The World Unclaimed: A Challenge To Heidegger's Critique Of Husserl (Series In Continental Thought)

The World Unclaimed A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique ofHusserl LILIAN ALWEISS O h i o University Press ATHENS Se...

Author: Lilian Alweiss

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The World Unclaimed A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique ofHusserl

LILIAN ALWEISS

O h i o University Press ATHENS

Series in Continental Thought EDITORIAL

BOARD

Steven Gait Crowell, Chairman, Rice University Elizabeth A. Behnke David Carr, Emory University J o h n J. D r u m m o n d , M o u n t St. Mary's College Lester E m b r e e , Florida Atlantic University B u r t C. Hopkins, Seattle University Jose Huertas-Jourda, Wilfrid Laurier University J o s e p h J. Kockelmans, Pennsylvania State University William R. McKenna, Miami University Algis Mickunas, O h i o University J. N. Mohanty, T e m p l e University T h o m a s N e n o n , University of Memphis T h o m a s M. Seebohm, J o h a n n e s G u t e n b e r g Universitat, Mainz Gail Soffer, New School for Social Research Elizabeth Stroker, Universitat Koln f Richard M. Zaner, Vanderbilt University INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY

BOARD

Suzanne Bachelard, Universite de Paris Rudolf Boehm, Rijksuniversiteit Gent Albert Borgmann, University of Montana A m e d e o Giorgi, Saybrook Institute Richard Grathoff, Universitat Bielefeld Samuel Ijsseling, Husserl-Archief te Leuven Alphonso Lingis, Pennsylvania State University W e r n e r Marx, Albert-Ludwigs Universitat, F r e i b u r g f David Rasmussen, Boston College J o h n Sallis, Pennsylvania State University J o h n Scanlon, D u q u e s n e University H u g h J. Silverman, State University of New York, Stony Brook Carlo Sini, Universita di Milano J a c q u e s Taminiaux, Louvain-la-Neuve D. Lawrence Wieder Dallas Willard, University of Southern California

Ohio University Press, Athens, Ohio 45701 © 2003 by Lilian Alweiss Printed in the United States of America All rights reserved Ohio University Press books are printed on acid-free paper 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03

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Aversion of chapter two was published as "The Enigma of Time" in PhanomenologischeForschungen 4/2 (1999): 159-202 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Alweiss, Lilian, 1966The world unclaimed : a challenge to Heidegger's critique of Husserl / Lilian Alweiss. p. cm. — (Series in Continental Thought; 30) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8214-1464-X 1. Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. 2. Husserl, Edmund, 18591938.1. Title. II. Series. B3279.H49 A644 2002 193-dc21 2002066301

For my parents

"Hiersdn ist herrlich * — Rainer Maria Rilke, Duineser Elegien

CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

XI

LIST OE ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE TEXT AND ENDNOTES

xiii

INTRODUCTION

xix

PROLOGUE

1

C H A P T E R O N E . H U S S E R L AND H E I D E G G E R : A REAPPRAISAL OF T H E I R R E L A T I O N S H I P

Introduction Why Husserl Is Not an Internalist §1. Husserl, a Methodological Solipsist? §2. Object and Meaning Do Not Coincide §3. The Structure of Consciousness §4. The Problem of Reference §5. "The Ontological Turn of the Concept of Evidence" Heidegger's Indebtedness to Husserl §6. Intuitions zvithout Concepts Are Blind §7. Categorial Intuition §8. Being Is Not a Predicate The Transcendental Turn §9. The Transcendental Turn §10. Husserl and Hu me §11. The Spectacle of the World §12. Ontology versus Epistemology Conclusion

3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 15 16 19 20

C H A P T E R T W O . T O W A R D AN " U N W O R L D L Y " B E G I N N I N G

Introduction Heidegger's Critique §13. HusserVs Cartesianism §14. The Incompleteness of Space §15. The Bracketing of the Unseen §16. An Incompleteness That Is Not Based on Lack §17. The Affirmation of an Enclosed Space Toward an "Unworldly" Existence §18. The 'Annihilation of the World" §19. The Description of Immanent Perception in Ideen I §20. Limitations of I d e e n I

22 23 24 25 26 27 29 30 32

CONTENTS

§84. Phenomenology as a Form of Archaeology §85. To Practice Phenomenology Is to Practice Humility Conclusion

134 136 138

C H A P T E R FIVE. T H E W O R L D RECLAIMED

Introduction The Return to an Embodied Dasein §86. The Need to Return to an Embodied Dasein §87. Heidegger's Reservations §88. "The Body as an Outer Brain of Man " §89. The Prioritization of Theoretical Consciousness The Body Moves before T Can'—The Break with Immanence § 90. The Body as the Hyletic Foundation of Consciousness §91. The Body That Is Felt §92. The Double Apprehension of the Body § 93. The Primacy of the Sensing Body §94. The Reduction of the 7 Can' §95. The Latency of Consciousness §96. The Spatium Sensibile as the Abiding Correlate ofExperien ce §97. Husserl as the True Heir of Kant The Primacy of the World §98. The Absolute Hereness' of My Body §99. The Refutation of Idealism §100. The Objective World §101. But the World Does Not Move Conclusion

141 142 145 147 149 151 152 153 155 155 156 157 158 160 161 162 163 165

A P P E N D I X . T H E W O R L D T H A T SPEAKS

(a) A Linguistic Departure (b) The Symbolic Structure of the World (c) Resisting the Hybrid Called Language' (d) The Return to Dasein (e) The Fear ofFragmentation (f) The Spatial Basis of Language

167 168 171 176 177 178

NOTES

181

WORKS CITED

227

SUBJECT INDEX

237

NAME INDEX

241

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

MY SPECIAL THANKS go to those who have guided me through this work. They are Jay Bernstein, Howard Caygill, Simon Critchley, Klaus Held, William Large, and David Smith. Many eyes and hands were involved to ensure the completion of this work, and I am indebted to them all: Yvonne Alweiss, Charles Barrow, Jeremy Dittmer, Ruth Goodwin, Brian Garvey, Richard Gray, Steven Kupfer, Jean Lechner, Ian Lyne, Alan Montefiore, Paul Naish, Joanna Oyediran, and Nicholas Walker. I am extremely grateful to series editor Steven Crowell for his encouragement and advice, to the two anonymous readers for Ohio University Press for their detailed and constructive comments, and to Sharen Rose and Bevin McLaughlin for their editorial help. Finally, I should like to thank the many friends (too numerous to list) for their advice and encouragement at various stages of writing. It goes without saying that I am to be held responsible for any errors or misjudgments that remain. This book is based on my Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Essex and entitled "The Recovery of Time and the Loss of the World." I should like to thank the British Academy for its support at that time.

Abbreviations Used in the Text and Endnotes

Unless it is indicated otherwise, I have a d h e r e d to the most recent translations cited. W h e r e the page n u m b e r of the original text is not provided in the marginalia, I have provided the page n u m b e r of the translated text. Anything in square brackets is my own addition.

A. ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR MARTIN HEIDEGGER Note: T h e n u m b e r after the Gesamtausgabe (GA) [Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 19-] refers to the individual volume. I have cited the GA only where no other edition is available. When referring to an individual essay, I give two page numbers: the first refers to the page n u m b e r in the original publication; the second, to the page n u m b e r in subsequent editions in which the essay appears. Brief Letter Heidegger wrote to Husserl on 22 October 1927 in Phdnomenologische Psychologie, Hua. IX, 601-2. [Translated by Thomas J. Sheehan: "The Idea of Phenomenology, with a Letter to Edmund Husserl." Listeningl2 (1977): 118-21.] BW David Farrell Krell, ed. Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings. London: Routledge Paul & Kegan, 1993. GA 4 Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. Erlduterungen zu Holdertins Dichtung. 1981. GA 15 Curd Ochwadt, ed. Seminare (1951-1973). 1986. GA 20 Petra Jaeger, ed. Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Marburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1925). 1988. [Translated by Theodore Kisiel: History of the Concept of Time, Prolegomena. Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.] GA21 Walter Biemel, ed. Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit (Marburger Vorlesung Wintersemester 1925/26). 1976. GA 24 Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie (Marburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1927). 1975. GA 26 Klaus Held, ed. Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz. (Marburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1928). 1978. [Translated by Michael Heim: The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.] GA 29/30 Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. Die Grundbegriffe der

A B B R E V I A T I O N S

Metaphysik, WeUFndUchkeit-Einsamkdt (Freiburger Vorlesung Wintersemester 1929/30). 1983. [Translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker: The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics— World, Finitude, Solitude. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.] Manfred S. Frings, ed. Parmenides (Freiburger Vorlesung WinGA54 tersemester 1942/43). 1982. Claudius Strube, ed. Phdnomenologie der Anschauung und des GA59 Ausdrucks—Theorie der Philosophischen Begriffsbildung (Freiburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1920). 1993. Kate Brocker-Oltmanns, ed. Ontobgie (Hermeneutik der FaktiziGA63 tat) (Friihe Freiburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1923). 1988. Holzwege Holzwege (1935-1946). Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950. Or GA 5, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. 1977. Kantbuch Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (1929), 5th extended edition. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991. Or GA 3, 1991. [Translated by Richard Taft: Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990.] Kunst und Raum "Die Kunst und der Raum" (1969). In GA 13, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, ed. Hermann Heidegger, 1983, 203-10. [Translated by Charles H. Seibert: "Art and Space." Man and Worldb (1973): 3-8.] Letter to Richardson. In William J. Richardson, Heidegger through Phenomenology to Thought, viii-xxi. The Hague: Martinus NijhofF, 1963. OWL On the Way to Language. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. SuZ Sein und Zeit (1927), 15th revised and extended edition. Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1979. Or GA 2, FriedrichWilhelm von Herrmann, ed., 1977. [Translated—based on the seventh edition—by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson: Being and Time. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962.] UzS Unterwegs zur Sprache (1950-59). Pfullingen: Gtinther Neske, 1959. Or GA 12, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed., 1985. WdG "Vom Wesen des Grundes" (1929) in Wegmarken, 123-73. [Translated—based on the fourth German edition—by Terrence Malick: The Essence of Reasons. Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1969. Wegmarken Wegmarken (1919-1961), 2nd revised edition. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978. Or GA9, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed., 1976. [The citations refer to the 1978 edition.] For translations of individual essays, see bibliography. WhD Was heisst Denken? (1951-1952), 4th edition. Tubingen: Max


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Niemeyer Verlag, 1984. Or GA 8. [Translated by Fred D. Wieck a n d j . Glenn Gray: What Is Called Thinking? New York: Harper & Row, 1968.] Zdhringer Seminare Seminare zu Zdhringen. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1973. Or "Seminar in Zahringen 1973" in GA 15,372-400. ZSD Zur Sache des Denkens (1962-1964). Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969. Or GA 14. [Translated by Joan Stambaugh: On Time and Being. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.]

B. ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR EDMUND HUSSERL Note: All references give the page number of the HUSSERLIANA (Hua) (Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke [based on the unpublished work in the Husserl-Archive]. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950-) first. T h e page n u m b e r s in the marginalia of the English translation of H u a X refer to the Hua, whereas the page n u m b e r s in the marginalia of the English translation of Idem / r e f e r to the 1913 (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag) edition. Unless otherwise noted, I have made only the following two amendments to the published translations: 1) I have translated the term Erlebnis as "lived experience" and not as "mental process"; 2) I have translated the term Leib as "lived body" and not as "Body." BrWII HUSSERLIANA-DOKUMENTE Karl Schuhmann in conjunction with E. Schuhmann, ed. Briefwechsel, vol. 2. 1994. BrWIII HUSSERLIANA-DOKUMENTE Karl Schuhmann in conjunction with E. Schuhmann, ed. Briefwechsel, vol. 3, Die Gottinger Schule. 1994. CM S. Strasser, ed. Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortrdge. 1950. The main text has been edited and individually published by Elisabeth Stroker: Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1987. [Translated by Dorion Cairns: Cartesian Meditations—An Introduction to Phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, I960.] EU Ludwig Landgrebe, ed. Erfahrung und Urteil, Untersuchungen zur Genealogie derLogik, 6th revised edition. With an afterword and index by Lothar Eley. Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1985. [Translated byJ. S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks: Experience and Judgement—Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic. Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1973.] Hua II Walter Biemel, ed. Idee der Phdnomenologie, Fiinf Vorlesungen (1907). 1973. [Translated by William P. Alston and George

XVI


Nakhnikian: The Idea of Phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.] Hua VIII Rudolf Boehm, ed. Erste Philosophie (1923-1924). 1959. Hua IX Walter Biemel, ed. Phdnomenologische Psychologie (Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925). 1962. Hua X Rudolf Boehm, ed. Zur Phdnomenologie des Inneren Zeitbeiousstseins (1893-1917). 1966. Originally published as "Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie des inneren ZeitbewuBtsein" (19051910), Martin Heidegger, ed., in Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phdnomenologische Forschung, vol. 9 (1928), 367-498; reprinted in Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1980. The additional texts of the critical edition of Zeitbewufitsein have been individually published and edited by Rudolf Bernet: Texte zur Phdnomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917). Hamburg: Felix Mei-ner Verlag, 1985. [Translated by John Barnett Brough: On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917) Collected Works IV. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991; Zeitbewufitsein was first translated by James S. Churchill as The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964.] Hua XI

Margot Fleischer, ed. Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis (Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918-1926). 1966. Hua XVI Ulrich Claesges, ed. Ding und Raum (Vorlesungen 1907). 1973. Individual publication and edition of the main text and appendix I by Karl-Heinz Hahnengress and Smail Rapic. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1991. Hua XVII Paul Janssen, ed. Formale und transzendentale Logik— Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft (1929). 1974. First published in Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phdnomenologische Forschung, vol. 10, and reprinted in Halle (Saale): Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1929. [Translated by Dorion Cairns: Formal and Transcendental Logic. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.] Ideen I Hua III. Walter Biemel, ed. Ideen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie und phdnomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einfuhrung in die reine Phanomenologie (1913), revised and extended edition based on Husserl's handwritten marginalia. 1950. Originally published under the same title in Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phdnomenologische Forschung vol. 1, and reprinted by Max Niemeyer, Halle, 1913. [Translated by F. Kersten: Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenobgical Philosophy, First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology; Collected Works, vol. II. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982. Ideen I was first translated by W. R. Gibson under the auspices of Hus-


Ideen II

Ideen III

Krisis

LI LU

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serl in 1931 as Ideas— General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology. New York: First Collier Books Edition, 1962.] H u a IV. Marly Biemel, ed. Ideen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie und phdnomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phdnomenobgische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution, ([1912-] 1928). 1952. [Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer: Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy; Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.] Hua V. Marly Biemel, ed. Ideen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie und phdnomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch, Die Phdnomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaf ten. 1971. [Translated by Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl: Edmund Husserl Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences; Third Book, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980.] Hua VI. Walter Biemel, ed. Die Krisis der europdischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phdnomenlogie (1934-1937). 1954. [Translated by David Garr: The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1970.] J. N. Findlay, trans. Logical Investigations, vols. I and II. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970. Hua XVIII-XIX/1-2; originally published as Logische Untersuchungen. Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2nd revised edition. Vol. I: Hua XVIIL Elmar Holenstein, ed. Prolegomena zur reinen Logik (1913). 1975. Vol. I I / l : Hua X I X / 1 . Ursula Panzer, ed. Untersuchungen zur Phdnomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis (1913). 1984. Vol. II/2: Hua XIX/2. Ursula Panzer, ed. "Elemente einer phanomenologischen Aufklarung der Erkenntnis (1921)" in Untersuchungen zur Phdnomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. 1984.

C. ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR IMMANUEL KANT KRV

AK

Wilhelm Weischedel, ed. Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781 A version, 1787 B version), in Kant-Werke, vol. 3, part 1 and vol. 4, part 2, special edition. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983. [Translated by Norman Kemp Smith: Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. London: Macmillan Press, 1933.] All references are the standard first- and secondedition pagination. Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences, ed.

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Kants gesammelte Schriften. Berlin: Georg Reimer, Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-.

D. ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR EMMANUEL LEVINAS AQE

DEHH

DL

DQVI EE

Autrement quetre on au-dela de ['essence (Phaenomenologica 54). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974. [Translated by Alphonso Lingis: Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981.] En decouvrant Vexistence avec Husserl et Heidegger, 2nd revised and extended edition. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1967. Difficile liberte, Essais sur le judaisme, 3rd edition. Paris: Albin Michel, 1976. [Translated by Sean Hand: Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism. London: Athlone Press, 1990.] De Dieu qui vient a Videe, 2nd revised and extended edition. Paris: J. Vrin, 1986. De Vexistence a Vexistant (1940-1945). Paris: J. Vrin, 1990. [Translated by Alfonso Lingis: Existence and Existents. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978.]

INTRODUCTION

H o w D O I K N O W that the external world exists? Can it not be that the world is nothing but a figment of my imagination? How can I b e certain that the content of my thought is identical with its referent, namely, an object in the external world? How can I ever know whether you view the world exacdy as I do? Moreover, how can I be sure that you exist a n d are not a m e r e automaton? T h e r e is a strand in contemporary philosophy that believes it has b r o u g h t these questions to a final halt. Instead of direcdy responding to these questions, which have b e e n troubling philosophy ever since Descartes, it has b e g u n to analyze the questioner herself. At issue h e r e is not so m u c h whether it is possible to provide a cogent proof for the existence of things outside us, but what it is that leads philosophers to seek such proof again a n d again. Attention has b e e n diverted from trying to solve the problem to analyzing its source, namely, the motivation that has led philosophy to raise these questions in the first place. It may be fair to say that there is a tendency in contemporary philosophy to problematize the problem. In this m a n n e r , philosophy has b e c o m e self-reflexive. It attempts to u n d e r s t a n d the source of the characteristic anxieties of m o d e r n philosophy—anxieties that center on the relation between m i n d a n d world. Adherents to the analytic tradition have t e n d e d to pathologize philosophical issues. From Wittgenstein we learn that philosophy o u g h t to b e nothing other than a form of therapy. Epistemological skepticism about the existence of the external world is treated as if it were an illness that needs to be cured (cf. Wittgenstein 1958, §255). Continental philosophers, in turn, claim that philosophical issues have b e e n s h a p e d by a tradition. We n e e d to r e a d the history of philosophy, n o t in o r d e r to u n d e r s t a n d the past b e t t e r , b u t to understand our own critical position in the present. We learn that distinctions between m i n d and world, reason and the given, e m e r g e

XX

I N T R O D U C T I O N

within an extended historical process of rational self-examination. Whatever counts as a constraint or limit of thought's self-determination is its very own product. While skeptics would question whether it is possible to match u p o u r ideas with the way things are "in themselves," anti-Cartesians would argue that skeptics fail to reflect on their own standards of evaluation. In the analytic tradition the a r g u m e n t would be that Descartes has distorted the requirements for knowledge. Skepticism is a misg u i d e d philosophical position and reveals nothing about o u r everyday o r scientific knowledge and beliefs. 1 T h e continental tradition, in turn, would argue that the standards of evaluation as to whether things are "thus and so" are historically d e t e r m i n e d or internal to consciousness (cf. Hegel 1977, 53). In other words, those standards are defined in terms of the kinds of reasons we have to r e g a r d t h e m as authoritative. Representatives of both traditions hold that philosophy needs to examine whether these grounds are legitimate. It would thus appear that contemporary philosophy is nothing o t h e r than a clearing u p after the storm. Its primary concern is to disclose the m a n n e r in which Cartesianism, particularly in its m e t h o d and criterion for determining truth, is flawed a n d misguided. We are told that epistemological skepticism arises only when "language goes o n holiday" (Wittgenstein 1958, §38). Epistemology is nothing b u t a history of bad ideas. If this were so, then philosophy should not seek to reveal anything new; rather it should disentangle our philosophical confusions and disclose that which Cartesianism has distorted a n d covered u p , namely, our original familiarity with the world. 2 However, t h e r e is a curious paradox connected with such a corrective or therapeutic stance to philosophy. Not only is it parasitic o n the Cartesian premise it seeks to overcome, but, m o r e important, the anti-Cartesian concerns are not as divorced from the Cartesian enterprise as they may first appear. We should n o t forget that philosophical skepticism about the external world is spurred by the desire to prove its existence. Descartes believed that he was able to prove that it is impossible to d o u b t the existence of the physical world. Yet, that the external world cannot be d o u b t e d can be known only t h r o u g h the m e t h o d of d o u b t itself. In other words: the proof provided by Descartes is that his initial doubts "should be dismissed as laughable." 3 D o u b t refutes skepticism. Hence Descartes, the father of m o d e r n skepticism, appears to be the first to agree with the claim that philos-


XXI

ophy should attempt to disentangle our initial confusions. T h e aim is to overcome skepticism. However, the parallel drawn h e r e is not as straightforward as it might seem. It is true that there are many anti-Cartesians who r e m a i n loyal to the Cartesian project. They believe that Descartes has failed to overcome skepticism and seek to improve his m e t h o d . T h o u g h their work is critical, it remains within the spirit of the Cartesian legacy. We may call such objections internal, insofar as they a d h e r e to the terms that Descartes has set himself. 4 Yet, what is distinctive about the ruling conception of philosophy today is that its anti-Cartesian stance is far bolder. Its objections are external to the Cartesian enterprise. It n o longer seeks to overcome skepticism; rather it seeks to u n d e r m i n e the very project itself. T h e various anti-Cartesian positions could b e presented in the following way. T h e first two refer to internal, a n d the last one refers to external, objections raised against the Cartesian enterprise: 1. T h e r e are those who accept Descartes's project, yet question whether Descartes has not b e e n disingenuous about the limits of possible doubt. They claim that Descartes was p r e m a t u r e in taking the certainty that "I am a thinking thing" as an ultimate premise, and argue that Descartes failed to overcome skepticism about the external world. Such objections are exemplified in Kant's "Refutation of Idealism." According to Kant, if self-knowledge is r e g a r d e d as primary, the existence of things outside us can only be inferred b u t never known. Hence, according to Kant, it is "a scandal to philosophy and to h u m a n reason in general" that there is still n o cogent proof for "the existence of things outside of us." 5 F r o m Kant we learn that we can d o away with skepticism about the external world only if we can prove that knowledge of ourselves presupposes knowledge of things outside us. In this m a n n e r , thinkers like Kant raise objections that are internal to the Cartesian enterprise. T h e aim is to overcome skepticism — a move which, they believe, Descartes has failed to accomplish. 2. T h e r e is another anti-Cartesian strand in philosophy that does n o t seek to correct the Cartesian project but endeavors to p u n c t u r e its pretensions of reason by showing that skepticism is impossible. Such objections are still internal to the Cartesian enterprise insofar as they show that Descartes fails to a d h e r e to the terms that h e has set himself. They question the possibility of universal doubt. H u m e , for example, contends that skeptical d o u b t is possible only if we believe

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we have knowledge of an external world in the first place. 6 Whatever argument is provided, it presupposes a belief in the existence of the external world which can never be undone. 7 Another prime contender for such an anti-skeptical position is Hegel. We learn from Hegel that true skeptics would have to concede that all points of view are relative to o u r own contingent subjective point of view. However, in o r d e r to make such a claim the skeptic must assume a detached universal point of view—one, however, which she cannot justify. T h e pretensions of skepticism are thus r e n d e r e d inefficacious by the impossibility of arriving at an Archimedian point that lies beyond the realm of doubt. 8 Skepticism (Zweifel) is nothing other than a pathway of despair (Verzweiflung). Authoritative skepticism must be skeptical about itself; it must realize that it itself is only an "appearance" (cf. Hegel 1977, 49f). 3. These internal objections to the Cartesian enterprise have b e e n replaced by external objections that define the ruling conception of the philosophical enterprise today. Today many philosophers n o longer seek to overcome or to refute the pretensions of skepticism; instead they question why we should desire to be skeptics in the first place. Contrary to Kant, they claim that the scandal of philosophy is n o t so m u c h that a proof for the existence of things outside us is still outstanding but that philosophy is expecting such proof again a n d again (cf. SuZ, §43a, 205). We are mistaken in seeking an ultimate premise that renders o u r relation to the world intelligible. As Wittgenstein observes: "It is so difficult to find the beginning. Or, better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not to try to go further back" (Wittgenstein 1975, §471). Contemporary philosophy questions whether there is an Archimedian point at all. We are encouraged to accept that a "beginning" could have "no foundation u p o n which something could be built" (ZSD, 34 / 32E). T h e aim, then, is to collapse the traditional project of Cartesian rationalism. Contemporary anti-Cartesianism is anti-foundationalist and thus departs radically from the Cartesian enterprise. The objections it raises are external to the terms that Descartes has set. T h e aim h e r e is n o longer to overcome skepticism and to arrive at certainty. Such an enterprise itself is jeopardized. Inevitably, the question arises whether such a radical a n d external objection to Descartes provides a new dimension to the understanding of our relation to the world, a dimension the Cartesian system cannot acknowledge. T o understand the significance of this


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question it is important first to recall that although Descartes reached the conclusion that his initial doubts were laughable, h e would not claim that his initial doubts were futile. Quite the contrary, Descartes contends that skepticism frees us "from an error that has gripped all of us since our childhood, when we came to believe that there are no bodies a r o u n d us except those capable of being perceived by the senses" (Descartes 1985, 17). In this m a n n e r Descartes wishes to show that physical science is possible once we realize that it should n o t be guided by the senses alone b u t also by the natural light of reason. D o u b t leads to certainty; however, it is a certainty of a world which we would not have were we not skeptics initially. If we follow the anti-Cartesian stance, we cannot accept Descartes's solutions since we n o longer accept his premise. T h a t is to say, if we can n o longer accept the process of d o u b t by means of which the assurance of the external world is achieved, then we have to arrive at a different conception of a world. Indeed, those anti-Cartesians who refuse to endorse the m e t h o d of d o u b t d o not affirm the world of physical science that Descartes had in mind, b u t a world that discloses itself before any d o u b t is possible. T h e world they refer to is the world of the everyday, the world of meaning and belief, or the world of praxis. T h e claim is that this world can be disclosed only outside the Cartesian project a n d thus remains anterior to and radically different from any Cartesian conception of a world. This book sets out to explore whether these external objections to Descartes do, in fact, reveal as fundamentally new a conception of o u r relation to the world as these thinkers would have us believe. We remain skeptical as to whether it is that easy to dispose of the Cartesian problematic; for it would appear that external objections shy away from the p r o b l e m of the external world, rather than proving why we should no longer b e troubled by skepticism. Moreover, we believe that the internal objections raised against Descartes's system allow for a far m o r e truthful depiction of o u r relation to the world than those external objections that refuse to face the p r o b l e m in the first place. This book contends that contemporary philosophy has b e e n prem a t u r e in dismissing skepticism and illustrates this by focusing on the writings of two closely related thinkers who share the same historical descent: E d m u n d Husserl and Martin Heidegger. It is tempting to c o m p a r e these two thinkers, since they were in constant dialogue with

XXIV

INTRO D U C TION

o n e another, debating whether to adopt an internal or an external critical stance to the Cartesian tradition. T h e philosophical dialogue between them is thus a very useful way of probing the issues that characterize Cartesian and anti-Cartesian responses to skepticism. Edm u n d Husserl sides with those thinkers who seek to rescue Descartes from his own pitfalls; namely, he develops internal objections to Descartes's skepticism and endeavors to replace it with what he calls a "critique of cognition" (Hua II, 29). Heidegger, in contrast, belongs to the contemporary strand of philosophy that is powerfully anti-Cartesian. H e regards Husserl as a representative of the (Cartesian) tradition and in his main work, SuZ, seeks to show why the Cartesian premise is flawed and misguided. In his view the p r o b l e m of the external world arises only if we believe that there is a subject that is distinct from the p h e n o m e n o n of the world. Heidegger contends that this "worldless" subject is a philosophical fiction, as is the p r o b l e m of the external world. T h e main thrust of SuZ is to show why skepticism, a n d with it the central issue that has troubled philosophy ever since Descartes, has become r e d u n d a n t . T h o u g h sympathetic to Heidegger's project, this book questions whether Heidegger manages to reclaim the world which the Cartesian tradition has puportedly overlooked. T h e b o o k sets out to explore what it means to ignore or, indeed, "jump over" the p h e n o m e n o n of the world. It asks what kind of world Heidegger has in m i n d when he articulates this critique. Rather than approaching this question sideways by postulating in advance o u r conception of the world, we will investigate what motivates Heidegger to reconsider the conception of the world and whether he fulfills his promise to salvage the p h e n o m e n o n of the world which h e believes the tradition of philosophy has ignored. T h e book is divided into five chapters: Chapter 1 explores how we are to interpret Heidegger's departure from Husserl. It argues that although Heidegger repeatedly accuses Husserl of exemplifying the tradition of philosophy by returning to a 'worldless subject', we should not understand this accusation as a form of internalism, in the sense made familiar by contemporary analytic philosophy. T h e chapter is divided into three parts. Part 1 will demonstrate that Husserl is not an internalist. LU show that propositional attitudes cannot be assessed without reference to external states of affairs. Part 2 argues that, as long as we depict Husserl as an internalist, we fail to recognize the significant breakthrough of Husserl's


xxv

phenomenology—namely, that it lays out a new form of objectivity and thereby facilitates the question of Being. Part 3 argues that, even after Husserl's so-called transcendental turn, the accusation that Husserl is a methodological solipsist is misplaced. Rather than ignoring the world, the transcendental reduction brings into the foreground the p h e n o m e n o n of the world. Indeed, Heidegger praises Husserl not only for overcoming Cartesian representationalism, but for raising, and even answering, the question of Being. H e n c e , Heidegger's objections to Husserl's work cannot be understood in terms of the recent internalism/externalism debate. What Heidegger objects to is Husserl's transcendental turn. This is not because he believes that it advocates a methodological solipsism, b u t because it is epistemologically motivated. T h e problem, for Heidegger, is that Husserl adheres to the tradition insofar as he raises internal objections to the Cartesian enterprise. H e uses Cartesian d o u b t as a methodological device without, however, taking any of its premises for granted. Husserl is thereby thoroughly anti-Cartesian in his Cartesianism. First, unlike Descartes, Husserl believes that d o u b t leads not to the certainty that "I am a thinking thing," b u t to the realization that we can never think without thinking of something. Essential to cognition is that thought is directed toward something, whether real or imaginary. Husserl calls this directedness intentionality. Second, Husserl believes Descartes was mistaken in equating doubt with a m o m e n t of negation. If we wish to be true skeptics, we need to abstain from making j u d g m e n t s . Husserl calls such a suspension of j u d g m e n t ^TTO^T], or bracketing. Thus Husserl avoids the pitfalls of skepticism as described above: namely, that if d o u b t were a form ofj u d g m e n t , we would conflate o u r own personal point of view with a universal point of view, a move that would p u n c t u r e the pretensions of skepticism. T h e issue for Heidegger is that because Husserl raises internal objections to the Cartesian enterprise, he fails to realize that the world is an existential structure of Dasein which can never be t u r n e d into an 'object' of reflection. This is why Husserl, in the final analysis, forgets the question of Being. Like other adherents to the tradition of philosophy, h e affirms a philosophy of consciousness (Bewufttseinsphilosophie) which ignores the p h e n o m e n o n of the world. Chapter 2 seeks to understand the nature of Husserl's Cartesianism. It explores Husserl's attempt to justify the claim that the stream

XXVI


of the appearing world in its suspension, t h o u g h constantiy changing, is fully present in its unity. We will show that Husserl's project is d o o m e d to failure: there is always a trail of life that escapes consciousness which can never be m a d e fully present. Husserl fails to remain faithful to the aim he has set himself, namely, to r e t u r n to an Archim e d i a n beginning that lies beyond the realm of doubt. The enclosed space of consciousness is always already broken. T h e chapter further shows that Husserl adheres to the tradition by prioritizing consciousness over and against the spatiotemporal world. It claims that Husserl's anti-Cartesianism is essentially Kantian in style. Just as Kant argues that the world needs to conform to o u r m o d e of representation, Husserl argues that objects need to conform to the "style" of consciousness. Also like Kant, Husserl realizes that any experience, even i m m a n e n t experience, needs to be accompanied by an experiencing consciousness, which is that of the p u r e Ego in Husserl, and the transcendental unity of apperception in Kant. T h o u g h Husserl's phenomenology imitates a certain form of Kantianism, it exceeds Kant insofar as it manifests that which critical philosophy posits. According to Heidegger, Husserl's anti-Cartesianism has deepe n e d philosophy's subjective turn, since the concern is n o longer "How do I know that the world exists?" b u t "How does the world in its suspension appear to consciousness?" Husserl is concerned neither with the subject n o r with the world, but merely with the directedness of t h o u g h t itself. In this respect Husserl's revised and critical Cartesianism epitomizes m o d e r n philosophy: it makes explicit philosophy's implicit disinterestedness in the existence of the external world. Philosophy is concerned only with the m a n n e r in which we are conscious ofthe world; everything that lies beyond the realm of consciousness is r e n d e r e d futile. This leads Heidegger to claim that Husserl affirms a claustrophobic i m m a n e n c e which excludes the possibility of a m o m e n t of exteriority. Chapter 3 sets out to explore Heidegger's response to the tradition of philosophy. Heidegger seeks to disclose a world that does n o t r e q u i r e validation t h r o u g h doubt. That which determines the meaning a n d n a t u r e of the world is n o longer d o u b t b u t the m a n n e r in which we are b o n d e d to the world. What defines us living h u m a n beings is our c o m p o r t m e n t to the world. Heidegger uses the term Dasein to emphasize o u r openness to the world. Before we think, we find ourselves "over there" (Da) in a world. Dasein is always already "other"


XXV11

(transcendent) to consciousness (immanence). Heidegger thereby suggests a "revolution of the place of thinking" (Zdhringer Seminare, 385 / 123) by prioritizing transcendence over immanence. A topology of thinking stands in "lieu" of consciousness. T h e chapter is c o n c e r n e d with the very dis-location, or Ortsverlegung (Zdhringer Seminare, 123 / 385), that the term Dasein suggests. It examines whether SuZ manages to retrieve the world that the tradition of philosophy has purportedly overlooked. Although SuZ suggests a radical break with Husserl, we show that SuZ consistently resists what its critique opens u p , namely, the r e t u r n to the material world and an e m b o d i e d Dasein. In a m a n n e r analogous to Husserl, Heidegger refuses to acknowledge the anterior excess of a life that lies beyond the grasp of Dasein. Rather than returning to things themselves as they show themselves, Heidegger turns away from what shows itself. Thus, Heidegger, like Husserl, discloses a self-enclosed constitutive site a n d fails to a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t this site is always already broken. Chapter 4 argues that SuZ fails to overcome philosophy's subjective turn. Heidegger remains concerned with the question of the "how"— namely, how Dasein comports itself to the world. T h e world is not at issue here; only the m a n n e r in which the world matters to Dasein counts. T h e world is understood purely adverbially. Like Husserl, Heidegger thereby defines the world as a temporal horizon of Dasein. Heidegger departs from Husserl only by calling this horizon finite, in contrast to Husserl's infinite stream of consciousness. In this m a n n e r Heidegger falls prey to the very critique that he himself directs against the tradition. His only concern is Dasein, and everything that exceeds Dasein's understanding is r e n d e r e d otiose. Moreover, by denying the possibility of bracketing the world, SuZ lets the world disappear without acknowledging its loss. Heidegger, even m o r e than Husserl, epitomizes the tradition, insofar as he brings its disinterestedness in the p h e n o m e n o n of the world to completion. Husserl at least lets the world appear in its suspension. T o p u t it another way, Husserl acknowledges the bracketing of the world, while Heidegger wipes out the world without leaving any traces behind, since he denies the possibility of doubting its existence in the first place. This has devastating consequences, for it leads to the denial of any form of exteriority. Dasein's transcendence is even m o r e claustrophobic than Husserl's account of immanence.

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INTRODUCTION

The final chapter explores whether Heidegger's project can be rescued—whether it is possible to pierce the field of immanence and retrieve the world that the tradition has overlooked. We shall claim that such a retrieval is possible if we return to those thinkers who raise internal objections to the Cartesian system, in particular Kant and Husserl. We can reclaim the world that the tradition has ignored only by returning to those thinkers whom Heidegger seeks to overcome.

PROLOGUE

T H E Y ARE T O O C L O S E to separate a n d too far away to see each other. They can neither u n d o their respect for o n e another n o r bear the closeness. It is the father who sees his life continued in the son. T h e son, however, can only accept the heritage by turning against the father. This is how we could describe the relationship between Husserl and Heidegger. Husserl considered Heidegger to b e his heir. Heidegger was the only student who could explore "unknown depths" of Husserl's phenomenological method. 1 With prophetic irony Husserl wrote to Pfander that Heidegger would "not only inherit b u t even surpass." 2 Husserl's hopes a n d expectations were that Heidegger would n o t just continue the phenomenological project but exceed it by allowing for new openings a n d insights Husserl himself could not have envisaged. Inevitably, however, as soon as Heidegger articulated his d e p a r t u r e in SuZ—a text Husserl accepted for publication in his Jahrbuchfur PhanomenologischeForschungwithout even having read the manuscript in detail (cf. Breeur 1994, 3)—an irreconcilable rift emerged. Heidegger would proudly claim that he u n d e r s t o o d the project of p h e n o m e n o l o g y better than its founding father did: "To this day I still consider [SuZ] a m o r e faithful adherence to the principle of phenomenology" (Letter to Richardson, xv). Heidegger believed that he had b o t h inherited and surpassed Husserl's legacy. Husserl, for his part, felt betrayed and a r g u e d that Heidegger's d e p a r t u r e was m a d e possible only by a distortion of his own phenomenological m e t h o d . In a letter to Roman Ing a r d e n Husserl complained: "Heidegger has never u n d e r s t o o d the true m e a n i n g of the m e t h o d of the transcendental reduction." 3 Heidegger, the heir so greatly admired, would soon become the "enemy" (Feind) .4 Accusations of betrayal would replace declarations of admiration. This is the setting in which o u r writing takes place. O u r aim is n o t to reconstruct the awareness and (mis)understanding each thinker had of the other; it is rather to explore SuZ in terms of its adherence to and d e p a r t u r e from Husserl. It will emerge that SuZ's adherence to

2

PROLOGUE

Husserl is far s t r o n g e r than it tries to m a k e us believe. T h e aim is not to vindicate Husserl, nor to blunt Heidegger's philosophical rigor. We a r e only too keenly aware that to philosophize means to do violence and any attempt to do justice, any academic exercise which is engaged merely in trying to minimize differences between thinkers, leads to the greater violence of a philosophical silencing. 5 Rather than r e d u c i n g the differences between the thinkers, the aim is to locate Heidegger's true d e p a r t u r e from Husserl. For SuZ's failure to d e p a r t from Husserl will unwittingly reveal the avenue by which a true departure is possible. SuZ's success thus lies in its failure. By drawing o n its failure we can b o t h exceed Husserl and overcome the limitations of SuZ. We e m b a r k on a curious journey. By taking SuZ's critique of Husserl as our point of d e p a r t u r e , we shall constantly be drawn back to Husserl. SuZ's critique of the tradition of idealism (the t e r m tradition h e r e always includes Husserl, who, according to Heidegger, still exemplifies the tradition) 6 paves the way for the claim that nothing is m o r e u r g e n t today than the task of rethinking our relation to the world in terms of kinaesthesia and embodiment. Yet, as this work will show, it is Husserl a n d n o t Heidegger who will allow us to u n d e r s t a n d our relation to the world in this m a n n e r . SuZ's critique of idealism thus inadvertently p r e p a r e s the g r o u n d for a r e t u r n to Husserl. F r o m the outset our reading is thematically restricted. We read SuZ in terms of its a d h e r e n c e to and d e p a r t u r e from Husserl, and m e a s u r e SuZ's success in relation to SuZ's own proclaimed trajectory. T h e Husserl in question is the Husserl preceding the publication of SuZ. For the aim is to investigate how Husserl unwittingly provides the way for an adequate response to SuZ before SuZ was even written.

CHAPTER ONE

Husserl and Heidegger A Reappraisal of Their Relationship

INTRODUCTION E D M U N D H U S S E R L ' S phenomenological a p p r o a c h is often interp r e t e d as a form of internalism or "methodological solipsism." 1 Husserl, it is claimed, describes o u r propositional attitudes in ways that d o not require the existence of any particular objects or properties in the world. We know the content of our minds. However, we "lack the resources with which to explain how such subjective, intentional experiences can ever make contact with reality, or can ever be related to things which are n o t subjective or intentional in such a way as to constitute objective knowledge of them" (Bell 1990, 148). In view of this, Heidegger's position may appear far m o r e attractive. It advocates an externalist position and shows that experience should b e u n d e r s t o o d n o longer in terms of consciousness but "as the transcendence of the self to things in the world" (Keller 1999, 100) .2 T h e aim of this chapter is to show that such a reading is misleading: although Heidegger accuses Husserl of returning to a philosophy of consciousness {Bexvufitseinsphilosophie), it would be a mistake to interpret that accusation in terms of the internalism/externalism debate. Heidegger does not accuse Husserl of returning to "the Cartesian conception of mind as a kind of inner theater" (Keller 1999, 43); indeed, he praises him for overcoming Cartesian representationalism (cf. GA 20, §6b, a, 78). Husserl, so Heidegger believes, shows that our lived experiences (Erlebnisse) are never of mental contents b u t "simple cognizance of what is found" (GA 20, §5c, a, 51). Nonetheless, H e i d e g g e r admonishes Husserl for his Cartesianism. Husserl still takes the Cartesian project seriously, insofar as h e seeks to secure our knowledge of the external world by puncturing the pretensions of skepticism. For Heidegger the

4

H U S S E R L AND H E I D E G G E R

p r o b l e m is not that Husserl can describe only the contents of our mind, b u t that he adheres to the parameters set by the Cartesian enterprise. Thus, when we seek to explain Heidegger's departure from Husserl, we should not draw on the internalism/externalism debate, but should focus on the different ways in which the two thinkers respond to the Cartesian legacy. 3

WHY HUSSERL IS N O T AN INTERNALIST §1. Husserl, a Methodological Solipsist? W h e n we turn to LU, the claim that Husserl promotes an internalist position seems far-fetched. After all, the explicit aim of LU is to salvage logic from psychologism and thereby to affirm the existence of a nonmental reality. In line with his contemporary Gottlob Frege, Husserl argues that we should never conflate concrete (psychical or p h e n o m enological) processes of thinking with p u r e logic, nor temporally individuated acts of thinking with the ideal conditions of cognition. W e r e we to fail to draw such distinctions, we would n o longer b e able to distinguish between "being true" and "being taken as true" (Frege 1966, 30 ff.), and would be paving the way toward skepticism, subjectivism, and relativism (cf. LU I, Prol. §36 ff.). Like Frege, Husserl is thus most anxious to ensure a level of meaning or sense which he regards to be the true object of logical inquiry. Moreover, like Frege, h e believes that logical propositions expressed as a result of logical thinking refer to a sphere of sense which is not contained in the act of thinking. Nothing about the act of counting, for example, belongs to the sense or content of a p u r e number. Rather n u m b e r s , propositions, and logical proofs constitute a closed realm of objects that Husserl calls ideal. Logic refers to p u r e concepts or propositions, just as mathematics speaks about mathematical truths whose m e a n i n g does not d e p e n d on the existence of a spatiotemporal world. Irrespective of whether there is such a world or, indeed, a subject that thinks, logical or mathematical truths such as 2 + 2 = 4 subsist. P u r e truths, according to Husserl, are ideal. They are not conditioned by the factual world. 4 So why is it that Husserl is nonetheless read as an internalist? 5 T h e reason seems to be that Husserl fails to deliver what he promises. Husserl cannot reach a full-blooded objectivity because he argues not

Why Husserl Is N o t an Internalist

5

only, in line with Frege, that logical truths are ideal, b u t also, unlike Frege, that it is only possible to overcome logical psychologism if one is also able to show how the truths of logic exhibit a necessary relation to psychological matters of fact (our actual thought processes). 6 It is this latter move that may suggest the view that Husserl is an internalist, for, inevitably, his focus is on the subjective side of experience (Husserl calls it noetic), and he has n o way of showing how it corresponds to an object as it is in itself. Such a reading is, however, misleading. Husserl does not study intentional objects as intrinsic to acts; Husserl in fact seeks to account for an extra-mental reality. Yet, he believes he can d o this only by addressing the p r o b l e m of constitution, namely, by showing how our thought processes relate to an objectivity, the existence of which Husserl takes for granted. 7 T h e question is not "How d o we impose subjective forms onto an objective reality?" or "How d o objects appear within our mind?" b u t "How d o subjective acts instantiate (cf. Smith 1989, 163), or constitute, objective ideal laws of logic or meanings which are true and exist in themselves, i n d e p e n d e n t of o u r thinking about them?" By addressing the p r o b l e m in this m a n n e r Husserl does n o t r e d u c e objectivity to subjective experience; rather, the reverse is true: he describes our relation to objectivity. 8 §2. Object and Meaning Do Not Coincide We can best illustrate what is at issue t h r o u g h reflections on language. According to Husserl, in every objectivating act, meaning is constituted. This meaning is never intrinsic to the act. As Husserl puts it: "Each expression not merely says something, b u t says it ^/something: it not only has a meaning, but refers to certain objects. . . . But the object never coincides with the meaning" (LU I, §12, 52; LI, 287). We need to differentiate between the acts that form words and that confer meanings and the object that is meant. Husserl illustrates this by pointing out (in line with Frege) that two acts of meaning can have the same object but different "contents." 9 We can n a m e the same historical figure when we refer to "the victor at J e n a " a n d "the vanquished at Waterloo." Although the expressed meanings are different, they intend or refer to the same object, namely, Napoleon (cf. LU I, §12, 53; LI, 287). In other words, apart from its meaning, an expression also has the function of "naming" something, the object we are thinking about. The object and the meaning of an expression d o not coincide.

6


While the act of meaning changes over time —it can be uttered in a n u m b e r of different ways—its object remains identical. To explain this difference Husserl distinguishes between the obj e c t p u r e and simple that is intended and the object as it is intended (cf. LU V, §17, 414; LI, 578). While the object that is intended does n o t change—it possesses an unchanging identity which is "ideal" — the object as it is intended can vary both qualitatively and materially. Not only can it be intended in different apprehensional modes—we can think, fantasize, desire, or perceive one and the same object; b u t the object can also be d e t e r m i n e d in a particular m a n n e r , i.e., we can refer to the knife as such, or the knife as lying o n the table. Husserl thus distinguishes between the objectivity (Gegenstdndlichkeit) to which an act taken fully directs itself (the knife as such) a n d the objects (Gegenstdnde) to which different partial acts direct themselves (cf. LU V, §17, 415; LI, 579). T h e object as such appears as the telos of various intentional processes. It stands to multiple acts of expressing as the species (or essence) "redness" stands to multiple instances of various shades of r e d (cf. LU I, §31,106; LI, 330) .10 In a word, the example of language illustrates that a certain contentspecies is instantiated or constituted in every act. This content is not reducible to individual acts or use. Rather it refers to an ideal unity (cf. LU I, §29) whose identity and objectivity persists over time and space. §3. The Structure of Consciousness Husserl now holds that every conscious act refers to an object; it is intentional. If this is so, then consciousness should not be understood as an inner theater, since it essentially involves reference to an object. Husserl, indeed, warns us not to confuse the term consciousnessvaXh the real being of the empirical ego, i.e., the psychic experiences in the stream of consciousness (cf. LU V, §4, 363; LI, 541), or with an inner awareness of one's psychic perception (cf. LU V, §5). Rather we should understand consciousness in the "pregnant" sense, as intentional experience (Husserl calls it a mental act) which incorporates the distinction between psychic processes (the individual acts) and ideal being (meaning) . Husserl thereby breaks with the tradition, inaugurated by Descartes, that advocates a representational theory of knowledge. 11 H e redefines the way we should understand the term consciousness. As Heidegger observes, "When all epistemological assumptions are set aside, it becomes clear that c o m p o r t m e n t itself—as yet quite apart


7

from the question of its correctness or incorrectness—is in its very structure a directing-itself-toward" (GA 20, §5a, 40). §4. The Problem of Reference Consciousness n o t only expresses "a [direct] relation . . . to some 'transcendent' matter" (LU V, appendix to §11 & §20, 437; LI, 595), b u t also directs itself toward something objective. It is important to u n d e r s t a n d what Husserl has in m i n d when he refers to "objectivity" or the "object." Like Frege, Husserl holds that even an expression that has n o actual object, such as a round square, has signification. Unlike a m e r e collection of words that does not form a unified sense (or meaningful whole), 1 2 the expression obeys the syntactic rules for forming complex meanings. While Frege believes that an expression that is correcdy constructed grammatically does not necessarily have a reference, Husserl argues that the fact that an expression has no actual object does not m e a n that it has no reference to an object or that it is non-referential. "To use an expression significantly, and to refer expressively to an object. . . ," Husserl says, "are o n e a n d the same. It makes n o difference whether the object exists or is fictitious or even impossible" (LU I, §15, 59; LI, 293). Distancing himself from Brentano, Husserl claims that the object that is intended is "not therefore part of the descriptive or real make-up (deskriptiven reellen Bestand) of the experience, it is in truth not really i m m a n e n t or m e n t a l But it also does n o t exist extramentally, it does not exist at all" (LU V, §11, 387; LI, 559). Every mental act that confers m e a n i n g necessarily refers to an object that is intended. T o refer to something with an expression is to m e a n (meinen) something, and that which is m e a n t (das Gemeinte) is never identical with the way it is meant. However, to refer to something is not to make the ontological claim that the object that is intended exists. "Object" for Husserl in the first instance means something about which meaningful statements can be m a d e (cf. §5 below). Yet this could suggest that Husserl is an internalist after all. Husserl can understand the notion of reference only as something intrinsicto an expression's meaning (cf. Bell 1990,130). As David Bell states it, "Precisely because 'objectrdirectedness' is an intrinsic property of acts, and one which they can possess without there actually being an object to which they are directed" (Bell 1990, 143), Husserl can have nothing to say about "how such subjective, intentional experiences can ever make contact with reality, or can ever be related to things

8


which are not subjective or intentional in such a way as to constitute objective knowledge of them" (Bell 1990, 148). 13 §5. "The Ontological Turn of the Concept of Evidence"14 Yet Husserl's position could n o t be m o r e opposed to such a reading. H e does not attempt to elucidate the concept of meaning independently from the concept of truth. To the contrary, Husserl holds that "consciousness was not merely an empty . . . having conscioused [Bezoussthaben], b u t also a process of accomplishing which is . . . goaldirected and directed towards the idea of truth" (Hua IX, 36). 15 Every mental act seeks to bring into coincidence what is i n t e n d e d with actual states of affairs. Husserl calls the experience of such a coincid e n c e meaning-fulfillment, or evidence. 16 Evidence, according to Husserl, is "the experience of the agreement between m e a n i n g and what is itself present, meant, between the actual sense of an assertion and the self-given state of affairs" (LU, Prol. §51, 193-4; LI, 195). W h e n we j u d g e , we make a j u d g m e n t not about the m e a n i n g of an expression but about the state of affairs that is intended (cf. LU I, §34). Full understanding—so Husserl holds —is guaranteed only if we know how to verify a meaning-intention; that is to say, if we know how to recognize its truth value. Husserl illustrates this in the following example: We clarify the concept (5 3 ) 4 by having recourse to the dennatory presentation: Number which arises when one forms the product 5 3 • 5 3 • 5 3 • 5 \ If we wish to clarify this latter concept, we must go back to the sense of 53, i.e., to the formation 5 • 5 • 5. Going back further, we should have to clarify 5 through the dennatory chain 5 - 4 + 1 , 4 - 3 + 1 , 3 = 2 + 1 , 2 = 1 + 1. After each step we should have to make a substitution in the preceding complex expression or thought, and, were this proceeding indefinitely repeatable —it is certainly so in itself, just as it is certainly not so for us—we should at last come to the completely explicated sum of ones of which we should say: "This is the number (5 3 ) 4 'itself'." It is plain that an act of fulfilment not only corresponded to this final result, but to each individual step leading from one expression of this number, to the expression next in order, which clarified it and enriched its content. In this manner each ordinary decimal number points to a possible chain of fulfilments. (LU VI, §18, 601; LI, 723)


9

To grasp evidently the equation, it is necessary to u n d e r s t a n d the whole chain of possible fulfillments that confirm it. Full understanding of mathematical expressions requires the ability to show how one arrived at them. T h e state of affairs is not a construction of the mind or an intrinsic property of an act b u t is arrived at t h r o u g h rational clarification. It is the telos of every act. Yet, if Husserl truly believes that we cannot elucidate the concept of meaning apart from the concept of truth, then how are we to make sense of the contention troubling so many readers of Husserl, namely, that it is possible to refer to a theory of intentionality that is based on acts of consciousness that n e e d have n o object at all (cf. Bell 1990, 130 ff.)? Husserl's position here is not as paradoxical as it may at first appear, once we realize that Husserl, like Kant, draws a distinction between thinking and knowing. For Kant an object is an object of knowledge only if it is given to us in a m a n n e r conforming to our form of intuition, namely, time (and space) and the categories of the understanding. This leads Kant to differentiate between objects that can be known and objects that cannot be known or experienced. The former are objects that relate to something given, the latter refer to objects that can only be thought. Likewise for Husserl, it is possible to think of objects, i.e., have meaning-intentions (such as a r o u n d square) that can never find meaning-fulfillment, i.e., become objects of knowledge, since they are never given to us. Every statement has an intended reference, but not all intended references can be fulfilled. This means that the notion of objecthood does not necessarily imply the possibility of experience. Let us look at this in m o r e detail: Husserl says we can recognize an experience as fulfillment only by grasping or understanding the meaningintention in the first place (cf. LU IV, §12). H e n c e , we can think of a " r o u n d square" even though it is never intuitively given, that is, it cannot be known or authenticated in thought. T h e absurdity cannot be detected by looking at the rules of grammar; the expression is not senseless (Unsinn), like a h e a p of words, rather it has a unified sense. Nonetheless, an expression can be absurd (Widersinn) when it, for example, defies "Laws such as that of Contradiction, Double Negation or the Modus Ponens" (LU IV, § 14,343; LI, 523). However, we can recognize it as absurd only if we have u n d e r s t o o d it previously. We recognize that an empty intention remains a presumption if it does not find intuitive confirmation. For example, the expression "round square" cannot be rationally explicated. The two intentions, "circle" and "square,"

10


contradict each other. The identifying fulfillment (which is the telosof the act) is thus inevitably frustrated. T h e expression bears an expectation of meaning-fulfillment that is a priori impossible. 17 This impossibility does not prove that Husserl seeks to provide a theory of intentionality based on acts of consciousness that need no object at all. T h e contrary is true: it shows that all intentional acts strive for intuitive fulfillment, but that intuitive fulfillment is not always possible. Some objects can only be thought and never be known. T o conclude: Husserl argues that our j u d g i n g is always subject to a kind of assessment as to whether it is correct, namely, true (corresponding to something objective) and successful (corresponding to the intention). Bell's reservations are unfounded: Husserl bites the bullet. H e asks, "Howdo we experience truth?" (cf. LU, prol., §51,193; LI, 194). He attempts precisely to show how subjective, "intentional experience can be related to things which are not subjective in such a way as to constitute objective knowledge." This shows that whatever reservations we may have about Husserl's theory, there is one charge of which Husserl is not guilty: Husserl does not believe that the propositional attitudes can be assessed without reference to states of affairs. In a word, he does not advocate an internalist position. H E I D E G G E R ' S INDEBTEDNESS TO HUSSERL §6. Intuitions without Concepts Are Blind It is time to address the question of how we are m e a n t to u n d e r s t a n d Heidegger's thought in relation to Husserl's. We have seen that the internalist/externalist distinction is irrelevant here. At first sight it would appear that rather than referring to a d e p a r t u r e from Husserl we should speak of an indebtedness to Husserl. O n studying SuZ's references to Husserl we sense that there is a positive engagement between the thinkers. Heidegger professes that he continues to work within the spirit of phenomenology by following the Husserlian maxim "Back to the things themselves" (zuriick zu den Sachen selbst) .18 Heidegger acknowledges, "The following investigation would [not] have b e e n possible if the g r o u n d had not been p r e p a r e d by E d m u n d Husserl, with whose LU phenomenology first emerged" (SuZ, §7, 38). In a footnote he expresses his gratitude to Husserl m o r e explicitiy: "If the following investigation has taken any steps forward in disclosing the 'things themselves', the author must first of all thank E. Husserl"

Heidegger's Indebtedness to Husserl

11

(SuZ, §7, p. 38, fn. 1). What is it, then, about LU that impresses Heidegger so much? I m p o r t a n t to Heidegger is that the LU argues not only that all intentional acts strive for intuitive fulfillment, but also that truth value is d e t e r m i n e d by states of affairs and not by us. Heidegger believes that Husserl thereby "touches or brushes against . . . the question of Being" (Zdhringer Seminare, 111 / 373), since he shows that what is given in experience is far m o r e than sensible data. Let us look at this in detail. T h e phenomenological breakthrough lies in Husserl's claim that it is possible to experience truth. We can experience states of affairs and not just their representations. It is exactiy this insight that leads Husserl to redefine the traditional conception of experience in the Sixth Investigation. O n the one hand, Husserl repeats Kant's insight that intuitions without concepts are blind (cf. KRV, A51 / B75). We cannot make any epistemological claims, i.e., recognize something to b e something, if the intuition has not b e e n subsumed u n d e r a corresponding (categorial, i.e., synthetic) intention. What is merely sensory within experience is insufficient to provide us with an object (Gegenstand) .19 O n the other hand, unlike Kant, Husserl holds that what is given in experience is far m o r e than sensible intuition. Whereas Kant regards intuitions as exclusively distinct from concepts, 20 one representing a m o m e n t of receptivity (intuition) a n d the other a m o m e n t of spontaneity (concepts) ,21 Husserl claims that fulfillment lies in an intuition that is categorial in its form. 22 T h e r e is an analogy here; Husserl says categories can be like intuitions. They can be intuited. § 7. Categorial Intuition Although Husserl argues that categories are given as "an analogue of common sensuous intuition' (LU VI, §44, 670; LI, 784), we should not confuse the term intuition h e r e with "the kind of intuition employed by Bergson" (GA 20, §6, 64). Husserl is not referring to an immediate p u r e seeing but to a cognitive fulfillment that is founded in the material of a perceptual act with which it is b o u n d up. 2 3 It is the disclosure of a state of affairs t h r o u g h the exercise of our understanding. Categorial intuition involves acts of identification and discrimination. It allows us to grasp relations such as "a is 'brighter than' &" or aggregates such as "a+ b+ c±d"24 Husserl says that these relational structures should not be confused with the addition of a series of acts; rather, like meanings, categorial objects are ideal. They are constituted

12

HUSSERL AND H E I D E G G E R

in the categorial act. Take the judgment "Sis P"as an example. According to Husserl, the is is not a copula that connects S and Pin the judgm e n t . Rather, the "is Pn is a nonindependent {unselbststdndiger) but unitary act. The categorial object "5 is P "comes into being when the act ofj u d g m e n t is performed. We do not have simple or first order objects u p o n which we impress a logical form. Rather the form is disclosed in the act. Like Kant, Husserl thus argues that knowledge is j u d g m e n t and j u d g m e n t is a form of synthesis. However, Husserl is unlike Kant in that synthesis is to him not the result of a spontaneous act—it is not the bringing together of various aspects, but it is understood intentionally; it 'gives the object' (cf. GA 20, §6c, 87). Husserl says: "But we d o not enact a m e r e sequence of presentations, but a judgement, a peculiar 'unity of consciousness,' that binds these together. In this binding together the consciousness of the state ofaffairsis constituted: to execute judgement, and to be conscious of a state of affairs, in this synthetic positing ofsomething as referred to something, are one and the same" (LU V, §36, 491; LI, 632). T h o u g h t is a m o d e of disclosure. T h e state of affairs is not assembled but given in a fulfilled intention. "To execute j u d g e m e n t , and to be conscious of a state of affairs, are one and the same." In other words, the synthetic achievement is determined by the object itself. It is not a question of fabricating sense but of "letting the entity be seen in its objectivity" (GA 20, §62, 97). It is through categorial intuition that we grasp that things are thus and so; we recognize something to ^ s o m e t h i n g . §8. Being Is Not a Predicate H e r e Heidegger locates Husserl's significant breakthrough. For "by way of understanding what is present in categorical intuition, we can c o m e to see that the objectivity of an entity is really not exhausted by this narrow definition of reality, that objectivity in its b r o a d sense is m u c h richer than the reality of the thing" (GA 20 §6c, 89). Take the simple expression "the paper is white" as an example. T h e actual word "is" appears in this expression as a sign. However, the "is" to which the meaning intention points is not a real inherent mom e n t given. It does not appear in the same way as sensuous matter does. Husserl says: "I can see colour, but not ^rnig-coloured. I can feel smoothness, but not being-smooth. . . . Being is nothing in the object, no p a r t of it, no m o m e n t tenanting it, no quality or intensity of i t . . . n o constitutive feature of it however conceived. But being is also nothing

T h e Transcendental T u r n

13

attaching to an object: as it is n o real [reales] internal feature, so also it is n o real external feature, and therefore not, in the real sense, a 'feature' at all" (LU VI, §43, 666; LI, 780). "The form-giving flexion Being, whether in its attributive or predicative function, is not fulfilled . . . in any percept. H e r e we are r e m i n d e d of Kant's dictum: Being is no real predicate" (LU VI, §43,665; LI, 780). It cannot be seen or touched. It never appears as such; it is never 'actual'; nonetheless "it" is assumed as given. W h e n we say "The p a p e r is white," we thus n e e d to differentiate between seeing and saying: "I see white paper," says Husserl, "and say 'white p a p e r ' " (LU VI, §40,659; LI, 775). W h e n we see white p a p e r we are referring to purely sensory information. When we say "the paper is white," we are introducing a syntax into what we perceive and recognizing something to be something. 2 5 T h e statement presents not just p a p e r and whiteness but the fact or state of affairs that the paper is white. T h e copula w h e r e provides an objective reference. It does not merely link the two words but presents the paper as "being" white. Heidegger believes that "with those analyses of categorial intuition Husserl has liberated Being from its d e p e n d e n c e u p o n j u d g e m e n t " (Zahringer Seminare, 115 / 377). 'Being-true' is a predicate that does not belong to the j u d g e m e n t a l act but to the state of affairs. T o follow Husserl: "Being is n o t a j u d g e m e n t nor a constituent of a j u d g e m e n t . Being is as little a real consituent of some inner object as it is of some outer object, and so not of a j u d g e m e n t " (LU VI, §44, 668; LI, 782) .26 This insight provides the g r o u n d for Heidegger's own analysis. "As a result of this t h e r e e m e r e d a new orientation of the whole sphere of investigation" (Zahringer Seminare, 115 / 377). "Husserl's achievement consisted precisely in this presentification of Being which is p h e n o m e nally present in the category." T h r o u g h this, achievement, Heidegger continues, "At last I found a ground: 'Being' is no m e r e concept, is n o p u r e abstracation which has e m e r g e d along the path of derivation" (Zahringer Seminare, 116 / 378). We can now understand why Heidegger believes that LU has p r e p a r e d the way for the question of the meaning of Being. It allowed him to assume that Being itself is given.27 THE TRANSCENDENTAL TURN §9. The Transcendental

Turn

While we have shown that we should not understand the relation between Husserl and Heidegger in terms of the internalism/externalism

14


debate, it seems feasible that when turning to Husserl's later work Keller is not mistaken in interpreting their relation in this way. For it is with his transcendental turn that Husserl reduces all p h e n o m e n a to the sense bestowal (Sinngebung) of consciousness. The accusation that Husserl's phenomenological approach affirms nothing other than a "methodological solipsism" thus does not seem unfounded. Indeed, this view appears to reflect Heidegger's reading of Husserl. While the LU touch upon the question of Being, Heidegger believes that with his Cartesian and transcendental turn Husserl betrays the very principle of phenomenology: Even today it is very hard to imagine the scope of the difficulties which stood in the way of asking the question of Being. . . . Husserl himself who came close to the true question of Being in the Logical Investigations—above all in the VI— could not persevere in the philosophical atmosphere of that time. He came under the influence of Natorp and turned to transcendental phenomenology which reached its first culmination in the Ideas. The principle ofphenomenology was thus abandoned. (ZSD, 47; 44E, emphasis added) Yet a closer look at GA 20 suggests that even this reading requires reassessment. Although Heidegger constantly turns against Husserl's transcendental idealism, he never accuses him of r e t u r n i n g to "the Cartesian conception of mind as a kind of inner theatre"; rather he concedes in passing that the aim of the transcendental reduction is "the determination of the very entity" (GA 20, §10b, 136) that has b e e n bracketed. Moreover, he states that "the question of being is thus raised, it is even answered' (GA 20, §12,155). This leads Steven Crowell to observe that, "though difficult to interpret with confidence, this provocative statement suggests that Heidegger has n o quarrel with Husserl's transcendental approach to the question of the being of entities" (Crowell 1997, 32). Indeed, despite the fact that Heidegger tends to object to Husserl's transcendental turn, there is no question that SuZ itself is transcendentally motivated. After all, Heidegger will be c o n c e r n e d with the "conditions for the possibility o f (SuZ, §18,85 & §41,199) all ontical or factual manifestations which h e believes are disclosed when we study the fundamental constitution of the Being of Dasein. Heidegger's approach, like Husserl's, is foundational: "The question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions n o t only for the possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such a type .. . but also for the possibility of those


15

ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations" (SuZ, §3, 11). In keeping with Crowell, we can thus assume that "transcendental reflection and ontology are not incompatible" (Crowell 1997, 29). If this is the case, we n e e d to ask why Heidegger nonetheless objects to H u s s e r l transcendental turn. §10. Husserl and Hume First let us consider why Husserl could be interpreted as defending an internalist position. It is assumed that Heidegger objects to Husserl's transcendental t u r n because it leads him to bracket the question of existence. After all, Husserl argues that it is necessary to bracket the general thesis of the natural attitude (rather than merely particular acts, as in L U ) . This attitude assumes that a world exists independently of consciousness. T h o u g h it remains unnoticed, this attitude informs o u r everyday life. Whether as scientist or layperson, we all operate with the belief that there is a world within which all experience takes place. H u m e would call this o u r "natural disposition to belief," which we can neither choose n o r u n d o . Since the reduction encourages us d o away with all our presuppositions, it forces us to bracket the belief that such a world and the things in it 'exist'. We are encouraged to look at the structure of appearing without assuming either its existence or nonexistence. It seems that by advocating such a suspension, Husserl is exemplifying the tradition of philosophy as depicted by Heidegger. H e explicitly encourages us to ignore and, indeed, to "jump over" the p h e n o m e n o n of the world. However, such a reading misses the ingenuity of Husserl's position. For Husserl argues not only that we have n o means of affirming, b u t equally that we have n o means of negating, our natural disposition to belief. H e thereby radicalizes a H u m e a n position and shows why scepticism is impossible. 28 H u m e has shown that all arguments in supp o r t of the skeptical position are totally inefficacious, a n d all arguments against it are totally idle. 29 Although a skeptical position may sound convincing, we cannot help believing in the existence of the body, a n d cannot help forming beliefs and expectations in general, in accordance with the basic canons of induction. This leads H u m e to refer to two irreconcilable attitudes: the philosophical attitude (which leads us to be skeptics) and the natural disposition to belief. Husserl, however, contends that this should have led H u m e to realize that both these attitudes are part and parcel of o n e a n d the same attitude, which h e calls the "natural attitude." For Husserl, H u m e has shown that it is

16


impossible either to affirm or to negate o u r belief in the existence of an external world. We can neither sustain a skeptical position n o r can we justify our natural disposition to belief. If we take H u m e ' s argum e n t seriously, we realize that it should have led him to a position that makes skepticism impossible. Inadvertently, H u m e has shown that we lose the right either to affirm or to negate the existence of the external world. This is why Husserl argues that true skepticism does not d o u b t the world but our capacity to judge whether or not there is a world. It leads to the suspension of j u d g m e n t — t o what Husserl calls the epoche or bracketing or reduction.™ Rather than turning us away from the world a n d describing o u r mental events or "intuitions" (Bell 1990,197), as Bell contends, the reduction leads us to turn o u r attention toward that which has b e e n susp e n d e d , our natural disposition to belief in the existence of the world a n d of entities found within it. As Heidegger observes: "The term 'suspension' is thus always misunderstood when it is thought that in susp e n d i n g the thesis of existence and by doing so, phenomenological reflection simply has nothing m o r e to do with the entity. Quite the contrary: In an extreme and unique way, what really is at issue now is the determination of the being of the very entity" (GA 20, §10, 135). Rather than ignoring it, the reduction brings into the foreground o u r general disposition to belief that there is an external world. It allows us precisely to "look at what we normally look through" (Sbkolowski 2000, 50). T h e transcendental reduction does not lead Husserl to advocate an internalist position. To the contrary, the epoche leads us to look at the world and p h e n o m e n a within it without assuming an innerouter distinction. §11. The Spectacle of the World As in LU, with the introduction of the transcendental reduction the aim is to r e t u r n to a n absolute givenness. 31 New at this stage is that this evidence is n o longer restricted to what can find adequate intuitive fulfillment—it includes objects in the external world, and moreover our general disposition to belief, which can never find adequate fulfillment. 32 In other words, evidence includes objects as they are given in their vagueness. Husserl thereby comes to show that what manifests itself is not only what is fully present but also what is absent. Let us look at this in m o r e detail: T h e world and its objects, looked at from a phenomenological attitude, Husserl calls noemata.


17

Noematarefer to objects as they are intended, or as looked at precisely as they are intended. Noemata work on two levels: First, the noema refers to individual acts of perception. T h e r e is n o noesiswithout a noema (cf. IdeenI, §93, 232 / 193). According to Husserl, any act of perception strives for fulfillment in the object as it is intended, which, however, can never be t u r n e d into a really inherent c o m p o n e n t of perception. W h e n we perceive an object, for example a die, be it an imagined or a real die, we d o not merely perceive one side of the die that is genuinely given. We cannot see a side of the die without instantaneously intending the unity and identity of the die as such, which is meant or intended, though never genuinely given. This fundamental form of synthesis—identification—is passive. We d o n o t n e e d to walk a r o u n d the die and add u p all its sides in o r d e r to perceive the unity of the die; rather, we perceive the unity as soon as we perceive a particular side of the die. This is not to say that we know what the object looks like from the other side, b u t we can see an object (as three-dimensional) only if we already have some expectations of what the object may look like from the other side. This intending is of a peculiar kind. For we are n o t trying to make present the sides that are absent; rather, the sides that are absent are seen as absent™ We h e r e r e t u r n to the distinction between the object as it is intended and the object that is intended. Perception involves layers of synthesis which are not only actual b u t also potential and thus absent. T h e r e is a multitude of perceptual acts (noeseis), which all strive to (intend) one and the same object as such, which is meant (noema). What is meant is not the essence of the different acts of perceptions but a correlate of all acts of perception. 3 4 T h e noema is the ideal correlate of noesis. It guides and in this way makes possible the manifold of perceptual acts (noeseis). Second, noemata now not only are limited to particular perceptual acts, b u t refer to the absolute interpretative horizon, which is given in its vagueness a n d thus can never find adequate fulfillment. T o follow Husserl: "Any actual experience points beyond itself to possible experiences, which in turn, point to new possible experiences and so ad infinitum. . . . Any hypothetical formulation in practical life or in empirical science relates to this changing but always co-posited horizon whereby the positing of the world receives its essential sense" (Ideen 7, §47,112-13/90). Consciousness is dynamic. Every perceiving not only intends the unity of an individual object as such, b u t co-intends the possibility of

18


o t h e r objects and, indeed, the unity of the world as such. "For i n d e e d their particularity is particularity within a unitary universe, which, even when we are directed to and grasping the particular, goes on 'appearing' unitarily. . . . This consciousness is awareness of the world-whole in its own peculiar form, that of spatio temporal endlessness" (CM §15, 75). Every object we perceive is situated in one way or another. I never perceive an object, let us say a chair, in isolation. T h o u g h my attention may be o n the chair, Husserl says, I can see the chair only if I also intend the chair as being in a room, and the r o o m , in turn, as being in a house, and the house as being in a city, and so forth. Moreover, all actual a n d possible perceptions a p p e a r within the horizon of one a n d the same world. The world allows for the continuity of experience and the iterative (the "and so forth" or "over and over again") fundamental forms of idealization. Again these intentions are of a peculiar kind. They are implicit, unthematized, or what Husserl calls pre-predicative. Nonetheless they are necessary for any object perception to take place. In a word, all our perceptions are teleologically structured. 3 5 They strive toward the unity of the world. What is evidendy given with every object perception is the implicit awareness of a world-whole in its spatiotemporal endlessness. Phenomenology thereby brings to evidence what H u m e has called our natural disposition to belief that there is an external world. In bracketing the world nothing is lost, and world knowledge is won. Phenomenology describes how all our experiential life —all actual, potential, or habitual posi tings—takes place against a b a c k g r o u n d of indeterminacy (cf Ideen I, §27,58 / 49). This background is the world as such. The reduction draws our attention to exactly that which has b e e n previously ignored—an underlying, implicit world-belief cannot be outstripped. Husserl h e r e operates with a version of ontological difference. T h e horizon of all horizons—the world as such—has a similar function to what Heidegger would call "the worldhood of the world" (SuZ, §14 ff.); it provides the condition for the possibility of any entity to be. It is transcendence p u r e and simple. The reduction brings to light what Heidegger would call the Being of the world, which can never be outstripped.^ 6 It facilitates the determination of the Being of entities. H e n c e , it should n o t surprise us that Heidegger comes to proclaim that the transcendental reduction thus n o t only facilitates, but even answers, the question of the meaning of Being (cf. GA 20 §12, 155).


19

§12. Ontology versus Epistemology This might suggest a complete overlap between Husserl a n d Heidegger: it was Husserl who raised the question of the meaning of Being in the first place. However, we should remain cautious in o u r assessment. T h e analogies we have drawn above merely make the discrepancies between the thinkers m o r e visible with respect to their approach and m e t h o d . We need to r e m e m b e r that, although Heidegger acknowledges the significance of the transcendental reduction, he nonetheless objects to Husserl's Cartesianism and insists that "the question of being itself is left undiscussedn (GA 20, §12, 157). T h e problem, as seen by Heidegger, is not so m u c h that Husserl fails to raise the question of Being, but that his m e t h o d and analysis remain epistemologically motivated. Rather than sidestepping skepticism, Husserl raises internal objections to the Cartesian enterprise. His aim is still to overcome skepticism in o r d e r to arrive at certainty. In view of this Heidegger believes that "the being of acts is in advance theoretically and dogmatically defined by the sense of being which is taken from the reality of nature" (GA20, §12, 157). Heidegger acknowledges that the significance of Husserl's thinking, with respect to Descartes, is that he does not r e d u c e the notion of person to a "thinking thing." 37 What remains after the reduction is not an T think', b u t thought as an intentional act (cogitatio).38 However, Heidegger believes that Husserl's analysis falls short, since it fails to question the "ontological meaning of 'performance [.]' How is the kind of Being which belongs to a person to b e ascertained ontologically in a positive way?" (SuZ, §10, 48). Husserl's primary question is simply not concerned with the character of the being of consciousness. Rather, he is guided by the following concern: How can consciousness become the possible object of an absolute science? The primary concern which guides him is the idea of an absolute science. This idea, that consciousness is to be the region of an absolute science, is not simply invented; it is the idea which has occupied modern philosophy ever since Descartes. The elaboration of pure consciousness as the thematic field of phenomenology is not derived phenomenologically by going back to the matters themselves but by going back to a traditional idea of philosophy. (GA 20, § l l d , 147)

20


T h e p r o b l e m facing Heidegger is that Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y focuses o n the question of cognition, namely, "how can experience as consciousness give or contact an object?" 39 Husserl thereby affirms a philosophy of consciousness (Beumpseinsphilosophie). Like Descartes, Husserl leaves the question "what is the sum of the cogito?" u n e x p l o r e d and fails to see that the world is an existential structure of Dasein. 40 Heidegger objects to Husserl's Cartesianism. This is not because he believes Husserl's position to be that of an internalist or methodological solipsist, but because he detects a philosophical "natural attitude" in Husserl's prioritization of consciousness a n d theory. 41 In Heidegger's view, Husserl's starting point is unphenomenological because he has failed to free himself from all theoretical presuppositions about the n a t u r e of our relation to the world. Husserl takes it for granted that "man" in the natural attitude "is given as a living being, as a zoological object" (GA 20, §12,155). Yet Heidegger believes that Husserl thereby fails to see that "[m]an's natural manner of experience . . . cannot be called an attitude" (GA 20, §12, 156). Husserl's natural attitude, according to Heidegger, is "totally unnatural. For it includes a welldefined theoretical position in which every entity is taken a priori as a lawfully regulated flow of occurrences in the spatio-temporal exteriority of the world" ( G A 2 0 § 1 2 , 1 5 6 ) . Heidegger thereby raises external objections to the Cartesian enterprise. For Heidegger, phenomenology as transcendental critique is adequate only if it reflects on the being that is able to raise the question of Being, namely, Dasein itself. Once this reflection takes place, we realize that we can never bracket the question of the world's existence, since any bracketing or questioning is possible only if we always already have — and, indeed, live with—an understanding of its existence. As Heidegger provocatively asserts: "The question of whether there is a world at all a n d whether its Being can be proved, makes no sense if it is raised hyDasein as Being-in-the-world; and who else would raise it?"42 Heidegger not only renders obsolete the problem of the external world, he questions the very possibility of questioning the existence of the world as such. H e questions whether its Being can ever be turned into an object of reflection. CONCLUSION It has become clear that we should not see the relation between Heidegger and Husserl in terms of the internalism/externalism oppo-

Conclusion

21

sition. The problem for Heidegger is not that Husserl returns to "a Cartesian conception of the mind as a kind of inner theater" (Keller 1999, 43), but that his approach remains epistemologically motivated. Husserl's fundamental concern is the question of cognition, namely, "How can experience as consciousness give or contact an object?" 48 Husserl still tries to dissolve Cartesian skepticism in o r d e r to arrive at the assurance that there is an external world. According to Heidegger, Husserl thereby fails to realize that the being that can find such an assurance is a being that always already has a world. While Husserl believes that phenomenology and epistemology go hand in hand, Heidegger argues that ontology precedes epistemology. T o p u t it another way, Husserl's fundamental question will be: "How d o p h e n o m e n a constitute themselves to consciousness?" T h e task is to show how cognitionis possible. Heidegger, in turn, rejects the p r o b l e m of cognition outright. Rather than trying to solve it, he presents traditional philosophy as being "out of tune with that with which [we are] most fundamentally attuned" (Mulhall 1996, 31). T h e problem of cognition is a pseudo-problem which disappears as soon as we realize that Dasein cannot be divorced from the p h e n o m e n o n of the world. Heidegger thereby raises external objections to skepticism. We need to reframe epistemology not by refuting it b u t by questioning its premise. 4 4 It is only by sidestepping epistemological concerns that the question of Being can come into the foreground. 4 5 For it is then that we realize that the Being of the world is an existential structure of Dasein which can never be t u r n e d into an object of reflection. Keller is thus not mistaken when he argues that Heidegger departs from Husserl in understanding experience n o longer in terms of consciousness, but "as the transcendence of the self to things in the world" (Keller 1999,100). However, contrary to Keller's findings, we have seen that we cannot understand this departure in terms of the internalism/ externalism debate.

CHAPTER TWO

Toward an "Unworldly" Beginning

INTRODUCTION T H E P R E V I O U S C H A P T E R has illustrated the proximity of Husserl's and Heidegger's thought. We have shown that Heidegger's d e p a r t u r e from Husserl should not be understood in terms of the internalism/ externalism debate. The aim of the transcendental reduction is not to improve the m e t h o d of analyzing consciousness, it is to bring the phen o m e n o n of the world into the foreground. Heidegger recognizes b o t h the significance of the transcendental reduction and its limitations. "There is n o doubt that Husserl's fundamental position is an advance from neo-Kantianism. For the latter the object is nothing o t h e r than the manifold of sense-data structured by the concepts of the understanding. With Husserl the object regains its p e r m a n e n c e . Husserl rescues the object—but only by integrating it within the immanence of consciousness" (Zahringer Seminare, 382 / 120). Heidegger praises Husserl for having overcome neo-Kantianism by showing that the external world is not a problem that needs to be surmounted. T h e r e is n o need for structuring a meaningless manifold of sense-data, because the world is always already meaningfully structured. In this m a n n e r Husserl departs from the tradition of philosophy. Nonetheless Heidegger criticizes Husserl for his Cartesianism, which in the final analysis leads him to r e t u r n to a worldless subject. T h e problem for Heidegger is that Husserl manages to overcome neo-Kantianism (i.e., "rescue the object") only through the transcendental reduction. This permits Husserl to r e d u c e the external world to the field of immanence. 1 T h e world in question is the world of consciousness. Husserl thus fails to see that the world itself is an existential structure of Dasein and can never be turned into an object of reflec-

H e i d e g g e r ' s Critique

23

tion. In a curious m a n n e r Husserl thus "rescues" the Being of the world, yet only by "ignoring," that is bracketing, the world. T h e paradox is that Husserl departs from the tradition only insofar as he adheres to it. H e n c e the fundamental p r o b l e m for Heidegger is that Husserl returns to a philosophy of consciousness (Bewufitseinsphibsophie). Husserl, so Heidegger claims, affirms a claustrophobic i m m a n e n c e which excludes the possibility of a m o m e n t of exteriority. Heidegger could n o t emphasize this point m o r e forcefully: "Husserl neither questions n o r pierces the realm of consciousness. . . . Indeed, it cannot be pierced as long as the starting point is the ego cogito. It is fundamental to the ego cogito (as it is for Leibniz's m o n a d ) that it has n o windows t h r o u g h which something could enter or depart. Thus the ego cogito is an enclosed space. T h e idea of being able to 'get out o f this sealed space is self-contradictory. H e n c e the necessity of starting from something other than the ego cogito' (Zahringer Seminare, 383 / 121). As long as philosophy takes consciousness, or the ego cogito, as its starting point, even if "the object is rescued," of necessity a m o m e n t of exteriority is r e n d e r e d impossible. Husserl hereby undermines the significance of his breakthrough. The transcendental reduction permits Husserl to r e d u c e the Being of the world to immanence. H e adheres to the tradition of m o d e r n philosophy by affirming a "worldless Ego" as "the beginning of all beginnings." T h e aim of this chapter is to explore the nature of Husserl's Cartesianism and to analyze the extent to which Husserl's r e t u r n to i m m a n e n c e can be described as a r e t u r n to an absolute and "enclosed" space.

H E I D E G G E R ' S CRITIQUE §13. Husserl's

Cartesianism

Heidegger believes that Husserl epitomizes the tradition of philosophy insofar as he makes philosophy's implicit disinterestedness in the p h e n o m e n o n of the world explicit. By prioritizing consciousness Husserl slights the i n d e p e n d e n c e of the world a n d "abandons the project of phenomenology" (ZSD, 47; 44E). His starting point n o longer differs from an idealist one. 2 Heidegger locates Husserl's "fatal" move in his r e t u r n to Descartes. This finds its fullest expression in §49 of Ideen 7, in which Husserl affirms consciousness as the absolute g r o u n d for

24

T O W A R D AN " U N W O R L D L Y "

BEGINNING

all appearances. T h e title of §49 alone implies a trajectory opposed to the o n e articulated in SuZ: "Absolute Consciousness as the Residuum After the Annihilation of the World" (Ideen I, §49, 114 / 91). As Heidegger argues, §49 indicates that, for Husserl, "In principle the possibility exists that consciousness itself is 'not affected in its own existence' by an 'annihilation of the world of things' — a consideration which, as is well-known, Descartes h a d already employed" (GA 20, § l l c , 144). While the Heidegger of SuZ maintains that "to Dasein, Being-in-aworld is something that belongs essentially" (SuZ, §4, 13), Husserl returns to a Being that can be defined independently of the p h e n o m e n o n of the world. This is articulated in the following passage of Ideen I: "No real being, no being which is presented and legitimated in consciousness by appearances, is necessary to the being of consciousness itself (in the broadest sense, the stream of lived experiences). Immanental being is therefore indubitably absolute being in the sense that by essential necessity immanental being nulla 're'indiget ad existendum" (Ideen I, §49,115 / 92). Husserl adheres to the Cartesian postulation that we need only thought, and not extension, in order to exist. It is an affirmation of an existence that is not, and could never become, spatial. §14. The Incompleteness of Space Husserl adheres to Descartes, however, only insofar as he departs from him. T h e above citation itself is a partial quotation of Descartes' definition of substance in the Prinapia: "By substancewe can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in such a way as to d e p e n d on n o other thing for its existence" (Descartes 1985, 210). As Jean-Luc Marion points out, it is important to note that "Husserl, however, modifies Descartes' formula: he omits aliain 'alia re,' and only accepts resin in-verted commas." 3 Husserl makes this modification because he wishes to differentiate consciousness from reality (cf. Ideen I, §42,96 / 77), and therefore has to prevent any association between consciousness and res in terms of realitas} Nonetheless, structurally Husserl adheres to Descartes: not only does Husserl intimate a dualism by defining consciousness (i.e., immanence) as essentially distinct from reality (transcendence), but, like Descartes, he argues that transcendence is characterized by extension. Space is the essence of transcendence 5 and never pertains to i m m a n e n c e , which reminds us of Descartes' definition of extensio as the essence of res corporea, which can never be attributed to res cogitans.

H e i d e g g e r ' s Critique

25

Indeed, this definition permits Husserl to argue that only the imman e n t field is absolutely given. T h e incompleteness of the transcendent field is d u e to the extended nature of the world. Since the transcend e n t world is spatial, that is, three-dimensional, it is never completely visible at o n e given time. Transcendent objects are given incompletely, for to be absolutely given is to be fully present and completely visible (i.e., clear and distinct). Being spatial and being incomplete are therefore virtually synonymous descriptions of the transcendent world. §15. The Bracketing of the Unseen This leads Husserl to maintain that it is possible to bracket the world, "a consideration which, as is well-known, Descartes had already employed." 6 Because transcendent being, or the world of things, is essentially incomplete and can neverbe exhaustively given to consciousness, it is in principle o p e n to doubt. "The world is dubitable not in the sense that rational motives are present to be taken into consideration over against the tremendous force of harmonious experiences,.. . but dubitability exists in the sense that a becoming doubtful and a becoming null are conceivable; the possibility of non-being, as an essential possibility, is never excluded." 7 We cannot exclude the possibility of d o u b t even if there is no rational motive for it, since o u r expectations might be disappointed and redirected. T h e bracketing of the transcendent world is not the exclusion of objects from the field of the theory of knowledge, b u t it is an exclusion of the unseen. What defines the transcendent world is its indeterminateness in terms of visibility: Of necessity a physical thing can be given only "one-sidedly"; and that signifies, not just incompletely or imperfecdy in some sense or other, but precisely what presentation by adumbrations prescribes. A physical thing is necessarily given in mere "modes of appearance" in which necessarily a core of "what is actually presented"is apprehended as being surrounded by a horizon of "co-givenness, " which is not givenness proper, and of more or less vague indeterminateness. . . . To be in infinitum imperfect in this manner is part of the unanullable essence of the correlation between "physical thing" and perception of a physical thing. (Ideen I, §44, 100 / 80)

26


BEGINNING

This leads Husserl to his provocative claim that the possibility of the annihilation of the world (Weltvernichtung) can never be excluded. Any perception of a transcendent thing necessitates the co-give nness of empty intentionalities and horizons which are not fully given (i.e., in their totality as being present) and therefore d o n o t provide us with the certainty n e e d e d for an adequate phenomenological starting point. 8 We can now u n d e r s t a n d how Husserl, in a way analogous to Descartes, reaches the conclusion that "in principle the possibility exists that consciousness itself is not affected by the annihilation of the world of things." T h e only area of study that can provide the absolute certainty n e e d e d is p u r e consciousness, and the transcendent world, in whose being d o u b t is conceivable, must be bracketed. Everything that is not actually given in the cogitationes and therefore n o t evidently seen remains only as suspended. §16. An Incompleteness That Is Not Based on Lack T h e transcendent world is essentially distinct from the i m m a n e n t field. Indeed, it is impossible for a transcendent thing ever to turn into an i m m a n e n t being, just as it is impossible for the stream of lived experiences ever to t u r n into a transcendent res. "A lived experience is possible only as a lived experience, a n d not as something spatial. However, the adumbrated is of essential necessity possible only as something spatial (it is spatial precisely in its essence), and not possible as a lived experience" (Ideen I, §41, 95 / 75-76, emphasis a d d e d ) . This definition leads Husserl to give a positive account of incompleteness, in contrast to Descartes. T h e absolute distinction between imman e n c e and transcendence defies a representative account of the world. If the distinction were not absolute, then we would b e led to believe the transcendent domain to be incomplete; it would be an incomplete representation of an ideal world which, in principle, could be given absolutely, i.e., as i m m a n e n t and fully present. If this were the case, t h e n we would u n d e r s t a n d p h e n o m e n a only privatively. "But this view is a countersense. It implies that there is n o essential difference between something transcendent and something immanent, that, in the postulated divine intuition, a spatial physical thing is present as a really i n h e r e n t constituent, that it is therefore itself a lived experience also belonging to the divine stream of consciousness and divine lived experiences generally." 9

Heidegger's Critique

27

Incompleteness, however, does not refer to a m o m e n t of lack. It is not that the transcendent field is an incomplete representation of an ideal, adequately given world. We too easily interpret the unseen as pointing to a mysterious reality from which we are barred. 1 0 T h e world ofrealitasis not an enigma that we, like paleontologists, have to reconstruct. T h e transcendent world can be perceived only incompletely, i.e., aspectivally. For to £e spatial means to be given incompletely. 11 This definition holds even for divine or intellectual intuition: "Not even a Divine physics can make simply intuited determinations out of those categorial determinations of realities which are p r o d u c e d by thinking, any m o r e than a Divine omnipotence can bring it to pass that someone paints elliptic functions or plays them o n the violin" (Ideen I, §52, 129 / 102). We have reached the limits of any form of skepticism. 12 Incompleteness is n o longer measured against a thingin-itself, or an absolute truth that lies beyond the field of p h e n o m e n a ; rather, it describes a m o d e of givenness that is essential to the perception of the transcendent world. T h e diversity between consciousness and reality is so absolute that even an intellectual intuition cannot bridge it. " [A] veritable abyss yawns between consciousness and reality" (Ideen I, § 4 9 , 1 1 7 / 93). This gulf cannot be overcome—a transcend e n t thing can never be t u r n e d into an i m m a n e n t being, since the gulf is founded in the different modes of givenness. §17. The Affirmation of an Enclosed Space Unlike Descartes, Husserl is a thinker of finitude. 13 T h e r e is n o world that lies behind the p h e n o m e n a l world (Hinterwelt). As we have shown, Husserl can sustain this claim only if i m m a n e n c e and transcend e n c e are r e g a r d e d as essentially distinct: "The essentially necessary diversity a m o n g m o d e s of being, the most cardinal of t h e m all, becomes manifest: the diversity between consciousness and reality "u Husserl, therefore, could never allow for a m o m e n t in which b o t h domains b e c o m e united. For Descartes, in contrast, both the substantia cogitans and the substantia corporea, though self-sufficient and distinct, are substances of a second order, after God. This position, as Marion points out, leads to a weaker claim: "For Descartes, every finite substance, thought as well as extension, indicates a radical weakening of God's (usual) support. In this way, the ego has to share its substantiality with extension (first disagreement with Husserl) and has only relative validity (with respect to God) and, thus, is in no way

28


BEGINNING

absolute (second disagreement with Husserl)" (Marion 1989, 127). Unlike Descartes, Husserl argues that the distinction between imman e n c e and transcendence is absolute and not relative to an absolute a n d ideal being. This leads to Husserl's second modification of Descartes. Not only are there two separate and essentially distinct fields, but Husserl wishes to show that transcendence is dependent on immanence: ''The world of transcendent res' is entirely referred to consciousness and, more particularly, not to some logically conceived consciousness but to actual consciousness" (Idem 7, § 4 9 , 1 1 5 - 1 6 / 92). Only immanence is self-sufficient, while transcendence is by virtue of immanence alone; 15 this is what Husserl calls i m m a n e n t transcendence. T h e r e is only one absolute field and that is the field of immanence; there is n o substance of a higher order. 1 6 Using Descartes' terminology, immanence is a substance of the first a n d transcendence a substance of the second o r d e r . With this claim Husserl avoids the Cartesian subject-object dualism, for everything that is can c o m e into being only through the field of immanence. T h e question "How do we get to know the outside world?" is therefore n o t a p r o b l e m , for the outside is already inscribed by the inside. These modifications allow Husserl to a d h e r e to the Cartesian parameters without affirming a dualism. I m m a n e n c e remains the absolute field that lies beyond the realm of doubt. By turning i m m a n e n c e into a substance of first order, Husserl denies any m o m e n t of exteriority, for everything that is, and could possibly be, is by virtue of consciousness alone. As Heidegger observes: "Consciousness is absolute in the sense that it is the presupposition of being o n the basis of which reality can manifest itself at all" (GA 20, § l l c 144). In this m a n n e r Husserl affirms a m o m e n t of closure. Without the presupposition of an enclosed and stable foundation, nothing can exist, be, or appear. "It is non-sensical to say that there is an object which could n o t principally be an object of consciousness" (Hua XI, §4,19-20). It is only with reference to a stable a n d enclosed terrain that any form of identification, signification, or j u d g m e n t can take place. Thus, in accordance with Heidegger, we can conclude that there is in Husserl a definite r e t u r n to Descartes, a r e t u r n which, however, is "elaborated at a higher level" and with "another philosophical goal": Already here, we can detect a kinship with Descartes. What is here elaborated at a higher level of phenomenological analysis

Toward an 'Unworldly' Existence

29

as pure consciousness is the field which Descartes glimpsed under the heading of res cogitans, the entire field of cogitationes. The transcendent world, whose exemplary index for Husserl as well is to be found in the basic stratum of the material world of things, is what Descartes characterizes as res extensa. This kinship is not merely factual. Husserl himself, at the point where he observes that the reflection has come to a climax refers explicitly to Descartes. He says that what comes to a head is simply what Descartes really sought in the Meditations, to be sure with another method and another philosophical goal. (GA 20, §10, 139) Husserl does not r e t u r n to the ego cogitobut to the structure of thought itself. However, the correlate of thinking and that which is thought— i.e., the entire field of cogitationes—is, in a m a n n e r analogous to Descartes' res cogitans, devoid of space and indeed world. The world Husserl has in m i n d is the world of res extensa. This allows Husserl to perform the transcendental reduction and thus "leap over" (uberspringen) the world. Not only this, b u t Husserl's notion of i m m a n e n t transcendence permits i m m a n e n c e to be an absolute and self-enclosed space, for everything that is and could be is by virtue of i m m a n e n c e alone.

TOWARD AN 'UNWORLDLY' EXISTENCE §18. The "Annihilation of the World" T h e gulf that separates i m m a n e n c e from transcendence permits Husserl to assert the possibility of the annihilation of the world. Transcendence is d e p e n d e n t o n and relative to immanence, while the field of i m m a n e n c e is absolute. Consciousness is thus described as the absolute given, the phenomenological residuum (cf. Ideen 7, §33, 72 / 59). Heidegger's concern is to show that such a self-enclosed realm does not exist, since there is n o being that can exist independently of the world. 17 I n d e e d Heidegger is perplexed about how we can move from a consciousness devoid of the world to the world (cf. GA 20, §10,139). We n e e d to show how Husserl attempts to describe the n a t u r e of consciousness as essentially distinct from the world (cf. GA 20, §1 l c ) . We shall argue that Husserl manages to u p h o l d that distinction by differentiating between temporalization and the spatiotemporal world. Husserl describes consciousness as an event. T h e i m m a n e n t field is nothing static, but is the transcendental stream of consciousness,

30


BEGINNING

which shows itself in its m o d e of temporalization. T h e transcendental reduction reveals a dimension of being in its temporal upsurge that is distinct from the spatiotemporal world. §19. The Description of Immanent Perception in Ideen I T h e phenomenological reduction does not lead us back to a punctual ego cogito; indeed, it does n o t lead to anything solid whatsoever, but to the transcendental stream of lived experiences {Erlebnisse). It is an experiencing and appearing that is anterior to the act of perception. T h e daring n a t u r e of the claim is that, although the field of imman e n c e is "a perpetual Heraclitean flux" (Hua X, n o . 5 1 , 349), and thus constantly changing, it wfully present in its unity. However, the following statement might lead us to assume the opposite: It is the case also of lived experience that it is never perceived completely, that it cannot be adequately seized upon in its full unity. A lived experience is, with respect to its essence, in flux which we, directing the reflective regard to it, can swim along after it starting from the Now-point, while the stretches already covered are lost to our perception. Only in the form of retention do we have a consciousness of the phase which has just flowed away, or else in the form of a retrospective recollection. And my whole stream of lived experiences is, finally, a unity of lived experiences, which, of essential necessity, cannot be seized upon completely in a perceiving which *'swims along with it." (Ideen I, §44, 103 / 82, emphasis added) T h e phenomenological reduction permits the r e t u r n to what Husserl calls "pure" consciousness (Ideen I, §33, 73 / 59). This "purity" of consciousness should not b e understood in the Kantian way, that is, as free from empiricism (cf. KRV, A50-51 / B74-75). Rather, it is p u r e because it is absolutely free from the incompleteness that defines transcendence; it is free from invisibility. From the beginning, though, it appears that phenomenology is faced with the impossible, for it wishes to present a field that constantly withdraws from any presentation. What is m a d e present through phenomenological reflection inevitably fades away a n d withdraws. It thus seems impossible to seize what p h e n o m e nology seeks to grasp. 18 At first sight it might therefore appear that Husserl's architectonic has lost its foundation, for it seems that it is impossible to seize u p o n lived

Toward an l Unworldly' Existence

31

experiences, for they are appearing within a flow a n d therefore by necessity "flowing away" or disappearing. I m m a n e n c e as a self-enclosed space appears thus to be an ideal that is never obtained. Although Husserl admits to this imperfection pertaining to i m m a n e n t perception, he argues that it is distinct from the incompleteness associated with transcendent perception: "But to incompleteness or 'imperfection,' pertaining to the essence of the perception of a lived experience, is radically different from the incompleteness or 'imperfection' pertaining to the essence of the perception of something 'transcendent'" (Ideen I, §44, 103 / 82, emphasis a d d e d ) . Husserl hereby holds o n to the radical distinction between i m m a n e n t and transcendent perception. For while the latter, because of its incompleteness, is not fully given, Husserl wishes to argue that i m m a n e n t perception, in contrast, is absolutely given. T h o u g h incomplete, it will not be incomplete in the sense of being aspectival, in the form of profiles —this incompleteness is peculiar to immanent perception, for it is inevitably accompanied by a sense of completeness. Since immanent being is not spatial, 19 there are n o empty intentions that accompany my perceptions. Rather, 'perceiving and what is perceived form essentially an unmediated unity" {Ideen I, §38, 68, translation slightly altered). H e n c e we are facing the peculiar scenario in which the self-presence of i m m a n e n t being is described as complete in its self-presence, yet simultaneously as an imperfection that should not be confused with the incompleteness of transcendent perception. To clarify this issue, Husserl draws the distinction between the adumbration (Abschattung) and the adumbrated (Abgeschattetes): "The adumbration, t h o u g h called by the same name, of essential necessity is not of the same genus as the o n e to which the a d u m b r a t e d belongs. T h e adumbrating is a lived experience. But a lived experience is possible only as a lived experience, and not as something spatial. However, the a d u m b r a t e d is of essential necessity possible only as something spatial" (Ideen I, §41, 94-95 / 75). Husserl's distinction between two forms of incompleteness is explained in terms of spatiality and temporality. T h e appearing of inner experience is not spatial and thus not aspectival. T h e field of immanence is procedural; it is thus adumbrating and never given as 'adumbration', like the objective transcendent world: 20 "Each actual lived experience . . . is necessarily an e n d u r i n g one; and with this duration it finds its place in an infinite continuum of duration—in a fulfilled continuum. Of necessity it has an all-round, infinitely fulfilled temporal

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horizon. At the same time this says: it belongs to one endless 'stream of lived experiences'" (Ideen I, §81, 198 / 163). T h o u g h incomplete, the stream of lived experiences should not be u n d e r s t o o d in terms of occlusion or obstruction, for occlusion is possible only in a threedimensional world. In i m m a n e n t experience we are faced with an incompleteness that does not occlude the co-appearance of that which appears in its failure to appear, which in t u r n is fully present. In imm a n e n t experience the infinite fulfilled stream of intentions is fully p r e s e n t despite the incompleteness of the a d u m b r a t i n g n a t u r e of lived experiences. §20. Limitations of Ideen I Reading Ideen I in isolation, we fail to u n d e r s t a n d how these claims have c o m e about. How can we simultaneously see incompleteness and completeness? Husserl admits that we can come to u n d e r s t a n d the stream of lived experiences only if we understand it in terms of temporality, which Ideen I leaves uninvestigated. Moreover, as will emerge from investigations to follow later on, time is a name for a completely delimited sphere of problems and one of exceptional difficulty. It will be shown that in order to avoid confusion our previous presentation has remained silent to a certain extent, and must of necessity remain silent about what first of all is alone visible in the phenomenological attitude and which, disregarding the new dimension, makes up a closed domain of investigation. (Ideen I, §81, 197-98 / 162) Husserl h e r e confesses to a certain inertia, as h e refuses to delve d e e p e r into the question of temporality. With a sense of relief h e announces: "Fortunately we can leave out of account the enigma of consciousness of time in o u r preliminary analyses without endangering their rigor." 21 T h e r e is a provisional character to the idea of constitution in Ideen I. In o r d e r not to complicate phenomenological reflection, the reduction has b e e n b r o u g h t to a halt. Ideen I can only naively presuppose the stream of lived experiences, since the Cartesian approach alone fails to show how we could possibly r e t u r n to consciousness in its full temporalization. As Iso Kern righdy observes, Ideen /fails to acknowledge the incompleteness of the Cartesian m e t h o d at this stage. "Is it not t h r o u g h the Cartesian a p p r o a c h of H u a II a n d Ideen I that Husserl after all reaches the


33

stream of consciousness in its full temporality? T h e r e is n o d o u b t that Husserl claims that h e has achieved this in those texts. But in critical remarks from the twenties, Husserl explains that in those texts he failed to show how h e arrived at the stream of lived experience, but naively presupposed it" (Kern 1964, 207). Like Descartes, Husserl affirms the quest for certainty, evidence, and the r e t u r n to subjectivity. However, this r e t u r n cannot be Cartesian, 22 for Descartes cannot explain how the phenomenological reduction leads us back to a stream of lived experiences. 2 8 §21. Why Lived Experiences Defy an Atomistic Worldview It is only by returning to Husserl's previous lectures on internal-timeconsciousness, 24 developed between 1905 and 1917, 25 that we can explain how we can simultaneously perceive difference and unity, imperfection and incompleteness, presence and the non-absence of absence. It is in H u a X that Husserl describes the temporalization of time itself. We never intuit momentary instances b u t only their duration. I m m a n e n t objects are called Ablaufsphdnomene26 since they belongto the i m m a n e n t sphere and are thus part of the flow. To emphasize this, H u a X starts off with a critique of Brentano, who, in the spirit of Descartes, is puzzled by the p h e n o m e n a of duration. According to Husserl, for Brentano, time, alteration, and succession are not perceived, b u t are c o m p r e h e n d e d only by means of association and fantasy.27 Although Brentano affirms the consciousness of succession, h e denies that it can be perceived, since we only perceive p u r e nows, for intstance, a single note at one time. 28 Husserl, in contrast, argues that we never intuit a punctual or a hyletic datum; rather, we experience a temporal event prior to any association or fantasy. In the i m m a n e n t sphere we do not perceive static, self-identical now-points b u t the life of the lived experiences (Erlebnisse). T h e emphasis is on the vital, adverbial, and transitory nature of their being, l i v e d experiences are not punctual instants but are given in their m o d e of temporal orientation. Only abstracdy can we isolate a single m o m e n t , for as soon as we experience this m o m e n t , as soon as it exists for us, we already experience it as pointing beyond itself. T h e lived experiences have a certain structure which abstracdy can be divided into three separate components: 'primal impression or sensation', 'primary r e m e m b r a n c e ' , and 'primary expectation'. Primary expectation a n d r e m e m b r a n c e are always already co-intuited with every impression; indeed they make its

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very existence possible. These three components constitute the concrete living present, which forms an original temporal field. 29 T h e actual now which we a p p r e h e n d is always already subject to the "law of modification." 30 It is an appearing which is only because it is temporal. W e should not be led to believe that Husserl is h e r e claiming, purely, that whatever we experience is in time, for it is not that lived experiences are in time but that they exist only as temporal events. Not the p h e n o m e n o n of time is described but the coming into being of lived experiences. T h e emphasis is o n the fact that phenomenological reflection never isolates an atomistic impression; it isolates the temporal form of an impression. 31 Phenomenological reflection cannot go beyond lived experiences, thus the beginning is always one of duration. Even "the point 'now' is also a small field" (Hua X, §16, 40 / 399). T h e now is nothing but an "ideal limit" (ideale Grenze), an abstraction 3 2 that is never experienced as such—for to be means to be temporal. §22. Retention as a Primordial

Intentionality

We d o not synthesize isolated moments; rather, the lived experiences are given in their temporal form. H e r e Husserl is following Kant, insofar as the emphasis is o n the m o m e n t of synthesis. 33 However, unlike Kant, Husserl believes that not all synthesis is active.34 T h e r e is a synthesis "which is not to be thought of as an active and discrete synthesis" (Ideen I, §118, 292 / 246). Synthesis is given. To show how this is possible, Husserl introduces the terms retention and protention, which should not be confused with remembrance and expectation.*5 Any lived experience, even the experience of a p u r e now, exceeds the m o m e n tary, "since it is a relative concept and refers to a ' p a s t / j u s t as 'past' refers to the 'now'" (Hua X, §31, 68 / 423). This pointing beyond itself Husserl calls retention and protention. 3 6 T h e peculiar nature of this pointing is that is has n o object, no contents in the original (i.e., impressional) sense, neither, however, is it imagined. Rather, retention a n d protention allow for the appearing of the now and are "actually existing" (Hua X, §11, 29 / 390). Retention does not belong to the past, and protention to the future, rather b o t h are m o m e n t s of the actual now. 37 Retention bears its object within itself intentionally: The retentional "contents" are not at all contents in the original sense. When a tone dies away, it itself is sensed at first with


35

particular fullness (intensity); and then there follows a rapid weakening in intensity. The tone is still there, still sensed, but in mere reverberation. This genuine tone-sensation must be distinguished from the tonal moment in retention. The retentional tone is not a present tone but precisely a tone "primarily remembered" in the now: it is not really on hand in the retentional consciousness. But neither can the tonal m o m e n t that belongs to this consciousness be a different tone that is really on hand; it cannot even be a very weak tone equivalent in quality (such as an echo). A present tone can indeed "remind" one of a past tone, exemplify it; pictorialize it; but that already presupposes another representation of the past. The intuition of the past cannot itself be a pictorialization. It is an original consciousness. . . . The reverberation of a violin tone is precisely a feeble present violin tone and is absolutely different from the retention of the loud tone that has just passed. (Hua X, §12, 3 1 - 3 2 / 3 9 2 - 9 3 ) Retention should not be confused with a m o m e n t of fading, for it is not an original impression; neither is it a replication of a m o m e n t which is n o longer, n o r is it pointing to the loss of the actual present. Unlike r e m e m b r a n c e , retention is not a re-presentation of something that n o longer is: "Retention is not image consciousness; it is something totally different" (Hua X, §13, 34 / 394). Retention differs from the past given in secondary remembering, insofar as r e m e m b r a n c e refers not to the transitory m o m e n t of something slipping away, but to something that has slipped out of sight. Retention is a retaining in its slipping away. It has n o concrete object or content; "the retentional 'contents' are not at all contents in the original sense." It has a "unique Rind of Intentionality" (Hua X, §12, 31 / 392), which can be neither reduced to an impression nor interpreted as an objectification or a re-presentation of an impression; rather, it is presentative. "For only in primary memory d o we see what is past; only in it does the past b e c o m e constituted, and constituted presentatively, not re-presentatively" (Hua X, §17,41 / 401). Retention is given in person without re-presenting anything. It is a presentative co-appearance. O u r immediate experience of an i m m a n e n t object is o u r first a n d most fundamental experience of pastness prior to any sense of loss. It is the slipping away that accompanies the experience of the present, an

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aging that is retained as present. Husserl refers to it in terms of a trail or trace: "This now apprehension is as it were, the head attached to the comet's tail of retentions relating to the earlier now—points of the motion" (Hua X, §11, 30 / 391). The retentional tail is not an additional m o m e n t that has b e e n attached to the present; rather, it is the trace (Hua X, §16, 39 / 398) that constantly accompanies and indeed makes possible any intuition of the now. Any intuition of a now is in this sense prolonged. 3 8 §23. The Identity of the Impression and the Fiction ofAtomistic Psychologism T h r o u g h his notions of retention and protention, Husserl questions an atomistic starting point. 39 It is not that we intuit the now and that intuition is accompanied by empty intentions, b u t that retention and protention are fully present in our intuition of the now. Every actual now is modified and adumbrated: Every actually present now of consciousness, however, is subject to the law of modification. It changes into retention of retention and does so continuously. Accordingly, a fixed continuum of retention arises in such a way that each later point is retention for every earlier point. And each retention is already a continuum. The tone begins and "it" steadily continues. The tone-now changes into a tone-having-been; the impressionalconsciousness, constantly flowing, passes over into ever new retentional consciousness. (Hua X, §11, 29 / 391, emphasis added) Unlike transcendent perception, which is accompanied by empty intentions, the object of immanent perception is fully present in all its "profiles" (cf. H u a X §43,91-92 / 444). In the above quotation Husserl refers to "der T o n setzt an, u n d stetig setzt 'er' sich fort." A direct translation reads: "The sound begins and 'it' steadily continues." T h e inverted commas are crucial, for they signify that no tone actually appears as an isolated moment. No sound-impression, though necessary, ever appears as a punctual impression, since it is only if it is given in its temporalizingyorm, which exceeds the impression. T h e primal impression is always already folded into the adumbrative horizon of retentions a n d protentions, which, in their modification, turn the now into an event. "The object becomes constituted as an object only in the apprehension of time, in the consciousness of time—as an object that endures, that changes or remains unchanged" (Hua X, no. 49, 321). Be


37

it the i m m a n e n t perceived, or a particular individual tone, it is never identical with the impression; rather, the very identity of the tone is constituted in the chain of retentions and protentions. "Immanent contents are what they are only as far as, during their 'actual' duration, they point ahead to the future and point back to the past" (Hua X, §40, 84 / 437). T h e punctual now is intuited only as temporally extended: If one speaks of the evident givenness of an immanent content, then of course the evidence cannot signify indubitable certainty respecting the being of the tone at a single point in time; I would consider an evidence so conceived . . . to be fiction. If it belongs to the essence of a content given in perception that it is temporally extended, then the indubitability that pertains to perception can signify nothing other than indubitability with respect to temporally extended being. (Hua X, §41, 84 / 438) What is completely grasped by immanent perception is never a nowpoint. "I would consider an evidence so conceived . . . to be a fiction." It is impossible to grasp completely a momentary point of experience, since it is ready to be perceived only if it is extended. T h e self-identical tone can appear only in inverted commas; t h o u g h it is one a n d the same tone, it is not the impression that appears but only the impression in its modification. §24. The Extension of the Present It should not surprise us that Husserl frequently refers to presence as a temporal extension (das zeitlich Ausgedehnte)40 or as a temporal field (cf. H u a X, §11,32 / 391; no. 15,42). Although these are spatial metaphors, it is important to note that the field of immanence describes lived experiences which are a m o m e n t of life and not of space. The immanent field is prior to and distinct from the transcendent spatiotemporal world: "A lived experience is possible only as a lived experience, and not as something spatial" (Ideen /, §41,95 / 75). Although we can divide the present of an immanent temporal object into impression and the adumbrative chain of retentions and protentions, we can do so only abstractly. For they are one and the same moment. 4 1 It is now that we can understand Husserl's distinction between appearing and appearances, or the adumbrated (Abgeschattetem) and the adumbration (Abschattungen) in Ideen V2 In transcendent perception, things are a p p r e h e n d e d only disjunctively, i.e., we perceive the object either horn the front, the

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side, or the back. In immanent perception, which is not spatial but purely temporal, there are no alternative points of view. "Here there is no actual perspective" (Hua IX, §30, 164). The difference or incompleteness is not disjunctive but assimilative.*3 To follow Sokolowski: "There are n o alternative points of view for an inner temporal object. There is only the present. All looks are available here, and only here. Elapsed looks are assimilated and still at work in the present; there is no other way we can have t h e m . . . . There are boxes inside boxes in temporal constitution, and they melt into one another" (Sokolowski 1974, §62, 163-64). T h e change in a temporal object is therefore presented in its presence. The segment of conscious life involving impression, retention, and protention is a whole and a concretum. It is by virtue of retention and protention that Husserl can describe i m m a n e n t experience, the appearing of appearances, as absolutely given. I m m a n e n t objects are completely given despite the fact that the appearing is not static but a dynamic flow. However, the extent to which i m m a n e n c e is the absolute foundation remains questionable, since it appears that the dynamic structure of i m m a n e n t experience is possible only by virtue of an impression.

THE PROBLEM OF "SENSUOUS HYLE" §25. The Problem of Data-Sensualism We have shown that our original experience is not sense-data, or a punctual now-point, but its temporal form. Phenomenology does not r e t u r n us to a meaningless manifold but synthesis. In this m a n n e r Husserl overcomes the problems of corpuscularism. T h e original and most fundamental experience is not sense-data but the stream of modifications, which is fully present in its unity. T h e problem, however, is that Husserl can reach this observation only by presupposing that there is a punctual now that initiates these modifications. Given this, Husserl still appears to operate with a matter-form dualism. This leads Sokolowski to argue that transcendental subjectivity is p u r e form, which is dependent on a reality that lies outside of its grasp (cf. Sokolowski 1964, 133-41, 210-11). T h e problem becomes visible in §85 of Ideen I, where Husserl distinguishes between two interrelated moments, that of sensuous hyle (impression a n d sensations), which he describes as formless stuffs, and

T h e Problem of "Sensuous Hyle"

39

intentional morphe, which h e describes as stuffless forms.44 Husserl initially argues that non-intentional sensations cannot be separated from their intentional structure: "This r e m a r k a b l e duality a n d unity of sensuous vXrj a n d intentive fiop(j)fj plays a d o m i n a n t role in the whole phenomenological sphere" (Idem I §85, 208-9 / 172). As in H u a X, Husserl h e r e purely affirms that consciousness should never be confused with an empirical or psychological m o m e n t : "Consciousness is precisely consciousness 'of s o m e t h i n g . . . . Consciousness is not a n a m e for 'psychical complexes/ for 'contents' fused together, for 'bundles' or streams of'sensations' which, without sense in themselves, also cann o t lend any 'sense' to whatever mixture; it is rather through a n d t h r o u g h 'consciousness.' . . . Consciousness is therefore toto coelo different from what sensualism alone will see, from what in fact is irrational stuff without sense—but which is, of course, accessible to rationalization" (Ideen I, §86, 212-13 / 176). Despite these affirmations, Husserl concedes that sensuous hyle&oes constitute an independ e n t field that is o p e n for an i n d e p e n d e n t hyletic phenomenological discipline (cf Ideen I, §86, 215 / 178). For he believes that n o t all experience is intentional, such as " 'sensuous' lived experiences, . . . sensationcontents'such as color-Data, touch-Data a n d tone-Data, and the like, which we shall n o longer confuse with appearing m o m e n t s of physical things—coloredness, roughness, etc.—which 'present themselves' to lived experiences [ertebnismaflig] by means of those 'contents'. Likewise the sensuous pleasure, pain a n d tickle sensations, a n d so forth, and n o d o u b t also sensuous m o m e n t s belonging to the sphere of 'drives'" (Ideen I, §85, 208 / 172). T h e r e is a sensuous sphere, the sphere of pleasure a n d pain, which should never be confused with the intentional experience of touch. Ideen /differentiates between the immediate, pre-objective life of experiences a n d the structuring or objectification of these experiences. Thus, Husserl appears to equate the m o m e n t of objectification a n d representation with intentionality, whereas the pre-objective sphere refers to formless stuff, the "irrational stuff without sense —but which is, of course, accessible to rationalization" (Ideen I, §86, 213 / 176). N o t only does Husserl refer to two separate fields, the sensuous and objective, b u t he points to the possibility of the existence of sensuous m o m e n t s that exceed objectification a n d thus any form or intentional structure: "Whether everywhere a n d necessarily such sensuous lived experiences in the stream of lived experiences bear some

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'animating construing' or other . . . whether, as we also say, they always have intentive functions, is not to be decided h e r e " {Idem I, §85, 208 / 172). In this m a n n e r Husserl advocates a heterological model in which hyle appears as p u r e matter for intentional activity.45 Husserl does not wish to operate with a matter-form dualism, b u t he questions whether all experience is o p e n to objectification. H e n c e the emphasis is n o t o n a data-sensualism b u t o n the possibility of experiencing feelings that are nonobjective. Indeed, the lectures on internal-time-consciousness have shown that all lived experiences, even pre-theoretical ones, are intentional. There are n o non-intentional sensations; data is ready to be perceived only once 'it' obtains a certain form. 46 Even existence that precedes any form of objectification is already intentional. Indeed, intentionality is n o t necessarily a mom e n t of objectification, for what the i m m a n e n t sphere reveals is the primordial n a t u r e of intentionality in its form of retention and p r o tention, which has n o intentional object; it is an intentionality in which an explicitly thematized object is absent. Only abstractly can we differentiate between hyle and morphe, for the hyletic d a t u m as such d o e s n o t exist, having n o being independently of its form. In r e t u r n ing to H u a X, we realize that, even in the i m m a n e n t field, the matterform distinction is an abstraction and a misleading schema to use. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty observes: "Husserl. . . for a long time defined consciousness or the imposition of a significance in terms of the Auffassung-Inhalt framework, and as a beseelende Auffassung. H e takes a decisive step forward in recognizing, from the time of his Lectures on Time, that his operation presupposes a n o t h e r d e e p e r o n e whereby the content is itself m a d e ready for this apprehension." 4 7 T h e r e t u r n to temporality r e n d e r s this dualistic schema r e d u n d a n t . It is, however, not as if Husserl were completely oblivious to these problems; rather, h e wishes to hold o n to "the clearly provisional character of reference to the idea of constitution in the Ideas' (Fink 1966,136). Husserl acknowledges that as long as the question of temporality remains bracketed, 4 8 he has failed to prevent the r e t u r n to a matter-form dualism. 4 9 §26. Inconsistencies in Hua X At first sight, however, the r e t u r n to temporality does not seem to solve the problem. Although H u a X emphasizes that we are never conscious of data, b u t only the form of the appearing, and thus argues

T h e Problem of "Sensuous Hyle"

41

that even hyle is intentional, H u a X upholds the claim that sense data provide the raw material for intentional formations. Husserl repeatedly emphasizes that t h o u g h atomistic psychologism is a fiction, there is n o consciousness without impression. 5 0 T h e impression is the unmodified source of all being: "The primal impression is something absolutely unmodified, the primal source of all further consciousness and being" (Hua X, §31, 67 / 423). Husserl h e r e appears to refer to a m o m e n t of transcendence within the field of i m m a n e n c e that exceeds the intentional structure of consciousness, but makes consciousness possible. 51 It thus appears that phenomenology is characterized by nothing b u t its failure. Rather than r e t u r n i n g to an absolute foundation, which is fully visible, phenomenology returns to that which fails to show itself—a p u r e 'now' that consciousness fails to grasp. It appears that we have to conclude, with Jacques Derrida, that the 'now' that we perceive is always already other to this p u r e m o m e n t a n d therefore structured by non-presence. According to Derrida, Husserl's account of p u r e presence is always already infected insofar as non-perception, in the form of retention and protention, structures the actual now: As soon as we admit this continuity of the now and the not-now, perception and nonperception, in the zone of primordiality common to primordial impression and primordial retention, we admit the other into the self-identity of the Augenblick; nonpresence and nonevidence are admitted into the blink of the instant There is a duration to the blink, and it closes the eye. This alterity is in fact the condition for presence, presentation, and thus Vorstellung. . . . The fact that nonpresence and otherness are internal to presence strikes at the very root of the argument for the uselessness of signs in the self-relation. 52 Against this view we have already argued that it is not that "nonpresence and non-evidence are admitted into the blink of the instant"; rather, that retentions and protentions are fully present. T h e now is onfy a now if it is experienced
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43. "But its spatiality shows the characters of de-seruerance a n d directionality" (SuZ, §23, 105). 44. This is a r a t h e r reductive reading of Kant. We shall evaluate Heidegg e r ' s reading of this passage in chapter 5, §87ff. 45. Indeed, H e i d e g g e r will ensure that spatiality will b e t r e a t e d as a phen o m e n o n secondary to temporality (cf. §74, below). 46. SuZ, Marginalia to §85b, 441-42. 47. SuZ, §18, 87, translation slightly altered. 48. This is a t e r m that H.-G. G a d a m e r introduces in o r d e r to explain what H e i d e g g e r calls the circle of understanding. Cf. G a d a m e r 1989, II, l a , 2 6 5 71. 49. As we shall show, it is a world that is n o n m a t e r i a l by definition, insofar as it is defined in t e r m s of its temporality. I n d e e d , it will b e d e m o n s t r a t e d that H e i d e g g e r needs to affirm the primacy of a n o n m a t e r i a l world, so that the inversion of Husserl's doctrine of immanent-transcendence can b e maintained. Cf. chapter 4, "From ' I m m a n e n t T r a n s c e n d e n c e ' to ' T r a n s c e n d e n t Immanence,'"§68ff. 50. Indeed, in his later writings Heidegger a p p e a r s to address this appare n t idealism with the introduction of notions such as the earth (Erde) a n d space-time c o n t i n u u m . T h e s e m o m e n t s of resistance, opacity, a n d withdrawal, however, will b e raised in his writings only following SuZ—in particular, in " U r s p r u n g des Kunstwerkes" in Holzwege. Cf. i n t r o d u c t i o n to chapter 5. 5 1 . This is confirmed by a note in the marginalia of Heidegger's own copy of SuZ, which indicates that Heidegger always h a d Husserl in m i n d when h e referred to Descartes or the Cartesian tradition. Heidegger argues: "Descartes has still laid the basis for characterizing ontologically that entity within-theworld u p o n which, in its very Being, every o t h e r entity is founded — material N a t u r e . " H e adds in the marginalia: "[This is] a criticism of Husserl's construction of'ontologies'! [one which] is implicit h e r e in the overall critique of Descartes" (SuZ, §21,98 & marginalia, a, p . 442). Marion also refers to this note in the marginalia: "A note in the marginalia of Heidegger's personal copy of SuZ confirms the p e r m a n e n c e of his j u d g m e n t concerning this 'affinity'" (Marion 1989,129 n. 16). 52. T h e world that is accessible (zugdngig) only t h r o u g h knowing, intellects o r cognition—i.e., t h r o u g h mathematics or physics this kind of "ontology of t h e 'world'"—does n o t seek the " p h e n o m e n o n of the world" (SuZ, §21, 95). 53. "A g e n u i n e grasp of what really is . . . lies in voeiv— ' b e h o l d i n g ' in the widest sense . . . ; Siavoeiv or 'thinking' is just a m o r e fully achieved form of VO£?vand is f o u n d e d u p o n it. Sensatio (aiGOrjoiq), as o p p o s e d to intellect™, still r e m a i n s possible as a way of access to entities by a b e h o l d i n g which is p e r c e p tual in character; b u t Descartes presents his 'critique' of it because h e is orie n t e d ontologically by these principles" (SuZ, §21, 96). 54. "And t h o u g h substance may i n d e e d b e known by some attribute; yet e a c h substance has o n e principal p r o p e r t y which constitutes its n a t u r e a n d essence, a n d to which all its o t h e r properties are referred" (Descartes 1985, 25; a n d SuZ, §19, 90). 55. "But the basic ontological state of'living' is a p r o b l e m in its own right

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a n d can be tackled only reductively and privatively in terms of the ontology of Dasein"(SuZ, §41,194). 56. T h e world of work in m i n d is, however, n o t the world of the industrial worker. H e i d e g g e r is motivated m o r e by an artisanal romanticism referring to n o n - m e c h a n i z e d labor. I n d e e d , it is this emphasis o n t h e world of work which leads us back to Ernst J u n g e r *s heroic descriptions of Der Arbeiter, Herrschaft und Gestalt (cf. J u n g e r 1982). H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t of the everyday is thus limited. It has to be said, however, that SuZ does n o t p r e t e n d to p r e s e n t a c o m p l e t e analysis of all the m o d e s of Being-in a n d Being-with. N o t only is the question of life bracketed, b u t also the b e i n g of artworks a n d the question of n a t u r e , which will b e c o m e increasingly i m p o r t a n t in his later writings. H e i d e g g e r acknowledges in passing that n o t all beings can b e red u c e d to the s t r u c t u r e of Dasein's Bewandtnis: "The N a t u r e which 'stirs a n d strives,' which assails us a n d enthralls us as landscape, r e m a i n s h i d d e n . T h e botanist's plants a r e n o t t h e flowers of t h e h e d g e r o w ; the ' s o u r c e ' which the g e o g r a p h e r establishes for a river is n o t t h e ' s p r i n g h e a d in t h e d a l e ' " (SuZ, §15, 70). Cf. SuZ, §43 a n d Villela-Petit 1992, 126. However, the p r o b l e m is that this bracketing is necessary for SuZ if it wishes to m a i n t a i n the unitary s t r u c t u r e of Being-in-the-world. Cf. a p p e n d i x to c h a p t e r 3, section (e), a n d c h a p t e r 4, §73 ff. 57. However, against this r e a d i n g Heidegger warns us that the t e r m besorgen is chosen n o t to emphasize the practical a n d economic e n g a g e m e n t in the world but to make manifest care as the existential overall structure of Dasein-asBeing-in-the-world: "This term has b e e n chosen n o t because Dasein h a p p e n s to be proximally a n d to a large extent 'practical' and economic, b u t because the Being of Dasein itself is to be m a d e visible as care" (SuZ, §12, 57). 58. J a c q u e s Taminiaux has shown convincingly that SuZ, despite its emphasis o n praxis, sides with Platonism, as its distinction between authenticity a n d inauthenticity expresses a disdain for doxa. In fundamental ontology t h e r e is n o r o o m for doxa (cf. Taminiaux 1991). O n the relation between H e i d e g g e r a n d Aristotle see Kisiel (1993), especially p a r t two, a n d Felix O M u r c h a d h a (1999), chapter two. 59. It refers us back to the care-structure, which is nothing b u t the existential structure of Being-in-the-world: "this p h e n o m e n o n [that is 'care'] by n o m e a n s expresses a priority of the 'practical' attitude over the theoretical. . . . 'Theory' a n d 'practice' are possibilities of Being for an entity whose Being must b e defined as ' c a r e ' " (SuZ, §41,193). T h e aim is therefore to reclaim the unity of theory a n d practice which is g u a r a n t e e d by the care-structure. In the Kantbuch Heidegger warns us n o t to mistake the analysis of the everyday as a form of pragmatism: "The existential analytic of everydayness does n o t want to describe how we use a knife a n d fork. It should show that a n d how all association with beings, even where it appears as if t h e r e were just beings, already presupposes the transcendence of Dasein —namely, Being-in-the-world" {Kantbuch, §43, 235 / 160E. 60. Emil Kettering explores the significance of the t e r m Ndhe in Heidegg e r ' s work (cf. Kettering 1987). In his later writings H e i d e g g e r relates the notion of closeness to withdrawal (Entzug) to stress a positive notion of concealment. Cf. introduction to chapter 5.

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61. "Interpretation is carried out primordially n o t in a theoretical statem e n t " (SuZ, §33, 157). 62. "Assertion is n o t a free-floating kind of behaviour which, in its own right, might b e capable of disclosing entities in general in a primary way: o n t h e contrary it always maintains itself o n the basis of Being-in-the-world" (SuZ, §32, 156). 63. This contradicts the r e a d i n g of Ernst T u g e n d h a t , who interprets the pre-predicative m o m e n t as pointing "beyond the domain of language" (Tug e n d h a t 1986,166, emphasis a d d e d ) . O n T u g e n d h a t ' s critique, see a p p e n d i x to c h a p t e r 3, section (a). 64. "From the fact that words are absent, it may n o t b e c o n c l u d e d that int e r p r e t a t i o n is absent" (SuZ, §33,157). 65. We d o n o t wish to reverse the presentation by arguing that the present-at-hand p r e c e d e s the ready-to-hand; r a t h e r , we wish to question the very dichotomy. For this radical disjunction suggests an avoidance of sensible visibility. However, it is n o t a p p a r e n t to us that seeing a n d sensing, interpretation a n d theory are necessarily radically distinct. 66. King 1964, 95. This is an excellent introductory text to SuZ. It p r o vides a sensitive r e a d i n g at a time when Heidegger was just being i n t r o d u c e d to t h e English-speaking world (J. Macquarrie a n d E. Robinson's translation was first published in 1962). 67. It has n o t "the m o d e s of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, a n d obstinacy" (SuZ, §16, 74); the m o d e s of the world of objects which a r e present-athand. 68. H e r b e r t Dreyfus suggests the translation "occurrentness" for Vorhandenheit: "This t e r m [ Vorhandenheit] is usually translated 'presence-at-hand,' b u t since t h e r e is n o m e n t i o n of presence in the G e r m a n , a n d since Heidegger rarely makes use of the embedded word for hand, I shall use the translation 'occurr e n t n e s s ' " (Dreyfus 1991,40, emphasis a d d e d ) . Dreyfus, however, thereby occludes the significance of the differentiation between Zuhandenheit a n d Vorhandenheit, for it is the 'handiness' of the e q u i p m e n t which is crucial. Vorhandenheit is n o t h i n g b u t a deficient m o d e of this handiness. T o follow H e i d e g g e r : the t e r m Zuhandenheit expresses that entities a r e "zurHand" ("to h a n d " ; SuZ, §22, 102), a n d ^ Vorhandenheit suggests that is it before o u r h a n d s a n d n o t to h a n d (cf. §70 below). 69. "That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. O n the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work—that which is to be p r o d u c e d at the time" (SuZ, §15, 69-70). 70. " E q u i p m e n t can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own m e a s u r e ( h a m m e r i n g with a h a m m e r , for e x a m p l e ) ; but in such dealings an entity of this kind is not grasped thematically as an occurring Thing, nor is the equipmentstructure known as such even in the using. T h e h a m m e r i n g does n o t simply have knowledge a b o u t the h a m m e r ' s character as e q u i p m e n t , b u t it has a p p r o p r i a t e d this e q u i p m e n t in a way that could not possibly b e m o r e suitable. In dealings such as this, w h e r e something is p u t to use, o u r c o n c e r n subordinates itself to the 'in-order-to' which is constitutive for the e q u i p m e n t we a r e employing at the time" (SuZ, §14, 69, emphasis a d d e d ) .

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71. "Taken strictly, t h e r e 'is' n o such thing as an e q u i p m e n t . T o the Being of any e q u i p m e n t t h e r e always belongs a totality of e q u i p m e n t , in which it can b e this e q u i p m e n t that it is" (SuZ, §15, 68). 72. " E q u i p m e n t is essentially 'something in o r d e r to . . . ' A totality of e q u i p m e n t is constituted by various ways of the 'in-order-to,' such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability. In the 'in-order-to' as a struct u r e t h e r e lies an assignment or reference of something to something (SuZ, §15, 68, emphasis a d d e d ) . 73. "Thematical p e r c e p t i o n of Things is precisely n o t the way e q u i p m e n t ready-to-hand is e n c o u n t e r e d in its ' t r u e ' 'in-itself,' it is e n c o u n t e r e d r a t h e r in the inconspicuousness of what we can c o m e across 'obviously' and 'Objectively'" (SuZ, §69a, 354). 74. Macquarrie a n d Robinson translate Bewandtnis as "involvement." 75. "To say that the Being of the ready-to-hand has the structure of assignm e n t o r reference m e a n s that it has in itself the character of having been assigned or referred. An entity is discovered when it has b e e n assigned o r r e f e r r e d to something, a n d r e f e r r e d as that entity which it is. With any such entity t h e r e is an involvement which it has in something. T h e character of Being which belongs to the ready-to-hand is j u s t such an involvement. If something has an involvement, this implies letting it be involved in something. T h e relationship of the 'with . . . in . , . ' shall b e indicated by the t e r m 'assignment' or 'reference'" (SuZ, §18, 8 3 - 8 4 ) . 76. "The less we j u s t stare at the h a m m e r - T h i n g , a n d the m o r e we seize hold of it a n d use it, the m o r e p r i m o r d i a l does o u r relationship to it b e c o m e , a n d the m o r e unveiledly is it e n c o u n t e r e d as that which it is—as e q u i p m e n t " (SuZ, §15, 69). 77. I n d e e d H e i d e g g e r later acknowledges that t h e r e is a 'thingliness' a b o u t tools which withdraws from Dasein. T h e thing is n o t reducible to the ready-to-hand a n d present-at-hand structure. T h e r e is something obtrusive a b o u t the thing that c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d to use o r utility. "It is m e r e things, excluding even utensils, that c o u n t as things in the p r o p e r sense" ("Der Ursp r u n g des Kunstwerkes" in Holzwege, 6; BW, 147-48). Similarly to the p h e n o m e n o n of life, things a r e n e i t h e r m e r e objects n o r tools. While the world of SuZ is described in terms of its structure of assignment a n d thus suggests a subjectincation of the world, in his later writings H e i d e g g e r moves away from the question of use a n d emphasizes m o r e the structure of 'letting b e ' , which is already implicit in SuZ. In " U r s p r u n g des Kunstwerkes" Heidegger, for example, writes against the m o m e n t of aesthetics, which b o t h divorces art from truth a n d turns art into a subjective e x p e r i e n c e (Erlebnis). 78. For example, in medical knowledge Te%VT1 refers to the m a n n e r whereby a goal is achieved. T h e d o c t o r ' s skills a n d 'tools', o r choice of m e t h o d , are assessed in accordance with the aim or deed, i.e., curing those who are ill. 79. Similarly William Blattner observes: "For Aristotelian energeiais complete in an instant; to b e in act is to realize its end. But for H e i d e g g e r quite the opposite seems to b e true: the goal is always 'outstanding'" (Blattner 1992, 126).

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80. "In the work t h e r e is also a reference o r assignment to 'materials': the w o r k is d e p e n d e n t o n leather, thread, needles, a n d the like, Leather, m o r e over is p r o d u c e d from hides. These are taken from animals. . . . " (SuZ, §15, 70-71). 8 1 . Figal 1988, 84. This leads J. M. Bernstein to argue: "The 'as' structure of equipmentality approximates the image of ethical life p r e s u p p o s e d by the logic of the lost sensus communis" (Bernstein 1992, 76). 82. However, H e i d e g g e r adopts the Aristotelian conception of a final e n d (telos) in the form of a ' g o o d life' by rearticulating it in terms of a n e n d (Ende) of Dasein as Being-towards-death. As we shall show, t h e r e is a finality or destin a t i o n (Bewandtnis) to the assignment structure that is Dasein itself (cf. chapter 4, esp. §76 a n d conclusion). 83. "If we are to investigate such p h e n o m e n a as references, signs, or even significations, n o t h i n g is to b e gained by characterizing t h e m as relations. Ind e e d we shall eventually have to show that 'relations' themselves, because of their formally general character, have their ontological source in a reference [assignment]" (SuZ, §17, 77). 84. "The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in o r d e r to b e ready-to-hand authentically" (SuZ, §15, 69). 85. "But h e r e we m u s t notice that this 'referring' as indicating is n o t the ontological structure of the sign as e q u i p m e n t Instead, 'referring' as indicating is g r o u n d e d in the Being-structure of e q u i p m e n t , in serviceability for. . . . " (SuZ, §17, 78). 86. Cf. §52ff., above. 87. SuZ, §17, 79, emphasis added. 88. SuZ, §17, 79, emphasis added. 89. SuZ, §18, 83, emphasis a d d e d . 90. "As the Being of something ready-to-hand, a n involvement is itself discovered only o n the basis of the prior discovery of a totality of involvements" (SuZ, §18, 85). 9 1 . As R o b e r t Bernasconi observes: "The constant necessity to suspend a specific sense of spatiality, suggests that in all of these p h e n o m e n a a certain sense of something like spatiality is still in play" (Bernasconi 1988, 48). 92. This withdrawal is m a d e possible by fundamental m o o d s such as anxiety o r p r o f o u n d b o r e d o m . Cf. chapter 4, §71. 93. Cf. SuZ, §12, 54 a n d SuZ, §13, 61. 94. Cf. SuZ, 76, 113, 176, 271, 344. 95. T h e expressions used for the analysis of the everyday in SuZ illustrate a fundamental dislocation a n d lostness: fallenness (175), curiosity (175), lost (168), not tarrying alongside (Unverweilen) (172), distraction (172), entangled (178), being everywhere and nowhere (173). 96. "Dasein's absorption in the 'they' and its absorption in the 'world' of its concern, make manifest something like afleeingof Dasein in the face of itself— of itself as a n authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self' (SuZ, §40, 184). 97. "We have prescribed in a prohibitive way how it is possible for authentic Being-towards-death not to b e " (SuZ, §53, 260, translation slightly

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c h a n g e d ) . "The m o r e unveiledly this possibility gets u n d e r s t o o d , the m o r e purely does the u n d e r s t a n d i n g p e n e t r a t e into it as the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at aT (ibid. 262). 98. "In anxiety o n e feels 'uncanny.'' H e r e the peculiar indefiniteness of that which Dasein finds itself alongside in anxiety, comes proximally to expression: the 'nothing a n d nowhere.' But h e r e 'uncanniness' also means 'notbeing-at-home'" (SuZ, §40, 188). 99. In SuZ the m o m e n t of negation is used dialectically. In his later writings —from "Was ist Metaphysik," (1929, Wegmarken; BW) onward—the adverb nothing (nichts) is substituted with the n o u n nothingness {das Nichts). Tug e n d h a t maintains that this move—from the adverb to the noun—is nonsensical and unjustifiable, since it leads Heidegger to combine the infinitive of the verb to be (Sein) with the substantive nothingness (das Nichts) rather than referring to being-nothing (dasNichtsein). T o follow T u g e n d h a t : "Having nothing to h o l d o n to is a g e n u i n e experiential possibility whereas to hold o n to nothingness, is not" ( T u g e n d h a t 1992, 59). However, T u g e n d h a t ' s intent to eliminate 'the question about nothingness' (dieFrage nach dem Nichts) is questionable. As J a c o b Taubes observes, we n e e d to contextualize Heidegger's motives. T h e substantive 'nothingness' (das Nichts) needs to be i n t e r p r e t e d in relation to H e i d e g g e r ' s (destructive) r e a d i n g of Parmenides. Parmenides needs to draw o n 'nothingness' in o r d e r to negate the possibility of the existence of nothing: "Heidegger's discursive transition from n o t h i n g to nothingness is a kind of an amnesis of the P a r m e n i d e a n transition from nothingness to nothing" (Taubes 1975, 147). 100. We a d h e r e to Kisiel's translation of Bedeutsamkeit as meaningfulness r a t h e r than significance, which Macquarrie a n d Robinson have chosen. Cf. Kisiel's translation of the GA 20, §23. 101. "These relationships a r e b o u n d u p with o n e a n o t h e r as a primordial totality; they a r e what they a r e as this signifying [Be-deuten] in which Dasein gives itself b e f o r e h a n d its Being-in-the-world as something to be u n d e r s t o o d . T h e relational totality of this signifying we call 'significance' This is what makes u p the structure of the world — the structure of that wherein Dasein as such already is" (SuZ, §18, 87). 102. "This state of Being does n o t arise just because some other entity is present-at-hand outside of Dasein a n d meets u p with it. Such an entity can ' m e e t u p with' Dasein only in so far as it can, of its own accord, show itself within a world' (SuZ, §12, 57). 103. I n d e e d Kant has shown that orientation is possible only by virtue of inc o n g r u o u s counterparts such as a right a n d a left h a n d (cf. chapter 5, §87). 104. Cf. "La main et le m o n d e " in Franck 1986, esp. p. 53, a n d Courtine 1987-88. 105. This reminds us of Aristotle's observation that "The soul, as it were, acts like a h a n d " (Aristotle 1957, 432a, translation slightly altered). 106. SuZ, §23, 108, emphasis a d d e d . 107. H e i d e g g e r later admits in a footnote to his essay "Vom Wesen des Grundes": "If we somehow equate the ontical system of useful things (of tools) with the world and explain Being-in-the-world as traffic with useful things, we

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t h e n a b a n d o n any u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t r a n s c e n d e n c e as Being-in-the-world in t h e sense of a 'basic constitutive feature of Dasein'" (WdG, 51 / 153 n. 55; 81E). 108. Implicitly, the Heidegger of SuZ questions the relationship between philosophy and life. Not only does philosophy arise o u t of o u r concrete existence, but it needs to r e t u r n to life. Heidegger is h e r e similar to Plato, who argues that the philosopher king needs to r e t u r n from the world of Ideas: "Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its d e p a r t u r e from the h e r m e n e u t i c of Dasein, which, as an analytic of existence, has m a d e fast the guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to which it returns" (SuZ, §7, 38 & §83,436). This issue of return or folding back becomes m o r e explicit in GA 26: "But the temporal analysis is at the same time the turning-around [Kehre], where ontology itself expressly r u n s back into the metaphysical ontic in which it implicitly always remains" (GA 26, appendix to §10, 201). An investigation concerning this turning back \lETafioXf[ (Umschlag) Heidegger calls metontology (Metontologie) (cf. GA 26, §10 & appendix, 199). A r e t u r n to the ontic world, however, questions the radical distinction between the ontic and ontological that SuZ suggests. Indeed, Heidegger concedes that t h e r e is a proximity between the ontic and ontological: "Nevertheless, the Interpretation which is m o r e primordial existentially, also discloses possibilities for a m o r e primordial existentiell understanding, as long as our ontological conceptualization does not let itself get cut offfrom our ontical experience" (SuZ, §59, 295, emphasis a d d e d ) . F u r t h e r m o r e , the r e t u r n to ontical experience thereby reveals that a. factical ideal informs the ontological investigation: "Is there not, however, a definite ontical way of taking authentic existence, a factical ideal of Dasein, underlying o u r ontological Interpretation of Dasein's existence? That is so indeed. But not only is this Fact one which must n o t b e denied and which we a r e forced to grant; it must also be conceived in its positive necessity, in terms of t h e object which we have taken as the theme of o u r investigation" (SuZ, §62, 310). A factical ideal guides philosophical investigation, which, however, philosophy needs to unfold: "Philosophy will never seek to deny its 'presuppositions' b u t neither may it simply admit them" (ibid.). A bridge between philosophy and life is affirmed. Hereby the question of authenticity a n d the necessity of 'choosing one's h e r o ' (SuZ, §74, 385) b e c o m e intelligible. Although this ideal needs to r e m a i n an illusion, Heidegger believes that it is necessary to a d h e r e to it if we wish to have an art of existence: "Not only d o we n e e d analyse in general, b u t we must p r o d u c e the illusion, as it were, that the given task at h a n d is the o n e a n d only necessary task. Only the person who understands this art of existing, only the person who, in the course of action, can treat what is in e a c h case seized u p o n as wholly singular, who at the same time nonetheless realizes the finitude of this activity, only such a one understands finite existence a n d can h o p e to accomplish something in it. This art of existing is not the selfreflection that hunts a r o u n d uninvolved, r u m m a g i n g about for motives a n d complexes by which to obtain reassurance a n d a dispensation from action. It is r a t h e r only the clarity of action itself, a hunting for real possibilities" (GA 26, §10, 201, emphasis a d d e d ) . For a discussion of metontology and the possibility of a n ethics, see Bernasconi (1988), Cullen (1991), and H o d g e (1995). Steven

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Gait Crowell (2000) convincingly shows why Heidegger's aim to replace transcendental philosophy (phenomenology) with metontology (metaphysics) remains an illusory idea. For a good overview of Heidegger's use of the term metontology, see McNeill (1993/1994) and Krell (1986), who initiated the discussion.

CHAPTER 4 1. H u a VIII, 45. Lecture, 121. 2. T h e o d o r e Kisiel has shown convincingly that Heidegger adopts the term Hingabe—which he translates as "devotion," "dedication," "submission," and "immersion"—from Emil Lask, who already differentiated between Hingabe and Hinsehen (cf. Kisiel 1993, chapter 1). J o h n Macquarrie and Edward Robinson translate Angewiesenheit as "submission." However, "referential dependency upon," "being ascribed," or "subjected to" is m o r e appropriate here. 3. Cf. SuZ, §69b, 363 n. 1; 498 n. xxiii(E). It is there that Heidegger argues that what Husserl calls "intentionality" is grounded in the ecstatical unity of Dasein. Heidegger explains in his 1929 lecture: "If o n e characterizes every way of behaving toward being as intentional, t h e n intentionality is possible only on the basis of transcendence. It is neither identical with transcendence n o r that which makes transcendence possible" (WdG, 133 / 31 / 29E). This text was originally published in a collection dedicated to Husserl in h o n o r of his seventieth birthday. 4. Although Heidegger refers n o t to the natural attitude, which he calls the world of things, b u t to the everyday, which is Dasein's environment—the world of work— the claim remains identical insofar as Dasein's distinctiveness lies in the fact that it is neither ready-to-hand n o r present-at-hand, b u t defined in terms of its structure of c o m p o r t m e n t . We have neglected Dasein's existential structure of Being-with since it does n o t structurally change the main arg u m e n t . Heidegger wishes to argue that Dasein is n o t only Being-in-the-world b u t equiprimordially Being-with. In the everyday this Being-with is characterized in terms of a lack of 'self. Dasein is n o t free (i.e., responsible), b u t defines itself in terms of the 'They' (be it n o r m s or conventions). Indeed, Heidegger uses the Husserlian terminology of the natural attitude when h e argues that in the everyday Dasein is fascinated by or u n d e r the spell of the world (benommen) (cf. SuZ, §13, 6 1 ; §16, 76; chapter 3, §66), a n d is thus lost in the world. 5. SuZ, §41, 196. "Ein . . . n o c h ursprunglichere [s] P h a n o m e n . " This quotation is taken out of context, for it does n o t refer to Husserl b u t to the primordial structure of care. 6. SuZ, §12, 53. llEinheitliches P h a n o m e n . " 7. Ideen I, §39, 87 / 70. Gibson's translations—"interwovenness," "entwinement," a n d "entanglement" —are m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e here. 8. Cf. H u a VIII, Lecture 45, 121. 9. "The Ego . . . is a b a n d o n e d to what is objective. . . . T o this state of affairs, however, t h e r e belongs apriori the 'possibility' of an alteration in the subject's attitude" (Ideen II, §4, 10-11).

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10. SuZ, §18, 87, emphasis a d d e d . 11. It is in this context that we can u n d e r s t a n d why Levinas criticizes H e i d e g g e r for his paganism (cf. "Heidegger, Gagarine et n o u s " in DL, 3 0 0 301). 12. "In d e t e r m i n i n g itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility, which it is itself a n d which, in its very Being, it somehow u n d e r stands" (SuZ, §9, 43). 13. "The 'essence' of this entity lies in its "to be"' (SuZ, §9, 42, emphasis added). 14. "Dasein always u n d e r s t a n d s itself in terms of its existence—in terms of a possibility of itself: to b e itself or n o t itself (SuZ, §4, 12). T h e aim of SuZ is to make this questionableness of Being visible again, thus to r e t u r n to this possibility ofchoosing a n d sustaining possibility as possibility, 15. SuZ, p . 440, " R a n d b e m e r k u n g e n zu," p . 42b. Although H e i d e g g e r insists that we should n o t u n d e r s t a n d the distinction between authenticity a n d inauthenticity in moralistic terms, this is disingenuous in some sense. For authenticity still constitutes the exemplary possibility for Dasein: to assume its true n a t u r e or Be-stimmung. This is a normative concept; what o n e essentially 'is' o n e should authentically become. 16. This is a translation King (1964) suggests o n p a g e 56. 17. SuZ therefore describes Dasein's everyday in the following m a n n e r : Dasein is floating, dispersed, lost, never dwelling anywhere, not-tarrying alongside of what is closest (i.e., its ownmost possibilities); it is dragging, groundless, unattached, a n d u p r o o t e d . 18. This presentation is n o t quite accurate because o n e of Husserl's p r o b lems is to account for the possibility of an a d e q u a t e philosophical beginning. H e i d e g g e r believes that such a beginning can b e motivated only by a fundam e n t a l m o o d , such as anxiety, which is unmotivated—i.e., t h e r e is n o t h i n g in t h e ontic world in the face of which o n e has anxiety. Husserl, meanwhile, arg u e s that the transcendental r e d u c t i o n also c a n n o t be motivated by the general thesis of the natural attitude: "No o n e can simply tumble into philosophy" ( H u a VIII, Lecture 3 0 , 1 9 ) . "Indeed, h e r e we a r e dealing with a n entirely 'unn a t u r a l ' attitude a n d a n entirely u n n a t u r a l way of viewing ourselves a n d the world" ( H u a VIII, Lecture 45, 121). T h e transcendental r e d u c t i o n is u n m o t i vated. Writing u n d e r the auspices of Husserl, Fink observes: "The u n m o t i vated character of the phenomenological r e d u c t i o n (the absence of any worldly p r o b l e m which could serve as its real motive) expresses the r e d u c tion's unfamiliar n a t u r e in a similar way. Because it is the suspension of the "natural attitude" it c a n n o t appear within this attitude a n d it therefore must b e unfamiliar. T h e r e d u c t i o n becomes knowable in its 'transcendentalmotivat i o n ' only with the transcending of the world" (Fink 1970, 105). I n d e e d Husserl will later relate this transcendental motivation to Plato's a n d Aristode's n o t i o n of Oav^etv (cf. Krisis, 331£). Cf. H e l d 1991, 89, a n d H e l d 1992a, 142. 19. SuZ, §40, 187. I n d e e d , there is a n etymological connection; Angst derives from the Latin angustus, which means "tight" (engin G e r m a n ) .

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20. SuZ, §40, 188, emphasis added: "Macht offenbar, ' s w e i n e m ist\ In der Angst ist einem 'unheimlichY' 21. G A 2 6 , §10,172, emphasis a d d e d . This passage is also cited by Derrida (1983, 70-71). D e r r i d a points o u t that "the Geschlechtslosigkeit would n o t be m o r e negative than aletheia" (ibid., 72). Geschlechtslosigkeit is the original 'potency' of the articulation of truth a n d u n t r u t h . 22. Heidegger repeats this a r g u m e n t in "Vom Wesen des G r u n d e . " "Only because Dasein is defined by selfhood can an I-se If relate 'itself to a Thou-self. Selfhood is the presupposition of the possibility of being an 'I,' which itself is revealed only in the ' T h o u . ' Selfhood is never related to a T h o u ; it is neutral toward 'being an I': and 'being a T h o u , ' a n d even m o r e toward 'sexuality,' since it is what makes t h e m all possible in the first place. All essential propositions of an ontological Analytic of Dasein in m a n treat Dasein in its neutrality" (WdG,54/156;87E). 23. "[A] lieutenant of the nothing" ("Was ist Metaphysik," 1929, in Wegmarken, 15 / 117; BW, 106). O n the question of the differentiation between dasNichts andnichts, see chapter 3, §66, n. 99. 24. T h e fact that Dasein always already is inauthentic (fallenness is an existential of Dasein) means that Dasein has always already avoided its responsibility. H e n c e Being-guilty is a n o t h e r existential of Dasein. 25. "The world as this 'How in its totality' underlies every possible way of segmenting being; segmenting being does n o t destroy the world b u t requires it" (WdG, 140-141 / 38-39; 49E). 26. WdG, 135 / 33; 35E, emphasis a d d e d . 27. Cf. chapter 3, §§62-67. 28. Indeed, the whole structure of the book reflects the fear of affirming a m o m e n t of dispersal r a t h e r than the unitary structure of Being-in-the-world. After the analysis of the everyday we are i n t r o d u c e d to a manifold of structures: "Being-in-the-world which is falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is an issue, both in its Being alongside the 'world and in its Being-with Others" (SuZ, §39, 181). Although these m o m e n t s are investigated separately, the aim is to show that Being-in, Being-alongside, a n d Being-ahead-of-itself equiprimordially constitute the structure of Being-inthe-world. They are not separate m o m e n t s that can be glued together but always already implicate each other. Being-in-the-world needs to b e t h o u g h t of in its indestructible totality (Ganzheit), which encapsulates all these structures. This totalizing structure H e i d e g g e r calls care: "Being-in-the-world, in turn, is b o u n d u p ontologically in the structural totality of Dasein's Being, a n d we have characterized care as such a totality" (SuZ, §43b, 209). T h e t e r m totality, however, still implies that t h e r e are diverse structures that form this structural whole. SuZ p r o c e e d s to show that care articulates n o t only Dasein's thrown projection b u t also Dasein's Being-toward-death, the call of conscience and anticipatory resoluteness. This diversified articulation of the structural whole thus persuades us to lose sight of the unitary structure of care. "The totality of the structural whole has become even more richly articulated; and because of this, the existential question of the unity of this totality has become still more urgenf (SuZ, §64,

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317). T h e totalizing structure of care is n o t sufficient. What needs to b e p r o v e n additionally is the unity of care. T h e ontological questioning needs to persist "until we can exhibit a still moreprimordialphenomenon which provides the ontological s u p p o r t for the unity and the totality of the structural manifoldness of care" (SuZ, §41, 196). This unity is g u a r a n t e e d by temporality alone: "The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality" (SuZ, §65, 327). T h e m o v e m e n t is thus from dispersal to totality (Ganzheit), a n d from the totality of care to the unity (Einheit) of temporality. 29. This is well illustrated by Protevi (1994, 117), and Derrida's "Ousia a n d G r a m m a r " (1982). 30. That is, if the primordial unitary structure of Being-in-the-world is to b e maintained. 31. This would suggest a n o t h e r form of dualism, for now there would be something lying beyond the grasp of Dasein. 32. As Sallis observes: "In Being and Time presence means predominantly, t h o u g h n o t exclusively, Vorhandenheit (present-at-hand . . .). This is to be und e r s t o o d in its correlation with p u r e seeing, with voeiv, with intuition (AnschauungY (Sallis 1986a, 142). 33. This is not quite correct, for Heidegger describes the everyday as an infinity without a telos, while for Husserl the infinite is teleologically structured (cf. §83, below). Indeed, it is interesting to note that the original Greek meaning of rsteiogis close to Heidegger's description of Being-toward-death: it signifies "a whole" or "something complete." It really means something "rounded off as a whole." For Aristode and Plato the infinite in the sense of an indefinite and unending multiplicity was precisely axekfiq (i.e., non-bounded and therefore imperfect: it did not have its 'limit' within itself; it was amipov [boundless]). I should like to thank Nicholas Walker, who drew my attention to this analogy. 34. I n d e e d the significance of the 'They' is that it c a n n o t die (cf. SuZ, §81, 424-25). 35. uFreedomfrom any standpoint if the p h r a s e should m e a n anything at all is precisely n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n the adoption of a viewpoint This is s o m e t h i n g historical, that is, s o m e t h i n g p e r t a i n i n g to Dasein (and h e n c e a m a t t e r of responsibility—Dasein's m o d e of relating to this viewpoint) — n o t a n extrat e m p o r a l chimerical in itself (GA 63, §17b, 83). 36. Ever since Kant, time a n d temporality have been defined in t e r m s of subjectivity (inner sense). This claim is n o t quite true, for in terms of the history of philosophy the "subjectification of time" was i n t r o d u c e d with Augustine. With this the path was set to characterize the subject in terms of its temporality, which found its full articulation only with Kant. However, we n e e d to note that Heidegger h e r e attempts to retrieve Aristode's claim that "time in a sense belongs to a psyche" when he argues that, when n o Dasein 'is', t h e r e 'is' n o truth or primordial temporality. 37. T h e p r o b l e m with this kind of claim is that in o r d e r to affirm a prim o r d i a l transcendence the 'I think' needs to be presupposed. Dasein's dislocation in this sense presupposes a 'location' from which it can depart. 38. Indeed, in the Kantbuch, Heidegger calls transcendental imagination (which is analogous to Dasein's temporality) "the original g r o u n d for the pos-

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sibility of h u m a n subjectivity" (Kantbuch, §31, 172; 118E). Transcendental imagination as the "sensibility a n d understanding, which p e r h a p s spring forth from a c o m m o n , b u t to us unknown, r o o t (KRV, A15 / B29)" (Kantbuch, §6, 37;24E). 39. A schema should therefore n o t be confused with a pictorial representation (cf. KRV, A140-41 / B179-80). 40. Cf. KRV, A227-28 / B279-81. 4 1 . "The consciousness of myself in the representation T is n o t an intuition, b u t a merely intellectual representation of the spontaneity of a thinking subject. This T has not, therefore, the least predicate of intuition, which, as p e r m a n e n t , might serve as correlate for the determination of time in inner sense" (KRV, B278). 42. I n d e e d the aim is to avoid any form of dualism: "We n e e d to avoid the schema: There are subjects and objects, that is to say, there is consciousness a n d existence [Sein]; existence is the object of knowledge; existence is really the existence of n a t u r e ; consciousness is T think,' h e n c e a self, an Ego-pole, the centre of acts, person" ( G A 6 3 , §17a, 81). 43. T h e whither of the ecstasis expresses the for the sake of which, that Dasein has to be (futural), that in the face of which Dasein is anxious—i.e., its thrownness (past)— a n d that Dasein is as Being along-side entities of the world, making p r e s e n t the world of tools t h r o u g h its projects (gegenwartigen). 44. Cf. Kantbuch, § 2 2 , 1 0 6 - 7 8c §35, 200-201. 45. Cf. a p p e n d i x to chapter 3, section (f). 46. "Transcendence is r a t h e r the p r i m o r d i a l constitution of the subjectivity of a subject. T h e subject transcends q u a subject; it would n o t be a subject if it did n o t transcend" (GA 26, §11, 210-11). It might be a r g u e d that Heidegger h e r e is purely in want of an a d e q u a t e term. Indeed, we d o n o t deny that Heidegger wishes to reconfigure a n d destruct what the tradition aimed at in its talk of 'subjectivity'. However, this is possible only as a qualified defense of idealism: unlike materialism, idealism at least opens u p the question of a constitutive a priori, i.e., a transcendental dimension within which o u r e n c o u n t e r with beings always already transpires. T h a t is why the world is ' m o r e ' subjective t h a n objective (cf. chapter 3, §49ff.). T h e p r o b l e m remains, however, that for H e i d e g g e r this reconfiguration is possible only in r e n d e r i n g the significance of the world meaningless. 47. This is an expression Paul Ricoeur employs to describe Levi-Strauss's structuralist approach. Levi-Strauss 1963, 633. 48. H e r e we a r e alluding to the phrase Heidegger coins in relation to Husserl w h e n he praises Husserl for "rescuing the object." Cf. Zdhringer Seminare, 382 / 120, a n d the introduction to chapter 2 in this volume. 49. SuZ, §69, 351, emphasis added, translation slightly altered. 50. "But in general the 'whither' to which the totality of places for a context of e q u i p m e n t gets allotted, is the underlying condition which makes possible the belonging-somewhere of an equipmental totality as something that can b e placed. This 'whither,' which makes it possible for e q u i p m e n t to belong somewhere, and which we circumspectively keep in view a h e a d of us in o u r concernful dealings, we call the 'region" (SuZ, §22, 103).

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5 1 . T h e significance of Dasein's locality is discussed in c h a p t e r 5, especially u n d e r "The Primacy of the World." 52. "Dasein's openness to the world" (SuZ, §29, 137); "This discovery of regions b e f o r e h a n d is co-determined [mitbestimmt] by the totality of involvem e n t s for which the ready-to-hand, as something e n c o u n t e r e d , is freed" (SuZ, §22,104). 5 3 . It is i m p o r t a n t to n o t e the inverted commas, for the aim is n o t to privilege the 'soul', 'subject', ' m i n d ' , 'ego, or ' p e r s o n ' . 54. It is only once, namely in §24 of SuZ, that H e i d e g g e r comes close to considering the a n t e r i o r structure of space. 55. T o follow Poggeler: "Although Heidegger goes beyond Becker's phenomenological investigation o n geometry by affirming a primordial experienced and 'lived' spatiality, h e still wishes to refer spatiality back to temporality, even though differently from Kant" (Poggeler 1983,179). This leads Edward Casey to claim: "Not only does Dasein not break into space from temporality, b u t the very terms of Heidegger's argument suggest that spatiality is prior to the fallen temporality with which every Dasein is beleaguered" (Casey 1990, 72). 56. We recall: that in the face of which Dasein has anxiety is Being-possible. Cf. §70, above. 57. For H e l d t h e r e is n o question a b o u t it: "Just as in Husserl's objecto r i e n t e d intentional consciousness the will to evidence is operative, so Dasein, in t h e freedom of its existence, gives vent to a militant will which, as its 'for-thesake-of-which,' gives the world in advance as the field of play for this freedom. With this idea H e i d e g g e r forces the sovereignty of the will a n d the m o d e r n voluntaristic world-relation to its e x t r e m e a n d outbids even Husserl's imman e n t a l theory of world constitution. T h e world is now fully integrated u n d e r the sway of the will" (Held 1992b, 313). For H e l d it is only after the iKehre\ w h e n concealment b e c o m e s a constitutive positive a priori of the world, that H e i d e g g e r manages to overcome this subjectivism. For it is t h e n that the world in its constant concealment is n o longer available (verfilgbar) to Dasein. 58. Cf. i n t r o d u c t i o n to chapter 2. 59. SuZ, §11, 52: "Ein Konstitutivum des Daseins." 60. SuZ, §43a, 202. Cf. SuZ, §43, 206. 6 1 . Heidegger thereby does not reject outright theological concerns. Rather, h e believes that the question of the "divine" can 'in principle' b e raised o n the basis of the clarification of issues in fundamental ontology. T h u s , there is a m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e way of grasping 'eternity' from the standp o i n t of the finite. 62. We h e r e a d h e r e to Ernst Cassirer's observations. Reviewing Heidegg e r ' s Kantbuch h e shows that Heidegger constantly brackets the significance of reason in his r e a d i n g of the KRV by r e d u c i n g everything to the unifying function of the transcendental imagination (i.e., temporality). Against this Cassirer argues: "Nowhere does Kant present such a ' m o n i s m ' of the imagination, r a t h e r h e insists o n a deliberate a n d radical dualism, the dualism between the sensible a n d the intelligible world. Kant's p r o b l e m is n o t that of 'Being' a n d ' T i m e ' b u t the p r o b l e m o f ' B e i n g ' a n d ' O u g h t , ' o f ' E x p e r i e n c e ' a n d 'Idea'" (Cassirer 1931, 16).

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63. Cf. H u a XVI, §38, 134. I n d e e d it is an inauthentic (uneigentliche) app e a r a n c e (cf. ibid., §22, 74). 64. Cf. H u a XVI, §19, 26 8c 28-30. 65. Cf. Idem I, §143 and chapter 1, §12ff. 66. Cf. Idem I, §52,129 / 102. 67. "The life which effects world-validity in natural world-life does n o t p e r m i t of being studied from within the attitude of natural world-life" (Krisis, §39, 151;148E). 68. "In the first place transcendental subjectivity is for itself absolutely anonymous' ( H u a VIII, a p p e n d i x XVIII, 417). 69. Idem I, §70,163 / 132, translation slightly altered. This drawn analogy is, however, n o t quite accurate, for Husserl refers to the notion of 'fiction' only when he introduces the eidetic r e d u c t i o n — n o t the transcendental reduction. 70. As Husserl adds in a footnote to the passage above: "A sentence which should be as a quotation perfectly suited to ridiculing eidetic knowledge from a naturalistic perspective" (Ideen I, §70, 163 / 132 n. 1, translation slightly altered) . 71. As Franck observes, Husserl discloses " that reason is an essential a n d universal structure of transcendental subjectivity" (Franck 1981, 56). 72. H u a VIII, additional texts, A, 197. 73. Cf. chapter 2, especially §28 a n d "The Enigma of the Consciousness of T i m e " a n d "The Vigilance of the Subject." 74. Krisis, a p p e n d i x X to §21 ff., 429. Cf. B r o e k m a n 1963, 136-87. 75. I n d e e d Fink notes that: "Husserl always d e p l o r e d the fact that the expression 'archaeology' so a p p r o p r i a t e to the essence of philosophy should already have b e e n taken u p by a positive science" (Fink 1966, 246). 76. H u a VIII, a p p e n d i x XVIII, 416. 77. "De la description a l'existence" in D E H H , 97. 78. As D e r r i d a observes: "Theoretical consciousness is nothing other, in itself a n d thoroughly u n d e r s t o o d , than a practical consciousness, the consciousness of an infinite task a n d the site of absolute value for itself a n d for humanity as rational subjectivity. . . . T h e unity of Reason in all its usages would manifest itself fuWy for Husserl in the theoretical project (rather than in the practical function, as would be the case for Kant)" (Derrida 1978,136 n. 162). 79. "Nachwort" in Ideen III, 139 / 550. 80. H u a VIII, additional texts, A, 197-98. 81. C f . B e r n e t 1979, 131. 82. H u a VIII, additional texts, A, 196. 83. H u a VIII, additional texts, A, 202. 84. I n d e e d it is at this stage that parallels between Husserl a n d structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers c o m e to l i g h t For once we bracket Husserl's ideal of philosophy as a rigorous science, we can r e p h r a s e this by arguing t h e r e is always already an overproduction of m e a n i n g / s e n s e — w h a t Deleuze calls a virtual reality—that can never be m a d e actual (cf. Deleuze 1973, 3 2 5 26 and Levi-Strauss 1950, floating signifiers). 85. Cf. "De la description a l'existence" in D E H H , 96.

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86. As he states in his 1929/30 lectures: "For God does not philosophise, if indeed (as the name already says) philosophy, this love of... as homesickness for . . . , must maintain itself in nothingness, in finitude" (GA 29 / 30, §6, 28). 87. Cf. SuZ, §§59 & 60. 88. SuZ, §76, 396: "'Monumentalen' Moglichkeiten menschlicher Existenz." 89. Cf. SuZ, §62, 310. 90. This is in contrast to Gunther Figal's reading, which argues that the claim that Dasein needs to chose one's hero "is nonetheless not very convincing. The choice of a hero after all betokens the wish to be like an other Dasein and with this one remains caught up in the structure of the 'They'" (Figal 1988, 322). Indeed, Bernasconi (1990) has beautifully illustrated how the call of conscience is linked to Being-towards-death through his reading of Tolstoy's The Death of Ivan Ilyich. Bernasconi convincingly shows that Heidegger cannot avoid existential commitments, though his analysis serves to protect the reduction of the formal existential analysis to the existentiell level. Cf. conclusion to chapter 3, n. 108. 91. Like Husserl, Heidegger emphasizes that this primordial possibility to which Dasein returns is representative of the community as a whole: "Its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny [ Geschick]. This is how we designate the historizing of the community, of a people" (SuZ, §74, 384). For destiny is to struggle for authenticity; it is a factical ideal that is not only Dasein's ideal but the ideal of the people (Volk). It is the repetition of facing the destiny by which Dasein understands itself as Being-with-others, a return to the fate of resolutely grasping Being-in-the-world as Being-possible. It is a destiny of the people, insofar as the forgetting of Being, and thus the forgetting and fleeing from our ownmost potentiality of Being, is our philosophical heritage. This heritage cannot be undone but only destructed—by undoing the forgetting without 'forgetting' the path that has led to this undoing. It is our fate that we are always already guilty and thus need to 'return' to authenticity, which is nothing other than Dasein's thrown-projection. Cf. SuZ, §58. CHAPTER 5 1. "Einleitung zu Was ist MetaphysikV in Wegmarken, 206 / 377 (in GA 9 only), footnote added to the fifth 1949 edition; Heidegger 1975a. Cf. ZSD, 15-16; 14-15E. 2. Cf. "Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" in Holzwege; BW, 139-212. 3. Kunst und Raum, 210; 8E. In this manner Heidegger fails to realize that the lived body is the common root of thought and intuition. And it is to that analysis that we wish to return through Husserl. The aim is thus to remain at the limits of SuZ, rather than turning to Heidegger's later accounts of the world—to put it another way, we wish to retrieve the world within the phenomenological project. 4. Cf. "Brief iiber den Humanismus," 1946, in Wegmarken; BW, 213-65.

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5. F r o m the GA 20 we know that H e i d e g g e r h a d the m a n u s c r i p t of Ideen his desk in 1925. Cf. GA 20, §13,167. 6. "[NJamely, that the surface which encloses the o n e c a n n o t possibly enclose the o t h e r " (AKII, 384). 7. As Michael F r i e d m a n (1992) observes, "he is n o t endorsing a Newtonian conception of the a u t o n o m o u s reality of 'absolute space.' This is clear from the passage (cf. AKII, 378) where Kant deliberately refrains from endorsing the Newtonian conception—adopted by Euler—of absolute motion' (p. 29). 8. Cf. A K I I , 385-419. 9. S. Glockner has coined this expression leibhaflige Anschauung. Cited by Kaulbach (1960), 134. 10. For Heidegger, Being-in-the-world makes possible the p h e n o m e n o n of orientation. Cf. chapter 3, §51ff., a n d G A 2 0 , §25b, 320-22. 11. SuZ, §23, 109. Cf. GA 20, §25b, 320-23 a n d chapter 3, §51. 12. Cf. a p p e n d i x to chapter 3, §5ff., a n d chapter 4, §70ff. 13. However, Kant's position is n o t as clear-cut as K a u l b a c h m a k e s it a p p e a r . While Kant treats time in the Transcendental Aesthetic as the formal a priori c o n d i t i o n of all a p p e a r a n c e s whatsoever — that is, a p p e a r a n c e s in time a n d space —and space as the a priori c o n d i t i o n only of o u t e r a p p e a r a n c e s (cf. KRV, A34 / B50), this relation is reversed in the Refutation of Idealism, in which he claims that self-knowledge (of my existence in time) presupposes knowledge of the existence of objects outside us (outer sense). Cf. KRV, B275ff. 14. This phrase alludes to Kant, who, according to Merleau-Ponty, calls the h a n d an "outer brain of m a n " (un "cerveau exterieur de rhomme"; MerleauPonty 1962, 316). As we have shown above, the true source of this insight, however, is n o t Kant b u t Aristotle, who says: "The soul, as it were, acts like a h a n d " (Aristotle 1957, 432a, translation slightly altered). Cf. chapter 3, §67 n. 105. 15. Husserl does n o t refer to this text in Ideen II. 16. This is analogous to Kant's presentation in the KRV. Kant distinguishes between the dynamic principles of substance (intensive magnitudes) a n d causality. Cf. 'Axioms of Intuition.' 17. Cf. chapter 2, §14ff. 18. Husserl introduces the t e r m phantom for visual a n d spatial forms in §10 of Ideen II 19. Husserl 1981b, 324; 239E. 20. I move my eye (occulatory kinaesthetic), I position the imagined obj e c t in relation to my reallived body. "In phantasy, I d o look at the centaur; i.e., my eye, freely moved, goes back a n d forth, a c c o m m o d a t i n g itself in this or that way, a n d the visual 'appearances,' the schemata, succeed o n e a n o t h e r in motivated ' a p p r o p r i a t e ' o r d e r , whereby they p r o d u c e the consciousness of an e x p e r i e n c e of an existing centaur-object viewed in various ways" (Ideen II, §18a, 5 6 - 5 7 ) . 21. Cf. Ideen II, §49e, 181-85. 22. "The pure Ego must be able to accompany all my representations" (Ideen II, §26,108). 23. Ideen II, §18c, 75: "Es h a n g t von d e m Leib u n d von d e m Eigenen d e r Psyche ab, was das Subjekt als Welt sich gegeniiber hat." lion

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24. Ludwig L a n d g r e b e has shown that Husserl fails to develop the essential insight he developed in the second section of Ideen / / b e c a u s e h e wishes to u p h o l d the primacy of a theoretical constituting consciousness. Cf. Landg r e b e 1981c. Cf. Claesges (1964), who develops L a n d g r e b e ' s claims. 25. Cf. chapter 2 u n d e r "The Problem of 'Sensuous HyleT 26. "Obviously, it c a n n o t b e said that I see my eye in the m i r r o r , for my eye, that which sees qua seeing, I d o n o t perceive" (Ideen II, §37, 148 n. 1). 27. Wittgenstein 1 9 6 3 , 1 1 6 - 1 7 , 5.633. 28. "But neither lived body nor soul thereby acquire 'nature-properties': in the sense of logico-mathematical n a t u r e " (Ideen II, §32, 132). 29. Cf. chapter 2 u n d e r "The Problem of 'Sensuous Hyle,'" §25ff. 30. W h e n I touch an object, I feel not only the object b u t also the movem e n t of my h a n d touching the object. T h a t is to say I have a kinaesthetic tactile sensation. Cf. Ideen II, §36. 3 1 . Cf. Merleau-Ponty 1962, 93. Merleau-Ponty therefore calls the lived body "a third genus of being" (ibid., 350) a n d argues that "1 know myself only in ambiguity" (ibid., 345). 32. In a beautifully written article on Ideen II, Merleau-Ponty illustrates how this ambiguous m o d e of existence, for example, shaking hands, makes intersubjectivity possible. "My right h a n d was p r e s e n t at the advent of my left h a n d ' s active sense of touch. It is in n o different fashion that the o t h e r ' s body c o m e s to life before m e when I shake a n o t h e r m a n ' s h a n d or when I j u s t look at it" (Merleau-Ponty 1964,168, translation slightly altered). Prior to analogical reasoning, the otherhody arises out of inter-corporeity. T h e copresence of the two hands, which are b o t h felt (sentir) and feeling (sentanf),is e x t e n d e d to the o t h e r person. T h e r e is an aesthesiological c o m m u n i t y which founds intersubjectivity a n d n o t reason, analogy, or indeed communication. 3 3 . T o follow Claesges (1964): "It is only by reflecting u p o n e m b o d i e d consciousness that we realize that hyle as such is possible only as sensation" (p. 134). 34. Cf. H u a XVI, § 4 6 , 1 6 1 . 35. This insight p r e e m p t s the Fifth Meditation in CM, in which Husserl realizes that a second r e d u c t i o n is necessary. It is possible that Ideen II rem a i n e d unpublished because Husserl h a d not yet gained this insight. As Alfred Schiitz notes: "In 1934 Husserl told the p r e s e n t writer (i.e., Schiitz) that he left the second volume of the / ^ ^ u n p u b l i s h e d , because h e h a d n o t at that time f o u n d a satisfactory solution for the p r o b l e m of intersubjectivity which h e believed to have b e e n achieved in the V. Cartesian Meditation" (Schutz 1 9 5 2 / 3 , 395-96). It is necessary to bracket not only the world of things, b u t also the idea that t h e r e is a n intersubjective world, i.e., a world that can b e perceived from a viewpoint that is different from m i n e . For it is only in this mann e r that the question can be raised of how an intersubjective world can c o m e about. T h e question requires that I bracket the animal n a t u r e a n d thus reg a r d spiritual or living beings purely as things, objective bodies (Kbrper) that n o l o n g e r play a constitutive role (cf. Fifth Meditation in CM). T h e Fifth Meditation is often m i s u n d e r s t o o d as introducing the ' o t h e r ' into philosophy. However, the fundamental question is n o t 'how d o we know that o t h e r h u m a n

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beings exist?' n o r the question of empathy or appresentation. Rather the question is "How is an objective world possible?"—i.e., a world that is identical for all of us a n d n o t d e p e n d e n t o n my viewpoint. For if something is inter subjective, it is objective. Cf. Schutz 1975, 51-91 and Fink 1970, 368. 36. Cf. Ideenll, §42c, 161. 37. Cf. chapter 2 u n d e r "The Enigma of the Consciousness of T i m e " a n d "The Vigilance of the Subject." 38. As Aristotle has already shown, what defines life ((pvaiq) is that all things move or change or c o m e a n d go. 39. Cf. §42 a n d §43 above. 40. Claesges has coined the t e r m transzendentaler Sensualismus (Claesges 1964,131). 4 1 . Cited by L a n d g r e b e (1974), 478G; 61E, translation slighdy altered: "Die E n t d e c k u n g des m e i n geht d e r Entdeckung des Ich voran." 42. Cf. §86 above. 43. A K 5 , 269; Kant (1987). 44. Ibid., A116 / B117, o u r translation: "Erregte Bewegung." 45. "[A] 11 representations, whether they have for their objects outer things or not, belong, in themselves, as determinations of the mind, to o u r inn e r state" (KRV A34 / B50). 46. OpusPostumum, AK22, 364. 47. Opus Postumum, AK 22, "Zehntes Convolut," 332. Cited by Kaulbach (1960), 136. 48. Kaulbach pursues this line of t h o u g h t in Kant in the most intriguing m a n n e r . H e shows that Kant ' r e t u r n s ' to the idea of an e m b o d i e d intuition in the Kntik der Urteilskrafi and the Opus Postumum. This leads Kaulbach to the conclusion: "Fruitful t h o u g h Heidegger's insight might have b e e n in g r o u n d i n g transcendental philosophy o n temporality, it was also one-sided: Movement is m o r e originary a n d makes possible b o t h time and space" (Kaulbach 1960, 152). Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Book IV. It is i m p o r t a n t to note that in the KRV Kant refuses to provide a transcendental d e d u c t i o n of movement. T h e r e he states: "Transcendental aesthetic cannot contain m o r e than these two elements, space a n d time. This is evident from the fact that all other concepts belonging to sensibility, even that of motion, in which b o t h elements are united, p r e s u p p o s e something empirical" (KRV, A42 / B58, emphasis a d d e d ) . 49. T o follow Casey, the lived body "is the ' c o m m o n , b u t to us u n k n o w n r o o t ' of all that comes to b e classified in rigidly stratified ways in m o d e r n Weste r n thought" (1993, 50). Ludwig L a n d g r e b e also alludes to this analogy (1954,202-3). 50. Cf. KRV, "First Analogy," A184 / B227. 51. KRV, B275. Cf. B XXXIX. 52. This has b e e n shown well by Kriiger (1950, 884ff.) and Allison (1983, 258-59). It is Vogel who does n o t accept this line of interpretation, arguing that inner sense has its own p u r e manifold (1993, 8 7 8 - 8 1 ) . T h e a r g u m e n t that Vogel provides, however, indicates a conflation of what Kant calls 'inner sense' a n d ' T i m e ' a n d 'subjectivity'. For Vogel it is deeply problematic "to see why the self, unlike outer things, has to be r e p r e s e n t e d (if we can talk that

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way) as a bare substratum rather than a fully-fledged object" (ibid., 881). H e r e Vogel conflates the substratum of the self with the self that can be known in time. We n e e d to distinguish between time that determines my empirical b e i n g {ich bin in der Zeit [I am in time]), and the temporal relation to myself (die Zeit in mir [the time in m e ] ) , which has its own sense of p e r m a n e n c e . T h e latter refers to a p e r m a n e n c e "as substratum (as p e r m a n e n t form of inner intuition) " (KRV, B224). This is well illustrated by Miiller-Lauter (1964, 74-78). 53. We are referring to inner sense in the narrower sense, i.e., to consciousness of ourselves in time. 54. Curiously we are h e r e repeating Kant's second analogy: alterations are governed by the law of the connection of cause and effect. Every event has a cause; that is to say, every event takes place in a temporal order. Every event is m e a s u r e d over against a c o m m o n ground, which is an absolute temporal horizon. As Husserl observes: "The constitution of myself in time and the o t h e r in time is tied u p essentially with the constitution of a world a n d a world time." 55. Chapter 2, §40, and Husserl, MS C7 II, 12 (1932), cited by H e l d (1966,70). 56. We do n o t wish thereby to u n d e r m i n e Dasein's distinctiveness over and against beings of other character than its own. Cf. chapter 3, §45, esp. n. 17. 57. GA 20, §13, 168. Simon Critchley, drawing o n the same citations, observes: "The point at issue h e r e is that Heidegger's critique of the Cartesian Husserl is necessarily based u p o n a partial reading of the Husserlian text a n d p r e m i s e d u p o n an oversimplification of the extremely rich and complex history of subjectivity between Descartes and Husserl" (Critchley 1996, 17).

APPENDIX 1. T u g e n d h a t 1986, 166, emphasis added. 2. T u g e n d h a t 1986, 166, emphasis added. 3. Lafont, 1994, 99. She h e r e refers explicitly to Apel. 4. Indeed, Lafont cites a passage from Heidegger's earlier work in which this link between discourse, disclosure, a n d truth is clearly expressed: "The achievement of discourse is to r e n d e r something accessible, as openly there As such Xoyoq has the privileged potentiality for aXr\6evew... making available, openly t h e r e as unconcealed that which was formerly concealed, covered over" (Lafont 1994, 96; cf. G A 6 3 , 11). 5. This claim is r e p e a t e d in SuZ: "To significations, words accrue. But word-Things d o n o t get supplied with significations" (SuZ, §34, 161). 6. Wittgenstein 1958, §43. Or: "Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? —In use it is alive'' (ibid., §432). 7. Cf. chapter 3, §58 a n d §62. 8. Ibid. 9. "For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday' (Wittgenstein 1958, §38). 10. SuZ, §69b, 361-62, emphasis added.

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11. Macquarrie a n d Robinson translate it as "change-over." 12- " [ T ] h e p h e n o m e n o n of w o r l d h o o d . . . gets passed over''' (SuZ, §14, 65). 13. Apel 1976a, 39 n. 56. 14. It is doubtful, however, whether this reading helps us to disclose a radical d e p a r t u r e from Husserl. For as we have shown in chapter 1, the transcendental reduction does n o t lead to a 'loss' of the world, n o r is the existence of the world negated; rather, the world remains as an intentional interpretative horizon. After the reduction, the world remains qua cogitatum, which is given p r i o r to a n y j u d g m e n t or positing. This horizon is, however, nothing b u t a horizon of meaning, indeed, Husserl himself refers to it as a "pre-predicative experience of the world" (EU, §9, 37), a general intuition that accompanies any particular constitution of an object. Thus, it appears that the r e t u r n to language is equally implicit in Husserl's texts. 15. This is, however, specific to SuZ. Heidegger will soon consider language and Being as co-original. Cf. Lafont 1994, second part. 16. As Lafont points out, Rede can be c o m p a r e d with Humboldt's concept of process or energeia, or Saussure's parole, whereas Sprache is synonymous with what H u m b o l d t calls system (ergon) and Saussure (langue) (cf Lafont 1994,95). 17. T h e aim is to avoid Burner's (and implicidy Husserl's) view of language. Buhler views language as having merely a representative function (Darstellungsfunktion); Husserl claims that m e a n i n g is intentional. 18. For a summary of these three issues see Lafont (1994, 135). Not only is H e i d e g g e r ' s conception of language still strongly u n d e r the influence of Husserl, but, because of a misreading of H u m b o l d t , H e i d e g g e r believes that language is always r e a d as a m e d i u m and tool. This leads h i m to differentiate between Rede (discourse or address) a n d Sprache (language), a differentiation that Lafont believes to fall short, since in SuZ there is a kind of indecision about the function of language. O n the o n e h a n d , Heidegger argues that Rede is the existential of language: "The existential-ontologicalfoundation of language is discourse or talk " (SuZ, §34,160). Indeed, in GA 20 Heidegger emphasizes that Rede allows for the pre-predicative disclosure of the world. Heidegger illustrates this by employing Husserl's term Apprasentation: "Making manifest t h r o u g h discourse first and foremost has the sense of interpretive appresentation of the environment u n d e r concern; to begin with, it is n o t at all tailored to knowledge, research, theoretical propositions, and propositional context" (GA 20, §28d, 361). ( O n Heidegger's adoption of Husserl's t e r m Apprasentation, see Kisiel 1983, esp. 199-206). O n the other hand, Heidegger gives an ontological interpretation of language. Suddenly it is n o t only an innerworldly p h e n o m e n o n , but: "Our Interpretation of language has b e e n designed merely to point o u t the ontological 'locus' of this p h e n o m e n o n in Dasein's state of Being" (SuZ, §34, 166; cited by Lafont 1994,107). 19. T o avoid any misinterpretations Heidegger later argues: "We speak a n d speak about language. What we speak of, language, is always ahead of us" ("Das Wesen d e r Sprache," 1957-58, in UzS, 179; OWL, 75E). 20. SuZ, §34, 161: "Als innerweldich Seiendes wie ein Z u h a n d e n e s vorfindlich."

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2 1 . This is well illustrated by Lafont, o n whose analysis we shall draw. See especially Lafont 1994, §1.4.3, "Sprache u n d Rede," 94-116. 22. SuZ, § 3 4 , 1 6 1 , emphasis added. Cf. GA 20, §28, 364. 23. SuZ, " R a n d b e m e r k u n g e n , " 442, 87c. 24. Indeed, as Cassirer has shown, H u m b o l d t ' s account of language is essentially Kantian. Language, like the categories of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g in KRV, does n o t represent an outside world. Rather it forms the objective world. N o t only this, but language discloses our original unity with the world (and p e o p l e ) . Language discloses objectivity in its subjective acts. Language is thus n o t the tool of an individual b u t r e t u r n s us to an original unity that has m a d e possible u n d e r s t a n d i n g in the first place: "We must free ourselves completely from the idea that it can be separated from what it designates, as for e x a m p l e t h e n a m e of a m a n from his person, a n d that like a conventional cipher it is a p r o d u c t of reflection a n d a g r e e m e n t o r in any sense the work of m a n . . . n o t to say the work of the individual For striving d e e p within him after that unity a n d totality, m a n seeks to surpass the barriers of his individuality T h e individual, wherever, whenever a n d however h e lives, is a fragment b r o k e n off from his whole race, a n d language demonstrates a n d sustains this eternal b o n d which governs the destinies of the individual a n d the history of the world" (Wilhelm F r e i h e r r von H u m b o l d t , "Uber die Verschiedenheiten des menschlichen Sprachbaues," cited by Cassirer [1953, 156-57]). 25. Lafont (1994), 107. In a footnote H e i d e g g e r refers explicitly to Husserl (ibid.). 26. T h e everyday, which o u r analysis has hardly m e n t i o n e d , is i n d e e d characterized in terms of a breathlessness a n d fluidity, where Dasein is never itself, b u t is always already defined by the 'They' (das Man). T e r m s such as averageness (Durchschnittlichkeit; SuZ, §27, 127), publicness (Offentlichkeit; ibid.), not tarrying along (Unvenveilen; SuZ, §36, 172), distraction (Zerstreuung; ibid.), idle talk (Gerede; SuZ, §35, 167), a n d ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit; SuZ, §37, 173) a r e chosen to describe this m o m e n t of lack of selfhood. O n the notions of 'selfhood' a n d 'authenticity', see chapter 4, §70 a n d §75. 27. Levinas 1989, 123. 28. Levinas praises SuZ for its anti-intellectualistic stance, which comes to light in its account of the everyday, in which H e i d e g g e r argues that o u r responsibility exceeds the r e a l m of intentionality. We c o m m i t ourselves to life a n d this committal easily turns into comedy, a n d this comedy can t u r n easily into tragedy. "The c o m e d y begins with the simplest of o u r movements, carrying with t h e m every inevitable awkwardness. In putting out my h a n d to app r o a c h a chair, I have creased the sleeve of my jacket, I have scratched the floor, I have d r o p p e d ash from my cigarette. In d o i n g that which I wanted to do, I have d o n e so m a n y things that I did not want to d o . T h e act has n o t b e e n p u r e for I have left traces, in wiping o u t these traces, I have left o t h e r s . . . . W h e n the awkwardness of the act turns against the goal p u r s u e d , we a r e at the h e i g h t of tragedy" (Levinas 1989, 122-23). 29. It is curious to see that Apel makes a similar move. H e too wishes to safeguard this constitutive m o m e n t by drawing analogies to what Wittgenstein calls ' d e p t h g r a m m a r ' . Apel advocates a symbolic a priori that could form the

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basis for a regulative principle in the Kantian sense, which makes possible any form of communication: "The factical existing multifarious a n d inconsistent language-games which are 'interwoven' with equally multifarious, inconsistent forms of life c a n n o t be assigned to the criterial context for the following of a rule as postulated by Wittgenstein. It is rather the 'transcendental' language-game which is p r e s u p p o s e d in all of t h e m as the condition of the possibility a n d validity for communication" (Apel 1976b, 162-3). T h e significant m o m e n t for Apel is that Wittgenstein still holds o n to a notion of a depth-grammar, "lTiefengrammatik" (Wittgenstein 1958, §664), which, like Heidegger's notion of the w o r l d h o o d of the world, allows for different language-games, namely, the e n c o u n t e r of beings in the world and i n d e e d differe n t 'worlds'. It is i m p o r t a n t to note that Wittgenstein does n o t purely affirm the multiplicity of language-games b u t searches for what h e calls a primitive form of language-game that could explain m o r e complicated forms. "If we want to study the p r o b l e m s of t r u t h a n d falsehood, of the a g r e e m e n t a n d disagreem e n t of propositions with reality, of the n a t u r e of assertion, assumption, and question, we shall with great advantage look at primitive forms of language in which these forms of thinking appear. . . . We see that we can build u p the complicated forms from the primitive ones by gradually adding new forms" (Wittgenstein 1969,17). Furthermore, Wittgenstein believes that these primitive forms of language are based on certainty: "The primitive form of the languageg a m e is certainty, n o t uncertainty. For uncertainty could never lead to action" (Wittgenstein 1976,404 / 420E). T h a t is to say, "Somewhere I must begin with not-doubting; and that is not, so to speak, hasty b u t excusable: it is p a r t of j u d g i n g " (Wittgenstein 1975, §150). What is of i m p o r t a n c e for Apel is that this d e p t h - g r a m m a r points to a quasi-transcendental apriorim the Kantian sense: "It is noteworthy that we are dealing h e r e with the linguistic analytical, that is the h e r m e n e u t i c transformation of the problematic of Kant's transcendental philosophy." (Apel 1976a, 327). For Apel, H e i d e g g e r a n d Wittgenstein are vehicles for the articulation of a quasi-transcendental regulative principle that allows n o t only for "providing in principle for the possibility of universal c o m m u n i c a t i o n . . . it [i.e., universal communication] first acquires its significance u n d e r the condition that this possibility be progressively realized. This, however, means that [linguistic analysts, hermeneuticists, and interpreters] must be able to p r e s u p p o s e the idea of universal communication as a regulative principle in the Kantian sense" (Apel 1976b, 162). This move appears justified insofar as Heidegger's search for a fundamental ontology leads him to "inquire into the basic forms in which it is possible to articulate anything u n d e r s t a n d a b l e " (SuZ, §34,166). Cf. GA 20, §28. Thus, the w o r l d h o o d of the world could be r e a d as the regulative principle that allows for a n d makes possible, to use the Kantian expression, 'the condition of possibility' of any form of communication. 30. Cf. Cassirer 1953, chapter 3, 149-69. 31. As we shall show later, SuZ's spatiality is a secondary p h e n o m e n o n to its temporality, as the tide of §70 indicates: "The Temporality of the Spatiality T h a t Is Characteristic of Dasein." Cf. chapter 4, §79. 32. In the lectures on Leibniz h e calls this "transcendental dissemination"

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(transzendentale Zerstreuung); it is nothing but Dasein's thrownness (GA 26, §10,173-74). 33. GA 4, "Holderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung," 35; 38. Also cited by Franck (1986, 52), and Lafont (1994, 122f.). 34. "Zeit und Sein" in ZSD, 24; 23E. 35. The essence of language will indeed be a moment of pointing: "What unfolds essentially in language is saying as pointing. Its showing does not culminate in a system of signs. Rather, all signs arise from a showing in whose realm and for whose purposes they can be signs" ("Der Weg zur Sprache," 1959, in UzS, 254; OWL 410).

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SUBJECT INDEX

absolute consciousness, 54-5 affectivity, 42, 89-90, 152, 153,155, 157, 159 animals, 75, 200 n. 17 anxiety, 110-1 'apophantic as', 93, 98, 103 atomism, 33-4, 36-7 authenticity, 103, 110, 139-40

Being versus beings, 75-6, 200 n. 16, 201 n.23 question of, xxv, 14, 15, 19-21, 72, 75-6, 77, 110, 186 n. 44, 188 n . l 7 , 2 0 0 n . l 6 , 201 n.20 Bewandtnis, 100-1, 104-6 body, 83, 87, 90, 111, 124, 142, 144, 146,147-9, 163-5, 220 n.32 lived body [Leib], 148-61, 163, 218 n.3,219n.20, 220nn.28,31,221 n.49 objective body [Korper], 150, 152, 164, 220 n. 35 see also embodiment bracketing, xxv, xxvii, 15, 16, 18, 25-6, 138, 155 Cartesianism, 3-4, 19, 22, 23-4, 32-3, 120 see also Descartes categorial object, 11, 184 n. 24 see also categorial intuition circumspection, 93, 97-8, 99, 101, 114, 170 circumvention, 93-6, 99, 101-2 consciousness, xxvi, xxvii, 3, 6-7, 16-7, 23-4, 27-30, 47-8, 54-5, 56-62, 67-70, 72-3, 134-6, 149, 151-2, 156-7, 160, 163-4

constitution, 5-6, 67-8, 74, 76-7, 94, 107-8,115,153-4,182n.8 corpuscularism, 38 Dasein, xxv, xxvi-xxvii, 14, 20, 22-3, 72-131 passim, 138-40, 141-51 passim, 158, 160, 163-5,169, 171, 172-80 passim, 200-18 passim, 223 n. 18 denned 73-9 Ego (pure T ) , xxvii, 55, 56, 58, 62, 67, 73,75,79,83,85,87,107-9,118, 149,150, 156,167,171,187 n. 4, 199nn.3, 7,202 n.26, 211 n.9, 216n.53, 219n.22 empirical ego, 6 Ego-pole, 118-21, 149, 152, 153, 156, 158, 160, 219 n. 42 embodiment, 78, 87, 89, 111, 124,142, 147, 151, 160, 165 see also body everyday, xxiii, 92-3, 96, 103, 108-10, 117, 177, 205 nn. 56, 59, 208 n . 9 5 , 2 H n . 4 , 213n.28,214 n.33,224nn.26,28 evidence, 8-10, 16, 18, 33, 37, 53, 183 n.17, 189n.22, 216n.57 external ism, xxv, 3 fallenness, 102-3, 208 n.95, 213 n.24 flowing phenomena [Ablaufsphdnomene], 33, 52, 62, 190 n.26 Gemiit, 159 'hermeneutic as', 93-4, 98, 103 idealism, 2, 74, 161-2, 200 n. 16

238

SUBJECT INDEX

immanence, 24-5, 52, 68,123,124,139 and transcendence, 26, 28, 29-32, 36-8, 53-4, 64, 79,108-10, 112, 122,126-7,129, 131, 138,149 see also transcendence intention, 10,11,12,18, 32, 48-9,191 n.38, 195 n. 72 empty intention, 9, 31, 36, 117, 183 n.16 fulfilled intention, 12, 32 meaning-intention, 8-9, 12, 183 n. 17, 184 n. 22 unfulfilled intention, 49,183 n. 17 intentionality, xxv, 9-10, 35, 108 longitudinal [Langsintentionalitdt], 50,59, 61,62, 70,179 n.93 intentional morphe, 38 see also matter versus form intentional object, 5, 40, 182 n.5, 188 n.ll internalism, xxiv-xxv, 3, 5 intuition, 11-2, 16, 5 0 - 1 , 116, 133-4 categorial intuition, 11-2, 184-5 n.27 sensible intuition, 11, 42-3, 144, 184n.21 Kehre (Turning), 141, 180, 210 kinaesthesia, 2, 154-5, 158, 159-60, 163 language [Sprache], xx, 5-6,64,75,142, 167-80,183 n. 10, 200-1 n. 18, 201 n. 19, 206 n.63, 222 n.9, 223 nn.14, 15,17, 18,19,224n.24, 226 n. 35 language-games, 224-5 n.29 leaps or jumps over [uberspnngen], xxiv, 15,29, 114, 141,142 lived experiences [Erlebnisse], 3, 24, 27, 30-5, 37, 39, 40, 50, 53, 55-56, 59-62,67, 68, 189 n. 19, 191 n.42,192 nn.45,48, 49,195 n.70 material, 42, 43, 96, 118, 155 material extension (versus spiritual extension), 125

material nature, 204 n.51 material world, xxvii, 29, 87, 102, 106,141,142,147,149,165,171 materialism, 158, 215 n.46 materiality, 78, 87-8, 92, 97, 99-104, 106,107,142,147,175 matter, 7, 12, 42, 125, 143, 159, 196 n.77 versus form, 38-40, 43, 44, 153, 184-5 n.27 see also sensuous hyle methodological solipsism, xxv, 3, 4-5 natural attitude, 15-6, 20, 108, 150 neo-Kantianism, 22 noema, 16-7 object that is intended and object as it is intended, 6, 7, 17 objectivity, 5-7, 12-3, 118-9, 157, 187 n. 2, 224 n. 24 ontology versus epistemology, 19-20, 21 passive synthesis, 66 passivity, 153, 155, 157 praxis, 92, 93, 170, 205 n.58 protention, 48-50 receptivity, 11,42-3, 184 n. 21 reference, 7-8 retention, 34-6 sensuous hyle, 38-52, 155, 157 see also matter versus form sign, 12, 41, 102,104, 169, 174-5, 187 n.9, 194n.60, 201 n. 19, 208 n.83, 222 n.6, 226n.35 versus equipment, 98-100, 208 n. 85 versus expression, 182 n.6 skepticism, xx-xxiv, xxv, 15-6, 19, 21 space, 6, 9, 24-5, 29, 37, 55, 62, 66, 7985,101,107,113-7,120,121, 123-6, 142,143-5,146,151-3, 157-65 passim, 178-80, 203 n.39, 216 nn.54, 55, 219 nn.7, 13,221 n.48

SUBJECT INDEX

spatiality, 31, 81-7, 100-2, 114,122-6, 141, 142-6, 151, 158, 165, 17880, 203 n.38, 204 nn.43, 45, 208 n.91,216n.55, 225n.31 spontaneity, 11, 43, 146, 158,159, 163, 184n.21,215n.41 state of affairs, 8-9, 12-3, 183-4 n. 19 synthesis, 12, 17, 34, 38, 54-5, 66, 131, 184-5 n. 27, 190 nn. 33, 34 transcendence, 108-10, 113-4, 125, 130 see also immanence transcendental object, 42-4, 46-7, 64 transcendental reduction, xxv, 14-6, 18,22, 23,29, 30,78,87,90,107, 118, 133, 137, 197 n.85, 212 n.l8,217n.69,223n.l4

239

transcendental subject, 118, 122, 133, 192 n.47, 193-4 n.55, 201 n.23 transcendental subjectivity, 38, 131, 135-6,153,189 n.22,217 nn.68, 71 transcendental turn, xxv, 13-5 transverse intentionality [ Quenntentionalitdt], 59 vorhanden [present-at-hand], 45, 104, 105,117,1234 worldless (subject, ego, or beginning), xxiv, 23, 72, 87,188-9, 111, 123, 129 zuhanden [ready-to-hand], 94-5, 98-9, 101,102, 105, 123,174, 207 n. 75

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