UN Peace Operations and Asian Security

UN Peace Operations and Asian Security UN Peace Operations and Asian Security provides an unparalleled analysis of the state of the United Nations peace operations and its impact on Asian security. It examines new strategies being adopted by the UN, including doctrinal shifts in peace operation, and assesses the division of labour between the UN, regional organization and non-governmental organizations/ actors. Based on selected papers from mostly Asian scholars, the book offers regional perspectives from south, southeast and Northeast Asia on the changing nature of UN Peace operations and analyzes some of the core issues that are of critical relevance to regional security in Asia. In addition it reveals interesting new insights on the new players in the area of peace operations i.e. China and Japan, and considers their projected roles as defined by their respective security concepts. It also delves into issues of possible areas of concern caused by the new activism of these regional powers in peace operations. Finally, the book revisits the significant lessons learnt from the UN experience in Cambodia and East Timor and examines their impact on future directions of peace operations. This was first published as a special issue of International Peacekeeping.

Mely Caballero-Anthony is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore. She has written extensively on ASEAN, ARF, UN Peace Operations, NGOs in Southeast. Her latest publications include Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), and Revisioning Human Security in Southeast Asia, Asian Perspective, 2004. Amitav Acharya is Deputy Director and Head of Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, where he also holds a professorship. His recent publications include: Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (Routledge, 2001).

UN Peace Operations and Asian Security Edited by Mely Caballero-Anthony & Amitav Acharya

First published 2005 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group

This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” # 2005 Mely Caballero-Anthony & Amitav Acharya All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested

ISBN 0-203-08715-1 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 0-415-37203-8 (Cased)

CONTENTS Notes on Contributors Preface

vi xi

INTRODUCTION UN Peace Operations and Asian Security

1

MELY CABALLERO-ANTHONY

ARTICLES 1. Current Trends in UN Peacekeeping: A Perspective from Asia

15

DIPANKAR BANERJEE

2.

A Regional Perspective of UN Peace Operations in Southeast Asia

28

KAMARULZAMAN ASKANDAR

3.

NGOs in Conflict Management in Southeast Asia

41

SEE SENG TAN

4.

Japan’s Policy towards UN Peacekeeping Operations

56

KATSUMI ISHIZUKA

5.

China’s Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping

73

PANG ZHONGYING

6.

Collaborative Human Security? The UN and Other Actors in Cambodia

88

SORPONG PEOU

7.

The United Nations and East Timor: From Self-Determination to State-Building

104

IAN MARTIN AND ALEXANDER MAYER-RIECKH

8.

Conclusion: Asian Norms and Practices in UN Peace Operations

122

AMITAV ACHARYA

DIGEST OF OPERATIONS (May –July 2004)

126

DOCUMENTATION Security Council Resolution 1547 ahead of a Possible UN Peace Operation in Southern Sudan

134

Index

138

Notes on Contributors Mely Caballero-Anthony Mely Caballero-Anthony is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, where she also serves as Coordinator for the Institute’s Non-traditional Security Programme. She has written on security cooperation in Asia-Pacific, track-two-diplomacy, conflict management, and human security. Her publications include Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the Asian Way (Singapore, ISEAS, 2005); edited volumes on The Asia Pacific in the New Millenium: Political and Security Challenges (2001); Beyond the Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities (Kuala Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 2000). Contact Address: Mely Caballero-Anthony Assistant Professor Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Nanyang Technological University South Spine 4, Level B4 Nanyang Avenue Singapore 639798 Tel: þ65 6790 5886 Fax: þ65 6793 2991 E-mail: [email protected] Amitav Acharya Amitav Acharya is Deputy Director and Head of Research at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, where he also holds a professorship. His recent publications include: Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order (Routledge, 2001), and Regionalism and Multilateralism: Essays on Cooperative Security in the Asia Pacific, 2nd edition, Eastern Universities Press, 2003), as well as a co-edited volume Asian Pacific Security Cooperation: Reconciling National Interest and Regional Order (M.E. Sharpe, 2004). Contact Address: Amitav Acharya Professor Deputy Director and Head of Research Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Nanyang Technological University

South Spine 4, Level B4 Nanyang Avenue Singapore 639798 Tel: þ65 6790 6213 Fax: þ65 6793 2991 E-mail: [email protected] Sorpong Peou Sorpong Peou is an Associate Professor of Political Science/International Relations on the Graduate Programme of Sophia University in Tokyo. He has written on peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as well as on security in East Asia and other regions. His major publications include Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefield to Ballotbox (Oxford University Press, 1997) and International Intervention and Change in Cambodia: Toward Democracy? (St. Martin’s Press, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, and Silkworm, 2000). Contact Address: Sorpong Peou Associate Professor Political Science Department Sophia University, 4-Yonban-cho Tokyo 102-0081, Japan Tel: þ813-3238-4028 Fax: þ818-3238-4076 E-mail: [email protected] See Seng Tan See Seng Tan is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, where he also serves as Coordinator for the Institute’s Multilateralism and Regionalism Programme. He has written on security cooperation, conflict management, counter-terrorism and non-governmental diplomacy in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific. His edited publications include Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order (M.E. Sharpe, 2004) and After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia (World Scientific, 2003). Contact Address: See Seng Tan Assistant Professor Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies Nanyang Technological University South Spine S4, Level B4, Nanyang Avenue Singapore 639798 Tel: þ65 6790 4277 Fax: þ65 6793 2991 E-mail: [email protected]

Kamarulzaman Askandar Kamarulzaman Askandar is the Coordinator for the Research and Education for Peace Unit, Universiti Sains Malaysia. He is also the Regional Coordinator for the Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network (www.seacsn.net). He is an Associate Professor at the School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia, where he teaches conflict resolution and international relations. His latest publication is Kamarulzaman Askandar (ed.), The Management and Resolution of Interstate Conflicts in Southeast Asia (Penang: SEACSN, 2003). Contact Address: Kamarulzaman Askandar Associate Professor and Coordinator Southeast Asian Conflict Studies Network Research and Education for Peace School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 11800 Minden, Penang, Malaysia Tel: þ60 4653 2658/2123 Fax: þ60 4657 7070 E-mail: [email protected] Katsumi Ishizuka Katsumi Ishizuka is Lecturer in the Department of International Business Management at the University of Kyoei, Japan. His research interest is in international peacekeeping operations. He received his MA in International Relations at the University of Nottingham (1996), and PhD in International Relations at the University of Keele (2000). Contact Address: Dr Katsumi Ishizuka University of Kyoei 4158 Uchimaki Kasukabe Saitama, 344-0051, Japan Tel: þ81-48-755-2932 Fax: þ81-48-755-3198 E-mail: [email protected] Dipankar Banerjee Major General (Retd) Dipankar Banerjee is the Director of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi since 2003. Earlier he was the Executive Director of the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies of South Asia based at Colombo and a Jennings Randolph Fellow at the US Institute of Peace, Washington, DC. He has been a consultant to the UN on the Conventional Arms Register in 2000 and an international adviser to the ICRC for 2000 – 2003. He has written extensively on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues.

Contact Address: Maj Gen Dipankar Banerjee (retd) Director Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies B-7/3 Safdarjung Enclave New Delhi – 110029 Tel: þ91-11-5100-1900 Ext 222/223 (d) Fax: þ91-11-51652560 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.ipcs.org Pang Zhongying Pang Zhongying is a Professor of International Relations at China’s Nankai University and Director of the Institute of Global Issues. He was research fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in the early 1990s. He joined the China Institute of International Studies in Beijing in 1997 and was posted as a political analyst with the China Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia from 1999 to 2001. He has a background of several years at Beijingbased universities like People’s University and Tsinghua University. His teaching and research interests include global governance, new diplomacy, regional security, China’s external relations and the theory of international relations. Among his most recent books and papers are Economic Nationalism: An International Political Economy Perspective (2002 in Chinese), Globalization and China: China’s Response to Asian Financial Crisis (2001 in English), Asia and China: Progresses, Problems and Prospects (2004 in Chinese) and China and Regional Institutions in Asia (in English, forthcoming) as well as editor of Globalization, the Resistance to Globalization and China (2002 in Chinese). He also writes extensively on international affairs for prominent media as an independent columnist. Contact Address: Pang Zhongying Professor of International Studies Director of the Institute of Global Issues Zhou Enlai School of Government Nankai University China Phone/Fax (home office in Beijing): þ86 10 65366642 Phone/Fax (campus office in Tianjin): þ86 22 23500327 Mobile (registered in Beijing): 13501080725 E-mails: [email protected] [email protected] Ian Martin Ian Martin is Vice President of the International Center for Transitional Justice. He was Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the East Timor

Popular Consultation and Head of the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) in 1999. He has also been Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) 2000 –2001. He held senior human rights field posts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda and Haiti, and served as Special Adviser to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on human rights field operations. He was Secretary General of Amnesty International from 1986 to 1992.

Alexander Mayer-Rieckh Alexander Mayer-Rieckh is conducting research on the vetting of public employees at the International Center for Transitional Justice. He was Head of the Policy and Planning Unit of the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in 2002. He coordinated the East Timor research for the study A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change (London: King’s College, 2003). He was Chief of the Human Rights Office of the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1999 to 2001, and worked for the United Nations in Rwanda, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Contact Addresses (for Mayer-Rieckh and Ian Martin) Alexander Mayer-Rieckh (principal contact) International Center for Transitional Justice 20 Exchange Place, Floor 33, New York, NY 10005, USA Tel: þ1 (917) 438-9311 Fax: þ1 (212) 509-6036 E-mail: [email protected]

Preface The UN Peace Operations and Asian Security examines the current state of UN peace operations and analyzes some of the core issues that are of critical relevance to the security of the Asia Pacific region. Among the salient questions that the volume seeks to address are: (1) how do Asian states perceive the new challenges and new doctrinal shifts in UN peace operations? (2) What have been the experiences of regional organizations in Asia in peace operations? And, (3) who are the new actors and players in peace operations and what are the implications on the region? These issues were first deliberated at a workshop on “The United Nations Peace Operation and the Security of the Asia-Pacific”, organized by the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore in collaboration with the United Nations University (Japan). The Workshop was held at the United Nations House in Tokyo, Japan on 12 –13 February 2003 and brought together practitioners in peacekeeping from around the world, as well as academics and researchers from Asia. This collection is a product of the Workshop and presents an array of Asian perspectives on the complex, but very important subject, of UN peace operations. One of the main objectives of this volume is to fill in the gap in the current literature on peace operations that brings in the perspectives and experiences of Asia. Since the end of the Cold War, many Asian countries have increasingly been involved in most of the UN peacekeeping operations. In fact, Asia had also been host to some of the most complex new developments in peace operations. Yet, the Asian experience in UN peace operations has not been adequately captured in the literature. This volume therefore, is part of the recent efforts to address the need to provide a more comprehensive and balanced perspective on the current challenges and new responses in the complex field of peace operations. The UN Peace Operations and Asian Security is also part of the much larger, four-part project that looks at the broad theme of Asia-Pacific security, undertaken by IDSS and generously supported by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation of Japan and the United States. This project is the second part of this series. The first project focused on the theme “Evolving Approaches to Security in the Asia-Pacific”, while the third project examined the issues of Globalization and Economic Security in East Asia. The fourth project was on “Reassessing Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region”. Together, these projects have produced four important books (including this volume) on the evolving security issues in Asia. In this respect, special thanks are due to Barry Desker, Director of IDSS, for his unwavering support for this project and his encouragement in the production of this book. Our thanks to the many valued colleagues, supporters and friends who have made this volume possible and have helped to bring this project to a fruitful end. We are most grateful to the authors for their valuable contribution to this

xii

PREFACE

volume and their active participation in the project from its inception. We have indeed been fortunate in bringing together an excellent group of both practitioners and scholars whose expertise and insights made this project not only a valuable learning experience but an inspiring one as well. We are deeply grateful for the financial support provided by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, without which this project would not have been possible. Our sincere thanks also to the United Nations University in Tokyo, Japan for their kind help in facilitating the organization of the February 2003 workshop where these issues were first deliberated. We are indebted to Ramesh Thakur, Albert Schnabel and Yoshie Sawada for their kind assistance in organizing the workshop. We also owe a special thanks to the administrative staff of the IDSS whose professionalism and efficient support in the production of the final manuscript eased much of the burden. We deeply appreciate the help of the anonymous reviewers for their constructive suggestions in making the manuscript a much better piece of work. We are especially grateful to Michael Pugh, Editor of International Peacekeeping, whose expertise and valuable advice helped to strengthen the final manuscript when it first came out as a special issue in the journal of International Peacekeeping, 12(1), 2005. We are indeed lucky to have worked so closely with him. Finally, this book would not have been possible without the kind assistance provided by the editoral team of Taylor & Francis. A very special thanks to Amber Bulkley, Editorial Assistant, for her important role in the production of this book. Mely Caballero-Anthony Amitav Acharya March 2005.

Introduction: UN Peace Operations and Asian Security

MELY CABALLERO-ANTHONY

The major structural changes in the international environment, particularly after the end of the Cold War, have had significant impacts on the global security agenda in general and in the Asian region in particular. To be sure, the nature of conflicts and the milieu within which these conflicts have occurred have become remarkably different. Whereas in the Cold War most conflicts were characteristically inter-state and the nature of security concerns were largely focused on protecting a state’s territorial integrity and securing its borders from outside intervention, the current strategic environment reveals conflicts increasingly found within states. Moreover, the nature of security threats has become much more complex and diverse – going far beyond the preoccupation with military threats to state security. Conflict in Asia has been no exception to the global pattern that, with the overlay of the Cold War structures now removed and the process of decolonization over, many weak states besieged by civil wars find themselves having to confront – internal conflict situations arising from ethnic, religious and territorial disputes and from poverty, deprivation and lack of development. The alarming global picture of escalating intrastate conflicts, and of situations where there is either ‘large-scale loss of life’ or ‘ethnic cleansing’ has cast serious doubts upon the role of the state in Asia as protector of the people. In many instances of intrastate conflicts, the state is seen to be ineffective, and in some cases even playing an adversarial role.1 Along with changing trends in the nature of conflict, and indeed conflict resolution, are evolving discourses on the concept of security. These developments are particularly relevant in the Asian context. In both academic and policy communities, reconceptualizing security became a resonant discourse in the region, partly as a consequence of the end of the Cold War and arguable also

2

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

because the 1997 Asian financial crisis opened up economic and social vulnerabilities. In the late 1990s, also, the notion of ‘human security’ was introduced into the security lexicon of the region. Security studies saw a turn towards expanding the notion of security beyond the preoccupation with state security and military threats. But many Asian scholars contend that such a shift was already undertaken in the region before the end of the Cold War, arguing that reconceptualizing security was not necessarily a novel activity.2 An expanded notion of security had already been present in the idea of ‘comprehensive security’, espoused by many states in Asia.3 And at least for Southeast Asia, comprehensive security was the ‘re-organized security concept’ that structured understanding about security. Hence, reconceptualizing security to include a wider set of security concerns – inter alia, economic, political, environmental and health – in the security agenda of states,4 had always been a compelling issue in the region. More importantly, the current debates on the concept of security have gone beyond the general expansion of security concepts to promoting ‘human security’ to replace state-centrism as a possible framework. Of increasing salience have been contending positions regarding the ‘security referent’, as well as the approaches to security. In addressing the questions: ‘Whose security?’, ‘Security against what?’, and ‘How and who provides security?’, advocates of the concept of ‘human security’ in Asia have challenged the dominant security thinking that focused primarily on protecting state security.5 Essentially, analysts of human security have joined their counterparts outside the region in calling for a reorientation of the security referent, moving it away from the state to focus instead on the security of individuals, societies and groups, and an expansion of the scope of security to reflect the chronic and complex insecurities commonly faced by people.6 The notion therefore of ‘security and emancipation’ is not far removed from the desire of many in the region who seek ‘freedom from physical and human constraints that would stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do’.7 The re-conceptualization of security, as well as the changing nature of conflict around the world are trends mirrored in Asia. The rapidly changing global environment and profound changes in the way conflicts have emerged have presented a huge challenge in the quest for world peace and security that requires innovative and, perhaps, radical approaches to managing and resolving security problems. These trends have forced international and regional policy elites to confront the pressing issues that challenge the premise for multilateral military operations, whether based on principles of collective security, alliances or UN peacekeeping. Specifically, in the Asian context, these trends have led to scrutiny of the prevailing regional norms of non-intervention and respect for the principles of sovereignty, particularly where threats to human security are concerned. Moreover, they highlight the key issue of ‘shared responsibility’ in the protection and enhancement of human security. This collection of essays speaks to these new challenges and new responses from Asian perspectives. The papers were selected from presentations at a workshop in Tokyo in February 2003, organized by the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore, in cooperation with the United Nations University,

INTRODUCTION

3

Tokyo, and with support from the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. The essays are written by academics and practitioners, mostly from Asia, who work on the broader area of peace operations and who can provide different regional perspectives on the current state of UN peace operations. More specifically, the essays examine some of the core issues of critical relevance to the security of the Asian region. While there are varied definitions as to what this region represents, for the purposes of the debate in this volume, Asia refers to the ‘core’ countries of Southeast Asia (comprising Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam); East Asia (Japan, Korea and China including Taiwan), and South Asia (India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka). The issues addressed include analyses of the evolving UN frameworks for peacekeeping and the new strategies being adopted in peace operations. The analyses cover the division of labour among the UN, regional organizations and non-governmental organizations, and the entry of new players from Asia into the field of peace operations. This volume also revisits the lessons learned from the peace operations in Cambodia and East Timor and their implications for the future of peace in Asia. This introduction therefore highlights some of the key points that run through the essays, namely: the implications of new UN initiatives for peace operations in Asia, which include emerging tensions in regional norms and processes in conflict prevention, the growing involvement of regional powers in peace operations, the role of civil society in conflict management, and the implications of lessons learned from the experiences of UN peace operations for the conceptualization of security in Asia. UN Peace Operations: New Challenges and New Responses It has become almost fashionable to explain the new security challenges as brought on by the end of the Cold War. This is true of many issues in Asia where direct effects of the end of that era are still being felt in many areas, such as the continuing tensions in the Korean peninsula and the problems with the Straits of Taiwan. One should also note, however, that the various kinds of problems that emerged not only post-Cold War but also from post-colonial intrastate conflicts have often found their origins in a complex web of problems stemming from the lack of credible political structures particularly in weak states, an absence of mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power, gross violations of human rights and widening social inequalities.8 Many of these types of problem are found in the region, such as secessionist activities in Muslim Mindanao in the Philippines, and the simmering tensions in the Indonesian provinces of Aceh and Papua. In response to these ‘relatively’ new challenges to peace and security, the UN embarked on a number of initiatives, expanding the scope of traditional peacekeeping to include a broader set of agendas which fall under the general rubric of peace operations. While there appears to be no agreement on the taxonomy of the term ‘peace operations’, it has increasingly been used to cover a broad spectrum of ‘multilateral engagement in one way or another to forestall, diminish, or end outbreaks of violence on the international scene’.9 For the purpose of this

4

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

study, the UN definition is applied, classifying peace operations into three principal activities: conflict prevention and peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding.10 Implications of Doctrinal Challenges to Peace Operations for Asia While peacemaking brings together a mixed bag of approaches geared towards conflict prevention, preventive diplomacy and mediation, rendering this particular region more impervious to doctrinal shifts in modalities, peacekeeping activities on the other hand have evolved into several stages that had consequently broadened its scope of activities. As discussed below, peacekeeping activities are increasingly being merged with peacebuilding. Peacekeeping mandates have also included preventive activities in the form of humanitarian intervention. In effect, the remit common to conventional, blue beret peacekeeping operations has gone beyond activities limited to monitoring ceasefire arrangements, assisting troop withdrawals, providing buffer zones between warring forces and helping in the implementation of a final political settlement. The ‘new’ UN peace operations have become much more complex and multidimensional in function: they include operations that involve setting the conditions for political participation leading to elections, disarmament and demobilization, promotion of human rights, security sector reform and human protection. In sum, the multidimensional approaches have brought a degree of conflation of conventional peacekeeping functions with peace support operations and peacebuilding.11 The widening of the remit of peacekeeping as well as the new initiatives that were introduced to address these new responsibilities have generated significant attention in Asia. Before analysing the impact of these new initiatives on the region, it is useful to recall that while these new configurations in peace operations were already initiated in the UN’s complex operations in Cambodia, Somalia, Mozambique, Bosnia and Rwanda in the late 1990s, the UN’s record was far from successful given the extent of the economic, political and social devastations that had been wrought by years of war. The tragedies of Srebrenica and Rwanda had revealed the serious weaknesses in the UN’s capabilities to quickly prevent or respond to threatening conflicts. In response to the UN’s deficiencies, the UN Secretary-General commissioned a study to address the complex challenges to peace operations. Subsequently, the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations, known as the Brahimi Report, was issued in 2000. The findings were startling. First, the UN peacekeeping department was severely understaffed: 32 military officers and 9 police officers at the UN headquarters were responsible for leading and supporting 28,000 soldiers and 8,000 policemen who served in UN peacekeeping operations.12 The often unpredictable and unbudgeted interventions cost more than twice the regular UN budget. It came as no surprise then that a core recommendation of the report was for UN peace operations to be provided with the necessary resources to manage crises. The Brahimi Report also outlined the intricate nexus between peacebuilding and peacekeeping. According to the Report: It should have come as no surprise to anyone that some of the missions of the past decade would be particularly hard to accomplish: they tended to deploy

INTRODUCTION

5

where conflict had not resulted in victory for any side, where parties. . .were not seriously committed to ending the confrontation. United Nations operations thus did not deploy into post-conflict situations but tried to create them. In such complex operations, peacekeepers work to maintain a secure local environment while peacebuilders work to make that environment self-sustaining. Only such an environment offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces, making peacekeepers and peacebuilders inseparable partners.13 Thus, the Brahimi Report presented a number of key recommendations that were essential to achieving success in peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It stressed that success depended on three key elements, aside from the provision of financial support and resources: clear organizational structures, achievable mandates and leadership. But, while the convergence of all three elements could go a long way in sustaining a successful peacekeeping and peacebuilding operation, other factors such as political support and universal contributions from member countries of the international community were equally important. While the Brahimi Report was generally well received by the international community, there remained concerns articulated by many governments in Asia about the very nature of peace operations, which they felt had not been given enough attention. Many of these concerns are found in the essays that follow – introduced briefly here. Decision-making for Peacekeeping Mandates Dipankar Banerjee, in his essay on ‘Current Trends in UN Peacekeeping: A Perspective from Asia’, draws attention to a number of issues with regard to peacekeeping operations that have concerned the region. One is the issue of representation in decision-making structures in UN peace operations. Banerjee points out that over the last decade, many countries in Asia had actively contributed forces to peacekeeping operations. The collective contribution from South Asian countries alone accounted for 30 per cent of the entire peacekeeping force in the UN. Yet, Asian countries largely removed from the decisionmaking structures of the United Nations given that the overall responsibility for peace operations rested entirely with the Security Council. The permanent five (P-5) members of the Security Council had dominated all aspects of any peace operations and essentially defined the mandate of these operations. Hence, political elites in Asia feel that while their countries have been active participants, they were largely ignored in the area of decision-making. These sentiments are echoed by Kamarulzaman Askandar, who provides a Southeast Asian perspective. If the countries of Southeast Asia are to be involved as peacekeeping providers, they need to be given the chance to contribute to policy-making regarding the mandate of peace missions. Another, closely related, issue is obsolescence in the structure and composition of the Security Council, which many Asian governments consider reflects the international order of 1945 and not of the twenty-first century. Hence, the lack of reforms in the composition of the Security Council continues to fuel the divide

6

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

within the UN, particularly between the developed and developing states. Given the gap between participation and decision-making in peace operations between Asian countries and the P-5, it would be difficult to address the challenge of generating universal political support for more effective peacekeeping operations around the world. Conflict Prevention and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention In tandem with the UN’s concern to improve the operational aspects of peacekeeping, the Report of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Armed Conflict was issued in June 2001. As noted in the report, ‘the rarity of the preventive action deployment suggests that the international community has been reluctant to expend the political and financial capital required for a peace operations without the clear case for deployment that is made by open conflict’.14 Moreover, as part of the UN agenda to develop a global culture of conflict prevention, the Responsibility to Protect Report (RTP), drafted by an ad hoc International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, followed in September 2001. The issues of conflict prevention and humanitarian intervention have drawn significant attention to the region. As far as conflict prevention is concerned, most of the essays here argue that Asian countries could play an active and distinctive role, given the nature of the conflicts found in the region and the lack of institutional structures to deal with peacekeeping operations. Three conflict prevention issues have great relevance to the region: the important roles of regional and subregional organizations, national governments and local actors in preventing violent conflicts from erupting; the salience of regional practices, norms and processes for conflict prevention; and the need to include non-governmental organizations in broader peace operations. Regionalization of Peace Operations Despite the resurgence of interest in the role of regional organizations in resolving regional conflicts, the record of regional organizations in managing disputes has been contentious. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has often been described as one of the more successful regional organizations in Asia. In spite of the setbacks it has encountered in its management of regional peace, such as the regional instability brought by the Asian financial crisis in 1997 – 98, instability in Cambodia after the 1997 elections and the periodic bilateral tensions between Malaysia and Singapore, one could argue that since the late 1960s, ASEAN has had a remarkable record in preventing the outbreak of war between member countries.15 In part, this ‘success’ was underpinned by the promotion of regional norms, often referred to as ‘the ASEAN way’. In addressing ASEAN’s role in UN-type peace operations, the analyses here present an ambivalent perspective. One study has argued that an ASEAN peace operation would indeed be significant given that: (1) the nature and sources of threat in the region have become more diverse and complex, requiring regional cooperation in both political and security areas; (2) internal conflicts continue to threaten regional stability; and (3) ASEAN’s credibility has been ‘tarnished’

INTRODUCTION

7

by its non-action over religious and ethnic killings in Indonesia and ethnic clashes on the Thai – Myanmar border.16 On the other hand, regional organizations such as ASEAN often face obvious constraints. Unlike the EU, NATO and the OSCE, ASEAN lacks the financial resources, logistic infrastructures, capacity and expertise to undertake peace operations. The primacy of national sovereignty and ASEAN’s principle of non-interference, as well as ASEAN’s emphasis on consensus-based decision-making practice, however, were the major constraints that deterred ASEAN from adopting a more interventionist stance in resolving conflicts, specifically with regard to having a regional peacekeeping force.17 Yet, in spite of such constraints and reservations, developments in ASEAN have taken a new direction as reflected in the kinds of policy initiatives that are percolating in the region. In October 2003, the 9th ASEAN Summit, in Bali, Indonesia adopted the idea of creating an ASEAN Security Community (ASC). The ASC concept was proposed by Indonesia as a way of handling security issues and conflicts within the ASEAN framework, moving it beyond the preferred regional practice of resolving disputes bilaterally or through international institutions such as the International Court of Justice. The ASC initiative would strengthen regional capacities in responding to new security problems that have plagued the region, including human trafficking, drug smuggling, piracy and other transnational crimes, as well as the global problem of terrorism.18 One of the mechanisms proposed under the ASC concept was an ASEAN peacekeeping force. As noted in Askandar’s essay, it is very significant that the proposal for an ASEAN peacekeeping force was sponsored by Indonesia – which had the highest number of conflicts but, like China, had long been a strong proponent of the policy of non-interference and non-intervention. In mid-2004 the idea was still being debated within the region. Nevertheless, more significant are the perceptible trends at the institutional and attitudinal level among states in the region that signal a move towards a more intrusive type of regionalism in Southeast Asia, a point taken up by See Seng Tan in his essay on NGOs. For some time, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) has been floating the idea of a regional peacekeeping training centre, a clear indicator of the seriousness of regional governments to consider conflict prevention mechanisms. But the reticence of ARF members to push ahead with the idea can also be read as being driven largely by the need of member states to be seen as committed to the principle of non-interference. Some analysts also argue that ASEAN would find it difficult to be an agent for change since its governments tend to support one another. Cooperation among ASEAN governments has often been perceived as driven by a desire to maintain regime stability among member states – hence the preference for not challenging the status quo.19 None the less, while it will indeed take some time for ASEAN to deal concretely with the modalities of having its own peacekeeping force, the best-case scenario, as suggested by Askandar, would be for ASEAN to create a regional peacekeeping training centre. Given the experience of individual states (Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines) in peacekeeping, as in Cambodia and East Timor, the prospects for such a centre are optimistic in the medium term.

8

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

Revisiting Regional Norms and Processes in Conflict Prevention The Canadian-sponsored RTP report also contends that regional organizations should be more proactive in preventing conflict, and challenged the inviolability of state sovereignty in this regard. The UN Secretary-General in his Millennium speech to the General Assembly in 2000 had posed the central question frankly: ‘If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity’.20 While supporting the goal of averting humanitarian crisis, the region’s perspective on the issue of humanitarian intervention has been cautious. As argued by Banerjee, there are major issues that had to be addressed to close the gap between the noble goal of the UN Secretary-General and its implementation. If humanitarian interventions have to occur, decisions must be taken with great deliberation, must be transparent and impartial. They must also be deliberated through a legitimate mechanism (such as the UN Security Council) and avoid favouring the national interests of the intervening power. Moreover, while peacekeeping mandates have now involved ‘armed’ intervention for humanitarian assistance, questions have been raised about identifying situations where member states are willing to use their resources to address conflicts that had crossed the threshold of humanitarian disasters where there is massive loss of human life, gross atrocities and abuse of human rights. A similar dilemma faces preventive action. Banerjee argues that: if the action succeeds and there is no conflict, then the question is whether such action was necessary; if the action fails and open conflict breaks out, then the interveners are blamed for the failure. In addition, against the disquiet over the US-led war in Iraq in March 2003, many Asian states have therefore been concerned about the RTP being used as an excuse for unilateral attempts to intervene outside the UN framework. An argument has been made by some governments in the region that humanitarian intervention will remain the prerogative of the strong states against the weak. In Southeast Asia, for example, concern has been raised that the region’s efforts in combating terrorism might give stronger countries outside the region the licence to intervene in the internal affairs of states in the region.21 Whether intervention can be justified under the RTP framework and whether there could possibly be a re-framing of sovereignty as a ‘responsibility’ rather than a ‘right’ will remain hotly contested issues in the region. Askandar points out that many governments in Asia claim that conflict cases must be dealt with by the government concerned and that the ‘responsibility to intervene’ should reside with it, thus precluding the kind of intervention prescribed by the RTP report. On the other hand, going beyond the context of the RTP, one notes that the experience of ‘intervention’ in the region has been significant. Askandar argues that the regional processes of ‘intervention’, translated through regional support for monitoring ceasefire agreements, had proved beneficial in facilitating the resolution of intrastate conflicts in the region. Examples include Thai and Philippine observers in Aceh in 2002, and Malaysian peacekeepers who

INTRODUCTION

9

monitored the ceasefire agreement between the Philippines government and the Muslim Islamic Liberation Front in 2004. Moreover, as discussed by Askandar, many governments in the region share the recommendations outlined in the RTP and the Report on Conflict Prevention regarding the importance of addressing deeply-rooted socio-economic, cultural, environmental and other structural causes of conflict as integral to prevention processes. Role of Non-state Actors While the importance of regional organizations in preventing conflicts has been emphasized through either their norm-building or informal mediative roles, other actors also provide additional mechanisms or tools available in resolving conflicts. See Seng Tan highlights the importance of civilian involvements in peace operations, and notes that NGOs are now increasingly viewed in the region as having certain capacities that can facilitate reconciliation in societies divided by civil war and ethnic strife. Notwithstanding state centrism, norms of non-intervention and noninterference, and the preference for ‘soft institutionalism’ over legalistic and more formal modes of cooperation, Tan submits that these emerging shifts in attitudes and accommodation toward non-state actors have been influenced by two significant regional trends. One is perceptible institutional change that has engendered more favourable attitudes to NGO involvement in conflict management. He describes four areas where institutional changes are emerging. First, a limited recalibration of longstanding state-centric norms has occurred in response to non-traditional regional challenges such as the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the political impasse in Myanmar. Against these non-conventional security challenges, ASEAN has instituted an economic ‘peer review’ mechanism with the creation of the ASEAN surveillance process. ASEAN leaders have also begun to express more openly their concern about Myanmar’s political situation, even at official meetings like the 2003 Summit. Second, a pattern, albeit uneven, of democratic transitions in parts of Southeast Asia has emerged. The trend towards greater political openness in certain countries has, among other things, led to the empowerment of NGOs with regional and international agendas and the willingness of NGOs to engage with governments and regional organizations. The fledgling ASEAN People’s Assembly established in 2000 is a good case in point. A third significant development is the growing cooperation between governments and certain NGOs in the region in facilitating dialogue between state and society as part of the multidimensional measures undertaken to counter terrorism. The fourth area is a tendency to adopt more formal mechanisms that are now challenging the modalities of the so-called ‘ASEAN way’. Together with these noticeable institutional developments is an attitudinal change, especially among the militaries in the region towards the involvement of NGOs in humanitarian activities. These developments include the willingness of the military to coordinate their activities with NGOs with a view to developing a symbiotic working relationship between peacekeepers and NGO volunteers in peace operations. While Tan cautions against inferring definitive results from these institutional and attitudinal shifts, he nevertheless acknowledges that the

10

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

transitions have provided opportunities for more interaction between NGOs and state actors. Regional Powers in UN Peace Operations Another major theme addressed in this volume is the increasing role of China and Japan in peacekeeping operations. As major powers in the region, their increasing interest in UN operations can be perceived by smaller countries in the region either positively as a means for both countries to contribute to regional and global peace and security, or negatively as an activist position that could upset the balance of power in the region and lead to regional instability. Pang Zhongying’s essay on China’s role in UN peace operations offers insights on how attitudinal changes have pushed for increased Chinese involvement in peacekeeping activities. According to Pang, the government’s determination to be seen as a ‘normal’ state and a responsible power in the region has led to a re-thinking of Chinese commitment to multilateralism. As China seeks to become a part of international society, participation in peacekeeping operations is seen as an integral part of this effort. This has also been clearly articulated in China’s new security concept, which outlines participation in UN peace operations as one of its guiding principles. However, China’s policy has also presented several dilemmas. While committed to the goal of peace and security, the desire to actively participate in peace operations requires striking a delicate balance between adherence to principles of noninterference and protection of sovereignty on the one hand, and supporting the goals of humanitarian intervention on the other. In also trying to protect its national interest with regard to Taiwan, China has had to deal with the emerging contradictions of having to promote greater democratization of the international system while coping with its own internal issues. China has expressed concern about the activities of peace operations that include the use of force with or without a UN mandate. China perceives such activities as providing the licence for the international community to interfere in China’s domestic affairs such as on the issues of Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. In spite of these contradictions, however, China has continued to push for reform within the UN, particularly with regard to increasing the participation and involvement of Asian and other developing countries in the decisionmaking processes of peace operations and defining the mandates. Finally, China’s interest in peace operations is also seen as part of a learning and socialization process as a member of the international community. But to move away from its former passive stance in international affairs and to actively contribute to world peace, Pang suggests that China may have to adopt a more flexible approach to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference. Japan’s increasing involvement in UN peace operations appears to be a logical step given its economic power. However, as discussed by Katsumi Ishizuka, Japan’s desire to play a more active role in international affairs has been hampered by several domestic factors, such as the limitation imposed on the country by its own Constitution. The challenge for Japan has been to seek a new approach to its participation in UN peacekeeping operations. In response

INTRODUCTION

11

to international criticism in the aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991 that Japan needed to carry its weight in the international arena, Japan adopted the International Peace Cooperation Law to provide a legal framework for joining UN operations. This law was further revised in November 2001 to enable Japan to increase its participation by despatching more members of Japan’s Self Defence Force (SDF) to peacekeeping operations. Ishizuka argues, however, that besides the need to increase its profile in the international community and be counted in multilateral peace operations, Japan was also driven by its desire to become a ‘normal nation’. According to Ishizuka, how this image of a ‘normal nation’ has been translated can be seen from both the liberal and realist perspectives. From the liberal approach, Japan needed to contribute ‘physically’ to peacekeeping, rather than just financially, in order to carry out its responsibility as member of international society. In other words, Japan needed to move away from its image of ‘chequebook diplomacy’. From a realist perspective, Japan needed to exert its political power in the world. And, since its participation in the Gulf War, Japan had sought to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council, to be in the same rank as China. Japan has had to recalibrate its participation in UN peacekeeping operations in the post-9/11 era. Given its alliance with the United States, Japan would have to demonstrate consistently its commitment to UN operations, enabling it to move its foreign policy from US-centrism towards UN-centrism. Ishizuka contends that this is intended to achieve a balance between its commitment as an ally of a superpower and as a responsible member of the international community. Finally, Japan’s increased commitment to UN peacekeeping would also help correct the misperceptions and suspicions held by countries in the region about a re-militarization of Japan. The trend toward increased participation by China and Japan in UN operations signals significant developments in the security landscape of the region. Should both countries regard this as a major tool in restructuring their policies and their capacity to influence policy on security in the region, their cooperation in this field would be a major contribution in the maintenance of peace and stability. Both countries bring considerable assets to the region. If they continue with their UN commitments, it would improve the perception in the region, and beyond, that the two major powers are responsible global citizens and that their motives are seen as trustworthy. Learning from the Experience of UN Peace Operations in Asia As efforts continue to improve the multidimensional task of peace operations, it is useful to revisit the lessons learned from the UN peace operations in Asia. The UN’s experience in Cambodia and East Timor are the two cases included in this volume. They have been chosen because they both encompass two interlinked issues of the changing nature of peace operations and the evolving re-conceptualization of security. As the international community is confronted with new threats and rising demands for peacekeeping, one of the questions that came out of these studies

12

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

was whether the UN should and could take on an ever-increasing range of peacekeeping operations or should it be restricted to concerning itself with norm-setting, standards and political support – leaving peacekeeping to regional organizations or coalitions. There is now a growing debate on this issue both within and outside the UN system.22 Sorpong Peou’s study of UN involvement in Cambodia almost a decade ago reflects on the approach taken by the UN on collective conflict management, which focuses on state security, and examines the prospects of re-working this approach to advance the cause of human security as an alternative framework. The essay presents a novel perspective by examining the world body’s operation in Cambodia through the lens of what he calls ‘collaborative human security’ (CHS). As explained by Peou, this concept draws on the fact that the provision of human security is not solely the responsibility of the state but involves a number of actors: other states and non-state actors and institutions. The human security concept and approach differs starkly from the conventional notion of security on two counts: (1) the object of security – what and who is being secured and (2) the attainment of security – what are the methods and how are they to be used. Peou supports the idea that there should be a shift in the security referent from the state to individuals, societies and groups. With this re-orientation it follows that as far as the approach of peace operations is concerned, Peou argues that the UN should put more effort into ensuring that collaborative efforts by state and non-state actors are directed at promoting human security. In applying the CHS framework, Peou’s study therefore has moved beyond a descriptive account of the nature of UN peace operations in the war-torn state to assess how in the respective areas of peacekeeping and peacebuilding the UN was able to address human security in Cambodia. He contends that Cambodia presented a laboratory for collaborative human security. Analyses have shown that in the UN’s work, both on peacekeeping and peacebuilding, several actors besides the UN came together to contribute not only to rebuilding the country but also to turning it into a semi-democratic state. But given the precarious nature of the country’s fledgling semi-democratic system, its uphill challenges in meeting basic human needs, and endemic problems of law and order, postUNTAC Cambodia was still unable to address the concerns related to ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from fear’. Cambodia has also yet to resolve the painful issues of justice and reconciliation. The essay by Ian Martin and Alexander Mayer-Rieckh examines the four peace operations in East Timor between 1999 and 2004. It is interesting to note that the UN’s most extensive peace operations in Asia have been in one of the region’s smallest and poorest countries. Starting from the 1999 UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), followed by the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) and finally the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) – the authors give the UN a mixed report. Underlying the less-than-impressive performance was its lack of expertise in post-conflict reconstruction or peacebuilding. The analysis of UNTAET highlights the issue of over-extended mandates. As discussed by the authors, on top of undertaking a robust peacekeeping role, UNTAET was entrusted

13

INTRODUCTION

with a wide range of functions that involved the setting-up of full administrative powers of the new state, coordination of humanitarian assistance, economic development and preparation for self-government. But as noted by the authors, there were several key issues that were missing from the mandate: a roadmap to selfgovernment, the relationship between governance and public administration of the future East Timorese government and the mechanisms for consultation with the East Timorese. East Timor had not been an independent country, and statelevel structures did not exist while it was part of Indonesia. In short, the problems with UNTAET stemmed from the confusion over its dual role as the transitional administration and as a mission tasked with preparing East Timor for democratic self-government. The UN’s experience in East Timor brought to the fore three important lessons. As Martin and Mayer-Rieckh point out, the first lesson has to do with the nature of planning and preparation for this type of peace operation. The importance of comprehensive planning in spite of time constraints could not be understated. The second lesson pertains to the tendency to conflate the distinct functions of peacekeeping and peacebuilding, with lack of preparation in moving from one to the other. As argued by the authors, ‘peacekeeping is an activity, while peacebuilding is [a long term] project’. The latter requires a different set of strategies, methods, resources and skills which traditional peacekeeping activities do not cover. Peacebuilding involves the active involvement of other UN agencies, besides the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), that are crucial in the complex tasks of institution building, human resource development and economic sustainability. Finally, the third lesson reiterates the importance of including other regional actors in UN peace operations. The authors echo the importance of bringing in regional expertise and an understanding of local situations, which the regional and local actors – involving both state and NGO components – can provide. To conclude, the lessons of the past examined against the current trends in UN peace operations highlight an important issue that confront the international community. This is the question of whether a new security concept could perhaps be the key to more productive thinking on the approaches to conflict resolution and maintaining world peace. In Asia the new challenges and approaches that have evolved to address the current limitations of peace operations have certainly raised both hope and concern. The optimistic outlook is underpinned by the region’s continued faith in the UN as the universal institution that symbolized legal authority and legitimacy in all aspects of peace operations. On the other hand, concern is generated by the dilemma faced by states in Asia in their having to lend support to a more proactive approach to peace operations, while holding on steadfastly to regional norms and practices to peace and security. NOTES 1. Sadako Ogata, ‘State Security – Human Security’, The Fridtjof Nansen Memorial Lecture, Tokyo, 12 Dec. 2001. 2. See for example, Muthiah Alagappa, ‘Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries’, in Robert Scalapino et al. (eds), Asian Security Issues Regional and Global, Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988; Mohamed Jawhar Hassan,

14

3. 4.

5.

6.

7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22.

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY ‘Asian Perspective on Security’, in Tatsuro Matsumae and Lincoln Chen (eds), Common Security in Asia: New Concepts of Human Security, Tokyo: Tokai University Press, 1995, pp.53–69. Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Practices Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, ‘Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods’, Mershon International Studies Review, Vol.40, Supplement 1, 1996, pp.229–30. See also Barry Buzan, Øle Waever and Jaap de Wilde (eds), Security: A New Framework of Analysis, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998. See for example, Japan Center for International Exchange, The Asian Crisis and Human Security, Tokyo: JCIE, 1998; Kanti Bajpai, ‘Human Security: Concept and Measurement’, Joan B. Kroc Institute, Working Paper No.19, University of Notre Dame, Illinois, 2000; Amitav Acharya, ‘Human Security: East Versus West’, International Journal, Vol.61, No.3, 2001, pp.442–60; Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘Human Security in the Asia– Pacific: Current Trends and Prospects’, in David Dickens (ed.), The Human Face of Security: Asia-Pacific Perspectives, Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 2002, pp.18–29. For Asian debates on human security see, e.g., William Tow, Ramesh Thakur and In-Taek Hyun (eds), Asia’s Emerging Regional Order, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2000; Japan Institute of International Affairs, In Quest of Human Security, Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 2001; Pranee Thiparat (ed.), The Quest for Human Security: The Next Phase of ASEAN?, Bangkok: Institute of Security and International Studies, 2001. For works on the general topic of human security, see also Fen Osler Hampson et al., Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002; Jennifer Leaning and Sam Arie, ‘Human Security: A Framework for Assessment in Conflict and Transition’, Harvard Center for Population and Development Studies Working Paper, Vol.11, No.3, 2001; Sverre Lodgaard, ‘Human Security: Concept and Operationalisation’, accessed at: www.cpdsindia.org/globalhumansecurity/security/operationalisation.htm. See Ken Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, Review of International Studies, Vol.17, No.7, 1991, pp.313–26. This section draws largely from the insights given by Julian Harston, Director of Asia and Middle East Division, DPKO, in a speech on UN Peace Operations presented at the Workshop on UN Peace Operations and the Asia-Pacific, organized by the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Tokyo, 12 Feb. 2003. United States Institute of Peace, ‘Peace Operations and Common Sense: Replacing Rhetoric with Realism’, 1996, accessed at www.usip.org/pubs/peace/peaceworks/mclean9/intro9.html. See Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/304, New York: United Nations, 2000. Harston (n.8 above), p.3. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (n.10 above). See Executive Summary of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, ibid., p.ix. See Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/55/ 985-2/2001/574, 2001. See Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘The Regionalisation of Peace in Asia’, in Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (eds), The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003, pp.195–212. Edy Prasetyono, ‘The Role of Regional Organisations in Peace Operations: The Case of ASEAN’, paper presented at the IDSS Workshop on UN Peace Operations and the Asia-Pacific, Tokyo, 12 Feb. 2003. Ibid., p.8. See the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (also known as Bali Concord II), 7 Oct. 2003, accessed at: www.aseansec.org/15159.htm. Muthiah Alagappa, ‘Regional Institutions, the UN, and International Security: A Framework for Analysis’, Third World Quarterly, Vol.18, No.3, 1997, p.432. Kofi Annan, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, UN SecretaryGeneral Millennium Report to the General Assembly, New York: United Nations, 2000. This was a common observation raised at the Seminar on Responsibility to Protect: Southeast Asian Perspective, jointly organized by the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, 30 March 2003, Singapore. See Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘Asian Attitudes and Approaches to Peace Operations’, UNISCI Paper No.29, Madrid: Complutense University, 2003, p.23. Presentation by Jussi Saressalo, Military Adviser to the International Peace Academy, at the IDSS workshop on UN Peace Operations and the Asia-Pacific, Tokyo, 12 Feb. 2003.

Current Trends in UN Peacekeeping: A Perspective from Asia DIPANKAR BANERJEE

The opening paragraph of the Brahimi Report presented to the UN General Assembly in September 2000 clearly highlighted the dilemma the world faces over peacekeeping today: The United Nations was founded . . . in order to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. Meeting this challenge is the most important function of the Organization, and to a very significant degree it is the yardstick with which the Organization is judged by the peoples it exists to serve. Over the last decade, the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge, and it can do no better today.1 This is indeed a stringent critique but perhaps a bit harsh. Actually the achievements of UN peacekeeping measured over its entire history have been remarkable and successful. In numerous cases it has prevented further blood-letting by intervening in situations that could have degenerated into all-out war, maintained peace in very complex situations of impending conflict, monitored the truce between armies after an often shaky ceasefire, helped disengage forces arrayed in battle and provided security to permit humanitarian assistance in conflict zones. Yet, the challenges it faced in the last decade are also significant, casting doubts in many minds regarding the efficacy of UN peace operations. More people have died in violent armed conflicts in the twentieth century than perhaps in all earlier centuries combined. This is as much due to global population

16

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

increase and developments in the means of inflicting death and destruction than to any increase in human proclivity for violence. Civilization has not evolved sufficiently to prevent conflicts or prevent them early enough to minimize casualties and reduce suffering. The evolution of warfare in the twentieth century has demonstrated how complex is the source of conflict today and varied are the means of waging war. Additional complexities of trans-border attack with an unknown face yet devastating consequences were revealed in September 2001. US responses in Afghanistan and Iraq have raised further concerns, and events since 9 September 2001 have emphasized as never before the need to direct all international actions, particularly in areas of war and peace, through the UN. Stages in the Evolution of UN Peacekeeping Operations Even after the extraordinary violence of 1939 –45 there was neither a strong commitment nor a clear policy for maintaining peace. The concept of ‘peacekeeping operations’ evolved slowly and in an ad hoc manner, for there is no mention of this in the United Nations Charter. As a former Under Secretary-General for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has remarked: ‘There is still no definition on what it entails, no criteria when operations are to be established and no guidelines on how to plan and deploy the forces’.2 There is no specific provision for ‘peacekeeping’ in the Charter. It evolved over the Cold War years as an extraordinary art, calling for the use of military personnel not to wage war but to prevent fighting between belligerents. However, UN peacekeeping operations have passed through four phases, each with its somewhat distinct characteristics. The first phase, often called traditional peacekeeping, refers to the ‘noninterventionist buffer zone deployments’ of the Cold War era. It relied on a situation where there was a peace to keep, and peacekeeping operations usually followed a ceasefire, the terms of which were generally accepted by the belligerents. The UN Security Council and all parties connected with the conflict agreed to the deployment of a force, which was international in composition and enjoyed complete freedom of movement in the host territories. It was meant to act impartially, and armed force was to be used only in self-defence.3 There was also one Chapter VII intervention where a force was used by major powers under Security Council approval in Korea. This force was provided by major powers under their operational command and was not a blue-helmet operation. There is a distinct difference between the two. Where the former is essentially political, impartial and non-coercive, the latter is a punitive process, conducted as a military operation and is not necessarily impartial, even though there is likely to be a degree of discrimination. The next stage may be described as second-generation peacekeeping and came about after the end of the Cold War. These operations eventually became more complex. The unique challenges of the era appeared to signal to the world an opportunity for the UN, and there were high expectations from its peacekeeping activities. Conflicts tended to be more intra-state than inter-state, even though neighbouring countries may have been involved in providing support. The cause of conflict was more often ethnic unrest, a consequence perhaps of the sudden realization of new

CURRENT TRENDS IN UN PEACEKEEPING

17

identities. There was seldom a peace to keep and instead there was an expectation that by the very presence of the UN force somehow peace might prevail. The permanent members of the Security Council sometimes had different views and interests on a particular conflict and often played a contrary role. There was greater reluctance in western developed countries to participate in operations. It usually took a long time for the force to be assembled, and the mandates assigned to it were not matched in the composition of the force, its resources, or its equipment and weaponry. Finally, there was usually a humanitarian dimension that had to be attended to simultaneously while dealing with the conflict.4 By the mid-1990s the euphoria of UN peacekeeping efforts tended to peter out. The experiences of Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Angola all had a sobering effect. First, they demonstrated that each conflict was unique and a ‘one size fits all’ approach would not work. It was one thing to maintain peace when both sides were exhausted and seriously wishing for an end to conflict and another when it was but an interval in the fighting, with the protagonists keen to have another go. Second, non-state armed actors had no regard for international norms and in such a situation traditional peacekeeping was not effective. Third, when major powers had different interests, their commitment also differed widely. Finally, with developed countries increasingly reluctant to participate, the burden fell on the developing world, countries that were sometimes unable to provide forces with the weapons, resources and training essential for the conduct of these operations.5 With the Srebrenica tragedy in 1995, the prospect of UN peacekeeping looked bleak. It then entered what may be called the third phase, a period when serious attempts were made to regionalize peacekeeping. The expectation was that with their local expertise perhaps regional organizations were better suited to maintaining peace in their respective areas. NATO in Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States in the Caucasus and African regional organizations in their respective regions in Africa were considered to be better suited for such tasks and were expected to take a larger responsibility. The world’s commitment also declined during this period, and UN peacekeeping forces and expenditures were reduced to about one-third of those that had prevailed in the early 1990s.6 But regional and sub-regional organizations were no panacea, and when they did not have the infrastructure or the resources such as could be provided by NATO, they were less well placed than the UN for these tasks. Second, countries within a region were often a party to the conflict or their interests were affected and hence they were not appropriate to the task. Third, regional organizations particularly when less developed lacked the moral legitimacy of the UN, a severe disadvantage in any role in conflict prevention.7 The exponential resurgence of peacekeeping from 1999 was a phenomenon that arose to intervene in failing and failed states, many drawn out of humanitarian considerations, and this may be considered as a fourth, overlapping, phase. Major operations were launched in Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, and in Eritrea/Ethiopia. Perhaps more importantly, these developments led to a serious soul searching to understand the limitations of earlier approaches and a determination to set in place corrective measures to strengthen and improve UN peacekeeping efforts.

18

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

Corrective Measures This return to the UN and confidence in its role and importance in peacekeeping is what determined subsequent developments. The Secretary-General initiated a fundamental reorientation of UN responsibilities to identify areas of weakness as well as areas of concern and actions required to rectify them. Three major reports that emerged are examined briefly in this connection. First, Kofi Annan’s own report on Prevention of Armed Conflicts submitted to the fiftysixth session of the General Assembly on 7 June 2001 attempted to fulfil his pledge ‘to move the United Nations from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention’.8 The other two were reports of two commissions. The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, under the chairmanship of Lakhdar Brahimi, was submitted to the Millennium Assembly in August 2000. It examined the state of peace operations under the UN and made many important recommendations.9 The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty instituted by the Canadian Government and co-chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun was the third, published on 30 September 2001. The Commission examined the dilemma facing the international community in intervening in acute humanitarian catastrophes that might infringe on state sovereignty. Its highly nuanced and sensitive report, appropriately titled The Responsibility to Protect, has been widely acclaimed and has been debated around the world.10 These documents provide the basis for new approaches to peacekeeping and raise serious questions, particularly from the perspective of nations in Asia. What are the commitments and responsibilities of states and are these being met equitably? If the Security Council is the principal body entrusted with peacekeeping is it fully representative? How is conflict to be prevented and who is responsible for implementing corrective measures? What should be done to improve the operational dimension of peacekeeping? Where does one draw the line between intervention and state sovereignty? This essay will briefly highlight the findings of the above reports and provide the Asian perspectives on issues that need our attention. Preventing Armed Conflict Conflict prevention, according to Secretary-General Kofi Annan, lies at the heart of the UN’s responsibility. Accordingly, he set two principal objectives: first, to review the progress made in conflict prevention under the UN; second, to make specific recommendations to enhance the UN’s capability. Only the key conclusions and specific recommendations are mentioned here. First, primary responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national governments. The role of the UN and the international community is principally to support and help develop capacity. Second, preventive actions should ideally be initiated at the earliest possible opportunity. More important, these have to address the deep-rooted socio-economic, cultural, environmental, institutional and other structural causes that often underlie conflict in a region. Third, an effective preventive strategy requires a comprehensive approach which has to take both a short-term view

CURRENT TRENDS IN UN PEACEKEEPING

19

to end the conflict and a long-term perspective encompassing political, diplomatic, humanitarian, human rights, developmental, institutional and other measures that should enlist the support of the international community and national and regional actors. Fourth, conflict prevention and sustainable and equitable development are mutually reinforcing activities and can best take place in an environment of sustainable peace. Finally, a successful preventive strategy depends on the cooperation of many international bodies including the Bretton Woods institutions. In his report, the Secretary-General particularly emphasized the role of regional and sub-regional organizations, the private sector, non-governmental organizations and other civil society actors.11 The issue of sustainable development assumes great importance in any conflict. Major inequities within a state are an important condition that could lead to conflict. When exacerbated by ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious differences they deepen into a complex situation which leads to intractability. The underlying causes are still economic imbalance and lack of opportunities. In a globalized world many of the principal causes and their remedies do not often lie within the purview and the control of a sovereign nation. When international actions are not equitable their adverse impact on weaker states is likely to be severe. The Secretary-General has highlighted these connections, but as he has mentioned, the solutions to these issues are not mainly within the UN organization but in the hands of international financial and economic institutions. The adverse impact of globalization on some countries poses a serious challenge today. Their continued economic travails have not merited the kind of response from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank that will contribute towards preventing conflicts. Instead the approach is often to put undue pressure on these countries and to emphasize human rights, insist on opening up national economies and similar economic liberalization policies, without adequately taking into account the conditions in a particular state or how individual countries are affected by them. The case of Malaysia after 1997 is particularly notable in this regard. When the country was affected by an exodus of capital, Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia adopted a fixed exchange rate for the Ringgit (instead of devaluing the currency), closed part of the economy from foreign competition and restructured it against prevailing international opinion. The Malaysian economy soon stabilized and there were no adverse social impacts from the short period of economic downturn that may otherwise have led to internal conflict. By contrast, Indonesia’s response led to deep social unrest. The Brahimi Report The Brahimi Report concluded that the UN had for too long been used by member states as a means to be seen as ‘doing something’, rather than focusing on the right things to do.12 The report offers general recommendations for the conduct of successful UN peacekeeping operations, especially: . . .

the need for a clear and specific mandate; consent to the operations by parties involved in the conflict; ensuring adequate resources for the task at hand.13

20

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

The report also contained some 57 explicit and more than 100 implicit recommendations. Some of the specific recommendations were under the following heads: . .

.

. . .

institution of fact-finding missions in an attempt to prevent future crises; the need for more robust peacekeeping in situations where peace has broken down due to the intransigence of one or more parties; the proposal for a UN Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) to support the Executive Committee on Peace and Security; call for a rapid deployment capability and greater on-call expertise; enhance the capacity of the DPKO and provide it with more funds; establishment of integrated mission task forces.14

These recommendations are all very positive and have been well received by the international community. The report is already being acted on at the Secretariat and a number of steps have already been taken. The staff at the DPKO has been increased by 50 per cent to 600 persons. Administrative aspects are being streamlined and areas falling within the purview of the Secretary-General have been expedited, especially in the management and planning areas. The UN Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS) has been streamlined. The On-Call List concept has been improved and 154 positions have been identified. The Rapid deployment level of UNSAS went into effect from mid2002, which is expected to substantially reduce the deployment time for future operations. The General Assembly has approved over US$140 million to create strategic deployment stocks. A modern inventory management system began functioning in mid-2003. A Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) has helped to provide a rapid deployment capability for emergent situations.15 Commendable improvements have been affected in peace operations in the last two years based on the Brahimi Report, which may set a trend for future effectiveness. Operations in Timor-Leste were successfully concluded. An Interim Authority in Afghanistan has been established. Peace and security was restored to Sierra Leone where UN-supported demobilization has been a success. Assistance in training police and border forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina were concluded after seven years.16 At the end of 2003 the UN had deployed 14 peacekeeping operations of which five were in Africa, four in the Middle East (including UNIKOM, the mission in Iraq – Kuwait that closed in October), two in Asia and the Pacific and three in Europe. It also had 15 political and peacebuilding missions – eight in Africa (including one in Angola that closed in February), four in Asia and the Pacific, two in the Middle East and one in Central America. Deployment of peacekeepers in these operations reached its high point for the year in December, as did the number of contributors. At that time almost 46,000 military and civilian police personnel from 94 countries were serving in the field. Civilian personnel included approximately 3,700 international and 7,600 local staff.17

CURRENT TRENDS IN UN PEACEKEEPING

21

Other trends in peacekeeping also merit our attention. First, peacekeeping forces are now provided from the developing rather than the developed world. All ten top force-contributing nations at the end of 2003 were from developing countries, in descending order: Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria, India, Ghana, Nepal, Jordan, Uruguay, Kenya and South Africa.18 Three South Asian countries are among the first four troop-contributing countries and in the last decade have collectively contributed about 30 per cent of the entire peacekeeping strength. India has borne the highest casualties in peacekeeping since its inception.19 We need to ask, are their voices sufficiently represented in shaping the decisions affecting peace operations, particularly at the planning stage and mandate formulation?20 The answer unfortunately is no. The overall responsibility for peace operations rests with the Security Council. Its members decide on all aspects of a particular operation and formulate the rules governing their mandate. Its permanent members in effect decide which operations will actually be deployed. Yet, in times of crisis they are unwilling to take the responsibility or support early corrective measures with necessary resources. The lack of timely intervention in the case of Rwanda is perhaps the strongest indictment of this state of affairs. The structure of the Security Council reflected the international order of 1945, not of the twentyfirst century. Is this an equitable division of responsibility and will it lead to effective participation by all nations? Today’s war on terror is somewhat mischievously defined as between Islam and the rest. But, if it is truly a war by all against the fanatical few, are Islamic countries sufficiently represented in the higher echelons of international decision-making on war and peace? The Responsibility to Protect In his Millennium speech, Kofi Annan asked the world body to consider, ‘armed intervention’ as an ‘option of last resort, but in the face of mass murder it is an option that cannot be relinquished’. He made compelling cases at the UN General Assembly both in 1999 and in 2000 and asked the international community to develop a new consensus on how to approach these issues: ‘If humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?’21 The Report goes on to lay down the basic principles of intervention. First, it identifies the responsibility to protect, which it presumes will be the state itself. Next, in the condition for international intervention, it defines both the extent of state failure and the condition, only when the state is ‘unable to halt or avert it’. The report then suggests the guiding principles for the international community. A right to intervention embraces three specific responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild. It also emphasizes that this right should be guided by four precautionary principles: right intention, which is to avert human suffering; last resort, that is after every nonmilitary option has been explored; proportional means, based on minimum force; and finally, reasonable prospects, both of success and that the consequences

22

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

should not outweigh the results of inaction. Overall the principles and recommendations are very well thought through and they ensure adequate safeguards against misuse. Yet, as the debate over this issue is joined globally, the concerns in Asia should also be put firmly on the agenda. In addition to practical issues a larger disquiet arises from the challenge posed to the very basis of the international state system – national sovereignty. We too often forget that many liberal democratic states of today were founded on vicious intraand inter-state violence of the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, a stage that many developing countries are now experiencing in their efforts at state formation. A strong sense of state sovereignty pervades much of Asia. The region remains firmly beholden to sovereignty, taking that as the fundamental basis of stability and identity.22 Having emerged from colonial domination and the ravages of the Second World War only half a century ago, there is a strong sense that more time is needed for state formation and consolidation, particularly where post-colonial conflicts were long-drawn-out. While national sovereignty must not be used as a shield to mask the atrocities perpetrated against its citizens by a state, any international action that violates this principle of state sovereignty must be founded on extremely solid ground. Both India and China have strongly endorsed this concept of state sovereignty in all their dealings with the international community. In numerous statements made by the Indian head of the Permanent Mission at the UN, particularly during the Kosovo crisis, the question of state sovereignty and principle of upholding it by the international community was stressed many times by its representative. China too has held strongly to these views. According to a key study by Bates Gill of the Brookings Institution: ‘The crucial principle is that the national authorities which rule over the people within a specific area are the ultimate authority for dealing with all domestic and foreign affairs faced by the nation state. These authorities alone enjoy these rights and responsibilities, to the exclusion of any other actor’.23 Given these views, the international community should carefully consider before undertaking any interventionary peacekeeping operations affecting Asia. If humanitarian interventions have to occur, decisions to intervene must be taken with great deliberation and through a transparent, impartial and legitimate mechanism, which does not favour the national interest of intervening powers. A number of other issues will have to be taken into account: .

.

.

.

Is the objective attainable militarily? Has a clear strategic assessment been done? Are the resources available? Is support to the operation strong within the region and internationally? Essential requirements include: early warning, preliminary planning, welltrained and equipped forces ready at short notice, good logistics and sound planning and support back-up. Should time and conditions permit, all measures other than force must first be considered. Participation in such humanitarian intervention, if necessary, should be by trained forces but from countries without any strategic interests in the

CURRENT TRENDS IN UN PEACEKEEPING

.

.

23

region. Let us not underestimate the fact that training for such tasks needs to be of an even higher order. Use of force is easy. Restraint in the use of force in situations of grave provocation is much more difficult. Only the United Nations under exceptional conditions can permit such an intervention. However, the Security Council as presently constituted and empowered is not an acceptable body to many nations in the world. There must be a clear exit policy.

Review of Peacekeeping Operations A Comprehensive Review of Peacekeeping Operations in all their aspects was conducted at the General Assembly in March 2002. A few conclusions are of particular interest. The Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping noted that since the Brahimi Report, the DPKO had been strengthened and its resource base enlarged. The General Assembly was committed to ensure that adequate resources were made available to it to fulfil all its responsibilities. In particular military capacity within the Secretariat would be enhanced. The integrated mission task force concept was accepted and the standby arrangement system which had come into effect was to be strengthened. There was concern regarding suitable geographic representation in missions and the principle of transparency in selecting contingents. Weaknesses in the DPKO were also noted and areas for improvement acknowledged.24 The Brahimi Report and subsequent actions at the UN headquarters have done much in recent years to improve the quality of peacekeeping. The challenge is to harness this and develop the political support for more effective operations around the world. UN peace operations in Asia remained generally satisfactory at the end of 2003 and at a lower key than in most preceding years. The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) successfully conducted the presidential elections, and administrative power was handed over to the new administration on 20 May 2002. Subsequently, a revised and a much smaller UN support team, the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET), was established with responsibility for policing and some administrative and advisory functions. The second oldest UN Mission in India–Pakistan, UNMOGIP, remains deployed in the disputed region of Jammu and Kashmir, but its ability to monitor the ceasefire is severely restricted. India no longer recognizes its jurisdiction and does not allow it to function, but tolerates its presence. In Tajikistan the situation has improved dramatically in recent years and the UN Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding continues to help the country build institutions and promote the rule of law. The UN Political Office in Bougainville (UNPOB) remains deployed to oversee the Peace Agreement, and a mission was sent in May 2002 to enhance disarmament efforts.25 The most significant UN activity is focused on Afghanistan. After the Bonn Agreement an Interim Authority and a Transitional Administration were established at the end of 2001. A donor meeting took place in Tokyo in January 2002. A Loya Jirga was convened for seven weeks (April – June 2002) of some 1500 tribal representatives, including 200 women, which legitimized Karzai’s leadership of the Transitional Administration. Sixteen UN agencies are currently

24

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

working in Afghanistan. Enormous efforts at nation building are going on there under extremely difficult circumstances. But international commitment to Afghanistan seemed to diminish in 2003 and the situation overall remained somewhat critical. Afghanistan may yet remain the one issue on which the success of UN peacebuilding efforts will be judged in the post-September 11 era. The Lessons from Iraq Even more than Afghanistan, lessons from Iraq will determine UN peacekeeping in the years ahead. The situation is presently poised at a delicate stage. The unilateral intervention by the United States and the UK once again bypassed the UN Security Council as it had done earlier in Kosovo. Neither principles of self-defence nor the possibility of an attack by weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), which subsequently were proved to be without foundation, justified pre-emptive attack on another nation in the absence of a clear Security Council resolution. The other objective emphasized subsequently, of ending the dictatorial rule of a despot, was even less convincing and has set a dangerous precedent. The issues related to Iraq will need serious discussion before clear guidelines are accepted by the international community. Indeed initial steps to learn from these processes have been initiated by the Secretary-General by appointing a High Level Panel to study global security threats and make recommendations for developing the elements of a collective response.26 The lessons that can already be drawn from Iraq begin with the point that interventionary actions, whatever the condition, are best achieved only under the legitimate authority of the UN. Second, the purpose and intent of such operations has also to be clearly determined by independent authorities, which alone will have any chance of international legitimacy. Suspicions of illegal possession of WMDs, which were neither effectively proved nor later verified by ground inspections, has further undermined the credibility of the initial steps. When an attempt was made to modify that justification through the ‘democracy option’ route, it found no credibility. Finally, the nature of military operation, which quickly transformed from a pretext of liberation to one of aggression and conquest further undermined the legitimacy of the intervening force and will surely hamper its successor. Challenges of Peacekeeping Operations in Asia Given the above evolving situation in peacekeeping operations under the UN, what are the challenges particularly as perceived from Asia? There are seven principal issues that should be foremost in our considerations.27 .

A new concept of human security. Accepting that a concept of security has never been static, there is indeed a fundamental difference in perception over the last decade, particularly in Asia. Since the publication of the Human Rights Development Report by the UNDP in 1994, alternative concepts of security, particularly ‘human security’, have gained much acceptance

CURRENT TRENDS IN UN PEACEKEEPING

.

.

.

.

.

25

around the world. This cut across cultures and bridged the gap between the rich and poor, bringing all under the umbrella of a similar human condition. Here, the focus of security is on the people and not the state. Development, empowerment, meeting legitimate aspirations and meeting basic human needs are the central issues. Regional organizations and the UN. As future conflicts become even more intra-state and complex, involving ethnic groups and leading to state failures, peace operations will become more complex. In these conditions, situations will need to be dealt with within the region, preferably under regional security organizations. There are two principal reasons for this: first, such local issues are better understood locally and solutions too are best evolved at local levels; and second, the UN cannot be everywhere – it should seriously consider doing less, but what it does undertake to do must be done well. In Asia there exists today only the Asian Regional Forum (ARF), which is not chartered to deal with peace operations and in any case does not cover the more disturbanceprone regions of Asia. Serious thought will have to be given to this in future. Doctrinal challenges to peace operations and the use of force. Complex peacekeeping operations need to be embedded in doctrinal clarity. The Brahimi Report did not seriously address issues of doctrine. A vexing question that has emerged again and again in complex peacekeeping operations is the nature and amount of force that may be used. The mandate for a particular operation is likely to provide guidelines in that respect, but more clarity is desirable. In situations in Asia, there may be conditions of ethnic strife where counter violence at an early stage by well-trained peacekeepers may well avoid considerable bloodshed later. Also, there may be situations where effective threat of use of force rather than actual force itself is likely to be sufficient. Preventive action. Much debate has taken place in recent years focusing on preventive action by the UN and other organizations, rather than responding to a situation after violence has broken out. Many early warnings related to conflict can be detected in advance of the outbreak of violence. Absence or lack of governance is a principal condition in many situations in Asia and may be observed at an earlier stage. Tackling root causes may require establishing foundations for developing improved governance. Using police forces. Many recent peace operations around the world have used civil police forces to maintain the peace, as these were often primarily a law and order issue. That may well be a distinguishing feature in the future. This should be welcomed, particularly in Asia, where sensitivities regarding use of regional military forces remain high. Yet, in deciding the type of forces, a critical question will continue to be the effectiveness of the force concerned. In complex peacekeeping operations the civil police are not expected to perform satisfactorily. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Around the world a major question in halting the fighting and establishing peace is disarming the combatants, permanently putting out of commission the weapons involved, demobilizing the combatants and integrating them within societies through gainful employment. This is relevant to Asian situations as well. In

26

.

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

Cambodia in particular, demobilization and reintegration have been important issues. Reintegration is a complex operation, involving social, political and psychological integration of combatants, which is not easily achieved without careful planning and expert guidance. This becomes a part of peacebuilding and needs to be funded adequately from the beginning. Safety and security of UN personnel. Sanctity and associated security connected with the UN emblem has been undermined in many instances in recent years. In some parts of the world this even symbolizes a target. While good training can address some concerns, other aspects will need to be seriously considered at an appropriate stage. In addition to combat security, other issues concern disease, health and hygiene and adequate treatment to counter them.

Conclusion The period from 1999 has again seen an increase in international peacekeeping. This has become necessary because of the continuing conflict in Africa and new issues emerging in different areas as a consequence of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. The challenge to the international community has also grown as a result. The UN and other regional organizations have to find ways to make these operations more effective and responsive to today’s needs. Most importantly, these responses have to be based on international law, uphold human rights and respect the rights of states. In an article in Foreign Affairs, ‘The New Interventionism’, Michael Glennon ended with the sentence: ‘If power is used to do justice, law will follow’.28 The view from Asia would suggest that it is law, fairly and equitably developed, that must define justice and the use of interventionary force. For too long and in its recent history Asia has been the victim of interventionist force. While developing greater commitment to internationalism it would like to see greater not less caution against unilateral intervention. Intervention should be sanctioned by the majesty of international law but with sufficient guarantees against misuse. Above all, international peacekeeping must continue to be the responsibility of the UN, the world’s only truly international organization.

NOTES 1. See UN doc. A/55/305 - S/2000/809 on Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, accessed at: www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations. 2. Jean-Marie Guehenno, ‘On the Challenges and Achievements of Reforming the UN Peace Operations’, in Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel (eds), International Peacekeeping (Special Issue: Recovering from Civil Conflict), Vol.9, No.2, Summer 2002, p.69. 3. Sandra Cummer, ‘The Challenges Faced by the Military in Adapting to Peacekeeping Missions’, in Peacekeeping and International Relations, Vol.27, No.1, Jan/Feb 1998, p.13. 4. Ibid. 5. Guehenno (n.2 above), p.70. 6. Ibid., p.71. 7. Ibid. 8. See, Prevention of Armed Conflicts, UN doc. A/55/985-S/2001/574, A/55/985/Corr.1-S/2001/ 574/Corr., 7 June 2001. 9. See Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations (n.1 above).

CURRENT TRENDS IN UN PEACEKEEPING

27

10. See Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: The Responsibility to Protect, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, Dec. 2001. 11. Prevention of Armed Conflicts (see n.8 above). 12. Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations (n.1 above), p.73. 13. See UN doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, accessed at www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/faq/q3. 14. Ibid. 15. ‘Issues related to UN Peace Operations – 2003’, accessed at: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ pub/year_review03. 16. ‘Overview in 2002’, in Year in Review, accessed at: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/ year_review03/Overview.htm. 17. Ibid. 18. See www.un.org/Depts/dpko/pub/year_review03. 19. See www.un.org/Depts/dpko/fatalities/totals.htm. 20. In recent years their representation in executive functions has increased. Maj.-Gen. Chitra Bahadur Gurung from Nepal is the Acting Military Adviser in the DPKO and Col. Virinder Dadhwal from India is the Chief of the Force Generation Service. 21. Quoted in the Foreword, The Responsibility to Protect (n.10 above), viii. 22. Amitav Acharya, ‘Sovereignty’, International Herald Tribune, 23 Jan. 2003. 23. Bates Gill and James Reilly, ‘Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing’, Survival, Vol.42, No.3, autumn 2000, pp.41–59. 24. See ‘Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations’, UN Doc. A/56/863, 11 March 2002. 25. The Year in Review 2003, accessed at: www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/year_ review03/Asia-Pacific_peace_operations.htm. 26. See www.un.org./News/Press/docs/2003/sga857.doc.htm. 27. Challenges of Peace Operations in the 21st Century, 2002, report prepared by the Government of Sweden, accessed at: www.peacechallenges.net/pdf/Concluding1.pdf. 28. Michael Glennon, The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just International Law, Vol.78, No.3, Foreign Affairs, May/June 1999, p.7.

A Regional Perspective of UN Peace Operations in Southeast Asia KAMARULZAMAN ASKANDAR

The General Situation in Southeast Asia Southeast Asia has not been spared the traumas and sufferings of conflicts, many of which show no signs of abating and some have the potential to escalate. This essay argues that the UN needs to play a more active role in mitigating and finding peaceful solutions to these conflicts. Regional mechanisms, such as those within ASEAN, have proved ineffective especially for intra-state conflicts, and new formulas, which could involve the UN, must be found. Reference will be made to two of the longest lasting conflicts in Southeast Asia, Aceh and Mindanao. The post-Cold War period has seen a number of factors that have contributed to the acceptance that the threat of inter-state war does not constitute the sole cause of insecurity. For example, the ‘war on terrorism’ signifies to some analysts that non-state actors have become a greater threat to global security than state actors. The terrorist attack in Bali on 12 October 2002 demonstrated that the threat to the security and stability of Southeast Asian countries today poses various questions for regional security. In keeping with the global trend, the threats that have emerged in Southeast Asia are not from outside but from within state boundaries. This is not to suggest that the region is free from potential inter-state conflict. A few observations from the trend of conflicts in the post-Cold War era suggest that a significant number of inter-state conflicts occur in the region, with border issues being the major bone of contention in the majority of them. They include: the Sabah claim by the Philippines; the border dispute between Thailand and Malaysia; competing claims to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea involving Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan and China; and the territorial dispute between Malaysia and Singapore over Pulau Batu Putih (Pedra Blanca), an island about 55 km east of Singapore in the Straits of Johor. Second, since the security environment of the

A SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE

29

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) area is essentially maritime, other issues for inter-state conflicts are maritime boundaries and offshore territorial claims, such as the boundary dispute between Indonesia and Vietnam concerning the demarcation line of the continental shelf in the South China Sea, near Natuna Island. All these point out the need for the institutionalization of conflict management mechanisms not only within the ASEAN region but also the wider Asian and Pacific regions. Some of these, though, have been managed at the regional level through ASEAN. For example, ASEAN prescribed a framework for conflict management through multilateral treaties such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (1976) as well as the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (1976). This has been expanded by the introduction of the ASEAN troika formula in 1999, whereby the foreign ministers of present, past and future chairs of the ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC) would sit in an ad hoc body at the ministerial level to address issues affecting regional peace and stability. Other conflict management procedures include the decision-making process of musyawarah, which in essence has called for the peaceful settlement of disputes between member countries. The musyawarah concept has contributed to the management of inter-state conflicts through providing a platform for consultation and negotiation of issues involving ASEAN countries. Conflict issues that might affect relations between member countries are filtered out through rigorous consultation and negotiation processes prior to decision-making.1 For ongoing conflicts, however, although ASEAN does provide a formal management strategy in its treaties, it has not been used. The members have preferred to resort to negotiating directly between each other (and in recent years using the International Court of Justice for arbitration as in the case of the Sipadan and Ligitan Islands dispute between Malaysia and Indonesia), or using ASEAN meetings as a place for consultation, albeit informally, as in many ASEAN negotiations).2 The Southeast Asian region is also rife with intra-state conflicts, the major issue facing many Southeast Asian countries today. They include: armed communist insurgencies in the Philippines, led by the New People’s Army (NPA); Muslim separatist movements in the southern Philippines, involving the government of the Philippines; the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Abu Sayyaf group; the Malay– Muslim separatist movement in the Southern Thailand provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, Yala and Songkhla; the Aceh separatist movement in northern Sumatra, Indonesia, led by Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) or Free Aceh Movement; spillover from the independence of East Timor, especially refugee problems along the border between east and west Timor; the separatist movement in Irian Jaya, Indonesia, led by the Free Papua Organization; communal conflicts in various parts of Indonesia such as Maluku and Kalimantan; and finally the perceived Muslim fundamentalist threats in Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. For these intra-state conflicts the role of ASEAN is clear. It does not, as a regional organization, involve itself in the management of these conflicts, no matter what their nature, revolutionary, state formation or other. The ASEAN

30

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

contribution to the management of this type of conflict is to provide the members with a formal place to make declarations that support each other when faced with domestic troubles, and that are binding upon all members. For example, one of the most sacred principles of ASEAN is non-intervention and non-interference by outsiders in the domestic politics of individual member countries. This prohibition refers not only to countries outside the region or outside ASEAN, but also to the ASEAN countries as well. All ASEAN countries have been allowed to manage conflicts within their own borders in their own chosen ways, from setting up civic programmes (such as the neighbourhood watch programme Rukun Tetangga in Malaysia under the Department for National Unity to improve ethnic relations), to outright suppression using military force (such as the implementation of martial law in Aceh, Indonesia in May 2003). Another way ASEAN has indirectly influenced intra-state conflicts has been by reassuring member governments that despite all the domestic problems that they may face at any time, they do not have to worry about problems arising out of their relations with other ASEAN countries since member states will not intervene in their domestic affairs, and inter-state issues will never escalate into direct military confrontations. This in turn enabled them to concentrate on problems within their own borders without worrying about problems from outside, or even about outside help for the insurgents or revolutionaries.3 In the absence of a proper regional mechanism of conflict management with regard to domestic conflicts however, intra-state conflicts within ASEAN continue to pose a threat to regional security. The most serious of these conflicts which might warrant UN involvement are in Indonesia (Aceh, Maluku, Kalimantan, West Papua), and the Philippines (Mindanao). The examples of Aceh and Mindanao are now considered to illustrate the seriousness of the problems and to locate ways in which the UN can be involved to manage conflicts in Southeast Asia. Aceh The Acehnese struggle for independence is probably one of the longest and bloodiest separatist insurgencies in Asia. A brief exploration of Aceh’s history explains the mix of factors that led Aceh into a ‘war of national liberation’ and turned thousands of its people into exiles. According to some historians, Islam first entered the Indonesian archipelago, and possibly all of Southeast Asia, through Aceh, around the year 700. The first Islamic kingdom, Perlak, was established in 804. Much later, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the port of Aceh became entangled, along with the rest of what is now Indonesia, in the competition of European colonial powers for worldwide political and economic dominance. Interested parties included the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch and British. For many centuries Aceh was a very distinct and influential political entity. The Sultan of Aceh and the Sultan of Malacca were major controllers of trade through the Straits of Malacca. One of the most significant events in Aceh’s history came in 1824 with the signing of the London Treaty, often referred to as the Anglo– Dutch treaty, in which the Dutch gained control of all British possessions on the island of

A SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE

31

Sumatra including Aceh. Yet the Dutch colonialists failed to fully capture Aceh. Only after all the neighbouring territory was conquered did they mount a final campaign to subdue Aceh. The war lasted 35 years. The next major agreement was the Linggarjati Agreement, mediated by Britain and signed by Indonesia and the Netherlands in March 1947, in which the Dutch recognized Indonesian sovereignty over the islands of Java, Sumatra and Madura. Perhaps the most critical event in explaining the attitude of many Acehnese is the signing of the 1949 Round Table Conference Agreements. Brokered under the auspices of the UN, the agreements provided for a transfer of sovereignty between the territory of the Dutch East Indies and fully independent Indonesia. The Kingdom of Aceh was included in the agreements despite not having been formally incorporated into Dutch colonial possession. Subsequently the Indonesian government used armed troops to annex Aceh. Since, the annexation, the Acehnese have continued to resent what they consider as foreign occupation. The precursor to Aceh’s independence movement began in 1953 when Indonesia experienced the Darul Islam rebellion, in which rebels on the major Indonesian island of Java tried to establish an Islamic state. The Acehnese lent support to this rebellion, which took years to crush. In 1959, the Indonesian government responded by giving Aceh the status of a ‘special territory, which ostensibly confers some degree of autonomy in religious, educational and cultural matters. Despite this status, in 1976 Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh) was founded as an armed resistance group. The Indonesian military refers to this group as the Gerombolan Pengacau Keamananan (GPK), which means ‘gang of security disturbers’. In the late 1970s, Indonesian authorities conducted mass arrests of Aceh Merdeka members and shut down their activities until 1989. In that year, a group now also calling itself the Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF) came out of hibernation and vigorously renewed its quest for independence, often through attacks on police and military installations. In 1989, Indonesia designated Aceh a military operations area, giving the army a free rein to crush the separatists. Amnesty International reported that between 1989 and 1992 about 2,000 people were killed in military operations in Aceh.4 In all about 12,000 people, mostly civilians, either have been killed or have disappeared since fighting began. This separatist issue became more compelling when large deposits of natural gas were discovered in the mid-1970s. The light at the end of the tunnel appeared when the Henri Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, which has been invited to act as a facilitator in the dialogue by the then President Abdurrahman Wahid, was able to persuade the Indonesian government and GAM to sign an accord in Geneva on 9 December 2002 that could end 26 years of rebellion. It became possible when both sides agreed to compromise on key strategic goals. On the one hand, GAM agreed to put aside its demand for full independence for the time being. On the other, the Indonesian government agreed to foreign monitors, mostly military officials from Thailand and the Philippines, to supervise the ceasefire and the disarming of GAM. This was a positive development because the Indonesian government had consistently refused to internationalize the conflict in Aceh. Nevertheless the peace accord suffered some setbacks, with sporadic acts of ceasefire violations

32

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

by both sides after the agreement was signed. These violations reflected the need for more continuous conflict prevention and peacebuilding effort as well as independent monitoring activities by international organizations, especially the UN. From May 2003 martial law was again implemented in Aceh, which effectively killed off any advances made in the peacebuilding efforts of the previous years. After the 9 December 2002 ceasefire and cessation of hostilities agreement (COHA), more concerted efforts should have been made to keep up the momentum and spirit of the agreement. While monitors from Thailand and the Philippines were present, more concerted efforts needed to be taken to enhance peacekeeping operations, as there have been cases of violations on both sides. Efforts should also have been taken to improve general peacebuilding efforts. Development and other related programmes for the area should be increased, and the civil society needs to be harnessed to guarantee the momentum for peace in Aceh. This is because the involvement of members of civil society, who are the victims themselves, is needed for the long-term peacebuilding process in Aceh. As it is, the COHA broke down with the implementation of Martial Law in May 2003. This had to be lifted before any real peace in Aceh could come about. Peacekeeping operations, especially involving international bodies like the UN, should be introduced into Aceh hand in hand with any peacemaking efforts. There should also be reciprocated moves by both sides including ceasefires, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and the release of GAM negotiators before any peacemaking efforts can be successful. Martial law was finally lifted in June 2004. The UN could contribute to peace in Aceh by bringing the parties back to the negotiating table and by sending in a peacekeeping mission to maintain the ceasefire and prevent human rights violations by both sides. The Southern Philippines The existence of ethnic minority groupings in the Philippines is a historical result of the incorporation of formerly autonomous peoples by the Spanish and American colonizers. This process of diminishing the sphere of authority of local and regional groupings was continued by the policy of unification and centralization under the Philippine state. Decades of perceived and actual neglect experienced by the minority groups have fuelled their separatist desires. Ethno-cultural separatism in the Philippines has manifested itself through the struggles of the Moros in the south and the Cordillerans in the north of the country. In the southern Philippines, the Muslim separatist group the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which evolved from the Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM), was established in 1968. Rejecting the leadership of the traditional Muslim elite politicians, the younger MIM members organized the MNLF in 1971. In 1974, the MNLF Central Committee issued a manifesto in Tripoli, Libya declaring the goal of establishing an independent Bangsa Moro homeland. The separatist struggle of the MNLF resulted in the outbreak of the Mindanao war in the 1970s. Several factions would later break away from the MNLF on the issues of leadership, ideology and autonomy. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front

A SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE

33

(MILF) is an example of a major faction of the MNLF composed of traditional, aristocratic and religious elites in Maguindanao. It broke away from the MNLF leadership in 1978, and formally organized itself in 1983. Wary of the Marxist leanings of the MNLF, it seeks the promotion of Islam and the preservation of Moro society. Aside from MILF, another faction known as the ‘MNLF Reformist Group’ broke away in 1982. The latter was co-opted by the Marcos and Aquino administrations. Another splinter group is the Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters. More popularly known, as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the group is composed of younger former MNLF guerillas. Often described in the media as an extremist fundamentalist group, the ASG was organized in the mid-1980s. It has been implicated in several kidnappings, extortion, banditry and smuggling activities, tainting its claim of being ‘freedom fighters’.5 The attempts of various administrations to address these armed groups demonstrate the efforts of the Philippine state to enforce domination over the me´lange of social forces in society. As years of violent confrontation proved disastrous to the nation in general, governments from the Marcos to Arroyo administrations introduced a series of initiatives to accommodate some of the demands of the insurgent groups. For example, the intensity of the war in Mindanao resulted in the peace negotiation between the MNLF and the Marcos administration. Under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), the negotiations culminated in the signing of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement in Libya. The internal Muslim problem was raised to an international level when OIC member countries and the oil embargo from oil-producing Islamic countries pressured President Ferdinand Marcos to negotiate with the MNLF. Nevertheless, the active involvement of the OIC has resulted in the MNLF scaling down its demands from secession to autonomy. The agreement included the granting of full autonomy to 13 provinces and nine cities in Mindanao provided that a ‘constitutional process’ takes place as a method of legitimately claiming these areas as duly covered in the autonomy. It also provided for the establishment of an elected Legislative Assembly and an Executive Council to be appointed by the Assembly. But negotiations broke down in 1977. Nevertheless, Marcos implemented parts of the agreement to give a semblance of addressing the desires of Muslim Mindanao. Under Marcos, the Tripoli Agreement was signed. However, at the start of its implementation when a plebiscite was held, which was identified as a ‘constitutional process’ by Marcos only at this time, the MNLF protested as they felt that Marcos had deliberately misled them and the public since no clear consultation had been conducted to make the constituents of Mindanao understand the implications and merits of the Agreement. It was not surprising that the voters were persuaded to ‘not adopt’ the idea of Autonomy for Mindanao and especially in the majority non-Muslim populated areas. Since then, the MNLF has continued its armed struggle but with the Marcos regime undertaking conflict management with the use of further militarization in the Muslim areas and coupled with a well-handled diplomacy with some of the OIC countries sympathetic to the Bangsamoro cause. On the other hand, Marcos also managed to gain allies from the traditional Moro politicians and succeeded in co-opting the MNLF Reformist Group, thereby creating a faction within the MNLF.

34

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

Under the Aquino administration, a historic meeting between President Cory Aquino and the MNLF Chair, Nur Misuari, highlighted the resumption of negotiations with the MNLF soon after the Philippines Edsa Revolution in 1986. This accorded Misuari the opportunity to re-establish his leadership over the Moro movement, weakened by factionalism. However, in the same manner the talks broke down due to disagreements regarding the implementing structures of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. Despite the lack of support from the MNLF, the Aquino administration signed into law Republic Act 6734 in August 1989 creating the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). As a result of the elections in Mindanao, only four of the 13 provinces covered by the act opted to be part of the autonomous politico-administrative body inaugurated in November 1990. These four Muslim-dominated provinces were Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. By 1996, with the administration of President Fidel Ramos, a peace agreement with the MNLF was signed leading to the election of MNLF Chair Nur Misuari as the governor of the ARMM, and the creation of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD). On the part of the MNLF, a sense of disappointment is slowly growing among its leadership because of the diminishing support from the national government in fulfilling the remaining portions of its agreement with the previous administration. Despite the MNLF’s successful integration of its military arm with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, much of its energy has been spent struggling with the bureaucracy in taking part in governing ARMM. Given the muddled peace policies of the more recent President Joseph Estrada’s administration, great difficulties have threatened the smooth passage from the transitional phase to regular autonomy based on the 1996 Peace Pact. For example, there was growing disillusionment within the former MNLF guerillas with the leadership of former Governor Misuari, his short-lived ‘rebellion’ and subsequent arrest in Malaysia, and the charges of rebellion for which he is awaiting trial in Manila. The basis for the disillusionment was a lack of concrete benefits from the peace agreement. The military, on the other hand, was concerned with the younger and more radical MNLF members, some of whom were already affiliated with the MILF and the ASG. These events were happening at a time when the GRP was negotiating with the MILF and this has affected the talks. The difficulty in realizing government commitments under the peace process serves to reinforce the MILF’s apprehensions about any peace process with the GRP. Unlike the MNLF, the former rejects autonomy and continues to envisage an independent Bangsa Moro homeland. Additionally, the involvement of the United States in its war against terrorism further aggravated the situation due to its interests of continued military presence, specifically in conducting the ‘Balikatan’ or joint military exercises with the AFP and the US Military in the areas of Central and Western Mindanao and which are predominantly Muslim areas. Furthermore, the lack of a more influential international third party mediator has brought an impasse to the peace process. This is where the UN should consider stepping in, though with the government on one side and a number of factions on the other, this will not be easy. Despite

A SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE

35

agreements signed with all the factions, with the exception of the ASG, peace has remained elusive for this area. A monitoring activity done by local civil society elements under the auspices of the Mindanao People’s Caucus6 points to the need for such activities to be undertaken by an international body such as the UN. Again, like in the Aceh case, development and other programmes should also be intensified to ensure the success of peacebuilding efforts in these two areas. Opportunities and Constraints for UN Intervention in Southeast Asia Peace operations must be viewed as covering the whole range of conflict situations – from conflict ending to conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Each area is important and requires equal attention. Three reports have become very important in charting out where UN peace operations should be directed: The Report of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Armed Conflicts (2001); the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (2000), also known as the Brahimi Report; and the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2002) or The Responsibility to Protect report. Each of these reports is important to the security of Southeast Asia and the future of peace operations in the region. At this point, however, it needs to be said that all UN peace operations in Southeast Asia have been successful, from West Papua (1962 – 63) to Cambodia (1991 –94), and to Timor Leste (1990 –). In Cambodia and Timor Leste, especially, the operations have involved the UN at every stage from peacemaking, to peacekeeping, to post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. They have also involved not only the uniformed bodies but those responsible for development projects as well. The prevention of future conflicts is the key here as steps are taken to identify causes of the problems and removing them. This is in line with The Report of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Armed Conflict.7 First, it accepts that responsibility for conflict prevention rests mainly with national governments.8 Consisting mostly of former colonies, the nations of Southeast Asia have jealously guarded their independence to make decisions pertaining to problems within their own boundaries. They have continuously upheld the policies of ‘non-interference’ and ‘non-intervention’ when faced with conflict situations in the region. Steps to change these policies or even upgrade them to another level, as evidenced through proposals for ‘constructive intervention’ and ‘flexible engagement’, have failed. Another point raised in the Report on Conflict Prevention contended that ‘the primary focus of preventive action should be in addressing the deep-rooted socioeconomic, cultural, environment, institutional, political and other structural causes that often underlie the immediate symptoms of the conflicts’.9 This is something which is shared by many Southeast Asian countries. As developing countries, they stressed these components as important for nation building and for conflict prevention. At the regional level, they stressed the use of the ASEAN to achieve these goals. ASEAN started out as an economic body, albeit a heavily politically motivated one, whose language has been more or less developmentally inclined. In the 1990s, which saw the inclusion of new members and a

36

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

potential for rifts between the more developed and less developed countries of the region, steps were taken to incorporate the new members into ASEAN by introducing such ‘new’ concepts as ‘cooperative peace’ and ‘shared prosperity’.10 This rhetoric formed part of the ASEAN conflict management strategies which include the treaties and agreements mentioned above, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the musyawarah consensus-seeking style of diplomacy. At present these ASEAN mechanisms are accepted as the norm, despite their failure to address many, if not most, intra-state problems in the region. On the other hand, the dominance of the ‘national sovereignty’ school of thought in Southeast Asia has meant that The Responsibility to Protect report was received cautiously by governments. They maintained that this prerogative rested with national governments and not with international bodies. It is significant to reiterate Dipankar Banerjee’s statement in this volume that ‘any international action that violates the principle of state sovereignty must be founded on extremely solid ground’. Such sentiments explain why there has been strong criticism of the unilateral moves by the United States against Iraq. They also explain why the American ‘war against terrorism’ is not a popular cause in Southeast Asia. In fact, when Australia declared that it too might consider, in the aftermath of the Bali bombing, targeting alleged terrorist cells in Southeast Asia and intervening when Australian interests are at stake, this created a public outcry from the peoples of Southeast Asia. For state sovereignty to be violated by an international body seemed harsh enough, but when it was violated by another country, it invoked a strong reaction and implied support for the armed defence of a country’s dignity and sovereignty. Defence of sovereignty was even more compelling when the UN was perceived as being used by a country such as the United States for its own objectives and agendas. ASEAN countries had always maintained through their policies of non-interference and non-intervention that there should be no intervention from outside, as the governments claimed that they are within national boundaries; that the governments can handle them; and that they are part of the process of growing up as a nation. And even when the international community feels that it might have the ‘responsibility’ to intervene, the governments of Southeast Asia argue that this ‘responsibility’ should reside with them, first and foremost, thus precluding intervention as prescribed by the Responsibility to Protect report. Nevertheless, other points raised in the three reports, especially those pertaining to the improvement of peacekeeping operations, have been well received in Southeast Asia, though concerns have been raised about the following: . .

.

The question of state sovereignty and the need for intervention from outside. Decision-making about when, why, how, by whom, for what and how long. As rightly mentioned by Dipankar Banerjee, if the countries of Southeast Asia are to be involved as providers of peacekeepers, they need to be given the chance to contribute to policy-making regarding the peace missions as well. The need to look at the root causes of the problems. As most of the conflicts in Southeast Asian countries are internally rooted, it is felt that solutions must come from within.

A SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE

37

Solutions must also focus on the multi-dimensional levels of the conflicts. For example, separatist conflicts such as those in Aceh, northern Sumatra and Mindanao, involve issues other than self-determination: development issues, economic resources and competition, religion, politics, use of arms to attain goals, and human rights violations. These questions and issues are sensitive for many countries and it is felt that they are better suited to be resolved internally. There needs to be further discussion of this by the international community including the UN and its agencies, especially in conflict areas where there has been massive human suffering but negligible intervention by the state, as in Maluku and Kalimantan in Indonesia. Any future UN peace operations can complement and support peace efforts currently being made by local and regional partners. In both Aceh and Mindanao the respective governments would be apprehensive about receiving international peacekeepers. However, they would welcome peace operations under the guise of development programmes as this would contribute to solving many of the core causes of the conflicts, including addressing economic issues and humanitarian concerns. The same applies for the other conflict areas and types in Southeast Asia. The core causes should be investigated and programmes introduced to tackle these causes. This should be done in conjunction with local governments and regional organizations. Thus, UN peace operations should be comprehensive, involve all the parties, and at all stages combine peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. They should go beyond ‘traditional’ peacekeeping operations and focus also on creating and promoting positive peace. It is also noteworthy that there is a move now towards creating an ASEAN peacekeeping force under the idea of the newly introduced ASEAN Security Community (ASC). This Indonesian-sponsored idea was first raised in 2003 as a way to handle security matters and disputes in an ASEAN framework rather than bilaterally or through international forums such as the Court of Justice at The Hague. This was then presented as part of the proposal approved at the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali in October 2003 and endorsed as the Bali Concord II, together with the ASEAN Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. Subsequent meetings have also been held to discuss the ASC including discussions on a plan of action for implementing the ASC by 2012. The proponent, Indonesia, said that there is ‘a crying need’ for Southeast Asia to boost its own security-solving mechanisms such as establishing a regional peacekeeping force, and according to the Indonesian Foreign Minister Hasan Wirajuda in his opening address to the Fourth ASEAN – UN conference on 24 – 25 February, ‘We have to begin developing a regional peacekeeping arrangement’.11 The proposed peacekeeping force’s maximum security response includes standby arrangements, along with other options like cooperation with the UN to benefit from their expertise, and coordination among ASEAN countries for joint training and other activities. Availability for operations outside the ASEAN region as well as other details, however, remains unclear. It is somewhat ironic that the idea of an ASEAN peacekeeping force was introduced by Indonesia, which has the greatest number of conflicts in the region as well as being one of the strongest proponents of the non-interference and

38

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

non-intervention policy. It will be interesting to see how ASEAN deals with the how, when and where of peacekeeping, as well as questions of sovereignty, humanitarian assistance, and sustainability of peacekeeping and other peace operations. ASEAN’s track record has not been very impressive in terms of regional peacekeeping and there is little to show that this will eventually take place. The best that can happen is the creation of a regionally-sponsored institution that will help train peacekeepers from the ASEAN countries in the art of peacekeeping. Their involvement in keeping the peace in the region remains in doubt if the Southeast Asian countries maintain their current position and thinking about the causes and nature of conflicts within their own boundaries. Conclusion Analysis of UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War period (Cambodia and East Timor) reveals that they have tended to be used to compel internal factions to comply with their previous agreements or to achieve peacebuilding objectives. As in the case of UNMISET, the UN was given a ‘nation building’ mandate. However, although it can be argued that UN peacekeeping operations in the region have met with a considerable degree of success, unresolved conflicts remain as illustrated above by Aceh and the southern Philippines. It is therefore vital for an international body, such as the UN, to seek a more active role as an impartial third-party mediator. Human sufferings in these two areas are such that peaceful solutions need to be reached as soon as possible. There needs to be proactive intervention because regional mechanisms, such as those within ASEAN, have proved to be ineffective for such intra-state conflicts. Despite initiatives to move beyond the non-interference and nonintervention mindset into something more proactive by way of constructive intervention, there have been no concrete improvements in the two cases. In Aceh, the deployment of observers from Thailand and the Philippines to monitor the implementation of the 9 December 2002 ceasefire agreement has proved to be beneficial. Future monitoring missions, if ever invited back, need to be upgraded to include a more comprehensive mandate for peacekeepers in their role in the conflict area. The UN might even consider playing a more active role in ensuring that the momentum of any agreement signed will be continued. Peacebuilding activities, especially those involving elements of civil society, need to be introduced and promoted. The same goes for the southern Philippines, where better monitoring and peacekeeping is needed to ensure that the agreement signed in Malaysia in 2002 between the GRP and the MILF is consolidated and that other peacebuilding activities involving these two parties are introduced. Civil society, through the Mindanao People’s Caucus in January 2003, took the initiative to investigate cases of ceasefire violations between the parties. To some extent they have been effective in providing much needed information directly from the conflict-affected areas, and in consistently persuading both parties (the government and the MILF) to go back to the negotiating table. Yet, these initiatives are also limited in terms of resources and more so with the political clout or support as in the case of the

A SOUTHEAST ASIAN PERSPECTIVE

39

volatile Philippine political environment and the government’s ambiguous policy towards conflict resolution in Mindanao. The Malaysian government in 2004 took an initiative to send a peacekeeping team, consisting of military personnel, to act as observers in the area. The assessment team from Malaysia was sent in April 2004. The UN should not, however, leave it completely to the Malaysian government and should consider becoming involved. This will serve not only to legitimize the mission even more but will also contribute to the process of peacebuilding with the involvement of other UN agencies. Furthermore, UN peace operations in these two areas can contribute to the prevention, containment, moderation and eventual termination of hostilities between the parties. Southeast Asian policy-makers and academics should emphasize the ultimate goal of achieving effective conflict resolution towards the attainment of world peace. Conflict stakeholders should uphold and promote proactive perspectives and working definitions on peacemaking for positive peace that should be just, based on law and order, and provide for peaceful settlements of existing and potential conflicts. The Southeast Asian community should also be able to identify potential conflicts and invoke internal conflict prevention mechanisms to prevent it from increasing in intensity and from becoming violent. Research into the core causes of the conflicts is also necessary. Peace should not be ‘negative’. It should not be peace created by intimidation of the strong against the weak, the many against the few or vice versa. It should not be aggressive. It should not be a single country working unilaterally to impose on others its own wishes, aspirations and agendas. Southeast Asians consider the UN as an organization that gives high hopes and assurance that the unheard voices of the many shall be taken into account. Thus, citizens from all walks of life continue to be involved in the UN as a demonstration of that trust. Therefore, the UN can be assured of this kind of support in Southeast Asia, especially so in the conduct of future peace operations. In the same manner, it should heed its mandate of ‘restoring and maintaining peace’ in countries or places wherever most needed. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The author would like to thank Ayesah Abubakar and Azeem Farouk of Research and Education for Peace, Universiti Sains Malaysia, for their advice and suggestions.

NOTES 1. See Kamarulzaman Askandar, ‘ASEAN experiences in conflict prevention and management: Evolution, strategies, and the need to reform?’, paper presented at the seminar on Conflict Prevention, Conflict Resolution, and Peacebuilding in Southeast Asia: ASEAN/UN Experiences in Anticipating and Mediating Conflicts, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore, 17–19 Feb. 2003. 2. Ibid. 3. For further discussion on Conflict in Southeast Asia, see Kamarulzaman Askandar, ‘Conflict and Conflict Management in Southeast Asia: Trends and Patterns’, Journal of Malaysian Studies, Vol.18, Nos 1&2, June/Dec. 2000, pp.1–27.

40

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

4. See The Manila Times, 14 Dec. 2002. 5. For further discussion on armed conflicts in the Philippines, see Julio C. Teehankee, ‘Internal Armed Conflicts and the Peace Process in the Philippines’, Journal of Malaysian Studies, Vol.18, Nos 1&2, June/Dec. 2000, pp.141–54. 6. This activity was carried out under the auspices of the Initiatives for International Dialogue and the Mindanao People’s Caucus. The objective was to investigate ceasefire violations by both the AFP and the MILF. See ‘Grassroots ceasefire monitoring’, The SEACSN Bulletin (Penang), Jan.– March 2003. 7. See Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/55/985– S/2001/ 574/2001. 8. Ibid., para.6. 9. Ibid., ‘Towards a Culture of Conflict Prevention’, para.169. 10. See Askandar, ‘ASEAN as a Conflict Management Process’, unpublished MA dissertation, University of Bradford, 1996. 11. ‘RI Pushes for Regional Peacekeeping Force’, accessed at: www. thejakartapost.com/ detaillatestnews.asp?fileid ¼ 20040224130650&irec ¼ 8.

NGOs in Conflict Management in Southeast Asia SEE SENG TAN

Since the end of the Cold War, peace operations specialists have been highlighting the fluid nature and context of conflicts, and urging comprehensive and integrative solutions in managing and resolving them.1 With issues of governance, democratic legitimacy, social inclusion and economic equity ranking just as high as, if not higher than, traditional military and security priorities, conflict management can no longer be restricted simply to military-based strategies. This truism is highlighted by the immense difficulties confronting the US-led coalition’s rebuilding efforts in post-conflict Afghanistan and Iraq. Conflict management today more often than not involves multiple actors with different mandates, decisionmaking structures, rules of engagement and capabilities. For instance, beginning with the first post-Cold War major effort in humanitarian intervention, Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq in 1991, institutions and agencies such as the UN, national governments, military forces and NGOs have been working together to address conflicts and humanitarian crises.2 In this respect, conflict management constitutes an ever-widening arena where civilians representing various constituencies and interests are increasingly assuming greater responsibility for a growing list of tasks. What these developments mean precisely for Southeast Asia remains nebulous, however. The region has played host to two key UN peace missions, one in Cambodia and the other more recently in East Timor. Although the general

42

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

success of these operations suggests that regional players have responded relatively well to the complex challenges facing conflict management today, the longstanding regional circumspection towards interventionism nevertheless cautions against any unwarranted sanguinity about the region’s readiness for greater civilian participation in peace operations. At least two commonly broached objections come to mind in this regard. First, regional elites prefer state centrism, non-interference and ‘soft’ regionalism, all of which have remained fairly robust throughout the post-Cold War period. The other concern derives from the fact that regional institutions such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific wide ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) continue to lack the institutional capacity as well as requisite collective will to contribute to peace operations, much less to tolerate civilian involvement in such missions.3 For example, the ARF meeting of 2001 barely mentioned the issue of peacekeeping, while the recently proposed idea of forming an ASEAN peacekeeping force met with some reticence from Singapore.4 To be sure, regional incapacity and reluctance has not precluded individual Association members from participating in UN-sanctioned missions.5 Nevertheless, combined with the mistrust and suspicion some ASEAN governments traditionally harbour against civil society activism, the short-term prospects for a fundamental reorientation among state elites appear dim.6 As a former Malaysian prime minister once put it: ‘Southeast Asians generally believe that humanitarian intervention could subvert the region’s dominant non-intervention norm, weakening political and social cohesion and allowing the West to call into question the legitimacy of governments and regimes not of their liking’.7 On the other hand, just how prominent a role such constraints actually play in shaping the current and future course and configuration of conflict management in Southeast Asia is equally open to question. If anything, there are good reasons to suggest that some of those constraints may not be the insurmountable roadblocks to closer civilian – military cooperation in conflict situations in the region that some make them out to be.8 The premise of this essay is that at least two contemporary interrelated developments in Southeast Asia – one institutional, the other attitudinal – may be paving the way towards greater civilian participation in peace missions in the region. These developments argue for greater coordination and coherence in the relationship between NGOs and international military peacekeeping forces. Despite the overall picture of regional continuity wherein norms that traditionally underwrite Southeast Asian regionalism remain essentially intact, specific institutional changes, including those undertaken in response to certain post-Cold War challenges confronting the region, have engendered social conditions more or less favourable to civilian involvement in conflict management. Second, paralleling these institutional changes is an arguably discernible adjustment in the attitudes of regional military actors towards favouring civilian involvement in peace operations. Civilian attitudes towards the military are also changing but certain ambivalences still persist. While recent experiences in Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone underline the dire need for a close relationship between peacekeepers and NGOs, preliminary evidence nevertheless suggests

43

NGOs IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 9

that attitudes on both sides have begun to evolve. In a study on the attitudes of various Asian (including ASEAN) militaries towards NGOs, many of the subjects polled not only recognized the contributions of NGOs to UN peace operations in Cambodia and East Timor but also maintained that relations with such civilian groups ought to be assiduously cultivated by peacekeeping forces. Although more reticent about the prospects for cooperation, NGO representatives – from Asia Foundation, Forum-Asia, International Crisis Group, Me´decins Sans Frontie`res and Nonviolence International Southeast Asia, among others – surveyed in the same study nevertheless favoured improving civilian –military ties.10 However, it remains unclear whether these developments would continue to evolve and, more importantly, consolidate. Nor is it evident that they would lead inexorably towards a more coordinated and coherent military– NGO partnership in peace operations, not least where the Southeast Asian region is concerned. At best, it can be said that the trends discussed below more or less favour the possible emergence of more robust integration of civilian and military capacities and implementations in regional conflict management. Growing Role of NGOs in Conflict Management The growing role of NGOs in conflict management reflects a wider trend in world affairs today, notably the rapid emergence of expanding coalitions of civil society groups which now claim the right to have a say in everything from the use of antipersonnel landmines to the operations of multinational corporations. Since the end of the Cold War, peacemaking and peacebuilding roles for NGOs have opened up, bringing many more individuals and institutions into the process and allowing private individuals and groups to intervene as third parties to bring peace to troubled societies.11 After being ignored for many years by states and international institutions, NGOs are now viewed as possessing certain capacities that can facilitate peace and reconciliation at the grassroots level in societies torn by civil war and ethnic strife. The UN today is visibly less reticent than states in working with NGOs, and many UN agencies and other international organizations regularly include NGOs as partners and service contractors in their programmes.12 Moreover, since the 1980s, the emergence and promotion by international institutions and specific activist countries of a proNGO norm has more or less made governments – many of which have previously discouraged societal participation and the formation of NGOs – less averse to dealing with NGOs.13 For their part, NGOs have responded to conflict situations all over the world, whether for the cause of humanitarian relief, human rights advocacy, or conflict prevention and resolution. NGOs are defined as ‘private, self-governing, non-profit institutions dedicated to alleviating human suffering; or to promoting education, health, economic development, environmental protection, human rights and conflict resolution; or to encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society’.14 As special interest organizations, most NGOs by definition engage, directly or indirectly, in advocacy. On the other hand, humanitarian-oriented NGOs act primarily as service providers of relief, development and medical assistance to the

44

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

poor. Apart from their technical expertise, their commitment to human rights and social justice often leads some of them to assume an advocacy role as well.15 Finally, NGOs that dedicate themselves to averting crises through preventive measures, or acting as intermediaries in conflicts, engage in conflict prevention and resolution. Working with opposing parties, they aim to facilitate negotiations and help to uphold accepted solutions. Through the intervention of NGOs in conflict settings over the years, there is no question that lives have been saved, post-conflict development maintained, human rights protected and conflict resolution proficiencies sharpened. To be sure, the NGO record is by no means without problems. For example, the evidence to support the view that NGOs enjoy comparative advantage over states is notably weak and patchy.16 Concerns about the quality of NGO performance have led to the creation of the International Forum on Southern NGO Capacity Building in 1998 for the purpose of sharing experiences of ‘good or best practice’ and fostering innovation.17 Furthermore, a 1997 report prepared by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development concluded that ‘NGO impact is difficult to assess’, although it also warned against any premature ‘downplaying [of] NGOs’ apparent strengths’.18 In conflict management, these concerns tend to be exacerbated by the complexities of the operating environment in which NGOs find themselves, which all too often distorts the impacts of their interventions in two fundamental ways. On the one hand, when NGOs introduce aid and resources into conflict situations, such assistance often becomes an additional source of struggle and contention among warring parties. On the other hand, the resolute commitment by some NGOs to the alleged probity of their specific mandates and ideological stances has on occasion led to secondary or tertiary consequences of a disastrous nature.19 Most NGOs are not unaware of these difficulties. ‘The most exciting challenges facing international NGOs today’, according to one analyst, ‘are to recognize where things go wrong in order that they “do no harm” and to explore, develop, and implement programs that support the shared interests and interconnectedness of people divided by war’.20 To that end, some NGOs – especially resource-poor regional NGOs such as Forum-Asia – have begun to view international peacekeeping forces as potential partners who more or less share the aim of saving communities from the ravages of war and conflict, and not just as competitors whose agenda and ideology fundamentally differ from theirs. On their part, governments and peacekeepers can no longer ignore the growing role of NGOs in conflict management. Arguably, the key relationship in most need of coordination and coherence is that between militaries and the NGOs, both of which play essential but different roles in peace operations where civilian presence is salient.21 Militaries, whether sanctioned by individual states or international organizations like the UN, enforce or keep the peace. NGOs, on the other hand, provide an assortment of services depending on their specific interests and mandates. Although they rarely perform the same function or engage in the same kind of work, the success of one is critical to the success of the other. On the one hand, NGOs are dependent on peacekeeping forces for protection and security in hostile and volatile environments. On the other, peacekeepers

NGOs IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

45

can only withdraw after the tasks of consolidation, reconstruction and reconciliation have been started by NGOs. Promising Institutional Developments For many Southeast Asians, the post-Cold War era has been anything but prosaic. The euphoria of the early to mid-1990s over a much-heralded ‘Pacific Century’ has since given way to a pervasive circumspection. According to some observers, watershed events such as the Asian financial crisis of 1997 –98 and the 11 September (9/11) terrorist attacks have exposed the ‘myth’ of regional community and cooperation, which ASEAN leaders have purportedly created about the Association, when in reality serious bilateral tensions, the burdens of membership enlargement and overall disunity better describe intra-ASEAN relations.22 Conversely, others have also argued that specific institutional changes have in effect been taking place which reflect broader and more long-term geopolitical and economic shifts in the international system, including the financial crisis and 9/11.23 According to one analyst: ‘Traditionally, ASEAN has resisted recognizing any humanitarian intervention in the affairs of sovereign states, but it is now having to adapt to a changing normative environment’.24 These ongoing changes affect the regional environment in that they call into question certain enduring features of Southeast Asian regionalism, among which four stand out: state centrism, noninterference, the importance of ‘soft power’ over structural or hegemonic leadership, and the preference for ‘soft institutionalism’ over legalistic and formalistic cooperation. In this regard, four areas in which one or more of these hitherto intractable features is presently under challenge are especially noteworthy.25 The first major area of change concerns the longstanding principle of noninterference, which for the most part continues to underpin regional multilateral collaboration. The financial crisis exposed the reluctance of ASEAN members to provide early warning to one another, presumably out of deference to this norm. Transnational challenges such as the 2003 SARS crisis and the haze emanating from forest fires in Indonesia caused serious economic and health concerns for neighbouring countries, while mounting problems with drug and human trafficking and refugee flows have proved equally worrying. Bangkok’s call to replace the Association’s ‘constructive engagement’ policy, which in itself is rooted in noninterference, with the more intrusive approach of ‘flexible engagement’ met with resistance from member capitals, especially Hanoi and Yangon. Moreover, the failure of ASEAN – during its ‘enhanced interaction’ phase, no less – to provide a timely response to the violence in secessionist East Timor damaged its credibility to provide ‘regional solutions to regional problems’. While ASEAN remains and would likely continue to remain divided on the issue of non-interference, there are encouraging signs that indicate some willingness among member states to adopt less dogmatic interpretations of the doctrine, such as the decision in 2000 to institute a ‘Troika’ system that could conceivably provide a rapid diplomatic response to unfolding crisis, the conduct of economic ‘peer reviews’ and the creation of an ‘ASEAN Surveillance Process’ in regional financial cooperation. While affirming that non-interference remains a cardinal

46

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

Association principle, an Indonesian senior official nevertheless conceded that ‘it is no longer a principle which cannot be discussed’.26 Even the ‘mother’ of taboo concerns, the political-security dimension, has not remained completely impervious, as evidenced by the discussion of domestic political concerns in Myanmar in the presence of its head of state at the ASEAN summit in Singapore in 2002. At best, these developments constitute a limited challenge to noninterference. Indeed, that the Cambodian and East Timor peace missions were permitted to take place implies that the regional commitment to non-interference does not automatically preclude interventionism, especially when those challenges prove sufficiently severe to warrant resort to quite intrusive measures, not least humanitarian intervention. Noting the common criticism of ASEAN inaction during the height of the violence in East Timor, one analyst has also called attention to the largely ignored roles played by various Association member states in response to that crisis and in ways that underlined the heightened consciousness within the region over perceived political sensitivities (presumably) affecting Jakarta: More significantly, it is important to note that Indonesia finally consented to some form of humanitarian intervention when it got the assurance that ASEAN members would be involved in the peacekeeping operations. At the height of the conflict when consultations within ASEAN was taking place, Indonesia had apparently intimated to ASEAN officials that it was willing to accept humanitarian intervention for as long as ASEAN has a role in it . . . Moreover, data from the UN peacekeeping office reveals that since UNTAET, ASEAN’s response has proved to be more robust and substantial than many outside the region had expected.27 Furthermore, it has also been argued that ASEAN, without much fanfare, has for long engaged in actions that, to all intents and purposes, militate against the non-interference principle: diplomatic efforts at resolving the Cambodian conflict (1979 – 93); diplomatic overtures to Myanmar in welcoming it to the ASEAN fold; establishing institutional mechanisms for dealing with the haze problem (the Regional Haze Action Plan) and a regional surveillance and early-warning mechanism for financial instability.28 This gradual toleration for increased intrusiveness can only bode well where future prospects for enhanced civilian participation in peace operations are concerned. A second albeit uneven pattern of institutional change has to do with the ongoing ‘liberalization’ in Southeast Asian regionalism, which is partly a consequence of democratic transitions in ASEAN countries such as the Philippines, Thailand and most recently Indonesia. Regional cooperation in Southeast Asia has been an essentially state-centred and elite-driven project, while the engagement of civil society has been minimal despite the proliferation of so-called Track 2 processes. Although often cited as illustrations of civil society involvement in regional institution building, these processes tend to be dominated by state-sponsored, or supported, think-tanks led by individuals with close professional or personal ties to their respective governments. Moreover, seldom have government officials who attend these meetings ‘in their private

NGOs IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

47

capacities’ – a key tenet of Track 2, ironically enough – been able to rise above national interests and concerns in what are ostensibly ‘non-official’ deliberations. Yet the post-Cold War attention accorded to transnational and ‘non-traditional’ issues has given rise to NGO-initiated campaigns on environmental degradation, human rights abuses, poverty and social justice that have been pursued at the regional level and which usually run counter to state policy.29 Clearly, political openness in ASEAN countries that have undergone domestic political transition has, among other things, led to the empowerment of NGOs with regional and international agendas. In addition, the enlarging of the security agenda of states to include ‘human security’ considerations provides a justification for the closer involvement of civil society and social movements in regional cooperation, a domain that traditionally has remained the exclusive preserve of governments. Since the mid-1990s, for example, various international networks of NGOs have held regular meetings to deal with issues and challenges arising from open regionalism and globalization; some of these sessions are parallel conferences that coincide with intergovernmental gatherings such as the annual APEC summits. Contra longstanding official positions on security matters, these NGOs seek to challenge the dominant discourse and practice of security in their efforts to ‘build constituencies for peace’.30 To be sure, NGOs active in Southeast Asia have long been reluctant to collaborate with regional intergovernmental organizations, preferring instead to pursue their own separate networking and advocacy activities. Most Southeast Asian governments regard NGOs in either of two ways. On the one hand, there is a general lack of governmental appreciation and support for NGOs, although this situation varies from country to country in the region. Accordingly, NGOs are variously treated as special interest organizations that do not keep the broader public interest at heart, as threats to social unity, or as private organizations that place additional burdens on government bureaucracies. On the other hand, thanks partly to the financial crisis, some ASEAN states have come to recognize the utility of NGOs in dealing with many newly emerging socio-economic problems that are beyond the capacity of governments to handle directly.31 In short, the emerging view among some state elites is that civil society groups can be positive social forces rather than dangerous anti-government elements. Constraints notwithstanding, there have been modest efforts by both governments and civil societies to promote dialogue over social and security issues, as exemplified by the ASEAN Peoples’ Assembly (APA) meetings in the Indonesian locales of Batam in 2000 and Bali in 2002. Castigated as ‘an incoherent babble of voices’32 on the one hand, the APA has also been viewed, on the other, as a ‘sign of the times – one characterized by an increasing willingness by actors in the second and third tracks to engage including the unlike-minded for the achievement of the goals they cannot obtain in isolation from or in hostile opposition to each other’.33 These sessions attest to a growing recognition by regional officialdom of the importance of engaging with regional civil society, and can rightly be regarded as a significant first step in the turn towards ‘participatory regionalism’.34 To the extent that the APA succeeds as a regional mechanism for highlighting human security concerns in Southeast Asia, the role of NGOs in humanitarian

48

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

intervention and specifically peace operations would constitute a natural outgrowth of that progress. A third key development is the growing agenda of regional cooperation against international terrorism and the conditions that engender and support it. Since 9/11, terrorism has come to dominate the security perceptions and agenda of Southeast Asian governments. Termed by some, fairly or otherwise, as the ‘second front’ in the global war on terror, the region is viewed as an attractive host to international terrorism, thanks to a combination of factors: multiethnic societies, weak and corrupt regimes with a tenuous hold over peripheral areas, economies and governments debilitated by the financial crisis, ongoing separatist insurgencies that lend themselves to potential exploitation by foreign elements, and democratic transitions in countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines which paradoxically have inhibited efforts at preventive suppression of terrorist elements.35 The impact of terrorism on regionalism has been both positive and negative. On the one hand, it has galvanized regional cooperation, including information and intelligence exchanges and measures to deal with money laundering. Counter-terrorism cooperative pacts at the intra-Association level and between ASEAN and the US, for example, have been established. On the other hand, constraints to further cooperation persist, such as varying perceptions among ASEAN states regarding the severity of the terrorist threat, which has encumbered efforts to devise common responses. Indeed, some analysts are decidedly less sanguine about the level and substance of existing cooperation.36 Others insist that even such limited collaboration has nevertheless proved relatively effective despite the limited capacities, divergent political imperatives and differing perceptions of the ASEAN member nations.37 While regional cooperation against terrorism has thus far involved primarily intelligence and security collaboration at the intergovernmental level, it is not unreasonable to suppose that NGOs can and likely would be drawn into humanitarian and conflict prevention efforts in the ‘war on terror’, just as many already are in civil conflict settings. For example, some governments including the United States are already enlisting the assistance of humanitarian and relief organizations and other NGOs in their wider counter-terror efforts, although it is fair to say not all would readily subscribe to such co-option.38 In the post9/11 Southeast Asian context, Track 2 communities, many of which include NGOs among their constituents (although the true extent of their autonomy from regional governments remains a point of contention), have begun engaging in confidence-building efforts through informal dialogue activities with representatives of religious organizations. For instance, Track 2 meetings organized by the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia – Pacific (CSCAP) have included panel discussions along these lines – as was the case in Jakarta in December 2003. Moreover, interfaith dialogue sessions have also been held among religious organizations.39 The attention on NGOs can be double-edged, however, in that some religious-oriented NGOs have increasingly come under the counter-terror spotlight.40 Finally, one other major source of change has to do with the growing trend towards a more formalized regionalism, which runs counter to the model of

NGOs IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

49

soft regionalism as the region’s preferred mode of institution formation. Whether this shift constitutes a sort of ‘functional imperative’ is debatable. Few, however, would question that the hallmarks of the once-venerated ‘ASEAN Way’ – decision-making by consensus, preference for informality and organizational minimalism, and so on – are increasingly coming under duress for its failure to facilitate ASEAN’s effort at coping with new challenges. As it is, the Association has not been particularly averse to arming itself with formal provisions for monitoring compliance through the use of regional mechanisms that have legally binding dispute-settlement authority backed by sanctions, such as the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone Treaty, the ASEAN Free Trade Area, or the Regional Haze Action Plan.41 Such agreements challenge the model of soft regionalism with which many so readily associate ASEAN. The latest expression of such ASEAN-styled Gesellschaft is the declared intention to establish an ASEAN Community comprising security, economic and sociocultural facets.42 In the case of the ASEAN Security Community (ASC), for instance, it would fully utilize existing institutions and mechanisms within ASEAN to strengthen national and regional capacities to counter terrorism, drug and human trafficking and other transnational crimes, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. However, the manner in which ASEAN member nations have sought to manage bilateral disputes suggests that the main instrument for resolving intramural problems, notably the High Council, would not likely be employed, and that, even when it is, it may be hampered by the noninterference principle, which the ASC has reiterated. At best, the ASC, as one study has put it, ‘promises the vague long-term prospect of more effective mechanisms for regional conflict resolution and, ultimately, a less fragile region offering fewer opportunities for interference by the rising Asian major powers as their diplomatic assertiveness and military capacity grows’.43 Incipient though all this may be at this point, it is also such legalizing impulses that could conceivably facilitate the turn towards ‘formalizing’ the requirement, as it were, for enhanced participation by civilian actors in conflict management. Towards Attitudinal Congruence As significant as the aforementioned institutional developments may be at facilitating greater civilian input in regional conflict management, there still is need for an adjustment in military attitudes towards the influx of ‘outsiders’ into milieux and activities long regarded as the sole preserve of governments and militaries. Without a consensus or congruence in the views of civilians and peacekeepers, the prospects for a viable civilian –military partnership would remain slim if non-existent. Writing in the context of the NATO peacekeeping experience in Bosnia, one analyst has highlighted the urgent need for ‘greater strategic coordination’ among international efforts, including those by civilian and military actors.44 She notes that political resources have at times been squandered as a result of divergent strategies among implementing agencies and governments, which led to ‘a chaotic blend of different mandates, incompatible timetables, and divided leadership’ among involved actors – divisions that warring parties

50

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

evidently exploited with some success – that, in turn, created a ‘destructive vacuum’.45 Her argument underlines the immense difficulties confronting efforts to integrate military and civilian implementation. One key impediment that has long stood in the way of further integration is the lack of agreement among the actors involved regarding the necessity for coordination among them. Stated differently, it is essential that a fair measure of attitudinal congruence if not convergence exist regarding robust civilian –military collaboration as the most efficacious way of conducting peace missions today. An unpublished 2002 survey conducted among over 60 members of various Asian militaries and international and NGOs active in the region suggests that there is underway an incremental shift, first, in military attitudes concerning increasing civilian participation in conflict management, and, second, in both civilian and military attitudes concerning the dire requirement for greater civilian –military coordination and integration in peace operations.46 Other studies also lend support to the general thrust of this survey’s findings.47 Where military attitudes towards civilian counterparts are concerned, three notable points can be made. First, despite inveterate differences between NGOs and militaries (which both parties readily acknowledge), peacekeepers are generally keen to work with NGOs in developing a quid pro quo or symbiotic working relationship. The military can provide NGOs with so-called ‘spare capacities’, notably, transportation, penetration of remote areas, security protection when visiting conflict hotspots and the like. On their part, NGOs can provide peacekeeping forces with intelligence and local knowledge (in so far as they are able to do so without compromising their independence, humanitarian codes and/or credibility with the local population). Second, the consensual view is that peacekeeping forces need to improve coordination with NGOs on the ground.48 For example, the sheer number and variety of NGOs on the ground during the East Timor mission ranged from huge international NGOs to myriad self-proclaimed ‘organizations’ of no more than ten members. Both INTERFET and UNTAET forces had to learn to distinguish between innumerable civilian groups and identify those with whom they could work.49 The concern with improving coordination with civilian actors leads logically to the third point: peacekeepers believe that coordination and synergy between themselves and NGOs are best forged under the rubric of umbrella organizations such as UN agencies and/or the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Most peacekeepers regard the UN mandate as the most logical framework for military participation in peace operations, although some noted the gradual shift towards a ‘coalitions of the willing’ approach. Where civilian attitudes towards peacekeepers are concerned, the survey results reflect some ambivalence in civilian responses. First, the NGO respondents value the positive ‘spill-over’ effects of civilian –military complementarity in their respective functions. They appreciate that militaries have a role to play in stabilizing the situation and emphasize the importance of coordinating operations to avoid confusion on the ground. Second, they perceive their role to be different from that of militaries. In particular, humanitarian NGO representatives maintain that the military and humanitarian missions of any peace operation should

NGOs IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

51

be kept separate. Peacekeepers should stick solely to the task of providing order and security, leaving the humanitarian mission to NGOs. Third, NGOs generally agree that civilian –military cooperation is most propitious during post-conflict phases because peace settlements are more probable, and where peacekeepers can help to disarm and demobilize warring parties. In pre-conflict phases, most NGOs tend to focus their efforts on working with host governments, local parties and local militaries, which renders any collaboration between NGOs and international peacekeeping forces suspect in the eyes of the people whose support and trust are necessary in order for the humanitarian mission to succeed. In mid-conflict phases, some NGOs involved in humanitarian and relief efforts are loath to collaborate with UN peacekeepers for fear of being viewed by local actors, unfairly or otherwise, as being partial.50 Moreover, all who were polled are of the opinion that natural disaster emergencies offer the least complications and hence the best possibility for NGOs and the military to work together and share resources. Finally, NGOs generally maintain that it is better for NGOs to work alongside peacekeepers, but not necessarily with them – an observation that raises interesting questions for what terms such as ‘coordination’ and ‘integration’ mean precisely to which actors. On the whole, the peacekeepers evince a more positive impression of NGOs than the other way around. They display a strong awareness of civilian contributions in conflict settings and for the most part welcome their presence on the ground. They ably distinguish differences in mandates, objectives and time frames of various NGOs with whom they had to work. On their part, some NGO members remain sceptical of UN missions, viewing them as politically driven and more of a ‘necessary evil’ needed for maintaining order and security in conflict zones. While both peacekeepers and NGOs emphasize the importance of better coordination and integration on the ground, with military practitioners supportive of mechanisms or ‘lead agencies’ such as the OCHA to maintain and enhance ‘civil – military operations coordination (or CMOC)’, some NGOs are more reticent about subordinating their missions to any lead agency, let alone one from the UN. Nevertheless, the survey results demonstrate acute awareness in both peacekeepers and NGOs regarding the complexity of the interrelationships between international organizations, governments, militaries, NGOs and local parties as well as the important need for more strategic coordination between these players, despite particular reservations some civilian activists hold about civilian –military collaboration. The foregoing analysis raises at least four preliminary observations. First, joint engagement in confidence-building efforts – dialogue sessions, educational exchanges, simulations on conflict prevention, mediation and resolution, and the like – by civilians and peacekeepers may be highly useful in helping to mitigate mutual suspicion, which continues to remain relatively strong in the Southeast Asian context (especially where NGO perceptions of the military are concerned). Second, in line with the recommendation in the UN report, An Agenda for Peace (1992) for a clear division of labour between military and humanitarian functions, peacekeeping forces would do well to eschew mission creep and focus on providing security and order in peace operations, while leaving the humanitarian

52

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY 51

aspects to NGOs. Third, given that post-conflict phases appear to provide the strongest possibility for any cooperative endeavour that might take place between peacekeepers and NGOs, it goes without saying that the two groups should thereby pursue post-conflict collaboration in peacebuilding efforts. Fourth, there is a need to establish and maintain mechanisms that bring together the military, NGOs and international organizations to advance mutual goals. In that regard, CMOC centres run by the military for exchanging information and other practical matters are integral to any strategic, coherent coordination of multiple capacities and implementations. Conclusion The changing nature and context of conflicts in the post-Cold War era has brought about a concomitant alteration in the modalities of conflict management. The way in which peace operations have evolved, both conceptually and practically, is emblematic of those broader structural and institutional shifts. The burgeoning participation of civilian actors, particularly NGOs, in humanitarian interventions throughout the world has raised concerns for developing regions wherein state centrism, norms of non-intervention and non-intrusion, and soft regionalism continue to hold sway, not least in Southeast Asia. Against that backdrop, this essay has highlighted two interrelated developments that imply gradual accommodation of, rather than resistance to, civilian involvement in a region long known for intolerance among its political elite of NGO activism for its ostensibly subversive connotations. On the one hand, it is maintained that specific institutional changes, including those undertaken in response to certain post-Cold War challenges confronting the region, have engendered social conditions more or less favourable to NGO involvement in humanitarian intervention. Four areas of institutional change have been noted: (1) a limited recalibration of longstanding state-centric norms in response to various contemporary, non-traditional regional challenges; (2) the proliferation and rising influence of NGOs as a result of ongoing political liberalization within the region; (3) the potential enlistment of civil society actors by governments in the regional war against terrorism; and (4) the growing pattern of formalization in the region, partly exemplified by ASEAN’s strategic efforts, still incipient at this stage, to utilize hitherto untested mechanisms in strengthening regional resilience against region-wide threats which have the potential to cripple the region’s economies and societies. On the other hand, it is also maintained that a parallel attitudinal adjustment in military opinions towards NGO activism in humanitarian intervention and particularly peace operations appears to be taking place. Civilian attitudes towards military counterparts are also changing, but at a much slower pace. Nevertheless, it is not immediately apparent how significant these ongoing institutional and attitudinal shifts would eventually prove; indeed, it is not at all clear whether they would continue to evolve and consolidate. Furthermore, whether such a felicitous situation would successfully translate into integrated and coordinated peace missions that synergistically combine military and civilian

NGOs IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

53

capacities and implementations remains to be seen. Yet it perhaps may be said of the current period of transition that there have been few better moments for the strengthening of civilian –military coordination in conflict management than that which exists today. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The author is indebted to Mely Caballero-Anthony and Michael Pugh for their incisive comments on an earlier version of this essay.

NOTES 1. Elizabeth M. Cousens, ‘Introduction’, in Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar with Karin Wermester (eds), Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p.1. Peace operations cover ‘conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-building’. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN doc. A/55/305S/2000/809, 21 Aug. 2000, viii. 2. Andrew Natsios, ‘NGOs and the UN System in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: Conflict or Cooperation?’ in Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Godenker (eds), NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996, pp.67–81. 3. Derek McDougall, ‘Regional Institutions and Security: Implications of the 1999 East Timor Crisis’, in Andrew T.H. Tan and J.D. Kenneth Boutin (eds), Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001, pp.166–96. 4. Ralf Emmers, ‘Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping: A Study of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)’, paper for the ‘Cosmopolitan Militaries in the 21st Century’ conference, Australian National University, Canberra, 28–29 Nov. 2002. Also see ‘Singapore Sidesteps ASEAN Peacekeeping Force’, Washington Post, 4 March 2004, accessed at: www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/articles/A29542-2004Mar4.html. 5. On participation by ASEAN states in UN-sanctioned peace operations, see various chapters in See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (eds), Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional Order, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004. 6. By default, civil society tends to be treated as synonymous with NGOs. See, Niraya Gopal Jayal, ‘Civil Society in India’, in Tadashi Yamamoto (ed.), Governance and Civil Society in a Global Age, Tokyo: Japan Centre for International Exchange, 2001. Also see Mely CaballeroAnthony, ‘Non-State Regional Governance Mechanism for Economic Security: The Case of the ASEAN Peoples’ Assembly’, paper for the IDSS–Sasakawa Workshop on ‘Globalization and Economic Security in East Asia: Governance and Institutions’, Singapore, 11–12 Sept. 2003. 7. Mahathir Mohamad. Quoted in Alan Dupont, ‘ASEAN’s Response to the East Timor Crisis’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.54, No.2, 2000, p.165. 8. Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001. Also see Michael Pugh, ‘The Challenge of Civil –Military Relations in International Peace Operations?’, Disasters, Vol.25, No.4, Dec. 2001, pp.345–7. 9. Pamela Aall, ‘What Do NGOs Bring to Peacemaking?’ in Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds), Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001, p.377. Nevertheless, it should be noted that some NGOs were co-opted by governments and intergovernmental agencies to participate in so-called ‘militarized humanitarian’ efforts during the Kosovo war and subsequently. See Sami Makki, Militarisation de l’humanitaire, privatisation du militaire, et strate´gie globale des E´tats Unis, Paris: Cahier d’E´tudes Strate´giques 36– 37, Groupe de Sociologie de la De´fense, E´coles des Hautes E´tudes en Science Sociales, 2004. 10. See Seng Tan, Sinderpal Singh and Melina Nathan, ‘Building Peace in Southeast Asia: Can NGOs and Peacekeepers Cooperate in Conflict and Humanitarian Crisis Management?’, paper for the IDSS–UNU–Sasakawa Workshop on ‘UN Peace Operations in the Asia-Pacific’, Tokyo, 12– 13 Feb. 2003. 11. See Henry F. Carey and Oliver Richmond (eds), Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs, special issue of International Peacekeeping, Vol.10, No.1, Spring 2003. On NGOs in international

54

12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY relations more broadly, see: Ann M. Florini (ed.), The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society, Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2000; Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998; Richard Price, ‘Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Landmines’, International Organisation, Vol.52, No.3, Summer 1998, pp.613– 44; Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (eds), The Power of Human Rights, International Norms and Domestic Change, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. After decades of avoiding NGOs, the UN (particularly the UN Development Programme) and the World Bank now regard NGOs as development partners, especially in humanitarian assistance and relief. UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees 2000: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, London and Geneva: Oxford University Press and UNHCR, 2000, p.194. Kendall W. Stiles, ‘Civil Society Empowerment and Multilateral Donors: International Institutions and New International Norms’, Global Governance, Vol.4, 1998, pp.199–216. Taken from Aall (see n.9 above), p.367. As service providers to the poor, humanitarian NGOs have been regarded as an antidote to market failure as well as vehicles for democratization. David Hulme and Michael Edwards, NGOs, States, and Donors: Too Close for Comfort?, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1997. Mark Robinson, ‘NGOs and Rural Poverty Alleviation: Implications for Scaling-Up’, in Michael Edwards and David Hulme (eds), Making a Difference: NGOs and Development in a Changing World, London: Earthscan, 1992, p.28. Michael Edwards, David Hulme and Tina Wallace, ‘Increasing Leverage for Development: Challenges for NGOs in a Global Future’, in David Lewis and Tina Wallace (eds), New Roles and Relevance: Development NGOs and the Challenge of Change, Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2000, p.6. Searching for Impact and Methods: NGO Evaluation Synthesis Study, OECD/DAC Expert Group on Aid Evaluation, Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1997, p.xiv. Mary B. Anderson, ‘Humanitarian NGOs in Conflict Intervention’, in Crocker, Hampson and Aall (see n.9 above), p.642. Ibid., p.646. Managing Communications: Lessons From Interventions in Africa, a summary of the proceedings of a conference sponsored by the US Institute of Peace and the National Defense University, 20 June 1996, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, March 1997. See, David Martin Jones and Michael L.R. Smith, ‘ASEAN’s Imitation Community’, Orbis, Winter 2002, pp.93–109. Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan, ‘Regionalism, Institutional Change, and New Military Missions in the Asia Pacific’, in Nontraditional Roles of the Military and Security in East Asia, Proceedings of the 50th Anniversary International Symposium on Security Affairs, Tokyo: National Institute of Defence Studies, Oct. 2003, pp.141–57. Shaun Narine, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and the Question of Sovereignty: The Case of ASEAN’, CANCAPS Papers, No.33, March 2004, p.17. This section draws partly from Acharya and Tan (see n.23 above). Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, ‘Will RI Commit ASEAN’s Sin?’, The Jakarta Post, 26 July 2000, p.1. Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘Regionalization of Peace in Asia: Experiences and Prospects of ASEAN, ARF and UN Partnership’, IDSS Working Paper No.42, Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, p.19. Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘Asian Attitudes and Approaches to Peace Operations’, UNISCI Papers No.29, Madrid: Faculty of Political Science, Complutense University, 2003, p.20. Various essays in Shinichi Shigetomi (ed.), The State and NGOs: Perspectives from Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002. Mely Caballero-Anthony, ‘Re-visioning Human Security in Southeast Asia’, paper for the 45th annual International Studies Association (ISA) Convention, 17–20 March 2004, Montreal, Canada. On NGO activity in ASEAN states, see Shigetomi (see n.29 above). Rehman Rashid, ‘Agenda Malaysia: The ASEAN People’s Assembly’, in Report of the First ASEAN People’s Assembly, Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2001, pp.237–40. Carolina G. Hernandez, ‘A People’s Assembly: A Novel Mechanism for Bridging the North– South Divide in ASEAN’, 2002, unpublished manuscript; cited in Caballero-Anthony (see n.6 above).

NGOs IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

55

34. Amitav Acharya, ‘Democratization and the Prospects for Participatory Regionalism in Southeast Asia’, Third World Quarterly, Vol.24, No.2, 2003, pp.375–90. 35. See various essays in Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan (eds), After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia, Singapore and London: World Scientific, 2003. 36. David Martin Jones and Michael Smith, ‘The Perils of Hyper-Vigilance: The War on Terrorism and the Surveillance State in South-East Asia’, Intelligence and National Security, Vol.17, No.4, Winter 2002, p.36. 37. See Seng Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna, ‘Interstate and Intrastate Dynamics in Southeast Asia’s War on Terror’, The SAIS Review of International Affairs, Vol.24, No.2, Winter–Spring 2004, pp.91–105. 38. Andrew S. Natsios, ‘Foreign Assistance in the Age of Terror’, remarks by Andrew S. Natsios, Administrator, United States Agency for International Development, 21 Apr. 2004, accessed at: www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2004/sp040421.html. 39. For Southeast Asian cases, see David R. Smock (ed.), Interfaith Dialogue and Peacebuilding, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2002; Syed Farid Alatas, Lim Teck Ghee and Kazuhide Kuroda (eds), Asian Interfaith Dialogue: Perspectives On Religion, Education and Social Cohesion, Singapore: Centre for Research on Islamic and Malay Affairs (Singapore), and the World Bank, 2003. 40. Various religious organizations have received attention in government documents, including the White Paper on the Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism, Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs, 7 Jan. 2003. 41. Acharya and Tan (see n.23 above), p.147. 42. See the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), Bali, 7 Oct. 2003, accessed at: www.aseansec.org/15159.htm. 43. Barry Desker, ‘Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s credibility tested’, Strategic Comments, Vol.9, Issue 8. Oct. 2003. 44. Elizabeth M. Cousens, ‘Building Peace in Bosnia’, in Cousens and Kumar with Wermester (see n.1 above), pp.113–52. 45. Ibid., p.141. 46. This section draws from Tan, Singh and Nathan (see n.10 above). 47. See, for example, Aall (see n.9 above), p.377. 48. For an important objection vis-a`-vis other regional contexts, see Joanna Macrae and Nicholas Leader, Shifting Sands: The Search for ‘Coherence’ between Political and Humanitarian Responses in Complex Emergencies, London: Humanitarian Policy Group Report 8, Overseas Development Institute, 2000. 49. Importantly, the East Timor experience should not be taken as a benchmark for civilian–military cooperation in general. The success of the INTEFET and UNTAET operations could largely be attributed to felicitous local conditions, particularly the largely benign environment in postconflict East Timor and the overwhelming support among the Timorese for secession from Indonesia. Tan, Singh and Nathan (see n.10 above). 50. Ibid. 51. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, Peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-General, 17 June 1992, New York: United Nations, 1992.

Japan’s Policy towards UN Peacekeeping Operations KATSUMI ISHIZUKA

Japan joined the UN in 1956. Since then it has adopted a ‘UN-centred policy’ as a main pillar of its foreign policy. As far as Japan’s recent contribution to UN operations is concerned, Japan has sent 442 peacekeepers in the form of UN troops, to the Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights and the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). At the end of October 2003 this figure ranked Japan at 26th among contributing UN member states.1 However, Japan’s policy towards UN operations has been complicated by several domestic factors, such as its Constitution and the right of collective defence. Meanwhile, various changes in the international political climate and the increasing demand for conflict resolution have compelled Japan to seek a new approach to participation in UN peacekeeping. This essay explains that the Gulf War in 1991 and the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States were catalysts in the evolution of Japan’s policy towards peacekeeping, and identifies several operational problems caused by the state’s restraining domestic laws. Finally, the essay clarifies the national interests of Japan in relation to UN peacekeeping and proposes options for the state’s future peacekeeping policy.

The Origin of Japanese Peacekeeping Policy The first significant domestic controversy over a Japanese military role within the international community was brought about by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. US President George Bush (Sr) recognized Japan’s constitutional restraints and asked Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu to contribute

JAPAN’S POLICY TOWARDS UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

57

minesweepers and other logistical support to the war. However, Kaifu was very reluctant to accede to this request. After the international coalition commenced airstrikes against Iraq in January 1991, Japan’s ‘non-bloodshed’ policy was the subject of much criticism from the international community. US pressure on Japan was particularly significant. Former US Secretary of State James Baker said during a speech to the Japan Institute for International Affairs in Tokyo in November 1991, ‘your checkbook diplomacy like our dollar diplomacy of an earlier era is clearly too narrow’.2 In Japan, the clamour for a larger role in world affairs was pervasive. The Foreign Ministry White Paper of 1991 stated that military personnel contributions were indispensable. Gradually, a consensus developed among the main political parties and the Japanese public that Japan should play a more active role in maintaining international peace and security rather than simply contributing money to solve global problems. In those days, the number of UN peacekeeping operations had sharply increased due to the outbreak of internal conflicts in the post-Cold War period. Therefore, UN peacekeeping, which was a consenttype operation and less coercive than multinational forces, was considered to be an ideal conflict resolution mechanism in which the SDF should initially participate. In fact, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa stated that Japan’s international contribution ‘should include some “sweating” or dispatch of personnel to assist UN peacekeeping operations’ rather than relying solely on ‘a lavish scattering around of aid’.3 Opinion among the Japanese public and the major political parties shifted significantly after the Gulf War. According to an opinion poll conducted by the largest newspaper company in Japan, while in June 1988 only 22.5 per cent of Japanese citizens said, ‘it is preferable that the SDF can be dispatched to peacekeeping operations’, this figure rose sharply to 67.8 per cent after the Gulf War in April 1992.4 In other words, Japanese citizens realized the significance for Japan of military contributions to international operations after international criticism for not doing so during the Gulf War. On 6 June 1991, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party created a ‘Special Study Group on Japan’s Role in the International Community’, chaired by LDP General Secretary Ichiro Ozawa, which became known as ‘the Ozawa Commission’. The Commission claimed that the Preamble of the Japanese Constitution had a clear provision for Japan’s pursuit of peaceful cooperation with all nations, and therefore that the dispatch of the SDF to UN forces under Articles 42 and 43 of the UN Charter would be constitutional.5 The Commission also maintained that on the subject of so-called ‘multi-national forces’, authorized under UN Security Council resolutions, as in the Gulf War, Japan would be able to contribute a logistical unit. Its conclusion, published in November 1991, strongly recommended Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations as well. The US Ambassador to Japan, Michael Armacost, had already argued that whether Japanese contingents could be dispatched to the UN Transitional Administration in Cambodia (UNTAC) would be a touchstone of the provision of its peacekeeping commitment in the future.6 The International Peace Cooperation Bill, the so-called ‘PKO’ bill, was presented to the Diet in September 1991. It included the

58

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

so-called ‘Five Principles’ for the participation of a Japanese contingent in peacekeeping operations. 1. Agreement on the ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties to the conflict. 2. The parties to the conflict, including the territorial states, shall have given their consent to deployment of the peacekeeping force and Japan’s participation in the force. 3. The peacekeeping force shall maintain strict impartiality, not favouring any party to the conflict. 4. Should any of the above guideline requirements cease to satisfy the Government of Japan, it may withdraw the contingent. 5. Use of weaponry shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of personnel, etc.7 The opposition parties such as the Democratic Socialist Party and Komeito Party called for the creation of a separate organization from the SDF for Japan’s peacekeeping participation. The Socialist and Communist parties were adamant in their opposition to the bill on the grounds that the SDF’s dispatch to peacekeeping was unconstitutional. However, more precisely, all of the three largest political parties – the LDP, the Socialists and Komeito – contained factions that favoured the SDF’s participation in UN peacekeeping as well as opponents. It was clear that the issue of the creation of a separate organization from the SDF was meaningless; organizations that participate in the military sector of peacekeeping operations are internationally regarded as military organizations. The important thing was not ‘who would act as the Japanese contingent’ but ‘what the Japanese contingent could do as a peacekeeper’. This issue was, however, sidelined. Providing the SDF with opportunities to participate in UN peacekeeping operations would help to broaden the international perspective of the SDF and defence authorities. It would also enhance public understanding of the SDF and, externally, increase transparency of the real image of the SDF and eventually build confidence in Japan. However, these benefits did not receive attention in the debates. Public opinion was divided. A poll conducted by the Asahi Daily indicated that 41.6 per cent of respondents favoured SDF participation in UN peacekeeping operations, while 36.9 per cent did not.8 The PKO Bill was finally voted into law in June 1992 after stormy deliberation and resistance by the opposition parties. Thus, the new International Peace Cooperation Law became the legal authority for SDF participation in all peacekeeping operations conducted by the UN. It was significant that this debate was the first opportunity for both the Japanese Diet and the public to seriously discuss the possibility and perspectives of their country’s first ‘physical commitment’ to international peace and security. It can be said that international criticism of Japan in the aftermath of the Gulf War urged Japan to seek a consensus on how to win international respect in terms of conflict management on the world stage. One question can be raised: what factors prompted Japan to change itself from a passive observer to a more proactive contributor to peacekeeping operations

JAPAN’S POLICY TOWARDS UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

59

after the Gulf War? From a liberal internationalist perspective, Japan and its citizens genuinely realized the necessity to make not only a financial contribution, but also a human contribution to peacekeeping in order to become ‘a normal nation’. This psychological shift among the Japanese government and citizens was partly due to the humiliation of Japan’s glaring omission from Kuwait’s public declaration of gratitude after the Gulf War.9 It is also noted that the rapidly increasing number of UN peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era required Japan to contribute physically to peacekeeping. During his visit to Tokyo in February 1993, UN Secretary-General Boutros BoutrosGhali also praised Japan and sought to encourage further participation within the framework of the Japanese Constitution.10 Japan’s ambition to play a new part in peacekeeping was also encouraged by the fact that Germany, which had similar historical experience to Japan during and after the Second World War, had changed its constitution more than 50 times in order to meet demands from the international community and involve itself in international and regional conflicts.11 Therefore, the Japanese government and many citizens felt a responsibility for playing a new peacekeeping role. This shift can also be explained from a realist perspective. After the Gulf War the Japanese government was determined to be a political power in the world and, therefore, to seek a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Indeed during that war the Minister of Finance, Ryutaro Hashimoto, hinted at the Japanese government’s irritation at not having detailed information about the war because Japan was not a permanent member of the Security Council.12 The government considered that participation in UN peacekeeping was a minimum condition for obtaining a permanent seat, and Japan’s commitment to some UN operations was primarily due to the ambition of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) on this issue. For instance, following the termination of the Japanese SDF’s stationing in ONUMOZ in Mozambique at the end of 1994, Japan was no longer scheduled to participate in UN peacekeeping operations. However, the MFA wanted to maintain continuous involvement, and hurriedly sent 15 electoral observers to ONUSAL in El Salvador, although the mission stayed only a week. The process by which the SDF were dispatched to UNDOF in the Golan Heights was similar.13 The policy was also affected by external factors. In July 1994, the US Senate passed a resolution threatening not to support Japan’s bid for a permanent Security Council seat unless it lived up to a full commitment to peacekeeping operations, particularly with reference to the possibility of war on the Korean peninsula.14 Yasushi Akashi, the Special Representative to UNTAC, also argued that ‘If Japan were given the status of a Security Council permanent member, it needs to act in accordance with its new responsibility because the Security Council is responsible for ensuring world peace and security’.15 Japan’s Response to International Conflicts after 11 September 2001 The attacks in the United States have had a huge impact on perspectives about how to maintain international peace and security. On the day after the attacks, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1368 (2001), which

60

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

called on member states ‘to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these terrorist attacks’.16 On 28 September 2001, Resolution 1373 (2001) to combat international terrorism was also adopted unanimously. It included the phrase ‘Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations’. Resolution 1373 provided a wide-ranging list of measures which all states are legally obliged to implement, such as preventing the financing of terrorist acts, preventing the movement of terrorists by effective border controls, and finding ways of intensifying and accelerating the exchange of operational information regarding the actions of terrorists and networks.17 The adoption of these resolutions indicated that Japan’s policy towards international peace and security in the post-11 September era should also respond to more complicated operations. Meanwhile, since the PKO law was established, several other laws involving security have been modified or enacted. In June 1998, the PKO law was reviewed in order to meet the demands of the changing climate of international security. Although the 1992 law accepted election-monitoring organized only by the UN, the current regionalization of conflict resolution led to an amendment expanding the scope of election monitoring to that sponsored by regional organizations such as the Organization of American States and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Likewise, one of the Five Principles in the 1992 law included an agreement on ceasefires among parties to the conflicts. However, this principle required more flexibility in the post-Cold War era when many reckless and even brutal belligerent factions ignored agreements. Therefore, the law was modified to drop this principle in the case of the participation of Japanese personnel in humanitarian missions involving the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). The 1998 amendment also allowed the use of weapons by Japanese personnel when senior officers ordered them to do so.18 Furthermore, the post11 September period in Japan witnessed an unprecedented legal advance in crisis management, namely, the passage of the Anti-terrorism Bill, and the further amendment of the PKO law. The Anti-terrorism Bill The day after the terrorist attacks in the United States, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi ordered his cabinet members to consider the possibility of dispatching the SDF for counter-terrorist activities in the near future.19 He subsequently mentioned in a press interview that Japan would fully support the United States and not hesitate to provide the necessary assistance and cooperation to the international community.20 The Director of the LDP, Taku Yamazaki, also said: ‘It is against the national interest not to use the SDF for counter-terrorism measures. It is possible under the current PKO law for the SDF to conduct humanitarian activities even in non-peacekeeping areas under UN resolutions as long as international organizations actually ask Japan to do so’.21 On 23 September, the government and the LDP agreed to create a new law to enable the SDF to join counter-terrorism operations. Thus, the prompt response to the 11 September incidents witnessed not only the government’s strong desire to overcome the

JAPAN’S POLICY TOWARDS UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

61

‘trauma’ of the Gulf War in 1991 but also its commitment to contribute to the international community in this crisis. According to a diplomatic source, the United States expected Japan to play a diplomatic role and to provide intelligence. In fact, President Bush positively evaluated Japan’s role in the Afghan conflict in sharing intelligence and providing US$40 million in financial aid to Pakistan.22 However in the final analysis, the primary request from Washington to Tokyo in the Afghan conflicts was to ‘show the Japanese flag’ or to play a physical role in the operational areas.23 The SDF Anti-terrorism Bill was passed on 29 October after exceptionally speedy deliberations in the Diet. Koizumi contended that: ‘The focus of the legislation was whether we think of the terrorist incidents in New York and Washington on September 11th as other people’s business or as our own affair’.24 This anti-terrorism law covered such activities as providing supplies and services, including medical treatment to US forces and their allies. It also legalized search-and-rescue activities and humanitarian relief to refugees overseas with the consent of host governments. This contrasted significantly with the PKO law. Under the PKO law, the SDF would be involved in operational areas where conflicts had ended, and the SDF would take a neutral position. Under the anti-terrorism law, the SDF, although limited to logistic missions, would put itself in volatile areas, committed to ‘universal objectives’ of exterminating terrorists. Whereas under the PKO law the SDF was allowed to use weapons only for self-defence, the anti-terrorism law approved the use of weapons to protect those under the SDF’s care including refugees and wounded foreign services members. In order to add flexibility to current restrictions on the use of force, this law would have a two-year time limit. Furthermore the government was obliged to seek Diet approval within 20 days of an SDF dispatch.25 The response from foreign states was largely positive. US Ambassador Baker said that the move was an important step for the bilateral alliance.26 The Pakistani President stated that his country would warmly welcome the SDF since the Japanese force was different from those of other countries.27 In a press interview the Thai Prime Minister expressed his support for the SDF dispatch to the Indian Ocean.28 Meanwhile, in South Korea a senior official appreciated that the legislation aimed to eradicate terrorism, but expressed a concern that the new bills should never be allowed to harm peace and stability in Asia.29 The prompt passage of this bill indicated the government’s enthusiasm to react to the new security climate. However, it should be noted that in the Diet debate very few argued the constitutional validity of the expected operations in terms of the issues of collective security or collective defence. A vague but general consensus on this issue in the Diet was that logistical support would not be ‘unified with combat’.30 In addition, the SDF would not be allowed to supply and transport armed equipment and ammunition. However, in reality, missions that were conducted under this law would be collective security missions. Furthermore, in counter-terrorism measures, it would be highly probable that urgent situations would inevitably require the Japanese SDF to engage in conduct beyond the missions within the new law. This urgent, flexible and expedient decision bypassed the controversial issue of collective security in Japan.

62

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

Amendment to the PKO Law In September 2001, the Japanese government had an initial meeting to discuss sending SDF personnel to the UN peacekeeping operation in East Timor (UN Transitional Administration in East Timor: UNTAET). Japan’s role of simply providing logistical support had been debated since the establishment of the PKO law in 1992. The issue was viewed as increasingly urgent after September 2001 because the government was expected to seek a broader role for the SDF in Afghanistan and neighbouring states as peacekeepers. For example, the Director of the Pakistan Office of UNHCR stated that he expected the Japanese SDF to play a major role in supplying mine-sweepers.31 Meanwhile, there had been reports from some former Japanese peacekeepers with experience of UNDOF in the Golan Heights that the current policy negatively affected Japanese SDF cooperation with forces from other countries. A director of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in the UN also urged amendment of the PKO law: ‘UN peacekeeping operations require each participating state’s cooperation. Strict restrictions among states would lose flexibility in operating peacekeeping units’.32 The Japanese public became more aware of the necessity of the SDF’s missions in international crisis management. According to an opinion poll, 44 per cent of the respondents supported the SDF’s participation in UN peacekeeping forces beyond logistical contributions, with 27 per cent opposed. As for the question, ‘What do you think is the most important issue for the SDF?’, 47 per cent of the respondents answered ‘Strengthening the ability to counter terrorism’.33 The Five Principles in the 1992 law were also reassessed after September 2001. For example, ‘the consent of the parties to the conflict’ was questioned as to its practicality, since there might be a case in which one could not clearly identify the parties to the conflict. The Yomiuri Daily suggested that Japan should modify the PKO law so that the SDF’s participation in UN peacekeeping could be approved if the government of a territorial state gave its consent.34 The issue of being ‘unified with combat’ became less significant in the post-11 September debate. The bill to amend the 1992 law was passed in the Upper House on 7 December 2001 in order to expand the scope of the SDF’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations. It was supported by the three ruling parties and a majority of the largest opposition Democratic Party. The revised bill lifted a ‘freeze’ on SDF participation in UN peacekeeping forces engaged in such activities as monitoring ceasefires, disarming local forces, patrolling demilitarized zones, inspecting the transport of weapons, and collecting and disposing of abandoned weapons. The use of weapons by SDF personnel under the revised law was similar in scope to that of the anti-terrorism law; the 2001 PKO law legalized the use of weapons by the SDF to protect ‘those under their control’, such as troops from other countries, refugees, government officials and personnel from the UN and other international organizations. The revision also lifted a ban on the application of Article 95 of the SDF law, which stipulated that weapons may be used to protect weapons stores.35

JAPAN’S POLICY TOWARDS UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

63

The amended PKO law was also compatible with new guidelines for UN peace operations, the Brahimi Report of August 2000, which advocated the following in terms of peacekeeping doctrine and strategy: ‘Once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and mission mandates, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence’.36 Japan’s commitment to the Brahimi Report required more robust legal framework for its participation in peacekeeping operations. Lessons Learned from Participation – Several Practical Problems Japanese peacekeepers began to play a more significant role. Following the establishment of the new peacekeeping law, Japan sent the SDF to Cambodia (UNTAC) in September 1992, Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in December 1992, Zaire and Tanzania as part of the Rwanda mission (UNAMIR) in 1994, and the SDF has been stationed in the Golan Heights (UNDOF) since January 1996, and in East Timor (UNTAET and UNMISET) since March 2002. Whereas no SDF personnel were appointed to headquarters in UNTAC, five SDF personnel were assigned as staff officers to the ONUMOZ headquarters in Mozambique. Japan sent the SDF to carry out humanitarian international relief operations as part of UNAMIR. The SDF’s deployment in Bona and Zaire was not requested by the UN Secretary-General, nor was a joint mission with other countries. It was an independent and voluntary mission by the SDF. Japan’s role in UNDOF, which monitors the separation of Israel and Syria, has been limited to transportation services; but it is a classic peacekeeping operation in the most politically and militarily tense area in the world. The dispatch of 690 SDF personnel to East Timor in March 2002 was its largest contribution to a UN peacekeeping operation. However, several practical problems have been identified as a result of the SDF’s involvement in these missions, due mainly to operational constraints and ‘inconveniences’ caused mainly by the PKO law. In Cambodia, for example, when the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm and actually ignored the ceasefire during the SDF’s deployment, the Five Principles were broken. The Japanese government did not consider withdrawing the SDF; the Five Principles were not applied consistently. The decision to stay was criticized by some political parties such as the Social Democratic Party. Meanwhile, it was reported that: ‘According to UNTAC sources, after the first casualties in UNTAC, at least six Japanese police abandoned their post near Ampit and went to Thailand [claiming that the local situation was against the Five Principles]. By contrast when a police officer from Colombia was killed on April 30 [1993] in an ambush by suspected bandits, none of his 146 colleagues in the Colombian contingent abandoned [their] post, the official said’.37 Strong adherence to the Five Principles – in other words withdrawal from dangerous areas in emergencies – could be regarded as egoism rather than

64

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

nationalism. Yasushi Akashi, head of UNTAC and then UNPROFOR, later remarked: ‘If Japan had withdrawn from UNTAC when a Japanese staff member died, Japan would have been mocked. Japanese politicians and citizens would know that, for example, the French and British battalions implemented their missions despite the fact that the French had more than 50 UN fatalities and the British had nearly 30 in UNPROFOR’.38 Another illustration of the constraints of the Five Principles occurred in UNAMIR. The SDF was deployed not in Rwanda but in its neighbouring countries, Zaire and Tanzania, because deployment in Rwanda, where the ceasefire had not been agreed, would have been regarded as a breach of the Five Principles. Susumu Takai, of the Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies, indicates the limitation of the SDF in UNAMIR on the grounds that it was an individual and voluntary mission: ‘An individual and voluntary mission without official appointment from the UN meant there was no security guarantee from the UN. There would have been no compensation from the UN in the case of casualties and fatalities amongst the Japanese SDF staff. In retrospect, no casualties among the Japanese contingents in Zaire was simply fortunate’.39 It was also noted that the standard of ‘minimum force’ was different in Japan’s PKO law from the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) stipulated by the UN. The UN allowed peacekeeping forces to use weapons not only for their own protection but also for the removal of any impediment to the completion of the assigned task, whereas Japanese PKO law allowed only the former. Hence, serious questions remained over whether Japan was to act on its own initiative in the use of weapons.40 The most critical issue for Japanese peacekeeping was that this law was applicable to emergency situations. For example, if other contingents were attacked by local factions, the Japanese SDF could not go to rescue them because of the limitation of minimum force. In fact, in UNAMIR, the SDF was criticized by other contributing states when it refused a request to look for missing staff from UN headquarters because of Japan’s domestic law. In a similar context, in UNTAC, the Japanese civilian police was the only component that could not accept a newly-added mandate to arrest those who violated the election process.41 In UNTAC, the operational situation inevitably required the SDF to extend its original mission, which occasionally included the ‘frozen part’ of the core assignments of peacekeeping. Close to election day in Cambodia, the Japanese engineer units became engaged in so-called peacekeeping missions such as patrolling, securing election monitoring and transporting ballot boxes. A Japanese researcher commented that: ‘While I was researching UNTAC, I came across the scene many times where the SDF were patrolling and guarding and where they were saying “I am a member of the Japanese army”. Their missions were camouflaged in the name of “information gathering.” It was doubtful whether the tremendous amount of debates, pledges, and amendments to the new PKO Law in the Diet were meaningful’.42 The SDF’s participation in UNTAET and UNMISET (the latter with over 400 troops) has not significantly differed from previous missions, involving activities such as construction and transportation. An engineering battalion

JAPAN’S POLICY TOWARDS UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

65

has worked in the areas close to West Timor, namely Covalima, Bobonaro and Oecusse, and ten military engineers have been based at headquarters in the capital, Dili. The work of the SDF focuses on the maintenance of the main supply routes, including paving Dili airport, and fixing bridges and holes on main roads. The writer’s field research in East Timor in September 2003 provided evidence that the Japanese engineering units have exerted a high degree of skill and professionalism. Many SDF members have achieved fame and popularity with the Timorese public. However, in specific terms, the SDF in East Timor faces similar issues to those involved in participation in UNTAC and UNDOF. Although personnel work in border areas viewed as security risks, they are mostly unarmed and unprepared for combat. They rely on the New Zealand battalion in Covalima, the Portuguese in Bobonaro and Dili, and the Koreans in Oecusse. One NGO group has seriously criticized the Japanese SDF in East Timor: Although both the Japanese and East Timorese governments speak about the humanitarian assistance of Japan’s SDF in East Timor, it is unclear how their contribution is humanitarian in any direct way. The SDF presence does nothing to provide local employment, and in fact seems to take jobs away from the East Timorese. It is also unclear why peacekeeping troops who are unprepared for combat are working in border areas where they may indeed face armed conflict.43 Some East Timorese activists also complained about the Japanese presence, claiming that a request for the Japanese government to apologize for the occupation during the Second World War should also include an apology for the 24 years that the Japanese government supported Indonesia’s victimization of hundreds of thousands of East Timorese.44 Despite the SDF’s distinguished professional skills, East Timor’s case indicates the difficulties faced in dispatching the SDF. There are problems of history, diplomacy and law. In sum, there are several problems for Japanese peacekeepers under the current law. In UN peacekeeping operations, contributing states have to cooperate with each other under a common command and standard operating procedures, and Japan cannot be an exception. Japanese personnel feel humiliated when they encounter situations where the law restrains the scope of their activities. A peacekeeping operation is an ad hoc mission. Furthermore, peacekeeping is not a classic military task, but a task conducted mainly by military personnel. Therefore, adherence to UN peacekeeping conventions inevitably leads to several difficulties for the Japanese contingents under the PKO law. The changing security situation for the Japanese missions comes into conflict with the practical consequences of the application of domestic law. East Timor’s case is particularly complicated. There was an impression that the priority for the Japanese government was to make use of the SDF overseas as a fait accompli for diplomatic purposes, rather than considering it as contributing to international peace.

66

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

Japan’s Peacekeeping Policy after 11 September National Interests Contributing states to international peacekeeping normally have a self-interest, not simply a charitable purpose behind their decision to participate. Factors in addition to ‘altruism’ or ‘internationalism’ make contributing states more disposed towards peacekeeping deployments. In other words, as Alan James says: ‘States will move if they judge that response to be in their national interests, nationally conceived’.45 Therefore, it is important to consider the national interest in Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations in the twenty-first century. One interest would be to develop a distinctive international policy as a new political power. Peacekeeping operations could provide Japan with the opportunity to own a new originality in its diplomacy. The reason why Canada and Ireland have been consistent international peacekeepers is based on this conception; they needed to establish an original diplomatic policy to counterbalance their ‘overbearing neighbours’, the United States and the UK, respectively. Unlike coalition enforcement, UN peacekeeping is conflict resolution which usually excludes the bigger powers. Japan has also been placed under ‘the US umbrella’ in both diplomatic and military respects. Japan’s consistent commitment to UN peacekeeping would broaden its diplomatic options internationally. Japan could have a more influential voice at the UN, and maintain its ‘UN-centred policy’. This is very important for Japan in the current period, when US unilateralism, which bypasses the UN, has been noticeable. While Japan inevitably complies with the decisions and policies developed by the United States to a considerable extent, participation in UN operations would ensure that Japan has a balance between its alliance with the United States and its UN-centred policy. The political difficulties of North Korea, Afghanistan, India –Pakistan, China – Taiwan and Sri Lanka mean that Asia is potentially one of the most insecure areas in the world. Regional stability is in Japan’s interests for economic and political reasons, and can be promoted through its commitment to peacekeeping operations. In fact, the major deployments to Cambodia, and East Timor involved 1,216 SDF personnel in UNTAC and 1,370 in UNTAET and UNMISET. Asia does not have a regional military alliance such as NATO. This means that regional peacekeeping such as the NATO-led Stabilization Forces in the former Yugoslavia cannot be established in Asia. Multinational forces led by European troops might be one option. However, in many cases, multinational forces are deployed only when local situations are too volatile for peacekeeping. They are interim measures, and therefore they are normally replaced by UN peacekeepers after situations become more stable, as in East Timor in 1999. The terrorist attacks of 2001 led the United States to a much more hawkish policy that marginalized peacekeeping operations. For example, National Security Adviser, Condoleeza Rice remarked in a New York Times interview that: ‘The U.S. is the only power that can handle a showdown in the Gulf, mount the kind of force that is necessary to protect Saudi Arabia, and deter a crisis in the Taiwan

JAPAN’S POLICY TOWARDS UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

67

Strait. And extended peacekeeping detracts from our readiness for these kinds of global missions’.46 Therefore, the United States has been keen to promote Japan’s peacekeeping policy as burden-sharing. In fact, in the Acquisition and CrossServing Agreement (ACSA) in 1995, President Bill Clinton promised Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto to supply Japan with the information and transport aircraft for participation in peacekeeping operations. This implied a continuing commitment from the United States and expressed a desire to increase Japan’s role and extend the security interest of Japan to a regional level.47 Japan’s physical commitment to Asian security will need to be high, and its participation in peacekeeping in Asia will enhance its political status as a regional power. This will also play a role in regional confidence-building and the impact of Japan’s role as peacekeepers in Asia and the Pacific would be highly significant. Furthermore, activation of the SDF for peacekeeping operations would be significant in terms of motivation. The benefits deriving from participation in peacekeeping include: .

.

.

.

.

experience of an operational nature, which cannot be gained in training in Japan; opportunities to develop and evaluate the leadership of SDF officers under operational conditions; reinforcement of home training, enabling personnel to practise and develop individual and team skills; opportunities to evaluate strengths and weakness vis-a`-vis other nationalities and armies working alongside; positive effects on morale.

The benefits would be especially significant for the SDF, which has not experienced conventional warfare since its establishment. The experience which the SDF could obtain from peacekeeping services would also be beneficial in its domestic mission of national defence. Suggestions for Japan’s PKO Policy Various measures can be taken to improve Japan’s role as a contributor to UN peacekeeping. First, the multifunctional trend in peacekeeping would encourage Japan to increase the number of civilian personnel dispatched to UN peacekeeping. As Michael Williams put it: ‘One of the most striking features of secondgeneration interventions (including peacekeeping operations) was their unique and previously unknown configuration of civil – military relations’.48 From the Japanese point of view, the dispatch of civilian personnel has fewer legal restraints than that for the SDF. In December 2002, a ‘Meeting for International Peace and Cooperation’, chaired by Yasushi Akashi, advocated consistent involvement in conflict resolution, from preventive measures to peacebuilding.49 This multilateral approach to conflict resolution has been strongly encouraged and put into practice since An Agenda for Peace in 1992.50 Japan would be expected to train and recruit a number of civilian personnel in fields such as government, administration, medicine, education, infrastructure and civilian police. In reality, the quality of civilian

68

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

police in international peacekeeping has not been assessed positively in terms of its function and effectiveness,51 and therefore, the Japanese police force, which is of the highest international standard, can assist in this area. For example, Germany has dispatched 455 police personnel to UN peacekeeping operations.52 In fact, there is increasing demand for civilian police in UN peacekeeping. In 1993, the proportion of civilian police as a percentage of all peacekeeping personnel, including military observers and troops, was merely 1.5 per cent. By 2003 it had increased to 14 per cent. Indeed, a shift in emphasis from military to non-military efforts in peacekeeping by the SDF was strongly recommended in a symposium organized by the MFA in February 2002.53 In retrospect, despite the many options that Japan has as a possible contributor to UN peacekeeping, there has been little debate on how it can most effectively participate. The debates have concentrated excessively on internal constitutional issues. Second, the revised PKO law enables the SDF to join infantry battalions for UN peacekeeping. This is not to say that Japan should shift its missions from logistical to military support completely. In fact, the UN’s DPKO has faced difficulty in securing logistical support from member states. Logistics requires high levels of training and skills in communication, engineering and transportation, exactly what Japan has supplied. In peacekeeping roles which focus primarily on mediation and arbitration, the coercive nature of some states’ forces may make host states feel insecure. On the other hand peacekeeping is a paramilitary role which requires appropriate military equipment, mission skill, discipline of soldiers and high morale among troops. Japan can contribute such qualities. Currently, the Japanese engineer units in UNMISET have a high reputation for their standard of skills. In reality, the DPKO has not had difficulty in recruiting troop contributors to provide infantry battalions. This is because this mission is popular among developing countries, since they can supply infantry with quite basic military equipment and skills. For Japan, it would be necessary to respond to the current demands of the DPKO regardless of the revision of the PKO law. Third, Japan should join a UN Stand-by Arrangement (UNSAS). UNSAS was one of the major pillars of the reform of UN peacekeeping operations advocated by several states such as Poland, Sweden, Malaysia, Canada, Holland and Austria in 1994. At present, as many as 73 member states have joined this system, which aims to provide the UN with a database of military units and equipment available from member states for UN peacekeeping operations (and an estimate of the time needed to respond to a UN request).54 By joining this system, elements of the SDF selected for UNSAS would have rapid-reaction capabilities while training in special skills for UN peacekeeping operations. Japan’s New Role: Its Relations with Asian and Pacific States It is well known that the so-called ‘anti-militarism’ attitudes towards Japan have been deep rooted among Asia-Pacific states, especially ASEAN states, South Korea and China. Analysis of their views by Hugo Dobson shows that ASEAN members strongly supported Japan’s commitment to UNTAC. In March 1992, Cambodian Premier Hun Sen said that even if Japan dispatches its troops to

JAPAN’S POLICY TOWARDS UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

69

the UNTAC no country would associate it with Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere concept which prevailed before and during the war. In May 1993, Malaysian Prime Minister Mohamad Mahathir stated that Japan could not remain removed from participation in peacekeeping operations and would have to do more than contribute financially. The SDF’s presence in UNTAC also received credit from the Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, who said in May 1993: ‘If it is the only nation to withdraw its troops, then in the future Japan will not be regarded as a nation that can make an international contribution’.55 Thus, the enthusiasm of ASEAN states about Japan’s peacekeeping in their own region was significant and persisted into the postUNTAC period. In January 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi proposed conflict prevention in Mindanao, Aceh and East Timor and claimed that ‘in cooperation with the countries of ASEAN, we intend to make an even more active contribution to ensure regional stability here in Southeast Asia’.56 Meanwhile, China and South Korea were initially suspicious about Japan’s peacekeeping role in UNTAC. One Chinese official said: ‘what we are worried about is not the present but the future. The fear is that the [Japanese PKO] law is a start in a bad direction’.57 However, South Korea’s policy towards Japan’s peacekeeping became much more conciliatory after UNTAC. In July 1995 there were reports of Defence and Foreign Affairs officials of Japan and South Korea discussing the possibility of cooperation in peacekeeping operations, with joint training exercises and the mutual use of transport planes.58 Therefore, it has been suggested that a training centre specifically for peacekeeping operations in the Asian and Pacific region should be established such as those in operation in the Nordic states, Canada and Ireland. Japan should create a ‘Joint Peacekeeping Training Centre for the Asia-Pacific Region’, which should be located in Japan with the cost borne by the Japanese government. If this happens the Japanese public and politicians would be able to obtain better knowledge about peacekeeping operations by observing the Japanese SDF personnel in special training for peacekeeping tasks with other Asian soldiers. This programme would also act as an incentive for SDF personnel and assure neighbouring states that Japan’s participation in peacekeeping operations is motivated neither by re-militarization objectives nor by neo-imperialism.59 It can be concluded that Japan’s new role as a regional peacekeeper, initiated in UNTAC, has been positive. This can have a huge impact on regional security, already recognized by Japan’s successful commitment to UNMISET with other Asian troops in East Timor. Conclusion Since the Gulf War in 1991 Japan’s policy towards UN peace operations has been in a state of evolution. The PKO law was created after many stormy debates in order to meet the demand for conflict resolution in the post-Cold War period. However, practical missions involving Japanese contingents should encourage further review of the law that needs to result in practical contributions in the

70

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

field, in parallel with the UN’s ambition to reform peace operations. The current situation requires more coercive, emergent, multifunctional and flexible operations, to which the anti-terrorist law and the revised PKO law can contribute positively. In retrospect, neither the government nor its citizens discussed seriously enough the national interests of Japan’s commitment to UN peacekeeping operations. Debates merely focused on the constitutionality of peacekeeping and its relevance to collective defence. Japan’s interests in UN operations would be to develop a distinctive international policy with a stronger voice in the UN, to take an initiative in Asia as a regional leader and to activate the SDF. The maintenance of its UN-centred policy by participation in peacekeeping operations is recommended for Japan to balance the US – Japan relationship. Japan’s peacekeeping policy should reflect these interests and assess how it can contribute more effectively to peacekeeping, through civilian involvement and expertise in logistics. Furthermore, burden-sharing with the United States and the decreased sense of anti-militarism towards Japan by its Asian neighbours encourage Japan to play a more significant security role in the region as peacekeepers. Japan should continue recognizing that it has an obligation to contribute to peacekeeping operations – in line with its own interests.

NOTES 1. Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations: Monthly Summary of Contribution, as of 31 October 2003, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, accessed at: www.un.org/Dept/ dpko. 2. Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo) 12 Feb. 1992. 3. Mainichi Daily News (Tokyo), 20 Oct. 1991. 4. Katsumi Ishizuka, ‘A Japanese Perspective to the UN Peacekeeping Operations’, unpublished MA dissertation, Department of Politics, University of Nottingham, UK, Sept. 1996, p.78. 5. The Preamble starts: ‘We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution’. 6. H. Mizuno, Kaigai Hi-hahei no Ronri [The theory of no foreign deployment], Tokyo: Shinpyouron, 1997, p.190. 7. Defense Agency, Defense of Japan: The White Paper of the Defense Agency, Tokyo: The Japan Times, 1995, p.99. 8. Asahi Shimbun (Tokyo), 12 June 1992. 9. Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), 31 May 1993. 10. Japan Times (Tokyo), 18 Feb. 1993. 11. H. Ehrhart, ‘Germany’, in Trevor Findlay (ed.), Challenges for the New Peacekeepers, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp.32–51. 12. K. Ebata, Ginjiryoku to wa Nanika [What is the Military Power?], Tokyo: Kodansha, 1994, pp.195–6. 13. M. Ito, ‘Expanding Japan’s Role in the United Nations’, Pacific Review, Vol.8, No.2, 1995, p.294. 14. Hugo Dobson, Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping, London: Routledge Curzon, 2003, p.140. 15. Japan Times, 4 Jan. 1993. 16. UN Doc. S/RES/1368(2001), 12 Sept. 2001. 17. UN Doc. S/RES/1371 (2001), 28 Sept. 2001.

JAPAN’S POLICY TOWARDS UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

71

18. Under the 1992 Law, the use of force was conducted by the judgment of individual SDF personnel. International Peace and Japan’s Cooperation, Tokyo: Centre for Education of Japanese Economy, 2001, p.4. 19. Yomiuri Shimbun, 13 Sept. 2001. 20. Ibid., 14 Sept. 2001. 21. Ibid., 16 Sept. 2001. 22. Ibid., 27 Sept. 2001. 23. Ibid., 18 Sept. 2001. 24. Ibid., 30 Oct. 2001. 25. Japan Times, 30 Dec. 2001. 26. Ibid., 30 Oct. 2001. 27. Yomiuri Shimbun, 3 Nov. 2001. 28. Ibid., 9 Nov. 2001. 29. Japan Times, 30 Oct. 2001. 30. ‘Unified with combat’ is a popular term among the government and the Diet in assessing the SDF activities in terms of collective defence. 31. Yomiuri Shimbun, 7 Dec. 2001. 32. Ibid., 29 Dec. 2001. 33. Ibid., 31 Oct. 2001. 34. Ibid., 29 Oct. 2001. 35. Japan Times, 8 Dec. 2001. 36. UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 21 Aug. 2000, para.55. 37. The Washington Post, 7 May 1993. 38. Interview in the magazine, SAPIO (Tokyo), 28 Feb. 1996, p.96. 39. Interview with Professor Susumu Takai, National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, 20 Sept. 1997. Takao Takahara agrees: ‘There was great skepticism about the relevance and effectiveness of sending the SDF to a refugee camp for just three months. There were also anxieties over whether SDF might be put in a situation where the single machine-gun which they brought with them had to be used. Fortunately, no serious incident occurred’. ‘Japan’ in Findlay (see n.11 above), p.62. 40. K. Chuma, ‘The Debate over Japan’s Participation in Peace-keeping Operations’, Japan Review of International Affairs, autumn 1992, p.244. 41. T. Jinyo, Shin Kokuren Ron [The New Theory of the United Nations], Osaka: Osaka University Press, 1995, p.243. 42. T. Maeda, PKO To JIEITAI [PKOs and the SDF], Tokyo: Iwanami, 1996, p.53. 43. East Timor Institute for Reconstruction Monitoring and Analysis, ‘Japanese Peacekeepers in East Timor’, The La’o Hamutuk Bulletin (Dili), Vol.3, No.6, Aug. 2002, p.6. 44. Ibid., pp.5–6. 45. Alan James, ‘Comparative Aspects of Peacekeeping: The Dispatching End – The Receiving End’, paper for National Center for Middle East Studies, Cairo, and the Jeffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1995, p.1. 46. Cited in Ishizuka, ‘Peacekeeping Operations After 9/11’, Newsletter of the British International Studies Association, No.74, July 2002, p.13. 47. Dobson (see n.14 above), pp.141–2. 48. Michael Williams, Civil–Military Relations and Peacekeeping, Adelphi Paper No.321, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Aug. 1998, p.13. 49. A. Yamanaka, ‘Why Japan Needs to Contribute to International Peace Now’, Gunshuku Mondai Shiryou [Journal for Disarmament Issues], March 2003, p.35. 50. UN Doc., A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992. 51. See, for example, Alice Hills, ‘International Peace Support Operations and CIVPOL: Should there be a Permanent Global Gendarmerie?’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.5, No.3, Autumn 1998, pp.26–41. 52. H. Nagata, ‘Japan’s PKO Policy’, Kokusai Anzen Hoshou [Journal for International Peace and Security], Vol.29, No.1, 1999, p.79. 53. Professor Hisashi Owada, Director of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), keynote address at the international symposium, ‘From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: Japan’s Role’, JIIA and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 5 Feb. 2002. 54. S. Kozai, ‘Japan and PKO; Japanese Experiences and its Policy’, Journal for International Studies, Osaka Gakuin University, Vol.12, No.2, Dec. 2001, p.107. 55. Dobson (see n.14 above), pp.109–20.

72

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

56. Ibid., p.145. 57. M. Leitenberg, The Participation of Japanese Military Forces in UN Peacekeeping Operations, Maryland/Tsukuba Papers on US– Japan Relations, June 1996, p.26. 58. Dobson (see n.14 above), p.145. 59. See comments by Yasushi Akashi, in T. Jinyo, Kokusai Heiwa Kyouryoku Nyumon [Introduction to International Cooperation], Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1995, p.263; and the Director of Japanese Studies at the Korean Institute for Defense Analysis, in Leitenberg (n.57 above), p.40.

China’s Changing Attitude to UN Peacekeeping PANG ZHONGYING

Today China actively supports enhancing the UN’s peacekeeping capacity and seeks to gradually increase its own participation in UN peacekeeping operations. This essay examines China’s changing attitude towards peacekeeping. Participation in UN operations is fast becoming a key part of China’s efforts in international security cooperation. In the view of Chinese policy-makers, active participation is a demonstration of China’s commitment to the UN and its security functions as mandated by the UN Charter. It is not only useful for serving China’s moral cause or fulfilling its international responsibility in the post-Cold War era. It also provides an arena in which China can learn to interact with the international community in ways commensurate with its status as a rising power.1 Needless to say, China’s reputation as a major power in the UN has become an important national goal. Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997 – 98, China has been pursuing its new role as a ‘responsible power’ with increasing confidence. Since assuming office in 2002, China’s new leadership under President Hu Jintao has also advocated the notion of ‘peaceful rise’ – a reflection of China’s ongoing foreign policy adjustment.2 However, China’s foreign policy, including its participation in peacekeeping in the post-Cold War period, has not been without ambiguity and contradiction: on the one hand, China desires a bigger role that better reflects its increasing influence in world politics; on the other, China hitherto has played a relatively limited role in peacekeeping. Central to Chinese concerns is the changing nature and context of peace operations – with the potential for mission creep and the

74

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

move to ‘coalitions of the willing’ – and the implications this would have for international involvement in China’s key internal affairs relating, for example, to Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. Against this backdrop, this essay analyses China’s evolving perspective on peacekeeping in the light of current Chinese strategic thought and national interests. It concludes that China needs to play a key part that would help to shape the future of UN operations. Although the UN is urging China to improve its capacity to respond more effectively in international conflict and crisis management, the country continues to face numerous obstacles that hinder greater involvement in peacekeeping. Aside from these immediate concerns, the more pressing geopolitical challenge for China could well be working to keep the peace in a US-dominated world. China’s Official Attitude to UN Peacekeeping China’s position on peace operations is more or less expressed in the following terms: as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has consistently engaged in efforts to maintain international peace and security, and fully supports the UN’s role to that end under the guidance of the principles of the UN Charter. China’s attitude to participation has grown more positive in recent years. There have been many important policy statements that underline this trend, as exemplified by the following observations: .

.

.

China firmly approves of peacekeeping as a core activity of the UN. China sponsored the first UN Security Council Summit Meeting in 2000, which addressed the role peacekeeping operations play in preserving world peace. At that meeting, the then president, Jiang Zemin, noted that they were ‘one of the major means by which the UN fulfils its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’.3 In firm defence of the principle of respecting state sovereignty and noninterference in domestic affairs, China still holds to the traditional concept of peacekeeping. This stance is reaffirmed not only in its various policy statements but also in many important international conferences. China’s 2000 Defence White Paper, for example, provides a good summary of China’s principles for conducting UN peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era. It begins by calling for adherence to the aims and principles of the UN Charter and insists on the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, such as mediation, good offices and negotiation. It also cautions against the use of military means for achieving humanitarian ends and the imposition of ‘double standards’. China supports peacekeeping reforms, and responded positively to the Brahimi Report, which contained specific recommendations to enhance the UN’s capacity to conduct peace operations more effectively.4 No doubt China has seen the proposed reforms as an opportunity for strengthening the world body itself. The 2002 Defence White Paper makes the following point: ‘China supports the active measures taken by the UN Secretariat in this regard, and welcomes the progress made by the UN General Assembly

CHINA’S CHANGING ATTITUDE TO UN PEACEKEEPING

75

and the Security Council in deliberating the Brahimi Report on Reforming the UN’s Peace-keeping Operations’.5 The Historical Perspective From the 1970s to the End of the Cold War Given China’s closed-door policy and as a consequence of China’s Cultural Revolution, China had been highly sceptical about the legitimacy of past UN peacekeeping missions. According to one Chinese scholar, ‘most of such UN actions were seen as interference in countries’ internal affairs and as the undesirable result of US –Soviet hegemonic power competition’.6 Therefore, China did not participate in the Security Council decisions on peacekeeping operations. It also refused to undertake any financial responsibility for such operations and avoided dispatching troops under the UN in any form. Although China did not want to appear to be obstructionist, it was either absent from or did not participate in votes on almost every UN peacekeeping operation during the 1970s.7 In the 1980s, a gradual shift in attitude began to emerge as China embarked on its economic reforms and adopted an open-door policy. For a start, China’s general attitude towards the UN began to be more positive, regarding the world body as ‘irreplaceable in [the] historical mission it shoulders and the impact it exerts on the world’.8 As a consequence, China’s particular attitude to peacekeeping also began to change significantly. By moving towards a more market-oriented economy and opening itself to the outside world (particularly the West), China found itself having to embark on a major foreign policy shift. Beijing introduced a historical ‘independent foreign policy of peace’ at the Chinese Communist Party’s 12th National Congress, which was written into the country’s revised constitution. As a consequence, China adopted an equidistant policy with regard to both the United States and the Soviet Union. It also began to be more positive with regard to UN affairs. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China re-evaluated the UN’s importance in China’s foreign policy and began to intensify its participation in UN activities including peacekeeping. The change became more noticeable at the start of the 1980s. In 1981, China voted for the first time for the extension of UN peacekeeping in Cyprus. In 1982, China paid dues to the operation in Lebanon. It also sent a fact-finding mission to the Middle East to study the peacekeeping operations there. These moves, according to one analyst, reflected China’s perception of UN peacekeeping operations through a more functional and less ideological lens. In 1988, when UN peacekeeping forces were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, China officially became a member of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. And in 1990, China began to send military observers to peacekeeping operations.9 Concerns about Unipolarity After the end of the Cold War, with growing concern about an emerging unipolar world and about the US position as the only remaining superpower, as well as the view that China was the only remaining ‘socialist country’ in the ‘new world

76

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

order’, policy-makers felt that China needed the UN more than at any other period since 1945. China began to boost its activities in the UN in order to balance the political pressures from the US and some of its allies in Asia. Although China was still worried about the possibility of a Western-led international intervention under the UN banner, this unprecedented attitude towards the UN spurred China to become more actively involved in the peacekeeping operations. To be sure, China fully endorsed the mission the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and played a special key role there in 1993. As argued by one analyst, China not only underwrote the operation politically and financially, it also sent a military unit, this being ‘a significant departure from its past behaviour in multilateral diplomacy for collective security purposes’.10 However, the involvement in UNTAC was not repeated in subsequent missions.11 This was partly due to China’s rigid attitude towards the principles of state sovereignty and its concern about the use of force in peacekeeping operations. These issues only served to highlight the emerging contradictions and ambiguities with regard to China’s position on the nature of peace operations. Nevertheless, as China found itself being rapidly and fully integrated into the global economy, and as it moved to become a member of the World Trade Organization, it felt compelled to participate more actively in multilateral activities. In 2001, China took on a larger role in the rebuilding of Afghanistan both financially and politically. Also, for the first time ever, China sent a special envoy to the Middle East to try to push forward an easing of tension between Israel and Palestine, and ‘to establish a broad and in-depth relationship with the parties in the Middle East’.12 Moreover, China had begun to stress the UN’s important role in safeguarding international peace and security. In particular, it repeatedly emphasized the ‘dramatic changes in international relations which had served to justify China’s change of attitude toward about peacekeeping operations’.13 As a result, China responded positively to Nepal’s suggestion to establish and host a regional UN peacekeeping training centre.14 China’s Contributions According to China’s official statistics the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has participated successively in 13 UN operations since its first dispatch of military observers to UN peacekeeping activities in 1990. By mid-2004 it had sent more than 2,000 officers and soldiers, including military observers, liaison officials, consultants, staff officers and engineering officers to UN peacekeeping operations. As of mid-2004, 53 Chinese military observers were serving in six regions, and two staff officers were working in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Four Chinese servicemen have laid down their lives, and dozens have been wounded in peacekeeping missions. China decided to create a peacekeeping centre for training civilian police in Langfang City, Beijing, the largest in Asia. China also dispatched a police contingent of 12 to Kosovo. The government sent, in succession, a total of 198 civilian policemen to serve with UNTAET and UNMIBH. In January 2002 China formally participated in the Class-A stand-by arrangements mechanism, making

CHINA’S CHANGING ATTITUDE TO UN PEACEKEEPING

77

preparations to provide engineering, medical and transport teams for peacekeeping missions. China is able to provide one UN-standard engineering battalion, one UN-standard medical team and two UN-standard transport companies.15 In 2003, China sent a 175-member engineering company and a 43-member medical company to conduct duties in the Democratic Republic of Congo. A team of 550 Chinese peacekeepers was then sent to Liberia, China’s largest single contribution to any mission. Since the end of the Cold War, Chinese participation in all UN debates and activities on peacekeeping issues has been more active. It has also tried to influence the process of decision-making regarding UN operations. The Chinese delegation to the UN has consistently affirmed the government’s position that China attaches great importance to the success of peacekeeping operations. China has expressed the view that the success of missions hinges on whether member states provide sufficient political support and resources. Over the years, China has urged the UN to strengthen the communication and coordination between the Security Council and the troop-contributing countries, and the Secretariat to pay more attention to the views of the troop-contributing countries and other parties concerned. It had expressed its views about the role of the Security Council as a key body in facilitating these interactions and supported Security Council resolution 1353, which outlined the framework for addressing these issues.16 Moreover, China has consistently supported the proposed joint meeting of the Security Council Working Group on peacekeeping operations and troop-contributing countries. Established by the Security Council as a significant supplementary provision to the mechanism of resolution 1353, China judged that it ‘will not only help make a fuller use of the potentials of the existing mechanisms within the Security Council but also enhance interactions with the troop-contributing countries’.17

Defining China’s Position China’s increased involvement in UN peacekeeping issues has been clearly illustrated in the official positions that the Chinese government has taken in the UN and its discourses with regard to peace operations. On the issue of reform, China welcomed the efforts by the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, under the initiative of the UN Secretary-General and relevant bodies, to undertake a comprehensive managerial review of the operations, doctrinal shifts and relevant issues concerning peacekeeping which led to the Brahimi Report. Since this had been the first time that such an exercise was undertaken, China had regarded the review as having enormous importance, as the following statement by its UN delegation indicates: The Secretary-General’s report provides an in-depth analysis of the shortcomings of the Secretariat and other relevant agencies and puts forward recommendations for strengthening the Secretariat’s overall capacity for information analysis, the formulation of policies and guidelines as well as planning and commanding of peacekeeping operations . . . We have noted

78

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

that relevant recommendations by the Brahimi report are being gradually implemented, including the one about the creation of an on-call list of military/civilian police personnel and civilian specialists. In this regard, on the one hand, we welcome the Secretariat [intention] to keep up its consultations with Member States and, on the other hand, we encourage cooperation by the latter. Moreover, we look forward to the early launching of the Galaxy Project, so that the recruitment of civilian personnel for peacekeeping operations will be more standardised. The Chinese Delegation hopes that relevant recruitment procedures will continue to be transparent and that the principles of equitable geographical distribution and balance between developing and developed countries are well observed . . . In recent years, participation by civilian police in peacekeeping operations has been going up. It is time to draw up lessons from past experience in this aspect every step of the way so as to promote standardisation and professionalism in civilian police activities. We look forward to the early issuing by the Secretariat [of] the principles and guiding rules in this regard and taking real action to help developing countries with civilian police training so as to create favourable conditions for their participation.18 China also stressed the importance of having a better Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) – outlined in the Brahimi Report – as a critical link in the efforts to strengthen the UN’s peacekeeping capacity. China’s participation in UNSAS was regarded as an important step to increase China’s engagement with future peace operations, as clearly articulated by the government: In addition to contributing engineering corps, military observers, civilian police and civilian personnel to relevant peacekeeping missions over the past years, the Chinese Government has decided to upgrade its participation in UNSAS by designating non-combat formed units to take part in UNSAS. We are willing to work together with other Member States to make an active effort to strengthen the peacekeeping capacity of the United Nations.19 More importantly, China actively supported the move to enhance the UN’s image as a universal organization, viewing with concern the perception that UN missions have been dominated by some Western powers and military alliances such as NATO. China had complained about the lack of officials from developing countries, including from its own country, who occupy high posts in the DPKO: In the recruiting process for new posts in the Secretariat, there [should] be more transparency and . . . the principles of equitable geographical distribution and balance between developing countries and developed countries [should] be faithfully observed. Most importantly, special attention should be paid to the concerns of countries that are underrepresented in some departments. In this regard, what the Secretariat has done is far from enough and we hope it can do a better job in the days yet to come.20 Closely related to the above, China also maintained that any further success of UN PKOs would also heavily hinge on the ‘democratization of international

CHINA’S CHANGING ATTITUDE TO UN PEACEKEEPING

79

21

relations’. In this regard, China has expressed its strong support for the UN Secretary-General’s Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict (2001), which highlighted this point.22 In its official statement, the government said: The United Nations should play an important role in the promotion of the democratisation of international relations. Armed conflicts in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Great Lakes region of Africa and other countries and regions could be stopped as early as possible and new conflicts could be prevented if all sides concerned could really follow the basic norms guiding state-to-state relations. Although the role and capacity of the United Nations has its own limitations, as the Secretary-General has pointed out in the report, preventing armed conflict represents an important orientation in the field of maintaining international peace and security as well as an important task of the United Nations. China is willing to make its own contribution, together with other Member States, to strengthening the capacity of the United Nations for the prevention of armed conflicts.23 China also underlined the crucial role of the Security Council in lending legitimacy to peace operations, urging it to become a responsible authority in deciding any peacekeeping operations and to develop relevant policies and guidelines. China shared the opinion with other states that the Council was at the core of all such operations from beginning to end, and pledged to work towards improving the Council’s working environment. It noted: The workload of the Security Council has been increasing at such a rate that, as time goes by, it will undermine the Council’s efficiency, functions and ability to handle important peace and security issues in a timely and effective manner . . . Improving working efficiency and increasing transparency constitute two important components of the reform. . . And the focus of the Security Council must be on the primary issue of maintaining international peace and security. It is unpractical to move the important issues of all fields of the United Nations into the Security Council.24 Finally, with regard to strengthening cooperation between the Security Council (as the decision-making body) and the peacekeeping contributors, the Chinese delegation maintained that there was much room for improving coordination between them. China regards the support and contribution of member countries in the UN as effective guarantees for the ability of the Security Council to perform its core functions of maintaining international peace and security effectively. Official statements have declared that: Importance should be attached to keeping regular consultations with troopcontributing countries and listening to their pertinent views in all stages of the set-up and implementation of a peacekeeping operation. . .[and] that such a mechanism should continue and be improved and, without prejudice to the efficiency of the work of the Security Council, more flexible forms of exchange and communication with troop-contributing countries should be considered to inspire free exchange of views. Troop-contributing countries

80

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

should also be encouraged to express to the Council their concerns in a more timely and flexible manner . . . As to strengthening co-operation between the Secretariat and troop-contributing countries, we support the establishment of closer partnerships between the Secretariat and troop contributors and the Secretariat should do its utmost to provide facilities to the latter. We would recommend that the Secretariat continue to give timely and accurate briefings to troop-contributing countries, which should be in line with those given to the Security Council.25 Thus China’s official position and policies clearly reflect the principles that define it as an active member state. In particular, the Beijing government placed much emphasis on being able to articulate its views, and for these views to be counted in the debates on the future directions of UN peacekeeping. In seeking to get its views considered by the international community, China has had to confront the realities and challenges that come with the developments in peace operations, particularly with regard to the discourses on changing international norms.26 Hence, one of the major challenges for China is to rationalize some of the positions it had taken, and constructively contribute to future UN peacekeeping policy. These developments are indeed significant given that it was only in the last two decades that China’s attitudes to peacekeeping had become more positive. Nevertheless, underlying these changes are also many contradictions.

Dilemmas in China’s Changing Attitude to Peacekeeping Although China’s overall official policy towards peacekeeping operations had seen positive transformations, contradictions have heightened the struggled in China between its desire to be able to do more for international peace and the kinds of domestic constraints it faces. The struggle has posed some difficult issues regarding China’s activism in the post-Cold War period and its implications for maintaining its national interests as well as the moral imperative to contribute to global order and world peace. The issue is often how to ‘walk and talk’ with regard to its motivations and pronouncements on peacekeeping. First, being part of the UN is critical to China’s status. According to Paul Taylor, ‘the context of the UN was one in which governments acquired status in the system . . . Being accepted as a candidate for high office in the UN, for instance by membership of its key committees, and the performing of key roles in the system, had come to be regarded as legitimising their autonomy’.27 This statement best explains why China attaches great importance to the UN and peacekeeping. With regard to the latter, it allows China to fully exploit its permanent membership of the Security Council. China has been exploring how it could use its symbolic power in the UN to its advantage. For some time, China has complained that there have been no Chinese professionals occupying higher positions on peacekeeping operations in the UN system. Since the outbreak of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, China gained the opportunity to project its new image of being a responsible country in the international community. The phrase

CHINA’S CHANGING ATTITUDE TO UN PEACEKEEPING

81

‘responsible country’ was first coined by the then Premier Zhu Rongji. It meant that China was not only a responsible economic player but also a political one in upholding justice and peace. Hence, its support and participation in peacekeeping can better serve this political purpose. Second, China has been promoting its own idea of a ‘new security concept’, which addresses international security cooperation, including in the area of peacekeeping missions. The new security concept still needs to be defined more accurately and intellectually, but China’s top leaders and analysts have explained it as serving to ‘foster mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and co-ordination, and the settlement of international disputes through dialogue and co-operation and not [through] resort to the use or threat of force’.28 General Xiong Guangkai pointed out that ‘China has already integrated the . . . [concept] into its foreign policy’.29 While in the previous era, Mao Zedong had stressed ‘the philosophies of struggle, based on class rivalry; now China is shifting to philosophies of peace, based on the new security concept’.30 As the idea is yet to be developed, it is none the less initiated as one of the new cardinal principles of international relations and as an approach to cope with power politics and the post-Cold War environment.31 Third, from the 1989 Tian’anmen event to the demise of Deng Xiaoping in 1997, against the prevailing environment at that time of wanting to keep a low profile and assign a relatively low priority to foreign policy [Tao Guang Yang Huai], China had also wanted to play an active role in international affairs [You Suo Zuo Wei]. The participation in peacekeeping belonged to the latter rather than the former. Fourth, China has gradually realized that peacekeeping missions can help to secure a peaceful international environment, which works in China’s national interest as the country begins to build a sound external environment for its long-term economic growth and social development. Along with the realization for developing its rapidly growing ‘interest in international linkages’ [Guo Ji Lian Xi Li Yi], China had to take on a more flexible and pragmatic approach in the highly sensitive issues of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. As observed by both Chinese and western analysts, such flexibility has allowed participation missions.32 Hence, China opposed the NATO intervention in former Yugoslavia in 1999 without UN approval, but it endorsed the Task Force on Kosovo’s Temporary Administrative Authorities. Moreover, China participated positively in the East Timor post-conflict peacebuilding processes. These two cases show that China was gaining confidence in being a part of multilateral security mechanisms by freeing itself from its own former conception of sovereignty.33 Fifth, as China’s ‘Fourth Generation’ of leaders took office in late 2002, China proposed and promoted the phrase, ‘peaceful rise’ [Heping Jueqi]. Chinese leaders have expounded on this idea during their visits to foreign countries. Notwithstanding the controversy that the phrase implies, this idea has gained popularity in China and beyond.34 The major consensus on the meaning of the idea among the Chinese scholars is that China’s rise had been peaceful and will continue by peaceful means.35 This idea should have a major impact on China’s evolving attitude to peacekeeping operations.

82

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

Given these five considerations, China has been very careful and highly selective in its participation in UN operations. While stressing its ‘peaceful rise’ as a player in the region, China still maintains a relatively limited participation in peacekeeping. China would not like to challenge the status quo in Asia region for as long as the United States does not intervene in its domestic issues, for example in the case of Taiwan. China has been careful in not projecting itself as America’s ‘strategic competitor’ in the region by purposely not being too assertive in its attitude to peacekeeping. This was demonstrated in the dispatch of civilian police forces rather than military forces to East Timor. And, while it had financially and politically supported peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts in post-Taliban Afghanistan, it never considered sending soldiers, thereby distinguishing its position from that of the United States. More importantly, one could also argue that China’s attitudinal change to peacekeeping can be seen as part of the process of state socialization.36 China’s participation is an important learning or socializing process from being a member of an international community.37 As this learning process continues, we should see a less passive and more active China that needs to craft its own strategies for participation in international affairs in the future. At present, as China’s foreign policy is still dominated by state-centred, realpolitik ideas, its attitude to peacekeeping could possibly remain in the current stage without further breakthroughs. However, from the long-term point of view, China would be able to do better in peace operations to meet the expectations of the international community. The next section will discuss some of the new ideas in China’s foreign policy-making and explore its implications for participation in peacekeeping. Foreign Policy and Implications for Participation in Peacekeeping Peace and Development In the past decades, China had held on to the so-called ‘peace and development’ ideology. China continues to regard this ideology as relevant in its contribution to world peace. According to Chinese leaders, ‘no matter how the international situation changes, China will, as always, pursue the independent foreign policy of peace’.38 China had always emphasized that the deployment of PKOs is not an end but a means to achieve peace and development. Thus, China logically relates its ‘peace and development’ paradigm to the nature of peace operations. China maintains that it would not be possible to achieve peace without achieving socio-economic development and that the pursuit of economic development in conflict areas should be an integral part of any peacekeeping effort. Partial Conflict But No Major Wars among Big Powers Chinese policy-makers acknowledge that, given the economic, social, political, ecological and religious problems brought on by a globalizing world, certain areas of the world will always be plagued by violent conflict and unrest. This

CHINA’S CHANGING ATTITUDE TO UN PEACEKEEPING

83

idea therefore justifies China’s necessary participation in UN peacekeeping operations. Democratization in International Relations [Guoji Guanxi Min Zhu Hua] The exact meaning of this phrase still remains unclear. On the one hand, it could mean that China wants its growing voice to be heard in the multilateral forum; while alternatively, the phrase could be interpreted as China’s way of highlighting the unfair practices and injustice in the contemporary world order, as often articulated by its leaders in their official speeches. Management of International Crises Many think-tanks in China have conducted studies on managing international crises since the US bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in the spring of 1999 and the aircraft collision between an American spy aircraft and a Chinese military plane off Hainan Island in the spring of 2001. Unfortunately, these studies have concentrated on Sino – US relations and have defined traditional security problems narrowly, rather than examining issues related to peacebuilding and peacemaking. However, since peacekeeping operations have become relevant in China’s foreign policy, a broader perspective of crisis management should lead to a deeper understanding of the complex tasks of peace operations. Given these new ideas, the next question concerns the extent to which these ideas could affect the nature of China’s participation in UN peacekeeping. While these ideas clearly indicate the desire of China to get more involved, in reality the tasks may not be that easy. First, China may do little to democratize peacekeeping. As a permanent member of the Security Council and, as of mid-2004, the only such member from the developing world, China is well aware of the problem of under-representation. There are many countries from the developing world that have made important peacekeeping contributions but that have had inadequate representation and a weak collective voice in UN decision-making.39 A Chinese leader said at the Security Council Summit Meeting in 2000 that this was an important issue for the Security Council to address. He urged that any reforms of the Security Council should fully reflect the will of the majority of the UN member states, and only then ‘can the reform stand the test of history’.40 Indeed, if ‘reform of the Security Council is centrally fundamental to the reform of UN peacekeeping’,41 then China’s proposal for increased representation for developing countries would be a major contribution. However, the competition among several developing countries to bid for permanent membership in the Council is very tough and would delay any process of UN reforms.42 Second, the gap between China’s capacity to supply peacekeepers and the increasing demand for more Chinese contributions may not be bridged in the short term. China has been pressured to do more to help the international community cope with many conflicts and problems. But in the various debates and discussions on the Brahimi Report, the Chinese perspectives had been weak, particularly on how to conduct peace operations in new conflict situations. So far, the

84

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

stance of Chinese officials in these matters has been rather repetitious, often boring, with no major initiative. Third, China’s ‘practical and realistic’ attitude towards peacekeeping will be continually tested as the UN increases its capacity to conduct peacekeeping operations. In recent years, the UN Secretary-General has visited China several times, one of his major tasks being to lobby for more participation in peacekeeping from this most populous and ‘peace-loving’ country. Fourth, China’s strong adherence to the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention of internal affairs could hamper UN efforts at peacekeeping. China’s determination to protect key national interests on issues such as Taiwan could also prevent it from participating fully. A good example was the UN Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia. Although this was considered to be one of the two most successful missions in Southeast Europe, it was ended prematurely by the Security Council, because of China’s angry protest against Macedonia’s ‘illegal’ relations with Taiwan. In this instance, the conflict of interests in defending sovereignty rights and pushing for the state’s foreign policy priorities had resulted in friction. In peacekeeping, China should have considered Macedonia’s interests more than its own national interests: this was therefore a difficult lesson for China. These types of experience will continue to present serious challenges for China as it resolves to be more active in UN operations. Ideationally, China’s knowledge of peacekeeping still lacks vision and in many cases has been influenced by the traditional concept of peacekeeping, which is not necessarily bad. As noted by a Chinese official: ‘Diplomacy influences the rise or fall of a nation. It is a main battlefield for safeguarding state sovereignty’.43 Hence, China’s participation in peacekeeping is still purely a practice of state military power.44 But, as mentioned above, contradictions are bound to arise as China formulates its own peacekeeping policy. Some of the ideas may not necessarily conform to its longstanding principle of being a ‘peace-loving country’.45 Therefore, countries like China can no longer treat peacekeeping operations just in terms of a state-defined national interest. And it may have to do something about getting NGOs involved in the cause of peacekeeping. Indeed, as the world role of NGOs expands, China might need to consider encouraging its nascent NGOs to participate in peace support missions. Such initiatives would not only complement the official efforts but would also allow the Chinese people to learn more about safeguarding world peace. In spite of these contradictions, one must also recognize the efforts that have been taken by China to demonstrate some flexibility in seeking a bigger role in Asia and the Pacific. In spite of a perceived rigidity in its attitude to state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, China has taken steps to improve its standing in the region. For example, China and ASEAN published a Joint Declaration.46 Although this declaration did not include plans for regional peacekeeping operations, it nevertheless lays an important foundation for improving the security relations between China and the ASEAN countries because it marks a shift in emphasis in non-traditional security concerns as a common area for cooperation. China has also conducted a strategic dialogue with

CHINA’S CHANGING ATTITUDE TO UN PEACEKEEPING

85

NATO, including peacekeeping operations, for the first time in the history of China – NATO ties, and indicates the first recognition of NATO’s role in the operations in Afghanistan. Conclusion China can act as a major force in keeping world peace. This study has shown that China’s attitude to peacekeeping has changed a great deal and has become more positive. In particular, China has demonstrated that it has been able to accommodate change, in spite of its principles of state sovereignty and non-interference, and with more flexibility than ever before. In fact, as China becomes more engaged, it cannot continue to safeguard these principles rigidly. Rather, it needs to change its approach to buttress the principles. The fact is that peacekeeping itself has weakened these principles. But for developing countries, including China, adherence to state sovereignty and non-interference still matters, and they will resist any attempts to destroy this commitment. China has also demonstrated that it wants to increase its role in maintaining world peace and security, but it needs to do more to undertake its moral responsibility as a major peacekeeping country. There is still much potential for China to play a larger role in UN operations.47 For instance, in expanding its participation and contribution, China might need to send military forces and NGOs to many conflict zones. China has begun to realize that today’s peacekeeping operations are different from the traditional ones. The country has to learn more about new ideas, concepts and processes in this regard. Several leading Chinese universities and think-tanks have now started studies on UN peace operations. China’s positive attitude towards the recommendations of the Brahimi Report has shown that the country is learning something new about the complex tasks, processes and challenges of peace operations. China would therefore need to coordinate its views with the rest of the international community. Constructively, it also needs to narrow further its differences with other peacekeeping actors. Hence, this study is cautiously optimistic that China can be a significant actor in future UN peace operations. Such a role could help China in becoming a source of stability in the developing world, particularly in Asia. As it improves its own role, China has also been working to promote greater involvement of Asian and other developing states in the decision-making processes of UN operations, particularly in the formulation of peacekeeping mandates. Finally, as it explores a new direction in its foreign policy, China needs to revisit its strategy for peace. This would help to improve and strengthen China’s confidence in becoming a responsible ‘citizen’ in the international community. NOTES 1. See Tang Yongsheng, ‘China’s Participation in PKOs’, in Wang Yizhou (ed.), Construction in Contradiction: A Multiple Insight into Relationship between China and Key International

86

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY Organizations, Beijing: China Development Press, 2003, pp.69–101; Yongjin Zhang, ‘China and UN Peacekeeping: From Condemnation to Participation’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.3, No.3, autumn 1996, pp.1–15. Pang Zhongying, ‘Theorizing the Official Idea of China’s Peaceful Rise: A Critical Perspective’ (in Chinese), International Review Bimonthly (Shanghai), Vol.68, No.3, 2004 (forthcoming). Jiang Zemin, ‘Address at the UN Security Council summit meeting’, People’s Daily (Beijing), 8 Sept. 2000. But Chinese analysts seemingly know little about the Brahimi Report and fail to mention it in the literature on peacekeeping and China’s participation. The Information Office of the State Council, White Paper on China’s National Defence in 2002, 9 Dec. 2002, accessed at: http://english.people.com.cn/features/ndpaper2002/nd.html. Jianwei Wang, ‘Managing Conflict: Chinese Perspectives on Multilateral Diplomacy and Collective Security’, in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang (eds), In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999, p.70. Ibid., p.75. Rosemary Foot, ‘China’s Foreign Policy in the Post-1989 Era’, in Robert Benewick and Paul Wingrove (eds), China in the 1990s, Basingstoke: Macmillan (rev. edn), 1999, p.236. Wang (n.6 above), p.76. Ibid. Ibid. China Daily (Beijing), 6 Nov. 2002. Jiang Zemin’s political report at the 16th CCP Congress claimed ‘great changes’ in international relations, China Daily, 8 Nov. 2002. BBC News, 22 Feb. 2001. Wang Yingfan, ‘Statement at the Special Committee on peacekeeping operations’, 12 Feb. 2002, accessed at: www.china-un.org/eng/25018.html. Ibid. Ibid. Wang, ‘At the Security Council open debate on the follow-up to the Security Council Summit meeting’, 7 March 2001, accessed at: www.china-un.org/eng/9007.html. Tang (see n.1 above), p.77. Sheng Guofang, ‘Statement at the Fourth Committee of the 56th Session of the General Assembly on agenda item 89: comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects’, 20 Nov. 2001, accessed at: www.china-un.org/eng/21244.html. The Chinese term, ‘democratization of international relations’, was proposed formally in the political report of the Chinese Communist Party’s 16th National Congress, Beijing, as a key objective of China’s foreign policy under the new leadership. Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/55/985-2/2001/ 574, 2001. Wang, ‘At the Security Council open debate on the review of the report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict’, 21 June 2001, accessed at: www.china-org/eng/13543.html. Shen, ‘On the topic of ‘peacebuilding: towards a comprehensive approach’, 5 Feb. 2001, accessed at: www.china-org/eng/8082.html. Shen, ‘On strengthening cooperation with troop-contributing countries’, 16 Jan. 2001, accessed at: www.china-org/eng/7795.html. Tang (see n.1 above), p.80. Paul Taylor, ‘The United Nations and International Order’, in John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds), The Globalisation of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2nd edn), 2001, pp.351–2. Jiang (n.13 above). Xiong Guangkai (Deputy Chief of PLA General Staff), ‘New security concept boosts peace’, China Daily, 7 Dec. 2002. Ling Xingguang, ‘China’s new peace strategy’, Japan Times (Tokyo), 18 Nov. 2002. Xia Liping, ‘New Security Concept in China’s New Concept of International Strategy’ (in Chinese), International Review Quarterly, Shanghai Institute of International Studies, Vol.34, No.3, 2004, p.24. Bates Gill and James Reilly, ‘Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing’, Survival, Vol.42, No.3, 2000, pp.41–59. Tang (n.1 above), pp.80–81. The Bo’Ao Forum for Asia Conference, ‘Globalisation and China’s Peaceful Rise’, 24–25 April 2002, Bo’Ao, Hainan Island, China.

CHINA’S CHANGING ATTITUDE TO UN PEACEKEEPING

87

35. Wang Yiwei, ‘The Dimensions of China’s Peaceful Rise’, Asia Times Online (Hong Kong), 14 May 2004, accessed at: www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FE14Ad03.html. 36. Pang Zhongying, ‘China as a Normal State: A State Socialisation Perspective’, paper at Centre for Contemporary Chinese Studies, University of Durham, 20 Feb. 2003. 37. Wang Yizhou, ‘Conducting a Multi-insight Study of China’s Relations with Key International Organizations’, in Yizhou (ed.), (see n.1 above), pp.28–32. 38. Jiang (see n.13 above), 7 Nov. 2002. 39. German Institute for International and Security Affairs, ‘The Brahimi Report Overcoming the North–South Divide’, Berlin, Jan. 2002, accessed at: www.swp-berlin.org/pdf/Berlin-6.pdf. 40. Jiang Zemin’s address at the Security Council Summit Meeting, Beijing: People’s Daily, 7 Sept. 2000. 41. German Institute for International and Security Affairs (n.39 above). 42. Li Dongyan, ‘A Chinese Perspective on the Reform of the Security Council’, in Yizhou (ed.), (see n.1 above), p.126. 43. Xinhua News Agency commentary, ‘Chinese diplomacy aims to maintain world peace and promote common development’, accessed at: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200211/13/ eng20021113_106764.shtml. 44. Tang (see n.1 above), p.83. 45. China has stated its policy towards UN peacekeeping operations many times in its four national defence white papers. To emphasize the defensive nature of its military forces, China always maintains that its national defence is based on China’s national interests. According to this logic, China’s participation in peacekeeping operations is also based on its consideration of national interests. Senior Col. Chen Zhou, Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, 13 Dec. 2002, accessed at: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200212/13/eng20021213_108409.shtml. 46. Joint Declaration on Co-operation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues, Phnom Penh, 4 Nov. 2002, accessed at: www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/37532.html. 47. Tang (see n.1 above), p.92.

Collaborative Human Security? The UN and Other Actors in Cambodia SORPONG PEOU

This essay seeks to advance the concept of collaborative human security with reference to Asia. Collaborative human security is defined here as something done for a common purpose by different actors, aiming to promote the security interests of other individuals or to meet their security needs. The concept differs from that of liberalism, which tends to define cooperation as ‘collaboration for mutual advantage’.1 The concept of ‘human security’ has come under criticism from scholars of various theoretical persuasions.2 According to Roland Paris, for instance, it ‘does not appear to offer a particularly useful framework of analysis for scholars or policymakers’.3 It is extremely difficult for academics to see the concept in an operational light, or for policy-makers to prioritize policy agendas. The critique notes that scholars find it difficult to identify human security actors, driven as they are by a variety of interests and diverse objectives. Because specific measures cannot be analytically isolated, scholars do not know where to concentrate their research efforts. Nevertheless, drawing on insights from the peace studies tradition, particularly neo-Kantian internationalism, the concept can provide a useful framework for analysis if we can answer the following questions: ‘what is being secured and against what?’, ‘what methods are used to achieve human security, and who provides it?’. The first question is certainly easier to answer than the others. It is clear that the referent is not the state, but rather societies, groups and individuals. The second question is more difficult; sources of threat to human security are numerous, from political repression and violations of human rights to hunger, disease, illicit drugs and organized crime. This essay defines human security as freedom from the fear of violent death, political subjugation and want. The essay also seeks to identify human security actors, by examining what the UN, in collaboration with other external actors, sought to achieve in Cambodia. It then assesses the methods used collectively to achieve human

THE UN AND OTHER ACTORS IN CAMBODIA

89

security objectives. The appropriate analytical concept is therefore ‘collaborative human security’, since human security is the responsibility of a number of actors: state, interstate and non-state. It may be difficult to assess the collaborative role of human security actors, but it is not impossible to determine whether their activities have made an impact. In answering the question: ‘to what extent have the UN and other actors contributed to the promotion of human security needs in Cambodia?’, this study examines collaboration among donors involved in both peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Approximately 15,000 UN peacekeepers were sent to Cambodia to monitor the ceasefire, disarmament and demobilization agreed by the country’s armed factions. Peacebuilding involved the pursuit of criminal justice against surviving Khmer Rouge leaders, international assistance to promote free and fair elections as well as human rights (with the aim of building liberal democracy) and economic reconstruction. The case study indicates that the UN has played a growing role in promoting the personal security of individuals, although its impact varies from method to method. The pursuit of international criminal justice and international peacekeeping especially disarmament as methods for achieving human security appear to be less successful than the political and economic approaches. But the overall success of even the last two methods remained far from ideal. Collaborative Human Security: A Conceptual Framework Collaborative human security differs from collective defence and collective security because the referent object for human security is not the state. In collective defence, military security is defined in national terms; the state is the referent object for security and is to be protected by military means.4 In collective security (inspired by Immanuel Kant’s idea that the majority of states act collectively to punish any state that committed an act of aggression), the state remains the referent object for security.5 In human security studies, however, the individual is the main referent object for security. Because of its ontological emphasis on the human level, human security as the key concept is indebted to several theoretical traditions, which are non-state-centric and humanistic in orientation.6 The concept of collaborative human security also differs from both collective defence and collective security, because it broadens the focus of political realism on war, in which ‘security studies is defined as the study of the threat, use, and control of military force’.7 In collective defence, states are driven by the fear of military defeat, foreign conquest and subjugation. Collective security is still based on the same kind of fear: states within the international community still live in fear of military defeat, foreign conquest and subjugation, since some are still expected to violate the norm of world peace, even though most states have already renounced wars of conquest. Collaborative human security still relies on the logic of fear, but turns analytical attention away from military conquest or aggression as the ultimate form of threat by locating sources of threat to security across and within the national boundaries. Proponents of human security do not argue that military sources of

90

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

threat are not important at all. But they seek to broaden the focus to include the fear of violent death, political subjugation and want. The fear of violent death and political subjugation includes the slaughter of civilians, civil conflict and statesanctioned aggression.8 Individuals are free when they are not subject to the politico-military control of other states or dictatorship as well as various other sources of threat to their personal survival and rights. From a classical liberal perspective, political and civil rights are most fundamental to human freedom/ security. ‘Freedom from the fear’ of want is more of a socio-economic nature and has its intellectual roots in liberalism and includes the fears of poverty, unemployment, hunger, crime and environmental degradation. Proponents of human security thus define fear in humanistic, rather than statist, terms and seek to reduce such fear by promoting freedom for human beings, not the freedom of sovereign states from military aggression, defeat and subjugation. Although the human security indicators are difficult to measure, freedom from living below a poverty line should serve as a key pointer for assessing the degree to which the fear of want (including survivable levels of per capita income, equitable access to health care and sufficient food consumption) was effectively reduced. Life expectancy in non-violent situations, however, should be the overall measure of fear reduction. The methods for achieving human security also differ from those advocated by realists. Proponents of human security see military means to achieve national security as often working against human security. As the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty put it, the traditional narrow conception of security ‘diverts enormous amounts of national wealth and human resources into armaments and armed forces’. Meanwhile, ‘countries fail to protect their citizens from chronic insecurities of hunger, disease, inadequate shelter, crime, unemployment, social conflict and environmental hazard’.9 This does not mean that proponents of human security reject all military means. Two military methods for promoting human security are humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping.10 Humanitarian intervention has a cosmopolitan emphasis on the need to end widespread starvation (Somalia in 1992), to restore democracy (Haiti in 1994), to end civil war (Bosnia in 1995) or to stop ‘ethnic cleansing’ (Kosovo in 1999).11 Traditionally, it has been treated as the international community’s ‘right to intervene’ in situations where human beings suffer from violent conflict, civil disorder and repression. The International Commission on Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty redefines the concept by introducing the term ‘the responsibility to protect’. The international community has the responsibility to intervene in violent situations, where there is either ‘large-scale loss of life’ or ‘ethnic cleansing’. Intra-state UN peacekeeping can also promote human security in helping to control and resolve conflicts between hostile domestic parties.12 Peacebuilding promotes human security through specific methods designed to prevent conflict from recurring. According to John Cockell, it ‘is a sustained process of preventing internal threats to human security from causing protracted, violent conflict’.13 There are at least three methods: legal, political and economic. The first emphasizes justice issues; for instance, efforts have been made to build an international criminal justice system, viewed

THE UN AND OTHER ACTORS IN CAMBODIA

91

14

as a way to build peace through justice. The second is of a political nature, primarily because of its emphasis on democratic institution building to promote liberal democracy based on free and fair elections and human rights.15 The third relies on socio-economic development.16 Together these methods provide the basis for market democracy building aimed at promoting freedom from the fear of violent death, subjugation and want. Regarding the question of who provides security, realist perspectives contend that it is the state that provides for its citizens. Clearly, however, states may not always protect their citizens, and some may even use violence against them. But the real problem is not states as such, but rather types of states. In Barry Buzan’s view, only ‘strong states’, defined in terms of internal stability and cohesion, are capable of providing their citizens with the security they need.17 It should be stressed that proponents of human security do not argue that states are unimportant. States thus have the primary responsibility to protect their own citizens and to promote human security in partnership with other actors,18 but they add that when states fail to protect their own people, outside actors must step in. Proponents of human security thus recognize the contribution of international organizations, such as the UN and its specialized agencies,19 regional organizations, and other non-state actors. For example, in peacebuilding, non-state actors include NGOs, business, media, scientific, professional and educational communities. Those that have their foundations within the new social movements ‘represent values and aspirations associated with peoples rather than with states’, including non-violent conflict resolution, the promotion of human rights, sustainable development, and social and economic justice.20 Furthermore, collaborative human security seeks to balance state aggression against people through a system of checks and balances and the preponderant power of the international community, whereby actors go beyond their own self-interest or even mutual interest to act in the best interest of others. Collaboration depends on their ideological consensus on humanistic values, the presence of their shared commitment to human security, and action taken for a common purpose. In sum, collaborative human security is a normative and empirical commitment to scholarship and humanity based on the understanding that the individual, not the state, is the main unit of analysis, that security means freedom from the fear of violent death, political subjugation and want (not simply the fear of foreign aggression or military defeat or subjugation), and that state, interstate and non-state actors are capable of taking collaborative action to promote this type of security. The following sections assess the impact of actors collaborating to promote human security in Cambodia. Cambodia: Who Provides Security and How? Cambodia provides a suitable case for testing the concept of collaborative human security. The country has a long history of armed conflict, political repression and poverty. Following the end of the Khmer Empire in 1431, it became subject to invasion and domination by several foreign powers, including Thailand, Vietnam, Spain (late sixteenth century) and France (1863 –1953).21 From the

92

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

time it gained its independence in 1953 to the end of the 1960s, it was under Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s paternalistic authoritarian rule. During 1970 – 78, Cambodians under the Khmer Republican and the Khmer Rouge regimes suffered from internal repression and crimes against humanity. The sources of threat to personal security were numerous. Physical violence during the civil war from 1970 to 1974 resulted in deaths estimated at somewhere between 600,000 and 800,000. Many thousands of ethnic Vietnamese were massacred and some 120,000 Vietnamese fled in fear to Vietnam. About two million Cambodians became internally displaced refugees, seeking refuge in the cities because of the war and bombing. Under the Khmer Rouge regime, between one and three million Cambodians are said to have died from brutality by Khmer Rouge soldiers and cadres, starvation, forced labour and lack of medical care.22 In 1978, Vietnam invaded and established a tight grip of socialist authoritarian rule.23 The situation improved in the 1980s, but was nowhere near to a decent degree of human security. Many Cambodians still fell victim to landmines, which killed between 200 and 300 per month. In the early 1990s, Cambodia was estimated to have between 22,000 and 30,000 amputees. Throughout the 1980s, its people were still dying in the ongoing civil war, deprived of their political rights and civil liberties.24 Freedom from fear of want was also limited. Basic human needs were not met. The high rates of morbidity and mortality were caused partly by an uncertain food supply. Hunger and malnutrition were common. Life expectancy improved only slightly, to about 49 years during 1982 – 93.25 Only in the early 1990s was Cambodia brought into the global fold of postCold War states making democratic transitions when four warring factions – the State of Cambodia (SOC), the Khmer Rouge (officially known as Democratic Kampuchea or DK), the Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF), and the royalist party known as FUNCINPEC – signed the Paris Agreements on 23 October 1991 and agreed to turn their battlefield into a ballot box.26 From analysis of the objectives of the agreements, it becomes clear that the signatories sought not only to defend the sovereignty of Cambodia as a state within the UN system, but also to promote the personal security of its people. The agreements did not negate the principle of state sovereignty, but in addition referred to ‘people’ as sovereign. The concept of popular sovereignty was thus fundamental to the agreements, which reaffirmed ‘the inalienable rights of States freely to determine their own political, economic, cultural and social systems in accordance with the will of their peoples, without outside interference, subversion, coercion or threat’.27 Role of the UN At the factions’ invitation, the UN intervened with two general approaches to human security in Cambodia: peacekeeping and peacebuilding. The peacekeeping force of 22,000 peacekeepers in 270 locations around the country played a crucial role in ensuring national and human security by way of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed forces. Annex 1 of the Paris Agreements stated that the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) would ‘supervise the regrouping and relocating of all forces to specifically designated cantonment

THE UN AND OTHER ACTORS IN CAMBODIA

93

areas’, would then ‘initiate the process of arms control and reduction’, and would ‘take necessary steps regarding the phased process of demobilization of the military forces of the parties’. UNTAC would also assist ‘with clearing mines’ and undertake ‘training programmes in mine clearance and a mine awareness programme among the Cambodian people’.28 The second approach was peacebuilding. The UN also pressed Cambodia to set up an international tribunal to try Khmer Rouge leaders for crimes against humanity. The agreements did not mention this because the Khmer Rouge was a signatory, it was impossible for them to include provisions other than those aimed at promoting democratic and human rights and preventing their violations. But in August 1998, long after UNTAC’s departure in 1993, the UN appointed a Commission of Experts to examine the issue and in March 1999 a small legal team recommended that 20 – 30 Khmer Rouge leaders be brought to trial. Efforts by the UN faced stiff challenges. In February 2002, the UN SecretaryGeneral ended negotiations with the Cambodian government, having failed to gain genuine support from the latter for the establishment of a court that would meet international standards of independence, impartiality and objectivity. The Hun Sen government resisted this, but in May 2003 the UN General Assembly finally adopted a resolution approving an agreement between the two sides to establish Extraordinary Chambers to try Khmer Rouge leaders. Another component of peacebuilding was to promote democracy and human rights. Part II, Article 12, of the agreements stated: ‘The Cambodian people shall have the right to determine their own political future through the free and fair election of a constituent assembly, which will draft and approve a new Cambodian Constitution’.29 For the 1993 election, UNTAC established 1,400 polling sites across the country and recruited and trained 48,000 Cambodian election workers, as well as 1,000 international supervising officers. Approximately 90 per cent of the estimated eligible voters were registered. During the 1998 general election the UN was further tasked with coordinating the Joint International Observers Group (consisting of 500 observers from 40 countries). Part III of the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict was devoted to human rights, including those of refugees and displaced persons.30 Cambodia and UNTAC shared the responsibility of ensuring that human rights would be respected. For its part, Cambodia agreed ‘to ensure respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ and agreed ‘to take effective measures to ensure that the policies and practices of the past shall never be allowed to return’ and ‘to adhere to relevant international human rights instruments’.31 UNTAC’s Human Rights Component had the responsibility to foster the ‘development and implementation of a programme of human rights education to promote respect for and understanding of human rights’, ‘to investigate human rights complaints’, and, where appropriate, to take ‘corrective action’ (Annex 1, Section E). After UNTAC’s departure, the UN established a branch of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to monitor and promote respect for human rights in Cambodia, in line with the agreement, which required international monitoring and an

94

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY 32

annual report to the UN. This was a unique development in that it was the first branch to be established outside the UNHCHR office in Geneva. A third component, based on Part IV of the agreements, was the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia and its economic development, even prohibiting any attempt to impose a development strategy on the country from any outside source or to deter potential donors from contributing to its reconstruction. Cambodia would have the primary responsibility for deciding its own needs, and aid and reconstruction was not to omit any area of the country or any level of society, especially the more disadvantaged. In the 1990s, numerous actors actively involved in the collaborative project to promote human security included states, international/regional organizations and foreign NGOs. There were 18 foreign state signatories of the Paris Agreements, and UNTAC was a multinational operation whose peacekeepers came from 34 countries. Between 1992 and 2001, there were 18 major bilateral donors,33 and several other multilateral ones, including UN agencies, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the European Union (EU). The NGO community has also been a major aid source. As recently as June 2002, foreign donors from 22 countries and seven international organizations attended the annual pledging conference. Between 1992 and 2001, the donor community had disbursed more than $4 billion.34 In addition, other types of assistance included freestanding technical cooperation, investment-related technical cooperation, investment project assistance, budgetary aid and balance-of-payments support, and food aid/emergency relief assistance.35 Thus, over the 1992 –2004 period, international assistance covered a wide range of human security activities associated with peacekeeping and peacebuilding (namely, international criminal justice, the promotion of electoral democracy and human rights, as well as economic reconstruction), with the external actors generally sharing a set of liberal norms promoting human security. But the question is whether they were successful in doing so, and effective in their collaborative action. A Critical Evaluation of Collaborative Action on Human Security The extent to which the conditions for human security improved in over the 1992 – 2002 period is difficult to measure in any precise fashion, but evidence shows that Cambodians have now enjoyed a higher degree of freedom from fear when compared with the 1980s. Without the UN intervention that led to the election in 1993, the Cambodian factions would have not signed the Paris Agreements and the country would not have seen its first multi-party election since the early 1970s. Neither of the two former socialist allies in the region – Laos and Vietnam – has experienced such international intervention, and neither has to this day moved in the direction of liberal democracy. Collaborative efforts made by the UN and other actors to bring violators of human rights to justice enjoyed the least success. The legislation establishing the Extraordinary Chambers came into effect in August 2001, and the Cambodian government subsequently made efforts to accommodate UN demands. Overall,

THE UN AND OTHER ACTORS IN CAMBODIA

95

however, the arrangements were flawed. The Extraordinary Chambers could even be judged as a major setback for international criminal justice. The Chambers have limited international character since they are ‘national courts’ established by Cambodian law, operating within the country’s existing judicial system and dominated by Cambodian judges. The Trial Chamber has three Cambodian and two international judges, the Appeals Chamber four Cambodians and three international judges, and the Supreme Court five Cambodian and four international judges. The decisions on guilt and innocence could be made on a ‘supermajority rule’ based on the consent of at least one international judge, but the international judges could have no supremacy over their Cambodian counterparts. According to the Asia Division of Human Rights Watch: On cases that don’t have any political implications, Cambodian judges can operate with independence. . .whenever there were significant cases in which the government was interested, the judges told us very clearly that they were given orders by the Cambodian government how to decide cases, that they could not refuse those orders for fear of their own safety.36 Moreover, the UN is planning to spend around $60 million to prosecute a handful of ageing Khmer Rouge leaders, only two of whom have been arrested and detained. Human Rights Watch criticized and urged the UN General Assembly and its Third Committee not to approve the draft agreement that would prosecute ‘senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible’.37 But peace in Cambodia resulted from the Khmer Rouge’s disintegration and integration into national politics after a series of amnesties, not from the pursuit of international criminal justice.38 The literature tends to support this point: the judicial method is viewed as expensive, time-consuming, driven by great powers’ geo-strategic interests,39 ineffective,40 and even counterproductive.41 The UN efforts to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate the factional armed forces and to reform the armed and security forces met with more success, but still faced limitations. UNTAC’s Mine Clearing Training Unit, for instance, began to train Cambodians in de-mining and the task was taken over by the Cambodian Mine Action Centre in June 1992. This operation made some progress: the reported number of deaths and injuries fell to 1,019 in 1999 from 1,715 in 1998 and 3,050 in 1996. Between 1994 and 1999, only about 155 square km officially registered as mined had been de-mined, but 644 square km were still known to be mined and another 1,400 square km suspected to contain mines.42 During the late 1990s, efforts to destroy weapons and to remove landmines that threaten the security of individual Cambodians were moderately successful. Between 1999 and 2002, for instance, the government collected and destroyed about 100,000 weapons. Unfortunately, UNTAC was unable to preserve the ceasefire effectively and could not disarm the armed forces of the four Cambodian signatories. While the other factions cantoned about 55,000 soldiers, the Khmer Rouge refused to do so because of factional security reasons.43 As a result, the other factions refused to comply and sent the soldiers on ‘agricultural leave’.44 Failure to disarm the factions haunted the country until 1998, when it was finally agreed to end the military conflict. Further efforts to demobilize the armed forces are far from meeting expectations.

96

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

Collaborative efforts to promote freedom from fear of violent death and subjugation through the promotion of political and civil rights have seemed more fruitful than justice and demilitarization. Cambodia has become more democratic compared to previous periods. There were national elections in 1993, 1998 and 2003, and a commune election in 2002, so that a sustained process is underway. The level of political violence and intimidation against opposition parties has also decreased. During the 1993 election, the number of casualties was about 200, but this level fell drastically in 1998 and 2002. Post-election transfers of power have also become increasingly peaceful, if not faster. According to a report by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative, the 2003 election ‘marked an important step in Cambodia’s efforts to establish a multiparty democracy’.45 With the exception of the violence in 1997, when Second Prime Minister Hun Sen removed First Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh by force, the issue of irreversibility appears to be less problematic. Since 1998, only two minor undemocratic attempts have been made to overthrow the government. The international intervention since the early 1990s has made it possible for human rights organizations to spring up, numbering over 40 by 2000. Evidence of political rights violations is now harder to find. By and large, Cambodian citizens also seem to have become increasingly satisfied with improvements in their political rights and civil liberties. A survey conducted in 2003 reported that citizens ‘are more likely now than in 2000 to report they have freedom of political expression and are less likely to worry about direct coercion or other forms of political repression’.46 This does not mean that Cambodia has now become a mature democracy. The degree of certainty that the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) would win in future elections has grown, and prospects for free and fair elections remain grim. The CPP dominates the judiciary, the security apparatus and the military establishment. Electoral administration remains weak. FUNCINPEC and the Sam Rainsy Party remain too weak to defeat the CPP in elections. Civil society actors, such as the human rights and democracy-related NGOs, are young and vulnerable to state control, unable to do more than monitor the electoral process and report election fraud and irregularities. They lack the political power to ensure a free and fair electoral process. Evidence suggests that diminishing political violence and intimidation had more to do with the CPP being in a stronger position to win in elections. Collaborative efforts to promote freedom from the fear of want also appear to be relatively successful. From 1992 to 2002, the Cambodian economy performed far better than expected. It grew about 7 per cent per annum in 1995 –96 with an average growth rate of 4.6 per cent in 1993 – 2000.47 Although it remains a poor country, Cambodia has witnessed overall socio-economic improvement to the extent that its rank in the UNDP Human Development Index was 140th in 1997 (rising from 153rd), just below that of India and Pakistan. By 2001 it had climbed to 121st out of 174 countries. In 2000, its per capita income was estimated to be a lowly US$271, but Cambodians appear to have grown more optimistic about their socio-economic conditions and economic development. In 2000, 57 per cent mentioned poverty as the biggest problem facing the country,

97

THE UN AND OTHER ACTORS IN CAMBODIA 48

but this had decreased slightly to 52 per cent in early 2003. Overall, the level of ‘freedom from the fear of want’ remains unacceptably low. In 2003, life expectancy was only 56 years. The number of people living below the poverty line remained at about 36 per cent in 2001, increasing to 43 per cent in 2003. It was estimated that 5.8 out of the 13 million population would still be living on less than $1 a day in 2005.49 Economic growth has not been fast enough to absorb the number of people joining the labour force every year, and ‘Cambodian families often sell portions of their land to pay for health care, and in the process become landless and/or assetless’.50 Cambodia received permission in September 2003 to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), but has been warned by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Human Rights in Cambodia that this could impact adversely on human rights, including the right to health.51 All this suggests a widening gap between rich and poor, as a consequence of economic liberalization without adequate state intervention or protection.52 Overall, peacebuilding as a method for the promotion of human security in Cambodia has been relatively more successful than either criminal justice or peacekeeping: with the security support given by the peacekeepers and the active role of UNTAC’s Electoral Component, the process of democratic transition emerged: the subsequent elections became freer and fairer and the level of respect for human rights increased noticeably. However, freedom from the fear of violent death and want remains limited. Cambodia thus shows the promise and limits of neo-Kantian internationalism.53 Why did the collaborative efforts succeed only in a limited way? First, Cambodia was an extremely difficult environment because of the high level of human and material destruction caused by violent conflict. Second, the various actors seemed to lack a clear strategy towards promoting human security, and the four approaches of the UN may have worked at crosspurposes. The pursuit of justice against Khmer Rouge leaders obviously made it more difficult for them to disarm and for the CPP to decrease military and security spending. It was no surprise that Hun Sen expressed his reluctance to bring Khmer Rouge leaders to justice, claiming, along with King Norodom Sihanouk, that any attempt to indict Ieng Sary, the foreign minister of the former Khmer Rouge government, would return the country to war.54 Third, the UN agencies and other actors have been unable to translate their assistance into overwhelming political influence, although they did much to prevent Cambodia from returning to the politics of the past. After the violence in 1997, for instance, the UN left the Cambodian seat at the General Assembly unoccupied and the UNDP office threatened to cut its assistance to Cambodia.55 The P-5 in the Security Council also pressured the CPP to hold elections, which took place in 1998. But the UNDP with responsibility for coordinating electoral activities has not always found it easy to uphold democracy. It was seen as being ‘soft’ on the Cambodian authorities during the 2002 election, when its electoral team contended that the National Electoral Commission (NEC) had neither the duty nor the legal right to ensure that the ‘coverage of the electoral campaign in state-run newspaper and TV’ was fair.56 This position raised criticism about the agency’s political role.57

98

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

Moreover, the legalistic and political engineering from outside may even have contributed to limiting democratic development. Concerned with the Khmer Rouge’s chances of returning to power and political instability, the donor community understandably aimed to destroy the Khmer Rouge movement but lent a weak helping hand to the political opposition. The United States has been the only donor willing to provide direct support to the opposition parties, but this action has been criticized as meddling in Cambodia’s internal affairs.58 Fourth, there have been severe limits to international collaboration. It took the UN about a year after the signing of the Paris Agreements before the pledged national troops were finally deployed in full strength.59 By then the ceasefire had already collapsed. Several ASEAN states sent in troops to support the mission but failed to do so as a collective force.60 As of 2004, ASEAN as a regional organization still had no regional peacekeeping force. In peacebuilding, collaboration on democratic institution building has been most positive. For instance, the UNDP’s office signed agreements with 12 donors for $4.7 million during the 2003 election, and its election adviser worked closely with the Cambodian authorities and other donors for the coordination of financial and technical preparation for the elections. Bilateral and multilateral donors have provided help to build election institutions, notably the electoral legal framework, the election administration and the election-monitoring organizations. However, donors were far from united on this front, as they often sent conflicting signals to the country. Some, particularly the United States, preferred a more aggressive method, whereas Japan took a slow approach to democracy building, justifying the need for patience and economic assistance as the means to achieve this objective. States may have weakened their commitments to democracy and human rights, and the UN General Assembly removed the discussion of human rights in Cambodia from its agenda. Japan was alleged to have written a ‘weak’ resolution on human rights in Cambodia (adopted on 20 April 2004 by the UN Commission on Human Rights). The resolution was viewed as ‘a marked contrast’ to the UN Special Representative’s report to the Commission, which ‘noted the continued struggle for democracy, rule of law and human rights’.61 Few states in East Asia have, if any, provided assistance for these political activities. Global collaboration on economic reconstruction has also been positive but still limited. Donors have played an active role in the process of economic liberalization. The World Bank has provided investment project assistance (disbursing $38.5 million in 2001 alone). However, the market remains unreliable. Foreign direct investment in the service sector grew during the UNTAC period and amounted to close to $300 million in 1996. After that, it declined dramatically to less than $100 million in 2001, despite increased political stability. For Cambodia to be able to create more jobs for new entrants to the labour market, it would need about $500 million per year. Even the country’s most dynamic sector, the garment industry (which contributed nearly 80 per cent of all exports) suffered, as the number of factories dropped from 220 in 2000 to 180 at the end of 2001.62 Collaboration among the UN and other member states in the field of international criminal justice was minimal. China was a consistent and outspoken

THE UN AND OTHER ACTORS IN CAMBODIA

99

opponent of an internationally managed or supervised crimes tribunal, apparently resisting the inclusion of the topic on the Security Council’s agenda and working against UN involvement, even if it was by Cambodian invitation.63 Other states in East Asia, with the exception of Japan, offered the UN little or no support at all. According to Youk Chhang, a leading activist documenting Khmer Rouge crimes, other states ‘are not helpful and useful at all when it comes to human rights and war crimes matters in Cambodia . . . they seem to think that human rights are about white people or western culture’.64 Conclusion Developments in security since the end of the Cold War suggest a process that has been chipping away at the foundations of international politics based on self- and collective defence. More analytical attention is being paid to concepts of human security. The number of inter-state wars has decreased significantly since the end of the Cold War, but intra-state threats to human security has received greater prominence. Collective security ‘was a miserable failure in the 1930s, was put on ice during the Cold War, and then, like Lazarus, rose from the dead in the Persian Gulf. But it was only a minor miracle’.65 Future military aggression may be deterred more effectively if more states in the UN system become democratic, and if such a society of states shows a degree of global solidarism in that they ‘accept not only a moral responsibility to protect the security of their own citizens, but also the wider one of guardianship of human rights everywhere’ .66 Cambodia provides a preliminary case for examining the concept of collaborative human security. Evidence used to ‘measure’ (for lack of a better word) degrees of human security is based on figures indicating the levels of human freedom from the fear of violent death, political subjugation and want, as well as on individuals’ changing perceptions of such fear. The case demonstrates the Cambodian state’s lack of competence in meeting the security needs of its people. The UN and other actors made a real, if less than desirable, contribution. After having spent more than $4 billion over the last decade, they managed to help transform the country ravaged by war into a semi-democracy that remains precarious, in which most Cambodians can hardly make ends meet. But without the assistance the donor community has given to the country, it seems likely that no such progress would have been possible. Without such active intervention, Cambodia would, for instance, probably have remained at war and as ‘authoritarian’ as both of its former allies – namely Laos and Vietnam – have been to this day. Collaborative action on Cambodia was evident, but can be enhanced. The biggest challenge found in this country case is that actors in human security tended to do almost everything without giving serious thought to the question of how best to achieve their objectives in a systematic fashion, and without ensuring effective collaborative action. States, regional organizations and non-state actors in East Asia were weak in their commitments to promoting freedom from the fear of violent death and political subjugation. The market is a useful but unreliable actor. This does not mean, however, that the UN, regional organizations, NGOs and the market forces will never be able to take more effective

100

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

collaborative action on human security. Since the end of the Cold War, several regional organizations, namely the Organization of American States, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and NATO began to engage in human security activities. But organizations in Asia, ‘a tightly sovereigntyoriented region’,67 are still unprepared to play this role. Barriers to normative change remain formidable, unless more states in the region become democratic or are unable to resist pressures from the liberal West, or perhaps until more states disintegrate into chaos and violence, such as those in Africa.68 Overall, the methods for human security are effective to the extent that they help increase freedom from the fear of violent death, political subjugation and want. More case studies are needed before general insights can be drawn. Collaborative human security is a concept that can be operationalized, based on the proposition that state, interstate and non-state actors can collaborate on human security activities. Future research may need to consider testing the following hypotheses: (1) the lower the degree of fear rooted in violent death, political subjugation and want, the higher the degree of human security; (2) the higher the degree of consensus on the concept of human security among actors involved in promoting freedom from fear, the higher the probability that they will be willing and able to collaborate; (3) the higher the degree of collaboration, the higher the degree of impact they will have on the promotion of human security; (4) the higher the number of democratic states within a region, the higher the probability that they will reach such consensus; (5) the weaker their ability to resist new norms, the stronger the possibility that states in the region are willing to accept new norms; and (6) the higher the number of internal conflicts and violence and the greater their intensity, the more likely states are willing to accept the norm of cosmopolitan intervention.

NOTES 1. This modifies my earlier use of ‘collective’ human security in ‘The UN, Peacekeeping and Collective Human Security: From An Agenda for Peace to the Brahimi Report’, in Edward Newman and Albrecht Schnabel (eds), Recovering From Civil Conflict: Reconciliation, Peace and Development, London: Frank Cass, 2002. See also, Stuart Harris, ‘Economic Cooperation and Institution Building in the Asia-Pacific Region’, in Richard Higgott et al. (eds), Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict?, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993, p.273. 2. Roland Paris, ‘Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?’, International Security, Vol.26, No.2, fall 2001, pp.87–102; Mohammed Ayoob, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and International Society,’ Global Governance, Vol.7, No.3, July–Sept. 2001, pp.225–30; Yuen Foong Khong, ‘Human Security: A Shotgun Approach to Alleviating Human Misery?’, Global Governance, Vol.7, No.3, July–Sept. 2001, pp.231–6. 3. Paris (see n.2 above), pp.88, 96. 4. Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the PostCold War Era, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner (2nd edn), 1991. 5. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace (Lewis White Beck, ed.), Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957; Immanuel Kant, Kant’s Political Writings (Hans Reiss, ed. and H.B. Nesbit, trans.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970; Inis L. Claude, Power and International Relations, New York: Random House, 1966, p.110. 6. See, Ken Booth, ‘Security and Emancipation’, Review of International Studies, Vol.17, No.4, 1991, pp.313– 26; Steve Smith, ‘Mature Anarchy, Strong States and Security’, Arms Control, Vol.12, No.2, 1991, pp.325–39; UNDP, Human Development Report, 1994, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994, p.4.

THE UN AND OTHER ACTORS IN CAMBODIA

101

7. Stephen M. Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.35, No.2, 1991, p.212. 8. See, David Preston and Don Hubert, ‘Towards Freedom from Fear: An Agenda for Human Security’, Bangladesh Institute of International and Strategic Studies, Journal, Vol.21, No.3, July 2000, p.347. 9. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, Ottawa, Canada: International Development Research Centre, Dec. 2001, p.15. 10. Johan Galtung was probably the first to coin the term ‘peacebuilding’, in ‘Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-building’, in J. Galtung (ed.), Peace, War and Defence – Essays in Peace Research, Vol.2, Copenhagen: Christian Ejlers, 1975, pp.282–304. 11. Joseph Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, New York: Longman, 2003, pp.156–7. 12. See Marrack Goulding, ‘The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping,’ International Affairs, Vol.69, No.3, 1993, pp.451–65; Mats Berdal, Disarmament and Demobilization after Civil Wars: Arms, Soldiers and the Termination of Armed Conflict, Adelphi Paper 303, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996; J. Bayo Adekanye, ‘Review Essay: Arms and Reconstruction in Post-Conflict Societies’, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.34, No.3, 1997, pp.359–66. 13. John G. Cockell, ‘Conceptualizing Peacebuilding: Human Security and Sustainable Peace’, in Michael Pugh (ed.), Regeneration of War-Torn Societies, London: Macmillan, 2001, p.21. 14. Hideaki Shinoda, ‘Peace-building by the rule of law: An examination of intervention in the form of international tribunals’, Institute for Peace Science, Hiroshima University, 2001, accessed at: www.theglobalsite.ac.uk; M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Policy Perspectives Favoring the Establishment of the International Criminal Court’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.52, No.2, Spring 1999, pp.795–810; Richard Goldstone, ‘Assessing the Work of the United Nations War Crimes Tribunals’, Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol.33, No.1, winter 1997, pp.1–8; ‘Justice as a Tool for Peace-making: Truth Commissions and International Criminal Tribunals’, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol.28, No.3, 1996, pp.485–503. 15. Krishna Kumar (ed.), Post-Conflict Elections, Democratization & International Assistance, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998; Elizabeth Cousens and Chetan Kumar (eds), Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 16. Michael Pugh, ‘Peacebuilding as Developmentalism: Concepts from Disaster Research’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.16, No.3, 1995, pp.320–46; Jonathan Goodhand (with Philippa Atkinson), Conflict and Aid: Enhancing the Peacebuilding Impact of International Engagement: A Synthesis of Findings from Afghanistan, Liberia and Sri Lanka, London: International Alert, 2001. 17. Buzan (see n.4 above), pp.57–111. 18. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (n.9 above), pp.13, 17. 19. Gregory H. Fox, ‘International Law and the Entitlement to Democracy After War’, Global Governance, Vol.9, No.2. Apr.–June 2003, pp.179–97; Nigel D. White, The United Nations System: Toward International Justice, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002, pp.173–96; Christopher C. Joyner, ‘The United Nations and Democracy’, Global Governance, Vol.5, No.3, July– Sept. 1999, pp.333–57. 20. Dianne Otto, ‘Nongovernmental Organizations in the United Nations System: The Emerging Role of International Civil Society’, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol.18, No.1, 1996, p.112. 21. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (see n. 9 above), pp.86, 137 –52. 22. Judith Banister and E. Paige Johnson, ‘After the Nightmare: The Population of Cambodia’, in Ben Kiernan (ed.), Genocide and Democracy in Cambodia: The Khmer Rouge, the United Nations and the International Community, New Haven, CT: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1993, p.72. 23. See Sorpong Peou, Intervention and Change in Cambodia: Toward Democracy?, New York: St. Martin’s Press for the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000. 24. Freedom House, a non-profit, non-partisan organization, which rates political rights and civil liberties separately on a scale of 1 to 7 (with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free), assigned Cambodia a 7 rating on both counts for most of the 1979–90 period, Freedom in the World Country Ratings, 1972 through 2003, accessed at: www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/ index.htm. 25. Banister and Johnson (see n.22 above), pp.93, 104; Robert J. Muscat with Jonathan Stromseth, Cambodia: Post-Settlement Reconstruction and Development, New York: East Asian Institute, Columbia University, occasional paper, 1989, pp.24–5. 26. United Nations, Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, Paris, 23 October 1991.

102 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

41.

42. 43.

44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY Ibid., p.42 (italics added). Ibid., p.20. Ibid., p.12. Ibid., art.15, para.1, p.12. Ibid. Ibid., p.13. Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Thailand, Russia, Sweden, the UK and the United States. Council for the Development of Cambodia, Development Cooperation Report, 2000, Phnom Penh: May 2001, pp.2, 9. Between 1992 and 2000, the UN system as a whole provided US$700 million, making it second only to Japan (the largest donor in Cambodia), which disbursed a total of $787 million bilateral aid in the same period. Brad Adams, ‘Cambodia Gears Up for Khmer Rouge Trials’, 23 Apr. 2003, Voice of America News, accessed at: www/voanews.com/article.cfm. Human Rights Watch, Serious Flaws: Why the UN General Assembly Should Require Changes to the Draft Khmer Rouge Tribunal Agreement, New York: HRW, 2003, p.1. Sorpong Peou, Intervention and Change in Cambodia (see n.23 above). Christopher Rudolph, ‘Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunal’, International Organization, Vol.55, No.3, summer 2001, pp.655–91. Michael Reisman, for instance, wrote, ‘The wars in former Yugoslavia provide acutely painful examples of the limited utility of war crime tribunals for stopping wars and making peace. . .[T]he [T]he belief that war crimes tribunals as a “magic-bullet” technique for deterring and stopping wars and making peace is unfounded’, cited in Rachel Kerr, ‘International Peace and Security and International Criminal Justice’, in Edward Newman and Oliver Richmond, The United Nations and Human Security, New York, NY: Palgrave 2001, p.128. See, for instance, Stephen Krasner, ‘After Wartime Atrocities, Politics Can Do More Than the Courts’, International Tribunal Tribune, 16 January 2001; Funmi Olonisakin, ‘An International War Crimes Tribunal for Africa: Problems and Prospects’, African Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol.9, No.4, 1997, pp.822–35; Alfred P. Rubin, ‘Challenging the Conventional Wisdom: Another View of the International Criminal Court’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol.52, No.2, Spring 1999, pp.783–94. Phnom Penh Post, 15–28 Sept. 2000, accessed at: www.phnompenhpost.com/full/papers/ is919/is919/cambo.htm. Sorpong Peou, Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefield to Ballot-Box, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. This security-based perspective is empirically supported by other case studies. A study of military operations in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina shows that, ‘in war, no side would agree to give up its most important means of defense’ and ‘a fullscale enforced disarmament is only feasible as long as the security concerns of the parties are met’. The study adds that ‘disarmament is closely linked to the notion of security’ and thus ‘for disarmament to be possible in the context of a multilateral conflict resolution effort, it is necessary that the security needs of the party to be disarmed must be fully and credibly assumed by the multinational force’. Barbara Ekwall-Uebelhart and Andrei Raeusky, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996, p.153. A study of the peace operations in Somalia also shows that the UN failed because its policy involved efforts to coerce local warlords into submission and shifted from disarmament to confiscation of arms without providing the warring clans any guarantees of security. C. Adibe, Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia, Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995. Michael Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC’s Civil Mandate, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp.34–5. UN Doc., A/58/317, 22 Aug. 2003. Asia Foundation, Democracy in Cambodia – 2003: A Survey of the Cambodian Electorate, Phnom Penh (draft, 16 May 2003), p.6. Sok Hach and Sarthi Acharya, Cambodia’s Annual Economic Review, Phnom Penh: Cambodia Development Resource Institute, Issue 2, Aug. 2002, pp.14–15, 48–9. Asia Foundation (see n.46 above), p.21. ‘World Bank warning on investment climate’, Phnom Penh Post, 13 Apr.–6 May 2004, p.6. Hach and Acharya (see n.47 above), pp.29, 35. Peter Leuprecht, ‘Situation of human rights in Cambodia’, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/105, 19 Dec. 2003, para.53.

THE UN AND OTHER ACTORS IN CAMBODIA

103

52. State as well civil society institutions in Cambodia remain extremely fragile. See Sorpong Peou with Samnang Ham et al., ‘International Assistance for Institution Building in Post-Conflict Cambodia’, The Hague: Netherlands Institute for International Relations, Working Paper 26, May 2004. Michael Pugh also makes an interesting point that, ‘The unwavering international commitment to a neo-liberal economic model has rubbed salt into war wounds, damaging the prospects for growth in “legal” employment, markets, and consumption patterns’, ‘Rubbing Salt into War Wounds: Shadow Economies and Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Kosovo’, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol.51, No.3, May/June 2004, p.2. 53. See Roland Paris, ‘Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism’, International Security, Vol.22, No.1, autumn 1997, pp.54–89; Pugh (see n.52 above). 54. Thomas Hammarberg, ‘Efforts to establish a tribunal against KR leaders: discussions between the Cambodian government and the UN’, paper at a seminar in Stockholm on 29 May 2001 organized by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and the Swedish Committee for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia on the proposed trial against Khmer Rouge leaders responsible for crimes against humanity, pp.9–11. 55. I am grateful to Gordon Longmuir, a former Canadian ambassador to Cambodia, for his insight on this point. 56. UNDP Electoral Team paper, Phnom Penh, 1 Feb. 2002. 57. Rajesh Kumar, ‘UN agency condemned for lobbying tactics’, Phnom Penh Post, 15–28 Feb. 2002. 58. Andrew Wells-Dang, ‘Republican group meddle in Cambodia’, Asia Times Online, 16 Apr. 2004, accessed at: www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FD16Ae01.html. 59. Peou (see n.43 above). 60. Peou, ‘The Subsidiarity Model of Global Governance in the UN-ASEAN Context’, Global Governance, Vol.4, No.4, 1998, pp.439–59. 61. ‘Fears that UN weakening on human rights’, Phnom Penh Post, 23 Apr.–6 May 2004, pp.1–2. 62. Hach and Acharya (see n.47 above), p.51. 63. Thomas Hammaberg, ‘How the Khmer Rouge tribunal was agreed: discussions between the Cambodian government and the UN: Part I, March 1997–March 1999’, unpublished mss [nd], p.3 and Part II, March 1999– January 2001, p.1. 64. Correspondence, 14 Mar. 2004. 65. Nye (see n.11 above), p.169. 66. See Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.12. 67. Amitav Acharya, ‘Redefining the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.56, No.3, 2002, p.378. 68. Mohammed Ayoob, ‘Third World Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention and International Administration’, Global Governance, Vol.10, No.1, Jan.–Mar. 2004, p.106.

The United Nations and East Timor: From Self-Determination to State-Building IAN MARTIN and ALEXANDER MAYER-RIECKH

The UN’s most extensive involvement in peace operations in Asia and the Pacific has been in one of its smallest and poorest territories – now the independent nation of Timor-Leste. The involvement has had several phases. It began with the declaration by the UN General Assembly in 1960 that East Timor, along with other territories under Portuguese administration, was a non-self-governing territory. Fifteen years later, when Portugal’s decolonization was overtaken by Indonesia’s seizure of the territory, the invasion of December 1975 was condemned by the Security Council and the General Assembly. East Timor was on the General Assembly agenda for 24 years before agreement was reached between Portugal and Indonesia on a process of selfdetermination.1 Then followed the mandating of the 1999 UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to carry out a self-determination ballot, termed the East Timor Popular Consultation. When the overwhelming vote for independence on 30 August 1999 was followed by an orgy of violence against people and property by pro-Indonesian militia and the Indonesian army, Indonesia was pressured to consent to an Australian-led, UN-mandated, multinational force, the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), to restore order. The Security Council then mandated the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), to administer the territory pending elections and the installation of a sovereign independent government. When this government was installed on 20 May 2002, the UN remained to assist it in the form of the UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET). This essay summarizes how the successive UN mandates came about, how they were implemented, and what role Asian countries played in each context. Although it focuses on the activities of the United Nations, credit for TimorLeste becoming an independent, democratic state should go first and foremost to the East Timorese people and their leaders for their courage and determination, and their readiness to suffer tremendous hardship.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND EAST TIMOR

105

From the Years of Non-intervention to the 5 May 1999 Agreements From 1975 to 1981 the General Assembly passed annual resolutions reaffirming the inalienable right of the East Timorese to self-determination and expressing concern at the suffering – which was indeed extreme – of the civilian population.2 Then in 1982 the Assembly mandated the Secretary-General to begin a diplomatic effort to help find a solution to the problem. Thereafter, while the question of East Timor remained on the Assembly’s agenda, consideration of the item was deferred each year on the basis of the progress report submitted by the Secretary-General on his good offices. There continued to be annual discussion of East Timor in the Decolonization Committee, and a massacre by the Indonesian army in November 1991 stirred the Commission on Human Rights into some activity. Asian governments had mostly supported Indonesia’s efforts to remove the item from the General Assembly agenda and sought to protect Indonesia from criticism in the Commission on Human Rights. The direct discussions between Indonesia and Portugal – but not the East Timorese – which then took place under the auspices of the Secretary-General saw little progress for well over a decade. Soon after he took office, SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan decided to attempt to revitalize the tripartite process, appointing Ambassador Jamsheed Marker of Pakistan as his Personal Representative, and the UN role became increasingly proactive. But it was the momentous political changes which began to take place in Indonesia with the fall of President Suharto in May 1998 which opened the way for significant progress on the diplomatic front.3 Suharto’s interim successor, President B.J. Habibie, first stated that he was prepared to offer East Timor a wide-ranging autonomy. But while for Indonesia this special autonomy would be the final dispensation, Portugal was willing to consider it only as an interim or transitional arrangement pending the eventual exercise by the East Timorese of their right to self-determination. As the mood of growing political freedom in Indonesia was reflected in increasingly open East Timorese pro-independence activism, Australia, the UN and others pressed Habibie to recognize that autonomy without an eventual act of self-determination could not achieve a final settlement. While they and the East Timorese envisaged a transitional period of several years, Habibie suddenly announced, on 29 January 1999, that if the East Timorese did not accept the offer of autonomy he would recommend separation of the territory from Indonesia. This provided the basis for the tripartite negotiations to reach agreement, on 5 May 1999, on a ‘popular consultation’ in East Timor to decide between autonomy and independence.4 Indonesia remained allergic to the term referendum, but it was to be a one-person, one-vote ballot, conducted by the UN. The most difficult part of the negotiations was the security arrangements for the consultation, which caused the UN increasing concern as pro-Indonesian militia established throughout East Timor by the Indonesian army went on the rampage against supporters of independence. Indonesia insisted on retaining responsibility for security, but agreed that this would be the responsibility of the Indonesian police, rather than the army, and that they would be advised by a small group

106

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

of UN police. The UN tried to insist upon the disarmament of all paramilitary groups and militia, together with the withdrawal of some Indonesian forces and restrictions on the movement of others, matched by similar restraint by Falintil, the pro-independence guerrillas. But Indonesia evaded clear commitments on these crucial issues.5 It was only after the 5 May Agreements were reached that discussion of East Timor opened up again in an intergovernmental forum, as the Security Council proceeded to mandate UNAMET to conduct the ballot. The preceding negotiations had taken place in the closed tripartite talks, and only a few governments – most notably Australia and the United States – had been closely involved in supportive diplomacy. Since the UN role was requested by the Indonesian government, it was initially uncontroversial. The UN established a Support Group for East Timor of over 30 member states, many of them Asian, to be briefed periodically by Ambassador Marker and the Secretariat. A self-styled ‘Core Group’ of five of the most closely engaged countries began to meet to coordinate their support to the UN role: Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the UK and the United States. The Popular Consultation: The Role of UNAMET UNAMET faced a formidable challenge in carrying out its basic task of registering East Timorese voters and organizing a well-conducted ballot, to be held on 8 August, in what many regarded as an unrealistic timescale. This had been insisted upon by Indonesia: following nationwide elections on 7 June, the new People’s Consultative Assembly was expected to convene at the end of August, and Habibie wished to be ready to present to it the outcome of the consultation. Rapid deployment of UNAMET’s personnel was thus required, not only for the electoral preparations, but also in the hope that the international presence would have a positive impact on the security situation. UNAMET soon became aware that the militia violence of recent months had resulted in extensive internal displacement, as pro-independence villages had been destroyed and their populations had fled to the interior. The opening of registration was twice delayed. The first delay of three weeks occurred because UNAMET could not be ready by the date of 22 June required by the original timetable and because the security situation patently did not conform to the requirements laid down by the Secretary-General. By the time of the second brief postponement, UNAMET was ready but its offices and staff had themselves been subjected to militia attacks. Under heavy international pressure, Habibie ordered his ministers – including the Defence Minister and army chief General Wiranto – to East Timor to address the situation before registration opened on 16 July. The Secretary-General was never able ‘to ascertain, based on the objective evaluation of the UN mission, that the necessary security situation exists for the peaceful implementation of the consultation process’, as required by the agreements before the start of registration.6 But the East Timorese were undeterred. Despite extensive continuing intimidation, they turned out to register in

THE UNITED NATIONS AND EAST TIMOR

107

numbers exceeding the UN’s expectations, and by the end of the period even the great majority of the internally displaced did so, with around 450,000 registered (including some 13,000 at external centres outside East Timor). This was far from the end of the security issue, however. The Agreements required an equal opportunity for pro-independence and pro-autonomy supporters to disseminate their views. Indonesian government officials, police and army were to remain neutral, and the use of public funds and government resources or recourse to pressure of office were prohibited. In fact, massive government funds and resources were channelled to the pro-autonomy groups, and indeed to the militia. The broad front of pro-independence parties, the CNRT (National Council of Timorese Resistance), many of whose leaders had been forced into hiding by the violence which preceded UNAMET’s arrival, was only with difficulty able to reopen or open offices, and most of these had to be closed again as the militia engaged in a series of attacks against them and against proindependence students in the later stages of the campaign. The date of the ballot itself was postponed by only 22 days, to 30 August, and the electoral arrangements were ready – and positively assessed by the independent Electoral Commission appointed by the Secretary-General and by the large numbers of international observers who had arrived in East Timor. But it was uncertain whether the security situation would or should allow it to go ahead. Voters had been displaced again by the resurgence of militia violence, and yet greater violence was threatened on or after polling day. The reasons not to go forward were unassailable in terms of Indonesia’s breaches of the agreements, and this might have been politically the safer course of action for the UN: the UN had already allowed itself to be successfully manipulated by Indonesia in one scandalously bogus act of supposed self-determination in West Irian in 1969, and could not afford to be party to a corrupted outcome in East Timor.7 But the window of opportunity might close, with Habibie unlikely to retain the presidency and many in Jakarta ready to take any opportunity to abort a process they had never supported. The UN consulted with the CNRT throughout, and could not have proceeded against its wishes. Its leader Xanana Gusma˜o was clear-sighted in his understanding of the risk and his mistrust of the Indonesian army, but he was also convinced that the East Timorese would defy intimidation to vote as they wished. The East Timorese had displayed the strength of their own commitment to the popular consultation in their determination to register, and seemed thereby to have conferred upon the UN a moral responsibility to share the risk they themselves were willing to take. The UN and others had been undertaking numerous efforts to head off or limit the threatened violence. The East Timorese bishops convened a peace and reconciliation meeting with leading East Timorese from both sides at the end of June. Thereafter the UN convened two smaller meetings which resulted in agreement that an East Timorese Consultative Commission would be launched the day after the ballot, with equal representation of pro-autonomy and proindependence leaders whatever the outcome, to help steer East Timor through post-ballot turbulence. UNAMET was also active in promoting communication between Falintil (the armed wing of the East Timorese resistance), the Indonesian

108

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

army and the pro-Indonesian militia, aimed at a mutual laying-down of arms. Meanwhile bilateral pressure was applied by governments directly to the Indonesian political and military leadership, seeking to contain current violence and to make it conscious of the cost to Indonesia’s international relations were violence to intensify. Pressure was exerted, too, by the Secretary-General, personally and through his representatives, and by the Security Council in repeated statements and periodic summonses to the Indonesian Permanent Representative to hear the Council’s concern. The UN and the diplomatic community believed – mistakenly as it turned out – that this would lead the Indonesian government to check the violence that would undoubtedly follow the expected vote for independence. The international community heaved a collective sigh of relief as the 30 August poll was largely peaceful, with an extraordinary 98.6 per cent of those registered casting their votes. UNAMET had accomplished its electoral task in less than four months from the agreements, and only three weeks behind schedule. Its international staffing totalled a little over 1,000, far below the numbers that were to follow in UNTAET. But their speed of deployment had been impressive, and particular credit was due to the UN Volunteers programme, which fielded the largest component, the district electoral officers. The quality of staffing benefited from the fact that UNAMET was the first of the UN’s major missions launched in 1999 and was understood to face a difficult task and tight timetable. Electoral and public information staff with proven records from other missions were rapidly gathered together. Equally important was the direct selection by the UN Department of Political Affairs (UNDPA) of political officers with particular knowledge of Indonesia and East Timor, and appropriate language skills. The speed of the logistical deployment was made possible by the use of a trust fund that received immediate voluntary contributions. This meant that financial commitments did not have to await the authorization of assessed contributions, and in-kind contributions from Australia overcame some potential procurement bottlenecks. Also, the UN’s logistics base in Italy had a substantial proportion of the necessary equipment immediately available for UNAMET. It remains to be seen whether as a result of implementation of recommendations of the Brahimi Report, such speed of deployment can become the norm.8 Asian countries were well represented within UNAMET. Bangladesh, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea and Thailand, as well as Australia and New Zealand, were represented among the 270 civilian police, while Bangladesh, Malaysia and Thailand, as well as Australia and New Zealand, contributed to the contingent of 50 military liaison officers. Many Asians were among the UN volunteers who served as district electoral officers: only India was unwilling to release officials for a ballot on self-determination. Asian NGOs were also a strong presence among the international observers. The dispatch of senior police officers had been closely debated in Tokyo, as it marked the first return to UN peacekeeping since the killing of a Japanese police officer in Cambodia in 1993. Japan was also a major contributor to the voluntary funding of UNAMET, was a member of the Core Group, and was diplomatically active in Jakarta, where it carried the weight of Indonesia’s largest

THE UNITED NATIONS AND EAST TIMOR

109

investor and trading partner. In the Security Council, by contrast, Asian and Muslim solidarity contributed to weakening the pressure applied to Indonesia when evidence mounted of its failure to fulfil commitments on security and neutrality. International Intervention After the Ballot: The Role of INTERFET The announcement on 4 September 1999 that 78.5 per cent of the East Timorese had voted for independence became the signal for pro-Indonesian militia and the Indonesian army to launch a destructive rampage throughout East Timor. As the scale of this violence became clear, the first diplomatic efforts were aimed at inducing Indonesia to rein it in. Member states varied in how quickly they reached the conclusion that this was not going to happen, but eventually coalesced around a joint campaign to obtain Indonesian agreement to international intervention. Although the UN had planned for a blue-beret peacekeeping force to take over from Indonesia after a gradual and peaceful withdrawal, it was quickly apparent that the only effective means of rapid intervention would be a UN-mandated ‘coalition of the willing’, which Australia was willing to lead. Neither Australia nor any other country would intervene without Indonesian consent, or without authorization by the Security Council, where the support of China and Russia as well as of several non-permanent members would itself undoubtedly depend upon Indonesian acquiescence. Between the ballot result and Habibie’s request to the UN for intervention on 12 September, an extraordinary crescendo of diplomatic pressure was applied against the government. It was led by the intense personal diplomacy of Kofi Annan, in close partnership with Prime Minister John Howard of Australia. The Security Council adopted the Secretariat’s proposal of a Council mission to Jakarta and to East Timor, where UNAMET was besieged in its Dili compound after the killing of several of its East Timorese staff and attacks on internationals. This key UN initiative contributed to the dual purposes of persuading Indonesia to accept international intervention and obtaining consensus in the Security Council. The United States joined in the pressure on Indonesia; and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund issued unprecedented warnings to the economically vulnerable government. Fortuitously, the Asia –Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders’ meeting was scheduled to take place in New Zealand from 9 September. In general, APEC has strongly resisted moving its agenda beyond strictly economic issues, but Canada pressed successfully for a Special Ministerial Meeting on East Timor to be held alongside the APEC meeting proper. Indonesia might have expected its Asian allies to absent themselves from it, but nearly all participated in a strong demonstration of shared regional concern. This was evident too in the statements of Asian member states when the Security Council held an open meeting on 11 September, and in their willingness to participate in a coalition should Indonesia consent. Indonesia was strongly opposed to Australian leadership of an international force, wanting as much Asian participation as possible and a force commander from an ASEAN country. Australia, however, considered it essential to have

110

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

command of a force to which it would make the largest contribution. Annan informed Indonesia that Australia would command the force, though this might change in a later phase, but he and Howard were working to maximize Asian participation. Thailand agreed to provide a contingent and the deputy force commander; Malaysia scaled down its participation when that post was earmarked, but the Philippines and the Republic of Korea confirmed major commitments. Singapore would send a medical company and Fiji also became a troop contributor. The practice of coalition participants bearing the costs themselves could have limited the force, but the trust fund, with Japan as the largest contributor, facilitated its establishment. INTERFET, headed by Australian Maj.-Gen. Peter Cosgrove, established its presence in Dili on 20 September, and was ultimately successful in restoring security for the East Timorese. It succeeded in avoiding lethal clashes with Indonesian troops, though it was unable to prevent some killings and a final burst of property destruction by the withdrawing Indonesians and their militia allies.9 Under its mandate, INTERFET was to protect and support UNAMET until its tired remnants could be safely redeployed. UNAMET’s knowledge of the territory was valuable to INTERFET and to the humanitarian operation now underway, coordinated by the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Some of the UNAMET volunteers, originally electoral staff, became the first international officials to work with the CNRT to address the most immediate needs of a territory in which all administration and most services had collapsed. The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor: UNTAET The 5 May Agreements provided for a post-ballot UN role. If the vote was against autonomy, authority would be transferred to the UN which would initiate a process of transition to independence. Throughout the UNAMET period, the rejection of the autonomy proposal and violence after the ballot appeared increasingly likely. Political sensitivities towards Indonesia and overstretched capacities at the UN Secretariat constrained, however, any meaningful planning and preparations for transition to independence. Despite UNAMET’s pleas for maximum strengthening of its uniformed components for the immediate aftermath of the ballot, only limited increases in the numbers of unarmed police and military liaison officers had been agreed with Indonesia, and no strengthening of their mandate (which remained strictly advisory). Moreover, the Security Council only authorized these increases when it was too late for them to be in place by polling day. In any event they would not have been able to affect the situation significantly. Humanitarian planning was also inadequate, despite UNAMET’s warnings. The UN was prepared neither to respond to the violence and devastation that followed the ballot, nor for the need to rapidly establish a transitional administration. The planning team set up by the UNDPKO after the ballot was understaffed and operated under tight time constraints.10 East Timorese involvement in the planning was marginalized, and other potential contributors to the process, in particular the UNDPA and the World Bank, were only tangentially involved.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND EAST TIMOR

111

Security Council resolution 1272 (25 October) effectively entrusted UNTAET with the full administrative powers of a state, a robust peacekeeping role, the coordination of humanitarian assistance and economic development, and preparation for self-government.11 However, the mandate left several key questions unanswered, including the roadmap leading to self-government, the relationship of the governance and public administration component to the future East Timorese government, and the mechanisms for consultation with the East Timorese. UNTAET was structured into three components: military peacekeeping, governance and public administration, and humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation. They were integrated into a single operation, and Sergio Vieira de Mello, Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Transitional Administrator, and coordinator of UN agencies, funds and programmes in East Timor, had unprecedented authority. The initial maximum authorized strength of UNTAET was 9,150 military, 1,640 police, 1,670 international civilian personnel (including 486 UN volunteers) and 1,905 East Timorese staff (mainly in administrative support functions). While UNTAET was a highly complex and difficult undertaking, the UN in East Timor did not have to deal with the additional complications of coordinating different regional organizations, as in Kosovo for example. UNTAET faced enormous challenges when it came into being in October 1999. Many East Timorese were mourning the loss of their relatives who died during the violence that followed the ballot, most people were displaced, over a quarter of the population had fled or were forced to flee the country, about 70 per cent of public buildings and private housing had been destroyed, and all public administration activities had collapsed. As East Timor had not been an independent country, most state-level functions had to be built from scratch. At the same time, security had been quickly restored by INTERFET, East Timor was free of serious internal conflict and there was broad support for UNTAET from the East Timorese population and leadership. But UNTAET got off to a slow start, as the UN’s complex recruitment procedures and the Secretariat’s understaffed personnel sections, under increasing pressure from other new or expanding missions, failed to expedite the recruitment of well-qualified international staff. By the end of January 2000, only 351 international civilian staff had arrived. This put an unreasonable burden on the few staff in the mission and contributed to UNTAET’s loss of credibility during its first months of operation. UNTAET’s security responsibilities were: to provide external security through its peacekeeping force; to maintain law and order with the UN police; to disarm and demobilize armed groups; to develop a defence framework; and to set up an East Timorese police service. INTERFET’s presence gave the UN an adequate period to prepare and deploy a peacekeeping force, with several key contingents merely changing berets. After the transfer of military responsibility to UNTAET in February 2000, the peacekeeping force maintained security effectively and deterred militia incursions from West Timor.12 Its peacekeeping record was not matched, however, by its performance in other security-related areas. In particular in the early period, the

112

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

performance of the UN police in executive policing was affected by slow recruitment and the mixed quality of the officers, insufficient induction training, and an inadequate understanding of the cultural context. The performance improved to a certain degree in the course of the operation. Uncertainty about the status of Falintil – was it an illegal armed group to be disarmed or the nucleus of a defence force? – and ambiguity over the role of UNTAET in security sector reform delayed decisions about Falintil’s future, demobilization and defence force development. Facing growing Falintil discontent, fuelled by poor living conditions and an uncertain future, UNTAET belatedly developed a security sector strategy and decided to establish the East Timor Defence Force (FDTL), with members of Falintil as its core.13 Those not recruited were to be demobilized through the Falintil Reintegration Assistance Programme (FRAP). Reintegration was generally successful, but the selection process for both the FDTL and the FRAP created resentment among those who were excluded, contributing to a number of security incidents involving former Falintil members. The development of the East Timor Police Service (ETPS) got off to a slow start, partly because no UNTAET staff members were initially assigned to this task. Early efforts focused on training individual East Timorese police officers, while the institutional development of the police service was neglected. The establishment of a regulatory framework, organizational structure, institutional safeguards to protect human rights and provide civilian oversight, infrastructure, funding and the provision of equipment did not receive adequate attention. As with the defence force, the ETPS selection process remained a matter of controversy in independent Timor-Leste, in particular with regard to the recruitment of East Timorese who had served in the Indonesian police. At independence on 20 May 2002, neither the ETPS nor the FDTL were ready to take over full responsibility for public security and external defence. The institutions responsible for civilian oversight and support of the security sector, in particular the ministries responsible for the police and defence force, the parliamentary committee for security and national defence, and the office of the National Security Advisor, remained underdeveloped and weak. Although UNTAET’s humanitarian operation confronted problems following the post-ballot violence, in particular the lack of preparations, the remoteness and difficult terrain of East Timor, it was generally effective and successful during the first critical months.14 There was a rapid return of the displaced population, few serious incidents in the returnee reintegration process, and no deaths related to epidemics or starvation. The humanitarian operation benefited from a generally favourable security environment. Overall coordination at central and district levels weakened, however, after the withdrawal of OCHA and the handover to UNTAET’s humanitarian and emergency relief component in April 2000. The successful humanitarian intervention was not paralleled from the outset by an effective strategic planning exercise for economic development. Long-term development and capacity-building objectives were neglected at the start and led to weaker results in generating economic recovery and building up public administration.

THE UNITED NATIONS AND EAST TIMOR

113

Of the 250,000 East Timorese refugees in West Timor, over 125,000 had repatriated by the end of 1999, some at significant risk to themselves. Intimidation by the militias distinctly slowed the pace of returns during the course of 2000, and the UN and the broader international community were criticized for failing to pressure Indonesia to disband the militias: by the end of UNTAET some 30 – 40,000 refugees remained in West Timor. UNTAET’s governance mandate was of unprecedented breadth. All legislative and executive powers were concentrated in the Transitional Administrator – though East Timorese participation was to be provided through unspecified ‘mechanisms for dialogue’. The political environment in East Timor was favourable and UNTAET enjoyed a high level of popular support. UNTAET faced, however, several serious challenges. The mandate provided little guidance: the path to independence was not spelled out, a political timetable had not been provided, and the nature of East Timorese participation had not been defined. The lack of preparation, slow recruitment and uneven quality of international staff, the immediate challenges facing security, humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation, and the ill-defined relationship to its East Timorese interlocutors, in particular the CNRT, meant that UNTAET was slow and tentative in developing and implementing a strategy for political transition. As a result, the timescale for the transition process was short, civic education was limited, and new political parties had little time to establish themselves. While the Constituent Assembly elections in August 2001 and the presidential elections in April 2002 were well organized and took place without significant security-related incidents, separate parliamentary elections were virtually impossible during UNTAET’s mandate. The constitutional process was rushed and the political institutions were relatively weak at the time of independence. While UNTAET secured independence in a short period, its contribution to sustainable self-government and a democratic political environment was limited.15 In part, these shortcomings resulted from confusions arising over UNTAET’s dual role as the transitional administration and as a mission tasked with preparing East Timor for democratic self-government. As a transitional administration, it had to conduct peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and public services. Its primary constituency was the UN Secretariat and the Security Council to which it was de jure accountable. In its state-building, it had to construct a selfsustainable East Timorese government and public administration, and oversee the transition to independence. Its primary constituency in this role was the East Timorese people and leadership to whom UNTAET was at least de facto accountable. The tension between the ‘logic of peacekeeping’ and the ‘logic of development’ remained a persistent predicament throughout UNTAET’s existence.16 In its role as the de facto government of East Timor, UNTAET interacted with regional governments, in particular with neighbouring Indonesia and Australia. From the start, the East Timorese leadership engaged in foreign relations through the CNRT and then through the two transitional governments. In October 2001, Jose´ Ramos-Horta was sworn in as Minister for Foreign Affairs. UNTAET conducted negotiations with Australia on the Timor Sea treaty on behalf of East Timor and with senior East Timorese representation. Under the

114

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

leadership of the then CNRT President, Xanana Gusma˜o, significant steps were taken in normalizing the relationship with Indonesia. However, negotiations on a range of issues including the demarcation of the border were not concluded during UNTAET’s term, and its authority to represent East Timor externally was limited, despite the extraordinarily broad legal powers available to it. The same problems that affected the process of political transition also undermined the establishment of a sustainable and effective public administration. This was undercut by the lack of early planning, failure to develop a coherent strategy, pressure to deliver short-term results, slow recruitment and uneven quality of international staff, UNTAET’s ambiguous relationship to the CNRT and the World Bank, inadequate civil service recruitment and training, and late ‘Timorization’. The absence of a common understanding of capacity and institutionbuilding, and the diverse approaches taken by different departments led to variable performance. Some sectors, such as health, did much better than others, such as power.17 While most of the key public institutions were established, some important institutions were not in place, or were incomplete and weak when UNTAET concluded. The basic infrastructure of a functioning civil service – clear operating procedures, regulatory frameworks and essential office systems – was not set up, undermining the post-independence efficiency and effectiveness of public administration. The development of the administration of justice was seriously inadequate in the transition period, despite being considered a priority by the 1999 Joint Assessment Mission led by the World Bank, with East Timorese and UN participation. UNTAET’s approach was piecemeal; there was no coordinated or comprehensive strategy to develop the rule of law sector, and funding was inconsistent and inadequate. The failure to develop a sustainable and effective administration of justice had negative repercussions on Timor-Leste’s subsequent development. The failure to design a coordinated strategy for the interdependent development and reform of the entire rule of law sector – police, courts, prisons, public prosecutors, the private legal profession, justice ministry, legislature and the body of laws – is an oft-repeated but by now inexcusable mistake in post-conflict peacebuilding.18 The creation of UNTAET was preceded not merely by the violence of September 1999 but by a 24-year history of human rights abuse, with ensuing demands that the perpetrators be brought to justice. The Secretary-General insisted that those responsible for serious crimes following the ballot be held accountable.19 The Commission on Human Rights established a commission of inquiry, which concluded that the United Nations had a special responsibility to bring justice in response to the human rights abuses during 1999.20 There was, however, little clarity about how UNTAET should deal with the issue. Some East Timorese initially called for the establishment of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal. Yet the vulnerability of the political situation in Indonesia, a general unwillingness to confront the Indonesian government, as well as a growing reluctance by the Security Council to revisit the model of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal, meant that however remote Indonesia’s intention or ability to provide justice using its own judicial system, the international community was not prepared to declare this to be the case. The Commission on Human Rights

THE UNITED NATIONS AND EAST TIMOR

115

affirmed that primary responsibility for bringing perpetrators to justice rested with the national judicial systems.21 Consequently, instead of one international tribunal, two separate domestic jurisdictions – a weak, disinterested Indonesian and a future East Timorese one – were responsible for the investigation and prosecution of those crimes. This proved inadequate, especially the proceedings of the Ad Hoc Court in Indonesia, where those with the greatest degree of responsibility live. Not only were the trials before the Ad Hoc Court an overall failure, the Indonesian authorities also failed to provide assistance to the investigation and prosecution of serious crimes in East Timor.22 In contrast to its approach to the administration of justice in general, UNTAET relied to a much greater extent on international involvement in dealing with serious crimes, due to political sensitivities, lack of East Timorese expertise and the UN’s specific responsibility to bring to justice those responsible for the violence in 1999.23 A Serious Crimes Investigation Unit comprising international civilian and police investigators was established in April 2000. Two months later, a specialized prosecution unit for serious crimes was created. From the beginning, the Serious Crimes Investigation Unit was plagued with staffing and management problems, and progress in the investigations was slow. In the second half of 2001, the investigation and the prosecution teams were formally integrated, thereby improving the quality of investigations. UNTAET created special panels for serious crimes at the Dili District Court in June 2000. They remained part of the newly established regular court system and comprised international and East Timorese judges. Recruitment delays and management problems prevented more than one panel from functioning. The judges had no prior experience in international criminal law and lacked administrative support. Inadequate resources remained a major issue, especially the insufficient number of qualified interpreters. Initially no international legal representation was provided, and adequate defence for those accused of serious crimes remained a problem for the entire UNTAET period. Following a decision of the CNRT and with the support of the UNTAET Human Rights Unit, a Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation was established in July 2001 and commenced working shortly after independence. Headed by seven East Timorese Commissioners, it has three distinct functions: to seek truth about human rights violations between 1974 and 1999, to facilitate community reconciliation, and to report to the government on its work. It is intended to complement serious crimes prosecutions, not to replace them.24 Regional countries generally played a positive role within UNTAET providing military, police and civilian personnel and resources. Following INTERFET’s departure, Australia continued to provide the largest military contingent to the military component, and many countries in the region contributed military personnel, including Japan (see Katsumi Ishizuka’s article in this volume). Force commanders were from Thailand and the Philippines, but although Southeast Asian nationals also held senior civilian positions, UNTAET was criticized for being an ‘Eastern mission with a Western face’.25 Asian, and also Lusophone, countries were underrepresented among UNTAET’s civilian staff, though the imbalance reflected general recruitment limitations rather than recruitment policy.

116

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

Independence and After: The Mandate and Beginnings of UNMISET In preparing for the period after independence, UNTAET faced a double task. It had to plan for a future international presence and prepare for transition to an independent East Timorese government. Planning for a UN successor mission began early. While an Integrated Mission Task Force was established in New York, the bulk of the planning was conducted in East Timor. In his January 2001 report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General stated that an independent East Timor would require not only substantial international support in the areas of peacekeeping and police, but also international civilian advisors in various functions of public administration. The member states required considerable persuasion to overcome their resistance to funding such ‘developmental’ activities from the assessed peacekeeping budget. Ultimately, the Security Council agreed to 100 posts that were considered ‘critical for the viability of the public administration and the stability of East Timor’.26 This was far too inadequate to support a fragile East Timor administration, especially as, by early 2003, bilateral support by donors funded fewer than half of the additional 200 posts UNTAET had determined were critical to support poverty reduction and development. Detailed and comprehensive planning continued during the remainder of UNTAET’s term, enabling the Secretary-General to include a detailed implementation plan in his final report to the Security Council on 17 April 2002. The Security Council endorsed the plan in its resolution establishing UNMISET. It consisted of three programmes, each specifying objectives, timelines, resource requirements, benchmarks and handover arrangements. UNMISET would initially retain responsibility for external defence and public security in a sovereign East Timor, handing over gradually to the East Timorese defence force and police as they reached operational capacity. The East Timorese leadership only reluctantly agreed not to insist upon immediate authority over the police. Less attention was paid to the transition to an independent government. A transition team was established in August 2001. At times, communication between East Timorese and international members of the team was tenuous, though demands on the members grew steadily as the date of independence drew nearer. The team failed to accomplish tasks relating to the transfer of residual functions from UNTAET and the creation of new bodies, such as civilian oversight of the police and legal policy development. The mandating of UNMISET came late, on 17 May, only three days prior to its establishment, which made it difficult to manage a seamless transition, particularly in terms of recruitment. Similarly, Kamalesh Sharma was designated as the new Special Representative of the Secretary-General only six weeks before independence, which did not allow him to participate in the planning. He arrived in the mission area only two days before the handover. The government of Timor-Leste faced daunting challenges. UNTAET’s shortcomings affected the functioning of the entire public sector. The administration of justice was barely operational. In the security sector, controversies over the selection procedures for the defence force and the police service continued; rioting and excessive force by the police in Dili on 4 December 2002 revealed significant

THE UNITED NATIONS AND EAST TIMOR

117

shortcomings in both the international and East Timorese police components and in the operation of their unified command structure. Reports of militia infiltrations also led the East Timorese to question the efficiency of the peacekeeping force. Three Lessons Overall, the UN’s performance was mixed. Many lessons are to be learned in the various fields of the UN’s involvement, and a number of assessments both within the UN and by other organizations have been conducted since UNTAET’s departure.27 In the context of Asian security and peace operations, three areas should be highlighted: peace operation planning and preparations, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and the role of regional actors. Planning and Preparations The quality and effectiveness of the UN’s planning and preparations for peace operation activities varied over the course of its involvement in East Timor. The tight schedule between the 5 May 1999 Agreements and the August ballot meant that there was little time to prepare for UNAMET, deploy the peace operation and organize the ballot. The speed of staff deployment was nevertheless impressive. The UN’s logistics base in Italy had the necessary equipment immediately available. The use of a voluntary trust fund and in-kind contributions from Australia helped to overcome procurement shortages. UNAMET also benefited from being first in the surge of missions in 1999. However, in response to the post-ballot violence, it was quickly apparent that it would take too long to assemble and deploy a peacekeeping force under UN command. The use of a Security Council-authorized multinational force proved to be particularly effective. Between the arrival of the first INTERFET troops five days after the Security Council mandate of 15 September and early November, security had generally been restored throughout the entire territory. Overall planning for independence was cursory. The limited capacities of the UN Secretariat were fully stretched in the second half of 1999, as backup for UNAMET absorbed most available resources and several peace operations were launched or restructured, in Kosovo, for example. Political sensitivities towards Indonesia prevented any significant ‘worst-case scenario’ planning, which might have led to the pre-positioning of resources. After the ballot, planning for a UN transitional administration faced extreme time constraints. East Timorese involvement in the planning was marginal and other international organizations were only tangentially involved. These planning and preparation deficits meant that UNTAET worked under extremely adverse conditions during its first months. By contrast, planning for UNMISET began early and resulted in the development of a detailed and comprehensive mandate implementation plan, which was endorsed by the Security Council without significant changes. Preparations for the transition from the UN transitional administration to an independent East Timorese government were, however, inadequate, and the government faced tremendous challenges at independence.

118

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

The UN Secretariat’s planning capacity should be further strengthened, particularly when it has to operate in politically sensitive circumstances. Political consultations and negotiations should be clearly separated from the responsibilities for strategic planning and operational preparations. Outsourcing planning functions to specialized non-UN organizations should be considered. Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding By its nature, peacebuilding, especially where it involves the construction of a new state, is a highly complex undertaking and expertise is limited. While the peace operations in East Timor did generally well in the areas of electoral assistance, traditional peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation, UNTAET consistently faced problems in institution building and governance tasks. UNTAET often applied a traditional peacekeeping logic to address peacebuilding tasks. Peacebuilding, however, requires a rather different set of strategies, methods, resources and skills: . .

.

.

Peacekeeping is an activity; peacebuilding a project. Peacekeeping is operational, technical and focuses on quick results; peacebuilding is based on long-term planning and strategic management, and seeks sustainable outcomes. Peacekeeping requires direct and outside intervention; peacebuilding develops local capacity. Peacekeeping is guided by impartiality and equidistance from contending parties; peacebuilding requires an in-depth understanding of the socio-political situation, is participatory and actively engages local stakeholders.

This characterization may be oversimplified; nevertheless it indicates why a department established primarily to conduct military peacekeeping struggles to supervise peacebuilding. As the UNDPKO seems certain to continue to be involved in peacebuilding, its capacity to do so must be reinforced, in particular its political analysis, institution building, capacity development and project management capacities. In addition, other UN agencies, funds and programmes should be more involved in peacebuilding activities and given distinct responsibilities even when the UNDPKO serves as the lead agency in an operation. Outsourcing institution-building activities to specialized non-UN organizations should be seriously considered. Role of Regional Actors While Asian countries were generally reluctant to put political pressure on Indonesia prior to the ballot, their contribution to the peace operations was positive and significant. They contributed major military contingents to all the missions and were generally well represented among the police staff. Civilian staff from Asian and Lusophone countries were, however, underrepresented in UNTAET because of difficulties in attracting staff members from these countries. To a significant extent, also, UNTAET’s performance suffered from a shortage of ‘peacebuilders’ with appropriate experience and/or understanding of the

THE UNITED NATIONS AND EAST TIMOR

119

cultural and historical context, with the latter given little weight in recruitment. UNTAET made several experiments with specialized national contingents to address these shortcomings, with varied results. The Australian technical input into the Department of Finance’s Budget Office has generally been assessed positively. The experiment with a Philippines UN police contingent in Baucau received mixed reviews. Shortcomings in understanding East Timor’s situation could have been addressed by more training in the socio-historical situation, and by recruiting more staff from countries with similar cultural or linguistic backgrounds. A principal advantage of UN operations over regional interventions is their universal legitimacy. Regional actors need also to consider national interests which may affect the assistance they provide. On the other hand, peace operations require regional knowledge and understanding of local contexts, particularly when the mandate includes peacebuilding responsibilities. UN peace operations would clearly benefit from a more extensive use of regional expertise in peacebuilding activities.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The views expressed in this essay are solely those of the authors and do not represent the official views of the United Nations. Ian Martin is responsible for the first three sections of this essay, which draw upon his Self-Determination in East Timor: the United Nations, the Ballot and International Intervention (International Peace Academy Occasional Paper, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001). Alexander Mayer-Rieckh is responsible for the sections on UNTAET and UNMISET.

NOTES 1. For a detailed account of the events in 1975, see Jill Jolliffe, East Timor: Nationalism and Colonialism, St. Lucia: Queensland University Press, 1978. For a comprehensive review of East Timor’s history and resistance struggle, see James Dunn, East Timor: A Rough Passage to Independence, NSW: Longueville, 4th edn, 2004; John G. Taylor, East Timor: the Price of Freedom, London: Zed Books, 1999. 2. For an account of the resistance movement from its leader’s perspective, see Sarah Niner (ed.), To Resist Is to Win: The Autobiography of Xanana Gusma˜o, Richmond (Aus): Aurora Books, 2000. 3. For details, see Don Greenlees and Robert Garran, Deliverance. The Inside Story of East Timor’s Fight for Freedom, Crows Nest, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2002. See also the main negotiator’s own account, Jamsheed Marker, East Timor: A Memoir of the Negotiations for Independence, Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2003. 4. For the text of the agreement, see ‘Question of East Timor. Report of the Secretary General’, UN Doc A/53/951-S/1999/513 (5 May 1999). 5. On the security aspect of the negotiations, see Tamrat Samuel, ‘East Timor: The Path to SelfDetermination’, in Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester (eds), From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003, pp.197–230. 6. ‘Question of East Timor’ (note 4 above), para.4. 7. See John Saltford, The United Nations and the Indonesian Takeover of West Papua: The Anatomy of Betrayal, 1962–1969, London: Routledge Curzon, 2003.

120

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

8. See ‘Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects: Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations’, UN Doc A/55/305-S/2000/809 (21 Aug. 2000). 9. On INTERFET’s intervention see Bob Breen, Mission Accomplished: The Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force, East Timor, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2001. 10. As UNTAET was to include a large military peacekeeping component, lead responsibility for the mission passed from the UNDPA to the UNDPKO. 11. Security Council Resolution 1272, UN Doc S/RES/1272 (1999). 12. On the peacekeeping force and the security sector, see Mike G. Smith, Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002. 13. Centre for Defence Studies, Independent Study on Security Force Options and Security Sector Reform for East Timor, London: King’s College, 2000. 14. On the humanitarian operation, see Chris Hurford and Margareta Wahlstrohm, OCHA and the East Timor Crisis, 1999: An Independent Study for OCHA, New York: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2001. 15. For the debate, see Astri Suhrke, ‘Peacekeepers as Nation-Builders: Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.8, No.4, Winter 2001, pp.1–20; Jarat Chopra, ‘Building State Failure in East Timor’, Development and Change, Vol.33, No.5, 2000, pp.979–1000; Simon Chesterman, East Timor in Transition: From Conflict Prevention to State-Building, New York: International Peace Academy, 2001. 16. See Joel C. Beauvais, ‘Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of UN State-Building in East Timor’, New York University Journal of International Law & Policy, Vol.33, No.4, 2001, pp.74–89; Astri Suhrke, ‘Reason and Reconstruction: the Multiple Logics of UNTAET’, 2001 (unpublished manuscript). 17. On the World Bank and international efforts to build an East Timorese public administration, see Sarah Cliffe and Klaus Rohland, ‘East Timor’s Reconstruction: Successes, Problems and TradeOffs’, CPR Working Paper No. 2, Washington, DC: World Bank, Nov. 2002. 18. On administration of justice, see Hansjoerg Strohmeyer, ‘Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor’, American Journal of International Law, Vol.95, 2001, p.46; Sidney Jones, ‘East Timor: The Troubled Path to Independence’, in Alice Henkin (ed.), Honoring Human Rights Under International Mandates: Lessons from Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, Washington, DC: The Aspen Institute, 2003, pp.115–46; Suzannah Linton, ‘Rising from the Ashes: The Creation of a Viable Justice System in East Timor’, Melbourne University Law Review, Vol.25, 2001, pp.122– 80. 19. ‘Question of East Timor’ (see n.4 above), para.42. 20. ‘Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor to the Secretary-General’, UN Doc A/54/726-S/2000/59 (31 Jan. 2000), para.47. 21. ‘Resolution of the Commission on Human Rights’, UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/1999/S-4/1 (27 Sept. 1999), para.4. 22. See Amnesty International, ‘Indonesia and Timor-Leste: International responsibility for justice’, AI Index ASA 03/001/2003, accessed at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ ENGASA030012003. See also International Center for Transitional Justice, Intended to Fail. The Trials Before the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court in Jakarta, New York: ICTJ, 2003, accessed at: www.ictj.org/asia/easttimor.asp. 23. On the serious crimes process see items in n.18 above. See also Suzannah Linton, ‘Cambodia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice’, Criminal Law Forum, Vol.12, 2001, 185 –246; Suzannah Linton, ‘New Approaches to International Justice in Cambodia and East Timor’, Review of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Vol.84, No.845, 2002, pp.93–119; and Judicial System Monitoring Programme, ‘Justice in Practice: Human Rights in Court Administration’, Nov. 2001, accessed at www.jsmp.minihub.org/resources. 24. Information on the commission and its proceedings is at: www.easttimor-reconciliation.org. 25. Mergawati Zulfakar, ‘Malaysian Quits as UNTAET Chief-of-Staff’, Kuala Lumpur Star, 9 Jan. 2002, accessed at: globalpolicy.org/security/issues/etimor/2002/0109resign.htm. 26. ‘Security Council Resolution 1410’, UN Doc S/RES/1410 (2002), para.2(a). 27. Lester B. Pearson Peacekeeping Center, Conference on the UN in East Timor: Lessons Learned, Montreal, 16 May 2002; UNITAR–IPS– JIIA, Conference on UNTAET: Debriefing and Lessons, United Nations University, Tokyo, 16–18 Sept. 2002; International Peace Academy, ‘You, the People: Transitional Administration, State-Building and the United Nations, Conference Report, New York: IPA, 18–19 October 2002’, accessed at www.ipacademy.org; and King’s College London, A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change, London: King’s College, 2003, pp.215–324, also at ipi.sspp.kcl.ac.uk/peaceoperationsreview.

Conclusion: Asian Norms and Practices in UN Peace Operations AMITAV ACHARYA

This collection of essays has offered a timely focus on the changing nature of UN peace operations in Asia. They point to three major trends. The first is reflected in the two important analyses of the Cambodia and East Timor operations. While many of the salient test cases of the changing nature of UN peace operations have taken place in Africa and Europe, Asia has not been far behind. The growing complexity of such operations is reflected, first and foremost, in Cambodia, where, between 1991 and 1993 the UN carried out its largest peace operation to date under the framework of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). It was also among the first major moves beyond peacekeeping to peacebuilding, involving a more elaborate and complex set of missions than ever previously undertaken by the UN. This in itself mirrored the changing nature of peacekeeping in the aftermath of the Cold War. As Yasushi Akashi, the then UN Special Representative for Cambodia put it: ‘To a larger extent than in previous operations in UN history, UNTAC . . . combines within itself elements of peacekeeping, peacemaking, economic and social maintenance and nation-building . . . Cambodia provides a new model of multi-faceted UN activity in an independent state [which] . . . if successful, will constitute a precedent that may well be followed in various situations around the world’.1 East Timor marked another turning point in the history of UN peace operations in the Asia Pacific region. While UNTAC was a Chapter VI-based operation, in East Timor, the multinational force, International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was a Chapter VII-based operation. The creation of INTERFET as an enforcement operation was somewhat ironic; the threat posed to INTERFET by local militias (with poor training and armaments) was far less than the risk to UNTAC personnel in Cambodia.2 In any case, the Security Council resolution authorizing INTERFET

122

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

stressed that the multinational force should be ‘replaced as soon as possible by a UN peacekeeping operation’. The East Timor operation reflected the increased willingness of the UN Security Council to authorize peace enforcement operations that included the use of force by military coalitions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. This trend was inspired by the experience of Rwanda, and the realization that Chapter VI operations which restricted the mission of peacekeeping forces may be less likely to realize their objectives than Chapter VII operations. As an enforcement operation, East Timor could also be seen as a test case for the shift in the emerging norm of humanitarian intervention from a right to intervene to a ‘responsibility to protect’. A second development in UN Peace Operations in Asia is the emergence of new actors able, and more importantly, willing to be engaged in substantial peace operations. Two such actors have been profiled in this volume and are especially important. The first is China. It was in Cambodia that China’s peacekeeping role came of age. As Jianwei Wang notes, China ‘not only underwrote the operation politically . . . but also sent a military unit to participate’, in contrast to its previous involvement, which began in 1990 when it only sent military observers. This was politically and symbolically important for China, as it came at a time of increasing regional anxiety about the rise of Chinese power. China had been seen as a reluctant player in regional multilateralism, and had expressed misgivings about the proposed regional multilateral security organization, which turned out to be the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Hence, participation in a regional operation has helped China to demonstrate its intentions and role as a constructive regional and international player. The second regional actor which has emerged as a serious role player in UN peacekeeping is Japan. Japan’s interest in peace operations was influenced by both its new international outlook and its changing domestic politics. Among these factors was the opportunity to be taken seriously by the international community, and enhance its chances of gaining a permanent seat in the UN. It also signifies Japan’s efforts to recast itself as a ‘normal’ country. More controversially, Japan’s engagement in peace operations, which entailed changes to its constitution and enactment of new legal frameworks, could be seen as a way of extending its security role and justifying post-Cold War reorientation and expansion – which could be geared to countering China’s rising power and clout in Asia. In Cambodia, Japan’s role was limited to non-military activities. Japanese supporters of the new peace operations role have pointed to the changing threats to international peace and stability. This includes the new threat of terrorism, which necessitated changes to Japan’s anti-terrorism special measures role, which in turn would justify greater involvement in UN peace operations. The major fallout of Japan’s growing role in peace operations is the perception of increased militarism. As noted in Ishizuka’s contribution, Tokyo’s International Peacekeeping Law of 2001 imposes restrictions on the Self-Defense Force’s participation in PKOs. Japan has tried to diffuse criticism of the law by working closely within the UN framework. The emergence of Japan as a new player, the growing participation of Southeast Asian countries in peacekeeping, along with the continuing roles of South

CONCLUSION

123

Asian nations and China, may suggest that Asia could, if it so wishes, become selfreliant in meeting the need for peace operations in its own backyard. After all, with so many nations with large militaries and police forces available for peacekeeping, why should the region be looking for help from outside, even from the UN? But this is far from the reality, and leads to a third observation about developments in UN peace operations in the region: one that concerns the role of regional institutions in undertaking collective peace operations. The initial expression of ideas about regionalizing peace operations concerned peacekeeping, or specifically the creation of a regional peacekeeping force. The idea briefly surfaced in the early 1990s, when ASEAN redefined its security role and launched the wider regional grouping, the ARF. The 1995 concept paper for the ARF included ideas for establishing a regional peacekeeping centre, but this has never been seriously pursued. Discussions on regional peacekeeping were held under the auspices of the ARF (such as the ARF Inter-Sessional Meetings on Peacekeeping Operations held in Kuala Lumpur during 10 – 14 March 1997 and in Auckland during 7 – 11 April 1997. But in the end it was decided not to establish any formal extension of such discussions under the auspices of ARF – probably because of concerns among members that it might make the ARF too intrusive, given that regional peacekeeping operations in Asia are likely to involve intrastate conflicts. The ARF has been, and remains a highly sovereignty-bound organization, limiting its activities to confidence-building and preventive diplomacy, and avoiding any operational measures in the security arena. For example, its role in regional preventive diplomacy is limited to inter-state conflicts only. Later, in 2002, Indonesia pushed for regional peacekeeping cooperation under the auspices of an ASEAN Security Community. But the idea has been opposed by other ASEAN members, Singapore and Vietnam. Singapore’s Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar argued in March 2004 that ASEAN was the ‘wrong entity’ to play a peacekeeping role, since it was neither a security nor a defence organization. In similar fashion, Vietnam’s Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien stated that it was ‘too early’ to consider setting up a peacekeeping force, and that such a force would be highly problematic because ‘each country has its own policy about politics and the military’.3 This outcome is unsurprising for several reasons. The most important is the continuing salience of state sovereignty and non-interference. These would be important considerations in any peacekeeping operation, but they are especially critical if the main actors in the peace operation are drawn from neighbouring states. These concerns about sovereignty have continued to shape debates not just about peacekeeping in its traditional sense, but also about the newer concepts of humanitarian assistance and intervention. Given that Asia now has a wider range of personnel and resources to mobilize in supporting such operations, the most significant barrier to peace operations in Asia, whether undertaken regionally or under the auspices of the UN, is normative, rather than lack of resources. This normative barrier dampens hopes of Asia crossing the newest and most difficult frontier in the evolutionary trajectory of UN peace operations: humanitarian intervention.4 This is evident in Asian responses to The Responsibility to Protect: The Report of the International

124

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

Commission on Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty.5 The report makes a major contribution towards defining the norms of humanitarian intervention so as to make it more legitimate as well as efficient. It redefines humanitarian intervention as a responsibility (first, of the state concerned, and failing that, of the international community), and not a right of outsiders (however they purport to represent the international community at large). The ‘right to intervene’ framework is unhelpful, because it stresses ‘the claims, rights and prerogatives of the potentially intervening states’ over the ‘the urgent needs of the potential beneficiaries of action’, and because it fails to capture the broader tasks of prevention and follow-up peacebuilding that must accompany intervention.6 The decision to intervene should be made from the perspective of those needing support and not those providing it. And protection would carry a broader meaning than simply an obligation to react; it would also encompass the equally important and parallel obligations to prevent and rebuild. Asia’s response to the concept of humanitarian intervention in general and the Responsibility to Protect report in particular has not been especially welcoming. Some Asian governments and intellectuals have raised the issue of double standards, albeit in a self-serving manner; on matters of humanitarian intervention, the developing countries would have precious little say over the Security Council decisions – a concern raised in many of the essays in this volume. In this view, humanitarian intervention is the prerogative of the strong against the weak; it can never be attempted against powerful states. They disregard Kofi Annan’s view, shared by the report, that the fact that you cannot act everywhere is no reason for not acting when you can.7 But without adequate Security Council reform, especially relating to the veto, it might be difficult to separate the responsibility to protect from traditional great power politics. Asian reactions to the Responsibility to Protect have been lukewarm despite the fact that the report offers a very high threshold of intervention, calling it ‘an exceptional and extraordinary’ measure which can only be triggered in the event of large-scale loss of life and ethnic cleansing, and would not be justified in other cases, including natural disasters, democratic breakdowns, or conflicts that do not produce ‘serious and irreparable harm’ to human beings. Asia remains a more sovereignty-oriented region than other parts of the developing world. It has no regional norm, of the kind that exists in Latin America, against military takeover of civilian governments. It has no regional human rights mechanism. In adopting its approach to preventive diplomacy and mediation, ARF, the only multilateral security institution in Asia, has expressly ruled out involvement in intra-state conflicts. Soft interventionist concepts, such as ‘constructive intervention’ proposed in 1997 by the then Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, and the idea of ‘flexible engagement’ proposed in 1998 by the then Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitswuan, which sought to go beyond the traditional notion of sovereignty and non-interference, have been rejected.8 Humanitarian intervention is thus the next ‘frontier’ for Asia in its grudging acceptance of UN peace operations. And there is not a great likelihood of this frontier being crossed in the near future. East Timor demonstrated the unwillingness

125

CONCLUSION

and inability of ASEAN countries to collectively assist, or put pressure on, Indonesia, owing to lack of resources as well as its adherence to the outmoded regional doctrine of non-interference. And in spite of the current initiative by Indonesia for an ASEAN peacekeeping force to be established, it is doubtful, given the East Timor experience, whether any future government of Indonesia will seek the involvement of the international community in Aceh, even for humanitarian assistance purposes. In Myanmar, short of clear proof of the Junta’s complicity in largescale loss of life and ethnic cleansing, the international community would be hard pressed to meet the Responsibility to Protect’s ‘just cause’ criteria. In the face of inconclusive and conflicting evidence on the nature and extent of humanitarian crisis and political violence in Myanmar, diplomatic debates about intervention there would remain highly controversial. In conclusion, it hardly needs to be stressed that Asian governments generally accept the UN rather than regional organizations as the primary agent of peace operations and humanitarian protection. For Asian regional institutions, the key task would thus be to engage in conflict prevention, or responsibility to prevent, while leaving the UN to undertake military protection. NOTES 1. Cited in Amitav Acharya, ‘Cambodia, the United Nations and the Problems of Peace’, Pacific Review, Vol.7, No.3, 1994, pp.297– 308. 2. Steve Ayling and Sarah Guise, ‘UNTAC and INTERFET – A Comparative Analysis’, accessed at: www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/pacific2001/aylingpaper.htm. 3. ‘Asean’s Peace’, The Straits Times (Singapore), 8 Mar. 2004. 4. The discussion of this report borrows heavily from the author’s previous article: ‘Redefining the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol.56, No.3, Nov. 2002, pp.373– 82. 5. The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, Dec. 2001. 6. Ibid., p.16. 7. Kofi Annan, ‘Two Concepts of Sovereignty’, The Economist, 18 Sept. 1999. 8. Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia; ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, London: Routledge, 2001, pp.151–7; and ‘How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism’, International Organization, Vol.58, No.2, Spring 2004, pp.239–75.

DIGEST Editor: Alexander Ramsbotham The Digest is produced by the UN and Conflict Unit, United Nations AssociationUK, using UN and News Agency sources. PEACEKEEPING MISSION UPDATES: May–July 2004

UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN KOSOVO (UNMIK) Security Situation In a 30 April report to the UN Security Council on the situation in Kosovo, Secretary-General Kofi Annan reported widespread violence in March, led by Kosovo Albanian extremists against the Serb, Roma and Ashkali communities as part of an organized, widespread and targeted campaign. Properties were demolished, public facilities destroyed, communities surrounded and threatened, and residents forced to leave their homes. Some 19 people were killed – 11 Kosovo Albanians and 8 Kosovo Serbs – and 954 people were injured. In addition, 65 international police officers, 58 Kosovo Police Service (KPS) officers and 61 personnel of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) suffered injuries. Around 730 mainly Kosovo Serb houses were damaged or destroyed, as well as 36 Orthodox churches, monasteries and other religious and cultural sites and property of KFOR and the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Sporadic attacks were continuing at the time of writing. The violence was sparked by the earlier deaths of a Kosovo Serb youth and then of at least two Kosovo Albanians. These incidents were themselves preceded by widespread demonstrations by Kosovo Albanians in response to arrests by UNMIK police of former members of the former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the arrest of four members of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) in connection with the murders of Kosovo Albanians. With the possibility of further violence KFOR and UNMIK police were maintaining a high level of visibility and there had been over 260 arrests in connection with the violence. The initial response by the leadership of the Provisional Institutions was ambivalent, at times even condoning the violence and exploiting it for political gain, including to promote independence and the transferral of competences from UNMIK. Some officials in municipalities may have also actively encouraged the violence. Later in April, under international pressure, Kosovo Albanian officials within the Provisional Institutions and other political leaders collectively condemned the violence and promoted unity among communities. A fund was set up to help repair damage and UNMIK was helping with reconstruction. Observations Kofi Annan lamented the serious damage to the process of normalization and reconciliation in Kosovo caused by the violence, which also undermined the timetable for

DIGEST

127

successful implementation of the standards that the international community had set for the province and threatened regional destabilization. He stressed that the violence underlined the need for concrete action by Kosovo’s leaders and people to implement measures that ensured that it would not be repeated, including efforts to address the causes of the violence. The Secretary-General further asserted that Kosovo Albanian leaders, as representatives of the largest community in Kosovo, were responsible for promoting the rights of all communities. UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN LIBERIA (UNMIL) Deployment of the Mission The Secretary-General’s report to the Security Council on Liberia of 26 May stated that the arrival of troops from Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Pakistan, as well as units from China and Sweden in late March and April had enabled the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) to deploy throughout most of the country. The Mission’s troop strength stood at 14,131 as at 18 May, and the arrival of more troops from Senegal and Ethiopia would raise the strength to its full authorized strength of 15,000 by late June. As at 18 May, the UNMIL civilian police stood at 720 personnel – 481 civilian police officers and two formed police units. A third formed unit was due in June and UNMIL had requested a fourth unit. UNMIL’s civilian police component was expected to attain its full strength of 1,115 in July. Security Situation and Implementation of the Ceasefire The ceasefire was largely holding following the deployment of UNMIL troops in all counties in Liberia. Security remained fragile, as the disarmament process was still incomplete, while intra-faction disputes continued to cause tension, particularly within the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). The presence of UN troops, police and Liberian police continued to help improve security in Monrovia. Monitoring the Peace Agreement The three mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement – the Joint Monitoring Committee, the Implementation Monitoring Committee and the International Contact Group on Liberia – all noted that both the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) and the National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA) were making sincere efforts to discharge their statutory responsibilities. Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) UNMIL re-launched the DDRR programme on 15 April and the disarmament process subsequently proceeded at all sites without major problems. As at 18

128

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

May, some 17,485 combatants had been disarmed since 15 April, together with 5,689 weapons and an estimated 930,806 rounds of ammunition and 7,667 pieces of unexploded ordnance. Overall, since December 2003, 30,975 combatants had been disarmed (around 58% of the estimated total of 53,000), 14,368 weapons had been surrendered, along with an estimated 3,648,474 rounds of ammunition and 10,317 pieces of unexploded ordnance. However, it appeared that some heavy weapons were being smuggled across the borders of Liberia. UNMIL and partners were now focusing on reintegration, including shortterm ‘bridging programmes’ to absorb ex-combatants pending the availability of long-term reintegration programmes. Additional resources were urgently required for this process, however. Security Sector Reform and the Rule of Law As at 1 May, 3,492 members of the Liberian National Police (LNP) had been registered and the process was due to be completed by September 2004. So far, UNMIL had trained 530 LNP officers. A Rule of Law Implementation Committee was established to coordinate the reform of the police, the judiciary and correctional institutions. UNMIL and other partners were cooperating to address major problems in the legal and judicial system. Restoration of State Authority With the support of the UNMIL civil affairs component, the Minister of Internal Affairs established a task force for the restoration of civil authority to formulate a phased and gradual deployment of government officials to all counties. Since early April, UNMIL began to deploy civil affairs officers in various parts of the country who were initiating contacts with existing local and traditional authorities and other groups. UNMIL continued to monitor progress made by the NTGL to launch mechanisms to ensure the proper management of two key natural resource industries, diamonds and timber, which were subject to UN sanctions. Elections Independent elections were planned for no later than October 2005. An assessment mission to develop proposals on the UN’s role in supporting the electoral process concluded that the UN would need 32 international posts, 11 national professional posts and 49 national general service staff for one year in the UNMIL electoral unit, as well as 92 national general service staff to work in the unit’s data centre for five months. Some 220 UN Volunteers would also be needed, as well as 4,080 temporary registration staff for six months. UNMIL was to be guided by two key objectives: (a) to assist the conduct of credible elections with all necessary expertise; and (b), to leave behind a Liberian election management body that would rely less on international assistance for elections following those scheduled for October 2005.

DIGEST

129

Human Rights and Humanitarian Situation The UNMIL human rights and protection component continued monitoring and reporting in all areas of the country where State authority was established. It worked with the Ministry of Justice to resolve the long-standing problem of overcrowding in prisons and police holding cells in Monrovia. The humanitarian situation and humanitarian access had both improved, but living conditions in urban areas remained poor. There were an estimated 300,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in camps, an increase following the recent spontaneous returns of Liberians from neighbouring countries. Large-scale operations to assist refugee returns were unlikely to begin until after the rains had subsided in October.

UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN COTE D’IVOIRE (UNOCI) Peace Process Reporting to the Security Council on 2 June on the Situation in Coˆte d’Ivoire, Kofi Annan stated that, despite some initial encouraging signs in the peace process, violence, unrest and political in-fighting were severely threatening the LinasMarcoussis peace agreement and process. A violent demonstration in Abidjan in late March, in which there were considerable casualties (over 100 by some estimates) and many injuries, prompted the opposition Forces Nouvelles (FN) to rule out any possibility of disarmament or a return to the Government of National Reconciliation (GNR) as long as President Laurent Gbagbo remained in power. A newly-formed opposition coalition, the ‘Coalition des Marcoussistes’, also presented conditions for resuming dialogue with the President, including the establishment of an international commission of inquiry to investigate human rights violations committed in connection with the recent violence. A commission was subsequently established by the UN. It concluded that the demonstration was in fact a carefully planned and executed operation by Ivorian security forces targeting opposition parties. The commission recommended that: . .

.

.

. .

.

the perpetrators be investigated; an International Commission of Inquiry be established to investigate human rights abuses since 19 September 2002; the UNOCI mandate be expanded to include protection of witnesses to the March violence; the establishment of a mixed human rights court, including international judges; the dismantling and disarmament of all armed groups; ensuring more effective protection of human rights in Abidjan towards elections in 2005; and a country-based UN special rapporteur or other independent expert.

A new International Commission of Inquiry was consequently being established in line with the recommendations.

130

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

To reinvigorate the peace process, an international delegation travelled to Coˆte d’Ivoire from 15 to 20 April, which urged President Gbagbo to support his Prime Minister, to give greater freedom for ministers to appoint aides and to dismantle immediately parallel government structures. It urged all parties to refrain from violence and called upon the FN to expedite the disarmament process. However, following this visit, the further deterioration of the political climate, which culminated in FN leader Guillaume Soro withdrawing all remaining representatives from the capital, continued to heighten tension in the country. Deployment of UNOCI On 4 April, UNOCI officially replaced the UN Mission in Coˆte d’Ivoire (MINUCI). ECOWAS troops were re-hatted under the UN command and control structure. As at 25 May, UNOCI’s troop strength stood at 3,004 of a total authorized strength of 6,240 military personnel. Virtually all troop deployments were scheduled to be completed by the end of July. After ensuring a balanced deployment in the ‘zone of confidence’ dividing Coˆte d’Ivoire, UNOCI would focus on establishing positions in critical and volatile areas north and south of the zone. UNOCI also had 49 civilian police as at 19 May. Their priority was the establishment of a national training programme and restructuring for the National Police and Gendarmerie, as well as the deployment of civilian police officers. However, tension remained very high and violence continued, not helped by the ongoing de facto partitioning of the country which also contributed to instability, and there were fears of a resumption of civil conflict. Contacts between the FN and the Forces Arme´es Nationales de Coˆte d’Ivoire (FANCI) had ceased entirely. Observations Kofi Annan reiterated the seriousness of the tension in Coˆte d’Ivoire, which was a threat both to the country itself and to the whole sub-region. He cited full implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement as the only way forward. Political rhetoric and posturing, the lack of effective cooperation within the GNR, deliberately restrictive interpretations of Linas-Marcoussis and the de facto partitioning of the country, coupled with threats of recourse to violence, were the major threats to stability. Instability was exacerbating humanitarian conditions and further weakening the economic situation. Annan asserted that the UN could neither impose nor enforce peace, but could only help to restore it: it was up to the Ivorian parties to fulfil their obligations under the contract made with the international community in the UNOCI mandate and the peace agreement. SUDAN On 3 June, Kofi Annan reported back to the Security Council in response to a request for him to initiate preparatory work on possible UN support for the implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement between the Government

DIGEST

131

of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Annan stated that he had established an Interdepartmental Task Force (ITF) on the Sudan to follow the peace process closely and serve as a forum for developing a UN common strategy, as well as dispatching a preliminary assessment mission which visited the Sudan and Kenya from 27 November to 16 December 2003. The mission consulted with the parties at all levels, as well as with other key stakeholders such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) mediation team. The Secretary-General’s Special Adviser, Mohamed Sahnoun, visited the region in March 2004, while UN technical experts had been in the Sudan since late April 2004 to carry out logistics planning and assessments. Peace Process The Government and SPLM/A reached agreement on the remaining three protocols on powersharing, the areas of Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile, and Abyei. These completed a series of six agreements – the result of almost two years’ work – and represented the parties’ commitment to conclude negotiations with a comprehensive peace agreement as soon as possible. Annan highlighted the complexity of the final peace agreement, combining arrangements on ceasefire and security arrangements, wealth-sharing, power-sharing and the future administration of three areas in the centre of the country, and that it was to be implemented over a long six-and-a-half year interim period. The Secretary-General voiced concern over the lack of inclusivity within the peace process beyond the two main parties, and so it was essential for the parties to promote acceptance of the process beyond their immediate constituencies. Even so, inevitable ‘spoilers’ of the process would provide serious challenges to a UN operation supporting its implementation, as did the sheer size of the country – comparable to Western Europe – and total lack of infrastructure in the south. Proposed Advance Team The precise tasks and configuration of a monitoring and observation operation in the Sudan were still being defined. However, based on agreements and understandings concluded thus far, they would likely include: . . .

.

. . .

Political affairs/good offices; Monitoring of ceasefire and security arrangements; Support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and their associates; Facilitation of development and humanitarian activities, regarding refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs); Civil affairs; Coordination of support for capacity-building; and Monitoring and assistance in: police and rule-of-law institutions; human rights and child protection; coordination of mine action activities; electoral assistance; and public information.

132

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

Logistical difficulties and political fragility underlined the importance of having a framework reception capability in place to ensure a smooth and timely deployment of the mission commencing as soon as possible, and assessments indicated that a phased deployment would be needed. As a first step, Annan was augmenting the current small group of UN personnel in the Sudan with the immediate deployment of additional support staff. He urged the Security Council to approve a UN advanced team, into which this group would then be subsumed. Given the operation’s probable multidimensional character, the advance team should include experts in all of the above listed areas, liaison officers, security staff and a strong mission support element. It would ensure cohesive preparations with the UN country team and would establish high-level contacts as well as working relationships with the parties on the ground. The advance team would include up to 25 military liaison officers and military support elements. Liaison officers would be deployed to the main envisaged sectors, establishing military contacts with the parties on practical preparations and as far as possible promoting liaison arrangements between parties’ armed forces. The mission support element would need to be robust to support effectively the technical planners and also for the continuation of practical administrative and logistical preparations for deployment of the mission, including: .

. .

surveying and preparing reception and staging areas, deployment sites and communications relay sites; pre-positioning critical equipment; and identifying qualified local staff.

Annan intended to appoint very soon the senior leadership of a future UN peace operation, including a Special Representative and two Deputy Special Representatives to lead preparations, as such key appointments made at this stage would help ensure continuity between ongoing negotiations and the later implementation phases, and would help facilitate quickly the deployment of a new UN Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator, in the light of the present humanitarian emergency. The advance team would need the full cooperation of the parties, including all necessary privileges, immunities and facilities and unrestricted freedom of movement throughout the Sudan. To confirm the parties’ commitment, Annan would initiate consultations on a draft agreement as soon as the Security Council had authorized the advance team. Observations While welcoming progress in the peace agreement between the Government and the SPLM/A, Kofi Annan warned of three areas where there remained reason for concern: 1. that the parties implement agreements in good faith; 2. that they use their influence to bring to an immediate halt the violence in Darfur and elsewhere; and

DIGEST

133

3. that the international community understand that peace was contingent its continuing and constant engagement, which demanded extensive investment and funding. Annan reiterated deep concerns about ongoing fighting in the Shilluk region in the Upper Nile region in south Sudan and in other parts of the south, and especially the catastrophic situation in Darfur.

DOCUMENTATION SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1547 AHEAD OF A POSSIBLE UN PEACE OPERATION IN SOUTHERN SUDAN Adopted by the Security Council at its 4988th meeting, on 11 June 2004 ‘The Security Council, Welcoming the signature of the Declaration on 5 June 2004 in Nairobi, Kenya, in which the parties confirmed their agreement to the six protocols signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), and reconfirmed their commitment to completing the remaining stages of negotiations, Commending the work, and continued support of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in particular the Government of Kenya as Chair of the Subcommittee on Sudan, in facilitating the peace talks, and recognizing the efforts of the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team, the Joint Military Commission in the Nuba Mountains and the Verification and Monitoring Team supporting the peace process, and expressing its hope that IGAD will continue to play a vital role during the transitional period, Reaffirming its support for the Machakos Protocol of 20 July 2002 and subsequent agreements based on this Protocol, Reaffirming its commitment to the sovereignty, independence and unity of Sudan, Recalling the statements by its President (S/PRST/2003/16) of 10 October 2003 and (S/PRST/2004/18) of 25 May 2004, Condemning all acts of violence and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by all parties and expressing its utmost concern at the consequences of the prolonged conflict for the civilian population of Sudan, including women, children, refugees and internally displaced persons, Urging the two parties involved to conclude speedily a Comprehensive Peace Agreement and believing that the progress now being made in the Naivasha Process will contribute to improved stability and peace in Sudan, Welcoming the Secretary-General’s report (S/2004/453) of 7 June 2004, 1. Welcomes the Secretary-General’s proposal to establish, for an initial period of three months and under the authority of an SRSG, a United Nations advance team in Sudan as a special political mission, dedicated to preparation of the international monitoring foreseen in the 25 September 2003 Naivasha Agreement on Security Arrangements, to facilitate contacts with the parties concerned and to prepare for the introduction of a peace support operation following the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement;

DOCUMENTATION

135

2. Endorses the Secretary-General’s proposals for the staffing of the advance team and requests in this regard the Secretary-General to conclude all necessary agreements with the Government of Sudan as expeditiously as possible; 3. Declares its readiness to consider establishing a United Nations peace support operation to support the implementation of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Council recommendations for the size, structure, and mandate of this operation, as soon as possible after the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement; 4. Requests the Secretary-General, pending signature of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement to take the necessary preparatory steps, including, in particular, pre-positioning the most critical logistical and personnel requirements to facilitate the rapid deployment of the above-mentioned possible operation principally to assist the parties in monitoring and verifying compliance with the terms of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement as well as to prepare for the Organization’s role during the transitional period in Sudan; 5. Underlines the need for an effective public information capacity, including through local and national radio, television and newspaper channels, to promote understanding of the peace process and the role a United Nations peace support operation will play among local communities and the parties; 6. Endorses the conclusions of the Secretary-General with regard to the situation in Sudan, in particular Darfur and the Upper Nile set out in paragraph 22 of his report, calls upon the parties to use their influence to bring an immediate halt to the fighting in the Darfur region, in the Upper Nile and elsewhere, urges the parties to the Ndjamena Ceasefire Agreement of 8 April 2004 to conclude a political agreement without delay, welcomes African Union efforts to that end, and calls on the international community to be prepared for constant engagement including extensive funding in support of peace in Sudan; 7. Requests the Secretary-General to keep it informed of developments in Sudan, particularly on the Naivasha negotiation process, the implementation of the peace process and the execution by the advance team of its mandate, and to submit a report to the Council no later than three months after adoption of this resolution; 8. Decides to remain seized of the matter. DECISION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE AFRICAN UNION ON THE AU OBSERVER MISSION TO DARFUR Taken at the Third Ordinary Session of the AU Assembly, 6 – 8 July 2004 ‘The Assembly: 1. REITERATES its serious concern over the prevailing situation in the Darfur Region of The Sudan, particularly the Humanitarian crisis and the continued reports of violations of human rights, including attacks against civilians

136

UN PEACE OPERATIONS AND ASIAN SECURITY

committed by the Janjaweed militia and other non regular armed groups, and reiterates the need to bring to justice all those responsible for human rights violations in Darfur; 2. NOTES THAT, even though the humanitarian situation in Darfur is serious, it can not be defined as a genocide. The Assembly further notes that the crisis should be addressed with utmost urgency to avoid further escalation; 3. WELCOMES the measures taken by the GOS to protect the civilian populations, facilitate the work of the humanitarian agencies and NGOs and provide them with unrestricted access to the affected populations. The Assembly welcomes the commitment by the GOS to disarm and neutralize the Janjaweed militia and other armed groups and urges the GOS to follow through these commitments; 4. STRESSES that the African Union should continue to lead these efforts to address the crisis in Darfur and that the International Community should continue to support this effort; 5. COMMENDS President Deby of Chad for his mediation efforts, undertaken with the support of the AU Commission and other partners. The Assembly calls on all concerned to vigorously pursue their efforts; 6. WELCOMES the establishment of the cease-fire commission in El Fashir as of 9 June 2004 and the partial deployment of the AU military observers in the Darfur Region and urges the Commission to expedite the process, including the deployment of the protection force; 7. DECIDES to increase the number of AU Observers to a minimum of 80 and decides that the protection force should be deployed immediately. In this regard, the Assembly welcomes the willingness of the GOS to cooperate with the AU Protection Force and its commitment to provide overall protection to the Mission. The Assembly urges the Member States concerned to contribute Observers and troops for the AU Mission as a matter of urgency; 8. AGREES that the rebel forces should be cantoned at mutually agreed sites and that the militia and all other outlaw groups should be disarmed by the GOS, and that these two operations shall be carried out simultaneously and monitored by the AU Mission; 9. UNDERLINES the centrality of a political solution and agrees that the political dialogue should resume on the scheduled date of 15 July 2004, at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa, with the view to reaching a political agreement. Such an Agreement would create conditions for the convening of the all-party conference provided for in the N’Djamena Humanitarian CeaseFire Agreement. The Assembly urges all parties to the meeting to participate at the highest level, to ensure that decision will be reached. In this respect, the

DOCUMENTATION

137

Assembly urges the Commission with the assistance of Member States and other partners, to ensure that the rebel movements participate in the meeting at the highest level, to avoid delays; 10. URGES the parties to strictly respect the provisions of the Cease-fire agreement and create conditions for the speedy and urgent return of refugees and IDPs. The Assembly urgently appeals to the International Community and Member States to extend full support to this process by providing the much needed humanitarian assistance; 11. ACKNOWLEDGES the Agreement signed between the Government of The Sudan and the United Nations which is consistent with the AU Peace efforts; 12. REQUESTS the Chairperson of the Commission to follow this matter as a matter of a priority and report to the Peace and Security Council regularly’.

INDEX

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 29, 33 Aceh 3, 8, 28 – 32, 35, 37 – 8, 69, 125 Aceh Merdeka 31 Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front (ASNLF) 31 Acharya, Amitav 121 – 5 Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA) 67 Ad Hoc Court 115 Afghanistan 15, 20, 23 – 4, 41, 61 –2, 66, 75, 82, 85 Africa 17, 20, 26, 79, 100, 121 Agenda for Peace 51, 67 Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict 93 Akashi, Yasushi 59, 64, 67, 121 Amnesty International 31 Anglo-Dutch Treaty 30 Angola 17, 20 Annan, Kofi 18, 21, 105, 109 – 10, 126, 129 –32 anti-militarism 68, 70 Anti-terrorism Bill 60 – 1 Appeals Chamber 95 Aquino, Cory 33 – 4 Armacost, Michael 57 Arroyo, –33 Asahi Daily 58 ASG 34 –5 Asia Foundation 43 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 47, 109 Asian Development Bank (ADB) 94 Askandar, Kamarulzaman 5, 7 – 9, 28 –40 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); Cambodia 98; China 84; Declaration of Concord 29; East Timor 109; Economic Community 37; Free

Trade Area 49; High Council 49; Japan 68–9; NGOs 42–3, 45, 47–8, 52; norms 123, 125; operations 6–7, 9; People’s Assembly 9; regional perspective 28–30, 35–6, 38; Security Community 123; Socio-cultural Community 37; Standing Committee 29; Surveillance Process 45; Way 49 Association of Southeast Asian Nations People’s Assembly (APA) 47 Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum (ARF) 7, 25, 36, 42, 122 – 4 Association of Southeast Asian Nations Security Community (ASC) 7, 37, 49 attitudinal congruence 49 – 52 Australia 36, 104 –6, 108 – 10, 113, 115, 117 Austria 68 Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) 34 Baker, James 57, 61 Bali 7, 28, 36 – 7, 47 Bali Concord II 37 Balkans 79 Banerjee, Dipankar 5, 8, 15 –27, 36 Bangladesh 21, 108, 127 Bangsa Moro 32 – 4 Batam 47 Baucau 119 Belgrade Embassy bombing 83 Bobonaro 65 Bonn Agreement 23 Bosnia 4, 17, 20, 49, 90 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 59 Brahimi, Lakhdar 18 Brahimi Report 4 –5, 15, 19 – 21, 23, 25, 35, 63, 74 –5, 77 –8, 83, 85 Bretton Woods 19

INDEX

Britain 30 –1, 64 Brookings Institution 21 Brunei 3, 28 buffer zones 4, 16 Bush, George Sr 56, 61 Buzan, Barry 91 Caballero-Anthony, Mely 1 –14 Cambodia 3 – 4, 6 –7, 11 –12, 26; China 75; East Timor 121 –2; human security 88 – 103; Japan 57, 63 –4, 66, 68; Mine Action Centre 95; NGOs 41, 43, 46; regional perspective 35, 38 Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) 96 Canada 8, 18, 66, 68– 9, 109 capital flight 19 Caucasus 17 Cavalima 65 ceasefire arrangements 4, 8, 32, 38, 60, 95, 98, 127, 131 Central America 20 cessation of hostilities agreement (COHA) 32 chequebook diplomacy 11, 57 Chhang, Youk 99 China 3, 7, 10 – 11, 21, 28, 66, 68 – 9, 73 –87, 98, 109, 122 –3, 127 civil wars 1, 9, 90, 92 civilian-military operations coordination (CMOC) 42– 3, 49 –52 Clinton, Bill 67 Cockell, John 90 Cold War 1 –3, 16, 122; Cambodia 92, 99 –100; China 73 – 5, 77, 80; East Timor 121; Japan 57, 59 –60, 69; NGOs 41 – 3, 45, 47, 52; regional perspective 28, 38 collaborative human security (CHS) 12, 88 – 103 Colombia 63 Commonwealth of Independent States 17 Communist Party 58, 75 Comprehensive Review of Peacekeeping Operations 23

139 comprehensive security 2 Constituent Assembly 113 Constitution; Germany 59; Japan 10, 56 –7, 59 constraints 35 –8, 42, 47 – 8 contractors 43 Cordillerans 32 Core Group 106, 108 corrective measures 18 – 23 Cosgrove, Peter 110 Cote d’Ivoire 129 –30 Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) 48 counter-terrorism 48 –9, 60 –2 crisis management 83 – 5 Cultural Revolution 75 Cyprus 75 Darul Islam 31 decision-making 5 – 7, 21, 29, 41, 49, 77, 79, 83 Decolonization Committee 105 demobilization 25 – 6, 51, 92 –3, 95, 112, 127 –8 Democratic Kampuchea (DK) 92, 95 Democratic Republic of Congo 17, 77 Democratic Socialist Party 58 Deng Ziaoping 81 Department for National Unity 30 Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 13, 16, 19, 23, 62, 68, 75, 78, 110, 118 Dili District Court 115 disarmament 4, 25–6, 51, 92, 95, 127–8 Dobson, Hugo 68 doctrinal challenges 4– 5, 25 drug smuggling 7, 45, 49, 88 Dutch East Indies 31 East Asia 3, 99 East Timor 3, 7, 11–13, 17; China 81–2; Consultative Commission 107; Japan 62–3, 65–6, 69; NGOs 41–3, 45–6, 50; norms 124–5; Popular Consultation 104; regional perspective 29, 38; state-building 104–22

140 East Timor Defence Force (FDTL) 112 East Timor Police Service (ETPS) 112 Edsa Revolution 34 El Salvador 59 Electoral Commission 107 elites 5, 32 – 3, 42, 46 – 7, 52 environment 47, 90 Eritrea 17 Estrada, Joseph 34 Ethiopia 17, 127 ethnic cleansing 1, 90, 125 ethnic relations 16, 25, 30, 43 Europe 17, 20, 30, 66, 121 European Union (EU) 7, 94 Evans, Gareth 18 exchange rates 19 Executive Committee on Peace and Security 19 exit policies 23 Extraordinary Chambers 93 –5 Falintil 106 – 7, 112 Falintil Reintegration Assistance Programme (FRAP) 112 Fiji 110 Financial crisis 2, 6, 9, 45, 47–8, 73, 80 Five Principles 58, 60, 62 – 4 Foreign Ministry White Paper 57 Forum-Asia 43 –4 Fourth Generation 81 France 64, 91 Free Aceh Movement 29 Free Papua Organization 29 FUNCINPEC 92, 96 Galaxy Project 78 Gbagbo, Laurent 129 – 30 General Assembly 8, 15, 18 – 21, 23, 74, 95, 97, 104 –5 Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) 29, 31 –2 Germany 59, 68 Gerombolan Pengacau Keamananan (GPK) 31 Ghana 21 Gill, Bates 21

INDEX

Glennon, Michael 26 globalization 19, 47, 82 Goh Chok Tong 69 Golan Heights 56, 59, 62 – 3 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 69 GRP 34, 38 Gulf War 11, 56 – 9, 61, 69 Gusmao, Xanana 107, 114 Habibie, B.J. 105 – 7, 109 Hainan Island 83 Haiti 90 Hashimoto, Ryutaro 59, 67 Henri Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue 31 Herzegovina 17, 20 High Level Panel 24 Holland 30 – 1, 68 Howard, John 109 – 10 Hu Jintao 73 Human Development Index 96 human rights 4, 8, 19, 129; Cambodia 88–9, 91, 93–4, 96–7, 99; East Timor 105, 114; NGOs 43–4, 47; regional perspective 32, 37; trends 21, 26 Human Rights Development Report 24 Human Rights Watch 95 human security 2, 12, 24–5, 47, 88–103 human trafficking 7, 45, 49 humanitarian intervention; Cambodia 90; East Timor 112; NGOs 41 –2, 45 –8, 50 –2; norms 122, 124; security 4, 6, 8, 10; trends 21 Ibrahim, Anwar 124 India 3, 21, 23, 66, 96, 108 Indonesia 3, 7, 13, 19, 28 –31; East Timor 104 – 10, 112 – 15, 117; Japan 65; NGOs 45 – 8; norms 123, 125; regional perspective 37 information gathering 64 Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies 2 institutional developments 45 –9

141

INDEX

Integrated Mission Task Force 116 Inter-Sessional Meetings on Peacekeeping Operations 123 Interdepartmental Task Force (ITF) 131 interfaith dialogue 48 Interim Authority 20, 23 International Commission on Intervention and State Security 6, 90 International Court of Justice 7, 29, 37 International Crisis Group 43 International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) 12, 50, 104, 109–11, 121 International Forum on Southern NGO Capacity Building 44 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 19, 94, 109 International Peace Cooperation Law (PKO) 11, 57 – 8, 60 – 5, 67 – 70, 78 International Peacekeeping Law 122 Iraq 8, 15, 20, 24, 36, 41, 56 – 7 Ireland 66, 69 Irian Jaya 29 Ishizuka, Katsumi 10 – 11, 56 – 72, 115, 122 Islam 21, 30 – 1, 33 Israel 63, 75 Italy 117 James, Alan 66 Jammu 23 Japan 3, 10 – 11, 56 –72, 98 – 9; East Timor 106, 108, 110, 115; Institute of International Affairs 57; National Institute for Defense Studies 64; norms 122 Java 31 Jiang Zemin 74 Jianwei Wang 122 Johor, Straits of 28 Joint Assessment Mission 114 Joint International Observers Group 93 Joint Peacekeeping Training Centre for the Asia-Pacific Region 69 Jordan 21

Kaifu, Toshiki 56 –7 Kalimantan 29 – 30, 37 Kant, Immanuel 88 – 9, 97 Karzai, Hamid 23 Kashmir 23 Kenya 21 Khmer Empire 91 Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF) 92 Khmer Republic 92 Khmer Rouge 63, 89, 92 – 3, 95, 97 – 9 Koizumi, Junichiro 60 – 1, 69 Komeito Party 58 Korea 3, 16, 59, 108, 110 Kosovo 17, 21, 24, 42, 76, 81, 90, 111, 117, 126 –7 Kuwait 20, 56, 59 Lanao de Sur 34 landmines 92 –3, 95 Laos 3, 94, 99 Latin America 124 Lebanon 75 Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 57 –8, 60 liberalization 19, 46, 52, 98 Liberia 77, 127 –9 Libya 32 life expectancy 90, 97 Ligitan Islands 29 Linggarjati Agreement 31 London Treaty 30 Loya Jirga 23 Macedonia 84 Madura 31 Maguindanao 33– 4 Mahathir, Mohamed 19, 69 Malacca 30 Malaysia 3, 6 – 8, 19, 28 –30, 34, 38, 42, 68 – 9, 108, 110 Maluku 29 – 30, 37 mandates 5–6, 19, 21, 25; Cote d’Ivoire 129; East Timor 104, 109–11, 113, 116–17; NGOs 41, 44, 49–51; regional perspective 38–9

142 Mao Zedong 81 Marcos, Ferdinand 33 Marker, Jamsheed 105 –6 market economies 75 martial law 30, 32 Martin, Ian 12 – 13, 104 –21 Marxism 33 Mayer-Rieckh, Alexander 12 – 13, 104 – 21 mediation 4, 34, 38, 51, 131 Me´dicins Sans Frontie`res 43 Middle East 20, 75, 79 Mindanao 3, 28, 30, 32 – 4; Japan 69; People’s Caucus 35, 38; regional perspective 37, 39 Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM) 32 minimum force 64 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 59, 68 mission creep 51, 73 Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) 23 Misuari, Nur 34 Miyazawa, Kiichi 57 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) 29, 32 – 4, 38 Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) 29, 32 –4 Mozambique 4, 59, 63 Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters 33 multilateralism 3 –4, 10 –11, 29, 45, 57, 75, 81, 83, 117, 124 Muslim Islamic Liberation Front 9 Muslims 3, 29, 32 –4, 109 musyawarah 29 Myanmar 3, 7, 9, 46, 125 Narathiwat 29 National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) 107, 110, 113 – 15 National Electoral Commission (NEC) 97 Natuna Island 29

INDEX

natural disasters 51 neighbourhood watch programme 30 Nepal 21, 75, 108 New People’s Army (NPA) 29 new security concept 81 New York Times 66 New Zealand 65, 106, 108 –9 Nguyen Dy Nien 123 Nigeria 21 Nobel Peace Prize 75 non-governmental organizations (NGOs); Cambodia 91, 94, 96, 99; China 84 – 5; conflict management 41 –55; Japan 65; security 3, 6 –7, 9 –10, 13; trends 19 non-interference/-intervention principle; China 81, 84; East Timor 105 –6; NGOs 42, 46; norms 123 – 5; regional perspective 30, 35 –6, 38; security 7, 9 – 10 non-state actors 9 – 10, 12, 17, 28, 91, 99 Nonviolence International Southeast Asia 43 normal nation status 11, 59 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 7, 17, 49, 66, 81, 85, 100 North Korea 66 Oecusse 65 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 50 –1, 110, 112 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 93 – 4 oil 32 – 3 On-Call List 20 ONUMOZ 59, 63 ONUSAL 59 open-door policy 75 Operation Provide Comfort 41 opinion polls 57 –8, 62 Organization of American States 60, 100 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 44

143

INDEX

Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) 32 –3 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 7, 60, 100 outsourcing 118 Ozawa Commission 57 Ozawa, Ichiro 57 Pacific Century 45 Pacific states 20, 29, 68 – 9, 84, 104 Pakistan 3, 21, 23, 61 – 2, 66, 96, 105, 108, 127 Palestine 75 Pang Zhongying 10, 73 –87 Papua 3, 35 Paris Agreements 92, 94, 98 Paris, Roland 88 participatory regionalism 47 Pattani 29 peace and development ideology 82 Peace Pact 34 peacebuilding 4, 12, 20, 26; Cambodia 90, 92 – 3, 97 – 8; China 82 –3; East Timor 114, 117 –18, 121; Japan 67; NGOs 43; norms 124; regional perspective 32, 35, 37 –8 peaceful rise 73, 81 – 2 peacekeeping 5 – 6, 117 – 18 peacemaking 4 peer reviews 9, 45 People’s Consultative Assembly 106 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 75 Peou, Sorpong 12, 88 –103 Perlak 30 Permanent Mission 21 Persian Gulf 99 Philippines 3, 7 –9, 28 –35, 38 – 9, 46, 48, 108, 110, 115, 119 piracy 7 Pitswuan, Surin 124 planning 117 –18 Poland 68 police 25, 112, 116 –17, 119 population 15 Portugal 30, 104 – 5

poverty 1, 47, 90, 96 – 7 pre-emptive attacks 24 precedents 24 preparations 117 – 18 preventative diplomacy 4, 25 Prevention of Armed Conflicts 18 problems 63 – 5 proportional means 21 Pulau Batu Putih (Pedro Blanca) 28 Ramos, Fidel 34 Ramos-Horta´, Jose´ 113 Ranariddh, Norodom 96 rapid deployment level 20 reasonable prospects 21 Reformist Group 33 refugees 29, 45, 60, 113 regional actors 10 – 11, 25 – 6, 118 –19 Regional Haze Action Plan 46, 49 regionalization 6 –7, 17, 46 – 9, 52 reintegration 25 – 6 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 18, 35 Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations 18, 35 Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict 9, 79 Report of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Armed Conflicts 6, 35 Republic Act 6734 34 responsibilities 2, 36, 73 – 4, 90, 93 –4, 99, 111 –12, 115, 124 Responsibility to Protect Report (RTP) 6, 8– 9, 18, 21 – 3, 35 – 6, 90, 123 – 4 Rice, Condaleeza 66 right intention 21 Round Table conference Agreements 31 royalists 92 Rukun Tetangga 30 Russia 109 Rwanda 4, 8, 17, 21, 63– 4, 122 Sabah 28 safety of personnel 26 Sahnoun, Mohamed 18, 131

144 Sam Rainsy Party 96 SARS virus 45 Sary, Ieng 97 Sasakawa Peace Foundation 3 Saudi Arabia 66 secessionists 3, 45 second front 48 Second World War 21, 59, 65 Secretary-General 4, 8; Cambodia 93, 96 –7; China 77, 79, 84; East Timor 105 – 8, 111, 114, 116; Japan 63; Kosovo 126 – 7; trends 18 – 19, 24 Security Council 5, 8, 11; Cambodia 99; China 74 –5, 77, 79 – 80, 83; East Timor 104, 106, 109 –11, 113 – 14, 116 – 17, 121; Japan 57, 59; norms 122, 124, 130; trends 16–18, 21, 23–4; Working Group 77 security studies 89 See Seng Tan 7, 9, 41 –55 Self Defence Force (SDF) 11, 57 –8, 60 –5, 67 –70, 122 self-determination 104 – 21 Sen, Hun 68, 93, 96 – 7 Senegal 127 separatists 29 – 32, 37, 48 September 11 2001 11, 15, 24, 26, 45, 48, 56, 59 –63, 66 –70 Serious Crimes Investigation Unit 115 Sharma, Kamalesh 116 Sierra Leone 17, 20, 42 Sihanouk, Norodom 92, 97 Singapore 2– 3, 6, 28 – 9, 42, 46, 69, 110, 123 Sipadan Islands 29 Social Democratic Party 63 Socialist Party 58 soft regionalism 42, 49, 52 Somalia 4, 17, 90 Songkhla 29 Soro, Guillaume 130 South Africa 21 South Asia 3, 5, 21 South China Sea 28 – 9 South Korea 61, 68 – 9

INDEX

Southeast Asia 3, 7– 8; East Timor 115; Japan 69; norms 122; Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone Treaty 49; regional perspective 28 – 40 Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) 34 sovereignty 21, 31, 36, 75, 81, 84 – 5, 92, 100, 123 – 4 Soviet Union 75 Spain 30, 32, 91 spare capacity 50 Special Ministerial Meeting on East Timor 109 Special Study Group on Japan’s Role in the International Community 57 Spratly Islands 28 Srebrenica 4, 8, 17, 21 Sri Lanka 3, 66 Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 64 Standby High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) 20 State of Cambodia (SOC) 92 state centrism 9, 42, 46, 52, 82, 89 state-building 104 – 21 strategic interests 21 – 2 Sudan 130 –1, 134 –7 Suharto, T.N.J. 105 Sulu 34 Sumatra 29, 31, 37 supermajority rule 95 Supreme Court 95 sustainable development 19 Sweden 68, 127 Syria 63 Taiwan 3, 10, 28, 66 – 7, 74, 82, 84 Tajikstan 23 Takai, Susumu 64 Taliban 82 Tanzania 63 – 4 Task Force on Kosovo’s Temporary Administrative Authorities 81 Tawi-Tawi 34 Taylor, Paul 80

INDEX

terrorism 7 – 9, 21, 26, 28; Japan 60 –2, 66, 70; NGOs 45, 48 – 9, 52; norms 122; regional perspective 34, 36 Thailand 3, 7 – 8, 28 – 9, 31 – 2; Cambodia 91; East Timor 108, 110, 115; Japan 63; NGOs 46; norms 124; regional perspective 38 think-tanks 83 Tibet 10, 74 Timor Sea Treaty 113 Timor-Leste 20, 35, 104, 112, 114, 116 Timorization 114 Track 2 processes 46 – 8 Transitional Administrator 23, 113 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia 29 Trial Chamber 95 Tripoli Agreement 32 – 4 troika formula 29, 45 troop withdrawals 4 UNAMIR 63 –4 Under Secretary-General 16, 23 UNDP 24, 96 unemployment 25, 90 UNIKOM 20 United Kingdom (UK) 24, 66, 106 United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) 56, 59, 62 –3, 65 United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 60, 62 United Nations Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) 19 United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) 12, 104, 106 – 9, 117 United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) 126 United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) 127 – 9 United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) 12, 38, 56, 63 –4, 66, 68 – 9, 104, 116 – 19

145 United Nations Operations in Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI) 129 – 30 United Nations peacekeeping; Cambodia 88–103; challenges 3–10, 24–6; China 73–87; current trends 5, 15–27; East Timor 104–21; evolution 16–17; experience 11–13; Japan 56–72; norms 121–5; regional perspective 28–40; responses 3–10; review 23–4; security 1–14 United Nations Political Office in Bougainville (UNPOB) 23 United Nations Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP) 84 United Nations Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS) 19 –20, 68, 77 –8 United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET); China 76; Japan 62 – 4, 66; NGOs 46, 50; security 12 –13; state-building 104, 110 –19; trends 23 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC); China 75; East Timor 121; Japan 57, 59, 63 –6, 68 –9; Mine Clearing Training Unit 95; security 12; state-building 92 –5 United Nations (UN); Charter 16, 60; Commission of Experts 93; Commission on Human Rights 98, 105, 114; Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation 115; Department of Political Affairs 108; Japan 56 –8; Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations 75, 77; Support Group for East Timor 106; Tajikstan Office of Peacebuilding 23; University 2 – 3 United States (US) 8, 11, 15, 24, 32, 34, 36, 41, 48, 56 – 7, 59 – 61, 66 –7, 70, 75, 82 – 3, 98, 106, 109 UNMIBH 76 UNMOGIP 23 UNPROFOR 64 Uruguay 21

146

INDEX

Vieira de Mello, Sergio 111 Vietnam 3, 28 –9, 91 –2, 94, 99, 123

World Trade Organization (WTO) 75, 97

Wahid, Abdurrahman 31 weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) 24, 49 West Irian 107 West Papua 30, 35 West Timor 65, 111, 113 Williams, Michael 67 Wirajuda, Hasan 37 Wiranto, - 106 World Bank 19, 94, 98, 109 – 10, 114

Xinjiang 10, 74 Xiong Guangkai 81 Yala 29 Yamazaki, Taku 60 Yomiuri Daily 62 Yugoslavia 66, 81 Zaire 63 –4 Zhu Rongji 81