The Inclusion of the Other
Studies in Contemporary G e r m a n Social T h o u g h t (partial listing) T h o m a s McC...
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The Inclusion of the Other
Studies in Contemporary G e r m a n Social T h o u g h t (partial listing) T h o m a s McCarthy, g e n e r a l e d i t o r James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, editors, Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal Craig Calhoun, editor, Habermas and the Public Sphere Maeve Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics Jiirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy Jiirgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics Jiirgen Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences Jiirgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory Jiirgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action Jiirgen Habermas, The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians'Debate Jiirgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures Jiirgen Habermas, Philosophical-Political Profiles Jiirgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays Jiirgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Communication Jiirgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society Jiirgen Habermas, editor, Observations on "The Spiritual Situation of the Age" Axel H o n n e t h , The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory Axel H o n n e t h , The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts Axel H o n n e t h and Hans Joas, editors, Communicative Action: Essays on Jiirgen Habermas's T h e Theory of Communicative Action Axel H o n n e t h , Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe, and Albrecht Wellmer, editors, Cul tural-Political Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe, and Albrecht Wellmer, editors, Philo sophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves and Seyla Benhabib, editors, Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity: Critical Essays on The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity Ernst Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination Albrecht Wellmer, Endgames: Essays and Lectures on the Irreconcilable Nature of Modernity Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics and Post modernism
The Inclusion of the Other Studies in Political Theory
e d i t e d by C i a r a n C r o n i n a n d P a b l o D e Greiff
T h e M I T Press, C a m b r i d g e , Massachusetts
This translation ©1998 Massachusetts Institute of Technology This work originally appeared in German u n d e r the title Die Einbeziehung desanderen. Studien zur politischen Theorie, ©1996 by Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, Germany. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. This book was set in New Baskerville by Wellington Graphics and printed and b o u n d in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Habermas, Jiirgen. [Einbeziehung des Anderen. English.] T h e inclusion of the other : studies in political theory / Jiirgen Habermas : edited by Ciaran Cronin and Pablo De Greiff. p. cm. Translation of: Die Einbeziehung des Anderen. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index.
ISBN 0-262-08267-5 (he) 0-262-58186-8 (pb) 1. Political science. 2. Liberalism. 3, State, The. 4. H u m a n rights. 5. Democracy. I. Cronin, Ciaran. II. De Greiff, Pablo. III. Title. JA68.H23 1998 320.51'3—dc21 98-21601 CIP 10 9 8 7 6
Contents
Editors' Introduction Translator's Note Preface
vii xxxiii xxxv
I H o w Rational Is the Authority o f the Ought? 1 A G e n e a l o g i c a l Analysis of t h e Cognitive C o n t e n t of
3
Morality II Political Liberalism: A D e b a t e with J o h n Rawls 2 R e c o n c i l i a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e P u b l i c Use of R e a s o n
49
3 " R e a s o n a b l e " versus " T r u e , " o r t h e Morality of Worldviews
75
III Is T h e r e a Future for the Nation-State? 4 T h e E u r o p e a n Nation-State: O n t h e Past a n d F u t u r e of Sovereignty a n d C i t i z e n s h i p
105
5 O n t h e R e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e N a t i o n , t h e R u l e of Law, a n d D e m o c r a c y
129
6 Does E u r o p e N e e d a Constitution? Response to Dieter G r i m m
155
Contents
IV H u m a n Rights: Global and Internal 7 K a n t ' s I d e a of P e r p e t u a l P e a c e : At T w o H u n d r e d Years' Historical R e m o v e
165
8 S t r u g g l e s for R e c o g n i t i o n i n t h e D e m o c r a t i c C o n s t i t u t i o n a l State
203
V What Is Meant by "Deliberative Politics"? 9 T h r e e N o r m a t i v e M o d e l s of D e m o c r a c y
239
10 O n t h e I n t e r n a l R e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e R u l e of Law and Democracy
253
Notes
265
Index
291
Editors' Introduction
T h e w i d e - r a n g i n g essays c o l l e c t e d in this v o l u m e p r o v i d e a n overview of J i i r g e n H a b e r m a s ' s w o r k i n political p h i l o s o p h y over t h e p a s t d e c a d e t o g e t h e r with a n u m b e r of i m p o r t a n t e l a b o r a t i o n s of its basic t h e m e s i n c o n n e c t i o n with c u r r e n t political d e b a t e s . O n e of t h e distinctive f e a t u r e s of this w o r k h a s b e e n its a p p r o a c h to t h e p r o b l e m of political legitimacy t h r o u g h a s u s t a i n e d reflection o n t h e d u a l l e g i t i m a t i n g a n d r e g u l a t i n g f u n c t i o n of m o d e r n legal systems. Es c h e w i n g t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y u t o p i a n i s m of t r a d i t i o n a l socialism while r e m a i n i n g t r u e to its e m a n c i p a t o r y a s p i r a t i o n s , H a b e r m a s h a s fo c u s e d o n t h e claim to legitimacy implicitly r a i s e d by t h e legal a n d political i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e m o d e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state a n d h a s a s k e d h o w this claim c a n b e g r o u n d e d in a n a p p r o p r i a t e t h e o r y of d e m o c r a c y . E x t e n d i n g his d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y of n o r m a t i v e validity to t h e legal-political d o m a i n , h e d e f e n d s a p r o c e d u r a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of deliberative d e m o c r a c y in w h i c h t h e b u r d e n of l e g i t i m a t i n g state p o w e r is b o r n e by i n f o r m a l a n d legally i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d p r o c e s s e s of political d e l i b e r a t i o n . Its g u i d i n g i n t u i t i o n is t h e r a d i c a l d e m o c r a t i c i d e a t h a t t h e legitimacy of political a u t h o r i t y c a n only b e s e c u r e d t h r o u g h b r o a d p o p u l a r p a r t i c i p a t i o n in political d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g or, m o r e succinctly, t h a t t h e r e is a n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e r u l e of law a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty. I n t h e p r e s e n t v o l u m e H a b e r m a s b r i n g s this discursive a n d p r o c e d u r a l i s t analysis of political legitimacy to b e a r o n s u c h u r g e n t c o n t e m p o r a r y issues as t h e e n d u r i n g legacy of t h e welfare state, t h e f u t u r e of t h e n a t i o n state, a n d t h e p r o s p e c t s for a g l o b a l politics of h u m a n rights. 1
viii Editors' Introduction
H a b e r m a s ' s political p h i l o s o p h y is m a r k e d by a d u a l focus t h a t m i r r o r s a duality i n h e r e n t in m o d e r n law itself. M o d e r n legal o r d e r s are d i s t i n g u i s h e d , o n t h e o n e h a n d , by t h e "facticity" of t h e i r e n a c t m e n t a n d t h e i r e n f o r c e m e n t by t h e state (i.e., by t h e i r positive a n d coercive c h a r a c t e r ) a n d , o n t h e o t h e r , by t h e i r claim to "validity." T h u s a political p h i l o s o p h y t h a t a t t a c h e s c e n t r a l i m p o r t a n c e to t h e legal system m u s t a p p r o a c h t h e legal a n d political i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state s i m u l t a n e o u s l y f r o m two distinct t h o u g h i n t e r r e l a t e d perspectives. I n t h e first p l a c e , it m u s t a d d r e s s t h e q u e s t i o n of legitimacy: W h a t is t h e g r o u n d of t h e validity of t h e principled of j u s t i c e t h a t f o r m t h e c o r e of m o d e r n d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n s ? T h i s is, of c o u r s e , t h e c e n t r a l q u e s t i o n of m o d e r n political p h i l o s o p h y in b o t h t h e liberal a n d civic r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n s . H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y of political l e g i t i m a t i o n is d e e p l y i n d e b t e d to b o t h , b u t h e takes his i m m e d i a t e o r i e n t a t i o n f r o m a discursive analysis of q u e s t i o n s of n o r m a t i v e validity. H e first d e v e l o p e d this a p p r o a c h in his d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y of m o r a l i t y a n d n o w e x t e n d s it to t h e legal d o m a i n in a way t h a t is sensitive to t h e f o r m a l f e a t u r e s of legality t h a t set it a p a r t f r o m morality. T h i s g e n e r a l a p p r o a c h to n o r m a t i v e q u e s t i o n s is b a s e d o n t h e cognitivist p r e m i s e t h a t c e r t a i n k i n d s of a c t i o n n o r m s a d m i t of r e a s o n e d justification in p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e a n d t h a t t h e i r validity c a n as a c o n s e q u e n c e b e e l u c i d a t e d by a n analysis of t h e f o r m s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h r o u g h w h i c h they a r e justified. 2
3
However, this n o r m a t i v e a p p r o a c h to law a n d politics is in n e e d of s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n by a n analysis of t h e f u n c t i o n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t positive legal o r d e r s m a k e to t h e stabilization a n d r e p r o d u c t i o n of m o d e r n societies. M o d e r n legal systems d e v e l o p e d in r e s p o n s e to t h e p r o b l e m s of social o r d e r c r e a t e d by a c c e l e r a t i n g p r o c e s s e s of m o d e r n i z a t i o n ; t h e f o r m a l f e a t u r e s of legality a r e d i c t a t e d by this regulative f u n c t i o n of m o d e r n law. Moreover, H a b e r m a s claims t h a t t h e s e two a p p r o a c h e s to law, t h e n o r m a t i v e a n d t h e f u n c t i o n a l , a r e i n s e p a r a b l e . T h e p r o b l e m of t h e basic p r i n c i p l e s of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y c a n n o t b e a d d r e s s e d in a b s t r a c t i o n f r o m t h e positive a n d coercive c h a r a c t e r of t h e legal m e d i u m in w h i c h they a r e to b e realized; a n d t h e s e f o r m a l f e a t u r e s of m o d e r n law a r e c o n d i t i o n e d by t h e p r o b l e m s of social i n t e g r a t i o n a n d r e p r o d u c t i o n to w h i c h m o d e r n legal o r d e r s r e s p o n d . It is crucial for t h e analyses of h u m a n
ix Editors' Introduction
r i g h t s a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty t h a t f o r m t h e c o r e of H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y of d e m o c r a c y t h a t t h e p a r a m e t e r s of t h e p r o b l e m t h e y a r e i n t e n d e d t o solve a r e laid d o w n by history. If, following H a b e r m a s , we a p p r o a c h t h e p r o b l e m of legitimacy by asking w h a t r i g h t s free a n d e q u a l c i t i z e n s h a v e to c o n f e r o n o n e a n o t h e r w h e n they delib e r a t e o n h o w t h e y c a n legitimately r e g u l a t e t h e i r c o m m o n life by m e a n s of law, t h e n t h e m e d i u m o r l a n g u a g e in w h i c h t h e y m u s t a n s w e r this q u e s t i o n is n o t s o m e t h i n g they a r e free to c h o o s e b u t is i m p o s e d by t h e c o n s t r a i n t s of t h e task they a r e t r y i n g to solve. T h e r e a r e n o f u n c t i o n a l alternatives to positive law as a basis for i n t e g r a t i n g societies of t h e m o d e r n type. It is n o t o u r a i m to offer a n exhaustive analysis of this w i d e - r a n g i n g t h e o r e t i c a l p r o j e c t h e r e . I n s t e a d , by way of i n t r o d u c t i o n we will o u t l i n e t h e r e l e v a n t f e a t u r e s of H a b e r m a s ' s d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y of n o r mative legitimacy as t h e y b e a r o n his t h e o r y of legal r i g h t s (sec t i o n 1 ) , b e f o r e t u r n i n g t o his p r o c e d u r a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of deliberative d e m o c r a c y (section 2 ) . We will t h e n c o n s i d e r t h e impli c a t i o n s of this p r o j e c t for t h e p r o b l e m s of t h e f u t u r e of t h e n a t i o n state, of a g l o b a l politics of h u m a n rights, a n d of c o r r e s p o n d i n g s u p r a n a t i o n a l political i n s t i t u t i o n s (section 3 ) . T h i s will p r o v i d e t h e b a c k g r o u n d for s o m e c o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s o n H a b e r m a s ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n s to t h e d e b a t e s c u r r e n t l y r a g i n g o n m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m a n d t h e r i g h t s of c u l t u r a l m i n o r i t i e s (section 4 ) . 1
T h e Discourse T h e o r y o f Morality and Law
H a b e r m a s starts f r o m t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t in m o d e r n , pluralistic societies, social n o r m s c a n derive t h e i r validity only f r o m t h e r e a s o n a n d will of t h o s e w h o s e d e c i s i o n s a n d i n t e r a c t i o n s a r e s u p p o s e d to b e b o u n d by t h e m . H e s h a r e s this s t a r t i n g p o i n t with J o h n Rawls, w h o h a s e m p h a s i z e d t h a t d i s a g r e e m e n t over c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d a n d q u e s t i o n s of u l t i m a t e value is likely to b e a n e n d u r i n g f e a t u r e of pluralistic societies a n d c o u l d only b e o v e r c o m e t h r o u g h t h e repressive i m p o s i t i o n of o n e belief system. Yet t h e i r r e s p o n s e s to t h e c h a l l e n g e p o s e d by p l u r a l i s m differ in i m p o r t a n t ways. Rawls a r g u e s t h a t citizens c o m m i t t e d to different a n d i n c o m p a t i b l e "com prehensive doctrines" can nevertheless reach an "overlapping
X
Editors' Introduction
c o n s e n s u s " o n basic p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e w h i c h t h e y justify separately w i t h i n t h e i r o w n evaluative worldviews, a s s u m i n g t h a t they c a n d r a w o n c e r t a i n s h a r e d ideals of t h e p e r s o n , of society, a n d of p u b l i c r e a s o n r o o t e d in t h e t r a d i t i o n of W e s t e r n liberal d e m o c r a c y . H a b e r m a s , by c o n t r a s t , t h i n k s t h a t t h e r e exists a m o r e universal basis for a g r e e m e n t o n general normative principles even a m o n g m e m b e r s of pluralistic societies w h o differ o n q u e s t i o n s of value a n d t h e g o o d life. T h i s c o n f i d e n c e is g r o u n d e d in t h e c e n t r a l r o l e his social t h e o r y a c c o r d s c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n — t h a t is, t h a t f o r m of social i n t e r a c t i o n in w h i c h t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s act o n , o r t r y t o r e a c h , a s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e s i t u a t i o n — i n r e g u l a t i n g a n d r e p r o d u c i n g f o r m s of social life a n d t h e i d e n t i t i e s of social a c t o r s . A m o n g t h e t h i n g s o n w h i c h c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t o r s a r e c o m m i t t e d to r e a c h i n g a s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g a c c o r d i n g to this t h e o r y a r e t h e n o r m a t i v e a s s u m p t i o n s t h a t i n f o r m t h e i r actions; h e n c e t h e y a r e implicitly o r i e n t e d to practical a r g u m e n t a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e validity of n o r m s as a m e a n s of resolving practical d i s a g r e e m e n t s . T h i s l e a d s H a b e r m a s t o suggest t h a t t h e g r o u n d s of t h e validity of n o r m s c a n b e e l u c i d a t e d t h r o u g h a n analysis of t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a t speak ers u n a v o i d a b l y m a k e w h e n they e n g a g e in g o o d faith in p r a c t i c a l argumentation. I n d e e d h e argues that these unavoidable pragmatic p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n e n t a i l a g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e of dis c o u r s e , ( D ) , w h i c h specifies t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t a n y valid social n o r m m u s t satisfy: ' J u s t t h o s e n o r m s a r e valid to w h i c h all possibly affected p e r s o n s c o u l d a g r e e as p a r t i c i p a n t s in r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e s . " 4
5
6
T h e d i s c o u r s e p r i n c i p l e f o r m s t h e c o r n e r s t o n e of a t h e o r y of b o t h m o r a l a n d legal validity w h i c h is i n t e n d e d to r e b u t n o n c o g n i t i v i s t skepticism c o n c e r n i n g t h e r a t i o n a l basis of m o r a l a n d legal n o r m s . T h e d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y h o l d s t h a t at least a c e r t a i n r a n g e of n o r m a t i v e q u e s t i o n s have g e n u i n e cognitive c o n J ^ t T T n " " p a r t i c u l a r , it claims t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s in a n ideally inclusive p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e c o u l d in p r i n c i p l e r e a c h a n u n c o e r c e d a g r e e m e n t o n t h e validity of t h e s e k i n d s of n o r m s o n t h e basis of r e a s o n s t h a t a r e a c c e p t a b l e to all. T h e idealizations to w h i c h this discursive a p p r o a c h a p p e a l s l e n d H a b e r mas's theory a d e m a n d i n g , counterfactual character: the principle of d i s c o u r s e p o i n t s to a n ideal p r o c e d u r e of discursive validation w h i c h f u n c t i o n s as a n o r m a t i v e s t a n d a r d a g a i n s t w h i c h existing c o n 7
xi . Editors' Introduction
d i t i o n s of d i s c o u r s e c a n b e criticized. A l t h o u g h t h e s e idealizations a r e u n d o u b t e d l y controversial, t h e suspicion t h a t t h e y a r e simply arbitrary, o r reflect a n idealistic c o n c e p t i o n of r e a s o n t h a t h a s little practical r e l e v a n c e , c a n b e allayed by n o t i n g t h a t t h e y a r e i n t e r n a l l y r e l a t e d to t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a c t o r s f o r m a n d m a i n t a i n their identities a n d regulate their interactions. T h i s discursive analysis of n o r m a t i v e q u e s t i o n s allows for a s h a r p differentiation b e t w e e n m o r a l a n d l e g a l validity. T h e p r i n c i p l e of d i s c o u r s e e x p r e s s e s a g e n e r a l i d e a of impartiality t h a t finds different, t h o u g h c o m p l e m e n t a r y , e x p r e s s i o n s in m o r a l a n d legal n o r m s . H a b e r m a s ' s differentiation b e t w e e n law a n d m o r a l i t y c h a l l e n g e s t h e t r a d i t i o n a l a s s u m p t i o n t h a t m o r a l i t y r e p r e s e n t s a h i g h e r d o m a i n of value in w h i c h basic legal a n d political p r i n c i p l e s m u s t b e g r o u n d e d . W i t h t h e e m e r g e n c e of m o d e r n societies o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d a state a n d a positive legal o r d e r , t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e basis of political legitimacy u n d e r w e n t a p r o f o u n d t r a n s f o r m a t i o n : m o d e r n n a t u r a l law o r social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y b r o k e with t r a d i t i o n a l n a t u r a l law in a r g u i n g t h a t political a u t h o r i t y flows f r o m t h e will of t h o s e w h o a r e subject to it r a t h e r t h a n f r o m a divinely o r d a i n e d m o r a l o r d e r . Nev e r t h e l e s s , t h e a s s u m e d priority of m o r a l i t y over law c o n t i n u e d to play a c e n t r a l , if n o t always critically e x a m i n e d , r o l e i n b o t h t h e liberal a n d c o m m u n i t a r i a n t r a d i t i o n s of m o d e r n political t h o u g h t . W h e r e a s classical liberalism in t h e L o c k e a n t r a d i t i o n a c c o r d s p r i m a r y i m p o r t a n c e to prepolitically g r o u n d e d r i g h t s of i n d i v i d u a l liberty, c o m m u n i t a r i a n t h i n k e r s a p p e a l t o values r o o t e d in i n h e r i t e d n a t i o n a l , religiousj o r e t h n i c i d e n t i t i e s as t h e i n e s c a p a b l e b a c k g r o u n d a g a i n s t w h i c h all q u e s t i o n s of political j u s t i c e m u s t b e a n s w e r e d . Against b o t h t r a d i t i o n s , H a b e r m a s a r g u e s t h a t law a n d m o r a l i t y s t a n d in a c o m p l e m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n . T h e basic h u m a n r i g h t s e n s h r i n e d in m o d e r n legal o r d e r s a r e essentially legal rights, n o t m o r a l r i g h t s t h a t a r e i m p o s e d as a n e x t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t o n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n - f o u n d i n g p r a c t i c e of t h e citizens, t h o u g h m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s e n t e r i n t o t h e justification of basic rights. H a b e r m a s c o n s t r u e s m o r a l i t y in b r o a d l y K a n t i a n t e r m s as a system of d u t i e s g r o u n d e d in t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l claim to r e s p e c t a n d c o n s i d e r a t i o n of all p e r s o n s . M o r a l d u t i e s a r e b i n d i n g o n all b e ings c a p a b l e of s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n a n d h e n c e h a v e u n r e s t r i c t e d o r 8
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universal s c o p e . However, t h e very n a t u r e of m o r a l i t y m e a n s t h a t it is l i m i t e d as a m e c h a n i s m for r e g u l a t i n g social i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e u n r e s t r i c t e d universality of m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s , t h e i r h i g h l y abstract, cognitive claim to validity, a n d t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r of t h e d u t i e s t h e y i m p o s e c r e a t e a rift b e t w e e n m o r a l j u d g m e n t a n d r e a s o n ing, o n the o n e h a n d , a n d motivation, o n the other. Moral n o r m s p r o v i d e a g e n t s with w e a k cognitive motives g r o u n d e d in t h e knowl e d g e t h a t they h a v e n o g o o d r e a s o n to act o t h e r w i s e , b u t p r o v i d e t h e m with n o r a t i o n a l motives t o act accordingly. Moreover, t h e justification a n d a p p l i c a t i o n of m o r a l n o r m s calls for p r a c t i c a l dis courses whose highly exacting conditions can at best b e approxi m a t e d by real discourses. T h u s m o r a l n o r m s a r e u n s u i t a b l e for r e g u l a t i n g social i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n s t r a n g e r s w h e r e t h e p r a c t i c a l costs in t i m e a n d effort of establishing a n d m a i n t a i n i n g t h e r e l a t i o n s of m u t u a l t r u s t r e q u i r e d for practical discourses a r e t o o h i g h . As a m e c h a n i s m for r e g u l a t i n g i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n s t r a n g e r s , m o d e r n law h a s a n u m b e r of i m p o r t a n t s t r u c t u r a l a d v a n t a g e s over morality. M o d e r n legal systems s e c u r e a s p a c e of i n d i v i d u a l liberty in w h i c h citizens a r e free to p u r s u e t h e i r private p u r p o s e s by c o n f e r r i n g a c t i o n a b l e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s o n all citizens: w h e r e a s in t h e m o r a l d o m a i n d u t i e s a r e p r i o r to r i g h t s a n d e n t i t l e m e n t s , in t h e legal d o m a i n i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s a r e p r i o r to d u t i e s in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e H o b b e s i a n p r i n c i p l e t h a t w h a t e v e r is n o t p r o h i b i t e d is p e r m i t t e d . I n a d d i t i o n , w h e r e a s m o r a l i t y m u s t rely o n t h e w e a k s a n c t i o n s of a guilty c o n s c i e n c e , t h e e n f o r c e m e n t of legal n o r m s is e n s u r e d by t h e p o l i c e a n d p e n a l p o w e r of t h e state. T h o u g h t h e c o n t e n t of basic legal n o r m s m a y s o m e t i m e s b e i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t h a t of univer sal m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s , t h e fact t h a t legal n o r m s m u s t b e e n a c t e d a n d t h a t all legal n o r m s a r e in p r i n c i p l e subject to revision m e a n s t h a t t h e i r d o m a i n of a p p l i c a t i o n is l i m i t e d in t h e first i n s t a n c e to a p a r t i c u l a r j u r i s d i c t i o n a n d its citizenry. If we a r e t o d o j u s t i c e t o t h e distinctive m o d e of legitimacy of positive legal o r d e r s , H a b e r m a s a r g u e s , we s h o u l d b e g i n by a s k i n g w h a t basic r i g h t s free a n d e q u a l citizens m u s t c o n f e r o n o n e a n o t h e r if t h e y a r e to r e g u l a t e t h e i r c o m m o n life by m e a n s of positive law. O n c e t h e g o a l of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n - f o u n d i n g p r a c t i c e is a p p r o p r i a t e l y c h a r a c t e r i z e d , t h e f o r m a l f e a t u r e s of t h e m e d i u m in w h i c h it m u s t
xiii Editors' Introduction
b e a c c o m p l i s h e d — t h a t is, positive, coercive law—set strict limits o n t h e possible o u t c o m e s of t h e p r o c e d u r e . I n particular, since legal r i g h t s p r e s u p p o s e t h a t citizens h a v e t h e status of legal subjects, t h e citizens m u s t first c o n f e r o n o n e a n o t h e r c e r t a i n basic liberty rights w h i c h g u a r a n t e e t h e m this artificial status, i n c l u d i n g r i g h t s to t h e g r e a t e s t possible m e a s u r e of e q u a l i n d i v i d u a l liberties, r i g h t s of m e m b e r s h i p i n t h e political c o m m u n i t y , a n d r i g h t s g u a r a n t e e i n g i n d i v i d u a l legal p r o t e c t i o n . W i t h o u t t h e s e r i g h t s of private auton omy, w h i c h c r e a t e a s p a c e for citizens to p u r s u e t h e i r private e n d s free f r o m i n t e r f e r e n c e , m o r a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e a g e n t s c o u l d n o t r e a s o n ably b e e x p e c t e d to s u b m i t t h e m s e l v e s voluntarily to a coercive legal o r d e r . B u t in a d d i t i o n t h e y m u s t g r a n t o n e a n o t h e r basic rights of political participation o r r i g h t s of public autonomy t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e laws t h a t give effect to all of t h e basic rights, i n c l u d i n g t h e political r i g h t s themselves, a r e f o r m u l a t e d a n d e n a c t e d . C o n t r a r y to classical liberalism, w h i c h treats liberty r i g h t s as p r e p o l i t i c a l e n d o w m e n t s a n d i n t e r p r e t s t h e m as n e g a t i v e r i g h t s of n o n i n t e r f e r e n c e , H a b e r m a s a r g u e s t h a t liberty r i g h t s c a n n o t b e i m p l e m e n t e d w i t h o u t b r o a d p o p u l a r p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e p r o c e s s e s of political o p i n i o n - f o r m a t i o n of a n inclusive p u b l i c s p h e r e , t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e citizens c a n influ e n c e t h e d e f i n i t i o n s of t h e i r n e e d s a n d i n t e r e s t s t h a t a r e e m b o d i e d in t h e l a w . V i e w e d f r o m this p e r s p e c t i v e , political r i g h t s c a n b e r e p r e s e n t e d as n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s for t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e ar tificial status of legal subject as b e a r e r of rights, b e c a u s e they r e g u late t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e liberty r i g h t s . However, t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n - p r i v a t e l a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y c a n also b e i n t e r p r e t e d in light of t h e c o n c e p t i o n of legitimacy e x p r e s s e d in t h e p r i n c i p l e of d i s c o u r s e . T h i s p r i n c i p l e stipulates t h a t laws derive t h e i r legitimacy f r o m t h e p r e s u m e d rationality of t h e d e c i s i o n s r e a c h e d t h r o u g h a p p r o p r i a t e l y r e g u l a t e d p r o c e d u r e s of d e l i b e r a t i o n ; t h u s t h e legiti m a c y of a legal o r d e r u l t i m a t e l y d e p e n d s o n t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e f o r m s of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n n e c e s s a r y for r a t i o n a l political will-formation, a n d t h e liberty r i g h t s c a n b e justified as n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s for t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e cor r e s p o n d i n g f o r m s of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h u s n e i t h e r t h e liberty r i g h t s n o r t h e political r i g h t s c a n b e a c c o r d e d priority b u t m u s t b e r e g a r d e d as co-original. T h e p r i n c i p l e of t h e essential 1 0
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i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e of private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y or, alternatively, of t h e co-originality of t h e r u l e of law a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty, f o r m s t h e c o r n e r s t o n e of H a b e r m a s ' s p r o c e d u r a l i s t m o d e l of deliberative democracy. B u t b e f o r e t u r n i n g to this, we s h o u l d n o t e a n u m b e r of i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e s of H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y of rights. I n t h e first p l a c e , it avoids t h e p r o b l e m s g e n e r a t e d by t h e fiction of t h e state of n a t u r e in social c o n t r a c t theory, p r o b l e m s t h a t a r g u a b l y still bedevil Rawls's device of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . H a b e r m a s n e e d n o t a p p e a l to controversial p r e p o l i t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s of h u m a n n a t u r e a n d of practical r e a s o n , n o r n e e d h e a p p e a l to c o n c e p t i o n s g r o u n d e d i n specific constitu t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n s ; o n his a c c o u n t , t h e d e c i s i o n to f o u n d a political c o m m u n i t y is n o t itself in n e e d of n o r m a t i v e justification. T h e n a t u r e of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n - f o u n d i n g task a n d t h e m e d i u m in w h i c h it is to b e a c c o m p l i s h e d n e e d only b e justified in f u n c t i o n a l t e r m s — t h a t is, in t e r m s of t h e regulative f u n c t i o n s of m o d e r n legal sys t e m s — a n d t h e n t h e g e n e r a l s h a p e of t h e t h e o r y of r i g h t s follows automatically, in c o n j u n c t i o n with t h e discursive a c c o u n t of n o r m a tive validity. T h e n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e o n t h e basis of w h i c h partici p a n t s m u s t d e c i d e w h i c h r i g h t s to g r a n t o n e a n o t h e r is n o t g r o u n d e d in t r a n s c e n d e n t ideals of r e a s o n a n d t h e p e r s o n b u t is i m p l i c i t in t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n a n d practical d i s c o u r s e . T h u s r i g h t s a r e n o t t r e a t e d as m o r a l givens w h i c h a r e i m p o s e d as a n e x t e r n a l c o n s t r a i n t o n t h e citizens' political d e l i b e r a t i o n s b u t a r e r e p r e s e n t e d as t h e r e s u l t of a p r o c e s s of c o n s t r u c t i o n , a n d h e n c e as a n e x p r e s s i o n of t h e r e a s o n a n d will of t h e citizens themselves. However, a l t h o u g h h e a r g u e s t h a t t h e t h e o r y of r i g h t s for t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state n e e d n o t d r a w o n c o n t r o v e r s i a l q u e s t i o n s of value a n d t h e h u m a n g o o d , H a b e r m a s d o e s n o t e x c l u d e e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n s f r o m t h e p u r v i e w of politics a l t o g e t h e r . Political q u e s tions of w h a t values a n d ideals of t h e g o o d s h o u l d b e politically realized d o n o t a d m i t of r a t i o n a l r e s o l u t i o n in t h e u n r e s t r i c t e d sense of q u e s t i o n s of j u s t i c e b e c a u s e t h e y a r e i n s e p a r a b l e f r o m t h e c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s a n d historical e x p e r i e n c e s t h a t s h a p e t h e i d e n t i t i e s of g r o u p s , a n d h e n c e c a n only b e a n s w e r e d w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of a n already constituted political c o m m u n i t y . T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t q u e s t i o n s of t h e collective g o o d c a n n o t b e rationally d e b a t e d a n d re12
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solved; b u t in pluralistic societies d e l i b e r a t i o n s a n d decisions c o n c e r n i n g w h a t values a n d ideals of t h e g o o d s h o u l d b e politically i m p l e m e n t e d m u s t take p l a c e w i t h i n a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k t h a t g u a r a n t e e s individual liberty a n d t h e r i g h t of m i n o r i t i e s to dissent f r o m t h e values of t h e majority c u l t u r e a n d t o cultivate t h e i r distinc tive i d e n t i t i e s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , e a c h political c o m m u n i t y m u s t realize t h e system of basic r i g h t s w i t h i n a political c u l t u r e t h a t reflects s h a r e d t r a d i t i o n s a n d historical e x p e r i e n c e s , t h o u g h this political c u l t u r e m u s t n o t b e assimilated to t h e majority c u l t u r e . A f u r t h e r n o t e w o r t h y f e a t u r e of H a b e r m a s ' s a p p r o a c h , o n e with f a r - r e a c h i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s for issues of i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e , is t h a t t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l p r o c e d u r e of a m u t u a l c o n f e r r i n g of r i g h t s c a n b e c o n c e i v e d as b e i n g p e r f o r m e d by g r o u p s of different scopes, r a n g i n g f r o m t h e local a n d t h e n a t i o n a l to t h e r e g i o n a l a n d t h e g l o b a l . W h i l e t h e basic h u m a n r i g h t s t h a t m u s t b e c o n f e r r e d in o r d e r to establish a l e g i t i m a t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e g i m e a r e essentially t h e s a m e in e a c h case, t h e political i n s t i t u t i o n s r e q u i r e d for t h e i r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n w o u l d h a v e to reflect t h e different s c o p e of t h e practical m a t t e r s to b e r e g u l a t e d a n d t h e different c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e p o p u lations subject to t h e laws e n a c t e d . T h u s , as we shall see, H a b e r m a s ' s g e n e r a l t h e o r y of h u m a n r i g h t s p o i n t s to t h e possibility of a global political o r d e r in w h i c h sovereignty w o u l d b e divided a n d d i s p e r s e d a m o n g local, n a t i o n a l , a n d r e g i o n a l r e g i m e s , with a g l o b a l r e g i m e a s s u m i n g responsibility for t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s at t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l level. -
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Public R e a s o n and Deliberative D e m o c r a c y
H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y of h u m a n r i g h t s a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty calls for t h e c r e a t i o n of political i n s t i t u t i o n s in w h i c h discursive p r o c e s s e s of o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation play a c e n t r a l r o l e . T h i s follows f r o m t h e radically p r o c e d u r a l i s t o r i e n t a t i o n of t h e d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y w h i c h places t h e w h o l e w e i g h t of political l e g i t i m a t i o n o n i n f o r m a l a n d legally i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d p r o c e d u r e s of o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation. O n this a c c o u n t , t h e legitimacy of legal n o r m s is a f u n c t i o n of t h e f o r m a l f e a t u r e s of p r o c e d u r e s of political d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d d e c i s i o n making which support the presumption that their outcomes are
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r a t i o n a l . T h e r e s u l t i n g r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t t h e e n a c t m e n t of legal n o r m s b e tied to discursive p r o c e s s e s of r a t i o n a l political will-forma t i o n a p p l i e s in different ways to basic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s a n d to e n a c t e d legal n o r m s a n d statutes. At t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l level, t h e p r i n c i p l e of p o p u l a r sovereignty r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e citizens m u s t b e a b l e to affirm t h e basic r i g h t s as o n e s t h e y w o u l d c o n f e r o n o n e a n o t h e r in a c o n s t i t u t i o n - f o u n d i n g p r a c t i c e . B e c a u s e in m o s t cases t h e citizens a r e b o r n i n t o a n already existing state a n d n e v e r actually p a r t i c i p a t e in s u c h a p r a c t i c e , t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of t h e i r v o l u n t a r y c o n s e n t m u s t b e given effect t h r o u g h p r o c e d u r e s by w h i c h existing c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s c a n b e c h a l l e n g e d a n d c h a n g e d if sufficient political will to d o so c a n b e m o b i l i z e d . I n t h e case of e n a c t e d laws, t h e p r i n c i p l e of p o p u l a r sovereignty r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e citizens s h o u l d play a n active r o l e in t h e e l a b o r a t i o n a n d d e f e n s e of t h e criteria in a c c o r d a n c e with w h i c h t h e basic r i g h t s a r e i m p l e m e n t e d , m o s t im p o r t a n t l y in s h a p i n g t h e definitions of t h e i r n e e d s a n d i n t e r e s t s w h i c h b e c o m e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o law. I n n e i t h e r case c a n t h e c o n t e n t of legal n o r m s b e d e t e r m i n e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e p o p u l a r will as e x p r e s s e d in a critical p u b l i c o p i n i o n . T h u s t h e i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e r u l e of law a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty calls for a p r o c e d u r a l i s t m o d e l of deliberative d e m o c r a c y in w h i c h all political deci sion m a k i n g , f r o m c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t s to t h e d r a f t i n g a n d e n a c t m e n t of legislation, is b o u n d to discursive p r o c e s s e s of a politi cal p u b l i c s p h e r e . H a b e r m a s h a s specified t h e basic s h a p e t h a t political i n s t i t u t i o n s w o u l d have to take in o r d e r to realize this m o d e l of deliberative d e m o c r a c y It calls in t h e first p l a c e for a p u b l i c s p h e r e of i n f o r m a l political c o m m u n i c a t i o n w h o s e i n s t i t u t i o n a l basis is p r o v i d e d by t h e v o l u n t a r y associations of civil society a n d w h i c h d e p e n d s o n i n p u t s of e x p e r t i n f o r m a t i o n a n d o n o p e n access to t h e p r i n t a n d e l e c t r o n i c m e d i a . T h e i n f o r m a l c h a r a c t e r of p u b l i c political discussion, a n d t h e fact t h a t it m u s t b e r e s p o n s i v e to p r o b l e m s as t h e y arise i n t h e lifeworld of everyday i n t e r a c t i o n , m e a n t h a t t h e associations in w h i c h it is c o n d u c t e d c a n n o t b e directly r e g u l a t e d by law; however, t h e basic political r i g h t s g u a r a n t e e d by t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n , s u c h as f r e e d o m of association, f r e e d o m of s p e e c h , a n d f r e e d o m of c o n science, a r e specifically d e s i g n e d to s e c u r e t h e b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i -
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tions t h a t m a k e possible a flourishing civil s o c i e t y . T h e p u b l i c s p h e r e h a s as its c o m p l e m e n t t h e legally r e g u l a t e d g o v e r n m e n t s p h e r e c o m p o s e d of t h e legislative, j u d i c i a l , a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e b r a n c h e s . T h e specific tasks of e a c h of t h e s e b r a n c h e s call for a c o m p l e x division of l a b o r in w h i c h e a c h b r a n c h plays b o t h a n e n a b l i n g a n d a l i m i t i n g r o l e vis-a-vis e a c h of t h e o t h e r s . F o r e x a m p l e , t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l j u d i c i a r y m u s t n o t p r e e m p t t h e political f u n c t i o n of t h e legislature by c r e a t i n g law; conversely, t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of j u d i c i a l review e n a b l e s t h e j u d i c i a r y to r e s t r a i n t h e legislature f r o m p r o g r a m m i n g specific legal j u d g m e n t s by e n a c t i n g laws to t h a t e f f e c t . 15
W h i l e this m o d e l c o n f o r m s to t h e basic i n s t i t u t i o n a l a r r a n g e m e n t s of m o d e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c i e s , H a b e r m a s p r o v i d e s a n origi n a l r a t i o n a l e for t h e s e a r r a n g e m e n t s in t e r m s of t h e l e g i t i m a t i n g f u n c t i o n of p u b l i c r e a s o n . T h i s h e c o n s t r u e s in t e r m s of a m o d e l of t h e c i r c u l a t i o n of p o w e r : o n t h e i n p u t side, i n f l u e n c e g e n e r a t e d in t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e is t r a n s f o r m e d t h r o u g h t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s of e l e c t i o n s a n d p a r l i a m e n t a r y o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation i n t o c o m m u n i c a t i v e power, w h i c h in t u r n is t r a n s f o r m e d t h r o u g h t h e legal p r o g r a m s a n d policies of p a r l i a m e n t a r y b o d i e s i n t o a d m i n istrative p o w e r ; at t h e o u t p u t e n d , a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o g r a m s c r e a t e t h e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s for t h e e x i s t e n c e of civil society a n d its v o l u n t a r y associations, a n d h e n c e of a v i b r a n t political p u b l i c sphere. 1 6
H a b e r m a s claims t h a t this p r o c e d u r a l i s t m o d e l of deliberative d e m o c r a c y c a p t u r e s t h e p r i n c i p l e of t h e i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e of t h e r u l e of law a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty b e t t e r t h a n rival t h e o r e t i c a l p r o p o s als. T h e rival p o s i t i o n t h a t is p e r h a p s closest to H a b e r m a s ' s is t h e political liberalism of Rawls, w h i c h is discussed at l e n g t h in t h e two essays t h a t c o m p r i s e P a r t II of this v o l u m e . I n t h e first, H a b e r m a s o u t l i n e s t h r e e basic criticisms of political liberalism: first, t h a t t h e devices of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n a n d t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e d o n o t a d e q u a t e l y m o d e l t h e i d e a of impartiality t h a t i n f o r m s d e o n t o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e ; s e c o n d , t h a t t h e i d e a of a p u b l i c justification of a political c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e in t e r m s of a n " o v e r l a p p i n g con s e n s u s " is n o t c o m m e n s u r a t e with t h e e p i s t e m i c o r cognitive validity claim s u c h a t h e o r y m u s t raise if it is to claim legitimacy; a n d , t h i r d t h a t Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e political i m p l i e s a rigid division
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b e t w e e n t h e p u b l i c a n d n o n p u b l i c i d e n t i t i e s of citizens w h i c h l e a d s h i m to a c c o r d t h e negative liberty r i g h t s priority over t h e r i g h t s of political p a r t i c i p a t i o n . I n a reply to this essay Rawls a r g u e d force fully t h a t H a b e r m a s ' s criticisms d i d n o t d o j u s t i c e to t h e c o m p l e x i t y of his p o s i t i o n , r e v e a l i n g in t h e p r o c e s s t h a t his p o s i t i o n is in s o m e r e s p e c t s closer to H a b e r m a s ' s t h a n t h e latter m a y h a v e a p p r e c i a t e d . However, i n t h e n e x t essay H a b e r m a s r e i t e r a t e s a n d f u r t h e r clarifies his basic criticisms. 17
18
P e r h a p s t h e key d i s a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e m c o n c e r n s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n a t u r e a n d s c o p e of a p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n t h a t w o u l d b e sufficient to g r o u n d a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e for a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y . A l t h o u g h b o t h take a b r o a d l y c o n s t r u c tivist a p p r o a c h to practical r e a s o n — t h e y r e p r e s e n t p r i n c i p l e s of j u s tice for a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y as t h o s e t h a t citizens w o u l d a g r e e to as t h e r e s u l t of a n a p p r o p r i a t e p r o c e s s of reflection o r d e l i b e r a t i o n — H a b e r m a s believes t h a t t h e c o n c e p t i o n of legitimacy implicit in m o d e r n d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n s calls for a m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e t h e o r y of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n t h a n Rawls allows. T h u s h e r e i t e r a t e s his a r g u m e n t t h a t Rawls's i d e a of r e a s o n a b l e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s is n o t sufficient to g r o u n d t h e legitimacy of t h e basic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s b e c a u s e it d o e s n o t allow for a s h a r e d p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m w h i c h t h e citizens c o u l d c o n v i n c e themselves of t h e validity of t h e p r i n c i p l e s for the same reasons. S u c h a p e r s p e c t i v e , h e a r g u e s , is implicit in t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a t s p e a k e r s u n a v o i d a b l y m a k e w h e n they e n g a g e in practical a r g u m e n t a t i o n , so t h a t t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n o r m a t i v e p r i n c i p l e s c a n b e g r o u n d e d in a p u r e l y p r o c e d u r a l m a n ner. Rawls, by c o n t r a s t , rejects this a p p r o a c h o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t a political t h e o r y of j u s t i c e m u s t b e f r e e s t a n d i n g , a n d h e n c e c a n h a v e n o p a r t of t h e o r i e s of r e a s o n g r o u n d e d in c o m p r e h e n s i v e p h i l o sophical d o c t r i n e s s u c h as H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. 19
20
T h e significance of t h e i r c o n t r a s t i n g a p p r o a c h e s to p r a c t i c a l rea son can b e b r o u g h t o u t by c o n s i d e r i n g t h e i r respective analyses of t h e legitimating function of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n , a n i d e a t h a t is c e n t r a l to b o t h of t h e i r positions. It h a s e m e r g e d f r o m t h e i r ex c h a n g e t h a t p u b l i c r e a s o n u n d e r g o e s a p r o b l e m a t i c split in Rawls's political liberalism. I n t h e first p l a c e , t h e r e is t h e u n r e s t r i c t e d ex-
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c h a n g e of i d e a s in t h e " b a c k g r o u n d c u l t u r e of civil society" in w h i c h all p r a c t i c a l a n d t h e o r e t i c a l p r o p o s a l s a r e o p e n to d e b a t e ; h e r e p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e free to a p p e a l to w h a t e v e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s they find c o m p e l l i n g , i n c l u d i n g t h e i r o w n c o m p r e h e n s i v e views, i n a n a t t e m p t t o c o n v i n c e t h e i r fellows. T h i s is t h e f o r u m in w h i c h j u s t i c e as fairness a n d rival political c o n c e p t i o n s of j u s t i c e m u s t p r o v e t h e m selves. However, a m u c h m o r e r e s t r i c t e d c o n c e p t i o n of p u b l i c r e a s o n i n f o r m s Rawls's i d e a of t h e "public justification" of a political con c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e by "political society" a n d t h e r e l a t e d n o t i o n of p u b l i c r e a s o n as a n ideal to w h i c h p a r t i c i p a n t s in p u b l i c political life s h o u l d c o n f o r m w h e n d e b a t i n g m a t t e r s of political c o n c e r n . I n p u b lic justification of a s h a r e d political c o n c e p t i o n , r e a s o n a b l e citizens, w h o have a l r e a d y justified t h e political c o n c e p t i o n "privately" by e m b e d d i n g it i n t h e i r various c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s , take a c c o u n t of the fact t h a t o t h e r s h a v e r e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s t h a t likewise e n d o r s e t h e political c o n c e p t i o n , t h o u g h for different rea sons. W h a t is g a i n e d by this " m u t u a l a c c o u n t i n g " a r e n o t f u r t h e r s u p p o r t i n g r e a s o n s for t h e political c o n c e p t i o n — s i n c e t h e e x p r e s s content of c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s plays n o n o r m a t i v e r o l e in p u b l i c j u s t i f i c a t i o n — b u t a s h a r e d r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t different citizens e n d o r s e t h e s a m e c o n c e p t i o n for different r e a s o n s t h a t m u s t b e r e s p e c t e d . T h i s m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n finds e x p r e s s i o n in t h e i d e a l of p u b l i c r e a s o n a n d t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g political v i r t u e of civility: w h e n a d d r e s s i n g political issues, especially o n e s t h a t b e a r o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l essentials, citizens, c a n d i d a t e s for office, officeholders, j u d g e s , a n d legislators m u s t .limit t h e m s e l v e s t o a d d u c i n g r e a s o n s t h a t t h e i r fel low citizens c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y a c c e p t a n d h e n c e m u s t refrain f r o m appealing to their own comprehensive doctrines. 21
H a b e r m a s is h i g h l y critical of this r e s t r i c t e d c o n c e p t i o n of p u b l i c r e a s o n . T h e c o n s e n s u s t h a t results f r o m p u b l i c justification as d e p i c t e d by Rawls is n o t "rationally m o t i v a t e d " in a sense t h a t is c o n s o n a n t with t h e d e o n t o l o g i c a l m e a n i n g of t h e basic p r i n c i p l e s of justice on which m o d e r n constitutional regimes are founded. T h e p r o b l e m is t h a t t h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s is n o t b a s e d o n s h a r e d r e a s o n s : citizens simply observe t h a t t h e i r fellows a c c e p t t h e political c o n c e p t i o n for t h e i r o w n r e a s o n s b u t c a n n o t j u d g e w h e t h e r this a c c e p t a n c e h a s a g e n u i n e r a t i o n a l basis. T h i s a t t e n u a t e d c o n c e p t i o n
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of p u b l i c justification m e a n s t h a t Rawls m u s t restrict t h e validity claim publicly associated with t h e basic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s to t h e w e a k claim t o " r e a s o n a b l e n e s s . " B u t this leaves h i m in t h e — f o r H a b e r m a s , h i g h l y p a r a d o x i c a l — p o s i t i o n of h o l d i n g t h a t publicly d e f e n s i b l e r e a s o n s c a n only s u p p o r t a w e a k claim to " r e a s o n a b l e ness," w h e r e a s t h e private r e a s o n s m o b i l i z e d in d e f e n s e of c o m p r e hensive d o c t r i n e s c a n g r o u n d t h e s t r o n g e r claim to " m o r a l t r u t h . " H a b e r m a s , by c o n t r a s t , h o l d s t h a t t h e values a n d ideals of t h e g o o d associated with religious a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l worldviews c a n n o t claim t h e universal validity of basic p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e , t h o u g h t h e y d o s h a p e t h e c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h basic p r i n c i p l e s m u s t b e i n t e r p r e t e d a n d a p p l i e d . Moreover, h e a r g u e s t h a t a consistently p r o c e d u r a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n entails t h a t i n f o r m a l political discussion in civil society (i.e., in t h e "public s p h e r e " ) a n d p u b l i c d e l i b e r a t i o n b e a r i n g o n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l essentials in legislative a n d j u d i c i a l c o n t e x t s a r e subject to essentially t h e same r a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s . I n b o t h cases t h e rationality of o u t c o m e s ideally s h o u l d b e solely a f u n c t i o n of t h e r e a s o n s a d d u c e d , t h e only differ e n c e b e i n g t h a t i n t h e p u b l i c s p h e r e t h e rationality of d e b a t e is a s s u r e d by a v i b r a n t political c u l t u r e t h a t facilitates o p e n participa tion, w h e r e a s i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y r e g u l a t e d g o v e r n m e n t a l s p h e r e it is a s s u r e d t h r o u g h legally p r e s c r i b e d p r o c e d u r e s of j u d i c i a l a n d p a r l i a m e n t a r y d e l i b e r a t i o n a n d d e c i s i o n m a k i n g d e s i g n e d to e n s u r e sufficient a p p r o x i m a t i o n to ideal c o n d i t i o n s of discursive o p e n n e s s u n d e r l i m i t a t i o n s of t i m e a n d i n f o r m a t i o n . O n this a c c o u n t , t h e legitimacy-conferring f u n c t i o n of political d e l i b e r a t i o n d o e s n o t h a v e to rely o n t h e civility of citizens, legislators, a n d j u r i s t s w h o voluntarily refrain f r o m a d d u c i n g r e a s o n s t h a t t h e y t h i n k w o u l d n o t b e a c c e p t a b l e to t h e i r fellow citizens; it c a n a n d m u s t b e left t o t h e p r o c e d u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s of discourses t h e m s e l v e s to d e t e r m i n e w h i c h r e a s o n s ultimately win o u t . A l t h o u g h it m u s t b e left to t h e r e a d e r to u n r a v e l t h e t h r e a d s of this i n t r i c a t e d e b a t e f u r t h e r , we w o u l d like to d r a w a t t e n t i o n to a d i v e r g e n c e b e t w e e n Rawls's a n d H a b e r m a s ' s a p p r o a c h e s t o issues of international justice, which has a bearing o n H a b e r m a s ' s b r o a d e r c o n c e r n s in this v o l u m e . Rawls's t h e o r y of j u s t i c e is t a i l o r e d f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g to a view of t h e state as a m o r e o r less self-sufficient system 22
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of social c o o p e r a t i o n t h a t is a s s u m e d to exist in p e r p e t u i t y ; h e n c e , it p r e s u p p o s e s t h e c o n c e p t i o n of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e as e x e r c i s i n g exclu sive sovereignty over a t e r r i t o r y a n d p e o p l e e n s h r i n e d in m o d e r n i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. T h i s o r i e n t a t i o n is r e i n f o r c e d by Rawls's m o r e r e c e n t i d e a of a political c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e as o n e t h a t draws o n i d e a s l a t e n t in t h e political c u l t u r e of W e s t e r n liberal d e m o c r a c i e s . W h e n h e t u r n s to t h e q u e s t i o n of h o w liberal d e m o c r a c i e s s h o u l d b e h a v e t o w a r d n o n l i b e r a l r e g i m e s w h o s e political c u l t u r e s a r e n o t s t r u c t u r e d by s u c h liberal ideas, t h e p r i n c i p l e of t o l e r a t i o n itself dictates t h a t a liberal r e g i m e m u s t n o t insist unilaterally o n liberal s t a n d a r d s as t h e basis f o r j u d g i n g w h i c h r e g i m e s it s h o u l d r e c o g n i z e as l e g i t i m a t e . I n o t h e r w o r d s , Rawls is c o m p e l l e d t o apply m u c h w e a k e r s t a n d a r d s of political legitimacy to t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l d o m a i n , a n d his t h e o r y of i n t e r n a t i o n a l j u s t i c e , at least as c u r r e n t l y f o r m u l a t e d , s e e m s t o allow for only l i m i t e d p r o t e c t i o n of t h e h u m a n r i g h t s of citizens of a u t h o r i t a r i a n s t a t e s . O n H a b e r m a s ' s a p p r o a c h t h e r e is n o s u c h t h e o r e t i c a l b r e a k b e t w e e n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of liberal p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e to t h e n a t i o n a l a n d to t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l d o m a i n s . R a t h e r t h a n a c c e p t i n g t h e frame w o r k of t r a d i t i o n a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l law w h i c h views states as t h e sole l e g i t i m a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e i r citizens, H a b e r m a s advocates a m o d e l of cosmopolitan law w h i c h w o u l d s u p e r s e d e i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, c o n f e r a c t i o n a b l e legal r i g h t s directly o n individuals, a n d m a n d a t e t h e c r e a t i o n of s u p r a n a t i o n a l political a g e n c i e s a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s to e n s u r e t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s o n a g l o b a l scale. W h i l e nation-states w o u l d r e t a i n l i m i t e d sovereignty, t h e i r citizens w o u l d b e a b l e to a p p e a l to t h e coercive legal a u t h o r i t y of r e g i o n a l o r g l o b a l a g e n c i e s , a g a i n s t t h e i r o w n g o v e r n m e n t s if necessary. T h i s e x t e n s i o n of t h e t h e o r y of r i g h t s a n d p r o c e d u r a l d e m o c r a c y in a c o s m o p o l i t a n d i r e c t i o n raises far-reaching q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e f u t u r e of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e , to w h i c h we n o w t u r n . 23
3
T h e Future o f the Nation-State in an Era o f Globalization
T h e essays c o l l e c t e d in P a r t s III a n d IV of this v o l u m e r e p r e s e n t s o m e of H a b e r m a s ' s m o s t significant i n t e r v e n t i o n s in t h e o n g o i n g d e b a t e s a b o u t t h e n a t u r e a n d f u t u r e of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e . I n c o n t r a s t
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to m o s t a r g u m e n t s for c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m , however, H a b e r m a s ' s p o i n t of d e p a r t u r e is n e i t h e r a n attack o n t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e n o r a r e p u d i a t i o n of n a t i o n a l i s m , b u t a n o r m a t i v e a n d e m p i r i c a l analysis of t h e i r successes as well as t h e i r l i m i t a t i o n s . Briefly, H a b e r m a s a r g u e s t h a t t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e e m e r g e d in r e s p o n s e to a d u a l crisis of l e g i t i m a t i o n a n d i n t e g r a t i o n t h a t a r o s e with t h e d e m i s e of t h e o l d E u r o p e a n f e u d a l o r d e r a n d d e e p e n e d with t h e a c c e l e r a t i o n of p r o c e s s e s of m o d e r n i z a t i o n . After t h e wars of r e l i g i o n a n d t h e e m e r g e n c e of c r e d a l p l u r a l i s m , a u t h o r i t y h a d to b e l e g i t i m a t e d in a secular fashion. M o d e r n i z a t i o n left in its wake isolated individuals a n d d i s l o c a t e d c o m m u n i t i e s . T h e a c h i e v e m e n t of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e consists p r e cisely in a d d r e s s i n g t h e p r o b l e m s of l e g i t i m a t i o n a n d i n t e g r a t i o n a t o n c e . By f o r m i n g states a n d i n c o r p o r a t i n g d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e s , c o m m u n i t i e s g a i n a m e a s u r e of legitimacy for t h e i r a u t h o r i t a t i v e political institutions. At t h e s a m e t i m e , it is precisely t h e (in m o s t cases d e l i b e r a t e ) a d o p t i o n of t h e i d e a of n a t i o n h o o d t h a t c r e a t e s b o n d s of m u t u a l solidarity b e t w e e n f o r m e r s t r a n g e r s a n d motivates t h e e x t e n s i o n of d e m o c r a t i c citizenship, t h e r e b y a d d r e s s i n g t h e p r o b l e m of d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . 2 4
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B u t if t h e i d e a of t h e n a t i o n was historically i m p o r t a n t in t h e f o r m a t i o n of d e m o c r a t i c a l l y o r d e r e d societies, for H a b e r m a s it s e e m s to h a v e outlived its usefulness, at least as traditionally c o n ceived a n d e n s h r i n e d in i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. It is n o t j u s t t h a t t h e i n c r e a s i n g p l u r a l i s m a n d r e l e n t l e s s p r o c e s s e s of e c o n o m i c globaliza t i o n a r e r e n d e r i n g o b s o l e t e t h e n o t i o n of i n t e r n a l l y h o m o g e n e o u s a n d e x t e r n a l l y sovereign states; in a d d i t i o n a n i n h e r e n t t e n s i o n b e t w e e n n a t i o n a l i s m a n d r e p u b l i c a n i s m is c o m i n g to a h e a d . W h e r e a s n a t i o n a l i t y d e p e n d s p r i m a r i l y o n ascriptive criteria s u c h as ethnicity, a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e , o r a s h a r e d history, r e p u b l i c a n i s m is f o u n d e d o n t h e ideals of v o l u n t a r y association a n d universal h u m a n r i g h t s . D e s p i t e t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e historical c o n v e r g e n c e of n a t i o n a l i t y a n d r e p u b l i c a n i s m in t h e f o r m a t i o n of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e since t h e F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n , H a b e r m a s a r g u e s , this was only a c o n t i n g e n t link: r e p u b l i c a n i s m is n e i t h e r c o n c e p t u a l l y n o r practically d e p e n d e n t o n nationality, a n d t h e t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y in p a r t i c u l a r h a s p r o v i d e d g r o t e s q u e e x a m p l e s of t h e d a n g e r s of e m p h a s i z i n g t h e relationship between ethnos a n d demos.
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H a b e r m a s ' s m a i n t a r g e t in this discussion is t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t r e g a r d s a culturally o r ethnically h o m o g e n e o u s p o p u l a t i o n as a n e c essary c o n d i t i o n of t h e effective o p e r a t i o n of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y . F o r H a b e r m a s , insisting o n this c o n d i t i o n i m p l i e s a failure to a c k n o w l e d g e t h e i m p o r t a n c e of legal i n s t i t u t i o n s in t h e f o r m a t i o n of n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t i e s . H e r e m i n d s u s t h a t m o d e r n c o n s c i o u s n e s s is n o t m e r e l y a r e s u l t of m e m b e r s h i p in p r e p o l i t i c a l a n c e s t r a l c o m m u nities b a s e d o n k i n s h i p , b u t is a t least in p a r t a f u n c t i o n of politics, of t h e active e n j o y m e n t of t h e status of citizen w i t h i n a political community. 26
A t t e n t i o n to t h e r o l e of legal s t r u c t u r e s — a s o p p o s e d t o i n h e r i t e d loyalties—in t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y h e l p s H a b e r m a s to m e e t o n e of t h e o b j e c t i o n s raised a g a i n s t s u p r a n a t i o n a l r e g i m e s s u c h as t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o s o m e critics, in t h e a b s e n c e of a g e n u i n e s u p r a n a t i o n a l identity s u c h r e g i m e s suffer f r o m a n i r r e solvable legitimacy deficit: t h e y will inevitably b e a n t i d e m o c r a t i c b o t h in o r i g i n a n d in o p e r a t i o n . H a b e r m a s , of c o u r s e , a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t a E u r o p e a n i d e n t i t y will n o t c o m e a b o u t m e r e l y t h r o u g h legal fiat; b u t h e a r g u e s t h a t t h e genesis of s u c h a n identity d e p e n d s o n t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of s u p r a n a t i o n a l d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s . J u s t as t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e F r e n c h , for e x a m p l e , is b a s e d n o t m e r e l y o n a s h a r e d c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y b u t also o n t h e s h a r e d legal-political institu t i o n s a n d p r a c t i c e s t h a t a r e p a r t of t h e legacy of t h e R e v o l u t i o n , t h e i d e n t i t y of E u r o p e a n s will b e at least in p a r t a f u n c t i o n of a legal f r a m e w o r k t h a t allows for t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of a g e n u i n e l y E u r o p e a n identity. H a b e r m a s ' s m o d e l h e r e is t h a t of t h e slow historical p r o c e s s t h r o u g h w h i c h , in t h e c o u r s e of t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , i n h e r i t e d local a n d dynastic loyalties b e c a m e s u b o r d i n a t e d to t h e m o r e ab stract a n d legally m e d i a t e d political i d e n t i t y of citizens of p a r t i c u l a r nation-states. I n m o u n t i n g this a r g u m e n t , H a b e r m a s m a k e s u s e of a p a i r of r e l a t e d d i s t i n c t i o n s t h a t a r e b e c o m i n g i m p o r t a n t in discussions n o t j u s t a b o u t n a t i o n a l i s m b u t m o r e g e n e r a l l y a b o u t political justifica t i o n in m u l t i c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t s . H e distinguishes, o n t h e o n e h a n d , b e t w e e n a civic a n d a n ethnic sense of t h e n a t i o n , a n d o n t h e o t h e r , b e t w e e n a political and a majority c u l t u r e . T h e idea, of c o u r s e , is to restrict t h e object of politics so as to m a k e a g r e e m e n t m o r e feasible.
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Citizens d o n o t h a v e to a g r e e o n a m u t u a l l y a c c e p t a b l e set of c u l t u r a l p r a c t i c e s b u t m u s t c o m e t o a t o m o r e m o d e s t t h o u g h still d e m a n d i n g a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g a b s t r a c t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s . As with n a t i o n a l identity w i t h i n pluralistic states, H a b e r m a s t h i n k s t h a t a s u p r a n a t i o n a l i d e n t i t y m i g h t evolve a r o u n d a n a g r e e m e n t a b o u t political p r i n c i p l e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s r a t h e r t h a n a b o u t c u l t u r e m o r e generally. T h e a g r e e m e n t in q u e s t i o n a m o u n t s to a n identification with basic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s a n d p r a c t i c e s w h i c h H a b e r m a s ( a m o n g o t h e r s ) calls " c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t i s m . " As w i t h i n t h e na tion-state, i n h e r i t e d r e g i o n a l loyalties c o u l d b e s u b o r d i n a t e d t o , b u t n o t c o m p l e t e l y r e p l a c e d by, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t r i o t i s m , so a similar p r o c e s s m i g h t take s h a p e at t h e s u p r a n a t i o n a l level, p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e different c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n s of t h e m e m b e r states e m b o d i e d t h e s a m e set of basic r i g h t s . 27
B u t H a b e r m a s ' s i n t e r e s t in c o s m o p o l i t a n s t r u c t u r e s g o e s b e y o n d t h e a p p r o v i n g o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t t h e different r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n s c o n v e r g e o n t h e s a m e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s . After all, t h e classical system of states, u p to a n d i n c l u d i n g t h e L e a g u e of N a t i o n s , also i n c l u d e d a set of p r i n c i p l e s t h a t all m e m b e r c o u n t r i e s w e r e s u p p o s e d to f o l l o w . B u t t h a t system d i d n o t give a n y o n e t h e a u t h o r i t y to i n t e r v e n e in d e f e n s e of t h e s h a r e d p r i n c i p l e s . I n this r e s p e c t , H a b e r m a s ' s c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m is m o r e d e m a n d i n g t h a n K a n t ' s i d e a of a f e d e r a t i o n of sovereign states, w h i c h is in s o m e ways r e f l e c t e d in t h e classical c o n c e p t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l a w . O n H a b e r m a s ' s view, t h e r e is a n i n c o n s i s t e n c y in K a n t ' s d u a l a s p i r a t i o n to p r e s e r v e t h e sovereignty of t h e associated states, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d to m a i n tain p e a c e in t h e l o n g r u n , o n t h e o t h e r . T h e t e n s i o n lies in t h e fact t h a t t h e p r o p o s e d federative s c h e m e exists only insofar, a n d as l o n g as, t h e m e m b e r states will to r e m a i n in it. However, if p e a c e is to b e p r o m o t e d , H a b e r m a s a r g u e s , states m u s t b e u n d e r t h e obligation to act in h a r m o n y with t h e p r i n c i p l e s of t h e f e d e r a t i o n . Although K a n t envisaged t h e possibility of a "universal f e d e r a l state" (Volkerstaat) "based u p o n e n f o r c e a b l e p u b l i c laws to w h i c h e a c h state m u s t s u b m i t , " in fact h e a d v o c a t e d a " f e d e r a t i o n of p e o p l e s " (Volkerbund), a m o r e m o d e s t s t r u c t u r e w h o s e a i m is n o t to c o n s t i t u t e a legal o r d e r to i n c r e a s e welfare a n d j u s t i c e , b u t r a t h e r only to f u r t h e r t h e a b o l i t i o n of w a r . T h i s v o l u n t a r y association d o e s n o t give rise to a n y a c t i o n a b l e rights, a n d h e n c e its p e r m a n e n c e r e m a i n s u n e x p l a i n e d . 28
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Editors' Introduction
Moreover, t h e c o n c e r n to leave i n t a c t t h e sovereignty of its m e m b e r states will, predictably, conflict with t h e n e e d to o b l i g a t e u n r u l y m e m b e r s to s u b o r d i n a t e t h e i r o w n raison d'etat so t h a t p e a c e m a y b e p e r p e t u a t e d . T h u s t h e r e is a n i n h e r e n t t e n s i o n in t h e d u a l a i m of e s t a b l i s h i n g a r e g i m e of e n f o r c e a b l e h u m a n rights, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d of m a k i n g c o n s e n t t h e sole s o u r c e of o b l i g a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, o n t h e o t h e r . 3 3
A n a p p r o p r i a t e r e f o r m u l a t i o n of classical i n t e r n a t i o n a l law is in o r d e r , t h e n . T h e t h r u s t of H a b e r m a s ' s p r o p o s a l is t h a t r e p u b l i c a n i s m n e e d s to b e p r e s e r v e d at t h e s u p r a n a t i o n a l level if it is to survive at all. T h e n a t i o n - s t a t e suffers t h r e e sorts of weaknesses, w h i c h a r e unlikely to b e o v e r c o m e by t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e a l o n e . First, i n d i v i d u a l nation-states d o n o t h a v e t h e n e c e s s a r y r e s o u r c e s to d e a l with risks o n a g l o b a l scale, i n c l u d i n g ecological p r o b l e m s , e c o n o m i c i n e q u a l i ties, t h e a r m s t r a d e , a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i m e . S e c o n d , states a r e b e c o m i n g helpless in t h e face of t h e g l o b a l i z a t i o n o r d e n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e e c o n o m y . It is n o t only t h e i n c r e a s e d m a g n i t u d e of t h e e c o n o m i c activity across n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s b u t also t h e r a p i d mobility of capital t h a t leads to t h e loss of a l a r g e m e a s u r e of i n d i v i d u a l states' c o n t r o l over t h e i r o w n e c o n o m i e s . T h i s w e a k n e s s is n o t m e r e l y a p r a g m a t i c m a t t e r b u t t h r e a t e n s to u n d e r m i n e t h e integrative a c h i e v e m e n t s of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e . O n e of t h e d a n g e r s of t h e d e n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of e c o n o m i e s is a r a c e b e t w e e n several c o u n t r i e s to d i s m a n t l e t h e i r welfare systems in t h e s e a r c h for c o m p e t i t i v e advan tages. T h i s in t u r n w o u l d a c c e l e r a t e t h e f o r m a t i o n of u n d e r c l a s s e s even in d e v e l o p e d c o u n t r i e s , with t h r e e fateful c o n s e q u e n c e s : a n i n c r e a s i n g r e c o u r s e to repressive politics in a vain a t t e m p t to c o n t a i n t h e a n o m i c effects of a l a r g e u n d e r c l a s s ; t h e decay of t h e infrastruc t u r e of e x p a n d e d areas; a n d , as a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e f o r e g o i n g , t h e collapse of t h e b o n d s of social solidarity a n d political legitimacy, two a c h i e v e m e n t s of t h e d e m o c r a t i c n a t i o n - s t a t e . Finally, t h e i n h e r e n t t e n s i o n b e t w e e n n a t i o n a l i s m a n d r e p u b l i c a n i s m m a k e s t h e sovereign state a less t h a n reliable g u a r a n t o r of t h e rights t h a t individuals a r e s u p p o s e d to h a v e q u a h u m a n b e i n g s , a n d n o t only as citizens of p a r t i c u l a r states. 34
S u p r a n a t i o n a l r e g i m e s , a c c o r d i n g to H a b e r m a s , a r e m o r e likely to s u c c e e d w h e r e sovereign states fail. F o r this r e a s o n , h e s u p p o r t s s u p r a n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s with g r e a t e r executive a n d j u d i c i a l p o w e r s ,
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so l o n g as t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e also m o r e d e m o c r a t i c t h a n p r e s e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s . T h e a i m of t h e s e r e g i m e s is t o c o n s t i t u t e a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l legal o r d e r t h a t at t h e very least w o u l d b i n d indi vidual g o v e r n m e n t s to r e s p e c t t h e basic r i g h t s of t h e i r citizens, if n e c e s s a r y t h r o u g h t h e t h r e a t o r t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of s a n c t i o n s . W h i l e i n c r e a s e d j u d i c i a l a n d executive f u n c t i o n s w o u l d b e n e c e s s a r y to m a k e i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n s effective in t h e p r o t e c t i o n of indi vidual rights, for this very r e a s o n t h e y w o u l d also h a v e to e m b o d y g r e a t e r d e m o c r a t i c o p e n n e s s in o r d e r t o p r e v e n t selective a n d u n f a i r uses of i n t e r n a t i o n a l force. T h e s a m e d e m o c r a t i c , c o s m o p o l i t a n o r i e n t a t i o n c a n b e s e e n in H a b e r m a s ' s p o s i t i o n o n t h e f u t u r e of E u r o p e . Critics allege t h a t t h e U n i o n suffers f r o m a serious " d e m o c r a t i c deficit" o n at least t h r e e g r o u n d s . First, t h e U n i o n rests o n i n t e r n a t i o n a l treaties, a s e e m ingly shaky basis for i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d legal p r e c e d e n t s t h a t increas ingly play a federative r o l e . S e c o n d , critics aver t h a t s t r u c t u r a l i m p e d i m e n t s t o d e m o c r a c y s u c h as t h e i n c r e a s i n g p o w e r of t h e C o m m i s s i o n , t h e p o o r l y d e v e l o p e d d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s of t h e C o u n c i l , a n d t h e relative s t r u c t u r a l u n i m p o r t a n c e of t h e Parlia m e n t , m a k e U n i o n d e c i s i o n s a p p e a r as i m p o s i t i o n s o n t h e p a r t of a b u r e a u c r a t i c b o d y t h a t h a s b e c o m e d a n g e r o u s l y a u t o n o m o u s . Even if m e m b e r states c o u l d " l e n d " t h e i r legitimacy to t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e U n i o n , over t i m e a d e m o c r a t i c g a p h a s allegedly o p e n e d u p , for t h e o v e r l o a d e d C o u n c i l h a s d e l e g a t e d d e c i s i o n s to t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m i s s i o n , w h o s e m e m b e r s a r e n o t a c c o u n t a b l e to t h e p a r t i c u l a r m e m b e r states b u t to t h e U n i o n itself. Finally, s o m e critics d i s p u t e t h e d e m o c r a t i c c h a r a c t e r of t h e U n i o n , asserting t h a t a s t r o n g e r U n i o n w o u l d h a v e a n even m o r e severe legitimacy deficit b e c a u s e of t h e n o n e x i s t e n c e of a E u r o p e a n p u b l i c . 3 5
3 6
37
38
3 9
H a b e r m a s ' s r e s p o n s e to t h e d e m o c r a t i c deficit of t h e U n i o n p a r allels his suggestions c o n c e r n i n g t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s . H e d e f e n d s " [ n ] e w political i n s t i t u t i o n s s u c h as a E u r o p e a n P a r l i a m e n t with t h e usual powers, a g o v e r n m e n t f o r m e d o u t of t h e C o m m i s s i o n , a Sec o n d C h a m b e r r e p l a c i n g t h e C o u n c i l , a n d a E u r o p e a n C o u r t of Justice with e x p a n d e d c o m p e t e n c e s . " I n s h o r t , H a b e r m a s advo cates "a transition of t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y to a d e m o c r a t i c a l l y constituted, federal s t a t e . " F o r h i m , t h e way to m a k e g o o d t h e 4 0
41
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d e m o c r a t i c deficit of t h e U n i o n is precisely to s t r e n g t h e n its political i n s t i t u t i o n s while giving it t h e c h a r a c t e r of a f e d e r a l g o v e r n m e n t . To t h o s e (like G r i m m ) w h o t h i n k t h a t a s t r o n g e r U n i o n w o u l d have a n even m o r e severe legitimacy deficit b e c a u s e of t h e n o n e x i s t e n c e of a n E u r o p e a n p u b l i c , H a b e r m a s offers t h e r e m i n d e r t h a t t h e identity of p e r s o n s as citizens is s h a p e d , at least in p a r t , by t h e legal a n d political i n s t i t u t i o n s w i t h i n w h i c h they c o n d u c t t h e i r lives. It is n o t u n r e a s o n a b l e , t h e n , to e x p e c t t h a t "the political i n s t i t u t i o n s t h a t w o u l d b e c r e a t e d by a E u r o p e a n c o n s t i t u t i o n w o u l d h a v e a catalytic e f f e c t " — t h a t is, t h a t t h e y w o u l d c o n t r i b u t e to t h e f o r m a t i o n of a n a u t h e n t i c E u r o p e a n identity, w h i c h w o u l d i n t u r n p r o m o t e t h e d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n of E u r o p e a n institutions. 42
T h e s u g g e s t i o n s for i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e f o r m t h a t H a b e r m a s offers a r e provocative, b u t t h e focus of his w o r k lies o n t h e n o r m a t i v e d i m e n s i o n of c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m . At this level, w h a t m a k e s his d e f e n s e of c o s m o p o l i t a n i s m p a r t i c u l a r l y c o m p e l l i n g is t h a t it follows f r o m a n a r g u m e n t t h a t seeks to r e c o n c i l e p a r t i c u l a r i s m a n d universalism, Sittlichkeit a n d Moralitat, by giving e a c h its d u e . T h e g u i d i n g i d e a is t h a t c o s m o p o l i t a n political i n s t i t u t i o n s c a n b e s e e n as t h e r e s u l t of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e very s a m e h y p o t h e t i c a l c o n s t r u c t in t e r m s of w h i c h h e e l u c i d a t e s t h e legitimacy of legal r i g h t s w i t h i n t h e n a t i o n state. J u s t as w i t h i n states r i g h t s a r e n e c e s s a r y in o r d e r to m e d i a t e social i n t e r a c t i o n s by m e a n s of laws, c e r t a i n r i g h t s b e c o m e n e c e s s a r y in o r d e r to achieve t h e s a m e g o a l w h e n t h e inter a c t i o n s t a k e p l a c e across n a t i o n a l b o r d e r s . Since for H a b e r m a s t h e l e g i t i m a t i o n of law r e q u i r e s sensitivity b o t h to t h e c o n c r e t e c o n t e x t of a p p l i c a t i o n a n d t o t h e universalistic t h r u s t of i m p a r t i a l r e a s o n , t h e universality of basic rights, far f r o m t h w a r t i n g t h e e x p r e s s i o n a n d d e v e l o p m e n t of c o n c r e t e f o r m s of life, actually p r o m o t e s t h e m , as will b e c o m e clear in t h e n e x t section. 4
Multiculturalism and the Rights o f Cultural Minorities
H a b e r m a s ' s discussion of m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m serves to illustrate t h e a d v a n t a g e s of his d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a p p r o a c h to m o r a l , legal, a n d politi cal issues a n d to t h e c o m p l e x r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n t h e m . B o t h liberals a n d c o m m u n i t a r i a n s c h a r g e o n e a n o t h e r with insensitivity
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t o w a r d difference a n d h e n c e with difficulties in d e a l i n g with s o m e of t h e p r e s s i n g issues of c o n t e m p o r a r y i d e n t i t y politics. C o m m u n i t a r i a n s c h a r g e t h a t t h e liberal e m p h a s i s o n e q u a l t r e a t m e n t a m o u n t s to "an a b s t r a c t leveling of distinctions, a leveling of b o t h c u l t u r a l a n d social d i f f e r e n c e s . " Liberals, in t u r n , claim t h a t m a n y of t h e c h a r acteristic f e a t u r e s of c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m l e a d to a n e x c l u s i o n of dif f e r e n c e . T h e s e i n c l u d e t h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n s ' willingness to g r a n t p r i m a c y to collective over individual r i g h t s a n d t h e i r c o n s t r u a l of r i g h t s as a n e x p r e s s i o n of values c o n t a i n e d in t h e t r a d i t i o n s of par ticular c o m m u n i t i e s . T h e s t r o n g link b e t w e e n t h e n o t i o n of collec tive i d e n t i t y a n d r i g h t s is particularly p r o b l e m a t i c in pluralistic societies, w h e r e conflicts inevitably arise c o n c e r n i n g t h e r i g h t s of m i n o r i t y g r o u p s w h o s e i d e n t i t i e s a n d t r a d i t i o n s differ f r o m t h o s e of t h e majority g r o u p . 43
T h e p e c u l i a r p o w e r a n d originality of H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y of politi cal l e g i t i m a t i o n consists in p a r t in its ability to d e a l with a b r o a d r a n g e of issues w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of a single u n i f i e d t h e o r y of h u m a n r i g h t s a n d of p o p u l a r sovereignty. However, it is n o t i m m e diately e v i d e n t t h a t his a p p r o a c h is b e t t e r a b l e t o a c c o u n t for politi cally significant differences b e t w e e n e t h n i c , religious, a n d n a t i o n a l g r o u p s t h a n e i t h e r c o m m u n i t a r i a n i s m o r classical liberalism. F o r o n e t h i n g , t h e highly a b s t r a c t t h e o r i e s of h u m a n r i g h t s a n d of p o p u lar sovereignty o n w h i c h h e p r o p o s e s to g r o u n d d e m o c r a c y at b o t h t h e n a t i o n a l a n d s u p r a n a t i o n a l levels s e e m to i g n o r e t h e c u l t u r a l values t h a t s h a p e t h e i d e n t i t i e s of g r o u p s . We shall c o n c l u d e with a few brief r e m a r k s o n t h e s e m a t t e r s . (1) T h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t e t h n i c a n d c u l t u r a l h o m o g e n e i t y a r e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s for t h e p r o p e r f u n c t i o n i n g of a d e m o c r a t i c c o m m u n i t y c r e a t e s obvious difficulties for justifying e q u a l t r e a t m e n t of m i n o r i t y g r o u p s . H a b e r m a s ' s d e f e n s e of t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e t h n o s a n d d e m o s , as we saw a b o v e , is d i r e c t e d precisely against this a s s u m p t i o n , a n d this e n a b l e s h i m to a r g u e t h a t t h e r e is n o a p r i o r i r e a s o n why a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c y s h o u l d find itself c h a l l e n g e d by ever-increasing e t h n i c a n d c u l t u r a l p l u r a l i s m . Critics will p r e d i c t ably c o m p l a i n t h a t this very a r g u m e n t u n d e r e s t i m a t e s t h e i m p o r t a n c e of c u l t u r a l identities. T h e y will p o i n t o u t t h a t m o d e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e m o c r a c i e s e m e r g e d for t h e m o s t p a r t f r o m strug gles for s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n by g r o u p s w h o saw t h e i r political destiny
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as a m a t t e r of cultivating p a r t i c u l a r f o r m s of life, c u s t o m s , a n d values t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h e m f r o m o t h e r n a t i o n a l g r o u p s . H a b e r m a s , by c o n t r a s t , s e e m s to t r e a t t h e q u e s t i o n of m e m b e r s h i p m e r e l y as a m a t t e r of historical c o n t i n g e n c y . Even critics w h o a c c e p t t h e c o n t i n g e n c y of political m e m b e r s h i p c o u l d a r g u e , however, t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e t h n o s a n d de m o s c a n establish at b e s t t h e impermissibility of overt d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , b u t t h a t t h e m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m d e b a t e reveals precisely t h e t e n s i o n b e t w e e n t h e p r i n c i p l e of e q u a l t r e a t m e n t a n d t h e a i m of p r o t e c t i n g c u l t u r a l identity. H a b e r m a s ' s r e l a t e d d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a s h a r e d political c u l t u r e a n d diverse s u b c u l t u r e s , w h i c h e m p h a s i z e s t h a t p o litical i n t e g r a t i o n is a m a t t e r of a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g basic consti tutional principles a n d procedures rather than about concrete forms of life, m i g h t a d d fuel to t h e o b j e c t i o n t h a t h e is insufficiently a t t u n e d to t h e i m p o r t a n c e of c u l t u r e in politics, t h a t m e r e a g r e e m e n t a b o u t a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n , in isolation f r o m t h e sub s t a n c e of a thick ethical life, is unlikely to l e a d t o t h e legal p r o t e c t i o n of m i n o r i t y o r f o r m e r l y u n r e c o g n i z e d c o m m u n i t i e s . W h i l e t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s h a v e a c e r t a i n plausibility, H a b e r m a s ' s so cial t h e o r y p r o v i d e s h i m with t h e o r e t i c a l r e s o u r c e s to d e a l with t h e m . I n t h e first p l a c e , h e c a n d r a w o n a n a c c o u n t of identity-forma t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h i n d i v i d u a t i o n is a c h i e v e d only t h r o u g h p r o c esses of s o c i a l i z a t i o n , Briefly, t h e i d e a is t h a t p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t y h a s a n i r r e d u c i b l y intersubjective basis b e c a u s e t h e a c q u i s i t i o n a n d m a i n t e n a n c e of a sense of self d e p e n d s u p o n t h e s t r u c t u r e s of reci p r o c i t y a n d r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t a r e b u i l t i n t o t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . If i d e n t i t i e s a r e always a r t i c u l a t e d in a n d t h r o u g h p r o c e s s e s of socialization, t h e n p r o t e c t i n g t h e i d e n t i t i e s of individuals necessarily implies p r o t e c t i n g t h e c o n t e x t s of i n t e r a c t i o n in w h i c h t h e y d e f i n e w h o they a r e . B e c a u s e r e s p e c t for t h e integrity of individuals t h u s r e q u i r e s r e s p e c t for t h e c o n t e x t s in w h i c h t h e y f o r m a n d sustain t h e i r identities, H a b e r m a s is l e d to d e f e n d policies t h a t s u p p o r t e r s of m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m also e n d o r s e , s u c h as m u l t i c u l t u ral e d u c a t i o n , g o v e r n m e n t a l s u p p o r t for t h e c u l t u r a l activities of m i n o r i t y g r o u p s , a n d t h e like. A l t h o u g h H a b e r m a s a n d his c o m m u n i t a r i a n o p p o n e n t s m a y s u p p o r t s o m e of t h e s a m e policies, t h e y differ sharply in t h e justifica tions they offer for t h e m . T h u s C h a r l e s Taylor ultimately a p p e a l s to 44
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a controversial n o t i o n of g r o u p r i g h t s , w h e r e a s H a b e r m a s relies o n t h e n o t i o n of p e r s o n a l a u t o n o m y . F o r h i m , m u l t i c u l t u r a l policies n o t only sustain t h e c o n d i t i o n s for m a i n t a i n i n g i n d i v i d u a l a n d g r o u p identities, b u t also s e c u r e t h e c o n d i t i o n s for e x e r c i s i n g a u t o n o m o u s c h o i c e . T h e g o a l of s u c h policies is to allow citizens t o e n g a g e in t h e i r c u l t u r a l p r a c t i c e s w i t h o u t b e i n g p e n a l i z e d , t h a t is, w i t h o u t b e i n g d i s c r i m i n a t e d a g a i n s t for t h e i r c h o i c e s . H e n c e , w h a t e v e r p r o g r a m s a r e i n s t i t u t e d for t h e p r o t e c t i o n of c u l t u r a l c o n t e x t s , t h e y o u g h t to b e s u c h as to s e c u r e t h e possibility of m e a n i n g f u l c u l t u r a l c h o i c e s . To this e x t e n t H a b e r m a s ' s p r o p o s a l is mistrustful of essentialist m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m s t h a t a t t r i b u t e to t h e m e m b e r s of n a t i o n a l o r c u l t u r a l g r o u p s w h a t A n t h o n y A p p i a h h a s called "tightly s c r i p t e d i d e n t i t i e s , " Or t h a t e n g a g e in a t t e m p t s to d i c t a t e to individuals t h e n a t u r e o r i m p o r t a n c e of s u c h g r o u p m e m b e r s h i p s . I n a pluralistic c o n t e x t , b o t h collective a n d p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t i e s a r e to s o m e d e g r e e o p e n to c h o i c e . H a b e r m a s ' s p o s i t i o n o n m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , t h e n , e n d o r s e s difference, b u t it is also sensitive to t h e p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t s to p e r s o n a l a u t o n o m y e n t a i l e d by d e m a n d s for r e c o g n i z i n g g r o u p i d e n tities. T h e oppressive p o t e n t i a l of t h e politics of r e c o g n i t i o n derives b o t h f r o m t h e d e s i r e t o d e f i n e w h a t c o u n t s as a n a u t h e n t i c manifes t a t i o n of c u l t u r a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d f r o m t h e e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t par ticipants s h o u l d m a k e t h e i r m e m b e r s h i p in n a t i o n a l o r c u l t u r a l g r o u p s t h e c e n t r a l , d e f i n i n g f e a t u r e of t h e i r identities. 46
4 7
(2) A s e c o n d a s p e c t of H a b e r m a s ' s w o r k t h a t u n d e r g i r d s its sensi tivity to difference is its h i g h l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a p p r o a c h to t h e n a t u r e of legal-political discussions. Liberals h a v e traditionally t e n d e d to t r e a t political d i s c o u r s e as t h o u g h it w e r e all of a p i e c e a n d h e n c e have b e e n divided over w h e t h e r d e m o c r a t i c discussion o u g h t to b e c o n s t r u e d e i t h e r as p u r e l y strategic, a c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g elites for t h e votes of t h e citizens ( S c h u m p e t e r , B o b b i o , Z o l o ) , o r as conversa tions t h a t s t a n d u n d e r t h e g e n e r a l r u l e s of m o r a l i t y a n d h e n c e r e q u i r e special sorts of c o n v e r s a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s ( A c k e r m a n , Rawls). H a b e r m a s ' s a p p r o a c h is m o r e c o m p l e x . S t a r t i n g f r o m his distinction b e t w e e n p r a g m a t i c , ethical, a n d m o r a l uses of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n , h e offers a n analysis of political d i s c o u r s e w h i c h u n d e r l i n e s the i m p o r t a n c e of ethical c o n c e r n s in t h e political d o m a i n . W h i l e the legitimacy of t h e law d e p e n d s o n p r o c e d u r e s d e s i g n e d t o e n s u r e 48
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h a r m o n y b e t w e e n basic legal n o r m s a n d morality, for H a b e r m a s legal n o r m s differ f r o m m o r a l n o r m s in t h a t in a d d i t i o n to m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , p r a g m a t i c a n d e t h i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , as well as p r o c esses of c o m p r o m i s e f o r m a t i o n a n d b a r g a i n i n g , play a c r u c i a l r o l e in t h e justification of t h e f o r m e r . T h o u g h t h e historical d e v e l o p m e n t s of m o d e r n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n s e x h i b i t a n u n m i s t a k a b l e c o n v e r g e n c e o n universal h u m a n r i g h t s w h o s e basic c o n t e n t is m o r a l , n o n e t h e l e s s t h e citizens of e a c h political u n i t , in legislating for themselves, i n t e r p r e t t h e s e basic c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s in light of t h e i r o w n h i s t o r y a n d t h e i r o w n culturally specific values. I n o t h e r w o r d s , in a d d i t i o n t o e n s h r i n i n g universal m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s , a legal system is o n e of t h e p r i m e m e a n s by w h i c h a p e o p l e defines w h o they a r e a n d w h o t h e y w a n t to b e a n d t h e r e b y a r t i c u l a t e t h e i r distinctive c u l t u r a l identity. (3) H a b e r m a s ' s clarification of t h e essential i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n legal validity a n d d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e p u t s h i m in a s t r o n g p o s i t i o n i n d e b a t e s a b o u t m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , for t h e i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y m e a n s t h a t t h e legitimacy of law is a f u n c t i o n n o t m e r e l y of t h e p r o t e c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l liberties b u t also of t h e exercise of p a r t i c i p a t o r y r i g h t s . Feminists, in p a r t i c u lar, h a v e insisted t h a t t h e r i g h t s of w o m e n c a n n o t b e p r o t e c t e d w h e n w o m e n a r e p r e v e n t e d f r o m a r t i c u l a t i n g t h e i r n e e d s , a n d t h a t this is so e v e n w h e r e i n s t i t u t i o n s have b e e n d e s i g n e d a n d b u d g e t s a l l o t t e d for t h e p u r p o s e of s u c h p r o t e c t i o n . I n criticizing welfare s c h e m e s t h a t l e a d t o t h e t r e a t m e n t of clients as passive r e c i p i e n t s of p u b l i c charity, t h e y have, e m p h a s i z e d t h e fragility of i n d i v i d u a l liberties w h e n t h e y a r e severed f r o m t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of t h o s e w h o s e n e e d s s t a n d in n e e d of p r o t e c t i o n . If p a r t i c i p a t i o n in t h e d e f i n i t i o n of n e e d s is w a n t i n g , welfare t u r n s i n t o a p e c u l i a r k i n d of charity t h a t is given c o n d i t i o n a l l y o n t h e r e c i p i e n t s ' a c c e p t a n c e of t h e a d m i n i s t r a tive s u p e r v i s i o n of t h e i r lives. M o r e broadly, i n t h e d o m a i n of strug gles for r e c o g n i t i o n of differences, t h e a i m c a n n o t b e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n f r o m a b o v e of p r o t e c t i o n s a n d benefits for p r e viously d i s a d v a n t a g e d g r o u p s , b u t m u s t r a t h e r b e t h e realization of full d e m o c r a t i c d i a l o g u e in w h i c h e v e r y o n e affected h a s s o m e i n p u t i n t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n of n e e d s a n d i d e n t i t i e s a n d h o w t h e s e will b e p r o m o t e d o r h a m p e r e d by state a c t i o n . 49
xxxii Editors' Introduction
I n t h e e n d , c o n v e r s a t i o n s a b o u t m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m a d v a n c e only if p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e n o t f o r c e d to c h o o s e b e t w e e n a n o r m a t i v e l y w e a k c o n t e x t u a l i s m , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d a context-insensitive universalism, o n t h e o t h e r . H e r e as e l s e w h e r e , r e l e v a n t d i s t i n c t i o n s d o m a k e a difference.
Translator's Note Ciaran Cronin
O f t h e essays c o l l e c t e d in this v o l u m e , I a m r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e t r a n s l a t i o n s of c h a p t e r s 1-5 a n d 7, t h o u g h J a m e s B o h m a n kindly s h o w e d m e a n early draft of his t r a n s l a t i o n of c h a p t e r 7. T h e r e m a i n i n g t r a n s l a t i o n s a r e by o t h e r h a n d s , t h o u g h I h a v e m a d e s o m e revi sions to all of t h e m , as I h a v e to previously p u b l i s h e d versions of c h a p t e r s 1 a n d 2, to take a c c o u n t of final revisions of t h e G e r m a n texts a n d to e n s u r e a n a p p r o p r i a t e level of consistency b e t w e e n t h e essays. A s h o r t e r version of c h a p t e r 1 a p p e a r e d in Proceedings of the Aristo telian Society 96 ( 1 9 9 6 ) : 3 3 5 - 3 5 8 . C h a p t e r 6 was p u b l i s h e d u n d e r t h e title " R e m a r k s o n D i e t e r G r i m m ' s ' D o e s E u r o p e N e e d a Constitu t i o n , ' " t r a n s l a t e d by Iain L. F r a s e r a n d J o h n R M c C o r m i c k , in Euro pean Law Journal4 ( 3 ) , 1995: 3 0 3 - 3 0 7 . C h a p t e r 8 was t r a n s l a t e d by S h i e r r y W e b e r N i c h o l s e n a n d a p p e a r e d in C h a r l e s Taylor, Multicul turalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, e d i t e d by A m y G u t m a n n ( P r i n c e t o n University Press: P r i n c e t o n , NJ, 1 9 9 4 ) , p p . 1 0 7 - 1 4 8 ; it is r e p r i n t e d h e r e by p e r m i s s i o n of t h e p u b l i s h e r . A n earlier version of c h a p t e r 9 a p p e a r e d in Constellations 1 ( 1 ) : 1-10. C h a p t e r 10 was trans l a t e d by William R e h g a n d a p p e a r e d in European Journal of Philosophy 3 ( 1 ) : 12-20. In preparing my own translations I l e a r n e d something from each of t h e s e t r a n s l a t i o n s , a n d especially f r o m Bill R e h g ' s t r a n s l a t i o n of H a b e r m a s ' s Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, t o w h i c h this b o o k is a c o m p a n i o n v o l u m e . I
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a m i n d e b t e d to P a b l o D e Greiff, Vic P e t e r s o n , a n d Bill R e h g for s u g g e s t i o n s o n various c h a p t e r s , a n d especially to J i i r g e n H a b e r m a s w h o w e n t t h r o u g h a c o m p l e t e draft a n d m a d e m a n y helpful sugges tions. I n a n u m b e r of p l a c e s h e h a s also revised t h e t e x t so t h a t t h e m e a n i n g is c l e a r e r t h a n it w o u l d h a v e b e e n in a m o r e literal translation.
Preface
T h e studies c o l l e c t e d in this v o l u m e w e r e w r i t t e n since t h e a p p e a r a n c e of Faktizitdt und Geltungin 1 9 9 2 . T h e y a r e u n i t e d by a n i n t e r e s t in t h e q u e s t i o n of w h a t c o n c l u s i o n s c a n still b e d r a w n f r o m t h e universalistic c o n t e n t of r e p u b l i c a n p r i n c i p l e s , i n p a r t i c u l a r for plu ralistic societies in w h i c h m u l t i c u l t u r a l conflicts a r e b e c o m i n g m o r e a c u t e , for nation-states t h a t a r e c o a l e s c i n g i n t o s u p r a n a t i o n a l u n i t s , a n d for t h e citizens of a w o r l d society w h o h a v e b e e n d r a w n u n b e k n o w n s t to t h e m s e l v e s i n t o a n i n v o l u n t a r y risk society. I n P a r t I, I d e f e n d t h e r a t i o n a l c o n t e n t of a m o r a l i t y b a s e d o n e q u a l r e s p e c t for e v e r y b o d y a n d o n t h e universal solidarity a n d responsibility of e a c h for all. P o s t m o d e r n suspicion of a n indiscrimi n a t e l y assimilating a n d h o m o g e n i z i n g universalism fails to g r a s p t h e m e a n i n g of this m o r a l i t y a n d i n t h e h e a t of c o n t r o v e r s y o b l i t e r a t e s t h e r e l a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of o t h e r n e s s a n d d i f f e r e n c e t h a t universal ism, p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d , precisely takes i n t o a c c o u n t . I n The Theory of Communicative Action I set f o r t h t h e basic c o n c e p t s i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e y reveal t h e possibility of c o n d i t i o n s of life t h a t e s c a p e t h e false o p p o j s i t i i m J ^ e n ^ " Gesellschaft" b e t w e e n " c o m m u n i t y " a n d "society." T h e c o u n t e r p a r t to this social-theoretical p r o g r a m in m o r a l a n d legal t h e o r y is a universalism t h a t is h i g h l y sensitive to differences. E q u a l r e s p e c t for everyone is n o t l i m i t e d to t h o s e w h o a r e like us; it e x t e n d s to t h e p e r s o n of t h e o t h e r in his o r h e r o t h e r n e s s . A n d solidarity with t h e o t h e r as one of us re fers to t h e flexibkj^'^of^^ substontive 1
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d e t e r m i n a t i o n s a n d e x t e n d s its p e r m e a b l e b o u n d a r i e s ever further. T h i s ( m ^ g r c o m r n u n r r y ^ c o n s t i t u t e s itself solely by way of t h e negative i d e a of a b o l i s h i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d h a r m a n d of e x t e n d m ^ r e l a t i o n s of m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n t o i n c l u d e m a r g i n a l i z e d m e n a n d w o m e n . T h e c o m m u n i t y t h u s constructively o u d i n e d is n o t a collec tive t h a t w o u l d force its h o m o g e n i z e d m e m b e r s t o affirm its distinct iveness. H e r e i n c l u s i o n d o e s n o t imply l o c k i n g m e m b e r s i n t o a c o m m u n i t y t h a t closes itself off f r o m o t h e r s . T h e "inclusion of t h e o t h e r " m e a n s r a t h e r t h a t t h e b o u n d a r i e s of t h e c o m m u n i t y a r e o p e n for all, also j u i d jaostjesrjecially for t h o s e w h o a r e s t r a n g e r s to o n e an^^ — P a r t II c o n t a i n s a d e b a t e with J o h n Rawls w h i c h t o o k p l a c e at t h e invitation of t h e e d i t o r s a n d p u b l i s h e r s of The Journal of Philosophy. I n m y c o n t r i b u t i o n I a r g u e t h a t d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y is b e t t e r a b l e to c o n c e p t u a l i z e t h e m o r a l i n t u i t i o n s t h a t i n f o r m b o t h Rawls's a n d m y work. My reply also a t t e m p t s to clarify t h e differences b e t w e e n p o litical liberalism a n d m y u n d e r s t a n d i n g of^Kantian r e p u b l i c a n i s m ) P a r t III a t t e m p t s to s h e d l i g h t o n a c o n t r o v e r s y t h a t h a s flared u p o n c e a g a i n in G e r m a n y since r e u n i f i c a t i o n . H e r e I take a s t e p fur t h e r a l i n e of a r g u m e n t I originally d e v e l o p e d in t h e essay "Citizen s h i p a n d N a t i o n a l Identity." T h e r o m a n t i c a l l y i n s p i r e d i d e a of t h e n a t i o n as a n ethnically b a s e d c o m m u n i t y of c u l t u r e a n d historical destiny t h a t m a y claim to exist as a n i n d e p e n d e n t state c o n t i n u e s to p r o v i d e s u p p o r t t o s u c h q u e s t i o n a b l e a t t i t u d e s as t h e a p p e a l t o a n a l l e g e d r i g h t of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g h o s tility t o w a r d m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m a n d a politics of h u m a n r i g h t s , a n d a distrust of t h e transfer of sovereignty r i g h t s t o s u p r a n a t i o n a l o r g a n i zations. T h e d e f e n d e r s of t h e e t h n i c n a t i o n (Volksnation) o v e r l o o k t h e fact t h a t we c a n take as o u r g u i d e precisely t h e impressive his torical a c h i e v e m e n t s of t h e d e m o c r a t i c n a t i o n state a n d its r e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s in d e a l i n g with t h e p r o b l e m s c u r r e n t l y p o s e d by t h e i n e x o r a b l e shift t o p o s t n a t i o n a l f o r m s of society. 2
P a r t IV deals with t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of h u m a n r i g h t s at b o t h t h e g l o b a l a n d t h e d o m e s t i c level. T h e b i c e n t e n n i a l of K a n t ' s essay o n perpetual peace is a suitable o c c a s i o n for revising his c o n c e p t i o n of c o s m o p o l i t a n law (Weltbiirgerrecht) in light of o u r s u b s e q u e n t histori cal e x p e r i e n c e s . T h e o n c e sovereign states h a v e l o n g since forfeited
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t h e p r e s u m p t i o n of i n n o c e n c e c o n f e r r e d o n t h e m by i n t e r n a t i o n a l law (Volkerrecht) a n d c a n n o l o n g e r a p p e a l to t h e p r i n c i p l e of n o n i n t e r f e r e n c e i n t h e i r i n t e r n a l affairs. T h e c h a l l e n g e of m u l t i c u l t u r a l ism is precisely a n a l o g o u s t o t h e q u e s t i o n of h u m a n i t a r i a n i n t e r v e n t i o n . H e r e t o o m i n o r i t i e s seek p r o t e c t i o n f r o m t h e i r o w n g o v e r n m e n t s . B u t in t h e case of m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m , d i s c r i m i n a t i o n takes p l a c e w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of a b r o a d l y l e g i t i m a t e constitu t i o n a l state a n d takes t h e m o r e s u b t l e f o r m of d o m i n a t i o n by a majority c u l t u r e t h a t h a s m e r g e d with t h e g e n e r a l political c u l t u r e . However, a g a i n s t C h a r l e s Taylor's c o m m u n i t a r i a n p r o p o s a l , I a r g u e t h a t a "politics of r e c o g n i t i o n , " w h i c h is s u p p o s e d t o e n s u r e t h e e q u a l r i g h t of different s u b c u l t u r e s a n d f o r m s of life to coexist w i t h i n a single r e p u b l i c a n polity, m u s t reject collective r i g h t s a n d survival g u a r a n t e e s . I n P a r t V, I review s o m e basic a s s u m p t i o n s of t h e discourset h e o r e t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of d e m o c r a c y a n d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state. I n particular, this u n d e r s t a n d i n g of deliberative politics allows a n ac c o u n t of t h e co-originality of p o p u l a r sovereignty a n d h u m a n rights.
How Rational Is the Authority of the Ought?
1 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content * of Morality
i If m o r a l s t a t e m e n t s o r u t t e r a n c e s c a n b e justified, t h e n t h e y have a cognitive c o n t e n t . T h u s if we w a n t to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r m o r a l i t y h a s a cognitive c o n t e n t we m u s t e x a m i n e w h a t it m e a n s to justify s o m e t h i n g morally. I n so d o i n g we m u s t d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t h e theoretical q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r m o r a l u t t e r a n c e s i n d e e d e x p r e s s k n o w l e d g e a n d , if so, h o w t h e y c a n b e justified, a n d t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n of w h a t cognitive m e a n i n g t h o s e w h o partici p a t e in m o r a l conflicts t h e m s e l v e s associate with t h e i r u t t e r a n c e s . I will u s e t h e t e r m " m o r a l justification" in t h e first i n s t a n c e in a descriptive m a n n e r t o refer t o t h e r u d i m e n t a r y p r a c t i c e of justifica t i o n w h i c h h a s its. p r o p e r p l a c e in t h e everyday i n t e r a c t i o n s of t h e lifeworld. I n everyday c o n t e x t s we m a k e s t a t e m e n t s t h r o u g h w h i c h we d e m a n d c e r t a i n c o n d u c t of o t h e r s (i.e., h o l d t h e m to a n o b l i g a t i o n ) , c o m m i t ourselves to a c o u r s e of a c t i o n ( i n c u r a n o b l i g a t i o n ) , re p r o a c h ourselves o r o t h e r s , a d m i t mistakes, m a k e excuses, offer to m a k e a m e n d s , a n d so f o r t h . O n this first level, m o r a l u t t e r a n c e s serve t o c o o r d i n a t e t h e a c t i o n s of different a c t o r s i n a b i n d i n g o r o b l i g a t o r y fashion. " O b l i g a t i o n " p r e s u p p o s e s t h e intersubjective rec o g n i t i o n of m o r a l n o r m s o r c u s t o m a r y p r a c t i c e s t h a t lay d o w n for a c o m m u n i t y in a convincing mannerwhat ^actors a r e o b l i g e d to d o a n d w h a t t h e y c a n e x p e c t f r o m o n e a n o t h e r . "In a c o n v i n c i n g m a n n e r "
4 Chapter 1
m e a n s t h a t t h e m e m b e r s of a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y a p p e a l t o t h e s e n o r m s w h e n e v e r t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n of a c t i o n b r e a k s d o w n a n d p f e s e n t t h e m as p r i m a facie c o n v i n c i n g r e a s o n s for claims a n d critical p o s i t i o n s . M o r a l u t t e r a n c e s a r e m a d e a g a i n s t a b a c k g r o u n d of p o t e n tial reasons o n w h i c h we c a n d r a w i n m o r a l d i s p u t e s . M o r a l r u l e s o p e r a t e i n a reflexive m a n n e r ; t h e i r p o w e r t o c o o r d i n a t e a c t i o n is c o n f i r m e d o n two i n t e r c o n n e c t e d levels of i n t e r a c t i o n . O n t h e first level, t h e y r e g u l a t e social a c t i o n i m m e d ^ e l y j b y ^ i n d t h e m i l of a c t o r s a n d o r i e n t i n g it in a p a r t i c u l a r way; o n t h e s e c o n d level, t h e y g o v e r n t h e critical p o s i t i o n s a c t o r s a d o p t when, conflicts arise. T h e m o r a l i t y of a c o m m u n i t y n o t only lays d o w n h o w its m e m b e r s s h o u l d act; it also ( p r o v i d e s g r o u n d s : for t h e c o n s e n s u a l r e s o l u t i o n of r e l e v a n t conflicts. To t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e b e l o n g d i s a g r e e m e n t s t h a t c a n b e resolved c o n v i n c i n g l y f r o m t h e p e r s p e c tive of p a r t i c i p a n t s o n t h e basis of p o t e n t i a l justifications t h a t a r e equally accessible t o all. Sociologically s p e a k i n g , m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s r e c o m m e n d t h e m s e l v e s by t h e i r i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n to t h e g e n t l e , p e r suasive force of r e a s o n s as a n a l t e r n a t i v e to strategic, t h a t is, coercive o r m a n i p u l a t i v e , f o r m s of conflict r e s o l u t i o n . To p u t it a n o t h e r way, if m o r a l i t y d i d n o t possess a c r e d i b l e cognitive c o n t e n t for m e m b e r s of t h e corrmaimity, it w o u l d h a v e no^^\^^ge_Q^j^o}^v more costly f o r m s of a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n ( s u c h as t h e u s e of d i r e c t force, o r t h e exercise of i n f l u e n c e t h r o u g h t h e t h r e a t of s a n c t i o n s o r t h e p r o m i s e of r e w a r d s ) . 9
W h e n we e x a m i n e m o r a l d i s a g r e e m e n t s , we m u s £ ^ c l u d £ ^ f f e c t i y e , r e a c t i o n s in t h e class of m o r a l u t t e r a n c e s . T h e key c o n c e p t of oblig a t i o n refers n o t only t o t h e c o n t e n t of m o r a l i n j u n c t i o n s b u t in a d d i t i o n t o t h e p e c u l i a r c h a r a c t e r of m o r a l validity (Sollgeltung) w h i c h is also r e f l e c t e d i n t h e feeling of b e i n g o b l i g a t e d . T h e critical a n d self-critical s t a n c e s we a d o p t t o w a r d t r a n s g r e s s i o n s find e x p r e s sion in affective a t t i t u d e s : f r o m t h e t h i r d p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e , i n a b h o r r e n c e , i n d i g n a t i o n , a n d c o n t e m p t , f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h o s e affected, in feelings of violation o r r e s e n t m e n t t o w a r d s e c o n d p e r s o n s , a n d f r o m t h e first p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e , in s h a m e a n d g u i l t . To t h e s e c o r r e s p o n d t h e positive e m o t i o n a l r e a c t i o n s of a d m i r a t i o n , loyalty, g r a t i t u d e , etc. B e c a u s e t h e y e x p r e s s i m p l i c i t j u d g m e n t s , t h e s e feelings in w h i c h a c t o r s e x p r e s s t h e i r p r o a n d c o n a t t i t u d e s a r e 1
5 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality
c o r r e l a t e d with evaluations. We j u d g e a c t i o n s a n d i n t e n t i o n s to b e " g o o d " o r "bad," w h e r e a s o u r t e r m s for virtues refer to p e r s o n a l qualities of a g e n t s . T h e claim t h a t m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a d m i t of justification also reveals itself in t h e s e m o r a l feelings a n d evaluations, for t h e y differ f r o m o t h e r feelings a n d evaluations i n . b e i n ^ j i i e d to o b l i g a t i o n s t h a t f u n c t i o n as r e a s o n s . We d o n o t r e g a r d t h e m as t h e ' e x p r e s s i o n of m e r e s e n t i m e n t s a n d p r e f e r e n c e s . F r o m t h e fact t h a t m o r a l n o r m s a r e "valid" for t h e m e m b e r s of a c o m m u n i t y it d o e s n o t follow, of c o u r s e , t h a t t h e y h a v e intrinsic cognitive c o n t e n t . A sociological o b s e r v e r m a y b e a b l e to d e s c r i b e a m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e as a social fact, a n d even to e x p l a i n why m e m b e r s a r e " c o n v i n c e d " of t h e i r m o r a l r u l e s , w i t h o u t h i m s e l f b e i n g in a p o s i t i o n t o give a p l a u s i b l e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e i r r e a s o n s a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . B u t a p h i l o s o p h e r c a n n o t r e m a i n c o n t e n t with this. H e will p u r s u e t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g y of t h e r e l e v a n t m o r a l disagree m e n t s f u r t h e r i n o r d e r to c o m p r e h e n d w h a t m e m b e r s of t h e c o m m u n i t y d o w h e n t h e y justify s o m e t h i n g m o r a l l y . O f c o u r s e , " c o m p r e h e n d " h e r e m e a n s s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n simply " u n d e r g B £ t i g " u t t e r a n c e s . Reflective r e c o n s t r u c t i o n oTtKe everyday p r a c tice of justification i n w h i c h we ourselves p a r t i c i p a t e as l a y p e r s o n s p e r m i t s r e c o n s t r u c t i v e t r a n s l a t i o n s t h a t foster critical u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I n this m e t h o d o l o g i c a l a t t i t u d e t h e p h i l o s o p h e r e x t e n d s from within t h e p a r t i c i p a n t p e r s p e c t i v e b e y o n d t h e circle of immediate participants. j. T h e results of s u c h efforts c a n b e g a u g e d by e x a m i n i n g m o d e r n p r o g r a m s i n m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y . T h e s e t h e o r i e s differ in t h e i r d e g r e e s of h e r m e n e u t i c o p e n n e s s . T h e i r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s of t h e cognitive c o n t e n t of o u r everyday m o r a l i n t u i t i o n s a r e m o r e o r less c o m p r e h e n s i v e to t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y a r e sensitive to t h e intuitive m o r a l , k n o w l e d g e of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s . Strong noncognitivism tries to u n m a s k t h e p r e s u m e d cognitive con t e n t of m o r a l l a n g u a g e i n g e n e r a l as a n illusion. It a t t e m p t s to show t h a t b e h i n d t h e u t t e r a n c e s t h a t a p p e a r to p a r t i c i p a n t s as m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a n d stances t h a t a d m i t of justification, t h e r e l u r k m e r e feelings, a t t i t u d e s , a n d decisions. Utilitarianism, w h i c h traces t h e " b i n d i n g " force of (evaluative o r i e n t a t i o n s ^ a n d o b l i g a t i o n s b a c k to p r e f e r e n c e s , arrives at revisionist d e s c r i p t i o n s similar to t h o s e of 2
3
st
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6 Chapter 1
n o n c o g n i t i v i s t views s u c h as emotivism (e.g., t h a t of S t e v e n s o n ) a n d d e c i s i o n i s m (e.g., t h a t of P o p p e r o r t h e early H a r e ) . B u t in c o n t r a s t with s t r o n g n o n c o g n i t i v i s m , u t i l i t a r i a n i s m r e p l a c e s t h e unreflective m o r a l s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p a r t i c i p a n t s with a utility c a l c u l a t i o n u n d e r t a k e n f r o m a n o b s e r v e r ' s p o i n t of view a n d t h e r e b y p r o v i d e s a m o r a l - t h e o r e t i c a l justification of t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e . I n this r e s p e c t t h e r e is a n affinity b e t w e e n u t i l i t a r i a n i s m a n d f o r m s of weak noncognitivism t h a t t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of m o r a l l y acting subjects, w h e t h e r by r e f e r e n c e t o m o r a l feelings (as in t h e t r a d i t i o n of Scottish m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y ) o r by r e f e r e n c e to a n o r i e n t a t i o n to a c c e p t e d n o r m s (as in H o b b e s i a n c o n t r a c t u a l i s m ) . However, t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of ( m o r a l l y judging subjects) suc c u m b s to revision. O n s u c h a c c o u n t s , t h e s u p p o s e d l y objectively g r o u n d e d p o s i t i o n s a n d j u d g m e n t s of m o r a l l y j u d g i n g subjects i n fact m e r e l y e x p r e s s r a t i o n a l motives, b e t h e y feelings o r interests, justified in a p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l m a n n e r . Weak cognitivism leaves i n t a c t t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e every day p r a c t i c e of m o r a l justification to t h e e x t e n t t h a t it ascribes a n e p i s t e m i c status to " s t r o n g " evaluations. Reflection o n w h a t is " g o o d " for m e (or for us) all t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d o r o n w h a t is " a u t h o r i t a t i v e " for m y ( o r for o u r ) consciously p u r s u e d life-plan o p e n s u p a f o r m of r a t i o n a l a s s e s s m e n t of evaluative o r i e n t a t i o n s (in t h e spirit of Aristotle o r K i e r k e g a a r d ) . W h a t in e a c h i n s t a n c e is valuable o r a u t h e n t i c forces itself u p o n us, so to speak, a n d differs f r o m m e r e p r e f e r e n c e s in its b i n d i n g character, t h a t is, in t h e fact t h a t it p o i n t s b e y o n d n e e d s a n d p r e f e r e n c e s . However, t h e intuitive u n d e r s t a n d i n g of j u s t i c e u n d e r g o e s revision o n this view. F r o m t h e p e r spective of e a c h individual's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d , j u s t i c e , w h i c h is t a i l o r e d t o i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , a p p e a r s as j u s t o n e value a m o n g o t h e r s (however p r o n o u n c e d ) , n o t as a c o n t e x t - i n d e p e n d e n t s t a n d a r d of i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t . U Strong cognitivism seeks in a d d i t i o n to take a c c o u n t of t h e categori cal validity claim of m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s . It a t t e m p t s t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e cognitive c o n t e n t of t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e across its full s c o p e . T h e K a n t i a n t r a d i t i o n , u n l i k e neo-Aristotelianism, is n o t j u s t c o n c e r n e d with clarifying a p r a c t i c e of m o r a l justification t h a t u n f o l d s within t h e h o r i z o n of r e c e i v e d n o r m s , b u t seeks to justify a m o r a l
7 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality
p o i n t of view f r o m w h i c h s u c h n o r m s c a n t h e m s e l v e s b e j u d g e d in a n i m p a r t i a l fashion. I n this t r a d i t i o n , m o r a l t h e o r y g r o u n d s t h e possibility of m o r a l justification by r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e p o i n t of view t h a t m e m b e r s of p o s t t r a d i t i o n a l _ s o c i e t i e s t h e m s e l v e s intuitively a d o p t w h e n t h e y find t h a t t h e y m u s t a p p e a l t o r e a s o n s t o justify p r o b l e m a t i c m o r a l n o r m s . B u t in c o n t r a s t with e m p i r i c i s t varieties of c o n t r a c t u a l i s m , this view h o l d s t h a t t h e s e r e a s o n s a r e n o t c o n c e i v e d as agent-relative motives, t h e r e b y leaving t h e e p i s t e m i c c o r e of m o r a l validity intact. I n w h a t follows I first d e s c r i b e t h e historical s i t u a t i o n in w h i c h m o r a l i t y loses its religious f o u n d a t i o n (II). T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n p r o v i d e s t h e b a c k g r o u n d for a g e n e a l o g i c a l e x p l o r a t i o n of t h e two variants of classical e m p i r i c i s m (III), two i n t e r e s t i n g a t t e m p t s to r e h a b i l i t a t e t h e e m p i r i c i s t p r o g r a m ( I V - V ) , a n d t h e two t r a d i t i o n s t h a t o r i g i n a t e with Aristotle (VI) a n d K a n t (VII), respectively. We a r e t h e n in a p o s i t i o n to e x a m i n e two systematic q u e s t i o n s : W h i c h m o r a l intui t i o n s a d m i t of r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ? (VIII) a n d c a n t h e discourset h e o r e t i c a l s t a n d p o i n t itself b e justified? (IX)
T h e various a t t e m p t s t h a t h a v e b e e n m a d e to e x p l i c a t e t h e " m o r a l p o i n t of view" r e m i n d us that, after t h e b r e a k d o w n of a universally valid "catholic" worldview a n d with t h e s u b s e q u e n t t r a n s i t i o n to pluralistic societies, m o r a l c o m m a n d s c a n n o l o n g e r b e publicly justified f r o m f C t r a n s c e n d e n t G o d ' s eye p o i n t of view) F r o m this latter v a n t a g e p o i n t b e y o n d t h e w o r l d , t h e w o r l d c o u l d b e objectified as a^ w h o l e . T h e m o r a l p o i n t of view is s u p p o s e d to r e c o n s t r u c t this p e r s p e c t i v e w i t h i n t h e w o r l d itself, t h a t is, w i t h i n t h e b o u n d a r i e s of' ^our intersubjectively s h a r e d w o r l d , while p r e s e r v i n g t h e possibility of d i s t a n c i n g ourselves f r o m t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e , a n d h e n c e t h e u n i versality of t h e w o r l d - e n c o m p a s s i n g viewpoint. T h i s shift in p e r s p e c tive to a " t r a n s c e n d e n c e f r o m w i t h i n " raises t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e specific b i n d i n g force of n o r m s a n d values c a n b e g r o u n d e d in th^__subjective f r e e d o m a n d j J i e p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n of h u m a n b e i n g s f o r s a k e n by G o d — a n d , if so, h o w t h e p e c u l i a r a u t h o r i t y of t h e m o r a l o u g h t is t h e r e b y t r a n s f o r m e d . I n t h e secular societies of t h e West, 4
(
8 Chapter 1
everyday m o r a l i n t u i t i o n s a r e still s h a p e d by t h e n o r m a t i v e s u b s t a n c e of so to s p e a k d e c a p i t a t e d , legally privatized, jreligious t r a d i t i o n s , in p a r t i c u l a r by t h e c o n t e n t s of t h e H e b r e w m o r a l i t y of j u s t i c e i n t h e O l d T e s t a m e n t a n d t h e C h r i s t i a n ethics of love in t h e N e w Testa m e n t . T h e s e c o n t e n t s a r e t r a n s m i t t e d by p r o c e s s e s of socialization, t h o u g h often only implicitly a n d u n d e r different titles. T h u s a m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y t h a t views its task as o n e of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g everyday m o r a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s is faced with t h e c h a l l e n g e of e x a m i n i n g h o w m u c h of this s u b s t a n c e c a n b e rationally justified. T h e biblically t r a n s m i t t e d p r o p h e t i c d o c t r i n e s f u r n i s h e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a n d r e a s o n s t h a t i m b u e d m o r a l n o r m s with t h e p o w e r to g e n e r a t e p u b l i c a g r e e m e n t ; t h e y e x p l a i n e d why G o d ' s c o m m a n d s a r e n o t a r b i t r a r y i n j u n c t i o n s b u t c a n claim validity in a cognitive sense. L e t u s a s s u m e t h e r e is n o f u n c t i o n a l e q u i v a l e n t for m o r a l i t y u n d e r m o d e r n c o n d i t i o n s either, a n d h e n c e t h a t t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e c a n n o t b e r e p l a c e d b y a _ s y s t e m of p u r e l y b e h a v i o r a l c o n t r o l s w h i c h a r e also s e e n as s u c h . T h e n t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y a t t e s t e d cognitive validity of m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a n d p o s i t i o n s p o s e s t h e p r o b l e m of w h e t h e r t h e p o w e r of a c c e p t e d values a n d n o r m s to g e n e r a t e r a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t m a y n o t b e a f o r m of ( t r a n s c e n d e n t a l illusior^, o r w h e t h e r it c a n still b e justified even u n d e r p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n d i tions. M o r a l p h i l o s o p h y d o e s n o t itself have to p r o v i d e t h e r e a s o n s a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t h a t , in secularized societies, take t h e p l a c e of t h e (at least publicly) d e v a l u e d religious r e a s o n s a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ; b u t it w o u l d h a v e to identify t h e k i n d s of r e a s o n s a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t h a t c a n l e n d t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e sufficient r a t i o n a l force even w i t h o u t t h e b a c k i n g of r e l i g i o n . W i t h r e g a r d to this g e n e a l o g i c a l p r o b l e m a t i c , I w o u l d like, first, to recall t h e m o n o t h e i s t i c f o u n d a t i o n of t h e validity of o u r m o r a l n o r m s (1) a n d , s e c o n d , to specify in g r e a t e r detail t h e c h a l l e n g e p o s e d by t h e m o d e r n historical situ ation (2). (1) T h e b i b l e g r o u n d s m o r a l c o m m a n d s in t h e r e v e a l e d w o r d of G o d . T h e s e c o m m a n d s a r e to b e o b e y e d u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y b e c a u s e they a r e b a c k e d by t h e a u t h o r i t y of a n o m n i p o t e n t G o d . B u t if t h a t w e r e t h e only s o u r c e of t h e i r authority, t h e i r validity w o u l d m e r e l y have t h e c h a r a c t e r of a "must" (Mussen), as a reflection of t h e u n l i m i t e d p o w e r of a sovereign: G o d c a n c o m p e l o b e d i e n c e . B u t this
9 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality
voluntaristic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n d o e s n o t yet e n d o w n o r m a t i v e validity with any cognitive significance. It first a c q u i r e s a cognitive m e a n i n g w h e n m o r a l c o m m a n d s a r e i n t e r p r e t e d as e x p r e s s i o n s of t h e will of a n all-knowing a n d c o m p l e t e l y just and loving G o d . M o r a l c o m m a n d s d o n o t s p r i n g f r o m t h e free c h o i c e of a n A l m i g h t y b u t a r e t h e e x p r e s s i o n s of t h e will of a n all-wise C r e a t o r a n d a n all-just a n d loving R e d e e m e r . We c a n distinguish two different o r d e r s of r e a s o n s for t h e r e s p e c t w o r t h i n e s s of t h e divine c o m m a n d s : m e t a p h y s i c a l (ontotheologisch) r e a s o n s g r o u n d e d in t h e o r d e r of c r e a t i o n a n d soteriological r e a s o n s r o o t e d in t h e (divinely o r d a i n e d ) h i s t o r y of salvation. Metaphysical justification a p p e a l s to a w o r l d o r d e r t h a t owes its e x i s t e n c e to t h e wise legislation of t h e Creator. It a c c o r d s h u m a n b e i n g s a n d t h e h u m a n c o m m u n i t y a privileged status w i t h i n c r e a t i o n a n d t h e r e b y e n d o w s t h e m with a "calling." C r e a t i o n i s t m e t a p h y s i c s gives c u r r e n c y to t h e c o n c e p t i o n of n a t u r a l law u n d e r l y i n g cosmologically g r o u n d e d e t h i c a l systems w h i c h is also familiar f r o m t h e i m p e r s o n a l worldviews of t h e Asiatic r e l i g i o n s a n d of G r e e k p h i l o s o phy. O n s u c h e t h i c a l c o n c e p t i o n s , t h i n g s a r e essentially e n d o w e d with teleological significance. H u m a n b e i n g s a r e also p a r t of t h e o r d e r of B e i n g a n d c a n d e d u c e f r o m it w h a t t h e y a r e a n d w h a t t h e y o u g h t to b e . I n this way t h e r a t i o n a l c o n t e n t of m o r a l laws receives o n t o l o g i c a l c o n f i r m a t i o n f r o m t h e r a t i o n a l o r d e r of B e i n g as a w h o l e . T h e soteriological justification of m o r a l c o m m a n d s , by c o n t r a s t , a p p e a l s to t h e j u s t i c e a n d g o o d n e s s of a R e d e e m e r ; at t h e e n d of t i m e h e will fulfill his p r o m i s e of salvation w h i c h is c o n t i n g e n t o n o n e ' s l e a d i n g a m o r a l o r lawful life. H e is J u d g e a n d R e d e e m e r in o n e p e r s o n . I n l i g h t of his c o m m a n d s , G o d j u d g e s e a c h p e r s o n ' s life in a c c o r d a n c e with his j u s t d e s e r t s . H i s j u s t i c e e n s u r e s t h a t his j u d g m e n t will b e c o n s o n a n t with t h e u n i q u e life h i s t o r y of e a c h individ ual, while at t h e s a m e t i m e his g o o d n e s s allows for h u m a n fallibility a n d for t h e sinfulness of h u m a n n a t u r e . M o r a l c o m m a n d s a c q u i r e a r a t i o n a l m e a n i n g b b t h f r o m t h e fact t h a t t h e y p o i n t t h e way to p e r s o n a l salvation a n d f r o m t h e fact t h a t t h e y a r e a p p l i e d in a n impartial manner. To b e s u r e , s p e a k i n g of " m o r a l c o m m a n d s " is m i s l e a d i n g in t h a t t h e p a t h to salvation is n o t p r e d e t e r m i n e d by a system of r u l e s b u t
10, Chapter 1
.
by a divinely a u t h o r i z e d way of life t h a t we a r e e n j o i n e d to e m u l a t e . T h i s is w h a t is m e a n t , for e x a m p l e , by a n imitatio Christi, t h a t is, by following in t h e footsteps of Christ. O t h e r w o r l d religions t o o , a n d even p h i l o s o p h y with its ideals of t h e wise m a n a n d t h e vita contemplativa, distill t h e m o r a l s u b s t a n c e of t h e i r d o c t r i n e s i n t o e x e m p l a r y f o r m s of life. T h i s m e a n s t h a t in religious-metaphysical worldviews, t h e just is still i n t e r w o v e n with specific c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e good life. H o w we s h o u l d t r e a t o t h e r s in i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s is laid d o w n by a m o d e l of t h e e x e m p l a r y life. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e r e f e r e n c e to a p e r s o n a l G o d w h o sits in j u d g m e n t o n t h e destiny of e a c h i n d i v i d u a l at t h e e n d of t i m e m a k e s possible a n i m p o r t a n t d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n two aspects of morality. Every p e r s o n h a s / a j F ^ first as ,a m e m b e r of t h e c o m m u n i t y of believers with w h o m G o d h a s e n t e r e d i n t o a c o v e n a n t , a n d s e c o n d as a u n i q u e p e r s o n i n d i v i d u a t e d by his life h i s t o r y w h o c a n n o t allow h i m s e l f to b e r e p r e s e n t e d (vertreten) by a n y o n e else b e f o r e G o d . T h i s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t r u c t u r e s h a p e s o n e ' s m o r a l r e l a t i o n — m e d i a t e d by G o d — t o o n e ' s n e i g h b o r u n d e r t h e aspects of solidarity a n d of justice ( h e r e u n d e r s t o o d in t h e n a r r o w s e n s e ) . As a m e m b e r of t h e universal c o m m u n i t y of believers, I a m b o u n d by solidarity to t h e o t h e r as m y fellow, a s ^ n e 6 f u s j as a n u n s u b s t i t u t a b l e (unvertretbar) individual; by c o n t r a s t , I owe t h e o t h e T ^ e q u a l r e s p e c t as ^^e^^^on^Sl^ p e r s o n s w h o , as u n i q u e individuals, e x p e c t to b e t r e a t e d justly. T h e "solidarity" g r o u n d e d in m e m b e r s h i p recalls t h e social b o n d t h a t u n i t e s all p e r s o n s : o n e p e r s o n s t a n d s in for t h e o t h e r . T h e u n c o m p r o m i s i n g e g a l i t a r i a n i s m of "justice," by c o n t r a s t , calls for sensitivity to t h e differences t h a t set e a c h individual a p a r t f r o m o t h e r s : e a c h p e r s o n d e m a n d s t h a t o t h e r s r e s p e c t h i m in his o t h e r n e s s . T h e Jhadaeo-Christian t r a d i t i o n rejraMsjsolida^ they p r o v i d e 5
two different perspectives o n t h e s a m e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s t r u c t u r e . (2) W i t h t h e t r a n s i t i o n to a p l u r a l i s m of worldviews i n m o d e r n society, r e l i g i o n a n d t h e e t h o s r o o t e d in it d i s i n t e g r a t e as a public basis of a morality s h a r e d by all. At a n y r a t e , t h e validity of universally binding m o r a l r u l e s c a n n o l o n g e r b e a c c o u n t e d for in t e r m s of reasons a n d interpretations that presuppose the existence a n d the a g e n c y of a t r a n s c e n d e n t C r e a t o r a n d R e d e e m e r . As a c o n s e q u e n c e , t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l validation of objectively r a t i o n a l m o r a l laws loses
11 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality
its force, a n d with it t h e soteriological c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e i r j u s t a p p l i c a t i o n a n d t h e objectively d e s i r a b l e g o o d of salvation. M o r e over, t h e d e v a l u a t i o n of m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n c e p t s ( a n d t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g c a t e g o r y of e x p l a n a t i o n s ) is also c o n n e c t e d with a d i s p l a c e m e n t of e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y f r o m religious d o c t r i n e s t o t h e e m p i r i c a l scii e n c e s . W i t h t h e dissolution of m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n c e p t s of essences, t h e i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n assertoric s t a t e m e n t s a n d c o r r e s p o n d i n g expressive, evaluative, a n d n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s also dissolves. ^ p i a t is "objectively r a t i o n a l " c a n b e justified only as l o n g as t h e j u s t a n d t h e g o o d a r e g r o u n d e d i n a n o r m a t i v e l y i m b u e d B e i n g itself; a n d w h a t is "objectively d e s i r a b l e " c a n b e justified only as l o n g as t h e teleology of t h e h i s t o r y of salvation g u a r a n t e e s t h e realization of t h e state of p e r f e c t j u s t i c e t h a t also involves ^ c o n c r e t e g o o d . I n this n e w situation, m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y d e p e n d s o n a j^gosF r n e t a p j ^ k a U e y e l ofjustification?] T h i s m e a n s i n t h e first p l a c e that, as r e g a r d s its m e t h o d , it m u s t r e n o u n c e t h e G o d ' s eye viewpoint; as r e g a r d s its c o n t e n t , it c a n n o l o n g e r a p p e a l t o t h e o r d e r of c r e a t i o n a n d sacred history; a n d , as regards its theoretical a p p r o a c h , it c a n n o t a p p e a l to {metaphysical c o n c e p t s of essence^tib^Fundercut t h e logi cal distinctions b e t w e e n different types of i l l o c u t i o n a r y u t t e r a n c e s . M o r a l p h i l o s o p h y m u s t justify t h e cognitive validity of m o r a l j u d g m e n t s a n d p o s i t i o n s w i t h o u t drawing o n t h e s e r e s o u r c e s . F o u r r e s p o n s e s t o this situation strike m e as t o o i m p l a u s i b l e t o m e r i t f u r t h e r discussion: 6
• M o r a l realism a t t e m p t s t o r e h a b i l i t a t e t h e o n t o l o g i c a l justification of n o r m s a n d values with p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l m e a n s . I t d e f e n d s t h e i d e a t h a t we c a n have cognitive access t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d t h a t h a s t h e p e c u l i a r p o w e r t o o r i e n t o u r desires a n d t o b i n d o u r wills. Since this n o r m a t i v e s o u r c e c a n n o l o n g e r b e e x p l a i n e d i n t e r m s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e , t h e p r o b l e m shifts t o t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l level: a m o d e of e x p e r i e n c e a n a l o g o u s t o p e r c e p t i o n — a n intuitive g r a s p o r ideal i n t u i t i o n of y a l u g s — m u s t b e postu l a t e d as t h e basis of value j u d g m e n t s w h i c h a r e assimilated t o factual statements. 7
• W h i l e utilitarianism d o e s offer a p r i n c i p l e i n t e r m s of w h i c h m o r a l j u d g m e n t s c a n b e justified, its o r i e n t a t i o n t o t h e a n t i c i p a t e d ag g r e g a t e utility of a c o u r s e of a c t i o n d o e s n o t p e r m i t a n a d e q u a t e
12 Chapter 1
r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e m e a n i n g of n o r m a t i v i t y in g e n e r a l . I n p a r t i c u lar, u t i l i t a r i a n i s m fails to g r a s p t h e individualistic m e a n i n g of a m o rality b a s e d o n e q u a l r e s p e c t for e v e r y o n e . • As we have s e e n , m e t a e t h i c a l skepticism leads to revisionist d e scriptions of t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e t h a t lose t o u c h with t h e participants' self-understanding. They c a n n o t explain what they are t r y i n g to e x p l a i n , namely, everyday m o r a l practices, w h i c h w o u l d b r e a k d o w n if t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s t h o u g h t t h a t t h e i r m o r a l d i s p u t e s d i d n o t h a v e a n y cognitive c o n t e n t . 8
• M o r a l f u n c t i o n a l i s m is n o t traditionalistic in t h e sense t h a t it re verts to p r e m o d e r n m o d e s of justification. It invokes t h e a u t h o r i t y of u p r o o t e d religious t r a d i t i o n s for t h e i r positive effects in stabilizing m o r a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s . B u t a f u n c t i o n a l justification of m o r a l i t y u n d e r t a k e n f r o m t h e o b s e r v e r p e r s p e c t i v e n o t only c a n n o t r e p l a c e t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e r e a s o n s t h a t c o n v i n c e d believers; it u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y destroys t h e cognitive c o n t e n t of a religiously g r o u n d e d m o r a l i t y by t r e a t i n g t h e e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y of belief as a mere social fact. 9
Ill T h e religious d o c t r i n e s of c r e a t i o n a n d t h e h i s t o r y of salvation p r o v i d e d e p i s t e m i c r e a s o n s for believing t h a t divine c o m m a n d s d o n o t s p r i n g f r o m b l i n d a u t h o r i t y b u t a r e r a t i o n a l o r " t r u e . " If r e a s o n n o w withdraws f r o m t h e objective r e a l m of n a t u r e o r s a c r e d h i s t o r y i n t o t h e m i n d s of a c t i n g a n d j u d g i n g subjects, t h e "objectively r a t i o n a l " r e a s o n s for m o r a l j u d g m e n t a n d a c t i o n m u s t b e r e p l a c e d by "subjec tively r a t i o n a l " r e a s o n s . O n c e t h e religious f o u n d a t i o n h a s b e e n u n d e r m i n e d , t h e cognitive c o n t e n t of t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e c a n h e n c e f o r t h b e r e c o n s t r u c t e d only o n t h e basis of t h e r e a s o n a n d t h e will of its p a r t i c i p a n t s . H e n c e "will" a n d " r e a s o n " also f o r m t h e basic c o n c e p t s of m o r a l t h e o r i e s t h a t set t h e m s e l v e s this task. W h e r e a s e m p i r i c i s m conceives of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n as t h e faculty of d e t e r m i n i n g o n e ' s c h o i c e (Willkur) by m a x i m s of p r u d e n c e , A r i s t o t e l i a n i s m a n d K a n t i a n i s m take a c c o u n t n o t only of r a t i o n a l motives b u t also of a will (Wille) t h a t is free to b i n d itself by insight. 1 0
E m p i r i c i s m identifies practical r e a s o n with i n s t r u m e n t a l r e a s o n . O n this view it is r a t i o n a l for a n a c t o r to act in o n e way a n d n o t in
13 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality
a n o t h e r if t h e ( a n t i c i p a t e d ) r e s u l t of t h e a c t i o n is in his interest, satisfies h i m o r gives h i m p l e a s u r e . I n a p a r t i c u l a r situation s u c h r e a s o n s c a r r y w e i g h t for a p a r t i c u l a r a c t o r w h o h a s specific prefer e n c e s a n d goals. We call t h e s e r e a s o n s " p r a g m a t i c " o r p r e f e r e n t i a l b e c a u s e they^n2otiTOte^aycjdons a n d , u n l i k e e p i s t e m i c r e a s o n s , d o n o t immediately support j u d g m e n t s or opinions. They provide rational motives for a c t i o n s b u t n o t for convictions. However, t h e y "affect" t h e will only to t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e a c t o r a d o p t s a c o r r e s p o n d i n g r u l e of a c t i o n . T h i s is w h a t differentiates i n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n f r o m s p o n t a n e o u s l y m o t i v a t e d a c t i o n in g e n e r a l . A n " i n t e n t i o n " is also a dispo sition; b u t , in c o n t r a s t with "inclination," it only arises t h r o u g h f r e e d o m of will, t h a t is, i n v i r t u e of t h e fact t h a t t h e a c t o r a d o p t s a r u l e of a c t i o n . A n a c t o r acts rationally w h e n h e acts o n reasonsand k n o w s why h e follows a m a x i m . E m p i r i c i s m only takes a c c o u n t of p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s , in o t h e r w o r d s , of t h e case in w h i c h a n a c t o r lets his will b e b o u n d (in K a n t ' s t e r m s ) to "rules of skill" o r "counsels of p r u d e n c e " by i n s t r u m e n t a l r e a s o n . I n this way h e obeys t h e p r i n c i p l e of i n s t r u m e n t a l rationality: " W h o e v e r wills t h e e n d , so far as r e a s o n h a s decisive i n f l u e n c e o n his a c t i o n , wills also t h e i n d i s p e n s a b l y n e c e s s a r y m e a n s to it t h a t lie in his p o w e r . " 11
T a k i n g this as t h e i r basis, t h e two classical e m p i r i c i s t p r o g r a m s a t t e m p t t o r e c o n s t r u c t a r a t i o n a l c o r e of morality. Scottish m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y takes m o r a l feelings as basic a n d conceives of m o r a l i t y as w h a t f o u n d s t h e b o n d s of solidarity t h a t u n i t e a c o m m u n i t y ( a ) . Social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y b e g i n s i m m e d i a t e l y with i n t e r e s t s a n d c o n ceives of m o r a l i t y as w h a t e n s u r e s t h a t social i n t e r a c t i o n s r e g u l a t e d by n o r m s a r e j u s t ( b ) . B o t h t h e o r i e s u l t i m a t e l y r u n u p against t h e s a m e p r o b l e m : they c a n n o t e x p l a i n t h e o b l i g a t o r y c h a r a c t e r of m o r a l d u t i e s , w h i c h p o i n t s b e y o n d t h e b i n d i n g force of p r u d e n c e , in t e r m s of r a t i o n a l motives a l o n e . (a) M o r a l a t t i t u d e s e x p r e s s feelings of a p p r o v a l a n d d i s a p p r o v a l . H u m e u n d e r s t a n d s t h e s e as t h e typical s e n t i m e n t s of a t h i r d p e r s o n w h o j u d g e s actors from a benevolent distance. Consequently an a g r e e m e n t in m o r a l j u d g m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g a p e r s o n ' s c h a r a c t e r sig nifies a c o n v e r g e n c e of feelings. Even if a p p r o v a l a n d d i s a p p r o v a l e x p r e s s s y m p a t h y a n d a n t i p a t h y a n d h e n c e a r e e m o t i o n a l in n a t u r e , it is r a t i o n a l for a n o b s e r v e r t o r e a c t in this way. F o r we e s t e e m
14 Chapter 1
s o m e o n e as v i r t u o u s if h e shows h i m s e l f to b e useful a n d a g r e e a b l e to u s a n d o u r friends. Moreover, this display of s y m p a t h y fills t h e v i r t u o u s p e r s o n with p r i d e a n d satisfaction, w h e r e a s b l a m e p a i n s t h e o n e w h o is r e p r o a c h e d a n d o c c a s i o n s h i m d i s p l e a s u r e . T h u s t h e r e a r e p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s even for altruistic a c t i o n : b e n e v o l e n c e t h a t m e e t s with t h e a p p r o v a l of o t h e r s gives satisfaction t o t h e useful a n d a g r e e a b l e p e r s o n himself. T h e s e affective dispositions p r o v i d e t h e basis u p o n w h i c h t h e socially integrative p o w e r of m u t u a l t r u s t c a n unfold. However, t h e s e p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s for m o r a l a t t i t u d e s a n d a c t i o n s a r e c o n v i n c i n g only as l o n g as we t h i n k of i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s in small c o m m u n i t i e s b a s e d o n solidarity, s u c h as families a n d n e i g h borhoods. Complex s o t i e j j e ^ s o l e l y by feelings like s ^ r p a t i h ^ j i i i d ^ t r u s t , w h i c h a r e g e a r e d to t h e local s p h e r e . A f o m F c o n d u c t t o w a r d s t r a n g e r s calls for "artificial" virtues, a b o v e all a disposition to j u s t i c e . I n t h e case of a b s t r a c t n e t w o r k s of a c t i o n , m e m b e r s of p r i m a r y r e f e r e n c e g r o u p s c a n n o l o n g e r rely o n t h e familiar r e c i p r o c i t i e s b e t w e e n p e r f o r m a n c e s a n d r e w a r d s a n d t h e r e b y lose t h e i r p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s for b e n e v o l e n c e . Feelings of o b l i g a t i o n t h a t b r i d g e t h e d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n s t r a n g e r s a r e n o t "ra t i o n a l for m e " in t h e s a m e sense as a r e feelings of loyalty t o w a r d m e m b e r s of m y g r o u p o n w h o s e ^ c o o p e r a t i o n I c a n rely. Insofar as solidarity is t h e reverse side of j u s t i c e , t h e r e is n o t h i n g w r o n g in p r i n c i p l e with t h e a t t e m p t t o e x p l a i n t h e origin of m o r a l d u t i e s as t h e r e s u l t of t h e e x t e n s i o n of p r i m a r y g r o u p loyalties to ever larger/ g r o u p s (or in t e r m s of t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of p e r s o n a l t r u s t i n t o "system t r u s t " ) . B u t t h e validity of a n o r m a t i v e t h e o r y is n o t m e a s u r e d by h o w it deals with q u e s t i o n s of m o r a l psychology b u t r a t h e r by h o w it a c c o u n t s for t h e n o r m a t i v e priority of d u t i e s . It s h o u l d e x p l a i n why, in cases of conflict b e t w e e n b e n e v o l e n t feelings a n d a n abstract r e q u i r e m e n t of j u s t i c e , it is r a t i o n a l for m e m b e r s of a g r o u p to subordinate t h e i r loyalty t o w a r d t h o s e t h e y k n o w p e r s o n a l l y to a solidarity with s t r a n g e r s . B u t feelings offer t o o n a r r o w a basis for t h e solidarity b e t w e e n m e m b e r s of a n i m p e r s o n a l c o m m u n i t y of m o r a l beings. 1 2
1 3
(b) Social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y overlooks t h e d i m e n s i o n of solidarity f r o m t h e o u t s e t by r e l a t i n g t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e n o r m a t i v e justifica\
15 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality
t i o n of a system of j u s t i c e directly t o t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e individual, t h e r e b y shifting t h e focus of m o r a l i t y f r o m d u t i e s t o rights. T h e j u r i d i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of a n i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t (subjektive Recht) t o t h e legally p r o t e c t e d f r e e d o m t o p u r s u e o n e ' s i n t e r e s t s w i t h i n c e r t a i n d o m a i n s a c c o r d s with a strategy of justification t h a t o p e r a t e s with p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s a n d is g e a r e d t o t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r it is r a t i o n a l for t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o subject h i s will t o a system of r u l e s . YurthermoreTTRF'^meTalized n o t i o n of t h e c o n t r a c t d e r i v e d f r o m . private law, w h i c h g r o u n d s s u c h r i g h t s i n a symmeuTraTway, is well s u i t e d for t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a social o r d e r b a s e d o n a g r e e m e n t . S u c h a n o r d e r is j u s t o r g o o d i n t h e m o r a l s e n s e w h e n it satisfies t h e i n t e r e s t s of its m e m b e r s equally. T h e social c o n t r a c t follows f r o m t h e i d e a t h a t e a c h c a n d i d a t e m u s t have a r a t i o n a l m o t i v e for c o n s e n t i n g of h i s o w n free will t o b e c o m e a m e m b e r a n d s u b j e c t i n g h i m s e l f t o t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g n o r m s a n d p r o c e d u r e s . T h u s t h e cognitive c o n t e n t of w h a t m a k e s t h e o r d e r a m o r a l o r a j u s t o r d e r rests o n t h e a g g r e g a t e d c o n s e n t of all of t h e i n d i v i d u a l m e m b e r s a n d c a n b e e x p l a i n e d m o r e precisely i n t e r m s of t h e r a t i o n a l w e i g h i n g of g o o d s t h a t e a c h of t h e m p e r f o r m s i n l i g h t o f h i s o w n p r e f e r e n c e s . T h i s p r o g r a m is o p e n t o / t w o o b j e c t i o n ^ First, t h e assimilation of m o r a l q u e s t i o n s t o q u e s t i o n s of t h e political j u s t i c e of a n association of individuals u n d e r l a w h a s t h e d r a w b a c k t h a t e q u a l r e s p e c t for everybody, a n d h e n c e a universalistic morality, c a n n o t b e justified o n this basis. OtalyMh^ in rule-governed i n t e r a c t i o n with o n e a n o t h e r h a v e a r e a s o n t o a c c e p t r e c i p r o c a l o b l i g a t i o n s . T h u s .the s p h e r e of t h o s e p o s s e s i m g r i g h t s will e x t e n d only t o t h o s e f r o m w h o m r e c i p r o c a t i o n c a n b e e x p e c t e d b e c a u s e t h e y w a n t t o , o r h a v e t o , c o o p e r a t e . S e c o n d , H o b b e s i a n i s m wrestles i n vain with iJTf^Jarmliar problem of t h e f r e e j d d e r , w h o e n g a g e s i n a s h a r e d p r a c t i c e o n l y with t h e proviso t h a t h e c a n deviate f r o m t h e a g r e e d n o r m s w h e n it is t o h i s a d v a n t a g e . T h e free r i d e r p r o b l e m shows t h a t a n a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n i n t e r e s t e d p a r t i e s c a n n o t itself g r o u n d a n y obligations. T h i s p r o b l e m h a s l e d t o a n i n t e r e s t i n g c o m b i n a t i o n of t h e two e m p i r i c i s t strategies. A m e n t a l r e s e r v a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g formally r e c o g n i z e d n o r m s is n o l o n g e r possible o n c e t r a n s g r e s s i o n s of n o r m s a r e p u n i s h e d n o t b y e x t e r n a l l y i m p o s e d s a n c t i o n s b u t i n s t e a d by t h e 1 4
16 Chapter 1
1 5
(iniemalizedsanctions)manifested in feelings of guilt o r s h a m e . B u t t h e p r o p o s e d e x p l a n a t i o n f o u n d e r s o n t h e rjrima facie difficulty of explainirig self-punishing feelings in a r a t i o n a l m a n n e r . O n e c a n n o t r a t i o n a l m o t i v e for "wishing to h a v e " i n n e r s a n c t i o n s of this k i n d . A p a r t f r o m a n y t h i n g else, t h e r e a r e c o n c e p t u a l r e a s o n s why it c a n n o t b e "rational for m e " to a c c e p t t h e p r o m p t i n g s of a b a d c o n s c i e n c e u n q u e s t i o n i n g l y a n d at t h e s a m e t i m e m a k e t h e m t h e object of p r a c t i c a l reflection, h e n c e n o n e t h e l e s s to q u e s t i o n t h e m . W h e n we act m o r a l l y we d o so b e c a u s e we take it to b e r i g h t o r g o o d a n d n o t b e c a u s e we w a n t to avoid i n n e r s a n c t i o n s . We call s a n c t i o n s " i n t e r n a l i z e d " w h e n we h a v e m a d e t h e m o u r o w n . B u t t h e p r o c e s s o f j g ^ i n g them o u r ^ e x p l a i n e d in a p u r p o s i v e 1 6
r a t i o n a l m a n n £ r ^ at a n y r a t e n o t f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e p e r s o n affected: for h i m t h e rationality of a n a c t i o n is n o t simply its ability to m a k e a f u n c t i o n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h e r e g u l a t i o n of t h e c o m m u nity as a w h o l e . 1 7
I
T h e r e is n o m o r e a way b a c k f r o m t h e c o n t r a c t u a l i s t justification of a n o r m a t i v e o r d e r to i n t e r n a l i z e d feelings of d i s a p p r o b a t i o n t h a n t h e r e is a d i r e c t r o u t e f r o m m o r a l feelings of s y m p a t h y a n d r e j e c t i o n to t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l justification of d u t i e s . M o r a l feelings give e x p r e s sion t o a t t i t u d e s t h a t imply m o r a l j u d g m e n t s ; a n d in d i s p u t e s over t h e validity of m o r a l j u d g m e n t s we d o n o t limit o u r a r g u m e n t s to p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s o r p r e f e r e n c e s . Classical^empiricism j a i l s to^acc o u n t for t h i s j j h e j i o m e M reasons. It c a n n o t u l t i m a t e l y e x p l a i n t h e o b l i g a t o r y force of m o r a l n o r m s i n t e r m s of p r e f e r e n c e s . IV Two m o r e r e c e n t t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h e s , w h i c h r e m a i n c o m m i t t e d to e m p i r i c i s t a s s u m p t i o n s while a t t e m p t i n g to d o j u s t i c e to t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g y of o b l i g a t o r y n o r m s , r e s p o n d t o this p r e d i c a m e n t of classical e m p i r i c i s m . W h e r e a s Allan G i b b a r d r e m a i n s closer to t h e expressivist a p p r o a c h of e x p l a i n i n g a social life b a s e d o n solidarity, E r n s t T u g e n d h a t r e m a i n s closer t o t h e c o n t r a c t u a l i s t a p p r o a c h of r e c o n s t r u c t i n g a social life b a s e d o n j u s t i c e . B u t b o t h start f r o m t h e s a m e i n t u i t i o n : viewed in t e r m s of f u n c t i o n , every m o r a l system
17 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality
p r o v i d e s a s o l u t i o n to t h e p r o b l e m of among b e i n g s w h o a r e d e p e n d e n t o n social i n t e r a c t i o n . M o r a l conscious ness is t h e e x p r e s s i o n of t h e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ t e ) d e m a n d s t h a t m e m b e r s of a c o o p e r a t i v e social g r o u p m a k e o n o n e a n o t h e r . M o r a l feelings r e g u late t h e o b s e r v a n c e of t h e u n d e r l y i n g n o r m s . S h a m e a n d guilt a l e r t a p e r s o n t h a t h e , in T u g e n d h a t ' s w o r d s , h a s failed as a "cooperative m e m b e r " o r as a " g o o d social p a r t n e r . " G i b b a r d r e m a r k s of t h e s e feelings: " [ t h e y a r e ] tied genetically to p o o r c o o p e r a t i v e will—to a special way a social b e i n g c a n fail to b e a g o o d c a n d i d a t e for inclu sion in c o o p e r a t i v e s c h e m e s . " B o t h a u t h o r s seek to d e m o n s t r a t e t h e r a t i o n a l basis of t h e e m e r g e n c e o r t h e c h o i c e of m o r a l i t y in g e n e r a l , b u t also of a universalistic m o r a l i t y b a s e d o n r e a s o n (Vernunftmoral). W h e r e a s T u g e n d h a t sticks to t h e subjective p e r s p e c t i v e of p a r t i c i p a n t s , G i b b a r d takes t h e objectifying a p p r o a c h of func tional explanation. I n c o n t r a s t with Kant, w h o u n d e r s t a n d s n o r m s exclusively as m a x ims of a c t i o n , G i b b a r d e x t e n d s t h e c o n c e p t of a n o r m to all k i n d s of s t a n d a r d s t h a t specify why it is r a t i o n a l to h o l d a n o p i n i o n , to e x p r e s s a feeling, o r to act in a c e r t a i n way. H a v i n g c e r t a i n o p i n i o n s c a n b e r a t i o n a l for m e in t h e s a m e way as c a n e x p r e s s i n g c e r t a i n feelings o r a c t i n g o n c e r t a i n i n t e n t i o n s . T h a t s o m e t h i n g is "rational for m e " m e a n s that^I h a v e j n ^ e ^ c e r ^ n j n p ^ ^ o w n in light of w h i c h it " m a k e s sense," o r is " a p p r o p r i a t e , " "plausible" o r simply "best," to believe, feel, o r d o s o m e t h i n g . G i b b a r d t h e n calls t h o s e n o r m s m o r a l t h a t lay d o w n for a c o m m u n i t y w h i c h classes of a c t i o n s m e r i t s p o n t a n e o u s d i s a p p r o v a l . T h e y specify in w h i c h cases it is r a t i o n a l for t h e m e m b e r s to feel a s h a m e d o r guilty o r to r e s e n t t h e c o n d u c t of o t h e r s . G i b b a r d ' s inclusive u s e of t h e c o n c g s j ^ o f ^ ^ that, u n l i k e Kant, h e c a n n o t derive t h e Rationality of a c t i o n (in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d p r i n c i p l e of p u r p o s i v e rationality) f r o m t h e a c t o r ' s r e a s o n s for b i n d i n g his__mll to this o r t h a t m a x i m . B u t if all r a t i o n a l motives refer to p r i o r s t a n d a r d s , it m a k e s n o sense to ask in t u r n why it was r a t i o n a l to i n t e r n a l i z e s u c h s t a n d a r d s in t h e first p l a c e . T h e fact t h a t s o m e o n e takes s o m e t h i n g to b e r a t i o n a l simply expresses t h e fact t h a t t h e s t a n d a r d s a u t h o r i z i n g this j u d g m e n t a r e his s t a n d a r d s . H e n c e G i b b a r d u n d e r s t a n d s rationality j u d g m e n t s , w h e t h e r m o r a l o r n o n m o r a l , as expressive s p e e c h acts. T h e y c a n n o t 18
19
18 Chapter 1
b e t r u e o r false, b u t only t r u t h f u l o r u n t r u t h f u l . A n d t h e only war r a n t for t h e agent-relative b i n d i n g n e s s of m o r a l r u l e s is a truthfully expressed mental state. Given this "expressivist" a c c o u n t of normativity, G i b b a r d m a k e s two moves. First h e offers a n e v o l u t i o n a r y e x p l a n a t i o n of m o r a l n o r m s f r o m t h e o b s e r v e r ' s p e r s p e c t i v e a n d t h e n h e tries to m a k e sense of t h e biological "value" of m o r a l i t y f r o m t h e p a r t i c i p a n t ' s perspective, t h a t is, h e tries to t r a n s l a t e it f r o m t h e Jhej)jretical lan g u a g e of a '^biolqgyof i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o o r d i n a t i o n " i n t o t h e l a n g u a g e ofjpracticai d e l i b e r a t i o n . ~ A c c o r d i n g to t h e p r o p o s e d n e o - D a r w i n i a n e x p l a n a t i o n , m o r a l feelings s u c h as s h a m e , guilt, a n d r e s e n t m e n t d e v e l o p e d in t h e c o u r s e of t h e e v o l u t i o n of t h e h u m a n species as r e g u l a t o r y m e c h a nisms to facilitate t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n of a c t i o n . T h e n o r m a t i v i t y of r u l e s in virtue of w h i c h it a p p e a r s r a t i o n a l to m e m b e r s of co o p e r a t i n g g r o u p s to have s u c h feelings, a n d h e n c e to d i s a p p r o v e of c o n d u c t t h a t deviates f r o m n o r m s a n d to offer o r t o e x p e c t c o r r e s p o n d i n g excuses as r e p a r a t i o n for a failure i n c o o r d i n a t i o n , is n o t rationally intelligible to t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s themselves. B u t t h e a u t h o r ity w h i c h simply manifests itself in t h e rationality j u d g m e n t s of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s c a n b e explained f r o m t h e o b s e r v e r ' s p e r s p e c t i v e in t e r m s of t h e " r e p r o d u c t i v e v a l u e " of t h e i n t e r n a l i z e d n o r m s a n d t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g affective dispositions. T h a t t h e s e n o r m s a n d dispositions a r e a d v a n t a g e o u s f r o m a n e v o l u t i o n a r y p o i n t of view is s u p p o s e d to find e x p r e s s i o n in t h e i r subjectively c o n v i n c i n g character. O n this analysis, t h e p r o p e r task for p h i l o s o p h y is t o establish a p l a u s i b l e connectio^ t h e o b s e r v e r ancTwhat is 20
taEen^to ^£J^twmd^[^the p a r t i c i p a n t . T h i s p r o b l e m takes o n par ticular u r g e n c y when t h e a c t o r s n o l o n g e r rely o n i n t e r n a l i z e d n o r m s b u t e n g a g e i n o p e n d i s p u t e s over w h i c h n o r m s they s h o u l d a c c e p t as valid. L a n g u a g e f u n c t i o n s in any case as t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t m e d i u m for i n t e r p e r s o n a l c o o r d i n a t i o n . M o r a l j u d g m e n t s a n d p o s i t i o n s t h a t rest o n i n t e r n a l i z e d n o r m s find e x p r e s s i o n i n a n e m o t i o n a l l y c h a r g e d language. But when the normative background consensus breaks d o w n a n d n e w n o r m s have to b e w o r k e d o u t , a different f o r m of c o m m u n i c a t i o n is r e q u i r e d . T h e p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t t h e n p u t t h e i r
19 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality
t r u s t i n t h e o r i e n t i n g p o w e r of " n o r m a t i v e discourses": "I shall call this i n f l u e n c e normative governance. It is i n this g o v e r n a n c e of action, belief, a n d e m o t i o n t h a t w e m i g h t find a p l a c e for p h e n o m e n a t h a t c o n s t i t u t e a c c e p t a n c e of n o r m s , as o p p o s e d t o m e r e l y i n t e r n a l i z i n g t h e m . W h e n we w o r k o u t at a d i s t a n c e , in c o m m u n i t y , w h a t to d o o r t h i n k o r feel in a situation w e a r e discussing, we c o m e t o a c c e p t n o r m s for t h e s i t u a t i o n . " B u t it is n o t a l t o g e t h e r clear w h a t c o u l d s u p p o r t t h e " n o r m a t i v e g o v e r n a n c e " s u c h discourses a r e s u p p o s e d t o p r o v i d e . It c a n n o t b e g o o d r e a s o n s , b e c a u s e t h e y derive t h e i r rationally m o t i v a t i n g p o w e r f r o m i n t e r n a l i z e d s t a n d a r d s w h i c h m u s t b e a s s u m e d t o have for feited t h e i r a u t h o r i t y — o t h e r w i s e t h e r e w o u l d b e n o n e e d t o r e a c h an u n d e r s t a n d i n g in discourse. W h a t t h e participants must m a k e a n object of discussion c a n n o t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y f u n c t i o n as a s t a n d a r d i n t h e discussion. G i b b a r d c a n n o t r e p r e s e n t discursively a c h i e v e d a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g m o r a l n o r m s o n t h e m o d e l of t h e coopera-j tive s e a r c h for t h e t r u t h ; r a t h e r h e m u s t r e p r e s e n t it as a p r o c e s s ini w h i c h p a r t i c i p a n t s rhetorically influence o n e a n o t h e r . | 21
A p r o p o n e n t w h o w a n t s t o win a g r e e m e n t for a n o r m t h a t h e believes is w o r t h y of r e c o g n i t i o n c a n only truthfully e x p r e s s t h e subjective state i n w h i c h h e experiences t h e n o r m as b i n d i n g . If h e m a n a g e s to d o this i n a n a u t h e n t i c way h e c a n win over his inter l o c u t o r s by i n d u c i n g similar affective states i n t h e m . T h u s i n n o r m a tive discourses^ r e a c h i n g ja r a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t is r e p l a c e d by s o m e t h i n g like achieving a m u t u a l h a r n i o n i z a t ^ n ^ Inter estingly, t h e publicT^egalitarian, a n d n o n c o e r c i v e c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o n d i t i o n s of a Socratic d i a l o g u e a r e s u p p o s e d to b e m o s t c o n d u c i v e to t h e exercise of this k i n d of r h e t o r i c a l i n f l u e n c e . T h e "conversa tional d e m a n d s " g o v e r n i n g Socratic d i a l o g u e a r e of a p r a g m a t i c k i n d (with t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e r e q u i r e m e n t t h a t c o n t r i b u t i o n s m u s t b e c o h e r e n t ) , T h e y a r e s u p p o s e d t o p r e v e n t t h e unjustified e x c l u s i o n of affected p a r t i e s a n d t h e a r b i t r a r y privileging of s p e a k e r s a n d t o p i c s — i n o t h e r w o r d s , u n e q u a l t r e a t m e n t ; t h e y a r e also s u p p o s e d to p r e c l u d e r e p r e s s i o n a n d m a n i p u l a t i o n a n d n o n r h e t o r i c a l f o r m s of i n f l u e n c e . T h e s e c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o n d i t i o n s a r e i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t h e p r a g m a t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a c o o p e r a t i v e s e a r c h for t r u t h . So it is h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e n o r m s t h a t win a g r e e m e n t 2 2
2 3
20 Chapter 1
u n d e r t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s a r e ultimately i d e n t i c a l to a m o r a l i t y of e q u a l solidaristic responsibility for everybody. B u t we c a n n o t s p e a k of 'justification" h e r e b e c a u s e t h e discursive p r o c e s s is n o t g e a r e d to t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n of t h e b e t t e r r e a s o n s b u t to t h e effectiveness of t h e m o r e impressive e x p r e s s i o n s of feelings. As a result, G i b b a r d owes us a n e x p l a n a t i o n of why precisely d i e n ^ r j u s ^ X h a l ^ r o y e ^ t o b e t h e b e s t f r o m t h e f u n c t i o n a l p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e i r "survival v a l u e " for a p a r t i c u l a r species s h o u l d w m ^ g r £ e j [ n e n t u n d e r t h e p r a g m a t i c a l l y privileged c o n d i t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n : "In n o r m a t i v e discussion we a r e i n f l u e n c e d by e a c h other, b u t n o t only by e a c h o t h e r . M u t u a l i n f l u e n c e n u d g e s u s t o w a r d c o n s e n s u s , if all g o e s well, but not toward any consensus whatsoever.^Evolutionary c o n s i d e r a t i o n s suggest this: c o n s e n s u s m a y p r o m o t e biological fitness, but only the consensus of the right kind. T h e c o n s e n s u s m u s t b e m u t u a l l y f i t n e s s - e n h a n c i n g , a n d so to m o v e t o w a r d it we m u s t b e responsive to t h i n g s t h a t p r o m o t e o u r biological f i t n e s s . " G i b b a r d r e c o g n i z e s t h e p r o b l e m t h a t t h e results r e a c h e d f r o m t h e objective p e r s p e c t i v e of investigation m u s t b e m a d e c o n s i s t e n t with t h e results t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s in d i s c o u r s e a c c e p t as r a t i o n a l f r o m a n i n s i d e r ' s perspective. B u t o n e looks in vain for s u c h a n e x p l a n a t i o n . G i b b a r d fails to e x p l a i n why t h e i m p r o b a b l e c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o n d i t i o n s of n o r m a t i v e d i s c o u r s e s a r e "selective" in t h e s a m e sense, a n d why t l ^ ^ Q u j ^ p r o d u c e t h e s a m £ r e s u l t — t h a t is, a n i n c r e a s e in t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of collective survival—as d o t h e m e c h a n i s m s of n a t u r a l evolution. 24
25
E r n s t T u g e n d h a t avoids t h e p r o b l e m a t i c d e t o u r t h r o u g h a f u n c t i o n alist e x p l a n a t i o n of morality. H e first d e s c r i b e s h o w m o r a l r u l e sys t e m s f u n c t i o n in general a n d w h a t motives we c o u l d h a v e to b e m o r a l at all ( a ) , a n d t h e n c o n s i d e r s what form of m o r a l i t y it w o u l d b e r a t i o n a l for u s to c h o o s e u n d e r p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n d i t i o n s ( b ) . (a) I n c o n t r a s t with classical c o n t r a c t u a l i s t n , T u g e n d h a t b e g i n s with a fulljOejiggd^ c o n c e p t of t h e ^ r n o r a l c o m m u n i t y . T h i s c o n c e p t iricludes t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h o s e w h o feel themselves b o u n d by m o r a l r u l e s a n d h e n c e t h o s e w h o "have a c o n s c i e n c e , " e x p r e s s
21 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality
m o r a l feelings, a r g u e a b o u t m o r a l j u d g m e n t s with r e a s o n s , a n d so f o r t h . M e m b e r s of t h e c o m m u n i t y t h i n k t h a t t h e y "know" w h a t is " g o o d " a n d "evil" in t h e c a t e g o r i c a l sense. H a v i n g o u t l i n e d this c o n c e p t i o n , T u g e n d h a t c o n s i d e r s w h e t h e r it is r a t i o n a l for a n y given c a n d i d a t e to e n t e r i n t o s u c h a m o r a l p r a c t i c e d e s c r i b e d as a whole, t h a t is, to b e c o m e a c o o p e r a t i n g m e m b e r of a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y as such: " T h a t we w a n t to b e l o n g to a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y at all . . . is u l t i m a t e l y a n act of o u r a u t o n o m y for w h i c h t h e r e c a n only b e g o o d motives, n o t r e a s o n s . " By " a u t o n o m y " T u g e n d h a t u n d e r s t a n d s only t h e capacity to act in a r u l e - g o v e r n e d m a n n e r f r o m r a t i o n a l motives. B u t t h e practical r e a s o n s h e g o e s o n to e n u m e r a t e g o b e y o n d t h e e m p i r i c i s t f r a m e w o r k of value-free c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of p r u d e n c e . F o r T u g e n d h a t adduces n o t p r e m o r a l interests b u t value-orientations w h i c h c o u l d only have d e v e l o p e d w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of a m o r a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d c o m m u n i t y . F o r e x a m p l e , it is r a t i o n a l for m e to e n t e r a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y b e c a u s e I p r e f e r t h e status of subject a n d ad d r e s s e e of r i g h t s a n d d u t i e s to t h e status of a n object to w h i c h r e c i p r o c a l i n s t r u m e n t a l i z a t i o n w o u l d r e d u c e m e ; o r b e c a u s e bal a n c e d f r i e n d s h i p s a r e b e t t e r for m e t h a n t h e s t r u c t u r a l isolation of a strategically a c t i n g subject; o r b e c a u s e I c a n e x p e r i e n c e t h e satis faction of b e i n g r e s p e c t e d by p e r s o n s w h o a r e w o r t h y of m o r a l r e s p e c t only as a m e m b e r of a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y a n d so f o r t h . 26
T h e preferences that T u g e n d h a t sp^ c o m m u r n t y a r e a l r e a d y infused with t h e values of s u c h a c o m m u n i t y ; tHey are c o n t i n g e n t o n pribr, in^ tions. At a n y r a t e - t h e s e motives d o n o t e x p l a i n h o w it c o u l d b e r a t i o n a l for a c t o r s who find themselves in a premoral condition a n d k n o w n o t h i n g else to m a k e t h e t r a n s i t i o n to a m o r a l c o n d i t i o n . S o m e o n e w h o arrives at r e a s o n s for his d e c i s i o n to p u r s u e a m o r a l life, r e a s o n s w h i c h c a n only r e s u l t f r o m reflection o n t h e p r i o r e x p e r i e n c e of t h e a d v a n t a g e s of m o r a l l y r e g u l a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n , h a s left b e h i n d t h e e g o c e n t r i c p e r s p e c t i v e of r a t i o n a l c h o i c e a n d takes his o r i e n t a t i o n i n s t e a d f r o m c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d life. H e o r i e n t s his p r a c t i c a l d e l i b e r a t i o n to t h e ethical q u e s t i o n of w h a t k i n d of life h e s h o u l d lead, w h o h e is a n d w a n t s t o b e , w h a t i n t h e l o n g r u n is " g o o d " for h i m all t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d , etc. R e a s o n s t h a t c o u n t in l i g h t of t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h a v e m o t i v a t i n g force only insofar as t h e y affect t h e
22 Chapter 1
identity a n d s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a n a c t o r w h o h a s a l r e a d y b e e n f o r m e d by a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y . M a r t i n Seel also u n d e r s t a n d s ( a n d accepts) t h e a r g u m e n t in this sense. A l t h o u g h t h e h a p p i n e s s of a successful life d o e s n o t necessar ily consist in a m o r a l life, a subject w h o w a n t s to live a g o o d life h a s g o o d r e a s o n s for a c c e p t i n g m o r a l c o n d i t i o n s (of w h a t e v e r k i n d ) . It is a l r e a d y j : l e a r f r o m t h e ethical p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t it is n o t possible to l e a d a good life o u t s i d £ j a _ j j ^ ^ O f c o u r s e , t h a t only m e a n s t h a t " t h e r e a r e n e c e s s a r y a r e a s of o v e r l a p b e t w e e n a g o o d life a n d a m o r a l l y g o o d life, b u t n o t t h a t a g o o d life is only possible within the limits of a m o r a l l y g o o d l i f e . " B u t T u g e n d h a t is n o t so m u c h i n t e r e s t e d in t h e relation b e t w e e n t h e g o o d life a n d m o r a l i t y as in t h e ethical justification for b e i n g m o r a l . A n d this leads to a n u n a v o i d a b l e p a r a d o x if, like T u g e n d h a t , o n e rightly insists o n t h e difference b e t w e e n w h a t is g o o d for o n e s e l f a n d m o r a l c o n c e r n for t h e interests of o t h e r s : insofar as a n a c t o r only h a s r a t i o n a l motives for p r e f e r r i n g m o r a l to p r e m o r a l c o n d i t i o n s , h e u n d e r m i n e s t h e o b l i g a t o r y n a t u r e of t h e m o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n s w h o s e categorical valid ity h e s h o u l d r e c o g n i z e u n d e r t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s . 27
Seel r e c o g n i z e s t h a t " m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n . . . t r a n s c e n d s t h o s e p r e f e r e n c e - b a s e d r e a s o n s we have for a c c e p t i n g t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view at all,"^ b u t h e d o e s n o t d r a w t h e c o r r e c t c o n c l u s i o n f r o m t h i s . T h e t h r u s t of a n ethical justification for b e i n g m o r a l is n o t t h a t s o m e o n e is m o t i v a t e d by p r e f e r e n c e - b a s e d r e a s o n s to " c o n f r o n t r e a s o n s of a c o m p l e t e l y different sort" b u t r a t h e r t h a t t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e loses t h e illocutiraarj^fprce of u n c o n d i t i o n a l demaric[s~as s o o n as p a r t i c i p a t i o n in_ t h e mora^ entjgn^^ a r a t i o n a l chooser. If t h e a c t o r w h o assures himself of t h e s u p e r i o r i t y of a m o r a l way of life is t h e s a m e as t h e o n e w h o accepts s u c h c o n d i t i o n s o n t h e basis of this p r e f e r e n c e , his ethical justification c o n d i t i o n s t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e as a w h o l e a n d c h a n g e s t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e m o v e s t h a t a r e possible w i t h i n it. F o r a c t i n g m o r a l l y "out of r e s p e c t for t h e law" is i n c o m p a t i b l e with t h e ethical proviso of always e x a m i n i n ^ w h e t h e r t h e p r a c t i c e as a w h o l e also pays off f r o m t h e p e ^ ^ life p l a n . F o r c o n c e p t u a l re^asonsTThe^categorical m e a n i n g of m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n s c a n b e u p h e l d only as l o n g as a d d r e s s e e s a r e p r e v e n t e d f r o m step8
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23 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality
p i n g o u t s i d e t h e m o r a l c o m m u n i t y , if only i n a virtual m a n n e r , i n o r d e r t o w e i g h t h e a d v a n t a g e s a n d d i s a d v a n t a g e s of m e m b e r s h i p f r o m t h e d i s t a n c e of t h e first p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e . N o r , conversely, is t h e r e a r o u t e f r o m ethical reflection t o t h e justification of morality. (b) Even if t h e e m p i r i c i s t d r e a m w e r e t o b e c o m e a reality, a n d reflection o n o n e ' s o w n interests w o u l d g e n e r a t e a rationally r e c o n s t r u c t a b l e d y n a m i c t h a t w o u l d p r o p e l o n e b e y o n d t h e p u r s u i t of t h o s e i n t e r e s t s in t h e d i r e c t i o n of u n c o n d i t i o n a l m o r a l c o n c e r n — even t h e n t h e essential p r o b l e m w o u l d n o t b e solved. Ethical r e a s o n s e x p l a i n a t m o s t why we s h o u l d e n g a g e i n s o m e j m O T ^ J a n ^ a g e ^ a m e 6 r otherTTiut n o t whicfiTone. T u g e n d h a t gives this p r o b l e m a g e n e a logical c a s t T T a v i n g lost t h e t r a d i t i o n a l f o u n d a t i o n of t h e i r s h a r e d morality, t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t r e a c h a s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g of w h i c h specific m o r a l n o r m s they s h o u l d a d o p t . I n this p r o c e s s n o b o d y c a n claim m o r e a u t h o r i t y t h a n a n y o n e else; all s t a n d p o i n t s f r o m w h i c h o n e c o u l d claim privileged access t o m o r a l t r u t h have lost t h e i r validity. T h e social c o n t r a c t c o u l d n o t p r o v i d e a satisfactory r e s p o n s e t o this c h a l l e n g e b e c a u s e a h a g r e e m e n t a m o n g c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t n e r s m o t i v a t e d by i n t e r e s t s c a n l e a d a t b e s t t o a n e x t e r n a l l y i m p o s e d social r e g u l a t i o n of c o n d u c t , b u t n o t t o a b i n d i n g , l e t a l o n e a universalistic, c o n c e p t i o n o f ( t h e T o m m ^ ^ Tugendhat's de s c r i p t i o n of t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t is similar t o t h e o n e I have p r o p o s e d . T h e m e m b e r s of a m o r a l c o m m u n i t y a r e n o t t r y i n g t o replace m o r a l ity with a social r e g u l a t i o n of b e h a v i o r t h a t is t o everybody's advan tage. T h e i r g o a l is n o t t o r e p l a c e t h e m o r a l l a n g u a g e g a m e as such, b u t only its religious f o u n d a t i o n . T h i s l i n e of t h o u g h t leads t o reflection o n t h e c o n d i t i o n s of c o m m u n i c a t i v e a g r e e m e n t w h i c h , after r e l i g i o n a n d metaphysics, r e p r e s e n t t h e only r e m a i n i n g r e s o u r c e o n w h i c h t h e justification of a m o r a l i t y of e q u a l r e s p e c t for e v e r y b o d y c a n draw: "If t h e g o o d is n o l o n g e r laid d o w n i n a t r a n s c e n d e n t m a n n e r , t h e only p r i n c i p l e of t h e g o o d s e e m s t o b e c o n s i d e r a t i o n for m e m b e r s of t h e c o m m u n i t y , w h o s e m e m b e r s h i p i n t u r n c a n n o l o n g e r b e limited, a n d h e n c e c o n s i d e r a t i o n for all o t h e r s — w h i c h m e a n s c o n s i d e r a t i o n for t h e i r wishes a n d interests. T o p u t it in t h e f o r m of a slogan: intersubjectivity t h u s u n d e r s t o o d takes t h e p l a c e of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t p r e g i v e n . . . . Since t h e r e c i p r o c a l d e m a n d s . . . c o n s t i t u t e t h e f o r m of morality
24 Chapter 1
in g e n e r a l j o n e c a n also say: i n a s m u c h as t h e c o n t e n t t o w h i c h t h e d e m a n d s refer is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n c o n s i d e r a t i o n for w h a t all w a n t , the content now fits the form."^ I n this way T u g e n d h a t derives t h e K a n t i a n p r i n c i p l e of universaliz a t i o n f r o m t h e symmetrical c o n d i t i o n s of t h e initial situation i n w h i c h t h e p a r t i e s , w h o h a v e b e e n s t r i p p e d of all privileges a n d as a r e s u l t a r e o n a n e q u a l footing, c o m e t o g e t h e r t o a g r e e o n basic n o r m s t h a t c a n b e rationally a c c e p t e d by all p a r t i c i p a n t s . However, h e fails t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t "rational acceptability" t h e r e b y t a k e s j o u a m e a n i n g d i f f e r e n t f r o m s o m e t h i n g ' s b e i n g "rational for m e . " If t h e r e is n o a u t h o r i t y for r e l a t i o n s of m o r a l r e c o g n i t i o n h i g h e r t h a n t h e g o o d will a n d i r m g h t of t h q s e j v h o c o m e t o a s h a r e d ^ ^ r e e m e n t concerning the rules t h a ^ a r e j t o ^ o v e r n livin^JogejJaer, t h e n 0
31
t h e s t a n d a r d f o r j u d g i n g t h e s e r u l e s m u s t b e d e r i v e d exclusively f r o m t h e s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h p a r t i c i p a n t s seek t o convince o n e a n o t h e r of t h e i r beliefs a n d p r o p o s a l s . By e n t e r i n g i n t o a c o o p e r a t i v e c o m m u nicative p r a c t i c e , t h e y a l r e a d y tacitly a c c e p t t h e c o n d i t i o n of symmet rical o r e q u a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n for e v e r y o n e ' s interests. B e c a u s e this p r a c t i c e only achieves its g o a l if e v e r y o n e is willing t o c o n v i n c e o t h e r s a n d t o b e c o n v i n c e d by t h e m , every serious p a r t i c i p a n t m u s t e x a m i n e w h a t is rationaLforJilm under the conditions of symmetrical a n d e q u a l c c ^ i d e r ^ i o n _ o f interests. B u t with t h e r e f e r e n c e ~to t h e possibility bf a n a g r e e m e n t r e a c h e d b y ^ ^ S q n ^ d i s c o u r s e ) (which i n Rawls's case is i m p o s e d by t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n ) , p r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s take o n a n e p i s t e m i c m e a n i n g . I n this way we t r a n s c e n d t h e b o u n d a r i e s of i n s t r u m e n t a l r e a s o n . A p r i n c i p l e of universalization t h a t c a n n o t b e justified by a p p e a l t o e a c h individ ual's interests ( o r t o e a c h individual's c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d ) serves as t h e g r o u n d of validity of r a t i o n a l morality. We c a n g a i n i n s i g h t into this p r i n c i p l e only t h r o u g h reflection o n t h e u n a v o i d a b l e c o n ditions of i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t . W h i l e G i b b a r d analyzes t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s as p r a g m a t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of n o r m a t i v e discourses, h e views t h e m solely f r o m t h e func tionalist p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e i r c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n of social a c t i o n . T u g e n d h a t , by c o n t r a s t , u p h o l d s t h e view t h a t t h e a c c e p t a n c e of m o r a l r u l e s m u s t b e justified f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s themselves; b u t h e t o o d e n i e s t h e e p i s t e m i c m e a n -
25 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality
i n g t h a t this a c c e p t a n c e a s s u m e s u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of discourse.
rational
VI W e a k n o n c o g n i t i v i s m a s s u m e s t h a t a n a c t o r ' s c h o i c e c a n b e affected by practical r e a s o n in j u s t o n e way, namely, t h r o u g h d e l i b e r a t i o n s t h a t a c c o r d with t h e p r i n c i p l e of i n s t r u m e n t a l rationality. If, by con trast, p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n is n o l o n g e r assimilated to i n s t r u m e n t a l rea son, t h e c o n s t e l l a t i o n of r e a s o n a n d will c h a n g e s , a n d h e n c e so d o e s t h e c o n c e p t of subjective f r e e d o m . F r e e d o m is n o l o n g e r e x h a u s t e d by t h e ability t o c h o o s e in a c c o r d a n c e with m a x i m s of p r u d e n c e b u t finds e x p r e s s i o n in t h e will's capacity to b i n d itself t h r o u g h insight. T h e significance of t h e t e r m "insight" h e r e is t h a t a d e c i s i o n c a n b e justified i n t e r m s of " e p i s t e m i c " r e a s o n s . Since e p i s t e m i c reasonsj g e n e r a l l y s u p p o r t t h e t r u t h of assertoric s t a t e m e n t s , t h e u s e of t h e e x p r e s s i o n " e p i s t e m i c " in p r a c t i c a l c o n t e x t s is in n e e d of e x p l a n a t i o n . P r a g m a t i c r e a s o n s d e p e n d o n t h e p r e f e r e n c e s a n d p u r p o s e s of e a c h p a r t i c u l a r p e r s o n . O n l y t h e a g e n t himself, w h o k n o w s his o w n p r e f e r e n c e s a n d p u r p o s e s , h a s t h e final e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y to j u d g e t h e s e "data." Practical reflection c a n l e a d t o ( m ^ g h t ^ o n l y w h e n it_ g o e s b e y o n d t h e subjective w o r l d to w h i c h t h e a c t o r h a s privileged access a n d p e r t a i n s to t h e c o n t e n t s of a n intersubjectively s h a r e d ^ social world. I n this way reflection o n s h a r e d e x p e r i e n c e s , practices, a n d f o r m s of life b r i n g s to a w a r e n e s s f | i n ^ ^ to w h i c h we d o n o t h a v e access simply t h r o u g h t h e e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y of t h e first p e r s o n singular. B r i n g i n g to c o n s c i o u s n e s s something^lmplicitly k n o w n is n o t t h e s a m e as a c q u i r i n g e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e . Scientific k n o w l e d g e is TOunTerrnTurti^^ achieved insight^ critically a p p r o p r i a t e s a p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w - h o w b y j T i a n n g it explicit, c o n t e x tualizing i t , j | r ^ Ethical insights r e s u l t f r o m t h e e x p l i c a t i o n of t h e k n o w - h o w t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y socialized individuals h a v e a c q u i r e d by g r o w i n g u p in a p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e . T h e m o s t ^ g e n e r a l e l e m e n t s of t h e practical k n o w l e d g e of a c u l t u r e h a v e b e c o m e s e d i m e n t e d in its evaluative v o c a b u l a r y a n d in its r u l e s for t h e u s e of n o r m a t i v e s e n t e n c e s . Actors d o n o t j u s t d e v e l o p 32
26 Chapter 1
c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e m s e l v e s a n d of t h e life t h e y w o u l d like to l e a d in g e n e r a l in l i g h t of t h e i r evaluatively c h a r g e d l a n g u a g e g a m e s ; they also discover attractive a n d repulsive f e a t u r e s of p a r t i c u l a r situations t h a t they c a n n o t u n d e r s t a n d w i t h o u t "seeing" h o w they ought to r e s p o n d to t h e m . B e c a u s e we h a v e intuitive k n o w l e d g e of w h a t is attractive a n d repulsive, r i g h t o r w r o n g , a n d in g e n e r a l of r e l e v a n c e , ^ t h e m o m e n t of i n s i g h t h e r e c a n b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m a c o r r e s p o n d i n g disposition o r p r e f e r e n c e . It consists of a n intersubjectively - s h a r e d k n o w - h o w t h a t h a s g a i n e d a c c e p t a n c e in t h e lifeworld a n d h a s " p r o v e d " itself in p r a c t i c e . As t h e s h a r e d possession of a c u l t u r a l f o r m of life, it enjoys "objectivity" in v i r t u e of its social diffusion a n d a c c e p t a n c e . H e n c e t h e p r a c t i c a l reflection w h i c h critically a p p r o p r i ates this irrtuitive k n o w l e d g e r e q u i r e s a social p e r s p e c t i v e t h a t g o e s b e y o n d t h e first p e r s o n s i n g u l a r p e r s p e c t i v e of s o m e b o d y a c t i n g o n his p r e f e r e n c e s . 3 4
H e r e I w a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h f r o m t h e o u t s e t b e t w e e n value-orientations (Wertorientierungen) a n d o b l i g a t i o n s (Verpflichtungeri). We j u d g e v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n s a n d t h e evaluative s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p e r s o n s o r g r o u p s f r o m t h e ethical p o i n t of view, w h e r e a s we j u d g e d u t i e s , n o r m s , a n d categorical i m p e r a t i v e s f r o m t h e moral p o i n t of view. E t h i c a l g u e s t i o n s arise f r o m t h e first p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e , S e e n f r o m t h e first p e r s o n p l u r a l p o l r T F ^ F ^ S v ^ T h e y refer t o I T s r i a r e d e t h o s : w h a t is at issue is h o w we u n d e r s t a n d ourselves as m e m b e r s of o u r c o m m u n i t y , h o w we s h o u l d o r i e n t o u r lives, o r w h a t is b e s t for u s in the l o n g r u n a n d all t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d . Similar q u e s t i o n s arise f r o m t h e first p e r s o n s i n g u l a r p e r s p e c t i v e : w h o I a m a n d w h o I w o u l d like to b e , o r h o w I s h o u l d l e a d m y life. S u c h existential c o n c e r n s differ f r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of p r u d e n c e n o t j u s t in view of t h e e x t e n d e d h o r i z o n s i m p l i e d by t h e f o r m u l a of w h a t "in the long run and all things considered is b e s t for m e . " I n t h e s e q u e s t i o n s t h e first p e r s o n p e r s p e c tive d o e s n o t i m p l y a n e g o c e n t r i c r e s t r i c t i o n to s h e e r p r e f e r e n c e s ; r a t h e r , it p o i n t s to a n individual life h i s t o r y t h a t is always a l r e a d y e m b e d d e d in intersubjectively s h a r e d t r a d i t i o n s a n d f o r m s of l i f e . T h e attractiveness of t h e values in light of w h i c h I u n d e r s t a n d myself a n d m y life c a n n o t b e e x p l a i n e d w i t h i n t h e limits of t h e w o r l d of subjective e x p e r i e n c e s to w h i c h I h a v e privileged access. F r o m t h e ethical p o i n t of view, m y p r e f e r e n c e s a n d goals a r e n o l o n g e r simply 35
27 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality
36
given b u t a r e t h e m s e l v e s o p e n t o d i s c u s s i o n ; since t h e y d e p e n d o n my self-understanding, they can u n d e r g o reasoned change t h r o u g h reflection o n w h a t h a s intrinsic value for us w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n of o u r s h a r e d social w o r l d . F r o m t h e ethical p o i n t of v i e w w e ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ c ^ ^ v ^ ^ a n ^ i ^ ^ ^ successful, o r better, n o t m i s s p e n t life, w h i c h arise i n t h e c o n t e x t of a particular, collective f o r m of life o r of a n individual life history. Practical r e f l e c t i o n takes t h e f o r m of a p r o c e s s of m e a n w h a t t h e y say; a n d (iv) t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n m u s t b e f r e e d f r o m e x t e r n a l a n d i n t e r n a l c o e r c i o n so t h a t t h e "yes" o r " n o " stances t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s a d o p t o n criticizable validity claims a r e m o t i v a t e d solely by t h e r a t i o n a l force of t h e b e t t e r r e a s o n s . If e v e r y o n e w h o e n g a g e s in a r g u m e n t a t i o n m u s t m a k e at least t h e s e p r a g m a t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , t h e n in v i r t u e of (i) t h e p u b l i c c h a r a c t e r of practical discourses a n d t h e i n c l u s i o n of all c o n c e r n e d a n d (ii) t h e e q u a l c o m m u n i c a t i v e r i g h t s of all p a r t i c i p a n t s , only r e a s o n s t h a t give e q u a l w e i g h t to t h e i n t e r e s t s a n d evaluative o r i e n t a t i o n s of e v e r y b o d y c a n i n f l u e n c e t h e o u t c o m e of p r a c t i c a l discourses; a n d b e c a u s e of t h e a b s e n c e of (iii) d e c e p t i o n a n d (iv) c o e r c i o n , n o t h i n g b u t rea s o n s c a n tip t h e b a l a n c e in favor of t h e a c c e p t a n c e of a c o n t r o v e r sial n o r m . Finally, o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s r e c i p r o cally i m p u t e a n o r i e n t a t i o n to c o m m u n i c a t i v e a g r e e m e n t to o n e a n o t h e r , this " u n c o e r c e d " a c j c e p t a n c e j c a n _ o n l y o c c u r "jointly" o r collectively^ A g a i n s t t h e f r e q u e n t l y r a i s e d o b j e c t i o n t h a t this justification is c i r c u l a r 1 w o u l d n o t e t h a t t h e c o n t e n t of t h e universal p r e s u p p o s i t i o n ^ o f j a r g u m e n t a t i o n is b y ^ n o ^ m e a n s " n o r m a t i v e " i n t h e m o r a l sense. F o r inclusivity only signifies t h a t access to d i s c o u r s e is u n r e stricted; it d o e s n o t i m p l y t h e universality of b i n d i n g n o r m s of ac t i o n . T h e e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of c o m m u n i c a t i v e f r e e d o m s a n d t h e r e q u i r e m e n t of t r u t h f u l n e s s in d i s c o u r s e h a v e t h e status of argumen6 7
45 A Genealogical Analysis of the Cognitive Content of Morality
tative duties a n d rights, n o t of moral d u t i e s a n d rights. So t o o , t h e a b s e n c e of c o e r c i o n refers toJ±iej3rocesj^^ f o l n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s outside of this p r a c t i c e . T h e s e constitutive r u l e s of t h e l a n g u a g e g a m e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n g o v e r n t h e e x c h a n g e of a r g u m e n t s a n d of "yes" o r " n o " r e s p o n s e s ; t h e y have t h e e p i s t e m i c forcejpf^nabling condrdons^for the j u s t i f i c a t i o n ^ o f ^ t ^ m e n t s b u t d o n o t h a v e a n y immediate practTcaT^ifects in m o t i v a t i n g a c t i o n s a n d i n t e r a c t i o n s o u t s i d e of d i s c o u r s e . T h e p o i n t of s u c h a justification of t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view is t h a t t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t of t h i s ^ p i ^ t e j n k ^ j a n g u a g e gamejl is transmit t e d o n l y by a r u l e of a r g u m e n t a t i o n t o t h e selection of n o r m s of action, w h i c h t o g e t h e r with t h e i r m o r a l validity claim p r o v i d e t h e i n p u t i n t o practical discourses. A m o r a l o b l i g a t i o n c a n n o t follow f r o m t h e so t o s p e a k t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s t r a i n t of u n a v o i d a b l e pre s u p p o s i t i o n s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n a l o n e ; r a t h e r it a t t a c h e s to t h e spe cific objects of practical d i s c o u r s e , namely, t o t h e n o r m s introduced i n t o d i s c o u r s e t o w h i c h t h e r e a s o n s m o b i l i z e d in d e l i b e r a t i o n refer. I e m p h a s i z e this w h e n I specify t h a t (U) c a n b e r e n d e r e d plausible in connection with a (weak, h e n c e n o n p r e j u d i c i a l ) concept of normative justification. T h i s justification strategy, w h i c h I have h e r e m e r e l y s k e t c h e d , m u s t b e s u p p l e m e n t e d with g e n e a l o g i c a l a r g u m e n t s j d r a w i r u ^ r i ^ ^ ^ of m o d e r n i z a t i r ^ ^ b e r e n d e r e d p l a u s i b l e . With (U) we(feassure o u r s e l v e ^ irrja reflexive m a n n e r ) o f a r e s i d u a l n o r m a tive s u b s t a n c e w h i c h is p r e s e r v e d in p o s t t r a d i t i o n a l societies by t h e f o r m a l f e a t u r e s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d a c t i o n o r i e n t e d to r e a c h i n g a s h a r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h i s isf^so) s h o w n by t h e p r o c e d u r e of estab lishing universal p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n by d e m o n s t r a t i n g p e r f o r m a t i v e self-contradictions, w h i c h I c a n n o t g o i n t o h e r e . T h e q u e s t i o n of t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of n o r m s arises as a n a d d i t i o n a l p r o b l e m . T h e p r i n c i p l e of a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s ] d e v e l o p e d by Klaus Gunt h e r first b r i n g s t h e j r n o r a l p o i n t j o f view to b e a r o n s i n g u l a r m o r a l j u d g m e n t s in a complete m a n n e r . T h e o u t c o m e of successful dis courses of justification a n d a p p l i c a t i o n sjigws t h a t practical questions a r e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d by t h e sharply d e f i n e d m o r a l p o i n t of view; m o r a ] q u e s t i o n s of w e l l - o r d e r e d i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s a r e s e p a r a t e d from p r a g m a t i c q u e s t i o n s of r a t i o n a l c h o i c e , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d frorrj 68
6 9
7 0
46 Chapter 1
e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n s of t h e g o o d o r n o t m i s s p e n t life o n t h e o t h e r . It h a s b e c o m e clear t o m e in r e t r o s p e c t t h a t (U) only o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d a m o r e c o m p r e h e n s i v e p r i n c i p l e of d i s c o u r s e with r e f e r e n c e to a p a r t i c u l a r subject m a t t e r , namely, m o r a l i t y . T h e p r i n c i p l e ^ of d i s c o u r s e c a n also b e o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d for o t h e r k i n d s of q u e s t i o n s , for e x a m p l e , for t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s of political legislators o r for legal discourses. 71
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II Political Liberalism: A Debate with John Rawls
2
Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason
1
J o h n Rawls's A Theory ofJustice m a r k s a pivotal t u r n i n g p o i n t in t h e m o s t r e c e n t h i s t o r y of p r a c t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y , for h e r e s t o r e d l o n g s u p p r e s s e d m o r a l q u e s t i o n s to t h e status of serious objects of p h i l o s o p h i c a l investigation. I m m a n u e l K a n t p o s e d t h e f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n of m o r a l i t y in s u c h a way t h a t it a d m i t t e d a r a t i o n a l answer: we o u g h t to d o w h a t is equally g o o d for all p e r s o n s . W i t h o u t e s p o u s i n g t h e b a c k g r o u n d a s s u m p t i o n s of K a n t ' s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y , Rawls r e n e w e d this t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h with p a r t i c u l a r r e f e r e n c e to t h e issue of t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of a j u s t society. I n o p p o s i t i o n to utili t a r i a n i s m a n d value skepticism h e p r o p o s e d a n intersubjectivist ver sion of K a n t ' s p r i n c i p l e of a u t o n o m y : we act a u t o n o m o u s l y w h e n we o b e y t h o s e laws t h a t c o u l d b e a c c e p t e d , b y all c o n c e r n e d o n t h e basis of a p u b l i c u s e of .their r e a s o n . M o r e recently, in Political Liberalism, in w h i c h Rawls h a s c o n c l u d e d a twenty-year p r o c e s s of e x t e n s i o n a n d revision of his t h e o r y of j u s t i c e , h e exploits this m o r a l c o n c e p t of a u t o n o m y as t h e key to e x p l a i n i n g t h e political a u t o n o m y of citizens of a d e m o c r a t i c society: " O u r exercise of political p o w e r is fully p r o p e r only w h e n it is e x e r c i s e d in a c c o r d a n c e with a c o n s t i t u t i o n , t h e essentials of w h i c h all citizens as free a n d e q u a l m a y b e r e a s o n ably e x p e c t e d to e n d o r s e in t h e light of p r i n c i p l e s a n d ideals accept able to t h e i r c o m m o n h u m a n r e a s o n . " J u s t as previously h e t o o k a s t a n d a g a i n s t utilitarian p o s i t i o n s , h e n o w r e s p o n d s p r i m a r i l y to c o n t e x t u a l i s t p o s i t i o n s t h a t q u e s t i o n t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a r e a s o n c o m m o n t o all h u m a n b e i n g s . 2
50 Chapter 2
B e c a u s e I a d m i r e this project, s h a r e its i n t e n t i o n s , a n d r e g a r d its essential results as c o r r e c t , t h e d i s s e n t I e x p r e s s h e r e will r e m a i n w i t h i n t h e b o u n d s of a family q u a r r e l . My d o u b t s a r e l i m i t e d t o w h e t h e r Rawls always b r i n g s to b e a r a g a i n s t his critics his i m p o r t a n t n o r m a t i v e i n t u i t i o n s in t h e i r m o s t c o m p e l l i n g f o r m . B u t first, let m e briefly o u t l i n e his p r o j e c t in its c u r r e n t state. Rawls offers a justification of t h e p r i n c i p l e s o n w h i c h a m o d e r n society m u s t b e c o n s t i t u t e d if it is to e n s u r e t h e fair c o o p e r a t i o n of its citizens as free a n d e q u a l p e r s o n s . H i s first step is to clarify t h e s t a n d p o i n t f r o m w h i c h fictional r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e p e o p l e c o u l d answer this q u e s t i o n impartially. Rawls e x p l a i n s why t h e p a r t i e s in t h e so-called o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n w o u l d a g r e e o n two p r i n c i p l e s : first, o n t h e liberal p r i n c i p l e a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h e v e r y o n e is e n t i t l e d to a n e q u a l system of basic liberties, a n d , s e c o n d , o n a s u b o r d i n a t e p r i n c i p l e t h a t establishes e q u a l access t o p u b l i c offices a n d stipulates t h a t social i n e q u a l i t i e s a r e a c c e p t a b l e only w h e n t h e y a r e also to t h e a d v a n t a g e of t h e least privileged. I n a s e c o n d step, Rawls shows t h a t this c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e c a n e x p e c t t o m e e t with a g r e e m e n t u n d e r t h e c o n d i t i o n s of a pluralistic society w h i c h it itself p r o m o t e s . Politi cal liberalism, as a r e a s o n a b l e c o n s t r u c t i o n t h a t d o e s n o t raise a claim to t r u t h , is n e u t r a l t o w a r d conflicting worldviews* I n a t h i r d a n d final step, Rawls o u t l i n e s t h e basic r i g h t s a n d p r i n c i p l e s of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state t h a t c a n b e d e r i v e d f r o m t h e two p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e . T a k i n g t h e s e steps in s e q u e n c e , I will raise o b j e c t i o n s di r e c t e d n o t so m u c h against t h e p r o j e c t as s u c h b u t against c e r t a i n aspects of its e x e c u t i o n . I fear t h a t Rawls m a k e s c o n c e s s i o n s to o p p o s e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o s i t i o n s t h a t i m p a i r t h e c o g e n c y of his o w n project. My c r i t i q u e is a c o n s t r u c t i v e a n d i m m a n e n t o n e . First, I d o u b t w h e t h e r every a s p e c t of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n is d e s i g n e d to clarify a n d s e c u r e t h e s t a n d p o i n t of i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t of d e o n t o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e ( I ) . F u r t h e r , I t h i n k t h a t Rawls s h o u l d m a k e a s h a r p e r d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n q u e s t i o n s of justification a n d q u e s t i o n s of a c c e p t a n c e ; h e s e e m s to w a n t to p u r c h a s e t h e n e u t r a l i t y of his c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e at t h e cost of forsaking its cognitive validity claim (II). T h e s e two t h e o r e t i c a l d e c i s i o n s r e s u l t in a c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state t h a t a c c o r d s liberal basic r i g h t s p r i m a c y
51 Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason
over t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r i n c i p l e of l e g i t i m a t i o n . Rawls t h e r e b y fails to achieve his g o a l of b r i n g i n g t h e liberties of t h e m o d e r n s i n t o h a r m o n y with t h e liberties of t h e a n c i e n t s (III). I c o n c l u d e m y r e m a r k s with a thesis o n t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of political p h i l o s o p h y : u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l t h o u g h t , this s h o u l d b e m o d e s t , b u t n o t in t h e w r o n g way. T h e adversarial r o l e assigned m e by t h e e d i t o r s of t h e Journal of Philosophy c o m p e l s m e to h e i g h t e n tentative r e s e r v a t i o n s i n t o objec tions. T h i s intensification is justified by m y i n t e n t i o n , at o n c e friendly a n d provocative, of s e t t i n g t h e n o t easily surveyable argu m e n t s of a h i g h l y c o m p l e x a n d well t h o u g h t - o u t t h e o r y in m o t i o n in s u c h a way t h a t t h e latter c a n reveal its s t r e n g t h s . 3
I
T h e D e s i g n o f the Original Position
Rawls conceives of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n as a situation in w h i c h rationally c h o o s i n g r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e citizens a r e subject to t h e specific c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t g u a r a n t e e a n i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t of practi cal q u e s t i o n s . T h e c o n c e p t of full a u t o n o m y is r e s e r v e d for t h e citizens w h o a l r e a d y live u n d e r t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s of a w e l l - o r d e r e d society. F o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , Rawls splits this c o n c e p t of political a u t o n o m y i n t o two e l e m e n t s : t h e m o r a l l y n e u t r a l characteristics of p a r t i e s w h o seek t h e i r r a t i o n a l a d v a n t a g e , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t h e m o r a l l y substantive s i t u a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s u n d e r w h i c h t h o s e p a r t i e s c h o o s e p r i n c i p l e s for a system of fair c o o p e r a tion, o n t h e o t h e r , - T h e s e n o r m a t i v e c o n s t r a i n t s p e r m i t t h e p a r t i e s to b e e n d o w e d with a m i n i m u m of p r o p e r t i e s , in particular, " t h e capacity for a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d ( a n d t h u s t o b e r a t i o n a l ) . " R e g a r d l e s s of w h e t h e r t h e p a r t i e s e n t e r t a i n exclusively p u r p o s i v e r a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o r also a d d r e s s e t h i c a l q u e s t i o n s of p a r t i c u l a r p l a n s of life, t h e y always r e a c h t h e i r d e c i s i o n s in light of t h e i r valueo r i e n t a t i o n s ( t h a t is, f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e g r o u p s of citizens they r e p r e s e n t ) . T h e y n e e d n o t r e g a r d m a t t e r s f r o m t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view, w h i c h w o u l d r e q u i r e t h e m to take a c c o u n t of w h a t is in t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of all, for this impartiality is e x a c t e d by a situation t h a t t h r o w s a veil of i g n o r a n c e over t h e m u t u a l l y d i s i n t e r e s t e d t h o u g h free a n d e q u a l p a r t i e s . B e c a u s e t h e latter d o n o t k n o w w h i c h 4
52 Chapter 2
p o s i t i o n s t h e y will o c c u p y in t h e society t h a t it is t h e i r task to o r d e r , t h e y find themselves c o n s t r a i n e d a l r e a d y by t h e i r self-interest to reflect o n w h a t is equally g o o d for all. T h i s c o n s t r u c t i o n of a n o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t h a t frames t h e f r e e d o m of c h o i c e of r a t i o n a l a c t o r s in a r e a s o n a b l e fashion is e x p l a i n e d by Rawls's initial i n t e n t i o n of r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e as p a r t of t h e g e n e r a l t h e o r y of c h o i c e . Rawls originally p r o c e e d e d o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e r a n g e of o p t i o n s o p e n to rationally c h o o s i n g p a r t i e s only n e e d e d to b e l i m i t e d in a n a p p r o p r i a t e fashion in o r d e r to facilitate t h e d e r i v a t i o n of p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e f r o m t h e i r enlight e n e d self-interest. B u t h e s o o n realized t h a t t h e r e a s o n of a u t o n o m o u s citizens c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d to r a t i o n a l c h o i c e c o n d i t i o n e d by subjective p r e f e r e n c e s . Yet even after t h e revision of t h e initial g o a l t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n was d e s i g n e d to achieve, h e h a s h e l d to t h e view t h a t t h e m e a n i n g of t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view c a n b e o p e r a t i o n alized in this way. T h i s h a s s o m e u n f o r t u n a t e c o n s e q u e n c e s , t h r e e of w h i c h I w o u l d like to a d d r e s s in w h a t follows: (1) C a n t h e p a r t i e s in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n c o m p r e h e n d t h e h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s of t h e i r clients solely o n t h e basis of r a t i o n a l egoism? (2) C a n basic r i g h t s b e assimilated to p r i m a r y g o o d s ? (3) D o e s t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e g u a r a n t e e t h e impartiality of j u d g m e n t ? 5
6
(1) Rawls c a n n o t consistently follow t h r o u g h o n his d e c i s i o n t h a t "fully" a u t o n o m o u s citizens a r e to b e r e p r e s e n t e d by p a r t i e s w h o lack this a u t o n o m y . Citizens a r e a s s u m e d t o b e m o r a l p e r s o n s w h o possess a sense of j u s t i c e a n d t h e capacity for t h e i r own c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d , as well as a n i n t e r e s t in cultivating t h e s e dispositions in a r a t i o n a l m a n n e r . B u t in t h e case of t h e p a r t i e s in t h e o r i g i n a l posi tion, t h e s e r e a s o n a b l e characteristics of m o r a l p e r s o n s a r e substi t u t e d by t h e c o n s t r a i n t s of a r a t i o n a l d e s i g n . At t h e s a m e t i m e , however, t h e p a r t i e s a r e s u p p o s e d to b e a b l e to u n d e r s t a n d a n d take a d e q u a t e a c c o u n t of t h e " h i g h e s t - o r d e r i n t e r e s t s " of t h e citizens t h a t follow f r o m t h e s e very characteristics. F o r e x a m p l e , they m u s t take a c c o u n t of t h e fact t h a t a u t o n o m o u s citizens r e s p e c t t h e i n t e r e s t s of o t h e r s o n t h e basis of j u s t p r i n c i p l e s a n d n o t m e r e l y f r o m self-inter est, t h a t t h e y c a n b e o b l i g a t e d to loyalty, t h a t they c a n b e c o n v i n c e d of t h e legitimacy of existing a r r a n g e m e n t s a n d policies t h r o u g h t h e p u b l i c u s e of t h e i r r e a s o n , a n d so f o r t h . T h u s , t h e p a r t i e s a r e sup-
53 Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason
p o s e d b o t h to u n d e r s t a n d a n d take seriously t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s a n d c o n s e q u e n c e s of a n a u t o n o m y t h a t t h e y a r e t h e m s e l v e s d e n i e d . T h i s m a y still b e p l a u s i b l e for t h e advocacy of self-related i n t e r e s t s a n d c o n c e p t i o n s of t h e g o o d t h a t a r e n o t k n o w n in detail. B u t c a n t h e m e a n i n g of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of j u s t i c e r e m a i n u n a f f e c t e d by t h e p e r spective of r a t i o n a l egoists? At a n y r a t e , t h e p a r t i e s a r e i n c a p a b l e of achieving, w i t h i n t h e b o u n d s set by t h e i r r a t i o n a l e g o i s m , t h e r e c i p r o c a l p e r s p e c t i v e t a k i n g t h a t t h e citizens they r e p r e s e n t m u s t u n d e r take w h e n t h e y o r i e n t t h e m s e l v e s in a j u s t m a n n e r to w h a t is equally g o o d for all: "in t h e i r r a t i o n a l d e l i b e r a t i o n s t h e p a r t i e s . . . r e c o g n i z e n o s t a n d p o i n t e x t e r n a l to t h e i r o w n p o i n t of view as r a t i o n a l r e p r e sentatives" (PL 7 5 ) . B u t if, d e s p i t e this, t h e p a r t i e s a r e to u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g of t h e d e o n t o l o g i c a l p r i n c i p l e s t h e y a r e s e e k i n g a n d to take sufficient a c c o u n t of t h e i r clients' i n t e r e s t s i n j u s t i c e , they m u s t b e e q u i p p e d with cognitive c o m p e t e n c e s t h a t e x t e n d f u r t h e r t h a n t h e capacities sufficient for rationally c h o o s i n g a c t o r s w h o a r e b l i n d to issues of j u s t i c e . O f c o u r s e , it is o p e n t o Rawls to modify t h e d e s i g n of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n accordingly. A l r e a d y in A Theory of Justice h e qualified t h e rationality of t h e c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t n e r s in various ways. O n t h e o n e h a n d , they take n o i n t e r e s t in o n e a n o t h e r , c o n d u c t i n g themselves like players w h o "strive for as h i g h a n a b s o l u t e score as p o s s i b l e " (TJ 144). O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e y a r e e q u i p p e d with a "purely f o r m a l " sense of j u s t i c e , for t h e y a r e s u p p o s e d to k n o w t h a t t h e y will c o n f o r m to w h a t e v e r p r i n c i p l e s a r e a g r e e d u p o r r i n t h e i r f u t u r e r o l e as citizens living in a w e l l - o r d e r e d society (TJ 1 4 5 ) . T h i s c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d to m e a n t h a t t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n a r e at least c o g n i z a n t of t h e k i n d of b i n d i n g m u t u a l i t y t h a t will c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e life of t h e i r clients in t h e f u t u r e , a l t h o u g h t h e y t h e m s e l v e s m u s t for t h e p r e s e n t c o n d u c t t h e i r n e g o t i a t i o n s u n d e r different p r e m i s e s . S u c h stipula tions a r e perfectly admissible. My only q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r , in b e i n g e x t e n d e d in this d i r e c t i o n , t h e d e s i g n loses its p o i n t by b e c o m i n g t o o far r e m o v e d f r o m t h e o r i g i n a l m o d e l . F o r as s o o n as t h e p a r t i e s step o u t s i d e t h e b o u n d a r i e s of t h e i r r a t i o n a l e g o i s m a n d a s s u m e even a d i s t a n t likeness to m o r a l p e r s o n s , t h e division of l a b o r b e t w e e n t h e rationality of c h o i c e of subjects a n d a p p r o p r i a t e objective c o n s t r a i n t s is d e s t r o y e d , a division t h r o u g h w h i c h self-interested
54 Chapter 2
a g e n t s a r e n o n e t h e l e s s s u p p o s e d to arrive at m o r a l l y s o u n d deci sions. T h i s c o n s e q u e n c e m a y n o t have a n y g r e a t significance for t h e rest of t h e project; b u t it draws a t t e n t i o n to t h e c o n c e p t u a l c o n straints i m p o s e d by t h e o r i g i n a l ( t h o u g h in t h e m e a n t i m e a b a n d o n e d ) i n t e n t i o n to p r o v i d e a d e c i s i o n - t h e o r e t i c a l s o l u t i o n to T h o m a s H o b b e s ' s p r o b l e m . F o r a n o t h e r c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e r a t i o n a l c h o i c e f o r m a t of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n is t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of basic g o o d s , a n d this d e t e r m i n a t i o n is i m p o r t a n t for t h e f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e t h e o r y . (2) F o r rationally c h o o s i n g a c t o r s b o u n d to t h e first p e r s o n p e r spective, n o r m a t i v e issues of w h a t e v e r k i n d c a n b e r e p r e s e n t e d solely in t e r m s of i n t e r e s t s o r values t h a t a r e satisfied by g o o d s . G o o d s a r e w h a t we strive f o r — i n d e e d , w h a t is g o o d for us. C o r r e s p o n d i n g l y , Rawls i n t r o d u c e s " p r i m a r y g o o d s " as g e n e r a l i z e d m e a n s t h a t p e o p l e m a y n e e d in o r d e r to realize t h e i r p l a n s of life. A l t h o u g h t h e p a r t i e s k n o w t h a t s o m e of t h e s e p r i m a r y g o o d s a s s u m e t h e f o r m of r i g h t s for citizens of a w e l l - o r d e r e d society, in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t h e y t h e m s e l v e s c a n only d e s c r i b e r i g h t s as o n e c a t e g o r y of " g o o d s " a m o n g o t h e r s . F o r t h e m , t h e issue of p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e c a n only arise in t h e guise of t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e j u s t d i s t r i b u t i o n of p r i m a r y g o o d s . Rawls t h e r e b y a d o p t s a c o n c e p t of j u s t i c e t h a t is p r p p e r t o a n ethics of t h e g o o d , o n e m o r e c o n s i s t e n t with Aristotelian o r utilitar i a n a p p r o a c h e s t h a n with a t h e o r y of rights, s u c h as his o w n , t h a t p r o c e e d s f r o m t h e c o n c e p t of a u t o n o m y . Precisely b e c a u s e Rawls a d h e r e s to a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e o n w h i c h t h e a u t o n o m y of citizens is c o n s t i t u t e d t h r o u g h r i g h t s , t h e p a r a d i g m of d i s t r i b u t i o n g e n e r a t e s difficulties for h i m . Rights c a n b e "enjoyed" only by b e i n g exercised. T h e y c a n n o t b e assimilated to distributive g o o d s w i t h o u t forfeiting t h e i r d e o n t o l o g i c a l m e a n i n g . A n e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of r i g h t s results only if t h o s e w h o enjoy r i g h t s r e c o g n i z e o n e a n o t h e r as free a n d e q u a l . O f c o u r s e , t h e r e exist r i g h t s to a fair s h a r e of g o o d s o r o p p o r tunities, b u t r i g h t s i n t h e first i n s t a n c e r e g u l a t e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n actors: they c a n n o t b e "possessed" like t h i n g s . If I a m c o r r e c t , t h e c o n c e p t u a l c o n s t r a i n t s of t h e m o d e l of r a t i o n a l c h o i c e p r e c l u d e Rawls f r o m c o n s t r u i n g basic liberties f r o m t h e o u t s e t as basic r i g h t s a n d c o m p e l h i m to i n t e r p r e t t h e m as p r i m a r y g o o d s . T h i s l e a d s h i m to assimilate t h e d e o n t o l o g i c a l m e a n i n g of o b l i g a t o r y n o r m s to t h e teleological m e a n i n g of p r e f e r r e d v a l u e s . Rawls t h e r e b y b l u r s cer7
8
55 Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason
tain d i s t i n c t i o n s t h a t I shall briefly m e n t i o n in o r d e r to show h o w this limits his o p t i o n s in t h e f u r t h e r d e v e l o p m e n t of his project. N o r m s i n f o r m d e c i s i o n s as to w h a t o n e o u g h t to d o , values i n f o r m d e c i s i o n s as t o w h a t c o n d u c t is m o s t d e s i r a b l e . R e c o g n i z e d n o r m s impose equal a n d exceptionless obligations o n their addressees, while values e x p r e s s t h e preferability of g o o d s t h a t a r e striven for by p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p s . W h e r e a s n o r m s a r e o b s e r v e d in t h e sense of a fulfillment of g e n e r a l i z e d b e h a v i o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n s , values o r g o o d s c a n b e r e a l i z e d o r a c q u i r e d only by p u r p o s i v e a c t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , n o r m s raise a b i n a r y validity claim in v i r t u e of w h i c h t h e y a r e said to b e e i t h e r valid o r invalid: to o u g h t s t a t e m e n t s , as to assertoric s t a t e m e n t s , we c a n r e s p o n d o n l y with "yes" o r " n o " — o r refrain f r o m j u d g m e n t . Values, by c o n t r a s t , fix r e l a t i o n s of p r e f e r e n c e w h i c h sig nify t h a t c e r t a i n g o o d s a r e m o r e attractive t h a n o t h e r s : h e n c e , we c a n a s s e n t t o evaluative s t a t e m e n t s t o a g r e a t e r o r lesser d e g r e e . T h e o b l i g a t o r y force of n o r m s h a s t h e a b s o l u t e m e a n i n g of a n u n c o n d i t i o n a l a n d universal duty: w h a t o n e o u g h t t o d o is w h a t is equally g o o d for all ( t h a t is, for all a d d r e s s e e s ) . T h e attractiveness of values reflects a n e v a l u a t i o n a n d a transitive o r d e r i n g of g o o d s t h a t h a s b e c o m e e s t a b l i s h e d in p a r t i c u l a r c u l t u r e s o r h a s b e e n a d o p t e d by p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p s : i m p o r t a n t evaluative d e c i s i o n s o r h i g h e r - o r d e r p r e f e r e n c e s e x p r e s s w h a t is g o o d for u s ( o r for m e ) , all t h i n g s c o n s i d e r e d . Finally, different n o r m s m u s t n o t c o n t r a d i c t e a c h o t h e r w h e n t h e y claim validity for t h e s a m e d o m a i n of a d d r e s s e e s ; t h e y m u s t s t a n d i n c o h e r e n t r e l a t i o n s to o n e a n o t h e r — i n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e y m u s t c o n s t i t u t e a system. Different values, by c o n t r a s t , c o m p e t e for priority; insofar as t h e y m e e t with intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n w i t h i n a c u l t u r e o r g r o u p , they c o n s t i t u t e shifting c o n f i g u r a t i o n s f r a u g h t with t e n s i o n . T o s u m u p , n o r m s differ f r o m values, first, in t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o r u l e - g o v e r n e d as o p p o s e d to p u r p o s i v e a c t i o n ; sec o n d , in a b i n a r y as o p p o s e d t o a g r a d u a l c o d i n g of t h e respective validity claims; t h i r d , in t h e i r a b s o l u t e as o p p o s e d to relative b i n d i n g n e s s ; a n d last, in t h e criteria t h a t systems of n o r m s as o p p o s e d to systems of values m u s t satisfy. N e v e r t h e l e s s , Rawls wishes to d o j u s t i c e to t h e d e o n t o l o g i c a l intui t i o n t h a t finds e x p r e s s i o n in t h e s e distinctions; h e n c e , h e m u s t c o m p e n s a t e for t h e leveling of t h e d e o n t o l o g i c a l d i m e n s i o n w h i c h h e — a s a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e d e s i g n of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n —
56 Chapter 2
initially a c c e p t s with t h e c o n c e p t of p r i m a r y g o o d s . So h e a c c o r d s t h e first p r i n c i p l e priority over t h e s e c o n d . A n a b s o l u t e priority of e q u a l liberties over t h e p r i m a r y g o o d s r e g u l a t e d by t h e s e c o n d p r i n ciple is, however, difficult t o justify f r o m t h e first p e r s o n perspective in w h i c h we o r i e n t ourselves t o o u r o w n interests o r values. H . L. A. H a r t h a s d e v e l o p e d this p o i n t clearly i n his c r i t i q u e of Rawls. I n t e r estingly, Rawls c a n m e e t this criticism only by b u i l d i n g a subsequent qualification i n t o t h e p r i m a r y g o o d s w h i c h s e c u r e s t h e m a r e l a t i o n to basic liberties as basic rights: h e a c k n o w l e d g e s as p r i m a r y g o o d s only t h o s e t h a t a r e e x p e d i e n t for t h e life p l a n s a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e m o r a l faculties of citizens asjree and equal persons. Further m o r e , Rawls differentiates t h e p r i m a r y g o o d s t h a t a r e constitutive of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k of t h e w e l l - o r d e r e d society i n t h e m o r a l sense f r o m t h e r e m a i n d e r of t h e p r i m a r y g o o d s by i n c o r p o r a t i n g t h e guararrteMg^ofjhe "fair v a l u e " of liberty i n t o t h e first p r i n c i p l e . 9
10
11
This a d d i t i o n a l determination^ ^ presupposes a deorrjtolbgka^ contra dicts t h e p r i m a facie classification of r i g h t s as g o o d s . Since t h e fair valulFor^quaT liberties r e q u i r e s t h e a c t u a l availability of e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o exercise t h e s e rights, only rights, n o t g o o d s , c a n b e qualified in this m a n n e r . O n l y i n t h e case of rights c a n w e d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n legal c o m p e t e n c e a n d t h e a c t u a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o c h o o s e a n d t o act. O n l y b e t w e e n rights, o n t h e o n e side, a n d a c t u a l c h a n c e s to exercise rights, o n t h e other, c a n t h e r e exist a c h a s m t h a t is p r o b l e m a t i c f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of j u s t i c e ; s u c h a r u p t u r e c a n n o t
I
exist b e t w e e n t h e possession a n d e n j o y m e n t of g o o d s . It w o u l d b e e i t h e r r e d u n d a n t o r m e a n i n g l e s s t o s p e a k of t h e "fair v a l u e " of equally d i s t r i b u t e d g o o d s . T h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n legal a n d factual equality h a s n o a p p l i c a t i o n t o " g o o d s " for g r a m m a t i c a l r e a s o n s , to p u t it i n W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n t e r m s . B u t if t h e n o t i o n of p r i m a r y g o o d s is subject to c o r r e c t i o n in a s e c o n d step, we m a y ask w h e t h e r t h e first s t e p — t h e d e s i g n of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t h a t necessitates this c o n c e p t i o n — i s a wise o n e . (3) T h e f o r e g o i n g reflections s h o w t h a t , for t h e p a r t i e s i n t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , t h e capacity t o m a k e r a t i o n a l decisions is n o t sufficient to c o m p r e h e n d t h e h i g h e s t - o r d e r interests of t h e i r clients o r t o u n d e r s t a n d r i g h t s (in R o n a l d D w o r k i n ' s sense) as t r u m p s t h a t o v e r r i d e collective goals. B u t w h y t h e n a r e t h e p a r t i e s d e p r i v e d of 12
57 Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason
practical r e a s o n in t h e first p l a c e a n d s h r o u d e d in a n i m p e n e t r a b l e veil of i g n o r a n c e ? Rawls's g u i d i n g i n t u i t i o n is clear: t h e r o l e of t h e c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e is t a k e n over by a n intersubjectively a p p l i e d p r o c e d u r e w h i c h is e m b o d i e d in p a r t i c i p a t i o n c o n d i t i o n s s u c h as t h e equality of p a r t i e s a n d in situational f e a t u r e s s u c h as t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e . I n m y view, however, t h e p o t e n t i a l gains of this t u r n a r e dissipated precisely by t h e systematic d e p r i v a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n . My t h i r d q u e s t i o n reveals t h e p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m w h i c h I also p o s e t h e two p r e v i o u s q u e s t i o n s . I believe t h a t Rawls c o u l d avoid t h e difficulties associated with t h e d e s i g n of a n o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n if h e o p e r a t i o n a l ized t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view in a different way, namely, if h e k e p t t h e p r o c e d u r a l c o n c e p t i o n of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n free of substantive c o n n o t a t i o n s by d e v e l o p i n g it in a strictly p r o c e d u r a l m a n n e r . Kant's categorical imperative already goes b e y o n d the egocentric c h a r a c t e r of t h e G o l d e n Rule: "Do n o t d o u n t o o t h e r s w h a t y o u w o u l d n o t h a v e t h e m d o u n t o y o u . " W h e r e a s this r u l e calls for a universalization test f r o m t h e v i e w p o i n t of a given individual, t h e c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e r e q u i r e s t h a t all t h o s e possibly affected b e able to will a j u s t m a x i m as a g e n e r a l r u l e . B u t as l o n g as we apply this m o r e e x a c t i n g test in a m o n o l o g i c a l fashion, e a c h of u s still c o n s i d e r s privately w h a t all c o u l d will f r o m individually isolated p e r spectives. T h i s is i n a d e q u a t e . F o r only w h e n t h e s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of e a c h individual reflects a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h a t is, a universally valid view of t h e w o r l d , w o u l d w h a t f r o m m y p o i n t of view is equally g o o d for all actually b e i n t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of e a c h individual. B u t this c a n n o l o n g e r b e a s s u m e d u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of social a n d i d e o l o g i c a l p l u r a l i s m . If we wish to p r e s e r v e t h e i n t u i t i o n u n d e r l y i n g t h e K a n t i a n universalization p r i n c i p l e , we c a n r e s p o n d to this fact of p l u r a l i s m in different ways. Rawls i m p o s e s a c o m m o n p e r s p e c t i v e o n t h e p a r t i e s in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t h r o u g h i n f o r m a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t s a n d t h e r e b y n e u t r a l i z e s t h e multiplicity of p a r t i c u lar i n t e r p r e t i v e perspectives f r o m t h e o u t s e t . jGlsa^^ by c o n t r a s t , views t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view as e m b o d i e d in a n i n t e r s u b jective p r a x i s of a r g u m e n t a t i o n w h i c h e n j o i n s t h o s e involved to a n idealizing enlargement of t h e i r i n t e r p r e t i v e perspectives. D i s c o u r s e ethics rests o n t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e p r i n c i p l e of universalization, p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d , c ^ U s J ^ r ^ a J c ^ t p r o c e s s of "irlear r o l e t a k i n g . " It i n t e r p r e t s this i d e a of G. H . M e a d
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1 3
| in t e r m s of a p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y of a r g u m e n t a t i o n . U n d e r t h e p r a g j m a t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of a n inclusive a n d n o n c o e r c i v e r a t i o n a l dis| c o u r s e b e t w e e n free a n d e q u a l p a r t i c i p a n t s , e v e r y o n e is r e q u i r e d to take t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of e v e r y o n e else a n d t h u s t o p r o j e c t h e r s e l f i n t o t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of self a n d w o r l d of all o t h e r s ; f r o m this inter l o c k i n g of perspectives t h e r e e m e r g e s a n ideally e x t e n d e d "wej j e r s p e c t i v e " f r o m w h i c h all c a n test in c o m m o n w h e t h e r they wish to m a k e a controversial n o r m t h e basis of t h e i r s h a r e d p r a c t i c e ; a n d this s h o u l d i n c l u d e m u t u a l criticism of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of t h e l a n g u a g e s in t e r m s of w h i c h situations a n d n e e d s a r e i n t e r p r e t e d . I n t h e c o u r s e of successively u n d e r t a k e n a b s t r a c t i o n s , t h e c o r e of g e n e r alizable i n t e r e s t s c a n t h e n e m e r g e step by s t e p . 1 4
T h i n g s a r e different w h e n t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e c o n s t r a i n s t h e field of vision of p a r t i e s in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n from the beginning to t h e basic p r i n c i p l e s o n w h i c h p r e s u m p t i v e l y free a n d e q u a l citizens w o u l d a g r e e , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e i r d i v e r g e n t u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of self a n d world. It is i m p o r t a n t to see t h a t with this initial a b s t r a c t i o n Rawls a c c e p t s a double b u r d e n of proof. T h e veil of i g n o r a n c e m u s t e x t e n d to all p a r t i c u l a r viewpoints a n d i n t e r e s t s t h a t c o u l d i m p a i r a n i m p a r t i a l j u d g m e n t ; at t h e s a m e t i m e , it m a y e x t e n d only to s u c h n o r m a t i v e m a t t e r s as c a n b e disqualified w i t h o u t furtlier a d o as c a n d i d a t e s for t h e c o m m o n g o o d to b e a c c e p t e d by free a n d e q u a l citizens. T h i s s e c o n d c o n d i t i o n places a d e m a n d o n t h e t h e o r y t h a t is difficult to m e e t , as is s h o w n by brief reflection. Following t h e justification of t h e p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e , t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e is g r a d u a l l y r a i s e d d u r i n g t h e successive steps of f r a m i n g t h e constitu tion, of legislation, a n d of a p p l y i n g law. Since t h e n e w i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t t h e r e b y s t r e a m s in m u s t h a r m o n i z e with t h e basic p r i n c i p l e s a l r e a d y s e l e c t e d u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of i n f o r m a t i o n a l c o n s t r a i n t , u n p l e a s a n t surprises m u s t b e avoided. If we a r e to e n s u r e t h a t n o d i s c r e p a n c i e s arise, we m u s t c o n s t r u c t t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n a l r e a d y with k n o w l e d g e , a n d even foresight, of all of t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t s t h a t c o u l d p o t e n t i a l l y n o u r i s h t h e s h a r e d s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of free a n d e q u a l citizens in t h e f u t u r e . I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e t h e o r e t i c i a n himself w o u l d have to s h o u l d e r t h e b u r d e n of a n t i c i p a t i n g at least p a r t s of t h e i n f o r m a t i o n of w h i c h h e previously relieved t h e p a r t i e s in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n ! T h e impartiality of j u d g m e n t w o u l d only b e
59 Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason
g u a r a n t e e d in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n if t h e basic n o r m a t i v e c o n c e p t s e m p l o y e d in its c o n s t r u c t i o n — t h o s e of t h e politically a u t o n o m o u s citizen, of fair c o o p e r a t i o n , a n d of a w e l l - o r d e r e d society, in t h e specific sense Rawls a t t a c h e s to t h e s e t e r m s — c o u l d w i t h s t a n d revi sion in light of m o r a l l y significant f u t u r e e x p e r i e n c e s a n d l e a r n i n g processes. If s u c h a heavy b u r d e n of p r o o f is g e n e r a t e d by t h e d e p r i v a t i o n of i n f o r m a t i o n i m p o s e d o n t h e p a r t i e s in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n by t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e , a c o n v e n i e n t r e s p o n s e w o u l d b e to l i g h t e n this b u r d e n by o p e r a t i o n a l i z i n g t h e m o r a l p o i n t of view in a different way. I h a v e in m i n d t h e m o r e o p e n p r o c e d u r e of a n a r g u m e n t a t i v e p r a x i s t h a t p r o c e e d s u n d e r t h e d e m a n d i n g p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s of t h e "public u s e of r e a s o n " a n d d o e s n o t b r a c k e t t h e p l u r a l i s m of convic tions a n d worldviews f r o m t h e outset. T h i s p r o c e d u r e c a n b e expli c a t e d w i t h o u t r e c o u r s e to t h e substantive c o n c e p t s t h a t Rawls e m p l o y s in t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . II
T h e Fact o f Pluralism and the Idea o f an Overlapping Consensus
Since his Dewey L e c t u r e s , "Kantian C o n s t r u c t i v i s m in M o r a l T h e o r y , " Rawls h a s stressed t h e political c h a r a c t e r of j u s t i c e as fairness. T h i s shift is m o t i v a t e d by d i s q u i e t c o n c e r n i n g t h e fact of social a n d , a b o v e all, i d e o l o g i c a l p l u r a l i s m . I n discussing t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e , I h a v e a l r e a d y clarified t h e b u r d e n of p r o o f t h a t t h e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e takes u p o n itself with its initial t h e o r e t i c a l decisions. T h e decisive issue in t h e justification of t h e two h i g h e s t p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e is less t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n t h a n t h e i n t u i t i o n s a n d basic c o n c e p t s t h a t g u i d e t h e d e s i g n of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n itself. Rawls i n t r o d u c e s n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t s i n t o t h e very p r o c e d u r e of justification, a b o v e all t h o s e i d e a s h e associates with t h e c o n c e p t of t h e m o r a l p e r s o n : t h e sense of fairness a n d t h e capacity for o n e ' s o w n c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . T h u s t h e c o n c e p t of t h e citizen as a m o r a l p e r s o n , w h i c h also u n d e r l i e s t h e c o n c e p t of t h e fair c o o p e r a t i o n of politically a u t o n o m o u s citizens, s t a n d s in n e e d of* a prior justification. F u r t h e r , it n e e d s to b e s h o w n t h a t this c o n c e p t i o n is n e u t r a l t o w a r d conflicting worldviews a n d r e m a i n s u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l after t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e h a s b e e n lifted. T h i s e x p l a i n s Rawls's 15
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i n t e r e s t in a "political," as o p p o s e d to a m e t a p h y s i c a l , c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e . I s u s p e c t t h a t this t e r m i n o l o g y i n d i c a t e s a c e r t a i n u n c l a r i t y a b o u t t h e p r e c i s e c h a r a c t e r of w h a t is in n e e d of justification; f r o m this, in t u r n , t h e r e results a n indecisiveness as to h o w t h e validity claim of t h e t h e o r y itself s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d . I will e x a m i n e w h e t h e r t h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s , o n w h i c h t h e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e d e p e n d s , plays a cognitive o r m e r e l y a n i n s t r u m e n t a l r o l e : w h e t h e r it p r i m a r i l y c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e f u r t h e r justification of t h e t h e o r y o r w h e t h e r it serves, in light of t h e p r i o r justification of t h e t h e o r y , to e x p l i c a t e a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n of social stability ( 1 ) . C o n n e c t e d with this is t h e q u e s t i o n of t h e sense in w h i c h Rawls uses t h e p r e d i cate " r e a s o n a b l e " : as a p r e d i c a t e for t h e validity of m o r a l j u d g m e n t s o r for t h e reflective a t t i t u d e of e n l i g h t e n e d t o l e r a n c e ( 2 ) . (1) I n o r d e r to p i n d o w n t h e u n d e r l y i n g n o r m a t i v e i d e a s , Rawls h a s r e c o u r s e to t h e so-called m e t h o d of reflective e q u i l i b r i u m . T h e p h i l o s o p h e r arrives at t h e basic c o n c e p t of t h e m o r a l p e r s o n a n d t h e a d j u n c t c o n c e p t s of t h e politically a u t o n o m o u s citizen, of fair c o o p e r a t i o n , of t h e w e l l - o r d e r e d society, a n d so f o r t h , via a r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of p r o v e n i n t u i t i o n s , t h a t is, i n t u i t i o n s actually found in t h e p r a c t i c e s a n d t r a d i t i o n s of a d e m o c r a t i c society. Reflective e q u i l i b r i u m is a c h i e v e d at t h e m o m e n t w h e n t h e p h i l o s o p h e r h a s at t a i n e d t h e a s s u r a n c e t h a t t h o s e involved c a n n o l o n g e r reject with g o o d r e a s o n s i n t u i t i o n s r e c o n s t r u c t e d a n d clarified in this m a n n e r . T h e p r o c e d u r e of r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n a l r e a d y fulfills T h o m a s S c a n l o n ' s c r i t e r i o n of w h a t it is " n o t r e a s o n a b l e to reject." O f c o u r s e , Rawls d o e s n o t wish to limit h i m s e l f solely to t h e f u n d a m e n t a l n o r mative convictions of a particular political c u l t u r e : even t h e p r e s e n t day Rawls, pace R i c h a r d Rorty, h a s n o t b e c o m e a c o n t e x t u a l i s t . H i s >. aim, as b e f o r e , is to r e c o n s t r u c t a s u b s t r a t u m of intuitive i d e a s l a t e n t in t h e political c u l t u r e of his society a n d its d e m o c r a t i c t r a d i t i o n s . B u t if e x p e r i e n c e s associated with a n incipiently successful institu t i o n a l i z a t i o n of p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e h a v e a l r e a d y b e c o m e sedim e n t e d in t h e existing political c u l t u r e — i n A m e r i c a n political c u l t u r e , for e x a m p l e — s u c h a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e a p p r o p r i a t i o n c a n ac c o m p l i s h m o r e t h a n m e r e l y t h e h e r m e n e u t i c clarification of a c o n t i n g e n t t r a d i t i o n . T h e c o n c e p t of j u s t i c e worked out o n this basis m u s t n o n e t h e l e s s b e e x a m i n e d o n c e a g a i n as to w h e t h e r it c a n e x p e c t to
61 Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason
m e e t with a c c e p t a n c e i n a pluralistic society. H o w is this s e c o n d step r e l a t e d t o t h e first stage of justification of t h e two h i g h e s t p r i n c i p l e s a l r e a d y e x a m i n e d ? Is it even p r o p e r l y a s e c o n d step of justification ? A l r e a d y i n t h e final c h a p t e r s of A Theory ofJustice, Rawls a d d r e s s e s t h e issue of w h e t h e r a society c o n s t i t u t e d in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e c o u l d stabilize itself: for e x a m p l e , w h e t h e r it c o u l d g e n e r a t e t h e functionally n e c e s s a r y m o t i v a t i o n s f r o m its o w n r e s o u r c e s t h r o u g h t h e r e q u i s i t e political socialization of its citizens (TJ 4 9 6 f f ) . I n view of t h e fact of social a n d i d e o l o g i c a l p l u r a l i s m w h i c h h e s u b s e q u e n t l y t o o k m o r e seriously, Rawls n o w w a n t s to e x a m i n e i n a similar way w h e t h e r t h e t h e o r e t i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e falls u n d e r t h e "art of t h e p o s s i b l e " a n d h e n c e is "practica b l e . " First of all, t h e c e n t r a l c o n c e p t of t h e p e r s o n o n w h i c h t h e t h e o r y u l t i m a t e l y rests m u s t b e sufficiently n e u t r a l t o b e a c c e p t a b l e f r o m t h e i n t e r p r e t i v e perspectives of different worldviews. H e n c e it m u s t b e s h o w n t h a t j u s t i c e as fairness c a n f o r m t h e basis of a n " o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s . " So far, so g o o d . W h a t b o t h e r s m e is Rawls's w o r k i n g a s s u m p t i o n t h a t s u c h a test of acceptability is of t h e s a m e k i n d as t h e test of consistency h e previously u n d e r t o o k with refer e n c e t o t h e w e l l - o r d e r e d society's p o t e n t i a l for self-stabilization. T h i s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l p a r a l l e l is p r o b l e m a t i c b e c a u s e t h e test can n o t b e u n d e r t a k e n in a n i m m a n e n t m a n n e r i n t h e case of accept ability; it is n o l o n g e r a m o v e w i t h i n t h e t h e o r y . T h e test of t h e n e u t r a l i t y of t h e basic n o r m a t i v e c o n c e p t s with r e s p e c t to conflicting worldviews n o w rests o n d i f f e r e n t p r e m i s e s : it is different f r o m a h y p o t h e t i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e capacity of a society, a l r e a d y o r g a n ized in a c c o r d a n c e with p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e , t o r e p r o d u c e itself. Rawls h i m s e l f i n his p r e s e n t w o r k d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n "two stages" o f t h e o r y - f o r m a t i o n . T h e p r i n c i p l e s justified a t t h e first stage m u s t b e e x p o s e d t o p u b l i c discussion a t t h e s e c o n d stage. O n l y w h e n t h e t h e o r e t i c a l d e s i g n is c o m p l e t e d c a n t h e fact of p l u r a l i s m b e b r o u g h t i n t o play a n d t h e a b s t r a c t i o n s of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n r e v o k e d . T h e t h e o r y as a w h o l e m u s t b e s u b j e c t e d t o criticism by t h e citizens in t h e p u b l i c f o r u m of r e a s o n . I n this f o r u m it is n o l o n g e r t h e fictional citizens of a j u s t society a b o u t w h o m s t a t e m e n t s a r e m a d e within t h e t h e o r y b u t r e a l citizens of flesh a n d b l o o d . T h e t h e o r y , t h e r e f o r e , m u s t leave t h e o u t c o m e of s u c h a test of acceptability u n d e t e r m i n e d . 1 6
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F o r Rawls h a s in m i n d r e a l d i s c o u r s e s w h o s e o u t c o m e is o p e n : " W h a t if it t u r n s o u t t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e as fairness c a n n o t g a i n t h e s u p p o r t of r e a s o n a b l e d o c t r i n e s , so t h a t t h e case for stability fails? . . . We s h o u l d h a v e to see w h e t h e r a c c e p t a b l e c h a n g e s in t h e p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e w o u l d achieve stability" (PL 6 5 - 6 6 ) . Clearly, t h e p h i l o s o p h e r c a n a t m o s t a t t e m p t to a n t i c i p a t e in reflection t h e di r e c t i o n of r e a l discourses as t h e y w o u l d p r o b a b l y u n f o l d u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of a pluralistic society. B u t s u c h a m o r e o r less realistic s i m u l a t i o n of r e a l d i s c o u r s e s c a n n o t b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e t h e b r y in t h e s a m e way as c a n t h e d e r i v a t i o n of possibilities of self-stabiliza t i o n f r o m t h e u n d e r l y i n g p r e m i s e s of a j u s t society. F o r n o w t h e citizens t h e m s e l v e s d e b a t e a b o u t t h e p r e m i s e s d e v e l o p e d by t h e p a r t i e s in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . T h e m i s l e a d i n g parallel w o u l d b e of n o f u r t h e r c o n s e q u e n c e if it d i d n o t cast t h e " o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s " with w h i c h t h e p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e a r e s u p p o s e d to m e e t in t h e w r o n g light. B e c a u s e Rawls situates t h e " q u e s t i o n of stability" in t h e f o r e g r o u n d , t h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s m e r e l y expresses t h e f u n c t i o n a l c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t t h e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e c a n m a k e to t h e peaceful i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of social c o o p e r a t i o n ; b u t in this t h e intrinsic value of a justified t h e o r y m u s t a l r e a d y b e p r e s u p p o s e d . F r o m this functionalist perspective, t h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r t h e t h e o r y c a n m e e t with p u b l i c a g r e e m e n t — t h a t is, f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of different worldviews in t h e f o r u m of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n — w o u l d lose a n e p i s t e m i c m e a n i n g essential to t h e t h e o r y itself. T h e o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s w o u l d t h e n b e m e r e l y a n i n d e x of t h e utility, a n d n o l o n g e r a c o n f i r m a t i o n of t h e c o r r e c t n e s s of t h e t h e o r y ; it w o u l d n o l o n g e r b e of i n t e r e s t f r o m t h e p o i n t of view of acceptability, a n d h e n c e of validity, b u t only froni t h a t of a c c e p t a n c e , t h a t is, of s e c u r i n g social stability. If I u n d e r s t a n d Rawls correctly, however, h e d o e s n o t wish to d i s t i n g u i s h in this way b e t w e e n q u e s t i o n s of justification a n d q u e s t i o n s of stability. W h e n h e calls his c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e "political" his i n t e n t i o n a p p e a r s r a t h e r to b e to collapse t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n its justified acceptability a n d its a c t u a l a c c e p t a n c e : " [ T ] h e a i m of j u s t i c e as fairness as a political c o n c e p t i o n is practical, a n d n o t m e t a p h y s i c a l o r e p i s t e m o logical. T h a t is, it p r e s e n t s itself n o t as a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e t h a t is t r u e , b u t o n e t h a t c a n s e r v e as a basis of i n f o r m e d a n d willing
63 Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason
political a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n citizens viewed as free a n d e q u a l persons." I n m y view, Rawls m u s t m a k e a s h a r p e r d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n accept ability a n d a c c e p t a n c e . A p u r e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e t h e o r y is a l r e a d y i n v a l i d a t e d by t h e fact t h a t t h e citizens m u s t first b e convinced by t h e p r o p o s e d c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e b e f o r e s u c h a c o n s e n s u s c a n c o m e a b o u t . T h e c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e m u s t n o t b e political in t h e w r o n g sense a n d s h o u l d n o t m e r e l y l e a d to a m o d u s vivendi. T h e t h e o r y itself m u s t f u r n i s h t h e p r e m i s e s t h a t "we a n d o t h e r s r e c o g n i z e as t r u e , o r as r e a s o n a b l e for t h e p u r p o s e of r e a c h i n g a w o r k i n g a g r e e m e n t o n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l s of political j u s t i c e . " B u t if Rawls r u l e s o u t a functionalist i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of j u s t i c e as fairness, h e m u s t allow s o m e epistemic r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e validity of his t h e o r y a n d t h e p r o s p e c t of its n e u t r a l i t y t o w a r d c o m p e t i n g worldviews b e i n g c o n f i r m e d i n p u b l i c discourses. T h e stabilizing effect of a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s w o u l d t h e n b e e x p l a i n e d i n cog nitive t e r m s , t h a t is, in t e r m s of t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n of t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t j u s t i c e as fairness is n e u t r a l t o w a r d " c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s . " I d o n ' t m e a n to say t h a t Rawls a c c e p t s p r e m i s e s t h a t w o u l d p r e v e n t h i m f r o m d r a w i n g this c o n s e q u e n c e ; I m e a n only t h a t h e hesitates to assert it b e c a u s e h e associates with t h e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n "political" t h e proviso t h a t t h e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e s h o u l d n o t b e b u r d e n e d with a n e p i s t e m i c claim a n d t h a t its a n t i c i p a t e d practical effect s h o u l d n o t b e m a d e c o n t i n g e n t o n t h e r a t i o n a l acceptability of its assertions. T h u s we h a v e r e a s o n to ask why Rawls d o e s riot t h i n k his t h e o r y a d m i t s of t r u t h a n d in what sense h e h e r e uses t h e p r e d i c a t e "reason a b l e " in p l a c e of t h e p r e d i c a t e " t r u e . " 17
18
(2) O n a w e a k i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e claim t h a t a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e c a n n o t b e t r u e o r false h a s m e r e l y t h e u n p r o b l e m a t i c sense t h a t n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s d o n o t d e s c r i b e a n i n d e p e n d e n t o r d e r of m o r a l facts. O n a s t r o n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , this thesis h a s t h e value-skep tical sense t h a t b e h i n d t h e validity claim of n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s t h e r e l u r k s s o m e t h i n g p u r e l y subjective: feelings, desires, o r deci sions, e x p r e s s e d i n a g r a m m a t i c a l l y m i s l e a d i n g fashion. B u t for Rawls b o t h value skepticism a n d m o r a l r e a l i s m a r e equally u n a c c e p t a b l e . H e w a n t s to s e c u r e for n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s — a n d for ^he t h e o r y of j u s t i c e as a w h o l e — a f o r m of r a t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n f o u n d e d o n justified
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intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n , b u t w i t h o u t a c c o r d i n g t h e m a n e p i s t e m i c m e a n i n g . F o r this r e a s o n h e i n t r o d u c e s t h e p r e d i c a t e " r e a s o n a b l e " as a c o m p l e m e n t a r y c o n c e p t to " t r u e . " T h e difficulty h e r e is in specifying in w h a t sense t h e o n e is a " c o m p l e m e n t a r y c o n c e p t " to t h e o t h e r . Two a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s suggest t h e m selves. E i t h e r we u n d e r s t a n d " r e a s o n a b l e " in t h e sense of practical r e a s o n as s y n o n y m o u s with "morally t r u e , " t h a t is, as a validity c o n c e p t a n a l o g o u s to t r u t h a n d o n t h e s a m e p l a n e as p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h ; this r e a d i n g is s u p p o r t e d by at least o n e line of a r g u m e n t a t i o n ( a ) . O r we u n d e r s t a n d " r e a s o n a b l e " in m o r e o r less t h e s a m e sense as " t h o u g h t f u l n e s s " in d e a l i n g with d e b a t a b l e views w h o s e t r u t h is for t h e p r e s e n t u n d e c i d e d ; t h e n " r e a s o n a b l e " is e m p l o y e d as a higher-level p r e d i c a t e c o n c e r n e d m o r e with " r e a s o n a b l e disagree m e n t s , " a n d h e n c e with t h e fallibilistic o u t l o o k a n d civil d e m e a n o r of p e r s o n s , t h a n with t h e validity of t h e i r assertions. I n g e n e r a l , Rawls s e e m s to favor this latter r e a d i n g ( b ) . (a) Rawls first i n t r o d u c e s t h e " r e a s o n a b l e " as a p r o p e r t y of m o r a l p e r s o n s . P e o p l e c o u n t as r e a s o n a b l e w h o possess a s e n s e of j u s t i c e a n d t h u s a r e b o t h willing a n d a b l e to t a k e a c c o u n t of fair c o n d i t i o n s of c o o p e r a t i o n , b u t w h o a r e also aware of t h e fallibility of k n o w l e d g e and—-in r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e s e " b u r d e n s of r e a s o n " — a r # willing to justify t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n of political j u s t i c e publicly. By c o n t r a s t , p e r sons act m e r e l y "rationally" as l o n g as t h e y a r e p r u d e n t l y g u i d e d by t h e i r c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . W h a t it m e a n s t o b e " r e a s o n a b l e " c a n i n d e e d b e e x p l i c a t e d in t e r m s of s u c h qualities of m o r a l p e r s o n s . B u t t h e c o n c e p t of a p e r s o n itself a l r e a d y p r e s u p p o s e s t h e c o n c e p t of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n . 1 9
U l t i m a t e l y Rawls e x p l a i n s t h e m e a n i n g of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n by ref e r e n c e to two d i m e n s i o n s : o n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e d e o n t o l o g i c a l di m e n s i o n of n o r m a t i v e validity (which I h e r e leave to o n e side as u n p r o b l e m a t i c ) a n d , o n t h e o t h e r , t h e p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n of a p u b l i c s p h e r e a n d t h e p r o c e s s of p u b l i c r e a s o n i n g (which is of p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t in t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t ) . T h e p u b l i c u s e is in a sense i n s c r i b e d in r e a s o n . "Publicity" is t h e c o m m o n p e r s p e c t i v e f r o m w h i c h t h e citizens mutually c o n v i n c e o n e a n o t h e r of w h a t is j u s t a n d u n j u s t by t h e force of t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t . T h i s p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n , in w h i c h all p a r t i c i p a t e , first l e n d s m o r a l
65 R e c o n c i l i a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e P u b l i c U s e of R e a s o n
convictions t h e i r objectivity. Rawls calls valid n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s "objective" a n d h e e x p l a i n s "objectivity" in a p r o c e d u r a l m a n n e r with r e f e r e n c e to a p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n t h a t satisfies c e r t a i n c o u n t e r f a c tual c o n d i t i o n s : "Political convictions (which a r e also, of c o u r s e , m o r a l convictions) a r e objective—actually f o u n d e d o n a n o r d e r of r e a s o n s — i f r e a s o n a b l e a n d r a t i o n a l p e r s o n s , w h o a r e sufficiently i n t e l l i g e n t a n d c o n s c i e n t i o u s in e x e r c i s i n g t h e i r p o w e r s of practical r e a s o n . . . w o u l d eventually e n d o r s e t h o s e convictions . . . p r o v i d e d t h a t t h e s e p e r s o n s k n o w t h e r e l e v a n t facts a n d h a v e sufficiently surveyed the g r o u n d s that bear o n the matter u n d e r conditions favorable to d u e r e f l e c t i o n " (PL 1 1 9 ) . Rawls d o e s a d d in this passage t h a t g r o u n d s a r e only specified as g o o d g r o u n d s in t h e light of a r e c o g n i z e d c o n c e p t of j u s t i c e ; b u t this c o n c e p t m u s t in t u r n m e e t with a g r e e m e n t u n d e r t h e s a m e ideal c o n d i t i o n s (PL 1 3 7 ) . H e n c e Rawls m u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d to m e a n t h a t , o n his view t o o , t h e p r o c e d u r e of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n ^remains t h e final c o u r t of a p p e a l for n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s . I n l i g h t of this reflection, it c o u l d b e said t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t e " r e a s o n a b l e " p o i n t s to t h e discursive r e d e m p t i o n of a validity claim. By a n a l o g y with a n o n s e m a n t i c c o n c e p t of t r u t h p u r i f i e d of all c o n n o t a t i o n s of c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , o n e c o u l d u n d e r s t a n d "reason a b l e " as a p r e d i c a t e for t h e validity of n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s . Clearly Rawls d o e s n o t w a n t to d r a w t h i s — i n m y view, c o r r e c t — c o n c l u s i o n ; o t h e r w i s e h e w o u l d h a v e to avoid t h e p e r p l e x i n g u s a g e a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h worldviews n e e d n o t b e t r u e even w h e n t h e y a r e r e a s o n a b l e , a n d vice versa. T h e p r o b l e m is n o t Rawls's r e j e c t i o n of m o r a l realism o r t h e c o n s e q u e n t r e j e c t i o n of a s e m a n t i c t r u t h p r e d i c a t e for n o r mative s t a t e m e n t s , b u t t h e fact t h a t h e d o e s a t t a c h s u c h a t r u t h p r e d i c a t e to worldviews ( c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s ) . H e t h e r e b y d e n i e s h i m s e l f t h e possibility of e x p l o i t i n g t h e e p i s t e m i c c o n n o t a t i o n s of t h e e x p r e s s i o n " r e a s o n a b l e , " c o n n o t a t i o n s t h a t h e m u s t n e v e r t h e less a t t r i b u t e to his o w n c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e if it is to b e a b l e to claim s o m e s o r t of n o r m a t i v e b i n d i n g force. (b) O n Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n , m e t a p h y s i c a l d o c t r i n e s a n d religious w o r l d - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a d m i t of t r u t h a n d falsity. As a c o n s e q u e n c e , a political c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e c o u l d only b e t r u e if it w e r e n o t m e r e l y c o m p a t i b l e with s u c h d o c t r i n e s b u t also derivable f r o m a t r u e 20
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d o c t r i n e . Yet f r o m t h e p o i n t of view of a political p h i l o s o p h y t h a t is n e u t r a l t o w a r d worldviews we c a n n o t d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r a n d w h e n this is t h e case. F r o m this secular viewpoint, t h e t r u t h claims of all r e a s o n a b l e worldviews h a v e e q u a l weight, w h e r e t h o s e worldviews c o u n t as " r e a s o n a b l e " t h a t c o m p e t e with o n e a n o t h e r in a reflexive a t t i t u d e , t h a t is, o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t o n e ' s o w n t r u t h claim c o u l d prevail in p u b l i c d i s c o u r s e in t h e l o n g r u n only t h r o u g h t h e force of b e t t e r r e a s o n s . " R e a s o n a b l e c o m p r e h e n s i v e d o c t r i n e s " a r e ultimately d i s t i n g u i s h e d by t h e i r r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e b u r d e n s of proof, w h i c h e n a b l e s g r o u p s with c o m p e t i n g i d e o l o g i e s to a c c e p t — f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g — a " r e a s o n a b l e d i s a g r e e m e n t " as t h e basis of t h e i r peaceful coexistence. Since d i s p u t e s c o n c e r n i n g m e t a p h y s i c a l a n d religious t r u t h s re m a i n u n r e s o l v e d u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of e n d u r i n g p l u r a l i s m , only t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s of this k i n d of reflexive c o n s c i o u s n e s s c a n b e trans f e r r e d as a validity p r e d i c a t e to a political c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e c o m p a t i b l e with all r e a s o n a b l e d o c t r i n e s . By way of this t r a n s f e r e n c e , a r e a s o n a b l e c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e p r e s e r v e s a n o b l i q u e r e l a t i o n to a t r u t h claim p r o j e c t e d i n t o t h e f u t u r e . B u t it c a n n o t b e c e r t a i n t h a t o n e of t h e r e a s o n a b l e d o c t r i n e s f r o m w h i c h it is derivable is also t h e t r u e o n e . A political c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is r e a s o n a b l e in t h e sense t h a t it c a n afford a k i n d of t o l e r a n c e t o w a r d n o t u n r e a s o n a b l e worldviews, in t h e sense a d v o c a t e d by Gottfried Lessing. W h a t r e m a i n s is a n act of faith in r e a s o n , " r e a s o n a b l e faith in t h e r e a l possibility of a j u s t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e g i m e . " T h i s view m a y a p p e a l to s o m e of o u r b e t t e r i n t u i t i o n s , b u t h o w c a n it b e h a r m o n i z e d with Rawls's r e a s o n s for a c c e p t i n g t h e priority of t h e r i g h t over t h e g o o d in t h e first place? Q u e s t i o n s of j u s t i c e o r m o r a l q u e s t i o n s a d m i t of justifiable an swers—justifiable in t h e sense of r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y — b e c a u s e they a r e c o n c e r n e d with w h a t , f r o m a n ideally e x p a n d e d perspective, is in t h e e q u a l i n t e r e s t of all. "Ethical" q u e s t i o n s , by c o n t r a s t , d o n o t a d m i t of s u c h i m p a r t i a l t r e a t m e n t b e c a u s e they refer to w h a t , f r o m t h e first p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e , is in t h e l o n g r u n g o o d for m e o r for u s — e v e n if this is n o t equally g o o d for all. Now, m e t a p h y s i c a l o r religious worldviews a r e at t h e very least p e r m e a t e d with answers to basic ethical q u e s t i o n s ; they a r t i c u l a t e in a n e x e m p l a r y fashion col lective i d e n t i t i e s a n d g u i d e individual p l a n s of life. H e n c e , world21
67 Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason
views a r e m e a s u r e d m o r e by t h e a u t h e n t i c i t y of t h e lifestyles t h e y s h a p e t h a n by t h e t r u t h of t h e s t a t e m e n t s they a d m i t . B e c a u s e s u c h d o c t r i n e s a r e " c o m p r e h e n s i v e " in precisely t h e s e n s e t h a t they offer i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of (the w o r l d as a w h ^ ^ t h e y c a n n o t m e r e l y b e u n d e r s t o o d as a n o r d e r e d set of s t a t e m e n t s of fact; t h e i r c o n t e n t s c a n n o t b e e x p r e s s e d c o m p l e t e l y in s e n t e n c e s t h a t a d m i t of t r u t h a n d t h e y d o n o t f o r m a symbolic system t h a t c a n b e t r u e o r false as s u c h . So, at least, it a p p e a r s u n d e r t h e c o n d i t i o n s of p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l t h i n k i n g in w h i c h j u s t i c e as fairness is to b e justified. B u t t h e n it is i m p o s s i b l e t o m a k e t h e validity of a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e c o n t i n g e n t o n t h e t r u t h of a worldview, h o w e v e r " r e a s o n a b l e " it m a y b e . Rather, u n d e r t h e s e p r e m i s e s it m a k e s sense to analyze t h e different validity claims t h a t we associate, respectively, with descrip tive, evaluative, a n d n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s (of various kinds) i n d e p e n d e n t l y of t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c c o m p l e x of validity claims t h a t a r e o b s c u r e l y fused t o g e t h e r in religious a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of r e a l i t y . W h y d o e s Rawls n e v e r t h e l e s s t h i n k t h a t identity-stabilizing worldviews a d m i t of t r u t h ? A possible m o t i v e m i g h t b e t h e conviction t h a t a p r o f a n e , f r e e s t a n d i n g m o r a l i t y is u n t e n a b l e , t h a t m o r a l convictions m u s t b e e m b e d d e d in m e t a p h y s i c a l o r religious d o c t r i n e s . T h a t , at any r a t e , w o u l d c o h e r e with Rawls's way of p o s i n g t h e p r o b l e m of a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n s e n s u s : h e takes as his m o d e l t h a t political institu tionalization of f r e e d o m of belief a n d c o n s c i e n c e w h i c h b r o u g h t t h e religious civil wars of t h e m o d e r n p e r i o d to a n e n d . B u t c o u l d t h e religious conflicts h a v e b e e n b r o u g h t to a n e n d if t h e p r i n c i p l e of t o l e r a n c e a n d f r e e d o m of belief a n d c o n s c i e n c e h a d n o t b e e n a b l e to a p p e a l , with g o o d r e a s o n s , to a m o r a l validity independent of relig i o n a n d metaphysics? 22
Ill
Private and Public A u t o n o m y
T h e o b j e c t i o n s I r a i s e d in t h e first p a r t a g a i n s t t h e d e s i g n of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n a n d in t h e s e c o n d against t h e assimilation of q u e s tions of validity to t h o s e of a c c e p t a n c e p o i n t in t h e s a m e d i r e c t i o n . By subjecting rationally c h o o s i n g p a r t i e s to r e a s o n a b l e p r o c e d u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s , Rawls r e m a i n s d e p e n d e n t o n substantive n o r m a t i v e
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a s s u m p t i o n s ; at t h e s a m e t i m e , by t a i l o r i n g a universalistic t h e o r y of j u s t i c e to q u e s t i o n s of political stability t h r o u g h a n o v e r l a p p i n g c o n sensus, h e c o m p r o m i s e s its e p i s t e m i c status. B o t h strategies a r e p u r s u e d at t h e cost of a strict p r o c e d u r a l i s t p r o g r a m . I n c o n t r a s t with this a p p r o a c h , Rawls c o u l d satisfy m o r e elegantly t h e b u r d e n s of p r o o f h e i n c u r s with his s t r o n g a n d p r e s u m p t i v e l y n e u t r a l c o n c e p t of t h e m o r a l p e r s o n if h e d e v e l o p e d his substantive c o n c e p t s a n d a s s u m p t i o n s o u t of t h e p r o c e d u r e of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n . Injcny^ vigw^_the m o r a l p o i n t of view is a l r e a d y j m p l i c i t in t h e socio-ontological c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e r j u M i c j g ^ ^ tion, c o m p r i s i n g t h e cojnjjlex r e l a t i o n s of m u t u a l r e c o g n i t k m _ t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s in r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e "must" a c c e p t (in t h e sense of w e a k t r a n s c e n d e n t a l necessity). Rawls believes t h a t a t h e o r y of j u s t i c e d e v e l o p e d in s u c h exclusively p r o c e d u r a l t e r m s c o u l d n o t b e "sufficiently s t r u c t u r e d . " Since I ^ s u b s c r i b e to a division o f j a b o r b e t w e e n m o r a l t h e o r y a n d t h e t h e o r y of a c t i o n , I d o n o t r e g a r d this as a serious r e s e r ^ i B o n r T R ^ c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r i n g of t h e c o n t e x t s of i n t e r a c t i o n to w h i c h q u e s t i o n s of political j u s t i c e refer is n o t w i t h i n t h e p r o v i n c e of m o r a l t h e o r y . T o g e t h e r with t h e c o n t e n t of action-conflicts in n e e d of r e s o l u t i o n , a w h o l e c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e for n o r m a t i v e l y r e g u l a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n is f o r c e d u p o n u s — a n e t w o r k of c o n c e p t s in w h i c h p e r s o n s a n d i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , a c t o r s a n d actions, n o r m - c o n f o r m i n j j _ ^ d ^ behavior, responsibility a n d a u t o n o m y , a n d even(intersubjectiveiy^ s t r u c t u r e d j n o r a l feejings)all find t h e i r p l a c e . E a c h of t h e s e c o n c e p t s d e s e r v e s a p r i o r analysis. If we t h e n take t h e c o n c e p t of p r a c t i c a l r e a s o n in t h e p r o c e d u r a l sense t h a t Rawls h i m s e l f i n t i m a t e s with his n o t i o n of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n , we c o u l d say t h a t precisely t h o s e p r i n c i p l e s a r e valid t h a t m e e t with u n c o e r c e d intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e . It r e m a i n s as a further, a n d p r i m a r i l y e m p i r i c a l , q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r a n d w h e n s u c h valid p r i n c i p l e s e n s u r e political stability u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s of p l u r a l i s m . I n w h a t follows, I a m inter e s t e d in t h e e x e c u t i o n of t h e p r o c e d u r a l i s t p r o g r a m only with r e f e r e n c e to a n i m p l i c a t i o n it h a s for t h e e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e consti t u t i o n a l state. Liberals h a v e stressed t h e "liberties of t h e m o d e r n s " : liberty of belief a n d c o n s c i e n c e , t h e p r o t e c t i o n of life, p e r s o n a l liberty, a n d
69 Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason
p r o p e r t y — i n s u m , t h e c o r e of subjective private rights. R e p u b l i c a n ism, by c o n t r a s t , h a s d e f e n d e d t h e "liberties of t h e a n c i e n t s " : t h e political r i g h t s of p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t m a k e pos sible t h e citizens' exercise of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . J e a n - J a c q u e s Rous s e a u a n d K a n t s h a r e d t h e a s p i r a t i o n of d e r i v i n g b o t h e l e m e n t s f r o m t h e s a m e r o o t , namely, f r o m m o r a l a n d political a u t o n o m y : t h e liberal r i g h t s m a y n e i t h e r b e m e r e l y foisted o n t h e p r a c t i c e of selfd e t e r m i n a t i o n as extrinsic c o n s t r a i n t s n o r b e m a d e m e r e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l to its exercise. Rawls, t o o , subscribes to this i n t u i t i o n ; n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e two-stage c h a r a c t e r of his t h e o r y g e n e r a t e s a p r i o r ity of liberal r i g h t s t h a t d e m o t e s t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s t o a n infe r i o r status. Rawls certainly p r o c e e d s f r o m t h e i d e a of political a u t o n o m y a n d m o d e l s it at t h e level of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n : it is r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e i n t e r p l a y b e t w e e n t h e rationally c h o o s i n g p a r t i e s a n d t h e f r a m e w o r k c o n d i t i o n s t h a t g u a r a n t e e impartiality of j u d g m e n t . B u t this i d e a is b r o u g h t to b e a r only selectively at t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l level of t h e d e m o cratic p r o c e d u r e for t h e political will-formation of free a n d e q u a l citizens f r o m w h i c h it is n o n e t h e l e s s b o r r o w e d . T h e f o r m of political a u t o n o m y g r a n t e d virtual e x i s t e n c e in t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n , a n d t h u s o n t h e first level of t h e o r y f o r m a t i o n , d o e s n o t fully u n f o l d in t h e h e a r t of t h e justly c o n s t i t u t e d society. F o r t h e h i g h e r t h e veil of i g n o r a n c e is r a i s e d a n d t h e m o r e Rawls's citizens t h e m s e l v e s take o n r e a l flesh a n d b l o o d , t h e m o r e d e e p l y they find t h e m s e l v e s subject to p r i n c i p l e s a n d n o r m s t h a t h a v e b e e n a n t i c i p a t e d in t h e o r y a n d have a l r e a d y b e c o m e i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d b e y o n d t h e i r c o n t r o l . I n this way, t h e t h e o r y d e p r i v e s t h e citizens of t o o m a n y of t h e insights t h a t t h e y w o u l d h a v e to assimilate a n e w in e a c h g e n e r a t i o n . F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e of t h e t h e o r y of j u s t i c e , t h e act of f o u n d i n g t h e d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n c a n n o t b e r e p e a t e d u n d e r t h e institu t i o n a l c o n d i t i o n s of a n a l r e a d y c o n s t i t u t e d j u s t society, a n d t h e p r o c ess of realizing t h e system of basic r i g h t s c a n n o t b e a s s u r e d o n a n o n g o i n g basis. It is n o t possible for t h e citizens to e x p e r i e n c e this p r o c e s s as o p e n a n d i n c o m p l e t e , as t h e shifting historical cir cumstances nonetheless d e m a n d . They c a n n o t reignite the radical d e m o c r a t i c e m b e r s of t h e o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n in t h e civic life of t h e i r society, for f r o m t h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e all of t h e essential d i s c o u r s e s of
70 Chapter 2
legitimation have already taken place within the theory; a n d they find t h e results of t h e t h e o r y a l r e a d y s e d i m e n t e d in t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n . B e c a u s e t h e citizens c a n n o t conceive of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n as a project, t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n d o e s n o t actually h a v e t h e significance of a p r e s e n t exercise of political a u t o n o m y b u t m e r e l y p r o m o t e s t h e n o n v i o l e n t preservation of political stability. G r a n t e d , this r e a d i n g d o e s n o t reflect Rawls's i n t e n t i o n in f o r m u l a t i n g his t h e o r y , b u t if I a m c o r r e c t it u n c o v e r s o n e of its u n d e s i r e d c o n s e q u e n c e s . T h i s is s h o w n , for e x a m p l e , by t h e rigid b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n t h e political a n d t h e n o n p u b l i c i d e n t i t i e s of t h e citizens. A c c o r d i n g to Rawls, this b o u n d a r y is set by basic liberal r i g h t s w h i c h c o n s t r a i n d e m o c r a t i c self-leg islation, a n d with it t h e s p h e r e of t h e political, from the beginning, t h a t is, p r i o r t o all political will-formation. 23
Rawls uses t h e t e r m "political" in a t h r e e f o l d sense. T h u s far we h a v e b e c o m e a c q u a i n t e d with t h e t h e o r e t i c a l m e a n i n g : a c o n c e p t i o n of j u s t i c e is political a n d n o t m e t a p h y s i c a l w h e n it is n e u t r a l t o w a r d conflicting worldviews. F u r t h e r , Rawls uses t h e t e r m "political" in t h e u s u a l sense to classify m a t t e r s of p u b l i c i n t e r e s t , so t h a t political p h i l o s o p h y limits itself to t h e justification of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k a n d t h e basic s t r u c t u r e of society. B o t h m e a n i n g s a r e u l t i m a t e l y c o m b i n e d in a n i n t e r e s t i n g way in Rawls's t r e a t m e n t of "political values." "Political" in this t h i r d sense c o n s t i t u t e s a f u n d b o t h for s h a r e d convictions of citizens a n d for t h e p u r p o s e of d e l i m i t i n g a n o b j e c t - d o m a i n . Rawls treats t h e political value s p h e r e , w h i c h is dis t i n g u i s h e d in m o d e r n societies f r o m o t h e r c u l t u r a l value s p h e r e s , as s o m e t h i n g given, a l m o s t in t h e m a n n e r of a n e o - K a n t i a n like M a x Weber. F o r only with r e f e r e n c e to political values, w h a t e v e r t h e y m a y b e , c a n h e split t h e m o r a l p e r s o n i n t o t h e p u b l i c identity of a citizen a n d t h e n o n p u b l i c i d e n t i t y of a private p e r s o n s h a p e d by his o r h e r i n d i v i d u a l c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . T h e s e two i d e n t i t i e s t h e n consti t u t e t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s for two d o m a i n s , t h e o n e c o n s t i t u t e d by r i g h t s of political p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t h e o t h e r p r o t e c t e d by basic liberal rights. T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h e private s p h e r e in this way enjoys p r i o r i t y while t h e "role of t h e political liberties is . . . largely i n s t r u m e n t a l in p r e s e r v i n g t h e o t h e r l i b e r t i e s . " T h u s with r e f e r e n c e to t h e political value s p h e r e a p r e political d o m a i n of liberties is d e l i m i t e d w h i c h is w i t h d r a w n f r o m t h e r e a c h of d e m o c r a t i c self-legislation. 24
71 Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason
B u t s u c h a n a p r i o r i b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y n o t o n l y c o n t r a d i c t s t h e r e p u b l i c a n i n t u i t i o n t h a t p o p u l a r sov e r e i g n t y a n d h u m a n r i g h t s a r e n o u r i s h e d by t h e s a m e r o o t ; it also conflicts with historical e x p e r i e n c e , a b o v e all with t h e fact t h a t t h e historically shifting b o u n d a r y b e t w e e n t h e private a n d p u b l i c s p h e r e s h a s always b e e n p r o b l e m a t i c f r o m a n o r m a t i v e p o i n t of v i e w . I n a d d i t i o n , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e welfare state shows t h a t t h e b o u n d a r i e s b e t w e e n t h e private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y of citizens are* in flux a n d t h a t s u c h differentiations m u s t b e s u b j e c t e d to t h e political will-formation of t h e citizens if t h e latter a r e to h a v e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to p r e s s a legal claim to t h e "fair v a l u e " of t h e i r liberties. A t h e o r y of j u s t i c e c a n take b e t t e r a c c o u n t of this c i r c u m s t a n c e if it differentiates t h e "political" in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e c r i t e r i o n of "legal r e g u l a t i o n " ( m e n t i o n e d only in p a s s i n g by Rawls). It is ulti m a t e l y by m e a n s of positive a n d coercive law t h a t t h e life of a political c o m m u n i t y is legitimately r e g u l a t e d (PL 2 1 5 ) . T h e basic q u e s t i o n t h e n is: W h i c h r i g h t s m u s t free a n d e q u a l p e r s o n s m u t u a l l y a c c o r d o n e a n o t h e r if they wish to r e g u l a t e t h e i r c o e x i s t e n c e by t h e l e g i t i m a t e m e a n s of positive a n d coercive law? A c c o r d i n g to K a n t ' s c o n c e p t i o n of legality, coercive law e x t e n d s only to t h e e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n p e r s o n s a n d a d d r e s s e s t h e f r e e d o m of c h o i c e of subjects w h o a r e allowed t o follow t h e i r o w n c o n c e p t i o n of t h e g o o d . H e n c e m o d e r n law, o n t h e o n e h a n d , c o n s t i t u t e s t h e status of legal subjects in t e r m s of a c t i o n a b l e subjective liberties t h a t m a y b e e x e r c i s e d by e a c h a c c o r d i n g to h e r o w n p r e f e r e n c e s . Since it m u s t also b e possible to o b e y a legal o r d e r for m o r a l r e a s o n s , t h e status of private legal subjects is legitimately d e t e r m i n e d by t h e r i g h t to equal subjective l i b e r t i e s . As positive o r codified law, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , this m e d i u m calls for a political legislator, w h e r e t h e legiti m a c y of legislation is a c c o u n t e d for by a d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e t h a t s e c u r e s t h e a u t o n o m y of t h e citizens. Citizens a r e politically a u t o n o m o u s only if t h e y c a n view t h e m s e l v e s as t h e j o i n t a u t h o r s of t h e laws to w h i c h t h e y a r e subject as i n d i v i d u a l a d d r e s s e e s . T h e dialectical r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y b e c o m e s clear in light of t h e fact t h a t t h e status of s u c h d e m o c r a t i c citizens e q u i p p e d with l a w m a k i n g c o m p e t e n c e s c a n b e institutional ized in t u r n only by m e a n s of coercive law. B u t b e c a u s e this law is d i r e c t e d to p e r s o n s w h o c o u l d n o t even a s s u m e t h e status of legal 25
26
72 Chapter 2
subjects w i t h o u t subjective private rights, private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y of citizens mutually p r e s u p p o s e e a c h o t h e r . As we h a v e s e e n , b o t h e l e m e n t s a r e a l r e a d y i n t e r w o v e n in t h e c o n c e p t of positive a n d coercive law: t h e r e c a n b e n o law at all w i t h o u t a c t i o n a b l e subjective liberties t h a t g u a r a n t e e t h e private a u t o n o m y of i n d i v i d u a l legal subjects, a n d n o l e g i t i m a t e law w i t h o u t collective d e m o c r a t i c law m a k i n g by citizens w h o , as free a n d e q u a l , a r e e n t i t l e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e in this p r o c e s s . O n c e t h e c o n c e p t of law h a s b e e n clarified in this way it b e c o m e s clear t h a t t h e n o r m a t i v e s u b s t a n c e of basic liberal r i g h t s is a l r e a d y c o n t a i n e d in t h e i n d i s p e n s a b l e m e d i u m for t h e legal i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n of sovereign citizens. T h e m a i n objects of f u r t h e r analysis a r e t h e n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a n d t h e p r o c e d u r e of a discursive p r o c e s s of o p i n ion- a n d will-formation in w h i c h t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n is m a n i fested. I c a n n o t discuss this a l t e r n a t i v e in g r e a t e r detail in t h e present context. 2 7
S u c h a p r o c e d u r a l m o r a l a n d legal t h e o r y is at t h e s a m e t i m e b o t h m o r e a n d less m o d e s t t h a n Rawls's t h e o r y . It is m o r e m o d e s t i n t h a t it focuses exclusively o n t h e p r o c e d u r a l aspects of t h e p u b l i c u s e of r e a s o n a n d derives t h e system of r i g h t s f r o m t h e i d e a of its legal i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n . It c a n leave m o r e q u e s t i o n s o p e n ^because it e n t r u s t s m o r e t o t h e process of r a t i o n a l o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation. P h i l o s o p h y s h o u l d e r s different t h e o r e t i c a l b u r d e n s when* as o n Rawls's c o n c e p t i o n , it claims to e l a b o r a t e t h e i d e a of a j u s t society, while t h e citizens t h e n u s e this i d e a as a p l a t f o r m f r o m w h i c h to j u d g e existing a r r a n g e m e n t s a n d policies. By c o n t r a s t , I p r o p o s e t h a t phi^^ clarification of t h e m o r a J p o i n t of view a n d j h g ^ r j r o c e d u r e of d e m o c r a t i c l ^ i t i m a t i p i y t o t h e analysis of t h e c o n d i t i o n s of r a t i o n a l discourses a n d n e g o t i a t i o n s . I n this m o r e mocTesFrole^ p h i l o s o p h y n e e d n o t p r o c e e d in a c o n s t r u c t i v e , b u t only in a reconstructive fashion. It leaves substantial q u e s t i o n s t h a t m u s t b e a n s w e r e c T h e r e a n d n o w to t h e m o r e o r less e n l i g h t e n e d e n g a g e m e n t of p a r t i c i p a n t s , w h i c h d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t p h i l o s o p h e r s mjM^ s c h a r y ^ p r o c l a m a t i o n of t h e w i l L o f a n ^ ^ before
the self-determination
of t h e p e o p l e b e c o m e s
Even solidified
i n t o t h e c o m p e t e n c e s of state o r g a n s , it finds e x p r e s s i o n in t h e
136 Chapter 5
s p o n t a n e o u s "yes" a n d " n o " r e s p o n s e s of t h e p e o p l e t o p r e d e t e r m i n e d alternatives: "Only t h e actually a s s e m b l e d p e o p l e is t h e p e o p l e . . . a n d c a n p e r f o r m t h e activity t h a t specifically p e r t a i n s to this p e o p l e : it c a n a c c l a i m — i n o t h e r w o r d s , signal its a c c e p t a n c e o r r e j e c t i o n by a s i m p l e act of a c c l a m a t i o n . " T h e p r i n c i p l e of majority rule merely operationalizes the accord between individual expres sions of will: "all will t h e s a m e t h i n g . " T h i s c o n v e r g e n c e only b r i n g s to t h e fore t h e substantive a p r i o r i of a s h a r e d n a t i o n a l f o r m of life. T h e a p r i o r i p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g is g r a n t e d by t h e substantive h o m o g e n e i t y of n a t i o n a l s w h o set t h e m s e l v e s a p a r t as a s e p a r a t e n a t i o n f r o m all o t h e r s : " T h e d e m o c r a t i c c o n c e p t of equality is a political c o n c e p t t h a t is p r e d i c a t e d o n t h e possibility of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . H e n c e political d e m o c r a c y c a n n o t rest o n t h e u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d n e s s of all h u m a n b e i n g s b u t only o n m e m b e r s h i p of a p a r t i c u l a r p e o p l e . . . . T h u s t h e equality t h a t is essential to d e m o c r a c y applies only internally, n o t e x t e r n a l l y . " 16
17
I n this way, S c h m i t t sets u p a p o l e m i c a l c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t h e " r ^ o p k , " ^ n ^ t h e operand, a n d a h u m a n i s t i c a l l y conceivecl " h u m a n 'it£con^ o n t h e o t h e r : " T h e c e n t r a l c o n c e p t of d e m o c r a c y is t h e p e o p l e , n o t h u m a n i t y . If d e m o c r a c y is i n d e e d a political f o r m , it c a n only b e a d e m o c r a c y of t h e p e o p l e , n o t of h u m a n i t y . " Insofar as t h e "idea off t h e equality of all h u m a n b e i n g s , " in t h e s e n s e of e q u a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e interests of everybody, h a s a n y r e l e v a n c e for t h e consti t u t i o n , it finds e x p r e s s i o n in a r u l e of law t h a t a p p l i e s to private citizens. T h e m e a n i n g of h u m a n r i g h t s is e x h a u s t e d by t h e private e n j o y m e ^ ^ ^ ^ e ^ ^ f f ^ ^ ^ n i e s , w h e r e a s t h e exercise of political free d o m s by citizens is s u p p o s e d t o o b e y a c o m p l e t e l y different logic. T h e m e a n i n g of d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n b a s e d o n e t h n i c h o m o g e n e i t y is n o t t h e political a u t o n o m y of i n d i v i d u a l citizens b u t r a t h e r n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e — t h e self-assertion, self-affirmation, a n d self-realization of a n a t i o n in its specificity. T h i s n a t i o n m e d i a t e s b e t w e e n t h e r u l e of law a n d d e m o c r a c y : only t h e citizens, w h o have b e e n t r a n s f o r m e d f r o m private p e r s o n s i n t o m e m b e r s of a politically self-conscious n a t i o n , c a n p a r t i c i p a t e in d e m o c r a t i c r u l e . 18
(2) By u n c o u p l i n g t h e basic r i g h t s r e g u l a t i n g private i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h i n civil society f r o m a substantialized "Volksdemokratie" ® in this 1
137 T h e N a t i o n , t h e R u l e o f Law, a n d D e m o c r a c y
way, S c h m i t t sets h i m s e l f in stark o p p o s i t i o n to a r e p u b l i c a n i s m g r o u n d e d i n social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y . O n this t r a d i t i o n , " p e o p l e " a n d " n a t i o n " a r e i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e c o n c e p t s for a citizenry t h a t is co-original with t h e political c o m m u n i t y . T h e p e o p l e w h o m a k e u p t h e state a r e viewed n o t as a p r e p o l i t i c a l d a t u m b u t as t h e p r o d u c t of t h e social c o n t r a c t . T h e p a r t i c i p a n t s f o r m a n association of free a n d e q u a l c o n s o c i a t e s u n d e r law t h r o u g h t h e i r j o i n t d e c i s i o n t o m a k e u s e of t h e i r o r i g i n a l r i g h t "to live u n d e r p u b l i c laws of free d o m . " T h e d e c i s i o n to live in political f r e e d o m is s y n o n y m o u s with t h e u n d e r t a k i n g to e n g a g e in a c o n s t i t u t i o n - f o u n d i n g praxis. I n c o n t r a s t with C a r l S c h m i t t ' s a c c o u n t , o n this c o n c e p t i o n p o p u l a r sovereignty a n d h u m a n rights, d e m o c r a c y a n d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state, a r e c o n c e p t u a l l y i n t e r t w i n e d . F o r t h e initial d e c i s i o n t o e n g a g e in d e m o c r a t i c self-legislation c a n only b e c a r r i e d o u t by realizing t h e r i g h t s t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s m u s t m u t u a l l y g r a n t o n e a n o t h e r if they w a n t to legitimately r e g u l a t e t h e i r life in c o m m o n by m e a n s of positive law. T h i s calls in t u r n for a l e g i t i m a c y - g u a r a n t e e i n g p r o c e d u r e of l a w m a k i n g t h a t gives p e r m a n e n t f o r m t o t h e f u r t h e r e l a b o r a t i o n of t h e system of r i g h t s . Following t h e R o u s s e a u e a n f o r m u l a , in this p r o c e d u r e all m u s t r e a c h t h e s a m e d e c i s i o n s for all. T h u s t h e basic r i g h t s spring from t h e v e r y i d e a of t h e legal i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n of t h e p r o c e d u r e of d e m o c r a t i c self-legislation. 20
T h e i d e a of a p r o c e d u r a l , f u t u r e - o r i e n t e d p o p u l a r sovereignty a l o n g t h e s e lines r e n d e r s m e a n i n g l e s s t h e delnlEiH^l^ will-formation to t h e s u b s t a n t i v e . a p r i o r i of a past, prepolitically e s t a b l i s h e d c o n s e n s u s a m o n g h o m o g e n e o u s m e m b e r s of a n a t i o n : "Positive law is n o t l e g i t i m a t e b e c a u s e it c o r r e s p o n d s to substantive p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e b u t b e c a u s e it is e n a c t e d in a c c o r d a n c e with p r o c e d u r e s t h a t a r e formally j u s t , t h a t is, d e m o c r a t i c . T h a t all d e c i d e t h e s a m e t h i n g for all in t h e legislative p r o c e s s is a d e m a n d i n g n o r m a t i v e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t is n o l o n g e r d e f i n e d in a substantive m a n n e r b u t is i n t e n d e d to p r e v e n t a r b i t r a r y d e c i s i o n s a n d m i n i m i z e d o m i n a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e self-legislation of t h e a d d r e s s e e s of t h e law, t h r o u g h e q u a l p r o c e d u r a l positions, a n d t h r o u g h t h e universality of legal r e g u l a t i o n . " A p r i o r b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s b a s e d o n a h o m o g e n e o u s c u l t u r e is n o t necessary, b e c a u s e d e m o c r a t i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d o p i n i o n - a n d will-formation m a k e possible r a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t even 21
138 Chapter 5
b e t w e e n s t r a n g e r s . B e c a u s e t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s g u a r a n t e e s legiti m a c y in v i r t u e of its p r o c e d u r a l characteristics, it c a n if n e c e s s a r y b r i d g e g a p s in social i n t e g r a t i o n . Insofar as it s e c u r e s t h e fair value of i n d i v i d u a l liberties for all, it e n s u r e s t h a t t h e n e t w o r k of civic solidarity r e m a i n s intact. Criticism of this classical c o n c e p t i o n is p r i m a r i l y d i r e c t e d against its "liberalistic" i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . S c h m i t t d i s p u t e s t h e capacity of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state f o u n d e d o n d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e s to s e c u r e social i n t e g r a t i o n u n d e r t h e two h e a d i n g s t h a t i n f o r m e d H e g e l ' s c r i t i q u e of t h e " N o t - u n d Verstandesstaat" [literally, "state of necessity a n d of t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g " ] of social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y a n d have b e e n t a k e n u p a g a i n by t h e " c o m m u n i t a r i a n s " in t h e i r c o n t r o v e r s y with " l i b e r a l s , " T h e p r i n c i p a l targets of this c r i t i q u e a r e t h e atomistic c o n c e p t i o n of t h e i n d i v i d u a l as a n " u n e n c u m b e r e d s e l f a n d t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t c o n c e p t of political will-formation as a m a t t e r of a g g r e g a t i n g social interests. F r o m t h e p o i n t of view of t h e s e critics, t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e social c o n t r a c t a r e c o n c e i v e d as isolated, e n l i g h t e n e d r a t i o n a l egoists w h o a r e n o t s h a p e d by c o m m o n t r a d i t i o n s a n d h e n c e d o n o t s h a r e any c u l t u r a l v a l u e - o r i e n t a t i o n s , a n d w h o s e ac t i o n s a r e n o t o r i e n t e d to r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Political willf o r m a t i o n o n this d e s c r i p t i o n m u s t take t h e f o r m of n e g o t i a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g a m o d u s vivendi w i t h o u t a n y possibility of r e a c h i n g a m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g f r o m ethical o r m o r a l p o i n t s of view. I n d e e d , it is difficult to see h o w s u c h p a r t i e s c o u l d p r o d u c e a n i n t e r s u b j e c tively r e c o g n i z e d legal o r d e r t h a t c a n b e e x p e c t e d to forge a n a t i o n of citizens f r o m s t r a n g e r s — i n o t h e r w o r d s , g e n e r a t e civic solidarity b e t w e e n s t r a n g e r s . Against s u c h a H o b b e s i a n b a c k d r o p , t h e s h a r e d e t h n i c o r c u l t u r a l i n h e r i t a n c e of a m o r e o r less h o m o g e n e o u s p e o p l e r e c o m m e n d s itself as t h e s o u r c e a n d g u a r a n t o r of t h e k i n d of n o r m a t i v e b o n d s to w h i c h possessive individualism is b l i n d . 22
However, t h e w e l l - f o u n d e d criticism of this e x t r e m e version of n a t u r a l law d o e s n o t apply to t h e intersubjectivistic u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p r o c e d u r a l p o p u l a r sovereignty, w h i c h is in a n y case m o r e c o n g e n i a l J to t h e r e p u b l i c a n t r a d i t i o n . O n this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e p r a c t i c e of I d e l i b e r a t i o n b e t w e e n p a r t i c i p a n t s in c o m m u n i c a t i o n w h o w a n t to arrive at rationally m o t i v a t e d decisions takes t h e p l a c e of t h g j j r i v a t e I law m o d e l of a c o n t r a c t b e t w e e n m a r k e t players. Political o p i n i o n -
139 The Nation, the Rule of Law, and Democracy
a n d will-formation is n o t l i m i t e d to t h e f o r m a t i o n of c o m p r o m i s e s b u t also c o n f o r m s to t h e m o d e l of p u b l i c d i s c o u r s e s o r i e n t e d to t h e r a t i o n a l acceptability of r e g u l a t i o n s in t h e l i g h t of g e n e r a l i z e d inter ests, s h a r e d evaluative o r i e n t a t i o n s , a n d justified p r i n c i p l e s . T h i s n o n i n s t r u m e n t a l c o n c e p t i o n of politics is b a s e d o n t h e i d e a of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a c t i n g p e r s o n . N o r s h o u l d t h e a u t o n o m y of legal p e r s o n s b e c o n c e i v e d in t e r m s of self-ownership. T h e social c h a r a c ter of n a t u r a l p e r s o n s is s u c h t h a t t h e y d e v e l o p i n t o individuals in t h e c o n t e x t of intersubjectively s h a r e d f o r m s of life a n d stabilize t h e i r i d e n t i t i e s t h r o u g h r e l a t i o n s of r e c i p r o c a l r e c o g n i t i o n . H e n c e , j d s o f r o m a j e g a l p o i n t of view, i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n s c a n b e p r o t e c t e d jgnly by simultaneously p r o t e c t i n g t h e c o n t e x t i n jvhich.,,their, f o r m a t i o n p r o c e s s e s u n f ( r i d , j ^ t j s , only by a s s u r i n g t h e m s e l v e s access to s u p p o r t i v e i n t e r p e r s o n a f _ x e l a t i o n s . social n e t w p r k s , a n d c u l t u r a l f o r m s of life. A discursively i n s t i t u t e d p r o c e s s of legislation a n d political d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g t h a t k e e p s this in view m u s t take a c c o u n t of values a n d n o r m s as well as existing p r e f e r e n c e s . As s u c h , it is well qualified to fulfill t h e task of p r o v i d i n g a political substitute for p r o c e s s e s of i n t e g r a t i o n t h a t fail at o t h e r levels. F r o m t h e p o i n t of view of K a n t a n d of R o u s s e a u ( p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d ) , d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n d o e s n o t h a v e t h e collectivistic a n d at t h e s a m e t i m e exclusionary m e a n i n g of t h e assertion o f n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d of t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of a u n i q u e n a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r . Rather, it h a s t h e inclusive m e a n i n g of self-legislation w h i c h involves all citizens equally. It is inclusive in t h a t s u c h a politi cal o r d e r k e e p s itself o p e n to t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n of t h o s e w h o suffer d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a n d to t h e integ^icm^ of t h e m a r g i n a l i z e d , b u t w i t h o u t imprisoning them iri..,the^miformity.of..a..homogenized e t h n i c c o m m u n i t y . I n this c o n n e c t i o n t h e p r i n c i p l e of v o l u n t a r i n e s s is cru cial; t h a t citizens b e l o n g to a state is a f u n c t i o n at least of t h e i r implicit a g r e e m e n t ) W h e r e a s t h e substantive u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p o p u lar sovereignty a s s u m e s a n essential i n t e r c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n "free d o m " a n d t h e external i n d e p e n d e n c e of a p e o p l e , t h e p r o c e d u r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o n n e c t s sovereignty with t h e private a n d p u b l i c a u t o n o m y g r a n t e d e v e r y b o d y equally within a n association of free a n d e q u a l legal subjects. Given t h e c h a l l e n g e s t h a t c o n f r o n t us today, I w a n t to a r g u e , t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c c o u n t of r e p u b l i c a n i s m is 23
140 Chapter 5
m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e t h a n e i t h e r a n e t h n o n a t i o n a l o r even a c o m m u n i t a r i a n c o n c e p t i o n of t h e n a t i o n , t h e r u l e of law, a n d d e m o c r a c y . II
O n the Meaning a n d Limits o f National Self-determination
T h e n a t i o n a l i t y p r i n c i p l e implies a r i g h t o f n a t i o n a l self-determina tion. A c c o r d i n g t o this p r i n c i p l e , every n a t i o n t h a t wishes t o g o v e r n itself h a s t h e r i g h t t o exist as a n i n d e p e n d e n t state. T h e e t h n o n a t i o n a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of p o p u l a r sovereignty s e e m s t o p r o v i d e a so l u t i o n t o a p r o b l e m t h a t r e p u b l i c a n i s m c a n n o t solve: H o w a r e we t o d e f i n e t h e totality of t h o s e t o w h o m citizens' r i g h t s s h o u l d legiti mately apply? K a n t ascribes t o every h u m a n b e i n g as s u c h t h e r i g h t t o h a v e r i g h t s a n d t o r e g u l a t e his life i n c o m m o n with o t h e r s i n s u c h a way t h a t e v e r y o n e c a n enjoy e q u a l liberties i n a c c o r d a n c e with p u b l i c , coer cive laws. B u t this d o e s n o t settle w h o m a y actually m a k e u s e o f this r i g h t with w h o m a n d w h e n ; n o r d o e s it settle w h o m a y u n i t e i n t o a s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g c o m m o n w e a l t h o n t h e basis of a social c o n t r a c t . T l e i ^ i e s t i o n of t h e legitimate composition oi t h e citizen b o d y r e m a i n s o p e n ^\o^^^eYaocr?i\ic s e l f ^ t o m i n a t i o n o n l y a f f e c t s tl^e m o d e of o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e c o m m o n life of legal c o n s o c i a t e s i n g e n e r a l . O f c o u r s e , t h e self-legislation of a n a t i o n with a d e m o c r a t i c constitu t i o n c a n b e t r a c e d b a c k t o t h e d e c i s i o n of a f o u n d i n g g e n e r a t i o n t o give t h e m s e l v e s a c o n s t i t u t i o n ; b u t with this a c t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s qualify.AemsefaesLonly retroactiveh as a sovereign p e o p l e (Staatsvolk). It is t h r o u g h t h e s h a r e d will t o f o u n d a state a n d , as a c o n s e q u e n c e of this r e s o l u t i o n , t h r o u g h t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n - f o u n d i n g p r a c t i c e itself t h a t t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s c o n s t i t u t e t h e m s e l v e s as a n a t i o n o f citizens. T h i s a p p r o a c h r e m a i n s u n p r o b l e m a t i c as l o n g as b o r d e r s a r e n o t in fact d i s p u t e d , as for e x a m p l e i n t h e F r e n c h o r e v e n t h e A m e r i c a n R e v o l u t i o n w h e n t h e citizens s t r u g g l e d for r e p u b l i c a n f r e e d o m s e i t h e r against t h e i r o w n g o v e r n m e n t , a n d h e n c e w i t h i n t h e b o u n d a ries o f a n a l r e a d y existing state, o r a g a i n s t a c o l o n i a l p o w e r w h i c h h a d itself a l r e a d y d e f i n e d t h e b o u n d a r i e s of u n e q u a l t r e a t m e n t . B u t in o t h e r cases t h e circular a n s w e r t h a t t h e citizens c o n s t i t u t e t h e m selves as a p e o p l e , a n d t h e r e b y d e l i m i t t h e m s e l v e s b o t h socially a n d territorially f r o m t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t , is n o t sufficient: "To say t h a t all
141 The Nation, the Rule of Law, and Democracy
people . . . are entitled to the democratic process begs a prior ques tion. W h e n d o e s a collection of p e r s o n s c o n s t i t u t e a n e n t i t y — ' a p e o p l e ' — e n t i t l e d t o g o v e r n itself d e m o c r a t i c a l l y ? " I n t h e r e a l world, w h o in e a c h i n s t a n c e a c q u i r e s t h e p o w e r t o d e f i n e t h e dis p u t e d b o r d e r s of a state is settled by historical c o n t i n g e n c i e s , usually by t h e q u a s i - n a t u r a l o u t c o m e of v i o l e n t conflicts, wars, a n d civil wars. W 5 e r e a s ~ r e p u b l i c a n i s m r e i n f o r c e s o u r a w a r e n e s s of t h e c o n t i n g e n c y of t h e s e b o r d e r s , this c o n t i n g e n c y c a n b e d i s p e l l e d by a p p e a l to t h e i d e a of a g r o w n n a t i o n t h a t i m b u e s t h e b o r d e r s with t h e a u r a of i m i t a t e d substantiality a n d l e g i t i m a t e s t h e m t h r o u g h fictitious links with t h e past. N a t i o n a l i s m b r i d g e s t h e n o r m a t i v e g a p by a p p e a l i n g to a so-called r i g h t of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . 24
I n c o n t r a s t with social c o n t r a c t t h e o r y w h i c h g r o u n d s t h e legal o r d e r in r e l a t i o n s of m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l citizens, Carl S c h m i t t s e e m s t o b e in a p o s i t i o n t o justify s u c h a collective r i g h t . F o r if d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n is u n d e r s t o o d o n t h e m o d e l of collective self-assertion a n d self-realization, n o single p e r s o n c a n realize his f u n d a m e n t a l r i g h t t o e q u a l citizens' r i g h t s o u t s i d e t h e c o n t e x t of a n e t h n i c n a t i o n t h a t enjoys t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e of a state. O n this view t h e collective r i g h t of every p e o p l e t o f o r m a n i n d e p e n d e n t state is a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n for t h e effec tive g u a r a n t e e of e q u a l i n d i v i d u a l rights. T h i s justification of t h e p r i n c i p l e of n a t i o n a l i t y also yields t h e possibility of e n d o w i n g t h e actual success of a n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e m o v e m e n t with r e t r o s p e c tive n o r m a t i v e force. A p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p of p e o p l e qualifies for t h e r i g h t of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e fact t h a t it defines itself as a h o m o g e n e o u s p e o p l e and at t h e s a m e t i m e h a s t h e p o w e r to c o n t r o l t h e t e r r i t o r i a l b o u n d a r i e s t h a t derive f r o m s u c h ascriptive characteristics. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e a s s u m p t i o n of a h o m o g e n e o u s p e o p l e contradicts the principle of voluntariness a n d has certain n o r m a tively u n d e s i r a b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s w h i c h S c h m i t t m a k e s n o a t t e m p t t o c o n c e a l : "A n a t i o n a l l y h o m o g e n e o u s state t h e n a p p e a r s n o r m a l ; a state t h a t lacks this h o m o g e n e i t y is a b n o r m a l , a t h r e a t to p e a c e . " T h e a s s u m p t i o n of a corrnpj^sq necessitates r e
2 5
pressive policies, w h e t h e r it b e t h e f o r c e d assimilation of alien ele m e n t s o r t h e p u r i f i c a t i o n of t h e p e o p l e t h r o u g h a p a r t h e i d a n d
142 Chapter 5
e t h n i c c l e a n s i n g , for, as S c h m i t t p u t s it, "a d e m o c r a t i c state (would) r o b itself of its s u b s t a n c e by consistently r e c o g n i z i n g t h e universal equality of h u m a n b e i n g s in t h e d o m a i n of p u b l i c life a n d of p u b l i c l a w . " I n a d d i t i o n to s u g g e s t i n g p r e v e n t i v e m e a s u r e s l i m i t i n g t h e a d m i s s i o n of aliens, S c h m i t t r e c o m m e n j i ^ t h e ^ p u l s i o n of h e t e r o g e n e o u s e l e m e n t s ^ of t h e p o p u l a t i o n " as well as t h e i r g e o g r a p h i c a l s e g r e g a t i o n , h e n c e t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of p r o t e c t o r a t e s , c o l o n i e s , r e s e r v a t i o n s , h o m e l a n d s , etc. 26
Of course, the republican conception does n o t preclude ethnic c o m m u n i t i e s ' giving t h e m s e l v e s d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n s a n d estab lishing t h e m s e l v e s as sovereign states so l o n g as this i n d e p e n d e n c e is l e g i t i m a t e d by t h e i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t of citizens to live in f r e e d o m u n d e r l^ws. B u t as a g e n e r a l r u l e nation-states d o n o t d e v e l o p p e a c e fully f r o m s e p a r a t e p e o p l e s living in isolation; r a t h e r t h e y typically e n c r o a c h o n n e i g h b o r i n g r e g i o n s , tribes, s u b c u l t u r e s , a n d linguistic o r religious c o m m u n i t i e s . F o r t h e m o s t p a r t n e w nation-states e m e r g e at t h e e x p e n s e of assimilated, s u p p r e s s e d , o r m a r g i n a l i z e d " s u b a l t e r n " p e o p l e s . T h e f o r m a t i o n of nation-states u n d e r t h e b a n n e r of e t h n o n a t i o n a l i s m h a s a l m o s t always b e e n a c c o m p a n i e d by b l o o d y p u r i f i c a t i o n rituals, a n d it h a s g e n e r a l l y e x p o s e d n e w m j n o r i ties to n e w waves of r e p r e s s i o n . I n late n i n e t e e n t h - and^ twentiethc e n t u r y E u r o p e it left i n its w a k e a h o r r i f i c legacy of e m i g r a t i o n a n d e x p u l s i o n , of f o r c e d r e s e t t l e m e n t , d i s e n f r a n c h i s e m e n t , a n d physical e x t e r m i n a t i o n , u p to a n d i n c l u d i n g g e n o c i d e . O f t e n e n o u g h t h e p e r s e c u t e d t h e m s e l v e s m u t a t e d i n t o p e r s e c u t o r s o n c e they suc c e e d e d in e m a n c i p a t i n g themselves. I n t h e prevailing p r a c t i c e c o n c e r n i n g r e c o g n i t i o n in i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, t h e e m e r g e n c e of t h e n a t i o n a l i t y p r i n c i p l e c o i n c i d e d with a shift to t h e " p r i n c i p l e of effec tiveness" a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h every n e w g o v e r n m e n t — r e g a r d l e s s of its legitimacy—-can c o u n t o n r e c o g n i t i o n only if it s u c c e e d s in stabi lizing its sovereignty b o t h e x t e r n a l l y a n d internally. B u t as in t h e salient cases of c o l o n i a l i s m a n d d o m i n a t i o n by a f o r e i g n power, t h e injustices a g a i n s t which, l e g i t i m a t e resigtance. is d i r e c t e d d o n o t r e s u l t f r o m t h e violation of a s u p p o s e d collective r i g h t of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n b u t f r o m t h e violation of t h e basic r i g h t s of individuals. T h e d e m a n d for s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n caiT only have as its i m m e d i a t e c o n t e n t t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of e q u a l civil
143 The Nation, the Rule of Law, and Democracy
rights. T h e a b o l i t i o n of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against m i n o r i t i e s d o e s n o t p e r se call i n t o q u e s t i o n t h e t e r r i t o r i a l b o u n d a r i e s of a n u n j u s t r e g i m e . A d e m a n d to s e c e d e is l e g i t i m a t e only w h e n t h e c e n t r a l state p o w e r violates t h e r i g h t s of a p o r t i o n of t h e p o p u l a t i o n c o n c e n t r a t e d in a p a r t i c u l a r t e r r i t o r y ; in this case t h e d e m a n d for i n c l u s i o n c a n b e r e a l i z e d via n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e . F r o m this s t a n d p o i n t , t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e of t h e U n i t e d States was a l r e a d y r e c o g n i z e d by S p a i n a n d F r a n c e in 1778. Since t h e d e f e c t i o n of t h e S p a n i s h c o l o n i e s in South a n d Central America, a n d contrary to the practice that pre vailed u n t i l t h a t t i m e , t h e view h a s g a i n e d g e n e r a l a c c e p t a n c e t h a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n of a secession f r o m t h e m o t h e r c o u n t r y is p e r m i s s i b l e e v e n w i t h o u t t h e assent of t h e f o r m e r s o v e r e i g n . So l o n g as n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e m o v e m e n t s a p p e a l to d e m o cratic s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n in t h e r e p u b l i c a n sense, a secession ( o r t h e a n n e x a t i o n of a s e c e d e d p o r t i o n of a t e r r i t o r y by a n o t h e r state) c a n n o t b e j u s t i f i e d w i t h o u t t a k i n g a c c o u n t of t h e legitimacy of t h e status q u o . F o r so l o n g as all citizens enjoy e q u a l r i g h t s a n d n o b o d y suffers d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , t h e r e is n o c o m p e l l i n g n o r m a t i v e r e a s o n to s e c e d e f r o m t h e l a r g e r political c o m m u n i t y . U n d e r t h e s e c i r c u m stances, issues of r e p r e s s i o n o r of "foreign d o m i n a t i o n " (Fremdherrschaft) w h i c h w o u l d give m i n o r i t i e s t h e r i g h t to s e c e d e c a n n o t arise. T h i s view fits t h e r e s o l u t i o n of t h e U N G e n e r a l Assembly w h i c h , in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e U N C h a r t e r , g u a r a n t e e s all p e o p l e s a r i g h t of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , b u t d o e s so w i t h o u t e m p l o y i n g t h e c o n c e p t "peo p l e " in t h e e t h n i c s e n s e . T h e r e s o l u t i o n rejects explicitly t h e r i g h t t o s e c e d e f r o m "states t h a t c o n d u c t t h e m s e l v e s in a c c o r d a n c e with t h e p r i n c i p l e s of e q u a l t r e a t m e n t a n d of t h e r i g h t of self-determina t i o n of p e o p l e s a n d t h e r e f o r e possess a g o v e r n m e n t w h i c h r e p r e sents t h e w h o l e p e o p l e , w i t h o u t d i s c r i m i n a t i o n o n t h e basis of r a c e , religion or sex." 2 7
28
2 9
30
Ill
A M o d e l o f Inclusion Sensitive to Difference
To b e s u r e , t h e liberal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of d e m o c r a t i c self-determina t i o n o b s c u r e s t h e p r o b l e m of " b o r n " m i n o r i t i e s , w h i c h c o m e s i n t o s h a r p e r focus f r o m t h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n p e r s p e c t i v e a n d f r o m t h e intersubjective p o i n t of view of d i s c o u r s e t h e o r y . T h e p r o b l e m also 31
32
144 Chapter 5
o c c u r s i n d e m o c r a t i c societies w h e n a politically d o m i n a n t , majority c u l t u r e i m p o s e s its way of life o n m i n o r i t i e s a n d t h e r e b y d e n i e s effective equality of r i g h t s to citizens f r o m o t h e r c u l t u r a l back g r o u n d s . T h i s p r o b l e m c o n c e r n s political issues t h a t b e a r o n t h e I ethical s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d t h e identity of citizens. I n t h e s e mat ters m i n o r i t i e s s h o u l d n o t b e simply o u t v o t e d by a majority. H e r e t h e p r i n c i p l e of majority r u l e r u n s u p a g a i n s t its limits as t h e c o n t i n g e n t c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e citizenry p r e j u d i c e s t h e o u t c o m e s of a s e e m i n g l y n e u t r a l p r o c e d u r e : " T h e majority p r i n c i p l e itself d e p e n d s o n p r i o r a s s u m p t i o n s a b o u t t h e u n i t : t h a t t h e u n i t w i t h i n w h i c h it is to o p e r a t e is itself l e g i t i m a t e a n d t h a t t h e m a t t e r s o n w h i c h it is e m p l o y e d p r o p e r l y fall w i t h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h a t u n i t . I n o t h e r w o r d s , w h e t h e r t h e s c o p e a n d d o m a i n of majority r u l e a r e a p p r o p r i a t e in a p a r t i c u l a r u n i t d e p e n d s o n a s s u m p t i o n s t h a t t h e majority p r i n c i p l e itself c a n d o n o t h i n g to justify. T h e justification for t h e u n i t lies b e y o n d t h e r e a c h of t h e majority p r i n c i p l e a n d , for t h a t m a t t e r , mostly b e y o n d t h e r e a c h of d e m o c r a t i c t h e o r y itself." 33
T h e p r o b l e m of " b o r n " m i n o r i t i e s c a n b e e x p l a i n e d by t h e fact t h a t citizens, e v e n w h e n viewed as legal subjects, a r e n o t a b s t r a c t individuals w h o a r e c u t off f r o m t h e i r o r i g i n s . By i n t e r v e n i n g ^ in ethical-political issues, t h e law affects t h e integrity of t h e f o r m s of life in w h i c h e a c h p e r s o n ' s c o n d u c t of life is e m b e d d e d . I n a d d i t i o n to m o r a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , p r a g m a t i c d e l i b e r a t i o n s , a n d n e g o t i a b l e interests, this a s p e c t of t h e law b r i n g s strong evaluations i n t o play t h a t d e p e n d o n intersubjectively s h a r e d , b u t culturally specific, tradi tions. L e g a l o r d e r s as w h o l e s a r e also "ethically i m b u e d " in t h a t t h e y i n t e r p r e t t h e universalistic c o n t e n t of t h e s a m e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r i n ciples in d i f f e r e n t ways, namely, against t h e b a c k g r o u n d of t h e e x p e r i e n c e s t h a t m a k e u p a n a t i o n a l h i s t o r y a n d in l i g h t of a historically prevailing t r a d i t i o n , c u l t u r e , a n d f o r m of life. O f t e n t h e r e g u l a t i o n of culturally sensitive m a t t e r s , s u c h as t h e official l a n g u a g e , t h e p u b l i c s c h o o l c u r r i c u l u m , t h e status of c h u r c h e s a n d religious c o m m u n i t i e s , a n d t h e n o r m s of c r i m i n a l law (e.g., t h o s e r e g u l a t i n g a b o r t i o n ) , b u t also of less o b v i o u s m a t t e r s s u c h as t h e status of t h e family a n d marriage-like p a r t n e r s h i p s , t h e a c c e p t a n c e of security s t a n d a r d s , o r t h e d e m a r c a t i o n of t h e private f r o m t h e p u b l i c r e a l m , is m e r e l y a reflection of t h e ethical-political s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of a
145 T h e N a t i o n , t h e R u l e of Law, a n d D e m o c r a c y
majority c u l t u r e t h a t h a s a c h i e v e d d o m i n a n c e for c o n t i n g e n t , his torical r e a s o n s . S u c h implicitly o v e r w h e l m i n g r e g u l a t i o n s c a n also s p a r k a c u l t u r a l s t r u g g l e by d i s r e s p e c t e d m i n o r i t i e s against t h e m a j o r i t y c u l t u r e e v e n w i t h i n a r e p u b l i c a n polity t h a t g u a r a n t e e s for mally e q u a l civil rights, as is s h o w n by n u m e r o u s e x a m p l e s s u c h as t h e F r a n c o p h o n e s in C a n a d a , t h e W a l l o o n s in B e l g i u m , a n d t h e B a s q u e s a n d C a t a l a n s in S p a i n . A n a t i o n of citizens is c o m p o s e d of p e r s o n s w h o , as a r e s u l t of socialization processes, also e m b o d y t h e f o r m s of life in w h i c h they f o r m e d t h e i r identities, even if as a d u l t s t h e y r e n o u n c e t h e t r a d i t i o n s in w h i c h t h e y w e r e b r o u g h t u p . I n virtue of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e i r character, p e r s o n s a r e so to s p e a k n o d a l p o i n t s j l n _ a n ^ a ^ r i p t i y e n e t w o r k of c u l t u r e s a n d t r a d i t i o n s . T h e c o n t i n g e n t c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e citizen b o d y — i n D a h l ' s t e r m i n o l o g y , t h e "political unit"-—also implicitly d e t e r m i n e s t h e ( j ^ i l ^ ^ y e ^ o r i z 1 ^ w i t h i n w h i c h c u l t u r a l conflicts a n d ethical-political d i s c o u r s e s of self-interpretation a r e p l a y e d o u t . T h i s evaluative h o r i z o n also c h a n g e s with shifts in t h e social c o m p o s i t i o n of t h e citizenry. F o r e x a m p l e , political q u e s t i o n s t h a t d e p e n d o n a culture-specific b a c k g r o u n d a r e n o t necessarily t r e a t e d differently after a secession, t h o u g h t h e o u t c o m e s of votes a r e different; n e w majorities a r e n o t always t h e r e s u l t of n e w arguments. . , O f c o u r s e , a m i n o r i t y t h a t suffers d i s c r i m i n a t i o n c a n achieve e q u a l r i g h t s t h r o u g h secession only o n t h e i m p r o b a b l e c o n d i t i o n t h a t its m e m b e r s are geographically concentrated. Otherwise the old prob lems merely recur u n d e r new banners. In general, discrimination c a n b e e l i m i n a t e d n o t t h r o u g h ..national i n d e p e n d e n c e b u t only througl^ is ^sufficiently sensitive to t h e c u l t u r a l....background- of individual a n d group-specific differences. T h e p r o b l e m of b o r n m i n o r i t i e s , e n d e m i c to all pluralistic societies, b e c o m e s m o r e a c u t e in m u l t i c u l t u r a l societies. B u t w h e n t h e l a t t e r a r e o r g a n i z e d as d e m o c r a t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n a l states, several different r o u t e s to t h e elusive g o a l of a " d i f f e r e n c e s ^ a r e at a n y r a t e available: federalist d e l e g a t i o n of p o w e r s , a functionally specified transfer o r d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of state c o m p e t e n c e s , a b o v e all g u a r a n t e e s of c u l t u r a l a u t o n o m y , group-specific rights, c o m p e n s a t o r y policies, a n d o t h e r a r r a n g e m e n t s for effectively p r o t e c t i n g
146 Chapter 5
m i n o r i t i e s . I n this way t h e b o d y of citizens w h o p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s i n a p a r t i c u l a r t e r r i t o r y o r i n p a r t i c u l a r policy d o m a i n s c h a n g e s w i t h o u t affecting its p r i n c i p l e s . To b e s u r e , t h e c o e x i s t e n c e with e q u a l r i g h t s of different e t h n i c c o m m u n i t i e s , l a n g u a g e g r o u p s , religious faiths, a n d f o r m s of life s h o u l d n o t b e p u r c h a s e d at t h e cost of t h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n of society. T h e painful p r o c e s s of u n c o u p l i n g m u s t n o t r e n d t h e society asund e r jnjtoji^m^ulgDlicJtyj3f s u b c u l t u r e s closed off f r o m o n e a n o t h e r . O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e majority c u l t u r e m u s t d e t a c h itself f r o m its fusion with t h e g e n e r a l political c u l t u r e i n w h i c h all citizens s h a r e equally; o t h e r w i s e it dictates t h e p a r a m e t e r s of political discourses f r o m t h e outset. As j u s t o n e p a r t , it m a y n o l o n g e r f o r m t h e facade of t h e w h o l e w i t h o u t p r e j u d i c i n g t h e d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e d u r e i n spe cific q u e s t i o n s of existential r e l e v a n c e for m i n o r i t i e s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e b i n d i n g force of t h e c o n i m o n political c u l t u r e , w h i c h b e c o m e s progressively m o r e abstract as s u b c u l t u r e s r e d u c e it t o a c o m m o n denominator^ must remain ^ s t i ^ t o .prjsyemQhe
3 4
n a t i o n of c]tiz£ns.^ "Multiculturalism, while e n d o r s i n g t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n of several c u l t u r a l g r o u p s i n a single political society, also r e q u i r e s t h e e x i s t e n c e of a c o m m o n c u l t u r e . . . . M e m b e r s of all c u l t u r a l g r o u p s . . . will have t o a c q u i r e a c o m m o n politi cal l a n g u a g e a n d c o n v e n t i o n s of c o n d u c t t o b e a b l e t o p a r t i c i p a t e effectively i n t h e c o m p e t i t i o n for r e s o u r c e s a n d t h e p r o t e c t i o n of g r o u p as well as individual i n t e r e s t s i n a s h a r e d political a r e n a . " 3 5
IV Democracy a n d State Sovereignty: T h e Case o f Humanitarian Intervention T h e substantive a n d p r o c e d u r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g s of d e m o c r a c y n o t only entail different c o n c e p t i o n s of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d m u l t i c u l t u r a l i s m ; they also have different c o n s e q u e n c e s for t h e c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of state sovereignty. T h e state t h a t d e v e l o p e d i n m o d e r n E u r o p e d e p e n d e d f r o m j h e b e g i n n i n g o n t h e r e s e r v e force of a s t a n d i n g army, t h e police^ a n d t h e p e n a l system, a n d j t e x e r c i s e d a m o n o p o l y over t h e legitimate m e a n s of v i o l e n c e . I n t e r n a l sover eignty meanT tKe 5nF67^ state, e x t e r n a l sovereignty t h e ability t o assert oneself i n t h e c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g
147 T h e N a t i o n , t h e R u l e of Law, a n d D e m o c r a c y
t h e m a j o r p o w e r s (as this b e c a m e c o n s o l i d a t e d in t h e E u r o p e a n state system after t h e P e a c e of W e s t p h a l i a ) . F r o m this s t a n d p o i n t t h e p r o c e s s of d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n w h i c h was set in m o t i o n by t h e f o r m a t i o n of nation-states a p p e a r s as t h e transfer of sovereign p o w e r f r o m t h e p r i n c e to t h e p e o p l e . B u t this f o r m u l a lacks p r e c i s i o n in c o m p a r i s o n with t h e alternative t h a t c o n c e r n s u s h e r e . If d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n m e a n s t h e e q u a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n of free a n d e q u a l citizens in t h e p r o c e s s of d e c i s i o n m a k i n g a n d legis lation, t h e n d e m o c r a c y in t h e first p l a c e c h a n g e s ^ t h e j i a t u r e a n d m o d e of e x e r c i s i n g i n t e r n a l sovereignty. T h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state revolutionizes t h e basis o n w h i c h political r u l e is l e g i t i m a t e d . If, by c o n t r a s t , d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n m e a n s t h e collective self-as s e r t i o n a n d self-realization of a h o m o g e n e o u s p e o p l e , t h e issue of e x t e r n a l sovereignty m o v e s i n t o t h e f o r e g r o u n d . F o r t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of state p o w e r in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l system t h e r e b y a c q u i r e s t h e a d d i t i o n a l significance t h a t a n a t i o n secures, t o g e t h e r with its exist e n c e , its u n i q u e c h a r a c t e r over a n d a g a i n s t o t h e r n a t i o n s . T h u s , in t h e first case, t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n d e m o c r a c y a n d state sover eignty lays d o w n s t r i n g e n t c o n d i t i o n s for t h e legitimacy of t h e inter n a l o r d e r b u t leaves t h e q u e s t i o n of e x t e r n a l sovereignty o p e n ; in t h e s e c o n d case it i n t e r p r e t s t h e p l a c e of t h e n a t i o n - s t a t e in t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r e n a , b u t t h e only c r i t e r i o n of legitimacy it r e q u i r e s for t h e i n t e r n a l exercise of p o w e r is civil p e a c e , t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of "law a n d o r d e r . " T h e c o n c e p t i o n of sovereignty in classical i n t e r n a t i o n a l law entails a p r o h i b i t i o n o n i n t e r f e r e n c e in t h e i n t e r n a l affairs of a n i n t e r n a tionally r e c o g n i z e d state. T h i s p r o h i b i t i o n of i n t e r v e n t i o n is i n d e e d r e a f f i r m e d by t h e U N C h a r t e r ; b u t f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g it s t o o d in t e n s i o n with t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n of h u m a n rights. T h e e r o s i o n of t h e p r i n c i p l e of n o n i n t e r v e n t i o n in r e c e n t d e c a d e s h a s b e e n d u e p r i m a r i l y to t h e politics of h u m a n r i g h t s . It is h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g t h a t S c h m i t t categorically r e p u d i a t e d this d e v e l o p m e n t . H i s r e j e c t i o n of i n t e r v e n t i o n g r o u n d e d in a p p e a l s to h u m a n r i g h t s c a n a l r e a d y b e a c c o u n t e d for by his bellig e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s , i n d e e d of politics in g e n e r a l . It was n o t only t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of c r i m e s against h u m a n ity after t h e S e c o n d W o r l d W a r t h a t elicited his scornful p r o t e s t . T h e 36
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c o n d e m n a t i o n of offensive w a r s h a d a l r e a d y s t r u c k h i m as i n c o m p a t i b l e with t h e status a n d r a n g e of a c t i o n of n a t i o n s t h a t c a n assert t h e i r e x i s t e n c e a n d u n i q u e identity only in t h e a n t a g o n i s t i c r o l e of sovereign subjects of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. M i c h a e l Walzer, w h o c o u l d n o t b e f u r t h e r f r o m t h e m i l i t a n t ethn o n a t i o n a l i s m of a Schmitt, d e f e n d s a similar p o s i t i o n . W i t h o u t wishing to suggest false parallels, I w o u l d like t o e x a m i n e his c o m munitarian reservations concerning humanitarian intervention, for t h e y t h r o w l i g h t o n t h e i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n c o n c e p t i o n s of d e m o c r a c y a n d t h e t r e a t m e n t of sovereignty rights. I n his b o o k o n j u s t w a r s , Walzer p r o c e e d s f r o m t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t a n y c o m m u n i t y h a s a r i g h t of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n if it possesses its o w n collective identity a n d , i n s p i r e d by a n a w a r e n e s s of its c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e , h a s t h e will a n d d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o c a r v e o u t a state exist e n c e for itself a n d to assert its political i n d e p e n d e n c e . A g r o u p of p e o p l e enjoys t h e r i g h t of n a t i o n a l s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n if it s u c c e e d s in laying claim to it. 3 9
40
To b e s u r e , Walzer d o e s n o t u n d e r s t a n d t h e c a n d i d a t e for political i n d e p e n d e n c e as a n e t h n i c c o m m u n i t y of d e s c e n t b u t r a t h e r as a c u l t u r a l c o m m u n i t y of i n h e r i t a n c e . However, t h e historically evolv i n g c u l t u r a l n a t i o n , like t h e c o m m u n i t y of s h a r e d ancestry, is also u n d e r s t o o d as a p r e p o l i t i c a l entity t h a t h a s t h e r i g h t to p r e s e r v e its integrity in t h e f o r m of a sovereign state: " T h e i d e a of c o m m u n a l integrity derives its m o r a l a n d political force f r o m t h e r i g h t s of c o n t e m p o r a r y m e n a n d w o m e n to live as m e m b e r s of a historic c o m m u n i t y a n d to e x p r e s s t h e i r i n h e r i t e d c u l t u r e t h r o u g h political f o r m s w o r k e d o u t a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s . " Walzer also d e d u c e s t h r e e e x c e p t i o n s to t h e p r i n c i p l e of n o n i n t e r v e n t i o n f r o m this r i g h t of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . H e r e g a r d s i n t e r v e n t i o n s as p e r m i s s i b l e (a) to lend support to ajiational l i t o t h a t manifests t h e 41
identity of a n i n d e p e n d e n t c o m m u n i t y by t h e very act of resistance a n d (b) to d e f e n d t h e integrity of a pojijjcal c o m m u n i t y u n d e r attack w h e n it c a n only b e p r o t e c t e d by a n o p p o s i n g i n t e r v e n t i o n . Walzer also justifies t h e t h i r d e x c e p t i o n , n o t o n t h e basis of violations of h u m a n rights p e r se, b u t o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t (c) in cases of enslave ment, j n a ^ a c £ e ^ o r ^ deprives its o w n citizens of t h e possibility of giving e x p r e s s i o n to t h e i r f o r m s of life a n d t h e r e b y of p r e s e r v i n g t h e i r collective identity.
149 T h e N a t i o n , t h e R u l e of Law, a n d D e m o c r a c y
T h e c o m m u n i t a r i a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of p o p u l a r sovereignty e m p h a sizes t h e a s p e c t of e x t e r n a l sovereignty in s u c h a way t h a t t h e q u e s tion of t h e legitimacy of t h e i n t e r n a l o r d e r gets p u s h e d i n t o t h e b a c k g r o u n d . T h e p o i n t of Walzer's reflections is t h a t a h u m a n i t a r i a n i n t e r v e n t i o n a g a i n s t violations of h u m a n r i g h t s by a d i c t a t o r i a l re g i m e c a n only b e justified w h e n t h e affected citizens t h e m s e l v e s take u p t h e c u d g e l s against political r e p r e s s i o n a n d , by a r e c o g n i z a b l e act of r e b e l l i o n , p r o v i d e c o n c r e t e p r o o f t h a t t h e g o v e r n m e n t is o p p o s e d to t h e t r u e a s p i r a t i o n s of t h e p e o p l e a n d t h r e a t e n s t h e integrity of t h e c o m m u n i t y . Accordingly, t h e legitimacy of a political o r d e r is m e a s u r e d in t h e first i n s t a n c e by t h e a c c o r d b e t w e e n t h e political l e a d e r s h i p a n d t h e c u l t u r a l f o r m of life t h a t is constitutive of t h e identity of t h e p e o p l e : "A state is l e g i t i m a t e o r n o t , d e p e n d i n g u p o n t h e 'fit' of g o v e r n m e n t a n d c o m m u n i t y , t h a t is, t h e d e g r e e to w h i c h t h e g o v e r n m e n t actually r e p r e s e n t s t h e political life of its p e o p l e . W h e n it d o e s n ' t d o t h a t , t h e p e o p l e h a v e a r i g h t to r e b e l . B u t if they a r e free to r e b e l t h e n they a r e also free n o t to r e b e l . . . b e c a u s e they still believe t h e g o v e r n m e n t to b e t o l e r a b l e , o r they a r e a c c u s t o m e d to it, o r they a r e p e r s o n a l l y loyal to its l e a d e r s . . . . A n y o n e c a n m a k e s u c h a r g u m e n t s , b u t only subjects o r citizens c a n act o n t h e m . " Walzer's critics p r o c e e d f r o m a different u n d e r s t a n d i n g of d e m o cratic s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n ; they reject t h e view t h a t i n t e r n a l sover eignty is simply a m a t t e r of t h e e f f e c t i v e j g r e j ^ ^ O n this r e a d i n g t h e key to j u d g i n g t h e legitimacy of t h e i n t e r n a l o r d e r is n o t c o m m o n c u l t u r a l i n h e r i t a n c e b u t t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of civil rights: " T h e m e r e fact t h a t t h e m u l t i t u d e s h a r e s some form of c o m m o n l i f e — c o m m o n t r a d i t i o n s , c u s t o m s , interests, history, institu tions, a n d b o u n d a r i e s — i s n o t sufficient to g e n e r a t e a g e n u i n e , i n d e p e n d e n t , l e g i t i m a t e political c o m m u n i t y . " T h e critics d i s p u t e t h e p r i n c i p l e of n o n i n t e r v e n t i o n a n d a d v o c a t e , as far as possible, t h e e x p a n s i o n of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p r o t e c t i o n of h u m a n rights. H e r e , of c o u r s e , t h a t a state is illegitimate a c c o r d i n g to the^stajridards of t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state is not, a suffidmt condition, for i n t e r v e n i n g in its i n t e r n a l affairs. O t h e r w i s e t h e U N G e n e r a l Assembly w o u l d h a v e to b e c o m p o s e d a l o n g c o m p l e t e l y different lines. Walzer rightly p o i n t s o u t t h a t f r o m a m o r a l p o i n t of view every d e c i s i o n t o act o n b e h a l f of citizens of a n o t h e r c o u n t r y is d u b i o u s . P r o p o s a l s for a case-by-case t r e a t m e n t of i n t e r v e n t i o n also take i n t o a c c o u n t t h e limits a n d t h e 4 2
43
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e x t r e m e d a n g e r s of a politics of h u m a n r i g h t s . B u t t h e decisions a n d strategies of t h e w o r l d o r g a n i z a t i o n , a n d especially t h e i n t e r v e n tions of forces c a r r y i n g o u t U N m a n d a t e s since 1989, i n d i c a t e t h e d i r e c t i o n a l o n g w h i c h i n t e r n a t i o n a l law (Volkerrecht) is g r a d u a l l y b e i n g t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a c o s m o p o l i t a n law (Weltbiirgerrecht) , T h e s e political a n d legal d e v e l o p m e n t s a r e r e a c t i o n s t o a n objec tively c h a n g e d situation. T h e u n p r e c e d e n t e d n a t u r e a n d scale of t h e g o v e r n m e n t criminality t h a t s p r e a d i n t h e wake of t h e t e c h n o l o g i cally u n f e t t e r e d a n d ideologically u n r e s t r a i n e d S e c o n d W o r l d W a r m a k e s a m o c k e r y of t h e classical p r e s u m p t i o n of t h e i n n o c e n c e of t h e sovereign subjects of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law. A p r e s c i e n t politics of p e a c e k e e p i n g m u s t take i n t o a c c o u n t t h e c o m p l e x social a n d politi cal causes of war. W h a t is u r g e n t l y n e e d e d a r e strategies d e s i g n e d to i n f l u e n c e — w h e r e possible, i n a n o n v i o l e n t m a n n e r — t h e i n t e r n a l o r d e r of formally sovereign states w h o s e goal is to foster self-sustain i n g e c o n o m i e s a n d t o l e r a b l e social c o n d i t i o n s , e q u a l d e m o c r a t i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n , t h e r u l e of law, a n d a c u l t u r e of t o l e r a n c e . S u c h inter v e n t i o n s i n s u p p o r t of i n t e r n a l d e m o c r a t i z a t i o n a r e , however, irrec o n c i l a b l e with a c o n c e p t i o n of d e m o c r a t i c s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t g r o u n d s a r i g h t of n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e for t h e sake of t h e collec tive self-realization of a c u l t u r a l f o r m of life. 46
V
Only a Europe o f Fatherlands?
I n view of t h e subversive forces a n d i m p e r a t i v e s of t h e w o r l d m a r k e t a n d of t h e i n c r e a s i n g density of w o r l d w i d e n e t w o r k s of c o m m u n i c a tion a n d c o m m e r c e , t h e e x t e r n a l sovereignty of states, h o w e v e r it m a y b e g r o u n d e d , is by n o w i n a n y case a n a n a c h r o n i s m . Also t h e i n c r e a s i n g global d a n g e r s w h i c h have l o n g since u n i t e d t h e n a t i o n s of t h e w o r l d unwittingly i n t o a n i n v o l u n t a r y risk society r e n d e r a practical necessity t h e c r e a t i o n of politically c o m p e t e n t organiza tions o n t h e s u p r a n a t i o n a l level. F o r t h e t i m e b e i n g thefeTs^aTackT of collective actors w h o c o u l d p u r s u e a " d o m e s t i c " politics o n a global scale a n d w o u l d have t h e p o w e r t o a g r e e o n t h e r e q u i s i t e p a r a m e t e r s , a r r a n g e m e n t s , a n d p r o c e d u r e s . Yet t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s have in t h e m e a n t i m e c o m p e l l e d nation-states t o u n i t e i n t o l a r g e r u n i t s . T h i s p r o c e s s gives rise t o d a n g e r o u s l e g i t i m a t i o n deficiencies,
151 The Nation, the Rule of Law, and Democracy
as is s h o w n by t h e e x a m p l e of t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n . As n e w o r g a n i zations e m e r g e even f u r t h e r r e m o v e d f r o m t h e political b a s e , s u c h as t h e Brussels b u r e a u c r a c y , t h e g a p b e t w e e n s e l f - p r o g r a m m i n g ad m i n i s t r a t i o n s a n d systemic n e t w o r k s , o n t h e o n e j i a n d , a n d d e m o cratic processes, o n t h e other, grows constantly. T h e helpless defensive r e a c t i o n s to t h e s e c h a l l e n g e s a g a i n d e m o n s t r a t e t h e i n a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of a substantive c o n c e p t i o n of p o p u l a r sovereignty. A l t h o u g h t h e verdict of t h e F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o u r t of Ger m a n y c o n c e r n i n g t h e M a a s t r i c h t T r e a t y effectively ratifies t h e p r o p o s e d e x p a n s i o n of t h e c o m p e t e n c e s of t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n , t h e justification it p r o v i d e s reaffirms t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e of d e m o c r a c y w o u l d b e u n a c c e p t a b l y " e m p t i e d of c o n t e n t " if t h e exercise of state f u n c t i o n s c o u l d n o t b e t i e d o n c e m o r e to a "rela tively h o m o g e n e o u s " citizen body. T h e C o u r t , w h i c h takes its o r i e n t a t i o n f r o m H e r m a n n H e l l e r ( r a t h e r t h a n Carl S c h m i t t ) , a p p a r e n t l y wants to reject a n e t h n o n a t i o n a l i s t c o n c e p t i o n of t h e p e o p l e . Never theless, it takes t h e view t h a t a d e m o c r a t i c a l l y l e g i t i m a t e d state a u t h o r i t y m u s t flow f r o m a political will-formation t h r o u g h w h i c h a p e o p l e gives sufficient e x p r e s s i o n to its prepolitically given " n a t i o n a l identity." If a d e m o c r a t i c p r o c e s s is to take r o o t at all, it m u s t b e possible for t h e citizen b o d y to e x p r e s s legally "what u n i t e s t h e m socially a n d politically in a relatively h o m o g e n e o u s m a n n e r . " Given this basic a s s u m p t i o n , t h e C o u r t e x p l a i n s why t h e Maas t r i c h t Treaty will n o t f o u n d a E u r o p e a n f e d e r a l state i n t o w h i c h t h e F e d e r a l R e p u b l i c w o u l d b e s u b s u m e d , t h e r e b y s t r i p p i n g it of its s t a n d i n g as a subject of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law (with t h e r i g h t to c o n d u c t i n d e p e n d e n t j u d i c i a l , d o m e s t i c , a n d f o r e i g n policies, a n d to m a i n tain its o w n d e f e n s e forces) . I n e s s e n c e t h e a r g u m e n t of t h e C o u r t a i m s t o p r o v e t h a t t h e treaty d o e s j i o ^ establish t h e s u p r e m e constit u t i o n a l a u t h o r i t y (^^^j^^^^^gfeasl, of a n i n d e p e n d e n t s u p r a n a t i o n a l legal subject ( o n a n a n a l o g y with t h e U n i t e d States, for e x a m p l e ) . T h e "alliance of s t a t e s " is s u p p o s e d t o owe its existence only to t h e " a u t h o r i z a t i o n of states w h i c h remain sovereign": " T h e M a a s t r i c h t T r e a t y takes a c c o u n t of t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d sover eignty of t h e m e m b e r states by o b l i g a t i n g t h e U n i o n to r e s p e c t t h e n a t i o n a l idejrtity^of its m e m b e r s t a t e s . " F o r m u l a t i o n s s u c h as t h e s e b e t r a y the^conceptual barriersj) t h a t t h e substantive c o n c e p t of p o p u l a r 4 7
4 8
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sovereignty e r e c t s to t h e transfer of sovereignty r i g h t s to s u p r a n a t i o n a l b o d i e s . M o r e o v e r , t h e y l e a d to a s t o n i s h i n g c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t c a n n o t b e r e c o n c i l e d with earlier verdicts of t h e c o u r t o n t h e pri m a c y of E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y l a w . O n e w o u l d n o t b e m i s t a k e n if o n e d i s c e r n e d in t h e t e n o r of t h e C o u r t ' s justification a c e r t a i n level of a g r e e m e n t with t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t H e r m a n n L u b b e draws f r o m his p h i l i p p i c a g a i n s t t h e " U n i t e d States of E u r o p e ; " as h e c o n f i d e n t l y asserts i n t h e subtitle, this u n i o n is " n o t to b e " : " T h e legitimacy of t h e f u t u r e E u r o p e a n U n i o n . . . rests o n t h e s h a r e d i n t e r e s t s of its m e m b e r c o u n t r i e s , n o t o n t h e s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g will of a E u r o p e a n citizenry. A E u r o p e a n p e o p l e h a s n o political e x i s t e n c e a n d , while t h e r e is n o r e a s o n t o t h i n k t h a t a n e x p e r i e n c e of m u t u a l b e l o n g i n g a m o n g E u r o p e a n s a n a l o g o u s to t h a t w h i c h u n i t e s a p e o p l e is i n c o n c e i v a b l e , at t h e p r e s e n t t i m e t h e r e a r e n o f o r e s e e a b l e c i r c u m s t a n c e s u n d e r w h i c h a legitimacy-founding E u r o p e a n will c o u l d take s h a p e . " Against this skepticism o n e c o u l d p o i n t to t h e decisive historical e x p e r i e n c e s jthat u n d e n i a b l y u n i t e t h e E u r o p e a n g e o p l e s . F o r t h e c a t a s t r o p h e s of two w o r l d wars h a v e tough^^ nationalistic, e x c l u s i o n a r y , m e c h a n i s m s feed. W h y s h o u l d a sense of b e l o n g i n g t o g e t h e r culturally a n d politically n o t g r o w o u t of t h e s e e x p e r i e n c e s — e s p e c i a l l y against t h e r i c h b a c k g r o u n d of s h a r e d tradi t i o n s w h i c h have l o n g since a c h i e v e d world-historical significance, as well as o n t h e basis of t h e o v e r l a p p i n g i n t e r e s t s a n d d e n s e n e t w o r k s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n w h i c h have m o r e r e c e n t l y d e v e l o p e d in t h e d e c a d e s of e c o n o m i c success of t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y ? Clearly L u b b e ' s e u r o s k e p t i c i s m is m o t i v a t e d by t h e artificial d e m a n d for a m u t u a l b e l o n g i n g , " a n a l o g o u s to t h a t of a p e o p l e . " B u t t h e " h o m o g e n e o u s p e o p l e , " w h i c h is a g a i n p r o v i n g a n i m p e d i m e n t to reflec tion, is t h e w r o n g analogy. 51
5 2
T h e conflict-ridden h i s t o r y of state f o r m a t i o n in t h e p o s t c o l o n i a l p e r i o d in Asia a n d especially in Africa d o e s n o t offer a c o n v i n c i n g c o u n t e r e x a m p l e . W h e n t h e erstwhile c o l o n i e s w e r e " g r a n t e d " i n d e p e n d e n c e by t h e w i t h d r a w a l of t h e c o l o n i a l p o w e r s , t h e p r o b l e m was t h a t t h e s e artificial t e r r i t o r i e s a c h i e v e d e x t e r n a l sovereignty w i t h o u t already h a v i n g a n effective state p o w e r at t h e i r disposal. After t h e w i t h d r a w a l of t h e c o l o n i a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t h e n e w g o v e r n m e n t s in
153 The Nation, the Rule of Law, and Democracy
m a n y i n s t a n c e s c o u l d assert t h e i r sovereignty i n t e r n a l l y only with g r e a t difficulty. N o r c o u l d this b e a c h i e v e d by m e a n s of r e p r e s s i o n : "The p r o b l e m was e v e r y w h e r e t o 'fill i n ' r e a d y - m a d e states with n a t i o n a l c o n t e n t . T h i s p o s e s t h e i n t e r e s t i n g q u e s t i o n , w h y postcolonial states h a d t o b e n a t i o n s . . . . N a t i o n - b u i l d i n g as d e v e l o p m e n t m e a n s t h e e x t e n s i o n of a n active sense of m e m b e r s h i p t o t h e e n t i r e p o p u l a c e , t h e s e c u r e a c c e p t a n c e of state authority, t h e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of r e s o u r c e s t o f u r t h e r t h e equality of m e m b e r s , a n d t h e e x t e n s i o n of effective state o p e r a t i o n t o t h e p e r i p h e r y . " T h e c o n t i n u i n g tribal conflicts i n formally i n d e p e n d e n t p o s t c o l o n i a l states serve as a r e m i n d e r t h a t n a t i o n s only arise o n c e t h e y have traversed t h e difficult road from e t h n i c a l l y j } ^ 53
oHlTalic^ solidarity a m o n g citizens w h o a r e stt angeTrsnto^ne anotherSln t h e West, this p r o c e s s of nation-state f o r m a t i o n , w h i c h i n t e r c o n n e c t s a n d m i x e s tribes a n d r e g i o n s , t o o k m o r e t h a n a century. T h i s p r o c e s s of i n t e g r a t i o n itself d e m o n s t r a t e s t h e t r u e f u n c t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s for d e m o c r a t i c will-formation, namely, t h e c o m m u n i cative circuits of a political p u b l i c s p h e r e t h a t d e v e l o p e d o u t of b o u r g e o i s associations a n d t h r o u g h t h e m e d i u m of t h e mass press. This enabled the same t h e m e s to acquire simultaneously t h e same r e l e v a n c e for a large p u b l i c t h a t r e m a i n e d a n o n y m o u s a n d t o s p u r citizens s e p a r a t e d by g r e a t d i s t a n c e s t o m a k e s p o n t a n e o u s c o n t r i b u tions. T h i s p r o c e s s gives rise t o p u b l i c o p i n i o n s t h a t a g g r e g a t e t h e m e s a n d a t t i t u d e s t o t h e p o i n t w h e r e t h e y exercise political i n f l u e n c e . T h e c o r r e c t a n a l o g y is obvious: t h e initial i m p e t u s t o i n t e g r a t i o n i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of a p o s t n a t i o n a l society is n o t p r o v i d e d by t h e s u b s t r a t e of a s u p p o s e d " E u r o p e a n p e o p l e " b u t by t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e n e t w o r ^ o f a^uropeanrwifjle political p u b l i c s p h e r e e m b e d d e d i n a s h a r e d political c u l t u r e . T h e latter is f o u n d e d onfa civjT Tociety\Torn^^ n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l organiza :
tions, a n d d t i z e n initiatives a n d m o y e m e n t s , a n d will b e o c c u p i e d by a r e n a s i n w h i c h t h e p o l i t i c a l partiej) c a n directly a d d r e s s t h e deci sions of E u r o p e a n i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d g o b e y o n d m e r e tactical alliance to f o r m a E u r o p e a n p a r t y s y s t e m . 54
6
Does Europe Need a Constitution? Response to Dieter Grimm
I basically a g r e e with D i e t e r G r i m m ' s d i a g n o s i s [of t h e c u r r e n t c o n stitutional status of t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n ] ^ h o w e v e r , a n analysis of its p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s l e a d s m e to d r a w a different political c o n c l u s i o n . T h e Diagnosis F r o m a constitutional perspective, o n e can discern a contradiction in t h e E u r o p e a n U n i o n ' s p r e s e n t situation. O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h e E U is a s u p r a n a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n e s t a b U ^ ^ ties a n d w i t h o u t a c o n s t i t u t i o n of its own. I n this r e s p e c t it is n o t a state (in t h e m o d e r n sense of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l state c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a m o n o p o l y o n v i o l e n c e a n d a domestically a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y rec o g n i z e d sovereignty). O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , C o m m u n i t y i n s t i t u t i o n s create_Eur^ejin^aw__ that binds the m e m b e r states—thus the EU exercises a s u p r e m e a u t h o r i t y previously c l a i m e d only by individual states. F r o m this results t h e o f t - b e m o a n e d d e m o c r a t i c deficit. C o m mission a n d C o u n c i l p r o n o u n c e m e n t s , as well as d e c i s i o n s by t h e E u r o p e a n C o u r t , a r e i n t e r v e n i n g ever m o r e p r o f o u n d l y i n t o t h e m e m b e r states' i n t e r n a l affairs. W i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of t h e sover eignty r i g h t s c o n f e r r e d u p o n t h e U n i o n , t h e E u r o p e a n executive m a y e n f o r c e its p r o n o u n c e m e n t s over a n d a g a i n s t t h e o p p o s i t i o n of t h e n a t i o n a l g o v e r n m e n t s . At t h e s a m e t i m e , as l o n g as t h e E u r o p e a n P a r l i a m e n t is only e q u i p p e d with w e a k c o m p e t e n c e s , t h e s e p r o n o u n c e m e n t s a n d e n a c t m e n t s lack d i r e c t d e m o c r a t i c l e g i t i m a t i o n .
156 Chapter 6
T h e executive i n s t i t u t i o n s of t h e c o m m u n i t y derive t h e i r legitimacy f r o m t h a t of t h e m e m b e r g o v e r n m e n t s . T h e y a r e n o t i n s t i t u t i o n s of a state t h a t is itself c o n s t i t u t e d by t h e act of will o n t h e p a r t of t h e u n i t e d citizens of E u r o p e . T h e E u r o p e a n p a s s p o r t d o e s n o t as yet c o n f e r r i g h t s constitutive for d e m o c r a t i c citizenship. Political Conclusion I n c o n t r a s t with t h e federalists w h o r e c o m m e n d a d e m o c r a t i c pat t e r n for t h e E U , G r i m m w a r n s a g a i n s t a n y f u r t h e r e r o s i o n of na t i o n a l c o m p e t e n c e s by E u r o p e a n law. T h e d e m o c r a t i c deficit w o u l d n o t b e effectively filled by a "statist s h o r t c u t " to t h e p r o b l e m , b u t r a t h e r d e e p e n e d . N e w political i n s t i t u t i o n s , s u c h as a E u r o p e a n P a r l i a m e n t with t h e u s u a l p o w e r s , a g o v e r n m e n t f o r m e d o u t of t h e Commission, a Second C h a m b e r replacing the Council, a n d a Euro p e a n C o u r t of J u s t i c e with e x p a n d e d c o m p e t e n c e s , in themselves offer n o s o l u t i o n s . If they a r e n o t filled with life, t h e y will i n s t e a d a c c e l e r a t e t h e t e n d e n c i e s t o w a r d a u t o n o m i z a t i o n of b u r e a u c r a t i z e d politics a l r e a d y a p p a r e n t w i t h i n t h e n a t i o n a l f r a m e w o r k s . T h e r e a l p r e r e q u i s i t e s for a E u r o p e a n - w i d e i n t e g r a t i o n of citizen will-forma t i o n have b e e n a b s e n t u p to now. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l e u r o s k e p t i c i s m t h u s a m o u n t s to t h e empirically b a s e d a r g u m e n t t h a t as l o n g as t h e r e is n o t a E u r o p e a n p e o p l e t h a t is sufficiently " h o m o g e n e o u s " to f o r m a d e m o c r a t i c will, t h e r e s h o u l d b e n o c o n s t i t u t i o n . T h e Discussion My reflections a r e d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t (1) t h e i n c o m p l e t e a c c o u n t of t h e alternatives a n d (2) t h e n o t entirely u n a m b i g u o u s n o r m a t i v e justification of t h e f u n c t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t s for d e m o c r a t i c willformation. (1) G r i m m p r e s e n t s u s with t h e u n w e l c o m e c o n s e q u e n c e s t h a t w o u l d r e s u l t f r o m t h e t r a n s i t i o n of t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y to a d e m o c r a t i c a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d , f e d e r a l state s h o u l d t h e n e w i n s t i t u t i o n s n o t take r o o t . So l o n g as a E u r o p e a n - n e t w o r k e d civil society, a E u r o p e a n - w i d e political p u b l i c s p h e r e , a n d a c o m m o n political c u l t u r e a r e lacking, t h e s u p r a n a t i o n a l d e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s w o u l d b e c o m e in-
157 Does Europe Need a Constitution?
creasingly independent of the still nationally organized processes of opinion- and will-formation. This prognosis of the dangers involved strikes me as plausible. But what is the alternative? Grimm's preferred option seems to imply that the constitutional status quo can at least freeze the extant democratic deficit. Completely independently of constitutional innovations, however, this deficit expands day by.day because the economic and social dynam ics, even within the^ existing institutional framework., perpetuate the erosion of national powers A As Grimm himself acknowledges, "The democratic principle is valid for the member states whose own decision capabilities are however diminishing: de cisional capability is accruing to the European Community where the democracy principle is developing only weakly." But if the gap is steadily widening between the European authorities' expanding scope and the inadequate legitimation of the proliferating European regulations, then decisively adhering to an exclusively nation-state oriented mode of legitimation does not necessarily mean opting for the lesser evil. The federalists at least accept the foreseeable—and perhaps avoidable—risk of the autonomization of supranational or ganizations as a challenge. The euroskeptics have, from the start, acquiesced in the supposedly irresistible erosion of democratic sub stance so that they do not have to leave what appears to be the reliable shelter of the nation-state. In fact, the shelter is becoming increasingly less comfortable. The debates on national economic competitiveness and the international division of labor in which we are engaged make us aware of quite another gap—a gap^ between the nation state^s_increasingly limited maneuverability and the imperatives of modes ofjpmdiicliQn interwoven worldwide . ( f e d e T n ^ profit from their respective economies only as long as there are "national economies" that can still be influenced by political means. With the denationalization of the economy, especially of the financial markets and of industrial production itself, and above all with the globalization and rapid expansion of labor markets, national governments today are increas ingly compelled to accept permanently high unemployment and the marginalization of a growing minority for the sake of international competitiveness. If the welfare state is to be preserved at least in its :
158 Chapter 6
essentials a n d if t h e c r e a t i o n of a s e p a r a t e u n d e r c l a s s is to b e a v o i d e d , t h e n i n s t i t u t i o n s c a p a b l e of a c t i n g s u p r a n a t i o n a l l y m u s t b e f o r m e d . O n l y r e g i o n a l l y c o m p r e h e n d r e g i m e s like t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y c a n still affect t h e g l o b a l system a l o n g t h e lines of a c o o r d i n a t e d w o r l d d o m e s t i c policy. I n G r i m m ' s a c c o u n t , t h e E U a p p e a r s as a n i n s t i t u t i o n to b e put up with, a n d with w h o s e a b s t r a c t i o n s we m u s t live. T h e r e a s o n s we s h o u l d want it politically a r e n o t p r e s e n t e d . I s u b m i t t h a t t h e g r e a t e r d a n g e r is p o s e d by t h e a u t o n o m i z a t i o n of g l o b a l i z e d n e t w o r k s a n d m a r k e t s w h i c h s i m u l t a n e o u s l y c o n t r i b u t e toc/^ Zeitung9 (1995): 421-430: "What is valid for the basic rights of individuals also holds mutatis mutandis for the 'basic rights' of states, especially for their sovereign equality, their self-determination as the supreme authority over persons and territory" (p. 424; see also p. 429). Draw ing an analogy between the sovereignty of states recognized by international law and the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of persons as legal subjects misses not only the fundamental importance of individual rights and the individualist orientation of m o d e r n legal orders; it also misses the specifically juridical meaning of h u m a n rights as the individual rights of citizens of a cosmopolitan order. 34. See the examples cited by Ch. Greenwood in, "Gibt es ein Recht auf humanitare Intervention?" Europa-Archiv 4 (1993): 93-106, p. 94. 35. See Habermas, The Past as Future (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1994), pp. 5-31. 36. "Theory and Practice," p. 77 [translation modified]; WerkeXI, p. 144. 37. See J. Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," below pp. 214ff. 38. "Perpetual Peace," p. 112 [translation modified]; WerkeXI, p. 223. 39. In a discussion of a work by Georges Scelle, Precis de droit de gens Vols. I and II (Paris, 1932 8c 1934) in C. Schmitt, Die Wendung zum diskriminierenden Kriegsbegriff (1938) (Berlin, 1988), p. 16. 40. Schmitt, Kriegsbegriff, p. 19.
285 Notes
41. O n the Vienna conference on h u m a n rights, see R. Wolfrum, "Die des internationalen Menschenrechtsschutzes," Europa-Archiv 23 (1993): the status of disputed rights to solidarity, see W. Huber's article rechte/Menschenwurde," in Theobgische Realenzyklopadie, Vol. XXII York, 1992), pp. 577-602; also E. Riedel, "Menschenrechte der dritten Europaische Grundrechte Zeitschrift (1989): 9-21.
Entwicklung 681-690; on "Menschen(Berlin/New Dimension,"
42. In 1993 the Security Council established such a tribunal to prosecute war crimes and crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia. 43. As argued by H. Quaritsch in his postscript to C. Schmitt, Das internationalrechtliche Verbrechen des Angriffskrieges (1945) (Berlin, 1994), pp. 125-247; here pp. 236ff. 44. See the analyses and conclusions of Greenwood, "Gibt es ein Recht auf hu manitare Intervention?" 45. Greenwood comes to the following conclusion: "The idea that the UN could use the powers granted in its Charter to intervene in a state on humanitarian grounds now appears to be much more strongly established;" "Gibt es ein Recht auf hu manitare Intervention?" p. 104. 46. Quoted in Greenwood, "Gibt es ein Recht auf humanitare Intervention?" p. 96. 47. "Perpetual Peace," p. 104; WerkeXl, pp. 21 Iff. 48. See R. Cooper, "Gibt es eine neue Weltordnung?" Europa-Archiv 18 (1993): 5 0 9 516. 49. A reasonable framework for discussing h u m a n rights is proposed by T. Lindholm, "The Cross-Cultural Legitimacy of H u m a n Rights," Norwegian Institute of Human Rights, No. 3 (Oslo, 1990). 50. D. and E. Senghaas, "Si vis pacem, para pacem," Leviathan (1992): 230-247. 51. E. O. Czempiel has investigated these strategies in light of many different exam ples in "Internationale Politik u n d der Wandel von Regimen," in G. Schwarz, ed., Sonderheft der Zeitschrift fur Politik (Zurich, 1989), 55-75. 52. I am here following D. Archibugi, "From the United Nations to Cosmopolitan Democracy," in Archibugi and Held, Cosmopolitan Democracy, pp. 121-162. 53. [Here the author has in mind the bicameral parliamentary system typical of European states in which an u p p e r house (in Germany, the Bundesrat) exercises legislative competence in a division of labor with the house of representatives (the Bundestag). Trans.] 54. See H. Kelsen, Peace Through Law (Chapel Hill, 1944). 55. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. F. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA, 1987), p p . 336ff. 56. C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. G. Schwab (Chicago, 1996), p. 54 [translation modified]. O n e finds the same argument in Isensee, "Weltpolizei fur
286 Notes
Menschenrechten," p . 429: "For as long as there have been interventions, they have served ideologies: religious ideologies in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, monarchical, Jacobin, a n d humanitarian principles, the socialist world revolution. Now h u m a n rights and democracy are the order of the day. In the long history of intervention, ideology has served to dissemble the power interests of the interveners and to invest their effectiveness with the aura of legitimacy." 57. Cf. Schmitt, Glossarium 1947-1951 (Berlin, 1991), p. 76. 58. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, (Berlin, 1963), p . 94. [This passage does n o t appear in the English translation. Trans.] 59. See S. Schute a n d S. Hurley, eds., On Human Rights (New York, 1993). 60. O. Hoffe, "Die Menschenrechte als Legitimation u n d kritischer MaBstab der Demokratie," in J. Schwardtlander (ed.), Menschenrechte und Demokratie (Strasbourg, 1981), p . 250; see also Hoffe, Political Justice, trans. J.C. Cohen (Cambridge, 1995). 61. S. Konig, Zur Begritndung der Menschenrechte: Hobbes-Locke-Kant (Freiburg, 1994), pp. 26ff. 62. T h e implications of the rights to political participation for h u m a n rights are such that everyone has at any rate the right to belong to one political community as a citizen. 63. See H u g o Bedau's analysis of the structure of h u m a n rights, which draws on H e n r y Shue's position, in "International H u m a n Rights," T Regan and D. van de Weer, eds., And Justice for All (Totowa, NJ, 1983), p . 279: "The emphasis on duties is meant to avoid leaving the defense of h u m a n rights in a vacuum, bereft of any moral significance for the specific conduct of others. But the duties are n o t intended to explain or generate rights; if anything, the rights are supposed to explain and generate the duties." 64. Cf. S. Konig, Zur Begrilndung der Menschenrechte, p p . 84ff. 65. Kant, Metaphysics of Morals, p . 24; Werke VLIl, p . 337. 66. Metaphysics of Morals, p. 30; WerkeVlll, 345. 67. O n the differentiation of the spheres of ethics, law, and morality, see R. Forst, Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit (Frankfurt am Main, 1994), p p . 131-142. 68. Cf. Schmitt, Das internationalrechtliche Verbrechen des Angriffskrieges. 69. In both The Concept of the Political and Die Wendung zur diskriminerenden Kriegsbegriff 70. Schmitt, Das internationalrechtliche Verbrechen, p . 19. 71. Schmitt, Glossarium, p p . 113, 265, 146, 282. 72. Schmitt, Die Wendung zur diskriminerenden Kriegsbegriff, p . 1.
287 Notes
73. Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, p . 110. [This section is n o t included in the English translations. Trans.] 74. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p . 33. 75. H. M. Enzensberger, Aussichten auf den Burgerkrieg (Frankfurt am Main, 1993), pp. 73ff. See A. H o n n e t h , "Universalismus as moralische Falle?" Merkur 546/7 (1994): 867-883. Enzensberger n o t only bases his case on a highly selective description of the current international situation which completely ignores the surprising expan sion of constitutional regimes in Latin American, Africa, and Eastern Europe in the last twenty years (cf. Czempiel, Weltpolitik im Umbruch, p p . 107ff.). H e also casually transmutes the complex relationships between fundamentalist politics, on the one hand, and social deprivations and the absence of liberal traditions, on the other, into anthropological features. But precisely the expanded conception of peace points to preventive, nonviolent strategies and highlights the pragmatic limitations to which humanitarian interventions are subject, as is shown both by the example of Somalia and the different situation in the former Yugoslavia. For a case-based analysis of different types of interventions, see D. Senghaas, Wohin driftet die Welt?, p p . 185ff. 76. A. Gehlen, Moral und Hypermoral (Frankfurt am Main, 1969). 77. Schmitt, Glossarium, p. 259. 78. Ibid., p . 229; also The Concept of the Political, p . 63. 79. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 54. 80. Ibid., p . 36 [translation modified]. 81. See Habermas, Kleine Polilische Schriften I-IV (Frankfurt am Main, 1981), p p . 3 2 8 339. 82. K. Gimther, "Kampf gegen das Bose? Wider die ethische Aufrustung der Kriminalpolitik," Kritische Justiz 17 (1994): 135-157. 83. Ibid., p. 144. 84. Ibid., p . 144.
Chapter 8 1. Cf. J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge, MA, 1996), chap. 3. 2. A. H o n n e t h , Struggles for Recognition, trans. J. Andersen (Cambridge, 1994). 3. Cf. Ch. Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, rev. ed., A. Gutmann, ed., (Princeton, 1994), pp. 25-73. 4. A. Gutmann, "Introduction," Multiculturalism, p . 8. 5. Cf. Taylor, in Multiculturalism, pp. 58-59.
288 Notes
6. Ibid. 7. J. Habermas, "Individuation through Socialization," in Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. W. M. Hohengarten (Cambridge, MA, 1992), p p . 149-204. 8. D. L. Rhode, Justice and Gender (Cambridge, MA, 1989), Part 1. 9. Nancy Fraser, "Struggle over Needs," in Unruly Practices (Minneapolis, 1989), pp. 144-160. 10. S. Benhabib, Situating the Self (New York, 1992), Part 2. 11. P. Berman, ed., Debating PC. (New York, 1992); see also J. Searle, "Storm Over the University," in the same volume, pp. 85-123. 12. J. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. F. Lawrence (Cam bridge, MA, 1987). 13. As Gutmann remarks of the deconstructionist method, 'This reductionist argu ment about intellectual standards is often made on behalf of groups that are underrepresented in the university and disadvantaged in society, but it is hard to see how it can come to the aid of anyone. The argument is self-undermining, both logically and practically. By its internal logic, deconstructionism has nothing more to say for the view that intellectual standards are masks for the will to political power than that it too reflects the will to power of deconstructionists. But why then bother with intellectual life at all, which is not the fastest, surest, or even most satisfying path to political power, if it is political power that one is really after?" "Introduction," Multi culturalism, pp. 18-19. 14. R. Dworkin, Taking Bights Seriously (Cambridge, MA, 1977). 15. R. Beiner, Political Judgment (Chicago, 1994), p. 138. 16. P. Alter, Nationalism (New York, 1989). 17. This essay was written in early 1993. 18. W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford, 1991). 19. S. Wolf, "Comment," in Multiculturalism, p. 79. 20. Cf. the Supreme Court decision in Wisconsin v.Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 21. D. Cohn-Bendit and T. Schmid, Heimat Babylon (Hamburg, 1992), p p . 316ff. 22. J. Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics, trans. C. Cronin (Cambridge, MA, 1993). 23. J. Rawls, ' T h e Idea of an Overlapping Consensus," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 7 (1987): 1-25. 24. J. Habermas, The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate, trans. S. W. Nicholsen (Cambridge, MA, 1989).
289 Notes
25. D. J. van de Kaa, "European Migration at the End of History," European Review 1 (January 1993): 94. 26. E. Wiegand, "Auslanderfeindlichkeit in der Festung Europa. Einstellungen zu Fremden im europaischen Vergleich," Informationsdienst Soziale Indikatoren (ZUMA), no. 9 (1993): 1-4. 27. M. Walzer, "What Does It Mean to Be an American?" Social Research 57 (1990): 591-614. Walzer notes that the communitarian conception does n o t take account of the complex composition of a multicultural society (p. 613). 28. R. Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA, 1992), pp. 128ff. 29. Cohn-Bendit and Schmid, Heimat Babylon, chap. 8. 30. J. H. Carens, "Aliens and Citizens," Review of Politics 49 (1987): 271; cf. also J. Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity," in Between Facts and Norms, pp. 4 9 1 515. 31. R C. Emmer, "Intercontinental Migration," European Review 1 (January 1993): 67-74: "After 1800 the dramatic increase in the economic growth of Western Europe could only be maintained as an 'escape hatch.' T h e escape of sixty-one million Europeans after 1800 allowed the European economies to create such a mix of the factors of production as to allow for record economic growth and to avoid a situation in which economic growth was absorbed by an increase in population. After the Second World War, Europeans also benefitted from intercontinental migration since the colonial empires forced many colonial subjects to migrate to the metropolis. In this particular period there was n o danger of overpopulation . . . . Many of the colonial migrants coming to Europe had been well trained and they arrived at exactly the time when skilled labor was at a premium in rebuilding Europe's economy" (pp. 72f.). 32. With a justification that is outrageous from a constitutional point of view, on May 14, 1996 the second senate of the Federal Constitutional Court upheld the constitu tionality of the clause concerning "third countries" and the clause defining "safe countries of origin" laid down in the revised version of the Basic Law. This ruling subordinates the constitution to functional imperatives that call for p r o m p t expul sion of asylum seekers. As Heribert Prantl wrote (in the Suddeutschen Zeitung of May 14/15, 1996): "Quick expulsion is more important to the constitutional court . . . than the right to asylum, more important than h u m a n dignity, more important than the principle of due process." 33. K J. Bade, "Immigration and Integration in Germany since 1945," European Review 1 (January 1993): 75-79. 34. Bade, "Immigration and Integration," p. 77. 35. See the title essay in J. Habermas, Die Normalitdt einer Berliner Republik (Frankfurt am Main, 1995).
290 Notes
Chapter 9 1. Cf. H. Arendt, On Revolution (New York, 1965); On Violence (New York, 1970). 2. Cf. F. I. Michelman, "Political Truth and the Rule of Law," Tel Aviv University Studies in Law 8 (1988): 283: "The political society envisioned by bumper-sticker republicans is the society of private rights bearers, an association whose first principle is the protection of the lives, liberties, and estates of its individual members. In that society, the state is justified by the protection it gives to those prepolitical interests; the purpose of the constitution is to ensure that the state apparatus, the government, provides such protection for the people at large rather than serves the special interests of the governors or their patrons; the function of citizenship is to operate the constitution and thereby to motivate the governors to act according to that protective purpose; and the value to you of your political franchise—your right to vote and speak, to have your views heard and counted—is the handle it gives you on influencing the system so that it will adequately heed and protect your particular, prepolitical rights and other interests." 3. O n the distinction between positive and negative freedom see Ch. Taylor, "What is H u m a n Agency?" in Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1 (Cambridge, 1985), p p . 15-44. 4. Michelman, "Political Truth and the Rule of Law," p. 284: "In [the] civic constitu tional vision, political society is primarily the society not of rights bearers, but of citizens, an association whose first principle is the creation and provision of a public realm within which a people, together, argue and reason about the right terms of social coexistence, terms that they will set together and which they understand as comprising their common good. . . . Hence, the state is justified by its purpose of establishing and ordering the public sphere within which persons can achieve free dom in the sense of self-government by the exercise of reason in public dialogue." 5. Michelman, "Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights," Florida Law Review 41 (1989): 446f. (hereafter 'Voting Rights"). 6. Michelman, "Voting Rights," p. 484. 7. Michelman, "Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: T h e Case of Pornography Regulation," Tennessee Law Review 291 (1989): 293. 8. Cf. J. Habermas, "Popular Sovereignty as Procedure," in Between Facts and Norms, trans. W. Rehg (1996), pp. 463-490. 9. Cf. The Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, article 20, sec. 2.
Index
Anderson, Benedict, 110 Appropriateness, principle of, 45 Arendt, H a n n a h , 247 Argumentation, 38, 42-45 individual interests transformed in, 81 pragmatic theory of, 57-58, 82 public practice of, 68 Aristotle and Aristotelianism and rational assessment, 6 and Rawls, 54 and Republicanism, 258 on will and reason, 12 Asylum. See Political asylum Autonomous morality, and positive law, 256-258 Autonomy, 99 and law, 257-258 and popular sovereignty, 250 private and public, 131, 258, 259-262 and feminist politics of equality, 209, 262 in legal domain, 257, 258 and Liberalism 1, 207-208 in postpolitical world, 125 and postwar Europe, 120 and proceduralist conception of law, 264 and procedural popular sovereignty, 139 and Rawls, 67-72, 101 Balance of power, 126, 167, 168, 170, 184 Bluntschli, J o h a n n Caspar, 134 B o d i n j e a n , 250 Bokenforde, Ernst-Wolfgang, 132-133
Born minorities. See at Minorities Bosnia-Herzogovina/ Croatia ethnic conflict in, 219 intervention in, 182 Briand-Kellogg Pact (1928), 178 Canada decentralization in, 213 French-speaking minority in, 145, 2 0 6 207, 213, 219, 220 Meech Lake draft constitution for, 219 Carter, Jimmy, 186 Categorical imperative discourse-theoretical interpretation of, 33-34, 39 intersubjectivistic interpretation of, 34 and Rawls's original position, 57 Censorship, Kant on, 175-176 Citizen (ship) double coding of, 113, 131, 132 and immigration, 228 liberalism vs. republicanism on, 240241 Michelman on, 290n.4 vs. philosopher (Rawls), 94-98 as politically autonomous, 71 and solidarity through democratic process, 159-161 vs. subject, 112 Cognitivism, strong, 6-7 Cognitivism, weak, 6 Communication conditions, for Socratic dialogue, 19 Communicative account of republican ism, 139-140
292 Index
Communicative agreement, and moral justification, 23-24 Communicative context, for demo cratic citizenship, 159-161 Communicative form of life, 30, 39-41 Communicative freedom, 259 Communicative power, and republican view on governmental authority, 241,243 Communicative structure of rational discourse, 37 Communitarian view, 138, 143, 216, 217, 244. See also Republicanism Community, morality of, 4 Consciousness, philosophy of, 248 Constitutional patriotism, 118, 132, 225-226 Constitutional state, xxxvii and coercive force, 199 and democracy, 253 (see also Demo cratic constitutional state) jurisprudence and political science on, 253 nation as basis for, 113, 116 permeation of by ethics, 215-216 Contractualism. See Social contract Cooper, R., 184 Correspondence notion of truth, 36 Cosmopolitan democracy, 166, 186-188 Cosmopolitan idea, 178 Cosmopolitan law, xxxvi, 165, 168, 179, 181 and contemporary world situation, 171-172, 178, 183 and politics of h u m a n rights, 188 and Schmitt's analysis, 188, 193, 195, 199, 285-286n.56 Decentered society, 125, 251 Decisionism, 6 Deconstructionism, Gutmann on, 288n.l3 Deliberative politics, xxxvii, 239, 244, 245-246, 248, 251-252 Democracy and democratic process deliberative politics on, 246, 248, 2 5 1 252 and discourse theory, xxxvii, 248 and law, 253-254 and autonomous morality, 256-258 and democracy as legitimizing, 254255 and feminist politics of equality, 2 6 2 264
and h u m a n rights, 258-260 and private and public autonomy, 260-262, 264 liberalism vs. republicanism on, 2 3 9 244, 246-248 {see also Liberalism; Republicanism) and popular sovereignty, 251 and Schmitt, 134-137, 197 social integration through, 159 Democratic constitutional state, 112, 203 and marginalized cultural forms, 205 Schmitt on, 138 undermining of, 123 Dialogical politics, 245 Disagreements, three kinds of, 91-93 Discourse, normative, 19-20 Discourse-ethical model of justification, 43 Discourse ethics, 39, 57-58 on moral point of view, 33, 41-45, 57 and religious foundations, 34-36 and validity, 36-38 Discourse principle, 41 and categorical imperative, 33-34, 39 and legitimacy, 260 moral point of view justified through, 41-45 and pluralistic society, 39-41 questions for, 46 Discourse theory, 248-249, 249-250, 251 and democratic procedure, 259 and minorities, 143 Discrimination and multiculturalism, xxxvii reverse, 221 and secession, 143, 145 Dworkin, Ronald, 28, 56, 206, 216 Emotivism, 6 Empiricism and Gibbard, 16 and morality, 12-16 and Tugendhat, 16, 23 Enzensberger, Hans Magnus, 197-198 Epistemic reasons, 16, 25, 35 Equality democratic (Schmitt), 135, 136 feminist politics of, 208-209, 217, 2 6 2 264 legal and factual, 254, 262 and respect, 205 and rights vs. goods, 28
293 Index
Ethical insights, 25-26, 272n.34 Ethical point of view, 26-28. See also Moral point of view Ethical questions, 215-216 vs. questions of justice or morality, 66 and Rawls's theory, 98-99 Ethics constitutional state permeated by, 2 1 5 216 legal systems permeated by, 218, 227 political culture permeated by, 225 Ethnic cleansing, 141-142, 219. See also Genocide Ethnic nation, xxxvi Ethnonationalism, 129-130 and Schmitt's account, 134—138 and treatment of minorities, 142 Eurocentrism, 213 European Community, 152 and immigration, 226-227 European public sphere, 177 European Union, 123-124, 150-153, 155-161 and communicative context of social integration, 159-161 democratic deficit of, 155, 156, 157 and Security Council, 187 Evolution, and Gibbard on normative discourse, 18, 20 Federalism, German, 161 Federalization, 220 Feminism, 208-210, 211 radical, 210, 263 Feminist politics of equality, 208-209, 217, 262-264 Fichte, J. G., atheism controversy over, 176 First World, 184 Flick, Friedrich, 195 Forst, Rainer, 91 France, development of national con sciousness in, 234 Frederick II (king of Prussia), 175 Freedom. See also Liberties of the ancients and of the moderns, 258 Kant on, 192 national and individual, 114, 1 3 1 132 Free rider problem, and Hobbesianism, 15, 80 French-speaking population of Can ada, 145, 206-207, 213, 219, 220
Functionalist explanation of morality, 12 and Gibbard, 16-20 and Tugendhat, 16, 20 Fundamentalism, 223-224 and political integration, 229 Gehlen, Arnold, 198 Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft distinction, xxxv Genocide, 142, 195. See also Ethnic cleansing German federalism, as European model, 161 Germany adaptations needed by, 235-236 development of national conscious ness in, 234-235 "historians' debate" in, 225 and political asylum, 227, 230, 2 3 2 234, 289n.32 and voting rights for resident aliens, 191 Gibbard, Allan, 16, 17-20, 24 Giddens, Anthony, 120 "Global domestic politics," 126 Globalization, 106, 120-122, 124, 1 2 5 127, 157-158, 174, 183 Global public sphere, 176-177 God, and morality, 7-10 Golden Rule, 31, 90 Good(s), 273n.41 and right(s), 28-30, 56 Grimm, Dieter, 155, 156-157, 158, 159, 161 Guehenno, J. M., 125 Gulf War and Eurocentrism, 213 as expansion of limits, 182 and global public sphere, 176 and Security Council discretion, 180 Gimther, Klaus, 45, 200-201 Gutmann, Amy, 205, 206 Hare, R. M., 6 Hart, H. L. A., 56 Hegel, G. W. F , 40 and administrative state, 125 and capitalist development, 173 and history, 106 and Kant, 100, 188, 198 of Mussolini and Lenin, 198 and social contract theory, 138 and World Spirit, 178
294 Index
Heller, H e r m a n n , 151 Hobbes, Thomas, and Hobbesian view, 80 contractualism, 6 and free rider, 15 and m o d e r n law, 109 in path to Kant, 80-83 and Rawls, 54, 85 and rights over duties, 191 H o n n e t h , Axel, 204 Horkheimer, Max, 198 Humanitarian intervention, xxxvixxxvii, 146-150 H u m a n rights, 189-193. See also Rights ambiguity of, 189-190 and Kant on law, 180-181 origins of, 189 politics of, 166, 186-193, 201 and popular sovereignty, 112, 258-260 vs. prohibition on intervention, 147 and Schmitt, 136, 188-189, 192-193, 197, 198-199 and UN, 181-182, 285n.42 Humboldt, Wilhelm von, 40 H u m e , David, 13 Immigration, 226-232, 289n.31 and German politics of asylum, 227, 230, 232-234, 289n.32 and multicultural self-understanding, 159-160 Imperialism, European, 116, 172 Insights, ethical, 25-26, 272n.34 Instrumental politics, 245 International civil society, 177 International Court, 180 International law and "civilizing" of war (Schmitt), 194, 197 and contemporary world situation, 183 and globalization, 174 and Kant on cosmopolitan law, 165 Nuremberg and Tokyo trials as prece dent for, 182 sovereignty in, 147 state as subject of, 108, 178 transformation of to cosmopolitan law, 150 and war, 167, 178 International relations balance of power in, 126 and cosmopolitan law, 165 and Kant's federation of nations, 179 and priority of right over good, 28
International trade, and Kant on fed eration for peace, 171, 173-175 Intersubjectivistic understanding of pro cedural popular sovereignty, 1 3 8 139 Israel, founding of, 212-213 Justice, 10 and ethical point of view, 27-28 vs. ethical questions, 66, 245 and priority of right over good, 28 and solidarity, 10, 30, 40 Justice, Rawls's theory of. See Rawls, John Justification. See also Argumentation; Validity moral, 5 communicative agreement in, 23-24 discourse-ethical model of, 43 normative, 43, 45 pragmatic conception of, 37 in Rawls's theory, 77, 84-98 semantic conception of, 36-37 Kant, Immanuel, 6-7 alternative to proceduralism of, 83-86 and autonomy, 112, 259 categorical imperative of, 57 on coercive law, 71 and democratic self-determination, 139 on freedom, 192 and freedom of nation, 114 and Hegel, 100, 188, 198 humanist morality of, 197 and instrumental rationality, 13 and justice, 30 on law, 71, 192, 201, 254, 255 on liberties of ancients and moderns, 69 and morality as self-legislation, 30-33 on norms as maxims of action, 17 in path from Hobbes, 80-83 and perpetual peace, xxxvi, 165-171, 282-283n.4 and contemporary global situation, 179-186 historical experience of arguments for, 167, 171-178 and politics of h u m a n rights, 186-193 and Schmitt's critique, 188-189, 192201, 285-286n.56 and Rawls, 49, 85-86, 88, 100 and right(s), 140
295 Index
to equal individual liberties, 206 and universalization, 24 on will and reason, 12 "Kantian Constructivism in Moral The ory" (Rawls), 59, 82 Kantian Republicanism, 101 Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), 178 Kelsen, Hans, 187 Kierkegaard, S0ren, 6 Kurds, 219 Kymlicka, Will, 221 Language, in Gibbard's theory, 18 Law and legal norms, 71-72, 191, 214^ 215, 217. See also Cosmopolitan law; International law; Natural law as coercive or as laws of freedom, 255 and culturally defined groups, 215 and democratic process, 253-254 and autonomous morality, 256-258 and democracy as legitimizing, 254— 255 and feminist politics of equality, 2 6 2 264 and h u m a n rights, 258-260 and private and public autonomy, 260-262, 264 ethical neutrality of, 215 as factual constraint and as perfor mative, 255 Kant on, 71, 192, 201, 254, 255 liberalism vs. republicanism on, 2 4 1 243 modern, 71, 214, 254-256 and morality, 201, 256-258 moralization of, 198-200 positive, 71, 254, 256-258 proceduralist conception of, 264 public vs. private, 109 League of Nations, 126, 169, 178, 188 Legal system, as ethically permeated, 218,227 Legitimation and legitimacy and discourse principle, 260 extension of citizenship for, 132 of legal norms, 256-257 and m o d e r n law, 254, 255 and nation-state, 111-112 and supernational units, 150-151 Walzer on, 149 Lenin, V. I., 134-135, 198 Lessing, Gottfried, 66 Liberalism, 258 and gender equality, 262-263
and morality, 29 neutrality of, 75 and pluralism, 78-79 political (Rawls), 76 political achievements of, 204 and private vs. public, 98-101 on role of democratic process, 239244, 246, 247-248, 249, 250 and Michelman on "bumper-sticker republicanism," 290n.2 Liberalism 1, 205, 207-208, 210, 216 Liberalism 2, 205, 216 Liberal legal paradigm, 261 Liberal political culture, 177-178 Liberia, intervention in, 182 Liberties. See also Freedom of the ancients, 69 of the moderns, 68-69 Locke, J o h n and h u m a n rights, 189 and law, 254 and liberalism, 258 Liibbe, H e r m a n n , 129, 152 Majority rule, and minorities, 144 Marriage, conventionalism in guaran tees for, 218 Marx, Karl, 108 Mead, G. H., 29, 40, 57-58, 81 Metaethical skepticism, 12 Michelman, Frank, 239, 245 Minorities and politics of recognition, 205-210 struggle for recognition of, 211-212 Minorities, born, and democratic selfdetermination, 143-146 Minorities, national, 219-220 Modern condition, 78-80 Modern constitutions, 203 Modernity, and political correctness de bate, 213-214 Modern law, 71, 214 formal properties of, 254-256 and individual rights, 256 Moral attitudes empiricist view of, 13-14 and pragmatic reasons or prefer ences, 16 Moral community, xxxvi, 29 Tugendhat on, 20-22, 23 Morality, xxxv as cognitive, 3 and affective attitudes, 4-5 and discourse principle, 39-46
296 Index
Morality (cont.) and empiricism, 12-16 and ethical insight, 25-26 and ethical point of view, 26-28 and Gibbard's approach, 16-20, 24 and Kant on self-legislation, 30-33 and loss of religious foundation, 7 12, 23, 34-36 m o d e r n moral programs on, 5-7 and moral rules, 4 and obligation, 3-4 and right-good relation, 28-30 and Tugendhat's approach, 16, 20-25 and validity of truth claims or moral claims, 36-38 vs. ethical questions, 66 functionalist explanation of, 12, 16-20 and individual life-histories, 100 and law, 201, 256-258 and liberalism, 29 Moral person freedom of, 101 in Rawls's theory, 59, 68 Moral point of view, 7, 31, 38, 39, 81. See also Obligation and application of norms, 45-46 discourse ethics on, 33, 41-45, 57 philosophy as clarification of, 72 and public practice of argumentation, 68 and Rawls's justification process, 95, 99 and Rawls's original position, 52, 57, 81,82 and social criticism, 98 Moral realism, 11, 36, 270-271n.7 Rawls's rejection of, 65, 79 Moral skepticism, 36 Moral universalism, 40 Multiculturalism, xxxvii and equality for individuals in diverse groups, 220-226 and ethical neutrality of law and poli tics, 215-216 and federalization, 220 and inclusion, 145-146 nation-state challenged by, 117 social and cultural rights as require ments i n , 1 1 8 Mussolini, Benito, and Hegel, 198 Nation (s) democratic constitution as basis vs. creation of, 133-134 and European union, 150-153
and humanitarian intervention, 146150 and minorities, 143-146 and national self-determination, 140143 and postcolonial Asian or African states, 152-153 and procedural popular sovereignty, 137-139 and Schmitt's account, 134-137 development of consciousness of, 109111 and "ethnonationalism," 129-130 formation of, 153 as social integration, 112-113 vs. state, 107-108 National identity, 130-131 Nationalism, 132 and antisemitism, 111 and fundamentalism, 223-224 and republicanism, 114-117, 132, 224 and right of self-determination, 141 and self-assertion, 172, 173-174 Nationalist movements, 212-213 Nationality principle, 134, 140, 141, 142 National minorities, 219. See also at Minorities National self-determination meaning and limits of, 140-143 right to, 116 Walzer on, 148 Nation-states, xxxvi abolition or transformation of, 124127 and ambivalence in freedom of na tion, 113-114 and ambivalence of nationalism vs. re publicanism, 114-117 challenges to, 106-107, 117, 157-158 double coding of citizenship in, 113, 131, 132 history of formation of, 105-106, 147, 153,219 restrictions of internal sovereignty in, 120-124 and Schmitt on democracy, 134-137 as solution to problems of legitima tion and integration, 111-113, 132133 and state vs. nation, 107-111 and subaltern peoples, 142 transformation of loyalties in, 131 unity of political culture in, 117-120
297 Index
Natural law in creationist metaphysics, 9 and h u m a n rights, 189 and legitimacy, 255 Nazis, racist policies of, 116 Noncognitivism, strong, 5-6 Noncognitivism, weak, 6, 25 Nongovernmental organizations, 177 Normative governance, Gibbard on, 19 Normative justification, and principle of universalization, 45 Normative statements, and Rawls, 63-64 Normativity, Gibbard's expressivist ac count of, 18 Norms, vs. values, 54-55 North Atlantic Charter, 181 Nuremberg trials, 178, 182 Obligation, 3-4. See also Morality and contractualist tradition, 80 vs. loyalties, 24 and norms vs. values, 54-55 vs. value-orientations, 26 Original position, in Rawls's theory, 5 1 59 Other, and universalism, xxxv-xxxvi Paternalism of Liberalism 1, 207 and Rawls's theory, 95 in substantive conception of good, 28 welfare, 262, 263 Patriotism, constitutional, 118, 132, 225-226 Peace, Senghasses' view of, 185 Peacekeeping, politics of, 150 Perpetual peace. See underKant, Immanuel Perspective-taking, reciprocal, 42 Philosophy, 77 Hobbes-to-Kant path in, 80-83 in Rawls's justification procedure, 9 4 98 task of, 18, 72 Philosophy of consciousness, 248 Pluralism and discourse principle, 39-41 as First World indicator, 184 and hidden interests, 244-245 and liberalism, 78-79 and nation-state, 117 and Rawls's theory, 59-61, 66, 68, 77, 85, 88, 94
and religion as basis of morality, 10 and social integration, 133 and universalization, 57 Political asylum, 227, 230 in Germany, 227, 230, 232-234, 289n.32 Political correctness, debate about, 213-214 Political culture and ethics, 225 and legal constitution, 177 in multicultural society, 146 and postnational Europe, 153, 282n.54 unity of, 117-120 Political liberalism. See Liberalism Political Liberalism (Rawls), 49, 77, 82, 83, 94, 96, 99. See also Rawls, J o h n Political process, liberal vs. republican view on, 243-244 Political public sphere. See Public sphere Politics of h u m a n rights, 166, 186-193, 201 Politics of peacekeeping, 150 Politics of recognition (Taylor), xxxvii, 205-210 and actualization of rights, 217-218 and equal rights to coexistence, 220226 and feminism, 209-211 (see also Femi nist politics of equality) and immigration, 226-232, 289n.31 and minorities, 211-212, 219-220 and nationalist movements, 212-213 and value of cultures, 221 Popper, K . R . , 6 Popular sovereignty, 250-251 and European Union, 151 and h u m a n rights, 112, 258-260 procedural, 137-139 Positive law, 71 and autonomous morality, 256-258 and legitimacy, 254 Postcolonial states, 152-153 Postmodernism, xxxv, 214 Postnational forms of society, xxxvi, 119 Postpolitical world, 124-125 Practical reason empiricist view of, 12-13 and Hobbes, 80 in Kantian tradition, 81 and pragmatic theory of argumenta tion, 82 Rawls on, 64, 82-83
298 Index
Pragmatic conception of justification, 37 Pragmatic theory of argumentation, 5 7 58, 82 Primary goods and liberal social reform, 204 in Rawls's theory, 54, 56 Principle of appropriateness, 45 Principle of universalization, 42-43, 45, 46, 57 Private autonomy. See under Autonomy "Private law society," 261 Proceduralist conception of law, 264 Procedural popular sovereignty, 137138 intersubjectivistic understanding of, 138-139 Public autonomy. See under Autonomy Public sphere and Arendt's view, 247 in decentered society, 251 and Kant on federation for peace, 171, 175-178 Michelman on, 290n.4 on republican understanding of poli tics, 240 Public use of reason and assimilation, 228 in Kantian Republicanism, 101 in Rawls's theory, 59, 64-65, 68, 94 and acceptance, 61 and basic liberal rights, 72 consensus assumed by, 84, 92 and nonpublic reasons, 86 political stability preserved by, 70 procedural requirements for, 98 and "reasonable," 92 Quebec, French-speaking majority of, 206-207, 213, 219, 220 Rational agreement, 19, 272n.22 Rationalization, 250 Rawls, J o h n , xxxvi, 49-50 and alternative to Kantian proceduralism, 83-86 avoidance strategy of, 72-73, 75, 99 and ethically neutral legal order, 206 and Hobbes-to-Kant path, 80-83 and liberalism on public vs. private, 98-101 and m o d e r n conditions, 79-80 and moral point of view, 52, 57, 81
and nonfundamentalist worldviews, 224 and original position, 51-59, 89 and overlapping consensus, 59-63, 67, 68, 77-78, 83-84, 86, 88-89, 91, 100 and acceptability vs. acceptance, 6 1 63 . and philosopher's vs. citizen's role, 94-98 points in critique of, 50-51 and political conception of justice, 5 9 60, 63, 65-66, 70, 75-77 and private or public autonomy, 6 7 72, 101 and rational agreement, 24 and "reasonable," 63-67, 86-89, 92, 93, 94 and right(s) vs. good(s), 56, 66, 93 Realism, moral, 11, 36, 270-271n.7 Rawls's rejection of, 65, 79 Reason, public use of. See Public use of reason "Reasonable," and Rawls's theory, 6 3 67, 86-89, 92, 93, 94 Reason in Rawls's outlook, 49, 82 and original position, 52 Reciprocal perspective-taking, 42 Recognition, politics of. See Politics of recognition Reflective equilibrium, of Rawls, 60, 76, 90, 97-98 Reflective reconstruction, and moral justification, 5 Republicanism (republican principles), 117, 258 and collective identity, 159 communicative account of, 139-140 and Kant on federation for peace, 172 Kantian, 101 and liberties, 69 and nationalism, 114-117, 132, 224 and national self-determination, 141, 142 and nation-state, xxxvi on role of democratic process, 2 3 9 244, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250 Schmitt in opposition to, 136-137 universalistic content of, xxxv Reverse discrimination, 221 Rights. See also H u m a n rights basic, 190-191, 258 to coexistence, 220-226 and equality for women, 210 vs. good(s), 28-30, 56
299 Index
Kant on, 140 on liberal vs. republican view, 241, 242-243 and m o d e r n constitutions, 203 and m o d e r n law, 256 as primary goods (Rawls), 54 and shift to popular sovereignty, 112 and social contract theory, 15 Rorty, Richard, 60 Rousseau, J e a n j a c q u e s and autonomy, 112, 69, 259 and democratic self-determination, 139 and h u m a n rights, 189 and law, 254 and popular sovereignty, 250 and Schmitt on democracy, 137 Rushdie, Salman, 224 St. Pierre, Abb, 165 Scanlon, Thomas, 60, 80, 81 Schmitt, Carl, 134-138 on cosmopolitan law, 181 and Federal Constitutional Court, 151 and Grimm, 158-159 on international humanitarianism, 188-189, 192-201 and intervention, 147-148 and right of national self-determina tion, 141-142 Schulze, H., I l l , 130 Scottish moral philosphy, 6, 13 Secession, justification of, 143> 145 Second World, 184 Seel, Martin, 22 Semantic conception of justification, 36-37 Senghass, Dieter and Eva, 185 Skepticism metaethical, 12 moral, 36 value-skepticism, 79 Social contract, 13, 14-15, 16, 23, 80 and Kant on cosmopolitan law, 168, 169 vs. Schmitt's account, 137-138 Social democracy, political achieve ments of, 204 Social integration. See also Solidarity communicative context of, 159-161 and nation-state,* 111-113 in pluralistic societies, 133 solidarity as, 240, 249
Social welfare model, and critique of liberal paradigm, 261 Social-welfare policies. See also Welfare state and equality for women, 209 and gender equality, 263 Social welfare state. See Welfare state Social world, 38 Socratic dialogue, 19 Solidarity, xxxv-xxxvi, 10. See also Social integration democratic participation as source of, 112,159-161 and justice, 10, 30, 40 and material conditions, 119 nation as source of, 111 as social integration, 240, 249 Somalia intervention in, 182, 231 as Third World, 184 Sovereignty and boundary between domestic and foreign policy, 174 external, 114, 146-147, 150, 179 and humanitarian intervention, 146150 internal, 146, 147, 170, 179 in international law, 147 limits of in nation-state, 120-124 popular, 112, 137-139, 250-251, 2 5 8 260 State. See also Constitutional state apparatus of, 108-109 arid European Union, 155 vs. nation, 107-108 and national identity, 130-131 in postcolonial Asia and Africa, 152 social makeup of, 218 sovereignty of, 146 Stevenson, C. L., 6 Strong cognitivism, 6 Strong noncognitivism, 5-6 Taylor, Charles, 205, 216, 226, 227. See also Politics of Recognition Theory of Communicative Action, The (Habermas), xxxv Theory of Justice, A (Rawls), 49, 53, 61, 82, 88, 94. See also Rawls, J o h n Third World, 183-184 Tokyo military tribunals, 178, 182 Truth cooperative search for, 19 correspondence notion of, 36
300 Index
Truth (cont.) and reasonableness (Rawls's theory), 63, 65-66, 67, 77, 95 in religious or metaphysical worldviews, 85 as validity, 36-37 Tugendhat, Ernst, 16, 17, 20-25 Underclass, 122-123, 158 United Nations, 105, 107, 126, 127, 178, 179-180 as "cosmopolitan democracy," 186-188 and First World, 184 General Assembly of, 149, 183, 187 overall safeguarding by, 231 and Schmitt's analysis, 188, 197 and war crimes, 285n.42 United Nations Charter, 179 and prohibition of intervention in, 147 and Schmitt, 193 on self-determination, 143 United States, 113 and ethical permeation of legal sys tem, 227 and immigration, 159-160, 228 as Maastricht Treaty analogy, 151 political culture of, 118 recognition of independence of, 143 and World Court (Nicaragua case), 180 Universalism, xxxv-xxxvi moral, 40 postmodern suspicion of, xxxv Universalization, principle of, 42-43, 45,46,57 Utilitarianism, 5-6, 11-12 and Rawls, 54 Scanlon's argument against, 80 Validity, 35-38 Value-orientations, 81 vs. obligations, 26 Values, vs. norms, 54-55 Value-skepticism, Rawls's rejection of, 79 Veil of ignorance, in Rawls's theory, 5 1 52, 57-59 Vienna conference on h u m a n rights, 182 Vietnam War, and global public sphere, 176 Voltaire, 175
Walzer, Michael, 148-149, 205, 216 War as crime, 167, 178 and Schmitt's analysis, 147-148, 188, 193, 194-196, 197-198 in Third World, 184 Weak cognitivism, 6 Weak noncognitivism, 6, 25 Weber, Max, 70, 105, 108, 130 Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, 129, 133 Weimar Republic, 134 Weizsacker, C. F. von, 126 Welfare paternalism, 262, 263 Welfare state. See also Social-welfare poli cies class antagonisms pacified by, 174 in postwar Europe, 119-120 and private vs. public autonomy, 71 and supranational institutions, 157158 Wilson, Woodrow, 134-135, 178 Wolf, Susan, 221 World Court, 187 Yugoslavia, former, 184, 285n.42