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ASSESSING THE THREAT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

NATO Science for Peace and Security Series This Series presents the results of scientific meetings supported under the NATO Programme: Science for Peace and Security (SPS). The NATO SPS Programme supports meetings in the following Key Priority areas: (1) Defence Against Terrorism; (2) Countering other Threats to Security and (3) NATO, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue Country Priorities. The types of meeting supported are generally “Advanced Study Institutes” and “Advanced Research Workshops”. The NATO SPS Series collects together the results of these meetings. The meetings are co-organized by scientists from NATO countries and scientists from NATO’s “Partner” or “Mediterranean Dialogue” countries. The observations and recommendations made at the meetings, as well as the contents of the volumes in the Series, reflect those of participants and contributors only; they should not necessarily be regarded as reflecting NATO views or policy. Advanced Study Institutes (ASI) are high-level tutorial courses to convey the latest developments in a subject to an advanced-level audience. Advanced Research Workshops (ARW) are expert meetings where an intense but informal exchange of views at the frontiers of a subject aims at identifying directions for future action. Following a transformation of the programme in 2006 the Series has been re-named and reorganised. Recent volumes on topics not related to security, which result from meetings supported under the programme earlier, may be found in the NATO Science Series. The Series is published by IOS Press, Amsterdam, and Springer Science and Business Media, Dordrecht, in conjunction with the NATO Public Diplomacy Division. Sub-Series A. B. C. D. E.

Chemistry and Biology Physics and Biophysics Environmental Security Information and Communication Security Human and Societal Dynamics

Springer Science and Business Media Springer Science and Business Media Springer Science and Business Media IOS Press IOS Press

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Sub-Series E: Human and Societal Dynamics – Vol. 61

ISSN 1874-6276

Assessing the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction The Role of Independent Scientists

Edited by

John L. Finney Department of Physics and Astronomy and London Centre for Nanotechnology, University College London, UK

and

Ivo Šlaus Rudjer Boskovic Institute, Zagreb, Croatia

Amsterdam • Berlin • Tokyo • Washington, DC Published in cooperation with NATO Public Diplomacy Division

Proceedings of the NATO Advanced Research Workshop on The Role of Independent Scientists in Assessing the Threat of WMD Zagreb, Croatia 13–16 November 2008

© 2010 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher. ISBN 978-1-60750-084-1 Library of Congress Control Number: 2009940947 Publisher IOS Press BV Nieuwe Hemweg 6B 1013 BG Amsterdam Netherlands fax: +31 20 687 0019 e-mail: [email protected] Distributor in the USA and Canada IOS Press, Inc. 4502 Rachael Manor Drive Fairfax, VA 22032 USA fax: +1 703 323 3668 e-mail: [email protected]

LEGAL NOTICE The publisher is not responsible for the use which might be made of the following information. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

Assessing the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction J.L. Finney and I. Šlaus (Eds.) IOS Press, 2010 © 2010 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.

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Foreword The NATO Advanced Research Workshop, ‘The Role of Independent Scientists in WMD Threat Assessment’, met for 2¼ days in Zagreb, Croatia from 13–16 November 2008. An interdisciplinary group of eminent experts and policy makers gathered from 12 countries to discuss ways in which the technical advice available to governments could be strengthened so as to aid governments and international organizations in their policy formation in response to perceived threats. Sessions addressed the following topics: Scientists and Policy Formation on CBRN Weapons: Current Structures; How Threat Assessment Affects Policy (with recent examples); Chemical Weapons; Biological Weapons; Nuclear Threats; Ballistic Missiles; The Relevance of WMD Threat Assessment for South-Eastern Europe and the Caucasus; The Way Forward: Breaking the Threat-Counter Threat Cycle. A final round table discussion brought together the main ideas presented and discussed, identified items of particular importance in the present international situation, and suggested possible next steps. Participants appreciated the interdisciplinary nature of this workshop, as it brought together leading experts who were able to share experiences in their own issue areas, while teasing out the common aspects that may strengthen the norm for independent scientific advising across the broad range of fields relevant to threat assessment. The consensus was that further exploration of the topic should be made, with the goal of strengthening the advice governments receive on WMD threat assessment. This is urgent, since threat assessment has a profound impact on the policies of governments and international organizations. A number of important questions arose from the workshop papers. First, the question was raised as to what constitutes a threat assessment; what role do cultural dependencies play within assessments and what is the role of independent scientists in their production? Secondly, the question of what exactly constitutes an independent scientist was addressed. What institutional, funding, and other pressures threaten independence? In giving independent advice, should scientists operate through existing national or international structures, or through new institutions or collaborative structures? Thirdly, the question of how independent scientists produce threat assessments was discussed, including the limitations they may have to work under, and how these might be minimized. Issues raised here concerned access to data and information, and the related problems of classified or commercial proprietary information. Fourthly, the widely differing models used by different countries to facilitate independent science input into policy were discussed, as were the challenges posed by the pace and complexity of current scientific advances. This problem of increased complexity was particularly relevant to biological weapons, and drawing the line between chemical and biological weapons is becoming increasingly difficult. Not surprisingly in the current ‘pre-nuclear renaissance’ situation, a point that stimulated particularly interesting discussion in the nuclear field concerned the difficulty of distinguishing activities related to peaceful uses of atomic energy and possible diversions for weapons development. There is a clear need to develop procedures that would ‘thicken the line’ between peaceful and possible weapons uses. This is a problem that clearly requires expert sci-

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entific input, and much work needs to be done urgently. Finally, regional threats were discussed, as were the implications for the region and the world if these threats were not addressed effectively. It was noted that the UN mandate is to maintain peace and security and that accurate threat assessments are very important to the fulfilment of this mandate, though it is the responsibility of governments to conduct such threat assessments. It was further noted that the difference between ‘threat’ and ‘risk’ should be more clearly delineated. The role of education was seen as crucial, especially the importance of multidisciplinary departments and fostering enhanced co-operation between universities in training the next generation of scientists equipped to give independent advice to policy makers. Education was also important in empowering societal verification of internationally agreed norms. It was suggested that enhanced co-operation between Israel and the Arab world would be of benefit in the production of more accurate regional threat assessments. Finally, it was argued that NATO is a unique alliance and out of its three components of military, politics and science, the latter is an essential element, as it potentially has the capability to co-operatively address all current threats and dangers, such as climate change, energy security, food security, economic and social issues, in addition to traditional and new security threats from terrorism, WMDs and states challenging international norms. NATO has the potential to transform itself, through initiatives such as the Science for Peace and Security program, from a military and political alliance to a driver towards a broad and inclusive knowledge-based society. This ARW would not have been possible without the help and commitment of many people and organizations. The co-directors wish to thank especially Sandy Butcher of British Pugwash and Andrea Ruk of the Institute of International Relations, Zagreb, who were instrumental in the organization and running of the workshop. We thank also the other members of the Organising Committee, namely Prof. Mladen Staničić, Dr Mustafa Kibaroglu and Prof. Dr Götz Neuneck, as well as Dr Jo Husbands, Prof. Julian P. Perry Robinson and Dr Mohamed Kadry Said for invaluable assistance in putting together the workshop programme. The very helpful assistance of Prof. Robert A. Hinde with the editing process is particularly appreciated. Finally, the ARW, and this volume, would have been impossible without the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme (Special Call – Assessing the Threat of WMD) which provided most of the funding, and the British Pugwash Trust. We are very grateful for this funding. The helpful assistance and advice of Dr Fausto Pedrazzini and Alison Trapp of the NATO Public Diplomacy Division is also particularly appreciated.

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Contents Foreword

v

Introduction: Workshop on the Role of Independent Scientists in WMD Threat Assessment Sandra I. Butcher, John L. Finney and Ivo Šlaus

1

Section 1. Institutions, Structures and Mechanisms The Role of Independent Scientific Input in NATO Brian Heap

15

NATO in the Post Cold War Era: Shift of Strategies Noha Bakr

28

The Role of Scientists in Verification Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack

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Risk Assessment, Transparency and Democracy: The French College for the Prevention of Technological Risks Venance Journé Beyond a Threat Assessment: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Defenses and Other Countermeasures, and Counter-Countermeasures on the Part of the Offense Richard L. Garwin

55

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Section 2. Chemical and Biological Weapons Scientists and Chemical Weapons Policies J.P. Perry Robinson

79

The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Role of Engineers and Scientists Jiří Matoušek

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The Need for WMD Threat Assessment in the Chemical Industry: Plant Site Level Donald C. Clagett

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Monitoring and Opposing the Misuse of Incapacitants – Exploring the Potential Roles for Independent Scientists Michael Crowley

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How Deadly Are Non-Lethal Weapons? Krill K. Babievsky and Daniil S. Rodionov The Role of Scientists in Assessing the Risks of Dual-Use Research in the Life Sciences Geoffrey Smith, Neil Davison and Ben Koppelman

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137

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Responsible Stewardship of Advances in Life Sciences Research: Lessons from the Fink and Lemon-Relman Reports Jo L. Husbands Dual-Use Biotechnological Research Oversight – An Israeli View David Friedman Best Practices: Advising the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention about Trends in Science and Technology Ralf Trapp

141 157

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Section 3. Nuclear Weapons, Missiles and Missile Defense Uranium Enrichment: Guns or Butter? Houston G. Wood

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Nuclear Terrorism Christopher Watson

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Independent Scientists and Ballistic Missile Defense Götz Neuneck

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The Role of Independent Scientists in Analyzing the Ballistic Missile Threat Geoffrey Forden

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Section 4. NATO’s Role in South-Eastern Europe in the Light of WMD Threat Assessment Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Process of Croatia’s Accession to NATO in the Light of WMD Threat Assessment Zvonimir Mahecic

253

A Macedonian View on NATO’s Role in South-East Europe in the Light of WMD Threat Assesment Mile Aleksoski

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Section 5. Scientists, Citizens and the Media Global Security, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Responsibility of Scientists Ivo Šlaus

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Including Civil Society into Confidence Building: Protecting Whistleblowers and Societal Verification Annegret Falter

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At the Interface Between Policy Makers, the Public and Independent Scientists. A Perspective on the Role of the Media Paul Guinnessy

293

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Section 6. Concluding Comments Concluding Comments on the NATO Advanced Research Workshop: The Role of Independent Scientists in WMD Threat Assessment Ivo Šlaus

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Subject Index

307

Author Index

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Assessing the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction J.L. Finney and I. Šlaus (Eds.) IOS Press, 2010 © 2010 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved. doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-084-1-1

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Introduction: Workshop on the Role of Independent Scientists in WMD Threat Assessment Sandra I. BUTCHERa, John L. FINNEYb1 and Ivo ŠLAUSc a British Pugwash, London, UK b Dept of Physics and Astronomy and London Centre for Nanotechnology, University College London, and British Pugwash, London, UK c South East European Division of the World Academy of Art and Science, Zagreb, Croatia, and Croatian Pugwash

Abstract. A NATO Advanced Research Workshop that took place in Zagreb, Croatia in November 2008, brought together scientists and other experts to discuss the role of independent scientists in assessing threats from nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons. This introductory chapter summarises the discussions that took place in the workshop, which addressed a range of related issues, examined current practices and their limitations, and worked through a number of case studies. Areas in which interactions could be strengthened are identified, and a number of suggestions for possible ways forward are made. Keywords. NATO, independent scientific advice, best practices, threat assessment, risk assessment, treaty regimes, advisory panels, National Academies, NGOs, think tanks, international commissions, international organizations.

Introduction: Workshop Objectives A NATO Advanced Research Workshop (ARW) on ‘The Role of Independent Scientists in WMD Threat Assessment’ took place in Zagreb, Croatia from 13-16 November 2008, involving a total of 35 experts from 12 countries: 19 were from NATO countries, 13 from Partner Countries and 3 from Mediterranean Dialogue Countries.2 The objective of the workshop was: To gather together non-governmental scientists from NATO and partnership countries, to compare best practices and limitations in independent scientific advising on the threat of WMDs, to explore areas in which this interaction can be strengthened, and to explore the potential impact of better scientific advice on strengthening current non-proliferation, counter-proliferation and defence strategies in national and Alliance strategies. The interdisciplinary group of experts shared experience across the chemical, biological, nuclear, and ballistic missile fields, and out of this unusual blend of 1 Corresponding author: Dept of Physics and Astronomy, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT, UK. E-mail: [email protected]. 2 This calculation is made, according to NATO guidelines, in terms of residence and not country of origin.

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S.I. Butcher et al. / Introduction

experience we were able to identify cross-cutting trends and to highlight best practices from the various fields that could inform other disciplines and also national and international approaches. The goal was to highlight areas in which the flow of information from the independent sector into the governmental and parliamentary streams can be strengthened, thus maximizing the resources available to decision makers. The chapters in this book are largely representative of the papers presented at the workshop, and this introduction borrows heavily from the contributions of the workshop participants and the reports of the two rapporteurs3, though it is the sole responsibility of the authors. There was no attempt to arrive at a commonly agreed workshop report.

1. The Need One participant, a retired Colonel from Croatia, framed the need in this way: In today’s world, especially after September 11th, it is widely regarded that use of the Weapons of Mass Destruction by different and seemingly ever increasing numbers of terrorist groups and organizations represents the ultimate threat to the safety and security of the citizens, states, the global civilization, or at least the ultimate threat to the Western way of life as we know it. This is not hyperbolic, as NATO and national defence policies are still grappling with the dilemmas posed by the collapse of the East-West confrontation coupled with the new security challenges. The format of the NATO ARW, emphasizing as it does inclusion of people from Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries, was ideally suited for exploring ways in which to strengthen the role independent scientists can play in building confidence among all parties on these important topics. The discussion highlighted the need for greater understanding of how regional perspectives can differ, and how such divergent views can impact not only threat assessments, but also the resultant security policies. There have been recent, well documented examples of policy decisions based on what turned out to be faulty threat analysis, the reasons for the Iraq War being highest on the list. The current tension around the Iranian nuclear program highlights the importance of engaging a wider group of scientists in finding ways to ‘thicken the line’ between civilian and military nuclear programs, as the uranium enrichment process can be used to make material for fuel in a nuclear power reactor or for a bomb. Thickening this line requires transparency and inspections, safeguards, and materials accountability and control. Determining when this line has been crossed requires defining an agreed trigger event, and clearly stating the response to the trigger event occurring. How to deal with clandestine activities is a separate question. Ballistic missile threat assessments, and the resulting policies which have broad strategic implications, was another important case study. For example, one expert participant wrote: “The bureaucratic imperatives for the [US] Missile Defense Agency and the Department of Defense in general to exaggerate or inflate Iran's missile 3 Conor Browne, School of Politics, International Studies and Philosophy, Queen’s University of Belfast, Northern Ireland, UK, and Robert Lovsin, The Harvard Sussex Program, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK.


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capabilities is obvious when one considers the Bush administration's efforts to enlarge national missile defense into Eastern Europe.” He then demonstrated an alternative analysis of the Iranian missile program, using open source information. This is a concrete example of an area in which greater independent scientific involvement in threat assessment can have an impact on the broader strategic balance, affecting NATO, relations with Russia, and the Middle East.

2. Definitions 2.1. Threat/Risk Assessment Our first task was to define our terms. Our definition of ‘threat’ was Threat = Capability Intentions

(1).

This is a different equation from that which was assumed in the Cold War, namely: Threat = Capability. During the Cold War, both the US and USSR could assume the other would use all their might against each other. As one participant wrote, too often in today’s environment, people tend to think of threat assessment as only the intention and not the actual capabilities of one’s potential adversaries, i.e. Threat = Intentions. This misses an essential part of the equation. In fact, those who seek to separate the threat and risk assessments often do so for political reasons and downplay the important contributions that independent scientists can make in this area. In addition, threat assessments can be subjective, as evidenced by the divergent threat assessments, for example, between the West/NATO and countries in the Middle East, a point that was made both by a senior UN official and a military man from the latter region. Our group focused, then, on the role independent scientists can contribute to an essential element of threat assessment, namely ‘risk assessment’. This included three possible elements: 1) the damage a potential weapon could cause; 2) its likely existence, and 3) the likelihood of breakout capability to build such a weapon. It is in the area of risk assessment where some of the most important data needed for informed decisions rests. Governments and international organizations, with relatively minor investments in targeted areas, can increase significantly the information they have available to them. The ARW sought to identify various structures that facilitate the flow of information into the decision making structures in a timely and efficient manner. Given the fact that so much of this question is at the intersection of commercial and academic research, one senior UK scientific advisor described the importance of engaging the independent scientific community: [R]isk assessment requires close interaction with scientists working at the forefront of dual use research since it will be they who will be best equipped to predict and explain emerging threats, assess risks and devise ways to manage and mitigate them. Second, independent scientists have an essential role in Governments’ communication strategies about security threats; policymakers need to reach out to independent scientists because the public is

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more likely to believe them than government officials, especially in time of major crisis. 2.2. What Is an Independent Scientist? We equally had to flesh out what we meant when discussing an independent scientist. One participant from South East Europe claimed: “scientific independence – at least if understood rigidly – might look like a pink elephant! Everybody is talking about it but nobody was in reality able to see it.” Another participant with experience in NATO’s international scientific programmes offered this definition: Independence in this context refers to an ability to inform about scientific and technological advances without the temptation to modify advice to meet political, military, economic or personal sensitivities. How that advice is used and translated into policy is left to those skilled in the art of application and communication. While this definition of independence is reasonable, there was some scepticism expressed by a member of the science community that the translation of scientific advice into policy should exclude further scientific input. As science-related issues beyond those in the original advice are likely to arise during policy formation, good arguments can be made for involving scientists ‘interactively’ in the policy-making process itself. 2.3. ‘The Paradox of Priority’ In seeking to clarify our terms of reference, several participants highlighted the fact that regional perspectives on the threat of WMDs vary greatly. Several South East European experts explored the limited ways in which WMD threats play out in their national discussions about joining NATO. In addition, the challenges are compounded, as a retired Major General from Egypt describes it, by the ‘paradox of priority’ that exists between the US and European NATO countries and Arab countries, and the need for better, perhaps more cooperative, explorations of the regional security balance. Another expert from Egypt pointed out that “NATO’s shift in strategies in the postCold War era within Europe proved more successful than its strategies manifested in the Mediterranean Dialogue and the ICI4.” The ARW explored ways in which engagement of independent scientists could help strengthen confidence and also help address some of the underlying causes for insecurity and distrust.

3. Current Practices and Limitations The workshop did not seek to comprehensively review the threat assessment practices of each nation and of various international bodies such as NATO, though these perspectives were woven throughout our discussions. In the short time we had available, we sought to elicit creative approaches to the overall issue. We cast a wide net about scientific advising practices that might or might not be relevant to WMD threat assessment. 4

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.


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There are those who insist that there is no role for independent scientists’ involvement in WMD threat assessment, as they believe this role is best done by intelligence agencies. While recognizing that intelligence plays an important role in developing threat assessments, reliance solely on this advice limits the overall picture and can in fact provide a skewed view of developments. One participant quoted an editorial in Science [1], which highlighted the tension between peer reviewed scientific papers and the critical review of intelligence information. While the scientific peer review process often yields added qualifications and limitations on conclusions, ‘intelligence science’ often results in the opposite, i.e. the deletion of qualifying language and caveats as the information moves higher up in the system, as happened in the case of Iraq. Or in the words of the Science editorial, “arguing from the desired conclusion rather than from the data”. Policy-based evidence rather than evidence-based policy is the likely result. For example, in the chemical and biological weapons (CBW) field, many of our workshop participants expressed the opinion that independent scientists in both academia and industry must be involved because the advances in science and technology are outpacing the ability of the existing regimes to respond, particularly in areas relating to dual use. Several of the participants highlighted the importance of this fact, and the need for more flexible and creative ways to keep abreast of the developments. Examples of such areas include: new technologies such as bioregulators for incapacitation, integrative trends in the life sciences, and the integration of engineering principles, database tools, and computer modeling into the practice of biology. Some workshop participants believe that this task of monitoring and responding to these developments is too great for security authorities, intelligence agencies, and international servants to handle alone. As one participant summarized, “Access to researchers working at the cutting edge, and a broad spectrum of scientific knowledge and institutions, should be involved in developing authoritative science advice.”

4. Case Studies There are many levels at which scientific advising is strengthened by the involvement of independent scientists. These structures are put in place through formal and informal mechanisms on both national and international levels. The following list is not comprehensive, but is illustrative of the types of structures that are possible, and which have had positive impact. 4.1. Treaty Regimes It is possible to incorporate mechanisms for the engagement of independent scientists in the early stages of negotiating treaties, through their advance negotiations, entry into force and implementation and monitoring. Several participants drew attention to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), in which scientists played an active role in all stages of the development and implementation of the treaty. The CWC itself includes specific provisions that allow the Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to appoint members of a Scientific Advisory Board, who serve in their individual capacities, and also to appoint temporary working groups as needed. The

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Scientific Advisory Board was able to offer advice to the Second Review Conference on a range of areas, including advances in science and technology (covering issues from the convergence of chemistry and biology to technologies for delivery systems), schedules of chemicals, verification, assistance and protection against the effects of chemical weapons, and education and outreach. While the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) does not include provision for a similar Scientific Advisory Board, the Sixth Review Conference of the BTWC established an Implementation Support Unit. This was tasked with facilitating upon request States Parties’ contacts with scientific and academic institutions and NGOs; it has developed a close relationship with scientific and academic institutions both nationally and internationally. Sometimes treaty regimes can encourage national structures to support independent scientific involvement on issues related to the treaty. For example in the UK, the National Authority established, in accordance with CWC Article VII.4, an independent Advisory Committee that was mandated to “advise on technical developments which may have potential application in chemical weapons” [2]. 4.2. Executive and Military Advisory Panels The United States has a good track record of engaging independent scientific expertise, and creates advisory groups in which it is possible for people with security clearances to interact with other researchers. One early important effort was the Presidential Science Advisory Committee’s (PSAC) Strategic Military Panel (SMP), composed of roughly ten highly qualified scientists and engineers from academia and industry. Each year it had the task of reviewing US and Soviet strategic weapons (excluding strategic aircraft). The SMP met two days every month in the Old Executive Office Building, supported by an able staff person who arranged briefings from the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and contractors. President Nixon ended PSAC in 1973, and yet as one contributor with experience stated, “the tradition of independent testimony to congressional committees on national defense programs had been set and continued.” A unique example from France was highlighted: the French College for the Prevention of Technological Risks, established by Prime Minister Michel Rocard in 1989. The mandate of the College was to assess collective risks and ways to counter or reduce them by gathering expert opinions, recommendations and studies. It focused on industry, especially nuclear activities, chemical or petroleum-related activities, transport and the development of new technologies. The college had latitude to publish its own findings, and to communicate its reports to the media. It was an interdisciplinary group, and while the mandate excluded military matters, the structure might prove useful to those seeking ways to improve scientific advising. It was disbanded in 1996. In the US, the JASON defense advisory panel is another successful example, in which an independent scientific advisory group has provided consulting services on matters of defense science and technology since 1960 [3]. Members of this group usually meet during the summer months, and are granted security clearances and given leeway in deciding what topics to explore. Their reports can be published in both classified and unclassified formats.


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4.3. National Academies National academies also provide very useful fora in which key issues can be resolved. We explored as examples both the US National Academy and an initiative from the Israeli Academy. The US National Academy of Sciences has a long history of work on nuclear, chemical, biological weapons and terrorism, and has had significant policy impact. It has a commitment to public dissemination, notwithstanding the fact that it can have access to classified information and involve experts with such access. Importantly, the Academy explores how both scientific progress can be made and international security strengthened. In the biological weapons field two recent reports helped to redefine ways in which independent scientists are engaged in these discussions. The 2004 Fink Report, Biotechnology Research in an Era of Terrorism [4], urged creation of a national scientific advisory board to link scientists and policy makers, with an international dimension aimed at developing common approaches. The 2006 Lemon-Relman Report, Globlization, Biosecurity and the Life Sciences [5], urged a broader view of the ‘threat spectrum’, and moved beyond a focus on microbial threats to new areas of science that could pose threats. It suggested ways to strengthen and enhance scientific and technological expertise in the security community, and sought to create a broader culture of responsibility. This report is widely cited and has been important for international cooperative efforts. A successful follow-on example from Israel is the Steering Committee on Issues in Biotechnological Research in an Age of Terrorism. The present Committee was established to address the problem of biosecurity threats. Its members were appointed jointly by the President of the Israel Academy of Sciences and the Head of the Israel National Security Council. It calls on the Ministry of Health to establish a National Biosecurity Council (NBC) in consultation with the head of the National Security Council and the President of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities. The NBC should maintain a ‘working relationship’ with similar domestic and international bodies, and include 15 members, most of them biomedical and legal professionals, as well as a public representative and professionals from the relevant ministries, academic research institutions and relevant government authorities, especially the security sector.

4.4. NGOs, Industry, Academics and Think Tanks There is a long list of successful examples of NGOs, think tanks, industry associations, and academics being involved in independent scientific evaluation and advising on issues related to WMDs. The most successful of these engage experts who have also been involved in governmental programs. One highlighted US example was the “Countermeasures” report, published by a UCS-MIT collaboration in 2000 [6]. The 11 authors included several who were intimately involved in various US missile programs and in missile defense, along with several who did not hold and had never held US government clearances. The International Panel on Fissile Materials [7] engages scientists worldwide in efforts to analyze the technical basis for practical and achievable policy initiatives to

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secure, consolidate, and reduce stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. The Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs [8] has a long experience in bridging between the expert communities and governments on technical issues related to treaties. The Harvard Sussex Program [9] works to maintain and strengthen the constraints against development and use of Chemical and Biological Weapons. The International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry [10] has collaborated with the OPCW on ways to create a better understanding of the multiple uses of chemicals. The Nuclear Threat Initiative [11] creates a “common ground where people with different ideological views are working together to close the gap between the global threats from nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the global response.” These are just a few illustrative examples. 4.5. Independent International Commissions There have been successful international commissions established, which engage a range of senior policy figures, experts, and scientists. The WMD Commission [12] chaired by Hans Blix, and the Canberra Commission [13] (which grew out of a Pugwash study) are two examples. 4.6. International Organizations In NATO, one specific example highlighted was the Von Kármán Committee that was tasked by the NATO Military Committee in 1960 to “develop an estimate of the possible and probable scientific progress to be expected in the next decade”. The Committee’s report in 1961 is described on the website of the NATO Research and Technology Organization [14] as “the first multi-national attempt to estimate the impact of scientific and technological advances on military capability”.

5. Limitations There are of course limitations on all of these efforts. Perhaps the foremost are the challenges involved with the lack of access to classified information, though as described above it is possible to create panels in such a way as to overcome this problem. There is a need for good scientists, and thus a need to know how to find and identify them, and also a need to ensure the proper training and funding of future scientists interested in these fields. There is a narrowing of career paths for scientists involved in these areas, as relevant questions often need to be addressed in interdisciplinary programs which can too often become dead ends for academics. One academic scientist suggested that schools of public policy should seriously think about creating departments for science and international security, and funding agencies should be more willing to provide core funding for such operations and not fund only specific projects. Without such steps, it is quite possible that science-based analyses could soon be a thing of the past. Decision makers must be able to identify when they are dealing with sciencerelated issues. This may not be as obvious as it sounds, as the scientific basis for the decisions can often be buried under the layers of bureaucratic response (as exemplified with the above-mentioned drawbacks of ‘intelligence science’). Policy makers and the public also need to be able to distinguish good science from bad science, and indeed


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scientists can sometimes skew their own findings for personal, economic, organizational or political reasons. This latter must be guarded against through e.g. adequate peer-review processes. This central need for peer review of advice is limited by the low number of peerreviewed journals available in which to publish these sorts of results (Science and Global Security [15] being particularly prominent). Web resources can help – for example disparate scientists working in a field can have their findings discussed and responded to on expert blogs like www.armscontrolwonk.org or the Wired blog [16]. Differences between educational levels, language and culture may result in different definitions of ‘scientist’; for example, the French usage of the term is broader than the British one – and those two countries are less than 40km apart. Finally, unpopular results can be subverted by interested parties. This must be guarded against. Effective whisteblower protection mechanisms and societal verification measures can help here.

6. Areas in Which Interaction Can Be Strengthened: Possible Ways Forward and Recommendations Cutting across the different disciplines and the specialist focus on chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile technologies, we identified overarching areas in which the involvement of independent scientists should be strengthened as a way to facilitate more informed decision making and policies that can keep pace with the quicklychanging scientific landscape. Independent scientists should be further engaged in undertaking open source monitoring and risk analysis of relevant current research, development, transfer, deployment and possible use of WMDs. They can aid in predicting future trajectories of R&D programmes and help to alert government and intergovernmental organisations, scientific communities and the public to the possible dangers (i.e. ‘threat awareness’), including working where appropriate with industry in creating plant-site level threat awareness. They can engage in analyses of the effectiveness of control regimes to meet both existing and future threats, and they can participate in developing strategies to combat these current and likely future threats. Independent scientists can contribute also to developing and monitoring inspection and verification technologies. This is particularly useful with respect to State as opposed to clandestine activities. 6.1. Why Involve Outsiders? We explored in depth, and across the fields, why it is essential to involve independent scientists. The primary reason is the pace and complexity of scientific advances and the need to maintain a connection with cutting-edge science. This is an impossible task for the intelligence agencies to handle alone, and a more cooperative interaction between the military, intelligence, political and research communities can yield very important results, as has been demonstrated in some of the examples above. Independent scientists bring an important level of authority and independence to the advice that policy makers receive. Also important is the fact that engaging independent scientists encourages feedback into the scientific community on issues

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such as awareness raising, dual use, adoption of codes of conduct, education and training. This feedback also helps build a culture of responsibility in the scientific community, by reinforcing the responsibility of scientists to reduce the risks of the malign use of scientific research. Increasing the ties between the science and security communities is an essential element for realistic threat assessments and responses. Such cross-fertilization also strengthens and enhances the science and technology expertise in the security community. Increasing such ties internationally helps to build common approaches, shared language and experience, and increases the ultimate effectiveness of efforts to reduce threats from WMDs. This also builds confidence among the international parties, as engagement on technical issues can be a precursor for closer international relations, leading toward a more stable and secure world. 6.2. What Can NATO Do? We did not go into detail on the current NATO threat assessment process. One researcher who was not present at our meeting, however, has commented that “In terms of threat assessment, for example, current practice in NATO is for confidential national memos on the nature of the threat to be exchanged between officials, who then meet as an ‘expert group’ each month to debate and refine the assessments. The aim is to reach a consensus threat assessment, which is then passed to Ministers. Where consensus has not been reached, Ministers will be informed of the extent of the agreement/ disagreement. There are currently no procedures for outside or independent scrutiny of NATO threat assessments” [17]. As a result of the discussions at the Zagreb ARW, we offer the following suggestions. 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

NATO could be more explicit about the way it arrives at threat assessments. It could begin a dialogue among Member States as to the best practices in each country of the involvement of independent scientists in threat/risk assessments, and seek to mirror the best practices in its own structures. To facilitate threat assessment discussions, a shared risk methodology and terminology would be particularly useful and would help in understanding how countries perceive threats differently. Developing such methodology and terminology might be useful as the framework for an ARW. A small subgroup of experts would be willing to meet with appropriate NATO staff (either in the WMD Centre, the RTO or other relevant departments) to discuss the structures and to propose ways to strengthen the scientific advice NATO receives. This could build upon the 1999 NATO WMD Initiative, which addressed information-sharing: “Allies have committed to increase their sharing of WMD information and intelligence in order to develop a more comprehensive, shared assessment of the current and evolving threat” [18]. A specific recommendation regarding chemical weapons arose: NATO should revisit the 1961 von Kármán Committee report and involve independent scientists in re-examining that 48-year-old categorization in order to form a view on the relevance of Type C chemical weapons to today’s risk assessments. A region-wide cooperative security system for the Mediterranean should be established involving functioning institutions, to assess threats and adopt


6.

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preemptive measures. For example, the establishment of a regional task force of independent scientists on missiles and missile defense is essential for confidence building and for supporting any future regional forum in this area. Another participant strongly urged a strengthening of the international impact of the Science for Peace Program, calling for a high-level review of the role of NATO’s non-military civil functions, to appreciably increase the resources for this component and to secure the interaction of the Science for Peace and Security Program with the EU, OECD and various countries’ R&D programs. Equally, he urged that “with the shift in the NATO Science Committee’s priorities towards military and defence strategies there is a strong case to be made for an urgent examination of the two initiatives to ensure they are either well-integrated or merged.”

7. The Potential Impact of Better Scientific Advice on Strengthening Current Non-Proliferation, Counter-Proliferation and Defence Strategies in National and Alliance Strategies “Effective policy must be governed by facts, not fears” [19]. While the participants in the ARW recognized the limitations of involving independent scientists in threat assessment, they nevertheless highlighted the pressing urgency of finding better mechanisms and structures to ensure that there is greater dialogue between the various governmental, intergovernmental, intelligence, and socalled independent actors. In the wake of the Iraq War, where a faulty interpretation of the threat led to policy with a profound implication for the entire international community, this is not an insignificant matter. NATO has been in a time of transition, and one participant from the Mediterranean noted that NATO’s shift of strategies within Europe has been more successful than its interactions with the Mediterranean Dialogue and the ICI. This sense of differing priorities must be addressed as a main concern. Working cooperatively to eliminate the tensions via transparency and dialogue is a key to greater understanding. Engaging independent scientists in cooperative projects related to reducing and eliminating the threat of weapons of mass destruction can contribute significantly to this process. As one of the participants, a leading scientist who has also been a member of his parliament summarized, “Since knowledge-based society is the only guarantor of sustainable future for humankind, the responsibility of scientists today is greater and more complex than ever.”

References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]

D. Kennedy, Intelligence Science: Reverse Peer Review, Science 303 (2004), 1945. http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/energy/non-proliferation/cbw/national-authority/naac/terms-ofreference /page40779.html, accessed 5 November 2008. For recent reports, see http://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/. http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10827#toc. http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11567. A.M. Sessler (Chair of the Study Group), J.M. Cornwall, R. Dietz, S.A. Fetter, S. Frankel, R.L. Garwin, K. Gottfried, L. Gronlund, G.N. Lewis, T.A. Postol, and D.C. Wright, Countermeasures. A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System, UCS-

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[7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19]


MIT Study, Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge MA, April 2000. Available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/cm_all.pdf. http://www.fissilematerials.org. http://www.pugwash.org. http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/. See for example http://www.iupac.org/web/ins/2004-048-1-020. http://www.nti.org. http://www.wmdcommission.org. http://www.dfat.gov.au/cc/index.html. http://www.rto.nato.int, accessed 31 October 2008. http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/SciGloSec.shtml. http://blog.wired.com/. Ian Davis, http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Notes/2004NATOMissileDefense-IstanbulSummit.htm. NATO, Fact sheet: NATO on Weapons of Mass Destruction, 24 April 1999. Available September 28, 2009 at http://www.fas.org/man/nato/natodocs/99042409.htm. Joseph Cirincione, Iraq’s WMD Arsenal Deadly But Limited, Proliferation Brief, Volume 5, Number 11, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC. Available at http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=1050&prog=zgp&proj=znpp &zoom_highlight=Effective+policy+must+be+governed+by+facts+not+fears.

Section 1 Institutions, Structures and Mechanisms



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The Role of Independent Scientific Input in NATO Brian HEAP Capability and Sustainability Centre, Von Hügel Institute, St Edmund’s College, Cambridge, UK

Abstract. NATO receives scientific input from multiple sources. One of these channels supports a non-military civil function served by the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme [1] which is administered by the Public Diplomacy Division (PDD). Direction for the Programme is provided by the NATO Science for Peace and Security Committee consisting of national representatives from each of the 26 Alliance countries. The PDD which is a new Division within NATO has emerged from a distinguished past going back almost to the Second World War. Since that time priorities have changed leading to the repositioning of the Science Programme to deal with NATO’s new international challenges. The history of this evolution, the importance of independent scientific advice, and the composition and role of the new Science Programme are outlined. Under the new name of ‘Science for Peace and Security’ (SPS) the Programme seeks to influence and fulfil NATO’s strategic objectives which include enhanced security in member states and partner countries, and the promotion of action through cooperation. While the Programme’s objectives together with its various components and mechanisms used to procure and deploy scientific input have been reshaped, a critique will show that limitations persist which restrict the international impact of NATO’s non-military civil function and that a high-level review of its role in the twenty-first century would be timely. Keywords. NATO Science Programme, science input, peace, security, objectives, high-level review.

Introduction: Why Is Independent Scientific Input Important? Independence in this context refers to an ability to inform about scientific and technological advances without the temptation to modify advice to meet political, military, economic or personal sensitivities. How that advice is used and translated into policy is left to those skilled in the art of application and communication. Independent scientific input is a prized commodity because it touches on questions of trust and veracity. A poll of 2000 adults in the UK asked whether they generally trusted 16 different types of people to tell the truth or not. In the top six, ninety per cent of the public said they trusted doctors to tell the truth compared with teachers (86%), professors (78%), judges (78%), clergy/priests (73%) and scientists (65%). In the bottom six were civil servants with 44%, trade union officials 38%, business leaders 26%, government ministers 22%, journalists 18% and politicians in general 18% [2]. Clearly, the trusted independent scientific expert is less of a rarity than some in the eyes of the general public, but if we let the species decline and become extinct we are in trouble.

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B. Heap / The Role of Independent Scientific Input in NATO

Science is a public good and has real value in its own right. It needs to flourish despite the pressures of market or military forces, it needs to be accountable, and it needs to be listened to if we are to have ‘evidence-based policies’. Bureaucrats, policy makers and administrators have long had to rely on expert advisory panels which can supply the quality assurance function relating to new science and technology published in peer-reviewed journals. However, science that is carried out for commercial or military purposes may not always be published (or peer-reviewed) in the open literature. This does not excuse the need for internal procedures that address objective scientific evaluation. Indeed, advice based on peer review may be even more necessary in preserves inevitably confined by privacy, confidentiality and national security. As Douglas Kennedy pointed out in an editorial in Science [3] a tension exists between the peer review of a scientific paper and the critical review of intelligence information. In the case of a new scientific paper qualifications and limitations on conclusions are frequently added at the insistence of reviewers. In contrast, ‘intelligence science’ requires the deletion of qualifying language and caveats so that the conclusions are strengthened and clarified, as experienced by experts who appeared before high-level reviewers at the Pentagon and the Executive Office in the USA concerning the decision to invade Iraq. “In a scientific setting, we’d call that arguing from the desired conclusion rather than from the data”, says Kennedy. Bearing in mind that USA defence spend subsidizes an enormous amount of science in universities and other institutions, this tension is by no means a trivial one. In this respect NATO is no exception. Three consequences follow. First, you need good scientists to consult and you must know how to find them if they are not in your employ. Second, decision-makers must, and increasingly do, recognise when they are dealing with a science-related issue. And third, we all need to distinguish good science from bad science. In the UK, Lord May of Oxford, when Chief Scientific Advisor at the Cabinet Office, presented his Guidelines for Scientific Advice and Policy Making [4] in which he stressed the need for a transparent and objective system for good governance that ensured scientific advice is thoroughly comprehensible and rigorously tested. In addition governments and international organisations need to be forewarned increasingly of potentially controversial issues at an early stage to ensure that the best scientific advice can be marshalled, that consultations are broadly based involving all interested parties, and that new knowledge is translated into publicly acceptable policies. His successor, Sir David King, also emphasised the case for a strong science base, not just because it is important for wealth generation, but because it can lead to the development of high-tech clusters which facilitate essential channels of knowledge transfer between higher education, industry, governments and non-governmental organisations. Rapid transfer of knowledge is just as essential for combating global terrorism as it is to deal with the dangers of infectious diseases, climate change or food insecurity. For some issues, scientific analysis informs new policy as it relates to international terrorism, population, energy options, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), stem cells, foot-and-mouth, or nanotechnology. Other issues arise as a result of scientific advance and therefore need scientific understanding (e.g. cloning, GM crops). Diplomatic science has a place, but when the converse occurs, as in nations that attempt to exclude foreigners from certain laboratories and conferences, it can result in undiplomatic science. Yet, in bringing these values to bear on public life we must


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recognise the limits of science and science advice and not fall into the trap of scientism as if science and scientific advice is the answer to all things.

1. Science and Evidence-Based Policy Science is not everything and nobody sensible imagines for one moment that you can make and implement policy on the back of scientific advice alone, or that science will give compelling, unambiguous answers to deep social questions. But to pretend that science has nothing to offer would be equally fatuous. J.T. Rosenbaum, writing in 1997 in the weekly journal Science concerning ‘Lessons from litigation over silicone breast implants: a call for activism by scientists’, commented that although scientific ‘truth’ is not immutable, “the courts have recognised that scientific arguments for causation must meet definable standards and that scientists themselves….are best qualified to judge science” [5]. People engaged in higher education, academies and learned societies of all types frequently seem to share the ambition that governance will achieve better decisionmaking and better policies, especially if it is evidence-based policy rather than policybased science. But the relationship between independent scientific advice and governance is a complex one. Science itself is not democratic – scientific truth is addressed by experiment and observation, not by counting votes and heads. Science needs openness and the story of Lysenkoism in the former Soviet Union, or of climate change as viewed by a sceptical administration, shows what can happen to science in a society where political orthodoxy determines what is acceptable and what is not, or where political and industrial imperatives are more highly valued than the best international evidence available which may point to a different solution. The free exchange of ideas on which science depends can be threatened by political correctness, and we all need to be alert to this. Science now operates in a world that is a complicated place. It always has been but the pressures now are greater than ever: bigger population, tougher international competition, and rapid consequences of taking the wrong decisions. Decision-makers (not only in government) can now make gross mistakes which are bigger than ever, and the technology of instant communication means that they are immediately exposed to universal critique. Science itself is fallible because theories change and knowledge expands and contradicts earlier thinking and we must recognise the limits of science and science advice. Over a century ago, Fellows of the Royal Society cautioned government about the danger of trains travelling at more than 30 mph. Their concern centered on air being drawn out of the carriages depriving passengers of oxygen and leading to whole-scale fatalities. Science can also be misconstrued as in the case of the flawed paper on autism that linked the condition to measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccination. As the UK’s Chief Medical Officer, Sir Liam Donaldson, has said: “if the paper had never been published, then we wouldn’t have had the controversy, we wouldn’t have had the seed of doubt sown in parents’ minds which has caused a completely false loss of confidence in a vaccine that has saved millions of children’s lives around the world” [6]. The measles virus is remarkably contagious and 1 in 300,000 cases leads to progressive neurological disorders; routine vaccination has reduced its incidence in the USA alone from 4 million a year to just 40.

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Eventually, however, some one or some body has to take action and Professor Sir Michael Marmot writing about evidence-based policy making or policy-based evidence warned that the relation between science and policy is also complicated. “Scientific findings” he wrote “do not fall on blank minds that get made up as a result. Science engages with busy minds that have strong views about how things are, and ought to be” [7]. In this context, our examination of the interaction between the scientific community which seeks to give advice to policy makers and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), a major international body which requires it, will show how complex the relationship between military, political and civil science levers can be. This paper is confined to the scientific advice that is provided for NATO’s civil science programme and refers only briefly to that required for NATO’s military arm.

2. How Does NATO Elicit Scientific Input? The North Atlantic Alliance was founded originally by 12 nations after the Second World War because of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. A civil science programme was initiated, a history of which is provided by the excellent review of Jens Erik Fenstad, former Representative of Norway on the NATO Science Committee [8]. Fenstad has drawn attention to the original function of the Science Programme which was to stimulate scientific exchanges among NATO Alliance countries through Fellowships, Advanced Study Institutes (ASI), Advanced Research Workshops (ARW), and Collaborative Research Grants (CRG). Initially, the work concentrated upon the physical sciences but later it took in biological, environmental and social sciences. This approach of using scientific research in the service of diplomacy was consistent with the philosophy encouraged by the distinguished physicist, Freeman Dyson, who expressed the view that “the most useful contribution that scientists can make to the abolition of war has nothing to do with technology. The international community of scientists may help to abolish war by setting an example to the world of practical cooperation across barriers of nationality, language and culture” [9]. In the 1990s the Programme reinvented itself by focussing on Partnership with the nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States. After the Cold War the emphasis changed towards solidarity, stability and peace. After 9/11 the objectives changed again with the emergence of new challenges as a result of the shift in global power balance, the proliferation of new technologies, the growing gap between the rich and poor, and the information revolution. The NATO Science programme, therefore, has had to show flexibility by responding to the exigencies of the times, notwithstanding the initial objective of the Programme which drew a clear distinction between the support of civilian science and NATO defence cooperation. This blurring of objectives has meant that the mechanisms by which it has gained scientific advice have also modified over the lifetime of its existence. An early intention of France, previously resisted, required that the programme should be ‘mission-orientated basic research of military significance’. Fenstad regrets that this idea has resurfaced so that the current Programme has restored that original intention and as a result several Science Committee members have departed as they no longer considered their expertise in basic science was well-suited to shaping such a programme. As we shall see later, the Programme is still the largest part of the civil budget of NATO, it still retains familiar labels, but it now has a much stronger ‘top-down’ influence derived from the drive to defend against terrorism and other threats to


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security. In terms of funding, the total budget for the current NATO Science for Peace and Security programme is small (only €12m and declining each year), a mere fraction of the total NATO budget; the precise figure is difficult to calculate because of the limited amount of information in the public domain about NATO’s total spend, but it is probably around 5%.

3. How Does NATO Use Scientific Input? The Science for Peace and Security Committee is the senior body of scientists that advises NATO through its Public Diplomacy Division responsible for the civil science programme, now called Science for Peace and Security [10]. The Programme has evolved (as at November 20081) into a unique network of 26 Member states, 24 Partner nations and 7 Mediterranean nations (total 57, Table 1). It currently sees itself as ensuring the joint security through political and military cooperation and collective defence of its member states. The work of the PDD reports to the Secretary General through the Assistant Secretary General of PDD, and is monitored by the nation’s Ambassadors to NATO. The Science for Peace and Security Committee meets twice a year, once a year in EAPC format (Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) with 26 plus 23 participants, and twice a year in NRC format (NATO-Russia Council), a special arrangement to meet the requirements of Russia because of surviving sensitivities about former countries of the Soviet Union. In terms of how the NATO Science for Peace and Security Committee elicits and uses scientific advice considerable structural changes have occurred. The Committee originally consisted of distinguished basic scientists but with the change in priorities it now also includes senior members who primarily reflect national needs. The Committee is given advice by Expert Panels consisting of bona fide scientists, technologists and sociologists from Alliance and Partner countries. The advice of these Panels determines decisions on such matters as the Advanced Study Institutes (ASI), Advanced Networking Workshops (ANW), Advanced Research Workshops (ARW),

Table 1. A Unique Network of Cooperation NATO Countries

Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States

Partner Countries

Albania1, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia1, Finland, Georgia, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, Ireland, Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, Russia, Serbia, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(*), Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan

Mediterranean Dialogue Countries

Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia

Total

57 countries

* Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name. 1

Albania and Croatia became Member Countries in 2009.

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Science for Peace Projects, Collaborative Linkage Grants (CLG), the Virtual Silk Highway and new initiatives. The Expert Panels are: x x x x

Chemistry/Physics/Biology (CPB) Panel. Environmental Security (ES) Panel. Human and Societal Dynamics (HSD) Panel. Information and Communications Security (ICS) Panel.

Today’s Science for Peace and Security Committee came into existence as a result of the merger in June 2006 of the NATO Science Committee (SCOM) and the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS, created by the North Atlantic Council in 1969). The need for the merger which became apparent in 2004 was driven both by the rapidly changing global security environment and the natural convergence of common priorities between the two programmes. The outcome was a clear focus to promote peace and stability by creating links between scientists in formerly separated communities. During the transition period the NATO Science Programme became the NATO Programme for Security through Science, and then the Science for Peace and Security Programme (SPS) to better reflect the new mission. The mission aimed to concentrate on security-related collaborative projects in response to the new threat of international terrorism, as well as other threats that affect the security of the modern world such as problems that influence the environment of the nations and the quality of life of their peoples. NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division oversees the SPS Programme which reaches out to countries in the NATO Alliance, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries. Its objectives in the promotion of civil science, regional cooperation, public information and identification of leaders of tomorrow are summarized in Table 2. The Programme identifies, understands and counters vulnerabilities and threats. It is a means of finding answers to key questions that connect nations. It engages scientists in Partner countries with those in Alliance countries providing creative activities for any who may otherwise be tempted by the lucrative offers associated with work on weapons of mass destruction or global terrorism. It recognizes that while international terrorism poses a real threat to society, terrorism does not operate in isolation from other global risks such as climate change, poverty, environmental damage, or the continuing inequities between more and less developed nations.

Table 2. Objectives of the Science for Peace and Security Programme Civil collaboration between NATO countries and Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries Solving problems affecting large societies in Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries Promotion of NATO’s values and image in targeted communities e.g. create young generation of ‘Leaders of Tomorrow’ Stability and Peace e.g. by promoting regional cooperation Seed money for projects that provide the basis for addressing priority needs


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Table 3. Key Priorities in Defence against Terrorism Rapid detection of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents and weapons, and rapid diagnosis of their effects on people Novel and rapid methods of detection Physical protection against CBRN agents Decontamination of CBRN agents Destruction of CBRN agents and weapons (e.g. chemical and vaccine technologies) Medical countermeasures Explosive detection Food security Information security Eco-Terrorism countermeasures Computer terrorism countermeasures

Table 4. Key Priorities for Scientific Collaboration to Counter Other Threats to Security Environmental security (e.g. desertification, land erosion, pollution) Water resources management Management of non-renewable resources Modelling sustainable consumption (e.g. food, energy, materials, fiscal measures and environmental costing) Disaster forecast and prevention Human and societal dynamics (e.g. new challenges for global security, economic impact of terrorist actions, risk studies, topics in science policy)

Key priority topics in the SPS Programme for defence against terrorism and for collaboration to counter other threats are given respectively in Tables 3 and 4. The process whereby these topics are determined consists of advice from members of the Science Committee which form the basis for decisions taken by the Expert Panels referred to above.

4. What Evidence Is there that NATO Uses Science Advice? Evidence that science advice plays a key role in the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme is illustrated by the remarkable mix and flow of new knowledge, ideas, information and people. This has been largely achieved in an open and uninhibited manner. Numerically, at its peak, some 10,000 scientists were involved,

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over 6,000 scientists participated in over 100 NATO scientific meetings, and about 100 volumes of scientific papers were published annually. Latterly, over 2500 Fellowships have been funded for Partner country scientists, and more recently an annual prize has been established for the most prestigious and relevant research. In these ways science advice was readily available to NATO and selected examples of grants show how quality advice could be disseminated through the instruments available to the Science Committee, namely, ASIs, Advanced Networking Workshops and ARWs (Table 5). The immediacy of this advice can be seen in the ARW held in Lisbon which addressed the subject of ‘Suicide Terrorism: the strategic threat and countermeasures’. At the ARW it was reported that suicide terrorism occurred more than 300 times between 2000 and 2003 killing more than 5,300 people in 17 countries. Interrogation of al-Qaeda detainees at Guantanamo Bay noted that Saudi-born operatives were often “educated above reasonable employment level…a surprising number have graduate degrees and come from high-status families”. Nevertheless, low social esteem and social marginality were contributing factors among others including Palestinian and Chechen suicide bombers.

Table 5. Illustrative Selected Examples of Recent Outputs from the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme with Nations Involved Advanced Study Institutes

Advanced Networking Workshops

Advanced Research Workshops

Advanced modelling techniques for rapid diagnosis and assessment of CBRN agents; effects on water resources

Turkey, Kyrgyz Republic

Network security and intrusion detection

Canada, Armenia

Novel biotechnologies for biocontrol; agent enhancement and management

Italy, Israel

Distance learning education for Central Asia, Caucasus and Afghanistan over the Virtual Silk Highway

USA, Kazakhstan

Policies for secure research and education networking

Poland, Georgia

Stand-off detection of suicide bombers

Germany, Russia

Diagnosis and treatment of post traumatic stress disorder

USA, Croatia

Sharing knowledge across the Mediterranean area for prevention of catastrophes and sustainable management of water and energy

France, Morocco

Environmental security threats in urban settings

Greece, Ukraine

Establishing security and stability in the Wider Black Sea Area: the role of the new Democracies

Netherlands, Bulgaria


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Further selected examples also show how the NATO Science Programme has funded high quality science and technology relevant to what it has identified as key threats to security. Collaborative linkages between Alliance, Partner and Mediterranean Dialogue countries (Table 6) have contributed towards stability and peace by providing topical advice about how to form ‘spin-off’ companies in Partner countries (including guidance from Alliance country scientists on matters to do with intellectual property), how to provide insights for end-users such as environmental agencies in the Commonwealth of Independent States faced with challenging problems arising from warfare and terrorist activities, and shared research and insights into explosives detection, the psychological and sociological consequences of terrorism, chemical biological radiological and nuclear (CBRN) protection, cybersecurity, transport security, defense-related environmental issues, environmental security and ecoterrorism (NATO-Russia Programme). The NATO Science for Peace and Security Committee has provided scientific advice to the SPS Programme and the PDD through its national representatives. It has built on the successes of earlier initiatives including those that involved industrial and environmental projects concerned with clean water supplies, pollution and seismology. At the beginning of the present decade, it provided advice to NATO in strongly supporting the development of internet technologies and communication networks. The purpose was to link together scientists in Alliance and Partner countries and to provide teaching and training resources in schools and universities, reserving access for civil research and educational purposes, with no access for the military. This decision has proved to be of particular importance for scientists in Caucasus and Central Asia nations (Figure 1).

Table 6. Illustrative Selected Examples of Recent Collaboration among Nations in the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme Science for Peace Projects

Collaborative Linkage Grants

Mélange rocket fuel conversion in Azerbaijan

NATO managed

Biosensor for detection of anthrax lethal toxin

USA, Russia

Uranium extraction and environmental security in Central Asia

Slovenia, Kazakhstan

New biological markers for nerve agents; exposures and antidote treatment

Netherlands, Bulgaria

Modelling of pollution, circulation and mixing in the Black Sea

USA, Russia

Sustainable development of water resources in the Middle East

USA, Israel

Smallpox countermeasures

USA, Egypt

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Figure 1. The Virtual Silk Highway linking Caucasus and Central Asia nations to the internet.

The construction of the Virtual Silk Highway has resulted in a highly successful satellite-based regional system connecting for the first time using a Turkish-French satellite three Caucasian and five Central Asian new independent states with one earth station per country. Afghanistan is now part of the network which is managed with support from Germany and the EU, and currently operates at 100 MHz and 21.5 Mbps. The Virtual Silk Highway is governed by the Silk Board and its Executive Committee consists of managers from each country with potential funders in attendance (Soros, World Bank). The NATO Public Diplomacy Division has agreed to continue funding this important initiative and the success of this venture has been unanimously applauded by all NATO countries and their partners.

5. Will the New Structure Work? While it is too early to offer a full evaluation of the new NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme after its all-important transformation post-9/11, an initial critique can be offered in the spirit of constructive dialogue based on my experience as the former UK Representative on the NATO Science Committee. Firstly, we note that ‘security’ means not just military might; it includes the nonmilitary threats that arise from incompetent governance, corruption, organised crime, insecure borders, smuggling, illegal migration, ethnic and religious conflict, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, shortage of natural resources and, of course, terrorism.


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POLITICAL

NATO’s Third Dimension

Y AR T I IL M

SC I SO ENCE CI ET & Y

Figure 2. The Role of Science in NATO’s Mission.

Secondly, we record that the newly established Science for Peace and Security Committee and its Programme provides a unique opportunity to contribute to world peace through enhancing cooperation with all partners based on science and innovation, to have a ‘horizon-scanning’ role raising awareness for NATO, and finding solutions to new challenges primarily through non-military means. Thirdly, we recognise that science has become central to many policies including the demand for new assessments of the environmental impact of climate change, the need for better models of disease spread, and the provision of food security particularly in less developed nations. However, NATO’s recent major publications speak of ‘NATO in the 21st Century’, ‘Understanding the new NATO’, and ‘NATO after Prague’. Its third dimension – Science – (Figure 2) is largely absent from such key publications and consequently the media have had great difficulty in recognising that NATO has a highly significant Science Programme relevant to the use of civil science for peace, and which has supported the work of hundreds of scientists. Some of these scientist have become Nobel Prize winners. For example, in 2000 NATO congratulated three Nobel Prize winners who received grants under the NATO Science Programme. Zhores I. Alferov, Director of the Ioffe Institute, St Petersburg, Russia, received the Nobel Prize for Physics jointly with Herbert Kroemer and Jack Kilby. At that time Prof. Alferov was co-director of a NATO Science for Peacesponsored research project on Light Emitting Devices, carried out in collaboration with colleagues in Germany, the UK and Belarus. He was also co-director of a 1994 NATO Workshop on Technology Transfer between NATO and Partner Countries. Alan G. MacDiarmid, of the University of Pennsylvania, USA, received the Nobel Prize for Chemistry with Alan J. Heeger and Hideki Shirakawa, while Paul Greengard, of the Rockefeller University, USA, received the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine with Arvid Carlsson and Eric Kandel. In the 1980s and early 1990s Professors MacDiarmid

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and Greengard received funding under the Science Programme for their research work, in collaboration with colleagues in Belgium and Italy. In 2008 Dr. Roger Y. Tsien of the University of California–San Diego (USA), a former grantee of the NATO Science Programme, was one of three recipients of the Nobel Prize in Chemistry 2008 for the discovery and development of the green fluorescent protein, GFP. In summary, the focus of new SPS priorities funded by NATO directly or by nationally-funded initiatives is two-fold: (a) defence against terrorism and (b) countering other threats to security. This focus aims to pre-empt and defend against terrorism, to counter other threats to security such as a lack of resource management, and to address specific priorities identified by Partner countries. Grants are small in value but they are indicative of priority areas that need support. They can also lead to the crucial leverage of funding from other national and international agencies. Activities funded directly by NATO are based either on applications submitted by individual specialists or on proposals developed by the SPS Secretariat or the Advisory Panels. Activities funded nationally are based on proposals submitted by nations. In both cases evaluation rests with the Science Committee and the Expert Panels. Further details of the programme can be accessed at www.nato.int/science/index.html.

6. What Does the Future Hold? The NATO Public Diplomacy Division has evolved from a distinguished past into a present with different priorities in view of the changing international scene. It seeks to influence military and defence strategies as well as broader foreign policy, and to enhance security in member states and partner countries. Member nations need to ensure that its appointed representatives can speak with an independent voice on scientific matters for all the reasons outlined at the beginning of this paper. This will help to ensure that decisions and policies are informed by the best advice on science and technology. Not only does the NATO PDD need demonstrably good scientists; it needs demonstrably impartial ones. Historically, they came from academia and from independent people, namely, those with independent means who owed no allegiance to anyone. The supply of truly independent bench scientists is threatened by policies energetically pursued in many countries to drive academia and industry together. This is not a minor matter. Academic biologists and corporate researchers have often become indistinguishable with special awards being given by governments for collaborations between the two sectors for behaviour that used to be cited as a conflict of interest. Efforts are now made either to avoid or to document potential conflicts of interest so that the nature of the advice is transparent and not called into question. The total budget for the NATO Science for Peace and Security programme is small (€12m and declining each year) and represents around 5% of the total civil NATO budget. This has forced a serious contraction of the opportunities for NATO-sponsored research, much of which was driven by scientific curiosity in its formative years but is now highly targeted. Many Ambassadors representing NATO nations have yet to come to terms with the importance of civil science at the centre of policies for security as indicated by the gradual erosion of funding for the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme. They and their paymasters are still wedded to the view that science and technology are required only for bigger bombs and faster and more dangerous planes, a task assigned to the Research and Technology Organisation (RTO)


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based in Paris. The impact of this has been to push the civil science of NATO towards weapons and military security rather than responding to the immense opportunities of NATO science directed towards improving civil society and the removal of inequities which are often the root of terrorism NATO-EU collaboration has a low profile but the limited funding available for science in NATO could be used more effectively to counter international terrorism through greater collaborative efforts. The current programme of the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission overlaps substantially with that of NATO yet there is negligible collaboration. Similarly, the NATO PDD, working closely with the NATO Research and Technology Organisation and others (e.g. OECD) could help to ensure responsible stewardship that avoids the potential abuse of dual-use research. The NATO Research and Technology Organisation promotes and conducts cooperative scientific research and exchange of technical information amongst 26 NATO nations and 38 NATO partners. It is the largest such collaborative body in the world, and encompasses over 3000 scientists and engineers addressing the complete scope of defence technologies and operational domains. This effort is supported by an executive agency, the Research and Technology Agency (RTA), which facilitates the collaboration by organising a wide range of studies, workshops, symposia, and other fora in which researchers can meet and exchange knowledge [11]. With the shift in the NATO Science Committee’s priorities towards military and defence strategies there is a strong case to be made for an urgent examination of the two initiatives to ensure they are either well-integrated or merged since it is now well over a decade since NATO’s civil science programme was reviewed by a high level team. Many believe that the time is right for this exercise to be repeated in a way that encompasses the role of the RTO and associated organizations, recognizes the key role of science and technology in global security and stability, and acknowledges that fresh instruments and organisations may be needed for the twenty first century.

Acknowledgements I am deeply indebted to Dr Peter Collins at the Royal Society, London and to Dr Keith Gardner, former Assistant Secretary General, and Dr Chris De Wispelaere at NATO Headquarters, Brussels for their invaluable help in preparing this paper.

References [1] [2]

http://www.nato.int/science/index.html (last accessed 2 January 2009). http://www.ipsos-mori.com/content/polls-07/doctors-still-top-the-poll-as-most-trusted-profess.ashx (last accessed 2 January 2009). [3] D. Kennedy, Intelligence Science: Reverse Peer Review, Science 303 (2004), 1945. [4] http://www.dius.gov.uk/~/media/publications/F/file9767 (last recovered 12 May 2009). [5] J.T. Rosenbaum, Lessons from litigation over silicone breast implants: a call for activism by scientists, Science 276 (1997), 1524-1525. [6] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3512195.stm. [7] M.G. Marmot, Evidence based policy or policy based evidence, British Medical Journal 328 (2004), 906-907. [8] J.E. Fenstad, NATO and Science, European Review 17 (2009), 487-497. [9] F. Dyson, Imagined Worlds, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1997. [10] http://www.nato.int/science/about_sps/introduction.htm (last accessed 2 January 2009). [11] http://www.rta.nato.int/ (last accessed 2 January 2009).

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NATO in the Post Cold War Era: Shift of Strategies Noha BAKR Political Science Department, The American University in Cairo, Egypt

Abstract. NATO has gone through a change of strategies in the post Cold War era. It has transformed from a merely military alliance to an active player in the international system confronting a variety of soft and hard threats. NATO’s strategies within Europe have proved more successful than its manifested strategies with the Southern Mediterranean countries through the Mediterranean Dialogue and with the Gulf through the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative. There has been minor success on the political and practical level of both initiatives. Both initiatives have taken place on a bilateral level, but they proved to lack momentum. In fact, there are several obstacles hindering further cooperation between NATO and the Southern Mediterranean and the Gulf Arab countries that require mutual efforts and understanding to overcome. Keywords. Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, Partnership for Peace, NATO Enlargement, Berlin Plus, NATO-Russia Council, ISAF, League of Arab States, African Union.

Introduction European countries that had previously opposed each other have been brought together to form a transatlantic link binding Europe and North America in a unique defense and security alliance against external aggression. The goal of NATO was established in the Washington Treaty as safeguarding the freedom and security of its members by political and military means [1]. NATO was established to counter the risk that the Soviet Union might seek to extend its control over Eastern Europe to other parts of the continent. It provided collective defense for its members and acted as an essential forum for consultation on security issues in the interests of its members. NATO achieved success in its mission in the era of the Cold War. The outbreak of the Korean War confirmed Western worries of the Soviet Union’s expansion ambitions. This led to the presence of North American forces on European soil at the request of European governments with the aim of deterring the Soviet Union. This paper is an attempt to discuss NATO’s transformation of strategies in the post Cold War era within the context of cooperation with Southern Mediterranean and Gulf countries. After the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact dissolved, and the Soviet Union collapsed; this led analysts to debate the need for NATO. Some analysts believed that the need for NATO was diminishing, and the future defense expenditure and investment in armed forces could be dramatically reduced in favor of development. Others advocated that the end of the Cold War might have removed the direct threat of military invasion by the Soviet Union, but that this was replaced by other challenges, such as those from within Europe due to instability in some parts, rooted in ethnic tension. Dealing with

N. Bakr / NATO in the Post Cold War Era: Shift of Strategies

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the latter would require a peace support and crisis management role from NATO. In addition to challenges from outside Europe due to the existence of failed states, there is the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and also the specter of these weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. There is also the problem of terrorism itself [2]. In addition, globalization has its disadvantages as well as its advantages. The disadvantages include not only transnational terrorism, organized crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, but also asymmetric threats from proxy actors or the abuse of financial and energy leverage. Furthermore, illegal migration continues to provide challenges across the world, and dramatic diseases such as HIV/AIDS and SARS have the potential to spread around the world faster than ever before. As time has passed since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, new challenges such as climate change have arisen. Such new challenges make the future less predictable, and are leading to a whole new type of politics – one predicated, perhaps more than ever, on our collective future. The challenge of energy security continues to absorb the world as the demand of individual nations increases, and the weakening of the international market infrastructure for energy distribution makes the situation more precarious than ever. A further challenge confronting the international system is the threat of religious fanatics. The cliché that the events of September 11, 2001 changed everything may be an exaggeration, but the attacks of that day undoubtedly changed the American and European peoples’ understanding of the world. There is also the threat of population imbalance with the increase in population of the developing nations. For example, in 2000, the population of Europe was 0.74 of that of North Africa. The development of these various challenges has led to a transformation of NATO’s strategies since the Cold War.

1. NATO’s Transformation of Strategies in the Post Cold War Era NATO had to find a new balance between addressing its traditional role centered in Europe, and tackling new global changes and threats. Transformations of strategies had to be initiated through enlargement of membership, effective cooperation with the European Union and Partnership for Peace, opening alliances with new countries, crises management, fighting threats beyond the European Atlantic areas, and cooperation with Southern Mediterranean and Gulf Countries [2]. 1.1. NATO Transformation of Strategies within Europe NATO has confronted challenges within Europe in the post Cold War era through various strategies. First, the enlargement of membership. The founding members of NATO in 1949 were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and the United States. In 1952 Greece and Turkey joined, to be followed in 1955 by the Federal Republic of Germany and Spain in 1982. After the end of the Cold War, enlargement of membership of NATO was encouraged, based on the assumption that the members willing to join should be enrolled in the Membership Action Plan, with no guarantees of their ultimate acceptance as NATO members [3].

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States wishing to join NATO have to achieve the following: have a democratic political system; operate a market economy; respect persons belonging to national minorities; resolve all outstanding disputes with neighbors; commit to the peaceful settlement of disputes generally; have the ability and willingness to make a military contribution to alliances; be able to achieve interoperability with other member forces. And the proper functioning of civilian-military relations should be in line with democratic standards. Post Cold War, the enlargement of membership took place as follows. In 1999 the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined, followed in 2002 after the Prague summit by Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. In 2004 Slovenia joined, resulting in 26 members [4]. This was followed in 2008 by the acceptance of two further European countries, Croatia and Albania. The second transformation in NATO’s strategies brought cooperation with the European Union. After the Cold War the European allies and Canada had not made the investment needed to adapt their military capabilities to new security challenges. The European allies remained dependent on the USA in many key areas such as air lift capabilities required for rapid deployment of military forces, satellite communications, and other areas of advanced technological capabilities. This was brought into sharp focus during the Balkans conflict of the 1990s when in Kosovo most sorties were undertaken by American aircraft. This led to the need to strengthen ties with the European Union. In 1999 the European Union and NATO agreed to establish a strategic partnership in order to strengthen their defense capabilities. NATO and the European Union published a joint declaration in December 2002 on their evolving strategic partnership. In March 2003 both agreed on a series of documents on cooperation in crisis management, including an agreement known as Berlin Plus. Berlin Plus can be illustrated as follows: NATO uses its assets and capabilities for EU-led operations, giving substance to the strategic partnership and opening the way for coordinated action. NATO and the European Union have also concluded an agreement aimed at ensuring consistency, transparency, and mutual reinforcement in development of capability requirements common to the two organizations. Third in the context of NATO’s transformation of strategies within Europe is the Partnership for Peace. This process was initiated in the 1990s, when allied leaders extended a hand of friendship across the former East-West divide, proposing a new cooperative relationship with countries of Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. The individual partner program is jointly developed between NATO and each partner country. The process of building security through peace has developed historically and institutionally. In 1991, the North Atlantic Council (later re-named the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) was established. This provides the principal forum for consultation and cooperation between NATO and non-member countries in the Euro-Atlantic area, and for building trust. This was followed by the 1994 initiative of the Partnership for Peace (PFP). This is a major program of practical bilateral cooperation between NATO and individual partners. The partnership includes 30 countries and involves 32 activities. It aims to assist participating countries in restructuring their armed forces, and to enable them to play their role in democratic societies. It also allows partners to participate in NATO-led peacekeeping operations, and other crisis management actions. This program has contributed significantly to cooperation between countries participating in peacekeeping forces such as the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Kosovo Force (KFOR). PFP activities range from military exercises to workshops, seminars and training courses to enable military forces to be


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transparent and subject to proper democratic oversight and control. The PFP program also assists in civil emergency planning and is tailored to each of the 30 partners’ needs. On the other hand the partner countries must make a number of political commitments. These commitments are: to preserve a democratic society, to maintain principles of international law, to fulfil obligations under the UN charter, to fulfil their obligations of human rights, to fulfil their obligations under the Helsinki Final Act and international disarmament and arms control agreements, to refrain from the threat or use of force against other states, to settle disputes peacefully, to promote transparency in national defense planning, to respect existing borders, to establish democratic control over armed forces, and to develop the capacity for joint action with NATO in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations [5]. Fourthly, NATO has set up alliances with new countries such as Russia and Ukraine. In 1996 Russia and NATO cooperated to develop a capacity for joint action in response to civil emergencies such as earthquakes and floods, and to coordinate the detection and prevention of disasters before they occur, leading to the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center in 1998 [6]. From 1996 to 2003 Russia worked alongside NATO in the Balkans, contributing the largest nonNATO UN-mandated peacekeeping forces. In 1997 the basis for a strong and durable partnership between NATO and Russia was provided by the creation of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), leading to regular consultation on common security issues and cooperation. However, the Kosovo air campaign by NATO that was undertaken without a Security Council resolution that Russia could have vetoed in 1977 led to a year’s interruption of PJC meetings, but peacekeeping in Bosnia and Hergovina continued without interruption. In 1998 scientific and technological cooperation between Russia and NATO focused on plasma physics, plant biotechnology, and the forecasting and prevention of natural and industrial catastrophes. After September 11, in the Rome Summit of May 2002, the NATO Russia Council (NRC) was established to replace the PJC [7]. The NRC created several working groups and committees on terrorism, proliferation, peacekeeping, missile defense, airspace management, and defense reform in the shape of training equipment and the management of human and financial resources. Cooperation against proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and of the spread of ballistic missile technology, was instituted. A cooperative airspace initiative was established to hinder the abuse of civilian aircraft by terrorists. Cooperation on rescue at sea was also initiated after the Russian nuclear submarine Kursk was lost with its crew. In 2003 the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society was established under NRC to handle environment protection problems caused by civilian and military activities [8]. NATO cut off formal ties with Moscow in the aftermath of the August 2008 war, as this war was seen as a solid signal of Russia’s shift of attitude towards sovereign borders, and involved the disproportionate use of force. NATO-Russia relations have been further strained by the possibility of NATO granting Georgia membership, which is viewed by Russia as interfering in its domain of power influence. However, the options of gradual and conditional re-engagement between Russia and NATO are open as a path to restore trust. In fact, most Western European countries, dependent on Russia for oil and especially natural gas, have been eager to resume relations with Moscow, and the United States would not object to a gradual, phased re-engagement between NATO and Russia [9]. Ukraine is a further example of NATO opening alliances with new countries in Europe. In 1991 Ukraine joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council immediately

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after independence and the break-up of the Soviet Union. Ukraine has over the years contributed to NATO-led peacekeeping forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It provides overflight clearance for coalition forces deployed as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and sent 1800 troops to the Polish-led multinational force in Iraq. NATO in return assists Ukraine through advice and practical assistance to achieve the reform agenda set out in NATO-Ukraine Action Plans. It helps Ukraine to have a small modern and more efficient force through a joint Working Group on Defense Reform (JWGDR) that assists in defense budgeting and planning, military downsizing and conversion, transition from conscription to volunteer forces, civil military relations, and cooperation in civil emergencies. In addition, Ukraine’s western parts are prone to heavy floods, so NATO provides assistance to improve preparations for such events and to manage their consequences. In addition there is cooperation in science and technology, including information technologies, cell biology, biotechnology, new materials and the rational use of natural resources. In 2002 the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan was initiated. This provides intensified consultations on political, economic, and defense issues. It sets out Ukraine’s strategic objectives and priorities on the road towards full integration in Euro-Atlantic Security Structures. Within this alliance relationship, NATO supports reforms through assistance and advice. However, the burden for implementation falls primarily on Ukraine. There is a need to strengthen democracy, the rule of law, human rights, the country’s market economy and its defense and security sector, and annual target plans include specific measures, and assessment meetings [10]. Fifth in NATO’s transformation of strategies within Europe is NATO’s crisis management in the Balkans area. This transformation of strategies illustrates how NATO crisis management has been transformed to accomplish the securing and ending of hostilities, launching attacks to bring peace, and adapting prevention strategies to bring stability to a failed state. In the Balkans NATO’s involvement in such operations has called for increased contacts and cooperation with non-NATO troop-contributing countries as well as with other organizations. As for Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO supported UN efforts to end the Bosnia war between 1992 and 1995, and deployed a UN-mandated multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) to Bosnia and Herzegovina six days after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord to implement military aspects of that peace agreement. The mission has aimed to secure and end hostilities and to separate the opposing armed forces. The Force completed its work within a year and was replaced by a smaller stabilization force (SFOR) in December 1996 that continued to be reduced in numbers. NATO also launched an air campaign on Kosovo. It took 78 days to force the Milosevic regime to end its repression and agree to the demands of the international community. The Kosovo Force (KFOR) was deployed to deter renewed hostilities, to establish a secure environment, to demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army, and to support humanitarian efforts and the work of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Several political analysts have marked this move as the start of a reduction in the role of the United Nations in the international system, as NATO launched this attack without the Security Council resolution that was granted only after the launch to give legitimacy to the use of force, In early 2001, a Prevention Strategy to help bring about the peaceful resolution of an armed conflict in Southern Serbia was established by NATO, as Albanians were ruled directly by Serbians and lacked political and social rights. The NATO team accompanied by a European Union representative helped negotiate a ceasefire and


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establish direct channels of communications between the Serbian authorities and the ethnic Albanian armed forces. It also assisted in integrating an Albanian political structure, returning refugees to their homes, and it organized local elections in August 2002. Further NATO efforts took place in Macedonia when in 2002 ethnic Albanian armed groups challenged the authorities. NATO condemned armed attacks, urging the government to pursue constitutional reforms to address Albanian grievances. The NATO Secretary General played a key role. NATO was requested to a keep a small force in the country to contribute to the protection of the observers [11]. NATO has also responded to civil emergencies such as accidents involving chemicals or toxic spills, floods, earthquakes and disasters, whether man-made or natural, and has managed the consequences of terrorist attacks. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Capability was established in June 1999. It acts as a focal point for information sharing and coordinates response among NATO and partner countries to disasters in the Euro-Atlantic area, such as the important responses to major floods in Ukraine, Romania, Hungary, Albania, and the Czech Republic, the Turkish earthquake in 1999, and forest fires in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. NATO also contributed to humanitarian relief operations during the Kosovo refugee crisis, and worked closely with UN agencies including the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and The Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees [12]. 1.2. NATO’s Transformation of Strategies External to the Euro-Atlantic Area The NATO shift of strategies was also manifested outside the Euro-Atlantic area, sustaining operations over distance and time, and playing a major role in curbing and fighting terrorism and its after-effects. The Prague Summit in 2002 set in motion a transformation to ensure NATO’s ability to deal with security challenges in the 21st century by combating terrorism through developing a military concept against terrorism and agreeing on a partnership action plan. It stated its willingness to act in support of the international community [13]. NATO took the decision in May 2002 to take its first mission beyond the EuroAtlantic area in Afghanistan, as a new strategy for crisis management. The Alliance agreed in August 2002 to take command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help bring stability to a failed state. This mission established the principle of NATO handling crises outside the Euro-Atlantic area. This required forces to move quickly to wherever they were needed and to sustain operations over distance and time. ISAF was first limited to Kabul, but later a UN Security Council resolution authorized the expansion of operations beyond Kabul. ISAF assumed military command of a substantial number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) which help to stabilize the region. At the Istanbul Summit in 2004, a comprehensive strategy for NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan was agreed, in close consultation with other international organizations and the Afghan transitional authority. According to the Istanbul 2004 Summit, ISAF accomplishments in Afghanistan included developing legitimate political institutions, fighters being gradually disarmed and their weapons placed in secure sites, and the area being secured for reconstruction projects, which improve the daily life of many citizens [14]. NATO forces in Afghanistan have been there for the last seven years, exerting efforts to overcome the Taliban extremists, and control drug plantations. Unfortunately neither goal has been met with success at the time of writing as the authority of NATO forces is limited to Kabul and drug plantations have shown no decline. Within the

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context of NATO’s transformation of strategy to take missions beyond the EuroAtlantic area, NATO agreed to support the Polish-led multinational divisions in central Iraq by assembling the forces, logistics, communications and intelligence. Further efforts by NATO to fight terrorism are taking place in a number of areas. First, they are manifested in enhanced intelligence sharing and cooperation. Secondly, NATO supports blanket overflight clearance and access to ports and airfields for US and other allied craft for operations against terrorism. Thirdly, naval forces have been deployed in the Eastern Mediterranean. Individual allies are contributing according to their resources and capabilities. In response to UN requests, NATO’s assistance includes military support, as well as legal and financial measures to cut the flow of revenue to terrorist organizations. It also includes active operations: NATO ships have been patrolling the Eastern Mediterranean, monitoring ships to deter any terrorist activity, and escorting non-military shipping upon request [15]. Within the context of its transformation of strategies that are external to the EuroAtlantic area, NATO plays a role in work on science and the environment. Two distinct NATO programs bring together scientists and experts on a regular basis. First, the Civil Science Pogramme of the NATO Science Committee that has existed for 45 years is now focusing on defense against terrorism or countering other threats to security. Its name has changed to ‘Security through Science’ [16]. Secondly there is the Environment and Society Program of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS). The CCMS deals with problems of the environment and society by bringing together national agencies to collaborate on pilot studies in these areas. It addresses scientific and environmental communities in Russia, Ukraine, and the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. Its domain of work covers noise pollution, urban problems, and energy, human health, defense-related environmental problems such as land formerly used for military purposes, clean-up methodology, and environmental security with regard to oil pipelines [17]. 1.3. NATO Transformation of Strategies with Southern Mediterranean and Gulf Countries Cooperation between NATO and the Southern Mediterranean and Gulf countries is taking place in two main programs: first, the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, and second, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. This transformation was governed by NATO self interest in promoting security in the areas of WMD proliferation, terrorism, interstate conflict, failed States, immigration, and civil war. “From a conceptual standpoint, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue may be defined as a key instrument in support of the Alliance’s overall strategy of partnership, dialogue, and cooperation. This was clearly outlined in the 1999 Strategic Concept, the document describing the security environment and the ways in which NATO addresses threats faced by member states, which elevated partnership into a fundamental security task of the Alliance” [18]. In 1995 NATO launched a dialogue with six Mediterranean countries: Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, and later, in 2000, Algeria. In 1997 the establishment of a Mediterranean Cooperation Group gave the Dialogue a more dynamic direction, providing a forum in which views can be exchanged between NATO member states and Dialogue members. In 1999 at the Washington Summit, further steps were taken to enhance both the political and practical dimensions of the Dialogue. After 11 September NATO and Dialogue countries met more frequently for


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consultations with the North Atlantic Council, both individually and as groups. At the Prague Summit of 2002 Alliance leaders agreed a package of measures to increase the political and practical dimensions of the Dialogue in aspects of crisis response operations, defense reforms, consultation on terrorism and disaster management. The Mediterranean Dialogue involves political dialogue as well as practical cooperation. First, in the political dialogue all Mediterranean partners are offered the same basis for discussion and joint activities, but the level of participation varies from country to country according to their wishes. It consists of bilateral political discussions at ambassadorial level, and multilateral meetings of the North Atlantic Council to provide briefing on NATO’s activities and to exchange views on topical events. Political diplomacy is a fundamental pillar, through workshops, activities, and visits to NATO headquarters by military personnel, parliamentarians and academics. Meetings with the Southern Mediterranean members of the dialogue occur at different levels to discuss regional issues and NATO relations with the member concerned [19]. Secondly, practical cooperation involves an annual work program that includes invitations to officials from Dialogue countries to participate in courses at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany, and the Defense College in Rome. Such courses cover: peacekeeping issues, arms control efforts, efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental protection, civilian-military cooperation in civil emergencies, European security cooperation, and visits of opinion leaders, academics, journalists, and parliamentarians from Dialogue countries to NATO. The military dimension provides opportunities for officials from Dialogue countries to observe PFP exercises and seminars, and to visit NATO’s headquarters. NATO standing Naval forces in the Mediterranean visit ports in Dialogue countries. The number of joint activities between NATO and Southern Mediterranean countries has been increasing, covering 27 distinct areas ranging from ordinary military contact to exchange of information on maritime security and anti-terrorism, access to educational programs provided by Alliance institutions, and finally to joint crisis management exercises [18]. In 2002, 300 officials from Dialogue countries participated in over 50 different activities. Egypt, Jordan and Morocco have in the past contributed to the NATO-led peacekeeping mission in the Balkans. A program was established to clear Jordan’s border with Israel of the mines that had accumulated there over several decades. An increasing number of Partner countries participate in Operation Active Endeavor, launched by the Alliance immediately after the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, in order to monitor maritime and air traffic in the Mediterranean as part of the international campaign against terrorism. Scientific cooperation has taken place since 2000: more than 800 scientists from dialogue countries have been involved in NATOsponsored scientific activities [19]. At the Istanbul Summit of 2004 a more ambitious and expanded framework for the Mediterranean Dialogue was agreed. This expansion took place through cooperative efforts via joint public diplomacy initiatives, promoting democratic control of armed forces, facilitating transparency in national defense planning and budgeting, combating terrorism via effective intelligence sharing and maritime cooperation, contributing to Alliance work on weapons of mass destruction, cooperation in the area of civil emergency planning and cooperation through participation in selected military exercises and related education and training activities. NATO has 32 activities within the PFP; Mediterranean countries are offered 31 out of these 32. It is up to the Mediterranean country to choose from these possible activities,

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for example civil emergency, civilian-military relations, airspace management, defense economics, defense budgeting. Of the 31 activities 70% are military oriented, such as military medicine, military education, and military exercises. NATO doesn’t require Mediterranean countries to fulfil the conditions that were required from Eastern European states in the PFP. The reason for NATO not imposing these conditions is that the Mediterranean countries will not eventually be part of the European Union or NATO [4]. In 2004 NATO leaders launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), a separate but complementary programme to promote practical cooperation within countries in the broader Middle East, beginning with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). NATO focuses on Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. ICI provides tailored advice on defense reform, budgeting, planning, civilian-military relations, and there is participation in selected military exercises and related education and training activities. ICI is involved in fighting terrorism including information sharing, and maritime cooperation and civil emergency planning; it has already shared in a NATO-led operation with the United Arab Emirates in Kosovo [20]. On the regional institutional level, NATO-African Union relations have witnessed limited cooperation. Following a request by the African Union (AU) on 26 April 2005, NATO has helped the AU expand its peacekeeping mission in Darfur. It provided air lift into the region for additional AU peacekeepers in July 2005: this included air transport for 31,500 peacekeeping troops and civilian personnel. Moreover, NATO is training 250 AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) officials in how to run a multinational military headquarters and to manage information effectively. As for NATO-AU joint efforts concerning Somalia, a country that suffers from lack of an effective government, making it an inviting target for terrorist groups, NATO has been offering the African Union assistance to approach this crisis, as after Al Qaeda lost its safe haven in Afghanistan there are concerns that it might attempt to relocate to Somalia. The AU requested from NATO air lift support to the AU mission in Somalia and assistance to the African Stand-by Force. NATO responded positively. It implemented its support with minimum footprint and with coordination with the UN and the EU and bilateral partners to ensure maximum complementarity and effectiveness. As for the League of Arab States, NATO-Arab League relations are manifested through the cooperation of the countries that are involved with the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue or the ICI, or are members of the League of Arab States or the African Union. There are no regular relations between NATO and the League of Arab States, although in November 2008 there were signs of expected cooperation between NATO and the League of Arab States as the Secretary General of the League visited NATO’s headquarters in Brussels and exchanged thoughts with NATO’s Secretary General for the first time in both organizations’ histories.

2. Obstacles to NATO Strategies for Further Cooperation with Southern Mediterranean and Gulf Countries The Mediterranean Dialogue has not been a great success; it has the limited number of seven countries and played no significant role in stabilizing the region because of several obstacles arising from the Southern Mediterranean as well as from the NATO perspective. On the NATO level, there is still no consensus within the organization on the precise role it should play with Arab countries or the challenges that must be met. It


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is also unclear whether NATO member states are willing to devote the defense resources necessary for the Alliance’s missions to continue to expand both geographically and functionally. A number of European countries believe that an overly strong and active NATO is an impediment to the development of the European Union as a global political and strategic actor. The institutional regional cooperation between the League of Arab States and NATO, and between NATO and the African Union, is confronted with obstacles. First, there is still no consensus within NATO on the precise role it should play with the League of Arab States and African Union, or on the major challenges that must be met. It also remains unclear if Arab league and AU state members will be willing to accept NATO’s long term involvement, as they fear experience with former colonial powers and more recently the USA. Secondly, public opinion partially views NATO’s initiative as a tool for Western pressure or control, or worse a tool to give Israel leverage through cooperating with NATO. Lastly, there is a high degree of ignorance about NATO’s shift of strategies after the Cold War. From the viewpoints of the Southern Mediterranean and Gulf countries there is a lack of investment of time, people and money, as well as a lack of the mechanisms necessary for dialogue and cooperation on which the success of NATO and the Partnership for Peace is based. Arab countries have specific needs that were not taken into consideration, such as assistance in clearing the Southern Mediterranean countries from land mines. Furthermore NATO has not made diplomatic efforts to free the area of weapons of mass destruction, with Israel being the only state in the area that has not joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Southern Mediterranean and Gulf countries view as essential NATO’s assistance in the refugee problem resulting from the invasion of Iraq, or from civil wars. There is a strong belief from the Southern Mediterranean perspective that NATO directs its attention to the Arab countries only when a security problem to NATO members arises, regardless of the Arab countries’ needs and requests on the practical level. A further obstacle is the fact that Europe and the United States seem to believe that political dialogue, discussions and information exchange must be the starting point for a relationship to build confidence and stimulate constructive cooperation. By contrast, Arab Dialogue countries prefer to start with hard issues, especially those relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Inability to decouple wider regional security issues from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is also a major obstacle confronting NATO-Mediterranean dialogue and the ICI. NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, regularly reiterates the three indispensable conditions for NATO engagement in the Arab-Israeli conflict: 1. 2. 3.

The existence of a real peace accord between the parties. A UN Security Council mandate for intervention. An official request by the parties for Alliance intervention.

However, the Southern Mediterranean and Gulf countries feel that NATO can play the role of the ‘honest broker’: it could help to negotiate, and then enforce, a sophisticated security package. There are several obstacles confronting defense cooperation of NATO through the ICI and the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue. First, such defense cooperation is a sensitive issue in the Arab world, as it can lead to exposing confidential national security, or strengths or weaknesses, to NATO members that they might use in the

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future against the country in the Dialogue or an ally country. For example, the following possible sequence of events causes concern: x x x

Country X trains with NATO. Country X has country Y as an ally. NATO uses expertise or knowledge gained to attack X or Y.

Secondly, military commanders of the Gulf countries are members of the Royal families; this might hinder cooperation in military reform programs. Thirdly, the Mediterranean Dialogue includes Israel and Arab countries, and due to pan-Arabism on one level, public opinion on another and fear of terrorism on a third level, Southern Mediterranean states will not be willing to cooperate on an operational level. Concerning interoperability between NATO and ICI, NATO has been successful with countries that are less important to NATO, i.e. the GCC. As the Initiative lacks operability in both Saudi Arabia and Oman, Saudi Arabia (unlike the GCC) sees that Gulf security policy cannot be guaranteed by the West, but only locally. GCC geographical land and military capabilities do not give much opportunity for interoperability [21]. For NATO to play a role in Southern Mediterranean and Gulf Countries it is also confronted by harsh political repression in some countries in the Southern Mediterranean and the Gulf, economic stagnation as well as fanaticism in parts of the region, and fears of cultural decline and Western cultural invasion. Public opinion partially views NATO’s initiative as a tool for Western pressure or control, or worse as a tool to give Israel leverage through cooperating with NATO. To enhance further cooperation with the Arab world there are several measures that need to be taken by NATO. NATO should work out arrangements with Southern Mediterranean and Gulf countries that are modeled on the Partnership for Peace Programme with former Soviet block countries. These arrangements should be tailored to the levels and terms that each of Southern Mediterranean and Gulf countries view as acceptable and as meeting their needs. In addition to transparency and confidence-building measures, the model of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council can be followed in its patterns and its policies for building trust. The Partnership for Peace provides a model of the kind of framework necessary to support engagement, primarily because it is a mechanism capable of great flexibility. There is almost total ignorance among the lay population, and even in certain governments in the Southern Mediterranean and Gulf region, about the true nature of NATO’s shift of strategies in the post Cold War era. As a result, a long-term broad based information and communication programme is needed. This requires active engagement not only of government bodies, but also non-governmental organizations, youth exchange programs, and the development of a mechanism and channel for NATO to convey its messages more clearly through websites in appropriate languages, and visual aids. More transparency and clarity about NATO’s goals, objectives and missions are needed [22]. Southern Mediterranean and Gulf Countries need and want to get their voices heard, and to be influencing NATO’s decision making. So NATO needs to listen and understand in order to comprehend the needs of the region. Any mechanism dealing with the Arab world must include cooperative offers on many levels based on the proven PFP principle of self-differentiation. It should be clear to NATO that some of the PFP requirements for democratization, governance and modernization might not be


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applicable in the Arab region. The countries of the region will choose different paths towards democracy and modernization, and will move with different speeds. Countries will resent any demands or conditions that appear culturally imperialistic, or to be undermining their state sovereignty [22]. NATO policies in the Mediterranean Dialogue and ICI must reflect the Arab world’s needs and wants. If offers are seen as ‘top-down’ proposals they will most likely be ignored. A successful relationship with NATO is likely to develop first along bilateral lines, and only secondly in a subregional collective forum, as many states have serious tensions with their own neighbors. Scientific cooperation, and cooperation in civil emergency, are ideal mechanisms of soft security cooperation and a good way to melt the ice between NATO on one hand and Southern Mediterranean countries on the other. Through a scientific cooperation program NATO will be in a good position to generate interest and debate in the region on new security issues that pose a common threat. This cooperation could be considered a source of soft security, as NATO scientists can visit the region and expand their own expertise and stimulate bilateral engagement by academic institutions in allied countries. Cooperation in civil emergencies is another source of soft security. A model of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination that was established in 1998 can be copied and used as a source of bilateral cooperation with Arab countries. It can function on bilateral basis as a capacity for joint action in response to civil emergencies, such as earthquakes and coordinated detection and prevention of disasters before they occur, and refugee problems. On the regional institutional level, its successful record as a highly institutionalized structure that was able to adapt to changes in the international situation puts NATO in an excellent position to help provide creative proposals for reforming the League of Arab States. A good example of cooperation with the League of Arab States can be through first offering assistance to the newly established organ in the organization named the Arab Peace and Security Council. This was initiated in the League of Arab States at the Riyadh Summit of 2007, and its role is to prevent and manage crises. To be effective this Council requires a data bank, and warning mechanisms, and NATO can assist in the logistics here. Secondly, the League of Arab States intends to set up peacekeeping forces [23]. Here NATO can assist in offering its logistics experience. Thirdly the League of Arab States has recently also recognized the importance of cooperating with civil society; NATO can assist here also by offering its past experience in this field. Fourthly, NATO can cooperate with the League of Arab States, as the latter has lately introduced efforts to explore the conditions of human security of its members. Within this context NATO can offer its experience in dealing with light and small weapons, and the abuse of women and children in times of conflict. Last but not least, cooperation between the two regional organizations can take place by avoiding duplication of existing efforts such as the Barcelona process established by the European Union in 1995, the ‘5+5’ security and defense initiative set up in 2000, and the Mediterranean Union project which came into being in July 2008 when France took over the presidency of the European Union. Enhanced cooperation with the European Union is indispensable to avoid competition, or duplication of other initiatives towards the Mediterranean or the Gulf area: ensuring cooperation and coordination is essential. Within the context of fighting terrorism, the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and ICI are confronted by the lack of agreement on the definition of terrorism. In order not to confuse the concept of terrorists with freedom fighters, or terrorism with the right of

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self defense, it is highly recommended that NATO sponsor an international conference based on the initiatives of Egypt and Tunisia – it is vital that we have a unified definition of terrorism and a code of conduct in fighting against terrorism. As part of the cooperative efforts to curb terrorism between NATO, the Mediterranean Dialogue and ICI, shared anti-terrorism training courses on operational and tactical levels are also highly recommended. Developing strategies of understanding terrorist organizations, tactics, doctrine, communications, ideology and personalities can help NATO, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the ICI produce an appropriate strategy and organization to detect, deter and defeat terrorist networks in the context of Security Council resolutions 1373, 1540, & 1566. In fact, it is important for NATO to coordinate its actions with the UN more closely, because the Mediterranean Dialogue countries, as well as the Gulf countries, are likely to take part in NATO’s future stabilization operations, or any suggested cooperation action if it is systematically based on UN Security Council resolutions. Last but not least, NATO has its own principles for decision making, but it can also develop effective mechanisms for involving the League of Arab States and the African Union in decision making through constructive consultative transparent dialogue which will enrich cooperation on the regional level.

3. Conclusion To conclude, NATO’s shift of strategies in the post Cold War era within Europe has proved more successful than have its strategies manifested in the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Within Europe, NATO has enlarged its membership, taken cooperative measures with the European Union, made alliances with European non-NATO members, and taken a vital positive stand in crisis management, dealing with civil emergencies and collaborating in science and environmental issues. NATO has also taken further activities beyond the EuropeanAtlantic area in Iraq and Afghanistan. NATO has taken cooperative measures with the Southern Mediterranean countries and the Gulf countries. The reason behind this shift of strategy is the border between the Southern European NATO members and the Mediterranean countries; security and stability in the Mediterranean is therefore necessary for Europe. In addition is the fact that the Gulf countries as well as the Southern Mediterranean ones are vital to NATO. NATO clearly has a strong self interest in promoting security in the areas of WMD proliferation, terrorism, and interstate conflict; in the problems of crises resulting from failed States spilling over borders; in illegal immigration from the south of the Mediterranean to the north; and in the high probability of civil wars in the area also spilling over borders. The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and the ICI have accomplished positive achievements on the practical and political levels. The number of high level meetings and joint activities has increased. The NATO Secretary General has visited all the Mediterranean Dialogue countries. In addition there are signs of success on a regional level in cooperation between NATO and the African Union. However there are obstacles and challenges confronting a future cooperative role with Mediterranean and Gulf countries on the bilateral and regional organizational levels. The future for the Mediterranean Dialogue and the ICI will depend on what policy choices concerning the Middle East are made by the NATO members, who are viewed


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by some Southern Mediterranean and Gulf countries to be governed solely by NATO members’ self interests. In addition success will depend on the partners’ degree of commitment and determination to eliminate their rivalries and work together in a transparent dialogue and not a monologue approach.

References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18]

[19] [20] [21]

[22]

[23]

North Atlantic Treaty 1949. Available at http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/treaty.htm. NATO Transformed, NATO, Brussels, 2004. Available at http://www.nato.int/docu/nato-trans/natotrans-eng.pdf. Istanbul Summit expands operations, strengthens partnerships, improves capabilities. NATO, Brussels: http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2004/06-istanbul/. M.M. Orfy, The New NATO, Its Survival and Resilience, Author House, Milton Keynes, UK, 2007. NATO’s relations with the European Union. NATO, Brussels, 2009. Available at http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/index.html. The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre, NATO, Brussels, 2008. Available at http://www.nato.int/issues/eadrcc/index.html. NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council Meeting, Press Statement 14 May 2002, NATO, Brussels. Available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p020514e.htm. NATO-Russia Council. See http://www.nato-russia-council.info/htm/EN/index.shtml. Steven Erlanger, Russia and NATO Begin to Re-engage, International Herald Tribune, 20-21 December 2008. NATO - Ukraine relations. See http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-ukraine/index.html. NATO in the Balkans. See http://www.nato.int/issues/balkans/index.html. Standing Operating Procedures for the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit (EADRU). See http://www.nato.int/eadrcc/sop/sop.htm. Prague Summit Declaration 2002. See http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm. NATO’s Role in Afghanistan. See http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/index.html. For information on ISAF see http://www.nato.int/isaf/. Richard Nelson, Expanding NATO’s counter-terrorism role, NATO Review, Autumn 2004. Available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/issue3/english/analysis.html. NATO Science Programme Changes Course. NATO. See http://www.nceai.gov.ua/ download.php?5b0d41c3329f8fe9c735f1741d089628&target=1. See for example NATO CCMS publication: https://www.denix.osd.mil/portal/page/portal/ 40A62DA493224647E040A8C00B161087. Alberto Bin, Enhancing NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, NATO Review, Spring 2003. Available at http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue1/english/art4.html. For more information on the Mediterranean Dialogue see http://www.nato.int/med-dial/home.htm. Pierre Razoux, presentation at El Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, 2008. Mostafa Elwi Saif, lecture on NATO and ICI, The American University in Cairo, April 2008. Noha Bakr, How could NATO engage with the African Union and the Arab League in the Mediterranean Region?, presentation at the MD-ICI International Research Seminar at the NATO Defense College, 6-8 May 2008. Recommendations of Mediterranean Dialogue III Workshop of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, in partnership with the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Malta, 15-19 February 2008. Wael El Assad, lecture at the American University in Cairo, 8 May 2008.

Bibliography Bakr, Noha, Obstacles to Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Five Plus Five Process. Mediterranean Dialogue III Workshop of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, in partnership with the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Malta 15-19 February 2008.

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Bakr, Noha, NATO Dialogue – The Situation in the Middle East, NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperative Initiative, Egyptian Council of Foreign Affairs, Cairo, May 2008. See www.nato.int/med-dial/2008/080525-programme.pdf. Masala, Carlo and Peter Faber, The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative - Possible Next Steps Ahead, NATO Defense College, Rome, Research paper no. 21, p.5, June 2005. Available from http://www.ndc.nato.int/about/search.php?icode=2. Razoux, Pierre, The NATO Mediterranean Dialogue at a crossroads, NATO Defense College, Rome, Research paper no. 35, April 2008. Available from http://www.ndc.nato.int/about/search.php?icode=2.


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The Role of Scientists in Verification Gabriele KRAATZ-WADSACK1 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, New York

Abstract: This chapter illustrates the extent and limitations of inspections and verifications in Iraq and the role of scientists in these processes, especially in the biological weapons area. The unique mandate in Iraq established an intrusive inspection regime for all areas of weapons of mass destruction. Technical experts – in the broader context of the definition of a scientist – provided technical assessments for the United Nations Security Council. Keywords. Scientists, verification, United Nations, Iraq, biological weapons inspections.

Introduction Science and technology play an important role in verification, especially in the selection and application of state-of-the-art technologies. Scientists can make invaluable contributions with respect to choosing the appropriate design and application tools for verification to make it credible. Furthermore, they can advise on how technologies, such as sampling, camera and sensor surveillance can best be applied. Scientists are trained to follow scientific methods and established principles in the gathering of data and in applying such methodologies and sound technical judgement throughout the verification process.

1. Verification Adequate and effective verification requires employment of different techniques, such as national technical means, international means and international procedures, including on-site inspections2. To assess the continuing adequacy and effectiveness of the verification system, an arms limitation and disarmament agreement should provide for procedures and mechanisms for review and evaluation. Where possible, timeframes for such reviews should be agreed in order to facilitate this assessment3. Adequate and effective verification arrangements must be capable of providing, in a timely fashion, clear and convincing evidence of compliance or non-compliance. Continued confirmation of compliance is an essential ingredient to building and maintaining confidence among the parties4. To be adequate and effective, a verification 1 Disclaimer: the views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the United Nations Secretariat. 2 No. 4 of the 16 principles of verification developed by the UN Disarmament Commission [1]. 3 No. 8 of the 16 principles of verification developed by the UN Disarmament Commission [1]. 4 No. 11 of the 16 principles of verification developed by the UN Disarmament Commission [1].

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G. Kraatz-Wadsack / The Role of Scientists in Verification

regime for any agreement must cover all relevant weapons, facilities, locations, installations and activities5. Verification of arms control and disarmament agreements is the process of gathering, compiling and interpreting information to permit a judgment to be made about whether each party is fulfilling its undertakings. Verification systems use a variety of techniques and technologies which are intended to make the system stronger than the sum of its parts [2]. Scientific and expert findings are one important component of this broader political context of verification. Based on day-to-day experience, scientists also assess the limitations of the verification process with a view to addressing shortfalls. These are all vitally important roles which ultimately can assist in risk assessments and ultimately to threat reduction. There is a great respect for scientists for how results are obtained and how scientific evidence provides for conclusions independently from an anticipated result. The term ‘scientist’ in the context of verification is intentionally extended to cover all technical experts, including industrial engineers as well as laboratory personnel. In the case of the Iraq inspections, many countries which provided personnel to the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) did not possess an offensive weapons programme of their own and therefore had no obvious expertise in such a programme. In order to distinguish an offensive from a defensive programme, or biological warfare agent production from vaccine production, the necessary skills required included a knowledge of research and development, production methods, materials and processing equipment for civilian facilities and activities and/or in defense programmes. For this reason, secondment or recruitment from academia, industry and institutions dealing with the protection against biological weapons was a common procedure. A broad range of professionals was seconded to UNSCOM: biologists, construction engineers, explosive ordnance experts, military officers for nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) defense, microbiologists, munitions experts, pharmacologists, production process engineers, veterinarians and many others. Inspectors were expected to detect indicators of a proscribed biological weapons programme, to undertake effective inspections and investigations, to recognize dual-use equipment, to be familiar with biological processes, and to conduct interviews of Iraqi scientists to discover diversion or concealment.

2. Security Council Resolutions and Agreed Modalities for Inspections in Iraq Security Council resolution 687 (1991) required that Iraq destroy, remove or render harmless, under international supervision all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, all related major parts, all repair and production facilities; and in the case of chemical and biological weapons, all weapons, all stocks of agents, all related subsystems, all related components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities. Security Council resolution 715 (1991) [3] approved the plans for future ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) in the chemical, biological and missile areas submitted by the Secretary-General (S/22871/Rev. l) and in the nuclear area by the Director General of the IAEA (S/22872/Rev.1). The OMV plan provided a comprehensive basis and all the rights required for the conduct of effective monitoring, verification and inspection process. The system was designed to be flexible so as to 5

No. 16 of the 16 principles of verification developed by the UN Disarmament Commission [1].


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accommodate continuing modification and be expanded or contracted as circumstances dictated depending on the data regarding Iraq's capabilities. Security Council resolutions 687 (1991) [4], 715 (1991) [3], 707 (1991) [5] also required Iraq to provide full cooperation in all aspects and provide immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access. This included not only access to physical locations but also to personnel and documents as determined by the inspectorate. All resolutions were adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. While Security Council resolution 687 mandated UNSCOM to conduct inspections in Iraq, it was necessary to establish the detailed modalities and legal basis on which such inspections would be conducted. This was achieved through an exchange of letters between the United Nations and Iraq in May 1991 [6] which constituted an agreement under which Iraq was to accord to members of UNSCOM, to officials of the United Nations, the IAEA and specialized agencies of the United Nations system, as well as to technical experts and specialists in Iraq for the purposes of fulfilling the mandate, all rights contained in the relevant provisions of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 1946. As agreed in the exchange of letters, Iraq was also to accord to UNSCOM: “Unrestricted freedom of entry and exit without delay or hindrance of personnel, property, supplies, equipment, spare parts and other items as well as means of transport, including expeditious issuance of entry and exit visas”; “Unrestricted freedom of movement without advance notice within Iraq of the personnel of the Special Commission and its equipment and means of transport”; “The right to unimpeded access to any site or facility for the purpose of the on-site inspection [pursuant to the mandate] whether such a site be above or below ground ... Any number of sites, facilities or locations may be subject to inspection simultaneously”; “The right to request, receive, examine and copy any record, data or information or examine, retain, move or photograph, including videotape, any item relevant to the Special Commission’s activities and to conduct interviews”; “The right to designate any site whatsoever for observation, inspection or other monitoring activity and for storage, destruction or rendering harmless” of the items described in operative paragraphs 8, 9 and 12 of resolution 687; “The right to install equipment or construct facilities for observation, inspection, testing or other monitoring activity and for storage, destruction or rendering harmless” of those items; “The right to take photographs, whether from the ground or from the air, relevant to the Special Commission’s activities”; “The right to take and analyse samples of any kind as well as to remove and export samples for off-site analysis”; and the right to unrestricted communication by radio, satellite or other forms of communication”. Iraq was also to: “Provide at no cost to the United Nations ... all such premises as may be necessary for the accommodation and fulfilment of the functions of the Special Commission”, to be under the exclusive control of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission; and “Without prejudice to the use by the Special Commission of its own security, ... ensure the security and safety of the Special Commission and its personnel”.

3. Biological Inspections and Monitoring during UNSCOM Operations Compared to nuclear and chemical weapons (CW) inspections, biological weapons inspections, verification and monitoring are generally considered the most arduous of all the weapons-related areas. In the biological area, it is much more challenging to

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detect non-compliance with obligations under international treaties or violation of international customary law, especially as there may be no obvious signs of diversion from peaceful to malevolent activities. Containment is not an absolute necessity for the production of biological warfare agents and facilities where prohibited activities may take place can have no tell-tale signatures from the outside. To make it trickier, there are no real choke points or bottlenecks which could be monitored. Many of the biological agents that are known to have been developed for Biological Weapons (BW) may also be of medical value for the advancement of health and living conditions such as for the production of vaccines. In addition, access to biological pathogens is possible from laboratories, hospitals and veterinary clinics or from natural outbreaks of diseases. Although nowadays the possible risks associated with the advances in life sciences, especially in biotechnology, are highlighted, there is no advanced technology required for producing biological warfare agents. In fact, biological warfare agents can be produced in laboratory flasks with little infrastructure. Iraq did so and even weaponized the biological agents which were produced in such flasks. The inspections in Iraq were exceptional in their scope in that the inspection mandate allowed for much more intrusive inspections anytime and anywhere as compared to other inspection regimes. This arrangement was part of the cease-fire agreement imposed on Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War. The United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) and later its successor organization, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), were tasked with implementing this particular inspection mandate. UNSCOM first established and operated the intrusive inspection, monitoring and verification system in the biological, chemical and missile areas in the early 1990s at a time when no international regimes or even procedures existed. In addition, it worked with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with regard to nuclear inspections. In 1996, UNSCOM and IAEA created and implemented the only global export/import monitoring regime covering all areas related to weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles. This uncharted territory required a receptive, open-minded and ingenious approach. Technical experts designed the watch-lists of compounds, equipment and agents to be monitored, and collaborated with Iraqi technical personnel to select methods for the safe destruction of weapons. The experts provided advice on forensic methodologies for use in the verification process and operated a chemical and biological laboratory to screen, analyze or safely package samples for shipment to laboratories outside Iraq. They also undertook interviews and discussions with Iraqi scientists. The biological weapons inspectors, many of them scientists, uncovered a biological weapons programme in Iraq in 1995, which was only disclosed by Iraq when the supporting evidence became overwhelming. The discovery of Iraq’s long concealed programme was made possible due to the data collected during on-site inspection activities, the analysis of Iraq’s declaration and third party information. Subsequently, Iraq admitted to possessing such a programme including the weaponisation of biological warfare agents. At the same time, Iraq declared that all agents and weapons had been unilaterally destroyed in 1991, an action which was in contravention of its obligations under the Security Council resolutions. It was extremely difficult to verify Iraq’s claim in that all weapons, all stocks of agents, all related subsystems, all related components, all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities had been destroyed. Iraq also kept together its core biological weapons staff in one place, first in


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the purpose-built biological weapons facility, Al Hakam, and after the destruction of that facility at the National Monitoring Directorate, which served as the liaison office for UNSCOM inspections. There was also evidence that related “cook-books” for the biological warfare agent production were retained and not destroyed as claimed by Iraq. The arrangement/strategy for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with relevant parts of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) [4], approved by the Security Council in its resolution 715 (1991) [3], states that facilities, equipment, other items and technologies which could be used for the development, construction, modification or acquisition of ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres should be subject to monitoring and verification. Therefore, UNSCOM designed a multi-level, interdisciplinary, comprehensive monitoring system covering chemical, biological and missile research and development, production facilities as well as facilities with related dual-use capabilities. The monitoring system provided for no-notice inspection of facilities by the Baghdad resident monitoring teams; sensor and camera surveillance of critical areas and key production equipment; inventory control by tagging and regular inspection of items and equipment at key dual-use facilities; special inspection teams to address specific issues (e.g. research and development, production activities, interviews); and aerial surveillance. The task of establishing ongoing monitoring and verification in the biological area took longer than in the other weapons areas and the system was only fully operational in April 1995. This was mainly due to the nature and scope of the task which required a broader effort due to the wide scope of the areas that needed to be covered. Furthermore, Iraq’s incomplete, deficient and contradictory declarations about its dualuse capabilities made it more difficult to set up a baseline. In order to establish a comprehensive ongoing monitoring regime in the biological area, an interim monitoring system was put in place as a means of obtaining baseline data. These baseline data included research and development as well as production technologies in order to determine the capabilities of a given facility. The regime included the evaluation and/or inventory of all applied dual-use activities, materials, items and equipment which could contribute to a biological warfare programme and was used to identify those facilities with the highest break-out capability to contribute to such a programme. This also included the assessment of the expertise and technical knowledge of the scientists at these facilities. The monitoring regime was backed up by inspections of sites not under monitoring and not declared by Iraq so as to ensure that no proscribed activities or activities requiring monitoring were undertaken at the site in question, thereby ensuring the comprehensiveness of the monitoring system and identifying any adjustments to the overall monitoring regime. The inspectors monitored Iraq’s basic biological research and development potential, its production capabilities, its stocks of micro-organisms and complex growth media, its routes of acquisition, its crop dusting activities and the whereabouts of its main scientists. All these capabilities were part of a broad range of civilian activities and the monitoring conducted in the biological area was therefore considered by Iraq, and the outside world, as extremely intrusive. The facilities under biological inspections comprised laboratories (found in hospitals, other public health facilities, universities and the food industry), biological production facilities (e.g. single-cell protein production, vaccine production, drug formulation and production, breweries and distilleries), and agricultural sites including crop dusters and sprayers and import

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and supply agencies. The overall monitoring was based on maintaining a comprehensive and accurate inventory of dual-use items and activities in Iraq, primarily through on-site inspections and the maintenance of monitoring and verification protocols for each facility. This involved the identification of newly acquired dual-use equipment, the inventory and tagging of such equipment, the determination of its intended use and the assessment of how such newly acquired capabilities could increase Iraq’s overall biological warfare potential. Due to the dual-use nature in the biological area and in order to ensure the highest practical probability of detection of a proscribed activity, the activities covered under the biological monitoring plan were extensive and wide-ranging as listed below: x x x x x x x x x x x

On-site inspections anytime, anywhere with or without prior notification. Verification of Iraqi site/activity declarations. Interviews with scientists and managers of facilities as well as Government representatives. Audits. Sampling. Remote sensors and cameras with 24 hours surveillance. Document examination. Equipment inventory with tagging and follow up of Iraq’s obligatory 30-day notification of transfers of inventoried items or their modification. Verification of imports or otherwise acquired dual-use materials and equipment and its end-use. Ground Penetration Radar for detection of underground facilities. Aerial surveillance from different level platforms.

In most cases, the starting point for verification was declarations. Iraq had to provide on a regular basis, full, complete, correct and timely information on activities, sites, facilities, materials or other items, both military and civilian, that could be used for purposes prohibited under resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991). These declarations were to be provided every six months and were designed to account for all activities at each facility, list the amount of raw material and equipment in stock and its use. Technical experts from the inspectorate could then assess the capacity and capability of the site as well as the individual expertise of the site personnel. Notifications were required for several areas such as unusual outbreak of diseases or modifications to equipment and facilities or transfer of equipment to other places. Notifications on equipment and facility changes had to be provided 30 days in advance on a non-objections basis. The ongoing monitoring and verification regime was designed on the basis of a presumed legitimate activity and should therefore enable the discovery of anomalies. Inspectors assessed and analyzed the Iraqi declarations, evaluated on-site changes to structures, vicinity and equipment, the selection of types and numbers of professionals on site and the potential for an overall conversion of the declared purpose of the facility. Interviews with site personnel, be it management, scientists or engineers, were conducted, especially with a view to account for activities and processes on site. The interaction with site management and technicians helped to clarify activities and, combined with on-site inspections, was very useful. A review of relevant documents was important to understand the paper trail and to establish the ‘life cycle’ of any material produced up to its end user. The declarations


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were analyzed to ensure their veracity as regards the nature of the dual-use materials, activities, and staffing on site. Other additional information was provided by Member States and was used to corroborate or contradict the information provided by Iraq in its declarations or to indicate possible undeclared sites and facilities which had not yet been inspected. Declarable dual-use materials and equipment listed in the Annexes of the monitoring plan were checked against the declaration. Significant equipment was inventoried with a bar coded tamper-proof tag and Iraq was required to notify the United Nations Special Commission 30 days prior to any change to be made to the equipment or to its location. The expected outcome was that any violation of obligations would be either deterred or detected. Specifically in the area of biological weapons, monthly monitoring parameters were developed for key sites in addition to the regular six-monthly declarations. This was considered essential in order to enhance the measures for monitoring and to detect any diversion of activities in a timely manner and perhaps to trigger an on-site inspection. Those parameters helped inspectors understand the regular activities and their outputs. Questionnaires were developed and used in interviewing management and scientists about the nature and scope of their work and were tailored to suit each facility’s activities – be it research and development or production. The questionnaires were divided into several sections to provide information on organizational charts and company structure, names of heads of units, source and amount of funding for the activities, water and electricity consumption, building construction expenditures, change of the function of buildings, site maintenance and equipment maintenance expenditures and respective logbooks, acquisition of new materials or equipment or transfer thereof, including that produced indigenously. If equipment was transferred from another facility, questions were asked about its previous location and the reason for the transfer. With respect to the activities on site, information had to be provided as to: whether research and development or production, or a combination thereof, was undertaken; an inventory of micro-organisms; the number and type of animals used for testing; and a production plan for the year. Information on usage of raw materials for quantities produced was also required. It was also important to know if any collaboration or cooperation projects with other entities were undertaken and if they involved an exchange of personnel or consultants from other facilities. Anything which could lead to a better understanding of the work was important in order to establish the baseline for these facilities. In case answers indicated discrepancies then a ‘ripple effect’ could be easily detected. Based on the broad monitoring plan, the information collected provided for the establishment of a baseline and any deviation from such a baseline or anomaly would provide an indication of an activity other than that declared. Through this data collection scheme and the continuous assessment of ongoing activities, the level of understanding of the declared activities was increased. The inspectors had to prepare a detailed inspection programme, determine the frequency of inspections and make the logistical arrangements for the inspections. The frequency of the inspections was determined according to on-site capabilities including available production equipment and activities of key personnel and, after the disclosure of the biological weapons programme, the whereabouts and activities of key personnel known to have been involved in that programme.

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4. Iraq’s Proscribed Biological Weapons Programme and its Uncovering by UNSCOM in 1995 Iraq’s offensive biological weapons programme was uncovered by UNSCOM inspectors in 1995. At the time when UNSCOM started its biological inspection activities in 1991, Iraq declared that it did not engage in biological weapons-related activities and only possessed a basic military biological research programme which had been discontinued at the end of 1990. In an effort to mislead the inspectors and to conceal the true scope and nature of its biological programme, Iraq falsified and forged documents, provided the wrong people for interview purposes, decontaminated equipment and sewage tanks, and painted storage tanks, floors and walls. Iraq also declared that documents and production records were destroyed and several metric tons of imported microbiological growth media were lost in riots after the 1991 war. The uncovering of Iraq’s well-concealed offensive biological weapons programme in July 1995 was the highlight of the biological weapons inspections process. Contrary to some reports, the uncovering of the programme was not due to the defection of Hussein Kamel, the son-in-law of Saddam Hussein, although the defection of Hussein Kamel in August 1995 led to more disclosures by Iraq. The unravelling of the offensive biological weapons programme had already started in early 1995 when UNSCOM reported to the Security Council its findings and assessments as follows: “…Iraq has not provided an account of its past biological warfare programme and a new full, final and complete declaration recently received from Iraq does not redress the problem. It is unable to account definitively for all the materials and items that may have been used in such a programme and are known to have been acquired by Iraq. The Commission assesses that Iraq obtained or sought to obtain all the items and materials required to produce biological warfare agents in Iraq. With Iraq's failure to account for all these items and materials for legitimate purposes, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a high risk that they had been purchased and in part used for proscribed purposes – the production of agents for biological weapons. In these circumstances, the Commission cannot conclude that its biological monitoring is comprehensive in coverage and properly focused, i.e., that it is monitoring all biological facilities, activities, materials and items that should be subject to monitoring” [7]. The report further notes that “…in addition to Iraq’s procurement activities, its construction activities for biological purposes are also a matter of concern. In particular, the production facility at the Al Hakam site has long raised concerns relating to its original intent, as opposed to its current use. Iraq claims that this facility is and always was intended only as a single-cell protein (SCP) plant for the production of animal feed. However, certain design features of the Al Hakam facility were superfluous to the requirements of an SCP plant, and more consistent with the requirements of a biological warfare agent facility” [8]. UNSCOM’s monitoring and verification system was not designed to search for proscribed weapons and materials, a task which was carried out separately through other investigations. The ‘investigators’ were non-resident teams with a specific mission assigned to them such as discovery and verification sampling, document


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searches, interview missions or other special inspection efforts. They were also provided with third party intelligence information which assisted their search activities. The monitoring teams were mostly resident in Iraq for several months and were sometimes tasked to work with the investigation teams. This collaborative work led to the discovery in 1995 of clues for further inspection activities. Intelligence information provided to UNSCOM investigators pointed out that Iraq may have imported microbial growth media – some 39 tonnes – in the late 1980s. UNSCOM monitoring teams collected evidence and inventoried a total quantity of some 22 tonnes at several facilities. At these facilities the quantities and types of the growth media had no obvious applicable use even for stated civilian purposes. Additionally, Iraq could not explain the fate of the other 17 tonnes of growth media unaccounted for. Confronted with the information, Iraq failed to provide an explanation for the apparent discrepancy but indicated that the excessive quantities imported were required for medical diagnostic purposes. UNSCOM technical experts assessed that for the stated medical diagnostic purposes, only small quantities in container sizes of 0.1 to 1 kg would be needed and that the hygroscopic nature of the growth media would provide for spoilage once the imported consignments of 25, 50 and 100 kg containers would be opened. Furthermore, UNSCOM concluded that the packaging was consistent with large-scale usage of growth media associated with the production of biological warfare agents. The types of growth media imported were deemed as suitable for the production of anthrax and botulinum toxin, biological warfare agents declared to have been researched by Iraq [9]. Eventually, in July 1995, Iraq acknowledged the production of some 19,000 litres of concentrated botulinum toxin, some 8,500 litres of concentrated anthrax and some 2,200 litres of aflatoxin. In August 1995, Iraq also acknowledged that 157 large aerial bombs and 25 warheads for long-range missiles had been filled with these agents [10]. The three main production facilities for biological warfare agents were a purpose-built facility in the Iraqi desert which had been provided with a civilian cover (Al Hakam), an agricultural facility and a veterinary vaccine production facility. In 1996, UNSCOM ordered and supervised the destruction of Iraq’s main declared BW production and development facility, Al Hakam, in order to demonstrate to the international community that a purpose-built biological weapons production facility is illegal and that it was within the mandate of UNSCOM “to remove, destroy or render harmless” the facility once discovered. Some equipment from other facilities involved in proscribed BW activities, as well as some 22 tonnes of the original imported growth media, were also destroyed during the process.

5. Lessons Learned A number of valuable lessons can be learned from the biological weapons inspections in Iraq. Foremost, the appropriate human capital for on-site inspections is the most powerful and indispensable tool in verification. Technical expertise and knowledge of inspectors and their practical and operational skills to undertake inspection, monitoring and verification activities in a cohesive international team were key factors. Scientists, although experts in their fields, had to be specifically trained to assume the role and responsibilities of ‘weapons inspectors’. Inspections such as the ones carried out in Iraq require other types of expertise including the capability to use modern navigation

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devices to find the way to the inspection sites, expertise in overhead photo imagery interpretation for on-the-ground verification, linguistic and interpretation, medical support, secure communication including by hand held systems. The most important skill, however, was common sense and the ability to operate as a team in an unusual and sometimes hostile environment. Physical survey of sites and facilities combined with sampling were considered the most powerful tool for locating and identifying the use to which equipment was put, the output of a production run or for discovering clandestine modifications made to a facility or equipment. The practical verification aspects and implementation in the biological area in Iraq at the time were and are still unique. Biological sampling and analysis was considered a scientific and commonly accepted tool, although infrequently used in the biological area for confirmation of the presence or absence of biological warfare agents. The infrequent use of biological sampling was due to the fact that environmental sampling in the biological area would not necessarily provide conclusive results of the absence of a biological weapons programme. Furthermore, many of the biological agents are endemic pathogens and can be found in the soil. Sampling in the biological area was mostly used in cases where a conclusive outcome would be a tell-tale sign, such as sampling of equipment or pipes connected to equipment, products of fermentation runs and spray drying equipment where the presence of a pathogen and its physical property would be more conclusive. Sensors and cameras likely had a deterrent effect due to the provision of 24/7 surveillance and provided the resident inspectors with a tool to be used as a trigger for further action, e.g. on-site follow-up. In principle, any type of inspection activities had a deterrent effect, raising the risk of detection to a high level. However, the political support provided by the Security Council is critical to the success of the inspection process. The combination of UN Security Council sanctions, the threat of military force and intrusive inspections and monitoring was far more effective in disarming Iraq, as well as deterring it from rearmament, than might have been expected. The effectiveness of the monitoring process was for a long time underestimated while the focus was on the 'investigation of past programmes”. There are also lessons to be learned from how Iraq circumvented several restrictions on imports. Iraq, while under an intrusive inspection and export-import monitoring regime, shifted its acquisition efforts from foreign to indigenous sources and developed its own biological production equipment and materials. Other lessons to be learned were Iraq’s demonstrated ability to produce biological warfare agents en masse, by producing on a small-scale (in glass bottles) and on a large-scale (in fermenters without any containment) to fill 157 aerial bombs and 25 missile warheads. Large scale fermenters already installed at a civilian vaccine production facility were converted in-situ to produce biological warfare agents; or in the case of Al Hakam, the equipment was first installed at a civilian site, and after the foreign company had left Iraq, it was disassembled and transported to Al Hakam for large-scale biological warfare agent production. Traces of such activities were easily hidden from inexperienced inspectors. In the case of the in-situ conversion, Iraq used a facility for Foot and Mouth Disease vaccine production and removed all visible tell-tale signs of such activities. At Al Hakam, the inspectors were told that this facility would produce products for civilian needs such as bio pesticides and single cell protein. In order to prove or disprove such a claim, it would have been preferable at the time for the inspectors to have had single cell production technicians or engineers in their


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monitoring team. With respect to means of delivery, Iraq succeeded in adapting conventional munitions for the delivery of BW and CW agents. Scientific and technological developments can affect the implementation of a disarmament instrument and the input from scientists with respect to verification is important. Modern analytical techniques are extremely sensitive and can provide a high level of confidence of the absence or presence of biological agents. The most challenging task in verification and in the evaluation of the technical data as part of the overall compliance assessment is that there is a need to have a good system of checks and balances in place, or a peer review system, so that judgement errors in the interpretation of the findings can be minimalised. Scientists from different countries and diverse disciplines may have divergent views and can challenge the assessment of the same data; this can be beneficial in reaching an accurate analysis and can also prevent ‘group think’. There should also be a code of conduct for scientists engaged in verification activities so as to set standards for professional behaviour. Scientists or technical experts in verification must be internationally respected and their work should be independent from political agendas and based solely on scientific evidence. The lessons from the inspections and verification in Iraq have shown the effectiveness and capabilities but also the limitations of such verification activities. In the example of inspections in Iraq, the weapons inspectors were not mandated to make any threat assessment. This was left to Member States, given the prerogative of the United Nations Security Council whose explicit mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter is to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” (Article 39). Article 39 also authorizes the Council to make recommendations or to decide upon measures to maintain or restore international peace and security. The UN Security Council is the only international body authorized to impose binding global sanctions on any country, including the use of force or other enforcement measures. In the case of Iraq, the threat was perceived differently within and outside the region, which indicates a subjective dimension inherent in any threat assessment. The full extent of the threat posed by Iraq’s offensive programmes was not known to the UN inspectorate and could not be scientifically assessed in its entirety. Even with a broad mandate and a comprehensive inspection, verification and monitoring regime, it was not easy for the technical experts to definitely confirm the absence of proscribed activities in Iraq. Iraq’s actions to obstruct the disarmament and sometimes even the monitoring process, including its unauthorized unilateral destruction activities of its weapons and bulk agents in 1991, declared only in 1992, or in the case of the biological weapons, not until 1995, as well as the continued concealment of the full scope of the illicit weapons programmes, and their own refusal to address certain aspects of the programmes, made it very difficult for UNSCOM to assess the veracity of Iraq’s claims of complete disarmament and the obliteration of all its WMD. Many aspects of the offensive BW programme were only revealed by Iraq because of the results of UNSCOM findings. In the biological area, Iraq preserved its facilities, raw materials and equipment until the unravelling of the programme by UNSCOM in 1995. Iraq also maintained its core biological weapons personnel first at Al Hakam and thereafter at the National Monitoring Directorate, the liaison office for UNSCOM inspections.

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The long term aim of inspections, verification and monitoring in Iraq was to reduce the uncertainty of the possible continuation of the illicit weapons programmes, to deter such programmes and in case of failure to do so, to detect any re-emergence. In November 2002, with the unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 1441 [11], Iraq was given a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations and disarm or face the serious consequences of failing to do so. The resolution strengthened the mandate of the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The return of inspectors to Iraq in November 2002 for almost four months of inspections after a hiatus of nearly four years, was too short a period to “establish and operate a reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification” and to “address unresolved disarmament issues” [12], as mandated by Security Council resolution 1284. Future monitoring, verification and inspection regimes should be robust and should be supported both politically, technically and financially in order to effectively address cases of potential proliferation.

References [1]

Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Special Session, Supplement No. 3 (A/S-15/3), para. 60 (para. 6, sect. I), 28 May 1988. [2] Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) and the United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UNA-UK), A Guide to Verification for Arms Control and Disarmament, London, 2002. Available at http://www.vertic.org/assets/verification_pamphlet.pdf. [3] UN document S/Res/715 (1991). [4] UN document S/Res/687 (1991). [5] UN document S/Res/707 (1991). [6] Exchange of letters in May 1991 involving the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq. [7] UN document S/1995/284 (Seventh Report of the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM to the Security Council under Resolution 715 (1991)), 10 April 1995, para. 60. [8] Ibid. para. 74. [9] Ibid. para. 65. [10] UN document S/1999/94 (Report to the Security Council, 29 January 1999). [11] UN document S/Res/ 1441 (2002). [12] UN document S/Res/ 1284 (1999) OP 2 and UNMOVIC working document “unresolved disarmament issues”, 6 March 2003.


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Risk Assessment, Transparency and Democracy: The French College for the Prevention of Technological Risks Venance JOURNÉ International Centre for Research on Environment and Development, Nogent sur Marne, France

Abstract. As activities in civilian and military fields become more complex and technologically advanced, taking into consideration the risks or threats associated with related incidents or accidents, or with misuse of these technologies, becomes increasingly complex. The French College for the Prevention of Technological Risks was in charge of assessing these new risks. This article recounts the history of this body and explains its originality – its main characteristics, its functioning – and the issues it dealt with. The conclusion draws out ways in which this organization as a model could meaningfully treat risks associated with military technologies. Keywords. Risk, risk assessment, democracy, public information.

Introduction As activities in civilian and military fields become more complex and technologically advanced, taking into consideration the risks or threats associated with related incidents or accidents, or with misuse of these technologies, becomes increasingly complex. Risk assessment, and therefore threat assessment, has to rest on the competence of a wider range of experts. These challenges have been recognised for several decades and decision makers have set up various bodies to advise them. The independence of the advising body is a necessary condition so as to ensure that decisions in matters of public policy choices in these fields are taken in the most impartial and transparent fashion. An original institution was set up in France in 1989: the College for the Prevention of Technological Risks1. After first recalling the socio-political context and the events which led to the decision to set up the College and to mandate such a body for advice on technological risks, this contribution describes the characteristics and the functioning of this unique body, as well as the issues the College has dealt with. In conclusion, a parallel is made regarding the relevance of the specific features of the College for a threat assessment committee in defence matters.

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Professor Jean-Jacques Salomon (1929-2008), who directed from 1963 to 1983 the OECD Department of Science Policy, has extensively studied the links between science and society. He was the president of the Collège from 1991 until 1995. His writings are the main source of information on the College, especially [1] and [2].

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V. Journé / Risk Assessment, Transparency and Democracy

1. Context As a response to the oil shocks in the 1970s, France decided to embark on an ambitious nuclear electricity program which is very centralised. The French Atomic Energy Commission had been created in October 1945, with the mission to implement all measures that could benefit the use of atomic energy in the fields of science, industry and national defense. Therefore this agency was the only source of nuclear technical expertise. The public utility Electricité de France, the nuclear operator that started operation of France’s first commercial nuclear reactor at Chinon in 1963, is responsible for constructing and maintaining the power plants. In 1976, the French Atomic Energy Commission created a subsidiary branch, the General Company for Nuclear Materials (Compagnie Générale des Matières Nucléaires – Cogéma) to supply nuclear fuel and be responsible for the management of spent fuel. Since 2001 a new company, AREVA, is in charge of dealing with all the aspects of the fuel cycle. In 1991, the responsibility of the long-term management of all radioactive waste was given to the National Radioactive Waste Management Agency (Agence Nationale pour la Gestion des Déchets Radioactifs – Andra). In the 1980s, practical solutions to the nuclear waste management problem started to be seriously addressed. Several options were studied and the preferred solution for the agencies in charge was to bury nuclear waste from the civilian electricity production program in deep underground storage. In 1987, four sites were chosen (in the Ain, Aisne, Anjou, and Deux-Sèvres departments) and the work started to set up the first repository. These projects met with extremely violent reactions (for example dynamiting of the drilling equipment, confrontation with the Gendarmerie) from the neighbouring inhabitants. The government decided to suspend the work. In 1988, faced with this deadlock, French Prime Minister Michel Rocard (who had just taken office after the presidential elections in 1988) asked Gérard Renon, then Secretary of State in charge of the prevention of major technological and natural risks, for advice on how the government could be better prepared to communicate with citizens affected by decisions on new technologies that would affect them. Gérard Renon submitted a report to the President of the Republic, in which he insisted on both the importance of an increased attention with regard to the industrial risks and the necessity to give the public information that was as complete as possible [3]: “The government has the responsibility to be vigilant and ensure the availability of such information. To exercise this responsibility, it matters that the government be advised and alerted by an outside body. To ensure that its advice and recommendations will have authority, this body should be composed of high level personalities, who will be in a position to express themselves according to their conscience. Its composition, its functioning, its means have to allow it to apprehend the various technical, economic and human aspects of the issues that it will analyse”. Such a recommendation was – and would still be – in sharp contrast with the prevailing French bureaucratic tradition, as any issue concerning nuclear policy is dealt with within closed circles. Just as in the military nuclear circles, the nucleocrats were – and still are – very reluctant to give the public information, in particular on any risk linked to nuclear activities: “The culture of secrecy was dominant in the Atomic Energy Commission, and there was no reason to explain or comment to the population what


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appeared to be technically good to those who had the knowledge” [4]. As an example of this attitude, one can mention the information provided to the public by the French authorities after the Chernobyl accident. A press release of 6 May 1986 from the French Ministry of Agriculture states: “The French territory, because of the distance [from Chernobyl] has been completely spared from the radioactive fallout which is a consequence of the Chernobyl accident. The observed radioactivity increases have never represented a problem in matter of public health” [5]. The Independent Commission of Research and Information on Radioactivity (Commission de Recherche et d’Information Indépendante sur la Radioactivité – CRIIRAD), an independent NGO, was created just after the Chernobyl accident, and it has been instrumental in getting independent information on the radioactivity levels in France [6]. Recently, the French Society for Nuclear Energy (Société Française d’Energie Nucléaire – SFEN) expressed the view that the Chernobyl accident did not lead to any additional cancer in France [7]. The 1980s were also a period in which consulting the public in decisions on major construction and infrastructure projects, such as airports, was not common. The surveys of public opinion used to be – and sometimes still are – often conducted too late to ensure a process that would allow the public to participate effectively in the decisionmaking process. In most cases, the information given to the public and to NGOs is not complete, and sometimes it is given with a delay that does not allow non-professionals or interested organisations time to study it. Moreover, the information is often given so late that no change of direction is possible. As an example, the decision to build the new European Pressurized Reactor (EPR) was taken by 2005 before the public debate on this issue.

2. Setting Up of the College 2.1. The College’s Origin and Mandate The assessment of the danger from nuclear wastes remains a controversial issue, and in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident, the public sensitivity on such controversies was very high. Michel Rocard, the French Prime Minister, decided to set up the College for the Prevention of Technological Risks, which was formally established by a decree signed by the French President on 8 February 1989. In establishing the College, on 20 February 1989 Michel Rocard expressed [8] that this new requirement of openness and credibility should contribute “to the good performance of democracy: to assure that the cloud from Tchernobyl does not imperil the health of the French people is not sufficient: they must know the truth to which they are entitled. . . . The efficiency and the credibility of action require [a] decision process that is more open, a sharing (pooling) of knowledge, and a continuous dialogue. . . . It is not enough to answer by information campaigns to groundless fears, it does not suffice to verify that an insurance mechanism will compensate the victims of an accident nor to expect that the market will be able to eliminate the dangers. . . .In the face of technological risk, it is the combination of the efforts from experts, civil servants, magistrates, workers, industry managers, elected representatives, which ensures the prevention. Nobody can monopolise the

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decision without creating risks. Democracy is also the quality and the honesty that the citizens may expect to benefit from. It is not a prerogative of the government to be the unique source of information (how illusory would that be!) but to make sure that the information is made available to the citizens and the media professionals even before a brutal event or an anxiety creates a specific demand. Democracy rests upon a learning process. Here we cannot take the time to let history draw the lessons.” The mandate of the College was “to help bring about by way of expert opinions, recommendations and studies, the assessment of collective risks and of the corresponding prevention actions in the industrial activities, specially the nuclear activities, chemical or oil activities, transport, and the development of new technologies” [8]. Military activities were not included in the mandate of the College. Many other specialised bodies exist in France to give advice to the government on issues such as food or drug safety, transport, or professional risks. They are usually composed of scientists specialised in the topic; the result of their work remains essentially inside the administrative circles and what is at stake is rarely made explicit to the public [9]. In the early 1980s, on the occasions of debates on space or nuclear programmes, the French Parliament had come to the conclusion that it was unable to evaluate the government’s decisions on the major directions of scientific and technological policies [10]. Therefore, it decided in 1983 to establish the French Parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of Scientific and Technological Choices, with a mission to exert political control over technological risks. The nuclear industry was one of the main issues of discussion for which the Office was set up, and a substantial fraction of the reports deal with the issues of nuclear facility safety and waste management. Out of 118 reports, two deal with French military program: one in 1997 covered the evolution of research on high level nuclear waste in the context of military nuclear waste, while one in 2002 addressed the environmental and health consequences of the French nuclear tests that were conducted from 1960 to 1996 [11]. The Office is composed of 36 members of the Parliament and of the Senate. This institution has a sizeable influence on institutional and legislative work, thus making information available to the general public. One could compare this French parliamentary office with the United States Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), which was established for the same kind of reason by the United States Congress in 1972. OTA provided members and committees of the Congress with in-depth analyses of complex scientific and technical issues. It produced 750 reports on a wide range of issues such as nuclear proliferation, pollution control, medical technology, computer security, etc. [12]. Unfortunately, OTA was de-funded and had to close its doors in September 1995. 2.2. Unique Features of the College The College had some particular features which made it, and today would still make it, unique. First, given the diversity of topics in its mandate, which included all technological risks in all the technological fields and its concern for prevention strategies, the College was composed not of specialists or technicians, but of generalists with wide ranging culture and interests (see panel). The members of the College were independent of specific ministries or agencies, and they came from various professional areas so that


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they would be sensitive to the multiple social concerns relating to these risks. Its approach was multidisciplinary. A noticeable difference from the Parliamentary Office for the Evaluation of Scientific and Technological Choices is that the College was composed only of members from outside both the Administration and political circles, so that there would not be conflict of interest in a possible assessment of public policies. The College (see box) included members from the senior civil service, but also scientific personalities, representatives of civil society, a trade unionist, a journalist, a sociologist and a physician. The members were formally nominated by the government. When a member needed to be replaced, the College itself nominated candidates who would later be agreed on by the government.

Composition of the College In 1991, the College included the following twelve members: -

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Martine Barrère, a scientific journalist, specialist on environment issues. Jean Bonnard, a trade unionist (president emeritus of the Confédération Française des Travailleurs Chrétiens). Raymond Castaing, a solid-state physicist, gold medallist of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. Dominique Coujard, a magistrate, now president of the Tribunal de Grande Instance in Paris. Paul Gardent, Ingénieur Général des Mines and Conseiller d’Etat, former director of the Charbonnages de France, who had been in charge of several reports on safety in industrial plants. Jules Horowitz, scientific adviser to the administrator of the Atomic Energy Commission, specialist on reactor physics and particle accelerators. Pierre Huguenard, director of the Service d’Aide Médicale d’Urgence. (Samu). Philippe Kourilsky, director of the Molecular Biology of the Gene Unit at the Institut Pasteur. Admiral Yves Leenhardt, president of the Naval Academy and the National Society for Marine Rescue; commanded the French Pacific Fleet. Jean-Jacques Salomon, Professor at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers and director of the research centre on Science, Technology and Society at the Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers. René Sautier, honorary president of the pharmaceutical company Sanofi, member of the consultative council for life and health sciences. Jean Servant, Ingénieur Général des Mines, who had been secretary of the Interministerial Committee on Nuclear Safety.

Secondly, instead of being attached to a particular ministry (for example Infrastructure or Environment), which could possibly lead to conflicts of interests, the College was hosted by the Prime Minister’s office and had an interministerial mandate.

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The College was completely independent from the government in its hearings, debates and writings. It should be underlined that it was also independent from industry, media, associations, NGOs and elected representatives. Being inserted in the Prime Minister’s office, the highest authority for national affairs, the College was at the core of the executive power and had therefore the legitimacy to take publicly into account the risks of industrial activities, and especially of the nuclear industry. This was a true innovation, and a very courageous one, given France’s very centralised power structure and the strong influence of the lobbies: the technocrats are most reluctant to listen to any idea that does not originate from inside the technostructure’s hermetically-sealed circles that consist almost exclusively of former graduates from the Ecole Nationale d’Administration or Ecole Polytechnique. One critical innovation was that the College would study issues not only on the request of the government, but could, on its own initiative, decide to study any specific issue in which it had competence. This ensured that the College would not depend upon the will of a government that might not be inclined to ask for its advice. This was a necessary condition for the College’s effectiveness. Another remarkable feature that facilitated transparency was that the College had independent authority to publish its findings: “The College sends to the Prime Minister its expert opinions and recommendations and decides, if need be, on the publications and of the modalities of this publication” [8]. This had been stated very clearly by Prime Minister Michel Rocard in his speech on the inauguration of the College. This authority to publish prevented the possibility of the advice from the College being ‘forgotten’ on shelves in the ministries. Paul Gardent, the first President of the College, set up a straightforward and simple procedure for the publication of findings: the expert opinion or recommendation would be sent to the Prime Minister, then a few days later to the various ministers concerned. One week later, it would be made public at a press release. Finally, the published documents had to be written in a clear and understandable fashion so that any nonspecialist (decision-maker, politician, general public) could understand them. This was a necessary condition for effective openness.

3. Issues on which Expert Opinions Were Expressed and Recommendations Made The college has published 20 expert opinions on various issues (see box). Half were examined at the request of government and half were initiatives of the College itself. The issue of underground storage of nuclear waste, which was the trigger for the creation of the College, was studied several times and three expert opinions were published. According to Jean-Jacques Salomon, this shows “how essential this topic was considered by my colleagues, not only because of the technical aspects, but also, and mainly, for its impact on the procedures of democracy in our country. As a matter of fact, each of these expert opinions drew attention to the practice of secrecy which has constantly concealed the issue of how to dispose of this waste, the noxiousness of which can stay for centuries and even in certain cases for thousands of years” [14]. The issue of radioactive waste had never been discussed in the Parliament before the deliberations of the law of 30 December 1991 on the long term management of


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radioactive waste2. This law did not include some features that the College would recommend, in particular “the implementation of structures and decision-making processes which would ensure public information and participation, transparency of decision making, independent assessment of studies” [14].

Issues Addressed by the College Seventeen expert opinions and recommendations were published by 1994 [13]. They dealt with the following issues (the numbers in parentheses indicate the publication numbers in chronological order). -

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The problems of communication on technological risks (1). This was the first study commissioned, which shows that the government at that time had a special concern about ways to improve communication between decision makers and the public. Biotechnologies (2). The human applications of biotechnologies being treated by another advisory committee, the National Consultative Council on Ethical Issues for Life and Health Sciences3, the College focused on their applications in agriculture. Underground storage (3, 13) and management (6) of long lived radioactive waste. These were the longest expert opinions given. The man-machine link (4). Busy traffic routes close to dangerous installations (5). Conditions of use of radioactive sources (7). European regulation for the transport of dangerous material (8) and regulation of road transport of dangerous material (15). Waste management policies (9). Transport infrastructure and technological risks (10), nuisances and collective risks linked to the road transport of merchandise (17). The prevention of BLEVE risk (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion: a type of explosion that can occur when a vessel containing a pressurized liquid is ruptured) (11). The conditions for the development of the Mediterranean TGV route (12). Road safety (14). Recommissioning of Superphénix (16).

Up to that period, only the technical aspects of waste management had been dealt with and “the Atomic Energy Commission concentrated all of the technical competence so that it had a quasi-monopoly on expertise in this field, and the safety authorities lacked credibility” [15]. According to Jean-Jacques Salomon, “The Institute for Nuclear Protection and Safety (IPSN) was the expert in this field, and would provide the technical expertise to the body in charge of the control, the Central Department of

2

Law no. 91-1381, voted 30 December 1991, called the Bataille Law, organises the research on radioactive waste management along three axes: separation/transmutation, geological storage and long term storage. 3 This body is attached to the Ministry of Research and the Health Ministry, and is concerned only with the moral issues.

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the Safety of Nuclear Installations (SCSIN). Therefore the IPSN had to assess a document that it had helped to write” [16]. In its recommendations, the College insisted on including the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) and the Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minières (BRGM) in the studies on waste management. These studies were conducted only by the Atomic Energy Commission and Andra, which itself depends upon the former body. This recommendation of the College, which was meant to diversify the sources of knowledge and also to add some independent expertise, was not followed [16]. The College also paid special attention to the issue of transport and road safety. Again on these issues, the lobbies are very strong and powerful. In its advice, the College recommended (a) to implement severe penalty and prevention policies and (b) to take into account the different risks of various transportation modes, which meant promoting rail for commercial transport instead of motorways. As a later catastrophe would show (the accident in the Mont Blanc Tunnel in March 1999, in which 39 people died when a transport truck caught fire in the tunnel), these concerns were very relevant. In particular the College recommended studying the case of Switzerland where, in order to be allowed to cross the country, road transport of merchandise has to be combined with rail. On this issue, there were pressures on the President of the College to prevent the publication of the recommendations.

4. Functioning of the College The quality of the participation of the members, “not only the intelligence, the culture, the competence, but also the sense of collective responsibility” [2] was praised by the President of the College [17]: “Admittedly, there were discussions, sometimes lively, on the reality, the probabilities or the magnitude of certain risks, especially in the field of nuclear energy or biotechnologies. The contrary would have been surprising: we were precisely in an area of inevitable conflict where one cannot and one must not include solely the ‘facts’ given by expert knowledge, but in which it is important to expose and to take into account not only the available data and testimonies, but also the consequences and stakes involved, and to clarify those issues that lead to controversies and opposing views, in the decisions which will have to be taken. In fact, there has never been any danger of the group breaking apart. On the contrary, the members were very conscious that a zero-risk situation does not exist and that some risks have to be faced. We were always united in identifying and exposing the risks for which prevention measures and even precautionary measures were required – or already taken but in an insufficient fashion, or unsuitable, or worse, non existent. Mere common sense implied that they had to be taken into account, instead of a scientific conclusion which, in most cases, would not be possible to reach”. The advice and recommendations were all agreed upon by the College members on a consensus basis. One critical problem was obtaining the data needed for the analyses. A secretariat consisting of four people was in charge of getting data from ministries, experts, associations, industry, members of parliament and the various documentary sources


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[18]. One difficulty was that the data were scattered across several ministries, and sometimes the available data were not relevant to the problem studied or there was a lack of coherence between the various sources. Another problem arose from the suspicions of some members of the agencies or departments from which the data had to be obtained. In some cases this resulted in bureaucrats holding back the information, creating real difficulties in getting the relevant data. There were also hearings with high-level civil servants as well as managers of relevant companies. Salomon writes: “Mostly, our investigations met with a positive response with those, at all level of responsibilities, who agreed to play the game of openness, dialogue and transparency, and they exist, more numerous that one can imagine, in the administration as well as in industry” [2]. Nevertheless the persons questioned were not obliged to answer and this proved to be a serious deficiency, as certain inquiries had consequently to be stopped [19]. Another problem arose from the fact that the budget of the College was included in that of the Prime Minister’s Office, but never had a separate line of funding. This budget was much too low, obviously limiting the possibilities of the College. The media should have played a more useful role. Generally, the media are interested in an issue when dramatic news can be on the front page, or when a scoop can be anticipated, or if a publication can negatively interfere with the actions of the ministers. But to be able to debate in a calm way, the College had to distance itself from headline news, as its role was more to alert society about dangers to be envisaged and to suggest prevention strategies. Consequently, the media did not publicize sufficiently the expert opinions published by the College, and reported even less the policies eventually taken in response to the College’s recommendations [20]. The reactions in the ministries reflected the repercussions in the media and varied as a function of the way in which a particular minister could be put in an awkward position by the College’s publication [2]. This minimal role of the media even had a limiting effect on the follow-up of the recommendations; if these remained unnoticed in the press, there would be even less incentive for the government to implement the recommended preventive policies.

5. The End It was obvious that the expert opinions and recommendations published by the College would include some criticism of public policies. For example, when the College criticized as inadequate the risk studies for the high speed train (TGV) route close to the nuclear installation in Pierrelatte in the South of France, or when it noted that the recommissioning of the fast breeder reactor Superphénix did not specify the missions for this reactor, it gave rise to discontent in ministerial circles. The governments following the government headed by Michel Rocard tended to see the College more and more as an opposition body, one that they consulted less and less. In the end, the College was working only on its own initiative. The government of Alain Juppé, French Prime Minister from 1995 to 1997, decided to dissolve the College in 1996. Without any prior consultation or explanation, without any notice to the President of the College, Jean-Jacques Salomon (who in fact learned of it by chance), the dissolution was implemented surreptitiously by one line inserted inside a decree on a Council for French language, an issue totally disconnected from the College [21]. Moreover, this procedure was not legal, as the College had been

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instituted by a decree signed by the French President, and should have been dismantled also by a decree of the same nature. To quote Paul Gardent, the first president of the College [22]: “As one cannot expect that the technological risks had miraculously disappeared, one has to admit that the government cannot stand that an independent body could publicly express criticism or reservations on its decisions or proposals. Such a body was doomed to disappear. This is the modern version of the ‘bearers of bad news’”. As already indicated, although very different in size, the College had some features in common with the United States OTA: its independence, its broad societal perspective and the quality of its members. The College also had a similar fate to that of the OTA. OTA’s advice was unwelcome to the Republican majority of the 1994 Congress and some influential members of the Senate had “worries regarding an independent and respected analytical voice” [23]. OTA was closed down in 1995, and up to the present day, no similar office with a broad mandate has replaced it.

6. Conclusions The College was a remarkable institution, given the fact that French decision makers very seldom let independent voices express themselves on sensitive topics. But it was an anomaly in the French system: the ephemeral nature of this wise body and its final extinction reflect real weaknesses in the French democracy. The State wanted to retain its monopoly of public expertise and communication on risks and refused the possibility offered by the College of informed debate on important issues of concern for the society. One of the main lessons of this experiment is that such a generalist body can treat meaningfully a wide range of different issues, whenever both the technical aspects and the social concerns matter. Compared to other existing expert committees, three characteristics made this institution very relevant and efficient for its mandate of giving independent advice as a part of a democratic decision-making process: its interdisciplinarity, the possibility of self-initiative, and the publication of the findings and recommendations. The College was independent, and neither the College nor its members were linked to any ministry. This allowed a non-partisan approach in its functioning, deliberations, and work. The necessity of total independence should be underlined: the President and the members of the College had to be able to stand firm with their recommendations when they were submitted to strong pressures not to publish them. It should be stressed that the College published several expert opinions on issues (nuclear industry and transportation) for which the involved lobbies were – and still are – very powerful. Another feature, which was essential to reinforce transparency, was that the expert opinions published by the College were easy to understand, so that the public and elected politicians could grasp what was genuinely at stake, and the decision makers were not obliged to depend solely upon technicians for advice. But the College would have greatly benefited from being more institutionalised. It was mainly the initiative of one person, Michel Rocard, the French Prime Minister at the time, and the governments that followed did not consider themselves bound to consult and make use of this body. The College should have been established from the start in the context of a genuine information policy, so that it would really have been included as a part of the decision-making process.


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Another important point that would have enhanced the effectiveness of the College relates to the decree creating the College. It should have included a provision that would make the people required to provide information to the College legally bound to deliver what was requested from them. And finally the College should have had its own distinct voted budget, separated from the global budget of the Prime Minister’s Office, so as to give more flexibility in the conduct of studies which needed major resources.

7. Epilogue: Could Such an Organisation Be Suitable to Give Advice on Military Matters? In the United States, after the Second World War, many scientists involved in the Manhattan project returned to their universities or research laboratories, and organised themselves into organisations and committees such as the Federation of American Scientists that was formed by ex-Manhattan project scientists in 1945. These scientists were concerned about the destructive power of the new weapons. New weapons programs were initiated in public arsenals and by private companies, and the government officials did not have the technical competence to stand up against well organised lobbyists. Knowledgeable about both bureaucracy and the military, Eisenhower did not trust the Pentagon to provide objective proposals and recommendations for its own programs.4 After the Sputnik surprise, in 1957, President Eisenhower installed at the White House the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), and he created the position of Presidential Science Advisor, who also chaired this committee. This Committee was a governmental one with members who, apart from the Chairman, were not government employees. The purpose of PSAC was to understand matters on behalf of the President, and to present options to him clearly and comprehensively. It is interesting to note that the nuclear issue was, again in this instance, the main focus of the discussions, in particular the nuclear test ban, which had been constantly rejected by the scientists of the United States Atomic Energy Commission and by Lewis Strauss, its chair at the time. 4

Eisenhower’s Farewell Address to the Nation on 17 January 1961 (http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/ike.htm) states: “This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence – economic, political, even spiritual – is felt in every city, every Statehouse, every office of the Federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society. “In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. “We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.[.....] “The prospect of domination of the nation’s scholars by Federal employment, project allocations, and the power of money is ever present – and is gravely to be regarded. “Yet, in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite.”

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The PSAC Committee consisted of 18 members meeting privately for two days each month. There were also specific panels; made up from a few PSAC members and some outside specialists, on issues such as military aircraft, naval warfare, and antisubmarine warfare, or on insecticides and pesticides. It had major influence in several areas, such as the reconnaissance satellite program and the creation of NASA. But because of strong opposition to the Vietnam war policies among the scientific communities, and the opposition of PSAC on important issues such as the supersonic transport plane and the anti-ballistic missile program, in 1973 President Nixon took the decision to dissolve PSAC. Let’s turn back to France. The assessment of risks related to weapon or military threats have also both a technical and political aspect as the episode of the resumption of the nuclear tests by France in 1995 has shown. When President Chirac had to decide upon the resumption of nuclear tests, the advice available to him came from the military nuclear circles of the French Atomic Energy Commission. Even now, in France, the public information on military nuclear matters is extremely limited: for example, in the recently published White Paper on Defense, a mere five pages out of a total of 345 pages deal with nuclear matters, including deterrence policy and weapon procurement [24]. Because military matters were excluded from the mandate of the College for the Prevention of Technological Risks, the College could not offer its advice on the issue of the resumption of the nuclear tests, although it was still in existence at that time. Nevertheless, independent expertise was offered by three scientists from the United States: Richard Garwin and Ray Kidder, two physicists who were specialists on nuclear weapon and nuclear testing issues, and Christopher Paine, an arms control and nuclear proliferation analyst. In 1994, after a report, The simulation of nuclear tests, had been published by the Defense Committee of the French Parliament [25], Richard Garwin, Ray Kidder and Christopher Paine decided to travel to Paris to discuss some assertions in this report with the main decision makers in the area of nuclear weapon testing. As they stated in a report published under the auspices of the Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council [26], the Americans were concerned that “the report drew wrong conclusions because it appeared to be premised on the mistaken belief that the US had already developed, and intended to rely upon a comprehensive ‘simulation system’ to replace the nuclear tests that will be banned under a CTBT. The report concluded that France requires a similar simulation capability that would require calibration by an unknown number of nuclear explosive tests before France could be confident of maintaining its nuclear deterrent under a CTB”. After sending their report to the decision makers who had participated in the discussions, and who were therefore given the opportunity to include their comments, the report was made public. This report proved later to be the trigger for a public debate on the reasons that led the French nuclear experts to advise the French President to resume nuclear testing for several tests before the total ban that they anticipated would be imposed under the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. If it had been given the relevant information – technical and strategic – on what was at stake, the College could have advised the President on the consequences of both options: resuming the tests or continuing the moratorium. It is of course possible that the College would have made the same recommendations as did the advisers of the French President on the nuclear testing issue. Nuclear testing is typical of the kind of issue on which a body with the same


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characteristics as the College – interdisciplinary in nature, and including generalists, and other members from diverse professional backgrounds – could have given its independent advice. Many other issues related to military matters could be dealt with by such a body. Some examples of common relevance for various countries are: x x x x x

The present relevance of nuclear deterrence strategies. The evolution of the nuclear deterrence strategies. The man-machine link, especially in nuclear systems or missile launches. The risk of accident or unauthorized launch. The risks due to the aging of equipment.

The College acted in a national framework; nevertheless, it would be possible to set up such a body in an international context. It is also possible that such an independent expert group could publish recommendations or expert opinions on specific issues. These reports could inform both the authorities and the public, without giving away classified information, as was indeed the case with the FAS-NRDC report [26] on the need for resumption of nuclear testing by France.

Acknowledgments The author wishes to acknowledge numerous discussions with Jean-Jacques Salomon who was always keen to share, with a very gracious generosity, his great knowledge on Science and Society issues with any interested person. The author wishes to thank Jean-Georges Heinz for providing valuable documentation and information on the College, and to Sandra Butcher, John Finney and Judith Reppy for their comments on the manuscript.

References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]

[8] [9]

[10] [11] [12] [13]

Jean-Jacques Salomon, De la transparence, in Le Risque technologique et la démocratie, La Documentation Française, 1994. Jean-Jacques Salomon, Précaution et Démocratie, Futuribles, no. 311, September 2005, 5 – 23 (DOI: 10.1051/futur:20053115). Quoted in Paul Gardent, Le Collège de la prévention des risques technologiques, in Le Risque technologique et la démocratie, La Documentation Française, 1994, p 11. Jean-Yves le Déaut, Rapport sur la gestion des déchets très faiblement radioactifs, Office parlementaire d’évaluation des choix scientifiques et technologiques, April 1992, p 12. Quoted in Pierre Schmitt, Le nuage de Tchernobyl se serait arrêté aux frontières, Point de vue, 2 May 2006. Available at http://www.dossiersdunet.com/spip.php?article750. CRIIRAD, Les preuves du mensonge. Available at http://www.criirad.org/. Tchernobyl, aucun cancer supplémentaire en France (Chernobyl, no additional cancer in France), http://tf1.lci.fr/infos/sciences/2005/0,,3214267,00-tchernobyl-aucun-cancer-supplementaire-france.html. Quoted in ref. 2 p. 10. Jean Michel Fourniau, Les instituts d’expertise nationaux face aux évolutions de la gouvernance des activités et situations à risque pour l’homme et pour l’environnement, 2007. Available at http://debatpublic.inrets.fr/spip.php?article11. Parliamentary office for evaluation of scientific and technological options, presentation, French Senate. Available at http://www.senat.fr/opecst/english.html. http://www.senat.fr/opecst/rapports.html. The OTA legacy, http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/. These reports were published in Le Risque technologique et la démocratie, La Documentation Française, 1994.

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[14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21]

[22] [23] [24] [25] [26]


Ref. 2 p. 14. Expert opinion no. 6 of 6 February 1991, on nuclear waste management. See ref. 13. Jean-Jacques Salomon, ref. 2 p. 15. Jean-Jacques Salomon, ref. 2 p. 13. Dominique Goujard and Jean-Georges Heintz, L’information du Collège, in Le Risque technologique et la démocratie, La Documentation Française, 1994. Paul Gardent, ref. 3 p. 12. Paul Gardent, ref. 3 p. 13. Décret no 96-235 du 21 mars 1996 portant suppression du collège de prévention des risques technologiques et portant modification du décret no 89-403 du 2 juin 1989 instituant un conseil supérieur de la langue française et une délégation générale à la langue française. Available at http://droit.org/jo/19960323/PRMX9600008D.html. Paul Gardant, Souvenirs d’un parcours professionnel. Available at: http://www.annales.org/ archives/x/gardent.html. Anthony M. Fainberg, private communication, 2009. The French White Paper on defence and national security, June 2008. Available at http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/084000341/index.shtml. Assemblée Nationale, La simulation des essais nucléaires, rapport 847, December 1993. Richard Garwin, Christopher Paine and Ray Kidder, discussions in Paris regarding the necessity of nuclear tests for maintaining a reliable French nuclear force, under a comprehensive test ban, FASNRDC, November 1994. Available at http://www.fas.org/rlg/paris94.pdf.


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Beyond a Threat Assessment: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Defenses and Other Countermeasures, and CounterCountermeasures on the Part of the Offense Richard L. GARWIN IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, New York, USA

Abstract. Examples are discussed of the use of independent technical analysis of a broad range of aspects of national security programs in the United States. These include assessments of effectiveness of defenses, and counter- and counter-counter measures, with particular reference to missile defense. Keywords. Independent testimony, ballistic missile defense, Strategic Defense Initiative, President’s Science Advisory Committee, PSAC, antisimulation, countermeasures, decoys, inflated balloons, biological weapons.

Introduction The deployment of a national defense against ballistic missiles has long been a contentious matter for the United States. When in 1953 I studied extending the air defenses of the US and Canada to the sea lines of approach of Soviet nuclear-armed bombers, I insisted to our study leaders, Jerome Wiesner and Jerrold Zacharias, that by the time anything we recommended could be deployed, the threat would be Soviet ICBMs armed with nuclear warheads. And I went on to propose that the United States should immediately begin to launch inflated balloons about 2-m in diameter, from ‘rockoons’ lifting a few-kg rocket above all but 1% of the mass of the atmosphere. A three-stage rocket, initially oriented by a permanent magnet with respect to the local horizontal magnetic field and tipped 22 degrees from the horizontal, would be used to launch an aluminum-coated plastic balloon that would inflate after rocket burnout to simulate a similar balloon that might contain a US nuclear warhead after the US developed and deployed ICBMs. This would ensure that the Soviet Union would not respond with a nuclear attack, in view of their every few days seeing such an object or objects approaching, that never were harmful. Of course, the light balloons would burn up in the upper atmosphere and would pose no threat to Soviet territory. This was an early example of offensive countermeasures to a defensive system, and clearly must be taken into account by both sides. For many decades, the United States was unique in having technical consultants to the US government largely from the academic (but in my case also from the industrial) community, some of whom regarded it as their obligation to society not only to contribute to the government programs, but also to an analysis of the utility of a government program. This is

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R.L. Garwin / Beyond a Threat Assessment

particularly important in the United States, where the US Congress plays a vital role, in addition to a supposedly informed Executive Branch that includes the Department of Defense, the nuclear weapons establishment in the Department of Energy, the intelligence community and the National Security Council. An ignorant Congress or one captured by or unduly influenced by contractors or the armed services can result in dangerous, costly, and often unnecessary programs.

1. Independent Testimony: Some Examples Despite the good work of the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) and its influence on the Executive Branch from its formation in 1956, until about 1968 the only testimony given in Congress in regard to national security programs was by the Executive Branch and by its contractors. Independent analysts were regarded as not having standing and were not invited by the Executive to testify on its behalf; nor were they invited by the committees of the Congress. This contrasted with much independent testimony on questions of public health, social security, monetary policy, and the like. That pattern was broken in 1968, with the controversy over strategic defense, when Congress somehow found it desirable to have independent testimony. Many of us such as Hans Bethe of Cornell University, Jerome Wiesner of MIT, Ed Purcell of Harvard, and W.K.H. (Pief) Panofsky of Stanford University worked many days each year for the US government to provide technical analyses, proposals, and invention, to seize opportunities and to counter threats. All those named had a fouryear term on the President’s Science Advisory Committee and I served two terms from 1962-1965 and 1969-1972. But none of us published unclassified critical papers on the topics on which we were working, and none testified in Congress until about 1968. The PSAC Strategic Military Panel (SMP) was composed of about ten highly qualified scientists and engineers from academe and industry. Each year it had the task of reviewing US and Soviet strategic weapons (although strategic aircraft on both sides were the responsibility of my PSAC Military Aircraft Panel). The SMP met two days each month in the Old Executive Office Building, supported by an able staff person who arranged briefings from the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, and contractors. Among the latter were not only those who would or could build strategic defenses or strategic offensive weapons, but also, importantly, in the field of missile defense, Bell Telephone Laboratories and Lincoln Laboratory. These were two extremely competent organizations that worked for the US Army especially in analyzing the phenomena of re-entry and the ‘observables’ – optical, infrared, and radar – associated with re-entry or for that matter with the passage of warheads through space. Any defense would not only need to detect the warhead itself and to be able to send an interceptor against it (nuclear-armed interceptor in those days), or some kind of directed-energy weapon would need to be used. It was not obvious to our non-technical audience in the White House and National Security Council that even a system that detected very reliably and could kill very reliably would fail as a defense unless the ballistic missile defense (BMD) system could distinguish (‘discriminate’) the warhead from other objects. Some of these would be the third stage of the rocket system or fragments thereof created by fragmenting the third stage with high explosives – ‘traffic decoys’. Others might be decoys that were crafted to look to the greatest extent possible just like the warhead and to provide the same observables as the warhead upon re-entry – ‘precision decoys’.


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Of course, systems that were to intercept in midcourse of the ICBM trajectory – while the warhead is above the sensible atmosphere – would have to cope with very light decoys – essentially inflated balloons. In fact, the United States has very good inflated balloons (carried and dispensed uninflated) that within a few seconds assume the precise contour and radar and visible observables as the warhead from the Minuteman missile, for instance. But that precision decoy would in no way deceive a defensive system operating in the lower or the upper atmosphere, where atmospheric drag would soon leave such decoys far behind the dense warhead itself. In general, until President Reagan conjured up the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in his speech of March 23, 1983, the military services (the Army in the case of national defense of the United States against ICBMs and SLBMs) needed to propose a specific system to be deployed, with a schedule and cost estimate. Year after year, the Strategic Military Panel analyzed each proposed system in turn, meeting with the Army and its contractors, and found that it would not contribute to US national security. Either it would not have the ability to handle the ‘traffic’ of the many hundreds of Soviet warheads, or it would have an Achilles Heel that was subject to destruction so that the defensive system was a much easier target than the undefended United States. In September 1967, President Lyndon Johnson’s defense secretary announced that it was necessary to deploy a ‘light area defense’ against a Chinese ICBM that was even then on the launch pad and might be launched within a few weeks. Indeed, it took 11 years for China to deploy an ICBM. When the Nixon Administration took office in January, 1969, it paid attention only to a small part of the SMP’s analysis that was very negative on the benefits of deploying the Army SENTINEL system. Since SENTINEL had many fewer interceptors than the Soviet deployed warheads, it could readily be overcome. SENTINEL had other flaws as well. But the National Security Council staff in the Nixon White House argued that because the system that they decided to deploy with the same technology but with a different purpose – SAFEGUARD – had more interceptors than the Soviets were expected to throw at those 150 Minuteman missiles, it could succeed in its task. Predictable failure if the number of interceptors is less than the number of attack warheads does not imply successful defense if interceptors outnumber attacking warheads. They missed an even simpler point: the individual missile silos and the control centers were hard to 1000 psi (about 70 atmospheres of overpressure from a nuclear blast), while the two radars to be deployed with SAFEGUARD (both of which were essential to the operation of the system) were hard at best to 25 psi. A warhead of similar accuracy as would destroy a missile silo could have about 2% of the yield and could still confidently destroy one of the radars at the same distance. Or the same warhead could be detonated about three times as far from the radar and still destroy it. And to destroy a single target, the offense can use tactics such a ‘ladder down’ 1 that would require at most ten warheads to nullify the entire defense, compared with the 150 or 300 that would be needed to destroy 150 silos.

1

This involves scheduling a number of re-entry vehicles (RVs) “to approach the target in rapid succession. The first RV is detonated just outside the range of the defense; the fireball produced by this first detonation masks the approach of the second RV, which in turn detonates a bit lower. This detonation marks the approach of a third RV to a point a bit lower, and so on. Eventually the target is reached” [1].

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David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Nixon Administration, testified that although the SAFEGUARD System might not be perfect, it needed to be deployed in order to develop the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) software. Gerard Smith, in the negotiation of the ABM Treaty, was persuaded to testify that deployment of SAFEGUARD was essential for the success of the arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. So the system was funded by Congress, deployed and operated for a time variously stated as days to months before it was de-funded and eventually dismantled. Clearly education was required, and not only for the administration but also and especially for the Congress. In part over dissatisfaction with lack of public support from PSAC for the Nixon ABM program and for the commercial Supersonic Transport aircraft (SST), President Nixon abolished PSAC and the Office of Science and Technology (OST) in early 1973, thereby denying the entire government of the advice and reports, both private and public, of that organization. But the tradition of independent testimony to congressional committees on national defense programs had been set and continued.

2. The Need for an Independent Source of Technically-Informed Advice Kurt Gottfried, Professor of Physics at Cornell University, in 1982 took a sabbatical with the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) – a year that he wanted to devote to work on national security and arms control. He asked my advice on the particular topic, and I suggested space weapons and anti-satellite capability were closely linked and a field that really demanded more understanding [2]. Kurt found this reasonable and we worked closely together for a year with what I think was a very fruitful outcome in my testimony of May 18, 1983, at which I presented a Draft Treaty to ban space weapons and anti-satellite tests [3]. Kurt and UCS had asked Leonard C. Meeker, former State Department Legal Advisor, to help draft that treaty, so we avoided many of the problems that amateurs might have encountered. Our work on limiting space weapons and arms control was well under way when President Reagan announced his concept of an SDI that would be an impenetrable barrier to Soviet nuclear weapons. After that announcement we worked with Hans Bethe of Cornell University and Henry Kendall of MIT and UCS to produce analyses of space-based missile defense, with a UCS report (and erratum) by that name in March 1984, followed in October 1984 by The Fallacy of Star Wars. The Heritage Foundation had been established in 1973 with a novel concept of having young staff members who would provide topical, timely few-page ‘briefs’ on matters relevant to congressional legislation. Unfortunately, the staff and the papers often showed little relation to technical reality. Kurt and I thought that it would be valuable to create a counterpart to provide timely, objective material on national security programs with a substantial technical component. We pondered this and with the assistance of the late Frank Long, former PSAC member and Deputy Director of the Arms Control Agency, and with the cooperation of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, we formulated in August 1984 a draft proposal ‘For a New Center in the Area of International Security Affairs’ that we called provisionally ‘The XYZ Center’. We then adopted the working name ‘Center for Rational Security Policy’. We discussed this over the months with potential funding sources and individuals who thought that it might fit in existing organizations or in a


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university. Discussions with university colleagues revealed, however, that departments dominate universities and that good young people who work in such programs from a departmental base have great difficulties being promoted and this reduces very much the involvement of people until they achieve tenure. So we were back to the proposal for a free-standing center. We traveled to MIT July 1986 to discuss this with Jerome Wiesner, who had been John F. Kennedy’s Science Advisor and Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. Wiesner asked which of us was going to give up his current job to head the Center. Neither Kurt nor I was willing to do this, and so the Center was never born. Kurt, particularly, continued to work with UCS, and two Cornell physics PhDs, Lisbeth Gronlund and David Wright, later joined UCS and concentrated on national security problems. Twenty years ago they helped to create an annual one-week International Summer Symposium on Science and World Affairs [4] to bring new people, especially foreign scientists, into independent national security activities, and this continuing activity has been, in my opinion, extremely successful. In recent years, to some extent the goal of the XYZ Center has been met by timely, topical papers from UCS, from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), from the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and a few other organizations, but not at the level and with the staff we envisaged for the XYZ Center.

3. Assessing Countermeasures to BMD. An example of a longer term but highly successful product is the volume Countermeasures published by a UCS-MIT collaboration in the year 2000 [5]. The 11 authors included several who had had intimate involvement in various US missile programs and in missile defense, together with several who did not hold and had never held US government clearances. In this way it was possible without transferring any Secret (‘Classified’) information to use basic physics to set limits on the performance of a defense and to provide concrete examples that would in any case be apparent to the technical leadership of any offensive missile program, of countermeasures that could defeat defenses that were not designed to handle them. One of the countermeasures was that identified in 1953 – the use of anti-simulation in the form of inflated aluminum-coated plastic balloons to mimic similar balloons around the actual warheads. But here the concept was fleshed out with the details of such balloons that NASA had developed and flown for the purpose of measuring air density at satellite altitudes. Substantial analysis was done to determine whether adequate simulation required a small battery and resistive heater for matching the heat transfer from a warm warhead inside the shielding balloon. Figures 1 to 4, previously published in Countermeasures [5], give examples of some of the technical evaluation work reported in that document.

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Figure 1. Cover page of the Countermeasures Report [5].

Figure 2. Figure 7.1 of Countermeasures [5]. Data presented are for large bomblets (10 kg). Small bomblets are about 1 kg.


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Figure 3. Figure 8-1 of Countermeasures [5]. Photograph of NASA Air Density Explorer balloons, first launched in 1961.

Figure 4. Figure H-2 of Countermeasures [5].Within less than a minute of deployment of the balloon, the temperature of the antisimulation balloon and of the empty balloon has stabilized to within 0.01°. Note that the entire range of temperatures covers a band of 0.4° − difference totally unobservable by any seeker involved in the National Missile Defense system.

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Because the missile defense system was promised to protect not only against ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads, but those with chemical and biological weapon (BW) payloads, the team considered an ICBM configured for militarily significant delivery of BW. It became clear that maximum BW effectiveness in attack on a city would be achieved not with a single warhead containing 500 kg of anthrax or smallpox, but with dozens or hundreds of small re-entry vehicles, each equipped with its own heat shield so that the payload would survive re-entry. The natural way of handling these multiple bomblets would be to disperse them, for instance from a slowly rotating carrier attached to the third stage of the rocket, as soon as the stage had reached its final velocity and was falling toward the target at ICBM range. In this way, with a 2000 second flight time, dispersal of 2 km would be achieved with a transverse speed of 1 m/s. Each of the bomblets would then penetrate through the atmosphere to the ground, where it would be activated to disseminate the BW payload, just as bomblets that had been developed by the United States in its abandoned and now proscribed BW program had been configured in the 1960s. The destructive capability of a smaller-payload multiple bomblet attack would be greater because there would be no enormous excess of BW (‘overkill’) in the body of the plume that would stretch from the impact point or the in-air dissemination point of the massive 500-kg BW payload of the single warhead system. In addition to the increase in destructive capability of a single ICBM-carrying BW agent, this approach would make the BW attack immune to the mid-course missile defense system (and to any terminal system operating within the atmosphere). It may be an indication of the (long delayed) effectiveness of the Countermeasures study that the Missile Defense Agency no longer claims that the defense it is deploying will protect against BW attack by long-range missiles.

4. Summary This paper has discussed a number of examples of technical analysis relating to WMD threat assessment in which I have been personally involved. I hope that this rather detailed and personal history provides an indication of the broader development of independent technical analysis of national security programs in the United States.

References [1] [2]

[3]

[4] [5]

Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz, Ballistic Missile Defense., Brookings Institution, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, 1984, pp 117-118. R.L. Garwin, The Militarization of Space, testimony given at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing, before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations and Environment, 09/20/82 pp 56-60. Available at http://www.fas.org/rlg/092082mos.htm. R.L. Garwin, A Treaty Limiting Antisatellite Weapons, oral testimony for a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 18, 1983. Available at http://tinyurl.com/6qkf2e or http://www.fas.org/rlg/051883TLAW_Draft_Treaty_Limiting_ASAT_Weapns.pdf. http://www.summersymposium.org. A.M. Sessler (Chair of the Study Group), J.M. Cornwall, R. Dietz, S.A. Fetter, S. Frankel, R.L. Garwin, K. Gottfried, L. Gronlund, G.N. Lewis, T.A. Postol, and D.C. Wright, Countermeasures. A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System, UCSMIT Study, Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, April 2000. Available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/cm_all.pdf.

Section 2 Chemical and Biological Weapons



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Scientists and Chemical Weapons Policies J.P. PERRY ROBINSON SPRU – Science & Technology Policy Research, University of Sussex, UK

Abstract. Roles for independent scientists in the formation of public policy on chemical weapons are specified by identifying different types of risk associated with chemical weapons and asking whether independent scientists could contribute usefully to their assessment and therefore to their management. Attention is paid to three sources of novel risk: the changing utility of chemical weapons; changing science and technology; and CW arms control. Having particular regard to the disappointing outcome of the April 2008 conference to review the operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and to the impending shift in the primary focus of the CWC oversight organization from disarmament to non-proliferation, twelve different roles are suggested. These include work on better implementation of the ‘general purpose criterion’, on expansion of the CWC Schedules, and on convergence of the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. Keywords. Biological Weapons Convention, chemical warfare, Chemical Weapons Convention, disarmament, Harvard Sussex Draft Convention, nonproliferation, toxin.

Introduction The Pugwash organization of scientists began in the mid-1950s mainly as reaction to the increasing dependence of security policy on nuclear weapons. As well, its attention to the formation of policy also for chemical and biological weapons has been active and continuous for more than 40 years [1]. In regard specifically to chemical weapons (CW) the present paper takes themes from that past work1 to address the subject before the present workshop, ‘The role of independent scientists in assessing the threat of WMD’. I start by stating the obvious. ‘Assessing the threat’ means gauging the capabilities and intentions of people possibly determined to do us harm. It is people, not things, that have to be at the focus of such assessment: inanimate objects can intend nothing and, in themselves, can therefore pose no threat. So it is not the threat of WMD that this workshop is actually about, but rather the threat of WMD when possessed by enemies. We can thus see at once that feasible roles in threat assessment for independent scientists are limited. Assessing the intentions of potential adversaries is the domain of Intelligence and, by definition, people who are ‘independent’ are kept out of that domain, privy to little of the otherwise unavailable information essential to threat assessment. The reasons for this do not need reciting here.

1

Drawn mainly from an overview by the present author [2].

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J.P. Perry Robinson / Scientists and Chemical Weapons Policies

However, threat without agency is ‘risk’,2 and risk can most certainly inhere to WMD, chemical weapons among them. Without a contributing assessment of risk – of the damage that CW could cause and the probability of its occurrence – a CW threat could not be defined and would therefore remain unassessable. The role in CW riskassessment of scientists who are independent of salient institutional or other vested interests is, I believe, crucial. For if in fact they had no role in assessing pertinent risks, neither the credibility nor the reliability of the threat assessment could, in the peculiar field of CW, be great. I also think that professionals in threat assessment do their customers no service at all when, as sometimes seems to happen, they disregard the distinction between threat and risk. That way lies exclusion of the input that independent scientists can, should and must make. Independent scientists have on occasion generated careful WMD risk assessments only to find their work ignored and sometimes even actively suppressed. A common mechanism of suppression is classification – imposing a security marking on the product, perhaps on grounds of ‘proliferation sensitivity’ or other such impressivesounding abstraction, thereby depriving the product of the readership for which it had been intended.3

1. Emergent and Changing CW Risks The utilities of chemical weapons today are not the same as those of the Cold War, so, from the standpoint of NATO, the risks that CW now display are also different. And not only has CW utility been changing; so also, to great effect, has applicable technology. If CW policy-making is to remain sound, there is therefore a continuing need, as the context changes, for CW risk assessment. This need is accentuated by developments at the political level. Prominent here are the achievements this past decade of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (the OPCW), which is the intergovernmental body headquartered in The Hague that is responsible for overseeing implementation of the 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (the CWC). It is no longer unthinkable or hopelessly idealistic to envisage a world free of chemical weapons. Of the 71,000-plus agent-tonnes of chemical weapons declared to the OPCW by CWC States Parties,4 a good 40 percent, plus most 2

This notion I owe to Kai-Bastian Ilchmann, whose doctoral dissertation, Biothreat and Policy Pathways: Influences upon current bioterrorism policies in the UK, is nearing completion at the University of Sussex. 3 Examples include studies of bioterrorism done under EU auspices in 2002 [3] and during 2004-2007 [4]. 4 Article III.1(a) of the CWC requires each state party to declare to the OPCW detailed information about any chemical weapons it possessed or that otherwise existed on its territory within a month of the treaty having entered into force. Six of the now-184 States Parties made such declarations: Albania, India, Libya, Russia, South Korea and the USA. Any state party is entitled to insist that the OPCW keeps some or all of the information that it declares out of the public domain, and some parties have done so, a consequence being that a dependable country-by-country breakdown of the total declared stocks cannot be compiled from open sources. Here, however, are some plausible-seeming estimates made from the best available data: Russia, 56 percent by weight of all the declared chemicals; USA, 39 percent; Libya, 2.0 percent (98 percent of it comprising precursors, however, not actual CW agent); South Korea, 1.5 percent; India, 1.5 percent; and Albania, 0.02 percent. An idea of the military significance of those holdings follows from the total quantity of mustard and nerve gases used by Iraq during its war with Iran in the 1980s. That quantity appears to have been around 2540 agent-tonnes, which is equivalent to about 3.6 percent of all the stocks declared to the OPCW.


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of the declared factories,5 have by now been eliminated under international supervision. So – utility, technology and arms control: it is important to examine these factors more closely for their likely effects on CW risk. From this should follow a fuller appreciation of roles for independent scientists in CW policy formation.

2. New Uses for Chemical Weapons We need no reminding that the very nature of warfare has been changing in recent years. Has this meant that chemical weapons are now more suited or less suited to the types of armed conflict for which NATO is obliged to prepare? Either way, CW risks will have changed, necessitating new assessment. Something of a parallel can be seen in the shift from ‘massive retaliation’ to ‘limited war’ doctrine that occurred in the West towards the end of the 1950s. This shift elevated the status of chemical (and biological) weapons in Western military thinking, causing new utilities to be seen for them, especially in Third World settings. The UK, for example, started moving towards a secret CW rearmament programme.6 Today, a new type of organized violence is taking the place of those confrontations between highly disciplined and technologically advanced armed forces that characterized the later Cold War. Conflicts these past two decades in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the horn of Africa, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Angola, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and post-invasion Iraq have eroded formerly clear distinctions between war, organized crime and large-scale violation of human rights. These new wars are fought by seeking political control through the displacement, or worse, of civilian populations and through the sowing of fear and hatred [6]. Chemical weapons, with their areaeffectiveness and terrorizing potential, seem particularly amenable to such objectives, so they may conceivably have a greater affinity to the new wars than they did to the old, and, notwithstanding the CWC, the weapons could therefore have an expanding future. It is a future that seems already to have begun: instances of ‘new’ chemical warfare include episodes in Iraqi Kurdistan, in southern Africa, in Bosnia and perhaps in Chechnya [7], and further chemical-warfare allegations have been emanating from Sudanese, Israeli, Palestinian, Baluchi, Lebanese, US/Iraqi and, once again, Sri Lankan sources [8]. The emotiveness of CW may mean that, in fact, some or all of the allegations are mistaken or else are false, put out as ‘black’ propaganda. Investigation by independent scientists has contributed to an understanding of some of these allegations, notably in Kurdistan [9], Bosnia [10] and Israel [11], as it did, too, for the ‘Yellow Rain’ toxin-warfare allegations in southeast Asia during the late 1970s and early1980s [12].

5 Article III.1(c) of the CWC requires each state party to declare any chemical weapons production facility it had possessed or controlled at any time since 1 January 1946 having a production capacity greater than one tonne per year. Twelve States Parties have made such declarations: Bosnia & Herzegovina, China, France, India, Iran, Japan, Libya, Russia, Serbia & Montenegro, South Korea, the UK and the USA. The Japanese declaration concerned solely the facility built by Aum Shinrikyo, the cult that was responsible for the terrorist releases of sarin nerve-gas in Matsumoto in June 1994 and in the Tokyo subway in March 1995. Evidently China, France, Iran, the UK and the former Yugoslav republics had destroyed their stocks before the CWC entered into force, as they would otherwise have had to declare stocks under CWC Art. III.1(a). Of the states that are not parties to the CWC as of November 2008, those understood to be current CW-possessors are Egypt, Israel, North Korea and Syria, with Iraq as a former possessor. 6 Which, however, it effectively abandoned in 1968 [5].

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Another area in which independent scientists can contribute to assessment of the risks in emergent new utility is the match between offensive properties of accessible toxic chemicals and the purposes to which such chemicals might be put under realistic scenarios of possible future conflict, having full regard to the practical problems of disseminating chemicals against targets, and to the factors that determine target uptake. During the Cold War, the primary criterion of the CW utility of a toxic chemical was whether the chemical was aggressive enough in its effects to make weapons disseminating it competitive, in quantitative casualty-producing terms or other such measures of tactical efficacy, with the modern conventional weapons that might otherwise be preferred. Not a great many such toxicants exist [13]. In ‘new wars’, however, it is not so much relative aggressivity that would usually determine the utility and therefore the value of chemical weapons but rather such other factors as accessibility or availability of the weapons and their terrorizing potential. A wide variety of toxic industrial chemicals and other chemicals not hitherto regarded as CW agents might thus find application in new-war contexts, as, most recently, chlorine – that long-obsolete, by old-war standards, killer gas that was briefly weaponized during the First World War has done in Iraq. Relative aggressivity may still be important, but the more central matter for assessment may be psychomotive power [4], for example, rather than casualty power. A relevant consideration is whether such new-war chemical agents are or are not captured by the Schedules of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Those of them that lie outside the Schedules would of course still fall within the general purpose criterion that sets the comprehensive scope of the Convention, but in that case the practical and administrative difficulties of enforcing the prohibitions could mean that the CWC did not significantly reduce the risk. Quite another type of novel utility now becoming manifest is the emerging role of chemical weapons, not in the hands of terrorists or other new-war aggressors as just described, but for purposes of counter-terrorism. This utility has demonstrably become a stimulus to rich-country uneasiness with the CWC [14]. It is rooted in past counterinsurgency applications of toxic chemicals, which reach back through the Vietnam War to British, French, Italian and Spanish use of toxic chemicals in colonial situations – a utility that the CWC was intended to suppress. Its re-emergence in counter-terrorist guise is to be seen in the proliferation of weapons based on Agent CR, evident each year in that part of the OPCW Annual Report addressing the declarations of ‘riot control agents’ required under CWC Article III.1(e), for the extreme aggressiveness and other properties of CR have caused it to be widely rejected as suited to civil police use. Police forces in the UK, for example, are equipped either with Agent CS or with PAVA (pelargonic acid vanillylamide) for law-enforcement use, and, although the UK has also declared Agent CR to the OPCW as a ‘riot control agent’, it has issued the agent only to its military forces, for counterterrorism. The growing counterterrorist utility of chemical weapons is further evident in the vigorous advocacy to be heard in some quarters for the arming of counterterrorist forces with more advanced types of ‘non lethal’ toxic weapon. The readiness with which the US Marine Corps has taken to toxin weapons of this type – devices disseminating Agent OC – seems indication of a trend. So, perhaps, is the absence of any serious criticism of the Russian government for having authorized use of toxic chemicals other than riot-control agents by the spetsnaz forces that, on 26 October 2002, liberated 634 of the people taken hostage by Chechen separatists in a Moscow theatre.7 All but five of the other 129 hostages were killed by the toxicant used, which is said to have been an agent “based on derivatives of 7

For a documented account of international reactions to this episode, see [15].


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fentanyl” that had been developed by USSR special services.8 Comparable in some respects, if very different in others, is a counterterrorist utility for toxic weapons that Israel has demonstrated in its espousal, following the Munich Olympics outrage in August 1972, of assassination as a major tool in counterterrorism [17]. Exacerbating the new-utility risk is the increasing dependence of some countries, not only on state forces for law enforcement including counterterrorism, but also on the private military contractors who have been providing security services at local, national and even global level. The potential value and, therefore, take-up of ‘non lethal’ chemical weapons by such contractors, who may be regulated less stringently than military or police forces, has become a matter of expressed concern [18]. It is unfortunate that the interest in counterterrorist CW should be growing just as a CW-free world is coming within reach. Risk as well as conceivable benefit attaches to counterterrorist CW. So both now need assessing as a matter of urgency, independently of any interests vested in ‘non lethal’ weapons technology.

3. Change in Science and Technology Of the ways in which scientific and technological (S&T) change could affect CW risk, one may think especially of knowledge newly gained in the life sciences suggesting novel modes of attack that could be the basis for militarily or politically attractive new forms of weapon. For example, if a new molecule is discovered that can exert novel disabling effects on the human body at uncommonly low dosage, attempts to weaponize it may well ensue. Albert Hofmann’s discovery of LSD in 1943 is a case in point, although half a decade elapsed before weaponeers took notice. Of course many considerations other than novelty or intensity of effect determine the usefulness of a new weapon, so the new science is not itself the source of risk that is here suggested. But it would be a step towards it; and many such can be envisaged.9 Again, it is the general purpose criterion of the CWC that is the international safeguard. But it is a safeguard only if it can be activated, and this requires continual monitoring of scientific and technological change for any new development that might challenge the CWC regime. This is a task that cannot reliably be left to security authorities or to international civil servants alone, simply because their surveillance of new science is unlikely to be sufficient. The scientific community at large must also be involved.10 Such a role for independent scientists is explicitly recognised in the CW policies of some countries. In the UK, for instance, the National Authority established in accordance with CWC Article VII.4 has an independent Advisory Committee mandated to “advise on technical developments which may have potential application in chemical weapons” [21]. Technical developments of that kind may originate in causes that have nothing to do with CW. Whether new or old, a particular piece of scientific knowledge may find more than one practical application, meaning that technologies embodying the knowledge may be multipurpose. The chemical dimethyl methylphosphonate is a valuable flame retardant 8

A recent publication in the medical literature identifies the agent used – without, however, citing any authority for the information – as something called “Kolokol-1 […] containing carfentanil” [16]. 9 A particularly rich recent source of information on advances in technology that may be applicable to chemical as well as biological weapons is the Lemon-Relman report of 2006 from the US National Academies [19]. 10 This was a matter explored by the UK CWC National Authority Advisory Committee during the October 2001 Sussex workshop on the general purpose criterion [20].

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much used to reduce the flammability of garments or of insulating materials in buildings, yet it can also be made into nerve gas. Thiodiglycol is a solvent used in ballpoint-pen inks and in the dyeing of textiles, but it is also just one chemical step short of mustard gas. Chlorobenzalmalononitrile is a sensory irritant widely used by civil police forces in CS spray and other such devices for law enforcement, but it can also be used for offensive battlefield purposes as payload for artillery shell or aircraft bombs. All three chemicals are thus manifestations of ‘dual-use’ technology of which one application is in chemical weaponry and the other for valued civil purposes. Controlling dual-use technology is the primary function of CW anti-proliferation and arms-control measures, but these can work only if the duality is properly recognised. Can this be achieved without the involvement of independent scientists? To conclude this brief treatment of S&T change, it is instructive to look at how NATO has approached such risk-assessment problems in the past. One way has been to assemble working parties of scientific and operational experts and ask them to extrapolate into the future from a foundation of present knowledge and experience. An early instance was the precursor of the subsequent Long-Term Scientific Studies, namely the Von Kármán Committee that was tasked by the NATO Military Committee in 1960 to “develop an estimate of the possible and probable scientific progress to be expected in the next decade”. The Committee’s report in 1961 is described on the website of the NATO Research & Technology Organisation [22] as “the first multi-national attempt to estimate the impact of scientific and technological advances on military capability”. It had 14 working groups that met in March 1961, one of which addressed Chemical, Biological and Radiological Defence. Asked to forecast scientific trends to the 1970-75 period and to predict their practical effect on CBR defence, this working group chose to envisage different categories of possible CBR attack against which defence was required, the forecasting exercise then proceeding through eight areas of defence requirement: (1) detection, (2) active neutralization of attack, (3) protective equipments and materials, (4) palliatives, (5) remedial measures, (6) surveillance, (7) large scale decontamination, and (8) means of agent identification. Each area was considered for each of three categories of attack, which, for the CW part of the study [23], were these: x

x x

Type A: “Direct attack on small areas (up to 1 km2, say) with respiratory agents. Rapid coverage of the whole area with vapour or quickly-evolved aerosols would be aimed at, in order to achieve maximum surprise against the enemy in the area (surprise is not essential, however, if the enemy is not provided with respirators).” Type B: “Direct attack with agents acting through the skin (areas up to the order of 100 km2).” Type C: “Off-target attack (areas up to the order of 100,000 km2) with respiratory agents of high toxicity or effectiveness (at least an order higher than the present nerve agents). Surprise against an enemy possessing respirators would be achieved by this method, because the attack is not observed and the agent arrives on target in very small but effective concentrations, which are not detected by the senses nor, quickly enough, by artificial means.”

That categorization of attack modes would have been rooted, if not in the actual CWuse doctrine or existing CW capability of possessor states, then at least in study of feasibility. Type C is the category that surprises some people today, for there is a tendency to portray CW as of only limited effect, hardly even WMD at all. Was it unrealistic, therefore, of the working group to anticipate the possibility of Type C attacks during the coming 10 to 15 years? The answer is probably not, for in 1968 chemical weapons


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comprising dry-agent spraytanks mounted on Phantom strike aircraft and charged with Agent PG were tested over caged monkeys and other animals at sea off Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands; and the test data indicated a 30 percent casualty rate over 2,400 km2 per weapon [24]. Agent PG (previously known as UC) is staphylococcal enterotoxin B, an incapacitating agent whose median effective inhalation dose in man has been estimated to be at least three orders of magnitude smaller than the corresponding median lethal dose of nerve-agents such as sarin or Agent VX [25]. Other such superpotent substances falling within the scope of the CWC include botulinal toxins such as the preparation known as Agent XR that was weaponized by the United States as part of its erstwhile chemical/biological-weapons programme, but there is no information in the open domain about their efficacy in Type C attacks. That being the case, should not independent scientists now revisit that 47-year-old categorization in order to form a view on the relevance of Type C chemical weapons to today’s risk assessments? Perhaps Agents PG and XR have by now been superseded as the best exemplars of the category, but, even if they have not, any continuing possibility of Type C weapons would seem to constitute a risk that is not being managed with all the available tools, including those that have been furnished by the CWC.

4. CW Arms Control The CWC is the cornerstone of today’s array of international arms-control measures applicable to CW, alongside the 1925 Geneva Protocol and such plurilateral initiatives as the Australia Group, as well as UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and its successors. Taken together, these measures have made CW increasingly difficult to acquire, develop, produce, retain or use. One may think, therefore, that CW risks have, in general, been reduced by CW arms control. Yet by the same token, shortcomings in the CWC regime may themselves constitute novel forms of CW risk and therefore require careful assessment. Here is another possible role for independent scientists. What is the most serious risk of this type has already been alluded to: shortcomings in applying the ‘general purpose criterion’. The scope of the CWC’s prohibitions is impressively comprehensive, for, as well as embracing the familiar CW agents and production intermediates listed in the CWC Schedules, it extends to dualuse chemicals without at the same time restricting their civil application, as well as to other toxic chemicals that, for reasons of history, novelty or secrecy, remain unlisted in the Schedules. All of this has been made possible through use of the general purpose criterion, whereby all toxic chemicals, and precursors from which they can be made, are subject to the treaty’s provisions “except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes”, as CWC Art.II.1(a) puts it. But, obvious though the benefits of this comprehensiveness are, two great obstacles are being allowed to get in its way. One is that, as a matter of practical administration, it is not at all easy to devise and execute effective policies for applying the general purpose criterion adequately, and only a small minority of CWC States Parties have yet managed to implement it into their domestic law. The other obstacle is the evident reluctance of some CWC States Parties, notably India, to acknowledge that the scope of the treaty is not set just by the Schedules. The final document of the recent Second CWC Review Conference (7-18

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April 2008) gave some recognition to the importance of the criterion but failed to envisage ways out of the present predicament. It is not at all clear why those States Parties that do so have obstructed proper implementation of the criterion. So central is it to the effective working of the CWC that treaty-wrecking objectives have to be suspected. The Second CWC Review was quinquennial opportunity to look further into the future than the OPCW otherwise has time for: opportunity, then, to initiate any necessary repair work and otherwise prepare the ground for actions to countervail emergent risks or other adverse consequences of technical, military or political change. One such change is approaching fast, but, as with the predicament of the general purpose criterion, States Parties, not only in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), seemed unconcerned during the Review Conference. On 29 April 2012, according to the CWC and subsequent agreements about implementation, the last of the declared chemical weapons are due to have been destroyed and all the declared CW factories eliminated. That deadline is likely to be missed, but the States Parties responsible (Russia and/or the USA) have convincingly demonstrated their continuing commitment, nonetheless, to the disarmament goal. If not in 2012, that goal will certainly be achieved some years later on. When it has been achieved, the OPCW will have discharged what has long been thought of as its primary function, that of overseeing CW disarmament. The Organization will then be set to enter a future that surely needs to be mapped out well ahead of time, since the bulk of its present activities, whether conducted by the OPCW inspectorate or by other headquarters staff, are strongly biased towards verification of stockpile-destruction and capabilityelimination. There will inevitably be a tendency to treat the transition as opportunity for cost-cutting and for downsizing the Organization’s staff. Yet what will then be the OPCW’s primary function will become even more important than it is now: verification of non-production – ascertaining or otherwise building confidence that rearmament is not happening through, especially, abuse of dual-use technology. This will require, above all, effective application of the general purpose criterion, as well as continuation and enhancement of the present industry controls. If the transition is to be effective in sustaining forward momentum towards a CWfree world and not simply regarded as a mere sloughing-off of old tasks, it will be prudent for friends of the CWC to seek an administrative or procedural innovation that would mark the transition, especially one that would have the effect of strengthening the norm against weaponization of toxicity that underpins the CWC. One area for such innovation is machinery for better ensuring compliance through stronger sanctions on non-compliance. Of course sovereign states do not readily commit themselves in advance to punitive or other reactive measures against one another. A possible way forward, then, is a mechanism for holding, not states, but individuals personally accountable for contravention of the CWC norm. Such an individual-responsibility approach is already discernible in international affairs. Individuals, or at least sub-state entities, in their identity as persons involved in WMD proliferation, are the main target of UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). In Iraq and in the Netherlands, individuals have been indicted, tried and convicted for CW-related crimes [26,27]. From among the several categories of stakeholder in the development of biotechnology, individual scientists are being made responsible for impeding access to ‘dual use’ materials thought helpful to bioterrorists. All of this is surely strengthening the norm and could be built upon.


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Yet the defining feature of a universal norm is not that it should dictate how particular individuals or groups behave, but rather how everyone should behave, high or low, head of state or simple citizen. All of us are responsible for the continued wellbeing of the norms against the weaponization of toxicity and other forms of disease, and the onus is therefore upon us all, individually, to uphold them. It is all very well saying that scientists need to think more about conceivable end-applications of their work and be taught about the international treaties that are meant to suppress chemical and biological weapons (CBW). Those treaties – the CWC and the 1972 Biological & Toxin Weapons Convention (the BWC) – codify the norms, but like the 1925 Geneva Protocol that outlaws use of CBW in war, they place their primary constraints on the behaviour of states, not of individuals. If the norm is to be strengthened, the overall regime must surely be developed so that its relevance to the individual as well as to the state becomes clear to all. This needs doing in step with the current moves towards enforceable codes of conduct for scientists, for if it is not those codes may come to be seen as ill-considered acts of discrimination, unpopular and ignored. A more compelling way of inserting the sanction of individual accountability into the regime is needed. Now that international criminal law is emerging from the constraints of the Cold War, just such a mechanism has become possible. It is a very simple one: a new international convention that would confer on national courts jurisdiction over individuals present in their national territory, regardless of their nationality or official position, who order, direct or knowingly lend substantial assistance to the acquisition, production or use of CBW anywhere. Such a convention might take various forms. One possible text, prepared with advice from an international group of eminent jurists, is the Harvard Sussex Draft Convention [28]. This has already attracted favourable notice from a number of governments and now constitutes the basis for a possible new initiative in the WMD area, perhaps by the European Union. Taken further forward, it could help secure the transition of the OPCW. One way or another, the basic norms on which the CWC and BWC both rest need reinforcing, given the climate of potentially adverse change within which they function. Let us remind ourselves of the reasons why CBW continue to carry grave implications for security – international, national and human security. It is not so much because some CBW are ‘weapons of mass destruction’ within the UN meaning of that expression. It is also because of another distinctive feature of CBW: their ability not necessarily to kill us in large numbers but rather to disable, even change, us. These weapons can attack life just as other weapons can, being capable of killing their victims no less dead than can heat, explosive blast, bullets or bayonets; but they work by targeting and then disrupting particular processes that contribute to life, which other weapons cannot do save by accident, not design. The nerve gases, for example, target nerve-signal transmission; the blood gases, cellular respiration mediated through the blood. So the idea started to take hold in the 1950s that other physiological systems might be disrupted, including ones governing the psyche or the will or ability to function properly, thereby furnishing disabling chemical weapons, perhaps in great variety. The old pre-CWC advocates of chemical weapons propagated the notion, which in some quarters persists to this day, that the effects of the weapons might therefore be tailored to suit different tactical or strategic purposes [29]. However, beyond ‘tear gas’, the disabling skin burns that mustard gas can cause, and the uncertain promise of the early psychotropic ‘incapacitating agents’, this did not begin to become a real option until the pace of change in applicable technology had

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accelerated during the latter part of the last century, around the time of negotiation of the 1972 BWC and its CW follow-on. It was becoming increasingly plain to those who followed such things then that advances in the life sciences, coupled with technologies that allow the analysis and construction of complex biologically active molecules, could eventually make it possible to design a chemical that would interfere with any life process that could be understood in molecular terms. It is exactly that form of increased understanding that today’s increasing convergence of biology and chemistry is providing. Because of convergence we may eventually be able to manipulate the processes of development, inheritance, reproduction, locomotion, sensation, cognition and any other process that keeps us working as normal human beings. The genes of otherwise harmless micro-organisms might be modified to express particular harmful molecules when they infect. The potential is there, inasmuch as it is not manifest already, for inducing many different forms of malfunction, maybe even ones that discriminate between ethnic groups. It is this potential for changing human beings and doing so in pursuit of who-knows-what aggressive strategy of subjugation or coercion that makes CW uniquely menacing [30,31,32]: weapons, in the extreme, of living death. The existence of the BWC is testimony to our sense that we need protection against that contingency. The CWC, in principle, can provide it and, for this reason, the CWC and its associated regime must be kept in the best shape possible. Other students of CW history may perhaps reach different conclusions about the object and purpose of the CWC, and therefore different assessments of the risk inherent in convergence. What the foregoing conception does is to point towards molecular dangers from within broad families of toxic chemical that, for the most part, lie outside the CWC Schedules and therefore outside the routine control procedures run by the OPCW. At first glance (and much more study is needed) these families comprise certain bioregulators and other bioactive chemicals of biological origin, as well as their synthetic analogues and also certain conceivable products of biotechnological processes. This whole category roughly corresponds to what the BWC means by ‘toxins’.11 It includes the CW agents that were mentioned earlier as exemplars of Type C chemical weapons, namely Agents PG and XR that, so conspicuously, are not listed in the CWC Schedules, despite one CWC State Party having maintained production capacity for each of them that, in 1970, exceeded one tonne per year.12 The convergence of biology and chemistry is an influence that may be moving such substances towards weaponization. May not a good way of reducing the risk of that happening be to promote convergence of the BWC and the CWC? Here is a policy question demanding the input of independent scientists.

5. Conclusion Nongovernmental scientists are, by and large, reluctant to engage themselves in public discourse on topics outside their immediate expertise. Most seem disinclined to accept 11 The BWC meaning of ‘toxin’, which extends to substances that are not called ‘toxins’ in other specialist communities, is set out in an international text published by the World Health Organization [33]. 12 Interdepartmental Political-Military Group, report to the [US] National Security Council, US Policy on Toxins dated 30 January 1970 [34]. This document, which records the “existing production capability” for PG as 600 pounds per month and for XR as 280 pounds per month, did not enter the public domain until well after the USA had made its initial declaration to the OPCW.


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that politicians, decision-makers and opinion-formers are often appallingly ignorant of even elementary scientific principles, let alone ones that shape technical aspects of CW risk. Pugwash grew in part because of this, as a way of stimulating greater participation by scientists in the shaping of WMD policies. When it comes to arms control, all of us, not only scientists, need reminding that treaties such as the CWC are engagements, not between governments, but between States Parties. Governments may represent States Parties in the fora of the OPCW, but organs of civil society are also elements of those same states, no less responsible for proper implementation of the treaty. If independent scientists can contribute, it would follow that they have an obligation to do so. The purpose of this paper has been to identify ways in which independent scientists can in fact contribute to implementation of the CWC and, more generally, to the formation of public policies for reducing the risks posed by the actual or possible existence of chemical weapons. A dozen such ways have been identified in earlier parts of this paper. In summary, and in the order identified, they are these: x x x x x x x x x x x x

Participating in the investigation of allegations of CW use. Identifying non-traditional CW agents or precursors for possible inclusion in the CWC Schedules. Assessing risks and benefits of counterterrorist CW. Monitoring S&T change for technical developments having potential application in chemical weapons. Identifying abusable dualities in applications of chemicals or of chemical and other technologies. Helping to determine whether the ‘Type C’ CW attack-mode should still be regarded as plausible, needing recognition in the CWC Schedules. Helping to identify, and assess as risks, shortcomings in the CWC regime. Contributing to a comprehensive investigation of the problems presented by the CWC’s ‘general purpose criterion’, and of remedies to them. Through international discourse with other scientists, advancing understanding of why there is such international variation in perceptions of the risk-reducing capacities of the general purpose criterion. Contributing to efforts to build on the opportunities presented by the impending transition of the OPCW’s primary function from verifying disarmament to verifying non-armament. Helping in efforts to strengthen the norm underpinning the CWC by inserting measures for individual (as well as state) accountability into the overall CWC regime. Exploring possible ways for promoting convergence between the CWC and the BWC.

These possibilities can be seen as challenges to independent scientists, both inside and outside Pugwash, who are concerned about chemical weapons and about other WMD.

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J.P. Perry Robinson, The impact of Pugwash on the debates over chemical and biological weapons, in Allison L.C. de Cerreño and Alexander Keynan (editors), Scientific Cooperation, State Conflict: The Role of Scientists in Mitigating International Discord, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 866 (1999), 224-52. J.P. Perry Robinson, Difficulties facing the Chemicals Weapons Convention, International Affairs 84 (2008), 223-39. EU Joint Research Centre and a consortium of the European Science and Technology Observatory, Scientific and Technological Advances Relevant to Bioterrorism, and Their Possible Impact on Vulnerabilities in EU Society: A Prospective Study, IPTS Seville, 29 November 2002. M.W. Leeuw (Project Coordinator), Final Report on European Commission Framework 6 project 502476, Assessment of the vulnerabilities of modern societies to terrorist acts employing radiological, biological or chemical agents with the view to assist in developing preventive and suppressive crisis management strategies (ASSRBCVUL), TNO, Rijswijk, 4 May 2007. Gradon Carter and Brian Balmer, Chemical and biological warfare and defence, 1945-90, in R. Bud and P. Gummett, (editors), Cold War, Hot Science: Applied Research in Britain’s Defence Laboratories, 1945-1990, Harwood Academic Publishers, Reading, UK, 1999, pp 295-338 at 298-99. Mary Kaldor, New & Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (second edition), Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2006. J.P. Perry Robinson, memorandum dated 17 February 2000 submitted to the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (session 1999-2000), Eighth Report: Weapons of Mass Destruction, London: Stationery Office, London, 25 July 2000, pp 203-206. News Chronology, The CBW Conventions Bulletin no. 66 (December 2004) through no. 78 (February 2008), passim. R.M. Black, R.J. Clarke, R.W. Read and M.T.J. Reid, Application of gas chromatography – mass spectrometry and gas chromatography – tandem mass spectrometry to the analysis of chemical warfare samples, found to contain residues of the nerve agent sarin, sulphur mustard and their degradation products, Journal of Chromatography A 662 (1994), 301-21. Alastair Hay, Surviving the impossible: the long march from Srebrenica. An investigation of the possible use of chemical warfare agents, Medicine, Conflict and Survival 14(2) (1998), 38-73. Alastair Hay, Rita Giacaman, Ramzi Sansur and Steven Rose, Skin injuries caused by new riot control agent used against civilians on the West Bank, Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 22(4) (October – December 2006), 283-291. Matthew S. Meselson and Julian Perry Robinson, The Yellow Rain affair: lessons from a discredited allegation, in Anne L. Clunan, Peter R. Lavoy and Susan B. Martin (editors), Terrorism, War, or Disease? Unravelling the Use of Biological Weapons, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, CA, 2008, pp 72-96. J.P. Perry Robinson, The chemical industry and chemical warfare disarmament: Categorizing chemicals for the purposes of the projected Chemical Weapons Convention, SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies no. 4 (1986), 55-104. Robert J. Elder, Jr, foreword to N.T. Whitbred IV, Offensive Use of Chemical Technologies by US Special Operations Forces in the Global War on Terrorism: The Nonlethal Option, The Maxwell Papers [Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air War College] no. 37, July 2006, pp iii-iv. J.P. Perry Robinson, Non Lethal Warfare and the Chemical Weapons Convention, a submission to the OPCW Open-Ended Working Group on Preparations for the Second CWC Review Conference, 24 October 2007. Available at http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/Papers/421rev3.pdf. James Geoghegan and Jeffrey L. Tong, Chemical warfare agents, Continuing Education in Anaesthesia, Critical Care & Pain 6 (2006), 230-34. Aaron J. Klein, Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel’s Deadly Response, Random House, New York, 2005, pp 104-11 and 205-8. Alan Pearson, Incapacitating biochemical weapons: science, technology, and policy for the 21st Century, Nonproliferation Review 13(2) (July 2006), 151-88. Stanley M. Lemon and David A. Relman (co-chairs), Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences, Institute of Medicine and National Research Council of the US National Academies, Committee on Advances in Technology and the Prevention of Their Application to Next Generation Biowarfare Threats, The National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2006. Julian Perry Robinson, What Should be the Scope of the CWC? A Workshop Report, The CBW Conventions Bulletin no. 55 (March 2002), 1-4. http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/energy/non-proliferation/cbw/national-authority/naac/terms-ofreference/page40779.html, accessed 5 November 2008.


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[22] http://www.rto.nato.int, accessed 31 October 2008. [23] UK Ministry of Defence Advisory Council on Scientific Research and Technical Development, paper no. SAC 1928, 11 February 1969, Future developments in chemical warfare: Extract from the Report of the von Kármán Committee 1961, in The National Archive, Kew, file WO 195/16864. [24] USA, Department of the Army, Fort Douglas, DTC Test 68-50, two vols, Desert Test Center, March 1969, as reported in: Ed Regis, The Biology of Doom, Henry Holt, New York, 1999, pp 204-206. [25] F.R. Sidell, E.T. Takafuji and D.R. Franz (editors), Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, a volume in Part I of the Textbook of Military Medicine series, [US] Department of the Army, Office of the Surgeon General, 1997, at pages 141 and 622. [26] Lisa Tabassi and Erwin van der Borght, Chemical Warfare as Genocide and Crimes against Humanity, The CBW Conventions Bulletin no. 74 (December 2006), 36-44. [27] Lisa Tabassi, The nexus between the OPCW and the International Criminal Court, The CBW Conventions Bulletin no. 75 (March 2007), 1 and 7-12. [28] Matthew Meselson and Julian Robinson, A Draft Convention to Prohibit Biological and Chemical Weapons under International Law, in R. Yepes-Enriquez and L. Tabassi (editors), Treaty Enforcement and International Cooperation in Criminal Matters, TMC Asser, The Hague, 2002, pp 457-69. [29] For example, Brig.-Gen. J.H. Rothschild, Tomorrow’s Weapons: Chemical and Biological, McGrawHill, New York, 1964. [30] Matthew Meselson and Julian Perry Robinson, Chemical warfare and chemical disarmament, Scientific American 242(4) (April 1980), 38-47 at p. 47. [31] J.P. Perry Robinson, Chemical, biological and radiological warfare: futures from the past, invited submission to the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (Chair: Olof Palme), September 1981. [32] Matthew Meselson, Averting the hostile exploitation of biotechnology, The CBW Conventions Bulletin no. 48 (June 2000), 16-19. [33] World Health Organization, Public health response to biological and chemical weapons: WHO guidance, WHO, Geneva, 2004, pp 214-16. [34] US Department of State, Office of the Historian, Foreign Relations of the United States: Nixon-Ford Administrations, volume E-2: Documents on Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 1969-1972 (2007), document 177.

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The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Role of Engineers and Scientists JiĜí MATOUŠEK EU Research Centre of Excellence for Environmental Chemistry and Ecotoxicology, Faculty of Science, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic

Abstract. Chemical weapons, like all military technology, are associated with activities of scientists and engineers. However, chemical weapons differ from any other military technology because they were invented, and their first mass use directly developed by famous chemists. The active contribution of engineers and scientists and their organisations in the negotiations on chemical disarmament, including drafting the Chemical Weapons Convention, is described. Their present and future role in implementing the Convention is analysed, taking into consideration the threats and benefits of advances in science and technology, and stressing the independent expertise of the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board. Keywords. Chemical Weapons Convention, engineers, scientists, NGOs, advances in science and technology, OPCW Scientific Advisory Board.

Introduction The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, referred to briefly as the Convention on General and Comprehensive Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, or Chemical Weapons Convention, abbreviated as CWC, was adopted in 1992 after negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (and previous multilateral negotiating fora in Geneva) which lasted nearly a quarter of a century. The delays were due not only to the then current East-West confrontation and the Cold War but also to the worldwide spread of the chemical industry and the relatively easy possibility of clandestine synthesis of chemical warfare agents in militarily-relevant quantities. This experience, and also experience with weak points of the previously adopted Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production and Stockpiling Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and of Their Destruction (BTWC)1, which lacked any objective verification mechanisms, has been reflected in very careful definitions and criteria, defining purposes not prohibited by the CWC, and a very complex and effective verification system. This is a very sophisticated and by no doubt also the best elaborated disarmament document that totally outlaws one important and very dangerous kind of weapon of mass destruction (WMD). It commits States Parties (SP) to eliminate their chemical weapon (CW) stockpiles and production facilities (CWPF). Both Review Conferences (2003 and 2008) reported generally good

1

Opened for signature in 1972, entered into force in 1975.

J. Matoušek / The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Role of Engineers and Scientists

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acceptance by the international community, showed positive results of implementation of the CWC provisions, and outlined future actions. Any arms control document, as for any functioning disarmament agreement, even if it is primarily a document of international law, is much more than just a legal document; it has political, military, military technological, military political, scientific and technological, economic, ethical and such like aspects also. It can be adopted and implemented only as a result of wide consensus of the international community, while it cannot exist without expertise in all the above-mentioned areas. The coherent formulation and concise regime of the CWC reflects the extremely valuable and effective contributions of well informed and concerned engineers and scientists and their national and international professional organisations. The latter include NGOs mainly in chemistry, chemical technology and allied branches associated with the development, production, use and protection against CW and other WMD. This paper describes the efforts made by the scientific and technological community to achieve a verifiable total and comprehensive ban of CW from the start of negotiations about the CWC, discusses activities involved in implementing the CWC as well as future tasks arising from the impact of scientific and technological development.

1. The Route to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Contribution of the International Community of Engineers and Scientists Beside the positive role of engineers and scientists in any arms control and disarmament issue, their negative role should also be mentioned. Any weaponry must have been designed by scientists and engineers at the relevant stages of scientific and technological development in their professional service in order to solve concrete demands for developing the technology of warfare. Mass use of chemical weapons could emerge only in the era of a chemical industry capable of delivering enough quantity of toxic chemicals (initially chlorine and phosgene) routinely produced as basic raw materials for syntheses of organic chemicals (originally organic dyestuffs). This prerequisite was most developed in Germany, which produced more than 90 per cent of the world production of synthetic dyestuffs in the second decade of the 20th century. The possibility of misusing this potential for weaponry was actually transformed into reality just shortly after the initial stage of the First World War (WW I) when the movements of big armies were stopped in the mud of the trenches. This was the impetus for developing new weapons able to overcome field fortifications. Chemical weapons with their widespread effects appeared on battlefields exactly at that time. It is typical, maybe only for chemical weapons, that they were not developed by any order of the military, and in this case also not following a wish of Emperor Wilhelm II. Rather, the first use of pernicious chemicals2 had been designed and developed from the original idea of scientists. The actual ‘Father of Chemical Warfare’ was Professor Fritz Haber (later Nobel laureate in chemistry for the synthesis of ammonia), then director of the Emperor Wilhelm Institute of Physical Chemistry and Electrochemistry in Berlin-Dahlem. He put together a staff of excellent scientists (among them some well-known Nobel laureates) – James Franck, Gustav Hertz, 2 Not to speak of the episodic use of irritants that had been started already in August 1914 by the French side, and was responded to several times by the Germans in 1914.

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Wilhelm Westphal and Richard Wilstätter – for designing scientifically the first use of chemical weapons. Industry was also represented – Professor Carl Duisberg, director of IG-Farben, was also a member of this group under Haber’s personal leadership. The idea for the first use (called Blasangriff in German) was the release on a wide front of gaseous chlorine from steel bottles. There is another interesting piece of evidence for the personal responsibility of Fritz Haber. Emperor Wilhelm asked Haber whether Germany’s international obligations would be breached by such use. It should be noted that the Declaration of the Peace Conference in The Hague, signed on July 29, 1899, contained an obligation for States Parties “not to use such projectiles, the only purpose of them is to disseminate asphyxiating or deleterious gases”. Furthermore, the Appendix of the IV Convention on the Principles of War on Land, signed in The Hague in 1907, contained in its Article 23 explicit prohibition of “use of poison or poisoned weapons”. Haber convinced the Emperor that “no munitions would be used”; thereby any doubts were diverted and preparations continued. Their result was the first mass use of chemical weapons by the Germans at Ieper (Ypres) in West Flanders on April 22, 1915, with the release of 168 metric tonnes of gaseous chlorine from steel bottles. The effect of this first act of chemical warfare was horrible: 15,000 casualties, among them 5,000 lethal ones, on the side of the British, French and Belgian Allies. By walking behind the green-greyish toxic plume, the German infantry penetrated 4 km into the depth of the enemy’s defence positions without firing a single shot. However, the military effect was greater than expected, so that chlorine was not utilised to try to break through the full depth of the Entente’s defence system. Having seen a new effective weaponry being used, none of the belligerents protested against chemical warfare. Quite the opposite: all other major belligerents, mostly SPs to the abovementioned agreements (France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, USA), gradually accepted this mode of warfare. Only the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) protested in its appeal of 1918 against chemical weapons that became standard weapons in many other countries after WW I. Shortly after constituting its foundation as the first universal international organisation, The League of Nations initiated the first negotiations for outlawing chemical weapons. The first modern valid arms control document, the Protocol banning use in war of asphyxiating and other toxic gases and bacteriological methods of warfare3, prohibited only the use of chemical weapons but not material preparations for chemical warfare. This left open the possibility of retaliation-in-kind, and has been shown not to be an effective instrument for prohibiting any CW use. The Protocol was violated by some of its SPs several times, starting with the use in 1935 of CW by Italy (incidentally the first country to have ratified it) in Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935, by Japan in China from 1937, and later by Iraq in the Iraq-Iran War in the 1980s. This Protocol was generally considered as prohibiting only the first use of such weapons because about one third of signatories ratified it with the reservation that they would not be bound by it in the case of the first use of CW by an adversary or its allies. In the post-WW II era, the UN General Assembly started discussions on the total and comprehensive ban of chemical and biological weapons as early as 1946. The negotiations were commenced at the multilateral negotiating body, the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee in Geneva, and continued in its successor bodies 3

Signed in Geneva, June 17, 1925; entered into force 1928.


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until the later Conference on Disarmament (CD). The first efforts addressed both chemical and biological weapons but in the late 1960s the problem of biological weapons was separated off, as the latter was then (i.e. in the time of the classical era of biological warfare, when its possible military value had been underestimated) considered as more easily solved. This enabled relatively quick adoption of the BTWC in 1972, though with all its gaps and weaknesses as mentioned above. The discussions and further negotiations on the main points of the future CWC started in the 1970s, while the deeper negotiations on its structure and contents commenced in the early 1980s. The CD had been precisely mandated by the UN General Assembly since 1984. The complex negotiations then lasted until 1992, after exploring many side-tracks, reflecting not only inherent difficulties of this issue but also the impact of the final years of the Cold War and East-West confrontation. The input of scientific and technological communities into the negotiations was undoubtedly crucial. Beside the personal engagement of military, scientific, technological and legal experts working in the national delegations who took an active part in the negotiations, with their backgrounds supported by domestic research institutes, academia, universities, industrial organisations and associations, and state offices, several prestigious international professional organisations of concerned scientists and engineers also contributed to the negotiations from their start. Among the prestigious international and leading national (research) institutes, organisations and programmes making major contributions to discussing the problems of CW and BTW, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) occupies the prime position. SIPRI was founded to commemorate 150 years of unbroken peace in Sweden and it is known worldwide for its impressive research and publication activity. Its Chemical and Biological (CB) Warfare Programme began in the late 1960s and is now one of SIPRI’s longest running programmes. Analyses devoted to various actual problems of chemical (CW) and biological and toxin weapons (BTW), and progress in BTWC and CWC negotiations and later in their implementation can be found in the respective chapters of all published SIPRI Yearbooks (since the first 1968/69) as well as in the series of CB Warfare Studies started in 1985, a couple of other previous and parallel books and other non-serial publications on various aspects of CW and BTW. These sources have been widely utilised as serious and fully reliable reference information by the whole community dealing with CB disarmament. The second most important programme relating to the old chemical and biological weapons (CBW) programme was obviously the Harvard Sussex Programme, which edited the quarterly CBW Conventions Bulletin (originally named CWC Convention Bulletin), another serious reference source on chronology, news, background information and comment on CBTW problems. The other institute worth naming is the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva. There are also other programmes contributing to CB weapons issues that have been active mainly in the last decade. Among these one cannot overlook the NATO Partnership for Peace Programme nor the NATO Programme for Security through Science that have organised frequent Advanced Research Workshops devoted to various aspects of CB disarmament and have also undertaken relevant educational activities. Among the national institutes and organisations known for their activities in organising periodic international conferences, congresses and symposia devoted to the issues of CB warfare, the prime position belongs to the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI, but previously the Swedish Defence Research Establishment FOA)

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which organises the CBW Protection Symposia in Stockholm every three years. These meetings constitute the biggest worldwide gathering of specialists on this topic, the latest having taken place in Gothenburg in 2007. A similar, slightly smaller NBC (nuclear, biological and chemical) event is organised also every three years in Finland by the chemical defence organisations, the latest being the 7th (NBC-2009) in Jyväskylä. A related periodic gathering in the Asia/Pacific region, organised since the late 1990s by the defence institutions in Singapore, is known as SISPAT. One cannot overlook the very active US organisation with links worldwide, Applied Science and Analysis (ASA) Inc., which organises the annual series of Chemical and Biological Medical Treatment Symposia (CBMTS), the first being in Spiez, Switzerland in 1994 and the recent ones dealing with CBR (chemical, biological and radiological) terrorism. This organisation also edits the ASA Newletter, which has been an important information source on various aspects of NBC protection and related problems for two decades. A very important series of symposia fully devoted to the destruction of CW, i.e. CW demilitarisation, is organised yearly by the British Defence Science and Technology Laboratories (Dstl). Another institute worth mentioning is the Illinois Institute of Technology Research Institute (IITRI) which has since 1996 organised four workshops on CB Agents – Detection and Decontamination (three in Chicago, USA, one in Brno, Czech Republic headed by the author). It is impossible not to mention the valuable contribution of the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) which in recent years has worked on destruction technologies. It has also worked on the actual problems of the impact of scientific and technological development on the CWC, including the developments in synthetic chemistry, problems of the changing face of chemical industry, developments in analytical chemistry, and verification issues. This latter issue is deeply studied also by the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), an organisation that deals with all aspects of verification. It is impossible to name all the organisations and institutes that make positive input but associations of chemical industry should be mentioned also. Among the prestigious international NGOs representing the community of scientists and engineers with an active input into CBW disarmament issues, pride of place belongs to the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, founded in 1957. Especially engaged in critical discussions and open exchange of views and standpoints has been the Pugwash Study Group on CB Disarmament, linking independent experts with negotiators in the CD at meetings convened at least once a year since the 1960s, mostly in Geneva, then also latterly in the Netherlands. Several joint SIPRI-Pugwash publications also contributed strongly to the formulation of the CWC. In the mid-1990s this forum was renamed the Pugwash Study Group on Implementation of the Chemical (1993) and Biological (1972) Weapons Conventions. Meetings continue normally twice a year, assessing all urgent aspects of implementation of the two Conventions, including identifying threats of scientific and technological development on the futures of both the CWC and BTWC. Another worldwide NGO of concerned scientists that made major contributions mainly in the time when the CWC was being negotiated is the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW), which then had a very large membership. The WFSW edited the Journal Scientific World, and its Standing Committee on Disarmament published two studies on the threat of chemical weapons and chemical disarmament (1983, 1986). Each of these studies was published in four languages (English, French, German and Russian), and were edited in London, Paris, Berlin and Moscow (with the


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author’s contribution). Total and comprehensive prohibition of CW has also been among the main goals of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (INES). This organisation was founded in 1991, with member organisations in about 60 countries on all continents. It contributes to the CW ban through its Working Group on Chemical Weapons (convened by the author), by dealing with this problem at INES events (for example the Workshop on CB disarmament at the INES Congress in Amsterdam, 1996), by the activities of its Council and Executive Committee, and by appealing to Parliaments to accelerate the ratification process to achieve the entry into force of the CWC in 1995. Important also are the links between, and representation of, the above-mentioned NGOs (mainly the WFSW) in the respective NGO Committees working in the headquarters of the United Nations (in New York, Vienna, and Geneva) to influence their engagement in the CB issues. It is impossible to mention all institutions and organisations contributing to the CW ban (including also, for example, Greenpeace International and Green Cross) but there is no doubt that without the engaged expertise of concerned professionals and their organisations, and state, public and private, national and international organisations and fora including NGOs, a document as sophisticated as the CWC could not exist at all.

2. Chemical Weapons Convention – Basic Facts The Chemical Weapons Convention opened for signature in Paris, on January 13, 1993 and entered into force on April 29, 1997. Its complexity is reflected in almost 200 pages of text, containing a Preamble, 24 Articles and three Annexes: On Chemicals (6 pp), On Implementation and Verification (105 pp), On Protection of Confidential Information (5 pp) [1]. The main pillars of the CWC are: x x x x

Verified destruction of chemical weapons and CW production facilities; (CWPF), i.e. disarmament. Verified non-production of CW, i.e. non-proliferation. Assistance and protection. International cooperation.

The spirit of this Convention, significantly influenced by scientific expertise, lies inter alia mainly in the method of defining the scope of the prohibition. The CWC is rather purpose- than chemical compound-oriented. This means that it is nothing like a list of prohibited compounds, as some less informed people might expect. The Convention’s leading principle, which is often reported as the General Purpose Criterion (GPC), is contained in the wording of Article II, paragraph 1, defining the purposes of the CWC among ‘Chemical Weapons’: “Article II DEFINITIONS AND CRITERIA For the purposes of this Convention: 1. “Chemical Weapons” means the following, together or separately: (a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under this Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes.

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(b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause….. (c) Any equipment specifically designed for use…”. Under purposes non-prohibited by the Convention according to Article II, paragraph 2 (a) – (d) are understood: “industrial, agricultural, research, medical, pharmaceutical or other purposes, protective purposes, namely those directly related to protection against toxic chemicals, “military purposes not connected with the use of CW and not dependent on the use of toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare as well as law enforcement including domestic riot control”. Toxic chemicals are further defined in Article II paragraph 2 as meaning: “Any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans and animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin or of their method of production and regardless of whether they are produced in facilities, in munitions or elsewhere”. From this explanation quoting relevant articles of the CWC, it is evident, consistent with the above-mentioned GPC, that the Convention is nothing like a list of prohibited compounds. It covers any toxic chemical intended to be used for chemical warfare (and therefore developed, produced and stockpiled), pursuant to Article II, paragraph 1 (a) and paragraph 2, even those not yet synthesised. This means that the CWC is open-ended and the prohibition covers any future scientific and technological development. In other words the Convention is ipso facto protected against the results of scientific and technological development. The most important toxic chemicals and their precursors endangering the CWC are listed within three Schedules, constituted according to the risk the chemicals pose for the Convention. Schedule 1 contains super-toxic lethal chemicals and key precursors that have no peaceful uses, Schedule 2 contains dual-use dangerous toxic chemicals and precursors produced in small quantities, and Schedule 3 lists toxic industrial chemicals that have been used for chemical weapons and their precursors and produced on a mass scale. A frequent misunderstanding is to consider the Schedules as something like lists of ‘prohibited compounds’, although it is explicitly stated in the CWC that “Schedules do not constitute a definition of CW”. However, the open-ended prohibition does not mean that toxic chemicals (including other than those contained in the Schedules) cannot appear on battlefields being used by non-States Parties, or less possibly by SPs breaching the CWC, or more possibly by terrorist groups. That is why scientific and technological development has to be very carefully watched, international verification measures extended, national authorities and operation systems established, and respective legislation adopted in order to enable prevention and an adequate and immediate response (repression, protection, rescue and recovery) in cases of emergency.


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3. Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Role of the International Community of Engineers and Scientists4 3.1 Facts about the Implementation of the CWC At present, there are 188 States Parties to the Convention. It is important that the Convention includes all P55 members of UN Security Council and the vast majority of states with declarable CWC facilities. Seven SPs (Russia, USA, India, Albania, South Korea, Libya and Iraq) declared possession of chemical weapons. Among SPs, there are 12 possessors of former (post 1946) CW production facilities: Russia, USA, India, South Korea, Libya, France, UK, China, Iran, Japan, Bosnia & Hercegovina and Serbia & Montenegro (the last two SPs declared one – i.e. the same – production facility). The CWC implementation and verification regime now covers over 98 % of the world’s population, but what is more important, 98 % of the world’s chemical industry. Reviewing the figure for the number of SPs, it is also important to note that there are 2 signatory states (inter alia Israel) that have not yet ratified the Convention and altogether 5 countries that have not even signed it. In addition to less important states it should be noted that to the non-signatories group belongs the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and also that the neighbours of Israel (Egypt and Syria) made their signatures conditional on Israel’s abandoning its nuclear weapons programme. Assessing the universality of the CWC (which is one of the requirements of the First Review Conference), it is interesting to compare the signatory states with those of other principal agreements on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as shown by Table 1. It seems that one could be satisfied with the relatively high number of SPs twelve years after entry into force, in comparison with other arms-control/disarmament agreements. Nevertheless, for the prevention of any use of CW, it is necessary to attain a higher number of SPs mainly because some of the above-mentioned important nonsignatories concentrated in the Near and Middle East and on the Korean peninsula are likely possessors of CW (not to speak of possession of another WMD in the case of Israel and North Korea). The most important data from the declarations of SPs (see Table 2) show the worldwide problems arising from the possession, storage and former production of CW, as well as from the spread of chemical industry. These problems affect not only the destruction of CW at present and in the near future but also the monitoring of the non-production of CW in the chemical industry in the future. Table 1. Universality: CWC Compared with Other Main Agreements on WMD Treaty

Entry into Force

SPs

Other Signatories

Non-Signatories

NPT

1970

190

0

5

BTWC

1975

163

12

20

CWC

1997

188

2

5

4 5

If it is not otherwise stated, the data are reported as of November 30, 2008. At the same time the nuclear weapons states recognised under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

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Table 2. Important Data from the Declarations by the SPs (as of June 30, 2009) Subject

Declaring SPs

Declared Sites

CW storage facilities

7

38

CW destruction facilities

6

37

CW production facilities

13

70a

Abandoned CW

3

35

Old CW

13

47

Schedule 1 chemicals

22

27


36

441


35

466

Discrete organic chemicals

80

4652

Chemical industry

a

Of the 70 reported (former) CWPFs, 62 are certified as already destroyed (43) or converted for peaceful purposes (19).

Verification of the destruction of CW stockpiles and of CW production facilities, as well as verification of non-production of CW by the peaceful chemical industry, is the concern of the main pillars of the Convention. The total number of sites declared by SPs that must be regularly or randomly inspected (over 5800) shows the heavy burden of necessary verification activities. At this stage of implementation, the inspections have been obviously concentrated on checking declarations, inspecting storage sites and destruction of CW stockpiles and CW production facilities and, in the chemical industry, on facilities producing scheduled chemicals. At present, the most important task is undoubtedly destruction of CW: Declared chemical agents: Destroyed: Declared munitions (containers) Destroyed

71,194 metric tonnes 32,819 metric tonnes (i.e. 46.1 %) 8.67 million items 3.88 million items (i.e. 44.8 %)

As expected, the destruction proceeds asymmetrically, with construction of destruction facilities meeting with domestic financial and technological difficulties and acceptance problems by local populations. The scheduled 10 year term set by the CWC for total CW destruction has not been met, and an allowed exemption to extend the destruction period for another 5 years has already been agreed for the Russian Federation and for the US. It seems now that it will be difficult for the latter SP to meet even the extended deadline for total destruction. On the other hand, Albania and South Korea had already finished destruction of their small stockpiles in 2008, as had India in 2009. Table 3 overviews the inspection activities. If we relate declared sites to inspection frequency, it is obvious that the main effort has been concentrated on checking


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declarations submitted by the SPs concerning the closed storage and production facilities, and to ongoing processes of CW destruction. Somewhat less attention has been devoted to the industry that produces scheduled chemicals. In future, when all CW stockpiles have been destroyed, the inspection effort will be focused on industry. For the reasons explained in the chapters in this book6 dealing with the impact of scientific and technological development on the Convention, it seems that potential threats stem mainly from the industry producing discrete organic chemicals. This is because of the changing face of the chemical industry and new developments in organic synthesis that are able to deliver new unscheduled toxic chemicals with incredible rapidity, something which was not expected when the Convention was drafted. That is why the inspection effort devoted to this part of industry seems to be low; it is restricted by the limited numbers of inspection personnel. The high number of such facilities worldwide (about 5600) as compared with the number of inspected facilities (up till now something over 1600, most of which have been inspected only once) clearly indicates the necessity to increase the focus on this type of site. The limited personnel capacity of inspection teams could be enhanced through two means. First, there could be considerable economising in the (till now continuous on-site) inspections at the destruction of CW stockpiles, which nowadays are regulated also by stringent domestic legislation dealing with both security and safety, namely health and workplace safety, and environmental protection. Secondly there could be increased utilisation of the capabilities of control and analytical instrumentation and other relevant information technology, including equipment for continuous checking, remote and off-site sensing, perimeter watching and observation, data recording, data transmission in real time, central data processing etc.

Table 3. Inspection Activities (as of June 30, 2009) Subject

Inspected Sites

Inspectionsa

CW production facilities

67

401

CW destruction facilities

37

1167

CW storage facilities

36

405

Abandoned CW

25

49

Old CW

30

86


36

198


254

465


234

263

Discrete organic chemicals

579

714

Industry inspections

a

81 SPs have been inspected.

6

See the chapters by Clagett, Perry Robinson and Trapp in this volume.

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3.2. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons – OPCW Pursuant to the CWC, after its signature, the Preparatory Commission was founded and after its entry into force, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established, with its headquarters in The Hague, The Netherlands [2]. The Organisation consists of three main elements: Conference of the States Parties, Executive Council and Technical Secretariat. With regard to the topic of this paper, it is necessary to stress the important role of the main subsidiary body. This is the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board (SAB). Consisting of 25 independent experts (from SPs), it plays a crucial role in advising the Technical Secretariat and the Director-General on issues of scientific and technological development having actual or potential impact on the CWC and its implementation. The SAB solves important issues by utilising broader scientific expertise, organising Temporary Working Groups (TWG) and launching some projects in cooperation with, for example, the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry. It also takes active part in other workshops and fora organised by the OPCW, and cooperates with specific organs of the OPCW. 3.3. Main Results of Both CWC Review Conferences The aim and tasks for the First Review Conference (2003) were determined as follows: x x x

Review operations of the Convention. Take account of scientific and technological development. Lessons learned and recommendation for future implementation.

It was not an amendment (revision) conference. The attendance represented 113 (then) SPs, two signatory states (Haiti, Israel), two non-signatory states (Libya, Angola), five international organisations – the European Space Agency (ESA), ICRC, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) and UNIDIR – 22 NGOs and six industry associations. Despite a somewhat provocative statement by the US alleging non-compliance by Iran and concerns about the Sudan, the Conference did not collapse into disarray and the CWC has not met the fate of BTWC7. The Conference did not result in radical change of direction for the OPCW or make substantive decisions on crucial, still outstanding issues (e.g. so called ‘non-lethal’ agents, riot control agents, ‘law enforcement’, nil declarations in respect of OCPFs and other problems). However, a number of priorities were clearly recognised. These included: x x x

Universality of the Convention. National implementation measures. International cooperation and assistance.

7 The last two (the 5th and 6th) BTWC Review Conferences were unable to adopt the Additional Protocol on implementation and verification that could have enhanced it to the level of the CWC with respect to, for example, declarations, verification mechanisms, destruction, non-proliferation, organization and national implementation measures. This addition (which itself was elaborated by prestigious international NGOs with the basic input of Federation of American Scientists in 1990-91) has been negotiated at four consecutive BTWC Review Conferences since the early 1990s. It was finally blocked by the US at the 6th Review Conference in 2006.


x x x x

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Verification regime for the chemical industry. Optimisation of verification measures. Scientific and technological development. Functioning of the OPCW.

Detailed explanation of these priorities is beyond the aim of this paper. For further information the adopted documents can be consulted. First there is the political declaration containing 23 paragraphs [3] and the main written result – the review document with 134 paragraphs [4]. Except for many mostly general statements, the programme did not go too deeply into the problems of the impact of scientific and technological development on the CWC that are obviously relevant to its future implementation. That issue was however deeply analysed in the document prepared by the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board and introduced to the Conference in the Note by the Director-General [5]. For the present status of the CWC’s implementation, the developments between the 1st and the 2nd Review Conferences were of utmost importance. Some of recommendations of the OPCW SAB are reflected in the SAB’s recent advice, and especially in projects that have been launched recently. It is generally expected that their results will influence the present and future activities of the OPCW, considering the crucial importance of the impact of scientific and technological development on the CWC, especially after current CW stockpiles have been destroyed. Recent advice and recommendations by the SAB are related to: x x x x

Salts of scheduled chemicals (of the same toxicological importance as free bases). Captive use of (scheduled) chemicals (generally not important for possible misuse). Structure of ricin (A + B chains, connected by disulphide crosslinking). Role of the Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) figures (only an auxiliary tool, with no regulatory power).

The ongoing projects under the aegis of the OPCW SAB include: x x x

Biomedical Sampling and Analysis (in investigating alleged use of CW) (TWG). Sampling and Analysis to upgrade objective verification efforts (TWG). Education and Outreach (a joint OPCW-IUPAC project) on introducing CWC issues in university curricula and on codes of conduct of chemists and life scientists. Workshops have been held in Bologna, Oxford and Moscow in 2005, and in Bologna in 2006. The latter workshop was associated with an informal SAB meeting [7].

For detailed information on the above-mentioned recent activities of the SAB see [6,7,8]. Those reports were utilized by the Open-ended Group, established within the OPCW Technical Secretariat, in preparing the 2nd Review Conference. These preparations, marked by the 10th anniversary of the OPCW and entry into force of the CWC, also involved inter alia: x x

A joint OPCW-IUPAC Workshop on Advances in Science and Technology (Zagreb, April, 2007) [9]. OPCW Academic Forum (The Hague, September, 2007) [10].

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x x

OPCW Industry and Assistance Forum (The Hague, November, 2007) [11]. OPCW NGO Forum (The Hague, November 2007).

The Second Review Conference took place in The Hague from April 7 – 18, 2008. Its character and tasks were defined simply as “Review operations of the CWC”, consistent with the requirement of the Convention for the review conferences. The attendance represented 114 SPs, two signatory states (Guinea-Bissau and Israel), three non-signatories (Angola, Iraq, Lebanon), five international organisations, and 28 NGOs. Beside general debate, procedural questions and reports of subsidiary bodies, especially that of the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board [12] dealing with problems of advances in science and technology and their impact on the Convention and its implementation, the programme went very deeply into all problems of reviewing and assessing the operations of the Convention in all its aspects, including especially: 1. 2. 3.

4.

The role of the CWC in enhancing international peace and security and in achieving the objectives as set forth in the preamble of the CWC. Ensuring the universality of the CWC. Implementation of the CWC’s provisions, related to: (a) General obligations and declarations related thereto. (b) Destruction of CW and destruction/conversion of CWPFs. (c) Verification activities of the OPCW. (d) Activities not prohibited by the CWC. (e) National implementation measures. (f) Consultations, cooperation, and fact-finding. (g) Assistance and protection against CW. (h) Economic and technological development. (i) Articles XII to XV of the CWC and final clauses. (j) The protection of confidential information. The general functioning of the OPCW.

The Second Review Conference, being very well prepared, and utilising results of a series of activities carried out within the framework of, and celebrating the 10th anniversary of, the CWC’s entry into force in 2007 (as described above), analysed individual points in a very deep and comprehensive manner. This is clearly reflected in one central document, adopted at the end of the conference [13] that will orient activities in chemical disarmament for the following five years. Detailed analysis of this document is beyond the aim of this paper. 3.4. Present Role of Engineers and Scientists in Implementing the Convention Engineers and scientists and their organisations made major contributions to negotiating and drafting the CWC and to its difficult ratification process, thereby enabling its entry into force. They again are now playing an important role in its implementation. The complicated and extensive text of the CWC body and annexes, many of them connected with implementation and verification, need precise study, explanation and acceptance by all segments of society committed to act pursuant to its provisions. The experience with implementing the CWC through national legislative systems has shown how difficult it is for initially less well-informed people to understand its


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provisions, however committed they may be to taking part in the implementation of those provisions. The first approach of, for example, those in industry with legal obligations under the treaty, was their frequently expressed thesis: What do we have to do with prohibition of any weapons – that is purely a military issue? It was and still is necessary to do much work in education and outreach on national as well as international levels, starting with educating officials of national authorities and the preparation of national implementation measures with respect to their legal and technical aspects. The practice of implementation, especially in countries possessing CW (and in countries where old CW are found), deals at present with very dangerous operations of CW destruction and disposal. The CWC leaves full responsibility in the choice of effective technology to the SPs but does not allow such environmentally barbaric methods of destruction/disposal, routinely used still in the 1970s, such as sea dumping, earth burial, open-pit burning or blasting. Development of cost-effective and safe technologies for the whole process of destruction (starting from storage sites up to the disposal of metal scrap and non toxic end-products) under domestic legal workplace safety and environmental standards are amongst the important international cooperative tasks of the scientific and technological communities. Development of verification technologies utilising the most sophisticated instrumental analytical techniques for detection, identification and determination of trace amounts or concentrations of toxic chemicals, their metabolites, breakdown products and excess impurities in other industrial chemicals, or under environmental conditions and in biological samples, is another serious task necessary for verifying implementation of all provisions of the CWC. Assistance and Protection are also amongst the main pillars of the CWC. These terms imply providing both equipment and know-how in detection and monitoring, decontamination, protection of personnel and medical treatments to those SPs that are experienced in this domain, and also to SPs with less or even zero experience with armed forces and the protection of the population. This area is gaining increased importance, not only because of possible military use of CW by non-SPs but also because of the increasing peacetime threats that modern industrialised society poses, including possible chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorist attacks.

4. Impact of Scientific and Technological Development on the Convention and the Future Role of Engineers and Scientists Both Review Conferences, and especially the reports prepared by the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board, identified positive and negative aspects of the impact of scientific and technological development on the CWC and its implementation. Consistent with these views it is possible to formulate the role of engineers and scientists and their organisations in the future implementation of the CWC. In the first instance there is their engagement in finishing the complete and safe destruction of CW stockpiles, and the destruction or conversion of the CWPFs. Then there is their involvement in assuring the non-proliferation of CW, i.e. verifying non-production by the peaceful chemical industry of potential CW, taking into account threats and benefits posed by scientific and technological development.

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Potential threats arise from scientific and technological developments because of the accelerated pace of production of new toxic chemicals, from new synthetic methods and from the changing face of the chemical industry. One present threat lies already in the inconsistency of the CWC with regard to riotcontrol agents. Even though law enforcement and domestic riot control are explicitly mentioned among the purposes not prohibited, the particular CWC wording (Article I, paragraph 5) prohibiting use of riot-control agents as a method of warfare is generally understood as ipso facto exempting these agents from the definition of toxic chemicals (for the purposes of the CWC); this has consequences for the current verification regime – even these known agents are unscheduled. This is a significant loophole in the CWC, allowing its possible circumvention because R&D and production of such chemicals are outside routine verification regimes. One can imagine legitimate search for new effective and safe (how safe?) irritants and various kinds of incapacitants based on a wide spectrum of toxicological action (calmatives, algogens, various bioregulators either isolated or of synthetic origin, influencing some biogenic processes associated with the nervous system) for policing purposes, but there are also temptations in the direction of the uncontrolled development and production of means that sometime might be used on battlefields. This problem of so-called non-lethal agents is a real, current and very serious problem. Every toxicologist knows that the toxic effect on, or response of, an organism is dose- (exposure-) dependent. This means that so-called non-lethal agents do not exist at all. The safety index of irritants and other harassing agents depends on the difference between the statistically determined dose (involving both concentration and exposure time) that has intolerable effects and the dose that causes death. This index of safety should be as big as possible, but it cannot by its very nature be unlimited. That is why the concept of ‘non-lethality’ is inevitably imprecise. Future threats arise mainly from the changing face of synthetic and manufacturing methods for production of both scheduled and new (unscheduled) toxic compounds. These new threats come primarily from the rapid pace of development in bio-molecular science (e.g. genomics and proteomics) and in chemical synthesis (i.e. combinatorial chemistry) that can produce toxic chemicals for potential misuse. These methods enable the very rapid syntheses of extensive series of compounds with ‘tailored’ structures, the effects of which are predicted theoretically on the basis of molecular engineering or architecture. Thus, what took months or years to produce in the classical era of organic synthesis in the middle of the 20th century can today be achieved within days or weeks. We are now faced also with the changed character of the chemical industry. Many parts of the chemical industry operate with multipurpose batch facilities whose production can readily be switched from one product to another. The potential of producing toxic chemicals is also considerably enhanced by the use of microreactors producing large volumes in small plants. Globalisation of this industry therefore necessitates reviewing the verification regime of ‘other chemical production facilities’ producing discrete organic chemicals. The number of such facilities (see Table 2) that are currently almost without international supervision shows the importance of this issue. The ever-growing range of toxic chemicals and new processes of small-scale syntheses increase also the threat of chemical terrorism. The main benefits of scientific and technological development can be expected in the development of progressive analytical methods and relevant high technology


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instrumentation. Many modern separation techniques (such as gas chromatography and high performance liquid chromatography) coupled with identification techniques (such as mass spectrometry) and other spectrophotometric methods (such as Fourier transform infra-red spectroscopy), and linked with computerised data-libraries accessible on-line, have been introduced into the OPCW-designated laboratories; some of these techniques are used routinely in portable or mobile equipment for on-site inspections. The problems are to keep up with the rapid development of potential (mainly unscheduled) toxic chemicals, technical upgrading of equipment, analysis of toxins and biological samples, conservation and transportation of samples for off-site analysis and the like. It is also desirable to introduce utilisation of automated analytical techniques. This includes remote (off-site) methods with automatic data transmission in real time to reduce the burden of continuous on-site presence of inspectors verifying destruction of CW. Verification efforts also need to shift to counter the much greater future threat by ensuring the non-production of CW by the increasing and spreading peaceful chemical industry facilities that manufacture discrete organic chemicals (see the bottom line of Table 2). The multifaceted technical issue of verification and its many practical applications is beyond the scope of this article, but it can be concluded that, if the power of modern analytical science were to be used to its full extent, all analytical requirements of the CWC could be achieved. Another very significant contribution of scientific and technological development that should be widely utilised in future implementation of Article X (relating to Assistance and Protection), includes the delivery of means and of know-how in the continuously developing areas of: x x x

x

Detection, identification and monitoring (point and stand-off detection, i.e. simple means, automatic alarms, reconnaissance vehicles, stand-off sensors, data transmission, field-portable and mobile laboratories and sets). Decontamination (means and methods for decontamination of personnel, decontamination of equipment and materiel, decontamination of stationary objects, decontamination and treatment of water). Protection of personnel (protective masks, suits, accessories and other means for armies, civil and population protection, for general and specialist use, shelters, filtration, ventilation and special equipment, filter-ventilated combat and transport vehicles. Treatment of intoxication (first aid methods and means, such as antidotes, syringes, auto injectors and other equipment, medical treatment methods and means, therapeutic procedures, equipment, evacuation and rescue systems, rescue and evacuation vehicles).

Other challenges of scientific and technological development are associated with the work of the OPCW, its Technical Secretariat and with education and outreach. Those issues also should be matters of interest to concerned engineers and scientists and their organisations.

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5. Conclusions The international community of engineers and scientists, including individual experts directly engaged in the negotiations as well as professional organisations, institutions and NGOs of concerned scientists, has played a positive role from the early stages of negotiations on the CW ban, through advanced negotiations of the CWC, preparations for its entry into force and during the first period of implementing the CWC [14]. Operations of the Chemical Weapons Convention that most probably would not exist without valuable input of expertise by the scientific and technological communities are proceeding generally satisfactorily8, judged according to the status of its implementation by the 188 States Parties and through verification by the Organisation for Prohibition of the Chemical Weapons in The Hague. The First Review Conference stressed the importance of achieving worldwide universality in order to totally eliminate the dark legacy of past chemical arsenals once and forever, to prevent threats and to utilise the benefits of scientific and technological development for the implementation of the CWC in the foreseeable future. These positive trends were confirmed by the outcome of the Second Review Conference in 2008. The future implementation of the CWC involves an essential active role for scientific and technological expertise, including the engagement of NGOs of concerned engineers and scientists.

References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]

8

United Nations Organisation, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, UN, New York, 1993. For more information on the OPCW see http//:www.opcw.org. Political declaration, OPCW, The Hague, 2003. Available at www.opcw.org/cwrevcon/doc/NAT/ FRCPolitical declaration.html. Review document, OPCW, The Hague, 2003. Available at www.opcw.org/html/global/wgrc/2k3/ rc1revdoc.html. Note by the Director General: Report of the SAB on Developments in Science and Technology, OPCW, Conference of the SPs, RC-1/DG.2, 23.04.2003, OPCW, The Hague. Note by the Director-General (EC-44/DG.7: 8 March 2006): response to the Report of the 8th Session of the SAB (SAB-8/1: 10 February 2006). Report of the Informal Meeting of the SAB, Bologna, September 2006. Report of the 9th Session of the SAB. OPCW, The Hague, February 2007. M. Balali-Mood, P.S. Steyn, L.K. Sydnes and R. Trapp, Impact of scientific developments on the CWC, Pure Appl. Chem. 80 (2008), 175-200. R. Trapp (Ed.), Academic Forum. Proceedings, OPCW, The Hague, 2007. Industry and Protection Forum. Proceedings, OPCW, The Hague, 2007. Note by the Director General: Report of the SAB on Developments in Science and Technology (RC2/DG.1), OPCW, The Hague, 28 February 2008. Report of the 2nd Review Conference, (RC-2/4), OPCW, The Hague, 18 April 2008. J. Matoušek, The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Role of Engineers and Scientists, INESAP Briefing Paper no. 12, 2004.

Except for the delayed schedule of destruction by the main CW possessors.


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The Need for WMD Threat Assessment in the Chemical Industry: Plant Site Level Donald C. CLAGETT Office of Chemical and Conventional Weapons Affairs, United States Department of State

Abstract. The size of chemical industry and rapid advances in science and technology increase the potential for illicit use of chemicals. There is a need for industry to contribute to threat assessment and can do so by considering several factors including the chemicals, their availability, quantities and likelihood of use. Keywords. Chemical Weapons Convention, general purpose criterion, scheduled chemical, toxic chemical, threat awareness, WMD.

Introduction The last quarter of the twentieth century saw an explosion of scientific and technological advances in all areas of endeavor. These advances have included the development of technology applicable to nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Some of this technology is used in commercial industry and is, therefore, to some extent publicly available. Chemicals, along with nuclear and biological materials, have the potential to be used as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in war and in terrorist scenarios. While nuclear materials are manufactured in a limited number of facilities, and biological materials are manufactured and used in relatively small quantities, chemical production, processing and consumption occur in tens of thousands of plant sites around the world each day. Further, chemicals are transferred in all manner of volumes and by various means of transportation. Some of these chemicals have the potential to be used directly as, or precursors for, chemical weapons (CW). Assessing the threat posed by chemicals is an important first step to precluding their misuse. This paper will address how the many thousands of individual plant sites might address the issue of having their chemicals potentially diverted for illicit purposes. The discussion will be limited to threat assessments of toxic chemicals produced, processed, consumed and transferred by plant sites. It will not include threats posed by chemicals with potential for fire or explosion or those threats posed by plant sites for toxic release that might be occasioned by terrorist action. Plant level threat assessments should address a number of factors including the chemicals, their availability, quantities and likelihood of use as CW. There is no exact equation to take these factors into account, but all are relevant to threat assessment. On the surface, each of these factors seems rather simple, but in fact and as will become evident, identification of chemicals with potential for CW use is not necessarily obvious.

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D.C. Clagett / The Need for WMD Threat Assessment in the Chemical Industry: Plant Site Level

1. Chemicals A basic listing of chemicals with a history of CW use or application is provided in the three schedules of chemicals in the Annex on Chemicals of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). These include toxic chemicals that have been weaponized, usually referred to as traditional agents, and their precursors. Many of these chemicals, particularly those identified in Schedules 1 and 2, do not have significant commercial use, although some do. Traditional agents and their precursors are known. Plant sites in the 184 countries that have ratified the CWC are required to declare to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), through their National Authorities, activities involving these chemicals when these activities exceed specified amounts. States Parties to the CWC that have made declarations have likely declared the majority, if not all, of the activities with these chemicals worldwide. However, adhering only to the provisions that apply to the chemicals on the CWC schedules of chemicals is not enough. The general purpose criterion, or more precisely Article I of the CWC, applies to any toxic chemicals and their precursors that are used for CW purposes. Since entry into force of this Convention, huge numbers of chemicals have been produced for test purposes using high throughput techniques including combinatorial chemistry and microreactor technology. The chemical and related pharmaceutical industry has screened hundreds of thousands of chemicals for biological activity and it is possible that non-traditional toxic chemicals and precursors exist whose threats should be considered. The CWC verification regime does not capture many of these chemicals and activities; it is therefore incumbent upon States Parties or relevant industries to address these threats through their respective mechanisms. There are some commercial chemicals that also have potential CW applications (i.e. dual-use chemicals), particularly those toxic gases that are heavier than air. Chlorine, which is the major disinfectant in water treatment systems, actually was used in World War I as a CW agent and was reported to have been employed as a terror weapon in isolated incidents in Iraq. Other chemicals of potential concern include neuro-toxic insecticides and cyanide salts used for precious metal extraction. Toxic and biologically active solids and low volatility chemicals and drugs, previously not considered CW agent candidates, can now be dispersed in air as a result of advances in dispersion and aerosol technology. Thus, they need to be considered as potential threats. While the CWC’s schedules of chemicals provide a convenient list of chemicals having been used and having the potential for CW use, the Article I provision of the CWC, or what is usually identified as the ‘general purpose criterion’, can apply to any toxic chemical. It requires anyone seeking to assess potential CW use to look at the chemical from a ‘what if’ standpoint and to make a judgment call.

2. Availability Chemical industry is in the business to yield profits for time and money invested. Obviously to do so it must sell its chemicals and conduct activities in a manner consistent with industry standards for legitimate business practices. In principle chemicals are available to the public. There are however constraints on some chemicals’ distribution. For example, the CWC prohibits the transfer from States


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Parties to non-States Parties of Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals and requires end-use certificates for transfers of Schedule 3 chemicals to these countries. In addition, many countries regulate sale and distribution of certain chemicals and implement export controls as a nonproliferation measure, either unilaterally or in concert with multilateral control regimes. As noted before, there are chemicals beyond these traditional CW agents and precursors that might be used as CW or to produce CW. In practical terms, threats from trade in these chemicals are probably very low when sales are made to known consumers with legitimate end-uses. The threat would be greater when sales are made to businesses or individuals whose consumption track record is unknown. Transport must also be considered. Short haul rail and truck deliveries within or between stable countries pose little threat. However, shipping in certain areas of the world can be subject to uncertainty. The recent acts of piracy in the waters off Africa and Southeast Asia bear testimony to this fact. Disposition of chemical waste is also an important consideration. Some wastes contain by-products that can be processed for CW use. This could represent a potential threat which can be minimized by ascertaining that this waste is actually destroyed and not resold.

3. Quantities of Chemicals The CWC specifies threshold quantities above which production, processing, consumption, import and export of specified toxic chemicals and their precursors must be declared and further thresholds of production, processing and consumption that may be verified by on-site inspection. These limits, which by industrial standards are rather low, indicate what the framers of the CWC viewed as militarily significant quantities. Again, for chemicals that do not fall under the purview of the CWC, other than through the general purpose criterion, there are no such indicative guidelines. The sale of several tons of chlorine to a municipal water treatment facility probably constitutes a low threat, but the sale of several tons of sodium cyanide to a small electroplating business that would ordinarily use kilogram quantities should raise a threat signal. Checking the end-users and end-uses for chemicals is a normal part of the export control process adopted by many countries.

4. Potential for Use The likelihood of the use of chemicals for CW purposes is affected by the availability of chemicals and technical acumen of individuals or groups with nefarious intent and by the local and international political situations. Instability can raise the threat of misuse, as exemplified by a few small-scale attacks in Iraq during 2006-2007 involving chlorine cylinders, for the most part obtained locally from water disinfectant facilities. Production, processing, consumption and transfer of chemicals where there is local instability or transfer to other regions where there is instability must be considered in any threat assessment. Additionally, there are a few countries that have not ratified the CWC and, hence, have not renounced the development, possession or use of CW. These countries may constitute a potential threat because non-participation in the CWC makes it difficult to

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determine whether or not these countries have CW and whether or not they may be providing chemicals for CW use to terrorists. Thus sales of chemicals deemed to have CW potential to these countries would increase the potential threat of misuse.

5. Threat Awareness We have discussed the principal considerations that individual plant sites need to evaluate CW threats. We now need to address threat awareness. Government regulation and reporting requirements contribute to plant site management awareness of the CW threat, in particular the threats in relation to traditional agents. Governments can play their part by enforcing plant site compliance with the CWC reporting requirements and meeting obligations in relation to United Nations Security Council Resolutions such as 1540. Also, some countries require export licenses for certain toxic chemicals, for example in the United States certain chemicals are controlled by the State Department and the Department of Commerce. There are chemicals on these lists beyond those on the schedules of chemicals in the CWC or those chemicals that might have CW potential. Regulation varies from country to country and sometimes from jurisdiction to jurisdiction so generalities about effectiveness of Governments in creating threat awareness can not be made. Suffice it to say that, the more Government attention, the more likely it will be that plant sites will comply with their obligations. The ability and inclination of a plant site to achieve threat awareness is directly related to its business history. Long established companies with regulatory experience are most capable, but due to globalization these types of companies are becoming less prevalent in the chemical industry. Recently acquired or divested operations will have management upsets that will tend to decrease focus on ethical/regulatory matters including concerns about CW threat assessments. The chemical industry, previously located mainly in Western Europe, the United States and Japan, has in the last decade been moving into regions and countries that have not previously had to consider the CW potential of chemicals on their territory. Personnel in these situations will be on a learning curve for some time. As noted before, the general purpose criterion applies the CWC prohibitions to any toxic chemical that is used for CW purposes. In a world experiencing rapid changes in technologies and business organization, the people most capable of being aware of potential CW threats and capable of making threat assessments are at the operational level. These will include personnel directly involved with the production, processing, consumption and transfer of chemicals. The first line will be the chemists and chemical engineers at the plant site. Regardless of changes in ownership it is they who have the technical knowledge to make assessments based on their knowledge of the chemistry and toxicology. Finally industry trade organizations can also be a source of information, especially to new operations. Examples include the European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC) in Western Europe, the American Chemistry Council (ACC) in the USA and the Indian Chemical Manufacturers Association (ICMA). These organizations need to continually alert evolving plant site management of the necessity for CW threat assessment. The need for plant sites to consider the CW threat of its products has been demonstrated in the recent past. The acquisition of unsecured chlorine cylinders in Iraq allowed terrorists to use them in attacks during 2006 and 2007, although the attacks


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were limited in nature. Clearly it behooves plant sites to make conscientious efforts to assess threats and to take effective follow-on actions to insure that the CW WMD threat is minimized.

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Monitoring and Opposing the Misuse of Incapacitants – Exploring the Potential Roles for Independent Scientists Michael CROWLEY Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project, Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University, UK

Abstract. This chapter explores the potential threats arising from the development and weaponization of incapacitants – chemical or biochemical agents that act on biochemical and physiological systems, especially those affecting the higher regulatory activity of the central nervous system to produce a disabling condition. The chapter then explores the roles for independent scientists in monitoring incapacitant research and development, utilising open source material, national oversight and transparency mechanisms, field missions, etc. It also explores how independent scientists can build a culture of responsibility, and promote and contribute to effective intergovernmental mechanisms to address the potential misuse of incapacitants. Keywords. Biochemical threat spectrum, Chemical Weapons Convention, incapacitant, riot control agent, human rights, international humanitarian law, open source monitoring, whistle-blower.

Introduction Over the past two decades there has been a revolution in the life sciences with extremely rapid advances in genomics, synthetic biology, biotechnology, neuroscience and the understanding of human behaviour. The speed of advance is staggering. For example, in 1999 a special meeting of the National Academies of Sciences and the Society of Neuroscience noted that: “The past decade had delivered more advances than all previous years of neuroscience research combined” [1]. Whilst many of these advances have great potential to benefit mankind – in, for example, the development of more effective, safer medicines [2], concern has been raised by a growing number of those in the scientific and medical communities at the potential for the misapplication of the new technologies for hostile purposes. Meselson has stated: “During the century ahead, as our ability to modify fundamental life processes continues its rapid advance, we will be able not only to devise additional ways to destroy life, but also be able to manipulate it including the processes of cognition, development and inheritance.” [3]. And he added: “A world in which these capabilities are widely employed for hostile purposes would be a world in which the very nature of conflict had radically changed. Therein could lie unprecedented opportunities for violence, coercion, repression or subjugation…” [3].

M. Crowley / Monitoring and Opposing the Misuse of Incapacitants

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Figure 1: Biochemical Threat Spectrum (adapted from Pearson [6])

1. Biochemical Threat Spectrum As the ongoing revolution in the life sciences has proceeded the boundary between chemistry and biology, and consequently the distinction between certain chemical and biological weapons, has become increasingly blurred. Rather than thinking of chemical and biological weapons threats as distinct, some analysts including Dando [4], Davison [5] and Pearson [6] believe it is more useful to conceptualise them as lying along a continuous biochemical threat spectrum (see Figure 1) from the classical chemical agents on one extreme (i.e. nerve, blood and blister agents), through mid-spectrum agents and on to biological agents (including traditional and genetically modified biological agents). This chapter will focus upon the mid-spectrum agents. To underline the breadth of this category of agents – which includes pharmaceutical chemicals, bioregulators and toxins the term incapacitating chemical and biochemical agents (or incapacitants) is utilised. Although there is currently no universally agreed definition for such agents, as a provisional working description, they can be described as substances whose chemical action on specific biochemical processes and physiological systems, especially those affecting the higher regulatory activity of the central nervous system, produce a disabling condition (e.g. can cause incapacitation or disorientation, incoherence, hallucination, sedation, loss of consciousness) [7]. The effects of incapacitants are designed to be temporary, lasting from hours to days, but in higher concentrations they can result in death. They are also called biochemical agents, biotechnical agents, calmatives, incapacitating biochemical weapons and immobilizing agents [7]. It is important to differentiate incapacitants from another distinct class of chemical agents currently used by many states for law enforcement, namely the riot control agents (RCAs). Unlike incapacitants, riot control agents act peripherally on the eyes, upper

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respiratory tract and skin to produce rapid sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure [5,7,8]. There is a wide variety of chemicals that could potentially be utilised as incapacitants and recent research has tended to concentrate upon the following varieties of candidate agents: anaesthetic agents, skeletal muscle relaxants, opiod analgesics, anxiolytics, antipsychotics, antidepressants and sedative-hypnotic agents [9]. A number of these agents are currently legitimately in use by the medical or veterinary professions as tranquilising or anaesthetising agents. Proponents of incapacitants have promoted their development and use in certain law enforcement scenarios (such as hostage taking situations) where there is a need to rapidly and completely incapacitate single or a group of individuals without causing death or permanent disability. Incapacitants have also been raised as a possible tool in a variety of military operations, especially in situations where combatants and noncombatants are mixed [10].

2. Threats Arising from Current Research, Development and Use of Incapacitants Whilst some members of the governmental scientific community in certain states have undertaken research into, and have sought to promote, the weaponization of incapacitants, a number of independent scientists (principally those in the life sciences) – together with international legal experts and arms control organisations – have sought to assess and consequently highlight the potential threat of incapacitating chemical and biochemical weapons to international peace and security. 2.1. Dose-Response Problem Research by a range of scientific and medical professionals has highlighted the fallacy of assertions made by some of those promoting incapacitants that such weapons would be inherently ‘non-lethal’. Pearson has phrased the so-called ‘dose-response problem’ thus: “For all practical purposes, any biochemical weapon that can significantly incapacitate the vast majority of those exposed will very likely cause a significant number of deaths at the same time.” [11]. Klotz, Furmanski and Wheelis have developed a predictive model indicating that, even with a safety margin higher than any known sedative or anaesthetic drug currently available, an incapacitant would be expected to cause at least 10% fatalities of those exposed [12]. Furthermore, even such predictive modelling will potentially underestimate fatalities when an incapacitant is used in real-life situations where there is uncontrollable variability “both in exposure (uneven concentration and exposure time) and within the target population (age, size, gender, health status and individual susceptibility)” [13]. As a result of such considerations, the British Medical Association believes: “The agent whereby people could be incapacitated without risk of death in a tactical situation does not exist and is unlikely to in the foreseeable future. In such a situation, it is and will continue to be almost impossible to deliver the right agent to the right people in the right dose without exposing the wrong people, or delivering the wrong dose” [14]. This was illustrated following the use of an incapacitant by the Russian Federation in October 2002.


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Russian Case Study rd

On the evening of 23 October 2002, a group of heavily armed Chechen separatists invaded the Dubrovka theatre in Moscow, taking approximately 800 people hostage. They demanded the withdrawal of Russian armed forces from Chechnya and threatened to kill the hostages if their demands were not met. After three days, during which time three hostages had been shot by the hostage-takers, Russian security forces pumped an unidentified aerosolised incapacitant into the theatre, putting the hostages and some of the hostage takers into a ‘deep sleep’. Approximately 30 minutes later, members of the Russian Spetsnaz special forces stormed the theatre killing all of the hostagetakers, including those unconscious from the incapacitant. An estimated 129 hostages died during or following the raid, mostly as a result of the incapacitant used by the Russian forces [15]. An additional unknown number have suffered permanent disability [7]. However, even if all technical barriers to the development of a truly ‘non-lethal’ incapacitating chemical or biochemical weapon were overcome, independent scientists and arms control experts have raised concerns about further serious risks that could follow from the development of such weapons. These include: x

x

x

Creeping legitimization and the erosion of the norm against weaponization of toxicity. Perry Robinson has described how “Today’s regime against chemical/biological-warfare armament...derives its reach and strength from that fundamental norm of state behaviour that eschews fighting with poison or infectious disease. Fragment the norm, as by asserting that this or that form of toxicity is not really a part of it, and the foundation of the regime may be weakened” [18]. Perry Robinson believes that attempts by certain states, particularly the US, to legitimize the development and use of incapacitants threaten to do just that. Describing the US ‘Advanced RCA Technology’ (ARCAT) development projects of the 1990s which included work on the fentanyls and “other such intensely toxic chemicals”, Perry Robinson states: “The process that can be seen here is a surreptitious equation of toxicity with lethal toxicity. In this attempt to loosen the CWC constraint on the weaponization of other forms of toxicity we have started to see a creeping legitimization of non-WMD CBW...” [19]. Perry Robinson believes that this ‘creeping legitimization’ presents the greatest danger to the existing prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons and to the re-emergence of chemical and biological warfare [20]. Proliferation and legitimization by states. Pearson has warned that “…efforts to develop incapacitating biochemical weapons may well gather steam as more nations become intrigued by them and, observing the efforts of Russia and the United States, become convinced not only that effective and acceptably ‘non-lethal’ incapacitating agents can be found, but that their use will be legitimized.” [11]. Proliferation to, and misuse by, non-state actors. Analysts have highlighted the potential utility of incapacitants to a range of non-state actors including criminals, terrorists, paramilitary organizations, and armed factions in failing or failed states, many of whom would not feel as constrained as states by international law and concerns about lethality [11,21]. The future use of

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x

x

x

x

x

incapacitants by private military or security companies is another related area of concern, given the inadequate regulation of such entities to date. [8] Use as a lethal force multiplier. There are concerns that incapacitants will be used by both military and law enforcement agencies, not as an alternative to lethal force, but as a means to make lethal force more deadly. This has happened previously with riot control agents.1 And the indications for incapacitants are worrying. During the October 2002 Moscow theatre siege, those Chechen hostage-takers who were rendered unconscious by the incapacitant were then reportedly shot where they lay by Russian Forces rather than being arrested [16]. Facilitation of torture and other human rights violations. Human rights and arms control organisations have highlighted how existing ‘non-lethal’ weapons – including riot control agents have been misused for torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment [8,22]. As well as potentially being utilised for torture and ill-treatment of individuals, incapacitants could also facilitate repression of groups by, for example, allowing the capture of large numbers of peacefully demonstrating crowds. Militarisation of biology. Analysts including Perry Robinson, and Wheelis and Dando have warned that the continuing utilisation of the life sciences in the development of incapacitants could potentially open the way to more malign objectives, such as the widespread repression of entire populations [21,23]. The British Medical Association (BMA) described this danger in its 2007 report: “Using existing drugs as weapons means knowingly moving towards the top of a ‘slippery slope’ at the bottom of which is the spectre of ‘militarization’ of biology; this could include intentional manipulation of peoples’ emotions, memories, immune responses or even fertility” [14]. Camouflage for lethal chemical weapons programme. Perry Robinson has highlighted how States could exploit the limited transparency mechanisms for incapacitants and other toxic chemicals designated for use in law enforcement, to hide illicit activities: “If a CWC State Party were challenged to explain why it was conducting development, production or stockpiling of toxic chemicals that it had not declared to the OPCW, it could assert, rightly or wrongly, that the activity was nothing to do with chemical weapons, but was for the nonprohibited purpose of law enforcement... A great loophole thus exists within the CWC’s international verification system, endangering confidence in the treaty” [24]. Confusion between lethal and ‘non-lethal’ chemical weapons. A state deploying or using a ‘non-lethal’ incapacitating chemical or biochemical weapon during an armed conflict may be perceived by another party as having used a lethal chemical weapon. This in turn could initiate an escalating cycle of retaliation leading to actual use of lethal chemical agents in a theatre of war [11].

1 For example, the US military employment of CS in the Vietnam War. See Furmanski, Historical military interest in low-lethality biochemical agents, in [7]. See also [8].


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3. Regulation of Incapacitants under the Chemical Weapons Convention Although there is a range of international law that is potentially applicable to incapacitants,2 currently discussions on the regulation of such weapons have largely concentrated on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The Convention prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons [25]. In addition, it also requires that all existing stocks of chemical weapons [26] and chemical weapons production facilities [27] be destroyed. Although the Convention prohibits chemical weapons, it allows for the controlled peaceful use of certain toxic chemicals. Article 2.2 of the Convention defines a ‘toxic chemical’ as: “any chemical, regardless of its origin or method of production, which, through chemical action on life processes, can cause death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals” [28]. The Convention therefore covers a wide range of chemicals within its scope of regulation including certain chemical agents that could be used for so-called ‘non-lethal’ chemical weapons, such as incapacitants. To determine whether the use of a toxic chemical such as an incapacitant would be in conformity with the CWC, the intention or purpose for its use needs to be determined. Under Article 2.1 of the Convention, chemical weapons are defined as: “(a) toxic chemicals or their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited by the Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes” [29]. Such “purposes not prohibited” are defined under Article 2.9 and include: “(c) Military purposes not connected with the use of chemical weapons and not dependent on the use of the toxic properties of chemicals as a method of warfare; (d) Law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes” [30]. Toxic chemicals such as incapacitants that are used for purposes not provided for in Article 2.9 (for example as a method of warfare) would then constitute a chemical weapon and be prohibited under the CWC. However, there are dangerous ambiguities in the CWC and limitations in its current implementation which could seriously restrict its ability to effectively regulate incapacitants. For example, there is uncertainty over the ‘types and quantities’ of certain toxic chemicals that can be employed for law enforcement activities. Whilst legal scholars agree that riot control agents can be used for “law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes”, the position of incapacitants is contested. Furthermore, although use of certain toxic chemicals is permitted for law enforcement, there is no definition of ‘law enforcement’ in the Convention. This, in turn, has led to questions being raised by international legal experts over the scope and nature of law enforcement activities permitted under the Convention both domestically and internationally.3 As a consequence of the range of unresolved issues and differing 2 The Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva Protocol, Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, UN Convention on Pyschotropic Substances, as well as aspects of international human rights law and international humanitarian law may well be applicable to the research, development, stockpiling, transfer and use of incapacitants. For an analysis of this see [8]. 3 For divergent argumentation on this issue see D. Fidler, Incapacitating Chemical and Biochemical Weapons and Law Enforcement Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, in [7]; A. Von Wagner, Toxic Chemicals for Law Enforcement Including Domestic Riot Control Purposes Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, in [7].

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interpretations highlighted, the circumstances (if any) in which incapacitants could be used for counter-terrorist/counter-insurgency operations are disputed [8,31]. Unfortunately, to date, there has been a collective failure by the CWC States Parties and policy making organs to effectively address the regulation of incapacitants under the Convention. The failures of CWC design and implementation risk allowing state practice to determine the scope and nature of the regulation of incapacitants under the Convention. The potential consequences of this have been highlighted by the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission: “There is an increasing interest among some governments to adopt a more flexible interpretation of the CWC rules on the use of incapacitating chemical weapons, even as a method of warfare, in order to use them in diverse situations. Such an interpretation, in the view of the Commission, would constitute a dangerous erosion on the fundamental ban on chemical weapons that the authors of the Convention intended.” [32].

4. State Proliferation of Incapacitant Research. Whilst the international governmental community has refused to adequately address the issue of incapacitants to date, there are indications that a number of countries have undertaken research programmes into such weapons. In 2004, during an interview with the Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project (BNLWRP), the Director of the Anaesthesiology Research Laboratories at the University of Utah, who was reportedly close to the US incapacitating biochemical programme [13] stated that: “The events in Moscow have opened up the potential for this area of research (i.e. incapacitating/immobilizing chemicals) to be explored in much greater depth. It would not be surprising if a number of countries were conducting more detailed and renewed research as a result” [33]. There have been open source reports indicating that prior to and following the Moscow theatre siege scientists in Russia [34,35], the Czech Republic (see case study below) and the US [5,36,37] have undertaken research into incapacitants and/or possible delivery mechanisms. Reports indicate that a number of other states including China [38], France [39] and the UK [5,37] have shown some interest in exploring this issue in the past. Furthermore, in its 2004 report outlining the utility of ‘non-lethal’ weapons in peace keeping operations, NATO’s Research and Technology Organisation outlined seventeen “non-lethal technologies of interest”. Among these were “chemical technologies [that] could act on the central nervous system by calmatives, dissociative agents”, [and] “equilibrium agents”, and “by convulsives” [40].

Case Study: Czech Republic Research and Development The Czech military has a long standing research programme into incapacitants dating from at least 2000;4 unusually much of this work has been published in scientific academic papers. In May 2005, at the 3rd European Symposium on Non-Lethal Weapons, Czech researchers delivered a paper [42] describing their investigations over several years, administering rhesus monkeys with 4 According to Davison and Lewer, research to develop sedative and anaesthetic agent combinations for use as weapons had been funded by the Czech Army under Project No: MO 03021100007. See [41].


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various pharmacological cocktails in order to determine which combinations and doses resulted in “fully reversible immobilization”. The paper also described how “Fully reversible analgesic sedation was...tested in man”, utilising the triple combination of dexmedetomidine, midazolam and fentanyl given to patients undergoing surgery, and a second combination of dexmedetomidine, midazolam and ketamine which was tested on ten nurses [43]. The paper also recorded the results of testing the ultrapotent opiods remifentanil, aflentanil and etorphine on rabbits [44]. In a follow-up paper presented in May 2007 to the 4th European Symposium on Non-Lethal Weapons, Czech researchers describe how they “decided to test new combinations [of calmatives] for suppression or complete abolition of aggressive behaviour.” According to the researchers, “All tested combinations resulted in macaques in reduction or complete loss of aggressiveness. Optimal combination was naphtylmedetomidine + dextrorotatory isomer of ketamine + hyaluronidase. The onset of effect was rapid and we achieved complete manipulability of the animal with low motoric sedation.” The researchers claim that “the results can be used to pacify aggressive people during medical treatment (mental disease), terrorist attacks and during [sic] production of new pharmacological non-lethal weapons.” [45]. The Czech researchers have also investigated a number of alternative means of agent delivery including via inhalation administration which was originally tested on rats and then on human ‘volunteers’ [46], who were reported to have been children in hospital [5]. Researchers have also explored conjuctival, nasal, transbucal, sublingual and transdermal administration [47]. The researchers have stated that “[t]he transdermal technique of administration could possibly be used to induce long-term sedation with alpha2 agonists, benzodiazepines, and a combination of them to pacify aggressive individuals. Using the paint-ball gun principle, anaesthetic-containing balls could be used. Impact of the ball would be followed by their destruction and absorption of garment with the anesthetics which will be quickly absorbed via the skin” [48]. One analyst has reported that “While Russian, Chinese and American scientists may have similar lines of study, the Czechs are brazen enough to go on scientific record… [M]ore than one American researcher connected with the military thinks [the] presentation is compelling.” [49].

5. Scientific and Technological Developments – the Future Threat In the light of the existing research being conducted by certain states into incapacitants, the potential application of current advances in genomics, biotechnology, neuroscience, etc. are a cause for concern. As one review noted: “Advances in discovery of novel bioregulators, especially bioregulators for incapacitation, understanding of their mode of operation and synthetic routes for manufacture have been very rapid in recent times…” [50]. The review continued: “Some of these compounds may be potent enough to be many hundreds of times more effective than the traditional chemical warfare agents. Some very important characteristics of new bioregulators that would offer significant military advantages are novel sites of toxic action; rapid and specific effects;

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penetration of protective filters and equipment; and military effective physical incapacitation.” [50]. Wheelis and Dando have surveyed current developments and future trends in neurobiology and believe that there are indications that military interest is already directed towards the next generation of biochemical agents affecting the brain and central nervous system: “In addition to drugs causing calming or unconsciousness, compounds on the horizon with potential as military agents include noradrenaline antagonists such as propranolol to cause selective memory loss, cholecystokinin B agonists to cause panic attacks, and substance P agonists to induce depression. The question thus is not so much when these capabilities will arise – because arise they certainly will – but what purposes will those with such capabilities pursue” [21]. Such concerns are reinforced by the 2008 National Research Council report [51] highlighting several areas of contemporary and possible future research and development applicable to incapacitant weaponization including “medical pharmacology, with particular attention to more potent fentanyl derivatives and inhalation anaesthetics” [52]. The report noted that “existing pharmacological agents could be used in a nefarious way. An example would be currently used agents, such as alpha blockers, that would work quickly to drop blood pressure if delivered in high doses. In addition, anticholinergic agents could cause molecular changes that lead to temporary blindness” [53]. Furthermore, the report highlights the potential for “new nanotechnologies [that] have allowed molecular conjugation or encapsulation that may permit unprecedented access [of drugs] to the brain” [54]. The report also highlights the potential threats resulting from developments in nanotechnologies or gas-phase techniques that allow dispersal of highly potent chemicals over wide areas. It notes that at the present time “pharmacological agents are not used as weapons of mass effect, because their large-scale deployment is impractical” as it is “currently impossible to get an effective dose to a combatant.” However the report states that “technologies that could be available in the next 20 years would allow dispersal of agents in delivery vehicles that would be analogous to a pharmacological cluster bomb or a land mine” [55].

6. Roles of Independent Scientists in Monitoring and Opposing the Misuse of Incapacitants Given the inadequacies of the existing control regime, the ongoing research and development of incapacitants by certain states and the potential application of scientific and technological developments to such R&D programmes, the author believes that the scientific community has a responsibility to act now to monitor and oppose the misuse of these agents. There are a number of potential activities that independent scientists – particularly those in the life sciences – can undertake.5

5 Although some of the following methodologies and case studies are taken from related areas of study, the author believes they can usefully be applied to monitoring incapacitant research, development and utilisation.


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6.1. Open Source Monitoring and Analysis A small number of academic and non-governmental organisations6 have undertaken monitoring and analysis of open source information relating to the research, development and utilisation of incapacitants by states and non-state actors. Open source monitoring and analysis is time consuming, resource intensive and the information obtained is often limited as a result of national security restrictions, commercial confidentiality considerations and limited access to research published in certain countries/languages. In addition there is much inaccurate or biased reporting disseminated by both proponents and opponents of such weapons. Despite the methodological difficulties and the limitations in the information obtained, such work is vital to the formation of an informed public discourse on the existing threats and potential dangers of the proliferation and misuse of these weapons. In addition it can also help in development of timely and realistic publicly available threat assessments relating to R&D, deployment or utilisation of such weapons in specific countries. It can also contribute to governmental threat assessments on this issue that may well be informed by national technical measures and intelligence. Indeed, despite its limitations, some governments have utilised and promoted open source monitoring methodologies for developing their own threat assessments (see case study below). One methodology – previously employed for investigating chemical and biological weapons development – that can have utility for monitoring incapacitant weapons programmes is collateral analysis. This method of information-gathering involves the collection and systematic examination of publicly-available scientific, technical and other information. It makes no judgement as to the purpose of the research. Such analysis may provide an initial picture of a country’s technological base and of its capacity to move in a variety of directions, some of which may be of concern. Although collateral analysis cannot be relied upon to reveal activities that are deliberately concealed, it can assist in the formulation of questions about the capabilities and activities of various facilities, in conjunction with other sources of information [56].

Case Study: Collateral Analysis of Iraqi Biological and Toxin Research A collateral analysis of biological and toxin research in Iraq was undertaken by the Verification Research Program of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division, External Affairs and International Trade Department of Canada in 1991 [56]. The Canadian study depended on the gathering of information available in the open scientific literature, including the BIOSIS Previews, Embase, Medline, CAB Abstracts and CS Search databases. Together, these databases contained over 29 million records of scientific research from over 130 countries. In the time period under review, 1969-1991, there were 10,100 publications from Iraq. The study identified: 6

Biological Weapons Prevention Programme, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project; Centre for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation; Federation of American Scientists; Harvard Sussex Programme; International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility; Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs; the Sunshine Project.

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x x x

Specific areas of published research activity. Institutions and scientists associated with such published research activity. The absence of published research activity in specific areas of endeavour.

It is interesting to note the utilisation of this last category by the Canadian study team who stated that: “In some cases, when examining the open scientific literature, what is not found may also be of interest” [57]. And consequently that: “One important early indicator of possible diversion of biological materials would be major government biological facilities that do not publish in the open literature” [58]. Indeed such an examination of the absence of research activity helped the study to focus attention on the role of the Salman Pak research centre in Iraq’s biological research and development programme.7

6.2. Use of National Oversight and Transparency Mechanisms Although research and development programmes for incapacitating chemical and biochemical weapons are normally considered to be issues of national security and remain classified, independent scientists and NGOs, particularly in North America and Europe, can potentially obtain information on these activities or on government policies regarding such weapons through utilising national oversight and transparency mechanisms, for example: x

x x x

7

Parliamentary/legislative oversight bodies have the authority and resources to initiate independent research or investigations into specific areas of government policy and practice. This can include conducting expert hearings where government ministers and officials are asked to account for their actions. The UK Foreign Affairs Select Committee, the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations as well as the European Parliament’s Panel on Scientific and Technology Options Assessment (STOA) have explored aspects of ‘nonlethal’ weapon policy and practice. Individual parliamentarians or representatives can question government ministers or sometimes initiate debates where government policy and practice are annunciated. Freedom of information legislation is in place in a number of countries and has been utilised with success, particularly by researchers in the US. Historical documents relating to past research and development of incapacitants have been released by some governments into the public domain and held in national archives.

“In 1989, several newspaper reports stated that the Iraqis were conducting research in biological warfare at Salman Pak…However, the Iraqis originally claimed that the research at Salman Pak was concerned with health matters related to food contamination. Through collateral analysis, the Canadian study found that whilst other research sites published papers relating to their specialisms, Salman Pak published no papers on any aspect of food contamination. Indeed the researchers found that “there were no publications at all from Salman Pak” (see [58]). The highly secure BW Research, Development and Production Facility at Salman Pak was assessed to be a major BW production and storage facility for the Iraqi programme by UNSCOM [59].


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These mechanisms and processes are often time consuming and the information obtained can be limited and heavily censored (or redacted). Furthermore, as the Sunshine Project has discovered and described, sometimes government officials or agencies can attempt to conceal potentially controversial materials by exaggerating exemptions allowed for under the legislation, thereby “trying to keep secrets that they are not legally entitled to maintain” [60]. Sometimes, however, the documents obtained do provide important information on the policy and practices of states in this area. Furthermore, although uncovering and highlighting new information and analysis on government programs is often the primary purpose of employing freedom of information legislation or other transparency mechanisms, another very important benefit lies in “asserting and maintaining the public’s right to this information” [60]. Unfortunately, there are very few individuals or organizations that currently seek to utilise Freedom of Information legislation or other transparency measures on the issue of incapacitants.

Case Study: The Sunshine Project’s Use of Freedom of Information Requests The Sunshine Project – a German-US based NGO researching biological and biochemical weapons – has made extensive use of open records law in its research and publications. Its requests under the US Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and related federal and state laws have provided documents illustrating “disturbing research on biological and chemical weapons” [60]. See for example: x

x

Harassing, Annoying, and “Bad Guy” Identifying Chemicals [61]. This document from the US Air Force proposed the development of a variety of chemical weapons, including: “One distasteful but completely non-lethal example would be strong aphrodisiacs, especially if the chemical also caused homosexual behaviour” [61]. Other chemicals proposed include ones that “made personnel very sensitive to sunlight”, and that “attract stinging and biting bugs, rodents, and larger animals” [61] to enemy positions. The Advantages and Limitations of Calmatives as a Non-Lethal Technique [62]. The Sunshine Project has described this as “a shocking report that sent shivers down the spine of every person interested in the prohibition of chemical and biological arms” [63].

Although the Sunshine Project has now suspended its activities, a unique online collection of government (and other) documents on incapacitating chemical and biochemical weapons is still held on their website.

6.3. Field Missions and Witness Testimony Independent scientists and NGOs can sometimes collect their own information, first hand, from on-site investigations or may be able to utilise information (e.g. witness testimony) and analyse materials (e.g. weapons shells, clothing fragments, soil samples,

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etc.) obtained from other civil society actors operating in the field (e.g. journalists, national NGOs, etc.). There are several potential constraints with such investigations including access, logistics and translation; safety considerations for researchers and witnesses; difficulties ensuring chain of custody, as well as establishing the representativeness, provenance, etc. of the information obtained. Despite such constraints, material collected during field missions can provide independent scientists and NGOs with information that could not be obtained by any other means, for example allowing identification of chemical agents utilised during a military or law enforcement operation.

Case Study: Independent Analysis of New Riot Control Agent Used against Civilians in the West Bank In July 2005 the Israeli army reportedly employed a new riot control agent against Palestinian and Israeli civilian protesters that resulted in severe skin injuries. The Israeli army refused to identify the agent. However, scientists based in the UK obtained one of the munitions utilised, and following physical and chemical analysis were able to identify the contents as capsaicin with an inert carrier and a dispersal agent [64]. The results were found to correspond with the commercially available ‘Pepperball Tactical Powder’. The paper noted that “Skin injuries of the severity described had not previously been reported with this agent, and would be difficult to manage for clinicians who were unaware of the nature of the agent” [64]. As well as alerting clinicians to the nature and effects of chemical agents they may face in the future, such research can also help to identify possible international transfers of chemical agents and devices.

In certain situations, such civil society investigations may be able to gain access to locations that are ‘out of bounds’ to official verification mechanisms due to mandate constraints, political sensitivities, organisational prioritisation, etc. For example, in 1998 it was an independent medical research scientist working together with Iraqi medical practitioners who initiated the first detailed on-site investigation of the longterm effects of the Iraqi chemical weapons attack on the Kurdish town of Halabja that had taken place 10 years earlier [65]. 6.4. Building a Culture of Responsibility: In its 2004 public statement ‘Preventing hostile use of the life sciences’, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) declared: “If measures to prevent the hostile use of advances in the life sciences are to work, a culture of responsibility is necessary among individual life scientists. This applies whether these scientists are working in industry, academia, health, defense or in related fields such as engineering and information technology. Such a culture of responsibility is also needed within the institutions that employ scientists and fund research in the life sciences.” [66]. However, despite the potentially grave dangers resulting from the misuse of relevant scientific and technological advances, research by Dando has recently highlighted the


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“lack of engagement with this issue among life scientists” which he considers “alarming” [67] Two kinds of normative approach should be actively considered now, separately or combined, to facilitate the nurturing of a much needed culture of responsibility: x

x

A code of ethics. An ethical code for scientists has long been promoted, most notably by Joseph Rotblat in his 1995 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech. “The time has come to formulate guidelines for the ethical conduct of scientists, perhaps in the form of a voluntary Hippocratic Oath” [68]. This could comprise a short, generic, scientific Hippocratic oath whereby those engaged in the life sciences (on entry to higher-education science courses or on graduating) pledge to respect national and international laws and use science only for the benefit of humanity. Codes of conduct or codes of practice. A professional guide to good practice that would be part of science education from secondary school to university and professional training, to raise awareness of the moral issues as well as instilling good practices for maintaining the security of materials, facilities and sensitive technologies.

In the light of concerns raised by bodies such as the BMA [14], ICRC [66] and National Research Council [69], such codes should highlight the responsibilities of life scientists to be diligent in safeguarding legitimate research from being used for any hostile purposes, including the development of chemical or biological weapons. Furthermore, whilst such codes can be useful in enunciating normative frameworks they must be vigorously promoted through national and international education, training and awareness-raising activities and incorporated into the operating procedures of all relevant academic, commercial or state research institutions – for example through research oversight committees – if they are to influence the actions of the scientific community [70]. 6.5. Protection of Whistleblowers There has been a tradition of independent-minded scientists and technicians alerting their fellow citizens and the international community to government policies and practices that have breached arms control agreements. For example, Russian chemist Vil Mirzajanow reported [71] on the secret chemical weapon activities of the former Soviet Union, and Russian defector Kanathan Alibekow (alias Ken Alibek) revealed in 1992 [72] the existence of Biopreparat, the network of clandestine Russian biological weapon research centres. Whilst it is the duty of individual scientists to make known their concerns about the misuse of scientific research for activities that breach ethical standards or international law, it is the responsibility of the scientific community as a whole to ensure that such whistleblowers are fully protected. This was recognised by the ICRC in their 2004 statement, which declared that: “Those working in life sciences who voice concern and take responsible action require and deserve political and professional support and protection” and the corresponding action point which was to “ensure that adequate mechanisms exist for voicing such concerns without fear of retribution.” [66]. Although a number of states such as South Africa [73], the UK [74] and the US [75], have legislation relating to whistleblowing activities on their statute books, the effectiveness of such legislation and its enforcement is variable [76]. It is important

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that independent scientists and professional bodies – in cooperation with human rights, civil liberties and whistleblowing organisations – promote the establishment of truly effective mechanisms under international and domestic law that provide legal protection against discrimination and criminal prosecution for whistleblowers. 6.6. Promoting and Contributing to Effective Intergovernmental Mechanisms to Address Incapacitants There are indications that some members of the international governmental community recognise the dangers resulting from the current inadequate regulation of incapacitants. In April 2008, during the Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention, a number of States Parties raised concerns about incapacitants and other non-lethal weapons, with the Swiss Government declaring that “Switzerland fears that the uncertainty concerning the status of incapacitating agents risks to undermine the Convention. A debate on this issue in the framework of the OPCW should no longer be postponed” [77]. Switzerland also presented a formal National Working Paper on incapacitating agents, the first time that any state had done so at a CWC Review Conference. The Swiss Working Paper concluded by calling “upon States Parties to consider adopting during the Second Review Conference a mandate for a discussion of, inter alia, an agreed definition of incapacitating agents, the status of incapacitating agents under the Convention, and possible transparency measures for incapacitating agents” [78]. In the light of these discussions, the author believes that there is an opportunity now for the scientific community to encourage concerned states to take action to address incapacitants, specifically by advocating and where appropriate contributing to: x

x

A moratorium on research and development of incapacitating biochemical weapons. Given the dangers of ‘creeping legitimization’ of incapacitants with the consequent risks of their proliferation and misuse, the scientific community should advocate that CWC States Parties take a preventative or precautionary approach to this issue. Consequently those States Parties currently engaged in the development of incapacitants should suspend such activities, and no other State Party should initiate such work. This moratorium should remain in place until the status of incapacitants under the CWC has been resolved by the States Parties to the Convention. [This moratorium is not intended to cover research, development and utilisation of incapacitating chemical or biochemical agents employed for medical and veterinary purposes, but solely those intended for use as weapons.] Technical studies. Given the limited information available regarding the development of incapacitants, the often unsubstantiated claims made by their proponents, and the long-standing concerns over their effectiveness and lethality in practice, the author believes that there is a need to initiate independent technical studies of such weapons. Such studies should explore whether existing incapacitants and means of delivery would incapacitate the designated target population without causing death or permanent harm to members of that population. Studies should examine likely tactical scenarios under which such weapons would be utilised, and ensure that the effects of consequent variability both in exposure and within target populations are fully explored. Such studies should be multidisciplinary in nature involving experts


x

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from relevant scientific and medical disciplines, with the input of international legal experts, law enforcement officials and military personnel. It is important that such studies be undertaken by authoritative and independent bodies. Intergovernmental consultation mechanism. Although the CWC Second Review Conference did not agree a formal mechanism for States to address incapacitants, there is an opportunity for concerned States to initiate an informal intergovernmental mechanism to discuss the regulation of these weapons under the CWC and other relevant international law. Given the multifaceted and multidisciplinary nature of the issues surrounding incapacitants, it is important that relevant experts from governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental scientific, medical, legal, law enforcement, security, human rights and humanitarian communities contribute to these discussions. Recommendations from this process should then be submitted to the relevant policy making organs of the Chemical Weapons Convention, with the aim that the issue of incapacitants be formally addressed at a Conference of States Parties and subsequently the Third CWC Review Conference. If it is deemed appropriate, recommendations from this process should also be submitted to the relevant policy making organs and meetings of other treaty bodies including the Biological Weapons Convention.

7. Conclusion The ICRC has noted that “Advances in the life sciences hold great promise for humanity”, but that “there is also great risk if these same advances are put to hostile use” [66]. Whether the life sciences will be employed for the further development and proliferation of incapacitant weapons with the consequent dangers of the misuse of such weapons for internal repression or offensive military operations will depend to a significant degree on whether scientists join the arms control, disarmament, human rights and humanitarian law communities to explore mechanisms to protect humanity from the potential of abuse of the relevant technologies they are developing, whilst preserving the beneficial applications.

References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]

[7]

Neuroscience 2000: A New Era of Discovery, Symposium organised by the Society of Neuroscience, Washington DC, 12-13 April 1999. N.C. Andreasen, Brave New Brain: Conquering Mental Illness in the Era of the Genome, Oxford University Press, USA, 2004. M. Meselson, Averting the Hostile Exploitation of Biotechnology, The CBW Conventions Bulletin 48 (2000), 16-19. M. Dando, Scientific outlook for the development of incapacitants, in M. Chevrier, M. Wheelis and A. Pearson (editors), Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons, Lexington Books, Lanham, USA, 2007. N. Davison, ‘Off the Rocker’ and ‘On the Floor’: The Continued Development of Biochemical Incapacitating Weapons, Bradford Science and Technology Report No. 8, 2007. G. Pearson, Relevant Scientific and Technological Developments for The First CWC Review Conference: The BTWC Review Conference Experience, CWC Review Conference Paper No.1. Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 2002. M. Chevrier, M. Wheelis and A. Pearson (editors), Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons, Lexington Books, Lanham, USA, 2007.

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[34] V. Klochinkhin, V. Pirumov, A. Putilov and V. Selivanov, The Complex Forecast of Perspectives of NLW for European Application, Proceedings of the 2nd European Symposium on Non-Lethal Weapons, Ettlingen, Germany, 13-14th May 2003, Pfinztal, Fraunhofer ICT, 2003. [35] V. Klochinkhin, A. Lushnikov, V. Zagaynov, A. Putilov, V. Selivanov and M. Zatekvakhin, Principles of Modelling of the Scenario of Calmative Application in a Building with Deterred Hostages, Proceedings of the 3rd European Symposium on Non-Lethal Weapons, Ettlingen, Germany, 10-12th May 2005, Pfinztal, Fraunhofer ICT, 2005. [36] Furmanski, Historical military interest in low-lethality biochemical agents, in M. Chevrier, M. Wheelis and A. Pearson (editors), Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons, 2007, Lexington Books, Lanham MD, 2007. [37] M. Dando and M. Furmanski, Midspectrum Incapacitant Programs, in M. Wheelis, L. Rózsa and M. Dando (editors), Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2006. [38] Guo Ji-Wei and Xue-sen Yang, Ultramicro, Nonlethal and Reversible: Looking Ahead to Military Biotechnology, Military Review, July-August 2005, as cited in ref. 13. [39] The Sunshine Project, French ‘Non-Lethal’ Chemical Weapons In: Sunshine Project Country Study No. 2: A Survey of Biological and Biochemical Weapons Related Research Activities in France, 16 November 2004. pp. 26-32. Available March 2007 at http://www.sunshineproject.org/countrystudies/France_BW_Report.pdf. [40] NATO Research and Technology Organisation, Non-Lethal Weapons and Future Peace Enforcement Operations, RTO-TR-SAS-040 (December 2004), cited in ref. 11. [41] N. Davison and N. Lewer, Bradford Non-Lethal Weapons Research Project, Research Report no. 8, March 2006, p. 50. [42] L. Hess, J. Schreiberová, and J. Fusek, Pharmacological Non-Lethal Weapons, Proceedings of the 3rd European Symposium on Non-Lethal Weapons, Ettlingen, Germany, 10-12 May 2005, Pfinztal, Fraunhofer ICT, 2005. [43] Ibid. pp 8-9. [44] Ibid. pp 9-10. [45] L. Hess, J. Schreiberová, J. Málek and J. Fusek, Drug-Induced Loss of Aggressiveness in the Macaque Rhesus, Proceedings of the 4th European Symposium on Non-Lethal Weapons, Ettlingen, Germany, 2123 May 2007, Pfinztal, Fraunhofer ICT, 2007. [46] L. Hess, J. Schreiberová, and J. Fusek, Pharmacological Non-Lethal Weapons. Proceedings of the 3rd European Symposium on Non-Lethal Weapons, Ettlingen, Germany, 10-12 May 2005, Pfinztal, Fraunhofer ICT, 2005. As cited in ref. 5. [47] Ibid. pp 10-14. [48] Ibid. p. 14. [49] M. Dumiak, Defense Technology International, November 2007, as cited in CBW Conventions Bulletin, June 2008, Harvard Sussex Programme, http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/bulletin/ cbwcb79.pdf. [50] S. Boken, J. Breen and Z. Orehovec, An Evaluation of Bioregulators as Terrorism and Warfare Agents, Applied Science and Analysis Newsletter 90 (2002), 1, 16-19. [51] National Research Council, Emerging Cognitive Neuroscience and Related Technologies, National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2008. Available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php? record_id=12177. [52] Ibid. p. 136. [53] Ibid. p. 138. [54] Ibid. p. 139. [55] Ibid. p. 137. [56] External Affairs and International Trade Department of Canada, Collateral Analysis And Verification Of Biological And Toxin Research In Iraq, Verification Research Program of the Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Ottawa, 1991. [57] Ibid p. 33. [58] Ibid.p. 35. [59] See UNSCOM, 3 December 1997, Major Sites Associated With Iraq's Past WMD Programs, http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/s/971203_sites.htm. [60] Sunshine Project, Freedom of Information research, http://www.sunshine-project.org/FOIA. [61] US Air Force Wright Laboratory, Harassing, Annoying, and ‘Bad Guy’ Identifying Chemicals (redacted), Wright-Patterson AFB (OH) June 1994. Available from http://www.sunshine-project.org. [62] Marine Corps Research University, Applied Research Laboratory, The Advantages and Limitations of Calmatives as a Non-Lethal Technique, Pennsylvania State University, October 2000. Available from http://www.sunshine-project.org.

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[63] Sunshine Project website, http://www.sunshine-project.org. [64] A. Hay, R. Giacaman, R. Sansur and S. Rose, Skin injuries caused by new riot control agent used against civilians on the West Bank, Medicine, Conflict and Survival 22(4) (October-December 2006), 283-291. [65] Christine M. Gosden, Testimony before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism and Government and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on Chemical and Biological Weapons Threats to America: Are We Prepared? April 22nd 1998, http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/congress/1998_hr/s980422-cg.htm. As cited in O. Meier and C. Tenner, Non-governmental monitoring of international agreements, Verification Yearbook 2001, VERTIC, London, 2001, pp 208-227. [66] ICRC, Preventing hostile use of the life sciences, from ethics and law to best practice, ICRC, Geneva, November 11, 2004. Available at http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/codesofconduct/Chronology/ Principles_Actionpoints_11Nov04.pdf. [67] M. Dando, Biologists napping while work militarized, Nature 460 (2009), 950-951. Dando’s concerns are echoed in an accompanying Nature editorial, A question of control: Scientists must address the ethics of using neuroactive compounds to quash domestic crises, Nature 460 (2009), 933. [68] J. Rotblat, Remember your humanity, in I. Abrams, Nobel Lectures, Peace 1991-1995, World Scientific Publishing, Singapore, 1999. As cited by J. Revill and M. Dando, A Hippocratic Oath for life scientists, EMBO Reports 7 (July 2006), S55-S60. [69] National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2004; National Research Council, Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences, National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2006. [70] J. Revill and M. Dando, A Hippocratic Oath for life scientists, EMBO Reports, 7 (July 2006), S55-S60. [71] Vil Mirzayanow, It’s time to release my mentor, speech to the ‘Democracy, Human Rights and Mordechai Vanunu’ international conference, Tel Aviv, Israel, 14–15 October 1996 (unpublished). For further information, see A poisoned policy, Moscow News Weekly, no. 39/1992. 9; Frank von Hippel, Russian Whistleblower Faces Jail, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 49(2) (March 1993), 7-8; New Times International, 45/1992, p. 22; Reiner Braun, Angeklagt wegen ‘Geheimnisverrats’, in Wissenschaft und Frieden, 1/1994, pp 71–72. As cited in D. Deiseroth, Societal verification: wave of the future?, Verification Yearbook 2000, VERTIC, London, 2000 (available at http://www.vertic.org/assets/VY00_Deiseroth.pdf). [72] Ken Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard, Random House, New York, 1999; Judith Miller, Aid is Diverted to Germ Warfare, Russian Scientists Say, New York Times, January 25, 2000, available at www.nytimes.com. As cited in D. Deiseroth, Societal verification: wave of the future?, Verification Yearbook 2000, VERTIC, London, 2000 (available at http://www.vertic.org/assets/ VY00_Deiseroth.pdf). [73] South African Protected Disclosures Act, available at: http://www.workinfo.com/free/Sub_for_legres/ data/Disclosure/protected.htm. [74] UK government, Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA). [75] US Federal Whistleblower Protection Act (5 USC sec. 1201), 9 July 1989. [76] See for example, R. Calland (editor), Whistleblowing around the World, Idasa, Cape Town, 2005; D. Deiseroth, Societal verification: wave of the future?, Verification Yearbook 2000, VERTIC, London, 2000 (available at http://www.vertic.org/assets/ VY00_Deiseroth.pdf); T. Devine, The Whistleblower’s Survival Guide, Fund for Constitutional Government, Washington DC, 1997; T. Devine, Whistleblowing in the United States: The Gap between Vision and Lessons Learned, in R. Calland (editor), Whistleblowing around the World, Idasa, Cape Town, 2005; B. Martin, The Whistleblower’s Handbook, Jon Carpenter, Charlbury, UK, 1999; B. Martin, Suppression of Dissent in Science, Research in Social Problems and Public Policy, 7 (1999), 105-135. [77] Statement by Ambassador Dominik M. Alder, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the OPCW, Second Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention, General Debate, The Hague, Netherlands, 8 April 2008. Available at http://www.opcw.org. [78] Switzerland Working Paper, Riot Control and Incapacitating Agents Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, The Hague, Netherlands, RC-2/NAT.12. Available at http://www.opcw.org.


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How Deadly Are Non-Lethal Weapons? Krill K .BABIEVSKY1 and Daniil S. RODIONOV Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russian Federation

Abstract. A concept of non-lethal weapons might be used as an alternative not only to weapons of mass destruction but, in a certain sense, to conventional weapons also. However this concept is very questionable: for example, immobilizing chemicals and mini-nukes are considered by some, unfairly, to be non-lethal weapons. This example suggests that the concept of ‘non-lethality’ is essentially a relative one: in reality, non-lethal weapons may be rather lethal depending on specific conditions. Therefore, problems of reduction, nonproliferation and prohibition are also of importance for many types of these socalled non-lethal weapons. Keywords. Weapons, non-lethal weapons, immobilizing chemicals, blinding lasers, laser weapons, energy threshold, calmative agents, Chemical Weapons Convention.

Introduction The ɫoncept of non-lethal weapons might be used ɚs an alternative, not only to weɚɪons of mass destruɫtion (WMDs) but, in a ɫertain sense, to ɫonventional weapons as well. This kind of logiɫ would imply that non-lethal weapons should not be ɫonsidered as tɚrgets for immediate anti-military actions of non-governmental organizɚtions. But the ɫonɫept of non-lethal weaɪons is itself very unɫlear. For example, immobilizing ɫhemiɫals and even mini-nukes are ɫonsidered by some to be non-lethal ones; detonating the latter in near-ȿɚrth sɪaɫe would generate a powerful eleɫtromagnetiɫ pulse which would be exɪected to be lethal for power lines and eleɫtronic ɫirɫuits. Ɍhis eɯample suggests that a ɫonɫept of ‘non-lethality’ is essentially of a relɚtive nature: in reality, non-lethal weapons may be rather lethal depending on speɫifiɫ ɫonditions. Ɍherefore, problems of reduɫtion, non-ɪroliferation and proscription are of importanɫe for many types of these weɚpons as well as for WMDs.

1. What Are Non-Lethal Weapons? The basic unɫertainty that is inherent in the ɫonɫept of non-lethal weapons makes their detailed classification impossible. But from the independent scientists’ point of view, some preliminary ɫlassifiɫation ɫɚn be made. In ɪarticular, one of the ɪossible classification ɫriteria is the purpose of a speɫifiɫ weapon type: either it is intended to destroy teɫhniɫal ɫomponents of an adversary or it 1 Corresponding author: Institute of Organoelement Compounds, Russian Academy of Sciences, Russian Federation, 28 Vavilov St, Moscow; E-mail: [email protected].

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is used to target people. Weapons falling in the latter ɫategory include maiming weapons, for example blinding weapons or weapons ɫausing irreversible mental disorder. Ɍhese weapons should be the subjects of the most serious ɫonɫerns. One ɫan ɫonsider lɚsers as a good illustration of the problems mentioned above. Ɍhe laser mechanism wɚs disɫovered about half a ɫentury ago, but today this field of physiɫs hɚs exɪanded enormously bɨth quɚntitatively and qualitatively: lasers can be made that ɫover many speɫtrɚl ranges, ɚnd their releɚsed power can vary by several orders of magnitude. So one cannot speak about laser weapons in a general way without specifying some important parameters, such as speɫtral range, laser type (solidstate or gaseous), mode of generation (pulsed or ɫontinuous wave), and releɚsed power (or energy per ‘shot’). Not every laser ɫan be regarded as a ɪotential weapon. On the ɫontrary, there are not very many tyɪes of laser that have a potential military nature. For example, the SDI epoɫh was characterized by a great interest in types of lasers that were ɫɚpable of delivering tens or hundreds of kilojoules (kJ) of energy in a single shot. Such laser beams have an ɚbility to burn holes in a missile’s fuel tanks at distɚnɫes of some thousands of kilometers. Ɍhese are examples of strategiɫ laser weɚpons – they demonstrate how high the military potential of lasers is. But pay attention to the faɫt that strategiɫ lasers ɫɚn be regarded formally as non-lethal weapons, sinɫe they are not intended for doing direɫt damage to personnel tɚrgets (although a human body would literally be burned up if exposed to suɫh a beam).

2. Laser Weapons Weapons that we used to ɫɚll ‘laser weapons’ are essentially battlefield ones with a typiɫal ‘kill range’ of about one kilometer. They are intended mostly to ɫɚuse damage to sensors loɫated in the foɫal plane of optiɫal deviɫes. In partiɫular, charge-coupled device (CCD) matriɫes (which are used in some optical devices) are extremely vulnerable to laser irradiation. But a laser beam from such a weapon ɫould destroy another important optiɫal deviɫe as well: the human eye. Charaɫteristics of taɫtiɫɚl laser weapons are speɫified in ɚ rɚther straightforward manner. Sinɫe a laser beam hɚs to penetrate the atmosphere then the laser should operate in the visible or near-infrared range (wavelength 0.4-1.4 μm). Pulsed lasers seem to be more relevant if ɚ target is moving; traɫking and aiming such a weapon might be a ɫompliɫated problem. Solid state lasers are preferable for portable (handheld) units. Incidentally, neodymium glass lasers meet all these ɫriteria. Ɍhe most important parameter of a laser weapon is its energy threshold. It turns out that this is extremely low for causing damage to an eye. Ɍhe ɪoint is that the eye is operating (at least in the 0.4-1.4 μm range) as an optiɫal foɫusing system in which the inɫoming power is ɫonɫentrated on the surface of the retina into a tiny spot with an area 10 to 100 times smaller than the size of the eye. lt is known thɚt the energy threshold for the totɚl destruɫtion of retinal tissue is about a few Joules per square centimeter. Ɍhis value ɫorresponds to an external inɫoming energy density of a few μJ/ɫm2. An external inɫoming energy density which results in total evaporation of a CCD pixel (loɫated in a foɫal plane of some optiɫɚl system) is also of the same order of μJ/ɫm2. The energy threshold for the burning of unproteɫted skin is about half that for retinal tissue destruɫtion. Sinɫe foɫusing effeɫts are generally not relevant in the case of


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skin irradiation, skin burning mɚy not be ɫonsidered to be an important destruɫtion mechanism for tactiɫal laser weapons. It is perhaps worth mentioning that eyelid skin is somewhat transparent to red and infrared light. This meɚns that closing ones eyes ɫɚnnot provide absolutely reliable proteɫtion against laser irradiation. An unproteɫted eye is extremely vulnerable to a narrow laser beam. Even a one milliwatt helium-neon laser is capable of projecting onto a retinal surface a power density about 1000 times greater than that of the destruɫtion threshold. A pulsed neodymium laser with a total energy rating of 10 Joules ɫɚn produɫe an energy density on the retina of about 100 kJ/cm2. It might be reasonable to operate a laser weapon not with a very nɚrrow laser beam (for which aiming problems might be important) but to use instead a divergent beɚm whiɫh would cover an area of about meter across in the target plane (ɫorresponding to a spot area of about 10,000 ɫm2). In this ɫɚse, the total energy for a blinding laser would be rather low, between about 0.01-0.1 J. A 10 Joule neodymium laser operating in divergent beam mode ɫould therefore illuminɚte an area of up to about 1000 m2. Let us remind ourselves that neodymium lasers are used in experiments on ɫontrolled laser fusion. About ten years ago, it was reported that such a neodymium laser had an energy of about 15 kJ per single shot. lf one ɫompares all these figures then the independent ɫonɫlusion is obvious: the techniɫal potential of modern laser physiɫs and technology exɫeeds ɫonsiderably the level which is needed for making blinding laser weapons. It is not physiɫs itself but an applied militɚry-oriented teɫhnology whiɫh would be responsible for ɫonverting potential non-lethal laser weapons into nearly lethal (at least, maiming) ones.

3. Calmative and Other Chemical Agents Ɍhe next important exɚmple relates to so-called ‘ɫalmɚtive agents’. Many sɫienɫe fiɫtion writers were at one time enthusiastiɫ about non-lethal chemiɫal weapons. For instɚnɫe, H.G. Wells, in his novel Ɍhe Shaɪe of Things to Come, mentioned some anaesthetiɫ gas dispersed by airɫraft. As a result, ɪeople were in a stupor until the end of the war described in this book. In the late nineteen fifties this ɫonɫept of non-lethal weɚɪons become no longer sɫienɫe fiɫtion. At that time representatives of the US Army Chemiɫɚl Corps made a publiɫ statement on the development of some new ɫhemiɫal inɫapaɫitants which had oɪened the way to “wars without death”. Non-lethal chemiɫal weapons are ɫonsidered now to have wider aspeɫts. They inɫlude not only old-fashioned inɫɚpaɫitɚnts and irritants (whiɫh are intended to damage only personnel targets) but all kinds of chemiɫɚl weapons which can destroy techniɫal components of an adversary’s weaponry. But those agents with anti-personnel and anti-vegetation chemiɫal aɫtivity which were exɫluded from the list of banned weapons in the 1993 Chemiɫɚl Weapons Convention (CWC) are still of speɫial ɫonɫern. Some of these agents are speɫified by the US Department of Defense as “less-than-lethal immobilizing chemiɫals”, and by the US Army as “advanɫed riot control agents”. Nevertheless, non-lethal chemiɫal agents have one ɫommon feature: they affeɫt normal vital funɫtions and can cause harm to ɪeople’s health. In other words, these agents are all essentially ‘toxiɫ chemiɫɚls’, a terminology that has been adopted by the Chemical Weapons Convention. Ɍherefore, when the CWC came into forɫe, all ‘toxic chemiɫal’ aɫtivity (development, produɫtion, storage, and use) had to be banned.

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However, some anti-personnel non-lethal chemiɫal agents such as CS are not banned by the CWC: they ɫan be produɫed and used for non-military objeɫtives such as riot ɫontrol. But these CWC definitions are unfortunately ambiguous: it is not ɫlear how to interpret them preɫisely. So there might be a kind of loophole for ɪotential violators of the CWC. In reɫent years ɫertɚin progress has been made in the development of such ɚgents. A number of armies were supplied with agent CR, whose unbeɚrable ɫonɫentration in air is one-tenth that of CS which was used in Vietnam. CR affects not only the eyes and respiratory organs but the skin as well. It was disɫovered that diterɪene esters have high irritɚnt charaɫteristiɫs. One of these esters ɫɚn effeɫt skin dɚmage when used in a dose of one ten-millionth of a milligram per square meter, or less than one thousɚndth of a milligram for the integument as a whole. None of the most modern masks ɫan give proteɫtion against CR agent ɚerosols. Contaminated air ɫan pass through smoke proteɫtion filters and the valves of any fitted gas mask to a degree amounting to one ten-millionth of that at the inlet side of the mask or filter. On the one hand, breathing in such an amount of organophosphorous ɚgent is not dangerous, but on the other hand, penetration of larger amounts of an agent may remain unnotiɫed. If an unbeɚrable amount of irritant agent penetrates through a mask it results in ɫoughing and suffoɫation; a person may therefore take the gas mɚsk off his faɫe involuntarily and expose himself to the effeɫt of a lethal dose of agent. Suɫh ɚɫtive agents from the military point of view may thus turn out to have very different charɚɫteristiɫs – they ɫould be transferred from the irritant to the lethal ɫategory. And they could overɫome such a proteɫtion barrier as a gas mask.

4. Conclusions By considering as examples so-called non-lethal weapons based on laser technology and chemical agents, we conclude that the concept of ‘non-lethality’ is essentially a relative one. Depending on specific conditions of their use, non-lethal weapons in reality may be rather lethal. Laɫk of prohibition on the development of irritants, and of some other chemical agents such as inɫɚpaɫitɚnts and vegetation destruɫtion agents, may enɫourɚge research institutes and industries to develop and produce new types of chemiɫɚl weaɪons which are not ɫovered by the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (which does not ban research on riot-ɫontrol or ‘less-than-lethal’ ɚgents). Problems of weapons reduɫtion, non-ɪroliferation and proscription are of importanɫe not only for WMDs, but for many types of these ‘non-lethal’ weɚpons as well.


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The Role of Scientists in Assessing the Risks of Dual-Use Research in the Life Sciences a

Geoffrey SMITH FRSa, Neil DAVISONb,1, and Ben KOPPELMANb Committee on the Scientific Aspects of International Security (SAIS), the Royal Society, London, UK b Science Policy Centre, the Royal Society, London, UK

Abstract. Dual-use research is that which could be misused for malign purposes. The challenge to the international community is to manage the risks from this type of research without constraining its benefits. Scientists have a clear role to play in placing dual-use concerns in the broader context of the full spectrum of biological risks, and to inform assessments of the changing nature of biological risks. They can help ensure a focus on the highest risk research and avoid unnecessary restrictions or censorship. They can also inform policymaking through contribution to risk assessment and management strategies, whilst recognising that the risk of misuse cannot be eliminated Keywords. Dual-use research, biosecurity, biological weapons, risk assessment, transparency, scientists.

Introduction The US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) defines dual-use research as “research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied by others to pose a threat to public health, agriculture, plants, animals, the environment, or materiel” [1]. The challenge to the international community is to manage the risks from this type of research in the life sciences without constraining its benefits. Scientists carrying out this research have a clear role to play in informing this process, in particular: setting the risks of dual use in the wider context of biological risks; avoiding unnecessary restriction on scientific openness; and assessing and communicating the balance between biological risks and benefits. These three areas are discussed briefly in the context of biological weapons threats.

1 Corresponding Author: Science Policy Centre, The Royal Society, 6-9 Carlton House Terrace, London SW1Y 5AG, UK; E-mail: [email protected].

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1. Dual-use Risks in Context Scientists can help place the issue of dual-use research in the broader context of the full spectrum of biological risks: from naturally occurring disease, through the unintended consequences of research and laboratory accidents, to the deliberate misuse of biological agents as weapons. Scientists from many nations emphasise the enormous current loss of life caused by naturally occurring diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, and the real dangers presented by emerging or re-emerging infections such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and pandemic influenza. These are global biological risks, which do not recognise borders. In stark contrast examples of bioterrorism have been very limited and resulted in little loss of life. For example, the 2001 Anthrax letters in the United States killed five people and infected 17, although they did cause significant disruption and resulted in huge costs for the clean-up operation. Nevertheless, the perceived risk of bioterrorism following this event led to very major investment in related defensive research. The benefit of considering the full spectrum of biological risks is that many measures taken to counteract infectious diseases will also reduce the risks from deliberate misuse of biological agents, including misuse of dual-use research [2]. It is also necessary to be cognisant that any measures aimed to mitigate risks specifically from dual-use research must avoid constraining the application of that research to the further understanding of infectious disease or advancement of biological science in general. So that beneficial research is not jeopardised, it is important that scientists help focus efforts on the small amount of research which presents the greatest potential risk of misuse, which the NSABB has termed this “dual-use research of concern”. The US National Academies of Science (NAS) Committee on Research Standards and Practices to Prevent the Destructive Application of Biotechnology highlighted seven general ‘experiments of concern’ that require the particular attention of the scientific community. Those experiments that: demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective; confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents; enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a non-pathogen virulent; increase transmissibility of a pathogen; alter the host range of a pathogen; enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection modalities; or enable the weaponisation of a biological agent or toxin [3]. The committee noted, however, that they had only addressed microbial threats, acknowledging that advances in science and technology might necessitate broadening the range of experiments of concern. This view was upheld by a subsequent NAS committee addressing the future of the life sciences and implications for biosecurity, which recommended a “broadened awareness of threats beyond the classical ‘select agents’ and other pathogenic organisms and toxins, so as to include, for example, approaches for disrupting host homeostatic and defense systems and for creating synthetic organisms” [4].

2. Ensuring Scientific Openness Scientists can help ensure that the channels of communication, which are intrinsic to the scientific tradition for validating, repudiating and building upon scientific ideas, remain open [5]. Similarly, scientists can help avoid unnecessary restrictions on dual-


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use research. Whilst research classified as dual use with the highest potential risk means that consideration may be warranted over the conduct of the research and the communication of the results, it does not mean that the research should be prohibited or its findings censored. It is a mistaken assumption that censorship of basic research prevents the misuse of advances in the life sciences, because it is likely to be published elsewhere, such as in other journals, websites or conference proceedings, or communicated informally via e-mail, telephone or face-to-face discussion. Censoring the results of dual-use research to prevent the misuse of the life sciences is counterproductive in that it could adversely affect the development of treatments and countermeasures to strengthen public health measures and provide protection against the full range of biological risks [6].

3. Risk/Benefit Assessment and Communication Scientists working at the forefront of dual-use research are well equipped to identify and assess risks, and devise means to manage them. They are also well placed to help communicate the potential risks and benefits from their research to the media and the wider public. There is an important role for scientists to help inform sensible policymaking through contribution to realistic risk assessments of dual-use research as part of the broad scope of biological risks. These assessments can guide risk management strategies to minimise dangers, whilst recognising that the risk of misuse cannot be eliminated [7]. Scientists can also help overcome problems of perception in assessing biological risks. A challenge is how to factor in public perceptions, which are determined in part by the level of public confidence and trust in science. Scientists have a clear role to play here in explaining new scientific advances, communicating risks and benefits clearly, with the aim of reducing fears about the potential misuse of their research. Another challenge is that risk environments and risk perceptions differ around the world. The perception of the likelihood of malign use of the life sciences and the potential harm to public health varies between countries. International scientists can help develop a shared risk methodology and terminology incorporating regional differences so that responses to the risks from naturally occurring disease and the potential risks from deliberate misuse of research are mutually reinforcing [6]. In the UK there is a common approach for reducing the risk of misuse of life science research, which involves existing safeguards and controls such as the Health and Safety Executive, the Genetic Manipulation Advisory Group, the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens, and the Gene Therapy Advisory Committee. At the first level, employees sign a contract with their employers stating compliance with all local and national safety legislation. A risk assessment for all projects must be submitted to the local safety committee, and if research involving genetic modification is involved, the project must be scrutinised by the local Genetic Manipulation Advisory Group. All genetic manipulation work with pathogens (containment level 2 or higher [8]) must be considered by and registered with the Health and Safety Executive. At the next level, grant applications proposing new scientific projects are considered for dualuse issues by funding agencies [9]. Finally, after research is completed, papers submitted to journals are considered for dual-use issues by referees, editors and publishers.

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4. Conclusion Scientists have a role to play in ensuring that measures aimed to mitigate risks associated with dual-use research do not constrain the benefits of research advances for combatting infectious diseases. Efforts should focus on the small amount of research that presents the greatest potential risk of misuse. However, it is necessary to be aware of the changing nature of biological risks. Scientists can help maintain the openness and transparency necessary for scientific progress, and avoid unnecessary restrictions on research or censorship. They can also inform policymaking through contribution to risk assessment and management strategies, whilst, whilst recognising that the risk of misuse cannot be eliminated.

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[7]

[8] [9]

National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, Proposed Framework for the Oversight of Dual Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing the Potential Misuse of Research Information, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda MD, 2007. Available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/pdf/ Framework%20for%20transmittal%200807_Sept07.pdf. Royal Society, Do no harm: reducing the potential for the misuse of life science research, RS policy document 29/04, Royal Society, London, 2004. Available at http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/ groups/corporatesite/@policy_communications/documents/web_document/wtx023408.pdf. National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2004. Available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10827. National Research Council, Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences, National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2006. Available at http://www.nap.edu/ catalog.php?record_id=11567. ICSU Committee on Freedom and Responsibility in the conduct of Science, Freedom, Responsibility and Universality of Science, International Council for Science (ICSU), Paris, 2008. Available at http://www.icsu.org/Gestion/img/ICSU_DOC_DOWNLOAD/2205_DD_FILE_Freedom_Responsibilit y_Universality_of_Science_booklet.pdf. Royal Society, Report of the RS-ISP-ICSU international workshop on science and technology developments relevant to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, RS policy document 38/06, Royal Society, London, 2006. Available at http://royalsociety.org/displaypagedoc.asp?id=23508. Royal Society, Royal Society activities on reducing the risk of the misuse of scientific research. RS policy document 17/08, Royal Society, London, 2008. Available at http://royalsociety.org/ displaypagedoc.asp?id=31055. Health and Safety Executive, Biological agents: Managing the risks in laboratories and healthcare premises, HSE, Sudbury, UK, 2005. Available at http://www.hse.gov.uk/biosafety/biologagents.pdf. BBSRC, MRC, and Wellcome Trust, Managing risks of misuse associated with grant funding activities, a joint Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC), Medical Research Council (MRC) and Wellcome Trust policy statement, September 2005. Available at http://www.bbsrc.ac.uk/organisation/policies/position/public_interest/misuse_of_research_joint.pdf.


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Responsible Stewardship of Advances in Life Sciences Research: Lessons from the Fink and Lemon-Relman Reports Jo L. HUSBANDS1 The US National Academies, Washington DC

Abstract. This chapter offers an account of the work of the US National Academies, in cooperation with other national and international scientific organizations, to address increasing concerns about the potential security risks posed by continuing and dramatic developments in the life sciences. The work, begun in 2001, builds on a much longer line of work by the Academies on the periodic tensions between the culture of scientific openness and the desire to prevent adversaries from using advances in science and technology to cause harm to national or international security. Keywords. Dual-use research, biotechnology, science and security, biological weapons, bioterrorism, scientific freedom and responsibility.

Introduction: The Academies and Independent Advice2 As discussed in other parts of this volume, what, if anything, constitutes ‘independent’ scientific advice and how it is best provided provoke serious controversies. This section discusses how one particular type of institution, using a variety of processes, attempts to achieve independence in order to fulfill a particular role, in this case as an advisor to its government. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) was created in 1863, with a charter from the US Congress signed by President Abraham Lincoln. In addition to its role as an honorific society to recognize the achievements of distinguished individuals in all branches of science, the NAS charter mandates the institution to “investigate, examine, experiment, and report upon any subject of science or art” whenever called upon to do so by any department of the government. To keep pace with the growing roles that science and technology would play in public life, the institution eventually expanded to include the National Research Council (NRC) in 1916, the National Academy of Engineering in 1964, and the Institute of Medicine in 1970. Collectively, the four organizations are now known as the National Academies. 1 The views expressed in this paper are my own and do not necessarily reflect conclusions or recommendations of The National Academies except where noted. I have been deeply involved in the work of The National Academies on biological weapons proliferation, including the report Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, which is the focus of much of this paper, and remain engaged in the implementation of its recommendations. 2 The material in this section is drawn from the website of the National Academies, http://nationalacademies.org/.

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J.L. Husbands / Responsible Stewardship of Advances in Life Sciences Research

Most of the institution's science policy and technical work is conducted by its operating arm, the NRC. The NRC does not receive direct appropriations from the government for its work. Individual projects are funded by federal agencies, foundations, other governmental and private sources, and the institution’s endowment. The work is made possible by thousands of the world’s top scientists, engineers, and other professionals who volunteer their time without compensation to serve on committees and participate in other activities. The core of the institution’s work consists of studies usually of six months to two years in duration and performed under contract to a sponsor or set of sponsors. Each study is conducted by a committee selected expressly for that purpose. In a typical year, as many as 10,000 volunteers serve on up to 1,000 different committees that generate 200-300 reports. Committee members are chosen on the basis of their knowledge and experience in the various aspects of the topic to be investigated, and are appointed by the chair of the NRC, who also is the president of the NAS. Committee members serve as individuals, not as representatives of organizations or interest groups. The potential committee roster is evaluated at several levels within the NRC in an attempt to ensure that the committee includes both the necessary substantive expertise and the range of views about the issues the committee will address. The names, affiliations, and short biographies of committee members are posted for public comment in the “Current Projects” area of the institution’s website, and the membership of a committee may be augmented if public comments suggest that either views or expertise is missing. In addition, since the credibility of a report can be called into question if the committee that produced it is perceived to be biased, potential sources of bias and conflict of interest are significant issues that are taken into consideration in the selection of committee members and are re-examined periodically throughout the study process. That said, the NRC recognizes that each individual who is knowledgeable about a subject brings his or her own biases and experiences to any study effort, and therefore has adopted specific procedures to achieve appropriate balance in the committee membership and to avoid conflicts of interest. At the time of appointment, each committee member is required to list all professional, consulting, and financial connections, as well as to describe pertinent intellectual positions and public statements by filling out a confidential form. The committee appointment is not finalized until the institution completes a review of information regarding potential conflicts of interest and bias. If a potential conflict becomes apparent, the committee member may be asked to resign. In exceptional circumstances, an individual may continue to serve on the committee if the conflict of interest is promptly and publicly disclosed, and the National Academies have determined that the conflict is unavoidable. To fulfill its legal requirement for such public disclosure, the institution posts a brief statement describing the unavoidable conflict on its website. When a question of balance arises, the usual procedure is to add members to the committee to achieve the appropriate balance. The committee meets at intervals to consider its scope of work, to review the relevant scientific evidence, and to develop its findings, conclusions, and recommendations. The charge to the committee – developed before committee members are selected – is the formal statement of the questions to be addressed by the study. This statement defines the study’s scope and issues to be examined. Study committees typically gather the information they need to fulfill the charge through:


x x x x

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Meetings that are open to the public and are announced in advance through the National Academies website. The submission of information by outside parties, including sponsoring agencies. Reviews of the scientific and technical literature. The investigations of the committee members, staff, and consultants.

In accordance with federal law (Section 15 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. § 15) and with few exceptions, information-gathering meetings of the committee are open to the public and any written materials provided to the committee by individuals who are not officials, agents, or employees of the National Academies are maintained in a public access file that is available for examination. The committee deliberates in meetings that are closed to the public in order to develop its findings and recommendations free from outside influences. All analyses and drafts of the committee’s reports remain confidential. Most committees eventually issue a unanimous report of their conclusions; consensus is the goal. Members of committees strive for consensus, but not at the cost of substantially weakening their analyses and conclusions. Where consensus is not possible, the committee is expected to explain the rationale behind areas of disagreement and provide a fair account of the pros and cons of the issue. The committee is the ‘author of record’ and the final report is issued by the institution, usually as an ‘NRC report’. In rare cases, however, individual committee members may file a separate individual statement of their views, but this is very much the exception. As a final check on the quality and objectivity of study, all reports undergo a rigorous review by independent experts with a range of views and perspectives, in accordance with policies determined by the institution’s Report Review Committee. The review process is structured to ensure that each report addresses its approved charge and does not go beyond it; that any findings are supported by the scientific evidence and arguments presented; that the exposition and organization are effective; and that the report is impartial and objective. Sponsors are not permitted to review draft reports except on occasion to check that specific factual material is accurate or where classified or specific types of ‘sensitive but unclassified’ material is involved. Each authoring committee must respond to, but need not agree with, reviewer comments in a detailed ‘response to review’ that is examined by one or two independent report review ‘monitors’ responsible for ensuring that the report review criteria have been satisfied. Reviewers are identified in the final report, although their comments are not revealed. After all committee members and appropriate officials of the National Academies have signed off on the final report, it is transmitted to the sponsor of the project and is released to the public. This rather long and detailed description is intended to convey the lengths to which the institution goes to try to be as independent and objective as possible. It does not always succeed but the effort is genuine. The major criticisms tend to be that the pursuit of ‘balance’ can drive committees toward the sometimes limited areas where consensus is possible, thus producing the lowest common denominator in the final report. Although the institution strives to represent all points of view fairly, the most extreme positions tend not to be represented on committees, especially if the subject is an area where there is significant scientific consensus on the fundamentals of the problem. But this also has the advantage of ensuring that committee recommendations are taken very seriously and can be hard for a sponsor to dismiss, even if the advice is

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not what was hoped for when the study was commissioned. And when a report does produce advice that is ‘outside the box’, the effect can be particularly dramatic. In the realm of ‘weapons of mass destruction’, an example of the latter might be the 1997 CISAC report, The Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy, which along with a series of proposals for deeper cuts in existing nuclear arsenals, concluded that, with the end of the Cold War, the time had come to examine seriously the conditions under which it could be possible to achieve prohibition of all nuclear weapons [1]. However circumspect the language, the message was clear. The report attracted substantial press attention, was translated into several languages and frequently cited in the policy debates of the time and since. The policies the report recommended were never achieved, but it nonetheless offers an example of genuine independence from the prevailing wind in US nuclear policy circles at the time.

1. Background: The Rise of ‘Biosecurity’ as an Issue Over the last 50 years, rapidly expanding knowledge in the life sciences, especially in microbiology and genetics, has brought great benefits to society and holds out the promise of continuing and perhaps greater benefits in the future. But could the same technologies that fuel these advances in medicine, agriculture, and industry also pose potential risks for international security – could the knowledge, tools, and techniques gained through biotechnology research be misused to create biological weapons (BW) or for bioterrorism?3 Matthew Meselson, a leading molecular biologist, gave a stark warning of the possible dangers posed by the destructive applications of biotechnology at the annual meeting of the National Academy of Sciences in May 2000 [2]. Every major technology – metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion, aviation, electronics, nuclear energy – has been intensively exploited, not only for peaceful purposes but also for hostile ones. Must this also happen with biotechnology, certain to be a dominant technology of the coming century? During the century just begun, as our ability to modify fundamental life processes continues its rapid advance, we will be able not only to devise additional ways to destroy life but will also be able to manipulate it – including the processes of cognition, development, reproduction, and inheritance. A world in which these capabilities are widely employed for hostile purposes would be a world in which the very nature of conflict has radically changed. Therein could lie unprecedented opportunities for violence, coercion, repression, or subjugation [2]. Yet even those most concerned with the risks acknowledge that research with great apparent potential for misuse may offer significant potential benefits as well. Concerns over potential misuse of biotechnology research also reflect the intense focus of post-Cold War security studies and policy, especially in the United States, on the dangers posed by the proliferation of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMD) – nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and some of the means, especially ballistic missiles, by which they could be delivered. President Yeltsin’s admission in early 1992, following years of accusations, that the Soviet Union had maintained a huge clandestine biological weapons program in violation of the Biological and Toxin 3 This paper does not address the issue of environmental or health risks, and the substantial controversies over areas of biotechnology research such as genetically modified plants and animals, gene therapy, or stem cell research.


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Weapons Convention (BWC) [3] came as the revelations of Iraq’s efforts to create biological weapons were unfolding in the wake of the first Gulf War. US policy makers feared that so-called ‘rogue states’ would seek WMD as a way to counter the overwhelming conventional military superiority of the United States. The first World Trade Center bombings in 1993, the Oklahoma City bombings in 1995, the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo attacks in Tokyo with chemical agents, and the growing awareness of the vulnerability of vast stocks of fissile materials in the former Soviet Union, spurred an increasing additional concern with ‘catastrophic’ terrorism [4]. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax letters in October turned those already existing concerns into the highest national security priority. One of President George W. Bush’s most famous statements of the problem came in a speech at West Point in June 2002: “The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations” [5].4 As already mentioned, this chapter focuses on the challenge of reducing the security risks of misuse of research in the life sciences, which includes threats to humans, animals, plants, the environment, and materiel.5 The potential that biotechnology research intended for legitimate and beneficent purposes might be misused for malevolent ends is often called the ‘dual-use’ dilemma [6]. This is different from the classic definition in defense and security of dual use as equipment or technology (including knowledge and skills) that could be applied for civilian or military purposes, but it reflects increasing attention to developments in science and technology that, although arising from the commercial sector, raise significant concerns for security. Nanotechnology and microcomputing are two other areas often cited as posing similar ‘dual-use’ issues. Although national measures are considered essential for addressing dual-use issues in life science research, most of those concerned about the risks of misuse of research believe that, to be effective, these responses should be harmonized and adopted internationally [7,8]. Biotechnology research is now a truly global enterprise and thus any meaningful approaches must ultimately be global as well [6,9]. The failure to undertake compatible international efforts risks, among other things, driving research to areas where there is less oversight. It also risks disrupting the international collaboration that is so much a part of the modern scientific enterprise; scientists sometimes point to the example of the barriers raised by legislation in the United States after September 11th as an example of what should be avoided. As discussed in more detail later, many studies addressing the dual-use dilemma also conclude that an essential first step would be raising awareness of dual-use issues and creating engagement in the scientific community in the United States and internationally. After the BWC was signed in 1972, most life scientists had little 4 It should be noted that the US response to the perceived threats of bioterrorism included a massive increase in funding for research of the type most likely to pose the questions of how to balance potential risks and benefits. 5 ‘Life sciences’ is a broad and messy category that includes agricultural sciences, biological sciences, and the health sciences. In addition, there is some overlap with the physical sciences (e.g. biochemistry in chemistry and biophysics in physics) and engineering (e.g. bioengineering or biomedical engineering).

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experience with the issues of biological weapons (BW) or bioterrorism; national research programs related to biological weapons permitted under the BWC are confined to defensive measures only. Thus without conscious personal effort or systematic education very few life scientists working today in the United States or overseas would have reason to know of past offensive weapons programs. They also have few connections to the national security branches of government. In this regard, the life sciences community differs markedly from the physics community or parts of engineering, which have been continuously aware of and involved in government-sponsored weapons research programs since at least World War II. The image of themselves as engaged in research only for the benefit of humankind is deeply engrained in the way life scientists view their work and their role in society. Although it might seem naïve to security specialists, it is a profound and unwelcome shock to ask many life scientists to consider that there could be risks of misuse of the results of their research, or that they might have responsibilities to help mitigate the risks [10,11]. To be fair, the potential risks of the misuse of advances in life sciences research are not universally accepted, within or outside the United States. WMD threat assessments are often the subject of controversy and those involving biological weapons and bioterrorism are particularly fraught. On the level of general policy, concerns about bioterrorism are sometimes considered part of a general US tendency to ‘hype’ the threat of WMD and terrorism [12]. On a technical level, some argue that “Mother Nature is the best terrorist,” so there is little reason for terrorists or less technologically advanced countries to do more than take advantage of the highly dangerous pathogens already abundantly available in nature (see [13] for a review of this argument). Other research suggests that absorbing and using new technology may require substantial tacit knowledge that is not easily transferred [14]. Concerns about misuse may also generate counter-concerns that efforts to limit the risks will damage the research enterprise, especially if they lead to limits or controls on the conduct of research or its dissemination. Openness in science has the status of a sacred principle, even if in practice there may be limits and restrictions from many sources.6 The International Council for Science (ICSU), for example, upholds the principle of the Universality of Science, under which “all scientists should have the possibility to participate, without discrimination and on an equitable basis in legitimate scientific activities, whether they be conducted in a national, trans-national or international context. ICSU has long promoted this principle, in particular by defending the rights of scientists to freely associate in international scientific meetings” [15]. In the United States, in the early 1980s the National Academy of Sciences issued a report on Scientific Communication and National Security at another time of concern: in this case that the Soviet Union would take advantage of the open culture of American science to gain knowledge and tools to use against the United States. As the ‘Corson’ report stated [16]:7

6 Limits on life sciences research may arise from concerns about worker safety and health, potential damage to the environment from laboratory accidents, ethical issues regarding the treatment of laboratory animals, or the use of human subjects. Restrictions may also arise from proprietary interests, from a desire to limit information about one’s work to avoid helping a competitor, or for security reasons. 7 This is called the ‘Corson report’, after its chair, Dale Corson, president emeritus of Cornell University.


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“Free communication among scientists is viewed as an essential factor in scientific advance. Such communication enables critical new findings or new theories to be readily and systematically subjected to the scrutiny of others and thereby verified or debunked. Moreover, because science is a cumulative activity – each scientist builds on the work of others – the free availability of information both provides the foundations for further scientific advance and prevents needlessly redundant work. Such communications also serve to stimulate creativity, both because scientists compete keenly for the respect of their peers by attempting to be first in publishing the answers to difficult problems and because communication can inspire new lines of investigation. Finally, free communication helps to build the necessary willingness to confront any idea, no matter how eccentric, and to assess it on its merits”. Interestingly, the Corson report does not mention the life sciences; it focuses exclusively on the physical sciences and engineering. In large part in response to the Corson report, in 1985 President Reagan issued National Security Decision Directive 189 [17], which among its key features stated that federally-funded fundamental research, such as that conducted in universities and laboratories, should be unrestricted “to the maximum extent possible” and when restrictions on research were considered necessary, formal classification should be the control mechanism. “No restrictions may be placed upon the conduct or reporting of federally-funded fundamental research that has not received national security classification, except as provided in applicable US statutes” [17].8 This policy is still in force and has been reaffirmed several times in recent years by Bush Administration officials [18]. Thus any efforts to limit the conduct of life sciences research out of concerns that it might assist terrorists or states seeking a biological weapons capability runs against a powerful culture in the life sciences that to some extent has the support of current US policy. The life sciences, however, do have a tradition of responding to concerns about risks through the development of self-governance mechanisms that may be complemented with formal regulations. When the first reports of gene splicing technology appeared, some in the scientific community immediately raised questions about whether the technology might be deliberately or inadvertently used to create organisms with increased virulence or novel characteristics [19,20]. These possibilities eventually led to the 1975 Asilomar Conference, where scientists gathered to discuss the safety of manipulating DNA from different species [21,22]. The meeting, which focused only on accidental creation of recombinant organisms with dangerous properties, led the National Institutes of Health to issue guidelines in 1976. With modifications over time, the guidelines continue to regulate the conduct of recombinant DNA research, including reviews of experiments at the proposal stage.9 In the same vein, following concerns in the scientific community about potential risks from breakthroughs in its research, the NIH Human Genome Project created the Ethical,

8

‘Fundamental’ research is defined in this directive as “basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the scientific community, as distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial development, design, production and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons.” 9 A description of the guidelines and their evolution and current operation may be found in Chapter 2 of [6].

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Legal and Social Implications Research Program to explore a set of ‘grand challenges’ for genomic research related to ethical, legal, and social issues.10 With this as background, the next section focuses on two efforts of the National Academies to provide ‘independent’ advice regarding WMD threat assessments related to biological weapons and bioterrorism.

2. Two Reports on Biosecurity from the National Academies 2.1 Earlier Efforts and Planning The National Academies have been active for many years on issues related to science and security and concerns about biological weapons. In the realm of addressing perceived and actual WMD threats, in the mid-1980s allegations about Soviet violations of the Biological Weapons Convention prompted the Academies’ standing Committee on International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) to create a special Working Group on Biological Weapons Control in 1986 with Nobel laureate Joshua Lederberg as chair. (CISAC’s primary focus was on nuclear arms control and the allegations were among a number of factors complicating US-Soviet negotiations in that arena at the time.) Over the next several years, the Working Group met with a group of counterparts organized by the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Most of the discussion focused on ways to improve the BWC, but the contacts lapsed in 1990. When the contacts resumed in 1993, the Working Group became deeply concerned about the proliferation risks posed by the financial crisis facing the former Soviet BW institutes, which had lost almost all of their government funding. But the Working Group also believed there was an opportunity to take advantage of the skills of scientists in these facilities to contribute to international public health research – a good number of the agents most likely to weaponized are also endemic diseases with continuing devastating effects in the developing world. The Working Group, in particular Joshua Lederberg and John Steinbruner, who was also a member, spent the next several years trying to persuade the US government to support cooperative research programs between American and Russian scientists.11 The idea of supporting research by former Soviet BW scientists at a time when questions remained over whether the former program had in fact been completely shut down was controversial to say the least. Eventually, however, in large part out of concerns that an inability to certify full Russian compliance with the BWC was endangering Congressional support of the nuclear threat reduction programs, the Defense Department asked the Academies to undertake a study and a series of pilot projects to explore the feasibility of cooperative research. The study was carried out by a panel of CISAC that included all the members of the Working Group plus a number of additional experts, and provided some of the first funding to reach the former BW institutes from the United States. The panel’s 1997 report, Controlling Dangerous Pathogens: A Blueprint for US-Russian Collaboration [24], provided support for the

10

Information about the program may be found on the website of the National Human Genome Research Institute at http://www.genome.gov/ELSI/. 11 An example of how biological weapons pose particular problems for security and a framework for addressing them and other issues may be found in [23].


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eventual decision to increase significantly the Defense Department’s support for former biological weapons scientists as part of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. In the late 1990s the Working Group expanded its focus beyond Russia and undertook a series of meetings and consultations. In 1999, for example, Working Group members took part in a meeting in London organized by the Royal Society, in which experts from the French Academie des Sciences also participated, and which formed the basis of a Royal Society report [25]. In 2001 the Working Group began exploring how the scientific community could contribute to preventing destructive applications of research in biotechnology, in expectation of a series of international consultations to examine the range of existing national and international arrangements and the possibilities for expanding these toward more comprehensive international approaches. As noted above, this reflected increasing concern in the policy community about the potential risks from continuing advances in research, as well as the continuing evolution of John Steinbruner’s interest in the issue.12 A planning meeting in June 2001 to discuss these consultations yielded an additional unexpected result. A number of participants in the meeting expressed fears that proposals being discussed in Congress could lead to draconian restrictions on scientific research. The Congressional proposals in part came in response to several articles in the scientific literature that critics charged could provide a ‘blueprint’ or ‘roadmap’ for terrorists or rogue states seeking to carry out bioterrorism or to acquire biological weapons.13 Gerald Epstein of the Center for Strategic and International Studies labeled these and similar articles ‘contentious’ research [27]; his article is an early review of the issues and policy options then under discussion.14 The participants argued that, in addition to whatever might be done overseas, the National Academies needed once again to address the fundamental issues of balancing scientific openness and security in the United States. The scientists also expressed frustration that efforts to address the potential risks arising from advances in life sciences were inappropriately attempting to use models and policy prescriptions drawn from the efforts to stem nuclear proliferation. In particular, they argued that there are profound differences between mad-made fissile materials and naturally occurring, self-replicating biological materials (see Table 1 for a review of the key differences), yet efforts to control access to pathogens were based on assumptions that they presented the same fundamental accounting issues. In 2000, for example, the Congressionally-mandated National Commission on Terrorism (the Bremer Commission) [28] had recommended that: “The Secretary of Health and Human Services should strengthen physical security standards applicable to the storage, creation, and transport of pathogens in research laboratories and other certified facilities in order to protect against theft or diversion. These standards should be as rigorous as the physical protection and security measures applicable to critical nuclear materials.”15 It is worth noting that this problem continues; the UN Security Council 12

See the papers listed on the website of the Controlling Dangerous Pathogens Project in the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, School of Public Affairs, the University of Maryland, http://www.cissm.umd.edu/projects/pathogens.php. 13 A review of some of the best known articles from that period may be found in on pp. 25-29 of ref. 6. An example of the concern in the defense policy community is ref. 26. 14 Epstein defines ‘contentious research’ as “fundamental biological or biomedical investigations that produce organisms or knowledge that could have immediate weapons implications, and that therefore raise questions concerning whether and how that research should be conducted and disseminated.” 15 Legislation to impose some of these restrictions, introduced jointly by Senators Kyl and Feinstein in late 2000, did not pass the House.

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Table 1. Characteristics of Fissile Materials and Pathogens Fissile Materials

Biological Pathogens

Do not exist in nature

Generally found in nature

Non-living, synthetic

Living, replicative

Difficult and costly to produce

Easy and cheap to produce

Not diverse: plutonium and highly enriched uranium are the only fissile materials used in nuclear weapons

Highly diverse: more than 20 pathogens are suitable for biological warfare

Can be inventoried and tracked in a quantitative manner

Because pathogens reproduce, inventory control is unreliable

Can be detected at a distance from the emission of ionizing radiation

Cannot be detected at a distance with available technologies

Weapons-grade fissile materials are stored at a limited number of military nuclear sites

Pathogens are present in many types of facilities and at multiple locations within a facility

Few nonmilitary applications (such as research reactors, thermo-electric generators, and production of radioisotopes)

Many legitimate applications in biomedical research and the pharmaceutical/ biotechnology industry

Source: ref. 30.

Resolution 1540, passed in 2004, makes no distinction among nuclear, chemical, or biological materials when it calls on states to “develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage or transport” (emphasis added) [29]. 2.2. The Fink Report As a result of the June 2001 planning meeting mentioned above, with support from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the Academies began preparing for a study that would: x

x x

Review the current rules, regulations, and institutional arrangements and processes in the United States that provide oversight of research on pathogens and potentially dangerous biotechnology research, within government laboratories, universities and other research institutions, and industry. The review would focus on how choices are made about which research is and is not appropriate, and how information about relevant ongoing research is collected and shared. Use the review to assess the adequacy of current US rules, regulations, and institutional arrangements and processes to prevent the destructive application of biotechnology research. Recommend changes in those practices that could improve US capacity to prevent the destructive application of biotechnology research while still enabling legitimate research to be conducted.


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The National Academies were thus actively planning the study before September 11th, anticipating that the committee would be able to reflect and develop its recommendations in relative peace and quiet. That opportunity disappeared almost immediately. The project, although privately funded, operated from the beginning with intense interest from US government officials, one of whom said in an early public session of the committee that the US government was now expecting the Academies to “solve” the problem of dual-use research in the life sciences. The committee assembled by the Academies to carry out the project was genuinely interdisciplinary, including life scientists with both little and extensive experience with biological weapons issues, lawyers, social scientists, and bioethicists. Gerald Fink, former director of the Whitehead Institute at MIT, a member of the National Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Medicine, and a pioneer in genetics research, served as chair. The committee’s report, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, was released in October 2003, and published several months later [6]. Using several published studies as examples of ‘contentious research’, the committee described the dual-use dilemma, which it defined as occurring because the “same technologies can be used legitimately for human betterment and misused for bioterrorism” [6]. The committee recommended a bottom-up approach to reduce the threat of misuse of life sciences research by mobilizing the scientific community to police itself. However, it also envisioned a role for the federal government analogous to that played by the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) of the NIH16 and recommended the creation of a National Science Advisory Board for Biodefense. The report proposed a system that would establish stages from proposal to publication at which scientists would review experiments and their results to provide public assurance that advances in biotechnology with potential applications for bioterrorism or biological weapons development were receiving responsible oversight. The committee’s report listed seven classes of experiments it believed “illustrate the types of endeavors or discoveries that will require review and discussion by informed members of the scientific and medical community before they are undertaken or, if carried out, before they are published in full detail” [6]. Where conducting research posed an immediate risk (i.e. the presence of imminent danger), the committee recommended classification as the appropriate method of protecting the public and national security. The fundamental conclusion of the committee, however, was that while some information could be dangerous, most is not, and self-governance by the scientific community should be relied on to reduce the potential misuse of legitimate science. The proposed system thus sought to protect scientific enquiry from untoward government interference and to permit open communication to the maximum extent possible for the public good. The report’s recommendations are summarized in Table 2.

16

For further information, see http://www4.od.nih.gov/oba/rac/aboutrdagt.htm.

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Table 2. Key Recommendations of the Fink Report Recommendation Educating the Scientific Community

We recommend that national and international professional societies and related organizations and institutions create programs to educate scientists about the nature of the dual use dilemma in biotechnology and their responsibilities to mitigate its risks.

Review at the Publication Stage

We recommend relying on self-governance by scientists and scientific journals to review publications for their potential national security risks.

Harmonized International Oversight

We recommend that the international policymaking and scientific communities create an International Forum on Biosecurity to develop and promote harmonized national, regional, and international measures that will provide a counterpart to the system we recommend for the United States.

Review of Plans for Experiments

We recommend that the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) augment the already established system for review of experiments involving recombinant DNA conducted by the National Institutes of Health to create a review system for seven classes of experiments (the Experiments of Concern) involving microbial agents that raise concerns about their potential for misuse.

Creation of a National Science Advisory Board for Biodefense

We recommend that the Department of Health and Human Services create a National Science Advisory Board for Biodefense (NSABB) to provide advice, guidance, and leadership for the system of review and oversight we are proposing.

Additional Elements for Protection Against Misuse

We recommend that the federal government rely on the implementation of current legislation and regulation, with periodic review by the NSABB, to provide protection of biological materials and supervision of personnel working with these materials.

A Role for the Life Sciences in Efforts to Prevent Bioterrorism and Biowarfare

We recommend that the national security and law enforcement communities develop new channels of sustained communication with the life sciences community about how to mitigate the risks of bioterrorism.

Source: ref. 6 pp. 4-12.

The study, which came to be known generally as the ‘Fink report’ after its chair, attracted substantial attention in the press, including coverage in the New York Times, Science, Nature, and other science journals, and editorials supporting its recommendations in the Washington Post and the Dallas Morning News. A number of the report’s key recommendations, were quite quickly adopted by the US government, in particular the creation of a National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity with an ambitious charter to develop oversight procedures and education and outreach materials [31].17 Beyond recognizing the importance of the international dimensions of the

17

More information is available on the NSABB’s website at http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/.


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problem, the government did not recommend any specific policies for these issues at that time.18 2.3. The Lemon-Relman Report The Fink report focused on biosecurity issues in the United States and also on microbial threats, although it recognized the importance for policy of moving beyond these issues [6]. To address these significant aspects of the potential threats from advances in biotechnology, the National Academies next undertook a study that looked explicitly at the global dimensions of a wide range of developments in the life sciences and the other disciplines with which these fields increasingly interacted. The Committee on Advances in Technology and the Prevention of their Application to Next Generation Biowarfare Agents committee, chaired by David Relman of Stanford University and Stanley Lemon of the University of Texas Medical Branch at Galveston, was charged to [9]: 1.

2.

3.

4.

Examine current scientific trends and the likely trajectory of future research activities in public health, life sciences, and biomedical and materials science that contain applications relevant to the development of ‘next generation’ agents of biological origin five to ten years into the future. Evaluate the potential for hostile uses of research advances in genetic engineering and biotechnology that will make biological agents more potent or damaging. Included in this evaluation will be the degree to which the integration of multiple advancing technologies over the next five to ten years could result in a synergistic effect. Identify the current and potential future capabilities that could enable the ability of individuals, organizations, or countries to identify, acquire, master, and independently advance these technologies for both beneficial and hostile purposes. Identify and recommend the knowledge and tools that will be needed by the national security, biomedical science, and public health communities to anticipate, prevent, recognize, mitigate, and respond to the destructive potential associated with advancing technologies [9].

In the course of its work, which began in late 2003 and was completed in mid2006, the committee also held a workshop in Mexico that brought together international participants to address the pace and breadth of globalization in the life sciences. The Committee’s report made five major recommendations, with detailed sub-recommendations for the implementation of each of them. The five major recommendations are contained in Table 3. The Lemon-Relman report received less immediate attention than the Fink report, in part because the issues of biosecurity and the continuing tensions between security and scientific openness were in a relatively quiet phase when the report appeared. Nevertheless, like the Fink report, the Lemon-Relman report is frequently cited, especially by analysts who are interested in its detailed accounts of the increasing globalization of life sciences research and the much broader array of science and technology that is relevant to understanding the accelerating advances in life sciences. 18 An account of the international efforts to promote the recommendations of the Fink report may be found in refs 32 and 33.

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Table 3. Key Recommendations of the Lemon-Relman Report 1.

The committee endorses and affirms policies and practices that, to the maximum extent possible, promote the free and open exchange of information in the life sciences.

2.

The committee recommends adopting a broader perspective on the ‘threat spectrum’.

3.

The committee recommends strengthening and enhancing the scientific and technical expertise within and across the security communities.

4.

The committee recommends the adoption and promotion of a common culture of awareness and a shared sense of responsibility within the global community of life scientists.

5.

The committee recommends strengthening the public health infrastructure and existing response and recovery capabilities.

Source: ref. 9 pp. 6-7.

3. Common Recommendations and Cumulative Impact One of the strengths of an institution like the National Academies is its ability to build a body of work on a topic, so that over time its major themes and messages can acquire additional force. (For this reason, the NRC pays particular attention to the ways in which reports on similar topics may change over time; clearly new evidence or advances in science and technology might affect such messages, but it is hoped that changes in recommendations from one report to another would be relatively impervious to shifting political winds.) In the case of biosecurity, I would argue that the reports of the Academies on biosecurity in the last few years have had several common messages: x x x x x x

The scientific community has a responsibility to help reduce the risks of malign use of scientific research. There is a need to raise awareness of risks and educate scientists about responsibilities. Efforts must be international as well as national. Efforts should rely largely on self-governance by scientific community. There is a role for governments, in particular through: o Guidelines. o Advisory bodies on policy and trends in S&T. Ties between the science and security communities should be increased – this is essential for realistic threat assessments and responses.19

These messages have had impact both in the United States and overseas, both on governments but also through the active engagement of academies of science and international scientific unions. As discussed in other chapters in this volume, two other academies, the Israeli and the French, have issued their own versions of the Fink report. In the Israeli case the report has led to new legislation by the Knesset to mandate an 19

A third NRC report, Seeking Security: Pathogens, Open Access, and Genome Databases, which was released in 2004, focused its recommendations on a more specific topic but made the same general points [34].


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oversight mechanism for biotechnology research in Israel20. The work of the Royal Society is also described elsewhere in this volume21. Taken together, they suggest that scientific bodies, whether national or international, can play a role in contributing to more informed discussions of WMD threats and appropriate responses to them. The ability to make that contribution comes in part from the continuing efforts of these bodies to find ways to offer the most independent and objective advice possible. They do not always succeed, but their efforts are important in thinking about how to increase the quality of the threat assessments that NATO and its member countries rely on for vital input to their decision making.

References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

[9] [10]

[11] [12] [13]

[14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20]

20 21

NRC, The Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy, National Academies Press, Washington DC, 1997. M. Meselson, The problem of biological weapons, Symposium on Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism, National Academy of Sciences, Washington DC, May 2 2000. Rossiskiye Vesti, interview with President Boris Yeltsin, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, FBISSOV-92-103, May 27 1992, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington DC. A. Carter, J. Deutch, and P. Zelikow, Catastrophic terrorism: Tackling the new danger, Foreign Affairs 77(6) (1998), 80-94. G.W. Bush, remarks at the graduation exercise of the United States Military Academy, June 1 2002. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html. NRC. Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, The National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2004. R.M. Atlas and J.R. Reppy, Globalizing biosecurity, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 3(1) (2005), 51-60. R. Atlas and M. Dando, The dual use dilemma for the life sciences: perspectives, conundrums, and global solutions, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, 4(3) (2006), 276-286. NRC, Globalization, Biotechnology, and the Future of the Life Sciences, The National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2006. C. McLeish and P. Nightingale, The BTWC Regime: The Impact of Dual Use Controls on UK Science, Bradford Briefing Paper #17, May 2005. Available at: http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/briefing/ BP_17_2ndseries.pdf. B. Rappert, Biotechnology, Security, and the Search for Limits: An Inquiry into Research and Methods, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, UK, 2007. M. Leitenberg, Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat, Carlisle Barracks PA, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2005. R.L. Frerichs, R.M. Salerno, K.M.Vogel, N.B. Barnett, J. Gaudioso, L.T. Hickok, D. Estes, and D.F. Jung, Historical Precedence and Technical Requirements of Biological Weapons Use: A Threat Assessment, SAND2004-1854, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque NM, 2004. K. Vogel, Bioweapons Proliferation: Where Science Studies and Public Policy Collide, Social Studies of Science 36(5) (2006), 659–690. International Council for Science, Universality of Science, updated January 4 2007. Available at http://www.icsu.org/5_abouticsu/INTRO_UnivSci_1.html. NRC. Scientific Communication and National Security, The National Academies Press, Washington DC, 1982. White House, National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information (NSDD-189), 1985. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-189.htm. C. Rice, letter to Dr. Harold Brown from Condoleeza Rise, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, November 1 2001. Available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/bush /cr110101.html. N. Wade, Biological Weapons and Recombinant DNA, Science 208 (1980) 271. S. Budiansky, US looks to biological weapons. Military takes new interest in DNA devices, Nature 297 (1982), 615-616.

See the chapter by Friedman. See the chapter by Smith et al.

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[21] M. Barinaga, Asilomar revisited: Lessons for today?, Science 287 (2000), 1584–1585. [22] M. Singer, Commentary: What Did the Asilomar Exercise Accomplish, What Did It Leave Undone?, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 44(2) (2001), 186-191. [23] A.B. Carter, J.D. Steinbruner, and W.J. Perry, A New Concept of Cooperative Security, The Brookings Institution, Washington DC, 1992. [24] NRC, Controlling Dangerous Pathogens: A Blueprint for US-Russian Collaboration, National Academies Press, Washington DC, 1997. [25] The Royal Society, Measures for Controlling the Threat from Biological Weapons, The Royal Society, London, 2000. Available at http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/displaypagedoc.asp?id=11409. [26] R. Zilinskas and J.B. Tucker, Limiting the contribution of the open scientific literature to the biological weapons threat, Online Journal of Homeland Security, December 2002. Available at http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/tucker.html. [27] G.L. Epstein, Controlling biological warfare threats: Resolving potential tensions among the research community, industry, and the national security community, Critical Reviews in Microbiology 27 (2001), 321-354. [28] The National Commission on Terrorism, 2000, The Changing Threat of International Terrorism. Available at http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/ bremerreport.asp. [29] UN Security Council. Resolution 1540 (S/RES/1540), adopted April 28 (2004). Available at http://disarmament2.un.org/Committee1540/Res1540(E).pdf. [30] J. Tucker, Preventing the Misuse of Pathogens: The Need for Global Biosecurity Standards, Arms Control Today, 33 (June 2003), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_06/Tucker. [31] D.A. Shea, Oversight of Dual-Use Biological Research: The National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 2006. [32] J.L. Husbands, The Science and Security Dilemma: The Particular and Peculiar Case of Biotechnology, Paper prepared for presentation at the 48th Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Chicago IL, March 2007. [33] NRC, 2nd International Forum on Biosecurity: Report of an International Meeting, Budapest, Hungary, March 30–April 2, The National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2008. [34] NRC, Seeking Security: Pathogens, Open Access, and Genome Databases, The National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2004.


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Dual-Use Biotechnological Research Oversight – an Israeli View David FRIEDMAN Institute for National Security Studies, Israel

Abstract. The Twin-Tower terrorist attacks and anthrax envelope scares of 2001 were a watershed for public perceptions of the threat of unconventional terror in general and of biological terror in particular. Biotechnology, genetic engineering and molecular biology began to develop at an unprecedented pace towards the end of the last century. Advances in DNA synthesis and cloning will soon make it possible to produce any desired gene rapidly on an industrial scale at minimal cost. Forecasts indicate that this pace will continue to increase exponentially. Many areas of modern biological research are unavoidably dual use by nature. Thus hostile forces could also take advantage of recent and future biotechnological advances to harm humans on a catastrophic scale. Much information is freely available, and the list of organisms whose genomes have been sequenced is hardly selective in terms of biological risk. Regulation of life science and biomedical research in Israel is largely limited to biosafety concerns. Israeli researchers are no strangers to a certain amount of well-justified regulation. The big challenge now is to incorporate biosecurity concerns into this system, in particular, to upgrade measures to prevent the leakage of dangerous organisms, information and technologies to terror organizations. To this end the Israel National Security Council and the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities initiated a national project, Biotechnological Research in an Age of Terrorism, and formed a special Steering Committee to analyze and report on the current situation and to recommend future action. In this article I will elaborate mainly on the risks of biotechnological dual-use research, the overview mechanisms and legislation aimed to encounter those risks. Keywords. Biosecurity, bioterror, dual use, bioweapon, legislation

Introduction The terror attacks of September 11, 2001 and the anthrax envelopes sent through the US mail later that year mark a watershed in public perceptions of the threat of nonconventional terror in general, and of biological terror in particular. Bioweaponry is now recognized as a new and dangerous threat. Several recent US reports [1,2] have documented and analyzed this emerging threat and its implications. They predict that the availability and wide distribution of scientific information on new advances will eventually enable terrorists to obtain and prepare bioweapons capable of inflicting huge damage. At the same time, international political-strategic developments have somewhat neutralized the bioweapon threat from nation states. Among these the dissolution of the Soviet Union was of particular importance. Many new states of the former Soviet Union have entered into disarmament treaties and other agreements with the United

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States, under which they had to dismantle and destroy their stockpiles of nonconventional weapons. The United States, declaring ‘war against terror’, has sought all means to prevent terror organizations from taking advantage of material, facilities or information originating in US laboratories. It also has sought to reduce the damage such an attack could cause. The US response was built on four foundations: deterrence, prevention, defense and response to terror attacks. The United States is investing considerable effort and resources simultaneously in all four areas. Existing laws have been reinforced and new legislation passed to facilitate efforts, particularly those against non-conventional terror. European countries have also joined this US-led crusade, although, with the exception of the UK, they are acting with less decisiveness and determination. The international treaty governing the inspection and (control of) proliferation of biological weapons is the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) of 1975. The BWC forbids the development, manufacture and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and requires the destruction of existing stockpiles. The Convention’s major Achilles Heel is the lack of agreement on an inspections regime to enforce and ensure the compliance of the signatories, which limits its effectiveness. Furthermore, by its nature, it is an agreement between nation states and thus provides no protection against independent terror organizations. The United States thus regards the enforcement of national legislation against bioterror as a more effective tool than international treaties for coping with the problem. It also supports oversight and supply regimes as additional tools for preventing proliferation and for encouraging other states to do the same. In response to the anthrax envelopes attack, which was generally assumed to originate from a US source, the US Congress passed the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 “to improve the ability of the United States to prevent, prepare for and respond to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies”. The law mandates specific activities to confront biological terror and assigns the responsibility for action to the Department of Health and Human Services, including the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), for human targets and to the Department of Agriculture (USDA) for animal targets. This law also contains extremely stringent steps to prevent and minimize, to the greatest extent possible, the seepage of dangerous biological agents and toxins, as well as relevant technology and information, from laboratories and research institutes in the US, including academic institutions, into hostile hands. The law includes a list of specific biological agents that present a clear danger of being turned into bioweapons. Regarding these, the law establishes severe security measures. These include reporting and registration of all institutions, organizations and individuals who have the listed agents in their possession. Likewise, there is a requirement to register, inspect, physically oversee, guard and track all stockpiles of these agents. The law establishes safety procedures for the transport of these agents and requires the registration and reporting of all workers authorized to work with and deal with them. Government representatives have the authority to refuse certification to workers in accordance with specific criteria. The most important is any known or suspected connection with a terror organization. Despite being a symbol of individual freedom, in this case the United States has adopted a strict security approach, giving national security priority over scientific and academic freedom. The United States has also taken energetic, large-scale measures to


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enforce its supply and export inspection regimes, a responsibility of the Department of Commerce. The US has enacted stringent laws and regulations to prevent import and export of weapons of mass destruction and their components including dual-use materials and equipment. As part of its international control activity, the United States participates in the ‘Australia Group’ (AG). Founded in 1984, the 38-country AG has become an active and key player in recommending and coordinating import and export control measures for chemical and biological materials. It regularly and systematically updates its standards in keeping with global strategic and scientific-technological developments. For example, the AG recently addressed what changes are required in its standards in the face of the non-conventional terror threat, publishing, in 2004, its Guidelines for Transfers of Sensitive Chemical or Biological Items [3]. It has also added new biological agents to its list of forbidden materials. Recently, its list of equipment requiring oversight has been expanded considerably to include, for example, aerial sprayers. AG activity has almost certainly reduced traffic in dual-use materials and equipment, as well as their dissemination to countries that support terror and terror organizations. In 2003, President George W. Bush initiated a new international framework called the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). This is a global attempt to prevent the shipment of weapons of mass destruction, the means for launching such weapons, and other components. It seeks to create a dynamic, proactive approach to preventing the spread of such items to and from terror organizations and their state supporters. Its principles were published in September 2003 by eleven countries [4] and, since then, many other countries have also adopted them. Participation is voluntary, but the founding states encourage its spread, since success depends on international cooperation. The PSI is part of a comprehensive non-proliferation effort, comprising intelligence, diplomatic, law enforcement and other means to this goal. New federal laws deriving from the PSI and affecting 3,000 ports and terminals came into force in the United States on July 1, 2004, to prevent the smuggling of biological materials in containers. Every container and every vessel must receive cargo certification from its country of origin. The United States’ resolute anti-proliferation policy, and its pressure on other international actors, have stimulated related action in additional organizations, such as the United Nations, the G8 Forum and the European Union. In 2004, the US National Research Council’s Fink Committee issued its report, Biotechnological Research in an Age of Terrorism – Confronting the Dual-Use Dilemma, which examined the state of biosecurity in civilian research in the US [5]. Such research is performed in government laboratories, universities, and biotech industries (their report did not examine classified research at defense research facilities). Their findings were used to draft recommendations regarding inspection and oversight mechanisms for biosecurity, focusing on dual-use research. The Fink Committee found that existing US legislation adequately provided for the physical aspects of biosecurity, especially with regard to safeguarding the biological agents themselves. In contrast, existing legislation was inadequate to curb the transfer of bioweapons-relevant technology, including information about research methods and results, into hostile hands. Nor did any other existing mechanisms address this concern. The dual-use nature of much biological research made this issue all the more serious.

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1. The Biological Threat in the 21st Century Biological weapons have a long history. In the Medieval period and in the 18th century in Europe and the Americas, virulent disease-causing bacterial agents were used for military purposes. In 20th century Japan (1930-1940) and later (1950s) in the United States, the Soviet Union, the UK and other countries, bioweapons were viewed as an important component of non-conventional arsenals, alongside chemical and nuclear weapons. Not just a strategic deterrent, such weapons were designated for battlefield use under a variety of conditions. In general, these countries used natural pathogenic microorganisms, such as anthrax, plague, yellow fever, smallpox and botulinum and their toxic products. The weaponization process included culturing these agents on a large scale, converting them into liquid or powder form, and using them to arm air bombs, rockets or warheads of various kinds. In the early 1980s this trend was reversed, as a result of the Biological Weapons Conventions (BWC) and for other political and strategic reasons. Subsequently, US President Richard Nixon declared a moratorium on the development, manufacture and use of biological weapons and destroyed the existing US arsenal. European countries, including the UK and France, followed suit. Despite its public accession to the BWC, the Soviet Union secretly continued to develop, manufacture and stockpile huge quantities of very advanced biological weaponry. During the 1960s and 70s Third World countries in the Middle East and Asia began developing and manufacturing their own biological and chemical weaponry. These poor and undeveloped countries viewed such weapons as their answer to the nuclear weapons possessed by other countries, including Israel. The result was a concrete threat to Israel by hostile states both on its inner perimeter (Egypt, Syria) and on its outer perimeter (Iraq, Iran and, for a while, Libya). The first layer of threat was thus from the countries that were labelled by President G. W. Bush as the so-called ‘Axis of Evil’. These bioweapons, mounted on long-range missiles, gave them a perceived strategic balance against the nuclear weapons they believed Israel to possess. The same countries support Islamic terrorism and might well help terror movements develop and/or obtain biological weaponry. The Twin-Towers and anthrax-letter attacks of 2001 increased awareness of worldwide Islamic terror and the ability of such groups to obtain nonconventional weaponry, especially bioweapons. The principal biological threat today comes from such terrorist organizations, since a biological attack requires only small amounts of material that can be concealed easily and dispersed secretly. In addition to creating huge casualties and a potent psychological effect, biological weapons also could create extensive peripheral and indirect economic, social and political disruption, a major goal of terrorism. Recent years have seen a revolution in the biological sciences. New molecular biological approaches and related technologies promise great benefit, but could also create more virulent microorganisms that are resistant to antibiotics and vaccines, or that have other characteristics of effective biological weapons. Such new technologies may initially be available only to a select few; but the rapid dissemination of information through modern communications makes it possible for hostile forces to access them. Such forces can use these new technologies to develop and produce sophisticated, dangerous biological weaponry that would be very difficult to counter. It is thus imperative to prevent knowledge, organisms and materials relevant to the production of bioweapons from reaching hostile hands.


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2. New Biological Technologies that Could be Used to Develop Bioweapons Biology – and such complementary fields as mathematics, computer science, and physics – began to develop at an unprecedented pace towards the end of the last century. Forecasts indicate that the pace will increase exponentially, even if its precise directions are unknown. Although such biological research and development can benefit humanity, hostile forces could also take advantage of biotechnological advances to harm humans and other species on a catastrophic scale. To counter this possibility, we must first understand the areas that modern biotechnology addresses and their likely directions of future development. This is not to underrate the bioweapons potential inherent even in the technologies of classic biology. These include methods for producing massive quantities of pathogenic bacteria and viruses, and sophisticated ways to store and disperse large quantities of such agents. By the 1980s, researchers were already expressing concern that recombinant DNA technology (genetic engineering) might be put to unacceptable use. While most discussion concerned ethical issues, the possibility of such technology providing dangerous capabilities to terrorists was also considered. Today, astonishing as it may seem, that technology has been largely superseded! Subsequent advances in DNA manufacture and cloning will soon make it possible to produce any desired gene rapidly on an industrial scale at ever less cost. All that is needed are the necessary enzymes and a single copy of the gene to be reproduced. Soon, even the original gene will not be required, since just its nucleotide sequence will suffice for chemical synthesis. Other important advances go hand-in-hand with this gene production capability. The genomes (the entire genetic codes) of a number of organisms have already been mapped, and this number is growing at the rate of about 10 eukaryote and 100 prokaryote genomes a year. This huge amount of information is freely available, and the list of organisms whose genomes have been sequenced is hardly selective in terms of biological risk. For example, the genome of the Spanish ’flu virus has been published, and so has an article that describes how to make a virus out of a genome map. Eventually, it will be possible to manufacture entire genomes, e.g. of a pathogenic virus at low cost and with huge speed. For example, by 2010, a single laboratory technician should be able to produce or transcribe a DNA chain of 1010 base pairs (the individual components of DNA) in a single day, which is three times the length of the entire human genome! In other words, the same technician will be able to produce both genes that encode pathogens or resistance to antibiotics and genes to be used in genetic medicine (see below). Even virulent and dangerous proteins may have bioweapons potential (although current prion proteins, e.g. the infectious agent in Mad Cow Disease, are slow acting). It would hardly be difficult for hostile forces to manufacture large quantities of fasteracting prions (if such exist) for use as bioweapons. These examples are only a sampling of the many of recent breakthroughs that are liable to be exploited by hostile forces. Others include research on transgenic organisms (e.g. insects and plants), on weak links in the immune system (e.g. development of a virulent mousepox virus), and impressive developments in producing drug targeting and delivery mechanisms. In light of the almost unlimited technological possibilities and the explosion in knowledge, questions such as whether it is possible to engineer more dangerous pathogens assume a meaning quite different from that in the previous century.

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Such biological developments are generally not linear in time but often appear suddenly, unexpectedly and sometimes by chance. (For example, RNAi interference (RNAi)1, the topic of a 2006 Nobel Prize, was discovered by chance during research on producing multicolored petunias!). Specific predictions are thus difficult to make. Hence, biosecurity policymakers must be up-to-date on research developments if they are to prevent hostile uses of biological technology.

3. Dual-Use Biological Research The term ‘dual use’ was originally coined to denote technologies that can be used for both civilian and military purposes. The latter term was broadened to include terror, when that became relevant. The fear of the hostile use of dual-use biological and biotechnological research exists on several levels, beginning with ostensibly civilian enterprises that secretly pursue exceptional applications. These can range from the conversion and exploitation of dual-use equipment and/or risk agents for terrorist purposes, to the use of biological information for developing biological weapons.

4. The Dual-Use Dilemma Can’t all scientific research be classified as dual use? Past proposals to block dual-use scientific research would have dealt a serious blow to nearly all biological research. Others argue that every biological research program can be evaluated in terms of its benefits (e.g. potential to cure serious illnesses) and risks (e.g. potential for catastrophic adverse use). The problem with this approach is the essential difference between benefits and costs. While every rational person understands the implications of a deadly terror attack, only a select few can foresee the results of a revolutionary scientific discovery. Usually, in fact, it is impossible to know whether (or how) any given research project will produce findings of practical value. Therefore, any attempt to prevent future biological research might be influenced more by populist considerations than by professional, scientific ones. Nevertheless, one cannot ignore the risk of dual-use research, nor forget that some researchers might deliberately seek to develop harmful applications for ideological, practical or financial reasons. There are surely financial backers and states who might support such research. To address the issue intelligently, dual-use research must be categorized. The first category includes research deliberately aimed at producing bioweaponry, even if it also produces useful civilian applications as a side benefit. This is of obvious concern. The second group comprises civilian research projects whose dual-use potential is known in advance. The third group encompasses research projects that are thought to have dualuse potential, but such potential can be evaluated only once the research is completed. The fourth group includes research projects that were initially considered to be free of dual-use potential, but which unexpectedly produced findings with potential for hostile use.

1

A system that uses long double-stranded RNAs to silence the expression of target genes.


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Although almost all biological research has some dual-use potential, that is not a reason for total inaction. The following two examples demonstrate the importance of addressing this issue. The first example comes from Australia, where scientists sought to control the mouse population by developing a contraceptive vaccine. They created an attenuated, non-infective mousepox virus and then inserted into it the gene that codes for interleukin-4 (IL-4), in the hope that it would boost antibody production in infected mice [6]. When the engineered virus was injected into mice, it unexpectedly turned off the mice’s entire immune system, killing all the animals, even those vaccinated against mousepox. The experiment showed how easily a harmless virus could be changed into a lethal one. Mousepox, by the way, is very similar to the human smallpox virus, so terrorists could theoretically produce a lethal smallpox virus from vaccinia (the cowpox virus), which is regularly used for vaccinations against smallpox. The second example comes from a study whose dual-use potential was evident from the start. In 2006, an American team published the complete genomic sequence of the Spanish ’flu virus [7], the cause of the ’flu pandemic that killed millions of people in 1918-1919. In a subsequent project, researchers manufactured an entire virus in the laboratory and showed, by injecting it into mice, that the artificial virus was indeed virulent and lethal [8]. Both these studies were publicly published in full and their details are available to anyone interested in them for any purpose, although these scientific papers could potentially aid the production of one of the most deadly biological weapons ever known. In fact, the Spanish ’flu virus research was performed and published in the face of the considerable criticism that was leveled at a previous project, which described the chemical synthesis of a complete polio virus.

5. Possible Sources for Bioweapons Components To prevent biological weapons and/or their components from reaching terrorist organizations, we must first identify their sources and the channels through which the terrorists might obtain them. In the current circumstances, several such channels can be posited: x

x

x

A terror-supporting state could actively and directly supply biological armaments or components from its own arsenal to an organization it supports. For example, Iran, in the framework of its current general strategy, could supply bioweaponry to Islamic terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda and Hizbullah. Terror organizations could steal biological weapons, components or information from countries with biological arsenals or weapons programs. For example, countries of the former Soviet Union were participants in the huge biological weapons program pursued by the Soviets, and a good deal of this biological arsenal is in their possession. The level of security surrounding these stockpiles is not known, and there have been reports of such weapons being sold for financial gain. This channel is certainly liable to enable terrorist groups to obtain bioweapons. Terrorist groups could produce bioweapons on their own. In a few cases, proof has been found of intentions, programs and actual attempts to do so, including

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the construction of a laboratory infrastructure appropriate for bioweapons production [9,10]. In fact, the Japanese terror group Aum Shinrikyo succeeded in producing its own non-virulent anthrax and released it in Tokyo. An ideologically-motivated terror group with large financial resources could acquire the knowledge, experts and infrastructure to develop and manufacture its own bioweapons. These may be primitive at first, but in time such a group might well be able to produce dangerous, sophisticated weapons. How can biological agents, methods and research results of interest to terrorist groups reach them from civilian research laboratories in academia, medical centers and industry? Two main paths can be surmised. The first of these paths is an intentional one. For example, workers in a research or industrial laboratory, because of financial or ideological inducements, might steal appropriate microorganisms and pass them on to terrorists. Alternatively, they might use them themselves to produce bioweapons in the laboratory where they work, or outside it, or even through the use of an industrial production plant. Such workers could also use or transfer specialized knowledge and biotechnological methods to the terrorist group they serve. The second path is unintentional. In the framework of scientific work and cooperation, strains of microorganisms are sent from one research institution to another, both within Israel and abroad. Scientists do not always observe appropriate security procedures, and a shipment of a dangerous agent could in error reach unauthorized individuals liable to use them for harmful purposes. The uncontrolled import and purchase of certain basic materials, biological agents, and laboratory and industrial equipment could also increase the chances that terror groups could construct a laboratory and research infrastructure for the secret production of biological weapons. The dissemination of sensitive research results via publications, conferences and the internet could also have unintended consequences.

6. The Biosecurity Situation in Israel Israel and the United Sates share common views concerning the threat of bioweapons, bioterror and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) among so-called ‘rogue states’ and terror organizations. Israel has repeatedly stated that its national policy is to prevent such proliferation, and it has taken concrete steps in this direction, some in the framework of internal legislation and some as part of international initiatives, including those of the United Nations. Although Israel has not formally joined the BWC (regarding it as an inseparable part of a more general regional disarmament) it wholeheartedly adheres to the US, EU and UN initiatives combatting bioterror and WMD proliferation. It adheres to (and coordinates its activities with) the AG regime and fully supports UN Resolution 1540. Israel also has consistently supported the policy of the United States in its war against international terror of all kinds. Although the Israeli Ministry of Defense and the Israel Defense Forces have a longstanding tradition of biodefense, Israel has been largely inactive, beyond the declarative level, in the area of prevention (particularly biosecurity). Unlike the US, Western Europe and other countries, Israel has yet to adopt legislation directly aimed at


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preventing or minimizing the spread from its own laboratories of non-conventional weaponry and its components (including dangerous biological agents). Israel does have a well-developed system of civilian biosafety (as distinct from biosecurity) laws and regulations; but these can make only a limited and indirect contribution to oversight and inspection aimed at preventing the seepage of dangerous agents or information into hostile hands. There is also an executive order issued by the Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Labor (MITL) in 2004 which mandates the oversight of chemical, biological and nuclear exports “to help prevent the spread of nonconventional weaponry… [by] forbidding the export from Israel of products, technologies and services that can be used to develop and manufacture chemical, biological or nuclear weapons”. It is important to note that – to minimize any harm to basic and clinical biomedical research – this MITL order specifically exempts the export of chemical and biological agents used for medical and veterinary diagnosis, treatment or research, and information related to such agents. Despite such gaps, the prevention of biological terror remains of supreme importance at the national level. Preliminary staff work at the National Security Council produced the following findings: x x x

x

There is virtually no awareness of the need for biosecurity within Israel’s civilian life sciences research community. Israel has no legal and/or regulatory infrastructure directed specifically towards biosecurity. Existing biosafety laws and regulations provide only indirect and partial means for dealing with biosecurity. Institutions where biomedical R&D and other work (diagnosis, production, etc.) is performed are not subject to inspection or supervision by any single Israeli authority or ministry. Instead this responsibility is divided between a number of different ministries where division of responsibility is often not clear. As a result, neither on the national nor on the ministerial level is there a system of control or supervision of biomedical research laboratories, nor is there sufficient information about any dangerous biological agents used, the types of research performed, or the technologies employed.

7. The Committee on Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism Clearly, the status of Israel’s biosecurity is far from satisfactory. Given the risk posed by biological terrorism, biosecurity must be adequately addressed on the national level. Therefore, the Committee on Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism was formed and assigned to study the issue and to draft recommendations for a national biosecurity policy, to be submitted to the President of the National Academy of Sciences and Humanities and to the Head of the National Security Council, who jointly appointed the members of the Committee. It included senior scientists with expertise in different areas of the life sciences and medicine, as well as lawyers with relevant expertise. The appointments were personal rather than institutional. The Committee’s mandate was:

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x x

x x x

To review the biosafety and biosecurity legislative and regulatory infrastructure governing Israel’s academic research institutions, biotechnology industry, hospital laboratories and government agencies. To determine the need for updating existing legislation and for supplementing it with new laws and/or regulations in areas not currently covered (such as the containment of dangerous materials, the control of sensitive information, and the prevention of seepage to hostile organizations). To decide on the biological agents and areas of biomedical and life sciences research to be protected. To suggest models of oversight for enforcing those biosecurity provisions, and to recommend whether such supervision should be centralized or decentralized. To explore the need for an ongoing inter-ministerial body to advise, guide, monitor and maintain national biosecurity.

8. Recommendations The Committee’s efforts have resulted in the following recommendations. Recommendation 1 - Awareness, Consciousness and Education The Committee recommends an ongoing effort to raise awareness and understanding of the risks associated with the biological threat in general, and with dual-use biological research in particular, among the Israeli life and medical sciences R&D community. Recommendation 2 - Legislation Legislation must be addressed on two levels: x

x

Since the creation of totally new legislation, under Israeli conditions, can be a long, slow and uncertain process, the Committee recommends that existing Israeli secondary legislation on biosafety should immediately be used as a model for ministerial executive orders and institutional (e.g. university) procedures designed to prevent the seepage of organisms, materials and information to potential terrorist elements. This will also empower the National Biosecurity Council (NBC), (see recommendation 8) to carry out a survey intended to assure that the different laboratories have indeed adopted the operational procedures necessary to enforce biosecurity as suggested by the committee. In parallel, specific longer-term legislation should be formulated. This legislation must be comprehensive and cover all issues involved with the bioterror threat, including all aspects of biosecurity, subject to the needs and principles of the State of Israel.

Recommendation 3 - Oversight and Supervision Mechanisms Similarly, the Committee believes that the fastest and most efficient way to enforce a regime ensuring biosecurity at relevant institutions is to upgrade and adapt existing


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biosafety oversight procedures to also assure biosecurity. This is the optimal and most practical solution for both R&D and service laboratories in the life and medical sciences. Local responsibility for the enforcement of biosecurity should be delegated to existing institutional biosafety committees (renamed “biosafety and biosecurity committees”) for the academic sector and special Central Safety and Security Committees for biomedical laboratories affiliated with the Ministry of Health (MOH), Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) and Ministry of Science (MOS). National biosecurity policy, procedures and enforcement should be overseen by a National Biosecurity Council to be appointed by the Ministry of Health. Recommendation 4 - List of Dangerous Agents The Committee believes that there should be an itemized core list of dangerous agents. Not all biological agents should be placed in this category. The Committee has reviewed the list of agents issued by the US Department of Health and Human Services and adopted it as its initial core list. This list is a minimal list of well-known pathogenic or toxic agents, and additional agents could emerge continuously at any time, or be produced artificially in the research labs. The list should be reviewed and updated annually, as required, by the NBC. Recommendation 5 - Oversight and Approval of the Publication of Information Generated by Dual-Use Research This sensitive subject must be an essential part of Israel’s biosecurity policy. Given the risks involved, the Committee recommends the establishment of a system to oversee and approve dual-use research projects, by an internal mechanism based on the judgment by the academic community itself. Recommendation 6 - Consideration of Biosecurity Issues by Funding Agencies The Committee recommends that the Israel Science Foundation (ISF) and government research foundations (national and binational research funds under the auspices of various government ministries) require, as part of their approval process, biosecurity approval from the institution in which the research will be conducted. This would ensure that these issues are considered by applicant institutions and that proper safety and security measures are enforced. In the case of non-academic laboratory research, similar certification should come from the chairman of the Central Safety and Security Committee in the relevant ministry (e.g. Health, Agriculture or Science). Recommendation 7 - Oversight of Importation and Sale of Dual-Use Biological Equipment In addition to existing export regulations, the Committee believes that it is necessary to establish a system to oversee the Israeli import of dual-use biological laboratory equipment and biological agents, as defined by the (export) risk list maintained by the MITL Export Authority, as well as the sale of these items in the local market (in particular, the sale of used equipment).

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Recommendation 8 - National Responsibility for Biosecurity The establishment of a biosecurity regime and its enforcement should be assigned to the Ministry of Health, which has both primary responsibility for public health and the requisite scientific knowledge and professional experience. It is especially important the MOH should establish, as soon as possible, a National Biosecurity Council. The Chairman and members of the Council should be appointed by the Minister of Health in consultation with the Head of the National Security Council and the President of the Israel Academy of Sciences.

9. Legislation Following the recommendations of the committee, the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) has enacted a new law called ‘The regulation of research into biological disease agents act’. Following are selected abridged provisions from this legislation. Provision 2. Holding Disease Agents and Conducting Research into Them (A) No person or institution shall hold or research disease agents, including applied and diagnostic research (hereafter research), other than in an institution accredited by the Director for these purposes under Article 5 of this Act (hereafter an accredited institution). (B) No accredited institution shall hold or research disease agents, unless and until it has received approval from an institutional committee for holding or researching disease agents, as the case may be, under Clauses 12(c) or 13(d) of this Act, and the said holding or research shall be carried out in conformity with the terms of this approval. (1) No person or institution shall hold or research disease agents other than in a manner that does not put at risk the security of the State of Israel and the welfare, health and security of its people. (2) The Minister, after consultation with the Minister of Defense and with the approval of the Knesset Science and Technology Committee, shall draw up directives as to the holding of and research into disease agents, including the handling, storing and managing of stocks of such agents, in a manner that does not put at risk the security of the State of Israel and the welfare, health and security of its people. Provision 3. Other Forms of Research (A) No one shall conduct research whose sole purpose is to cause or exacerbate a disease or illness or to impair the ability to prevent or treat it. (1) A person or institution that has conducted a research study for which permission did not have to be obtained under this Act but which has made findings of a nature to increase the virulence or the contagiousness of disease agents not included in the Supplement to this Act, or findings of a nature to alter the host range of the said disease agents, so that the disease


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can pass to humans, shall halt the research and act in accordance with the following directives: a. If the research was conducted in an accredited institution – the researcher shall submit a request under Article 5 to its internal institutional committee or, if there is none, to the External Institutional Committee, for approval to continue the research. b. If the research was not conducted in an accredited institution – the researcher shall submit a request under Article 5 to the External Institutional Committee for approval to continue the research. (2) In special circumstances, where an institutional committee considers that the anticipated damage to the research outweighs the fear of injury to the security of the State and the welfare, health and security of its people, the committee may instruct the researcher as to the resumption of his research until it reaches a decision on the said application for approval to continue the research. (3) The provisions of Section 4 shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to research as described in Clause 3(2) above. Provision 4. Accrediting an Institution (A) The Director may designate an institution an accredited institution for holding or researching disease agents if he finds, after consultation with the Council, that the said institution’s holding or researching of disease agents in no way puts at risk the security of the State and the welfare, health and security of its people, and after he has satisfied himself that the said institution can meet the requirements of this Act. (B) As part of the said accreditation process in Clause 4(A) above, the Director shall decide if the institution may set up an internal institutional committee under the provisions of Article 13. (C) The Director may, after consultation with the Council, rescind either accreditation granted under Clause 4(A) above or approval to set up an internal institutional committee under Clause 4(B) above, should he find that the said institution’s holding or researching of disease agents does put at risk the security of the State and the welfare, health and security of its people, or that the said institution is not complying either with the requirements of this Act or with directives issued to the institution by the Director or its institutional committee. (D) Before the Director decides not to accredit an institution or to rescind either accreditation or the approval to set up an internal institutional committee the institution shall be given an opportunity to make its case in the said regard. Provision 5. Applying to Hold or Research Disease Agents Requests to hold or research disease agents shall be submitted to an internal institutional committee and, if there is none, to the External Institutional Committee.

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Provision 6. The Council for Biological Disease Agent Research (A) Having consulted with the president of the National Academy of Sciences and with the Director of the National Security Council, the Minister shall appoint a Council for Biological Disease Agent Research, to comprise fifteen members. (B) The Council’s membership shall be as follows: (1) Six experts in the fields of microbiology, infectious diseases or biotechnology, to be selected by the Minister from a list submitted to him by academic research institutions, including hospitals; the Minister shall appoint one of the six to chair the Council. (2) A representative of the Ministry of Health. (3) A representative of the Ministry of Science, Culture and Sport, recommended by the Minister of Science, Culture and Sport. (4) A representative of the Ministry of Environmental Protection, recommended by the Minister of Environmental Protection. (5) A representative of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, recommended by the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development. (6) A representative of the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Employment recommended by the Minister of Industry, Trade and Employment. (7) A representative of Israel Police, recommended by the Minister of Internal Security. (8) A representative of the Ministry of Defense, recommended by the Minister of Defense. (9) A representative of the National Security Council. (10) A representative of the Association of Industrialists. (C) The representatives appointed to the Council under paragraphs 6(B)(2)6(B)(5) shall be experts in one of the areas of expertise enumerated in paragraph 6(B)(1). (D) No person shall be appointed to the Council who has been convicted of a security offense or of an offense whose nature, gravity or circumstances make him unfit to be a member of the Council. (E) Council members shall serve for a period of four years and may be reappointed for one more such period. Provision 8. The Council’s Duties (1) To advise the Minister on drawing up directives for the holding and researching of disease agents and for conducting research under Clause 3(b), and also in the matter of alterations to the Supplement. (2) To advise the Director on accrediting institutions. (3) To advise the Director on the processing of objections submitted under Article 17. (4) To institute public information campaigns on matters within its purview, as well as in-service training courses for researchers in fields related to researching disease agents and to research under Clause 3(b). (5) To approve the operating rules for institutional committees under Articles 12 and 13.


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(6) To exercise oversight over the implementation of the provisions of this Act and over institutional committees’ compliance with their operating rules. Provision 12. The External Institutional Committee (A) The Director shall appoint an External Institutional Committee from among the members of the Council, to comprise three of the Council members appointed under Clause 6(B)(1) and the members appointed under Clauses 6(B)(2), 6(B)(6) and 6(B)(7); he shall appoint one of the Committee members chairman. (B) The External Institutional Committee shall issue approvals for the holding or researching of disease agents and exercise oversight over approved researches and over the implementation of the provisions of this Act in institutions which have no internal institutional committee. (C) The External Institutional Committee shall, with the Council’s approval, determine its own working arrangements. Provision 13. An Internal Institutional Committee (A) Internal institutional committees shall comprise three members, all senior researchers in the given institution in the fields of microbiology, infectious diseases or biotechnology, one of whom shall chair the committee. (B) In taking its decisions, the committee shall consult with its institution’s Director of Security and the institution official in charge of safety, either or both of whom may attend the committee’s discussions as observers. (C) Internal institutional committees shall, within the institution of which they are a part, issue approvals to hold and research disease agents in conformity with the provisions of this Act, and shall exercise oversight over research studies so approved and over the compliance with the provisions of this Act by the institution of which they are a part. (D) Internal institutional committees shall, with the Council’s approval, determine their own working arrangements. Provision 15. An Institutional Committee’s Approval for Holding and Researching Disease Agents (A) Before an institutional committee issues a approval to hold and research disease agents it must be satisfied that all the following conditions have been met: (1) That there is nothing in the conduct of the research to put at risk the security of the State and the welfare, health and security of its people; in deliberating this issue the Committee shall take account, inter alia, of the following concerns, as they relate to the goals of any given research study: a. Any increase to the damage the disease agents are capable of doing. b. Any increase to the disease agents’ resistance to means of therapy and disinfection or to other physical conditions.

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c.

(B)

(C)

(D)

(E)

(F)

Anything that may make the disease agents harder to detect or identify. (2) That the research study meets all requirements and protocols concerning the holding and researching of disease agents, including equipment and research staff requirements and the latter’s level of training. No institutional committee shall issue an approval to hold and research disease agents unless: (1) The institution applying to hold or research disease agents has a copy of the complete file of rules and instructions regarding the holding and researching of disease agents in compliance with this Act. (2) The researcher has submitted a signed declaration set out in due form and conforming to ministerial directives, affirming that he has never been convicted of a security offense. Prior to issuing a said approval under this Article an institutional committee may demand that the approval applicant furnish it any additional datum or information it needs in order to assess the application. An institutional committee shall not refuse to issue an approval if it can issue an approval by attaching conditions to it, or by restricting the scope of the research, or by issuing directions as to how the research is to be conducted. Should an institutional committee find that an approval it has issued is liable to put at risk the security of the State or the welfare, health and security of its people, or that the said approval was issued in error, or on the basis of mistaken information, or that the research is not being conducted in compliance with conditions and limitations laid down for it, the committee may lay down new conditions for the research’s approval or limitation, or it may withdraw the approval previously issued. An institutional committee decision under Clause 15(E) above shall not be issued before the researcher has been given an opportunity to make his case; however, the committee may decided to hear his arguments after the approval has been withdrawn, should it find that delaying the said withdrawal of approval is liable to put at risk the security of the State or the welfare, health and security of its people.

10. Summary Rapid advances in life sciences and the anticipated developments in biotechnology, genetic engineering and other advanced technologies can be used to produce new treatments for serious diseases, but they also could be used by terror organizations to cause epidemics and other biologically related damage. The threat of non-conventional terror requires simultaneous action on several levels: deterrence, defense prevention and consequence management. The US and other advanced countries have adopted laws, regimes and initiatives designed to prevent the spread of dangerous materials and techniques to hostile elements. Although it is still too early for a full assessment, initial indications suggest that these actions may be effective in reducing the trade and transfer of nonconventional weapons, components and technologies to terrorist elements. Israel shares a common interest with other countries combating the bioterror threat via proliferation prevention, the use of legislation and regulation, and the imposition of supplier and export control


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regimes. It must continue its coordination with international policy in this area, and promote the adoption and enforcement of relevant initiatives. It must increase awareness among its pharmaceutical and biotechnological industries and its academic community regarding the security risks posed by some life science research and development and set up mechanisms for coordination and cooperation between these bodies and appropriate government ministries. The role and initiatives of independent scientists in this area are crucial. The recommendations of Israel’s Committee on Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism, and the findings and principles on which they are based, form a useful starting point for this effort.

References [1]

Jonathon B. Tucker, The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons, materials and technologies to state and sub-state actors, Testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Service, Nov. 12, 2001. Available at http://cns.miis.edu/research/cbw/ cbwol.html. [2] J. Pate and G. Ackerman, Assessing the threat of mass-casualty bioterrorism, Nuclear Threat Initiative, Washington DC, 2001. Available at http://www.NTI.org/e_research/e3_1b.html. [3] Australia Group, Guidelines for transfers of sensitive chemical or biological items, June 2007. Available at http://www.australiagroup.net/en/guidelines.html. [4] Proliferation security initiative (PSI), National strategy to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD), White House, Washington DC, December 2002, p. 2. [5] National Research Council, Biotechnology Research in an age of terrorism, The National Academies Press, Washington DC, 2004, p. 4. [6] R.J. Jackson, A.J., Ramsay, C.D. Christensen et al. Expression of mouse interleukin-4 by a recombinant Etromelia virus suppresses cytolytic lymphocyte responses and overcomes genetic resistance to mousepox, Virol. 75 (2001), 1205-1210. [7] J.K. Taubenberg, A.H. Reid, R.M. Lourens et al. Characterization of the 1918 influenza virus polymerase genes, Nature 437 (2005), 889-893. [8] T.M. Tumpey et al. Characterization of the reconstructed 1918 Spanish influenza pandemic virus, Science 310 (2005), 77-80. [9] K.B. Olson, Aum Shinrikyo: once and future threat? (1999). Available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol5no4/olson.htm. [10] J.E. Farley, Bioterrorism. Available at http://www.nosoweb.org/bioterrorism, accessed March 23, 2009.

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Best Practices: Advising the Chemical Weapons Convention and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention about Trends in Science and Technology Ralf TRAPP Independent Disarmament Consultant, Chessenaz, France

Abstract. Advances in the life sciences and in enabling technologies affect the operations of both the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Both treaty regimes have developed mechanisms to review scientific and technological advances in order to ensure that their future implementation will not be negatively affected by such developments. These reviews also identify opportunities where new scientific knowledge and technology can help enhancing the effectiveness of the treaty regimes, or improve protections against CB weapons. This paper reviews experiences with both formal and informal mechanisms to provide effective and meaningful science advice to the States Parties of the two conventions, and in the case of the CWC also the international agency implementing it (the OPCW). These mechanisms include, for example, the provision of scientific advice by government scientists, in the CWC case by the Scientific Advisory Board of the OPCW, and independent advice received from international science unions, the Inter-Academy Panel, the International Council for Science and other international scientific institutions, as well as industry associations. The paper concludes that independent science advice is important for the proper functioning of the two conventions, and that dialogue between the science, technology and industry community on the one hand, and the arms control and security community on the other, is needed if the conventions are to be implemented in depth, and made to adapt to new requirements emanating from advances in the life sciences. Keywords. Independent scientific advice, Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, OPCW, Scientific Advisory Board, IUPAC, IAP, ICSU, life sciences, chemistry, chemical technology, biotechnology, biology.

Introduction Both the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) are global disarmament accords that prohibit the development, production, stockpiling and use of certain non-conventional weapons. They require the elimination of these weapons (and in the case of the CWC their production facilities) within agreed time frames. At the same time, both treaties contain provisions that are aimed at preventing the recurrence of the banned weapons as a result of chemical or biological activities of the States Parties involving dual-use

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materials, equipment and technologies. Both treaties have strong foundations in their respective areas of science and technology. As a consequence, their operation, and the way they are being implemented by their States Parties, can be affected by advances in science and technology, as well as by changes in the industries that manufacture or use dual-use chemical or biological materials, equipment or technologies. Advances in science and technology can affect the two regimes in a variety of ways. New discoveries in the life sciences may bring about new types of agents available as candidate chemical or biological weapons. Advances in chemistry, biotechnology and other technological fields may lead to new processes that could be used for the production of chemical and biological agents or for their dissemination over target areas. Life science and technological advances could allow a more effective and specific targeting of receptors or regulatory systems in the human body. Life science and technological advances may require the adaptation of national implementation measures (and in the case of the CWC also international verification measures) to take account of changing parameters in the industries that are subject to regulation and control. On the other hand, advances in science and technology also bring about new opportunities, for example with regard to the protection against the banned weapons, or the conduct of verification measures. Both treaties, furthermore, have the stated objective of fostering international cooperation in relevant areas of science and technology between their States Parties. Advances in science and technology create new opportunities for such international cooperation; in fact, many advances are the results of such cooperation. There are therefore good reasons why the parties of these two Conventions should from time to time review the impact of advances in science and technology on their operations. Scientific advice, including from independent scientists, is an important facet of the treaty regimes and is indispensable for their proper long-term functioning. This has become more apparent in recent years, as the pace of progress in the life sciences has increased significantly. Trends in such areas as synthetic biology, systems biology, combinatorial synthesis, DNA synthesis, high-throughput screening, particle engineering, or the use of microreactors in development and production of chemical compounds have all changed the scientific, technological and industrial environment in which the two conventions operate. New risks have emerged, but so have new opportunities. To understand whether and how the treaty regimes may need to be adapted to take account of these advances requires effective science advice for the States Parties and the international agencies involved in their implementation.

1. Relevant Provisions of the Two Conventions 1.1. The Chemical Weapons Convention The CWC 1 contains a number of provisions that explicitly recognize the need to monitor advances in science and technology, and to adapt implementation processes to new requirements emanating from such changes. These include:

1

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC).

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x x

x

x

Paragraph 6 of Article VIII requiring the OPCW 2 in undertaking its verification activities to consider measures to make use of advances in science and technology. Paragraph 21(h) requiring the Conference of the States Parties to review scientific and technological developments that could affect the operation of this Convention and, in this context, direct the Director-General to establish a Scientific Advisory Board (SAB). Paragraph 22 of Article VIII requiring the Conference to convene in special sessions to undertake reviews of the operation of this Convention. Such reviews shall take into account any relevant scientific and technological developments. Paragraph 45 of Article VIII requiring the Director-General, in consultation with States Parties, to appoint members of the Scientific Advisory Board, who shall serve in their individual capacity. The members of the Board shall be appointed on the basis of their expertise in the particular scientific fields relevant to the implementation of this Convention. The Director-General may also, as appropriate, in consultation with members of the Board, establish temporary working groups of scientific experts to provide recommendations on specific issues. In regard to the above, States Parties may submit lists of experts to the Director-General.

Other provisions of the CWC also demonstrate the desire of the drafters to provide for adaptation to new requirements, as may be necessary in light of changes in the environment in which the CWC is operating as well as in recognition of experiences gained with its implementations. For example, the CWC contains an unusual procedure for making changes to some of its technical and administrative provisions. Article XV contains the standard amendment procedure that can be found in many international treaties, but then also establishes what it calls a ‘change’ procedure, in paragraphs 4 and 5. There is stipulated, in order to ensure the viability and the effectiveness of the Convention, that provisions in the Annexes shall be subject to changes if they are related only to matters of an administrative or technical nature. All changes to the Annex on Chemicals shall be made in accordance with this procedure. Another example is the regime regarding “other chemical production facilities” producing discrete organic chemicals. This regime was among the last agreements reached during the negotiations of the CWC. Many aspects remained only loosely defined. At the same time, the negotiators recognized that the chemical industry was itself evolving. Paragraph 26 of Verification Annex Part IX therefore stipulated that at the first Review Conference, the provisions of this Part of the Verification Annex shall be re-examined in the light of a comprehensive review of the overall verification regime for the chemical industry on the basis of the experience gained. Based on these provisions, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) which implements the CWC at the international level has developed a strong institutional approach towards reviewing advances in science and technology. Its Scientific Advisory Board provides regular advice to the Director-General, who in turn advises the States Parties on his assessment of how these trends affect the operation of the Convention. The SAB meets once or twice per year in formal session. In addition, it studies specific issues in temporary working groups. These working 2

The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.


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groups are made up of SAB members with specific expertise regarding the issue(s) under discussion, as well as other experts with relevant expertise in the specific field under consideration. Such additional experts can be proposed by States Parties to the Director-General; at the same time, the Director-General can appoint experts of his own choosing to become members of such temporary working groups [1]. In the past, SAB temporary working groups have either been assembled to provide advice on specific questions, or to provide ongoing advice on a field of activity that needed scientific input from the SAB. Examples for the former types of one-off working groups include a group that provided advice on how to implement the CWC’s provisions regarding ricin, advice on the treatment of adamsite, or advice regarding the transfer of small amounts of saxitoxin as reference standards for test kits used in the detection of paralytic shellfish poisoning (PSP) toxins in shellfish. Examples for the latter include a working group on analytical procedures, and a working group on the establishment of an OPCW capability to analyze biomedical samples. In addition to these working groups, the SAB as a whole has reviewed in a comprehensive fashion advances in science and technology, as part of its contribution to the two Review Conferences held, respectively, in 2003 and 2008 [2,3]. The reports prepared by the SAB made use of reports separately prepared by the International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC), which will be discussed later in this paper. The SAB reports were provided to the Director-General of the OPCW first as provisional reports, during the preparatory phase of the Review Conferences, and then as final reports just before the commencement of the Review Conferences. This approach ensured that the provisional findings and recommendations by the SAB were available to the Executive Council’s working groups preparing the two Review Conferences. At the same time, the final SAB recommendations, which took the discussions in the working group into account, were available to all States Parties before the commencement of the Review Conferences. These reports influenced the discussions and recommendations of the two Review Conferences. At the same time, there remained issues that needed further consideration by the Executive Council, and a practice has been established to review the SAB findings by a group of governmental experts who would scrutinize them on behalf of the Executive Council, and report to the Council any specific recommendations and proposed action that should be taken by the Council or the Technical Secretariat. In addition to the advice rendered by the SAB, the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat has on occasion submitted advice to the States Parties, for example on the changes in the chemical industry and their expected impact on the Convention’s operation. An example was a paper prepared by the Technical Secretariat in preparation of the Second Review Conference, in which a section was included to discuss the impact of scientific and technological advances on the operation of the CWC [4]. In addition to the institutional advice prepared by the different organs of the OPCW, some States Parties themselves have used the occasions of the two Review Conferences to undertake their own assessments, and submitted them to the Review Conference. The approach to science advice is built into the structure of the OPCW and is systematic in nature. But at the same time, science advice for the CWC has not remained limited to governments or institutional structures of the OPCW, as will be explained below.

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1.2. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention The provisions of the BTWC3 are less specific with regard to the review of advances in science and technology. Its Article XII requires that five years after the entry into force of the Convention, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention. In subsequent Review Conferences, this practice was continued, based on decisions taken by the States Parties. But the BTWC did not establish a formal mechanism that was comparable to the CWC’s Scientific Advisory Board to undertake such reviews and prepare scientific advice to that end. Instead, the BTWC relies on input from its States Parties, today supported by an Implementation Support Unit (ISU) in the United Nation’s Office of Disarmament Affairs. Nevertheless, the BTWC has developed a systematic and institutionally wellsupported approach to receiving relevant science advice from governments and other sources. The website of the United Nations Geneva Office indicates how the number of submissions to BTWC Review Conferences on relevant scientific and technological developments has evolved over time (see Figure 1) [5]. In preparation of the Sixth BTWC Review Conference in 2006, the Preparatory Committee for that Review Conference requested the UN Secretariat, inter alia, to prepare “[a] background information document on new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention, to be compiled from information submitted by States Parties as well as from information provided by relevant international organizations” [6]. That paper was prepared by the Secretariat with the support of seven BTWC States Parties as well as information drawn from a variety of documents made available by intergovernmental, international and professional scientific organizations [7]. In addition, ten States Parties submitted national papers to the Review Conference on issues related to relevant developments in science and technology.

Figure 1. Submissions on Relevant Developments in Science and Technology to BTWC Review Conferences. 3

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or BTWC)


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The Sixth Review Conference took these background and national papers into account as it proceeded with its Article by Article review of the operation of the BTWC. This was of particular importance with regard to Article I, which defines the scope of the treaty. In this respect, the Review Conference reaffirmed “that Article I applies to all scientific and technological developments in the life sciences and in other fields of science relevant to the Convention” [8]. At the same time, the Review Conference ensured that the subsequent review of the BTWC’s operation, at the Seventh Review Conference in 2011, will also be addressing further advances in science and technology that are relevant to the Convention. The Final Document recorded that “[t]he Conference decides that the Seventh Review Conference shall be held in Geneva not later than 2011 and should review the operation of the Convention, taking into account, inter alia: (i) new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention” [9]. Also worth noting is that the Sixth Review Conference established an Implementation Support Unit (ISU), as well as an intersessional programme for the years 2007 to 2010, which included a number of topics that will provide a structure for focused discussions of, inter alia, such issues as: x x

x

National, regional and international measures to improve biosafety and biosecurity, including laboratory safety and security of pathogens and toxins. Oversight, education, awareness raising, and adoption and/or development of codes of conduct with the aim of preventing misuse in the context of advances in bio-science and bio-technology research with the potential of use for purposes prohibited by the Convention. With a view to enhancing international cooperation, assistance and exchange in biological sciences and technology for peaceful purposes, promoting capacity building in the fields of disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and containment of infectious diseases: (1) for States Parties in need of assistance, identifying requirements and requests for capacity enhancement; and (2) from States Parties in a position to do so, and international organizations, eliciting opportunities for providing assistance related to these fields.

In these discussions, issues related to advance in science and technology and their impact on the operation of the BTWC will again come up, in the specific context of the issue under discussion. The ISU was tasked, inter alia, to facilitate, upon request, States Parties’ contacts with scientific and academic institutions, as well as nongovernmental organizations [10]. These decisions of the Sixth BTWC Review Conference establish an institutional framework for a structured dialogue among the BTWC States Parties, as well as between them and scientific and academic institutions, in which science advice can be provided to the States Parties. In fact, one could argue that the framework so established, in a certain sense, goes beyond what the CWC has established. Whilst the BTWC does not have a standing advisory body in the form of a Scientific Advisory Board, it has developed a close relationship to scientific and academic institutions, both at the national level and internationally. This has made it possible for the BTWC States Parties to gather additional input and advice from independent sources, in addition to the advice they receive from government sources and the ISU.

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2. The Need for Independent Advice The need for such independent scientific advice is not necessarily immediately apparent. In fact, States Parties of international agreements have at times been reluctant to involve external, non-governmental actors in discussions of how these treaties should be implemented. But there are good reasons why in the cases of the CWC and the BTWC, dialogue between the States Parties and scientific and academic institutions is important, and sought after by the States Parties themselves. This, inter alia, became apparent during the OPCW’s Academic Forum organized as part of the celebrations of the Tenth Anniversary of the entry into force of the CWC. The proceedings of that meeting recorded “the value of academic input to the OPCW and the implementation process. There is a range of mechanisms that already exist to enable such interaction. They include, inter alia, the OPCW Scientific Advisory Board and the collaboration between the OPCW and IUPAC (which has led to a number of international workshops and studies with substantial academic and industrial input). However, there was a sense that there would be benefits from an increased academic input to OPCW/CWC processes” [11]. A first reason is that the pace of advances in relevant areas of science and technology has increased significantly in recent years. At the same time, there are strong integrative trends in the life sciences, at the interface between chemistry and biology but also with regard to the integration of engineering principles, database tools and computer modeling into the way biology is being practised. This trend becomes immediately apparent when one compares the content of the scientific advice given by the OPCW’s SAB to the Second CWC Review Conference [3] with the content of the Implementation Support Unit’s background information on scientific and technological developments that may be relevant to the BTWC [12]. The overlap between the two documents is remarkable. Providing authoritative science advice in such dynamic circumstances requires a good grasp of what constitutes cutting edge science and what directions, at least in principle, the scientific enterprise may take. It is important that science advice is based on a thorough understanding of these trends, and is developed in dialogue with researchers working at the forefront of science and technology. Access to researchers working at the cutting edge, and a broad spectrum of scientific knowledge and institutions, should be involved in developing authoritative science advice. A second reason relates to limitations that are inherent in institutional advisory bodies such as the CWC’s SAB. The meeting frequency of the SAB is low and the ability to assign work to temporary working groups is determined, inter alia, by the available budget. Institutional advice by international scientific advisory committees and boards has some difficulty coping with dynamic situations where issues are multidisciplinary and fast-evolving; it also has difficulties predicting which of the promises that science is making will actually materialize, and in which form. International science advisory committees tend to be stable in composition over several years and hence somewhat inflexible. Their composition is not merely based on scientific merit and expertise, but other, including political, factors also play a role. They sometimes lack access to cutting-edge knowledge and researchers working at the frontiers of science. Thirdly, there are limitations with regard to the input that States Parties themselves provide. Only a small number of States Parties, compared to the overall number of States Parties to the agreements, have the capacity to regularly submit papers on their


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own assessments of the impact of advances in science and technology on the regime. For example, for the 2006 Sixth BTWC Review Conference, ten States Parties submitted national papers on issues related to the impact of advances in science and technology: Argentina, Australia, China, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States [13]. Of the 25 States Parties of the CWC that submitted national papers to the Second CWC Review Conference in 2008, only three dealt with issues specifically related to the impact of scientific and technological advances on the implementation of the Convention: Switzerland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom [14]. Naturally, such national submissions tend to focus on issues of particular interest to the State Party concerned; they do not normally aim at a systematic and comprehensive assessment of the impact of scientific progress on the regime(s). A fourth reason relates to the fact that the implementation of both treaties affects private industry, with regard to national measures implemented to prevent the misuse of dual-use materials, equipment and technologies for hostile purposes and, in the case of the CWC, with regard to the application of international verification measures. Industry is not simply the object of such measures. It is also a partner in the development and implementation of national implementation measures, including with regard to the elaboration of legislation and regulatory and administrative measures. The same applies to the application of verification methods and their adaptation to changing circumstances in the industry. In the case of the CWC, this involvement dates back to the 1980s when the Convention was still being negotiated. To quote Jack Gerard, CEO of the American Chemistry Council, speaking on behalf of the International Council of Chemical Associations (ICCA) at the OPCW’s Industry and Protection Forum in 2007 [15], “[t]he story of the OPCW is one of remarkable leadership and cooperation between nations, between national chemical associations under the ICCA umbrella, and between government and industry. This industry-government relationship is both the hallmark of the CWC and the key to fulfilling its mission. …from the start of the negotiation process in the 1980s through today’s ongoing discussions about implementation, ICCA has been an active partner – and leader – in transforming the CWC from a concept to reality”. The involvement of the pharmaceutical industry in the development of the BTWC regime was perhaps more troublesome. Some would argue that lack of timely and proper involvement of the industry in the negotiations of the Verification Protocol to the BTWC that failed in 2001 was one of the reasons for that failure. But today, the industry is at the negotiating table. An example was the presentation made by the Industry Association Synthetic Biology (IASB) to the 2008 Meeting of the BTWC States Parties in Geneva, in which the association confirmed that its aim was to set the foundation for secure and responsible development of the field of synthetic biology. The IASB presentation described the various industry initiatives that have been adopted towards this aim, from increasing biosafety and biosecurity to developing and harmonizing best practices and adopting codes of conduct. Practical measures suggested by IASB included, for example, the screening of orders by association members so as to raise barriers for malign attackers, and informing the authorities about inquiries and orders that clearly indicate illegal activities [16,17]. Finally, science advice is not a one-way street. Many of the issues where science advice is sought lend themselves to recommendations that in turn need to be taken up and adopted by the scientific community itself. An example in point is the need to

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create awareness in the scientific community of the regulatory requirements of the CWC and the BTWC, as well as of underlying ethical norms and principles. Whilst governments have a responsibility to reach out to the science community and provide information, such measures as the adoption and implementation of codes of conduct or the establishment of (self)-governance measures cannot simply be ordered by governments; to be effective, they require the active involvement and participation of the scientists themselves. At the base of this have to be attempts to incorporate dual-use issues (from ethics to knowledge of the norms and regulations, to compliance and governance) into educational schemes for future generations of scientists and engineers, as well as to reach out to practising scientists in the life sciences so as to ensure that they understand their responsibilities and help preventing the misuse of their science.

3. Evolving Practices of Independent Science Advice for the CWC and the BTWC At the national level, there have in recent years been a number of efforts to develop governance schemes in the life sciences. They were prompted by the rapid advances in the life sciences and related enabling technologies, combined with fears, after September 11 and the anthrax attacks in the USA, that non-State actors might attempt to acquire biological or chemical materials and use them as weapons. Perhaps the most prominent example is the Fink Report, prepared by the Committee on a New Government-University Partnership for Science and Security of the US National Research Council and published in 2007 by the US National Academy of Sciences [18]. But other countries also have developed mechanisms to create a dialogue between their scientific and policy communities. For example, in Germany, there is an ‘Arbeitskreis Abrüstung und Nichtverbreitung biologischer und chemischer Waffen’ (working party on disarmament and non-proliferation of biological and chemical weapons) that meets from time to time to bring together German scientists, diplomats and other experts to discuss current issues related to the implementation of the two Conventions. The group does not provide formal assessments and advice; instead it provides a platform for discussions and the exchange of information and views. Internationally, perhaps the longest-standing informal mechanism that brings together scientists and the policy and diplomatic community is Pugwash. For decades, Pugwash has been organizing meetings of its study group dealing with chemical and biological weapons. The group changed its name several times, reflecting the changing focus after completion of the CWC negotiations, and again after the collapse of the BTWC Verification Protocol negotiations. Today, it calls itself the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation of the Chemical and the Biological Weapons Conventions. The study group meets twice a year, in the autumn in Geneva where the negotiation process of the BTWC States Parties takes place, and in the spring in Noordwijk, the Netherlands, near The Hague where the seat of the OPCW is. It brings together scientists, political scientists, negotiators, military experts and other members of the arms control and security communities. The group does not agree on any advices as such – it creates an informal platform for open and informed dialogue. It has been used as a test bed for discussing new ideas and approaches when formal negotiations had got stuck. The combination of meeting privacy, use of Chatham House rules, participation of recognized experts in the field, and access to key negotiators has made this Pugwash study group a most effective informal mechanism to channel science advice from the scientific community into the diplomatic world, and at the same time to


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inform scientists of the difficulties and obstacles encountered in the negotiation and implementation processes. There are other such fora, which all in one way or another try to create a bridge between the worlds of science and politics. Examples include the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility (INES), the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP), the World Federation of Scientific Workers, the Wilton Park Conferences and, of course, the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme. What is common to all of these different mechanisms is that they rely on dedicated and well-placed people who have in one way or another been associated with the enterprise of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) arms control for some time, be it as previous government advisers, scholars who have taken an interest in this somewhat obscure interdisciplinary field, or activists who were driven by concerns regarding the possible misuse of science for hostile purposes, or regarding the safety of people and the environment. It was (and remains) much more challenging to engage mainstream scientists in this dialogue. The level of awareness within the scientific community about issues related to the prohibitions and requirements of the CWC and the BTWC remains low. However, developments in recent years have shown that institutions that (nationally and internationally) represent the interests of the academic and science communities are becoming more aware of the challenges that advances in their respective disciplines pose for the potential misuse of their scientific results, or for the safety of people and the environment, as well as for the acceptance of their science by regulatory bodies and the public. This led to conversations within the scientific community about the need for proper governance; conversations that coincided with a new interest of governments in finding additional means of ensuring compliance with such arms control regimes as the ban on chemical and biological weapons, inter alia to address threats associated with non-State actors such as terrorists. In the context of the BTWC, the failure of the verification protocol negotiations in 2001 prompted a focus by States Parties on intersessional thematic discussions to cover such issues as national implementation; surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases as well as capabilities for responding to cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease; and codes of conduct for scientists. There was thus a coincidence of States Parties looking for practical ways of moving forward on issues that they considered important for the future implementation of the BTWC, and discussions within the scientific community that responded to the rapid advances in the life sciences and the perceived need to reduce the risk that the results of this work could be misused for hostile purposes by terrorists and states, or cause safety concerns. An important step to move the discussion of these issues forward at the international level was the First International Forum on Biosecurity, held in Como, Italy, in March 2005. This important gathering was jointly organized by the InterAcademy Panel on International Issues (IAP), the International Council for Science (ICSU), the InterAcademy Medical Panel (IAMP) and the National Academy of Sciences of the USA. In the same year, the InterAcademy Panel released a statement on biosecurity which was subsequently endorsed by 70 national science academies worldwide. The statement [19] “addresses five fundamental issues facing scientists working in the life

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sciences – awareness, safety and security, education and information; accountability; and oversight – and offers principles to guide national academies and other scientific bodies in developing codes of conduct”. The Second International Forum on Biosecurity followed in March/April 2008 in Budapest, Hungary, and was additionally co-sponsored by three international science unions: the International Union of Microbiological Societies (IUMS), the International Union of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology (IUBMB) and the International Union of Biological Sciences (IUBS). This second forum “reflected a growing awareness that, while the rapid developments in the life sciences offer great benefits, they also pose the risk that the knowledge, tools, and techniques that enable these advances might also be used to cause deliberate harm.” It understood itself [20] as “part of a broader process of engagement by the scientific and policy communities considering biosecurity issues”. These discussions have essentially two audiences: within the scientific community, their results are being distributed through national science academies and national scientific societies that form the constituencies of the international science unions and academic institutions participating in the process. This aims at creating awareness and promoting oversight and self-regulation through codes of conduct and other mechanisms. At the same time, these discussions aim at creating a dialogue between the scientific and the policy communities so as to advise the adoption of regulatory and control measures in a way that does not harm scientific progress, freedom of research, and communication and exchange of information within the scientific community. Another example of addressing issues at the interface between the life sciences and society was the SynBioSafe project supported by the European Commission's 6th Framework Programme, the first European project to research the safety and ethical aspects of synthetic biology. It involved extensive literature search, interviews with scientists, social scientists, NGOs and finally a four week long public e-forum. Part of the discussion at that e-forum focused on issues related to biosecurity, and underlined again the need for awareness raising in the scientific community dealing with synthetic biology, the practicability of self-governance mechanisms in order to prevent the misuse of this new field of research, and the need of the practitioners’ pro-active participation in the development of regulatory instruments [21]. The e-forum also underlined [22] “that scientists would certainly be well advised to adopt an open approach towards the public and engage in ethical discussions that go beyond factual information about scientific and technological advances. Regulation is no guarantee for public acceptance. Although imminent safety and security issues must be taken seriously, nanotechnology provides examples that in certain contexts flexible forms of governance may be more appropriate than strict regulation”. In the context of the CWC, the first step towards a closer involvement of scientific and academic institutions was made when the SAB, in the run-up to the first CWC Review Conference, approached IUPAC and asked it for its support with a review of advances in science and technology and how they affected the CWC. IUPAC responded to this request with organizing an international workshop on the topic, held in 2002 in Bergen, Norway. The report on this workshop with its recommendations and findings was published by IUPAC as a Technical Report, and at the same time made available to the OPCW’s SAB as well as all States Parties of the CWC [23]. A similar approach was taken for the preparation of the Second CWC Review Conference, with an international workshop held in 2007 in Zagreb, Croatia, the report of which was also subsequently published as well as circulated to the OPCW and its States Parties [24].


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Both reports are examples of effective and dependable independent science advice. They significantly broadened the basis for the advice given to the OPCW, by involving in the development of the recommendations an authoritative, geographically widelyspread and scientifically well-recognized group of practitioners. At the same time, both meetings included experts from government institutions as well as National Authorities. IUPAC was able to draw on the knowledge base of its Divisions, its constituent national science academies and chemical societies, as well as its close and longstanding association with the chemical industry. The requests from the OPCW to help with these reviews, furthermore, coincided with attempts within IUPAC to increase the relevance to society of its work. At the time it was first approached by the OPCW, IUPAC had just adopted a strategic plan 2002-2003 which stated [25], inter alia, that IUPAC “provides leadership, facilitation, and encouragement of chemistry and promotes the norms, values, standards, and ethics of science and the free exchange of scientific information”. The interaction between IUPAC and the OPCW did not remain a one-way street. Subsequent to its review of the impact of advances in science and technology on the CWC, IUPAC held a conference (organized jointly with the OPCW and held in 2005 in Oxford, UK) to study options for how to enhance the awareness of practising chemists for the goals and requirements of the CWC. This meeting led to two follow-up projects. The first one was the development of an internet-based educational tool on the multiple uses of chemistry, in the “recognition that there was a need for educational material for chemists, which both encouraged them to consider the implications of their research and informed them about the CWC and the OPCW” [26]. The material is available at the IUPAC website (http://www.iupac.org/multiple-uses-of-chemicals). The second project is still active at the time of writing, and relates to the development of recommendations for Codes of Conduct for chemists that might be promulgated by IUPAC and its national adhering organizations. It recognizes [27] that there is “growing concern that chemicals should be used for good and not for ill, there are responsibilities for those engaged in science and technology using chemicals to ensure that their activities are aimed only at bringing benefit to humankind and to the environment. Their work needs to be, and perceived to be, in compliance with the international treaties and national laws and regulations prohibiting chemical or biological weapons, illicit drugs, and relating to banned and severely restricted chemicals and the environment such as the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, the Montreal Protocol and the Basel Convention on Hazardous Wastes.” The project summary further states that “it is evident that increasing attention is being given around the world to ethical principles and codes and that the new generation of chemists are keen to see consideration of ethical and other considerations, such as the environment, taken into account. Guiding principles for a code of conduct would strengthen international chemistry, and help to achieve high standards of excellence and relevance in academic, governmental and industrial activities and promote the service of chemistry to society and to global issues”. As in the case of the BTWC, independent science advice has evolved into a dialogue between the scientific and policy communities. In addition, particularly given that ethical issues are involved, there is a growing recognition that there needs to be an open and well-informed discourse with the public. It is important that international organizations such as the OPCW develop a structural and stable framework for this dialogue. Whilst the conduct of Review

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Conferences every five or so years offers opportunities to maintain a dialogue between the policy and the science and engineering communities, this may not be sufficient given the pace of advances in science and technology. In 2007, the OPCW used the occasion of the Tenth Anniversary of the entry into force of the CWC to start an initiative to create a more constant and innovative framework for exchanges between the academic, research and industry communities on the one hand, and the OPCW on the other. It organized two meetings to bring these different communities together: the Academic Forum and the Industry and Protection Forum. But the intention with those two meetings was not merely to hold yet another set of meetings. As the OPCW Director-General explained at the end of the Industry and Protection Forum [28]: “[w]e should now think about how this process of dialogue and expertise-sharing, so powerfully demonstrated during the two above-mentioned forums that were held in this commemorative year, can be extended into the future. This could, for example, involve more detailed study of specific issues by small project groups, specialized workshops on themes that are important for the Convention and that require broad involvement of multiple stakeholders including from chemical industry, and the use of the worldwide web as a platform for raising and discussing issues. Such a structured feedback process would complement the regular work of the policy-making organs and the advisory bodies of the OPCW, and would provide a feedback mechanism between the OPCW and the outside world”.

4. Concluding Remarks Independent science advice is today recognized as an important aspect of shaping policies and regulations on a range of societal issues, including non-proliferation and disarmament of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological weapons. The examples of the BTWC as well as the CWC show that such independent advice is both forthcoming, and sought after. Regimes such as these two treaties cannot be fully implemented unless the scientists, technologists and industrialists that deal with the materials, equipment and technologies relevant to those treaties are fully aware of their objectives, support them, and are ready to comply with them. This understanding, respect and knowledge must be built into educational curricula of students of chemistry, biology, technology and other relevant disciplines. In fact, it should become part of school education. At the same time, scientists and engineers have a distinct self-interest in the matter. In a dynamic field such as the life sciences with great potential but also noticeable risks, funding as well as public perception about safety and the ethical acceptability of their research work are at stake. The one thing that the life science community does not want to experience is a ‘knee-jerk’ reaction of governments to public concerns and misperceptions that would complicate, if not in fact obstruct, scientific progress. For many years, science advice in the CBW field has been somewhat disconnected from the discussions within the scientific community itself about the pros and cons of their future work. Issues of safety and security, for example, were kept well apart. Recent developments have demonstrated the benefit of taking these conversations about dual-use issues into the mainstream scientific institutions, both nationally and internationally. Whenever this happens, the agenda broadens. Ethical issues cannot be reduced to issues related to dual-use – the ethics of sciences encompasses much more than that.


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Security issues cannot be separated from safety – as discussions of risks associated with life science research have shown time and again, the entire risk spectrum needs to be looked at, from naturally-occurring diseases to emerging new diseases, accidental releases, negligence and possible misuse, including in crime, terrorism or warfare. Codes of conduct and governance mechanisms are not just there to deal with dual-use risks – the safety of researchers, populations and the environment are by necessity part of such codes and mechanisms. There may be those who fear that that may dilute the message regarding dual-use requirements. But in fact, the opposite is often the case: by imbedding dual-use issues into mainstream processes in science and engineering, the strength of the legal norms established under the Conventions is actually enhanced by increased awareness and readiness to comply with the norms. At the same time, such amalgamation of dual-use issues with mainstream scientific and engineering issues facilitates effective and authoritative science advice and creates opportunities for sustainable dialogue between the science/engineering and the policy/security communities.

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[17]

OPCW Document C-II/Dec.10, 5 December 1997, OPCW, The Hague. Report of the Scientific Advisory Board on Developments in Science and Technology, OPCW Document RC-1/DG.2, 23 April 2003, OPCW, The Hague. Report of the Scientific Advisory Board on Developments in Science and Technology, OPCW Document RC-2/DG.1, 28 February 2008, OPCW, The Hague. Note by the Technical Secretariat, Review of the Operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention since the First Review Conference, OPCW Document RC-2/S/1*, 31 March 2008, OPCW, The Hague. Available at http://www.opcw.org/documents-reports/conference-of-the-states-parties/second-reviewconference/. United Nations, Relevant Scientific and Technological Developments. Available at http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/4B475A27129CB4D2C125747 A0049EA58. BWC Document BWC/Conf.VI/PC/2, paragraph 22 (c), 3 May 2006. Available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/611/97/PDF/G0661197.pdf. BWC Document BWC/Conf.VI/INF.4, 28 September 2006. Available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/643/31/PDF/G0664331.pdf. BWC Document BWC/Conf.VI/6, Part II, paragraph 2, 2006. Available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/600/30/PDF/G0760030.pdf. Ibid., paragraph 61. Ibid., Part III, paragraphs 5 and 7. Ralf Trapp (editor), Academic Forum Conference Proceedings, OPCW, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Clingendael and TNO (Netherlands Organisation for Applied Scientific Research), The Hague, 2007, p. 12. BWC Document BWC/MSP/2008/INF.1, 28 November 2008. Available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/643/62/PDF/G0864362.pdf. UN Geneva website. Available at http://www.unog.ch/unog/website/disarmament.nsf/(httpPages)/ 23958FD3E9A0A67BC12571F10032D47B?OpenDocument&unid=3496CA1347FBF664C125718600 364331. OPCW website. Available at http://www.opcw.org/documents-reports/conference-of-the-statesparties/second-review-conference/. Jack Gerard, The CWC at 10 years – partnership, progress, and the path ahead, in OPCW Industry and Protection Forum, OPCW, The Hague, 2007, pp 31-37. Industry Association Synthetic Biology, presentation at the 2008 BTWC Meeting of the States Parties. Available at http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/55E15F1EB02210EDC125751A 004B1A7E/$file/BWC_MSP_2008-Presentation-IASB.pdf. Germany, IASB Code of Conduct (Draft), BWC Document BWC/MSP/2008/WP.3, 2008. Available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/644/46/PDF/G0864446.pdf?OpenElement.

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[18] Committee on a New Government-University Partnership for Science and Security of the US National Research Council, Science and Security in a Post 9/11 World: A Report Based on Regional Discussions Between the Science and Security Communities, National Academy of Sciences, Washington DC, 2007. [19] Statement by the Biosecurity Working Group of the InterAcademy Panel on International Issues to the 2008 BWC Meeting of States Parties. Available at http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/ (httpAssets)/FDE952580DBE6C56C125751400457AA6/$file/BWC_MSP_2008-InterAcademy+Panel081201-NGO.doc.pdf. [20] National Research Council of the National Academies, The 2nd International Forum on Biosecurity, NRC, Washington DC, 2008. [21] Markus Schmidt, Helge Torgersen, Agomoni Ganguli-Mitra, Alexander Kelle, Anna Deplazes, and Nikola Biller-Andorno, SYNBIOSAFE e-conference: online community discussion on the societal aspects of synthetic biology, available at http://www.synbiosafe.eu/uploads///pdf/SSBJSYNBIOSAFE%20e-conference.pdf. [22] Markus Schmidt, Helge Torgersen, Agomoni Ganguli-Mitra, Alexander Kelle, Anna Deplazes, and Nikola Biller-Andorno, The Societal Aspects of Synthetic Biology: A Priority Paper, first draft, 2008. Available at http://www.synbiosafe.eu/uploads///pdf/priority_paper_SB4.pdf. [23] George W. Parshall, Graham S. Pearson, Thomas D. Inch and Edwin D. Becker, Impact of scientific developments on the Chemical Weapons Convention (IUPAC Technical Report), Pure Appl. Chemistry 74 (2002), 2323-2352. [24] Mahdi Balali-Mood, Pieter S. Steyn, Leiv K, Sydnes and Ralf Trapp, Impact of scientific developments on the Chemical Weapons Convention (IUPAC Technical Report), Pure Appl. Chemistry, 80 (2008), 175-200. [25] IUPAC Strategic Plan 2002-2003. Available at http://old.iupac.org/news/archives/2002/strategicplan.html. [26] Alistair W.M. Hay, Multiple Uses of Chemistry – an Educational Tool, Chemical Disarmament 6(4) (2008), 9-10. Available at http://www.opcw.org/news/publications/cdq/cdq-dec-2008/. [27] Graham S. Pearson et al., Recommendations for Codes of Conduct, IUPAC current project 2007-022-2020. Available at http://old.iupac.org/projects/2007/2007-022-2-020.html. [28] Rogelio Pfirter, Statement at the Joint Session with the Annual Meeting of National Authorities, in OPCW Industry and Protection Forum, OPCW, The Hague, 2007, pp 25-30.

Section 3 Nuclear Weapons, Missiles and Missile Defense



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Uranium Enrichment: Guns or Butter? Houston G. WOOD Mechanical & Aerospace Engineering, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, USA

Abstract. Uranium enrichment refers to a process to alter the isotopic composition of uranium. This is to produce fuel for nuclear power reactors, which requires a 235U content of about 3-5%, and to produce material for a nuclear weapon, which requires a 235U concentration of about 93%. A process that enriches reactor fuel can also enrich weapons material, which makes uranium enrichment a dual-use process. The line between civil and military purposes is very thin, and ways to broaden the line are being investigated. In this chapter, the fundamentals of uranium enrichment for these two purposes are discussed, the current Iranian nuclear situation assessed, and possible ways forward suggested for countries wanting to develop peaceful nuclear energy. Keywords. Uranium enrichment, isotope separation, gas centrifuge

Introduction Uranium found in nature has three isotopes, 234U, 235U, and 238U, and their concentrations are shown in Table 1. The 235U isotope is fissile, and it can sustain a chain reaction of nuclear fission. Uranium fuel for a nuclear power reactor generally requires enrichment of 235U in the range of ~3% to 5%, while uranium for use in a nuclear weapon requires enrichment of 235U in the range of 93%. A uranium enrichment process that can make reactor fuel can also be used to produce material for a bomb. The line between these two applications of enrichment is very thin and easy to cross. Member countries of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) with declared uranium enrichment facilities are subject to safeguards and inspections carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In order to thicken the line between the civil and military uses, it is necessary to broaden and to strengthen the safeguards and inspections regimes.

Table 1. Isotopic Concentration of Natural Uranium [1] U-234

0.0055 at%

U-235

0.7200 at%

U-238

99.2745 at%

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H.G. Wood / Uranium Enrichment: Guns or Butter?

It can be argued that a country with uranium enrichment capabilities and nuclear power reactors is essentially a nuclear weapons country. To go from strictly peaceful uses of nuclear technology to military uses requires only a political decision. However, if a country truly wants only civil nuclear power, then the country should be willing to demonstrate their position to the rest of the world through the Additional Protocol of the NPT and submitting to strengthened safeguards.

1. Separative Work and Separative Capacity In an enrichment process, the separative work is a measure of how much effort is required to enrich from some given feed concentration to a specified concentration of product and to strip to a specified concentration of tails. Because there is so little 234U in natural uranium, we will ignore it in this analysis. Separative work is measured in kgU (kilograms of uranium) and is denoted SWU. For binary mixtures, the value function, v(x), is used in the calculation of separative work and is defined by Ȟ(x) = (2x – 1) ln(x/(1 – x)),

(1)

where x is concentration and v(x) is non-dimensional. The process has an input or feed, F, a product, P, and a tails, W. A value balance around the process then leads to SWU = PȞ(yP) + WȞ(xW) – FȞ(xF),

(2)

where yP, xW and xF are concentrations of product, tails and feed, respectively. Generally F, P, and W are measured in kilograms of uranium (kgU), so a SWU is measured in kgU or sometimes in metric tonnes of uranium. By definition, low enriched uranium, LEU, is uranium with a 235U concentration of less than 20% and highly enriched uranium, HEU, is uranium containing more than 20% of 235U. The IAEA defines a significant quantity (SQ) of uranium to be 25 kgHEU. To enrich 1 SQ at 93% 235U from natural uranium and strip to tails of 0.3% 235U requires 5,000 SWU, and to enrich 1 SQ at 93% 235U from 3.5% 235U and strip to tails of 0.72% 235U requires 1400 SWU. So 72% of the separative work required to make the SQ of HEU is expended in making 3.5% 235U from natural uranium. Separative capacity refers to the rate at which separative work is performed and is measured in SWU per unit time, for example, SWU/yr. Separative capacity is often designated by 'U . To provide fuel for a typical power reactor requires a separative capacity of about 100,000 SWU/yr. If centrifuges with separative capacity of 2 SWU/yr are used to enrich the uranium, then 50,000 centrifuges would be required to supply fuel to the reactor.

2. The Gas Centrifuge A schematic of a gas centrifuge is shown in Figure 1. A gas centrifuge is a hollow cylindrical rotor that is filled with gas and rotated at very high speeds to produce a gravitational field capable of separating isotopes of the elements in the gas. The rotor


90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

193

East West North

1st Qtr

3rd Qtr

Figure 1. Schematic of a Gas Centrifuge

is spun in a vacuum to reduce drag and heating, and the casing contains the rotor in case of failure. Three streams flow into or out of the rotor: feed, product and tails. For the enrichment of uranium, the process gas is uranium hexafluoride, UF6. A small separation in the radial direction is produced by the gravitational field, causing the heavier 238UF6 to move toward the wall and the lighter 235UF6 to move toward the axis of the rotor. This separation is strongly enhanced in the axial direction by a counter-current flow as depicted in Figure 1. For more information on the countercurrent flow and separation of isotopes in a gas centrifuge, the reader may consult references [1,2,3]. The separation factor, Į, for a gas centrifuge is defined as

D

ª§ y P · ¸ «¨¨ ¸ «¬© 1 y P ¹

§ xW ¨ ¨1 x W ©

·º ¸». ¸ ¹»¼

(3)

The numerical value of Į is a function of the particular centrifuge, in particular the length and rotational speed of the rotor. The P1 centrifuge deployed by Pakistan and Iran has been estimated to have an Į § 1.2 [4]. Generally, a single gas centrifuge will not be able to produce the product concentration and product mass flow rate desired, so the centrifuges are arranged in a cascade. The centrifuges are connected in series to achieve the desired product concentration

194


90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

East West North

1st Qtr

3rd Qtr

Figure 2. Schematic of a Gas Centrifuge Cascade (from [3])

and in parallel to achieve the desired product mass flow rate. The cascade depicted in Figure 2 has 15 stages. The cascade feed is introduced in stage number 5, the tails are removed from stage number 1, and the product is removed from stage number 15.

3. The Current Iran Situation The cascade in Figure 2 has 164 centrifuges and is representative of the cascades in the Iran facility. A commercial scale gas centrifuge enrichment plant would be comprised of numerous such cascades. According to a recent IAEA report [5], Iran continues to feed UF6 into the 3000-machine Unit A24 and six cascades of Unit A26. They have an additional nine cascades in Unit A24 with centrifuges installed and under vacuum. This means they have approximately 5400 centrifuges at their disposal. Their stated intention is to have about 50,000 centrifuges in their enrichment plant. It has been reported that the Iran’s P1 centrifuge (or IR1 as used by Iran) has a potential separative capacity of ǻU § 2.0 SWU/yr [4]. Using this estimate, the 5400 centrifuges currently operating would provide separative capacity of 10,800 SWU/yr and the planned 50,000 centrifuge cascade would have separative capacity of 100,000 SWU/yr. This means the planned cascade would be appropriate for supplying most if not all the fuel needed for the reactor located at Bushehr.


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At the moment, the enrichment plant at Natanz is under IAEA safeguards, but Iran has not responded to some of the requests of the IAEA [5]. Unless there are clandestine activities taking place in Iran, the current safeguards should provide reasonable confidence that Iran is not making HEU or weapons. If there are clandestine operations, there is no way to predict how long it would take Iran to build a nuclear explosive device. The IAEA report [5] also states that Iran has accumulated 1,010 kg of low enriched uranium in the form of uranium hexafluoride. If Iran were to decide to kick the IAEA out and withdraw from the NPT, the low enriched uranium could be used for feed to the existing cascades. If this low enriched uranium is 3.5% 235U, then, as explained in the section 1, it can be used as feed and only 1400 SWU are needed to make 1 SQ enriched to 93% 235U. Then, with 10,800 SWU/yr separative capacity, 1 SQ can be produced in less than two months. This estimate hinges on the estimate for how much separative capacity their centrifuges have, and producing this 1 SQ would require essentially all of the currently available LEU feed. This would be the fastest way to produce the HEU for one device.

4. Break-Out Example If the safeguards were removed, a more logical way to proceed to make HEU with existing centrifuges would be either batch recycling or using some of the centrifuges to

Figure 3. Plant with Cascades Dedicated to HEU Production (from [3])

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produce LEU and others to take the LEU as feed to produce HEU continuously. The example considered in [3] is two plants, one with 12 and one with 36 164-machine cascades (1968 and 5904 machines, respectively) all with P1-type centrifuges (see Figure 3). With LEU as feed, the 12 cascade plant can produce about 90 kgHEU/yr. A plausible approach would be to use the 24 cascade plant to continuously produce HEU to feed into the 12 cascade plant. This would allow the continuous production of 90 kgHEU/yr with a total of 5904 centrifuges. Of course, a clandestine 12 cascade could produce the 90 kgHEU/yr with the LEU feed being produced in the full 36 cascade plant. A clandestine plant could be contained in a small building of 500 square meters or so, and such a plant has no significant characteristics to identify it from satellite imagery. This illustrates the necessity to continue to monitor and to account for all LEU that is produced. The concern could be mitigated if the LEU were immediately converted into reactor fuel rather than being stored in gaseous form.

5. A Way Forward For a country wanting peaceful civil nuclear energy, safeguards are a way to demonstrate to the rest of the world that the country is following its declared intentions. However, for a nation that has the political will and intention to make a nuclear weapon, safeguards cannot prevent this from happening. There are several scenarios that may occur: 1.

2. 3.

A nation can keep all nuclear weapons activities hidden. For example, it is very difficult to detect a gas centrifuge plant. The one in Iran was hidden for almost two decades and was made public by opponents to the current government. A nation can withdraw from the NPT and then begin development of the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear weapons. This is a legal option. A nation can be a member of the NPT, develop nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, accede to safeguards, and then break out from this position and develop nuclear weapons. This is a problem to be resolved by political decisions, not technical decisions.

Safeguards do not apply to scenarios 1 and 2. Under scenario 1, if clandestine activities are discovered, political actions are required. Likewise, under scenario 2, political actions are required to prevent development of a nuclear weapon. Safeguards apply only to nations that are members of the NPT and have declared nuclear fuel cycle facilities. There are technical measures that can strengthen current safeguards and provide increased confidence that a nation is abiding by their declared intentions. One would be to develop and to deploy continuous enrichment monitors (CEMO) that would provide flow rates and 235U assays in the process pipes of the gas centrifuge plant. Such devices are under development and have been tested in URENCO facilities. A second approach would be to require the isotopic assays of all the feed and tails streams. The minor isotopes (234U in natural uranium and 232U, 234U, and 236U in reprocessed fuel) could be used as a monitor to see if HEU is being produced. For example, with natural uranium feed, if HEU is being produced, the 234U will be


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enriched faster than the 235U, and, hence, it will be depleted more in the tails. So the tails assays would demonstrate the undeclared activity without revealing the product assays, which are often considered proprietary. Another approach would be to bring nations acknowledging they want to acquire the nuclear fuel cycle into the position of suggesting and developing advanced safeguards techniques. Treating these nations as equal partners rather than adversaries might provide an environment that would nurture mutual respect and trust. Iran is simply the nation of interest at this time. In the future, other countries may well decide to pursue nuclear fuel cycle capabilities – announced or not. It is imperative that the NPT regime uses the current situation to develop generic means for dealing with events likely to occur in the future. For example: 1.

2. 3. 4.

If more nations pursue the nuclear fuel cycle, there are several consequences for the non-proliferation regime and safeguards. In particular, more resources must be made available to the IAEA. This requires educating a new generation of scientists and engineers to be capable of performing these tasks. Advanced safeguard methods must be developed and applied to new countries in the business. More accurate measurements and better accountability of nuclear materials must be developed and enforced. This applies especially to LEU. More human intelligence is required to discover clandestine nuclear facilities.

With all the current attention on gas centrifuge enrichment plants, the world must remain aware of other methods to enrich uranium such as: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Thermal diffusion. Electromagnetic isotope separation. Aerodynamic separation. Chemical and ion exchange. Plasma separation. Laser separation.

Just because these processes may not at this time offer economic advantages over the gas centrifuge, it does not mean a nation interested in pursuing a nuclear weapon would ignore them.

References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]

H.G. Wood III, and J.B. Morton, Onsager's Pancake Approximation for the Fluid Dynamics of a Gas Centrifuge, Journal of Fluid Mechanics 101(1) (December 1980), 1-31. Frederic Doneddu, Philippe Roblin and Houston G. Wood, Optimization Studies for Gas Centrifuges, Separation Science and Technology 35(8) (2000), 1207-1221. H.G. Wood, A. Glaser and R.S. Kemp, The Gas Centrifuge and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation, Physics Today 61(9) (September 2008), 40-45. H.G. Wood, Analysis of the Proposed Gas Centrifuge Plant at Natanz, Proceedings of the 8thAnnual Meeting of INMM (2007). Available at http://inmm.org/publications/proceedings.cfm. IAEA Board of Governors, GOV/2009/8, February 19, 2009. Available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-8.pdf.

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Nuclear Terrorism Christopher WATSON Merton College, Oxford, UK

Abstract. There is growing international concern about the use of nuclear materials for the purposes of terrorism. This chapter examines the possible threats, the strengths and weaknesses of the current defences against these, and the steps which the international community needs to take to address these concerns. Keywords. Nuclear, terrorism, uranium, plutonium, dirty bomb, information, access, delivery, economics, public relations, psychology, over-reactions.

Introduction This chapter seeks to illustrate by way of example the role which independent professional scientists and engineers can play in addressing one of the current issues in international peace and security – the risk to mankind posed by the threat of nuclear terrorism. The analysis which follows was first presented in a talk given to the British Pugwash Group at a Public Discussion Meeting on Britain and Unconventional Terrorism on 10 December 2003. It was subsequently published, in a slightly abridged form, in Nuclear Future [1]. The material presented here was intended to reach a professional audience interested in international affairs: however I was conscious as I wrote it that it might inadvertently reach another audience – individuals who for reasons of their own have an unhealthy interest in the potential of nuclear terrorism. I therefore tried to ensure that such people would find nothing which was not already available in the scientific literature or on the Internet. In the present chapter I have added some material which has become relevant since my original presentation. Nuclear Terrorism is a hostile act (or a threat of such an act) involving nuclear materials (fissile or radioactive) performed by a terrorist, a term which covers a wide range of individuals. What they all have in common is that for some reason they have become motivated to hurt or destroy sections of society which they have come to regard as the enemy. It is very important to remember that they are human beings with real (if distorted) feelings, since otherwise it is very difficult to formulate an appropriate response to their behaviour. Their motivation varies enormously: it may spring from deep religious or political beliefs, or from some painful personal or collective experience – loss of someone they loved in a military confrontation, erosion of their personal or national self-confidence by the behaviour of occupying powers, denigration of their ethnic group by the behaviour of other groups, exploitation of their productive capacity by strong commercial groups etc. Occasionally they are mercenaries, funded by some political or national power. They also vary enormously in the extent and nature of their technical/scientific education. There are, as the saying goes, ‘PhD terrorists’ and ‘peasant terrorists’, and

C. Watson / Nuclear Terrorism

199

they differ greatly in the threat that they represent, and the steps which can appropriately be taken to counter it.

1. The Technology of Nuclear Terrorism There are a number of different approaches which the nuclear terrorist might adopt: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Theft or diversion of existing nuclear weapons, and their use or threat of use. Development and construction of a ‘home-made’ nuclear weapon. Dispersal of radioactive materials held by an adversary on his own territory. Theft or diversion of radioactive materials and their incorporation into a ‘dirty bomb’. Other means of dispersal of such materials on the adversary’s territory.

Let us consider each of these options in turn. 1.1. Theft or Diversion of Existing Nuclear Weapons, and Their Use or Threat of Use This option has been extensively explored in contemporary cinematographic fiction (e.g. in James Bond films), and in discussions on the safeguarding of the nuclear weapons of the former Soviet Union, or of nuclear weapons which have been ‘lost’ in accidents by air or sea. It is widely believed (and it may be true) that nuclear weapons are less well protected from theft now than they were at the height of the Cold War; however there have been a number of quiet inter-governmental discussions on improvements in the protection regime, so it is perhaps less plausible as an option today than it was ten years ago. It depends on either having an ‘inside track’ which gives information about the location, protection and movement arrangements and on the eventual use of the weapon, or an organisation which can create the required infrastructure for the theft and eventual use of the weapon. The thief has to be able to handle an object weighing up to a tonne or more, and avoid detection at normal crossborder checks, and in the massive search operations which would be initiated if/when the loss of such a weapon became known. Having stolen the weapon, the terrorist has to find a way to deliver it (e.g. a rocket or aircraft delivery system). Alternatively he can dismantle the weapon, and simply use it as a source of fissile material in convenient form. 1.2. Development and Construction of a ‘Home-Made’ Nuclear Weapon This option has also been the subject of numerous works of fiction, e.g. Nicholas Freeling’s The Gadget [2] or Vic Mayhew’s Plutonium [3], and it underlies the widespread public concern about the availability of fissile nuclear materials. The technology required to manufacture a weapon of sorts from highly enriched uranium or almost any plutonium is not ‘rocket science’, and could be mastered by a small group of PhD terrorists over a relatively short period, using published information (the Internet provides a regrettably good starting point). The key problems facing such a group are getting access to the fissile material (or to the technology required to enrich natural uranium) and delivering the weapon to the target. In this case, it is unlikely that the group will have access to rocket or airborne delivery systems, so the ‘suitcase

200


bomb’ option tends to be envisaged. The components of a small nuclear weapon are not very large, but getting them across a national border without detection would not be trivial (airports tend to have effective detection equipment for such material). Such weapons are not absolutely certain to work first time, but the target country can hardly rely upon such a failure, so the threat of use may be perfectly credible. 1.3. Dispersal of Radioactive Materials Held by Adversary on His Own Territory Countries which already have a civil (or military) nuclear programme are potentially vulnerable to a terrorist armed with conventional explosives and rocket-launchers or a large aircraft which can be crashed onto a nuclear facility. For example, an armed terrorist could clandestinely enter a nuclear facility and place explosive charges (as in the Special Operations Executive raid on the Norsk Hydro heavy water plant at Rjukan in November 1942), or accurately target a rocket on a facility such as a nuclear reactor, reprocessing plant or store for spent nuclear fuel or high-level radioactive waste. This could disperse millions of Curies of radioactive material into the local environment. If close to a centre of population, such an event could have very serious consequences. Such facilities tend to be well-guarded against such intrusion, so the alternative option of crashing an aircraft into the facility has been much discussed. Most existing nuclear facilities were not designed to withstand such a crash, and the cost of retro-fitting protection is often prohibitive. 1.4. Theft or Diversion of Radioactive Materials and Incorporation in a ‘Dirty Bomb’ If there are no radioactive materials located near the target, the terrorist has the option of stealing the material from elsewhere, and incorporating it in a ‘dirty bomb’ – a device containing conventional explosive and radioactive material, which will disperse the material on ignition, in much the same way as the traditional nail-bomb. 1.5. Other Means of Dispersal of Such Materials on the Adversary’s Territory There are many other ways in which radioactive materials can be dispersed within the adversary’s territory. These include deposition in sources of drinking water, incorporating it into materials sold as food, or dispersal as aerosols in enclosed spaces such as the Underground (as in the serious terrorist attack, using a chemical weapon, in the Tokyo underground).

2. The Existing Barriers to Nuclear Terrorism None of the above options open to the nuclear terrorist is without its technical problems, but how far are these really a barrier to the use of that option? The barriers include the following. 2.1. Lack of Scientific Expertise and Know-How Most of the above options require a certain minimum level of scientific and technical competence, perhaps beyond that possessed by the majority of terrorists, and some (e.g.


201

the home-made bomb option) require access to information which used to be highly classified. However for the ‘PhD terrorist’, the barriers to obtaining the necessary education/information are now almost non-existent. British and other nuclear-weaponsstate educational establishments offer courses in nuclear physics or technology to students from around the world, and there is nothing to stop a would-be nuclear terrorist from enrolling (as the 9/11 terrorists did to learn aircraft navigation). Much of the required technical information has been declassified, and is publicly available. The aspects which remain highly classified mostly relate to the design of sophisticated weapons with high yield, light weight etc, and would tend not to be of concern to the terrorist. Information about sealed sources and radioactive waste is very largely declassified, so it is only rather specific information about location and protection of stores etc. which are not in the public domain. So this barrier is of limited value. 2.2. Access to Nuclear Materials This is a much more serious barrier, especially for the home-made bomb maker. Uranium-235 is not on the open market, and even natural uranium in the quantities which are required (tons) is not easily procured without detection. Although the world’s press is full of stories of the theft of such material, especially from the Former Soviet Union (though there are also reports of the disappearance of significant quantities of U-235 from the US in the 1960s and 70s), most of these ‘thefts’ involved less than one critical mass of material, and were attempts by non-expert individuals to make money. In a large number of cases, they were caught. The Russian authorities are rather confident that no Russian material of military significance is now unaccounted for. The International Atomic Energy Agency maintains a database recording all reported cases of such thefts [4], which have grown sharply during recent years. Equipment for separating uranium isotopes (and the centrifuge option is probably the only feasible one) is rather carefully controlled under the London Convention on dualuse technology. Evasion of those controls is possible (as the cases of Iraq and Pakistan show) but it is difficult, and there is always a risk of detection. Once the equipment has been procured, there is a non-trivial industrial-scale process to be set up and operated, which takes time and expertise, and is somewhat vulnerable to satellite detection. So the tendency is to assume that the terrorist wishing to procure U-235 will try to steal it. The potential sources are research reactors (of which there are about 1000 world-wide, many of which use highly enriched fuel), nuclear submarines which use HEU (the best known examples are the Russian Alpha class subs) or nuclear weapons themselves (or stockpiles of weapons material). It cannot be claimed that the current level of protection of these sources is as good as might be desired, but there is a rapidly growing awareness of this problem. The alternative material – plutonium – raises different problems. It is produced in a reactor, so the terrorist has either to build and operate a reactor for some years, or to have access to material from a reactor operator. Ideally, he wants ‘weapons-grade’ plutonium, typically material containing more than 93% Pu-239, and this requires the reactor to be operated in a non-standard mode. However any material with more than about 20% Pu-239 (and that includes material from a conventional civil nuclear reactor) can make a ‘fizzle-yield’ weapon of over one kiloton yield. The plutonium does however need to be free of the fission products with which it is associated in a spent nuclear reactor fuel assembly. This implies a chemical plant which can separate off the plutonium and convert it to metallic form. So the terrorist either has to create such a

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facility, or steal the product from someone who has. Although the chemistry is not very sophisticated, spent fuel is very highly radioactive, so the facility has to be shielded to protect the operators, and the material has to be handled remotely. The alternative – to steal separated plutonium from some existing source – is made attractive by the fact that several nations have stockpiles containing as much as 100 tons of such material. In the UK, for example, the stores at Sellafield have about 108 tons of separated plutonium [5]. However these are now (since 9/11) rather securely guarded, so it is not obvious that they would be an attractive terrorist target. The task of making a plutonium weapon is also more difficult than making a uranium-235 weapon, because of the need to implode the core using carefully shaped charges. For all these reasons, this option is likely to be much less attractive to the terrorist. Fissile materials which have already been prepared in an existing weapons programme are subject to quite strong protective measures: stockpiles are protected by armed guards trained to cope with a determined attack, and transport outside protected sites is normally restricted so that quantities less than the critical mass are on the road at any time. Where this is not possible, armed escort teams are used. By contrast, access to radioactive materials for making a dirty bomb or for one of the local dispersion options, is relatively straightforward. The most widely distributed material is in the form of nuclear ‘sealed sources’, which are widely used in medicine (~25 KCi each for radiotherapy), in marine transport (~100 KCi each, as power sources for un-manned lighthouses), in the food industry (~10 MCi each, for sterilisation plants), in the oil and gas industry (~10 Ci each, for down-hole monitoring) and in the engineering industry (~100 Ci each, for weld inspection etc). There are some 8 million such sources in circulation worldwide, and 745 have been lost (and 510 not recovered) since 1998. Institutional control of sealed sources is very imperfect, and many are ‘orphan sources’ – i.e. sources in use whose provenance is unknown and/or are not under any system of control [6]. In addition to sealed sources, the existing nuclear countries now have many millions of tons of radioactive waste material (at various different levels of activity) and much of it is stored in facilities with relatively limited restrictions on access. On the other hand, mere access to the facility is not enough – highly active nuclear materials inside such facilities are rather heavily shielded (typically by over a metre of concrete or in a heavy lead or steel cask). Thus to achieve release of its radioactivity locally it is necessary to intervene in such a way as to cause some beyond-design accident (e.g. a major disruption of the control system leading to a power surge and eventual meltdown) or to break open a thick concrete or metal containment system. To produce such an effect reliably requires considerable knowledge of the facility design and/or of the use of explosives. 2.3. Having a Delivery System Except in the case where the radioactive material is to be dispersed directly from its place of storage or use, the terrorist has to be able to deliver the weapon to its target. The alternatives are rocket or aircraft delivery systems which pass above national defenses, or clandestine delivery by land or sea at ground level through any border controls that are in place. The existence of rogue states which possess (or are developing) rockets with a cross-border range has raised the threat that these might ‘sponsor’ terrorism by making their rocketry available to terrorist groups. This threat is one of the motivations underlying the current interest in limited-scope missile defence


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systems. From the terrorist perspective, one of the disadvantages of this approach is that the payload of many rocket systems is rather small, and this may restrict the feasibility of delivering a home-made bomb or a sufficiently large dirty bomb to be of interest. Thus the alternative option of clandestine delivery at ground level through the national border controls becomes interesting. The quality of the radiation detection equipment at such borders ranges from the excellent (at many international airports) to the non-existent (along most sea coastlines). A particular delivery problem arising in the case of the dirty bomb is that the radioactive material is to some extent ‘self-protecting’. Precisely when the level of activity is such that the dirty bomb would be a real threat, the level of radiation around it would be lethal to anyone who seeks to make it and transport it without a large shielded container, which would be heavy (over 100 kg) and highly visible to the security authorities. The following trivial calculation will indicate the nature of the problem. Suppose that the terrorist wishes to threaten an action which would force a government to evacuate an area of (say) one square kilometre in the centre of London, by claiming that he has the capability to disperse enough radioactive waste to compel this. He might judge that a dirty bomb which uniformly distributed caesium-137, at a density of say 30 Curies per square km, would be sufficient. The quantity of caesium137 required to do this is minuscule – about 3 grams. However if that whole amount were held unshielded by the terrorist at a distance of 30 cm, he would get a dose of order 1 Sievert per hour – i.e. a lethal dose within a few hours. So he needs both to keep it within a thickly shielded container at all times until he is ready to use it, and then distribute it reasonably evenly over a square kilometre. The manufacture of the required mixture of radioactive material and explosive under fully-shielded conditions, and the transport of the bomb (again in a shielded container) to the target area would not be easy.

3. Consequences of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism The various different terrorist scenarios discussed above have widely different consequences. These can be summarised as follows. 3.1. Theft or Diversion of Existing Nuclear Weapons, and Their Use or Threat of Use. This is the most serious of all the scenarios, with consequences which could range from 50,000 to 10 million deaths, depending on the size of weapon stolen. 3.2. Development and Construction of a ‘Home-Made’ Nuclear Weapon Assuming that no attempt is made to produce a fusion weapon, the consequences of its use will depend enormously on its design, and could range from a ‘fizzle’ equivalent to a few tons of TNT up to a full Hiroshima/Nagasaki weapon of say 20 kilotons. Even the fizzle could cause radiation injuries at up to a few hundred metres, and the full scale explosion could cause destruction of 5 square miles and kill 50,000 people.

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3.3. Dispersal of Radioactive Materials Held by Adversary on His Own Territory The consequences would depend strongly on the amount of material released, and the height to which it was lifted by the initiating explosion. One such event (occurring as a result of an industrial accident, not terrorism) was the so-called Kishtym incident in Russia, where about 20 MCi of fission products (Sr-90 etc.) were released by a chemical explosion in a waste storage tank, and led to fall-out at a level exceeding 0.1 Ci/km2, extending over 20,000 km2 (the so-called East-Urals radioactive trace) within which there were some 270,000 inhabitants. Within this, an area of 1000 km2 was contaminated to a level exceeding 2 Ci/km2, and a total of some 10,000 inhabitants were temporarily evacuated from this area as a precautionary measure. 3.4. Theft or Diversion of Radioactive Materials and Incorporation in a ‘Dirty Bomb’. Fortunately, there has not yet been a real-life incident of this kind, though the event in November 1995, where Shamil Basayev, the Chechen rebel leader, directed a Russian television crew to Moscow’s Izmailovsky Park, where they found a container with a small amount of Cs-137, is often cited as an indication of the credibility of this kind of threat. A number of hypothetical scenarios can be found in the testimony of Dr Henry Kelly, President of the Federation of American Scientists, to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs in 2002 [7]. He envisaged three conceivable incidents in Washington or Manhattan, and estimated the probable consequences, in terms of evacuation of populations, increased risk of deaths from cancer, and the cost of decontamination operations. His estimates have been challenged by the US National Research Council (NRC) as unduly pessimistic, though their reasons for thinking so do not appear to have been published. 3.5. Other Means of Dispersal of Such Materials on the Adversary’s Territory A number of authorities, including the World Health Organisation, have expressed concern that terrorists might clandestinely insert nuclear materials into a public water supply (e.g. a reservoir or a purification plant). If this were undetected, it could cause serious doses to 10,000 or more individuals; if it were detected, and the water supply were disconnected, it could cause a major water shortage in any area which is largely dependent on a single main source of supply. Other fission products (e.g. iodine-131) are volatile, and could be clandestinely introduced into the air-conditioning plant of a major building or an underground transport system, the vulnerability of which to terrorist action was well illustrated by the incident in the Tokyo underground in March 1995, in which terrorists introduced the chemical agent sarin in which 12 people died and over 3000 were hospitalised. A volatile radioactive weapon could have had a similar effect.

4. Psychological Aspects of Nuclear Terrorism One of the most disturbing aspects of nuclear terrorism is that it is not actually necessary for the terrorist to possess a usable weapon for him to achieve his objective: it is sufficient that enough people in the target group should believe that he has. Thus


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‘nuclear blackmail’ is a highly credible weapon. The best defence against this is a welleducated and informed public, which can form a realistic assessment of the probability that the terrorist can actually do what he claims, and of the probable consequences, and hence of the credibility of such a threat. Given the present state of public opinion about nuclear matters generally, and about radiation threats in particular, this may be a somewhat utopian objective. The public is not helped by much of the material published in the media. In a paper presented at the Russian-American Seminar on High-Technology Terrorism (held in Moscow in 2001) it was argued that the media exaggeration factor is about 10,000 [8]. It also has to be recognised that public health authorities sometimes play their part in maintaining a high state of public alarm. For example, in Goiania, Brazil, scavengers broke into an abandoned cancer clinic in September 1987, and took a metal canister containing 1.3 KCi of Cs-137, which they then broke up and distributed among their friends, and then abandoned the remainder in a junkyard. The resulting dispersion of the caesium caused four deaths and one amputation, and some radiation burns to a further 28 individuals. However in the ensuing panic, encouraged by the local press, the authorities felt obliged to monitor 110,000 individuals. The advice to the public published in 2003 by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission on how to respond to an incident of nuclear terrorism: x x x x x

Move away from the immediate area – at least several blocks from the explosion – and go inside. This will reduce exposure to any radioactive airborne dust. Turn on local radio or TV channels for advisories from emergency response and health authorities. If facilities are available, remove clothes and place them in a sealed plastic bag. Saving contaminated clothing will allow testing for radiation exposure. Take a shower to wash off dust and dirt. This will reduce total radiation exposure, if the explosive device contained radioactive material. If radioactive material was released, local news broadcasts will advise people where to report for radiation monitoring and blood and other tests to determine whether they were in fact exposed and what steps to take to protect their health,

was fortunately replaced before anyone had to act on their advice.

5. Economic Aspects of Nuclear Terrorism A number of authors have published estimates of the economic cost of a nuclear terrorist attack. These estimates tend to be measured in billions of dollars for even a comparatively minor attack, and are based on the assumption that the reaction of the public and/or its advisors will be to demand wholesale evacuation and radical decontamination or reconstruction of the affected area, whenever the current ‘reference levels’ are exceeded. In my view, these are incorrect assumptions. Such an attack is an act of war, and under wartime conditions, normal peacetime responses are often seen to be inappropriate. The actual risk to life or health from even quite high levels of contamination is small compared with the risk of death on the roads or other nonmilitary causes of mortality. So the reasonable (and the only economically feasible) approach would surely be to move away from the extremely cautious peacetime

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radiological safety reference levels towards more realistic levels. Areas requiring evacuation or decontamination would then become much smaller

6. Conclusions This is a large subject, and one which is currently occupying the minds of many serious scientists and government officials around the world. It is too early to draw many very definitive conclusions. However my personal view is that the following conclusions are already fairly evident. First, the most serious threat comes from the potential ability of terrorists to steal or manufacture nuclear weapons of mass destruction (e.g. capable of causing thousands of deaths). In this respect, Pandora’s Box cannot be repacked: the knowledge of the existence of these weapons, and of the way in which they might be manufactured, is in the public domain, and accessible to any PhD terrorist. So unless we can quickly remove the underlying causes of terrorism, we have a duty to mankind to make terrorist access to such weapons, and to the nuclear materials (U-235 and Pu-239) which are their essential ingredients, as difficult as possible. Not nearly enough is being done at this time to protect or relocate vulnerable sources of fissile material, especially research reactors which use HEU, or certain civilian fuel cycle facilities. All other nuclear terrorist threats are relatively minor, and the greatest danger is public over-reaction to such threats. The media typically overstate their significance (in terms of consequences and probabilities) by a factor which may be as high as 10,000. We all have a duty to demand from the media balanced and accurate quantitative information, and to demand from government a balanced strategy for the management of such incidents. To monitor 100,000 individuals following the dispersal of 1 KCi of Cs-137 is not a balanced reaction. Finally, we should improve the arrangements for denying unauthorised access to radioactive material, with the protective measures made proportionate to the number of Curies at risk and the likelihood of a terrorist initiative. An important first step is to know where these are – the reported incidence of ‘orphan sources’ is a matter of concern. The preventative measures, sadly, need to take account of the possibility that the terrorist will use lethal force to access the material.

References [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

Nuclear Future 1 (Issue 3), (2005), 96. The author and editors thank the editor of Nuclear Futures for that journal’s agreement to publish this revised paper. Nicholas Freeling, Gadget, Penguin Books Canada, 1979. Vic Mayhew, Plutonium, Arrow Books, London, 1979. http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Features/RadSources/PDF/fact_figures2007.pdf. http://www.nda.gov.uk/documents/upload/Plutonium-Options-for-Comment-August-2008.pdf. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03638.pdf. http://www.fas.org/ssp/docs/kelly_testimony_030602.pdf. Russian-American Seminar on High-Technology Terrorism, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 2001 (available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10301&page=275; paper by L. Bolshov, R. Artunyan and O. Pavlovskiy, ibid. p.137 (available at http://books.nap.edu/ openbook.php?record_id =10301&page=137).


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Independent Scientists and Ballistic Missile Defense Götz NEUNECK Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, University of Hamburg, Germany

Abstract. Efforts to erect a defense against attacking missiles were considered and pushed forward from the beginning of the missile age by the superpowers. Cold War deterrence was based on massive nuclear deterrent arsenals and offensive missiles with intercontinental ranges. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) advocates argue that missile defense is feasible and necessary to discourage proliferation. Opponents claim that missile defenses can be easily fooled and would lead to new arms races. This chapter describes the history and development of BMD programmes, the role scientists played in these developments, and the current debate to establish BMD systems, which reflects the old arguments about invulnerability, feasibility, costs and the implications for arms control. Keywords. Ambivalence, policy advice by independent scientists, missile defense, ABM Treaty, strategic stability, SDI, directed energy weapons, arms control.

Introduction Science, which was developed on humanistic foundations and justified in terms of the betterment of mankind, contributed significantly to military purposes during the 20th century. Basic discoveries and developments such as nuclear fission (1938), the transistor (1948), the laser (1960), the structure of DNA (1953) or the computer (after 1946) are today beneficial to society but have also found their way to the military and into warfare itself, helping to create incredibly destructive weapon capabilities, thus exacerbating the ambivalent role of scientific knowledge. Some of these technical milestones were exclusively developed in the military realm. The modern guided missile was developed during the Second World War (WW II) by German rocket engineers and later on – based on this knowledge – enhanced in the United States and Russia. During the Cold War scientists, engineers and technicians invented or worked on scientific discoveries, technical masterworks and operational strategies, and at the time gave advice to their governments as to how to operate, control or prevent their use. Confronted with the incredible destructive potential of nuclear weapons, others favoured arms control and disarmament to mitigate the consequences of wars or to prevent their outbreak. The ambivalence of modern science emerged and affected international security in the 20th century in a fundamental way. Nuclear deterrence and proliferation linked with various delivery systems became a major topic. Missiles equipped with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) can be a monstrous threat to capitals and countries. In principle, there are two ways to eliminate this threat. The first is through the complete and verifiable abolition of WMD,

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especially nuclear weapons, and the second is by annihilating all incoming WMD deliveries in a war-like situation. Whereas governments, especially the United States and the Soviet Union, invested much money in ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs, scientists were always sceptical about technical solutions for this problem, thus favouring disarmament and arms control. Up to the present day these debates are continuing, while more and more countries are considering missile defenses for various purposes. In principle, there are always fundamental arguments for and against BMD. Indeed, wouldn’t it be formidable to construct an ‘astrodome’ which bounces back all threats from other countries? This vision was articulated by US President Ronald Reagan in his well-known SDI speech on March 23, 1986. He said [1]: “Wouldn’t it be better to save lives than to avenge them? Are we not capable of demonstrating our peaceful intentions by applying all our abilities and our ingenuity to achieving a truly lasting stability?” If this science fiction vision becomes true, no country would fear any threat from other countries. One follow-on argument is that other states would not invest any longer in missile programmes, discouraged by the insurmountable nature of such an ‘impenetrable shield’. The proponents of missile defense also argue that in a crisis situation, retaliation by a second strike would not be possible for the attacked country, because at least the defense capability of the attacking country could intercept limited retaliation attacks. Early on in the missile age, the arguments against this ‘invulnerability paradigm’ were also articulated. First, there is the ‘feasibility argument’ which says that the ‘impenetrable shield vision’ is technically not possible because an attacker always can find ways and means to deliver his deadly payloads to other countries in different forms. Secondly, as a consequence of this ‘action-reaction cycle’ an arms race would be triggered and antagonists will not be discouraged but stimulated. A third criterion is the costs: what if the costs of intercepting missiles are much higher than the costs of producing more missiles and countermeasures? The following paper will show that all these arguments were raised by different parties, actors and advisers. This contribution intends to describe the experiences of the advice given by independent scientists in the field of Ballistic Missile Defense. The first section deals with the general relation of science, technology and politics and some general experiences of independent scientists before and during the Cold War. With the appearance of long-range ballistic missiles as delivery systems of WMDs, the need and demand to develop defenses against the missile threat also emerged. The second section deals with the role of scientists at the beginning of the arms race and during the last phase of the Cold War, especially during the Reagan-Gorbachev years. The third section reflects the current debate on global missile defense especially during the Bush administration. The fourth section concludes the article.

1. Science, Technology and Politics: Some Fundamental Dilemmas In the 20th century, modern science and technology became an integral part of warfare, strategy and international security. The industrial and the scientific revolutions of the 19th and 20th centuries politicised science further, reaching its most visible culmination in World War II with projects such as missiles, radar, operational research and cryptography [2]. Scientists always had different and sometimes contradicting opinions about their motives and role in conflict and wars. The German chemist Fritz Haber and


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others used their scientific genius to develop new chemical agents to unleash poison gas during the First World War (WW I). He believed: “Science belongs to humanity in peace time and to the fatherland in war”. His close friend during his Berlin days, Albert Einstein, a pacifist, favoured basic science and tried to avoid any military applications. He also derived from scientific knowledge a duty: “The right to search for truth implies also a duty; one must not conceal any part of what one has recognized to be true” [3]. His involvement in the US nuclear program showed that eminent pacifists played an important role in that struggle. Scientists before and during WWII wrote letters to their governments to alert them about scientific developments and dangers of nuclear energy. Scientific results were turned into instruments of warfare and used directly to wage war. Leading physicists in the US, many of them refugees or exiles from fascism, urged governments to build the first atom bombs [4]. In the beginning, the main motivation of many of them was to prevent the use of the bomb by Hitler. Without their insights and knowledge of how to unleash the energy of the atom, politics and the military would have never achieved the destructive force of nuclear weapons. The US scientists’ last-minute struggle to prevent politicians and the military from dropping the bomb on Japanese cities showed their ‘political passion’, but they were ultimately unsuccessful1. In the Cold War science-based military research was institutionalized and in some areas of science there was a heavy concentration of resources to find scientific and technical solutions in the military field. This led to an arms race especially in the area of missiles and nuclear weapons [5]. The superpowers established huge isolated military research laboratories (United States) and secret cities (Soviet Union) where scientists and engineers were paid to solve practical military problems. The proclaimed ‘bomber gap’ (1950) and ‘missile gap’ (1960) and atmospheric testing drove the arms competition which also involved scientific laboratories and institutes. Science became an essential and systematically sponsored factor of national security, and scientists began to intervene in politics. Some scientists such as Robert Oppenheimer, Leo Szilárd and Peter Kapitsa became aware of what their work had spawned and altered their course. They feared that sooner or later nuclear weapons would again be used – this time on a global scale – and started to educate the public on the possible consequences of a nuclear war. Leo Szilárd, Joseph Rotblat and Eugene Rabinovitch helped to found organisations such as the Atomic Scientists Association, the Federation of Atomic Scientists [6] and the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (1957). Others continued to advise governments and work on the hydrogen bomb. As political advisors, scientists such as Edward Teller, John von Neumann, Hans Bethe and Andrei Sakharov played active roles in the arms race [7]. The H-Bomb, a weapon with a destructive energy potential many times greater than a ‘simple’ atomic bomb, was created. Missile engineers such as Wernher von Braun (1912-1977), who originally created the V-2 missile for Nazi Germany and later on became a naturalized US citizen, and Sergei Korolev (1907-1966), imprisoned under Stalin and then ‘Chief designer’ of the Soviet Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program, became decisive drivers for space 1 In June 1945 a group under the leadership of James Franck and Leo Szilard submitted a written proposal to the US Secretary of War, the so-called Franck-Report, urging the US government not to use the bomb over an inhabited region. In particular, the report argued that: “If the United States were the first to release this new means of indiscriminate destruction upon mankind, she would...precipitate the race for armaments, and prejudice the possibility of reaching an international agreement on the future control of such weapons”. See http://www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/ManhattanProject/FranckReport.shtml.

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flight and missile programmes of the US and the Soviet Union at the same time. Both von Braun and Korolev were pivotal figures in the ICBM programmes of both countries and used the military’s interest in space affairs to advance their dream of manned spaceflight [8]. On the other hand scientists and their networks helped to mitigate the consequences of the arms dynamics and helped to end the arms race. Matthew Evangelista’s book Unarmed Forces described four areas in which scientists from East and West played important roles [9]: x x

x x

Working out verification technologies and procedures to monitor nuclear testing to prepare the ground for international agreements. Criticizing approaches of offensive military strategies/technologies. This triggered conventional disarmament and established the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) regime. Raising awareness of the consequences of a global as well regional nuclear war to strengthen the taboo not to use nuclear weapons in any case. Contributing to the analysis of the feasibility of missile defense (which led to the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, limitations on nuclear weapons, and to the end of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)) and analyzing the dangers of weaponizing space.

1.1. What Can Scientists Do in Matters of National and International Security? Scientific advice on national and international security can be articulated by different actors and targeted at various recipients such as governments, the national and international public, political groups or parties. Additionally, the political and historical context is crucial to understanding the different motives, actions and decisions. 1.2. What Advice Can Scientists Give? Scientists are mostly motivated to improve scientific knowledge in their specific scientific field and are not trained nor obliged to give advice to politicians. On the contrary, it is proscribed to use his or her role as a scientist to influence politics or even to touch the world of politics, which is often seen as “dirty, immoral and unscientific”. On the other hand, scientific discoveries such as nuclear fission and technical inventions such as missiles can have wide consequences and the scientists are the persons who play the active role in developing these fields. Sometimes, scientists see themselves as having only a minor role in influencing politics. David Hafemeister, a physicist who produced marvellous teaching material for physicists and engineers in the area of international security said: “Physics and Physicists can provide honest answers that stand the test of time”. W. K. (‘Pief’) Panofsky asserted: “Independent science advice to the government is essential simply to prevent ‘bad science’, which occasionally is supported by government over a protracted period of time”2. It remains clear that science should influence all those questions of the political world to which science is relevant. But science is embedded in politics and here also the independence of science can be put into question. Science and Policy are mutually dependent on each other. Science itself has ‘vested interests’ in a political environment. 2

An example here is the nuclear-propelled aircraft (see p.160 of ref. [10]).


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It needs also political as well as financial support in the budgets and research programs. On the other hand, politicians need scientific advice, because politicians in general are neither trained as scientists nor have they insight into the long-term scientific-technical developments and their potential impact on society. Scientists also have to recognize that science is very different from politics. Panofsky wrote [11]: “Science searches for objective evidence for a truthful description of nature, for identification of future developments and opportunities and any limitations thereof. Politics, however, is ‘the art of the possible’ in governing a country, based on the conviction of the decision makers, tempered by the acceptability of the decisions by those in power or the electorate, as the case may be”. 1.3. Advice to Governments: Conflicting Interests Based on their political culture, tradition and experiences, states have different approaches to decision making on missile issues and subsequently on BMD. Missile developments were mostly initiated and directed by the governments and related agencies and institutions. The secret nature of such developments which include significant parts of the scientific-technological infrastructure and resources of a country makes it very hard for the public or external scientists to understand the status, scope and aim of such developments. Different governments have different attitudes to decision making and transparency. In the United States, science from 1945 on had strong support from Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy. Shortly after the Sputnik launch in 1957, the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) was created and right from the beginning its chairmen James Killian (1957-1959), George Kistiakowsky (1959-1961) and Jerome Wiesner (1961- 1964) dealt with missiles and missile defense. US Presidents disagreed sometimes with their scientific advisors on issues of national security. President Nixon entirely eliminated PSAC because of a conflict over the construction of a supersonic transport plane. President Reagan’s science advisor George Keyworth II worked on President Reagan’s ‘Star Wars speech’, “but reluctantly withdrew his objections after [Reagan’s National security advisor] McFarlane informed him that inclusion of the proposed missile defense system was a political, not a scientific, decision” [12]. The advisory body of the US Congress, the Office of Technology Assessment, which was established in 1972, was abolished in 1995 by the Republican majority. In the field of BMD, the criticism of Government shifted in the 1980s and 1990s to non-governmental organizations such as the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) and the Center of Defense Information (CDI). Due to a lack of tradition of public debate in Russia and some other countries, a comparable independent scientific advice network did not exist outside the US at that time. Science institutions and governments are dependent on each other for information, resources and consequently for advice. The founder of the Stanford Linear Accelerator and eminent physicist Wolfgang K. Panofsky, who headed a Sub-Committee of the President’s Science Advisory Committee under President Kennedy, said [13]: “Indeed, science and government need each other, and many major decisions of government have a scientific or technical component”. He went on by arguing: “The issue of science advice to the highest levels of governments comes to the very heart of the relation between science and government.” In his memoirs from 2007, he lists the following factors: (1) conflict of interest; (2) who owns the advisor? (3) accountability; (4) access to the subject of advice; (5) science advisors versus politicians; (6)

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workload; and (7) conflict of advice with preconceived policy [14]. Here is not the place to discuss all these factors, but especially the ‘independence of scientific advice’ is an important criterion. As a scientific advisor one has to be aware [13] that “Decisions taken in response to the advice given may influence the future of the advisor’s field, and sometimes even the career of the adviser. Thus the advisors frequently have a direct interest in the outcome of governmental decisions. Such tensions can be minimized but never fully eliminated”. On the other hand, one has to assess realistically the role science can play in politics. Very often, politicians are not interested in scientific advice. First, not all decision makers are receptive to science. Even if they are interested that does not mean that the given advice fits into their own agenda, party program or belief. Secondly, even scientists have different political orientations and it is not trivial for them to forget that totally. Scientists such as Edward Teller advised their government to build the Hbomb and also strategic missile defense. Thirdly, there are always different opinions as to how to achieve different political goals. Consider for the example the different schools during the Cold War. Some nuclear physicists were strong believers in the strategy of ‘Peace through Strength’ whereas others invested much in cooperation and the balancing of different views to resolve conflicts. Others changed their mind when they discovered the imminent danger stemming from the nuclear weapons which they developed. Fourthly, the possibility cannot be ruled out that politics does not understand scientific arguments or does not believe that ‘the other side’ is acting in a rational way. Fifthly, even if governments accept scientific expertise they might choose contradictory positions because those fit better in their political agenda. 1.4. Advice from Outside: Public Interest Science Besides practical policy making in the executive branch, there is also another area of public life which consists of the media, education and the legislative branch. Many examples show that governments are not acting in an unbiased way in making information and decisions transparent to citizens. Frank von Hippel described the need for ‘public interest science’ in the following way [15]: “The growing public awareness of the dangerous consequences of leaving the exploitation of technology under the effective control of special industrial and governmental interests has led to a readiness within the scientific community to undertake a serious commitment to what we will term ‘public interest science’”. ‘Citizen Scientists’ have the tasks to identify, analyze and bring to public attention government policies or practices that may threaten the public health, the well-being of countries and the survival of societies. Credibility, knowledge, and independence are key ingredients. Studies, commissions, whistleblowing, speeches and conferences are important tools. The history of science and technology include specific cases where the dissenting views of scientists caused a change in policy.3 Another dilemma is that science advice to a government can be seen as private, but science policy issues are always of general public interest or parliamentary concern. Very often NGOs such as the Federation of American Scientists and others felt the responsibility to speak out when their scientists believed that public debate is needed in order to correct the record.

3

Examples such as the crop destruction and defoliation in South Vietnam, the regulation of pesticides or the debate about the ABM-Treaty can be found in [15] p.11 et seq.


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Eminent scientists who also served in the sphere of international security, environment and arms control outlined on which moral grounds and for what purpose scientists can help to improve the well-being of mankind [16]: “The basic human value is life itself; the most important of human rights is the right to live. It is the duty of scientists to see to it that, through their work, life will not be put into peril, but will be made safe and its quality enhanced. The problem is how this is to be achieved”.

2. Scientists and BMD Policies during the Cold War Shortly after WW II the United States and the Soviet Union began to exploit German technology to develop their own guided ballistic missiles with long range [17]. Ballistic missiles are guided weapons consisting of one or more rocket stages which provide propulsion over the first minutes of a flight path. Therefore, the ballistic trajectory can be divided into a ‘boost phase’, a free-flying ‘midcourse phase’ with its peak altitude in space and the very short ‘terminal phase’ where the payload enters the atmosphere with a very high closing speed. Due to their high speed, a defense against incoming warheads is very hard to achieve. Nevertheless, right from the beginning of the missile age, developers also began to think about defenses against ballistic missiles. As ballistic missiles are able to deliver within minutes payloads of mass destruction over considerable distances, they represent an enormous strategic threat if equipped with nuclear warheads. After the USSR started to develop nuclear weapons and ICBMs capable of delivering them over the North Pole, the US widened their efforts to develop missiles for ‘Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense’ (ABM) purposes. 2.1 Nike-Ajax and Nike-Hercules In December 1945 the US Army Air Forces discussed the use of missiles or energy beams against missile attacks. In the 1950s there were various research programs in the US such as the army’s anti-aircraft missiles Nike-Ajax and Nike-Hercules. The first proposal for an ABM system by the US military services in 1961 was the Nike-Zeus ABM system to defend 27 areas in the US with around 7,000 interceptor missiles equipped with nuclear warheads [18]. A PSAC panel chaired by Jerome Wiesner identified some weaknesses of the system such as the mechanically steered tracking radar and the inadequate agility of the interceptors. Other problems identified have been potential countermeasures, the Electro-magnetic Pulse (EMP) vulnerability of the radar and the tremendous costs [19]. Kennedy’s Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara convinced Kennedy to only consider a limited Nike-Zeus program with a reduced number of interceptors. President Kennedy accepted the R&D, but withheld a deployment decision. In 1965, the US military modified its plan and proposed the Nike-X system by adding ‘phased-array radars’ which could direct a greater number of interceptors. Two interceptor missiles were equipped with nuclear warheads. The Nike-X, and the later Spartan system, were designed for exo-atmospheric interception and the Sprint interceptor for close-in interception. A phased-array radar was used for detection and a multi-function array radar for tracking and guidance. President Johnson also indicated support for further development, but he insisted that Nike-X was not ready for deployment. The rationale at that time was on building up US strategic offensive

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forces, especially the creation of invulnerable retaliatory forces (cf. the Killian Committee) [20]. The existence of US bombers to deliver nuclear weapons to the USSR prompted the Soviet Union to begin work on defense systems [21]. Serious R&D started in the mid-1950s [22]. On 25 May 1953 a surface-to-air guided missile V-300 shot down an unmanned TU-4 bomber, by using radar guidance. This project became the basis of the S-25, the first operational surface to air missile (SAM) system in the world. In September 1953 the Central Committee of the Communist Party initiated a feasibility study which determined that BMD was possible. In 1953 the construction of an antiaircraft defense system started and in February 1956 the Soviet government decided to develop an ABM system called Galosh (A-35) and set up an ABM test site. Radarsteered, nuclear equipped A-350 missiles had the primary mission to destroy incoming warheads delivered from Titan or Minutemen ICBMs. On March 4th, 1961 a V-1000 interceptor struck the warhead of an R-12 (SS-4) ballistic missile. The ABM defense ring should have received the first Soviet ABM-system in November 1967, but tests showed that the new S-350 interceptor had problems with the new US MIRV4 technology: each US ICBM payload could carry several warheads and decoys which could confuse or overwhelm the defense. 2.2. From Sentinel to Safeguards The US military then proposed a ‘light area defense’ called Sentinel using Nike-X technology which was planned to defend the US against a small number of Chinese ICBMs. This two-layer ABM System had two nuclear-equipped interceptors: the Spartan with a 5 Megaton warhead for exo-atmospheric intercept and a short-range Sprint interceptor. The PSAC Strategic Military Panel concluded that due to the lack of a discrimination capability such a system would be ineffective [23]. Bureaucratic pressure within the Johnson administration and the US Senate prevented the total cancellation [24]. In September 1967 Secretary of Defense McNamara in a speech in San Francisco outlined the deficiencies of Sentinel and expressed concern that ABM systems might become a destabilizing factor threatening the existing nuclear parity between the US and the USSR. But to the puzzlement of many he announced the deployment of the Sentinel ABM system to provide ‘light’ defense against China. In June 1967 China had tested its first thermonuclear warhead. McNamara’s speech triggered a national debate in 1968. At first, there was considerable opposition to and public debate about this decision. Scientists who worked behind the scene now became public figures also in the missile field. As Panofsky writes [25]: “for the first time, senior United States senators (A. Gore, S. Symington) sought the advice of individual independent scientists rather than relying solely on briefings from administration witnesses”. In March 1968 Hans Bethe and Richard Garwin published in the magazine Scientific American a profound critique on the Sentinel proposal and in the public there was much opposition to nuclear-equipped missiles close to American cities [26]. Richard Garwin writes in his paper in this volume that before 1968 “independent analysts were regarded as not having standing and were not invited by the Executive to testify on its behalf; nor were they invited by the committees of the Congress (…) That pattern was broken in 1968, with the controversy over strategic defense, when Congress somehow found it desirable to have independent testimony”. One important 4

Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle.


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factor here is certainly that in 1968 during the Vietnam War the public increasingly distrusted the government. On the Russian side, it was not easy to understand that ABM systems could endanger strategic stability. At the summit meeting at Glassboro, New Jersey in June 1967, the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union Alexei Kosygin insisted that the Soviet Union’s projected defensive missiles “don’t kill people” and he said: “Defense is moral; offense is immoral” [27]. In February 1969 the new President Richard Nixon cancelled the Sentinel program and in March he announced the Safeguard program, an ABM system which, by using the same ABM elements, was designed to defend silos housing US Minuteman ICBMs against a possible first strike. Again in testimonies scientists such as Panofsky, Rathjens and others raised much doubt as to whether the hardware could fulfill its role [28]. In August 1969 the US Congress approved the funding, but only by the deciding vote of Vice-President Spiro Agnew. The ABM system was to consist of 12 installations of Spartan and Sprint missiles. In the early phase two sites for defense of the Minuteman silos were planned at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana and Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota together with subsequent sites, but these were not approved in the years that followed. Other efforts and studies were made to develop an ABM site around Washington DC. Opponents of the ABM program criticized the high costs and lack of efficacy of the project. They argued that such a system would impede further strategic arms reductions and increase crisis instability due to the fact that an adversary might calculate that a disarming first strike by the US could be strengthened by a limited defense to intercept the retaliatory second strike. Additionally the fear emerged that nuclear weapons could be put into space by developing the so-called ‘Fractional Orbital Bombardment System’ (FOBS)5. Meanwhile, the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, an informal network of scientists which was founded in 1957 and which held constantly highranking workshops on security issues, made possible meetings between American and Soviet Scientists [9]. At a meeting in Udaipur (India) in 1964 Russian scientists advocated strategic missile defenses [29]. A paper by Jack Ruina and Murray GellMann argued somewhat paradoxically that the introduction of ABM systems would be destabilizing for the strategic stability of the two deterrent forces. After some debates at subsequent meetings, Russian Academicians such as Mikhail Millionschchikov and Lev Artsimovich also adopted that position at a meeting in Sochi [30]. The SALT talks on strategic arms reductions between the USSR and the USA which started one month after the Sochi meeting adopted this view and as a result the ABM treaty was concluded6. The first attempts towards negotiations on BMD began in 1964 with talks between William Foster, Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the USSR’s Ambassador to the US Anatoly Dobrynin. On August 10 1968, the USSR Politbureau decided to start discussions with the US to limit offensive and defensive strategic forces. The SALT talks began in Helsinki (Finland) on 17 November 1969. 5 The Fractional Orbital Bombardment System was developed by the Soviets in the late 1960s to overcome the US early warning radars. A missile launches a nuclear warhead into a low earth-orbit. Undisturbed it orbits the earth, but can re-enter the atmosphere by a manoeuvre. The 1967 Outer-Space Treaty prohibits nuclear weapons encircling the earth in an orbit. 6 In reality more persons such as Jeremy Stone and George Rathjens were important figures in this complex debate. See chapter 10 in ref. 8.

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The US delegations agreed that BMD could endanger the then current strategic stability and the Soviets indicated their willingness to limit ABM development “to geographically and numerically low limits” [31]. In the fall of 1971 the delegates agreed in Geneva on the Article V which agrees “not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile landbased”. The Agreed Statement D of the ABM Treaty also stated that “ABM systems based on other physical principles (…) would be subject to discussions and agreement”. Here, the fear, especially on the Soviet side, was the possibility of using ‘Directed Energy Weapons’ against ballistic missiles. On 26 May 1972 US President Nixon and the General Secretary of the USSR Communist Party Brezhnev signed the SALT I Agreements which included the ABM Treaty. Under this treaty and a 1974 revision, the USSR and the US was allowed to deploy two ABM sites (from 1974 one site) with 100 interceptors each to protect a single area. The ABM Treaty prohibited the creation of a nationwide ballistic missile defense system. Both superpowers started to deploy their limited ABM systems. The US installed an ABM site at Grand Forks Air Force Base to protect their ICBM silos in North Dakota and the ABM system became partially operational with 28 Sprint and 8 Spartan missiles in April 1975. Full operation was reached within the ABM limit on 1 October 1975 with 70 Sprint and 30 Spartan missiles, but on 2 October 1975 the US Congress voted to shut down the Safeguard system due to its technical limitations. It became clear that the phased array radars were very vulnerable to an attack of Soviet missiles. Also the highaltitude nuclear explosions of the Sprint and Spartan interceptors could blind the radars. The USSR deployed its single-layer exo-atmospheric Galosh (ABM-1) system at four sites around Moscow in the early 1970s. Under the ABM Treaty it was limited to the two sites and upgraded to a two-layer system consisting of the Gorgon long-range ABM interceptor for exo-atmospheric intercept and the Gazelle for endo-atmospheric interception. The Soviet ABM system was seen as equivalent to the US Safeguard system. Table 1. US ABM Programs ABM System

Program Start Date

Operation

Description

Thumper

1944-1961

R&D

Protection from V-2 rockets; leads to Ballistic Missile Boost Intercept (BAMBI) concept

Nike-Ajax

1953

Anti-aircraft defense by Army

Nike-Zeus

1956

Army links radar with interceptor

Nike-X

1962/63

Multiple-array radar and Sprint interceptors

Sentinel

1968

1969

To be deployed nationwide against China

Safeguard

1975

Until 1976

Operational until 1976 to defend ICBM silos at a cost of $23 billion (in year 2000 dollars)


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Table 2. USSR ABM Programs ABM system

Program Start Date

Operation

Description

A-25

1953

ABM-1 (A-35)

1958

Testing

Galosh for protection against attacking ICBM (1967)

ABM-3 (A-135)

1978

Since 1989

100 Gorgon and Gazelle Missiles for the defense of Moscow

Anti-bomber defense uses V-300

At the same time debates took place in both countries about these decisions: about the effectiveness of such systems and about their effect on the strategic balance between the US and the Soviet Union. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the US and USSR ABM programs [32]. 2.3. Ronald Reagan’s SDI Speech and the End of the Cold War US President Reagan revitalized the debate about the introduction of strategic missile defense with his so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), while critics dubbed it ‘Star Wars’ due to its extensive space components. In a televised speech on 23 March 1983 Reagan announced “a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program” as part of a vision to overcome the MutuallyAssured Destruction (MAD) strategy of nuclear deterrence. In his speech, he said the following: “Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. (…) What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant US retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?” Reagan hoped that scientists could overcome the problems of such a system by technical means through an ambitious research effort: “I call upon the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.” With his speech, which he rewrote personally the night before, the President surprised not only the public but also his own administration. The military had not been consulted and the science adviser withdrew his objections. No technological study supported his approach and the US Congress had not been briefed. Secretary of State George Shultz tried in a last minute effort to eliminate passages of the speech [33]. It soon became clear that an SDI system would challenge strategic stability between the USSR and the USA. Four days after the SDI speech Yuri Andropov,

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General Secretary of the USSR Communist Party, raised concern about the strategic benefits of SDI for the US if it acquires a strategic BMD capacity. He said [34]: “The strategic offensive forces of the United States will continue to be developed and upgraded at full tilt and along quite a definite line at that, namely that acquiring a first strike capability. Under these conditions the intention to secure itself the possibility of destroying with the help of ABM defenses the corresponding strategic systems of the other side, that is of rendering it unable of dealing a retaliatory strike, is a bid to disarm the Soviet Union in the face of the US nuclear threat”. Since then, various Russian governments were concerned about a shift towards a strategic imbalance based on the combination of offense and defense. At that time, for the Soviets this was the last element in a jigsaw puzzle which would lead the US to strategic superiority. The NATO deployment of very accurate Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) missiles, US Navy manoeuvers in the North Pacific and the NATO ‘Able Archer’ exercise in 1983 were interpreted as war preparations [35]. For many in the US the SDI program was an attack on the ABM treaty leading to a new arms competition; for others it was a bargaining chip to negotiate new arms control agreements or a reinforcement of deterrence. Others argued that SDI was a brilliant antidote for the nuclear freeze movement in the US, by throwing abolition by technical means into the debate. For President Reagan it also represented a possible way to cooperate with the Soviet Union. Several times he argued that the US could share SDI technology with the USSR. In later speeches Reagan insisted that SDI was his idea and that it was based on his fear of a possible nuclear war. The response in the public was a stunned one and defense experts were surprised. No realistic technology was in view that could intercept many incoming missiles. Prominent physicist Edward Teller, a principal advocate of SDI who had direct contact with the US President, proposed futuristic technology such as an X-ray laser. Triggered by a nuclear weapon such a pop-up system in space could theoretically direct X-ray beams to destroy attacking Soviet warheads. This program was intensified by including nuclear testing for the X-ray laser technology, but later Teller and Lowell Wood were accused of deliberately overselling the program [36]. Hans Bethe, who worked with Teller on the H-bomb, argued that an X-ray laser would be costly and very difficult to build, but simple to destroy. He co-authored a Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) study, which concluded: “the X-ray laser offers no prospect of being a useful component in a system for ballistic missile defense” [37]. Shortly after the speech, the presidential Scowcroft commission on strategic forces concluded that “applications of current technology offer no real promise of being able to defend the United States against massive nuclear attack in this century” [38]. In April 1983 Reagan set up two expert panels named after their chairman Fred S. Hoffman and James C. Fletcher to study future BMD systems.7 The Fletcher report recommended the acceleration of SDI R&D and outlined in February 1984 a layered interceptor BMD system and five basic research areas such as directed energy weapons (for example lasers or particle beams), kinetic energy weapons (electromagnetic guns), 7 The Future Security Strategy Study (FSSS) team, chaired by Fred S. Hofman, consisted of 24 members of which 17 have been SDI contractors. The group concluded that a perfect defense might “take a long time and may prove to be unattainable in a practical sense against a Soviet effort to counter the defense” [39].


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surveillance and sensors, battle management, command and control etc. One year later the SDI Organization (SDIO) was established in March 1984. At the start of the program very artificial tests should demonstrate the maturity of already existing technologies. After three failures, on June 10 1984 a Kill Vehicle with an unfolded metallic umbrella destroyed in the Army’s Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE) a mock-up warhead of a Minuteman missile with a closing speed of about 6.1 km/s at an altitude of more than 160 km. This was seen as a breakthrough, but the intercept was too artificial to show any advances. In September 1985 a laser beam from the Mid-Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser (MIRACL) destroyed a Titan booster tank from a very near distance of several meters. Obviously the planned space-based laser (SBL) would only attack over large distances by consuming much energy which would have to be generated and delivered only in space. In the classical interpretation the ABM-Treaty prohibits any development and testing of space-based missile defense (MD) systems, but the Reagan administration now favored the ‘broad interpretation’ which now would permit R&D of space weapons. This provoked disagreement in the US Congress where Senators such as Sam Nunn and Carl Levin launched studies and tried to prohibit SDI testing. ABM Treaty prohibition of SDI testing based on the provisions of the ABM treaty was approved in the US Congress in 1987. Very early on in the SDI program, independent scientists with long experiences in BMD matters published articles and studies on SDI. In 1984 a Union of Concerned Scientists study with the title The Fallacy of Star Wars which was co-chaired by the well-known physicists Richard Garwin, Kurt Gottfried and Henry Kendall conducted a comprehensive first assessment of the proposed exotic technologies and flawed concepts [40]. This study, and also a report by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) about Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space [41] was attacked by proponents of SDI as “less than scientific” and caused a major debate about costs, vulnerabilities and countermeasures [42]. Proponents such as Keith Payne or Robert Jastrow published their own studies, but could not turn around the public and scientific skepticism [43]. The debate about the feasibility of an ‘astrodome in space’ emerged also in Europe. In 1986 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger announced seven SDI contracts for the first phase of a Theater Missile Defense system architecture, which should intercept medium range BMs. Scientists from Europe started studying SDI technologies and triggered discussions in society and academia. In Germany physicist Hans-Peter Dürr, director of the Max-Planck Institute, became a leading critic of SDI and he triggered debates and studies. For his work he was awarded with the Right Livelihood Award in 1987. Scientists in the USSR also criticized Reagan’s SDI speech. Within the Soviet Academy of Sciences a high-level panel was established in reaction to Reagan’s Star Wars speech. The Committee of Soviet Scientists (CSS) for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat was chaired by Yevgeni Velikhov and consisted of several high-level members of the Academy such as Roald Sagdeev and Andrei Kokoshin. The CSS group also discussed SDI concepts with the US National Academy CISAC8 group including persons such as Richard Garwin [44]. Already in 1983 these dialogues helped to persuade the Soviet government to declare an Anti-Satellite Weapon (ASAT) moratorium in 1983. Later in 1986 the Soviet Scientists published a study which concluded that it would be less expensive to overcome space-based defense by easier countermeasures [45]. One reason for this work was also to educate a new generation 8

Committee on International Security and Arms Control.

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of scientists about arms control and to reopen the debate with the US. According to Frank von Hippel who participated in this dialogue not only the “…open publication of a technical discussion of possible future weapons systems was an unprecedented event in the Soviet Union” but the CSS group also helped persuade Mikhael Gorbachev, who became General Secretary in 1985, to announce that the Soviet Union would not compete with the US to establish its own space-based defense [46]. On March 30 1985 President Reagan’s chief arms control advisor Paul Nitze introduced three important criteria that would have to be fulfilled for any SDI deployment: (1) military utility, (2) survivability, and (3) cost effectiveness. Any antimissile system should be effective by intercepting most of the incoming missiles. Additionally, it should be able to survive an attack against the system itself. Moreover, the costs of investments in the system to increase the defense should be less than the adversaries’ costs to increase their offense. Criticism of the proposed technology was raised not only by prominent physicists, but also by engineers who had studied the feasibility and reliability of the software necessary for the battle management component. On June 28 1985, the software engineer David L. Parnas resigned from SDIO’s Panel on Computing in Support of Battle Management, arguing that the software required for SDI could never be made to be “trustworthy” [47]. He went on to say that an unreliable SDI system would constitute a menace to humanity. On October 11-12 1986, US President Reagan met USSR President Gorbachev at their second summit in Reykjavik, Iceland. Both presidents agreed orally that their governments should eliminate all their nuclear weapons, but the proposal faded away because President Reagan did not want to give up SDI, and later on his advisors also turned around the President’s ideas on this.9 In 1983 the American Physical Society (APS) appointed a special advisory group to undertake an unclassified study on Directed Energy Weapons [50]. Prominent physicists such as Nicolaas Bloembergen and ‘Pief’ Panofsky helped in a five year study process to analyze different proposed SDI technologies, especially Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) [51]. They also cooperated partially with SDI and the Pentagon. Towards its end, even before the release of the APS report in 1987, the Pentagon drew back from DEW as SDI systems and started concentrating on kinetic interceptors. Another study by the congressional OTA which had access to classified material pointed out that the SDI technology was immature and inadequate for the planned defense purposes [52]. Some of the SDI concepts re-emerged under the name of National Missile Defense (NMD) during the Clinton Administration. Despite much public concern President Reagan decided in September 1987 to start the MD acquisition process, the so-called Strategic Defense System (SDS) Phase I Architecture. Six major systems, including a space-based interceptor (SBI) as well as ground-based interceptors and sensors, were involved, and first contractor teams were selected. The space-based laser (SBL) concept was replaced by a new interceptor concept called ‘Brilliant Pebbles’, which consists of many small satellites, equipped with infrared sensors, computers and rocket motors to detect and intercept missiles in space. The JASONs, a group of scientists and defense experts advising the US government in the summer months, reviewed the program. According to their inventors Lowell Wood and Greg Canavan, ‘brilliant technologies’ would make space-based 9 Reagan is quoted as saying: “It would be fine with me if we eliminated all nuclear weapons” and Gorbachev replied: “We can do that”. See [48,49].


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interceptors more manoeuverable and cheaper10, but it became clear that launching and maintaining several hundred interceptors in space would be nevertheless very costly. Democratic Senator Sam Nunn nevertheless argued for a “limited system for protecting against accidental and unauthorized missile launches” at a speech to the Arms Control Association in 1988. SDI remained an ambitious R&D program and was never deployed, but several SDI technologies, especially the kinetic energy programs, survived. The funding was scaled back, especially when the East-West Confrontation ended in 1989 with the fall of the Berlin wall and the decline of the Soviet Union.

3. The Current Debate on BMD: From George H. Bush to the Obama Administration In late 1989 the George H. W. Bush Administration reviewed the SDI program and undertook a broader examination of the US requirements for the ‘new world order’. On 29 January 1991 the first President Bush announced a transformation from SDI to a more “realistic” system called GPALS which stands for ‘Global Protection Against Limited Strikes’. This consisted of three subsystems: a National Missile Defense (NMD), Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and a space-based global defense. In the 1991 Gulf War, Patriot anti-missiles, originally planned as an anti-aircraft system, were used against attacking short-range SCUD ballistic missiles from Saddam Hussein. The US government claimed a high intercept rate, but the numbers were challenged by physicists Ted A. Postol and George Lewis, who examined public sources of information on the Patriot-SCUD engagement and found that the success rates of the system against Saddam Hussein’s SCUD missiles were almost certainly zero [53]. The study produced another important message: if a system cannot effectively discriminate between targets then any national missile defense system will fail if an attacker uses countermeasures. This was in contradiction to the first President Bush, who said after the Gulf War that there was a “proof positive that missile defense works.” In 1992 the General Accounting Office reviewed the data and concluded that the Patriots intercepted only four of forty-five SCUD warheads. One reason for this meager intercept rate was the fact that the SCUDs break up in flight. A debate in the science community over the performance of missile defense systems emerged [54]. The Gulf War nevertheless shifted the debate from the Russian threat to ‘rogue’ or ‘irrational’ states, but the rhetorics of several Administrations to erect a global MD system annoyed the Russians and the Chinese constantly. In 1993 the SDI Organization was redesignated the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) which focused its work more on Theater Missile Defense and the proliferation of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). The Republican Party won control over the US Congress in 1994. In their program ‘Contract with America’ the GOP (i.e. the Republican Party) called for deploying a “cost-effective, operational anti-ballistic missile defense system” as early as possible. Some Republicans argued that the ABM treaty was “a relic of the Cold War” and again tried to challenge President Clinton for a set of other domestic reasons. On the other hand, medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) tests by North Korea, Pakistan and Iran 10 In February 1989 SDIO Director Abrahamson estimated that a Brilliant Pebbles Architecture could be deployed in five years for $25 Billion USD.

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drew the attention of the public. In November 1996 the GOP appointed an independent commission to “assess the ballistic missile threat” which was chaired by future Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In July 1998 the Rumsfeld Commission submitted its report to Congress. The Executive Summary states that “the newer ballistic missile-equipped nations11 would be able to inflict major destruction on the US within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq)” [55]. It is noteworthy that this direct threat to the US never materialized, even 10 years later, demonstrating that it is much harder for Third World countries to build ICBMs. The US continued to develop tactical BMD systems such as Patriot (PAC3), the US Navy Aegis System and the US Army’s THAAD System. President Bill Clinton and the Democrats dropped their opposition to strategic BMD in exchange for maintaining the arms control agenda. By introducing the socalled ‘3+3’ program in 1996, the Clinton administration made NMD a major issue of their policy and set the course for deployment using more down-to-earth technologies. Three years of development time would provide the technology which would permit deployment of these systems within a further three years if a threat were identified. In the meantime, this was modified to a ‘3+5’ program [56]. The final decision about the deployment of the planned NMD systems was due in June 2000. In January 1999 the US Senate voted 97 to 3 “to commit the United States to deploy a national anti-missile defense system”. The National Missile Defense Act says: “It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as is technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate).” In January 1999, the administration announced that the deployment decision would be based on four criteria: the ballistic missile threat, the costs, the readiness of interception technology, and arms control implications. Deployment should take place between 2003 and 2005 if construction work starts in 2001. After an initial veto of the Republican majority demand enshrined in the act, President Clinton eventually signed the National Missile Defense Act of 1999, which states that it was US policy to deploy a territorial NMD system “as soon as technologically feasible.” Meanwhile, the US had started talks with Russia to modify the ABM Treaty which had been limiting the use of interception technology since 1972. NMD’s purpose was to defend all 50 US States, i.e. including Hawaii and Alaska, against a limited ICBM strike [57]. The system would comprise the identification of incoming missiles, discrimination, battle management, and interceptor navigation. This complex interception process would require the integration of a large variety of sensors, communication facilities, and the actual weapon systems. In addition it was planned to integrate the mobile missile defense systems THAAD (the Army’s Theater High Altitude Area Defense system) and the Navy Wide Area system, which is now the Navy Aegis BMD system, and to link all sensors and interceptors in a network. The feasibility of the strategic NMD system was challenged by an MIT-UCS group which consisted of Richard Garwin, Kurt Gottfried, Steve Fetter and others. Ted Postol from MIT analyzed data from NMD fly-by tests and found again that the used sensor technology of the kill-vehicle which destroys the target by collision is incapable of discriminating between warheads and decoys. Nira Schwartz, a former TRW expert blew the whistle on TRW’s attempt to exaggerate their testing results and induced

11

Such as North Korea, Iran and at that time Iraq.


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further inquiries by scientists.12 An analyst from the impartial General Accounting Office (GAO), Subrata Ghoshroy, blew the whistle again – about the NMD test from 1997 which was crucial to demonstrate that the kill-vehicle can discriminate. He found out that an infrared sensor had failed during the test and the contractor had doctored data and skewed results. He said later that the GAO ignored evidence about the fraudulent claims. He eventually lost his job at the GAO [59]. One key argument (which continues today) is that an adversary can release decoys to confuse the NMD sensors and the kill-vehicle. Decoys can be designed to conceal warheads or they can look like warheads. An adversary can put many light balloons and a warhead with a missile into space, thus concealing a warhead in a swarm of balloons. The ability to discriminate between signals from all these is the technology that is the most critical for the success of the NMD system. In the so called ‘Countermeasures Report’ of April 2000 a group of prestigious scientists explained in detail that effective countermeasures require technology much less sophisticated than is needed to build a long-range missile and that this technology would be available to a potential attacker [60]. Others such as Richard Garwin favored boost-phase defense instead of midcourse defenses. This would attack starting missiles in the launch phase because the signature of the rocket engine is more visible, the missile bigger and in the case of an intercept the debris would fall down on the attacker’s territory. A July 2003 study by the American Physical Society focused on the feasibility of intercepting missiles in the boost phase, which the current NMD system does not yet attempt [61]. The study concluded that it might be possible to develop a limited system capable of destroying a liquid-fuel propelled ICBM during the propelled ascent phase. It would be much harder to destroy solid-propellant missiles from bigger countries such as Iran. The APS study concludes: “Even with optimistic assumptions, a terrestrial-based system would require very large interceptors with extremely high speed and accelerations to defeat a solidpropellant ICBM launched from even a small country such as North Korea”. Due to the different boost time and range to target it would not be possible with current technology to destroy solid-fuelled missiles from e.g. North Korea. However, there is a trend toward using solid-fuelled ICBMs which are harder to intercept during boost phase. An analysis of NMD testing already produced mixed results and on September 1 2000 President Clinton concluded that he would leave the deployment decision of NMD to his successor George W. Bush. He said: “The technology of the system is promising, the system as a whole is not yet proven”. 3.1. Global and Layered Missile Defense in the Bush-II Administration Then-presidential candidate George W. Bush criticized Clinton’s repudiation of missile defense and promised that he would deploy a Missile Defense system during his first term. As President he declared that attack by ballistic missiles is the “most urgent threat” facing the United States. September 11 2001, however, showed how vulnerable the continental US was to low-technology attacks by terrorists. Nevertheless Missile 12 In 2000 Ted A. Postol briefed the White House and MIT officials of possible fraud and misconduct by the MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory. No formal investigation was made but reports from the General Accounting Office confirmed that the TRW Inc. test data had been exaggerated. See [58]. In 2006 an official investigation by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research exonerated MIT of any wrongdoing. Postol’s allegations nevertheless were convincing scientifically.

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Defense became the centerpiece of the Bush Administration’s policy to protect the United States against long-range missiles. In December 2002, President Bush directed the military to begin fielding the ground-based interceptors by the end of 2004 despite the fact that such a system was not capable of working properly. The Presidential Directive 23 says that the Bush Administration “plans to deploy a set of initial missile defense capabilities beginning in 2004” [62]. The Bush Administration revised the MD program by institutionalizing the so-called ‘spiral development’ strategy, a process whereby a weapon system such as the GMD system is deployed as it is developed, and then upgraded later on. In fact the Bush Administration deployed a nascent defense system which was not tested under realistic operational conditions.13 The stated purpose of the ‘ground-based midcourse defence system’ is to help to defend US forces stationed in Europe and US friends and allies, as well as US territory, against long-range missile threats, mainly from Iran. The idea of the US integrated and layered BMD system is to engage ballistic missiles in all phases of flight. Beside the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) System (formerly NMD), there are six further MD systems in the testing, planning or deployment phase.14 The proposed European BMD components would consist of an interceptor site in Poland, a fixed midcourse radar in the Czech Republic and a mobile radar which will be deployed closer to the Middle East region. The ‘European Midcourse Radar’ (EMR) is a high-resolution, X-band (8-12 GHz) tracking radar which has the task to identify and to distinguish the missile warhead from the missile parts and to guide the ground-based interceptor (GBI) to the target [64]. Whereas upgrades do not seem to be planned at present, a possible future US expansion of the EMR system capabilities could become a problem for the Russian deterrent. The second radar is mobile, the forward-based X-band radar (FBX). Over the following years the Bush Administration planned to deploy 54 silo-based interceptors (GBI) at three locations, 44 in the US (Vandenberg, California and Fort Greely, Alaska), and 10 in Europe. The administration fielded the first GBIs in 2002 and maintains that it has had since then an “operational capability” or “a rudimentary protection” of the continental United States. The 10 GBIs planned for the site in Poland are to be operational from 2013 on. If the production capability of the GBI is established and more locations are ready for deployment then this infrastructure can be expanded rapidly. Further BMD System elements are a sea-based X-band radar, capable of moving on the Pacific Ocean from its Alaskan base; upgraded early-warning radars, particularly at Fylingdales (England) and Thule (Greenland); mobile sea-based and forward-based radars; a Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS); other lower-tier missile defense systems; and a Command, Control, Battle Management and Communication Network. The US Government plans to build a strategic component of its ballistic missile defense system in Eastern Europe, as parts of the intended Global Ballistic Missile Defense System. Under President G.W. Bush the US Government had negotiated with the respective governments about placing an interceptor site in Poland and a fixed 13

An official stated: “The system is what it is, and it will get better over time. … You’ll have some capability. It’s limited. It’s not what everybody wishes it may be, perhaps. But some capability exists while you continue to improve upon the capability of that system.” Pentagon Spokesman Lawrence Di Rita in a press briefing. See [63]. 14 Deployed or soon to be deployed are the Tactical Patriot System, THAAD and the Sea-based Aegis MD system (SM-3). The MEADS System is in the conceptualisation phase and the Airborne Laser is in the testing phase.


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midcourse radar in the Czech Republic, and concluded agreements with both in summer 2008. In addition a mobile radar is to be deployed closer to the Middle East region. These plans have caused controversy in Europe about the necessity, rationale and implications of such a system. This discussion is getting new emphasis as the Obama administration goes into office in the USA. A review of the current BMD technology may lead to a cancellation of some programs. The main argument brought forward by the USA is about a potential Iranian threat of attacking the USA with nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles. While the Iranian nuclear threat is doubly hypothetical and could be removed from the agenda by international agreement with Iran, there is another strand of argument discussing the relevance for Russia. Former President Putin strongly criticized the US missile defence plans in Europe at the Security Conference in Munich in February 2007, arguing that these plans would lead to “an inevitable arms race”. President Bush said on the way to the G-8 summit in Heiligendamm, Germany that [65] “The Cold War is over … Russia is not our enemy. (….) As a matter of fact why don’t you cooperate with us on a missile defence system?” On the political level, there is much discussion of encirclement of Russia by NATO and US troops, East-West alienation, a new European split etc. Russia has made several strong political as well as military gestures to demonstrate its rejection of the US plans.15 Former President Putin has put into question the whole arms control architecture which helped to end the Cold War because of a changed “strategic balance in Europe”. Russia suspended adherence to the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty on December 12, 2007, which imposed limits on the deployment of tanks and other military equipment in Europe. At the same time, President Putin ordered the military to place the strategic forces on a higher alert level. Russia has already resumed its long-distance strategic bomber patrols. After the military had mentioned that nuclear short- or medium-range ballistic missiles (S/MRBMs) could be deployed in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad in return, President Medvedev in November 2008 announced that Russia would do so [66], but suspended this step when Barack Obama became US president. On the other hand, former President Putin has also offered cooperation to the USA through common use of a Russian early-warning radar in Azerbaijan or southern Russia and proposed an interceptor deployment in South-East Europe or Turkey [67]. The ongoing US-Russian talks on MD cooperation have not at the time of writing led to any concrete result. Both the European and the German debates are mainly political [68]. High-ranking US politicians tried to downplay the threat for Russia posed by an additional BMD site in Europe. The reactions in Europe are quite controversial: some governments, especially in Poland and the Czech Republic, hoped that the two BMD sites would strengthen their ties with the US and could become a decisive security guarantee against Russia. The supporters of the US missile defense system claim that the GMD sites would protect Europe as well as the US. However, for geographical and technical reasons, the GMD sites cannot protect the countries close to Iran such as Turkey, East Bulgaria etc. – these countries would have to be ‘protected’ by additional NATO MD systems. Meanwhile more than 60 percent of the public in Poland and the Czech Republic oppose the BMD bases, fearing that these countries might become a target of missiles in the future. However, the Czech government signed deployment treaties with 15 For example: “If the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic make such a decision [to host US GMD system], the Strategic Missile Forces will be able to target these systems.” Statement by Russian General and Chief of General Staff of Russian Armed Forces Yuri Baluyevsky (26 April 2007).

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the USA in July and September 2008 and the Polish government did so in August 2008.16 European opponents argue that the technology is premature, that no Iranian ballistic missile threat to Europe exists, and that the unilateral participation of Poland and the Czech Republic would damage the efforts for a common European Defence and Security Policy. Russian politicians have clearly set out what their main concerns are. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said [70] that “Any unilateral anti-missile projects would fundamentally alter the continent’s strategic relationship”. Minister Lavrov also said [71]: “We must acknowledge that these objects are fully suitable to intercept missiles fired from Russian territory”. However, there are also some technical arguments presented by US envoys who try to challenge Lavrov’s statements. The then Director of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), General Obering, and the then Executive Director Patricia Sanders, have come forward with explicit statements that the Polandbased interceptors could not reach Russian ICBMs, arguing using missile and interceptor velocities and times [72]. However, these statements are based on wrong numbers and assumptions. The political discussion about the implications of the US GMD for Russia and Europe has to be based on geographical, physical and technical facts. The present article intends to point these out, analyse the misleading briefings from the MDA and arrive at a reliable answer to the question of if and how Russia would be affected by the planned US deployments and their probable sequels. A technical assessment [73] shows that the planned radar in the Czech Republic and interceptors in Poland would provide substantial capabilities against Russian ICBMs in their western silos. In this respect the radar is more relevant, due to its integration in a global BMD system, than is the interceptor site. The interceptors would grow in importance as their number would increase – in Europe as well as in the USA. A Russian strategic planner will foresee considerable future growth, and this would be seen as particularly threatening to the Russian second-strike capability as Russian arsenals continue to shrink [74]. Much of the Iranian ballistic missile technology goes back to early Russian origins, with detours via e.g. North Korea. If from its better knowledge of the Iranian capabilities Russia feels that Iran may be incapable of building an ICBM, then it has all the more reason to fear that the US plans are directed predominantly against Russia. Thus, the deployment is not just a bilateral issue between the USA and the Czech Republic and Poland respectively: nuclear-strategic issues are at stake which have ramifications for Europe and the whole world, in particular for the discussion of future disarmament. Not only would further nuclear reductions become more and more difficult, but there is the outlook of a new nuclear arms race in terms of missiles, warheads, penetrations aids and ballistic-missile defences. This holds despite the fact that decoys which are much less sophisticated than long-range missiles will continue to frustrate any attempt to make oneself secure from nuclear attack, even by a much smaller power. The Russian proposals of common use of an early-warning radar much closer to Iran make technical sense; the same holds for the concept of deploying interceptors 16 The US-Polish agreement of August 20 2008 includes further political-military cooperation and consultation, the expansion of the Polish air-missile defense system by deploying a US Patriot battery and information sharing. See for example [69].


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only after observation of Iranian long-range ballistic-missile tests, and deploying them closer to Iran as well. This holds also for potential ballistic missiles directed against Europe. The common use of a radar, on the other hand, would require a very high degree of cooperation. How the USA will deal with such proposals for cooperation can be used as a litmus test of whether it takes Russian concerns seriously and makes attempts to allay these fears. Europe can play an important role by bridging the Russian and the US interests. On the other hand, if Europe as a whole fails to do so it might find itself again between the fronts of two nuclear powers. [75] It goes without saying that the best solution would be to prevent the development of Iranian ICBMs and nuclear weapons by international arms control agreements. Achieving this will probably need a return to the nuclear disarmament obligations of the declared nuclear-weapon states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. With highranking former defence and foreign-policy officials in the USA arguing for a nuclearweapon free world [76] and the new President supporting nuclear disarmament, there may be realistic chances of solving the problem at its source.

4. Conclusions Missile defense efforts have been under development for more than sixty years, especially in the United States. Independent scientists and experts have always pointed to the tremendous technical challenges that have to be met in order to intercept warheads and missiles in flight. During the Cold War, scientists worked for governments and frequently raised concerns about the feasibility and strategic implications of missile defenses. The internal debates and studies also demonstrated the technical and financial problems as well as the strategic contradictions. Increasingly, experts also raised their voices in public and during hearings, and studied the concepts and the maturity of the technology. Bureaucratic pressure and the enormous paradoxical threat from nuclear weapons justified by the deterrence strategy kept the BMD programs alive, especially within the United States. By signing the ABM treaty in 1972 both superpowers had cooperatively concluded that offense has advantages over defense and that effective defense was not feasible against hundreds of attacking nuclear warheads. The SDI approach remained a dream. New potential threats from North Korea and perhaps Iran or Pakistan are far less demanding of a BMD system than is one designed to counter Russian or Chinese missiles. Since the 1983 SDI speech it is estimated that the Pentagon has spent $120 billion on BMD programs. Despite these efforts the current technology is not ripe for deployment. The Pentagon has not yet demonstrated that the strategic GMD system is capable of defending against long-range missile attacks under realistic conditions. This includes intercepting more than two warheads, handling the countermeasure problems and testing under realistic conditions. Without clearly formulated criteria such as feasibility, costs and arms control implications, R&D efforts are a bottomless pit. The fights over BMD also show how often politics ignores scientific facts. As a member of the Challenger Commission Richard F. Feynman once said: “For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for Nature cannot be fooled” [77]. Under the neoconservative approach of G. W. Bush Jr, BMD became a highly symbolic and ideological program which absorbed much in the way of financial resources: under his Administration the Pentagon requested a five year missile

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defense budget of $62.5 billion. As long as such a MD system is not proven under realistic conditions, it creates an illusory security by pretending it can handle the multiple countermeasures such as decoys by simply producing more missiles or by using other means of WMD delivery. It can also create an obstacle for further nuclear disarmament because an arms control partner might simply assume it has to retain or modernize its strategic arsenals to preserve its second strike capability. Russian planners would assume that its nuclear arsenal might be destroyed in a first strike and that the limited second-strike capability can be annihilated by the limited missile defense. While scientists understand that these interceptors can be fooled by countermeasures, planners usually assume a worst-case analysis and would retain or increase their strategic arsenals, or could retain their missiles on high-alert. R&D on missile defenses might continue, but the real problem is nuclear proliferation and the huge arsenals which can destroy civilization if they are ever released. Very often it is the case that military research claims scientifically untenable facts, because contracts and much money are involved in this kind of classified work. The SDI example shows how some excessive, scientifically absurd and scientifically unproven defense technologies and projects have been undertaken. Additionally, political pressure can make possible, and back up, programs which create an illusionary sense of security. Former presidential advisor and physicist Wolfgang Panofsky said in a speech at the XVIth Amaldi Conference in Trieste [11]: “When decisions are made which disregard scientific or technical realities, and instead are based on political considerations or on faith, then a major risk to the health and well-being of the country is the consequence.”

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[2] [3] [4] [5]

[6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13]

President Ronald Reagan: Address to the Nation Peace and National Security, March 23, 1983, in Franklin A. Long, Donald Hafner and Jeffrey Boutwell (editors), Weapons in Space, New York, 1986, W.W. Norton, New York, 1986, pp 351-353. See for example Tom Shachtman, Laboratory Warriors. How Allied Science and Technology Tipped the Balance in World War II, Perennial, New York, 2003. Albert Einstein, quoted on the Einstein Memorial Statue, Washington DC. Gerard J. DeGroot, The Bomb. A Life, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2005. See Herbert F. York, Race to Oblivion. A Participant’s View of the Arms Race, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1970. For a discussion of the relations between science and war see Jean-Jacques Salomon, Le Scientifique et le Guerrier, Belin, Paris, 2001. See the memoirs of Jeremy Stone: Every Man Should Try. Adventures of a Public Interest Activist, Public Affairs, New York, 1999. See for example Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Weapons Policy, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1962. Michael J.Neufeld, Von Braun. Dreamer of Space – Engineer of War, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2007. Matthew Evangelista, Unarmed Forces. The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1999. Wolfgang K. Panofsky, Panofsky on Physics, Politics and Peace. Pief remembers, Springer, New York, 2007. Wolfgang K. Panofsky, The Problem of Independent Scientific Input to Government Security Policy Advising in the United States, XVI Amaldi Conference, Trieste, Italy, November 18, 2004. Joseph M. Siracusa, Nuclear Weapons. A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008, p.94. Ref. 9, p.70.


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[14] Ibid. pp 70-72. [15] Frank von Hippel, Citizen Scientist, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1991, p.10. [16] Joseph Rotblat, Science and Nuclear Weapons: Where do we go from here?, The Blackaby Papers, No. 5, Abolition 2000 UK, December 2004. [17] MDA Historian’s Office, Ballistic Missile Defense: A Brief History, http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/briefhis.html [18] Ref. 9 p. 102. [19] R. Garwin. See his chapter in this book. [20] See for example the chapter by Richard Garwin in this book and also ref. 5, p. 194. [21] See Ref. 12 p. 86 on Soviet Missile Projects; see also Johan J. Holst, William Schneider et al., Why ABM? Policy issues in the missile defense controversy, Pergamon, New York, 1969. [22] Sayre Stevens, The Soviet BMD Program, in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz (editors), Ballistic Missile Defense, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 1984. [23] Richard Garwin, The First Panofsky Lecture: Pief’s Contributions to Arms Control and Nuclear Disarmament, in Klaus Gottstein and Götz Neuneck, Proceedings of the XVII International Amaldi Conference of Academies of Sciences and National Scientific Societies on Scientific Questions of Global Security, Hamburg, 2009. [24] Morton H. Halperin, The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration, World Politics 25(1) (October 1972), 62-95. [25] Ref. 9 p. 103. [26] Richard L. Garwin and Hans A. Bethe, Anti-Ballistic-Missile Systems, Scientific American, 218(3) (March 1968), 21-31. [27] Ref. 12 p. 85. [28] For more details see ref. 9 pp 104-105. [29] Richard L. Garwin, Megawatts and Megatons. A Turning Point in the Nuclear Age?, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2001, p. 265. [30] Metta Spencer, Political Scientists, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 51(4) (July/August 1995), 62-68, p. 64. [31] See ref. 12, pp 104-106 and the Federation of American Scientists, Soviet BMD Programs. Available at http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/soviet/index.html. [32] Ref. 12 p. 90. [33] Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan Star Wars, and the End of the Cold War, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2000. [34] Quoted in: Sidney Drell, Philip J. Farley and David Holloway, The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: A Technical, Political, and Arms Control Assessment, CISAC, Stanford, 1984, p. 105. [35] Richard Rhodes, Arsenal of Folly. The Making of the Nuclear Arms Race, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2007. [36] William J. Broad, Teller’s War: The Top-Secret Story Behind the Star Wars Deception, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1992. [37] Union of Concerned Scientists, Space-Based Missile Defense: A Report, The Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge MA, 1984. [38] Ref. 33 p. 210. [39] Ref 12 p. 98 [40] John Tirman (editor), The Fallacy of Star Wars, Vintage Books, New York, 1984. See also H.A. Bethe, R.L. Garwin, K. Gottfried and H.W. Kendall, Space-Based Ballistic-Missile Defense, Scientific American 251(4) (October 1984), 39-49. [41] Ashton Carter, Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space, Office of Technology Assessment, Washington DC, 1984. [42] Ref. 15 pp 99-104. [43] Keith B. Payne, Strategic Defense: ‘Star Wars’ in Perspective, Hamilton Press, Lanham, MD, 1986. [44] Ref. 15 pp. 88-89. [45] Yevgeni Velikhov, Roald Sagdeev and Andrei Kokoshin, Weapons in Space: The Dilemma of Security, Mir Publishers, Moscow, 1986. [46] Ref. 15 p. 89. [47] David L. Parnass, Software Aspects of Strategic Defense Systems, Communications of the ACM, 28(12) (December 1985). Reprinted from American Scientist (Journal of Sigma Xi), 73(5), 432-440. [48] George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander, Reykjavik Revisited: Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, Policy Brief, World Security Institute, Washington DC, September 2007. [49] See the Gorbachev-Reagan Reykjavik Transcripts on the afternoon of October 12, 1986 at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/Document16.pdf.

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[50] The study process and the problems and lessons are brilliantly told in Bernd Kubbig, The American Physical Society’s Directed Energy Weapons Study: Genesis, Influence on the Strategic Defense Initiative, and Lessons for Renewed APS Involvement During the George W. Bush Administration, PRIF Research Report, Frankfurt am Main, 2001. [51] Nicolaas Bloembergen et al, Science and Technology of Directed Energy Weapons, Reviews of Modern Physics 59 (1987), S1. [52] US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, SDI: Technology, Survivability, and Software, OTAISC-353, US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, May 1988. [53] Theodore A. Postol, Lessons on the Gulf War Experience with Patriot, International Security 16(3) (Winter 1991-1992), 119-171. See also the debate in the following issue 16(4) (Spring 1992), 199-240. [54] http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/docops/operate.htm. [55] Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the Unites States, July 15, 1998 Pursuant to Public Law 201; 104th Congress. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm. [56] George Lewis, The US “3+3” NMD Program and the ABM Treaty, INESAP Information Bulletin, No. 16 (November 1998), pp. 26-29. Available at: http://www.inesap.org/sites/default/files/inesap_old/ bulletin16/bul16art11.htm). [57] FY 1998 Annual Report of the Director, Operation Test & Evaluation, submitted to Congress, February 1999. Available at: http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/dote98/index.html. [58] William J. Broad, M.I.T. Studies Accusations of Lies and Cover-Up of Serious Flaws in Antimissile System, New York Times, January 2, 2003. Accessible at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/02/us/mitstudies-accusations-lies-cover-up-serious-flaws-antimissile-system.html. [59] William J. Broad, Accountability Office Finds Itself Accused, New York Times, April 2, 2006. [60] A.M. Sessler (Chair of the Study Group), J.M. Cornwall, R. Dietz, S.A. Fetter, S. Frankel, R.L. Garwin, K. Gottfried, L. Gronlund, G.N. Lewis, T.A. Postol, and D.C. Wright, Countermeasures. A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System, UCSMIT Study, Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, April 2000. Available at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/cm_all.pdf. [61] Daniel Kleppner and Frederick K. Lamb, (Co-chairs of the APS Study Group), Boost-Phase Missile Defense Study, American Physical Society, College Park, MD, Executive Summary p. xxv. Available at http://www.aps.org/policy/reports/studies/index.cfm. Also published in Reviews of Modern Physics, 76 (2004), S1-S424. [62] The White House, National Security Presidential Directive NSPD-23, December 16, 2002. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-23.htm. [63] Missile Defense Activation Date Remains Uncertain, Global Security Newswire, January 14, 2005. Available at http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/GSN_20050114_6E8BC9D8.php. [64] George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, The Technological Basis of Russian Concerns, Arms Control Today, 37 (October 2007), 13-18. Accessible at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_10/LewisPostol. [65] See for example http://english.pravda.ru/news/world/05-06-2007/92850-bush_putin-0. [66] Dmitryi Medvedev, Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, November 5, 2008, http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/11/05/2144_type70029type82917type127286_208836.shtml (25 Nov. 2008). [67] Putin Surprises Bush with Plan on Missile Shield, New York Times, June 8, 2007. Available at: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE3DA1F30F93BA35755C0A9619C8B63&sec=& spon=&pagewanted=print . [68] See for example J.-F. Kallmorgen and A. Beckmann, Deutschland diskutiert am strategischen Nutzen der Raketenabwehr vorbei, DGAP Standpunkt No. 4, May 2007, or N. Busse, Thema verfehlt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, April 10, 2007. [69] Thomas Shanker and Nicholas Kulish, US and Poland Set Missile Deal, New York Times, August 15, 2008 (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/15/world/europe/15iht-15poland.15312293.html); Paul Richter, US – Poland sign Missile Deal, Los Angeles Times, August 21, 2008 (available at http://articles.latimes.com/2008/aug/21/world/fg-poland21). [70] Sergei Lavrov, A Crucial debate on Europe’s anti-missile defences, Financial Times, April 10, 2007. [71] Moscow perplexes US over missile defense in Europe, International Herald Tribune, February 21, 2007. [72] Henry A.T. Obering, Missile Defense For US Allies And Friends, presentation, March 2007, viewgraph 22; P. Sanders, Missile Defense Program Overview For The European Union, Committee On Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee On Security And Defence, presentation, 28 June 2007 (viewgraph 26). [73] The technical analysis here relies on Theodore A. Postol and George N. Lewis, The Proposed US Missile Defense in Europe: Technological Issues Relevant to Policy, presented on Capitol Hill,


[74]

[75] [76]

[77]

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Washington, DC, August 28, 2007, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy. See the discussion about ‘Nuclear Primacy’ especially K.A. Lieberand and D.G. Press, The Rise of US Nuclear Primacy, Foreign Affairs, 85(2) (March/April 2006). Available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/issues/2006/85/2. Giovanni Gasparini, Götz Neuneck, Stephen Pullinger and Xavier Pasco, Missile Defence and European Security, Policy Department External Policies, European Parliament, Brussels, 2007. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, A World Free of Nuclear Weapons, Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2007 (available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/ digest/6731276.html); George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn., Toward a Nuclear-Free World, Wall Street Journal, 15 Jan. 2008 (available at http://www.hoover.org/ pubaffairs/dailyreport/13796412.html). Physics Laureate Richard F. Feynman, in the Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, in compliance with Executive Order 12546 of February 3, 1986, Appendix F. Available at: http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/missions/51-l/docs/rogerscommission/Appendix-F.txt).

Bibiliography Ahearne, John F., W.R. Frazer, Steve Koonin, Frederick K. Lamb (Chair), Kumar C. Patel, Roberta P. Saxon, Jeremiah D. Sullivan, James S. Langer, George H. Trilling and Judy Franz, Report of the APS Advisory Committee for Technical Studies on National Missile Defense, American Physical Society, College Park, MD, December 20, 2000. Available at http://www.aps.org/policy/reports/popa-reports/nmd.cfm. Center for International Security and Arms Control, Assessing Ballistic Missile Proliferation and Its Control, Stanford, CA, 1991. Cirincione, Joseph, Assessing the Ballistic Missile Threat, Statement in Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services, Committee on Governmental Affairs, US Senate, 9 February 2000. Cirincione, Joseph, Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, revised edition, 2005. Coyle, Philip E., Status of the US Missile Defense Programs, The Conference on Security and Cooperation in South Asia: A Global Perspective, organized by MIT/BAKS/IFSH, Berlin, October 8, 2007. Coyle III, Philip E., Prepared Remarks before the House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, The Future of Missile Defense Testing, Wednesday February 25, 2009. Available at http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/CoyleHASCfull2_25_091.pdf. Hoffmann, Fred S., The SDI in US Nuclear Strategy, International Security 10(1) (Autumn 1985), 13-24. Karp, Aaron, Ballistic Missile Proliferation. The Politics and Technics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996. Kubbig, Bernd W., The APS’s DEW Study: Genesis, Influence on SDI, and Lessons for Renewed APS Involvement During the George W. Bush Administration, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt, 2001. Kubbig, Bernd W., Communicators in the Cold War: The Pugwash Conferences, the US-Soviet Study Group and the ABM Treaty: natural scientists as political actors, historical ... and lessons for the future, PRIF reports No. 44, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt, 1996. Mistry, Dinshaw, Containing Missile Proliferation. Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control, University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, 2003. Nolan, Janne E., Trappings of Power: Ballistic Missiles in the Third World, Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, 1991. Postol, Theodore A, Proposed US Missile Defense in Europe: Technological Issues Relevant to Policy, Presentation, Capitol Hill, Washington, DC, August 28, 2007, Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy, AAAS, New York, 2007. Available at http://cstsp.aaas.org/content.html?contentid=1175.

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Sanders, Patricia, presentation, June 28, 2007, European Union. Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ comparl/afet/sede/hearings/20070627_antimissile/ sanders_en.pdf. Scheffran, Jürgen, Missiles in Conflict: The Issue of Missiles in all its Complexity, in Disarmament Forum: Missile Control 1/2007, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva, Switzerland. Schlesinger, James R., Rhetoric and Realities in the Star Wars Debate, International Security 10(1) (Autumn 1985), 3-12. Union of Concerned Scientists, Empty Promise. The Growing Case Against Star Wars, Beacon Press, Boston MA, 1986. US Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, OTA-BPISC-115, Washington DC, 1993. Available at www.wws.princeton.edu/%7Eota/disk1/1993/9344.html. Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, Final Report, Weapons of Terror. Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms, Stockholm, June 2006. Wilkening, Dean A., Ballistic Missile Defence and Strategic Stability, Adelphi Paper 334, International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, May 2000. Yost, D.S., Soviet ballistic missile defense and the Western alliance, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988.


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The Role of Independent Scientists in Analyzing the Ballistic Missile Threat Geoffrey FORDEN Program in Science, Technology, and Society, MIT, Cambridge, MA, USA

Abstract. The role of independent scientists in evaluating the threat posed by the development of ballistic missiles is reviewed. This includes assisting the legislative branch, informing the public debate, and, in particular, countering the military’s inflation of the threat that the missiles of developing countries present. The last of these issues is covered in more detail as a special case. Following a long history of threat inflation by government agencies intent on increasing their budgets, the present US Missile Defense Agency continues this tradition and takes a number of opportunities to inflate the threat from Iran’s missile development program. These financial motivations are not, unfortunately, limited to government agencies and affect even supposedly independent analysts. One way of preventing this is for independent scientists to publish their research results in peer-reviewed journals or, because such journals are fairly rare, subject their research to other review mechanisms. A new way of doing this is to present results on established blogs. Finally the funding and career paths of independent scientists are reviewed and it is found that universities are fundamentally ill-suited for supporting new, multidisciplinary areas of study. Without some sort of academic home, this field is likely to dry up in the coming harsh funding environment. Keywords. Ballistic missiles, threat assessment, independent scientists.

Introduction Today, the threat of ballistic missiles plays a larger and larger role in policymaking. It is used to justify the expansion of the US national missile defense into Europe, and tougher sanctions on Iran because its nuclear program, in conjunction with longer range missiles, is seen to threaten more and more democracies. The threat of ballistic missiles even affects space policy, because the development of China’s anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) is related to the advance of the Chinese missile program. Unfortunately, increasing defense budgets are becoming tied similarly to an increasing threat from ballistic missiles around the world. This creates organizational imperatives in various government agencies to inflate that threat. Taken together, these tendencies make the role of independent scientists in evaluating the capabilities of ballistic missiles that much more important. Evaluating the threat posed by missile programs, however, is not a straightforward process. Instead it blends an objective evaluation of capability with a more subjective evaluation of a nation’s intentions. Conceptually, this can be represented by the equation

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G. Forden / The Role of Independent Scientists in Analyzing the Ballistic Missile Threat

where capability is a determination of objective missile capabilities such as range, accuracy, and payload mass. These can almost all be estimated by a straightforward physical analysis of data, many of which are publicly available. Intentions, on the other hand, are much harder to determine. Nevertheless, both are important in assessing the threat. Often this is done automatically. For instance, few, if any, analysts consider Japan a threat to the United States even though it has considerable capability both to produce nuclear weapons quickly and a very mature space launcher capability that could very quickly be used to produce ICBMs. It is tempting, however, to assume that intentions can be determined by capabilities or even to ignore the factoring-in of intentions altogether. The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States makes no mention of intentions in its executive summary of Iran’s missile development program, only of capabilities [1]. Some individual members of the Commission even rejected the notion that intentions can be determined by denying that the leaders of some countries are rational [2]. Unfortunately, it is not, as one might hope, straightforward to determine intentions from a nation’s stated policy. For instance, public utterances might be intended more for internal public consumption or international propaganda rather than serving as indications of real intentions. The criteria for judging intentions also change with time. For instance during the Cold War, threat equaled capability since the Soviet Union and the United States could be counted on to use all resources in their arsenals during a general nuclear war. Today’s world is very different with much less universal agreement on how to evaluate intentions. Some important countries in the nonaligned movement, for instance, insist the presumption should be that the intentions are always benign, and only when incontrovertible proof has been found should this presumption be dropped. This is very different from the assumptions of the Bush administration which championed preventive war. It is also very problematic to go from capabilities to intentions, for example by saying a country’s missile capabilities are very large and therefore its intentions are very threatening. There is of course a very natural tendency to do just that. Furthermore, it has been my experience that physical scientists are not, in general, good at evaluating intentions. As a result, the role of the physical scientist, either independent or employed by government, should be to analyze capabilities and remove intentions from the equation. The rest of the paper will be devoted, therefore, to evaluating capabilities.

1. The Roles Independent Scientists Have Played Independent scientists can play a wide variety of roles in making the world a better place. In this paper, I will concentrate as an example on three areas in which my own group, the Science, Technology and Global Security Working Group in MIT’s program on Science, Technology and Society, have worked as an example. These are: 1. 2. 3.

Countering the inflation by the military of the ballistic missile threat. Providing independent analysis to the US Congress and foreign governments. Educating the public and informing the public debate.

I will spend most of the paper discussing the first role: that of countering the military’s inflation of ballistic missile threats. Let me, therefore, briefly discuss our group’s role in the other two areas.

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1.1. Providing Independent Analysis to the Legislature Congress has an increasing appetite for independent, scientifically-based analyses of national security issues. This is especially true since the demise of the Office of Technology Assessment in 1994. Members of our group have testified before Congressional committees, assisted the investigations of Congressional agencies (such as the Congressional Budget Office and the Government Accountability Office), and briefed the staff of individual members of Congress, most recently on the capabilities of China’s anti-satellite weapon. All too often, briefings from the military to Congress obscure or minimize problems with weapons systems being procured or, as is the case with justifying National Missile Defense, inflate the threat posed by the missile programs of other countries. Another important example of informing Congress is illustrated by China’s 2007 shooting down of their obsolete weather satellite, the Feng Yun 1C [3]. Since China accomplished this interception with a direct ascent interceptor mounted on a DF-21 missile, it qualifies as a ballistic missile threat. While there are indications that the US government knew of the intended shoot-down before it happened, it took most of the world by surprise [4]. While Congress can, of course, ask for briefings from the intelligence communities and the Pentagon, it finds it very useful to be able to discuss publicly unclassified findings made by independent scientists. I briefed the staff of individual members’ offices on my findings within one month of the test (three weeks after it became public knowledge). This covered my analysis of the properties and capabilities of the Chinese interceptor, which was both very sophisticated and very massive; these conclusions were based on my analysis of the debris pattern resulting from the interception. I also presented my results on the Chinese ASAT, and its potential for use in a hypothetical space-based conflict with the United States over Taiwan, to a gathering of Congressional staff at a meeting organized by the AAAS [5]. 100 kg

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One of the most important properties of the Chinese ASAT, and one that helps shape its usefulness in any future space-based conflict with the US, is its mass. It is possible to determine the ASAT’s mass by analyzing the pattern of debris in the plane transverse to the target satellite’s orbital velocity1. This can be done without knowledge of the debris pieces’ masses because it is known from hypervelocity collisions that the pieces created in such collisions follow the same general directions of the two colliding spacecraft [6]. When combined with a simulation of the ballistic missile, this pattern can determine the mass of the interceptor as well as the type of trajectory (lofted or depressed 2) used. See Figure 1. This same analysis is also the only publicly available determination that the Chinese ASAT was indeed a hit-to-kill interceptor as opposed to a simpler and, in principle, less sophisticated fragmentation weapon. I concluded this by looking at the distribution of debris velocities along the direction of the target satellite’s original orbital velocity. It turns out that a significant number of pieces of debris large enough to be seen and tracked from the Earth had a much greater velocity than the original target satellite’s orbital velocity even though they resulted from a nearly head-on collision. The analogy I made was bouncing a ping pong ball off a ‘super ball’3. In that analogy, the super ball (the heavy pieces of the target satellite in the analogy) hardly changes its velocity at all while the ping pong balls (the light pieces of the interceptor) bounce back in the Earth reference system with very large velocities. When these are translated back into the reference frame, the pieces – which originate from the light components of the ASAT – can have very large velocities in the original target satellite’s direction. This remains the only unclassified determination of the type of interception used by the Chinese ASAT. 1.2. Informing the Public Debate Informing Congress is just a component of the larger task of educating the public and encouraging a more informed public debate. While Congress is directly responsible for funding government projects, and thereby helping shape policy, all the true direction should come from the electorate. However, to be heard, the electorate must be informed about a subject. Scientists can help shape the debate by presenting unbiased analyses and arguing policy options from non-ideological points of view. They can do this, in addition to publishing scholarly papers, by appearing on radio and TV news and commentary shows, by writing op-eds, contributing to blogs, and giving public lectures, to name just a few possibilities. Most of these interventions must of necessity be short and concise and do not allow issues to be explained using a graphical format. It takes considerable practice to acquire the skills for handling such opportunities. The scientist just starting out on this path should take heart from the fact that practice does improve these skills. Again, China’s 2007 anti-satellite test provides an important illustration of how an unbiased, scientific analysis of a foreign ballistic missile program can inform the public 1

The orbital elements of the debris pattern are available to the general public on the NASA website http://www.space-track.org. 2 In general, there are a multitude of free body trajectories that take a projectile from point A to point B but only one that minimizes the required energy. If more energy than that minimum is given to the projectile, it can either fly above (lofted) the minimum energy curve or below it (depressed). 3 For those not familiar with popular American fads from years gone by, a super ball is a very bouncy ball that is also very heavy.


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debate. As part of an effort to disseminate information about the level of military threat the Chinese ASAT represents, I ‘published’ a long account of what a space war with China would look like on a popular blog (the Wired magazine’s defense blog, Danger Room) [7]. Besides getting about 60,000 ‘hits’ the first day it was posted, this article was also picked out by the academic community and used by both sides of the debate [8]. While the Wired blog is an example of informing the public debate by communicating on the web, it is not the only such venue. There are blogs that have established themselves as more oriented to policy makers, such as armscontrolwonk.com (also known as ACW). ACW has, over the years, obtained quite an international readership with many people in government reading it even if they do not post their comments [9]. It serves as a modern way for independent scientists to get an almost instantaneous peer review of assessments of foreign ballistic missile development programs. As we shall see below, peer review is particularly important for independent scientists. Although this is an element that should also be a vital component of government sponsored assessments, it is one that appears all too often to be supplied only by independent scientists. 1.3. Countering the Inflation of Missile Threats One of the earliest examples of inflating the threat from ballistic missiles first surfaced in the public debate during the presidential election of 1960. Soon-to-be President Kennedy ran on a platform that included closing the ‘missile gap’ with the Soviet Union. But even before Kennedy publicized the controversy, the US Air Force was claiming that the Soviet Union had 150 to 200 ICBMs while the US was still struggling to develop its first. However, there was an intense debate going on behind closed doors, with the CIA denying the existence of such a gap [10]. Of course, the Air Force was bureaucratically inclined to believe in a missile gap because it could be used to justify enormous spending on a US ICBM program, the majority of that money going to the Air Force. It took overhead imagery, first from U2 over-flights and later from Corona spy satellites, to settle the argument. Today, the military uses the threat of ballistic missile attacks from Iran as a justification for establishing forward basing of interceptors and radars in Europe. Iran does have a sophisticated missile development program in progress and a leader, President Ahmadinejad, who is reported to deny the Holocaust and call for wiping the state of Israel off the map [11]. With all that, it hardly seems necessary to exaggerate the threat from Iran. On the other hand, some analysts claim that President Ahmadinejad was misquoted in translation and made no such threat against Israel, so exaggeration does seem to be endemic in any discussion of Iran [12]. Nevertheless, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) appears to have used every opportunity presented by the normal uncertainty in intelligence to exaggerate Iran’s missile capabilities and the progress it is making toward producing an ICBM. The bureaucratic imperatives for the Missile Defense Agency and the Department of Defense in general to exaggerate Iran’s missile capabilities are obvious when one considers the Bush administration’s efforts to enlarge national missile defense into Eastern Europe. For instance, Figure 2 shows the US MDA’s estimate of how much the US ground-based missile defense coverage would increase by having radars and interceptors in Eastern Europe. This figure comes from a briefing presented to the

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Figure 2. A slide from the US Missile Defense Agency showing estimates of how much the US National Missile Defense coverage is increased with radars and interceptors in Eastern Europe.

Russians as justification for the expansion of the US system into Russia’s neighbors. As such, it tries to convince the Russians that the missile defense system is a response to a real threat and is therefore not directed at Russia. Of course, this increased coverage is meaningless unless Iran has missiles capable of threatening Europe. With this incentive, it appears that the Missile Defense Agency would go to any lengths to inflate the threat to Europe and the United States. In the next section we will discuss the MDA’s estimates of Iran’s missile development as well as various independent scientists’ critiques of that assessment.

2. Case Study: Iran’s Missile Program Consider the briefing chart shown by General Obering in May 2008 (Figure 3) [13]. The shorter range missiles are not controversial; they include SCUD Bs, SCUD Cs, and the Shahab 3. (Surprisingly, the Shahab 3 shown in the diagram has an unsophisticated simple, conical warhead whereas Iran has been fielding Shahabs with the more sophisticated ‘baby bottle nose cone’ shown on the “Ashura” for quite some time. The


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Figure 3. MDA’s slide from May 2008 showing their estimates for Iranian missiles that are being or, they believe, will soon be developed.

tri-conic nose cone is more stable during reentry than a simple conical warhead and therefore should be more accurate.) 2.1. MDA’s Missile Assessments General Obering’s May 2008 presentation lists a number of missiles that the United States believes Iran is developing and in some cases has already developed. It is informative to go through these long-range missiles, as shown in Figure 3, one by one. He labels the first missile on the right of the dotted line (Obering’s device for indicating which missiles are deployed and which are supposedly being developed by Iran) as the Ashura but it looks remarkably like the solid-propellant Sejil – minus the boxes on its sides (see Figure 4). Since Gen. Obering lists it as already having flown in May of 2008 (and in a November 2007 briefing, with a very similar graphic to that shown in Figure 3, he lists it as not having been flown), he has presumably confused it with the Kavoshgar-1 that had been test launched in February 2008. But why does it then appear to be a two stage missile when we know that the Kavoshgar had only a single stage [14]? I think we are seeing some of the problems with intelligence gathering, analysis, and use. Drawing the “Ashura” that way represents, in one respect, a remarkable intelligence success. They obviously had some very good inside information from the Iranian missile development program: the same ‘baby bottle nose cone’ as the Sejil and roughly – as near as we can tell from the graphic – the right

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Figure 4. Various rockets that might be the inspiration for MDA’s Ashura. On the left, an image of the solid-propellant Sejil (whose first test flight was in November 2008); in the middle is MDA’s graphic of the Ashura as presented in Gen. Obering’s May 2008 briefing; on the right is the Kavoshgar-1 launched on 1 February 2008.

proportions between the first and second stages. Not shown in the composite presented in Figure 4, is that MDA shows the “Ashura” as considerably larger than Shahab-3 (see Figure 3). I’m not sure how it actually stacks up to the Shahab-3B in size since it is hard to compare quantitative measurements between photos and the MDA graphic, but I believe the Sejil can be transported in the same Transporter, Erector, Launcher (TEL) as the Shahab-3. Unfortunately, it appears that somebody, perhaps the ‘user’ of the intelligence (i.e. the MDA), has ignored all the differences between their “Ashura” and the Kavoshgar – namely that the Kavoshgar was a single stage missile – to try to show that the threat was closer than it really was in May 2008. The assessment of the SLV (see Figure 3) is somewhat better since it shows a nose cone very similar to the nose cone actually used; again, something of a success for the intelligence analysts who must have spotted the nose cone in pictures from Ahmadinejad’s February 2008 visit to the Iranian Space Center [15]. Even here, however, the threat it represents is exaggerated but, this time at least, it is almost understandable coming from an intelligence estimate. The graphic in Figure 3 shows the SLV, which I take to be the Safir, as having a second stage almost as large as its first stage. (The Safir was flown for the first time in August 2008, well after Gen. Obering’s May 2008 briefing.) When you consider the size of a multistage missile, an optimal approach to designing the different stages is to assume that each will produce about the same change in velocity that the other stages


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Figure 5. The Safir two stage, liquid-propellant missile, which was flight tested for the first and so far only time in August 2008, is shown on the left while the MDA graphic of this missile, as presented in Gen. Obering’s May 2008 briefing is shown on the right. Note the different ratios between the first and second stages between the actual missile and the MDA depiction.

produce. That implies a second stage size similar to the first stage.4 The actual Safir has a second stage noticeably smaller than its first stage (see Figure 5), and it might well run into structural problems if the second stage was made any bigger since the current missile has a length to diameter ratio of about 17, which is at the upper end of the rule of thumb for structural stability.5 Nevertheless, we are left with the question of why the intelligence community missed the fact that the non-flight mockup of Safir, also visible in President Ahmadinejad’s February 2008 visit to the space center, showed a second stage more in keeping with the actual Safir. Did the intelligence community simply not believe that mockup was an actuate portrayal of the Safir? If so, were they unduly influenced by an organizational imperative to enhance the threat by making the missile seem more capable? It obviously wouldn’t be the only example in this graphic! Consider the “Projected ICBM,” the last Iranian missile shown in Figure 3. One of the most interesting features of it is that this is an entirely new missile. North Korea, in contrast, followed a different track and stacked existing missiles one on top of another to produce the Tae’podong I missile. This appears to be consistent with what some independent scientists also believe: Iran is no longer dependent on North Korea for advances in missile technology; it is innovating for itself. The “Projected ICBM” in MDA’s graphic appears to be a two stage missile (it’s hard to know for sure what the intelligence community intends, but the cable raceways running down the right side of the missile seem to indicate they think this will be a two stage missile.) We will consider this in more detail in the next section on extrapolating 4 Similar, but not exactly the same size. In general, the second stage will be somewhat smaller than the first stage. 5 Since the original writing of this chapter, Iran has succeeded in using the Safir to put a 27 kg satellite into orbit. Doubt remains as to the second stage’s structural ability to carry anything much heavier, such as a nuclear warhead.

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SCUD-type technology, which Iran is known to have, to missiles capable of flying ICBM distances. But let me borrow some of those results to say that a 750 kg payload (including the nuclear device and its re-entry body) mounted on a two stage missile with a deadweight fraction of 10% and an average specific impulse of 240 s implies a total mass of 120 tons!6 That is a very massive missile! Yet MDA shows this missile with the same height as the SLV/Safir. Furthermore, I estimate that the SLV/Safir mass to be less than 21 tons for it to carry a 750 kg warhead – about 100 tons less than the “Projected ICBM”. While the latter does appear to have a slightly greater volume than the SLV/Safir, because of the increased first stage diameter, MDA has clearly understated its volume graphically (see Figure 3). This has the effect of minimizing the difficulty Iran would face in developing such a missile since, to paraphrase Stalin, mass has a quantity all its own. As an example, consider simply building the airframe to contain the fuel for such a large missile. SCUD-size missiles derive a lot of their structural stability from the missile skin itself and have minimal internal structure. The SCUD has, for instance, only ‘rings’ spaced longitudinally along the fuel tanks and no vertical struts at all. Iran would have to develop a whole new expertise to support such a large volume of fuel. An Iranian ICBM would be so massive, in fact, that a cluster of four Nodong engines – which are believed to power the first stage of the North Korean Tae’podong II – yield a thrust to weight ratio of roughly one to one at liftoff. (And would be so under-powered that they would only lift the payload a total of about 4000 km, well below the intercontinental distances needed to reach the United States.) For comparison, the Nodong has a thrust to weight ratio of over 1.8 at liftoff. In the next section, I will discuss what it would take for Iran to achieve even this, and how long it might take them to field such a missile if they remain on the SCUD-type technology arc. North Korea seems to have taken another path: stacking existing missiles one on top of another to produce some sort of hybrid. In its Tae’podong I missile, North Korea stacked an existing solid-propellant third stage (some say it used the booster from an SA-2 air defense missile) on top of a SCUD-B on top of a Nodong missile. This missile failed during its third stage and, if I had to guess, I would say that spinning its third stage to stabilize it produced higher burning rates that increased its chamber pressure beyond what it could stand. The failure of the Tae’podong II, however, was more informative about North Korea’s development path. (And why doesn’t the Obering graph indicate it failed? I’m afraid that, too, is a clear example of inflating the threat.) Less is known about the Tae’podong II. However, many analysts believe it used a design borrowed from an old Soviet missile for the first stage and, perhaps, a Nodong for the second stage. It is, of course, not known if it had a third stage, though if it was intended to put a satellite into orbit it would make sense for it to have one. The missile, however, is reported to have failed some 42 seconds after liftoff, a number that suggests to me that it failed because the combined forces due to aerodynamic drag, acceleration, and gravity, caused this rather kludged design to collapse. 2.2. An Independent Assessment of What an Iranian ICBM Would Look Like What are the challenges Iran, or other countries who are still using SCUD-type technology, have to face if they decide to build a missile capable of conveying a 6 This has been calculated using constant mass fractions and specific impulses to facilitate the discussion in the next section.


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nuclear warhead intercontinental distances? First, I agree with the intelligence community’s implicit assessment that Iran would build a custom designed ICBM rather than follow the route seemingly taken by North Korea of stacking existing single stage missiles one on top of another. Iran’s recent missile activity shows that they are innovative and intent on finding solutions to problems from an Iranian perspective. With that in mind, I want to ‘design’ an Iranian ICBM (which I call the IranCBM) and see just how far SCUD-type technology can go. This is done graphically by a method discussed in many books written in the 1950s and 60s, which are usually the best for understanding missile proliferation today. I have compiled the data for the graphs in Figure 6 from Flight performance Handbook for Powered Flight Operations [16]. The graph on the left can be used to determine the ‘effective’ velocity required at launch to deliver a warhead to a given range for a minimum energy trajectory. This includes the effects of atmospheric drag as well as the losses in speed due to gravity; ‘fast’ missiles lose more energy than ‘slow’ missiles in passing through the atmosphere. As we shall see, an Iranian ICBM is going to be a relatively slow missile. That implies that the missile must be capable of producing an effective launch velocity of 8.3 km/s. This is, of course, much higher than what we think of as the velocity needed for a 10,000 km trajectory, and in fact it is much higher than Low Earth Orbit (LEO) orbital velocities. But, again, the ‘excess’ is lost during the passage through the atmosphere and to gravity.

Figure 6. These two graphs can be used to design two-stage ICBMs that are based on SCUD technologies. The graph on left is used to determine the effective burnout velocity (which includes the velocity to be ‘lost’ to gravity and atmospheric effects). The graph on the right uses the velocity necessary to loft a 750 kg warhead to 10,000 km in determining the total mass of a two stage ICBM. The specific impulse, Isp, is a measure of how powerful the fuel/engine combination is.7

7

The thrust of an engine/fuel combination is given by T = Isp g.dm/dt, where dm/dt is the rate at which propellant is burned.

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That information is used in the graph on the right which shows a two-stage8 launch vehicle’s gross weight required to move a 750 kg warhead 10,000 km as a function of the average deadweight of the missile. This design would not require Iran to develop a new, more powerful engine and therefore seems to be the quickest for them to build. I also assumed a higher specific impulse for the first stage (240 s) than the widely accepted value for the Nodong/Shahab (232 s). That could be achieved either by replacing the jet vanes with gimbaled engine-based thrust vector control or switching to a new, higher energy propellant, or perhaps both. One consequence of designing this missile graphically, however, has been to approximate the missile as having a constant specific impulse and the same deadweight fraction for both stages. The overall weight of the missile, as can be read off from the graph on the right, is 120 tons regardless of what fuel and oxidizer are used just so long as they produce a specific impulse of 240 s. An assumption of a SCUD-type propellant mix (such as RP1/IRFNA, which is basically kerosene and nitric acid) leads to a first stage 2.5 m in diameter and 15.4 m long. The same propellant mix for the second stage yields a diameter of 1.25 m and length of 12.3 m, which includes 2 meters for the engine and guidance system. Adding 1.5 m for the warhead yields a total missile length of 29.2 m, the height of a 10 storey building! This graphical method of designing a missile is full of approximations but a more sophisticated simulation, which also uses some approximations, though fewer and less significant, shows the resulting design would achieve a range of over 9100 km; I therefore consider the graphical design something of a success [18]! This missile design is almost a third again as long as the Safir space launch vehicle and yet Obering shows these two missiles almost exactly the same length. One possible reason for this is that a nearly 30 m long missile weighing 120 tons will take Iran a long, long time to develop if it uses SCUD-type technology. It represents a threat that is far from imminent, something that is not in the Missile Defense Agency’s interest to admit. One of the key relevant facts is that Iran will need to develop a new, very powerful engine for the first stage even if it sticks with SCUD-type propellants. Four Nodong engines, even with their own custom turbopump, are simply not powerful enough for this mission. Iran would have to develop a cluster of engines with the equivalent power of ten Nodong engines. They would also have to develop a turbopump to feed the cluster of newly developed engines. While I have not been able to identify the engines used on the Safir second stage, it seems likely that they were developed for a different missile. (One Wonk reader has suggested the second stage engines for the R-27 – an obsolete Soviet missile – though I cannot tell from the pictures I’ve seen). If so, Iran has no history of developing its own engines or turbopumps; the Safir almost certainly used a SCUD turbopump. Finally, Iran would also have to finish the development of thrust vector control using gimbaled engines that it started with the failed Safir launch on 17 August 2008. I have a hard time believing that Iran has enough skilled manpower to develop these two missiles (the Safir and the IranCBM) concurrently. Iran’s guidance and control people must all be very busy developing the control systems for the Safir, which is, after all, a test bed for the IranCBM. To take full advantage of that experience, 8 Two stages are considered here because that appears to be the number of stages the MDA has focused on for the “Projected Iranian ICBM by 2015”. A 750 kg warhead seems to be possible if Iran really did get the design for a 500 kg nuclear explosive [17].


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the same people developing the Safir should also be used to develop the IranCBM. If I use the date of the first publication (early 2007) of papers published by Iranian scientists examining how to control the fuel mixture for twin engines, and add a year for them to have worked out the details before the paper was published, I get a starting date for the Safir (a bit simplistic, I agree) of 2006. Then, adding another year and a half from the time of writing for them to successfully develop the advances the Safir represents, I get a total development time of four years. So the guidance and control development for the IranCBM could start at the end of 2009. It’s possible that Iran has already started to develop the new first stage engine, assuming they were willing to take on such a large and daunting project as the first engine they develop. There are rumors that Iran has received an SS-N-6 missile or missiles from North Korea. If so, even those engines would be far too underpowered to drive the IranCBM. But as far as I know, there is no indication that Iran has a sufficiently large test stand to develop an engine with a 300 ton thrust, much less a cluster of four of them. Such a facility would be extremely large and would be visible in satellite photos. Developing such an engine is considerably harder than the Safir second stage. Perhaps twice as hard? Would it take Iran twice as long to develop just the engine? Perhaps eight years? For one thing, they would have to be developing the production line for the much larger diameter first stage. They could, of course, have already started this using the trained manpower from the Nodong factory. This would mean that the Safir development might be slowed down unless they recycled deployed Shahabs as first stages for the Safir in the rest of its development flights. These are all part of the program risks associated with concurrent development and production [19]. I think that even eight years development time sounds optimistic considering Iran’s known state of development, but even that would be considerably longer than implied by Obering’s 2015 date. A more realistic estimate might be sometime beyond 2020. And that assumes that Iran has made the strategic decision to develop an ICBM capability – something that is not a logical consequence of the Safir space launch vehicle development.

3. Pitfalls of Independent Analysis Government agencies are not, unfortunately, the only ones subject to external pressures that might skew analyses. Independent scientists are also subject to similar economic and career pressures that must be guarded against. These pressures can, in principle, skew the analysis either to inflate the threat or to minimize the threat; both must be guarded against. 3.1. External Pressures Affect Independent Scientists Too! Some independent analysts also tend to exaggerate the threat from ballistic missiles, though it is not clear what motive is driving this phenomenon. It could be a simple desire to appear better informed. There are however other, less pure, motivations possible. For instance it’s possible that exaggerating the threat might increase an independent analyst’s access to government information. If the analyst feels that supporting a position allows him to have more information he will be more in demand with the media and with funding agencies. A recent example of retired generals who

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were acting as military experts for cable and broadcast news is a good illustration of this. It now appears that these generals were allowed access to classified information in the Rumsfeld Defense Department if they reported generally positive views of the US success in Iraq but were denied access to that information if they were not supportive [20]. It is, in principle, possible that similar pressures might be applied to independent analyses of foreign ballistic missile programs, though I have no knowledge of any such interference. It is also possible that independent analysts might be influenced to underestimate a country’s missile development program. This could arise if their funding source was ideologically driven and, say, committed to preventing the spread of missile defense, to list a hypothetical example. Again, I have no knowledge of any such pressure being applied to any analysts but it is good to be aware of all these possibilities. There are, however, examples of independent analysts going far beyond any reasonable interpretation of the data publicly available. Globalsecurity.org, for instance, lists five different versions of the Tae’podong II missile (see Figure 7) – a missile that failed tens of seconds after its one and only flight test [21]. 3.2. Ensuring Independent Scientists are Really Independent There is only one way to assure that independent scientists are really independent. All must subject their research and results to peer review. Unfortunately, the opportunities for peer review are fairly limited because there are few peer-reviewed journals in which to publish these sorts of results. Perhaps the most influential such journal is Science and Global Security, set up by the Princeton group for publications in this field [22].

Figure 7. A screen shot of globalsecurity.org’s data page for the Tae’podong II. It shows an incredible amount of detail, listing things like total masses down to the half kilogram, burn times for individual stages, and shroud masses to the nearest kilogram. (Overwriting added by the author.)


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Fortunately, peer-reviewed journals are not the only means by which independent scientists can subject their research to constructive criticism. Today, blogs are becoming more and more appropriate for this use since they can provide almost instant criticism from a world of respected analysts. The best, in my opinion, but by no means the only such blog is armscontrolwonk.com, started and maintained by Jeffrey Lewis. I have used this blog as a means of testing my ideas on Iranian missile development programs and have found it very useful because the readership contains a number of excellent missile engineers from around the world [23]. At the same time, any discussion having to do with Iran can break down very quickly into nationalistic jingoisms among a fraction of the web readership. But that is, after all, the marketplace of free ideas that we live in.

4. Supporting the Independent Scientist/Analyst A handful of funding agencies have, over the years, supported independent technical analysis related to national and international security. The most successful programs have, in my opinion, been funded because private philanthropist believed that the people involved were capable of creating a significant impact on public policy on the most important projects of the time. To a large extent, their funding was not tied to a specific project but rather to the capabilities of a group. This encouraged these groups to respond to the immediate needs of Congress and other policy makers at the moment they needed it. Now, however, there are fewer and fewer grant-making institutions giving these sorts of core grants to independent scientists. In the United States, there is only the MacArthur Foundation and its program on Science and Technology. Unfortunately, MacArthur has announced that they will stop providing core grants to the groups they have supported for so long and move into a more project oriented grant making philosophy. Under such a system, grant managers – who are not, in general, physical scientists – will decide which problems will be the most important in the near future and will solicit proposals in those areas. This will have a significant chilling effect on independent analyses of, for instance, foreign missile development programs. After all, it would have been nearly impossible to predict, even in January 2008, the level of activity of Iran’s missile development program during 2008; a year in which they test flew three significantly different large missile designs and a very significant sounding rocket that was clearly intended to further their understanding of staging techniques. If the funding agencies are falling down in their support of independent scientists, universities also have failed to support them. Independent scientists working on these issues are, almost by definition, multidisciplinary; a characteristic that does not easily find a home in a university. Universities are composed of independent departments that jealously guard their prerogatives and fight very hard for everything they get. Unless an established, tenured faculty member switches his interest to this field, as many physicists did after World War II, it is very difficult to support such an independent scientist in today’s universities. Granting a joint faculty appointment between, say, the physics department and the political science department is not satisfying for either department. Faculty slots are limited in every university and half an appointment gets rid, in general, of a complete faculty slot since the other half would have to also go to a shared appointment. That means the department is in effect increasing the average

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teaching load of the other faculty when it makes such an appointment; this is not a popular decision to make.9 Joint appointments are also, by definition, moving the department away from the core interests of the original faculty by appointing a member interested in multidisciplinary studies. Many of the original faculty might also feel they run the risk of changing the department in the future and, perhaps, losing their standing with colleagues at other universities. These are real fears and the only real solution is for universities to create new departments for physical scientists who are interested in studying issues related to national and international security. Furthermore, most university departments are geared to refining a general theory related to their department’s core interest. For instance, physics departments are all devoted to advancing our understanding of the physical laws of the universe and political science departments to developing theories of international relations or organizations etc. Schools of engineering, on the other hand, are more geared to refining techniques, answering practical questions, and teaching and passing along techniques to the next generation of students. Engineering schools might therefore be a more appropriate choice in a university setting for independent scientists interested in the ballistic missile threat, except that most engineering departments feel an even bigger divide between themselves and political science-type studies than science departments do. That leaves schools of public policy and every attempt should be made to encourage those institutions to create new departments for scientific analysis of security issues.

5. Conclusions Independent scientists are perhaps more important than ever before in contributing to the shaping of public policy. There are also more and more outlets to review their research and ensure their independence. At the same time, however, there is a restriction of funding and a narrowing of career paths for independent scientists. Universities and funding agencies should be aware of the difficulties independent scientists face in making a career of their vocation and take steps to overcome the organizational difficulties in their path. In particular, schools of public policy should seriously think about creating departments for science and international security and funding agencies should be more willing to provide core funding and not be tied to specific projects. Without such steps, it is likely that scientific analysis of threats from ballistic missiles, and other important science-based analyses, could end within a couple of years.

References [1] [2]

Donald H. Rumsfeld et. al., Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States; Executive Summary. Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm. See the interview with Paul Wolfowitz on Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ missile/threat/real.html. Accessed 5 January 2009.

9 This is my analysis of the situation in the US. As with any generalization, there are exceptions and some have suggested it does not hold true in other countries, such as the UK. If so, those countries have been remarkably successful at changing the organizational culture at universities and I congratulate them.


[3] [4]

[5] [6] [7] [8] [9]

[10]

[11] [12]

[13] [14] [15] [16] [17]

[18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23]

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M. Gordon and D. Cloud, US Knew of China’s Missile Test, but Kept Silent, New York Times, 23 April 2007, p.1. Geoffrey Forden, A Preliminary Analysis of the Chinese ASAT Test, 28 January 2007. Available at: http://web.mit.edu/stgs/pdfs/A%20Preliminary%20Analysis%20of%20the%20Chinese%20ASAT%20e st%20handout.pdf. Accessed 6 January 2009. AAAS Press Release, http://www.aaas.org/news/releases/2008/0327satellite.shtml. Accessed 13 January 2009. See the cover of the Lincoln Laboratory Journal, 13(1) (2002). Geoffrey Forden, How China Loses the Coming Space War, Danger Room, http://blog.wired.com/defense/2008/01/inside-the-chin.html. Accessed 6 January 2009. Michael Krepon, China’s Military Space Strategy: An Exchange, Survival, 50(1) (2008), 157 – 198. This characterization of ACW’s readership is based on private conversations with policy makers and others in government rather than on any scientific survey and so is perhaps more anecdotal than a scientific assessment. Dwayne A. Day, Of Myths and Missiles: the Truth about John F. Kennedy and the Missile Gap, The Space Review, 3 January 2006. Available on the web at http://www.thespacereview.com/article/523/1, accessed 7 January 2009. Helene Cooper and David E. Sanger, A Talk at Lunch That Shifted the Stance on Iran, New York Times, June 4, 2006. Juan Cole, Informed Comment: Thoughts on the Middle East, History, and Religion, http://www.juancole.com/2006/05/hitchens-hacker-and-hitchens.html, 3 May 2006. Accessed 7 January 2009. General Tray Obering, Ballistic Missile defense Overview for the National Defense Industry Association, 8 May 2008, Release08-MDA-3495 (7 MAY 08). Geoffrey Forden, Smoke and Mirrors: analyzing the Iranian missile test, Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 2008, pp. 47-51. Jeffrey Lewis, Forden on Safir-e Omid, Armscontrolwonk.com. Available at http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2004/forden-on-safir-e-omid. Accessed on 7 January 2009. J. Frederick White (editor), Flight performance Handbook for Powered Flight Operations, Space Technology Laboratory, Redondo Beach CA, 1962. A 500 kg nuclear explosive has been reported as a possible design the A.Q. Khan network had. See, for instance, George Jahn, Black market nuclear network had sophisticated info on how to make bomb, Associated Press, 12 September 2008. Also see Jeffrey Lewis, More on Libya’s Bomb Design, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/816/more-on-that-chinese-design-that-ended-up-in-libya. Accessed 13 January 2009. Geoffrey Forden, GUI_Missile_Flyout: A General Program for Simulating Ballistic Missiles, Science and Global Security, 15 (December 2007) 133-146. Wayne Glass, Concurrent Weapons Development and Production, US Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC, 1988. David Barstow, New York Times, April 20, 2008, p.1. Charles P. Vick, Taep’o-Dong-2 (TD-2) Design Evolution, Shahab-5, A, B, C/6. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/td-2-specs.htm. Accessed 26 December 2008. Science and Global Security is published by the Taylor and Francis group and can be found at http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/publications/SciGloSec.shtml. Accessed 8 January 2009. See for example, Geoffrey Forden, When is a Solid-Propellant Rocket Not?, Armscontrolwonk.com, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/2096/when-is-a-solid-propellant-rocket-not-a-solid-propellant-rocket. Accessed 8 January 2009.


Section 4 NATO’s Role in South-Eastern Europe in the Light of WMD Threat Assessment



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Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Process of Croatia’s Accession to NATO in the Light of WMD Threat Assessment Zvonimir MAHECIC Institute for International Relations, Zagreb, Croatia

Abstract. This chapter examines the role of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the present security environment from the point of view of a small transitional state like Croatia. Attention is focused on the existing contemporary strategic documents, their approach to the possible WMD threat, and the kinds of instruments and tools they prescribe to deal with this threat. We explore the similarities and differences within society, from the political institutions to the general public, regarding the NATO accession discussions and what specific role WMD played in these discussions. Finally, we attempt to clarify the interaction between the politics and the science that followed, or preceded, discussions connected with the eventual Croatian membership, especially those in NATO. Finally we offer some favourable and not so favourable conclusions based on first hand experience of these discussions, with the emphasis on what might have been, or still may be, improved in order to reach a better understanding between the public, science and politics in the Croatian social and political spheres, and try to reconsider the importance of the WMD threat in the future world. Keywords. Accession to NATO, communication strategy, politics, science, security, society, weapons of mass destruction.

Introduction In this chapter we will try to shed some light on three important aspects of this very important topic. The first aspect is the attempt of the Republic of Croatia, a small transitional European country, to become more involved in European political and security affairs by trying to join the EU and NATO. This attempt is embodied most strongly in the process of adjusting the domestic legal framework to fit European standards and in the reform of the security sector that is needed to prepare security and defence structures and institutions to attain the necessary levels of interoperability with NATO member countries. Of course, these processes can be connected with both beneficial and less beneficial expectations and consequences, so it is very important that our society comes to grips with the possible associated costs and benefits of each of them. The second aspect concerns the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). This threat represents one of the most important elements in our understanding of the security environment in today’s world. Thirdly, there is the role of science and scientists, words interpreted in the broadest possible sense, in pursuing the activities that are necessary in order to enable political and social institutions, and the public in general, to recognize and understand important elements relevant to assessing

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Z. Mahecic / Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Process of Croatia’s Accession to NATO

the advantages and disadvantages of becoming full members of the two most important international integrative organizations on European soil: the EU and NATO. This scientific role should be focused mainly on helping both political institutions and every single citizen to make decisions regarding the accession to these two organizations. By doing so, science and scientists would help to preserve, and even improve, national consensus and the level of understanding within society. In what follows we will try to elaborate the role of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the present security environment from the point of view of the small transitional state of Croatia. We will then focus our attention on the existing contemporary strategic documents, examine their approach to the possible WMD threat and the kinds of instruments and tools the documents prescribe to deal with this threat. We then try to explain the similarities and differences within society, from the political institutions to the general public, regarding the NATO accession discussions and the specific role that issues relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction played in these discussions. We attempt to clarify the interaction between politics and science that accompanied all the discussions relating to the eventual Croatian membership of NATO. Finally we offer some favourable – and not so favourable – conclusions based on first hand experience of these discussions, with the emphasis on what might have been – or still may be – improved in order to reach a better understanding between the public, science and politics in Croatian social and political life, and attempt to reconsider the relevance of Weapons of Mass Destruction in future world.

1. Security and Weapons of Mass Destruction If we look at the security of Croatia, and the region to which it belongs, through the lens of Weapons of Mass Destruction, it is easy to discern different levels at which this topic can be discussed. In today’s world, especially after September 11th, it is widely regarded that use of Weapons of Mass Destruction by different, and seemingly ever increasing numbers of terrorist groups and organizations, represents the ultimate threat to the safety and security of citizens, states and global civilization; it is often considered to be the ultimate threat to the Western way of life as we know it. This is the same way of life that the majority of the population in the socialist or ex-Eastern bloc states dreamed about during the long years of the Cold War, and which they strove to achieve as soon as possible after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Individual citizens, often too busy with the fight to secure their existence, and/or too ignorant to care about all the intricacies of global, regional, national and individual security and safety, partly listen to and accept what their politicians and media tell them. Often, to no avail, they hold different opinions about the political and social life of their societies and the actions of their Governments. This brings us to the role of the politicians, political structures and institutions (the Parliament, the Government, political parties, etc.) that sometimes seem to use the fluid and ambivalent security situation to their own benefits, pursuing goals that somehow look out of touch with the real needs of the citizens and society, but, cynics would say, seem to be very much in touch with the personal and group needs and interests of the political and financial elite. During discussions preceding and following NATO’s April 2008 Bucharest Summit invitation to Croatia to join the Alliance, it was widely regarded by our politicians that accession to NATO presented the key security guarantee to the state,


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nation and society. This view was more or less accepted by the public, as was clearly seen in the results of several different opinion polls.1 While these and other polls clearly demonstrated that the majority of the people were persuaded that Croatia’s security would be enhanced by accession to NATO, and that the nation would be better positioned to fight the threat of the terrorism, neither the political structures nor the polls mentioned the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction in any way. WMDs were completely ignored as a threat to the nation, society and citizens, and no part of the societal institutions mentioned them even in the context of terrorist threats. Discussion about accession to NATO was also marked by lack of a clear understanding of what NATO could do to bolster Croatian security and its international political position. In parallel, there was a lack of realization among the citizens of what we, as a society, really need to maintain our security status, and how we could benefit the most from our membership of NATO. It is only natural then that any discussion about the future modalities of our participation in NATO activities was focused merely on our participation in the international military missions and operations. Even here there was a widespread avoidance of discussing both the possible repercussion of that participation in terms of a terrorist threat, and the unlikely but possible threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction. What was worrying was not so much the public position towards, and general lack of knowledge about, this issue but rather the very obvious restraint of the majority of scientific circles to express their opinions and to take sides in this debate.

2. The Role of Science and Scientists in Security Affairs The only specific difference pertaining to the scientists involved in the security matters of the nation, as opposed to those scientists coming from other fields of activity, arises from the degree to which national security is considered by the public and media to be crucially important for the well-being, and even the very existence, of the nation and society. However, having said that, we are aware that scientists involved in other nonsecurity related scientific fields could probably claim the same degree of importance. An important question here is, of course: who is and who should be considered to be a scientist? Is a scientist defined by the scientific title? Is attachment to an established and recognized scientific institution the relevant criterion? Or involvement with some crucial scientific projects and research? Or is it something else that defines a scientist? There are many people with scientific titles who are not employed by scientific institutions. Moreover, sometimes scientists working in scientific institutions are not really involved with full time scientific work of any importance or significance. For a small country like Croatia, with roughly four and a half million citizens and only about 7.8% of its population having a university level education 2 , sticking to very strict criteria for who can and who can not be considered scientist might in practice result in only a handful of people being legitimately considered as scientists belonging to the scientific community. That is the reason why, at least for the purposes of this article, 1

Three polls undertaken during March 2008 gave the following figures in support for accession: (a). Accent Agency: 59%; (b). GFK Agency: 61%; (c). Puls Agency: 67%. Results of the last population census undertaken during 2001.

2

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we will take the position that anyone fulfilling any of the three criteria mentioned above could be legitimately called a scientist. This position will be substantiated by the extension of Peter Haas’s approach [1]. He argues that four key elements – professionalism, expertise, domain and knowledge – are relevant to give scientific, or at least firm professional, credibility and legitimacy to the work done by people working in state and non-state institutions and organizations in the field of security and defence. Although taken in a different context, we find applicability of these four elements to be sufficient in order not to undermine the scientific and professional positions of all the holders of scientific titles working in the state administration, independent institutes and think-tanks, NGOs, the media, etc.

3. Croatian Strategic Documents and Weapons of Mass Destruction In an attempt to understand better the lack of focus and orientation among the political structures and general population regarding the impact of Weapons of Mass Destruction on our security, we take a closer look at what the Croatian strategic documents say about the scope of security threats to the nation. After the death of the first Croatian President, Franjo Tudjman, the then opposition that formed around the coalition of the six political parties won the Parliamentary elections and formed the Government early at the beginning of the 2000. It was only after this change that Croatian state institutions attempted, and succeeded, in passing the basic security and defence strategic documents of the country. The National Security Strategy [2] and the Defence Strategy [3] were adopted and passed by the Parliament in the spring of 2002, and the Military Strategy [4] was signed by the President in the spring of 2003. Obviously, all these strategic documents are now six or seven years old and arguably there is a serious need to update them and adjust their findings, concepts and visions in the context of the changes there have been in the regional, European and global security environment. So what do these documents, albeit somewhat outdated, say specifically about the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction? The National Security Strategy [2] paid attention to Weapons of Mass Destruction in several pages and chapters but only in an extremely brief way. It mentioned the threat of the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in general, the need to implement existing international regulations relating to them, the need to introduce export controls on dual-use materials that could be used as ingredients for producing different kinds of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the need for the defence and military structures, organizations and units to provide help to the civilian institutions in case of need and in order to help them pursue control of and prevent proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Defence Strategy [3] adds scarcely anything to the picture presented above. This document repeats the issue of the threat of WMD proliferation in general, but adds nothing new to the strategic posture of Croatia in dealing with the threats presented by Weapons of Mass Destruction. Very much the same can be said for the Military Strategy [4]. It reiterates the need for the military structures to be able to support and offer help to the civilian institutions if and when the need arises, and in dealing with WMD proliferation.


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Even more importantly, if we pay attention to the process of risk analysis undertaken by the state institutions and organizations and try to draw a conclusion from the prioritization of security threats, we are faced with even more stunning revelations. If we attempt to compile a prioritized list of threats from above three strategic documents, we find that the top five places are filled by: x x x x x

A potential crisis in the neighbourhood. A low intensity conflict in the region. A crisis in the wider area. Problems relating to the transit of energy, having especially in mind the position of Croatia at an international traffic crossroad. Problems relating to the as yet not completely finished and irreversible political and democratic transition of the countries in the Eastern European/South Eastern European region, etc.

It seems obvious this prioritized list of threats might benefit from some updating; by deciding to accept such a list the security institutions and political structures left a lot to be desired. First, the threats listed were not particularly clear and unequivocal even when the documents were originally produced in 2002. More specific explanations are lacking regarding the kind of “crisis in the neighbourhood” that is meant, and what kind of “conflict in the region” is visualised and where. What is meant by the “wider area”? What specific problems with the “transit of energy” might have been expected, and what were the problems facing “transitional countries”? And now today (2009), seven years after these documents were drawn up, it is clear that such a list should be replaced with a list of the new prioritized threats that have come out of the latest reiteration of the risk analysis process. Deciding to accept such an unspecified and too broadly stated list of threats arguably can be considered as an attempt by the top security decision makers to not to miss too much because such security posture statements, while covering nothing in particular, at the same time cover almost everything in general. The weakest points of the current strategic documents are the following: x x x

A lack of a coherent approach to identifying applicable instruments and tools of pursuing security policy, apart from those bureaucratically approved and recognized. A failure to identify, and if possible reorganize, all the elements of the existing institutional security framework. A rather loose approach to the existing and available resources. These are perhaps not adequate to safeguard the security of the nation and society in the event of a grave emergency, but still they are much more at hand and existing than recognized by the present strategic documents.

4. Society, NATO Accession Discussions and Weapons of Mass Destruction All the issues mentioned in the two sections above, together with many other topics not mentioned because of space limitations, set the stage for development of the wide, national level public discussion regarding the costs and benefits, or better, the advantages and disadvantages, of accession to NATO. Starting earlier but gaining momentum from approximately 2006, as the first year when politics and the public

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alike started to comprehend that eventual full membership of NATO was just around the corner, results of the regular periodic polls showed relatively weak general support among the citizens for accession to NATO. According to a number of polls3, support was floating somewhere between 30-40%, which was considered by many – the Government representatives, NGOs, citizens and representatives of assorted foreign organizations and states – to be insufficient. In order to raise the level of support, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) Government adopted and adjusted a so-called ‘Communication Strategy’ that was previously introduced by the preceding (left wing) Coalition Government4. However, unfolding events in the following two years (2006-2008) proved it was almost impossible to discern if the real goal of the Communication Strategy was to inform the public, or whether this document was simply prepared and put in motion with the sole purpose of producing support for the Government’s views, moves and actions. This dilemma was enhanced among the scientists, security and defence analysts, citizens and media by the realization that some of the official actions taken to promote Croatian membership of NATO really looked like some old fashioned propaganda. As already mentioned earlier, discussion of the role and importance of Weapons of Mass Destruction throughout this discussion was negligible, if mentioned at all. The question is: why? While most of the common people, and even the majority of the scientists and professionals with adequate knowledge of security and defence matters, decided simply to accept at face value the views expressed by the Government, it is also true that, as a result of the post September 11th trauma (or should we say more likely a fashion in this part of the World?!), it is generally seen to be acceptable to talk about terrorism without going deeper into the matter and trying to disassemble and analyse some apparently unquestionable truths. It is generally perceived that once we are talking about terrorism we have done our homework and that there is no need to try to understand all the opportunities for the terrorist groups that are rooted in and arise from structural deficiencies and weaknesses in our own domestic security structures. The primacy of place that Weapons of Mass Destruction held in strategic considerations during the Cold War has been taken during the last ten years by terrorism. Finally, part of the reason for not discussing WMD threats in the context of NATO accession lies also in the question we did not satisfactory answer to ourselves: why do we want to join NATO? Whose needs and requirements do we fulfil by accession to the Alliance? Answers to these questions again vary strongly across the whole spectrum of society, depending on the particular individual or group perspective and perception. The political elite, especially that part belonging to the Government, reiterates strongly that Croatia is going to join NATO in order to raise the level of security, and to gain favourable recognition within international political, economic and financial circles. The political Opposition also supports accession to NATO, although it sometimes questions the manner in which this is being done. The media and some of the so-called independent scientists are noticeably indifferent to this issue, partly mildly supporting 3 Polls undertaken during December 2003 by students of the Faculty of Sociology showed 30% support for accession among the university student population. A September 2006 poll by the MFA Agency showed 32.8% support for accession, while one by the GFK Agency in March 2007 showed 43% support. 4 The strategy was first prepared by the Ministry for European Integrations. Entitled Communication Strategy for Informing Croatian Public on the Republic of Croatia Accession to European Integrations, it was adopted by the Coalition Government on 18 October 2001.


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NATO accession and partly noticing some discrepancies in the official position but without a strong intention to correct these. NGOs, or most of them, are most vociferous in asking questions and seeking explanations but sometimes they go too far in their resentment to NATO – actually so far that it becomes clear they do not present a valid alternative because their arguments are clearly strongly biased. However, some defence analysts joined ranks with the representatives of some NGOs and a few opposition politicians in asking significant questions. For example, how much would our membership of NATO contribute to our readiness and preparedness in fighting possible terrorist attacks on the Croatian soil? How much would involvement in international military missions and operations help to raise the Croatian Armed Force’s operational capabilities for such a task? Would it undermine our domestic security and international image, especially having doubted the long term success and utility of such operations? In such an environment most of the citizens are left to their own devices and their ability to recognize the real and valid motives and reasons for or against accession to NATO, motives and reasons that often have to be unearthed from behind layers of distorted views and statements. All of this is compounded by official strategic meddling that leaves more questions than it offers answers. Ever since the times of President Tudjman, Croatian politics has tried to navigate somewhere in between the EU and NATO. Or to put it in more practical terms, it was trying to sail between the pro-European and pro-American lines, while at the same time lacking the clear vision as to how to use both approaches to the nation’s best interest, but without harming Croatian interest too much with either of these two sides.

5. Some of the Issues Considered During the nationwide discussion regarding Croatian accession to NATO, a lot of issues have been raised by participants from different parts of the political and social spectrum, scientists included. It was the issue of sovereignty that took quite a lot of consideration, despite the fact that NATO is based on the consensual decision making process. Still, the question of sovereignty was never connected with the possibility of storing or transporting Weapons of Mass Destruction across Croatian territory. This was related to the possibility of establishing foreign military bases on Croatian territory which was presented as a big problem, partly because of the so-called Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) that were supposed to exclude foreign soldiers from the domestic judicial system and give them immunity from domestic laws. Security perception on the parts of the politicians and general public alike was widely discussed and, as already mentioned, it was considered to be one of the main reasons for accession to NATO. However, in discussing security status and position of the country, Weapons of Mass Destruction were not mentioned at any significant level. Among the public there was only the echo of the general political expectation: that we will be more secure through accession to NATO. This assertion was accepted at face value; it became a sort of urban myth and no party was ready to question it in discussion, or to shed more light on it by explaining to citizens how this statement, which even might be correct, would be realised practically and maintained through deliberate Governmental plans and actions. Modalities, tools and instruments aimed at

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raising the level of security of the whole society were not discussed by the official representatives, and numerous scientists remained mostly silent too. There was a heated debate about the level of public support for accession to NATO and about the possibility of a popular referendum that would decide this issue nationwide. The threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction was again no part of this debate. Many other issues were mentioned and considered important, either to support demands of parts of the public, some NGOs and a few opposition politicians and relatively small political parties, or on the other hand to reject demands for a referendum through the statements of the official representative. But both sides of the accession argument obviously concluded that there was no place for Weapons of Mass Destruction in deciding on the accession issue. Fear of terrorism was used and misused on both sides, but also with no reference to the possible use of Weapons of Mass Destruction by terrorist groups. It was interesting to note that NGOs, scientists and groups of citizens focused on protection of the environment and ecological issues, fears being expressed of all sorts of pollution coming from consequent NATO military activities. Specifically, there was fear of the consequences of use of depleted uranium ammunition during exercises on military testing grounds, and fear of the consequences of the presence of foreign nuclear powered and/or armed ships in Croatian territorial waters or near international waters5. But this was as close as the accession to NATO debate came to the WMD issue. Ever since Croatia was admitted to join the Partnership for Peace, the process of security sector reform was pursued by the state institutions in order to prepare and adjust security and defence structures to the needs of eventual membership in NATO, to make them conform with the way security and defence organizations operate in a democratic country and to make them more interoperable with the old NATO member countries’ armed forces. This process naturally had its ups and downs. Sometimes it was oriented too much towards centralization of authority and sometimes it was easy to recognize power struggles between the political institutions behind the proclaimed reform processes. After September 11th, pressure to extend the repressive rights and capabilities of the political institutions and security agencies to suppress some of the long established civil rights incorporated in the domestic legal framework experienced a renewed boost. Strangely enough, these intentions were not vehemently opposed by political and social scientists who were only a few years earlier proponents of human and civil rights within the society. Despite all of these problems, the security sector reform process had positive consequences for the security and defence structures, and for society as a whole. However, it was clear then as it is today that these reforms were not tailored to counter the WMD threat. It is even questionable, despite the terrorist threat becoming almost a mantra in today’s world, how much the reforms managed to improve society’s ability to defend itself against serious terrorist threats. A prominent argument during the NATO accession discussion was the fear of possible victims among the Croatian soldiers sent to participate in the international military missions and operations. Strangely, while the possibility of the death of a couple of soldiers played such a prominent role in heated debates throughout the society, there was a total institutional and societal neglect of the possibility of mass

5

The Adriatic Sea is a relatively closed sea. It is 80-160 km wide and 800 km long, with six countries placed on its shores with coast lengths ranging from 20 to 6000 km (islands included).


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casualties, destruction and suffering in the case of a terrorist attack with Weapons of Mass Destruction on domestic soil. It seemed that an official panacea that would prevent such an attack had been found in the widely-proclaimed sharing of intelligence data amongst the members of the Alliance. However, our politicians failed to recognize that such already-established procedures did not prevent terrorist attacks in Madrid and London. Again, political and social scientists and other security professionals kept very low profiles in explaining to the public the need for raising the level of readiness and awareness. Moreover, in addition to sharing intelligence, we need all sort of different activities in order to safeguard society against terrorist attacks: firmly established and smooth international cooperation which is not based on selfish interests; national coordination within society encompassing not only state institutions but also the widest possible array of societal institutions; preparedness of the local authorities and communities, and ever improving operational readiness and analytical work – not only among intelligence agencies. The Government tried very hard to persuade the public that a direct consequence of the accession to NATO would be a significant increase of foreign direct investments and sharp economic development resulting in a distinct increase in the gross domestic product. Official representatives made unequivocal statements that the other new NATO member states experienced such consequences. The politicians thus created high expectations among the population, although they were not ready to support such statements with hard evidence and analysis. Quite to the contrary: all the available research done in other European transitional countries, data from international economic organizations and institutes, as well as domestic research [5], showed it was impossible to prove a hard connection and strong correlation between accession to NATO and an improvement of the economic and financial markers. Economic and financial scientists and the media mostly remained silent about these predictions. Fittingly, Ministry of Defence representatives along with some political advisors expressed the views that defence costs would be significantly lowered as a consequence of NATO accession. What in reality happened was that defence costs for 2008, along with the projections of the military budget up to the 2011, showed a significant increase over their levels in the preceding years. When announcing the expected decrease of the defence costs the MoD’s professionals – as well as some of the scientists who in the meantime became strongly politically involved – failed to mention the increase of the financial and other resources that would result from Croatian extended ‘out of area’ engagement. They also failed to mention the need to increase our ‘in area’ capabilities to counteract the almost ten years’ neglect of military acquisition and modernization after the end of the war. Most importantly in the present context, there was no mention of the relevance of these two elements for countering possible domestic Weapons of Mass Destruction threats. Finally, the opposition to the Croatian accession to NATO made the case that there would be negative impacts on tourism as a consequence of NATO military hardware running up and down the Adriatic Sea and adjacent coast. But again, nobody mentioned any influence of Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Croatian tourist appeal.

6. Politics – Science Interaction Politics is usually characterized by values and irrationality. Science, on the other hand, is characterized by facts and rationality [6], and should represent critical mass and

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combination of rational thought based on hard evidence and framed by established verifiable procedures. If that is so one can only ask the question: how come that so many fraudulent policies manage to win the support of at least part of the scientific communities all around the world?! It is very easy to have high expectations of science and scientists. After all, science gives the rest of the participants in social life an excuse: if science cannot hold politics at bay then the rest of us are helpless. But is this really so? If we look at the budgets of different state and non-state institutions and organizations, applied science and research and development activities are generally neglected. Is there any other possible conclusion, and can we really expect more of the impact of science if we know that scientifically, R&D oriented activities usually get less than 1% of any specific budget? Furthermore, there is an obvious lack of educated individuals on both sides of the fence – the state and non-state institutions and organizations. NGOs, the media, enterprises and political structures suffer equally from the lack of available quality professionals and scientists. Governmental institutions and the education system fail to produce the needed number of adequately educated and trained civilians for all sorts of scientific activities in the security and defence fields. Once they fulfil their education and training, target destinations should include the Parliament, Government, and ministries (where in all three they should work as staffers), the media (printed and electronic alike), scientific institutes and think-tanks, NGOs, universities and the academic community as a whole. Another important issue is the question of alleged scientific independence. In reality it is quite hard to find independent, credible and impartial voices dealing with security and defence matters. There are many reasons for this, and not all of them can be attributed to the politicians. Croatian societal and public life experienced very clearly and vividly in the last 10 to 15 years a tendency on the part of the scientists to ‘join the flock’. There were many ways for them to do so. One, we dare to say particularly damaging, way is for comparatively well-established scientists to join the ranks of politicians. This very often results in the emergence of the lose-lose scenario through the very simple yet very vivid consequence that a good scientist becomes a not-so-good political appointee; and during the course of time science effectively loses a good scientist and the political life of the country gets a not particularly good politician! This finally brings us to the central question: is there such a thing as independent science or an independent scientist? To be able to offer at least a partly satisfactory answer to this question we have to recognize that security and defence in large part belong to the socio-political sciences and not to the so-called hard sciences. If we look at the position of science within the society it becomes noticeable that it is more or less dependent on external factors. First there is the issue of money – financing the scientific activities – and that issue alone is enough to recognize the reality that science, like any other activity, is more or less openly or tacitly dependent on it financiers. Then there is the issue of social recognition which becomes important once we recognize that scientists are only humans with all their good and bad characteristics. Lastly, as already explained, scientists are also prone to the Sirens’ call of political might, power and influence which makes them susceptible to becoming dependent on inner motives, if not already forced to become so by outside forces. The reasons for a scientist to move into politics may vary, but it is not incomprehensible to realize that sometimes a scientist can decide to take active role in political life because of his or her expectations


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that it might be beneficial for that person individually, for the scientific institution where he or her was previously employed, or for science as a whole. The bottom line is: scientific independence – at least if understood rigidly – might look like a pink elephant! Everybody is talking about it but nobody is in reality able to see it. Because in the end, if a scientist manages to avoid all the Scyllas and Kharybdises of his or her social, political and economic environment there is still a danger of becoming dependent on one’s own scientifically reinforced prejudice. This became clear during the process of discussion on Croatian accession to NATO. In some cases some of the alleged professionals and scientists on both sides were impossible to be dissuaded of their beliefs and opinions, whatever argument one could put before them. Of course, even if the scientists do their task to the best of their ability, by providing ample scientific findings and enabling politics to use these findings in order to reach optimal decisions within the framework of the political decision-making process, the question still remains: how much politics really wants to be ‘framed’ by the scientific advice? With this question we are back to the starting issue of rationality of science versus the irrationality of politics. In such a scenario science cannot be held responsible for political shortcuts and distorted interests. Scientists are at the end of the list of those called upon to foster responsibility and rationality within and between the nations. But they are very important in providing ‘ammunition’: ideas, arguments, concepts, visions, analysis and synthesis for those who are above them on that list. However, one cannot ignore the reality that many scientists, for reasons outlined previously in the text, take firm scientific rules and procedures as an excuse and some kind of hideaway for not daring to venture into promoting fresh scientific vision to at least try to offer cures for many of the problems troubling the present civilization (or civilizations). By seeking refuge in sticking too tightly to rigid scientific rules they in fact desert science and their credibility as scientists.

7. Concluding Remarks The main problem with discussing WMD threats in a small country like Croatia lies in the widespread belief that such threats are regarded, by most of the politicians and the public alike, as the exclusive domain of the few most wealthy and militarily capable states. So why should we bother? While it is true that Croatia cannot do much to prevent a ballistic missile attack – and in a hope that Alliance capabilities might resolve the issue this might be one of the plausible reason for accession to NATO – still there are many actions and moves we can take to protect our territory, society and citizens from consequences of many other forms of use or misuse of Weapons of Mass Destruction. This brings us to the point that Weapons of Mass Destruction are treated as a mono-dimensional threat, despite the multiple layers and facets to their possible utilization. Chemical and biological agents could be smuggled across Croatian territory either with the objective of being transported further to the West or used against Croatia. In both cases, by deliberate action or by some accidental mishap, we can be faced with the consequences for which we as a state and society are not ready to deal with. By turning the blind eye to such a possibility, while in parallel repeating generally accepted mantras about terrorism, our political, social and scientific institutions and

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organizations seem to repeat the same mistake that some of the Western states have already committed by looking for all the wrong appearances of Weapons of Mass Destruction in all the wrong places and by all the wrong tools and instruments. The problem of recognising the real threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the present world at least partially results from an overlapping and intermingling with the threat of terrorism. In the end we are no longer sure where the main threat comes from: from terrorism or from Weapons of Mass Destruction? Publicly announced security policies and intentions developed by crisis management and planning – if this is done at all – mostly speak about terrorism. But the threat of terrorism exists regardless of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The opposite is also true: the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction exists regardless of terrorism. Our strategic and planning documents should be able to recognize that, and prepare the society for dealing with these two threats in the most affordable and realistic way without pretending that one does not exist because the other somehow takes precedence. This places more emphasis on the need for the institutional risk assessment process and its results – generally unknown recently – to be more transparent and involve as many societal institutions as possible, not only old-fashioned ministries and security agencies. In doing so we would be able to sort things out and prioritize our domestic and international commitments. The clash between our ‘out of area’ involvement (very likely based on wrong judgments and expectations that are even more out of touch with reality) and the need to improve our ‘in area’ capabilities in order to safeguard domestic security, could and probably would be put aside and enable us to set down realistic foundations for dealing with the regional and domestic security threats, allowing more financial, diplomatic, defence and administrative resources to be used in the development of proper, realistic and affordable ways for fighting, among others, the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Consequently, domestic institutional expectations – looking almost as if someone else (NATO, EU, UN, international community, USA) will do the job – could be transformed into an active approach focused on the well-being of society. In order to do this we should take off our tinted glasses of politically correct and acceptable threat assessment, which can be summed up by the notion that threats are coming from the South (or East, or undeveloped countries, or so-called failed states), and that the North (or West, or developed countries, or democratic states) is the only side that is rightfully entitled to feel threatened by the opposite side. History to the present day shows enough evidence that the South, East, and undeveloped countries all have more than enough reason to feel threatened by the developed democratic North and West. Naturally, for our political elites, even for most of the scientists and citizens, it is much easier to believe the threat is always coming from ‘over there’, from somebody else. Never from here in our own backyard!

8. Look to the Future - What Are the Real Weapons of Mass Destruction? When the term Weapons of Mass Destruction was coined in early days of the Cold War following the use of atomic bombs against Japan (although there is at least one known instance of a similar term being used in reference to the consequences of conventional weapons) it referred mainly to atomic weapons. The term covered the notion of a weapon that can kill very large numbers of people, and cause great damage to structures and installations, nature, or the biosphere in general [7]. Over the course of


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time the term’s usage has been broadened by applying it to other kinds of weapons, such as chemical, radiological and biological weapons and agents. At the time of and for the most part of the Cold War, Atomic, Biological and Chemical (ABC) weapons remained the most likely cause of wide-scale global devastation that could cause destruction or drastic deterioration of life on planet Earth, thus deservedly claiming the right of the title of Weapons of Mass Destruction. A question remains: is this situation unchanged today? And if someone would have to decide today, without previous knowledge, what kind of threat deserves this title, what would be the choice? Despite the continuing threat, Atomic, Biological and Chemical Weapons never came close to destroying civilization, or even part of it. The same is true for terrorism that, although being considered the Number One threat of the modern Western world, in reality has so far not been able to threaten the Western way of life. Furthermore, the psychological and moral implications of misuse of the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction in combination with terrorism also have to be considered, with some views being expressed that in the recent years the term WMD was actually misused as ‘Weapons of Mass Distraction’. A closer look to the trends, however, suggests at least two possible contenders for the title of WMD in the present and future world. As a result of overconsumption and overpopulation, the combination of technological development and energy needs let loose out of Pandora’s box results in the deterioration of the natural preconditions for a sustainable and quality life on the planet. On the other hand, as we can all witness recently, financial meddling, unrestricted economic development (always at somebody else’s expense), and general vulnerability of the financial structures and procedures is becoming more dangerous then ever, coming closer than has any previous threat to undermining and destroying the Western way of life. So it would be wise to think about further extension and adjustment of the meaning of the term Weapons of Mass Destruction. Since this term has broadened its meaning already in the past we should not lure ourselves into believing it is not going to change again in the future. By not so doing, we would demonstrate that we are considering possible and eventual consequences of human activities with open minds, aware of emergencies that could result from unrestricted and loosely regulated economic and financial human activities that could, if not kept at bay, become bigger threats to the present civilization and way of life than the Weapons of Mass Destruction themselves.

References [1] [2] [3] [4]

[5] [6]

[7]

P.M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, International Organization, 46(1) (1992), 1-35. The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia, Narodne Novine 32/02, 28 March 2002. The Defence Strategy of the Republic of Croatia, Narodne Novine 33/02, 29 March 2002. The Military Strategy of the Republic of Croatia, Compendium of Defence-related Legal Acts and Strategic Documents, Ministry of Defence/General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Croatia, Zagreb, March 2004. Institute for International Relations, Zagreb, project on Costs and Benefits of Croatia’s Accession to NATO, IMO, Zagreb, December 2008. See for example R. Pielke Jr, Facts, Values, and Scientists in Policy Debates, Center for Science and Technology Policy Research, Univesity of Colorado at Boulder, October 16 2006. Available at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/prometheus/archives/the_honest_broker/000958facts_values_and_s.ht ml. Weapons of Mass Destruction, New York Times Magazine, 19 April 1998, p.22.

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A Macedonian View on NATO’s Role in South-East Europe in the Light of WMD Threat Assesment Mile ALEKSOSKI Balkan Security Forum, Skopje, Republic of Macedonia.

Abstract. Macedonia lies at the crossroad of the main routes of trade, terrorism, illegal migration, human trafficking, and the smuggling of drugs, light weapons and components for production of weapons of mass destruction from Asia and Africa towards Western Europe. With the help of the international community, Macedonia hopes that it will achieve its projected goals of full NATO and EU membership. The country continues to contribute to collective defense through developing different capabilities and more effective and deployable forces that are trained for expeditionary warfare. Keywords. Macedonia, terrorism, measures against terrorism, goals, EU, NATO.

Introduction: Geography, History and Factors Relating to the Emergence of Terrorism and Organized Crime Macedonia is located in South-Eastern Europe, on the Balkan Peninsula. Its neighboring countries are Bulgaria to the east, Greece to the south, Albania to the west, and Serbia and Kosovo to the north. The country became independent on 8 September 1991, after the disintegration of former Yugoslavia, and entered into a period of transition which was characterized by big macro-social changes. These changes created space for the growth of organized crime and terrorism. The main factors that contributed to the emergence of these highly negative developments were: x x x

The country’s geo-strategic position and its surroundings. Ethnic conflicts and clashes in the former Yugoslav republics. Weapons inflow from Albania after the fall of the Enver Hoxa regime.

The influence of these unconventional threats was partly reflected in the attempted assassination of President Kiro Gligorov in 1995, and the security crisis of 2001. Macedonia realized that the only way to fight these unconventional threats was through the implementation of NATO and EU standards and the country’s incorporation into these structures.

M. Aleksoski / A Macedonian View on NATO’s Role in South-East Europe

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1. The Key Role of the Ministry of the Interior In the fight against terrorism and organized crime, the Ministry of the Interior (MOI) is the major actor. Through bilateral and multilateral cooperation, the MOI has achieved significant improvement in the widening and intensification of cooperation, especially with the neighboring countries and with other countries in the region. This cooperation is an essential condition for successfully confronting and fighting organized crime, illegal human trafficking, drugs, weapons and terrorism.

2. Measures Taken against Terrorism and Organized Crime Macedonia participates in the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of WMD by taking the following measures: x x x x x x

Participation in exchanges of security information. Regional cooperation on the security plan in the Adriatic Charter1 and Balkan Security Initiatives. Detection and prevention of illegal trafficking of dangerous materials which can be used to create weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). Suitable education of personnel in the Ministry of Defense (MOD), the MOI and other institutions that are involved in the fight against terrorism. Participation in and integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures. Participation in missions against terrorism (Iraq Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina…).

Governmental measures taken against terrorism and organized crime are: x x x x x x x x x x

Synchronization of domestic laws with international laws. Active participation against terrorism on both international and state levels. Regional cooperation. Transfer of border controls from the Army of the Republic of Macedonia (ARM) to the MOI (completed in 2005). Border control at border crossing points. New biometric passports. Equipping border crossing points with mobile X-ray scanners. Signing the memorandum for regional cooperation between South-East European countries for combating illegal trafficking. Regional cross-border cooperation through multiple bilateral agreements with neighboring countries. Information exchange among different agencies in the region and with friendly security and intelligence services.

Cooperation is achieved through meetings at ministerial and expert levels, mutually providing and exchanging information, data and education through 1

An association formed by Albania, Croatia and Macedonia for the purpose of aiding their attempts to join NATO. The Charter was signed in 2003 in Washington under the aegis of the USA. On December 2008 Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the Charter. On April 1, 2009, Albania and Croatia became the first of the group to join NATO.

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workshops of NATO, the Stability Pact2, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Center for Combating Trans-border Crime. Through the international military exercises and peacekeeping operations of NATO, EU and UN forces, the Macedonian Army contributes to the fight against terrorism and the wider proliferation of WMDs.

3. The Legal Framework In striving toward integration in NATO and the EU, Macedonia has adopted a significant number of international laws. The legal framework on which the confrontation with organized crime and terrorism is based consists of the following elements: x x x x x x x x x

The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. Criminal law. Defense law. Interior affairs law. Crisis management and rescue law. Border surveillance law. The country’s Strategic Defense Review. The directive signed by the President of the Republic of Macedonia for the army’s support of the MOI. The directive signed by the Ministries of Defense and Information for the engagement of the army in the Directorate for Crisis Management.

4. International Contribution Macedonia since 2002 has become an active participant in fighting against global threats throughout the world (see figure 1). The contribution of the Republic of Macedonia to international operations is constantly increasing. In 2008, the Republic of Macedonia has continued to provide support to five international operations. This has involved about 240 military personnel, a number which represents 4% of the total number of the country’s land forces. Following the end of the Iraqi Freedom mission (December 2008), Macedonia plans in 2009 to reinforce the mission in Afghanistan with part of the Iraqi contingent.

2 The Stability Pact was the first serious attempt by the international community to replace the previous, reactive crisis intervention policy in South-Eastern Europe with a comprehensive, long-term conflict prevention strategy. The idea arose in late 1998 and thus predates the Kosovo war. The main priority of the Stability Pact Special Coordinator was to encourage regional discussions and cooperation in each of the three priority areas: democratization, economic development and security.


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Figure 1. Contribution to international operations (situation as of November 2008).

5. Conclusions and Prospects Regardless of the decisions of the NATO 2008 Bucharest summit, the strategic interests of the Republic of Macedonia remain unchanged. NATO and EU integration, and active participation in all other forms of international cooperation, are its strategic priorities. Here I would like to stress that after the Bucharest summit the country’s public support for NATO membership was about 85 %, a figure which is higher than in most of the countries that have become full NATO members in the last 10 years. The enthusiasm has not been lost. On the contrary our country is fully committed to achieving our goal, which is full NATO and EU membership. We are continuing to contribute to collective defense through developing different capabilities and more effective and deployable forces that are trained for expeditionary warfare.

Bibliography Website of the Government of the Republic of Macedonia: http://www.vlada.mk/?q=frontpage. Website of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia: http://www.mvr.gov.mk/EN/. Website of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Macedonia: http://www.morm.gov.mk:8080/ morm/en/homepage.html.


Section 5 Scientists, Citizens and the Media



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Global Security, Weapons of Mass Destruction and The Responsibility of Scientists Ivo ŠLAUS Croatian Pugwash and World Academy of Art and Science, Zagreb, Croatia

Abstract The usefulness of military power and deterrence are analyzed and it is concluded that most of the threats and dangers facing the contemporary world can be neither prevented nor reduced by military power and deterrence. It is argued that the best solution is a knowledge-based society, and that NATO, through its pillar ‘Science for Peace and Security’, is a unique alliance that is capable of assuring global security. Keywords Global security, military power and deterrence, weapons of mass destruction, knowledge-based society.

Introduction During 2007 a group of retired politicians and a group of retired commanding officers publicly spoke out respectively against and for nuclear deterrence. G. Schultz, S. Nunn, W. Perry and H. Kissinger wrote [1] that a nuclear-weapons-free world is in the interest of the USA and that it should be the goal of the USA and all democratic countries. Contrary to that statement, K. Naumann, J. Shalikashvilli, Lord Inge, J. Lanxade and H. van den Breemen in their manuscript [2] ‘Towards a grand strategy for an uncertain world. Renewing transatlantic partnership’ argued that current threats and challenges require NATO to keep open the option of first use of nuclear weapons. Interestingly, a group of active Italian politicians, together with a renowned physicist and Pugwashite, published in 2008 an article ‘For a World Free of Nuclear Weapons’ [3]. Furthermore, the Southeast European (SEE) Division of the World Academy of Art and Science has argued that “…peace and security are essential for the development of South-East Europe and that is best assured through NATO membership of all SEE countries. The extension of NATO to all SEE countries should not bring nuclear weapons... Therefore, countries of SEE should join together in declaring the SEE region a nuclear-weapon-free-zone similar to those nuclear weapons free zones in Central Asia, Latin America and South Pacific” [4]. In June 2007 Canadian Pugwash called for denuclearization of NATO. Does our security require possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)? Do we need military power at all?

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I. Šlaus / Global Security, Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Responsibility of Scientists

1. Threats and Dangers Addressing the Annual conference of The Club of Rome in Madrid in October 2007 Rodrigo Rato, then the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, listed the three greatest threats to humankind: financial instability, demographic transition and climate change. In less than a year financial instability had turned in to an economic crisis, possibly the most dangerous economic crisis the world has ever faced. It is projected that during the 21st century the world population will increase to about ten billions, and then in two to three centuries will decrease to about two billions – indeed a major demographic transition which will have significant consequences: immigration, labour shortages and radical change in age distribution. The adverse effects of climate change can be presently mitigated by 1.6% of the world gross domestic product (GDP). However, if action is delayed by 20 or more years, more than 20% of our GDP will be needed [5]. These three threats are quite recent. We can expect that many new, so far totally unknown, threats will face us in the near future. However, many new opportunities and options1 will also appear. Some events – both threats and opportunities – are highly unlikely, but if realised would have profound effects. N.N. Taleb called these possible events “black swans” [7]. Interestingly, the doctrine of third generation warfare calls for ‘thinking the unthinkable’. The contemporary world is global and rapidly changing. In a global world problems and threats cannot be contained; they affect the entire world. However, the present world is not fully global: it is not global when it has to react and particularly when it has to anticipate, stimulate and generate desirable changes. Then it becomes fragmented. Rato’s list of contemporary threats and dangers is obviously not complete. Among recent threats one should emphasize not only terrorism [8] and rogue and failing states [9], but also totalitarian regimes [10], global organized crime [11], water and energy shortages, pollution and global health problems. In addition to these more recent dangers there are threats and dangers that our ancestors were also faced with, for example, natural disasters, xenophobia, war and shortages of resources. Various experts have listed these threats and dangers and ranked them according to their current significance. We will present them in a 2-dimensional plot where one axis is the likelihood that the event will occur and the other axis represents consequences of the event. We have put the destruction of our civilization as the maximum consequence (Figure 1). One concludes that most of the threats and dangers are human-made. Indeed, we live in an epoch that is rightly termed the Anthropocene epoch [12]: human beings are appreciably influencing both their own evolution [13] and the Earth – for better or for worse. In the figure, natural disasters fall in a hyperbolic area extending from high probability and low impact to very low probability and tremendous consequences, e.g. the impact of a large celestial body on the Earth, a major earthquake or major climate change.

1

It is possible that we will be suffocated by a variety of options that we are unable to choose from. See [6].


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Figure 1. Threats and dangers facing the contemporary world.

2. Are Military Means Useful in Countering Contemporary Threats? How should we protect ourselves from threats and dangers? How should we minimize and mitigate their adverse effects? Throughout our history power assured security and dominance, and power meant military power. Is presently military power and military deterrence useful? Does it protect us from all, or at least from most, of the threats and dangers we are facing today? Military means can neither protect us from nor diminish the effects of any of the Rato’s three threats, and the same is true for pollution, global health problems, decreasing bio- and cultural diversity and inadequate governance. Inadequate governance is, according to many polls [14], truly miserable. How useful is military deterrence for protecting us from aggression, thereby reducing likelihood of war? From rogue and failing states? From terrorists, and for assuring adequate water, energy and other scarce resources? We will now analyze the usefulness and perils of military power and of deterrence. Since military power and deterrence appear to have been so useful throughout our history, they create a perception of security even now, and unfortunately, in politics it is perception and not reality that counts. Military power could be useful if we were threatened by alien hostile power, whatever that is, though it is unlikely that that alien hostile power could be at approximately the same technological level as we are and that our military power would be of any use. The scenario of wars over resources [15], where indeed military power and military deterrence are necessary, are among the darkest scenarios and everything should be done to avoid them, since already scarce resources will be destroyed by military actions. Highly organized, hierarchically

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structured organization such as the military is very useful in addressing many natural disasters, but such organizations can be developed and can exist independently of military power. What are the perils of current nuclear deterrence? First. It led us to the concept of mutually assured destruction (MAD), with nuclear arsenals more than a hundred times greater than required for any deterrent purpose. In addition, there is no solid evidence that nuclear deterrence has worked as a stabilizing factor. It is claimed that the threat of using nuclear weapons worked only in one case: it forced the USA to provide Israel with spare parts during wartime, when Israel threatened to use its nuclear arsenal to assure victory [16]. This case can hardly be quoted as avoiding the war. Second. Various measurements have almost become our current obsession [17]. Although most of these measurements (including GDP, many socioeconomic indicators and science-innovation indicators) are quite unreliable for detailed assessments, certain general conclusions can be drawn from them. The University of Sydney and the Economist Intelligence Unit have developed a Global Peace Index [18] which uses 24 different input indicators and covers 140 states. The highest peace indices are achieved by Iceland, Denmark, Norway, New Zealand, Japan and Ireland. At the bottom of the list is Iraq at 140th. France is 36th, behind Slovenia (which is 16th) and just ahead of Vietnam (37th). The UK is 49th, not much better than Croatia, 60th, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 66th. The USA is 97th behind Syria which is ranked 75th and Serbia (85th). Iran is 105th, India 107th, Pakistan 127th, Russia 131st, North Korea 133rd, and Israel 136th. We see that all states possessing nuclear weapons are ranked very low. Obviously, having nuclear weapons does not guarantee peace, contrary to the old Latin proverb that in order to live in peace one should prepare for war. Third. Another indicator is provided by the Doomsday clock [19]. It was set at 7 minutes to midnight in 1947, and was at 2 minutes to midnight in 1952 after both the USA and USSR developed their nuclear weapons. After the collapse of communism and the fall of the Berlin wall it was back at 17 minutes, but it is now forward again at only 5 minutes to midnight, demonstrating that these WMDs do not provide sufficient security. On the contrary, together with other real threats such as climate change and economic crisis, they push us closer to the catastrophe. Fourth. Nuclear deterrence is very expensive. The Brookings Institute estimated that the USA has spent 5.8 trillion dollars on nuclear weapons [20] and France has spent 1.5 trillion. To put these figures in perspective, the hunger in the world would be appreciably reduced by allocating about 20 billion dollars, and for only 5 billion dollars all landmines could be removed. Fifth. Tests of nuclear weapons in the USA and in the USSR have caused significant exposures to radiation, not only of workers, but also of civilian populations that have been neither properly informed nor protected. Sixth. Accidents involving nuclear weapons have been happening regularly since 1950 at an average frequency of more than one per year2. 2

There were many accidents involving nuclear weapons between 1950 and 1980. The list of these accidents in the Hiroshima museum includes: February 5, 1958: a B47 accidentally dropped a nuclear bomb which was never recovered. January 24, 1961: a B52 caught fire above North Carolina and accidentally dropped two hydrogen bombs. April 10, 1963: a nuclear submarine sank in Boston harbour resulting in 129 deaths. August 19, 1965: a Titan missile caught fire resulting in 53 deaths.


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Seventh. Currently, the few nuclear weapon states are preventing almost 200 other sovereign states from getting nuclear weapons, making this so-called deterrence by WMD inherently unstable [21]. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 aims to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons, and its Article VI specifically calls for nuclear disarmament, so committing those states having nuclear weapons to reducing and eventually eliminating them. There has been very little progress in that direction, as the VIIth Review Conference of the NPT in May 2005 showed. Though the number of nuclear weapons has been reduced, a significant fraction of them is on hairtrigger alert status, and the doctrine of the first-use of nuclear weapons is still adhered to by several of the nuclear weapons states. Eighth. Nuclear weapons are in various ways vulnerable to terrorist use [22]. There are about 10,000 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) unaccounted for, an amount that is equivalent to about 400 nuclear bombs. A terrorist group that acquired HEU could make a primitive nuclear weapon and if that is done in the place where they intend to detonate it, there is no need for a delivery system. In 2003 there were over 3700 metric tons of plutonium and HEU in 60 states. Over the last decade the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported 18 incidents involving these materials. If the fraction of 235U in this ‘surplus’ HEU were reduced to less than 20%, it would not be useful for a terrorist bomb, since it would require a major enrichment installation to reconstitute weapons-grade HEU. In early 1990 Russia and the USA agreed to down-blend 500 tons of surplus Russian HEU, but this process remains to be fully realized [23]. Ninth. Nuclear weapons, as emphasized by US Secretary of Defense R. Gates [24] “are designed on the assumption of limited shelf life... No nuclear weapon in our arsenal has been tested since 1992... China and Russia have embarked on a plan to design and field new weapons. To be blunt there is no way that we can maintain credible deterrence without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing modernization program... For several years DoD and DoE have pursued a Reliable Replacement Warhead Program.” Nuclear weapons are not only immoral and illegal, but also unusable as military weapons. Though it has been argued [25] that the USA could use nuclear weapons in a surprise first-strike attack to destroy its enemy, it would be suicidal because of the nuclear winter that would ensue [26]. A nuclear conflict involving 4400 nuclear explosions with a 440 Megaton total yield3 [27] has been estimated would cause 770 million casualties. It would also generate 180 trillion grams of soot that would result in Ice Age conditions: the indirect effects would thus likely eliminate the majority of the

January 17, 1966: a B52 with two hydrogen bombs crashed over Spain. January 21, 1968: a B52 crashed over Greenland. May 21, 1968: a nuclear submarine sank resulting in 99 deaths. 1969: a nuclear accident in China. February 1970: an explosion in a nuclear submarine factory in the USSR. October 25, 1976: an underground nuclear explosion in the USSR caused 40 deaths. July 6, 1979: an accident at the French nuclear test site at Mururoa Atoll. The US Department of Defense has estimated that between 1950 and 1980 there were 32 serious accidents. Accidents involving WMDs continue to this day. 3 According to the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty of 2002 the USA and Russia should reduce their operationally deployed warheads to 1700-2200 each by 2012, i.e. 6% of the maximum number of 70,000 warheads existing in 1986. The total yield quoted here is based on an average yield of 0.1 Megatons per warhead. Therefore, the explosion of 440 Megaton total yield is the lowest limit in a possible nuclear war between the USA and Russia.

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human population. Even a much smaller nuclear conflict involving only 100 Hiroshima-size bombs and a 1.5 Megaton total yield, e.g. a conflict between two minor nuclear powers, would cause 44 million casualties and would produce 6.6 trillion grams of soot, causing ozone destruction and significantly changing the climate. Therefore, “for any nuclear conflict, nuclear winter would seriously affect noncombatant countries” [26]. Nuclear deterrence is only one of the triad of WMDs. Are the two other members of this triad, biological and chemical weapons, or even cyber-weapons, more useful as deterrents? Biological and chemical weapons are much cheaper, but because they are easier to get, there is more danger that “by error or for terror they will be used, since in a global village there will be also many global village idiots” as Lord Rees, President of the Royal Society wrote [27]. Stability and security during the Cold War rested on symmetric deterrence. Today, in addition to confrontation among nuclear weapon states, there are confrontations between a WMD state and a terrorist group, or a failing state or international McMafia. Most of these non-WMD actors operate as guerrillas, and for them the statement of Henry Kissinger is valid: the guerrilla wins when he does not lose; the military lose when they do not win. The nuclear doctrine during the Cold War has been characterized by a balance between the WMDs of the two superpowers, though the sheer numbers of conventional forces in the Warsaw Pact and the People’s Republic of China were considerably larger than those of NATO. Today, the conventional forces of the US are considerably superior to any other conventional force anywhere in the world, and this superiority creates frustration and possibly stimulates nuclear proliferation. In addition, the US conventional forces are very sophisticated and modern. The limited usefulness of military conflicts has been demonstrated by the history of wars since the end of the Second World War. War is obviously not a clever and useful extension of policy by other means, to paraphrase von Clausewitz. Wars, preparation for war and deterrence, specifically deterrence based on WMD, do not eliminate enemies. They create enemies and generate other threats. This analysis leads us to the conclusion that the world does not need WMDs. According to John Holdren there are three conceivable nuclear futures [28]. One is the status quo, or muddling through. This is unstable because of accidents, nuclear terrorism, and above all because of a nuclear posture which declares ‘the right’ of nuclear states to use nuclear weapons first and even against non-nuclear states. The second is the nuclear nightmare. The third is to eliminate nuclear weapons – a trajectory toward a nuclear-weapons-free world. His conclusion that getting to zero is not an impossible mission is supported by the final Hiroshima 2005 document of Student/Young Pugwash entitled: ‘Mission Possible’ [29].

3. If Not Military Power and Military Deterrence, What Else Can We Count On? Though “governments pretend that military might and bombing innocent civilians will bring security” [30], contemporary problems cannot be addressed, and much less solved, if we attempt to approach them using old ‘tools’ that were designed for an almost static and completely fragmented world. War is definitely an ‘old tool’. When war, fighting and violence stop being useful and even become dangerous, it is prudent


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not to use them; several species and some societies indeed are to a large extent violence-free [31]. Globalization and the rapid changes characterizing the present world are science generated. Scientists are responsible for what they do and for what they fail to do. Many socio-economic indicators, notably life expectancy and quality of life, demonstrate progress, and scientists can certainly take credit for that. However, throughout history scientists have built weapons: from Archimedes and Leonardo da Vinci to Fermi, Heisenberg and Sakharov. Some did not care for whom they worked, such as Werner von Braun who said that it did not matter whether he worked for Uncle Sam or Uncle Joe as long as the uncle was rich [32]. Some, for example Fritz Haber, even stimulated their governments to use poison gas. Governments and business not infrequently pressure and manipulate scientists and scientific organisations [33]. To successfully face contemporary threats and dangers and to assure global security, new tools, discoveries and innovations are required, i.e. a knowledge-based society [34]. In a knowledge-based society people are the primary resource and value, and they generate and maintain knowledge; they stimulate, generate and anticipate changes without ever endangering sustainable development.

4. Conclusion Since a knowledge-based society is the only guarantor of sustainable future for humankind, the responsibility of scientists today is greater and more complex than ever. How we should meet this challenge? First: work as Pugwash has done and does: it has always based its work at the political level on impeccable science and absolute integrity [35]. Secondly, by addressing a variety of threats, dangers and problems, such as overshooting ecological footprint, climate change, inadequate governance, organized crime, etc. Scientists should never underemphasize curiosity-driven research, since it can open new vistas and provide true breakthroughs. Thirdly, science has made significant progress by specializing on specific issues. But now a comprehensive, multi-, inter-, and transdisciplinary, holistic approach is necessary, and results of research and scientific activity have to be intertwined with the interests and demands of the public. Fourthly, scientific activity involves incremental research and instrument development as well as breakthrough research. Though research is primarily focussed on where the light shines, as Peter Medawar said, scientific activities always contain at least a component that extends ‘out of the box’. I am told that at a high-level meeting one participant bragged that he had a group of excellent scientists that did not think. That meant that they focused on narrow issues, and never questioned the larger context. The box was determined by the boss, whoever that was. Researchers who do not question and who do not go ‘out of the box’ stop being researchers. Finally, scientists have to be independent and their independence has to be protected. It is in the interests both of their institution, of those who directly depend on and benefit from their work, and of the public, that scientists are independent. Even working on a mission-oriented project (and many basic scientific studies are mission oriented) it is better that scientists maintain their independence. Scientific activity is a cumulative activity and research and educational organizations have always played a crucial role in the development of science. The

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tasks and goals of the knowledge-based society will be accomplished through individual and collective activities in national research centres, academies and universities, in regional and world institutions and academies. An excellent organizational structure that can be the basis of the knowledge-based society is NATO, through its Science for Peace and Security pillar. Emphasizing scientific research, NATO is a unique alliance that goes beyond its political pillar, and it can keep the military pillar to a necessary constantly diminishing minimum. Therefore, the end of the Cold War does not make NATO obsolete. Now, possibly more than ever, through its Science for Peace and Security program, NATO could become a pivotal structure that intertwines research and policy-making. The aim should be to achieve no less than the challenges set out in two famous statements: “Every gun made, every warship launched, every rocket signifies in the final sense a theft from the hungry. The world in arms is not only spending money. It is spending the sweat of its labourers, the genius of its scientists” [36], and: “The quest for war-free world has a basic purpose – survival. If in the process we learn how to achieve it by love rather than by fear – if we learn to combine the essential with the enjoyable...that will be the extra incentive to embark on this great task” [35]. In a slowly developing world it was possible to avoid solving problems, since time could heal and solve them. In a fast changing world this ostrich attitude is extremely dangerous. Whatever problem we do not solve today will be more difficult to solve later. In his speech at the opening of the NPT Conference in May 2005, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, to jolt states out of their inertia and complacency asked them to imagine a nuclear catastrophe in one of the great cities – regardless of whether it is the result of aggression, terrorism or an accident. And he posed a question: “Could I have done more to reduce the risk...We are all too important to be held hostage to the politics of the past.”

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Fry, Beyond War, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007; D. Adams et al, The Seville Statement on violence, UNESCO, Seville 1986 (available at http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/ev.phpURL_ID=3247&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html; M. Shermer, The Science of Good and Evil, Times Books, H. Holt, New York, 2004. [32] J. Cornwell, Hitler’s Scientists, Viking, the Penguin group, New York, 2003.

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[33] C. Mooney, The Republican War on Science, Basic Books, New York, 2005; Science Under Siege, The Bush Administration’s Assault on Academic Freedom and Scientific Inquiry, ACLU Report, The American Civil Liberties Union, New York, 2005 (available at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/ sciundersiege.pdf). [34] Ivo Šlaus, Knowledge-based Society: Why and How?, in The Future of Knowledge – Evolutionary Challenge of the 21st Century, Croatian Association of the Club of Rome for The World Academy of Art and Science, Zagreb 2007. [35] J. Rotblat, Nobel Prize acceptance speech, 1995. Available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/ peace/laureates/1995/rotblat-lecture.html [36] Dwight D. Eisenhower, speech given on August 16, 1953.


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Including Civil Society into Confidence Building: Protecting Whistleblowers and Societal Verification Annegret FALTER Federation of German Scientists (VDW), Berlin, Germany

Abstract. Threat assessment needs valid information. At times, whistleblowing and societal verification are the only reliable sources to provide that information. These sources need to be protected. WMD threat assessment is based, to a considerable extent, on the efficient verification of disarmament or nonproliferation treaties and agreements. This is also crucial for confidence building among nations. To the extent that technical verification measures, applied by states or international organisations, get increasingly unreliable, or access for on-site inspection is barred, societal verification by civil society actors could gain importance. It could partially substitute or complement technical verification by national or transnational actors, or be instrumental for deploying technical verification means in the right sites. To encourage further societal verification, social approval and the provision of legal protection measures for those citizens willing to report breaches of contract are necessary. The Model Nuclear Weapons Convention of 2008 provides a model set of protective clauses for whistleblowers. Keywords. Missile defense, military funding, classified research, dual-use technologies, nuclear non-proliferation, civil society, legal protection, Model Nuclear Weapons Convention.

“But there are…areas of scientific research that may directly or indirectly lead to harm to society. This calls for constant vigilance. The purpose of some government or industrial research is sometimes concealed, and misleading information is presented to the public. It should be the duty of scientists to expose such malfeasance. “Whistle-blowing” should become part of the scientist’s ethos. This may bring reprisals; a price to be paid for one’s convictions. The price may be very heavy, as illustrated by the disproportionately severe punishment of Mordechai Vanunu. I believe that he has suffered enough.” Joseph Rotblat in his Acceptance and Nobel Lecture in Oslo, December 10th, 1995.

Introduction Mordechai Vanunu is the Israeli technician who worked at the Dimona nuclear reactor and who revealed to the public the existence of an Israeli atomic weapons programme. It had been denied by his government and concealed from the Israeli citizens and from the world. As a consequence, Mordechai Vanunu spent 18 years of his life in prison,

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mostly in solitary confinement. In 1993, when Joseph Rotblat closed his above remark with the statement “I believe that he has suffered enough”, Vanunu still had 11 more years ahead of him in prison. Even after he had served his full sentence and was dismissed, the harassments against him have continued. No wonder that Vanunu has remained the only ‘atomic whistleblower’, as Daniel Ellsberg discovered in his studies.1 More precisely, Vanunu is the only employee who ever revealed workplace details of a hidden atomic weapons programme to the public. But there have been whistleblowers on other memorable weapons programmes. Their whistleblowing is worth mentioning in this context. In this chapter, I will very briefly: 1.

2.

3. 4.

Describe two cases of whistleblowing that are relevant to our overall concern with sound scientific advice to political decision makers by independent scientists. Outline the ideas of Joseph Rotblat’s concept of ‘societal verification’ of nuclear non-proliferation treaties. In principle, his ideas could be applied to all international disarmament agreements and their respective systems of verification. Introduce a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention2 [1], which contains a set of rules advancing the concept of societal verification and its legal protection. Conclude that the impact of societal verification could increase if whistleblowers and informants were guaranteed a better protection.

1. Two Cases of Whistleblowing 1.1. Whistleblowing on SDI and the X-ray Laser in the 1980s: Roy Woodruff In 1985, Roy Woodruff, then director of the defense programs of the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL), resigned under protest. He claimed Edward Teller had deceived political decision makers about the development state of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, among them President Reagan and the White House Science Adviser George Keyworth. In particular Woodruff referred to several letters Teller had written to Washington between 1983 and 1985. In one of them he had advised Paul Nitze, then the head of the US disarmament delegation in Geneva, not to make concessions to the Russians, because SDI could soon be deployed. Teller claimed that its centre piece, the nuclear-bomb-pumped X-ray laser, was “entering engineering phase”. Woodruff alleged that Teller’s assessments were wildly optimistic and had been so from the very beginning, when he had first ‘sold’ the idea of SDI to the President. The SDI project resulted in the budget of Livermore Laboratory increasing substantially. [2]. Consequently, Woodruff did not get support from Roger Batzel, then director of LLL, nor from the Head of the University of California, which managed Livermore for the Department of Energy (DOE). He was accused of being instrumentalized by the opponents of SDI. Batzel “agreed that the letters sent by Dr. Teller … were technically incorrect” but would not let Woodruff correct them. He asserted that “researchers are

1 2

Based upon personal conversation.

The Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (see [1]) prohibits the development, production, testing, de-

ployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat, or use of nuclear weapons.


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generally optimistic for the outcome” of their research and that there are always “ranges of expectation”. William Frazer, Vice President of the University of California, said the letters contained no “outright lies”. The helpless administration in Washington complained that “it’s a very far-out technology and there’s so little data” [2]. In 1987, Woodruff’s accusations leaked to the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and consequently to the media. Ultimately, a General Accounting Office (GAO) team investigated. They “did find a spectrum of opinions about the laser, and Teller … [was] essentially off the scale on the optimistic side”. The GAO [2] “did not find that any laws had been broken”. Eventually, the idea of the X-ray laser was dropped. After having been bypassed and sidelined for several years and with his reputation seriously damaged, Woodruff managed to return to a respectable senior position at the Laboratory. During that time, when President Reagan, his scientific advisers and his ambassador to disarmament negotiations were made to believe they were soon going to have an efficient missile defense system at their disposal, there were at least two historic decisions made by the US that were influenced by this misinformation. 1.

2.

The US did not react positively to the one-sided Soviet moratorium on atomic weapons tests in 1985, and turned down Gorbachev’s appeal to join in the moratorium. When Reagan and Gorbachev met in Iceland for negotiating disarmament on October 11, 1986, Gorbachev proposed to Reagan and Schultz to get rid of all atomic weapons down to zero within ten years. Reagan was thrilled and Schultz said: “Then, let’s do it”. But the idea was finally dropped because Reagan refused to agree to a ban on SDI testing for ten years. Gorbachev claimed testing SDI would be a flagrant violation of the ABM treaty and he demanded that the US should restrict themselves to theoretical research. Reagan would not accept that. That put an end to those promising disarmament talks more than 20 years ago [3].

1.2. Whistleblowing on Missile Defense and the MIT Cover-up since 1991: Theodore A. Postol [4] In early 1991 the United States deployed Patriot Air and Missile Defense Batteries in Saudi Arabia and Israel to defend against Iraqi ballistic missiles. After the Gulf War of 1991, the US Army reported to the American Congress that Patriot had a 96% intercept rate. Prof. Theodore A. Postol and the MIT Science, Technology, and Global Security Working Group analyzed substantial amounts of data on Patriot-SCUD engagements that were captured by the press on television cameras and showed that the actual success rate was almost certainly zero. In 1996, the Clinton administration started the Ground-Based Missile Defense System (GMD) designed to defend the country from potential attacks by rogue states using nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. The idea is to shoot down attacking warheads in space during the ‘mid-course phase’ of a ballistic missile by a combination of sensors to identify and track the targets, rocket-powered interceptors, and infrared homing systems designed to destroy warheads in outer space. The feasibility of such a ‘missile defense system’ is highly controversial. It is also at the center of Postol’s critical expertise. He found out that the Missile Defense Agency had concealed the failure of the first two critical national missile defense

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experiments, IFT-1A and IFT-2. These experiments were designed to prove that the then-current US national missile defense could tell the difference between very simple decoys and real nuclear warheads. The tests, costing $100 million each, showed instead that the ‘exoatmospheric kill vehicle’ could not even discriminate between balloons painted with stripes and warheads. This result clearly indicated that the US national missile defense could be defeated by the simplest of decoys and therefore could never be expected to work in combat conditions. The dispute about the reliability of the antimissile weapon began in the midnineties when Dr Nira Schwartz, a senior engineer at TRW, then the main contractor for the system of interceptor rockets, claimed that her company had falsified test results. She finally filed a lawsuit under the False Claims Act. This lead to an investigation of the GAO that examined Schwartz’s charges. Their report exonerated the contractors of covering up the warhead’s failures and of committing scientific fraud. A senior defense analyst of the GAO, Dr Subrata Ghoshroy, then accused his agency of a cover-up. He said that the report ignored evidence that the contractors had falsified research findings and test data about the system’s capability to differentiate warheads from decoys. The GAO denied any allegation of a biased report and in turn questioned Ghoshroy’s competence and integrity. Ghoshroy now works as a research fellow at MIT. Nira Schwartz’s qui tam3 suit was suspended in 2003. The official reason given was that otherwise classified data and military secrets could be revealed and endanger national security [5]. According to Postol, the investigations of the Missile Defense Agency’s cover-up of the fundamental flaw in the missile defense system showed that MIT Lincoln Laboratory had played a critical role in covering up the fraud. MIT repeatedly denied investigations or subsequently publication of their outcomes on grounds of classified information. Postol also accused the MIT administrators of covering up the research on Patriot which indicated that it had totally failed in the Gulf War of 1991 [4]. As in the case of SDI, misleading scientific advice could have far reaching consequences. For example, the weapon system is supposed to be deployed in Poland and the Czech Republic with the serious implications that Götz Neuneck points out in his chapter in this volume: the deployment in Europe would lead to a new arms race and would put an end to the possibility of strategic nuclear disarmament.4 1.3. Parallels between these Two Cases The parallels between the two cases are evident and striking. From these two examples, far reaching conclusions could be drawn that may be helpful in answering the leading question of this conference: of how “to ensure structures … to foster a sound scientific

3

The qui tam ‘whistleblower’ law is a federal law that applies nationally in the US. It is designed to protect against the fraudulent use of public funds by encouraging people with knowledge of fraud on the government to blow the whistle on the wrongdoers. The law provides for whistleblowers to receive a reward in the form of a share of the recovery. 4 Note also the following statements that were quoted by Neuneck, in his talk at this workshop, from senior Russian military personnel. (a). General Yuri Baluyevsky (26/2/07): “If the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic make such a decision [to host US GMD system], the Strategic Missile Forces will be able to target these systems”. (b). General Nikolai Solovtsov, Cdr Strategic Rocket Forces (RIA-Novosti, 15/2/07): “If a political decision is taken to abrogate the INF Treaty, new medium-range missiles to replace the SS-20 may be developed in five to six years … If a decison is taken, we will be able to target US missile defense in Poland and the Czech Republic”.


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basis for policy information”. I have to confine myself here to a few keywords that point into the direction of the structural changes to be undertaken. Whereas this is not a place to bring forward blueprints for institutional changes, the above examples can help identify policies that are inconsistent with the goal of producing solid policy advice. 1. In both cases, policy information was based on classified data. Only a very limited number of scientific experts with highest clearance had access to the data. 2. The extremely complicated scientific database concerned a novel ‘far-out’ technology that relatively few experts were equipped to be able to analyze effectively. 3. Consequently, there was no, or insufficient, peer review. 4. In both cases, we have to deal with military funding of, and political vested interests in, the research results. 5. The GAO as a most important auditing and control instrument of the US Congress could or would not clarify the scientific disputes. 6. The judiciary could not adequately pursue a qui tam case on the grounds of classified information and national security. Any one of these conditions is likely to imply a structural infliction of bias on scientific advice. Besides this, there is the imminent danger of scientific fraud. Political decision makers have to be aware of these possible problems when implementing far reaching and expensive policy programs on the basis of classified information. Two consequences seem evident. First, research and development work in universities should be kept free from military funding. Military funding will, by definition, tend towards technical and military solutions of societal problems or of international conflicts. There may be different approaches to problem solving, though, in the social sciences and humanities which never get pursued because of a bias in funding. In addition, the enormous amounts of money often provided by military donors are likely to become an integral part of the university’s budget. This does not advance academic independence. Neither should universities be burdened with the administration and supervision of weapons laboratories. Their interests may also become inseparably enmeshed, as shown by the cases of Lincoln Laboratory and MIT as well as of Lawrence Livermore Laboratory and the University of California. Secondly, whistleblowers should be better valued and protected. The whistleblowing of Roy Woodruff and Ted Postol served public policy. And yet both scientists suffered at least a loss in reputation (instead of the gain they deserved) and a reduction of research funds (instead of an increase). It would be in the interest of societies and their political decision makers to better protect these independent scientists. Often they are the only sources of reliable information. They can disclose structural biases of research results as well as scientific fraud. Furthermore, an established culture of whistleblowing in the research system, at least in matters of outstanding importance and implied dangers for society, could develop a certain ‘preventive capacity’ of its own. Indeed, there are different whistleblower protection laws in various countries. There are relatively encompassing provisions, like in the US, or none at all, like in the Federal Republic of Germany. But when it comes to revealing military secrets, or other sensitive security matters, often defined as state secrets, whistleblowing becomes

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extremely dangerous in every country – and not just in Israel as the Vanunu case may suggest. In such cases, whistleblowers can be sued and punished for treason and, as in Germany, could be imprisoned for life. Therefore I would like to give a short outline of a concept developed by Joseph Rotblat [6] and others before him and since [7],5 that could help to protect whistleblowers especially in cases such as these.

2. The Concept of Societal Verification since the Late 1950s Joseph Rotblat has proposed [6] a set of provisions for how to best include all members of society into a process which he called ‘societal verification’. He was aware that if you want civil society, including scientists and engineers, to blow the whistle on wrongdoing of individuals or groups or governments; if you want responsible scientists to watch over the compliance of their country and its citizens with an international treaty or a set of agreements; if you want whistleblowers to be instrumental to verification; you will have to find ways to protect them in all countries party to that treaty, by virtue of that treaty. This is necessary because it is neither realistic nor legitimate to put the full burden of whistleblowing and potential retaliation on individual scientists and their moral sensibilities. Rotblat defined societal verification as: “a system of monitoring compliance with treaties, and detecting attempts to violate them, by means other than technological verification. (…) societal verification can be viewed as being part of the political requirements for the disarmament process. (…) The main form of societal verification is by inducing the citizens of the countries signing the treaty to report to an appropriate international authority any information about attempted violation going on in their countries. For this system of verification to be effective it is vital that all such reporting becomes the right and the civic duty of the citizen. This right and duty will have to become part of the national codes of law in the countries party to the treaty. The adoption of such laws would be greatly facilitated if this was made an integral part of the treaty on the elimination of nuclear weapons, and explicitly expressed in a specific clause of that treaty.(…) Thus, disclosing to an outside – albeit international – body information about sensitive security matters inside one’s country, would not only cease to be considered as a crime, an act of treason, but would in fact become part of the law of one’s country.” Rotblat foresaw serious difficulties in establishing societal verification norms and whistleblower protection in international and domestic law, as whistleblowers are often stigmatized with disloyality and treason, and with spying on their fellow citizens. He contrasts this misunderstanding with the concept of a different loyalty, the loyalty to

5 “The concept of citizen’s reporting has been discussed in the literature for many years, under different names, such as ‘inspection by the people’, or ‘knowledge detection’. The idea was introduced in the late 1950s by Lewis Bohn and Seymour Melman and incorporated in the classic World Peace Through World Law by Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn. Leo Szilard, in his quixotic The Voice of the Dolphins also considered it an important part of the disarmament process.” Rotblat, in ref. 6.


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mankind. As reasons to develop this more encompassing loyalty he sees a) the growing interdependence of modern societies in the process of globalization and b) the existence of the atomic bomb, i.e. the deadly threat of the annihilation of mankind and the end of civilisation. But he also sees that the implementation of societal verification provisions in domestic law “requires a change in certain attitudes of the general public, which may take time.” This is the reason why the Federation of German Scientists (VDW) and the German section of the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) present a Whistleblower Award every other year. The award is given to personalities, who as insiders have revealed grave irregularities, abuses, or wrongdoings, or risks and dangers or undesirable developments in their professional field of work. Their disclosure will have served public policy, and may have revealed substantial dangers to life and health, democracy or equitable socio-economical living conditions, the protection and sustainable advancement of ecosystems and the peaceful coexistence of people. They will also have risked retaliation, taking into account serious drawbacks for their career or private life. So far, in Germany, there are no whistleblower protection laws at all, or even a translation for the word itself. So we are at the very beginning of a process of establishing a ‘culture’ of whistleblowing, or early warning, or citizens’ reporting. The award may be instrumental to reaching that goal.

3. Clauses Concerning Societal Verification in the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention of 1997/2008 In 2008 the UN Permanent Representatives of Costa Rica and Malaysia submitted as ‘work in progress’ a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention to the Secretary General of the United Nations. It is an updated version of the Convention handed over to the UN by Costa Rica ten years earlier.6 With regard to societal verification, this Convention draws upon the basic ideas of the early concerned scientists and of Joseph Rotblat, and refines them in a normative and systematic form. As argued by Rotblat, the protection of persons reporting violations is considered a vital component of the verification rules (Chapter VII.C – see box). Clause C.11 takes up Rotblat’s idea of guaranteeing the right of asylum to whistleblowers. The importance of that proposal can easily be illustrated by the Vanunu case. The convention also contains important new elements. The main difference from Rotblat’s proposals is in the absence of any legallybinding duty for any person to report violations or suspicions of violations of the treaty to state or supranational verification authorities (a verification agency is to be established under the convention). Instead, it appeals to the responsibility of citizens to report violations [8]: “This responsibility takes precedence over any obligation not to disclose information which may exist under national security laws or employment contracts”.

6

This Model Convention had been drafted and subsequently revised by an international committee of NGOs and legal and scientific experts, among them the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, IALANA, the International Network of Engineers and Scientists against Proliferation (INESAP) and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW).

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Model Nuclear Weapons Convention [1,10] Chapter VII. Rights and Obligations of Persons C. Protection for Persons Providing Information Intra-state protection 6. Any person reporting a suspected violation of this Convention, either by a person or a State, shall be guaranteed full civil and political rights including the right to liberty and security of person. 7. States Parties shall take all necessary steps to ensure that no person reporting a suspected violation of this Convention shall have any rights diminished or privileges withdrawn as a result. 8. Any individual who [in good faith] provides the Agency or a National Authority with information regarding a known or suspected violation of this Convention cannot be arrested, prosecuted or tried on account thereof. 9. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because such person has opposed any practice as a suspected violation of this Convention, reported such violation to the Agency or a National Authority, or testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation or proceeding under this Convention. 10. Any person against whom a national decision is rendered on account of information furnished by such person to the Agency about a suspected violation of this Convention may appeal such decision to the Agency within [...] months of being notified of such decision. The decision of the Agency in the matter shall be final. Inter-State Protection 11. Any person reporting a violation of this Convention to the Agency shall be afforded protection by the Agency and by all States Parties, including, in the case of natural persons, the right of asylum in all other States Parties if their safety or security is endangered in the State Party in which they permanently or temporarily reside. Additional Provisions 12. [The Executive Council may decide to award monetary compensation to persons providing important information to the Agency concerning violations of this Convention.] 13. Any person who voluntarily admits to the Agency having committed a violation of this Convention, prior to the receipt by the Agency of information concerning such violation from another source, may be exempt from punishment. In deciding whether to grant such exemption, the Agency shall consider the gravity of the violation involved as well as whether its consequences have not yet occurred or can be reversed as a result of the admission made.


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An important difference from today’s established verification practices is the obligation that verification activities “be carried out on the basis of full respect for the sovereignty of States Parties and in the least intrusive manner possible” [9]. This seems worth explicitly mentioning in the context of the very intrusive on-site-inspection’s searching and monitoring measures that were, for example, being practised in Iraq7. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon has recently confirmed his support for the ‘Model Nuclear Weapons Convention’ and called it a “good approach” in an address to the East-West Institute on October 24, 2008 [11]. He said that he had circulated the draft to all member states of the UN. He also suggested starting negotiations for an Atomic Weapons Convention and explicitly referred to the necessity of a strong verification system.

4. Societal Verification: Compensating for the Flaws of Verification by States and International Organizations? A leading verification expert has recently come to the conclusion that civil society actors using novel open source technologies may counterbalance the “failure of the conventional verification of nuclear non-proliferation agreements” [12]. As an example, he quotes the activities of the ‘National Council of Resistance of Iran’, an oppositional group which, at a press conference in Washington DC in 2002, revealed secret enrichment activities in Iran. Their detailed references concerning the secret uranium enrichment facility of Natanz were critical input for the research group of David Albright of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), who subsequently analysed satellite photos of that site in 2002. The resistance group had been able to disclose violations of the NPT over 18 years, which the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) had not been able to discover. The IAEA inspectors visited Natanz for the first time within months of the publication of the Albright report. This is impressive evidence for the verification potential of civil society groups. But it goes without saying that the National Council of Resistance of Iran operated in exile. They would never have been able to publish their findings in Iran, as they would have been threatened by severe punishment. This example demonstrates at the same time the capacity and potential range of societal verification and the necessity of internationally respected rules to protect individuals and groups reporting violations of non-proliferation regimes. There are other typical incidents of proliferation, when individuals may have access to information which state actors or institutions may not attain. Examples from Kalinowski [12] include dual-use technologies; highly-enriched uranium (according to him, the civil use of HEU constitutes the greatest threat of an atomic bomb being built by terrorists); enrichment technologies on the black market (greatest danger of horizontal proliferation); replacement of underground atomic tests by laboratory methods. Clearly, societal verification is most important where other verification provisions have not been politically established, as is the case for the Biological Weapons Convention. Or where they don’t exist at all, as in the case of terrorist activities.

7

See the chapter by Kraatz-Wadsack in this volume.

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5. Conclusions The two cases of whistleblowing discussed in this chapter show the valuable political input scientific dissenters can make when they decide to blow the whistle on the fraudulent or exaggerated presentation of research results or implied dangerous consequences. Especially when dealing with classified information, the political system depends heavily on the independence and integrity of its scientific advisors. Public policy and national security could also be served by a closer look at the institutional and organizational causes of the covering up of delays or failures in the research process. As to societal verification, a better protection of whistleblowers and other informants in an established legal framework of societal verification of arms control regimes would increase the risks for violators of contracts to be detected, and also enhance the availability to the international community of valid information on matters of arms control. The greater reliability of the verification process could contribute to confidence building among nations, and thus help to break the threat-counter-threat cycle.

References [1]

Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (UN Document A/62/650) of January 18, 2008 (available at http://www.icanw.org/nuclear-weapons-convention). See also M. Datan, F. Hill, J. Scheffran and A. Ware, Securing our Survival, The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, IPPNW, Cambridge MA, 2007 (available at http://www.inesap.org/book/securing-our-survival). [2] D. Blum, Weird Science: Livermore’s X-Ray Laser Flap, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 44(6) (July/August 1988), 7-13. See also H. DeWitt, Nuklearpolitik und Repression in den USA, in H.-J. Fischbeck and R. Kollek (editors), Fortschritt wohin?, Agenda Verlag, Münster, 1994. [3] Based upon a talk the historian David Holloway gave in Berlin on October 14, 2008: Science, Peace and Politics: Is the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons Realistic? He referred to a personal conversation with then Secretary of State George Schultz who was present at the Reykjavik meeting. See also Dieter Buhl: Wir können es schaffen, Die Zeit (No.39), September 21, 2006. [4] Götz Neuneck, Theodore A. Postol’s Critique of the US Missile Defense Program (GMD), in D. Deiseroth and A. Falter, Whistleblower in Gentechnik und Rüstungsforschung, Berliner WissenschaftsVerlag, Berlin, 2006; see documents therein. Also a talk Postol gave in Berlin on October 15, 2005, when he was awarded the Whistleblower Prize by the Federation of German Scientists (German section of Pugwash) and the German section of IALANA. [5] Accountability Office Finds Itself Accused, New York Times, April 2, 2006. See also Press Release of Congressmen H.L. Berman (D-CA) and Ch. Grassley (R-IA), March 4, 2002. [6] Joseph Rotblat, Societal Verification, in J. Rotblat, J. Steinberger and B.M. Udgaonkar, A NuclearWeapon-Free World: Desirable? Feasible?, Westview Press, Boulder CO, 1993. [7] See also Dieter Deiseroth, Societal Verification, Books on Demand, Norderstedt, 2008. [8] Ref. 1 Chapter VII. B: Responsibility to Report Violations. [9] Ibid. Chapter V. C.13. [10] http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/nwc/nwc.pdf. See also section 4 on verification: http://www.icanw.org/files/SoS/SoS_section4.pdf. [11] Ban Ki-Moon, The United Nations and security in a nuclear-weapon-free world, address to the EastWest Institute Conference on 24 October 2008. For the correspondence that followed between Ban KiMoon and Judge Christopher G. Weeramantry, President of IALANA, see http://www.ialana.net/node/28. [12] Martin Kalinowski, Nukleare Verifikation versagt und doch so stark wie nie zuvor?, in Wie lässt sich die globale Aufrüstungsdynamik umkehren?, Working Papers, Deutschen Stiftung Friedensforschung (DSF) 4, Osnabrück, 2009.


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At the Interface between Policy Makers, the Public and Independent Scientists. A Perspective on the Role of the Media Paul GUINNESSY Physics Today, American Institute of Physics, College Park, MD, USA

Abstract. It has never been easier or cheaper to reach a wide audience through the use of tools such as the Internet. Conversely, it has never been harder to raise the profile of an issue such as weapons of mass destruction above the daily background noise of 100 million web sites. This chapter investigates the current state of professional media in all its forms for disseminating news, and presents evidence of the value of such media compared to amateur and academic web sites. Moreover, it highlights the benefits professional media can provide to independent scientists, policymakers, and the public in publicizing independent critical analysis of threat assessments by both journalists and scientists. Keywords. Media, newspapers, television, radio, blogs, web, Internet, US Congress, public, scientists, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, missiles, WMD.

Introduction Although using internet sources has overtaken reading print newspapers as an access point for national and international news for many members of the public [1], it is mass media organizations that still manage and highlight policy and the events that shape them. Of the top 100 news sources that are regularly read by the general public, all of them rely on content from professional journalists [2]. The impact and influence of television news still reaches a wider audience than any blog or individual effort (see Figure 1) particularly on dealing with major political and sociological events of a global nature. It is my contention that to rely on amateur bloggers or non-profit organizations to provide the public access to the research of independent scientists, particularly in the field of national security and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), is to do a disservice to the public, and to policy makers. Moreover, it increases the risk that views that are different to the prevailing viewpoint will not be heard. More likely, such views would be drowned out by organized marketing campaigns by deep-pocketed organizations that independent scientists would be ill-equipped to combat without access to high profile news services that can provide critical fact-based analysis of any contention.

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P. Guinnessy / At the Interface Between Policy Makers, the Public and Independent Scientists

Figure 1. Sources of national and international news since 2001. Source: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, December 23, 2008.

Furthermore, despite the mistakes news organizations recently made during the years of the Bush administration, journalists are still trusted by a high percentage of the populace, and are effective in raising awareness on risk assessment issues of WMDs, both to the public and policy makers. Making use of connections to journalists at reputable media organizations by independent scientists only increases the effectiveness of arguments and can help guide foreign policy to be based on facts, and not on dubious classified information.

1. The Current State of the Media It is now well known that daily newspaper circulation is slowly declining1. This is partly due in the US to the near-demise of two-newspaper towns, as the weaker

1 In the US daily circulation per 100 people declined from 32.8 to 19.8 between 1960 and 2000 according to the Newspapers of the United States of America.


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newspapers in most cities have folded, the collapse of advertising revenue brought about by the Internet, or to larger media organizations succumbing to an overwhelming debt load. The danger that is highlighted by the current economic crisis is the vast number of journalists that are having to leave the profession. The number of journalists working at news organizations has shrunk by more than 8% in the last year – the biggest drop in more than 30 years2 – and many of them have experience and expertise that will be lost to their previous employers. There are now entire segments of the federal government that no longer have dedicated reporters assigned to report on them. For example, currently (early 2009) there is only one journalist in the entire US whose beat is the union movement and the US labor department, despite more than a million union members in the US. A small room could be filled by the number of reporters whose beat is connected to national security issues. On the bright side, the value of advice provided by independent scientists to journalists is increased; on the down side, the risk that some journalists will not be able to judge the quality of the information they are receiving is also increased. Another unhappy trend is the closure of many foreign bureaus that were staffed by organizations such as the Washington Post (the only US organization to exclude from this list is National Public Radio, which recently expanded its bureaus). These closures limit the coverage of international affairs in the US media. The one bright spot – from a consumer perspective – is that access to news has increased to embrace a multitude of competing professional news sources, including international news organizations, and that these sources are available though high-speed internet, cellphones, or digital, satellite and cable television channels. This trend is seen not only in the US but in nearly all countries globally. There has never been a time in which so much information produced by professional media has been accessible to the public through so many different mechanisms. In turn, this vast number of information sources, and the limited amount of personal time that most individuals can spend in assessing news, increases the value of visible and famous news source brands such as CNN, the New York Times, the Washington Post, the BBC, Al Jazeera, and the Guardian. The caché that professional news organizations have is particularly valuable in countries with more restrictive media and undemocratic regimes. Moreover, news organizations are adapting to the changing media climate – it is no longer a surprise to see a newspaper offer video reports on their web site along with their written copy, or a television broadcaster offer a written newswire service on their web site to go along with their television broadcasts. Media organizations are becoming true media organizations that produce news and analysis for a multitude of media – an outfit that produces news for one medium only, such as print, will shortly be as outdated as the typewriter. How else will the media landscape change in the near future? Many media publications are starting to adapt to a world which assumes information is cheap, and mostly free to consumers. And as a result of this trend, there will be fewer local media outlets in the future that will cover a broad swath of international or national news. But because users have access to content produced from further afield, the total volume of media available to the consumer will remain roughly the same, if not increase.

2

Source: American Society of Newspaper Editors.

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2. Blogs and the Media The internet may have enabled a new direct communication channel between the public and decision makers [3] through low-cost platforms such as the video service Youtube, Twitter or Facebook, but such services do not provide context and analysis to the public. They are effective in strengthening the opinion of the public along lines they already agree with, but are less effective in changing minds. It is also rare for viral marketing – the internet ‘chatter’ if you will – to cause an issue to percolate to larger public awareness. It is even rarer for this to happen when the issue is related to weapons of mass destruction. Blogs, which are defined here as web sites in which the owner can post commentary and analysis to the wider world to be commented on, can be split into four distinct subgroups: amateur blogs written by individuals on topics of interest to themselves; corporate PR blogs written by organizations to promote their viewpoint in the marketplace; academic blogs to allow discussion on a subtopic, and professional media blogs that are designed to attract an audience and make money. Of the four it is the latter two which attract the public’s attention: professional and academic blogs can receive millions of page views. Academic-style blogs can be useful in encouraging collaboration for individual scientists or policy analysts and in getting their message into wider circulation. Like the rest of the media in the commercial world however, there are winners and losers – the most popular blogs are substantially more popular than the even the third or fourth most popular blog on the same topic. Although there is a large amount of content produced by bloggers, most of it is commenting or copying directly reports produced by professional media. There is a very limited amount of material that is produced to the same independent high quality editorial standards of media organizations3. Newspaper blogs such as the New York Times Dot Earth, are becoming valuable resources in their own right as they can assign professional staff to produce unique content for the web, and use copyeditors to proof them. This in fact is their most valuable weapon: the ability to assign editorial and technical resources to new media platforms, as most amateur blogs have a short life of under a year before postings tail off and the site is abandoned. The more erratic the posting schedule is for a blog, the less likely it is that people will visit it. Moreover, media organizations do significant fact checking that amateur blogs do not. Content that appears in Physics Today magazine, for example4, is usually reviewed by several individuals and at minimum two (usually four or more) experts in the field of the article. Alternatively, sometimes popular academic and amateur blogs will move to media organizations, such as the migration of a number of science blogs to SEED and Discover magazines’ web sites. Such a move can increase traffic, resolve technical support issues for the bloggers and also provide financing. The median pay for a blogger who receives more than 100,000 visitors5 is under $22,000 per year. As well as increasing the blogger's visibility, moving to a professional media site can increase pay to closer to $75,000. The value of these professional blogs can be clearly seen in the arms control community. There are a number of fairly popular arms control related blogs, but even

͵ 4 5

The one main exception is talkingpointsmemo.com. Disclosure: I work for Physics Today. Most bloggers are lucky if their web site receives more than 30 visitors a day.


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the most popular blogs are not that popular. Using a industry standard metric [4], armscontrolwonk.com, for example, is ranked at 531,603 in popularity. The Physics Today blog site, which reports on arms control issues, generally for the physical sciences community, is ranked at 163,740, and content that appears in the print magazine is rated at 10,000. The New York Times is ranked 100. This means, in terms of web usage alone, that a report on an arms control issue appearing in armscontrolwonk.com will have about fifty times the visibility – in terms of audience and the likelihood it will be picked up by other media outlets and amateur blogs – if it appears in the print issue of Physics Today and 5,300 times the visibility if it appears in the New York Times, let alone on the most popular news site in the world (the BBC web site). In other words, to get a risk assessment of WMDs to the attention of the public and policy makers there is no better way to do so than through a media organization. Where arms control blogs are particularly useful is where they sometimes have information that a reporter will pick up on, and contact the blogger to confirm the blog’s report. Like a canary in a coal mine, a blog posting, if noticed by a reporter, can be brought to the attention of a wider audience, but without the posting being highlighted by a news organization, it is unlikely to reach the attention of the public or politicians.

3. The Importance of Headlines The invasion of Iraq in 2003 by a US-led coalition, which was fought on the pretense that there were weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, had favorable public and congressional support because of leaks and statements from the Bush administration, and from sources close to that administration, that Iraq posed a significant threat [5]. Only two main media outlets – the McClatchy Group, which syndicates news to local newspapers, and the Washington Post – pointed out that one of the public pieces of evidence the Bush administration relied on to gain Congressional and public approval to go to war was false [6]. The story published in the two media outlets was unique in that they relied on independent scientists with the necessary technical expertise, who were willing to speak publicly and authoritatively. This is also a clear demonstration of how accurate news can be drowned out, with the Washington Post article on the false story appearing on page 18, while inaccurate reports from the administration appeared on page 1. The articles referred to above concerned a Chinese shipment of aluminum tubes that was intercepted off the Jordanian coast [7]. The Bush administration claimed that the parts were manufactured to the specifications for building centrifuges as part of a clandestine nuclear program. Independent scientists and analysts at the Department of Energy’s nuclear weapons laboratories who had some familiarity with centrifuge technology suggested the specifications more closely matched that of a short-range missile program. Although details about the controversy were published on some specialist web sites, few media organizations in the US picked up these stories. It was only outside the US that the analysis gained traction and helped strengthen skepticism among the international public over the rationale for the Iraqi invasion. So in spreading the threat assessment of WMDs to a wider public, this particular example turned out to be a mixed bag of results for the media.

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Ironically the only US intelligence organization that correctly assessed what the threat of Iraq’s so-called WMD programs was to the US was the State Department – and it used public media sources to provide the analysis. In other words, the media had a better threat assessment of Iraq’s WMD capabilities than did the CIA.

4. Why Do We Need the Media? The overwhelming support that the public gave President Bush and his administration in the first years after the 11 September 2001 attacks influenced government policy in two ways. Democrats in Congress were reluctant to vote against the Iraq war because of public support for it, and the media was reluctant to investigate too closely the rationale for the invasion of Iraq for a multitude of reasons. The successful sell that Iraq should be invaded did rely on one aspect that was only looked at more closely some years after the invasion – the role of independent experts in the media influencing the public’s perception of threat assessment. According to Ben O’Loughlin from London University [8], in assessing whether Iraq was a threat the public paid more attention to expert commentators than they did to the government or to reporters. Although a proportion of these commentators did have conflicts of interest that were not reported at the time6 their fatal flaw as experts was to rely solely on US and UK government sources for intelligence, which later turned out to be unreliable. Tougher interrogation by journalists of these experts before they were allowed on the air might have limited the public’s confusion on a number of arms control issues. The impact of the false information spread by Bush administration officials can be seen in a series of Harris opinion polls that asked the public whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction before the US Invasion. In October 2004, 38 percent of those surveyed thought this was true. By July 2006 [9] the number had reached 50% before declining in October 2008 to 37% [10]. The public is reaching a point in which they are not sure who to believe any more. Outside of the US the percentage of the public in European countries that thought Iraq had WMDs was smaller: under 8% in 2004 and 2% today. The experience of the media’s gullibility over Iraq has led to a new appreciation by reporters of independent experts, and their ability to assess strategic military government decisions using public sources such as satellite photographs or computer simulations of missile trajectories. In particular, this appreciation has been seen in media coverage of the decision by the Bush administration to develop a new nuclear warhead, the bombing by the Israelis of a suspected Syrian nuclear reactor, the failure to successfully prosecute anyone for the 2001 US Anthrax attacks, and the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran. Moreover, media organizations have one other feature that can be invaluable when trying to confirm conclusions about WMDs – legal protection. When a number of public documents regarding the survivability of structures of nuclear power plants in response to a plane crash were re-classified in 2002, and the US implemented a radical change of direction in the Nuclear Posture Review which would allow the pre-emptive strike with tactical nuclear warheads on a non-nuclear-weapon state, it was legal protections at the L.A. Times and other organizations that stopped the reporters going to

͸ For example, some expert commentators were negotiating military contracts while providing on-air expertise to CNN.


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jail and enabled the information to be published. It is from amid this confusion that both the media and independent scientists who have expertise on WMD issues can provide the public with guidance and help influence policy.

5. How to Reach a Policy Maker In the US there are currently (November 2008) four scientists who serve in Congress and only a dozen representatives who pay close attention to affairs regarding WMDs. The remaining Congressmen and representatives are influenced by the executive branch, the party leaders, and their standings among the public. This means that there are hundreds of politicians who have no stake in voting in a particular way, and may vote on the basis of incomplete data or rely too closely on threat assessments that cannot be accurately checked. A classic example of this can be seen in the debate over whether the US should develop a new nuclear weapon called the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). The RRW is designed to replace the W80 and W60 warheads that form part of the Trident missile system. The idea to do so has been kicking around Congress since President George H. W. Bush placed a moratorium on underground nuclear testing in 1992. The rationale for the RRW depends on assessments of the stockpile stewardship program. For example, with respect to plutonium metallurgy, how does the metal behaves as it ages? How fine are the tolerances of the initial Trident warhead design for creating ignition? How reliable are the electronics? Can you can live with a warhead that, when used, produces only 70% of its expected yield? And finally, how much will the RRW cost to develop? Most of the information concerning the RRW is classified, along with the assessment arguing for building it. In the last few years of the George W. Bush administration, despite strong democratic opposition the RRW limped forward. It was only independent analysis by groups such as the Federation of American Scientists that strengthened opposition, and coverage in newspapers such as the Washington Post and New York Times, that brought the matter to the attention of the public and to some members of Congress. Although there are dozens of policy briefings each week on Capitol Hill for members of Congress and their staff, the average time that a representative or Senator will take to make a policy decision outside of the legislator’s committee or his personal interests is 30 seconds, according to a verbal report by their staffers and through reading a two paragraph memo7. A voting decision will be based almost completely on how it affects the politician’s standings, both economic and in the opinion of the people in his district. The only exception to this rule is if the legislator reads about the upcoming vote in one of the major newspapers, or hears about it on TV or radio. This is one very good reason why independent scientists need to contact the media – an article though a professional media outlet can have far more significant impact in the legislative body in providing an assessment on a given issue, particularly on WMDs, than might have been anticipated. A classic example is the WMD threat assessment regarding Iran. Is the country

7

Data based on conversations with Hill staffers.

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developing a nuclear weapons program, a civilian nuclear program, or, like Japan, is it creating the potential capability that would allow it to develop nuclear weapons at a later date? In terms of effectiveness, it is media reports that will likely influence the final outcome in determining whether Congress will relax or increase the number of sanctions on Iran, or influence the likelihood that President Obama’s chief negotiator will get confirmed by the Senate.

6. Conclusion It is from amid this confusion that both the media and independent scientists who have expertise on WMD issues can provide the public with guidance and help to influence policy. As mentioned earlier the number of journalists that deal with arms control issues is relatively small both in the US and in the rest of the world. Arranging to brief these journalists on WMD issues, as does the American Association for the Advancement of Science in organizing lunch and breakfast briefings for journalists in the DC Area, is fairly straightforward and can help publicize not-widely known threat assessment aspects to a wider audience, such as the real status of North Korea’s nuclear program. Moreover, nearly every journalist is available by phone or by email and is interested in building up a valuable index of contacts who can provide advice and context in given issues. Sometimes the most effective technique is not to contact reporters on publications such as the New York Times, but to contact reporters at the magazines that the members of mass media read such as Arms Control Today and Physics Today. Scientists on the whole are not necessarily good communicators, and it is the mass media who can translate jargon and obscure terms into something a wider audience can understand, and help protect whistleblowers from intimidation. It is the mass media that can provide the accuracy and trust that is needed to allow the public to assess WMD threat assessments, and it is the mass media that can go against governments on occasion, with some protection, when the situation is warranted. The conclusion is not that independent scientists need the mass media to bring WMD threat assessments to the attention of the public. The conclusion is rather to ask how influential the work of any independent scientist would be if the media didn’t exist.

References [1]

[2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]

Generations Online in 2009, Pew Research Center Publications January 26, 2009 (available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1093/generations-online); Internet Overtakes Newspapers As News Outlet, Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, December 23, 2008 (available at http://peoplepress.org/report/479/internet-overtakes-newspapers-as-news-source). Data from Alexa http://www.alexa.com/site/ds/top_sites?catid=8&ts_mode=subject&lang=none. Bypassing the Media Filter, Washington Post, February 5, 2009. Available at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ thefix/2009/02/white_house_cheat_sheet_around.html. http://www.alexa.com/. See for example Judith Miller, Illicit Arms Kept Till Eve of War, an Iraqi Scientist Is Said to Assert, New York Times, April 21, 2003. Joby Warrick, Evidence on Iraq Challenged, The Washington Post, September 19, 2002. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_aluminum_tubes_order.


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[8]

Ben O’Loughlin, BBC this Morning, CNN Tonight: Being an ‘Expert’ in the War on Terror, paper presented at the International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention, Chicago, 28 February – 3 March 2007. [9] The Harris Poll® #57, July 21, 2006: http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?pid=684. [10] Harris Interactive Polls: http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=972.

Bibliography Hans Blix, Inspectors ‘need months’, BBC March 7, 2003. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/middle_east/2829213.stm. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Reports regarding Iraq. Available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/search.tkl?q=iraq&search_crit=subject&search=Search&date1=Any time&date2=Anytime&type=form. McClatchy references relevant to the Iraq war (available at http://www.mcclatchy.com/): -

10/11/01: Former CIA director looks for evidence that Iraq had a role in attacks. 09/06/02: Lack of hard evidence of Iraqi weapons worries top US officials. 09/12/02: Experts: Iraq unable to get materials needed for nuclear bomb. 10/04/02: CIA report reveals analysts’ split over extent of Iraqi nuclear threat. 04/19/03: Officials: Data didn’t back Bush claims on Iraqi weapons. 05/30/03: Troubling questions over justification for war in Iraq. 06/02/03: Failure to find weapons in Iraq leads to intelligence scrutiny. 10/14/03: CIA investigated tip on WMD from previously discredited source. 05/05/05: British memo indicates Bush made intelligence fit Iraq policy. 11/16/05: In challenging war’s critics, administration tinkers with truth. 06/05/08 Senate committee: Bush knew Iraq claims weren’t true.

John Hanrahan, Missing before the war: Journalism 101 questions, Nieman Watchdog May 7, 2004. Available at http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=background.view&backgroundid=0023. Senate Report on Pre-war Intelligence on Iraq. Available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/ creports/iraq.html The Internet as a Resource for News and Information about Science, Pew Internet Research Center, 2006. Available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2006/The-Internet-as-a-Resource-for-News-andInformation-about-Science.aspx. The New Face of Washington’s Press Corps, Pew Research Center Publications, February 9, 2009. Available at http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1115/washington-press-corps-study. The Times Scoops That Melted: Cataloging the wretched reporting of Judith Miller, Slate.com. Available at http://www.slate.com/id/2086110. Kenneth Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq, Random House, New York, 2002. United States Nuclear Weapons Program: The Role of the Reliable Replacement Warhead. Available at http://cstsp.aaas.org/content.html?contentid=899. Weapons of Mass Destruction? Or Mass Distraction? New York Times, May 30, 2004. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/30/weekinreview/the-public-editor-weapons-of-mass-destruction-or-massdistraction.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all.


Section 6 Concluding Comments



305

Concluding Comments on the NATO Advanced Research Workshop: the Role of Independent Scientists in WMD Threat Assessment Ivo ŠLAUS South-East European Division of the World Academy of Art and Science, Zagreb, Croatia

This NATO Advanced Research Workshop has demonstrated that NATO is a unique organization with the potential of having a clear and special mandate and strategy in the contemporary world. The uniqueness of NATO stems from its three components: political, military and the use of science for peace and security. While the military component has been diminishing since the Cold War and military deterrence has proved to be inadequate for solving contemporary problems, the science for peace and security component is becoming more important. Of course, this does not imply that scientists are saints or perfect human beings, as the contrasting cases of Fritz Haber, Edward Teller and Andrei Sakharov show. However, scientific activity is a very well structured social activity, likely the best we have. Through the ‘Science for Peace and Security’ (SPS) component NATO shows itself to be a forerunner of the knowledgebased society. The importance of the Science for Peace and Security component is illustrated by the following characteristics. 1.

2.

3.

It can address all threats and dangers and all security issues – both military and non-military. These include notably climate change and with it linked energy and food security, and economic and social issues such as financial instability that has resulted in economic crisis and demographic transition. It is capable of anticipating rather than merely reacting to events, and of creating new conditions and relations rather than only attempting to achieve possible solutions. Through the Science for Peace and Security activity, a community of independent scientists committed to world peace and global development is fostered, encouraged and developed. NATO’s Science for Peace and Security programme generates an international, global network of scientists and R&D institutions that enables the fulfilling of the most important duty of scientists: to achieve and assure global peace and the social cohesion that is necessary for a sustainable global world.

Several critical issues barely touched at this ARW are easily solved if NATO’s Science for Peace and Security aspect is emphasized adequately. 1.

Terrorism, failed and rogue states, and organized crime.

306

I. Šlaus / Concluding Comments on the NATO Advanced Research Workshop

2. 3.

Ballistic missiles and defence in Poland, the Czech Republic and in Kaliningrad (an issue which may appear as a replay of the Cuban crisis). Regional issues, for example in the Middle East and in the West Balkans, where demography plays a preponderant role.

Military means and deterrence do not solve any if these issues. Only an innovative ‘new tools’ approach is useful. Emphasis on NATO’s Science for Peace and Security activity allows NATO enlargement that is non-controversial and desirable for everybody, thereby enabling enlarging to include Ukraine, Caucasian states, the Middle East and Russia. NATO’s Science for Peace and Security program can adequately address issues relating to dual-use and single-use technologies. Almost all technologies can be used, misused and abused, starting from the knife and fire. Abolition of war and violence as ways of carrying out social relations and politics (von Clausewitz’s definition of war as a continuation of politics is obsolete) would reveal that some technologies, e.g. ballistic missiles and fighter planes, are mainly for aggressive war-like purposes. Of course, ballistic missiles are important for space research and some uses of fighter planes are helpful in civil aviation. But there is no need for many countries to have such programs, and it would be best if these programs were international and UN supervised. Some other technologies such as nuclear energy and synthetic biology have multiple beneficial applications, but albeit can be abused. NATO’s Science for Peace and Security program is a new tool for addressing current global problems. 1) It contributes towards establishing and clearly defining the concept of the ‘independent scientist’. Nobody is fully independent – we can be influenced by our biases due to culture and education, and by direct dependence on industry forcing some scientists to drift into bad science. However, through NATO’s SPS programs and grants, groups of independent scientists can be formed to tackle specific security-related problems. 2) It defines NATO’s strategy for a post-Cold war era more precisely in relation to our global contemporary world. NATO dilutes the role of sovereign nation states and in effect reduces the gross numerical difference between the number of sovereign UN members (about 200) vs the number of major world cultures (about 500-1000) vs the number of transnational companies each having total wealth larger than the gross domestic product (GDP) of many countries (a few thousand). 3) It overcomes the value imbalance across nations and societies because, rather than addressing values at the superficial level of differences and contradictions between socio-economic systems and cultures, it can reach down to the foundation where the values are identical – as stated in the ‘Golden rule’. For NATO to completely fulfil its new mandate in today’s world more resources need to be allocated to the Science for Peace and Security component and this component emphasised much more. It is necessary to appreciably increase the resources for this component and to secure positive interaction between this program and the EU, the OECD and the R&D programs of various countries.


307

Subject Index ABM Treaty 207 access 198 accession to NATO 253 advances in science and technology 92 advisory panels 1 African Union 28 ambivalence 207 antisimulation 69 arms control 207 ballistic missile defense 69 ballistic missiles 233 Berlin Plus 28 best practices 1 biochemical threat spectrum 114 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 174 biological weapons 69, 137, 141 Biological Weapons Convention 79 biological weapons inspections 43 biology 174 biosecurity 137, 157 biotechnology 141, 174 bioterror 157 bioterrorism 141 bioweapon 157 blinding lasers 133 blogs 293 calmative agents 133 chemical technology 174 chemical warfare 79 Chemical Weapons Convention 79, 92, 109, 114, 133, 174 chemistry 174 civil society 283 classified research 283 communication strategy 253 countermeasures 69 decoys 69 delivery 198 democracy 55 directed energy weapons 207 dirty bomb 198 disarmament 79

dual use 157 dual-use research 137, 141 dual-use technologies 283 economics 198 energy threshold 133 engineers 92 EU 266 gas centrifuge 191 general purpose criterion 109 global security 273 goals 266 Harvard Sussex Draft Convention 79 high-level review 15 human rights 114 IAP 174 ICSU 174 immobilizing chemicals 133 incapacitant 114 independent scientific advice 1, 174 independent scientists 233 independent testimony 69 inflated balloons 69 information 198 international commissions 1 international humanitarian law 114 international organizations 1 Internet 293 Iran 293 Iraq 43, 293 ISAF 28 isotope separation 191 Istanbul Cooperation Initiative 28 IUPAC 174 knowledge-based society 273 laser weapons 133 League of Arab States 28 legal protection 283 legislation 157 life sciences 174 Macedonia 266 measures against terrorism 266 media 293 Mediterranean Dialogue 28

308

military funding 283 military power and deterrence 273 missile defense 207, 283 missiles 293 Model Nuclear Weapons Convention 283 National Academies 1 NATO 1, 266 NATO Enlargement 28 NATO Science Programme 15 NATO-Russia Council 28 newspapers 293 NGOs 1, 92 non-lethal weapons 133 non-proliferation 79 North Korea 293 nuclear 198 nuclear non-proliferation 283 objectives 15 OPCW 174 OPCW Scientific Advisory Board 92, 174 open source monitoring 114 over-reactions 198 Partnership for Peace 28 peace 15 plutonium 198 policy advice by independent scientists 207 politics 253 President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) 69 psychology 198 public 293 public information 55 public relations 198

radio 293 riot control agent 114 risk 55 risk assessment 1, 55, 137 scheduled chemical 109 science 253 science and security 141 science input 15 scientific freedom and responsibility 141 scientists 43, 92, 137, 293 security 15, 253 society 253 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) 69, 207 strategic stability 207 television 293 terrorism 198, 266 think tanks 1 threat assessment 1, 233 threat awareness 109 toxic chemical 109 toxin 79 transparency 137 treaty regimes 1 United Nations 43 uranium 198 uranium enrichment 191 US Congress 293 verification 43 weapons 133 weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 109, 253, 273, 293 web 293 whistle-blower 114


309

Author Index Aleksoski, M. Babievsky, K.K. Bakr, N. Butcher, S.I. Clagett, D.C. Crowley, M. Davison, N. Falter, A. Finney, J.L. Forden, G. Friedman, D. Garwin, R.L. Guinnessy, P. Heap, B.

266 133 28 1 109 114 137 283 1 233 157 69 293 15

Husbands, J.L. Journé, V. Koppelman, B. Kraatz-Wadsack, G. Mahecic, Z. Matoušek, J. Neuneck, G. Perry Robinson, J.P. Rodionov, D.S. Šlaus, I. Smith, G. Trapp, R. Watson, C. Wood, H.G.

141 55 137 43 253 92 207 79 133 1, 273, 305 137 174 198 191


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Activating Psychosocial Local Resources in Territories Affected by War and Terrorism: Volume 57 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human ... Security, E: Humans and Societal Dynamics)

Complexity and Security (Nato Science for Peace and Series) (Nato Science for Peace and Series)

Hypermedia Seduction for Terrorist Recruiting - Volume 25 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series: Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Science for Peace and Security)

Environmental Security and Environmental Management: The Role of Risk Assessment (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Understanding and Responding to Terrorism: Volume 19 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Security Through Science)

Tangled Roots: Social and Psychological Factors in the Genesis of Terrorism, Volume 11 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Security Through Science)

NATO at 60: The Post-Cold War Enlargement and the Alliances Future (Nato Science for Peace and Security Series E: Human and Sociental Dynamics)

Energy and Environmental Challenges to Security (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Environmental Security and Public Safety (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Mini-Micro Fuel Cells: Fundamentals and Applications (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security) (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Optimisation of Disaster Forecasting and Prevention Measures in the Context of Human and Social Dynamics - Volume 52 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human and Societal Dynamics

Optimisation of Disaster Forecasting and Prevention Measures in the Context of Human and Social Dynamics - Volume 52 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - E: Human and Societal Dynamics

Suicide as a Weapon: Volume 30 NATO Science for Peace and Security Series - Human and Societal Dynamics

Security and Reliability of Damaged Structures and Defective Materials (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Building and Using Datasets on Armed Conflicts (Nato Science for Peace and Security) (Nato Science for Peace and Security)

Problems of High Altitude Medicine and Biology (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series NATO Science for Peace and Security Series A: Chemistry and Biology)

Globalization and Human Security

Promoting the Psych Well Being of Children Following War and Terrorism: Volume 4 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics ... Science, Human and Societal Dynamics)

Nuclear Power and Energy Security (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series B: Physics and Biophysics)

Invisible Threats: Financial and Information Technology Crimes and National Security, Volume 10 NATO Security through Science Series: Human and Societal Dynamics (Nato Security Through Science)

The Viability of Human Security

Security and Human Rights

Remote Sensing of the Atmosphere for Environmental Security (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security)

Political Violence, Organized Crimes, Terrorism and Youth (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol 46)

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