On the pragmatics of social interaction: preliminary studies in the theory of communicative action

On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction

Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (partial listing) T h o m a s McCarthy, g e n e r a l e d i t o r Karl-Otto Apel, Understanding and Explanation: A Transcendental-Pragmatic Perspective Seyla Benhabib a n d Fred Dallmayr, editors, The Communicative Ethics Controversy James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy James Bohman a n d Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, editors, Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal Craig Calhoun, editor, Habermas and the Public Sphere J e a n Cohen a n d Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory Maeve Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics J o h n Forester, editor, Critical Theory and Public Life Jiirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy Jiirgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics Jiirgen Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences Jiirgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory Jiirgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action Jiirgen Habermas, The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate Jiirgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures Jiirgen Habermas, Philosophical-Political Profiles Jiirgen H a b e r m a s , Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays Jiirgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Communication Jiirgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction: Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action Jiirgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society Jiirgen Habermas, editor, Observations on "The Spiritual Situation of the Age " Axel H o n n e t h , The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory Axel H o n n e t h , The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts Axel H o n n e t h a n d Hans Joas, editors, Communicative Action: Essays on Jiirgen Habermas's T h e T h e o r y of Communicative Action Axel H o n n e t h , Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe, and Albrecht Wellmer, editors, Cul­ tural-Political Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment Axel H o n n e t h , T h o m a s McCarthy, Claud Offe, and Albrecht Wellmer, editors, Philo­ sophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment Hans Joas, G. H. Mead: A Contemporary Re-examination of His Thought Cristina Lafont, The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves a n d Seyla Benhabib, editors, Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity: Critical Essays on T h e Philosophical Discourse of Modernity Kirk Pillow, Sublime Understanding: Aesthetic Reflection in Kant and Hegel Albrecht Wellmer, Endgames: The Irreconcilable Nature of Modernity. Essays and Lectures Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics and Postmodernism Rolf Wiggershaus, The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance

On the Pragmatics of Social Interaction Preliminary Studies in the Theory of Communicative Action

Jiirgen Habermas translated by Barbara Fultner

T h e MIT Press

Cambridge, Massachusetts

This translation © 2001 Massachusetts Institute of Technology T h e lectures and essays in this volume a p p e a r e d in G e r m a n in Jiirgen H a b e r m a s , Vorstudien und Ergdnzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, © 1984 S u h r k a m p Verlag, Frankfurt a m Main, Germany. Though substantially revised, the translation of "Reflections o n the Linguistic Foun­ dation of Sociology" is based on Jeremy Shapiro's original translation of the Gauss Lectures as they were delivered at Princeton. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage a n d retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. This book was set in New Baskerville by Wellington Graphics, Westwood, Massa­ chusetts a n d printed a n d b o u n d in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Habermas, Jiirgen [Vorstudien u n d Erganzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. English] O n the pragmatics of social interaction : preliminary studies in the theory of communicative action / J i i r g e n H a b e r m a s ; translated by Barbara Fultner. p. cm. — (Studies in contemporary German social thought) Includes bibliographical references a n d index. ISBN 0-262-08288-8 (alk. paper) 1. Language a n d languages—Philosophy. 2. Communication—Philosophy. 3. Sociolinguistics. 4. Pragmatics. 5. Communicative competence. 6. Social interaction. I. Title. II. Series. P106 .H2513 401—dc21

2000 00-055886

Contents

Translator's I n t r o d u c t i o n Reflections o n the Linguistic Foundation o f Sociology: The Christian Gauss Lecture (Princeton University, February-March 1971)

vii

1

I Objectivist a n d Subjectivist A p p r o a c h e s to T h e o r y F o r m a t i o n in t h e Social Sciences

3

II T h e P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l Constitutive T h e o r y of Society: T h e F u n d a m e n t a l Role of Claims to Validity a n d t h e M o n a d o l o g i c a l F o u n d a t i o n s of Intersubjectivity

23

III F r o m a Constitutive T h e o r y to a C o m m u n i c a t i v e T h e o r y of Society (Sellars a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n ) : C o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d Cognitive Uses of L a n g u a g e

45

IV Universal Pragmatics: Reflections o n a T h e o r y of Communicative Competence

67

V T r u t h a n d Society: T h e Discursive R e d e m p t i o n of Factual Claims to Validity

85

Intentions, Conventions, and Linguistic Interactions (1976)

105

Reflections o n Communicative Pathology (1974)

129

I vi Contents

Notes

171

Index

183

Translator's Introduction

Philosophy in t h e twentieth century, in b o t h its analytic a n d conti­ n e n t a l traditions, h a s b e e n s h a p e d by w h a t has c o m e to be k n o w n as "the linguistic t u r n . " Be it in metaphysics, epistemology, or value t h e ­ ory, p h i l o s o p h y of l a n g u a g e has b e c o m e a keystone of c o n c e p t u a l analysis. Most p r o f o u n d l y p e r h a p s , t h e linguistic t u r n has affected t h e c o n c e p t i o n a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of r e a s o n . It is n o l o n g e r possible t o d a y to d e f e n d t h e universal validity of a t r a n s c e n d e n t , objective reason, n o r can l a n g u a g e be r e g a r d e d any l o n g e r as a n e u t r a l tool at r e a s o n ' s disposal. T h e role of this m o v e m e n t in critical t h e o r y is d u e in large m e a s u r e to the work of J i i r g e n H a b e r m a s . A n d yet, in a n in­ creasingly p o s t m o d e r n era, H a b e r m a s has r e m a i n e d a d e f e n d e r of m o d e r n i t y . W h i l e t h e reason of t h e e n l i g h t e n m e n t h a s c o m e u n d e r g e n e r a l attack, h e c o n t i n u e s to e n d o r s e its e m a n c i p a t o r y p o t e n t i a l , a l b e i t in t h e a l t e r e d f o r m of a "postmetaphysical" r e a s o n t h a t is al­ ways situated in c o n t e x t s of i n t e r a c t i o n . H a b e r m a s locates the r o o t s of rationality in t h e s t r u c t u r e s of everyday c o m m u n i c a t i o n s u c h t h a t t h e critical p o w e r of r e a s o n is i m m a n e n t in o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e f r o m t h e start. T h e a i m of his intersubjectivist a c c o u n t of " c o m m u n i c a t i v e r e a s o n " is to displace b o t h subjectivist a c c o u n t s that cling to Carte­ sian c o n c e p t i o n s of m o n o l o g i c a l selfhood a n d objectivist a c c o u n t s t h a t i g n o r e t h e a g e n t ' s perspective entirely. T h e essays a n d lectures collected in this v o l u m e explain why H a b e r m a s c o n s i d e r s a linguistic t u r n to be necessary, how he t h i n k s it is to b e w o r k e d out, a n d w h a t h e takes its i m p l i c a t i o n s to b e . T h e y

viii Translator's Introduction

address questions c o n c e r n i n g t h e n a t u r e of social i n t e r a c t i o n a n d its c o n n e c t i o n to c o m m u n i c a t i o n , a n d they trace t h e implications for d e v e l o p i n g a n a d e q u a t e social theory. T h e y will b e of i n t e r e s t n o t o n l y t o r e a d e r s w h o have followed H a b e r m a s ' s intellectual develop­ m e n t b u t also to those looking for a n i n t r o d u c t i o n to his t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. M o r e generally, p h i l o s o p h e r s of l a n g u a g e will find in these essays a host of original ideas o n t h e relationship be­ tween l a n g u a g e a n d society. Since its p u b l i c a t i o n in 1 9 8 1 , H a b e r m a s ' s The Theory of Communica­ tive Action h a s been widely acclaimed for its c o n t r i b u t i o n to philoso­ p h y a n d social theory. However, its two v o l u m e s a r e d a u n t i n g , n o t only for r e a s o n s of l e n g t h , b u t owing to t h e b r e a d t h of its subject m a t t e r a n d t h e d e n s e n e s s of its a r g u m e n t a t i o n . T h e essays a n d lec­ t u r e s in t h e p r e s e n t v o l u m e p r o v i d e a less a r d u o u s r o u t e to u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g t h e t h e o r y b e h i n d t h a t larger work. T h e y a r e a partial translation of Vorstudien und Erginzungen zur Theorie des kommuni­ kativen Handelns, which was p u b l i s h e d in 1984 a n d c o n t a i n s not only p r e l i m i n a r y studies l e a d i n g u p to t h e fully d e v e l o p e d t h e o r y of c o m ­ m u n i c a t i v e action, b u t also several essays t h a t c o m p l e m e n t The Theory of Communicative Action in i m p o r t a n t respects. T h e first p a r t of this v o l u m e , "Reflections on t h e Linguistic F o u n d a t i o n of Sociology," f o r m e d t h e text o f t h e Gauss L e c t u r e s t h a t H a b e r m a s delivered at P r i n c e t o n in 1 9 7 1 . T h e s e l e c t u r e s a r e driven by t h e s a m e t h e o r e t i c a l a i m t h a t u n d e r l i e s The Theory of Communicative Action, namely, t h e at­ t e m p t to g r o u n d a t h e o r y of society o n t h e f o u n d a t i o n s of c o m m u n i ­ cative rationality. T h e y p r o v i d e a largely self-contained a c c o u n t of t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l motivations b e h i n d t h e t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action as well as a n e l u c i d a t i o n of its theoretical g r o u n d i n g in w h a t H a b e r m a s called first universal a n d later formal pragmatics. T h e p r e ­ s e n t a t i o n of t h e issues h e r e is m o r e accessible t h a n in The Theory of Communicative Action precisely b e c a u s e H a b e r m a s is o c c u p i e d with laying o u t t h e g e n e r a l p a r a m e t e r s of his project a n d situating it rela­ tive to o t h e r t h e o r i e s of society. Moreover, h e discusses certain issues h e r e , such as "systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n , " t h a t h e has n o t a d d r e s s e d i n t h e s a m e detail again. In short, t h e s e " p r e p a r a t o r y studies" offer i m p o r t a n t aids to u n d e r s t a n d i n g his m a t u r e philoso­ p h y a n d social theory. 1

2

ix . Translator's Introduction

H a b e r m a s ' s interest in t h e t h e o r y of l a n g u a g e a n d m e a n i n g has always b e e n m o t i v a t e d by his w o r k in social theory a n d the theory of action. T h r o u g h o u t his career, he has s o u g h t to i n t e g r a t e p h i l o s o p h y a n d e m p i r i c a l social research, in p a r t i c u l a r to i l l u m i n a t e t h e f o u n d a ­ tions of social theory while r e m a i n i n g faithful to t h e m e t h o d s a n d re­ sults of e m p i r i c a l inquiry. His p r i m a r y c o n c e r n has b e e n with p r o b l e m s of social action a n d action c o o r d i n a t i o n , a n d with t h e use of c o m m u n i c a t i v e r e a s o n as a m e a n s of a d d r e s s i n g such p r o b l e m s . T h e resultant t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action a c c o r d s a f o u n d a ­ tional role to linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n , i n a s m u c h as c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, as H a b e r m a s u n d e r s t a n d s it, is action o r i e n t e d toward r e a c h ­ ing m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , which h e r e g a r d s as t h e i n h e r e n t telos of l a n g u a g e . I n acting communicatively, a n a g e n t seeks to r e a c h a n u n ­ d e r s t a n d i n g with a n o t h e r a b o u t s o m e t h i n g in t h e world. T h e goal of formal p r a g m a t i c s is to identify t h e universal c o n d i t i o n s a n d p r e s u p ­ positions of such processes of r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g in lan­ guage. T h e t e r m s "universal" a n d "formal" draw a t t e n t i o n to key claims of this theory: (1) t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s it identifies a r e u n ­ avoidable if c o m m u n i c a t i o n is to take place at all; (2) it is n o t con­ c e r n e d with t h e p r a g m a t i c s of p a r t i c u l a r speech situations b u t w i t h a g e n e r a l "species" c o m p e t e n c e ; a n d (3) it r e c o n s t r u c t s f o r m a l r a t h e r t h a n substantive c o n d i t i o n s of r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . F o r H a b e r m a s , t h e s t r u c t u r e s of c o m m u n i c a t i v e rationality a r e to b e f o u n d in t h e formal s t r u c t u r e s of speech; r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s of de­ liberation a r e i m p l i c i t in t h e s t r u c t u r e of o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e c o m ­ m u n i c a t i o n . T h u s l a n g u a g e , r e a s o n , a n d action a r e i n h e r e n t l y intermeshed.

T h e Gauss L e c t u r e s m a r k t h e b e g i n n i n g of H a b e r m a s ' s a p p r o p r i a ­ tion of s p e e c h act t h e o r y a n d c o n t a i n t h e first f o r m u l a t i o n of his for­ m a l p r a g m a t i c s . H i s c e n t r a l c o n c e r n is with e x p l i c a t i n g t h e " b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g " force of s p e e c h acts, w h i c h u n d e r w r i t e s w h a t h e calls t h e i r a c t i o n - c o o r d i n a t i n g power. F o r this p u r p o s e , speech act theoryoffers several advantages. First, it focuses o n utterances r a t h e r t h a n s e n t e n c e s a n d t h u s aims to be a pragmatic t h e o r y of m e a n i n g , r a t h e r t h a n a s e m a n t i c t h e o r y completely a b s t r a c t e d f r o m c o n t e x t s of use. S e c o n d , it gives f o r m a l r e c o g n i t i o n t o n o n a s s e r t o r i c u s e s of l a n g u a g e 3

Translator's Introduction

a n d to t h a t e x t e n t d e p a r t s f r o m typically "cognitivist" a p p r o a c h e s to semantics. T h i r d , s p e e c h act t h e o r y analytically separates a s p e e c h act's p r o p o s i t i o n a l from its illocutionary c o m p o n e n t , which m a k e s it possible to distinguish b e t w e e n w h a t speakers say a b o u t t h e w o r l d a n d t h e intersubjective relations they establish in d o i n g s o . 4

W h a t originally p r o m p t e d H a b e r m a s to apply this linguistic ap­ p r o a c h to social t h e o r y was his desire to steer a course b e t w e e n two d o m i n a n t p a r a d i g m s in social science, n e i t h e r of which c a n p r o v i d e a satisfactory m o d e l . T h e first is t h e objectivist p a r a d i g m , w h i c h as­ similates t h e social to t h e n a t u r a l sciences. It e x a m i n e s social situa­ tions entirely f r o m t h e e x t e r n a l perspective of an o b s e r v e r l o o k i n g for p a t t e r n s of behavior. T h i s a p p r o a c h is characteristically u n i n t e r ­ ested in agency or in w h a t a g i v e n b e h a v i o r m e a n s from t h e e n g a g e d perspective of t h e a g e n t s involved, a n d as a result, it fails to p r o v i d e a n a d e q u a t e a c c o u n t of intersubjectivity. A p r i m e e x a m p l e of this type of a p p r o a c h is classical behaviorism. T h e s e c o n d p a r a d i g m is t h e subjectivist, w h i c h a d o p t s t h e p o i n t of view of p a r t i c i p a n t s a n d c o n s t r u e s society as a meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d w h o l e . T h i s a p p r o a c h is i n t e r e s t e d in i n t e n t i o n a l actions r a t h e r t h a n m e r e behavior, it ac­ k n o w l e d g e s t h e centrality of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , a n d it views subjects as i m p l i c a t e d in c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e i r worlds. However, it t o o fails to p r o ­ vide a n a d e q u a t e a c c o u n t of intersubjectivity, n o t b e c a u s e it i g n o r e s t h e perspective of t h e a g e n t , b u t b e c a u s e it gets c a u g h t in t h e m o n o l o g i c a l perspective of a Cartesian subject. A n d t h a t perspective m a k e s it h a r d to see how m e a n i n g f u l societal s t r u c t u r e s c a n b e f o r m e d at all. I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e subjectivistic a p p r o a c h h a s difficulty e x p l a i n i n g h o w it is possible to b r e a k o u t of t h e c o n s t r u c ­ tions of a solitary c o n s t i t u t i n g subject i n t o a g e n u i n e social reality. N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n constitution a n d i n t e r p r e t a ­ tion provides H a b e r m a s with the o p e n i n g he n e e d s to give critical t h e o r y a linguistic t u r n : a n a d e q u a t e social t h e o r y m u s t a c c o u n t for t h e fact t h a t subjects in i n t e r a c t i o n e n c o u n t e r t h e world a n d o n e an­ o t h e r as meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d . H a b e r m a s offers a t h i r d — c o m m u n i c a t i v e — p a r a d i g m t h a t takes intersubjectivity i n t o a c c o u n t f r o m t h e start a n d r e g a r d s l a n g u a g e as its p r o p e r m e d i u m . T h e differences b e t w e e n the subjectivist a n d objectivist p a r a d i g m s t u r n o n their respective decisions to allow or

xi____ Translator's Introduction

reject " m e a n i n g " as a basic, i r r e d u c i b l e c o n c e p t . I n H a b e r m a s ' s view, to u n d e r s t a n d the n a t u r e of intersubjectivity, we n e e d to u n d e r s t a n d how a g e n t s i n t e r a c t i n g with o n e a n o t h e r arrive at t h e s a m e i n t e r p r e ­ tations of their situation; in this respect, intersubjectivity is g r o u n d e d in sameness of m e a n i n g . H a b e r m a s r e g a r d s c o m m u n i c a t i o n in lan­ g u a g e as t h e p a r a d i g m case of achieving such "identity of m e a n i n g " a n d t h u s h o l d s t h a t linguistic normativity c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d to m e r e behavior in t h e sense of t h e objectivist p a r a d i g m . T o distance himself from t h e subjectivist p a r a d i g m , H a b e r m a s goes o n t o a r g u e t h a t t h e normativity of m e a n i n g m u s t b e based o n t h e intersubjective ( r a t h e r t h a n merely subjective) validity of a r u l e . T h u s , intersubjectivity is to be e x p l a i n e d o n t h e m o d e l of h o w two different individuals are able to use a t e r m with o n e a n d t h e s a m e m e a n i n g . T h a t i n t e r l o c u t o r s s u c c e e d in assigning t h e s a m e m e a n i n g s to t h e i r actions a n d c i r c u m s t a n c e s attests to t h e i r m a s t e r y of w h a t H a b e r m a s calls " c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e . " O n this view, if we can d e l i n e a t e t h e s t r u c t u r e of c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e , we will also have c a p t u r e d t h e s t r u c t u r e of c o m m u n i c a t i v e rationality. H a b e r ­ mas's formal p r a g m a t i c s aims to p r o v i d e a rational r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of this c o m p e t e n c e , t h a t is, to t r a n s f o r m an implicit k n o w l e d g e , a know-how, into a "second-level know-that." This is not to say, of course, t h a t a speaker actually h a s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of t h e r e c o n ­ s t r u c t e d k n o w l e d g e "in t h e h e a d . " H e r know-how is p r e t h e o r e t i c : a skill o r mastery of a p r a c t i c e in t h e W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n sense. Subjects capable of s p e e c h a n d action have acquired a tacit m a s t e r y of r u l e - g o v e r n e d practices that e n a b l e t h e m to r e a c h a m u t u a l u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g with o n e a n o t h e r a b o u t t h e world. Successful c o m m u n i c a ­ tion r e q u i r e s , t h e n , that t h e r u l e s c o n s t i t u t i n g such c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e be valid intersubjectively. 5

H a b e r m a s uses Husserl, Sellars, and Wittgenstein as foils for his o w n account. T h e subjectivist a n d objectivist p a r a d i g m s a r e r e p r e ­ sented by E d m u n d H u s s e r l a n d Wilfrid Sellars respectively. I n The Cartesian Meditations, Husserl explicitly sets himself t h e task of r e c o n ­ s t r u c t i n g intersubjectivity f r o m a subjectivist starting p o i n t . ( T h e tra­ d i t i o n of i n t e r p r e t i v e sociology initiated by Alfred Schiitz is r o o t e d i n this Husserlian enterprise.) H a b e r m a s a r g u e s t h a t H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f consciousness fails i n t h e e n d t o establish t h e

xii Translator's Introduction

intersubjectivity of a c o m m u n i t y of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l egos, a n d so h e t u r n s to Sellars. Sellars's a p p r o a c h is initially p r o m i s i n g because h e wants to m o d e l intentionality a n d t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h o u g h t o n t h e s t r u c t u r e of l a n g u a g e : H e takes a linguistic t u r n w i t h i n t h e philoso­ p h y of m i n d . However, his u n d e r s t a n d i n g of l a n g u a g e , a c c o r d i n g to H a b e r m a s , is essentially objectivist. T h a t is, speakers c o m e to m e a n t h e s a m e t h i n g s by t h e s a m e w o r d s b e c a u s e t h e y r e s p o n d similarly to their e n v i r o n m e n t a n d m u t u a l l y observe each o t h e r ' s r e s p o n s e s f r o m a m o n o l o g i c a l , t h i r d - p e r s o n perspective r a t h e r t h a n f r o m a dialogical s e c o n d - p e r s o n perspective. T h e y are " m o n o l o g i c a l lan­ g u a g e u s e r s " with a full, i n t e n t i o n a l ( i n n e r ) life of beliefs a n d desires, b u t l a c k i n g a n y i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s . But m o n o l o g i c a l lan­ g u a g e t h a t c a n n o t b e used for p u r p o s e s of c o m m u n i c a t i n g with oth­ ers, H a b e r m a s a r g u e s , is n o t really l a n g u a g e at all. T h u s , in different ways, Husserl a n d Sellars b o t h p r e s u p p o s e r a t h e r t h a n a c c o u n t for the existence of intersubjectivity. It is n o a c c i d e n t that H a b e r m a s ' s a r g u m e n t against Sellars is r e m i ­ n i s c e n t of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s private-language a r g u m e n t . S a m e n e s s of m e a n i n g is g r o u n d e d in t h e validity of rules, a n d H a b e r m a s , follow­ ing W i t t g e n s t e i n , argues t h a t a subject c a n n o t follow rules in isola­ tion. If s o m e o n e is following a r u l e , it m u s t b e at least in p r i n c i p l e possible for s o m e o n e else to check w h e t h e r she is following t h a t r u l e correctiy; o n e p e r s o n ' s rule-following b e h a v i o r is, in o t h e r words, subject to evaluation a n d criticism by a n o t h e r . T h i s p r e c l u d e s any m o n o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t of rule-following, for it p r e s u p p o s e s that differ­ e n t p e o p l e have the s a m e c o m p e t e n c e and are mutually c a p a b l e of assessing e a c h o t h e r ' s p e r f o r m a n c e . Wittgenstein e m p h a s i z e d t h a t m e a n i n g is a m a t t e r of use a n d t h a t words a n d s e n t e n c e s are used in i n t e r a c t i o n with others; his "use theory of m e a n i n g " was in this sense i n h e r e n t l y p r a g m a t i c a n d intersubjective. As action a n d l a n g u a g e a r e intimately i n t e r w o v e n , to u n d e r s t a n d a n u t t e r a n c e is to grasp its role in a l a n g u a g e g a m e , t h a t is, to u n d e r s t a n d it as a m o v e in a r u l e g o v e r n e d , i n t e r p e r s o n a l activity. T h u s b e i n g able to e n g a g e in a l a n g u a g e g a m e p r e s u p p o s e s sharing a f o r m of life with o n e ' s inter­ l o c u t o r s . T h e rules constitutive of such l a n g u a g e g a m e s a r e n o t stipu­ l a t e d arbitrarily, b u t h a v e t h e status of c o n v e n t i o n s , a topic to w h i c h I shall r e t u r n below. H a b e r m a s elaborates o n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s a c c o u n t (i

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in two ways. First, h e aims to d e v e l o p a t h e o r y of t h e s t r u c t u r e s of intersubjectivity: T h o u g h W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s l a n g u a g e g a m e s clearly sup­ pose dialogical relationships a m o n g p a r t i c i p a n t s i n interaction, h e does n o t analyze these relationships as such. S e c o n d , H a b e r m a s wants t o d o m o r e justice t h a n Wittgenstein did to t h e fact t h a t lan­ guage refers to t h e world. T h e early W i t t g e n s t e i n a t t e m p t e d to e l a b o r a t e a p u r e l y cognitive l a n g u a g e , the p r i m e f u n c t i o n of which was to r e p r e s e n t the totality of facts that m a k e u p the world. T h e later W i t t g e n s t e i n a b o r t e d t h a t at­ t e m p t b e c a u s e , in H a b e r m a s ' s t e r m s , he discovered c o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e u s e ( s ) . I n o t h e r words, he c a m e to realize that l a n g u a g e can b e used for all sorts of p u r p o s e s o t h e r t h a n cognitive ones a n d , a c c o r d i n g to H a b e r m a s , h e n c e f o r t h mistakenly d o w n p l a y e d t h e im­ p o r t a n c e of t h e cognitive use altogether. By contrast, H a b e r m a s maintains that reaching mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g requires a speaker a n d h e a r e r to o p e r a t e at two levels: t h e level of intersubjectivity o n which they speak with o n e a n o t h e r , a n d t h e level of objects o r states of affairs a b o u t which they c o m m u n i c a t e . His discussion h e r e is argu­ ably t h e best, m o s t extensive e l u c i d a t i o n of his c o n c e p t i o n of t h e "double s t r u c t u r e of s p e e c h . " H e m a k e s it clear t h a t the two uses of l a n g u a g e are interdependent. "A c o m m u n i c a t i v e t h e o r y of society m u s t d o justice to t h e d o u b l e cognitive-communicative s t r u c t u r e of s p e e c h " (p. 6 4 ) . T h i s d u a l s t r u c t u r e u n d e r l i e s t h e reflexive c h a r a c t e r of l a n g u a g e : N a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s can function as t h e i r own meta-lan­ guages, as D o n a l d Davidson, for e x a m p l e , has also p o i n t e d o u t . Ac­ c o r d i n g to H a b e r m a s , we c a n n o t c o m m u n i c a t e a b o u t things o r states of affairs in t h e w o r l d w i t h o u t also " m e t a - c o m m u n i c a t i n g " a b o u t w h a t we a r e d o i n g o r h o w we a r e using t h e c o n t e n t of w h a t we a r e saying. It is h e r e t h a t s p e e c h act t h e o r y e n t e r s t h e p i c t u r e . Every s p e e c h act takes t h e f o r m Mp, w h e r e M expresses t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y force of t h e u t t e r a n c e ( t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e d i m e n s i o n ) a n d p ex­ presses its p r e p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t (the cognitive d i m e n s i o n ) a b o u t which m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g is to b e r e a c h e d . I n this sense, all s p e e c h acts h a v e a cognitive a n d a c o m m u n i c a t i v e d i m e n s i o n . H a b e r m a s ' s key m o v e in linking c o m m u n i c a t i v e rationality with a t h e o r y of m e a n i n g is to c o n n e c t t h e t h e o r y of m e a n i n g with a t h e ­ ory of a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d justification. T h e r e is, as h e p u t s it, a

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"validity basis" to speech; all s p e e c h acts carry a n implicit c o m m i t ­ m e n t to justification, t o giving reasons t h a t b a c k o n e ' s claims. W h e n we use s p e e c h acts to c o m m u n i c a t e with o n e a n o t h e r , we m o v e , as R o b e r t B r a n d o m h a s recently r e m i n d e d us, i n " t h e space of giving a n d a s k i n g f o r r e a s o n s . " Or, as H a b e r m a s p u t s it, every speech act raises certain claims to validity t h a t a r e o p e n to b e i n g c h a l l e n g e d a n d d e f e n d e d with reasons. T h e illocutionary c o m p o n e n t of a n utter­ ance expresses validity claims a speaker raises in p e r f o r m i n g s p e e c h acts. H a b e r m a s initially identifies four s u c h claims: intelligibility, t r u t h , n o r m a t i v e Tightness, a n d sincerity or truthfulness. T h a t is, in m a k i n g a n u t t e r a n c e , a speaker simultaneously raises t h e claims t h a t w h a t she says is intelligible, t h a t t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t of w h a t she says is t r u e , t h a t s h e is m a k i n g t h e u t t e r a n c e i n t h e a p p r o p r i a t e social context, a n d t h a t she is s p e a k i n g truthfully. Following o n this, H a b e r m a s classifies s p e e c h acts i n t o four types, e a c h of w h i c h c o r r e ­ s p o n d s to o n e of t h e f o u r validity claims: c o m m u n i c a t i v e s (e.g., speaking, asking, r e p l y i n g ) , constatives (e.g., r e p o r t i n g , asserting, c l a i m i n g ) , regulatives (e.g., Ordering, r e q u e s t i n g , d e m a n d i n g , re­ m i n d i n g ) , a n d expressives (e.g., k n o w i n g , t h i n k i n g , fearing, h o p i n g , wishing). C o m m u n i c a t i v e speech acts a r e u s e d to m a k e explicit t h e n a t u r e of a n u t t e r a n c e itself. I n constative s p e e c h acts, speakers rep­ r e s e n t states of affairs in t h e objective world a n d refer to s o m e t h i n g in t h a t world. I n p e r f o r m i n g regulative s p e e c h acts, speakers estab­ lish intersubjective relationships with i n t e r l o c u t o r s a n d thus relate t o a social world. I n expressive s p e e c h acts, speakers refer t o things i n their subjective world by m a k i n g public i n t e n t i o n s , desires, o r o t h e r private states o r o c c u r r e n c e s . I n The Theory of Communicative Action, t h e number of validity claims is r e d u c e d t o t h r e e ; intelligibility d r o p s out, leaving t r u t h , normative Tightness, a n d sincerity. 7

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C o m m u n i c a t i v e action takes p l a c e a g a i n s t a b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n ­ sus t h a t it r e n e w s a n d develops. W h e n c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n is p r o c e e d i n g smoothly, i n t e r l o c u t o r s m a k e w h a t t h e y a r e saying intelli­ gible to o n e a n o t h e r , g r a n t w h a t they a r e saying to b e t r u e (i.e., they a s s u m e t h e r e f e r e n t i a l expressions they a r e using pick o u t objects t o which t h e attributes they p r e d i c a t e of t h e m actually apply), r e c o g ­ nize t h e Tightness of t h e n o r m t h a t t h e s p e e c h act claims to fulfill, a n d d o n ' t d o u b t e a c h o t h e r ' s sincerity. I n short, they m u t u a l l y a c c e p t

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the validity of t h e claims being raised. I n this " n o r m a l " case, a speaker uses expressions such t h a t t h e h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s t h e speaker as t h e speaker wants to b e u n d e r s t o o d , she f o r m u l a t e s p r o p ositional c o n t e n t s such t h a t they r e p r e s e n t e x p e r i e n c e s o r facts, she expresses h e r i n t e n t i o n s (sincerely), a n d s h e p e r f o r m s s p e e c h acts such t h a t t h e y c o n f o r m to r e c o g n i z e d n o r m s of a c c e p t e d self-images. At t h e same t i m e , p a r t i c i p a n t s in c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n a r e a s s u m e d t o be p r e p a r e d to r e a c h m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g — t h a t is, t h e i r atti­ t u d e is c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t h e r t h a n strategic ( o r i e n t e d toward realiz­ ing o n e ' s own e n d s ) . As such, they are a s s u m e d to b e a c c o u n t a b l e , t h a t is, c a p a b l e of justifying t h e i r actions a n d expressions. A c c o u n t ­ ability t h u s refers to a g e n e r a l p r e s u m p t i o n of rationality, c a s h e d o u t in t e r m s of o n e ' s r e a d i n e s s to justify t h e claims o n e raises. Because, normally, in raising validity claims, a s p e a k e r takes o n t h e w a r r a n t to m a k e g o o d on t h e m , f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s as a t h e o r y of " c o m m u n i c a ­ tive rationality" can serve as a f o u n d a t i o n for a critical t h e o r y . As a speaker can be called u p o n to justify t h e claims raised in h e r utter­ ances, the b u r d e n of justification a n d t h e possibility of critique are built into t h e very s t r u c t u r e of l a n g u a g e a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n . W h e n t h e consensus u n d e r l y i n g s m o o t h l y f u n c t i o n i n g c o m m u n i ­ cative i n t e r a c t i o n breaks d o w n a n d t h e flow of t h e l a n g u a g e g a m e is i n t e r r u p t e d , p a r t i c u l a r claims to validity may b e t h e m a t i z e d . T o re­ d e e m p r o b l e m a t i c claims to t r u t h o r to n o r m a t i v e Tightness, we m u s t r e s o r t to a level of a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h a t H a b e r m a s calls discourse, t h r o u g h which we seek to attain a rational c o n s e n s u s on t h e s e claims. But how a r e speakers able to d i s t i n g u i s h a t r u e (or r a t i o n a l ) f r o m a false (or merely c o n t i n g e n t ) consensus? N o t e t h a t we routinely as­ s u m e , as a m a t t e r of fact, t h a t we are able to d o so, a n d that, in this sense, s p e e c h is f u n d a m e n t a l l y rational. To m o d e l t h e a s s u m p t i o n s built i n t o t h e ideal of r a t i o n a l discourse, H a b e r m a s i n t r o d u c e s t h e n o t i o n of t h e ideal speech situation. T h e ideal s p e e c h situation is sub­ j e c t only to t h e " u n f o r c e d force of t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t " ; it is devoid of all o t h e r constraints. All i n t e r l o c u t o r s a r e equally e n t i t l e d to m a k e assertions, raise q u e s t i o n s a n d objections, o r p r o v i d e justifications f o r their positions. A n d all express t h e i r t r u e i n t e n t i o n s . It is crucial to r e m e m b e r t h a t discourses as a matter offact usually d o not manifest t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e ideal s p e e c h situation, b u t t h e m o d e l c a n serve

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as a s t a n d a r d in identifying deviations from t h e ideal of r a t i o n a l consensus. T h e q u e s t i o n of w h e n c e t h e justifications for t h e m a t i z e d validity claims are d r a w n brings us to t h e notion of t h e lifeworld, which is c o m p l e m e n t a r y to t h a t of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. T h e lifeworld p r o ­ vides a c o n t e x t of relevance within which c o m m u n i c a t i v e actions ( a n d actors) a r e "always already" situated. As such, it always r e m a i n s in t h e b a c k g r o u n d , s t a n d i n g "at t h e backs" of p a r t i c i p a n t s in c o m m u ­ n i c a t i o n , as it w e r e . It c a n n o t b e t r a n s c e n d e d : Speakers a n d actors c a n n o t act by p l a c i n g themselves outside of it. It has, o n t h e contrary, a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c h a r a c t e r insofar as it functions itself as a c o n d i t i o n of possibility f o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. I n this sense, it functions as a b a c k g r o u n d of m u t u a l intelligibility. I n t e r subjectively s h a r e d , it makes possible t h e s m o o t h f u n c t i o n i n g of everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. I n g e n e r a l , speakers d o n o t have explicit b u t only tacit knowl­ edge of it; n o n e t h e l e s s , t h e lifeworld provides c o m m u n i c a t i v e actors w i t h a s h a r e d stock of taken-for-granted i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o n w h i c h they c a n d r a w in trying to u n d e r s t a n d others. In discourse, e l e m e n t s of this i m p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e can b e r e n d e r e d explicit in o r d e r to re­ d e e m validity claims t h a t have b e e n c h a l l e n g e d . This c o n n e c t i o n b e ­ tween universal p r a g m a t i c s a n d t h e lifeworld is discussed in t h e f o u r t h G a u s s L e c t u r e , w h e r e H a b e r m a s d e f e n d s the linguistic t u r n in p h e n o m e n o l o g y a n d suggests t h a t universal p r a g m a t i c s aims t o eluci­ d a t e basic s t r u c t u r e s of t h e lifeworld. T h u s we can see t h a t h e early o n c o n c e i v e d c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n a n d lifeworld as c o m p l e m e n ­ tary, a c o n n e c t i o n h e later s t r e n g t h e n e d a n d e l a b o r a t e d in The The­ ory of Communicative Action. Of special n o t e is H a b e r m a s ' s discussion of t r u t h i n t h e Gauss Lec­ tures, for t r u t h claims enjoy p a r a d i g m a t i c status as validity claims (p. 8 6 ) . W h e n we raise a t r u t h claim, we use l a n g u a g e cognitively. A n d H a b e r m a s ' s discussion of cognitive l a n g u a g e use in t h e Gauss L e c t u r e s focuses o n questions of r e f e r e n c e a n d p e r c e p t i o n — e l e ­ m e n t s t h a t are n o t e m p h a s i z e d in his s u b s e q u e n t articulations of for­ m a l p r a g m a t i c s . W h e n a t t r i b u t i n g a p r o p e r t y to a n object, h e claims, a s p e a k e r p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t t h e object exists a n d t h a t t h e p r o p o s i t i o n she asserts is t r u e . T h a t is, she assumes t h a t t h e subject e x p r e s s i o n has a r e f e r e n t a n d t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t e can b e correctly a p p l i e d to it.

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H a b e r m a s h e r e e n d o r s e s a d e s c r i p t i o n t h e o r y of r e f e r e n c e . Interest­ ingly, h e also states t h a t o u r e x p e r i e n c e is in t h e first i n s t a n c e sensory a n d only in t h e s e c o n d i n s t a n c e c o m m u n i c a t i v e (p. 79). In l i g h t of r e c e n t criticisms to t h e effect t h a t h e n e e d s a t h e o r y of r e f e r e n c e to avoid s o m e f o r m of linguistic idealism, the Gauss discussion is t h e r e ­ fore i m p o r t a n t . 9

It is also i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e it c o n t a i n s a n early t r e a t m e n t of t h e so-called consensus theory of truth, which e m e r g e s f r o m H a b e r m a s ' s ac­ c o u n t of t h e discursive r e d e m p t i o n or vindication of validity claims. As we h a v e seen, a claim is discursively v i n d i c a t e d if r a t i o n a l c o n s e n ­ sus is r e a c h e d c o n c e r n i n g its validity, a n d t h e m e a n i n g of t r u t h , ac­ cording to H a b e r m a s , is explicated by specifying t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h validity claims can (or c o u l d ) b e vindicated. All of this suggests an epistemic c o n c e p t i o n of t r u t h as w h a t is rationally a g r e e d u p o n u n d e r ideal c o n d i t i o n s . T h e i n t e r e s t of t h e "consensus t h e o r y of t r u t h , " however, lies n o t so m u c h in w h a t it says a b o u t t h e n a t u r e of t r u t h , as in w h a t it says a b o u t h o w we reach a g r e e m e n t o n claims to t r u t h . T h u s it is n o t so m u c h a t h e o r y of truth as a t h e o r y of justification. A n d in fact, H a b e r m a s has since a b a n d o n e d a n epis­ temic c o n c e p t i o n of t r u t h a n d has d e v e l o p e d this c o n c e p t i o n of ra­ tional c o n s e n s u s primarily in the c o n t e x t of his t h e o r y of discourse ethics, which h e d e v e l o p e d after t h e c o m p l e t i o n of The Theory of Com­ municative Action. While t h e Gauss L e c t u r e s focus o n t r u t h as a d i m e n s i o n of validity, "Intentions, C o n v e n t i o n s , a n d Linguistic I n t e r a c t i o n s " (1976), an es­ say m o r e explicitly l o c a t e d within t h e p h i l o s o p h y of action, focuses o n t h e validity of social n o r m s a n d e x a m i n e s t h e c o n c e p t u a l inter­ c o n n e c t i o n s between rules, conventions, n o r m - g o v e r n e d action, a n d intentionality. R a t h e r t h a n establishing t h e n e e d f o r a t h e o r y of c o m ­ municative a c t i o n o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t o t h e r t h e o r i e s have failed to p r o v i d e a d e q u a t e a c c o u n t s of intersubjectivity, H a b e r m a s is h e r e c o n c e r n e d to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e n e e d for a t h e o r y of a c t i o n t h a t is intersubjective. T h e c o n c e p t of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action is to a c c o u n t for i n t e n t i o n a l action, t h a t is, a c t i o n caused by i n t e r n a l i n t e n t i o n a l states (in B r e n t a n o ' s sense) of t h e agent, as well as f o r n o r m c o n f o r m i n g action o r b e h a v i o r in t h e sense of a c t i o n in a c c o r d a n c e

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with e x t e r n a l rules. T h e essay aims at d e v e l o p i n g a c o n c e p t of com­ m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n (or, as h e p u t s it h e r e , i n t e r a c t i o n m e d i a t e d through interpretation) that incorporates both intentional and n o r m - g o v e r n e d action. H a b e r m a s c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e two m o d e l s of i n t e n t i o n a l a n d n o r m - g o v e r n e d a c t i o n t h a t h e discusses a r e c o m p l e ­ m e n t a r y , a n d t h a t linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n can b e seen as constitu­ tive for b o t h . But h e d o e s n o t advocate assimilating o r r e d u c i n g social to linguistic t h e o r y . I n d e e d , h e a r g u e s against taking l a n g u a g e as a p a r a d i g m for rule-following, o r assimilating semantic a n d social c o n v e n t i o n s a n d taking t h e f o r m e r as p a r a d i g m a t i c of t h e latter, since this w o u l d o b s c u r e t h e crucial distinction b e t w e e n c o m m u n i c a ­ tive a n d strategic action. Rather, h e conceives c o n v e n t i o n s "in t h e sense of valid—that is, intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d - n o r m s " as a sub­ set of rules of action in g e n e r a l . T h e latter i n c l u d e s rules of instru­ m e n t a l a c t i o n a n d strategic rules as well. T h e duality of cognitive a n d n o n c o g n i t i v e o r i e n t a t i o n s c o n t i n u e s to play a role in this essay as well. H a b e r m a s draws a n analytic distinc­ t i o n b e t w e e n two types of intentionality, o n e r e f e r r i n g to a cognitive r e l a t i o n to a w o r l d of objects, the o t h e r r e f e r r i n g to the stance a sub­ j e c t adopts toward t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t she is expressing. I n t e n ­ tional a c t i o n c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d o n the m o d e l of teleological action, in t h a t t h e a g e n t has a goal t h a t she i n t e n d s to a c c o m p l i s h a n d which t h u s f u n c t i o n s as a cause of h e r actions. W h e n we e x a m i n e inten­ tional action w i t h a view to t h e a g e n t ' s cognitive relation to t h e world, it is p o s s i b l e — u p to a p o i n t — t o u n d e r s t a n d this relation monologically. T h a t is, we can consider h e r as a n individual in isola­ tion from o t h e r s a n d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e c u l t u r e in which she lives. B u t as s o o n as we t r y t o give a n a c c o u n t of h o w t h e a g e n t c o m e s to have the goals she has, this m o d e l begins to b r e a k d o w n . For h e r goals d e p e n d o n h e r desires a n d o t h e r i n t e n t i o n a l states, w h i c h i n t u r n result f r o m w h a t H a b e r m a s calls h e r " n e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . " T h e s e in t u r n are a f u n c t i o n of t h e a g e n t ' s cultural values a n d n o r m s , a n d this m e a n s t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l action c a n n o t b e a c c o u n t e d for monologically. Rather, o u r a c c o u n t of n e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s r e ­ q u i r e s l o o k i n g at h o w subjects i n t e r a c t in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h m u t u a l l y r e c o g n i z e d n o r m s a n d values, a n d this establishes a n e x u s b e t w e e n intersubjective cultural t r a d i t i o n s a n d individual n e e d s .

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O n e of t h e negative c o n s e q u e n c e s of starting f r o m t h e teleological m e a n s - e n d s m o d e l is t h a t values a n d motives of action a r e r e p r e ­ sented as private n e e d s a n d w a n t s — t h e m o s t serious flaw of a n em­ piricist ethics, in H a b e r m a s ' s view. B u t if a p e r s o n ' s motives are to be intelligible to o t h e r s , n e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s m u s t b e intersubjecdve, a l t h o u g h t h e i r intelligibility does n o t yet c o n s t i t u t e a normatively binding s t a n d a r d . An intelligible motive is n o t yet a justification; the latter r e q u i r e s reasons t h a t all c a n share: "To say t h a t a n o r m is valid is to say t h a t it claims to express a universalizable i n t e r e s t a n d to de­ serve t h e c o n s e n t of all t h o s e affected" (p. 122). This f o r m u l a t i o n an­ ticipates H a b e r m a s ' s s u b s e q u e n t f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e p r i n c i p l e of universalizability of discourse ethics. More importantly, however, these relatively early writings show t h e d e e p c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e universalizability of interests a n d their origin in intersubjectivity. In­ sofar as o u r wants a n d n e e d s always a p p e a r u n d e r s o m e i n t e r p r e t a ­ tion, they p r e s u p p o s e a c o m m u n i t y that has a l a n g u a g e c o n t a i n i n g evaluative expressions, w h i c h in t u r n are r o o t e d in an intersubjectively s h a r e d t r a d i t i o n of c u l t u r a l values. T h e s e values b e c o m e normatively b i n d i n g w h e n t h e r e is a c o n s e n s u s t h a t is r e p r o d u c e d i n l a n g u a g e a n d s e d i m e n t e d in t h e f o r m of c o n v e n t i o n s . C o n v e n t i o n s , of course, a r e c o m m o n l y a p p e a l e d t o in o r d e r t o ex­ p l a i n how we u n d e r s t a n d o n e a n o t h e r . H a b e r m a s d o e s n o t p r e s u p ­ pose t h a t t h e r e simply are such c o n v e n t i o n s t h a t m a k e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g possible any m o r e t h a n h e p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t t h e r e simply are subjects w h o a b i d e by t h e m (let a l o n e stipulate t h e m ) . In­ stead, relying o n G. H . M e a d ' s analyses, h e offers a d e v e l o p m e n t a l ac­ c o u n t of h o w such c o n v e n t i o n s are established as n o r m a t i v e e x p e c t a t i o n s p r e s u p p o s e d in s p e e c h acts. O n c e we a c c e p t that b o t h having i n t e n t i o n s a n d acting in a c c o r d a n c e with n o r m s p r e s u p p o s e linguistic i n t e r a c t i o n , we can u n d e r s t a n d h o w subject f o r m a t i o n is the result of linguistic i n t e r a c t i o n , h o w we a r e socialized in a n d t h r o u g h communicative interaction. 11

Finally, t h e essay "Reflection on C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology" (1974) seeks to address t h e q u e s t i o n of deviant processes of socialization—a topic t h a t any d e v e l o p m e n t a l a c c o u n t of interactive c o m p e t e n c e m u s t a d d r e s s — a n d c o n t a i n s an analysis of t h e f o r m a l c o n d i t i o n s of

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Translator's Introduction

systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n . H a b e r m a s ' s g u i d i n g as­ s u m p t i o n h e r e is t h a t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of interactive c o m p e t e n c e is c o n n e c t e d t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of i n t e r n a l m e c h a n i s m s for c o n t r o l ­ ling behavior, b u t t h a t these two d e v e l o p m e n t s a r e distinct (since m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a n d actual b e h a v i o r in conflict r e s o l u t i o n d o n o t c o i n c i d e ) . His analysis stresses t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d e g o d e v e l o p m e n t : " C o m m u n i c a t i v e action is t h e m e d i u m of socialization" (p. 131). Picking u p o n a t h e m e m e n t i o n e d above, this essay establishes t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n subjectivity a n d intersubjectivity by showing t h a t a subject's i n t e n t i o n s a r e socially, t h a t is, intersubjectively, s t r u c t u r e d . H a b e r m a s w a n t s to show t h a t b o t h social a n d individual p a t h o l o ­ gies c a n b e analyzed in t e r m s of d i s t u r b a n c e s in interactive c o m p e ­ t e n c e . S u c h a n a c c o u n t , however, p r e s u p p o s e s a m o d e l of undisturbed or normal c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d interaction in t h e t e r m s of his f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s . O n this a p p r o a c h t h e n o t i o n of n o r m a l c y is n o t deter­ m i n e d by a n y p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e , n o r is it a statistical n o r m ; it is r a t h e r a culturally invariant n o r m a t i v e n o t i o n . H a b e r m a s h a s b e e n criticized for p r e s e n t i n g t o o idealized a n ac­ c o u n t of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , particularly owing to his n o t i o n of t h e ideal s p e e c h situation. This last essay shows t h a t h e is very m u c h at­ t u n e d t o the e m p i r i c a l vagaries of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I n claiming t h a t t h e validity basis of s p e e c h h a s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l status, H a b e r m a s cer­ tainly does n o t m e a n to imply t h a t we c a n n o t deviate from t h e c o n d i ­ tions of n o r m a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n ; otherwise, we would n o t have t o explicate t h e normative basis of s p e e c h . T h e c o n d i t i o n s of possible c o m m u n i c a t i o n a r e t h u s n o t t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n t h e s a m e sense as, say, Kant's t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n t u i t i o n s of space a n d time q u a c o n d i t i o n s of possible p e r c e p t i o n . N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e f o r m a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s u n d e r ­ lying c o m m u n i c a t i o n a r e , a c c o r d i n g t o H a b e r m a s , unavoidable. Moreover, as s u c h they f u n c t i o n s o m e w h a t like regulative ideals in t h e K a n t i a n sense. T h e y a r e n o t inviolable, b u t in cases w h e r e t h e inter­ n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of speech is violated, t h e p a t t e r n s of c o m m u n i c a ­ tion a r e pathologically distorted. We h a v e a l r e a d y seen t h a t i n t e r l o c u t o r s m a y c h a l l e n g e t h e validity claims raised by o t h e r s a n d t h e r e b y p r o m p t c o m m u n i c a t i o n shifts from action t o discourse. It is also possible t h a t t h e claims t o intelligibility, t r u t h , Tightness, o r sin-

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cerity a r e continually s u s p e n d e d o r flawed w i t h o u t p r o m p t i n g such a shift. If this h a p p e n s , t h e result is systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i ­ cation. T h e k i n d of violation of the universal p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t leads to systematic distortion is n o t the result of a lack of c o m p e t e n c e in the l a n g u a g e , a m i s c o n c e p t i o n of the level of discussion, or a r e t r e a t f r o m c o m m u n i c a t i v e to strategic action. T h e s e all involve a cessation of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, w h e r e a s in t h e cases t h a t H a b e r m a s has in m i n d , c o m m u n i c a t i v e action c o n t i n u e s in spite of t h e violation of its f o r m a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . T h e s t r o n g e s t cases of systematic d i s t o r t i o n a r e those in which t h e s p e a k i n g sub­ jects themselves are u n a w a r e of their violation of c o m m u n i c a t i v e pre­ suppositions, such as w h e n a c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r expresses herself unintelligibly w i t h o u t r e a l i z i n g it, w h e n o n e spouse deceives herself a b o u t h e r feelings for t h e other, or w h e n a s p e a k e r t h i n k s she is act­ ing in a c c o r d a n c e with social n o r m s b u t is actually violating t h e m . Ideally, t h e rejection of a validity claim leads to d i s c o u r s e , in which t h e s p e a k e r seeks to justify t h e claims she is m a k i n g ; or t h e s p e a k e r shows by h e r actions t h a t she is sincere. But this d o e s n o t h a p p e n in cases of distorted c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t stem from conflicts t h a t can­ n o t b e q u i t e suppressed yet m u s t n o t b e c o m e o p e n l y manifest— because, for e x a m p l e , they t h r e a t e n t h e identity o r self-understand­ ing of o n e or m o r e i n t e r l o c u t o r s . T h i s sort of situation results in a kind of p a r a d o x of systematic distortion of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , for the very validity claims t h a t are b e i n g violated "serve to k e e p u p t h e ap­ p e a r a n c e of c o n s e n s u a l a c t i o n " (p. 155). This discussion m a k e s clear t h a t t h e idealizations r e q u i r e d by this m o d e l of c o m m u n i c a t i o n m a y fail. However, t h e idealized m o d e l al­ lows for a systematic u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e different sorts of failure a n d provides t h e n o r m s or s t a n d a r d s for criticizing t h e m . As t h e e m p i r i c a l literature u p o n w h i c h H a b e r m a s draws in this dis­ cussion indicates, systematic distortions c o n n e c t e d with subjectf o r m a t i o n occur particularly often within families. N o t only is this a c o n t e x t i n which p e o p l e ' s identities are f o r m e d a n d c o n f i r m e d , it is a c o n t e x t in which a particularly h i g h p r e m i u m is p l a c e d o n c o m m u n i ­ cative r a t h e r t h a n strategic action. O n t h e o n e h a n d , families a r e ex­ p e c t e d to function as units; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e n e e d s a n d wants of individuals have to b e m e t within t h e family structure. T h u s t h e r e

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is a tension a n d p o t e n t i a l conflict b e t w e e n t h e o r i e n t a t i o n toward m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d t h e o r i e n t a t i o n toward individual n e e d satisfaction. Failure t o resolve s u c h conflicts explicidy c a n l e a d t o sys­ tematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n , in which m e m b e r s e m p l o y dif­ f e r e n t strategies for m a i n t a i n i n g or p r o d u c i n g a "pseudo-consensus." T h e y ma}' seek to safeguard an e n d a n g e r e d c o n s e n s u s a n d p r e v e n t c h a l l e n g e s to it by, for instance, i n t e r r u p t i n g or b r e a k i n g off con­ versation, r e f o r m u l a t i n g a d i s a g r e e m e n t as a n a g r e e m e n t , falsely re­ c i p r o c a t i n g a n o t h e r ' s action, o r — i n t h e most e x t r e m e case t h a t t h r e a t e n s t h e very intelligibility of t h e i r u t t e r a n c e s a n d actions inas­ m u c h as i n c o h e r e n c e violates t h e n o r m s of rationality—behaving in­ consistently. T h e n o t i o n of systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n evidently i n t r o d u c e s a t h i r d o p t i o n between t h e successful c o m p l e ­ t i o n of a s p e e c h act a n d w h a t J. L. Austin t e r m s a "misfire" in w h i c h t h e s p e e c h act itself fails. H a b e r m a s links a family's p o t e n t i a l for conflict t o p o w e r relations, c l a i m i n g t h a t a "family's ability to solve . . . p r o b l e m s stands in an in­ verse relation to its i n t e r n a l p o t e n t i a l for conflict. T h e latter in t u r n is a function of t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of p o w e r " (p. 161). H e d o e s n o t , however, s u g g e s t t h a t a h e a l t h y family m u s t s u c c e e d in t r a n s c e n d i n g p o w e r relations. Rather, h e allows for a "healthy" distribution of power, which, nevertheless, is c o n n e c t e d to an "asymmetrical distri­ bution of o p p o r t u n i t i e s " for gratification. O n c e again, t h e r e is a clear r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t empirical c i r c u m s t a n c e s — e v e n in c o m m u n i ­ catively s t r u c t u r e d c o n t e x t s — d i v e r g e significantly from t h e ideal s p e e c h situation. While t h e s e lectures a n d essays p r o v i d e a g o o d i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, they a r e also transitional in n a t u r e : T h e y f o r m a b r i d g e b e t w e e n H a b e r m a s ' s work of t h e 1960s a n d t h a t of t h e 1980s. H i s linguistic t u r n was initially motivated by t h e convic­ tion t h a t a critical social t h e o r y r e q u i r e d a s o u n d m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a n d e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n : h e n c e t h e project of p r o v i d i n g a linguistic g r o u n d i n g for sociology. However, t h e project of develop­ i n g a c o m p r e h e n s i v e t h e o r y of rationality, which is w h a t t h e t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action in effect a t t e m p t s , c a n n o t be c a r r i e d o u t m e r e l y f r o m t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l perspective of finding a n a l t e r n a -

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tivc to objectivist a n d subjectivist social t h e o r i e s . T h u s H a b e r m a s soon f o u n d it n e c e s s a r v to d e v e l o p a n a c c o u n t of t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of action o r i e n t e d toward r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n d e p e n d e n t l y of an a c c o u n t of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of social-scientific k n o w l e d g e . T h i s h e l p s e x p l a i n why t h e distinction b e t w e e n cogni­ tive a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e use, which is so c e n t r a l in t h e Gauss Lectures, b e c o m e s less p r o m i n e n t in his s u b s e q u e n t f o r m u l a ­ tions of t h e t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . 12

13

At the same time, while H a b e r m a s has b e e n w o r k i n g o u t a c o m ­ p l e x t h e o r y of action, h e has also e l a b o r a t e d his c o n c e p t i o n of s p e e c h act t h e o r y a n d of f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s to serve as t h e basis f o r a social theory of m e a n i n g . Since t h e writing of t h e Gauss Lectures, h e has d e v e l o p e d a systematic classification s c h e m e for t h e o r i e s of m e a n i n g , in which h e distinguishes f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s , i n t e n t i o n a l i s t semantics, a n d use t h e o r i e s of m e a n i n g . I n his view, e a c h of these fo­ cuses on but o n e of the t h r e e functions of l a n g u a g e that an a d e q u a t e t h e o r y of m e a n i n g m u s t i n c o r p o r a t e . As we saw, in c o m m u n i c a t i n g , we r e p r e s e n t facts a b o u t t h e world, we express o u r subjective states, a n d we interact w i t h others; a n d these t h r e e functions c o r r e s p o n d to t h e t h r e e validity claims of t r u t h , sincerity, a n d Tightness t h a t f o r m a l pragmatics analyzes. I n his r e c e n t work, in a d d i t i o n to s p e e c h act theory, H a b e r m a s also draws o n Michael D u m m e t t ' s assertibilist se­ mantics, a c c o r d i n g to which t h e m e a n i n g of a s e n t e n c e ( o r utter­ a n c e ) is given by t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which it is a c c e p t a b l e to h e a r e r s . D e v e l o p i n g this aspect of f o r m a l pragmatics once again u n ­ d e r s c o r e s t h e aspects of rationality a n d intersubjectivity; for t o say t h a t u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n u t t e r a n c e is k n o w i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h it is a c c e p t a b l e entails t h a t a s p e a k e r - h e a r e r d o e s n o t fully u n ­ d e r s t a n d a given u t t e r a n c e unless s h e knows w h a t r e a s o n s c o u l d b e offered t o back u p t h e claims raised i n t h e u t t e r a n c e . A n d c o n s t r u e d in this way, acceptability c o n d i t i o n s c a n n o t b e d e t e r m i n e d i n d e ­ p e n d e n t l y of an intersubjective p r a c t i c e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d justification. 14

H a b e r m a s has recently r e t u r n e d to s o m e of t h e t h e m e s a d u m ­ b r a t e d in t h e early 1970s. O n e of these is t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e n a t u r e of t r u t h , as I i n d i c a t e d above. A n o t h e r is t h e distinction b e t w e e n c o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d n o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e u s e . Yet t h e views 15

xxiv Translator's Introduction

a r t i c u l a t e d in these early works are n o t only relevant to H a b e r m a s ' s c u r r e n t t h o u g h t ; they b e a r o n c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o s o p h i c a l discus­ sions m o r e broadly. W i t h i n Anglo-American philosophy, t h e r e has b e e n a r e s u r g e n c e of i n t e r e s t in p r a g m a t i c s a n d in social t h e o r i e s of m e a n i n g t h a t d o justice to t h e intersubjectivity of social i n t e r a c t i o n . A p r i m e e x a m p l e is R o b e r t B r a n d o m ' s Making It Explicit, w h i c h is a n e l a b o r a t e working o u t of a s e m a n t i c t h e o r y b a s e d o n social practices a n d , in particular, practices of justification. O n B r a n d o m ' s view, se­ m a n t i c s is b a s e d o n t h e giving of a n d asking for r e a s o n s : T o give t h e m e a n i n g of a s e n t e n c e is t o articulate t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h its assertion is justified, w h i c h is to articulate a w e b of justificatory rela­ tions. However, u n l i k e H a b e r m a s , B r a n d o m does n o t distinguish be­ tween i r r e d u c i b l y distinct types of validity claims; t h e focus of his analysis r e m a i n s t h e assertion, w h i c h h e c o n t i n u e s to r e g a r d as basic. This constitutes a p o t e n t i a l c h a l l e n g e t o H a b e r m a s ' s system n o t only with r e s p e c t to t h e irreducibility of t h e t h r e e validity claims to t r u t h , Tightness, a n d sincerity, b u t also with r e s p e c t to t h e status of t h e as­ sertion w i t h i n his o w n framework. Given t h e p r o f o u n d i n f l u e n c e Sellars has h a d o n B r a n d o m , H a b e r m a s ' s discussion of Sellars m i g h t also b e a potentially fruitful p o i n t of e n g a g e m e n t , with r e g a r d to b o t h s e m a n t i c s a n d p e r c e p t i o n . It w o u l d be a way of fleshing o u t t h e cognitive d i m e n s i o n of l a n g u a g e a n d clarifying its r e l a t i o n s h i p to t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e d i m e n s i o n , a r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t lies at t h e h e a r t of H a b e r m a s ' s project. 16

Acknowledgments T h i s p r o j e c t w o u l d n o t have b e e n possible w i t h o u t t h e h e l p a n d sup­ p o r t of o t h e r s . I a m i n d e b t e d to J e r e m y Shapiro for his e x c e l l e n t o r i g i n a l translation of t h e Gauss L e c t u r e s , w h i c h m a d e my o w n task i m m e a s u r a b l y easier. My t h a n k s to H a r r y Heft, J o n a t h a n Maskit, Ste­ ven Vogel, C h r i s t o p h e r Z u r n , a n d especially T h o m a s M c C a r t h y w h o all p r o v i d e d i n v a l u a b l e f e e d b a c k o n t h e translation a n d i n t r o d u c ­ tion. I w o u l d also like t o t h a n k Pat Davis, w h o t r a n s f e r r e d t h e origi­ n a l typescript of t h e lectures o n t o disk, as well as L a r r y C o h e n a n d J u d y F e l d m a n n of M I T Press for t h e i r assistance. Finally, I a m grate­ ful to J i i r g e n H a b e r m a s for his generosity in r e s p o n d i n g to my queries.

Reflections on the Linguistic Foundation of Sociology The Christian Gauss Lectures (Princeton University, February-March 1971)

f

Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation in the Social Sciences

T h e r e a r e c o m p e t i n g t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h e s in t h e social sciences that differ n o t only in t h e k i n d s of p r o b l e m s t h e y address a n d t h e re­ search strategies t h e y apply, b u t in t h e i r f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e s . They diverge i n t h e i r c h o i c e of categorial frameworks a n d i n how they c o n c e p t u a l i z e their object d o m a i n — t h a t is, in h o w they define what it is they a r e actually studying. T h e s e differences of c o n c e p t u a l strategy express m o r e d e e p l y r o o t e d conflicts: conflicting views of sci­ e n c e a n d cognitive interests. My aim h e r e is n o t to investigate a n d systematically e x p o u n d these theoretical a p p r o a c h e s . I i n t e n d r a t h e r to develop a p a r t i c u l a r c o n c e p t u a l strategy for t h e social sciences a n d to establish its theoretical plausibility a n d p o t e n t i a l . I s h o u l d like to b e g i n with some c o m p a r a t i v e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t lead to some p r e l i m i n a r y classifications. T h e s e a r e to serve exclu­ sively as a provisional delimitation of a c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h e o r y of so­ ciety. T h i s t h e o r y d o e s n o t yet exist in a satisfactory f o r m , a n d I can only discuss a few issues t h a t motivate m e to c o n s i d e r such a n ap­ p r o a c h to b e fruitful. In terms of c o n c e p t u a l strategy, t h e first decision t h a t is of funda­ m e n t a l significance for a t h e o r e t i c a l p r o g r a m in t h e social sciences is w h e t h e r to a d m i t o r reject " m e a n i n g " [Sinn] as a primitive t e r m . I take t h e p a r a d i g m of " m e a n i n g " to b e t h e m e a n i n g [Bedeutung] of a w o r d o r a s e n t e n c e . T h u s I a m assuming t h a t t h e r e are n o p u r e or a priori s p e a k e r i n t e n t i o n s ; m e a n i n g always has o r finds a symbolic expression; to attain clarity, i n t e n t i o n s m u s t always b e able to t a k e o n 1

4

Lecture I

symbolic f o r m a n d to b e expressed. This expression c a n b e an ele­ m e n t of a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e o r linguistically derivative (it may, for ex­ a m p l e , b e l o n g to a system of signs with which t h e deaf-mute or drivers in traffic c o m m u n i c a t e ) . T h e expression may also b e n o n ­ verbal, t h a t is, it m a y t a k e t h e f o r m of an action o r of a bodily ex­ pression (a g r i m a c e or g e s t u r e ) , or of an artistic or musical r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I a m a s s u m i n g t h a t a m e a n i n g t h a t is e x p r e s s e d nonverbally c a n i n p r i n c i p l e b e r e n d e r e d , at least approximately, in words: W h a t e v e r can b e m e a n t c a n be said. T h e converse, however, d o e s n o t h o l d . Not e v e r y t h i n g t h a t can be said is necessarily express­ ible nonverbally. 2

If we may d e f i n e " m e a n i n g " from t h e o u t s e t as linguistic m e a n i n g [Sinn], t h a t is, with r e f e r e n c e to t h e signification [Bedeutung] of w o r d s a n d s e n t e n c e s , t h e n this first basic decision in c o n c e p t u a l strat­ egy can be r e f o r m u l a t e d m o r e precisely. It is in fact a m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l decision as to w h e t h e r linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n is to b e r e g a r d e d as a constitutive f e a t u r e of t h e object d o m a i n of t h e social sciences. T h e t e r m "constitutive" m e a n s t h a t t h e object d o m a i n s t u d i e d by t h e so­ cial sciences is itself d e t e r m i n e d in t e r m s of linguistic c o m m u n i c a ­ tion. S o m e t i m e s we describe l a n g u a g e by using categories of o b s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o r or transmissible i n f o r m a t i o n a n d e x p l a i n lin­ guistic processes in t e r m s of l e a r n i n g theory. I n these cases, m e a n ­ ingfully s t r u c t u r e d forms are t a k e n as objects a m o n g o t h e r physical objects; t h e l a t t e r are d e s c r i b e d in a c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k t h a t is n o t specific to a n y l a n g u a g e a n d a r e s t u d i e d by m e a n s of e m p i r i c a l t h e o r i e s . I n contrast, l a n g u a g e is constitutive of an object d o m a i n if its categorial framework is s u c h t h a t meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d f o r m s (such as p e r s o n s , expressions, a n d institutions) c a n a p p e a r in it as p h e n o m e n a r e q u i r i n g e x p l a n a t i o n . " M e a n i n g " h a s t h e status of a primitive t e r m in t h e social sciences if we use it to characterize t h e structure of t h e object d o m a i n itself, r a t h e r t h a n j u s t individual ele­ m e n t s within it. I s h o u l d like to clarify this first m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l deci­ sion by p o i n t i n g o u t t h r e e of its implications.

(a) Behavior versus action Only if " m e a n i n g " is a d m i t t e d as a primitive t e r m in sociology c a n we distinguish a c t i o n f r o m behavior. At p r e s e n t I s h o u l d like to set aside

Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

the p r i o r p r o b l e m of t h e d e m a r c a t i o n b e t w e e n those o b s e r v a b l e events t h a t we i n t e r p r e t as b e h a v i o r a n d those events t h a t we c a n n o t i n t e r p r e t as behavior. T h e i n t e r p r e t i v e s c h e m e t h a t allows us t o u n ­ derstand t h e m o t i o n of a b o d y as t h e e x p r e s s i o n of a n o r g a n i s m , in o t h e r w o r d s , as t h e m o v e m e n t of a living body, has n o t yet b e e n satis­ factorily analyzed. By d e s c r i b i n g an o b s e r v a b l e m o t i o n as behavior, we ascribe it to an o r g a n i s m t h a t r e p r o d u c e s its life by a d a p t i n g to its e n v i r o n m e n t . W e u n d e r s t a n d it as a m o v e m e n t b r o u g h t a b o u t by an organism. I n so d o i n g , we are a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e r e is a n e n d t y X that in some b r o a d sense is "responsible" for this m o v e m e n t . I n this con­ text, of course, t h e c a t e g o r y of responsibility can b e u s e d only in scare q u o t e s , t h a t is, w i t h certain reservations. F o r a n a n i m a l c a n n o t be h e l d responsible for its b e h a v i o r in t h e same sense t h a t a subject capable of s p e e c h a n d c o g n i t i o n c a n b e h e l d r e s p o n s i b l e for its ac­ tions. N o n e t h e l e s s , we a p p a r e n t l y derive t h e perspective from w h i c h we i n t e r p r e t m o t i o n s as m o d e s of b e h a v i o r f r o m a private modificat­ ion of the p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of o u r own social lifeworld. I call this modification privative b e c a u s e we a r e capable of distinguishing be­ havioral r e s p o n s e s f r o m o t h e r events w i t h o u t h a v i n g t o a p p e a l to t h e category of m e a n i n g . For t h a t c a t e g o r y m a k e s it possible to differen­ tiate between b e h a v i o r t h a t I can u n d e r s t a n d as i n t e n t i o n a l action a n d b e h a v i o r t h a t c a n n o t b e c o m p r e h e n d e d u n d e r this d e s c r i p t i o n . 3

I call b e h a v i o r intentional if it is g o v e r n e d by n o r m s or o r i e n t e d t o rules. R u l e s o r n o r m s d o n o t h a p p e n like events, b u t h o l d o w i n g to a n intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d m e a n i n g [Bedeutung]. N o r m s have se­ m a n t i c c o n t e n t : t h a t is, a m e a n i n g [Sinn] t h a t b e c o m e s t h e r e a s o n o r motive for b e h a v i o r w h e n e v e r t h e y a r e o b e y e d by a subject to w h o m things a r e m e a n i n g f u l . I n this case we speak of a n action. T h e i n t e n ­ tion of a n a c t o r w h o o r i e n t s his o r h e r b e h a v i o r t o a r u l e c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e m e a n i n g of t h a t r u l e . O n l y t h i s normatively g u i d e d b e h a v i o r is what we call action. It is only a c t i o n s t h a t we speak of as i n t e n t i o n a l . O b s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o r fulfills a prevailing n o r m if a n d only if this b e ­ havior can b e u n d e r s t o o d as p r o d u c e d by a n a c t i n g subject w h o has g r a s p e d t h e m e a n i n g of t h e n o r m a n d o b e y e d it intentionally. Behav­ ior that we o b s e r v e over a p a r t i c u l a r p e r i o d of time can de facto ac­ cord with a given n o r m w i t h o u t being n o r m - g o v e r n e d . T h a t is why we distinguish r e g u l a r b e h a v i o r f r o m r u l e - g o v e r n e d behavior, o r

6 Lecture I

action. We discover regularities t h r o u g h inductive generalizations; e i t h e r t h e y exist o r t h e y d o n o t . In contrast, we m u s t u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g of r u l e s ; thev have n o r m a t i v e validity. We c a n b r e a k rules; b u t it is m e a n i n g l e s s t o say t h a t regularities a r e violated. Rules t h a t u n d e r l i e a practice can be a c c e p t e d o r rejected, whereas regularities in b e h a v i o r c a n b e affirmed o r d e n i e d . Naturally we can assert t h e existence of regularities in c o n t e x t s of i n t e n t i o n a l action as m u c h as in a c h a i n o f b e h a v i o r a l r e s p o n s e s . But in t h e f o r m e r case, we c a n d e ­ d u c e t h e assertion from t h e fact t h a t n o r m s a r e followed with spe­ cifiable probability, w h e r e a s in t h e l a t t e r we m u s t base o u r assertion o n a n i n d u c t i v e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n f r o m o b s e r v e d behavior. (b) Observation versus the understanding of meaning [Sinnverstehen] T h e distinction we have drawn b e t w e e n b e h a v i o r a n d action leads to a f u r t h e r distinction b e t w e e n different m o d e s of e x p e r i e n c e in which b e h a v i o r a l responses a n d actions a r e accessible to us. W e o b ­ serve b e h a v i o r a n d behavioral regularities, whereas we u n d e r s t a n d actions. O n c e a g a i n it is t h e c a t e g o r y of m e a n i n g t h a t differentiates t h e two m o d e s o f e x p e r i e n c e . I c a n n o t o b s e r v e actions as m e r e be­ havior. F o r if a g i v e n b e h a v i o r is to b e d e s c r i b e d as a n action, t h e n I m u s t relate features of this b e h a v i o r to rules o n which it is b a s e d a n d u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g of these rules. Of course t h e a p p r e h e n s i o n of s t r u c t u r e s of a c t i o n t h r o u g h t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of m e a n i n g rests on observations. Let m e c o m p a r e two p e r c e p t u a l j u d g m e n t s o r "observation state­ m e n t s . " "I see a fly b o u n c i n g against t h e window" is a s e n t e n c e in which I r e p o r t t h e o b s e r v a t i o n o f a behavior. I n contrast, "I see J o h n r e t u r n i n g from work" is a s e n t e n c e with w h i c h I describe an "ob­ served" action. I u s e t h e e x p r e s s i o n "to see" in t h e s a m e way in b o t h cases. F o r b o t h sentences r e p o r t e v e n t s t h a t t h e s p e a k e r claims to perceive at t h e t i m e . Nevertheless, in t h e f o r m e r case "seeing" m e a n s o b s e r v i n g a n e v e n t t h a t c a n b e c o m p r e h e n d e d as behavior, w h e r e a s i n t h e latter it m e a n s u n d e r s t a n d i n g an action. Of c o u r s e this u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g is based on t h e o b s e r v a t i o n of an o c c u r r e n c e ( t h e d o o r b e l l r i n g i n g , a p e r s o n e n t e r i n g t h e r o o m , etc.); b u t t h e o b s e r v e d behav­ ioral e l e m e n t s a n d events a r e interpreted with r e f e r e n c e to a s t r u c t u r e of action. T h e latter consists in n o r m s , in this case, social n o r m s t h a t

7____ Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

regulate work h o u r s a n d t r a n s p o r t a t i o n to a n d from work. I have to be a c q u a i n t e d with n o r m s of this sort a n d t h e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e i r ap­ plication in o r d e r to know when a given o c c u r r e n c e can be inter­ p r e t e d as a case in w h i c h t h e n o r m applies. "I see J o h n r e t u r n i n g from work" m e a n s t h a t I u n d e r s t a n d a n o b s e r v e d o c c u r r e n c e as t h e fulfillment of a n o r m : t h a t is, as a p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n — i n this case, as "returning from work." To see, o b s e r v e , or perceive a n action always involves u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n o r m (or the c o r r e s p o n d i n g i n t e n t i o n of the actor) a n d i n t e r p r e t i n g m o v e m e n t s (or states of affairs) in t h e light of t h e n o r m (or i n t e n t i o n ) t h a t is u n d e r s t o o d . T h e decision w h e t h e r i n t e n d o n a l action s h o u l d be a d m i t t e d has m e t h o d o l o g i c a l implications precisely w i t h r e g a r d to t h e m o d e of ex­ p e r i e n c e . T h i s can be s e e n at the level of p r o b l e m s of m e a s u r e m e n t . M e a s u r e m e n t s serve to t r a n s f o r m e x p e r i e n c e i n t o d a t a t h a t m e e t t h e d e m a n d s of intersubjective reliability a n d o n t h e basis of which t h e claim to empirical validity of t h e o r e t i c a l s t a t e m e n t s c a n be verified. Observations o f events ( a n d behavioral responses) c a n b e l i n k e d with t h e l a n g u a g e g a m e of physical m e a s u r e m e n t . B u t t h e r e is n o c o r r e s p o n d i n g system of reliably i n c u l c a t e d basic m e a s u r e m e n t o p ­ erations, such as t h e o n e available for m o v i n g b o d i e s (or p o i n t s of mass) for objects such as actions, w h i c h a r e accessible only t h r o u g h c o m m u n i c a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e [sinnverstehende Erfahrung]. In other w o r d s , observations t h a t can b e e x p r e s s e d in descriptive s e n t e n c e s of a l a n g u a g e for t h i n g s a n d events can b e verified t h r o u g h r e c o g n i z e d p r o c e d u r e s t h a t a r e r e d u c i b l e to physical m e a s u r e m e n t . T h e inter­ p r e t a t i o n of t h e m e a n i n g of symbolic forms s u c h as actions, w h i c h can b e r e p r e s e n t e d in descriptive s e n t e n c e s of a l a n g u a g e f o r per­ sons a n d expressions, c a n n o t b e reliably o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d in a n a l o ­ gous fashion. U n t i l now, t h e m e a s u r e m e n t of symbolized m e a n i n g has d e p e n d e d o n a d h o c p r o c e d u r e s t h a t in t h e final analysis rest o n an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of l a n g u a g e t h a t r e m a i n s prescientific, a l t h o u g h it m a y b e s h a p e d by t h e discipline of h e r m e n e u t i c s . In p r i n c i p l e , any­ one w h o masters a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e can, by virtue of c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e , u n d e r s t a n d a n infinite n u m b e r of expressions, if they are a t all m e a n i n g f u l , a n d m a k e t h e m intelligible t o others. T h a t is, she can i n t e r p r e t t h e m . Some a r e m o r e practiced at this t h a n o t h e r s : H e r m e n e u t i c s is an art a n d n o t a m e t h o d . W e m a k e use of 4

5

8 Lecture I

h e r m e n e u t i c s , t h e art of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , instead of a m e a s u r e m e n t p r o c e d u r e ; b u t it is n o t s u c h a p r o c e d u r e . T h e only t h i n g t h a t w o u l d allow for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of basic m e a s u r e m e n t o p e r a t i o n s for m e a n i n g w o u l d be a t h e o r y of o r d i n a r y - l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t did n o t m e r e l y g u i d e a n d discipline t h e n a t u r a l faculty of com­ m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e , as h e r m e n e u t i c s d o e s , b u t t h a t could also explain it. (c) Conventionalism versus essentialism N o m a t t e r h o w t h e p r o b l e m of m e a s u r i n g t h e m e a n i n g of symbolic expressions is solved, t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l basis of a t h e o r y of action re­ m a i n s distinct from t h a t of a behaviorist theory in t h e strict sense. For t h e a d e q u a c y of a d e s c r i p t i o n of a meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d con­ struct, a n u t t e r a n c e o r an action, can b e tested only by r e f e r e n c e t o t h e k n o w l e d g e of t h e subject w h o p r o d u c e d t h e expression. I n m a n y cases a subject c a p a b l e of a c t i o n m a y n o t b e a b l e to specify explicitly the n o r m s a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h it orients his behavior. Nevertheless, insofar as it m a s t e r s n o r m s a n d c a n follow t h e m , it h a s an implicit k n o w l e d g e of rules. O n t h e basis of this know-how it can always d e ­ cide w h e t h e r a given b e h a v i o r a l r e s p o n s e c o r r e s p o n d s to a k n o w n rule at all, t h a t is, w h e t h e r it can b e u n d e r s t o o d as action. T h e sub­ j e c t c a n d e c i d e w h e t h e r , in a given case, s u c h a b e h a v i o r a l r e s p o n s e a c c o r d s w i t h o r deviates f r o m a given n o r m , a n d to w h a t e x t e n t it de­ viates from a n u n d e r l y i n g n o r m . T h e situation is similar w i t h r e g a r d to linguistic u t t e r a n c e s . Usually, c o m p e t e n t speakers a r e able to ex­ plicate t h e g r a m m a t i c a l r u l e s of t h e n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e in w h i c h they f o r m a n d u n d e r s t a n d s e n t e n c e s only incompletely, if a t all. N o n e t h e ­ less, every a d e q u a t e l y socialized s p e a k e r has at his disposal a know-how t h a t e n a b l e s h i m to distinguish p h o n e t i c u t t e r a n c e s f r o m m e r e s o u n d s , to distinguish semantically m e a n i n g f u l a n d syntacti­ cally well-formed s e n t e n c e s f r o m those t h a t are deviant, a n d to o r d e r such s e n t e n c e s a c c o r d i n g to t h e d e g r e e of t h e i r deviation. T h i s intu­ itively available k n o w l e d g e of rules t h a t c o m p e t e n t i y s p e a k i n g a n d a c t i n g subjects have, which can also b e discursively a r t i c u l a t e d a t a n y time, provides t h e r e q u i r e d e x p e r i e n t i a l basis for t h e o r i e s of action. Strictly behaviorist theories, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , d e p e n d exclusively

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Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

on observational data. This fact gives rise to a n i m p o r t a n t difference between t h e s t r u c t u r e s of t h e two types of t h e o r y a n d their r e l a t i o n to their respecdve object d o m a i n . T h e o r i e s t h a t are to explain t h e p h e n o m e n a accessible t h r o u g h the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of m e a n i n g [Sinnverstehen]—that is, t h e utter­ ances a n d e x p r e s s i o n s of subjects capable of s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n — u s t t a k e t h e f o r m of a systematic explication of t h e k n o w l e d g e of rules based o n w h i c h c o m p e t e n t speakers a n d actors g e n e r a t e their expressions. T h e o r y f o r m a t i o n serves to r e c o n s t r u c t the systems of rules a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d f o r m a t i o n s , sen­ tences a n d actions, a r e p r o d u c e d . T h e s e generative rules n e e d n o t b e directly r e a d off t h e surface s t r u c t u r e of e x p r e s s i o n s . As with grammar, t h e r e may b e d e e p s t r u c t u r e s , which u n d e r l i e t h e surface structures t h a t have b e e n p r o d u c e d a n d yet are p a r t of a c o m p e t e n t speaker's implicit know-how; h e n c e t h e y a r e n o n e t h e l e s s k n o w n . T h e goal of s u c h a t h e o r y is t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of r u l e sys­ tems t h a t disclose the i n t e r n a l logic of t h e r u l e - g o v e r n e d g e n e r a t i o n of intelligible surface s t r u c t u r e s . L e t u s n o w a s s u m e t h a t these intelli­ gible surface s t r u c t u r e s c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e e m p i r i c a l regularities of observable e v e n t s ( a n d behavioral r e s p o n s e s ) . I n this case we c o u l d c o m p a r e the r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e a b s t r a c t systems of r u l e s underly­ ing surface s t r u c t u r e s with t h e o r i e s of the e m p i r i c a l sciences from w h i c h we derive laws of n a t u r e t h a t s o m e h o w " u n d e r l i e " e m p i r i c a l regularities. B u t this c o m p a r i s o n clearly reveals t h e difference in status of t h e two types of t h e o r i e s . T h e h y p o t h e t i c a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s advance a n a l m o s t essentialist c l a i m t h a t is a b s e n t f r o m t h e n o m o logical t h e o r i e s in t h e e m p i r i c a l sciences. For, insofar as t h e l a t t e r ref­ er to t h e object d o m a i n of physicallv m e a s u r a b l e events, t h e primitive terms of systems of n o m o l o g i c a l s t a t e m e n t s are primarily i n t r o d u c e d by c o n v e n t i o n . T h e y p r o v i d e t h e i d i o m for a t h e o r e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t t h a t can b e c o r r o b o r a t e d indirectly t h r o u g h t h e derivation of lawlike h y p o t h e s e s t h a t a r e subject to c o n f i r m a t i o n . O n e m i g h t say that n o m o l o g i c a l hypotheses, if they a r e true, c o r r e s p o n d to struc­ tures of a reality objectified in t e r m s of physics o r t h e b e h a v i o r a l sci­ ences (or t h a t they pick o u t invariant features of this objectified reality). B u t t h e y c a n n o t b e said m e r e l y t o r e c o n s t r u c t a n intuitive m

10 Lecture I

knowledge t h a t c o m p e t e n t observers of this reality always already possess. Rather, t h e sort of k n o w l e d g e t h u s p r o d u c e d is, as a r u l e , quite counterintuitive. In contrast, t h e rational r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s of t h e k n o w l e d g e of sub­ j e c t s c a p a b l e of s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n d o raise such a n essentialist claim. T h e primitive t e r m s to b e e m p l o y e d in t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of struc­ tures of o p e r a t i o n a l l y effective generative rules, t h e r e f o r e , a r e n o t in­ t r o d u c e d conventionally. I n s t e a d they are i n t r o d u c e d in c o n n e c t i o n with categories t h a t m u s t b e derivable from t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e very subjects w h o p r o d u c e these structures. As I see it, t h e essentialist m o m e n t consists in t h e fact t h a t h y p o t h e t i c a l r e c o n s t r u c ­ tions, if t r u e , c o r r e s p o n d n o t to s t r u c t u r e s of a n objectified reality b u t to s t r u c t u r e s of t h e implicit know-how of c o m p e t e n t subjects ca­ pable of j u d g m e n t . W h a t is to b e explicated by t h e s e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s are t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l y effective r u l e s themselves. I h a v e discussed t h e m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l decision w h e t h e r m e a n i n g s h o u l d b e a d m i t t e d as a primitive t e r m in t h e social sciences by look­ i n g at t h r e e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l implications of great i m p o r t . H a v i n g d o n e so, I c a n p r o v i d e a provisional d e m a r c a t i o n b e t w e e n objectivist a n d subjectivist a p p r o a c h e s t o t h e o r y f o r m a t i o n . I shall call a t h e o ­ retical p r o g r a m subjectivist if it conceives of society as a meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d system of life [Lebenszusammenhang], a n d as a system of symbolic expressions a n d s t r u c t u r e s t h a t is c o n t i n u o u s l y p r o d u c e d a c c o r d i n g t o u n d e r l y i n g abstract rules. T h u s t h e o r y is given t h e task of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g a p r o c e s s whereby a meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d social reality is p r o d u c e d . I n contrast, I shall call a t h e o r e t i c a l p r o g r a m objectivist if it conceives t h e life process of society n o t internally as a p r o c e s s of c o n s t r u c t i o n , t h a t is, of t h e p r o d u c t i o n of m e a n i n g f u l structures, b u t externally as a n a t u r a l process that, like o t h e r p r o ­ cesses, c a n b e observed in its empirical regularities a n d e x p l a i n e d by m e a n s of n o m o l o g i c a l h y p o t h e s e s . I n this sense, all strictly behavior­ ist t h e o r i e s , s u c h as classical l e a r n i n g theory, are objectivist. At this p o i n t I p r e f e r n o t to d e c i d e b e t w e e n these two c o m p e t i n g ap­ p r o a c h e s . I shall c o n t e n t myself with p o i n t i n g o u t t h a t t h e objectivist t h e o r e t i c a l p r o g r a m , w h i c h h a s b e e n q u i t e successful within its lim­ its, h a s to d e a l with difficulties arising f r o m its m e t h o d o l o g i c a l n e ­ glect of t h e symbolic p r e s t r u c t u r i n g of social reality. T h e s e

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Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

difficulties show u p at t h e level of t h e m e a s u r e m e n t p r o b l e m s in­ volved in a t t e m p t i n g t o r e d u c e action to behavior, w h i c h have b e e n discussed by Cicourel (1965) a n d o t h e r s . T h e s e difficulties are exemplified by w h a t can n o w b e c o n s i d e r e d t h e failed a t t e m p t to de­ velop a behaviorist theory of l a n g u a g e . 1 d o not w a n t to e n t e r i n t o this discussion h e r e . I n s t e a d I will limit myself in these lectures to t h e theoretical p r o g r a m of subjectivism. T h e generative t h e o r i e s of soci­ ety [Erzeugungstheorien], as I shall call t h e m f r o m n o w on, h a v e c o m ­ p l e m e n t a r y difficulties to d e a l with. A theoretical p r o g r a m of this kind m u s t a n s w e r t h r e e q u e s t i o n s . A s s u m i n g t h a t society is conceived as a process of g e n e r a t i n g a meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d reality: 6

7

(a) W h o is t h e subject of this generative process, o r is t h e r e n o such subject? (b) H o w is the m o d e of this g e n e r a t i v e process to be c o n c e p t u a l ­ ized—as cognitive activity (Kant a n d H e g e l ) , as linguistic expression ( H u m b o l d t ) , as l a b o r ( M a r x ) , as artistic c r e a t i o n (Schelling, Nie­ tzsche), o r as instinct ( F r e u d ) ? (c) A n d , finally: A r e t h e u n d e r l y i n g systems of r u l e s a c c o r d i n g to which social reality is c o n s t r u c t e d invariant for all social systems, o r do even t h e s e abstract r u l e systems d e v e l o p historically, a n d is t h e r e possibly an i n n e r logic of their d e v e l o p m e n t t h a t can be r e c o n ­ structed as well? Before setting u p a typology of h o w t h e most i m p o r t a n t g e n e r a t i v e theories of society have a n s w e r e d t h e s e q u e s t i o n s , I w a n t to discuss very briefly two f u r t h e r f u n d a m e n t a l decisions c o n c e r n i n g c o n c e p ­ tual strategy t h a t have g r e a t b e a r i n g for t h e o r y f o r m a t i o n in t h e so­ cial sciences. T h e second metatheoretical decision is w h e t h e r i n t e n t i o n a l action is t o be c o n c e p t u a l i z e d in t h e f o r m of purposive-rational action or in t h e f o r m of c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . L e t m e first c h a r a c t e r i z e these two types of action with r e f e r e n c e to t h e status of t h e rules t h a t g o v e r n b e h a v i o r in each case. By purposive-rational action! u n d e r s t a n d e i t h e r i n s t r u m e n t a l action o r r a t i o n a l choice o r a c o m b i n a t i o n of t h e two. I n s t r u m e n t a l action follows technical rules b a s e d o n e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e . T h e s e rules i m p l y c o n d i t i o n a l p r e d i c t i o n s r e g a r d i n g ob­ servable events, w h e t h e r physical o r social. T h u s such p r e d i c t i o n s

12 Lecture I

c a n p r o v e to b e c o r r e c t or i n c o r r e c t . Rational c h o i c e is g o v e r n e d by strategies b a s e d o n analytical k n o w l e d g e . T h e y imply derivations from p r e f e r e n c e rules (value systems) a n d decision p r o c e d u r e s . T h e s e p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e d e r i v e d e i t h e r correctly o r incorrectly. Pur­ posive-rational action attains definite goals u n d e r given c o n d i t i o n s . B u t w h e r e a s t h e m e a n s o r g a n i z e d by i n s t r u m e n t a l action are a p p r o ­ p r i a t e o r i n a p p r o p r i a t e a c c o r d i n g to criteria of effective c o n t r o l of reality, strategic action d e p e n d s only on t h e c o r r e c t assessment of possible b e h a v i o r a l o p t i o n s , which results from derivation u s i n g val­ u e s and m a x i m s a l o n e . By communicative action I u n d e r s t a n d symbolically m e d i a t e d inter­ action. It is g o v e r n e d by b i n d i n g n o r m s t h a t define r e c i p r o c a l expec­ tations a b o u t behavior a n d that must be understood a n d a c k n o w l e d g e d o r r e c o g n i z e d by at least two a c t i n g subjects. Social n o r m s are e n f o r c e d t h r o u g h sanctions. T h e i r m e a n i n g is objectified in symbolic expressions a n d is accessible only t h r o u g h o r d i n a r y lan­ g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t i o n . W h e r e a s t h e effectiveness of t e c h n i c a l rules a n d strategies d e p e n d s o n t h e validity [ Gultigkeit] of empirically t r u e o r analytically c o r r e c t p r o p o s i t i o n s , t h e validity [Geltung] of social n o r m s is e n s u r e d by a n intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t is based o n a c o n s e n s u s a b o u t values o r o n m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Violating a rule has different c o n s e q u e n c e s in each case. I n c o m p e t e n t behavior, which violates proven t e c h n i c a l rules or c o r r e c t strategies, is con­ d e m n e d p e r se to failure t h r o u g h its lack of success. T h e "punish­ m e n t , " so to speak, is built i n t o its f o u n d e r i n g o n t h e shoals of reality. Deviant behavior, on t h e o t h e r h a n d , which violates prevailing n o r m s , triggers sanctions t h a t are c o n n e c t e d with t h e rules only ex­ ternally, by c o n v e n t i o n . L e a r n e d rules of purposive-rational action p r o v i d e u s w i t h a r e g i m e of skills; i n contrast, i n t e r n a l i z e d n o r m s fur­ nish u s with a r e g i m e of personality structures. Skills e n a b l e u s t o solve p r o b l e m s , w h e r e a s motivations allow us t o c o n f o r m to n o r m s . Table 1 s u m m a r i z e s t h e s e definitions. T h e y r e q u i r e a m o r e precise analysis, w h i c h I c a n n o t u n d e r t a k e h e r e . T h e o r y f o r m a t i o n in t h e social sciences h a s t h e o p t i o n of defining t h e object d o m a i n to c o m p r i s e e i t h e r actions of t h e strategic type only o r b o t h strategic a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e actions. Strategic action c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d as a limiting case of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action; it oc-

13

Qbjectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

Table 1 Rules of Action

Social Norms

Technical and Strategic Rules

Linguistic Means of Definition

intersubjectively shared ordinary language

context-free language

Elements of Definition

reciprocal normative ex­ pectations of behavior

conditional predictions; conditional imperatives

Mechanisms of Acquisition

internalization of roles

learning of skills and qualifications

Function of the Type of Action

maintenance of institu­ tions (conformity to norms based o n recipro­ cal reinforcement)

problem-solving (goal at­ tainment, defined in terms of means-ends relations)

Sanctions for Violating Rules

p u n i s h m e n t based o n conventional sanctions; failure against social authority

lack of success; failure against reality

curs w h e n o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n i n t e r l o c u t o r s breaks d o w n as a m e a n s of m a i n t a i n i n g consensus, a n d each assumes an objectifying a t t i t u d e toward t h e other. For strategic action is based on rules for t h e purposive-rational choice of m e a n s ; a n d , in princi­ ple, each actor can m a k e this c h o i c e by herself. Maxims of b e h a v i o r in strategic action are d e t e r m i n e d by t h e interests of m a x i m i z i n g gains a n d m i n i m i z i n g losses in t h e context of c o m p e t i t i o n . In this case, my o t h e r is n o l o n g e r a n alter e g o whose e x p e c t a t i o n s I can fulfill (or d i s a p p o i n t ) a c c o r d i n g to intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d n o r m s . Rather, s h e is a n o p p o n e n t whose decisions I seek t o influence indirectly by m e a n s of p u n i s h m e n t s a n d rewards. I n s t r u ­ m e n t a l actions, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , are n o t social actions at all; rather, they can a p p e a r as c o m p o n e n t s of social actions (i.e., as ele­ m e n t s of role definitions). If only strategic actions are a d m i t t e d , we can d e v e l o p r a t i o n a l choice t h e o r i e s such as t h e o r i e s of e x c h a n g e . If c o m m u n i c a t i v e actions are a d m i t t e d as well, we can d e v e l o p conven­ tional theories of action such as those of W e b e r or Parsons. T h e third metatheoreticcd decision t h a t I c o n s i d e r to b e of major con­ s e q u e n c e is w h e t h e r we s h o u l d choose an atomistic o r a so-called

14

Lecture I

holistic a p p r o a c h . I c a n n o t go i n t o the details of t h e extensive litera­ t u r e o n this issue. B o t h c o n c e p t u a l strategies seem to m e to b e feasi­ ble, a l t h o u g h t h e different t h e o r i e s have different d o m a i n s of a p p l i c a t i o n a n d capacities. At t h e level of t h e o r i e s of action, t h e atomistic a p p r o a c h takes t h e f o r m of m e t h o d o l o g i c a l individualism. J. W. N. Watkins (in a g r e e m e n t with P o p p e r ) has f o r m u l a t e d two in­ d e p e n d e n t postulates: (a) "the u l t i m a t e c o n s t i t u e n t s of the social world a r e individual p e o p l e w h o act m o r e o r less appropriately in t h e light of their dispositions a n d t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of their situation." T h u s all social p h e n o m e n a m u s t be analyzable in t h e f o r m of state­ m e n t s a b o u t t h e actions of individual subjects. S t a t e m e n t s in a t h e o ­ retical idiom, w h i c h c o n t a i n s expressions for s u p r a i n d i v i d u a l social entities, such as roles, institutions, value systems, a n d traditions, are inadmissible unless they c a n b e r e d u c e d to s t a t e m e n t s in a n o t h e r t h e o r e t i c a l i d i o m in which t h e only p r e d i c a t e s a r e for acting subjects, t h e i r u t t e r a n c e s , a n d t h e i r motivations. T h e s e c o n d p o s t u l a t e is t h a t (b) "no social t e n d e n c y exists which could n o t b e a l t e r e d if t h e indi­ viduals c o n c e r n e d b o t h w a n t e d to alter it a n d possessed t h e a p p r o ­ priate information." T h i s s t r o n g e r claim h a s t h e status of a p h i l o s o p h i c a l a s s u m p t i o n . It states t h a t subjects capable of s p e e c h a n d action a r e t h e only a g e n t s of c h a n g e in t h e historical develop­ m e n t of social systems. Social c h a n g e can b e e x p l a i n e d with refer­ e n c e to t h e p r o p e r t i e s of supraindividual units (such as systems, g r o u p s , or s t r u c t u r e s ) if a n d only if these supraindividual p r o p e r t i e s a r e r e d u c i b l e to p r o p e r t i e s of individual subjects c a p a b l e of s p e e c h a n d action. T h e c o u n t e r p o s i t i o n to an individualistic t h e o r y of ac­ tion is r e p r e s e n t e d today by social systems t h e o r y (such as t h e work of D e u t s c h , P a r s o n s , a n d L u h m a n n ) . Systems t h e o r y takes i n t o ac­ c o u n t t h e fact t h a t t h e s t r u c t u r e of social n o r m s t r a n s c e n d s t h e sub­ jectively i n t e n d e d m e a n i n g of individuals acting a c c o r d i n g to n o r m s . Systems a r e i n t r o d u c e d as units t h a t c a n solve objectively given p r o b ­ lems t h r o u g h l e a r n i n g processes t h a t t r a n s c e n d individual subjects. 8

9

10

T h e t h r e e o p t i o n s t h a t I have m e n t i o n e d , from w h i c h a c o n c e p t u a l strategy for t h e social sciences m u s t b e c h o s e n , offer c o n v e n i e n t cri­ teria for classifying t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t theoretical a p p r o a c h e s , as in­ d i c a t e d i n table 2. I d o n o t w a n t to e x a m i n e t h e relative fruitfulness o f these various t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h e s . T h i s overview is i n t e n d e d r a t h e r for t h e

15 Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

Table 2 Approaches to Social T h e o r y Meaning as primitive term not admissible

admissible

behavior

strategic action

communicative (and strategic) action

atomistic

behaviorist psychology

rational choice theories (e.g., p u r e economics)

"interpretive" sociology (e.g., ethnomethodology)

holistic

biological sys­ tems theory

social cybernetics (e.g., organiza­ tional sociology)

structuralist and functionalist sys­ tems theories; sym­ bolic interactionism

p u r p o s e of classifying t h e generative t h e o r i e s of society t h a t I a m in­ terested in. Obviously they d o n o t b e l o n g a m o n g strictly behaviorist theories; n o m o r e , however, d o they b e l o n g a m o n g theories of strate­ gic action. T h e s e t h e o r i e s i n c o r p o r a t e a s s u m p t i o n s of rationality t h a t o b t a i n — a p p r o x i m a t e l y — b u t for limited s e g m e n t s of social reality. Both rational c h o i c e t h e o r i e s a n d social cybernetic m o d e l s have a n o r m a t i v e analytical status. T h e y c a n be applied only o n o n e of two presuppositions. T h e first is t h a t subjects act rationally a n d t h a t the assumed maxims of b e h a v i o r a r e in fact t h e basis of their actions. T h e s e c o n d is t h a t t h e self-regulating systems a r e stabilized in p r e ­ cisely t h e state t h a t is conventionally p o s t u l a t e d to b e o p t i m a l . G e n ­ erative t h e o r i e s of society c a n n o t b e l o n g to this type of theory, since they claim to c o m p r e h e n d t h e life process of society as a w h o l e a n d , in particular, as a c o n c r e t e process of t h e g e n e r a t i o n of m e a n i n g structures. T h e y d o n o t c o n t e n t themselves with s e g m e n t s of reality t h a t can b e seen as a p p r o x i m a t i n g m o d e l s of rationality. In o t h e r words, t h e y a r e n o t satisfied w i t h a n o r m a t i v e analytical status. T h e r e ­ fore t h e y m u s t b e classified u n d e r t h e type of t h e o r y t h a t a p p e a r s in t h e r i g h t h a n d c o l u m n of t h e table. T o be able to use this f r a m e w o r k to differentiate b e t w e e n different c o n s t r u c t i o n t h e o r i e s of society, we m u s t r e t u r n to t h e questions t h a t

16

Lecture I

already f o r c e d themselves u p o n u s with r e g a r d to t h e as yet u n c l e a r c o n c e p t of t h e g e n e r a t i o n of meaningfully o r g a n i z e d s t r u c t u r e s of life. If I a m right, we can try to clarify the generative process of soci­ ety by m e a n s of the following f o u r m o d e l s . T h e first modelis that of t h e knowing or " j u d g i n g " subject. K a n t ex­ a m i n e d t h e n e c e s s a r y subjective conditions of t h e possibility of em­ pirical k n o w l e d g e in g e n e r a l a n d , in so d o i n g , i n t r o d u c e d the c o n c e p t of the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the objects of e x p e r i e n c e . Following this p a t t e r n , Husserl c o n c e i v e d t h e constitution of t h e everyday world of lived e x p e r i e n c e (lifeworld) in which we can have experi­ ences, relate to objects a n d p e r s o n s , a n d p e r f o r m actions. Alfred Schutz in t u r n d e r i v e d a constitutive t h e o r y of society f r o m H u s s e r l ' s analysis. T h e epistemological origins of this p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l the­ ory of society are e v i d e n t in t h e title of t h e well-known study by Schutz's s t u d e n t s B e r g e r a n d L u c k m a n n . T h e y speak of t h e social c o n s t r u c t i o n of reality. T h e y conceive of t h e generative process of so­ ciety as p r o d u c i n g a n i m a g e of reality in relation to which subjects o r i e n t their b e h a v i o r toward o n e another. T h a t is why for B e r g e r a n d L u c k m a n n sociology a n d t h e sociology of k n o w l e d g e are basically identical. For t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of social reality coincides with the gen­ e r a t i o n of a worldview t h a t o r i e n t s social action. Constitutive theories a t t r i b u t e t h e process of g e n e r a t i o n t o a n acting subject. T h i s subject c a n b e e i t h e r a n intelligible e g o m o d e l e d after t h e e m p i r i c a l individ­ u a l subject or, as in H e g e l a n d M a r x a n d dialectical social theory, a species-subject constituting itself in history. L a t e r we shall see t h a t precisely t h e s e c o n c e p t s of a g e n e r a l i z e d individual ( " t r a n s c e n d e n ­ tal") consciousness or of a collective consciousness c r e a t e specific difficulties for transferring t h e constitutive m o d e l f r o m t h e w o r l d of possible e x p e r i e n c e to society. 11

T h e second and third models of t h e generative process of society are subjectless rule systems. I have in m i n d structuralist social a n t h r o p o l ­ ogy o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d sociological systems t h e o r y o n t h e other. B o t h s t r u c t u r a l i s m a n d systems t h e o r y conceive of society as a system of either symbolic forms o r i n f o r m a t i o n c h a n n e l s p r o d u c e d by u n ­ derlying s t r u c t u r e s . I n b o t h cases t h e d e e p structures are w i t h o u t a subject. They are a n o n y m o u s systems of rules. S t r u c t u r a l i s m m o d e l s

17__ Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

1

these on g r a m m a r , w h e r e a s systems t h e o r y thinks of t h e m as self regulating. T h e f o r m e r is b a s e d on structural linguistics g o i n g b a c k to Saussure, t h e l a t t e r o n cybernetics, which h a s b e e n t r a n s p o s e d to apply to o r g a n i s m s . T h e basic s t r u c t u r e s are subjectless in the s a m e sense as is t h e g r a m m a r of a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e or a self-regulating ma­ chine. W h a t first a p p e a r s to b e a n advantage t u r n s o u t to b e a weak­ ness specific to this p o i n t of view: T h e constitutive m o d e l n o m o r e shows t h e way o u t of t h e m o n a d i c shell of t h e active subject t h a n t h e systems m o d e l c a n i n c o r p o r a t e s p e a k i n g a n d a c t i n g subjects a n d , es­ pecially, t h e i r i n t e r r e l a t i o n s . For t h e system of g r a m m a t i c a l r u l e s re­ quires c o m p e t e n t speakers f o r its actualization, w h e r e a s t h e m a c h i n e regulates itself a n d h a s n o n e e d of a n y subject at all. I n n e i t h e r case is the p a r a d i g m suited for giving an a c c u r a t e a c c o u n t of h o w intersubjectively b i n d i n g m e a n i n g s t r u c t u r e s a r e g e n e r a t e d . For s u c h a n a c c o u n t , we c a n r e s o r t t o the fourth model, t h a t of ordi­ nary l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t i o n ( s p e e c h a n d i n t e r a c t i o n ) . H e r e we are d e a l i n g with the g e n e r a t i o n of i n t e r p e r s o n a l situations of speak­ ing a n d acting t o g e t h e r — t h a t is, with t h e f o r m of t h e intersubjec­ tivity of possible u n d e r s t a n d i n g [Verstdndigung]. The underlying abstract systems of r u l e s m u s t be conceived in such a way as to ex­ plain two things. T h e first is t h e p r a g m a t i c g e n e r a t i o n of t h e c o m ­ m o n basis of intersubjectively s h a r e d m e a n i n g . T h e second is t h e m o r e specifically linguistic g e n e r a t i o n of s e n t e n c e s t h a t we use in speech acts for p u r p o s e s of b o t h cognition a n d action. T h i s m o d e l p e r m i t s i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h e relation of intersubjectivity as o n e of t h e main topics of a generative t h e o r y of society. E x a m p l e s a r e G. H . M e a d ' s social psychology o f role-taking a n d t h e later W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s t h e o r y of l a n g u a g e g a m e s . T h e generative r u l e s u n d e r l y i n g role-tak­ ing a n d l a n g u a g e g a m e s a r e conceived as subjectless, j u s t like the grammatical r u l e s of a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e . However, they a r e c o n ­ structed in s u c h a way t h a t t h e surface s t r u c t u r e s t o w h i c h t h e y give rise i n c l u d e not only symbolic forms such as s e n t e n c e s a n d actions, b u t also t h e subjects of speech a n d a c t i o n themselves, w h o a r e f o r m e d t h r o u g h o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t i o n . M e a d ' s social psychology is at t h e s a m e t i m e a t h e o r y of socialization. T h e m e a n ­ ingful s t r u c t u r e s t h a t a generative t h e o r y of society m u s t a c c o u n t for

18 Lecture I

c o m p r i s e b o t h personality structures a n d t h e f o r m s of i n t e r s u b ­ jectivity within which subjects express themselves by m e a n s of s p e e c h and interaction. G e n e r a t i v e t h e o r i e s of society t h a t in o n e way or a n o t h e r p r e ­ s u p p o s e a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject I shall from n o w o n refer to as constitutive theories of society, those t h a t base t h e generative process o n s t r u c t u r e s lacking a subject system theories, a n d , finally, those t h a t ac­ c e p t abstract systems of r u l e s for g e n e r a t i n g intersubjective r e l a t i o n s in which subjects themselves a r e f o r m e d , communicative theories of soci­ ety. W e c a n add, as a differentiating feature, t h a t s o m e t h e o r i e s allow for t h e historical d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e active subject or u n d e r l y i n g rule systems, w h e r e a s o t h e r s e i t h e r keep to a strict d i c h o t o m y be­ tween t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a c h i e v e m e n t s a n d c o n s t i t u t e d p h e n o m e n a or at least e x c l u d e t h e logical r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e history of t h e con­ stitutive factors. T h i s yields t h e classification s h o w n in table 3. T h e i n f o r m a t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f this r o u g h overview is t o b e f o u n d in the—naturally e m p t y — b o t t o m right-hand c o r n e r . T h e table serves to d e l i m i t a t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h t h a t h a s n o t yet b e e n a d e q u a t e l y d e v e l o p e d . T h e r e f o r e I c a n n o t refer to a n existing body of work. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , I c a n a t l e a s t d r a w o n M e a d ' s t h e o r y of role-taking a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s t h e o r y of l a n g u a g e games. F o r they prefigure t h e universal p r a g m a t i c s t h a t I take to b e the r i g h t k i n d of f o u n d a t i o n for social t h e o r y a n d whose basic tenets I should like t o develop. But I w o u l d first like to c o n s i d e r t h e e x a m p l e of a constitutive t h e o r y of so­ ciety t h a t derives f r o m Kant. T h i s e x a m p l e will allow us to b e clear f r o m t h e o u t s e t a b o u t t h e p r e m i s e s to w h i c h we a r e c o m m i t t e d as s o o n as we try to conceive of t h e l e a r n i n g process of society as a g e n ­ erative p r o c e s s . Moreover, t h e characteristic weakness of constitutive t h e o r i e s will c o m e to light precisely in the p r o b l e m with w h i c h com­ m u n i c a t i v e t h e o r y begins: t h e derivation of intersubjective r e l a t i o n s f r o m t h e m o n o l o g i c a l f r a m e w o r k of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y of consciousness. G e o r g S i m m e l d e v o t e d a well-known a p p e n d i x to t h e first c h a p t e r of his m a j o r w o r k to the q u e s t i o n : "How is society possible?" T h i s is t h e a n a l o g u e to t h e basic question of t h e Critique of Pure Reason: H o w is k n o w l e d g e of n a t u r e possible? Kant h a d s o u g h t to answer this question by d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t t h e k n o w i n g subject itself constitutes 12

K L _ _ Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation :

Table 3 Generative Theories of Society Constitutive Theories

Systems Theories

Communica­ tive Theories

atomistic

holistic

holistic

holistic

not admissible

Neo-Kantianism (Rickert, Adler); Phe­ nomenology (Husserl, Schtitz)

romantic so­ cial theories (O. Spann)

structuralism (Levy-Strauss)

symbolic interactionism (G. H. Mead); theory of lan­ g u a g e games (Wittgenstein, Winch)

admissible

Marxist phe­ nomenology (Marcuse, Sartre, Kosik)

dialectical so­ cial theory (Lukacs, Adorno)

systems theory of societal de­ velopment (Parsons, Luhmann)

?

\

Types

historiX cal de- \ velopmenK of constitu- \ five factors \

n a t u r e as t h e r e a l m of t h e objects of possible e x p e r i e n c e . H e ana­ lyzed the necessary subjective c o n d i t i o n s of i n t u i t i o n a n d j u d g m e n t that a r e t h e a p r i o r i c o n d i t i o n s of t h e possibility of e x p e r i e n c e , t h a t is, t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of the m a n i f o l d of sensations as p h e n o m e n a in a totality of lawlike c o n n e c t i o n s . I n S i m m e l we find a classic formula­ tion of the a t t e m p t to e x t e n d this a p p r o a c h of a constitutive t h e o r y of t h e k n o w l e d g e of n a t u r e to a constitutive t h e o r y of society: n o t of the k n o w l e d g e of society, b u t of society itself. It is very tempting to treat as an analogous matter [analogous to the ques­ tion of the a priori conditions of the knowledge of nature—J. H . ] the ques­ tion of the aprioristic conditions under which society is possible. Here, also, we find individual elements. In a certain sense, they too, like sense percep­ tions, stay forever isolated from one another. They, likewise, are synthesized into the unity of society only by means of a conscious process which corre­ lates the individual existence of the single element with that of the other, and which does so only in certain forms and according to certain rules. 13

However, S i m m e l i m m e d i a t e l y n o t e s t h e key difference. F r o m t h e perspective of a constitutive theory, n a t u r e a n d society a r e n o t at t h e

20 Lecture I

same level of analysis. " N a t u r e " c a n be d e n n e d as a n object d o m a i n of k n o w l e d g e only in relation to t h e synthetic activity of t h e knowing subject, w h o creates unity in t h e m a n i f o l d of intuition. But t h e knowi n g subject e n c o u n t e r s society as an already c o n s t i t u t e d u n i t y — o n e c o n s t i t u t e d by empirical subjects themselves. T h e q u e s t i o n of how n a t u r e is c o n s t i t u t e d refers to t h e p r o b l e m of t h e knowledge of n a t u r e ; t h a t of h o w society is c o n s t i t u t e d refers to t h e p r o b l e m of h o w society is possible. T h e process of social life occurs o n t h e level of constitu­ tive activities a n d not, like the process of n a t u r a l events, at the level of w h a t is already constituted. I n o t h e r words, t h e processes of con­ sciousness w h e r e b y societal subjects constitute society t a k e p l a c e at t h e s a m e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l level at which t h e k n o w i n g subject consti­ tutes n a t u r e as the object of possible e x p e r i e n c e . T h u s the s p h e r e of society attains a type of objectivity in relation to the k n o w i n g m i n d t h a t n a t u r e c a n n o t claim in r e l a t i o n to t h e subject involved in know­ ing n a t u r e . [T] here is a decisive difference between the unity of a society and the unity of nature. It is this: In the Kantian view (which we follow here), the unity of nature emerges in the observing subject exclusively; it is produced exclu­ sively by him in the sense data, and on the basis of sense data, which are in themselves heterogeneous. By contrast, the unity of society needs no ob­ server. It is directiy realized by its own elements because these elements are themselves conscious and synthesizing units. . . . Societal unification needs no factors outside its own component elements. Each of them exercises the function which the psychic energy of the observer exercises in regard to ex­ ternal nature: the consciousness of constituting a unity with the others is ac­ tually all there is to this unity. 14

S i m m e l goes o n to say t h a t Owing to these circumstances, the question of how society is possible im­ plies a methodology which is wholly different from that for the question of how nature is possible. The latter question is answered by the forms of cog­ nition, whereby the subject synthesizes the given elements into "nature." By contrast, the former is answered by the conditions which reside a priori in the elements themselves, whereby they combine, in reality, into the synthesis "society." 15

T h i s c o n s i d e r a t i o n is of c e n t r a l i m p o r t a n c e for t h e starting p o i n t of all g e n e r a t i v e t h e o r i e s of society, r e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r t h e y follow

' 1

2 1 _ _ _

-

Objectivist and Subjectivist Approaches to Theory Formation

pilthev, Rickert, Husserl, o r Wittgenstein or a r e based directly o n j ^ t or H e g e l a n d M a r x . F o r it is t h e f o u n d a t i o n of a dualistic philos­ ophy of science, which o n p r i n c i p l e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l l y sets off t h e cul­ tural or social sciences a n d h u m a n i t i e s f r o m the n a t u r a l sciences. Nature is r e g a r d e d as a n object d o m a i n t h a t can b e a c c o u n t e d for i n terms of t h e constitutive activities of t h e k n o w i n g subject. I n con­ trast, t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of society by m e a n s of t h e synthetic activities of societal subjects p r o d u c e s s o m e t h i n g t h a t is singularly objective in comparison to n a t u r e . It c o n f r o n t s t h e k n o w i n g subject as a unity that is already meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d , leaving t h e subject with t h e possibility only of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g o r r e p r o d u c i n g a constitutive act t h a t has a l r e a d y b e e n a c c o m p l i s h e d . T h i s dualism h a s t h r e e implica­ tions for the t h e o r e d c a l p r o g r a m of t h e social sciences, all of w h i c h c a n already b e f o u n d in Simmel. i n

First, a constitutive social t h e o r y goes b e y o n d t h e s p h e r e of c o g n i ­ tion of n a t u r e , t h a t is, of science. T h e p r e c o n s t i t u t e d w o r l d t h a t so­ cial science m u s t r e c o n s t r u c t in o r d e r to b e able to explain societal processes is t h e s p h e r e of prescientific e x p e r i e n c e a n d of everyday practices. T h a t is Fry t h e analysis of t h e lifeworld b e c o m e s t h e focus of Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y . Second, t r a n s c e n d e n t a l analysis, w h e n a p p l i e d to t h e n o n c o g n i tive, practical a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s of a subjectivity t h a t is n o l o n g e r u n ­ derstood merely as t h e subject of possible k n o w l e d g e , leads to conceiving of t h e system of social life as a "fact of k n o w l e d g e , " to use Simmel's e x p r e s s i o n . T h e p r o g r a m of e x a m i n i n g t h e necessary sub­ jective c o n d i t i o n s of possible sociation with m e a n s b o r r o w e d from epistemology is b y n o m e a n s self-evident. F o r the phenomenon which arises from these processes of sociation and which receives its norms from their forms is not cognition but consists of practical processes and actual situations. Nevertheless, what is to be examined (as the general idea of sociation) in regard to its conditions is something cognitive, namely, the consciousness of sociating or of being sociated. This conscious­ ness is perhaps better called knowledge (Wissen) than cognition (Erkenntnis). For here, the subject is not confronting an object of which it gradually acquires a theoretical picture. . . . It is the processes of interaction which sig­ nify to the individual the fact of being sociated—not an abstract fact, to be sure, but a fact capable of abstract expression. What are the forms that must underlie this fact? What specific categories are there that human beings

22 Lecture I

must come with, so to speak, so that this consciousness may arise? And what, therefore, are the forms that this consciousness—society as a fact of knowl­ edge—has to support? These questions may be called (the subject matter of) the epistemology of society. 16

T h i s t u r n in t h e a r g u m e n t has a n o t e w o r t h y implication. If t h e sys­ tem of social life is c o n s t r u c t e d out of cognitive acts, t h e n it rests on the facticity of the s a m e validity claims as are p o s i t e d with every f o r m of k n o w l e d g e . Consciousness, we say, can b e t r u e or false, c o r r e c t or i n c o r r e c t , r a t i o n a l or i r r a t i o n a l . T h e r e f o r e a society t h a t is m e a n i n g ­ fully s t r u c t u r e d by synthetic acts of consciousness a n d is c o n s t i t u t e d as a "fact of k n o w l e d g e " h a s an i m m a n e n t r e l a t i o n to t r u t h . I shall e l a b o r a t e o n this later. A g a i n it was Husserl w h o first said this a n d de­ v e l o p e d a t h e o r y of t r u t h t h a t i n c o r p o r a t e d everyday practice. Third, S i m m e l h a d already discovered t h e difficulty with which all constitutive t h e o r i e s of society struggle in vain. Epistemology is con­ c e r n e d w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l (or individual) subject a n d its cognitive object, a n d this r e l a t i o n is in p r i n c i p l e m o n o l o g i c a l . Society, in contrast, is c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o u g h t h e syn­ thetic a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s of a multiplicity of subjects, w h o mutually r e c o g n i z e o n e a n o t h e r as subjects. But h o w can t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of this intersubjectivity be c o n c e p t u a l i z e d by m e a n s of a n e p i s t e m o l o g y t h a t is c o m m i t t e d to a m o n o l o g i c a l a p p r o a c h ? T h e O t h e r is e n c o u n ­ t e r e d as a c e n t e r of possible constitutive a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s o n t h e s a m e level as t h e k n o w i n g e g o : [T]he other m i n d has for me the same reality which I have myself, a n d this reality is very different from that of a material object. . . . This for-itself (Fur-sich) of the other does not prevent us from turning it into our represen­ tation. In other words, something which can by no means be resolved into our representing, nevertheless becomes its content, and thus the product of our representative capacity. This phenomenon is the fundamental psychologico-epistemological paradigm and problem of sociation. 17

T h i s p r o b l e m was t a k e n u p b y Husserl, w h o dealt with it m o s t subtly i n his Cartesian Meditations. 18

II The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society: The Fundamental Role of Claims to Validity and the Monadological Foundations of Intersubj ectivity

It is n o a c c i d e n t t h a t t h e m o s t influential constitutive social t h e o r y in c o n t e m p o r a r y sociology, especially in t h e U n i t e d States, is based o n t h e work of Husserl. For Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y is b e t t e r suited than Kant's t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y to e x p a n d i n g t h e constitutive theory of k n o w l e d g e into a t h e o r y of society. T h e r e are two reasons for this. First, H u s s e r l differs from K a n t t h r o u g h his r e c o u r s e to t h e lifeworld as t h e level in which t h e t h e o r y of k n o w l e d g e is g r o u n d e d . Second, h e uses t h e c o n c e p t of constitution in a descriptive m a n n e r . I s h o u l d like to discuss these two p o i n t s b e f o r e g o i n g i n t o t h e two p r o b l e m s t h a t m u s t be solved by any constitutive social theory, in­ c l u d i n g those t h a t have overcome t h e limitations of a p h i l o s o p h y of consciousness: t h e p r o b l e m of society's i m m a n e n t r e l a t i o n to t r u t h , a n d t h e p r o b l e m of t h e f o u n d a t i o n of intersubjectivity. (a) Like Husserl, Kant analyzed t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of a world of pos­ sible e x p e r i e n c e . Yet u n l i k e Husserl, h e focused o n objectivity, t h a t is, o n t h e necessary subjective c o n d i t i o n s of possible k n o w l e d g e of n a t u r e . For K a n t believed t h a t a c c o u n t i n g for t h e validity of t h e m o s t exact empirical j u d g m e n t s (that is, t h e t h e o r e t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s of c o n t e m p o r a r y physics) w o u l d at t h e s a m e t i m e a c c o u n t for t h e tran­ s c e n d e n t a l bases of e x p e r i e n c e in g e n e r a l . H u s s e r l challenges t h e self-evidence of this view i n his f a m o u s treatise, The Crisis of the Euro­ pean Sciences. H e conceives the object d o m a i n of the n a t u r a l sciences n o t as t h e i n f r a s t r u c t u r e of t h e objects of p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e i n 1

24

Lecture II

g e n e r a l , b u t as a derived artificial p r o d u c t . This artifice can b e ade­ quately a c c o u n t e d for only if we disclose t h e everyday lifeworld as t h e f o r g o t t e n f o u n d a t i o n of m e a n i n g . Since Galileo, t h e n a t u r a l sciences have dealt with a f o r m of " n a t u r e " t h a t has e m e r g e d from a transfor­ m a t i o n of prescientific everyday e x p e r i e n c e , o r g a n i z e d as a lifeworld, r a t h e r t h a n from a synthesis of t h e m a n i f o l d of sensations given p r i o r to any o r g a n i z e d e x p e r i e n c e . This c o m m o n s e n s e experi­ e n c e of daily life is at first relative t o the b o d y and its organs: T h e per­ c e p t u a l field is kinesthetically s t r u c t u r e d . It is tailored to t h e perspective of an ego: T h e e x p e r i e n c e of space a n d time is c e n t e r e d in a subject. S e c o n d , everyday e x p e r i e n c e is f o r m e d n o t only in ac­ c o r d a n c e w i t h cognitive e n d s b u t in c o n n e c t i o n with affective atti­ tudes, i n t e n t i o n s , a n d practical i n t e r v e n t i o n s in t h e objective world. N e e d s a n d e m o t i o n a l attitudes, as well as valuations a n d actions, f o r m a h o r i z o n of n a t u r a l interests; a n d only in this c o n t e x t c a n ex­ p e r i e n c e s c o m e into b e i n g and be c o r r e c t e d . T h i r d , everyday experi­ e n c e is n o t a p r i v a t e matter. It is p a r t of an intersubjectively s h a r e d world in w h i c h I live, speak, a n d act t o g e t h e r w i t h o t h e r subjects. Intersubjectively c o m m u n a l i z e d e x p e r i e n c e is e x p r e s s e d in symbolic systems, especially n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e , in which a c c u m u l a t e d knowl­ edge is p r e g i v e n to t h e individual subject as c u l t u r a l tradition. At this level we e n c o u n t e r cultural objects, which are expressions of t h e life of subjects c a p a b l e of action a n d speech. T h e sciences, too, are s u c h cultural objects. H u s s e r l makes us realize t h a t Kant naively took as his starting p o i n t t h e object d o m a i n of physics a n d failed to see t h a t scientific t h e o r i e s of this type a r e p r o d u c e d in a c o m m u n i t y of investigators ( P e i r c e ) . This c o m m u n i t y , in t u r n , m u s t take for g r a n t e d t h e factual validity of its everyday lifeworld: Since this is to be a matter of spiritual functions which exercise their accom­ plishment in all experiencing and thinking, indeed in each and every preoc­ cupation of the human world-life, functions through which the world of experience, as the constant horizon of existing things, has any meaning and validity for us, it would certainly be understandable that all objective sci­ ences would lack the precise knowledge of what is most fundamental, namely, the knowledge of what could procure meaning and validity for the theoretical structures of objective knowledge with any meaning and validity

25___ The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society

and thus first gives them the dignity of a knowledge which is ultimately grounded. 2

T h u s we m i s c o n s t r u e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e world of possible experi­ ence if we c h o o s e t h e object d o m a i n of scientific k n o w l e d g e as o u r paradigm a n d fail to see t h a t science is a n c h o r e d in t h e lifeworld a n d that this lifeworld is t h e basis of t h e m e a n i n g of scientifically objectified reality. T h e constitutive t h e o r y of empirical k n o w l e d g e must t h e r e f o r e presuppose a constitutive t h e o r y of t h e lifeworld. T h e latter, in t u r n , c o m p r i s e s a constitutive t h e o r y of society (as p a r t of a so-called o n t o l o g y of t h e lifeworld ). 3

(b) But this is n o t t h e only r e a s o n why p h e n o m e n o l o g y is c o n g e ­ nial to the project of a consdtutive t h e o r y of society. Husserl gives the concept of c o n s t i t u t i o n itself a descriptive t u r n , so t h a t an i n t e r p r e ­ tive sociology b a s e d o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g [ Verstehen], s u c h as t h a t devel­ o p e d by Alfred Schtitz, c a n consistently i n c o r p o r a t e Husserl's analyses of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e lifeworld. H e r e again, H u s s e r l dif­ fers from Kant. K a n t conceives the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the objects of pos­ sible e x p e r i e n c e as t h e genesis of t h e necessary subjective c o n d i t i o n s of t h e synthesis of a m a n i f o l d . T h u s h e arrives a t a g e n e r a l t h e o r y of t h e activities a n d u n d e r l y i n g s t r u c t u r e s of t h e k n o w i n g mind. By con­ trast, Husserl from t h e outset directs t h e m e d i t a t i n g p h e n o m enologist's reflective gaze at t h e way in w h i c h s e n s o r y a n d categorial objects are "given" to him. U n l i k e Kant, Husserl does n o t w a n t to re­ c o n s t r u c t t h e o n e universal m o d e of objectification t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e e x p e r i e n c e of reality b e c o m e s at all possible. Rather, h e w a n t s to grasp descriptively t h e varying m o d e s of t h e "self-givenness" of o b ­ jects. For a n y object w h a t e v e r t h a t r e m a i n s t h e s a m e t h r o u g h o u t o u r c h a n g i n g m o d e s of consciousness, we c a n "see," as it were, h o w its m e a n i n g a n d b e i n g are s h a p e d in h o w it is given to us by o u r syn­ thetic a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s . T r u e , Husserl, too, assumes a universally productive subjectivity. But this subjectivity g e n e r a t e s an open hori­ z o n of possible objects, w h i c h allows a m a n i f o l d of various types of objectivity t h a t c a n b e g r a s p e d o n l y descriptively. I n this way, Husserl clears t h e way for a constitutive t h e o r y of society, which a d o p t s a descriptive a t t i t u d e a n d studies t h e universal struc­ tures of t h e lifeworld. A sociology t h a t p r o c e e d s p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y 4

26 Lecture II

u n d e r s t a n d s t h e social lifeworld from t h e outset as a world consti­ t u t e d by synthetic a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s . In the m o s t g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e of these activities it recognizes t h e typical m e a n i n g s t r u c t u r e s t h a t intersubjectively c o m m u n a l i z e d subjects m u s t continually p r o d u c e insofar as they at all o r i e n t themselves to objects of possible e x p e r i ­ ence in t h e i r everyday p r a c t i c e . H u s s e r l ' s p h e n o m e n o l o g y h a s o n e final a d v a n t a g e over Kant's a s a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o a sociological version of constitutive theory. P h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l investigation takes as its f r a m e of r e f e r e n c e n o t a n a n o n y m o u s consciousness in g e n e r a l , b u t r a t h e r t h e individual tran­ s c e n d e n t a l ego of t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l o b s e r v e r (who practices t h e epoche). H u s s e r l assumes a multiplicity of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l egos w h o c o n s t i t u t e t h e social lifeworld in r e l a t i o n to o n e a n o t h e r d e s p i t e t h e cognitive priority of e a c h o n e ' s own subjectivity. By contrast, K a n t (at least in his t h e o r e t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y ) strictly distinguishes b e t w e e n a plurality of e m p i r i c a l egos a n d a singular t r a n s c e n d e n t a l conscious­ ness in g e n e r a l . T h u s t h e p r o b l e m of t h e possible t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o m m u n i t y of subjects w h o first monadically p r o d u c e t h e i r world c a n n o t even arise for h i m . 5

I n o w w a n t t o e x a m i n e m o r e closely two p r o b l e m s t h a t r e s u l t f r o m t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n of a constitutive t h e o r y of society. We shall see t h a t these p r o b l e m s arise for any conceivable g e n e r a t i v e t h e o r y of society. I w a n t to show that they c a n n o t be solved within the framework of a t h e o r y of consciousness a n d that they necessitate the transition to a t h e o r y of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . Every society t h a t we conceive of as a meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d sys­ tem of life has a n i m m a n e n t relation to t r u t h . For the reality of m e a n i n g s t r u c t u r e s is b a s e d on the p e c u l i a r facticity of claims to va­ lidity: In g e n e r a l , these claims a r e naively a c c e p t e d — t h a t is, they are p r e s u m e d to be fulfilled. B u t validity claims can, of c o u r s e , be called i n t o q u e s t i o n . T h e y raise a claim to legitimacy, a n d this legitimacy can b e p r o b l e m a t i z e d : It can b e c o n f i r m e d o r rejected. W e can s p e a k of " t r u t h " h e r e o n l y in t h e b r o a d sense of t h e legitimacy of a claim t h a t c a n be fulfilled o r d i s a p p o i n t e d . T h u s we say, f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t a n o p i n i o n o r assertion, as well as a h o p e , wish, o r guess, is c o r r e c t o r justified, t h a t a p r o m i s e o r a n n o u n c e m e n t has b e e n p r o p e r l y m a d e ,

27. The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society

that advice has b e e n h o n o r a b l y given, t h a t a m e a s u r e has b e e n p r o p ­ erly taken, a d e s c r i p t i o n o r an evaluation correctly d o n e . I n everyday interactions, we rely naively o n an u n s u r v e y a b l e wealth of such claims t o legitimacy. It is always only individual claims t h a t e m e r g e from t h i s b a c k g r o u n d a n d t h a t a r e t h e m a t i z e d a n d c h e c k e d in case of d i s a p p o i n t m e n t . Husserl c a p t u r e s t h e specific c h a r a c t e r of factually operative m e a n i n g s t r u c t u r e s with the c o n c e p t of intentionality, which he de­ rives p r i m a r i l y f r o m B r e n t a n o . I n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s h a v e t h e c h a r a c t e r of being t h e consciousness of something. T h e y a r e d i r e c t e d toward s o m e t h i n g in t h e way t h a t an o p i n i o n , e x p e c t a t i o n , o r wish is paradigmatically o r i e n t e d toward an object o r state of affairs. Sen­ tences f o r m e d with i n t e n t i o n a l expressions, such as "believe," "ex­ pect," a n d "wish," always r e q u i r e a direct object o r objective clause of the f o r m "I hate (insult) x" or "I m e a n t h a t p." This g r a m m a t i c a l form expresses w h a t Husserl w a n t e d to grasp i m m e d i a t e l y at t h e level of consciousness with t h e c o n c e p t of intentionality. W h a t distin­ guishes i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s from o n e a n o t h e r is t h e m e a n i n g with w h i c h different acts of consciousness a r e d i r e c t e d toward t h e i r objects. Different i n t e n t i o n s m a y b e d i r e c t e d at t h e s a m e object, in which case t h e y h a v e , as H u s s e r l says (in t h e first Logical Investiga­ tion) , the s a m e real [reell] c o n t e n t b u t different i n t e n t i o n a l c o n t e n t s . T h e latter h e also refers t o as t h e i n t e n t i o n a l object ( o r noema, as h e calls it from Ideas o n w a r d ) . It is to Husserl's c r e d i t t h a t h e e l u c i d a t e d t h e r e m a r k a b l e i n t e n t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of o u r consciousness a n d d e m ­ o n s t r a t e d t h e i m m a n e n t t r u t h r e l a t i o n of i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s . 6

We i n t e n d a n object t h a t is n o t p r e s e n t t o u s , b u t w h i c h w e k n o w c o u l d b e directly given to us. I n t e n t i o n a l i t y r e q u i r e s t h e possibility of t h e virtual p r e s e n c e of objects t h a t could also b e actually p r e s e n t . O t h e r w i s e we w o u l d n o t b e a b l e t o take quite different i n t e n t i o n a l at­ titudes toward t h e same object. T h e i n t e n t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of o u r con­ sciousness r e q u i r e s t h e possibility of a difference b e t w e e n t h e m e r e l y m e d i a t e d a n d t h e i m m e d i a t e givenness of objects. A t t h e linguistic level, we c a n illustrate this difference in t e r m s of t h e division of t h e declarative s e n t e n c e i n t o a subject expression a n d a p r e d i c a t e ex­ pression. T h e subject expression, a n o u n o r definite description, re­ fers t o a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t t h a t c a n b e d e t e r m i n e d by t h e positive or

28 Lecture II

negative ascription of p r e d i c a t e s . T h i s r e f e r e n c e d o e s n o t r e q u i r e t h a t t h e object d e n o t e d b e p r e s e n t . R a t h e r , it suffices t h a t t h e object c a n b e r e p r e s e n t e d a t all as a n identifiable object. It is t o this f e a t u r e of t h e logic of l a n g u a g e t h a t we owe t h e possibility of contexti n d e p e n d e n t l a n g u a g e use. I n d e e d , t h e m o s t n o t a b l e a c h i e v e m e n t of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n is precisely t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of objects a n d states of affairs t h a t are absent. W i t h i n t h e b o u n d s of a t h e o r y of consciousness, however, H u s s e r l c a n n o t m a k e t h e distinction b e t w e e n c o n t e x t - d e p e n d e n t e x p e r i e n c e a n d c o n t e x t - t r a n s c e n d e n t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by m e a n s of referential ex­ pressions (which refer to t h e c o n t e x t or s i t u a t i o n ) . Instead, h e inter­ p r e t s t h e difference b e t w e e n t h e m e d i a t e d a n d i m m e d i a t e givenness of objects as a difference b e t w e e n n o n i n t u i t i v e givenness a n d intu­ itively fulfilled givenness. T h e m e a n i n g of an i n t e n t i o n a l object t h e n always r e q u i r e s t h e possibility of t h e intuitively i m m e d i a t e p r e s e n c e of t h e object. T h e intuitive r i c h n e s s of a n object t h a t is given in evi­ d e n c e can h e n c e be u n d e r s t o o d as t h e fulfillment of a c o r r e s p o n d ­ ing i n t e n t i o n of t h e object. Ideally, t h e stages of fulfillment p o i n t to a goal in which t h e entire i n t e n t i o n has b e e n fulfilled. T h e full intu­ itive p r e s e n c e of t h e object leaves, so to speak, n o trace of unfulfilled i n t e n t i o n . T h i s c o n c e p t i o n is c o n n e c t e d with a c o n c e p t of t r u t h as evidence, discussion of w h i c h I shall p o s t p o n e f o r t h e m o m e n t . H u s s e r l i n t r o d u c e s his t h e o r y of t r u t h w i t h o u t f u r t h e r justification. H e considers it simply "the p r i n c i p l e of all principles: t h a t . . . every­ t h i n g originarily offered to us in ' i n t u i t i o n ' is to b e a c c e p t e d simply as w h a t it is p r e s e n t e d as b e i n g . " T r u t h c a n t h e n b e d e f i n e d with ref­ e r e n c e to t h e c o n c e p t of i n t e n t i o n . T r u t h is t h e identifying t h o u g h t , a c c o m p a n i e d by an evidential e x p e r i e n c e , of s o m e t h i n g i n t e n d e d , as c o i n c i d i n g with a c o r r e s p o n d i n g intuitively given object. Conversely, it follows from this t h a t all i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s are i m m a n e n t l y a n d necessarily related to t r u t h . 7

W h a t m a t t e r s for my p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s is t h e following consider­ ation. Every i n t e n t i o n is usually c o n n e c t e d w i t h a "positing," w h e r e b y t h e act of consciousness goes b e y o n d t h e i n t e n d e d object a n d antici­ pates its factual givennness. T h e quality of positing consists in antici­ p a t i n g t h e intuitive fulfillment of t h e i n t e n t i o n . T h e unfulfilled act posits t h e i n t e n t i o n a l object as existing. In so d o i n g , it associates with

29_ The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society

it t h e claim t h a t if t h e object w e r e to c o m e to t h e s t a g e of self-givenness, it w o u l d a p p e a r j u s t as it is i n t e n d e d , a n d n o t o t h e r ­ wise. S u c h a c l a i m is e i t h e r legitimate o r illegitimate; its legitimacy can b e d e m o n s t r a t e d only by t h e intuitive fulfillment of t h e origi­ nally "empty" i n t e n t i o n . O f course, positing qualities c a n also be bracketed or "neutralized," in which case we set aside t h e question of the legitimacy of t h e claim t h a t a given i n t e n t i o n c a n b e fulfilled pre­ cisely as anticipated. I n t e n t i o n s t h a t are not n e u t r a l i z e d in this sense, however, a r e c o n n e c t e d with a validity claim t h a t c a n b e u n d e r m i n e d a t a n y t i m e by a failed a t t e m p t to b r i n g t h e i n t e n d e d object to a d e ­ quate self-givenness. T h e lifeworld as a w h o l e is a l s o posited. F o r t h e m e a n i n g struc­ tures t h a t c o n s t i t u t e t h e lifeworld exist only in t h e manifold of valid­ ity claims i n h e r e n t in t h e m . T h e s e claims c o m e t o g e t h e r in the "general thesis of t h e n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e , " t h a t is, in t h e basic belief of naive realism t h a t " t h e " world in which I find myself exists a n d has al­ ways existed as a n actuality t h a t s u r r o u n d s m e . T h e g e n e r a l thesis e n c o m p a s s e s t h e totality of life in t h e n a t u r a l world. 8

There we move in a current of ever new experiences, judgments, valuations, and decisions. In each of these acts, the ego is directed toward objects in its surrounding world, dealing with them in one way or another. It is of them that we are conscious in these acts themselves, sometimes simply as actual, sometimes in modalities of actuality (for example as possible, doubtful, etc.). None of these acts, and none of the validities contained in them, is iso­ lated. In their intentions they necessarily imply an infinite horizon of inac­ tive [inaktuelle] validity which simultaneously function with them in flowing mobility. 9

Interestingly e n o u g h , Husserl extends t h e positing characteristics t h a t h e derived from a p a r t i c u l a r class of i n t e n t i o n s to all classes of i n t e n t i o n s . At first, positings are c o n n e c t e d with so-called doxic acts t h a t are o r i e n t e d to matters of fact. For t h e belief t h a t a n i n t e n d e d object in fact d o e s o r d o e s n o t exist as i n t e n d e d is associated with such i n t e n t i o n s as p e r c e p t i o n s , r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , m e m o r i e s , j u d g ­ m e n t s , a n d so on. Moreover, it w o u l d a p p e a r t h a t only acts of this sort imply t h e k i n d of m o d a l i t i e s of B e i n g — t h a t is, modifications of t h e absolute certainty of t h e existence of a n object (of Urdoxa)—such t h a t I consider it possible o r p r o b a b l e o r d o u b t f u l t h a t a n i n t e n d e d

30 Lecture II

object will a p p e a r in reality j u s t as it is i n t e n d e d . But if only doxic acts were capable of t r u t h , t h e n H u s s e r l could n o t s u p p o r t t h e assertion t h a t positings are c o n n e c t e d with all i n t e n t i o n s . I n d e e d , h e w o u l d h a v e to a b a n d o n t h e c o n c e p t of i n t e n t i o n itself: For this c o n c e p t al­ ways c o n t a i n s the a n t i c i p a t i o n of possible fulfillment t h r o u g h evi­ d e n t self-givenness, as well as, in p r i n c i p l e , the possible d i s a p p o i n t m e n t of such fulfillment; a n d it t h u s always has an i m m a ­ n e n t relation to t r u t h . This w o u l d also r e n d e r u n t e n a b l e t h e ex­ tremely strong thesis t h a t t h e lifeworld itself is b a s e d o n t h e facticity of a c c e p t e d validity claims t h a t in p r i n c i p l e can n o n e t h e l e s s b e p r o b l e m a t i z e d . If, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , all i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s h a v e a n i m m a n e n t r e l a t i o n to t r u t h , t h a t is, if all i n t e n t i o n s a r e d e f i n e d by t h e possibility of their intuitive fulfillment (or disappoint­ m e n t ) , t h e n acts of t h e " s p h e r e of e m o t i o n a n d will," as H u s s e r l calls t h e m , m u s t also imply positings. T h e r e a r e two a r g u m e n t s for this. First, all e m o t i o n a l a n d volitional acts, such as fears a n d desires, a n d decisions a n d e x p r e s s i o n s of will, a r e b u i l t u p o n acts in w h i c h a n object is i n t e n d e d . I n t e n t i o n a l s t a t e m e n t s such as "I fear (or h o p e or desire) t h a t t h i s m a n will d e p a r t " refer to a state of affairs t h a t may or may n o t obtain. (In o u r e x a m p l e s , t h e s a m e state of affairs is r e p r e ­ s e n t e d in e a c h case by t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t "that this m a n will d e p a r t . " ) T h e r e f o r e emotive a n d volitional acts imply, as Husserl says, p o t e n t i a l positings: T h e y a r e potentially thetic. S e c o n d , how­ ever, emotive a n d volitional acts also c o n t a i n positings i n themselves, a n d n o t only w i t h r e g a r d to t h e potentially existing states of affairs t o which they refer. T h e types of positings for emotive a n d volitional acts are g r o u n d e d . Husserl assumes specific positings t h a t can b e ex­ plicated as value j u d g m e n t s , such as t h a t an i n t e n d e d object is o r is not actually (or p r o b a b l y o r presumably) pleasing o r repulsive, lovely or h o r r i b l e , desirable or indifferent, beautiful o r ugly, g o o d o r evil: "Even in valuing, wishing, willing, s o m e t h i n g is 'posited,' a p a r t f r o m t h e d o x i c positiohality ' i n h e r e n t ' in t h e m . " A n d elsewhere: 10

On the one hand, there are new characteristics which are analogous to the modes of belief but possess, at the same time, themselves doxo-logical positableness; on the other hand, connected with the novel moments there are also novel "apprehensions," and a new sense becomes constituted. . . . with it no new determining parts of mere "things" are constituted, but instead

31___ The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society

values of things, value-qualities, or concrete Objects with values: beauty and ugliness, goodness and badness; the use-Object, the art work, the machine, the book, the action, the deed, and so forth. 11

Even nondoxically p e r f o r m e d acts of consciousness, t h e r e f o r e , imply claims t o validity t h a t c a n b e naively p r e s u p p o s e d o r p r o b l e m a t i z e d , accepted or rejected. T h e universal a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e c o n c e p t of intuitively fulfillable intention g u a r a n t e e s t h a t all meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d f o r m a t i o n s are capable of t r u t h , w h e t h e r they have cognitive m e a n i n g o r primarily e m o t i o n a l a n d volitional m e a n i n g . T h a t is why H u s s e r l can a d o p t Cartesian l a n g u a g e . H e calls all i n t e n t i o n a l objects cogitata, r e g a r d ­ less of w h e t h e r they are associated with doxic or n o n d o x i c positing qualities. T h u s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of everyday lived practices c a n be conceived a c c o r d i n g to principles of a constitutive t h e o r y of knowl­ edge u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g s ego, cogitatio, a n d cogitatum. T h e entire life process must be r e d u c i b l e to the p e r f o r m a n c e of acts by a p r o d u c t i v e subjectivity, w h i c h articulates itself in m e a n i n g s t r u c t u r e s of possible objects of intuitive e x p e r i e n c e . F r o m t h e fact t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l life universally is o r i e n t e d t o t r u t h , Husserl d r e w a n ethical c o n c l u s i o n . H e i n f e r r e d f r o m it t h e r e m a r k ­ able d e m a n d for a b s o l u t e self-responsibility o n t h e p a r t of sociated h u m a n beings. T h i s r a d i c a l n o t i o n is d e v e l o p e d i n his m u c h n e ­ glected essay, " T h e I d e a of Individual a n d C o m m u n i t y Life in Abso­ l u t e Self-Responsibility":1

Here clearly emerges the universality with which the realm of knowledge en­ compasses all types of activities that derive from emotional and volitional subjectivity. Correlatively, however, the sphere of the valuating emotions and the will, in their endeavors and activities, extends to the entirety of subjectiv­ ity and all its intentional functions. What this means for science, however, is that all of evaluative and practical reason is reflected and objectified in sci­ ence as the objectification of cognitive reason. In other words, all truth, in­ cluding every evaluative and practical truth, finds expression and is determined in the cognitive forms of theoretical truth, where it also takes on the forms of cognitive justification. 13

Absolute self-responsibility is t h e subjective c o u n t e r p a r t of t h e i n t e n ­ tional s t r u c t u r e of t h e lifeworld; for t h e positings of t h e lifeworld im­ ply an interest in p r o v i n g t h e i r p r e s u m p t i v e legitimacy. O n b o t h t h e

32 Lecture II

p e r s o n a l as well as t h e political level, a life is irresponsible if it con­ tents itself with t h e facticity of claims to validity without a t t e m p t i n g to verify t h e lifeWorld's universal t r u t h claim t h r o u g h t h e equally com­ p r e h e n s i v e exercise of p h i l o s o p h i c a l reason. A c c o r d i n g to this idea, h u m a n p r a c t i c e c o u l d be said to be radically responsible only if the c o n s t i t u t i n g activities from w h i c h t h e lifeworld is c o n s t r u c t e d were first r e c o n s t i t u t e d in t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a t t i t u d e , a n d all empty positings w e r e u n c o v e r e d a n d all unfulfillable i n t e n t i o n s rejected: We must consider that every form of human action, willing, and feeling can become the object of sciences in which it becomes the theoretical object, and that every instance of theoretical knowledge can find immediate nor­ mative application, in which it becomes the rule for a possible practice, etc. Since it is the vocation of philosophy as universal science to be the original source from which all other sciences draw their ultimate justification, we can then understand that such a philosophy can be no theoretical fancy to hu­ man beings. Rather, a philosophical life must be understood as life itself based on absolute self-responsibility. 14

For Husserl this c o n t e m p l a t i v e life is n o t only t h e business of t h e in­ dividual p h i l o s o p h e r b u t also a political p r o g r a m : This question, how—ideally speaking—a majority if not the totality of per­ sons who are in possible relations of mutual understanding or are already linked as a community through personal relations would lead a life for which they could take absolute responsibility, leads to another: is communal life of this sort conceivable without a community of wills directed at such a life based on absolute responsibility? Furthermore, is such a life possible if the idea of it has not first been worked out scientifically, epistemologically, that is, unless we have a normative science about it (ethics)? '' 1

T h u s far I have s o u g h t to explicate Husserl's o w n train of t h o u g h t . T h e occasional references t o t h e p h i l o s o p h y of l a n g u a g e w e r e for p u r p o s e s of clarification only a n d n o t of critique. Now, however, I s h o u l d like to p o i n t o u t certain difficulties that raise t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r a n a d e q u a t e t r e a t m e n t of t h e i m m a n e n t t r u t h r e l a t i o n of a meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d lifeworld d o e s n o t r u p t u r e t h e framework of a t h e o r y of consciousness a n d d e m a n d instead to be a p p r o a c h e d t h r o u g h p h i l o s o p h y of l a n g u a g e . U n l i k e T u g e n d h a t , I shall n o t d e a l w i t h t h e difficulties i n h e r e n t i n t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l t h e o r y of m e a n i n g (which originates in Husserl's deriving t h e c o n c e p t of t h e

33___ . The I'henomenological Constitutive Theory of Society

.

intentional object from t h e reification of t h e p r e d i c a t e s we a t t r i b u t e to identifiable objects). I n s t e a d I s h o u l d like to call a t t e n t i o n to t h e difficulties entailed by t h e c o n c e p t of t r u t h as evidence. We have seen t h a t Husserl defines t r u t h with r e f e r e n c e to t h e intu­ itive fulfillment of a n i n t e n t i o n as t h e i m m e d i a t e p r e s e n c e of t h e in­ tentional object (for which there is a c o r r e s p o n d i n g e x p e r i e n c e of evidence). This r e q u i r e s an intuition sui g e n e r i s for all categorial ob­ jects, which a p p e a r in every f o r m of j u d g m e n t . T h a t is why Husserl develops his d o c t r i n e of categorial i n t u i t i o n , with w h i c h h e a t t e m p t s to r e n d e r plausible t h e idea of a n o n s e n s i b l e i n t u i t i o n a n a l o g o u s to sensible i n t u i t i o n . T h e force of t h e c o n c e p t u a l strategy t h a t leads Husserl to d e v e l o p such a c o n c e p t i o n is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e . B u t h e p r o ­ vides n o c o n v i n c i n g a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e c o n c e p t of "categorial intu­ ition" can b e c o n c e i v e d of in any logically consistent m a n n e r at all or that t h e expression c a n b e used n o n m e t a p h o r i c a l l y . T h e p r o b l e m is solved as soon as we r e g a r d w h a t Husserl calls categorial objects, such as syntactic f o r m s o r m a t h e m a t i c a l relations, as symbolic constructs g e n e r a t e d in a c c o r d a n c e with rules, a n d refrain f r o m i m p u t i n g to t h e m quasi-objects toward which i n t e n t i o n s can be d i r e c t e d . For t h e n a claim to validity can n o l o n g e r b e c o n n e c t e d with a n individ­ ual category; r a t h e r it applies to w h e t h e r syntactic o r m a t h e m a t i c a l forms, for instance, a r e g e n e r a t e d in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e rules. Q u i t e a p a r t from this, it seems t o m e q u e s t i o n a b l e w h e t h e r Husserl correctly c o n c e i v e d t h e function of sensible intuition t h a t provides t h e m o d e l for categorial intuition. T h e c o n c e p t of t h e "self-givenness" of a n object relies o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t sense ex­ perience gives us intuitive access to s o m e t h i n g t h a t is i m m e d i a t e l y a n d evidently given. T h i s a s s u m p t i o n is difficult t o d e f e n d , as s o m e of Husserl's own analyses i n d i c a t e (see, for e x a m p l e , Erfahrung und Urteil). Every i n t u i t i o n , n o m a t t e r h o w originary, i n c l u d e s categorial d e t e r m i n a t i o n s ; every p e r c e p t i o n , n o m a t t e r how pre-predicative, contains h y p o t h e t i c a l e l e m e n t s t h a t go b e y o n d a n y t h i n g t h a t is actu­ ally given. T h e p a r a d i g m a t i c e x p e r i e n c e t h a t may h a v e b e e n in Husserl's m i n d w h e n h e f o r m u l a t e d his c o n c e p t of t r u t h as e v i d e n c e c a n scarcely b e f o u n d at t h e level of e x p e r i e n c e s of sensory evidence. It is m o r e likely t o b e f o u n d a t t h e level o f e x p e r i e n c e s of c o n s t r u c ­ tion. W h e n we g e n e r a t e symbolic objects a c c o r d i n g t o r u l e s —

34 Lecture II

w h e t h e r we a r e c o n s t r u c t i n g a n u m e r i c a l series o r geometrical figures, p e r f o r m i n g a c o m p o s i t i o n for p i a n o , o r p r o d u c i n g a sen­ t e n c e — a n i n t e n t i o n is always fulfilled by a n object t h a t is g e n e r a t e d a n d was previously i n t e n d e d as s u c h . 16

However, this i n t u i t i o n of t h e success of a c o n s t r u c t i o n owes its ability to g u a r a n t e e certainty precisely to the c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t we ourselves h a v e p r o d u c e d t h e symbolic object a c c o r d i n g to underly­ i n g g e n e r a t i v e rules. C o n s e q u e n t l y we c a n u n d e r s t a n d the object perfectly, for t h e history of its genesis is t r a n s p a r e n t to us. T h e intu­ ition of g e n e r a t i v e activity t h u s is n o t b e confused with t h e i n t u i t i o n of w h a t is i m m e d i a t e l y given, a c o n c e p t t h a t Husserl i n t r o d u c e d prog r a m m a t i c a l l y by a p p e a l i n g to t h e m o d e l of sense e x p e r i e n c e . Even p e r c e p t i o n s d e p e n d o n a n i n t e r p r e t i v e framework. T h e r e f o r e they c o n t a i n h y p o t h e t i c a l claims to validity, which can by n o m e a n s b e re­ d e e m e d by r e c o u r s e to e l e m e n t a r y p e r c e p t i o n s at s o m e d e e p e r level; for every sense e x p e r i e n c e c a n b e p r o b l e m a t i z e d . If, however, t h e r e is n o r e c o u r s e to an u l t i m a t e , u n d e r l y i n g f o u n d a t i o n of intuitive self-givenness, a n d if, as P e i r c e convincingly d e m o n s t r a t e d l o n g ago, we m u s t a b a n d o n t h e c o n c e p t of t r u t h as evidence, t h e n t h e claims to validity implicit in i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s c a n n o t b e r e d e e m e d intuitively, b u t only discursively. It is n o t i n t u i t i o n s b u t a r g u m e n t s t h a t c a n lead us to a c k n o w l e d g e o r reject t h e legitimacy of claims to validity t h a t h a v e b e e n p r o b l e m a t i z e d . 17

H u s s e r l ' s c o n c e p t of intentionality stands a n d falls with t h e con­ cept of t r u t h as evidence. It was d e r i v e d f r o m t h e m o d e l of a solitary, m o n a d i c subject o r i e n t i n g itself to an object in meaning-giving acts. T h e r e is m u c h to b e said for r e f o r m u l a t i n g this c o n c e p t in linguistic t e r m s . W e shall t h e n h a v e to distinguish those i n t e n t i o n s t h a t signify simply t h a t we u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g of symbolic f o r m s t h a t h a v e b e e n p r o d u c e d a n d e m p l o y e d in conformity with rules from t h o s e i n t e n t i o n s t h a t involve a "positing," t h a t is, a validity claim t h a t ex­ t e n d s b e y o n d well-formedness o r intelligibility. These i n t e n t i o n s are paradigmatically c o n n e c t e d with s e n t e n c e s t h a t are u t t e r e d in situa­ tions where subjects c a p a b l e of s p e e c h a n d action a t t e m p t to r e a c h m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I n this version, Husserl's thesis of a t r u t h claim i m m a n e n t i n a meaningfully structured lifeworld b e c o m e s in­ teresting. W e have s e e n t h a t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e t h e o r y of society re-

35__ The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society

gards the surface s t r u c t u r e of t h e lifeworld as a system of symbolic forms instead of as a s t r e a m of i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s . But this the­ ory, too, m u s t a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t t h e facticity of t h e validity claims im­ plicit in these u t t e r a n c e s is constitutive of t h e m o d e of b e i n g of t h e lifeworld. T h e s e positings are simultaneously based o n e x p e r i e n c e and tradition a n d a r e culturally habitualized. But t h e y n o l o n g e r ref­ er to intuitively identifiable objects; their legitimacy can b e estab­ lished only in discourse. W h a t is a n t i c i p a t e d in t h e s e positings, b o t h doxic a n d o t h e r w i s e , is n o t t h e possibility of t h e intuitive fulfillment of a n i n t e n t i o n , b u t justifiability: t h a t is, t h e possibility of a c o n s e n ­ sus, o b t a i n e d w i t h o u t force, a b o u t t h e legitimacy of t h e c l a i m in question. This consideration leads m e b a c k once m o r e to Husserl's idea of a life of absolute self-responsibility. If every positing is associated with an interest in r e d e e m i n g t h e p o s i t e d claim to validity, t h e n t h e fact that t h e lifeworld rests o n a b r o a d f o u n d a t i o n of claims t h a t a r e hardly r e d e e m e d , b u t m e r e l y a c k n o w l e d g e d , in fact calls for e x p l a n a ­ tion. Until now, o u r story has t r e a t e d t h e u b i q u i t y of naively ac­ cepted, u n p r o b l e m a t i c , a n d yet u n p r o v e n a s s u m p t i o n s of validity as a basic characteristic of social lifeworlds. Husserl obviously c a n n o t specify a n i n t e r e s t t h a t w o u l d b e powerful e n o u g h to effect a persist­ ent a n d sweeping clarification a n d e n l i g h t e n m e n t of all claims. T h a t is why his a t t e m p t to u n i t e t h e task of p h e n o m e n o l o g y with t h e n e e d for a p h i l o s o p h i c a l life of absolute self-responsibility retains t h e char­ acter of a powerless p o s t u l a t e . A c o m m u n i c a t i v e t h e o r y of society, too, will p r o c e e d from t h e fact that a claim to validity i m p l i e d in a symbolic u t t e r a n c e c a n subsist as l o n g as p e o p l e a r e c o n v i n c e d of t h e discursive justifiability of its im­ plied validity, a n d n o longer. But t h e n t h e fact t h a t t h e lifeworld is based o n a mass of m e r e d e facto claims w h o s e legitimacy has never b e e n p r o b l e m a t i z e d o r d e m o n s t r a t e d b e c o m e s a p h e n o m e n o n re­ q u i r i n g e x p l a n a t i o n . W h a t n e e d s to b e e x p l a i n e d is h o w t h e convic­ tion that validity claims a r e discursively r e d e e m a b l e comes i n t o b e i n g a n d is stabilized w i t h o u t actual c o r r e s p o n d i n g a t t e m p t s a t discursive justification. For, w h e n e v e r a claim w o u l d n o t h o l d u p to verification, this naive trust w o u l d reveal itself to b e false consciousness. T h u s we n e e d a t h e o r y t h a t e x p l a i n s h o w t h e genesis a n d stabilization of false

36 Lecture II

consciousness is possible, a n d in particular why ideology f o r m a t i o n is necessary. S u c h an e x p l a n a t i o n w o u l d a t the s a m e t i m e be able to an­ swer t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e r e is an i n t e r e s t in t h e enlighten­ m e n t of false consciousness. W e can already see that if such an interest in e n l i g h t e n m e n t c o u l d be identified and derived from the c o n d i t i o n s of r e p r o d u c t i o n of a symbolically s t r u c t u r e d reality, it c o u l d n o t be satisfied by p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l reflection on the tran­ s c e n d e n t a l h i s t o r y of the genesis of the lifeworld. Rather, it w o u l d re­ q u i r e a t h e m a t i z a t i o n of validity claims t h a t h a d h i t h e r t o escaped t e s t i n g f o r n o t m e r e l y c o n t i n g e n t , b u t systematic reasons. S u c h a t h e m a t i z a t i o n w o u l d have t o have practical c o n s e q u e n c e s . W i t h this anticipation I have g o t t e n a h e a d of m y a r g u m e n t . I criti­ cized the c o n c e p t of t r u t h as evidence a n d s h o w e d that the difficulties m e n t i o n e d can be avoided by r e p l a c i n g t h e a p p r o a c h of the p h i l o s o p h y of consciousness with t h a t of t h e p h i l o s o p h y of lan­ g u a g e . But I have not shown j u s t why this a p p r o a c h s h o u l d be cho­ sen. T h i s I shall d o by e x a m i n i n g t h e s e c o n d p r o b l e m t h a t confronts every g e n e r a t i v e theory of society in a d d i t i o n to t h e i m m a n e n t truth relation of a meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d lifeworld. T h e a t t e m p t to pro­ vide a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n of intersubjectivity will show that we are f o r c e d t o a b a n d o n the primacy of intentionality in favor of the priority of m u t u a l linguistic u n d e r s t a n d i n g . H u s s e r l takes himself to be c o n f r o n t e d with t h e following p r o b ­ lem. H o w c a n I, as a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e g o constituting t h e entirety of my e x p e r i e n c e , constitute a n o t h e r ego a n d n e v e r t h e l e s s e x p e r i e n c e w h a t is c o n s t i t u t e d in m e as a n o t h e r ego? As H u s s e r l explicitly says, t h e p h i l o s o p h y of consciousness starts with t h e c o n s t i t u t i n g activities of t h e m e d i t a t i n g e g o q u a m o n a d . Given t h e a s s u m p t i o n s of t h e phi­ l o s o p h y of consciousness, this task is t h u s clearly paradoxical. O n t h e o n e h a n d , it is I w h o constitutes t h e o t h e r as an e l e m e n t of my world; b u t as a n other, h e precisely c a n n o t b e given to m e originarily in his o w n constitutive activities, w h i c h in p r i n c i p l e h e w o u l d h a v e to b e if t h e o t h e r were c o n s t i t u t e d by m e . It m u s t b e possible to resolve this p a r a d o x with t h e m e a n s available to p h e n o m e n o l o g y , if only to estab­ lish the m e a n i n g of an objective world. For the objectivity of t h e world m e a n s t h a t the world is p r e s e n t for e v e r y o n e as t h e s a m e world t h a t I c o n s t i t u t e for myself. As a n objective world, t h e w o r l d t h a t I

37

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The J'henomenological Constitutive Theory of Society

constitute m u s t b e t h e s a m e as t h a t c o n s t i t u t e d by all o t h e r s . O n l y na­ ture is given to m e as objective. I constitute it in m o d e s of givenness that are t h e s a m e for all o t h e r s . In this objective w o r l d , I c a n e n c o u n ­ ter the initially c o n s t i t u t e d o t h e r s as e m p i r i c a l subjects: Accordingly the intrinsically first other (the first "non-Ego") is the other Ego. And the other Ego makes constitutionally possible a new infinite domain of what is "other": an Objective Nature and a whole Objective world, to which all other Egos and I myself belong. 18

Husserl sees t h a t t h e m e a n i n g of t h e objectivity of m y world d o e s n o t d e p e n d only o n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of m a n y o t h e r subjects, all of w h o m are given t h e i r o w n world. It f u r t h e r r e q u i r e s t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of a c o m m u n i t y of all possible subjects, i n c l u d i n g myself, for w h o m my world a n d t h e i r worlds are posited identically as o u r world. H e con­ tinues in t h e passage j u s t q u o t e d , This constitution, arising on the basis of the "pure" others (the other Egos who as yet have no worldly sense), is essentially such that the others-for-me do not remain isolated; on the contrary, an Ego-community, which includes me, becomes constituted . . . as a community of Egos existing with each other and for each other—ultimately a community of monads, which, moreover . . . constitutes the one identical world. In this world all Egos again present themselves, but in an Objectivating apperception with the sense "men" or "psychophysical men as worldly Objects." 19

Husserl m a k e s t h e i m p o r t a n t distinction b e t w e e n a n objective world a n d a n intersubjective world; this distinction is also i m p o r t a n t for a c o m m u n i c a t i v e t h e o r y of society. T h e objective w o r l d is o n e in which all n a t u r a l objects (including o t h e r p e o p l e ) c a n b e e n c o u n ­ tered as i n n e r w o r l d l y entities, w h e r e a s t h e intersubjective w o r l d is o n e of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l y sociated subjects, w h o e n c o u n t e r o n e a n ­ o t h e r at t h e level of t h e c o m m o n constitution of a w o r l d t h a t is i d e n ­ tical f o r t h e m a n d h e n c e objective. T h i s is t h e social lifeworld, in w h i c h subjects can r e a c h m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g with o n e a n o t h e r a b o u t i n n e r w o r l d l y m a t t e r s . "In" their lifeworld, sociated subjects are always already o p e r a t i n g "at" t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l level of inter­ subjectivity. H e n c e they m u s t u n d e r g o a c h a n g e of perspective as soon as o n e subject is to take a n o t h e r n o l o n g e r as alter ego, b u t as a c o m p o n e n t of objective n a t u r e , t h a t is, as a n o b s e r v e d body.

38 Lecture II

In t h e fifth Cartesian Meditation Husserl tries to solve t h e p r o b l e m of t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n of intersubjectivity. H e h a s to s u p p o s e t h a t the c o n s t i t u t i n g ego has an initial state in which n a t u r e is given as radically d e n u d e d of all other subjects a n d all inter­ subjective relations. This n a t u r e can n o t yet be p o s i t e d as objective n a t u r e . If we abstract in this way from everything ti*a"t is foreign to the e g o , we a r e left with a " p r i m o r d i a l " world t h a t only c o n t a i n s w h a t is i m m e d i a t e l y m y (that is, the m e d i t a t i n g ego's) own a n d t h a t presents itself to m e in a n o d d l y m u t e d t r a n s c e n d e n c e . Of all t h e bodies of this " n a t u r e r e d u c e d to t h e e g o ' s p r o p e r s p h e r e , " o n e a l o n e is distin­ g u i s h e d as m y body. My living b o d y is t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y b o d y in which I can d o as I please while constituting my world. I can ascribe fields of sensation a n d activity a n d c o r r e s p o n d i n g kinesthetic phe­ n o m e n a to t h e o r g a n s of my body. Taking this state as his r e f e r e n c e p o i n t , H u s s e r l c o n s t r u c t s t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l history of inter­ subjectivity in two steps. (a) E x p e r i e n c i n g m y o w n b o d y in a n o r i g i n a r y m a n n e r , I first en­ c o u n t e r the o t h e r within my p r i m o r d i a l world as a body. I n an analogizing a p p r e h e n s i o n , I can perceive this b o d y as o n e similar to my own living body. I perceive it in analogizing a p p e r c e p t i o n as an­ o t h e r living body, t h a t is, I i n t e r p r e t it as a n o t h e r living body. In so d o i n g , a n d conscious of t h e i n n e r life t h a t is always c o n n e c t e d with m y body in o r i g i n a r y e x p e r i e n c e , I p e r f o r m a n analogizing transfer: I a s s u m e t h a t t h e o t h e r living b o d y is also associated in t h e s a m e way with a n i n n e r life, a l t h o u g h this life is n o t accessible to m e originaliter. H u s s e r l calls such a p r e s e n t a t i o n , in which s o m e t h i n g n o t given is m a d e p r e s e n t , appresentation. T h e living body of t h e o t h e r " a p p r e s e n t s " a life of c o n s c i o u s acts t h a t is at first inaccessible a n d foreign to m e . T h i s life of t h e conscious acts of t h e other, m e d i a t e d by his living body, is t h e absolutely first foreign object t h a t comes i n t o b e i n g in m y p r i m o r d i a l world. T h i s constitutes t h e m e a n i n g of an­ o t h e r subject whose b o d y is associated with h e r as a living b o d y j u s t as m y own living b o d y is associated with m e . (b) I n t h e s e c o n d step of h i s a r g u m e n t , Husserl tries t o m a k e t h e case t h a t t h e m e a n i n g of t h e a p p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e o t h e r ' s i n n e r life u n p r o b l e m a t i c a l l y gives rise to the c o m m u n i t y [Vergemeinschaftung]

39____

.

The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society

of m o n a d s . H e bases his a r g u m e n t o n t h e fact t h a t the spatial per­ spectives of " h e r e " a n d " t h e r e , " w h i c h are c e n t e r e d i n t h e living body, are mutually i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e a n d , in this way, can b e objectified. I can i n t e r p r e t t h e o t h e r ' s body o n analogy with m y own, as t h o u g h my body h e r e were in the place of the o t h e r ' s b o d y t h e r e . Having d o n e this, a n d inferring from t h e a p p r e s e n t e d i n n e r life of t h e other, I c a n constitute t h e o t h e r ' s world o n analogy with my own. Husserl n o w wants to show that, with t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e other, a t r a n s c e n d e n ­ tal We is also f o r m e d , to w h i c h o n e a n d t h e s a m e n a t u r e , a n d t h u s a n objective n a t u r e , is given. T o d e m o n s t r a t e this, H u s s e r l a p p e a l s t o the interchangeability of spatial perspectives. J u s t as I c a n virtually occupy t h e p l a c e of t h e o t h e r living body a n d e x c h a n g e my H e r e for its T h e r e , so I can also a d o p t t h e world perspective of t h e o t h e r w h o is a p p r e s e n t e d in t h a t b o d y a n d relativize t h e e g o c e n t r i c association of its a n d my world perspectives in favor of o n e t h a t is c o m m o n t o both of us. T h e o t h e r ' s living b o d y appresents first of all the other Ego's governing in this body, the body over there, and mediately his governing in the Nature that appears to him per­ ceptually—identically the Nature to which the body over there belongs, identically the Nature that is my primordial Nature. It is the same Nature, but in the mode of appearance: "as if I were standing over there, where the Other's body is." . . . In the appresented other ego the synthetic systems are the same, with all their modes of appearance, accordingly with all the possible perceptions and the noematic contents of these: except that the actual per­ ceptions and the modes of givenness actualized therein, and also in part the objects actually perceived, are not the same; rather the objects perceived are precisely those perceivable from there, and as they are perceivable from there. 20

T h e i n t e r c h a n g e a b i l i t y or reciprocity of perspectives g r o u n d s t h e identity of m y system of a p p e a r a n c e s with t h a t of t h e bodily a p p r e s e n t e d other. At t h e s a m e time, t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l W e of c o m m u n a l i z e d m o n a d s is c o n s t i t u t e d in this identity t h r o u g h interchangeability. I have p r e s e n t e d Husserl's a c c o u n t to t h e p o i n t w h e r e I can n o w discuss t h e t w o m o s t i m p o r t a n t objections to it. B o t h of t h e m indi­ cate t h a t Husserl begs t h e q u e s t i o n of intersubjectivity, which h e can­ n o t derive o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n s of a p h i l o s o p h y of consciousness.

40 Lecture II

Against ( a ) : Husserl m u s t b e able to give g r o u n d s for why, in my p r i m o r d i a l world, in which only o n e b o d y is d i s t i n g u i s h e d as my originarily e x p e r i e n c e d living body, I s h o u l d be able to s e p a r a t e o u t of t h e totality of all o t h e r b o d i e s a subclass of t h e p o t e n t i a l living b o d i e s of o t h e r subjects. Husserl justifies t h e possibility of the a p p e r c e p t i v e transfer of my own bodily e x p e r i e n c e to the o t h e r ' s b o d y by a p p e a l to a p e r c e p t i b l e similarity b e t w e e n t h e two objects. B u t w e c o u l d perceive a r e l a t i o n o f similarity b e t w e e n m y living body a n d a n o t h e r b o d y only after h a v i n g objectified my o w n b o d y as an el­ e m e n t of an objective n a t u r e . T h e merely subjectively e x p e r i e n c e d b o d y is so dissimilar t o t h e perceived body, t h a t it provides n o basis for an analogizing transfer. In fact, even Husserl d o e s n o t rely o n a r e l a t i o n of similarity. T h e a t t e m p t to i n t e r p r e t a n o t h e r body as a liv­ i n g b o d y m u s t also be verifiable in the h a r m o n i o u s succession of con­ secutive a p p r e s e n t a t i o n s : 21

The experienced living body of another continues to prove itself as actually a living body, solely in its changing but incessantly "harmonious behavior." Such harmonious behavior (as having a physical side that indicates some­ thing psychic appresentatively) must present itself fulnllingly in original experience, and do so throughout the continuous change in behavior from phase to phase. The living body becomes experienced as a pseudo-organ­ ism, precisely if there is something discordant about its behavior. 22

W h a t is m e a n t h e r e by " h a r m o n i o u s behavior"? If, as p r e s u p p o s e d , only t h e o b s e r v a b l e m o v e m e n t s of o t h e r physical b o d i e s a r e given t o m e , t h e n w h a t r e s u l t a r e at best regularities in t h e succession of phys­ ical states, w h i c h is t r u e of all b o d i e s in my e n v i r o n m e n t . I c a n n o t de­ rive from this a criterion for distinguishing p o t e n t i a l living b o d i e s . If, o n the o t h e r h a n d , I u n d e r s t a n d the b e h a v i o r of the o t h e r ' s living body as symbolic expression, then t h e c o h e r e n c e of successive ges­ tures is d e t e r m i n e d a c c o r d i n g to r u l e s t h a t institute a symbolic sys­ t e m : t h a t is, r u l e s that d e t e r m i n e what physical characteristics are to c o u n t as signs, what m e a n i n g s can be assigned to t h e s e signs, a n d in which c o n t e x t s of use. A l t h o u g h I a m to u n d e r s t a n d t h e m o v e m e n t s of a n o t h e r b o d y as gestures by a p p r e h e n d i n g t h e m in an analogizing m a n n e r , I c a n d o so only if intersubjective k n o w l e d g e of w h a t t h e signs a r e a n d of t h e lexicon already exists. In n e i t h e r case c a n t h e m e r e " h a r m o n y " of successive a p p r e s e n t a t i o n s serve as a c r i t e r i o n

j

41___ The Phenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society

for d e m a r c a t i o n . My i m p r e s s i o n is t h a t Husserl d e l u d e d himself •jhout t h e viability of his first a r g u m e n t b e c a u s e , in t h e c o n c e p t of p p e s e n t a t i o n , h e tacitly assumed w h a t h e w a n t e d to d e d u c e with its aid. In the Cartesian Meditations this c o n c e p t is a d m i t t e d only in t h e sense of the diadic association of a p e r c e p t i b l e with a n i m p e r c e p t i b l e object. But Husserl implicitly relies o n a f u r t h e r m e a n i n g suggested in his earlier works, n a m e l y Ideas a n d Logical Investigations. Appresentation is tacitly conceived as the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a m e a n i n g by a symbolic expression: in this case, by a c o r p o r e a l o n e . However, this representative function, which is specific to l a n g u a g e , o u g h t n o t to be p r e s u p p o s e d i n a t t e m p t i n g t o give a n a c c o u n t of the origins of an intersubjective r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n m e a n d a n o t h e r subject. F o r it is this relation t h a t is t o m a k e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g by m e a n s of sym­ bols possible in the first place. ;1

r

Against (b): I n t h e s e c o n d step o f h i s a r g u m e n t , t o o , if I a m n o t mistaken, H u s s e r l is guilty o f b e g g i n g t h e q u e s t i o n . H e is r i g h t i n his basic a s s u m p t i o n t h a t an intersubjective world of c o m m u n a l i z e d sub­ jects comes into b e i n g t h r o u g h t h e m u t u a l i n t e r t w i n i n g of p e r s p e c ­ tives. I n this reciprocity, all p a r t i c i p a n t s a p p r e h e n d themselves, others, a n d n a t u r e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y from t h e i r o w n s t a n d p o i n t a n d from t h e s t a n d p o i n t of every possible o t h e r subject. I n this way, t h e subjects constitute a n objective world in c o m m o n . Note, however, that Husserl develops this c o n s t r u c t i o n only to t h e p o i n t where I, the meditating p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t , p u t myself in t h e place of t h e appresented i n n e r life of t h e o t h e r a n d identify its w o r l d with m i n e . For a c o m m o n world is c o n s t i t u t e d only t h r o u g h a symmetrical rela­ tionship t h a t allows t h e o t h e r equally to p u t itself in m y place, t h a t is, in place of t h e i n n e r life t h a t is a p p r e s e n t e d t o it, a n d identify m y world with its. H u s s e r l c a n n o t a d e q u a t e l y a c c o u n t for this c o m p l e t e reciprocity since t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a p p r o a c h b e g i n s with t h e meditating ego, w h o s e subjectivity m u s t always b e t h e u l t i m a t e pos­ sible h o r i z o n of d e m o n s t r a t i o n a n d verification. T h i s leads inevita­ bly to an a s y m m e t r y b e t w e e n myself a n d any other. During selfobservation, t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i s t ' s e g o always r e t a i n s the f u n c t i o n of an a p r i o r i o r i g i n a r y ego [ Ur-Ich]. T h e d i m e n s i o n s of " H e r e " a n d " T h e r e " are used with an ambiguity that is of g r e a t c o n s e q u e n c e for t h e strategy of H u s s e r l ' s d e d u c t i o n .

42 L e c t u r e II

At first " H e r e " a n d " T h e r e " d e n o t e spatial perspectives c e n t e r e d t h e living body. I virtually occupy all possible locations. Therefore even in my p r i m o r d i a l world, t h a t is, before t h e e n t r a n c e of another e g o , I can sever spatial p e r s p e c d v e s from their o r i e n t a t i o n to m y liv­ ing body a n d objectify t h e m as spatial c o o r d i n a t e s . (This is o n e of the c o n d i t i o n s of my being able to a p p r e h e n d a n o t h e r body o n analogy with m y own.) Husserl n o w assumes t h a t t h e free variation of spatial perspectives also m a k e s possible the i n t e r c h a n g e of world perspec­ tives, w h i c h we m u s t u n d e r t a k e in o r d e r to constitute an intersubjective world. H e d o e s n o t realize t h a t h e is talking a b o u t two different things. T h e spatial c o o r d i n a t e s within which I relativize the bodily spatial p e r s p e c d v e s of " H e r e " a n d ' T h e r e " provide a frame­ w o r k only for the m o n o l o g i c a l p e r c e p t i o n of moving b o d i e s . But as i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e world perspectives from which I e n c o u n t e r others a n d o t h e r s e n c o u n t e r m e within t h e framework of a n intersubjective world, " H e r e " and " T h e r e " take on a different m e a n i n g . O n l y in a m e t a p h o r i c a l sense can these be called spatial p e r s p e c d v e s . Unlike spatial perspectives, they c a n be i n t e r c h a n g e d a n d objectified as per­ specdves of a c o m m o n world only o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n of t h e c o m p l e t e reciprocity of all p a r t i c i p a t i n g subjects. Physical space is r e p l a c e d by social space. Alfred S c h u t z d i s c e r n e d this weakness: E v e n if o n e a c c e p t s H u s s e r l ' s t h e o r y o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e O t h e r , ac­ c o r d i n g t o w h i c h , by v i r t u e of a p p r e s e n t a t i v e transfer, y o u r [living] b o d y , ap­ p e a r i n g i n m y p r i m o r d i a l s p h e r e , l e a d s t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f y o u r full psychic life a n d f u r t h e r t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of y o u r t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e g o for m e ; e v e n if, u n l i k e H u s s e r l , o n e a d m i t s t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t m y b o d y a p p e a r ­ i n g in y o u r p r i m o r d i a l s p h e r e l e a d s i n a n a n a l o g o u s m a n n e r to t h e c o n s t i t u ­ t i o n of m y full p s y c h i c life a n d m y t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e g o f o r y o u ; if o n e a s s u m e s all t h i s , still n o t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o m m u n i t y , n o t r a n s c e n d e n t a l W e , is e v e r e s t a b l i s h e d . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , e a c h t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e g o has n o w consti­ t u t e d for himself, as t o its b e i n g a n d s e n s e , h i s w o r l d , a n d in it all o t h e r sub­ j e c t s , i n c l u d i n g myself; b u t h e h a s c o n s t i t u t e d t h e m j u s t f o r h i m s e l f a n d n o t f o r all o t h e r t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e g o s as w e l l . 23

Even o n Husserl's p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o m m u n i t y can be established only in a n a b s u r d sense: t h a t t h e r e are c o m m u n i t i e s for m e a n d c o m m u n i t i e s for o t h e r s , w h i c h d o n o t necessarily coin­ cide. T h e g e n e r a t i o n of intersubjectively c o m m u n a l i z e d e x p e r i e n c e ,

4 3 :j^Tphenomenological Constitutive Theory of Society :

which is identical for m e a n d all o t h e r s , c a n n o t be m a d e plausible in this way. In The Crisis of the European Sciences Husserl speaks unequivocally of [ "unique sort of p h i l o s o p h i c a l s o l i t u d e " i n w h i c h t h e p h e n o m enologist i m m e r s e s h i m s e l f w h e n h e p e r f o r m s t h e epoche a n d aban­ dons the n a t u r a l attitude: t

i e

I am the one who performs the epoche, and, even if there are others, and even if they practice the epoche in direct community with me, [they and] all other human beings with their entire act-life are included, for me, within my epoche, in the world-phenomenon, in my epoche, which is exclusively •

24

mine/* This is a f u n d a m e n t a l m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p o s t u l a t e of a p h i l o s o p h y of consciousness w h o s e starting p o i n t is solitary reflection o n t h e activi­ ties of the individual's own subjectivity. It e x c l u d e s in p r i n c i p l e the possibility that t h e o t h e r s c o n s t i t u t e d by a n d for m e could have ex­ actly the same relation t o m e t h a t I have to t h e m as m y i n t e n t i o n a l objects. Rather, in t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a t t i t u d e , I a m m e t h o d o l o g ­ ically forced to assert myself as t h e p r i m a r y a n d f o u n d a t i o n a l origi­ nal ego against all o t h e r egos t h a t g u a r a n t e e t h e intersubjectivity of my world. 25

E x p e r i e n c e t h a t is intersubjectively c o m m u n a l i z e d i n t h e strict sense c a n n o t b e conceived w i t h o u t t h e c o n c e p t of m e a n i n g t h a t is c o m m u n i c a t e d a n d s h a r e d by different subjects. I d e n t i c a l m e a n i n g s are n o t f o r m e d in t h e i n t e n t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of a solitary subject t h a t confronts its world in isolation. For m e a n i n g s to b e identical in any intelligible sense, t h e y m u s t have t h e same validity for different sub­ jects. T o a c c o u n t for t h e identity of s e m a n t i c c o n v e n t i o n s , Wittgenstein p r o p o s e d t h e m o d e l of a r u l e t h a t at least two subjects must b e able to follow. M e a d r e c o m m e n d s t h e m o d e l of a r o l e t h a t establishes reciprocally i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e e x p e c t a t i o n s a b o u t b e h a v i o r for at least two subjects. C o n c e p t s such as " r u l e " o r "role" m u s t b e defined from t h e o u t s e t in t e r m s of a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n subjects. They circumvent t h e n o t i o n of a n y t h i n g like a private conscious­ ness t h a t only s u b s e q u e n t i y e n t e r s i n t o c o n t a c t with a n o t h e r con­ scious b e i n g . Moreover, t h e primitive t e r m s a r e c o n c e i v e d such t h a t the intersubjective relation a n d t h e use of symbolic expressions o n

44 Lecture II

t h e p a r t of subjects c a p a b l e of s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n originate simultaneously. C o m m u n i c a t i v e t h e o r i e s enjoy the a d v a n t a g e of b e i n g able to take as their starting point t h e intersubjective relation t h a t constitutive t h e o r i e s a t t e m p t in vain to derive from t h e activity of m o n a d i c con­ sciousness. T h e i r task, t h e n , is to give a c o m m u n i c a t i o n - t h e o r e t i c ac­ c o u n t of t h e subjective e x p e r i e n c e s , to which each ego has privileged access. T h e constitution of t h e objects of possible e x p e r i e n c e about which we c o m m u n i c a t e with o n e a n o t h e r m u s t also be a c c o u n t e d for in terms of a theory of o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I should like to discuss this set of p r o b l e m s in terms of W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s theory of l a n g u a g e g a m e s .

Ill

From a Constitutive Theory to a Communicative Theory of Society (Sellars and Wittgenstein): Communicative and Cognitive Uses of Language

I should like to b e g i n by d e v e l o p i n g t h e categorial framework for a communicative t h e o r y of society. H e r e W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s c o n c e p t of a language g a m e will serve as a g u i d e . By contrast, Wilfrid Sellars's quasi-transcendental a c c o u n t o f t h e genesis o f intentionality clearly illustrates t h e limitations that face the t h e o r y of consciousness after the linguistic t u r n . His original views occupy a p e c u l i a r i n t e r m e d i a r y position b e t w e e n a constitutive t h e o r y a n d a c o m m u n i c a t i v e theory. Sellars distinguishes b e t w e e n acts of consciousness t h a t have a sen­ sory or c o n c e p t u a l c o n t e n t ( p e r c e p t i o n s a n d j u d g m e n t s ) , these c o n ­ tents themselves ( t h e objects or states of affairs i n t e n d e d in perceptions a n d j u d g m e n t s ) , a n d existing objects (or things-in-themselves): or, as h e calls t h e m , " r e p r e s e n t i n g s , " " c o n t e n t s of r e p r e s e n t ­ ing," a n d "that which exists simpliciter as so existing." T h e s e distinctions a r e i n t r o d u c e d from t h e perspective of epistemological realism; thus they d o n o t c o i n c i d e with t h e c o n c e p t s of e i t h e r Kant's or Husserl's t r a n s c e n d e n t a l logic. Nevertheless, w h a t Sellars calls "content" a n d " r e p r e s e n t i n g s " c o r r e s p o n d fairly accurately to Husserl's i n t e n t i o n a l object a n d i n t e n t i o n a l acts, respectively. Sellars wants to e x p l a i n h o w it is possible t h a t m a n y individual r e p r e s e n t i n g s can h a v e o n e a n d t h e s a m e c o n t e n t . For only sameness of m e a n i n g [Bedeutung] can a c c o u n t for t h e intersubjectivity of a t h o u g h t t h a t re­ m a i n s t h e same t h o u g h t even if it is t h o u g h t by different p e o p l e o r by t h e s a m e p e r s o n at different times. "What, after all, d o e s it m e a n t o say t h a t c o n t e n t exists ' i n ' r e p r e s e n t i n g ? " T o a n s w e r this q u e s t i o n , 1

2

46 Lecture III

Sellars d o e s n o t simply switch f r o m t h e level of t h e p h i l o s o p h y f consciousness to t h a t of p h i l o s o p h y of l a n g u a g e . Rather, he proposes to e l u c i d a t e t h e relation of acts of consciousness to their conceptual c o n t e n t in terms of t h e linguistic model of t h e r e l a t i o n of linguistic ex­ pressions to t h e i r s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t . This m e a n s t h a t Husserl's ques­ tion of h o w an object is given in t h e s t r e a m of intentional e x p e r i e n c e s c a n b e r e p l a c e d by t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w a m e a n i n g is ex­ p r e s s e d symbolically by a linguistic sign. T h e sense in which we talk of " c o n t e n t s of r e p r e s e n t i n g s " or of "contents existing in representings," or of "mental e p i s o d e s representing i n t e n s i o n s " is to b e elu­ c i d a t e d with r e f e r e n c e to t h e sense in w h i c h we talk of " m e a n i n g s of expressions," o r of " m e a n i n g existing in expressions," or of "linguis­ tic e p i s o d e s standing for or expressing i n t e n s i o n s . " R e p r e s e n d n g s and t h e i r c o n t e n t s are to i n t e r p r e t e d on the m o d e l of linguistic expres­ sions a n d their m e a n i n g s [Bedeutungen]. I n t e n t i o n a l acts a r e to be t r e a t e d as t h o u g h t h e r e are n o i n t e n t i o n s [Intentionen] whose m e a n i n g o r i n t e n s i o n [Sinn], as I posited in t h e first l e c t u r e , c a n n o t always find symbolic e x p r e s s i o n . 0

3

Starting w i t h s e n t e n c e s t h a t c a n b e e i t h e r t r u e or false, Sellars ex­ a m i n e s several types of m e a n i n g [ S i n n ] : t h e m e a n i n g of states of af­ fairs t h a t c a n b e r e p r e s e n t e d in declarative s e n t e n c e s a n d t h a t d o or d o n o t o b t a i n ; the m e a n i n g of universal attributes t h a t a p p e a r in the f o r m of p r e d i c a t e expressions a n d may o r may n o t b e exemplified in existing objects; a n d t h e m e a n i n g of objects t h a t a r e r e p r e s e n t e d in individual c o n s t a n t s o r d e n o t a t i o n s a n d t h a t m a y or may n o t exist. T h e relation b e t w e e n a linguistic expression a n d t h e m e a n i n g it sym­ bolizes is called a semantic relation. Sellars p r o p o s e s an e l e g a n t way to g r a s p this s e m a n t i c relation m o r e precisely. Every expression, w h e t h e r for states of affairs, g e n e r a l attributes o r individuals, can be p u t in q u o t a t i o n m a r k s in o r d e r to indicate t h a t w h a t is m e a n t is not t h e c o n c r e t e e x p r e s s i o n in a given l a n g u a g e b u t r a t h e r t h a t this ex­ pression s t a n d s for all conceivable expressions t h a t play a r o l e in c o m p a r a b l e l a n g u a g e s precisely a n a l o g o u s to t h e r o l e played by the given e x p r e s s i o n in "our" l a n g u a g e . [Sellars i n t r o d u c e s the conven­ tion of dot q u o t e s for this p u r p o s e . Trans.] In chess we speak of the king- in t h e sense t h a t -kings- may m a k e certain moves a n d n o t oth­ ers, r e g a r d l e s s of t h e actual physical f o r m t h e -kings- m a y take as 4

4____ p ^ j i a Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society

pieces or signs. T h u s in the s e n t e n c e , "the wine is r e d , " I can p u t t h e predicated adjective red- in d o t q u o t e s to i n d i c a t e t h a t "red" in Eng­ lish has the s a m e f u n c t i o n as "rot" in G e r m a n , " r o u g e " in F r e n c h , "rosso" in Italian, a n d so o n . T h e s e m a n t i c r e l a t i o n holds n o t b e ­ tween the English w o r d "red" a n d t h e class of all r e d objects, b u t be­ tween it a n d t h e abstract m e a n i n g (sense) -redness,- which c o m e s only from t h e way in w h i c h I u s e t h e w o r d "red" in English a n d t h e uses of expressions a n a l o g o u s t o "red" in all o t h e r ( c o m p a r a b l e ) lan­ guages. T h u s h e r e t h e q u o t a t i o n m a r k s are a metalingustic device for highlighting h o w an expression is n o r m a l l y u s e d within a linguistic system. T h e y direct o u r a t t e n t i o n to t h e u n i f o r m l y identical m e a n i n g for which t h e r e a r e expressions with a n a n a l o g o u s r o l e i n every c o m ­ parable l a n g u a g e system. Socrates is wise- is a state of affairs t h a t is r e n d e r e d in English by t h e s e n t e n c e "Socrates is wise" a n d i n L by the expression S ( t h e same holds for p r e d i c a t e s a n d i n d i v i d u a l con­ stants). T e r m s such as -wise- a n d Socrates- refer to t h e f u n c t i o n t h a t these words have in English a n d that expression with a n a n a l o g o u s role have in c o m p a r a b l e languages. x

x

In u n d e r t a k i n g this a b s t r a c d o n , Sellars m u s t tacitly rely o n t h e ba­ sic h e r m e n e u t i c e x p e r i e n c e t h a t every s e n t e n c e of a n a t u r a l lan­ guage m u s t in p r i n c i p l e b e translatable i n t o every o t h e r l a n g u a g e . Curiously, however, h e uses t h e c o n c e p t of t h e role or f u n c t i o n an ex­ pression has in a l a n g u a g e system w i t h o u t analyzing it further (or even using it in t h e explicit sense given to these key c o n c e p t s by Wittgenstein in his analyses of l a n g u a g e g a m e s ) . Sellars treats t h e ab­ straction of expressions with t h e same m e a n i n g as a logical o p e r a t i o n and n o t as a n exercise of h e r m e n e u t i c skill r e q u i r i n g e x p l a n a t i o n in the p h i l o s o p h y of l a n g u a g e . As I shall show shordy, this has r e p e r c u s ­ sions for his a t t e m p t to c a r r y t h r o u g h his o w n p r o g r a m , for t h e sake of which h e p r o p o s e s to c o m p a r e t h e c o n t e n t s of m e n t a l e p i s o d e s t o the m e a n i n g s of s p e e c h episodes. Sellars gives Husserl's a t t e m p t to p r o v i d e a p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l f o u n d a t i o n of intersubjectivity a linguistic t u r n . H e w a n t s to show how an i n t e n t i o n a l i d i o m , in w h i c h we c o m m u n i c a t e a b o u t o u r de­ sires, t h o u g h t s , h o p e s , a n d feelings, could h a v e arisen f r o m a lan­ g u a g e devoid of i n t e n t i o n a l expressions: in o t h e r words, from a n empiricist l a n g u a g e . His c o n s t r u c t i o n is g o v e r n e d by t h e basic i d e a

48 Lecture III

t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l expressions were originally hypothetically intro­ d u c e d as primitive terms of a theory a c c o r d i n g to which t h e observ­ able b e h a v i o r a l r e s p o n s e s of thinking, feeling, o r willing organisms are to b e conceived as t h e final states of specific processes t h a t begin with i n t e r n a l episodes or acts of consciousness ( r e p r e s e n t i n g s ) . This t h e o r y is b a s e d o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t observable episodes at the level of linguistic articulation have t h e same r e l a t i o n to u n d e r l y i n g i n t e r n a l episodes (i.e., i n t e n t i o n s ) t h a t linguistic expressions h a v e to their m e a n i n g s . O n c e t h e theory was discovered, it was so widely cor­ r o b o r a t e d t h a t today it is p a r t of t h e r e p e r t o i r e of processes of early c h i l d h o o d socialization. T h e i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e of the other's e g o , o n c e a theoretical c o n s t r u c t , h a s since b e c o m e a self-evident, m u t u a l l y p r e s u p p o s e d reality. I a m n o t i n t e r e s t e d in e x a m i n i n g w h e t h e r Sellars's c o n s t r u c t i o n is consistent in its details. I n t h e p r e s e n t context, w h a t is of interest is only t h e fictitious state of n a t u r e in which, as in H u s s e r l ' s p r i m o r d i a l world, subjects are e q u i p p e d with a full-fledged conscious life while b e i n g d e p r i v e d of all intersubjective relationships. T h e y have com­ m a n d of a l a n g u a g e t h a t c a n b e used descriptively, a n d that, e x c e p t for logical constants, allows only t e r m s for observable (spatiot e m p o r a l l y localizable) events. T h i s empiricist l a n g u a g e can be used for cognitive e n d s , such as f o r m i n g h y p o t h e s e s a b o u t n a t u r a l events, b u t n o t for c o m m u n i c a t i v e e n d s . Sellars has to t a k e this r e d u c t i o n i s t a p p r o a c h if t h e initial state is to b o t h e x c l u d e i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations a n d still allow for the existence of l a n g u a g e . This latter c o n d i t i o n is necessary b e c a u s e t h e t h e o r y of o t h e r m i n d s he postulates is to be c o n s t r u c t e d o n t h e m o d e l of l a n g u a g e , which m e a n s t h a t it also re­ quires k n o w l e d g e of s e m a n t i c relations. I will a r g u e t h a t t h e r e is n o consistent c o n c e p t i o n of a l a n g u a g e of this sort, severed f r o m its c o m m u n i c a t i v e use a n d thus c o m p l e t e l y m o n o l o g i c a l . Sellars's solitary l a n g u a g e users m u s t have m a s t e r y of t h e s a m e m e a n i n g s for w o r d s a n d s e n t e n c e s w i t h o u t having p e r f o r m e d a sin­ gle s p e e c h act in relation to a n o t h e r speaker. To s e p a r a t e o u t such a " n o n - p e r f o r m a t o r y s t r a t u m of linguistic behavior," t h a t is, t h e "epistemic f u n c t i o n of l a n g u a g e as c o n t r a s t e d with its p e r f o r m a t o r y r o l e in i n t e r p e r s o n a l relationships," Sellars distinguishes b e t w e e n "actions" t h a t can b e r e p e a t e d at a n y time willingly a n d consciously, 5

p^nTa Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society

that is, intentionally, a n d m e r e "acts" [Reaktionen] t h a t o c c u r nonintentionally. Sellars's m o n o l o g i c a l l a n g u a g e users may p r o d u c e only acts, or linguistic events. Since we a r e a t t e m p t i n g t o explain t h e genesis of i n t e n t i o n a l l a n g u a g e , we d o n o t w a n t falsely to p r e s u p p o s e its existence in t h e m o n o l o g i c a l state. T h a t is w h y t h e s e l a n g u a g e us­ ers may articulate t h e i r i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s , t h o u g h t s , feelings, and desires only in " l o c u t i o n a r y n o n - a c t i o n s , " t h a t is, in p u r e l y reac­ tive linguistic behavior: "these episodes o r 'acts' c a n n o t qualify as ac­ tions." O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , even such linguistic b e h a v i o r m u s t allow the expression of identical m e a n i n g s . O t h e r w i s e even a theoretically imaginative R o b i n s o n C r u s o e w o u l d have n o suitable m o d e l at his disposal a c c o r d i n g to which h e could c o m e to u n d e r s t a n d t h e rela­ tion between t h e o b s e r v a b l e episodes of t h e o t h e r ' s e g o a n d t h e rat­ ter's (theoretically p o s t u l a t e d ) i n n e r episodes. T o m e e t this difficulty, Sellars distinguishes b e t w e e n "rules of p e r f o r m a n c e " a n d "rules of criticism." Rules a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h we o r i e n t o u r actions establish w h a t we o u g h t to d o . Rules of criticism, in contrast, p r o v i d e only criteria f o r d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r s o m e t h i n g " o u g h t to b e , " t h a t is, whether it actually accords with a r u l e or not. P r e s e r v i n g s a m e n e s s of m e a n i n g o r s e m a n t i c uniformity, a n d t h u s t h e very character of lan­ guage in t h e case of m o n o l o g i c a l l a n g u a g e use, r e q u i r e s only rules of cridcism a n d n o t rules of p e r f o r m a n c e . T h e latter w o u l d illicitly in­ t r o d u c e i n t o o u r fictitious state of n a t u r e precisely w h a t m a y n o t yet appear t h e r e — i n t e n t i o n s : 6

7

Because the thinking out loud, and the mental acts modeled on them, with which we have been concerned, are not actions, we have stressed the distinc­ tion between rules of performance and rules of criticism. Non-actions, as well as actions, are subject to rules of criticism, and actions, are subject to rules of criticisms, and the linguistic non-actions we have in mind are no ex­ ceptions. Linguistic rules of criticism play a key role in developing, main­ taining, and improving our linguistic character, thus ensuring the existence of the semantic uniformities, which are the descriptive core of meaningful speech. 8

T h e force of t h e c o n c e p t u a l strategy t h a t c o m p e l s Sellars to m a k e these distinctions is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , b u t t h e distinctions themselves are by n o m e a n s plausible. I t a k e issue with t h e claim t h a t s e m a n t i c uniformities [Identitdt von Bedeutungen] c a n b e s e c u r e d solely o n t h e

50 L e c t u r e III

basis of m o n o l o g i c a l m a s t e r y of t h e criteria of o n e ' s own j u d g m e n t of linguistic behavior. Moreover, I dispute the i d e a t h a t it is at all possi­ ble to j u d g e w h e t h e r a given b e h a v i o r m e e t s t h e criteria of rule-gov­ e r n e d b e h a v i o r if o n e d o e s n o t oneself possess the c o m p e t e n c e to follow t h e s e rules. Let us recall Wittgenstein's f a m o u s a r g u m e n t , which r u l e s o u t t h e possibility t h a t a solitary subject could follow a r u l e in isolation: T o think o n e is o b e y i n g a r u l e is n o t t o o b e y a r u l e . H e n c e it is n o t p o s s i b l e to o b e y a r u l e "privately": o t h e r w i s e t h i n k i n g o n e w a s o b e y i n g a r u l e w o u l d be t h e s a m e t h i n g as o b e y i n g i t . 9

W i t t g e n s t e i n starts from t h e i d e a t h a t t h e use of t h e w o r d " r u l e " is in­ t e r t w i n e d with the use of the w o r d "same." A subject A, if it follows a r u l e , can d o so only in such a way t h a t it follows t h e same r u l e regard­ less of c h a n g i n g c o n t i n g e n t circumstances. It is implicit in t h e mean­ i n g of t h e r u l e t h a t w h a t A takes as t h e basis of its o r i e n t a t i o n r e m a i n s the s a m e . I n that case, however, at least o n e a d d i t i o n a l subject B must b e able to c h e c k w h e t h e r A actually is following t h e p r e s u m e d r u l e in t h e given case. A m u s t b e in a position to deviate from t h e r u l e a n d m a k e systematic e r r o r s . At the same time, B m u s t be able to recog­ nize deviations as systematic e r r o r s a n d criticize t h e m . Only if these two c o n d i t i o n s are satisfied is t h e m e a n i n g e x p r e s s e d in t h e r u l e the s a m e for b o t h subjects—and, of course, n o t only for t h e s e two partic­ u l a r subjects, b u t for all subjects capable of s p e e c h a n d action who could take o n t h e roles of A a n d B. w

T h e p o i n t of these reflections is t h a t I myself c a n n o t b e sure of w h e t h e r I a m following a r u l e unless there is a c o n t e x t in which I can subject my behavior to another's criticism a n d we can c o m e to a consensus. T h e o t h e r ' s capacity to criticize p r e s u p p o s e s in t u r n that she has mas­ tery of t h e same r u l e - c o m p e t e n c e t h a t I have. F o r w h e r e i n d o e s t h e intersubjectivity of t h e validity of rules consist? B can p e r f o r m t h e re­ q u i r e d c h e c k of A's r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r only if B can d e m o n ­ s t r a t e to A that, in a given case, A has m a d e a mistake: t h a t is, only if B can, if necessary, b r i n g a b o u t a m u t u a l a g r e e m e n t a b o u t t h e c o r r e c t a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e r u l e . F o r e x a m p l e , B c a n take o n A's r o l e a n d show w h a t A has d o n e w r o n g . I n this case, A takes o n t h e r o l e of t h e critic w h o c a n n o w justify h e r original b e h a v i o r in t u r n if she c a n d e m o n -

5d____ . From a Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society

strate t o B t h a t B h a s m i s a p p l i e d t h e r u l e . W i t h o u t this possibility of reciprocal critique a n d i n s t r u c t i o n l e a d i n g to a g r e e m e n t , w i t h o u t t h e possibility of r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t t h e r u l e accord­ ing to which b o t h subjects o r i e n t their b e h a v i o r by following it, we could n o t even speak of "the s a m e " r u l e at all. I n d e e d , w i t h o u t t h e possibility of intersubjective rule-following, a solitary subject c o u l d not even h a v e t h e c o n c e p t of a rule. Wittgenstein uses t h e analysis of t h e c o n c e p t of "obeying a r u l e " to show that u n d e r s t a n d i n g s a m e n e s s of m e a n i n g c o n c e p t u a l l y p r e s u p ­ poses t h e ability to e n g a g e in a public p r a c t i c e w i t h at least o n e o t h e r subject, w h e r e all p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t have t h e c o m p e t e n c e b o t h t o b e ­ have in r u l e - g o v e r n e d fashion a n d critically t o evaluate such behav­ ior. An isolated subject who possesses only o n e of t h e s e c o m p e t e n c i e s cannot m a s t e r s e m a n t i c c o n v e n t i o n s . 11

T h e m o n o l o g i c a l l a n g u a g e users w h o p o p u l a t e Sellars's state of na­ ture are s u p p o s e d to k n o w w h a t it m e a n s to say t h a t a w o r d o r a sen­ tence h a s a m e a n i n g . T h e y a r e s u p p o s e d to b e in a p o s i t i o n to find out by c o m p a r i s o n t h e a n a l o g o u s roles played in different l a n g u a g e s by expressions with t h e s a m e m e a n i n g a n d t h u s to identify abstract m e a n i n g s "by c o m p a r i n g t h e j o b s they d o with t h e j o b s d o n e by ex­ pressions in t h e base l a n g u a g e . " W i t t g e n s t e i n speaks in t h e s a m e sense of t h e role t a k e n o n by w o r d s in l a n g u a g e . But Wittgenstein analyzes t h e l a n g u a g e systems within w h i c h w o r d s (or sentences) c a n assume c o m p a r a b l e functions a n d shows t h a t these l a n g u a g e systems are public in c h a r a c t e r a n d always r e q u i r e t h e i n t e r a c t i o n of at least two subjects. If Sellars's m o n o l o g i c a l l a n g u a g e users actually c o u l d identify m e a n i n g s , t h e y w o u l d already b e f u n c t i o n i n g at t h e level of intersubjec ive c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h a t is t o say, t h e y w o u l d already b e using t h e very i n t e n t i o n a l i d i o m t h a t was to have b e e n derived from the fictitious state of n a t u r e . It is t r u e t h a t Sellars avoids Husserl's er­ r o r of a n o n l i n g u i s t i c intentionalist t h e o r y of m e a n i n g . B u t h e ac­ cepts W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s insight t h a t "it is in l a n g u a g e [and only in language—J. H . ] t h a t an e x p e c t a t i o n a n d its fulfillment m a k e con­ tact" only i n o r d e r to s e p a r a t e l a n g u a g e itself f r o m its i n h e r e n t form: t h e intersubjectivity of possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Sellars fails at this p a r a d o x i c a l task of g r o u n d i n g intersubjectivity i n m o n o l o g i c a l l a n g u a g e j u s t as H u s s e r l d i d in his a n a l o g o u s 12

13

14

52 L e c t u r e III

a t t e m p t — a n d for similar reasons. As t h e w o r d " m o n o l o g i c a l " im­ plies, t h e m o n o l o g i c a l u s e of l a n g u a g e is conceivable only as a limit­ i n g case of c o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e use, a n d n o t as its possible foundation. I n contrast, Wittgenstein makes t h e transition from t h e philoso­ phy of consciousness to the p h i l o s o p h y of l a n g u a g e w i t h o u t hesita­ tion. First, h e treats i n t e n t i o n a l c o n t e n t s i n d e p e n d e n t l y from i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s ; they a t first have n o t h i n g to d o with acts of c o n s c i o u s n e s s or i n n e r e p i s o d e s . It is in l a n g u a g e itself t h a t inten­ tions m a k e contact with their fulfillment. As an example W i t t g e n s t e i n uses a m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o b l e m a n d t h e o p e r a t i o n that solves it: " F r o m e x p e c t a t i o n to fulfillment is a step in a calculation." T h e case o f s e n t e n c e s is a n a l o g o u s . F r o m a n i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e we derive t h e action t h a t can be r e g a r d e d as fulfilling t h e imperative, a n d f r o m a declarative s e n t e n c e we can derive t h e fact t h a t m a k e s it t r u e . I n t e n t i o n a n d fulfillment b e l o n g to t h e g r a m m a r of the sentence: 13

I n s o f a r as t h e m e a n i n g of w o r d s b e c o m e s clear i n t h e f u l f i l l m e n t o f a n ex­ p e c t a t i o n , i n t h e satisfaction of a wish, in t h e c a r r y i n g o u t o f a n o r d e r , etc., it a l r e a d y shows itself w h e n w e p u t t h e e x p e c t a t i o n i n t o l a n g u a g e . It is t h e r e ­ fore completely d e t e r m i n e d in the g r a m m a r . 1 6

T h e m e a n i n g of t h e s e n t e n c e is n o t p n e u m a t i c ; it is n o t e x p l a i n e d by relating it to i n t e n t i o n s or meaning-giving acts. To t h e contrary, the m e a n i n g of i n t e n t i o n s can only be specified with r e f e r e n c e to the m e a n i n g of s e n t e n c e s : " T h e m e a n i n g of the s e n t e n c e is n o t a soul." S o m e t h i n g is a s e n t e n c e only in a l a n g u a g e . T h u s t o u n d e r s t a n d an i n t e n t i o n is to u n d e r s t a n d t h e r o l e of a s e n t e n c e in a linguistic sys­ tem. B u t in w h a t sense c a n we s p e a k h e r e of a system of l a n g u a g e ? As we know, W i t t g e n s t e i n m a k e s use of a m o d e l : a l a n g u a g e is like a g a m e . H e i n t r o d u c e s the c o n c e p t of a g a m e t h r o u g h e x a m p l e s . T h e first g r o u p of e x a m p l e s consists in simple calculations t h a t can b e p e r f o r m e d with the aid of signs a n d usage rules for c o m b i n i n g signs. T h e p a r a d i g m o n which h e draws a g a i n a n d a g a i n is t h e series of n a t u r a l n u m b e r s . A f u r t h e r g r o u p of e x a m p l e s consist in chil­ d r e n ' s games, which h a v e t h e advantage t h a t they c o o r d i n a t e t h e ac­ tivities of several p a r t i c i p a n t s . T h e t h i r d g r o u p of e x a m p l e s consists 17

18

F r o m a C o n s t i t u t i v e t o a C o m m u n i c a t i v e T h e o r y of S o c i e t y

in party games, strategic g a m e s such as chess, c a r d g a m e s , a n d so forth. Against t h e diffuse b a c k g r o u n d of everyday s p e e c h a n d action, the c o m p a r i s o n of g r a m m a t i c a l rules w i t h t h e r u l e s of g a m e s high­ lights stereotypical, r e c u r r i n g p a t t e r n s : These are w h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n calls language games. I n o w w a n t to r.how b o t h t h e advantages of this model for analyzing n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s as well as t h e limitations it im­ poses on linguistic analysis. T h e g a m e m o d e l calls t h e analyst's a t t e n t i o n to habitualized, lin­ guistically m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n s . W i t t g e n s t e i n n e g l e c t s t h e truly lin­ guistic d i m e n s i o n of rules t h a t g o v e r n h o w strings of words a r e generated in favor of t h e p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n of rules t h a t govern how speakers c o m m u n i c a t e with o n e a n o t h e r . C o n s e q u e n t l y t h e "grammar" of a language g a m e is n o t to b e c o n f u s e d with t h e gram­ mar of a l a n g u a g e . T h e f o r m e r e n c o m p a s s e s t h e r u l e s a c c o r d i n g to which situations of possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g are b r o u g h t about. T h e s t r u c t u r e of a l a n g u a g e g a m e d e t e r m i n e s how I can use sentences in u t t e r a n c e s t h a t can b e subject to consensus. H a d Wittgenstein d e v e l o p e d a t h e o r y of l a n g u a g e g a m e s , it w o u l d have had to ta te t h e f o r m of a universal p r a g m a t i c s . W i t t g e n s t e i n , how­ ever, did not even c o n s i d e r this theoretical p r o g r a m , which I shall elaborate a n d e n d o r s e as t h e basis for a c o m m u n i c a t i v e t h e o r y of so­ ciety. H e never r e g a r d e d t h e g r a m m a t i c a l investigation of l a n g u a g e games as a theoretical investigation. R a t h e r , h e viewed it as a n a d h o c p r o c e d u r e t h a t uses indirect messages, t h a t is, theoretically i n a d m i s ­ sible descriptions, with t h e t h e r a p e u t i c i n t e n t of m a k i n g speakers aware of h o w t h e i r l a n g u a g e g a m e s function. If we take a l a n g u a g e g a m e to b e a system of rules a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h u t t e r a n c e s t h a t can yield a c o n s e n s u s can b e f o r m e d , then, a c c o r d i n g t o Wittgenstein, the g r a m m a r of a l a n g u a g e g a m e c a n b e exhibited b u t c a n n o t b e ex­ pressed in the f o r m of a t h e o r e t i c a l a c c o u n t . Before r e t u r n i n g to this r e n u n c i a t i o n of theory, I should like to n o t e t h r e e ways in which Wittgenstein m a d e t h e g a m e m o d e l fruitful for t h e analysis of n a t u ­ ral languages. 19

(1) W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s p r i m a r y interest in t h e g a m e m o d e l is t h e status of t h e rules of t h e g a m e a n d t h e c o m p e t e n c e of t h e players w h o master such r u l e s . T h e rules of t h e g a m e d e t e r m i n e w h a t signs a r e

54 Lecture III

p e r m i t t e d a n d w h a t o p e r a t i o n s m a y b e c a r r i e d o u t w i t h these signs. W e have to fall back o n t h e m w h e n we d o n ' t k n o w w h a t a p i e c e (such as a chess p i e c e ) o r a m o v e with a p i e c e is s u p p o s e d to " m e a n . " T h e use t h e o r y of m e a n i n g , w h i c h m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e m e a n i n g of a word or s e n t e n c e is t h e role it plays in t h e system of a l a n g u a g e , is derived f r o m this m o d e l . T h e rules of t h e game, of course, may b e described; b u t a d e s c r i p t i o n d o e s n o t really c a p t u r e w h a t t h e r u l e s d o . A player w h o u n d e r s t a n d s t h e rules, that is, one w h o can m a k e moves in t h e game, n e e d n o t also b e able to describe t h e rules. T h e specific na­ ture of a r u l e is e x p r e s s e d in the c o m p e t e n c e of s o m e o n e who mas­ ters it r a t h e r t h a n in a d e s c r i p t i o n . T o u n d e r s t a n d a g a m e is to have a certain k i n d of know-how. U n d e r s t a n d i n g m e a n s m a s t e r i n g a tech­ n i q u e . This "mastery" expresses t h e s p o n t a n e i t y with which o n e can apply a n a c q u i r e d rule i n d e p e n d e n t l y a n d t h u s also t h e creativity of p r o d u c i n g n e w instances t h a t c o u n t as e x a m p l e s of following the r u l e . T h i s e x p l a i n s W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s interest in the fact that a s t u d e n t w h o h a s l e a r n e d a p a r t i c u l a r n u m e r i c a l series by o s t e n s i o n has u n ­ d e r s t o o d t h e u n d e r l y i n g r u l e w h e n h e "knows h o w to go o n by him­ self." T h e "and so o n " with which t h e t e a c h e r e n d s a series of n u m b e r s t h a t is s u p p o s e d to exemplify a rule stands for t h e abstract possibility of p e r f o r m i n g infinitely m a n y f u r t h e r o p e r a t i o n s a n d gen­ e r a t i n g infinitely m a n y a d d i t i o n a l instances t h a t accord with t h e r u l e . T h e c o m p e t e n c e t h a t I a c q u i r e i n l e a r n i n g a r u l e of a g a m e o r a g r a m m a t i c a l r u l e is a generative capacity. W i t t g e n s t e i n never tires of explaining why t h e cognitive ability of u n d e r s t a n d i n g a rule also re­ quires a practical skill, namely, t h a t of acting a c c o r d i n g to t h e r u l e . T h e m e a n i n g of a r u l e is s o m e t h i n g universal t h a t I c a n exemplify only t h r o u g h a finite n u m b e r of cases; t h u s I c a n e x p l a i n it to s o m e ­ o n e else only t h r o u g h ostensive training. T o explain s o m e t h i n g u n i ­ versal by m e a n s of e x a m p l e s , however, is n o t to get s o m e o n e to g e n e r a l i z e inductively f r o m a finite n u m b e r of cases. Rather, t h e stu­ d e n t h a s grasped t h e universal if a n d only if h e h a s l e a r n e d to see in t h e t h i n g s s h o w n h i m only e x a m p l e s of s o m e t h i n g t h a t can be seen in t h e m . Even a single e x a m p l e c a n suffice for this: "So it is t h e r u l e s g o v e r n i n g an e x a m p l e t h a t m a k e it a n e x a m p l e . " T h e objects o r ac­ tions t h a t serve as e x a m p l e s a r e never in a n d of themselves e x a m p l e s of t h e r u l e . O n l y t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of a r u l e lets u s r e c o g n i z e t h e u n i 20

f r o m a C o n s t i t u t i v e t o a C o m m u n i c a t i v e T h e o r y of S o c i e t y

versa! in t h e particular. Every a p p l i c a t i o n c o n t a i n s in nuce a creative m o m e n t . T h e s t u d e n t w h o has l e a r n e d a r u l e has b e c o m e a p o t e n t i a l teacher. For o w i n g to h e r generative ability, she can herself n o w cre­ ate examples: n o t only n e w e x a m p l e s , b u t even fictitious o n e s . (2) A n o t h e r feature of t h e g a m e m o d e l t h a t interests Wittgenstein is the c o n s e n s u s t h a t m u s t exist a m o n g t h e players a b o u t w h a t t h e rules are. T h e c o n n e c t i o n of l a n g u a g e a n d practice t h a t is s u p p o s e d to be expressed by t h e t e r m "language g a m e " is n o t exhaustively ac­ c o u n t e d for by r e f e r r i n g to o p e r a t i o n s t h a t g e n e r a t e strings of sym­ bols a c c o r d i n g to a r u l e . W h e n Wittgenstein calls a c o n t e x t of language a n d activities a "language g a m e , " h e has in m i n d actions of a different sort, namely, i n t e r a c t i o n s . O r d e r s , for e x a m p l e , a r e lin­ guistic u t t e r a n c e s t h a t can b e fulfilled or violated by actions: S u p p o s e y o u c a m e as a n e x p l o r e r i n t o a n u n k n o w n c o u n t r y w i t h a l a n g u a g e q u i t e s t r a n g e t o y o u . I n w h a t c i r c u m s t a n c e s w o u l d y o u say t h a t t h e p e o p l e t h e r e gave o r d e r s , u n d e r s t o o d t h e m , o b e y e d t h e m , r e b e l l e d a g a i n s t t h e m , a n d so o n ? T h e c o m m o n b e h a v i o r of m a n k i n d is t h e system of r e f e r e n c e by m e a n s of w h i c h w e i n t e r p r e t a n u n k n o w n l a n g u a g e . 2 1

The g r a m m a r of a language game governs m e a n i n g structures that are e m b o d i e d in c o m p l e m e n t a r y fashion in s e n t e n c e s , bodily expres­ sions such as grimaces a n d gestures, a n d actions. Insofar as they a r e elements of a l a n g u a g e g a m e , linguistic u t t e r a n c e s are i n c o r p o r a t e d in i n t e r a c t i o n s . As c o m p o n e n t s of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, linguistic u t t e r a n c e s also h a v e t h e c h a r a c t e r of actions. I n p e r f o r m i n g s p e e c h acts such as c o m m a n d s , questions, descrip­ tions, or w a r n i n g s , I n o t only m a k e use of c o m p l e m e n t a r y m o d e s of actions b u t also p a r t i c i p a t e in a " c o m m o n b e h a v i o r [Handlungsweise] of h u m a n k i n d . " In a c o n t e x t of i n t e r a c t i o n , s p e a k i n g and a c t i n g sub­ jects are a p r i o r i l i n k e d by s o m e t h i n g s h a r e d , namely, a c o n s e n s u s a b o u t h a b i t u a l i z e d r u l e s . A n a n t h r o p o l o g i s t in a c o u n t r y w i t h a n u n ­ known l a n g u a g e assumes t h a t t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s she observes are based o n s o m e p a r t i c u l a r r u l e . She derives this r u l e b a s e d o n a p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h e r own traditions. She can test this hypothesis only by s t e p p i n g o u t of h e r r o l e as observer, at least virtually, a n d p a r ­ ticipating herself in t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t she m e r e l y observed at first. Successful p a r t i c i p a t i o n is t h e only c r i t e r i o n for assessing t h e 22

56 L e c t u r e III

a d e q u a c y of h e r u n d e r s t a n d i n g . If h e r hypothesis was false, t h e tacit c o n s e n s u s a c c o m p a n y i n g a c d o n breaks down. T h e e x p e r i e n c e t h a t a l a n g u a g e g a m e "does n o t f u n c t i o n t h e way I h a d a s s u m e d " is t h e ex­ p e r i e n c e of a d i s r u p t e d c o n s e n s u s : "That is not a g r e e m e n t i n opin­ ions b u t in f o r m of life." Intersubjective validity for or recognition by a c o m m u n i c a t i n g g r o u p t h u s has a b i n d i n g character. In discuss­ i n g t h e r u l e s of games, Wittgenstein m a k e s this clear: "To obey a r u l e , to m a k e a r e p o r t , to give a n order, t o play a g a m e of chess, are customs (uses, i n s t i t u t i o n s ) . " 23

24

(3) Finally, t h e t h i r d aspect of t h e g a m e m o d e l t h a t interests W i t t g e n s t e i n is the m e a n i n g of constituting a new c o n t e x t . T h e rules of a g a m e are established arbitrarily. We can modify old r u l e s to the p o i n t w h e r e we can be said to have invented a n e w g a m e . I n so d o i n g , we n e e d n o t have any particular p u r p o s e o r e n d in m i n d . Rather, it is i n h e r e n t in t h e c o n c e p t of a g a m e that, t h o u g h it may be a b o r i n g or exciting g a m e , a g a m e of c h a n c e o r of skill, or a g a m e for o n e or m a n y players, its e n d can consist only in being a g a m e . N e i t h e r gram­ matical n o r g a m e r u l e s are technical rules t h a t can be d e t e r m i n e d by a p p e a l i n g to an e n d t h a t is to b e realized with their aid. Wittgenstein uses t h e e x a m p l e of c o o k e r y to e x p l a i n this: W h y d o n ' t I call c o o k e r y r u l e s a r b i t r a r y , a n d w h y a m I t e m p t e d t o call t h e r u l e s of g r a m m a r a r b i t r a r y ? B e c a u s e I c o n c e i v e t h e c o n c e p t " c o o k e r y " as d e f i n e d by t h e e n d of c o o k e r y , b u t I d o n o t c o n c e i v e t h e c o n c e p t " l a n g u a g e " as d e f i n e d b y t h e e n d of l a n g u a g e . You cook b a d l y if y o u a r e g u i d e d i n y o u r c o o k i n g b y r u l e s o t h e r t h a n t h e r i g h t o n e s ; b u t if y o u follow o t h e r r u l e s t h a n t h o s e of c h e s s y o u a r e p l a y i n g a n o t h e r g a m e . . . . T h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e r u l e s o f c o o k e r y a n d t h e g r a m m a r of t h e w o r d "cook" is n o t t h e s a m e as t h a t b e t w e e n t h e r u l e s of c h e s s a n d t h e e x p r e s s i o n "play c h e s s " or t h a t b e ­ t w e e n t h e r u l e s o f m u l t i p l i c a t i o n a n d t h e g r a m m a r o f t h e w o r d "multiply. "' &

Like t h e rules of games, g r a m m a t i c a l rules are constitutive. F o r they d o n o t serve t o regulate a f o r m of b e h a v i o r t h a t exists i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e m . R a t h e r they c r e a t e a n e w category of m o d e s of behavior. T h e p u r p o s e to which such generative r u l e s can b e r e l a t e d is consti­ t u t e d by these rules themselves. T h u s we c a n n o t r e g a r d l a n g u a g e as a n institution t h a t serves a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e , such as r e a c h i n g m u ­ tual u n d e r s t a n d i n g . For t h e c o n c e p t of l a n g u a g e is already c o n t a i n e d in this c o n c e p t of c o m m u n i c a t i o n .

57__ from a Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society

Nevertheless, it is precisely t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r of t h e g a m e that shows the limits of a t t e m p t i n g to u n d e r s t a n d l a n g u a g e o n the model of a g a m e . W i t t g e n s t e i n himself n o t e s a t o n e p o i n t t h e differ­ ence between the arbitrariness of a g a m e u p o n w h i c h we have a g r e e d and t h e recalcitrance of a l a n g u a g e passed d o w n by tradition, whose grammar I m u s t obey. A l a n g u a g e is j u s t n o t simply a g a m e ; we have to take it seriously. Is meaning then really only the use of the word? Isn't it the way this use meshes with our life? Isn't its use part of our life? 26

In this passage Wittgenstein expressly distances himself f r o m t h e idea t h a t t h e use of l a n g u a g e is m e r e l y a g a m e o r a f o r m of propriety. Kor m e to b e a b l e to u n d e r s t a n d it, "it m u s t m e s h with my own life." What can this m e a n ? W e d o n o t c h o o s e t h e r u l e s of a l a n g u a g e in t h e same a r b i t r a r y way in which we d o t h e rules of a g a m e . Precisely in this r e g a r d a strategic g a m e like chess is n o t a n a p p r o p r i a t e m o d e l for l a n g u a g e . Two constitudve features of l a n g u a g e have n o ana­ logue in games of strategy'. 27

(a) G a m e s of strategy are e x t e r n a l to the playing subjects, w h e r e a s a language p e r m e a t e s t h e personality s t r u c t u r e s of t h e speakers themselves. Because g a m e s a r e set u p merely by c o n v e n t i o n , t h e rules of t h e g a m e a r e e x e m p t f r o m discussion f o r t h e d u r a t i o n of play. D u r i n g t h e g a m e t h e y c a n n o t a t t h e s a m e t i m e b e w h a t t h e game is a b o u t . N o r d o t h e playing subjects c h a n g e i n t h e i r abilities while playing; t h e y b r i n g to t h e g a m e their g e n e r a l i z e d c o m p e t e n c e to a g r e e u p o n r u l e s of t h e g a m e as such a n d t o act in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e m . T r u e , t h e i r personality s t r u c t u r e s b e l o n g to t h e ancillary conditions of t h e g a m e , b u t n o t to t h e variables t h a t c h a n g e t h e i r val­ ues d u r i n g its course. T h i s is n o t t h e case for the g r a m m a r of lan­ guage games a n d t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e of speakers. B o t h are implicated in a d e v e l o p m e n t a l process d u r i n g linguistic c o m m u ­ nication. T h e g r a m m a r of l a n g u a g e g a m e s c h a n g e s in t h e c o u r s e of cultural transmission, w h i l e s p e a k e r s a r e f o r m e d in t h e c o u r s e of their socialization; a n d b o t h processes take place in t h e m e d i u m of l a n g u a g e itself. Precisely b e c a u s e , u n l i k e strategic rules, they a r e n o t based o n c o n v e n t i o n , g r a m m a t i c a l rules c a n b e c o n t i n u o u s l y m a d e

58 Lecture III

t h e object of m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n . S p e a k i n g subjects, however, if they want to u n d e r s t a n d a n y t h i n g , are at the s a m e time u n d e r the c o n s t r a i n t of h a v i n g to draw o n their p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e situa­ tion in which they always already find themselves. For their c o m p e ­ t e n c e as speakers is itself t h e result of linguistically m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n s . T h e g a m e m o d e l c a n easily m a k e us forget t h e fact that t h e t h o r o u g h l y symbolically s t r u c t u r e d personality of speakers is p a r t of t h e s t r u c t u r e of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . Speakers a n d l a n g u a g e are i n t e g r a t e d in a different a n d m o r e i n t i m a t e way t h a n are players a n d their g a m e s . Wittgenstein d o e s n o t take a c c o u n t of this systematically. (b) H e takes n o g r e a t e r n o t i c e of a n o t h e r fact: t h e g r a m m a r of l a n g u a g e c a n n o t c o n s t i t u t e m e a n i n g s i n d e p e n d e n t i y of e x t e r n a l constraints, as is t h e case in t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l i n t r o d u c t i o n of g a m e rules. Of c o u r s e , t h e g r a m m a r of a l a n g u a g e g a m e c a n n o t b e refuted by e m p i r i c a l s t a t e m e n t s . It d o e s n o t d e p e n d o n n a t u r a l laws; rather, we m i g h t say, it is prior to e x p e r i e n c e . But is t h e g r a m m a r of a lan­ guage p r i o r to e x p e r i e n c e in t h e same way as are t h e r u l e s of a strate­ gic g a m e ? T h e m e a n i n g a t t r i b u t e d to a m o v e in a g a m e m e a n s n o t h i n g o u t s i d e t h e c o n t e x t of t h e g a m e . L a n g u a g e , however, refers to objects in t h e world. W e talk a b o u t s o m e t h i n g that is n o t in lan­ guage b u t in t h e world. I n t h e c o n t e x t of a g a m e t h e r e is n o t h i n g we can d o that is n o t part of t h e g a m e . U n l i k e s e n t e n c e s , g a m e s c a n n o t r e p r e s e n t a n y t h i n g . T h a t is w h y g r a m m a t i c a l rules are "constitutive" in a different sense t h a n g a m e r u l e s are: T h e y c o n s t i t u t e t h e possibil­ ity of e x p e r i e n c e . A l t h o u g h they are p r i o r to this possible experi­ e n c e , they a r e n e v e r t h e l e s s n o t i n d e p e n d e n t of restrictions associated b o t h with invariant features of o u r biological m a k e - u p a n d with c o n s t a n t s of o u r n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t : It is o n l y i n n o r m a l cases t h a t t h e u s e of a w o r d is clearly p r e s c r i b e d ; w e k n o w , a r e i n n o d o u b t , w h a t t o say i n t h i s o r t h a t case. T h e m o r e a b n o r m a l t h e c a s e , t h e m o r e d o u b t f u l it b e c o m e s w h a t w e a r e t o say. A n d if t h i n g s w e r e quite different f r o m what t h e y actually are—if t h e r e were f o r instance n o c h a r a c t e r i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n o f p a i n , o f fear, of j o y ; if r u l e b e c a m e e x c e p t i o n a n d e x c e p t i o n r u l e . . . t h i s w o u l d m a k e o u r n o r m a l l a n g u a g e g a m e s lose t h e i r p o i n t . T h e p r o c e d u r e of p u t t i n g a l u m p of c h e e s e o n a b a l a n c e a n d f i x i n g t h e p r i c e b y t h e t u r n o f t h e scale w o u l d lose its p o i n t if it frequently

59___ From a Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society

happened for such lumps to suddenly grow or shrink for no obvious 28

reason/ This p r o b l e m arises only for r u l e s that, unlike g a m e r u l e s , constitute not merely a n self-contained c o n t e x t of m e a n i n g b u t r a t h e r t h e m e a n i n g of objects of possible e x p e r i e n c e . This difference, too, was n o t systematically a c c o u n t e d for by W i t t g e n s t e i n after h e a b a n d o n e d the c o n c e p t of a universal l a n g u a g e t h a t r e p r e s e n t s t h e facts a n d has a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l status. I would like to discuss briefly t h e two d i m e n s i o n s in w h i c h to de­ velop p h i l o s o p h y of l a n g u a g e b e y o n d t h e limits of t h e g a m e m o d e l of l a n g u a g e . R e g a r d i n g ( a ) , t h e intersubjecdve r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n speakers: Witt­ genstein r e d u c e s sameness of m e a n i n g to the intersubjective recog­ nition of rules. But h e does n o t e x a m i n e ^ t h e reciprocal r e l a t i o n between t h e two subjects w h o a c c e p t a r u l e ] for w h o m a r u l e , s u c h as a semantic c o n v e n t i o n , is valid. [ T h e fact That each p a r t n e r m u s t be able to anticipate t h e o t h e r ' s expectation^is by n o m e a n s trivial. G. H . ^ M e a d was t h e first t o analyze this f o u n d a t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n . T h e intersubjectivity of a r u l e ' s validity and, h e n c e , s a m e n e s s of m e a n i n g have t h e s a m e basis: t h e fact t h a t r u l e - o r i e n t e d b e h a v i o r c a n b e mutually criticizecf/what this d e m a n d s , in t u r n , is n o t reci­ procity of behavior b u t reciprocity of expectations a b o u t behavior. A m u s t b e a b l e t o anticipate a n d identify with B's e x p e c t a t i o n j u s t as B can in relation to A. This m u t u a l reflexivity of e x p e c t a t i o n s is t h e condition in virtue of which b o t h p a r t n e r s c a n j o i n in t h e same ex­ pectation, identify t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t is objectively p o s i t e d with t h e rule, a n d "share" its symbolic m e a n i n g . W e can call these expecta­ tions intentions. 29

L

I n t e n t i o n s a r e meaningfully s t r u c t u r e d e x p e c t a t i o n s that a r e ori­ e n t e d to identical m e a n i n g s a n d whose c o n t e n t can b e u n d e r s t o o d . T h e y m a y n o t b e t a k e n as s i m p l e e x p e c t a t i o n s of a subject. I n t e n t i o n s a r e n o t e x p e c t a t i o n s t h a t c a n b e c o m e reflexive as s o o n as t h e y h a v e b e e n m a d e t h e object of f u r t h e r e x p e c t a t i o n s , w h e t h e r of t h e s a m e subject or a n o t h e r . At t h e level of symbolized m e a n i n g , t h e r e c a n b e n o such "simple" e x p e c t a t i o n s : E x p e c t a t i o n s a r e always consti­ tuted by t h e r e c i p r o c a l reflexivity of e x p e c t a t i o n s . T h i s shows t h a t

60 L e c t u r e III

c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h r o u g h m e a n i n g is possible only o n c o n d i t i o n of si­ m u l t a n e o u s m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n . C o m m u n i c a t i o n by m e a n s of shared meanings requires reaching understanding about something a n d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t t h e intersub­ jective validity of what is b e i n g c o m m u n i c a t e d . By m e a n s of symbol­ ized m e a n i n g , s o m e t h i n g t h a t is n o w absent is m a d e p r e s e n t i n a s m u c h as at least two subjects c a p a b l e of s p e e c h a n d action c o m e to s h a r e this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Yet it d o e s n o t suffice t o r e d u c e identity of m e a n i n g to t h e reciprocal reflexivity of expectations. For this reci­ procity p r e s u p p o s e s in t u r n t h e subjects' mutual recognition. By j o i n i n g in their e x p e c t a t i o n s , subjects constitute m e a n i n g s t h a t they can s h a r e . H e r e we m u s t s u p p o s e t h a t they themselves were f o r m e d as subjects capable of s p e e c h a n d action only in c o n n e c t i o n with acts of m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n . For it is only their c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e , t h a t is, t h e i r capacity t o s p e a k ( a n d to act), t h a t m a k e s t h e m subjects. F r o m this p o i n t of view, intersubjectivity reveals itself as a p a r a d o x i c a l relation. Insofar as t h e y take t h e r o l e of subjects, subjects w h o m u t u a l l y rec­ ognize e a c h o t h e r as such m u s t r e g a r d o n e a n o t h e r as identical: E a c h m u s t s u b s u m e b o t h herself a n d t h e o t h e r u n d e r t h e s a m e category. At the same time, however, t h e r e l a t i o n of reciprocity in r e c o g n i t i o n also r e q u i r e s t h e n o n i d e n t i t y of e g o a n d other. I n d e e d , each m u s t affirm h e r a b s o l u t e difference f r o m t h e other. For to b e a subject in­ c l u d e s t h e claim t o individuation. This dialectic of t h e e g o was first d e v e l o p e d by Fichte a n d H e g e l . Obviously o n e is i n i t i a t e d i n t o t h e p a r a d o x i c a l r e l a t i o n of intersubjectivity t h r o u g h t h e system of per­ sonal p r o n o u n s ; H u m b o l d t , in particular, called a t t e n t i o n to this. As even H u s s e r l realized, reciprocal reflexivity of e x p e c t a t i o n , in which identical m e a n i n g s a r e constituted, r e q u i r e s t h a t e a c h subject can identify a n d h a v e a n e x p e c t a t i o n s i m u l t a n e o u s l y f r o m h e r o w n posi­ tion a n d from t h a t of the other. T h i s requires, in t u r n , t h e simulta­ n e o u s p e r c e p t i o n of dialogue roles t h a t a r e i n c o m p a t i b l e to t h e e x t e n t t h a t a s p e a k i n g a n d acting e g o can identify with h e r o t h e r as with a n o t h e r ego only if the latter is c a p t u r e d as different f r o m her­ self, as n o t identical with herself. W h e n e v e r two subjects c o n f r o n t o n e a n o t h e r a t t h e level of intersubjectivity in o r d e r to speak o r i n t e r ­ act with o n e a n o t h e r , t h e y m a s t e r this p a r a d o x i c a l relation. T o b e

61__ _____ From a Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society

able to e n t e r i n t o t h e p a r a d o x i c a l r e l a t i o n of intersubjectivity t h a t underlies all logically consistent c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , a speaker m u s t have t h e c o m p e t e n c e to apply p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n s in a c c o r d a n c e with rules. She must say "I" to herself, a n d address the other, w h o equally can say "I" to himself, as "you." At t h e s a m e time t h e two d e l i m i t themselves as "we" from all outsiders (from " h i m " a n d " t h e m " ) , w h o are merely p o t e n t i a l p a r t i c i p a n t s in conversation. This intersubjective r e l a t i o n is e l a b o r a t e d in t h e g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m of t h e e l e m e n t a r y u n i t of s p e e c h : t h e s p e e c h act. P a r a d i g m e x a m p l e s of speech acts a r e "I p r o m i s e y o u I will c o m e " ; "I advise y o u to stop that"; "I shall describe to y o u h o w y o u s h o u l d go"; a n d so on. I n every explicit s p e e c h act of t h e f o r m "Mp," M c o n t a i n s a p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n in the first p e r s o n as t h e g r a m m a t i c a l subject a n d a p e r s o n a l p r o ­ n o u n in t h e s e c o n d p e r s o n as t h e object, as well as a p e r f o r m a t i v e verb as t h e p r e d i c a t e . W e use s e n t e n c e s of this f o r m i n u t t e r a n c e s in order to both g e n e r a t e a n d r e p r e s e n t a relation of intersubjectivity based on m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n . S p e e c h acts a r e b a s e d on reciprocal re­ lations. T h e roles of a s k i n g a n d answering, affirming a n d d e n y i n g , o r c o m m a n d i n g a n d obeying a r e in principle interchangeable. This interchangeability, however, h o l d s only o n c o n d i t i o n of simulta­ neously r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t individuals w h o a s s u m e d i a l o g u e roles a r e in principle i r r e p l a c e a b l e a n d u n i q u e . T h e success of a s p e e c h act d e p e n d s a m o n g o t h e r things o n speakers e n t e r i n g i n t o a n intersubjective r e l a t i o n by using p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n s , a n d this rela­ tion m a k e s possible reciprocally t h e s i m u l t a n e o u s assertion of t h e identity a n d n o n i d e n t i t y of e g o a n d other. T h i s p a r t i c u l a r f o r m of intersubjectivity c o u l d be e l u c i d a t e d f u r t h e r by investigating the logic of t h e use of p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n s . R e g a r d i n g ( b ) , t h e r e l a t i o n of speech to s o m e t h i n g in t h e world: In t h e Tractatus W i t t g e n s t e i n h a d investigated t h e f o r m of a universal l a n g u a g e t h a t r e p r e s e n t e d facts. All a n d only those s e n t e n c e s o r p r o p o s i t i o n s [Sdtze] of t h e l a n g u a g e t h a t a r e syntactically c o r r e c t are empirically m e a n i n g f u l . It is to these a n d only these p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t facts c o r r e s p o n d if t h e f o r m e r a r e t r u e . T h u s t h e universal lan­ g u a g e was to d e t e r m i n e t h e object d o m a i n of possible empirical a n d scientific p r o p o s i t i o n s of t h e n a t u r a l sciences a n d could h a v e claimed a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l status. A p a r t from t h e logical difficulties

62 L e c t u r e III

t h a t s t o o d in t h e way of c a r r y i n g o u t this p r o g r a m , o n e motive above all c o m p e l l e d Wittgenstein t o a b a n d o n his original p o s i t i o n : t h e dis­ covery of the c o m m u n i c a t i v e use of l a n g u a g e . Wittgenstein b e c a m e a w a r e of t h e p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n of s p e e c h acts, w h e r e b y we pro­ d u c e a m a n i f o l d of c o n t e x t s for the possibility of r e a c h i n g understanding: T h e r e a r e . . . c o u n t l e s s d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f u s e o f w h a t w e call "symbols," " w o r d s , " " s e n t e n c e s " . . . N e w types o f l a n g u a g e , n e w l a n g u a g e g a m e s , as we m a y say, c o m e i n t o e x i s t e n c e , a n d o t h e r s b e c o m e o b s o l e t e a n d g e t forgotten. 3 0

Of c o u r s e , W i t t g e n s t e i n was led astray by this insight. T h e discovery t h a t d e s c r i b i n g a n d e x p l a i n i n g facts is b u t o n e type of s p e e c h act a m o n g o t h e r s led W i t t g e n s t e i n n o t only t o b r e a k with t h e false m o ­ n o p o l y of t h e l a n g u a g e g a m e of fact-stating discourse o r with "logos as t h e m a r k of distinction of l a n g u a g e " (Apel). It also led h i m to suc­ c u m b to t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y e r r o r of i g n o r i n g h e n c e f o r t h t h e privi­ l e g e d role of cognitive l a n g u a g e use. I n his catalog of l a n g u a g e g a m e s t h e description of a n object, physical m e a s u r e m e n t , a n d the verification of h y p o t h e s e s are p u t o n t h e s a m e level as, for e x a m p l e , c o m m a n d s , offerings of advice, o r p r o m i s e s . W i t t g e n s t e i n does n o t r e c o g n i z e t h a t only t h e cognitive u s e of l a n g u a g e o p e n s u p t h e di­ m e n s i o n to w h i c h all s p e e c h acts must refer. This can be seen o n c e again in t h e g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m of t h e e l e m e n t a r y u n i t of s p e e c h . Every e l e m e n t a r y u t t e r a n c e of t h e f o r m "Mp" c o n t a i n s a d e p e n ­ d e n t clause p t h a t expresses t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t a b o u t which m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d a g r e e m e n t is to b e r e a c h e d . T h i s d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e of t h e s p e e c h act m i r r o r s t h e s t r u c t u r e of s p e e c h in gen­ eral. T h e r e is n o m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g unless b o t h i n t e r l o c u t o r s a r e o p e r a t i n g simultaneously at two levels: (a) t h e level of inter­ subjectivity, at which t h e s p e a k e r - h e a r e r s speak with o n e a n o t h e r ; a n d (b) t h e level of objects o r states of affairs a b o u t w h i c h t h e y c o m ­ m u n i c a t e with o n e another. In every s p e e c h act, speakers c o m m u n i ­ cate with o n e a n o t h e r a b o u t objects in t h e world, a b o u t t h i n g s a n d events, or a b o u t p e r s o n s a n d their u t t e r a n c e s . W i t h o u t t h e p r o p o s i ­ tional c o n t e n t "that p," which is e x p r e s s e d in cognidve l a n g u a g e use in t h e f o r m of t h e assertoric p r o p o s i t i o n p, even c o m m u n i c a t i v e use w o u l d b e impossible, i n d e e d w i t h o u t c o n t e n t . W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s analysis

63__ From a C o n s t i t u t i v e t o a C o m m u n i c a t i v e T h e o r y of Society

of l a n g u a g e g a m e s focuses only o n t h e m e a n i n g - c o n s t i t u t i n g aspect of language, namely, its use. It neglects its knowledge-constituting as­ pect, t h a t is, its r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l function. T h e holistic analysis of lan­ guage games fails t o r e c o g n i z e t h e d u a l s t r u c t u r e of all s p e e c h acts and h e n c e t h e linguistic c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which reality is m a d e t h e object of e x p e r i e n c e . It is t r u e t h a t t h e g e n e r a t i o n of contexts of c o m m u n i c a t i o n c a n n o t b e conceived o n t h e m o d e l of possible expe­ rience; n o m o r e so, however, c a n t h e latter b e g r a s p e d a d e q u a t e l y in t e r m s of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e aspect of l a n g u a g e . F r o m this p o i n t of view it is advisable t o r e i n t r o d u c e a t t h e level of linguistic analysis H u s s e r l ' s distinction b e t w e e n i n t e n t i o n a l objects or "contents" o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d t h e "positings" c o n n e c t e d with our i n t e n t i o n s o n t h e other. T h e m e a n i n g of a s p e e c h act consists of i t s p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t / ) (expressed in t h e d e p e n d e n t clause) a n d t h e sense of t h e m o d e M of m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t is s o u g h t (ex­ pressed in the p e r f o r m a t i v e c l a u s e ) . T h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y e l e m e n t de­ termines t h e m e a n i n g of t h e validity t h a t we claim f o r an u t t e r a n c e . ( T h e m o d e l o f t h e s e claims t o validity i m p l i e d i n t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n ­ i n g of a s p e e c h act is t r u t h value/ (or w h a t Husserl called doxic posit­ ing) . T h e m e a n i n g of an assertion q u a assertion is t h a t t h e asserted state of affairs is t h e case. T h e r e are, in a d d i t i o n , o t h e r classes of claims to validity ( n o n d o x i c positings).] T h u s t h e m e a n i n g of a p r o m ­ ise q u a p r o m i s e is t h a t t h e s p e a k e r will in fact k e e p a n obligation t o which she h a s c o m m i t t e d herself. Similarly, it is t h e m e a n i n g of a c o m m a n d q u a c o m m a n d t h a t t h e s p e a k e r wants to h a v e h e r d e m a n d fulfilled. T h e s e validity claims t h a t a s p e a k e r raises b y p e r f o r m i n g speech acts g r o u n d intersubjective relations, t h a t is,[the facticity of social facts. I want to distinguish four classes of claims to validity: 5

(1) Intelligibility. ' W i t h every actual u t t e r a n c e t h e speaker associates t h e claim t h a t it c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d in t h e given situation. T h i s claim is n o t r e d e e m e d o r v i n d i c a t e d if speaker a n d h e a r e r d o n o t k n o w t h e s a m e l a n g u a g e . T h e n a h e r m e n e u t i c effort is r e q u i r e d in o r d e r t o yield s e m a n t i c clarification. (2) Truth. Assertions a n d e x p l a n a t i o n s imply a claim t o t r u t h . It is n o t justified if t h e asserted state of affairs d o e s n o t o b t a i n . I call this u s e of l a n g u a g e cognitive. I n cognitive l a n g u a g e use we initiate

64 Lecture I I I

c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h t h e goal of c o m m u n i c a t i n g s o m e t h i n g a b o u t an objectified reality. (3) Sincerity a n d (4) Normative Tightness. All u t t e r a n c e s that are ex­ pressive in t h e n a r r o w e r sense (feelings, desires, expressions of will) imply a claim to sincerity. This claim proves to be false if it turns o u t t h a t t h e s p e a k e r d i d n o t in fact have t h e i n t e n t i o n s t h a t she ex­ pressed. All normatively o r i e n t e d u t t e r a n c e s (such as c o m m a n d s , ad­ vice, p r o m i s e s , etc.) imply a claim to n o r m a t i v e Tightness. This claim is n o t justified if t h e prevailing n o r m s u n d e r l y i n g t h e u t t e r a n c e s can­ n o t b e legitimated. I call this use of l a n g u a g e communicative. H e r e we refer to s o m e t h i n g in the world in o r d e r to p r o d u c e specific interper­ sonal relations. C o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e use p r e s u p p o s e s cognitive use, whereby we a c q u i r e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s , just as, inversely, cognitive use p r e s u p p o s e s c o m m u n i c a t i v e use, since assertions can only b e m a d e by m e a n s of constative s p e e c h acts. A l t h o u g h a c o m m u n i c a t i v e the­ ory of society is i m m e d i a t e l y c o n c e r n e d with t h e s e d i m e n t a t i o n s a n d p r o d u c t s of c o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e use, it must d o justice to t h e d o u b l e , cognitive-communicative structure of s p e e c h . T h e r e f o r e in d e v e l o p i n g t h e t h e o r y of s p e e c h acts I shall at least refer to t h e con­ stitutive p r o b l e m s t h a t arise in c o n n e c t i o n with cognitive l a n g u a g e use. W i t t g e n s t e i n h a d m a r k e d reservations r e g a r d i n g a t t e m p t s to de­ velop a theory of l a n g u a g e . T h e systematic reason for his i n t e r p r e t a ­ tion of linguistic analysis as a merely t h e r a p e u t i c activity lies in his m a k i n g an absolute of a single use of l a n g u a g e , namely, t h e c o m m u ­ nicative. Cognitive l a n g u a g e use n o l o n g e r has a n y claim to inde­ p e n d e n c e . W i t t g e n s t e i n believed t h a t t h e plurality of l a n g u a g e g a m e s t h a t h e discovered e n c o m p a s s e d all conceivable ways of using w o r d s a n d s e n t e n c e s . H e d i d n o t realize t h a t it covers b u t o n e of sev­ eral categories of l a n g u a g e u s e . After i n t r o d u c i n g his l a n g u a g e g a m e m o d e l , Wittgenstein, if I a m n o t m i s t a k e n , d i d n o t offer any justification for his a b s t e n t i o n from theory. T o b e sure, h e h a d a m p l e r e a s o n to consider t h e r o a d s to a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l o r empiricist o r constructivist theory of l a n g u a g e im­ passable. Linguistic t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s m , which tries to r e c o n s t r u c t a

6j_____—-—. Frorn a Constitutive to a Communicative Theory of Society

"language in g e n e r a l " t h a t constitutes t h e objects of possible experi­ ence, ignores n o n c o g n i t i v e l a n g u a g e use. Linguistic empiricism, which seeks to analyze l a n g u a g e by r e d u c i n g it to o b s e r v a b l e events or episodes, fails to a c c o u n t for t h e intersubjective s t r u c t u r e of lan­ guage (as Sellars's artful c o n s t r u c t i o n d e m o n s t r a t e s ) . A n d linguistic constructivism a la C a r n a p abstains f r o m t h e outset f r o m analyzing natural languages. T h e r e r e m a i n s o n e alternative, w h i c h h a s b e e n developed since W i t t g e n s t e i n i n t h e p r o c e s s of dealing with his antitheoretical analysis of n a t u r a l languages, namely, t h e project of a generative t h e o r y of l a n g u a g e . If we take g e n e r a t i v e g r a m m a r as a model for d e v e l o p i n g a universal p r a g m a t i c s , why s h o u l d we n o t be able to discover a n d r e c o n s t r u c t t h e rule systems a c c o r d i n g to which we g e n e r a t e c o n t e x t s of interactions, t h a t is, t h e symbolic reality of society?

IV Universal Pragmatics: Reflections on a Theory of Communicative Competence

Wittgenstein's investigations are t h e result of h i s reflecting o n t h e ac­ tivity of analyzing language with t h e r a p e u t i c i n t e n t . H a d h e w a n t e d instead to d e v e l o p a theory of l a n g u a g e games, it w o u l d h a v e h a d to take t h e f o r m of universal pragmatics. For W i t t g e n s t e i n is n o t con­ cerned with t h e g r a m m a r of s e n t e n c e s t h a t are used in u t t e r a n c e s but r a t h e r with t h e g r a m m a r of t h e s e u t t e r a n c e s themselves: t h a t is, with rules for u s i n g s e n t e n c e s in contexts. By t h e s a m e t o k e n , it is n o t merely a pseudo-linguistic flourish on his p a r t to talk of t h e g r a m ­ matical structure of l a n g u a g e g a m e s . Wittgenstein uses this n o t i o n to give expression to the fact that his investigations take place at t h e level of t h e logical o r c o n c e p t u a l analysis of c o n t e x t s of m e a n i n g a n d not at t h e level of an empirically o r i e n t e d p r a g m a t i c s . T h e latter con­ ceives t h e p h e n o m e n a of l a n g u a g e use within a f r a m e w o r k t h a t is n o t specific to l a n g u a g e , r e g a r d i n g t h e m , for e x a m p l e , as m o d e s of be­ havior c o n t r o l l e d by signs or as self-regulated i n f o r m a t i o n flows. B u t not even the t h e o r y of action c a n p r o v i d e a n a d e q u a t e c o n c e p t u a l framework for a theoretical analysis of l a n g u a g e g a m e s . O f c o u r s e , one can say t h a t t h e g r a m m a r of l a n g u a g e g a m e s consists in r u l e s for t h e contextually a p p r o p r i a t e use of symbolic expressions. But t h e rules in q u e s t i o n a r e constitutive rules, a n d it is by t h e s e very r u l e s that contexts in w h i c h it is possible to use symbolic expressions a r e p r o d u c e d . T h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e f o r m of life itself d e p e n d s o n t h e g r a m m a r of l a n g u a g e games. T h i s p o i n t is o b s c u r e d by t h e particularistic b e n t of Wittgenstein's later p h i l o s o p h y ; b u t it c o m e s

68 Lecture IV

to t h e fore as s o o n as we i n q u i r e i n t o t h e p r o b l e m of a theory of pos­ sible l a n g u a g e games. F o r t h e n we are a i m i n g at r e c o n s t r u c t i n g the system of rules by m e a n s of which we g e n e r a t e contexts w h e r e we can r e a c h a m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t objects (and states of affairs). T h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l a t t e m p t to elucidate t h e universal structures of t h e lifeworld r e t u r n s in t h e f o r m of a n a t t e m p t in t h e philosophy of l a n g u a g e to discover a n d r e c o n s t r u c t t h e universal structures of t h e c o m m u n i c a d v e f o r m of life in the universal pragmatics of lan­ guage games. W h e r e a s t h e analysis of t h e lifeworld follows t h e m o d e l of a consti­ tutive t h e o r y of k n o w l e d g e , t h e investigation of t h e communicative f o r m of life (as t h e c o n d i t i o n of all possible l a n g u a g e games) follows t h e m o d e l of a universalist generative linguistic analysis. T h e theory of g r a m m a r o r i g i n a t e d by N o a m C h o m s k y p r o v i d e s such a m o d e l — b u t a m o d e l only. T h a t is w h y I s h o u l d like to characterize t h e level at which a universal pragmatics has to b e d e v e l o p e d by c o m p a r i n g it with t h e C h o m s k y a n p r o g r a m . This will facilitate my s u b s e q u e n t t r e a t m e n t of t h e two most i m p o r t a n t theoretical c o m p o n e n t s of a universal p r a g m a t i c s : o n e d e a l i n g with t h e cognitive use of language, t h e o t h e r with its c o m m u n i c a t i v e use. T h e object of t h e t h e o r y of generative g r a m m a r is l a n g u a g e , not s p e e c h processes (langue as o p p o s e d to parole). T h e linguistic phe­ n o m e n a i m m e d i a t e l y accessible to t h e linguist a r e o r d e r e d expres­ sions t h a t c a n b e e m p l o y e d in s p e e c h situations. T h e a i m of the t h e o r y is a n a d e q u a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e system of r u l e s by m e a n s of which c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r - h e a r e r s p r o d u c e ( a n d u n d e r s t a n d ) strings of s u c h linguistic expressions. Linguistic c o m p e t e n c e is the capacity t o m a s t e r a system of r u l e s of this sort. It accords with the g e n e r a l c o m p e t e n c e to follow r u l e s analyzed by W i t t g e n s t e i n in hav­ i n g the following two features. First, the speaker h a s the capacity to g e n e r a t e s p o n t a n e o u s l y w h a t is in p r i n c i p l e a n u n l i m i t e d sum of ex­ pressions t h a t are syntactically, semantically, and phonetically accept­ able in a given l a n g u a g e . S e c o n d , t h e speaker is capable of j u d g i n g w h e t h e r ( a n d to w h a t extent) a n expression is well f o r m e d a l o n g these t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s . W i t h a finite n u m b e r of e l e m e n t s , every c o m p e t e n t speaker can g e n e r a t e a n d u n d e r s t a n d a n u n l i m i t e d n u m ­ b e r of strings of symbols, i n c l u d i n g ones t h a t have never b e e n ut-

69__-

• Universal Pragmatics

tered previously. Moreover, t h e s p e a k e r can distinguish ad h o c between correctly f o r m e d a n d deviant expressions ( a n d o r d e r ex­ pressions that a r e syntactically m a l f o r m e d , unclear, o r semantically or phonetically d i s t o r t e d a c c o r d i n g to t h e d e g r e e to which they a r e grammatically c o r r e c t ) . This type of j u d g m e n t m a d e by speakers is indicative of a n a p p a r d y intuitive or tacit k n o w l e d g e , which t h e t h e o r y of universal grammar sets o u t to explicate a n d r e c o n s t r u c t . T h e linguist expli­ cates t h e know-how t h a t c o m p e t e n t speakers have at t h e i r disposal. The task of t h e t h e o r y of universal g r a m m a r is t h e r a t i o n a l r e c o n ­ struction of a system of rules t h a t is n o t yet r e c o g n i z e d or t h e o r e t i ­ cally specifiable even t h o u g h it is already practically m a s t e r e d and to that e x t e n t k n o w n . R e c o n s t r u c t i o n should m a k e it possible to derive a structural d e s c r i p t i o n for every relevant e x p r e s s i o n of a l a n g u a g e (this applies to syntactic, semantic, a n d p h o n e d c s t r u c t u r e s ) . Since it is impossible to e n u m e r a t e all relevant expressions of a l a n g u a g e , it is further necessary t h a t t h e rules of t h e system b e recursively applica­ ble f o r m a t i o n rules. A t h e o r y t h a t m e e t s b o t h these d e m a n d s c a n specify explicitly h o w all t h e possible expressions of a l a n g u a g e c a n be related to o n e a n o t h e r . e n

Two goals of this theoretical p r o g r a m m u s t at least b e m e n t i o n e d in t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t . T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of generative g r a m m a r fol­ lows a universalistic r e s e a r c h strategy: T h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s of r u l e systems for individual l a n g u a g e s a r e to b e effected at increasingly higher levels of generalization until t h e g r a m m a t i c a l universals u n ­ derlying all individual l a n g u a g e s are arrived at. In a d d i t i o n , g e n e r a ­ tive g r a m m a r has two levels, that is, it is a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n a l g r a m m a r . Strings of linguistic expressions a r e c o n s i d e r e d surface s t r u c t u r e s formed from u n d e r l y i n g d e e p s t r u c t u r e s by m e a n s of a set of transformational rules. Every d e e p s t r u c t u r e c a n t h e n b e c o r r e l a t e d with a class of surface s t r u c t u r e s t h a t p a r a p h r a s e it. T h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n has b e e n fairly well c o r r o b o r a t e d empirically. It c a n also b e u s e d to give a syntactic a c c o u n t of s e m a n t i c ambiguities. F o r o u r p u r p o s e of delimiting universal p r a g m a t i c s from universal grammar, it is i m p o r t a n t to explain t h e sense in w h i c h Chomsky, in i n t r o d u c i n g t h e c o n c e p t of linguistic c o m p e t e n c e , is c o m p e l l e d to p e r f o r m a n idealization. H e h i m s e l f talks of t h e ideal s p e a k e r - h e a r e r :

70 L e c t u r e IV

L i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y is c o n c e r n e d p r i m a r i l y with a n i d e a l s p e a k e r - l i s t e n e r , in c o m p l e t e l y h o m o g e n e o u s s p e e c h c o m m u n i t y , w h o k n o w s h i s l a n g u a g e per­ fectly a n d is u n a f f e c t e d b y s u c h g r a m m a t i c a l l y - i r r e l e v a n t c o n d i t i o n s as m e m ­ o r y l i m i t a t i o n s , d i s t r a c t i o n s , shifts o f a t t e n t i o n a n d i n t e r e s t , a n d e r r o r s ( r a n d o m o r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ) i n a p p l y i n g his k n o w l e d g e o f t h e l a n g u a g e in ac­ tual p e r f o r m a n c e . a

1

It s e e m s to m e t h a t t h e c o n c e p t of t h e ideal s p e a k e r is e n t a i l e d by the c o n c e p t of t h e n o r m a t i v e validity of g r a m m a t i c a l rules a n d the com­ p l e m e n t a r y c o n c e p t of r u l e - c o m p e t e n c e . It is t r u e that grammatical rules d o n o t a t all c o n t a i n ideal postulates, as g e o m e t r i c a l r u l e s of m e a s u r e m e n t , for e x a m p l e , d o — s u c h as drawing a perfectly straight line. I n p r i n c i p l e , postulates of p e r f e c t i o n can be fulfilled only ap­ p r o x i m a t e l y u n d e r e m p i r i c a l b o u n d a r y c o n d i t i o n s . "Ideal" rulec o m p e t e n c e c a n b e claimed for such postulates in a nontrivial sense, for t h e idealizations a r e p e r f o r m e d by t h e m e a s u r i n g subjects them­ selves. I n t h e case of l a n g u a g e , however, it is n o t t h e speaker w h o ide­ alizes, b u t t h e l i n g u i s t — a n d in a trivial sense. T h e c o n c e p t of a n o r m already c o n t a i n s latitude for possible deviations from t h e n o r m . The m e a n i n g of t h e n o r m a t i v e validity of rules implies t h a t the possibility exists in principle of violating t h e rule. N o n e t h e l e s s , in t h e linguistic r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e rule system of a l a n g u a g e we d i s r e g a r d all the e m p i r i c a l c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which g r a m m a t i c a l r u l e s can be realized e i t h e r perfecdy, inadequately, o r n o t at all. T h e linguist posits the fictitious case of the c o m p l e t e a n d c o n s t a n t fulfillment of postulates (that a r e fulfillable in p r i n c i p l e ) . Every logical or c o n c e p t u a l analysis of rule systems must o p e r a t e on this supposition. T h e r e is n o t h i n g mysterious a b o u t this idealization. B u t we must distinguish it f r o m t h e e m p i r i c a l a s s u m p t i o n with which Chomsky gives it o n t o l o g i c a l i m p o r t . I a m r e f e r r i n g h e r e to the hypothesis that t h e linguistic rule system (like t h e cognitive a p p a r a t u s in Piaget) de­ velops f r o m a g e n e t i c basis t h r o u g h t h e i n t e r a c t i o n of biologically c o n d i t i o n e d m a t u r a t i o n a l processes a n d stage-specific stimulus in­ puts. T h e child does n o t u n d e r g o a l e a r n i n g process to c o n s t r u c t the g r a m m a r of his m o t h e r t o n g u e m e r e l y by l e a r n i n g from t h e available linguistic data. Rather, g u i d e d by i n n a t e a priori k n o w l e d g e of t h e ab­ stract s t r u c t u r e of n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s in g e n e r a l , he can derive that g r a m m a r from t h e r u d i m e n t a r y linguistic d a t a in his e n v i r o n m e n t by

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verifying his built-in p r o g r a m of h y p o t h e s e s . C h o m s k y uses this as­ sumption of an i n n a t e linguistic capacity to s u p p o r t t h e f u r t h e r as­ sumption t h a t all n o r m a l l y socialized m e m b e r s of a s p e e c h c o m m u n i t y if they have l e a r n e d t o s p e a k at all, have c o m p l e t e mas­ tery of t h e system of abstract linguistic rules. In o t h e r words, linguis­ tic c o m p e t e n c e c a n n o t b e d i s t r i b u t e d differentially. By m e a n s of these assumptions t h e ideal s p e a k e r o b t a i n s a curiously empirical sta­ tus. A n d it is for this r e a s o n alone t h a t C h o m s k y sees himself moti­ vated to explain o b s e r v a b l e linguistic p e r f o r m a n c e in t e r m s of an innate, linguistic c o m p e t e n c e and e x t e r n a l restrictive empirical con­ ditions. For t h e a c t u a l p e r f o r m a n c e of s p e e c h acts is d i s t r i b u t e d over a r a n g e at b o t h t h e individual a n d g r o u p levels, giving evidence of a thoroughly n o n h o m o g e n e o u s s p e e c h c o m m u n i t y . A n d if linguistic c o m p e t e n c e is uniformly distributed, t h e n t h e actual differential dis­ tribution m u s t b e t r a c e d to restrictive c o n d i t i o n s . These c o n d i t i o n s must a c c o u n t for t h e i m p e r f e c t manifestation of u n d e r l y i n g knowl­ edge that in itself is perfect. T h u s , if we think of linguistic c o m p e ­ tence as r e p r e s e n t e d by w h a t we call passive k n o w l e d g e of a l a n g u a g e ( u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) , t h e n we c a n e x p l a i n active linguistic k n o w l e d g e by psychological variables (such as m e m o r y , a t t e n t i o n , motivational in­ hibitions, a n d so o n ) . T h e s e variables selectively d e t e r m i n e how t h e empirical speaker can use t h e s u p p o s e d l y invariant linguistic r e p e r ­ toire that t h e ideal s p e a k e r has at h e r disposal. T h i s relation b e t w e e n linguistic c o m p e t e n c e a n d linguistic p e r f o r m a n c e results f r o m t h e hypothesis t h a t t h e linguistic a p p a r a t u s is innate, a n d n o t from lin­ guistic idealizations. It is ir this r e a s o n t h a t t h e sociolinguistic objections t h a t have been raised against Chomsky's position are d i r e c t e d n o t at t h e con­ cept of t h e ideal s p e a k e r b u t at t h e m i s t a k e n a s s u m p t i o n t h a t active language use can be e x p l a i n e d solely o n t h e basis of linguistic com­ p e t e n c e a n d e m p i r i c a l p a r a m e t e r s . Sociolinguistic findings s u p p o r t the view, rather, t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of linguistic c o m p e t e n c e , t o o , is g o v e r n e d by r u l e systems. T h e strategies of selection f r o m t h e pas­ sively available linguistic r e p e r t o i r e are themselves obviously d e p e n d ­ ent o n rules (or codes) t h a t also a r e linguistic systems of r u l e s — a l t h o u g h they are n o t g r a m m a t i c a l b u t p r a g m a t i c systems. These linguistic c o d e s (to w h i c h I shall r e t u r n ) d e t e r m i n e t h e

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contextually a p p r o p r i a t e use of s e n t e n c e s (or n o n v e r b a l expres­ sions) in u t t e r a n c e s . T h e y are by n o m e a n s invariant, b u t instead are d i s t r i b u t e d a c c o r d i n g to sociocultural characteristics. But the con­ c e p t u a l analysis of linguistic c o d e s d e p e n d s o n an idealization in the s a m e trivial sense as does g r a m m a t i c a l analysis. Every individual code h a s a c o r r e s p o n d i n g r u l e - c o m p e t e n c e , a l t h o u g h t h e latter m u s t al­ ways be b a s e d on linguistic c o m p e t e n c e ( n o o n e can k n o w a dialect o r j a r g o n b e f o r e having l e a r n e d a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e ) . T h e differential distribution of p r a g m a t i c c o m p e t e n c e s d o e s not w a r r a n t a b a n d o n i n g idealizations; it simply r e q u i r e s different empir­ ical a s s u m p t i o n s with r e g a r d to h o w these c o m p e t e n c e s are acquired. Like linguistic c o m p e t e n c e in t h e n a r r o w e r s e n s e (which f r o m now o n I shall call g r a m m a t i c a l c o m p e t e n c e ) , p r a g m a t i c c o m p e t e n c e s find t h e i r expression i n implicit knowledge: i n s p e a k e r s ' j u d g m e n t s a b o u t t h e acceptability of linguistic expressions. W u n d e r l i c h distin­ guishes b e t w e e n grammaticality a n d acceptability as follows: T h e f o r m e r is a p r o p e r t y of s t r i n g s of s y m b o l s t h a t a r e p r o d u c e d as sen­ t e n c e s b y a g r a m m a r ; t h e l a t t e r is a p r o p e r t y of s t r i n g s o f s y m b o l s t h a t o c c u r i n c o n t e x t s a n d , w h e n u t t e r e d , c a n b e e v a l u a t e d d i f f e r e n t l y by d i f f e r e n t speak­ ers. B o t h p r o p e r t i e s can be t h e o r e t i c a l l y e x p l i c a t e d : t h e f o r m e r i n t h e g r a m ­ m a t i c a l a n d t h e l a t t e r i n t h e p r a g m a t i c p a r t of o n e ' s a c c o u n t of l a n g u a g e . 3

I have b r o u g h t u p t h e s e p o i n t s in o r d e r t o d e f i n e m o r e precisely the p r o j e c t of a universal p r a g m a t i c s . Universal p r a g m a t i c s s t a n d s be­ tween linguistics o n o n e h a n d a n d empirical pragmatics o n the other. Linguistics limits itself to linguistic expressions a n d disregards c o n t e x t s of their possible use. T h e t h e o r y of linguistic c o d e s o n the o t h e r h a n d , which is c o n c e r n e d with t h e differential m o d e s of lan­ g u a g e use, p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t t h e c o n t e x t s in w h i c h m u t u a l u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g is possible h a v e already b e e n p r o d u c e d . J u s t w h a t is the status of t h e s e contexts, in which s e n t e n c e s ( a n d n o n v e r b a l expres­ sions) c a n b e u t t e r e d , r e m a i n s u n e x p l a i n e d . Linguistics d o e s n o t have to c o n s i d e r them, a n d within the theory of linguistic c o d e s they c o u n t as b o u n d a r y c o n d i t i o n s . Yet t h e c o m p o n e n t s t h a t r e c u r in every possible s p e e c h situation u n d e r s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n s a r e n o t extralinguistic e l e m e n t s . T h e general structures of possible s p e e c h e n t e r i n t o t h e very c o n c e p t of a linguistic c o d e . T h e y u n d e r l i e the

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differential d e t e r m i n a t i o n s of individual codes. Obviously in perform­ ing speech acts we also performatively produce the conditions that make possi­ ble the utterance of sentences in the first place. G e n e r a t i n g c o n t e x t s of possible s p e e c h certainly m e a n s s o m e t h i n g different t h a n g e n e r a t i n g grammatically o r d e r e d strings of symbols. For s p e e c h acts, w h i c h we m a y r e g a r d as t h e e l e m e n t a r y u n i t s of speech, have simultaneously a linguistic a n d a n institutional m e a n ­ ing: linguistic insofar as they are parts of s p e e c h , and institutional in­ sofar as they m a k e possible t h e c o n t e x t u a l i z a t i o n of linguistic expressions. By u t t e r i n g "I p r o m i s e y o u I will c o m e t o m o r r o w , " I a m not only expressing a p r o m i s e , I a m makings p r o m i s e . T h i s u t t e r a n c e is the p r o m i s e t h a t it also r e p r e s e n t s . By m e a n s of s u c h s p e e c h acts we g e n e r a t e g e n e r a l conditions for c o n t e x t u a l i z i n g s e n t e n c e s . At t h e same time, however, these s t r u c t u r e s a r e also r e p r e s e n t e d in s p e e c h itself—and precisely as t h e linguistic expressions t h a t we call prag­ matic universah. A t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e m u s t ex­ plain w h a t speakers or h e a r e r s a c c o m p l i s h by m e a n s of p r a g m a t i c universals w h e n they use s e n t e n c e s (or n o n v e r b a l expressions) in utterances. T h e key p h e n o m e n o n t h a t a universal p r a g m a t i c s m u s t e x p l a i n is the p e c u l i a r reflexivity of n a t u r a l languages. It is t h e basis for t h e ca­ pacity of t h e c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r to p a r a p h r a s e any expressions of a language in t h a t l a n g u a g e itself. A n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e h a s n o m e t a l a n ­ guage t h a t is not d e p e n d e n t in t u r n o n an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s in t h a t (or a n o t h e r ) n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e . Schwayder describes this p h e n o m e n o n in t e r m s of self-explication: What is at once most essential to and perplexing about language is that it speaks for itself. In seeing me do whatever it is I m a y b e doing, e.g., shooting at the top of the target, you may not know what I am doing. But if you hear me say something you will there and then come to know what it is I mean to say. My choice of words is calculated to tell you what I mean to do with those words. They speak for themselves.... In asking a question, I do not also state that I mean to ask a question; nor when I make a statement, I do not also state that I mean to make that statement. . . . My act is not one of saying what I intend to do; but rather my act . . . must show what I mean to do. This, I think, is part of what underlies Wittgenstein's remark that the assertion shows its sense, and says that things are so. 4

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T h e p e r f o r m a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s investigated by A u s t i n are paradig­ matic for this self-explicating capacity of l a n g u a g e . T h e g r a m m a r of t h e s e s p e e c h acts reflects a p e c u l i a r d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e , which is the f o u n d a t i o n of t h e reflexivity of n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s . 6

I have already p o i n t e d o u t t h a t a s p e e c h act is c o m p o s e d of a p e r f o r m a t i v e clause a n d a d e p e n d e n t clause with p r o p o s i t i o n a l con­ t e n t . T h e m a i n clause is u s e d in an u t t e r a n c e in o r d e r to establish an intersubjective relation b e t w e e n speakers a n d h e a r e r s . T h e .depend­ e n t clause is u s e d in a n u t t e r a n c e in o r d e r to c o m m u n i c a t e a b o u t ob­ j e c t s (or states of affairs). T h e e l e m e n t a r y c o n n e c t i o n of the p e r f o r m a t i v e clause a n d t h e clause w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t illus­ trates t h e d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e of o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t i o n : C o m m u n i c a t i o n a b o u t objects (or states of affairs) takes place only on c o n d i t i o n of s i m u l t a n e o u s m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n a b o u t the m e a n ­ ing of the use of the d e p e n d e n t clause. A situation w h e r e it is possi­ ble to r e a c h a m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e q u i r e s that at least two s p e a k e r - h e a r e r s simultaneously establish c o m m u n i c a t i o n at both lev­ els: at the level of intersubjectivity, w h e r e the subjects talk with o n e a n o t h e r , a n d a t t h e level of t h e objects (or states of affairs) about w h i c h they c o m m u n i c a t e . Universal pragmatics aims at t h e recon­ s t r u c t i o n ofi t h e r u l e systeirpthat a c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r m u s t k n o w if she is to be able to fulfill this p o s t u l a t e of t h e simultaneity of c o m m u ­ n i c a t i o n a n d m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I s h o u l d like to reserve the t e r m communicative competence for this qualification.* 7

T o d e l i n e a t e m o r e sharply t h e c o n c e p t of c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e ­ t e n c e , I w o u l d like to p r o p o s e a didactically plausible series of steps of abstraction. T h e abstractions b e g i n with c o n c r e t e u t e r a n c e s . I call a n u t t e r a n c e " c o n c r e t e " if it is m a d e within a c o m p l e t e l y d e t e r m i n ­ i n g context. T h e first step is sociolinguistic abstraction. It p r e s c i n d s f r o m all t h o s e b o u n d a r y c o n d i t i o n s of linguistic r u l e systems that vary c o n t i n g e n l y a n d are specific only to individual speaker-hearers, a n d r e t a i n s " u t t e r a n c e s in g e n e r a l i z e d social contexts." T h e s e c o n d step is universal-pragmatic abstraction. It p r e s c i n d s from all spatiot e m p o r a l l y a n d socially c i r c u m s c r i b e d contexts a n d r e t a i n s only "situ­ ated u t t e r a n c e s in g e n e r a l . " In this way we arrive at t h e e l e m e n t a r y units of s p e e c h . T h e t h i r d abstraction is linguistic abstraction, which

Universal P r a g m a t i c s

prescinds from t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of s p e e c h acts a n d retains only "lin­ guistic expressions" o r s e n t e n c e s . In this way we arrive at t h e e l e m e n ­ tary units of l a n g u a g e . T h e f o u r t h step is logical abstraction, w h i c h disregards all performatively relevant linguistic expressions a n d re­ tains "assertoric p r o p o s i t i o n s . " I n this way we arrive at the e l e m e n ­ tary units for r e n d e r i n g states of affairs. U t t e r a n c e s in g e n e r a l i z e d social c o n t e x t s a r e t h e object of sociolinguistics: It takes t h e f o r m of a t h e o r y of p r a g m a t i c c o m p e ­ tences. Its task is r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e linguistic c o d e s a c c o r d i n g t o which c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r s e m p l o y u t t e r a n c e s in a contextually ap­ propriate m a n n e r a c c o r d i n g to sociocultural s t a n d a r d s . Situated ut­ terances in g e n e r a l that are n o t specific to a given c o n t e x t a r e t h e object of universal p r a g m a t i c s : It takes t h e f o r m of a t h e o r y of com­ municative c o m p e t e n c e . Its task is r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e r u l e system according to w h i c h c o m p e t e n t speakers t r a n s p o s e linguistic expres­ sions i n t o u t t e r a n c e s . Linguistic expressions (or strings of symbols) are t h e object of linguistics: It takes t h e f o r m of a t h e o r y of syntactic c o m p e t e n c e . Its task is r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e r u l e system a c c o r d i n g t o which c o m p e t e n t speakers f o r m a n d t r a n s f o r m s e n t e n c e s . Finally, assertoric p r o p o s i t i o n s [Aussagen] are t h e object of logic. Logic has the task of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e r u l e system a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h we form p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d t r a n s f o r m t h e m while p r e s e r v i n g t h e i r truth-value. Logic p r e s c i n d s from t h e e m b e d d e d n e s s of assertoric sentences in speech acts. T o this e x t e n t it deals w i t h b o t h less a n d m o r e t h a n linguistics. T h e s e distinctions give rise to t h e following correlations:

Object d o m a i n

Competence

Theory

u t t e r a n c e s in social contexts

pragmatic

sociolinguistics

non-context-specific utterances

communicative

universal p r a g m a t i c s

linguistic expres­ sions (sentences)

grammatical

linguistics

propositions

logical

formal logic

76 Lecture TV

9

This overview is i n t e n d e d only to delimit universal pragmatics. L e t u s t u r n o n c e again t o t h e d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e of s p e e c h acts. Only in constative s p e e c h acts d o s e n t e n c e s with p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t take t h e f o r m of assertoric s e n t e n c e s or p r o p o s i t i o n s . I n o t h e r types of s p e e c h acts, such as questions, c o m m a n d s , w a r n i n g s , disclosures, a n d so o n , t h e d e p e n d e n t clauses d o n o t a p p e a r in t h e f o r m of assertoric s e n t e n c e s . T h e y d o n o t r e n d e r any p r o p o s i t i o n s , yet they h a v e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t n o n e t h e l e s s . N o m i n a l i z e d expressions of t h e f o r m "that p" can be t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o p r o p o s i t i o n s at any time. T h i s e x p l a i n s h o w t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t can r e m a i n t h e same even if t h e m o d e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n is c h a n g e d , as w h e n questions are t r a n s f o r m e d into o r d e r s , o r d e r s into confessions, o r confessions i n t o s t a t e m e n t s . ' I n this c o n n e c t i o n we can take u p o n c e again the distinction b e t w e e n cognitive a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e use and m a k e it m o r e precise. I call the use of constative s p e e c h acts, in w h i c h p r o p o s i t i o n s m u s t always figure, cognitive, b e c a u s e the performatively established i n t e r p e r s o n a l relation b e t w e e n speaker a n d h e a r e r serves t h e p u r p o s e of r e a c h i n g a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t objects (or states of affairs). By contrast, I call c o m m u n i c a t i v e t h e use of l a n g u a g e w h e r e r e a c h i n g a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t objects ( a n d state of affairs) occurs for t h e p u r p o s e of establishing an interper­ sonal r e l a t i o n s h i p . T h e level of c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t is t h e e n d in o n e case is m a d e i n t o a m e a n s in t h e other. In cognitive l a n g u a g e use p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s a r e t h e topic; they are w h a t t h e c o m m u n i c a ­ t i o n is about. But c o m m u n i c a t i v e use m e n t i o n s p r o p o s i t i o n a l con­ t e n t s only in o r d e r to establish performatively a n intersubjective relation b e t w e e n speaker-hearers. W h a t gives rise to t h e reflexivity of n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s is that e a c h use of l a n g u a g e implicitly refers to the other. 1

11

We a r e n o w ready to i n t r o d u c e t h e p r a g m a t i c universals (a) a n d then to analyze t h e constitutive r o l e t h a t they play in b o t h t h e cogni­ tive (b) a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e (c) u s e of l a n g u a g e . (a) First, following W u n d e r l i c h , I shall list t h e classes of words ( a n d their g r a m m a t i c a l forms) t h a t r e f e r to g e n e r a l structures of t h e s p e e c h situation.

77___ Universal P r a g m a t i c s

1. Personal p r o n o u n s (owning to their d o u b l e p e r f o r m a t i v e a n d ref­ erential function I shall n o t simply s u b s u m e t h e m u n d e r singular terms); 2. Words a n d p h r a s e s t h a t are u s e d for t h e initiation of s p e e c h a n d for address ( g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m : vocative, h o n o r a t i v e ) ; 3. Deictic expressions (of space a n d t i m e ) ; d e m o n s t r a t i v e s a n d arti­ cles; n u m e r a l s , quantifiers ( g r a m m a t i c a l forms: tense, g r a m m a t i c a l modes); 4. Performative imperative);

verbs

(grammatical

forms:

interrogative,

5. N o n p e r f o r m a t i v e i n t e n t i o n a l verbs a n d m o d a l adverbs. I call these classes of linguistic expressions pragmatic universals be­ cause they can b e c o r r e l a t e d with universal s t r u c t u r e s of t h e s p e e c h situation. Classes 1 a n d 2 i n d i c a t e t h e s p e a k e r - h e a r e r s a n d t h e p o t e n ­ tial participants in conversation. Class 3 i n d i c a t e s t h e s p a t i o t e m p o r a l and factual e l e m e n t s of t h e s p e e c h situation. Class 4 indicates t h e re­ lation t h e speaker to h e r u t t e r a n c e , a n d t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n speakers a n d h e a r e r s . Class 5, finally, i n d i c a t e s t h e i n t e n t i o n s a n d ex­ p e r i e n c e s of t h e speaker. I d o n o t c o n s i d e r it a d e q u a t e to r e g a r d t h e p r a g m a t i c universals as c o m p o n e n t s of a m e t a l a n g u a g e in which we can reach an u n d e r ­ standing a b o u t t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e s p e e c h situation. T h i s view cre­ ates t h e misleading impression t h a t t h e universal s t r u c t u r e s of t h e speech situation are given as empirical b o u n d a r y c o n d i t i o n s i n d e ­ p e n d e n t of s p e e c h . I n fact, however, we c a n e m p l o y s e n t e n c e s in ut­ terances only if we ourselves, by m e a n s of p r a g m a t i c universals, p r o d u c e t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which c o m m u n i c a t i o n is possible, thereby p r o d u c i n g t h e s p e e c h situation. W i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e to these universals we c a n n o t even define t h e r e c u r r i n g c o m p o n e n t s of situa­ tions of possible s p e e c h , namely, t h e u t t e r a n c e s themselves, t h e in­ t e r p e r s o n a l relations g e n e r a t e d b e t w e e n s p e a k e r - h e a r e r s a l o n g with u t t e r a n c e s , a n d t h e objects a b o u t which s p e a k e r - h e a r e r s c o m m u n i ­ cate with o n e a n o t h e r . T h i s does n o t affect t h e fact t h a t p r a g m a t i c universals, at t h e s a m e time as we use t h e m to p r o d u c e the s p e e c h sit­ uation, also serve to represent it. 12

78 Universal Pragmatics

I n cognitive l a n g u a g e u s e we e m p l o y p r a g m a t i c universals in such a w a y as to c o n s t i t u t e describable object d o m a i n s . This role of consti­ t u t i n g e x p e r i e n c e is to be e x p l a i n e d by a t h e o r y of r e f e r e n c e . In c o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e u s e we e m p l o y p r a g m a t i c universals in such a way as to establish intersubjective relations performatively. This role is to b e e x p l a i n e d by a t h e o r y of s p e e c h acts. I n b o t h cases we c o m e u p o n systems of rules that, u n l i k e g r a m m a t i c a l rules, d o not merely r e p r e s e n t intralinguistic relations. Rather, t h e universalp r a g m a t i c rule system reveals t h e restrictions t h a t the e x t e r n a l reality of n a t u r e a n d society, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t h e i n t e r n a l reality of the cognitive a n d motivational m a k e - u p of t h e h u m a n o r g a n i s m , o n the other, place o n l a n g u a g e . I n t h e p r a g m a t i c universals we see t h e in­ terface of l a n g u a g e and reality. T h e describable reality of n a t u r e and society is f o r m e d in t h e interplay of l a n g u a g e , c o g n i t i o n , a n d action, which is g o v e r n e d by universal-pragmatic rules. At t h e same time we ourselves p r o d u c e t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o n t e x t of t h e intersubjec­ tively e x p e r i e n c e d lifeworld t h r o u g h s p e e c h acts t h a t a r e g o v e r n e d by universal-pragmatical r u l e s . (b) I shall c o n f i n e myself to b u t a few brief r e m a r k s o n t h e prag­ matics of cognitive language use. We m a k e two suppositions with r e g a r d to p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t we express in constative s p e e c h acts. W e suppose t h e existence of t h e object a b o u t which we m a k e a statement; a n d we p r e s u p p o s e t h e t r u t h of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n itself, t h a t is, of w h a t we as­ sert a b o u t t h e object. Existence a n d t r u t h r e p r e s e n t t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m u s t b e fulfilled if t h e s t a t e m e n t is to r e p r e s e n t a fact. T h e first s u p p o s i t i o n is justified if b o t h speakers a n d hearers are able to iden­ tify unequivocally t h e object d e n o t e d by t h e subject expression of a p r o p o s i t i o n . T h e s e c o n d is justified if b o t h speakers a n d h e a r e r s can verify w h e t h e r w h a t is p r e d i c a t e d of t h e object in t h e p r o p o s i t i o n as­ s e r t e d is in fact t r u e of it. T h e referential expression, b e it a singular t e r m o r a definite d e s c r i p t i o n , c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as a specification of h o w a n object can b e identified. T o g e t h e r with t h e p r e d i c a t e ex­ pression, it constitutes a p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t is s u p p o s e d to c o r r e s p o n d to a n existing s t a t e of affairs. N o w I would like to m a i n t a i n t h a t t h e p r a g m a t i c r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d reality p r o d u c e d in t h e cognitive u s e of l a n g u a g e d e p e n d o n an a p r i o r i c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e object of possible e x p e r i e n c e . T h e p r a g m a t i c s of cognitive lan-

Universal Pragmatics

guage use shows t h a t a n y given object d o m a i n is s t r u c t u r e d by partic­ ular i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e , c o g n i t i o n , a n d action. O u r e x p e r i e n c e as t r a n s m i t t e d by o u r sense o r g a n s is e i t h e r sensory o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e , in w h i c h case it b u i l d s o n sensory experi­ ence. Sensory e x p e r i e n c e leads to t h e p e r c e p t i o n of things, events, or states t h a t we ascribe to things (we see t h a t s o m e t h i n g is in a cer­ tain state). T h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e based o n sensory experi­ ence leads via p e r c e p t i o n s to t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p e r s o n s , utterances, or states t h a t we ascribe to p e r s o n s (we "see," i.e., u n d e r ­ stand, t h a t s o m e o n e is in a certain state). E x p e r i e n c e s can h a v e infor­ mational c o n t e n t only b e c a u s e and to t h e e x t e n t t h a t they are surprising—that is, to t h e e x t e n t t h a t they d i s a p p o i n t a n d modify sta­ bilized e x p e c t a t i o n s a b o u t objects. This b a c k g r o u n d , which acts as a foil a n d against which e x p e r i e n c e s s t a n d out, consists in beliefs (or p r e j u d g m e n t s ) a b o u t objects t h a t we have already e x p e r i e n c e d . I n cognitive l a n g u a g e use we p u t o u r beliefs in t h e f o r m of p r o p o s i ­ tions. T h e s e in t u r n a p p e a r in a descriptive i d i o m t h a t , a c c o r d i n g to its g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m , is e i t h e r a thing-event l a n g u a g e o r a n inten­ tional l a n g u a g e (which a d m i t s expressions for p e r s o n s a n d t h e i r ut­ terances in a d d i t i o n t o expressions for things and events). If we analyze t h e g r a m m a r of t h e s e l a n g u a g e s , we c o m e u p o n categories that a p r i o r i s t r u c t u r e t h e object d o m a i n of possible e x p e r i e n c e . To form beliefs a b o u t objects or states of affairs t h a t c a n be disap­ p o i n t e d by e x p e r i e n c e , we m u s t first p r e s u p p o s e objects of possible e x p e r i e n c e in g e n e r a l , namely, universal s t r u c t u r e s of a n object d o ­ main. We i m p u t e to o u r sensory e x p e r i e n c e s a n object d o m a i n of moving b o d i e s , a n d to o u r c o m m u n i c a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s an object d o ­ main of subjects w h o express themselves t h r o u g h s p e e c h a n d action. T h e two d o m a i n s a r e of c o u r s e c o o r d i n a t e d with o n e a n o t h e r . O b j e c t d o m a i n s r e p r e s e n t systems of primitive t e r m s t h a t e n a b l e us simulta­ neously b o t h to o r g a n i z e e x p e r i e n c e s and to f o r m u l a t e beliefs. I n t h e case of o r g a n i z i n g e x p e r i e n c e s of objects we conceive t h e primitive t e r m s as cognitive schemata; in f o r m u l a t i n g beliefs a b o u t objects of e x p e r i e n c e we can r e p r e s e n t t h e m as logico-semantic cate­ gories. Evidently t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n these two levels (of experi­ ence o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d l a n g u a g e o n the other) is created by action: specifically, by e i t h e r i n s t r u m e n t a l o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e action.

80 Lecture IV

T h i s c a n b e s e e n ifwe e x a m i n e t h e use of referential expressions. We d e n o t e objects by m e a n s of n a m e s or definite descriptions. To do this, we h a v e to o r i e n t ourselves by characteristic features. T h a t is why we can always r e p l a c e a n a m e with a definite d e s c r i p t i o n . If it is to f u n c t i o n pragmatically, t h e definite d e s c r i p t i o n m u s t c o n t a i n an identifying d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e object. It generally d e p e n d s o n the c o n t e x t which feature is sufficiently characteristic for speakers a n d h e a r e r s to b e able to pick o u t f r o m all possible objects precisely that object which is b e i n g discussed. T h e less we can rely o n contexts of p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , however, the m o r e deictic expressions m u s t bear t h e b u r d e n of d e n o t a t i o n . H e r e we m a k e use of specifying expres­ sions (definite articles: t h e ; demonstratives: this, t h a t ) , quantifying expressions ( n u m e r a l s ; indefinite quantifiers such as s o m e , many, all), as well as spatial and t e m p o r a l adverbs. At t h e linguistic level t h e s e e x p r e s s i o n s r e p r e s e n t cognitive s c h e m a t a , namely, substance, quantity, space, a n d time. T h e s e expressions, however, f o r m a func­ t i o n i n g d e n o t a t i v e system only after they have b e e n i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of a descriptive l a n g u a g e (a thing-event lan­ guage o r a n i n t e n t i o n a l l a n g u a g e ) . T h e identifiable object is catego­ rized in t h e first case as a m o v i n g b o d y (or an a g g r e g a t e of things, states, o r events) a n d in t h e s e c o n d as a p e r s o n (or as a s t r u c t u r e d w e b of p e r s o n s , states, o r u t t e r a n c e s ) . These categories, in t e r m s of w h i c h we perceive a n d u n d e r s t a n d t h e identified object, r e f e r to al­ ternative p a t t e r n s of action. T h i n g s a n d events m o v e in physically m e a s u r a b l e t i m e . T h e f o r m of t h e objectivity [Gegenstdndlichkeit] of m o v i n g b o d i e s c o m p r i s e s , be­ sides E u c l i d e a n space, a n abstract c o n d n u u m of t e m p o r a l points as t h e d i m e n s i o n of time m e a s u r e m e n t . T h e objects of s e n s o r y experi­ ence m u s t b e identifiable as points in space-time. P e r s o n s a n d utter­ ances m o v e w i t h i n t e m p o r a l h o r i z o n s with b i o g r a p h i c a l a n d historical r e f e r e n c e . T h e f o r m of t h e objectivity of p e r s o n s w h o ex­ press themselves comprises, besides social space ( t h e intersubjective r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n subjects c o m m u n i c a t i n g in o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e ) , t h e perspectives of past a n d future, which are c e n t e r e d in the p r e s e n t a n d s t r u c t u r e action. T h e "objects" of c o m m u n i c a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e m u s t b e identifiable in t h e i r identity as a p e r s o n or g r o u p . T h i s d o u ­ ble s c h e m a t i z a t i o n of time is c o n n e c t e d with t h e fact that, o n t h e o n e

81___ Universal Pragmatics

hand, we have e x p e r i e n c e s of objects t h a t w e c a n m a n i p u l a t e within the functional s p h e r e of i n s t r u m e n t a l action, while o n t h e o t h e r hand, we have e x p e r i e n c e s of ourselves a n d of o n e a n o t h e r w h e n we e n c o u n t e r o n e a n o t h e r at t h e level of intersubjectivity as i n t e r l o c u ­ tors. In doubtful cases we m u s t c o m b i n e deictic expressions w i t h par­ ticular actions in o r d e r to s u c c e e d in identifying an object. T h e s a m e p r o n o u n s a n d adverbs, such as "this" a n d "that," " h e r e " a n d " t h e r e , " "now" a n d "then," a n d " o n e " a n d "many," r e q u i r e different actions d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r they a r e a p p l i e d to t h i n g s o r p e r s o n s . To identify "this t h i n g h e r e " in case of d o u b t , I m u s t fall b a c k o n t h e m e a s u r e m e n t of a s p a t i o t e m p o r a l l o c a t i o n a n d (at least) o n e de­ scriptive o b s e r v a t i o n p r e d i c a t e . T o identify "this p e r s o n h e r e " I have to address her a n d involve her in i n t e r a c t i o n s of some p a r t i c u l a r kind. A n identity is ascribed to things by those w h o d e a l with t h e m . Persons f o r m their own identity in c o n t e x t s of action. T h e y m u s t b e able t o say w h o they a r e (unless, they a r e "beside themselves," in which case it b e c o m e s q u e s t i o n a b l e in w h a t sense they are still persons). T h a t is why in identifying p e r s o n s we also rely o n t h e d u a l performative-demonstrative role of t h e first-person personal pronoun. A similar c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e , c o g n i t i o n , a n d action is manifest in p r e d i c a t i o n . If I w a n t to establish w h e t h e r a p r e d i c a t e ap­ plies to an object or not, I have t o verify w h e t h e r t h e object in fact exemplifies the universal attribute expressed by the p r e d i c a t e . If t h e proposition is f o r m u l a t e d in an i d i o m t h a t c o n t a i n s only o b s e r v a t i o n predicates, t h e n I h a v e to rely o n observation. If it is f o r m u l a t e d in a n i n t e n t i o n a l idiom, I use i n t e r r o g a t i o n as t h e most a p p r o p r i a t e m e t h o d of verification. In t u r n , these m e t h o d s refer to a p a r t i c u l a r practice: to t h e "language g a m e " of physical m e a s u r e m e n t in t h e first case a n d the creation of intersubjective relations in t h e s e c o n d . O n e f u r t h e r c a t e g o r y c o m e s i n t o play in t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f p r e d i c a t e s to objects of (sensory or c o m m u n i c a t i v e ) e x p e r i e n c e : causality. Causal­ ity is t h e f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t a c c o r d i n g to which we subject t h e ob­ jects of e x p e r i e n c e to t h e idea of a lawlike c o n n e c t i o n : It m u s t be possible to c o m p r e h e n d every event, every u t t e r a n c e , a n d every state of affairs as t h e effect of a cause. T h e supposition of a lawlike c o n n e c ­ tion a m o n g things a n d events, as Peirce has s h o w n , o n l y m a k e s sense

82 Lecture IV

within t h e f u n c t i o n a l s p h e r e of i n s t r u m e n t a l action. T h e corre­ s p o n d i n g s u p p o s i t i o n of motives for actions a n d of action orienta­ tions m a k e s sense only with r e f e r e n c e to p u r e c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. Dispositional p r e d i c a t e s ( s u c h as "soluble" o r "friendly") are para­ d i g m e x a m p l e s of t h e causal generalizations t h a t are i m p l i c a t e d in t h e descriptive idiom a n d t h a t e m e r g e w h e n we verify p r e d i c a t i o n s . T h e c o r r e c t u s e of t h e denotative system seems to d e p e n d o n inte­ g r a t i n g l a n g u a g e with cognitive s c h e m a t a o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d types of action o n t h e other. (c) The pragmatics of communicative language use. I s h o u l d like to elucidate this by providing a classification of s p e e c h acts. T h e logic of t h e use of p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n s , which I c a n n o t go into at this point, a n d s p e e c h act t h e o r y a r e t h e two p a r t s of universal p r a g m a t i c s t h a t are i m m e d i a t e l y r e l e v a n t to g r o u n d i n g sociology in p h i l o s o p h y of l a n g u a g e . U n t i l now, n e i t h e r linguists n o r analytic p h i l o s o p h e r s have s u c c e e d e d in setting u p a systematic a c c o u n t of s p e e c h acts. How­ ever, insofar as we may i n c l u d e a m o n g p r a g m a t i c universals certain aspects of s p e e c h acts, the lexical multiplicity of s p e e c h acts t h a t are realized idiolectically by individual speakers m u s t be r e d u c i b l e to a universally valid classification. Searle has identified t h e following aspects of s p e e c h acts in g e n e r a l : t h e p r e p a r a t o r y r u l e , which deter­ m i n e s t h e c o n d i t i o n s of a p p l i c a t i o n of a s p e e c h act; t h e proposi­ tional c o n t e n t r u l e , which d e t e r m i n e s w h a t linguistic expressions are a c c e p t a b l e in the s p e e c h act's d e p e n d e n t clauses with p r o p o s i t i o n a l content; t h e sincerity r u l e , which d e t e r m i n e s t h e c o n d i t i o n s of seri­ ousness f o r t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of t h e s p e e c h act; a n d finally t h e essen­ tial r u l e , w h i c h d e t e r m i n e s t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g of t h e s p e e c h a c t . 1 shall limit myself to this last aspect a n d distinguish f o u r classes of s p e e c h acts. 13

T h e first class of s p e e c h acts, w h i c h I shall call communicatives, serves to express t h e various aspects of t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g of s p e e c h as such. It explicates t h e m e a n i n g of u t t e r a n c e s q u a utter­ a n c e s . F o r every s p e e c h p r e s u p p o s e s a factual p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t w h a t it m e a n s to c o m m u n i c a t e in l a n g u a g e , to u n d e r s t a n d a n d to m i s u n d e r s t a n d u t t e r a n c e s , to b r i n g a b o u t c o n s e n s u s o r to w o r k o u t a dissensus; t h a t is, a b o u t h o w to use l a n g u a g e . E x a m p l e s are: to say, to express oneself, to speak, to talk, to q u e s t i o n , to answer, to re-

83 (J niversal P r a g m a t i c s

ply, to retort, to a g r e e , to c o n t r a d i c t , to object, to admit, to m e n t i o n , to render, to q u o t e , a n d so on. T h e s e c o n d class of s p e e c h acts, w h i c h I shall call constatives, serves to express t h e m e a n i n g of t h e cognitive use of s e n t e n c e s . It expli­ cates t h e m e a n i n g of p r o p o s i t i o n s q u a p r o p o s i t i o n s . "To assert," t h e prototypical v e r b of t h e assertoric m o d e , c o m b i n e s two e l e m e n t s t h a t a p p e a r separately in t h e two subclasses of those s p e e c h acts. O n t h e o n e h a n d , "to assert" b e l o n g s to t h e set of e x a m p l e s including: to de­ scribe, to report, to i n f o r m , to n a r r a t e , to illustrate, to note, to show, to explain, to p r e d i c t , on so o n . T h e s e e x a m p l e s r e p r e s e n t t h e assertoric use of p r o p o s i t i o n s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , "to assert" b e l o n g s to t h e g r o u p of e x a m p l e s i n c l u d i n g : t o affirm, to aver, t o c o n t e n d to deny, to contest, to d o u b t . T h e s e e x a m p l e s illustrate the specific pragmatic m e a n i n g of t h e t r u t h c l a i m of p r o p o s i t i o n s . T h e t h i r d class of s p e e c h acts, w h i c h I shall call representatives (expressives), serves to express t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g of t h e speaker's self-representation to an a u d i e n c e . It explicates t h e m e a n ­ ing of t h e s p e a k e r ' s b r i n g i n g to expression his i n t e n t i o n s , attitudes, a n d e x p e r i e n c e s . T h e d e p e n d e n t clauses with p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s are i n t e n t i o n a l clauses w i t h verbs such as to know, to t h i n k , to be­ lieve, to h o p e , to fear, to love, to h a t e , to like, to wish, to w a n t , t o de­ cide, a n d so on. Some e x a m p l e s are: to reveal, to disclose, to betray, to confess, to express, to h i d e , to conceal, to p r e t e n d , to o b s c u r e , to keep secret, to suppress, to deny (these s p e e c h acts a p p e a r only in negative f o r m as in: "I will not hide f r o m you t h a t . . . " ) . T h e f o u r t h class of s p e e c h acts, which I shall call regulatives, serves to express t h e n o r m a t i v e m e a n i n g of t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations t h a t a r e established. It explicates t h e m e a n i n g of t h e stance t h a t speaker-hearers take in relation to n o r m s of action. E x a m p l e s are: to order, to d e m a n d , to r e q u e s t , to r e q u i r e , to r e m i n d , to forbid, to al­ low, to suggest, to refuse, to o p p o s e , to c o m m i t oneself, to p r o m i s e , t o a g r e e u p o n , to answer for, to c o n f i r m , to e n d o r s e , to v o u c h for, to r e n o u n c e , to apologize, to forgive, to p r o p o s e , to d e c l i n e , to r e c o m ­ m e n d , t o accept, to advise, to w a r n , to e n c o u r a g e , a n d so o n . T h e r e is a f u r t h e r class of s p e e c h acts, which is crucial for t h e p e r ­ f o r m a n c e of institutionally r e g u l a t e d actions, b u t w h i c h d o e s n o t b e l o n g t o p r a g m a t i c universals p e r s e — a l t h o u g h it was w h a t

84 Lecture IV

p r o m p t e d Austin to study t h e n a t u r e of s p e e c h acts in t h e first place. E x a m p l e s are: to greet, to c o n g r a t u l a t e , to thank, to felicitate, to con­ dole, to bet, t o marry, to b e c o m e e n g a g e d , to baptize, to transgress, to curse, to a n n o u n c e , to publicize, to proclaim, to appoint, to con­ d e m n , to acquit, to testify, to vote for, a n d so on. ' T h e s e s p e e c h acts already p r e s u p p o s e institutions, w h e r e a s the dialogue-constitutive universals themselves p r o d u c e g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s of s p e e c h situa­ tions. Also, m a n y institutional s p e e c h acts d o n o t r e q u i r e a d e p e n d ­ e n t clause w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t ("I t h a n k y o u "I a p p o i n t you," "I curse y o u " ) . 1

1

S p e e c h acts serve to m a k e t h r e e f u n d a m e n t a l distinctions t h a t we m u s t m a s t e r if we w a n t to b e able to c o m m u n i c a t e at all. I n philoso­ p h y t h e s e distinctions have a l o n g tradition: reality a n d a p p e a r a n c e [Sein und Schein], essence a n d a c c i d e n t [Wesen undErscheinung], and is a n d o u g h t [Sein und Sollen] T h e use of constatives makes possible t h e distinction of a public world of intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d con­ ceptions f r o m a private world of m e r e beliefs or o p i n i o n s (reality and a p p e a r a n c e ) . T h e use of representatives makes possible a s e c o n d dis­ tinction: b e t w e e n t h e i n d i v i d u a t e d being [ Wesen], to whose recogni­ tion subjects capable of s p e e c h a n d action reciprocally lay claim, and t h e linguistic u t t e r a n c e s , expressions, a n d actions in which t h e sub­ j e c t a p p e a r s (essence and a c c i d e n t ) . T h e use of regulatives makes possible t h e distinction between empirical regularities, w h i c h c a n be o b s e r v e d , a n d prevailing n o r m s , which can b e i n t e n t i o n a l l y obeyed or violated (is a n d o u g h t ) . Finally, those t h r e e distinctions, t a k e n to­ gether, m a k e possible the c e n t r a l distinction b e t w e e n a " t r u e " (real) a n d "false" ( a p p a r e n t ) consensus. T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n in t u r n e n t e r s into t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g of s p e e c h as such, which we express by m e a n s of t h e first class of s p e e c h acts, t h e communicatives. F o r the m e a n i n g of s p e e c h as such is obviously that at least two speaker-hear­ ers r e a c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t s o m e t h i n g . A n d they s u p p o s e that insofar as they r e a c h a m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , it leads to a valid con­ sensus. T h e c o r r e l a t i o n of classes of s p e e c h acts with distinctions so funda­ m e n t a l t h a t t h e y c a n n o t be f u r t h e r analyzed is m e a n t to lay the g r o u n d w o r k for a n a t t e m p t at d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e systematic basis of o u r classification.

Truth and Society: The Discursive Redemption of Factual Claims to Validity

Having provided a p r e l i m i n a r y clarification of the cognitive a n d c o m m u n i c a d v e uses of l a n g u a g e , I s h o u l d like to e x a m i n e t h e claims t o validity t h a t are c o n t a i n e d in s p e e c h acts. T h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e the­ ory of society whose d e v e l o p m e n t I a m a d v o c a t i n g conceives of t h e life process of society as a generative process m e d i a t e d by s p e e c h acts. T h e social reality t h a t e m e r g e s from this rests o n t h e facticity of the claims to validity implicit i n symbolic objects such as s e n t e n c e s , actions, gestures, traditions, institutions, worldviews, a n d so o n . This n i m b l e facticity of m e a n i n g t h a t lays claim to validity conceals as m u c h as it expresses t h e ultimately physical force of strategic influences a n d t h e m a t e r i a l force of functional constraints; they can gain p e r m a n e n c y only t h r o u g h t h e m e d i u m of a c k n o w l e d g e d inter­ pretations. In t h e t h i r d l e c t u r e I d i s t i n g u i s h e d f o u r classes of claims to validity: intelligibility, t r u t h , n o r m a t i v e Tightness, a n d sincerity. These converge in t h e single claim to rationality. I a m i n t r o d u c i n g these concepts at t h e level of universal p r a g m a t i c s a n d linking t h e m to t h e strong assertion t h a t t h e idealizations c o n t a i n e d i n ' t h e possi­ bility of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n itself by n o m e a n s express m e r e l y a p a r t i c u l a r historical f o r m of reason.! Rather,! t h e idea of r e a s o n , w h i c h isfdifferentiated in t h e various claims to validity^is necessarily built into the way in which t h e species of talking animals r e p r o d u c e s itself. Insofar as we p e r f o r m a n y s p e e c h acts at all, we a r e subject t o t h e i n h e r e n t imperative of "reason," to use an honorific for t h e power t h a t I s h o u l d like to derive from t h e s t r u c t u r e of possible

Lecture V

s p e e c h . T h i s is the sense in which I take it to b e m e a n i n g f u l to talk of t h e social life p r o c e s s as h a v i n g an i m m a n e n t relation to t r u t h . T h e p a r a d i g m of all claims to validity is propositional truth. Even t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use of l a n g u a g e m u s t p r e s u p p o s e cognitive lan­ g u a g e use with its t r u t h claims, since s t a n d a r d s p e e c h acts always con­ tain p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s . W e call s t a t e m e n t s [Aussagen] " t r u e " or "false" with r e g a r d to t h e existence of t h e states of affairs t h a t are rep­ r e s e n t e d i n assertoric s e n t e n c e s . If a s t a t e m e n t r e p r e s e n t s an actual state of affairs o r a fact, we call it true. Assertions are justified or unjustified. By asserting s o m e t h i n g , I a m claiming t h a t t h e proposi­ tion [Aussage] t h a t I a m asserting is t r u e . T r u t h is n o t a p r o p e r t y of assertions. Rather, I use constative s p e e c h acts such as assertions to raise the validity claim " t r u e " or "false" for a p r o p o s i t i o n . T h u s the metalinguistic s t a t e m e n t , " T h e assertion ' t h a t p' is justified," which m e a n s t h e s a m e as 'p'is t r u e , " is n o t r e l a t e d to t h e simple s t a t e m e n t "that p" or "p" as a p r e m i s e to a c o n c l u s i o n . T h e metalinguistic state­ m e n t simply makes explicit an implicitly raised validity claim. It spe­ cifies w h a t we tacitly m e a n w h e n we m a k e assertions or, by so doing, state p r o p o s i t i o n s . T h e m e a n i n g of t r u t h , therefore, can b e ex­ p l a i n e d only with r e f e r e n c e to the pragmatics of a specific class of s p e e c h acts. W h a t we m e a n by the t r u t h or falsity of p r o p o s i t i o n s can be shown only by e x a m i n i n g the p e r f o r m a n c e of constative s p e e c h acts. 1

T h u s universal p r a g m a t i c s is w h e r e we can give a n a c c o u n t of the m e a n i n g of t r u t h . T h i s s h e d s light o n t h e i n a d e q u a c y of the correspon­ dence theory of truth, b o t h in its s e m a n t i c f o r m (associated with Tarski and C a r n a p ) a n d its traditional ontological f o r m o r i g i n a t i n g with Aristotle. T h e explicit f o r m u l a t i o n of t h e s e m a n t i c definition o f t r u t h is (1)

s is t r u e if a n d only if "p" is t r u e

w h e r e 5 is a n assertoric s e n t e n c e t h a t m e a n s p? T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n clearly shows t h a t t h e semantic c o n c e p t i o n of t r u t h begs t h e ques­ tion of t h e c o n c e p t of p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h . Tarski c a n replace (1) with 3

(2)

s is t r u e iff/)

87__ Truth and Society

only b e c a u s e h e assumes t h e equivalence (3)

P

=

s

"P" i t r u e .

T h e equivalence sign, however, h i d e s t h e very p r o b l e m t h a t is at is­ sue. F o r by "p" I m e a n a t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n [Aussage] only if I e m b e d the assertoric s e n t e n c e 5 in a s p e e c h act t h a t takes t h e f o r m of a n as­ sertion. W e c a n n o t c o n t e n t ourselves with t h e equivalence in (3) if we w a n t to give a n a c c o u n t of t h e validity implicit in assertions. Rather we m u s t explicate t h e claim to validity t h a t we raise in constative s p e e c h acts. 4

T h e classic a t t e m p t to c i r c u m v e n t this p r o b l e m is t h e ontological i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d facts as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n [Abbildung] ( t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e t h e o r y of t r u t h ) . T h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n obviously fails to c a p t u r e t h e m e a n i n g of truth, since images or copies can b e m o r e o r less like t h e original they are s u p p o s e d to r e p r e s e n t , w h e r e a s a t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n c a n n o t be m o r e or less like reality: T r u t h is n o t a relative property. (This has b e e n p o i n t e d o u t by Austin as well as Sellars.) T h e real difficulty of ontological t h e o r i e s of t r u t h , however, is t h a t t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d facts (or reality as t h e totality of all facts) can in t u r n b e r e p r e s e n t e d o n l y in p r o p o s i t i o n s . As Peirce d e m o n ­ strated, we can a c c o r d t h e t e r m "reality" n o m e a n i n g o t h e r t h a n w h a t we m e a n by the t r u t h of p r o p o s i t i o n s . W e c a n i n t r o d u c e t h e c o n c e p t of "reality" o n l y with r e f e r e n c e t o " t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n s " : Reality is t h e totality of all states of affairs a b o u t which t r u e s t a t e m e n t s a r e possi­ ble. O n t o l o g i c a l t h e o r i e s of t r u t h try in vain to g o b e y o n d t h e s e m a n ­ tic realm. But only in this r e a l m c a n t h e validity claim of s p e e c h acts be explicated. 5

T h e m e a n i n g o f t r u t h d o e s n o t consist i n t h e m e t h o d o f ascertain­ ing t r u t h ; nevertheless, t h e m e a n i n g of a validity claim also c a n n o t be d e t e r m i n e d w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e t o t h e possibility of r e d e e m i n g , limit­ ing, o r rejecting it. T h a t is why t h e evidential theory of truth, t h e Husserlian version of which we have e x a m i n e d m o r e closely, defines t r u t h with r e f e r e n c e t o t h e intuitive fulfillment of a n i n t e n t i o n . T h e m e a n i n g of t r u t h , a c c o r d i n g to Husserl, refers t o t h e evidence of t h e intuition of w h a t is i m m e d i a t e l y given. I shall n o t r e h e a r s e t h e argu­ m e n t s t h a t have b e e n a d v a n c e d by p h i l o s o p h e r s from Peirce to

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P o p p e r a n d A d o r n o against this sort of Ursprungsphilosophie. I Husserl, t h e impossibility of t h e evidential t h e o r y of t r u t h e m e r g e s in t h e a t t e m p t to p r o v e that t h e r e is a n o n s e n s o r y (or categorial) intu­ ition for universal p r o p o s i t i o n s , in which universals a r e s u p p o s e d to b e self-evident. But even singular p r o p o s i t i o n s (so-called p e r c e p t u a l j u d g m e n t s ) c o n t a i n at least o n e universal expression (namely, o n e of t h e p r e d i c a t e s of disposition, m e a s u r e m e n t , relation, or sensation al­ lowed in o b s e r v a t i o n l a n g u a g e s ) . T h e s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t of such a g e n e r a l t e r m c a n n o t be e x h a u s t e d by a finite n u m b e r of particular o b s e r v a t i o n s . As Wittgenstein showed with t h e e x a m p l e of introduc­ i n g semantic c o n v e n t i o n s , t h e m e a n i n g s of words a n d s e n t e n c e s con­ n o t e a n e l e m e n t of universality t h a t t r a n s c e n d s all possible particular exemplifications. T h a t is why t h e claim tp validity implicit in an asser­ tion c a n n o t be r e d e e m e d by empirical evidence. Nevertheless, the validity of empirically m e a n i n g f u l assertions obviously rests) o n expe­ rience^,'In a c e r t a i n sense, t h e validity claim is f o u n d e d in experi­ e n c e s . W e c a n show w h a t this m e a n s by c o n s i d e r i n g t h e dissonant c h a r a c t e r of " e x p e r i e n c e s , " w h i c h b o t h G a d a m e r a n d P o p p e r have emphasized. n

6

Especially Peirce a n d t h e pragmatists w h o followed h i m have p l a c e d epistemological w e i g h t on the fact t h a t we l e a r n only from h a v i n g o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s d i s a p p o i n t e d . We s p e a k of e x p e r i e n c e s in an e m p h a t i c sense o n l y if t h e y modify o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d c o m p e l us to r e o r i e n t ourselves. W e d o n o t n o t i c e w h e n o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s are c o n f i r m e d . C o r r o b o r a t i n g e x p e r i e n c e s are the f o u n d a t i o n on which t h e everyday p r a c t i c e of o u r lifeworld rests; they p r o v i d e us with cer­ tainty. B u t certainties are always subjective; they can b e u p s e t at any time by d i s s o n a n t e x p e r i e n c e s . F r o m t h e perspective of the believing subject, certainty is the c o r r e l a t e of t h e actual validity of a belief. To t h a t e x t e n t e x p e r i e n c e — t h a t is, continually c o r r o b o r a t i n g experi­ e n c e — g r o u n d s t h e t r u t h claims raised in constative s p e e c h acts. " G r o u n d i n g " m e a n s stabilizing claims q u a claims: As l o n g as "experi­ e n c e d o e s n o t t e a c h us o t h e r w i s e , " we have in fact n o plausible cause to d o u b t a t r u t h claim, even t h o u g h we k n o w t h a t d o u b t s , w h e n they arise, c a n n o t b e resolved by e x p e r i e n c e s , b u t only by a r g u m e n t s . Of course, e x p e r i e n c e c a n be a p p e a l e d to in t h e c o u r s e of a n a r g u m e n t . But t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a p p e a l to e x p e r i e n c e , as in e x p e r i m e n t s , it-

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self d e p e n d s o n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s whose validity c a n be d e m o n s t r a t e d only in discourse. E x p e r i e n c e s support t h e t r u t h claims of assertions; we m a i n t a i n this claim as l o n g as t h e r e a r e n o d i s s o n a n t e x p e r i e n c e s . But these t r u t h claims c a n b e redeemed only t r o u g h a r g u m e n t . A claim g r o u n d e d [jundiert] in e x p e r i e n c e enjoys provisional backing; as soon as it b e c o m e s p r o b l e m a t i c , we can see t h a t a claim g r o u n d e d in experiences is n o t yet by any m e a n s a justified [ begriindet] claim. T h e validity claim of constative speech acts, t h a t is, t h e t r u t h t h a t we claim p r o p o s i t i o n s to have by asserting t h e m , d e p e n d s o n two conditions. First, it m u s t b e g r o u n d e d in e x p e r i e n c e ; t h a t is, t h e statement may n o t conflict with d i s s o n a n t e x p e r i e n c e . S e c o n d , it must b e discursively r e d e e m a b l e ; t h a t is, t h e s t a t e m e n t m u s t b e able to h o l d u p against all c o u n t e r a r g u m e n t s a n d c o m m a n d t h e assent of all p o t e n t i a l p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a discourse. T h e first c o n d i t i o n m u s t be satisfied t o m a k e credible t h a t t h e s e c o n d c o n d i t i o n could b e satisfied as r e q u i r e d . T h e m e a n i n g of t r u t h implicit in t h e p r a g m a t i c s of asser­ tions can b e explicated if we specify w h a t is m e a n t by the "discursive r e d e m p t i o n " of claims to validity. T h i s is t h e task of the/'consensus the­ ory of truth. A c c o r d i n g to this theory, I can a t t r i b u t e a p r e d i c a t e t o an object if a n d only if e v e r y o n e else w h o c o u l d e n t e r into discourse with m e w o u l d also a t t r i b u t e t h e s a m e p r e d i c a t e t o t h e same object. To distinguish t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n s f r o m false o n e s , I take r e c o u r s e t o the j u d g m e n t of o t h e r s — t h a t is, of all o t h e r s with w h o m I c o u l d ever e n t e r i n t o discourse (including counterfactually all discursive part­ ners w h o m I could e n c o u n t e r if my life history w e r e coextensive with the history of h u m a n k i n d ) . T h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n of p r o p o s i t i o n s is the p o t e n t i a l assent of all o t h e r s . E v e r y o n e else should b e able to convince h i m - o r herself t h a t I a m justifi ed in p r e d i c a t i n g t h e attrib­ ute p of object x a n d s h o u l d t h e n be able to a g r e e with m e . T h e uni­ versal-pragmatic m e a n i n g of t r u t h , therefore, is d e t e r m i n e d in t e r m s of t h e d e m a n d of r e a c h i n g a r a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s . i T h e c o n c e p t of t h e discursive r e d e m p t i o n of validity claims leads to t h e c o n c e p t of ratio­ n a l consensus. Before discussing t h e aporias t h a t arise from this, I would like to e x a m i n e t h e types of validity claims o t h e r t h a n t r u t h claims t h a t occur in o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e g a m e s . A f u n c t i o n i n g l a n g u a g e g a m e , in w h i c h s p e e c h acts a r e c o o r d i ­ n a t e d a n d e x c h a n g e d , is a c c o m p a n i e d by a " b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s . "

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This c o n s e n s u s rests o n t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of at least f o u r claims to va­ lidity t h a t c o m p e t e n t speakers m u s t raise reciprocally for each of t h e i r s p e e c h acts: t h e intelligibility of the u t t e r a n c e , t h e truth of its p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t , t h e normative Tightness of its performative c o m p o n e n t , a n d t h e sincerity of t h e i n t e n t i o n expressed by the speaker. T h e c o u r s e of a c o m m u n i c a t i o n r u n s smoothly (on t h e basis of a socially l e a r n e d [eingespielt] consensus) if s p e a k i n g and acting subjects (a) r e n d e r intelligible t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g of t h e intersubjective relation (which c a n b e e x p r e s s e d in t h e f o r m of a performative clause) as well as t h e m e a n i n g of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t of their utterances; (b) r e c o g n i z e t h e t r u t h of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n stated with t h e s p e e c h act (or the existential p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of the p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t men­ tioned therein); (c) a c k n o w l e d g e t h e n o r m a t i v e Tightness of t h e n o r m t h a t the given s p e e c h act m a y be r e g a r d e d as fulfilling; a n d (d) d o n o t cast d o u b t o n t h e sincerity of t h e subjects involved. Particular validity claims are t h e m a t i z e d only if t h e f u n c t i o n i n g of a l a n g u a g e g a m e is d i s t u r b e d a n d the w o r k i n g b a c k g r o u n d consen­ sus is u n d e r m i n e d . This t h e n gives rise to typical q u e s t i o n s a n d an­ swers, w h i c h are a n o r m a l p a r t of c o m m u n i c a t i v e practice. If the intelligibility of an u t t e r a n c e b e c o m e s p r o b l e m a t i c , we ask such ques­ tions as, "What d o you m e a n by that?" "How a m I to u n d e r s t a n d that?" "What d o e s that m e a n ? " W e call t h e answers to such questions interpretations. If t h e t r u t h of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t of a n utter­ ance b e c o m e s p r o b l e m a t i c , we ask such questions as "Are things as y o u say?" "Why are they t h a t way a n d n o t s o m e o t h e r way?" We reply to such questions with assertions a n d explanations. If t h e n o r m a t i v e Tightness of a s p e e c h act or its n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t b e c o m e s p r o b l e m ­ atic, we ask s u c h q u e s t i o n s as, "Why did you d o that?" "Why d i d n ' t y o u b e h a v e differently?" To these q u e s t i o n s w e r e s p o n d with justifica­ tions. Finally, if in the c o n t e x t of an i n t e r a c t i o n we call i n t o d o u b t an­ o t h e r ' s sincerity, we ask q u e s t i o n s such as, "Is he deceiving m e ? " or "Is she deceiving herself a b o u t herself?" T h e s e questions, however,

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are a d d r e s s e d n o t to t h e u n t r u s t w o r t h y p e r s o n himself, b u t r a t h e r to third parties. A s p e a k e r s u s p e c t e d of b e i n g i n s i n c e r e can at best b e cross-examined in c o u r t o r may p e r h a p s " b r o u g h t t o his senses" i n analysis. These four claims to validity a r e f u n d a m e n t a l in t h a t they c a n n o t be r e d u c e d to a c o m m o n d e n o m i n a t o r . T h e m e a n i n g of intelligibil­ ity, n o r m a t i v e Tightness, a n d sincerity c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d to t h e m e a n i n g of t r u t h . W e u n d e r s t a n d w h a t t r u t h is w h e n we grasp t h e m e a n i n g of t h e claims to validity c o n t a i n e d in constative s p e e c h acts: T h e pragmatics of assertion is t h e key to t h e c o n c e p t of t r u t h , whereas t h e a p p e a l of models such as t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e theory, which are l o c a t e d in a different s p h e r e , namely, t h a t of iconic r e p r e ­ sentation, is misleading. T r u t h is n o t a r e l a t i o n of r e s e m b l a n c e . T h e same h o l d s for t h e o t h e r classes of validity claims. T h e intelligibility of a n u t t e r a n c e is n o t a t r u t h relation. Intelligibility is a validity claim that signifies t h a t I h a v e mastery of a specific r u l e - c o m p e t e n c e , namely, that I k n o w a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e . An u t t e r a n c e is intelligible if it is grammatically a n d pragmatically well f o r m e d , so that e v e r y o n e who h a s m a s t e r e d t h e a p p r o p r i a t e r u l e systems is able to g e n e r a t e the same u t t e r a n c e . T h u s w h a t we call "analytic t r u t h " c o u l d b e u n ­ derstood as a special case of intelligibility, namely, t h e intelligibility of s e n t e n c e s in f o r m a l l a n g u a g e s . But intelligibility h a s n o t h i n g to d o with "truth." T r u t h is a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n s e n t e n c e s a n d t h e reality a b o u t which we m a k e s t a t e m e n t s . By contrast, intelligibility is an in­ ternal relation b e t w e e n symbolic expressions a n d the relevant system of rules, a c c o r d i n g to which we can p r o d u c e these expressions. Sincerity is n o m o r e a t r u t h relation t h a n is intelligibility. Sincerity is a validity claim c o n n e c t e d with s p e e c h acts b e l o n g i n g to t h e class of representatives. It signifies t h a t I sincerely m e a n t h e i n t e n t i o n s that I express exacdy as I have e x p r e s s e d t h e m . A s p e a k e r is sincere if she deceives n e i t h e r herself n o r o t h e r s . J u s t as " t r u t h " refers to t h e sense in which I can p u t forth a p r o p o s i t i o n , "sincerity" refers to t h e sense in which I disclose o r manifest in front of o t h e r s a subjective e x p e r i e n c e to which I have privileged access. As s o o n as we conceive of sincerity as a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e expression of a n e x p e r i e n c e a n d a n i n n e r state q u a entity, we have already m i s u n d e r s t o o d it on analogy with t r u t h . I n acts of self-representation, I assert n o t h i n g

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a b o u t i n n e r episodes—I m a k e n o assertions at all; r a t h e r I express s o m e t h i n g subjective. T h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , which u n d e r l i e s disclosure theories of truth, is n o less serious. In these theories (of which H e i d e g g e r ' s is a g o o d e x a m p l e ) t r u t h is conceived o n the m o d e l of sincerity as manifestation o r u n c o n c e a l m e n t . This concep­ t i o n d o e s n o t d o justice to t h e fact t h a t t h e cognitive use of l a n g u a g e refers to reality. 7

C o m p a r e d to intelligibility a n d sincerity, t h e claim to n o r m a t i v e Tightness has received g r e a t e r a t t e n t i o n in p h i l o s o p h i c a l discus­ sions—albeit usually u n d e r t h e title of m o r a l t r u t h . Rightness is a va­ lidity claim c o n n e c t e d with t h e class of regulatives. It signifies t h a t it is r i g h t to r e c o g n i z e a prevailing n o r m a n d t h a t this n o r m " o u g h t " to have validity. This n o r m a t i v e validity has n o t h i n g to d o with t h e valid­ ity of t r u t h . T h i s is i n d i c a t e d by t h e fact t h a t n o r m a t i v e sentences c a n n o t b e d e r i v e d from descriptive s e n t e n c e s . T h e oft-repeated ob­ j e c t i o n s to t h e naturalistic fallacy in ethics apply to the difference be­ tween r i g h t n e s s a n d t r u t h . As soon as we conceive of r i g h t n e s s as a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a c o m m e n d a t i o n o r a d m o n i t i o n a n d a n i n n e r en­ tity such as a desire or aversion, we have already m i s u n d e r s t o o d it on analogy with t r u t h . In acts of motivated choice I no m o r e make asser­ tions a b o u t i n n e r episodes t h a n I d o in acts of self-representation. R a t h e r I d o s o m e t h i n g right or wrong. N e v e r t h e l e s s j t o infer from this t h a t t h e r e can b e n o t r u t h in practical matters w o u l d equally be t o m i s c o n s t r u e t h e m e a n i n g of N o r m a t i v e validity} By expressing that o n e n o r m o u g h t to b e p r e f e r r e d to a n o t h e r , I w a n t precisely to ex­ c l u d e t h e e l e m e n t of arbitrariness: N o r m a t i v e rightness coincides w i t h t r u t h in t h a t b o t h claims c a n b e r e d e e m e d o n l y discursively t h r o u g h a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d t h e a t t a i n m e n t of r a t i o n a l consensus. C o n s e n s u s , however, d o e s n o t m e a n t h e s a m e t h i n g in t h e two cases. T h e c r i t e r i o n o f t h e t r u t h of p r o p o s i t i o n s is t h e possibility of univer­ sal assent [Zustimmung] to a n o p i n i o n , w h e r e a s ^ h e c r i t e r i o n of t h e r i g h t n e s s of a c o m m e n d a t i o n o r a d m o n i t i o n is t h e possibility of uni­ versal a g r e e m e n t [ Ubereinstimmung] in a n o p i n i o n . 81

N o t all of t h e claims to validity t h a t we have e l u c i d a t e d by way of universal pragmatics with r e f e r e n c e to t h e four classes of s p e e c h acts imply t h a t they can b e r e d e e m e d discursively. T h e c o n s e n s u s t h e o r y of t r u t h , w h i c h has to rely o n t h e c o n c e p t of a discursively a t t a i n e d

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consensus, is r e l e v a n t only for claims to t r u t h a n d to Tightness. Claims t o sincerity can b e r e d e e m e d only t h r o u g h actions. N e i t h e r i n t e r r o g a t i o n s n o r analytic conversations b e t w e e n d o c t o r a n d pa­ tient m a y be c o n s i d e r e d to b e discourses. T h e case of claims to intel­ ligibility is different. If t h e b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s is u p s e t to t h e p o i n t t h a t ad h o c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are n o l o n g e r a d e q u a t e , it is advis­ able t o r e s o r t to h e r m e n e u t i c d i s c o u r s e in which different i n t e r p r e ­ tations can b e tested a n d t h e o n e t h a t is t a k e n to b e correct c a n b e justified. H e r e t o o the difference is u n m i s t a k a b l e . Claims t o t r u t h a n d t o n o r m a t i v e Tightness f u n c t i o n in everyday practice as claims that are a c c e p t e d in light of t h e possibility t h a t they could b e discur­ sively r e d e e m e d if necessary. Intelligibility, by contrast, is a claim t h a t is in fact r e d e e m e d as l o n g as t h e course of c o m m u n i c a t i o n p r o c e e d s u n d i s t u r b e d ; it is n o t m e r e l y a n a c c e p t e d p r e m i s e ; c o m m u n i c a t i o n that is u n i n t e l l i g i b l e breaks d o w n . T h e c o n s e n s u s theory of t r u t h , to which I n o w r e t u r n h a v i n g dis­ tinguished t h e different types of validity claims, picks u p o n t h e fact that r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g [Verstdndigung] is a n o r m a t i v e concept. W i t t g e n s t e i n r e m a r k s that the c o n c e p t of r e a c h i n g u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g is c o n t a i n e d in t h e c o n c e p t of l a n g u a g e . H e n c e t h e claim that t h e p u r p o s e of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n is t o r e a c h m u t u a l u n ­ d e r s t a n d i n g is analytic. Every act of r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g is c o n f i r m e d by a r a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s ; o t h e r w i s e it is n o t a "real" act of r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , as we say. C o m p e t e n t speakers k n o w t h a t any d e facto c o n s e n s u s a t t a i n e d c a n b e illusory; b u t t h e i r basis for t h e concept of an illusory (or simply forced) c o n s e n s u s is t h e c o n c e p t of a r a t i o n a l consensus. Thev k n o w t h a t an illusory c o n s e n s u s must b e r e p l a c e d with a n actual o n e if c o m m u n i c a t i o n is t o lead t o m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . As soon as we start c o m m u n i c a t i n g , we implicidy de­ clare o u r desire to reach an u n d e r s t a n d i n g with o n e a n o t h e r a b o u t s o m e t h i n g . If c o n s e n s u s — e v e n a b o u t a difference of o p i n i o n — c a n n o l o n g e r be r e a s o n a b l y expected, c o m m u n i c a t i o n breaks d o w n . Yet, if r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is n o t a descriptive c o n c e p t , w h a t is t h e criterion for a r a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s , as o p p o s e d t o a c o n t i n g e n t l y estab­ lished c o n s e n s u s t h a t is n o t "sound"? A r a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s , as we have said, is a t t a i n e d t h r o u g h discourse. What d o we m e a n by discourse?

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Discourses a r e events with t h e g o a l of justifying cognitive utter­ ances. Cognitive e l e m e n t s such as i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , assertions, expla­ n a t i o n s , and justifications are n o r m a l c o m p o n e n t s of everyday lived p r a c t i c e . T h e y fill i n f o r m a t i o n gaps. However, as s o o n as their claims to validity are explicitly called i n t o question, t h e p r o c u r i n g of further i n f o r m a t i o n is n o l o n g e r simply a p r o b l e m of d i s s e m i n a t i o n b u t a p r o b l e m of epistemic gain. I n t h e case of f u n d a m e n t a l problematizations, equalizing i n f o r m a t i o n deficits is of n o h e l p . Rather, we ask for c o n v i n c i n g reasons, a n d in discourse, we try to reach a s h a r e d conviction [ Uberzeugung]. I n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , assertions, e x p l a n a t i o n s , a n d justifications, whose claim to validity was initially naively a c c e p t e d a n d t h e n prob­ l e m a t i z e d , are t r a n s f o r m e d t h r o u g h discursively a t t a i n e d justifica­ tions. Casuistic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a r e i n t e g r a t e d i n t o interpretive contexts^ singular assertions are c o n n e c t e d with t h e o r e t i c a l state­ m e n t s , e x p l a n a t i o n s are justified with r e f e r e n c e to n a t u r a l laws or n o r m s , a n d singular justifications of actions are d e r i v e d from t h e g e n e r a l justifications of t h e n o r m s u n d e r l y i n g t h e actions. W e en­ g a g e in hermeneutic discourse w h e n c o n t e s t i n g t h e validity of h o w to in­ t e r p r e t e x p r e s s i o n s within a given linguistic system. W e e n g a g e in theoretico-emprical discourse w h e n verifying the validity of empirically m e a n i n g f u l assertions a n d of e x p l a n a t i o n s . We e n g a g e in practical dis­ course when a c c o u n t i n g for t h e validity of c o m m e n d a t i o n s (or a d m o ­ n i t i o n s ) , which refer to t h e a c c e p t a n c e (or rejection) of certain s t a n d a r d s . If what is a t issue is d e t e r m i n i n g which linguistic system to select in o r d e r to be able to describe a preliminarily identified p h e ­ n o m e n o n adequately, to c a p t u r e a n existing p r o b l e m exactly a n d r e n d e r it m a n a g e a b l e , or even to pick out a k n o w l e d g e - g u i d i n g inter­ est, t h e n we have a special case of a practical discourse at t h e metalevel. Substantive a r g u m e n t s h a v e t h e p o w e r rationally to motivate the r e c o g n i t i o n of a validity claim, t h o u g h they c a n n o t force this recogni­ tion simply by way of d e d u c t i o n (or by a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a p p e a l to e x p e r i e n c e ) . T h a t is, they c a n n o t d o so analytically (or empirically) . T h e logic of discourse c a n give a n a c c o u n t of w h a t "rational motiva­ t i o n " m e a n s only by c o n t r a s t i n g it with "logical necessity." T h i s expla­ n a t i o n will have to appeal in a circular fashion t o t h e characteristic 9

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unforced force of t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t — b e t t e r b e c a u s e it is m o r e convincing. B u t is it t h e n possible to define t h e m e a n i n g of truth—which differs f r o m m e r e certainty precisely in its claim to b e absolute—by r e f e r e n c e to t h e wobbly f o u n d a t i o n of t h e e n d e a v o r t o reach c o n s e n s u s discursively? H o w a r e we t o distinguish a r a t i o n a l from a merely c o n t i n g e n t l y established consensus? Let us r e t u r n t o t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e truth of propositions. Constative speech acts allow us to claim that p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e t r u e . They e n a b l e us to draw t h e f u n d a m e n t a l distinction b e t w e e n reality a n d a p p e a r ­ ance. A c c o r d i n g to the c o n s e n s u s t h e o r y of t r u t h , the c o n d i t i o n for r e d e e m i n g t h e t r u t h of p r o p o s i t i o n s is t h e p o t e n t i a l assent of all o t h e r p e r s o n s . Now, as a m a t t e r of fact, t h e r e a r e always only a few persons against whose assent I can c h e c k my assertion's claim to va­ lidity. T h e actual assent t h a t I can possibly o b t a i n f r o m a few o t h e r s is m o r e likely to b e e n d o r s e d by f u r t h e r j u d g e s , t h e less we a n d o t h e r s see a n y r e a s o n to d o u b t their c o m p e t e n c e to j u d g e . T h e r e f o r e we shall restrict t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n t h a t has b e e n i n t r o d u c e d counterfactually as follows: I m a y assert p if every o t h e r competent j u d g e w o u l d a g r e e with m e in this assertion. B u t w h a t can c o m p e ­ tence in j u d g m e n t m e a n in this context? Kamlah a n d L o r e n z e n have p r o p o s e d t h a t c o m p e t e n t j u d g e s m u s t be c a p a b l e of p e r f o r m i n g a p p r o p r i a t e verification p r o c e d u r e s . T h e y m u s t h a v e e x p e r t k n o w l e d g e . But h o w can we d e t e r m i n e w h a t sort of verification p r o c e d u r e is to c o u n t as a p p r o p r i a t e in a given case a n d who m a y claim to b e a n expert? T h e s e q u e s t i o n s , t o o , m u s t b e sub­ ject to discourse t h e o u t c o m e of which in t u r n d e p e n d s o n a c o n s e n ­ sus a m o n g t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s . Expertise is n o d o u b t a c o n d i t i o n t h a t must b e satisfied by a c o m p e t e n t j u d g e . But we c a n n o t specify any in­ d e p e n d e n t criteria for w h a t counts as "expertise"; d e c i d i n g o n t h e choice of these criteria itself d e p e n d s o n t h e o u t c o m e of a discourse. T h a t is why, if t h e assent of a j u d g e is to b e t h e test of m y o w n j u d g ­ m e n t , I s h o u l d n o t like to m a k e his c o m p e t e n c e d e p e n d o n his ex­ pertise, b u t simply o n w h e t h e r h e is "rational." W e c a n n o t escape this d i l e m m a even if we a s s u m e t h a t verification p r o c e d u r e s a p p r o p r i a t e for compelling c o n s e n s u s a b o u t t h e validity of empirically m e a n i n g ­ ful assertions c o u l d b e derived from t h e universal-pragmatic features of descriptive l a n g u a g e — o r even if we could t e r m "rational" all

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j u d g e s who, for e x a m p l e , a r e capable of m e t h o d i c a l o b s e r v a t i o n a n d inquiry. For h o w could we ascertain this c o m p e t e n c e with any cer­ tainty? It is by n o m e a n s sufficient for s o m e o n e to act as t h o u g h she is m a k i n g a n o b s e r v a t i o n o r e n g a g i n g in inquirv. W e also e x p e c t h e r to b e , for lack of a better word, in possession of h e r s e n s e s — t h a t is, to b e a c c o u n t a b l e for h e r actions. S h e m u s t live in t h e public world of a s p e e c h c o m m u n i t y a n d m u s t n o t b e an "idiot," t h a t is, i n c a p a b l e of distinguishing b e t w e e n reality a n d a p p e a r a n c e . To be sure, we can tell w h e t h e r s o m e o n e is i n d e e d rational only if we speak with h e r a n d c a n c o u n t o n h e r in c o n t e x t s of i n t e r a c t i o n . I n cases of d o u b t , w h e t h e r a consensus is t r u e o r false m u s t b e de­ c i d e d t h r o u g h discourse. B u t t h e o u t c o m e of discourse d e p e n d s in t u r n o n t h e a t t a i n m e n t of a s o u n d consensus. T h e c o n s e n s u s t h e o r y of t r u t h makes us aware t h a t it is n o t possible to d e c i d e o n t h e truth of p r o p o s i t i o n s w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e to the c o m p e t e n c e of possible j u d g e s . T h i s in t u r n c a n n o t b e d e t e r m i n e d w i t h o u t evaluating the sincerity of t h e i r u t t e r a n c e s a n d t h e rightness of their actions. T h e i d e a of t r u e c o n s e n s u s r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s in discourse be able to d i s t i n g u i s h reliably b e t w e e n reality a n d a p p e a r a n c e , essence a n d a c c i d e n t , a n d is a n d o u g h t ; for o n l y t h e n c a n t h e y b e c o m p e t e n t to j u d g e t h e t r u t h of p r o p o s i t i o n s , t h e veracity of u t t e r a n c e s , a n d the legitimacy of actions. Yet in n o n e of these t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s can we specify a c r i t e r i o n t h a t w o u l d allow for a n i n d e p e n d e n t assessment of t h e c o m p e t e n c e of possible j u d g e s o r p a r t i c i p a n t s in deliberation. R a t h e r , it seems as t h o u g h t h e c o m p e t e n c e to j u d g e itself m u s t be j u d g e d o n t h e basis of t h e very same k i n d of c o n s e n s u s for whose evaluation criteria a r e to b e found'-,! ,This circle c o u l d b e b r o k e n only by a n o n t o l o g i c a l t h e o r y of truth, b u t n o n e of t h e s e copy or corre­ s p o n d e n c e theories has yet held u p u n d e r scrutiny. 0

W e r e this t h e case, however, it would be h a r d to u n d e r s t a n d why we n o n e t h e l e s s a s s u m e in every conversation t h a t we c a n r e a c h a mu­ tual u n d e r s t a n d i n g . In fact we are always c o n f i d e n t t h a t we know how to tell a r a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s from a n illusory o n e . O t h e r w i s e we could n o t tacitly p r e s u p p o s e t h e sense of s p e e c h t h a t is always already ac­ c e p t e d at t h e m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e level a n d w i t h o u t which o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i c a t i o n w o u l d b e m e a n i n g l e s s — n a m e l y , its ratio­ n a l character. This p h e n o m e n o n r e q u i r e s e x p l a n a t i o n .

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,

I would a r g u e t h a t what explains it is t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s in argu­ m e n t a t i o n m u t u a l l y presuppose s o m e t h i n g like a n ideal s p e e c h situa­ tion. T h e defining feature of t h e ideal s p e e c h situation is t h a t a n y consensus attainable u n d e r its c o n d i t i o n s can c o u n t p e r se as a ratio­ nal consensus. My thesis is t h a t only t h e anticipation [ Vorgriff] of an ideal speech situation w a r r a n t s a t t a c h i n g to a n y c o n s e n s u s t h a t is in fact attained t h e claim t h a t it is a r a t i o n a l consensus. A t t h e s a m e time, this anticipation is a critical s t a n d a r d t h a t can also b e u s e d to call i n t o question a n y factually a t t a i n e d consensus a n d to e x a m i n e w h e t h e r it is a sufficient i n d i c a t o r of real m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e c o n s e n s u s theory of t r u t h is, it seems to m e , s u p e r i o r to all o t h e r t h e o r i e s of truth. But even it c a n b r e a k o u t of t h e circular m o v e m e n t of argu­ m e n t only if we a s s u m e t h a t i n everv discourse we a r e m u t u a l l y re­ quired to p r e s u p p o s e a n ideal s p e e c h situation. Obviously this o r a similar a n t i c i p a t i o n is necessary in o r d e r to avoid m a k i n g t h e discur­ sive r e d e m p t i o n of a validity claim d e p e n d o n a c o n t i n g e n t l y at­ tained c o n s e n s u s . T h e q u e s t i o n r e m a i n s of w h e t h e r it is possible t o design [entwerfen] a n ideal s p e e c h situation. If, first of all, all s p e e c h requires t h a t a t least two subjects r e a c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t s o m e t h i n g or, if necessary, discursively arrive at m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d ­ ing a b o u t d i s p u t e d validity claims; if, s e c o n d , m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g means b r i n g i n g a b o u t a r a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s ; a n d if, t h i r d , a t r u e con­ sensus can b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m false o n e only by r e f e r e n c e to a n ideal s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n — t h a t is, t h r o u g h r e c o u r s e t o a n a g r e e m e n t that is conceived counterfactually as t h o u g h it h a d c o m e a b o u t u n d e r ideal c o n d i t i o n s — t h e n this idealization m u s t involve an antici­ pation t h a t we must m a k e every time we w a n t to e n g a g e in a r g u m e n ­ tation a n d t h a t we a r e also able to m a k e by m e a n s of t h e tools t h a t every speaker h a s at h e r disposal by v i r t u e of h e r c o m m u n i c a t i v e competence. H o w is it possible t o d e s i g n a n ideal s p e e c h situation by m e a n s of the s p e e c h acts t h a t every c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r k n o w s h o w to p e r ­ form? I n t e r m s of distinguishing b e t w e e n a t r u e a n d a false c o n s e n ­ sus, we call a s p e e c h situation ideal if c o m m u n i c a t i o n is i m p e d e d n e i t h e r by e x t e r n a l c o n t i n g e n t forces nor, m o r e importantiy, by c o n ­ straints arising from t h e s t r u c t u r e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n itself. T h e ideal speech situation e x c l u d e s systematic distortion of c o m m u n i c a t i o n .

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O n l y t h e n is t h e sole prevailing force t h e characteristic unforced force of t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t , which allows assertions to b e methodi­ cally verified in a n e x p e r t m a n n e r a n d decisions a b o u t practical is­ sues to be rationally motivated. O n l y if t h e r e is a symmetrical distribution of t h e o p p o r t u n i t i e s for all possible p a r t i c i p a n t s to c h o o s e a n d p e r f o r m s p e e c h acts does the s t r u c t u r e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n itself p r o d u c e no constraints. N o t only are d i a l o g u e roles t h e n universally i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e , b u t t h e r e is in effect also a n equality of o p p o r t u n i t i e s to take on t h e s e roles, t h a t is, to p e r f o r m s p e e c h acts. F r o m this general a s s u m p t i o n of symmetry we can derive special r u l e s for each of t h e f o u r classes of s p e e c h acts t h a t we have i n t r o d u c e d . If all participants in dialogue have t h e same o p p o r t u n i t y to employ c o m m u n i c a t i v e s , t h a t is, to initiate c o m m u n i ­ c a t i o n a n d c o n t i n u e it t h r o u g h s p e a k i n g a n d r e s p o n d i n g or asking q u e s t i o n s a n d giving answers, t h e n equally distributing opportunities for e m p l o y i n g constatives (as well as t h e subset of regulatives relevant for c o m m e n d i n g a n d a d m o n i s h i n g ) — t h a t is, equally distributing the o p p o r t u n i t i e s to p u t forth i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , assertions, explanations, a n d justifications a n d t o establish or refute t h e i r claims to valid­ ity—can be a way of c r e a t i n g a basis o n which n o p r e j u d i c e or unex­ a m i n e d belief will r e m a i n e x e m p t from t h e m a t i z a t i o n a n d critique in t h e l o n g r u n . T h e s e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s are w h a t ideally g o v e r n the s p e e c h acts t h a t we e m p l o y in discourses. However, they do n o t fully specify the c o n d i t i o n s of an ideal s p e e c h situation t h a t e n s u r e s not only u n r e s t r i c t e d , b u t also n o n h e g e m o n i c discussion solely in virtue of its situational characteristics—that is, its s t r u c t u r e . For the pre­ vious definitions d o n o t by themselves g u a r a n t e e t h a t interlocutors n o t merely i m a g i n e themselves to b e e n g a g e d in a discourse while they a r e in fact t r a p p e d i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n subject to c o e r c i o n . We m u s t a s s u m e in a d d i t i o n that speakers deceive n e i t h e r themselves n o r others a b o u t t h e i r i n t e n t i o n s . Interestingly e n o u g h , therefore, t h e ideal s p e e c h situation r e q u i r e s d e t e r m i n a t i o n s t h a t refer directly to how c o n t e x t s of i n t e r a c t i o n a r e organized, and only indirectly to discourses. T h e freeing of discourse from coercive s t r u c t u r e s of ac­ tion a n d i n t e r a c t i o n , w h i c h is r e q u i r e d for the ideal s p e e c h situation, is a p p a r e n t l y conceivable o n l y u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of p u r e c o m m u n i c a ­ tive action. T h e r e f o r e , t h e two o t h e r special a s s u m p t i o n s refer to r u l e s g o v e r n i n g s p e e c h acts t h a t we use in i n t e r a c d o n s .

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Truth and Society

T h e ideal s p e e c h situation a d m i t s o n l y speakers w h o as actors have the same o p p o r t u n i t i e s to use representatives. For only a h a r m o n i o u s reciprocity as to t h e scope of u t t e r a n c e s , w h i c h a r e always individual, and t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y oscillation b e t w e e n p r o x i m i t y a n d distance ensure t h a t subjects are t r a n s p a r e n t to themselves a n d o t h e r s in w h a t they actually d o a n d believe a n d , if necessary, c a n translate t h e i r n o n ­ verbal expressions i n t o linguistic u t t e r a n c e s . T o this reciprocity of u n i m p a i r e d self-representation t h e r e c o r r e s p o n d s a c o m p l e m e n t a r y reciprocity of e x p e c t a t i o n s a b o u t behavior, w h i c h r u l e s o u t privileges in the sense of n o r m s of action t h a t are only unilaterally b i n d i n g . In turn, this s y m m e t r y of e n t i t l e m e n t s a n d obligations is g u a r a n t e e d if interlocutors have equal o p p o r t u n i t i e s to employ regulatives, t h a t is, if the o p p o r t u n i t i e s to c o m m a n d a n d resist, to allow a n d forbid, t o make a n d extract p r o m i s e s , a n d to answer for o n e ' s actions a n d d e ­ m a n d that o t h e r s d o so, a r e equally distributed. T o g e t h e r with t h e equal o p p o r t u n i t y to use c o m m u n i c a t i v e s , this ensures the possibility of withdrawing at any time f r o m c o n t e x t s of i n t e r a c t i o n a n d e n t e r i n g into discourses t h a t t h e m a t i z e claims to validity. T h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l c o n d i t i o n s of t h e ideal s p e e c h situation can also b e conceived of as necessary c o n d i t i o n s of an e m a n c i p a t e d f o r m of life. F o r t o d e t e r m i n e t h e symmetrical d i s t r i b u t i o n of o p p o r t u n i ­ ties to c h o o s e a n d p e r f o r m s p e e c h acts in terms of (a) p r o p o s i t i o n s q u a p r o p o s i t i o n s , (b) t h e s p e a k e r ' s r e l a t i o n to his u t t e r a n c e s , a n d (c) c o m p l i a n c e w i t h n o r m s is to recast in linguistic t e r m s w h a t we have traditionally s o u g h t to c a p t u r e in t h e ideas of t r u t h , f r e e d o m , and justice. T h e s e t e r m s m u t u a l l y i n t e r p r e t o n e a n o t h e r . T a k e n to­ gether, they define a f o r m of life t h a t follows t h e m a x i m t h a t all p u b ­ licly relevant issues a r e to b e d e a l t with by e n t e r i n g into d i s c o u r s e a n d t h a t in d o i n g so, we m u s t p r e s u p p o s e t h a t if we w e r e to e n g a g e i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n with this i n t e n t i o n a n d persist l o n g e n o u g h , we would necessarily arrive at a c o n s e n s u s t h a t would c o u n t as a r a t i o n a l consensus. 11

T h e idealization o f t h e s p e e c h situation is i n t e r l o c k e d i n a c h a r a c ­ teristic way with an idealization of t h e action situation. T h e c o n c e p t of " p u r e c o m m u n i c a t i v e action," which I have i n t r o d u c e d w i t h o u t justifying it, requires e x p l a n a t i o n . U p t o n o w we have d i s t i n g u i s h e d b e t w e e n two f o r m s of c o m m u n i ­ cation (or " s p e e c h " ) : communicative action (interaction) a n d discourse.

100 Lecture V

I n c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, t h e validity of u t t e r a n c e s is naively presup­ p o s e d in o r d e r to e x c h a n g e i n f o r m a t i o n ( e x p e r i e n c e s related to ac­ t i o n ) . I n discourse, validity claims that have b e e n problematized b e c o m e explicit topics of discussion, b u t n o i n f o r m a t i o n is ex­ c h a n g e d . I n discourses we a t t e m p t to reestablish or r e p l a c e an agree­ m e n t t h a t h a d existed in c o m m u n i c a t i v e action a n d b e c a m e p r o b l e m a t i z e d . T h i s is t h e sense in which I spoke of r e a c h i n g a mu­ tual u n d e r s t a n d i n g discursively. T h e goal of a r g u m e n t a t i o n is to w o r k t h r o u g h a situation t h a t arises t h r o u g h t h e p e r s i s t e n t problematization of validity claims that are naively p r e s u p p o s e d in com­ m u n i c a t i v e action. T h i s reflexive f o r m of c o m m u n i c a t i o n leads to a discursively p r o d u c e d , justified a g r e e m e n t (which of c o u r s e can set­ tle o n c e again i n t o a traditionally pregiven, secondarily habitual agreement). 12

C o m m u n i c a t i v e action takes p l a c e in h a b i t u a l i z e d a n d normatively m a i n t a i n e d l a n g u a g e g a m e s . T h e y c o m p r i s e expressions [Ausserungen] f r o m all t h r e e categories (sentences, expressions [Expressionen], a c t i o n s ) , which are n o t only f o r m e d a c c o r d i n g to rules, but are also c o n n e c t e d with o n e a n o t h e r a c c o r d i n g to c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y a n d s u b s t i t u t i o n rules. Discourse, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , r e q u i r e s sus­ pending constraints on action. This is m e a n t to b r a c k e t all motives save t h a t of a c o o p e r a t i v e s e a r c h for t r u t h , a n d to s e p a r a t e q u e s t i o n s of t h e validity of k n o w l e d g e f r o m q u e s t i o n s of its origins. S e c o n d , dis­ c o u r s e r e q u i r e s suspending claims to validity. This is to m a k e us reserve o u r j u d g m e n t r e g a r d i n g the existence of t h e objects of c o m m u n i c a ­ tive action ( t h a t is, t h i n g s a n d events, p e o p l e a n d their expressions) a n d to r e m a i n skeptical with r e g a r d t o states of affairs a n d n o r m s . In d i s c o u r s e , to use H u s s e r l i a n t e r m s , we b r a c k e t t h e g e n e r a l thesis of the n a t u r a l a t t i t u d e . T h u s facts t u r n i n t o states of affairs t h a t mav or may n o t o b t a i n , while n o r m s b e c o m e suggestions t h a t may or m a y not b e right. In c o n c l u s i o n , I w a n t to e l u c i d a t e t h e m e a n i n g of n o r m a t i v e valid­ ity, w h i c h is a f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e t h e o r y of society. T h e naive validity of n o r m s of action c o n t a i n s a very far-reaching claim. T h i s claim is t h e source of t h e c o u n t e r f a c t u a l p o w e r that allows prevailing n o r m s to sustain without violence their i m m u n i t y against c o n t i n u a l violations. Let m e take as my starting

101 T r u t h a n d Society

point a p h e n o m e n o n of w h i c h every subject c a p a b l e of a c t i o n has a n intuitive awareness. If we e n c o u n t e r a n o t h e r as a subject a n d n o t as an o p p o n e n t , let a l o n e as a n object t h a t we c a n m a n i p u l a t e , we (inev­ itably) take h e r to be a c c o u n t a b l e for h e r actions. W e can only inter­ act with h e r or, as I h a v e p u t it, e n c o u n t e r h e r a t the level of intersubjectivity, if we p r e s u p p o s e t h a t u n d e r a p p r o p r i a t e question­ ing she c o u l d a c c o u n t for h e r actions. Insofar as we want to relate t o her as to a subject, we must p r o c e e d on t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e o t h e r could tell us why in a given situation she b e h a v e d as she d i d a n d n o t otherwise. T h u s we p e r f o r m a n idealization, a n d o n e t h a t affects us as well, since we see t h e o t h e r subject with t h e eyes with w h i c h w e look at ourselves. W e s u p p o s e t h a t t h e o t h e r , w e r e we to ask her, c a n give us reasons for h e r actions j u s t as we believe t h a t we c a n a c c o u n t lor o u r own actions if asked by a n o t h e r subject. T h i s intuitive knowl­ edge, which in t h e c o u r s e of action conceals from itself the status of a s u p p o s i t i o n (or a n t i c i p a t i o n ) , can b e b r o k e n d o w n into two counter factual e x p e c t a t i o n s : (a) W e e x p e c t t h a t actors intentionally obey the n o r m s t h a t they follow. T h u s we are i n c a p a b l e of i m p u t i n g unconscious motives to t h e o t h e r in t h e c o u r s e of an i n t e r a c t i o n . As soon as we m a k e such a n i m p u t a t i o n we leave t h e level of inter­ subjectivity a n d treat t h e o t h e r as a n object about w h i c h we can c o m ­ m u n i c a t e with t h i r d p a r t i e s b u t with w h o m c o m m u n i c a t i o n has b r o k e n down. I n a d d i t i o n , this expectation of intentionality i n c l u d e s t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t all n o n v e r b a l expressions c a n if necessary b e t r a n s ­ f o r m e d i n t o linguistic u t t e r a n c e s , (b) W e e x p e c t t h a t a c t i n g subjects obey only t h o s e n o r m s t h a t they t a k e to b e justified. T h u s we a r e in­ c a p a b l e in t h e c o u r s e of i n t e r a c t i o n t o e x p e c t t h e o t h e r t o o b e y a n o r m t h a t she w o u l d n o t also r e c o g n i z e as legitimate (if she is obey­ ing it i n t e n t i o n a l l y ) . Even if a subject is obviously only bowing to an empirically i m p o s e d constraint, we i m p u t e to h e r g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h she w o u l d justify this behavior, t o o . This expecta­ tion of legitimacy also i n c l u d e s t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e only n o r m s (or general principles) t h a t are c o n s i d e r e d justified in t h e eyes of acting subjects a r e t h o s e t h a t they are c o n v i n c e d w o u l d h o l d u p if necessary u n d e r u n r e s t r i c t e d a n d u n c o e r c i v e discussion. 13

T h e s e two c o u n t e r f a c t u a l e x p e c t a t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e idealiza­ tion of reciprocally i m p u t e d accountability, which is inevitable for

102 Lecture V

actors, refer to a m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t is in p r i n c i p l e attainable in practical discourses. T h e m e a n i n g of the claim to validity of n o r m s of action consists t h e r e f o r e in t h e promise t h a t t h e n o r m - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r of subjects, which is i n fact habitual, c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as t h e r e s p o n s i b l e action of a c c o u n t a b l e subjects. W e p r e s u p p o s e that subjects c a n say w h a t n o r m they a r e obeying and why they a c c e p t this n o r m as justified. I n so d o i n g , we also s u p p o s e that subjects to whom we c a n discursively d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t they d o n o t m e e t t h e two above c o n d i t i o n s would a b a n d o n t h e n o r m in q u e s t i o n a n d c h a n g e their behavior. W e k n o w t h a t institutionalized actions as a r u l e d o n o t cor­ r e s p o n d to this model ofpure communicative action, a l t h o u g h we cannot h e l p b u t always act counterfactually as t h o u g h this m o d e l were real­ ized. O n this inevitable fiction rests t h e h u m a n i t y of social inter­ c o u r s e a m o n g p e o p l e w h o are still h u m a n , t h a t is, w h o have not yet b e c o m e completely a l i e n a t e d from themselves in t h e i r selfobjecti fixations. T h e status o f t h e u n a v o i d a b l e anticipation of a n ideal s p e e c h situa­ t i o n (in discourse) a n d of a m o d e l of p u r e c o m m u n i c a t i v e action (in i n t e r a c t i o n ) , however, r e m a i n s unclear. I w a n t to c o n c l u d e by cau­ t i o n i n g against two obvious m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s . T h e c o n d i t i o n s un­ der which a r g u m e n t s actually o c c u r are clearly n o t the s a m e as those of t h e ideal s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n — a t least n o t often or usually. Neverthe­ less, it is p a r t of t h e s t r u c t u r e of possible s p e e c h t h a t in p e r f o r m i n g s p e e c h acts ( a n d actions) we act counterfactually as t h o u g h t h e ideal s p e e c h situation (or t h e m o d e l of p u r e c o m m u n i c a t i v e action) were n o t m e r e l y fictitious b u t real—precisely this is what we call a presup­ position. T h u s the n o r m a t i v e f o u n d a t i o n of linguistic c o m m u n i c a ­ tion is b o t h a n t i c i p a t e d a n d yet, as an a n t i c i p a t e d basis, operative. T h e f o r m a l a n t i c i p a t i o n of idealized conversation ( p e r h a p s as a form of life to b e realized in t h e future?) g u a r a n t e e s t h e "ultimate" u n d e r ­ lying c o u n t e r f a c t u a l m u t u a l a g r e e m e n t , which d o e s n o t first have to be c r e a t e d , b u t which m u s t c o n n e c t p o t e n t i a l s p e a k e r - h e a r e r s a pri­ ori. Moreover, r e a c h i n g a m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e g a r d i n g this a g r e e m e n t m u s t n o t be r e q u i r e d if c o m m u n i c a t i o n is to be at all pos­ sible. T h u s t h e c o n c e p t of t h e ideal s p e e c h situation is n o t m e r e l y a regulative p r i n c i p l e in t h e K a n t i a n sense. For with o u r first act of lin­ guistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n we m u s t in fact always already be m a k i n g this

103 Truth and Society

presupposition. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e c o n c e p t of t h e ideal s p e e c h situation is n o t a n existing c o n c e p t [existierender Begriff] in t h e H e ­ gelian sense. F o r t h e r e is n o historical society t h a t c o r r e s p o n d s to t h e form of life t h a t we a n t i c i p a t e in t h e c o n c e p t of t h e i d e a l s p e e c h situ­ ation. T h e ideal situation could best b e c o m p a r e d with a transcen­ dental illusion [Schein] w e r e it n o t at t h e s a m e t i m e a constitutive condition of possible s p e e c h i n s t e a d of a n i m p e r m i s s i b l e p r o j e c t i o n (as in t h e n o n e m p i r i c a l e m p l o y m e n t of t h e categories of t h e u n d e r ­ standing) . For every possible c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t h e a n t i c i p a t i o n of t h e ideal speech situation h a s t h e significance of a constitutive illusion that is at t h e s a m e t i m e t h e prefiguration [Vorschein] of a f o r m of life. Of c o u r s e , we c a n n o t k n o w a p r i o r i w h e t h e r t h a t p r e f i g u r a t i o n is a m e r e delusion ( s u b r e p t i o n ) — n o m a t t e r h o w u n a v o i d a b l e t h e presuppositions t h a t give rise to it—or w h e t h e r t h e empirical c o n d i ­ tions of an even a p p r o x i m a t e realization of this s u p p o s e d f o r m of life can be b r o u g h t a b o u t in p r a c t i c e . From this p o i n t of view the funda­ mental n o r m s of possible s p e e c h t h a t a r e built i n t o universal pragmatics c o n t a i n a practical hypothesis. T h i s hypothesis, which must first b e d e v e l o p e d a n d justified in a theory of c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e , is the p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e for a critical t h e o r y of society. 14

Intentions, Conventions, and Linguistic Interactions (1976)

1

1

Semantic Conventions and Social Conventions

T h e notions of i n t e n t i o n a l a n d n o r m - r e g u l a t e d a c t i o n e x t e n d t h e concept of r u l e - g o v e r n e d b e h a v i o r in two opposite directions. I n contrast, t h e n o t i o n of interpretively m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n c o m p r i s e s b o t h c o n c e p t s of a c t i o n a n d sees t h e i r d e v e l o p m e n t as c o m p l e m e n ­ tary. I n this essay, I shall discuss two c o n c e p t u a l levels t h a t t r a n s c e n d rule-governed b e h a v i o r as well as two c o n c e p t s t h a t are differenti­ ated accordingly. In d o i n g so, I will show how to systematically incor­ p o r a t e c o n c r e t e action, which I h a v e elsewhere d e l i n e a t e d from r u l e - g o v e r n e d behavior. O n e m i g h t object t h a t t h e f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t s of i n t e n t i o n a n d c o n v e n t i o n , let alone t h e c o n c e p t of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , are already im­ plicit in t h e c o n c e p t of rule-following. After all, Wittgenstein intro­ d u c e d t h e c o n c e p t of a r u l e in o r d e r to conceive of t h e expression of i n t e n t i o n s as a way of following c o n v e n t i o n s . W e d o not use i n t e n ­ tional expressions such as "to m e a n " a n d "to u n d e r s t a n d , " "to w a n t " a n d "to desire," "to h o p e " a n d "to fear" in o r d e r t o r e p o r t private states or i n t e r n a l events, n o r d o we use t h e m to express o u r subjectiv­ ity, to manifest our i n n e r life. Rather, in using t h e s e expressions, we rely on intersubjective s e m a n t i c c o n v e n t i o n s , w h i c h give o t h e r partic­ ipants in interaction t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to test w h e t h e r we a r e k e e p i n g t o t h e rules of a n established l a n g u a g e g a m e in a given situation or not. Wittgenstein basically wants to r e d u c e i n t e n t i o n s to an u n d e r ­ standing of rules, to k n o w i n g h o w to use rules. H e elucidates this u n ­ d e r s t a n d i n g of rules paradigmatically with t h e h e l p of simple a r i t h m e t i c c o n s t r u c t i o n s o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of s i n g u l a r p r e d i c a t e s . .Scan b e h a v e intentionally insofar as she knows f o r m a t i o n r u l e s o r se­ mantic conventions. T h i s yields a semantically a b r i d g e d c o n c e p t of t h e intentionality of actions. T h e very p o i n t of t h e semantic c o n c e p t of t h e intentionality of actions derives from t h e fact t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n implicitly e q u a t e s s e m a n t i c c o n v e n t i o n s with social c o n v e n t i o n s . H e e x p l a i n s t h e m e a n ­ ing of a r u l e of a r i t h m e t i c o r of p r e d i c a t i o n n o t with r e f e r e n c e to ab­ stract rule systems a c c o r d i n g to which we p e r f o r m calculations or linguistic o p e r a t i o n s , b u t with r e s p e c t to typical c o n t e x t s of use for such o p e r a t i o n s . H e d o e s n ' t really distinguish b e t w e e n a l a n g u a g e

108 I n t e n t i o n s , Conventions, a n d Linguistic Interactions

a n d t h e g r a m m a r of l a n g u a g e g a m e s . M. R o c h e d e v e l o p s t h e thesis t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n s c a n only t r e a t i n t e n t i o n s , r u l e s , a n d conven­ tions as m u t u a l l y e x p l a n a t o r y p r i m i t i v e t e r m s b e c a u s e t h e y t r e a t se­ m a n t i c c o n v e n t i o n s a n d social c o n v e n t i o n s as i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e : C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , t h e s c h o o l o f c o n c e p t u a l analysis h a s s e e n n o t e n s i o n b e ­ t w e e n i n t e n t i o n a n d c o n v e n t i o n ; a c c o r d i n g t o its view, t h e l a t t e r c o n t a i n s t h e f o r m e r a n d vice versa. H a m p s h i r e s h a r e s this c o n c e p t i o n w h e n h e writes: "Each c o n v e n t i o n o r r u l e t h a t I a c c e p t is a n i n t e n t i o n t h a t I i n d i c a t e " ; a n d " W h e r e t h e r e is l a n g u a g e u s e , t h e r e m u s t b e t h e i n t e n t i o n t o follow a c o n v e n t i o n o r r u l e . " I n c o n t r a s t , h o w e v e r , t h e r e is t h e possibility t h a t i n t e n ­ t i o n a l a c t i o n c a n , i n a c e r t a i n s e n s e , b e t h e o p p o s i t e o f c o n v e n t i o n a l action. W e h a v e d e a l t w i t h this possibility i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e i d e a t h a t society " c a u s e s " a c t i o n s b y e n f o r c i n g c o n v e n t i o n s . A t issue h e r e is t h e possibility that, by explaining o u r o w n actions o r those of others i n terms of conven­ tions, w e o f t e n t e n d t o a b d i c a t e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e m a n d s o m e t i m e s e v e n c o n d e m n t h e m , w h i l e w e t e n d t o take r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a n d s o m e t i m e s a p p r o v e of a c t i o n s b y i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e m i n t e r m s of fulfilled i n t e n t i o n s . . . . A t m i n i ­ m u m t h i s i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e r e is a c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n t h e c o n c e p t s o f i n t e n t i o n a n d c o n v e n t i o n i n s o f a r as t h e o n e r e f e r s t o w h a t w e w a n t t o d o a n d t h e o t h e r t o w h a t we d o n o t w a n t t o d o . 1

A c c o r d i n g t o R o c h e , this c o n f u s i o n arises b e c a u s e p h i l o s o p h e r s of l a n g u a g e a r e too q u i c k to identify l a n g u a g e with society. C o n c e p t u a l analysis n o r m a l l y r i g h t l y a s s u m e s t h a t t h e analysis of c o n c e p t s r e q u i r e s a n analysis of " l a n g u a g e g a m e s " a n d o f social " f o r m s of life" ( W i t t g e n s t e i n ) o r t h a t t h e analysis o f s p e e c h acts r e q u i r e s a n analysis of social acts ( A u s t i n ) . H o w e v e r , it m i s t a k e n l y i n f e r s f r o m this t h a t c o n v e n t i o n s g o v e r n i n g c o m m u n i c a t i o n a r e p a r a d i g m s o f t h e social c o n v e n t i o n s t h a t s u r r o u n d t h e m a n d t h a t l a n g u a g e u s e is r e l a t e d t o c o n v e n t i o n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n t h e s a m e w a y as a social a c t i o n is t o social c o n v e n t i o n s . 2

I r e f e r t o this a r g u m e n t h e r e b e c a u s e it shows t h a t t h e t h e o r y o f ac­ tion e x c e e d s t h e capacity of t h e c o n c e p t of rule-following. O n e c a n m a k e a c o n v i n c i n g a r g u m e n t t h a t W i t t g e n s t e i n did n o t h a v e in m i n d a t h e o r y of action, b u t of m e a n i n g . B u t p h i l o s o p h e r s of l a n g u a g e , es­ pecially t h o s e w h o , like W i n c h a n d H a m p s h i r e , h a v e m a d e t h e use t h e o r y of m e a n i n g t h e basis for a t h e o r y of a c t i o n , fail to see t h a t t h e c o n c e p t of a r u l e , w h i c h has b e e n d e r i v e d f r o m a n d a n a l y z e d in t e r m s of e x a m p l e s of g r a m m a t i c a l a n d m a t h e m a t i c a l r u l e s , m a y well

109 Intentions, Conventions, a n d Linguistic Interactions

apply t o o p e r a t i o n s t h a t are p e r f o r m e d along with c o n c r e t e actions, b u t is too i m p o v e r i s h e d f o r c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g t h e actions themselves. W i n c h unhesitatingly t r a n s p o s e s t h e c o n c e p t o f rule-following from t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a n u m e r i c a l series a n d p r e d i c a t i o n to t h e fulfillment of an i n t e n t i o n to act a n d t h e following of social conven­ tions. H e d o e s n o t distinguish between g r a m m a t i c a l o r m a t h e m a t i c a l rules t h a t d e t e r m i n e t h e m e a n i n g of an intelligible expression a n d rules t h a t g o v e r n h o w c o n c r e t e actions are p r o d u c e d . F u r t h e r m o r e , n o t all rules of a c t i o n a r e c o n v e n t i o n s in t h e sense of valid—that is, intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d — n o r m s . T h e rules of i n s t r u m e n t a l action are n o t c o n v e n t i o n a l in this sense, n o r do rules of strategic a c t i o n p e r se enjoy validity in t h e sense of intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n of a n o r m a t i v e claim to validity. In a d d i t i o n , b o t h of these types of r u l e s r e q u i r e an a t t i t u d e o r i e n t e d to success, n o t to r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e m o n o l o g i c a l application of technologies a n d strategies r a t h e r suggests an analysis t h a t p r o c e e d s from t h e perspective of t h e individual acting subject; t h a t is, it starts with t h e subject's i n t e n t i o n s . N o r m s , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , are o b e y e d with an a t t i t u d e t h a t c o n f o r m s to expectations; h e n c e t h e y suggest a n analysis t h a t p r o c e e d s from r u l e s f o r action a n d derives t h e inten­ tions of actors from t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of n o r m s i n t o motives f o r ac­ tion. T h e m e d i u m of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n c a n be e x a m i n e d from either of these analytical perspectives; it is n o t as if, as R o c h e ' s r e m a r k s w o u l d suggest, l a n g u a g e always r e p r e s e n t s a m e d i u m for t h e free expression of o n e ' s own i n t e n t i o n s a n d society r e p r e s e n t s a sphere of externally i m p o s e d n o r m s . A s p e e c h act c a n b o t h signify that o n e is obeying a n o r m a n d b e used in pursuit of a private inter­ est. However, t h e primitive n o t i o n s of i n t e n t i o n a l action a n d of n o r m - g o v e r n e d a c t i o n d o lead to different, a n d one-sided, c o n c e p t u ­ alizations of linguistically m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e a d v a n t a g e of these a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c a p p r o a c h e s over a t h e o r y that m o d e l s behav­ ioral rules on s e m a n t i c c o n v e n t i o n s is t h a t they i n t r o d u c e c o n c e p t s of action t h a t r e n d e r a c t i o n s n o t only intelligible b u t also explicable e i t h e r by r e f e r e n c e to t h e i n t e n t i o n s of t h e a g e n t or by r e f e r e n c e t o the validity of a n o r m . T h e o p e r a t i o n a l rules t h a t d e t e r m i n e t h e m e a n i n g of symbols s t r u c t u r e actions, b u t they c a n n o t b e c o m e m o ­ tives for acting. T h e y have t h e c h a r a c t e r of s e m a n t i c c o n v e n t i o n s , b u t

110 Intentions, Conventions, a n d Linguistic Interactions

n o t of social c o n v e n t i o n s t h a t give rise to motives in t h e f o r m of obli­ gations. W e follow such r u l e s ( m o r e or less) intentionally, b u t t h e in­ t e n t i o n s [Intentionen] with which we f o r m g r a m m a t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s or m a t h e m a t i c a l expressions c a n n o t have t h e motivating force of be­ liefs a n d p u r p o s e s [Absichten], desires a n d inclinations, feelings a n d moods. 2

Intentional Action

It is well k n o w n t h a t B r e n t a n o took u p t h e c o n c e p t of intentionality in c o n n e c t i o n with discussions of late Scholasticism, in o r d e r to distin­ guish psychic o r m e n t a l p h e n o m e n a from observable physical ap­ p e a r a n c e s . T h o u g h t s a n d e x p e r i e n c e s are i n t e n t i o n a l in the sense t h a t t h e y a r e d i r e c t e d in s o m e p a r t i c u l a r way toward objects a n d con­ tents. T h e sense in q u e s t i o n is t h a t in w h i c h we direct ourselves to­ w a r d s o m e t h i n g we see o r m e a n to pick out, n o t t h e sense in which we p o i n t a stick at a physical object in o r d e r to p u s h it o u t of t h e way. T h e i n t e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n of t h o u g h t s and e x p e r i e n c e s to t h e i r object is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e fact that w h a t they are about is in a way con­ t a i n e d in t h e m — i t i n h e r e s in t h e m . Husserl r e n d e r e d t h e c o n c e p t of i n t e n t i o n m o r e precise by defining these i n h e r e n t objects as n o e m a t i c c o n t e n t s . T h a t is, he defined t h e m as s o m e t h i n g c o n c e p ­ tual t h a t can b e e x p r e s s e d in linguistic m e a n i n g s . T h i s t u r n e d o u t to be significant for the s u b s e q u e n t linguistic t u r n of t h e c o n c e p t of intentionality. In a n a r r o w e r , teleological sense, i n t e n t i o n [Intention] is u n d e r ­ stood as t h e i n t e n t [Absicht] of a subject w h o w a n t s to p u r s u e a goal or realize a n end: S is d i r e c t e d toward or intends a state of affairs she w a n t s to b r i n g a b o u t . H e r a c t i o n t h e n consists in o r g a n i z i n g t h e m e a n s a p p r o p r i a t e to b r i n g i n g a b o u t t h e i n t e n d e d state of affairs. I n this teleological schema for action, we call i n t e n t i o n t h e a c t o r ' s in­ tent o r will o r p u r p o s e of realizing a n end. A m o n g an a g e n t ' s i n t e n ­ tions in a b r o a d e r sense a r e also h e r h o p e s , fears, a n d e x p e c t a t i o n s , h e r desires a n d dispositions, e v e n h e r e m o t i o n s : love a n d h a t e , a n g e r a n d s h a m e , disgust, l o n g i n g , a n d so on. W h a t t h e s e i n t e n t i o n s have in c o m m o n is t h a t they refer to objects o r states of affairs—although they d o so in different ways. T h a t which they are a b o u t in each case

Ill Intentions, Conventions, a n d Linguistic Interactions

can b e r e p r e s e n t e d as s o m e t h i n g t h a t is e n c o u n t e r e d or takes place in t h e world. I n t e n t i o n s are a b o u t s o m e t h i n g in t h e world. We may want, i n t e n d , strive for, fear, h o p e , l o n g for, or be disgusted with t h e same p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t , say, t h a t S m a n a g e s to arrive o n time for the o p e n i n g of t h e n e w b u i l d i n g . T h e i n t e n t i o n s e m b o d i e d in lin­ guistic or n o n l i n g u i s t i c expressions c o r r e s p o n d t o p r o p o s i t i o n a l atti­ tudes. In a certain sense, p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s must thus already b e available. Before we c a n w a n t o r l o n g for o r b e disgusted with some­ thing, we m u s t have cognitively a p p r o p r i a t e d this " s o m e t h i n g " in some other way. Expressing i n t e n t i o n s w h e r e b y we assume a p r o p o s i ­ tional attitude p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t we can refer t o a n objectified w o r l d of t h i n g s a n d states of affairs. This cognitive r e l a t i o n t o s o m e t h i n g in t h e world m a k e s available to us t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s t h a t o u r i n t e n t i o n s , desires, a n d feelings can b e a b o u t w h e n we express o u r subjectivity. H e n c e t h e r e is a family r e s e m b l a n c e b e t w e e n the i n t e n t i o n s w h e r e b y speakers a n d actors express their subjectivity a n d cognitive acts of perceiving and t h i n k i n g . H a m p s h i r e finds a similarity be­ tween i n t e n t i o n s a n d beliefs: "To express an i n t e n t i o n , or to i m p u t e an i n t e n t i o n to d o s o m e t h i n g is in m a n y ways like e x p r e s s i n g o r im­ p u t i n g a belief. . . . Any h u m a n m i n d is t h e locus of u n q u e s t i o n e d a n d silently f o r m e d i n t e n t i o n s a n d of u n q u e s t i o n e d a n d silentiy f o r m e d beliefs." Yet this similarity m u s t n o t l e a d to mistaking o n e t h i n g for a n o t h e r . I n Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l investigations, p e r c e p t i o n s a n d j u d g m e n t s a r e p a r a d i g m a t i c for i n t e n t i o n a l acts in g e n e r a l . In t h e linguistic analyses of C a r n a p , C h i s h o l m , Sellars, Hintikka, a n d o t h e r s , expressions of k n o w l e d g e a n d belief p r o v i d e m o d e l s for u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n t e n t i o n a l expressions. T h u s C h i s h o l m ' s n o w classic investigation o f i n t e n t i o n a l l a n g u a g e u s e begins with a n analysis of belief-sentences. T h e r e is, however, a n i m p o r t a n t difference b e t w e e n a referential relation to a n object a b o u t w h i c h S wants to m a k e a s t a t e m e n t (intentionalityi) a n d t h e expressive r e l a t i o n to a p r o p o s i t i o n a l con­ t e n t w h e r e b y 5 assumes an a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s o m e t h i n g (intention­ ality,) . Intentionality_ is d e t e r m i n e d by t h e fact t h a t S places herself in a cognitive r e l a t i o n to t h e objectified world a n d in d o i n g so ori­ ents herself toward t h e validity claim to t r u t h . I n contrast, w h a t is

112 Intentions, Conventions, a n d Linguistic Interactions

characteristic of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y is t h a t 5 takes a stance toward a prop­ ositional c o n t e n t in such a way t h a t she expresses h e r subjectivity in d o i n g so. She p u t s herself in a n o n c o g n i t i v e relation to a merely pre­ s u p p o s e d w o r l d w i t h o u t o r i e n t i n g herself t o any claim to t r u t h . As­ s u m i n g a n a t t i t u d e t o w a r d a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t to express oneself does of c o u r s e p r e s u p p o s e t h a t S could f o r m u l a t e a p r o p o s i t i o n a b o u t this s o m e t h i n g in t h e world a n d t h a t she c a n r e f e r to t h e con­ t e n t of this p r o p o s i t i o n w i t h o u t o r i e n t i n g herself to its t r u t h claim. E x a m i n i n g belief-sentences is admittedly revealing for neutralizing t h e t r u t h claim of a p r o p o s i t i o n p a n d for s e p a r a t i n g t h e proposi­ tional c o n t e n t "that p" from t h e assertoric force of a given statement. If s e n t e n c e s such as 2

(1)

(I h e r e b y assert:) 11 is g o i n g to rain.

(T)

I k n o w (see, believe) t h a t it is g o i n g to rain.

are u t t e r e d by t h e s a m e s p e a k e r in t h e s a m e situation, we can treat t h e m as equivalent. However, (1') I k n o w t h a t it is going t o rain. and (1") H e k n o w s t h a t it is g o i n g to rain. are n o t equivalent. Insofar as t h e cognitive act of k n o w i n g o r perceiv­ i n g e x p r e s s e d in the first p e r s o n can b e seen as e q u i v a l e n t to a corre­ s p o n d i n g constative speech act, it reveals t h e o r i e n t a t i o n to a claim to t r u t h t h a t t h e speaker raises r e g a r d i n g a p r o p o s i t i o n . T h e intentionality! of h e r a t t i t u d e to s o m e t h i n g in t h e world, which is ori­ e n t e d to t r u t h , as such b e c o m e s a n e l e m e n t of a f u r t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n as soon as t h e i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e in t h e first p e r s o n is t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a c o r r e s p o n d i n g s e n t e n c e in t h e third p e r s o n . I n s e n t e n c e (1"), t h e c o n t e n t of t h e p r o p o s i t i o n expressed in (1') b e c o m e s n e u t r a l with r e s p e c t to any t r u t h claim. I n (1") the s p e a k e r only raises a t r u t h claim r e g a r d i n g t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t 5 claims t o k n o w t h a t it will r a i n , b u t n o t (as in [1']) r e g a r d i n g t h e p r o p o s i t i o n that it will rain. In (1") t h e u t t e r a n c e m a d e in (1) "It is g o i n g to r a i n " is t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o t h e n o m i n a l i z e d p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t " t h a t it is g o i n g to rain."

113 Intentions, Conventions, a n d Linguistic Interactions

W e can r e a d off f r o m t h i r d - p e r s o n belief-sentences h o w S refers to p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s , t h a t is, h o w she fulfills a necessary c o n d i t i o n for placing h e r subjectivity in relation to p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s . Only this r e l a t i o n can b e t e r m e d i n t e n t i o n a l in a n a r r o w e r sense. A n d this i n t e n t i o n a l i t y c a n b e read off from t h e a t t i t u d e with which S expresses herself, t h a t is, h e r i n t e n t i o n s , desires, inclinations, feel­ ings, a n d so o n by r e f e r r i n g to p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s . I n o t h e r words, she i n t e r p r e t s h e r subjectivity in a s s u m i n g a p r o p o s i t i o n a l atti­ t u d e toward c o n t e n t s . T h u s , S's i m m e d i a t e o r i e n t a t i o n is n o l o n g e r toward claims to t r u t h b u t r a t h e r toward sincerity: "intentions are s o m e t h i n g that may be c o n c e a l e d o r disguised." 2

After this p r e l i m i n a r y a c c o u n t o f t h e c o n c e p t o f intentionality, I would like to address t h e teleological s c h e m a for a c d o n . W e call goal-directed b e h a v i o r i n t e n t i o n a l if a n actor wants to b r i n g a b o u t a certain state of affairs in t h e world by m e a n s of it. In a b r o a d e r sense, however, we c a n i n c l u d e a m o n g t h e i n t e n t i o n s of a n a g e n t n o t only goals, b u t also desires a n d e m o t i o n s . In d e s c r i b i n g b e h a v i o r as inten­ tional, we refer to t h e i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s of t h e agent. An inten­ t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e is t h e subjective t a k i n g of a stance toward a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t "that p," which is e x p r e s s e d in words o r ac­ tions. By ascribing an i n t e n t i o n to a n agent, we p r e s u p p o s e that: (i) p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s are available to t h e a g e n t , i.e., t h a t h e h a s a d e t e r m i n a t e cognitive r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a reality t h a t , f o r h i m , is objectively given; (ii) t h e a g e n t takes a stance toward t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s whereby h e places his subjectivity in a p a r t i c u l a r n o n c o g n i t i v e rela­ tion t o reality. By d e s c r i b i n g a b e h a v i o r as an i n t e n t i o n a l action, we take t h e per­ spective of t h e actor himself; b u t this a g e n t ' s p o i n t of view signifies a two-tiered i n t e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n to s o m e t h i n g in t h e world, namely, the relation to t h e cognitive r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of reality t h a t is valid for the agent a n d to t h e subjective a t t i t u d e t h a t t h e a g e n t takes t o w a r d this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of reality. T h e two-tiered n a t u r e of t h e i n t e n t i o n a l r e l a t i o n to s o m e t h i n g in the world is implicit in t h e l a n g u a g e we use to describe a b e h a v i o r as

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an i n t e n t i o n a l action. It h a s n o ontological significance. B r e n t a n o w a n t e d to use t h e c o n c e p t of intentionality to d e l i m i t t h e ontological d o m a i n s of t h e psychological a n d t h e physical. Yet t h e choice of ac­ t i o n - t h e o r e t i c c o n c e p t s implies t h e d e l i m i t a t i o n of object d o m a i n s at t h e level of m e t h o d o l o g y . T h e linguistic t u r n in discussions of intentionality is characterized by t h e idea t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s m u s t a d m i t of symbolic ex­ pression. T h i s m e a n s that S c a n n o t , strictly speaking, act i n t e n t i o n ­ ally u n l e s s she is able to express h e r i n t e n t i o n in t h e right c i r c u m s t a n c e s . She m u s t have a m a s t e r y of an i n t e n t i o n a l i d i o m in w h i c h she c o u l d describe h e r situation from h e r e n g a g e d perspective. This thesis arises from t h e logic of e x p l a n a t i o n o n which we rely at least implicitly in d e s c r i b i n g b e h a v i o r as i n t e n t i o n a l action. W e ex­ plain an i n t e n t i o n a l action by citing the i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e of the a g e n t as a motive, as a p u r p o s e or i n t e n t i o n , a t e n d e n c y or dispo­ sition to r e a c t to s o m e t h i n g in a certain way, a feeling or affective per­ c e p t i o n of s o m e t h i n g , a m o o d , a sensory stimulation, a n d so o n . T h e s e i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s ( i n t e n t i o n s , n e e d s , feelings) c a n n o t b e identified i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e i r p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s . T h i s m e a n s t h a t i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s d o n o t c o r r e s p o n d to t h e logical type of events t h a t c a n b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e action they cause. T h i s relation b e t w e e n an i n t e n t i o n a n d t h e action ex­ p r e s s i n g it is n o t c o n t i n g e n t a n d is p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h the a g e n t ' s in­ t e r p r e t a t i o n of his situation. In u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e a g e n t ' s i n t e n t i o n as t h e motive or cause of a c o r r e s p o n d i n g action, we treat his inter­ p r e t a t i o n of his s i t u a t i o n as constitutive of t h e b e h a v i o r u n d e r an in­ t e n t i o n a l description. We t h e r e b y p r e s u p p o s e t h a t t h e a g e n t himself h a s at his disposal a n i n t e n t i o n a l i d i o m in which h e c a n describe his situation a n d f o r m u l a t e his i n t e n t i o n s explicitly (given t h e r i g h t cir­ c u m s t a n c e s ) . Insofar as we a r e following t h e e x p l a n a t o r y logic f o r in­ t e n t i o n a l action, we p r e s u p p o s e t h a t t h e a g e n t h a s a m a s t e r y of a n i n t e n t i o n a l i d i o m . I shall r e t u r n to this c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n intentionality a n d language. First, however, I w o u l d like to address t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r a n d in w h a t sense i n t e n t i o n s m a y b e s e e n as causes of actions. Late W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n s such as Peters, M e l d e n , a n d W i n c h have derived a

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k i n d of d u a l i s m f r o m t h e fact t h a t actions a n d t h e i n t e n t i o n s they ex­ press are necessarily, t h a t is, internally related. A c c o r d i n g to this du­ alism, causal e x p l a n a t i o n is i n a d e q u a t e to a c c o u n t for i n t e n t i o n a l actions. C h a r l e s Taylor h a s p r e s e n t e d a f u n d a m e n t a l critique of this thesis. H e starts from a teleological m o d e l of a c d o n : End: S wants to b r i n g a b o u t state of affairs A; Means: S knows t h a t A will n o t o c c u r in t h e given situation unless a c t i o n p is p e r f o r m e d ; C h o i c e of Means: Situation x is t h e case; h e n c e 5 u n d e r t a k e s action p. F o r e x a m p l e , S wants to b e c o m e t h e n e x t h e a d of g o v e r n m e n t . S h e knows t h a t a traditional ministerial portfolio is a g o o d p o s i t i o n f r o m which t o c o m p e t e against o t h e r c a n d i d a t e s . T h e r e f o r e , s h e seeks to obtain such a portfolio d u r i n g t h e n e x t c a b i n e t shuffle. A practical syllogism of this sort c a n b e a r e a s o n for S's choice of action p as a n i n s t r u m e n t a l m e a n s . Of c o u r s e this reason can t a k e o n the r o l e of a cause only o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t S takes it to b e a motive for action. 5 m u s t have t h e goal or i n t e n t i o n o r willingness to b r i n g a b o u t A. If 5 has set herself a certain goal, t h e n t h e i n t e n t i o n to attain this goal can causally explain a c o r r e s p o n d i n g action. F o r t h e r e f e r e n c e to an intention indicates why S acts t h u s a n d n o t o t h e r w i s e . T h e act of set­ ting a goal plays t h e s a m e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l role for i n t e n t i o n a l action as a physical cause plays f o r a c o r r e s p o n d i n g event. T h u s o n e m i g h t try to m a k e S d o a certain action by g e t t i n g h e r to h a v e a c o r r e s p o n d ­ ing i n t e n t i o n . T h i s can b e d o n e by m e a n s of a r g u m e n t , p e r s u a s i o n , or by c h a n g i n g t h e situation. Moreover, k n o w i n g an i n t e n t i o n c a n b e u s e d t o p r e d i c t future actions j u s t as k n o w i n g t h e physical c a u s e c a n be u s e d t o p r e d i c t future events. T h e teleological m o d e l allows e n d s to be viewed as causes of a c d o n if we m a y p r e s u p p o s e t h a t S acts with t h e goal of b r i n g i n g a b o u t t h e state of affairs in question. Setting this goal is a n i n t e n t i o n w h e r e b y 5 assumes an a t t i t u d e toward a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t in such a w a y t h a t t h e state of affairs e x p r e s s e d by t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t is rec­ o g n i z e d as a possible state of t h e world t h a t can o b t a i n u n d e r spe­ cific c o n d i t i o n s a n d t h a t c a n b e b r o u g h t a b o u t by effecting these

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c o n d i t i o n s . P h e n o m e n a such as i n t e n d i n g , desiring, o r willing to d o s o m e t h i n g , however, are themselves in n e e d of e x p l a n a t i o n . T h e te­ leological a c c o u n t in terms of e n d s t h a t p r e s u p p o s e s c o r r e s p o n d i n g i n t e n t i o n s is b u t t h e first step in a n e x p l a n a t i o n of motivation. Taylor analyzes two f u r t h e r steps: an a c c o u n t in terms of desires a n d disposi­ tions a n d a n e x p l a n a t i o n in t e r m s of e m o t i o n s , t h a t is, of feelings and moods. 3

An e x p l a n a t i o n o f S's i n t e n t i o n t o b e c o m e h e a d o f g o v e r n m e n t m i g h t b e s o u g h t in t h e g e n e r a l disposition to seek r e c o g n i t i o n , o r in t h e c o n c r e t e desire finally t o o u t d o a friend w h o h a s always b e e n a h e a d of S, t h a t is, in a m b i t i o n or envy. O n e m i g h t e x p l a i n t h e fact t h a t 5 m a d e h e r decision at a time w h e n n o o n e e x p e c t e d h e r to d o so in terms of strong e m o t i o n a l motives: t h e a n g e r at a h u m i l i a t i o n 5 suffered at t h e h a n d s of a rival, a p e c u l i a r e u p h o r i c m o o d S has b e e n in ever since s h e successfully u n d e r w e n t surgery, a n d so o n . In any case, we fall b a c k on n e e d s a n d wants, t h a t is, on motives t h a t lie d e e p e r t h a n i n t e n t i o n s or decisions. N e e d s are Janus-faced: T h e y are differentiated o n o n e h a n d into dispositions a n d desires (the voli­ tional perspective) a n d i n t o feelings a n d m o o d s o n t h e o t h e r (the p e r c e p t u a l p e r s p e c t i v e ) . Dispositions a n d desires a r e o r i e n t e d to­ w a r d situations of w a n t satisfaction; feelings a n d m o o d s perceive objecs in t h e light of our wants. O u r Bedurfnisnatur is the b a c k g r o u n d of a partiality t h a t steers subjects to take a stance t o w a r d reality, to­ w a r d t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s t h a t are cognitively available to t h e m . T h i s partiality guides b o t h h o w we actively i n f l u e n c e a n d h o w we affectively perceive situations t h a t are t h e m a t i z e d as c o m p o n e n t s of our lifeworld r a t h e r than as a n objectified S o m e t h i n g in the world. Desires a n d w a n t s dispose o n e to choose goals of action; feelings a n d m o o d s evaluate situations a n d o p e n u p perspectives o n possible goals of action. Desires a n d wants p r e s u p p o s e t h e evaluation of desir­ able o r u n d e s i r a b l e states of affairs, w h e r e a s e m o t i o n s a n d m o o d s have a dispositional e l e m e n t . T h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n dispositions a n d e m o t i o n s b e c o m e s clearer if we conceive of b o t h as interpretations of underlying wants and needs. N e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s involve b o t h feelings a n d desires. F o r de­ sires are i n t e r p r e t e d indirectly, o n t h e o n e h a n d by m e a n s of action

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p r e f e r e n c e s o r ends, a n d o n t h e o t h e r h a n d by m e a n s of affectively l o a d e d categories a n d situations, t h a t is, by m e a n s of values. E n d s a n d values are m u t u a l l y i n t e r p r e t i n g . To specify what expressions such as "beautiful," "terrible," "happy," or " h o r r i b l e " m e a n in a given con­ text, we can refer to individual objects o r situations t h a t a r e plausible as possible goals of action. T o r e n d e r plausible t h e choice of particu­ lar ends, we can in t u r n a p p e a l to a c c e p t e d values. T h i s m u t u a l inter­ p r e t a t i o n of e n d s against t h e b a c k g r o u n d of values a n d of values by m e a n s of ends can b e informative b e c a u s e e n d s t e n d to c h a r a c t e r i z e particular states of affairs w h e r e a s c u l t u r a l values t e n d to express s o m e t h i n g universal. Moreover, t h e descriptive c o m p o n e n t is m o r e p r o n o u n c e d in ends, a n d t h e evaluative m o r e in values. I shall r e t u r n below to this d u a l descriptive-evaluative c o n t e n t of expressions inter­ p r e t i n g n e e d s a n d wants. But first I w a n t to show h o w t h e c o n c e p t of i n t e n t i o n a l action char­ acterizes motives as "final" causes. W i t h i n this f r a m e w o r k it is n o t possible t o treat motives (i.e., feelings a n d desires) themselves o r t h e needs they i n t e r p r e t as p h e n o m e n a r e q u i r i n g e x p l a n a d o n . T h e ex­ p l a n a t i o n of i n t e n t i o n a l action m a y b e r e d u c i b l e via ends a n d inten­ tions to desires a n d dispositions a n d , ultimately, to feelings a n d m o o d s . Yet t h e c h a i n of e x p l a n a t i o n e n d s with motives, h o w e v e r "deeply" r o o t e d they may be. As long as we a r e describing b e h a v i o r as i n t e n t i o n a l action, motives a r e basic. As s o o n as we u n d e r s t a n d the n e e d s of individuals in t u r n as t h e result of a p r o c e s s of i n t e r p r e t a ­ tion, we d i s r u p t the m o n o l o g i c a l m o d e l of a c t i o n of a subject ex­ pressing i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s . It is n a t u r a l to s u p p o s e t h a t n e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s d e p e n d o n cultural values a n d o n n o r m s t h a t e m ­ b o d y such values. However, we c a n n o t r e d u c e an a g e n t ' s i n t e n t i o n s t o t h e social reality of n o r m s a n d values by way of t h e process of m o ­ tive f o r m a t i o n w i t h o u t a b a n d o n i n g t h e c o n c e p t of i n t e n t i o n a l ac­ tion. T h u s e x p r e s s i o n s of monologically m i n d e d subjects acting intentionally are r e p l a c e d with i n t e r a c t i o n — g o v e r n e d by i n t e r s u b ­ jectively r e c o g n i z e d n o r m s a n d v a l u e s — a m o n g subjects acting so as to c o n f o r m to e x p e c t a t i o n s . T h i s p r e s u p p o s e s a causal c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n cultural traditions a n d n e e d s , a n d b e t w e e n institutionalized values a n d dispositions. T h i s empirical c o n n e c t i o n , however, fails t o

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c a p t u r e t h e i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n between reasons a n d motives, which is t h e only admissible c o n n e c t i o n in t h e c o n t e x t of i n t e n t i o n a l action m o r e narrowly c o n s t r u e d . 3

Fulfilling N o r m s

T h e specific c o n c e p t of n o r m - g o v e r n e d o r value-oriented action de­ v e l o p e d by Parsons, which has b e c o m e de r i g u e u r i n sociology, c o u n t s o n a s p h e r e of linguistic intersubjectivity t h a t is i n d e p e n d e n t f r o m t h e subjectivity of an e x p e r i e n c i n g subject. Not only matters of t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e , b u t also values a n d n o r m s a r e "shared" in this s p h e r e . T h i s s h a r i n g or "having in c o m m o n " is m a d e possible t h r o u g h c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t h a t is, t h r o u g h m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g that is r e a c h e d on t h e basis of validity claims that are r e c o g n i z e d by sub­ j e c t s c a p a b l e of s p e e c h a n d action. T h e c o n c e p t of i n t e n t i o n a l action already p r e s u p p o s e s t h a t cognitive acts m a k e r e f e r e n c e to t r u t h ; a n d t h e teleological m o d e l of action counts o n t h e r e being a n acting sub­ j e c t that can be motivated by reasons or practical syllogisms. Yet within t h e f r a m e w o r k of t h e c o n c e p t of intentionality, t r u t h is n o t u n d e r s t o o d as a validity claim t h a t g r o u n d s intersubjectivity. T h e claim to t r u t h c a n b e r e i n t e r p r e t e d monologically so as to fit i n t o t h e c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k of t h e subjective m i n d . T h e c o n c e p t of v a l u e - o r i e n t e d action, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n t r o d u c e s a s e c o n d valid­ ity claim. It p r e s u p p o s e s t h e n o r m a t i v e validity of values a n d r u l e s of action. A n d this validity claim c a n n o t be i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h o u t refer­ e n c e to intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n — a m o n o l o g i c a l r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n in this i n s t a n c e is all b u t impossible. As I c a n n o t yet at this p o i n t u n d e r t a k e t h e task of a systematic ex­ plication of the m e a n i n g of validity claims, I shall p r o c e e d byway of a critique of t h e basic p r i n c i p l e s u n d e r l y i n g empiricist ethics. Ethics deals with t h e s a m e q u e s t i o n s f r o m t h e n o r m a t i v e perspective of j u s ­ tifying actions as t h e t h e o r y of action does f r o m t h e perspective of e x p l a i n i n g t h e m . T h e question, "Why s h o u l d S i n situation x perfor­ in a c t i o n a r a t h e r t h a n any of a , . . . o r a„?" calls for giving (at least) o n e r e a s o n . Similarly, it is possible to answer t h e q u e s t i o n "Why d i d Sin situation xperform action a (rather t h a n a?, 03, . . . o r a,,)?" with a n e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t cites a r e a s o n as motive. Ethics deals with a x

2

x

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specific class of actions, namely, t h o s e whose choice c a n be evaluated as morally good o r c o r r e c t . T h e explication of r e a s o n s for morally relevant actions m u s t t h e r e f o r e t a k e a c c o u n t of t h e sense of ought im­ plicit in this way of asking t h e q u e s t i o n . Every ethics is faced with t h e task of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e n o n d e s c r i p t i v e c o n t e n t of o u r n o t i o n s of values a n d n o r m s . A n empiricist ethics, which is c o m m i t t e d to t h e te­ leological m o d e l of a c t i o n a n d h e n c e to a subjectivist r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of i n t e n t i o n a l action, faces t h e special difficulty of r e d u c i n g valua­ tions, which by its own lights are far from m e r e l y subjective, to w h a t a r e u l t i m a t e l y private n e e d s . E m p i r i c i s m bases t h e justification of morally relevant actions o n t h e wants a n d n e e d s of a n actor w h o is herself t h e final j u d g e of w h a t h e r wants a n d n e e d s a r e : By a n e m p i r i c i s t p o s i t i o n I m e a n t h e i d e a t h a t t h e u l t i m a t e g r o u n d s o f o n e ' s factual beliefs a b o u t t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d a r e p r o p o s i t i o n s a b o u t w h a t o n e di­ rectly p e r c e i v e s . T h e p a r a l l e l s b e t w e e n s u c h a p o s i t i o n a n d t h e a c c o u n t s of r e a s o n s - f o r - a c t i n g are: first, t h e i d e a t h a t i n a n y c h a i n of r e a s o n s t h e r e m u s t 'ays b e a p o i n t at w h i c h o n e h a s t o s t o p , i.e., t h e r e a r e always u l t i m a t e r e a ­ s o n s ; s e c o n d , t h e i d e a t h a t t h e s e u l t i m a t e r e a s o n s m u s t all s h a r e s o m e c o m ­ m o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c (s); t h i r d , t h e i d e a t h a t t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s p o s s e s s e d b y the ultimate reasons must be such that they c a n n o t be questioned further, a n d t h e r e f o r e n o f u r t h e r r e a s o n s a r e n e e d e d , i.e., t h e u l t i m a t e r e a s o n s m u s t be such that they can constitute "foundations"; a n d fourth, t h e idea that s u c h r e a s o n s a r e p r o v i d e d by first-person p s y c h o l o g i c a l s t a t e m e n t s , s i n c e these c a n n o t be questioned further a n d c a n n o t b e d o u b t e d . 4

R i c h a r d N o r m a n shows t h a t n e i t h e r t h e emotivist r e c o u r s e to b r u t e attitudes, wants, o r feelings n o r t h e decisionist r e c o u r s e to ulti­ m a t e decisions suffices for justifying a morally r e l e v a n t action. O n l y such reasons a r e a c c e p t a b l e as m a k e clear w h y t h e a g e n t in a given situation has precisely this feeling or t h a t disposition, o r why she has t h e i n t e n t i o n to a c c o m p l i s h precisely this goal. T h e m e r e assertion t h a t S in a given s i t u a t i o n has certain i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s lacks a n y practical justificatory force so l o n g is it is n o t plausible t h a t p e o ­ ple o t h e r t h a n S in such situations also have e x p e r i e n c e s of this sort t h a t motivate t h e i r a c t i o n s in this way. A w a n t is o n l y a n intelligible m o ­ tive if it is i n t e r p r e t e d so t h a t it m a k e s sense to o t h e r s : T o w a n t simply a s a u c e r o f m u d is i r r a t i o n a l , b e c a u s e s o m e f u r t h e r r e a s o n is n e e d e d f o r w a n t i n g it. T o w a n t a s a u c e r of m u d b e c a u s e o n e w a n t s t o e n j o y

120 I n t e n t i o n s , C o n v e n t i o n s , a n d Linguistic Interactions

its r i c h river-smell is r a t i o n a l . N o f u r t h e r r e a s o n is n e e d e d f o r w a n t i n g to en­ j o y t h e r i c h river-smell, f o r t o c h a r a c t e r i z e w h a t is w a n t e d as "to enjoy t h e r i c h river-smell" is itself to g i v e a n a c c e p t a b l e r e a s o n f o r w a n t i n g it, a n d t h e r e f o r e t h i s w a n t is r a t i o n a l . 5

T h e r e f e r e n c e t o t h e "rich river-smell" i n t e r p r e t s a s o m e w h a t pecu­ liar want. If t h e d e s i r e for a h a n d f u l of m u d does n o t m a k e sense un­ d e r this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d c o n t i n u e s to s e e m like s o m e t h i n g private, i n s c r u t a b l e , a n d idiosyncratic, t h e n we will take the actions or fanta­ sies motivated by this desire to be a b n o r m a l and may p e r h a p s look for p a t h o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n s . Against t h e b a c k g r o u n d of this exam­ ple, t h e specific a c h i e v e m e n t of evaluative expressions by which we i n t e r p r e t n e e d s a n d wants stands out. I n c h a r a c t e r i z i n g a n object or a situation as rich, p u n g e n t , stimulating, terrific, uplifting, successful, happy, d a n g e r o u s , f o r b i d d i n g , terrifying, revolting, a n d so o n , we are trying to m a k e sense of a c e r t a i n a t t i t u d e to this object or situation by a p p e a l i n g to universal s t a n d a r d s of evaluation. To the e x t e n t that these s t a n d a r d s of evaluation, or values, for short, are r e c o g n i z e d by o t h e r s , and to the e x t e n t t h a t t h e n e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are s h a r e d by o t h e r s , we can justify the c o r r e s p o n d i n g desires or feelings, and the actions they motivate, with s u c h n e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . Evaluative ex­ pressions have justificatory p o w e r if and to the e x t e n t t h a t they can c h a r a c t e r i z e a w a n t such that o t h e r s r e c o g n i z e their own wants u n d e r this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . A w a n t will b e a c c e p t a b l e as a r e a s o n for an ac­ tion insofar as t h e cultural values to which we a p p e a l in i n t e r p r e t i n g the want are recognized. N o r m a n gives t h e following e x a m p l e : A p r o p o s e d r o a d s c h e m e m i g h t b e very m u c h to a particular individual's o w n d i s a d v a n t a g e , i n v o l v i n g t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e w h o l e o f h i s f r o n t gar­ d e n , t h u s d e p r i v i n g h i m of d i e o p p o r t u n i t y t o e n g a g e i n his favorite h o b b y of g a r d e n i n g , d e s t r o y i n g his b e a u t i f u l rose b e d s , r u i n i n g t h e w h o l e a p p e a r ­ a n c e of the f r o n t of the h o u s e , a n d b r i n g i n g the n o i s e a n d the f u m e s of t h e traffic r i g h t u p t o his f r o n t d o o r s t e p . B u t if asked f o r his a s s e s s m e n t of t h e m e r i t s of t h e s c h e m e , h e m i g h t n e v e r t h e l e s s say t h a t h e t h o u g h t it was t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e o n e i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , since it w o u l d e n a b l e p e o p l e t o travel m o r e easily a n d i n g r e a t e r c o m f o r t , c u t d o w n t h e n u m b e r o f acci­ d e n t s , a n d c a u s e t h e least o v e r a l l i n c o n v e n i e c e . . . . T h i s , h o w e v e r , is n o t w h a t I h a v e b e e n r e f e r r i n g t o i n e m p h a s i z i n g t h e n e c e s s a r y p u b l i c i t y of s t a n ­ d a r d s . I n m y s e n s e , t h e m a n is e m p l o y i n g p u b l i c s t a n d a r d s j u s t as m u c h

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w h e n h e a d o p t s t h e f o r m e r o f t h e two p o i n t s of view. T h i s c a n b e s e e n f r o m t h e k i n d of v o c a b u l a r y h e m i g h t u s e . I n s o f a r as h e r e f e r s t o t h e n o t i o n o f " p e a c e a n d q u i e t , " d i s t u r b a n c e c a u s e d b y n o i s e , t h e c h o k i n g s t e n c h o f traffic f u m e s , the e n j o y m e n t of a hobby, t h e b e a u t y of flowers, e t c . , h e is i n v o k i n g publicly s h a r e d c o n c e p t s a n d p u b l i c s t a n d a r d s of e v a l u a t i o n . It is b e c a u s e h e d o e s so t h a t w e c a n d e s c r i b e a s " r a t i o n a l , " h i s p o t e n t i a l o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e r o a d s c h e m e f r o m t h e p o i n t of view of his private w a n t s a n d interests. 6

T h e e x a m p l e is m e a n t to s u p p o r t t h e thesis t h a t motives for a c t i o n can take o n t h e r o l e of moral-practical reasons only insofar as t h e y r e p r e s e n t publicly interpreted wants r a t h e r t h a n any private features of t h e acting subject. W h a t a p a r t i c u l a r individual w a n t s or desires or feels is logically d e p e n d e n t o n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e u n d e r l y i n g w a n t t h a t prevails in t h e given linguistic c o m m u n i t y . N o r m a n fails to distinguish clearly t h e intelligibility of a n evaluative expression a n d t h e normative b i n d i n g n a t u r e of a c o r r e ­ s p o n d i n g s t a n d a r d of value. By assessing t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of t h e projected d e s t r u c t i o n of his front lawn by m e a n s of evaluative expres­ sions for, for e x a m p l e , t h e b e a u t y of t h e r o s e b e d s , t h e p l e a s u r e of working in t h e g a r d e n , t h e g r a n d facade of t h e h o u s e , t h e u n b e a r ­ able noise and s t e n c h of the traffic, the r e s i d e n t provides a persua­ sive r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of his interests t h a t w o u l d b e violated by i m p l e m e n t i n g t h e c o m m u n a l traffic p l a n . H e c h o o s e s i n t e r p r e t a ­ tions u n d e r which others c a n r e c o g n i z e t h e i r own w a n t s and n e e d s if they put themselves in his situation. His n e e d i n t e r p r e t a d o n s m a k e intelligible why s o m e o n e in this situation w o u l d o p p o s e such a p l a n . B u t a plausible w a n t o r n e e d falls s h o r t of justifying a n action t h a t is motivated by it, such as a c o m p l a i n t t o t h e city g o v e r n m e n t . T h e per­ son w h o is affected may b e able to r e p r e s e n t his p e r s o n a l interests in a n intelligible a n d plausible fashion, as o u r e x a m p l e shows, a n d yet h e m a y p l a c e t h e m o r e g e n e r a l interests of t h e n e i g h b o r h o o d o r of all t h e drivers first. H e m a y refrain f r o m trying to o p p o s e t h e city plan by legal means, for e x a m p l e . T h e evaluative expressions t h a t oc­ c u r in n e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s r e n d e r a n i n t e n t i o n , a desire, o r a feeling intelligible b e c a u s e t h e y r e l a t e t h e s e motives to t h e cultural values t h a t are s h a r e d in a linguistic c o m m u n i t y . Yet a plausible motive d o e s n o t yet a m o u n t t o a justification for a n a p p r o p r i a t e l y motivated ac­ tion. An action c a n only b e justified with r e f e r e n c e to n o r m s t h a t lay

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d o w n t h a t certain values ought to receive p r i m a r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n in certain circumstances. A strictly n o r m a t i v e validity t h a t c a n be b i n d i n g for motives for ac­ tion a c c r u e s to values only if they are e m b o d i e d in n o r m s . A n d t h e e m b o d i m e n t of values in n o r m s signifies t h a t in situations in which this r e g u l a t i o n is valid, everyone is justified in o r i e n t i n g herself t o w a r d certain values a n d to base h e r actions on t h e wants a n d n e e d s inter­ p r e t e d in these values. T o say t h a t a n o r m is valid is to say t h a t it claims to e x p r e s s a universalizable interest a n d to d e s e r v e t h e con­ sent of all those affected. C u l t u r a l values p e r se c a n n o t raise this k i n d of a claim to validity. However, they a r e candidates for being e m b o d ­ ied i n n o r m s , t h a t is, for b e c o m i n g universally b i n d i n g in c e r t a i n cir­ c u m s t a n c e s . I n t h e light of cultural values, t h e wants of o n e individual a r e also intelligible to o t h e r individuals w h o s t a n d in t h e same cultural tradition. But wants a n d n e e d s t h a t a r e i n t e r p r e t e d as plausible are t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o legitimate motives for action only by m a k i n g the c o r r e s p o n d i n g values normatively b i n d i n g in certain cir­ c u m s t a n c e s a n d for certain g r o u p s . T h e basic moral-practical p r e d i c a t e s s u c h as "correct" or "just" o r " g o o d " refer t o this sense of o u g h t implicit in a n intersubjectively b i n d i n g n o r m of action. T h e "validity" of a n o r m m e a n s the un­ forced r e c o g n i t i o n of its validity claim. This claim in t u r n consists in t h e claim t h a t all those affected have g o o d r e a s o n to c o n s e n t to the n o r m b e c a u s e it expresses t h e i r c o m m o n interest. T h e m o s t g e n e r a l n o r m s t h a t express t h e c o m m o n interest of all h u m a n b e i n g s are called "moral." T h u s t h e i d e a of t h e moral-practical justification of an action in t h e end refers t o t h e i d e a of a universal a g r e e m e n t t h a t is m o t i v a t e d by r e a s o n s a n d r e a s o n s a l o n e : T o e n g a g e i n t h e d e f e n s e of a l i n e of a c t i o n . . . is t o i m p l y t h a t t h e m e m b e r s of o n e ' s a u d i e n c e h a v e c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w h i c h m a k e t h e i r o p i n i o n s w o r t h t a k i n g i n t o a c c o u n t . I t is, in p a r t i c u l a r , t o a s s u m e t h a t t h e y c a n u n d e r ­ stand o n e ' s p r e s e n t a t i o n , a n d are able to r e s p o n d w i t h intelligible criticism. B u t t h i s i n t u r n m e a n s t h a t o n e c o n c e d e s a p o t e n t i a l (at v e r y least) of p r a c t i ­ cal r e a s o n i n g o n t h e i r p a r t s . T o see, i n t h e light of this, w h y " t h e d i c e of r e a ­ s o n a r e l o a d e d i n favor of t h e g e n e r a l i n t e r e s t , " we c a n r e f l e c t t h a t it w o u l d b e a b s u r d (i.e., p o i n t l e s s ) t o r a i s e q u e s t i o n s a n d m a k e d e f e n s e s of o n e ' s acts t o o t h e r p e o p l e , if o n e w e r e n o t p r e p a r e d to a c k n o w l e d g e s i m i l a r w e i g h t t o s i m i l a r c l a i m s o n t h e i r p a r t s . . . . T h e r e is n o p o i n t i n b e i n g p r e p a r e d t o ar-

IP It'

123 Intentions, Conventions, a n d Linguistic Interactions

g u e if o n e d o e s n ' t e n v i s a g e a n y p o s s i b l e t e r m s of s e t t l e m e n t ; a n d o n e c a n ­ n o t h o p e f o r s e t t l e m e n t if o n e ' s " a r g u m e n t s " a r e g o i n g t o b e a r b i t r a r i l y l o a d e d i n favor of oneself. . . . T o a r g u e f o r m o r a l i t y a t all is t o claim t h e as­ s e n t of all r a t i o n a l b e i n g s . B u t t h e o n l y p r i n c i p l e m u t u a l l y a c c e p t a b l e t o all r a t i o n a l b e i n g s is o n e w h i c h r e g a r d s all of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s as e q u a l l y w o r t h sat­ isfying (less, t h e r e f o r e , t h o s e w h i c h a r e i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h o t h e r s ) . E v e r y o n e c a n a g r e e t o this b e c a u s e e v e r y o n e ' s i n t e r e s t s a r e r e s p e c t e d . 7

T h e s e reflections serve as a bridge to t h e c o n c e p t of norm-gov­ e r n e d action. This can b e d o n e by a step-by-step revision. First, t h e Bedurfnisnatur, in w h i c h the i n t e n t i o n s of a subject w h o takes a stance a r e rooted, is divested of its subjective c h a r a c t e r . Wants always a p p e a r u n d e r s o m e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t p r e s u p p o s e s (a) a linguistic c o m m u ­ nity, (b) a l a n g u a g e c o n t a i n i n g evaluative expressions, a n d (c) a n intersubjectively s h a r e d t r a d i t i o n of cultural values. Next, values c a n be shown t o r e p r e s e n t s o m e t h i n g like candidates for e m b o d y i n g n o r m s . Values b e c o m e normatively b i n d i n g if a consensus arises a m o n g m e m b e r s o f a g r o u p a b o u t certain situation-specific value-ori­ e n t a t i o n s . C o r r e s p o n d i n g t o this m o d e l of action, t h e r e is a n explan­ a t o r y strategy t h a t admits t h e r e a s o n s f o r a n action as a n agent's motives o n l y insofar as t h e y a r e c o n n e c t e d with cultural values t h r o u g h t h e n e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a n d with intersubjectively recog­ nized n o r m s t h r o u g h t h e cultural values. I n s t e a d of private wants a n d n e e d s , p u b l i c n o r m s take o n t h e role of t h e e x p l a n a n s . T h e val­ ues by which t h e agents o r i e n t themselves a r e institutionalized i n these n o r m s . Valid n o r m s h a v e t h e p o w e r t o motivate actions be­ cause t h e values they e m b o d y — a n d h e n c e a b o u t which c o n s e n s u s can b e reached—represent t h e standards according to which t h e n e e d s a n d wants a r e i n t e r p r e t e d a n d d e v e l o p e d i n t o dispositions by m e a n s of linguistically m e d i a t e d l e a r n i n g processes. T h i s is t h e basic o u t l i n e of t h e m o d e l t h a t P a r s o n s c o n s t r u c t e d b a s e d o n t h e c o n c e p t of a n o r m a n d of c o n f o r m i t y with n o r m s . J u s t as w e c o n n e c t t h e o r i e s t o a claim t o t r u t h , so w e c o n n e c t n o r m s t o a claim t o Tightness. W h e r e a s t h e o r e t i c a l t r u t h p r e s u p p o s e s a c o m m u n i c a t i v e society of r e s e a r c h e r s , n o r m a t i v e Tightness i m m e d i ­ ately p r e s u p p o s e s t h e s o u n d i n g b o a r d of a social lifeworld. N o r m s in­ tervene regulatively i n t h e c o m m u n a l life of subjects capable of s p e e c h a n d action. N o r m a t i v e validity m e a n s t h a t t h e rules of action are intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d by t h e m e m b e r s of a social g r o u p .

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G. H. Mead h a s analyzed n o r m s in t e r m s of e x p e c t a t i o n s others have a b o u t o u r behavior. H e calls a behavioral e x p e c t a t i o n generalized if every m e m b e r of a social g r o u p expects all others to b e h a v e in a certain way in a given situation. 5 acts i n conformity with a n o r m or 5 fulfills a valid n o r m by acting in this way if h e o r i e n t s his action ac­ c o r d i n g to t h e situation-specific e x p e c t a t i o n s to w h i c h t h e m e m b e r s of his social g r o u p a r e entitled: [ I ] n o r d e r t h a t o n e s h o u l d b e h a v e "as a m e m b e r of t h e c o m m u n i t y " t h e fol­ l o w i n g f o r m a l c o n d i t i o n s m u s t h o l d . First, o n e m u s t h a v e p r a c t i c a l knowl­ e d g e o f t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h h e is t o b e h a v e , a n d so b e able t o k n o w w h e t h e r o r n o t h e is c o n f o r m i n g . Second, it is i m p l i e d a n d k n o w n by t h e a g e n t t h a t all o t h e r m e m b e r s o f t h e c o m m u n i t y s h o u l d h a v e a s i m i l a r p r a c t i ­ cal k n o w l e d g e a b o u t t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h t h e y a r e t o b e h a v e . Third, t h e a g e n t k n o w s t h a t o t h e r m e m b e r s o f t h e c o m m u n i t y will, as d o e s h e , believe t h a t all o t h e r s w h o m t h e y t a k e to b e m e m b e r s of t h e c o m m u n i t y will have c o m p a r a b l e k n o w l e d g e . In s h o r t , w e have a c o m m u n i t y i n w h i c h e a c h m e m ­ b e r is p r e s u m e d t o k n o w h o w h e is t o b e h a v e a n d t o believe t h a t all o t h e r s have knowledge comparable to his own. 8

T h i s f o r m u l a t i o n , by u s i n g t h e t e r m "should," r e m o v e s t h e ambi­ guity i n h e r e n t i n M e a d ' s o w n f o r m u l a t i o n s of the t e r m "behavioral e x p e c t a t i o n . " If we u n d e r s t a n d "behavioral e x p e c t a t i o n " i n t h e p u r e l y cognitive sense of S p r e d i c t i n g t h e b e h a v i o r of Si, t h e n t h e m e r e g e n e r a l i z a t i o n across m e m b e r s of a g r o u p c a n n o t give rise to a n o r m . A b e h a v i o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n g e n e r a l i z e d i n this sense would im­ ply, for e x a m p l e , that Si knows that S expects in a given situation t h a t Si will b e h a v e i n a certain way. A n d since some o t h e r m e m b e r S knows t h a t Si k n o w s this, S t o o will e x p e c t t h a t Si will m e e t S 's ex­ p e c t a t i o n . B u t t h e n the "generalized behavioral e x p e c t a t i o n " would be j u s t a n o t h e r t e r m for " a c c e p t e d t h e o r y of t h e everyday" (in t h e sense e x p l i c a t e d by J a r v i e ) . Yet t h e c o n c e p t of a b e h a v i o r a l expecta­ tion c o n t a i n s n o t only t h e sense of a p r e d i c t i o n , b u t also t h e n o r m a ­ tive sense t h a t m e m b e r s of a social g r o u p a r e m u t u a l l y entitled to e x p e c t c e r t a i n types of b e h a v i o r from o n e a n o t h e r . O n e m i g h t say t h a t t h e o r i e s , too, if t r u e a n d applicable to certain situations, e n t i t l e o n e to c e r t a i n e x p e c t a t i o n s . However, b e i n g enti­ tled to a c o n d i t i o n a l p r e d i c t i o n rests o n the t r u t h of e m p i r i c a l state­ m e n t s , w h e r e a s t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t Swill a b i d e by a n o r m is justified 2

2

n

n

2

125 Intentions, Conventions, and Linguistic Interactions

only if S b e l o n g s to a social g r o u p w h e r e this n o r m (as expression of a g e n e r a l interest) is r e c o g n i z e d . T h e kind of justification varies ac­ c o r d i n g to t h e type of validity claim that can be raised for a g e n e r a l ­ ized b e h a v i o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n . W h e n they b e c o m e a c o m p o n e n t of n o r m s , values lose their particularity in a similar way as d o beliefs w h e n they a t t a i n t h e status of t h e o r e t i c a l s t a t e m e n t s . However, t h e universality of n o r m s is based o n t h e generalizability of t h e interests they express. It is this r e l a t i o n to t h e Bedurfnisnatur t h a t e m e r g e s i n t h e o u g h t of a n o r m , b u t is missing in t h e t r u t h o r objective validity of a theory. A t h e o r y justifies t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t a c e r t a i n e v e n t will o c c u r if c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s o b t a i n ; a n o r m justifies t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t S will b e h a v e in a c e r t a i n way in certain situations if we c a n as­ s u m e she recognizes this n o r m a n d orients h e r a c t i o n a c c o r d i n g to the values e m b o d i e d i n it. 4

L Qguage

T h e sociological a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e two m o d e l s of i n t e n t i o n a l a n d n o r m - g o v e r n e d action u n p r o b l e m a t i c a l l y p r e s u p p o s e s l a n g u a g e as t h e m e d i u m of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , w h i c h c o n n e c t s subjects w h o act. If the rules are conceived of as semantic c o n v e n t i o n s , t h e n t h e use of linguistic symbols c a n b e e l u c i d a t e d by m e a n s of t h e c o n c e p t of rule-following t h a t I h a v e i n t r o d u c e d . However, this r u l e - m o d e l of l a n g u a g e use is p e r c e i v e d from o p p o s i t e perspectives, d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r p a r t i c i p a t i o n in c o m m u n i c a t i o n is r e p r e s e n t e d as a n i n t e n ­ tional a c t i o n o r as t h e fulfillment o f a n o r m . I n t h e f o r m e r case, lan­ g u a g e is conceived as t h e m e d i u m in which t h e actor expresses h e r beliefs a n d a t t i t u d e s a n d t h r o u g h w h i c h s h e t r a n s m i t s t h e i n f o r m a ­ tional c o n t e n t of h e r i n t e n t i o n s by using linguistic m e a n s to m a k e a n o t h e r a c t o r r e c o g n i z e w h a t s h e m e a n s o r i n t e n d s . L a n g u a g e is es­ sentially r e p r e s e n t e d as a medium for transmitting intentional experi­ ences. In t h e latter case, l a n g u a g e is u n d e r s t o o d as a m e d i u m w h e r e i n a consensus o n g e n e r a l situation i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s is s e c u r e d a m o n g m e m b e r s of a social g r o u p in t h e l i g h t of c o m m o n c u l t u r a l values a n d n o r m s . Sharing a c o m m o n symbolic system m e a n s be­ longing to a n intersubjectively b i n d i n g f o r m of life. H e r e , l a n g u a g e is r e p r e s e n t e d essentially as a medium of participation in the same 9

126 Intentions, Conventions, a n d Linguistic Interactions

culture. T h e c o m m o n a l i t y h e r e is secured n o t only t h r o u g h using the s a m e l a n g u a g e , b u t also and f o r e m o s t t h r o u g h r e c o g n i z i n g the same values. I n t h e f o r m e r case, subjects acting intentionally s u b s e q u e n t l y e n t e r into a c o m m u n i c a t i v e r e l a t i o n with o n e another. A l o n g with t h e nor­ mative c o n t e n t of t h e processes of r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w h a t is lost o n this m o d e l of l a n g u a g e is t h e n o t i o n of a reality c o n s t i t u t e d by t h e intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n of reciprocally raised universal claims to validity. I n t h e latter, t h e subjectivity of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s is sub­ m e r g e d i n the n o r m a t i v e c o n s e n s u s a b o u t the c u l t u r e that is objec­ tively given in the linguistic world view. This m o d e l of l a n g u a g e leaves n o r o o m for any i n t e r p r e t i v e c o m p e t e n c e o n t h e p a r t of the individual vis-a-vis t h e values a n d n o r m s of her lifeworld. This is the p o i n t w h e r e o u r critique b e g a n . T h e n o r m a t i v e m o d e l of a c t i o n conceives of l a n g u a g e as a m e d i u m w h e r e i n c o n s e n s u s a b o u t values b e c o m e s h a b i t u a l a n d is r e p r o ­ d u c e d . C o n v e n t i o n a l role theory, which I discuss elsewhere, is based o n this a s s u m p t i o n . H e r e I only w a n t to m e n t i o n t h a t t h e critique of r o l e - t h e o r y h a s p a i d p a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n to t h e constitutive achieve­ m e n t s of t h e actor. W e m u s t n o t p r o c e e d f r o m t h e a s s u m p t i o n that the motives for action simply c o r r e s p o n d to t h e values that a r e insti­ tutionalized in roles. Nor may we a s s u m e that the p a r t i c i p a n t ' s situa­ tion i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a n d t h e i r o r i e n t a t i o n s to action are g u i d e d exclusively by n o r m s a n d fully c o n g r u e n t with roles so as to b e sub­ s u m e d by t h e m . Rather, the m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a t t a i n e d in any p a r t i c u l a r s e q u e n c e of i n t e r a c t i o n is t h e result of a p r o c e s s of reach­ i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e p a r t i c i p a t i n g subjects u n d e r t a k e this process within a c o n t e x t t h e y d o n o t fully c o n t r o l . N o n e t h e l e s s , it is a n en­ d e a v o r in which they are e n g a g e d together m virtue of their interactive c o m p e t e n c i e s . T h e p a r t i c i p a n t s c o o r d i n a t e their m u t u a l expecta­ tions by o r i e n t i n g themselves by institutionalized values. B u t social roles a r e idealizations t h a t serve as g u i d e l i n e s f o r c o n s t r u c t i n g s h a r e d situation definitions. T h e process of role-taking is a con­ t e x t - d e p e n d e n t , r e c i p r o c a l i n t e r p r e t i v e process a i m e d a t r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . It develops a n d revises a n existing t r a d i t i o n of values a n d n o r m s by m e a n s of applying a n d e x t e n d i n g t h e m as m u c h as it is itself d e t e r m i n e d by t h a t tradition.

127 Intentions, Conventions, and Linguistic Interactions

Interpretation is t h e f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t of a m o d e l of communica­ tive action. T h e goal of such a m o d e l is to c o m p e n s a t e for t h e respec­ tive weaknesses of t h e m o d e l s of i n t e n t i o n a l a n d n o r m - g o v e r n e d action a n d t o take p r o p e r a c c o u n t of t h e constitutive significance of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t of i n t e r p r e t a ­ tion shows that the m o d e l of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action e m p h a s i z e s t h e constitutive activities of participants in i n t e r a c t i o n , b u t does n o t re­ vert t o a subjectivist position. I n t e n t i o n a l a g e n t s d o n o t e n t e r i n t o c o m m u n i c a t i v e relations with o n e a n o t h e r after t h e fact, so to speak, in o r d e r to fabricate a n intersubjective world. Rather, c o m m u n i c a t i v e action p r e s u p p o s e s the n o r m a t i v e reality of a society j u s t as m u c h as a n objectifiable reality a n d t h e subjectivity of t h e a g e n t herself. F o r every i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e f e r s to a c o n t e x t in w h i c h t h e s e t h r e e ele­ m e n t s are i n t e r w o v e n : n o r m s a n d values, objects a n d states of affairs, and intentional experiences. O f c o u r s e t h e c o n c e p t of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n easily l e a d s t o t h e miscon­ c e p t i o n t h a t t h e activity of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e a g e n t is in t h e first in­ stance t h a t of a cognizing subject w h o first i n t e r p r e t s a situation a n d t h e n goes a b o u t d i s s e m i n a t i n g t h a t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n socially. T h i s mis­ u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n b e a v o i d e d by (a) tying t h e c o n c e p t of c o m m u n i ­ cative action to t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t p a r t i c i p a t i n g subjects a s s u m e a n attitude o r i e n t e d toward r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g r a t h e r t h a n toward r e a c h i n g success, a n d (b) tying m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g to a c o n s e n s u s n o t only a b o u t t r u t h claims, b u t also a b o u t sincerity- a n d Tightness claims. For t h e n t h e p r o c e s s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t h a t m u t u a l l y refer t o o n e a n o t h e r will b e subject n o t only to t h e p a r a m e t e r s of a g i v e n p a r ­ ticular context, b u t to the e x a c t i n g p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t a c o n s e n s u s c a n b e a t t a i n e d o n l y by way of the shared recognition of universal validity claims. A n d since Tightness a n d sincerity b e l o n g t o these validity claims as m u c h as p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h d o e s , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n (which, in c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, is conceived of as a process of m u t u a l u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g ) m e a n s t h e s e a r c h for a m u t u a l a g r e e m e n t a b o u t a situation definition. T h i s definition refers to w h a t is c o m m o n l y r e c o g n i z e d as t h e society's n o r m a t i v e reality, w h a t is m u t u a l l y r e c o g n i z e d as t h e manifested subjecdvity of a participant, as well as to a c c e p t e d beliefs a b o u t an objectified reality.

1

Reflections on Communicative Pathology (1974)

My point of d e p a r t u r e is t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of in­ teractive c o m p e t e n c e regulates t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n [Aufbau] of i n t e r n a l behavioral c o n t r o l s . However, t h e systematic differences b e t w e e n moral j u d g m e n t a n d t h e actual b e h a v i o r in situations of conflict res­ olution show t h a t t h e two lines of d e v e l o p m e n t d o n o t c o i n c i d e . Lin­ guistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n is relevant f o r motivational d e v e l o p m e n t in two respects. O n t h e o n e h a n d , c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n is t h e m e d i u m of socialization t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e influences of familial environ­ ments are filtered a n d t r a n s m i t t e d to t h e personality system. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , l a n g u a g e offers a w a y of o r g a n i z i n g w a n t s a n d n e e d s t h a t are subject to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; o u r n e e d - b a s e d n a t u r e [Bediirfnisnatur] is communicatively s t r u c t u r e d . T h e difference b e t w e e n levels of moral j u d g m e n t a n d levels of moral action can b e e x p l a i n e d by dis­ t u r b a n c e s of t h e socialization process. T h e s e " d i s t u r b a n c e s " can be analyzed o n two levels: t h e level of p a t h o g e n e t i c p a t t e r n s of t h e lin­ guistic e n v i r o n m e n t t h a t are relevant to socialization, a n d t h e level of t h e s t r u c t u r e s of n e e d s a n d of behavioral controls t h a t d e v e l o p u n ­ d e r c o n d i t i o n s of systematically distorted c o m m u n i c a t i o n . F r e u d in­ troduces t h e e g o f u n c t i o n of u n c o n s c i o u s r e p r e s s i o n as a m e c h a n i s m of linguistic p a t h o g e n e s i s . T h e repression of conflicts t h a t are n o t consciously resolved, t h a t is, n o t o n a basis of c o n s e n s u a l action, leaves traces t h a t t a k e t h e f o r m of c o m m u n i c a t i v e d i s t u r b a n c e s . Intrapsychic d i s t u r b a n c e s of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n parts of the personality system a r e a n a l o g o u s t o d i s t u r b a n c e s in family c o m ­ m u n i c a t i o n . O f c o u r s e t h e analysis of such deviations p r e s u p p o s e s knowledge [Kenntnis] of t h e k i n d of c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t can be characterized as " n o r m a l . " But w h e n can a c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e c o n ­ sidered u n d i s t u r b e d , n o t systematically d i s t o r t e d , o r "normal"? (1) First, we have to explain t h e sense in w h i c h we m e a n to talk a b o u t the n o r m a l c y c o n d i t i o n s of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . Obvi­ ously, t h e statistical notion of n o r m a l c y is u n s u i t a b l e . A n o r m a l distri­ bution of c o m m u n i c a t i v e features tells u s n o t h i n g a b o u t the n o r m a l c y c o n d i t i o n s of socially effective i n t e r a c t i o n s , unless we have already classified t h e p o p u l a t i o n s b e i n g e x a m i n e d b a s e d o n clinical criteria; b u t t h a t w o u l d b e to evaluate t h e m based o n criteria of n o r ­ malcy. O t h e r w i s e we c o u l d n o t r u l e o u t an " a b n o r m a l " s c e n a r i o ,

132 _ Reflections on Communicative Pathology

w h e t h e r t h e deviating individuals o r linguistic u n i t s it comprised were greater o r fewer in n u m b e r t h a n average. T h e clinical notion of n o r m a l c y stems from t h e field of somatic illnesses. H e r e , t h e healthy or n o r m a t i v e state [Sollzustand] of t h e organism, f r o m which the state of illness deviates, is r e a s o n a b l y well k n o w n . T h a t is, we either k n o w it t h r o u g h empirical analysis or by m e a n s of intuitively inter­ p r e t e d e m p i r i c a l indicators. T r a n s f e r r i n g this n o t i o n of n o r m a l c y to the r e a l m of psychic or c o m m u n i c a t i v e d i s t u r b a n c e s is difficult be­ cause t h e c u r r e n d y available t h e o r i e s have not b e e n able to deter­ m i n e unequivocally the n o r m s [Sollwerte] of psychic organization. A n y p r o p o s a l s t h a t appeal to intuitive evidence are suspect of deriv­ i n g from c u l t u r a l traditions t h a t are n o t m a d e explicit. Nowadays, t h e r e f o r e , t h e culturalistic notion of n o r m a l c y characterizes a widely a c c e p t e d fallback position. A c c o r d i n g to this n o t i o n , we have to confine ourselves to a descriptive a c c o u n t of what a given culture c o n s i d e r s t o b e " n o r m a l " for a given d o m a i n of life. T h u s t h e key to the culturally relative c o n c e p t s of n o r m a l c y is not the n o r m a l distri­ b u t i o n of o b s e r v e d aspects of behavior, b u t t h e definitions of nor­ malcy that a r e to be a s c e r t a i n e d in any given case. However, e t h n o p s y c h i a t r y h a s raised strong reservations r e g a r d i n g this relativism t h a t is widely a c c e p t e d in cultural anthropology. G. D e v e r e u x suggests s o m e distinctions t h a t clearly show t h e limits of t h e a r g u m e n t for cultural relativism. H e j u x t a p o s e s individual pa­ t h o l o g i e s with d i s t u r b a n c e s t h a t have b e e n culturally standardized, a n d shows t h a t even these d i s t u r b a n c e s , w h i c h have b e e n n o r m a l ­ ized, as it w e r e , deviate from what is n o r m a l in t h e clinical sense. Cul­ tural n o r m a l i z a t i o n refers to all t h r e e e l e m e n t s of t h e "disturbance": 1

2

(i) t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e d i s t u r b i n g or s h o c k i n g events t h a t are e x p e r i e n c e d as stress o r t r a u m a a n d trigger an intrapsychic conflict (in Sparta, a m o t h e r ' s m o u r n i n g a son w h o has died in battle is an "ethnic d i s t u r b a n c e , " b e c a u s e its cause is a culturally r e c o g n i z e d and c o n v e n t i o n a l i z e d t r a u m a , w h e r e a s in Athens, t h e s a m e act of m o u r n ­ ing r e m a i n s a t t h e level of a n individual e m o t i o n a l r e a c t i o n ) ; (ii) strategies of r e p r e s s i o n w h e r e b y t h e intrapsychic conflict can be k e p t o u t of c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d m a d e b e a r a b l e (i.e., n o t t h e r a p e u t i ­ cally "resolved"). Every c u l t u r e , even in cases of e x t r e m e d i s t u r b a n c e

|33 Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology

(as D e v e r e u x ' s e l a b o r a t e e x a m p l e of t h e s h a m a n d e m o n s t r a t e s ) , of­ fers a system of p r e f e r e n c e s for m e a n s of r e p r e s s i o n t h a t allow for a superficial n o r m a l i z a t i o n (i.e., a conventionally r e c o g n i z e d restruc­ turing) of t h e i n n e r conflict; (iii) finally, t h e s y m p t o m s in which t h e u n c o n s c i o u s l y r e p r e s s e d conflict m a y b e m a n i f e s t e d . ( U n d e r this h e a d i n g D e v e r e u x e x a m i n e s social roles t h a t institutionalize culturally recognized deviant behav­ ior: t h a t of t h e s h a m a n , t h e p e r s o n r u n a m o k , t h e " m a d d o g , " t h e M o h a v e transvestite, t h e stoic saint, etc. Even w h e r e such roles h a v e n o t b e e n differentiated, t h e r e a r e cultural definitions f o r "how t o b e ­ have w h e n o n e is crazy.") Individual d i s t u r b a n c e s o c c u r t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e n o r m a l i z i n g activity of a c u l t u r e fails i n such a way t h a t t h e p e r s o n affected h a s t o improvise f o r herself h o w to i n t e r p r e t t r a u m a t i c events a n d which m e a n s of r e p r e s s i o n a n d types of s y m p t o m s to c h o o s e . P e r h a p s a comparative c o n c e p t f o r m a t i o n is p r e f e r a b l e t o t h e d i c h o t o m o u s c o n c e p t f o r m a t i o n t h a t j u x t a p o s e s e t h n i c a n d individual distur­ bances a n d leads to t h e p o s t u l a t i o n of a n "ethnic u n c o n s c i o u s . " But even if D e v e r e u x ' s thesis is w e a k e n e d in this sense a n d d i s t u r b a n c e s a r e classified a c c o r d i n g to t h e i r d e g r e e of cultural stereotyping, t h e analysis of limit cases is of critical i m p o r t a n c e for t h e culturalistic n o ­ tion of normalcy. T h e cross-cultural c o m p a r i s o n of e t h n o p s y c h i a t r i c p h e n o m e n a shows t h a t t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l r e s t r u c t u r i n g of f o r m s of r e p r e s s i o n a n d of symptoms n o r m a l i z e s t h e u n d e r l y i n g a n o m a l y of a s e r i o u s psychic conflict o r illness in t h e sense of socially accepted roles. However, it does so in such a way t h a t t h e a n o m a l y r e m a i n s p e r c e p t i b l e as such. T h e s h a m a n is psychologically ill in t h e clinical sense e v e n t h o u g h h e plays a socially r e c o g n i z e d role: T h e primitive who, after suffering from psychological disturbances, u n d e r ­ goes a s h a m a n i c t r e a t m e n t that "cures" h i m a n d m a k e s h i m a s h a m a n , i n re­ ality o n l y e x p e r i e n c e s a c o n v e n t i o n a l r e s t r u c t u r i n g o f h i s conflicts a n d s y m p t o m s w i t h o u t t h e r e b y g a i n i n g a n y real insight i n t o t h e n a t u r e o f h i s conflicts. . . . T h e s e c u r e s t a k e p l a c e as if t h e t r e a t m e n t c o n s i s t e d m e r e l y i n r e p l a c i n g conflicts a n d c u l t u r a l r e p r e s s i o n b y c o n v e n t i o n a l c u l t u r a l conflicts a n d ritualized symptoms, without ever p r o d u c i n g t h e insight which alone can lead to a real c u r e . 3

134 Reflections o n Communicative Pathology

D e v e r e u x tells of two Native A m e r i c a n I n d i a n s s e n t e n c e d to d e a t h , w h o h a d b e e n d e e m e d "of s o u n d m i n d in t h e legal s e n s e " by the p r i s o n psychiatrist b e c a u s e t h e y t o o k their h a l l u c i n a t i o n s from the cultural m a t e r i a l of the beliefs of t h e i r tribe. Only a,closer examina­ tion s h o w e d t h a t they n o l o n g e r objectively lived these cultural con­ tents, b u t u s e d t h e m for h a l l u c i n a t o r y p u r p o s e s . T h e psychiatrist h a d confused t h e h a l l u c i n a t i o n s of his p a t i e n t s with t h e beliefs of the tribe of which they were m e m b e r s . Similarly, the difference between delirium a n d faith c a n also b e r e n d e r e d culturally i n c o n s p i c u o u s if t h e p e r s o n affected "clothes" his clinical b e h a v i o r in a social role, say t h a t of t h e s h a m a n , and n o r m a l i z e s it. H e n c e the psychiatrist assess­ i n g psychic d i s t u r b a n c e s a c c o r d i n g to a c u l t u r a l n o t i o n of n o r m a l c y is 4

i n c a p a b l e of h e l p i n g a n I n d i a n w h o is i n r e m i s s i o n after a first p s y c h o t i c at­ t a c k or u r g e a n d d e f i n e s h i m s e l f as a s h a m a n . A c c o r d i n g t o "relativistic" n o r m s that govern the limited diagnostic technique I am talking about, one w o u l d c l a i m t h a t this I n d i a n s h a m a n h a s n o n e e d of p s y c h i a t r i c t r e a t m e n t , since h e c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d " c u l t u r a l l y n o r m a l . " H o w e v e r , I h a v e s h o w n t h a t t h e s h a m a n is e i t h e r a s e v e r e n e u r o t i c o r a p s y c h o t i c in r e m i s s i o n a n d h e n c e is i n u r g e n t n e e d of p s y c h i a t r i c aid. I n fact, s u c h a n i n d i v i d u a l is i n r e m i s s i o n only w i t h r e s p e c t t o a single socially d e t e r m i n e d m i l i e u : h i s o w n t r i b e . H e is m o r e or less well a d a p t e d t o this, a n d only t h i s , m i l i e u . He is not capable of adapting, and especially not capable of re-adapting. A n o r m a l I n d i a n , i n c o n t r a s t , w h o is n o t a s h a m a n , c a n b e well a d a p t e d t o h i s c u l t u r e a n d still r e t a i n his ability t o c o p e w i t h a v a r i e t y of s i t u a t i o n s . I n m y o p i n i o n , t h e t o u c h s t o n e of m e n t a l h e a l t h is n o t a d a p t e d n e s s as s u c h , b u t a s u b j e c t ' s a b i l i t y to d e v e l o p further t h r o u g h successive new a d a p t a t i o n s w i t h o u t losing t h e sense o f his own temporal continuity. 5

D e v e r e u x p u r s u e s t h e n o r m a l i z i n g activities of c u l t u r e s o m e w h a t f u r t h e r t h a n p r o p o n e n t s of cultural relativism do. H e shows t h a t dis­ t u r b a n c e s a n d deviations themselves are subject to t h e definitions of normalcy, albeit only i n such a way t h a t the difference b e t w e e n n o r ­ m a l a n d d e v i a n t b e h a v i o r is simply leveled o u t r a t h e r t h a n m a d e unrecognizable. T h e distinction drawn h e r e r e q u i r e s a culturally invariant n o t i o n of normalcy. It m u s t b e c o r r o b o r a t e d by clinical e x p e r i e n c e , b u t ex­ plicated i n d e p e n d e n t l y . I n t h e last passage q u o t e d above, Devereux cites as t h e d e t e r m i n i n g criterion t h e ability to r e s t r u c t u r e o n e ' s own

135 Reflections on Communicative Pathology

identity in a c c o r d a n c e with o n e ' s situation. Elsewhere, h e thinks t h a t all psychological d i s t u r b a n c e s result in d e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a n d d e i n d i v i d u a t i o n . Yet "individuation" is a c o n c e p t l a d e n w i t h p r e s u p p o s i ­ tions, a n d t h e c o n c e p t of a level of differentiation is useful only if we c a n give a n a d e q u a t e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e system— precisely by m e a n s of t h e d y n a m i c of progressive individuation. 6

T h e cultural c o n c e p t of n o r m a l c y t u r n s o u t t o b e u n t e n a b l e . Yet a culturally invariant c o n c e p t of n o r m a l c y t h a t refers n e i t h e r to fea­ tures of physical h e a l t h n o r to statistical averages has a n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t . How can this c o n t e n t be justified within a n empiricaldescriptive science? P i a g e t u s e d t h e c o n c e p t of d e v e l o p m e n t a l logic, w h i c h p e r m i t s t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of n o r m a t i v e n o t i o n s for p u r p o s e s of e m p i r i c a l analysis. T h e c o n c e p t has so far b e e n c o r r o b o r a t e d only in t h e d o m a i n of cog­ nitive development. H e r e , the n o r m a t i v e a s s u m p t i o n [Wertprdmisse] is n o t suspect, f o r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of objectifying t h o u g h t is m e a s u r e d by t h e level of unequivocally d e c i d a b l e p r o b l e m s , t h a t is, of p r o b l e m s t h a t have true solutions. P r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h is a validity claim p r e s u p ­ posed by a n y a r g u m e n t a t i o n . Normative Tightness of a c t i o n a n d evalua­ tion is a validity claim t h a t is u n d e r d i s p u t e , b u t c a n still be m a d e plausible. R e s e a r c h i n t o t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a l logic of m o r a l j u d g m e n t d e p e n d s o n this n o r m a t i v e a s s u m p t i o n . Its o n t o g e n e s i s is also m e a ­ s u r e d a c c o r d i n g to levels of p r o b l e m solving. But in this case we can­ n o t rely o n e l e m e n t a r y knowledge of logic, m a t h e m a t i c s , a n d physics for validating t h e c o r r e c t solutions. W e h a v e to v e n t u r e o n t o t h e u n ­ stable g r o u n d of p h i l o s o p h i c a l ethics in o r d e r to justify t h e thesis t h a t e a c h h i g h e r level of m o r a l consciousness allows f o r a n increas­ ingly a d e q u a t e c o n s e n s u a l solution of increasingly c o m p l e x conflicts of action. E x p a n d i n g t h e c o n c e p t of t h e capacity for m o r a l j u d g m e n t i n t o t h e c o n c e p t of interactive c o m p e t e n c e o n c e a g a i n transforms t h e n o r m a t i v e a s s u m p t i o n . For t h e ability t o p a r t i c i p a t e in interac­ tion a n d to m a i n t a i n t h e c o n s e n s u a l basis of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action even t h r o u g h conflicts includes t h e c o m p e t e n c e to act in a c c o r d a n c e with m o r a l j u d g m e n t s , b u t , b e y o n d this, also p r e s u p p o s e s t h e validity basis of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n in its full spectrum. Interactive com­ p e t e n c e is m e a s u r e d n o t a c c o r d i n g to t h e ability to solve p r o b l e m s of k n o w l e d g e a n d m o r a l insight at t h e a p p r o p r i a t e level, b u t a c c o r d i n g

136 Reflections o n Communicative Pathology

to t h e ability to m a i n t a i n processes of r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d ­ ing even in conflict situations r a t h e r t h a n b r e a k i n g off c o m m u n i c a ­ tion o r merely s e e m i n g to m a i n t a i n it. T h e psychoanalytic c o n c e p t of u n c o n s c i o u s repressioii s h e d s light, as we shall see, o n t h e t e c h n i q u e of a p p a r e n d y c a r r y i n g o n processes of r e a c h i n g c o n s e n s u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Unconsciously r e p r e s s e d conflicts a r i s e — e i t h e r intrapsychically as a n i n t e r r u p t i o n of c o m m u ­ n i c a t i o n within t h e self, o r as a n i n c o n s p i c u o u s b a r r i e r b e t w e e n indi­ viduals within t h e f a m i l y — u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s t h a t e x c l u d e processes of m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d h e n c e h e a l i n g (conflict resolution) t h r o u g h insight. T h e c o n c e p t of n o r m a l c y for e g o s t r e n g t h devel­ o p e d by psychoanalysis in this c o n n e c t i o n is m e a s u r e d by t h e de­ p e n d e n c e o n strategies of u n c o n s c i o u s r e p r e s s i o n . T h e ego's s t r e n g t h increases to t h e same e x t e n t t h a t t h e e g o is able t o d o with­ o u t s u c h strategies a n d to process its conflicts consciously. T h e n o r ­ mative a s s u m p t i o n h e r e lies in t h e c o n c e p t of consciousness a n d in t h e r e l a t i o n to t h e insight i n t o a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l l y caused psychological conflict. In a c c o r d a n c e w i t h my c o m m u n i c a t i o n - t h e o r e t i c r e a d i n g of t h e basic psychoanalytic assumptions,' I relate these topologically conceived c o n d i t i o n s of conscious conflict processing t o c o n d i t i o n s of n o r m a l linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n : Conscious conflict processing m e a n s conflict p r o c e s s i n g u n d e r conditions of u n d i s t o r t e d communication. 7

T h u s we r e t u r n to w h e r e we b e g a n o u r reflections, h a v i n g f o u n d t h a t we c a n n o t avail ourselves of t h e available statistical, clinical, o r cultural notions of n o r m a l c y t h a t a r e at o u r disposal. R a t h e r we have to m a k e explicit t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t i n h e r e n t in the n o t i o n of lin­ guistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n itself. T h e expression " u n d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i ­ c a t i o n " does n o t a d d a n y t h i n g to m u t u a l linguistic u n d e r s t a n d i n g [Verstdndigung], f o r " m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g " signifies t h e telos i n h e r ­ e n t in linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I w o u l d like to establish t h e condi­ tions of n o r m a l c y of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n by way of a c o n c e p t u a l analysis of t h e m e a n i n g of "mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g " be­ cause I assume t h a t every s p e e c h act h a s a n u n a v o i d a b l e , as it were, t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l y necessitating basis of validity. I w a n t to d e v e l o p t h e thesis t h a t every c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t o r h a s t o c o m m i t to fulfilling uni­ versal claims to validity. Insofar as she participates in c o m m u n i c a t i o n

137 Reflections on Communicative Pathology

(i.e., a process of r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g ) a t all, she c a n n o t avoid raising t h e following claims: (i) to express herself intelligibly, (ii) to m a k e something u n d e r s t o o d , (iii) t o m a k e AerseZ/understood in d o i n g so, a n d (iv) to r e a c h a m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g with another. O f c o u r s e if c o m p l e t e a g r e e m e n t [Einverstdndnis], which encom­ passes all f o u r c o m p o n e n t s , w e r e t h e n o r m a l state of linguistic c o m ­ m u n i c a t i o n , t h e n it w o u l d n o t b e n e c e s s a r y to analyze t h e process of r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g u n d e r t h e d y n a m i c aspect of bring­ ing about a g r e e m e n t . W h a t is typical i n s t e a d are situations t h a t lie in t h e gray a r e a s o m e w h e r e b e t w e e n a lack of u n d e r s t a n d i n g [Unverstdndnis] a n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g [Missverstdndnis], intended a n d i n v o l u n t a r y insincerity, veiled a n d o p e n d i s a g r e e m e n t on t h e o n e h a n d , a n d a n always already existing p r e - u n d e r s t a n d i n g [Vorverstdndigtsein] a n d m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n t h e other. I n this gray area, a g r e e m e n t m u s t be actively b r o u g h t about. M u t u a l u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g is a process t h a t seeks to o v e r c o m e a lack of u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , insincerity toward oneself a n d others, a n d d i s a g r e e m e n t . A n d it does so o n t h e c o m m o n basis of validity claims t h a t aim at r e c i p r o c a l r e c o g n i t i o n . I w o u l d n o w like t o c o n s i d e r t h e o n t o g e n e s i s of t h e validity basis (2) i n o r d e r to t h e n d e m o n s t r a t e t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m p o r t of t h e claims t h a t g r o u n d validity a n d t h a t p r e c e d e every possible instance of c o m m u n i c a t i o n ( 3 ) . Starting from this validity basis a n d t h e g e n ­ eral s t r u c t u r e s of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n , I shall t h e n discuss for­ mal c o n d i t i o n s of systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n (4). Finally, I shall discuss a few e x a m p l e s of such c o m m u n i c a t i o n . 8

(2) H a v i n g s t u d i e d prelinguistic child d e v e l o p m e n t , R. Spitz at­ t r i b u t e s p a r t i c u l a r i m p o r t a n c e to l e a r n i n g processes i n the t h i r d m o n t h of life w h e r e b y p r i m a r y narcissism is overcome a n d t h e stage of t h e first "object a n t i c i p a t i o n " sets in. F r o m t h e perspective of t h e c o n s t i t u e n t s of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t h e following t h r e e m o m e n t s seem significant: (a) T h e child learns to distinguish s o u n d s t h a t it p r o d u c e s itself f r o m e x t e r n a l acoustic stimuli

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Reflections on Communicative Pathology

( b a b b l i n g m o n o l o g u e s ) a n d it b e g i n s to react with u n d e r s t a n d i n g [Verstdndnis] to t h e p h y s i o g n o m i c s c h e m a of t h e m o t h e r ' s face (smil­ ing with eye c o n t a c t ) . (b) T h e child l e a r n s to act in a goal-directed fashion b a s e d o n s c h e m a t a of sensory-motor action. Along with these b e g i n n i n g s of initiatives to act, we can observe (c) a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n f r o m r e a c t i o n s t o stimuli to p r o t o - f o r m s of i n t e n t i o n a l action g u i d e d by p e r c e p t i o n . F r o m t h e very b e g i n n i n g , t h e actions serve t h e dou­ ble task of c o n t r o l l i n g t h e e n v i r o n m e n t a n d of f e n d i n g off danger. In d o i n g this they r e g u l a t e drives a n d affects. T h i s t h i r d aspect sheds light o n t h e b e g i n n i n g s of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e s t r u c t u r i n g of i n n e r n a t u r e . T h e first two aspects r e f e r to t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of c o m m u n i ­ cative r e l a t i o n s a n d t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g capabilities of active a n d pas­ sive p a r t i c i p a n t s in i n t e r a c t i o n . I n t h e s e c o n d half of t h e first year of life, t h e love object " m o t h e r " is c o n s t i t u t e d for t h e child as an identifiable entity. First, t h e child l e a r n s to i n t e g r a t e i n t o a single i m a g e two object anticipations: t h e "good," permissive m o t h e r a n d t h e "bad," restrictive o r a b s e n t o n e . This synthesis m a r k s equally a cognitive d e v e l o p m e n t (the begin­ n i n g s of object p e r m a n e n c e ) and a n increasing r e g u l a t i o n of affects a n d drives ( b e g i n n i n g s of the t o l e r a n c e for a m b i v a l e n c e ) . T h e eighth-month anxiety t h a t then follows ( a n d which Spitz analyzes in de­ tail) signals t h a t t h e child l e a r n s to distinguish b e t w e e n t h e t r u s t e d a n d loved object of t h e m o t h e r a n d strangers. T h e child n o longer reacts only with u n d e r s t a n d i n g to t h e p h y s i o g n o m i c s c h e m a (be it t h a t of t h e m o t h e r , a mask, o r a s t r a n g e r ) . R a t h e r h e n o w r e s p o n d s to t h e gestures of a n individual r e f e r e n c e p e r s o n . T h i s alters t h e level of r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n p a r t n e r s in c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e child identifies with t h e m o t h e r by imitating h e r gestures. T h i s is an i m p o r t a n t pre­ c o n d i t i o n for t h e e x c h a n g e , m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h gestures, w h e r e b y the child l e a r n s to r e g u l a t e his own activity in relation to that of the m o t h e r (i.e., giving a n d taking, b e i n g active and passive). For this self-regulation of the initiative to act, shaking o n e ' s h e a d in denial plays a significant r o l e . First t h e child l e a r n s t h e g e s t u r e with t h e m o t h e r w h o refuses h i m Later, t h e child uses t h e n e g a t i n g w h e r e h e rejects a d e m a n d o r offer

of s h a k i n g his h e a d by identifying s o m e t h i n g by s h a k i n g h e r h e a d . shaking of t h e h e a d in situations himself. A n d after l a n g u a g e devel-

139 Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e P a t h o l o g y

o p m e n t has b e g u n with t h e first h o l o p h r a s t i c (one-word) s e n t e n c e s , from a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e fifteenth m o n t h , t h e c h i l d uses t h e w o r d " n o " instead of t h e n e g a t i n g gesture. T h i s step is t h e b e g i n n i n g of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n in a specificc W i t h t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f t h e g e s t u r e of n e g a t i o n , a c t i o n is r e p l a c e d b y w o r d , a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n a c r o s s d i s t a n c e is i n t r o d u c e d . T h i s m a y b e t h e m o s t i m ­ p o r t a n t t u r n i n g p o i n t i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e i n d i v i d u a l a n d t h e s p e c i e s . T h i s is t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e h u m a n i z a t i o n o f t h e s p e c i e s , o f t h e zoon

politikon, of society.

9

Spitz, I think righdy, attributes a crucial i m p o r t a n c e to t h e g e s t u r e of d e n i a l o n t h e p a r t of t h e prelinguistic child a n d to t h e nay-saying o f t h e child w h o h a s o n l y j u s t b e g u n to speak in t h e transition from symbolically mediated to g e n u i n e l y linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . Yet t h e insistence with which h e d o e s so does n o t fit well w i t h t h e analytic c o n c e p t i o n of this p h e n o m e n o n . Spitz speaks of t h e c o n c e p t u a l c h a r a c t e r of n e g a t i o n . H e believes t h a t n e g a t i o n m a k e s possible t h e capacity to j u d g e [Urteilsfahigkeit]. B u t the first " n o " is n e i t h e r t h e n e ­ gation [Verneinung] of p r e d i c a t e s ("this ball is n o t r e d " ) , n o r t h e n e ­ gation [Negation] of states of affairs ("it is n o t t r u e t h a t this ball is r e d " ) . O t h e r w i s e t h e c h i l d would already b e able to distinguish dif­ f e r e n t types of s p e e c h acts or i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations. T h e first " n o " is r a t h e r constitutive for p r o d u c i n g symbolically m e d i a t e d i n t e r p e r ­ sonal r e l a d o n s t o u t court. It m a k e s possible t h a t early m o d e of t h e first linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n which is, in a way, d e t e r m i n e d by imperatives. I n prelinguistic i n t e r a c t i o n s with a r e f e r e n c e p e r s o n , the child ex­ p e r i e n c e s satisfactions as well as f r u s t r a d o n s , b u t t h e frustrations of drives are in t h e first i n s t a n c e externally i m p o s e d events; they are n o t yet perceived as prohibitions. O n l y after t h e child h a s l e a r n e d , t h r o u g h a process of identification, to u n d e r s t a n d t h e refusals t h e m o t h e r imposes o n h i m as i n t e n t i o n a l actions a n d has himself l e a r n e d to say n o , d o e s h e m e e t t h e p r e c o n d i t i o n for p a r t i c i p a t i n g in a c o m m u n i c a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p for w h i c h t h e o p t i o n of o b e y i n g o r ac­ c e p t i n g a n d refusing is constitutive. A r e q u e s t is n o t a r e q u e s t , an of­ fer n o t an offer, as l o n g as t h e a d d r e s s e e lacks t h e conscious ability to say n o , t h a t is, t h e ability, in p r i n c i p l e , to d e c i d e n o t to abide by t h e r e q u e s t or to a c c e p t t h e offer. T h e first " n o " n e g a t e s a n e x p e c t a t i o n

140 Reflections o n Communicative Pathology

of behavior. T o say n o m e a n s rejection. Spitz describes t h e psychod y n a m i c s of this first nay-saying t h a t is constitutive f o r t h e interper­ sonal r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n speakers as follows: T h e n e g a t i n g g e s t u r e o f s h a k i n g o n e ' s h e a d a n d t h e w o r d " n o " u t t e r e d by t h e O b j e c t a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d [einverkibt] i n t o t h e e g o of t h e i n f a n t as m e m ­ o r y t r a c e s . T h e n e g a t i v e affect is s e p a r a t e d f r o m this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h i s s e p a r a t i o n t r i g g e r s a f r u s t r a t i o n t h a t is t h e n l i n k e d t h r o u g h a s s o c i a t i o n with t h e m e m o r y t r a c e i n t h e e g o . If t h e c h i l d i d e n t i f i e s w i t h t h e O b j e c t , t h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n w i t h t h e a t t a c k e r is f o l l o w e d b y a n a t t a c k o n t h e o u t s i d e w o r l d , a c c o r d i n g to A n n a F r e u d . F o r t h e fifteen-month-old child, this c o n c e p t t a k e s t h e f o r m o f " n o " (first t h e g e s t u r e , t h e n t h e w o r d ) . T h e c h i l d h a s a d o p t e d t h i s f o r m o f t h e c o n c e p t f r o m its love o b j e c t . B a s e d o n n u m e r o u s e x p e r i e n c e s o f d i s p l e a s u r e , t h e " n o " c a r r i e s a n e g a t i v e v a l e n c e . A s a result, " n o " is s u i t a b l e f o r e x p r e s s i n g a g g r e s s i o n , a n d this is w h y " n o " is u s e d i n t h e defense m e c h a n i s m of identifying with t h e attacker a n d t u r n e d against t h e O b j e c t . A s s o o n as this level is r e a c h e d , t h e p h a s e o f d e f i a n c e ( t h e w e l l - k n o w n " t e r r i b l e twos") c a n b e g i n . 1 0

Saying " n o " is n o t significant i n l a n g u a g e d e v e l o p m e n t simply be­ cause t h e child p e r f o r m s h e r first s p e e c h act with t h e first i n t e n t i o n a l "no." R a t h e r , saying " n o " is a c e n t r a l i n d i c a t o r of l a n g u a g e develop­ m e n t b e c a u s e t h e child is only able t o p e r f o r m a s p e e c h act, t h a t is, to e n t e r i n t o a linguistically m e d i a t e d i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n , o n c e she u n d e r s t a n d s o r d e r s , p r o h i b i t i o n s , o r offers as r e q u e s t s t h a t c a n b e d e n i e d , t h a t is, as b e h a v i o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n s t h a t c a n b e n e g a t e d . O n this first level of linguistic communication, concepts, which have de­ v e l o p e d prelinguistically a n d have h i t h e r t o s t r u c t u r e d t h e interactive realm, can be r e s t r u c t u r e d : (i) T h e r e is a differentiation b e t w e e n primitive linguistic expres­ sions a n d n o n l i n g u i s t i c gestures a n d actions. Communicative symbols express b e h a v i o r a l expectations a n d t h u s r e m a i n r o o t e d in a c o n t e x t of action, w h e r e a s n o n l i n g u i s t i c actions a r e c o n n e c t e d t o linguisti­ cally p r o d u c e d interpersonal relations as t h e fulfillment o r nonfulfill­ m e n t of b e h a v i o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n s . (ii) T h e semantic content c o m m u n i c a t e d b y m e a n s o f symbols a n d ac­ tions r e p r e s e n t s a s y n d r o m e in which certain m e a n i n g s of t h e i m p e r ­ ative m o d e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n (requests, offers) are fused with

141 Reflections o n Communicative Pathology

p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s (in r e f e r e n c e to objects in t h e world) a n d certain i n t e n t i o n s of t h e speaker (sympathy, antipathy, p l e a s u r e , p a i n , etc.). (iii) T h e c o n c e p t s of t h e actor a n d of agency are d e t e r m i n e d by t h e complementary relation b e t w e e n t h e b e h a v i o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t t h e al­ ter expresses by m e a n s of a c o m m u n i c a t i v e symbol a n d t h e action w h e r e b y t h e ego fulfills or t h w a r t s this e x p e c t a t i o n . I n t e r l o c u t o r s act from reciprocal perspectives—under c o n d i t i o n s of a d o u b l e contin­ gency: For b o t h , it is possible in p r i n c i p l e to frustrate t h e expecta­ tions of the other. (iv) A l t h o u g h t h e i m p e r a t i v e m o d e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n does n o t yet a d m i t of a n y alternative uses of l a n g u a g e , it does establish a n i m m e ­ d i a t e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n communication a n d the regulation of behavior. By p e r f o r m i n g a s p e e c h act, o n e individual i n f l u e n c e s t h e motives of t h e other. Since linguistically p r o d u c e d i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations p r e ­ suppose in p r i n c i p l e t h e possibility of rejection, motives for action m u s t b e c o n s t r a i n e d to c o m p e n s a t e f o r this new d e g r e e of f r e e d o m . (v) I n a s m u c h as i n t e r a c t i o n s are e m b e d d e d i n p o w e r relations, b e ­ havioral e x p e c t a t i o n s c a n b e s a n c t i o n e d o n t h e basis of symbolically g e n e r a l i z e d p l e a s u r e / p a i n . T h a t is, they c a n b e e n f o r c e d by m e a n s of t h e p r o s p e c t of rewards a n d t h e t h r e a t of p u n i s h m e n t . T h r o u g h this m e c h a n i s m , drives a n d affects a r e t r a n s f o r m e d into motives for ac­ tion. T h e prelinguistic predispositions of o n e ' s i n n e r n a t u r e a r e d r a w n into a n intersubjectively s h a r e d universe t h r o u g h c o m m u ­ nicative action, a n d this is h o w culturally i n t e r p r e t e d n e e d s a r e created. T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e second level of communication c a n b e e x a m ­ ined f r o m t h e perspective of t h e differentiation of l a n g u a g e as a pe­ culiar d o m a i n of reality. T h e linguistic u t t e r a n c e is differentiated f r o m (a) o t h e r semantically contentful, b u t n o n v e r b a l expressions (gestures); (b) t h e c o n t e x t of action in which it is e m b e d d e d ; (c) n o r m a t i v e social reality ( n o r m s of action a n d values); (d) t h e subjec­ tivity of t h e speakers; a n d (e) t h e c o m m u n i t y of those p a r t i c i p a t i n g in c o m m u n i c a t i o n . All these r e l a t i o n s manifest themselves in (f) t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h ; they d e t e r m i n e t h e validity basis of

142 Reflections on Communicative Pathology

linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t of t h e following r o u g h d e v e l o p m e n t a l sketch is a level of i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t p r e s u p ­ poses p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y differentiated s p e e c h . (a) A g r a m m a t i c a l s p e e c h act is distinct from n o n v e r b a l acts a n d gestures, t h a t is, bodily expressions, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d from sym­ bolic b u t n o t propositionally differentiated forms of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n such as music, d a n c e , p a i n t i n g , a n d so on, o n t h e other. S p e e c h acts a n d n o n v e r b a l expressions c a n b e functional equiva­ lents of o n e a n o t h e r . Hailing a cab nonverbally can be r e p l a c e d with a verbalized call. Silently taking s o m e o n e ' s a r m can, in the a p p r o p r i ­ ate c o n t e x t , mean t h e s a m e as t h e assurance "I'll h e l p you." I n still o t h e r cases, t h e r e is a c o m p l e m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n catego­ ries of expressions. A verbal p r o m i s e can b e k e p t by n o n v e r b a l ac­ tions. T h e s e actions t h e n have the meaning that the s p e a k e r "has k e p t his w o r d . " Linguistic a n d n o n l i n g u i s t i c expressions c a n express t h e s a m e s p e a k e r i n t e n t i o n , a n d t h e s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t of b o t h types of expression c a n by analyzed from t h e dual perspective of t h e interper­ sonal r e l a t i o n a n d t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l content. T h e r e r e m a i n s , to be sure, t h e difference t h a t s p e e c h acts b e c o m e reflexive, t h a t is, they can be t u r n e d into t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t or c o n t e n t of o t h e r s p e e c h acts. T h e linguistic a n d n o n l i n g u i s t i c m e a n s w h e r e b y c o m m u n i c a t i v e acts are p e r f o r m e d s t a n d on the s a m e level of o r g a n i z a t i o n , so to speak. T h i s is n o t the case for s p e e c h acts and gestures. For bodily ex­ pressions a r e n o t r e l a t e d to the psychological p r o c e s s they express conventionally i n t h e way t h a t s e n t e n d a l symbols are to t h e i r seman­ tic c o n t e n t . T h e y a r e often t h e sign (index) as well as t h e icon of w h a t they m e a n . B u h l e r has s o u g h t to c a p t u r e this difference b e t w e e n t h e gestural a n d linguistic functions of m e a n i n g with t h e c o n c e p t s of ex­ pressive versus r e p r e s e n t a t i v e function; Bateson with the distinction, b o r r o w e d f r o m c o m p u t e r science, between a n a l o g a n d digital trans­ mission; a n d Arieti with t h e j u x t a p o s i t i o n of p r o t o - l a n g u a g e a n d n o r ­ m a l l a n g u a g e , a j u x t a p o s i t i o n g e a r e d toward p s y c h o p a t h o l o g i c a l p h e n o m e n a . W h a t defines these c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s is t h e view t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n s c o n t a i n g e n e r a l predicates. T h e s e m u s t b e c o n n e c t e d to individual objects t h r o u g h acts of identification, w h e r e a s t h e

143 Reflections on Communicative Pathology

m e a n i n g of a gesture is explicated by its own c o n c r e t e visual charac­ ter a n d is from t h e outset r o o t e d in t h e c o n t e x t in which it is ex­ p r e s s e d so t h a t an explicit r e f e r e n c e is unnecessary. T h e bodily expression is u n e n c u m b e r e d by p r o b l e m s of r e f e r e n c e a n d by decisions a b o u t t h e context-specific a p p l i c a t i o n a n d concretization of general t e r m s b e c a u s e it lacks a propositionally artic­ ulated structure. (b) A f u r t h e r aspect of this d e v e l o p m e n t is t h e t r a n s i t i o n from c o n t e x t - d e p e n d e n t l a n g u a g e use in symbolically m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c ­ tions to context-independent language use in propositionally differenti­ ated speech. As l o n g as the d o m i n a n t m o d e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n is uniformly s t r u c t u r e d by imperatives and d o e s n o t allow for differen­ t i a t e d l a n g u a g e use, speech acts r e m a i n r o o t e d in t h e c o n t e x t of ac­ tion i n a s m u c h as t h e situation in which a n u t t e r a n c e is m a d e coincides w i t h t h e situation to which its c o n t e n t refers. But as soon as p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t can b e k e p t i n v a r i a n t with r e s p e c t to different illocutionary acts a n d c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y c h a n g i n g i n t e r p e r s o n a l rela­ tions, s e n t e n c e m e a n i n g h a s to b e r e c o n n e c t e d to t h e s p e e c h situa­ tion by m e a n s of expressions t h a t refer to t h e situation a n d b e l o n g to t h e system of r e f e r e n c e t h a t has n o w e m e r g e d . T h e flip side of free­ i n g p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t f r o m t h e imperative w e b of i n t e r a c t i o n s , of which t h e u t t e r a n c e itself is a p a r t , is t h e a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d p r o b l e m of r e f e r e n c e a n d a p p l i c a d o n . N a m e s o r definite d e s c r i p t i o n s have t o b e c h o s e n by t h e s p e a k e r in such a way t h a t a h e a r e r in a given situa­ tion could reliably identify t h e object to which t h e e x p r e s s i o n refers, t h a t is, t h a t she c o u l d pick it o u t f r o m a n u m b e r of possible objects of reference. T h e d e v e l o p m e n t s discussed u n d e r (a) a n d (b) create a n e w level of linguistic differentiation. Insofar as a s p e a k e r r e m a i n s b e l o w this level, his u t t e r a n c e s t a k e o n idiosyncratic features. B o t h inconsistencies b e t w e e n verbalized s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t a n d c o n t e n t e x p r e s s e d in n o n ­ verbal actions or gestures, as well as t h e a r b i t r a r y a p p l i c a t i o n of p u b ­ lic l a n g u a g e with o p a q u e r e f e r e n c e s betray a d e f o r m e d l a n g u a g e use t h a t is shot t h r o u g h with private meanings. (c), (d) A f u r t h e r t e n d e n c y toward the i n c r e a s i n g a u t o n o m y of l a n g u a g e e m e r g e s in the s e p a r a t i o n of s p e e c h from the n o r m a t i v e

144 Reflections o n Communicative Pathology

b a c k g r o u n d of s p e e c h acts. Elsewhere, I h a v e s h o w n t h a t t h e sys­ tematic c o n n e c t i o n of p a r t i c i p a n t a n d o b s e r v e r perspective is con­ stitutive for roles, t h a t is, for reciprocal n o r m a t i v e behavioral e x p e c t a t i o n s . T h i s splits t h e d o m a i n of the reality of symbolically m e ­ diated i n t e r a c t i o n s in two: N o r m s of action a n d values f o r m t h e rela­ tively invariant b a c k g r o u n d against which interpretive events take p l a c e in s e q u e n c e s of s p e e c h acts, n o n v e r b a l actions, a n d gestures. T h i s differentiation b e t w e e n s p e e c h a n d n o r m a t i v e social reality cor­ r e s p o n d s to t h e differentiation b e t w e e n s p e e c h a n d a s p e a k e r ' s sub­ jectivity. T h e double-sided differentiation of s p e e c h from t h e institutional reality of n o r m s of action a n d values as well as from the symbolically o r g a n i z e d e g o of a g e n t s w h o take their place within sys­ tems of roles leads to a g r e a t e r complexity in processes of r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . At t h e level of symbolically m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n , r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g within t h e m o d e of i m p e r a t i v e c o m m u n i c a ­ tion m e a n s b o t h g e t t i n g t h e o t h e r to u n d e r s t a n d a b e h a v i o r a l expec­ tation a n d to fulfill it. " R e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g " [Verstdndigung] today still h a s t h e a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d d u a l c o n n o t a t i o n of u n d e r s t a n d ­ i n g [Verstehen] a n d agreeing [Ubereinstimmen]. As soon as s p e e c h is d e t a c h e d f r o m its n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d a n d f r o m t h e identity of the speaker, t h e s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g [ Verstdndnis] of the m e a n i n g [Sinn] of a n expression in itself n o l o n g e r g u a r a n t e e s a g r e e m e n t a b o u t its r i g h t n e s s a n d acceptability. In such a case, dissensus regard­ i n g t h e r i g h t n e s s of an u t t e r a n c e t h a t is intelligible in terms of its se­ m a n t i c c o n t e n t may c o n c e r n t h e fact t h a t t h e u t t e r a n c e (i) fails to m e e t a c o m m o n l y r e c o g n i z e d n o r m or (ii) a c c o r d s with a d i s p u t e d n o r m . T h e dissensus, however, m a y also r e f e r to t h e self-representa­ tion of t h e speaker, t h a t is, to t h e fact (iii) t h a t an u t t e r a n c e d o e s n o t fit with a r e c o g n i z e d identity o r a n ego-ideal o r (iv) t h a t it accords w i t h a n identity t h a t is itself c o n t e s t e d . (e) S p e e c h b e c o m e s a u t o n o m o u s relative to o t h e r f o r m s of ex­ pression, relative to t h e c o n t e x t of action, relative to n o r m a t i v e social reality a n d t h e speaker's subjectivity. T h e result is t h a t s p e e c h be­ comes subject t o an external organization t h a t resolves t h e steering p r o b l e m s t h a t c r o p u p . Socially, f o r e x a m p l e , t h e r e a r e q u e s t i o n s as to w h o m a y p a r t i c i p a t e (actively o r passively) in which s p e e c h situa­ tions, h o w formally or diffusely relationships get defined, a n d so o n .

145 Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology

T e m p o r a l l y t h e r e are issues r e g a r d i n g w h o may start or stop discus­ sion, w h o may c o n t r i b u t e s o m e t h i n g to t h e conversation, h o w often, a n d in w h a t order. I n terms of c o n t e n t , t h e r e are issues r e g a r d i n g t h e o r d e r of topics a n d c o n t r i b u t i o n s , h o w precisely topics are d e f i n e d a n d h o w extensively they g e t treated, h o w b r o a d t h e s p e c t r u m of c o n t r i b u t i o n s s h o u l d b e , a n d so o n . Of c o u r s e t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t t h a t d e t e r m i n e s t h e p a t t e r n s of i n t e r a c t i o n is also r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e e x t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h . But in a d d i t i o n , s p e e c h is subject to its o w n o r g a n i z i n g imperatives. Moreover, it serves as t h e a r e n a w h e r e speakers h a v e to reconcile different i n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n t e x t s a n d c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r differential p l a n s of action a n d t h e i r n e e d s . T h u s e a c h p a r t i c i p a n t can try t o i n f l u e n c e t h e e x t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h with t h e aim of altering t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t t o h e r advan­ tage. T h e a u t o n o m y of s p e e c h o p e n s u p t h e possibility of e m p l o y i n g t h e means of communicative action strategically w i t h o u t ostensibly violat­ i n g t h e c o m m i t m e n t to consensus. Some e x a m p l e s of this a r e de­ bates over t h e o r d e r of business in associations a n d p a r l i a m e n t s , c o n v e r s a t i o n s in i n f o r m a l g r o u p s , a n d especially h a b i t u a l s p e e c h strategies in t h e family t h a t serve t h e u n d e c l a r e d p u r s u i t of u n a p ­ proved interests u n d e r t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of c o n s e n s u a l action ( a n d c o n s e n s u a l conflict r e s o l u t i o n ) . E g o c e n t r i c perspectives m a y b e built i n t o t h e asymmetries of h o w speech is o r g a n i z e d in m o r e or less obvi­ o u s ways. (f) T h e differentiation of s p e e c h t h a t I have e l a b o r a t e d u n d e r (a) t h r o u g h (e) is m i r r o r e d by t h e internal organization of speech. T h e e x t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h normatively d e t e r m i n e s (i.e., t h r o u g h r e g u l a t i o n s o f a n institutional n a t u r e ) h o w t h e g e n e r a l s t e e r i n g p r o b l e m s of a linguistic system of c o m m u n i c a t i o n a r e re­ solved. T h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h consists i n t h e universal p r a g m a t i c r e g u l a t i o n of s e q u e n c e s of s p e e c h acts, a n d this r e g u l a t i o n does n o t r e q u i r e any b a c k i n g by social n o r m s o w i n g to its t r a n s c e n dentally necessitating n a t u r e . As the i n d e p e n d e n t s p h e r e of g r a m m a t i c a l s t r u c t u r e s t h a t a r e f o r m e d in a c c o r d a n c e to (or violation of) certain rules d e s c r i b e d u n ­ d e r (a) b e c o m e s a u t o n o m o u s , t h e n e e d arises for evaluating an ut­ terance as an e l e m e n t of a l a n g u a g e . An u t t e r a n c e is unintelligible if it d o e s n o t b e l o n g to t h e set of well-formed expressions t h a t can b e

146 Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology

p r o d u c e d by m e a n s of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e system of g r a m m a t i c a l rules. T h e differentiation of p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s d e s c r i b e d u n d e r (b) gives rise to t h e n e e d t o j u d g e w h e t h e r a p r o p o s i t i o n is true or false, a n d w h e t h e r an object of w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is asserted can b e i d e n t i f i e d or n o t , t h a t is, w h e t h e r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n c o u l d b e t r u e o r w h e t h e r it is meaningless. T h e s e p a r a t i o n b e t w e e n s p e e c h a n d a n o r ­ mative b a c k g r o u n d i n d i c a t e d in (c) gives rise to t h e n e e d to j u d g e a given u t t e r a n c e with r e s p e c t to w h e t h e r it m e e t s socially b i n d i n g val­ ues or a prevailing n o r m and is in that sense right or w h e t h e r it vio­ lates established structures of e x p e c t a t i o n . Similarly, the split between s p e e c h a n d a s p e a k e r ' s subjectivity cited u n d e r (d) raises t h e n e e d to j u d g e t h e s p e a k e r ' s expressed i n t e n t i o n with r e g a r d t o w h e t h e r t h e s p e a k e r expresses it sincerely or insincerely. In p e r f o r m i n g s p e e c h acts, we are r e q u i r e d to m e e t universal de­ m a n d s t h a t g r o u n d t h e validity of o u r claims. T h e s e d e m a n d s reflect t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n t h e s p e e c h acts a n d t h e i r p r o p e r linguistic m e d i u m , t h e n o r m a t i v e social reality, a n d t h e i n n e r subjecdve n a t u r e of t h e speakers. As soon as this validity basis of s p e e c h is established, different m o d e s of l a n g u a g e u s e c a n b e differentiated d e p e n d i n g o n w h i c h validity c l a i m is thematically h i g h l i g h t e d : T h e r e a r e cognitive, interactive, a n d expressive uses of l a n g u a g e . T h e o c c u r r e n c e of these different m o d e s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n is a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n for p e r f o r m a t i v e n e g a t i o n , t h a t is, for e x t e n d i n g the n e g a t i o n of sen­ tences to s p e e c h acts. At t h e first level of c o m m u n i c a t i o n only t h e be­ havioral e x p e c t a t i o n of a n o t h e r can b e n e g a t e d ; at t h e s e c o n d level, t h e s p e a k e r is able to d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n a r e j e c d o n of w h a t is p r o ­ p o s e d in t h e s p e e c h act (I d o n ' t accept y o u r p r o m i s e ) , a n e g a t e d s p e e c h act (I a m n o t p r o m i s i n g you t h a t I will c o m e ) , a n d a n e g a t e d p r o p o s i t i o n (I p r o m i s e t h a t I will n o t c o m e ) . (3) In discussing t h e " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " place value of t h e validity basis, o n e m i g h t t h i n k t h a t it is impossible to diverge from t h e uni­ versal d e m a n d s t h a t g r o u n d validity, t h a t t h e i n t e r n a l organization of s p e e c h is inviolable. If t h a t were t h e case, we would n o t even n e e d to explicate t h e n o r m a t i v e f o u n d a t i o n of s p e e c h since t h e n o r m a l con­ d i t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n f r o m w h i c h a s p e a k e r c o u l d n o t diverge w o u l d b e of n o i n t e r e s t for analyzing distorted p a t t e r n s of c o m m u n i ­ cation. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , n o r m a l c y c o n d i t i o n s for t h e e x t e r n a l or-

147 Reflections on Communicative Pathology

ganization of speech seem to b e given in a different sense t h a n t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r its i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . T h e p r o b l e m s r e g a r d i n g t e m p o r a l , spatial, a n d substantive dispositions leave c o n s i d e r a b l e lee­ way for s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n , which can be utilized differently d e p e n d i n g o n t h e functional c o n t e x t in w h i c h c o m m u n i c a t i o n takes place. T h e key t o t h e p a t h o g e n e s i s of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n , in my view, lies in a certain overburdening of the external organization of speech. T h i s bur­ d e n must be shifted onto the internal organization of speech a n d results in systematic distortion. I use the t e r m "distortion" to stress the insight t h a t the i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h expresses u n i v e r s a l a n d u n ­ avoidable p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e t r a n ­ s c e n d e n t a l necessity implied by this f e a t u r e of ineluctability o r of a lack of alternatives d o e s n o t imply inviolability. Rather, it m e a n s t h a t t h e violation of t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h gives rise to p a t h o l o g i c a l m u t a t i o n s of t h e p a t t e r n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I n o t h e r words, t h e p a t h o g e n e s i s c a n b e t r a c e d b a c k to p r o b l e m s t h a t e x e r t p r e s s u r e o n t h e e x t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of speech. W h e n this p r e s s u r e is shifted f r o m t h e e x t e r n a l to the i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h , it has a distorting effect. I s h o u l d n o w like to analyze this distortion, w h i c h sets in at the validity basis of speech. T h e d i s t u r b a n c e of systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n lies at a d e e p e r level than the d i s t u r b a n c e of a n o m a l o u s b e h a v i o r that ex­ presses itself in d i v e r g e n c e f r o m a socially b i n d i n g n o r m . D i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n does n o t violate a n y n o r m s of a c t i o n t h a t enjoy so­ cial validity f o r c o n t i n g e n t reasons; t h e y violate universal p r e s u p p o s i ­ tions of c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t in n o way c h a n g e from o n e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t to a n o t h e r . Of course even a flawed c o m m u n i c a t i o n is a c o m ­ m u n i c a t i o n , w h i c h in m a n y cases m a y still b e r e g a r d e d as n o r m a l s p e e c h — " n o r m a l " in t h e cultural sense of n o r m a l c y t h a t covers everything within t h e b o u n d s of w h a t is socially a c c e p t e d . T h e following a r e universal presuppositions

of communicative

action:

(i) t h a t the p a r t i c i p a n t s m u t u a l l y c o n s i d e r each o t h e r to b e account­ able. T h a t is, they m u s t p r e s u m e o n e a n o t h e r to have overcome child­ ish e g o c e n t r i s m a n d to b e able to distinguish between t h e intersubjectivity of l a n g u a g e , t h e objectivity of e x t e r n a l n a t u r e , t h e subjectivity of i n n e r n a t u r e , a n d t h e normativity of society; a n d

148 Reflections on Communicative Pathology

(ii) t h a t t h e y m u t u a l l y c o n s i d e r o n e a n o t h e r ready and willing to reach mutual understanding. T h e y must mutually s u p p o s e o n e a n o t h e r to be disposed e i t h e r t o act o n t h e basis of or to b r i n g a b o u t a c o n s e n s u s r e g a r d i n g t h e f o u r validity claims i n h e r e n t in s p e e c h (the intelligibil­ ity of a n u t t e r a n c e , t h e t r u t h of t h e asserted o r m e n t i o n e d proposi­ tional c o n t e n t , t h e rightness of t h e u t t e r a n c e w i t h r e f e r e n c e to a n accepted n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d , a n d t h e sincerity of t h e s p e a k e r re­ g a r d i n g t h e i n t e n t i o n s she is e x p r e s s i n g ) . I n o t h e r words, they m u s t a t t r i b u t e to each o t h e r dispositions to reach agreement. T h i s g e n e r a l c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of a m u t u a l l y a t t r i b u t e d willingness to r e a c h m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g d o e s n o t h o l d for strategic, b u t only for c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. T h u s a speaker S w h o is willing t o r e a c h m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g will (a) select a linguistic expression so t h a t t h e h e a r e r / / u n d e r s t a n d s it as S i n t e n d s H to u n d e r s t a n d it; (b) f o r m u l a t e t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t so t h a t it r e p r e s e n t s a n ex­ p e r i e n c e o r a fact ( a n d so that Hcan share S's k n o w l e d g e ) ; (c) express h e r i n t e n t i o n so t h a t t h e linguistic expression r e p r e s e n t s w h a t S m e a n s ( a n d so t h a t Hmay t r u s t S); (d) e x e c u t e t h e s p e e c h act so t h a t it m e e t s a c c e p t e d n o r m s o r c o r r e ­ s p o n d s to a c c e p t e d self-images ( a n d so t h a t H c a n a g r e e w i t h S o n this). T h e validity of t h e sentence u s e d d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r it is well formed in a c c o r d a n c e with g r a m m a t i c a l rules. T h e validity of t h e proposition (or t h e existential p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t ) de­ p e n d s o n w h e t h e r it (or they) correspond(s) to reality. T h e validity of t h e intention e x p r e s s e d d e p e n d s on w h e t h e r it coincides with what the s p e a k e r m e a n s . A n d , finally, t h e validity of t h e s p e e c h act d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r it fulfills a c k n o w l e d g e d b a c k g r o u n d n o r m s . If t h e intelligibility of a c o m m u n i c a t i o n breaks down, t h e c o m m u n i ­ cative d i s t u r b a n c e c a n b e t h e m a t i z e d at t h e level of h e r m e n e u t i c dis­ c o u r s e , in c o n n e c t i o n with t h e relevant linguistic system. I n cognitive l a n g u a g e u s e , we take on an obligation to g r o u n d o u r claim [Begrundungsverpflichtung] t h a t is i n h e r e n t in t h e s p e e c h act. Con­ stative s p e e c h acts c o n t a i n t h e offer to t a k e r e c o u r s e , if necessary, t o t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l s o u r c e f r o m w h i c h t h e speaker draws the certainty

149 Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology

t h a t his s t a t e m e n t is t r u e . If this i m m e d i a t e g r o u n d i n g [Begriindung] fails to satisfy an ad h o c d o u b t , t h e p r o b l e m a t i z e d t r u t h claim can be­ c o m e t h e object of a t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . I n interactive l a n g u a g e use, we take o n a n obligation to justify o u r claim [Rechtfertigungsverpflichtung] i n h e r e n t in the s p e e c h act. Regulative s p e e c h acts c o n t a i n only t h e offer of a s p e a k e r to refer, if necessary, to t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t t h a t gives t h e speaker t h e conviction t h a t h e r utter­ ance is right. O n c e again, if t h e i m m e d i a t e justification [Rechtfertigung] fails to r e m o v e a n a d h o c d o u b t , we may m o v e to the level of discourse, in this case of practical discourse. With this m o v e , how­ ever, t h e object of t h e discursive test b e c o m e s n o t t h e claim to n o r ­ mative validity t h a t is c o n n e c t e d t o t h e s p e e c h act; b u t t h e validity claim of the underlying norm. Lastly, even in expressive l a n g u a g e use, t h e speaker u n d e r t a k e s a w a r r a n t i n h e r e n t in t h e s p e e c h act, namely, t h e obligation to p r o v e trustworthy [Bewahrungsverpflichtung] by d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h r o u g h t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of his actions t h a t h e has expressed t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t actually motivates him. I n case t h e im­ m e d i a t e assurance t h a t expresses w h a t is evident to t h e speaker himself fails to dissipate a n ad h o c d o u b t , t h e sincerity of t h e u t t e r a n c e c a n only b e tested against t h e consistency of t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of action. N o w w h a t does a violation of t h e universal p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of c o m ­ munication mean? A n u t t e r a n c e m u s t b e sufficiently well f o r m e d so t h a t it c a n b e u n ­ d e r s t o o d . Otherwise it does n o t serve t h e p u r p o s e of r e a c h i n g m u ­ t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . It is n o t possible to w a n t to c o m m u n i c a t e and to express oneself unintelligibly o r misleadingly: h e r e i n lies t h e necessi­ t a t i n g m o m e n t t h a t is r e m i n i s c e n t of a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l necessity. In­ telligibility is a claim t h a t can b e satisfied to a d e g r e e : An u t t e r a n c e may b e m o r e o r less intelligible, b u t it m u s t b e intelligible uberhaupt (i.e., sufficiently so) if it is to fulfill its c o m m u n i c a t i v e p u r p o s e . It is possible to set different s t a n d a r d s of intelligibility for u t t e r a n c e s de­ p e n d i n g o n t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r functional contexts. F o r e x a m p l e , t h e s t a n d a r d s of precision a n d d e m a n d s f o r e x p l i c a t i o n in science a r e different from t h o s e of everyday c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I w o u l d like to c o m p a r e several violations of t h e claim to intelligibility in o r d e r to identify t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which s o m e t h i n g like a systematic dis­ tortion of c o m m u n i c a t i o n occurs.

150 Reflections on Communicative Pathology

(a) A s p e a k e r wishes t o e x p r e s s h i m s e l f in a foreign l a n g u a g e of which h e has limited mastery, b u t t h e a t t e m p t fails. His u t t e r a n c e s re­ m a i n unintelligible. Yet the s p e a k e r w o u l d be perfectly able to ex­ press w h a t h e m e a n s intelligibly in his m o t h e r t o n g u e . I d o n o t call this a case of systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n , b u t of incom­ p e t e n c e . T h e s p e a k e r is i n c o m p e t e n t t o express w h a t h e m e a n s w i t h i n t h e c o n v e n t i o n s of a f o r e i g n l a n g u a g e . (b) A scientist fails to express herself sufficiently clearly. She abides n e i t h e r by t h e d e m a n d s for explication n o r by t h e t e r m i n o l o g y of a discourse, which is regulated by an academic discipline. H e r col­ leagues c o m p l a i n t h a t she is unintelligible. T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t her factual assertions are n o t intelligible, b u t only t h a t they violate t h e n o r m s of a level of intelligibility to be e x p e c t e d in t h e c o n t e x t of a specialized p u b l i c s p h e r e . I n this case, c o m m u n i c a t i o n is n o t dis­ t o r t e d either. (c) I n an e m b a r r a s s i n g situation, o n e of t h e p e o p l e involved tries to express himself so as to m a i n t a i n a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g that defuses t h e situation. T h i s m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g may have b e e n i n t e n d e d o r it m a y h a v e arisen by accident. O r a s p e a k e r tries to express herself u n ­ intelligibly i n a c o m m u n i c a t i v e situation t h a t has d e r a i l e d a n d in which any of t h e possible r e a c t i o n s w o u l d be equally e m b a r r a s s i n g . She c h o o s e s a m i l d f o r m of b r e a k i n g off c o m m u n i c a t i o n o r of obfuscation i n o r d e r to avoid t h e o t h e r w i s e u n a v o i d a b l e conflict. N e i t h e r is so m u c h a case of systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n as a n in­ stance of strategic action r e p l a c i n g c o n s e n s u a l action. I n t e n d e d mis­ u n d e r s t a n d i n g s a n d i n t e n d e d lack of u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e p a r t of a strategy in t h e course of which t h e s p e a k e r silently s u s p e n d s essential p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n (sincerity, r i g h t n e s s ) . (d) A s p e a k e r expresses himself (in his m o t h e r t o n g u e ) unintelligi­ bly or confusedly w i t h o u t n o t i c i n g o r i n t e n d i n g it. T h e a n o m a l y of his m a n n e r of expression m a y b e c a u s e d by illogical o r p a r a d o x i c a l l a n g u a g e use. T h a t is, verbal a n d n o n v e r b a l messages m a y c o n t r a d i c t e a c h other. A b i z a r r e f o r m of expression, however, m a y also result from a n idiosyncratic use of s e m a n t i c s o r f r o m violations of syntax. If i n t e r j e c d o n s of private l a n g u a g e violate t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r e s u p ­ position of intelligibility, a n d t h u s t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of

151 Reflections on C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology

s p e e c h , even t h o u g h t h e s p e a k e r does n o t intentionally a b a n d o n t h e f o u n d a t i o n of c o n s e n s u a l action, t h e n we h a v e w h a t I w a n t to call sys­ tematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n . S o m e t h i n g similar applies to two o t h e r validity claims: sincerity a n d n o r m a t i v e Tightness. Unless an i n t e n t i o n is expressed sincerely, t h e speaker's i n t e n t i o n c a n n o t serve t h e p u r p o s e of r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Again, t r a n s c e n d e n t a l necessitation is evident in t h e fact t h a t o n e c a n n o t w a n t b o t h to m a k e oneself u n d e r s t o o d a n d to express o n e ' s i n t e n t i o n insincerely. In cognitive l a n g u a g e u s e (I as­ sert t h a t p) t h e implicit i n t e n t i o n of t h e speaker (that t h e speaker knows s o m e t h i n g ) is n o t t h e m a t i z e d . Similarly, in interactive lan­ g u a g e use (I o r d e r y o u t h a t p), t h e s p e a k e r ' s e m b e d d e d i n t e n t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e s (that she gives t h e o r d e r fearfully, threateningly, cold-bloodedly, embarrassedly, etc.) are e x p r e s s e d only incidentally. O n l y in expressive l a n g u a g e use (I suspect that p; I h o p e that p; I do n o t deny that I miss you, that I h a t e you, love you, etc.) d o i n t e n ­ tional e x p e r i e n c e s lose t h e i r s e c o n d a r y c h a r a c t e r . A l t h o u g h t h e r e is t h e possibility t h a t t h e speaker expresses h e r i n t e n t i o n sincerely o r insincerely, t h e c l a i m to sincerity m a y also b e r e d e e m e d by degree. How m u c h a s p e a k e r conceals b e h i n d his explicit sincere u t t e r a n c e s d e p e n d s o n t h e context. I n different f u n c t i o n a l c o n t e x t s , this cir­ c u m s t a n c e is g r o u n d s for s t a n d a r d i z i n g t h e s c o p e of sincere utter­ ances. E x a m p l e s a r e u t t e r a n c e s u n d e r o a t h d u r i n g trials o r m a r r i a g e c e r e m o n i e s , w h i c h institutionalize a uni- o r bilateral claim to "the whole t r u t h , " t h u s e x c l u d i n g strategic w i t h h o l d i n g of i n f o r m a t i o n . C o n s i d e r t h e following e x a m p l e s : (a) A witness is u n d e r suspicion of having given false testimony. H e r e p e a t s his t e s t i m o n y u n d e r o a t h . L a t e r it t u r n s o u t t h a t h e h a s pur­ posely s u p p r e s s e d a relevant fact without h a v i n g c o m m i t t e d a n out­ right lie. H e r e t h e witness is violating a n o r m t h a t is i m p o r t a n t to the f u n c t i o n i n g of c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s ; namely, telling t h e t r u t h to its full e x t e n t . H e is acting strategically in a d o m a i n of action for which a valid n o r m p r e s c r i b e s acting o n t h e basis of c o n s e n s u s . (b) O n e p a r t n e r in a c o u p l e p r e t e n d s t o have feelings t h a t t h e o t h e r expects. Let's a s s u m e we a r e talking a b o u t a w o m a n w h o d o e s n o t w a n t t o e n d a n g e r t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t of t h e m a r r i a g e a n d t h e

152 Reflections on Communicative Pathology

family. F o r t h e sake of this strategic goal, she k e e p s u p t h e a p p e a r ­ a n c e of r e c i p r o c a t i n g the affection of h e r h u s b a n d w h o m she has l o n g d e t e s t e d . T h i s gives rise to two levels of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . At t h e level of manifest behavior, t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of c o n s e n s u a l a c t i o n a r e m e t . At the level of l a t e n t behavior, o n e of the p a r t i c i p a n t s is acting strategically a n d intentionally violates t h e p r e ­ s u p p o s i t i o n of sincerity. T h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h is b e i n g unilaterally a n d intentionally violated. (c) W e m a y modify this e x a m p l e . T h e wife deceives n o t only h e r hus­ b a n d r e g a r d i n g h e r t r u e feelings, b u t also herself. (We n e e d n o t con­ sider t h e structurally a n a l o g o u s case in which b o t h p a r t n e r s relate to e a c h o t h e r as well as to themselves insincerely, since it differs from t h e simple case o n l y in d e g r e e of complexity.) Again, c o m m u n i c a ­ tion is split a n d transpires at t h e manifest level such t h a t t h e condi­ tions of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action are m e t , while at the l a t e n t level, o n e of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s is acting strategically by s u s p e n d i n g t h e sincerity claim. But n o w t h e s p e a k e r violates a c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y a n d in such a way t h a t t h e violation of t h e organiza­ tion of s p e e c h goes u n n o t i c e d by bothparties. In cases (b) a n d (c) t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n participants is systematically distorted, b u t only in t h e latter case can t h e d i s t u r b a n c e b e t r a c e d back to a d i s r u p ­ tion of c o m m u n i c a t i o n within t h e psyche of o n e of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s . S u s p e n d i n g t h e claim to n o r m a t i v e rightness has similar conse­ q u e n c e s . A n u t t e r a n c e has to fit i n t o t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t ; o t h e r ­ wise it is n o t r e c o g n i z e d a n d fails to serve t h e p u r p o s e of r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . A t r a n s c e n d e n t a l necessitation asserts itself in t h e fact t h a t o n e m a y n o t at t h e same t i m e w a n t m u t u a l u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g a n d m a k e u t t e r a n c e s t h a t violate r e c o g n i z e d n o r m s a n d val­ ues. H e r e I w a n t to leave it o p e n w h e t h e r the n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d is equally b i n d i n g for all p a r t i c i p a n t s or w h e t h e r it m e d i a t e s by m e a n s of a n o r m a t i v e self-image a n d d e t e r m i n e s h o w a particular per­ son o u g h t to act i n a given situation. I w a n t to distinguish b e t w e e n t h e degree of formalization w h e r e b y a b e h a v i o r is s t a n d a r d i z e d a n d t h e degree of fulfillment of an existing n o r m by a p a r t i c u l a r behavior. I n o u r c o n t e x t , only this deviation from n o r m s , which can-

153 Reflections on Communicative Pathology

n o t be f u r t h e r s t a n d a r d i z e d , is of interest. C o n s i d e r t h e following examples. (a) A speaker b e h a v e s t o o informally by i g n o r i n g social distance a n d trying to create an intimacy t h a t is i n a p p r o p r i a t e in t h e situation a t h a n d . This k i n d of n o r m violation h a s n o t h i n g to d o with d i s t o r t e d communication. (b) A s p e a k e r may b e h a v e awkwardly a n d m a y not feel u p to h a n ­ dling a particularly f o r m a l situation, such as a r e c e p t i o n , a test, etc. O r s h e behaves i n a p p r o p r i a t e l y b e c a u s e she d o e s n o t k n o w what t h e n o r m a d v e c o n t e x t is. This is a case of b e h a v i o r t h a t deviates from t h e n o r m s o w i n g to i n c o m p e t e n c e . Again, it has n o t h i n g to d o with dis­ torted communication. (c) B o t h of these are q u i t e different f r o m inflexible b e h a v i o r t h a t stereotypically r e c u r s , b u t is n o t necessarily e x p e r i e n c e d by t h e a c t o r as a b n o r m a l . This c a t e g o r y i n c l u d e s n e u r o t i c b e h a v i o r p a t t e r n s — u t t e r a n c e s t h a t are forcibly s t a n d a r d i z e d a n d are felt to b e p e c u l i a r a n d o u t of place by o t h e r s . Again, a split of c o m m u n i c a t i o n can b e o b s e r v e d : T h i s time, only t h e s p e a k e r takes t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r e ­ suppositions to b e met, while o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s r e g a r d t h e c o m m u ­ n i c a t i o n as flawed. T h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of speech is d a m a g e d at t h e level of manifestation; only for t h e s p e a k e r does t h e s e m b l a n c e of a s m o o t h flow of c o m m u n i c a t i o n persist. (d) If p a r t i c i p a n t s d i s a g r e e a b o u t t h e n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d , if t h e o t h e r considers c e r t a i n n o r m s of a c t i o n to b e r i g h t t h a t t h e e g o re­ j e c t s , o r if t h e o t h e r d o e s n o t a c c e p t t h e e g o ' s i m a g e of herself, t h e n we c a n n o l o n g e r talk a b o u t deviating behavior; instead, we n o w have a conflict. T h i s c a n give rise to distortion effects for t h e i n t e r n a l or­ ganization of s p e e c h if t h e conflict is r e p r e s s e d a n d disguised a n d c o n t i n u e s to s m o l d e r u n d e r t h e cover of a p p a r e n t l y c o n s e n s u a l ac­ tion. Here, too, t h e r e is a split of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , w h i c h we shall ex­ a m i n e in detail. I h a v e n o t discussed violations of t h e claim to t r u t h . T h e social s t a n d a r d i z a t i o n of w h a t c o u n t s as vindicating this claim c a n a p p l y only to the w a r r a n t to g r o u n d t h e claim, which is i m m a n e n t in t h e

154 Reflections on Communicative Pathology

s p e e c h act. I d o n o t take o n t h e s a m e w a r r a n t for an assertion I m a k e in t h e c o u r s e of small talk as I d o for a s t a t e m e n t I m a k e i n t h e course of a scientific discussion. Curiously, t h e r e is n o violation of t r u t h t h a t is s y m p t o m a t i c of systematically distorted c o m m u n i c a t i o n . (a) O n e can b e m i s t a k e n , a n d o n e maybe mistaken. An u n i n t e n t i o n ­ ally false s t a t e m e n t d o e s not fall into t h e class of actions for which we are a c c o u n t a b l e . T h e care with which a speaker makes g o o d o n t h e w a r r a n t h e takes o n with a constative s p e e c h act can be s a n c t i o n e d m u c h like lying, b u t e r r o r c a n n o t . I n d e e d discovering mistakes is a c o n d i t i o n for l e a r n i n g . Mistakes d o n o t affect t h e i n t e r n a l organiza­ tion of s p e e c h . (b) T h i n g s a r e s o m e w h a t different in t h e case of "wanton asser­ tions. " If by t h a t we m e a n u t t e r a n c e s in which t h e speaker carelessly or intentionally n e g l e c t s the m i n i m a l obligations of a constative s p e e c h act, we are n o t d e a l i n g with assertions or at least n o t with correcdy f o r m e d a c c e p t a b l e s p e e c h acts. In certain contexts, we m a y be d e a l i n g with assertions with w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r tries t o m a k e t h i n g s easy for himself by n o t t a k i n g t h e b u r d e n of p r o o f seriously, etc. H e r e t h e s p e a k e r is violating social n o r m s , n o t communicative presuppositions. (c) Lies, too, d o n o t d a m a g e t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h as l o n g as they o c c u r as o p e n l y d e c l a r e d and permissible c o m p o n e n t s of strategic action. O n l y if t h e y a r e u s e d to disguise a conflict c a n t h e y d i s t o r t c o m m u n i c a t i o n . B u t in t h a t case it is n o t t h e p r e s u p p o s i ­ tion of t r u t h b u t t h a t of sincerity t h a t is violated: t h e speaker is n o t expressing h e r i n t e n t i o n sincerely; s h e knows t h a t h e r s t a t e m e n t is false, b u t h i d e s it f r o m o t h e r s . T h e c o m p a r i s o n of these e x a m p l e s shows t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n c a n b e systematically d i s t o r t e d only if t h e i n t e r n a l organization of speech is d i s r u p t e d . This h a p p e n s if t h e validity basis of linguistic c o m m u n i ­ cation is c u r t a i l e d surreptitiously; t h a t is, w i t h o u t l e a d i n g to a b r e a k in c o m m u n i c a t i o n or to the transition to o p e n l y declared a n d permissi­ ble strategic action. T h e validity basis of s p e e c h is c u r t a i l e d surrepti­ tiously if at least o n e of the t h r e e universal validity claims to intelligibility (of t h e e x p r e s s i o n ) , sincerity (of t h e i n t e n t i o n ex-

155 Reflections on Communicative Pathology

p r e s s e d by the s p e a k e r ) , a n d n o r m a t i v e Tightness (of t h e expression relative to a n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d ) is violated a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n n o n e t h e l e s s c o n t i n u e s o n t h e p r e s u m p t i o n of communicative (not strategic) action o r i e n t e d toward r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h i s is only possible by splitting c o m m u n i c a t i o n , by d o u b l i n g it u p i n t o a public a n d a private process. W e c a n e x a m i n e h o w this h a p ­ p e n s by f u r t h e r l o o k i n g at defense m e c h a n i s m s . Since systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o n t i n u e s t h e t h r e a d of action o r i e n t e d to r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , this d i s t u r b a n c e m a y b e culturally n o r m a l ­ ized u n d e r c e r t a i n conditions. T h e c o n f o u n d i n g t h i n g a b o u t "sys­ tematic d i s t o r t i o n " is t h a t t h e same validity claims t h a t a r e b e i n g violated ( a n d violation of w h i c h has p a t h o l o g i c a l effects) at t h e s a m e t i m e serve to k e e p u p t h e a p p e a r a n c e of c o n s e n s u a l action. T h e vio­ lation of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of cognition has t h e effect of a loss of m e a n i n g , as c a n b e seen in t h e e x a m p l e of category mis­ takes. T h e violation of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of commu­ nication also leads to a loss of m e a n i n g , if the s p e a k e r falls below t h e level of differentiation of t h e s e c o n d level of c o m m u n i c a t i o n (as is t h e case with s c h i z o p h r e n i c linguistic d i s t u r b a n c e s ) . But these a r e e x t r e m e cases. Usually c o m m u n i c a t i v e p a t h o l o g i e s r e s u l t n o t in a loss of m e a n i n g , b u t in distortion. T h i s is b e c a u s e c o m m u n i c a t i v e processes c o n t i n u e as l o n g as t h e violation of s o m e of their transcen­ d e n t a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s is n o t manifest, t h a t is, as l o n g as it is n o t rec­ ognized a n d a d m i t t e d by t h e participants. (4) Systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s express a p o t e n t i a l for conflict t h a t c a n n o t b e c o m p l e t e l y s u p p r e s s e d b u t is n o t sup­ p o s e d to b e c o m e manifest. O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e s t r u c t u r e of c o m ­ m u n i c a t i o n is d e f o r m e d u n d e r t h e p r e s s u r e of conflicts t h a t a r e n o t c a r r i e d o u t b e c a u s e t h e validity basis of s p e e c h is d a m a g e d . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a n d simultaneously, this d e f o r m e d s t r u c t u r e stabilizes a c o n t e x t of action that, a l t h o u g h c h a r g e d with t h e p o t e n t i a l for conflict, constrains a n d to some extent immobilizes t h a t p o t e n t i a l . T h u s we a r e d e a l i n g w i t h conflicts t h a t c a n b e n e i t h e r o p e n l y c a r r i e d o u t n o r resolved consensually, b u t t h a t s m o l d e r o n w i t h t h e effect of distorting c o m m u n i c a t i o n . Conflicts of identity t h a t arise from t h e u n c o n s c i o u s r e p r e s s i o n of

156 Reflections on Communicative Pathology

t h r e a t s to g r o u p o r e g o identity fit this d e s c r i p t i o n . A n identity c a n b e secured only by m e a n s of i n t e r p e r s o n a l relationships; it stands a n d falls with t h e " r e c o g n i t i o n " it finds—be it at t h e cross-cultural or i n t e r n a t i o n a l level o r at t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l level a m o n g friends a n d family, a n d so o n . If a n identity is t h r e a t e n e d by t h e w i t h h o l d i n g of r e c o g n i t i o n , it is often d e f e n d e d i n a p a r a d o x i c a l m a n n e r . O n t h e o n e h a n d , every d e f e n s e is a strategic action; it can b e o p t i m i z e d only u n d e r t h e m a x i m s of p u r p o s i v e action. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e goal of t h e defense c a n n o t be a t t a i n e d strategically, t h a t is, by w i n n i n g a fight o r a g a m e by defeating o n e ' s o p p o n e n t — r e c o g n i t i o n ultimately c a n n o t be w o n by force. Only d i s i n g e n u o u s or a p p a r e n t r e c o g n i t i o n c a n be t h u s g a i n e d ; this is e i t h e r t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o real r e c o g n i t i o n o r it b e c o m e s frail. T h a t is, it b e c o m e s clear t h a t t h e f o r c e d signs o f r e c o g n i t i o n w e r e n o t seriously m e a n t as r e c o g n i t i o n . I n w h a t follows I w a n t to set aside p r o b l e m s of collective identity a n d c o n s i d e r d e f e n s e strategies for p e r s o n a l identities. L a i n g ' s ob­ servations a r e helpful h e r e : A person's "own" identity cannot be perfectly abstracted from his identity-for-others. His identity-for-himself; the identity that others ascribe to him; the identities that he attributes to them; the identity or identities he thinks they attribute to him; what he thinks they think he thinks they think. . . . "Identity" is that whereby one feels that one is the same in this place, this time as at that time and at that place, past or future. It is that by which one is identified. I have the impression that most people tend to come to feel that they are the same continuotis being from womb to tomb. And that this "identity," the more it is phantasy, is the more intensely defended. 11

T h e p a r a d o x t h a t I m e n t i o n e d can b e c o r r o b o r a t e d by t h e strategies u s e d to d e f e n d o n e ' s e g o identity. T h e d e f e n d e r , w h o c a n stabilize his t h r e a t e n e d identity only by s u c c e e d i n g in h a v i n g it r e c o n f i r m e d , o n t h e o n e h a n d m u s t s t a n d his g r o u n d in a conflict, b u t o n t h e o t h e r h a n d m u s t suppress this conflict in o r d e r n o t t o destroy t h e c o n s e n s u a l f o u n d a t i o n of the m u t u a l l y d e s i r e d r e c o g n i t i o n a n d in o r d e r n o t to risk t h e b r e a k d o w n of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p . At this p o i n t , I w a n t to illustrate t h e dynamics of such identity conflicts with a n e x a m p l e t h a t L a i n g a n d his colleagues c o n s t r u e as follows.

157 Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology

[ T h e vicious c i r c l e ] s t a r t s t o w h i r l s o m e t h i n g like this: Peter:

Paul:

1. I ' m u p s e t . 2. P a u l is a c t i n g v e r y dispassionate.

1. P e t e r is u p s e t . calm

and

2. I'll t r y t o h e l p h i m by r e m a i n i n g calm a n d just listening.

3. If P a u l c a r e d a b o u t m e a n d w a n t e d to h e l p h e w o u l d g e t m o r e involved a n d show s o m e e m o t i o n also.

3. H e ' s g e t t i n g e v e n m o r e u p s e t . I m u s t be even m o r e calm,

4. P a u l k n o w s t h a t t h i s u p s e t s m e .

4. H e ' s him.

5. If P a u l k n o w s t h a t t h i s b e h a v i o u r upsets me, t h e n he m u s t be intend­ ing to h u r t m e .

5. I ' m really t r y i n g to h e l p ,

6. H e m u s t b e c r u e l a n d sadistic. M a y b e h e g e t s p l e a s u r e o u t o f it, e t c .

6. H e m u s t b e p r o j e c t i n g .

accusing

me

of

hurting

A t t r i b u t i o n s o f t h i s k i n d , b a s e d o n a virtually i n e x t r i c a b l e m i x o f m i s ­ m a t c h e d e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d p h a n t a s y a n d p e r c e p t i o n , a r e t h e v e r y stuff of i n t e r h u m a n reality. O n e h a s , f o r i n s t a n c e , t o e n t e r i n t o t h i s r e a l m i n o r d e r to u n d e r s t a n d h o w o n e p e r s o n ' s attributions a b o u t o t h e r s m a y b e g i n to be particularly disturbing a n d disjunctive to these others, a n d c o m e to b e re­ p e a t e d l y i n v a l i d a t e d by t h e m , so t h a t h e m a y b e g i n t o b e s u b j e c t t o t h e global attribution of b e i n g m a d . 1 2

T h e first p r e c o n d i t i o n for this k i n d o f spiraling i n i n t e r p e r s o n a l re­ lationships is a mistrust o n t h e p a r t of at least o n e party, which can b e t r a c e d b a c k to insecurity r e g a r d i n g o n e ' s own identity. I'm n o t talk­ ing a b o u t s o m e a r b i t r a r y affect, b u t a b o u t a type of mistrust that c a n b e conceived in t e r m s of t h e t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i o n : a mistrust of t h e s o u n d n e s s of t h e c o n s e n s u a l f o u n d a t i o n of t h e i n t e r a c t i o n , t h a t is, t h e w o r r y t h a t t h e o t h e r m i g h t leave t h e f o u n d a t i o n of a c t i o n ori­ e n t e d to m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d m i g h t "veer o f f m o r e o r less surreptitiously i n t o strategic behavior. T h e second p r e c o n d i t i o n of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e spiral is a l a t e n t lack of a g r e e m e n t i n t h e assessment of (at least o n e of) t h e two self-images t h a t r e g u l a t e t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of self. I n o u r e x a m p l e t h e violations of t h e claims to sincerity a n d to Tightness a r e r e l e v a n t for t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e disturbance.

158 Reflections on Communicative Pathology

T h e first " m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g " a p p e a r s in t h e s e c o n d s e q u e n c e : Pe­ t e r d o e s n o t u n d e r s t a n d t h a t P a u l w a n t s to h e l p him, b e c a u s e P e t e r expects P a u l to b e h a v e differendy toward h i m if h e w a n t e d to h e l p . T h e s e c o n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g e m e r g e s in t h e t h i r d s e q u e n c e : Paul d o e s n o t u n d e r s t a n d t h a t P e t e r m i s u n d e r s t a n d s h i m b e c a u s e h e ex­ p e c t s P e t e r to i n t e r p r e t his b e h a v i o r as helpful. I n t h e f o u r t h se­ q u e n c e , t h e c o n s e n s u a l f o u n d a t i o n of t h e i n t e r a c t i o n breaks d o w n w i t h o u t e i t h e r of the p a r t i c i p a n t s clearly giving n o t i c e that he is a b a n d o n i n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e action: P e t e r believes that Paul inten­ tionally wants to h u r t him, while P a u l this t i m e knows w h a t P e t e r m e a n s . I n t h e fifth a n d sixth s e q u e n c e s , b o t h p a r t i e s r e a c h t h e con­ clusion t h a t t h e o t h e r is violating sincerity claims: P e t e r t h i n k s t h a t P a u l is enjoying h u r t i n g him, b u t d o e s n o t a d m i t it; P a u l t h i n k s t h a t P e t e r is falsely t r a n s f e r r i n g t h e hostile feelings h e h a s toward P a u l o n t o Paul. T h u s P e t e r attributes to P a u l an i n t e n t i o n a l violation of t h e claim to sincerity, a n d Paul a t t r i b u t e s t o P e t e r a n u n i n t e n t i o n a l o n e . O n t h e c o n d i t i o n — a n d this is t h e third p r e c o n d i t i o n — t h a t nei­ t h e r of t h e two p a r t n e r s is in a pqsition to go o n acting with an orien­ t a t i o n t o r e a c h i n g m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g at a m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e level, the c o m m u n i c a t i v e spiral c o n t i n u e s . Let's a s s u m e t h a t , i n a c e r t a i n context, o u r p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e , namely, P e t e r ' s b e i n g upset, r e p r e s e n t s P e t e r ' s a t t e m p t to assert his identity. T h e n t h e systematically g e n e r a t e d a n d r e i n f o r c e d m i s u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g h a s t h e p a r a d o x i c a l result of m a k i n g P e t e r ' s i d e n d t y still less s e c u r e . F o r P e t e r fails t o h a v e his identity, which is r e p r e s e n t e d in his u p s e t r e s p o n s e , r e c o g n i z e d . T h e r e c o g n i t i o n would have to con­ sist in a n a g r e e m e n t [Einverstdndnis] t h a t w o u l d have given P e t e r the feeling t h a t Paul h a d understood h i m . U n d e r s t a n d i n g [ Verstehen], b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d , a n d feeling to have b e e n u n d e r s t o o d a r e functions of a process of r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , which in this case w o u l d have to c o m e a b o u t n o t only by m e a n s of (a) t h e intelligibility of t h e expres­ sion (of P e t e r ' s b e i n g upset) a n d (b) t h e t r u t h of a p r o p o s i t i o n (equivalent to a n o n v e r b a l e x p r e s s i o n ) , b u t also by m e a n s of (c) t h e r i g h t n e s s of P a u l ' s r e s p o n s e (calm listening) w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o a n o r ­ mative c o n t e x t ( P e t e r ' s a n d Paul's self-images) a n d by m e a n s of (d) t h e sincerity of t h e i n t e n t i o n s P e t e r a n d P a u l express. I n the in­ teractive s e q u e n c e s of o u r e x a m p l e , t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s (c) a n d (d)

159 Reflections on Communicative Pathology

a r e n o t m e t , b u t c o m m u n i c a t i o n is n o n e t h e l e s s n e i t h e r b r o k e n off in a manifest c h a n g e of a t t i t u d e to strategic a c t i o n n o r c o n t i n u e d at t h e m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e level of a clarificatory discourse. F o r this reason, this s e q u e n c e of u t t e r a n c e s is a n e x a m p l e of systematically p r o d u c e d misunderstandings. Systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t results f r o m p r o b ­ lems of s e c u r i n g e g o identity occurs n o t exclusively b u t particularly frequently within family relations. T h e family is a privileged site of identity m a n a g e m e n t , n o t only for c h i l d r e n w h o are only just estab­ lishing their identity, b u t also for adult family m e m b e r s . I n a d d i t i o n , this milieu obliges family m e m b e r s to action t h a t is t h o r o u g h l y ori­ e n t e d t o m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; i n societies of o u r sort, i n a n y case, strategic action is i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e with t h e c o m m i t m e n t s t o con­ sensus t h a t h o l d within t h e family. T h e family r e g u l a t e s i n f o r m a l relationships a n d i n t i m a t e face-to-face i n t e r a c t i o n s within t h e frame­ w o r k of a diffuse s t r u c t u r e of roles. Recent l i t e r a t u r e o n e g o psychol­ ogy p r o c e e d s f r o m t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t i n t e r p e r s o n a l relationships of this sort always h a v e a dual character: "Object relations" serve b o t h t h e f o r m a t i o n a n d c o n f i r m a t i o n of a p r o j e c t i o n of o n e ' s identity a n d t h e satisfaction of drives. I n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s within t h e family a r e c h a n n e l s of a n affective as well as a cognitive e x c h a n g e , which are d e t e r m i n e d simultaneously by t h e p s y c h o d y n a m i c s of satisfying drives a n d of s e c u r i n g o n e ' s identity. T h e s e aspects c a n be s e p a r a t e d only analytically. T h e diffuse r o l e s t r u c t u r e of t h e n u c l e a r family m e e t s t h e d u a l c h a r a c t e r of t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l relationships t h a t are p e r m i t t e d within it halfway. W i t h r e s p e c t to t h e personality systems of its m e m b e r s , t h e family does n o t h a v e particularly s t r o n g functional specifications. It allows f o r a b r o a d s p e c t r u m of n e e d s to b e m e t . T h e r e are n o particularly rigid s t a n d a r d s for h o w r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e ­ tween family m e m b e r s a r e defined; t h e leeway for individual selfp r e s e n t a t i o n is relatively wide since any given aspect of a r e l a t i o n s h i p c a n b e t h e m a t i z e d at any time. If, of course, individual family m e m ­ b e r s use a role s t r u c t u r e t h a t is subject to conflict s i m u l t a n e o u s l y for satisfying their drives a n d for s e c u r i n g t h e i r identities, special regula­ tory capacities are called for in o r d e r to resolve e m e r g i n g systemic p r o b l e m s adequately, t h a t is, w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e to strategies of r e p r e s ­ sion t h a t h a v e oppressive side effects.

160 Reflections on Communicative Pathology

T w o systemic p r o b l e m s arise from t h e perspective of t h e functions t h a t t h e family system is to fulfill for individual m e m b e r s : o p t i m a l n e e d satisfaction a n d securing identity. A t h i r d systemic p r o b l e m arises f r o m t h e complementary^ p o i n t of view of w h a t t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s between m e m b e r s are to achieve for t h e family system: s e c u r i n g au­ t o n o m y within the self-regulation of the family's e x c h a n g e with its s u r r o u n d i n g s (its " e n v i r o n m e n t s " ) . Moreover, we may a s s u m e t h a t t h e f o u r t h systemic p r o b l e m , which establishes t h e family's func­ tional r e l a t i o n to t h e system of t h e w h o l e of society, namely, t h e so­ cialization of t h e c h i l d r e n , c a n b e resolved to t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e o t h e r t h r e e systemic p r o b l e m s c a n b e satisfactorily dealt with. H e n c e I shall confine myself i n w h a t follows t o t h e s e t h r e e . First, I w a n t t o c o r r e l a t e t h e systemic p r o b l e m s with t h e d i m e n ­ sions in w h i c h t h e i r solutions c a n b e analyzed. It will t h e n b e c o m e clear w h i c h of t h e s e d i m e n s i o n s is relevant to t h e e x t e r n a l organiza­ tion of s p e e c h a n d h o w t h e p r e s s u r e of unsolved p r o b l e m s (by m e a n s of an u n c o n s c i o u s r e p r e s s i o n of conflicts) has a d i s t o r t i n g effect w h e n it is shifted o n t o t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h . T h e systemic p r o b l e m of n e e d satisfaction of individual family m e m b e r s can be e x a m i n e d in t h e d i m e n s i o n of a mutual giving and taking. Processes in this d i m e n s i o n can in t u r n b e e x a m i n e d from t h r e e p o i n t s of view: (a) w h a t t h e ratio of drive satisfaction to desire frustration is f o r a n individual a n d h o w t h e b a l a n c e of gratification is d i s t r i b u t e d a m o n g family m e m b e r s ; (b) w h a t t h e p r o p o r t i o n of t h e i r s h a r e of i m m e d i a t e gratifications is relative to delayed gratifications; a n d (c) h o w t h e stimulating variation o f stimuli a n d t h e stabilizing c o n t i n u i t y of stimuli b a l a n c e out. H. Stierlin has shown t h a t t h e s e t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s v a r y i n d e p e n d e n t l y of o n e a n o t h e r . T h e p r o b l e m of securing one's identity can b e b r o k e n d o w n i n t o t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s : (a) t h e r e g u l a t i o n of t h e p r o x i m i t y a n d distance t h a t is to b e m a i n ­ t a i n e d d u r i n g i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n participants; (b) t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n a m o n g g r o u p m e m b e r s of o p p o r t u n i t i e s to actively take t h e initiative or simply to e x p e r i e n c e t h e activities of o t h e r s passively; a n d (c) t h e d e g r e e of c o n v e r g e n c e a n d difference b e t w e e n n o r m a t i v e o r i e n t a ­ tions, especially b e t w e e n intersubjectively r e c o g n i z e d self-images. T h e p r o b l e m of t h e independence of the family system from its environ13

I; 161 Reflections o n Communicative Pathology

m e n t , finally, is a q u e s t i o n of b o u n d a r i e s : t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h t h e family closes itself off o r o p e n s u p , h o w m u c h it constitutes a u n i t with r e g a r d to family issues a n d m y t h s , o r t h e e x t e n t to w h i c h its in­ t e r n a l c o m m u n i c a t i v e n e t w o r k s are tied to extrafamilial forces. Empirical studies have s h o w n t h a t a family's ability t o solve t h e above p r o b l e m s s t a n d s in a n inverse relation to its i n t e r n a l p o t e n t i a l for conflict. T h e latter in t u r n is a f u n c t i o n of t h e distribution of power. T h e m o r e u n e q u a l l y p o w e r is d i s t r i b u t e d a m o n g t h e (adult) m e m ­ b e r s of a family, t h e h i g h e r t h e probability of a n asymmetrical distri­ b u t i o n of t h e c h a n c e s each individual h a s of a t t a i n i n g a satisfactory b a l a n c e of gratifications. T h e r e s u l t i n g conflicts, however, often c a n n o t b e carried o u t strategically within t h e confines of t h e family b e c a u s e they are i m m e d i a t e l y i n t e r t w i n e d with t h e identity m a n a g e ­ m e n t of the p a r t i c i p a n t s . A family whose p o w e r constellations d o n o t p e r m i t a solution of t h e p r o b l e m of b a l a n c i n g n e e d satisfaction a m o n g its m e m b e r s c o n s t r a i n s t h e leeway f o r successfully m a n a g i n g identities. F e r r e i r a has c o m p a r e d t h e problem-solving b e h a v i o r of clinically u n u s u a l family g r o u p s of t h r e e a n d f o u r m e m b e r s with cor­ r e s p o n d i n g b e h a v i o r of c o n t r o l g r o u p s . As e x p e c t e d , t h e s y m p t o m ­ atic families d e m o n s t r a t e d a g r e a t e r p o t e n t i a l for conflict (i.e., less s p o n t a n e o u s a g r e e m e n t of a t t i t u d e s m e a s u r e d p r i o r t o family discus­ sions) . T h e y n e e d e d m o r e t i m e to r e a c h decisions in family discus­ sions, a n d t h e satisfaction of drives, m e a s u r e d by t h e m u t u a l sensitivity toward t h e wishes of o t h e r family m e m b e r s , was lower t h a n in t h e c o n t r o l families. 14

15

Since t h e 1960s, various theoretical a p p r o a c h e s have p r o d u c e d e m p i r i c a l studies of conflict-ridden families. T h e r e s u l t s c a n n o t eas­ ily b e r e d u c e d to a c o m m o n d e n o m i n a t o r . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e y war­ r a n t several tentative c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t t h e causes of systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n . D i s t u r b a n c e s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n in t h e sense of r e c u r r i n g , structurally p r o d u c e d unclarities a n d m i s u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g s o c c u r m o r e o f t e n in families t h a t h a r b o r a "clinical p o ­ tential" in t h e b r o a d sense—families, in o t h e r w o r d s , t h a t have characteristics t h a t c o u n t as "symptoms" a c c o r d i n g to t h e usual vague p r e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e t e r m . S y m p t o m a t i c families of this sort a r e c h a r a c t e r i z e d by an asymmetrical distribution of power, with 16

162 Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology'

d o m i n a n c e r e l a t i o n s a n d coalition f o r m a t i o n s , as well as by c o r r e ­ s p o n d i n g tensions, d i s c r e p a n t expectations, r e c i p r o c a l d e p r e c a t i o n , a n d so o n . T h e conflicts at issue h e r e t e n d to b e s m o l d e r i n g , partially c o n c e a l e d o n e s that c a n n o t be publicly played out b e c a u s e the p s y c h o d y n a m i c p r e c o n d i t i o n s d o n o t exist for r e a c h i n g a n u n d e r ­ s t a n d i n g m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a n d dealing with these conflicts dis­ cursively. C o m m u n i c a t i v e styles that m e d i a t e distance a n d clear the g r o u n d for discourse, such as j o k i n g , irony, a n d f o r m s of trivializing a n d n e u t r a l i z i n g , are t h e r e f o r e also e n c o u n t e r e d less often in these families. T h e p o t e n t i a l f o r conflict affects t h e e x t e r n a l organization of s p e e c h so as to m a k e likely e x t r e m e manifestations in t h e a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d d i m e n s i o n s . C o n c e p t s such as pseudo-mutuality, schism, skew, s e p a r a t e d n e s s , a n d c o n n e c t e d n e s s t h a t have b e e n de­ v e l o p e d by r e s e a r c h in s c h i z o p h r e n i a are n o t sufficiently precise for o u r d i m e n s i o n s . T h e y have b e e n selected as c o u n t e r - c o n c e p t s to t h e symmetries of a b a l a n c e d role systems (role-reciprocity, c o m p l e ­ m e n t a r i t y of e x p e c t a t i o n , m u t u a l i t y of u n d e r s t a n d i n g , etc.) a n d h e n c e they cut across t h e aspects I w a n t to distinguish in what follows. Proximity/Distance T h e well-known studies of Lidz a n d W y n n e ' s r e s e a r c h t e a m s confirm t h a t t h e distances b e t w e e n individual family m e m b e r s in pathologi­ cal families c a n n o t be r e g u l a t e d appropriately. T h e basic roles of t h e family ( g e n d e r / g e n e r a t i o n ) either are t o o s e p a r a t e d from o n e an­ o t h e r or r e m a i n t o o diffuse, so t h a t the b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e n genera­ tions a n d g e n d e r s r e m a i n overly rigid or insufficiendy differentiated. This p a t t e r n c a n p e r m e a t e all interactions. T h u s social distances can­ n o t b e i m p l e m e n t e d as flexible e i t h e r b e c a u s e t h e disintegration of the g r o u p w o u l d l e a d to s p l i n t e r i n g a n d alienation or b e c a u s e a co­ e r c e d a n d frantic o v e r i n t e g r a t i o n w o u l d lead to a solidarity t h a t is m a i n t a i n e d by force. T h e c o n c e p t of a p p a r e n t l y m a i n t a i n e d reci­ procity (pseudo-mutuality) b e l o n g s in this c o n t e x t . 17

Equality /Difference Hess a n d H a n d e l have s h o w n how i m p o r t a n t it is for the family sys­ tem to allow a n a p p r o p r i a t e leeway for the self-presentation of indi-

163 Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology

vidual m e m b e r s . I n p a t h o l o g i c a l families t h e m u t u a l l y c o r r o b o r a t e d c o n g r u e n c e of self-images (i.e., of t h e r e p r e s e n t e d a n d r e c o g n i z e d identities of m e m b e r s ) is e i t h e r so h i g h t h a t o v e r p o w e r i n g family ste­ r e o t y p e s i m p e d e t h e f o r m a t i o n of individuals or so low t h a t t h e col­ lective u n i t is t h r e a t e n e d by t h e lack of n o r m a t i v e a g r e e m e n t . W h a t is decisive h e r e is n e i t h e r t h e d e g r e e of stereotyping n o r t h e d e g r e e of d i s c r e p a n c y as such, b u t r a t h e r t h e inability to synthesize aspects of s a m e n e s s a n d difference. T h u s t h e n e e d arises t o mask t h e con­ trast b e t w e e n t o l e r a t e d self-images a n d actual b e h a v i o r . 18

Activity /Passivity T h e u n e q u a l distribution of p o w e r m e a n s t h a t t h e sphere of action of a p a r t n e r in i n t e r a c t i o n is n o t merely d e l i m i t e d by t h e s p h e r e of a c t i o n of a n o t h e r family m e m b e r , b u t is d e t e r m i n e d a n d c o n t r o l l e d by t h e initiatives of t h a t family m e m b e r . I n s y m p t o m a t i c families, we can often o b s e r v e p a t t e r n s of i n t e r a c t i o n b e c o m i n g solidified. T h e s e i n g r a i n e d p a t t e r n s c a n b e t r a c e d t o t h e d e p e n d e n c e of o n e s p o u s e o n a n o t h e r a n d to t h e f o r m a t i o n of coalitions b e t w e e n a t least o n e p a r e n t a n d o n e or several c h i l d r e n . U. O e v e r m a n n h a s d e v e l o p e d t h e c o n c e p t of affective solidarity b e t w e e n p a r e n t s , w h i c h is applica­ ble in this c o n t e x t a n d is d a m a g e d in t h e families t h a t were studied. O n c e again, it is n o t t h e u n e q u a l distribution of activities a m o n g family m e m b e r s as s u c h t h a t is t h e p r o b l e m , b u t r a t h e r t h e m o r e o r less surreptitiously h a b i t u a l i z e d d o m i n a n c e relations t h a t p r o h i b i t s h o w i n g a n y c o n s i d e r a t i o n for t h e desires of m a r g i n a l i z e d family m e m b e r s . T h i s is a p r e c o n d i t i o n of t h e various strategies of exploita­ tion i n t e r n a l to t h e family to which we shall r e t u r n . 19

Demarcation of the family system A large n u m b e r of o b s e r v a t i o n s s u p p o r t t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t symp­ t o m a t i c families d o not d e v e l o p a sufficient capacity for self-regula­ tion in o r d e r to regulate their e x c h a n g e with their e n v i r o n m e n t a u t o n o m o u s l y . Severely dysfunctional families a r e o n t h e o n e h a n d m o r e isolated, t h e y have less well-organized c o n t a c t s t o t h e i r sur­ r o u n d i n g s t h a n n o r m a l families; b u t o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , they are less p r o t e c t e d from e x t e r n a l influences, typically o n t h e p a r t of t h e par­ e n t s ' two e x t e n d e d families. A c k e r m a n a n d B e h r e n s have d e v e l o p e d

164 Reflections on Communicative Pathology

t h e following typology based o n clinical observations. T h e y distin­ guish, a m o n g o t h e r things, b e t w e e n t h e externally isolated family, t h e family t h a t is externally i n t e g r a t e d b u t n o t internally unified, a n d finally, t h e d i s i n t e g r a t e d a n d regressive family. I n this context, we can apply t h e c o n c e p t of t h e " r u b b e r f e n c e " t h a t was d e v e l o p e d by t h e W y n n e g r o u p . T h e idea is t h a t of a diffuse d e m a r c a t i o n of t h e pathological family, which allows n e i t h e r for a clear inside-outside differentiation nor, in particular, for a distinction b e t w e e n partic­ ularistic a n d m o r e strongly universalistic relationships. T h i s has t h e result t h a t family m e m b e r s actually isolate themselves from their environment. S y m p t o m a t i c families frequently s h o w e x t r e m e r e a d i n g s in the four m e n t i o n e d d i m e n s i o n s . This m e a n s t h a t t h e interactive a n d role s t r u c t u r e s t h a t d e t e r m i n e t h e e x t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h are too rigid to p r o d u c e t h e flexible r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n p r o x i m i t y a n d dis­ t a n c e , b e t w e e n equality a n d difference, b e t w e e n action initiatives a n d b e h a v i o r a l r e s p o n s e s , b e t w e e n inside a n d o u t s i d e , w h i c h , ac­ c o r d i n g to all e m p i r i c a l i n d i c a t o r s a r e r e q u i r e d for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t [Entwurf] a n d m a i n t e n a n c e of t h e e g o identity of family m e m b e r s a n d of t h e collective identity of t h e g r o u p . T h e m a n a g e m e n t of t h e identities of individual m e m b e r s is curtailed i n these families. T h i s causes c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n to b e o v e r b u r d e n e d w i t h t h e k i n d s of conflicts t h a t p l a y themselves o u t i n a systematic d i s t o r t i o n of c o m ­ m u n i c a t i o n . The pressure of identity conflicts is shifted onto the internal or­ ganization of speech where it is stabilized but remains unresolved. T h i s explains t h e f r e q u e n t o c c u r r e n c e of c o m m u n i c a t i v e d i s t u r b a n c e s in s y m p t o m a t i c families. T h e s e d i s t u r b a n c e s a r e r e v e a l e d in a thinly veiled strategic use of the m e a n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n in situations w h e r e the c o n s e n s u a l ba­ sis of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action m u s t n o n e t h e l e s s n o t be a b a n d o n e d . I a m t r a c i n g systematically p r o d u c e d unclarities a n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d ­ ings to t h e paradoxical a c h i e v e m e n t of trying to m a i n t a i n an en­ d a n g e r e d b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s , w h i c h rests o n t h e r e c i p r o c a l r e c o g n i t i o n of validity claims raised i n speech acts, precisely by tacitly violating o n e o r several of these universal claims. (5) I n conclusion, I w o u l d like to cite s o m e e x a m p l e s of systemati­ cally d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I a m using t h e results of r e s e a r c h by 20

165 Reflections on Communicative Pathology

L u c K a u f m a n n as well as by U. O e v e r m a n n a n d Y. Schtitze. K a u f m a n n analyzes t h e first fifteen m i n u t e s of interviews b e t w e e n a hospitalized p a t i e n t , t h e p a t i e n t ' s family, a n d two physicians. T h e r e a r e seven cases of n e u r o s e s a n d d e p r e s s i o n , seven b o r d e r l i n e cases, a n d seven cases of s c h i z o p h r e n i a . T h e study follows a c o d e p l a n based o n criteria from W y n n e a n d Singer o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d from t h e Bateson g r o u p o n t h e other. O e v e r m a n n a n d Schtitze use t a p e d protocols from five visits e a c h with two families; in b o t h cases, t h e p a r e n t s h a v e s o u g h t c o u n s e l i n g because of p r o b l e m s w i t h t h e i r chil­ d r e n w h o h a d j u s t started school. T h e scenes o n w h i c h t h e analysis is based h a v e been selected partly at r a n d o m , partly based o n t h e i r rel­ evance for t h e s u s p e c t e d family conflict. T h e m a t e r i a l is r e c o n ­ s t r u c t e d at t h e t h r e e levels of s p e e c h acts ( p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t , s p e a k e r i n t e n t i o n , a n d m e a n i n g of i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s ) with a view to h o w t h e u n d e r l y i n g family conflict is at t h e s a m e time ex­ p r e s s e d a n d c o n c e a l e d in t h e linguistic m e d i u m . I d o n ' t want to p r e ­ sent t h e d e t a i l e d results of t h e two studies, b u t will r a t h e r d r a w o n t h e m in o r d e r t o illustrate m y a c c o u n t of linguistic d i s t u r b a n c e s . 21

Recall t h a t m y basic hypothesis is t h a t families i n w h i c h skewed p o w e r constellations, u n e q u a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d o p p o r t u n i t i e s of n e e d satisfaction, a n d conflicts t h r e a t e n cohesiveness t e n d t o w a r d a dedifferentiation o r c o n s o l i d a t i o n of interactive a n d role s t r u c t u r e s . T h i s signifies a n inflexible e x t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h , w h i c h limits t h e possibilities of individual family m e m b e r s t o d e v e l o p a n d to m a i n t a i n t h e i r e g o identities w i t h o u t mistrust. However, unless t h e c o n s e n s u a l basis of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action is manifestly upset (which w o u l d m a k e identity conflicts i n s o l u b l e ) , identity conflicts c a n be c o n t a i n e d only by diverting t h e p r e s s u r e caused by t h e p r o b l e m from t h e e x t e r n a l t o t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h . T h e distorting effect of flawed c o m m u n i c a t i o n is e x p l a i n e d by t h e fact t h a t t h e fam­ ily c o n s e n s u s appears to be m a i n t a i n e d . T h i s pseudo-consensus is at­ t a i n e d at the e x p e n s e of r e d e e m i n g the universal validity claims of intelligibility, sincerity, and n o r m a t i v e Tightness on w h i c h the recog­ n i t i o n of t h e b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s of a successful l a n g u a g e g a m e d e p e n d s . W h a t m u s t n o t b e c o m e manifest is t h e systematic d i s t o r t i o n of t h e validity claims. C o m m u n i c a t i v e d i s t u r b a n c e s a r e all t h e m o r e c o n s p i c u o u s , t h e m o r e difficult it is t o h i d e t h e violation of validity

166

Reflections on Communicative Pathology

claims. I w a n t to distinguish a c c o r d i n g l y t h e following levels at which a p s e u d o - c o n s e n s u s can be p r o d u c e d : (a) At t h e first level, t h e r e a r e strategies to shield t h e c o n s e n s u s so t h a t t h e validity basis—which, if e x a m i n e d , w o u l d n o t b e subject to c o n s e n s u s — c a n n o t even b e sufficiently precisely identified. This can be achieved by using h a r m l e s s t e c h n i q u e s such as b r e a k i n g off o n e ' s o w n u t t e r a n c e s o r i n t e r r u p t i n g s o m e o n e else. A somewhat m o r e ob­ vious strategy is to i g n o r e t h e u t t e r a n c e s of a n o t h e r or to force a c h a n g e of topic. K a u f m a n n distinguishes t h e following variants of n o t r e s p o n d i n g , where (ii)-(v) f u n c t i o n as substitutes for a real answer: (i) simple refusal to answer, i.e., silence; (ii) a n s w e r i n g question;

to someone

other

than

the person

asking

the

(iii) c o m m e n t i n g , in t h e t h i r d p e r s o n , o n t h e p e r s o n e x p e c t i n g an answer; (iv) c u r a t o r i a l answer: C answers instead of £ to a question o r re­ m a r k by A; (v) answer or i n t e r v e n t i o n t h e c o n t e n t of w h i c h h a s n o t h i n g to d o with w h a t h a s b e e n said. 22

T h e " t a n g e n d a l r e s p o n s e , " w h i c h is a n evasive response strategy t h a t i m p e r c e p t i b l y shifts t h e topic by p i c k i n g u p o n p e r i p h e r a l e l e m e n t s of t h e m e a n i n g of w h a t has b e e n said (Ruesch) also b e l o n g s in this last category. Most c o n s p i c u o u s a r e strategies of obfuscation: diffuse chatter, s p i n n i n g tales, s e q u e n c e s t h a t K a u f m a n n has e n c o d e d as "idle c o m m u n i c a t i o n " [Leerlaujkommunikation] ( p p . 84ff.) a n d t h a t Y. Schiitze discusses u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g of r e d u n d a n c y strategies. O n e r e p e a t s a n d e l a b o r a t e s t h e details t o such a n e x t e n t t h a t o n e ' s inter­ l o c u t o r loses t h e t h r e a d of t h e conversation a n d n o l o n g e r k n o w s w h a t it is a b o u t . This gives rise to functional i m p r e c i s i o n s a n d unclarities t h a t d o n o t result f r o m a violation of any specific validity claim, b u t r a t h e r c o u n t e r a c t all attempts to e x a m i n e t h e status of the a g r e e m e n t m o r e closely a n d to p u r s u e any suspicion of p s e u d o consensus. Typical of this is t h e " t a n d e m p h e n o m e n o n " t h a t Kaufmann observed,

167 Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology

so n a m e d after t h e two-seat bicycles w h e r e y o u also c a n ' t tell w h o is really "working." T h e m a n e u v e r causes insecurity with r e g a r d to role distribution, a n d i n d i v i d u a l initiative, a u t h o r i t y a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . T h u s w e c a n n o t tell f r o m t h e b e h a v i o r o f two p e o p l e , f o r e x a m p l e , w h e t h e r A r e a l l y s h a r e s a n d actively s u p p o r t s B's o p i n i o n o r w h e t h e r A is o n l y passively " c o a s t i n g " i n t h e same direction. 2 3

(b) At t h e s e c o n d level, t h e r e a r e strategies for b r i n g i n g a b o u t a pseudo-consensus.

Kaufmann

has

studied

these

pseudo-

c o n f i r m a t i o n s following W y n n e . A d i f f e r e n c e o f o p i n i o n is f o r m u l a t e d i n t h e a n s w e r o r o t h e r r e s p o n s e as a n a g r e e m e n t or, conversely, a g r e e m e n t is r e c i p r o c a t e d w i t h d i v e r g e n c e . W e d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t d e g r e e s a n d v a r i a n t s of p s e u d o - c o n f i r m a t i o n : A n s w e r s t h a t , b e c a u s e o f a h e s i t a t i o n , a p a r t i c u l a r c h o i c e of w o r d s , o r t o n e o f v o i c e leave a d o u b t w h e t h e r t h e s p e a k e r a c c e p t s t h e m e s s a g e o f t h e o t h e r as valid o r w h e t h e r h e h a s a l r e a d y d i s q u a l i f i e d i t (easy, f r e q u e n t disqualificat­ ion) . "Correction" of t h e s e n d e r ' s message by a d d i n g w o r d s o r s o u n d s that q u e s t i o n t h e v a l u e a n d significance o f t h e s e n d e r ' s c o m m u n i c a t i o n o r sim­ p l y a n n u l w h a t h a s b e e n said. "False r e c i p r o c a t i o n , " a c o m m o n p h e n o m e ­ n o n w h e r e t h e r e s p o n s e is r e c i p r o c a t e d i n a d i f f e r e n t " c u r r e n c y " o r "coin"; the respondent does n o t encounter the interlocutor's message at the same (logical) level o r d o e s n o t r e s p o n d t o it w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e s a m e c o n t e x t . T h e false r e c i p r o c a t i o n p r a c t i c a l l y always r e p r e s e n t s a d i s t u r b a n c e o f "inter­ p e r s o n a l logic" a n d c a n o v e r l a p w i t h t h e p h e n o m e n o n o f p a r a d o x i c a l c o m ­ m u n i c a t i o n . P s e u d o - c o n f i r m a t i o n s , finally, leave o u t ("forget") s o m e c r u c i a l b i t o f w h a t t h e o t h e r h a s c o m m u n i c a t e d a n d o p e r a t e as t h o u g h t h e r e m a i n ­ der were t h e whole. Moreover, t h e above-mentioned tangentialization m a y f u n c t i o n as a p s e u d o - c o n f i r m a t i o n . 2 4

T h e e x a m p l e s t h a t K a u f m a n n analyzes in w h a t follows show t h a t t h e p s e u d o - c o n f i r m a t i o n disqualifies t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y s p e e c h a c t a t t h e level of its claims to intelligibility, sincerity, o r Tightness. At t h e s a m e t i m e , it suggestively i m p l i e s t h a t other validity claims, w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r h a s n o t r a i s e d at all, a r e r e c o g n i z e d in t h e s p e e c h act. T h e m o r e o r less o b v i o u s m a n e u v e r t h u s consists i n p r o d u c i n g a c o n s e n ­ sus a b o u t s p e a k e r i n t e n t i o n s a n d a b o u t a n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t t h a t c o n c e a l s t h e dissensus a b o u t w h a t h a s actually b e e n said. (c) A t t h e t h i r d level, t h e r e a r e i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s t h a t b e t r a y t h e u n a v o w e d v i o l a t i o n s of t h e validity claims t h a t u n d e r l i e t h e c o n s e n s u s . All i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i m p e d e t h e intelligibility of u t t e r a n c e s ; yet u n d e r

168 Reflections o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e Pathology

certain c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e y c a n b e traced back to t h e fact t h a t t h e s p e a k e r deceives herself o r o t h e r s a b o u t h e r i n t e n t i o n s o r p r e s u p ­ poses t h e intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n of w h a t is in fact a d i s p u t e d n o r m a t i v e context. I would like to d i s r e g a r d e x t r e m e linguistic er­ r o r s s u c h as b i z a r r e or idiosyncratic s e n t e n c e c o n s t r u c t i o n s , obvi­ ously i n c o r r e c t p r o n u n c i a t i o n , concretistic c o n c e p t f o r m a t i o n , c a t e g o r y mistakes, secret messages in t e l e g r a m style, o n o m a t o p o e i c associations, n o n s t a n d a r d plays o n w o r d s , m a n n e r i s m s , etc., which indicate t h a t a s p e a k e r is o p e r a t i n g below t h e level of differentiation of n o r m a l s p e e c h . I n t h e p r e s e n t context, w h a t is of i n t e r e s t are t h e less obvious divergences t h a t a r e p r o d u c e d specifically by vio­ lating logical, s e m a n t i c , a n d p r a g m a t i c rules a n d t h a t t h r e a t e n t h e p s e u d o - c o n s e n s u s from t h e outset t h r o u g h an a l i e n a t i n g unintelligibility. C o n v e r s a t i o n a l s e q u e n c e s t h a t do n o t h a n g t o g e t h e r logically are usually the result of self-contradictions, n a m e l y i n t h e f o r m o f p a r t s of o r a d d i t i o n s t o c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t d i m i n i s h , d e v a l u e , o r r e n d e r q u e s t i o n a b l e t h e w h o l e of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n ; "forget­ t i n g " w h a t h a s o r h a s b e e n said i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e s a m e c o m m u n i c a t i o n by t h e s a m e p e r s o n o r of w h a t h a s n o t b e e n said, b u t is obviously b e i n g p r e s u p ­ p o s e d ; all t h o s e i n d i v i d u a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t h a t , t o t h e e a r of t h e e x a m i n e r , c o n t a i n a p a r t i a l r e t r a c t i o n of w h a t h a s b e e n s a i d . 25

Logical i n c o h e r e n c e may be t h e manifestation of a p e c u l i a r strategy t h a t Y Schiitze describes as follows: O n e a s s o c i a t e s a l o o s e c h a i n of a r g u m e n t s t h a t c a n n o t b e r e n d e r e d logically c o n s i s t e n t , t h a t is, o n e uses a n a r g u m e n t , w i t h d r a w s its a s s e r t o r i c f o r c e i n t h e n e x t s t e p of t h e a r g u m e n t , a n d u s e s it i n a n o t h e r c o n t e x t s u c h t h a t it n o w h a s a n e w m e a n i n g , w h i c h is t h e o p p o s i t e of h o w it w a s u s e d initially. 26

T h e i n c o h e r e n c e d o e s not arise f r o m a logical i n c o m p e t e n c e , mis­ t a k e n i n f e r e n c e s o r definitions, b u t r a t h e r from t h e r e a d i n e s s subse­ q u e n t l y to disqualify validity claims t h a t o n e initially d e f e n d e d . T h i s also applies to t h e self-contradictory strategy of c o n d i t i o n a l selfdenial: "Concessions are m a d e to t h e p o i n t of self-denial. If t h e o t h e r t h e n believes t o have w o n , o n e m a k e s an about-face a n d withdraws o r relativizes o n e ' s c o n c e s s i o n s . " 27

T h e s i m u l t a n e o u s expression of two contrary e x p e c t a t i o n s is p a r -

169 Reflections on Communicative Pathology

ticularly confusing. T h i s p a r a d o x i c a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n has b e e n stud­ ied by t h e Palo-Alto t e a m as t h e "double-bind." Bateson a n d his colleagues of course d i d n o t sufficiently differentiate b e t w e e n i n t e n ­ tional p a r a d o x e s t h a t are u s e d for conveying a message indirectly a n d are p a r t of n o r m a l linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d the involun­ tary p a r a d o x e s t h a t stabilize a p s e u d o - c o n s e n s u s d e s p i t e a barely repressible conflict in cases w h e r e t h e addressee is e m o t i o n a l l y d e p e n d e n t o n t h e s p e a k e r a n d is u n a b l e to verbalize t h e c o n t r a d i c ­ tion, t h a t is, to identify it as s u c h a n d t h u s to resolve it (for h i m s e l f ) . Also at the level of logic, t h e r e are p h e n o m e n a of u n c l e a r r e f e r e n c e so t h a t n o u n e q u i v o c a l a t t r i b u t i o n of t h e e x p r e s s e d i n t e n s i o n s t o par­ ticular participants e m e r g e s f r o m t h e course of t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n . Vi­ olations of s e m a n t i c and p r a g m a t i c rules, for e x a m p l e , using w o r d s w i t h idiosyncratic m e a n i n g s or in a way t h a t is n o t context-specific, d i s r e g a r d i n g p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , a n d so on, all b e l o n g t o t h e r e a l m of private l a n g u a g e u t t e r a n c e s . L o r e n z e r has a c c o u n t e d for t h e s e c o m ­ p o n e n t s of private l a n g u a g e by m e a n s of t h e m e c h a n i s m of splitting t h e m e a n i n g s of t r a u m a t i c scenarios f r o m p u b l i c l a n g u a g e use, t h a t is, by m e a n s of t h e process of d e s y m b o l i z a t i o n . T h i s c o n c e p t fits o u r m o d e l , for t h e private m e a n i n g s , o n this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , express t h e u n l i c e n s e d s p e a k e r i n t e n t i o n so t h a t they c a n n o t e n d a n g e r t h e exist­ i n g superficial c o n s e n s u s owing to their unintelligibility. 28

T h i s survey of typical p a t t e r n s of systematically d i s t o r t e d c o m m u ­ n i c a t i o n was to give a p r e l i m i n a r y illustration of t h e suggested con­ c e p t of a c o m m u n i c a t i v e d i s t u r b a n c e at t h e level of t h e validity basis of s p e e c h . I h a v e tried to e x p l a i n t h e o v e r b u r d e n i n g of t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of speech in t e r m s of t h e p r e s s u r e e x e r t e d by p r o b l e m s t h a t stem f r o m conflicts of identity a n d t h a t initially overtax t h e ex­ t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h . Yet m e r e l y saying t h a t t h e p r e s s u r e ex­ e r t e d by these p r o b l e m s is "shifted" or "diverted" to t h e i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of s p e e c h w h e r e it is " a b s o r b e d " d o e s n o t e x p l a i n m u c h . We can only u n d e r s t a n d this process if we follow its intra­ psychic traces a n d clarify h o w u n c o n s c i o u s d e f e n s e m e c h a n i s m s a g a i n s t conflicts w o r k a n d i n t e r v e n e in c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. How­ ever, conflicts of identity, on t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t h e d i s t o r t e d c o m ­ m u n i c a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s within w h i c h such conflicts smolder, o n t h e

170 Reflections on Communicative Pathology

other, a r e p a r t of a circular process. T h e conflicts, as it were, cause the systematic distortion, yet c a n b e t r a c e d b a c k to deficiencies of e g o o r g a n i z a t i o n (in t h e p a r e n t s ' g e n e r a t i o n ) , w h i c h in t u r n were p r o d u c e d in d e v i a n t formative processes, t h a t is, in families with d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s . Simplistic a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t diffusion a n d transmission a r e i n a d e q u a t e for fully grasping the i n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l transmission of c o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d identity distur­ b a n c e s . T h i s r e q u i r e s clarification in at least t h r e e d o m a i n s of hy­ p o t h e s e s : I have i n m i n d the d e v e l o p m e n t a l p r o b l e m s that are specific to the levels of a b i p h a s i c formative process; a classification in t e r m s of d e v e l o p m e n t a l logic of t h e pathologies t h a t a r e c a u s e d by (or are corollaries of) unfavorable c o n d i t i o n s of socialization; a n d , lasdy, a n etiology t h a t a c c o u n t s for t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n c o m m u ­ nicative d i s t u r b a n c e s within t h e family a n d c h i l d h o o d p a t h o l o g i e s .

Notes

Translator's Introduction l.Jvirgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols., trans. Thomas McCar­ thy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984/1987). Hereafter cited as TCA. 2. For the sake of convenience, I shall refer to t h e m henceforth as the Gauss Lec­ tures. They follow closely u p o n the publication of the English translation of Knowl­ edge and Human Interest, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), a n d m o r e or less coincide with the 1970 G e r m a n publication of On the Logic of the Social Sciences, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen a n d Jerry A. Stark (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988). 3. T h e fourth lecture clearly served as basis for the essay "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" trans. Thomas McCarthy, in Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon, 1979), pp. 1-68. 4. See J o h n Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press: 1969), 57ff., as well as Jtirgen H a b e r m a s , "Toward a Critique of a T h e o r y of Mean­ ing," in Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. William H o h e n g a r t e n (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1 9 9 2 ) , p p . 70-72, a n d "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" pp. 6 0 - 6 1 . 5. Habermas, "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" 13. See also his "Reconstruction a n d Interpretation in the Social Sciences," in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Ac­ tion, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), pp. 21-42. 6. This dialogical dimension is lacking in Saul Kripke's discussion of the rule-follow­ ing problem, even though the connection of the private language a r g u m e n t with the rule-following problem is strikingly similar. See Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982). 7. Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).

172 Notes

8. See T C A : l , p p . 295-328. 9. See Cristina Lafont, The Linguistic Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), chs. 5-6.

Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy (Cambridge,

10. See Jiirgen Habermas, "Rorty's Pragmadc Turn," in On the Pragmatics of Communi­ cation, ed. Maeve Cooke (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 343-382. For his account of discourse ethics, see Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian L e n h a r d t a n d Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), a n d Justification and Application, trans. Ciarin Cronin (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994). Habermas's critique of empiricist ethics in the essay "On Intentions, Conventions, a n d Linguistic Interactions" offers insight into the roots of his funda­ mentally intersubjectivist approach to ethics. See pp. 118-125 in this volume. 11. Cf. "What Is Universal Pragmatics?" pp. 35 a n d 54. 12. Jiirgen Habermas, Zur Logic der Sozialwissenschaften (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982), p. 10, a n d T C A l : xli. 13. For further changes, see TCA. Subsequent modifications to the theory have often been the result of Habermas's response to his critics. See his replies in J. B. T h o m p ­ son and D. Held, eds., Habermas: Critical Debates (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982), Richard Bernstein, ed., Habermas andModernity (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1985), and Axel H o n n e t h a n d H a n s Joas, eds., Communicative Action (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992). 14. See Jiirgen H a b e r m a s , "Toward a Critique of a Theory of Meaning," in Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. William M. H o h e n g a r t e n (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992). 15. See "Some Further Clarifications of the Concept of Communicative Rationality," in On the Pragmatics of Communication. Here Habermas distinguishes communicative use of language from epistemic and teleological use. 16. A dialogue between the two has already been initiated. See Jiirgen Habermas, "Von Kant zu Hegel: Zu Robert Brandoms Sprachpragmatik," in Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1999), pp. 138-185. An English translation is forthcoming in The European Journal of Philosophy.

Lecture I 1. [Although h e assigns primacy to linguistic meaning, Habermas conceives of Sinn quite broadly. H e does not distinguish in these lectures between "sense" (Sinn) a n d "reference" (Bedeutung) in the tradition of Frege, for example, as his point of depar­ ture is not that tradition but social action theory, where "meaning" is the usual term. Trans.] 2. Cf. J o h n Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p p . 19ff. 3. Cf. D. S. Shwayder's conceptual analyses in his The Stratification of Behavior (Lon­ don: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965).

173 Notes

4. Cf. A. V. Cicourel, Method and Measurement in Sociology (New York: F r e e Press, 1964). 5. H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Crossroad, 1989). 6. N. Malcolm, "Intentional Activity Cannot be Explained by Contingent Causal Laws," in L. I. Krimerman, ed., The Nature and Scope of Social Science (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), 334-350; Th. Mishel, Psychologische Erklarungen (Frankfurt: 1981). 7. Cf. N . Chomsky's critique of Skinner in J. A. Fodor a n d J. J. Katz, eds., The Structure of Language (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 547-578. 8. Cf. Krimerman, Nature and Scope of Social Science, Part 7, p p . 585ff, especially the ar­ ticles by Watkins, Goldstein, and Mandelbaum. 9. Ibid, p. 604. 10. Ibid., p. 605. 11. Peter L. Berger a n d T h o m a s Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City,N.Y.:Doubleday, 1966). 12. G. Simmel, Soziologie (Leipzig: Duncker & Humbolt, 1908; 3rd ed, 1923). [A par­ tial translation appears as "How Is Society Possible?" in On Individuality and Social Forms, ed. Donald Levine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 6-22. Where appropriate, references to the English are included in square brackets. Trans.] 13. I b i d , p. 22 [p. 6, translation modified]. 14. I b i d , p. 22 [p. 7 ] . 15. I b i d , p. 23 [p. 8 ] . 16. Ibid., p. 24. 17. Ibid., p. 23. 18. In comparison with Rickert's a n d Dilthey's proposals for a t h e o r y of the cultural or h u m a n sciences, Simmel's brief c o m m e n t s are merely programmatic. O n the other hand, this program derives immediately form Kant and, unlike the theories of Rickert and Dilthey, does not aim to provide a foundation for the h u m a n sciences that developed in the n i n e t e e n t h century. Instead, it is geared toward a constitutive social theory in the strict sense. The only one who pursued a similar goal and actually went through with an epistemological foundation of the social sciences is Max Adler in Das Rdtsel der Gesellschaft (Vienna: Saturn, 1936). More recently, H e l m u t Schelsky has renewed the call for a "transcendental theory of society"; see his Ortsbestimmung der deutschen Soziologie (Dtisseldorf: E. Diederich, 1959), 93ff. His empirical work, however, belongs m o r e to an anthropological theory of society. T h u s the subjectivist approaches in c o n t e m p o r a r y sociology all derive directly (Schiitz, Berger, Luckmann, Nathanson) or indirectly (Garfi.nkel, Cicourel, Sacks) from Husserl rather than from Kant. Rickert's philosophy of value of course has found its way into m o r e recent sociology via Max Weber and Parsons. However, t h e constitutive prob­ lem already receded into the b a c k g r o u n d in Weber, a n d in Parsons it was superceded by the basic tenets of a moderately empiricist philosophy of science.

174 Notes

Lecture II 1. E d m u n d Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. D. Carr (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970), §28ff., p p . 103ff. Hereafter cited as Crisis. 2. Crisis, §32, p. 119. 3. Crisis, §51, p. 173. 4. Husserl reproaches Kant for the "lack of a n intuitive exhibiting m e t h o d " (Crisis, §30, p. 114). 5. Simmel apparently fails to see the i n h e r e n t difficulty of the architectonic of the Kantian opus. Max Adler, in contrast, undertakes the following revision. H e intro­ duces the social a priori a n d raises this relationship of the singular ego to the commu­ nity of many egos to the level of the transcendental determination of the individual consciousness: "Transcendental epistemology not only teaches that every object nec­ essarily belongs to a subject, but m u c h more: to be a n object is f or the t h i n g to belong to indeterminately m a n y subjects. This plurality must not be u n d e r s t o o d empirically, but transcendentally, that is, already as characteristic of the individual consciousness itself'." Adler, DasRdlsel der Gesellschaft (Vienna: Saturn, 1936), p. 111. 6.1 n connection with what follows, see Ernst Tugendhat's excellent study o n the con­ cept of t r u t h in Husserl a n d Heidegger:,Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1967), part 1. 7. E d m u n d Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, book 1, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), §24, p. 44. 8. Ideas, §30, pp. 56ff. 9. Crisis, §40, p . 149. 10. Ideas, §117, p . 279. 11. Ideas, §116, p . 277. 12. E d m u n d Husserl, "Meditation iiber die I d e e eines individuellen u n d Gemeinschaftelebens in absoluter Selbstverantwortung" a n d "Besinnung als Aktivitat," both in Husserliana, ed. (The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1959), pp. 193-211. 13. Ibid., p . 194. 14. Ibid., p. 197. 15. Ibid., p. 199. 16. Vico's epistemic interpretation of t h e phrase factum et verum convertuntur, which he develops based on the model of geometry, is based o n this insight.

175 Notes

17. For a critique of immediacy as a concept of epistemological justification, see T. W. A d o r n o , Zur Metakritik derErkenntnistheorie (Stuttgart: Kolhammer, 1956). 18. E d m u n d Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), §49, p. 107. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid., §55, p. 123. 21. Schtitz refers t o corresponding works by Scheler, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl," in Collected Papers, v o l 3, ed. I. Schtitz (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), pp. 51-84. 22. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §52, p. 114. [Translation modified. Trans.] 23. Schtitz, "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl," p. 76. 24. Crisis, p. 184. 25. "As primal ego, I constitute my horizon of transcendental others as cosubjects within the transcendental intersubjectivity which constitutes the world," ibid.

Lecture III 1. To begin with, I shall eschew the question of how it is possible that the same prop­ ositional content can pick out many different things: "If we admit one content 'in' many representings, why n o t admit o n e attribute 'in' m a n y things: platonism for things as well as platonism for thoughts?" (W. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics [Lon­ don: Routledge a n d Kegan Paul, 1968], p. 62). Elsewhere, Sellars talks about content as inherent in [Innewohnen] acts of consciousness (in-esse of attributes in representings) a n d of content residing within things themselves (in-esse of attributes in things) (p. 92). 2. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, p. 62. 3. I a m disregarding t h e fact that Sellars from t h e outset interprets acts of conscious­ ness objectivistically, that is, as mental episodes: "If anything which occurs or takes place is to count as an episode, then, whenever an object changes from having one disposition to having a n o t h e r the c h a n g e is an episode" (ibid, p. 72). Sellars's physicalism manifests itself in that he conceives of acts of consciousness or representings as events in the world like objectified natural events. 4. I b i d , p. 64: [Sellars proceeds by identifying contents first with intensions a n d then with (Fregean) senses. This distinction does not figure in Habermas's account here. Trans.] 5. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, p. 156. 6. Ibid. 7. I b i d , p. 76.

176 Notes

8. Ibid., p. 157. 9. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), §202, p . 81. 10. [For a similar interpretation of Wittgenstein, see Saul Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). Trans.] 11. Cf. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958), pp. 2 4 - 4 4 ; also H. J. Giegel, Die Logic der seelischen Ereignisse (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969), pp. 99-108, 112, 134. 12. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics,^.

128.

13. E.g., Philosophical Investigations, §182, p- 73. 14. Philosophical Investigations, §445, p . 131. 15. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, trans. A. Kenny (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), p a r t i , §111, p. 160. 16. Ibid., P a r t i , § 4 5 , p . 88. 17. Ibid., P a r t i , §84, p . 131. [Translation modified. Trans.] 18. "No one will deny that studying the nature of the rules of games must b e useful for the study of grammatical rules, since it is beyond doubt that there is some sort of similarity between t h e m . — T h e right thing is to let the instinct that there is a kinship lead one to look at the rules of games without any preconceived j u d g e m e n t or preju­ dice about the analogy between games and grammar" (ibid., §134, p. 187). 19. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), vol. 2, §54, p p . 84ff. 20. Philosophical Grammar, part II, §9, p . 272. 21. Philosophical Investigations, §206, p . 82. 22. Cf. Jiirgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), ch. 7, pp. 140-160. 23. Philosophical Investigations, §241, p. 88. 24. Ibid., §199, p . 80. 25. Philosophical Grammar, part I, §133, p . 184. 26. I b i d . , p a r t l , §29, p. 65 [italicsJ.H.]. 27. Ibid., p. 66 [original italics]. 28. Philosophical Investigations, §142, p. 56. 29. G. H. Mead, Mind, Self, Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).

177 Notes

30. Philosophical Investigations, §23, p. 11. 3 1 . [Other Habermas translators, following McCarthy, have r e n d e r e d Verstdndlichkeit as "comprehensibility." However, "intelligibility" is the m o r e usual in contexts of phi­ losophy of language. Trans.]

Lecture IV 1. Noam Chomsky, Aspects of a Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, MA: T h e MIT Press, 1965), pp. 3ff. 2. Cf. E H. Lenneberg, Biological Foundations of Language (New York: Wiley, 1967). 3. Dieter Wunderlich, Tempus und Zeitreferenz imDeutschen (Munich: Hueber, 1970). 4. D. S. Shwayder, The Stratification of Behavior (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p. 288. 5. T h a t is, t h e illocutionary acts analyzed by Searle following Austin a n d Strawson; see Speech Acts (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969). 6. By introducing the singular speech act as the elementary unit of speech, we al­ ready perform an abstraction: We prescind from the fact that speech acts usually oc­ cur in pairs, as questions a n d answers, assertions a n d denials, etc. 7. Even if the performative c o m p o n e n t s are n o t explicitly verbalized, they are always implicit in the linguistic process. Thus they must be present in the deep structure of every linguistic utterance. 8. Dell Hymes uses the expression instead for the mastery of linguistic codes; for this I have suggested the term pragmatic competence. 9. In the most recent linguistic debates, consideration of universal pragmatic rela­ tions has led to a revision of the semantic theory initially proposed by Katz, Fodor, Postal, and others. In the newer conception of generative semantics, drawing o n the work of McCawley, Fillmore, a n d especially Lakoff, the categorical separation of syn­ tactic deep structure and semantic interpretation for meaning-preserving transfor­ mations has b e e n d r o p p e d and replaced with the assumption of a semantic deep structure with pre- a n d postlexical transformations. Accordingly, the process of sen­ tence formation begins with a semantic entity whose general characterization also in­ volves aspects of universal pragmatics. Ross and McCawley have suggested interpreting every highest 5 as a performative utterance, that is, as the d o m i n a n t clause of a speech act. Lakoff a n d others incorporate, in addition to the performative mode (question, order, assertion, etc.), references to possible speech situations, as well as focus, presupposition, a n d co-reference into the description of deep struc­ ture. Fillmore's suggestion of representing deep structure as a role structure that would show how elements such as agentives, instrumentals, datives, factitives, locatives, objectives, e t c , contribute to sentence m e a n i n g approximates a cognitivist approach to semantics. I cannot predict the course of this discussion within linguis­ tics. Nevertheless, there are indications that in describing semantic deep structure, linguistics will come across a linguistically basic system of reference that might be un­ derstood as a representation of the rule system of universal pragmatics.

178 Notes

10. Cf. Searle, Speech Acts, p p . 29ff. 11. We may call the use of language that exploits this reflexivity for purposes of para­ phrasing hermeneutic. Relative to the cognitive a n d communicative uses of language, it occurs at a metalevel, but it is nonetheless an element of everyday communication since it merely expresses the reflexivity inherent in natural language. I do not wish to elaborate on this here. 12. Empiricist pragmatics in t h e sense of a behaviorist semiotics (Charles Morris), of course, characteristically introduces t h e universal structures of speech without refer­ ence to pragmatic universals from the perspective of the observer. Cf. K. O- Apel, "Szientismus oder transcendental Hermeneutik? Zur Frage nach d e m Subject der Zeicheninterpretations in der Semiotik des Pragmatismus," in R. Bubner et al. (eds.), Hermeneutik und Dialektik (Tubingen: Mohr, 1970), vol. 1, pp. 105-144; also Arno Mviller, Probleme der behavioristischen Semiotik (doctoral dissertation, University of Frankfurt, 1970). 13. Searle, Speech Acts, pp. 57ff. 14. Austin groups these speech acts with "behabitives" and "exercisives" (see Searle, Speech Acts, pp. 150-162).

Lecture V 1. Cf. Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception, and Reality (New York: Humanities Press, 1963), pp. lOOff. 2. [The G e r m a n here reads: "wobei 's' einen assertorischen Satz mit der Bedeutung 'p' bezeichnet." In keeping with Frege's distinction between sense (Sinn) and refer­ ence (Bedeutung), H a b e r m a s can be u n d e r s t o o d as saying that s has p as its reference. This interpretation fits well with the subsequent discussion of correspondence theo­ ries of truth. T h e formulation is particularly interesting in light of Davidson's appro­ priation of Tarski's semantic conception of truth. Davidson explicitly uses Convention T to replace ' means that.' (See Donald Davidson, "Truth a n d Meaning," in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).) Trans.] 3. Cf. E. Tugendhat, in Philosophische Rundschau, vol. 8, no. 2 / 3 , p p . 131-159. 4. T u g e n d h a t (ibid., p. 138) rightly maintains that "if t h e meaning of ' t r u e ' is ex­ hausted by the fact that we can replace 'p is t r u e ' by 'p,' t h e n any inquiry into the truth of j u d g m e n t s is pointless." 5. Cf. K. O . Apel's introduction to C. S. Peirce, Schriflen I (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1968). 6. Cf. H. G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd rev. ed. (New York: Crossroad, 1989), a n d Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Basic Books, 1959). 7. [For a r e c e n t discussion of world disclosure, see Thesis 11, vol. 37 (1994), espe­ cially the articles by Kompridis, Lafont, Seel, a n d B o h m a n n . Trans.]

179 Notes

8. This difference may be connected with the fact t h a t empirical beliefs must be g r o u n d e d in experience\whereas the acceptance or rejection of n o r m s n e e d n o t have', an immediate experiential connection to external reality. T h e claim of a norm to be" right may be based o n the reflexive experience of the participating subjects of them­ selves. This experience indicates whether o n e "really wants" to accept the n o r m and whether the interpretation of needs and desires that it expresses "really" picks o u t what can be understood as "one's own" n e e d s and desires. 1

1

9. S. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964), pp. 146ff. 10. This goal cannot be attained because we cannot go behind a discourse; that is, we c a n n o t engage in "metadiscourse." In a metadiscourse, we act as if—and this has b e e n our attitude until now—we could ascertain that the participants in this dis­ course satisfy the conditions that allow them to participate in discourse. Yet strictly speaking, discourse and metadiscourse are at the same level. All discourses are intersubjective events. T h e appearance of the arbitrary iteration of the self-reflection of isolated subjects does not so m u c h as get off the ground; see A. Kulenkampff, Antinomie undDialektik (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1970). Even the self-reflection whereby in­ terlocutors ascertain that they have indeed stepped out of contexts of communicative action and have suspended the forces of the reality of making risky decisions—even this is an intersubjective event; cf. my Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), ch. 10). We cannot engage in discourse without presup­ posing that the conditions for entering into discourse have already been met. After having made this presupposition, however, discourse about whether we were right to do so is meaningless. At the level of discourse, there can be no separation of dis­ course and the external point of view of observing discourse. 11. I have sought to characterize the ideal speech situation not in terms of the fea­ tures of the personality of ideal speakers, but in terms of the structural features of a context of possible speech, specifically the symmetric distribution of opportunities to take o n dialogue roles a n d to perform speech acts. This construction is meant to demonstrate that we are i n d e e d capable of anticipating an ideal speech situation, which a competent speaker must be able to do if she wants to participate in discourse, by means of the four m e n t i o n e d classes of speech acts—and only those four. Hence my suggestion for giving a systematic account of speech acts can b e justified in retro­ spect from the point of view that speech acts can only function as pragmatic univer­ sals—that is, as means of producing universal structures of possible speech—if they can simultaneously serve f or designing an ideal speech situation. 12. Even a discursively justified validity claim regains t h e status of b e i n g "naively" presupposed as soon as the result of the discourse reenters contexts of action. 13. This also holds in the special case of therapeutic discourse, which both interlocu­ tors enter with the intention of raising unconscious motives to the level of consciousness. 14. I have since retracted this formulation. See J. H a b e r m a s , "A Reply to my Critics," in J. B. T h o m p s o n and D. Held, e d s , Habermas: Critical Debates (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1982), pp. 261ff.

180

Notes

Intentions, Conventions, and Linguistic Interactions 1. M. Roche, "Die philosophische Schule der Sprachanalyse," in R. Wiggershaus, ed., SprachanalyseundSoziologie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1975), p . 187. 2. Ibid., pp. 188ff. 3. Charles Taylor, "Explaining Action," Inquiry, 13, 1970, 54-89. 4. R. N o r m a n , Reasons for Actions (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971), p. 24. 5. Ibid., pp. 63-64. 6. Ibid., p. 72. 7. From J. Narveson, Morality and Utility (Baltimore: J o h n s Hopkins University Press, 1967), quoted in N o r m a n , Reasons for Actions, p. 48. 8. D. S. Shwayder, The Stratification of Behavior 1965), pp. 254ff.

(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul,

9. See my critique of intentionalist semantics in J. Habermas, "Intentionalistische Semantik," in Vorstudien und Ergdnzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984). [More recently, Habermas has made this criticism in "Comments on J o h n Searle: Meaning, Communication, a n d Representation," in John Searle and His Critics, ed. Ernest Lepore a n d Robert Van Gulick (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p p . 17-29, and in Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. Bill H o h e n g a r t e n (Cam­ bridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992). Trans.]

Reflections o n Communicative Pathology 1. G. Devereux, Normal und Anormal (Frankfurt, 1974). 2. Ibid., pp. 28ff. 3. Ibid., p p . 44, 46. 4. Ibid., p p . 122ff. 5. Ibid., p p . 119ff. 6. Ibid., p . 86. 7. J. Habermas, KnowledgeandHuman Interests, trans. J. Shapiro (Boston, MA: Beacon Press 1971), ch. 10, and "The H e r m e n e u t i c Claim to Universality," in Contemporary Hermeneutics, ed. Josef Bleicher (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), p p . 181-211. 8. R . A . Spitz, Vom Sduglingzum 9. Ibid., p. 204.

Kleinkind (Stuttgart, 1967).

181 Notes

10. Ibid., pp. 201ff. 11. R D . Laing, Self and Others (New York: Pantheon, 1969), p. 70. 12. R. D. Laing, H. Phillipson, a n d A. R. Lee, Interpersonal Perception (New York: Springer, 1966), p p . 21-22. 13. H. Stierlin, Das Tun des Einen ist das Tun des Anderen (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971). 14. W. D. Winter and A. J. Ferreira, eds., Research in Family Interaction ence and Behavior Books, 1969). 15. See the literature review in t h e introduction Kommunikation, Psychose (Bern: 1972).

(Palo Alto: Sci­

to L. Kaufmann,

Familie,

16. G. Handel, e d . The Psychosocial Interior of the Family (Chicago: Aldine, 1967). 17. E. G. Mishler a n d N. E. Waxier, Interaction inFamilies (New York: Wiley, 1968). 18. R. D. Hess a n d G. Handel, "The Family as a Psychosocial Organization," in Han­ del, The Psychosocial Interior of the Family, pp. lOff. 19. M. T. Siegert, Strukturbedingungen 1977).

von Familienkonflikten

(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,

20. N. W. Ackerman a n d M. L. Behrens, "A Study of Family Diagnosis," American Jour­ nal of Orthopsychiatry (1956): 66ff. 21. Kaufmann, Familie, Kommunikation, Psychose, p p . 73ff. 22. I b i d , p . 106. 23. I b i d , p p . 105ff. 24. I b i d , p . 92. 25. I b i d , p . 8 1 . 26. Y Schiitze, Innerfamiliale Kommunikation und kindlichePsyche (Berlin, 1977). 27. Ibid. 28. A. Lorenzer, Sprachzerstirung und Rekonstruktion (Frankfurt: S u h r k a m p , 1970).

r

Index

Absolute self-responsibility, for Husserl, 31-32, 35 Abstraction linguistic, 74-75 logical, 75 sociolinguistic, 74 universal-pragmatic, 74 Accountability, xv, 101, 147 Ackerman, N. W , 163-164 Action. See also Communicative action; Strategic action vs. act (Sellars), 48-49 vs. behavior, 4 - 6 intentional, xviii, 11, 110-118, 125 (see also Intention) normative model of, 126 presuppositions of, xxiii purposive-rational, 11-12 and rules, 5-6, 13, 108-109 social, ix teleological means-end model of, xix, 113-114, 115-116, 118 theory of, ix, xvii, 108 Action-theoretic approaches, 109 Activity, in family relationships, 163 Actor, 141 Adler, Max, 19, l74n.5 A d o r n o , Theodor, 19, 87-88 Agency, x, 141 Analytic truth, 91 Arieti, Silvano, 142 Aristotle, 86

Assertion (s), 90, 94 and Brandom vs. H a b e r m a s , xxiv pragmatics of, 89, 91 Atomistic approach i n social sciences, 13-14 Attributions, 157 Austin, J. L., xxii, 74, 83-84, 87, 108 Bediirfnisnatur (need-based n a t u r e ) , 123, 125, 131 Behavior, vs. action, 4-6 Behavioral expectation, generalized (Mead), 124 Behaviorism, x, 8-9, 10 Behrens, M. L , 163-164 Beliefs, and intentions, 111 Berger, Peter L , 16 Brandom, Robert, xiv, xxiv Brentano, Franz, xvii, 27,110, 114 Buhler, Karl, 142 Carnap, Rudolf, 65, 86, 111 Cartesian Meditations, The (Husserl), xi, 22, 38, 41 Categorial intuition, 33, 88 Causality, 81 and intention, 114-115 Child development, communication de­ velopment in, 137-140 Chisholm, Roderick, 111 Chomsky, Noam, 68, 69-71 Cicourel, A. V., 11

184 Index

Communicative speech acts, xiv, 82-83, Claims to validity. See Validity claims 84, 99 Cognitive orientations, vs. noncognitive, Communicative spiral, 157-159 xviii Communicative symbols, 140 Cognitive use of language, 63-64, 76 Communicative theory(ies) of society, a n d communicative use, xiii, xxiii 3, 18, 85 and disclosure theories of truth, 92 categorial framework for, 45 obligation in, 148 a n d communicative language use, 64 pragmatics of, 78-82 a n d intersubjective relation, 44 and Wittgenstein, 62 a n d lifeworld, 34-35 Commonsense experience, 24 a n d normative validity, 100 Communication a n d objective vs. intersubjective world, a n d consensus, 93 37 empirical vagaries of, xx a n d universal pragmatics, 53 a n d ideal speech situation, 97-98 Communicative use of language, 64, 76 simultaneous metacommunication as a n d cognitive use, xiii, xxiii condition of, xiii, 59-60, 74 pragmatics of, 82-84 systematically distorted, viii, xx, 137, a n d Wittgenstein, xiii 147-149 (see also Systematically dis­ Community torted communication) behaving as member of, 124 a n d validity claims, xx, xxiii (see also Va­ Husserl o n , 32 lidity claims) transcendental, 26, 42-43, 174n.5 Communication theory of society. See Competence Communicative theory of society communicative, xi, 57, 60, 73, 74, 75 Communicative action, xvii-xviii, 11, interactive, xx, 131, 135-136 12-13, 99-100 and rules, 54 and autonomy of speech, 145 C o m p e t e n t judges, 95-96 a n d interpretation, 127 Conditional self-denial, 168 and lifeworld, xvi Conflicts, identity. See Identity conflicts and mutual understanding, ix Conscious conflict processing, as undis­ pure, 99-100, 102 torted communication, 136 a n d socialization, xx, 131 Consciousness, philosophy or theory of. a n d strategic action, xviii, 12-13 See Philosophy or theory of a n d supposition of motives, 82 consciousness a n d systematic distortion, xxi (see also Consensus Systematically distorted a n d communication, 93 communication) rational, xv, xvii, 93, 95, 96, 99 and theory of rationality, xxii-xxiii on truth vs. on rightness, 92 universal (formal) presuppositions of, Consensus theory of truth, xvii, 89, xx, 147-149 92-93 violations of, 149-155 a n d competent judges, 95-96 and validity claims, xiv-xv a n d ideal speech situation, 97-99 Communicative competence, xi, 57, 60, Constative speech acts, xiv, 76, 78, 83, 73, 74, 75 84 Communicative language use. See Com­ a n d mistakes, 154 municative use of language obligation in, 148-149 Communicative paradigm, x-xi a n d t r u t h , 86, 88, 95 Communicative pathologies, 155. See also validity claim of, 89, 91 Systematically distorted Constitution, a n d Husserl, 2 3 , 25 communication Constitutive rules, 56 Communicative rationality or reason, vii, Constitutive theory of knowledge, 25 ix, xi a n d analysis of lifeworld, 68 and The Theory of Communicative Action, a n d Husserl, 31 viii

185 Index

Constitutive theory(ies) of society, 18-22, 173n.l8 and Husserl, 25-26 a n d intersubjective relation, 44 and lifeworld, 25 a n d phenomenology, 25 two p r o b l e m s for, 23, 26 Contemplative life, Husserl on, 32 Context-independent language use, 143 Conventionalism, vs. essentialism, 8-10 Conventional role theory, 126 Conventions and m u t u a l understanding, xix and rule-following, 107 semantic, 88, 107-110 social, 107-110 Correspondence theory of truth, 86, 91 Crisis of the European Sciences, The (Husserl), 23, 43 Critical theory a n d formal pragmatics, xv a n d universal pragmatics, 103 Culturalistic notion of normalcy, 132-135 Cultural tradition, 24 Cultural values, a n d norms, 122 Davidson, Donald, xiii Defense mechanisms, 155, 169 Definite descriptions, 80, 143 Denial, in child development (Spitz), 138-140 Desires, 116-117 Desymbolization, 169 Devereux, G, 132-135 Deviant behavior, 12 Deviant processes of socialization, xix Dialectical social theory, 16, 19 Dialectic of the ego, 60 Difference, in family relationships, 162-163 Discourse (s), xv, 94 vs. communicative action, 99-100 a n d ideal speech situation, 98 a n d metadiscourse, I 7 9 n . l 0 rational consensus through, 93 a n d validity claims, xxi Discourse ethics, xvii universalizability of, xix Dispositions, 116 Dissensus, on Tightness of utterance, 144

Distance between family members, in pathological families, 162 Double bind, 168-169 Doxic acts, and Husserl, 29-30 Doxic positings, 63 Dual structure of speech, xiii, 63, 76 D u m m e t t , Michael, xxiii Ego, dialectic of, 60 Emancipated form of life, 99 Emotional a n d volitional acts, a n d Husserl, 30-31 Empirical pragmatics, 72 Empiricist ethics, 118-119 Epistemology, a n d society, 22 Equality, in family relationships, 162-163 Essentialism, vs. conventionalism, 8-10 Ethics discourse, xvii, xix empiricist, 118-119 and Husserl o n absolute responsibility, 32 Evaluative expression, vs. normative standard of value, 121 Examples, Wittgenstein on, 54-55 Expectations in double bind, 168-169 generalized (Mead), 124 of intentionality, 101 intentions as, 59 and learning, 88 of legitimacy, 101 Experience commonsense, 24 truth claims g r o u n d e d in, 88-89 Explanations, 90, 94 Expressive language use, warrant in, 149 Expressive speech acts, xiv False consciousness, 35-36 False reciprocation, 167 Families a n d intrapsychic disturbances of com­ munication, 131 systematically distorted communica­ tion in, xxi-xxii, 159-165, 170 Feelings, 116 Ferreira, A . J , 161 F i c h t e , J o h a n n Gottlieb, 60 Formalization, degree of, 152

186 Index

Formal pragmatics. See Universal pragmatics Freud, Anna, 140 Freud, Sigmund, 131 Fulfillment, degree of, 152 Gadamer, H. G., 88 Galileo, 24 Games, language. See Language games Games of strategy, 57 Gauss Lectures, Princeton (1971), viii, ix, xxiii Generative grammar, 68-72 Generative process of society, models of, 16-18 Generative semantics, l 7 7 n . 9 Generative theories of society, 11, 15-18 constitutive theories, 18-22, 23, 25-26, 44, 173n.l8 Generative theory of language, 65 Grammar, generative, 68-72 Grammatical competence, 75 Grammatical rules, 56, 57-58 Habermas, Jiirgen, vii and Brandom, xxiv and Husserl, xi-xii and linguistic turn, vii, xxii and Sellars, xi, xii, xxiv and theory of language, ix and Wittgenstein, xi, xii-xiii Hampshire, Stuart, 108, 111 Handel, G., 162-163 H a r m o n i o u s behavior, a n d Husserl, 40-41 Hegel, G. W. F., 16, 60 Heidegger, Martin, 92 H e r m e n e u t i c discourse or language, 94, 178n.ll Hermeneutics, 7-8 Hess, R. D., 162-163 Hintikka, Jaakko, 111 Holistic approach in social sciences, 13-14 Humboldt, Wilhelm, 60 Husserl, E d m u n d , xi-xii, 16, 19 on absolute self-responsibility 31-32, 35 on categorial intuition, 33 a n d constitutive social theory, 23 on "contents" vs. "positings," 63 on intentionality, 2 7 - 3 1 , 32-34, 110, 111

a n d intersubjectivity, 60 a n d Kant, 23, 24, 25-26 and lifeworld, 16, 21, 23, 24 social, 26, 37 a n d nonlinguistic intentionalist theory of meaning, 51 and other egos, 36 a n d phenomenological foundation of intersubjectivity, 47 a n d Sellars, 45, 46 a n d subjectivist approaches, 173n.l8 o n transcendental history of intersubjectivity, 3 8 - 4 3 a n d truth, 22, 28-31, 33, 87-88 "Idea of Individual a n d Community Life in Absolute Self-Responsibility, T h e " (Husserl), 31 Idealized model of communication, sorts of failure of, xxi Ideal speaker-listener (Chomsky), 69-70, 71 Ideal speech situation, xv-xvi, xx, 97-99, 102-103, 1 7 9 n . l l vs. empirical circumstances, xxii Ideas . . . (Husserl), 27, 41 Identity, 156 personal, 156 Identity conflicts, 155-159 a n d family relation, 159-165, 170 and pseudo-consensus, xxii, 165-169 a n d systematic distortions, 169-170 Instrumental action, rules of, 109 Intelligibility and truth, 91 as validity claim, xiv, 63, 90, 91, 93 violation of, 148, 149-151 I n t e n t i o n ( s ) , 5 9 , 110-111 and beliefs, 111 as cause, 114-115 a n d rule-following, 107 Wittgenstein on, 52 Intentional action, xviii, 11, 110-118 and cognitive acts, 118 and language, 125 a n d norm-governed action, 109 Intentional behavior, 5 Intentional expressions, Sellars on, 47-48 Intentionality, xviii, 27-31, 32-34, 36 a n d B r e n t a n o , 27, 110, 114 cognitive vs. noncognitive relation in, 111-112

187 Index

expectation of, 101 and first- vs. third-person, 112-113 and Husserl, 27-31, 32-34, 110, 111 and language, 114 Sellars's account of, 45 "Intentions, Conventions, and Linguistic Interactions" (Habermas), xvii Interactive competence, xx, 131 a n d moral j u d g m e n t , 131, 135-136 Interactive language use, obligation in, 149 Interpersonal relationships within family, 159 spiraling in, 157-159 Interpretation (s), 90, 9 4 , 1 2 7 a n d intersubjectivity, xi and rule-following, 107 Intersubjectively communalized experi­ ence, 24 Intersubjective world, vs. objective world, 37 Intersubjectivity, x-xi and assertibilist semantics, xxiii and communicative vs. constitutive the­ ories, 44 a n d Habermas on Wittgenstein, xiii Husserl and Sellars on, xi-xii and intentional expressions, 107 a n d monological language, 51-52 as paradoxical relation, 60-61 phenomenological foundation of, 36, 38, 47 problem of foundation of, 23 of society, 22 a n d speech acts, 61 and subjectivity, xx of thought, 45 transcendental history of, 38-43 and universalizability of interests, xix of validity of rules, 50, 59 Intrapsychic disturbances of communica­ tion, family disturbances analogous to, 131 Intuition, and Husserl, 28, 33, 88 J u d g e s , competent, 95—96 Justification(s), 90, 94. See also Validity claims a n d consensus theory of truth, xvii moral-practical, 119-123 a n d motive, xix a n d theory of meaning, xiii—xiv

Kamlah, Wilhelm, 95 Kant, Immanuel, 16, 18-19 a n d Husserl, 23, 24, 25-26 and Sellars, 45 Kaufmann, Luc, 165, 166-167 Laing, R. D , 156 Language, 125-127 autonomy of, 143-144 generative theory of, 65 g r a m m a r of, 67 and intentionality, 114 knowledge of rules of, 8-10 a n d m e a n i n g , xxiii monological, 48-50, 51 reflexivity of, 73-74 Language development, Spitz on, 138-140 Language games, xii, 52-63, 64, I76n.l8 and analysis of concepts (Roche), 108 background consensus in, 89-90 communicative action in, 100 and communicative theory, 44, 53 a n d dual structure of speech acts, 63 and generative theory of society, 17, 18, 19 g r a m m a r of, 67, 107-108 a n d role or function of expression, 47 Wittgenstein and theory of, 53, 67 Language use cognitive, xiii, xxiii, 63-64, 76 and disclosure theories of t r u t h , 92 obligation in, 148 pragmatics of, 78-82 and Wittgenstein, 62 communicative, xiii, xxiii, 64, 76 pragmatics of, 82-84 and Wittgenstein, xiii context-independent, 143 Legitimacy, expectation of, 101 Levy-Strauss, Claude, 19 Lidz, T h e o d o r e , 162 Lies, 154 Lifeworld, xvi and communicative theory of society, 34-35 constitutive theory of, 25 of Husserl, 16, 21, 23, 24 p h e n o m e n o l o g y a n d philosophy of language on, 68 as posited, 29, 30

188

Index

Lifeworld (continued) and science, 24-25 social, 26, 37 Linguistic abstraction, 74-75 Linguistic codes, 71-73 Linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n , ix, xviii, 4, 109 a n d absence, 28 in child's development, 137-140 levels of first, 140-141 second, 141-146 and model of communicative action, 127 and motivational development, 131 mutual u n d e r s t a n d i n g as purpose of, 93 normalcy conditions of, 131-137 normative foundation of, 102 Linguistic c o m p e t e n c e , 69-70, 71 Linguistic empiricism, 65 Linguistics, 75 Linguistic transcendentalism, 64-65 Linguistic t u r n of twentieth-century phi­ losophy, vii for Habermas, xii, xxii a n d Sellars, xii, 47 a n d theory of consciousness, 45 Logic, 75 Logical abstraction, 75 Logical Investigations (Husserl), 27, 41 Lorenzen, Paul, 95 Lorenzer, A., 169 Luckmann, Thomas, 16 L u h m a n n , Niklas, 14, 19 Lukacs, G., 19 Making It Explicit (Brandom), xxiv Marcuse, Herbert, 19 Marx, Karl, 16 Marxist phenomenology, 19 Mead, G. H., xix, 17, 18, 19, 43, 59, 124 Meaning, 3-4, l 7 2 n . l a n d action vs. behavior, 4-6 communication as sharing of, 60 and conventionalism vs. essentialism, 8-10 a n d intersubjectivity, x-xi, 43 normativity of, xi a n d observation vs. understanding, 6-8 and Sellars, 46

social theory(ies) of, xxiii, xxiv use theory(ies) of, xii, xxiii, 54 Measurement, 7, 10-11 M e l d e n , A . L , 114-115 Mental health, Devereux on, 134 Metacommunication, xiii, 59-60, 74 Metadiscourse, 179n.l0 Moods, 116 Moral j u d g m e n t a n d interactive competence, 131, 135-136 normative assumption of, 135 Moral justification, 119-123 Mutual understanding. See Understand­ ing, mutual Naturalistic fallacy in ethics, 92 Nature a n d natural sciences, 24 a n d other Ego, 37 vs. society, 19-21 Need-based nature (Bedurfnisnatur), 123,125,131 Need interpretations, xviii Needs, 116 Negation in child development (Spitz), 138-140 a n d speech acts, 146 Neo-Kantianism, 19 Neurotic behavior patterns, 153 Nomological statements, 9 Nonverbal expressions, and speech acts, 142 Normalcy of linguistic communication, xx, 131-137 and conscious conflict, 136 Norman, Richard, 119-121 Normative model of action, 126 Normative rightness, 123 and truth, 92 as validity claim, xiv, 64, 90, 91, 92, 93, 179n.8 violation of, 152-153 Normative social reality, a n d speech, 144, 146 Normative validity, 100-103, 122, 123 of rules, 6 a n d value-oriented action, 118 Norm-governed action, xviii, 123 and language, 125 Norms a n d accountability, 101

189 Index

a n d action, 5-6, 7, 8 a n d communicative action, 12 a n d deviations, 70 fulfilling of, 118-125 M e a d on, 124 a n d rules of action, 109 validity of, 122-123 a n d values, 125 Objective world vs. intersubjective world, 37 a n d paradox of others, 36-37 Objectivist approach to theory forma­ tion, x-xi, xii, 10-11 Object relations, 159 Observation, vs. understanding, 6-8 Oevermann, U , 163, 165 Ontological theories of truth, 86, 87 Other(s) and constitutive theories of society, 22 Husserl o n , 36-37, 39-40, 42 a n d personal identity; 156 Parsons, Talcott, 13, 14, 19, 118, 123 Passivity, in family relationships, 163 Peirce, C. S., 24, 34, 81-82, 87, 88 Perception, and cognitive language, xvi-xvii Performative clause, 90 Performative utterances, 74 Performative verbs, 77 Peters, R. S, 114-115 Phenomenological attitude, 43 Phenomenological foundation of intersubjectivity, 36, 38, 47 Phenomenology, 19 a n d constitutive theory o f society, 25 a n d intersubjectivity, xi-xii Philosophical life, Husserl on, 32 Philosophy of language and game model of language, 59 a n d philosophy of consciousness, 32, 36 a n d Wittgenstein, 52 Philosophy or theory of consciousness Husserl on, 36 a n d linguistic turn, 45 philosophy of language as replacement for, 32, 36 solitary reflection in, 43 a n d Wittgenstein, 52 Philosophy in twentieth century, "lin­ guistic turn" of. See Linguistic

turn of twentieth-century philosophy Piaget.Jean, 70, 135 Popper, Karl, 14, 87-88 Positing(s), 28-30, 34-35, 63 Power relations, and family distortions, xxii, 161-162 Practical discourse, 9 4 Pragmatic competences, 75 Pragmatics. See also Universal pragmatics of assertions, 89, 91 of cognitive language use, 78-82 of communicative language use, 82-84 empirical, 72 resurgence of interest in, xxix Pragmatic theory of meaning, and speech act theory, ix Pragmatic universals, 73, 76-78 Predication, 81-82 Presuppositions of action, xxiii Private language utterances, 169 Pronouns, 6 1 , 77, 81 Propositions, truth of, 95 Proximity of family members, in patho­ logical families, 162 Pseudo-confirmation, 167 Pseudo-consensus, xxii, 165-169 Public standards, 120-121 Pure communicative action, 99-100, 102 Purposive-rational action, 11-12 t

Rational choice theories, 15 Rational consensus, xv, xvii, 93, 9 5 , 9 6 , 99 Rationality. See also Reason a n d assertibilist semantics, xxiii claim to, 85 communicative, ix, xi of judges, 95-96 and theory of communicative action, xxii-xxiii Rational motivation, 94-95 Reality, 87 Reason, 8 5 - 8 6 . See also Rationality communicative, vii, ix a n d Habermas on communication, vii a n d linguistic turn, vii "postmetaphysical," vii

190 Index

Reasons, a n d speech acts, xiv. See also Va­ lidity claims Reference and cognitive language, xvi-xvii and context-independence, 143 Referential expressions, 80 "Reflection on Communicative Pathol­ ogies" (Habermas), xix Regulative speech acts, xiv, 83, 84, 99, 149 Representative (expressive) speech acts, 83, 84, 99 Responsibility, a n d behavior, 5 Rickert, Heinrich, 19, 173n.l8 Rightness, 92. See also Normative rightness Roche, M., 108, 109 Role theory, conventional, 126 Rule-competence, 7 0 , 7 2 Rule-following, xii, xviii, 107 Rule-model of language use, 125 Rules, 50-51 and action, 5-6, 13, 108-109 grammatical, 56, 5 7 - 5 8 of performance vs. criticism (Sellars), 49 Wittgenstein on, xii, 43, 50, 5 1 , 56, 68, 107-108 a n d Wittgenstein on language games, 53-55, 56 Rule systems, subjectless, 16 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 19 Schutz, Alfred, xi, 16, 19, 25, 42 Schiitze, Y, 165, 166, 168 Schwayder, D. S., 73 Science, and lifeworld, 24-25 Searle, J o h n , 82 Self-responsibility, for Husserl, 31-32, 35 Sellars, Wilfrid, xi, xii, xxiv, 45-49, 5 1 - 5 2 , 6 5 , 87, 111, I75n.3 Semantic content, 140-141 Semantic conventions, 107-110 as Wittgenstein example, 88 Semantic definition of truth, 86 Semantic relation, Sellars o n , 46-47 Semantics assertibilist, xxiii Brandom on, xxiv formal, xxiii intentionalist, xxiii Simmel, Georg, 18, 19-20, 21-22, 173n.l8

Sincerity and speech vs. speaker's subjectivity, 146 a n d truth, 91-92 as validity claim, xiv, 64, 90, 91, 93 violation of, 151-152, 154 Social action, and Habermas, ix Social change, on atomistic approach, 14 Social conventions, 107-110 Social cybernetic models, 15 Socialization and communicative action, xx, 131 deviant processes of, xix disturbances of, 131 Social lifeworld, 2 6 , 3 7 Social reality, constitution of, 16 Social science (s). See also T h e o r y forma­ tion in social sciences dominant paradigms in, x a n d meaning, 3-4 theoretical approaches in, 3 Social systems theory. See Systems theory Social theory Habermas's linguistic approach to, ix, x of meaning, xxiii Society epistemology as i n a d e q u a t e to, 22 vs. n a t u r e , 19-21 truth in immanent relation to, 22, 23, 26-27, 32 Sociolinguistic abstraction, 74 Sociolinguistics, 75 Spann, O., 19 Speech. See aho Ideal speech situation autonomy of, 144-145 dual structure of, xiii, 63, 76 external a n d internal organization of, 144-145, 147, 154, 169 a n d normative social reality, 144, 146 Speech acts, 55, 61, 73-74, 76 classification of, xiv, 82-84 communicatives, xiv, 82-83, 84, 99 constatives, xiv, 78, 83, 84 (see aho Constative speech acts) regulatives, xiv, 83, 84, 99, 149 representatives (expressives), xiv, 83, 84, 99 a n d intentions vs. norms, 109 a n d nonverbal expressions, 142 normative background of, 143-144

191 Index

a n d reason, 85-86 and t r u t h , 86 validity claims for, xiv, 90, 136, 146 (see also Validity claims) and Wittgenstein, 62 Speech act theory, ix-x, xiii-xiv, xxiii and pragmatic universals, 78 and validity claims, xiv Spitz, R, 137-140 Stierlin, H , 160 Strategic action, 12-13 and communicative action, xviii, 12-13 vs. consensual action, 150 Strategic games, 57 Structuralism, 16-17, 19 Subjectivist approaches i n contemporary sociology, 173n.l8 Subjectivist approaches t o theory forma­ tion, x-xi, 10, 15 Subjectivist theoretical program, 10 Subjectivity, a n d intersubjectivity, xx Symbolic interactionism, 19 Systematically distorted communication, viii,xx, 137, 147-149 and conflicts of identity, xxi, 155-159 as circular process, 169-170 in families, xxi-xxii, 159-165, 170 a n d pseudo-consensus, 165-169 examples of, 164-165 as third option, xxii violations of validity claims, 149-155 Systems theory(ies), 14, 16-17, 18, 19 Tandem p h e n o m e n o n , 166-167 Tangential response, 166 Tarski, Alfred, 86 Taylor, Charles, 115 Teleological m o d e l of action, xix, 113-114, 115-116 and acting subject, 118 Theoretico-empirical discourse, 94 Theories, and expectations, 124-125 T h e o r y of action, ix, xvii and rule-following, 108 Theory of Communicative Action, The (Habermas), viii, xiv, xvi T h e o r y of consciousness. See Philosophy or theory of consciousness T h e o r y formation in social sciences atomistic vs. holistic a p p r o a c h in, 13-14

classification of approaches t o , 14 a n d generative theories of society, 15-22 objectivist vs. subjectivist approaches to, 10-11, 15 and strategic vs. communicative ac­ tion, 11-13 T h e o r y of knowledge, constitutive. See Constitutive theory of knowledge Theory of language, and Wittgenstein, 64 T h e o r y of meaning, xiii-xiv T h e o r y of rationality, xxii Tractatus . . . (Wittgenstein), 61 Transcendental community, 26, 42-43, 174n.5 Transcendental history of intersubjectivity, 38-43 T r u t h , xvi, xxiii, 86 analytic, 91 consensus theory of, xvii, 89, 92-93, 95-99 correspondence theory of, 86, 91 disclosure theories of, 92 as evidence (evidential theory of), 33, 34, 36, 87-88 Husserl on, 22, 28-31, 33, 87-88 a n d intelligibility, 91 a n d normative Tightness, 92 of propositions, 95 and sincerity, 91-92 society's i m m a n e n t relation t o , 22, 23, 26-27, 32 universal-pragmatic meaning of, 89 as validity claim, xiv, 6 3 - 6 4 , 90, 91, 93 violation of, 153-154 Tugendhat, Ernst, 32 Unconscious motives, a n d accountabil­ ity, 101 Unconscious repression, 136 Understanding a n d acceptability conditions, xxiii of games, 54, 55-56 mutual, 93, 97, 101-102 and consensus, 127 a n d conventions, xix a n d dual structure of speech, xiii and formal pragmatics, ix

192 _ Index

Understanding (continued) and normalcy of linguistic communi­ cation, 136-137 as presupposition of communicative action, 148 and role-taking, 126 as telos of language, ix a n d normative social reality, 144 vs. observation, 6-8 and spiral of interpersonal relation­ ships, 157, 158 Universalizability of discourse ethics, principle of, xix Universal-pragmatic abstraction, 74 Universal-pragmatic m e a n i n g of truth, 89 Universal (formal) pragmatics, viii, ix, 72. See aho Pragmatics and cognitive use of language, 68 a n d communicative competence, xi, 74, 75 and communicative theory of society, 53 a n d communicative use of language, 68 and critical theory, xv, 103 generative grammar as model for, 65 and generative semantics, 177n.9 of language games, 68 a n d lifeworld, xvi a n d reflexivity of natural languages, 73-74 and social theory of meaning, xxiii Uses of language. See Language use Use theory of meaning, xii, xxiii, 54 Utterance abstractions from, 74-75 and speech act theory, ix as unintelligible, 145-146 Validity claims, xiv, xxiii bases of, 136-137 ontogenesis of, 137-146 transcendental i m p o r t of, 146-155 B r a n d o m on, xxiv challenging of, xiv, xx classes of, xiv, 63-64, 90-91 intelligibility, xiv, 63, 90, 9 1 , 93, 148, 149-151 normative rightness, xiv, 64, 90, 9 1 , 92, 93, 152-153, I79n.8 sincerity, xiv, 64, 90, 91, 93, 151-152, 154

truth, xiv, 63-64, 90, 91, 93, 153-154 a n d consensus theory of truth, xvii discursive r e d e m p t i o n of, xvii, xxi, 89, 92-93, 97 a n d experiences, 88 facticityof, 22, 85 a n d false consciousness, 35-36 and mutual agreement, 136-137 of n o r m , 122 (see aho Normative validity) a n d positing, 34 a n d social life, 22 a n d society's relation to truth, 26 suspension of in discourse, 100 violation of, 149-155 Values, 117, 123 a n d common culture, 126 cultural, 122 and norms, 125 Volitional acts a n d Husserl, 30-31 Vorstudien und Ergdnzungen zur theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Habermas), viii Wants, 123 intelligible, 119-120 publicly interpreted, 121 W a t k i n s J . W. N., 14 Weber, Max, 13 Winch, Peter, 19, 108-109, 114-115 Wittgenstein, xi, xii—xiii, 67 and analysis of concepts, 108 and comparable functions in lan­ guage, 51 o n intention and language, 52 o n language-games, 17, 18, 19, 44, 47, 52-63, 64, 67, 176n.l8 o n reaching understanding, 93 o n rules, xii, 43, 50, 51, 56, 68, 107-108 a n d semantic conventions, 88 semantic a n d social conventions equated by, 107 on sense of assertion, 73 a n d theory of action vs. of meaning, 108 a n d theory of language, 64 Wunderlich, Dieter, 72, 76 Wynne, Lyman, 162, 164, 165