Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects (Asian Security Studies)

TAIWAN’S SECURITY

When Chiang Kai-Shek fled from mainland China, his military was in disarray. Today, it appears to be a modern, well-equipped, and well-trained force. But how capable is it? This book offers the first in-depth explanation and evaluation of Taiwan’s defence forces and infrastructure. The author not only examines in detail each of Taiwan’s military services, with descriptions of their organization, equipment, and personnel but also assesses the defence infrastructure as a whole with a focus on the ongoing attempt to civilianize that organization. As the Taiwan Strait remains the focus of international tension between China and the United States this volume provides essential base-data and evaluation of one of the major participants in this crisis and in this concluding part offers a comparative framework of Taiwan versus PRC militaries, with analysis of likely future developments between the two states, based on that comparison. This book will be essential reading for students of Asian Security, Asian Politics, International Relations, and Security Studies as well as to analysts and policy-makers. Bernard D. Cole served thirty years in the US Navy and is a widely published authority on the Chinese and Taiwan militaries. He holds a PhD in History and has traveled widely in China and Taiwan, including many visits to warships, air force squadrons, and army units.

ASIAN SECURITY STUDIES Edited by Sumit Ganguly Indiana University, Bloomington Andrew Scobell US Army War College

Few regions of the world are fraught with as many security questions as Asia. Within this region it is possible to study great power rivalries, irredentist conflicts, nuclear and ballistic missile proliferation, secessionist movements, ethnoreligious conflicts, and inter-state wars. This new book series will publish the best possible scholarship on the security issues affecting the region, and will include detailed empirical studies, theoretically oriented case studies, and policy-relevant analyses as well as more general works. CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS Alternate paths to global power Marc Lanteigne CHINA’S RISING SEA POWER The PLA Navy’s submarine challenge Peter Howarth IF CHINA ATTACKS TAIWAN Military strategy, politics and economics Edited by Steve Tsang CHINESE CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS The transformation of the People’s Liberation Army Edited by Nan Li THE CHINESE ARMY TODAY Tradition and transformation for the 21st century Dennis J. Blasko TAIWAN’S SECURITY History and prospects Bernard D. Cole

TAIWAN’S SECURITY History and prospects

Bernard D. Cole

First published 2006 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2006 Bernard D. Cole This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006.

“To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Cole, Bernard D., 1943– Taiwan’s security : history and prospects / Bernard D. Cole. p. cm. – (Asian security studies) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Taiwan–Armed Forces. 2. National security–Taiwan. 3. Taiwan–Military policy. I. Title. II. Series. UA853.T28C58 2006 355
.033051249–dc22 ISBN10: 0–415–36581–3 (Print Edition) ISBN13: 9–78–0–415–36581–9

2005022645

THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED TO MY DAUGHTERS, JENNIFER AND MARISSA

CONTENTS

List of illustrations Preface Acknowledgments List of abbreviations Note on transliteration

viii ix xi xii xvii

1 Introduction

1

2 History of Taiwan’s military

13

3 Threat to Taiwan’s security

32

4 Defense organization and administration

52

5 Personnel

72

6 Taiwan Army

91

7 Taiwan Air Force

105

8 Taiwan Navy

119

9 Civil–military relations in Taiwan

135

10 A look ahead

152

11 Conclusion

169

Appendices Notes Bibliography Index

186 192 233 247 vii

ILLUSTRATIONS

Map 1

Taiwan

xviii

Tables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

China’s military regions PLAN ships and aircraft PLA aircraft PLA systems China’s strategic missiles PLA budget Professional courses for civilian officials Taiwan Army equipment Taiwan Air Force equipment Taiwan Navy equipment Self-identity among three generations MND five-year budget plan Taiwan defense expenditures The time–distance factor

viii

33 34 41 46 48 50 85 95 107 122 147 158 173 180

PREFACE

I was on sabbatical leave from the National War College during the 2004–2005 academic year, serving as a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at National Defense University’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), when I wrote this monograph on Taiwan’s military and civilian national security structure. My research was based on many years of study and experience with Taiwan and mainland China. For instance, I both participated in the last US–Taiwan military exercise, in December 1978 (“Shark Hunt XVIII”), and hosted the first visit to the United States by a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ship, in 1989. My goal is to take a wide view of Taiwan’s security situation, focusing on more than military capabilities. Those are important, of course, but really play a secondary role to the political positions and policies of Taiwan and China. The United States also plays a crucial role supporting Taiwan’s independence from China. That status, although not formally recognized by most of the world, including Washington and the United Nations, is besieged by economic, political, sociocultural, and military pressures from Beijing. All of these are considered in this work. I visited Taiwan in September 1999 after a gap of more than twenty years, the first of a series of at least annual visits. More recently, I investigated the state of the Taiwan military and PRC views on that institution during 2004 and 2005, when I had the opportunity to talk with Chinese military and civilian officials, as well as with many Chinese citizens, in Beijing, Qingdao, Xi’an, Shanghai, Xiamen, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong. I also spent several weeks in Taipei, conducting extensive discussions with Taiwan military officers and civilian officials. I visited and discussed the status of Taiwan’s defense forces with Defense Attache Office (DAO) Beijing officers, and at China’s National Defense University, the Academy of Military Sciences, the Chinese Institute of Contemporary International Relations, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Chinese Institute for International Studies, the Chinese Institute for International Strategic Studies, and Tsinghua University in Beijing; at Xiamen University’s Taiwan Studies Center; at the Zhongshan University in Guangzhou, the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, and Fudan University in Shanghai. ix

PREFACE

I was privileged to have interviews with Taiwan’s Minister of Defense and Chief-of-Staff of the Navy, as well as with American Institute in Taiwan officials in Taipei and Washington, DC, and at Taiwan’s National Defense University, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Navy Headquarters, Army Headquarters, Air Force Headquarters, Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff (DCOS), the Cross-Strait Prospect Foundation, the Chinese Association for Policy Studies, the Institute for International Relations, Tamkang University, National Chengchi University, and various other think tank and academic analysts in Taipei. My sessions at Taiwan military units typically began with an office call on a major general (MG) or rear admiral (RADM), followed by sessions with 0–6 and junior personnel. Both military and civilian government officials were interested in my project and almost all eager to participate. I began each session with the “junior” officers by noting that information would be on a “not-for-attribution” basis and that my interlocutors would not be named. I was impressed by the apparent frankness and willingness to engage of almost all the Taiwan military officers I interviewed.

x

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I owe a debt to many individuals who facilitated my work on this book. Many Taiwan and US military officers, government officials, and analysts were extremely helpful but must go nameless. Lieutenant-General Michael A. Dunn, USAF, President of the US National Defense University, authorized my sabbatical during the 2004–2005 Academic Year; my absence from the National War College during that year was approved by its Commandant, Rear Admiral Richard C. Jaskot, USN. I was privileged to join the superb team of fellows at INSS during my sabbatical; the Institute’s Director, Dr Stephen J. Flanagan, was supportive both in terms of encouraging my work and providing funding for travel and research. The collegial atmosphere and staff at INSS was most beneficial. Ms Jean-Marie Faison of the National Defense University library provided superb support. The staffs of the Naval Historical Center and the Center for Military History were also very helpful. The manuscript was read in part or in whole by my chief mentor, Paul H.B. Godwin, and by Monte Bullard, who served for many years in Taiwan and provided particularly helpful insights. Other readers included Kenneth Allen, Dennis Blair, Dennis Blasko, Daniel Blumenthal, Richard Bush, Richard Fisher, Alexander Huang, Ellis Joffe, Roy Kamphausen, Michael McCallus, Eric McVadon, Larry Mitchell, Ronald Montaperto, Alan Romberg, Philip Saunders, Mark Stokes, Michael Swaine, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, and Andrew Yang. Other Chinese scholars and former military attaches readily provided advice and suggestions based on their experience and expertise. Colleagues at the National War College were helpful and supportive, especially Robert Brannon, James Harris, Lee Kass, Theodore Lavin, Harvey Rishikof, B.A. Williams, and Richard Schwartz. Dr Cynthia A. Watson read several drafts of the manuscript with an invaluable editorial eye. Ms Lora Saalman provided expert translation services, and Mr Patrick Bratton was tireless as a research assistant. I owe an incalculable debt to my sister, Lisa. All errors of fact or omission are, of course, strictly my own responsibility. This manuscript represents only my views and may not represent those of the National Defense University or any other agency of the US Government.

xi

ABBREVIATIONS

AAV AAW AB ADIZ ADM AFP AFRC AFSS AIDC AIP AMRAAM AMW AOR APC ASEAN ASROC ASUW ASW ATARS AWACS BG BVR C2 C3 C4 C4I C4ISR CAPT CCIT CDC CDR CEIB

Assault amphibian vehicle Anti-air warfare Air force base Air defense and identification zone Admiral Agence France Presse Armed Forces Reserve Command Air Force Staff School Aero Industry Development Corporation Air-independent propulsion Advanced medium range air-to-air missile Amphibious warfare Underway replenishment ship Armored personnel carrier Association of Southeast Asian Nations Anti-submarine rocket Anti-surface warfare Anti-submarine warfare Advanced tactical airborne reconnaissance system Airborne warning and control system aircraft Brigadier general Beyond visual range Command and control Command, control, and communications Command, control, communications, and computers C4, intelligence C4, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance Captain Chung cheng Institute of Technology Combat Direction Center Commander Communications, Electronics, and Information Bureau xii

ABBREVIATIONS

CEP CGS CIA CIC CINC CIWS CJCS CLC CMA CMC COL CRC CSBC CSIST CSS CV CVBG DAO DCOGS DCS DD DDG DIFAR DOD DPD DPP DSP ETDDC EW FAS FBM FDC FF FFG FMS GA GAO GEN GPS GPWB GRC GSH GWOT HARM

Circle error probable Chief of the general staff Central Intelligence Agency Combat Information Center Commander-in-Chief Close-In Weapons System Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff Combined logistics command Chinese Military Academy Central Military Commission Colonel Central Reorganization Commission China Shipbuilding Corporation Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology Center for Strategic Studies (NDU) Aircraft carrier Aircraft carrier battle group Defense Attache Office Deputy Chief of the General Staff Direct commercial sales Destroyer Guided missile destroyer Directional frequency and ranging US Department of Defense Defense Procurement Division Democratic Progressive Party Department of Strategic Planning Education, Training, and Doctrine Development Command Electronic warfare Federation of American Scientists Ballistic missile submarine Formosa Defense Command Frigate Guided missile frigate Foreign military sales Group Army General Affairs Office General Global positioning system General Political Warfare Bureau Government of the Republic of China General Staff Headquarters Global war on terrorism High speed anti-radiation missile xiii

ABBREVIATIONS

HRD IAEA IAO ICAO ICBM IDF Il INER IO IOC IR IRBM ISR IT IW JAG JCS JDAM JIC JOCC JROTC JTDC KMT KT LACM LANTIRN LCU LTC LTG LY MAAG MAC MAD MCTL MG MHC MIB MIW MND MOFA MOS MP MPC MPH

Human Resources Department International Atomic Energy Agency Integrated Assessment Office International Civil Aviation Organization Intercontinental ballistic missile Indigenous defense fighter Ilyushin Institute for Nuclear Energy Research Information Operations Initial operating capability Infrared Intermediate range ballistic missile Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance Information Technology Information warfare Judge Advocate General Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint direct attack munition Joint Intelligence Center Joint Operations Command Center Junior reserve office training Joint Training Development Center Kuomintang Knot Land attack cruise missile Low altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night Landing craft utility Lieutenant colonel Lieutenant general Legislative Yuan Military Assistance Advisory Group Mainland Affairs Council Magnetic anomaly detection Militarily Critical Technologies List Major general Mine hunter coastal Military Intelligence Bureau Mine warfare Ministry of National Defense Ministry of Foreign Affairs Military Occupational Specialty Military Police Military Police Command Miles per hour xiv

ABBREVIATIONS

MR MRD MSO NCO NDMC NHMP nm NRA NSA NSB NSC NTU OSD OTH PAP PB PGM PLA PLAAF PLAN PLANAF PME PNTR POAM PRC PWO RAD RADM RMA ROC ROCA ROCAF ROCN ROE ROTC RUV RVN SAM SAR SEAD SIGINT SLCM SLOCs SNIE

Military Region Military Resources Department Mine sweeper ocean Non commissioned officers National Defense Management College National health medical plan Nautical mile National Revolutionary Army National Security Agency National Security Board National Security Council New threat upgrade Office of the Secretary of Defense Over the horizon People’s Armed Police Procurement Bureau Precision guided munition People’s Liberation Army People’s Liberation Army Air Force People’s Liberation Army Navy People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force Professional military education Permanent normal trade relations Plan of action and milestones People’s Republic of China Political Warfare Officer Reserve Affairs Department Rear Admiral Revolution in Military Affairs Republic of China Republic of China Army Republic of China Air Force Republic of China Navy Rules of engagement Reserve Officers Training Corps Remotely operated underwater vehicle Republic of Vietnam Surface-to-air Missile Search and rescue Suppression of enemy air defenses Signals Intelligence Sea launched cruise missile Sea lines of communications Secret National Intelligence Report xv

ABBREVIATIONS

SOC SOF SP SPD SS SSM SSN STUFT Su TA TAF TCG TECRO TFG TFS TFW TGC TMIC TN TOSS TRA TVM UAVs USA USAF USMC USN VADM VLS

Special operations command Special operations forces Self-propelled Strategic Planning Department Submarine Surface-to-surface Missile Nuclear powered submarine Ships taken up from trade Sukhoi Taiwan Army Taiwan Air Force Taiwan Coast Guard Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office Tactical Fighter Group Tactical Fighter Squadron Tactical Fighter Wing Taiwan Garrison Command Taiwan Military Industrial Complex Taiwan Navy Tactical Operations Security System Taiwan Relations Act Track-via-missile Unmanned aerial vehicles US Army US Air Force US Marine Corps US Navy Vice Admiral Vertical launching system

xvi

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The Pinyin system is standard for mainland names, titles, and terms, but the Taiwan situation is more complex: I have tried to follow common usage for names and vocabulary, but while the Wade-Giles system predominates, there is no common system of transliteration in Taiwan.

xvii

Map 1 Taiwan.

1 INTRODUCTION

The most dangerous situation in East Asia is that involving Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (the PRC, or China), despite the possibility of North Korea deploying nuclear weapons.1 The issues are relatively simple: Beijing insists that the island of Taiwan has historically been and remains part of China; Taipei maintains that it is independent, although just two dozen or so nations formally recognize Taiwan as a sovereign state.2 The elected government in Taipei is headed by President Chen Shui-bian, leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). In the 2004 presidential election, he defeated former Vice-President Lien Chan of the National People’s Party (KMT) and James Chu-yu Soong of the People’s First Party (PFP). Both Lien and Soong visited the mainland during April and May 2005 as guests of the Beijing government, historic visits that further challenge Chen’s ability to rule effectively. The United States is deeply enmeshed in this dispute, both as the world’s strongest power, with vast interests in Asia, and as guarantor of the Taiwanese people’s freedom of political choice. American support for democracy is an inherent feature of its foreign policy; in China’s case, this for the past century has meant supporting the Republic of China (ROC), even when it was a military dictatorship ruled by Chiang Kai-shek. During the Second World War, President Franklin D. Roosevelt insisted, over the disparaging views of Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin (as well as those of his own advisors), that the ROC be treated as a major world power, and as one of the future “four policemen” he at one point envisioned maintaining peace in the postwar world. This support notwithstanding, China emerged from its Civil War in 1949 as a communist regime, an ally of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, and a selfdeclared enemy of the United States. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, President Harry Truman tried to withdraw the United States from the China situation, with the expectation that Taiwan would be conquered by mainland military forces and that Washington would eventually recognize the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government. The Korean War ended this prospect and the United States reentered the Chinese Civil War in 1950, becoming the arbiter of Taiwan’s fate. During the decades of diplomatic and sometimes military hostilities between Washington and Beijing, the central issue was Taiwan, where Chiang Kai-shek’s 1

INTRODUCTION

ROC government took refuge in 1949. He had been a difficult US ally during the Second World War, and the relationship was often contentious thereafter. The PRC–US relationship changed when the United States did not veto China replacing Taiwan in the United Nations in 1971, and then with President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to Beijing. The United States remained a primary participant in the China–Taiwan situation after this rapprochement began. Washington formally shifted diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, but without conceding that Taiwan was a Chinese province, and with the caveat that any resolution of the island’s status had to occur peacefully.3 As stated by President William Clinton in March 2000, “the issues between Beijing and Taiwan must be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people of Taiwan.”4 China considers its 1949 Civil War victory incomplete without Taiwan’s reunification; the island’s status remains the only issue between China and the United States that might draw these two nuclear-armed superpowers into armed conflict. Although the United States is an important participant in the current dispute between China and Taiwan, this book will concentrate primarily on the two contestants. The US role will be addressed, but as an influence rather than a main player. Events will be offered primarily from the perspective of Beijing and Taipei, not Washington.

The strategic view from Taipei Taipei’s view of its security situation understandably focuses on China’s threat to use military force to prevent Taiwan from becoming formally independent. Taipei describes its defense policy as the prevention of war, maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait, and defending the nation; self-stated guidelines for accomplishing these objectives are all-out defense, modern defense capabilities, effective crisis management, promoting regional cooperation, and the “three assurances policy.” Taipei sees its strategic position as one of “immense geostrategic significance” and the PRC’s potential “gateway to the Pacific Ocean” with “a controlling position over the Taiwan Strait, the Bashi Channel, and adjoining Pacific waters.”5 Its strategy is based on a strong enough military posture to deter China from attacking, with the operational objectives “command of the air and the sea” and the ability to conduct effective ground defensive operations, all through joint warfare.

Physical geography Taiwan lies 90 to 105 nautical miles (nm)6 from the Chinese mainland, a distance well within range of modern missiles and air-launched weapons, but any military campaign against the island would depend on naval or aerospace power. The Taiwan Strait is frequently subject to high winds and seas, tidal ranges up to 15 meters, complex currents, and is susceptible to typhoons during most of the year. It is relatively shallow, with a maximum depth of less than 40 fathoms, and 2

INTRODUCTION

marked by shoals. There are very few suitable landing beaches on either of Taiwan’s coasts; the eastern littoral is characterized by high cliffs and a steep ocean bottom gradient, while the western is marked by wide areas of mud flats.7 Second, the hydrography of the Strait is not conducive to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) operations. The shallow depth, rapid currents, frequent rough seas, often limited visibility, and the high number of fishing and merchant craft create a very high level of ambient noise in the Strait that severely hampers sonar operation. These conditions also affect submarine operations, but they limit ships and aircraft more than submarines. Third, the unpleasant weather conditions that characterize the Strait affect surface ship operations, especially small landing craft, which are typically flatbottomed to facilitate beaching to offload troops and cargo. Poor weather makes embarked troops seasick, makes maintaining formation difficult for the assault ships, increases command and control problems, and would also limit the air support so vital to a successful operation. Good weather would ameliorate these problems and would ease the voyage from the mainland, but would increase the efficacy of Taiwanese patrols. Fourth, the Strait’s narrowness affects both sides. It eases an assault force’s problem, of course, simply because it has a shorter distance to cover, but it also eases the defenders’ problem, since it places them on interior lines and limits the assaulting force’s possible lines of approach. Fifth, and most significantly, geography severely limits Taiwan’s ability to defend against sea and airborne assault. An island 245 miles long by 90 miles wide at its widest point, located no more than 105 nm from the Chinese mainland, greatly outnumbered in terms of manpower and numbers of aircraft and submarines, faces an extremely difficult security situation. In his 2005 New Year’s Day speech, President Chen Shui-bian described Taiwan as confronted by . . . with the escalating belligerent rhetoric and military intimidation from the other side of the strait. . . . the other side remains reluctant in giving up its military intimidation against Taiwan [and] continues its saber rattling and suppression of Taiwan on all fronts. Chen then cautioned the PRC “not to under-estimate the will of the Taiwan people in defending the sovereignty, security and dignity of the Republic of China,” and stated Taiwan would “continue to adhere to our policy of ‘keeping a firm stance while moving forward pragmatically’.”8 China is serious about possibly using military force against Taiwan, but this is not a preferred option. Beijing characterized its approach to Taipei during the period from 1979 to 1995 as offering Deng Xiaoping’s peaceful “one country, two systems.”9 Additionally, the Anti-Secession Law passed by the National People’s Congress in Beijing in early 2005 repeatedly emphasizes “peaceful reunification” through consultation and negotiation.10 3

INTRODUCTION

Taipei’s primary defense focus is on China’s military strength, embodied in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), but also has an appreciation of other regional military actors. Japan’s military was described in 2002 as “efficient, small, powerful, and sophisticated”; South Korea was considered to be “improving [its] overall defense capabilities and establishing a 21st century armed force to work with the U.S. in maintaining regional stability”; North Korea was perhaps surprisingly described as having “won diplomatic recognition from the U.S. and Japan and successfully [entering] the international stage.” Analysis of Russia’s military status focused on arms sales to China and activities in Central Asia, while discussion of the Southeast Asian nations focused on the potential conflict over sovereignty claims in the South China Sea.11 The Ministry of National Defense’s (MND) January 2005 Report on PRC Military Strength, argued that while “the PRC has maintained a state of preparedness for potential military invasion of the ROC. . . . and is promoting military modernization which has made significant advancement in war planning, weaponry and equipment as well as military training” that supports Beijing’s strategy of “preventing independence by military force.” Chinese military action against Taiwan would involve the PLA’s “enormous troops, expansive territory, missile strike capabilities, numerous submarines, massive amounts of weaponry, abundant petrol bombs, [and] swift mobilization.” The MND correctly identifies the keys to the Taiwan Strait military situation as control of the air, command of the sea, and effective command and control. Nonmilitary Chinese tactics might also be employed against Taiwan, to include creation of a “united front” devoted to opposing independence, causing disunity among the island’s population, or courting support from Taiwan businessmen with mainland interests.12

The Constitution on national defense Taiwan’s Constitution has two articles that directly address the role of the military. Article 137 states that “The national defense of the Republic of China shall have as its objective the safeguarding of national security and the preservation of world peace. The organization of national defense shall be prescribed by law.” Article 138 requires that “The land, sea, and air forces of the whole country shall be above personal, regional, and party affiliations, shall be loyal to the state and shall protect the people.” These are supported by Article 1 of the 2000 National Defense Act, which describes “the goal of the ROC’s national defense” as “protecting national security and safeguarding world peace through display of national strength as a whole and building of a national defense military force.” This is described in Articles 2 and 3 of the 2003 National Defense Law as the “utilization of comprehensive national power” and “all-out national defense, involving affairs pertaining to military, civil defense and those in political, economic, psychological and technological domains.”13

4

INTRODUCTION

Three mission areas are identified as guidelines for accomplishing this goal: 1 2

3

preventing war and conflicts by establishing a sustainable defense and deterrence capability; maintaining stability in the Taiwan Strait through dialogue and exchange of security information, transparency in military affairs, and increased mutual understanding on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait; and defending the national territory through military preparedness, effective deterrence, and resolute defense.

The MND is tasked with “effectively using the personnel, material, and financial assets of the nation to maintain combat readiness and strengthen overall defense capabilities, in accordance with the policy of ‘combining national defense with people’s livelihood’ based on the principles of the ROC Constitution,” which in turn requires—and presumably authorizes—“integrating the nation’s military, economic, and psychological infrastructures and promoting popular participation, trust, integrated defense, and overall development to implement comprehensive national defense mobilization” during a security crisis.14 This last responsibility leaves moot the question of the span of MND control, especially in a time of security crisis. Who or what agency declares such a crisis? The ongoing transformation of Taiwan’s security infrastructure, which includes redefining the decision-making process in national security, is addressing that and other troublesome issues, but they are not easy to resolve.

National Security Policy Taipei’s National Security Policy includes sound cross-strait policies and promoting “benign interaction” with the mainland, expanding Taiwan’s international role, developing its economy, promoting “the people’s participation in national defense affair’s” and striving for a “consensus on all-out defense,” promoting the development of advanced technologies in the civilian sector, establishing an autonomous, technologically advanced, dedicated military, and maintaining a democratic governance that protects human rights and is not corrupt.15 Taiwan requires an effective Military Strategy to realize these goals.

Military Strategy Taiwan’s Military Strategy is based on “effective deterrence and strong defense posture,” which includes effective information operations, electronic warfare, effective antiballistic missile capability, gaining command of the air and the sea, and establishing an “all-out defense” that includes popular participation.16 More specifically, the Air Force is responsible for establishing air superiority, the Navy for exercising sea denial, and the Army for carrying out anti-landing warfare.

5

INTRODUCTION

The frequent reference to “all-out defense” undoubtedly reflects uncertainty on the part of Taiwan’s senior civilian and military leadership about both its military’s effectiveness against the PLA and the will of the Taiwanese people to endure a hard military conflict. The first of these concerns is well-founded, and will be investigated in this book. The second—the will of the people—is more difficult to evaluate, but also more important. Taipei’s strategic problem is how to confront an apparently insurmountable geopolitical situation that is further complicated by different views among Taiwan’s military services, including a Navy and Air Force perception that the Army is unjustifiably influential. There are also different views between senior military and civilian leaders.

The offensive option Taiwan’s acquisition of offensive weapons will also be addressed. This strategic issue affects relations among the military services, including efforts to increase jointness among the Army, Air Force, and Navy. The Army has traditionally emphasized the need to defeat a Chinese amphibious assault on the beaches, but this focus blurred during the 1990s and probably changed irrevocably with Chen Shui-bian’s presidency in 2000. In a 1999 Defense White Paper, Chen’s DPP advocated the need to emphasize air and naval superiority, materialize [sic] precision deep strike capabilities. . . . develop joint air/naval operation capabilities. . . . to pre-empt potential aggressions, . . . deploy military forces to conduct naval blockades against enemy’s sea ports and to carry out precision deep strikes against enemy’s inland targets.17 During Chen’s successful 1999–2000 campaign for the presidency, his opponent, Lien Chan, also advocated developing “an intimidating military force” to threaten Beijing.18 Several members of the Legislative Yuan (LY) at the time issued similar calls.19 In May 2000, the new DPP government described a strategic concept of “decisive battle outside the territory,” to halt PLA forces while they were still at sea and in the air, not after they had established a lodgment on the island.20 By 2005, this had led to calls for the capability to attack the mainland to deter Beijing from employing military force against Taiwan in the first place. After more than five years in office, however, the government has done little to fulfill this rhetoric. Advocates for acquiring an offensive capability argue that China would be deterred by the threat of cruise or ballistic missiles poised against cities such as Shanghai or Guangzhou. Some may also believe offensive weapons are more affordable than expensive defensive systems. This may be true for specific weapons, but fails to acknowledge the more important issues of targeting and effectiveness: an ineffectual offensive capability misses the point—literally—if deterrence is not achieved. 6

INTRODUCTION

Arguments against offensive weapons include Taipei’s inability to acquire an offensive force strong enough to significantly impact PLA capabilities; and that attacks against civilian targets would have the opposite of a deterrent effect on Beijing, provoking a devastating attack against Taiwan. This last would be devastating, given Taiwan’s relatively high population density in its urban areas. Finally, the United States opposes Taiwan deploying offensive weapons, and Taipei cannot afford to ignore its only strong supporter and principal arms supplier. The armed forces’ missions are unambiguous: countering blockade operations, defeating amphibious landings, and defending against air threats. All of these require control of the sea and of the air, which are difficult to accomplish. Recent additions to these missions require the military to defeat mainland information warfare (IW) and space systems. A key point in gauging Taiwan’s defense is how it evaluates its own capabilities vis-à-vis the PLA. The MND argues that an “imbalance in cross-strait military strength” will not occur until 2008. Writing in mid-2005, this seems unrealistically optimistic, as will be discussed in Chapters 10 and 11.21

The US role in Taiwan’s defense The US relationship with China since the late eighteenth century had been unique, built on the twin pillars of commerce and religion, with strong diplomatic, military, and Congressional commitment.22 The United States was the first nation to recognize the newly proclaimed ROC, in 1913, when President Woodrow Wilson stated: The government of the United States is not only willing but earnestly desirous of aiding the great Chinese people in every way that is consistent with their untrammeled development and its own immemorial principles. The awakening of the people of China to a consciousness of their possibilities under free government is the most significant, if not the most momentous, event of our generation.23 The CCP’s 1949 assumption of power in China was a traumatic experience for many Americans. The United States has been the guarantor of Taiwan’s status since 1950, when the onset of the Korean War spurred President Harry S. Truman to recommit the United States to Taiwan’s defense. A series of crises in the Taiwan Strait and tensions between the two allies has marked the period since then, with the relationship seemingly set on a terminal course when President Richard M. Nixon visited China in 1972. In many respects, a de facto US–Taiwan alliance has continued even after President Jimmy Carter shifted US diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979 and terminated the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. This continuing relationship is codified in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), passed by Congress in April 1979 and including language designed to mitigate the effects of Carter’s 7

INTRODUCTION

diplomacy. The TRA reflects popular American sentiment, expressed through Congress, for continued support of Taiwan. The activities of American missionaries and the hopes of American businessmen in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries provided the base for this sentiment, which was sustained by strategic American interests during the Cold War, including Taiwan’s substantial support for US military efforts during the Korean and Vietnam Wars. American support is now firmly rooted in the belief that upholding democratic regimes leads the list of US foreign policy priorities.24 The US–Taiwan relationship is managed through the quasi-diplomatic vehicles of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) in Taipei and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Offices (TECRO) in Washington and several other US cities.25 It is also the subject of two formal annual conferences. The US–Taiwan Monterey Talks are conducted in Monterey, California; the US–Taiwan Defense Review Talks, are conducted at various sites. The former conference focuses on defense and military strategy issues, while the latter is concerned largely with armaments acquisitions and defense policy.26

Military equipment The question of future US arms sales to Taiwan was addressed in the August 1982 Shanghai Communiqué between the United States and China, in which President Ronald Reagan agreed that the United States does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan; that US arms sales would not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years; and that the US intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan.27 This agreement was based on the American understanding that China would not employ non-peaceful means against Taiwan.28 US arms sales were reduced from $820 million in 1982 to approximately $580 million by the mid-1990s.29 From 1996 to 1999, however, the United States delivered defense systems and services to Taiwan totaling $7.2 billion, and $4.5 billion during the period 2000 to 2003. Taiwan received the second largest amount of US defense assistance during 1996–1999 (behind Saudi Arabia) and the third largest amount during 2000–2003 (behind Saudi Arabia and Egypt).30 The US role is a basic, perhaps the pivotal, point in the cross-strait situation. Beijing and Taipei both believe their problem could be resolved by a change in US policy. China credits American political support and military sales as crucial support not only for Taiwan’s independence, but as encouraging Taipei to push for de jure independence; Taipei blames American ambiguity for placing the island at continued risk. Both are correct to a degree, but Washington is trying not to commit to either side, seeking to maintain peace and stability in the area.31 8

INTRODUCTION

The following chapters describe and evaluate the components that make up Taiwan’s defensive capability. The focus is on the military equation, including both the uniformed military and the civilian defense bureaucracy. Chapter 2 surveys the history of the Taiwan military, focusing on the 1949–2005 period, with a brief look at the 1923–1949 period. The emphasis is on identifying threads of organization and administration in the origin and maturing of the armed forces that continue to influence Taiwan’s military as the twenty-first century begins. This chapter will include discussion of the US role in China–Taiwan relations from 1972 to the present. The documents of this period, the three Sino-American communiqués (1972, 1978, 1982) and the 1979 TRA contribute significantly to defining Taiwan’s status, but Taipei is neither a signatory nor was it a direct participant in the formulation in any of them.32 PRC, Taiwan, and US leaders have made public statements to supplement these written documents. President Ronald Reagan’s “Six Assurances” to Taiwan in 1982 was issued in the run-up to the third communiqué, and essentially negated the intent of that document as viewed by Beijing. He reassured Taipei that the United States would not 1 2 3 4 5 6

set a date for termination of arms sales to Taiwan; alter the terms of the TRA; consult with China in advance before making decisions about US arms sales to Taiwan; mediate between Taiwan and China; alter its position about the sovereignty of Taiwan . . . and would not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with China; and formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.33

Chinese President Jiang Zemin’s 1995 statement of “Eight Conditions,” spelled out China’s view of the unification process, noting that it 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

opposed an independent Taiwan or any “contravention . . . of one China”; did not challenge the development of non-governmental economic and cultural ties by Taiwan with other countries; would hold negotiations with the Taiwan authorities on the peaceful unification of the motherland; strove for peaceful unification of the motherland; would expand the economic exchanges and cooperation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait; urged that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait should inherit and carry forward fine traditions of Chinese culture; urged that all political parties in Taiwan promote the expansion of relations between the two sides; and stated that Taiwan authorities were welcome to pay visits in appropriate capacities . . . and that Chinese leaders were also ready to accept invitations from the Taiwan side.34 9

INTRODUCTION

President Lee Teng-hui rejected this statement and later emphasized Taiwan’s independence in his “two state” declaration in July 1999. This was received with consternation in Beijing and perhaps in Washington, but such claims of Taiwan independence have become commonplace during the terms of Lee’s successor, President Chen Shui-bian. President Clinton’s enunciation of the “three noes” in a “secret letter” to Jiang Zemin in August 1995 was followed by his public statement in June 1998 that the United States (1) would “oppose” Taiwan independence; (2) would not support “two Chinas,” or “one China, one Taiwan”; and (3) would not support Taiwan’s membership in any organization for which statehood is a requirement.35 President George W. Bush’s April 2001 interpretation of the TRA, in which he said the United States would do “whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend herself ” in the event of an armed attack by the PRC, made a notable impact in the media. Usually overlooked, however, is that the President followed this by stating that “a declaration of independence by Taiwan ‘is not part of the [US’s] one-China policy’.”36 Bush’s statement was followed by his April 2001 approval of the most comprehensive list of weapons systems ever made available for Taiwan’s purchase. These two events seemed at the time to signal an important change in American policy, a change justified by the intent of the TRA to ensure the defense of Taiwan, and by arguments that these weapons were needed by the Taiwan military against the much larger, modernizing Chinese forces. It seemed to indicate a new US view of American responsibilities under the TRA. However, the war against terrorism and Washington’s awareness of growing PRC military and economic power continue to underline US policy. The President’s April and June 2001 signals that American policy toward the defense of Taiwan has fundamentally changed have been clarified by administration statements headlined by President Bush’s December 2003 caution to Taipei: the longstanding US policy of “deliberate ambiguity” toward the China–Taiwan issue remains in effect. Since Chen Shui-bian’s election to Taiwan’s presidency in 2000 and especially since his reelection in March 2004, the China–Taiwan–United States diplomatic environment has been increasingly stirred by Taiwanese claims of sovereignty, American cautions against disturbing the cross-strait status quo, and Chinese refusal to deal with Chen, combined with warnings of military action should he declare de jure independence. None of the three parties are willing to change the status quo in a way inimical to their own interests, and do not even agree on how to define that term. In Beijing’s view, “status quo” means that Taiwan is part of China and negotiations leading to reunification must occur. To Taipei, the status quo is defined as Taiwan’s independence. The US understanding of status quo is less definite, embracing no particular definition of Taiwan’s relationship to the mainland, focusing instead on the maintenance of peace and stability, and support for the island’s democratic system. This reflects Washington’s perception that no 10

INTRODUCTION

mutually acceptable solution to this very difficult diplomatic and military situation is on the horizon. Of all these documents and statements, only the TRA carries the force of US law. While it does not pledge US military assistance to Taiwan’s defense, it does in effect guarantee that any unprovoked Chinese recourse to military (or economic) force against the island would be met by US intervention.37 On the other hand, the three US–PRC joint communiqués have been reaffirmed by every US president since they were signed and they constitute a formal framework for US–PRC relations concerning Taiwan’s status. Chapter 3 describes the military threat to Taiwan, with a brief description of China’s military capability. In addition to the army, navy, and air force, the missile forces of the Second Artillery and the instruments of IW are surveyed. Chapter 4 describes and evaluates Taiwan’s new (c.2000) MND. The important processes of civilianization and depoliticization of Taiwan’s defense establishment begun by Chiang Ching-kuo in 1977 are examined, as are the bureaucratic processes and civil–military relationships that influenced the reorganization. Chapter 5 focuses on the personnel in Taiwan’s defense structure, both military and civilian. This chapter includes examination of the island’s conscription system, training, and the extensive professional military education system. The role of the political warfare officer in this (at least on paper) Leninist military will be examined, especially in relation to the later discussion of civil–military relations on the island. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 are devoted to examining Taiwan’s Army, Air Force, and Navy. The Marine Corps and Coast Guard are also discussed, although the Corps’ existence is endangered; the Coast Guard is an organ not of the MND but of the Executive Yuan. The armed forces’ capabilities will be examined within a framework of Taiwan’s defensive strategy; equipment will of course be described, but more importantly so will individual service cultures and operational art. The army always has been the dominant service in the Taiwan military in terms of leadership, budget share, and governmental influence. Taiwan’s current geopolitical situation, however, has placed the army in a position of severely reduced operational importance; given the island’s maritime environment and the PRC’s concentration on naval and air force modernization, the primary military threat to Taiwan is not susceptible primarily to traditional army capabilities. The Taiwan Air Force (TAF) established a sterling record against the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) during the 1950s Strait crises. This was due to pilot proficiency, but also owed a great debt to US equipment and training. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, the TAF is facing its most daunting challenge, in view of the PLAAF’s increasing inventory of fourth generation Russian designed fighters, the increasing presence of airborne warning and control system aircraft (AWACS)-type aircraft, and its acquisition of modern air-to-air missiles and aerial refueling capability. Additionally, the TAF faces a shortage of pilots and stagnant aircraft acquisition. 11

INTRODUCTION

The Taiwan Navy (TN) is composed of well-found and well-maintained ships. The submarine force is weak, and the naval fixed-wing aviation is almost non-existent—not a minor matter in view of China’s growing submarine force— but operates capable rotary wing assets. TN personnel appear to be well-trained professionals; the questions included in this chapter are whether that force’s training and at-sea experience are sufficiently strong to defend Taiwan as part of a joint military effort. Chapter 9 may be the book’s most important, as it surveys the state of civil–military relations in Taiwan. The evolution of the island’s government from military autocracy to Western-style democracy is a remarkable accomplishment, one almost unique in modern history. How that process proceeds—the developing nature of civil–military relations—will determine, in the final analysis, if Taiwan is successful in maintaining itself as a distinct political entity. Chapter 10 looks at the future, including budget problems, personnel shortfalls, and the steps under consideration to resolve them, strategic options, Taiwan’s acquisition of offensive weapons, and the US role in the current impasse. Examination of Taiwan’s defense organization and military capabilities will be concluded in Chapter 11. The preceding chapters will be summed up, examined, and integrated; material, organization, and military and civilian personnel will be factored into an evaluation of Taiwan’s ability to avoid war and retain its present political identity.

Conclusion The present strategic situation in East Asia is dominated by old issues: SinoJapanese and Korean-Japanese antagonism, unstable conditions on the Korean peninsula, territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, insurgencies in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand, and the dispute over Taiwan’s status. The United States is involved in all these situations, but none is so dangerous or so deeply involves two nuclear-armed superpowers as does that involving Taiwan’s future. There are no apparent diplomatic solutions in the offing; the military instrument of statecraft remains prominent on China’s list of options, although Beijing clearly would prefer peaceful resolution of Taiwan’s status. The PLA has been transformed over the past quarter-century, but is still no match for the US military at sea or in the air. That is not the crux of Taiwan’s military predicament, however, since its own military must be able to offer a credible deterrent to Beijing’s willingness to use military force. US assistance to Taiwan’s military has been a major factor in its growth and capability for more than half a century, and continues to represent a serious and complicated American commitment. Resolution of Taiwan’s status depends in part on Beijing’s policy choices and in part on Washington’s decisions. Taiwan’s military must be strong enough to afford Taipei some freedom of choice, however, if it is to influence its own fate. Whether that fate is forced or peaceful unification with the mainland, or continued de facto or even de jure independence will to a significant extent depend on the Taiwan government’s ability to avoid unjustifiable provocation. 12

2 HISTORY OF TAIWAN’S MILITARY

“The Civil War is not ended: I question whether any serious civil war ever does end.”1

The early years Taiwan’s military descends directly from the Nationalist Revolutionary Army (NRA) educated at the Whampoa Military Academy. Whampoa was founded in Guangzhou in spring of 1924 with “the sole purpose of creating a new revolutionary army for the salvation of China.”2 The academy’s curriculum came primarily from Soviet military and political advisors, and “political indoctrination [was] its most important objective.”3 The academy was a major influence in the organization of both the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) militaries. Sun Yat-sen was titular director and he appointed Chiang Kai-shek as commandant, while Zhou Enlai headed the political department. All officers and students were expected to join the academy’s KMT cell. Chiang led the NRA in the successful Eastern Expedition, which began in February 1925. The Northern Expedition followed from 1926 to 1928, ending with the nominal reunification of China under a central government, a major event in the emergence of both the Republic of China (ROC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The United Front (KMT and CCP) armies accomplished remarkable military and political feats during the early stages of the Northern Expedition, but fell apart in the summer of 1927, when the drive northward against warlords and competing national rulers invested the Yangtze River Valley. Chiang Kai-shek then turned on his erstwhile allies, correctly suspecting them of attempting to take over the revolutionary movement. Chiang initially defeated his communist opponents and continued moving north, aware that he had little time to complete his campaign to unite China under the Republican flag. Chiang often bribed and co-opted warlords and other opponents during his campaign, instead of defeating them in battle. The result was a swift campaign, but also a Nationalist army and republican movement that to a significant extent compromised its revolutionary credentials, a loss never regained. A unified ROC was declared in December 1928, but in some respects was a hollow victory. 13

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The Red Army of Workers and Peasants was organized as the CCP’s formal military force following the end of the First United Front with the Nationalists in 1927. It was heavily influenced not only by Soviet advisors, but also by CCP leaders who had been trained in Moscow. The CCP and the Red Army soon resumed their version of the revolution, with the Nationalists the enemy. Chiang Kai-shek faced both the Red Army and foreign economic, cultural, and diplomatic pressures. British, Japanese, and US ships and troops stationed throughout China made the country, in Mao Zedong’s phrase, a “semi-colony.”4 The foreign military units enforced treaties of extraterritoriality and supported economic and cultural intrusion. To these challenges was soon added Japan’s 1931 seizure of China’s three most northeastern provinces, followed by the outright assault on Shanghai in 1932 and the invasion of northern China in 1937. Chiang was unable to overcome either communist opposition or the Japanese assault, and the KMT lost control of the Chinese revolution. A Second United Front with Mao Zedong’s CCP followed Chiang’s kidnapping at Xi’an in December 1936, but neither Mao nor Chiang placed top priority on fighting Japan. Their primary concern remained winning the revolutionary struggle to unite China. Both at least nominally adhered to Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles of nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihood. Both led armies formed on a Leninist model, in which a hierarchy of political officers attempted to ensure the primacy of political reliability. Both eagerly sought foreign assistance: military advisors and material assistance from Japan, Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States were all grist for the revolutionary mill. Under US pressure, Chiang and Mao conducted talks through representatives in Chongqing during the war, but neither was willing to reach an accommodation on other than his own terms. Chiang especially sought to wring the maximum material advantage from his American ally. He wanted this assistance not as much to fight the Japanese, however, as to hoard it for resuming the civil war after Japan surrendered.5 Mao’s priority also lay with taking control of the Chinese revolution. He was unable to obtain significant US military assistance for the Red Army, but tried to establish a positive relationship with Washington until he became convinced that the United States unwaveringly supported the Nationalists. The efforts and professional abilities of General Joseph Stilwell and others notwithstanding, Chiang allowed his forces to fight the Japanese only when it was unavoidable, preferring the operational delusions of US Army Air Corps Brigadier General Claire Chennault, whose plans did not demand the resources of Stilwell’s more practical campaign.6 Nationalist troops fought well when properly equipped, trained, and led, but were not often afforded that opportunity.7

After the Second World War The Chinese Civil War reblossomed not long after Japan’s surrender in August 1945, although dampened by the year long Marshall Mission, during which 14

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General George C. Marshall, former commander of the US military effort in the Second World War and future Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, tried vainly to bring the two sides together.8 He conceded defeat and was recalled to Washington in January 1947, after which the two sides resumed fighting in earnest. Mao’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as the Red Army was called after 1945, conducted a series of relatively conservative campaigns, ceding territory in favor of achieving political objectives. The PLA captured large quantities of USsupplied weapons from Nationalist troops and also received military equipment from the Soviet troops who forced the Japanese surrender in northeastern China. The United States continued supplying military assistance to the Nationalists and Chiang launched dramatic military movements made possible by US logistical resources, but sometimes taken against the advice of American advisors. By mid1947, the best Nationalist troops had deployed to North China, making them “dependent on a communications network whose disintegration they could not prevent.”9 During the Huai-Hai (Xuzhou) Campaign of November 1948–January 1949, the PLA’s East China Field Army (ECFA) and the Central Plains Field Army (CPFA) of more than 500,000 troops, augmented by 1.1 million civilian laborers, drove south from north China across through the Yangtze Valley, destroying the Nationalist armies as an effective force.10 One observer of this campaign paints an ugly picture of the army in defeat: Rioters raided food stores . . . . at Xuchou where bodies were thrown into open graves, cannibalism was reported . . . . Chiang halted supplies to try to force the garrison to break out, but they made no concerted move . . . . General Du Yuesheng fled disguised as an ordinary soldier; . . . but he was captured. Another general did escape, shedding his uniform and being taken through the lines in a wheelbarrow. . . . On 15 January, after looting the shops, the last Nationalist crossed the Huai River, blowing up the main bridge and killing thirty civilians who were on it at the time. The campaign cost the Nationalists 200,000 casualties. Even more men surrendered or defected. . . . Officials and their families [in Nanking] joined an exodus to the south . . . . Chiang’s eye was now on Taiwan. The PLA crossed the Yangtze without opposition on 20 April 1949.11 The PLA victory was due to many factors, including better military leadership, higher morale, more acute operational decisions in the field, chance, “extensive mobilization of the population to support the war effort,” and not least, poor military judgment by Chiang and his commanders.12 The PLA campaign was a prominent example of Mao’s strategy of “people’s war,” drawing on the resources of the civilian population to defeat an enemy. Ironically, the Nationalists had developed a similar concept during the Kiangsi Period of the mid-1930s, but the Japanese invasion contributed to their inability or unwillingness to again employ the strategy.13 15

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To Taiwan KMT forces had moved swiftly to Taiwan following Japan’s August 1945 surrender. The Army’s 70th Division landed on October 17 and the Japanese garrison officially surrendered on October, 25 which was declared “Taiwan Restoration Day.”14 A crowd estimated at 300,000 Taiwanese greeted the arriving Nationalist soldiers, but their commander, General Keh King-en, disparaged the island’s inhabitants: in a public address, he referred to Taiwan as “beyond the passes” and a “degraded territory” populated by a “degraded people.”15 Despite the welcoming crowd, Keh did face a generally pro-Japanese population; furthermore, removal of Japanese police and troops meant the absence of authorities to enforce the rule of law. Chiang Kai-shek visited Taiwan a year later, in October 1946. An estimated 2 million military and civilian personnel (including family members) had made the crossing to Taiwan by 1949, as part of what was to a degree an inglorious sauve qui peut scramble. The first KMT Governor of Taiwan was General Ch’en Yi, whose primary qualification was his personal loyalty to Chiang; Ch’en immediately announced that the Taiwanese people would not be granted the rights of the new (1947) ROC constitution, but would be ruled under “KMT tutelage.”16 Ch’en’s oppressive regime was marked by the “2–28 Incident,” February 1947. The immediate cause was public reaction to policemen beating a female sidewalk vendor; the larger issue was KMT “governmental behavior that was vastly inferior—more uncivilized, more corrupt, more lawless, and more arbitrary—to that of their Japanese predecessors.” Civilian demonstrators were fired on by army troops “with utmost brutality;” by the end of the incident, as many as 30,000 people may have died, many of them potential future leaders in Taiwan’s civilian society.17 US President Harry Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson had begun moving the United States away from support of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime following the failure of the Marshall Mission in January 1947. The National Security Council (NSC) declared in October 1949, following the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), that “the U.S. Government does not intend to commit any of its armed forces to the defense of the island.”18 The administration was concerned, however, that Chiang’s Congressional supporters would link continued aid with the Marshall Plan request. Hence, a bill for $570 million in economic assistant to the KMT was sent to Congress in February 1948 in conjunction with the funding the Marshal Plan for Europe; it provided “$63 million in economic assistance plus $125 million for the purchase of military equipment.”19 The US Administration presented its interpretation of why the communists had won in an August 1949 White Paper, understandably placing the blame squarely on the ROC’s shoulders: The unfortunate but inescapable fact is that the ominous result of the civil war in China was beyond the control of the government of the 16

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United States . . . . It was the product of internal Chinese forces, forces which this country tried to influence but could not . . . .The Nationalist armies did not have to be defeated; they disintegrated.”20 Truman then declared in January 1950 that “The United States Government will not pursue a course which will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China. Similarly, the United States Government will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces on Formosa.”21 This did little to diminish continued Congressional and public support for Chiang Kai-shek. The “China Lobby” in the United States took many forms and succeeding administrations had to deal with this domestic pressure, while limiting diversion of diplomatic and military efforts from more important Cold War objectives. Chiang had resigned from the ROC presidency before leaving the mainland in 1949, but resumed the office after arriving on Taiwan. He continued a military campaign from Taiwan, with periodic attacks on various targets, not all of them communist. British, Polish, and other non-Chinese merchant ships were attacked; perhaps most egregious was the Nationalist Air Force bombing of Shanghai in February 1950: US supplied aircraft and ordnance were used in this raid, which targeted the American-owned Standard Oil and Shanghai Power Company facilities and resulted in “heavy casualties” among civilians. The State Department was outraged, in part because it was still manning the US Consulate in Shanghai. Taipei’s response to the ensuing protest note was unsatisfactory, but the US Consul-General in Taipei reported that Taiwan’s military leaders “believed that the United States ‘will not retaliate in any serious way almost regardless of what they do’.”22

Korean War In part because Washington interpreted North Korea’s June 1950 invasion of South Korea as the first step in a global communist assault, Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait, nominally to prevent either China or Taiwan from attacking the other, but possibly also in acknowledgment of the continued domestic support for the Nationalist regime. He announced that The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. . . . in these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area. . . . The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.23 17

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Truman’s decision returned the United States to the middle of the Chinese civil war, where it remains. The President directed the US Seventh Fleet based at Subic Bay in the Philippines to prevent the war from spreading to Chinese waters and islands. US Far East Commander General Douglas MacArthur was specifically directed to prevent attacks by either China or Taiwan on the other, and cautioned that “no one other than the President as Commander-in-Chief has the authority to order or authorize preventive action against [China].”24 The aircraft carrier Valley Forge (CV-45), the heavy cruiser Rochester (CA-124), and eight destroyers sortied from Subic Bay to make a show of force along the China coast.25 This flotilla was by 1951 reduced to a destroyer tender anchored in Kaohsiung Harbor and four destroyers, two of which were always on patrol, transiting the Strait 16–20 miles from the mainland. Aviation patrols were also flown daily.26 US ships were stationed in the Taiwan Strait to maintain peace in the area, although in the words of one patrol commander, Chiang Kai-shek “felt all along that his objective was to return to the mainland [while the United States] wanted to keep him there in Taiwan.”27 Mao’s decision to intervene in the Korean War across the Yalu meant the indefinite postponement of his planned invasion of Taiwan. This decision reflected Chinese concern about an allied military presence on its border with Korea, but also apparently resulted to a degree from Mao’s belief that he had to prove himself to Joseph Stalin as a true communist.28 The US strove to isolate the Taiwan situation; despite General Douglas MacArthur’s favorable endorsement, Washington refused Chiang Kai-shek’s offer of 33,000 Nationalist troops to fight in Korea.29

The battle for the islands, 1949–1952 The communist victory was not complete in October 1949, since Nationalist military forces still occupied many islands, as well as some small areas on the mainland. The PLA quickly took the more northern islands of Daxie, Jintang, and Taohua, due in large part to disorganized Nationalist defenders. In fact, the PLA attacks on these and several other islands were poorly planned and coordinated, without effective joint operations among sea, ground, and air forces. Despite their successes, these shortfalls became apparent during the assault on the more ably commanded and better equipped Nationalist force on Jinmen (Quemoy). The Jinmen campaign was launched on the night of October 24, 1949, when more than 9,000 troops of the PLA 28th Army attacked across the water near Xiamen. Planned follow-on support for the amphibious landing units did not arrive, however, and by the 27th the entire invasion force had collapsed after intense fighting. Most of the 9,000 soldiers were killed and the remainder taken prisoner. It was a complete tactical defeat, the first of any significance suffered by the PLA since the Kiangsi campaigns of the mid-1930s. A recent critique by PLA General Liu Yazhou notes that in the battle of Jinmen the 28th Army operations were uncoordinated and unsupported by logistics 18

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forces. KMT planes and ships destroyed the PLA’s 300 military vessels and after a three-day battle not a single PLA soldier or boat escaped. Their lack of air superiority left several thousand PLA troops on the mainland powerless to assist their comrades on Jinmen. The PLA Daily has also analyzed the Jinmen defeat, noting that the assault force suffered from a lack of preparation, shortage of assault ships, absence of experienced crews, inadequate communications, lack of firepower, and a lack of intelligence.30

Taking Hainan Hainan was, after Taiwan, the largest island occupied by the Nationalists after October 1949, and an important objective for Beijing. The PLA learned from the Jinmen disaster; the assault on Hainan was carefully planned and rehearsed, with an emphasis on coordinated operations and massed firepower. Approximately 100,000 PLA troops were placed under the unified command of the 15th Group Army and assembled in staging areas on the Leizhou Peninsula, across from Hainan, in January and February 1950. They landed hundreds of intelligence agents on the island to gather information for the assault force, and communications units were assigned throughout the assault force as part of an effort to overcome the serious command and control problems that had severely hampered the Jinmen operation. The units designated for the initial amphibious attack on Hainan conducted four major amphibious exercises before the operation. Another lesson taken from the Jinmen failure was the inadequacy of using unmodified civilian shipping to carry the assault waves. For the Hainan operation, the PLA modified conscripted civilian ships with sandbags and light artillery. The initial assault itself was conducted under cover of darkness, which enhanced the element of surprise against the poorly organized Nationalist defenders. Poor deployment and disorganized patrol routines by the Nationalist navy resulted in less than half a dozen warships on patrol in the narrow waters between Hainan and the mainland, further enhancing the PLA’s ability to launch a surprise attack. The Nationalist navy suffered significant losses in the naval engagements that did occur, and were unable to hamper the invasion to any significant extent, although they sank several PLA craft. The actual assault was preceded by carefully planned artillery barrages from the mainland that established control of the sea and airspace. The PLA’s first wave of approximately 20,000 troops crossed the strait in almost 400 conscripted civilian ships, many of them armed. They landed during the night of April 16 on several suitable landing beaches, and achieved almost complete surprise; the island was secured by May 1, following additional, largely unopposed, amphibious landings. At least 70,000 Nationalist troops surrendered. The Hainan defeat came at the hands of well-trained PLA troops executing a carefully designed operation plan, but was also due to extremely poor leadership by Nationalist commanders, many of whom abandoned their troops and escaped 19

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to Taiwan. It was a dark episode in the history of the Nationalist army, and further testament to the ineptness and poor morale of that military in the 1950s.

Taipei’s military objectives in the early 1950s Chiang Kai-shek formally resumed the presidency of the remnants of the Nationalist government on March 1, 1950 and instructed the Army “to secure the military’s base in Taiwan before making the move to recover the Mainland.”31 He would never publicly relinquish that goal. Despite its strategic focus on the Cold War, the United States assisted Nationalist incursions against the mainland, primarily through CIA-sponsored operations. One major effort was support of Nationalist remnants that had fled into northern Burma in 1949, although the plan for these troops to invade China’s Yunnan Province was “an unmitigated failure.” The efforts in Tibet and along China’s coast were more productive and sometimes costly to the mainland.32 The enthusiasm of CIA and US military advisors for these Nationalist military efforts was often stronger than that in Washington.33 Eisenhower, Dulles, and other senior American officials were concerned about Nationalist military morale, however, supported forays against the mainland to maintain Taipei’s determination. Chiang Kai-shek used this argument to justify these attacks.34

Taiwan strait crisis, 1954–1955 The Hainan operation was followed by the efficient PLA seizure of several smaller islands; the final, significant phase of this campaign came in 1954, when the PLA secured the Dachen Islands. The Dachen Island campaign began with several weeks of sea and air battles from March through May 1954. China’s East Sea Fleet attacked Taiwan naval forces north of Dachen; over several days, nine Taiwan combatants were sunk, or damaged, and forced to withdraw. The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) was not as successful, although by the beginning of May Taiwan’s Air Force (TAF) had largely withdrawn from the air over the Dachens. Meanwhile, PLA ground forces were conducting the training and rehearsals that had proven so beneficial prior to the Hainan operation. The amphibious assault began in the evening of May 15 with air cover and naval gunfire support. Despite achieving initial surprise, PLA air and naval forces suffered significant losses; these were not sufficient to deter the overall attack, however, and the PLA soon occupied four of the smaller islands in the chain, killing or capturing the defenders. Dachen itself, as well as Yijiangshan Island in the same chain, were attacked in January 1955. Large naval and air forces supported the troops with whom they had trained and rehearsed the operation. Both islands were immediately seized, against numerically weak Nationalist defenders. Under US pressure, Chiang Kai-shek directed the evacuation of the remaining Dachen Islands on January 21. The successful evacuation of 13,701 military 20

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personnel and the islands’ 11,120 civilian inhabitants was made possible by American amphibious ships; US military officers effectively conducted the operation and their reports of uncooperative Nationalist commanders echoed those of earlier US military advisors to Chiang Kai-shek.35 In another echo of earlier Nationalist military shortcomings, the garrison’s junior officers and enlisted personnel for the most part worked hard and courageously, while senior officers and staff stood by. The success of the operation was also due in part to the PLA’s rules of engagement (ROE) imposed by Mao Zedong, which forbade attacks on US units. The Dachens were in PLA hands by the end of February 1955, which effectively ended the islands campaign, although future crises occurred over Jinmen and Mazu (Matsu), as discussed later. China’s announced policy was to “liberate Taiwan and its offshore islands of Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu.”36 Mao ordered an artillery bombardment of these small islands in early September 1954 that lasted for twelve days, but was not followed by an invasion attempt. The PLA began apparent assault preparations on the mainland opposite Jinmen, following the successful operations in the Dachens, but the crisis eased in April 1955 when Premier Zhou Enlai called for talks over the issue at the Bandung Conference of nonaligned nations. Mao misjudged the strength of the US reaction in 1954–1955, and complained: “We fired a few shells on Jinmen and Mazu [actually more than 10,000 were fired]. I did not expect the entire world would be so deeply shocked and the smoke and mist is shading the sky.”37 The United States misjudged Beijing’s intentions in the Strait and the Administration’s threats to attack China with nuclear weapons influenced Mao’s decision to develop a nuclear arsenal. One of the reasons cited by Mao Zedong for bombarding Jinmen and Mazu was to “destroy the chance of the United States concluding the treaty with Taiwan,”38 but in fact Mao’s policy was the primary cause of the December 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and Taiwan. Only Taiwan benefited to a degree from the 1954–1955 crisis. In addition to the treaty, in January 1955 Congress passed the Formosa Resolution, which authorized the President “to employ the Armed Forces of the United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and defending Formosa and the Pescadores (Penghus) against armed attack.”39 The resolution also included the phrase “security and protection of such related position and territories of that area now in friendly hands,” which was intended by Congress to include Jinmen and Mazu.40 The Nationalists, however, were forced off all the islands except the Penghus (Pescadores), Jinmen, and Mazu. The latter two were in a tactically valuable position near the harbors of Xiamen and Fuzhou, respectively, and offered convenient outposts for launching raiders and propaganda against the mainland, but they constituted a significant drain on the Taiwan military. The 1954–1955 crisis had mixed results for the US–Taiwan relationship. While the Mutual Defense Treaty pleased Chiang Kai-shek, Washington insisted that he 21

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not attack the mainland without first obtaining American approval, refused overtly to include Jinmen and Mazu in the treaty’s coverage, and refused Chiang any control over US troops stationed in Taiwan. Chiang, in turn, thought that Washington had reneged on a promise to publicly announce that the treaty covered the offshore islands.41 Neither President Dwight D. Eisenhower nor Secretary of State John Foster Dulles especially favored the treaty with Taiwan, but the 1954–1955 crisis forced them to increase American support to Chiang in the face of what they interpreted as a global communist campaign directed by Moscow, and by popular sentiment in the United States. Military advice to the President was contradictory and often inflammatory; fortunately, Eisenhower’s military credentials were impeccable and his judgment proved correct.42 At times during this crisis, both the President and the Secretary of State spoke directly and forcefully to Chiang, to ensure that the United States was not drawn into a war with China, which some State Department officials thought was the Taiwan leader’s objective.43 After approving the treaty with Taiwan, Eisenhower opined that “This has been a difficult negotiation but the result, I believe, stakes out unqualifiedly our interest in Formosa and the Pescadores [not Jinmen and Mazu] and does so on a basis which will not enable the Chinese Nationalists to involve us in a war with Communist China.”44

Taiwan strait crisis, 1958 The 1954–1955 crisis effectively ended with Zhou En-lai’s statements at Bandung, Indonesia in April, and informal talks in Geneva in August 1955 between Chinese and US ambassadors. Mao resumed artillery and verbal attacks in August 1958, however, that lasted until January 1, 1959. PLA artillery fired more than 400,000 shells at Jinmen and Mazu during this period.45 Beijing probably had several reasons for launching this crisis. First, Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” campaign in 1958–1959 had proven an unmitigated disaster and he may have been seeking a diversion from domestic problems. Second, the coming split with the Soviet Union was already apparent to Mao and he may have been seeking a means either to draw his ally into renewed support of China or, failing this, to demonstrate that Nikita Krushchev’s Soviet Union was no longer deserving as communism’s world leader, a role more appropriate to Maoist China. Third, Mao thought that the Soviet nuclear arsenals and new inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) established something of a nuclear safety net for China; he also proclaimed the acceptability of a nuclear war, directly contradicting Krushchev’s position that such a war was unimaginable.46 Fourth, the international scene in Asia was colored by the still burbling war in Vietnam, insurgencies at various levels of activity throughout Southeast Asia and in Tibet, and US involvement in Lebanon in the summer of 1958. Mao may have also thought that American involvement in the Middle East would limit Washington’s possible responses in support of Taiwan. 22

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Fifth, not only did the US–ROC Mutual Defense Treaty and the Formosa Resolution rankle, but Chiang Kai-shek was actively engaged in the first stages of what he insisted was an eventual effort to retake the mainland by military force. In the mid-1950s, Chiang not only refused to evacuate Taiwan troops from Jinmen and Mazu, but reinforced those tenuously positioned islands, building to a force of more than 86,000 on the former and over 23,000 on the latter, which represented fully one-third of the army.47 Taiwan’s forces also continued making periodic raids on mainland installations, assisting Tibetan insurgents, and resupplying KMT troops in northern Burma and northwest Thailand. The President had little choice but to support Taiwan, given the ongoing Cold War, although Dulles described the situation as “a horrible dilemma.” One apt description of American policy during the decade’s crises over the Taiwan Strait islands is that the “United States slid down [a] slope of uncertainty and apprehension into defense of Jinmen and Mazu.”48 Military support became especially significant in the mid-to-late 1950s, as TAF fighter pilots were provided with heat-seeking Sidewinder missiles that helped them establish and maintain air superiority over the Taiwan Strait. Even more significant was the American provision of nuclear-capable 8-inch howitzers, which were stationed on Jinmen and could easily reach targets on the Chinese mainland. Although nuclear shells were not provided for these weapons, nuclear-capable, 600 mile-range Matador missiles were stationed on Taiwan.49 Sixth, Mao may have been determined to demonstrate China’s independence from the post-Stalin Soviet Union. He ordered resumption of a massive artillery assault on Jinmen and Mazu, which began on August 23, 1958 with a 57,000 shell barrage, while appearing to make preparations on the mainland for an amphibious assault on the islands. The 48,000 PLA troops stationed in the Fuzhou area were believed sufficient to take Mazu, but the 80,000 garrisoned on the mainland near Jinmen were considered far short of the 200,000 needed to occupy that island.50 Eisenhower and Dulles remained concerned that Chiang wanted to drag the United States into war with China, but Beijing probably never intended assaulting Jinmen or Mazu in 1958.51 As was the case in 1954–1955, Mao forbade the PLA from attacking US forces without his prior permission. Despite his claim that “the East Wind is prevailing over the West Wind” in international affairs, Mao wanted to pressure Taiwan, not get involved in a war with the United States.52 Mao once again misjudged the situation. He apparently underestimated Taiwan’s morale and military determination. Not only did the TAF decisively defeat the PLAAF, but the Nationalist troops on Jinmen and Mazu withstood the PLA artillery bombardment with steadfast dedication.53 Washington’s reaction also seemed to surprise Beijing. In the face of a PLAN attempt to blockade the islands to prevent resupply by sea, the President ordered US Naval forces to escort TN ships resupplying the islands and assembled a powerful nuclear-capable task force in the area, including five aircraft carriers 23

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and “all available minesweepers,” while the Strategic Air Command deployed nuclear-capable B-47 bombers to Guam.54 Mao apparently had not believed Dulles’ public statements of January 12, 1954, in which he had threatened “massive [nuclear] retaliation” against Communist aggression.55 Possibly sparked by the public disclosure of the disagreement between Washington and Taipei about maintaining the garrisons on Jinmen and Mazu, Mao decided not to continue threatening to assault the islands. A brief cease-fire was declared by Beijing in early October and succeeded by a strange period during which the islands were bombarded only on even days.56 Washington followed a careful line during the 1958 crisis to deter both Beijing and Taipei. John Foster Dulles insisted that the United States had to defend the Strait islands for symbolic rather than military reasons, but also ruefully observed that the United States was “drifting in ‘very dangerous waters without an adequately prepared chart’.”57 Nuclear attacks against Chinese targets were discussed in an effort to deter China from trying to seize the islands, while Chiang Kai-shek was warned not to attack mainland targets and contingency plans to evacuate Jinmen and Mazu were drawn up. As was the case during most earlier crises, except for the Air Force the Taiwan military demonstrated poor organization and inadequate training in 1958. Extensive US assistance was required to resupply Jinmen and Mazu and some US commanders suspected Taiwan military leaders of deliberately trying to make it appear that US strikes on the mainland were required to save the islands.58 Hence, the JCS issued, President Eisenhower approved, and local American military leaders rigidly enforced strict ROE designed to prevent US clashes with Chinese military forces. In the words of the Commander, US Seventh Fleet, “I think if the ChiNats [Chinese Nationalists] would slow down now on provocative actions that the situation would quiet down.” This view was echoed by the US commander on Taiwan.59 To reduce the chances of an inadvertent war with China, Washington placed US commanders in a position where they could control Taiwanese as well as American military forces, to include preparing to “assume total responsibility for the air defense of Taiwan.”60 In retrospect, Beijing misjudged Taipei and Washington; Washington misunderstood Beijing and Taipei; Taipei floundered through the crises, much as Chiang Kai-shek seemed to have done since 1927. It was not an example of wise statesmanship by either the PRC or the United States, as they allowed a relatively minor player to drive their relationship. Chiang continued to be a difficult ally; his intransigence echoed that of earlier crises: “Taiwan will not be coerced into changing its position because of the allied nations’ attitude, . . . If necessary, Taiwan will fight alone.”61 Despite US advice and pressure to reduce his military costs and the number of personnel in uniform, Chiang insisted on continuing to enlarge his military, maintaining 600,000 personnel under arms and obligating 15 percent of Taiwan’s GNP and fully 85 percent of total governmental expenditures devoted to the military.62

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The US commitment to defend Jinmen and Mazu remained an issue even after the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty deliberately omitted them. It was a prominent point of dispute between John F. Kennedy and Richard M. Nixon during the 1960 presidential campaign debates.63

Taiwan strait crisis, 1962 This episode was more a potential than an actual crisis, since no combat occurred. That was because Washington was determined not to allow Chiang Kai-shek’s provocations to drive its policies, and because of Beijing’s effective deterrent moves. The scene was set by several factors. First, the United States and Japan signed a Mutual Defense Treaty in January 1960, which reinforced Beijing’s fear that they were conspiring against China. Second, Mao’s disastrous “Great Leap Forward” in 1958 resulted in famine and unrest throughout China that lasted into the early 1960s: approximately 30 million Chinese died, perhaps 80,000 Moslems fled Xinjiang Autonomous Region into neighboring Kazakhstan, and about the same number escaped into Hong Kong. Third, the border with the Soviet Union was unsettled. These events apparently contributed to Chiang Kai-shek’s view that he had an opportunity to recover the mainland. In a 1962 Chinese New Year’s speech he stated that Our armed forces have made adequate preparations for the counteroffensive, and, therefore, are capable of moving into action at any time. Have no fear of being alone in rising against the Communists. Have no fear of lack or shortage of supplies or help. Both will be forthcoming once you take action.64 In addition to this belligerent talk, PRC leaders noted an increase in Taiwan’s conscription numbers, visits by senior US leaders to the island, and optimistic newspaper articles in the Taiwan press about recovering the mainland. The newly appointed US Ambassador was Admiral Alan G. Kirk, a Second World War amphibious expert.65 This appointment and official US visits actually were intended to dampen Chiang’s aggressiveness, but apparently sent the opposite message to China. Hence, Beijing transferred an estimated seven divisions of troops into Fujian Province, opposite Taiwan.66 Taiwan did send some commando teams into China, but they were unsuccessful and Washington forced Chiang to back off. The potential crisis was defused by Washington’s pressure on Taipei and through the Warsaw discussions with Chinese representatives that had continued sporadically since 1955. Not only did American representatives tell their Chinese counterparts that the United States would not support a Nationalist invasion, but President John F. Kennedy told reporters that “he opposed the use of force in the area.”67

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Military Advisory Assistance Group From 1951 to 1978, the US Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG) headquartered in Taipei maintained advisors throughout the Nationalist military, growing from 67 personnel in April 1951 to 1,886 by October 1955, before declining to 487 by July 1969.68 The MAAG, formally the 8678th American Advisory Unit, was responsible for assessing, advising, and assisting Taiwan’s military, and assigned advisors down to the division level. MAAG personnel considered China an active enemy, that “a state of war, even though undeclared, exists between the U.S. and China.”69 The MAAG’s 1954 assessment described the Taiwan military as suffering from personnel shortages, especially a “deplorable lack of technicians,” and requiring a “complete reorganization.”70 The army was considered poorly led and inexperienced; the navy was “woefully inadequate,” and the air force was demoralized and manned by poorly trained pilots.71 US advisors were “particularly distressed” by the influence of the Taiwan military’s political warfare officers, believing that they “infringed upon the responsibilities normally assigned other staff functions,” took too much of the available training time, and reduced the military proficiency of the troops.72 They noted after the Dachen evacuation “the reluctance of the Nationalists’ air and naval forces to come to grips with the Chicoms [which] did little to thwart further agree action from across the Formosa Strait.”73 The MAAG quickly generated a plan to create a smaller, combat-effective army of 240,000 troops organized into twenty-one divisions. Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership resisted this reorganization, and the American-style training and doctrinal regime it included. Congress appropriated an immediate package of more than $40 million at the beginning of fiscal year (FY) 1951, followed by an additional $50 million. The FY 1952 military assistance package was more than $237 million.74 Although only $25 million of the Congressionally authorized aid and 30 percent of the material actually reached Taiwan, the MAAG made significant progress improving the armed forces’ effectiveness and morale.75 Both Truman and Eisenhower, and later Kennedy and Johnson, took care to limit the capability and size of the Taiwan military, however, to ensure that Chiang Kai-shek did not build a military force capable of dragging the United States into a war with China. The military improved during the 1950s with American aid, but the Eisenhower administration also continued to keep a tight rein on Nationalist military action against the mainland, despite talk about “unleashing” Chiang Kai-shek. Eisenhower and Dulles mentioned this policy during the 1952 presidential election campaign and, when after the election Eisenhower directed the “removal” of the US Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait, many sources described this as the aforementioned “unleashing.” Nothing of the sort occurred, and the US Navy continued patrolling the Strait throughout the 1950s and 1960s.76 MAAG personnel were involved in all of the crises that occurred in the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s and 1960s. They were initially collocated with the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and played a significant role in reorganizing and training the Taiwan military. The group’s mission had been refined by 1969, 26

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when it was tasked with influencing the GRC [Government of the Republic of China] to maintain and utilize its armed forces in support of U.S. objectives [while] maintaining GRC Armed Forces sufficient, in combination with available U.S. forces, to defend Taiwan and the Penghus.77 The MAAG maintained advisors on Jinmen and Mazu until mid-1976, when they were withdrawn as part of the sharp reduction in American advisors to approximately 600 in 1978, just before the shift of US diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. The MAAG was not the only US military presence in the Taiwan Strait theater during this period; in August 1950, the Far East Command Group in Tokyo sent a group of 37 personnel commanded by Major General Alonzo Fox, one of General Douglas MacArthur’s staff officers, to Taiwan to survey Taiwan’s military needs.78 The US military presence soon evolved into the US Formosa Defense Command in December 1953, under a joint organization commanded by a vice-admiral (the Seventh Fleet Commander).79 The US–Taiwan military relationship was regularized by the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty. The Formosa Patrol Force was renamed the Taiwan Patrol Force in 1957, at the same time that the Formosa Defense Command was renamed the US–Taiwan Defense Command, with a vice-admiral as commander. In September 1958, this command included the US–Taiwan Patrol Force, the assigned US Air Task Force, and the MAAG.80 US military aid to Taiwan was focused on turning the island’s military into a force able to contribute to the war against the international communist threat. The MAAG helped the reorganization and increased effectiveness of the Taiwan military throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s. The navy’s improvement was noted as early as 1957, when US naval officers reported the “excellent performance” by two Taiwan Navy (TN) destroyers and their unit commander conducting joint exercises with US forces.81 In 1969, the US Pacific Commander provided a complimentary assessment of the Taiwan military, which “has grown from a defeated, demoralized and basically unequipped army . . . in 1949 [and] has developed the capability to deter the Chinese Communists from attempting to carry out their avowed threat to ‘liberate’ Taiwan.”82 This evaluation was almost certainly based on a perception framed in terms of conventional warfare, in which the PLA was credited with aspiring to launch a classic amphibious assault against Taiwan. The island’s armed forces hence had as a primary training objective developing the capability to defeat such an invasion attempt.

1962–1995 The Taiwan military grew and modernized after the 1962 crisis, albeit under relatively tight American tutelage. When Chiang Ching-kuo formally assumed 27

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power in the early 1970s and began changing the character of the Taiwan military, he was reacting to dramatic foreign events that impacted the defense of the island. First, the 1969 Nixon Doctrine stated that while the United States would fulfill its treaty commitments and continue providing military assistance and a “nuclear umbrella to its allies,” it would “look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.” Then the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué was issued, in which the United States signaled its rapprochement with China. Finally, the end of the Vietnam War in 1973–1975 led to a much-reduced American military presence in East Asia and a psychological withdrawal from possible intervention in local conflicts. These all changed the basic nature of American support for Taiwan’s military, which had to face a very different strategic arena, from which its major ally might well be absent. This unease was heightened when the 1978 Sino-American Communiqué announced the shift of US diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing, occasioning the end of the 1954 US–ROC Mutual Defense Treaty. This shock to the Taiwan military establishment was eased, however, by rapid passage of the Taiwan Relations Act, spelling out concern for the island’s security and promising continuing military aid. The military seems to have dealt relatively well with these events. The US promise in the 1982 Communiqué with China to “reduce gradually” arms sales to Taiwan was qualified both by President Ronald Reagan’s restatement that the promise was based on peaceful resolution of Taiwan’s status and by his previous “Six Assurances” to Taipei. Hence, although it was a psychological blow, this third communiqué probably had little long-term impact on the volume of US arms sales to Taiwan. One could even argue that it provided reassurance of continued US military assistance, given China’s oft-stated refusal to rule out the use of military force. The end of the Cold War was probably seen in Taipei as more significant to Taiwan’s defense. No longer would Washington see value in maintaining an antiSoviet front with Beijing; Taipei likely was more hopeful of maintaining long-term American support for its de facto independence. The intervening quarter-century has demonstrated Washington’s determination to maintain constructive relations with Beijing, which has led to Taiwan’s diminution in US priorities. On China’s part, the US change served as a palliative to Beijing’s anxiety about reuniting Taiwan. A policy of “peaceful resolution” was adopted, highlighted by the 1993 discussions in Singapore between representatives from Beijing and Taipei. These discussions did not produce a resolution of the issues but were significant in themselves. They have not convened since the 1995 crisis marked by Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States in June.83

Taiwan strait crisis, 1995–1996 The 1995–1996 crisis differed from those of the 1950s and 1960s. China’s choice of military pressure to express its displeasure with Lee Teng-hui’s activities and 28

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democratization on Taiwan intensified the potential for military conflict between the two and drew the US military back into the struggle more strongly than at any time since before the 1972 Nixon visit. Beijing seemed determined to prevent further moves toward independence by Taiwan, to ensure that the world community understood that the island’s sovereignty was not an issue for negotiation or even discussion, and to maintain pressure on Taipei by limiting and reducing international acceptance of its legitimacy. China also had made significant progress in modernizing the PLA, which no longer depended on massive manpower, but was absorbing and deploying modern military technology. Taiwan’s continuing democratization, demonstrated in fall 1995 legislative and spring 1996 presidential elections, increased China’s concern about the island’s growing independence. In an attempt to counter this trend, the PLA conducted missile firings and other military exercises near Taiwan during the summer and fall of 1995, and in March 1996. Most threatening were three PLA exercises during March 8–25, 1996. The first centered on firing medium range ballistic missiles at maritime target areas within a few miles of Taiwan’s major seaports, Keelung and Kaohsiung. Second consisted of live-ammunition naval and air exercises in the waters west of the Penghus. The third phase focused on amphibious exercises in the Mazu area.84 Taipei’s response to China’s military pressure was relatively low key; all elections were conducted as scheduled, with the results apparently unaffected by Beijing’s military demonstrations. The strongest effects were felt in Taiwan’s economic sector, as the stock market “lost one-third of its value” and “$10 billion in capital fled the island.”85 Washington reacted strongly to the PLA pressure with both diplomatic and military means. Demarches were sent and the State Department spokesman described the missile tests as “reckless and potentially dangerous.”86 Two aircraft carrier battle groups were dispatched to the vicinity of Taiwan, a strong force of naval combatants centered around two aircraft carriers. These ships operated approximately 200 nm from the island, close enough to conduct flight operations against Chinese forces, if necessary, and to send a strong signal of American concern to Beijing.87 This naval deployment demonstrated that the United States was serious about upholding the central dictate of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which does not commit the US to come to Taiwan’s defense, but does stipulate that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means; [and] to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means . . . a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.88 Potential misunderstanding between China and the United States was ameliorated by Beijing notifying Washington that no attack on Taiwan was contemplated. High-level discussions in Washington followed, during which China 29

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and the United States “established the boundaries of anticipated movements by both sides.”89 Nonetheless, PLA commanders were surprised and sobered by the strong American response.90 The PLA exercises ended, probably before they were scheduled to, for several reasons, including the US intervention, bad weather, and perhaps because significant training objectives had already been achieved. While this crisis was arrested without the exchange of hostile fire or other dangerous events, it set some parameters for possible future conflict over Taiwan’s status. First, Beijing is almost certainly convinced that employing military force against Taiwan will evoke American intervention. Second, Taipei is almost certainly convinced of the same thing. Third, Washington realizes that despite the flexible wording of the TRA US popular and Congressional support for democratic Taiwan has established a de facto American defensive aegis for the island. China’s reaction has included well-funded PLA modernization to deter Taiwan’s formal independence and to force eventual reunification with the mainland, despite US military intervention. Taiwan’s reaction has included the belief that the United States will defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack under almost any circumstances. For the United States, the 1995–1996 crisis highlighted the dangers of its post-1979 policy of “strategic ambiguity.” While on the one hand still refusing to commit either to Taiwan’s military defense or on the other to agree that the island is or is not part of the PRC, Washington is in the position of trying simultaneously to deter two sides of an apparently intractable political impasse.

Conclusion Taiwan’s military was founded as a revolutionary army in the early 1920s, to save China from imperialist domination and to reunite the nation. The military’s defeat in 1948–1949 by the PLA was the culmination of two decades of accommodation, compromise, war weariness, the loss of popular support, and “the ineptitude of the Nationalist elite.”91 It arrived on Taiwan in the late 1940s as a defeated, lowspirited, poorly led force. When wisely and energetically commanded, the troops fought bravely and effectively, but that leadership was too often lacking, as demonstrated in the loss of Hainan. The 1950–1953 Korean War reinstituted US support and during the next two decades Taiwan’s military was reequipped, retrained, and reorganized. The United States provided enormous amounts of military hardware, ranging from Second World War-era M-1 rifles to U-2 reconnaissance aircraft. Even more important was “software” assistance, including training, organization, and doctrinal development. The United States gained some benefits from rebuilding Taiwan’s military: during the 1950s and 1960s, the Nationalist incursions against the mainland provided an intelligence “window” into the Chinese regime; during the Vietnam Conflict, Taiwan served as a major support base for US forces, especially in the years before 1972.92 The military remained dominated by the army throughout 30

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this period, although US assistance was provided to the island’s entire defense establishment. The Taiwan military’s record during the Cold War was mixed. The ineffective military force of 1949 had by 1989 developed into a modern, capable force, but the intervening forty years were marked by inconsistent performances during several crises. Taipei’s core military strategy was based on a return to the mainland throughout much of this period; Washington simply never believed this goal was achievable and hence, US military support for Taiwan during the Cold War was based on a fundamentally different strategic view from Taipei’s. From the very beginning of Truman’s reluctant recommitment of US forces into the Chinese civil war, therefore, Washington and Taipei had different objectives. For the United States, maintaining a Nationalist regime on Taiwan was a minor campaign in the war against international communism; for the Republic of China, it was literally life or death. Recapturing the mainland has never completely died as a goal in the breasts of some KMT loyalists,93 but was always an unachievable goal for at least three reasons: there has never been convincing evidence that the mainland population would support a KMT return to power, Taiwan’s military has never been able to field a force strong enough to defeat the PLA, and the United States has never been willing to wage major warfare on the Chinese mainland.94 Even before President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to China initiated a fundamental change in the US relationship with Taiwan, the American military mission in Taipei had shifted away from supporting cross-strait military operations. This conclusion is further supported by the termination of dedicated US naval patrols in the Taiwan Strait and US global war plans, which required the US Pacific commander to immediately dispatch most of his forces to the European Command.95 The United States dominated the rebirth of the Taiwan military following the debacle of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Beijing wanted a relationship with the United States separate from that with Taiwan, which it described as “an internal Chinese matter, in which the U.S. government has no right to interfere, nor has it any right to request us not to use force.”96 This was an unattainable objective and in 2005 the United States remains the Taiwan military’s only source of assistance in a world that refuses to recognize the nation it serves. The military’s historical background, marked by ideological dedication and relative oneness with the governing regime, has come up against a reality of political heterodoxy and a new relationship with its governmental masters. The Taiwan military is reorganizing and modernizing to deal with current circumstances, as will be discussed in the following chapters.

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3 THREAT TO TAIWAN’S SECURITY

Taiwan confronts the most basic of threats to its security: a very large, powerful neighbor is determined to deprive it of its sovereignty. There are, to be sure, other concerns that Taipei probably considers “threats,” such as encroachments into areas of traditional fisheries or other maritime resources, control of the airspace defined by the Taiwan Air Defense and Identification Zone (ADIZ), protection of its citizens traveling overseas, and so forth. None of these, however, are as serious as the threat posed by the PRC’s determination to prevent the island’s formal independence and to unite it with the mainland, regardless of the preferences of Taiwan’s people. China refuses to admit formally the influence of the United States in determining Taiwan’s future, a posture eased by the American preference for the status quo. The more than two dozen nations that recognize the island’s sovereignty are not influential participants in Taiwan’s future, since they are small, poor, and militarily weak; none are in a position to assist in the island’s defense. Examining the threat will serve to frame later discussion of the steps Taipei is taking to counter it. How is Taiwan preparing to face the dynamic, increasing Chinese military poised 90 nm away?

Maritime dependency Taiwan is almost completely reliant on the sea for its economic survival, including food and energy. With the exception of the relatively small amount of cargo and goods moving to and from the island by air, the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) lie at the heart of Taiwan’s existence.1 Secure SLOCs are key to the trade that is critical to Taiwan’s economic well-being. Threats to the SLOCs include military concerns (conflicts between regional countries involving naval and air warfare) and nonmilitary conditions (natural disasters and accidents, piracy, and excessive maritime sovereignty claims by regional states).

The military threat from China Taipei’s anxiety about its security results not only from its dependence on maritime communications, but more because of Beijing’s oft-stated willingness to 32

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employ the PLA against Taiwan. Beijing is determined first, to prevent Taipei from declaring independence and second, to return Taiwan to mainland sovereignty. China classifies these goals as vital strategic interests, in support of which Beijing refuses to rule out military action. Several “triggers” for such military action have been delineated at various times; these include a formal declaration of independence by Taipei; Taiwan developing nuclear weapons; invasion of Taiwan by a third country; uncontrolled civic disorder on the island; and most nebulously, Taipei refusing to engage in reunification discussions.2

PLA organization China is currently divided into seven Military Regions (MR), each responsible for the army, air, and naval forces located in several provinces. Each MR is commanded by an Army lieutenant general, although occasionally an officer is left in command after promotion to full general. MR commanders are assisted by several deputy commanders, including the regional air force commander and naval commander (if naval forces are present adjacent to the MR); and a political commissar with a full staff. MR staffs parallel the organization of the PLA’s General Departments; each MR has headquarters, political, joint logistics, and equipment departments. The presence of a “joint logistics department” indicates that this element is intended to provide support to army, naval, and air forces assigned to the region Table 1.3 MR commanders have always been army officers, signifying the continued dominance of that service in the PLA. Assigning a PLAN or People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) officer to command the Nanjing MR, directly across the Strait, might well signify Beijing’s more serious view of the situation, with increased possibility of military action against Taiwan, since any such campaign would rely primarily on naval and air forces, rather than ground troops.

Naval strength The geography of a potential Taiwan conflict is not going to change, but the forces that the parties may bring to bear will. A comparison of current naval strength between China and Taiwan provides necessary background. Table 1 China’s military regions Military region

Areas included in region

Shenyang military region Beijing military region Lanzhou military region Nanjing military region Guangzhou military region Jinan military region Chengdu military region

NE China Capital region and northern China Western China (Xinjiang) SE China (Taiwan, East Sea Fleet) Southern China (South Sea Fleet) Eastern China (North Sea Fleet) SW China (Tibet)

Source: Table by B.D. Cole.

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THREAT TO TAIWAN’S SECURITY

China’s navy The PLAN is a capable and steadily improving twentieth century maritime force, with an ongoing modernization program bringing it into the twenty-first century (Table 2). Submarine force The PLAN regards its submarines as the weapons most capable of threatening foreign forces, especially US aircraft carriers. China is modernizing its submarine force at a steady pace, replacing old Romeo boats with imported Kilo and Table 2 PLAN ships and aircraft Type Destroyers Type 956 Type 52B Type 52C Type 054 Type 052 Type 051 Frigates Type 054 Type 059 Type 057 Type 055 Type 053 Type 053K Type 065 Type 01 Submarines Type 094 Type 092 Type 093 Type 091 Type ? Type ? Type 039 Type 035 Type 033 Amphibious ships Type 074 Type 072 Type ??? Type 073 Type ???

Class

Displacement

Sovremenny Yantai/ASUW ?/AAW Luhai Luhu Luda

8,400 8,000 8,000 6,600 5,700 4,000

Manshan Jiangwei III Jiangwei II Jiangwei Jianghu Jiangdong Jiangnan Chengdu

3,000 2,250 2,250 1,900 1,900 1,400 1,500

SSBN Xia SSBN SSN Han SSN Kilo Wuhan Song Ming Romeo

8,000 6,500 6,500 5,500 2,300 ? 2,250 2,100 1,700

Yuting LST Yukan LST Yudeng LST Yudao LCM LST

4,800 4,170 1,850 1,460 ?

1985 15 — — — — — 11 31 — — — — 20 2 5 4 117 — 1 — 3 — — — 2 90 4 — 3 — 1 —

2004 20 2 2 2 1 2 15 39 — — 4 4 31 — — — 75 — 1 — 5 4 1 3 17 38 15 6 7 1 1 ?

Source: Numbers drawn from numerous sources and represent best estimates by B.D. Cole.

34

2008 29 4 4 4 1 2 14 38 4 2 8 4 20 — — — 58 2 0 4 3 12 4 12 21 — 29 20 7 1 1 ~16

THREAT TO TAIWAN’S SECURITY

home-built Song and Yuan-class submarines. The five Han-class nuclear powered submarines in China’s inventory are old, relatively noisy, and have been unreliable; at least three of them have recently undergone a thorough overhaul, however, and may be serviceable for several more years. The first two of their replacement class, the Type-093, have been launched and at least one of them will probably become operational in 2005. This submarine is based on the Victor III-class SSN, a very capable, quiet boat designed by the Soviet Union in the 1970s. The Chinese version will no doubt incorporate many improvements, making this submarine— which posed a significant problem for US ASW capabilities a quarter-century ago—even quieter and more effective. China’s next-generation nuclear powered ballistic missile launching submarine, the Type-094, has been launched but may not be operational before 2008. This means the nation will remain without the sea-based leg of a strategic triad, given the questionable seaworthiness of China’s current intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) submarine, the Xia. The PLAN’s conventionally-powered submarine inventory includes the Kilo-, Song-, Yuan-, Ming-, and Romeo-classes. The 4 Kilos will increase to 12 when the 8 boats under construction in Russia join China’s navy in 2005 and 2006. Song construction has not stopped with the increased Kilo buy, as some analysts expected, but is continuing at a steady pace, with orders for the French-designed sonar suites and German diesels used in these boats indicating that 10 are already in service or under construction.4 By 2008, the PLAN will probably include 12 Kilo-class, 12 Song-class, and at least 2 Type-93 nuclear powered boats.5 The force will also include 2 to 6 Yuanclass, the conventionally-powered attack submarine that made an unexpected appearance in July 2004. The Yuan bears a strong resemblance to the Kilo, and appears to draw heavily on Russian technology. The PLAN also has 17 Ming-class submarines in commission, as well as approximately 30 older but still seaworthy Romeo-class boats, most of them held in reserve. China does not have enough trained crews to man the entire Romeo force; to do so would have to call on untrained reserve personnel. The presence at sea of even minimally manned, old submarines serves as a deterrent to intervening naval forces, however, forcing delay and caution until locating data is obtained on the undersea opposition. PLAN acquisition of submarines built with Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) plants would increase the force’s potency, and the indigenously built Yuan-class submarine “rolled out” in May 2004 from covered shipways in Wuhan may be so equipped. AIP allows a conventionally powered submarine to operate submerged for extraordinary periods of time—perhaps as long as 40 days, compared to a non-AIP (conventionally powered) boat’s 4 days.6 China’s submarines are armed with modern torpedoes acquired from Russia, including formidable wake-homers and wire-guided weapons. Wake-homing torpedoes need not be fired directly at a ship, but follow its wake (the disturbance left in the water by the vessel’s propellers, perhaps for several hours) to the 35

THREAT TO TAIWAN’S SECURITY

target ship. Wire-guided torpedoes allow the firing submarine to guide the weapon as it tracks and attacks the target ship. These boats are also capable of firing cruise missiles, as well as short range anti-aircraft missiles. The anti-surface ship cruise missiles are able to strike targets that are over-the-horizon (OTH) from the launching platform; the PLAN is continuing to develop OTH systems and the addition of these cruise missiles significantly raises the threat posed by China’s submarines. China’s submarine force poses a serious challenge to the US Navy, which presumably would form the spearhead of American military assistance to Taipei should the United States intervene in a Taiwan conflict. Indeed, PLAN planners are almost certainly planning to overcome not just or even primarily the Taiwan military, but the US Navy. Hence, the PLAN devotes considerable attention to counter-aircraft carrier tactics, with a goal not necessarily to destroy the ships, but to prevent them from coming into action in support of Taiwan. Fulfilling this sea-denial objective is best accomplished by deploying and then maintaining submarines on station in the East China Sea, forcing transiting aircraft carrier battle groups either to slow their arrival enough to locate the opposing submarines, or to greatly increase their risk. Surface force While focusing on its submarine force, China is also making impressive progress modernizing its surface navy. Two Russian Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers (DDGs) are being acquired to join the two already in the fleet. The Sovremennys were designed in the 1970s to target US aircraft carriers and Aegis cruisers. While only moderately capable in the anti-air (AAW) and anti-submarine (ASW) warfare areas, they are armed with one of the world’s most potent antisurface ship missile, the Moskit (in NATO parlance the SS-N-22, or Sunburn). The destroyers each carry 8 of these missiles, which reach a range of 56 nm while flying at Mach 3.5.7 China has reportedly purchased 50 Moskit’s for its first two Sovremennys, and is trying to order its successor missile, the Kh-41, for the two ships due for delivery in 2006; this missile can also be launched from Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft.8 The Moskit’s most formidable feature is its ability during the final stage of its flight to increase speed to Mach 4.5 and engage in radical terminal maneuvers while simultaneously climbing sharply for a final dive into its target. These flight characteristics make the missile very difficult to counter; the obvious “solution” to the missile is to sink the launching platform before it can fire. The PLAN deploys three other front-line destroyers, all indigenously built, although two additional classes of DDGs are being constructed. The two ships of the Luhu-class were constructed in the early 1990s and are each powered by two US supplied LM-2500 gas turbine engines built by General Electric.9 The Luhus are multi-mission combatants armed with C-802 anti-surface ship missiles that, while not possessing the range, speed, or elusiveness of the Moskits, are still 36

THREAT TO TAIWAN’S SECURITY

formidable weapons. The ships are only moderately capable AAW and ASW platforms, but like the Sovremennys operate two helicopters. The third Chinese built DDG in commission is the Luhai, apparently a one-ship class. This destroyer has a sensor and weapons suite very similar to that of the Luhus, but is considerably larger, displacing almost 2,000 more tons. This is because Luhai is propelled by a system utilizing Ukranian-built gas turbine engines, which are larger than the LM-2500s, although delivering approximately the same shaft horsepower. Several indigenously designed DDGs are being constructed, some of them equipped with a track-while-scan, multi-target processing air warfare system. This capability would for the first time provide the PLAN with an area defense capability against attacking aircraft and possibly missiles. Until 2005, even the most modern PLAN combatant possessed AAW defenses limited to defending itself, but not ships steaming in the same formation. The new DDGs appear capable of providing this wider AAW capability, crucial in a fleet escorting essentially unarmed amphibious assault ships in the high-threat environment that would prevail in the East China Sea during wartime. The PLAN also deploys 17 older, steam-powered Luda-class DDGs. These ships have limited capabilities against submarines and aircraft, but their older anti-surface ship missiles still pose a threat that cannot be ignored. China is building a new class of guided missile frigates (FFGs) to replace the more than 30 ships of the Jianghu-class. These 1960s designed ships are dieselpropelled and lack a combat direction center (CDC), indispensable for a multimission destroyer to survive in modern naval warfare. The Jianghus are armed with the old Chinese version of the Silkworm anti-surface missile system, the HY-1 or -2. Although lacking the capabilities of more modern anti-ship missiles, the Silkworm remains a threat.10 At least one Jianghu-class has been converted to a naval gunfire support ship.11 The 12 Jiangwei-class FFGs are both newer and much more capable. These diesel engine ships are armed with the proven C-801 or C-802 anti-surface ship missile, and either the French-designed Crotale short range AAW missile, or the trouble-prone Chinese version of that system, the HQ-61. This relatively small (2,250 tons displacement) warship is multi-mission capable, although it suffers from the same AAW and ASW limitations as its larger brethren. The Jiangwei construction program continued in 2002, but is being succeeded by the next-generation FFG, the Type-054 (Manshan). The first of these ships is in commission and the second is scheduled for commissioning in late 2005. They are powered by German-designed diesels, as are the Jiangweis. China’s surface combatants are improving in capability as well as increasing in number; by 2008 the front-line force of at least 24 ships will all be armed with capable missiles, improved ASW and AAW systems, and embarked helicopters. Most importantly, the PLAN surface force is continuing to improve integration of its sensor and weapons systems within each ship, among ships in a task group, and in joint operations with army and especially air force units. 37

THREAT TO TAIWAN’S SECURITY

The improved and enlarged surface force will significantly increase PLAN capabilities across all maritime warfare areas. Still unproven, however, is the AAW proficiency necessary to allow PLA non-submarine naval or air forces to operate effectively against Taiwan defenses assisted by the US military. Seapower in the twenty-first century remains defined by airpower, as it has been since Japanese bombers sank two British battleships, Repulse and Prince of Wales, off the Malaysian Peninsula on December 10, 1941. Amphibious ships Discussion of China’s amphibious lift is rarely enlightening; the usual equation of PLAN “lift for one mechanized division,” leaves open the difficult-to-quantify issue of employing China’s vast merchant fleet for an assault on Taiwan. In fact, Beijing is building additional amphibious ships—at least 16 large landing craft since 2002—while exploring the use of merchant vessels to lift tens of thousands of troops across the Taiwan Strait.12 China currently deploys the fifth largest international merchant fleet in the world.13 It is subsidized by a national policy supporting construction of a massive supporting infrastructure, including the world’s largest shipbuilding complex, in Shanghai’s Pudong district.14 China also relies on many thousands of coastal and riverine cargo vessels, and passenger ferries, many of which could be pressed into service as troop carriers. Nonmilitary ships have been exercised several times in military tasks. First, artillery pieces have been embarked on merchant ships and fired against targets ashore. Given the lack of firing platform stabilization in such cases, however, friendly troops would have as much to fear as would the opponent from such supporting fires.15 Second, many of China’s tens of thousands of fishing boats have been organized into a rough militia. In Qingdao, for instance, local fishermen are organized into “regiments,” although it is not clear that they drill regularly or are able to constitute disciplined naval formations.16 Missions for such small craft might include surveillance and reporting in the Taiwan Strait, and serving as early warning for coastal formations; they could also embark special operations forces (SOF) for missions against shipping or Taiwanese-held islands. While the ubiquitous fishing boats in the Taiwan Strait and surrounding waters are manned by experienced seamen, their use as military vessels is problematical, since they do not practice formation steaming, lack advanced communications and navigation equipment, and have no means for landing troops other than at a pier or by running themselves aground, a mission they could perform only once. Third, civilian-crewed ships have been used as support vessels during operational exercises, including serving as repair ships and supply vessels.17 Fourth, merchant ships serve as cargo transports for PLA missions during both peacetime and wartime, thus augmenting China’s land-based transportation network.

38

THREAT TO TAIWAN’S SECURITY

Finally, merchant ships are frequently mentioned as possible troop transports. This mission would be easily conducted in a nonhostile environment, lifting PLA troops to an already-captured Taiwanese port, for instance. Using such vessels as assault transports would be difficult for the same reasons cited for fishing boats. But if China is willing to sacrifice many of its very numerous coastal passenger ferries by running them ashore, such shipping might deliver many thousands of PLA troops to Taiwan’s coast, although actually getting them ashore would be a tenuous proposition.18 Mine warfare (MIW) is an important element in naval operations that is ignored by military forces at their peril; the PLAN deploys 40–50 Sovietdesigned ocean-going and coastal minesweepers, but many of them are in reserve—unmanned and not operational. China maintains tens of thousands of sea mines, however, that can be sowed by aircraft, submarines, naval or civilian ships, or even by fishing boats. The mining threat is especially serious against Taiwan, since the island has only two major commercial ports (Kaohsiung and Keelung). Indeed, MIW and ASW pose the most serious challenge to both Taiwan and US naval forces.19 The PLAN’s seagoing logistics support force consists of just three large fuel and ammunition ships (AOR) capable of replenishing other ships while underway. The South Sea Fleet’s Nancang-class displaces 37,000 tons and was acquired from Russia; the two Fuqing-class each displace 21,000 tons and are assigned to the East and North Sea Fleets. Two additional replenishment ships, the 887-class, may have been constructed and have joined the PLAN. The small number of underway replenishment ships attests to the PLAN’s limited power projection capability over distance. Naval power projection, defined as the ability to land and support ground forces ashore, includes four necessary capabilities in support of those forces: Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); fire support; enhanced mobility for surface landed troops; robust command and control (C2); and the logistics distribution systems necessary for sea-based support.20 While working to develop greater ISR, fire support, and C2 capabilities, China does not appear to be constructing a more robust underway replenishment force. This points to the PLAN’s focus on areas of concern lying close to the mainland: Taiwan, and sovereignty concerns in the East and South China Seas. Conducting naval operations in these areas does not require more power projection resources, but continued improvement in the sophistication of equipment already in the force and under acquisition. Chinese energy needs appear to be leading Beijing to significant naval expansion across the Indian Ocean. The long sea lines of communication over which China receives much of its imported oil from the Middle East presents a classic, Mahanian requirement for a large naval presence. Beijing has already moved to establish port facilities in Burma and Pakistan; future moves may be forthcoming to support PLAN operations west of the Malacca Strait.

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THREAT TO TAIWAN’S SECURITY

Naval aviation All PLAN fixed-wing aircraft are shore based; only helicopters are flown from ships. While all helos are multi-mission capable, China flies Russian designed Ka-28A’s from the Sovremenny-class DDGs primarily for ASW and electronic warfare (EW). The PLAN has two French-designed helos, the Zhi-8 for logistics and the Zhi-9 for ASW, assigned to Luhu-, Luhai-, and Jiangwei-class ships. They will also operate from the new PLAN destroyers and frigates currently under construction. The navy’s fixed-wing assets include attack and fighter aircraft, led by very capable fighters, the F-8II, F-11 (Su-27), and the Su-30. Naval Aviation is improving in terms of equipment and experience, but remains weak in numbers of ASW aircraft, surveillance platforms, and air-to-air refueling capability. The force’s operational capability is improving as a result of the increasing number of exercises with surface ships and PLAAF units. The emphasis on joint operations and coordinated operations over water is notable. The effectiveness of the PLA’s air power in a maritime environment has not been demonstrated: the PLAAF’s domination in tactical aviation extends into the maritime theater and fixed-wing naval aviation may in fact be more an adjunct of the continentally oriented Air Force than it is part of a naval warfare team. From Taiwan’s perspective, however, this factor is not as important as the increasing, modernizing air power it faces across the Strait. The naval balance China has been steadily investing in naval modernization for the past twenty years and the PLAN’s force structure and capability reflect that investment. Taiwan’s naval modernization efforts during the same period pale in comparison. The PLAN and the Taiwan Navy are for the moment (mid-2005) roughly equal in surface combatant capability, allowing for China’s greater numbers against Taiwan’s superior technology. Above and below the ocean’s surface, however, the PLAN is much superior. China’s submarine force is beyond compare, both in numbers and capability, a situation that will not change significantly in the foreseeable future. The maritime balance of power in the Taiwan Strait in 2005 rests with the PLA.

PLA Air Force China’s air force has changed during the past 15 years from a collection of obsolete, Soviet-designed fighters and poorly manufactured indigenous copies to a force flying modern Russian Su-27 and Su-30 fighters. Reliance on Russian designs and production assistance remains. The PLAAF in early 2005 has deployed well over 200 of these fighters, a number likely to rise to 400 by 2006.21 China is also arming its fighters with Russian state-of-the-art air-to-air missiles, including some beyond visual range (BVR) systems.22 Today, these aircraft are deployed in all seven of the PLA’s military regions (Table 3). 40

THREAT TO TAIWAN’S SECURITY

Table 3 PLA aircrafta Aircraft

Mission

Weapons

2000

H-6 H-5 JH-7 Q-5 Su30 J-11(Su27) J-10 J-9/FC-1 J-8 J-7 J-6 Helicopters Transports AWACS

Bomber

YJ6b YJ8b YJ8b Bombs, Rkts AA12c AA12 AA12 PL7/10c PL2/7/9c PL1/2/7c PL1/2/7

150 200 0 450 40 75 — 0 150 500 1800 230 425 0

Attack Fighter

Air control

—

2005 150 175 100 300 100 200 10 0 400 500 1000 380 425 2

2010 130 0 150 200 ? ? 40 25 450 500 0 430 450 8

Notes a Numbers drawn from numerous sources and represent best estimates by B.D. Cole. b Air to surface missiles. c Air to air missiles.

Two other aircraft acquisition programs are improving PLAAF mission capabilities. The first is the procurement of Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, a version of the Russian A-50E. AWACS offers an airborne radar system capable of detecting, localizing, and controlling attacks on opposing aircraft. More importantly, China’s acquisition of AWACS may indicate a change in service culture, from the Soviet model of close centralized control of aircraft from ground stations, to one more analogous to the US model, offering more flexibility in asset employment and pilot decision-making. Second is China’s slowly growing inventory of aerial tankers. During the PRC’s 50th Anniversary parade in Beijing in 1999 a demonstration flight team flew overhead while simulating an air-to-air refueling evolution, but training Chinese pilots in this procedure has apparently been proceeding slowly.23 When aerial refueling proficiency becomes a common skill among China’s pilots, it will enable increased power projection, allowing multi-axis approaches to Taiwan, and greater on-station time into the East and South China Seas.24 The PLAAF has various types of air-launched anti-ship cruise missiles in its inventory and China is developing air-launched land-attack cruise missiles for the PLAAF’s H-6 bombers, which may be deployed later this decade.25 The air force also operates the S-300 (SA-10) surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) acquired from Russia in the 1990s. At least 12 S-300 batteries (120 missiles) are on hand, with the purchase of an additional 4 to 8 batteries in negotiation in late 2004.26 China also is developing indigenous versions of this system.27 Effective air defenses requires integrated, centralized command and control; the PLA is working to 41

THREAT TO TAIWAN’S SECURITY

establish such a system, but progress is uncertain. This air defense network will be much strengthened by China’s recent acquisition of the formidable S-400 (SA-20) missile system from Russia. Balance of air power The annual US DOD reports for 2000 stated that “The PLAAF and Naval Aviation combined number over 400,000 personnel, 4,300 tactical fighters, 1,000 bomber and close air support aircraft, and 650 transport aircraft.”28 The PLAAF also has 3 SAM divisions, 1 combined SAM-AAA division, and 7 SAM brigades, 3AAA brigades, and over 100 SAM units.29 The announced reduction of 500,000 PLA personnel has affected the PLAAF, but not as much as the army, which reflects the increased importance Beijing is according to airpower. In 2003, the DOD reported that “Although the PLAAF and Naval Aviation have approximately 3,200 aircraft, only about 150 are considered modern, 4th generation fighters, augmented by modern missiles, electronic countermeasures, and several AWACS-type aircraft.”30 The 2004 report noted that “The PLA Air Force’s primary strength remains its size—approximately 3,000 combat-capable aircraft.”31 This number will likely be further reduced to less than 2,000 by 2010, but will include at least 500 fourth generation fighters.32 This data is the result of the PLA’s policy of reducing numbers while increasing quality: the PLAAF certainly flies significantly fewer aircraft than a decade ago, but a much higher proportion of its aircraft are state of the art, and form a force on its way to being able to overwhelm Taiwan’s approximately 200 F-16s and Mirage 2000s. Taiwan’s 2004 National Defense Report stated that There are about 100 dual-purpose airports on the mainland within 600 nm (1000 km) [of] Taiwan [with] 730 fighters and bombers . . . . More than 1,000 fighters can be mobilized from airports outside range of 600 nautical-miles as reinforcement in operations against Taiwan in just 1 to 3 days.33 The PLAAF may forward deploy hundreds of aircraft prior to an offensive attack on Taiwan, but China would obviously be concerned with secrecy and early detection of its plans given US intelligence-collection capabilities, including satellite and airborne surveillance.34 Hence, Taiwan has to be concerned about a “bolt from the blue” strategy by the PLA, which might include a scenario based on surprise, with minimal warning and intelligence of an attack.35 That in turn would involve PLAAF operations from a “standing start,” using aerial refueling and aircraft already stationed at airfields within range of Taiwan. The acquisition of Su-27 and Su-30 aircraft and increasing PLAAF–Naval Aviation exercises have significantly increased China’s capability to establish control of the air in a Taiwan scenario, a trend that will continue as the force acquires more modern fighters, AWACs-type aircraft, and aerial refueling 42

THREAT TO TAIWAN’S SECURITY

experience. The current situation is clear: for the past decade, the PLAAF has steadily improved capability, joint operational experience, and numbers of modern aircraft; the Taiwan Air Force has made only marginal improvements since completion of the F-16 and Mirage 2000 acquisition programs. The key to comparing air forces, of course, is the airmanship of the pilots; Taiwan historically has demonstrated advantages in this area, but that cannot be assumed in future scenarios, since pilot training, including maritime operations, has assumed such a more prominent role in PLA exercises. Even more so than in the maritime realm, geography favors mainland air power. First, it facilitates initial attacks on the island’s airfields, since their locations are well-known, and since the mountainous topography offers the Taiwan Air Force few alternate sites for stationing its interceptors. Second, Taiwan’s proximity to the mainland means that the flying time from mainland airfields to targets on the island is short, on-station time over Taiwan for mainland aircraft high, and the “turn around time” for refueling and rearming relatively rapid. This last factor is a force-multiplier for the PLAAF, by enabling multiple missions in a given period of time. The island’s proximity also means that the S-400 (SA-20) AAW missile network being installed by China will be able to cover the entire island and detect Taiwan Air Force (TAF) fighters as soon as they lift off from their airfields.36

Army forces37 China’s army greatly outnumbers Taiwan’s, over 1.6 million to approximately 220,000, but is not as direct an element in the island’s threat calculus as PLA air and naval forces. First, mainland ground forces face a significant problem arriving on a battlefield against Taiwan’s army. Second, ground combat on Taiwan would be expensive in terms of manpower, should the Taiwan Army fight determinedly, and damage to the island’s infrastructure, with resulting severe economic and civilian human costs. Most importantly, perhaps, extended ground combat on the island would yield several weeks of globally broadcast pictures of the PLA shelling and fighting its way through Taiwan’s densely populated cities. That would engender global anti-Chinese feelings and sanctions that would dwarf the after-effects of the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. PLA ground forces are still capable of playing a significant role in a campaign against Taiwan. Army helicopter units, airborne, and SOF troops would likely lead the way in any military assault of the island; employment of heavy PLA forces on the island is unlikely in the early stages of an assault. Surface-tosurface missiles (SSM) would almost certainly be an early weapon of choice in a Chinese attack on Taiwan, and the Nanjing MR ground forces include an SSM brigade. The PLA does not ignore amphibious warfare. The Marine Corps’ two brigades number approximately 12,000 personnel; each is equipped with organic artillery, 43

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armor, engineers, signals, and other staff elements to support the infantry that form the core of the brigades. Both are stationed near Zhanjiang in southeastern China, where their primary mission area appears to be the South China Sea. The Army provides amphibious forces tasked with a Taiwan operation. Two infantry divisions totaling more than 20,000 personnel have been trained as “amphibious mechanized divisions” since 2000, one in the Nanjing MR and one in the Guangzhou MR. Several other PLA units have trained for amphibious operations, using the four large joint amphibious training areas along the coast. Amphibious warfare (AMW) skills are difficult to acquire, but the PLA has been including AMW in many exercises. The elite ground forces unit is probably the 15th Airborne Army, technically a PLAAF organization, but perhaps actually subject to direct tasking by the Central Military Commission (CMC) in Beijing. This corps is composed of three divisions, one of which is always on rapid deployment status, with assigned Il-76 transports.38 The airborne troops probably are tasked with responding to serious domestic disturbance, as well as forming the spearhead in almost all scenarios involving insertion of PLA forces into Taiwan. The PLA is organized into 18 Integrated Group Armies (GA), each numbering from 30 to 65,000. While their composition varies, each GA contains infantry/ mechanized infantry, artillery, and AAW units, as well as staff support. China’s ground forces have undergone significant restructuring since 1998. Approximately one-half of the army’s 80 infantry and armor divisions have been downsized to brigades, but the two strongest group armies, the 38th and the 39th, are still composed of mechanized infantry and armor divisions. This reorganization has accommodated the 2000 force reduction of 500,000 personnel and the 200,000 man reduction announced in 2003, and may offer the PLA a more flexible and deployable structure. Approximately 20 percent of this force is designated for “rapid reaction”: combined arms units capable of deploying by road or rail within China without significant preparation or reserve augmentation. The army is supported by large reserve, militia, and People’s Armed Police (PAP) forces. Although their numbers are not precisely known, an authoritative source lists the PLA Reserve force at “some 800,000” and credits the PAP with an “estimated 1.5 million.” Beijing estimates its “primary militia” at 10 million personnel and describes its “ordinary militia” as an even larger force. The state of training of these militia forces is unclear, however, and their military effectiveness probably low.39 The PLA has devoted considerable resources to the development of SOF, particularly since the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict; each MR now has at least one SOF unit assigned. These units likely have been assigned specific missions for a Taiwan conflict, including locating and destroying C4I assets, transportation nodes, and logistics depots; capturing or destroying airfields; destroying air defense assets; removal of leaders (“decapitation”); and conducting reconnaissance operations. They regularly train with helicopters. China’s ground forces traditionally have been strong in operational and communications security, as well as in the use of camouflage, concealment, and 44

THREAT TO TAIWAN’S SECURITY

deception. Weaknesses in transport and logistic support are being addressed, both in the areas of equipment and organization. Joint operations are highlighted in doctrine, and they have been increasingly included in exercises. Almost all troops apparently train in rapid mobilization and every MR has a “combined arms training center” through which units rotate to exercise in a free play environment. One significant addition to the PLA training syllabus has been the institution of “integrated joint operations,” training that aims for a level beyond “joint operations,” including reserve and military units, and even civilian assets.40 Imbuing any military with a joint culture is a slow process, however, and actual wartime experience seems required to evaluate how effective that process has been.41 The PLA has not fought a war since 1979, which does not mean it may not perform extremely well in its next war, but does mean that it will enter that conflict without benefit of battlefield experience. The PLA’s readiness process is hampered by the short term of obligated service for conscripts of 24 months. This means that one-third of China’s ground forces leave active duty each year and the percentage of troops with a complete, annual exercise cycle on their record is limited. The PLA has typically lacked the large body of experienced professional soldiers needed to operate sophisticated equipment; however, revision of the military’s system of training and education during the past decade and a half has resulted in significant progress overcoming this shortfall. Almost no PLA enlisted or officer personnel has combat experience, however, which could be a significant factor. A related weakness in the PLA is the ongoing struggle to develop a professional NCO corps. Military service, with its low remuneration and family disruption, is still viewed as a poor alternative to work in the private sector. China’s leadership is aware of these weaknesses and is trying to address them in its overall modernization program.

Army equipment The PLA fields many weapons of foreign design, but China’s military industry is capable of manufacturing weapons systems across the spectrum of warfare missions, including tanks and armored personnel carriers (APC), anti-tank weapons, artillery, logistics vehicles, radar and EW systems, ground-to-air and ground-to-ground missile systems, and a range of infantry weapons. The PLA remains predominantly an infantry army, but has a strong armor force with an inventory of 10,000 heavy tanks and perhaps 1,000 light and amphibious tanks (Table 4). The Main Battle Tank (MBT) force is dominated by older models—6,000 T-59s—but many of those have been modernized; there are also more than 1,000 T-88s and 1,200 Type-96s in the force. China’s most modern MBT is the Type-90 series, of which perhaps 80 have entered service. More than 5,000 APCs are deployed, mostly older T-63s. The PLA’s armor force is modernizing at 45

THREAT TO TAIWAN’S SECURITY

Table 4 PLA systems Armor

2005

Main Battle Tanks Light Tanks Armored Personnel Carriers Artillery Towed Self-Propelled Rocket Launchers Air Defense Guns/Missiles Surface-to-Surface Missiles Surface-to-Air Missiles Helicopters

7,580: 1,280 modern (80Type 98, 1,200Type 96) 1,000 4,500: ~2,000 modern (300Type 89I; 600Type92; 1,000Type 86A)

Unmanned Air Vehicles

14,000: 100 mm–155 mm 1,700: 1,200122mm; 500152mm 2,400: 122/130/273/320 mm 7,700/7,200 HY-2/C-201/CSS-C3; HY-4/C-401/CSS-C7 HN-5(SA-7); 24HQ61A; 200HQ-7A; 60SA-15 381: 30Mi-8; 47Mi-17; 114Mi-171; 3Mi-6; 7Z-8; 40Z-9; 8SA-342; 53Z-11; 8SA-316; 19S-70C ASN-104/105/206; W-50a

Sources: Table by B.D. Cole, with assistance from LTC Dennis J. Blasko, USA (Ret.). The Federation of American Scientists, at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/agency/pla-inventory, provides a far less definitive table and notes that “Detailed listings of PLA equipment holdings are rather scarce in the unclassified literature.” Note a China operates the Israeli-manufactured Harpy UAV.

a moderate pace; its most modern tank, the Type-90 series, would pose a challenge to the US M1A2, and is a generation ahead of Taiwan’s MBT, the M-60A3.42 The PLA maintains a strong artillery branch, with 1,200 self-propelled artillery pieces and an estimated 14,000 towed guns and howitzers, ranging from 100 mm to 155 mm. The majority of this impressive armor and artillery inventory is old, and is being modernized at a relatively slow pace. Modernization has focused on fielding self-propelled howitzers, ranging from 122 to 152 mm. This probably reflects the lack of any invasion threat to the country, and a budget priority on modernizing air and naval systems.

Space and information warfare China views information warfare (IW) as “the main form of warfare” at the onset of the twenty-first century. It is joint and encompasses “combined operations carried out by land, sea, air forces and marine corps.”43 A subset of IW difficult to evaluate is China’s capability in command, control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Beijing has for at least a decade focused national assets on achieving military capability in this broad spectrum of “soft” military capability. The other aspect to this capability is the PLA’s determination to acquire the ability to attack an opponent’s C4ISR system, as well as its civilian infrastructure. 46

THREAT TO TAIWAN’S SECURITY

The existence of a PLA “e-blockade strategy” has been argued; it aims to disrupt Taiwan’s utilities, internet, and communications networks, which would strike heavily at the island’s economy, as well as the government’s ability to function.44 In fact, China already conducts IW on a daily basis, against its own citizens as well as against foreign internet sites. Beijing has instituted a wide-ranging campaign to control what the Chinese people read and hear on the internet and in all forms of nominally public media. Space is a theater of increasing concern to Chinese strategists. Use of space as a military theater has been exercised by the PLA, but the dual-use nature of the Chinese space program complicates evaluation of the military effect of such programs. China’s space program is advanced and extensive, including satellite design and manufacture, space launch vehicles, and proven manned space flight capability. The PLA believes that space is crucial to twenty-first-century military operations, describing it as “the new high ground” of military operations and national strategy. A nascent space doctrine has been delineated around three foci: “seek space superiority, employ different methods of attack, and do not limit thinking to space forces.”45 The PLA ground forces have relatively few aviation assets, flying fixed-wing cargo aircraft and less than 400 transport and attack helicopters, all of Russian or French design, with the exception of 24 S-70Cs purchased from the United States in the 1980s. Nineteen of these helos remain, but are reportedly grounded because of a lack of spare parts.46 The PLA obviously has not embraced the US helointensive “air-land doctrine,” or even the older USMC concept of “vertical envelopment.” Helicopters are usually assigned only at the MR level, although 2 of the 39 Group Armies are assigned their own helos; no brigade or division has helicopters directly assigned to it, and the average brigade may well not train in aviation operations during its annual exercise cycle.47 This supports a PLA ground combat focus on relatively static operations and limited power projection intentions. The Minister of Defense, General Cao Gangchuan, has described key policies necessary to “Win the Next War” as converting divisions to brigades, higher training standards for high-tech warfare, creation of an efficient joint logistical support system, and the adoption of the new military regulations, particularly the 1999 PLA Joint Logistics Regulations. While not listed in these priorities, training with new hardware is emphasized repeatedly in leadership statements.48

The Second Artillery The Second Artillery is the PLA organization responsible for China’s nuclear arsenal and ballistic missiles. Cruise missile employment might also fall under its operational control during a conflict, in order to ensure targeting coordination and inventory management. China is very unlikely to use nuclear weapons against Taiwan. Their employment against US military intervention to defend the island against a PLA assault, 47

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however, is an option that must be considered. Mao Zedong’s 1955 directive to develop a nuclear arsenal was made after the United States threatened the use of nuclear weapons against the PRC during the Jinmen and Mazu crises, coupled with the loss of faith in the Soviet Union’s willingness to employ nuclear warfare to defend China’s interests. Since its first successful nuclear test in October 1964, Beijing has built a modest nuclear-armed ballistic missile force, including land- and sea-based intermediate-range (IRBM) and intercontinental-range (ICBM) ballistic missiles. China has approximately two dozen nuclear-armed ICBMs capable of striking the United States, a minimal deterrence profile designed to deter an aggressor from launching a first strike.49 The PRC is currently modernizing this deterrent force by increasing its survivability and effectiveness with the fielding of the Dong Feng-31 (CSS-9 in NATO parlance) ICBM. The DF-31 is a solid-fuel, road-mobile missile with the range (5,000 miles) to reach the western United States. This new missile will first supplement and then, in combination with a longer range version, the DF-31A, replace the present inventory of liquid-fuel, nonmobile, DF-5 ICBMs. The DF-31A’s design goal is probably sufficient range (12,000 miles) to reach targets across the entire United States.50 The Second Artillery Corps apparently receives priority funding within the PLA and may be exempt from ongoing personnel reductions (Table 5). More significant than the number and capability of China’s nuclear weapons is Beijing’s concepts of their employment and viability as an instrument of national security. China’s adherence to a no-first-use of nuclear weapons may be qualified in at least one case. Beijing might equate conventional and nuclear Table 5 China’s strategic missiles Chinese name

Western name

Range (km)

Operational date

Inventory

DF-5 DF-31 DF-31A JL-2 SubmarineLaunch DF-4 DF-21 JL-1 SubmarineLaunch DF-15/M-9 DF-11/M-11 HY-?

CSS-4 CSS-X-9 CSS-X-10 CSS-NX-5

13,000 8,000 12,000 8,000

1981 2003 2010 200?

20–24 8 — —

CSS-3 CSS-5 CSS-N-3

4,750 1,800 1,700

1980 1986 1986

20–30 36–50 12

CSS-6 CSS-7 Land Attack Cruise Missile

600 300 1,000

1995 1995 2006?

~450 ~200 —

Source: B.D. Cole, from data in US OSD, FY2004 Report to Congress on PRC Military Power: Annual Report on the Military Power of the PRC, Washington, DC, 2004.

48

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“strategic” strikes. Under this concept, a nuclear strike could be ordered against an American carrier task force intervening to defend Taiwan against a PLA assault without violating the no-first-use principle. The possibility of Beijing employing nuclear weapons directly against Taiwan is so low, however, and Taipei’s conventional defense needs so pressing, that preparations for a possible nuclear strike are unlikely to draw any significant effort from Taipei. Employment of conventionally armed ballistic missiles is much more likely. China may have as many as 650 DF-11 and DF-15 missiles now stationed within range of Taiwan.51 These are road-mobile, increasingly accurate missiles, whose previous 300 meter Circle Error Probable (CEP) has been improved to 150 meters; with the probable future application of Global Positioning System (GPS) information, the CEP will be further reduced, to as little as 35 meters. They are armed with unitary, conventional, 300 kilogram warheads, and are Beijing’s primary means of threatening Taipei with immediate armed attack.52 As demonstrated in 1995–1996, Beijing may use missiles to establish a blockade of Taiwan ports and as a psychological weapon to weaken the will of Taiwan’s people. China is also continuing to develop its arsenal of cruise missiles, with models that can be fired from ship, submarine, aircraft, or shore launchers. These include long-range land-attack missiles, the newest of which (the Donghai 10) has a reported range of 3,000 km, which places Japan and Guam within its reach.53 Cruise missiles may be even more difficult to defend against than ballistic missiles, because of their low-altitude, variable flight profiles. Beijing has also probably maintained “an advanced chemical warfare program,” according to US intelligence sources. Similar conclusions about a Chinese biological warfare capability are also creditable.54

Personnel Personnel performance is key, however, to the effective use of military power, and it is in this area that the PLA’s progress during the past fifteen years has been so impressive. China realized at least that long ago the era of the “peasant soldier” was over and has taken significant steps overhauling the PLA’s personnel accession, education, and training programs. These “software” improvements have transformed the personnel system, embodying many programs and objectives from the United States and other militaries. Some of these are first, focusing officer recruiting on colleges and universities, including creation of US-style reserve officer training corps programs by establishing links between the military and universities specializing in engineering and the hard sciences.55 Second, the education and training system for enlisted personnel has been overhauled, based on the reduced (to 24 months) term of obligated service for draftees and the increasing complexity of modern military equipment. Both initial enlistment time and career obligations are adjusted for degrees of technical training and competence, recognizing talent and productivity. Third, the training paradigm appears similar to the US model, with ordered 49

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Table 6 PLA budget (billions of Yuan)a Year

Announced budget

Announced % increase

Actual spending

Final % increase

Planned increase

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

120.5 141.2 169.4 185.3 212.9 247.7b

11.9 17.7 17.5 9.6 11.6 12.6b

121.3 144.2 170.8 190.8 220.0 N/A

12.6 18.9 18.4 11.7 15.3 12.6b

13.6 22.9 26.6 20.0 29.2 27.7b

Source: Data provided by Mr John Culver, e-mail dated March 7, 2005. Notes a Not adjusted for inflation, which has been relatively flat. b Projected budget announced at March National People’s Congress, not end-of-fiscal-year figure.

stages proceeding from individual to team to unit to multi-unit levels, emphasizing integration and doctrinal consistency throughout.

Budget China’s defense budget is difficult to analyze for at least three reasons. First is Beijing’s secrecy. Second are budget categorization differences; for instance, the official PLA budget does not include several accounts categorized by as “defense” spending by many other nations. These include research and development spending, whether carried out by state-owned companies or in the nominally civilian sector; personnel retirement costs; and the resources spent on acquiring foreign systems. This last category is particularly significant, given China’s purchases during the past 25 years of advanced US, Russian, French, Israeli, and other foreign aircraft, ships, missiles, and advanced systems. Third are significant variations in actual versus announced spending on defense.The difference in spending versus announced budget is illustrated for the years 2000–2004 (Table 6). As a result of these conditions, China’s actual defense budget, in Western terms, is at least two to three times the amounts announced by Beijing.56

Conclusion This brief analysis shows that China may be superior to Taiwan in 2005 and will clearly be superior by 2008 across the military spectrum. The PLA describes its modernization process as one of “mechanization and informatization.” This slogan probably describes the PLA’s aim to become a mechanized force, but also one that takes full advantage of and is able to operate effectively in the information age.57 China’s military superiority against Taiwan in terms of numbers is not surprising. In the event of armed conflict, Taiwan by itself does not appear capable of 50

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prolonged defense against the PLA. Furthermore, if there is a conflict it will almost certainly be decided by naval and aviation forces, well before Taiwan’s army has a chance to intervene. And it is precisely in these two warfare arenas that the PLA is rapidly increasing its superiority. The US Government listed seven forms of possible PLA operations against Taiwan in its 2003 Report on the Military Power of the PRC.58 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

provocative military exercises, including missile tests; provocative air activities, particularly flying across the unofficial but hitherto mutually respected “center line” over the Taiwan Strait; small-scale missile attacks against selected, low-density population targets; medium-scale missile attacks against valuable economic targets and defense capabilities; employing sea mines and submarine attacks to blockade Taiwan’s SLOCs; seizing offshore islands, such as Tai-ping, Pratas, or the Penghus; and attacking Taiwan’s military capabilities.59

This list fails to include two important mainland options. The first is a full-scale amphibious assault, which reflects the opinion of most experienced observers that the PLA has neither the capability nor the desire to carry out such a massive, complex, and destructive operation. Amphibious operations on a lesser scale, however, are well within PLAN capabilities. The second option that must be considered is both more formidable and more likely: a massive, sudden strike with aerospace assets, including ballistic and cruise missiles as well as manned aircraft. Such a strike might succeed in effectively “decapitating” Taiwan’s leadership by destroying the communications infrastructure, neutralize its air defenses by severely damaging TAF ground facilities, and destroying its aircraft on the ground, and leave the island so reeling that it is forced to acquiesce to Beijing’s demands before US military assistance can arrive. All of these options—as well as variations and combinations of them—are viable and must be anticipated by Taiwan’s military. Furthermore, the PLA will almost certainly hold the initiative in any of these courses of action. Finally, the Taiwan military may not even be the direct target in a Chinese campaign to force Taipei into direct negotiations on its terms; the military may end up helplessly watching its civilian masters concede strategic and operational advantages. This goes directly to the point of decision of a military conflict between China and Taiwan: it will be both a military and political campaign. Taipei can win the former only with US assistance and can win the latter only if the military and civilian people of Taiwan maintain their will to fight, to resist, and to preserve their independence.

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4 DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

The history of Taiwan’s national security organization since 1949 may be categorized in four phases. “Recapture the Mainland” characterized Phase One.1 It spanned approximately 1949–1962 and was a direct holdover of China’s civil war. Taipei maintained a military numbering more than 600,000 personnel during the latter part of this period, with the strategic goal of recapturing the mainland. Taiwan’s 1947 Constitution delineated the post-1949 national security establishment. It established two separate lines of authority, both terminating in the Office of the President. The Minister of National Defense headed the Military Administration, while the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) headed the uniformed military. The Minister was a Cabinet official, responsible for defense policies, budget, and administration, with the CGS a member of his ministry; however, the CGS was responsible directly to the President for military command affairs. This allowed the President and the CGS to deal directly with defense matters, bypassing the civilian bureaucracy of Defense Minister, Cabinet, Premier, and Vice-President, all of whom were statutory members of the National Security Council (NSC). It was not so much organizational weakness, however, as it was evidence of the dominant influence of personal relationships in Taiwan’s governance. The second strategic period for the Nationalist regime on Taiwan overlapped with the first; “Recapture the mainland and Defend the Island,” lasted until the mid-1970s. The Korean War redounded to Taipei’s benefit since it forced Mao Zedong to postpone indefinitely his planned 1951 assault on Taiwan.2 This operation would almost certainly have succeeded, since President Harry Truman had withdrawn the United States from the Chinese civil war and since the Taiwan military would have been unable to defeat the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).3 The end of this phase was signaled when President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 began a period of ambiguity about US military support for Taiwan. This period reflected the diplomatic shift started by Richard Nixon and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, and formalized by President Jimmy Carter in 1978 and the Congress in 1979.4 “Resolute defense, Effective Deterrence” is Taipei’s apt description of the third phase of the suggested strategic paradigm for Taiwan, lasting from the mid-1970s 52

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to 2000. Chiang Ching-kuo had effectively replaced his father (Chiang Kai-shek) as Taiwan’s ruler by the early 1970s and even before Nixon’s visit to China realized Taiwan was facing an irrevocably altered political-military situation.5 Chiang Ching-kuo launched the democratization process in the late 1970s to change Taiwan’s polity. It included, in the mid-term, civilianization of the defense infrastructure from one dominated by active duty military officers to one directly responsible to and directed by elected and appointed civilian officials. Although still incomplete, Chiang Ching-kuo’s initiative took effect throughout the 1990s, marked by the selection in 1992 and the election in 1996 of Lee Teng-hui to the presidency. The 2000 victory of the first non-Kuomintang (KMT) candidate to Taiwan’s presidency marked the success of Chiang Ching-kuo’s program. Phase Four of this construct is an extension of Phase Three, with “Effective Deterrence, Resolute defense” reversing the Phase Three terms. This is more than a syntactic change; the post-2000 Chen Shui-bian government has operated more independently of US policy preferences than any of its predecessors, since Chiang Kai-shek’s machinations against President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Since 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government in Taipei has campaigned to formalize its independence, emphasizing deterrence of mainland coercion while devoting as much verbiage as resources to the “resolute defense” of the island. This phase remains very much in force, as the Taiwan military struggles to gain from the Legislative Yuan (LY) the resources necessary for both deterrence and defense against the modernizing Chinese military.

Reorganization of the defense structure National command authority The “National Defense Law” and the “Organization Law of the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of China” were passed in 2000, but it then took two years to substantively implement their provisions, which formally occurred on March 1, 2002.6 The laws superseded a long series of defense legislation dating back to the Supreme Defense Council established in the 1947 constitution. Their objective is “to implement civilian control, enhance the professionalism of personnel, and strengthen the capability of joint operations.”7 Article 36 of Taiwan’s constitution stipulates that the president of the republic “shall have supreme command of the land, sea and air forces of the whole country,” Article 7 of the 2000 National Defense Law names the president as the head of Taiwan’s defense structure, which includes the NSC, Executive Yuan, and the Ministry of National Defense (MND).8 He is assigned responsibility for national security policy, which encompasses national defense policy. Article 3 of the Organic Law of the Executive Yuan stipulates that “the Executive Yuan shall establish (among others) a Ministry of National Defense.” According to the Organization Law of the MND, the ministry shall be in charge of the defense affairs of the whole country, and the minister shall be a civilian. 53

DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

President Chiang Ching-kuo began changing the 1947 structure in the late 1970s, and the process culminated in formal reorganization of the defense structure in 2000. The two defense laws passed that year currently provide the guidelines within which Taiwan’s civilian and military defense bureaucracy is reorganizing and modernizing. This process received major impetus from the defense reorganization initiated during President Lee Tung-hui’s 1996–2000 term of office. The plan was heavily influenced by committees under the co-chairmanship of representatives from both the military headquarters and Defense Ministry offices.9 Each of the services naturally had its own view, as did the various civilian offices concerned. Other influences came from the political parties, and the KMT’s loss of the presidency in the spring of 2000 gave new sharpness to the political aspects of reorganization. Observers and participants alike focused especially on the question of the line of responsibility from uniformed leaders to the civilian administration.

The Defense Reorganization laws Taiwan’s defense reorganization effort combines provisions similar to those of the US 1947 Defense Reorganization Act and the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. The reorganization is basic and comprehensive, focusing on three primary objectives. First is depoliticizing the military, separating it from the ruling political party. Second, and directly tied to the first, is civilianizing the national security structure, to ensure that civilian officials and not military officers are the primary policy-formulators and decision-makers. Third is to revise the chain of command, again to ensure that civilian officials, either elected or professionally trained, are making the important decisions about the military’s role.10 The two defense laws offer specific steps to accomplish these objectives. First, to get the military formally out of the political process, Article 6 of the National Defense Law stipulates that serving military people cannot work for a political party, political group, or any political candidate, nor force other serving military people to join a political party or political group, or to participate and assist the activities by a political party, political group, or political candidate.11 This article reflects civilian concern about military officers’ political preferences, perhaps understandable in view of that body’s long adherence to the KMT. An event that shadowed the 2004 presidential election reflected this unease. Traditionally, a high percentage of military personnel were assigned to a duty status on election day, to be ready in case of attempted disruptions to the electoral process. They would be granted periods of leave so they could vote; in 2004, however, this practice was not permitted, which meant that tens of thousands of military personnel were not able to vote. The fact that the great percentage of those individuals were expected to have voted for the KMT candidate contributed to the 54

DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

DPP’s electoral victory. Since Chen Shui-bian’s margin of victory was 29,518 votes, the “fewer than 38,000” troops the government estimated were on duty and unable to vote may have affected the election’s result.12 Second is the method by which the national command authority controls national defense. The National Defense Law does not specifically remove the Premier from the defense policy formulating and decision-making process, but its description of that process—focusing on the President, NSC, Executive Yuan, and the MND—has in practice meant that the Premier is involved only to the extent that conscientious officials keep him informed after decisions are made.13 Third, and perhaps most significant, is the civilianization of the defense establishment and security policy-making process. A civilian defense minister is established as the path between the military and the elected president. Article 12 of the National Defense Law requires that a civilian serve as Minister to further ensure a military separate from and subservient to the political government, to create a military chain of command responsible to civilian control through a systemic civilian bureaucracy with the minister appointed by the democratically elected president. In the MND, the General Staff Headquarters (GSH), supervises the various services: Army, Navy, Air Force, Combined Services Forces, Armed Forces Reserve Command/Coast Guard Command, and Military Police Command. The GSH is in charge of military affairs; it is headed by the chief of the general staff, who acts in the military command system as chief of staff to the president for operational matters. Within the administrative system, he serves as chief of staff to the minister of national defense. The MND is responsible for formulating military strategy, setting military personnel policies, devising draft and mobilization plans, delineating supply distribution policies, arranging for the research and development of military technology, compiling data for the national defense budget, setting military regulations, conducting court martial proceedings, and administering military law. The ministry itself has a Minister’s Office; Departments of Manpower, Materials, and Law; a Bureau of the Comptroller, and the Judge Advocates Bureau.

MND internal organization The MND includes three sub-systems: military administration, military command, and military armament. The first of these in turn is composed of fourteen departments: Strategic Planning, Manpower, Resources, Legal Services, Judge Advocate, Reserve Affairs, Military History and Translation, Integration and Evaluation, the Inspector General, Appeals Committee, Council for the Protection of Servicemen Rights, Personnel, Accounting, and the Office of the Minister. Additionally, the MND oversees the General Political Warfare Bureau, Accounting Bureau, Medical Bureau, Combined Logistics Command, Reserve Command, Armed Forces (Military) Police Command, the three service General Headquarters (Army, Navy, and Air Force), and lesser organizations such as those 55

DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

that compose the professional military education system and the military justice system. The MND’s GSH serves as the Minister’s command staff. GSH is composed of offices devoted to Training and Doctrine Development for Joint Operations, Personnel, Intelligence, Operations and Planning, Logistics, Communications and Electronics, and Military Affairs.14 This organization provides the Minister with a personal staff mirroring the larger MND staff, and provides a vehicle to ensure that he remains well-informed. It also may have led to emergence of a dual chain of operational command that could lead to confusion and misunderstood orders, especially during a crisis. One of the most important organizations in this panoply is that dealing with doctrinal development. Doctrine is defined as “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.” Joint Doctrine is simply “fundamental principles that guide the employment of U.S. military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective.”15 Establishing doctrine is the responsibility of a development system that begins with guidelines from the armed forces chief of staff and proceeds through the Joint and Functional Doctrines offices and development chains to produce operational guidelines and field manuals. Technical manuals are promulgated to support the field manuals. The system is headed by the MND’s Doctrine Development Steering Committee, supported by the Joint Operations and Doctrine Development Office, which works with the Service Doctrine Development and Review Steering Committee. The service headquarters are then responsible for turning this guidance into service related doctrines. Each service has its own doctrinal development structure, culminating in its Education and Doctrine Development Command.16 The 2000 laws are actually just part of a larger legal overhaul of defense matters in Taiwan. Between July 2000 and June 2002, 38 new laws and several new sets of regulations replaced 55 existing laws and regulations.17 This process modernized and streamlined Taiwan’s legal framework for national security. In addition to the army, air force, and navy, which are discussed in later chapters, the reorganized MND includes three significant topical departments. Logistics functions were reorganized as the Combined Logistics Command (CLC) to manage logistics on a joint, force-wide basis, to increase efficiency, and enhance combat capability. Acquisition of increasingly sophisticated military technology makes these improvements essential, and the CLC is tasked with increasing the use of automated information systems, and improving management of stocks and production, from personal protection materials to products for sale on the global market.18 The GSH is also responsible for coordinating service-wide training and exercises in the pursuit of joint capability and readiness for a wide range of military contingencies. The official policy of “streamlining exercises and training missions [while] establishing joint operational command” is pursued in a series 56

DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

of annual exercises. These are categorized as operational, mobilization, defense against nuclear and chemical warfare, and general training.19 In practice, the service-wide annual training program usually addresses more than one of these areas during the same exercise. The MND is organized into distinct divisions to accomplish these goals: policy, armaments, and military operations. Policy and Armaments are each headed by a Vice Minister of Defense, while the CGS heads Military Operations. Other offices have been created to solidify the civilian Defense Minister’s span of control and to facilitate his control of the military: the Strategic Planning Department, the Integrated Assessment Office (IAO), the Reserve Affairs Department (RAD), the Human Resources Department (HRD), and the Material Resources Department (MRD). Two of these organizations are focused on Taiwan’s difficult strategic situation. The first of these is the Strategic Planning Department (SPD). The SPD is tasked with the military planning functions normally assigned to a nation’s J-5 organization, but also has authority in the areas of financial and material resources.20 Hence, the SPD has been provided with the tools necessary to conduct a comprehensive strategic process for Taiwan’s national defense structure. Second, the IAO is tasked with analyzing the strategic and operational situation, and developing possible military scenarios that might face Taiwan. The IAO both evaluates and anticipates; it looks at the “branches and sequels” of possible military action and interaction, using operations analysis techniques, modeling and simulation, and war gaming, all of which feeds directly into the military’s planning for exercises and training. The new MND is organized to carry out Taiwan’s defense in a logical, responsible fashion, although personalities and institutional ties count for much, as is the case with any governmental bureaucracy. The Ministry is also subject to pressure from political parties, defense industry, and other interest groups, the media, the public, think tanks, and academics. Article 3 of the 2000 law describes Taiwan’s strategy as one of “all-out defense,” with political, economic, military, psychological, and technological aspects. The MND is responsible for formulating and executing a National Defense Policy that is in accord with the National Security Policy. The National Defense Policy is defined as “the aggregate of plans, initiatives, and actions adopted by [the nation] to achieve the security goals in peacetime and wartime for resisting external military threats and suppressing internal riots.”21 Article 4 of the law assigns to the MND “matters concerned with the planning, reviewing and executing of the military strategy.”22 “Military strategy” is defined in this process as “the use or [threatened] use [of] all possible military means to achieve the guidance and concept of the military goals of a nation.”23 This is close to the common Western definition of military strategy as “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.”24 Article 11 of the 2000 MND Organization Law states that the MND should “develop the professional functions of military administration, military 57

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command, and military armament, provide suggestions on defense policy, and formulate military strategy based on the needs of national defense security.”25 The defense laws reordered Taiwan’s governmental lines of responsibility for security policy and execution. The Executive and the MND are supported in the national security process by the NSC, which is tasked with “setting national security policies and assisting in planning security strategy;”26 its membership includes the President, Vice-President, Premier, National Security Advisor, and Minister of Defense. The Minister of Defense is one of eight cabinet members; he is responsible for “all the affairs pertaining to national defense.” The Ministry maintains liaison with the other central government departments, but the effectiveness of these ties, while formal in some cases, are dependent to a significant extent on the personalities involved and the political relationships among them. Inter-agency cooperation is both difficult and crucial in any government; Taiwan’s very challenging security position heightens its importance, especially for the MND.27 The MND and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), for instance, formed a joint liaison office in August 2002 to improve information flow and strive for common policy formulation. In practice, this office has been more ignored than effective.28 A more effective inter-agency organization has been the MND’s Search and Rescue (SAR) Coordination Center, which in July 2000 was incorporated into the Executive Yuan’s National Search and Rescue Command Center. The center’s mission includes domestic SAR and cooperation with international SAR efforts. It works with Taiwan’s Coast Guard, fire and police administrations of the Ministry of the Interior, as well as with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).29 A fourth, largely unspoken objective of Taiwan’s post-2000 defense reorganization is to reduce the army’s dominance in the military, both in terms of numbers and influence. Progress in this area has occurred, but is difficult to evaluate. One indicator that the situation is changing is the 2003 defense budget’s breakdown by service: Army-10.24 percent, Air Force-10.61 percent, Navy-8.49 percent; another is the relatively extensive personnel changes in the MND since May 2004, with Navy and Air Force officers often replacing their Army brethren. A third indicator is the apparent shift in strategic emphasis toward repelling a PLA invasion before it approaches Taiwan.30

Developing professional civilian defense specialists The law also requires ensuring that civilian defense experts man the new defense infrastructure as another step to ensure the subservience of the military to the civilian polity. Carrying out this element of civilianization requires MND to convert one-third (approximately 200 positions) of its officials from military to civilian personnel. This conversion has occurred on paper, but more than 90 percent of the new civilian positions have been filled by recently retired military officers, while the remaining positions have been filled by long-term MND civilian 58

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employees who transferred into the reorganized positions. The law further requires that close to half of the designated MND billets are filled by civilians by 2012, a goal that will be difficult to meet. The lack of civil servants trained to serve at middle and senior levels of the defense ministry is a challenging problem. The idea of a professional career as a civilian defense specialist is new in Taiwan; there is no tradition of successful businessmen and other private sector administrators seeking a second career in government, as there is, for instance, in the United States. This option is being explored by the Taipei government, but had met with little success by mid-2005.31 The government is also having difficulty finding the resources for financial compensation sufficient to attract the highly educated personnel desired, especially in the midst of a generally healthy economy. The still uncertain nature of Taiwan’s civil–military relationship also shadows the appeal of a long-term career in the MND, as does the continued appointment of retired senior officers to the nominally civilian minister’s position. Most importantly, Taiwan’s tenuous position in the face of China’s uncompromising stand and improving military must make any potential civilian defense specialist wonder about the viability of such a career. In sum, although the civilianization of the MND is in progress, it is a difficult transformation that will take generations to complete.32 Retired Admiral Lee Jye’s appointment as Minister of National Defense in May 2004 has provided the process with additional impetus. He appointed a Vice Admiral (VADM) as Vice Minister of Defense, replacing an army officer. Lee then replaced army officers with navy or air force personnel in several key positions, including the SPD, as Director of the Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST), and as head of war planning on the General Staff. He also named new army generals to serve as J-4 (Director of the Logistics Department of the General Staff) and as J-1 (Director of the Personnel Department of the General Staff).33 Furthermore, the new Chief of the General Staff is Air Force General Li Tien-yi, while President Chen Shui-bian’s primary civilian defense advisor is a retired admiral. A National Security Council had been first established in 1950, and a draft National Defense Organization Law was considered in 1951 and 1954 but not adopted. A Ministry of National Defense Organizational Law was promulgated in 1970 and a General Staff Organization Law in 1978. The current laws were drawn up following the 1997 amending of the Constitution and submitted to the government’s Executive Yuan later that year.34 The NSC’s position seems less rather than more clear after passage of the 2000 law. The Constitution assigns to the NSC authority over “all other administrative organizations,” while Article 10 of the Defense Law instructs the NSC to “integrate national power and formulate all-out defense policies [and] should integrate resources of all other agencies to help the MND to achieve the military goals of national security with military means in order to ensure national security and [the] people’s well being.”35 In practice, however, it appears that the NSC, a relatively powerful body in the defense policy process in previous governments, 59

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currently is a relatively minor participant in formulating, enabling, and implementing Taiwan’s defense policies, apart from its presidential advisory role.36

Joint culture The reorganization removed the individual service heads from the direct operational chain of command. For instance, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy is no longer directly responsible for the deployment and employment of naval forces; instead, he is responsible for training and equipping naval forces, which are then provided to national joint commanders for tasking in defense of the nation. These units will report directly to the Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC) in wartime, rather than through the Navy’s chain of command.37 The other services are similarly tasked, but questions remain about the efficacy of this system, both in terms of communications links and service culture.38 The defense laws mandate jointness among Taiwan’s military services, a difficult cultural change to effect. Although by most accounts, the Army still fills a disproportionate number of the military billets both in the MND and in GSH, the structure is in place to facilitate the eventual institution of true jointness. The Joint Doctrine and Training Development Center, the JOCC, the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), the Integration and Evaluation Office (IEO), and the General Staff themselves are the leading joint organizations. All three services are represented in the staff “J” code structure and the Doctrine Center is led by a Marine Corps lieutenant general. The JOCC, which exercises operational control of forces in the field, is manned by officers from all the services and reports directly to the Defense Minister. While the Army General, the Navy General, and the Air Force General Headquarters were renamed the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force Headquarters on February 1, 2003, questions remain about how effectively joint planning and joint operations are taking root. This concern appears to be well-founded; the services are stationing very few officers in each other’s planning directorates, and those officers apparently are not engaged in the planning process, but merely serving as points of contact in the event of an emergent situation. Of course, not engaging in truly joint planning is in itself an invitation for emergent situations to develop.39 Ground was broken for a new MND headquarters building on December 18, 2003, at Dazhiyuan, just north of Taipei City. The facility, which is expected to be finished by 2008, will be linked up with the Hengshan Command Post through two aboveground and underground passages, to facilitate wartime command and transfer. The building is located at the foot of a hill and on the opposite slope to protect against attacks from fighters and missiles. The completed MND complex will accommodate 5,000–6,000 people in both working and living spaces. The main building connects the island’s navy headquarters, air force headquarters, and Hengshan command post, forming a National Defense Park (the Dazhi Special Military Zone) for centralized control of Taiwan’s island’s security. Physically 60

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collocating the different service headquarters should serve as a useful forcing function toward increasing jointness.

Combined Services Force General Headquarters The Combined Services Force General Headquarters is responsible for acquiring ordnance, military maps, and communication equipment for Taiwan’s Armed Forces. It also provides support and services commonly needed by all service branches, such as surveying, engineering, rear echelon administration, purchase and procurement, and armament appraisal and testing.

Reserve Command The Reserve Command is organized into ten divisions: Director of Political Warfare, Inspector General, Personnel and General Affairs, Comptroller, Training, Logistics, Mobilization, Communications-Electronics-Information, Reservist Service, and Reservist Management.40 It manages three District Reserve Commands: the County (City) Reserve Command, Military Assisting Duty Corps; and four “safeguard” units: Coastal, Urban, Garrison Protection, and Expanded Mobilization. These latter units are the Reserve Command’s “operators.” The Coastal Safeguard reserves are responsible for recruit training and readiness preparations during peacetime, and assume a coastal defense role in wartime. They include the Army’s eight Coastal Safeguard Brigades that conduct recruit training (including the Marine Corps Recruit Training Depot), and nine Mobilization Battalions. These units, the Marine Corps Base Garrison Brigade recently assigned to the Reserve Command, and four “Forward Deployment Reserve Brigades” are tasked with coastal defense duties. The Urban Safeguard units are responsible in peacetime for implementing mobilization readiness and for urban defense during wartime. They include seventeen county or city reserve brigades, theoretically trained as light infantry forces to “defend families, hometown and personal property.” The Garrison Protection units are tasked with implementing mobilization preparedness during peacetime and defending “key stations in low and high mountainous areas” of various operational sectors in the event of war. They consist of 29 Highland Companies and 5 Mountain Post Companies, all of which are trained as light infantry and assigned to defend “critical military terminal stations and key defiles.” The Expanded Mobilization Reserves carry out reserve education and training programs, as well as mobilization preparedness during peacetime; in wartime, they would serve as guards for naval and air force bases, depots, and other military facilities. Finally, the Military Assisting Duty Corps would be formed during wartime to provide military service support or local or air defense. The various units that make up this Corps are under either county or city reserve commands during peacetime; in the event of war, they could be assigned to civilian infrastructure repair or military facilities construction. 61

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The Reserve Command will almost certainly continue increasing its important role as the major link between the uniformed services and their reserve forces, and between the military and the civilian population. The central government tasks the Reserve Command with “refining the reserve forces,” but offers little direction other than advising the “digitalization of mobilization management.” The Reserve Command’s real objectives are crucial to Taiwan’s defense at a time when active military numbers and obligated service for conscripts are decreasing. The first of those objectives is to field reservists able to contribute to the island’s defense despite inadequate active duty training periods. Second, the Reserve Command has to integrate the civilian population into the defense effort. The system to serve this purpose is in place, but making it effective requires the commitment of the civilian population, difficult in any democracy, and an especially complex one in Taiwan, given the problematic sense of nationalism that prevails. Third, the Reserve Command is responsible for mobilizing Taiwan’s military reserve manpower, industry, and transportation system in the event of war. Again, in an era of decreasing numbers of active duty personnel, reduced military budgets, and declining obligated service for conscripts, this is an extremely challenging task.

Armaments Bureau US provision of weapons systems and other military assistance to Taiwan has had a history of waste and corruption dating back to the American Volunteer Flying Group (the Flying Tigers) under the command of Brigadier General Claire Chenault in 1941.41 There have been at least two facets to this problem. Most prominent has been “traditional” financial corruption, with bribes, kickbacks, and rake-offs artificially raising the cost of purchases and concomitantly lowering stocks and readiness. Less obvious is a corruption of effectiveness, wherein ignorance, prejudice, and self-interest by both purchaser and seller result in the wrong systems being acquired. This paradigm has continued until recent times, with the French sale of Lafayette-class guided-missile frigates (FFGs) in the 1990s the most egregious example.42 The situation finally led to the transfer of the Military Procurement Bureau and the CSIST from the General Staff Headquarters to the MND in March 1998.43 The defense reorganization’s primary vehicle for preventing corruption in armaments acquisition was the 2002 creation of the Armaments Bureau, led by the Vice Minister of Defense for Armaments. Administratively, the Bureau is staffed by a combination of military and civilian personnel and is responsible directly to the Minister of National Defense. Its responsibilities include 1 2

the planning, evaluation, and management of military armaments, technical specifications, and “special funds”; developing defense industries, to include dual-use products and services; 62

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3 4 5 6 7 8

military procurement planning, management, and supervision; armaments acquisition and logistics support; defense projects, facilities, assets and properties planning, supervision and management; armaments information supervision; human resources and general administration development; and “other things relevant to military armament.”44

The Armaments Bureau is organized around eight lower level bureaus, five of them—Planning and Evaluation, Technological Industries, Procurement Management, Acquisition Management, and Projects and Assets—supported by the Information Management, General Affairs, and Comptroller Offices. Education and training responsibilities include responsibility for associated “military schools, bases, and other complexes.” Among the Armament Bureau’s most important responsibilities is its authority to direct government research and development funds into programs managed jointly with private sector concerns.45 To this end, three “science research parks” have been opened to provide nonMND government agencies and private sector concerns with technological assistance and to further “spin off ” and “spin on” to the benefit of Taiwan’s defense programs.46 The bureau was designed to serve as a semi-independent, professionally manned, comprehensive point of decision-making for acquiring new weapons systems and other military goods, and provided with a large physical establishment in Taipei City. It is envisioned as a relatively transparent, authoritative, apolitical organization dealing with indigenous armaments development, as well as oversight of the foreign procurement process. Political influence obviously remains a major influence in the weapons acquisition process, however, and the Armaments Bureau has yet to prove itself.

Strategic Planning Department While the Armaments Ministry represents the government’s efforts to develop an indigenous defense capability, the SPD is tasked with developing and executing defense strategies and policies that support the national security strategy and national principles of civil defense. As noted earlier, the SPD was established in March 2003 under the National Defense and MND Organization Laws. It is tasked with employing the best practices from industrial, public, academia, and research sectors to plan and coordinate the reorganization and reengineering of Taiwan’s armed forces. Additionally, the SPD is responsible for analyzing global and regional strategic environments, and then proposing appropriate national defense policies and plans. This task is complicated by the requirement that SPD products satisfy the Executive Yuan’s political requirements and also garner wide public support. The SPD is divided into three divisions: (1) the Strategic Assessment Division is responsible for conducting strategic analysis and assessments of the national 63

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security environment; (2) the Defense Policy Division is responsible for developing national defense policy recommendations, designing and implementing the TenYear Military Development Plan, establishing a national defense emergency response mechanism, and perhaps most importantly is in charge of the revision and implementation of planning Programming Budgeting System of the NMD; and (3) the Force Planning Division is responsible for laying out the MND’s Five-Year Force Restructuring Project; developing budget proposals; promoting military exchanges with allied nations; and proposing future weapon system procurement. The Force Planning Division is also responsible for developing a well-equipped professional military that operates under civilian control, and provides a strategic deterrence against, and a relative strategic advantage over, potential aggressors. Its Manning and Equipping Division is responsible for modernizing the military personnel system, refining the defense organization, allocating defense personnel, restructuring military forces, and proposing mission responsibilities. It is also charged with continually developing policy to streamline and establish modernized armed forces. The SPD’s “major tasks” are categorized as “Current” and “Future.” Under the former category are to: develop and implement a Ten-Year Military Development Plan; implement the Force Restructuring Project; and develop a detailed streamlining program. Future tasks may include instituting a formal mechanism for strategic assessments to support national security policy-makers; streamlining and force restructuring efforts; developing national strategies that make optimal use of national resources to provide effective deterrence against aggression; and continuing to promote international military cooperation and exchanges. The SPD’s most significant responsibility, however, is its assumption of planning functions normally conducted by a military’s J-5. The process of designing the new national defense infrastructure embodied in the 2000 laws was a complex and drawn out affair, with completion deadlines repeatedly extended. The process remained incomplete even after passage of the two pertinent laws in January 2000, as a September briefing that year revealed different points of view about proposed defense ministry organization between senior military and civilian policy-makers and between senior officers of the different services. A particularly sharp disagreement at that time concerned the crucial planning, resource allocation, and program approval functions. It was at one point proposed that a single office execute all of these functions.47 This would have been an extraordinarily powerful “box” on the organizational diagram, since the principal would, in effect, been able to initiate, approve, fund, and evaluate programs with little chance of disapproval except at the very highest level. Instead, a traditional J-5 office was established, headed by a lieutenant general or vice admiral. After Lee became Minister of Defense in May 2004, he effectively disestablished J-5, with its duties assigned elsewhere. The office whose power has increased most significantly is the SPD. In addition to its planning functions, J-5 64

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lost its responsibility for resource management, which was shifted to the MND’s Resource Division, while J-5’s evaluation and programming functions went to the relatively newly organized IEO. Minister Lee’s motive for eviscerating J-5 may have included a desire to enhance jointness and establish more balanced service roles within the MND.

General Staff Headquarters, MND The GSH is in charge of the planning and supervision of joint war activities, political warfare, personnel, military intelligence, operations, education and training, logistics, organization and equipment calibration, communications, military archives management, and medical services. It includes the Office of the Chief of the General Staff; the Department of Supervision and Inspection; the General Political Warfare Department; Offices of the Deputy Chiefs of the General Staff for Personnel, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, and Planning; the Bureau of Communications and Electronics; the Military History and Translation Bureau; the Military Medical Bureau; and the General Affairs Bureau. A brief summary of the duties of the various General Staff offices reveals the following responsibilities.48 The Deputy Chief of the General Staff (DCOGS) for Intelligence, a lieutenant general or vice admiral, oversees an office organized into four bureaus, each headed by a major general or rear admiral. These are (1) management of Taiwan’s military attaches; (2) Counter-Intelligence; (3) Military Intelligence; and (4) the PLA. The DCOGS for Operations and Planning has broad responsibilities for strategy and operations, to include operational policy, readiness regulations, order of battle and force deployment, and contingency planning. This office also plans and conducts exercises; oversees officer, enlisted, and unit training; coordinates disaster relief operations; and is in charge of ensuring that jointness is the dominant military paradigm. In an area liable to conflict with the DCOGS for Intelligence, the Operations and Planning DCOGS is also tasked with “collecting, processing reporting, and disseminating real-time operational intelligence.” The DCOGS for Logistics exercises an extremely broad sweep of authority over logistics, to include operational supply, maintenance, and personnel training. Of note is the emphasis the office places on involving Taiwan’s private sector in supporting military operations. This program includes allocating to commercial concerns aspects of transportation of personnel and supplies, petroleum supply management, ordnance management, spare parts procurement and storage, and equipment maintenance at all levels, to include aircraft repair and maintenance. The DCOGS for Communications, Electronics, and Information is tasked with “achieving superiority in electronic information.” He is charged with the “policymaking, planning, and implementation of programs of military communications, electronic warfare, C4ISR, and information warfare.” The General Affairs Office (GAO) is organized into five divisions: administrative affairs, secretarial affairs, transport supply, comptroller functions, and public 65

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affairs. The GAO is also responsible for relations with the LY. The Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB) comes with a very checkered historical background, descending from units organized during the earliest days of the revolution, heavily politicized, and completely controlled by the KMT. Today’s MIB is responsible for signals intelligence, reportedly cooperating with US intelligence agencies.49 The Bureau also conducts human intelligence-gathering and is an organ of Taiwan’s national intelligence structure. It can no longer depend on a powerful political officer system, embedded in an officer corps belonging to the KMT, but almost certainly retains a strong KMT coloration.

Procurement Bureau (PB) The Procurement Bureau (PB) of the MND and its representative in the United States, the Defense Procurement Division (DPD) of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in Washington, DC, are Taiwan’s two most important official military purchasing agencies. They purchase most of the military equipment and supplies required by Taiwan’s defense organizations. Other military procurement bodies, such as the military services’ logistics commands and the CSIST, play a relatively minor role in military purchasing abroad. Military organizations may purchase imported items without PB or DPD tendering bids, but all equipment and supplies with a purchase amount exceeding the designated audit ceiling of NT$30 million for domestic purchase and US$600,000 for overseas purchase must be purchased through PB or DPD tenders.

Civilianization At the heart of Taiwan’s defense reorganization lies an effort to ensure that the military is controlled by and owes its allegiance to the country’s civilian government, and not to uniformed senior officers. This decision represents a crucial step to Taiwan’s emergence as a twenty-first-century democracy. It helps guarantee individual freedom, and also provides assurance of US support of that freedom and the island’s independence. In January 2000, Minister of Defense Tang Fei, although himself a retired general, cogently described the parameters of civilianization in the Taiwan military, which would be transformed into a modern force “led by a civilian official . . . marked by integration of military political work with military orders . . . compatible rights and responsibilities [and] respect for the division of specialized military work.” He emphasized the importance of the “streamlining and enhancement program” as “a major army building project” that included modernizing the military’s organizational structure, renewing its equipment and systems, improving its mobility, and most importantly, “intensifying its overall national defense strength.” The goal, he emphasized, was a military that was “small in number, high in quality, and strong in combat effectiveness.”50 66

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In addition to vital modernization and civilianization processes, the military’s reorganization includes a force structure reappraisal addressing seven factors: 1 2

3

4

5

6

7

an analysis of the military threats posed by the mainland; impacts on Taiwan’s security resulting from globalization, a process that both benefits that security, but also changes its nature through reduction of the isolation previously characteristic of an island polity; American global military strategy and force requirements; these deployments, especially since the beginning of the Global War on Terror, directly impact US ability to come to the assistance of friends and allies such as Taiwan; security concerns on the island itself, which are headed by the obvious dangers of “fifth column” activity, ranging from information gathering to espionage to decapitation strikes by special operations forces (SOF); the effects of high technology weaponry, particularly with respect to those systems that replace/eliminate the need for direct human participation in war fare; force structure and combat capability assessment, analysis, and a general “lessons learned” process from past force structure paradigms and operational experiences; and the effects on Taiwan’s security posed by and resulting from the campaigns to fight terrorism around the world.51

Taiwan military-industrial complex Despite its historically heavy dependence on foreign arms suppliers, especially the United States, Taipei would prefer a self-sufficient Taiwan military-industry complex (TMIC) able to satisfy its defense requirements.52 The Armaments Bureau is the military’s primary conduit with TMIC. The government hopes to strengthen domestic military industries; even before it took office, the ruling DPP’s 1999 Defense White Paper thought that Taiwan should integrate the Capabilities in the Private Sectors to strengthen the indigenous Defense Industry . . . reform the defense industry by introducing entrepreneurship, technology management, and incentive packages into its current inefficient operations. . . . take advantage of her world-class information industrial base to build up a more productive defense industry.53 A domestic armaments industry began in earnest in the mid-1960s, following a major reduction in US economic assistance and the shift in American focus to the Vietnam conflict. Development accelerated following pronouncement of the 1972 Nixon Doctrine of regional self-reliance, but Taiwan remains dependent on American and other foreign assistance.54 Taiwan’s ability to design weapons and sensor systems for the TMIC to produce depends to a significant extent not only on the well-regarded CSIST, but on the more basic levels of research that provide input to that and similar institutions. 67

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Although now a decade old, the US Department of Defense survey of global militarily critical technological capabilities remains a useful indicator of national potential in more than eighty subject areas.55 Each country surveyed is awarded one of four levels of capability in a particular critical area, with “0” indicating no capability and “4” indicating that “All” the necessary elements to develop militarily useful systems from the component technologies are present. Taiwan is evaluated as possessing “limited capability to design and produce standard ammunition for small arms, artillery, and in most instances at least elementary rocket and missile systems”; “some offensive chemical agent capability” and “some” capability in the “detection, warning and identification” of such agents be employed against its forces. A similar level of Limited to Some Capability is awarded Taiwan in the area of electronic components, advanced diesel engine manufacture, and vetronics (vehicle electronics). Perhaps surprisingly, Taiwan does not fare well in many of the subfields that make up Information Systems Technology, although evaluated as possessing a “majority” of the applicable technologies in High Performance Computing, Networks and Switching, and Transmission Systems. A range of capabilities is awarded in the Materials Technology category, with Taiwan receiving its highest grade in Special Function Materials, which includes “lubricants and seasonal corrosion protection coatings.” Almost no capability in Marine Systems Technology is granted, but Taiwan receives maximum evaluations (“All” technologies present) in Nuclear Systems Technology. “Limited” or “Some” capability in the category of Signature Control Technology is awarded, although a weakness is noted in integration of these technologies. These evaluations indicate TMIC potential in ground combat systems and ordnance, possibly including precision-guided munitions (PGM). The high capability ranking in nuclear technology no doubt results from Taiwan’s experience in operating civilian nuclear power plants; there is no indicator relating to the possibility of such knowledge being applied in the military sector. Missing from this impressive list are several dozen technologies categorized in the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL), including: aeronautics, guidance and navigation, information warfare, power systems, sensors and lasers, and space systems. These are of varying importance to Taiwan’s security, but overall the picture is at best mediocre for the TMIC’s capability for independent growth in producing military systems “from scratch.”56 This probably results more from lack of application and investment, than from technological capability. There are two important organizations attempting to bridge the gap between government defense priorities and the private sector. The first is the CSIST, the government’s primary military research and development organization; the second is the Aerospace Industry Development Corporation (AIDC), a joint public–private sector company established by the government in 1969. The CSIST was also established that year and has several significant successes to its credit, including the design and fielding of surface-to-air, surface-to-surface, and air-toair missile systems; fire control, sonar, and electronics systems for all the services. 68

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The CSIST has more than 10,000 employees and includes uniformed personnel as well as civilian researchers. The Institute is a full-spectrum research and development organization, performing tasks from basic scientific research to operational testing and evaluation of the systems it develops. It is staffed and resourced across all service lines, and in all warfare areas. Furthermore, the CSIST interacts with civilian industry, for mutual advantage of the spin-on and spin-off benefits of dual-use technologies development.57 The Aero Industry Development Center was originally assigned to the TAF to serve as Taiwan’s partner with the United States for co-production of UH-1 helicopters and F-5 fighter aircraft. The organization was transferred to the CSIST in 1983, but in 1996 was separated as a government-owned company under the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Its current chief is a retired lieutenant general, and its missions include supporting Taiwan’s aerospace development programs.58 AIDC is ranked among the world’s 100 defense industries in terms of annual revenue. Furthermore, although still tied to the government, AIDC’s self-stated business strategy “has turned from products and services or solely military applications to a well-balanced diversified provider to both military and commercial markets.”59 In August 2002, President Chen Shui-bian described the government’s plan for transforming AIDC into a completely private sector company in the future.60 CSIST and AIDC have both been successful innovators and developers of military systems. Their successes have been heavily supported by US defense companies, but are nonetheless impressive, ranging across the spectrum of land, air, and sea warfare. As is the case with Taiwan’s overall defense infrastructure, however, these organizations are constrained by limited resources. One important innovation has been offering qualified, draft-age men the opportunity to serve 3 years at CSIST instead of 2 years with the uniformed military forces. Despite the successes scored by the CSIST and AIDC, Taiwan’s defense industrial sector is hampered by its almost complete isolation from every one of the world’s nations with a significant defense industrial base. Some dual-use technology does flow, but acquisition of complete systems and technology specifically for military purposes is limited almost exclusively to the United States. Even that source is not completely open, although in April 2001 President George W. Bush approved Taiwan’s access to a very wide range of armaments and defense systems. In addition to its isolation, two general factors limit development of the TMIC. First, although the opportunity to acquire defense products from the United States has been expanded, the government has been unable to convince the LY, and by inference the people of Taiwan, of the need to expend the resources required for large-scale defense modernization. This factor also reflects the new situation confronting the TMIC; prior to the 1990s advent of democratic government, the TMIC was very much a government-dominated part of the island’s economy, which was focused on defense.61 Today, the TMIC must compete within the economy. 69

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Second, in 1990 the government established a system of offset requirements for foreign procurements. This program is intended to maintain the continued existence of indigenous defense companies. Under the offset arrangement, a foreign company selling defense products to the Taiwan military must include in its offering technology transfer, training, or technical assistance to a Taiwan defense company, usually to a value of 30, but possibly as high as 70 percent, of the contract with the foreign company. In effect, all foreign military sales to Taiwan must include a local business partner.62 One of the most troublesome facets of weapons acquisition for the Armaments Bureau is the politicization of that process. US provision of armaments to Taiwan has always been a political issue, but since 2001 has become more political than military in character; acquisition program decisions have perhaps inevitably reduced the role of the Armaments Bureau commander to that of a perhaps not very influential advisor. The acquisition of new armaments is a matter of the highest state interest, going directly to the question of Taiwan’s continued existence as a self-governing political entity.

Conclusion To offer a credible defense in the new century, Taiwan’s military must fulfill at least four requirements. These are first, equipment incorporating state-of-the-art technology, or “mechanization and informatization,” in Chinese terms. Second is the organization necessary to best utilize new technology, embodied in the post2000 efforts to reorganize the military. Third is the development of the “soft power” necessary to employ the new technology and organization successfully for the benefit of the nation’s security interests. Fourth and most important is the need to integrate strategic political efforts with military preparedness. This includes the development of military doctrine suitable to its mission, resources, and the threat. Doctrine must suit the national security policy and military strategy it serves. It must also suit the military technology at hand and the military organization charged with its execution. Finally, training and education of the military forces must be updated to accord with the other conditions of doctrinal transformation and technological advances. Taiwan’s defense leaders, both uniformed and civilian, recognize these requirements and are trying to institute the infrastructure to achieve them. The first and most basic requirement—state-of-the-art military technology—is proving the most difficult to acquire, as the civilian administration falters in its ability to provide necessary resources to the military, either for foreign purchases or operational budget requirements. The second tenet of military capability is reorganization, and Taipei’s plan to accomplish this objective is in place. Taiwan is attempting such a basic, comprehensive process that its accomplishment will take several years to accomplish, years that Taiwan may not have, given the mainland’s growing military strength.

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Taiwan’s grasp of the third modernization requirement—strategy, doctrine, and training—is the most difficult to evaluate. It is this area that, while susceptible to budget requirements, is most acutely dependent on the human factor. The civilianization and depoliticalization that have occurred during the past quarter-century have laid the framework for an MND capable of defending Taiwan to the limits of its resources. The island’s leaders and military personnel must continue to work to obtain those resources and make the framework a reality. The succeeding chapters will look at each of Taiwan’s services, in turn, to see how they are progressing in meeting that challenge.

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The vision The manpower issue was directly addressed during the development of the defense reorganization laws adopted in 2002, following earlier decisions to streamline the military. As have most of the world’s defense organizations, the Ministry of National Defense (MND) recognizes the need to emphasize quality over quantity when constructing a twenty-first century-military, oriented toward high-technology warfare and tight command and control. Hence, all three services of the Taiwan military have reduced their numbers since 1985 and especially since 1997. The MND wants to make increasing use of civilian resources to reduce the number of personnel required for active military service and is moving to outsource support functions.1 The MND also aims to take advantage of the civilian research and development sector in a way not dissimilar to China’s current interpretation of “People’s War”: trying to draw on the entire society’s resources for the defense of the nation. A three-stage program to reduce further Taiwan’s uniformed personnel was announced in 1993.2 Under this plan, the “ROC Military Ten-year Force Target Program,” MND directed a reduction of total military force to less than 400,000, with a concomitant reduction in the number of flag and general officers. This plan was not fully implemented, possibly because then President Lee Teng-hui was concerned that the civil–military balance might be upset, but clearly signaled that future reductions were inevitable. The 1993 program apparently was superseded by the “Streamlining and Consolidation Program,” approved by the Defense Ministry and by President Lee in July 1997, with a completion date set for June 2001. It aimed to reduce military personnel from 453,000 to 400,000, was part of a plan for overhauling the entire military administrative structure, but was subsumed by the 2000 defense reorganization laws. The effort to modernize the Taiwan military was an important focus of the 2000 reorganization laws, which became effective on February 1, 2002. They dictated a two-phase personnel downsizing. The two-stage Chingshih project was

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the first phase and was implemented in 1997; it ended in July 2001 after reducing military manning by approximately 20,000 personnel. A further reduction to 370,000 personnel by 2004 was planned. Many of the personnel billets eliminated during the first stage came from the Armed Forces Reserve Command (AFRC), which in November 2000 reported that 20,000 personnel had been cut “from its payroll,” and that the command would be downsized to a “bureau.”3 Approximately 18,000 of these 20,000 billets were transferred to the newly organized Coast Guard, however, which reports not to the Ministry of National Defense, but to the Executive Yuan of Taiwan’s national government. Hence, while “military” manpower was reduced, the total number of personnel in uniform was only very slightly affected. The next phase in reducing the size of the military is the Chingchin program, designed to reach a troop level of 325,000 by the end of 2006 by eliminating 15,000 billets each year.4 Lack of a clearly stated date for this phase of force reduction has become academic, since the cuts planned for 2004 have apparently not occurred. This does not mean force reduction will not occur, but probably reflects inter-service rivalry and the difficult calculus of maintaining Taiwan’s defense capability. The MND has also discussed reducing the force to 265,000 by 2009, driven in part by a lack of funding.5 A central government memorandum on “National Defense Manpower” begins with the sentence “In line with national goals and requirements for social and economic developments,” before discussing the necessity of “allocating military personnel properly and efficiently.”6 The reduction in numbers of personnel on active military duty is tied to the MND reorganization; it also recognizes the need to strengthen the Noncommissioned Officers (NCO) corps, and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) as a source of commissioned officers, establish the military institutions necessary to ensure joint management of the individual services, and proceed toward an all-volunteer military. These are ambitious goals and force reductions are proceeding tentatively, at best. Taiwan maintains thirteen military paths for accessing military personnel. They include military academy “Regular Classes,” junior college “Technical Class,” NCO Professional Female Officer Class, NCO “Specialized Officer Class,” NCO “Regular Class,” Navy Petty Officer Class, Air Force Professional Flight Class, Junior College for Sergeants, ROTC, and the Chung-Cheng Armed Forces Preparatory School.7

Officers Officers in the Taiwan military obtain their commission from one of three sources; approximately 15 percent of the officers commissioned each year are academy graduates and receive Regular Commissions. They serve at least six years and are expected to become career officers. Various specialized military schools requiring shorter terms of duty are a second source of commissioned

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officers. Third, civilian college graduates who have passed a written test may become reserve officers. Reserve commission officers also come from the ROTC program, choose a commissioning program after being conscripted, or possess a particular specialty needed by the military. They must serve at least five years. The ratio of officers to NCOs in 2004 was 1:2.4, while that to enlisted men is 1:2.6. Thus, the ratio of officers to soldiers as a whole in the armed forces is 1:5, which is close to the 2004 officer to enlisted ratio in Japan’s military of 1:4.8 and in the US armed forces of 1:5.1.8 Officers are commissioned as ensigns in the Navy or second lieutenants in the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps. Promotion rates differ slightly among the services, but all follow a similar progression to lieutenant (junior grad)/first lieutenant after two years of commissioned service, lieutenant/captain after 4–5 years, lieutenant commander/major at the 7–9 year point, commander/lieutenant colonel after 12–15 years in uniform, and captain/colonel at 18–19 years of service. Promotion to flag or general rank is a much less structured process, although an officer normally must prove himself (there are no woman flag or general officers in Taiwan) for at least two to four years in each of the general officer grades before further promotion.

Noncommissioned officers NCOs constitute the backbone of any military; they are critical for training troops and junior officers. An outflow of senior NCOs has occurred in recent years, however, leaving the current proportion of career NCOs too low and the percentage of inexperienced NCO reservists too high. Reservists are on active duty for a very limited period of time, making it difficult for them to keep up with changes in the operation and maintenance of increasingly sophisticated weapons and equipment. Solving this problem requires reconfiguring the NCO organizational, training, and education structure, as well as recruiting new, higher quality NCOs. Regular service NCOs must serve more than four years and usually hold an Associates Degree or graduate from the National Army Senior High School (NCO school). Conscripted personnel and volunteers may become NCOs; reserve NCOs are enlisted personnel with particular skills or conscripted men who apply to become enlisted NCOs obligated to serve 3 years. Conscripted NCOs must serve 20 months and may include college graduates who do not wish to become officers. As a result of the weakened NCO corps, the military has been forced to assign junior officers to the tasks normally performed by NCOs. Service leaders recognize and have launched efforts to correct the situation, including an overhaul of NCO recruitment procedures that require candidates to be volunteers possessing at least a high school diploma and to have had at least one year of proven enlisted service. The Navy’s Regular NCO recruiting goal for the first quarter of 2005 was 362; 330 volunteers actually entered the NCO education and training pipeline, which 74

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is a good start. Second quarter recruiting is reportedly ahead of schedule.9 Despite the new program, an experienced, competent NCO corps requires years to develop. Another change is implementation of a revised “Non-Commissioned Officer Promotion System” that emphasizes quality performance rather than time-in-grade for promotion.10 Volunteers may enlist in the military for a 3-year period; draftees must serve 20 months. Enlisted soldiers must also serve an extended period of reserve duty following their active duty. A massive overhaul of NCO education and training was being planned in 2005. If fully implemented, this program will serve as a joint NCO program and will occur on a dedicated campus. Career planning for NCOs will include graduation from the basic school with promotion to E-4, followed 2 years later by promotion to E-5, 3–4 years later to E-6, and then attendance at one of the specialized sergeant-major’s courses.11 Graduation from the basic NCO school will incur a minimum 4 years of obligated service. Graduates may also apply to admission to one of the military academies following 1 year of exemplary service. The objective is to produce career NCOs who are competent in English, information operations, and a military branch specialty.12

Volunteer military program Pay is probably the most important issue in attracting volunteers for military service and then retaining them once they are educated and trained, a factor highlighted in a recent Ministry of Defense survey. The results indicated that “only 3 percent of [Taiwan’s] youth are willing” to volunteer for military service, and that the MND’s project to attract “at least 70,000 troops by 2012” was off to a very slow start, with just 600 agreeing to serve during the project’s first year. The students surveyed agreed that they did not want to be conscripted, and urged the government to expand the current alternative service plan and seek additional women for military service. The results of the Defense Ministry’s efforts in 2003–2004 to create three allvolunteer units—an army motorized infantry battalion, a marine infantry battalion, and an air force guards battalion—confirm that young people have little desire to join the military. In the fall of 2004, the Director of MND’s Department of Manpower reported that of the 647 service members the MND required, it was only able to secure 328 volunteers, and 81 percent of those were already members of other military units. He credited this failure to several factors. First, that the $900 monthly salary offered to volunteers was too low to attract volunteers;13 second, that the publicity campaign for the program “had not been powerful enough;” finally, that the physical fitness of the “average volunteer recruits” had been too low.14 The conscription pool is also limited by Taiwan’s graying population, emigration of draft-aged youths, and reduced interest in military service by the young.15 75

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Despite this result, the MND announced in late December 2004 that it was going to begin moving Taiwan toward an all-volunteer military: “From now on, we will have more and more volunteer soldiers.” The MND announced a plan to recruit 6,561 volunteer soldiers beginning in January 2005, including adding women in the military “across different units, including combat units.”16 In January 2005, Vice-Minister of Defense Michael (Ming-hsien) Tsai announced that mandatory military service would be shortened to 18 months on July 1, 2005 and to 12 months in 2008. He also stated that the maximum age for military service volunteers was being lowered from 40 to 35 years of age. Tsai included in this announcement a monthly pay raise for newly conscripted men from $900 to $1,167. He admitted that the pay offered to volunteers would still fall short of that offered in the private sector, but noted the availability of special pay for special duty, such as serving in submarines. The plan aims for “a ratio of three volunteer soldiers to two conscripts [to] be achieved in three years.” Tsai went on to claim that “the planned shortening of military service will not undermine the military’s overall combat capabilities, as modern warfare stresses ‘beyond vision’ and ‘no contact’ combat strategies.”17 He did not define what he meant by “no contact,” but probably was exaggerating the decisiveness of the high-technology warfare employed by the United States in recent conflicts. This announcement was followed by one from Dr Fu Mao-yao, Director of the MND Talent Recruitment Center, who stated the ministry’s intention of recruiting “6,561 young people, including 90 women, in February, April, June and August” 2005. He averred that “more than 1,000” volunteers signed up on the first day (January 31) alone, in response to increased pay and benefits.18 The MND now estimates—almost certainly too optimistically—that it will achieve a ratio of 60 percent volunteers to 40 percent conscripts by 2012.19 Creating an all-, or even “almost all”-volunteer military is further constrained by available conscriptionage males in Taiwan.

Conscripts Under the Military Service Law, conscription is administered jointly by the MND and the Ministry of the Interior. The former is responsible for securing an adequate number of conscripts and training them, while the latter determines the sources of the conscripts and ensures their rights and benefits. All males are required to fulfill military service by Taiwan’s Military Service Law, Article 3 of which states: Male persons shall be liable for military service on January 1 of the year immediately following the year during which they reach the age of 18, and shall no longer be drafted for service beginning on December 31 of the year during which they reach the age of 45. There were 6,556,484 males between the ages of 15 and 49 in 2004. Of this number, 4,992,737 were estimated to be physically qualified for military service, 76

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with 182,677 of these reaching the age of 19 each year.20 The military will require an average of almost 138,000 men per year between 2003 and 2012, under the present system. Given these figures, 75 percent of the available 19-year-olds will have to be actually conscripted and progress to the point of active service in operational units. The manpower shortage is unlikely to improve, given Taiwan’s net decline in population growth.21 In 2001, the average age of all serving military personnel was 25.2:31.3 for officers, 24.7 for NCOs, and 22.0 for conscripts.22 Taiwan’s population of 22.6 million includes 10.9 million women, yet only men are subject to conscription, which provides 60 percent of the military’s total strength.23 Some women do serve as volunteers, making up 4 percent of the military’s officers and 3.1 percent of the NCOs.24 MND’s 2002 annual report emphasizes the goals of “Gender Equality” and “Effective Utilization of Female Servicemen” [sic], but the intervening three years have not shown significant progress in attaining these goals.25 These numbers must be considered in light of options available to draft-age males. The Implementation Act for Substitute Services was revised on June 18, 2003 and allowed “those not suitable for regular military service” to choose substitute services, according to their interests or special skills. These services include civilian police and fire fighters, social services (social, environmental protection, medical, and educational), and other categories designated by the Executive Yuan. In 2003, about 12,202 young men were able to elect substitute services.26 Senior high, vocational high, and college students whose studies would be interrupted by military conscription can defer their induction until after graduation. Students who are admitted to a university or college undergo two months of basic training in the summer before their freshman year. Upon graduation, they re-enter the military to fulfill the remainder of their commitment. Citizens who have been sentenced to imprisonment for longer than seven years are prohibited from entering the military.27 Candidates in poor health are exempt from military conscription, and those in “average health” may serve in the National Guard. Draftees from impoverished families also may apply for National Guard service, giving them reserve status and allowing them to stay with their families. In addition, the only son of parents who are over seventy may also apply for National Guard service to satisfy his military obligation. Additionally, qualified college graduates may opt to serve three years at the CSIST instead of serving in uniform. They are paid regular CSIST salaries and are often offered regular positions at the institute following completion of their obligatory service.28 The MND’s Department of Manpower is responsible for both active-duty and reserve force uniformed personnel. Specifically, the department was established by the 2000 Defense Organization Act to oversee the planning and execution of national defense manpower issues, including the verification and execution of employment, dismissal, and transfer of personnel; as well as the planning, management, and execution of national defense education. It also plans and manages military contractor employees and MND nonmilitary personnel. Uniformed MND 77

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personnel performance ratings are under its purview, as is the military manpower management system. Finally, the Department of Manpower is responsible for planning and coordinating the system of demobilization and retired serviceman.29 The all-volunteer service plan will have to overcome at least four obstacles. First, the 2004 experiment in creating all-volunteer units failed by the government’s own admission; there is no indication that the new effort will be more successful. Second, officers in all Taiwan’s military services agree that even twenty-two months is not long enough to train conscripts adequately; as the period of obligated service is reduced, an even less well-trained military will result. Third, while the proposed pay raise of almost 25 percent is significant, it almost certainly will not be enough to attract volunteers in sufficient numbers to allow the planned reduction in conscription to succeed. Finally, Tsai’s statement about “modern warfare” stressing “no contact” combat is preposterous, ignoring the record of combat since 1990, especially highlighted by the current US operations in Iraq. This is a bold plan, and probably unattainable. It rests on the ability to “phase out non-volunteers,” although no timetable was provided, and the greater accession of women. Although not stated, an all-volunteer military will also have to include assigning women not just to the Navy’s warships (where they already serve), but also to Army combat units and Air Force tactical squadrons.30

The reserve force Despite the changes directed in the 2000 National Defense Organization Laws, the AFRC has retained significant authority in the military. It now is responsible for operating all military recruit training depots, as well as for defending the civilian infrastructure; this latter assignment includes serving as the military’s primary liaison with civilian authorities.31 Taiwan’s defense manning philosophy is based on maintaining a minimum active-duty force in peacetime and mobilizing a large number of troops in the event of war. The reservist system is supposed to play a key role, by supporting the rapid mobilization of combat ready troops. The military may also be mobilized for disaster assistance, but defense and combat is its primary mission. MND lists 3,500,000 reservists, 2.7 million of them Army, including 300,000 officers, 1.4 million NCOs, and 1.7 million other enlisted ranks.32 After a man is discharged from active duty, he must report to his local military reserve unit in the Armed Forces Reserve Command. Reservists are organized according to their military occupational specialty (MOS). Since a prolonged mobilization recall might adversely affect both the livelihood of a reservist and the overall economic development of the country, limited annual reservist training is usually conducted through selected recalls. An MOS refresher training course is conducted, and each reservist is notified of his unit combat mission and relative location.

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There are three categories of readiness in the reserve forces. The first is “Mobilize According to Actual Vacancies;” the On-Call Reservists in this category are trained to be mobilized and report to their active-duty units within 24 hours of notification. The second category of billets is “Mobilize Beyond Actual Vacancies,” designed for On-Call Reservists to report to duty within 24 hours, but not to be ready for duty until 48 hours after notification. The final category is “Mobilize According to Combat Attrition,” for On-Call Reservists mobilized within 24 hours to replace combat casualties. The above readiness categories seem nominal, since reserve personnel are required to receive so little training, no more than 4 training periods within the 8 years following their discharge from active duty. Not only is each training period limited to a maximum of 20 days, but they “actually last for only five to seven days” each; 20 to 28 days of training over an 8-year period is certainly not enough to maintain any level of meaningful physical or professional readiness for a serviceman or woman.33 Taiwan also has established systems for mobilizing “Military Supply Industries” and “Military Transportation.” The first of these aims to identify civilian factories key to providing military supplies and maintaining military systems; the MND has listed 300 factories in this program. Taiwan’s topography severely limits ground communications, both north–south and east–west; the plan for military transportation mobilization aims to identify usable civilian transportation systems and equipment that might be available for military use during wartime. The Reserve Command is responsible for administering ground components of this system, while sea going vessels of greater than 200 tons displacement and civil aircraft are the responsibility of the Navy and Air Force headquarters, respectively.34 Exercises are conducted for all these mobilization units, usually annually. As part of mobilizing its population in the event of armed attack, Taipei aims to “consolidate the national defense and the people’s livelihood for defense purposes,” including organizing “legally established armed and civil defense groups and [merging] them into order of battle.” The government has reportedly taken steps to implement this version of “people’s war.” Regulations have been published and civilian government employees have been required to attend all-out defense mobilization seminars. This program is apparently intended to be activated only if Taiwan’s security situation is in extremis, and authorizes the MND to “incorporate legal armed groups into the order of battle” in annual exercises and combat readiness training. Meanwhile, police and fire forces, civil defense groups, and students may be mobilized during exercises “to support military operations and maintain social order.”35 Given the very scarce resources currently allocated for training the On-Call Reserve forces, who are supposed to be ready for immediate combat, it is difficult to take this public mobilization program seriously.

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Manning the active force The active-duty military force is supposed to number 300,000 by the end of 2006 and 265,000 by 2009; most of that reduction will likely come from the Army and will be spread throughout the ranks, from general officers to junior enlisted. Continuing reductions in military manning may result from the desire to modernize, but also reflect the increasing difficulty in attracting volunteers to serve. The Army has borne the brunt of personnel reductions during the past decade, but the other services have also been affected. The Marine Corps has been drastically impacted. The Air Force wants to establish an improved pilot-to-cockpit ratio of 1:1.33 for single-seat and 1:1.25 for double-seat fighter aircraft, a target it is still having difficulty meeting. This in turn has meant taking personnel cuts in administrative, logistics, and other support areas, a course of action preferable to losing pilot billets, but still costly in terms of preparedness and long-term force stability. Factories and repair facilities previously controlled by the military have been civilianized, primarily to save on personnel billets, and to concentrate the men and women forming the military in combat-related positions. A similar process is included for schools and medical care facilities but these aspects of the civilianization process appear to be moving more slowly than the administrative and organizational processes.36

Personnel and military modernization Resolution of the modernization issues described by Minister of Defense Tang Fei in 2000 relies on personnel volunteering to join the military, which indeed is the factor basic to Taiwan’s continued security: the willingness of its people to serve and fight. The need to rationalize and modernize the personnel accession system is one of the most pressing problems faced by Taiwan’s defense establishment. It is a complex issue, ranging from identifying draft and enlistment-eligible young men and women, to developing civilian administrators skilled with the education, knowledge, and experience to serve effectively and manage the defense infrastructure. The female population will have to be specifically targeted for service. No all-volunteer military can ignore one-half of its candidate population and be successful. A first step in resolving these issues is to ensure the existence of rational, productive guidelines and regulations for identifying, accessing, educating, training, managing, and rewarding the required personnel. These steps must in turn have a creditable foundation based on consistent standards, resting on widely accepted definitions. The rule of law is as important to developing an effective personnel system for Taiwan’s defense infrastructure as it is for ensuring a healthy economy. Taiwan’s status as a mature global economy and de facto independent polity ironically has impacted negatively on the military’s ability to attract and retain personnel, both officer and enlisted. It has also reduced the attractiveness and security of the MND as a career for civilians. This is not a development to be 80

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regretted, of course, but it is one that must be dealt with, if Taiwan’s defense infrastructure is to be led and manned by dedicated, well-qualified personnel. Retaining high-quality uniformed personnel is an especially serious problem, and the MND has instituted a program of “Insurance, Welfare, and Medical Care” designed to improve the living conditions of military personnel and their families, especially enlisted personnel. This program pays for group life and casualty insurance for military personnel, as well as 60 percent of the premiums for them and their families to join Taiwan’s National Health Insurance Plan. This latter step was driven by the government’s decision to close the three military outpatient medical clinics it operated at Taipei, Taichung, and Kaohsiung, and reflects the government’s concern for military personnel welfare. Additionally, the MND operates a system of commissaries and post exchanges at which military families may purchase food and retail goods at a cost approximately 20 percent below the average civilian market price. A Consortium Corporation operates to care for the dependents and survivors of military members injured or killed in the line of duty, and a system of emergency financial support is also available. Medical care is provided and a program to expand and improve housing for military dependents has been established. These steps are no doubt welcomed by service members, but appear not to have had a significant effect in attracting new volunteers, a problem more acute than in the days of a low-skill military. Today, Taiwan’s military forces require welleducated and educable men and women to man increasingly technologically complex systems. The individual components of these systems are themselves increasingly sophisticated; the result is a series of “systems of systems” that have distanced today’s military technology as far from that of Taiwan’s military crises of the 1950s—the last time that military engaged in combat—as that was from the bow and arrow age.37 This is particularly evident in the shortages of fighter pilots, electronic-warfare officers, and other highly specialized areas. The fighter pilot issue is further complicated by the very strict physical standards required, most prominent of which is 20/20 eyesight: in 2000, only about 700 out of 10,000 applicants for the military could meet that requirement.38 One avenue the MND is pursuing to overcome personnel shortages is to simplify and better regulate the accession means and terms of service for crucial personnel, within a paradigm of short-, mid-, and long-term service. This approach should provide a more accurate basis for determining the numbers of new personnel required at initial accession point, as well as at the various retention (reenlistment) points that occur during a typical military career. Assigning heretofore military duties to civilian personnel is also being pursued as a means of reducing the number of technologically qualified officers and NCOs needed by the active-duty forces. Finally, while significantly more expensive than a conscription-based military, an all-volunteer military would presumably be manned by more dedicated and professional personnel. Shifting to an all- or even almost all-volunteer military is 81

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an expensive proposition, requiring pay raises, increased availability of advanced technical training, and additional opportunities for post-graduate education. The current defense budget has resulted in a reduction of such opportunities.39 It is not clear that the Taipei government has conducted the analysis necessary to accurately gauge these costs. The implications of an all-volunteer military for Taiwan have been studied, of course, although no comprehensive report was available in early 2005. One initial estimate for creating a personnel system completely independent of conscription was more than $4 billion. This figure has apparently—and understandably—been deemed excessive, and as of December 2004, the Ministry of Defense had tentatively floated a plan to create a “partial” all-volunteer military by increasing pay and benefits enough to significantly reduce the number of personnel who would have to be conscripted. The initial cost for this plan is $400 million.40

Professional military education Speaking at the 2002 joint graduation ceremony of united military academies, President Chen Shui-bian argued that wars from now on, would surely be reliant on high technology. [We are] facing new age wars depending mainly on new weapons and technology; it is even more important for us all to encourage and start our lifetime learning, unceasingly absorbing new knowledge. Thus, we can move forward to grasp victory.41 In 2001, 84.4 percent of active duty military personnel were high school graduates and 43.66 percent had completed college.42 Taiwan builds on this level of secondary education by administering a four level system of military education for officers and NCOs. Preparatory, Basic, Advanced, and Superior Education courses are conducted under the aegis of the National Defense University (NDU), which has launched a comprehensive course of improvement central to the further development of the defense infrastructure. There has also been discussion of more directly linking “defense think tank efforts” to the military education process.43 NDU’s creation in 2000 was unsettling to the individual services whose schools were merged into the national university, and this resistance has not been completely overcome.44 The remaining parts of the professional military education system, reaching from officer candidates to post-graduate, senior officers, have also received much-needed attention. While the Chinese Military, Naval, Air Force, and Political Academies continue to produce most career officers for the various services, the MND in 1997 introduced a program at four civilian universities similar to the American ROTC system. This source of new officers was expected eventually to produce 50 percent of the officer corps, but has failed so completely that it will be ended in 2006. Just fourteen qualified applicants joined the program in 1998, a number that rose to 100 in 2000.45 82

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Hence, for the next twenty or so years, the Taiwan military will continue to be led by graduates of the old officer preparation system, which dates back to the Whampoa Military Academy. This is a proud heritage, but one colored by its political heritage. There are not many noncommunist regimes, for instance, that maintain a corps of political officers—“commissars”—down to the company and squadron level, as does Taiwan. Civil–military ties are strengthened by the attendance of military officers in civilian university graduate programs. These concentrate on the hard science and engineering curricula, but include participation in some social science programs. Yet another ingredient in the military’s Professional Military Education (PME) system is the attendance of its officers at a wide range of foreign military academies, professional technical schools, and senior staff colleges, including those in the United States.46 Another step to increase the effectiveness of the Taiwan defense forces is to maximize the manning and ability of the civil servants. The Defense Organization Law mandates that civilians fill at least one-third of the MND’s positions, a figure likely to increase as the civilianization of Taiwan’s defense infrastructure takes hold. National Defense University Taiwan’s NDU divides its history into three periods: Army Strategic, Joint Staff/Command, and General Staff, and War Strategy/Command and General Staff periods.47 The first opened in 1906 as the Imperial Army Officer School, which was succeeded by the Army Preparation School and then the Army College. The National Defense College opened in 1951, initiating the second phase of NDU’s history, and was joined in 1952 by the newly organized Command and General Staff College. The third phase was initiated in 1968; the Armed Forces Combined College opened its doors in 1969 but was soon succeeded by the Armed Forces University. NDU was organized in 2000 when the existing schools merged with the Defense Management College, Defense Medical College, and the Chung Cheng Institute of Technology (CCIT). NDU’s Armed Forces College & Strategic Studies School was assigned responsibility for the Army, Navy, and Air Force Command and Staff Schools in early 2000, over the loud objections of the individual services. The Minister of Defense Lee Jye personally suspended this consolidation in May 2004, a decision that may lead to revision of NDU composition and mission. The Fu Hsing Kang Political Warfare College is scheduled to be absorbed by the NDMC in 2005, which should reduce the prominence of political officers in the military. Center for Strategic Studies An important addition to NDU is the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), a graduate level institution focusing on national defense strategy, established in 83

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July 1995. The Director of the CSS, a major-general, is also the Chief Executive Officer of the Graduate Institute of Strategic Studies. This “double hat” means that while he is in his latter position directly responsible to the Commandant of the Armed Forces College, as CSS Director he also reports directly to the NDU President. His duties are described as establishing “real-time” counseling capability, coordinating and consolidating all NDU research activity, promoting exchanges with other academic institutions, maintaining the NDU web, and translating and publishing for the University. For an enterprising officer, these widely defined duties and alternate chains of command could mean a great deal of freedom and potential influence. CSS has been quite active establishing relationships with both civilian universities in Taiwan, and with foreign military schools. Domestic links exist with the Straits Exchange Foundation; National Policy Foundation; Foundation of Security in the Asia Pacific Region; Foundation on International & Cross-Strait Studies; Taiwan Institute of Economic Research; European Union Study Institute; Future China Research Foundation; Center of National Defense Police and Strategy Studies; Taiwan New Century Foundation; Tamkang University’s Graduate Institutes of American Studies, International Affairs and Strategic Studies, Southeast Asian Studies; Wen-Hwa University’s Graduate School of Southeast Asian Studies; Chung-Sen University’s Graduate Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; and Fu-Ren University’s Chinese Customs and Culture Studies. Relationships have also been established with the US NDU and its component colleges, US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, Navy Post-Graduate School, Atlantic Council, Center of Strategic and International Studies, Brookings Institution, Heritage Foundation, and the RAND corporation. Similar ties exist with senior defense institutions in Australia, Great Britain, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Sweden. The schools and centers currently occupy five separate campuses, but by the end of 2006 are scheduled to be co-located at the new NDU campus being constructed at Ba De County, just south of Taipei City. It is commanded by a full general with the title of president, with a lieutenant-general as vice-president, a major-general as Director of Political Warfare, and a major-general as Dean. NDU’s objectives are to ● ●

●

●

educate senior commanders for each of the services; ensure the professional competence of military officers, to include both technical and “art of war” qualities, such as decision management, resources allocation, and personnel management; regularize and ensure the currency of “military science” in terms of theory, methodology, and modeling; and carry out the aforementioned strategic education of civilian defense professionals.

One way of attacking this problem is under the lead of the NDU, which since late2000 has had a plan in place to accept civilian government officials as students. 84

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Table 7 Professional courses for civilian officials Field

Principal contents

Comprehensive security

Traditional and non-traditional Trans-dimension security International political situation Intelligence judgment and analysis Strategic culture Military thought and force comparison Introduction to military strategy Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) Strategy and geopolitics Net assessment and war gaming Comparative national defense policies Military cooperation and exchange Military-legislative relations Law of war/treaty formulation Comparative national defense budgets Budget delineation PPBS Services development Force structure Force planning paradigm

Strategic assessment

Strategic planning

Policy making

Budget formulation Force composition design

Source: Information from Taiwan NDU Briefing, presented to B.D. Cole October 27, 2004.

Courses have been designed, and workshops conducted with US PME advisors, but as of mid 2005, no civilian students have entered the curriculum Table 7.48 Army Command and Staff College The Army Staff School was established in December 1951. It was renamed the Army Command and Staff School the following month, the Army Command and Staff University in September 1959, and the Army Command and Staff College in December 1959. The College was included as part of the new NDU, in May 2000, and renamed the Army Command and Staff School of the Military College. The Command and Staff Officers Regular Course aims to combine military studies, science, and philosophy for leaders at operational level. The stated goal is twofold: to cultivate leaders in the values and quality of the operational command and staff procedure, military management practices, and profession of arms; and also to promote critical thinking and a proactive, wide-ranging mind vision. The curriculum focuses on field operations, including division and brigade tactics, and the study of theater strategy, military history, and threat analysis. The Force Design course is based on the study of military system theory, with a focus on army military strategy. The Defense Management curriculum focuses 85

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on military law, management, and organization theory, especially on the research and development of weapons systems and the planning, programming, and budgeting system. Finally, the school’s General Course looks at international regional studies, warfighting philosophy, Chinese political thinking, comparative national studies, and political warfare theory and employment. The Advanced Military Studies Course aims to educate officers in military art and science, to impart to officers the flexibility and capability to solve complex problems. Educational focuses are combined arms tactics, and scenario editing and educational capabilities at the tactical level. Naval Command and Staff College The Naval Staff School was established in January 1951 at Tsoying and began to run the advanced course of professional study for naval officers in April 1952. This school became the Naval Command and Staff College in 1952 and was integrated into the overall military education system. Its curriculum was tailored to include naval staff university level courses with a view to promoting advanced military education, relocated to Tachih in December 1967, and was incorporated into the Armed Forces University in 1999. The College’s mission is training mid-level naval officers to plan operations and to command forces on the tactical level in support of joint military strategies and operations. It addresses disciplined thinking and communications abilities; command and control procedures; tactics and mid-level joint staff planning. The educational curriculum includes studying the current global situation; Taiwan’s national strategies and policies for military readiness; military philosophies, history, and modern warfare; and staff research. The College offers master’s degree programs and, like all the staff colleges, conducts extensive physical fitness programs for its students. Air Force Command and Staff School The Air Force Command and Staff School began as the Air Force Staff School in 1940, in Chengdu. The School was redesignated the Air Command and Staff University in 1952, and Air Command and Staff College in Taipei in 1967. Its curriculum focuses on Air Power Force Structure, employing air power from the tactical through the strategic levels, and modern weapons technology. More time appears to be spent training tacticians than at the Army and Navy counterpart institutions. Chung Cheng Institute of Technology The CCIT was formed by combining the Army Institute of Technology, the Naval Institute of Technology, and the Survey College of the Combined Service Force during the period 1966–1968, at Taoyuan. It offers programs leading to associate to doctoral degrees, but its major mission is the research, development, and 86

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deployment of new military systems, with an emphasis on operationalizing the latest technological developments. The Institute’s curricula are offered by 11 departments organized into 2 Schools. The School of Science includes departments of Applied Chemistry, Applied Physics, and Computer Science and Technology. The School of Engineering includes the departments of Mechanical, Aeronautical, Weapon System, Electrical, Civil, Vehicle, Surveying and Mapping, and Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering. The Junior (undergraduate) College offers majors in Mechanical, Electrical, Civil, Electronic, and Chemical Engineering. A master’s degree is offered in Applied Physics, Applied Chemistry, Weapon Systems, and Electronic, Civil, Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering, while a doctorate is available in Applied Chemistry, Applied Physics, Weapons Systems, and Electronic Engineering. National Defense Management College The National Defense Management College (NDMC) traces its origins to the Military Support School founded at Nanjing in 1911. The more recent iteration opened in Taiwan in 1951 as the Military Support and Training School. NDMC was formed in 1982 with the merger of the National Defense Finance and Quartermaster College and the National Defense Management School. The College grew further between 1989 and 1996, with the accession of the Department of Law and the Graduate School of Law Research. NDMC is scheduled to move to the new NDU campus in 2007, a move not popular with the college’s current leadership.49 National Defense Medical College China’s first modern military medical school was established in Tianjin by the Qing court in 1902 as the Northern Military Medical School. This institution merged with the Army Public Health Training Academy in Kweichow in 1947 and moved to Taipei in 1949 as the National Defense Medical Center. The school became part of NDU in May 2000. Eight curricula are currently offered at the Center’s college: Medicine, Dentistry, Pharmacology, Nursing, and four specializations within Public Health. The College has over 450 faculty members to teach almost 4,000 students in programs ranging from the undergraduate to the doctoral levels. These curricula are supported by sixteen schools, institutes, and departments: Medicine, Dentistry, Pharmacy, Nursing, Public Health, Physiology and Biophysics, Medical Sciences, Pharmaceutical Research, Aerospace Medicine, Biochemistry, Undersea Medicine, Microbiology and Immunology, Biomedical Engineering, Parasitology and Tropical Medicine, Humanities and Social Sciences, and Political Science. The College works with the new, huge Tri-Service General Hospital in Taipei. This institution opened in 2000; it has 1,800 beds and a 3,000 person staff. 87

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The will to fight: the most important personnel issue In April 2005, Vice-Minister of National Defense Huo Shou-yeh was forced to state that “the military will fight to defend Taiwan.” That this question was even asked (by a KMT legislator) illustrates how widely spread is doubt about the military’s commitment.50 The most crucial issue in Taiwan’s defense capability is whether the people of Taiwan are willing to support its cost. Defense cost discussions usually focus on hardware, especially aircraft, submarines, missiles, and other eye-catching systems. More crucial and more expensive, however, are the personnel costs incumbent on establishing and maintaining an effective military. This cost relates directly to both the quality of newly joined personnel and the ability to retain them, once they are trained and educated. This concern is also important to any effort to institute an all-volunteer military, a process that will almost certainly involve revision of the benefits provided under pay and benefits regulations and entitlements. The less well-educated are new recruits, then the more time and money required to educate and train them to the level required of a twenty-first century, high-tech military. A certain percentage of these individuals, once trained and qualified, will of course decide not to reenlist; the higher the percentage of such losses, then the higher the cost of preparing their replacements; and more seriously, replacements may well not be available at all, since the non-reenlistees obviously possess time in service and experience that cannot be taught in the classroom. Inducing this commitment to further service requires both financial and spiritual remuneration. The former has to be provided by the Legislative Yuan (LY) passing pay raises; the latter is far more difficult even to evaluate, let alone quantify and increase if found lacking. A particularly sensitive issue is the dedication of Taiwan’s military personnel, especially the young conscripts serving their mandatory terms of obligated service. Beginning in January 2004, obligated service for conscripts was reduced from 22 to 20 months, with possible reduction to 18 months if the inductee has completed a specified course of junior reserve officer training (JROTC); obligated service will be reduced to 18 months for all inductees in 2005, with the 2 month JROTC reduction apparently remaining. One experienced American observer of the Taiwan conscription process is concerned that the sense of dedication to an independent Taiwan will, in the event of a major conflict with the PRC, be immediately subsumed by the more deeply felt loyalty to family. Similar concerns have been expressed by senior officers of all the services.51 This supposition cannot of course be proven in advance of the fact, but raises several factors and assumptions. First is the Taiwan military’s inability to prevail against the PRC military over the long term, without very significant assistance from the United States or other allies. Second is the increasing frustration among senior Taiwan military leaders arising from a perceived lack of the resources required to defend Taiwan, a frustration probably sensed throughout the ranks.

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Third is the very problematic military proficiency of a short-term inductee who will likely spend 3 months in recruit training and 2 or more months in specialized training, at which point he will have less than 1 year of active service remaining. The frequency and timing of individual, team, unit, and large-scale exercises will afford him at most a single complete training cycle before the end of obligated service. Given the very short attention span of an inductee in his final 2 to 4 months of service, this means that even a dedicated, well-meaning conscript in the Taiwan military will spend little time as a relatively fully trained soldier, seaman, or airman, perhaps no more than 9 months. Fourth is the emphasis on family, and the reliance on children, especially sons, to care for parents and other relatives. This in turn emphasizes the importance of obtaining financial well-being to care for those dependent on oneself, and the education that makes it possible. What these factors might add up to in time of military crisis would be for the young Taiwanese conscript (or junior officer, for that matter) to decide that the best course of action for him and his family is to simply go home, rather than to risk his life in a losing battle against overwhelming odds and against fellow Chinese.52 This is an old concern of American observers; its more recent expression may reflect myth more than reality.53

Conclusion Taiwan’s PME structure remains in a state of uncertainty. NDU is the structure’s designated leader, patterned after proven systems in the United States, China, and many other nations. Progress toward establishing that leadership is encountering problems. The first is the defense minister’s 2004 decision to suspend the consolidation of the individual service command and staff colleges under the Armed Forces University. Second is the planned 2005 accession of Fu Hsing Kang Political Warfare College to NDMC. The third development is the absence of civilian MND officials as students at the NDU, despite the presence of a curriculum developed specifically for their benefit. Fourth, completion of the new consolidated NDU campus has been significantly delayed, probably until 2007, which will slow the NDU’s physical consolidation of many of its component schools. The result of these factors, combined with the bureaucratic resistance to consolidation evident since at least 1999, seems to be a strengthened NDMC, which may emerge as a direct competitor to NDU, rather than its subsidiary. This would weaken the envisioned Taiwan PME system and detract from the professional education of uniformed and civilian defense professionals. The future of Taiwan’s uniformed personnel picture is also problematic. Even the status of the announced, multi-phase and multi-stage personnel reduction programs is not clear. Apparently, approximately 400,000 personnel are still in uniform, a number which does not include about 20,000 men and women of the Coast Guard. 89

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First, the 2004 experiment in attracting volunteers to the military failed by the government’s own estimation. The next phase of this project will apparently continue, however, with the MND’s announced goal to attract 12,000–15,000 volunteers per year for the next three years. It is doubtful that Taiwan will be able to meet this goal, even under the disingenuous definition of “volunteer” that includes personnel already serving in the active military. The government has not been able to offer programs attractive enough to draw volunteers in the face of economic and cultural constraints. Overall, Taiwan’s economy remains positive, and entry level military pay even for enlisted volunteers does not exceed that available to an average high school graduate moving directly into civilian employment. Cultural constraints may also affect building a volunteer military in Taiwan. The old Chinese saying that “one does not make nails from good iron; one does not make soldiers from good men” may apply in the public mind. Hence, the majority of Taiwanese parents strongly prefer that their children seek civilian rather than military careers, especially when the former holds greater promise that they will be in a position to support their parents in their old age.54 Second, MND personnel officials understand the need for significant increases in financial and ancillary benefits to attract volunteers to military service, but current defense budget programs do not provide the resources for such increases.55 In fact, the annual decreases in the defense budget seem more likely to become even more significant: in early January 2005, KMT legislators called for a decrease of 3–5 percent in personnel accounts, a decrease that would apparently include defense funds.56 Third is the continuing reduction in obligated service for conscripts. The 2003 cut from 24 to 22 months is considered by the Taiwan military too short a period of service to allow adequate training. Former Defense Minister Tang Fei dwelled on this point, arguing that “service length of three years is not enough. . . . what is the use of a two-year length of service?”57 Yet, President Chen Shui-bian has approved cutting obligated service to 18 months in 2005, with further cuts to 12 months as a step toward an all-voluntary military. This plan will likely founder on the shoals of insufficient numbers of volunteers, but each reduction in obligated service translates directly into decreased readiness by the armed forces, and a reduction in Taiwan’s ability to defend itself. When Taiwan cannot attract volunteers and the military is composed of barely trained conscripts, then the military will confront a serious hollowing out. These issues affect each of Taiwan’s armed services. The next three chapters examine the Army, Air Force, and Navy, including their personnel structure.

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6 TAIWAN ARMY

The character of Taiwan’s military has always been defined by its army. Chiang Kai-shek was sworn in as the Army’s commander-in-chief in July 1926 and led the Nationalist military for a half-century. By 1936, a complete army organization had been established, including a Staff Command, Military Senate Department, Military Affairs Department, and under the Central Training Department the following institutions: Military Academy (moved from Whampoa to Nanjing in 1928), Infantry School (1932), Artillery School (1931), Transportation School (1936), Engineer School (1932), Signal School (1935), Ordnance School (1917), Military Supplies School (1912), and the Medical School (1902).1 The Taiwan Army (TA) has always depended on foreign military models, equipment, and advisors. The official army history notes, for example, that “the best techniques from America, the Soviet Union, Japan and the European countries” were selected when the Infantry School was established.2 A four-phase transition in Taiwan’s strategic perspective is discussed in Chapter 4: from civil war on the mainland to the 1949–1972 period of focusing on militarily retaking the mainland, a 1973–1990 transition period from that offensive posture to one of defending the island, to the post 1991 emphasis on defense. The TA’s view of these phases is less complex. From expulsion from the mainland until the mid- to late 1980s, the Army was organized, trained, and equipped as a heavy, ground-centered force preparing to assault the mainland. This paradigm continued even after Chiang Kai-shek’s late 1960s statement that recovering the mainland would be primarily political. It was probably only in 1991, when President Lee Teng-hui ended the “Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion,” with its implied renunciation of military force as the primary instrument for reunifying China, that the Taiwan Army completed shifting to a defensive strategic framework. Today, the Army’s focus is on building a military instrument strong enough to serve as “an elite deterrent force.” Operationally, however, the Army vision is still a ground force strong enough to defeat a PLA invasion attempt. One Taiwan strategist described the Army’s task as “chiefly anti-disembarkation and anti-landing [sic], with secondary tasks being armored opposition with [helicopter launched] Hellfire missiles.”3 91

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The Army’s 190,000 personnel are organized into combat, combat support, and service support troops in the following units: Army Corps, Logistics Command, Defense Command, Aviation and Special Warfare Command, Divisions, Air Cavalry Brigades, Armored Brigades, Armored Infantry Brigades, Motorized Rifle Brigades, Infantry Brigades, and the Special Warfare Brigades. The Army is tasked by the central government with developing an enhanced automated command and control system, training for “three-dimensional operations,” and increasing its employment of mechanized equipment. These goals are not dissimilar to Beijing’s announced aims for the PLA of “mechanization and informatization.” Accomplishing this capability requires the Army to improve its information and electronic warfare systems, battlefield management, unit mobility, and air defenses; develop air-ground combined operational capability, increase unit firepower, maintain high morale, and improve its ability to conduct joint warfare in conjunction with the other services.4

Organization Army General Headquarters Army General Headquarters is responsible for developing and maintaining the Army’s combat power, as well as commanding and supervising all subordinate troops and units. Under its control are the Army Logistics Command, Army Commands, and the Airborne and Special Operations Command. The service’s hierarchy consists of the corps, division, brigade, battalion, company, and platoon. The General Headquarters organization includes normal military support functions, including Signal Corps, Engineers, Chemical Warfare, Inspector General, Logistics, Training and Doctrine Command, various staff corps, and the Combat Arms (Infantry, Artillery, and Armor). The Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of the Army is assisted by two Deputy CINCs, one for Policy and one for Administration. At the next level of command are the Chief of Staff, the Director of Political Warfare, and the Inspector General. Then come the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Personnel, Logistics, Combat Readiness and Training, Plans, Combat Systems, General Affairs, and Comptroller.5 Taiwan conducted a major army reorganization in the late 1990s, as part of the military’s Chingshi program. This included downsizing and shifting from a division to a brigade-based structure by 2000.6 The program follows the example provided by the relatively recent reorganization process undergone by the US Army in an attempt to increase flexibility, mobility, firepower, and the overall effectiveness of combat units.7 As noted in the previous chapter, the Taiwan military’s end strength was scheduled under the Chingshi program to decline from 450,000 in 1997 to 400,000 in 2001, and to 370,000 by the end of 2004, with the bulk of the cuts coming from the Army, which in 2005 numbers approximately 200,000 personnel. 92

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Operationally, Taiwan’s ground force is organized into three armies (corps) and four defense commands. On Taiwan itself, the North Central, Southern, and Eastern Armies are each commanded by a senior lieutenant general (LTG), while the Hualien, Jinmen, Mazu, and Penghus Defense Commands are commanded by junior LTGs.8 Other major troop formations include the Air Defense Missile Command, with two air-defense surface-to-air missile (SAM) groups consisting of two Nike Hercules and four I-Hawk missile batteries; the Coastal Defense surface-tosurface missile (SSM) battalion; and the Aviation and Special Forces Command, composed of three aviation brigades and the Special Warfare Group.9 Administratively, the Army is organized into three Corps, the Logistics Command, the Taiwan Defense Command, the Aviation and Special Warfare Command, the Missile Command, and combat arms brigades for Air Cavalry, Armor, Mechanized Infantry, Infantry, and Artillery troops. Army support units are assigned at the corps level; these include Engineers, Signals, Chemical, Medical, Ordnance, Aviation and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and Judge Advocate General (JAG) specialists; Electronic Warfare (EW) units are assigned at the brigade level. The Corps commanders report directly to the Commander of the Joint Operations Command Center in both peacetime and wartime for operational matters and to Army General Headquarters for administrative issues and support. The Missile Command was established as a separate command in January 2004 by combining air-defense units from the Army and the Navy’s shore-based antiship missile units. Commanded by a major-general, the Missile Command was reportedly going to be assigned the PAC-III missiles purchased from the United States. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) apparently envisioned also assigning to the Missile Command the new “strategic” ballistic missiles long rumored to be under development, which might very well establish the Missile Command as a separate service, much as the Second Artillery functions in the PLA. This plan has been suspended, however, and the missile units returned to the Army and Navy, because of unsatisfactory progress in the strategic missile program.10 The Jinmen Defense Command is composed of three infantry brigades, one armor brigade, and artillery units. The Mazu and Penghus Defense Commands each contains two infantry brigades, artillery support units, and an Amphibious Reconnaissance company. Additionally, a radar surveillance and missile complex is reportedly located on Tungyin Island, in the Mazus, and a similar facility in the Penghus. These centers would be well-situated to provide early warning of Chinese air activity, but also would probably have a short life expectancy in the event of hostilities.11 The Army has cut several divisions and independent brigades, and instead formed division-level commands and more than thirty joint-branch brigades. These include eight armored, eight infantry, and eight artillery brigades with two-three of each assigned to each of the three armies noted earlier. Each of these is 93

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commanded by a major general (MG) and designed to be a “combined arms” brigade, a relatively self-reliant combat organization with organic armor, artillery, mechanized infantry, and joint service components.12 Other organizational restructuring has also been carried out to support a more task-oriented army. As of mid-2005, remaining division headquarters existed as wartime-only organizations. During peacetime, they are staffed as contingency commands, with a headquarters cadre and signals company, but with no operational units assigned. A brigade normally includes three battalions, each commanded by a lieutenant colonel (LTC). Each battalion is normally composed of three line companies and a Headquarters Company, the latter including staff support elements. The line companies, in turn, usually are composed of three platoons and a small headquarters group. An armor battalion has four tanks in each platoon and, in addition to the standard triangular organization, a Support Platoon of four refueling trucks for its armored vehicles. Army bases Taiwan is divided into five Military Regions, each considered a distinct area of operations, with a LTG in command. The disposition of its forces on Taiwan proper is undisclosed in the readily available public literature, but approximately 80 percent of the Army’s combat strength is on Taiwan proper, under the control of three field armies. The three offshore island commands—Kinmen, Matsu, and Penghu—are garrisoned by a total of approximately 50,000 soldiers. The MND is dealing with excess public and civilian lands used by the military as well as military lands used by nonmilitary parties in accordance with the law to fully utilize national land resources. Hence, the Army is proceeding with comprehensive barracks planning and restructuring to enhance quality of life for servicemen while complying with laws and regulations, implementing policies professionally, and improving work efficiency. A subsidiary program on offshore islands is building new above-ground quarters to replace subterranean barracks, while restructuring defense facilities in line with budget resources. This program also includes systematic evaluation of Army barracks and installation, with a view toward disposing of excess facilities. Unneeded facilities will be returned to public use or transferred to the National Property Bureau. Some surplus army installations have already been turned over to public use, including parcels of more than 400 acres at 93 bases in 2000 and 2001, some located at Taipei, Yunlin, Taoyuan, Hsinchu, Taitung, Kaohsiung, and Pintung. In accordance with land redistribution operations on Jinmen and Mazu area, the Army is gradually restructuring defense areas to improve the quality of life for servicemen stationed on these offshore islands. The first phase including the restructuring of ten places in Jinmen and four places in Mazu was completed in 2000. These second-line bases are now in use.The second phase started in 2002, with the Army continuing restructure barracks on Jinmen and Mazu. 94

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Table 8 Taiwan Army equipment Armor

Type

Main Battle Tanks Armored Personnel Carriers Artillery Towed Self-Propelled Rocket Launchers Surface-to-Surface Missiles Surface-to-Air Missiles

926: 376  M-60A3; 550xM-48A5/H 1175: 875  M113; 300  V-150

Air Defense Weapons Helicopters Unmanned Air Vehicles

1,060: 650  105mm; 340  155mm; 70  203mm 405:100  105mm; 245  155mm; 60  203mm 300: 117mm; 126mm Kung Feng; 1,000 TOW 40  Nike-Hercules; 100  I-Hawk; Tien Jing; 74  Avenger; 2  Chaparral; 25  Patriot (II) 400  40mm Guns; Stingers 220: 9  CH-47SD; 80  UH-1H; 62  AH-1W; 30  TH-67; 39  OH058D Mastiff III

Source: B.D. Cole, with assistance of LTC Dennis J. Blasko, USA (Ret.).

Army equipment The Taiwan Army’s equipment modernization effort focuses on improving mobility and fire power, through the acquisition of tanks, helicopters, and airdefense missiles. The United States remains almost the only source of foreign army equipment and the defense budget is declining; hence, the TA is struggling to modernize (Table 8). The Taiwan Army faces a transforming process that is inadequately resourced. It must improve its capability by acquiring state-of-the-art equipment and only a limited armaments industrial capability has developed on Taiwan, often in conjunction with US industry. The Army’s equipment inventory plans must also accommodate the shift from a large ground force prepared to fight an amphibious invasion to one focused on deterring that assault and defeating the enemy before a successful landing is made. Topographical and geographical conditions dictate that combat on Taiwan proper would be best conducted by highly mobile, fast-moving infantry units. Hence, it seems surprising that the TA has so few helicopters, the best way to provide that mobility. The advent of the new wheeled Armored Personnel Carrier (APC), the CM-32 nicknamed “Clouded Leopard,” should lead to increased mobility, if purchased in large enough quantities. Unfortunately, despite President Chen Shui-bian unveiling the first vehicle at a major media event in January 2005, the government does not plan to begin manufacturing of these vehicles until 2007.13 Armor Taiwan’s armor force numbers more than 2,000 tanks, but probably no more than about one-half of these are operable. The main battle tank (MBT) is the 95

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US-designed M-60A3, 300 of which Washington sold Taiwan for $223 million. The United States sold an additional 180 surplus M-60A3 tanks to Taiwan in 1997–1998 for approximately US$1 million per vehicle.14 The M-60A3 has a 105 millimeter (mm) gun, thermal sights, and a capable fire control system, with laser range finder and trajectory calculator. The other Taiwan MBT is the USdesigned M-48A5 and its indigenously produced version, the M-48H. Taiwan also produces the CM-11, which combines M-48 and M-60 features. The CM-11 is a capable tank, armed with a 105 mm gun and powered by a relatively fuel efficient diesel engine.15 The United States provided Taiwan with more than 600 now-obsolete M-41 light tanks, beginning in 1958. Many of these were modernized in the 1990s, with a new (diesel replacing gasoline) engine and armament, but only Taiwan’s Marine Corps still operates them; they are difficult to maintain and have a low rate of readiness. The Army’s 1,000 older M-41 and M-24 light tanks are in storage and inoperative.16 The APC inventory is composed for the most part of locally produced variants of the US designed M113, an old but combat-proven vehicle. These are designated the “CM” family and several versions are deployed. The CM-21 is the basic infantry transportation vehicle; the CM-22 and -23 are mortar firing platforms; the CM-24 transports ammunition; the CM-25 is armed with missiles; the CM-26 is equipped to serve as a command and control vehicle for an armored force commander; and the CM-27 is a “multi-fire tractor,” providing the body for mounting the Kung Feng IV 126 mm multiple rocket launching system discussed later.17 Taiwan is not amenable to armor warfare, because topography and transportation infrastructure limit the mobility of its armor and self-propelled (SP) artillery. The M-60A3, weighing 58 tons, remains the Army’s MBT for instance; although modernized by Taiwan, its capability does not compare to the MBTs that equip the PRC, US, Russian, and other modern armies. The United States might sell its MBT, the M1A1/2, to Taiwan, but these models weigh 68 tons, which would further limit the use of the island’s highways and bridges.18 The Army has a modernization plan for its armor forces, based on replacing its present inventory with the acquisition of upto 1,000 tanks and other vehicles by about 2010. Informal discussion about acquiring a number of surplus M1A1 tanks at a unit price of approximately $1.4 million occurred in late 1998, but as of mid-2005 this scheme remained unsupported by the Ministry of Defense.19 A new generation of armored vehicles might well be wheeled rather than tracked, in order to better use Taiwan’s road and bridge structure.20 The CM-32, weighing just 16 tons and capable of 60 mph speed, might provide the base technology for the development of a more heavily armed, tank-like version. Renewal of the heavy armor force seems unlikely, however, in view of the declining defense budget and the announced shift in emphasis away from army modernization in favor of air force and naval improvements. 96

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Artillery The Army’s artillery systems are US imports, or local versions of US designs. The M109 155 mm self-propelled howitzer is the most common weapon, with 225 in the inventory. This weapon became operational in the US Army in 1963 and is being supplemented in the TA with the indigenously developed M110/T69 155 mm extended-range SP howitzer and the 155 mm extended-range SP gun. Twenty of the former and forty-five of the latter are reported to have been manufactured. The Army also relies on approximately 100 old but reliable M108 105 mm SP howitzers. Finally, batteries on Jinmen and other islands still are equipped with emplaced 203 mm (8 inch) howitzers, capable of firing nuclear shells. Sixty SP versions of this 1963 weapon are also listed in the TA inventory. The Army’s towed artillery force is similar in caliber to the foregoing. Current inventory is given as 70 M115 203 mm, 250 M114 155 mm, and 90 M59 155 mm howitzers.21

Army aviation TA does not employ helicopters in large numbers. It needs helos both for vertical envelopment of a battle site, and for countering Taiwan’s difficult topography. The mainstay of the Army’s vertical lift force, all of which is US-produced or designed, remains the UH-1H “Huey” helicopter, 118 of which were built under license by Taiwan’s AIDC, beginning in 1978. This utility helicopter first went into combat with the US Army in 1967 and was the workhorse of the US military for decades, where it remains in service. It can carry almost 5 tons of cargo or up to 13 troops. The TA’s newest, most capable logistics helo is the CH-47D “Chinook,” 9 of which are in the inventory, with 7 more on order.22 The US Army began flying this large, fast, dual-rotor helicopter in 1962, but continued development and modifications have kept it as one of the world’s premier medium-lift helos. It is allweather and night-capable and can carry 13 tons of cargo or approximately 40 troops. Taiwan’s primary attack helicopters are 50 AH-1W “Super Cobras,” armed with cannon, machine guns, and air-to-surface Hellfire missiles. Hellfire is a combat-proven weapon against armored vehicles and other ground targets, most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. The latest sale of 400 Hellfires to Taiwan was announced in January 2005.23 The Army also flies 26 OH-58D “Kiowa” armed reconnaissance helicopters. It has a highly accurate navigation system that permits precise targeting for hand-off to other aircraft, an infrared thermal imaging and a laser designator/ rangefinder, and can be armed with air-to-air Stinger missiles to fire against other aircraft. Finally, the Army has 14 S-70C utility (UH-60 “Blackhawk”) helos in its inventory. Taiwan has an attack helicopter modernization program valued at approximately $2.7 billion that it wanted included in the 2005 budget, with aircraft deliveries 97

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beginning in 2008. Selection of the new helo has apparently stalled over choosing between the Bell AH-1Z, which would include a co-production arrangement with AIDC, and American-produced AH-64 “Longbow Apache” attack helicopters. Hence, the attack helicopter modernization program is on hold, awaiting possible inclusion in the 2006 defense budget submission.24 Sixty of the new attack helos would equip two armored brigades, creating a powerful counter-armor system, a direct reflection of US Army thinking. As is the case with other TA aspirations, however, the declining defense budget and strategic shift away from strong armor formations casts serious doubt on purchasing a completely new aircraft like the AH-64, especially since the AH-1Z is already being developed by the US Marine Corps.25 The army’s fixed-wing aircraft include 20 “Bird Dog” (0–1) observation aircraft, small single-engine planes used for artillery spotting and scouting. The Army also flies 12 Bell 47-G training helos, approximately 32 other aircraft, and a number of UAVs, the development of which has been a project by the CSIST.26 Missile systems The Army mans Taiwan’s missile systems. Ground defense systems include versions of the Ray-Ting 2000 rockets intended to supplement conventional tube artillery against amphibious assault forces. The Ray-Ting 2000 launcher with self-reloading crane is mounted on a high mobility truck, and has a sealed rocket pod for rapid reloading, simplified maintenance, and easy stockpiling. The system also has an automatic fire control system. The Kung Feng VI Multiple Rocket Launcher System is a mobile system designed in the 1970s to counter an amphibious assault. A planned follow-on system with twice the 15 km range and an improved circular error probable (CEP) was developed in the early 1980s by CSIST.27 This improved weapon, labeled Kung Feng VII, was not fielded by the military, possibly in recognition of the shift of strategic mission away from opposing a large-scale amphibious assault. The army’s ground launched anti-armor weapons include the proven TOW-type missile, with an inventory of approximately 1,000.28 Taiwan first deployed the PAC-II version of the Patriot anti-aircraft and antimissile system in 1997, and the United States has made the much more capable PAC-III system available for purchase.29 The Patriot is an advanced air-defense system with a range of more than 160 km, and both radar and semi-active guided systems. Other anti-aircraft missiles include the old, but still capable US-supplied Hawk system, with a range in excess of 25 miles and a semi-active guidance system.30 The CSIST developed the Tien-kung (Sky Bow) air-defense missile systems in the early 1990s in cooperation with the American Raytheon Company. The system has a range of 62 miles; the Tien-kung II version has double that range. The Tien-kung missile batteries are based in northern Taiwan at Sanchih, at Taichung in central Taiwan, in the island’s southern Kaohsiung County, on Penghu, and 98

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on Mazu. The least capable anti-air warfare (AAW) missile system is the US-supplied Chaparral, designed for low-altitude intercept and also adapted for shipboard use. Taiwan’s army is spending over $385 million to deploy 200 fourth-generation Patriot PAC-II missiles in 3 batteries in northern Taiwan. The system is equipped with a track-via-missile (TVM) guidance system and receives midcourse guidance commands from the mobile ground-based control center. The missile is armed with a high explosive 198 pound warhead, has a range of 43 miles, and a maximum altitude of more than 79,000 feet. The system was used extensively in the 1991 Persian Gulf War to defend against Scud missile attacks, although evaluations of its effectiveness vary widely.31 It was again employed in the 2002 war against Iraq; the US Army report summarized Patriot performance during the invasion of Iraq as one of “substantial success,” with 9 of 17 incoming Iraqi ballistic missile downed. The Patriot system was criticized, however, for locking on to 3 friendly fighters and shooting down 2 of them.32 The newer Patriot (PAC-3) missile system began production in 1999 and has increased effectiveness against both ballistic and cruise missiles. Sixteen PAC-3 missiles can be loaded on each launcher, compared to four on a PAC-II launcher. Taipei has included PAC-3 acquisition in the Special Defense Budget proposal presented to the Legislative Yuan (LY) for approval in September 2004, but still being debated in mid-2005.33 These missiles would be Taiwan’s front line defense against the medium range ballistic missiles Beijing had stationed in Fujian Province, across the Strait, against which Taiwan currently has no effective defense.34 Infantry weapons The basic weapon for Taiwan’s infantrymen is the 5.56 mm rifle, either the old US M-16 (for most Reserve units) or the locally produced and improved T65k2 version; 40 mm grenade launchers and “SAW” 5.56 mm light machine guns are also issued. A locally produced variant of the NATO M-60 7.62 mm machine gun has been standard since the mid-1980s; light (60 mm), medium (81 mm), and heavy (120 mm) mortars are also in the Army’s inventory. These are based on US models and are locally produced by the Combined Services Force factories.35 Military Police Command The Military Police Command (MPC) occupies a position in Taiwan’s security structure that may be unique among world militaries. Current missions include guarding military and certain governmental installations, enforcing military law, maintaining military discipline, and supporting combat troops. What is different, however, is the MPC responsibility to serve as supplementary police when necessary to maintain public security. This last mission derives from the MPC’s founding in the late Qing Dynasty, when it was created to “keep order within the capital [Beijing].”36 99

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The current MPC Center traces its origin to its 1932 founding, with responsibilities in both “military and civil justice” systems.37 The MPC commander defines his organization’s “three main missions” as focusing on protecting central safety, securing public security, and ensuring national securities.38 As noted in Chapter 5, the Military Police (MP) receive priority, as do the Special Forces, in the conscript allocation process; the MPC appeal to potential recruits emphasizes a “new” MP, who embodies improved combat effectiveness, political reliability, and the ability to function in “the e-century.”39 The MP have 4 sub-command centers and 1 training center. The MPC has a Department of Political Warfare and offices of Personnel, Intelligence, Police Affairs, Logistics, Planning, and Comptroller. Military Police troops are a select group, reportedly with superior physical conditioning and combat capability.40 The MPC has been instructed by the central government to increase the automation of its command and control systems, improve its mobility, and digitalize the island’s security processes. Today’s MPC is much less powerful than its pre-1987 predecessor, but retains a role in defending Taiwan’s infrastructure and leadership, as well as contributing to the maintenance of public order, both in peace and wartime. Special Operations The Army includes a Special Operations Command (SOC), formed by an attack brigade and two aviation brigades. The SOC troops are “primarily intended to be used for political action and for fighting behind enemy lines.” This does not, according to Army sources, mean that these forces have a domestic role in Taiwan, but their mission is that originally assigned to US Special Forces: “to organize guerrilla units . . . in enemy territory . . . to engage in both overt and secret psychological, economic and political warfare . . . behind enemy lines.”41 Improving its Special Operations capability is a TA goal, for two reasons. First is antiterrorism concern spurred by the events of September 11, 2001. Second is long-standing concern about infiltration by Chinese Special Forces troops and the likely activities of fifth columnists on Taiwan. The Army will most likely continue to be the focus of the special troops dedicated to combating these threats, although as noted in Chapter 8, the Coast Guard is organizing a small counter-terrorism force for seaborne operations. Reportedly, however, no more than 100 of the approximately 2,000 members of the Army’s special operations forces (SOF) Brigade are actually trained in special operations, as defined by the US Army.42 The Army currently maintains an Airborne Special Operations Brigade, which includes a high-altitude parachute platoon. Several Special Operations Teams are apparently trained as political warfare specialists, while “amphibious reconnaissance units,” probably with training and a mission similar to US Navy SEALS, are available for maritime operations, including support of offshore island garrisons.43 100

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The Army Commander-in-Chief, General Chu Kai-sheng, has denied that the army is organizing an elite unit to guard against a “decapitation strike” by China, but MND Vice-Minister Huo Shou-yeh did note that “the military is determined to beef up its special forces’ combat capabilities.”44 Given the threats from mainland infiltrators, it would be surprising if the Army were not under direction to increase its capabilities in the area of special operations. The Military Academy The military education system addressed in the preceding chapter is based on the individual service schools, especially the undergraduate academies. The Army’s academy is located near Kaohsiung. In June 1954 the academy system was modified to provide cadets with a four-year general knowledge education combining civilian and military skills. During the early days after the founding of the Chinese Military Academy (CMA), military training formed the curriculum’s core; the goal was imparting practical military officer skills. In 1954 the academy changed over to a new four-year instructional format, with the US Military Academy at West Point serving as a model for the CMA’s development. The Academy includes ten academic departments: Chemistry, Physics, Information Science, Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Civil Engineering, Management Science, Political Science, Foreign Languages, and Literature and History. Co-equal with the academic departments are a Workshop Office and an Academic Affairs Section. The Army also maintains specialty schools for commissioned officers. Those assigned to armor units first undergo the Armor School course of instruction in Hsinchu, for example, while the parachutist school is located in Pingtung County, in southern Taiwan. Army aviators are trained in the Air Force training command, at Kang Shan Air Base. Readiness Army readiness is evaluated by the General Headquarters G-5 Readiness and Training Division. Existence of a formal rating system—similar to the “C” system used by the US military—reportedly is not used for overall unit readiness,45 but standards of personnel training are used, as are rating systems for equipment operability and support adequacy. Each line Company files a daily “Equipment Service Report” with its battalion headquarters, which in turn sends a battalionwide report to its brigade headquarters. The Equipment Service Reports thus make their way to Army Headquarters from all units. For an Army unit to report “fully ready” to carry out all assigned missions, it must be manned to at least 90 percent of assigned personnel, with 85 percent of its assigned equipment fully functional, and 80 percent of all assigned Service Support Components in place and functional. Measures of personnel readiness 101

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are comprehensive, including education level attained, training received, physical condition, and “stress capability,” the last category possibly being assessed by a unit’s assigned Political Warfare Officer. Conversations with several senior Army officers indicated that the personnel shortages that exist, from unit to unit, are acceptable; the biggest readiness problem is equipment operability, in part because of lack of timely responsiveness by the spare parts system to individual unit equipment maintenance needs. This reflects poorly on the current system of spare part support, which is centrally managed from Army Headquarters. The key element in military readiness, of course, is the degree to which personnel are trained to carry out assigned missions. Simply put, can they fight successfully? Army readiness suffers acutely from problems that are to a significant extent beyond the Army’s ability to correct. For one thing, the island offers an insufficient amount of training grounds, especially for mobile units. Inadequate personnel training time is most critical, however, as discussed in Chapter 5. The period of required service for the conscripts who make up the bulk of Army manpower was reduced from 22 to 20 months at the end of 2004; in January 2005, Vice-Minister of Defense Tsai Ming-hsien announced that mandatory military service would be shortened to 18 months as of July 1, 2005 and to 12 months in 2008 as part of a process of attaining a military made up largely of volunteers.46 This process has so far not been successful and the Army is forced to compress its training cycle into an unsatisfactorily brief period of time. For example, the average draftee spends 2 months in recruit training (boot camp), followed by 2–4 months in “Basic Training,” which is additional training in the branch—infantry, artillery, armor, etc.—to which he is assigned. Then comes specialty training, which may last several months. By the time the majority of conscripts reach their first operational Army unit, they will have little more than 10–12 months of service left. Even that does not account for terminal leave at the end of their obligated service or for a 2-month reduction in service if they completed high school-level “Junior ROTC” training. Thus, the Army’s biggest readiness problem is simply not having personnel assigned to combat units long enough to complete at least one full training cycle. This shortfall and the resulting lack of readiness will worsen as obligated service for conscripts is further reduced. The Army has established a well-constructed, logical system of progressive training and unit exercises. As is the case with virtually all militaries, in all countries, senior army officers in Taiwan complain about a lack of funding for training and readiness. This likely is an increasingly important issue in Taiwan, however, given the declining annual defense budgets over the past decade. The training regimen begins with individual soldier training and evaluation, then progresses through small unit, company, battalion, brigade, and higher exercises. The process culminates in annual battalion-level “rotational training,” and biannual brigade-level rotational training.47 The importance of training with the Air Force and Navy is acknowledged, but apparently joint training is minimal, 102

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with the final two weeks of the Rotational Training period including close air support exercises with the Air Force. Liaison officers from these services are stationed at Corps-level headquarters; their absence from Army Headquarters and from the division or brigade level almost certainly means that little joint planning occurs on a routine basis. Another readiness issue for TA is tied to its relationship with the Reserve Command. Regular Army units reportedly have little if any regular interchanges with the Reserves, who “do not exactly” follow the same doctrines and procedures as do the active forces. This apparent lack of coordination, combined with the very short Reserve training periods, further casts doubt on the “wholeness” of Taiwan’s active duty and reserve military readiness.48

Conclusion The Army has been the core of the ROC/Taiwan military since the 1920s, but the 1949 retreat to Taiwan established a new strategic reality for the government and the people it serves. The army lost its pride of place with the passing of the Chiang Kai-shek era and Taipei’s 1991 announcement ending the “Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion,” which virtually ended the state of war with the PRC and tacitly acknowledged that the mainland would not be retaken by military means. Geography dictates that sea power and command of the air are the key values in defending Taiwan against assault by the mainland. This reordering of the capabilities most important in Taiwan’s defense is slowly permeating the military and the Army as generational change transforms the officer corps. Reorganization of the MND has also been a catalyst in the evolution of Taiwan’s defense structure. The Army will always retain an important role, but it is one defined by the insular nature of the battlefield on which it is going to have to fight. Army modernization faces the two challenges of renewing a mostly old inventory of equipment and finding a way to ensure an adequate number of trained personnel. Elected civilian leaders have announced that their goal is an all- (or mostly all-)volunteer military, which particularly affects Army training regimens and long-term force composition planning. The Army will almost certainly bear the brunt of future personnel reductions. Relying on volunteers for a significantly smaller army will place an increasing premium on fielding personnel who are both smarter and more dedicated than their conscripted predecessors. This will further place the army in direct competition with the civilian economy. These difficulties notwithstanding, the Army should be able to man its units adequately, if the sense of patriotism, self-confidence, and popular will is present among the island’s young men and women. These values are related to the emerging sense of Taiwan nationalism discussed in Chapter 5. One certain requirement will be further increases in personnel budgetary resources for the Army. A first step 103

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in this process was announced in January 2005 by the Deputy Minister of Defense, but will have to be followed by a program of long-term, systemic increases.49 Equipment recapitalization is also required to transform the Army into a twenty-first-century force with the requisite mobility and firepower to react effectively to possible sea borne and air borne assault by the PLA. The Army’s shift to a brigade structure accords with this transformation, and will have to be accompanied by a changed investment strategy, one that focuses on helicopters and fast-wheeled combat vehicles at the expense of traditional armor. The Army is no longer the source of organic “glue” within the nation-state that it was for so many years.50 It has not, to its credit, identified itself as the keeper of patria, the sense of being uniquely responsible for defending the nation that has been endemic in Latin America.51 As the Army moves forward under the guidance of a newly organized, civilian MND, and serves a democratic, civilian government, it must redefine itself as a Taiwanese Army, with a mission to defend an island against long odds.

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7 TAIWAN AIR FORCE

The Air Force has effectively fought its mainland opponents in every contest since the early 1950s. This was due in part to the US supply of advanced weaponry, but more directly resulted from the superior airmanship of the Taiwan pilots. The Air Force’s ability to maintain control of the air will be examined in this chapter.

Mission The Taiwan Air Force’s (TAF) primary strategic goal is control of Taiwan’s airspace and air dominance over the Taiwan Strait. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) 2002 White Paper described this mission as defending “the airspace over land, territorial water, and protecting the nation’s sovereignty, together with the Army and Navy through joint operations.” Given the TAF’s inability to provide distant air cover, such as over claimed South China Sea land features, this mission is limited in practice to Taiwan’s airspace as defined by its Air Defense and Identification Zone (ADIZ), which is delimited by 21N to 27N latitude and 117.5E to 123E longitude. Within this zone, the Air Force is tasked with detecting, identifying, and monitoring “flying objects.”1 Sea-lane control and protection of offshore economic zones and interests are also TAF missions. These missions can only be accomplished if the TAF is able to execute a successful suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) campaign, which almost certainly means striking mainland PLA Air Force (PLAAF) bases. The TAF does not presently possess this capability. Notably absent from its arsenal are anti-radiation missiles, aerial refueling tankers, the numbers of aircraft and the training required. The Air Force is also charged by the central government with enhancing its automated command and control capability and improving the ability to conduct precision strikes. This in turn requires the Air Force to develop long-range reconnaissance capabilities, to include more effective electronic intelligence and early warning networks, especially with respect to countering surface-to-surface missiles. Programs are in place or planned to enable success in accomplishing this complex operational paradigm, but the TAF currently is unable to do so. Improved air defense emerges as the key TAF capability in these requirements, and requires integrated and joint operations. 105

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General Headquarters Air Force General Headquarters is located in Taipei, but scheduled to move to the new MND headquarters complex at Hengshan in 2006. It is responsible for combat commands and their strength, and supervises subordinate troops and units. Its units include the Air Force Operations Command, the Air Force Logistics Command, the Air Defense Artillery Command, the Educational Training and Standards Development Command, and various tactical wings. In descending order under the wing are group, squadron, and flight organizations. The TAF is organized around 6 tactical combat aircraft wings, composed of 20 fighter/ground attack squadrons, and a reconnaissance squadron. The TAF also includes Basic and Fighter Training Groups, Transport and VIP Transport Groups, the “Thunder Tiger” Air Demonstration Team, the Tactical Control Wing, the Communications-Air Tactical Control Wing and associated Control Report Centers. Additionally, the TAF is responsible for the Air Force Academy at Kangshan, not far from Kaohsiung; the Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Command, with 14 ADA battalions, 11 guard battalions, the Communications and Air Traffic Control Wing, and the Weather Wing. The Air Force’s logistical support system is composed of the Logistics Command Center, three Logistics Support Divisions, one Fuel Group, and various Logistics and Base Service Support Units.

Personnel Air Force active duty personnel strength was reduced from 65,000 to 55,000 between 1997 and 2001, and was supposed to have been further reduced to 45,000 by the end of 2004. That had not happened by mid-2005, but remains the goal.2 Perhaps twice that number of Air Force personnel are in the reserves.3 The Air Force has chosen to make these reductions in its support organizations, preserving the operating units’ strength. This reflects the TAF’s commendable determination to maintain maximum combat capability, but has the effect of tasking its squadron personnel with a host of distracting support duties.4

Aircraft TAF numbers approximately 475 aircraft, perhaps one-seventh the size of its only likely opponent, the PLAAF. The TAF modernized at a rapid pace during the 1990s, as it acquired F-16s from the United States, Mirage 2000s from France, and the Ching Kuo fighters produced by Taiwan with American support. These programs have not been succeeded by further modernization plans, while the PLAAF has continued replacing its Korean War-era combat aircraft with Russiandesigned Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, and acquiring indigenously produced F-8II and J-10 aircraft (Table 9). Before the 1990s, the bulk of the TAF’s fighters were 1950s and 1960s vintage American-produced or designed F-5s and F-104s.5 These aircraft had exceeded 106

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Table 9 Taiwan Air Force equipment

Fighters F-16 Mirage 2000 IDF F-5 Early warning E-2T Reconnaissance RF-5E RF-16 EW CC-47 C-130HE Transports Beech 1900 C-130H Fokker F-50 Helicopters S-62A (VIP) S-70C Trainers AT-3 T-34C

Source

2000

2005

2008

US France Taiwan/US US

478 146 58 130 144

~420 146 57 128 90

~420 146 57 128 90

4 8 8

4 8 — 8 5 2 3 34 11 20 3 18 1 17 78 36 42

4 8 — 8 5 2 3 34 11 20 3 18 1 17 78 36 42

US US US

4 2 2 34 11 20 3 18 1 17 78 36 42

US US US US German US US Taiwan/US US

Source: Numbers drawn from numerous sources and represent best estimates by B.D. Cole.

their service life and were becoming increasingly difficult to maintain and fly safely. Shortly after the PLAAF received its first regiment of Su-27s from Russia in 1992, therefore, the United States agreed to sell 150 F-16s and France agreed to sell 60 Mirage-2000–5s to Taiwan. The first deliveries of both types of aircraft occurred in early 1997, which was less than a year after the PLAAF received its second regiment of Su-27s. The aircraft Taiwan received are designed primarily for air superiority and not for ground attack, a reflection of American policy to sell Taipei only defensive weapons.6 The propeller-driven T-34C “Mentor” and jet-powered AT-3 are the TAF’s primary training aircraft. The primary transport aircraft are nineteen C-130 H “Hercules,” first purchased from the United States in 1984; Taiwan also flies three Dutch-built Fokker-50, and ten Beech 1900C transports for administrative and personnel missions. The Air Force uses 17 SH-70 helicopters for search and rescue missions. The tactical aircraft inventory is led by six E-2T “Hawkeye” airborne warning and control system (AWACS) platform, long the mainstay of US aircraft carrier air groups. This extremely capable airplane has been upgraded with the AN/ASP-145 107

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early warning radar and is able to track more than 600 targets simultaneously.7 Taiwan took delivery of the first four E-2Ts in 1995; the sale of two more was announced in August 1999, for delivery by the end of 2004. The first of these two aircraft was delivered to Taiwan in August and the second in October 2004.8 Two C-130s have been equipped for electronic warfare surveillance and are designated as “EH-130H.” Three fighter aircraft form the core of the TAF. With the E2Ts, they are the first line of Taiwan’s defense; successful engagement against the PLAAF would evoke Winston Churchill’s famous 1940 panegyric that “never . . . was so much owed by so many to so few.”9

Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) During the mid 1980s, Lockheed Martin (General Dynamics), AlliedSignal, and various US avionics manufacturers cooperated with Taiwan’s Aero Industry Development Corporation (AIDC) in a direct commercial sales (DCS) program to design the IDF, the Ching Kuo, which started as an upgrade of the American designed F-5E/F jet (now used for advanced pilot training) and was also influenced by the F-16.10 The IDF became operational in November 1993 and the first operational squadron was deployed in December 1994. It is armed with cannon and the Taiwan-designed Tien Chien-I (Skysword I) and Tien Chien-II (Skysword II) air-to-air missiles. The first of these is an infra-red (IR) guided missile similar to Sidewinder. The second is a medium-range air-to-air intercept missile that uses an inertial guidance system and can receive mid-course guidance. The IDF may also be armed with two anti-ship missiles. The Hsiung-Feng I is a beam riding missile that requires the launching aircraft to remain “locked on” the target until missile impact. Hsiung-Feng II is a fire-and-forget missile similar to the US designed Harpoon. Plans to produce 250 IDF were reduced to 130 following the 1992 American decision to sell F-16 “Fighting Falcons” to Taiwan.

F-16 Significantly more capable than the IDF are the 150 F-16 fighters sold to Taiwan in 1992, with delivery in 1997–1999. Taiwan reportedly paid $6 billion for these aircraft and pilot training, which is still conducted in the United States, at Luke Air Force Base (AFB) in Arizona. After some initial accidents apparently due to pilot inexperience, the TAF has proven adept at employing its remaining 146 F-16s.11 The F-16 remains one of the world’s premier fighters in terms of speed, rate of climb, and maneuverability. Taiwan’s version of this all-weather air superiority and ground attack aircraft has upgraded navigation and fire control systems,

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including the low altitude navigation and targeting infrared for night (LANTIRN) navigation and targeting system.12 It can be armed with AIM-7 Sparrow semiactive radar guided, AIM-9 Sidewinder IR guided, AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air (AMRAAM) “fire and forget” air-to-air missiles, and cannon. The 26th Fighter Squadron, stationed at Hualien Air Force Base (AB), has been assigned a maritime mission and armed with Harpoon anti-ship missiles that have a range of over 65 nautical miles (nm). The first Harpoon firing was conducted in April 2001 during a joint AF-Navy exercise against a decommissioned Taiwan Navy (TN) destroyer that simulated a Chinese Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyer (DDG).13 Twelve F-16s have been converted to a reconnaissance role, equipped with the Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System (ATARS) pod produced by the United States.14 The AMRAAM sale to Taiwan in 2000 included unusual caveats.15 The missiles were not to be transferred to Taiwan unless China threatened an attack or acquired the similar AA-12 missile from Russia, restrictions designed to meet the US arms export pledge not to introduce new offensive military capabilities into Southeast Asia.16 Taiwan’s F-16s were updated with the weapon system software, but their pilots trained with the missiles only at US training ranges. After China received AA-12s, 120 AMRAAMs were delivered to Taiwan in 2004, and in September TAF F-16s armed with AMRAAM flew the first combat air patrol from Hualien.17 Taiwan also has the AGM-12 Bullpup and AGM-65A Maverick air-to-ground missiles, which are old but still effective against armored vehicles and ships. Mirage 2000–5 The only completely non-US designed aircraft in the TAF is the Mirage 2000–5, 60 of which were acquired from France in 1992, and delivered in 1997 and 1998. Taiwan’s first Mirage squadron, the 41st Tactical Fighter Squadron (TFS) became operational in December 1997 at Hsinchu AB, where all 58 of these aircraft are now stationed as part of the 2nd Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW).18 The TAF also obtained 960 Mica medium-range and 480 Magic II short-range air-to-air missiles from France to arm the Mirages. The Mica is a fire-and-forget missile with active radar and IR guidance capability and beyond-visual-range capability; Magic II is an IR missile with capabilities similar to Sidewinder. The Mirage may also be armed with two centerline cannons mounted in gun pods. It is an air superiority fighter with look-down capability and an automated detection and tracking system. Beijing strenuously protested this acquisition, successfully pressuring Paris to ban future military sales to Taiwan. Future acquisitions may include 18 to 22 “tactical transport aircraft,” but this requirement has not been formalized; candidates are the CN-235, C-27J, and ATR-42. The CSIST has also developed an unmanned aviation vehicle (UAV) for reconnaissance and targeting employment.19

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Air Force installations The TAF mans nine primary air bases, and a facility at Taipei’s Sung Shan commercial airport:20 1

Taoyuan AB: 5th Tactical Fighter Group (TFG), which includes the 401st TFW, composed of the 15th, 16th (F-5) Fighter Squadrons (base will be closed and the TFG disestablished in 2005–2006); 2 Chingchuan Kang AB: 427th TFW, composed of the 7th, 8th, 28th (IDF) Fighter Squadrons; Test and Evaluation (IDF) Squadron; 35th Training (AT3B) Squadron; 3 Pingtung AB: 439th Composite Wing, composed of the 10th Tactical Airlift Group (101st, 102nd (C-130-H) Squadrons); 20th Electronic Warfare Group (2nd, 6th (E2-T) Electronic Warfare Squadrons); 33rd and 34th (Navy S-2T) squadrons are also stationed at Pingtung; 4 Tainan AB: 443rd TFW, composed of the 1st, 3rd, 9th (IDF) Fighter Squadrons; 5 Chiayi AB: 455th TFW, composed of the 21st, 22nd, 23rd (F-16) Fighter Squadrons; Search and Air Rescue (S-70C) Squadron; 6 Hsinchu AB: 499th TFW, composed of the 41st, 42nd (Mirage) Fighter squadrons; 48th (Mirage) Training Squadron; 7 Taitung AB: 7th TFG, composed of the 737th TFW (44th, 45th (F-5E) Fighter Squadrons); 46th (F-5) Fighter Squadron, which flies for the Tactical Training and Development Center (Taiwan’s “Top Gun,” which uses the Training Range located at Tai Chung); 8 Hualien AB: 401st Tactical Composite Wing, composed of the 17th, 26th, 27th (F-16) Fighter Squadrons; 12th (F-16) Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron; 9 Kangshan AB: 26th (F-16) Fighter Squadron; Air Force Academy; Basic (T-34C) Training Group; Fighter (AT-3A) Training Group; Airlift (B-1900C) Training Group; “Thunder Tiger” (AT-3A) Air Demonstration Team; and 10 Sungshan AB (Taipei): Special (VIP) Transport (B-1900, Boeing 737, Fokker 50) Group.

The Air Force academy The academy traces its origin to the 1929 founding of China’s first aviation school, at Nanjing. It moved to its present location at Kangshan in 1949. The academy describes its academic objectives as instilling a strong sense of country, duty, and honor; providing a systematic curriculum at the university level; offering a physical training program designed to develop physical strength and stamina, as well as mental perseverance; and to instill a sense of strict self-discipline, a strong sense of honor, and the spirit of teamwork. The cadets are offered a four year, combined science and engineering program leading to a Bachelor of Engineering or a Bachelor of Business Administration degree with a specialization in aeronautical and space engineering, avionics 110

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engineering, aeronautical mechanical engineering, or aviation management. After graduation and commissioning as second lieutenants, a physical examination helps determine flight training students. Other graduates may be assigned to specialty education at the Air Force Technical Institute or the Army’s Artillery and Missile School. An alternative, non-Academy path to flight training is also available: the Flight Officer Program allows high school graduates to receive specialty training and education (fundamental flight theory and military courses) and 104 weeks of flight training, followed by commissioning as second lieutenants.

Flight training The aged T-34C turbo-prop aircraft is used for 10–12 hours of preliminary flight evaluation.21 If found qualified, the student pilot then has 80 hours of Basic Flight Training in the same aircraft, followed by Advanced Flight Training. Trainees designated for fighters undergo more than 100 hours of training in the AT-3 jet trainer; those designated for logistics aircraft have 81 hours of training in the BH-1900 or 91 additional hours in the T-34C. Finally, all student aviators have approximately 100 hours of instruction in a ground-based flight simulator. The TAF estimates the cost of training a fighter pilot as $10 million.22

Readiness Pilot proficiency and numbers are the most important elements in air force readiness. Taiwan’s pilots performed extremely well against their mainland opponents during the 1950s Strait crises; it has been a long time since they have been in combat, but that is also true for the PLAAF. The TAF, as is the case in most air forces in advanced countries with expanding economies, has periodically faced a shortage of pilots, especially those qualified to fly high-performance fighter aircraft. This shortage was especially acute in 1999–2000, when the Air Force Chief-of-Staff advised the Legislative Yuan (LY) that the TAF had only half as many fighter pilots as it did aircraft for them to fly.23 Vice Minister of Defense Soong Li-chuan stated in May 2000 that “the number of pilots for the Air Force’s second-generation warplanes has fallen short of the officially sanctioned quota by between 25 percent and 28 percent,” but argued that this was not a problem for Taiwan’s air defense.24 The shortage may have eased by the end of 2004, although opinion differed among Taiwan observers.25 In January 2005, the Minister of Defense issued an explanation that leaves the issue still open to question. Admiral Lee stated that “100 percent of pilots are now assigned to the newest planes. There is no longer a lack of pilots.” He then explained “the grounded fighter planes” as part of Air Force “research on using the ‘sealed bag’ concept to execute Mirage fighter ‘Environmental Control and Prevention’.” He argued that this is not the same as “mothballing,” but an effort “to extend the service life of fighter planes”.26 111

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A similarly dubious explanation was offered in January 2005. In response to a question in the LY about a reported Air Force plan to inactivate some of its Mirage-2000 fighters, Vice Minister of National Defense Tsai Ming-hsien admitted that a plan “still in the pipeline” was being considered. He claimed that mothballing the Mirage-2000s would lengthen their life expectancy, reduce maintenance costs, and save money in the face of “a defense budget that has been falling yearly.” The Vice Minister further argued, as had his processor four years earlier, that reducing the number of active fighters “would not affect Taiwan’s air defense capability,” an argument no more convincing in 2004 than it was in 2000.27 What makes these claims especially suspect is the apparent ratio of less than one trained fighter aircraft per aircraft in the inventory: manning in the PLAAF is 1.2 pilots per fighter; that in US Navy and Air Force fighter squadrons is typically between 1.6 and 2.0 pilots per aircraft.28 The state of TAF readiness is frequently evaluated for real; every time an unknown aircraft enters Taiwan’s air space, and especially any time PLAAF aircraft are suspected of crossing the Taiwan Strait centerline, TAF fighters are launched to intercept and identify the intruders. The potential for in-flight encounters is increased by the constrained geography between Taiwan and the mainland: the centerline of the Taiwan Strait usually has been honored as a “do not cross” boundary by both sides since it was delineated as the “Davis Line” by the US Formosa Strait Patrol in the 1950s. Taiwan’s sensitivity to possible encounters with PLAAF fighters was emphasized in July 2000 by Defense Minister Wu Shih-wen, when he noted the increasing frequency of PLAAF flights east of the centerline. Wu stated that TAF fighters were remaining well to the east of the line to reduce the chance of accidental encounters.29 This line not only restricts TAF training space, but also serves as a tripwire for possible attack. The more frequently the centerline is “innocently” crossed weakens that role, but to date still evokes immediate alert fighter launch by the TAF. Beijing also conducts Strait patrols, is fully aware of the centerline’s role, and apparently approaches and occasionally crosses it to send political signals to Taipei. Most recently, Taiwan’s MND asserted that PLAAF fighters “make nearly 100 sorties on average per month,” which “adversely affects the early-warning time for Taiwan.”30 In October 2004 excited media attention was drawn to a series of sorties by as many as 30 PLAAF fighters during flights from Taipei by VIP aircraft carrying President Chen Shui-bian and Vice President Annette Lu. Press speculation that this unusual flight activity had both caught the TAF unawares and was meant as a deterrent signal to Taipei has been discredited by the Taiwan military, if not accepted by the press.31

Responding to the threat The Air Force faces an air threat from China’s aircraft and ballistic missiles, the latter operated by the PLA’s Second Artillery. The TAF is especially vulnerable to 112

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air strikes since it must depend on relatively few air bases, and those are almost all located on the coastal plains, given the island’s mountainous topography. As of April 2005, China has approximately 650 short-range (300–600 kilometers (km)) ballistic missiles positioned within range of Taiwan.32 These Dong Feng (DF)-11 and 15 missiles (also known as the M-11 and M-9) carry 500 kilogram (kg) conventional explosive warheads and are accurate to within 300 meters (m) of their aim point; accuracy is improving dramatically, however, possibly to 75 m, as China installs satellite assisted targeting.33 This is three times the missile force that threatened Taiwan in 2000, and Beijing is continuing to add approximately 75 missiles each year. Additionally, China deploys the DF-21 mediumrange (1,800 km) ballistic missile armed with a conventional explosive warhead and reportedly accurate to within 50 m of aim point.34 Two basic categories of defense are available against an air-launched threat, whether from manned aircraft or ballistic missiles. Least expensive and most readily available are passive defenses, usefully termed “hardening.” Passive defensive steps include, first, building underground or well protected aboveground shelters for aircraft. Taiwan is taking steps in this direction, but much room for progress remains. One hardened facility, Chashan, has been built among the mountains near Hualien AB in eastern Taiwan, with which it shares runways. The Chashan facility consists of underground storage capacity for approximately 100 aircraft, has underground power generators, and is reportedly stocked with several months of food, fuel, and military stores.35 The base does not have aircraft specifically assigned to it, apart from the F-16s stationed at Hualien, which apparently rotate through the underground facility. Chashan would serve as an emergency base in the event of an attack; ideally, every major TAF base would have a similar facility. Second is protecting aircraft support facilities. Fuel storage and piping systems should be moved underground; maintenance and supply facilities should similarly be covered. A third passive defense step is to harden command and control systems; effective defense requires that they be both protected and redundant. Ensuring the durability and continued effectiveness of command and control systems under air attack points to the most important passive defensive step that Taiwan should be pursuing: an island-wide, joint, automated, integrated, redundant air defense infrastructure. The intention to build this system is often stated, but is only slowly coming to fruition.36 Problems in funding expensive but unglamorous command and control improvements remain, as does the need to improve joint operating capability among the services. A fourth means of passive defense against air attack is the dispersal of defending aircraft. This is difficult for Taiwan, given the island’s topography, but experiments have been conducted using highways for air operations. The TAF is also instituting a variation on dispersal by creating composite air wings, a post-2000 organizational change apparently based on the US Air Force model.37 This should change the present system of assigning one aircraft model to one base. Hualien, for example, is primarily an F-16 base. Such concentration eases supply and 113

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maintenance, but limits flexibility. By organizing composite wings, the TAF will complicate its support issues and increase costs, but enhance its operational flexibility while reducing its susceptibility to PLAAF attack. Under a system of composite wings, Taiwan’s F-16s, for example might be spread out among several air bases and the island would not have to fear a strike on Hualien eliminating most of the F-16 force.38 A fifth step is deception, trying to prevent the opponent from gaining the intelligence and localizing data necessary for accurate air attack. Here too, Taiwan’s terrain, small size, and China’s proximity make effective deception difficult. The imaginative use of information and electronic warfare may, however, serve as a force multiplier for Taiwan’s defensive efforts against mainland attack. Finally, airfields can be rapidly repaired after being bombarded. Taiwan needs to invest significantly greater assets in rapid runway repair capability. Active defense against ballistic missiles remains in its infancy as an element of warfare, as demonstrated by the problematic results achieved by US and allied forces in Iraq in 1991. Nonetheless, Taiwan has constructed a “four line” air defense system that includes both missiles and manned aircraft. Space assets may also play a role, since Taiwan has an active satellite development and monitoring program. A satellite launched in June 2004, nominally for weather forecasting, was reported to be taking “crystal-clear photos of Tiananmen Square and the Forbidden City,” with the capability of taking pictures “of about 80 percent of the land surface of China.”39 According to a 1999 description, Air Defense Line One is formed by the relatively long-range Patriot PAC II and the indigenously designed Skybow family of anti-aircraft missiles operated by the Army, both of which have limited capability against ballistic missiles. There are far too few of them, however, to seriously damage a well-coordinated incoming strike of DF 15s and 11s. The United States has made available the Patriot PAC III missile system, which is significantly more capable against incoming ballistic missiles, but the Taipei administration is having difficulty justifying their purchase to the LY and the people of Taiwan. This problem is based both on the domestic political contest between the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the KMT, and on the system’s high cost: each Patriot missile costs more than $3 million.40 Air Defense Line Two is posed by Taiwan’s new fighters—IDF, F-16, and Mirage 2000—and by shorter-range Skysword I and II missiles. The third Air Defense Line depends on still shorter-range anti-aircraft systems, such as the USdesigned Hawk, while the fourth line depends on short-range systems, including the Skyguard radar, Chaparral missiles, and anti-aircraft artillery.41 Only the first of these Air Defense Lines offers any prospect whatsoever against ballistic missiles, and the missiles forming the other three lines have limited utility against even modern aircraft. The TAF will also face PLAAF manned aircraft in the event of a conflict. Countering this threat would benefit from the same passive defense measures noted earlier. Active defense against manned aircraft is, of course, far more 114

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feasible than against ballistic missiles. For one thing, while the capability of opposing fighters is significant, the skill of the pilots is even more significant. Despite a proud record of accomplishment against their mainland opponents, however, TAF aviators face very real difficulties in preparing for twenty-firstcentury air-to-air combat. First is the PLAAF’s rapidly improving aircraft, as China acquires more and more fourth generation fighters from Russia (J-11 and Su-30), and builds capable fighters itself (J-10 and F-8II). Taiwan’s current fighters match up well against these aircraft, but rumored PLAAF acquisition of Mirage 2000–9CS fighters from France would mean the “ROC Air Force will feel the pinch,” and would consider either upgrading its F-16s or acquire new aircraft.42 Second, the PLAAF is slowly acquiring both AWACS-type and tanker aircraft. The former provides a force-multiplying early warning and air control capability; the latter will enable mainland fighters to fly farther to a point of combat and to arrive there with more fuel and hence more time on station. Air-to-air refueling will also allow multi-cycle missions for PLAAF fighters who will not have to return to home base to refuel (although they may have to do so to rearm). Another equipment category important to prevailing in aerial combat is the variety and effectiveness of aircraft armament. Nothing makes this point clearer than the dominance established by TAF aviators during the Strait crises of the 1950s, when they used heat-seeking Sidewinder missiles to dominate their mainland opponents. Taiwan’s fighters today are armed with the formidable AIM-120 (AMRAAM) missile acquired from the United States, but PLAAF fighters will be armed with the roughly equivalent AA-12 missile, supplied by Russia.43 The TAF has chosen not to acquire an air-to-air refueling capability. The underlying rationale for that decision is the small aerial theater in which senior Air Force officers believe combat with the PLAAF will occur. That is not a unanimous opinion on the part of all officers, however, who point out that an air-to-air refueling capability, but would extend the life of Taiwan fighters whose home bases might be damaged by PLA air attack, and allow time for runway repair or the ability to reach another, undamaged, field.44 Additionally, aerial refueling would be required to conduct an effective SEAD campaign against mainland PLAAF bases; it would also greatly enhance the TAF’s ability to defend its airspace from the east, as well as from the west. Third, PLAAF pilots have during the past decade demonstrated improving airmanship and increased capability over water, the latter obviously of prime importance in a contest with Taiwan. This relates directly to the number of hours flown by an aviator. To a significant extent, more flight hours translate into a more capable pilot. Currently, PLAAF fighter pilots fly approximately 125 hours per year, up from 110 in 2000; TAF pilots are required to fly 150 hours annually, but average 180 hours per year, a marked advantage over their mainland counterparts.45 However, the steadily declining Taiwanese defense budget may adversely impact its pilots’ proficiency, if the number of flying hours is reduced due to 115

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a reduced Air Force budget and compensating time in state-of-the-art ground simulators is not provided.46 Fourth is the issue of geography. As noted earlier, Taiwan’s air force is based at relatively few positions, with little flexibility. The likely opponent, on the other hand, has the benefit of flying from a continent with the capacity of hosting a very large number of bases. Adding to the TAF’s geographical disadvantage is that possession of aerial refueling and modern aircraft with greater range will allow the PLAAF to conduct multi-axes approaches to Taiwan, not just from the west. Hence, Taiwan’s Air Force would face a 360-degree threat from an attacker. Finally, and most important to Taiwan’s ability to defend against attack from the air, is the creation of an island-wide, integrated, automated command and control system. A “power radar system” was described in 2001 as fulfilling this role, reportedly linking an internal network of Air Force Base radars, missile sites, and the TAF’s four combat control centers at Sung Shan, Hsinchu, Pingtung, and Makung. Next on line is the Po Sheng C4 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) program, which is moving forward, but needs to be expanded to cover the island completely. Currently based on acquisition and installation of the US-designed Link 16 computerized integration system, by the end of 2005 the program should provide the ability to “link” the command and control centers with one E-2T aircraft, a Patriot missile battalion command center, and two of the Kidd-class destroyers. Future development aims to include 14 additional command centers, 8 Mirage fighters, more than 2 dozen F-16 fighters, all 4 Kidd-class destroyers, 2 Cheng Kung-class frigates, and 2 Kang Ding-class frigates. This is a beginning, but the system needs to be expanded and accelerated to include more operating units and an increased level of integration under the centralized command center.47 The MND estimates that a Chinese DF/M-family missile with a 500-kg warhead would create a crater 10 m in depth and 20 m in width after hitting the ground, and that it could take as many as 50 missiles to destroy a military airport. According to a RAND Corporation analysis, a 500-kg ballistic-missile submunitions warhead covers almost 8 times more area than does a unitary warhead. The former estimate may be unduly pessimistic, and sub-munitions are effective only against unprotected, “soft” targets.48 The combination of increased accuracy from GPS guidance and increased warhead efficiency decreases the number of missiles required to attack airbases from hundreds to dozens.49 Although more detailed modeling might produce somewhat different results, these rough order of magnitude estimates suggest that China’s existing inventory of several hundred DF-11 and DF-15 missiles could inflict only modest damage on Taiwan’s Air Force, if preparations are made and time is available to disperse aircraft prior to an attack. Even a substantially enlarged missile arsenal would appear inadequate to the task of gaining decisive air superiority through airfield attacks. The greater accuracy being built into these missiles, however, combined with the slow pace of Taiwan’s installation of passive airfield defenses, will significantly increase the damage resulting from ballistic missile attacks. 116

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Damage will be inflicted, however, during any Chinese air attack. Taiwan’s Air Force is so outnumbered that it must be afforded every resource to maximize the readiness of its airplanes and the proficiency of its pilots. Ballistic missile attack is almost certainly the most serious political-military and psychological threat facing Taiwan; Taipei should move rapidly and with maximum resources to ensure the systematization of all air defense systems and measure into a thoroughly integrated defensive system.

Conclusion The Air Force is confronting the same problem of scarce resources as the other Taiwan armed services. The personnel problem is especially acute, however, since it is completely dependent on its pilots. Numbers are not enough, since such a low percentage of available candidates are able to meet the demanding physical requirements and aptitude required of a capable tactical aviator. There is no easy solution to this problem, although increased pay and benefits may help. The Air Force’s pilot shortage is compounded by the personnel cuts required by the Chingshih and Chingchin programs. The TAF’s policy of maintaining the current number of operating squadrons, while applying required cuts to non-pilot personnel is commendable and will only work in the short term. At some point, an imbalance of squadrons and support personnel will develop, with the likely result of reduced readiness in both numbers of operable aircraft and fully trained pilots.50 One solution would be to reduce the number of operating squadrons, but this is an unattractive option, given the absolute necessity of air defense to Taiwan’s security. Some other form of relief must be found. Military personnel reductions could be focused so as to ensure no reduction in TAF defense capability, or Air Force support functions could be opened to civilian contractors. Equipment capability is a second major problem facing the Air Force. The acquisition programs of the 1990s effectively provided state-of-the-art fighter aircraft to match the proven airmanship of Taiwan’s pilots. The development of succeeding generation of fighters is not within the capability of Taiwan’s militaryindustrial complex, despite its production of the IDF; no foreign acquisition programs are in place, although discussion of eventually acquiring either the proven US F/A-18 multi-role aircraft or one of the next generation of American fighters, the F-22 and/or the F-35, is ongoing. The IDF costs approximately $24 million, but does not have the operating capability to justify that price, when compared to the F-16, which costs $26 million. An F/A-18 costs a relatively modest $29 million; other than the advantage of two engines, it has about the same capability as the single-engine F-16. The F/A-35 is designed for short or vertical takeoff and landing, will cost approximately $40–50 million (depending on model), but will not be available (IOC) until 2010. The F-22 will be the world’s most capable fighter and has a 2006 IOC, but at more than $250 million per aircraft will be prohibitively expensive.51 117

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The TAF’s best choice would seem to be an immediate purchase of additional F-16s, pending F-35 availability. The latter aircraft seems to offer the best combination of price and capability; its short-vertical takeoff and landing capability would be particularly valuable for Taiwan. The combat effectiveness of its current inventory could be increased with the installation of improved avionics, but that would require significant monetary cost. Additionally, increased flight hours in the air and in capable simulators would increase pilot proficiency; increasing flight hours also costs money and inflicts equipment wear and tear. Both of these steps represent very efficient expenditure of funds, compared to the cost of new aircraft. A second course of action is to increase the number of fighter pilots through a dramatic raise in pay and benefits; a 50 percent pay raise would likely draw an increased number of candidates and, as in paying for added flight hours, would be relatively inexpensive. A third way to maintain air defense capability is to implement force-multipliers. Acquiring even a small number of aerial refueling aircraft would serve this purpose, as discussed earlier. As demonstrated by the US Marine Corps, some of the C-130H transport aircraft already flown by the TAF could be relatively inexpensively converted to KC-130 refuelers.52 Fourth, the Air Force should continue seeking alternate basing options, such as underground facilities and highway operations. Most important is for Taiwan to press forward as quickly as possible with creating an island-wide air defense network that is integrated, centrally controlled, redundant, and as comprehensive as possible. Central to establishing a local version of netcentric warfare capability are Taiwan’s E2T aircraft, fighters, Patriot and other missile systems, AAW ships, fighter aircraft, and control centers on the ground, all linked together through “Link 16” or a similar system. Defense of Taiwan depends on defense of the air. In addition to C4ISR and other equipment acquisition and additional funding for training and operations, this requires a joint planning and operational effort by all the services, led by the TAF. Additional investments in passive defenses, aircraft, and pilot training are required.

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8 TAIWAN NAVY

Mission The Navy has never achieved prominence among Taiwan’s armed forces, which is somewhat surprising, given the island’s dependence on its sea lines of communication (SLOCs) for almost all of its trade, which constitutes more than 80 percent of its GNP. This includes all of its petroleum requirements, which constitutes approximately 90 percent of total energy requirements.1 The Navy describes its mission as focused on ensuring the Taiwan Strait and maintaining the safe passage of SLOC. [It] conducts naval reconnaissance and patrolling, supply of offshore islands and escort of ships in peacetime while countering sea blockades and conducting naval interception as well as joint operations with the Army and the Air Force so as to ensure the capabilities in sea control in wartime.2 Taiwan’s naval officers have a vision for defending their island based on technology, leadership, and “smart” warfare.

Organization Navy Headquarters oversees operational and land-based forces that total approximately 50,000 active-duty personnel. The reduction in military manpower discussed in Chapter 5 affects the Navy, and its current and projected strength will make it increasingly challenging to provide full crews for the fleet, particularly when the four Kidd-class destroyers join the fleet in late 2005 and 2006. The Navy is a strong supporter of the current overhaul of the non-commissioned officer (NCO) training and education system, and is similarly restructuring officer accession programs. The Officer Candidate School was closed in 2004, which has placed a greater burden on the Naval Academy. Fortunately, applicants for the academy in 2004 significantly exceeded the available positions in the freshman class, and they scored higher on academic entrance exams than had their 119

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predecessors. The Navy is determined to impose a rigid “phase out system” for its junior officers, to strive for retention of only the top performers. A “lifelong study program” is also envisioned, to ensure that the officer corps remain current in warfare and associated topics.3 The Navy’s primary operational units include the following commands. The Fleet Command is headquartered at Tsoying, from where it coordinates the operating fleet, which is spread out among several homeports (Tsoying, Kaohsiung, Penghus, Keelung, and Suao). The Destroyer Fleet contains Taiwan’s remaining Second World War-era combatants homeported at Tsoying. These are undergoing deactivation, which may also result in the deactivation of the Destroyer Fleet command. The arrival of the ex-US Kidd-class destroyers in late 2005 and 2006, however, may lead to this command’s continued existence. The Frigate Fleet is spread out among various homeports by ship type, while the Amphibious Fleet is collocated at Tsoying with the Marine Corps. The Navy’s oilers, supply, and salvage ships are organized into a Service Fleet, homeported primarily in Tsoying and Kaohsiung. Taiwan’s four submarines (the Submarine Squadron) is stationed at Tsoying, while the Fast Attack Missile Boat Force is headquartered at Keelung. The Navy’s Aviation Command shares facilities with the Taiwan Air Force at Pingtung AB, near Tsoying. Finally, the Navy’s Land-based Missile Force and Surveillance and Communications System Command are located at various sites around the island. The Marine Corps Command is also located at Tsoying, as is a considerable number of its troops. The Corps is in the midst of a significant downsizing and reorganization, that will drastically alter its mission. Tsoying is also the site of the Navy’s Logistics Command, which manages the service’s material and financial resources. The Education, Training, and Doctrine Development Command (ETDDC) is collocated with Fleet Headquarters, where it can most directly affect fleet training and education. The ETDDC operates the modern ship trainers at Tsoying, where ship crews are able to train on computer-generated operational scenarios.

Navy General Headquarters The Navy General Headquarters is in charge of developing and maintaining combat readiness, as well as operating its subordinate fleets and ground units. Under its command are the Naval Fleet Command, the Marine Corps Headquarters, the Navy Logistics Command, the Educational Training and Standard Development Command, and the Bureau of Maritime Survey. Subordinate Navy units are under the direct supervision of the Naval Fleet Command and are organized into fleet, group, and ship levels. The Navy’s “major objectives” assigned by Taiwan’s central government include improved and automated command and control capabilities, developing a “three-dimensional approach” to conducting anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and emphasizing missiles as the main battery of its combatant ships. Achieving these 120

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goals will require “a viable submarine force,” improving coastal defense, ASW, anti-air warfare (AAW), anti-surface warfare (ASUW), electronic warfare (EW), and mine warfare (MIW) capabilities, all of which must fit into a military-wide joint operational paradigm (Table 10).4

Surface ships The Navy has a long-standing, comprehensive ship acquisition program, the Kwang Hua (“Glorious China”) plan. It included six phases, when adopted in the early 1990s: 1 2

3 4 5

6

Project I was construction of the eight Cheng Kung-class frigates modeled on the US-designed Perry-class; Project II was acquisition of six Lafayette-class (Kang Ding-class) frigates from France. This phase originally included construction of an additional eight similar ships; Project III includes construction in Taiwan of the 500-ton Jing Chiang class patrol boats; Project IV was leasing eight Knox-class frigates; Project V was the plan to build several “stealthy” 1,500–2,000-ton patrol boats as “secondary class warships,” that would supplement the more formidable warships; and Project VI envisions construction of 30 “stealthy” 150-ton fast attack missile boats.

This plan has accomplished impressive goals, including completion of the three frigate acquisition programs. The “secondary” warship acquisition programs are started, but progress has been slow. Acqusition of the four US-built Kidd-class DDGs, which Taiwan has renamed the Chi Teh-class—Chi Teh (DDG 1801), Ming Teh (DDG 1802), Tong Teh (DDG 1803), and Wu Teh (DDG 1805)—was not part of the Kwang Hua plan, but they will be the pride of the Taiwan fleet. The Chi Tehs will join the TN by the end of 2006 and will strongly supplement Taiwan’s long-term plan to modernize its surface combatant force. They were originally built in the United States for Iran and acquired by the US Navy after the Shah was overthrown in 1978–1979. The four ships are built on Spruance-class destroyer hulls, but displace over 9,000 tons fully loaded. They are armed with a cruiser-size, extremely sophisticated AAW sensor and weapon system. The Kidds were operated by the US Navy for only about a decade, and so have many years of operation life remaining; before the ships were decommissioned in the late 1980s, they were modernized with a suite of AAW technology called the New Threat Upgrade (NTU). NTU makes the Kidds the most advanced, potent AAW ships in the world, other than those equipped with Aegis. They are able to 121

Table 10 Taiwan Navy equipment Submarines Guppy II/Hai Shih Zwaardvis/Hai Lung New Construction Destroyers Ex-US Gearing/ Wu Chin III Kidd/Chi Teh Aegis Frigates Knox/Chi Yang Cheung Kung Lafayette/Kang Ting Missile Corvettes Jing Chiang Kwang Hua VI Project Patrol Boats Dvora/Hai Ou Other Patrol Craft Mine Sweepers MWW 50-class Aggressive-class Coastal Amphibious Ships Anchorage/Shui Hai Cabildo/Chung Cheng Command Ship (LCC) Newport/Chung Ho LST LCU Auxiliaries Wu Yi AOE Troop Transports Coast Guard Fixed Wing Aircraft Helicopters Source: B.D. Cole.

2000

2005

2008

Notes

2

2

2

2 —

2 —

2 ?

7

7

0

— —

2 —

4 2?

9 7 6

9 8 6

9 8 6

ex-US US design; built in Taiwan French design; built in Taiwan

2 —

2 1

2 ?

12 planned but program canceled 30 planned but program on hold

49

49

?

Israeli design; to be replaced by Kwang Hua VI boats if they are built

10

10

10

4 4 5

4 4 5

4 4

German design/constructed ex-US ex-US(2)/ex-Belgian(3)

1 1

1 1

2 0

ex-US LSD ex-US LSD

1

1

1

ex-US LST conversion

2 10 26

2 10 26

2 10 26

ex-US LSTs ex-US; all 60 years old Utility landing craft

1 5 — 26

1 5 ~100 26

1 5 ~120 ?

19

30

30

Training only; limited to 250 feet dive depth Dutch design/construction Authorized by United States but source unidentified Will be decommissioned as Kidds arrive join the fleet 2 in 2005/2 in 2006 As of 2005 not authorized for sale by United State

Underway replenishment ship Yuen Feng/Wan An/Tai Wu Various patrol craft S2Ts obsolete; 12 P3C offered by United States 20 S70C/10 Hughes 500 for ASW

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detect and track air targets at ranges greater than 200 Nautical miles (nm), and can fire salvos of “Standard” AAW missiles with a range of 90 nm.5 These ships are also armed with Close-in Weapons Systems (CIWS); although it has a range of less than 2 nm, CIWS is a multi-barrel 20 millimeter (mm) weapon that fires depleted-uranium shells, designed to destroy incoming missiles. Each Kidd also is armed with two 120 mm rapid-fire guns that are designed for both surface and air targets. Finally, the ships are superb ASW platforms, equipped with low frequency, long-range active and passive sonars, rocket-propelled torpedoes, and torpedo tubes. The ships each embark two helicopters that are capable of finding and launching torpedoes against submarines and missiles against surface ships, as well as serving as EW platforms. These helos are able to electronically “link” with the mother ship (or the other ships of the class) to pass information and orders back and forth through computerized communications. Finally, the Kidds provide an extremely capable command and control platform for a joint maritime commander. The four ships are being outfitted in the United States; two will be delivered to Taiwan near the end of 2005 and the remaining two will arrive in 2006.6 They will challenge the Navy, but not on technological grounds. First, their crews are large—approximately 375 personnel—and the sailors will require extensive schooling to operate the ship’s complex systems; this in turn will require a very significant expenditure of resources to ensure that the crew structure—requiring not just initial training and education, but that for succeeding “generations” of crewmen—is established. Taiwan is partially filling initial personnel billets by decommissioning several old destroyers; given the difficult recruiting environment in Taiwan, and the failure of the 2004 attempt to create units manned only by volunteers, the Navy may well face future difficulties in maintaining the numbers required for the new ships. Second, the primary naval base at Tsoying is too small and too shallow to accommodate the Kidds adequately. The Navy has launched the first steps in a long-term process to enlarge and deepen the harbor, but this project is expected to take a decade to complete, and is encountering opposition from the civilian populace near Tsoying.7 In the meantime, the Navy will homeport the ships at Suao, on Taiwan’s northeastern coast. Suao is deep enough for the new ships, but is constrained geographically; ship movements in the harbor, which is bounded by two breakwaters, will have to be cautiously executed. Suao does have the significant advantage of being further away from the mainland than Tsoying or Kaohsiung (both of which are located close to each other on Taiwan’s southwestern coast). Taiwan’s navy boasts no other destroyers, although the United States may in the future offer to sell ships equipped with the Aegis AAW missile system, the most effective in the world. The Navy’s surface force in the meantime will continue to rely primarily on frigates, three classes of which form the backbone of the TN. These frigates and Taiwan’s missile patrol boats are armed with one of several anti-surface ship missile systems, most effective of which is the US-supplied 123

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Harpoon. Taiwan has imported the Gabriel II missile from Israel, but also relies on the capable Hsiung Feng family of anti-surface ship missiles. Although not as capable as the Harpoon, the Hsiung Feng II is effective at ranges out to 90 nm. The CSIST has also been working to develop a longer-range version of this missile. The Hsiung Feng III reportedly has been successfully tested, has a range of more than 300 km and may be capable of attacking land targets. In January 2005, the MND reported that a long-range, supersonic Hsiung Feng III cruise missile had been successfully test-fired. It was described as an anti-ship missile, but it would clearly be adaptable to target shore installations, as well.8 This missile reportedly has been under development for more than a decade; it could almost certainly be fired from shipboard as well as from the shore. A final round of testing is scheduled for late 2005; if successful, the missile would presumably then enter production.9 Employing this long-range missile accurately, however, requires long-range targeting capability that Taiwan has yet to demonstrate. The key to defending Taiwan is the ability to control the sea around it, which in turn requires control of the air. Taiwan’s modern combatants are not especially well equipped for the AAW mission, but that will change dramatically when the Kidds join the fleet. No navy can be too capable in AAW and Taipei should continue pushing to acquire the Aegis missile system, although the United States has not approved sale of that system to Taiwan. Acquisition of Aegis technology—viable options are also available from Spain and the Netherlands—should remain very high on Taipei’s weapons priority list. Given the continuing difficulty obtaining legislative authorization for the Special Defense Budget proposed in 2004, however, the Taipei government would be hard-pressed to obtain funding Aegis, despite the military need. Hence, the Navy would be wise to press for near-term improvements, such as installation of more capable AAW sensors and weapons systems on Taiwan’s present combatants. Taiwan’s frigate force is modern and capable in most warfare areas. It is composed of three classes of foreign-designed ships, all multi-mission capable and armed with ASW, AAW, and ASUW systems, although of varying capability. The oldest class is the steam-driven, ex-US Knox class, named the Chi Yang class by Taiwan. These eight ships were acquired between 1998 and 2002 from the United States, where they were designed as open-ocean, ASW platforms. They are equipped with powerful low-frequency hull-mounted and towed sonars, and armed with torpedoes, rocket-thrown torpedoes, Harpoon missiles, a 127-mm gun, and CIWS; it also deploys a helicopter capable of ASW, ASUW, and EW missions. The Navy has begun a modernization program for these ships that will include updating their combat information centers (CIC) and electronics; if sufficient funding is provided, a vertical launch system for AAW missiles will also be added. These frigates are homeported at Suao (where the Kidd-class ships will also be initially based). This is a tactically logical homeport for both classes, since both are equipped with powerful sonars that were intended for open ocean use; employing the Chi Yangs in an ASW role in the East China Sea will probably 124

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make better use of their capabilities than stationing them in the restricted waters of the Taiwan Strait.10 The TN’s second US-designed frigate, the Cheng Kung class, is modeled closely on the Perry-class FFG. This gas-turbine powered ship is designed primarily for AAW, with a three-dimensional air search radar and the “Standard” anti-aircraft missile. The ships have a much less powerful sonar than the Chi Yangs, but one better suited to the shallow, noisy water conditions typical of the Taiwan Strait. They are armed with torpedo tubes and two helicopters, compared to the Chi Yang’s one helo. The Cheng Kungs are also armed with CIWS for close-in anti-missile defense and the Hsiung Feng II anti-surface ship missile system, which is similar to the Harpoon. Their main gun is a 76 mm, compared to the Chi Yang’s 127 mm. The eight Cheng Kung-class frigates are well suited to Taiwan’s maritime needs, with their reliable engineering plant, relatively shallow draft, and good AAW capability.11 The Cheng Kungs are homeported at Makung, in the Penghu Islands, where they would form the first line of naval defense in the event of a conflict with the PRC. Most of the ships in this class were constructed by the CSBC in Taiwan, under license from the United States. Their successful completion—the final, eighth ship of the class joined the navy in 2004—is proof of Taiwan shipbuilders’ ability to build modern warships. Taiwan’s third class of frigate is composed of six French-designed Lafayette-, or Kang Ding-class, ships. The acquisition process for these frigates was apparently riddled with corruption. The ensuing investigations, heightened by the death of a TN-captain who had been a participant in negotiations for the ships, have never been satisfactorily resolved. The reported graft and bribery has tarnished the reputation of many, both in Taiwan and in France, but the Kang Ding-class ships have contributed significantly to the modernization and greatly improved combat capability of the Navy. These ships are slightly smaller than the Cheng Kung or Chi Yang-classes— 3,500 tons to the others’ 4,200—and lack a capable AAW missile system. Correcting this weakness is high on the Taiwan Navy’s priority list, since the Chaparral system currently installed is an obsolete US design that adapted the air-to-air heat-seeking Sidewinder missile for surface units.12 The Kang Ding’s ASW and ASUW suites are similar to those of the Cheng Kung: a medium-frequency sonar, torpedo tubes, and (a single) ASW helicopter, itself capable of launching torpedoes. Also like the Cheng Kung, the Kang Ding is diesel powered and armed with Hsiung Feng II anti-surface ship cruise missile, a 76 mm gun, and CIWS. The ships are notable for their stealthy design, with beveled hull and superstructure surfaces.13 The TN’s force of patrol and fast attack craft is small and not a match for the opposing PLAN force. The Kwang Hua Program’s phases III, V, and VI envisions replacing these old boats, but the plan has been slowed by funding shortfalls, equipment reliability problems, and a lack of anti-surface missiles. Construction 125

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of eleven Lung Chiangs—a derivative of the old US Asheville-class gunboat— under Phase III was suspended after the first two were commissioned; the first was built in the United States and the second in Taiwan. The United States has not been able to offer a sufficient number of Harpoons to arm these boats, and plans to substitute the similar, Italian-produced Otomat missile did not work out. Kwang Hua Phase III was a plan for construction of the Jing Chiang class of 500-ton boats.14 Thirteen of these vessels have been constructed, each armed with four Hsiung Feng I anti-surface ship missiles. All are homeported in Tsoying. Kwang Hua Phase VI planned construction of thirty small missile boats that while displacing just 150 tons, would include stealthy characteristics. These craft would carry relatively heavy armament, including four Hsiung Feng II anti-ship missiles.15 The first was commissioned in October 2003, but funding for the remaining boats remains uncertain as of mid-2005. The 2 Lung Chiang- and 12 Jing Chiang-class armed with Hsiung Feng I antiship missiles—2 for the former and 4 on the latter—are the most capable. They are augmented by 48 Hai Ou-class, each armed with 2 Hsiung Feng Is.16

Amphibious warfare The TN maintains an awkwardly sized force of amphibious ships; more than is necessary for logistics missions among Taiwan’s islands, and not enough to conduct significant amphibious operations (AMW) against the PRC. The force is led by two landing-ships dock (LSDs). The more modern of the two is Hsu Hai, ex-USS Anchorage.17 This 14,000-ton displacement ship is capable of carrying several hundred troops and their equipment. The second LSD, the 60-year-old Chen Hai (ex-USS Cabildo), is being decommissioned as the TN puts into service Anchorage’s sister ship, ex-USS Pensacola. These ships are also capable of operating at least two helicopters. The amphibious force also relies on two ex-US Newport-class landing-shipstank (LSTs), named Chung Ho and Chung Ping, acquired in 1997.18 These ships are designed to beach themselves and lower internally carried ramps onto the beach, over which embarked vehicles may be driven. They also have a well-deck, through which amphibious landing vehicles may be deployed, and are able to operate a single helicopter. Taiwan still operates an older class of ex-US LST dating from the Second World War. One of these, the Kaohsiung, has been reconfigured by the TN to serve as an amphibious command ship; as many as ten others of this Chung Haiclass have been overhauled and remain useful as logistics support ships and troop transports.19 The remainder of Taiwan’s amphibious ships are relatively small landing craft, their names describing their intended role: landing craft utility (LCU), landing craft infantry (LCI), and landing ship mechanized (LSM).20 Three Wu Kang troop transports, the most capable of Taiwan’s eight transports, are based in Kaohsiung. The 5,000-ton displacement ships are used primarily for supporting troops 126

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stationed on Jinmen, Mazu, and Taiwan’s other island garrisons.21 These transports are lightly armed and able to carry smaller landing craft to disembark troops and cargo.

Mine warfare As noted earlier, Taiwan is almost completely dependent on its SLOCs for imports and trade. One senior naval officer stated that “98 percent of [Taiwan’s] imports and exports are transported by sea,” noting the harm that would be caused by enemy mine warfare. Taiwan’s resources in laying and sweeping mines (mine warfare, or MIW) are inadequate. They consist of just four Yung Yang (ex-US Agile-class) minesweepers built in the 1950s, four Yung Chia (ex-US Adjutantclass) coastal minesweepers also built in the 1950s, and four Yung Fung (German-built MWW 50-class) acquired in 1990–1991. These ships are equipped with sonars for locating mines, and Taiwan in 2004 purchased the “Penguin” system, which employs remotely operated underwater vehicles (RUV) capable of much more effective (and safe) mine location.22 MIW is a warfare area in which the offense continues to outpace the defense. Moored contact mines designed in 1908, for example, remain effective and difficult to counter almost one hundred years later.23 The problem for Taiwan is particularly acute, since the island has only two really capable commercial seaports, Kaohsiung and Keelung; keeping them open in the event of mine warfare will require the latest in technology and capability.24 China’s surface combatants reportedly exercise laying mines at least annually;25 the PLAN may have an inventory of, from 10,000 to 100,000 mines, but even a fraction of the lower number would be enough to close Taiwan’s harbors, while time-consuming clearance operations are carried out. A relatively few mines, augmented by dummies, would freeze merchant traffic. Mine clearing efforts by Taiwan’s small force of ships, even if augmented by the US Navy’s twelve mine-sweeping helicopters and the two mine hunters homeported in Japan, would require several weeks.

Service ships The Navy deploys one underway replenishment ship, Wu Yi, a large (17,000-ton displacement) vessel designed to transfer fuel, ordnance, and dry stores to combatant ships during underway operations. Two salvage ships and five fleet tugs support the fleet. They are all ex-US ships built in the 1940s, but remain serviceable.

Submarines Taiwan’s submarine force consists of just four boats, two ex-US Guppy-class submarines built in 1944, and two Dutch-built Zwaardis-class subs acquired by Taiwan in 1987. The former, renamed the Hai Shih-class, are listed as “training only,” and are limited to a diving depth of 250 feet. They are reportedly extremely 127

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well-maintained, however, and in the event of war with China would presumably be employed in combat.26 The Dutch boats, named the Hai Lung II-class, are still very capable weapons. Amsterdam had agreed in 1980 to sell additional submarines to Taiwan, but reneged under pressure from Beijing.27 There have been rumors of Taiwan equipping these boats with a submersible-launch capable version of the Hsiung Feng cruise missile, presumably as part of Cheng Sung Institute of Science and Technology’s (CSIST) cruise missile program.28 They may also suffer from a shortage of torpedo reloads. In April 2001, the United States offered to Taiwan, access to previously withheld military equipment. Conventionally powered submarines headed that list, but none of the countries currently building conventionally powered submarines is willing to offend China by selling them to Taiwan. Neither Taiwan nor the United States has found a way to produce boats at a price affordable to Taipei.29 US shipyards, although they have not built a conventionally powered fleet submarine since the early 1950s, would undertake the project, but serve it would require creation of a construction and assembly line from scratch to do so, the price would be approximately US$1 billion for each boat.30 A state-of-the-art German boat, by contrast, costs no more than $350 million. Additionally, US Navy submarine officers oppose a US shipyard that has been building nuclear powered boats switching to conventionally powered submarines. They fear the inadvertent transfer of nuclear power-specific technology and may also be concerned that Congress would force conventionally-powered boats on the US Navy.31 Hence, Taipei understandably does not find the US option attractive. A more acceptable course of action might be to include Taiwanese manufacturers in the construction process, which several Taiwanese legislators have advocated. The China Shipbuilding Corporation (CSBC), which built the Kang Ding-class FFGs, among other ships, has produced a tentative plan for submarine construction under the title of “Indigenous Defense (Hidden Dragon) Submarine.”32 Submarine production is almost certainly within Taiwan’s industrial capability, especially if augmented by foreign technological expertise and systems, but is not likely to produce operating boats any more quickly than the 7–8 years required to acquire them from the United States. Under the best of circumstances, therefore, additional conventionally powered submarines could not become operational in the Taiwan navy before 2013.33 Taiwan naval officers for the most part support the acquisition of submarines and a tentative plan to build a second submarine base at Hualien has been drawn up.34 Given the delay and cost of deploying a large enough submarine force to make an operational difference in a conflict with the mainland, however, it makes more sense for Taipei to spend its resources on other defense priorities. Eight additional submarines would increase Taiwan’s ability to conduct ASW, to conduct attacks on Chinese naval and merchant shipping, to conduct mining operations against mainland harbors, and perhaps most significantly, would introduce another element into the balance-of-forces equation with which China 128

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would have to deal. But increasing Taiwan’s submarine force from two to ten would not decisively change the naval balance.

Naval aviation The TN’s fixed-wing aviation force includes just twenty-six ASW aircrafts, 40year old S-2T “Trackers” acquired from the United States that are well past their useful life. These aircraft were transferred from the Air Force to the Navy in 2000, a change long overdue, but the transfer’s significance was much reduced by the aircraft’s unreliability. As long ago as 2000, the Navy’s Chief of Staff admitted that “only a small percentage” of these aircrafts were operational.35 Only six were estimated to be operational in January 2005.36 If the Legislative Yuan (LY) approves and allocates the funds to purchase the twelve P-3C patrol aircraft offered in April 2001 by the United States, it would establish a meaningful fixedwing element in Taiwan’s Naval Air Force. The P-3C is a four-engine turboprop anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft, requiring eleven personnel to operate fully. Its primary mission is ASW, but it is also a very capable platform for conducting reconnaissance and surveillance, ASUW, and EW. It is also capable of laying minefields. The aircraft cruises at 328 knots (kts) for a maximum mission range of 2,380 nm, and can operate at altitudes up to 28,300 feet. These flight characteristics translate to the ability to fly over 1,000 nm to a target area, remain on station at 1,500 feet altitude for three hours, and then return to home base.37 The P-3C has advanced submarine detection sensors such as directional frequency and ranging (DIFAR) sonobuoys and magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) equipment. The avionics system is automated and integrates all onboard sensors, weapons, and navigation systems through a general purpose digital computer. It not only supports all tactical displays, but monitors and automatically launches ordnance. The P-3C can carry up to ten tons of weapons internally and on wing pylons. These include Harpoon anti-ship cruise missiles, with a range of 65–150 nm, depending on the model; Maverick air-to-ground missiles, with a range of 12 nm; Mk-46 and Mk-50 ASW torpedoes; rockets; and mines. The P-3C would be an extremely useful system for Taiwan, offering multimission capabilities in a durable, flexible airframe. Initial surveys of available P-3 aircraft presently in storage have been conducted by Taiwan military personnel and civilian officials. P3 acquisition would have to be accompanied by construction of at least one ASW Operations Center (ASWOC) on Taiwan. The ASWOC serves as integration and coordination site for operations conducted by P3s and other ASW platforms, and would form an important part of an island-wide C4ISR system.

Helicopters The TN’s helicopter force is its most valuable aviation asset, including US-designed logistics and ASW helos, although the latter are also capable of 129

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executing ASUW and EW missions. Leading the force are twenty S-70C helos almost identical to the US Navy’s SH-60s. They are superb ASW aircraft, equipped with air and surface search radars, electronic data link capability, and a dipping sonar. This latter system allows the helicopter to hover over the ocean surface while, lowering a small sonar set on a cable into the water to search for a suspected submarine. They are armed with sonobuoys and two torpedoes and may be embarked on any of the navy’s three frigate classes. The Navy also flies twelve small Hughes 500 helos, built in the United States. Although designed for logistics, Taiwan adapted the helos for ASW, stationed onboard the soon-to-be out of service Yang-class destroyers.38 It has limited endurance, is too small to be equipped with a dipping sonar or sonobuoys, and usually is armed with just one torpedo. Presumably, they will be retained in service after the last Yang-class is decommissioned, to supplement the more capable S-70C helo. The Hughes 500s might, for instance, be useful flying from shore bases in a harbor defense/sanitization role. The Marine Corps is even less helo-capable than the Army, flying just six Hughes 500s.

Marine Corps Marine Corps units, like those of the Army, consist of brigade, battalion, company, and platoon, but the Corps is fighting for its existence, as it seeks a new mission in a post-return-to-the-mainland era. The Corps numbered 30,000 men and women in 2002; it had been reduced to approximately 14,500 by the end of 2004, with a further reduction to less than 13,000 planned for 2005. The previous two divisions have been reduced to three brigades: one of these is assigned base defense duties, with a focus on the large naval complex at Tsoying.39 The remaining two brigades will be integrated with the Reserve Command, which is responsible for coordinating civil defense and other issues between the military and the civilian sectors. Their mission will focus on infrastructure defense, but the Navy commander envisions them serving as quickreaction forces, capable of active defense in Taiwan’s littoral. Under this concept, one of these two brigades would be stationed in northern Taiwan and the other in the south. Each is formed of three battalions, which will be trained with smaller squads using motorized transport and increased firepower.40 The Corps’ dramatic reduction in strength, the apparent irrelevance of amphibious warfare as an instrument of national security for Taiwan, the replacement of the Marine garrisons on Pratas, Ittu Abba, and Pengchiayu Islands by Coast Guard personnel,41 and the obsolescence of much of their equipment, combine to cast serious doubt on the Marine Corps’ future.

The Naval academy The academy traces its history to the Foochow Naval School, established in 1866; the present institution was relocated to Zuo Ying, Taiwan in September 1949. 130

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The academy lists its educational goals as technological knowledge, clear-cut logical thinking, creativity, and leadership, with a program of General Education, Science Education, Industrial Education, and Management Education. The General Education Center oversees curricula in engineering, science, information management, and liberal arts. The School of Military Studies includes the Tactical, Marine Engineering, and Physical Training Sections. The Tactical Section curriculum includes navigation, seamanship, leadership, warfare fundamentals, and naval operations and administration. The normal brigade size had been approximately 100 midshipmen, including women, but more than 130 midshipmen were admitted to the academy in 2004.42

Coast Guard The Taiwan Coast Guard (TCG) is not a Navy or even an MND organization, but reports directly to the central government’s Executive Yuan. The organization emerged in its present form in 1999, drawing together several organizations hitherto responsible for various “coast guard” missions.43 These included offices and services in the Ministries of the Interior (police), National Defense (Navy, Marine Corps), Treasury (smuggling), and the Executive Yuan (customs). The new service was formally established as of August 1, 2002. The Coast Guard Command is organized around 8 local commands and twenty-five battalions to guard the coastline against intrusion and smuggling. Coast Guard ships and aircraft regularly patrol Taiwan’s harbors, coastline, and adjacent waters. The service’s East Coast Patrol Agency operates a relatively modern radar surveillance system along the island’s east coast. There has been little direct interaction and little coordination between the Coast Guard and the Navy, at least with respect to ASW operations.44 The current Navy commander and Coast Guard commandant have discussed a closer relationship, and the latter is participating in this year’s Hangguang Exercise. Cooperation and some integration are being pushed, with the Coast Guard trying to obtain the resources to be able to join Navy command and control systems and developing common standard operating procedures in applicable warfare area missions. The Navy was also trying to coordinate the latter’s acquisition of weapons systems.45 Despite its nominally civilian status, Coast Guard manpower requirements are initially filled by products of the national conscription system. In addition to normal functions, such as safety at sea, SAR, maritime law enforcement, and environmental protection, the Coast Guard garrisons, the Pratas Atoll in the northern South China Sea, and Ittu Abba, the only island in the Spratly group occupied by Taiwan.46 In March 2005, the Coast Guard announced the organization of a Secret Security Company (SSC) to combat “terrorism, people smuggling, and the importation of unapproved products.” The Coast Guard’s Director General, Hsu Hueyyu, emphasized the new unit’s counter-terrorism mission, noting that 72 military volunteers are currently assigned to the SSC and will be stationed at various points around the island. He also noted a shortage of larger patrol boats.47 131

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Conclusion Taiwan’s maritime defenses are primarily the Navy’s responsibility, although the Coast Guard and Marine Corps also play a role. Senior Taiwan naval officers demonstrate a firm grasp of the strategic and operational situation they face. The threat from China is estimated to reach a critical point between 2005 and 2010, a view echoed by TAF officers and some MND officials.48 Efforts to conduct joint training with the other services have borne fruit in recent years, but annual exercises only go so far in creating the true joint service culture necessary for the TN to be able to make the maximum, synergistic contribution to Taiwan’s defense. More jointness in operational and planning is needed. One step being advocated by naval leaders is the Tactical Operations Security System (TOSS), being developed to coordinate and better inform operations both within the navy and in the joint arena with the island’s army and air force.49 The Navy’s vision for the period ending in 2010 focuses on 1

2 3

integrating sea-based C4ISR and land-air based C4ISR to provide for “comprehensive theater awareness” to facilitate “fully functional joint-force defense” of Taiwan; enhancing fleet “integrated combat capability” able to launch “symmetrical and asymmetrical” force against an attacker; and improving TN capabilities by increasing “flexible mission” range, improving the “common support” infrastructure, fulfilling operational requirements in the near term, and accommodating “budget, manpower, and organizational” constraints.

This vision emphasizes networking and integration of assets to achieve its goals. It assumes the acquisition of additional submarines and P-3C ASW aircraft, among several other weapons and systems. An early version was tested during the early, gaming phase of Hankuang 23 in April 2005 and reportedly performed well.50 The submarine issue is extremely difficult, as noted earlier, simply because no nation that builds conventionally powered boats has been willing to make Taiwan either a direct or indirect customer. P-3Cs would be a more valuable acquisition, since they would increase the TN’s capabilities across several warfare areas. Taiwan’s three frigate classes provide a force of twenty-two capable combatants with formidable capabilities across the warfare areas of AAW, ASW, and ASUW. They are also equipped with state-of-the-art electronic warfare and command and control capabilities with US-designed systems. But there are just those twenty-two ships against a modernizing Chinese navy that already outnumbers Taiwan’s fleet. The Kang Ding frigates are homeported in Tsoying, which positions them close to the initial scene of a maritime conflict with the PLAN. This might make good use of their ASUW capability, but also places them at risk of being trapped in their home harbor. Most importantly, the Kang Dings must be provided with 132

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a better AAW missile system if they are to successfully operate in a twenty-first century combat environment.51 The TN has given a good deal of thought to employing Aegis technology. Taipei’s maritime thinkers perceptively value the system as much for its command and control capability as for its missiles. The system possesses the potential to serve as a coordinating node for integrating sea-based and land-based command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems for Taiwan.52 Since the navy’s enthusiasm for Aegis—if made available by the United States—is not likely to be matched in the LY, Taipei should initiate an indigenous development program of an Aegis-like system based on track-while-scan radar and multi-phase, very rapid data processing, technology that should be well within CSIST and private sector capabilities. Taking advantage of this Aegis potential, however, will require the Taiwan military to continue pursuing a truly joint warfare infrastructure and operating paradigm, accomplishments they were very far from reaching as of the end of 2004. Finally, while Aegis-equipped ships are certainly the most capable AAW combatants in the world, their acquisition will not, by itself, solve Taiwan’s air defense problem. That demands joint efforts in organization, equipment acquisition and operation, and integrated C4ISR. Taiwan’s small combatant forces needs to be modernized; it may offer an effective defensive option against a mainland naval assault, especially amphibious assault or blockade. Employing small, lightly manned craft equipped with surface-to-surface missile systems provides a viable instrument of defense in the coastal waters with which Taiwan would be most concerned. The mine warfare force needs to be improved and enlarged if it is to counter the most effective naval instrument at an opponent’s disposal to attack Taiwan’s critical seaborne commerce and bottle up its fleet in port. The most efficacious way for Taipei to improve its MIW capability would be to complete the acquisition of American-built MH-53 mine-sweeping helicopters, which the United States has approved for sale, a purchase proposed by the MND to the United States in August 2004.53 The acquisition of mine-sweeping helos is an important, but not the only, step required to allow Taiwan to survive in the face of a determined mining campaign by an opponent. Another course of action would be to acquire the smaller, lighter airborne mine countermeasures suites being developed by the United States for the SH-60 helicopter airframes that Taiwan already possesses.54 A March 2005 MND statement emphasized the increasing threat to Taiwan posed by China’s modernizing navy, especially its submarine force. “A great challenge” are apt words to describe the challenge faced by Taiwan’s Navy.55 “Persuasive in peace, decisive in war” is that navy’s byline, but it requires more support from its clientele, ultimately, the people of Taiwan, if it is to be furnished the means to achieve its ends.56 Development of systems for enhancing naval power faces the continued paucity of defense budgetary resources that confronts all of Taiwan’s military 133

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services. The Navy, however, also is battling the Army-centric character of the island’s military. Budget figures for 2001, for example, show the combined Navy–Marine Corps budget as a marginal percentage of the total defense budget. In the three main categories of defense spending, the naval services received just 20 percent of “Military Investment” funds, 1.7 percent of “Personnel Maintenance” funding, and 20.7 percent of “Operation Maintenance” budgeting; the total Navy–Marine Corps budget for these three categories amounted to 10.38 percent of the total military budget.57 This balance may be in the process of shifting, in recognition of the threat from the mainland demanding naval and air power, but relatively minor ground power.58 An additional challenge facing the Navy is the January 2005 appointment of a Marine, General Chen Pan-chih, as Navy Commander-in-Chief (CINC). Although a graduate of the Naval Academy, General Chen never served aboard ship; his appointment may have been due more to his political loyalty to the administration and status as a native-born Taiwanese than to his operational experience.59 There is no evidence, however, that having a Marine as the Navy’s CINC has had any deleterious affect on the service’s performance. That should not be unexpected, given General Chen’s impressive knowledge of the Navy and its challenges, his undoubted military and administrative ability, apparent effectiveness dealing with the LY and civilian administration, and most important, the professionalism and dedication of the TN officer corps.60 The Taiwan Navy in 2005 is a capable force across the key naval warfare areas of ASW, ASUW, EW, and AAW. Any attempt by Beijing to use naval force against Taiwan will face formidable opposition, especially after the four Kidd-class destroyers strengthen the TN in 2006, and the P-3C aircraft acquisition is finalized. Meanwhile, the Navy continues, with its sister services, to suffer from the budget shortfalls and personnel shortages that characterize Taiwan’s military defense in 2005.

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9 CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN TAIWAN

Good citizens are the basis for good soldiers. Good soldiers are model citizens.1

This chapter focuses on the interaction between civilian and military sectors of Taiwan’s polity. This topic includes relations between the legislature and the military, between the civilian government and the military, and within the military itself. “Civil–military relations” is especially complex in Taiwan’s case, since the island is heir to governmental cultural influences ranging from celestial imperialism to Leninist communism to Jeffersonian democracy. Furthermore, the island is still in the process of moving from military autocracy to civilian democracy. Taiwan’s military faces major changes not just in its relationship with the civilian sector of the polity it serves, but also must deal with that polity’s transition. The government is one of the few in the world to make this change as an intentional process.

Taiwan under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo Taiwan’s civil–military heritage is distinct from that found in the United States. The classic American view of the military subordinate to civilian government is rooted in the founding of the nation in the eighteenth century, when a major concern was to relieve the populace of the onus of quartering and otherwise directly supporting standing military forces. This paradigm changed after Second World War, when the United States for the first time maintained a peacetime draft and a large standing army, but belief in the principle of civilian supremacy has not wavered. The Republic of China (ROC) was dominated by military rulers after it succeeded the Qing Dynasty in 1911. Chiang Kai-shek had been engaged in constant warfare for a quarter-century when he established his Taipei government in 1949. Article 140 of that 1947 constitution under which that government was formed stipulates that “no person in active military service shall concurrently hold a civil office.” Article 138 stipulates that the armed services “shall stand above personal, 135

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regional, and party affiliations,” while Article 139 states that “no political party and no individual shall make use of armed forces as an instrument in the struggle for political power.”2 The constitution was suspended in 1949, however, and Chiang Kai-shek and then Chiang Ching-kuo functioned as military autocrats, ruling both military and civilian sectors of Taiwan’s society. Chiang Kai-shek identified the military, the party, and the nation as one. The military was a force both in civilian society and in the ruling political party, the KMT, occupying two to five seats in the party’s Central Standing Committee and at least one-seventh of the seats in the full Central Committee.3 The new regime faced a grim situation. First, the KMT government came to the island seeking refuge from a long civil war that it had lost. Second, the Nationalist military was in the words of an American military observer “defeated, demoralized, and basically unequipped” against a huge, determined, well-equipped and trained enemy that was only 100 miles away.4 Third, survival of the tenuously established regime seemed to depend on the rapid development of a coherent, dedicated, strongly disciplined populace defended by a tough, well-trained military. Fourth, the military’s unreliability and demonstrated incompetence had to be rectified through the strictest military training and political indoctrination. Finally, the military and the populace would have to trust and rely on each other if the new regime on Taiwan was to survive. While a capable military eventually emerged, the Chiangs’ military autocracy failed to develop the hoped-for-civil polity, and a deep divide between their supporters and other sectors of society persisted. The mainland origin of the island’s new rulers complicated the difficult political environment for a territory that had never experienced democracy. This situation was greatly exacerbated by the February 28, 1947 massacre of Taiwanese citizens by the KMT army, which reflected both the Taiwanese desire for greater political and economic rights, and the KMT view of the island as conquered, pro-Japanese territory. This incident remains a force in Taiwanese politics as a symbol of civil–military and mainland–island antipathy. Chiang Kai-shek systematically constructed an integrated process for controlling the island’s civilian life late 1949 and 1952. Educational and economic improvements under the banner of Sun Yat-sen’s “Three People’s Principles” of nationalism, democracy, and the peoples’ livelihood goals survived the transition to Taiwan. However, Chiang’s straitened circumstances—ruling a small island with less than 11 million people in 1949, instead of China’s huge expanse, with its 550 million population—both vastly reduced the central government’s span of control and altered application of Sun’s principles. The post-1949 Taiwan regime was a military dictatorship under the close control of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo. They believed that the mainland could be recovered by military means, if Taiwan’s army received the “political education and ideological leadership . . . to build a spiritual armament in order to

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guarantee the success of the military combat mission.”5 It was a period of not just danger and preparation, but one of active war with the mainland. The KMT government also campaigned against the small pro-Taiwan movement on the island. The military sought to secure the domestic situation by “organizing, penetrating, and politically socializing military and civilians” on Taiwan.6 This would assist in the detection and capture of enemy agents who tried to infiltrate, but also empowered the military with police powers and authority in the island’s civilian sector. Chiang Ching-kuo also embarked on a thorough reorganization of the KMT.7 The military was involved throughout Taiwan’s society, enmeshed in setting the conditions that contributed to the economic modernization that began in the 1960s and 1970s, and also led to the emergence of Taiwan as a modern, democratic polity.8 The General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) was central in the military’s political and socialization roles. This department was first, responsible for the political reliability of the military forces, a typically Leninist approach; but as one keen observer writes, the GPWD had a second, perhaps equally important mission to carry out party work—to recruit, train, and manage KMT members within the military.9 The army essentially was one with the dominant (only) political party for the first four decades of Taiwan’s rule by the KMT, but also empowered that party within the army. In fact, Nationalist military officers were required to be members of the KMT, at least until the end of martial law in June 1987, when the LY passed the National Security Law. The reimposition of martial law has been discussed on rare occasions. In December 1999, then Minister of Defense Tang Fei stated that martial law would be imposed if China attacked Taiwan; in early 2004, there were several unsubstantiated reports in the Taiwan press about martial law being imposed if preelection chaos developed during the lead-up to the presidential election in March.10 The education offered by the political warfare structure in the military aimed to accomplish much more than indoctrinate military personnel in a sort of anticommunist nationalism. Its goal was to develop and instill nothing less than a new national ideology within the military, and through the military as its agents, within the civilian population as a whole. This came neatly under the concept of the commonality of party-army-nation envisioned by the KMT. The current government in Taipei probably would strongly support these goals, absent the specificity of the KMT as the political party in question. Indeed, good relations with civilians had constituted the basis of its soldiers’ behavior since the founding of the Nationalist Military in the 1920s as a revolutionary army dedicated to uniting and freeing China’s downtrodden population. Reaching out to youth has also been a continuous thread in the development of political socialization within the military and between the military and the civilian populace.

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Implementation was formalized with the establishment of the Central Reorganization Commission (CRC) in 1950, tasked with solidifying the supremacy of the KMT, specifically to: 1 2 3 4 5 6

make the KMT a revolutionary-democratic party; broaden the Party’s social base by including peasants, workers, youth, intellectuals and producers; adopt democratic-centralism as the organizing principle; emphasize KMT cells as the basic Party units; establish KMT supremacy through its committees; and insist that KMT members obey the Party.11

This campaign was thoroughly instituted and KMT supremacy harshly enforced.

Chiang Ching-kuo engages democracy Soon after the KMT installed itself on Taiwan in 1949, Chiang Ching-kuo had been appointed director of the newly renamed General Political Department of the Ministry of Defense and he launched a program to rebuild the political officer structure along Soviet lines, and to strengthen KMT activities throughout the military. Chiang was also appointed by his father to a new party committee whose mission may best be described as one of rectifying the KMT to ensure its dominance over both military and civilian sectors in Taiwan. The committee’s political program “paid scant attention to political rights” and continued to espouse economic and political dominance by the central government.12 Little occurred during the next 25 years to indicate any softening in Chiang Ching-kuo’s attitude toward the domestic situation on the island. He authorized the suppression of a nascent opposition party in the late 1950s, and supported the elevation to the KMT Central Committee of party hardliners in late 1963. Several factors probably contributed to Chiang’s eventual decision to allow and guide the development of a democratic government. First, the US shift of diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979 was an event that forced Taiwan to redefine itself; the previously maintained claim to the mainland as part of the ROC was no longer tenable. This dramatically increased diplomatic isolation demanded a more strongly committed, dedicated populace, qualities apparently thought more likely in a free people living in a democratic society. This in turn would ease the increasing political dissent from citizens wanting to form new political parties. The most notable opposition party, the Democratic Progress Party (DPP), was legally established in September 1986.13 Second, and relating directly to these events, the United States would more readily and strongly support a democratic Taiwan than one whose military governance “did not meet the requirements of democratic politics.”14 This support could not be assumed by a single-party, military autocracy, despite the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act’s implied commitments. Some elements of military rule 138

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remained well into the 1980s, sometimes weakening the American commitment. One particularly egregious example occurred in 1984, when military agents murdered a Chinese–American in California, after he had published a book critical of Chiang Ching-kuo.15 Third, given his earlier realization of the futility of retaking the mainland by military action, Chiang may have thought that the best hope for frustrating the communist regime in Beijing was to build a stable society on Taiwan so economically prosperous and politically free that it would serve as a model the mainland population would strive to emulate. Fourth, Chiang Ching-kuo probably foresaw that with the January 1979 abrogation of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States, Taiwan’s military would have to improve its capability and professionalism very significantly. Reducing and eventually removing its responsibilities in the civil sector would increase the military’s focus on defending Taiwan. Fifth, Chiang might have perceived a need to hold the military to more general accountability than that involved in its loyalty first to his father and then—almost certainly less devotedly—to himself. The solution to this was that Taiwan’s security required a military loyal to the state and not to a political party. It must have been obvious to Chiang that none of his children were on track to succeed him, and that his consolidation of military and civilian power had not allowed emergence of an officer capable of the one-man rule characteristic of the past half-century. The democratization process he officially launched and encouraged began a period of the depoliticization necessary to change the character of Taiwan’s society from military to civilian. Sixth, Chiang Ching-kuo’s education reflected an interesting combination of Chinese, Western, Japanese, and Russian (communist) influences. The influence of Chinese culture, “lessons” perhaps learned from his father, early tutors, and seven years in the Soviet Union, followed by decades of further service in his father’s autocratic KMT, must have created a unique ideological brew. The outcome of this political chemistry apparently led Chiang to conclude, however, that Taiwan’s future demanded a civilian-led, non-autocratic state.16 Finally, Chiang’s ideological rationale may be attributable to Sun Yat-sen’s democracy principle. Sun believed that democratization could only develop after a a period of military rule followed by a “period of political tutelage under the [KMT’s] guidance.”17 On the domestic front, in his last days in power, Chiang Ching-kuo freed most political prisoners, allowed the formation of the DPP, and manned “the upper echelons of the [KMT] with a new generation of pragmatists.”18 Even earlier, he seemed to recognize the reality of Taiwan’s international geopolitical situation. His appointment as Minister of Defense in 1965 formalized a grip on military affairs already evident in the government’s economic and political policies. The National Security Council established in 1967 served as Taiwan’s “supreme policymaking body.” It was dominated by the military and more powerful than either the Executive or Legislative Yuans.19 Chiang Ching-kuo used his position publicly to support his father’s calls for military action against the mainland, but in private conversations with US 139

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officials, he discounted such action. As had Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo believed that the fall of the communist regime in Beijing would have to be “more political than military.”20 Most importantly, as early as the mid-1960s, Chiang Ching-kuo began a comprehensive program to replace aging mainland civilian and military leaders with Taiwan-born individuals. He also began in the late 1970s to turn the KMT into a more traditional popular political party in the late 1970s. Chiang Ching-kuo began a rarely-seen process of deliberate democratization, depoliticizing Taiwan’s military, and democratizing the island’s government and political life. The November 1977 legislative elections were only marginally democratic, with riots occurring, particularly in Kaohsiung. More progress toward democracy was demonstrated in the 1981 LY elections, when some “KMT reformers” won seats in the legislature, while others were appointed to government positions.21 The first national competitive election was held in 1980 and the first two-party election in 1986. Finally, in 1987 Chiang Ching-kuo ended more than twenty years of martial law and military dominance of civilian society in.22 The KMT began separating itself from the military’s political warfare efforts in the early 1990s, in part because of the pressure of having to confront other political parties, especially the DPP. The abolition of the Taiwan Garrison Command (TGC) that year was a major step in the civilianization of the island’s polity; it removed the military from the civilian police function, and disengaged it from the mass media and from the public school system.23 This was an important step in transforming Taiwan’s political system from military dominance to a more western-style system of a professional military serving a civilian government. The 1992 elections also strengthened the procedures for legislative oversight of the military. Prior to the onset of democracy, the defense process, including policy formulation and procurement, had been described as a “black box.” Lee Teng-hui’s presidency, from 1990–2000, was a period of increasing civilianization and democratization of civil–military relations that opened this box.24

Final KMT-military separation Lee Teng-hui’s popular election to the presidency in 1996 was an important step toward the democratic government now maturing in Taiwan. The 1996 election occurred because of Chiang Ching-kuo’s decision in the 1980s to change Taiwan and reflected his intellectual flexibility, the recognition that Taiwan needed to change, and the willingness to gamble on that realization. The military deserves significant credit for supporting the civilianization process in Taiwan. It ended overt active participation in the political process during the 1990s, reflecting belief in civilian government. Although perhaps not fully realized until the 2000 election of Taiwan’s first non-KMT ruler, the military has been separated from the ruling political party. The GPWD structure is no longer imbued with KMT sympathies, which has reduced the influence and hence the importance of political warfare officers. This was not entirely altruistic on the 140

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military’s part, of course, as many officers recognized and followed the political power shift away from the KMT.25 The first post-martial law election in 1991 saw the DPP win enough seats to propose legislation and demonstrate significant support in precincts in which 40 percent of Taiwan’s population voted. There had been many abuses during the period of military oppression, as the government sought to find and root out communists and communist sympathizers. Hence, creation of civilian political activism required no government impetus; dedicated individuals had long struggled for political freedom and individual rights, enduring persecution, imprisonment, torture, and assassination. Another important step was taken in 1991 when in January the Executive Yuan established the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) to manage mainland affairs. In March, the “Guidelines for National Unification” were passed and on May 1 President Lee Teng-hui announced the end of martial law. Then, the end of the “Period of National Mobilization for the Suppression of the Communist Rebellion” formally ended the state of war with the PRC, renounced the use of military force to reunite Taiwan with the mainland as “China,” and led to the TGC’s abolition in 1992.26 The TGC’s demise was an important step, as was the Ministry of Justice’s empowerment to oversee possible illegal criminal and political activities hitherto considered to lie within the military domain. These cases included land-use disputes between military commands and private citizens and municipalities, as well as issues of recruit abuse. One of the most noteworthy cases confronting the post-TGC legal structure has been the still-unsolved (as of mid-2005) murder in 1993 of an active duty navy captain, Yin Qing-feng. Yin headed the Taiwan Navy’s Acquisition Office at the time of his death and was apparently killed as a result of the scandal involving Taiwan’s purchase of Lafayette-class guided-missile frigates (FFG) from France.27 His death evidenced the corrupt nature of military procurement in Taiwan.

Civilianization of the Ministry of Defense Important aspects of the civilianization process were codified in the 2000 legislative acts reorganizing the Ministry of Defense. These acts seem to be modeled to a significant extent on the American system of civil–military relations, specifically with respect to subordinating the military to civilian direction and control. The Defense Minister position remained occupied by professional military officers until May 1990, however, when Dr Chen Li-an was appointed to the position.28 Chen was close to the Chiang family, but was succeeded by a less-well connected civilian, Dr Sun Chen, an economist and former National Taiwan University president. Another retired general, Chiang Chong-ling, became Minister of Defense in 1994, a practice that has continued.29 The creation of a professional civilian bureaucracy dedicated neither to the Taiwan military nor to its parent party, the KMT, is required, but still not fully met. 141

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As discussed in Chapter 5, despite the 2000 laws’ provision for civilianizing MND positions, the vast majority of office-holders remain military in background, education, political orientation, and policy predilection. This personnel paradigm should be temporary, as civilianization of the MND takes hold and is not likely to outlast the present generation of office holders. Inevitably, barring a resurgence of the military into Taiwan’s political life, within the midterm the island’s defense administration will in fact be peopled by individuals from a civilian career, educated at civilian institutions, politically independent, and oriented toward more heterodox policy options.

The first non-KMT president The 2000 presidential election posed a test for civil–military relations in Taiwan. For the first time in its history, Taiwan’s military faced a non-KMT government, but even before the election results were known, CGS Tang Yiau-ming pledged “to the would-be commander-in-chief that the armed forces will be loyal [and] defend the national security of the Republic of China.”30 This was a courageous and patriotic act that set an important path Tang’s successors have followed assiduously. The DPP’s assumption of power not only undercut the basis of the GPWD’s education program, but placed in office a president whose political history had been one of advocating Taiwan’s independence. The military passed the 2000 test with flying colors, pledging its loyalty to the election victor, since “according to Article 138 of the Constitution, the armed forces should be loyal to the country and protect the people. Article 36 stipulates the president is the supreme commander of the armed forces.”31 Depoliticization has, really for the first time in Taiwan’s experience, established legislative oversight of the military, but the practice has been slow in developing, for more than one reason. Without a tradition of such oversight, legislators have had first to develop an interest in such activities (and responsibilities), and second to develop the expertise to exercise oversight effectively. Both learning the technical knowledge of military issues, and demonstrating the expertise and oversight in such a manner as to earn the respect and hence the cooperation of the military services, is taking time. Another reason why such legislative authority has been slow to develop has been a lack of cooperation by the military. In all but a very few cases, this has almost certainly reflected not an anti-democratic bias by military officers, but rather the doubtful view of politicians common to almost every military, perhaps exaggerated in Taiwan’s case because of the very major change in the island’s security structure occurring at a time of what most military officers consider to be great peril. They do not doubt the correctness of civilian control of the military or even the right of legislative oversight, but rather neither understand nor support a civilian administration following policies that seem to heighten the crisis with the mainland and the risk of a PLA attack, while at the same time failing to provide them with the increased budgets resources necessary to defend Taiwan.32 142

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Two additional factors contribute to the uncomfortable military–LY relationship. First, the military is still populated by an officer corps almost uniformly KMT in sympathy; the DPP’s advent to leadership is a very significant change. Second, this also may reflect a division between an officer corps that mostly identifies itself as Chinese, and a legislature that mostly identifies itself as Taiwanese. Nonetheless, the first clause of Article 6 of the 2000 National Defense Law placed into force in February 2002 stipulates that the “Armed Forces shall remain legally neutral from personal, regional, or party affiliations. . . . and [will retain] its nature as a nationalized force, which belongs to the people.” All evidence attests to the fact that the Taiwan military has acceded to the depoliticization process and is supporting civilian democratic government, despite remaining mostly KMT in orientation. This emphasis was repeated in the 2003 National Defense Law passed by the DPP administration. Article 6 of this law states that “the ROC Armed Forces shall remain neutral from personal, regional and party affiliations . . . . Active servicemen are forbidden” from “assuming positions offered by political parties, political groups and electoral candidates; forcing active servicemen to join or help political parties, political groups, and electoral candidates; and establishing within military units to promote partisan spheres, party platforms and other propaganda activities.”33 Military officers are not pursuing a path of what one historian described as “double patriotism” or others have ascribed to an exaggerated sense of “patria.”34 The Taiwan military has acquiesced in the depoliticization process since the onset of democratization in the 1980s. Today’s military officers have reservations about the direction of Taiwan’s security policies, but do not appear to be setting themselves up as the guardians of the island’s independence and defensibility.35 Their concerns appear to be professional and not overtly political, focused on trying to ensure that the military is equipped and trained to carry out the missions assigned by the civilian government. A significant step in the military’s acquiescence to civilian control was signaled in 1998 when General Tang Fei appeared in uniform in the LY to discuss defense issues. More formal testimony by a chief-of-service occurred in November 2000, when Air Force Chief of Staff Chen Chao-ming appeared before the LY Defense Committee for interpellation about acquisition plans. His appearance, reluctantly scheduled by the MND, was followed by visits to the legislature by the uniformed chiefs of the Army and Navy. Interestingly, the LY response was mixed: “it was good to have a service leader present at the committee for the first time. But what Chen told us was really not as interesting as we expected.”36 A mature relationship between LY and military will develop as civilian defense professionals populate the defense bureaucracy. MND is pursuing several steps to attracting qualified, dedicated civilians to these positions. First, a progressive career path is being established, with increasing pay and responsibilities as an incumbent progresses upward through the bureaucracy. Second, the number of 143

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political appointees must be carefully balanced against professional office holders. Third, an effort is being made to attract successful businessmen and administrators from the civilian sector to MND positions. Fourth, a career as a civilian defense manager must be perceived positively in the civilian community. None of these requirements can be accomplished easily or in the short-term, but the government’s success in building a competent civilian defense bureaucracy will be key to the future success of Taiwan’s security. A recently retired senior MND official described the challenge by averring that “a professional career in national defense does not command respect.”37 Creating a professional civilian defense bureaucracy is just one aspect of the enormity of the task the people and rulers of Taiwan have undertaken. An appropriate analogy would be the United States trying simultaneously to implement the changes of the 1947 Defense Reorganization Act and the 1986 GoldwaterNichols Act. The 1947 act completely reorganized the US defense establishment, with different service departments removed from Cabinet rank and subordinated to a single Department of Defense. The 1986 act established cross-service jointness as military canon, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as the president’s sole military advisor. Implementation of both of these seminal changes has been a slow, sometimes painful process for the US armed services and civilian officials.

The General Political Warfare Bureau The Taiwan military is still very conscious of political education. The General Political Warfare Bureau (GPWB) remains as overseer of the military’s political reliability, and continues to focus on morale, citizenship training, and evaluation of military personnel. Although it no longer wields the power it held during the Chiang family’s rule on Taiwan, the GPWD still plays a role in something of dual system of authority, with the line officers sharing responsibility and authority with political warfare officers (PWO). PWO’s are assigned to all units of company size and greater, with larger units assigned three such officers, each with a different area of responsibility: security, political reliability, and morale.38 These PWOs’ duties are usually described in terms similar to those of religious chaplains in the US armed forces, but all Taiwan military personnel must attend two hours of “political education” weekly.39 This is not much of a difference in definition from that used to describe the Taiwan military’s structure half a century ago, that the “Political Warfare Officer was considered the mother of the unit and the Commander the father, or disciplinarian.”40 The GPWB is organized into seven divisions. The Cultural and Patriotic Affairs Division operates a “TV-campus” at Jai-kun to project an all-services curriculum of political and “social education.” It is described as “the major channel of 144

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patriotic education for all military personnel,” with the mission of supporting military readiness and national defense. Seven principal concerns are listed: building a common view and belief, promoting national culture, enhancing training, instilling perseverance and dedication, knowing global current events, and providing “entertainments beneficial to the body and the mind.” In addition to instilling patriotism, the Division aims to encourage a selfless devotion to duty and absolute obedience to orders, “even at the expense of life.”41 The Military Discipline and Ethics Division aims to establish communications channels for, and to protect the legal interests of, enlisted and lower ranking civilian employees of the defense ministry. A toll-free hotline is maintained for complainants to use, but they must identify themselves; anonymous complaints are not pursued. The Security Division is tasked with guarding military security. It focuses on internal military matters, including safeguarding classified military information, monitoring personnel security investigations, guarding against sabotage and “subversive schemes,” and “scrutinizing enemies lurking inside the military.”42 Personnel are invited to report, either by telephone or mail, only one of a list of ten suspected security violations: espionage; possible disclosures of classified information; activities endangering “the unity and combat capabilities of the armed forces”; actions “damaging [to the] organization’s security”; “cases of psychological and physical injury”; incidents “ruining” information facilities’ security; “negative mindset of uniformed men and women”; conspiracies and acts either illegal or “disgracing the military”; “military-civilian disputes, petitions, and demonstrations;” and any other activities “negatively affecting the security of Taiwan’s armed forces.”43 The third division is devoted to Military Dependents, and is organized into five sections: General Administration; Construction Management, Planning, and Contracting; Real Estate and Management; Ethics; and Accounting. The Division’s mission is the care and well-being of military dependents, especially housing and education. The GPWB’s General Administration Division is responsible for issues that affect military personnel. Personal, family, medical, and other problems that might affect professional performance are subject to counseling and action by the Division’s personnel. The Military Spokesman’s Office writes, coordinates, promulgates, replies to, and deals with the military news policies of the Taiwan Armed Forces. It manages domestic and foreign news media visits, and monitors domestic and foreign military news reports. Public statements are authorized only for those military units above the corps level, which means that almost all media relations are managed at the service headquarters or MND levels. The final GPWB division has the title “Psychological Consultation.” Its mission, “Military Mental Hygiene (Counseling),” aims to assist officers and enlisted personnel to grow accustomed to military life and to enhance mental and physical health, including the reduction of “self-destruction.” This effort utilizes an 145

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apparently sophisticated system of monitoring and a counseling network extending throughout the military structure. The Division operates five Mental Hygiene Centers throughout Taiwan (including one on Jinmen), which draw on civilian as well as military mental health practitioners. The GPWB’s role today is certainly different than when Chiang Ching-kuo reorganized it in 1950. It is not only relatively powerless in civilian society, but within the military it is far less intrusive and powerful. Just as the old militaryparty linkage is now largely lacking, that between military and the people is also much weakened. Officers recognize an increasing separation from the population at large, with their military culture growing further apart from that of their civilian counterparts.44 The unattractiveness of military service results from several factors, including greater economic opportunities in civilian life and disinclination to delay graduate school and other opportunities. It also is influenced by popular attitudes towards Taiwan’s military and the question of whether there is a serious armed threat to the island.

Taiwan nationalism This in turn raises the issue of “Taiwan identity”: do the people of the island believe themselves more “Taiwanese” or more “Chinese”? Despite numerous polls, that is probably too nebulous a question to answer with certainty, but the perceptive observations of two American scholars, Shelley Rigger and Lowell Ditmer, are instructive, that Taiwan’s emerging nationalist identity draws both on common factors and deliberate government policy.45 The former depends first, on the “natural” factors of collective group characteristics, such as “shared language, culture, or ethnicity,” and second, on commonly held goals of international status and fate, all of which apply to the great majority of Taiwan’s population. The current DPP government continues trying to mold a Taiwanese national identity.46 In the words of one analyst, “nationalists . . . are working self-consciously to resist the implications of integration [with the PRC], to cultivate Taiwanese subjectivity, and to establish an independent nation-state.”47 Certainly, Taiwan’s distinctive history—fifty years as a Japanese colony, followed by fifty years of dominance by a mainland political party—has engendered a feeling of distinctiveness from the mainland, a feeling no doubt deepened by the democracy that the people have enjoyed since 1996. They have at least matched and often exceeded the economic benefits of their mainland counterparts, while completely outstripping them in terms of personal independence and human rights.48 A post-legislative election poll in 2002 addressed the question of Taiwan nationalism (Table 11). This poll indicated that the older their generation, the more the respondents identify themselves as Taiwanese, while a bare majority of all the respondents consider themselves both Taiwanese and Chinese. Perhaps more germane is the popular feeling about threat and defense, about which recent polls offer a mixed 146

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Table 11 Self-identity among three generations Self identity

Taiwanese (Tw) (% of age group) Both Tw and Chinese (% of age group) Chinese (% of age group) No opinion (% of age group) Total polled (count) 740 % of Total

Age groups 56

20–35

36–55

Total

34.7 57.7

37.9 51.7

43.8 37.1

38.0 50.6

5.1 2.4 834 36.6

7.4 3.0 448 41.2

13.2 6.0 2022 22.2

7.9 3.5 100

Source: “Electoral and Democratization Survey, 2002” http://ucpress.net/doi/pdf/10.1525/ as.2004.44.4.484.

picture. In July 2004, a poll by Taipei’s National Chengchi University reported that 63 percent of the people of Taiwan favored “signing a peace treaty with mainland China under which Beijing promises not to invade Taiwan and Taiwan promises not to declare independence for the next 50 years.”49 That same month, however, Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) conducted a poll in which nearly 70 percent of the respondents expressed the belief that China’s authorities were “unfriendly toward the Taipei government, while 73.6 percent opposed Beijing’s “one country, two systems” scheme. Finally, 82.6 percent expressed a preference for the status quo “while deciding whether to move toward independence or unification with China.”50 Polls were also being conducted about the government’s 2004 submission to the LY for a supplemental bill for approximately US$18 billion to purchase armaments from the United States. In late September, an Agence France Presse poll reported that 50 percent of the respondents opposed the plan to purchase the arms package, while 31 percent supported the plan. This poll also reported, however, that only 17 percent of the respondents opined that “the current national defense strength could safeguard Taiwan’s security,” against 57 percent who believed it could not.51 In other words, according to this poll, the majority of the people of Taiwan believe their defense establishment is inadequate, but do not favor spending the money to improve it. Those demonstrating and writing against the special supplementary budget include, interestingly, a significant number of retired nationalist military officers and defense analysts.52 This draws directly on the widespread belief that if China does attack Taiwan, the United States will immediately and successfully intervene. An important, but difficult to evaluate variable links these two developments: the rise of Taiwanese nationalism and the degree to which the island’s people feel threatened by the PRC. The more Beijing perceives a developing Taiwanese nationalism, the more the stance it believes it must to exhibit; the more threatening the 147

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people of Taiwan feel threatened by the PRC, the more “separate” and Taiwanese they may feel. Poll results often change rapidly, of course, and are notoriously mutable; after former Vice President and KMT Chairman Lien Chan visited the mainland in April 2005, 56 percent of 859 poll respondents said the visit would relax cross-strait tensions, while 31 percent said they thought tensions with China were easing.53 The nationalism issue impacts directly on the military’s ability to attract new recruits and retain qualified personnel. Another factor for the military is the longstanding division between officer and enlisted views, with the former not as susceptible as the latter to KMT sentiments and Taiwan nationalism. A general difference in political views between officers and enlisted men is common, but Taiwan’s strategic situation is so tenuous that if a widening gulf develops, the military’s effectiveness will be in question.

Conclusion The 2000 defense laws address four primary themes: national defense command and control, relations between the military and politics, civilian control of the MND, and the development of specialized divisions within the MND.54 The Taiwan military is increasingly frustrated with the perceived “disconnect” between the civilian government’s words and deeds. The December 2004 legislative elections left the DPP as a minority party, unable to obtain a greater than 50 percent majority of the seats in the LY even in coalition with the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), the political party organized by former President Lee Tung-hui. Hence, the Chen Shui-bian administration has had a weak hand to play in the LY, which has affected its ability to pass the special defense budget. Many former and present officers report a state of low morale throughout Taiwan’s military. Among mid-grade and senior officer ranks, this is based on the belief, invariably discussed in connection with specific cases, of promotion not by merit but by political influence within the service, or guanxi. The officer promotion system in fact represents a weak point in civilian control of Taiwan’s military. The LY has no role in the promotion process and the president’s role is not a strong one. The heads of each military service have the authority to select and promote officers to the grades of colonel (captain in the Navy) and below; the Minister of Defense has the authority to select and promote officers to flag and general officer ranks. The President signs officer commissions, and receives a briefing on officers to be promoted to flag and general ranks. Civilian control in this system is further weakened by the nominally civilian Minister of Defense position consistently filled by a recently retired admiral or general, and by the President’s apparent lack of statutory authority in the officer promotion system, although as recently demonstrated in his selection of a Marine Corps general to command the Navy, President Chen Shui-bian has demonstrated influence at the highest levels of military command. 148

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A suspected lack of dedication to defending Taiwan independence among the enlisted ranks is reportedly based on a combination of a lack of feeling of nationalism vis-à-vis the island, a sense that Taiwan’s military situation against the mainland is hopeless, and a belief that they owe primary allegiance to family rather than to a nation known as “Taiwan,” or the “Republic of China.”55 Personnel benefits also continue to be an issue, although the government has moved to ameliorate previous inequities. The low point in the military’s relationship with the Chen Shui-bian government was probably during and immediately after the 2004 presidential election, when the President accused senior military officers of trying to conduct a “soft” coup d’etat to prevent him from remaining in office.56 That the President would have ventured to make such a dramatic accusation in public is disturbing, since no evidence of this allegation has emerged. The episode also demonstrates the still nascent nature of the civilianization process of Taiwan’s polity; the civilian president’s obvious lack of trust in his military leaders is almost certainly reciprocated. The best explanation of this unfortunate episode may be that offered in November 2004 by Antonio Chiang, former Secretary General of the National Security Council. He described “a number of senior officers” as not recognizing that Taiwan was no longer a one-party state, and accused them of owing more “loyalty to the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) . . . than to democracy.” Chiang also criticized Chen Shui-bian, however, describing the President’s lack of understanding of “military or defense issues” and, somewhat inexplicably, his lack of “professional military advisors.” The President no doubt has felt himself on uncertain ground with the military, given its long-term KMT loyalties and his “green” reputation and program, while the military were not reassured by the sound and fury coming from the Presidential Office, counterpoised by decreasing military budgets. Chiang concludes that “the chances of an actual coup d’etat . . . are virtually zero,” but he paints a picture of an unhealthy civil–military relationship in Taiwan.57 Is that picture accurate? The military was directly involved in the process of civilianization and democratization initiated by Chiang Ching-kuo, but the military remained a bastion of KMT loyalty and conservative views as the civilian governmental structure changed. With Lee Teng-hui’s election to the presidency in 1990 and again in 1996, however, the military began more actively to adjust to true civilian regulation and direction.58 Hence, and perhaps unexpectedly, the Taiwan military is leading the civilian polity in establishing the Western model, rather than the other way around. This evidences the military’s professionalism, a word that refers not so much to martial skills as much as it does to a military Whose members (1) possess a high degree of specialized, theoretical knowledge, plus certain methods and devices for the application of this knowledge in their daily practice, (b) are expected to carry out their 149

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tasks with due attention to certain ethical rules and (c) are held together by a high degree of corporateness stemming from the common training and collective attachment to certain doctrines and methods.59 The Defense Law’s Article 16 stipulates that active-duty officers should be respected; their pay, insurance, benefits, awards and punishment as well as other rights should be protected by law.”60 The wistfulness of this sentence aside, it is apparent that these values are not routinely accorded active-duty officers in the Taiwan military, perhaps another reflection of a lack of popular belief in any serious armed threat to Taiwan. Senior military officers, civilian MND officials, and members of the LY all agree that such respect is lacking. One problem is the suspicion that the officer corps remains dominated by KMT loyalists who are not committed fully to supporting a DPP government. Additionally, civilian government office-holders often were so long in opposition to and persecuted by a KMT-military consortium that they neither fully trust nor know how to interact with the professional military. Mid-grade officers are worried about their future during an era of force reduction and apparent indifference by legislators. There is no equivalent of the GI Bill to assist officers forced out of the military, and a training and education plan to ease the transition to civilian life is just being formulated.61 Second, LY members and staff possess very little knowledge of the military; there are, for instance, only two former career military officers in the legislature.62 This tends to reduce both the military’s ability to explain its capabilities and requirements, and also reduces the LY’s ability to understand those explanations; the result increases the gulf between military and legislature. It has also led to a lack of leadership from the LY on defense issues. Third, the central government’s Executive Yuan is empowered to overrule the MND in matters concerning budget and national strategy. This is a tenet of the civilianization of Taiwan’s defense structure, but heightens the requirement for mutual understanding between military officers and civilian officials.63 These factors appear to be contributing to a professional military dedicated to supporting civilian government in Taiwan, but frustrated by the current administration’s policies and uncertain of its own future. This frustration support neither Taiwan’s effective defense nor its future as a democratic state. The Western model of civil–military relations is one of civilian control, “to ensure that defense policy and the agencies of defense are subordinated to other national traditions, values, customs, governmental policies, and economic and social institutions.”64 The civilian side of this model is still forming in Taiwan; the democratization and depoliticization process begun under Chiang Ching-kuo established the environment, the defense reorganization acts of 2000 established the guidelines, but implementation remains a work in progress. Taiwan was a military autocracy less than three decades ago; key to the continued success of the developing relationship between Taiwan’s military and

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civilian government is respect between both. There currently is little indication that the military will falter in this relationship, but there are indications that the civil administration does not appreciate the necessity of a well-manned and equipped modern military. The challenge for both is to continue their developing relationship while literally under the gun of the PLA.

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Effective deterrence and resolute defense remain Taiwan’s military strategy.1 Strategy

The strategist seeking to defend Taiwan faces almost insurmountable conditions. First, geography places the avowed military opponent, China, 100 nm away and the only potential military supporter, the United States, several thousand miles distant. Second, domestic support for the military is problematic and while the public evidences almost no desire for unifying with the mainland, it also seems content with Taiwan’s undeclared status quo as a sovereign nation. Third, this contributes to weak support for military modernization by many civilian government officials, either because they do not credit the Chinese military threat, or because they believe the United States will come immediately to Taiwan’s effective assistance in the event they are wrong. Ministry of National Defense (MND) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) incumbents come from a range of backgrounds—KMT, DPP, and professional bureaucrats—but there seems little linkage between background and assumptions about a Chinese threat.2 Fourth is the issue of Taiwan nationalism. The question is not so much whether the island’s people feel “Taiwanese” more than they feel “Chinese,” but what vision they hold for their future. Does the majority of the population share a vision of a sovereign nation recognized by the international community, or does it anticipate some form of reconciliation with China? Or perhaps the present ambiguous status is enough.3 In his 2000 presidential inauguration address, Chen Shui-bian delineated his administration’s position in the “Five Noes.” Based on China not employing military force against Taiwan, Chen pledged not to: “declare independence, . . . change the national title, . . . push forth the inclusion of the so-called ‘state-tostate’ description in the Constitution, [or] . . . promote a referendum to change the status quo in regards to the question of independence or unification,” and that “abolition of the National Reunification Council or the National Reunification Guidelines will not be an issue.”4 More recently, he emphasized the development 152

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of a “new Taiwan identity” as necessary for “rapprochement” in both domestic politics and cross-strait relations. Chen argued that “a new Taiwan identity” will “protect Taiwan from being taken over by China.”5 In any event, the Taipei government must implement a strategy appropriate to a militarily inferior power dependent on an ambiguously committed “ally.” This dictates a strategy of defense, but one with both active and passive components. The primary defensive task is protection of the island’s leadership, command and control system, and vital infrastructure in the face of concentrated PLA air and missile strikes, and probable attack by Special Operations Forces and Fifth Columnists.6 These tasks are the focus of the “Resolute Project” program, designed to “integrate the [C3] systems of the three services, to enhance the [ECM] and [ECCM] ability of C4ISR, and to consolidate infrastructure in protecting those command and control assets.”7 Some planners also argue for strikes against the mainland in order to maintain popular resolve. Others theorize that strikes against selected targets would throw off the PLA’s operational tempo. Taiwan’s military strategists would prefer not to assume immediate US intervention, but to plan independent and autonomous operations, while of course hoping for eventual US assistance. This may be why Taiwan’s defense establishment does not want to base its strategy completely on “strategic endurance”: simply waiting for Washington to make a decision and for US forces to move over the distances involved. In view of the heavy odds they face across the Strait and declining manpower, Taiwan’s military will have to depend on quality rather than quantity,; the military must be as technologically advanced as possible. Second, the services must be truly joint in organization, training, doctrine, and operability. Third, the island must develop a thoroughly integrated, coherently organized intra- and extrastructure of intelligence, sensors, and weapons systems under centralized, redundant C4ISR. The current description of military tasks is not adequate for this purpose: “In war, the Army conducts joint operations with the Navy and Air Force. The ROC Navy maintains control and surveillance of the waters around Taiwan and participates in joint operations with the Army and Air Force.”8 Defense Minister Lee Jye noted this shortcoming in January 2005, when he announced that his goals for Taiwan’s military included improving joint combat capabilities “using the resources available,” with “innovation and streamlining” the focus “of building military capacity and combat readiness.”9

Information operations Information about conventional military systems is usually available, but Information Warfare (IW) capabilities remain obscure, although certainly receiving attention in both China and Taiwan as an effective form of warfare. Beijing apparently believes IW can play an important role in weakening Taiwan’s ability to resist Chinese pressure. The MND is aware of this focus, and concerned with 153

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building Taiwan’s ability to both resist and counter mainland information technology.10 Defense Minister Tang Fei mentioned the threat when he spoke to the LY in 1999, warning that Beijing “was expected to establish an electronic warfare supremacy by 2010.”11 The dangers posed by China’s IW capability were also described that year by MAC Vice Chairman Lin Chong-pin, who warned that it could severely disrupt Taiwan’s C2 system, disrupt its social order, and “plunge the island into chaos without shedding a drop of blood.”12 Taiwan’s society is deeply immersed in information technology (IT); only Hong Kong and Japan were evaluated in 2000 as more “thoroughly wired.”13 The island’s population provides conscripts who are almost all comfortable with the technology required for information operations. Significantly, however, China has in the past five years worked hard to develop information technology; it has been catching up with Taiwan’s world-class production of IT hardware, in part as the result of investment from the island’s business community on the mainland. IW occurred across the Strait in 1999 through loosely organized computer virus attacks on national-level military and economic systems. While a good deal of this seemed to be spontaneous, by the end of the episode the PLA was definitely involved in directing mainland hackers. The same was apparently true of the Taiwan military, which warned in November of that year that a dangerous Chinese IW attack could occur as early as 2005.14 Concern was heightened in 2001 when a Chinese fishing trawler accidentally cut the island’s submarine cable, knocking out 90 percent of Taiwan’s non-satellite Internet capability, Taipei was reportedly surprised to discover that cable makes landfall in Shanghai before reaching Taiwan.15 The MND moved to meet the threat, in 1999 organizing the Communications, Electronics, and Information Bureau (CEIB) to build up Taiwan’s IW capability. The CEIB faces a difficult defensive situation, since the island’s civilian and military electronic infrastructures have grown in a relatively undisciplined fashion and are closely comingled, which allows a hacker to cross the boundary between the two with relative ease.16 The Bureau is charged with coordinating among the military services for issues of C4I, IW, EW, and “other related areas.” It has direct links with the Cheng Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) research and development resources.17 The CEIB outlined a seven-point plan in March 2000, calling for: 1 2

3

network security through improved military communications security and directional electromagnetic protection; IW offensive capability, with utilization of the civilian research and development sector to organize an “IW Laboratory” to identify and collect computer viruses, and a research and development program on “the key technologies of effective information weapons, a joint C4ISR system that would combine independent service management information, naval intelligence, and ground operational systems; including integration of newly acquired radar and digital links; 154

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4

5

6 7

transformation of Defense Management Systems, to “support defense policy decision-making and strategic development” in peacetime, and joint warfare in wartime, while emphasizing information transparency across service lines; “a high-quality communication and information environment,” by implementing network digitization, wireless systems, creation of “a multimedia data environment” for the military; a public–private sector partnership to expand the resources available to improve military information capability; and a national IW command organization under the Executive Yuan to develop and implement protection for the entire public and private sectors’ information infrastructure.18

Thus, Taiwan’s MND has recognized the importance of IW from both defensive and offensive perspectives, and is organizing to exploit them. Deploying a C4ISR joint operations system capable of integrating the combat efforts of all the services, for the entire island, is an important element in this effort.19 Progress implementing this complex system has been slow in part because it requires significant costs, new technology, and organizational changes. In 2003, the Executive Yuan submitted to the LY a plan for the MND to “focus its efforts on establishment of a crisis management system.” This plan reiterated previously delineated MND priorities, focusing on the ability to conduct joint, coordinated military strikes in defense of Taiwan.20 The government is supporting the IW effort, in part because it fits well into the strategy of moving any battle away from the island, delineated in the DPP’s 1999 Defense White Paper and advocated on several occasions since. This document advocates offensive strikes against “any enemy force before it enters our territory, preferably destroying the enemy deep in its own rear base.” Taiwan’s professional military has not been enthusiastic about this strategy, perhaps because of uncertainty about how effectively to implement a “decisive offshore battle.”21 IW, however, seems to offer a relatively “non-offensive” means of pursuing active defense. Like many areas of Taiwan’s defense needs, however, IW capability development faces budget shortages. At least three factors contribute to this shortfall: first, as a warfare area independent of the traditional military services, IW suffers from a lack of a powerful sponsor and is susceptible to having its priorities ranked very low among MND priorities. Second, the recent governmental focus on major foreign purchases leaves few resources for the relatively unglamorous IW programs. Third, access to American state-of-the-art IW technology is constrained by export restrictions. Fourth, the information technology private sector may be hesitant to link its fortunes to those of the military.22

Budget Under its pre-democratic regime from 1949 to 1996, Taipei was able to allocate resources to military defense almost free of legislative and independent of 155

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popular opinion. That changed with the free elections of 1995 and 1996, and ended with the election of the DPP administration in 2000. Military expenditures and national defense issues are now subject to popular discussion and sensitive to public will, expressed through LY representatives and their committees. The National Defense Committee is most directly concerned with military affairs, charged as “responsible to deliberate bills related to the powers of the Ministry of National Defense, and the Veterans’ Affairs Commission.”23 The Foreign and Overseas Chinese Affairs, Finance, and Budget Committees also may address MND issues in their deliberations. Additionally, suspected corruption or other issues of malfeasance are subject to investigation by the Control Yuan, which is the government’s senior “watchdog,” exercizing the powers of impeachment, censure, and audit. Its members are presidential appointees who serve six-year terms, following confirmation by the LY. The Control Yuan audits the final accounts of revenues and expenditures of all government agencies, including the MND.24 The government reported that Taiwan ranked nineteenth in the world in terms of defense spending in 2004, but the defense budget has been reduced each year over the past decade, except for slight increases in 1996 and 1998.25 Since 1994, the portion of the total national budget devoted to defense has decreased from 24.51 to 16.08 percent, and of Givers National Product (GNP) from 3.69 to 2.45 percent. During that decade, the total central government budget increased by 47.6 percent; that for defense remained relatively flat, increasing by just 4.68 percent.26 Taiwan’s foreign military purchases have tracked with the overall defense budget. A total of $32.25 billion was spent on “foreign weapon systems” during the period 1993–2006 (projected). Expenditures of $3.25 billion in 1993 declined to $0.6 billion in 2003. They climbed slightly in 2004, to $1.0 billion, and if the special defense budget is approved by the LY, would amount to $4.0 billion in 2005.27 This indicates that the total budget grew ten times as much as the defense budget, reflecting the government’s emphasis on social welfare, economic growth, and other priorities obviously more highly valued than defense by the people of Taiwan and their representatives in the LY. As stated by President Chen Shui-bian, “[my] administration will not cut social welfare spending for the sake of promoting economic development or procuring defensive weapons.”28 The concern with the island’s economic health attests to the multifaceted nature of Taiwan’s security. The economic trends since at least 2000 have included a significant shift of Taiwanese economic interests and investments to the mainland. The Director of the Bureau of Foreign Trade stated in 2004 that Taiwan was China’s eight largest source of imports and ninth largest export destination.29 Estimates of Taiwan’s investments in mainland enterprises vary widely. Taipei’s 2002 estimate was $60 billion, while Beijing estimated $100 billion.30 The economic relationship between Taiwan and China has interesting social implications. At least one million Taiwan citizens are full-time residents in China, almost 156

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5 percent of the island’s population. Approximately 400,000 of these reside in the Shanghai area alone. There are also at least 200,000 cross-strait marriages.31 The impact of these phenomena on the cross-strait political situation is difficult to quantify, but deeply concerns the Taipei government.32 Senior officials are concerned that increasing economic ties will lead to increasing dependence on the mainland, which will decrease their opportunities to foster Taiwan’s nationalism and increase popular willingness to come to an accommodation with Beijing. Businessmen on the island have made clear their priority on maintaining sound, profitable relations with the mainland.33 Domestic politics plays a sometimes dominant role in Taiwan’s budget determination. In December 2000, for instance, the LY made three major changes to the government’s defense budget submission that reflected both domestic political concerns but also perceived shortfalls not necessarily in line with the views of the MND. First, the LY cut the money requested to purchase spare parts for the Navy’s six Kang Ding-class frigates, in reaction to the scandal associated with the frigates’ acquisition from France. Second, the legislature also cut the money requested for spare parts for the Navy’s S-2T ASW aircraft, when the Navy chief-of-staff admitted that only one of the 26 planes was operational. Another example is the decision to buy six Patriot PAC-3 batteries in addition to upgrading the existing three PAC-2 units, apparently driven not by military judgment, but by the government’s desire to satisfy political constituents in Kaohsiung and Taichung.34 Domestic politics will always factor into governmental decisions made by a democracy. Future defense budgets will increase significantly only if the government and the people who elect its legislature believe the military threat to Taiwan is serious and imminent.35 Chen’s government has been pushing for passage of the Special Defense Budget in 2004 and 2005, but faces lackadaisical public support and strong opposition from the pan-Blue majority parties in the LY. The spring 2005 legislative session ended without the LY voting on the Special Budget.36 Opposition comes from politicians, academics, and retired generals who criticize the proposed budget either because of its high cost or because of the long delay time before the new systems could become operational in Taiwan’s defense, as much as eight to ten years for new submarines.37 This opposition has also affected annual defense budget proposals in significant ways. The newly acquired Kidd-/Chiteh-class destroyers will join Taiwan’s navy, for instance, with only half of their designed AAW missile loadout.38 The MND estimates result from a progressive, complex budget delineation process that attempts to account for both military and political factors. Its prospectus for 2005–2009 is not optimistic. The MND’s Five Year Defense Plan was submitted to the Executive Yuan in September 2004, and the Yuan responded with support for the following annual defense budgets (Table 12). The MND has stated that it “cannot meet the needs of beefing up the military strength” with this five year projection.39 Taiwan’s military forces face a defense 157

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Table 12 MND five-year budget plan 2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

260.7

258.0

257.9

257.8

257.8

Source: Table by B.D. Cole from data in MND, 2004 National Defense Report, ROC, Taipei, 2005.

budget plan provided by the central government that leaves a 25 percent shortfall. Even worse from the operating forces’ point of view, a fifth of that shortfall will likely have to come from funds earmarked for operations and maintenance, which would directly and negatively affect military readiness. The MND will attempt to ameliorate this shortfall by requesting additional funds and by allocating “the appropriated budget to the missions of top priority.”40 The 2005 defense budget does contain funding for several programs for modernizing Taiwan’s defensive capabilities. Approximately 50 percent of this budget is allocated for personnel costs; 25 percent for modernizing the force, and 22.5 percent for operations and maintenance.41 The budget includes a wide range of equipment improvements, demonstrating the military’s awareness of the threat, knowledge of its own capabilities and shortfalls, and the limited amount of resources allocated by the administration to defense. The new budget’s modernization effort is focused on improving the vital command and control capability, as well as other technologically advanced areas across the services that, when added to existing systems, serve as “force multipliers” for those systems.42 A force multiplier is defined by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff as an addition to operational capability—usually an equipment system or subsystem, but also possibly new software or even a tactical innovation—that makes an existing sensor or weapon system significantly more capable. For instance, while a torpedo-armed submarine is a formidable weapons system, enabling that submarine to launch cruise missiles in effect multiplies the boat’s effectiveness; the cruise missile-firing capability is a “force multiplier.” The government made efforts in public as well as in the LY in late 2004 and 2005 on passing the “special” defense budget intended to purchase the submarines, P-3C aircraft, and PAC-III missiles made available for sale by the United States in April 2001.43 The Taipei administration was unable to place the Special Budget on the legislative agenda during the 2004 LY sessions, a problem that continued as of May 2005, when the legislature adjourned until the autumn. The problem is both political and financial. In addition to the opposition parties, the KMT and the People First Party (PFP), objecting to the high cost of the buy, they cite their victory in the 2004 legislative elections as public opposition “to paying an exorbitant price for the major arms purchase.”44

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Acquisition of PAC-3s, P-3Cs, and submarines would boost Taiwan’s defense, but mid-2005 press reports are not encouraging regarding quick passage of the Special Budget. Only the P-3C buy seems ready to close, should the LY appropriate the necessary funding.45 A source for the submarines has not yet been identified and the Patriot missile batteries may also be delayed. Much discussion among LY members and other government officials has occurred about the feasibility of separating the Special Defense Budget request into sections that would be independently considered by the legislature. Advantages to this proposal are cited as allowing the members to vote on less expensive and more immediately available systems, the P-3Cs as opposed to the submarines for example.46 For example, the number of new Patriot units—six is part of the current package—is open to debate: Taipei would probably benefit in the long-run by purchasing three batteries immediately, while using the remaining several hundred million dollars for other defense purposes. Possibly in response to this sentiment, the United States has reportedly reduced the per-battery price of the Patriots, from US$3.2 million to $3 million.47 A legitimate requirement certainly exists for active missile defense in the face of the increasing PRC conventional ballistic missile batteries. In March 2005, the MND stated that 70 percent of Taiwan’s population would “be under the theater missile defense system’s protection” afforded by the PAC-2s already on the island and the PAC-3s proposed for acquisition. Vice Defense Minister Huo Shou-yeh then testified in the LY that while a missile fired from China could reach Taiwan in just seven minutes, it would take the island’s radar system five minutes just to detect and track the incoming missile; he then strongly implied that Taiwan thus would be unable to intercept incoming Chinese missiles.48 As important as the three items in the Special Budget are, the military has more critical requirements. Heading this list is technology and systems for improved C4ISR, including data links and broadband communications satellite capability to enhance its national- and operational-level command and control systems. Since C4ISR systems depend to a significant extent on dual-use technology, however, the military should be able to benefit from technological advances in the nominally civilian sector. While there are no known, proven cruise missile defensive systems available, this is a research area in which Taipei should be heavily investing, in conjunction with ongoing US efforts, if possible. The biggest problem with the Special Budget, however, is that it has become such a political symbol that if it passes, other systems very much needed for Taiwan’s defense will be unlikely to garner the attention or support they deserve from the LY. The Army’s historical dominance in Taiwan’s defense establishment may be slowly fading. The service recognizes the need to recapitalize its force, evidenced in its plan for updating its armored and helicopter forces. While the Air Force and Navy would bear the brunt of initially defending Taiwan against a mainland

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assault, without immediate US assistance that defense would almost certainly be overwhelmed within ten days. To emulate Winston Churchill’s we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender.49 It would be the responsibility of a Taiwan Army equipped and trained to fight for at least one month against invading PLA forces, enough time for the United States to intervene effectively. To allow this period of defense—and to signal to Beijing that no military assault will be easy—Taipei needs especially to increase its supply of munitions, focusing on PGMs for all the services. The TAF requires additional advanced medium range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM), Maverick air-to-ground missiles, high speed anti-radiation missile (HARM) anti-radiation, and joint direct attack munition (JDAM) air-to-ground missiles. The Navy needs more Harpoon anti-ship and Standard anti-aircraft missiles: the lack of Standard (SM-2) missiles, for instance, means that the new Kidd-class destroyers will put to sea with only half of their designed ordnance load.50 Taiwan also is not buying Vertical Launched anti-submarine rocket (ASROC) missiles, needed to engage PLA submarines at stand-off ranges. Finally, the Army’s stock of anti-tank Hellfire missiles is inadequate. China has not stood still on the defense front during the period of decreasing Taiwan defense budgets, and the difference cannot be made up in just one or two years. A former senior Defense Ministry official attributed the slow pace of Taiwan’s arms acquisitions—“perceived delay” in his words—to several factors. First is political: the role played by the active legislature in Taiwan’s relatively new democratic system of government has been exacerbated by the administration’s lack of a majority in the LY. Second is economic: the global economic slowdown since 2000, which has particularly affected Taiwan’s important IT industry, and the continuing shift of economic interests and investments to the mainland. Third is military: the April 2001 expanded arms list approved by the United States came as a surprise, for which the Taiwan defense establishment was unprepared. Fourth is the MND and LY concern that arms purchases be priced “fairly”; fifth, that prior to purchasing, arms be carefully evaluated for “suitability and survivability.”51 There can be little argument with the final reason, especially since Taiwan has perhaps not paid enough attention to these factors of suitability and survivability during past armaments acquisitions. The other reasons do not hold up as well. The legislative problem is evident, and may reflect a collective lack of concern about the military threat posed by the PLA and hence Taiwan’s need to improve its defense posture in the near term. Legislators are of course sensitive to the wishes and priorities of their constituents, and the Taiwan public in general does not seem supportive of large defense outlays, especially in view of the current economic environment. Additionally, Taiwan’s slowing economy means that 160

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increased defense spending poses zero-sum, “guns or butter” decisions for the government. The economy almost certainly will not soon expand as strongly as it did during the final thirty years of the last century; the more important change, however, is the increasing ties with and dependence on the mainland economy. Taiwan investment and technology transfer, both open and through third parties, have established a strategic economic linkage that may already allow Beijing to influence Taipei’s decision-making process through economic pressure. An economic campaign, however, would also exact a price on the mainland’s economy. The overall economic health of the island since the 1980s has been among the most impressive in the world, but tax revenues are down because of economic inconstancy since 2000. The shift of Taiwan businesses and investments to the mainland should have served as a spur to increased defense expenditures, if this development was viewed as a matter of national security alarm. The expanded list of arms made available by President George W. Bush in the spring of 2001 should not have been much of a surprise, given the many years of plaints by Taiwanese and their American supporters about the need for these systems. The military services should have had acquisition, development, and operating plans “on the shelf.” Apparently, however, the MND failed adequately to anticipate the 2001 decision. Finally, the question of “fair price” is a legitimate concern, but one whose importance relates directly to the degree of danger estimated by Taipei. If Beijing’s threat to employ military force against Taiwan is taken seriously, and the relatively rapid modernization of the PLA is taken into account, then the “cost” side of the cost–benefit equation is significantly skewed in the direction of needing the weapons, now.

Leadership The 2000 defense reorganization laws are not yet fully implemented, at least not in spirit. What one close observer has described as “systemic paralysis” too often seems to characterize Taiwan’s defense establishment. Some continued service parochialism is inevitable, but its suppression requires additional attention and action, especially in order to increase effective joint organization, planning, exercising, and operations throughout the military. An additional drag on effective defense may be over-centralization of decisionmaking within the President’s office. Few senior military officers will be more decisive if they are certain of the civilian leadership’s policy positions. Chen Shui-bian’s status as a minority president has hampered his ability to institute comprehensive, innovative improvements in Taiwan’s defensive capability.52

Personnel Taiwan is reducing the size of its military, but enhancing the quality and capability of the smaller force. Taiwan’s military numbered 385,524 active duty 161

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personnel in 2004, broken down as follows: Army—199,311; Navy—56,125; Air force—55,053; Military Police—15,027; Combined Logistics Command— 14,949; MND and subordinate entities—39,031; and the Reserve Command (not including the reserve troops)—6,028. Under this Chingchhin Program, the military plans to eliminate an additional 45,524 personnel by the end of 2006 to meet a goal of 340,000 personnel in uniform. The planned reduction of 15,000 personnel during 2004 apparently did not occur, however, and the program’s future is in doubt. Since a majority of the planned personnel reductions would come from the Army, it is thought chiefly responsible for delaying further reductions.53 Other significant steps are planned or have been taken, including transfer of all ordnance production, facility management, and range and testing units from the Logistics Command to the relatively new Armaments Bureau. The MND also plans to reassign personnel from the Army to strengthen the Missile Command as a new branch of service, directly subordinate to the Ministry. The new command would consist of the two air defense Missile Groups formerly attached to the army, and the Navy’s shore-based surface-to-surface missile task force of Hai-Feng missiles. The Chingchin Program will significantly affect each of the services. The Army should number 134,907 by the end of 2006, organized into three Field Armies, 4 Defense Commands, 6 Division-level Commands, and 2 Area Commands. Operating units will include 10 Strike and 8 Garrison Brigades, 1 Armored Battle Group, and the Aviation and Special Operations Command. The Air Force’s personnel goal for 2006 is 51, 898. These will man an organization of six Tactical Fighter Wings; and the Communications, Information, and Air Traffic Control; Tactical Air Control; Meteorological; and CombinedElectronic Warfare Wings; as well as the Air Base Command and the Regional Air Defense and Garrison Commands. The Navy plans to number 51,731 in 2006, organized into two Destroyer Flotillas; and Frigate, Amphibious and Auxiliary/Service, Specialized Missions, and Submarine Flotillas. Other commands will include the Aviation and the Maritime Surveillance and Reconnaissance Commands; the Guided Missile Craft Taskforce; and the Marine Corps. The Corps will be composed of three brigades focusing on different assignments. Mission definition remained undecided as of mid-2005, but one brigade will be assigned to naval base defense. The other two will likely be assigned to domestic infrastructure defense, but may also retain some amphibious warfare capability. The Combined Logistics Command should number 19,970 by the end of 2006, including the Transportation Services Division and Regional Support Command. Various units dealing with military personnel and dependents’ services will be reduced from eight to six in 2005 and two military orphanages closed. The Reserve Command will likely assume a strengthened role in Taiwan’s defense picture, although its personnel numbers will change only slightly, numbering 16,577 assigned to three regional reserve command posts, six urban 162

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garrison brigades, and eight coastal garrison brigades. The Marine Corps Base Garrison Brigade will be assigned to the Reserve Command, although remaining under the administrative control of the Navy. The Navy’s recruit training command will be transferred to the Reserve Command, which as a result will operate all military recruit training facilities. The Military Police Command will retain its present strength of 12,900 personnel, but its organization will be streamlined. It will include 4 command posts, 6 company-size units, 15 Military Police Battalions, 2 Armored Battalions, and 1 Artillery Battalion.

Military readiness Taiwan’s military has long included progressive, multi-threat exercises in its effort to maintain a military ready to combat likely threats. Training shortfalls have arisen in part because of restricted exercise space, especially for the Air Force; from a lack of exercise funding; and most critically from a lack of jointness in the planning and operational aspects of all-service training. This also implies a lack of common standards for personnel training and equipment management.54 The 2005 exercise program tries to correct this last shortcoming, spurred by Defense Minister Lee Jye’s stated objective to improve jointness as a basic tenet of Taiwan military performance and capability. The MND 2005 Annual Training Schedule described the program’s primary goal as “enhancing joint operations (involving all three branches of the armed forces) and anti-terrorist response capability.” The year’s major military exercises will be divided into one of four categories: combat, mobilization, nuclear/chemical, and training. Planning priorities are listed as “joint operations drills on simulation systems,” testing combat readiness on a real-time, no-notice basis; practicing urban combat tactics; Special Forces training; and emergency rescue training.55 These would include “anti-unrestricted” and “urban” warfare. A potentially challenging, three-day anti-terrorism exercise was conducted in mid-April, with an emphasis on countering decapitation strategies.56 The Navy also conducted an emergency exercise in late April, when a frigate was directed to get underway for a visit to the Marshall Islands, with less than one day’s notice.57 The 2005 exercise plan features themes needed to enhance Taiwan’s military readiness, but will require additional financial support to be effective. Furthermore, the exercise program will face increasingly difficult odds as the obligated service required of conscripts continues to be reduced.

Offensive capability In April 1999, Minister of Defense Tang Fei stated in the LY that the military was developing “offensive weapons.” Details were not offered, but the Minister urged the legislators on the Defense and Budget Committees to closely examine the CSIST budget when it was presented to the LY.58 Then in September 2000, 163

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Cabinet spokesman Chen Chi-mai stated that Taiwan was considering using “weapons with offensive capabilities” and that “if China attacks, we will not rule out striking back at the enemy.”59 The idea of Taiwan striking the mainland as a deterrent to aggressive action by Beijing has been discussed in the press, in the LY, among senior Taiwan military officers, and by senior government officials, including President Chen Shui-bian and Premier Frank Hsieh. One means of offensive missile strikes against mainland targets may lie in the Hsiung-Feng III cruise missile system described in Chapter 8.60 According to the US Department of Defense’s 2004 Report to Congress, Since Taipei cannot match Beijing’s ability to field offensive systems, proponents of strikes against the mainland apparently hope that merely presenting credible threats to China’s urban population or high-value targets, such as the Three Gorges Dam, will deter Chinese military coercion.61 Targeting this dam complex was discounted in testimony before the LY’s National Defense Committee by Vice Minister of Defense Tsai Ming-hsien in June 2004, but he did mention plans to attack the mainland: “If China provokes us and makes the first move to attack Taiwan, our military will certainly strike back. Our targets will include Chinese military facilities and the sources of the attack.”62 Those who favor Taiwan acquiring weapons to strike mainland targets argue that Taipei should enhance its ability to deter Beijing from employing armed force, especially the hundreds of short-range ballistic missiles stationed in Fujian Province. The arguments for acquiring offensive weaponry are most frequently advocated by civilian legislators and government officials; military justification has been most coherently based on preempting Taiwan as the battlefield.63 The strategy of conducting a “decisive campaign outside the territory” of Taiwan is credited to President Chen Shui-bian, who in the DPP’s 2000 Defense Policy White Paper stated that “Taiwan’s military should build up the capability to strike at enemy bases.”64 In a 16 June 2000 speech, he advocated transforming Taiwan’s defense from “a passive defense to an active one,” and described this strategy as “initiating preemptive operations to . . . detain the enemy on its land [and] strike the enemy at sea.”65

The nuclear option Offensive weapons in Taiwan’s case may more accurately be described as “weapons capable of deterring China.” Given the vast difference in size, resources, and military might, effective deterrence against China almost certainly means recourse to weapons of mass destruction. There is no evidence that Taiwan has engaged in the production of strategic levels of biological or chemical weapons. 164

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Taipei has, however, attempted in the past to develop nuclear weapons. This program probably began following China’s nuclear tests in the 1960s, when Taiwan’s Defense Ministry proposed establishing a $140 project based on acquisition of a heavy water reactor and production plant, a reprocessing research laboratory, and a future plutonium separation plant from Germany’s Siemens corporations. This Hsin Chu Program was approved as a civilian undertaking in 1969, with Taiwan’s Power Company buying light-water reactors and the Institute for Nuclear Energy Research (INER) acquiring a heavy-water research reactor from Canada. The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concluded in 1974 that “Taipei conducts its small nuclear program with a weapon option clearly in mind, and it will be in a position to fabricate a nuclear device after five years or so.”66 Both the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) became convinced, following 1975–1976 on-site inspections, that Taiwan was establishing a nuclear weapons development program. President Chiang Ching-kuo responded to US pressure by announcing in September 1976 that Taiwan would neither develop reprocessing facilities nor engage in reprocessing activities. Despite that promise, after Washington shifted diplomatic recognition of “China” from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, reprocessing apparently resumed (or perhaps had never ceased) and the United States again demanded that Taipei abandon its reprocessing. The heavy-water reactor was shut down by 1988, and reprocessing facilities dismantled.67 The United States pressured Taipei to end its program because of concern for the destabilizing impact of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and in the interests of maintaining stability across the Taiwan Strait, since Beijing has clearly included Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons as a casus belli for military action.68 A desire by Taipei to acquire nuclear weapons might be understandable, given both its extremely tenuous strategic position and the example posed by Israel, India, and Pakistan. However, the island’s population density and lack of strategic depth, Beijing’s threats, and the belligerence of many PLA leaders, would almost certainly make development of a nuclear strategy self-defeating for Taiwan. While Taiwan today uses nuclear technology for medical purposes and to generate electricity, there is no reported evidence of a weapons development program. In July 1995, however, following China’s missile launches into waters near Taiwan, President Lee Teng-hui told the LY that “whether we need the protection of nuclear weapons . . . we should restudy the question from a long-term point of view.”69 He quickly backtracked, however, stating a few days later that while Taiwan “has the ability to develop nuclear weapons, but will definitely not” do so.70 The issue reappeared in the fall of 2004, when Premier Yu Shyi-kun reportedly referred to mutually assured destruction, stating that “The best scenario will see a ‘balance of terror’ being maintained across the Taiwan Strait so that the national security is safeguarded . . . if [China launches] an attack on . . . Kaohsiung, [Taiwan] should be able to launch a counterattack on Shanghai.”71 Premier Yu 165

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Shyi-kun denied in October 2004 that Taiwan was developing weapons to attack Shanghai specifically, although in September he had argued that “if mainland China fired 100 missiles at Taiwan, the island should be able to fire at least 10 back at the mainland.”72 Yu was criticized by opposition legislators and defense analysts. For instance, KMT member Shuai Hua-min, a retired lieutenant general, argued that “developing nuclear weapons will only force Taiwan into an arms race with a powerful nuclear country like China [which we cannot win];”73 and Minister of Defense Lee disowned any adoption of a “balance of terror” strategy.74 As recently as March 2005, however, Foreign Minister Chen Tan-sun reportedly stated that Taiwan “had the scientific ability to manufacture nuclear weapons but [had] no intention of doing so despite the recent threats from the mainland.”75

Active defense Talk of nuclear or other offensive weapons is distracting from the more important discussion about Taiwan adopting a strategy of active defense that includes striking the mainland. For the most part, uniformed officers are either reticent to express their opinion about adopting such a policy or even acquiring offensive systems. They probably do not think their acquisition viable, an opinion based on several factors. First is the demonstrated reluctance of the LY to fund even present defense budget requirements, let alone the expensive systems necessary to strike high-value mainland targets. Second is the difficulty in identifying targets on the mainland valuable enough to deter Beijing from acting against Taipei, and the possibility that striking the mainland would simply intensify Chinese strikes against the island. Third is the concern, widely felt among Taiwan’s military officers, that their ability to defend against determined mainland strikes is being more and more overwhelmed by improving PLA capabilities. The sum of these thoughts is that before expending scarce resources on so-called offensive weapons systems, Taiwan should first concentrate on strengthening its defensive capabilities at a time when the military balance is noticeably shifting in China’s favor.76 An even stronger argument for Taiwan not to adopt a strategy of striking the mainland is the stated American policy against Taipei doing so, even though US doctrine states that the most effective counter to enemy missiles is to destroy them before they can be launched.77 US opposition matters a great deal since despite not officially recognizing the Taipei regime as the government of a sovereign nation, Washington provides the only significant support for Taiwan’s continued de facto independence. Despite these concerns, steps are being taken to strengthen the military’s ability to actively defend Taiwan. The CSIST continues to work on cruise missiles capable of striking targets on the mainland. The Minister of Defense was quoted in May 2005 as describing Taiwan’s intention to “research and develop long-range strategic missiles.”78 The Air Force also has had long-standing programs to 166

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improve the “surgical bombing” capability of its F-16 and F-5 fighters against mainland targets.79 Finally, it is easier and simply makes more sense to destroy a missile launcher before the missile is launched.

Conclusion Strategy, resources, leadership, personnel, offensive capability all reflect shortfalls in Taiwan’s defense, and are receiving the attention of the island’s leadership. The strategic situation seems rigid, and Taiwan’s only likely opponent inflexible. In other words, geo-strategically the island holds an interior position with respect to China,80 the Taiwan military is a modern, capable force, and US intervention in Taipei’s support is quite possible, although it will have to come from far over the horizon. An US military survey group visit to Taiwan in 2000 concluded that the island’s defense problems included inadequate capability against aircraft, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, compounded by its international isolation, inadequate domestic security, and sharp inter-service rivalries.81 A secure future for Taiwan requires mounting and presenting a formidable defensive stance, which in turn demands robust, continuing support and resources for modernization that have not been available since 2000. The government must take at least three steps to improve Taiwan’s defense. First is a realistic appreciation of the Chinese capability described in Chapter 3; second, the realization that Beijing is willing to employ it. Third is allocation of the very significant financial, personnel, and national resources required. The MND took a strong step in early 2003 to bolster Taiwan’s defense capability when it promulgated a “Plan of Action and Milestones (POAM) for Logistics Strategic Planning” written with American assistance.82 It has not been executed, however, and its effectiveness has yet to be demonstrated. President Bush’s spring 2001 decision gave Taiwan access to the US military inventory to an extent previously unknown. Taipei has been unable to take full advantage of this access, apparently due primarily to its domestic political situation, but also possibly because of service parochialism, an absence of militarywide agreement on the best operational options to pursue to maximize its defensive capability, and the uncertainty engendered by Washington’s ambiguous commitment to Taiwan’s defense. There is no apparent solution to this last problem; US esteem for Taiwan’s people and their democracy is sincere and long-standing, but must be balanced against the reality of China’s sheer size, in terms of geography, population, economy, and military might. These factors contribute to the importance of Washingtons cooperation with Beijing in international affairs ranging from trade issues to the war on terrorism to the unstable situation on the Korean peninsula. Moreover, in current circumstances, the most likely precipitant of a PRC attack would be Taiwan’s pro-independence activities, and the United States wants to leave Taipei in doubt about American support if such activities do provoke war. 167

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The past decade has seen improvements in PLA capability that significantly exceed that of the Taiwan military, and that trend is likely to continue. Future military effectiveness will depend on raising the percentage of GNP spent on defense, both for equipment and personnel. This again highlights that the will of the Taiwan people is the most important factor in their defense. One senior Taiwan general told the author that China would have to physically occupy the island to conquer its people, and that even if Beijing used nuclear weapons there would be “a second Chechnya.” He also admitted, however, that there “was no way Taiwan could fight against China.” The task for the island’s government is to maintain a defensive infrastructure credible both to the PRC and to the United States: Beijing must be given pause before deciding to employ military force; Washington must be reassured that Taipei is serious about modernizing and expanding its defensive capabilities. This will occur only if Taiwan’s people and their government make the necessary military and diplomatic investments.

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Taiwan’s security posture rests on military capability and political will. Analysis of these factors in the preceding chapters has not been reassuring. Military capability is declining in relation to China due to a lack of popular will to build a stronger deterrent force to confront the mainland; apparently due to a strategic syllogism holding sway in Taiwan: ● ●

●

China is not serious about employing military force against Taiwan; if China does employ military force against Taiwan, the United States will intervene immediately and effectively; therefore, Taiwan does not need to strengthen and modernize its military forces.

China is expanding and modernizing the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with a focus on a Taiwan scenario. Their plans include a wide spectrum of military force against Taiwan directly and against US forces in the case of intervention. Beijing’s threats to use military force to prevent the island’s de jure independence are credible, generally invalidating Taipei’s apparent strategic analysis. While the PLA is a formidable, rapidly modernizing force, a military campaign against the island would not be simple. Taiwan’s natural “moat” would be defended by modern, capable naval and air forces; as they demonstrated during past clashes with the PLA, the military should be able to hold out for the one month necessary to allow US intervention, should that be forthcoming. China would have to project power across a distance, 90–100 miles, similar to that faced by the Allies’ D-Day invasion of June 1944, which was the greatest amphibious operation in history. This challenging environment would be colored by Beijing’s very spotty record of accurately judging the American reaction to use of active military force. China did not, during any of the Strait crises of 1954, 1958, 1962, and 1995–1996 recounted in Chapter 2, intend either to invade Taiwan or engage US forces. That was not necessarily known at the time by Taipei or Washington, and Chinese misjudged the American reaction in every one of those instances. Furthermore, the PLA seems to be holding to a fallacious belief that the United States will not 169

CONCLUSION

persevere in the face of casualties. This belief is based mostly on the withdrawal from Somalia in 1993, despite the contravening evidence of American willingness to stay the course for nine years in Vietnam and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan.1 Taiwan’s fate was in American hands in those Strait crises, however, a fact that continues to define the strategic situation: Beijing commands a military against which Taipei cannot prevail alone in the long term. Geography is not going to change, and while the United States continues to stand between the island and mainland military aggression, it is steadfastly refusing to go further in support of Taipei’s bid for formal independence.

The PLA Beijing appears to have decided, as a result of the 1996 Strait Crisis, that Taiwan has two vulnerable centers of gravity. The first is the will of the island’s people and the second is American military intervention. Hence, future Chinese military plans against Taiwan are likely to try to weaken the first and delay the second of these centers. An example of this strategy is Beijing’s warm welcome to Chen Shui-bian’s leading political opponents in the spring of 2005. While a full-scale amphibious invasion cannot be ruled out, it is almost certainly Beijing’s least preferred option for using military force. More likely is a less massive, but not necessarily less violent series of military steps, a significant element of which will be an information warfare (IW) campaign focused against Taiwan’s C4, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) system, as well as the civilian communications and computer infrastructure. First, of course, what and how the PLA employs its forces will depend on its orders from Beijing: what is the mission? It could be to “teach a lesson,” which would likely involve a carefully orchestrated campaign of limited military force applied over a limited period of time, after which Beijing would declare the “lesson taught.” This was the model of the campaigns against India in 1962 and against Vietnam in 1979. Beijing would be taking a significant risk employing this model against Taiwan, however, in view of the likely intervention of the United States. Also, an extensive psychological campaign to convince the Taiwan people not to fight would be part of any Chinese strategy. The Korean conflict and the Strait crises of the past half century do not inspire confidence in Beijing’s ability to anticipate Washington’s reactions to the employment of military force against American interests.2 There is the danger that China would lose control of a conflict it intended to fight with limited means for a limited period of time. Unintended escalation between two nuclear-armed powers could end in global tragedy. Second, PLA modernization during the past decade and a half has focused on the navy, air force, and Second Artillery, not on the army. Army modernization has taken place, however, in units offering the capabilities most applicable to various Taiwan scenarios. These include Special Operations Forces (SOF), 170

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reconnaissance and helicopter units, significantly increased amphibious training, and positioning of long-range missiles strike units in the Nanjing Military Region. Third, these Army units are being trained and equipped not only to conduct an amphibious invasion, but to support naval and airborne strikes against Taiwan that might offer Beijing its most attractive military option. This support would include reconnaissance and targeting; small-scale strike missions, including decapitation efforts; battle damage assessment; and attacks on civilian infrastructure and military facilities. Fourth, amphibious operations could occur in a second or later stage of a conflict, when Taiwan’s defenses have been significantly degraded and Beijing wants to send an especially strong signal to the island’s military and people that the time to end the fighting has arrived. Finally, Beijing is almost certainly assuming that Taiwan and possibly the United States will launch strikes against the mainland; every available air defense asset will be called into action against anticipated cruise missile and aircraft strikes. Of course, strong US military intervention into a Strait conflict would change the equation for both Taipei and Beijing, posing significant problems for the latter. The strategic heart of the matter for Beijing is domestic: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership must prevent Taiwan’s formal independence and achieve reunification, or lose credibility with its increasingly nationalistic people.

Taiwan’s response The “cross-strait military balance” is a frequent topic of conversation within the military and with outside observers. It appears, however, that there already is no effective balance of military capability between Taiwan’s military and the PLA. The question, rather, is how long the former can and will hold out against the latter, in the event of an unlikely, but possible, unprovoked, large-scale military attack. The most commonly cited year for the military balance to shift decisively in China’s favor is 2005, particularly with respect to control of the air over the Taiwan Strait. One former Deputy Defense Minister has opined that the PLA would be capable of taking Taiwan in 2010. A senior Defense Ministry officer in November 2004 gave 2010–2012 as that date, but since then Ministry of National Defense (MND) officials have cited 2012, 2015, or even “in 30 years.” Do the people of Taiwan believe they are in danger of a military attack by the mainland? Although there is little hard evidence, a November 2003 poll indicates that they do not. Summarized below are the results of 1,069 respondents to the question: “Do you think China would then attack Taiwan if ” 1

2

If Taiwan declared independence right away: – 23.3 percent agreed – 65.6 percent disagreed; If our Referendum Law on revising the Constitution is passed: – 10.5 percent agreed – 76.2 percent disagreed; 171

CONCLUSION

3

4

If our Referendum Law stipulates that a referendum can be held on “changing the national title”: – 20.2 percent agreed – 66.9 percent disagreed; If our country presently wants to change the national title: – 20.1 percent agreed – 66.9 percent disagreed.3

Even if Taipei formally declares independence, the number one casus belli listed by Beijing, less than a quarter of the population believes China would attack Taiwan. An even more discouraging poll was reported in April 2005, when 65 percent of Taiwan college students “in northern Taiwan” responded that they were “unwilling to fight for Taiwan [and] will surrender if China attacks.”4 This sort of result must be taken skeptically—in 1933, Oxford University undergraduates averred that they would not fight for their country, but almost all rallied to Great Britain’s defense in 1939. Furthermore, very different results were obtained from a 2003 poll of 1,107 citizens: 77 percent of the respondents said they would be “willing” or “very willing” to fight if “Mainland China launches a war against Taiwan.”5 Polls notwithstanding, the question of Taiwan’s nationalism and the people’s willingness to fight and die for that concept remains unanswered. No knowledgeable Taiwan officer or official thinks the island could successfully fight the PLA without US intervention. Indeed, most seem to believe it is a US obligation to intervene, no matter what the Taiwan government does or does not do. Taiwan’s defense structure is impressive as written, but if it had to act alone would face an apparently insurmountable strategic and operational situation. The point Taipei must first evaluate is the seriousness of the military threat from Beijing. The current administration may understand the power of the PLA, but not Beijing’s willingness to employ it against Taiwan. Speaking in March 2005, Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Joseph Wu acknowledged “the danger that war might happen,” but concluded that war is not imminent.6 Vice President Annette Lu provided a surprising threat prioritization in December 2004, when she listed the “Three [sic] Big Changes” facing Taiwan as: China’s emergence as a world power, the island’s aging population, “the increasing number of foreign women who enter” Taiwan, the “information gap” between those who do/do not have internet access, and “in people’s thinking,” omitting any direct mention of China’s military threat.7

Defense budgets Perhaps the most puzzling question in any analysis of Taiwan’s defense posture is the declining defense budgets over the past twelve years. The answer may be that the leadership believes it can control the seriousness of the Chinese military threat 172

CONCLUSION

by raising or lowering the intensity of its independence rhetoric; if this is so, Taiwan is playing a dangerous game, given Beijing’s unremitting hostility toward the current government in Taipei and consistent threats to employ military. Taipei’s defense policies have retarded the modernization and improvement of the Taiwan armed services that is strongly supported by their uniformed professionals. The Chen Shui-bian administration hopes to pass at least a portion of the special US$18 billion defense budget (perhaps without the submarines), but that hope was unrealized as of June 2005.8 Even if passed in calendar 2005, the special defense budget will not correct the readiness deficits that have resulted from the declining annual defense budgets, including that passed in October 2004.9 Why have the annual budgets continued declining in the face of the repeatedly announced mainland military threat? Reducing the defense budget while simultaneously claiming an increased military threat from China does little to increase feelings in friendly and allied countries that the Taipei government is acting responsibly. Inquiries among more than two-dozen military officers and civilian officials failed to elicit a reasonable rationale for the continued reductions in the defense budget. These reductions directly reflect the apparently widely held belief among Taiwan’s government officials that the United States would intervene in the event of a mainland military attack, and would do so within a matter of days. The civilian government’s apparent view that Beijing will not use military force strengthens its national budget priorities, which emphasize civilian concerns ahead of defense requirements. Although evidence is strictly anecdotal, this seems to reflect the popular attitude on Taiwan, which is not consistent: China poses a serious military threat, but China will not attack. The 1996 crisis indicates that if military action appears imminent, the number of Taiwanese who would flee the island would be limited only by the number of available airline seats. Table 13 shows this decline in terms both of the percentage of the central government’s budget and the percentage of gross national product (GNP). The latter figure dropped below 3 percent in 2000 and below 2.5 percent in 2004, a trend that continued in 2005, when the defense budget passed in October 2004 was almost 2 percent below that for 2004.10 In other words, the amount of money Table 13 Taiwan defense expenditures Year

1993

Percentage 25.32 of total government budget Percentage 4.72 of GNP

1994

1995

1996

24.28 24.51a 22.76

4.11

3.69

3.47

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

22.51 22.43

21.60

17.41

16.48 16.37 16.59

3.09

2.76

3.33

3.14

2.78

2002 2003

2.61

2.50

Source: B.D. Cole, from data in MND, 2004 National Defense Report, ROC, Taipei, Chapter 11. Note a slight increase in 1995 in percentage of total government budget.

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spent on defense as a percentage of the Taipei government’s budget has decreased by approximately one-half during the past decade or so. The defense budget peaked in dollar totals in 1994 at $7.66 billion. In the 2002 annual defense report, the MND noted that the “national defense budget [as a percentage of the] total government budget has dropped annually from 25.32 percent in 1993 to [16.5] percent in 2002.” It attributed this decline to “increased budget demands for development of a diversified society, social welfare and overall national economic development.”11 MND closed this section of its 2002 Annual Report by observing that Taiwan was “facing a highly hostile threat” from the PRC and stated, rather ruefully, it “earnestly hopes that . . . the government . . . may keep the national defense budget on a reasonable level to achieve the goals of maintaining combat readiness and ensuring national security.”12 This wish has not been answered, and in 2003 the MND claimed there would be a “three hundred billion (NT) [US$100 billion] defense budget gap in the upcoming five years.”13 The Chen Shui-bian government has justified this trend by claiming that the most effective way to safeguard Taiwan’s security was to promote its economic health and competitiveness; in 2003, Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council Tsai Ing-Wen argued that in the near-term the government should focus on “cross-Strait economic and trading issues,” focusing on military issue only in “the intermediate term (2006–2007).”14 This is a valid policy by the democratically elected government in Taipei, but may not adequately acknowledge the threat from the communist government in Beijing. While Taiwan’s GDP did decline by almost 2 percent in 2001, the economic argument does little to ameliorate a stark difference in attitude between civilian officials and defense professionals about what constitutes effective security for Taiwan and the defense structure required to achieve that security. The fact that the Chen Shui-bian administration, elected in 2004 for another four-year term, acquiesced in October to the Legislative Yuan (LY) passing with little discussion a 2005 defense budget lower than the previous year’s raises serious questions about the government’s estimates of the peril facing Taiwan. President Chen has indeed overseen a comprehensive overhaul of the organization and administration of Taiwan’s military and defense establishment since he took office in 2000. These promise to be the most significant such steps since 1949, but require the resources necessary to implement them. Furthermore, Chen has throughout his tenure in office lacked a majority in the LY. Not only has the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and its “pan-green” coalition never held a simple majority in the LY, but that even within that party and coalition there have been serious differences of opinion over various issues; Chen has not really commanded even his own party, let alone the LY, in matters of such all-encompassing national import as significantly increasing the defense budget. To a significant extent, this difficulty reflects the realities of a modern democracy, but it also reflects a widespread lack of concern about Taiwan’s defense requirements in comparison to domestic economic, social, and environmental 174

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priorities. Political strife in the LY had reached the point in May 2005 where the opposition parties refused to “support any bill proposed by the Chen administration.”15

Personnel concerns One area possibly needing reform is the military officer promotion system, which has been described as “corrupt” by several retired and active duty officers. They meant “corrupt” in the sense that promotions to senior ranks are based too much on personal relationships and insufficiently on merit.16 The number of flag and general officers has been reduced as overall military strength has been cut, but there are still complaints in the LY about excess numbers of generals. These complaints may also reflect the LY’s frustration at not participating directly in the military promotion process, as is the case in the United States and other Western systems.17 The most serious personnel problem facing Taiwan’s military, however, is its noncommissioned officers (NCO) corps, universally described by officers of all the services as weak and inadequate. They blame this primarily on the short term of service required of conscripts and the difficulty retaining good enlisted personnel for more than that period. The weak NCO corps means that junior officers perform duties that in a modern military are accomplished by mid-grade noncommissioned officers; this also reflects, however, complaints by military officers of all the services that even the most minor decisions tend to be made at very senior levels. For instance, the Minister of Defense personally selects the dozen or so military officers who attend various professional military education (PME) courses in the United States each year.18 Today’s enlisted personnel are described, again by officers of all the services, as medically less-qualified and more poorly conditioned than those of 10–20 years ago. They are also described as generally lacking dedication to the service or mission of defending Taiwan, and with “too many personal problems.” This leads to concern that the enlisted troops will not fight in the event of an assault by the PLA. One facet of this concern was described by a Taiwan Air Force (TAF) colonel as the “one-child syndrome”: an only son laying in a trench, responsible for defending against a PLA amphibious assault, might well believe that his responsibility to family outweighed his responsibility to an amorphous Taiwan “nation.” Among those interviewed by the author, only a senior Taiwan Marine Corps officer disagreed, insisting that his enlisted men were reliable, attributing this to Marine esprit and small unit loyalty. Every officer interviewed criticized the short length of conscript service, currently just 20 months (and a conscript who has completed 2 years of reserve officers training corps (ROTC) in high school serves only 18 months) as too short to allow an enlisted man to be properly trained. This situation obviously will be exacerbated when required service for all conscripts is reduced to 18 months in 2006 and to 12 months in 2008. 175

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A majority of Taiwan’s defense professionals, both military and civilian, favor an all-volunteer military in principle, but doubt the government would be able to provide the funding to make it happen. MND officials are especially concerned about the lack of resources, and offer as a possible solution a “partial all-volunteer” military, although no authoritative numbers of either personnel or cost are publicly available. One estimate for an all-volunteer military provided is $20 billion.19 The General Political Warfare Bureau (GPWD) is still very much part of the Taiwan military, although Political Warfare Officers seem to be viewed with some lack of respect by their line officer counterparts and even by many MND civilians; one reason may be the end of the Kuomintang (KMT) monopoly on national power. Officers are consistently critical of the DPP government, however, often arguing that Chen Shui-bian was needlessly provoking the PRC while failing to provide the military with required resources. They were not referring to the “special” military budget proposed to purchase submarines, P-3C aircraft, and PAC-III missiles, but to the “regular” defense budget that provides for flight hours, exercise rounds, ship steaming days, and other readiness requirements.

Ministry of National Defense Most Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps officers, as well as mid-grade MND and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) officials, think the Army is too influential within the defense establishment, an opinion shared by many foreign observers.20 These complaints specified that the Army is absorbing an unjustified percentage of the budget, filling too many overseas PME slots, skewing the training/exercise process, and refusing to go along with the defense modernization embodied in the 2000 defense reorganization laws. MND officials complained that true reform could not occur until the Army’s “over balance” in administration and operation of the military was reduced. Minister of National Defense Lee seems determined to establish a balanced defense establishment, but faces both a complex political environment, and the inter-service rivalries common in all proud, dedicated armed services.21 These must be moderated to the extent necessary to maximize joint effectiveness among Taiwan’s military. Many Taiwan officers and MND officials think jointness is occurring more on paper than in practice. While a difficult paradigm to develop, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps senior officers are particularly critical of the lack of progress, several directly blaming the Army for not supporting jointness. A particular point of weakness appears to be the planning process, where almost no liaison or joint planning officers from the various services are stationed at the other service headquarters.22 These problems almost certainly extend to the Reserve Command. Active duty officers stationed at Army headquarters say they “had nothing to do with” the reserves, who are trained under different doctrine from that of the active forces. Marine Corps reserve units reportedly will be absorbed by the Army reserve in 2005; Air Force reserve units are described as “small” and not ready to operate. 176

CONCLUSION

A joint MOFA-MND office was established in December 2002 to coordinate planning between the two ministries. MOFA individuals assigned to this office are frustrated at their lack of progress, which they not surprisingly attribute to MND recalcitrance, noting that “even the minor decisions” have to be made at “the most senior” MND levels. These officials also criticize former President Lee Teng-hui and President Chen Shui-bian for not taking the mainland military threat seriously.

Military readiness Concerns about Taiwan’s defense problems too often focus on hardware issues. Equipment capability is obviously important, as discussed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, but can be outweighed by other factors in the military equation. Some of these were highlighted in a 2001 analysis quoting Taiwan military officers: “top to bottom reform” was called for, specifically to combat low morale, “corruption in the arms procurement process, weak leadership, undue influence of the army, lax training and problems in integrating weapon systems from around the world.” KMT legislator and retired lieutenant general (LTG) Shuai Hua-min has argued that “we need to reform our organization, get a new defense system and deal with the threat from the PRC, all at once.”23 Army officers listed equipment readiness as the Army’s most serious problem; Army officers also listed lack of training funds; Air Force officers listed money for flying hours and long-range air-to-air missiles; Navy officers listed the lack of C4ISR and weak jointness; the Marine Corps listed obsolete equipment and reduced manning. None of these shortfalls would be included directly in the “special defense budget” that in 2004–2005 has been the focus of defense resource allocation debates in the administration and legislature. Formally designed, measured exercises are an important means of both training and evaluating military readiness. A mid-2004 report claimed that Taiwan “has in the past four years held the most frequent military exercise in the world.” Exercise categorization by size, complexity, or purpose was not specified in this report, but the number—over 400, averaging 47 “large-scale” drills per year—is impressive.24 Taiwan’s premier annual military exercises are the Hankuang series, the 21st of which began in April 2005 with a wargame. This first phase, with live-fire exercises and troop operations planned for June-August, was deemed successful by both Taiwan and U.S. military observers.25 Each Hankuang has a specific theme, but since at least 1997 all have been conducted in a framework of comprehensive joint warfare. The exercises’ basic assumption has been defense of Taiwan against a PLA attack, but air defense, anti-amphibious and anti-airborne assault operations, anti-submarine warfare, air-ground warfare integration, counter-terrorism, defense of the civilian infrastructure and urban warfare, IW and counter-IW, Reserve Command integration, and TAF use of non-airfield sites have all been included as exercise goals. 177

CONCLUSION

Additional, less all-inclusive exercises have focused on many of these same missions, as well as counter-bio terrorism, reserve forces mobilization, and antidecapitation drills. Exercises have been conducted at various sites on Taiwan and its lesser islands, including Jinmen, Penghu, Pingtung County, and Taipei. A new major training base is planned for the Hsinchu area, in northern Taiwan.26 This long series of exercises yield important “lessons learned,” including the central importance of defending against the PLA air threat from both manned aircraft and missiles. While the ballistic missiles Beijing keeps adding to in Fujian Province receive most of the media attention, China is also rapidly developing cruise missiles that will be even more difficult for Taiwan’s air defenses to counter. The most difficult problem highlighted by these exercises is preserving TAF assets from destruction by initial Chinese attack, so that they may engage PLAAF attackers and strike PLAN combatant and amphibious ships.27 Anti-decapitation exercises reflect the military’s concern about a dissimilar, but no less dangerous, mainland strategy; Taiwan’s military and civilian leadership, its nuclear power plants, which provide almost one-tenth of the island’s power, and other civilian infrastructure nodes are all likely targets of PLA Special Forces or Fifth Columnists.28 Taiwan cannot afford to ignore possible imaginative steps toward improving its defense posture. In 2003, the TAF began experimenting with using superhighways as contingency airfields; several “flyby” exercises were conducted in July 2004, and on the twenty-first of the month two Mirage 2000 fighters landed, rearmed and refueled, and then took off from the Sun Yat-sen Freeway near Tainan AB.29 At least six “wartime runways” have been identified, in Chungli, Huatan, Minhsiung, Jente, Matou, and Tungshih.30 Additional exercises have not occurred and are not planned, however, reportedly because the government fears further use of civilian highways by the TAF would alarm the public.31 Similar concerns reportedly have limited other operational developments for Taiwan’s army, with exercises limited by topography and an infrastructure that cannot support the armored forces. Areas available for conducting military exercises are also growing scarcer as the population increases and the economy expands.

Civil–Military concerns Effective jointness is lacking not only at the strategic and operational levels, but also in administration and policy-making. The Taiwan military culture, like most, is conservative and slow to change. That may be exaggerated in Taiwan’s case by the seriousness of the Chinese threat, with only the United States as a potential ally, and also perhaps because of its rich tradition as a KMT party army throughout the first 75 years or so of its existence. The dynamic political situation in Taipei is characterized by a president without a legislative majority or even a unified party, a still-developing civil–military 178

CONCLUSION

relationship with rifts between legislature and defense establishment, and an extremely daunting geopolitical situation. Officers interviewed between 1999 and 2005 have been frank in their comments and criticism about their own service, their sister services, MND leadership, and the civilian administration, which may indicate a significant level of dissatisfaction among military officers, which in turn implies a serious difference of viewpoint between military officers and the civilian administration. There does not appear to be any attitudes that might give rise to the possibility of unconstitutional action by the military, but rather doubts about dedication to Taiwan as a “nation.” Other factors contributing to these differing perspectives include: 1 2 3 4

5 6 7

the incomplete civilianization of MND; the military is still in the early stages of developing jointness; all the services suffer from budget shortfalls in training and readiness; the services in general operate capable equipment and weapons systems, but strongly believe they are lagging PLA modernization; the Marine Corps is an exception, with its M41 tanks, obsolete AAVs, and lack of helicopters; given its halving in strength in the past two years and lack of clear missions, the Corps may well be absorbed into the Army, perhaps as early as 2006; most significant are widely-expressed doubts about the willingness to fight by enlisted personnel; the attitude among some military officers and civilian officials that Taiwan’s defense is a US responsibility; and by inference (and as vocalized by some interlocutors) the attitude that Taiwan does not need to increase defense spending: either the United States will defend Taiwan or it will not, in which case the island’s status vis-à-vis the mainland is hopeless.

The US role US support for the Chinese people dates back well into the nineteenth century, based originally on the efforts of American missionaries, the interests of American businessmen, and Chinese aspirations to establish democratic governance. This affinity transferred to Taiwan with the Chiang Kai-shek government in 1949 and was maintained as a product of the Cold War, when the Taipei regime was an ally in the fight against communism. That said, deciding to intervene in a Taiwan scenario would still pose difficult issues for any American president. First, while the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) does not dictate American intervention to prevent non-peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, it certainly implies that role. Second, Washington’s post-September 11, 2001 “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT) continues in 2005 to place very heavy demands on US military resources in areas far from the Taiwan theater. While the commitments in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere are most heavily impacting the Army and 179

CONCLUSION

Marine Corps, the Navy and Air Force are also stretched thin. Significant US military intervention in a Taiwan scenario will require the transfer of forces from other commitments around the world. Furthermore, the costs of these conflicts will extend well beyond actual combat, as the United States will require significant time and money to restore its military weapons supplies and manpower from the ravages of the Iraqi commitment. Third, US military intervention faces time–distance constraints, as indicated in Table 14, which explains the delays incurred by US naval forces dispatched to Taiwan. Aircraft carriers would be able to launch aircraft while several hundred miles from Taiwan, but imaginative employment of its submarines by Beijing could slow the carriers’ arrival at even those distances. Presumably, US air forces stationed in Korea, Japan, and on Guam could intervene almost immediately, but their effectiveness would be reduced by the distances they would have to fly to reach the scene of action. This raises a fourth issue: the willingness of US allies in East Asia to support military intervention. American mutual defense treaties with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia do not commit those nations to support US military action against China in order to defend Taiwan. For one thing, none of those nations recognize Taiwan as a sovereign country and like the United States “do not challenge” Beijing’s claim that the island is “part of China.” For another, all recognize the Table 14 The time–distance factora From

To

Distance in nmb

Time in days at 12 kts c

Time in days at 20 kts

West Coast West Coast West Coast Hawaii Hawaii Japan Guam East Coast via Cape of Good Hope East Coast via Cape Horn

Hawaii Japan Guam Japan Guam Guam Keelung Singapore

2,223 4,755 5,289 3,346 3,303 1,359 1,470 8,364 12,138 6,879 13,561

8 16.5 18.5 11.5 11.5 5 5 29 42 24 47

4.6 10 11 7 7 3 3 17.5 25 14 28

Guam

Source: B.D. Cole, with distances from Hydrographic Office Publication (HO Pub) 151 http:// pollux.nss.nima.mil/pubs/pubs_j_show_sections.html?dpathDBP&ptid5&rid189. Notes a A speed of advance (SOA) of 12 kts allows an aircraft carrier to conduct flight operations as desired; an SOA of 20 kts makes that difficult and also makes it very difficult for escorting ships to keep up with the carrier. Distances are for Great Circle routes, including Panama Canal transit for East Coast ships except as otherwise noted. b 1 nautical mile (nm) equals approximately 1.1 statute miles. c 1 knot (kt) equals approximately 1.2 mph.

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growing economic and strategic gravitas China brings to Asia. Japan’s attitude would be the most important, given the presence on Japanese territory of major US military bases. US military action in the Taiwan Strait area would be difficult without Tokyo’s full cooperation, including use of Japanese bases, especially Okinawa. No US allies advocate military support of Taiwan’s de facto independence; should American military forces be committed to that mission, however, a minimum level of support is likely to be forthcoming from Japan and Australia, but it would be directed to support the United States, not Taiwan. The response by American allies would be more robust in the unlikely event of an unprovoked attack by the PRC against Taiwan. Fifth, the domestic political environment in the United States will affect the decision to intervene and the strength of intervention. Both the legislative and executive branches, irrespective of party, strongly support Taiwan democracy, but will be hesitant to commit US troops to the defense of a semi-ally, especially if Taipei is perceived as not doing all it should to build its own defenses. Washington’s ability to push Taiwan to devote greater resources to its defense is limited and Congress is especially disturbed by Taipei’s inability to pass the Special Defense Budget, on more than one occasion urging that the special budget be passed “in full and without further delay.”32 American reluctance to intervene would be far higher if Taiwan is seen as provoking the crisis. The spring 1996 crisis in the Taiwan Strait has imbued the TRA with neartreaty authority in the minds of Chinese and Taiwanese policy-makers. The United States effectively intervened in this crisis by deploying two aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs) to the area, intervention that apparently surprised Beijing and for which the PLA was unprepared and unable to counter.33 China has appreciated the power of American military might demonstrated in the Iraqi wars of 1991 and 2003, and the Afghanistan campaign in 2001–2002, but Beijing remains undaunted by possible US intervention in a Taiwan Strait scenario. The PLA is systematically analyzing lessons learned from these conflicts, closely watching the continuing struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan, and exercising extensively to find the means to achieve Taiwan reunification despite probably US intervention. These lessons include the need in modern warfare for the armed forces to fight jointly; the efficacy of airpower, especially when armed with precision guided munitions (PGMs); the fact that space is a vital warfare theater; the importance of information operations; the necessity of fielding special operations forces; and the importance of doctrinal development.34 Taipei’s defense policies influence and are influenced—perhaps even driven— by US attitudes and policies. Taiwan’s military equipment comes almost completely from US sales or designs. The “shopping list” approved by President George W. Bush in April 2001 was the most dramatic offering since his father authorized the F-16 sale in 1992. At least as important as equipment, however, has been “soft” American military assistance to Taiwan. Technical assistance and logistical support has 181

CONCLUSION

accompanied virtually all material assistance; this was facilitated while the United States maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan by the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) established in Taipei in 1951, the Taiwan Defense Command, and the large American military presence on the island. At its peak, the MAAG numbered 1,886 personnel and included Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps divisions.35 Since 1979, that role has been played by the much smaller Technical Assistance Group, consisting of less than a dozen retired US military personnel, stationed at the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the unofficial US representative office in Taipei. The United States has continued this training and assistance program with Taiwan, highlighted by the F-16 training program for TAF pilots at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona. Additionally, the US Department of Defense (DOD) has conducted more than a dozen assessments of Taiwan’s military capabilities between 1997 and 2004. These have been conducted by mid-grade military officers (0–6 and below) and civilian specialists under the direction of the US Pacific Command and have evaluated infrastructure weaknesses, the island’s C4ISR structure, the Marine Corps, and the Taiwan military’s abilities to defend against air attack, naval blockades, submarines, and amphibious assaults. The results of these studies have been mixed. Taiwan’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability was rated as “poor,” but the Marine Corps and port security received “positive findings.”36 The United States has also provided training assistance team visits and other advice, particularly in the areas of joint operations, C4ISR, air defense doctrine, missile defense, information warfare, modeling and simulation for war gaming, and logistics management.37 The US National Defense University (NDU) has established an agreement with Taiwan’s NDU for the exchange of students, faculty, and annual strategic discussions. American mid-grade active duty and senior retired officers have observed several Taiwan military exercises since 2001 to evaluate the Taiwan military performance, and to survey possible noncombatant evacuation of US citizens, should the need arise. US and Taiwan military experts do not necessarily agree on how best to equip and organize the island’s military; similarly, defense analysts on the island may hold an unjustifiable view of Taiwan’s strategic importance to the United States. One former senior security advisor has written that “Taiwan is an indispensable partner for Washington,” and invoked the “first island chain,” a strategic construct that originated in China but has only rarely appeared in recent PLA writings.38 A senior Taiwan military officer also commented that “the U.S. should just give Taiwan the weapons we need, since we are the U.S.’s strategic outpost in Asia.”39 These differences are fed by Taiwan pride, resource limitations, and sensitivity to the tenuous political environment in Taipei. On the American side, the lack of formal recognition of Taiwan, the few American experts available in Taipei and Washington to address the issues, the resources demands of the GWOT, the US priority on maintaining good relations with the PRC, and the reservations toward 182

CONCLUSION

American Taiwan policy by its most important Asian allies, Australia, Japan, and Singapore, all bound US options in the cross-strait situation. US assistance to Taiwan is vital but limited; what is more important to the island’s military officers and defense officials is the lack of clear parameters to that assistance. In the three communiqués between the United States and China— 1972, 1978, and 1982—American support for Taiwan was hedged by adherence to a “one China” policy expressed in the 1982 language in which Washington stated that it had “no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China’s internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’.”40 Counterposed to this is the TRA’s assurances to Taiwan of “such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability, and asserts that Washington will view with “grave concern” any Chinese effort to determine Taiwan’s future by “other than peaceful means.” These provisions, however, are also caveated.41 The picture is further clouded by the actions of the 2001–2004 Bush Administration. The President first promised, in April 2001, to “do whatever it took” to help Taiwan defend itself, but in December 2003 during a joint conference with China’s Premier Wen Jiabao, cautioned Taipei not to upset the current cross-strait balance, stating that “the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose.”42 Hence, Taiwan military planners cannot be certain even about the parameters of the playing field on which they might be forced to defend against the PLA. Most Americans support the people of Taiwan and dislike the communist government in Beijing, but the enormous economic links between the United States and China are a significant factor in the triangular relationship.43 Americans might also wonder how much Taipei values its de facto independence when its economy is becoming increasingly interdependent with the mainland’s. Taiwan democracy is important to the United States, but sending young Americans to die for it may not be supported. A September 2004 poll showed only 33 percent of the US respondents support committing American troops to Taiwan’s defense, while a January 2005 poll indicated only 25 percent of Americans would support “using U.S. military power to defend Taiwan.”44 A similar lack of enthusiasm may exist in the Congress.45 The thorny nature of the US–Taiwan relationship is not new, but Taipei’s declining defense budgets are clouding American support. Indeed, there are indicators that Washington takes the threat of Chinese military action against Taiwan more seriously than does Taipei. Several senior US Government officials have cautioned Taiwan that Washington’s commitment to its security is being negatively affected by its perceived reluctance to invest in its own defense and would have “serious repercussions.” Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless warned Taiwan defense officials in October 2004 that: “Make no mistake, the passage of this budget is 183

CONCLUSION

a litmus test of Taiwan’s commitment to its self-defense.”46 Even stronger sentiments were expressed by former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in February 2005. After noting the Bush administration’s decision to make a wide variety of weapons available to Taipei for the first time, he stated that “Taiwan has not purchased any weapons from the United States. . . . we must say Taiwan is not quite serious about its own defense.”47 This is not fair, focusing on the Special Defense Budget before the LY and ignoring the very considerable steps Taiwan is taking otherwise to strengthen its defenses. Armitage’s statement does reflect, however, the political symbolism of the Special Budget, as well as the increasing frustration in Washington about Taipei’s activities. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia James Kelly urged Chen Shui-bian to take Chinese threats seriously in April 2004 Congressional testimony.48 Secretary of State Colin Powell issued even harsher cautions to Taipei during an October 2004 press interview.49 The United States is attempting to steer a difficult path between not allowing a communist dictatorship to overpower a democratic society, while simultaneously not allowing that democracy to drag it into a war with a nuclear-armed China.

Conclusion Minister of Defense Lee Jye argued in March 2005 that Taiwan’s military had “enough equipment and supplies to sustain a conflict with the Mainland for two weeks at the most.” He implied that this was a satisfactory state of affairs, since “U.S. intervention forces would take one week to reach the island.” He also opined that passage of the Special Defense Budget (and presumably fielding its systems) would allow the Taiwan military to “last a short time longer,” but then claimed that this “arms procurement” would “ensure peace across the Taiwan Strait for 30 years.”50 The Minister seems overly optimistic in this report, both in noting the length of time it would take US forces to arrive and in his “30 years” estimate. This estimate was also offered without apparent regard for China’s almost certain continued attention to improving its military capability. The PLA is not standing still. It also indicates that the scope of US intervention is not understood in Taipei: the American goal would not necessarily be to establish Taiwan’s independence, but merely to force a halt to Chinese military action. The political situation in Taipei is characterized by a president without a legislative majority or even a unified party, a still-developing civil–military relationship with rifts between legislature and defense establishment, and an extremely daunting geopolitical situation. The key point in the calculus of American military support for Taiwan seems to lie in the views expressed by Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Michael Ying-mao Kau, immediately following the November 2004 US presidential election. Kau stated that while tension would continue across the Strait, he foresaw “no cross-strait war.” He continued to note that “only the United States is qualified” to intervene in the cross-strait 184

CONCLUSION

situation.51 As baldly stated to the author by at least two Taiwan military officers and a seminar of graduate students in Taipei, why spend more money on defense if (a) one does not credit the PRC threat to employ military force, or (b) the United States is certain to intervene in the event of such an attack. The most realistic strategic estimate of Taiwan’s position is that of a former US Pacific Commander, who urged Taipei to “reverse the decline in [its] military spending of the past decade,” but then noted the difficulty the PLA would face attacking the island, and concluded that “to win,” Taiwan “needs only to endure and pose a threat.”52 In other words, the foundation of Taiwan’s military defense remains the dedication and professional skill of its military and the will of its civilian government and people. Given present trends in China and Taiwan, only successful US intervention could alter the military calculus. Taiwan’s defensive capability requires, more than anything else, the realization that, even if US support is forthcoming, the island will have to be capable of defending itself against the PLA for at least a month. Japan and Australia are strong enough American allies that they might— albeit reluctantly—support US military action against China in support of Taiwan should China launch an unprovoked military assault.53 Recent exercises indicate that the island’s military leadership is trying to prepare for the full spectrum of possible Chinese military options, from sabotage to missile strikes to amphibious assault. Defensive improvements underway include a more survivable air defense, better integrated command and control, and improved joint operational capability. These measures also legitimately include “active defense”: the ability to strike selected Chinese targets to derange PLA efforts systemically. The government’s support for these objectives is inadequate, however, and demonstrates that it does not understand the basic principles of defense: ensuring the compatibility of ways, means, and ends. The government must either match Taiwan’s military capabilities to its political goals, or change those goals to reflect the commitment it is willing make to defense. Chen Shui-bian’s remaining three years in office do not provide enough time for Taiwan to operationalize the weapons and sensors made available by the United States. What his administration can do in that time is educate its electorate about the military threat posed by the mainland, adjust its rhetoric to that reality, and provide the military with the increased resources it requires to pose a credible defense of Taiwan.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Organization of Taiwan’s General Staff (2004) Office of Deputy Chief of General Staff for Intelligence Responsible for the armed forces intelligence efforts, including policy formulation and implementation, collection, processing, application of intelligence, provision of intelligence guidance, mapping and topography, weather forecasting, military counter-intelligence, liaison and protocol, and military diplomacy. Office of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Operations and Planning Responsible for (1) delineating the strategic concepts and guidance for defensive operations; (2) planning and directing relevant operational policies; (3) planning joint defensive operations plan; (4) delineating readiness regulations for operations in defense of Taiwan and Penghus; (5) planning order of battle and force deployment; (6) delineating the restricted water, no-fly zone, and national policies for defensive engineering facilities; reviewing and approving the requirements criteria for operational engineering; (7) coordinating itineraries of superior officers and reviewing those of subordinated forces; (8) writing contingencies regulations for peacetime readiness and crisis; (9) management; (10) conducting joint operations exercises; (11) enforcing the restrictions limiting construction on mountains, coast-land, and important military facilities (including garrison points); (12) formulating the policies and writing the directives for annual troop training; (13) developing troop training grounds and supervising troop inspections; (14) planning, coordinating, and inspecting physical and fitness training; (15) planning officer on-the-job training programs; (16) planning and supervising NBC protection and readiness; (17) planning, implementing, and evaluating integrated air defense readiness and programming control; (18) hazardous rescue and disaster relief operations; (19) collecting, processing, reporting, and disseminating real-time operational intelligence; (20) establishing the Armed Forces

186

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Typhoon Emergency Center; (21) supervising the modeling and simulation of joint operations and the use of computerized war gaming; (22) outlining operational estimates, formulating future operational plans, developing exercise and war game scenarios, validating operational plans feasibility and assessing combat effectiveness; (23) evaluating, analyzing, and formulating initiatives to enhance joint operations and integrating the operational requirements of all services; (24) reviewing, analyzing, and recommending the force structure plan to be formed from individual service submissions and recommending defense resources allocation; (25) integrating the requirements for the joint operations C2 automation system, and developing an operational command and staff management information system; (26) formulating the combat readiness plan and wartime policies, and coordinating acquisition of operational resources and contingent requirements for joint commanders; (27) updating the general operations situation, briefing joint operations, and coordinating among services and allied forces; (28) planning and recommending regional cooperation and support of military operations; (29) recommending and executing military cooperation policies; (30) compiling the annual budget plan for the General Staff Headquarters; (31) recommending the organization and equipment, allocation of strength, and responsibilities for the General Staff and its subordinate institutions and forces; (32) other matters related to operations and planning, as directed.

Office of the Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Logistics Responsible for (1) formulating, supervising and implementing logistics policies for military readiness and operations; (2) providing recommendations for logistic readiness requirements and resources distribution to military policy-makers and armaments designers; (3) supervising the distribution, maintenance, management, and training required by the acquisition of materiel; (4) leading and organizing the joint logistics center; (5) providing logistics estimates, analysis, and recommendations; (6) formulating and executing logistics support plans. 1. Organization. Executive Office of the DCGS and the General Administration, Materiel Readiness, Logistics Management Divisions. a. The General Administration Division is responsible for executing logistic plans for military readiness and operations; b. The Material Readiness Division is responsible for materiel preparation and management, as well as the maintenance and operation of logistic capabilities; c. The Logistics Management Division is responsible for the control of logistic capabilities and battlefield management, including logistics estimates, information management, and military transportation.

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Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Communications, Electronics, and Information Reponsible for the policy-making, planning, and implementation of programs of military communications, electronic warfare, C4ISR and information warfare. General Affairs Office Responsible for administrative affairs supports, military honor duty for the Minister of National Defense; and secretarial affairs, transport supply, comptroller, public affairs, and supervising guard and service troops of the MND. Missions include enforcing military-honor-duty to publicize soldiers’ discipline; ensuring precise budget accountability to encourage legal use of public funds; and completing communications with the Legislative Yuan to safeguard the image of ROC Armed Forces.

Military Intelligence Bureau The Special Work Department is responsible for intelligence collection and personnel training; the Investigation and Statistics Bureau collects and collates data; the Counterespionage Bureau is responsible for defending against espionage; the Intelligence Bureau is responsible for early-warning intelligence collection and analysis at the strategic level.

Appendix B: US–China Communiqués (1972, 1979, 1982) website US–China Communiques (1972, 1979, 1982) are at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/ apsg/communiques.htm

Appendix C: US Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 (Excerpt) US Taiwan–Relations Act (Public Law 96–8, 96th Congress): Excerpt (Full Text at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/apsg/communiques.htm). To help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan, and for other purposes. Sec. 2. (a) The President having terminated governmental relations between the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, the Congress finds that 188

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the enactment of this Act is necessary (1) to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific; and (2) to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan; (3) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern; (4) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means; (5) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States; (6) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and (7) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan. (c) Nothing contained in this Act shall contravene the interest of the United States in human rights, especially with respect to the human rights of all the approximately 18 million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people of Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States. Sec. 3. (a) In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. (c) The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people of Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.

Appendix D: Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan: 1992–2005 Canada 30 Bell-206 JetRanger Light helicopters (1997–1999). Ordered via the US.

France 60 Mirage 2000–5 fighter aircraft (1992–1998), with 960 MICA and 480 Magic2 air-to-air missiles (1996–1998) for Mirage 2000–5: $1.2 billion (costs in US dollars). 6 La Fayette-/Kang Ding-class FFGs (1996–1998): $2.8 billion. 189

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United States Helicopters – – – – – – – – – – –

26 Bell-206/OH-58D(I) combat helicopters (1993–1995): $367 million. 13 Bell-206/OH-58D(I)s (1999–2000): US$172 million, including ammunition; assembled in Taiwan. 42 Bell-209/AH-1W combat helicopters (1993–1997). 21 Bell-209/AH-1Ws (2000–2002): $479 million. 9 CH-47SD Chinook medium-lift helicopters (2002–2003). Cost US$300–486 million. 4 S-70A/UH-60L Super Blue Hawk helicopters (1997–1998), for Search and Rescue mission. 11 S-70B/SH-60B Seahawk ASW helicopters (2000–2001). 209/AH-1W helicopters. 684 AGM-114A Hellfire anti-tank missiles (1993–1995), for Bell-206/OH58D and Bell. 240 AGM-114K Hellfires (2001): $23 million. 400 AGM-114A Hellfires (2005). Fixed-wing aircraft

– – – – – – – – –

4 C-130H Hercules transport aircraft (1994–1996). 4 C-130H Hercules (1997–1998): $200 million. 4 E-2C(T) Hawkeye AEW&C aircraft (1994–1995): $700 million. 2 E-2C(T) Hawkeyes (2003–2005): $400 million. 150 F-16C fighter aircraft (1997–1999): $5.8 billion, including 600 AIM-7M and 900 AIM-9S air-to-air missiles. 40 AGM-65G Maverick anti-surface missiles (2003), for F-16s: $18 million. 200 AIM-120C air-to-air missiles (2001–2003) for F-16s: $150 million. 58 RGM-84 Harpoons (1999–2000): $101 million; AGM-84 version for F-16s. 182 AIM-9M-2 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles (by 2006): $17 million. Army/Marine corps equipment

– – – – – – –

28 M-109A5 self-propelled guns (1998). 54 LVTP-7A1/AAV-7A1 rebuilt, ex-US APCs (beginning 2005): $156 million. 160 M-60A3 modernized, ex-US Patton-2 Main Battle Tanks (1995–1998): $91 million. 300 M-60A3 ex-US Patton-2 Main Battle Tanks (1998–2002): $223 million. 4 M-88A1 Armor Recovery Vehicles (1995). 1 AN/FPS-117 Air Surveillance Radar (1999) GE-592 version; part of ‘Sky Net’ air defense network. 11 AN/FPS-117s Air Surveillance Radar (2002).

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– – – – – –

786 BGM-71E TOW-2A anti-tank missiles (1999–2001): $80 million, including 114 launchers. 290 BGM-71F TOW-2Bs (2002–2003): $18 million. 299 FIM-92A Stinger portable surface-to-air missiles (1999–2001): $420 million, including 74 Avenger surface-to-air missiles. 728 Stingers (2000–2001): $180 million, including 61 launchers. 360 Javelin anti-tank missiles (2002): $51 million, including 40 launchers. 3 Patriot (PAC-II) surface-to-air missile systems (1996–1997): $1.3 billion, including 200 Patriot missiles. Navy equipment

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

6 Phalanx Mk-15 CIWS (1996–1998), for Kang Ding FFGs: $75 million. 12 R-76 fire control radars (1994–2000); for 12 Jin Chiang-class corvettes. 282 MIM-72F ex-US Chaparral surface-to-air missiles (2000). 38 RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship missiles (1995): $68 million; for Chi Yangclass frigates. 52 RGM-84 Harpoons (1998–2000). Cost US$95 million. 71 RGM-84 Harpoons (2002). 22 RGM-84L Harpoons (2003) for Chi Teh-class destroyers. 97 RIM-66B Standard-1MR surface-to-air missiles for Cheng Kung-class FFGs (1993–1994): $55 million. 383 RIM-66B Standard-1MRs (1994–2001) for Cheng Kung-class frigates. 100 RIM-66M Standard-2s (2003) for Chi Teh-class destroyers. 4 Aggressive (Yung Yang)-class ex-US minesweepers (1994–1995): $2.5 million. 2 Anchorage (Shui Hai)-class ex-US landing ships dock(LSD) (2000, 2006). 3 Bolster-class ex-US salvage ships (1999–2000). 4 Kidd (Chi The)-class ex-US DDGs (2005–2006): $740 million. 4 Knox (Chi Yang)-class ex-US frigates (1995–1998) $225 million for 5-year lease. 4 Knox (Chi Yang)-class (2002–2003). 2 Newport (Chung Ho)-class ex-US landing-ship-tanks (LSTs) (1997).

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1 INTRODUCTION 1 Just as “China” will often be used to refer to the People’s Republic of China, “Taiwan” will often be used to refer to the Republic of China (ROC). The Taipei administration has continued to refer to its government as the ROC, continuing the post-1911 tradition; the Chen Shui-bian government’s pushing to characterize the ROC as less Chinese has given rise to increased use of “Taiwan,” but no political judgment is intended in this book by using either ROC or Taiwan, or China or the PRC. North Korea is surrounded by concerned parties: China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea; Taiwan may prove the cause of the world’s first conflict between two nuclear-armed powers, China and the United States. 2 With Grenada’s December 2004 shift of recognition from Taipei to Beijing, the following twenty-five countries recognize an independent Republic of China: Belize, Burkina Faso, Chad, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gambia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Kiribati, Malawi, the Marshall Islands, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Sao Tome and Principe, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Vincent and The Grenadines, Senegal, the Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Tuvalu, and the Vatican. At least forty-five nations maintain missions in Taipei that do not embody diplomatic recognition. 3 The US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, which states that establishing diplomatic relations with the PRC “rests on the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.” 4 Remarks accompanying submission to Congress of the Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) for China, March 8, 2000, quoted in Gerrit Gong, “Cross-Strait Cross-Fire,” Comparative Connections, Honolulu, HI: Pacific Forum CSIS, 2000, Online: www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/001Qchina_taiwan.html 5 The “Bashi Channel,” the channel between Taiwan and Luzon, is usually included as part of the “Luzon Strait.” 6 Weapons ranges and geographic distances are given in nautical miles, one of which equals approximately 1.2 statute miles. 7 Author’s interviews with US Navy Meteorological Service officers, August 1999. One fathom equals 6 feet or 1.83 meters. 8 “President Chen’s New Year’s Day Address: ‘Creating a New and Stable Environment for Consultation and Dialogue’,” released by the Office of the President, Taipei, and quoted in FBIS-CPP20050101000055, January 1, 2005, pp. 4–5. 9 Full text of Deng’s definition of “one country, two systems” is at http://www. chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004–02/19/content_307590.htm 10 The text of the Anti-Secession Law is at http://www.china.org.cn/english/ 20051h/122724.htm

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11 MND, ROC National Defense Report, 2002, Taipei: July 2002, Chapter 3, Section II, pp. 1–8, Online: www.mnd.gov.tw/report/revised/bb/Chapter%203–2.htm. This is not an impressive section of this report, but perhaps reflects the overwhelming focus on the PLA. 12 ROC National Defense Report, 2002, pp. 7ff. 13 Full text of the 2003 law is at http://cns.miis.edu/straittalk/Appendix%20141.htm, Appendix 141. 14 Taipei Times, Taiwan Yearbook: 2004, Taipei: Government Information Office, 2004, Online: http://ecommerce.taipeitimes.com/yearbook2004/P101.htm 15 ROC National Defense Report, 2002, Chapter 3 (“National Security Policy”), pp. 1–4. 16 Quoted in Martin Edmonds and York W. Chen, “An Assessment of the ROCN’s Modernization Program,” in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai (eds), Taiwan’s Maritime Security, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p. 91. 17 Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), National Defense Policy White Paper, “Executive Summary,” Taipei: November 1999, Point 4. 18 Quoted in Michael Kitchen, “VP Lien Calls for Long-Range Missiles, Cross-Strait Hot Line,” China Post, Taipei, December 9, 1999, p. 1. 19 Discussed in Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, The Armies of East Asia: China, Taiwan, Japan, and the Koreas, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 2001, p. 144. 20 Discussed in Edmonds and Chen, “An Assessment of the ROCN’s Modernization Program,” p. 100. 21 Ministry of National Defense, “The PRC’s Military Strength Report for 2004 (Public Version),” Taipei, 2004, p. 20. In November 2004, a senior Ministry of Defense official told the author the balance could be maintained until “2008 or 2010.” 22 Among the many notable works on these interests are John King Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: The Opening of the Treaty Ports 1842–1854, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953; also see Paul A. Varg, Missionaries, Chinese, and Diplomats: The American Protestant Missionary Movement in China, 1890–1952, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1958; Bernard D. Cole, Gunboats and Marines: The U.S. Navy in China, 1925–1928, Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 1982; and a novel by John Hersey, The Call: An American Missionary in China, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985. 23 Quoted in “Woodrow Wilson: Repudiation of ‘Dollar Diplomacy’,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. VII, pp. 338–9. http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/ ww83.htm 24 Harold R. Isaacs, Scratches on Our Minds: American Views of China and India, New York: John Day, 1958, remains a valuable work on the development of this American view of China. 25 Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Guam, Honolulu, Houston, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Francisco, and Seattle. 26 Discussed in Michael D. Swaine, “Deterring Conflict in the Taiwan Strait: The Successes and Failures of Taiwan’s Defense Reform and Modernization Program,” Carnegie Paper Number 46, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), July 2004, p. 13. The motto of the Monterey talks is described as “software, not hardware” in Michael Pillsbury, “The U.S. Role in Taiwan’s Defense Reforms,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2, Winter 2003/2004, p. 70. 27 “1982 U.S.–P.R.C. Joint Communique,” in Shirley A. Kan, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Order Code RL30341, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC: CRS, June 1, 2004, p. 38. 28 See Ambassador James Lilley’s account of his conversation with President Reagan, in Kerry B. Dumbaugh, Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices, CRS, Order Code IB98034, Washington, DC: April 2003, p. 5.

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29 Unless otherwise noted, all monetary amounts will be given in US dollars. 30 Shirley A. Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, Congressional Research Service, Order Code RL30957, Washington, DC: March 21, 2005, p. 2. 31 See Alan D. Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy Toward Taiwan and U.S.–PRC Relations, Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003, p. 105; this work is an excellent description of US policy toward China and Taiwan. 32 This statement should probably be qualified in the case of the TRA: see Lester L. Wolff and David L. Simon (eds), Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act, Baltimore, MD: OPRSCAS, 1982, for a description of Taipei’s representatives’ activities during formulation and passage of the TRA. 33 Kan, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy, p. 39. 34 Ibid., p. 50. 35 Ibid., p. 58; the third point was expressed in the 1995 letter as not supporting Taiwan’s admission to the United Nations (p. 52). 36 Quoted in CNN Interview, “Bush Vows ‘whatever it takes’ to Defend Taiwan” (April 25, 2001), Online: archives.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/04/25/bush.taiwan.03. But also see http://www.issues2000.org/2004/George W. Bush_Foreign_Policy.htm, for varying reports of what the President actually said. 37 Frequent American citing of this legal requirement may have played a role in Beijing’s passage of the Anti-Secession Law in February 2005 declaring Taiwan’s secession from the PRC to be illegal, although the major motivation for the new law was likely the evolution of what Beijing perceived to be independence-oriented developments in Taiwan in 2003–2004. 2 HISTORY OF TAIWAN’S MILITARY 1 T.S. Eliot on the Spanish Civil War, cited in Michael R. Stevens, “T. S. Eliot’s Political ‘Middle Way’,” Religion and Liberty, Vol. 9, No. 5, September–October 1999 http:// www.acton.org/publicat/randl/print_article.php?id320 2 Sun Yat-sen’s address at the opening exercises, quoted in F.F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China, 1924–1949, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956, p. 8. 3 Jane L. Price, Cadres, Commanders, and Commissars: The Training of the Chinese Communist Leadership, 1920–1945, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1976, p. 57. Price’s Ch. 4 remains an excellent description of Whampoa’s founding and organization. 4 Mao Zedong, “Letter to Comrade Lin Piao,” January 5, 1930; also in Mao, On Contradiction, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, August 1937, Ch. IV. 5 Monte Bullard reminded me that Chiang did in fact commit his best troops against the Japanese invaders during the late 1930s; the Nationalists’ defeat made Chiang reluctant to reengage the Japanese. 6 Chennault was an early advocate of air power who had been retired from the US Army Air Corps in 1937 for medical reasons as a captain; he became a civilian advisor to the Chinese Air Force in 1938 at the invitation of Madame Chiang Kai-shek. He organized the Flying Tigers in 1941, a group of American volunteers that disbanded in 1942, after which he was recalled to active duty and promoted to brigadier general by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. 7 Barbara Tuchman, Stillwell and the American Experience in China, 1911–1945, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1970, remains the classic work on this period. 8 Marshall was in China from December 1945 to January 1947. 9 Edward L. Dreyer, China at War, 1901–1949, New York: Longman, 1995, p. 329. This is probably the single best description of the military aspects of the civil war’s final phases.

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10 Gary Bjorges, “Mobilization and the Huai-Hai Campaign,” Paper Presented at the RAND-CNA Conference on the PLA, February 23–25, 2005, at Airlie House, Warrenton, Virginia, pp. 1, 10. This campaign lasted approximately two months and involved more than one million soldiers on both sides. 11 Jonathan Fenby, Chiang Kai Shek: China’s Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost, New York: Carroll & Graf, 2003, pp. 486–7, 492. 12 Bjorges, “Mobilization and the Huai-Hai Campaign,” pp. 14, 16. 13 Notes from Monte Bullard, May 2005. 14 Illustrated history of The Republic of China Army, Taipei, 1997, pp. 156–7; in English and Chinese; presented to the author by the Taiwan Army G-5, November 2004. Referred to hereafter as “Illustrated History.” 15 George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1965, p. 72, attributes to Keh the expression “kuan wai,” meaning the Taiwanese were “beyond the pale of Chinese civilization.” 16 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945–1992: Uncertain Friendships, New York: Twayne, 1994, p. 26. 17 Cited in “Taiwan Strait I: What’s Left of ‘One China’,” International Crisis Group Asia Report No. 53, Washington, DC: ICG, June 6, 2003, p. 38. The 30,000 figure is on the http://www.duke.usask.ca~ss_tsa/228/intro.html, cited in Ibid., p. 5. At the other end of the scale, Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wu, Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991, pp. 155–64, give a detailed account of the incident and conclude that 8,000 Taiwanese were killed; the 1995 Taiwan Government Taskforce investigating the incident estimated that “18,000 to 28,000” lost their lives (cited by Masahiro Wakabayashi, “Overcoming the Difficult Past: Rectification of the 2–28 Incident and the Politics of Reconciliation in Taiwan,” in Yoichi Funabashi (ed.), Reconciliation in the Pacific, Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2003, p. 94). For KMT deaths, Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 2003, p. 68, cites a report that “about a thousand Mainlanders were killed or injured.” The incident has been officially memorialized in Taiwan since 1995. 18 “Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Strategic Importance of Formosa,” February 7, 1949, JCS 1966 Series, Microfilm Records of the JCS, 1946–1955, Far East: Roll 2. 19 David Finkelstein, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma, 1949–1950: From Abandonment to Salvation, Washington, DC: George Mason University Press, 1993, p. 31–2. 20 Acheson’s Letter of Transmittal, sending the White Paper to Truman, August 9, 1949, in The China White Paper, August 1949, Vol. I, Stanford, 1967, p. xiv. 21 “President Truman’s Statement on U.S. Policy Respecting the Status of Formosa, 5 January 1950,” American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955, Basic Documents, Vol. 2, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1961, p. 1669. 22 Finkelstein, Washington’s Taiwan Dilemma, pp. 292–6, describes this raid and the ensuing exchanges between Washington and Taipei. 23 “Statement Issued by the President, 27 June 1950,” Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1950, Vol. 7, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1976, pp. 202–3. 24 Personal Letter from Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson to MacArthur, 4 August 1950, Enclosure “B” to “Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense,” in “Note by the Secretaries to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Strategic Importance of Formosa,” February 7, 1949, JCS 1966 Series, Microfilm Records of the JCS, 1946–1955, Far East: Roll 2. 25 Edward J. Marolda, The U.S. Navy in the Cold War Era, 1945–1991, Washington, DC: US Naval Historical Center, 2000, discusses USN deployments during the Korean War, including those in the Taiwan Strait.

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26 Paul D. Stroop, Vice Admiral (VADM), US Navy (USN), Retired (Ret.), Reminisces, Oral History/Interviews by Etta-Belle Kitchen, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute, 1970, pp. 210–1. Stroop served ten months as patrol commander; his flagship was a seaplane tender stationed in Okinawa. 27 Truman J. Hedding, VADM, USN (Ret.), Reminisces, Oral History/Interviews by EttaBelle Kitchen, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute, 1972, p. 172; Hedding also served a tour as patrol commander. 28 “Draft Message from Stalin to Mao Zedong, 4 October 1950,” Document No. 5, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 14/15, Winter 2003–Spring 2004, p. 375; also see discussion on p. 370 by James G. Hershberg. 29 Robert Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950–1955, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, 1996, p. 39. The State Department, Defense Department, and the JCS all advised Truman to refuse this offer, in part because the Nationalist troops would have to be reequipped and trained by the United States before they could fight. 30 Tang Guodong, “Jinman Landing Battle,” PLA Daily, quoted in “Amphibious Warfare Capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army: An Assessment on Recent Modernizations,” http://www.chinadefense.com/pla/plaamphops/plaamphops02.html 31 Illustrated History, pp. 210–1. 32 John W. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and Cold War Strategy in Asia, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997, p. 148. Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, pp. 64ff., states that the CIA organization in Taiwan grew to 600 persons. The CIA efforts included its own procurement agent, Western Enterprises, and airline, Civil Air Transport. 33 Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, p. 121, cites US Ambassador to the ROC Karl Rankin, a strong Chiang Kai-shek supporter, as believing that “U.S. military representatives were giving Chiang advice at variance with that of the State Department.” 34 Ibid., pp. 84, 87, 125, 136. 35 Colonel Robert L. Walton, USA, US Military Assistance Advisory Group G-3 [Operations Officer], “Report on the Evacuation of the Tachen Islands,” in 1955 History of Army Section, MAAG, Taiwan, Ch. III, pp. 5ff., describes the evacuation (“Operation King Kong”) and makes clear the US pressure placed on Nationalist commanders in Taipei and on the Dachens; the local Nationalist commander reportedly never received orders from Taipei to evacuate the islands, perhaps because Chiang could not bring himself to issue orders to retreat in the face of a communist assault. According to Tuchman, p. 371, at the May 1943 “Trident” Conference in Washington, Stilwell responded to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s request to describe Chiang Kai-shek by describing him as “a vacillating tricky undependable old scoundrel who never keeps his word.” 36 He Di, “The Evolution of the People’s Republic of China’s Policy toward the Offshore Islands,” in Warren I. Cohen and Akira Iriye (eds), The Great Powers in East Asia, 1953–1960, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, p. 223. 37 Ibid., p. 110. 38 Quoted in Allen S. Whiting, “China’s Use of Force, 1950–1996, and Taiwan,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2, Fall, 2001, p. 108. 39 US Department of State, FRUS, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, Vol. II, pp. 2486ff. 40 Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, pp. 334–5. 41 See Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “John Foster Dulles and the Taiwan Roots of the ‘Two Chinas’ Policy,” in Richard H. Immerman (ed.), John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1990, pp. 241–4. Gordon H. Chang, “To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis,” International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4, Spring 1988, p. 102, paints a revisionist picture

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42 43

44 45 46

47

48 49

50 51 52 53

54

55

56

of Eisenhower and Dulles stumbling through the crisis and provides a believable description of Taipei’s perspective; H.W. Brands, Jr, “Testing Massive Retaliation: Credibility and Crisis Management in the Taiwan Strait,” International Security, Vol. 12, No. 4, Spring 1988, p. 146, presents a more realistic view of the policy-making process during this crisis. Brands, “Testing Massive Retaliation,” p. 149. He Di provides a detailed explanation of this crisis. Robert Bowie, Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, quoted in Brands, “Testing Massive Retaliation,” p. 130. Chang, “To the Nuclear Brink,” p. 198, indicates that on more than one occasion US officials (including the Secretary of Defense) raised the idea of deposing Chiang Kai-shek. Quoted in Brands, “Testing Massive Retaliation,” p. 134; emphasis added. Steven Phillips, Between Independence and Assimilation, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003, p. 133. See, Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995, pp. 583–4, citing Kruschev’s statement that when he became head of the USSR, “and learned all the facts about nuclear power, I couldn’t sleep for several days. Then I became convinced that we could never possibly use these weapons, and when I realized that, I was able to sleep again.” According to Secret National Intelligence Report (SNIE) 100-9-58, “Probable Developments in the Taiwan Strait Area,” August 26, 1958, p. 132, http://www. cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_declass_support/china%20conference/pdfs/snie_100_9_58. This was fully one-third of the total Taiwan Army; 16,000 troops were stationed on the Penghu Islands with the army’s remaining 331,000 personnel on Taiwan itself. Waldo Heinrichs, “Eisenhower and Sino-American Confrontation,” in Cohen and Iriye p. 99. See Jonathan T. Howe, Multicrises: Sea Power and Global Politics in the Missile Age, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971, pp. 167, 173. Apt here is Hans Morgenthau’s caution that “in alliances among unequals, the contributions of lesser members are at once wanted and of relatively little importance. . . . the greatest mistake a great power can make is to let a small ally drag it into war against its interests.” SNIE 100-9-58, p. 127. See Monte Bullard, The Soldier and the Citizen: The Role of the Military in Taiwan’s Development, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997, p. 29, on this point. Speech at the Moscow Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties, November 18, 1957, in Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1966, pp. 80–1. SNIE 100-4-59, p. 147, notes that “there were no defections from the offshore island garrisons or on Taiwan, and in fact Nationalist morale seemed to improve [during the artillery barrages].” However, two American Army lieutenant-colonels assigned to the US MAAG in Taipei were killed while visiting Jinmen on September 3, 1954. Joseph F. Bouchard, “Uses of Naval Force in Crises: A Theory of Stratified Crisis Interaction,” 3 vols, PhD diss., Stanford University, 1988, in the Operational Archives of the NHC, “Post-1974 Command File,” pp. 449ff., thoroughly explains the movements of US forces reacting to the 1958 Strait crisis, which included a Marine Corps air group. The Eisenhower Administration’s (including Dulles’s) view on the use of nuclear weapons against China is described in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “The United States, the Department of State, and China,” in Cohen and Iriye; also see Heinrichs, “Eisenhower and Sino-American Confrotation,” p. 100. This phase of the barrage, which consisted for the most part of shells filled with propaganda leaflets rather than explosives, ended in January 1979, when Washington shifted diplomatic recognition to Beijing.

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57 Quoted in Rosemary Foot, “Anglo-American Relations and China Policy,” in Cohen and Iriye, p. 157. 58 Bouchard, “Uses of Naval Forces in Crises,” p. 465, cites several sources. 59 VADM Wallace M. Beakley, letter to VADM A.M. Price, September 8, 1958, cited by Bouchard, “Uses of Naval Forces in Crises,” p. 475; Smoot, cited by Bouchard, pp. 313–5. 60 Bouchard, “Uses of Naval Forces in Crises,” pp. 459–60. 61 Quoted in He Di, “The Evolution of the People’s Republic of China’s Policy,” p. 239. 62 Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, pp. 69, 71. 63 Kennedy won this debating point, but the issue apparently did not play a significant role in the election. He accused Nixon of wanting to defend indefensible and unimportant islands, averring that “I do not intend to let Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists decide whether our troops shall fight on these islands.” Kennedy repeated this argument during the actual debate, noting that “I believe strongly in the defense of Formosa.” Nixon responded that the offshore islands were an “area of freedom” and were “steppingstones” for a communist attack on Formosa. The debate transcripts are available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/60 64 Quoted in Hungdah Chiu, “The Question of Taiwan in Sino-American Relations,” in Hungdah Chiu (ed.), China and the Taiwan Issue, New York: Praeger, 1979, p. 173. 65 Samuel Eliot Morison, The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War, Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1963, Chs. 8 and 13, describes Kirk’s record as the senior American amphibious commander in the European Theater of Operations, including commanding the US amphibious assault on Normandy. 66 Whiting, “China’s Use of Force,” p. 111. 67 Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, p. 45, notes that Kennedy’s pronouncement “promptly defused the crisis.” 68 1955 History of Army Section, MAAG, Taiwan, 1947–1955, Vol. IV, Draft ms., p. 1, in the US Center for Military History (CMH), File 8–6.4/AA1955. Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC), Command History for 1969, Vol. II, p. 43, in the NHC, also noted that the group was then named “MAAG China.” 69 JCS Memorandum dtd December 27, 1950, in Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Part 2: 1946–1953 “The Far East,” Reel 2. 70 1955 History of Army Section, MAAG, Taiwan, p. 15. 71 Cited in Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, p. 68. 72 1955 History of Army Section, MAAG, Taiwan, p. 38. 73 Walton, “Report on the Evacuation of the Tachen Islands,” p. 1. 74 Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, p. 67. The 1952 amount was 40 percent of total Mutual Defense Assistance Program funds. Unless otherwise specified, all monetary amounts will be given in US$ valued at the time. 75 Ibid., pp. 94–5. 76 MacArthur’s discussion of “unleashing” Chiang is at http://usinfo.org/usia/usinfo. state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/58.htm. For Eisenhower and Dulles’ use of the term, see Tucker, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, p. 36; and Chapter 18 of the official US Army history of the Korean Conflict http://www.army.mil/ cmh-pg/books/korea/truce/ch18.htm 77 CINCPAC, Command History for 1969, Vol. II, p. 48. 78 MacArthur himself made an unauthorized (by Washington) and unexpected (by Taipei), visit to the island. In the 1955 History of Army Section, MAAG, Taiwan, p. 22, Ambassador Karl Rankin stated that “the first indication of [MacArthur’s] presence on the island was a phone call to the Embassy announcing the fact that he was at Sung Shan Airport.” 79 Commander Destroyer Squadron SEVEN memo of September 13, 1955, “TG 72.1 Turnover Information,” NHC, also noted that the MAAG was not under the Formosa Defense Command (FDC), a less than perfect arrangement since while the MAAG

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80 81

82 83 84 85 86

87 88 89 90 91 92 93

94

95

96

coordinated “all combined U.S.–GRC training,” the FDC provided the US forces for that training. Bouchard, describes these commands in detail. Commander Destroyer Division 72 (CTG 72.1) report, “Combined Training Exercise conducted October 1, 1957 with Government of the Republic of China (GRC) Forces, October 7, 1957, p. 3, in Commander U.S. Taiwan Patrol Force Pacific Report for 1957, Operational Archives of the Naval Historical Center (NHC), Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC. CINCPAC, Command History for 1969, Vol. II, p. 80. ICG Asia Report No. 53, p. 18. Qimao Chen, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Causes, Scenarios, and Solutions,” in Suisheng Zhao (ed.), Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995–1996 Crisis, London: Routledge, 1999, p. 127. Ibid., p. 146; Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, p. 197. Qimao Chen, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis,” p. 146, estimates 20 percent stock market losses and 10 percent loss of the currency’s value. Nicholas Burns, quoted in Jaw-ling Joanne Chang, “The Taiwan-Strait Crisis of 1995–1996: Causes and Lessons,” in Chun-Chieh Huang and Feng-fu Tsao (eds), Postwar Taiwan in Historical Perspective, College Park, MD: University of Maryland, 1998, p. 286. Author’s conversations with US Navy officers. US Congress, HR 2479: “Taiwan Relations Act of 1979,” Washington, DC: USGPO, 1979. Whiting, “China’s Use of Force,” p. 123. Author’s May 1996 conversation with then Lieutenant General General Cao Gangchuang, later promoted general and appointed Minister of Defense. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, p. 11. Ibid., pp. 202–4, notes repeated US refusal of Taipei’s offer of troops to fight in South Vietnam, although Taiwan did establish a civic action program in that country and served as political advisors to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) Army. In Taipei in January 2002, in response to my suggestion at an open conference that Taiwan’s navy was devoting excessive resources to maintaining its extensive amphibious force, a TN officer (lieutenant-commander) responded heatedly that the amphibious force was required to facilitate Taiwan’s eventual reinvasion of the mainland. The record of the CCP’s governance has been marked by a series of self-inflicted disasters, such as the land reform period in the early 1950s, the Great Leap Forward (1957–1958), and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), but even during these periods Chiang Kai-shek apparently had no realistic chance of engaging significant popular support on the mainland. CINCPAC, Command History for 1969, Vol. I, pp. 104ff., 142. “Budgetary constraints” was the reason given by Chiang Kai-shek for ending the Strait patrols, but the real reason was the burden of Vietnam War requirements. The war plan’s intended transfer of Pacific forces to the European theater remained in place until at least 1988, despite bitter arguments from a long series of Pacific commanders. Wang Bingnan, Review of the Nine-Year-Long Sino-American Ambassadorial Talks, Beijing: World Knowledge Publishing House, 1985, pp. 5–6, quoted in He Di, “The Evolution of the People’s Republic of China’s Policy,” p. 232.

3 THREAT TO TAIWAN’S SECURITY 1 Stanley B. Weeks, “Policy Paper 3, ‘Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) Security and Access’,” n.d., n.p., writes authoritatively about the importance of East Asian SLOCs.

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2 Discussed in Denny Roy, “Tension in the Taiwan Strait,” Survival, Vol. 42, No. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 76–97. Also listed in the Ministry of National Defense, The PRC’s Military Strength Report for 2004 (Public Version), Taipei: December 17, 2004, p. 19, in FBIS-CPP20041228000156. 3 This paragraph draws on Dennis Blasko, “PLA Ground Force: Moving Toward a Smaller, More Rapidly Deployable, Modern Combined Arms Force,” “People’s Liberation Army Order of Battle: Military Regions,” 2002, http://www.china-defense.com/orbat/ pla_orbat/pla_orbat_02.html 4 The author, for one, in the late 1990s would have expected China to stop building Songs when the decision was made to purchase additional Kilos. Also see Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “China Emerges as a Maritime Power,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 16, No. 10, October 2004, pp. 34–8, for a useful summary of China’s naval buildup, especially the submarine force. 5 PLA planners are likely using 2008 as the year by which China’s leadership has tasked the military to be ready to execute any one of several levels of military operations against Taiwan. 6 A clear explanation of AIP technology is provided by Richard Scott, “Boosting the Staying Power of the Non-Nuclear Submarine,” Jane’s International Defense Review, Vol. 32, No. 11, November 1999, pp. 41–50. Great Britain, France, Russia, and Germany are all developing AIP modules, which produce combustion without requiring oxygen; Sweden is currently operating Gotland-class submarines equipped with the British-designed Stirling engine; Pakistan is purchasing AIP-capable submarines from France; Russia is proposing construction of the Luda family of conventionally powered boats, one (the Amur) with an AIP system; Germany’s Type U-212A is probably the most advanced AIP-equipped submarine currently operating. 7 3.5 times the speed of sound, which is 672.7 kts. 8 The Moskit’s Russian designation is the 3M-80; follow-on models have greater range, probably more than 100 nm. The Chinese purchase was apparently resisted by elements in the Russian military, according to a report in Flight International magazine, October 7–13, 2004, p. 8. http://www.aeronautics.ru/moskit01.htm 9 The United States sold five LM-2500s to China in the 1980s, before the postTiananmen Square massacre sanctions cut off American military sales. Four of the five are incorporated in the two Luhus; the fifth is probably used for training. The LM-2500 is also installed in Taiwan’s eight Cheng Kung-class frigates and the four ex-U.S. Kiddclass DDGs that will join the Taiwan Navy in 2005 and 2006. 10 The Iraqis fired Silkworms against US and allied ships during the first Iraqi war, in 1991. The missile’s lack of success was due as much to Iraqi incompetence as it was to the ships’ ability to shoot them down: they were fired without targeting data; one was downed by a British DDG. 11 Picture in April 3, 2005 e-mail from Mr John Culver on April 3, 2005. The Jianghu had been modified by addition of two dual-100MM automatic guns fore and aft, and replaced the anti-ship missiles with five 122mm rocket launchers. 12 Department of Defense (DOD), Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, Washington, DC: July 2000, gives the one-mechanized division figure; availability of port facilities in Taiwan (not landing over an unimproved beach) would be necessary to use general navy or civilian shipping to transport troops and equipment. 13 See PRC Ministry of Communications, January 1, 2001, “Chapter One, China’s Shipping: A Review of 2000 and a Preview of 2001,” http:// www.globalsecurity.orb/ military/library/report/2001/shipping2000chap1.doc. Wayne R. Hugar, “The Sea Dragon Network: Implications of the International Expansion of China’s Maritime Shipping Industry,” MA Thesis submitted to the US Navy Postgraduate School,

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16 17

18 19

20 21 22 23 24

25

Monterey, CA, 1998, remains a valuable study of China’s merchant marine. For a discussion of China’s employment of “STUFT” (Ships Taken Up From Trade), see “Ships Taken Up From Trade,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/stuft.htm “Shanghai Aims at World’s Largest Shipyard,” China Daily, Beijing http://www1. chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003–08/14/content_254857.htm See, for instance, “Fujian Mobilizes Civilian Vessels in Drills,” Fuzhou Fujian Ribao, July 16, 1999, 2, in FBIS-CHI-99-0802; “PLA Refits Merchant Ships in Reserve,” Ming Pao, November 2, 1999, p. B14, in FBIS-CHI-99-1102, reports that these ships are also being outfitted to augment the PLAN in warfare missions. Also see Dai Zhixin, Feng Weihua, and Yang Xiaogang, “Making a Comeback After ‘Defeat’—Account of How a Certain Water Transport Group Drills Hard on Support Capabilities Aiming at Actual Battles,” Jiefangjun Bao, February 6, 2002, in FBIS-CPP20020206000059; and “Organizing PRC Fishing Craft for Sea Crossing Operations,” Jianchuan Zhishi, Beijing, February 1, 2002, pp. 11–12, in FBIS-CPP20020304000243. Author’s conversation with Qingdao Vice-Mayor Liu Jianhua, May 2004, who also serves as a senior colonel in the local PLA Reserve division. See, for instance, Kuo Nai-jih, “Percentage of Hits of Ship-Carried Artillery of the Communist Troops Reaches 90 Percent,” Lieh-Ho Pao, Taipei, August 23, 2001, in FBIS-CPP20010823000121; Dai Zhixin, Feng Weihua, and Yang Xiaogang, “Making a Comeback After ‘Defeat’—Account of How a Certain Water Transport Group Drills Hard on Support Capabilities Aiming at Actual Battles,” Jiefangjun Bao, Beijing, February 6, 2002, p. 2, in FBIS-CPP20020206000059; and “PLA Fujian Military District to Conduct Maritime Logistic Replenishment Drill,” Wenweipo News, Hong Kong, July 23, 2004. A similar tactic would be using the dozen and a half old Jianghu-class frigates as “one time only” beach assault ships; this would have the advantage of placing ships actually on the beach armed with their own artillery and missiles. Michael A. Glosny, “Strangulation from the Sea?: A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4, Spring 2004, pp. 125–60, investigates a PLA mine and submarine blockade of the island. Also see Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the 21st Century, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001, Chapters 5, 7. The author participated in the last formal US–Taiwan military training, an ASW exercise in December 1978, during with the Taiwan Navy’s expertise was repeatedly demonstrated. Defined by the US Office of Naval Research http://www.onr.navy.mil/fncs/explog/ litcom The 2006 estimate is in Marc Selinger, “China’s Weapons Buildup Seen Posing Growing Challenge to U.S.,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, April 26, 2004, http://www.AviationNow.com This is the Russian Vympel R-77 missile, NATO code name AA-12 Adder. Author’s conversations with senior PLAAF and PLAN officers, 2000–2004. The versatile Il-76/78 airframe (Candid/Midas in NATO parlance) provides transport, AWACS, and aerial tanker versions. “On-station” time refers to the amount of time an aircraft—the Su-27/30 fighters, for instance—is able to remain over a target area. The PLAAF received its first batch of fifteen Il-76 transports from Russia in 1992, used for airlifting the PLAAF’s 15th Airborne Army. Media reporting indicates that the PLAAF is purchasing another twenty Il-76 transports. Richard D. Fisher, Jr, “The Impact of Foreign Weapons and Technology on the Modernization of China’s People’s Liberation Army,” A Report for the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, January 2004; Geoffrey T. Lum, “China’s Cruise Missile program,” Military Review, January–February 2004, pp. 67–73, provides a good overview of this subject.

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26 Lyuba Pronina, “$900 Million Arms Deal is Close,” The Moscow Times, August 20, 2004. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2004/08/20/042.html 27 Various Jane’s Information Group reports from 2004. http://www.missilethreat.com/ news/chinese_md.html, report that these are known variously as the HQ-10 or HQ-15, with the HQ-9 and FT-2000 supposedly incorporating technology acquired from the American Patriot system. 28 US Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), “Report on the Current and Future Military Strategy of the People’s Republic of China,” Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act, June 23, 2000. http:// www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2000/china06222000.htm 29 It is not clear whether “100  units” refers to regiment, battalions, or companies, but the report states it includes more than 500 HQ-2/2A/2B, 60 HQ-7, 144 SA-10, and 72 HQ-9 SAMs. 30 OSD, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, July 2003, pp. 21–3. http://www.41aw.co.il/Lea1.pdf. The report is not clear; at one point it credits the PLAAF with 3,200 aircraft and on another page it credits that number to both the PLAAF and Naval Aviation. 31 OSD, FY04 Report to Congress on PRC Military Power, Washington, DC: July 2004 http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/d20040528PRC.pdf. Also see the 14 June 2000 Jane’s Defense Weekly report describing the PLAAF as consisting of 33 divisions, including 27 fighter, 4 bomber, and 2 transport divisions. The Institute for International Strategic Studies’ (IISS) Military Balance, 2002–2003, London: Oxford University Press for the IISS, 2003, counted 1,900 combat aircraft organized into 32 air divisions, including 22 fighter, 3 bomber, 5 ground attack, and 2 transport divisions to the PLAAF. 32 See Kenneth W. Allen, “PLA Air Force Operation and Modernization,” 1999. http://www.china-defense.com/aviation/plaaf-ops/plaaf-ops_20.html, for a discussion of PLAAF acquisition of fourth generation fighters: Su-27 (J-11), Su-30, and J-10. 33 MND, 2004 National Defense Report, Taipei, 2004, p. 29. The Federation of American Scientists website, at http://www.fas.org, phrases this as “6 military airfields within 400 kilometers, 11 more between 400–600 kilometers, and 19 more between 600–800 kilometers [of Taiwan].” 34 Allen, “Briefing from PRC Ministry of National Defense, December 2000,” unpublished paper discussed with author. 35 “Bolt from the blue” was used by British naval theorists during the first decade of the twentieth century to describe a possible surprise attack on the Royal Navy by Germany’s fleet. 36 This missile, NATO name SA-20, is credited with a 400 km range. A report at www.missilethreat.com/systems/s-400.html, asserts that in 2003–2004 China spent US$500 million on S-400s. 37 This section draws from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) website http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/agency/pla-intro.htm 38 Allen, “PLA Air Force Operation,” pp. 68–9. 39 Christopher Langton (ed.), The Military Balance 2004–2005, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004, pp. 170, 3 gives the Reserve and PAP figures; the militia numbers are from People’s Republic of China, 2004 White Paper on National Defense, Beijing: State Council Information Office, 2004, Ch. VI. http: www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2004.html 40 LTC Dennis J. Blasko, USA (Ret.) clarified PLA ground force structure, and described the PLA training progress. 41 The US Goldwater–Nichols Act was passed in 1986; while Desert Storm in 1990–1991 demonstrated its dominance in Army and Air Force culture, it has taken longer for Navy and Marine Corps cultures to change.

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42 Data is at http://www.emeraldesigns.com/matchup/armored.htm. The precise designation of China’s newest series of MBTs is not clear, but it appears to be a formidable weapon, weighing just 48 tons, powered by a super-charged diesel engine, and armed with a 125 mm gun. 43 Chen Xinneng, “Operational Guidelines on Air Force Operations in Information Warfare,” International Strategic Studies, Beijing: China Institute for International Strategic Studies, 4th Issue, 2004, p. 70. 44 US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless, in “Beijing ‘Has E-Blockade Strategy’,” Associated Press report, November 17, 2004. http:// taiwansecurity.org/AP/2004/AP-171104.htm 45 Dean Cheng, “Possible Attributes of a Chinese Military Space Doctrine,” Chinese Military Update, Vol. 2, No. 3, London: RUSI, September/October 2004, pp. 1–3. 46 Helo information is at http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/aircraft/helicopter/ wz9.asp. The United States sold these helos to China in the 1980s, but has refusal to sell spare parts to the PLA since the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. 47 Author’s discussions with senior PLA officers. 48 For instance, see Zhang Lin and Wu Gang, “Informationization Strengthens Regiment’s Combat Effectiveness,” Jiefangjun Bao, Beijing, September 18, 2003, in FBIS-CPP20030919000033; He Xianfeng and Gao Minghua, “Various Measures Taken by a Division to Upgrade Online Training Quality,” Jiefangjun Bao, March 1, 2004, in FBIS-CPP20040302000106; “Highlights: Chinese Military Training Activities from 8 November to 27 November 2004,” in FBIS-CPP20041213000122; and “PLA Emphasizes Mechanization and Informatization,” Takungpao News, March 23, 2005, translated by the Asian Studies Detachment. 49 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists website http://www.thebulletin.org/article_nn.php? art_ofnnd03norris; Langton, The Military Balance, p. 170, credits China with an additional brigade of eight DF-31s, a claim not endorsed by DOD. 50 The number of nuclear warheads is uncertain; the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and Langton, The Military Balance, p. 252, agree on a maximum of approximately 400, from ICBM warheads to tactical weapons. 51 The 650 missile estimate is derived from OSD, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, July 2003, p. 5, which listed 450, with “this number expected to increase by over 75 missiles per year for the next few years.” 52 http://www.sinodefence.com/nuclear/df15.asp, contains this information. CEP is the radius of a circle in which there is a 50 percent probability of the missile impacting. 53 “China’s New, Successfully Test-Fired Missile was Probably Donghai No. 10 Cruise Missile,” The Sun Daily News, August 20, 2004, in PACOM VIC Site, Asia Daily News Summary, August 24, 2004, http://www.vic-info.org/vicindex.nsf/ VirtualInformationCenter?OpenNavigator 54 Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research Carl Ford, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 19, 2002; Director of Naval Intelligence Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks, Testimony before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials, March 7, 1991; and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements: 1997 Annual Report to Congress http://www.state.gov/ www/global/arms/reports/annual/comp97.html 55 See, for instance, Xhang Jiajun and Zhang Xuanjie, Xinhua, Beijing, May 28, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-99-0601, for the report that the “Second Artillery Corps signed an agreement with the Northwest Engineering University in Xi’an today to cultivate cadres for guided missile troops” and will “supply a certain number of outstanding university and graduate students for the Second Artillery Corps every year,” with the Corps establishing a “national defense scholarship” at the school to “encourage and fund” likely

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58 59

students. Also see Liu Jianxin, Xinhua, Beijing, October 28, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-991103, for the report that the “Guangzhou Military Region and Wuhan University have signed an agreement on jointly training military cadres. . . . this military region will . . . expand the selection of outstanding personnel from institutions of higher learning across the country . . . . All major military regions and armed services have separately designated one local university to be the designated school for training their own cadres.” Similar reports are in Li Meijuan, “Navy Fosters National Defense Cadets at Civilian University,” Jiefangjun Bao, November 4, 2003; and “Beijing Military Region Relies on Universities To Train Military Officers,” Xinhua, Beijing, June 21, 2002, in FBIS-CPP20020621000063. Ibid.; also see Robert J. Saiget, “China to Increase Military Spending by 12.16 Percent in 2005,” Agence France Presse (AFP), March 3, 2005, in FBIS-CPP20050303000157. For instance, see You Ji, “China’s Emerging National Defense Strategy,” Association for Asian Research, January 12, 2005. http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/2428.html; “PLA Emphasizes Mechanization and Informatization,” Takungpao News, March 23, 2005, PACOM VIC Site Asia Daily News Summary, March 25, 2005. DOD, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, July 30, 2003. http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/20030730chinaex.pdf Ibid., pp. 109–10. 4 DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

1 See Chieh-cheng Huang, “Taiwan’s Defense Modernization for the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities,” Paper Prepared for the Conference on War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait, Durham, NC, February 26, 1999, for a discussion of these phases. 2 See John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army, New York: Oxford University, 1967, pp. 40–3, for the original August 1950 Taiwan invasion date. Also see Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950–1953, Lawrence, KS: Kansas University Press, 1995, p. 67, for a brief description of the disruptive effects of the Korean War on China’s military plans. 3 This was certainly the view of the American military officers who in September 1950 conducted the “Survey of Military Assistance Required by the Chinese Nationalist Forces” led by Colonel Alonzo Fox, United States. Among its conclusions was that the Nationalist “Navy is woefully inadequate for the defense of Formosa” and that a PLA assault on the island would succeed unless US forces intervened. This report is available on microfilm, “Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Far East 1946–1955,” CCS 381, Formosa, JCS 1992/44, Reel 2. 4 See Alan D. Romberg, Rein In at the Brink of the Precipice: American Policy Toward Taiwan and U.S.–PRC Relations, Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003, pp. 33, 46; this entire volume presents the best existing explanation of the process. 5 Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo’s Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 297–8. 6 Taiwan National Defense Report, 2002, Taipei, July 2002, p. 1, at MND website http:// www.mnd.gov.tw/report/revised/bb/Preface.htm. Also see Sofia Wu, “President Presides Over Inauguration of Restructured Ministry of National Defense,” Central News Agency (CNA), Taipei, March 1, 2002, cited in Dennis V.V. Hickey, “China’s Military Modernization and Taiwan’s Defense Reforms: Programs, Problems and Prospects,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2, Winter 2003/2004, p. 43. 7 Senior Taiwan Army officer, in a March 2004 speech. 8 This section draws on Ching-Pu Chen, “Defense Policy-Making and Civilian Roles,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2, Winter 2003/2004.

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9 The author attended a September 2000 brief of the reorganization plan at which the principles were lieutenant generals from Taiwan’s Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Defense Ministry. 10 Michael Swaine has done path-breaking study of Taiwan’s civil-military relations. See Chapter 7 in his work in progress, “The Successes and Failures of Taiwan’s Defense Reform and Modernization Program” written for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC: 2004; and “Deterring Conflict in the Taiwan Strait.” 11 Cited in Arthur Shu-fan Ding, “Civil–Military Relations in Taiwan and China: A Comparison,” Paper Presented at The CAPS-RAND Conference on the PLA, in San Diego, CA, August 14–17, 2003. 12 The Central Election Commission, Report on the 2004 Presidential Election, http://www.president2004.nat.gov.tw/cec/index.php, claims without explanation that only 13,000 of these military troops would have voted if given the chance. Author’s discussions with Taiwan military officers revealed general disbelief in this statement and some outrage. 13 Ibid., p. 8. Several MND, MOFA, and military headquarters personnel interviewed by the author supported this interpretation of the Premier’s noninvolvement in defense decisions. 14 This section relies on information in the ROC National Defense Report, 2002, Chapter 4, “National Defense Policy and Military Strategy”, Section V(2)–(5), pp. 7–9. http:// www.mnd.gov.tw/report/revised/bb/Chapter%204-2.htm. 15 U.S. JCS Publication 1–02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, DC: November 30, 2004, pp. 172, 287. 16 ROC National Defense Report, 2004, Taipei: MND, 2004, pp. 222ff. 17 These numbers are from the ROC National Defense Report, 2002, Chapter 2, Section II(1), p. 1. 18 Ibid., Chapter 5, Section 4, pp. 4–5. 19 Ibid., Chapter 5, Section I, “Training of the ROC Armed Forces,” p. 1. 20 Almost every military in the world uses the same numerical codes to indicate staff responsibilities. These are usually: “1” for administration and personnel, “2” for intelligence, “3” for operations, “4” for logistics, “5” for plans, “6” for command and control, “7” for education, “8” for budget matters, and “9” for technology. 21 ROC National Defense Report, 2004, Chapter 5, Section I, p. 1. 22 Quoted in Ibid., p. 203. 23 Quoted by Ching-Pu Chen, “A Review of the Framework of R.O.C. Strategic Planning—from the Perspective of the Two National Defense Acts,” Defense Journal, Vol. 18, No. 15, September 2003, p. 17. 24 Sir Basil Liddell Hart, quoted in Fred Nickols, “Strategy: Definitions and Meanings” abstract at http://home.att.net/~nickols/strategy_definition.htm 25 Quoted in Ibid., p. 187. 26 Government of Taiwan Information website http://english.www.gov.tw/index. jsp?recid139&id33&viewdate0. 27 “Government Organization,” ROC Office of the President website http://www. president.gov.tw/1_roc_intro/e_struct.html#2. The other cabinet ministries are Interior, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Education, Justice, Economic Affairs, and Transportation and Communications; there are also two cabinet-level Commissions and usually a halfdozen Ministers Without Portfolio. 28 Briefings, visits, and interviews with ministry officials. 29 ROC National Defense Report, 2002, Chapter 3, Section III, pp. 2–3. http:// www.mnd.gov.tw/report/revised/bb/Chapter %203-7.htm 30 2004 National Defense Report, ROC, Taipei: MND, 2004, p. 149.

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31 Interviews with Taiwan MND officials and civilian analysts, and with US analysts of Taiwan’s military. 32 The author was told in September 2000 that a course for senior Ministry of Defense civilians was being designed at NDU, following the model of the US NDU. Also see Hung-fu Hsueh, “NMD Unveils Training Program for Civilians and Military Personnel,” Taiwan News, Taipei, October 23, 2002, reports establishment of this course at NDU, but in November 2004, NDU’s president told the author that no civilian officials had entered the course. 33 E-mail from Mr Gregory Man, August 31, 2004, citing Taipei press reports. 34 Discussed in detail in Huang, “Taiwan’s Defense Modernization for the 21st century,” pp. 9–15. 35 Quoted in Chen, “Defense Policy-Making and Civilian Roles,” p. 187. 36 Interviews with senior military officers and MND and MOFA officials. Arthur Shu-fan Ding and Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, “Taiwan’s Military in the 21st Century: Redefinition and Reorganization,” in Larry M. Wortzel (ed.), The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century, Carlisle, PA: Army War College SSI, 1999, p. 265, list the NSC’s composition as: President (Chairman), Premier (Vice Chairman), SecretaryGeneral of the Office of the President, Vice Premier, Ministers of Economic Affairs, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Interior, and National Defense; Chief of the General Staff, Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, Secretary-General of the National Security Bureau, Secretary-General of the National Security Council; other participants appointed by the President. 37 Jimmy Chuang, “New Navy Chief Faces Criticism,” Taipei Times, February 9, 2005, p. 2, reports that the appointment of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Chen Pan-chih as Navy CINC resulted more from his political loyalty to Chen Shuibian as well as the need to enhance jointness. 38 Interlocutors from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and MND all expressed skepticism about the new system; the availability of the C4SIR system necessarily for a truly joint system of this cast is problematical now and for the immediate future. 39 Interview with senior Taiwan military officers. 40 Discussion of the Reserve Command relies heavily on the ROC 2004 National Defense Report, Taipei: MND, 2004, pp. 122ff. 41 Barbara Tuchman, Stillwell and the American Experience in China: 1911–1948, New York: Macmillan, 1970, and Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby, Thunder Out of China, New York: William Morrow, 1946, remain valuable works about this period. The frustrations expressed by General Joseph Stillwell and others trying to assist Chiang Kai-shek were echoed recently by several US government officials, especially in remarks by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (East Asia) Richard Lawless, speaking at a US–Taiwan Defense Industry Conferences in San Antonio, Texas in February 2003: “It is imperative that Taiwan dedicates the resources necessary to maintain an effective self-defense capability.” (in “Remarks” http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/taiwan/Lawless-TaiwanSpeech-13feb03.pdf, and at Scottsdale, Arizona in October 2004: “Mr. Lawless also warned that Taiwan’s legislature needs to pass a special $18 billion defense spending bill or risk losing international support . . . . Make no mistake, the passage of this budget is a litmus test of Taiwan’s commitment to its self-defense.”) Reported in Bill Gertz, “Chinese Information Warfare Threatens Taiwan,” Washington Times, October 13, 2004. http:// washingtontimes.com/national/20041012-101455-7846r.htm. 42 See, for instance, “Nine Ex-Military Officers Indicted in Arms Scandal,” Los Angeles Times, July 6, 2001; “Taiwan Military Under Fire in Kickback, Murder Scandal,” Agence France Presse (AFP), August 3, 2000, for stories relating to the aftereffects of the Lafayette scandal, which included the murder of a Taiwan navy captain. The

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53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62

incident remains newsworthy; see Teng Sue-feng (trans. by Paul Frank), “Revelations Revive Interest in Lafayette Scandal Case,” Sinorama Magazine, December 2, 2003, http://www.sinorama.com.tw/en/print_issue.php3?id200349204061e.txt&magpast M. Taylor Fravel, “Towards Civilian Supremacy: Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan’s Democratization,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 29, No. 1, Fall 2002, p. 71. Discussed by Ta-Chen Cheng, “The Establishment of Taiwan’s Bureau of Armament and Acquisition,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 3, Spring 2003, pp. 26, 35–6. Article 22 of the National Defense Law. According to the ROC National Defense Report for 2002, Chapter 3, Section I.(5)b., p. 6, these are located at Chingshan, Lungyuan, and Taichung. Briefing at which the author was present at MND, in September 2000, hosted by two senior Taiwan military officers. A more complete list of the responsibilities for these offices may be found on the MND Website, General Staff Headquarters section http://163.29.3.66/gsh. See, for instance, http:www.stratmag.com/issue2Aug-1/page01.htm, for the report that the US National Security Agency and Taiwan’s Military Intelligence Bureau run a joint Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) complex on Yangmangshan Mountain in Central Taiwan. Quoted in Wang Chiung-hua, “Full Text of Tang Fei’s Exclusive Interview with This Paper,” Chung-Yang Jih-Pao, Taipei, January 24, 2000, p. 3, in FBISFTS20000127001038. Ping-Hsiung Lo, “Human Resource Policy of the ROC Military,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2, Winter 2003/2004. Richard A. Bitzinger, “Taipei’s Arms Procurement Dilemma: Implications for Defending Taiwan,” Asia–Pacific Security Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4, Honolulu, HI: April 2004, states that “between 1995 and 2002, Taipei imported more than $20 billion worth of foreign weaponry,” which was second only to Saudi Arabia. Shirley Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, CRS Report to Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, March 21, 2005, provides a detailed accounting of these acquisitions. Taiwan Democratic Progressive Party, National Defense Policy White Paper, “Executive Summary,” Taipei: November 1999, Point 9. Janne E. Nolan, Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea, New York: St. Martin’s, 1986, p. 48. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) (DODXA), Militarily Critical Technologies List (MTCL), Washington, DC: National Technical Information Service, 1997. The evaluations described are found on the well organized pages of the MCTL; useful descriptive narrative is also provided for each technology category. Author’s discussions with senior CSIST personnel, November 2004. AIDC http://www.tradefind.com/aerospace.co “Defense News Top 100,” Defense News, August 7, 2000, p. 14, ranked AIDC at number 32. Chen Shui-bian, quoted in “Chen to Push Inter-Agency Integration,” Central News Agency, Taiwan, August 22, 2001,  http://www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/ 20010822/20010822p2.html  Nolan, Military Industry in Taiwan and South Korea, p. 109, makes this point. Gilles Charveriat, “Critical Factors Behind Successful Offset Strategies,” Paper delivered at the International Business & Offset in Emerging Asia Conference, Kuala Lumpur, March 24–25, 1997. http://www.barternews.com/critical_factors.htm, explains various offset arrangements. The US General Accounting Office, National Security and International Affairs Division, Report: GAO/NSIAD-96-65 (B-270620), April 12, 1996, discusses Taiwan’s program http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/ns96065.html

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5 PERSONNEL 1 “National Defense Manpower,” Memorandum, Taipei, 2004, p. 6; author’s discussions with MND officials and senior officers. 2 This discussion draws on the description of this process in Ibid., pp. 16ff. 3 The AFRC restructuring is reported by Brian Hsu, “Taiwan Military Restructuring to Downgrade Reserve Command,” Taipei Times, November 13, 2000, in FBISCPP20001113000172. The headline is misleading, and Hsu’s reporting is less than fully accurate, but the gist of his story is correct. 4 Discussed in Michael D. Swaine, “Deterring Conflict in the Taiwan Strait: The Successes and Failures of Taiwan’s Defense Reform and Modernization Program,” Carnegie Papers, No. 46, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2004, p. 7. 5 Taijing Wu, “PRC Would Most Likely Invade Taiwan in 2012, MND Warns,” Taiwan News, Taipei, September 23, 2004, in FBIS-CPP20040923000195. 6 “National Defense Manpower,” MND memorandum, Taipei, 2004, p. 1. 7 Ibid., p. 4. As discussed below, the ROTC program is due to be phased out by the end of 2006. 8 The Taiwan data is from the MND website. The US ratio in the Second World War was 1:10, but modern militaries are very different from those of sixty years ago, especially in terms of technology and intelligence systems. The 1999 US Congressional Budget Office study, The Drawdown of the Military Officer Corps, Washington, DC: USGPO, 2000, Ch. IV. http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index1772&sequence4, gives the current ratio as 1:5.3. 9 Author’s interview with Taiwan Navy Commander-in-Chief, April 2005. 10 Wen-Chung Chai and Tzu-Yun Su, “Military Education and Defense Reform,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2, Winter 2003/2004, pp. 301–2. 11 Enlisted ranks are designated from E-1 (a new recruit) to E-9 (a senior sergeant-major, or in the Navy a master chief petty officer). 12 This description is from an Army brief on the proposed NCO program, 2005. 13 All salaries are in US dollars unless otherwise noted. 14 Statement by Wu Ta-peng, Director of the MND’s Department of manpower, at a LY National Defense Committee meeting, quoted in Deborah Kuo, “Trial Voluntary Military Service Program Not as Popular As Expected,” CNA, Taipei, October 14, 2004. http://www.cna.com.tw/eng/ceplist.php?class-1P. Wu stated that only 20 percent of “young male civilians” had been made aware of the volunteer program and that of those who applied, a stunning 31.98 percent had failed to pass the physical examination. 15 MND, ROC National Defense Report, 1998, Taipei: Liming Publisher, 1998, pp. 85–6, and discussion in Alexander Huang, “Taiwan’s Defense Modernization for the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities,” Paper Prepared for the Conference on War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait, Duke University, Durham, NC, February 26–28, 1999, p. 3. 16 Ibid. 17 Quoted in Deborah Kuo, “Mandatory Military Service To Be Shortened To 18 Months,” CNA, Taiwan January 24, 2005. http://www.cna.com.tw/eng/ceplist.php? class1P 18 This questionable data was reported in “Recruitment Drive for Volunteer Soldiers Gets Good Response,” CNA, February 2, 2005. http://www.cna.com.tw/eng/ ceplist.php?dass1P 19 Wang Chung-ming, “Local Scholars Urge Adoption of Voluntary Military Services,” Taiwan News, Taipei, August 28, 2004, in FBIS:CPP20040830000178, quotes a

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22

23

24 25

26

27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

contradictory MND comment on all-volunteer militaries: a warning that they are more likely to launch a military coup against the nation’s civilian leadership; the spokesman then added, however, that “Taiwan is not in danger of such coups because almost all its troops are drafted under the current conscription system.” CIA, The World Factbook (Washington, DC: USGPO, 2004), updated to February 2005. http://www. cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/tw.html#Govt The ROC Government Memorandum on “National Defense Manpower,” at http:// www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/20011115/20011115s5.html, predicted that the population would peak in 2037 at 25,682,000; with net zero population growth in effect in 2036. These numbers are from the “National Defense Manpower” memo cited earlier, but either the 22.0 figure refers to all non-NCO enlisted personnel—instead of “conscripts” specified in the memo—of deferments are so easy to obtain that the average conscript is not in fact 18, but the 22.0 cited in the memo. “Taiwan’s Population Set to Shrink in 2040,” China Times, January 10, 2000, reports an aging population, reaching its peak size (25 million) in 2037. The traditional Chinese preference for sons, and a widespread trend to have just one child, has led to a gender imbalance in Taiwan’s population, with male births disproportionately outnumbering female births, 109.45–100. See the ROC Yearbook: 2002 http://www. roc-taiwan.org.uk/taiwan/5-gp/yearbook/chpt02-1.htm, for these numbers. MND, ROC National Defense Report, 2002, Taipei: July 2002, Chapter 1, p. 1, http:// www.mnd.gov.tw/report/revised/bb/Chapter%201-3.htm Several visits to Navy ships and administrative organizations since 1999 indicate that this service, at least, is taking significant steps to take advantage of the talents of its women officers. Similar evidence has not been apparent during (admittedly fewer) visits to Army and Air Force units. “What’s New?: National Defense,” 2004 Taiwan Yearbook http://ecommerce. taipeitimes.com/yearbook2004/P101.htm. The phrase “those not suitable for regular military service” is not explained, but presumably does not refer to physical disability, given the demanding civilian options stipulated. 2004 ROC Yearbook http://ecommerce.taipeitimes.com/yearbook2004/P101.htm Author’s discussions with senior CSIST officials, 2002 and 2004. “Department of Manpower,” ROC MND website http://163.29.3.66/mnod/dom Quoted in Sophia Wu, “Ministry Begins Drive for an All-Volunteer Military,” Taipei Times, December 28, 2004, p. 3. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/ 2004/12/28/2003217024 Interviews with senior Taiwan military officers, 2004. Another sign of the Reserve Command’s continuing importance is the rank (full general) and prominent careers of recent incumbents. ROC National Defense Report, 2000, Chapter 4, Section I(1), p. 1. Ibid., Chapter 4, Section I(3), p. 2. Ibid., Chapter 4, Section II, pp. 2–3. Ibid., Chapter 3, Section II(6); Section III describes this program in detail. The 2002 Annual Defense Report list “13 military recruiting programs,” which presumably includes all paths by which an individual may become an officer: military academy, junior college technical program, Professional Female Officer (NCO) Class, Specialized Officer (NCO) Class, Regular NCO Class, Navy Petty Officer Class, Air Force Professional Flight Class, Junior College for Sergeants, Reserve Officer Training Corps, and the CSIST Armed Forces Preparatory School. Interviews with senior officers at Navy headquarters and Army headquarters report that the ROTC program will be phased out by the end of 2006. Tang Fei indicated ten years to complete the process (pp. 3–4).

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37 “System of systems” was first made popular, if not coined, by then Vice Admiral William Owens, when he served in the early 1990s as the US Navy’s Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Requirements, and Assessments. 38 Julian Baum, “Defense Flaw,” Far Eastern Economic Review, May 11, 2000, p. 21. 39 Author’s discussions with senior Taiwan military officers. Reduced graduate education opportunities are being driven both by personnel reductions and budget constraints. 40 The estimates in this paragraph are from conversations with MND officials in late 2004. 41 Quoted at MND website, “Military Police Command E-Journal,” Issue 53 http:// 163.29.3.66/mh/mpc/e-journal/issue53.asp 42 “National Defense Manpower,” p. 2. 43 Ping-Hsiung Lo, p. 279. 44 Author’s discussions with senior Taiwan military officers, 1999–2005. 45 Baum, “Defense Flaw,” p. 20. 46 It is not uncommon for a Taiwan Army officer, for instance, during the course of his career to attend a US military school at the undergraduate level; then a combat arms school, such as the Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; a junior PME institution, such as the US Army Command and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and finally a senior service course, such as the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, or the National Defense University in Washington, DC. Taiwan Air Force and Navy officers may follow similar patterns of foreign PME. 47 Information about NDU comes from the author’s conversation with senior NDU officers, and from the 2004 “Briefing on the National Defense University.” 48 Workshops were conducted by US NDU faculty members in 2000. 49 Author’s discussion with senior Taiwan military officer; the present NDMC campus is expansive and impressive; reluctance to move is quite understandable. 50 Rich Chang, “Military Will Defend Taiwan, MND Says,” Taipei Times, April 14, 2005, p. 1. LY member Ting Shou-chung asked if the military would “fight for Taiwan’s independence;” in his answer, Huo said the military would “fight any invasion of Taiwan, regardless of what the cause [is].” 51 Author’s discussions with Taiwan Army, Navy, and Air Force officers. 52 This thought is not meant to be pejorative of Taiwan military personnel’s motives, but to emphasize the unusually heavy pressures on them in time of doubtful battle. 53 Discussed with the author by Monte Bullard and Richard Bush, 2004–2005, both “old Taiwan hands.” 54 These conclusions are evidenced anecdotally in discussions with Taiwanese military officers and MND officials, and statistically in the difficulty attracting volunteers to military service at both the enlisted and officer ranks. 55 The United States’ shift to an all-volunteer military in the early 1970s involved very large pay raises and hence a significant increase in the military budget, although most economists point out that the societal cost is about the same for a volunteer or a conscript military. For a mathematical analysis, see Roger N. Gordon, Chong-En Bai, and David D. Li, “Efficiency Losses from Tax Distortions vs. Government Control,” April 5, 1999 http://www.nber.org/~confer/99/pecsi99/eea6.pdf 56 Staff, “Opposition Plans to Wield Big Ax on Central Government Budget,” The China Post, Taipei, January 3, 2005, reported that under this demand, government agencies’ operations costs would be cut by 5 percent, construction and equipment costs by 20 percent, the travel and transport costs by 20–30 percent, overseas trip costs by 5 percent, and house and office rental costs by 15 percent. 57 Hu Yuan-hui, Lin Chien-hua, and Teng Po-jen, “Tang Fei: No Intention of Engaging in Arms Race with Communist China,” Tzu-li Wan-Pao, Taipei, January 18, 2000, in FBIS-CPP20000126000032.

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6 TAIWAN ARMY 1 Illustrated history of The Republic of China Army, Taipei, 1997, pp. 84–5; in English and Chinese. Referred to hereafter as “Illustrated History.” 2 Ibid., pp. 220–1. 3 Quoted in “Notice! Helicopters! Desert Storm Division 101,” Chuan-Ch’iu Fang-Wei Tsa-Chih, No. 165, Taipei, May 1, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98-174, p. 2. 4 MND, ROC Defense Report, 2002, Chapter 5, Section 1, pp. 1–2. http:// www.mnd.gov.tw/report/revised/bb/Chapter%205-2.htm 5 ROC Army Organizational Chart, 2004. 6 A brief history of Taiwan’s Army divisions, from origin on the mainland to becoming brigades, is in “Taiwan Army Division, Brigade Evolution,” Multimedia Product, June 2, 2004, in FBIS-CPP20040602000265. 7 One explicit example of this process is in “Taiwan Army to Organize Digitized Tank Brigades in 2009,” Sina Com, August 23, 2004, at the Pacom Virtual Intelligence Center (VIC) Site, Asia Daily News Summary, August 24, 2004. For the US model, see Douglas A. MacGregor, Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997, who addresses the reorganization of ground forces for a thoughtful, imaginative approach. The U.S. Army plan is addressed in a CRS report and two briefings: most descriptive is Andrew Feichert, “U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), July 19, 2004; also germane is “Serving a Nation at War: A Campaign Quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset,” Draft US Army White Paper, March 24, 2004, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ ssi/pdffiles/PUB586.pdf 8 Wu Ming-chieh, “MND: Jinmen, Mazu, Penghu, Hualien Defense Commands to be Downgraded to Headquarters,” Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao http://news.chinatimes.com/ Chinatimes/newslist/news_list-conntent/0,3546,110502112005050200048,00.html, reported that these organizations would be downgraded to major-general commands as part of the Army’s downsizing, but this has not been confirmed. The Taiwan military does not use the rank of brigadier general, although in November 2004 the MND was considering a proposal to establish that rank. The ranks of major general (MG) and LTG, however, each contain three grades; promotion to the next senior requires a formal promotion board process. 9 Christopher Langton (ed.), The Military Balance 2004–2005, London: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, IISS, 2004, p. 189. The Nike Hercules systems will be retired by the end of 2005. 10 The rationale for organizing the Missile Command is provided in Rich Chang, “Defense Minister Plans for ‘Long-Range Strategic Weapons’,” Taipei Times, May 3, 2005, in FBIS-CPP20050503000136; Wu Ming-chieh, “Taiwan to Research, Develop Long-Range, Strategic Missiles,” Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao, May 3, 2005, credits Defense Minister Lee with deciding to delay the new command until “long-range, strategic missiles” are fielded. 11 Reported in Wendell Minnick, “Revealed: Taiwan Missile Complex,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, Vol. 41, No. 30, July 28, 2004, p. 18. 12 “Joint Service Components” include the staff functions, such as medical, engineers, signals, etc. 13 Sophia Wu, “Presidential Office Rebuts ‘Clouded Leopard’ Armored Vehicle Report,” CNA, Taiwan, January 9, 2005, reported the CM-32 named the “Clouded Leopard” by President Chen Shui-bian when he “christened the vehicle in January 2005.” Mid-2005 discussions with senior Taiwan Army officers indicated production had not started and the Defense & Security Report, First Quarter 2005, Washington, DC: US–Taiwan Business Council, 2005, p. 10, reports that “as many as 1,000” will be built.

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14 Bear Lee, “20 M-60 Tanks from US Arrive at Keelung Port,” CNA, Taiwan, September 6, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0906. 15 M48 data is at http://www.battletanks.com/m48a5.htm; the M48A5 weighs 50 tons. 16 Interview with senior Taiwan Marine Corps officer. The M-41 was designed in the early 1950s to be air-transportable; data at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ systems/ground/m41.htm. The TA first introduced the M-41 in 1958; it was decided in 1996 to improve the capabilities of 50 M-41s at a cost of NT$1.3 billion: the tanks were converted to run on diesel fuel and equipped with new 76 mm guns and improved night vision battle devices. Interviews with senior TA officers in 2005 reported the inoperative condition of the Army’s stored M-41s. 17 Christopher F. Foss (ed.), Jane’s Armour and Artillery: 2002–2003, London: Jane’s Information Group, 2003, pp. 123, 177, 656ff. discusses some of the armor and artillery systems operated by Taiwan’s Army. Also see “Illustrated History,” pp. 312–13. 18 M1 data is at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/m1.htm. An M1A1 armed with a 105 mm gun weighs 60 tons; an M1A1 or A2 armed with a 120 mm gun weighs 68 tons. 19 Discussions with senior Taiwan Army officers; also see Hickey, “China’s Military Modernization and Taiwan’s Defense Reforms: Programs and Prospects,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2, Winter 2003/2004, p. 151, quoting Parris Chang, a DPP legislator who is particularly attuned to defense issues. 20 Military vehicle manufacturers from Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, and the United States have expressed interest in this program. 21 Global Security. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/taiwan/army-inventory.htm 22 The first three of these were described as a commercial variant, the Model 234MLR, with the intent of not irritating China, to whom the manufacturer, Boeing, wants to continue selling airliners. Report of the nine-helo buy is at http://www.emeraldesigns.com/matchup/roc_november.htm 23 “Military Buys 400 Hellfire Missiles,” Taipei Times, January 6, 2005, p. 4. The most advanced Hellfire, with thermobaric fusing to enhance its effectiveness against caves and building interiors, is not included in this sale, according to discussions with senior US military officers. A Reuters report, “Lockheed to Sell Hellfire Missiles to Taiwan” http://sg.biz.yahoo.com/050104/3/3pn7y.html, gives the price as $50 million. 24 US–Taiwan Business Council, “Defense & Security Report: Third Quarter, 2004,” Washington, DC: October 1, 2004, pp. 10–11. 25 Brian Hsu, “Army Plans to Purchase Apache Attack Helicopters,” Taipei Times, October 22, 2001, p. 2. The AH-1Z is in development in mid-2005, with initial operational capability (IOC) scheduled for 2011. The United States is also developing an improved Huey, with an IOC in 2008. 26 Langton, The Military Balance, p. 189, lists the Mastiff III UAV, but provides neither numbers nor details. 27 CEP is a measure of the delivery accuracy of a weapons system; it is defined as the radius of a circle within which half of a system’s missiles or other projectiles are expected to fall. 28 Global Security. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/taiwan/armyinventory.htm 29 Sofia Wu, “1st of 3 Patriot Antimissile Systems Said Operational,” CNA, January 14, 1997, in FBIS-CHI-97-009, reported deployment of “the first of three Patriot” batteries. 30 Langton, The Military Balance, p. 189, credits Taiwan with 40 of these missiles. 31 A balanced discussion of Patriot evaluation is at www.cdi.org/issues/bmd/ Patriot.html

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32 John Lumpkin, “Patriot Missiles Faulted in Deaths,” Boston Globe, March 5, 2005. http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2005/03/05/patriot_missiles_faulted_ in_deaths/. “Blue on Blue” engagements are, unfortunately, almost unavoidable during intensive air battles involving numerous manned aircraft and missiles. Modern AAW missile systems of necessity depend on computers to evaluate complex aero-space pictures, but this reduces the opportunity for human intervention and increases the chances of computer glitches or mechanical problems firing at the wrong time or at the wrong target. 33 The other major systems in the Special Budget request are 8 conventionally powered submarines and 12 P-3C ASW aircraft, which totaled approximately $16 billion, down from $18 billion, according to “Taiwan Military Budget: 510.8 Billion Taiwan Dollars” http://military.china.com/zh_cn/news/568/20050103/12045073.html 34 The 650 missile estimate is derived from OSD, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, July 2003, p. 5, at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/ 20030730chinaex.pdf, which listed 450, with “this number expected to increase by over 75 missiles per year for the next few years.” 35 Richard D. Jones (ed.), Jane’s Infantry Weapons: 2004–2005, London: Jane’s Information Group, 2004, pp. 366–7, 539–40. 36 MND ROC website http://163.29.3.66/mh/mpc/origin.asp, “Military Police Command: Origin.” 37 ROC MND website, Military Police Command E-Journal, Issue 54. http:// 163.29.3.66/mh/mpc/e-journal/issue54.asp 38 Ibid., “Statement of MPC Commander,” General Shi-ji Shen. 39 Ibid., “Military Police Command: Recruiting Information.” 40 Interviews with senior Army officers and MND officials. 41 “Illustrated History,” pp. 272–3. U.S. Special Forces appear to have lost this mission since the onset of the Afghan and Iraqi wars. 42 Author’s interview with senior TA SOF officer. SOF missions are defined at http://www.specialoperations.com/Army/Special_Forces/SF_Info/Missions.htm, as including: unconventional warfare, direct action, special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, counter-terrorism, psychological operations, civil affairs, coalition warfare/support, and humanitarian and civic action. 43 Author’s interview with US analyst. 44 “Military Denies Having Plans to Create Elite Unit,” Taipei Times, March 22, 2005. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/Taiwan/archives/2005/03/22/2003247314 45 This was the gist of the response to my question by a senior Army officer, but probably reflects that the system is classified. Basically the US “C” system rates as C-1 a unit ready to perform all its missions, with all assigned equipment present and fully operational and all personnel billets manned; C-4 is assigned to a unit that for equipment and/or personnel/training problems is not ready to perform any of its missions; C-2 and C-3 are intermediate ratings. 46 The plan is described in full in Chapter 5, n. 11. 47 The Army’s primary training area for these annual and biannual exercises is in Pintung County, in southern Taiwan. 48 Discussions with senior Taiwan Army officers. Reserve personnel training periods are discussed in Chapter 5. 49 Quoted in Deborah Kuo, “Mandatory Military Service to be Shortened To 18 Months,” CNA, Taiwan, January 24, 2005. http://www.cna.com.tw/eng/ceplist.php? class1P 50 A Short History of Napoleon the First, Book 19, Section 2, Chapter 2: “How Far Napoleon was Shaped by Circumstances: His Lawlessness,” discusses this concept. http://napoleonic-literature.com/Book_19/S2_C2.htm 51 See below, Chapter 9, n. 27.

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7 TAIWAN AIR FORCE 1 Chien Chung, “Military Culture and Air Force Restructuring,” in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai (eds), Taiwan’s Security and Air Power: Taiwan’s Defense Against the Air Threat from Mainland China, London: Routledge, 2004, p. 155. This zone was established by the US Air Force during the early 1950s. 2 The ROC “Government Information Office” http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/ 5-gp/yearbook/P101.htm, gives “about 50,000 officers and men” as Air Force strength, while Natasha Alexander (ed.), Taiwan: Army, National Security & Defense Policy Handbook, Washington, DC: 2004 International Business Publications, 2004, p. 264, cites TAF strength as “45,000 personnel.” Senior officers at TAF Headquarters supported the 45,000 figure and further informed the author that personnel strength would be less than 30,000—possibly as low as 27,000—by the end of 2006. 3 TAF reserves are cited as 90,000 by several sources, including http://www. militaryperiscope.com/mdb-smpl/nations/asia/taiwan/airforce/index.shtml, but TAF senior officers do not think the reserves are able to maintain a meaningful state of readiness (interviews with the author, 2004). 4 This was frequently raised in discussions with Taiwan Air Force officers. See Chien Chung, “Military Culture and Air Force Restructuring,” pp. 158, 161 (n. 4), who also cites the China Times, Taipei, October 6, 2002, p. 6. 5 Taiwan built nearly 300 Northrop F-5s under license from 1974 to 1986. 6 The 150 F-16s include 120 single-seat F-16A models and 30 two-seat F-16B models. With slight modifications both F-16 and Mirage are capable of ground attack missions. 7 See statement by LY member Trong Chai in September 1999. http:// www.fas.org/news/taiwan/1999/e-09-14-99-19.htm 8 Reported in Nelson Chung and Victor Lai, “US to Sell 2 Airborne Early Warning Aircraft to Taiwan,” CNA, Taiwan, August 1, 1999, in FBIS-FTS19990801000119; the price for the two aircraft and associated systems was cited as $400 million. Delivery was reported in US–Taiwan Business Council, “Defense and Security Report: Third Quarter, 2004,” Washington, DC, October 2004, p. 10. 9 Winston Churchill, “The Few,” Speech to the House of Commons, August 20, 1940, http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/thefew.html 10 John W.R. Taylor and Kenneth Munson, “Ching-Kuo (IDF),” Air Force Magazine, October 1997, p. 67. 11 Three F-16 crashes “during routine training flights” are reported in Sofia Wu, “ROC Air Force to Slow Commissioning of F-16 Wings,” CNA, Taiwan, June 14, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0614. The Air Force implied that the crashes were due to inadequate pilot training. Unless otherwise noted, all financial figures are in US dollars. 12 http://www.f-16.net/f-16_armament_article2.html. LANTIRN consists of two pods which allow the F-16 to operate day, night, and in bad weather by using terrainfollowing radar, forward-looking IR, and target laser illumination. 13 Sofia Wu, “Taiwan Test-fires Anti-ship Harpoon Missile from F-16,” CNA, Taipei, April 4, 2001, in FBIS-CPP20010404000077, reported as successful the first Taiwan F-16 Harpoon firing, against “a decommissioned destroyer,” which is a common target for Harpoon exercises. Also see “26th Squadron of the Taiwan Air Force Succeeds in First Test Firing of Harpoon Anti-Ship Missiles,” Oriental Daily, August 18, 2004, http://www.sina.com.tw, which reports another successful Harpoon shot from an F-16, against a moving target; the report presumably erred in calling this exercise the first such event. 14 Information available in Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft, London: Jane’s Information Group, 2004, and at Lieven Dewitte and Stefaan Vanhastael, “ROCAF” http://www. f-16.net. The original US F-16 was designed to be nuclear weapon-capable. The Sparrow has undergone many modifications since its initially troublesome

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20 21 22 23

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26 27 28

performance during the Vietnam War; the Sidewinder played a major role in the TAF’s overwhelming victory over the PLAAF during the Taiwan Strait crises in 1958 and afterward; AMRAAM is one of the world’s most capable air-to-air missiles: it employs active, semi-active, and inertial navigational methods of guidance to provide an autonomous “fire and forget” capability against single and multiple targets in all environments; has a solid-fuel rocket motor; and reaches a speed of Mach 4 with a range over 30 miles. F-16 conversion plan is discussed in Brian Hsu, “Taiwan Air Force Reconnaissance Squadron Put on Display,” Taipei Times, August 27, 2002, in FBISCPP20020827000194; also see http://www.f-16.net/f-16_news_article575.html See statement by US Undersecretary of Defense Walter B. Slocombe, quoted in Thomas E. Ricks and Steven Mufson, “Taiwan Arms Deal Excludes Warships,” Washington Post, April 18, 2000, p. A01. Bruce Lemkin, Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs, Comments at the US–Taiwan Business Council’s Third Annual Defense Industry Conference, Phoenix, Arizona, October 4–5, 2004; Yu Tai-lang, “AIM-120 Air-to-Air Missiles Make Debut in Hualien,” Tzu-Yu Shih-Pao, Taipei, September 22, 2004. Two of the aircraft have been lost in accidents. Squadron commissioning is reported in Sofia Wu, “First Mirage Squadron Commissioned,” CNA, Taiwan, December 1, 1997, in FBIS-CHI-97-335. Lilian Wu, “Military-Run Institute Unveils Unmanned Aviation Vehicle,” CNA, Taiwan, June 27, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0627; Brian Hsu, “Locally Developed UAV to be Tested in Hankuang Exercise,” Taipei Times, March 29, 2003, in FBISCPP20030331000162. This assignment order is from http://www.taiwanairpower.org/af/index.html, corrected by a senior TAF officer. The TAF has been flying the T-34C since 1985; replacement plans are reported in “Military Aims to Replenish Air Force Trainer/Fighters,” Taipei Times, March 9, 2005. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2005/03/09/2003245484 Sofia Wu, “Taiwan’s F-16 Accident Rate not Especially High: Officer,” CNA, January 26, 1999, p. 1. Author’s discussions with senior TAF officers in 1999. The 50 percent ratio was cited in Brian Hsu, “Official Acknowledges Fighter Pilot Shortage,” Taipei Times, November 28, 2000, reporting statements by General Chen Chao-ming before the LY Defense Committee. Another report, “Air Force Denies Report that F-16s Lack Pilots,” Taipei Times, December 5, 2000, quoted an anonymous “air force official” as stating that there were 150 pilots for the 334 TAF fighter aircraft. Sofia Wu, “2nd-Generation Fighter Pilots Fall Short of Official Quota,” CNA, Taiwan, May 5, 2000. The Vice-Minister was joined at this press conference by Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff MG Liu Kuei-li; their argument apparently was that all the fighters were not necessary for the TAF to defend Taiwan against the PLAAF, a position difficult to accept. Author’s discussions with senior TAF officers in 2004. Not having a shortage of fighter pilots would be unusual in any air force; hence, this position, although presented informally, is suspect. Supporting this conclusion is Chien Chung, “Military Culture and Air Force Restructuring,” p. 161, who describes the TAF as “short of pilots both in terms of new recruits and experienced pilots.” Quoted in ROC MND press release of 30 January 2005. http://163.29.3.66/# Quoted in Deborah Kuo, “Defense Ministry Considering Whether To Mothball Some Jet Fighters,” CNA, Taipei, January 3, 2005. http://www.cna.com.tw/eng/ ceplist.php?class1P Information from USN and USAF sources. US squadrons on operational deployment typically have the higher manning.

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29 Sofia Wu, “Defense Minister Maps Out Taiwan’s Military Build-Up Plans,” CNA, Taipei, July 2, 2000, based on the deputy minister’s interview with the China Times published on July 2, 2000, in FBIS-CPP20000702000048. 30 “Mainland Chinese Fighter Sorties Affect Taiwan’s Early-Warning Time,” CNA, Taiwan, September 1, 2004. http://www.cna.com.tw/eng/ceplist.php?class1P Kenneth W. Allen, “Air Force Deterrence and Escalation Calculations for a Taiwan Strait Conflict: China, Taiwan, and the United States,” Paper Presented at RANDCAPS-CEIP International Conference of the PLA Affairs in Taipei, October 20–23, 2004, provides an excellent overview of the cross-Strait air picture. 31 See Sofia Wu, “Defense Ministry Denies Mainland China Interfered with Presidential Flight,” CNA, Taiwan, November 11, 2004. These reports were denied by the MND, which issued a statement found at http://163.29.3.66. Senior military officers also assured the author that the PLAAF flights had been tracked by radar and TAF fighters had been in the area. 32 Higher figures were cited by President Chen Shui-bian, who claimed that 706 missiles were deployed against Taiwan, in “Text of Taiwan President’s 1 March Teleconference With European Parliament,” Office of the President, Taipei, in FBISCPP20050303000272; and by Defense Minister Lee Jye, who stated China would have “at least 800” missiles “targeting Taiwan” in 2006, in “China to Have 800 Missiles Aimed at Taiwan in 2006,” Agence France Presse (AFP), Taipei, March 9, 2005. http://www.spacewar.com/2005/050309090708.c137piv0.html 33 The best work on China’s missile systems continues to be that by Mark Stokes. See China’s Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States, University Press of the Pacific, 2004. 34 In addition to works by Stokes, also see Eric A. McVadon, “Joint Air and Missile Defense for Taiwan: Implications for Deterrence and Defense,” in Edmonds and Tsai, pp. 116–39. 35 Global Security.org http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/taiwan/cha-shan.htm, provides a brief description of this facility; more details are provided by Ming-Yen Tsai, “Air Base Defense: Taiwan’s Defensive Responses to China’s Missile Threat,” in Edmonds and Tsai, pp. 147–8, who credits it with a 200-plane capacity and cites a $850 million cost for the facility. 36 Sofia Wu, “Taiwan to Establish Comprehensive Missile Defense System,” CNA, August 19, 1999, in FBIS-FTS19990819000759, reported a plan to integrate Navy, Air Force, and Army efforts. 37 Discussions with senior TAF officers. The US Air Force Expeditionary Wing combines fighters and bombers, supported by reconnaissance, airlift, and refueling aircraft, into a single organization for specific national-level missions (described at http://www.afa.org/magazine/July2002/0702eaf.asp). 38 This argument is made in Ding-Jong Tyan, “Analysis of a Potential Cross-Straits War, of PLA Air Force Strategy, and Improvements for Taiwanese Self-Defense,” in Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 1, Autumn 2003, p. 105. Almost as important is the ground support equipment required to support aircraft operations; this much also be protected and redundant. “Shakeup for Taiwan Air Force,” Paris Intelligence Online, April 8, 2003, in FBIS-EUP20030418000070, noted that this reorganization would allow a number of pilots to return to flying duties. 39 Chiu Yu-Tzu, “Nation’s Satellite Photos to be on the Market Soon,” Taipei Times, September 24, 2004, p. 2. 40 A per-missile price of $3.01–$3.2 million is cited at http://www.globalsecurity.org/ wmd/library/news/taiwan/2005/taiwan-050320-cna02.htm 41 Zhu Xianlong, “Taiwan’s Air Defense Capability in Perspective,” Ta Kung Pao, Hong Kong, September 12, 1999, p. B2, in FBIS-FTS19990923000761. The author is

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48 49 50 51

52

identified as a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, in Beijing, so his conclusion that “Taiwan’s air defense combat capability should not be overrated” is likely written with malice aforethought. LTG Peng Sheng-chu’s remarks to the LY Defense Committee, cited in “Air Force to Feel the Pinch if China Buys Mirage 2000–9CS: Official,” Sofia Wu, CNA, April 11, 2005, in FBIS-CPP20050411000092. “Nation’s Defenses Strengthened with New US Missiles,” Taipei Times, September 23, 2004, p. 2, records the first F-16 flights with AIM-120s; “Gamblers Test Missile,” Taiwan Defense Review, Taipei, November 15, 2003, reported AIM-120 training in the United States for TAF pilots. Discussions with senior TAF officers. Discussions with TAF pilots. The quality of flight training is as important as the number of hours; one hour of intense, mock aerial combat is more valuable than two hours of cross-country flying, for instance. McVadon, “Joint Air and Missile Defense for Taiwan,” p. 125, describes Taiwan’s lack of a truly integrated air defense system. The system currently under development is discussed in “Power Radar System Becomes Taiwan’s Air Defense Hub,” Tzu-Yu Shih-Pao, Taipei, June 10, 2001, p. 4, in FBIS-CPP200106011000028. This paper is described as supporting Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) positions, but discussions with senior TAF officers in 2004 cast doubts on the report’s accuracy. The progress in acquiring Link 16 was discussed by the author with a senior Taiwan officer in January 2002. Also see US–Taiwan Business Council, “Defense & Security Report: Third Quarter, 2004,” Washington, DC, October 1, 2004, p. 9. I am indebted to Colonel B.A. Williams, USAF, for bringing this to my attention. Cited on the http://www.fas.org/irp/world/taiwan/facility/ab-overview.htm One observer estimates that one-half of the supporting personnel will be lost if all personnel cuts are applied to non-aviators. Aircraft data is at the Federation of American Scientists website: http://www.fax.org. The best account of F/A-22 development and costs is Christopher Bolkcom, F/A-22 Raptor, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service (Order Nr. RL31673), March 3, 2005. Cost per aircraft will vary considerably, from $138 million upward, depending on the number of aircraft manufactured. Depending on the condition of the aircraft being converted and the precise configuration desired, a C-130H can be converted to tanker (KC-130) configuration for $20–25 million (estimate furnished by Headquarters, USMC). 8 TAIWAN NAVY

1 Jackie Chen, “Sea Change: ROC Naval Modernization and the Defense of Taiwan” http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/taiwan/1997/971100-sinoramaD4821.htm 2 MND Website http://163.29.3.66 3 This discussion of officer accession and education was the subject of the author’s interview with the ROC Navy Commander, 2005. 4 ROC National Defense Report, 2002, Chapter 5, Section 2, pp. 2–3 http:// www.mnd.gov.tw/report/revised/bb/Chapter%205–2.htm 5 The SM-2 missile purchased by Taiwan for the Kidds has a follow-on model with a 230 nm range. 6 Discussion with senior TN officer; also see the Agence France Presse (APF) report, “Destroyer Delivery Pushed Ahead,” in the Taipei Times, September 15, 2004, p. 2.

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7 Discussion with senior TN officer. Local farmers are resisting government efforts to buy their land to facilitate enlarging the Tsoying harbor, in actions reminiscent of Japanese farmers’ resistance to the original construction of Narita Airport outside Tokyo. The harbor improvement plan is discussed in Edward Chen, “Navy is to Expand Tsoying Naval Base to House Bigger Warships,” CNA, Taipei, April 24, 2001, in FBISCPP20010424000202. 8 Taijing Wu, “Locally Developed Missile Successfully Test Fired,” Taiwan News, September 27, 2004, p. 1, reported that the “Hsiung-feng IIE, with a 300 km range” had been successfully tested, with the intent of allowing Taipei to launch missile strikes against Shanghai, should China attack Taiwan; “Taiwan Successfully Test-Fires Supersonic Anti-Ship Missile,” China Times, Taipei, January 7, 2005, p. 2, reported a “number of test-firings . . . more than a month ago in the presence of Defense Minister Lee Jye.” An AFP report on the same day. http://www.defencetalk.com/news/ publish/article_002040.shtml, gave the missile’s range as approximately 160 nm. 9 Wu Ming-chieh, “Taiwan to Commence Mass Production of Supersonic Anti-Ship Missiles Next Year,” Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao, Taipei, quoted in China Times, April 11, 2005. http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/newslist/news_list-content/o,3546,_ 110501112005041100016,00.html 10 A complimentary evaluation of the ship’s sonars is proved by Captain Maio Yen-hsin, quoted in Taijing Wu, “Sonar Aboard Knox-Class Frigates Helps Navy Keep a Close Watch,” Taiwan News, Taipei, September 20, 2004, in FBIS-CPP20040920000233. 11 Although both classes displace approximately 4,200 tons, the Cheng Kengs draw 19.6 feet of water and their small sonar dome is mounted on the keel; the Chi Yangs draw 26.7 feet of water and have a very large, bow-mounted sonar dome. These two features, combined with their bow-thruster propellers, make the Cheng Keng-class more maneuverable and more suitable to coastal operations. 12 The US Army’s first Chaparral unit became operational in 1969; it was completely phased out by 1998, when the National Guard retired the weapon. 13 The Chinese apparently recognize the value of the Taiwan ship’s design, since the PLAN’s newest FFGs, the Manshan-class, has a remarkably similar appearance to the Kang Ding. 14 Victor Lai, “10th Local-Made Patrol Vessel for Taiwan Navy Christened,” CNA, Taipei, January 21, 2000, in FBIS-FTS20000121001306. 15 Reported in Sofia Wu, “Navy to Build 30 Stealth Missile Speed Boats,” CNA, Taipei, March 8, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98-067. “Navy officials” were quoted in “New Stealth Fast-Attack Boats Planned,” Chien-Tuan K’o-Chi, Taipei, No. 162, February 1, 1998, pp. 115–16, in FBIS-CHI-98-103, as citing the cost of the program as $311 million. 16 The Hsiung Feng I is a Taiwan-produced version of the Israeli Gabriel II surface-tosurface missile. Equipment problems are discussed in “Taiwan to Commission MissileEquipped Patrol Boat,” AFP, Hong Kong, June 3, 1998, in FBIS-CHI-98-154. 17 Bear Lee, “Taiwan to Receive New LSD Leased From US,” CNA, Taipei, May 1, 2000, in FBIS-CPP20000501000093. 18 Sofia Wu, “U.S.-Leased Landing-Supply Ships Commissioned,” CNA, Taiwan, May 8, 1997, in FBIS-CHI-97-128, reported the commissioning of these ships into the TN. 19 Based on the author’s visit to one of these ships, the crews have maintained them in amazingly good condition; they have been reengined and presumably remain reliable. Ironically, the PLAN operated identical ex-US LSTs (seized from the TN in the late 1940s) well into the 1990s. 20 The LCIs and LCUs are old but still capable; the LSMs are intended to be embarked on larger ships, such as the LSDs. 21 Discussion with senior TN officer. 22 Taiwan’s acquisition of robotic underwater vehicles (RUV) is discussed by an unidentified Taiwan naval officer cited in Lu Chao-lung, “As Mines are More Sophisticated,

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28 29

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33 34

Mine Sweeping Becomes More Arduous,” Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao, Taipei, February 6, 2002, p. 4, in FBIS-CPP20020206000049; also see “Taiwan Navy Demonstrates MineHunting Capacity,” Taipei Times, February 6, 2002, in FBIS-CPP200202060000126, for acquisition of the “PB3 Penguin.” These are the mines that look like basketballs with horns sticking out of them one sees in old Hollywood movies. The USS Tripoli, a helicopter carrier functioning, ironically, as the minesweeping support ship, struck just such a mine in the Persian Gulf in 1991; the ship did not sink, but was forced out of action. Bottom-moored mines would be impractical in the case of Kaohsiung, given the ocean bottom’s steep gradient near that port, but other types of mines are in the PLAN inventory. Taiwan’s other commercial ports, such as Hualien, Suao, Makung, Aiping, and Taichung, are relatively small and in some cases do not have good communication with the interior. Author’s discussion with senior PLAN officers. Material condition as reported by a visiting US Navy retired senior officer. This decision was reaffirmed in May 2001 by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as reported in Luis Huang, “Netherlands Observes ‘One China’ Policy: Rejects Taiwan Submarine Sale,” Central News Agency (CNA), Taipei, May 30, 2001, in FBISCPP20010530000195. Report at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/row/rocn/indes.html. This project was not mentioned to the author during the course of two visits to CSIST and several conversations with senior Taiwan naval officers between 1999 and 2005. In addition to the Netherlands, noted earlier, these are Germany, Sweden, Russia, and Japan. Spain, Italy, Pakistan, India, South Korea, and Australia build conventionally powered submarines under license from one of the foregoing countries, or assemble them with the originating country’s assistance. See “Germany Will Not Approve Sub Exports to Taiwan,” Main Frankfurter Allgemeine, Frankfort, April 26, 2001, in FBISEUP20010426000021, which reports Berlin’s refusal. Dan Morgan, “New Life for Diesel-Sub Builders?,” Washington Post, April 26, 2001, p. E1, notes interest in building submarines for Taiwan by Northrop Grumman’s Ingalls Shipyard and the Raytheon Corporation. All costs are in US dollars, unless otherwise noted. Discussions with senior US Naval officers. Both reservations are justified, although the problem of nuclear power technology transfer, such as welding methodology, may be overdrawn. Brian Hsu, “Taiwan Shipbuilding Company Says Able to Build Submarines,” Taipei Times, September 27, 2001, in FBIS-CPP20010927000128. There is little substance to this proposal; see information at http://www.csbcnet.com.tw/csbc/ids/default.htm. Ma Zhijun, “Purchase of Submarines is Rebuffed, Military Prepares to Rely on its Own Efforts for Relief,” Hsin Hsin Wen, Taipei, January 11, 1998, p. 28, in FBIS-CHI98-099 discusses some of the foreign technology that Taiwan would require. Also see “Ministry Has Plan for Submarines,” Taipei Times, August 16, 2004, p. 4, which discusses CSBC’s plan to have “the US to help nurture Taiwan’s production capability in submarine-related industries.” Even this date, allowing approximately eight years for design and construction, is very optimistic. Alternatives, such as purchase of existing submarines, are possible, but not likely. Discussed in Yu T’ai-lang, “The Antung Plan for a Submarine Base Resurfaces,” TzuYu Shih-Pao, Taipei, May 7, 2001, in FBIS-CPP20010507000043. The proposed base would be located on Taiwan’s northeast coast, away from the mainland and near the deep waters of the East China Sea, while the current submarine force is homeported in Tsoying, facing and just 100 nm from the PRC. Brian Hsu, “Navy Planning to Build a Submarine Base in Mountain Along East Coast,” Taipei Times, June 10, 2002.

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37 38 39 40 41 42

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http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2002/06/10/story/0000139713, discusses a similar plan, while “Taiwan Navy to Build Submarine Piers at Suao and Tsoying Naval Bases,” United Daily News, November 24, 2003, n.p., talks about spending $2.9 billion on two new submarine bases, a sum that is almost certainly beyond the Navy’s reach. Brian Hsu, “Taiwan Navy Admits Problems Keeping Planes Ready,” Taipei Times, December 12, 2000, in FBIS-CPP20001212000140, quotes the Navy commander that readiness averaged 51 percent annually, although it had dipped to 23 percent that month. Brian Hsu, “Taiwan Hopes to Extend Life of Submarine Aircraft,” Taipei Times, August 12, 2002, in FBIS-CPP20020812000122, cited in Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, “Undersea Dragons: China’s Maturing Submarine Force,” International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4, Spring 2004, p. 181, n. 98. Aircraft characteristics are from US Navy website. http:// www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/factfile/aircraft/air-p3.html. One knot (kt) equals one nm per hour. The Yang-class were Second World War-era US Gearing-class destroyers acquired by Taiwan; they rendered good service past the age of fifty. Author’s interviews with Marine Corps officers. Author’s interview with Navy Commander. “Taiwan Pullout is Gesture to China,” Associated Press report in the New York Times, November 19, 1999. Pratas lies at the northern end of the South China Sea; Ittu Abba is roughly in that sea’s center; Pengchiayu is little more than a reef 25 nm off Keelung. This increase might be explained by the need to man the Kidd-class destroyers joining Taiwan’s navy in 2005 and 2006, but does not explain why the Class of 2005 numbered 125, while that of 2006 decreased rather dramatically, to 105. A plan to install the longer-range Hsiung Feng III cruise missile is reported in “Taiwan to Build Locally Designed Stealth Missile Boats by Mid-2002 to Counter PRC,” AFP, Hong Kong, April 29, 2001, in FBIS-CPP20010429000031. A recent test firing report, however, describes this missile as designed for land-attack rather than ship attack, reported in Kathrin Hille, “Taiwan Test Fires Anti-Ship Cruise Missile,” Financial Times, January 7, 2005, http://www.taiwandc.org/ft-2005–01.htm Premier Vincent Siew [Hsiao Wanchang] announced that the Coast Guard would be established on January 1, 2000; reported in Victor Lai, “Coast Guard Agency to be Set Up,” CNA, Taiwan, March 26, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0326. See, for instance, You Tai-lang, “Coastal Surveillance Radar Systems Can Catch Submarine Chasers in East Sea Areas Once for All,” Tzu-Yu Shih-Pao, Taipei, May 9, 2001, in FBIS-CPP20010509000028; author’s interviews with Taiwan military officers and MND personnel. Author’s discussion with senior Taiwan naval officers. Coast Guard personnel replaced Marine Corps garrisons in 2001. The government may have made this move to reduce the islands’ military status, but it is more likely that it was due to the 50 percent reduction in Marine Corps personnel. Quoted in “New Secret Service Force to Bolster Security,” Taiwan News Online, March 22, 2005. http://www.etaiwannews.com/Taiwan/Society/2005/03/15/1110851275.htm Interviews with senior Taiwan naval and air force officers and MND officials. In September 1999, a very senior Taiwan AF officer described 2005 as the year in which Taiwan would lose control of the air over the Taiwan Strait to mainland air power. Interviews with senior Taiwan military officers. Author’s discussions with senior Taiwan and U.S. observers. Taiwan naval officers are acutely aware of the need to improve the ship’s AAW capability. Possible solutions include installation of a vertical launching system (VLS) firing the SM2 MR missile with which the Cheng Kung and the Chi Teh are armed, or the RAM anti-missile system, or possibly a naval version of the Taiwan-designed Tien Chien II surface-to-air missile system.

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52 Discussions with senior Taiwan naval officers. Also see Wu Ming-chieh, “Our Capability of Operating Aegis Warship Affirmed by US Forces,” Tzu-Yu Shih-Pao, Taipei, March 24, 2001, in FBIS-CPP20010326000014. 53 “Defense Ministry to Purchase 12 MH-53E Helicopters from U.S.,” Oriental Daily, August 9, 2004, in PACOM VIC Site, Asia Daily News Summary, August 11, 2004. This article stated, probably erroneously, that the helos were being acquired for the Marine Corps, which would imply a logistical rather than the MIW mission for which this version of the versatile H-53 is designed. 54 Nick Brown, “A Clean Sweep for AMCM,” Jane’s Navy International, Vol. 110, No. 1, January/February 2005, pp. 13–17, discusses the proposed “MH-60,” as well as other MIW innovations currently under development. 55 Lin Chin-ching, an “MND analyst,” quoted in “Military Predicts China Sea Dominance in Taiwan Strait,” China Post, March 23, 2005. http://www.chinapost. com.tw/p_latestdetail.asp?id27176 56 “ROC Naval Vision,” a briefing that apparently originated in 1991 and has passed through several iterations since that time. These quotes are from the version heard by the author in May 2002. 57 “Fiscal year 2001 ROC Armed Forces, Navy, Marine Corps Budget Analysis and Comparison,” MND, Taipei: 2003. 58 Interview with author, November 2004. 59 Jimmy Chuang, “New Navy Chief Faces Criticism,” Taipei Times, February 9, 2005, p. 2; Rich Chang, “President Visits Troops,” Taipei Times, February 8, 2005, p. 2, describes Chen Pan-chih “as one of the president’s favorites in the military.” 60 Author’s interview with Navy Commander-in-Chief, April 2005.

9 CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS IN TAIWAN 1 ROC Soldier’s Handbook-1951, quoted in Monte Bullard, The Soldier and the Citizen: The Role of the Military in Taiwan’s Development, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997, p. 156. 2 Chih-cheng Lo, “Taiwan: The Remaining Challenges,” in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001, p. 143. 3 Ibid., p. 150. 4 Quoted in Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command History, 1969, Vol. II, p. 80, US Naval Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC. 5 See Bullard, The Soldier and the Citizen, p. 67. 6 Ibid., p. 12. 7 See Thomas A. Marks, Counterrevolution in China: Wang Sheng and the Kuomintang, Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1995, pp. 128ff., for an interesting description of this process. 8 Bullard, The Soldier and the Citizen, pp. 2–4, discusses this role. 9 Ibid., p. 70. 10 Maubo Chang, “Taiwan to Re-impose Martial Law if Attacked,” Central News Agency (CNA) December 23, 1999, in FBIS-FTS19991223000835. Informal comments about imposing martial law if a DPP victory in the March 2000 presidential election led to civil unrest were expressed to the author by a senior Taiwan officer. 11 Discussed in detail in Bullard, The Soldier and the Citizen, pp. 34ff. This is described in slightly different terms by Cheng Hsiao-shih, Party-Military Relations in the PRC and Taiwan: Paradoxes of Control, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, p. 37, when he

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24

25 26 27

argues that the Political Officers “must maintain closer organizational ties to the civilian part than to the military command system.” This discussion draws from Bullard, The Solidier and the Citizen, pp. 194ff. The new party passed its “April 17 Resolution” in 1987, declaring that “Taiwan is an independent nation; is not a part of China; any change of its international position needs concurrence by the residents of Taiwan.” 2002 National Defense Report, ROC Ministry of National Defense, Taipei: 2002, p. 228. Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 2003, p. 145, describes this incident. Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo’s Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000, is probably the best biography of Chiang Ching-kuo in English. Mark Pratt, “Political Development,” in Cecilia S. Chang (ed.), The Republic of China on Taiwan, 1949–1988, New York: St. John’s University, 1991, pp. 13ff., presents a shorter, but equally complementary portrait of Chiang Ching-kuo. Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China, New York: W.W. Norton, 1990, p. 295. Sun’s other two principles are nationalism and socialism. Taylor, The Generalissiomo’s Son, p. 412. Ibid., p. 62. Quoted in Ibid., p. 269, 273. Taylor’s apparently authoritative history paints a picture of the CIA mission in Taipei, headed by Ray Cline from 1958–1962, as more belligerent than Chiang Ching-kuo himself. Given the almost complete failure (as far as the public record goes) of CIA efforts to infiltrate and attack China, it is interesting that Cline was promoted in 1962 from his Taipei position to become deputy director for intelligence in Washington. Ibid., p. 366. Roy, Taiwan: A Political History, pp. 165–6, describes the riots associated with the 1977 elections. Martial law was in effect since the first KMT troops landed on Taiwan in 1945, although formally declared in 1949. Lo, “Taiwan: The Remaining Challenges,” p. 150. The TGC was probably responsible for the notorious “Kaohsiung Incident” of December 1979, an account of which from the demonstrators’ point of view is in Dennis Engbarth, “The Formosa Incident,” Taiwan News Online, December 13, 2004. http://etaiwannews.com/Opinion/2004/ 12/09/1102558940.htm, including a long excerpt from “The Democratic Movement in Taiwan” published by the Asian Forum for Human Rights, Hong Kong, January 1980. Lo, “Taiwan: The Remaining Challenges,” p. 156. Also see M. Taylor Fravel, “Towards Civilian Supremacy: Civil–Military Relations in Taiwan’s Democratization,” Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 29, No. 1, Fall 2002, pp. 57–84, for a good description of this process. In fact, Chen Shui-bian co-authored a DPP view of Taiwan’s defense structure in 1997 with the title “Opening the Defense Black Box.” Interviews with Ministry of National Defense officials and senior military officers, October–November 2004. There is little doubt, however, that the overwhelming majority of serving military officers still support the KMT. ROC Yearbook, 1994, Taipei: ROC Office of Information, 1994, p. 159. The series of events from January–May 1991 also seemed to imply Taipei acknowledging that reunification would not occur, at least for a very long time. David Isenberg, “Taiwan Frigate Scandal Refuses to Sink,” Taipei Times, August 21, 2002. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/DH21Ad02.html: The Control Yuan concluded that military investigators had not only failed to collect fingerprints, but also had actually blocked investigators and withheld evidence that would prove his death a murder. Shortly afterward, the French

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shipbuilder’s (Thomson CSF) agent left Taiwan on December 20 . . . the Taiwan agent for Thomson CSF left Taiwan.

28

29

30 31 32 33 34

35

36

Military coroners quickly announced the death was a suicide. An independent autopsy demanded by his widow called his death a murder, however, pointing out that “his head had been bashed in and that he had suffered painful wounds while still alive.” The crime remains unsolved. Also see Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “France’s Taiwan Policy: A Case of Shopkeeper’s Diplomacy,” Paper presented at the International Conference on “The Role of France and Germany in Sino-European Relations,” June 22–23, 2001, Hong Kong Baptist University, especially p. 15. Arthur Shu-fan Ding, “Civil–Military Relations in Taiwan and China: A Comparison,” Paper Presented at RAND-CNA Conference on the PLA, San Diego, CA, August 14–17, 2003, p. 3. Although Yu Da-wei was a civilian when he served as Minister from 1953 to 1964, he had previously served in the ministry as an active duty general, 1943–1945. Also see “Taiwan’s Long Line of Defense Ministers,” Taipei Times, June 15, 2000, p. 4. Chiang Chong-ling was not related to Chiang Ching-kuo. Ding also discusses the progression of appointees to the Ministry. Retired Admiral Lee Jye became Minister of Defense in May 2005. Kenneth W. Allen, in an e-mail to the author dated April 18, 2004, identified Taiwan’s past Ministers of Defense as follows: January 2002–May 2004: General Tang Yau-ming (Army); May 2000–January 2002: Admiral Wu Shih-wen (Navy); January 1999–May 2000: General Tang Fei (Air Force); December 1994–January 1999: General Chiang Chung-ling (Army); February 1993–December 1994: Sun Chen (Civilian); May 1990–February 1993: Chen Li-an (Civilian); November 1989–May 1990: General Hao Pei-tsun (Army); April 1987–November 1989: General Cheng Wei-yuan (Army); June 1986–April 1987: Wang Tao-yuan (Civilian); November 1981–June 1986: Admiral Soong Chang-chih (Navy); June 1973–November 1981: General Kao Kuei-yuan (Army); June 1972–June 1973: General Cheng Ta-ching (Army); July 1969–May 1972: General Huang Chieh (Army); January 1965–June 1969: Chiang Ching-kuo (Civilian!); June 1954–January 1965: Yu Da-wei (Retired Army); March 1951–May 1954: General Kuo Chi-liing (Army); April 1950–February 1951: Yu Da-wei (Retired Army). Quoted in Fravel, “Towards Civilian Supremacy,” p. 66. Immediately after Chen Shuibian’s election, Tang reissued his pledge. Minister of Defense Tang Fei, quoted in Brian Hsu, “Military Pledges Loyalty to New Leader,” Taipei Times, March 19, 2000, p. 21. Ibid. This view was expressed by all but two of the more than forty officers interviewed; those two said they did not believe Beijing would launch an armed attack against Taiwan under any circumstances. Full text of the 2003 National Defense Law is at http://cns.miis.edu/straittalk/ Appendix%20141.htm. Appendix 141. Richard Storry, Double Patriots: A Study of Japanese Patriotism, Westwood Press, 1973, remains a perceptive description of a military clique convinced it “knows best” for its nation. See Cynthia A. Watson, “Can the Civilians Hold On? Civil–Military Relations in Colombia,” in Nibaldo Galleguillos (ed.), Civil–Military Relations and Democracy in the Americas, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, forthcoming, for a clear explanation of the concept of patria. See, for instance, “Political Warfare Director on Arms Acquisition,” Chun-shih Shinwen Tung-hsun-she, August 19, 2004, in FBIS-CPP20040819000079, which quotes Political Warfare Department Director, General Chen Pang-chi as “demanding” of an audience of “political warfare cadres” on August 18 that they “maintain administrative neutrality.” Several officers, as well as MND and MOFA officials, said that Taiwan civilians generally do not respect the uniformed military. Brian Hsu, Taipei Times, November 28, 2000, quoting an unidentified legislator.

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37 Gu Chonglian, Making Peace: Taiwan’s Defenses, trans. Lora Saalman, Taipei: n.p., 2004, p. 47. 38 Author’s interviews with Taiwan military officers, October–November 2004, some of whom described this last position as “the psychological officer.” 39 From 0800–1000 every Thursday; one military officer suggested with a smile that it should be easy for the PLA to plan a surprise attack, based on this regular schedule. There are no religious chaplains in Taiwan’s military services. 40 Bullard, The Soldier and the Citizen, p. 98. 41 See the MND website http://163.29.3.66/gpwb/cpad/ 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. Some of these offenses—“negative mindset of uniformed men and women,” for example, would be familiar to Franz Kafka’s “K” (The Trial), or to Alfred Koestler’s Rubashov (Darkness at Noon). 44 Author’s interviews with Taiwan military officers, 2004. Also see Amanda Chang, “Poll: Taiwan People Lack Confidence in Armed Forces,” CNA, July 15, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0715. 45 Discussion of the issue of Taiwanese nationalism is provided in Shelley Rigger, Politics in Taiwan: Voting for Democracy, London: Routledge, 1999, and the collection of articles in Asian Survey, Vol. XLIV, No. 4, July/August 2004, keynoted by Lowell Dittmer, “Taiwan and the Issue of National Identity,” pp. 475–83. 46 Dittmer, “Taiwan and the Issue of National Identity,” pp. 475–6, 479. An extreme case is reported by Rich Chang, “Outdated Lyrics,” Taipei Times, April 3, 2005, p. 2, who quotes a demand by some DPP legislators to “desinicize” Taiwan’s military songs by banning soldiers from “singing about the glory of China and being Chinese” or about Chiang Kai-shek, and only sing songs glorifying Taiwan. 47 Daniel C. Lynch, “Taiwan’s Self-Conscious Nation-Building Project,” Asian Survey, Vol. XLIV, No. 4, July/August 2004, p. 533. 48 See Gang Lin (ed.), The Evolution of a Taiwanese National Identity, Asia Program Special Report No. 114, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, August 2003, especially the essay by June Teufel Dreyer, “Taiwan’s Evolving Identity.” 49 Reported in Lilian Wu, “63% Favor Cross-strait Peace Agreement: Poll,” CNA, July 22, 2004. 50 Reported in Sophia Wu, “Most Local People Feel China Unfriendly Toward Taiwan: MAC Poll,” CNA, July 23, 2004. 51 “Poll Says 50 Percent Oppose But 31 Percent Support Arms Procurement,” cited in Lien-Ho Pao, Taipei, September 26, 2004, in FBIS-CPP20040926000026. 52 See, for instance, “Former Generals, Academics to Rally Against Arms Deal,” The China Post, September 21, 2004, in FBIS-CPP20040921000214. 53 Reported in James Peng and Koh Chin-ling, “Taiwan Criticizes Hu-Lien Talks; Public Supports Them,” United Daily Poll http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid 10000087&sidaOKokXORrJIM&refertop_world_news 54 This useful characterization of the defense laws was suggested to me by Dr Arthur Shu-Fan Ding. 55 This paragraph is based on the author’s conversations with Taiwan officers and enlisted personnel. Although anecdotal, and certainly not the result of scientific polling, the consistency of the responses lend the conclusions credibility. 56 Quoted in Dennis Engbarth, “Failed Coup Still a Coup, Declares Chen,” Taiwan News, November 17, 2004, p. 1, cited in Cheng-yi Lin, “Chen Shui-Bian’s Defense Policy,” Paper Presented at Seminar at National Chengchi University’s Institute of International Relations, November 2004.

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57 Antonio Chiang, “ ‘Soft Coup’ Was Merely Anxiety,” Taipei Times, November 30, 2004, p. 8. 58 Lee Teng-hui was “elected” to a six-year term as president in 1990 by the National Assembly, which in turn was composed largely of delegates selected by the KMT. Once in office, Lee established the direct election of the president to a four-year term. I am indebted to Richard Bush for clarifying this sequence of events. 59 Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalism and Political Power, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1972, p. 160 (emphases in the original). I am grateful to Dr Philip Saunders for bringing this paper and Millet’s, cited earlier, to my attention. 60 Ibid., p. 281. 61 Author’s interviews with military officers, LY members, and LY staff personnel. 62 Retired Army Lieutenant General Shuai Hua-min and retired Vice Admiral Ku Chung-lien, both of whom played important roles in drafting the 2000 MND reorganization laws; many other LY members of course performed their obligated military service. 63 Author’s interviews with military officers, MND officials, and LY members and staff, 2004–2005. 64 Allan R. Millett, “The American Political System and Civilian Control of the Military: A Historical Perspective,” The Mershon Center Position Papers in The Policy Science: The Mershon Center of the Ohio State University, No. 4, April 1979, p. 2. 10 A LOOK AHEAD 1 Minister of Defense Lee Jye, quoted in Lilian Wu, “ ‘Balance of Terror’ Not Part of Defense Concept,” Taipei Central News Agency (CNA), September 30, 2004, in FBISCPP20040930000108. 2 This conclusion rests on admittedly anecdotal evidence gathered from the author’s conversations with MND and MOFA officials, 1999–2005. 3 President Chen Shui-bian is a strong proponent of Taiwan nationalism, but in a January 2005 statement, drew a tenuous distinction between “the increasing sense of Taiwanese identity” and “a rise in pro-independence sentiment,” in Sophia Wu, “Rise of Taiwanese Identity Differs from Pro-Independence: President,” CNA, January 25, 2005, p. 1. 4 See “Transcript of an Interview with President Chen Shui-bian.” http://tacpa.org/ column/Abian/abianTalks.html 5 S.C. Chang, “President Advocates ‘New Taiwan Identity’ as Basis of Rapprochement,” CNA, May 26, 2005. http://www.cna.com.tw/eng/topread.php?id200505260038 6 Lin Chien-hua, “Smuggled PRC Weapons Said Enough to Equip Two Divisions,” Tzu-Li Wan-Pao, Taipei, March 1, 1999, p. 1, in FBIS-FTS19990309000708, is an interesting report of a police raid of an “underground arsenal;” an MND official stated that “the principal strategy employed by the Chinese communist authorities to destabilize Taiwan has always been that of providing Taiwan’s criminal syndicates with arms and ammunition.” 7 Discussed in Andrew Nien-Dzu Yang, “The Alternative to Peace: War Scenarios,” in Steve Tsang (ed.), Peace and Security Across the Taiwan Strait, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p. 169. 8 “National Defense,” in A Brief Introduction to Taiwan Taipei: ROC Government Information Office, 2004. http://www.roc-taiwan.org.uk/taiwan/5-gp/brief/info04_6.html 9 Quoted in MND Press Release, January 30, 2005 http://163.29.3.66/# 10 See for instance, “Taiwan Armed with 1,000 Computer Viruses Against China,” Agence France Presse (AFP), January 9, 2000. http://taiwansecurity.org/AFP/AFP010900-Viruses-Against-China.htm

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11 “Tang Fei: PRC May Have Electronic War Supremacy by 2010,” CNA, May 5, 1999, cited in Ibid.; OSD, Annual Report On the Military Power of the PRC, June 22, 2000, warned of China’s view of IW as a “strategic weapon.” 12 Maubo Chang, “MAC Official: ‘Information War’ Poses Threat to Taiwan,” CNA, March 19, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0319. 13 Path-breaking work on information operations and warfare continues to be produced by James Mulvenon; see his “Taiwan and the RMA,” in Emily O. Goldman and Thomas G. Mahnken (eds), The Information Revolution in Military Affairs in Asia, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, on which this section draws. 14 “Defense Minister Calls for Budget Increase,” China Times, November 2, 1999, cited in Mulvenon, “Taiwan and the RMA,” p. 6. Also see “China/Taiwan: Information Warfare,” Oxford Analytica Brief, November 16, 1999. http://www.csrforum.com/csr/ csrwebassist.nsf/content/f1b2a3bf4.html 15 “Coping With the Cutoff,” Asiaweek.com, Vol. 27, No. 7, February 23, 2001. http:// www.asiaweek.com/asiaweek/technology/article/0,8707,99528,00.html 16 This is not a criticism, but reflects Taiwan’s status as a democracy with a free economy. 17 Mulvenon, “Taiwan and the RMA,” p. 15. 18 Ibid., pp. 25–6. The CEIB plan was first demonstrated during the Hankuang 16 exercise in 2001, when the military’s first IW battalion of specialized troops operated with armed forces in the field. 19 Ch’en Wei-k’ang, “Military Anxious to Set Up Tri-Service Joint Operations System,” Tzu-Li Wan-Pao, Taipei, May 8, 2001, p. 3, in FBIS-CPP20010508000052. 20 “Ministry of National Defense to Focus Crisis Management System in 2003,” Taiwan Youth Daily News, September 2, 2002, in Pacific Command Virtual Intelligence (VIC) Site, Asia–Pacific Daily News Summary, September 6, 2002. 21 DPP Policy Committee, White Paper on Defense, Taipei: November 23, 1999. Also see Alexander Huang, “Homeland Defense with Taiwanese Characteristics: On President Chen Shui-bian’s New Defense,” Paper presented at the US Army-AEI-Heritage Foundation 11th Annual PLA Conference, Carlisle Barracks, PA, December 1–3, 2000. 22 In addition to Mulvenon, see Arthur Shu-fan Ding, “Taiwan: From Integrated Missile Defense to RMA,” in Goldman and Mahnken (eds), pp. 167–84 who discusses Taiwan’s early IW organizational moves. 23 “National Defense,” in A Brief Introduction to Taiwan, Taipei: ROC Government Information Office, 2004. http://www.roc-taiwan.org.uk/taiwan/5-gp/brief/ info04_6.html 24 “Government Organization,” Office of the ROC President. http://www.president. gov.tw/1_roc_intro/e_struct.html 25 Deborah Kuo, “Taiwan Ranks 19th in the World in Defense Spending,” CNA, March 2, 2005. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/taiwan/2005/taiwan-050302cna02.htm, citing the Directorate General of Budget, Accounting & Statistics report that Taiwan spent “US$7.3 billion on national defense in 2003.” This report also stated that Taiwan spent 2.3 percent of GDP “on the military,” compared to China’s 2.5 percent and the US’s 3.4 percent. 26 2004 National Defense Report, ROC, Taipei: MND, 2004, pp. 142–3. 27 Compiled by the MND’s Department of Strategic Planning, in Lin Chong-pin, Win With Wisdom When Wrestling with a Giant, Taipei, February 2004, p. 467. 28 Sofia Wu, “Arms Deal, Economic Development Won’t Squeeze Welfare Budget: Chen,” CNA, September 24, 2004. http://www.cna.com.tw/eng/topread.php? id200409240007 29 January Briefing at the Ministry of Economic Affairs; information provided by Monte Bullard.

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30 Author’s interview with Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) vice-chairman, 2002; “Taiwan’s Investments in Mainland Jumped by 47% in First Half of Year,” People’s Daily, Beijing. http://english.people.com.cn/200209/16/eng20020916_103303.shtml 31 Author’s interview with MAC vice-chairman, September 2003; Monte Bullard, “Trip Report: Taiwan, January 2004,” unpublished paper. 32 Author’s interviews with President Chen Shui-bian, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of National Defense, and the Vice-Chairman of the MAC, all in January 2002. 33 Mike Clendenin, “Business Leaders Lobby Taipei to Ease China Rules,” EE Times. http://www.my-esm.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID163105653 34 Maubo Chang, “Taiwan Lawmakers Cut Budget for Lafayettes’ Logistic Supplies,” CNA, December 11, 2000, in FBIS-CPP2000121000118; author’s interview with former US Government official. 35 Michael Tsai and Jason C. Lin, “Funding for Taiwan’s Defense Reform,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2, Winter 2003/2004, pp. 232–58, present a thorough discussion of the pressures on the defense budget. 36 See S.C. Chang, “DPP Lawmakers Walk Out of Meeting After Major Bills Blocked,” CNA, May 24, 2005. http://www.cna.com.tw/eng/ceplist.php?date=1116940779&class1P 37 “Taiwan Protestors to Rally 25 September Against $18 Billion Special Defense Budget,” AFP, Hong Kong, September 20, 2004, in FBIS-CPP20040920000130. 38 Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan’s Military Will Fire Blanks,” Taipei Times, May 25, 2005, p. 8, discusses the overall lack of ordnance acquisition by Taipei, although he does not mention the shortage of SM-2 missiles that are the Chitehs’ main battery, reported in Brian Hsu, “Budgets Cut Gives Green Light to Kidds Deal, Taipei Times, June 3, 2003, p. 3. 39 ROC 2004 National Defense Report, p. 145. 40 Ibid. 41 These estimates were provided by a knowledgeable U.S. analyst in Taipei, in February 2005. 42 One list includes additional units and improved capabilities for APCs, ships, aircraft, sensors, missile systems, EW, IW, and ordnance. 43 MND press releases and testimony in the LY focused on the increasing threat posed by China’s military modernization and the need for the submarines, Patriots, and P-3Cs that were the objects of the Special Defense budget request. See, for instance, Rich Chang, “High Success Rate Claimed for Patriots,” Taipei Times, March 22, 2005, p. 3; “Military Predicts China Sea Dominance in Taiwan Strait,” China Post, March 23, 2005. http://www.chinapost.com.tw/p_latestdetail.asp?id27176; Rich Chang, “Submarine Force Imperative,” Taipei Times, March 3, 2005; and “Taiwan MND: PLA’s 20 Submarines Can Block Taiwan,” The Sun, Hong Kong, March 21, 2005. http://the-sun.com.hk/channels/news/20050321/20050321013244_0001.html 44 Lee Yung-ping (PFP Caucus Whip in the LY), in Lilian Wu, “Statute for Arms Procurement Fails to Reach Agenda at Legislature,” CNA, Taipei, March 22, 2005. These opposition parties are known as the “pan-Blue alliance;” the ruling DPP and its allies in the LY are known as the “pan-Green forces.” 45 “Taiwan Delays Procurement of PAC 3 Missile,” unattributed article in Flight International, February 1, 2005. http://www.flightinternational.com. Taiwan survey teams inspected P-3s in storage in the United States in 2004. 46 Jimmy Chuang, “Defense Ministry Trims Cost of Special Arms Budget,” Taipei Times, February 16, 2005, p. 3, quotes MND spokesman Liou Chih-chien averring that the Special Budget will not be split, but that the Ministry had cut its request from $19.3 billion to $16.8 billion “to reflect the change in exchange rates.” (All cost figures are in US dollars unless otherwise noted.) 47 Sophia Wu, “U.S. Offers Cheaper Price for Patriot PAC-III.” MND Report,” CNA, March 20, 2005, in FBIS-CPP20050320000069.

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48 Sophia Wu, “U.S. Offers Cheaper Price for Patriot PAC-III.” MND Report,” CNA, March 20, 2005, in FBIS-CPP20050320000069. 49 Winston S. Churchill, Radio Address, June 4, 1940. http://www.putlearningfirst.com/ language/20rhet/chill.html 50 Brian Hsu, “Budget Cut Gives Green Light to Kidds deal with U.S. Navy,” Taipei Times, June 3, 2003, p. 3, reported that the TN agreed to reduce the number of Standard missiles purchased with the ships, to cut the cost of the four-ship package by 15 percent. 51 Chong-pin Lin, “Taiwan’s Defense Modernization,” December 8, 2003, unpublished paper. Taiwan has been China’s largest foreign investor since 1991. 52 This section on Taiwan’s military requirements owes much to the observations and expertise of Lt Col Mark Stokes, USAF (Ret.). 53 In discussions with the author, U.S. and Taiwan observers in Taipei think that the 2004 reduction has been postponed and that the entire Chingchin program is in hiatus, but the evidence is anecdotal. 54 Eric A. McVadon, “Arming Taiwan for the Future: Prospects and Problems,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2, Winter 2003/2004, p. 161. 55 ROC MND News Conference, Taipei: March 16, 2005. http://163.29.3.66 56 Lillian Wu, “Three-Day Anti-Terrorism Drill to Begin Wednesday,” CNA, April 12, 2005. http://www.cna.com.tw/eng/ceplist.php?class1P 57 Author’s discussion with senior naval officer. 58 Lu Te-yun, “Tang Fei: Taiwan to Develop ‘Offensive Weapons’,” Lien-Ho Pao, Taipei, April 16, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0421. 59 “New Defense System Could Have Offensive Weapons Capabilities,” China Post, Taiwan, September 25, 2000. http://www:chinapost.com.tw/p_detail.asp? id52697&GRPB&onNews 60 “Taiwan Test-Fires Missiles that Can Hit Chinese Cities,” AP report in Liberty Times, Taipei, September 27,2004; also reported on “Asia Pacific Report, Voice of America broadcast, 27 September 2004. 61 Department of Defense, FY04 Report to Congress on PRC Military Power, July 2004. 62 Quoted in Debby Wu, “China to Attack Taiwan by 2008,” Taipei Times, June 12, 2004, at Association for Asian Research (AFAR). http://www.asianresearch.org/articles/ 2146.html 63 See Hung-Chieh Liao and Cheng-Hui Lin, “A Comparison of the General Public’s Expectations [About] the ROC Ground Force [Capability] to Carry Out Combat and MOOTW Missions,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 3, No. 1, Autumn 2002, pp. 66–88. The authors draw the obvious conclusion, but present a well-reasoned argument (and also make a good case for the continued existence of the Taiwan Marine Corps). Also see Ding-Jong Tyan, “Analysis of a Potential Cross-Strait War, of PLA Air Force Strategy, and Improvements for Taiwanese Self-Defense,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 1, Autumn 2003, pp. 84–109, for a reasoned advocacy of active defense for Taiwan. 64 Quoted in Parris Chang, “China’s Analysis of Taiwan’s New Strategic Think—Decisive Battle Outside the Territory,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 1, Autumn 2003, p. 65. Chang also advocated (p. 70) placing “the primacy on developing the fighting capabilities to strike at depth and ‘preemptive attack’.” 65 Cited by Jyr-Perng Wang, “What Type of Submarine Meets Taiwan’s Requirements,” Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 4, Summer 2004, p. 68. Wang is a Taiwan submarine captain who on p. 70 argues that Taiwan needs “at least ten submarines” for its “basic operational requirements.” 66 Quoted in “Taiwan Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists (FAS) report. http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/taiwan/nuke 67 This discussion draws heavily on “Taiwan Country Profile: Past Nuclear Policies,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) at http://projects.sipri.se/

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68 69 70 71 72

73 74 75 76

77 78 79 80

81 82

nuclear/cnsc2tai.htm. Also see David Albright and Corey Gay, “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54, No. 1, January/February 1998, pp. 54–60. See Denny Roy, “Tension in The Taiwan Strait,” Taiwan Security Research, March 2000, http://taiwansecurity.org/IS/IS-0300-Roy.htm, for discussion of the various conditions Beijing has listed as casus belli, including the nuclear weapons issue. Quoted in James Kynge, Reuters, “Taiwan to ‘Restudy’ Whether to Create a Nuclear Arsenal,” Washington Times, July 29, 1995, p. 7. Quoted in Albright and Gay, “Taiwan: Nuclear Nightmare Averted,” p. 54. Quoted in “Yu Heralds a ‘Balance of Terror’,” Taipei Times, September 26, 2004, p. 1. Lilian Wu, “Taiwan Not Developing Missiles That Can Reach Shanghai: Premier,” CNA, October 2, 2004. http://www.cna.com.tw/eng/. Yu was also reported in this article denying existence of a governmental cell planning development of long-range cruise missiles or nuclear weapons. Quoted in “Nuclear Weapons Would Leave Taiwan Isolated,” The News International, October 19, 2004. http://jang.com.pk/thenews/oct2004-daily/19-10-2004/world/ w6.htm. Several other analysts were quoted in this report, all criticizing Yu. Quoted in Lilian Wu, “ ‘Balance of Terror’ Not Part of Defense Concept: Defense Minister,” CNA, September 30, 2004, in FBIS-CPP20040930000108. Keith Bradsher, “China’s Hard Line Stirs Throng in Taiwan,” New York Times, March 27, 2005, p. 1. Author’s interviews with Taiwan military officers and civilian analysts; also see the discussion of military strategic rationale, and civilian-military differences, in Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars, Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1984, pp. 220ff. U.S. Joint Publication 3–01.5, Doctrine for Joint Theater Missile Defense, Washington, DC, 1999, p. xi. Wu Ming-chieh, “Taiwan to Research, Develp Long-Range, Strategic Missiles,” Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao. http://news.chinatimes.com/Chinatimes/newslist/news_listcontent/0,3546,110501112005050300006,00.html “Air Force Improves F-5 Fighter for Surgical Bombing of China,” CNA, September 2, 2002, trans. by 500th MI Group. Simply put, a defender (Taiwan, in this case) is able to use interior lines—the area the defender occupies—to avoid combat or collect combat power at vulnerable points exposed to an attacker (China, in this case). Because the interior distance to all points is shorter than the exterior distance, the defender has the advantage and can shift forces more quickly to meet an enemy attack than the enemy can shift its forces to attack a vulnerable spot in the defender’s lines. The attacker in this case operates on exterior lines, which have some advantages, allowing the attacker to surround the enemy, or attack simultaneously all along the enemy’s defensive line to prevent him from massing forces. Thomas Ricks, “Taiwan Seen as Vulnerable to Attack,” Washington Post, March 31, 2000, p. 1. “Ministry of National Defense Logistics Strategic Planning,” prepared for the Bureau of Armaments and Acquisition, February 15, 2003. The “Foreword” notes that “this report documents the U.S. DOD POAM to assist the Taiwan MND in developing” the plan. 11 CONCLUSION

1 Author’s discussions with senior PLA officers, and Chinese academics and think-tank analysts, 1994–2004. 2 This discussion is based on information provided by LTC Dennis J. Blasko, USA (Ret.).

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3 I am indebted to Shirley Kan for providing these poll results. 4 Reported in “Sixty-Five Percent of College Students Unwilling to Fight for Taiwan, Will Surrender if China Attacks,” Cross-Strait News, April 7, 2005, in FBISCPP20050407000073. 5 Poll by the Foundation on International & Cross-Strait Studies, cited in Chong-pin Lin, Win With Wisdom When Wrestling with a Giant, Taipei, February 2004, p. 471. 6 Quoted in Joy Su and Melody Chen, “Wu Rides the Waves of Cross-Strait Relations,” Taipei Times, March 28, 2005, p. 3. 7 “Taiwan To Face Three Big Changes Within Three Years,” Central News Agency (CNA) December 29, 2004. http://www.cna.com.tw/eng/ceplist.php?class1P 8 All financial amounts will be in US dollars unless otherwise noted. 9 Estimated at either 2 or 20 percent, as figured by various US analysts and in various press reports. 10 This table is from York W. Chen and Martin Edmonds, “Taiwan Defense Reform: An Overview Perspective,” in Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 2, Winter 2003/2004, p. 91. The 2 percent figure was provided by a US expert and long-time close observer of the Taiwan military budget process in October 2004. Cheng Hsiao-shih, PartyMilitary Relations in the PRC and Taiwan: Paradoxes of Control, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990, pp. 129–30, compares Taiwan’s defense expenditures with Israel’s for the period 1967–1975: the former spent 46.5 percent of its annual governmental budget and 9.5 percent of its GNP on defense; the latter spent 43.1 percent of its annual governmental budget, but 24.2 percent of its GNP on defense. 11 MND, ROC National Defense Report, 2002, Taipei, July 2002, Chapter 2, Section II, p. 1. 12 Ibid., Chapter 2, Section V(2), pp. 6–7. 13 Cited in Ming-hsien Tsai, and Lin, J.-C. “Funding Taiwan’s Defense Reform,” in Taiwan Defense Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 1, Autumn 2003, p. 3. 14 Chen and Edmonds, “Taiwan Defense Reform,” p. 90, citing the United Daily News, Taipei, September 30, 2003, p. 13. 15 Ko Shu-ling, “Pan-Blue Camp Blocks Arms Bill Again,” Taipei Times, May 18, 2005, p. 1. 16 While none of the active duty flag/general officers with whom I interacted complained of “corruption,” one Army colonel apparently in line for promotion to general officer, and one Air Force colonel already selected for promotion to major general (the rank of brigadier general does not exist in the Taiwan military), were concerned that personal relationships were weakening Taiwan’s officer corps. 17 For instance, see Brian Hsu, “Number of Military Brass Under Scrutiny,” Taipei Times, October 15, 2002, p. 4. 18 Author’s conversations with senior Taiwan military officers and MND officials, 2004–2005. 19 Conversations with civilian MND officials in 2004, 2005. 20 Author’s interviews in Taiwan. 21 Author’s interview in Taiwan. 22 A senior naval officer stated that commanders were stationed at Air Force Headquarters and at Army Headquarters as liaison officers, but that joint planning was not among their duties. Army G-5, however, stated that no Navy or Air Force officers were stationed at Army Headquarters; Air Force G-5 said a Navy and an Army liaison officer were stationed at the Air Combat Command, primarily for planning air-tosurface ops training. 23 John Pomfret, “Also on Taipei’s Radar: Reform,” Washington Post, April 25, 2001. http://taiwansecurity.org/WP/2001/WP-042501-1.htm

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24 Yu Bin, “All Still Quiet Across the Taiwan Strait, but for How Long,” PacNet 33, Honolulu, HI: CSIS Pacific Forum, July 22, 2004, p. 2. 25 Author’s conversations with senior Taiwan and US observers. Also see Deborah Kuo, “Han Kuang 21 Military Drills Begin with Computer simulations,” CNA. http:// www.cna.com.tw/eng/ceplist.php?class1P; S.C. Chang, “One ‘Virtual’ Taiwan Destroyer Holds Off Chinese Attacks for Two Weeks,” CNA, April 26, 2005, in FBISCPP20050426000141. 26 This discussion of Taiwan military exercises is based primarily on media reports from the 1990s; the Hsinchu base is discussed in Lin Chieh-yu, “Military Plans New Northern Base for Joint Training Drills,” Taipei Times, September 22, 2004, p. 3. 27 See, for instance, the threat by an unnamed PLA General that China “could erase [the] Taiwan Air Force,” in the South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, June 11, 1997, p. 9, in FBIS-CHI-97-162; “PLA Succeeds in Invasion of Taiwan Within 130 Hours,” China Times, August 11, 2004, n.p., and “Taiwan Stages War Games as Report Shows China Would Win in Six Days,” Agence France Presse (AFP), August 11, 2004, in FBISPP20040811000090. 28 Cited in Li Jun-t’ien, “Taiwan Lieutenant General Speculates on Targets of Mainland Attack on Taiwan,” Huangqiu Shibao, Beijing, December 9, 2003, p. 10, in FBISCPP20031223000031. 29 Reported in Jimmy Chuang, “Jet Fighters Carry Out Freeway Landing,” Taipei Times, July 22, 2004, p. 1. Also see “Taiwan Holds Rare Military Drill,” BBC News, July 20, 2004. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3911961.stm. The “flybys” are reported by Chuang in the Times on July 15, “Air Force Conducts Second Freeway Fly-by.” 30 Mac William Bishop, “Military Might and Political Messages,” Asia Times, July 24, 2004. http://tbrnews.org/Archives/a1020.htm 31 Interviews with TAF officers and MND officials. A report at http:// www.fas.org/irp/ world/taiwan/facility/ab-overview.htm, states that Taiwan has 26 civilian runways over 5,000 feet in length suitable for TAF fighters. 32 For instance, see Congressional “Public Letter to President Chen Shui-bian,” May 27, 2005, in e-mail to author from Shirley Kan, May 27, 2005. 33 Author’s conversation with then LTG Cao Gangchuan, May 1996, who in 2002 became China’s Minister of Defense. 34 For Chinese writings on these and other PLA thinking at the operational art level, see the two volumes by Michael Pillsbury, Chinese Views of Future Warfare, Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2002, and China Debates the Future Security Environment, Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2004. A third volume is pending publication. 35 Briefly discussed in Chih-heng Yang, “The Contents and Goals of the ROCN’s Modernization,” in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai (eds), Taiwan’s Maritime Security, London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p. 80. 36 Kan, Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990, pp. 3–4. 37 Discussed in Swaine, “Deterring Conflict in the Taiwan Strait,” pp. 8–9. The NDUNDU relationship, formalized in April 2004, parallels one between the US and PRC NDUs. 38 Chong-pin Lin, “Beijing’s New Grand Strategy: Dominating the Region Without Fighting,” Luncheon Keynote Address at the US–Taiwan Business Council’s US–Taiwan Defense Industry Conference 2004, October 2004, Scottsdale, AZ, pp. 2–3. Lin formerly served as Vice-Chairman of the MAC, Deputy Minister of Defense, and Senior Advisor to the National Security Advisor. 39 This comment was sincere and if widely held heightens the chance of strategic miscalculation by Taipei. 40 All three communiqués and the TRA may be found at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/apsg/ communiques.htm

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41 All three communiqués and the TRA may be found at http://www.nwc.navy.mil/apsg/ communiques.htm 42 Quoted in Michael D. Swaine, “Trouble in Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2, March–April 2004. http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040301faessay83205/michael-dswaine/trouble-in-taiwan.html 43 For valuable discussions of US attitudes toward “China,” see Harold Isaacs, Scratches On Our Mind: American Views of China and India, Pb.ed., Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997, and James Mann, About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton, New York: Random House, 1998. 44 Eugene Low, “Only 33 Percent of Americans Support Sending Troops to Help Taiwan,” Straits Times, Singapore, September 30, 2004. http:// straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/ sendmail/0,1881,EmailReporter—275276,00.html, which reports a poll of 1,195 Americans by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations that attributed the reluctance to the Iraq War commitment; “American Attitudes About Defending Taiwan Changing,” China Post, Taipei, January 17, 2005, in FBIS-CPP20050117000142, cites a poll by US-based Zogby International that also reported “47 percent of Americans think their government should not play a more active role in cross-strait relations.” 45 Remarks by senior Congressional staffers at Washington-area meetings, spring– summer 2004. 46 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless is quoted in Edward Cody, “Politics Puts Hold on Taiwan Arms Purchase,” Washington Post, October 10, 2004, p. A28, as he was in Nadia Tsao, “Arms Budget Limbo Sends Negative Message to U.S.,” Taipei Times, February 26, 2005, p. 3. Similar stern comments were offered by former Secretary of Defense William Cohen during his “welcoming” remarks to the annual luncheon of the US–Taiwan Business Council, in Washington, DC in October 2004. 47 Ryoichi Hamamoto, “Interview with Armitage on China, Taiwan, North Korea, Japan–US Alliance,” Chuo Koron, Tokyo, May 5, 2005, pp. 194–203, in FBISJPP20050425000032. 48 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, “Balancing Act: Bush, Beijing, and Taipei,” in Robert M. Hathaway and Wilson Lee (eds), George W. Bush and East Asia: A First Term Assessment, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2005, p. 139, cites polling data in support of this conclusion and discusses Kelly’s testimony on p. 140. 49 Powell’s comments are at http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/ 37361.htm 50 Cited in “Taiwan Could Last Two Weeks in Conflict with China,” March 15, 2005. http://East-Asia-Intel.com 51 Quoted by the CNA, Taipei: November 8, 2004. http://www.cna.com.tw/eng/ ceplist.php?class1P 52 Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Address to the US–Taiwan Business Council Defense Conference, San Antonio, Tx, 13 February 2003. 53 The February 2005 “2 plus 2” talks in Washington resulted in a joint statement of concern by Japan and the United States and spurred hopeful opinions among government and media sources in Taiwan. Author’s conversation with JDA officials; also see Anthony Faiola, “Japan to Joint U.S. Policy on Taiwan; Growth of China Seen Behind Shift,” Washington Post, February 18, 2005, p. A01; and Tsou Ching-wen, “National Security Council Holds meeting on Strengthening Ties with U.S., Japan,” Liberty Times, February 22, 2005. http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/2005/new/feb/today/ today-fo1.htm

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INDEX

Note: Page numbers in italics indicates tables. AAW see anti-air warfare Acheson, Dean 16 active defense 114–15, 155, 166–7, 185 active-duty military force 80 ADIZ see Air Defense and Identification Zone Aegis missile system 123, 124, 133 Aerospace Industry Development Corporation (AIDC) 68, 69, 98, 108 AFRC see Armed Forces Reserve Command AIDC see Aerospace Industry Development Corporation aircraft (TAF) 106–8; F-16 42, 43, 106, 107, 108–9, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117–18, 167, 181, 182, 214 nn.6, 14; F-22 117; F-35 117; F/A-18 117; Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) 108, 117; Mirage 2000–5 42, 43, 106, 107, 109, 112, 114, 115, 116, 178, 189; P-3C 129, 132, 134, 158, 159, 176 Air Defense and Identification Zone (ADIZ) 32, 105 Air Force Academy 106, 110–11 Air Force Command and Staff School 83, 86 AIT see American Institute in Taiwan AlliedSignal 108 all-volunteer service plan see volunteer military program American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) 8, 182 American Volunteer Flying Group (Flying Tigers) 62, 194 n.6 amphibious ships 34; PLAN 38–9; Taiwan Navy 122, 126 amphibious warfare: Taiwan 126–7

anti-air warfare (AAW) 213 n.32; China 36, 37, 38, 43, 44; Taiwan 99, 118, 121, 123, 124, 125, 132, 133, 134, 157 Anti-Secession Law (2005) 3, 194 n.37 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) 3; China 36, 37, 39, 40; Taiwan 120, 121, 124–5, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 177, 182, 201 n.19 anti-surface warfare (ASUW): Taiwan 121, 124, 125, 129, 130, 132, 134 Armaments Bureau 62–3, 67, 70, 162 Armed Forces Reserve Command (AFRC) 55, 73, 78 Armed Forces University 83, 86, 89 Armitage, Richard 184 Army Command and Staff College 85–6, 210 n.46 ASUW see anti-surface warfare ASW see anti-submarine warfare budget see defense budget bureaucracy: civilian defense 9, 144 Bush, George W. 10, 69, 161, 167, 181, 183, 184 C4ISR see China’s capability in command, control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance program Canada: military sales to Taiwan 165, 189 Cao, Gangchuan 47 Carter, Jimmy 7, 52 CCIT see Chung Cheng Institute of Technology CCP see Chinese Communist Party

247

INDEX

CEIB see Communications, Electronics, and Information Bureau Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) 83–5 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (US) 20, 165 Central Plains Field Army (CPFA) 15 Central Reorganization Commission (CRC) 138 Chen, Chao-ming 143 Chen, Chi-mai 164 Chen, Li-an 141 Chen, Pan-chih 134 Chen, Shui-bian 1, 3, 6, 10, 53, 55, 59, 69, 82, 90, 95, 112, 148, 149, 152–3, 156, 161, 164, 170, 173, 174, 176, 177, 184, 185, 192 n.1, 225 n.3 Ch’en, Yi 16 Chennault, Claire 14, 62, 194 n.6 Chiang, Antonio 149 Chiang, Ching-kuo 11, 27–8, 53, 54, 146, 149, 150, 165; engages democracy in Taiwan 138–40; Taiwan under 135–8 Chiang, Chong-ling 141 Chiang, Kai-shek 1–2, 13–14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21–2, 23, 24, 25, 26, 53, 91, 103, 135–6, 140, 179, 196 n.35, 197 n.43, 198 n.63, 199 n.94, 206 n.41; Taiwan under 135–8 China see People’s Republic of China China Communiqué see Shanghai Communiqué China’s capability in command, control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) program 46, 65, 116, 118, 129, 132, 133, 153, 154, 155, 159, 170, 177, 182, 188, 206 n.38 Chinese Air Force see People’s Liberation Army Air Force Chinese Army see People’s Liberation Army Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 1, 7, 13, 14, 171, 199 n.94 Chinese Military Academy (CMA) 101 Chinese Navy see People’s Liberation Army Navy Chingchin program 73, 117, 162 Chingshi project 72–3, 92, 117 Chu, Kai-sheng 101 Chung Cheng Institute of Technology (CCIT) 83, 86–7

Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) 59, 62, 66, 67, 68–9, 77, 98, 109, 124, 128, 133, 154, 163, 166 Churchill, Winston 1, 108, 160 CIA see Central Intelligence Agency CINC see Commander-in-Chief civilianisation 11, 53, 55, 66–7; civil-military relations 140, 149–50; of defense specialists 58–60; Ministry of Defense 141–2 civil-military relations 12, 135, 148–51; Chiang Ching-Kuo engagement of democracy 138–40; civilianization of Ministry of Defense 141–2; concerns 178–9; KMT-military separation 140–1; non-KMT president 142–4; Taiwan nationalism 146–8; under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-Kuo 135–8 Civil War (1949) 1–2, 14, 16, 18, 31, 52, 91 CLC see Combined Logistics Command Clinton, Bill (William) 2, 10 CMA see Chinese Military Academy Cold War 1, 8, 17, 20, 23, 28, 30, 30, 179 Combined Logistics Command (CLC) 56 Combined Services Force General Headquarters 61 Commander-in-Chief (CINC): Chiang Kai-shek 91; Taiwan Army 92; Taiwan Navy 60, 134, 206 n.37 Communications, Electronics, and Information Bureau (CEIB) 154–5 conscription 45, 62, 76–8, 88, 90, 102, 154, 163, 175, 209 n.22; see also volunteer military program Consortium Corporation see medical care corruption: acquisition of frigates 125; Armaments Bureau 62; military officer promotion system 175, 230 n.16 CPFA see Central Plains Field Army CRC see Central Reorganization Commission CSIST see Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology CSS see Center for Strategic Studies Dachen Islands 26; Taiwan Strait crisis 20–1 DCOGS see Deputy Chief of the General Staff defense budget (China) 50

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defense budget (Taiwan) 12, 58, 98, 99, 134, 155, 172–5; declining 90, 95, 96, 98, 102, 112; domestic politics 156–7, 160–1; foreign military purchases 156, 158–60; MND five year budget plan 157–8; modernization efforts 158 Defense Organization Act (2000) 59, 77, 78, 83 defense personnel (China) 49–50 defense personnel (Taiwan) 12, 24, 72–3, 89–90, 161–3, 167; active force 80; air force 106; concerns 175–6; conscripts 76–8; and military modernization 80–2; noncommissioned officers 74–5; officers 73–4; professional military education 82–7; reserve force 78–9; will to fight 88–9 Defense Procurement Division (DPD) 66 defense reorganization: joint culture 45, 60–1; law and legislation 54–5, 58, 62, 72, 144, 150, 161, 176 Defense Reorganization Act (1947) 54, 144 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) 1, 6, 53, 55, 67, 114, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 146, 148, 150, 152, 155, 156, 164, 174, 176, 217 n.47 democratization process 29, 53, 139; civil-military relations 138–40, 143, 149, 150 depoliticization 11, 139, 142, 143, 150 Deputy Chief of the General Staff (DCOGS) 65 destroyers: Kidd-class 121–3, 134, 157, 160, 220 n.42; PLAN 34, 36–7; Taiwan 120; US fleet at Subic Bay 18; Yang-class 130 Ditmer, Lowell 146 DPD see Defense Procurement Division DPP see Democratic Progressive Party Du, Yuesheng 15 Dulles, John Foster 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 197 n.41 East China Field Army (ECFA) 15 ECFA see East China Field Army Education, Training and Doctrine Development Command (ETDDC) 120 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 197 n.41

electronic warfare (EW): China 40, 45, 154; Taiwan 5, 65, 81, 92, 93, 108, 114, 121, 123, 124, 129, 130, 132, 134, 162, 188 ETDDC see Education, Training and Doctrine Development Command EW see electronic warfare FDC see Formosa Defense Command Fleet Command (Taiwan) 120 Flying Tigers see American Volunteer Flying Group Foochow Naval School 130 force multipliers 43, 114, 118, 158 Formosa Defense Command (FDC) (US) 27, 198 n.79 Formosa Resolution (US) 21, 23 Fox, Alonzo 27, 204 n.3 France: military sales to Taiwan 106, 107, 109, 115, 121, 141, 157, 189 frigates: PLAN 34, 37, 40; Taiwan Navy 116, 122, 122, 123, 124–5, 132–3, 157 Fu Hsing Kang Political Warfare College 83, 89 Fu Mao-yao 76 GAO see General Affairs Office General Affairs Office (GAO) 65–6, 188 General Political Warfare Bureau (GPWB) 55, 144–6, 176 General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) 65, 137, 140, 142, 144 General Staff Organization Law (1978) 59 “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT) 179, 182 Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) (US) 54, 144, 202 n.41 GPWB see General Political Warfare Bureau GPWD see General Political Warfare Department GWOT see “Global War on Terrorism” Hainan Island 19–20, 30 Hankuang series see military exercises helicopters: AH-1W “super cobras” 97; AH-64 “Longbow attack” 98; Canada 189; China 37, 40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 47; MH-53 mine-sweeping 127, 133; SH-60 133; SH-70 107; Taiwan Army 95, 97–8, 104; Taiwan Navy 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 129–30; UH-1 69, 97; United States 190

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Hsieh, Frank 164 Hsin chu program 165 Hsu, Huey-yu 131 Huo, Shou-yeh 88, 101, 159 IAEA see International Atomic Energy Agency IAO see Integrated Assessment Office Implementation Act for Substitute Services: 2003 revision 77 Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) see aircraft (TAF) infantry weapons: Taiwan 99 information operations 5, 75, 153–5, 181 information technology (IT) industry 154, 155, 160 information warfare (IW): China 7, 46–7, 153–5, 170 Insurance, Welfare, and Medical Care program 81 Integrated Assessment Office (IAO) 57 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 165 Iraqi wars 99, 114, 181, 200 n.10 J-5 organization 57, 64–5 Japan 4; battle with British ships 38; defense treaty with United States 25, 180; invasion of China 14; military ratio 74; surrender in August 1945 14–15, 16; ties with defense institutions of Taiwan 84 Jiang, Zemin 10; “Eight Conditions” 9 Jinmen Island 18–19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 48, 93, 94, 97, 127, 146, 178, 197 JOCC see Joint Operations Command Center Johnson, Louis 26 Joint Operations Command Center (JOCC) 60, 93 Kau, Michael Ying-mao 184–5 Keh, King-en 16 Kelly, James 184 Kennedy, John F. 25, 26, 198 n.63 Kissinger, Henry 52 KMT see National Peoples Party Korean War (1950–1953) 1, 17–18, 30, 52, 170 Ku, Chung-lien 225 n.62

landing-ships dock (LSDs) 126, 218 n.20 landing-ships tank (LSTs) 126 Lawless, Richard 183–4, 206 n.41 leadership: Taiwan 6, 19–20, 89, 150, 161, 167, 185 Lee, Jye 59, 64, 65, 83, 111, 153, 163, 184 Lee, Teng-hui 10, 28, 53, 54, 72, 91, 140, 141, 148, 149, 165, 177, 225 n.58 Li, Tien-yi 59 Lien, Chan 1, 6, 148 Lin, Chong-pin 154 Liu, Yazhou 18 Lockheed Martin 108 LSDs see landing-ships dock LSTs see landing-ships tank Lu, Annette 112, 172 MAAG see Military Advisory Assistance Group MAC see Mainland Affairs Council MacArthur, Douglas 18, 27 Main Battle Tank (MBT) see Taiwan Army Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) 141, 147, 154, 172, 174 manpower see defense personnel Mao Zedong 14, 15, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 48, 52 Marine Corps: Taiwan 43, 46, 60, 61, 74, 80, 96, 120, 130, 132, 134, 148, 162, 163, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 182; United States 98, 118 Marine Systems Technology 68 Marshall, George C. 15, 194 n.8 Marshall Mission 14–15, 16 martial law 137, 140, 141, 222 n.22 Mazu (Matsu) Island 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 48, 93, 94, 99, 127 MCTL see Militarily Critical Technologies List “mechanization and informatization” see state-of-the-art military technology medical care 80, 81; Consortium Corporation 81 MIB see Military Intelligence Bureau Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL) 68 Military Academy 13, 73, 82, 91, 101; Air Force 106, 110–11; Navy 119, 130–1, 134 Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG) 26–7, 182, 198 n.79

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military education 82–8; civilian university graduate programs 83; professional courses for civilian officials 85 military equipment 8–12: People’s Liberation Army 45–6; supply by foreign countries to Taiwan 189–91; Taiwan Air Force 106–8; Taiwan Army 95–9 military exercises: Hankuang series 177–8, 226 n.18; People’s Liberation Army 29–30, 45; Taiwan 56–7, 163, 177–8, 185, 213 n.47 Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB) 66, 188 military modernization: China 11, 30, 34, 40, 45, 46, 50, 170; “systems of systems” 81, 210 n.37; Taiwan 4, 67, 69, 71, 80–2, 95, 96, 97–8, 103, 106, 124, 125, 152, 158, 161, 167, 173, 176 Military Police Command (MPC) 55, 99–100, 163 military readiness: People’s Liberation Army 45; Taiwan 163, 177–8; Taiwan Air Force 111–12, 117; Taiwan Army 79, 90, 96, 101–3; Taiwan Navy 120 Military Service Law 76 military strategy 5–6, 12, 52–3, 57, 91, 152–3 military supply industries 79 military transportation 62, 65, 79, 96, 187 mine warfare (MIW): China 39; Taiwan Navy 121, 127, 133 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) (Taiwan) 58, 152, 176, 177 Ministry of National Defense (MND) (Taiwan) 4, 5, 7, 11, 26, 53, 55–8, 60, 71, 72, 73, 81, 93, 94, 103, 106, 116, 124, 133, 148, 150, 152, 156, 157, 161, 162, 167, 171, 176–7; 2000 Annual Training Schedule 163; budget plan & expenditure 157–8, 173–4; civilianization of 59, 141–2, 143–4; and conscription 76–9; Force Restructuring Project 64; General Staff Headquarters (GSH) 55, 56–7, 65–6; and information operations 153–4, 155; internal organization 55–8; organizational law 53, 59, 63; Procurement Bureau 66; on TAF mission 105; volunteer military program 75–6, 90

Ministry of National Defense Organization Law 53, 57–8, 59, 63 Ministry of the Interior (Taiwan) 58, 76 Mirage 2000–5 see aircraft (TAF) Missile Command (Taiwan) 93, 162 missile systems: China 37, 42, 45; Taiwan 68, 98–9, 114, 118, 123–5, 133, 164, 220 n.51 MIW see mine warfare MND see Ministry of National Defense mobilization: China 45; Taiwan 5, 61, 62, 79 MOFA see Ministry of Foreign Affairs MOFA-MND office 177 MPC see Military Police Command Mutual Defense Treaty: between United States and Japan 25; between United States and Taiwan 7, 21–2, 23, 25, 27, 28, 139 National Chengchi University 147 national command authority 53–4, 55 National Defense Act (2000) 4 National Defense Committee 156, 164 National Defense Law (2000) 53, 54–5, 56, 57, 143, 148, 150 National Defense Law (2003) 4, 143 National Defense Management College (NDMC) 83, 87, 89 National Defense Medical College 83, 87 national defense policy 53, 57, 63, 64, 84 National Defense University (NDU) 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 89, 182 National Health Insurance Plan 81 nationalism, Taiwanese 146–8, 152, 153 Nationalist military 18, 20, 21, 26, 91, 136, 137 Nationalist Revolutionary Army (NRA) 13 National Peoples Party (KMT) 1, 13, 14, 16, 19, 23, 31, 54, 66, 88, 90, 114, 141, 143, 148, 149, 150, 152, 176, 178; on defense budget 158; military separation 140–1; under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo 136, 137, 138, 139, 140 National Security Council (NSC) 16, 52, 53, 55, 58, 59–60, 139 national security organization (Taiwan) 52–3 Naval Academy 119, 130–1, 134 Naval Command and Staff College 86

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naval exercises: People’s Liberation Army 44; Taiwan 109, 132, 214 n.13; Taiwan-US joint exercises 27 naval power projection (China) see People’s Liberation Army Navy NDMC see National Defense Management College NDU see National Defense University Nixon, Richard 2, 7, 25, 29, 31, 52, 53, 198 n.63 Nixon Doctrine (1969) 28, 67 North Korea 1, 4, 192 n.1; invasion of South Korea 17–18 NRA see Nationalist Revolutionary Army NSC see National Security Council Nuclear Systems Technology 68 nuclear weapons 1, 21, 22, 23, 33, 35, 47–9, 164–6, 168 offensive weapons 6–7, 12, 163–4, 166, 167 Office of Deputy Chief of General Staff: Communications, Electronics and Information 188; Intelligence 186; Logistics 187; Operations and Planning 186–7 officers, military 73–4; female 77; non-commissioned (NCOs) 74–5; promotion system 175, 230 n.16; reserve commission 74 “One China” policy 3, 9, 10, 147, 183 PB see Procurement Bureau “peaceful resolution” policy 12, 28 People’s First Party (PFP) 1, 158 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 4, 6, 7, 12, 15, 43–5, 50, 52, 169, 170–1, 200 n.5; battle for islands 18–20; equipments 45–6; organization 33; and Taiwan Strait crisis 20–1, 22, 23, 29–30 People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) 11, 20, 23, 33, 40–3, 178, 201 n.24; aircraft 106, 107, 112; balance of air power 42–3; pilots 112; threat to Taiwan Air Force 114–17 People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) 34–40; amphibious ships 34, 38–40; destroyers 34, 36–7; frigates 34, 37; mine warfare 127; naval aviation 40; naval balance 40; naval power projection 39; submarine force 34–6; surface force 36–8

People’s Republic of China (PRC) 1, 13, 169, 192 n.1; military action against Taiwan 3–4, 6–7, 172; military capability 11, 32–46; military regions 33; military threat to Taiwan 32–3, 50–1, 172–3; naval strength 33–6 PFP see People’s First Party PLA see People’s Liberation Army PLAAF see People’s Liberation Army Air Force PLAN see People’s Liberation Army Navy “Plan of Action and Milestones” (POAM) 167 PME system see Professional Military Education system POAM see “Plan of Action and Milestones” political warfare officers (PWO) 26, 140, 144, 176 Powell, Colin 184 Procurement Bureau (PB) 66 Professional Military Education (PME) system 11, 56, 82–3, 89, 175, 176, 210 n.46 PWO see political warfare officers Reagan, Ronald 8; “Six Assurances” to Taiwan 9, 28 Red Army of Workers and Peasants 14, 15; see also People’s Liberation Army Republic of China (ROC) see Taiwan Reserve Command 55, 61–2, 79, 103, 130, 162, 163, 176, 177 reserve force: People’s Liberation Army 44; Taiwan 74, 78–9 “Resolute Project” program 153 Rigger, Shelley 146 ROC see Taiwan “ROC Military Ten-year Force Target Program” 72 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 1, 53 SAR see Search and Rescue Coordination Center sea lines of communication (SLOCs) 32, 39, 51, 119, 127 Search and Rescue (SAR) Coordination Center 58 Second Artillery (China) 11, 47–9, 93, 112, 170

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Secret Security Company (SSC) 131 service ships 127 Shanghai Communiqué (1972) 8, 9, 28, 183, 188 Shuai Hua-min 166, 177, 225 n.62 Sino-American Communiqué see Shanghai Communiqué SLOCs see sea lines of communication SOC see Special Operations Command SOF see Special Operation Force Soong, James Chu-yu 1 Soong Li-chuan 111 Soviet Union 1, 14, 23, 35, 48, 91, 139: and Taiwan Strait crisis 22, 25 space warfare: China 47 SPD see Strategic Planning Department Special Operation Force (SOF) 38, 43, 44, 67, 100, 153, 170, 181 Special Operations Command (SOC) 92, 100–1, 162 SSC see Secret Security Company Stalin, Joseph 1, 18 state-of-the-art military technology 50, 70, 92, 155 Stilwell, Joseph 14 Strategic Planning Department (SPD) 57, 63–5 “Streamlining and Consolidation Program” 64, 66, 72 Suao (port) 120, 123, 124 submarines 3, 4; Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) 35, 200 n.6; PLAN 34–6; Taiwan Navy 120, 122, 127–9, 132, 133 Sun, Chen 141 Sun, Yat-sen 13, 14, 136, 139, 178 surface ships: Cheng Kung-class frigates 122, 125, 218 n.11; Chi Yang-class frigates 122, 124–5, 218 n.11; Close-in Weapons Systems (CIWS) 123, 124, 125; Hsiung Feng III missiles 124, 220 n.42; Jing Chiang-class frigates 126; Kidd-class destroyers 121–3, 134, 157, 160, 220 n.42; Kwang Hua (“Glorious China”) Plan 121, 125–6; Lafayette/Kang Ding-class frigates 122, 125, 132–3; Lung Chiangs 126; missiles 123–4, 220 n.51 Surveillance and Communication System Command 120 “systems of systems” see military modernization

TA see Taiwan Army Tactical Operations Security Systems (TOSS) 132 TAF see Taiwan Air Force Taipei see Taiwan Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Offices (TECRO) 8, 66 Taiwan 1–2, 4, 13, 16, 135, 138, 192 nn.1, 2; constitution on national defense 4–5; first-non-KMT president 142–4; foreign military sales to 189–91; military threat from China 32–3, 50–1, 172–3; National Security Policy 5; offensive option 6–7; physical geography 2–4; population 209 n.23; strategic position 2; under Chiang Ching-kuo 135–8; under Chiang Kai-shek 135–8 Taiwan Air Force (TAF) 11, 20, 23, 43, 105, 117–18, 166; academy 110–11; active defense against ballistic missiles 114, 116–17; equipment 107; flight training 111; “four line” air defense system 114; General Headquarters 106; installations 110; mission 105; passive defense against PLAAF manned aircraft 114–16; personnel 106; readiness 111–12; response to threat 112–17 Taiwan Army (TA) 11, 91, 103–4; armor force 95–6; artillery 97; aviation 97–8; bases 94; equipment 95; General Headquarters 92–4; infantry weapons 99; Main Battle Tank (MBT) 45, 46, 95–6; military academy 101; Military Police Command 99–100; missile systems 98; readiness 101–3; Special Operation Command 100–1 Taiwan Coast Guard (TCG) 11, 55, 58, 73, 89, 100, 131, 132 Taiwan Garrison Command (TGC) 140, 141, 162, 222 n.23 Taiwan Marine Corps 11, 130, 132 Taiwan military 11–12, 13, 17, 30–1, 167, 185; after Second World War 14–15; battle for the islands (1949–1952) 18–19; early years 13–14; Korean War 17–18; objectives in early 1950s 20; readiness 177–8; recruiting programs 209 n.36; Taiwan Strait crisis 20; taking Hainan 19–20

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Taiwan military-industrial complex (TMIC) 67–70 Taiwan Navy (TN) 11, 12, 119, 132–4, 199 n.93, 212 n.16; academy 130–1; amphibious warfare 126–7; aviation 129; Coast Guard 131, 132; destroyers 120, 130, 134, 157, 160, 220 n.42; equipment 122; frigates 116, 122, 122, 123, 124–5, 132–3, 157; General Headquarters 120–1; helicopters 129–30, 133; Marine Corps 130, 132; mine warfare 127, 133; organization 119–20; service ships 127; submarines 120, 122, 127–9, 132, 133; surface ships 121–6 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) 7–8, 9, 10, 11, 28, 29, 30, 138, 179, 181, 183, 188–9, 192 n.3 “Taiwan Restoration Day” 16 Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) 148 Taiwan Strait crisis: 1954–1955 20–2; 1958 22–5; 1962 25; 1962–1965 27–8; 1995–1996 28–30, 170 Tang, Fei 66, 80, 90, 137, 143, 154, 163, 209 n.36 Tang, Yiau-ming 142 TCG see Taiwan Coast Guard TECRO see Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Offices TGC see Taiwan Garrison Command TMIC see Taiwan military-industrial complex TN see Taiwan Navy TOSS see Tactical Operations Security Systems TRA see Taiwan Relations Act Truman, Harry 1, 7, 16, 17, 26, 52 Tsai, Ing-Wen 174

Tsai, Michael (Ming-hsien) 76, 78, 102, 112, 164 Tsoying 120, 123 TSU see Taiwan Solidarity Union United Front (KMT and CCP) 4, 13, 14 United States (US): arms sales to Taiwan 8, 190–1, 200 n.9; and China-Taiwan relationship 1–2, 9–11; intelligence 42, 49, 66, interpretation of communists victory in 1949 16–17; in Korean War 17–18; role in Dachens operation 21; role in Taiwan’s defense 7–8, 30–1, 167, 179–84; sale of surface ships to Taiwan 121, 123, submarine project for Taiwan 128; and Taiwan Strait crisis 21–2, 23–5, 29–30, 181 United States-China Communiqué see Shanghai Communiqué United States-Taiwan Defense Command see Formosa Defense command Vietnam War (1973–1975) 8, 22, 28, 30, 67 volunteer military program 75–6, 78, 80, 81–2, 88, 90, 103, 176 Wen, Jiabao 183 Whampoa Military Academy 13, 83, 91 Wilson, Woodrow 7 Wu, Joseph 172 Wu, Shih-wen 112 Yijiangshan Island 20 Yin, Qing-feng 141 Yu, Shyi-kun 165–6 Zhou, Enlai 13, 21, 22

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