null negation operator Op in addition to an overt restriction. 60 The inherent negative operator then enters into a checking relation with a negative head to take up its scopal position. (86) illustrates the proposal: Op moves to SpecNegP (in Minimalist terms it moves to check the [+NEG] feature of Neg). This explains why pas is incompatible with the presence of N-words (but recall the discussion of (85) for a qualification). Also in (86), the head ne raises from Neg to cliticize onto Inn. (86) Jean n'a [NegP Opi vu [DP ei personne]]. Jean NE-has negative operator seen restriction The analysis suggests that the Neg feature on Neg zero is universally strong. This is bolstered with evidence from West Flemish, where N-words move overtly (Haegeman and Zanuttini, 1991; Haegeman, 1995, 1997). French is the same, except for the fact that it moves a phonologically null operator. In contrast, we will analyze NPIs as providing a restriction only, and as relying on the presence of an independently introduced c-




88


(87) John has not seen anything. negative operator nominal restriction It follows that the crucial difference between NPIs and N-words is that whereas N-words consist of a null negative operator element and a restriction together as a morphological unit, NPIs do not form a morphological word with negative elements such as not. These differences are illustrated in (88). (88) a. b. c.

[Op personne] [[Not] ... [anyone]] [[pas] ... [qui que ce soit]

It is this difference in how the negative operator is introduced that establishes the differences between N-words and NPIs. For example, that N-words can appear in isolation and generally have negative import whereas NPIs do not (see §3.4/81). Bouvier (2001) observes some audible effects of the silent operator we are postulating for French N-words. "In a widespread colloquial use, a phonological rule optionally reduplicates the initial liquid consonant that constitutes, after the schwa-drop, the third person singular accusative clitic, when it stays between two vowels in overt syntax" (p. 6). (89) illustrates this reduplication. (89) Jel-1'aime. Ih-him/her-love 'I love him/her.' This phonological rule is not available in negative sentences, as (90) shows. (90)*Jel-l'aime pas. Ih-him/her-love not. 'I don't love him/her.' Bouvier takes this to indicate that there is a clitic negative Boolean operator blocking the reduplication rule, as (91) illustrates.



commanding negative operator. The result is an identical split construction, just arrived at with different means, as (87) illustrates. Note how this shows that our explanation of the intervention effect will have nothing to do with movement per se.


89

The fact that the null operator has bearings on phonology indicates that null operator movement is not the equivalent of ("covert") feature movement. Instead, it must be that null operator movement is in our case an overt process, separate from full movement. Finally, we should note that although we grant negative status to French N-words, the contention that we make is that French N-words nevertheless differ from English, Dutch and German NQs in that they are inherently negative by way of the null negative operator, not by their intrinsic quantificational force. We have decomposed French N-words into a negative operator which takes up a scope position + nominal restriction, whereas Germanic N-words form one semantic unit that does not split. 61

3.6

Summary

The goal of this chapter was to show that constructions with negative indefinites (NPIs and N-words) are further cases of split constructions. We have shown that previous accounts of intervention effects with NPIs cannot be correct, at least when applied to French N-words. We proposed an alternative in which such constructions involve the splitting of a bare operator from its semantic restriction. This splitting has consequences for the semantic evaluation: scopal elements cannot intervene between the restrictor and its bare operator. Before we are in a position to complete this part of the account, we need to introduce logical tools for the semantic evaluation. We do this in the next chapter.



(91)*Jel-Neg-l'aime pas. Ih-him/her-love not.




Interfacing Syntax and Semantics 4-1

Introduction

In this chapter we take a break from looking at split construction phenomena to introduce Predicate Logic with Barriers, together with the family of systems that it builds on. This will give us a formal architecture with which we can complete in the next chapter our account of intervention effects in split constructions. Also, in this chapter, we link Predicate Logic with Barriers to a Minimalist syntax by assuming what is in the generative literature a standard conception of the interface between syntax and semantics. This interface sees syntax and semantics as constituting autonomous but closely related systems. It views syntax as a recursive procedure that generates syntactic Logical Form representations (LFs), while semantics is a recursive procedure that assigns assembled LFs an interpretation. We take as our basic assumption the architecture of Chomsky (1995) depicted in (1). (1)

PF^

Numeration

(Spell-Out)

LF 91 10.1057/9780230501607 - The Syntax and Semantics of Split Constructions, Alastair Butler and Eric Mathieu


Chapter 4


In (1), syntax consists of a derivation that, in proceeding towards LF, builds phrase markers from the lexical elements in a Numeration. At some point in the derivation (referred to as Spell-Out) the representation is sent to Phonological Form (PF), where it is given a representation usable by the articulatory-perceptual system responsible for speech, etc. It is customary to refer to the pre-Spell-Out part of the derivation as overt syntax, and to the post-Spell-Out part as covert syntax. The central idea of the Minimalist Program is that only certain assembled phrase markers can be interpreted at the two interfaces. If, for any reason, the P F representation cannot be read by the articulatory-perceptual system, the representation is said to have crashed at P F . Similarly, if the LF representation cannot be read by the semantics, the representation has crashed at LF. Only if the representations at both interfaces are interpretable does a linguistic object "converge," earning it "well-formed" status. On this view, no linguistic conditions should refer specifically to the levels of representation known as S-structure and D-structure in earlier models of transformational grammar; conditions are to be stated with reference only to the levels of LF and PF, and to the "internal" processes of the derivation leading to those levels (e.g. Case assignment). The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 introduces Propositional Logic, Predicate Logic, Predicate Logic with Anaphora, and Predicate Logic with Barriers. After this, §4.3 is concerned with constraints on dependencies among positions in syntactic structure. Given our syntax/semantics interface assumptions, we show that such constraints manifest the interpretation conditions of the Predicate Logic with Barriers system. Section 4.4 gives a summary.

4-2

Logical Tools

In this section we introduce a family of formal logical systems, keeping to the following order: - Propositional Logic, - Predicate Logic, - Predicate Logic with Anaphora, and - Predicate Logic with Barriers.



92

Interfacing Syntax and Semantics

93

Our view of such systems is that they consist of two components: 62

4.2.1

Propositional Logic

We begin with the simplest of logics: Propositional Logic. We assume a collection of elementary expressions called atomic propositions. These are the building blocks of propositions and may be combined by means of logical connectors (not, and, or, etc.). There are two possibilities: 1. These expressions do not need breaking down. In this case they are represented by a letter identifier: P, Q, etc. These symbols are called proposition symbols. Longer identifiers will also be used to better express what is represented, e.g. i t _ i s p r a i n i n g . 2. The atomic proposition expression itself is structured. In this case the interpretation depends on term expressions, giving as many possible interpretations as term expressions. For example, we can consider the individual denoted by the term expression John, and construct an expression in predicate-argument notation stating that John is happy: happy (John), happy is called a one-place predicate symbol. John is called a constant symbol. 6 3 Predicate symbols with any number of places can be introduced. For example, John visits Amsterdam can be expressed with the twoplace predicate symbol v i s i t s and the constant symbols John and Amsterdam, giving: v i s i t s (John, Amsterdam). The difference between the second situation and the first is superficial for now. For example, John_vi s i t s .Amsterdam can be used to replace v i s i t s (John, Amsterdam). On the other hand, the first type of expression can be considered to be a particular case of the second: the proposition symbols (P, Q, i t _is t r a i n i n g ) can be taken to represent zero-place predicate symbols. Thus, all atomic propositions can



1. a formal language, and 2. an intended semantic interpretation. The presentation of later systems will build on former systems: unless a definition is explicitly redefined it is assumed to carry thorough to the next logic. The overall goal is to introduce Predicate Logic with Barriers (PLB), and proceeding thus we hope will emphasize that the system contains few surprises. We should however warn the reader that by itself this section does not constitute a proper introduction to either Propositional Logic or Predicate Logic, as it takes liberties to introduce a background most relevant for understanding PLB.

94


Constructions

be formally constructed by combining a zero or more placed predicate symbol with zero or more constant symbols, in accordance with (2).

Propositions are defined as in (3).


(2) if P is an n-place predicate symbol, and t\,...,tn are constant symbols, then P(t\, ...,tn) is an atomic proposition.

(3) - every atomic proposition is a proposition; - if (pronounced "not ") is a proposition; - if (f> and I/J are propositions, %j) (pronounced "(j) and ^>", "0 or ^ " and " implies -0", respectively) are propositions; 64 - there are no propositions other than those constructed via the preceding three rules. We should note that (3) gives only the essentials of propositions. To reduce ambiguities in a concrete expression such as P A Q V R, it is convenient to introduce priority levels for the operations -», A, etc., as well as parentheses "(" and ")" when necessary. 65 To illustrate the terminology, consider the expression in (4). (4) v i s i t s (John, Amsterdam) A v i s i t s (Mary, Singapore) In this example: - (4) is a proposition; - v i s i t s (John, Amsterdam) and v i s i t s (Mary, Singapore) are also propositions, more specifically, atomic propositions; - John, Mary, Amsterdam and Singapore are constant symbols; and - v i s i t s is a predicate symbol. Interpretation The approach to interpreting the language of Propositional Logic is as follows. First we assume the set of Booleans. This contains exactly two elements representing the truth values true and false. To every atomic proposition we can immediately attach a truth value. For example, true for P, i t _ i s t r a i n i n g and John_isJhappy; false for Q and Mary_isJiappy. For the general case involving predicate and constant symbols, we require a first order model: M = (D,T). This contains a universe of discourse V (more formally, a non-empty



95

(5) i. to each constant symbol a member of V ii. to each one-place predicate symbol a subset of V iii. to each n-place predicate symbol a subset of V x ... x X> n

(i.e. a set of ordered n-tuples of elements from V) With model M = (V,X), each constant symbol c is mapped with X(c) to a value in V. Similarly, each predicate symbol P is mapped with X(P) to relationships over the domain. In what follows, we will use M(c) to abbreviate X(c), and M(P) to abbreviate X(P). Every atomic proposition involving a predicate P(...) can now be given a truth value obtained by finding out whether the values of its arguments are in M(P). If (j) n a s the value true in M, we say that M satisfies <j>. We write this: \=M - Otherwise, we say that M fails to satisfy , with (j) having the value false in M. We write this Y=M 0. Thus, (6) holds for the general case involving predicate and constant symbols. (6) \=M P(cu.-., Cn) iff (M(Cl),...,

M(cn)) E M(P)

For the assignment of a truth value to all propositions, the connectives -i and A are associated with the satisfaction relations in (7). (7) - \=M - 0 iff V^M 4> - K M Ail>ifi \=M and \=M ^ For the other connectives V and —>, we can use the standard equivalences of (8) and likewise for all the logics that follow. (8) - (j) V ip iff -.(-.0 A ->V>) - cj) —> ij) iff -i( A -it/))

4.2.2

P r e d i c a t e Logic

The language we have considered thus far, Propositional Logic, does not allow us to capture more general statements such as: (9) Every individual who visits somewhere finds enjoyment. To this effect, we need parameterized propositions, for example:



set of individuals called a domain), and an interpretation function X which assigns:

96


Such a parameterized proposition is called a formula. The next step consists of quantifying formulas. Universal quantification over x in (10) is expressed as in (11). (11) Vx(visits_somewhere(a;) —• f i n d s .enjoyment (#)) for all x, if x visits somewhere, then x finds enjoyment This can be viewed as the potentially infinite conjunction in (12). (12) (visits_somewhere(John) —> f i n d s .enjoyment (John)) A ( v i s i t s .somewhere (Mary) —> f i n d s .enjoyment (Mary)) A... if John visits somewhere, then John finds enjoyment and if Mary visits somewhere, then Mary finds enjoyment and ... etc. Finally, the existential quantification of y in (13) is expressed as in (14). (13) x visits somewhere y (14) 3yvlsits(x,y) there exists y such that x visits y This can be viewed as the potentially infinite disjunction in (15). (15) v i s i t s ( x , Amsterdam) V v i s i t s ( x , S i n g a p o r e ) V... x visits Amsterdam or x visits Singapore or ... etc. We can now use (14) to replace visits_somewhere(x) of (11) to give (16), which counts as a fuller representation of (9). (16) \/x(3y(visits(x

,y)) —• f i n d s .enjoyment (x))

The simplest logic for interpreting (16) is Predicate Logic. More precisely, we only consider First-Order Predicate Logic, with variables restricted to varying over the domain V of a first order model, and not over relationships over V or propositions. Syntax To get Predicate Logic, we introduce into the language a set of variables V = {x,y,...} and two symbols 3 (there exists) and V (for all), also called quantifiers (respectively, the existential and universal



(10) v i s i t s _somewher e ( x) —• f i n d s .enjoyment (x) if x visits somewhere, then x finds enjoyment


97

(17) - every constant symbol is a term; - every variable is a term; - if 0 is a formula and # is a variable then 3x<j> and Vx0 are formulae, (x need not occur in , although in practice this is often the case.) Free and Bound Variables In logic we use the term free or bound variable. For example, in (18), x is free while y is bound. (18) 3yvisits(x,y) One must be conscious of the fact that in the same formula a variable can have both free and bound occurrences; for example x in (19). (19) P(x,y)

AVxQ(x,y)

The free occurrences of x are defined as in (20). (20) - every occurrence of x in an atomic formula is free; - every free occurrence of x in <j> is also free in ->0;


quantifiers). Terms, atomic formulae and formulae are then defined by: (a) replacing constant symbol with term, atomic proposition with atomic formula and proposition with formula in definitions (2) and (3), and (b) adding the rules of (17).

- every free occurrence of x in is also free in A I/J, (f> V ip, (j) —» ip; idem for every free occurrence of x in -0; - no occurrence of x in 3xcj) or in Vx is free. Interpretation How do we interpret a formula depending on x? Consider (21), the value of which (true or false), depends on the value of x. (21) happy (x) To evaluate (21), the concept of an assignment is needed, which is a function from a set of variables V to V. Fixing an assignment Y gives (21) the value true iff Y(x) € happy, and false iff T(x) $ happy. More generally, as definition (22) spells out, the value of a term depends on the model M, and the assignment T.



/oo\ imi

f M(t) if t is a constant symbol

(22) [t]M,r = j

m

iftisavariable

The division of labour here is between M, a more permanent linkage corresponding to longer-term linguistic conventions that one learns, and T, a more local "dynamic" linkage that may shift as required by context. To accommodate T, the satisfaction relation itself is extended thus: V \=M (j). This says that formula (j) is true in model M under assignment T. Contra, T ^M (j) for false. We can now interpret atomic formulae, negation and conjunction as in (23). T aside, these are the same as in the propositional case. (23) - T \=M P(tu.», *n) «

- r [=M $ A ip iff r \=M and T \=M *l> The quantified formula 3xcj) is interpreted as in (24). Y[x/d\ is the assignment which is like Y except for the possible difference that it assigns the object d to the variable x. (24) T \=M 3x0 iff 3d € V : T[x/d]\=M 4> Suppose that the domain of M. contains only two individuals d\ and di and that .M(John) = d\ and A^(Mary) = d 2 , it follows from (24) that (25) has the same truth value as (26). (25) 3 y v i s i t s ( # , ] / ) (26) v i s i t s ( x , J o h n ) V v i s i t s ( x , M a r y ) It follows that the truth value of (25) depends only on the free variable x and not on the bound variable y. Hence, we could just as easily have written (27) as (25). (27) 3 2 v i s i t s ( x , 2 ) This uncovers the phenomenon of dummy variables, and shows that only free variables can be viewed as parameters of a formula. Thus, the truth value of a formula containing n free variables Xi,...,x n depends on T(xi),..., T(x n ). Finally, we note that attention may be restricted to just the logical constants -«, A and 3, given the equivalences of (8) and (28): (28) \/x
This leaves I/J requiring there to be s(ip) — l(ip) — 1(4) visible existential quantifiers in the discourse preceding 4 A ty. When this number exceeds the demands of 4 (given by s(4) — l(4))itne whole conjunction's scope becomes this number plus the length of the conjunction, i.e. s(-0) — 1(I/J) — 1(4) + 1(4 Ai/j) = s(i/)). Otherwise, the scope of the conjunction equals the demands of 4 p l u s the length of the conjunction, i.e. s(4) — 1(4) +1(4 A ^ ) = s(4) + W ) Thus, the scope of 4 w * u D e whichever is larger: s(4) + l(ip) or By way of illustration, consider the formulae of (33) and (34). (33) 3x(man(x) A 3t/(woman(?/) A dated(x,y))) woman.] (34) 3x(rose(x) A g a v e ( p 1 , p 2 , x ) )

[A man dated a [He gave her a rose.]

The length and scope of (33) is two: since it contains no pointers, its scope equals its length. The length of (34) is one. In contrast, its scope is three: since it (a) adds a new witness itself, and (b) has its most demanding pointer requiring an antecedent that is the witness for the second visible existential quantifier occurrence back in the previous discourse. The length of the conjunction of the two sentences, Z((33) A (34)), as well as its scope s((33) A (34)), is three. For although the second conjunct establishes an anaphoric link that is





Constructions

two visible existential quantifier occurrences back, these are provided by the first conjunct. Generally, if the scope of a formula 4 equals its length we will say that it is resolved, or anaphorically closed. In that case the formula contributes 1(4) witnesses but it does not impose (trans-sentential) conditions upon witnesses from previous discourse. Interpretation We now give the definition of the satisfaction \=M of a formula 4 in an assignment V and a sequence e made up of individuals from V (the domain of M). This is written: T, e \=M 0- Terms are interpreted as in (35). That is, constant symbols and variables are interpreted just as in Predicate Logic, while a pointer pi selects the i-ih individual from the sequence, since if e is a sequence of individuals (d\, d^ ...), then ei is di.

(

M(t) if t is a constant symbol Y(t) if t is a variable ei if t is a pointer p^

The remainder of the semantics is spelled out in (36), with the following notation: - ce is the concatenation of sequences c and e; - de is a sequence with witness d as its first element; and - T>n is the set of all sequences with length n made up of elements from V. (36) -T,e\=M - r, e

P(h,..., tn) iff €= M(P)

KM

-4 iff - 3 c G V1^ : T, ce

KM

4

- T,de \=M 3x0 iff T[x/d], e \=M (/> - T,ce

\=M

4 Aip 1ST,e

\=M

and T,ce

^ where c G T>1^

\=M

Satisfaction of an atomic formula P(...) is defined just as in Predicate Logic, except for the fact that the formula may house anaphoric pointers, the interpretation of which is determined by the given sequence of individuals. The negation of a formula 4 tells us that 4 is simply false. It states that there is no way to match up the existential quantifiers of 4 with a sequence c of 1(4) individuals. A negation thus closes the "existential holes" of the formula 4 i n its scope, so that,



102

103

e.g., -i3xP(x), as usual, means that no x is P. As a consequence, existential quantifiers in 4 cannot serve as antecedents for subsequent pointers. An existentially quantified formula 3x0 behaves like an ordinary quantifier in that it binds free occurrences of the variable x in its scope. But it also behaves like a free variable itself: possible witnesses for the quantified statement come from the first individual in the sequence relative to which the quantified formula is evaluated. So if e is a sequence satisfying 4 under an assignment of d to x, then de satisfies 3x0. Such a sequence is thus seen to keep track of the possible witness d for x, which as a consequence can be (re)addressed by subsequent pointers outside the scope of 3x0. From the existential quantifier's interpretation it follows that sequences reflect the introduction of witnesses for corresponding quantifiers in reversed order, so that a sequence (d\, c^, •••) is said to satisfy a certain discourse, if d\ is a possible referent of the existential used last (the most "salient" one, so to speak), d

iff and

This shows, firstly, how each conjunct may contribute its sequence of (possible) witnesses ((di+i...di+j) for 0 and (di...di) for -0), and, secondly, that pointers can be related to the witnesses of previous discourse ((di+j+i...) for 0 and (di+i...di+jdi+j+i...) for I/J). Notice that such a "dynamic" conjunction is stated in terms of a static satisfaction relation: it is only the presence of witnesses that make it different from a classical notion of conjunction. Thus conceived, all that is dynamic here (and, hence, about the PLA notion of interpretation) is that it accounts for the intuition that in a succession of two assertions, one assertion literally precedes the other. With this knowledge of how conjunction works, we should note that existentials and pointers are quite similar, with the equivalences of (38)-(40) holding. (38) T, de \=M 3xP (x) iff T, de ^=M P (Pi) (39) T,bde

K M 3X(P(X)

A 3j/Q(y)) iff T,bde \=M P(p x ) AQ(p 2 )





(40) T,bde \=M 3xP(x) A 3yQ(y)

ffiT,bde\=M

P(p 2 )AQ(p 1 )

Differences between existentials and pointers reside in the way they are taken up in various configurations. Existentials can be seen to introduce "new" referents, whereas pointers refer back to "old" ones. A second key difference is that existentials are quantified away under negation, while pointers are not. Also note that (39) and (40) illustrate how the relevant order of existentials does not necessarily correspond to their linear surface order. Rather the ordering is determined by syntactic structure, thus 3y comes after 3x in (41) (that is, is more "salient"), but 3y comes before 3x in (42) (that is, is less "salient"). (41) 3x(...) (42)

A3y(...)

3x(..3y(...)).

Examples Let us now see how PLA handles some key-note examples of systems of dynamic interpretation. Consider (33), repeated as (43). (43) 3x(man(x) A Ely (woman (y) A d a t e d ( x , y ) ) ) woman.]

[A man dated a

As (44) shows, (43) is satisfied by a sequence cde. (Throughout this section e can be taken to be any sequence.) That is, (43) is true if and only if c is a man who dated woman d. (44) Y,cde \=M (43) iff c G M(maji),d M (dated)

G At (woman) and (c,d) G

Now consider (34), repeated as (45). (45) 3x(rose(x) A g a v e ( p 1 , p 2 , x ) )

[He gave her a rose.]

As (46) shows, (45) is satisfied by a sequence bode. (46) T,bcde^M

(45) iff b G .M(rose) and (c,d,b) G .M(gave)

That is, (45) is true if and only if b is a rose given by c to d. (47) illustrates the conjunction of (43) and (45). Notably, the pointers of (45) get identified with the intended referents of the man and woman mentioned in (43), that is, to the witnesses of the first and second existentials back in the discourse.



104


105

(47) T,bcde K M (43) A (45) iff c G M(man), d G M(woman), (c,d) G .M(dated), b G Morose) and (c,d,b) G Al(gave)

(48) (43) —» (45) [If a man dated a woman then he gave her a rose.] The PLA notion of implication is defined in terms of negation and conjunction as in (8). Working this out, we find (49) holds. (49) r , e h M 0 - + ^ i f f \/ce VlM: if r , c e \=M 0 then 3a G V1^: T,ace \=M 4 This gives (48) the satisfaction conditions of (50). (50) r , e h M ( 4 8 ) i f f Vcd G V2: iir,cde\=M (43) then 36 G V: T,bcde\=M (45) iff Vcd eV2: iice M(m<m), d G M(woman), and (c,d) G M(dated) then 3b eV: be .M(rose) and (c,d,b) G .M(gave) Hence, (48) will be satisfied by any sequence provided that every man gives a rose to every woman he dates. These are the standard truth conditions associated with an implication with the form of (48) in Discourse Representation Theory and systems of dynamic semantics.

4.2.4

Predicate Logic with Barriers

In PLA, pointers and variables have a complementary distribution. Variables can only be bound by quantifiers in whose scope they find themselves; pointers, however, do not 'see' these quantifiers, and only refer back to witnesses which pop up after an existential formula has been closed. This is great if our attention is limited to accounting for inter-sentential anaphora and donkey anaphora. But there are plenty of instances in natural language where anaphoric relations are established internal to a sentence, for example, as the coindexation in (51) indicates. (51) Someonei thinks that he* is happy. In a PLA type logic, this equates to being able to establish anaphoric relations with an existential internal to that existential's scope. To achieve this we turn to our final logic, Predicate Logic with Barriers (PLB) (first introduced in Butler, 2003). Building on the previous



Finally, consider a so-called "donkey sentence" with the form of (48).

106


systems, this logic introduces a barrier operator that moves witnesses from the assignment to the discourse context where they are in the reach of pointers.

For PLB, we introduce into the language a barrier operator, adding (52) to the syntax rules of (2), (3), (17) and (29). (52) if 0 is a formula and xi,..., xn are variables then BAR/xi...x n 0 is a formula. The variables x\,..., xn in BAR/xi...x n are considered free occurrences of variables in the formula. We treat x\, ...,xn in jjx\...xn as a set. So jjx\...xn is in fact a shorthand for jj{x\, ...,xn}. We will say that BAR/xi...x n is slashed by X\,...,xn. We further shorten BAR/0 to BAR. Length and Scope of a Formula To get an immediate idea of how BAR is going to work, as well as the system in general, we can look at how it effects the scope of a formula. This is calculated with s of (54), which is the length of the formula (calculated with I of (31) and (53)) plus the number of existentials which the pointers of the formula require there to have been in the preceding discourse. (53) /(BAR//X 0) = 1(4) (54)

8(4)

- 5(0,0,0) s(e,k,Pti,...,tn) = max{fc,max{z | p^ is among ti,...,tn}} s e s(e,k,- card(X)

For bookkeeping purposes, the definition of scope for PLB carries two additional numbers, e and k, both initially set to 0. - e keeps track of the number of existentials able to bind variables. Upon a BAR/X occurrence, it is reset to the cardinality of X. This corresponds to the number of existentials that maintain there binding influence past the BAR//X occurrence.



Syntax


107

The number that is added to k is also subtracted from the overall scope calculation. The reason for this is that k enters into the scope calculation at the atomic formula level, and so this apparent removal of information actually prevents its duplication. We should also note that s(e,k, BAR//X4) only works provided e > card(X), that is the number of variables left open in 0 does not exceed the number of variables bound. The other operations of negation, existential quantification and conjunction are defined basically as they were in (32). Also, just as in (32), if an atomic formula contains a pointer pi, it requires there to be (at least) i existentials in the preceding discourse. But this is not all, as the number k is returned when it happens to be higher than the indices carried by the formula's pointers. Thus, the scope of an atomic formula equals either the index of the most demanding pointers among its terms or the number k, whichever is highest. If there are no pointers around, its scope sets to k, which as noted starts out as 0. By way of illustration, consider the formulas of (55)-(58): (55) 3XBARPCP!) (56) 3x3t/3zBARP(p3) (57) 3xBAR/xP(p x ) (58)

3x3y3zBAR//xyzP(ps)

The length and scope of (55) is one: since it contains a BAR which destroys the binding potential of the existential while adding to the discourse context the witness the pointer picks up. For the same reason, the length and scope of (56) is three. The length of (57) is one. In contrast, its scope is two: despite containing a BAR, this is slashed for x, leaving the binding potential of 3x intact, thus requiring an additional witness for the pronoun to be resolved. For the same reason, the length of (58), which is three, differs from its scope, which is six.



- k keeps track of the number of existentials which will have lost their binding role. This number only increases with a BAR/X, where it has added to it the number e minus the number of existentials that maintain there binding influence (namely, card(X)).

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Free Variables

(59) no occurrence of x in 3x0 or Vx0 is free unless it occurs free under the scope of a BAR/X where x & X (and with such a case, the resulting formula cannot be evaluated). Interpretation PLB breaks in two the single sequence of PLA to give: 1. a sequence of individuals yet to be introduced by the discourse, which we will call the novel sequence, and 2. a sequence of individuals already introduced by the discourse, that is, the discourse context. With this change, we give the definition of the satisfaction \=M of a formula 0 in the assignment T, the novel sequence c and the discourse context e. This is written: T,c, e \=M 4- All terms (constant symbols, variables and pointers) are interpreted just as in PLA, that is, as in (35). However, the assignment in PLB is taken to be partial. Thus, it is possible that a variable x has no mapped value. If such is the case, x can have no denotation, and so the satisfaction relation is said to crash. Similarly, an adequately sized discourse context is not secured, so that if p^ is evaluated with respect to a sequence with length less than i, the satisfaction relation is once more said to crash. 69 Hence, pointers can only be used in environments where the context supplies a suitable range of antecedents. The rest of the semantics is spelled out in (60). Note that () is the empty sequence. T|X is the assignment T, but with its domain of application restricted to the variables in X. (60) - r , ( ) , e > ^ P ( t i , . . , g

iff([*iW,?v.,[*nkr,?)€^(P)

-r,(),ehM-0iff-3cG^W

:T,c,e^M4

- T, dc, e \=M 3x0 iff T[x/d], c, e \=M 4 - T, ca, e -Y,c,e

\=M

4 Aip iff T, a, e

\=M

4

an(

i I\ c, de

\=M

ty

\=M BAR//X 0 iff T\X,c, (T(xi),...,T(x n ))e \=M 4 where {xi,..., x n } = domain(r) — X

Just as in PLA, atomic formulae in (60) are evaluated relative to a model, an assignment and a discourse context. The thing to note



Given the introduction of BAR, the definition of free variables in (20) needs to be adjusted thus:

109

that is different about the PLB formulation is that an atomic formula can only be evaluated if the novel sequence is empty. Failure to meet this condition causes the evaluation to crash. This has the effect of helping to ensure that there are not too many witnesses present for the evaluation. We should note that an evaluation crash does not have the same status as being undefined in a three valued logic. An interpretation crash is in essence a syntactic violation, and indeed from §4.3/113 onwards we equate interpretation crash with ungrammaticality. A clear distinction between the two notions arises with disjunction. In a three valued logic, a disjunction is true if either disjunct is true, false if both are false and otherwise undefined. This gives the truth table in (61a), with "u" the truth-value status of being undefined. In contrast, the interpretation of the disjunction of PLB (as derived via (8)) crashes whenever one of its disjuncts crashes. For illustrative purposes, we can think of this as giving the table in (61b), with "c" indicating an interpretation crash. However, be aware that "c" does not have a truth value status: PLB, like the previous logics we looked at, has only the truth values true and false. A T u F T u F T u F

B T T T u u u F F F

AVB T T T T u u T u F

A T c F T c F T c F

B T T T c c c F F F

AVB T c T c c c T c F

The negation of a formula 0 tells us that there is no way of supporting 0. Just like in PLA, in determining this, negation binds the existential quantifiers of 0. The only difference comes in the separation of the novel sequence from the discourse context, since the novel sequence is required to be empty. If the novel sequence is not empty, the evaluation crashes, with too many witnesses being present for the evaluation. The existential quantifier removes a witness and assigns this to the variables it binds. This is the PLA behaviour. In taking as its value the first element of the novel sequence, it even picks up the same witness: the single sequence of PLA being the concatenation of the





novel sequence and the discourse context. What is different is that if 3x0 is evaluated with respect to an empty novel sequence, T[x/d\ can have no completion, causing the satisfaction procedure to crash. This ensures that enough witnesses are present for the evaluation. The system inherits its conjunction from PLA: the first conjunct is evaluated before the second has come up with its possible witnesses and the second after the first has done so. What is different is that the single sequence of PLA is broken in two, that is, into the novel sequence and the discourse context. Because an interpretation crash will occur if there are either too many witnesses in the novel sequence or too few, an 1(4) calculation is not required in the semantic definition: that the novel sequence is the length it needs to be is assured by an evaluation success. More formally, if novel sequence a satisfies 0 given the discourse context e, and novel sequence c satisfies a subsequent 4 given the extended discourse context de, then the combined novel sequence ca also satisfies the conjunction of 0 and ijj given discourse context e. This can be pictured as in (62), given that i is the length 1(4) of 4 (making (di...di) the equivalent of c), and j is the length 1(4) of 0 (making (di+i...di+j) the equivalent of a). (62)

T, (d1...didi+1...di+j),(di+j+1...) T, {di+i...di+j), (di+j+1...) T, (di...di), (di+i...di+jdi+j+i...)

\=M 0A-0 \=M 4 \=M 4

iff and

As (62) makes clear, since the ordering of items both inside and between the novel sequence and discourse context is always maintained, we could continue to think of the two sequences as forming a single sequence just as in PLA that is judiciously broken up by the interpretation procedure. (62) also illustrates how the first conjunct is able to contribute its sequence of (possible) witnesses as accessible values for the pointers of the second conjunct, since for the second conjunct these witnesses are at the front of the discourse context. This "dynamics" is further illustrated by the calculations in (64) and (66). In (64), p x (he) and 3x (someone) are forced to take as their values different witnesses, while in (66) their values are the same witness. (63) smiles(p x ) A 3xlaughs(x)

[He smiles and someone laughs.]

(64) {},a,be\=M (63) iff {},(),be\=M smiles(p 1 ) and {},a,be \=M 3xlaughs(x) iff {}, (),be \=M smiles(p x ) and {x H-> a}, (),be \=M l a u g h s ( X ) iff b e .M(smiles) and a G .M(laughs)



110

Interfacing Syntax and Semantics (65) 3xsmiles(x) A laughs (p x )

111

[Someone smiles and he laughs.]

This demonstrates how a witness is moved from the novel sequence to the assignment by an existential (where it becomes the value of a variable occurrence) and then on to the discourse context by the conjunction (where it is accessible for pointers). Thus, just as in PLA, a pointer p^ in taking as its denotation the i-th witness from the discourse context, receives an interpretation that is coreferential with the i-th existential quantifier occurrence found when going back in the discourse from the place where the pointer occurs. We should note that existentials and pointers are no longer as similar as they were in PLA. Now, the equivalences of (67)~(69) hold.

(67) r,d,ehAi3xP(x) iffr,(),dehMP(Pi) (68) T,bd,e\=M 3x(P(x) A3yQ(y)) iff r, (),bde \=M P( P l ) AQ(p2) (69) Y,bd,e\=M

3xP(x) A 3y§(y) iff T,(),bde\=M

P(p 2 ) AQCp^

The difference between the two types is sharply illustrated with existentials taking their witnesses from the novel sequence (being seen to introduce "new" referents), whereas pointers link up to witnesses from the discourse context (being seen to refer back to "old" ones). The novel ingredient of the system is the BAR operator. This performs two roles: 1. it restricts the assignment F, so that T only assigns witnesses to the variables that slash it, and 2. it adds to the front of the discourse context all witnesses removed

from r. The calculation in (70) illustrates these roles, with BAR slashed for y. In addition, (70) shows that, as a consequence of moving to the discourse context, witnesses removed from the assignment cannot be reached by subsequent quantifier actions, but can be reached by pointers. Thus, while the first occurrence of 3x no longer binds x of P(^>y >Pi) 5 it does have the effect of binding p 1? or rather it 'colinks' with p x .



(66) {},a,e\=M(6h)ffi {},a,e\=M 3xsmiles(x) and {}, (),ae \=M laughs(p 1 ) iff {x i—• a}, (),e \=M smiles(x) and {}, (),ae \=M laughs(p x ) iff a G M(smiles) and a G M(laughs)

112


(70) {yâ},bc,e \=M 3xBAR//y3xP(xyyyj>1) iff {x i-> b,y i-> a},c,e\=M BAR/?/3xP(x,y,p 1 ) iff {x^b,y^ a}|{y},c,{x ^b,y*-> a}(x)e \=M 3xP(x,?/,p 1 ) iff {y â},c,be \=M 3xP(x,y,p 1 ) iff

iff

d}, (ci...c n ), (ei...) \=M BAR 0 iff {}, (ci...c n ),(dei...) |=>t 0

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4.3.1

A Word on Notation

Before launching into the topics of this section, we need to comment on less standard aspects of the notation we will use to bridge the gap between conventional syntactic LF representations and the formulas PLB evaluates. First, we reduce the notion of c-command to the methods of phrasal composition in (75) with their identical semantic expansions. (75) a. [Op 0] 4 iff Op(0 4) b. ^ [ O p 0 ] iffOp(0^) The connective is sensitive to the choice of Op. In the case of existential quantification Op = "3x" and 0 = "A". For universal quantification, Op = "Vx" and ® = "—•". For example, "Some man likes every woman" gets the interpretable LF in (76), which, given (75), is identical to (77). (76) [DP some man] [vp likes [DP every woman] ] [3xman(x)] ( l i k e s ( x , i / ) \Sy woman(y)] ) (77) 3y(maii(y) A V^(woman(z) —• l i k e s ( z / , z ) ) ) Unless specified otherwise (as was the case with the universal), we will always assume that = "A". Second, sentences with embedded clauses will yield formulas with content P : 0 . We use ":" to indicate that 0 is an additional argument of P. Thus, (78) is identical to (79). (78) someone thinks someone lied [3x] t h i n k s (x) : \3y] lied(?/) (79) 3xthinks(x,3?/lied(y)) However, we are unable to evaluate (79) since we have no semantic interpretation for embedding verbs. To provide this would require a lengthy digression and that we replace our extensional set up with a more involved intensional one. 71 Instead, to evaluate such formulae we will simply remove the contribution of the embedding verb. This



and §4.3.4/121 deal with movement relations (A- and A-, respectively), 70 while §4.3.3/119 and §4.3.5/126 are concerned with dependencies that do not appear to involve movement (binding dependencies and strong crossover effects, respectively).


115

gives an interpretable formula, while leaving intact the claims we wish to make with such examples.

A ( r g u m e n t ) Movement

In this section we look at phenomena that have been held to involve movement of an element to an A-position or argument position in terminology stemming from Government Binding Theory. Such positions were those in which an element could be base generated and bear a crucial semantic role with a clause's main predicate. This included the Spec-IP or subject position, since subjects were taken to be base-generated in Spec-IP before the VP-Internal Subject Hypothesis (Koopman and Sportiche, 1991, among others). 72 An example of A-movement is the movement of the object to subject position in passive constructions, as in (80). (80) Someonei was nominated ei. Under Minimalism, all nominals have Case features that must be checked. The affixation of a passive morpheme is thought to destroy a verb's ability to check the Case feature of its object, which is still generated in complement position. As a result, the object is forced to move to a subject position in which its ("nominative") Case feature may be checked. A second form of A-movement involves the subject of an infinitival complement having to raise to become the subject of the predicate selecting the infinitival complement. Illustrated in (81), this is known as subject-to-subject raising. It is likewise driven by the need for the nominal to check its Case feature which will have gone unchecked in its base position. 73 (81) a.

Someonei seemed/proved/tended/is likely ei to be a great linguist, b. Therei seemed/proved/tended/is likely ei to be a lot of discussion.

Such raising instances need to be distinguished from control constructions like in (82). One difference is the fact that the subject of a control construction must be animate, as the ungrammatical (82b) shows. In contrast, no such restriction is placed on the subjects of the infinitive-taking predicates in (81), except that they be possible subjects of the infinitive predicate. Thus, while the selecting



4.3.2


predicate of a control infinitive imposes "thematic" restrictions on its subject, the selecting predicate of a raising infinitive does not bear any relation, other than person, number, and gender features, to its subject. This difference is accounted for with the idea that a control construction like (82a) involves the presence of the null pronominal PRO in addition to the (base generated) matrix subject to give two linked elements capable of taking separate theta roles, whereas raising infinitives have no such additional element. Someone tried/strived/wanted/expected [PRO to be a great linguist], b. *There tried/strived/wanted/expected [PRO to be a lot of discussion].

(82) a.

A second difference is Stowell's (1982) observation that control infinitivals and raising infinitivals have different temporal properties. The event time of control infinitivals is, in some sense, unrealized or future with respect to the event time of the matrix. For example, in (83a) remembering precedes beer-bringing; in (83b) Mary has been convinced to fly once to Singapore sometime in the future; in (83c) the purchase of a new laptop is as yet unrealized. (83) a. J o h n remembered [PRO to bring the beer]. b. John convinced M a r y [PRO to fly once to Singapore]. c. J o h n wants [PRO to buy a new laptop]. In contrast, the event time of raising infinitivals is identical to, or simultaneous with, the event time of the matrix. For example, (84) is true if and only if at some past time/interval t, John was believed to be the best at/during t; it cannot mean that at some past time/interval t, it was believed that John would be (become) the best at some future time/interval t'. (84) Johni was believed ei to be the best. Stowell characterizes this interpretive difference in terms of the feature [±TENSE]: control infinitivals are [+TENSE] whereas raising infinitivals are [—TENSE]. We will adopt Stowell's idea and suppose that a BAR operator is introduced with [+TENSE]. There are good reasons for supposing that the tense feature uniformally moves to C (e.g., T-to-C movement, verb-second languages, etc.) and so we will assume that, at LF, a [+TENSE] clause has a BAR in its C domain. 74 We also need an



116


117

analysis of PRO, which we take to be a pronoun, as in (85), that is, a pronoun that picks up the most salient individual of the discourse context. 75 Pl]

With these assumptions we are in a position to account for the contrast between control infinitivals and raising infinitivals. T in infinitivals selected by control predicates is [4-TENSE] and so introduces a BAR. This allows PRO as in (86), but prohibits raising as in (87). (86) Someone tried [CP P R O to be great]. BAR [3x] t r i e d ( x ) :BAR I3y y = p x ] g r e a t (y) (87) *Someonei tried [cp ei to be great]. BAR [ 3 x ] t r i e d ( x ) : BAR g r e a t (?/) (86) is okay because, as the derivation in (88) shows, the presence of the BAR sends someone's witness to the discourse context where it is available for anaphoric pick up by PRO. (88) {},bb,e\=M (86) iff {}, bb, e ^=M B x ] BAR [3y y = p x ] g r e a t (y) iff {x i-» b}, b, e \=M BAR [3y y = p-^ g r e a t (y) iff {}, b, be K M By y = p ^ g r e a t (t/) iff {y *-* b}, (), be \=M g r e a t (y) (87) is bad because, as the derivation in (89) shows, x is left without a binder in the infinitive clause, having been scoped over by a BAR that eliminates someone's x-binding. (89) {}, b, e\=M (87) crashes trying {},b,e \=M [3x] BAR g r e a t (x) iff {x i-> b}, (),e \=M BAR g r e a t (x) iff {}A)ibe\=M g r e a t (x) In contrast, T in infinitivals selected by raising predicates is [—TENSE] and so does not introduce a BAR. This allows raising in (90), but prohibits PRO in (91). (90) Someonei seems ei to be great. BAR [3x]seems:great(x) (91) ^Someone seems P R O to be great. BAR [3x] seems: [3y y = p x ]great(y)



(85) PRO := [3x x =

118


(92) {},ab,be\=M (91) iff {},ab,be\=M Qx] I3y y = p x ] g r e a t (y) iff {x H-» a}, b, be \=M I3y y = p x ] g r e a t (y) iff {x H+ a, y \-+ b}, (), be ^=M g r e a t (y) This analysis predicts that adding additional raising predicates allows successive applications of A-movement to apply to a single DP, as illustrated in (93). (93) a.

Someonei seems ei likely ei to win. BAR [3x]seems:likely:win(x) b. Someonei is believed ex to appear ei to be likely ei to be nominated ei. BAR [3x] believed: appears: l i k e l y : nominated(x)

But while A-movement can move a DP indefinitely far, as (93) suggests, this appears to be achievable only with the most local of steps. Long-distance raising or "super-raising" that crosses a filled subject position is ill-formed, as (94) illustrates. (94) a. *Someonei seems [CP that it is likely ei to win]. BAR [3x] seems:BAR likely:win(t/) b. *Someonei is believed [CP that a medal was awarded ei]. BAR [3x]believed:BAR I3y medal(y)]awarded(x,y) Given that [—TENSE] clauses with filled subject positions do not exist, the data in (94) is exactly as expected. We should note that in the literature, two types of accounts have been offered for (94). First, under the ECP inspired proposal of Lasnik and Saito (1984), (94a,b) are ruled out by viewing the longdistance raised subject as failing to antecedent govern the trace because of the intervening C P / I P pair. Second, (94a,b) are ruled out under Relativized Minimality (Rizzi, 1990): someone as the head of an A-chain cannot antecedent govern its trace due to an intervening A-spec (it and a medal, respectively). In this respect, the PLB analysis is most closely related to the ECP inspired account.



(90) is okay, since x in the embedded clause is bound by someone, there being no BAR to disrupt the binding. (91) is bad because, as (92) shows, there is no BAR present to send the witness of someone into the discourse context, prohibiting PRO form entering into an anaphoric link with someone.


119

To sum up, the constraints on A-movement are the constraints on variable binding we see in PLB.

Binding Dependencies

In this section we consider what PLB has to say about the locality contrast between anaphors and pronominals. We assume that anaphors are variables x, y, z, etc. and that pronominals are interpreted as in (95). (95) he, she, him, her := [3x x = p^] The rough generalization is that anaphors must be bound by an antecedent that not only c-commands, but is also sufficiently "local." Pronominals can be bound, but only if the antecedent is sufficiently "non-local." Thus, the well-formed anaphoric dependency in (96), which does not cross a clause boundary, contrasts with the ill-formed dependency in (97), which does. (96) Someonei likes himselfi BAR [ 3 x ] l i k e s ( x , x ) (97)*Someonei thinks that [you like himselfi] BAR [3x] t h i n k s (x) : BAR youJLike (x) Conversely, disjoint reference with a pronoun is enforced internally to a clause, as in (98), but not across a clause boundary, as in (99). (98)*Someonei likes himi BAR [3x] ( l i k e s (x, y) \3y y = p x ]) (99) Someonei thinks [you like himi] BAR [3x] t h i n k s (x) :BAR (youJLike(y) [3y y = p j ) These facts fall out from the PLB semantics. As the calculation of (100) shows, (97) is bad since T(x) fails to denote. Here, the ungrammaticality is not just relative to the indexing: himself requires an antecedent and so the sentence remains out even when himself is not coindexed with someone. (100) {},b,e\=M (97) crashes trying {},6,e | = M [3x] BAR youJLike(x) iff {x i—• b}, (), e \=M BAR youJlike(x) iff {},(), be \=M youJLike (x)



4.3.3

120


(101) {},ab,be\=M (98) iff {}, ab, be \=M B x ] ( l i k e s (x, y) [3y y = p j ) iff {x f-> a}, b, be \=M l i k e s (x, y) [3y y = P}] iff {x h-> a, y «-> b}, (),be\=M l i k e s (x,t/) iff (a,b) G M ( l i k e s ) In (99), him can corefer with someone. This is possible because the BAR of the embedded clause moves someone's witness from the assignment to the discourse context. This has the effect of making someone's witness unavailable for anaphors but available for pronouns, as (102) shows. (102) {},66,ehM(99)iff {},bb,e | = M [3x]BAR (youJLike(y) I3yy = p1]) iff {x i-» b}, b, e \=M BAR (youJLike (y) [3y y = p x ]) iff {}, b, be \=M youJLike (?/) I3y y = p x ] iff {y H-» b}, (),be\=M youJLike(y) iff b e .M(youJLike) Our account of binding makes a further prediction, namely, that the degree of locality that applies to A-movement should also apply to anaphors. Hence, without [+TENSE], and hence a BAR, the binding domain grows. Compare e.g. (103a,b) to (93a,b), and (104a,b) to (94a,b). Once again, ungrammaticality judgements (here (104a,b)) follow from evaluation failures. (103) a.

Someonei seems to know herselfi very well. BAR [3x]seems:know_very_well(x,x) b. Someonei is believed to appear to be likely to nominate herselfi. BAR [3x] b e l i e v e d : appears: l i k e l y : n o m i n a t e s (x, x)

(104) a. *Someonei says [CP that it is possible to know herselfi very well]. BAR [3x] says (x) : BAR p o s s i b l e : know_very_well (x, x) b. *Someonej believes [CP that a medal was awarded herselfi]. BAR [3x] b e l i e v e s (x) : BAR I3y medal (y) ] awarded (x, y)



The ungrammaticality indicated by the star of (98) is relative to the indexing: as (101) demonstrates, (98) is interpretable given that he and someone are not coindexed. This is because someone removes the witness a from the opening novel sequence ab, placing a into the assignment where it is unavailable for the pronoun to pick up.

121

Finally, consider (105), a typical so called "Condition C" violation. As (106) shows, the ungrammaticality indicated by the star is relative to the indexing: the structure of (105) dictates that he must take its witness from the discourse context before someone has taken its referent from the novel sequence. This rules out the possibility of coreference as a witness can only cross from the novel sequence to the discourse context. (105) *Hei likes someonei. BAR [3x x = p x ] ( l i k e s (x,y) [3y]) (106) {},ba,be\=M (105) iff {},ba,be\=M [3x x = p x ] ( l i k e s ( x , y ) [3y]) iff {x H-> b}, a, be \=M l i k e s (x, y) \_3y~] iff { X H b,yt-> a}, (),be\=M l i k e s ( x , y ) Moreover, coreferential dependence remains impossible even if someone in (105) were to scope over the pronoun, as it would if quantifier raised, and as it does in the topicalized (107). This is illustrated with the calculation in (108). Notably, the impossibility of interpreting (107) under the stated indexing arises as a consequence of the form of the interpretable LF representation. This result contrasts with previous theories of binding that have captured such facts with appeals to S-structure as the level at which to specify constraints on binding, an appeal that cannot even be stated with a Minimalist syntax. 76 (107) * Someonei, hei likes ei. [3yl [3x x = p t ] l i k e s ( x , y ) (108) {},ab,be\=M (107) iff {y H+ a},b, be \=M C3X X = p x ] l i k e s ( x , y ) iff {x H 6 , J / H a}, {),be^=M l i k e s ( x , y ) To sum up, the constraints on binding dependencies are the constraints on variable/pointer binding we see in PLB, capturing the fact that anaphors must, and pronouns can, be bound.

4.3.4

A-Movement

A - m o v e m e n t is movement to a non-argument position. The prototypical example is WH-movement, as in (109a-e) (showing five subcases: main clauses, embedded clauses, free relatives, pseudoclefts, and relative clauses). Other types are null operator movement,




122


(109) a. b. c. d. e. f.

Whoi do you like ei? I don't know whoi you mean ei. Whatever! you say ei about John, I still think he's okay. Whati John is e[ is proud of himself. I have never read the book whichi John recommended e\. I have never read the book Opi (that) John recommended ei.

g. Shakespeare is tough Opi to get students to read ei. h. [These books] i, I have never read e^ Unlike A-movement, A-movement is not Case driven. Thus it is able to affect more categories than just DP, as (110) shows. (110) a. [To whom]i did you speak ei? b. [In these books]i, I would never write notes ei. Also unlike A-movement, A-movement is not required to be strictly local, e.g. filled subject positions are crossed in (109) and (110). In fact the grammatical dependencies of (109) and (11.0) have the appearance of being "unbounded," in that the two members of the dependency can occur an indefinite distance apart. ( I l l ) illustrates this, and one can imagine examples in which the distance between the WH-phrase and its trace, measured say in terms of clausal boundaries crossed, is greater. (111) a. Whoi do you like e[ b. Whoi do you believe [that John likes ei] c. Whoi do you believe [that John said [that Mary likes ei]] However, there is an abundance of evidence stemming from Ross (1967) that this type of dependency is also restricted. Thus Amovement is ill formed out of strong islands, regardless of the total distance between the moved element and its gap: (112) illustrates movement from a tensed WH-island, (113) a sentential subject (subject island), (114) an adjunct island, and (115) a relative clause (a complex NP island). (112)*Whoi did you know [why John likes ei]? (113)*Whati does [explaining ei] bother you?



as in (109f-g) (showing two subcases: relative clauses and toughmovement), and the movement of focused or topicalized elements, as in (109h). Each of these can be analyzed as movement to Spec-CP. 77


123

(114)*Whati was Mary bothered [because Peter explained e^?

Based on the unacceptability of such examples, Chomsky (1973) proposed that long distance movement is never possible, and that apparently distant connections like in (111) are in fact mediated by a sequence of relatively local connections. On one interpretation, this involves a sequence of movements accessing successively higher Spec-CP positions (escape hatches) between the gap position and the ultimate position of the moved item. Thus, a derivation for (111c) can be schematized as in (116), with the successive positions of WHi indicated by ti (its traces). Such step-by-step movement is known as successive cyclic movement. (116) [CP WHi C [IP ... [CP ti C [IP ... [CP tj C [IP ... ej ... ]]]]]] The key significance of this account is that it can then be argued that such short movements are, for some reason, not available in derivations for (112)-(115). In roughly the terms of Chomsky (1973), movement across more than one bounding node is prohibited by subjacency. IP and NP are bounding nodes. Thus, the movement in (116) is licensed. In (112), on the other hand, an example with a tensed WH-island, the embedded Spec-CP is occupied, as shown in (117). Therefore subjacency is violated: the movement of who must have been in one step, crossing two bounding nodes on the way (indexed for illustrative purposes). (117)*[CP

Whoi C [IP 2 you know [CP whyj C [IPX John likes ei ej]]]]?

Similarly, (113)-(115) violate subjacency, as (118)-(120) illustrate, respectively. (118)*[Cp Whati C [IP 2 [NPx [CP ti [rp explaining ei]]] bother you]]? (119)*[CP

Whati C [IP 2 Mary bothered because [rpx Peter explained

(120)*[CP Whati C [rp3 you know [NP 2 the girl [cp whoj [n>x ej explained ei]]]]]? The successive cyclic perspective on A-movement has gained widespread acceptance, and not only because of the theory of island-hood that it supports. Also, languages have been found to provide morphosyntactic confirmation for the core idea that seemingly long move-



(115)*Whati do you know the girl [whoj ej explained ei]?

124


Constructions

ex etait arrive]]? (121) [cp Quii Jean a dit [CP ti qui who Jean has said that.AGR was arrived 'Who did Jean say arrived?' We too will take the successive cyclic perspective seriously and assume that it is the existence of intermediate traces in e.g. (116) that saves (111). But how to make sense of what intermediate traces are? We have been assuming since §4.3.2/116 that BAR gets introduced at the top of a clause with [+TENSE]. Now we will assume that the syntactic operation of filling Spec-CP or leaving a trace in Spec-CP exists to slash the local BAR. That is, placing variable information x in the specifier position of a CP that scopes over a [+TENSE] clause has the effect of coindexing the BAR introduced at the top of the clause thus: BAR/x. It is this that makes the movement count as an A-movement, and it is this that has the effect of maintaining x as a variable that continues to receive an interpretation past BAR/x. Consequently such a movement can be seen to cross a C P / I P boundary. For example, this gives (111) the LF representation in (122). (122) [CP Whoi C you believe [CP ti C John said [cp ti C BAR/x BAR/x BAR/x 3x Mary likes ei]]]? 3x BAR/x you_believe: BAR/x john_said: BAR/x maryJLikes (x) This is interpretable because, as (123) shows, the x-binding is kept in the assignment by the slashed BARs throughout the semantic derivation. Thus, each BAR occurrence gives rise to the need for a movement that has the effect of preventing x from having to be semantically closed. That is, movement can be used to maintain an open proposition, but only when successive cyclic.78 (123)

{}, a, e ^M

3X BAR/X BAR/X maryJLikes (x) iff

{x H-> a}, (), e \=M BAR/x BAR/x maryJLikes (x) iff {x »-• a}, {), e \=M BAR/x maryJLikes (x) iff {x H-> a}, (), e \=M maryJLikes (x)



ments are compositions of more local operations. See e.g. McCloskey (1979) on Irish and Torrego (1984) on Spanish, among many other studies. A quick illustration is French (121). Here, the complementizer que undergoes agreement in C indicating that the WH-phrase has passed through its specifier (cf. Rizzi, 1990).


125

In contrast, (112) gives rise to the LF representation in (124).

This is uninterpretable because, as (125) shows, x is left in a subordinate clause without a binder and under the scope of a BAR that eliminates all previous x-bindings. (125) {}, ab, e \=M 3X BAR/X 3y BAR//y j ohnJLikes_since (x, y) crashes trying {x H-> a}, b, e \=M BAR/x 3y BAR//y j ohnJL i k e s . s i n c e (x, y) iff {x — i > a}, b, e \=M 3y BAR//y johnJLikes_since(x, y) iff {x h-» a,y H-> b}, (),e\=M BAR/?/ johnJLikes_since(x,y) iff {y H-> 6}, (),ae (=j\4 johnJLikes_since(x,?/) Other strong islands e.g. (113)-(115) can be accounted for in an identical fashion. Finally, note that a further prediction is made when the clause is [—TENSE], since such clauses fail to introduce a BAR. This allows long movement, that is, movement out of a clause that does not require a stop over in Spec-CP. Thus, in contrast to (112)/(124), (126) is okay, since there is no intermediate BAR to eliminate the x-binding provided by what. (126) Whati did you wonder [how to fix ei]? 3xBAR/x youjffonder:how_toJ:ix(x) However, we do not yet predict the contrast discovered by Huang (1982) between the locality behaviour of A-dependencies created by arguments, such as in (126), and that of A-dependencies created by adjuncts, such as in (127). That is, we are not yet predicting WHisland effects. (127) *Howi do you wonder [what to fix ei]? The contrast between (126) and (127) will only become transparent in the next chapter when we turn to our account of intervention effects. For the time being we can think of adjuncts as being just like arguments when it comes to the mechanics of A-movement per se. Notably, adjunct A-movement can be successive cyclic as in (128) (cf. (111)).



(124)*[cp Whoi C you know [CP whyj C John likes ei ej]]? 3x BAR/x BAR 3x BAR/x youJmow: 3yBAR//y johnJLikes_since(x,y)

126


Also adjunct A-movement is subject to the same strong islands as argument A-movement, as (130) illustrates (cf. (112)-(115)). (129) a. b. c. d.

*Howi *Howi *Howi *Howj

do you believe [whoj ej repaired it ei]? did [fixing it ei] bother Mary? was Mary bothered [because John had fixed it ei]? do you know the girl [that fixed it ei]?

4.3.5

Strong Crossover

The strong crossover phenomenon, first noted in Postal (1971), designates binding failures like those in (130) (from Postal, 1997): (130) a. *[CP Whoi did Frank convince heri [cp ti that you would hire ei]]? b. *the principlei [CP whichi I inferred from iti [CP ti that no other principle entailed ei]] c. *[cp Whati Jane compared iti to a model of ei] was the Eiffel Tower. d. *It doesn't matter [cp whoi they claim shei believes you should invite ei]. Such failures come as a direct consequence of pronouns (pointers) only being able to pick up witnesses from the discourse context. Successive cyclic movements via Spec-CP ensure that these effects are enforced all the way up the syntactic tree to the point where the movement stops. Alternatively put, as a consequence of extending the domain in which variables can be bound (and so used), movement via a BAR has the reverse effect of excluding pronouns. Example (131) illustrates an existential "moving through" two BAR occurrences. Since both BAR occurrences are slashed for x, the witness that 3x takes from the novel sequence is kept in the assignment throughout the semantic calculation, and so out of reach for the pointer p x . (131) {},ab,be\=M 3x BAR/x By y = p x ]BAR/x Q(x) iff {x i-* a}, b, be \=M BAR/x I3y y = p 2 ] BAR/x Q(x) iff {x i-> a}, b, be \=M [By y = ?1] BAR/x Q (x) iff {x H* a,y H-» b}, (),be\=M BAR/x Q(x) iff {x i-> a}, (), bbe f=M Q (x)



(128) a. Howi do you fix it ei? b. Howi do you believe [ti John fixes it ei]? c. Howi do you believe [ti John said that [ti Mary fixes it ei]]?

127

With pronouns being excluded from the path of an A-moved element, another prediction is made, namely, that reflexives should be licensed to occur along the path of any (A- or A-) movement. However, there are no obvious examples to show that this holds for A-movements, and indeed (132) and (133) appear to be counterexamples. (132)*Whoi did himselfi convince ei? (133)*[CP Whoi did Frank convince herselfi [CP t i that you would hire ei]]? But (132) and (133) are bad for independent reasons. (132) is out because the reflexive requires accusative Case but gets nominative, while (133) is out because reflexives are basically limited to linking up with the local subject. This requirement of linking to the local subject is further demonstrated in (134) (attributed to C.-T.J. Huang by Progovac, 1994, 15). In (134a) himself is ultimately bound to John, which looks like long distance binding, but this is only achieved by a set of local anaphoric dependencies linking subjects, as shown by the ungrammaticality of (134b,c). John believed himself1 to have persuaded himself 2 [ P R O to criticize himself3]. BAR [3x x = John]believed(x) :persuaded(x,x) :BAR [3x x = p x ] c r i t i c i z e ( x , x ) b. *John believed himself1 to have persuaded M a r y [ P R O to criticize himself3]. c. * John believed [Mary to have persuaded himself 2 [PRO to criticize himself3].

(134) a.

This shows that reflexives are more than just variables, which is a fact that the current analysis abstracts away from. Interestingly, the requirement of linking to a local subject breaks down when a local subject is not around, as with the picture NP of (135). As predicted whom in (135) is able to bind the anaphor that is placed along its movement path. 7 9 (135) [To whomi]i does it appear that pictures of himselfi are flattering ei? BAR [3x] appears ( x ) : BAR/x [3y pictures_of (y, x) ] f l a t t e r i n g - t o (y, x)





Constructions

Another piece of evidence in support of the current analysis comes from the prediction that movement to an A-position does not give rise to a strong crossover violation. As (136) and (137) illustrate, this is indeed the case. Notably, these examples work because the moved element moves to the subject position to which the anaphor has to be linked. (136) Someonei seems to himselfi ei to be polite. BAR [3x] seems_to ( x ) : p o l i t e (x) (137) Whoi C ei seems to himselfi ej to be polite. [3x]BAR seems_to(x): p o l i t e (x) Similarly, the raised subject NP in (138) is the only antecedent a reflexive of the infinitival complement can take. (138) a.

Johni seems to Mary2 ei to fancy himselfi. BAR [3x x = John] [3y y = mary] seems _to(?/) : fancies(x,x) b. *Johni seems to Mary 2 ei to fancy herself2.

4.4

Summary

We have seen that PLB in imposing interface conditions forms an integral component in the explanation of syntactic phenomena. In particular, we were concerned with how the interpretation procedure constrains the types of grammatical dependencies possible. Little more was needed besides the set up of the semantics and a few motivated assumptions: - that [+TENSE] introduces a barrier at the clausal boundary; - that A-movement is movement that slashes a barrier; - that anaphors and gaps left by A- and A-movements are variables, in the sense of operator-variable constructions in logic; and - that pronouns are uniformally taken to use pointers to pick up witnesses from the discourse context, even when in the scope of quantificational elements to which they are "bound." All this has given us an architecture of the syntax/semantics interface and an account of a wide range of locality effects, but this does not yet give us an account of intervention effects in split constructions. For that we turn to the next chapter, where we extend the usage information available to PLB.



128

T h e Account 5.1

Introduction

In PLA/PLB, an 1(4) calculation makes it possible to anchor the number of witnesses introduced for the visible existentials of 4 to the number of witnesses required by the visible existentials of 0. This chapter provides extensions to this type of usage information. As a result, new distinctions are made between lexical elements that, while performing essentially the same semantic function, are limited to specific discourse roles. That is, lexical elements are made context sensitive as a consequence of coming with information about how they should be used. We then see how this machinery complements the syntactic analysis of the most relevant examples of this book: §5.3 looks at N-words and NPIs from chapter 3, while §5.4 goes through the WH data in chapters 1 and 2. §5.5 gives a summary.

5.2

Additions to PLB

This section adds PPI, NPI and WH-phrase usage information to the PLB system of the previous chapter. All three expression types are treated very much like indefinites, that is, as introducing instances of existential quantification. However, they have special properties in that they can only be used in particular contexts. Specifically, both PPIs and WH-phrases will need to be visible from the top of the clause of an interpretable LF representation, while an NPI will need to be under the scope of a local licensing operator like negation. 129 10.1057/9780230501607 - The Syntax and Semantics of Split Constructions, Alastair Butler and Eric Mathieu


Chapter 5

130


5.2.1

Constructions

Usage Information

(1) - if 4 is a formula and x is a variable then pos x4 is a formula; - if 4 is a formula then wid 4 and wh 4 are formulae. (2) - pos x4 iff 3x4 - wid 4 iff 4 - wh 4 iff 4 That is, pos x gets interpreted as an instance of existential quantification, while wid 4 and wh 4 have no impact whatsoever. Instead, wid 4 and wh 4 are purely syntactic elements that, as visible elements, contribute to the w(4) calculation of (3) and the q(4) calculation of (4), respectively, pos x4 contributes to the revised 1(4) calculation of (5). (3)

w(3x4) w(pos x4) w(wid 4) w(wh 4) w(BAR//X 4) w(P(tU...,tn)) w(Neg x 4) w(4 A 4)

= = = = = = = =

w(4) w(4) w(4) +1 w(4) w(4) 0 0 w(4) + w(4)

(4)

q(3x4)

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