On the pragmatics of communication

Studies i n Contemporary G e r m a n Social Thought (partial listing) O n the Pragmatics of Communication T h o m a s ...

Author: Jürgen Habermas | Maeve Cooke

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Studies i n Contemporary G e r m a n Social Thought (partial listing)

O n the Pragmatics of Communication

T h o m a s McCarthy, general editor James B o h m a n , Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy James B o h m a n and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann, editors, Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal Craig C a l h o u n , editor, Habermas and the Public Sphere Maeve Cooke, Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy Jürgen Habermas, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics Jürgen Habermas, On the Logic of the Sotial Sciences Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action Jürgen Habermas, The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate Jürgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures Jürgen Habermas, Philosophical-Political Profiles Jürgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays Jürgen Habermas, On the Pragmatics of Communication (edited by Maeve Cooke) Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society Jürgen Habermas, editor, Observations on "The Spiritual Situation of the Age" Axel H o n n e t h , The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Sotial Theory Axel H o n n e t h , The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Sotial Conflicts Axel H o n n e t h a n d H a n s Joas, editors, Communicative Action: Essays on Jürgen Habermas 's T h e T h e o r y of Communicative Action Axel H o n n e t h , T h o m a s McCarthy, Claus Offe, a n d Albrecht Wellmer, editors, Cultural-Political Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment Axel H o n n e t h , T h o m a s McCarthy, Claus Offe, a n d Albrecht Wellmer, editors, Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment Maurizio Passerin d'Entrèves and Seyla Benhabib, editors, Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity: Critical Essays on T h e Philosophical Discourse of Modernity E r n s t Tugendhat, Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination Albrecht Wellmer, Endgames: Essays and Lectures on the Irreconcilable Nature of Modernity Albrecht Wellmer, The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics, and Postmodernism

Jürgen Habermas edited by Maeve Cooke

T h e M I T Press, C a m b r i d g e , M a s s a c h u s e t t s

Contents

©1998 Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Editor's Acknowledgments

T h i s volume is published by arrangement with Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt a m Main, Germany. T h e sources on which the translations are based are listed i n the acknowledgments.

Introduction

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced i n any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, (including photocopying, recording, or information storage a n d retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher.

1 What I s U n i v e r s a l Pragmatics? (1976)

T h i s book was set i n Baskeryille by Wellington Graphics and was printed a n d bound in the United States of America

vii

1

Maeve Cooke

2

21

S o c i a l A c t i o n , P u r p o s i v e Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

105

(1981) 3

C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality a n d the T h e o r i e s o f

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Meaning a n d Action (1986)

Habermas, Jürgen. O n the pragmatics of communication / Jürgen Habermas : edited by Maeve Cooke. p. c m . — (Studies i n contemporary G e r m a n social thought) Essays translated from German. Includes bibliographical references a n d index. I S B N 0-262-08265-9 (alk. paper) 1. Pragmatics. I . Cooke, Maeve. I I . Title. I I I . Series B831.5.H33 1998 193—dc21 98-18171 CIP

4 Actions, Speech Acts, Linguistically Mediated

183

215

I n t e r a c t i o n s , a n d the L i f e w o r l d ( 1 9 8 8 ) 5

C o m m e n t s on J o h n Searle's "Meaning,

Communication,

a n d R e p r e s e n t a t i o n " (1988)

257

6 T o w a r d a C r i t i q u e o f the T h e o r y o f M e a n i n g ( 1 9 8 8 )

277

7

S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t

of

Communicative Rationality (1996)

307

8

R i c h a r d R o r t / s Pragmatic T u r n (1996)

343

9

O n the D i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n P o e t i c a n d

U s e s of Language (1985)

Communicative 383

vi Contents

10 Q u e s t i o n s a n d C o u n t e r q u e s t i o n s ( 1 9 8 5 )

403

Selected B i b l i o g r a p h y a n d F u r t h e r Reading

435

Index

447

Editor's Acknowledgments

I w o u l d like to t h a n k T h o m a s M c C a r t h y f o r i n i t i a t i n g this u n d e r t a k i n g , f o r f u l f i l l i n g t h e r o l e o f series e d i t o r i n a n e x e m p l a r y m a n n e r , a n d for considerable

h e l p over a n d above his e d i t o r i a l duties w i t h

r e g a r d t o t r a n s l a t i o n d i f f i c u l t i e s . M y t h a n k s a r e also d u e t o J ü r g e n Habermas for encouraging the project, for replying p r o m p t l y to m y m a n y queries, a n d f o r his u n f a i l i n g cordiality. R o n a l d B ö h m e h e l p e d with the proofreading, with

financial

assistance f r o m t h e D e p a r t -

m e n t o f G e r m a n , U n i v e r s i t y C o l l e g e D u b l i n , a n d h e also c o m p i l e d the index. H e r e , too, I a m very grateful. Thanks,

finally,

to M a r t i n

Sauter, n o t j u s t f o r h i s p a i n s t a k i n g h e l p i n c h e c k i n g t r a n s l a t i o n s b u t f o r h i s l o v e a n d s u p p o r t o v e r t h e m a n y years i t t o o k t o p u t t h i s b o o k together. T h e t r a n s l a t i o n s o f m a n y o f t h e c h a p t e r s have b e e n b a s e d

on

e a r l i e r p u b l i s h e d t r a n s l a t i o n s , as f o l l o w s : A translation o f chapter 1 by T h o m a s J ü r g e n H a b e r m a s , Communication

M c C a r t h y was p u b l i s h e d i n

and the Evolution

of Society, © 1 9 7 9

b y B e a c o n Press, B o s t o n . A t r a n s l a t i o n o f c h a p t e r 2 b y T h o m a s M c C a r t h y was p u b l i s h e d i n J ü r g e n H a b e r m a s , The Theory of Communicative Action, v o l . 1 , © 1 9 8 4 b y B e a c o n Press, B o s t o n . A t r a n s l a t i o n o f c h a p t e r 3 b y J e r e m y G a i n e s a n d D o r i s L . J o n e s was first

p u b l i s h e d i n Communicative Action: Essays on Jürgen Habermas's

T h e T h e o r y o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e A c t i o n , e d i t e d by A x e l H o n n e t h a n d H a n s J o a s , © 1 9 9 1 b y P o l i t y Press, C a m b r i d g e , U . K .

viii Editor's Acknowledgments

A p a r t i a l t r a n s l a t i o n o f c h a p t e r 4 was p u b l i s h e d i n Philosophical Problems Today, e d i t e d b y G u t t o r m F l 0 i s t a d , © 1 9 9 4 b y K l u w e r A c a d e m i c

Introduction

Publishers, Dordrecht. A t r a n s l a t i o n o f c h a p t e r 5 was p u b l i s h e d i n John Searle and His edited by Ernest Lepore a n d R o b e r t Van Gulick, ©1991

Critics,

by Basil

Maeve Cooke

Blackwell, O x f o r d , U.K. A t r a n s l a t i o n o f c h a p t e r 6 b y W i l l i a m M . H o h e n g a r t e n was p u b l i s h e d i n J u r g e n H a b e r m a s , Postmetaphysical Thinking,

©1992 by Massachu-

setts I n s t i t u t e o f T e c h n o l o g y , C a m b r i d g e , Mass. A t r a n s l a t i o n o f c h a p t e r 9 b y F r e d e r i c k G . L a w r e n c e was p u b l i s h e d i n J u r g e n H a b e r m a s , The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity,

©1985

b y M a s s a c h u s e t t s I n s t i t u t e o f T e c h n o l o g y , C a m b r i d g e , Mass. A

translation of chapter

10 b y J a m e s B o h m a n was p u b l i s h e d i n

Habermas and Modernity, e d i t e d b y R i c h a r d B e r n s t e i n , © 1 9 8 5 b y P o l i t y Press, C a m b r i d g e , U . K . C h a p t e r s 7 a n d 8 a n d t h e f i n a l p a r t o f c h a p t e r 4 have b e e n t r a n s l a t e d by Maeve C o o k e a n d appear i n E n g l i s h f o r the first t i m e .

T h i s a n t h o l o g y b r i n g s t o g e t h e r f o r t h e first t i m e , i n revised o r n e w t r a n s l a t i o n , t e n essays t h a t p r e s e n t t h e m a i n c o n c e r n s o f H a b e r m a s ' s p r o g r a m i n f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s . I t s a i m is t o c o n v e y a sense o f t h e overall p u r p o s e o f his linguistic investigations, w h i l e i n t r o d u c i n g t h e r e a d e r t o t h e i r specific d e t a i l s . H a b e r m a s ' s f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s f u l f i l l s t w o m a i n f u n c t i o n s . F i r s t , i t serves as t h e t h e o r e t i c a l u n d e r p i n n i n g f o r h i s t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , w h i c h is a c r u c i a l e l e m e n t i n h i s t h e o r y o f society. S e c o n d , i t c o n t r i b u t e s t o o n g o i n g p h i l o sophical discussion o f p r o b l e m s c o n c e r n i n g t r u t h , rationality, a c t i o n , m e a n i n g . Correspondingly, the a i m o f the present

anthology

is t w o f o l d . F i r s t , i n p r o v i d i n g b e t t e r access t o essays b y

and

Habermas

t h a t focus e x p l i c i t l y o n language, i t may h e l p those interested i n s o c i a l t h e o r y t o assess c r i t i c a l l y t h e l i n g u i s t i c basis f o r his a c c o u n t s o f communicative action a n d communicative rationality. Second, i t may h e l p those interested i n m o r e t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b lems

to u n d e r s t a n d a n d to appreciate

Habermas's

treatment of

them. H a b e r m a s ' s o r i g i n a l t e r m f o r h i s l i n g u i s t i c r e s e a r c h p r o g r a m was " u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s . " T h e a d j e c t i v e " u n i v e r s a l " was m e a n t t o i n d i cate t h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n h i s l i n g u i s t i c p r o j e c t a n d o t h e r p r a g m a t i c analyses o f l a n g u a g e . W h e r e a s e a r l i e r p r a g m a t i c a p p r o a c h e s t o l a n g u a g e h a d t e n d e d t o analyze p a r t i c u l a r c o n t e x t s o f l a n g u a g e use, H a b e r m a s set o u t t o r e c o n s t r u c t u n i v e r s a l f e a t u r e s o f u s i n g l a n guage. T h i s explains the

title

o f h i s p r o g r a m m a t i c essay, " W h a t

3

2

Introduction

Introduction

Is U n i v e r s a l P r a g m a t i c s ? , "

first

p u b l i s h e d i n 1976. However, i n a

a c t i o n o f t h i s s o r t is " c o m m u n i c a t i v e , " a n d h i s analysis o f i t t u r n s o n

f o o t n o t e t o t h e 1979 E n g l i s h t r a n s l a t i o n , H a b e r m a s expresses d i s -

t h e thesis t h a t e v e r y d a y l a n g u a g e has a n i n - b u i l t c o n n e c t i o n

satisfaction w i t h the label "universal" a n d a preference f o r the t e r m

v a l i d i t y . M o r e precisely, l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s as t h e y are u s e d

with in

" f o r m a l pragmatics." O n e advantage o f the latter t e r m i n o l o g y , i n his

e v e r y d a y processes o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n c a n b e c o n s t r u e d as claims t o

view, is t h a t i t r e m i n d s us t h a t f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s is r e l a t e d t o f o r m a l

v a l i d i t y . F r o m h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , e v e r y d a y l i n g u i s t i c i n t e r a c t i o n is p r i -

s e m a n t i c s . A s w e s h a l l see, t h e n a t u r e o f t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p is p a r t i c u -

m a r i l y a m a t t e r o f r a i s i n g a n d r e s p o n d i n g to validity claims. Haber¬

larly crucial i n Habermas's accounts o f m e a n i n g a n d t r u t h .

mas d o e s a l l o w f o r o t h e r f o r m s o f l i n g u i s t i c i n t e r a c t i o n , s u c h

W h a t is m e a n t b y u n i v e r s a l or, as w e s h o u l d n o w say, f o r m a l p r a g matics? H a b e r m a s ' s s t a r t i n g p o i n t is t h a t f o r m a l analysis o f l a n g u a g e

strategic,

and

or symbolic i n t e r a c t i o n , b u t he contends

as

that

these a r e p a r a s i t i c o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . I n its s i m p l e s t t e r m s , c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n is a c t i o n w h o s e success

s h o u l d n o t b e r e s t r i c t e d t o s e m a n t i c analysis, f o r f o r m a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n s o f l a n g u a g e is e q u a l l y p o s s i b l e

figurative,

d e p e n d s o n t h e h e a r e r ' s r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e validity claim r a i s e d b y

Habermas

t h e s p e a k e r w i t h a "yes" o r a " n o . " H e r e , H a b e r m a s i d e n t i f i e s t h r e e

m e a n s t h o s e p e r t a i n i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y t o t h e employment o f s e n t e n c e s i n

basic types o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h a t a r e r a i s e d b y a speaker w i t h h e r

u t t e r a n c e s . H e m a k e s c l e a r t h a t " f o r m a l " is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d i n a

s p e e c h act: a claim t o t h e t r u t h o f w h a t is s a i d o r p r e s u p p o s e d ,

i m p o r t a n t . By the "pragmatic" dimensions o f language,

a

general

claim t o t h e normative Tightness o f t h e s p e e c h a c t i n t h e given

i n t u i t i o n s o r c o m p e t e n c i e s . F o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s , t h e n , a i m s a t a sys-

context or of the u n d e r l y i n g n o r m , a n d a claim to the truthfulness

t o l e r a n t sense t o r e f e r t o t h e r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f

tematic reconstruction of the intuitive linguistic knowledge of com-

o f t h e speaker. I n u s i n g a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n communicatively, t h e

p e t e n t subjects, t h e i n t u i t i v e " r u l e c o n s c i o u s n e s s " t h a t a c o m p e t e n t

s p e a k e r raises a l l t h r e e o f these c l a i m s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . I n a t y p i c a l

s p e a k e r has o f h e r o w n l a n g u a g e . I t a i m s t o e x p l i c a t e p r e t h e o r e t i c a l

c o m m u n i c a t i v e e x c h a n g e , h o w e v e r , j u s t o n e o f t h e c l a i m s is r a i s e d

knowledge

explicitly; the other two r e m a i n implicit presuppositions o f under-

o f a g e n e r a l s o r t , as o p p o s e d t o t h e c o m p e t e n c i e s o f

p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s a n d g r o u p s . F o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s t h u s calls t o

s t a n d i n g t h e u t t e r a n c e . T h e t h r e e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s are d e s c r i b e d

mind

" u n i v e r s a l " b y H a b e r m a s , i n t h e sense o f b e i n g r a i s e d w i t h every

the unavoidable

presuppositions

that guide

l i n g u i s t i c ex-

c h a n g e s b e t w e e n speakers a n d h e a r e r s i n e v e r y d a y processes o f c o m -

as

c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y u s e d s p e e c h act.

m u n i c a t i o n i n a n y l a n g u a g e . I t m a k e s us a w a r e t h a t , as speakers a n d

T h e three universal validity claims—to t r u t h , normative lightness,

h e a r e r s , t h e r e are c e r t a i n t h i n g s w e m u s t — a s a m a t t e r o f n e c e s s i t y —

a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s — p r o v i d e a basis f o r c l a s s i f y i n g s p e e c h acts. T h u s ,

always a l r e a d y h a v e p r e s u p p o s e d i f c o m m u n i c a t i o n is t o b e success-

c o m m u n i c a t i v e utterances can be d i v i d e d i n t o three b r o a d catego-

f u l . I n focusing o n the f o r m a l properties o f speech situations i n

r i e s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e e x p l i c i t c l a i m s t h e y raise: c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts

general, Habermas's p r o g r a m may thus be distinguished f r o m e m -

are c o n n e c t e d i n t h e

pirical pragmatics—for example, sociolinguistics—which looks p r i -

s p e e c h acts w i t h

m a r i l y a t p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s o f use.

s p e e c h acts w i t h c l a i m s t o t r u t h f u l n e s s .

Habermas's f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c investigations i n t o everyday linguis-

first

instance w i t h t r u t h claims, regulative

claims to n o r m a t i v e lightness, a n d

expressive

T h e thesis o f t h r e e u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s has i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r

t i c p r a c t i c e s i n m o d e r n societies a r e a t t e m p t s t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e

b o t h language

u n i v e r s a l c o m p e t e n c i e s t h a t a r e i n v o l v e d w h e n social a c t o r s i n t e r a c t

m e a n t t o p r o v i d e a m o r e c o n v i n c i n g basis f o r c l a s s i f y i n g s p e e c h acts

w i t h the a i m o f achieving m u t u a l understanding

t h a n , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e proposals o f A u s t i n a n d his followers o r t h e

{Verständigung)}

t h e o r y a n d social t h e o r y . O n t h e o n e

h a n d , i t is

C o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e is c r u c i a l f o r H a b e r m a s ' s s o c i a l t h e o r y ,

m o r e t h e o r e t i c a l l y m o t i v a t e d t y p o l o g i e s o f Searle a n d h i s f o l l o w e r s .

w h i c h is b a s e d o n t h e thesis t h a t a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g

On

u n d e r s t a n d i n g is t h e f u n d a m e n t a l t y p e o f social a c t i o n . H i s n a m e f o r

c o n n e c t i o n w i t h v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , t h e r e b y g i v i n g rise t o a p a r t i c u l a r

the other

h a n d , i t proposes that language

has

an

in-built

4

5

Introduction

Introduction

conception

o f s o c i a l o r d e r as r e p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h c o m m u n i c a t i v e

action.

a i m o f reaching agreement w i t h r e g a r d to the validity o f the disputed v a l i d i t y c l a i m , t h a t n o f o r c e e x c e p t t h a t o f t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t is

I n s h o w i n g t h a t everyday l i n g u i s t i c i n t e r a c t i o n d e p e n d s o n r a i s i n g

e x e r t e d , t h a t n o c o m p e t e n t parties have b e e n e x c l u d e d f r o m t h e

a n d r e c o g n i z i n g v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , H a b e r m a s p r e s e n t s a p i c t u r e o f so-

discussion,

c i a l o r d e r as a n e t w o r k o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t

p r e s s e d , t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s are u s i n g t h e s a m e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s

h a v e t w o s i g n i f i c a n t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . T h e y a r e , first, c o o p e r a t i v e r e l a -

i n t h e s a m e way, a n d so o n . T h e s e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s r e f e r b o t h

that no

r e l e v a n t a r g u m e n t has k n o w i n g l y b e e n

sup-

tionships o f c o m m i t m e n t a n d responsibility: participants i n c o m m u -

t o t h e p r a c t i c e o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d t o its o u t c o m e . F o r H a b e r m a s ,

n i c a t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n undertake t o b e h a v e i n c e r t a i n ways, a n d t h e

the various idealizing suppositions unavoidably g u i d i n g a r g u m e n -

success o f t h e i n t e r a c t i o n d e p e n d s o n t h e cooperation o f b o t h p a r t i e s

t a t i o n a r e w h a t give m e a n i n g t o t h e i d e a s o f t r u t h a n d j u s t i c e as

involved. Second, the relationships of m u t u a l recognition

ideas t h a t t r a n s c e n d a l l l o c a l c o n t e x t s o f validity. T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t

charac-

t e r i s t i c f o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n h a v e a n i n h e r e n t rational d i m e n -

t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s r a i s e d i n e v e r y d a y processes o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n

sion: the communicative actor undertakes a n o b l i g a t i o n to provide

have a c o n n e c t i o n

r e a s o n s f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e c l a i m s h e raises w i t h h i s u t t e r a n c e s ,

course, they have a n i n h e r e n t c o n t e x t - t r a n s c e n d e n t

power.

w h i l e his c o u n t e r p a r t i n a c t i o n may e i t h e r accept the

power

processes

proffered

r e a s o n s o r c h a l l e n g e t h e m o n t h e basis o f b e t t e r reasons. I n t h i s sense, e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n i n v o l v e s a r u d i m e n t a r y p r a c t i c e o f " a r g u m e n t a t i o n . " F u r t h e r m o r e , these e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s g i v i n g reasons f o r a n d against c o n t r o v e r s i a l validity

of

claims—some-

t i m e s r e f e r r e d t o b y H a b e r m a s as n a i v e c o m m u n i c a t i v e

action—

p o i n t t o w a r d the possibility o f other, m o r e d e m a n d i n g f o r m s

of

a r g u m e n t a t i o n , w h i c h h e calls " d i s c o u r s e . " E v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n n o r m a l l y operates o n t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e reasons supp o r t i n g t h e validity claims raised are g o o d ones. W h e n this backg r o u n d c o n s e n s u s is s h a k e n — a s

will happen more frequently i n

posttraditional societies—communicative

action cannot

continue

r o u t i n e l y . P a r t i c i p a n t s t h e n have t h r e e o p t i o n s : they can switch t o strategic a c t i o n ; they can b r e a k o f f c o m m u n i c a t i o n altogether; o r they can r e c o m m e n c e t h e i r c o m m u n i c a t i v e activity at a d i f f e r e n t , m o r e reflective level—namely, argumentative speech. I n the processes o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n k n o w n as d i s c o u r s e s , c e r t a i n i d e a l i z i n g s u p positions already operative i n everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e action are f o r m a l i z e d . T h e s e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s a r e u n a v o i d a b l e i n t h e sense t h a t t h e y b e l o n g t o t h e v e r y m e a n i n g o f w h a t i t is t o t a k e p a r t i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n ; t h e y are i d e a l i z i n g i n t h e sense t h a t t h e y a r e t y p i c a l l y c o u n t e r f a c t u a l a n d w i l l n o t as a r u l e b e s a t i s f i e d m o r e t h a n a p p r o x i mately. T h u s , H a b e r m a s claims, p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n necessarily s u p p o s e , a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , t h a t t h e y share t h e

common

i n p r i n c i p l e w i t h possible

v i n d i c a t i o n i n dis-

is t h e r a t i o n a l p o t e n t i a l b u i l t i n t o e v e r y d a y

This of

communication. H a b e r m a s ' s p i c t u r e o f e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n t h u s has i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r critical social theory. F o r one t h i n g , i n p r e s e n t i n g s o c i a l o r d e r as a n e t w o r k o f c o o p e r a t i o n i n v o l v i n g c o m m i t m e n t a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , i t o p p o s e s m o d e l s o f social o r d e r t h a t t a k e i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n s t r a t e g i c a l l y a c t i n g subjects as f u n d a m e n tal, for example, models g r o u n d e d i n decision o r game theory. For another, i n the context-transcendent p o t e n t i a l o f the validity claims r a i s e d i n e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e processes, i t l o c a t e s a basis f o r a " p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l " c o n c e p t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y a n d , accordingly, a standard f o r critique. As that conception

refers t o a

p o t e n t i a l already b u i l t i n t o everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e action, i t situates r e a s o n i n e v e r y d a y l i f e : t h e ideas o f t r u t h a n d j u s t i c e t o w a r d w h i c h i t p o i n t s are g r o u n d e d i n i d e a l i z i n g suppositions that are p a r t o f e v e r y d a y h u m a n activity. M o r e o v e r , c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is n o t reducible to the standards o f validity p r e v a i l i n g i n any local c o n t e x t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e activity. R a t h e r , t h e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i tions o n w h i c h i t rests p r o v i d e s t a n d a r d s f o r c r i t i c i z i n g l o c a l p r a c t i c e s o f justification, b o t h w i t h regard to the outcomes o f the agreements reached

a n d w i t h r e g a r d to practices o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n

themselves.

T h u s t h e i d e a o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is m e a n t t o p r o v i d e a postmetaphysical alternative to traditional conceptions of t r u t h a n d j u s t i c e t h a t nonetheless avoids value-relativism.

7

6

Introduction

Introduction

F r o m a m o r e s t r i c t l y l i n g u i s t i c - p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t o f view, H a b e r mas's f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s offers a n a p p r o a c h t o questions o f m e a n i n g a n d t r u t h t h a t radicalizes t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n w i t h i n m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y . I n h i s view, t r a d i t i o n a l f o r m a l - s e m a n t i c a p p r o a c h e s t o m e a n i n g have b e e n g u i l t y o f t h r e e k i n d s o f a b s t r a c t i v e fallacies: a s e m a n t i c i s t abstraction, a cognitivist abstraction, a n d a n objectivist o n e . T h e s e m a n t i c i s t a b s t r a c t i o n is t h e v i e w t h a t t h e analysis o f l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g c a n c o n f i n e i t s e l f t o t h e analysis o f sentences, a b s t r a c t i n g f r o m t h e p r a g m a t i c c o n t e x t s o f t h e use o f s e n t e n c e s i n u t t e r a n c e s . T h e c o g n i t i v i s t a b s t r a c t i o n is t h e v i e w t h a t a l l m e a n i n g c a n b e t r a c e d back to the propositional content o f utterances, thus indirectly red u c i n g m e a n i n g t o t h e m e a n i n g o f assertoric s e n t e n c e s . T h e o b j e c tivist

a b s t r a c t i o n is t h e v i e w t h a t m e a n i n g is t o b e d e f i n e d i n t e r m s

language games a n d p a r t i c u l a r f o r m s o f life. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , p r a g m a t i c a p p r o a c h e s t h a t have a t t e m p t e d t o a v o i d such a r e d u c tion—Habermas succumbed

m e n t i o n s Searle's s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y — t y p i c a l l y h a v e

t o t h e cognitivist abstraction, i n t e r p r e t i n g validity t o o

n a r r o w l y as p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h . H a b e r m a s sees h i s o w n p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g as a n a t t e m p t t o c o m b i n e t h e p r o d u c t i v e i n s i g h t s o f existing formal-semantic a n d pragmatic approaches to m e a n i n g w h i l e a v o i d i n g t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e weaknesses. H e r e g a r d s s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y as a f r u i t f u l s t a r t i n g p o i n t , b u t i n s u f f i c i e n t as i t stands, a n d attempts t o b u i l d i n t o i t the formal-semantic emphasis o n t r u t h o r a s s e r t i b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s . I n a sense, t h e n , H a b e r m a s ' s p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g c a n b e r e g a r d e d as t h e p r o p o s e d h a p p y m a r r i a g e o f A u s t i n a n d Searle w i t h F r e g e a n d D u m m e t t .

c o n d i t i o n s , as o p p o s e d t o t h e

F r o m t h e s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y o f A u s t i n a n d Searle ( w h o m h e praises

knowledge o f t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s t h a t c a n b e i m p u t e d t o speakers o r

f o r r e n d e r i n g A u s t i n ' s t h e o r y m o r e p r e c i s e ) , H a b e r m a s takes o v e r

hearers. F o r H a b e r m a s , p r a g m a t i c theories o f m e a n i n g have t h e

t h e e m p h a s i s o n u t t e r a n c e s r a t h e r t h a n s e n t e n c e s as t h e c e n t r a l u n i t

a d v a n t a g e t h a t t h e y f o c u s n o t o n s e n t e n c e s b u t o n u t t e r a n c e s ( h e is

o f analysis. H e also associates h i m s e l f w i t h t h e i r m o v e b e y o n d t h e

o f objectively ascertainable

truth

t h i n k i n g here primarily o f t h e use-oriented theories o f m e a n i n g

t r a d i t i o n a l n a r r o w focus o n assertoric a n d descriptive m o d e s o f l a n -

suggested b y t h e later w o r k o f W i t t g e n s t e i n , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d

g u a g e use t o i n c l u d e — p o t e n t i a l l y o n a n e q u a l f o o t i n g — o t h e r ways

t h e w o r k o f A u s t i n a n d Searle, o n t h e o t h e r ) . F u r t h e r m o r e , p r a g -

o f u s i n g l a n g u a g e , s u c h as acts o f p r o m i s i n g , r e q u e s t i n g , w a r n i n g , o r

m a t i c theories o f m e a n i n g d o n o t emphasize o n l y t h e assertoric o r

c o n f e s s i n g . I n a d d i t i o n , h e finds f r u i t f u l s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y ' s e m p h a -

descriptive m o d e s o f language use; they d r a w a t t e n t i o n t o t h e m u l -

sis o n t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f u t t e r a n c e s , t h a t is, o n t h e f a c t t h a t a

o f m e a n i n g f u l ways o f u s i n g l a n g u a g e . F i n a l l y , s u c h t h e o r i e s

s p e a k e r i n s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g also does s o m e t h i n g . H o w e v e r , i t m a y b e

stress t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m e a n i n g o f u t t e r a n c e s a n d s o c i a l

helpful here to notice Habermas's distinctive conception o f illocu-

tiplicity

practices; they draw a t t e n t i o n t o t h e institutions a n d conventions

t i o n a r y f o r c e , w h i c h goes b e y o n d A u s t i n ' s i n a n u m b e r o f s i g n i f i c a n t

o f t h e f o r m s o f l i f e i n w h i c h c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i v i t y is always e m -

respects. A u s t i n u s e d t h e n o t i o n o f i l l o c u t i o n t o r e f e r t o t h e act o f

bedded.

u t t e r i n g sentences w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t . F o r h i m , t h e force o f

I n H a b e r m a s ' s view, h o w e v e r , e x i s t i n g p r a g m a t i c a p p r o a c h e s t o m e a n i n g h a v e weaknesses c o m p l e m e n t a r y t o t h o s e o f f o r m a l s e m a n tics. T h e g r e a t s t r e n g t h o f f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s h a s b e e n i t s a t t e m p t t o r e t a i n a c o n n e c t i o n between t h e m e a n i n g o f linguistic expressions a n d some n o t i o n o f context-transcendent validity. I n t h e m a i n p r a g matic approaches,

however, this c o n n e c t i o n

e i t h e r slips f r o m v i e w

c o m p l e t e l y o r is i n t e r p r e t e d t o o n a r r o w l y i n a c o g n i t i v i s t way. F o r e x a m p l e , use t h e o r i e s o f m e a n i n g d e r i v e d f r o m t h e l a t e r w o r k o f W i t t g e n s t e i n have i n effect r e n o u n c e d tion

a context-transcendent n o -

o f validity by r e d u c i n g i t t o t h e prevailing validity o f local

a n u t t e r a n c e consists i n t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t — i n t h e a t t e m p t t o reach a n u p t a k e ; h e contrasted t h e force o f a n utterance w i t h its m e a n i n g , c o n c e i v e d as a p r o p e r t y o f t h e s e n t e n c e u t t e r e d . H a b e r mas's o b j e c t i o n t o t h i s is t h r e e f o l d : first, A u s t i n ' s d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n f o r c e a n d m e a n i n g o v e r l o o k s t h e f a c t t h a t u t t e r a n c e s have a m e a n i n g d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e sentences they employ; second, i t is c o n n e c t e d w i t h a p r o b l e m a t i c c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts i n t o constatives a n d p e r f o r m a t i v e s , w h e r e b y i n i t i a l l y , f o r A u s t i n , o n l y c o n statives a r e c o n n e c t e d w i t h v a l i d i t y c l a i m s ; t h i r d , i t n e g l e c t s t h e r a tional f o u n d a t i o n o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y force.

By contrast,

Habermas

8

9

Introduction

Introduction

p r o p o s e s a n a c c o u n t o f u t t e r a n c e m e a n i n g t h a t brings together t h e

w h e n t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s are s a t i s f i e d . S u c h a n a s s u m p t i o n ,

c a t e g o r i e s o f m e a n i n g a n d f o r c e ; h e extends t h e n o d o n o f i l l o c u t i o n -

argues, i m p l i c i t l y relies o n a n e m p i r i c i s t t h e o r y o f knowledge

a r y force t o a l l utterances t h a t are used c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y ; a n d h e

regards t h e simple predicative sentences o f a n observational l a n -

e m p h a s i z e s t h e rational f o u n d a t i o n o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e . A s w e s h a l l

guage

see, H a b e r m a s ' s p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y gives a n a c c o u n t o f t h e m e a n i n g

suggests r e p l a c i n g t h e e m p h a s i s o n t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s w i t h a c o n s i d -

o f u t t e r a n c e s as i n s e p a r a b l e f r o m t h e a c t o f u t t e r i n g t h e m , a n d

e r a t i o n o f w h a t i t is f o r a s p e a k e r t o know when

d e f i n e s u t t e r a n c e s as acts o f r a i s i n g v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . H i s d e f i n i t i o n o f

w o u l d b e s a t i s f i e d . T h i s is w h a t h e r e f e r s t o as D u m m e t t ' s e p i s t e m i c

as

fundamental. Habermas

then

follows

Dummett,

he that who

the truth conditions

i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e f o l l o w s f r o m t h i s : i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e consists i n a

t u r n ; h e , however, wants to t u r n even f u r t h e r . As H a b e r m a s reads i t ,

s p e e c h act's c a p a c i t y t o m o t i v a t e a h e a r e r t o act o n t h e p r e m i s e t h a t

D u m m e t t ' s t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g has t w o m a i n s h o r t c o m i n g s t h a t p r e -

t h e c o m m i t m e n t s i g n a l l e d b y t h e s p e a k e r is s e r i o u s l y m e a n t . O n t h i s

vent his developing fully the i n h e r e n t potentials o f the

epistemic

as-

t u r n . T h e f i r s t is a p r i o r i t i z a t i o n o f t r u t h c l a i m s o v e r o t h e r k i n d s o f

s u m p t i o n o f a warranty, i f c h a l l e n g e d , t o p r o v i d e reasons i n s u p p o r t

validity claims: D u m m e t t ' s n o t i o n o f assertibility conditions accords

c o n c e p t i o n , i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e is b o u n d u p w i t h t h e speaker's

o f t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e c l a i m s she raises. So u n d e r s t o o d , i l l o c u t i o n a r y

p r i o r i t y t o assertoric utterances. I n o r d e r t o m a k e r o o m o n a n e q u a l

f o r c e is a r a t i o n a l f o r c e , f o r i n p e r f o r m i n g a s p e e c h act, t h e s p e a k e r

f o o t i n g f o r n o n a s s e r t o r i c u t t e r a n c e s s u c h as p r o m i s e s , i m p e r a t i v e s ,

u n d e r t a k e s t o s u p p o r t w h a t she says w i t h reasons, i f necessary. T h u s ,

o r avowals, H a b e r m a s p r e f e r s t o s p e a k o f acceptability c o n d i t i o n s . T h e

a l t h o u g h H a b e r m a s acknowledges

s e c o n d is t h a t D u m m e t t ' s n o t i o n o f a s s e r t i b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s is i n -

s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y as t h e

most

f r u i t f u l p o i n t o f departure for his p r o g r a m o f f o r m a l pragmatics, he

s u f f i c i e n t l y p r a g m a t i c : i t r e m a i n s o n t h e s e m a n t i c l e v e l o f analysis

e n g a g e s w i t h i t c r i t i c a l l y , m a k i n g use o f s o m e o f its c e n t r a l c a t e g o r i e s

i n a s m u c h as i t r e l i e s o n a n i d e a l o f v a l i d i t y t h a t is c o n c e p t u a l l y

i n d i s t i n c t i v e ways.

i n d e p e n d e n t o f discursive practices o f r e d e e m i n g validity claims.

F r o m the p o i n t o f view o f Habermas's p r o g r a m o f f o r m a l p r a g m a t ics, t h e m a i n w e a k n e s s o f s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y is its f a i l u r e t o c o n n e c t all c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y used utterances w i t h validity claims t h a t are i n principle deficiency

context-transcendent.

He

attempts to make

by d r a w i n g o n M i c h a e l D u m m e t t ' s account

good of

this

under-

T h i s last o b j e c t i o n takes us t o t h e h e a r t o f H a b e r m a s ' s

pragmatic

theory of meaning. B e f o r e c o n s i d e r i n g i t , however, i t m a y be h e l p f u l to clarify t h e status o f t h e t h e o r y . B r o a d l y s p e a k i n g , i t seems p o s s i b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t w o a c c o u n t s o f its status. A c c o r d i n g t o t h e

first,

a

standing m e a n i n g i n terms o f k n o w i n g assertibility conditions. I n

p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g is m e r e l y a n e x t e n s i o n o f t r u t h - c o n d i -

a n a l o g y w i t h D u m m e t t ' s f o r m u l a t i o n o f w h a t i t is t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e

t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s i n t h e sense t h a t i t b r o a d e n s its f o c u s . O n t h i s view,

m e a n i n g o f a n assertoric e x p r e s s i o n , H a b e r m a s p r o p o s e s t h a t w e

H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y leaves t h e basic a s s u m p t i o n o f t h e f o r m a l - s e m a n -

u n d e r s t a n d a n utterance w h e n we k n o w w h a t makes i t acceptable.

tic a c c o u n t o f t h e m e a n i n g o f s e n t e n c e s i n t a c t , w h i l e e x p a n d i n g its

T r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics r u n s i n t o d i f f i c u l t i e s w h e n i t explains

range,

t h e m e a n i n g o f sentences i n t e r m s o f t h e i r t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s w i t h o u t

o n d , t o e m b r a c e utterances as w e l l as s e n t e n c e s . H i s e a r l i e r essay

first,

t o i n c l u d e nonassertoric l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s a n d , sec-

m e d i a t i o n t h r o u g h t h e knowledge t h e s p e a k e r o r h e a r e r m a y h a v e o f

" W h a t I s U n i v e r s a l P r a g m a t i c s ? " suggests t h i s a c c o u n t o f t h e tasks o f

such conditions. T h u s Habermas adopts D u m m e t t ' s "epistemic t u r n "

a pragmatic t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g . However, i n most o f his later writ-

a n d criticizes D o n a l d Davidson f o r o f f e r i n g an objectivist r e a d i n g o f

i n g s , h e seems t o o f f e r a m o r e r a d i c a l a c c o u n t . A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s , a

F r e g e ' s a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s thesis t h a t t o u n d e r s t a n d a n u t t e r a n c e is

pragmatic

t o k n o w w h a t is t h e case i f i t is t r u e . H e r e j e c t s t h i s o b j e c t i v i s t r e a d i n g

p r o a c h t o m e a n i n g . T h i s v i e w is s u g g e s t e d , f o r e x a m p l e , i n c h a p t e r s

as t a c i t l y a s s u m i n g t h a t f o r e v e r y s e n t e n c e , o r a t least f o r

2 a n d 3 i n the present volume, where D u m m e t t ' s assertibility-condi-

every

assertoric sentence, p r o c e d u r e s are available f o r effectively d e c i d i n g

tional

theory of meaning

undercuts

the formal-semantic

ap-

t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g is c r i t i c i z e d f o r f a i l i n g t o c a r r y t h r o u g h

10

11

Introduction

Introduction

completely the move f r o m the semantic to the pragmatic level o f analysis. I n a r e c e n t Schnadelbach

response

to

objections

raised by

Herbert

(see c h a p t e r 7 ) , H a b e r m a s c l a r i f i e s t h e status o f h i s

p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g i n a w a y t h a t suggests t h a t b o t h

of

t h e s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are c o r r e c t . S t a r t i n g f r o m a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d n o n c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , h e acknowledges

that epistemically used

p r o p o s i t i o n a l sentences

t e l e o l o g i c a l l y u s e d i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s have a m e a n i n g

and

content

t h a t is i n s o m e sense i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts i n w h i c h t h e y c a n b e e m b e d d e d . I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d p r o p o s i t i o n a l sent e n c e s t h a t s e r v e p u r e l y t o r e p r e s e n t states o f a f f a i r s o r facts, i t is sufficient.to k n o w their t r u t h conditions. I n order to u n d e r s t a n d i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s t h a t serve t o c a l c u l a t e a c t i o n c o n s e q u e n c e s m o n o l o g i c a l l y — w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o a s e c o n d p e r s o n — i t is s u f f i c i e n t t o k n o w t h e i r success c o n d i t i o n s . S u c h s e n t e n c e s , w h i c h a r e used noncommunicatively,

can be analyzed exhaustively w i t h

the

t o o l s o f f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s . H o w e v e r , t h e y are s p e c i a l cases o f l a n g u a g e use, d u e t o a f e a t o f a b s t r a c t i o n t h a t s u s p e n d s t h e i r p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n : t h e possible c o m m u n i c a t i v e situations i n w h i c h a speaker w o u l d assert t h e p r o p o s i t i o n "p," o r d e c l a r e t h e i n t e n t i o n "p," w i t h t h e a i m o f f i n d i n g a g r e e m e n t w i t h a n addressee a r e a b s t r a c t e d f r o m . As a r u l e , however,

p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s a n d i n t e n t i o n a l sen-

t e n c e s a r e e m b e d d e d i n i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts i n t h e f o r m o f a s s e r t i o n s and announcements.

The

m e a n i n g o f assertions

and

announce-

m e n t s , w h i c h are p a r t o f t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , c a n b e e x p l i c a t e d o n l y p r a g m a t i c a l l y . F r o m t h i s w e c a n see t h a t H a b e r m a s does n o t reject the f o r m a l semantic approach to m e a n i n g , f o r he a c k n o w l e d g e s its a b i l i t y t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e m e a n i n g o f

noncommu-

nicatively used p r o p o s i t i o n a l a n d i n t e n t i o n a l sentences. A t t h e same time,

he does challenge the claims o f formal-semantic theories to

e x p l a i n t h e m e a n i n g o f utterances s u c h as assertions a n d

announce-

m e n t s , o r m o r e generally, o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y used linguistic expressions. M o r e o v e r , i f f o r m a l - s e m a n t i c t h e o r i e s o f m e a n i n g c a n a c c o u n t only for the noncommunicative

use

o f language,

t h e n their re-

s t r i c t e d s c o p e suggests t h a t t h i s a p p r o a c h t o m e a n i n g is i t s e l f l i m i t e d . W e h a v e a s c e r t a i n e d t h a t a p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y is r e q u i r e d t o e x p l i cate t h e m e a n i n g o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y used linguistic expressions. I t

r e m a i n s u n c l e a r , h o w e v e r , i n w h a t sense s u c h a t h e o r y is p r a g m a t i c . A s i n d i c a t e d , i n h i s e a r l i e r essay o n u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s , H a b e r m a s h a d j u s t i f i e d his preference for the category o f acceptability c o n d i t i o n s , as o p p o s e d t o t r u t h o r a s s e r t i b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s , o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t i t avoids t h e p r i o r i t i z a t i o n o f the assertoric m o d e o f

language

use i m p l i c i t i n t h e l a t t e r c a t e g o r i e s . I n t h e s e l a t e r w r i t i n g s , h o w e v e r , h i s o b j e c t i o n t o t r u t h o r a s s e r t i b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s seems t o g o

beyond

t h i s . T h e y a r e s a i d t o rest o n f a u l t y p i c t u r e s o f t r u t h a n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n t h a t f a i l t o r e c o g n i z e i n t e r n a l , c o n c e p t u a l l i n k s w i t h pragmatic contexts of justification

a n d t h u s r e m a i n t r a p p e d i n a b s t r a c t i v e fallacies o f a

c o g n i t i v i s t a n d s e m a n t i c i s t k i n d . I n H a b e r m a s ' s view, v a l i d i t y a n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n — a n d h e n c e utterance m e a n i n g — a r e inescapably p r a g matic notions. T h e y cannot be explicated i n d e p e n d e n d y o f discursive processes o f r e d e e m i n g d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . W h i l e D u m m e t t ' s n o t i o n o f assertibility c o n d i t i o n s pushes i n the d i r e c t i o n o f a p r a g m a t i c a c c o u n t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n a n d validity, i t does n o t q u i t e arrive t h e r e ; i t r e m a i n s a semantic t h e o r y t o t h e e x t e n t that i t fails t o e x p l i c a t e these n o t i o n s as conceptually l i n k e d t o discursive p r o c esses o f r e d e e m i n g d i s p u t e d — a s s e r t o r i c a n d n o n a s s e r t o r i c — v a l i d i t y claims. H a b e r m a s proposes t h a t we u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a speech act w h e n w e k n o w w h a t m a k e s i t a c c e p t a b l e . W e k n o w w h a t m a k e s a s p e e c h a c t a c c e p t a b l e w h e n w e k n o w t h e kinds o f reasons t h a t a speaker can offer, i f challenged, i n o r d e r to reach u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h a hearer c o n c e r n i n g t h e validity o f t h e d i s p u t e d c l a i m . I n everyd a y processes o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t h e k i n d s o f r e a s o n s t h a t a h e a r e r m u s t k n o w i n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d a g i v e n u t t e r a n c e are c i r c u m s c r i b e d c o n t e x t u a l l y . L e t us i m a g i n e a r e q u e s t t o a passenger b y a n a i r l i n e steward to stop s m o k i n g . I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d this request, t h e p a s s e n g e r has t o b e a b l e t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e k i n d s o f r e a s o n s t h a t the a i r l i n e steward c o u l d p r o v i d e i n o r d e r to justify his request, i f necessary. T h e s e r e a s o n s m i g h t i n c l u d e t h e a r g u m e n t t h a t s m o k i n g is u n p l e a s a n t f o r o t h e r passengers o r t h a t i t is a g a i n s t t h e r e g u l a t i o n s o f t h e a i r l i n e o r against a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l code o f a i r l i n e practice. T h e s e r e a s o n s a r e o f c e r t a i n k i n d s . I f o t h e r k i n d s o f responses w e r e o f f e r e d as r e a s o n s — f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t i t is r a i n i n g o u t s i d e , o r t h a t Finnegans

Wake is J a m e s J o y c e ' s best b o o k , o r t h a t t h e r e a r e n o snakes

13

12

Introduction

Introduction

in I r e l a n d — t h e context i n question w o u l d render t h e m irrelevant a n d , i n d e e d , u n i n t e l l i g i b l e . T h u s , a l t h o u g h t h e set o f r e a s o n s c o n s t i t u t i n g a g i v e n kind o f reasons is always i n p r i n c i p l e o p e n - e n d e d , i n everyday

contexts

of

communication

contextual

considerations

a c t as a c o n s t r a i n t o n t h e k i n d s o f r e a s o n s t h a t a r e r e l e v a n t t o justification. T h e h e a r e r n o t o n l y has t o k n o w t h e k i n d s o f r e a s o n s t h e s p e a k e r c o u l d a d d u c e i n a g i v e n i n s t a n c e , h e has t o k n o w h o w t h e s p e a k e r m i g h t use t h e m i n o r d e r t o e n g a g e i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n w i t h a h e a r e r c o n c e r n i n g the validity o f a d i s p u t e d c l a i m . T h i s focus o n k n o w i n g h o w t h e s p e a k e r m i g h t use r e a s o n s t o s u p p o r t a d i s p u t e d v a l i d i t y claim

clearly recalls

D u m m e t t ' s epistemic

turn.

Like Dummett,

H a b e r m a s also stresses t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e s e reasons c a n n e v e r i n p r i n c i p l e be d e c i d e d once a n d for a l l . Rather, t h e i r validity m u s t be c o n s t r u e d f a l l i b i l i s t i c a l l y , t h a t is, as always i n p r i n c i p l e s u b j e c t revision i n l i g h t o f new a r g u m e n t s based o n

new evidence

to and

i n s i g h t s . T h i s is o n e sense i n w h i c h t h e q u e s t i o n o f v a l i d i t y is tied t o pragmatic contexts o f justification, a n d i t constitutes a f u r t h e r reason for describing Habermas's

theory of meaning

(and,

indeed,

D u m m e t t ' s ) as p r a g m a t i c . H o w e v e r , t h e r e is a s e c o n d , p o s s i b l y m o r e contentious

sense, i n w h i c h H a b e r m a s

ties v a l i d i t y t o

pragmatic

c o n t e x t s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I n t h i s s e c o n d sense, v a l i d i t y is n o t o n l y always s u b j e c t i n p r i n c i p l e t o d i s c u r s i v e r é é v a l u a t i o n , i t is in itself p r a g m a t i c . T h e p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n is n o t s o m e t h i n g a t t a c h e d t o t h e i d e a o f v a l i d i t y e x t e r n a l l y , as i t w e r e ; r a t h e r , i t is i n t e r n a l t o t h e v e r y c o n c e p t o f v a l i d i t y . A t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g t h a t sees i t s e l f as p r a g m a t i c i n t h i s s t r o n g e r sense m u s t t h e r e f o r e o f f e r a p r a g m a t i c a c c o u n t o f v a l i d i t y itself. T o t h i s e x t e n t , H a b e r m a s ' s p r a g m a t i c t h e o ries o f t r u t h ( e m p i r i c a l a n d t h e o r e t i c a l validity) a n d justice ( m o r a l v a l i d i t y ) — a n d , i n d e e d , his accounts o f e t h i c a l a n d aesthetic v a l i d i t y — a r e crucial ingredients o f his pragmatic t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g . H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y o f m o r a l v a l i d i t y has b e e n t h e s u b j e c t o f e x t e n sive c o m m e n t a r y a n d c r i t i c i s m . F r o m t h e p o i n t o f view o f t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g , o u r q u e s t i o n is t h e f o l l o w i n g : h o w is t h e c o n c e p t i o n

of

m o r a l v a l i d i t y i t p r o p o s e s i n t e r n a l l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h processes o f d i s c u r s i v e l y r e d e e m i n g v a l i d i t y claims? A n o r m o r p r i n c i p l e is m o r a l l y v a l i d ( r i g h t o r j u s t ) , f o r H a b e r m a s , i f i t is t h e p o s s i b l e o b j e c t o f

a d i s c u r s i v e l y a c h i e v e d c o n s e n s u s t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t i t is e q u a l l y i n t h e interest o f all affected. Therefore, agreement reached i n discourse— i d e a l i z e d r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y — c o n t r i b u t e s c o n s t r u c t i v e l y t o t h e val i d i t y o f m o r a l n o r m s . I t is c l e a r f r o m t h i s t h a t H a b e r m a s c o n c e i v e s m o r a l v a l i d i t y as i n t e r n a l l y l i n k e d t o t h e i d e a o f d i s c u r s i v e l y a c h i e v e d consensus a n d hence to pragmatic contexts o f justification. H a b e r m a s also p r o p o s e s a p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f t r u t h .

Discussion

o f t h i s is c o m p l i c a t e d b y t h e f a c t t h a t h e s i g n i f i c a n t l y a m e n d e d

the

a c c o u n t h e o r i g i n a l l y p r e s e n t e d i n t h e 1973 essay, " W a h r h e i t s t h e o ¬ r i e n , " w i t h o u t subsequently p r e s e n t i n g a fully revised version. H o w ever, a r e c e n t essay o n R i c h a r d R o r t y ' s n e o p r a g m a t i s m

(included

h e r e as c h a p t e r 8 ) c a n b e seen as a n a t t e m p t t o r e c t i f y t h i s d e f i c i e n c y . F o r o u r p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s , w h a t is m o s t i n t e r e s t i n g a b o u t these r e c e n t r e m a r k s is t h e i r c o n t i n u e d i n s i s t e n c e o n t h e p r a g m a t i c n a t u r e o f t r u t h . H a b e r m a s associates h i m s e l f w i t h R o r t y ' s a i m o f r a d i c a l i z i n g the linguistic t u r n w i t h i n m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y by m o v i n g to a p r a g m a t i c l e v e l o f analysis. H e c r i t i c i z e s h i m , h o w e v e r , f o r d r a w i n g t h e w r o n g conclusions f r o m his c r i t i q u e o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f language. R o r t y reduces t r u t h to practices o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n , thus losing sight o f the p o t e n t i a l power o f validity claims to e x p l o d e actual contexts

of

j u s t i f i c a t i o n . H a b e r m a s , by contrast, wants t o h o l d o n t o t h e m o m e n t o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l i t y t h a t is p a r t o f t h e i d e a o f t r u t h , w h i l e r e t a i n i n g an internal relation between t r u t h a n d justifiability. His aim, i n other w o r d s , is t o w o r k o u t a t h e o r y o f t r u t h t h a t is i n h e r e n t l y p r a g m a t i c yet retains t h e idea o f a n u n c o n d i t i o n a l c l a i m t h a t reaches b e y o n d a l l t h e e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e t o us a t a n y g i v e n t i m e . W h a t w o u l d s u c h a t h e o r y l o o k l i k e ? I n t h e 1980s, H a b e r m a s d e f e n d e d a v i e w n o t unlike Hilary Putnam's conception

o f t r u t h as i d e a l i z e d r a t i o n a l

a c c e p t a b i l i t y : a p r o p o s i t i o n was s a i d t o b e t r u e i f i t c o u l d b e j u s t i f i e d u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f a n i d e a l s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n . T r u t h , o n t h i s acc o u n t , is a r e g u l a t i v e i d e a , t h e a n t i c i p a t i o n o f a n i n f i n i t e r a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s . I n t h e r e c e n t essay, h o w e v e r , convincing objections

Habermas

to this earlier c o n c e p t i o n .

t i o n s is d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t s o m e c o n c e p t u a l

acknowledges

O n e set o f o b j e c -

difficulties w i t h the very

n o t i o n o f a n ideal speech situation, i n particular, the paradox i n volved i n a i m i n g for "complete"

o r "conclusive

knowledge."

The

o b j e c t i o n has b e e n r a i s e d , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t i t w o u l d b e p a r a d o x i c a l

14

15

Introduction

Introduction

f o r h u m a n b e i n g s t o strive t o r e a l i z e a n i d e a l , t h e a t t a i n m e n t o f w h i c h w o u l d b e t h e e n d o f h u m a n h i s t o r y . A n o t h e r set o f

objections

draws a t t e n t i o n to the difficulties involved i n conceptualizing

the

connection

one

between

t r u t h a n d j u s t i f i e d acceptability. O n t h e

h a n d , i f t h e r e is a n u n b r i d g e a b l e g a p b e t w e e n d e f a c t o a n d i d e a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y , t h e i d e a o f a n i d e a l i z e d r a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s seems so f a r r e m o v e d f r o m a c t u a l h u m a n p r a c t i c e s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n as t o u n d e r m i n e the regulative role ascribed to i t . O n the o t h e r h a n d , such a g a p seems t o b e necessary i n o r d e r t o p r e s e r v e t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t t r u t h has a m o m e n t o f

context-transcendence.

I n t h e face o f these a n d o t h e r d i f f i c u l t i e s , H a b e r m a s n o

satisfied o n l y i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n , t h e i r satisfaction o r nonsatisfaction is n o t i t s e l f a n e p i s t e m i c f a c t . W h e r e a s , as w e have seen, i d e a l i z e d r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y constitutes t h e v a l i d i t y o f m o r a l n o r m s , i t m e r e l y indicates t h e t r u t h o f p r o p o s i t i o n s . N o n e t h e l e s s , i t is c l e a r f r o m t h e f o r e g o i n g t h a t , o n H a b e r m a s ' s a c c o u n t , t h e concept o f t r u t h m u s t b e u n p a c k e d p r a g m a t i c a l l y ; w e have n o access t o t r u t h e x c e p t b y w a y o f a concept o f validity explicated i n terms o f h o w we talk about t r u t h , t h a t is, i n t e r m s o f a n i d e a l i z e d p r a c t i c e o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n . A f u r t h e r c o n c e r n o f Habermas's p r o g r a m o f f o r m a l pragmatics is t o a r g u e t h a t t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s is

longer

t h e basic m o d e o f l a n g u a g e use o n w h i c h o t h e r m o d e s , f o r e x a m p l e ,

c o n c e i v e s t r u t h as i d e a l i z e d r a t i o n a l c o n s e n s u s . H e n o w focuses o n

strategic o r

t h e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s g u i d i n g t h e process o f r a t i o n a l a r g u m e n -

o t h e r modes, t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n that everyday communicative

t a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n o n t h e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s m a r k i n g its outcome.

t i o n has a n i n - b u i l t c o n n e c t i o n

T h e f o r m e r idealizations p e r t a i n to the c o n d u c t o f discourse r a t h e r

c l a i m s w o u l d b e s e r i o u s l y l i m i t e d . I n a r g u i n g f o r t h e d e r i v a t i v e status

than to the agreement

o f t h e s t r a t e g i c use o f l a n g u a g e , H a b e r m a s i n i t i a l l y d r e w o n A u s t i n ' s

to w h i c h participants i n discourse aspire.

fictional

ones, are parasitic. O t h e r w i s e , i n i g n o r i n g these with context-transcendent

ac-

validity

T h e y i n c l u d e t h e i d e a l i z i n g suppositions that p a r t i c i p a n t s are m o t i -

d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n i l l o c u t i o n s a n d p e r l o c u t i o n s (see c h a p t e r 2 ) . I n

vated only by the force o f the better a r g u m e n t , that all c o m p e t e n t

response to criticisms o f his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f this d i s t i n c t i o n , how-

parties are e n t i t l e d to p a r t i c i p a t e o n equal terms i n discussion, t h a t

ever, H a b e r m a s

n o r e l e v a n t a r g u m e n t is s u p p r e s s e d o r e x c l u d e d , a n d so o n . I t is

s t a n d i n g o f A u s t i n ' s c a t e g o r i e s (see

f r o m such idealizations, w h i c h g u i d e t h e process o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n ,

c o n t i n u i n g t o i n s i s t t h a t t h e s t r a t e g i c use o f l a n g u a g e is p a r a s i t i c o n

subsequendy m o d i f i e d

and

chapters

c l a r i f i e d his 3, 4, a n d 7)

underwhile

t h a t t h e i d e a o f t r u t h d r a w s its p o w e r as a r e g u l a t i v e i d e a . T h i s p o w e r

t h e use o f l a n g u a g e w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d r e a c h i n g

is e x p r e s s e d i n t h e i d e a t h a t a c l a i m , i f t r u e , c o u l d w i t h s t a n d a l l

s t a n d i n g . H i s a r g u m e n t f o r t h e p a r a s i t i c status o f t h e s y m b o l i c , t h e

a t t e m p t s t o refute i t u n d e r i d e a l discursive c o n d i t i o n s . T h e i d e a o f

figurative,

t r u t h has a " d e c e n t e r i n g " f u n c t i o n t h a t serves t o r e m i n d us t h a t w h a t

d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e f u l f i l l s i n d i s p e n s a b l e

is c u r r e n d y r e g a r d e d as r a t i o n a l l y a c c e p t a b l e m a y c o n c e i v a b l y

solving functions that require idealizing suppositions not

be

and the

fictional

under-

m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e use is t h a t t h e e v e r y problemdemanded

c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n i n t h e f u t u r e , as t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f o u r c u r r e n t

b y t h e w o r l d - c r e a t i n g a n d w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g use o f l a n g u a g e

understanding of argumentation become apparent.

t e r i s t i c f o r t h e a e s t h e t i c r e a l m . T h e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s of, f o r

I t is i m p o r t a n t h e r e t o b e w a r e o f c o n f u s i n g H a b e r m a s ' s

explica-

t i o n o f the idea o f t r u t h w i t h an explanation o f what makes

a

example,

charac-

consistency o f m e a n i n g or a shared o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d

m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g are s u s p e n d e d i n t h e

fictional

use o f l a n -

p r o p o s i t i o n t r u e . T h e thesis t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n , i f t r u e , c a n s t a n d u p

guage, a n d w i t h these, the i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g p o w e r

to attempts to refute i t u n d e r the d e m a n d i n g conditions o f r a t i o n a l

o f e v e r y d a y s p e e c h acts (see c h a p t e r s 9 a n d 1 0 ) .

a r g u m e n t a t i o n e x p l i c a t e s t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g o f t r u t h . I t is n o t , however, a n e x p l a n a t i o n o f w h a t makes t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t r u e . As to t h e l a t t e r , H a b e r m a s ' s p o s i t i o n is t h e s t a n d a r d o n e t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n is t r u e i f a n d o n l y i f its t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a r e satisfied. A l t h o u g h w e c a n establish w h e t h e r t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f a g i v e n p r o p o s i t i o n a r e

Finally, Habermas's pragmatic t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g attempts to d o justice to t h e relations between utterances a n d t h e situations a n d c o n t e x t s i n w h i c h t h e y are e m b e d d e d . F o r t o u n d e r s t a n d a n u t t e r a n c e is always t o u n d e r s t a n d i t as a n u t t e r a n c e i n a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n , w h i c h i n t u r n may be p a r t o f m u l t i p l e , e x t e n d e d contexts.

Here,

17 16

Introduction

Introduction

H a b e r m a s draws a t t e n t i o n to various k i n d s o f b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l edge: f o r instance, k n o w l e d g e o f t h e speaker's p e r s o n a l h i s t o r y o r f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h t h e ( c u l t u r a l l y specific) t o p i c is n o r m a l l y discussed.

contexts i n w h i c h a given

These kinds o f knowledge,

although

u s u a l l y o n l y i m p l i c i t i n acts o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , are r e l a t i v e l y close t o the f o r e g r o u n d a n d can be r e n d e r e d explicit w i t h o u t difficulty. T h u s they can be contrasted w i t h the deep-seated, prereflective, taken-forg r a n t e d b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d t h a t , as a h o r i z o n o f shared, u n p r o b l e m a t i c convictions, c a n n o t be s u m m o n e d

to

con-

sciousness a t w i l l o r i n its e n t i r e t y . T h i s b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e

of

the lifeworld forms the indispensable context for the communicative use o f l a n g u a g e ; i n d e e d w i t h o u t i t , m e a n i n g o f a n y k i n d w o u l d b e i m p o s s i b l e . I t also f u n c t i o n s t o a b s o r b t h e r i s k o f social d i s i n t e g r a tion

t h a t arises w h e n a s o c i a l o r d e r is r e p r o d u c e d p r i m a r i l y t h r o u g h

m e c h a n i s m s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . I t is t h u s a n e c e s s a r y c o m p l e m e n t to Habermas's theories o f m e a n i n g a n d communicative action (see, i n p a r t i c u l a r , c h a p t e r s 2, 4, a n d 8 ) . T h e essays c o l l e c t e d i n t h i s a n t h o l o g y w e r e s e l e c t e d w i t h t h e a i m o f p r o v i d i n g g e n e r a l access t o H a b e r m a s ' s t r e a t m e n t o f f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s , f r o m h i s e a r l i e s t p r o g r a m m a t i c essay ( c h a p t e r 1) t o h i s m o s t r e c e n t a t t e m p t s t o resolve s o m e p e r c e i v e d

p r o b l e m s w i t h h i s ac-

counts o f m e a n i n g a n d t r u t h (chapters 7 a n d 8). Whereas, i n the process o f translating, revising e x i s t i n g translations, a n d retranslati n g , e v e r y e f f o r t has b e e n m a d e tency, n o

t o ensure t e r m i n o l o g i c a l consis-

a t t e m p t has b e e n m a d e

to impose

consistency

on

the

a r g u m e n t s as t h e y a r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e v a r i o u s essays. W e h a v e s e e n , f o r instance, that Habermas's earliest proposal for a pragmatic theo r y o f m e a n i n g differs i n s o m e respects f r o m his subsequent als, a n d

that he

h i m s e l f has

modified

his d i s t i n c t i o n

proposbetween

i l l o c u t i o n s a n d p e r l o c u t i o n s as i n i t i a l l y d r a w n . I n l a t e r w r i t i n g s

(see

c h a p t e r 7) h e i n t r o d u c e s a d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h i n t h e c a t e g o r y o f Verstdndigung b e t w e e n a w e a k a n d s t r o n g o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d c o n s e n s u s , a n d (see c h a p t e r 8 ) h e takes o n b o a r d o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h h i n t e d at i n c h a p t e r 3 o f t h e p r e s e n t v o l u m e . W i t h

the

e x c e p t i o n o f t h e last t w o p i e c e s , w h i c h a r e n o t d i r e c t l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n o f m e a n i n g , t h e a n t h o l o g y p r e s e n t s t h e essays i n

r o u g h c h r o n o l o g y i n o r d e r t o show d e v e l o p m e n t s a n d revisions; t h e r e a d e r is e n c o u r a g e d t o l o o k o u t f o r t h e m . I n c h a p t e r 1 w e a r e i n t r o d u c e d t o f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s as a r e s e a r c h program

aimed

speech. T h e

a t r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y basis

procedure

t h r o u g h reference

of

r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n is

of

elucidated

b o t h to empirical-analytic approaches a n d

to

K a n t i a n t r a n s c e n d e n t a l analysis. T h i s is f o l l o w e d b y a s k e t c h o f a t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts, w h i c h d i v e r g e s f r o m A u s t i n ' s a n d Searle's t h e o r i e s i n several i m p o r t a n t respects, a n d i n w h i c h s p e e c h acts a r e characterized i n terms o f claims to validity. C h a p t e r s 2, 3, 4, a n d 6, t h o u g h s i t u a t i n g f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s i n r e l a t i o n t o H a b e r m a s ' s t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , focus o n t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g . T h e c o o r d i n a t i n g p o w e r o f s p e e c h acts is e x plained t h r o u g h an account of understanding utterance meaning i n terms o f k n o w i n g acceptability conditions. T h i s pragmatic theory o f m e a n i n g is p r e s e n t e d as a n a t t e m p t t o o v e r c o m e t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f semantic theories t h r o u g h d r a w i n g o n K a r l Buhler's schema o f lang u a g e f u n c t i o n s a n d o n speech-act t h e o r y . I n a d d i t i o n , a t y p o l o g y o f s p e e c h acts b a s e d o n t h e i r c o n n e c t i o n w i t h o n e o f t h r e e u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s is set u p i n c h a p t e r 2, f o r m i n g t h e b a c k g r o u n d f o r H a b e r m a s ' s discussion i n subsequent chapters. T h e c o n c e p t o f lifew o r l d as a k i n d o f d e e p - s e a t e d , i m p l i c i t , b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e is also i n t r o d u c e d i n c h a p t e r 2 a n d d e v e l o p e d , i n p a r t i c u l a r , i n c h a p t e r 4. H a b e r m a s stresses t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f t h i s c o n c e p t , o n t h e h a n d , as a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g u t t e r a n c e

one

meaning

a n d , o n t h e o t h e r , as a r i s k - a b s o r b i n g c o u n t e r p o i s e t o t h e p o t e n t i a l l y d i s i n t e g r a t i v e effects o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g

under-

standing. Further, Austin's distinction between illocutions a n d perl o c u t i o n s is a t h r e a d r u n n i n g t h r o u g h these c h a p t e r s , a n d is u s e d b y H a b e r m a s t o s u p p o r t h i s thesis t h a t t h e s t r a t e g i c m o d e o f l a n g u a g e use is p a r a s i t i c o n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e discussion

use. T h i s i n v o l v e s h i m i n

a b o u t t h e status o f s i m p l e i m p e r a t i v e s ( f o r

example,

t h r e a t s ) , w h i c h as a t y p e o f u t t e r a n c e n o t a p p a r e n t l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h validity claims, seem to u n d e r m i n e his c l a i m t h a t strategic utterances h a v e a d e r i v a t i v e status. C h a p t e r 5 is a c r i t i c a l d i s c u s s i o n o f Searle's t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g as d e v e l o p e d f r o m t h e l a t e 1970s o n w a r d s . H a b e r m a s exposes s o m e

18

19

Introduction

Introduction

problems attached

t o Searle's view, w h i c h h e r e a d s as a

modified

Note

i n t e n t i o n a l i s t o n e , a r g u i n g t h a t h i s o w n p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y is b e t t e r able to a c c o u n t for the m e a n i n g

of, i n p a r t i c u l a r , i m p e r a t i v e s

and

promises. Chapter

7

Habermas's

responds concept

to of

Herbert

Schnadelbach's

communicative

criticisms

rationality.

of

Accepting

S c h n a d e l b a c h ' s c r i t i c i s m t h a t h e has h i t h e r t o a c c o r d e d i t a p r i v i leged position, Habermas now

identifies three core structures

r a t i o n a l i t y ; t h i s leads h i m t o m a k e s o m e n e w d i s t i n c t i o n s d i f f e r e n t m o d a l i t i e s o f l a n g u a g e use. O n e n o t e w o r t h y

modification

h e r e is h i s i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a c t i o n toward reaching

understanding

oriented

i n a w e a k e r sense a n d a c t i o n

e n t e d t o w a r d a g r e e m e n t i n t h e s t r i c t sense a n d ,

of

between

ori-

correspondingly,

between weak and strong communicative action. Some implications o f t h e s e d i s t i n c t i o n s f o r t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g a r e also discussed. Chapter 8 examines Richard Rorty's neopragmatism, interpreted b y H a b e r m a s as a n a t t e m p t t o c a r r y t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n t h r o u g h t o its c o n c l u s i o n , a n d c r i t i c i z e s i t f o r its a s s i m i l a t i o n o f t r u t h c l a i m s t o j u s t i f i e d assertibility. C h a p t e r 9 focuses o n t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e

fictional

or poetic

use o f l a n g u a g e a n d l a n g u a g e as i t is u s e d i n e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a tive a c t i o n ; i t criticizes D e r r i d e a n s

for faulty accounts o f everyday

a n d poetic language, for a consequent problematic leveling o f the distinction between literature and communicative action, and for a failure to appreciate the distinctive m e d i a t i n g roles o f p h i l o s o p h y and literary criticism. I n c h a p t e r 10, H a b e r m a s r e s p o n d s t o several c r i t i c i s m s o f

his

t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. Against Rorty, he defends his view o f p h i l o s o p h y as g u a r d i a n o f r e a s o n , w h i l e a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h a t t h i s r o l e m u s t b e d e f i n e d i n a n e w way. H e t h e n c l a r i f i e s h i s p o s i t i o n w i t h respect to m o d e r n art a n d the validity claims c o n n e c t e d w i t h i t , reaffirms his position t h a t interpretive u n d e r s t a n d i n g

inescapably

i n v o l v e s e v a l u a t i o n , c l a r i f i e s h i s i d e a o f t h e u n i t y o f r e a s o n as a n interplay o f validity dimensions, a n d concludes w i t h a discussion o f t h e o b j e c t i o n t h a t his t h e o r y concentrates o n justice at t h e expense o f happiness.

1. Verständigung ( n . ) : "reaching understanding," "mutual understanding," or "communication. T h e corresponding verb is sich verständigen. As Habermas acknowledges, this term is ambiguous even in G e r m a n . Although it embraces linguistic comprehension (Verstehen), it goes beyond this to refer to the process of reaching understanding, in the sense of reaching an agreement with another person or persons. However, despite having previously used the two terms interchangeably, Habermas now distinguishes between Verständigung a n d Einverständnis, agreement or consensus in the strict sense (see chapter 7). Finally, Verständigung can also be used as a synonym for "communication"; thus, for example, communicative rationality is occasionally rendered by Habermas as Verständigungsrationaätät.

1 What Is Universal Pragmatics? (1976)

I T h e task o f u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s is t o i d e n t i f y a n d r e c o n s t r u c t u n i v e r s a l c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung).

1

I n o t h e r c o n t e x t s , o n e also speaks o f " g e n e r a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s

of

c o m m u n i c a t i o n , " b u t I p r e f e r to speak o f g e n e r a l presuppositions

of

communicative

a c t i o n because I t a k e t h e t y p e o f a c t i o n a i m e d a t

r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o be f u n d a m e n t a l . T h u s I start f r o m t h e assumption (without u n d e r t a k i n g to demonstrate it here) that other f o r m s o f s o c i a l a c t i o n — f o r e x a m p l e , c o n f l i c t , c o m p e t i t i o n , strategic a c t i o n i n g e n e r a l — a r e derivatives o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung). F u r t h e r m o r e , s i n c e l a n g u a g e is t h e specific m e d i u m

o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g at t h e

sociocultural

stage o f e v o l u t i o n , I w a n t t o g o a step f u r t h e r a n d s i n g l e o u t e x p l i c i t speech actions f r o m o t h e r forms o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. I shall ignore n o n v e r b a l actions a n d bodily expressions.

2

T h e V a l i d i t y Basis o f S p e e c h Karl-Otto A p e l proposes the f o l l o w i n g f o r m u l a t i o n i n regard to the g e n e r a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f c o n s e n s u a l s p e e c h acts: t o i d e n t i f y s u c h presuppositions

w e m u s t , h e t h i n k s , leave t h e p e r s p e c t i v e

of

the

o b s e r v e r o f b e h a v i o r a l facts a n d c a l l t o m i n d " w h a t w e m u s t n e c e s sarily always a l r e a d y p r e s u p p o s e i n r e g a r d t o o u r s e l v e s a n d o t h e r s as

22

23

Chapter 1

W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

n o r m a t i v e conditions o f the possibility o f reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g ;

a n c e t h a t is r i g h t (richtig) w i t h r e s p e c t t o p r e v a i l i n g n o r m s a n d v a l u e s

a n d i n t h i s sense, w h a t w e m u s t necessarily

have

so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n a c c e p t t h e u t t e r a n c e , a n d b o t h s p e a k e r a n d

a c c e p t e d . " A p e l h e r e uses t h e a p r i o r i s t i c p e r f e c t (immer schon: always

h e a r e r c a n , i n t h e u t t e r a n c e , t h e r e b y agree with one another w i t h

always a l r e a d y

3

a l r e a d y ) a n d a d d s t h e m o d e o f necessity i n o r d e r t o e x p r e s s t h e

respect to a r e c o g n i z e d n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d . Moreover,

t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s t r a i n t t o w h i c h w e , as speakers, are s u b j e c t

n i c a t i v e a c t i o n c a n c o n t i n u e u n d i s t u r b e d o n l y as l o n g as a l l p a r t i c i -

as

commu-

s o o n as w e p e r f o r m o r u n d e r s t a n d o r r e s p o n d t o a s p e e c h act. I n o r

p a n t s s u p p o s e t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h e y r e c i p r o c a l l y raise

a f t e r t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f t h i s act, w e c a n b e c o m e a w a r e t h a t w e h a v e

raised justifiably.

are

i n v o l u n t a r i l y m a d e c e r t a i n a s s s u m p t i o n s , w h i c h A p e l calls " n o r m a -

T h e a i m o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung) is t o b r i n g

tive c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " T h e

a b o u t a n a g r e e m e n t (Einverständnis) t h a t t e r m i n a t e s i n t h e i n t e r s u b -

a d j e c t i v e " n o r m a t i v e " m a y g i v e rise t o m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g . O n e

jective mutuality of reciprocal comprehension,

can

shared

knowledge,

say, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e g e n e r a l a n d u n a v o i d a b l e — i n t h i s sense t r a n -

m u t u a l t r u s t , a n d a c c o r d w i t h o n e a n o t h e r . A g r e e m e n t is b a s e d o n

scendental—conditions

r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e four corresponding v a l i d i t y c l a i m s :

o f possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g have

a

normative content w h e n one thinks n o t only o f the validity d i m e n -

comprehensi-

b i l i t y , t r u t h , t r u t h f u l n e s s , a n d Tightness. W e c a n see t h a t t h e word

sion o f n o r m s o f action o r evaluation, o r even o f the validity d i m e n -

"Verständigung" is a m b i g u o u s . I n its n a r r o w e s t m e a n i n g i t i n d i c a t e s

s i o n o f r u l e s i n g e n e r a l , b u t also o f t h e v a l i d i t y basis o f s p e e c h across

t h a t t w o s u b j e c t s u n d e r s t a n d a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e same way;

its e n t i r e s p e c t r u m . As a p r e l i m i n a r y , I w a n t t o i n d i c a t e b r i e f l y w h a t

i n its b r o a d e s t m e a n i n g i t i n d i c a t e s t h a t a n a c c o r d exists b e t w e e n t w o

I m e a n b y t h e " v a l i d i t y basis o f s p e e c h . "

subjects concerning t h e Tightness o f a n utterance i n relation t o a communicatively

mutually recognized normative background. I n a d d i t i o n , the partici-

m u s t , i n p e r f o r m i n g a n y s p e e c h act, raise u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s

pants i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n can reach u n d e r s t a n d i n g about s o m e t h i n g

a n d s u p p o s e t h a t t h e y c a n b e v i n d i c a t e d (einlösen). I n s o f a r as she

i n the w o r l d , a n d they can make their i n t e n t i o n s understandable to

wants to p a r t i c i p a t e i n a process o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,

one

I s h a l l d e v e l o p t h e thesis t h a t a n y o n e a c t i n g

she

c a n n o t avoid raising the f o l l o w i n g — a n d i n d e e d precisely t h e followi n g — v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . She c l a i m s t o b e

another.

I f f u l l a g r e e m e n t , e m b r a c i n g a l l f o u r o f these c o m p o n e n t s , were a n o r m a l state o f l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n , i t w o u l d n o t b e necessary to analyze

a. u t t e r i n g s o m e t h i n g intelligibly,

dynamic

b . g i v i n g ( t h e h e a r e r ) something t o u n d e r s t a n d ,

t h e process o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g f r o m

perspective

o f bringing about a n a g r e e m e n t .

states a r e i n t h e g r a y areas b e t w e e n ,

on

the one

the

T h e typical

h a n d , lack

of

c. m a k i n g herself t h e r e b y u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , a n d

understanding and misunderstanding, intentional and involuntary

d . c o m i n g t o a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h another person.

untruthfulness, concealed and open discord,

T h e s p e a k e r m u s t c h o o s e a n i n t e l l i g i b l e (verständlich) e x p r e s s i o n so t h a t s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r c a n comprehend one another. T h e s p e a k e r m u s t have t h e i n t e n t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i n g a t r u e (wahr) p r o p o s i t i o n (or a prepositional content, the existential presuppositions o f w h i c h a r e satisfied) so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n share the knowledge o f t h e speaker. T h e s p e a k e r m u s t w a n t t o e x p r e s s h e r i n t e n t i o n s truthfully haftig) so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n

find

(wahr-

the utterance o f the speaker

credible (can trust h e r ) . Finally, the speaker m u s t choose a n u t t e r -

and, on

the

other

h a n d , p r e e x i s t i n g o r a c h i e v e d c o n s e n s u s . R e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is t h e process o f b r i n g i n g a b o u t a n a g r e e m e n t

o n the presupposed

basis o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h a t are m u t u a l l y r e c o g n i z e d . I n e v e r y d a y l i f e , we start f r o m a b a c k g r o u n d consensus p e r t a i n i n g t o those i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d a m o n g p a r t i c i p a n t s . A s s o o n as t h i s c o n sensus is s h a k e n , a n d as s o o n as t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s a r e satisfied ( o r c o u l d b e v i n d i c a t e d ) is s u s p e n d e d i n t h e case o f a t least o n e o f t h e f o u r c l a i m s , c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n c a n n o t continued.

be

25

24


Chapter 1

T h e task o f m u t u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e n , is t o a c h i e v e a n e w d e f i n i -

i n t u i t i o n s a n d experiences or t h r o u g h a r g u m e n t s a n d action conse-

t i o n o f t h e s i t u a t i o n t h a t a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s can share. I f this a t t e m p t

quences, justifies the claim's worthiness to be r e c o g n i z e d a n d b r i n g s

f a i l s , o n e is b a s i c a l l y c o n f r o n t e d w i t h t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s o f s w i t c h i n g t o

a b o u t a s u p r a s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n o f its v a l i d i t y . I n accepting a v a l i d -

strategic a c t i o n , b r e a k i n g o f f c o m m u n i c a t i o n altogether, o r

i t y c l a i m r a i s e d b y t h e speaker, t h e h e a r e r r e c o g n i z e s t h e v a l i d i t y o f

recom-

m e n c i n g a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g at a d i f f e r -

the

ent

grammatical, a statement true, an i n t e n t i o n a l expression t r u t h f u l , or

level,

the

level

of

argumentative

speech

(for

purposes

of

symbolic

s t r u c t u r e s ; t h a t is, h e r e c o g n i z e s t h a t a s e n t e n c e is

discursively e x a m i n i n g the p r o b l e m a t i c validity claims, w h i c h are

an

u t t e r a n c e correct. T h e validity o f these symbolic

s t r u c t u r e s is

n o w r e g a r d e d as h y p o t h e t i c a l ) . I n w h a t f o l l o w s , I s h a l l t a k e i n t o

justified b y v i r t u e o f t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y satisfy c e r t a i n a d e q u a c y c o n d i -

c o n s i d e r a t i o n o n l y c o n s e n s u a l s p e e c h acts, l e a v i n g aside b o t h d i s -

t i o n s ; b u t t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e v a l i d i t y consists i n t h e i r worthiness t o

course a n d strategic a c t i o n .

b e r e c o g n i z e d t h a t is, i n t h e g u a r a n t e e t h a t i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i -

I n communicative action, participants presuppose that they k n o w w h a t m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n o f reciprocally raised validity claims means.

tion

can be b r o u g h t about u n d e r suitable c o n d i t i o n s .

4

I have p r o p o s e d t h e n a m e " u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s " f o r t h e r e s e a r c h 5

I f i n a d d i t i o n they can rely o n a shared d e f i n i t i o n o f the situation

program

a n d t h e r e u p o n act consensually, t h e b a c k g r o u n d consensus i n c l u d e s

speech.

the f o l l o w i n g :

p r o g r a m i n a p r e l i m i n a r y way. T h u s b e f o r e p a s s i n g o n ( i n p a r t I I )

a. S p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r k n o w i m p l i c i t l y t h a t e a c h o f t h e m has t o r a i s e t h e a f o r e m e n t i o n e d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i f t h e r e is t o b e

communication

a t a l l ( i n t h e sense o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g

under-

6

aimed

a t r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y basis

I w o u l d n o w like to d e l i m i t t h e t h e m e o f this

of

research

t o t h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts, I s h a l l p r e f i x a f e w g u i d i n g r e m a r k s dealing w i t h (i) an initial d e l i m i t a t i o n o f the object d o m a i n o f the proposed p r o g r a m o f universal pragmatics; (ii) an elucidation o f the procedure

o f r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , as o p p o s e d t o a n e m p i r i c a l -

standing) .

a n a l y t i c p r o c e d u r e i n t h e n a r r o w e r sense; ( i i i ) a f e w

b . B o t h r e c i p r o c a l l y s u p p o s e t h a t t h e y a c t u a l l y d o satisfy t h e s e p r e -

d i f f i c u l t i e s r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t l i n g u i s t i c s c l a i m s t h e status o f

suppositions

o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , t h a t is, t h a t t h e y j u s t i f i a b l y raise

methodological

a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e ; a n d finally ( i v ) t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e p r o p o s e d u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s assumes t h e status o f a t r a n s c e n d e n -

t h e i r validity claims. c. T h i s m e a n s t h a t t h e r e is a c o m m o n c o n v i c t i o n t h a t a n y v a l i d i t y

tal t h e o r y o f r e f l e c t i o n o r t h a t o f a n e m p i r i c a l l y substantive r e c o n -

c l a i m s r a i s e d e i t h e r are a l r e a d y v i n d i c a t e d , as i n t h e case o f

structive science. I shall restrict myself t o g u i d i n g r e m a r k s because,

the

c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y o f t h e s e n t e n c e s u t t e r e d , or, as i n t h e case o f t r u t h , t r u t h f u l n e s s , a n d Tightness, c o u l d b e v i n d i c a t e d b e c a u s e t h e s e n t e n c e s , p r o p o s i t i o n s , e x p r e s s e d i n t e n t i o n s , a n d u t t e r a n c e s satisfy

w h i l e these questions are f u n d a m e n t a l a n d deserve t o be

examined

independently, they f o r m only the c o n t e x t o f the topic I shall treat a n d must thus remain i n the background.

t h e corresponding a d e q u a c y c o n d i t i o n s . T h u s I d i s t i n g u i s h ( i ) t h e conditions f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f a g r a m m a t i cal sentence, t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n , t r u t h f u l i n t e n t i o n a l expression,

or

n o r m a t i v e l y c o r r e c t u t t e r a n c e a p p r o p r i a t e t o its c o n t e x t f r o m ( i i ) the

claims w i t h w h i c h s p e a k e r s d e m a n d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n

for the well-formedness o f a sentence, t r u t h o f a p r o p o s i t i o n , t r u t h f u l n e s s o f a n i n t e n t i o n a l e x p r e s s i o n , a n d Tightness o f a s p e e c h act, as w e l l as f r o m ( i i i ) t h e vindication o f j u s t i f i a b l y r a i s e d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . V i n d i c a t i o n means that the p r o p o n e n t , whether t h r o u g h appeal to

Preliminary Delimitation of the Object D o m a i n I n several o f h i s w o r k s , A p e l has p o i n t e d t o t h e a b s t r a c t i v e f a l l a c y that u n d e r l i e s the a p p r o a c h to the logic o f science favored by c o n t e m p o r a r y a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y . T h e l o g i c a l analysis o f l a n g u a g e t h a t 7

o r i g i n a t e d w i t h C a r n a p focuses p r i m a r i l y o n s y n t a c t i c a n d s e m a n t i c properties o f linguistic formations. L i k e structuralist linguistics, i t d e l i m i t s its o b j e c t d o m a i n b y first a b s t r a c t i n g f r o m t h e p r a g m a t i c

26

27

Chapter 1


properties o f language, a n d subsequentiy i n t r o d u c i n g the pragmatic

o f s i g n s ) . I f t h e s p e a k i n g p r o c e s s is c o n c e p t u a l i z e d i n t h i s way, t h e

d i m e n s i o n i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i v e c o n n e c t i o n

f u n d a m e n t a l question o f universal pragmatics concerning the gen-

between

t h e g e n e r a t i v e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s o f subjects c a p a b l e o f s p e a k i n g a n d

e r a l c o n d i t i o n s o f possible

acting, o n the one h a n d , a n d the general structures o f speech, o n

c a n n o t b e p o s e d i n a n a p p r o p r i a t e way. F o r e x a m p l e , t h e i n t e r s u b -

t h e o t h e r , c a n n o t c o m e i n t o view. I t is c e r t a i n l y l e g i t i m a t e t o d r a w

j e c t i v i t y o f m e a n i n g s t h a t a r e i d e n t i c a l f o r a t least t w o speakers d o e s

a n a b s t r a c t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e as s t r u c t u r e a n d speak-

n o t e v e n b e c o m e a p r o b l e m ( i ) i f t h e i d e n t i t y o f m e a n i n g s is reduced

m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung)

i n g as p r o c e s s . A l a n g u a g e w i l l t h e n b e u n d e r s t o o d as a system o f

t o e x t e n s i o n a l l y e q u i v a l e n t classes o f b e h a v i o r a l p r o p e r t i e s , as is

rules f o r g e n e r a t i n g expressions, such t h a t a l l w e l l - f o r m e d expres-

d o n e i n l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r i s m , o r ( i i ) i f i t is p r e e s t a b l i s h e d a t t h e 9

sions (e.g., sentences) m a y c o u n t as e l e m e n t s o f t h i s l a n g u a g e .

On

a n a l y t i c l e v e l t h a t t h e r e exists a c o m m o n

t h e o t h e r h a n d , subjects c a p a b l e o f s p e a k i n g c a n e m p l o y s u c h

ex-

b e t w e e n s e n d e r a n d receiver, as is d o n e i n i n f o r m a t i o n t h e o r y .

pressions

as p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a p r o c e s s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n ; f o r i n -

c o d e a n d s t o r e o f signs

I n a d d i t i o n t o e m p i r i c i s t a p p r o a c h e s t h a t issue, i n o n e w a y o r

s t a n c e , t h e y c a n u t t e r s e n t e n c e s as w e l l as u n d e r s t a n d t h e m a n d

another, f r o m the semiotics

r e s p o n d t o t h e m . T h i s a b s t r a c t i o n o f language f r o m t h e use o f l a n -

p r o a c h e s t o t h e l o g i c a l analysis o f g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s o f s p e e c h a n d

g u a g e i n speech (langue versus parole),

a c t i o n . T h e f o l l o w i n g analyses c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as c o n t r i b u t i o n s

w h i c h is m a d e i n b o t h t h e

o f M o r r i s , t h e r e are i n t e r e s t i n g ap-

l o g i c a l a n d t h e s t r u c t u r a l i s t analysis o f l a n g u a g e , is m e a n i n g f u l .

a l o n g t h e way t o a u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s . B a r - H i l l e l p o i n t e d o u t q u i t e

N o n e t h e l e s s , t h i s m e t h o d o l o g i c a l step is n o t s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n f o r t h e

e a r l y t h e necessity f o r a p r a g m a t i c e x t e n s i o n o f l o g i c a l s e m a n t i c s .

view that the pragmatic d i m e n s i o n o f language

A l s o o f n o t e a r e t h e p r o p o s a l s f o r a deontic logic ( H a r e , H . v o n W r i g h t ,

abstracts is b e y o n d

from which

one

f o r m a l ( o r l i n g u i s t i c ) analysis. A n a b s t r a c t i v e

f a l l a c y arises i n t h a t t h e successful, o r a t least p r o m i s i n g , r e c o n s t r u c -

N . Rescher)

and corresponding

1 1

10

a t t e m p t s at a f o r m a l i z a t i o n o f

s p e e c h acts s u c h as assertions a n d q u e s t i o n s ( A p o s t e l ) ;

1 2

approaches

t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c r u l e systems is seen as j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r r e s t r i c t i n g

to a logic o f nondeductive a r g u m e n t a t i o n ( T o u l m i n , Botha) b e l o n g

f o r m a l analysis t o t h i s o b j e c t d o m a i n . T h e s e p a r a t i o n o f t h e t w o

h e r e as w e l l .

a n a l y t i c levels, language a n d speech, s h o u l d n o t b e m a d e i n s u c h a way

suppositions (Kiefer, Petöfi), conversational postulates (Grice, L a k -

t h a t t h e p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n o f l a n g u a g e is l e f t t o e x c l u s i v e l y e m -

off),

p i r i c a l a n a l y s i s — t h a t is, t o e m p i r i c a l sciences s u c h as p s y c h o l i n g u i s -

a n d texts ( F i l l m o r e , P o s n e r )

tics a n d s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c s .

m a t i c d i m e n s i o n o f l a n g u a g e f r o m a r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i s t p o i n t o f view.

I w o u l d l i k e t o d e f e n d t h e thesis t h a t n o t o n l y l a n g u a g e b u t s p e e c h t o o

— t h a t is, t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f s e n t e n c e s i n u t t e r a n c e s — i s accessi-

b l e t o f o r m a l analysis. L i k e t h e e l e m e n t a r y u n i t s o f l a n g u a g e

(sen-

tences), the elementary units o f speech (utterances) can be analyzed f r o m t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l stance o f a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e s c i e n c e . Approaches

to a g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n have

been

d e v e l o p e d f r o m the semiotics o f Charles M o r r i s . I n t h e i r f r a m e w o r k 8

o f f u n d a m e n t a l concepts they integrate the m o d e l o f linguistic behaviorism

(the symbolically m e d i a t e d behavioral reaction o f

stimulated individual organism)

with

transmission (encoding a n d decoding

the model

the

of information

signals b e t w e e n s e n d e r a n d

r e c e i v e r f o r a g i v e n c h a n n e l a n d a n a t least p a r t i a l l y c o m m o n

store

1 3

F r o m t h e side o f l i n g u i s t i c s , t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f p r e 14

1 5

s p e e c h acts (Ross, M c C a w l e y , W u n d e r l i c h ) , 1 7

1 6

and

dialogues

lead to a consideration of the prag-

T h e d i f f i c u l t i e s i n semantic t h e o r y ( L y o n s , Katz) p o i n t i n the same direction.

1 8

F r o m t h e side o f formal semantics, i n p a r t i c u l a r t h e d i s -

cussion—going

back

to Frege

and

Russell—of

the structure of

propositions, o f referential terms a n d predicates (Strawson)

1 9

is sig-

n i f i c a n t f o r a u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s . T h e s a m e h o l d s f o r analytic action theory ( D a n t o , H a m p s h i r e , S c h w a y d e r )

2 0

a n d f o r t h e discussion t h a t

has a r i s e n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e l o g i c o f t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f i n t e n tional ing

a c t i o n ( W i n c h , Taylor, v o n W r i g h t ) . introduced

(Alston),

2 2

b y W i t t g e n s t e i n has

2 1

T h e use t h e o r y o f m e a n -

u n i v e r s a l - p r a g m a t i c aspects

as d o e s t h e a t t e m p t b y G r i c e t o t r a c e t h e m e a n i n g

s e n t e n c e s b a c k t o t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e speakers fer).

2 3

of

( B e n n e t t , Schif-

As the most p r o m i s i n g p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e for a universal

28

29

Chapter 1


pragmatics, I shall draw p r i m a r i l y o n

t h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts

i n i t i a t e d b y A u s t i n (Searle, W u n d e r l i c h ) ,

These approaches developed f r o m logic, linguistics, a n d t h e ana-

which

I understand

formal

analysis

can

best be

characterized

have t h e c o m m o n g o a l o f c l a r i f y i n g

t h r o u g h the m e t h o d o l o g i c a l attitude we a d o p t i n the rational recon-

use f r o m t h e v i e w p o i n t o f f o r m a l analysis.

s t r u c t i o n o f concepts, criteria, rules, a n d schemata. T h u s we speak

lytic p h i l o s o p h y o f language processes o f l a n g u a g e

a m n o t u s i n g f o r m a l analysis i n a sense t h a t r e f e r s , say, t o t h e s t a n d a r d p r e d i c a t e l o g i c o r t o a n y s p e c i f i c l o g i c . T h e t o l e r a n t sense i n

2 4

H o w e v e r , i f o n e evaluates t h e m w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n t h e y

of the explication o f meanings

m a k e t o a u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s , t h e i r weaknesses also b e c o m e a p p a r -

presuppositions

e n t . I n m a n y cases I see a d a n g e r t h a t t h e analysis o f c o n d i t i o n s

of

a. b e c a u s e these a p p r o a c h e s d o n o t g e n e r a l i z e r a d i c a l l y e n o u g h a n d d o n o t p u s h t h r o u g h the level o f f o r t u i t o u s contexts to general a n d is t h e case, f o r i n s t a n c e , w i t h m o s t

o f the linguistic investigations o f semantic a n d pragmatic

of

recon-

s t r u c t i v e p r o c e d u r e s a r e also i m p o r t a n t f o r e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c r e s e a r c h , f o r e x a m p l e , f o r e x p l i c a t i n g f r a m e w o r k s o f basic c o n c e p t s ,

p o s s i b l e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g is f o r e s h o r t e n e d , e i t h e r

unavoidable presuppositions—as

a n d c o n c e p t s , o f t h e analysis

a n d r u l e systems, a n d so f o r t h . O f c o u r s e ,

for f o r m a l i z i n g assumptions

initially f o r m u l a t e d i n ordinary lan-

guage, for clarifying deductive relations a m o n g particular hypotheses, f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g r e s u l t s o f m e a s u r e m e n t , a n d so o n . N o n e t h e l e s s , r e c o n s t r u c t i v e p r o c e d u r e s are n o t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f sciences t h a t d e -

presuppo-

velop n o m o l o g i c a l hypotheses a b o u t d o m a i n s o f observable objects

sitions; o r

a n d events; r a t h e r , these p r o c e d u r e s a r e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h o s e sci-

b . because they restrict themselves to t h e i n s t r u m e n t s d e v e l o p e d i n

e n c e s t h a t systematically reconstruct the intuitive knowledge of competent

logic a n d g r a m m a r , even w h e n these are i n a d e q u a t e f o r c a p t u r i n g

subjects.

p r a g m a t i c relations—as, f o r e x a m p l e , i n syntactic e x p l a n a t i o n s the performative character o f speech acts;

25

of

or

s t r u c t i v e sciences, I w o u l d l i k e t o b e g i n w i t h t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n

c. b e c a u s e t h e y m i s l e a d o n e i n t o a f o r m a l i z a t i o n o f basic c o n c e p t s t h a t have n o t b e e n satisfactorily analyzed—as

I n clarifying the distinction between empirical-analytic and recon-

c a n , i n m y view, b e

s e n s o r y e x p e r i e n c e o r observation a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e o r understanding

( Verstehen). O b s e r v a t i o n is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d p e r c e p t i b l e

s h o w n i n t h e case o f t h e l o g i c s o f n o r m s w h i c h t r a c e n o r m s o f a c t i o n

t h i n g s a n d events ( o r states); u n d e r s t a n d i n g is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t h e

back to commands; or finally

meaning of utterances.

d . b e c a u s e t h e y start rational actor

from

the model

o f the isolated,

a n d thereby fail—as do,

for instance,

purposiveGrice

and

L e w i s — t o r e c o n s t r u c t i n a n a p p r o p r i a t e way t h e s p e c i f i c m o m e n t 2 6

o f mutuality i n the understanding o f identical meanings or i n the r e c o g n i t i o n o f intersubjective validity claims. I t is m y i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts is l a r g e l y f r e e o f

2 7

I n e x p e r i e n c i n g , t h e o b s e r v e r is i n p r i n c i -

p l e a l o n e , e v e n i f t h e c a t e g o r i a l n e t i n w h i c h e x p e r i e n c e s are o r g a n i z e d as e x p e r i e n c e s l a y i n g c l a i m t o o b j e c t i v i t y is always a l r e a d y s h a r e d b y several ( o r e v e n a l l ) i n d i v i d u a l s . I n c o n t r a s t , t h e i n t e r p r e t e r w h o u n d e r s t a n d s m e a n i n g u n d e r g o e s h e r e x p e r i e n c e s f u n d a m e n t a l l y as a p a r t i c i p a n t i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n , o n t h e basis o f a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n established t h r o u g h symbols w i t h o t h e r individuals, even i f she is i n f a c t a l o n e w i t h a b o o k , a d o c u m e n t , o r a w o r k o f a r t . I s h a l l n o t h e r e analyze t h e c o m p l e x r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n o b s e r v a t i o n a n d

t h e s e a n d s i m i l a r weaknesses.

u n d e r s t a n d i n g any further; I w o u l d like to direct attention to j u s t Some Remarks o n the Procedure o f Rational Reconstruction

o n e aspect o f this: t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n level b e t w e e n p e r c e p t i b l e reality a n d the understandable m e a n i n g o f a symbolic f o r m a t i o n . Sensory

I have b e e n e m p l o y i n g t h e e x p r e s s i o n

" f o r m a l analysis" i n o p p o s i -

e x p e r i e n c e is r e l a t e d t o s e g m e n t s o f r e a l i t y w i t h o u t m e d i a t i o n , c o m -

t i o n t o e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c p r o c e d u r e s ( i n t h e n a r r o w e r sense) w i t h -

m u n i c a t i v e e x p e r i e n c e o n l y m e d i a t e l y , as i l l u s t r a t e d i n t h e d i a g r a m

o u t p r o v i d i n g a d e t a i l e d e x p l a n a t i o n . T h i s is, a t least, m i s l e a d i n g . I

below:

31

30


Chapter 1

Level 1

O b s e r v a b l e events A

Level 2

'-

Observation

cally Understanding p )

I - O b s e r v a t i o n sentence

( I n t e r

t

r e t e r

I Interpretation

i

Level 3

T h e two pairs o f concepts—"perceptible

(Observer)

prestructured

reality"

and

r e a l i t y " versus " s y m b o l i -

"observation"

versus

"under-

s t a n d i n g " — c a n b e c o r r e l a t e d w i t h a n o t h e r p a i r : " d e s c r i p t i o n " versus " e x p l i c a t i o n . " W i t h the aid o f a sentence that represents a n observation,

I c a n describe t h e o b s e r v e d a s p e c t o f r e a l i t y . W i t h t h e a i d o f a

sentence t h a t represents an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e m e a n i n g o f a symb o l i c f o r m a t i o n , I c a n explicate t h e m e a n i n g o f s u c h a n u t t e r a n c e .

T h i s d i a g r a m represents three d i f f e r e n t relationships:

N a t u r a l l y , o n l y w h e n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n is u n -

a. E p i s t e m i c r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n e x p e r i e n t i a l acts a n d t h e i r o b j e c t s . I n

clear does the e x p l i c a t i o n n e e d

t h i s sense, t h e act o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e l a t e s t o t h e s y m b o l i c

expres-

s i o n ( h e r e o f t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s e n t e n c e ) , i n a way s i m i l a r t o h o w t h e act o f o b s e r v a t i o n relates t o t h e o b j e c t s a n d events

observed.

b . Relations o f r e p r e s e n t i n g a n aspect o f reality i n a p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e . I n t h i s sense, t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n r e p r e s e n t s t h e s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t ( h e r e o f t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s e n t e n c e ) , i n a way s i m i l a r t o h o w t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s e n t e n c e r e p r e s e n t s c e r t a i n o b j e c t s a n d events. c. R e l a t i o n s o f e x p r e s s i n g i n t e n t i o n a l acts. I n t h i s sense, t h e u n d e r standing

t o b e set o f f as a n

independent

a n a l y t i c step. I n r e g a r d t o s e n t e n c e s t h a t w e use t o d e s c r i b e o b j e c t s a n d events, t h e r e c a n b e a l a c k o f c l a r i t y a t v a r i o u s levels. D e p e n d i n g o n the level, we d e m a n d explications o f d i f f e r e n t kinds. I f the p h e n o m e n o n d e s c r i b e d is i n n e e d o f e x p l a n a t i o n , w e d e m a n d a n e x p l i cation

that

makes

phenomenon tion

clear

how

reality

operates

and

how

the

i n question comes about. I f , by contrast, the descrip-

i t s e l f is i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e ,

we

demand

an explication

that

makes clear w h a t t h e observer m e a n t by his u t t e r a n c e a n d h o w t h e symbolic expression i n need o f elucidation comes about. I n the

first

( h e r e o f t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s e n t e n c e ) is e x p r e s s e d i n t h e

case, a s a t i s f a c t o r y e x p l i c a t i o n w i l l h a v e t h e f o r m o f a n e x p l a n a t i o n

p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , j u s t as t h e o b s e r v a t i o n

w e u n d e r t a k e w i t h t h e a i d o f a causal h y p o t h e s i s . I n t h e s e c o n d case,

is

we speak o f e x p l i c a t i o n o f m e a n i n g .

expressed

in

the

propositional

content

of

the

observation

( O f course, explications

of

m e a n i n g n e e d n o t be l i m i t e d t o descriptive sentences; any m e a n i n g -

sentence. A p a r t f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t a l l t h r e e types o f r e l a t i o n s i m p l y p o i n t t o f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m s , t h e r e is a n a d d i t i o n a l d i f f i c u l t y i n s p e c i f y i n g

fully s t r u c t u r e d f o r m a t i o n can be

subjected

to the operation

of

meaning explication.) D e s c r i p t i o n s a n d e x p l i c a t i o n s h a v e d i f f e r e n t r a n g e s ; t h e y c a n be-

t h e precise differences b e t w e e n the epistemic r e l a t i o n s o f t h e obbetween

g i n o n t h e surface a n d p u s h t h r o u g h to u n d e r l y i n g structures. We

the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l relations o f t h e observation sentence to reality,

are f a m i l i a r w i t h this fact f r o m t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f n a t u r a l p h e n o m -

server a n d t h e i n t e r p r e t e r to t h e i r respective objects a n d

o n the one h a n d , a n d t h a t o f the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n sentence to (sym-

e n a — t h e m o r e general t h e theories are w i t h w h i c h we e x p l a i n n a t u -

bolically p r e s t r u c t u r e d ) reality, o n

ral phenomena, the more penetrating the corresponding theoretical

the other. T h i s

specification

w o u l d require a comparison between observation and interpreta-

d e s c r i p t i o n s . T h e same is t r u e o f e x p l i c a t i o n s o f m e a n i n g . O f c o u r s e ,

tion, between description a n d explication. For the time being, the

i n t h e case o f m e a n i n g e x p l i c a t i o n s , t h e r a n g e o f e x p l i c a t i o n d o e s

d i a g r a m is i n t e n d e d m e r e l y t o i l l u s t r a t e t h e t w o levels o f r e a l i t y t o

n o t d e p e n d o n the level o f generality o f theoretical knowledge a b o u t

w h i c h sensory a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e experience

t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f a n e x t e r n a l r e a l i t y accessible t o o b s e r v a t i o n b u t

respectively relate.

T h e difference i n level between p e r c e p t i b l e a n d symbolically p r e -

on

structured

understanding—a

r e a l i t y is r e f l e c t e d

i n the gap

between

direct access

knowledge

of

the deep structures o f reality

of

symbolic

a r e a l i t y accessible

formations

produced

t h r o u g h o b s e r v a t i o n of r e a l i t y a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y m e d i a t e d access

c o r d i n g to rules. T h e explication o f natural p h e n o m e n a

t h r o u g h u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n u t t e r a n c e concerning reality.

in a different direction f r o m the explication o f the meaning expressions.

to ac-

pushes of

32

33

Chapter 1


F u r t h e r m o r e , I w a n t t o d i s t i n g u i s h t w o levels o f e x p l i c a t i o n

of

m e a n i n g . I f the m e a n i n g o f a w r i t t e n sentence, action, gesture, w o r k

f o r m a t i o n — p e n e t r a t i n g t h r o u g h its s u r f a c e , as i t w e r e — i n o r d e r t o d i s c o v e r t h e r u l e s a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h t h i s s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n was

o f a r t , t o o l , t h e o r y , c o m m o d i t y , t r a n s m i t t e d d o c u m e n t , a n d so o n is

p r o d u c e d ( i n o u r example, the rules according to w h i c h the lexicon

u n c l e a r , t h e e x p l i c a t i o n o f m e a n i n g is d i r e c t e d first t o t h e s e m a n t i c

o f a l a n g u a g e is c o n s t r u c t e d ) . T h e o b j e c t o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g is n o

c o n t e n t o f t h e s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n . I n t r y i n g t o u n d e r s t a n d its c o n -

l o n g e r t h e content o f a s y m b o l i c e x p r e s s i o n o r w h a t specific a u t h o r s

t e n t , w e t a k e u p t h e same p o s i t i o n as t h e " a u t h o r " a d o p t e d w h e n h e

m e a n t b y i t i n s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s b u t r a t h e r t h e i n t u i t i v e rule conscious-

w r o t e the sentence, p e r f o r m e d the gesture, used the t o o l , a p p l i e d

ness t h a t a c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r has o f h i s o w n

t h e t h e o r y , a n d so f o r t h . O f t e n , t o o , w e m u s t g o b e y o n d w h a t was m e a n t a n d i n t e n d e d by the a u t h o r a n d take i n t o consideration

F o l l o w i n g a suggestion m a d e by R y l e ,

2 9

language.

we can d i s t i n g u i s h between

a

know-how, t h e a b i l i t y o f a c o m p e t e n t s u b j e c t w h o u n d e r s t a n d s h o w t o

T y p i c a l l y , h o w e v e r , the un-

p r o d u c e o r a c c o m p l i s h s o m e t h i n g , a n d know-that, t h e e x p l i c i t k n o w l -

derstanding of content p u r s u e s c o n n e c t i o n s t h a t l i n k t h e s u r f a c e s t r u c -

e d g e o f h o w i t is t h a t h e is a b l e t o d o so. I n o u r case, w h a t t h e a u t h o r

c o n t e x t o f w h i c h h e was n o t c o n s c i o u s .

2 8

tures o f t h e i n c o m p r e h e n s i b l e f o r m a t i o n w i t h t h e surface structures

m e a n s b y a n u t t e r a n c e a n d w h a t a n i n t e r p r e t e r u n d e r s t a n d s o f its

o f other, familiar f o r m a t i o n s . T h u s , linguistic expressions can

c o n t e n t are a

e x p l i c a t e d t h r o u g h paraphrase i n t h e same language

be

or through

t r a n s l a t i o n i n t o e x p r e s s i o n s o f a n o t h e r l a n g u a g e ; i n b o t h cases, c o m -

first-level

k n o w - t h a t . T o t h e e x t e n t that his utterance

is c o r r e c t l y f o r m e d a n d t h u s c o m p r e h e n s i b l e ,

the author produced

i t i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h c e r t a i n r u l e s o r o n t h e basis o f c e r t a i n s t r u c -

p e t e n t speakers d r a w o n i n t u i t i v e l y k n o w n m e a n i n g r e l a t i o n s t h a t

t u r e s . H e k n o w s h o w t o use t h e system o f r u l e s o f h i s l a n g u a g e a n d

o b t a i n w i t h i n the l e x i c o n o f one language o r between t h e léxica o f

u n d e r s t a n d s t h e i r c o n t e x t - s p e c i f i c a p p l i c a t i o n ; h e has a p r e t h e o r e t i -

two languages.

cal k n o w l e d g e

I f she c a n n o t a t t a i n h e r e n d i n t h i s way, t h e i n t e r p r e t e r m a y

find

o f t h i s r u l e system, w h i c h is a t least s u f f i c i e n t t o

enable h i m to produce the utterance i n question. This implicit r u l e

i t n e c e s s a r y t o a l t e r h e r a t t i t u d e . She t h e n e x c h a n g e s t h e a t t i t u d e o f

c o n s c i o u s n e s s is a k n o w - h o w . T h e i n t e r p r e t e r , i n t u r n , w h o n o t o n l y

understanding

structures)—in

shares b u t w a n t s t o u n d e r s t a n d t h i s i m p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e o f t h e c o m -

w h i c h she, as i t w e r e , l o o k s t h r o u g h s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n s t o t h e w o r l d

p e t e n t speaker, m u s t t r a n s f o r m t h i s k n o w - h o w i n t o e x p l i c i t k n o w l -

content

(directed

t o w a r d surface

a b o u t w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is u t t e r e d — f o r a n a t t i t u d e i n w h i c h

she

e d g e , t h a t is, i n t o a s e c o n d - l e v e l k n o w - t h a t . T h i s is t h e task

of

focuses o n t h e g e n e r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s o f t h e e x p r e s s i o n s t h e m s e l v e s .

r e c o n s t r u c t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t is, o f m e a n i n g e x p l i c a t i o n i n t h e

T h e i n t e r p r e t e r t h e n attempts to explicate the m e a n i n g o f a sym-

sense o f r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f g e n e r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e s u n d e r l y i n g

bolic f o r m a t i o n w i t h the help o f the rules according to w h i c h the

the p r o d u c t i o n o f symbolic f o r m a t i o n s . Since t h e r u l e consciousness

a u t h o r m u s t have p r o d u c e d i t . I n n o r m a l p a r a p h r a s e a n d t r a n s l a -

t o b e r e c o n s t r u c t e d is a c a t e g o r i a l k n o w l e d g e ,

tion,

d e p e n d s first o f a l l o n t h e o p e r a t i o n o f c o n c e p t u a l e x p l i c a t i o n .

the i n t e r p r e t e r draws o n semantic m e a n i n g relations (for i n -

stance b e t w e e n

the different words o f a language)

i n an ad

m a n n e r , so t o speak, i n t h a t she s i m p l y a p p l i e s a k n o w l e d g e

hoc

shared

w i t h c o m p e t e n t speakers o f t h a t l a n g u a g e . I n t h i s sense, t h e r o l e o f interpreter can

( u n d e r suitable conditions)

be

attributed to

the reconstruction

Carnap p u t f o r w a r d four requirements that the explication o f a c o n c e p t m u s t f u l f i l l i n o r d e r to be

adequate:

the

i . T h e e x p l i c a n s s h o u l d b e similar t o t h e e x p l i c a n d u m , t h a t is, f r o m

a u t h o r h i m s e l f . T h e a t t i t u d e c h a n g e s , h o w e v e r , as s o o n as t h e i n t e r -

n o w o n the explicans s h o u l d be able to be used i n place o f the

p r e t e r t r i e s n o t o n l y t o apply t h i s i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f s p e a k e r s b u t

e x p l i c a n d u m i n a l l r e l e v a n t cases.

t o reconstruct i t . She t h e n t u r n s away f r o m t h e s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e o f

i i . R u l e s s h o u l d b e p r o v i d e d t h a t f i x t h e use o f t h e e x p l i c a n s

t h e s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n ; she n o l o n g e r l o o k s t h r o u g h i t intentione

c o n n e c t i o n w i t h o t h e r s c i e n t i f i c c o n c e p t s ) i n a n exact m a n n e r .

recta t o t h e w o r l d . She a t t e m p t s i n s t e a d t o p e e r i n t o t h e

symbolic

(in

i i i . T h e e x p l i c a n s s h o u l d p r o v e t o b e fruitful w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f general statements.

34

35

Chapter 1


iv. ( P r e s u p p o s i n g t h a t r e q u i r e m e n t s i - i i i c a n b e m e t ) t h e e x p l i e a n s

particular competencies of individual groups

s h o u l d b e as simple as p o s s i b l e .

u t t e r s e n t e n c e s i n a L o w - G e r m a n d i a l e c t o r t o solve p r o b l e m s i n

30

W u n d e r l i c h s u m s u p h i s r e f l e c t i o n s o n t h e status o f c o n c e p t e x p l i c a t i o n as f o l l o w s :

(e.g., t h e a b i l i t y t o

q u a n t u m physics) or, i n d e e d , t o t h e a b i l i t y o f p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s (e.g., t o w r i t e a n e x e m p l a r y Entwicklungsroman

even i n the m i d d l e o f

the twentieth c e n t u r y ) . W h e n the pretheoretical knowledge to be

Explication always proceeds ( i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h Carnap's requirements i - i v ) -with regard to theories; either such c e n t r a l concepts (as "meaning") are explicated that entire theories correspond to t h e m as explieans, o r d i f f e r e n t concepts are explicated interconnectedly. We explicate always with regard to clear cases, so as to be able ( i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h these) to replace our i n t u i t i o n s w i t h exact arguments. However, the t h e o r y can t h e n also provide answers to b o r d e r l i n e cases; o r we explicate separately what a clear b o r d e r l i n e case is. T h e language o f explication is at the same level as the e x p l i c a n d u m language (e.g., o r d i n a r y language o r a standardized version derived f r o m i t ) . Accordingly, i t is n o t a question here o f a descriptive language o r a metalanguage relative to the language o f the e x p l i c a n d u m (the explieans does n o t describe the explicandum) . 31

r e c o n s t r u c t e d expresses a u n i v e r s a l c a p a b i l i t y , a g e n e r a l c o g n i t i v e , linguistic, or interactive competence (or subcompetence), then what b e g i n s as a n e x p l i c a t i o n o f m e a n i n g a i m s a t t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f species c o m p e t e n c i e s . I n s c o p e a n d status, these r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s c a n be c o m p a r e d w i t h general t h e o r i e s .

3 2

I t is t h e g r e a t m e r i t o f C h o m s k y t o h a v e d e v e l o p e d t h i s i d e a i n t h e case o f g r a m m a t i c a l t h e o r y ( f o r t h e first time i n Syntactic Structures, 1 9 5 7 ) . R o u g h l y s p e a k i n g , i t is t h e task o f g r a m m a t i c a l t h e o r y t o r e c o n s t r u c t the intuitive r u l e consciousness c o m m o n

to all compe-

t e n t speakers i n s u c h a w a y t h a t t h e p r o p o s a l s f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i o n r e p r e s e n t t h e system o f r u l e s t h a t p e r m i t s p o t e n t i a l speakers, i n a t least o n e l a n g u a g e L , t o a c q u i r e t h e c o m p e t e n c e t o p r o d u c e a n d t o

I n these r e f l e c t i o n s o n t h e e x p l i c a t i o n o f c o n c e p t s , o n e

point

u n d e r s t a n d a n y s e n t e n c e s t h a t c o u n t as g r a m m a t i c a l i n L , as w e l l as

s t r i k e s m e as i n s u f f i c i e n t l y w o r k e d o u t — t h e evaluative accomplishments

t o d i s t i n g u i s h these s e n t e n c e s w e l l - f o r m e d i n L f r o m u n g r a m m a t i c a l

of rule consciousness. R e c o n s t r u c t i v e

sentences.

proposals

are d i r e c t e d t o w a r d

33

d o m a i n s o f p r e t h e o r e t i c a l knowledge, t h a t is, n o t t o j u s t a n y i m p l i c i t o p i n i o n , b u t to a proven intuitive preknowledge. T h e r u l e consciousness o f c o m p e t e n t speakers f u n c t i o n s as a c o u r t o f e v a l u a t i o n , f o r i n s t a n c e w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e g r a m m a t i c a l i t y o f sentences. W h e r e a s t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f c o n t e n t is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a n y u t t e r a n c e w h a t e v e r , reconstructive u n d e r s t a n d i n g refers o n l y to symbolic objects charact e r i z e d as " w e l l f o r m e d " b y c o m p e t e n t subjects t h e m s e l v e s . T h u s , f o r e x a m p l e , syntactic t h e o r y , p r o p o s i t i o n a l l o g i c , t h e t h e o r y o f s c i e n c e , a n d ethics start w i t h syntactically w e l l f o r m e d sentences, c o r r e c t l y fashioned propositions, well-corroborated theories, a n d m o r a l l y u n objectionable resolutions o f n o r m conflicts, i n order to reconstruct t h e r u l e s a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h these f o r m a t i o n s c a n b e p r o d u c e d .

To

t h e e x t e n t t h a t , as i n t h e f o l l o w i n g e x a m p l e s , u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s ( t h e g r a m m a t i c a l i t y o f sentences, t h e consistency

of propositions,

t h e t r u t h o f h y p o t h e s e s , t h e Tightness o f n o r m s o f a c t i o n ) u n d e r l i e i n t u i t i v e e v a l u a t i o n s , r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s relate t o p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e o f a g e n e r a l sort, t o universal capabilities, a n d n o t m e r e l y t o

R e c o n s t r u c t i v e versus E m p i r i c i s t L i n g u i s t i c s I h o p e I have sufficiently c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i v e p r o c e d u r e of

sciences t h a t t r a n s f o r m a p r a c t i c a l l y m a s t e r e d

pretheoretical

k n o w l e d g e ( k n o w - h o w ) o f c o m p e t e n t subjects i n t o a n o b j e c t i v e a n d e x p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e ( k n o w - t h a t ) , so t h a t i t is c l e a r i n w h a t sense I a m using the expression methodological

" f o r m a l analysis." B e f o r e

m e n t i o n i n g some

difficulties w i t h reconstructive linguistics, I w o u l d

like t o contrast, i n b r o a d strokes, two versions o f linguistics, o n e e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c a n d o n e r e c o n s t r u c t i v e . ( W u n d e r l i c h speaks o f a n empirical-descriptive and an empirical-explicative linguistics. ) I will 3 4

compare b o t h approaches u n d e r f o u r headings. Data T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l basis is s u p p o s e d t o b e

secured

t h r o u g h o b s e r v a t i o n a l o n e , t h e d a t a o f l i n g u i s t i c s consist o f m e a s -

36

37

Chapter 1


u r e d v a r i a b l e s o f l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r . B y c o n t r a s t , i n s o f a r as

recon-

s t r u c t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g is p e r m i t t e d , t h e d a t a a r e p r o v i d e d b y t h e

Theory and Everyday

Knowledge

T h e r e is y e t a n o t h e r p e c u l i a r i t y a r i s i n g f r o m these d i f f e r e n d y o r i -

r u l e c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f c o m p e t e n t speakers, m a i e u t i c a l l y a s c e r t a i n e d

ented conceptualizations. A n empirical-analytic theory i n the n a r r o w

(i.e., t h r o u g h suitable q u e s t i o n i n g w i t h t h e a i d o f systematically or-

sense c a n ( a n d as a r u l e w i l l ) r e f u t e t h e e v e r y d a y k n o w l e d g e o f a n

d e r e d examples). T h u s t h e data are d i s t i n g u i s h e d , i f y o u w i l l , accord-

o b j e c t d o m a i n t h a t w e i n i t i a l l y possess p r i o r t o s c i e n c e a n d r e p l a c e

i n g t o t h e i r o n t o l o g i c a l l e v e l : a c t u a l l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r is p a r t o f

it w i t h a correct theoretical knowledge

r e g a r d e d p r o v i s i o n a l l y as

p e r c e p t i b l e reality, a n d r u l e consciousness p o i n t s to t h e p r o d u c t i o n

true. A proposal for reconstruction, by contrast, can represent pre-

o f s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n s i n w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is u t t e r e d a b o u t r e a l i t y .

t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e m o r e o r less e x p l i c i t l y a n d a d e q u a t e l y , b u t i t

3 5

F u r t h e r m o r e , o b s e r v a t i o n s always m e a n a k n o w l e d g e o f s o m e t h i n g

c a n n e v e r falsify i t . A t m o s t , t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a s p e a k e r ' s i n t u i -

particular, whereas r u l e consciousness contains categorical k n o w l -

tion

c a n p r o v e t o b e false, b u t n o t t h e i n t u i t i o n i t s e l f .

3 7

T h e latter

edge. Finally, observational data are selected o n l y f r o m t h e analytic

belongs to the data, a n d data can be e x p l a i n e d b u t n o t criticized. A t

v i e w p o i n t s o f t h e l i n g u i s t , w h e r e a s , i n t h e o t h e r case,

m o s t , d a t a c a n b e c r i t i c i z e d as b e i n g u n s u i t a b l e , t h a t is, e i t h e r e r r o -

competent

s p e a k e r s t h e m s e l v e s evaluate a n d p r e s e l e c t p o s s i b l e d a t a f r o m t h e

neously

p o i n t o f view o f t h e i r g r a m m a t i c a l well-formedness.

purpose.

Theory and Object Domain

c a n say, o f c o u r s e , t h a t t h e o r e t i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n s

A s l o n g as n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s c o u n t as t h e o b j e c t o f l i n g u i s t i c d e s c r i p -

t r u e ) t o c e r t a i n s t r u c t u r e s o f r e a l i t y i n t h e s a m e sense as

tion

structions "bear a likeness" ( i f correct) to t h e deep structures e x p l i -

gathered

or w r o n g l y selected f o r

a specific

theoretical

T o a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s m a k e a n essentialist c l a i m . O n e

a n d n o t as t h e f o r m o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f a r e c o n s t r u c t i b l e

"correspond"

(if

recon-

p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e , l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y r e l a t e s t o its o b j e c t d o -

c a t e d . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e asserted c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n

m a i n as a causal-analytic t h e o r y t h a t e x p l a i n s l i n g u i s t i c d e s c r i p t i o n s

d e s c r i p t i v e t h e o r y a n d its o b j e c t a d m i t s m a n y e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l

o f linguistic reality w i t h the aid o f n o m o l o g i c a l hypotheses. I f , o n the

p r e t a t i o n s a p a r t f r o m t h e r e a l i s t i c (e.g., i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t o r c o n v e n -

c o n t r a r y , l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y is s u p p o s e d t o serve t o r e c o n s t r u c t p r e -

tionalist)

theoretical knowledge,

t h e p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e t h a t t h e y e x p l i c a t e o n l y i n a n essential-

t h e o r y r e l a t e s t o its o b j e c t d o m a i n as a n

ones. Rational reconstructions, by contrast, can

a

inter-

reproduce

e x p l i c a t i o n o f m e a n i n g t o its e x p l i c a n d u m . W h e r e a s i n t h e e m p i r i -

ist sense; i f t h e y a r e t r u e , t h e y have t o c o r r e s p o n d

cist v e r s i o n t h e r e l a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y t o t h e l a n g u a g e t o b e

r u l e s t h a t a r e o p e r a t i v e l y e f f e c t i v e i n t h e o b j e c t d o m a i n — t h a t is, t o

e x p l a i n e d is basically i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m t h a t b e t w e e n

theory

precisely to t h e

t h e r u l e s t h a t a c t u a l l y d e t e r m i n e t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f surface s t r u c -

a n d r e a l i t y i n o t h e r n o m o l o g i c a l sciences, i n t h e e x p l i c a t i v e v e r s i o n

tures.

t h e l i n g u i s t i c c h a r a c t e r o f t h e o b j e c t necessitates a r e l a t i o n t h a t c a n

l i n g u i s t i c g r a m m a r is r e p r e s e n t e d o n t h e p a r t o f t h e s p e a k e r b y a

h o l d o n l y between d i f f e r e n t linguistic expressions: the r e l a t i o n be-

m e n t a l g r a m m a r t h a t c o r r e s p o n d s e x a c t l y t o i t , is, a t least i n t h e

tween explication a n d e x p l i c a n d u m , whereby the language o f expli-

instance, consistent.

cation

( t h a t is, t h e c o n s t r u c t l a n g u a g e

3 8

T h u s Chomsky's correlation assumption, according to w h i c h first

o f l i n g u i s t i c s , w h i c h is a

standardized version o f o r d i n a r y language) belongs i n p r i n c i p l e to

Methodological

Difficulties

t h e same l e v e l as t h e n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e t o b e e x p l i c a t e d . ( N e i t h e r i n

T o be sure, serious m e t h o d o l o g i c a l

t h e e m p i r i c i s t n o r i n t h e e x p l i c a t i v e case o f t h e o r y f o r m a t i o n c a n

n e c t i o n w i t h t h e C h o m s k i a n p r o g r a m f o r a g e n e r a l science o f l a n -

difficulties have arisen i n c o n -

t h e r e l a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y t o its o b j e c t d o m a i n b e c o n c e i v e d as

g u a g e as t h e r a t i o n a l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e . I

that of metalanguage to object

w o u l d l i k e t o consider, f r o m a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l

language. ) 3 6

perspective, two o f

39

38


Chapter 1

the problem

complexes t h a t have developed. O n e

concerns the

o f the grammaticality o f linguistic expressions. T h e object o f recon-

status a n d r e l i a b i l i t y o f t h e i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f c o m p e t e n t speak-

s t r u c t i o n is t h e p r o c e s s o f p r o d u c t i o n o f t h o s e sentences h e l d b y

ers; t h e o t h e r , t h e a f o r m e n t i o n e d

linguistic a n d

c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r s t o b e l o n g t o t h e set o f g r a m m a t i c a l s e n t e n c e s .

T h e r e h a v e b e e n t w o p r i n c i p a l o b j e c t i o n s a g a i n s t c h o o s i n g speak-

ers e v a l u a t e t h e s e n t e n c e s p u t b e f o r e t h e m a r e n o t t h e o b j e c t o f

relation between

By c o n t r a s t , t h e m e t a l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s i n w h i c h c o m p e t e n t speak-

mental grammar. e r s ' i n t u i t i o n s as t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r r e c o n s t r u c t i v e t h e o r y f o r m a tion.

39

F i r s t , t h e q u e s t i o n has b e e n r a i s e d w h e t h e r a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e

reconstruction b u t part of the data gathering. ii. B e c a u s e o f t h e r e f l e x i v e c h a r a c t e r o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s , speakdirect or indirect mention

of

w h e t h e r o n t h e c h o s e n d a t a basis i t is n o t l i m i t e d t o d e v e l o p i n g , a t

speech c o m p o n e n t s , b e l o n g s t o t h e n o r m a l l i n g u i s t i c process

of

b e s t , a t h e o r y o f t h e i n t u i t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t c o m p e t e n t speak-

reaching understanding. T h e expression "metalinguistic j u d g m e n t s "

ers have o f t h e i r o w n l a n g u a g e . S i n c e t h e m e t a l i n g u i s t i c use o f o n e ' s

i n a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e a b o u t s e n t e n c e s o f t h e s a m e l a n g u a g e suggests

o w n o r d i n a r y language, to w h i c h a science t h a t appeals t o speakers'

a d i f f e r e n c e i n l e v e l t h a t d o e s n o t e x i s t . I t is o n e o f t h e m o s t i n t e r -

linguistics can

ever a r r i v e a t a t h e o r y o f l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e ;

i n g a b o u t w h a t has b e e n s p o k e n ,

j u d g m e n t s m u s t have r e c o u r s e , is s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e d i r e c t

e s t i n g f e a t u r e s o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s t h a t t h e y c a n b e u s e d as t h e i r

use o f l a n g u a g e

own

( a n d is p r o b a b l y s u b j e c t t o d i f f e r e n t l a w s ) , a g r a m -

m a t i c a l t h e o r y o f t h e C h o m s k i a n type can at best r e c o n s t r u c t t h a t special p a r t o f linguistic c o m p e t e n c e t h a t regulates the m e t a l i n g u i s -

languages o f explication.

( I shall c o m e back to this p o i n t

below.) Hi. H o w e v e r , i t seems t o m e t h a t t h e m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g lies, a b o v e

tic use; i t c a n n o t r e c o n s t r u c t t h e c o m p e t e n c e t h a t d i r e c d y u n d e r l i e s

all, i n Levelt's considering

speaking a n d understanding a language.

abstraction f r o m the u n d e r l y i n g research

T h e e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r a c o m p l e t e t h e o r y o f l i n g u i s t i c i n t u i t i o n s is i d e n t i c a l w i t h a c o m p l e t e t h e o r y o f h u m a n l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e . . . . C h o m s k y h a s n o d o u b t as to t h i s identity. . . . T h e t h e o r y o f o n e k i n d o f

t h e recourse to speakers' i n t u i t i o n s i n paradigm. Only i f

one

p r e s u p p o s e s a n e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c a p p r o a c h ( i n t h e n a r r o w sense) t o the reality o f a natural language a n d the utterances i n i t can

one

view speaking a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g language, o n the one h a n d , a n d

l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r , n a m e l y m e t a l i n g u i s t i c j u d g m e n t o n s u c h t h i n g s as g r a m -

j u d g m e n t s i n a l a n g u a g e a b o u t t h a t l a n g u a g e , o n t h e o t h e r , as t w o

m a t i c a l i t y a n d p a r a p h r a s e , w o u l d t h e n as a w h o l e b e b u i l t i n t o t h e o r i e s o n

d i f f e r e n t object d o m a i n s . I f one chooses a reconstructive

approach,

o t h e r f o r m s o f l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r s u c h as s p e a k i n g a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . . . .

then one

I f w e w i s h to t h i n k i n t e r m s o f p r i m a r y a n d d e r i v e d f o r m s o f v e r b a l b e h a v i o r ,

a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h the linguistic k n o w - h o w o f a c o m p e t e n t speaker

t h e s p e a k i n g a n d t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f l a n g u a g e fall p r e c i s e l y i n t o t h e category o f p r i m a r y forms, while metalinguistic j u d g m e n t s will be conside r e d h i g h l y d e r i v e d , artificial f o r m s o f l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r , w h i c h m o r e o v e r

thereby c h o o s e s a c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n

o f the object d o m a i n

is a t t h e r o o t o f t h e s e n t e n c e s she p r o d u c e s w i t h t h e h e l p o f o n l y w i t h t h e h e l p of) this k n o w - h o w . W h i l e this research

(and

paradigm

a r e a c q u i r e d late i n d e v e l o p m e n t . . . . T h e e m p i r i c a l p r o b l e m i n t h e psy-

m a y p r o v e to be u n f r u i t f u l , this c a n n o t be s h o w n at the level o f a

c h o l o g y o f l a n g u a g e is i n t u r n d i v i d e d i n two, t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f p s y c h o -

c r i t i q u e that already presupposes a c o m p e t i n g p a r a d i g m ; i t may be

logical

s h o w n o n l y i n t e r m s o f t h e success o r f a i l u r e o f t h e t h e o r i e s

factors

in

primary

language

investigation o f linguistic i n t u i t i o n s .

usage,

and

the

psychological

4 0

I t h i n k t h i s o b j e c t i o n is b a s e d o n a c o n f u s i o n o f t h e t w o r e s e a r c h paradigms elucidated above, the empirical-analytic a n d the

and

e x p l a n a t i o n s t h e c o m p e t i n g r e s e a r c h p a r a d i g m s m a k e possible.

recon-

structive. I wish to make three c o m m e n t s i n this regard:

T h e s e c o n d o b j e c t i o n is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t h e u n r e l i a b i l i t y o f i n t u i tively f o u n d e d s p e a k e r s ' j u d g m e n t s ,

f o r w h i c h t h e r e exists i m p r e s s i v e

empirical evidence.

i t seems t o m e h e r e t h a t o n c e

4 1

Nonetheless,

i. R e c o n s t r u c t i o n r e l a t e s t o a p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e o f c o m p e -

again a n e m p i r i c i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f speakers' j u d g m e n t s stimulates

t e n t s p e a k e r s t h a t is e x p r e s s e d , o n t h e o n e h a n d , i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n

false e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d suggests t h e w r o n g r e m e d i e s . T h e e x p r e s s i o n

o f sentences i n a n a t u r a l language a n d , o n the other, i n the appraisal

" i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e " s h o u l d n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d as m e a n i n g t h a t a

40

41

Chapter 1


speaker's p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e

about the grammaticality of a

u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n n o t , i n t h e o p i n i o n o f Bever, W a t t , a n d o t h e r s , b e

sentence (about the r i g o r o f a derivation, about the cogency o f a

e x p l a i n e d i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f a c o m p e t e n c e t h e o r y , t h a t is, o f a

t h e o r y , a n d so f o r t h ) is t h e k i n d o f d i r e c t l y a s c e r t a i n a b l e i n t u i t i o n

reconstructively o r i e n t e d linguistics. I a m n o t very certain h o w to

t h a t is i n c a p a b l e o f b e i n g d i s c u r s i v e l y j u s t i f i e d . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e

j u d g e t h i s c o n t r o v e r s y ; b u t I w o u l d l i k e t o suggest t w o p o i n t s o f v i e w

i m p l i c i t k n o w l e d g e has t o b e b r o u g h t t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h r o u g h t h e

t h a t h a v e n o t , so f a r as I c a n see, b e e n s u f f i c i e n t l y t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t

choice o f suitable examples a n d counterexamples, t h r o u g h contrast

i n t h e discussion.

a n d s i m i l a r i t y r e l a t i o n s , t h r o u g h t r a n s l a t i o n , p a r a p h r a s e a n d so o n —

i. H o w s t r o n g d o t h e essentialist a s s e r t i o n s o f a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e

t h a t is, t h r o u g h a w e l l - t h o u g h t - o u t , m a i e u t i c m e t h o d o f i n t e r r o g a -

l i n g u i s t i c s r e g a r d i n g t h e p s y c h i c r e a l i t y o f r e c o n s t r u c t e d systems o f

t i o n . A s c e r t a i n i n g t h e so-called i n t u i t i o n s o f a s p e a k e r is a l r e a d y t h e

r u l e s h a v e t o be? C h o m s k y ' s m a t u r a t i o n i s t a s s u m p t i o n — t h a t g r a m -

f i r s t step t o w a r d t h e i r e x p l i c a t i o n . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e

procedure

matical t h e o r y represents exactly the i n n a t e dispositions that enable

p r a c t i c e d b y C h o m s k y a n d m a n y o t h e r s seems t o m e t o m a k e sense

t h e c h i l d to develop the hypotheses t h a t d i r e c t language acquisition

a n d t o b e a d e q u a t e . O n e starts w i t h c l e a r cases, i n w h i c h t h e r e a c -

a n d t h a t process t h e l i n g u i s t i c data i n t h e e n v i r o n m e n t — s e e m s

t i o n s o f t h e subjects c o n v e r g e , i n o r d e r t o d e v e l o p s t r u c t u r a l d e s c r i p -

me too s t r o n g .

t i o n s o n t h i s basis; t h e n , i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e h y p o t h e s e s g a i n e d , o n e

m o r e plausible assumption that g r a m m a t i c a l t h e o r y represents the

a t t e m p t s t o r e n d e r t h e less c l e a r cases m o r e p r e c i s e i n s u c h a w a y

l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e o f t h e a d u l t s p e a k e r is s u f f i c i e n t . T h i s c o m p e -

t h a t t h e process o f i n t e r r o g a t i o n can l e a d to a n adequate clarifica-

t e n c e i n t u r n is t h e r e s u l t o f a l e a r n i n g p r o c e s s t h a t m a y e v e n — i n a

tion

m a n n e r similar to cognitive development

o f these cases as w e l l . I d o n o t see

a n y t h i n g w r o n g i n this

4 4

to

W i t h i n t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i v i s t c o n c e p t u a l strategy, t h e

or the development

of

c i r c u l a r p r o c e d u r e ; every research process moves i n such a circle

m o r a l consciousness—follow a rationally reconstructible p a t t e r n .

between

A s B e v e r suggests, e v e n t h i s thesis c a n b e w e a k e n e d

theory formation and a more

object d o m a i n .

precise

rendering of

the

4 5

to allow for

restrictions placed o n the acquisition a n d application o f grammati-

4 2

T h e s e c o n d m e t h o d o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n is m o r e d i f f i c u l t . I t is o n e

cal rule-knowledge by n o n l i n g u i s t i c p e r c e p t u a l mechanisms or n o n -

t h a t has b e e n t r e a t e d as a n e m p i r i c a l q u e s t i o n i n t h e p s y c h o l i n g u i s -

l i n g u i s t i c e p i s t e m i c systems i n g e n e r a l , w i t h o u t s u r r e n d e r i n g t h e

tics o f t h e p a s t d e c a d e , a n d as s u c h has i n s p i r e d a g r e a t a m o u n t o f

categorial framework o f a competence theory.

r e s e a r c h : i t asks w h e t h e r t h e r e is a d i r e c t c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n

ii. I t is n o t c l e a r t o m e t o w h a t e x t e n t t h e p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c c r i t i q u e

t h e l i n g u i s t i c t h e o r y o f g r a m m a r a n d t h e m e n t a l g r a m m a r t h a t is, so

o f t h e a d m i t t e d l y essentialist i m p l i c a t i o n s o f C h o m s k y ' s c o m p e t e n c e

t o speak, " i n t h e m i n d " o f t h e s p e a k e r .

t h e o r y can be traced back to a confusion o f research paradigms. T h i s

43

According to the correlation

hypothesis,

linguistic reconstructions

and

c o u l d be adequately discussed o n l y i f t h e r e w e r e clarity a b o u t t h e

economical

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f l i n g u i s t i c d a t a ; i n s t e a d , t h e r e is a

w a y i n w h i c h c o m p e t e n c e t h e o r i e s c a n b e t e s t e d a n d , as t h e case m a y

psychological corresponds,

complexity supposedly,

of

are

not

simply l u c i d

the actual p r o d u c t i o n process

that

be, falsified. I have the i m p r e s s i o n t h a t psycholinguistic investiga-

to the transformational complexity

that

tions

c a n be r e a d o f f t h e s t r u c t u r a l d e s c r i p t i o n o f linguistic expressions. I

p r o c e e d e m p i r i c a l l y a n d a n a l y t i c a l l y , a n d n e g l e c t a limine t h e

distinction between competence a n d

performance.

4 6

c a n n o t deal w i t h the i n d i v i d u a l research projects a n d the various i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s h e r e . A p p a r e n t l y , i n p s y c h o l i n g u i s t i c s t h e r e is a g r o w -

U n i v e r s a l P r a g m a t i c s versus T r a n s c e n d e n t a l H e r m e n e u t i c s

i n g t e n d e n c y t o m o v e away f r o m t h e o r i g i n a l c o r r e l a t i o n h y p o t h e s i s ; the m e n t a l g r a m m a r that underlies the psychologically ble p r o d u c t i o n o f language

and the corresponding

demonstra-

H a v i n g p r e s e n t e d t h e idea o f a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e science a n d b r i e f l y

processes o f

elucidated i t t h r o u g h a consideration o f reconstructive linguistics

42

43

Chapter 1


( a n d t w o o f its m e t h o d o l o g i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s ) , I w o u l d l i k e t o t o u c h o n

F r o m this weaker i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , consequences ensue that are

o n e f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n : W h a t is t h e r e l a t i o n o f a u n i v e r s a l - p r a g m a t i c

scarcely c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e o r i g i n a l p r o g r a m . W e c a n n o

r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f g e n e r a l a n d u n a v o i d a b l e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f possi-

e x c l u d e t h e possibility t h a t o u r c o n c e p t s o f objects o f possible expe-

b l e processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t o t h e t y p e o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n

r i e n c e c a n b e a p p l i e d successfully o n l y u n d e r c o n t i n g e n t b o u n d a r y

t h a t has, s i n c e K a n t , b e e n c a l l e d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l analysis? K a n t t e r m s

conditions

" t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " a n i n v e s t i g a t i o n t h a t i d e n t i f i e s a n d analyzes t h e a

fulfilled by natural constants.

that

have,

for

example, 5 0

heretofore

longer

regularly

been

Further, we can n o longer exclude

p r i o r i c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f e x p e r i e n c e . T h e u n d e r l y i n g i d e a is

t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e basic c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r e o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i -

clear: i n a d d i t i o n to the e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e t h a t relates to objects

e n c e has d e v e l o p e d p h y l o g e n e t i c a l l y a n d arises a n e w i n e v e r y n o r -

o f e x p e r i e n c e , t h e r e is, s u p p o s e d l y , a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l k n o w l e d g e o f

m a l ontogenesis, i n a process t h a t c a n be analyzed e m p i r i c a l l y .

concepts o f objects i n g e n e r a l t h a t p r e c e d e experience. T h e m e t h o d

c a n n o t even exclude the possibility that a n a p r i o r i o f

b y w h i c h these a p r i o r i c o n c e p t s o f o b j e c t s i n g e n e r a l c a n b e s h o w n

t h a t is r e l a t i v i z e d i n t h i s sense is v a l i d o n l y f o r s p e c i f i c , a d m i t t e d l y

t o b e v a l i d c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e is less clear. T h e r e is

a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l l y deep-seated,

a l r e a d y d i s a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e thesis: " [ T ] h e

m a k e s p o s s i b l e a specific s t r a t e g y f o r o b j e c t i v a t i n g reality. T h e t r a n -

a p r i o r i c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e i n g e n e r a l a r e a t t h e same

s c e n d e n t a l l y o r i e n t e d p r a g m a t i s m i n a u g u r a t e d b y C. S. P e i r c e a t -

t i m e c o n d i t i o n s o f the possibility o f objects o f e x p e r i e n c e . "

t e m p t s t o s h o w t h a t t h e r e is s u c h a s t r u c t u r a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n

4 7

T h e analytic r e c e p t i o n o f t h e K a n t i a n p r o g r a m (Strawson's w o r k is a w e l l - k n o w n e x a m p l e )

4 8

leads t o a m i n i m a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f

the transcendental. Every coherent experience

is o r g a n i z e d i n a

c a t e g o r i a l n e t w o r k ; t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t w e d i s c o v e r t h e same i m p l i c i t

We

5 1

experience

b e h a v i o r a l systems, e a c h o f w h i c h

experience and instrumental a c t i o n ;

5 2

the hermeneutics stemming

f r o m D i l t h e y a t t e m p t s — o v e r against this a p r i o r i o f e x p e r i e n c e — t o do justice to an additional a priori of understanding or communicative e x p e r i e n c e .

5 3

c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r e i n any c o h e r e n t e x p e r i e n c e whatsoever, we m a y

F r o m the perspective o f a t r a n s f o r m e d transcendental p h i l o s o p h y

c a l l t h i s basic c o n c e p t u a l system o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e " t r a n s c e n -

( i n A p e l ' s sense), t w o f u r t h e r r e n u n c i a t i o n s called f o r b y t h e analytic

dental." This conception renounces the claim that Kant w a n t e d to

r e c e p t i o n o f K a n t seem precipitate: the r e n u n c i a t i o n o f the concept

v i n d i c a t e w i t h h i s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l d e d u c t i o n ; i t gives u p a l l c l a i m t o

o f the constitution o f experience a n d the r e n u n c i a t i o n o f an explicit

a p r o o f o f t h e objective validity o f o u r concepts o f objects o f possible

t r e a t m e n t o f t h e p r o b l e m o f validity. I n m y o p i n i o n , the reservation

experience i n general.

r e g a r d i n g a s t r o n g a p r i o r i s m i n n o way d e m a n d s l i m i t i n g oneself t o

4 9

T h e strong apriorism of Kantian philosophy

gives w a y t o a w e a k e r v e r s i o n . F r o m n o w o n , t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n v e s t i -

a logical-semantic analysis o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e s . I f

g a t i o n m u s t r e l y o n t h e c o m p e t e n c e o f k n o w i n g subjects w h o j u d g e

we s u r r e n d e r the c o n c e p t o f t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject—the subject

w h i c h experiences may be called coherent experiences i n o r d e r t h e n

that accomplishes

t o analyze t h i s m a t e r i a l w i t h a v i e w t o

g e n e r a l a n d necessary

e d g e - e n a b l i n g s t r u c t u r e s , is r e m o v e d f r o m a l l e x p e r i e n c e — t h i s d o e s

c a t e g o r i a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s . E v e r y r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f a basic c o n c e p -

n o t m e a n t h a t w e have t o r e n o u n c e t h e u n i v e r s a l - p r a g m a t i c analysis

t u a l system o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e has t o b e r e g a r d e d as a h y p o t h e t i -

o f t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f o u r concepts o f objects o f possible experience,

c a l p r o p o s a l t h a t c a n b e t e s t e d a g a i n s t n e w e x p e r i e n c e s . A s l o n g as

t h a t is, r e n o u n c e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f e x p e r i e n c e .

t h e a s s e r t i o n o f i t s necessity a n d u n i v e r s a l i t y has n o t b e e n r e f u t e d ,

is j u s t as l i t t l e a c o n s e q u e n c e o f g i v i n g u p t h e p r o j e c t o f a t r a n s c e n -

we t e r m " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " t h e c o n c e p t u a l structure r e c u r r i n g i n a l l

dental d e d u c t i o n that one must h a n d over p r o b l e m s o f validity to

c o h e r e n t experiences.

o t h e r d o m a i n s o f investigation, f o r instance, t o t h e t h e o r y o f science

finding

I n this weaker version, the c l a i m that this

s t r u c t u r e c a n b e d e m o n s t r a t e d a p r i o r i is d r o p p e d .

t h e synthesis a n d t h a t , t o g e t h e r w i t h its k n o w l -

5 4

It

o r o f t r u t h . O f c o u r s e , t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f possi-

44

45

Chapter 1


ble experience a n d the t r u t h o f propositions looks different t h a n i t

u t t e r a n c e s . C o n c e p t s s u c h as m e a n i n g a n d i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , t h e a b i l i t y

d o e s u n d e r K a n t i a n p r e m i s e s . A p r i o r i d e m o n s t r a t i o n is r e p l a c e d b y

t o speak a n d act (agency), i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s a n d t h e l i k e ,

transcendental investigation o f the conditions for argumentatively

w o u l d b e l o n g to this conceptual f r a m e w o r k .

r e d e e m i n g t h e validity claims t h a t l e n d themselves to possible discursive v i n d i c a t i o n .

T h e expression "situation o f possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g " that, f r o m t h i s p o i n t o f view, w o u l d c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e e x p r e s s i o n

5 5

"object

T o b e s u r e , i n m y view t h e q u e s t i o n is m o r e t h a n s i m p l y t e r m i -

o f p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e , " a l r e a d y shows, h o w e v e r , t h a t a c q u i r i n g t h e

n o l o g i c a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g w h e t h e r we may still call such investigations

e x p e r i e n c e s w e have i n processes o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n is s e c o n d a r y t o

of

general

and

"transcendental"

unavoidable

presuppositions

( i n t h i s case, p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s

of of

communication argumentative

t h e g o a l o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t t h e s e processes serve. T h e g e n e r a l structures o f speech m u s t t h e r e f o r e first be

investigated

s p e e c h ) . I f w e w a n t t o s u b j e c t processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g

f r o m the perspective o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d n o t f r o m that

( " s p e e c h " ) t o a r e c o n s t r u c t i v e analysis o r i e n t e d t o g e n e r a l a n d u n -

o f e x p e r i e n c e . A s s o o n as w e a d m i t t h i s , h o w e v e r , t h e p a r a l l e l s w i t h

avoidable

presuppositions

cognitive processes,

56

i n t h e s a m e w a y as has b e e n d o n e

for

then the m o d e l of transcendental philosophy

transcendental philosophy

(however conceived)

recede i n t o

the

b a c k g r o u n d . T h e idea u n d e r l y i n g transcendental philosophy i s — t o

u n d e n i a b l y suggests i t s e l f — a l l t h e m o r e so since t h e t h e o r y o f l a n -

o v e r s i m p l i f y — t h a t we constitute experiences by objectivating reality

g u a g e a n d a c t i o n has n o t ( d e s p i t e H u m b o l d t ) f o u n d its K a n t . N a t u -

f r o m i n v a r i a n t p o i n t s o f view. T h i s o b j e c t i v a t i o n shows i t s e l f i n t h e

r a l l y , r e c o u r s e t o t h i s m o d e l is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e o n l y i f o n e has i n v i e w

o b j e c t s i n g e n e r a l t h a t necessarily a r e p r e s u p p o s e d i n e v e r y c o h e r e n t

o n e o f t h e weaker versions o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y m e n t i o n e d

e x p e r i e n c e ; t h e s e o b j e c t s i n t u r n c a n b e a n a l y z e d as a system o f basic

a b o v e . I n t h i s sense, A p e l — i n o r d e r t o c h a r a c t e r i z e h i s

concepts. However, I do n o t

programmatically—speaks

of

"transcendental

approach

hermeneutics"

or

find

any correspondent

u n d e r w h i c h t h e analysis o f g e n e r a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f

to this idea communica-

"transcendental pragmatics." I w o u l d like to m e n t i o n two reasons f o r

t i o n m i g h t be carried out. Experiences

h e s i t a t i n g t o a d o p t t h i s usage.

K a n t i a n idea, constituted; utterances are, at most, generated. A t r a n -

a. S o m e t h i n g l i k e a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g seems p l a u s i b l e t o m e as l o n g as w e v i e w t h e s e u n d e r t h e aspect o f processes o f e x p e r i e n c e . I t is i n t h i s sense t h a t I speak o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e

experience; i n understanding the

a r e , i f w e f o l l o w t h e basic

s c e n d e n t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n t r a n s p o s e d t o processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g w o u l d t h u s have t o be g u i d e d b y another m o d e l — n o t

the

epistemological m o d e l o f the constitution o f experience b u t perhaps the m o d e l o f d e e p a n d surface s t r u c t u r e .

u t t e r a n c e o f a n o t h e r s p e a k e r as a p a r t i c i p a n t i n a c o m m u n i c a t i o n

b. M o r e o v e r , a d o p t i n g t h e e x p r e s s i o n " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " m i g h t c o n -

process, t h e h e a r e r (like t h e o b s e r v e r w h o perceives a s e g m e n t o f

c e a l t h e b r e a k w i t h a p r i o r i s m t h a t has b e e n m a d e i n t h e m e a n t i m e .

r e a l i t y ) has a n e x p e r i e n c e . F r o m t h i s c o m p a r a t i v e p e r s p e c t i v e ,

con-

K a n t h a d t o s h a r p l y separate e m p i r i c a l a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l analysis.

to e m p i r i c a l objects, a n d u t t e r -

I f w e n o w u n d e r s t a n d t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t h e sense o f a

ances i n g e n e r a l t o o b j e c t s i n g e n e r a l ( i n t h e sense o f o b j e c t s o f

reconstruction o f general a n d unavoidable presuppositions o f expe-

p o s s i b l e e x p e r i e n c e ) . J u s t as w e c a n analyze o u r a p r i o r i c o n c e p t s o f

riences

o b j e c t s i n g e n e r a l — t h a t is, t h e c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r e o f a n y c o h e r e n t

a d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n r e c o n s t r u c t i v e a n d e m p i r i c a l - a n a l y t i c analysis.

experience whatsoever—we

Against this, the distinction between d r a w i n g o n a p r i o r i

crete utterances w o u l d c o r r e s p o n d

w o u l d also b e

able to analyze o u r

a

t h a t c a n lay c l a i m t o o b j e c t i v i t y , t h e n t h e r e c e r t a i n l y r e m a i n s knowledge

p r i o r i c o n c e p t s o f u t t e r a n c e s i n g e n e r a l — t h a t is, t h e basic c o n c e p t s

and drawing o n a posteriori knowledge

o f s i t u a t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g {Verständigung), t h e

o n e h a n d , t h e r u l e c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r s is f o r t h e m

c o n c e p t u a l s t r u c t u r e t h a t e n a b l e s us t o e m p l o y s e n t e n c e s i n c o r r e c t

a n a p r i o r i knowledge; o n the o t h e r h a n d , t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f this

becomes b l u r r e d . O n

the

46

47

Chapter 1


k n o w l e d g e calls f o r i n q u i r i e s u n d e r t a k e n w i t h e m p i r i c a l s p e a k e r s —

select a n d discuss these ideas leads, h o w e v e r , t o a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n

the linguist procures for herself a knowledge a posteriori. T h e i m -

t h a t d i v e r g e s i n several i m p o r t a n t respects f r o m A u s t i n ' s a n d Searle's

plicit knowledge

u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f speech-act t h e o r y , w h i c h r e m a i n s a s e m a n t i c a l l y

o f c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r s is so d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e

explicit f o r m o f linguistic description that the individual linguist c a n n o t rely o n reflection o n h e r o w n speech intuitions. T h e

determined one.

proce-

dures e m p l o y e d i n c o n s t r u c t i n g a n d testing hypotheses, i n apprais-

T h r e e Aspects o f Universal Pragmatics

i n g c o m p e t i n g reconstructive proposals, i n g a t h e r i n g a n d selecting d a t a , a r e i n m a n y ways l i k e t h e p r o c e d u r e s c u s t o m a r i l y u s e d i n t h e

T h e basic u n i v e r s a l - p r a g m a t i c i n t e n t i o n o f s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y is e x -

n o m o l o g i c a l sciences. M e t h o d o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t c a n b e t r a c e d

pressed i n t h e fact that i t thematizes t h e e l e m e n t a r y u n i t s o f speech

b a c k t o d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e s t r u c t u r e o f d a t a ( o b s e r v a b l e events versus

( u t t e r a n c e s ) f r o m a stance s i m i l a r t o t h a t f r o m w h i c h l i n g u i s t i c s

c o m p r e h e n s i b l e signs) a n d t o d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f

thematizes the units o f language

laws a n d r u l e s d o n o t s u f f i c e , f o r e x a m p l e , t o b a n i s h l i n g u i s t i c s f r o m

s t r u c t i v e l a n g u a g e analysis is a n e x p l i c i t d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e r u l e s t h a t

t h e sphere o f e m p i r i c a l science.

a competent

T h i s is p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e f o r o n t o g e n e t i c t h e o r i e s t h a t , l i k e P i a g e t ' s

(sentences).

T h e goal of recon-

speaker m u s t master i n o r d e r to f o r m g r a m m a t i c a l

s e n t e n c e s a n d t o u t t e r t h e m i n a n a c c e p t a b l e way. T h e t h e o r y o f

cognitivist d e v e l o p m e n t a l psychology, c o n n e c t t h e structural descrip-

s p e e c h acts shares t h i s task w i t h l i n g u i s t i c s . W h e r e a s t h e l a t t e r starts

t i o n o f c o m p e t e n c i e s (as w e l l as o f r e c o n s t r u c t e d p a t t e r n s o f d e v e l -

f r o m t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t e v e r y a d u l t s p e a k e r possesses a r e c o n ¬

o p m e n t o f these c o m p e t e n c i e s ) w i t h a s s u m p t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g c a u s a l

structible i m p l i c i t knowledge i n w h i c h his linguistic rule

mechanisms.

5 7

T h e paradigms i n t r o d u c e d by C h o m s k y a n d Piaget

have p r o m p t e d a type o f research d e t e r m i n e d by a p e c u l i a r c o n n e c -

tence

(to

postulates

produce a

sentences)

corresponding

is

expressed,

communicative

speech-act rule

competheory

competence,

t i o n b e t w e e n f o r m a l a n d e m p i r i c a l analysis r a t h e r t h a n b y t h e i r

n a m e l y t h e c o m p e t e n c e t o e m p l o y s e n t e n c e s i n s p e e c h acts. I t is

classical s e p a r a t i o n . T h e e x p r e s s i o n " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l , " w i t h w h i c h w e

f u r t h e r a s s u m e d t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e has j u s t as u n i v e r -

associate a c o n t r a s t t o e m p i r i c a l s c i e n c e , is t h u s u n s u i t e d t o c h a r a c -

sal a c o r e as l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e . A g e n e r a l t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts

t e r i z i n g , w i t h o u t m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a l i n e o f r e s e a r c h s u c h as u n i -

w o u l d t h u s d e s c r i b e p r e c i s e l y t h a t f u n d a m e n t a l system o f r u l e s t h a t

versal p r a g m a t i c s . B e h i n d t h e t e r m i n o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n can be f o u n d

a d u l t speakers m a s t e r t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y c a n f u l f i l l the conditions

t h e systematic q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e as-yet i n s u f f i c i e n t l y c l a r i f i e d

for a happy employment of sentences in utterances, n o m a t t e r t o w h i c h

status o f n o n n o m o l o g i c a l e m p i r i c a l sciences o f t h e r e c o n s t r u c t i v e

p a r t i c u l a r l a n g u a g e t h e sentences m a y b e l o n g a n d i n w h i c h r a n d o m

t y p e . I s h a l l have t o leave t h i s q u e s t i o n aside h e r e . I n a n y case, t h e

contexts the utterances may be

attempt to play d o w n the interesting methodological differences that

embedded.

T h e p r o p o s a l t o i n v e s t i g a t e l a n g u a g e use i n

competence-theoretic

arise h e r e , a n d t o i n t e r p r e t t h e m away i n t h e sense o f t h e u n i f i e d

t e r m s calls f o r a r e v i s i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t s o f c o m p e t e n c e a n d p e r f o r -

s c i e n c e p r o g r a m , seems t o h a v e l i t t l e p r o s p e c t o f s u c c e s s .

m a n c e . C h o m s k y i n i t i a l l y u n d e r s t a n d s these c o n c e p t s i n s u c h a way

58

t h a t i t m a k e s sense t o r e q u i r e t h a t t h e p h o n e t i c , s y n t a c t i c , a n d s e m a n t i c p r o p e r t i e s o f s e n t e n c e s be i n v e s t i g a t e d l i n g u i s t i c a l l y w i t h i n

II

the framework o f a reconstruction o f linguistic competence a n d that T h e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts has g i v e n rise t o ideas

the p r a g m a t i c p r o p e r t i e s o f utterances be left to a t h e o r y o f linguis-

o n w h i c h the f u n d a m e n t a l assumptions o f universal pragmatics can

tic p e r f o r m a n c e .

be based.

o f w h e t h e r " c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e " is n o t a h y b r i d c o n c e p t . I

5 9

T h e universal-pragmatic p o i n t o f view f r o m w h i c h I shall

6 0

T h i s c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n gives rise t o t h e q u e s t i o n

49

48


Chapter 1

have, to b e g i n w i t h , based the d e m a r c a t i o n o f linguistics f r o m u n i -

at t h e s a m e t i m e f u l f i l l i n g t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s

versal pragmatics o n t h e c u r r e n t d i s t i n c t i o n between sentences a n d

T h i s can be m a d e clear by l o o k i n g at t h e relations to reality i n w h i c h

specific t o speech.

utterances. T h e p r o d u c t i o n o f sentences a c c o r d i n g to t h e r u l e s o f

e v e r y s e n t e n c e is first e m b e d d e d t h r o u g h t h e a c t o f u t t e r a n c e . I n

g r a m m a r is s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e use o f s e n t e n c e s i n a c c o r d a n c e

b e i n g u t t e r e d , a s e n t e n c e is p l a c e d i n r e l a t i o n t o (a) t h e e x t e r n a l

w i t h pragmatic rules that shape the infrastructure o f speech situ-

reality o f that w h i c h can be perceived, (b) the i n t e r n a l reality o f that

a t i o n s i n g e n e r a l . B u t t h i s raises t h e f o l l o w i n g t w o q u e s t i o n s ,

w h i c h a s p e a k e r w o u l d l i k e t o e x p r e s s as h e r i n t e n t i o n s , a n d (c) t h e

(i)

C o u l d n o t t h e u n i v e r s a l s t r u c t u r e s o f s p e e c h — w h a t is c o m m o n t o a l l

n o r m a t i v e r e a l i t y o f t h a t w h i c h is s o c i a l l y a n d c u l t u r a l l y

utterances

recognized.

ade-

I t is t h e r e b y s u b j e c t e d t o v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h a t i t n e e d n o t a n d c a n n o t

quately d e t e r m i n e d t h r o u g h universal sentential structures? I n this

f u l f i l l as a n o n s i t u a t e d s e n t e n c e , as a p u r e l y g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m a t i o n .

case, w i t h h i s l i n g u i s t i c a l l y r e c o n s t r u c t i b l e l i n g u i s t i c c o m p e t e n c e ,

A c h a i n o f s y m b o l s " c o u n t s " as a s e n t e n c e o f a n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e , L ,

independendy

of

their

particular contexts—be

for mastering situations o f

i f i t is w e l l f o r m e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e system o f g r a m m a t i c a l r u l e s , GL.

p o s s i b l e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung), f o r t h e g e n e r a l task

T h e g r a m m a t i c a l i t y o f a sentence means ( f r o m a pragmatic perspec-

o f u t t e r i n g sentences; a n d t h e p o s t u l a t e o f a g e n e r a l

t i v e ) t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e , w h e n u t t e r e d b y a speaker, is comprehensible

the

s p e a k e r w o u l d also b e

equipped

communicative

competence distinguishable f r o m linguistic competence c o u l d

not

t o a l l h e a r e r s w h o h a v e m a s t e r e d GL. C o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y is t h e o n l y

b e j u s t i f i e d . I n a d d i t i o n t o t h i s t h e r e is t h e q u e s t i o n ( i i ) w h e t h e r t h e

u n i v e r s a l c l a i m t h a t is t o b e f u l f i l l e d i m m a n e n t l y t o l a n g u a g e

s e m a n t i c p r o p e r t i e s o f s e n t e n c e s ( o r w o r d s ) m a y n o t , i n t h e sense o f

can be raised by p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h r e g a r d to a

the

sentence. T h e validity o f a stated p r o p o s i t i o n , by contrast, d e p e n d s

use t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g , b e e x p l i c a t e d i n a n y case o n l y w i t h

reference to situations o f possible typical e m p l o y m e n t . T h e n

the

o n w h e t h e r the p r o p o s i t i o n represents a fact o r experience (or o n

d i s t i n c t i o n between sentences a n d utterances w o u l d be i r r e l e v a n t , at

whether the existential presuppositions o f the m e n t i o n e d

least t o s e m a n t i c t h e o r y (so l o n g as s u f f i c i e n t l y t y p i c a l c o n t e x t s

tional

of

u t t e r a n c e w e r e t a k e n i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n ) . A s s o o n as t h e d i s t i n c t i o n

that

proposi-

c o n t e n t h o l d ) ; the validity o f an expressed i n t e n t i o n depends

o n w h e t h e r i t c o r r e s p o n d s t o w h a t is a c t u a l l y i n t e n d e d b y

the

b e t w e e n t h e l i n g u i s t i c analysis o f s e n t e n c e s a n d t h e p r a g m a t i c a n a l y -

speaker; a n d t h e validity o f the speech act p e r f o r m e d d e p e n d s o n

sis o f u t t e r a n c e s b e c o m e s hazy, h o w e v e r , t h e o b j e c t d o m a i n o f u n i -

whether

v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s is also i n d a n g e r o f b e c o m i n g b l u r r e d .

g r o u n d . W h e r e a s a g r a m m a t i c a l sentence f u l f i l l s t h e c l a i m t o c o m p r e -

W i t h r e g a r d to the first question, I w o u l d agree, w i t h c e r t a i n qualifications,

6 1

t h a t a speaker,

i n transposing a well-formed

sen-

t e n c e i n t o a n act o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , m e r e l y actualizes w h a t is i n h e r e n t i n t h e s e n t e n c e s t r u c t u r e s . B u t t h i s is n o t to deny the difference

between

the production of a grammatical

this action

conforms

to a recognized

normative

back-

h e n s i b i l i t y , a successful utterance m u s t satisfy t h r e e a d d i t i o n a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s : i t m u s t c o u n t as t r u e f o r t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n s o f a r as i t r e p r e sents s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d ; i t m u s t c o u n t as t r u t h f u l i n s o f a r as i t expresses s o m e t h i n g i n t e n d e d b y t h e s p e a k e r ; a n d i t m u s t c o u n t as r i g h t i n s o f a r as i t c o n f o r m s t o s o c i a l l y r e c o g n i z e d

expectations.

s e n t e n c e a n d t h e use o f t h a t s e n t e n c e i n a s i t u a t i o n o f p o s s i b l e

We can, o f course, i d e n t i f y features i n t h e surface structures o f

m u t u a l understanding, or the difference between the universal pre-

s e n t e n c e s t h a t have a s p e c i a l s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r t h e t h r e e g e n e r a l p r a g -

s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a t a c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r has t o f u l f i l l i n e a c h case. I n

m a t i c f u n c t i o n s o f t h e utterance: t o r e p r e s e n t s o m e t h i n g , to express

presuppo-

an i n t e n t i o n , to establish an i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p . Sentences

s i t i o n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n . E v e n i f she f u l f i l l s t h e s e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s

w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t are used to represent a n experience o r a

i n c o n f o r m i t y t o t h e s t r u c t u r e s t h a t a r e a l r e a d y g i v e n w i t h t h e sen-

state o f a f f a i r s ( o r t o r e f e r t o these i n d i r e c t l y ) ; i n t e n t i o n a l e x p r e s -

t e n c e e m p l o y e d , she m a y v e r y w e l l f o r m t h e s e n t e n c e i t s e l f w i t h o u t

sions, m o d a l f o r m s , a n d so o n a r e u s e d t o e x p r e s s t h e s p e a k e r ' s

o r d e r to u t t e r a sentence, the speaker m u s t f u l f i l l general

50

51

Chapter 1


i n t e n t i o n s ; p e r f o r m a t i v e phrases are used t o establish i n t e r p e r s o n a l

d o m a i n o f f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s has b e e n p u r s u e d w i t h i n a n a l y t i c p h i -

relations between speaker a n d hearer. T h u s , the general structures

losophy f r o m Frege to D u m m e t t .

o f s p e e c h a r e also r e f l e c t e d a t t h e l e v e l o f s e n t e n c e s t r u c t u r e . B u t

p r a g m a t i c investigation can be seen i n t h e fact t h a t the t r u t h value

i n s o f a r as w e c o n s i d e r a s e n t e n c e as a g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m a t i o n , t h a t

o f p r o p o s i t i o n s is systematically t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t . T h e t h e o r y o f

is, i n d e p e n d e n d y

o f speech situations i n w h i c h i t can be u t t e r e d ,

p r e d i c a t i o n d o e s n o t i n v e s t i g a t e s e n t e n c e s i n g e n e r a l (as d o e s l i n -

t h e s e g e n e r a l p r a g m a t i c f u n c t i o n s are n o t y e t " o c c u p i e d . " I n o r d e r

g u i s t i c s ) b u t s e n t e n c e s i n t h e i r f u n c t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t i n g facts. A n a l y -

to p r o d u c e a grammatical sentence—as an example,

say, f o r

g u i s t s — a c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r n e e d satisfy o n l y t h e c l a i m t o h e n s i b i l i t y . H e has t o have m a s t e r e d t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g

T h a t t h i s is a m a t t e r o f u n i v e r s a l -

6 2

lin-

sis is d i r e c t e d a b o v e a l l t o t h e l o g i c o f u s i n g p r e d i c a t e s a n d t h o s e

compre-

expressions t h a t e n a b l e us t o r e f e r t o objects. T o be sure, this p a r t

system

of

g r a m m a t i c a l rules; this we call his l i n g u i s t i c ability, a n d i t can

be

o f u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s is n o t t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t f o r a t h e o r y o f communication.

The

analysis o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , t h e d i s c u s s i o n

of

a n a l y z e d l i n g u i s t i c a l l y . I t is a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r w i t h r e g a r d t o h i s

avowals, a n d t h e d e b a t e o n p r i v a t e s p e e c h , i n so f a r as t h e y c l e a r t h e

a b i l i t y t o c o m m u n i c a t e ; t h i s is s u s c e p t i b l e o n l y t o p r a g m a t i c analysis.

way t o a u n i v e r s a l pragmatics o f t h e expressive f u n c t i o n o f u t t e r -

By " c o m m u n i c a t i v e

ances, a r e o n l y b e g i n n i n g s .

competence," I understand

the ability o f

a

6 3

Finally, speech act t h e o r y provides a

speaker o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g to e m b e d a w e l l -

useful p o i n t o f departure for the p a r t o f universal pragmatics related

f o r m e d s e n t e n c e i n r e l a t i o n s t o r e a l i t y — t h a t is,

to the interpersonal f u n c t i o n o f utterances.

i . t o c h o o s e t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e i n s u c h a way t h a t e i t h e r t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f the p r o p o s i t i o n stated o r the existential presuppositions o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t m e n t i o n e d are supposedly f u l f i l l e d (so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n s h a r e t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e s p e a k e r ) ;

W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e s e c o n d q u e s t i o n r a i s e d a b o v e , o n e m i g h t see a further difficulty with my proposal

for conceptualizing

universal

p r a g m a t i c s i n t h e f a c t t h a t f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s d o e s n o t fit w e l l i n t o the distinction between

a l i n g u i s t i c analysis c o n c e r n e d w i t h

i i . T o e x p r e s s h i s i n t e n t i o n s i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s -

a b r o a d s p e c t r u m o f different approaches to semantic theory.

s i o n r e p r e s e n t s w h a t is i n t e n d e d (so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n t r u s t t h e

guistically oriented theories of meaning *

speaker); a n d

sen-

t e n c e s a n d a p r a g m a t i c analysis c o n c e r n e d w i t h u t t e r a n c e s . T h e r e is 6

Lin-

t r y t o g r a s p systematically t h e

s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s . I n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f trans-

i i i . T o p e r f o r m t h e s p e e c h a c t i n s u c h a way t h a t i t c o n f o r m s

to

formational

grammar, e x p l a n a t i o n s o f t h e s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e s o f

sen-

r e c o g n i z e d n o r m s o r t o a c c e p t e d self-images (so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n

tences e i t h e r start w i t h semantic d e e p structures o r rely o n semantic

be i n a c c o r d w i t h the speaker i n shared value o r i e n t a t i o n s ) .

p r o j e c t i o n s i n t o s y n t a c t i c s t r u c t u r e s . T h i s a p p r o a c h leads as a r u l e

T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t these decisions d o epistemic

presuppositions

not depend

and changing

contexts

o n particular b u t cause

t e n c e s i n g e n e r a l t o assume t h e u n i v e r s a l - p r a g m a t i c f u n c t i o n s representation, expression,

and the production

of

senof

interpersonal

r e l a t i o n s h i p s , w h a t is e x p r e s s e d i n t h e m is p r e c i s e l y t h e c o m m u n i c a tive c o m p e t e n c e f o r w h i c h I a m p r o p o s i n g

a universal-pragmatic

investigation. T h e p a r t o f u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s t h a t is f u r t h e s t d e v e l o p e d is t h a t related to the representational f u n c t i o n o f utterances, for to

the

use

of

elementary

p r o p o s i t i o n a l sentences.

This

example classic

t o a c o m b i n a t o r y system, c o n s t r u c t e d u s i n g e l e m e n t a r y sentences, o f g e n e r a l s e m a n t i c m a r k e r s . Lexical semantics p r o c e e d s i n a s i m i l a r m a n n e r ; i t clarifies t h e m e a n i n g structures o f a given l e x i c o n by way o f a f o r m a l analysis o f m e a n i n g r e l a t i o n s . T h e w e a k n e s s o f t h e s e l i n g u i s t i c a p p r o a c h e s lies i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y a c c o m m o d a t e t h e p r a g m a t i c d i m e n s i o n o f t h e use o f s e n t e n c e s o n l y i n a n a d h o c way. H o w e v e r , t h e use t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g d e v e l o p e d f r o m t h e w o r k o f W i t t g e n s t e i n has p r o v i d e d g o o d r e a s o n s f o r h o l d i n g t h a t t h e m e a n i n g o f l i n g u i s t i c expressions can be i d e n t i f i e d o n l y w i t h reference to situations o f possible e m p l o y m e n t .

52

53

Chapter 1


F o r t h e i r p a r t , pragmatic theories of meaning

65

are faced w i t h

the

difficulty o f d e l i m i t i n g a linguistic expression's typical situations o f e m p l o y m e n t f r o m contexts tional

I w o u l d n o w l i k e t o s u m u p t h e d i f f e r e n t levels o f analysis a n d c o r r e s p o n d i n g object d o m a i n s o f semiotics.

t h a t h a p p e n b y c h a n c e t o have a d d i -

meaning-generating power

b u t d o n o t affect t h e

semantic

core o f the linguistic expression. A c c o r d i n g to w h i c h criteria may we

Sentences versus Utterances I f w e s t a r t w i t h c o n c r e t e s p e e c h acts e m b e d d e d i n s p e c i f i c c o n t e x t s

e x t r a p o l a t e t y p i c a l b e h a v i o r f r o m a c t u a l l i n g u i s t i c b e h a v i o r ? Reference

a n d t h e n d i s r e g a r d a l l aspects t h a t t h e s e u t t e r a n c e s o w e t o t h e i r

w h e t h e r f r a m e d as a t h e o r y o f e x t e n s i o n a l o r o f i n t e n -

p r a g m a t i c f u n c t i o n s , we are left w i t h linguistic expressions. Whereas

sional d e n o t a t i o n , determines the m e a n i n g o f a n expression by the

t h e e l e m e n t a r y u n i t o f s p e e c h is t h e s p e e c h act, t h e e l e m e n t a r y u n i t

class o f o b j e c t s t o w h i c h i t c a n b e a p p l i e d i n t r u e s e n t e n c e s . O n t h i s

o f l a n g u a g e is t h e s e n t e n c e . T h e d e m a r c a t i o n is o b t a i n e d b y a t t e n d -

premise, one can explicate t h e m e a n i n g o f expressions that appear

i n g to c o n d i t i o n s o f validity: a grammatically w e l l - f o r m e d sentence

i n s e n t e n c e s w i t h a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n . I d o n o t see,

however,

satisfies t h e c l a i m t o c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y ; a c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y successful

w h y semantic t h e o r y s h o u l d m o n o p o l i s t i c a l l y single o u t the r e p r e -

speech act r e q u i r e s , b e y o n d t h e c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y o f the l i n g u i s t i c

sentational f u n c t i o n o f language

mean-

expression, t h a t the participants i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n be p r e p a r e d to

interpersonal

r e a c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d t h a t t h e y raise c l a i m s t o t r u t h , t r u t h f u l -

semantics,

66

ings

that language

a n d neglect

t h e specific

d e v e l o p s i n its expressive a n d

functions.

ness, a n d Tightness, a n d r e c i p r o c a l l y i m p u t e t h e i r s a t i s f a c t i o n . S e n -

These p r e l i m i n a r y reflections are i n t e n d e d merely to s u p p o r t t h e c o n j e c t u r e t h a t s e m a n t i c t h e o r y c a n n o t f r u i t f u l l y b e d e v e l o p e d as a u n i f i e d t h e o r y . B u t i f i t is h e t e r o g e n e o u s l y

composed, no

t e n c e s a r e t h e o b j e c t o f linguistic analysis, s p e e c h acts o f p r a g m a t i c analysis.

objection

t o t h e m e t h o d o l o g i c a l s e p a r a t i o n o f t h e analysis o f s e n t e n c e s t r u c -

Individual

tures f r o m that o f utterance structures can be i n f e r r e d f r o m the

T h e f i r s t task o f l i n g u i s t i c s is t o d e v e l o p a g r a m m a r f o r e a c h i n d i v i d -

difficulties o f d e m a r c a t i n g semantics f r o m pragmatics (difficulties

u a l l a n g u a g e so t h a t a s t r u c t u r a l d e s c r i p t i o n c a n b e c o r r e l a t e d w i t h

t h a t are equally present i n d e m a r c a t i n g semantics f r o m syntax). T h e

any sentence o f the language. O n the o t h e r h a n d , general g r a m m a t i -

Languages versus Language in General

analysis o f g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s o f s p e e c h c a n i n d e e d b e g i n w i t h g e n -

c a l t h e o r y is c o n c e r n e d w i t h r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e r u l e system

e r a l s e n t e n c e s t r u c t u r e s . H o w e v e r , i t is d i r e c t e d t o f o r m a l p r o p e r t i e s

u n d e r l i e s t h e ability o f a subject to generate w e l l - f o r m e d sentences

o f sentences o n l y f r o m t h e perspective

i n a n y l a n g u a g e whatsoever.

o f the possibility o f

using

G r a m m a t i c a l t h e o r y claims to

that

recon-

sentences as e l e m e n t s o f s p e e c h , t h a t is, f o r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l , e x p r e s -

s t r u c t t h e u n i v e r s a l l i n g u i s t i c a b i l i t y o f a d u l t speakers.

( I n a strong

sive, a n d i n t e r p e r s o n a l f u n c t i o n s . U n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s , t o o , c a n b e

version, this linguistic competence means the ability to develop hy-

u n d e r s t o o d as s e m a n t i c analysis. B u t i t is d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m o t h e r

p o t h e s e s t h a t g u i d e l a n g u a g e a c q u i s i t i o n o n t h e basis o f a n i n n a t e

theories o f m e a n i n g i n that the meanings o f linguistic expressions

disposition; i n a weaker version, linguistic competence

a r e r e l e v a n t o n l y i n s o f a r as t h e s e e x p r e s s i o n s a r e u s e d i n s p e e c h acts

t h e r e s u l t o f l e a r n i n g processes i n t e r p r e t e d c o n s t r u c t i v i s t i c a l l y i n

t h a t satisfy t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s o f t r u t h , t r u t h f u l n e s s , a n d n o r m a t i v e

Piaget's sense.)

represents

l i g h t n e s s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s is d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m e m p i r i c a l pragmatics, f o r example, sociolinguistics, i n that the m e a n i n g o f linguistic expressions comes u n d e r consideration

only

i n s o f a r as i t is d e t e r m i n e d b y formal p r o p e r t i e s o f s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n s i n g e n e r a l , a n d n o t b y p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s o f use.

Aspects of Linguistic

Analysis

Every linguistic expression

c a n be c o n s i d e r e d

f r o m a t least t h r e e

a n a l y t i c v i e w p o i n t s . P h o n e t i c s e x a m i n e s l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s as i n s c r i p t i o n s i n a n u n d e r l y i n g m e d i u m ( i . e . , as f o r m a t i o n s o f

sound).

54

55

Chapter 1

What Is Universal Pragmatics?

S y n t a c t i c t h e o r y investigates l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e

e x a m i n e s i n t e n t i o n a l e x p r e s s i o n s i n s o f a r as t h e y f u n c t i o n i n

f o r m a l c o n n e c t i o n s o f the smallest m e a n i n g f u l units. Semantic t h e -

s o n s e n t e n c e s . F i n a l l y , t h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts e x a m i n e s i l l o c u t i o n -

first-per-

o r y examines the m e a n i n g c o n t e n t o f linguistic expressions. Evi-

ary force f r o m

dendy,

i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations. These semiotic d i s t i n c t i o n s are s u m m a r i z e d

only

phonetic

linguistic theories;

and

semantic

syntactic

theory

are

self-sufficient

t h e o r y , by contrast, c a n n o t

be

con-

d u c t e d solely i n t h e a t t i t u d e o f t h e t h e o r e t i c i a n o f l a n g u a g e , t h a t is, i n d i s r e g a r d o f p r a g m a t i c aspects. Particular

versus Universal Aspects of Speech Acts

T h e task o f e m p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s consists, t o b e g i n w i t h , i n d e s c r i b i n g s p e e c h acts t y p i c a l o f a c e r t a i n m i l i e u , w h i c h c a n i n t u r n

be

analyzed f r o m sociological, ethnological, a n d psychological points o f

the viewpoint of the establishment

i n the f o l l o w i n g table: T h e o r e t i c a l level

Object domain

Linguistics

Sentences

Grammar

Sentences o f an i n d i v i d u a l language

Grammatical theory

Rules f o r generating sentences i n any

view. G e n e r a l p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , is c o n c e r n e d Uni-

v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s t h e r e b y raises t h e c l a i m t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e a b i l i t y

A s p e c t s o f l i n g u i s t i c analysis Phonetic

theory

Inscriptions (language

o f a d u l t speakers to e m b e d sentences i n r e l a t i o n s to r e a l i t y i n such a way t h a t they can take o n

the general pragmatic functions

of

representation, expression, a n d establishing legitimate interpersonal r e l a t i o n s . T h i s c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o m p e t e n c e is e x p r e s s e d i n t e r a l i a i n those accomplishments

t h a t h e r m e n e u t i c s stylizes t o a n a r t (Kunst¬

language

whatever

w i t h r e c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e r u l e system t h a t u n d e r l i e s t h e a b i l i t y o f a s u b j e c t t o u t t e r s e n t e n c e s i n a n y r e l e v a n t s i t u a t i o n whatsoever.

o f legitimate

sounds) Syntactic t h e o r y

Syntactical rules

Semantic

Lexical units

theory

Pragmatics

S p e e c h acts

lehre), n a m e l y p a r a p h r a s i n g u t t e r a n c e s b y m e a n s o f c o n t e x t - s i m i l a r

Empirical pragmatics

C o n t e x t - b o u n d s p e e c h acts

u t t e r a n c e s o f t h e same l a n g u a g e o r t r a n s l a t i n g t h e m i n t o c o n t e x t -

Universal pragmatics

R u l e s f o r u s i n g sentences

comparable utterances i n a f o r e i g n Universal-Pragmatic

language.

i n utterances Aspects o f universal-pragmatic

Aspects

T h e three general pragmatic functions o f an utterance—to sent

something

i n the w o r l d u s i n g a sentence, to

repre-

express

the

speaker's i n t e n t i o n s , a n d to establish l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations—are

t h e basis o f a l l t h e p a r t i c u l a r f u n c t i o n s t h a t a n u t t e r a n c e

c a n assume i n s p e c i f i c c o n t e x t s . T h e f u l f i l l m e n t o f t h o s e

general

analysis Theory of elementary

Acts o f reference a n d

propositions

predication

Theory of

first-person

sentences

f u n c t i o n s is m e a s u r e d a g a i n s t t h e v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s f o r t r u t h , t r u t h f u l n e s s , a n d Tightness. T h u s e v e r y s p e e c h a c t c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d f r o m the corresponding

analytic viewpoints. F o r m a l semantics

examines

t h e s t r u c t u r e o f e l e m e n t a r y p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d t h e acts o f r e f e r e n c e a n d p r e d i c a t i o n . A s t i l l scarcely d e v e l o p e d t h e o r y o f i n t e n t i o n a l i t y

Linguistic expression o f intentions Establishment of

T h e o r y o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts

interpersonal relations

For a theory of communicative

a c t i o n , t h e t h i r d aspect o f u t t e r -

ances, n a m e l y t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t

o f legitimate interpersonal rela-

tions,

is c e n t r a l . I s h a l l t h e r e f o r e t a k e t h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts as

my point of departure.

57

56


Chapter 1

T h e Standard F o r m o f the Speech Act—Searle's Principle o f

p r o m i s e , a s s e r t i o n , s u g g e s t i o n , a n d so f o r t h ) . T h u s t h e g e n e r a t i v e

Expressibility

p o w e r consists i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e speaker, i n p e r f o r m i n g a s p e e c h

T h e p r i n c i p a l task o f s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y is t o c l a r i f y t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e

up an interpersonal relation with her.

status o f l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s . A u s t i n a n a l y z e d t h e sense i n w h i c h I

e v e r y i n t e r a c t i o n , a n d n o t o n l y o f s p e e c h acts, t h a t t h e y e s t a b l i s h

act, c a n i n f l u e n c e t h e h e a r e r i n s u c h a w a y t h a t t h e l a t t e r c a n t a k e 6 8

I t c a n , o f c o u r s e , be s a i d o f

c a n u t t e r s e n t e n c e s i n s p e e c h acts as t h e illocutionary force o f s p e e c h

i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s . W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e y have a n e x p l i c i t l y l i n -

acts. I n u t t e r i n g a p r o m i s e , a n a s s e r t i o n , o r a w a r n i n g , I s i m u l t a n e -

g u i s t i c f o r m , c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n s a r e r e l a t e d t o a c o n t e x t o f ac-

ously execute an action w i t h the c o r r e s p o n d i n g

tion

sentences: I t r y t o

norms

a n d values. W i t h o u t t h e

normative background

of

make a p r o m i s e , t o put forward a n a s s e r t i o n , t o issue a w a r n i n g — I d o

routines, roles, h a b i t u a l i z e d f o r m s o f l i f e — i n short,

t h i n g s by saying s o m e t h i n g . A l t h o u g h t h e r e are o t h e r m o d e s

of

the individual action w o u l d remain indeterminate. A l l communica-

employing language—Austin mentions, a m o n g others, w r i t i n g

po-

e m s a n d t e l l i n g j o k e s — t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y use seems t o b e t h e f o u n dation on

w h i c h these o t h e r k i n d s o f e m p l o y m e n t

rest. T o

be

u n d e r s t o o d i n a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n , e v e r y u t t e r a n c e m u s t a t least i m p l i c i t l y e s t a b l i s h a n d give e x p r e s s i o n

t o a c e r t a i n relation b e t w e e n

the

s p e a k e r a n d h e r c o u n t e r p a r t . W e c a n also say t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a s p e e c h act consists i n f i x i n g t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e f u n c t i o n o f the content uttered. T h e current distinction between the content and the relational aspects o f a n u t t e r a n c e has, t o b e g i n w i t h , a t r i v i a l m e a n i n g .

6 7

I t says

t h a t , i n b e i n g u t t e r e d , t h e s e n t e n c e u s e d is e m b e d d e d i n a c o n t e x t , m o r e precisely, i n s p e c i f i c i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s . I n a c e r t a i n way, e v e r y e x p l i c i d y p e r f o r m a t i v e u t t e r a n c e b o t h establishes a n d r e p r e sents a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a t least t w o s u b j e c t s c a p a b l e o f s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n . T h i s c i r c u m s t a n c e is t r i v i a l so l o n g as u n d e r t h e r e l a t i o n a l aspect we m e r e l y c o n t r a s t t h e u t t e r a n c e c h a r a c t e r

of

tive

actions

satisfy

or

violate

normative

w i t h a t least o n e o t h e r s u c h s u b j e c t . T h u s t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n is a c r i t e r i o n t h a t is n o t selective e n o u g h o u r purposes. I emphasized

analysis t o p a r a d i g m a t i c cases o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y e x p l i c i t a c t i o n t h a t is oriented toward reaching understanding. This restriction must now b e d r a w n s o m e w h a t m o r e precisely. I n d o i n g so, w e c a n b e g i n w i t h t h e s t a n d a r d e x a m p l e s f r o m w h i c h s p e e c h - a c t t h e o r y was d e v e l o p e d . T h e f o l l o w i n g are typical speech-act f o r m s : "I . . .

you

6 9

that...

[verb]

[sentence]

e.g., " I ( h e r e b y ) p r o m i s e y o u t h a t I w i l l c o m e t o m o r r o w . " "You are . . .

...

."

[verb] [p. part.]

tive p o w e r o f s p e e c h acts.

for

at t h e start t h a t I a m r e s t r i c t i n g m y

e.g., " Y o u a r e r e q u e s t e d t o s t o p s m o k i n g . "

c o n c e p t c a n n o t l i e t h e r e i n . I find i t r a t h e r i n t h e p e c u l i a r l y g e n e r a -

or

c a p a b l e o f s p e a k i n g a n d a c t i n g takes u p a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n

i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a s p e e c h act, t h e c o n c e p t " i l l o c u t i o n a r y " c o u l d c h a r a c t e r o f a c t i o n s , t h a t is, a r e s p e e c h actions. T h e p o i n t o f t h e

expectations

conventions. Satisfying a c o n v e n t i o n i n a c t i n g means t h a t a subject

s p e e c h w i t h its s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t . I f n o t h i n g m o r e w e r e m e a n t b y t h e s e r v e a t best t o e l u c i d a t e t h e f a c t t h a t l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s h a v e t h e

social

conventions—

" I ••.

... [auxiliary verb]

[sentence]

you that [verb]

... [sentence]

e.g., " I c a n assure y o u t h a t i t w a s n ' t I . "

I t is t o t h i s g e n e r a t i v e p o w e r t h a t I t r a c e t h e f a c t t h a t a s p e e c h a c t

I shall h o l d to the f o l l o w i n g t e r m i n o l o g i c a l rules. A n explicit

c a n s u c c e e d ( o r f a i l ) . W e c a n say t h a t a s p e e c h a c t succeeds i f a

s p e e c h a c t satisfies t h e standard form i n its s u r f a c e s t r u c t u r e i f i t is

r e l a t i o n between the speaker a n d hearer comes to pass—the r e l a t i o n

m a d e u p o f a n illocutionary a n d a propositional c o m p o n e n t . T h e i l l o -

i n t e n d e d b y t h e s p e a k e r — a n d i f t h e h e a r e r c a n understand and accept

c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t consists i n a n illocutionary a c t c a r r i e d o u t w i t h

t h e c o n t e n t u t t e r e d b y t h e s p e a k e r i n t h e sense i n d i c a t e d (e.g., as a

t h e a i d o f a performative sentence. T h i s s e n t e n c e is f o r m e d i n t h e

58

59

Chapter 1


p r e s e n t i n d i c a t i v e , a f f i r m a t i v e , a n d has as its l o g i c a l s u b j e c t t h e

first

t o state s o m e t h i n g a b o u t t h e w o r l d , e i t h e r d i r e c d y i n t h e f o r m o f a n

person

the

a s s e r t i o n o r i n d i r e c d y , i n n o n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, t h r o u g h m e n -

a n d as its l o g i c a l

(direct)

object the second person;

predicate, constructed w i t h the help of a performative permits i n general the particle "hereby." n e n t needs to be c o m p l e t e d structed with

the

help

of

expression,

tioning

a propositional

content.

This performative compo-

E x p l i c i t s p e e c h acts always have a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t i n

by a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t c o n -

w h i c h a state o f a f f a i r s is e x p r e s s e d . N o n l i n g u i s t i c a c t i o n s n o r m a l l y

7 0

a sentence w i t h

W h e n e v e r i t is u s e d i n c o n s t a t i v e

propositional

content.

s p e e c h acts, t h e s e n t e n c e w i t h

p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t takes t h e f o r m o f a propositional sentence

(Aus-

lack this c o m p o n e n t ; thus they cannot fulfill representational funct i o n s . S i g n a l i n g t o a t a x i so t h a t I c a n b e g i n w o r k i n m y o f f i c e b y eight i n the m o r n i n g , reacting to the news o f m y child's

miserable

sagesatz) . I n its e l e m e n t a r y f o r m , t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e c o n t a i n s

school grades w i t h a desperate look, j o i n i n g a d e m o n s t r a t i o n m a r c h ,

(i) a n a m e or a r e f e r r i n g expression,

the

expressing n o n a c c e p t a n c e o f an i n v i t a t i o n by n o t s h o w i n g u p , shak-

s p e a k e r d e n o t e s a n o b j e c t a b o u t w h i c h she w a n t s t o assert s o m e -

i n g a c a n d i d a t e ' s h a n d a f t e r h e has passed t h e e x a m , a n d so o n a n d

t h i n g ; a n d (ii) a predicate expression for the general

so f o r t h , I o b s e r v e o r v i o l a t e c o n v e n t i o n s . N a t u r a l l y , these n o r m a t i v e

with the aid of w h i c h

specification

t h a t the speaker wants to g r a n t o r d e n y to the object. I n n o n c o n s t a -

expectations

tive s p e e c h acts, t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t is n o t s t a t e d , b u t men-

tional content

have a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t ; m u s t a l r e a d y be

however, the

proposi-

k n o w n to the participants i f the

tioned, i n t h i s case, p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t

c o i n c i d e s w i t h w h a t is

e x p r e s s e d b e h a v i o r is t o be c o m p r e h e n s i b l e as a r r i v i n g at w o r k , a

usually called the unasserted p r o p o s i t i o n .

( T h u s I d i s t i n g u i s h be-

p a r e n t ' s r e a c t i n g , t a k i n g p a r t i n a d e m o n s t r a t i o n — i n s h o r t as a n

t w e e n t h e n o m i n a l i z e d p r o p o s i t i o n " t h a t p," w h i c h expresses a state

action. T h e

o f affairs, a n d t h e p r o p o s i t i o n

t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f t h e p r e s u p p o s e d n o r m t o e x p r e s s i o n because i t

w h i c h represents a fact a n d w h i c h

nonverbal utterance itself cannot b r i n g the

owes its assertoric f o r c e t o t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t i t is e m b e d d e d i n

cannot

a s p e e c h act o f t h e t y p e " a s s e r t i o n , " a n d is t h e r e b y c o n n e c t e d w i t h

understood

a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act o f asserting. I n f o r m a l logic, o f course, we treat

content o f the presupposed n o r m .

p r o p o s i t i o n s as a u t o n o m o u s u n i t s . O n l y t h e t r u t h v a l u e w e assign t o "jf>" i n c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o " t h a t p" is a r e m i n d e r o f t h e

embedding

o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n i n s o m e c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h act, a n e m b e d d i n g is systematically n e g l e c t e d . )

that

take o n

proposi-

representational functions. I t can, o f course,

as a n i n d i c a t o r t h a t calls t o m i n d t h e

be

propositional

O w i n g to their representational function, propositionally different i a t e d speech acts a l l o w t h e a c t o r a g r e a t e r d e g r e e o f f r e e d o m

in

f o l l o w i n g n o r m s . I f w o r k b e g i n s a t e i g h t i n t h e m o r n i n g , t h e r e is t h e o p t i o n o n l y o f a p p e a r i n g o r n o t a p p e a r i n g ; i n t h e f o r m e r case, t o b e

7 1

I s h a l l c a l l s p e e c h acts t h a t h a v e t h i s s t r u c t u r e propositionally differ-

o n t i m e o r t o b e l a t e ; i n t h e l a t t e r case, t o b e e x c u s e d o r n o t e x c u s e d ,

entiated. T h e y are d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m s y m b o l i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c -

a n d so o n . N o n v e r b a l a c t i o n s are o f t e n t h e r e s u l t o f s u c h " t r e e s " o f

t i o n s — f o r i n s t a n c e , a s h o u t o f " F i r e ! " t h a t releases

complementary

"yes" o r " n o " d e c i s i o n s . B u t i f t h e a c t o r c a n e x p r e s s h e r s e l f v e r b a l l y ,

a c t i o n s , assistance o r f l i g h t — i n t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t o f

h e r s i t u a t i o n is

s p e e c h is u n c o u p l e d f r o m t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, so t h a t ( i ) t h e p r o -

s p e e c h act, say a c o m m a n d ,

p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t can b e h e l d i n v a r i a n t across c h a n g e s i n i l l o c u t i o n -

f u l f i l l t h e s a m e r o l e s e g m e n t , say t h a t o f a n E n g l i s h t e a c h e r d u r i n g

ary potential, and

class d i c t a t i o n , w i t h v e r y d i f f e r e n t s p e e c h acts. I n s h o r t , p r o p o s i t i o n -

(ii)

the

holistic m o d e

of

speech, i n

which

rich

w i t h a l t e r n a t i v e s . She

can express t h e same

i n a v e r y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d way; she w i l l

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , expression, a n d b e h a v i o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n are still one,

a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d s p e e c h leaves t h e a c t o r m o r e d e g r e e s o f

can be r e p l a c e d by d i f f e r e n t i a l m o d e s o f speech. I shall r e t u r n to

i n r e l a t i o n t o a r e c o g n i z e d n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d t h a n does a n o n -

freedom

t h i s p o i n t i n t h e f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n . F o r t h e p r e s e n t , i t suffices t o

linguistic interaction.

p o i n t o u t t h a t t h i s l e v e l o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f s p e e c h is a p r e c o n d i t i o n

O f c o u r s e , p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d u t t e r a n c e s d o n o t always

f o r a n a c t i o n ' s a b i l i t y t o t a k e o n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n s , t h a t is,

h a v e a l i n g u i s t i c f o r m , as is s h o w n b y t h e e x a m p l e o f a g r a m m a t i c a l -

60

61

Chapter 1


ized sign language, for instance, the standardized language o f the

contrast, c o m m a n d s o r advice o r questions d o n o t represent i n s t i t u -

d e a f a n d m u t e . I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n , o n e m i g h t also m e n t i o n p o i n t i n g

tions

g e s t u r e s , w h i c h r e p r e s e n t a n e q u i v a l e n t f o r t h e use o f r e f e r e n t i a l

T o be sure, t h e c r i t e r i o n o f b e i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d does n o t

b u t types o f s p e e c h acts t h a t c a n fit v e r y d i f f e r e n t i n s t i t u t i o n s .

terms, thereby s u p p l e m e n t i n g p r o p o s i t i o n a l speech. O n the o t h e r

always p e r m i t a n u n a m b i g u o u s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n . C o m m a n d s

h a n d , t h e r e a r e also s p e e c h acts t h a t a r e n o t p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y d i f f e r -

wherever relations o f a u t h o r i t y are i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d ; a p p o i n t m e n t s

e n t i a t e d , f o r e x a m p l e , i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y a b b r e v i a t e d s p e e c h acts s u c h as

presuppose special, bureaucratically d e v e l o p e d organizations;

" H e l l o ! " as a g r e e t i n g f o r m u l a , o r " C h e c k ! " a n d " C h e c k m a t e ! "

m a r r i a g e s r e q u i r e a s i n g l e i n s t i t u t i o n ( w h i c h is, h o w e v e r , t o b e f o u n d

as

can exist and

p e r f o r m a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n s f o r m o v e s i n a g a m e o f chess a n d t h e i r

u n i v e r s a l l y ) . B u t this does n o t devalue t h e usefulness o f the analytic

c o n s e q u e n c e s . T h e c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t is

v i e w p o i n t . I n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts, i n s o f a r as t h e y h a v e

l a c k i n g places t h e s e v e r b a l u t t e r a n c e s o n a l e v e l w i t h n o r m a l n o n -

a n y r e g u l a t i v e m e a n i n g a t a l l , r e f e r t o g e n e r a l aspects o f

v e r b a l a c t i o n s ; w h i l e t h e l a t t e r a c t i o n s d o refer t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l

n o r m s ; they are n o t , however, d e f i n e d by p a r t i c u l a r institutions.

c o n t e n t o f a p r e s u p p o s e d c o n v e n t i o n , t h e y d o n o t represent i t .

We

A s a first step i n d e l i m i t i n g t h e p r a g m a t i c u n i t s o f analysis, w e c a n

can n o w define

action

t h e d e s i r e d a n a l y t i c u n i t s as propositionally

differentiated a n d institutionally unbound speech acts. T o b e s u r e , o n l y

the

t h o s e w i t h a n e x p l i c i t l y linguistic f o r m a r e s u i t a b l e f o r analysis. F r e -

consensual f o u n d a t i o n o f reciprocally raised a n d recognized validity

q u e n t l y , o f c o u r s e , t h e c o n t e x t i n w h i c h s p e e c h acts are e m b e d d e d

c l a i m s — t h e subset o f propositionally differentiated speech acts. B u t e v e n

makes standard linguistic f o r m s superfluous; for example, w h e n the

t h i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n is n o t y e t selective e n o u g h ; f o r a m o n g t h e s e u t t e r -

p e r f o r m a t i v e m e a n i n g is d e t e r m i n e d e x c l u s i v e l y b y t h e c o n t e x t

a n c e s w e find s u c h s p e e c h acts as " b e t t i n g , " " c h r i s t e n i n g , " " a p p o i n t -

u t t e r a n c e ; o r w h e n t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e m e a n i n g is m e r e l y i n d i c a t e d ,

specify—out

o f t h e set o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e

actions t h a t rest o n

of

i n g , " a n d so o n . D e s p i t e t h e i r p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d c o n t e n t

t h a t is, e x p r e s s e d t h r o u g h i n f l e c t i o n , p u n c t u a t i o n , w o r d p o s i t i o n , o r

(betting o n / f o r . . . , christening as/with . . . , appointing to . . . ) ,

p a r t i c l e s s u c h as " i s n ' t i t ? , " " r i g h t ? , " " i n d e e d , " " c l e a r l y , " "surely," a n d

they are b o u n d

similar expressions.

to a single i n s t i t u t i o n

(or to a narrowly circum-

s c r i b e d set o f i n s t i t u t i o n s ) ; t h e y c a n t h e r e f o r e b e seen as t h e e q u i v a -

F i n a l l y , w e s h a l l e x c l u d e t h o s e e x p l i c i t s p e e c h acts i n s t a n d a r d

l e n t o f actions that fulfill presupposed n o r m s , either n o n v e r b a l l y o r

f o r m t h a t a p p e a r i n c o n t e x t s t h a t p r o d u c e shifts o f m e a n i n g . T h i s is

i n a n i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y a b b r e v i a t e d way. T h a t t h e s e s p e e c h acts a r e

the

institutionally bound c a n b e seen i n ( a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s ) t h e f a c t t h a t

speech act diverges f r o m the m e a n i n g o f t h e sentences used i n i t

case w h e n

the pragmatic

meaning

of

a

context-dependent

the permissible p r o p o s i t i o n a l contents are n a r r o w l y l i m i t e d by t h e

( a n d f r o m t h e i n d i c a t e d g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s t h a t have t o

normative meaning of betting, christening, appointing, marrying,

b e f u l f i l l e d f o r t h e t y p e o f s p e e c h act i n q u e s t i o n ) . Searle's " p r i n c i p l e

a n d so o n . O n e bets f o r stakes, c h r i s t e n s w i t h n a m e s , a p p o i n t s t o

o f e x p r e s s i b i l i t y " takes t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t i n t o a c c o u n t : a s s u m i n g t h a t

o f f i c i a l p o s i t i o n s , m a r r i e s a p a r t n e r , a n d so o n . W i t h i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y

t h e s p e a k e r expresses h i s i n t e n t i o n precisely, e x p l i c i d y , a n d l i t e r a l l y ,

b o u n d s p e e c h acts, s p e c i f i c i n s t i t u t i o n s c a n always b e s p e c i f i e d . W i t h

i t is p o s s i b l e i n p r i n c i p l e f o r e v e r y s p e e c h act c a r r i e d o u t o r c a p a b l e

i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts, o n l y g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i -

o f b e i n g c a r r i e d o u t to be specified

tions

sentence.

can be specified—conditions

that typically m u s t be m e t for a

c o r r e s p o n d i n g act t o s u c c e e d . I n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts e x press a s p e c i f i c i n s t i t u t i o n i n t h e s a m e u n m e d i a t e d w a y t h a t p r o p o sitionally

nondifferentiated

and

nonverbal

actions

express

a

p r e s u p p o s e d n o r m . T o e x p l a i n w h a t acts o f b e t t i n g o r c h r i s t e n i n g m e a n , I must refer to the institutions o f betting or christening. By

unequivocally by a complex

K a n n g i e s s e r has g i v e n t h i s p r i n c i p l e t h e f o l l o w i n g f o r m : " F o r e v e r y m e a n i n g x, i t is t h e case t h a t , i f t h e r e is a s p e a k e r S i n a l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i t y P w h o m e a n s (meint) x, t h e n i t is p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e r e b e a n e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e l a n g u a g e s p o k e n b y P w h i c h is a n e x a c t e x p r e s s i o n o f x."

72

For o u r purposes, we can weaken

this postulate

to

63

62


Chapter 1

r e q u i r e that i n a given language, f o r every interpersonal r e l a t i o n that

I have n o t e l u c i d a t e d t h e e m b e d d i n g

of communicative

action

a speaker wants to take u p e x p l i c i t l y w i t h a n o t h e r m e m b e r o f his

( " a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g " ) i n o t h e r types o f

language c o m m u n i t y , a suitable p e r f o r m a t i v e expression

a c t i o n . I t seems t o m e t h a t strategic action ( " a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d

is e i t h e r

a v a i l a b l e o r , i f necessary, c a n b e o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h a s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f

t h e a c t o r ' s success" s u c h as c o m p e t i t i v e b e h a v i o r o r c o m b a t g a m e s —

available expressions

i n general, modes of action that correspond to the utilitarian m o d e l

o r newly i n t r o d u c e d . W i t h this m o d i f i c a t i o n , expressed

o f p u r p o s i v e r a t i o n a l a c t i o n ) as w e l l as t h e s t i l l i n s u f f i c i e n d y a n a l y z e d

I n a n y case, t h e h e u r i s t i c m e a n i n g

c a t e g o r y o f symbolic action ( s u c h as a c t i o n m a n i f e s t e d i n a c o n c e r t o r

we can take i n t o a c c o u n t reservations t h a t have b e e n c o n c e r n i n g Searle's p r i n c i p l e .

7 3

is c l e a r — i f t h e p o s t u l a t e o f e x p r e s s i b i l i t y is v a l i d , analysis c a n

be

l i m i t e d t o i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d , e x p l i c i t s p e e c h acts i n s t a n d a r d

a d a n c e — i n general, m o d e s o f a c t i o n t h a t are b o u n d to n o n p r o p o s i t i o n a l systems o f s y m b o l i c e x p r e s s i o n )

differ f r o m communicative

a c t i o n i n that i n d i v i d u a l validity claims are suspended

form. T h e f o l l o w i n g d i a g r a m sums u p t h e v i e w p o i n t s f r o m w h i c h I have d e l i m i t e d t h e class o f s p e e c h acts basic f o r analysis.

7 4

( i n strategic

M y previous analy-

ses o f " l a b o r " a n d " i n t e r a c t i o n " h a v e n o t y e t a d e q u a t e l y c a p t u r e d t h e m o s t g e n e r a l d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f i n s t r u m e n t a l a n d so-

D e r i v a t i o n o f the Analytic U n i t s o f t h e T h e o r y o f Speech Acts I n s t r u m e n t a l actions

action, truthfulness, i n symbolic action, t r u t h ) .

cial (or c o m m u n i c a t i v e ) action. I c a n n o t pursue this here.

Social actions O n the D o u b l e Structure o f Speech

S y m b o l i c actions

C o m m u n i c a t i v e actions

Strategic actions I w o u l d l i k e t o r e t u r n n o w t o t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c double structure t h a t

N o t propositionally

Propositionally

differentiated

differentiated

c a n b e r e a d o f f f r o m t h e s t a n d a r d f o r m o f s p e e c h acts. O b v i o u s l y , the two components,

the illocutionary a n d the propositional, can

vary independently o f one

another. We can h o l d a propositional

c o n t e n t i n v a r i a n t vis-a-vis t h e d i f f e r e n t types o f s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h i t o c c u r s . I n t h i s a b s t r a c t i o n o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t f r o m t h e asNonverbal

Verbal

Nonverbal

serted p r o p o s i t i o n , a f u n d a m e n t a l a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f o u r language

Verbal

(illocutionarily

is e x p r e s s e d . P r o p o s i t i o n a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d s p e e c h d i s t i n g u i s h e s i t -

abbreviated

s e l f t h e r e i n f r o m t h e s y m b o l i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n we c a n a l -

speech acts)

Institutionally

Institutionally

bound

unbound

ready observe a m o n g p r i m a t e s .

7 5

A n y n u m b e r o f examples o f the

invariance of propositional content d e s p i t e v a r i a n c e i n s p e e c h act m o d e can be p r o v i d e d — f o r instance, f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t "Peter's s m o k i n g a p i p e , " t h e r e are t h e f o l l o w i n g :

Implicit

Explicit

" I assert t h a t P e t e r s m o k e s a p i p e . " " I beg y o u (Peter) to smoke a p i p e . "

Context-

Context-

dependent

independent

" I ask y o u ( P e t e r ) , d o y o u s m o k e a p i p e ? " " I w a r n y o u (Peter) against s m o k i n g a p i p e . "

Analytic units

64

65

Chapter 1

W h a t Is U n i v e r s a l P r a g m a t i c s ?

I n a genetic perspective, t h e speech-act invariance o f p r e p o s i t i o n a l

m a d e . B u t t h e c o n c e p t o f a h i e r a r c h y o f l a n g u a g e was i n t r o d u c e d

c o n t e n t s a p p e a r s as a n uncoupling of the illocutionary and propositional

f o r f o r m a l languages, i n w h i c h j u s t that reflexivity o f o r d i n a r y l a n -

components i n t h e f o r m a t i o n a n d t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts. T h i s

g u a g e is l a c k i n g . M o r e o v e r , i n a m e t a l a n g u a g e o n e always r e f e r s t o

u n c o u p l i n g is a c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f t h e d o u b l e s t r u c -

a n object language i n the objectivating a t t i t u d e o f someone asserting

t u r e o f s p e e c h , t h a t is, f o r t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f t w o c o m m u n i c a t i v e levels

facts o r o b s e r v i n g

o n w h i c h s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r m u s t simultaneously c o m e t o a n u n d e r -

c o n t r a s t , o n t h e m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e l e v e l o f s p e e c h , i t is p r e c i s e l y

standing i f they want to c o m m u n i c a t e

statements t h a t are n o t possible. I n s t e a d , at this level, one chooses

their intentions to one

an-

events; o n e

f o r m s m e t a l i n g u i s t i c statements. B y

o t h e r . I w o u l d d i s t i n g u i s h ( i ) t h e level of intersubjectivity o n w h i c h

t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y r o l e i n w h i c h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t is t o

s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r , t h r o u g h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, e s t a b l i s h t h e r e l a -

used; a n d this m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n

tions that p e r m i t t h e m to come to an understanding w i t h one

an-

s e n t e n c e w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t is t o b e e m p l o y e d r e q u i r e s a

o t h e r , a n d ( i i ) t h e level of propositional content a b o u t w h i c h t h e y w i s h

p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e o n the p a r t o f those c o m m u n i c a t i n g . Thus, the

to reach u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n the communicative f u n c t i o n specified i n

p e c u l i a r r e f l e x i v i t y o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e rests in the first instance o n t h e

( i ) . C o r r e s p o n d i n g t o t h e r e l a t i o n a l a n d t h e c o n t e n t aspects, f r o m

combination of a communication of content—effected

t h e p o i n t o f view o f w h i c h every u t t e r a n c e can be analyzed, t h e r e are

tivating

(in the standard f o r m ) the illocutionary a n d the propositional com-

tional

o f v i e w o f w h i c h t h e c o n t e n t is t o b e

act-comple-

m e n t d e t e r m i n e s t h e c o n t e n t t h a t is u n d e r s t o o d "as s o m e t h i n g

..."

i n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e f u n c t i o n s p e c i f i e d . ( T h e h e r m e n e u t i c "as" c a n b e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d o n b o t h c o m m u n i c a t i v e levels. W i t h a p r o p o s i t i o n "p,"

a n i d e n t i f i a b l e o b j e c t w h o s e e x i s t e n c e is p r e s u p p o s e d c a n

characterized

"as s o m e t h i n g " — e . g . ,

object. I n connection

as a " r e d , " " s o f t , " o r

be

"ideal,"

w i t h a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, t h a t is, t h r o u g h

b e i n g e m b e d d e d i n a s p e e c h act, t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t c a n , i n t u r n , b e uttered "as s o m e t h i n g " — e . g . , as a c o m m a n d o r a s s e r t i o n ) .

a b o u t t h e sense i n w h i c h t h e

i n an objec-

a t t i t u d e — w i t h a m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n concerning the rela-

p o n e n t s o f t h e s p e e c h act. T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y act fixes t h e sense i n w h i c h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t is e m p l o y e d , a n d t h e

be

aspect—effected i n a performative a t t i t u d e — f r o m the p o i n t understood.

O f c o u r s e , p a r t i c i p a n t s i n d i a l o g u e n o r m a l l y have t h e o p t i o n o f o b j e c t i f y i n g e v e r y i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t p e r f o r m e d as t h e c o n t e n t o f a further

(constative)

s p e e c h act. T h e y c a n a d o p t a n o b j e c t i v a t i n g

attitude t o w a r d the i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t o f a n already

per-

f o r m e d speech act a n d shift this c o m p o n e n t t o t h e level o f p r o p o s i tional

c o n t e n t s . N a t u r a l l y , t h e y c a n d o so o n l y b y p e f o r m i n g a n e w

speech act t h a t contains, i n t u r n , a n o n o b j e c t i f i e d i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t . T h e d i r e c t a n d i n d i r e c t m e n t i o n o f speech standardizes this possibility o f r e n d e r i n g explicit the reflexivity o f natural

language.

A basic f e a t u r e o f l a n g u a g e is c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h i s d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e

T h e m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t takes p l a c e o n t h e l e v e l o f i n t e r s u b -

o f s p e e c h , n a m e l y , its i n h e r e n t r e f l e x i v i t y . T h e s t a n d a r d i z e d p o s s i b i l i -

j e c t i v i t y i n a s p e e c h act tn c a n b e d e p i c t e d o n t h e l e v e l o f p r o p o s i -

ties f o r d i r e c d y a n d i n d i r e c t l y m e n t i o n i n g s p e e c h m e r e l y m a k e

ex-

t i o n a l c o n t e n t i n a f u r t h e r ( c o n s t a t i v e ) s p e e c h act tn+1. O n t h e o t h e r

t h a t is a l r e a d y c o n t a i n e d i n e v e r y s p e e c h act.

h a n d , i t is n o t p o s s i b l e simultaneously t o p e r f o r m a n d t o o b j e c t i f y a n

p l i c i t a self-reference In

filling

o u t the double structure o f speech, participants i n dialogue

c o m m u n i c a t e o n t w o levels s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . T h e y c o m b i n e nication of a content with

illocutionary act.

7 6

commu-

T h i s o p t i o n is s o m e t i m e s t h e o c c a s i o n f o r a d e s c r i p t i v i s t f a l l a c y t o

"metacommunication"—communication

w h i c h e v e n p r a g m a t i c t h e o r i e s f a l l p r e y . W e c a n analyze t h e s t r u c -

a b o u t t h e sense i n w h i c h t h e c o m m u n i c a t e d c o n t e n t is u s e d .

The

tures o f speech, j u s t like every o t h e r object, o n l y i n a n objectivating

expression " m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i o n " m i g h t be m i s l e a d i n g h e r e because

a t t i t u d e . I n d o i n g so, t h e r e l e v a n t a c c o m p a n y i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m -

it c o u l d be

p o n e n t c a n n o t , as w e saw a b o v e , b e c o m e uno acto t h e o b j e c t . T h i s

associated w i t h

metalanguage a n d suggest a n i d e a

of

l a n g u a g e levels s u c h t h a t , a t e v e r y h i g h e r l e v e l , m e t a l i n g u i s t i c state-

circumstance

ments about the object language

c o m m u n i c a t i o n processes t a k e p l a c e a t a s i n g l e l e v e l , n a m e l y t h a t o f

o f t h e n e x t lower level can

be

misleads m a n y language

theorists i n t o the view that

66

67

Chapter 1


t r a n s m i t t i n g c o n t e n t (i.e., i n f o r m a t i o n ) . F r o m t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e ,

the

as f u n c t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e s e n t e n c e m e a n i n g s ) , t h e r e s t r i c t i o n t o t h e

r e l a t i o n a l a s p e c t loses its i n d e p e n d e n c e vis-à-vis t h e c o n t e n t aspect;

p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t s o f s p e e c h acts is n o t p l a u s i b l e . O b v i o u s l y ,

the communicative

t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t s also h a v e a m e a n i n g i n a l i n g u i s t i c

r o l e o f a n u t t e r a n c e loses its c o n s t i t u t i v e sig-

n i f i c a n c e a n d is c o u n t e d as p a r t o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n c o n t e n t .

The

sense. I n t h e case o f a n e x p l i c i t l y p e r f o r m a t i v e u t t e r a n c e , t h e p e r -

pragmatic operator of the statement, w h i c h i n formalized presenta-

formative verb employed

tions

m a t i v e s e n t e n c e c o n s t r u c t e d w i t h its h e l p has a m e a n i n g i n a m a n n e r

(e.g., d e o n t i c l o g i c s ) r e p r e s e n t s t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t

has a l e x i c a l m e a n i n g , a n d t h e

perfor-

o f a n u t t e r a n c e , is t h e n n o l o n g e r i n t e r p r e t e d as a s p e c i f i c m o d e o f

similar t o t h e s e n t e n c e w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t d e p e n d e n t o n i t .

r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s b u t falsely as

" W h a t A u s t i n calls t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a n u t t e r a n c e is t h a t

p a r t o f t h e i n f o r m a t i o n t r a n s m i t t e d . I d o n o t w i s h t o analyze fallacy here; I merely p o i n t to o n e

this

a s p e c t o f its m e a n i n g w h i c h is e i t h e r c o n v e y e d b y its e x p l i c i d y p e r -

o f its c o n s e q u e n c e s : t h a t t h e

f o r m a t i v e p r e f i x , i f i t has o n e , o r m i g h t h a v e b e e n so c o n v e y e d b y

c o n s t i t u t i v e m e a n i n g o f t h e d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e o f s p e e c h is n e g l e c t e d i n theoretical approaches.

t h e use o f s u c h a n

expression."

7 7

T h i s p l a u s i b l e a r g u m e n t n e g l e c t s , h o w e v e r , t h e f a c t t h a t f o r c e is

A s o p p o s e d t o t h i s , I c o n s i d e r t h e task o f u n i v e r s a l p r a g m a t i c s t o

s o m e t h i n g t h a t , i n a s p e c i f i c sense, b e l o n g s o n l y t o u t t e r a n c e s a n d

be the r a t i o n a l reconstruction o f the double structure o f speech.

n o t t o s e n t e n c e s . T h u s , o n e m i g h t first h i t u p o n t h e i d e a o f r e s e r v i n g

T a k i n g A u s t i n ' s t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts as m y p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e ( i n

"force"

t h e n e x t t w o sections) I w o u l d n o w l i k e t o r e n d e r t h i s task m o r e

t h r o u g h its b e i n g u t t e r e d , t h a t is, e m b e d d e d i n s t r u c t u r e s o f s p e e c h .

precise i n r e l a t i o n to the p r o b l e m s o f m e a n i n g a n d validity.

We

Universal-Pragmatic Categories o f M e a n i n g

f r o m the phenomenon

can

for

the

meaning

content

that accrues to

qertainly distinguish the p h e n o m e n o n

the

sentence

of meaning

that

comes about t h r o u g h the e m p l o y m e n t o f a sentence i n an utterance o f s e n t e n c e m e a n i n g . W e c a n speak i n a

p r a g m a t i c sense o f t h e m e a n i n g o f a n u t t e r a n c e , as we d o A u s t i n ' s c o n t r a s t i n g o f l o c u t i o n a r y a n d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts set o f f a

in a

l i n g u i s t i c sense o f t h e m e a n i n g o f a s e n t e n c e . T h u s A l s t o n has t a k e n

the

t h e fact t h a t t h e same speech act can be p e r f o r m e d w i t h v e r y d i f f e r -

the

e n t s e n t e n c e s as a r e a s o n f o r g r a n t i n g p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g a c e r t a i n

m e a n i n g o f sentences w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t , w h i l e he used t h e

p r i o r i t y o v e r l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g . I n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a c o n s i s t e n t use

c o n c e p t force o n l y f o r t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t o f u t t e r i n g s e n t e n c e s w i t h

t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g , h e suggests t h a t s e n t e n c e ( a n d w o r d )

p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t . T h i s leads t o t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n s t e l l a t i o n s :

a r e a f u n c t i o n o f t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h t h e y a r e

b r o a d discussion

t h a t has also b r o u g h t s o m e c l a r i f i c a t i o n t o

theory o f meaning. Austin reserved

t h e c o n c e p t meaning f o r

M e a n i n g : sense a n d r e f e r e n c e , l o c u t i o n a r y act Force: a t t e m p t t o reach a n u p t a k e , i l l o c u t i o n a r y act

"principally" used.

7 8

meanings

T h e d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h i s p r o p o s a l is t h a t i t d o e s

n o t a d e q u a t e l y t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e r e l a t i v e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f sentence meanings i n relation to the c o n t i n g e n t changes o f m e a n i n g that a sentence can u n d e r g o w h e n used i n d i f f e r e n t contexts. M o r e -

A u s t i n c o u l d p o i n t to t h e fact t h a t sentences w i t h t h e same p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t c o u l d b e u t t e r e d i n s p e e c h acts o f d i f f e r e n t types, t h a t is, w i t h d i f f e r i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o r i n d i f f e r e n t i l l o c u t i o n a r y m o d e s . Nevertheless, one

t h e p r o p o s e d d i s t i n c t i o n is u n s a t i s f a c t o r y . I f

i n t r o d u c e s m e a n i n g solely i n a l i n g u i s t i c sense, as s e n t e n c e

m e a n i n g ( w h e r e b y e i t h e r s e n t e n c e m e a n i n g is c o n c e i v e d as a f u n c t i o n o f w o r d m e a n i n g s or, w i t h F r e g e , w o r d m e a n i n g s a r e c o n c e i v e d

over, t h e m e a n i n g o f a s e n t e n c e is o b v i o u s l y less d e p e n d e n t o n t h e i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e s p e a k e r t h a n is t h e m e a n i n g o f a n u t t e r a n c e . E v e n i f a s e n t e n c e is v e r y o f t e n u s e d w i t h d i f f e r e n t i n t e n t i o n s a n d i n a c o n t e x t t h a t p r a g m a t i c a l l y shifts m e a n i n g , its l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g d o e s n o t have t o c h a n g e . T h u s , f o r e x a m p l e , w h e n c e r t a i n s o c i a l roles prescribe t h a t c o m m a n d s be u t t e r e d i n t h e f o r m o f requests, t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g o f t h e u t t e r a n c e (as a c o m m a n d ) i n n o w a y

69

68


Chapter 1

a l t e r s t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g o f t h e s e n t e n c e u t t e r e d (as a r e q u e s t ) . T h i s is a n a d d i t i o n a l r e a s o n f o r s i n g l i n g o u t t h e s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h the p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g o f a n e x p l i c i t speech act c o i n cides w i t h t h e linguistic m e a n i n g o f t h e sentences e m p l o y e d i n i t . Precisely i n t h e case o f a n e x p l i c i t s p e e c h act i n s t a n d a r d f o r m , however, t h e categorial d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e expressions o r i g i n a l l y used i n p r e p o s i t i o n a l sentences, o n t h e

one

h a n d , a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e s (as w e l l as o f

ex-

p r e s s e d i n t e n t i o n s ) , o n t h e o t h e r , c o m e s i n t o view. T h i s shows t h a t i t d o e s n o t m a k e sense t o e x p l i c a t e t h e c o n c e p t s " m e a n i n g " versus "force" w i t h reference to the distinction between the linguistic m e a n i n g o f a sentence a n d the pragmatic m e a n i n g o f an utterance. T h e l i n g u i s t i c analysis o f s e n t e n c e m e a n i n g t e n d s t o a b s t r a c t f r o m c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s t o r e a l i t y i n t o w h i c h a s e n t e n c e is p u t as s o o n as i t is u t t e r e d a n d f r o m t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s u n d e r w h i c h i t is t h e r e b y p l a c e d . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a c o n s i s t e n t analysis o f m e a n i n g is n o t p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t s o m e r e f e r e n c e t o s i t u a t i o n s o f p o s s i b l e use. E v e r y linguistic expression can be used to f o r m statements. Even i l l o c u t i o n a r y phrases ( a n d o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n t i o n a l expressions) can be

ob-

j e c t i f i e d w i t h t h e h e l p o f a f u r t h e r s t a t e m e n t . T h i s suggests t h a t i t m a k e s sense t o secure a c e r t a i n u n i f o r m i t y f o r t h e l i n g u i s t i c analysis o f t h e m e a n i n g s o f l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s b y r e l a t i n g i t i n e v e r y case t o t h e possibilities f o r u s i n g these expressions i n p r o p o s i t i o n s . B u t t h i s m a k e s sense o n l y f o r s u c h e x p r e s s i o n s as c a n a p p e a r

exclusively

i n p r e p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t s o f speech. By contrast, the m e a n i n g o f p e r f o r m a t i v e expressions s h o u l d be

clarified by r e f e r r i n g to

the

p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r u s i n g t h e m i n i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts ( a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n t i o n a l expressions by r e f e r r i n g to the possibilities f o r u s i n g t h e m t o express i n t e n t i o n s d i r e c d y ) . T h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p l i cation o f the m e a n i n g o f "to p r o m i s e " should o r i e n t itself a r o u n d t h e possibilities f o r using the sentence

(1')

instead o f to the sentence (2')

" I hereby promise you that

..."

a n d n o t a r o u n d the possibilities f o r using the sentence (2)

" H e promises her t h a t . . . "

Correspondingly, the explication o f the m e a n i n g o f "to hate" should refer to the sentence

" H e hates her."

O n l y b e c a u s e a n d so l o n g as t h e l i n g u i s t i c analysis o f m e a n i n g is b i a s e d i n f a v o r o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l i z e d f o r m s (2 o r 2') is i t n e c e s s a r y to supplement

t h e m e a n i n g o f p r e p o s i t i o n a l sentences w i t h

the

m e a n i n g o f the illocutionary force o f an utterance (and the intent i o n o f the speaker). N o d o u b t this circumstance m o t i v a t e d A u s t i n to draw his d i s t i n c t i o n between m e a n i n g a n d force. To m y m i n d , i t w o u l d be b e t t e r to start w i t h t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g o f a n expression, as o p p o s e d t o t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g o f a n u t t e r a n c e ; t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e a n i n g o f expressions w o u l d t h e n be d i f f e r e n t i a t e d a c c o r d i n g

to

t h e u n i v e r s a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r u s i n g t h e m i n s p e e c h acts ( a n d a c c o r d ing to the corresponding

validity claims), w i t h reference to

the

o r i g i n a l o c c u r r e n c e o f such expressions. B u t w h a t does " o r i g i n a l " m e a n i n t h i s c o n t e x t ? L e t us c o n s i d e r t w o s e n t e n c e s as e x a m p l e s : (3)

" I ' m t e l l i n g y o u t h a t f a t h e r ' s n e w c a r is y e l l o w . "

(4)

" I ' m a s k i n g y o u , is f a t h e r ' s n e w c a r y e l l o w ? "

U n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e t w o ( d i f f e r e n t ) i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts is t i e d t o o t h e r p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s t h a n is u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e i r ( c o n c o r d a n t )

pro-

p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t . T h e d i f f e r e n c e b e c o m e s p e r c e p t i b l e as s o o n as one r e t u r n s to the conditions that m u s t be f u l f i l l e d by situations i n w h i c h s o m e o n e w h o d o e s n o t k n o w E n g l i s h m i g h t l e a r n (i.e., o r i g i nally understand) the meanings. A hearer can understand the meani n g o f the sentence w i t h the propositional content "the being yellow o f f a t h e r ' s c a r " o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t h e has l e a r n e d t o c o r r e c d y use t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l sentence: (5)

(1)

" I hate you."

" F a t h e r ' s n e w car is y e l l o w "

i n order, f o r e x a m p l e , t o express a c o r r e s p o n d i n g e x p e r i e n c e , i n this case h i s o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t f a t h e r ' s n e w c a r is y e l l o w . T h e a b i l i t y t o make this or a similar observation must be presupposed, for a p r o p e r use o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e i n ( 5 ) d e m a n d s a t least t h e f o l l o w i n g o f t h e speaker:

70

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Chapter 1


a. T h e e x i s t e n t i a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n : t h a t t h e r e is o n e a n d o n l y

one

Understanding

(5)

the

presupposes

possibility

of

sensory

ex-

object to w h i c h the designation "father's new car" applies.

periences

b. T h e presupposition o f identifiability: that the (denotatively em-

u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( 6 ) a n d ( 7 ) i t s e l f represents a c o m m u n i c a t i v e e x p e r i -

ployed) prepositional content contained i n the designation "father's

ence (an experience o f the type, p a r t i c i p a t o r y observation): i l l o c u -

n e w c a r " is a s u f f i c i e n t i n d i c a t i o n , i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t , f o r a h e a r e r t o select t h e ( a n d o n l y t h e ) o b j e c t t o w h i c h t h e d e s i g n a t i o n a p p l i e s . c. T h e act o f p r e d i c a t i o n : t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t e " y e l l o w " c a n b e a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e o b j e c t t h a t is d e s i g n a t e d .

(experiences

of

the

type,

observation);

by

contrast,

t i o n a r y u n d e r s t a n d i n g is a n e x p e r i e n c e m a d e p o s s i b l e t h r o u g h communication. T h e difference between originally illocutionary a n d originally prop o s i t i o n a l m e a n i n g s ( " f o r c e " a n d " m e a n i n g " i n A u s t i n ' s sense) c a n be traced back to differences

i n possible l e a r n i n g situations. We

Correspondingly, understanding the meaning of the prepositional

l e a r n t h e m e a n i n g o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts o n l y i n t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e

sentence c o n t a i n e d i n (5) d e m a n d s o f t h e hearer t h a t h e

a t t i t u d e o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n s p e e c h acts. B y c o n t r a s t , w e l e a r n t h e

a', s h a r e t h e

m e a n i n g o f sentences w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t i n t h e n o n p e r f o r -

speaker-presupposition,

b'. fulfill the speaker-presupposition,

mative—objectivating—attitude o f observers w h o t h a t is, a c t u a l l y i d e n t i f y t h e

sent

their

experiences i n propositional

correctly

sentences.

79

We

repreacquire

object designated, a n d

originally illoctionary meanings i n connection with

c'.

e x p e r i e n c e s t h a t w e have i n e n t e r i n g t h e l e v e l o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y a n d

u n d e r t a k e f o r his p a r t t h e act o f p r e d i c a t i o n . I t is a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r so f a r as t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t s o f

u t t e r a n c e s ( 3 ) a n d (4) a r e c o n c e r n e d . A h e a r e r c a n u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f n o t i f y i n g o r a s k i n g o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t h e has l e a r n e d t o t a k e p a r t i n successful s p e e c h acts o f t h e f o l l o w i n g t y p e :

communicative

establishing an interpersonal relation. We learn originally propositional

meanings

t h r o u g h r e p o r t i n g experiences w i t h objects a n d

events i n t h e w o r l d . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g this d i f f e r e n c e ,

meanings learned in a perfor-

m a t i v e a t t i t u d e c a n , o f c o u r s e , also o c c u r i n s e n t e n c e s w i t h p r o p o s i -

(6)

" I ( h e r e b y ) n o t i f y y o u t h a t . . ."

tional

(7)

" I ( h e r e b y ) ask y o u w h e t h e r . . ."

(8)

" I assure y o u t h a t h e n o t i f i e d m e y e s t e r d a y t h a t . . ."

(9)

" I ' m r e p o r t i n g t o y o u t h a t she asked m e yesterday w h e t h e r . . ."

T h e h e a r e r , t h a t is, has l e a r n e d t o a s s u m e b o t h t h e r o l e o f ( a c t i n g ) s p e a k e r as w e l l as t h a t o f t h e ( c o o p e r a t i n g ) performance

hearer.

the The

o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t c a n n o t serve t o r e p o r t a n o b -

s e r v a t i o n as t h e use o f a p r e p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e c a n ; n o r m u s t t h e a b i l i t y t o have p e r c e p t i o n s e s s e n t i a l l y b e p r e s u p p o s e d h e r e . R a t h e r , conversely, t h e e x e c u t i o n o f a s p e e c h a c t is a c o n d i t i o n o f p o s s i b i l i t y o f a n experience, n a m e l y t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e

experience that

the

h e a r e r has w h e n h e a c c e p t s t h e o f f e r c o n t a i n e d i n t h e a t t e m p t e d speech

act

and

enters

into an

interpersonal relation with

the

speaker, a r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n o n e w h o n o t i f i e s o r i n f o r m s a n d o n e w h o r e c e i v e s t h e n o t i f i c a t i o n o r i n f o r m a t i o n — o r , a l t e r n a t i v e l y , takes u p the relation between answers.

a person w h o questions a n d a person

who

content:

T h i s fact may e x p l a i n why the i n d i c a t e d difference between the two c a t e g o r i e s o f m e a n i n g is o f t e n n o t n o t i c e d . I n s e n t e n c e s w i t h p r o p o sitional c o n t e n t , however, we can d i s t i n g u i s h t h e m e a n i n g s o f expressions t h a t m a y be used i n a p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e f r o m t h e w o r d meanings

t h a t — l i k e the n o m i n a l a n d predicative expressions i n

( 5 ) — a r e p e r m i t t e d only as m e a n i n g c o m p o n e n t s i n sentences w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t . I n utterances like (8) a n d ( 9 ) , " n o t i f y " a n d "ask" b e a r a s h a d e o f m e a n i n g d e r i v e d f r o m t h e p o w e r t h a t t h e y have o n l y i n i l l o c u t i o n a r y roles—as i n (6) a n d ( 7 ) . We can retain Austin's distinction between "force" a n d " m e a n i n g " i n t h e sense o f t h e s e t w o c a t e g o r i e s o f m e a n i n g . " F o r c e " t h e n stands

72

73

Chapter 1


f o r t h e m e a n i n g o f e x p r e s s i o n s t h a t are o r i g i n a l l y u s e d i n c o n n e c -

a b o u t basic types o f s p e e c h acts a n d basic m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e use has

tion

w i t h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, a n d " m e a n i n g " f o r t h e m e a n i n g o f e x -

also t a k e n t h i s p a i r o f c o n c e p t s as i t s s t a r t i n g p o i n t . A t f i r s t A u s t i n

pressions o r i g i n a l l y used i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h propositions. T h u s we

w a n t e d to draw the b o u n d a r y i n such a way that "the p e r f o r m a t i v e

d i s t i n g u i s h " f o r c e " a n d " m e a n i n g " as t w o c a t e g o r i e s o f m e a n i n g t h a t

s h o u l d b e d o i n g s o m e t h i n g as o p p o s e d t o j u s t s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g ; a n d

arise w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e g e n e r a l p r a g m a t i c f u n c t i o n s o f tion:

communica-

the establishment o f interpersonal relations, o n the one h a n d ,

a n d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( r e p o r t i n g o f facts o r states o f a f f a i r s ) , o n t h e o t h e r . ( I s h a l l h e r e leave t o o n e side t h e t h i r d c a t e g o r y o f m e a n i n g , w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d s t o t h e f u n c t i o n o f expression, t h a t is, t o t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse),

a l t h o u g h reflections simi-

l a r t o t h o s e c a r r i e d o u t f o r i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts a p p l y t o i n t e n t i o n a l

t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e is h a p p y o r u n h a p p y as o p p o s e d t o t r u e false."

and

8 2

F r o m this the f o l l o w i n g correlations resulted: L o c u t i o n a r y acts: constatives, t r u e / u n t r u e I l l o c u t i o n a r y acts: p e r f o r m a t i v e s ,

happy/unhappy

B u t t h i s d e m a r c a t i o n o f l o c u t i o n a r y a n d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts c o u l d n o t

s e n t e n c e s as w e l l . )

be m a i n t a i n e d w h e n i t became a p p a r e n t that a l l speech acts—the

I w o u l d like t o h o l d o n t o t h e f o l l o w i n g results:

constatives

included—contain

a locutionary component

(in

the

a. I t is n o t advisable t o r e s e r v e t h e c o n c e p t meaning f o r t h e p r e p o -

f o r m o f a sentence w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l content) a n d an i l l o c u t i o n a r y

s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t o f a speech act a n d t o characterize t h e m e a n i n g

c o m p o n e n t ( i n the f o r m o f a p e r f o r m a t i v e sentence) ,

o f an illocutionary c o m p o n e n t only by a pragmatic operator (which

h a d i n i t i a l l y i n t r o d u c e d as t h e l o c u t i o n a r y act was n o w r e p l a c e d b y

8 3

What Austin

d e s i g n a t e s a specific i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e ) .

(a) t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t c o n t a i n e d i n e v e r y e x p l i c i t s p e e c h

b . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i t is also u n s a t i s f a c t o r y t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e

act, a n d ( b ) a s p e c i a l class o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t s — c o n s t a t i v e

m e a n i n g o f a p e r f o r m a t i v e s e n t e n c e i n e x a c d y t h e s a m e w a y as t h e m e a n i n g o f a sentence w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l content; the i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t o f a s p e e c h a c t n e i t h e r expresses a p r o p o s i t i o n mentions a propositional content.

nor

8 0

c. I t is e q u a l l y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y t o e q u a t e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e w i t h t h e m e a n i n g c o m p o n e n t that accrues to the m e a n i n g o f a sentence

speech

acts—that i m p l y the validity claim o f t r u t h . A u s t i n himself later r e g a r d e d c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts as o n l y o n e a m o n g several d i f f e r e n t classes o f s p e e c h acts. T h e t w o s e n t e n c e s (1)

" I assert t h a t . . . "

(2)

" I ' m warning you t h a t . . . "

t h r o u g h t h e act o f u t t e r i n g i t i n a given context.

equally express i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts.

d . R a t h e r , f r o m a u n i v e r s a l - p r a g m a t i c p o i n t o f view, t h e m e a n i n g o f

s e q u e n c e t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m c o n t a i n e d i n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts

84

B u t t h i s has t h e i n t e r e s t i n g c o n -

linguistic expressions can be categorically d i s t i n g u i s h e d a c c o r d i n g t o

( t r u t h / f a l s i t y ) r e p r e s e n t s m e r e l y a s p e c i a l case a m o n g t h e v a l i d i t y

w h e t h e r they may appear o n l y i n sentences that take o n a r e p r e -

c l a i m s t h a t speakers, i n s p e e c h acts, raise a n d o f f e r f o r v i n d i c a t i o n

s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n o r w h e t h e r t h e y c a n s e r v e s p e c i f i c a l l y t o estab-

vis-à-vis h e a r e r s .

lish i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations o r t o express speaker i n t e n t i o n s .

8 1

Thematization o f Validity Claims a n d Modes o f C o m m u n i c a t i o n A u s t i n ' s c o n t r a s t i n g o f l o c u t i o n a r y a n d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts has

be-

c o m e i m p o r t a n t n o t o n l y f o r the t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g ; the discussion

I n general we may say this: w i t h b o t h statements (and, for example, descriptions) a n d warnings, etc., the question o f whether, g r a n t i n g that y o u d i d w a r n a n d h a d the r i g h t to w a r n , d i d state o r d i d advise, y o u were right to state or to w a r n o r advise, can arise—not i n the sense o f whether i t was o p p o r t u n e or expedient, b u t whether, o n the facts a n d y o u r knowledge o f the facts a n d the purpose for w h i c h y o u were speaking, a n d so o n , this was the p r o p e r t h i n g to say. 85

74

75

Chapter 1


I n t h i s passage, A u s t i n e m p h a s i z e s t h e c l a i m t o be right, o r c l a i m

t h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s ; t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m o f c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts is

t o validity, t h a t w e raise w i t h a n y ( a n d n o t j u s t w i t h c o n s t a t i v e ) s p e e c h

p r e s u p p o s e d i n a c e r t a i n way b y s p e e c h acts o f every t y p e . T h e m e a n -

acts. B u t h e d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e s e o n l y i n c i d e n t a l l y f r o m t h e g e n e r a l

i n g o f the p r o p o s i t i o n a l content m e n t i o n e d i n nonconstative speech

c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s — r e s t r i c t e d a c c o r d i n g t o speech-act t y p e — t h a t

acts c a n b e m a d e e x p l i c i t t h r o u g h t r a n s f o r m i n g a s e n t e n c e o f p r o p -

l i k e w i s e m u s t be f u l f i l l e d i f a s p e e c h act is t o s u c c e e d ( t h a t is, f r o m

o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t , " t h a t />," i n t o t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e

happiness/unhappiness

t h e t r u t h c l a i m b e l o n g s essentially t o t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n

tions,

c o n d i t i o n s i n g e n e r a l ) . I t is t r u e o f asser-

i n t h e same way as i t is o f w a r n i n g s , pieces o f a d v i c e , p r o m i s e s ,

a n d so f o r t h , t h a t t h e y c a n

s u c c e e d o n l y i f both c o n d i t i o n s

are

and

thereby expressed. T r u t h claims are thus a type o f validity c l a i m b u i l t i n t o t h e s t r u c t u r e o f p o s s i b l e s p e e c h i n g e n e r a l . T r u t h is a u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m ; its u n i v e r s a l i t y is r e f l e c t e d i n t h e d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e o f

f u l f i l l e d : (a) t o b e i n o r d e r , a n d ( b ) t o b e r i g h t .

speech. B u t t h e r e a l c o n c l u s i o n m u s t s u r e l y be t h a t we n e e d . . .

to e s t a b l i s h w i t h

r e s p e c t to e a c h k i n d o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t — w a r n i n g s , e s t i m a t e s , v e r d i c t s , s t a t e m e n t s , a n d d e s c r i p t i o n s — w h a t i f a n y is t h e s p e c i f i c way i n w h i c h t h e y a r e i n t e n d e d , first to b e i n o r d e r o r n o t i n o r d e r , a n d s e c o n d , to b e " r i g h t " o r " w r o n g ; " w h a t t e r m s o f a p p r a i s a l a n d d i s a p p r a i s a l a r e u s e d for e a c h a n d w h a t t h e y m e a n . T h i s is a w i d e f i e l d a n d c e r t a i n l y w i l l n o t l e a d to a s i m p l e d i s t i n c t i o n o f t r u e a n d false; n o r w i l l it l e a d to a d i s t i n c t i o n o f s t a t e m e n t s f r o m t h e rest, for stating is o n l y o n e a m o n g v e r y n u m e r o u s s p e e c h acts o f the illocutionary c l a s s .

8 6

S p e e c h acts c a n b e i n o r d e r w i t h r e s p e c t t o t y p i c a l l y r e s t r i c t e d c o n t e x t s ( a ) ; b u t t h e y c a n b e v a l i d (gültig) o n l y w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e f u n d a m e n t a l c l a i m t h a t t h e s p e a k e r raises w i t h h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t

L o o k i n g b a c k , A u s t i n assures h i m s e l f o f w h a t h e o r i g i n a l l y h a d i n m i n d w i t h h i s c o n t r a s t o f c o n s t a t i v e a n d n o n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts ( c o n s t a t i v e s versus p e r f o r m a t i v e s ) : W i t h the constative utterances, we abstract f r o m the i l l o c u t i o n a r y . . . aspects o f the speech act, a n d we concentrate o n the locutionary; moreover, we use an oversimplified n o t i o n o f correspondence w i t h the facts. . . . We a i m at the ideal o f what w o u l d be r i g h t to say i n all circumstances, for any purposes, to any audience, etc. Perhaps this is sometimes realized. W i t h the performative we a t t e n d as m u c h as possible to the i l l o c u t i o n a r y force o f the utterance, a n d abstract f r o m the d i m e n s i o n o f correspondence w i t h facts.

87

A f t e r h e r e c o g n i z e d t h a t c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts r e p r e s e n t o n l y o n e

( b ) . I s h a l l c o m e b a c k t o b o t h o f t h e s e classes o f c o n d i t i o n s t h a t m u s t

o f several types o f s p e e c h acts, A u s t i n gave u p t h e

b e f u l f i l l e d i n o r d e r f o r s p e e c h acts t o s u c c e e d . A t t h i s p o i n t I a m

c o n t r a s t i n f a v o r o f a set o f u n o r d e r e d f a m i l i e s o f s p e e c h acts. I a m

interested only i n the fact that the comparison between

o f t h e o p i n i o n , however, t h a t w h a t h e i n t e n d e d w i t h the contrast

constative

a n d n o n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts t h r o w s l i g h t o n t h e v a l i d i t y basis t h a t m a n i f e s t l y u n d e r l i e s all s p e e c h a c t i o n s .

" c o n s t a t i v e " versus " p e r f o r m a t i v e " c a n b e a d e q u a t e l y

aforementioned

reconstructed.

W e h a v e seen t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n l a n g u a g e c a n t a k e p l a c e o n l y

T o be sure, this does i n i t i a l l y clarify t h e special p o s i t i o n o f consta-

when the participants, i n communicating with one another

about

t i v e s p e e c h acts. A s s e r t i o n s d o n o t d i f f e r f r o m o t h e r types o f s p e e c h

s o m e t h i n g , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e n t e r t w o levels o f

acts i n t h e i r p e r f o r m a t i v e / p r o p o s i t i o n a l d o u b l e s t r u c t u r e , n o r

level o f intersubjectivity o n w h i c h they take u p i n t e r p e r s o n a l rela-

do

communication—the

they d i f f e r by v i r t u e o f g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s , f o r these v a r y

tions

i n a t y p i c a l way f o r a l l s p e e c h a c t i o n s ; b u t t h e y d o

we can m a k e e i t h e r t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l

differ f r o m

a n d t h e level o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l contents. However, i n speaking,

( a l m o s t ) a l l o t h e r types o f s p e e c h acts i n t h a t t h e y p r i m a f a c i e i m p l y

content more

a n u n m i s t a k a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m , a c l a i m t o t r u t h . I t is u n d e n i a b l e t h a t

i n t e r a c t i v e o r a m o r e c o g n i t i v e use o f o u r l a n g u a g e . I n t h e interactive

c e n t r a l l y t h e m a t i c ; i n so d o i n g , w e m a k e a

more

o t h e r types o f s p e e c h acts also i m p l y some or other v a l i d i t y c l a i m ; b u t

use of language, w e t h e m a t i z e t h e r e l a t i o n s i n t o w h i c h s p e a k e r a n d

i n d e t e r m i n i n g exacdy w h a t validity c l a i m they imply, we

hearer

seldom

enter—as

a warning, promise,

r e q u e s t — w h i l e we

merely

e n c o u n t e r such a clearly d e f i n e d a n d universally recognized validity

m e n t i o n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f t h e u t t e r a n c e s . I n t h e cognitive

c l a i m as " t r u t h " ( i n t h e sense o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h ) . I t is easy t o see

use of language, b y c o n t r a s t , w e t h e m a t i z e t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e u t t e r a n c e

76

77

Chapter 1


as a s t a t e m e n t a b o u t s o m e t h i n g t h a t is h a p p e n i n g i n t h e w o r l d ( o r

J u s t as o n l y c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts a r e p e r m i t t e d f o r t h e c o g n i t i v e

t h a t c o u l d b e t h e case), w h i l e w e e x p r e s s t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n

use o f l a n g u a g e , so f o r t h e i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e o n l y t h o s e

o n l y i n d i r e c d y . T h i s i n c i d e n t a l character can be seen, f o r

example,

s p e e c h acts a r e p e r m i t t e d t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e a s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n t h a t

("I am

speaker a n d hearer can adopt to the n o r m a t i v e contexts o f t h e i r

i n the fact that i n E n g l i s h the e x p l i c i t f o r m o f assertion

a s s e r t i n g ( t o y o u ) t h a t . . . " ) , a l t h o u g h g r a m m a t i c a l l y c o r r e c t , is r a r e

a c t i o n . I c a l l t h e s e regulative s p e e c h a c t s .

in comparison

f o r c e o f s p e e c h acts, t h e n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m — l i g h t n e s s o r a p -

to the short f o r m that disregards the i n t e r p e r s o n a l

relation.

propriateness

88

(Richtigkeit, Angemessenheit)—is

W i t h the illocutionary b u i l t j u s t as u n i v e r s a l l y

A s t h e c o n t e n t is t h e m a t i z e d i n t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , o n l y

i n t o t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f s p e e c h as t h e t r u t h c l a i m . B u t t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m

s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s c a n assume t h e e x p l i c i t

o f a n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d is e x p l i c i t i y i n v o k e d o n l y i n r e g u l a t i v e

f o r m o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s a r e p e r m i t t e d . W i t h these c o n s t a t i v e

s p e e c h acts ( i n c o m m a n d s a n d a d m o n i t i o n s , i n p r o h i b i t i o n s a n d

s p e e c h acts, w e raise a t r u t h c l a i m f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n asserted. I n

r e f u s a l s , i n p r o m i s e s a n d a g r e e m e n t s , n o t i f i c a t i o n s , excuses, r e c o m -

t h e i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , i n w h i c h t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n

m e n d a t i o n s , a d m i s s i o n s , a n d so f o r t h ) . T h e t r u t h r e f e r e n c e o f t h e

is t h e m a t i c a l l y stressed, w e r e f e r i n v a r i o u s ways t o t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e

m e n t i o n e d propositional content remains, by contrast, merely i m -

n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d o f t h e s p e e c h act.

p l i c i t ; i t p e r t a i n s o n l y t o its e x i s t e n t i a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s .

F o r t h i s l a t t e r use, t h e ( a u t h o r i z e d ) c o m m a n d has a p a r a d i g m a t i c s i g n i f i c a n c e s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f t h e a s s e r t i o n f o r t h e c o g n i t i v e use

of

Conversely,

i n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, w h i c h e x p l i c i t l y raise a t r u t h c l a i m , t h e n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m r e m a i n s i m p l i c i t , a l t h o u g h these too

(e.g.,

only—

reports, explications, communications, elucidations, narrations, a n d

validity c l a i m reflected i n the f o r m a l structures o f speech. T h e i l l o -

so f o r t h ) m u s t c o r r e s p o n d t o a n e s t a b l i s h e d p a t t e r n o f r e l a t i o n s —

c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f t h e s p e e c h act, w h i c h g e n e r a t e s a l e g i t i m a t e ( o r

t h a t is, t h e y m u s t b e

illegitimate) interpersonal relation between

g r o u n d — i f t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations i n t e n d e d w i t h t h e m are to

language.

T r u t h is m e r e l y t h e m o s t c o n s p i c u o u s — n o t t h e

t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s , is d e -

r i v e d f r o m t h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g f o r c e (bindende Kraft) o f r e c o g nized n o r m s o f action (or o f evaluation); to the extent that a speech

covered by a recognized normative

back-

c o m e t o pass. I t seems t o m e

t h a t w h a t A u s t i n h a d i n m i n d w i t h his

(later

a c t is a n a c t i o n , i t actualizes a n a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d p a t t e r n o f r e l a -

a b a n d o n e d ) c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts i n t o c o n s t a t i v e versus p e r -

tions.

f o r m a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s is c a p t u r e d i n t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e c o g -

T h e validity o f a n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d o f institutions, roles,

s o c i o c u l t u r a l l y h a b i t u a l i z e d f o r m s o f l i f e — t h a t is, o f

conventions—is

n i t i v e a n d t h e i n t e r a c t i v e uses o f l a n g u a g e .

I n t h e cognitive use of

always a l r e a d y p r e s u p p o s e d . T h i s b y n o m e a n s h o l d s t r u e o n l y f o r

language, w i t h t h e h e l p o f c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, w e t h e m a t i z e t h e

i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts s u c h as b e t t i n g , g r e e t i n g , c h r i s t e n -

p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f a n u t t e r a n c e ; i n t h e interactive use of lan-

i n g , a p p o i n t i n g , a n d t h e l i k e , e a c h o f w h i c h satisfies a specific n o r m

guage, w i t h t h e h e l p o f r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts, w e t h e m a t i z e t h e k i n d

o f a c t i o n ( o r a n a r r o w l y c i r c u m s c r i b e d class o f n o r m s ) . I n p r o m i s e s ,

o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n established. T h e difference

too, i n recommendations,

tion

prohibitions, prescriptions, a n d the like,

i n thematiza-

r e s u l t s f r o m stressing o n e o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s u n i v e r s a l l y i n h e r -

w h i c h are n o t r e g u l a t e d f r o m t h e outset by i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h e speaker

e n t i n s p e e c h , t h a t is, f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t i n t h e c o g n i t i v e use

i m p l i e s a v a l i d i t y c l a i m t h a t m u s t , i f t h e s p e e c h acts a r e t o s u c c e e d ,

l a n g u a g e w e raise t r u t h c l a i m s f o r p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d i n t h e i n t e r a c t i v e

b e c o v e r e d b y e x i s t i n g n o r m s , a n d t h a t m e a n s b y ( a t least) d e

use o f l a n g u a g e w e lay c l a i m t o ( o r c o n t e s t ) t h e v a l i d i t y o f a n o r m a -

facto

of

r e c o g n i t i o n o f the claim that these norms rightfully exist. T h i s i n t e r n a l

tive b a c k g r o u n d f o r i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s . A u s t i n h i m s e l f d i d n o t

r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i m p l i c i t l y r a i s e d i n s p e e c h acts

d r a w this c o n s e q u e n c e because, o n t h e o n e h a n d , h e t o o k o n l y o n e

a n d t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e i r n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d is e m p h a s i z e d i n t h e

universal validity claim i n t o consideration,

i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , j u s t as is t h e t r u t h c l a i m i n t h e c o g n i t i v e

t r u t h interpreted i n terms of the correspondence theory of t r u t h ;

use o f

b u t he w a n t e d , o n the o t h e r h a n d , to m a k e this single validity c l a i m

language.

namely,

propositional

78

79

Chapter 1


c o m p a t i b l e w i t h m a n y types o f s p e e c h acts ( a n d n o t j u s t c o n s t a t i v e

to t h e case); legal verdicts, r e p r i m a n d s , a n d o r d e r s can only be p a r t

s p e e c h a c t s ) . I n h i s w o r d s : " I f , t h e n , w e l o o s e n u p o u r ideas o f t r u t h

o f a n i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e . A u s t i n h i m s e l f o n c e c o n s i d e r e d t h e

a n d f a l s i t y w e s h a l l see t h a t s t a t e m e n t s , w h e n assessed i n r e l a t i o n t o

o b j e c t i o n t h a t d i f f e r e n t v a l i d i t y c l a i m s a r e a t w o r k i n these cases:

t h e facts, a r e n o t so d i f f e r e n t a f t e r a l l f r o m p i e c e s o f a d v i c e , w a r n i n g s , v e r d i c t s a n d so o n . "

8 9

T o b e s u r e , t h i s l o o s e n i n g u p o f t h e ideas

A l l o w i n g that, i n d e c l a r i n g t h e a c c u s e d guilty, y o u h a v e r e a c h e d y o u r v e r d i c t p r o p e r l y a n d i n g o o d faith, it still r e m a i n s to a s k w h e t h e r t h e v e r d i c t was

o f t r u t h a n d falsity i n favor o f a b r o a d d i m e n s i o n o f e v a l u a t i o n , i n

j u s t , o r fair. A l l o w i n g t h a t y o u h a d t h e r i g h t to r e p r i m a n d h i m as y o u d i d ,

w h i c h a n a s s e r t i o n c a n j u s t as w e l l be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as

exaggerated

a n d t h a t y o u h a v e a c t e d w i t h o u t m a l i c e , o n e c a n still a s k w h e t h e r y o u r

o r p r e c i s e o r i n a p p r o p r i a t e as t r u e o r false, r e s u l t s , o n t h e o t h e r

r e p r i m a n d w a s d e s e r v e d . . . . T h e r e is o n e t h i n g t h a t p e o p l e will be p a r t i c u -

h a n d , i n the assimilation o f all validity claims to the universal validity

larly t e m p t e d to b r i n g u p as a n o b j e c t i o n a g a i n s t a n y c o m p a r i s o n b e t w e e n

c l a i m o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h . "We see t h a t , w h e n w e have a n o r d e r

this s e c o n d k i n d o f c r i t i c i s m a n d t h e k i n d a p p r o p r i a t e to s t a t e m e n t s , a n d t h a t is this: a r e n ' t t h e s e q u e s t i o n s a b o u t s o m e t h i n g ' s b e i n g g o o d , o r j u s t , o r

o r a w a r n i n g o r a p i e c e o f a d v i c e , t h e r e is a q u e s t i o n a b o u t h o w t h i s

fair, o r d e s e r v e d e n t i r e l y d i s t i n c t f r o m q u e s t i o n s o f t r u t h a n d f a l s e h o o d ?

is r e l a t e d t o f a c t w h i c h is n o t p e r h a p s so d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h e k i n d o f

T h a t , surely, is a v e r y s i m p l e b l a c k - a n d - w h i t e b u s i n e s s ; e i t h e r t h e u t t e r a n c e

q u e s t i o n t h a t arises w h e n w e discuss h o w a s t a t e m e n t is r e l a t e d t o

c o r r e s p o n d s to t h e facts o r it d o e s n ' t , a n d that's t h a t .

fact."

9 0

I t seems t o m e

that A u s t i n confuses the validity c l a i m o f

p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h , w h i c h c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e first i n s t a n c e i n t e r m s o f a c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n s t a t e m e n t s a n d facts, w i t h t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m o f n o r m a t i v e Tightness, w h i c h c a n n o t i n a n y w a y b e interpreted i n terms of the correspondence theory of t r u t h . T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t w a r n i n g s o r p i e c e s o f a d v i c e rest o n p r e d i c t i o n s , t h e y a r e p a r t o f a c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e . W h e t h e r t h o s e i n v o l v e d

9 1

I n compressing the universal validity claim o f t r u t h together w i t h a h o s t o f p a r t i c u l a r e v a l u a t i v e c r i t e r i a i n t o a s i n g l e class, A u s t i n b l u r r e d the d i s t i n c t i o n between the clear-cut universal validity claims o f propositional t r u t h and normative lightness (and truthfulness). B u t t h i s p r o v e s t o b e u n n e c e s s a r y i f i n a g i v e n s p e e c h act we d i s t i n guish a m o n g

w e r e r i g h t t o u t t e r c e r t a i n w a r n i n g s o r pieces o f a d v i c e i n a g i v e n

a. t h e i m p l i c i t l y p r e s u p p o s e d g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s ,

s i t u a t i o n d e p e n d s i n t h i s case o n t h e t r u t h o f t h e

b. t h e specific m e a n i n g o f the i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n to be

corresponding

p r e d i c t i o n s . A s p a r t o f a n i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , w a r n i n g s a n d p i e c e s o f a d v i c e c a n also have a n o r m a t i v e m e a n i n g . T h e n t h e r i g h t t o issue c e r t a i n w a r n i n g s a n d a d v i c e d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r t h e p r e -

estab-

lished, a n d c. t h e i m p l i c i t l y r a i s e d g e n e r a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m .

s u p p o s e d n o r m s t o w h i c h t h e y r e f e r a r e v a l i d ( t h a t is, a r e i n t e r s u b -

W h e r e a s a. a n d b . fix t h e d i s t i n c t classes ( d i f f e r e n t i n d i f f e r e n t

j e c t i v e l y r e c o g n i z e d ) o r n o t ( a n d , a t a n e x t stage, o u g h t o r o u g h t n o t

l a n g u a g e s ) o f s t a n d a r d i z e d s p e e c h acts, c. d e t e r m i n e s t h e u n i v e r s a l

t o b e v a l i d , t h a t is, i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y r e c o g n i z e d ) .

modes o f communication,

M o s t types o f s p e e c h acts, h o w e v e r , c a n b e c o r r e l a t e d w i t h a s i n g l e

t h a t is, m o d e s i n h e r e n t i n s p e e c h i n

general.

m o d e o f l a n g u a g e use. W h e t h e r a n e s t i m a t e is g o o d o r b a d c l e a r l y

B e f o r e g o i n g i n t o a. a n d b . , I w o u l d l i k e a t least t o r e m a r k t h a t

d e p e n d s o n t h e t r u t h o f a c o r r e s p o n d i n g statement; estimates usu-

the Austinian starting p o i n t o f the distinction between performative

a l l y a p p e a r i n t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e . L i k e w i s e , w h e t h e r t h e

a n d constative utterances provides a n overly n a r r o w view; the validity

verdict o f a court, the r e p r i m a n d o f a person, or the c o m m a n d o f a

s p e c t r u m o f s p e e c h is n o t e x h a u s t e d b y t h e t w o m o d e s o f c o m m u n i -

superior to a subordinate w i t h r e g a r d to certain behavior are "justly"

cation that I developed f r o m this d i s t i n c t i o n . Naturally, there can be

pronounced,

"deservedly" delivered, o r " r i g h t f u l l y " given d e p e n d s

no mode of communication i n which the comprehensibility of an

j u s t as c l e a r l y o n w h e t h e r a r e c o g n i z e d n o r m has b e e n c o r r e c d y

u t t e r a n c e is t h e m a t i c a l l y stressed; f o r e v e r y s p e e c h act m u s t f u l f i l l

a p p l i e d t o a g i v e n case ( o r w h e t h e r t h e r i g h t n o r m has b e e n a p p l i e d

t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f comprehensibility i n t h e s a m e way. I f i n s o m e

80

81

Chapter 1


c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h e r e is a b r e a k d o w n o f i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y , t h e r e q u i r e -

s p e a k e r m u s t , i n a t r i v i a l sense, t r u t h f u l l y e x p r e s s h i s t h o u g h t s , o p i n -

m e n t o f c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y c a n b e m a d e t h e m a d c o n l y t h r o u g h pass-

i o n s , a s s u m p t i o n s , a n d so f o r t h ; h o w e v e r , i n a s s e r t i n g a p r o p o s i t i o n ,

i n g over to a h e r m e n e u t i c discourse, a n d t h e n i n c o n n e c t i o n

with

w h a t m a t t e r s is n o t t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s o f h i s i n t e n t i o n s b u t t h e t r u t h

t h e r e l e v a n t l i n g u i s t i c system. T h e truthfulness w i t h w h i c h a s p e a k e r

o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n . S i m i l a r l y , i n t h e i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , t h e

expresses h e r i n t e n d o n s c a n , h o w e v e r , b e e m p h a s i z e d a t t h e l e v e l o f

s p e a k e r expresses t h e i n t e n t i o n o f p r o m i s i n g , r e p r i m a n d i n g , r e f u s -

c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n i n t h e s a m e way as t h e t r u t h o f a p r o p o s i t i o n

i n g , a n d so f o r t h ; b u t i n b r i n g i n g a b o u t a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n

a n d the lightness (or appropriateness)

of an interpersonal relation.

w i t h a h e a r e r , t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s o f h i s i n t e n t i o n is o n l y a necessary

the transparency o f a subjectivity r e p r e -

c o n d i t i o n , w h e r e a s w h a t is i m p o r t a n t is t h a t t h e a c t i o n fit a r e c o g -

Truthfulness guarantees

s e n t i n g i t s e l f i n l a n g u a g e . I t is e s p e c i a l l y e m p h a s i z e d i n t h e expressive use of language. T h e p a r a d i g m s a r e f i r s t - p e r s o n s e n t e n c e s i n w h i c h

nized normative context. T h u s w e have t h e f o l l o w i n g c o r r e l a t i o n s :

t h e s p e a k e r ' s wishes, f e e l i n g s , i n t e n t i o n s , etc. ( w h i c h a r e e x p r e s s e d i n c i d e n t a l l y i n e v e r y s p e e c h act) a r e t h e m a t i z e d as s u c h , d i s c l o s i n g s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s s u c h as (3)

" I long for you."

(4)

" I wish that

Type o f Mode of communication

act

Theme

Cognitive

Constatives

Propositional

Interactive

Regulatives

i l l o c u t i o n a r y act: Expressive

" I h e r e b y express t o y o u t h a t I l o n g f o r y o u . "

Truth

of

s e l f - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , is n o t t h e m a t i c i n t h e expressive use o f l a n g u a g e a n d thus n e e d be m e n t i o n e d o n l y i n situations i n w h i c h the presupp o s i t i o n o f t h e s p e a k e r ' s t r u t h f u l n e s s is n o t t a k e n f o r g r a n t e d ; f o r t h i s , avowals are t h e p a r a d i g m : (5)

" I m u s t confess t o y o u

(6)

" I d o n ' t w a n t t o c o n c e a l f r o m y o u t h a t . . ."

Rightness,

relation

appropriateness

Speaker's

Truthfulness

N.B.: another

T h e m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e use c a n b e d e m a r c a t e d f r o m o n l y paradigmatically. I a m n o t c l a i m i n g t h a t every

one se-

q u e n c e o f s p e e c h acts c a n b e u n e q u i v o c a l l y classified u n d e r t h e s e v i e w p o i n t s . I a m c l a i m i n g o n l y t h a t e v e r y c o m p e t e n t s p e a k e r has i n p r i n c i p l e the possibility o f unequivocally selecting one cause w i t h e v e r y s p e e c h act she

that..."

F o r t h i s r e a s o n , expressive s p e e c h acts s u c h as d i s c l o s i n g ,

Avowals

Interpersonal

intention

T h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n , w h i c h can take o n t h e f u n c t i o n

c l a i m s , so t h a t she

mode

be-

must raise f o u r u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y

can s i n g l e o u t o n e

o f three universal validity

claims i n o r d e r to thematize a c o m p o n e n t o f speech. concealing,

r e v e a l i n g , a n d t h e l i k e c a n n o t b e c o r r e l a t e d w i t h t h e e x p r e s s i v e use o f language

validity claim

content

..."

I t is u n u s u a l f o r s u c h s e n t e n c e s t o b e e x p l i c i t l y e m b e d d e d i n a n

(3')

Thematic

speech

( w h i c h c a n , i n a way, d i s p e n s e w i t h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts)

i n t h e same m a n n e r as c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts are c o r r e l a t e d w i t h t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e a n d r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts w i t h t h e i n t e r a c t i v e . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t r u t h f u l n e s s , t o o , is a u n i v e r s a l i m p l i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h , as l o n g as t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n i n g e n e r a l a r e n o t s u s p e n d e d . I n t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e

the

T h e Rational F o u n d a t i o n o f I l l o c u t i o n a r y Force H a v i n g e l u c i d a t e d t h e m e a n i n g s t r u c t u r e a n d v a l i d i t y basis o f basic types o f s p e e c h acts, I w o u l d l i k e t o r e t u r n t o t h e q u e s t i o n , i n w h a t d o e s t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a n u t t e r a n c e consist? A t t h i s stage, w e k n o w o n l y w h a t i t results i n i f t h e speech act succeeds—in b r i n g i n g a b o u t a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n . A u s t i n a n d Searle a n a l y z e d i l l o c u -

82

83

Chapter 1


t i o n a r y f o r c e b y l o o k i n g f o r c o n d i t i o n s o f success o r f a i l u r e o f s p e e c h

tions

acts. A n u t t e r e d c o n t e n t receives a s p e c i f i c c o m m u n i c a d v e f u n c t i o n

speech act itself.

t h r o u g h the fact that the s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n s f o r the c o m i n g a b o u t o f a c o r r e s p o n d i n g i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n are f u l f i l l e d . W i t h

o f acceptability that lie w i t h i n

Searle

analyzed

the institutionally

the conventional presuppositions

unbound

of different

the

types o f s p e e c h acts t h a t m u s t b e f u l f i l l e d i f t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e

i l l o c u d o n a r y act, t h e s p e a k e r m a k e s a n o f f e r t h a t c a n b e a c c e p t e d

is t o b e c o m p r e h e n s i b l e a n d a c c e p t a b l e . U n d e r t h e t i d e " p r e p a r a -

o r rejected. T h e a t t e m p t a speaker makes w i t h a n i l l o c u d o n a r y act

t o r y r u l e s , " h e specifies g e n e r a l i z e d o r r e s t r i c t e d contexts f o r p o s s i b l e

m a y f o u n d e r f o r c o n t i n g e n t reasons o n t h e refusal o f t h e addressee

types o f s p e e c h acts. A p r o m i s e , f o r e x a m p l e , is n o t a c c e p t a b l e i f t h e

t o e n t e r i n t o t h e p r o f f e r e d r e l a t i o n s h i p . T h i s case is o f n o i n t e r e s t

f o l l o w i n g conditions, a m o n g others, are n o t fulfilled:

i n t h e p r e s e n t c o n t e x t . W e s h a l l b e c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e o t h e r case,

h e a r e r ) p r e f e r s S's ( t h e s p e a k e r ' s ) d o i n g A (a s p e c i f i c a c t i o n ) t o h i s

(a) H

(the

i n w h i c h t h e speaker h i m s e l f is r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e f a i l u r e o f t h e

n o t d o i n g A, a n d S m o r e o v e r believes t h i s t o b e t h e case; ( b ) i t is n o t

s p e e c h act because t h e u t t e r a n c e is u n a c c e p t a b l e . W h e n t h e s p e a k e r

obvious to b o t h S a n d H that S w o u l d d o A anyhow i n the n o r m a l

makes a n u t t e r a n c e t h a t m a n i f e s d y contains n o serious offer,

course o f events.

he

c a n n o t c o u n t o n the r e l a t i o n s h i p i n t e n d e d by h i m c o m i n g about.

93

I f c o n v e n t i o n a l presuppositions o f this k i n d are

n o t f u l f i l l e d , t h e a c t o f p r o m i s i n g is p o i n d e s s , t h a t is, t h e a t t e m p t b y

I s h a l l speak o f t h e success o f a s p e e c h act o n l y w h e n t h e h e a r e r n o t o n l y u n d e r s t a n d s t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e s e n t e n c e u t t e r e d b u t also

a s p e a k e r t o c a r r y o u t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t a n y w a y m a k e s n o sense a n d is c o n d e m n e d t o f a i l u r e f r o m t h e o u t s e t .

9 4

a c t u a l l y e n t e r s i n t o t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p i n t e n d e d b y t h e speaker. A n d I

T h e general contextual conditions for institutionally u n b o u n d

s h a l l analyze t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e success o f s p e e c h acts i n t e r m s

s p e e c h acts a r e t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a p p l y i n g

o f t h e i r "acceptability." Since I have restricted m y e x a m i n a t i o n f r o m

established n o r m s o f a c t i o n .

9 5

T h e t w o sets o f c o n d i t i o n s o f a p p l i c a -

t h e o u t s e t t o c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n — t h a t is, a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d

tion,

r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g — a s p e e c h a c t c o u n t s as a c c e p t a b l e o n l y i f

o f a c t i o n , m u s t vary (largely) i n d e p e n d e n d y o f one another i f (insti-

t h e speaker n o t m e r e l y feigns b u t sincerely makes a serious o f f e r .

t h o s e f o r types o f s p e e c h acts a n d t h o s e f o r e s t a b l i s h e d n o r m s

9 2

t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d ) s p e e c h acts a r e t o r e p r e s e n t a r e p e r t o r y f r o m

A serious offer d e m a n d s a c e r t a i n c o m m i t m e n t o n t h e p a r t o f t h e

w h i c h t h e a c t i n g s u b j e c t , w i t h t h e h e l p o f a finite n u m b e r o f types,

speaker. B u t b e f o r e g o i n g i n t o t h i s , I w o u l d l i k e t o m e n t i o n a d d i -

can p u t t o g e t h e r any n u m b e r o f n o r m - c o n f o r m a t i v e actions.

tional

r e a s o n s f o r t h e u n a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f i l l o c u d o n a r y acts.

Austin developed

his d o c t r i n e o f "infelicities" p r i m a r i l y o n

T o be s u r e , t h e p e c u l i a r f o r c e o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y — w h i c h i n t h e the

case o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts c a n n o t b e d e r i v e d directly

basis o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts; f o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e e x a m -

f r o m the validity o f established n o r m s o f a c t i o n — c a n n o t be

p l e s o f " m i s f i r e s " (i.e., m i s i n v o c a t i o n s , m i s e x e c u t i o n s , m i s a p p l i c a -

p l a i n e d by means o f t h e speech-act-typical c o n t e x t u a l restrictions. I t

ex-

t i o n s ) a r e t y p i c a l f o r a l l p o s s i b l e cases o f r u l e v i o l a t i o n . T h u s , t h e

is p o s s i b l e t o e x p l a i n t h i s f o r c e o n l y w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e s p e c i f i c

u n a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f s p e e c h acts c a n s t e m f r o m t r a n s g r e s s i o n s o f u n -

presuppositions

d e r l y i n g n o r m s o f a c t i o n . I f i n a w e d d i n g c e r e m o n y a priest recites

r u l e s . " I n d o i n g so, h e a d m i t t e d l y a p p e a r s t o a c h i e v e n o m o r e t h a n

t h a t Searle i n t r o d u c e s u n d e r t h e t i d e " e s s e n t i a l

the prescribed marriage f o r m u l a i n c o r r e c d y or n o t at a l l , the mis-

a paraphrase o f the m e a n i n g o f the corresponding performative

t a k e lies a t t h e same l e v e l as, l e t us say, t h e c o m m a n d o f a u n i v e r s i t y

v e r b s ( f o r e x a m p l e , r e q u e s t s : " c o u n t as a n a t t e m p t t o g e t Hto

l e c t u r e r i n class t o o n e o f h e r s t u d e n t s , w h o c a n r e p l y t o h e r ( r i g h t l y ,

o r q u e s t i o n s : " c o u n t as a n a t t e m p t t o e l i c i t i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m H"). I t

l e t us a s s u m e ) :

is i n t e r e s t i n g , h o w e v e r , t h a t c o m m o n t o these c i r c u m s c r i p t i o n s is t h e

cannot

"You c a n i n d e e d request a favor o f m e , b u t y o u

command

me." The

c o n d i t i o n s o f acceptability are

not

d o A;"

s p e c i f i c a t i o n , " c o u n t as a n a t t e m p t . . . . " T h e e s s e n t i a l p r e s u p p o s i -

f u l f i l l e d ; b u t i n b o t h cases, these c o n d i t i o n s a r e d e f i n e d b y t h e

tion

f o r t h e success o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t consists i n t h e s p e a k e r ' s

presupposed n o r m s o f a c t i o n . W e a r e l o o k i n g , b y c o n t r a s t , f o r c o n d i -

t a k i n g o n a s p e c i f i c commitment (Engagement), so t h a t t h e h e a r e r c a n

84

85

Chapter 1


r e l y o n h i m . A n u t t e r a n c e c a n c o u n t as a p r o m i s e , a s s e r t i o n , r e q u e s t ,

h e r s e l f i n a s p e c i f i c w a y a n d takes o n o b l i g a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g c e r t a i n

q u e s t i o n , o r avowal i f a n d o n l y i f t h e speaker makes a n offer t h a t he

c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r a c t i o n ; I c a n e s t a b l i s h a t b e s t w h e t h e r t h e r e are

is r e a d y t o m a k e g o o d i n s o f a r as i t is a c c e p t e d b y t h e h e a r e r .

sufficient indicators for the conjecture

The

s p e a k e r m u s t c o m m i t h i m s e l f , t h a t is, i n d i c a t e t h a t i n c e r t a i n s i t u ations he w i l l draw c e r t a i n consequences f o r a c t i o n . T h e type

that the offer w o u l d w i t h -

stand testing.

of

T h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p i n t o w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r is

o b l i g a t i o n d e t e r m i n e s t h e content o f t h e c o m m i t m e n t , f r o m w h i c h

w i l l i n g t o e n t e r w i t h t h e p e r f o r m a n c e o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act s i g n i f i e s

t h e s i n c e r i t y o f t h e c o m m i t m e n t is t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d .

a g u a r a n t e e t h a t , i n c o n s e q u e n c e o f h e r u t t e r a n c e , she w i l l f u l f i l l

9 6

This condi-

t i o n , i n t r o d u c e d b y Searle as t h e " s i n c e r i t y r u l e , " m u s t always b e

c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s — f o r e x a m p l e , r e g a r d a q u e s t i o n as s e t d e d w h e n

fulfilled

under-

a s a t i s f a c t o r y a n s w e r is g i v e n ; d r o p a n a s s e r t i o n w h e n i t p r o v e s t o be

standing. T h u s , i n w h a t follows I shall, i n speaking o f t h e speaker's

false; f o l l o w h e r o w n a d v i c e w h e n she f i n d s h e r s e l f i n t h e s a m e

c o m m i t m e n t , p r e s u p p o s e b o t h t h a t t h e c o m m i t m e n t has a s p e c i f i c

s i t u a t i o n as t h e h e a r e r ; p l a c e e m p h a s i s o n a r e q u e s t w h e n i t is n o t

i n t h e case o f a c t i o n

oriented toward reaching

c o n t e n t a n d t h a t t h e s p e a k e r s i n c e r e l y is w i l l i n g t o t a k e o n

his

c o m p l i e d w i t h ; act i n accordance w i t h an i n t e n t i o n disclosed by a n

c o m m i t m e n t . So f a r as I c a n see, p r e v i o u s analyses o f s p e e c h acts

a v o w a l , a n d so o n . Thus, the illocutionary force of an acceptabk speech act

h a v e b e e n u n s a t i s f a c t o r y , as t h e y h a v e n o t c l a r i f i e d t h e c o m m i t m e n t

consists in the fact that it can move a hearer to rely on the speech-act-typical

o f t h e speaker o n w h i c h t h e acceptability o f his utterance specifically

obligations of the speaker. B u t i f i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e has m o r e t h a n a

depends.

m e r e l y suggestive i n f l u e n c e , w h a t c a n m o t i v a t e t h e h e a r e r t o base

T h e discernible a n d sincere readiness o f t h e speaker t o e n t e r i n t o

his

action o n the premise

t h a t t h e speaker seriously i n t e n d s t h e

a specific k i n d o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p

c o m m i t m e n t she indicates? W h e n i t is a q u e s t i o n o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y

has, c o m p a r e d

with the general contextual conditions, a peculiar

b o u n d s p e e c h acts, h e c a n p e r h a p s r e l y o n t h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g

status. T h e r e s t r i c t e d c o n t e x t s t h a t s p e c i f i c types o f s p e e c h acts p r e -

f o r c e o f a n e s t a b l i s h e d n o r m o f a c t i o n . I n t h e case o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y

s u p p o s e m u s t (a) exist a n d ( b ) b e s u p p o s e d t o e x i s t b y t h o s e i n -

u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts, h o w e v e r , i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e c a n n o t be t r a c e d

volved.

Thus,

the

following

two

statements

must

hold:

a

b a c k directly t o t h e b i n d i n g f o r c e o f t h e n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d . I

those

w o u l d t h u s l i k e t o p r o p o s e t h e thesis t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e w i t h

(a)

s t a t e m e n t to t h e effect t h a t c e r t a i n contexts o b t a i n , i n d e e d

r e q u i r e d b y t h e type o f s p e e c h a c t i n q u e s t i o n ; a n d ( b ) a s t a t e m e n t

w h i c h t h e speaker, i n c a r r y i n g o u t h e r s p e e c h act, i n f l u e n c e s

to t h e effect

to

hearer can be u n d e r s t o o d o n l y if, over a n d above i n d i v i d u a l speech

o b t a i n . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , i t d o e s n o t m a k e sense t o analyze t h e specific

acts, w e t a k e i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e "yes" o r " n o " responses o f t h e

p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f t h e s p e a k e r ' s c o m m i t m e n t i n t h e same way, t h a t

h e a r e r t o t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s r a i s e d a t least i m p l i c i d y b y t h e speaker.

t h a t speaker a n d h e a r e r suppose these contexts

is, so t h a t t h e f o l l o w i n g t w o s t a t e m e n t s w o u l d h o l d : (a) a s t a t e m e n t

the

W i t h t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r raise v a l i d i t y

t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e r e is a c e r t a i n c o m m i t m e n t o n t h e p a r t o f t h e

claims a n d d e m a n d that they be recognized.

speaker; a n d (b) a statement t o t h e effect that t h e h e a r e r supposes

n e e d n o t f o l l o w i r r a t i o n a l l y , s i n c e t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s have a c o g n i t i v e

this c o m m i t m e n t o n t h e p a r t o f the speaker to o b t a i n . O n e

character a n d can be tested. I w o u l d l i k e , t h e r e f o r e , to d e f e n d

could

B u t this r e c o g n i t i o n the

c h o o s e t h i s strategy o f analysis; b u t I r e g a r d i t as u n s u i t a b l e . I t w o u l d

f o l l o w i n g thesis: In the final analysis,

suggest t h a t w e speak o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c o m m i t m e n t o n t h e p a r t

influence the hearer, and vice versa, because speech-act-typical obligations are

o f a s p e a k e r i n t h e s a m e sense as w e s p e a k o f t h e e x i s t e n c e restricted

contexts.

t h r o u g h observation

I

can

ascertain

i n an

appropriate

of

manner

or questioning whether certain contexts

the speaker can illocutionarily

connected with cognitively testable validity claims—that

is, because t h e

r e c i p r o c a l b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p has a r a t i o n a l basis.

ob-

T h e speaker w h o c o m m i t s herself n o r m a l l y connects the specific

t a i n ; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , I c a n o n l y test w h e t h e r a s p e a k e r c o m m i t s

sense i n w h i c h she w o u l d l i k e t o t a k e u p a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n -

86

87

Chapter 1


s h i p w i t h a t h e m a t i c a l l y stressed v a l i d i t y c l a i m a n d t h e r e b y c h o o s e s

d i s p e l a n a d h o c d o u b t , w e c a n pass o v e r t o t h e l e v e l o f

a

i n t h i s case, p r a c t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . I n s u c h a d i s c o u r s e , however,

specific

mode

of

communication.

Thus,

the

content

of

the

be

established, a n d

c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e s p e e c h act, b u t t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m o f t h e u n d e r l y i n g norm. F i n a l l y , i n t h e expressive use o f l a n g u a g e , t h e s p e a k e r also enters into a s p e e c h - a c t - i m m a n e n t

• a t h e m a t i c a l l y stressed u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m . I n t h i s way, assertions, d e s c r i p t i o n s , classifications, e s t i m a t e s , p r e d i c t i o n s , o b j e c t i o n s , a n d t h e l i k e h a v e , respectively, s p e c i f i c m o d a l m e a n i n g s ; b u t t h e c l a i m p u t f o r w a r d i n these d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p e r s o n a l o r o n t h e ability o f a subject t o have cognitions.

obligation, namely, t h e obligation

to prove trustworthy (Bewahrungsverpflichtung)—that

r e l a t i o n s is, o r is b a s e d o n , t h e t r u t h o f c o r r e s p o n d i n g

propositions

Correspondingly,

requests, orders, a d m o n i t i o n s , promises, agreements,

excuses, a d -

m i s s i o n s , a n d t h e l i k e have a s p e c i f i c m o d a l m e a n i n g ; b u t t h e c l a i m p u t f o r w a r d i n these d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s is, o r r e fers t o , t h e lightness o f n o r m s o r to t h e ability o f a subject to assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . W e m i g h t say t h a t i n d i f f e r e n t s p e e c h acts t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e s p e a k e r ' s c o m m i t m e n t is determined by a specific way of appealing to the same, thematically stressed, universal validity claim. A n d , s i n c e as a result o f this appeal to universal validity claims, the speech-act-typical obligations take o n t h e character o f obligations to p r o v i d e

the

s u b j e c t o f d i s c u r s i v e e x a m i n a t i o n is n o t t h e Tightness c l a i m d i r e c t l y

s p e a k e r ' s c o m m i t m e n t is d e t e r m i n e d b y b o t h o f t h e f o l l o w i n g : • t h e s p e c i f i c m e a n i n g o f t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n t h a t is t o

discourse,

grounds

o r to prove trustworthy, the hearer can be rationally m o t i v a t e d by t h e speaker's signaled c o m m i t m e n t t o accept t h e latter's offer. I w o u l d like to elucidate this for each o f the three modes o f c o m m u nication. I n t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , t h e s p e a k e r p r o f f e r s a s p e e c h a c t - i m m a n e n t obligation to provide grounds (Begründungsverpflichtung). C o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts c o n t a i n t h e o f f e r t o r e c u r i f n e c e s s a r y t o t h e experiential source f r o m w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r d r a w s t h e certainty t h a t h i s s t a t e m e n t is t r u e . I f t h i s i m m e d i a t e g r o u n d i n g d o e s n o t d i s p e l a n a d

is, t o s h o w i n t h e

c o n s e q u e n c e s o f h i s a c t i o n t h a t h e has e x p r e s s e d j u s t t h a t i n t e n t i o n t h a t a c t u a l l y g u i d e s h i m . I n case t h e i m m e d i a t e assurance e x p r e s s i n g w h a t is evident t o t h e s p e a k e r h i m s e l f c a n n o t d i s p e l a d h o c

doubts,

t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s o f t h e u t t e r a n c e can be c h e c k e d o n l y against t h e consistency o f his subsequent behavior. I n the consequences o f his a c t i o n , t h e o b l i g a t i o n t a k e n o n w i t h t h e s p e e c h a c t i t s e l f is p r o v e n t o h a v e b e e n m e t — a n d n o t t h e v a l i d i t y o f a c l a i m t h a t , as i n t h e case o f t h e n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d , is a n c h o r e d o u t s i d e o f t h e u t t e r a n c e . Every speech-act-immanent levels,

namely,

direcdy,

in

o b l i g a t i o n can be m a d e g o o d at two the

context

of

utterance—whether

t h r o u g h recourse to an experiential certainty, t h r o u g h indicating a c o r r e s p o n d i n g n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d , o r t h r o u g h assurance o f w h a t is s u b j e c t i v e l y e v i d e n t — a n d i n d i r e c t l y , i n d i s c o u r s e o r i n t h e s e q u e l o f consistent

a c t i o n s . B u t o n l y i n t h e case o f t h e o b l i g a t i o n s

to

g r o u n d a n d t o prove trustworthy, i n t o w h i c h we e n t e r w i t h constative a n d w i t h e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts, d o w e r e f e r — o n b o t h l e v e l s — t o t h e same t r u t h a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s c l a i m . T h e o b l i g a t i o n t o j u s t i f y , i n t o w h i c h w e e n t e r w i t h r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts, r e f e r s d i r e c t l y t o t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e s p e e c h act p e r f o r m e d fits a n e x i s t i n g n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d ; whereas w i t h the e n t r a n c e i n t o practical discourse, the topic o f discussion

is t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e n o r m

itself f r o m w h i c h

the

s p e a k e r ' s l i g h t n e s s c l a i m is m e r e l y d e r i v e d . O u r r e f l e c t i o n s have l e d t o t h e f o l l o w i n g p r o v i s i o n a l results:

hoc d o u b t , the persistently p r o b l e m a t i c t r u t h c l a i m can b e c o m e the

a. A s p e e c h a c t succeeds, t h a t is, i t b r i n g s a b o u t t h e i n t e r p e r s o n a l

s u b j e c t o f a t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c o u r s e . I n t h e i n t e r a c t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e ,

r e l a t i o n t h a t 5 i n t e n d s w i t h i t , i f i t is:

the

speaker proffers

justification

a speech-act-immanent

(Rechtfertigungsverpflichtung).

obligation to

provide

O f course, regulative speech

• comprehensible

a n d acceptable, a n d

acts c o n t a i n o n l y t h e o f f e r o n t h e p a r t o f t h e s p e a k e r t o i n d i c a t e , i f

• accepted by the hearer.

necessary, t h e normative context t h a t gives h i m t h e conviction t h a t h i s

b. T h e

u t t e r a n c e is r i g h t . A g a i n , i f t h i s i m m e d i a t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n d o e s n o t

things) the f u l f i l l m e n t o f two pragmatic

acceptability o f a speech act d e p e n d s o n

(among

presuppositions:

other

88

89

Chapter 1


. t h e existence o f speech-act-typical r e s t r i c t e d contexts ( p r e p a r a t o r y

He

rule); and

existential presuppositions

• a recognizable

c o m m i t m e n t o n t h e p a r t o f the speaker to enter

i n t o c e r t a i n speech-act-typical

obligations

(essential r u l e , s i n c e r i t y

claims t r u t h f o r t h e stated p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t or f o r

H e c l a i m s r i g h t n e s s ( o r a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s ) f o r n o r m s ( o r values) t h a t , i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t , j u s t i f y a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n t h a t is t o established performatively. Finally, he claims truthfulness f o r

rule). c. T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a s p e e c h act consists i n its c a p a c i t y t o m o v e a h e a r e r t o act u n d e r t h e p r e m i s e t h a t t h e c o m m i t m e n t sign a l l e d b y t h e s p e a k e r is s e r i o u s l y m e a n t : • i n t h e case o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts, t h e s p e a k e r c a n borrow

this force directly f r o m

the obligating force o f existing

norms;

the

of a mentioned propositional content. be the

s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse) e x p r e s s e d . O f c o u r s e , i n d i v i d u a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s c a n b e t h e m a t i c a l l y stressed: t h e t r u t h o f t h e p r o p o s i tional

c o n t e n t c o m e s t o t h e f o r e i n t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f

the rightness (or appropriateness)

language,

o f the interpersonal relation i n

t h e i n t e r a c t i v e , a n d t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s o f t h e s p e a k e r i n t h e expressive. B u t i n e v e r y i n s t a n c e o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n t h e system o f a l l f o u r v a l i d i t y c l a i m s c o m e s i n t o p l a y ; t h e y m u s t always b e r a i s e d simultane-

• i n t h e case o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts, t h e s p e a k e r c a n

ously a n d r e c o g n i z e d as j u s t i f i e d , a l t h o u g h t h e y c a n n o t a l l b e t h e -

d e v e l o p this f o r c e by m o t i v a t i n g t h e h e a r e r t o t h e r e c o g n i t i o n

of

m a t i c at t h e same

to

s p e e c h c a n p e r h a p s b e e l u c i d a t e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e systematic

recognize validity claims because t h e c o n t e n t o f the speaker's c o m -

p l a c e o f l a n g u a g e . L a n g u a g e is t h e m e d i u m t h r o u g h w h i c h speakers

m i t m e n t is d e t e r m i n e d b y a s p e c i f i c w a y o f a p p e a l i n g t o a t h e m a t i -

a n d hearers realize certain f u n d a m e n t a l demarcations. T h e

c a l l y stressed v a l i d i t y c l a i m , w h e r e b y t h e speaker, i n a t e s t a b l e way,

d e m a r c a t e s h e r s e l f ( i ) f r o m a n e n v i r o n m e n t t h a t she o b j e c t i f i e s i n

assumes:

the third-person attitude o f an observer; (ii) f r o m an e n v i r o n m e n t

validity claims.

time.

T h e universality o f the validity claims i n h e r e n t i n the structure o f

d. Speaker a n d hearer can reciprocally motivate one

another

subject

t h a t she c o n f o r m s t o o r deviates f r o m i n t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e

• w i t h a t r u t h claim, obligations to provide grounds;

o f a p a r t i c i p a n t ; ( i i i ) f r o m h e r o w n s u b j e c t i v i t y t h a t she expresses o r

• w i t h a rightness claim, obligations to provide justification; a n d

conceals i n the

• w i t h a truthfulness claim, obligations to prove trustworthy.

first-person

attitude; and

finally

(iv) f r o m t h e m e -

d i u m o f l a n g u a g e itself. F o r these d o m a i n s o f r e a l i t y I have p r o p o s e d t h e s o m e w h a t a r b i t r a r i l y c h o s e n t e r m s external nature, society, internal

A M o d e l of Linguistic C o m m u n i c a t i o n

nature,

and

language. T h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s u n a v o i d a b l y i m p l i e d i n

every speech act show t h a t i n speech o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n The

analysis o f w h a t A u s t i n c a l l e d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f

an

d e r s t a n d i n g t h e s e f o u r r e g i o n s m u s t always s i m u l t a n e o u s l y appear. I

u t t e r a n c e leads us b a c k t o t h e v a l i d i t y basis o f s p e e c h . I n s t i t u t i o n a l l y

shall characterize t h e way i n w h i c h these regions appear w i t h a few

u n b o u n d s p e e c h acts o w e t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e t o a c l u s t e r o f

phenomenological

validity claims that m u s t be raised reciprocally by speaker a n d hearer, a n d be

r e c o g n i z e d b y t h e m as j u s t i f i e d , i f g r a m m a t i c a l ( t h a t is,

comprehensible)

s e n t e n c e s a r e t o b e e m p l o y e d i n s u c h a w a y as t o

r e s u l t i n successful c o m m u n i c a t i o n . A p a r t i c i p a n t i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n acts w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n l y u n d e r the condition

that, i n e m p l o y i n g

comprehensible

sentences,

he

raises w i t h h i s s p e e c h acts t h r e e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i n a n a c c e p t a b l e way.

indications.

B y external nature I m e a n t h e o b j e c t i v a t e d s e g m e n t o f r e a l i t y t h a t the a d u l t subject

( e v e n i f o n l y i n d i r e c d y ) is a b l e t o p e r c e i v e a n d

m a n i p u l a t e . T h e subject can, o f course, a d o p t a n objectivating attit u d e n o t o n l y t o w a r d i n a n i m a t e n a t u r e b u t t o w a r d a l l objects a n d states o f a f f a i r s t h a t a r e d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y accessible t o s e n s o r y e x p e r i e n c e . Society d e s i g n a t e s t h a t s y m b o l i c a l l y p r e s t r u c t u r e d segm e n t o f reality t h a t the a d u l t subject can u n d e r s t a n d i n a n o n o b j e c -

90

91

Chapter 1


t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e , t h a t is, as o n e a c d n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y (as a p a r t i c i -

T h e social reality o f n o r m s o f a c t i o n a n d values e n t e r s s p e e c h b y way

p a n t i n a system o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n ) . L e g i t i m a t e i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a -

o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t s o f s p e e c h acts ( p e n e t r a t i n g t h r o u g h

tions

belong

here,

as

do

sentences

and

actions,

institutions,

t h e p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e o f t h e s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r , as i t w e r e ) as a

t r a d i t i o n s , c u l t u r a l values, o b j e c t i v a t i o n s i n g e n e r a l w i t h a s e m a n t i c

slice o f n o n o b j e c t i f i e d reality. I n t h e s a m e m a n n e r , t h e internal nature

c o n t e n t , as w e l l as t h e s p e a k i n g a n d a c t i n g subjects t h e m s e l v e s .

We

o f t h e s u b j e c t s i n v o l v e d m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f i n s p e e c h b y way o f speakers'

can replace this p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e w i t h a n objectivating a t t i t u d e

i n t e n t i o n s as a f u r t h e r slice o f n o n o b j e c t i f i e d r e a l i t y . I w o u l d l i k e t o

t o w a r d society; conversely, w e c a n s w i t c h t o a p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e

p r o p o s e t h e t e r m s " n o r m a t i v i t y " a n d "subjectivity" f o r the way i n

i n domains i n w h i c h (today) we n o r m a l l y behave objectivatingly—

w h i c h n o n o b j e c t i f i e d s o c i e t y or, as t h e case m a y b e ,

f o r e x a m p l e , i n r e l a t i o n t o a n i m a l s a n d p l a n t s . I class as

internal

nature a l l wishes, f e e l i n g s , i n t e n t i o n s , a n d so f o r t h t o w h i c h a n

nonobjectified

i n n e r n a t u r e a p p e a r s i n s p e e c h . " R i g h t n e s s " is t h e c l a i m w i t h w h i c h

"I"

w e assert v a l i d i t y f o r t h e n o r m a t i v i t y o f a n u t t e r a n c e ; " t r u t h f u l n e s s "

has p r i v i l e g e d access a n d c a n e x p r e s s as its o w n s u b j e c t i v e

experi-

is t h e c l a i m w i t h w h i c h w e assert v a l i d i t y f o r t h e i n t e n t i o n e x p r e s s e d

ences. I t is p r e c i s e l y i n t h i s e x p r e s s i v e a t t i t u d e t h a t t h e " I "

knows

i n t h a t u t t e r a n c e . I n t h i s way, t h e g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s o f s p e e c h e n s u r e

i t s e l f n o t o n l y as s u b j e c t i v i t y b u t also as a n a u t h o r i t y t h a t has always

n o t o n l y a r e f e r e n c e t o o b j e c t i f i e d r e a l i t y , t h e y e q u a l l y o p e n u p space

already transcended the b o u n d s o f m e r e subjectivity i n c o g n i t i o n ,

f o r t h e n o r m a t i v i t y o f u t t e r a n c e s as w e l l as t h e s u b j e c t i v i t y o f t h e

language, a n d i n t e r a c t i o n simultaneously. T o be sure, i f t h e subject

i n t e n t i o n s e x p r e s s e d t h e r e i n . F i n a l l y , I use t h e t e r m " i n t e r s u b j e c t i v -

a d o p t s a n o b j e c t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e t o w a r d h e r s e l f , t h i s d i s t o r t s t h e sense

i t y " t o r e f e r t o t h e c o m m o n a l i t y e s t a b l i s h e d b e t w e e n subjects c a p a b l e

i n w h i c h i n t e n t i o n s c a n b e e x p r e s s e d as my i n t e n t i o n s .

o f s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n b y way o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f i d e n t i c a l

9 7

F i n a l l y , I i n t r o d u c e d t h e m e d i u m o f o u r u t t e r a n c e s as a r e g i o n o f

meanings a n d t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f universal claims. W i t h respect to

its o w n ; p r e c i s e l y because language ( i n c l u d i n g n o n p r o p o s i t i o n a l s y m -

i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y , t h e c l a i m f o r w h i c h v a l i d i t y is asserted is c o m p r e -

b o l systems) r e m a i n s i n a p e c u l i a r h a l f - t r a n s c e n d e n c e i n t h e p e r f o r -

h e n s i b i l i t y — t h i s is t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s p e c i f i c t o s p e e c h .

m a n c e o f o u r c o m m u n i c a t i v e actions a n d expressions, i t presents itself t o t h e speaker a n d actor

( p r e c o n s c i o u s l y ) as a s e g m e n t

We

can

examine

e v e r y u t t e r a n c e t o see

w h e t h e r i t is t r u e o r

of

u n t r u e , j u s t i f i e d o r u n j u s t i f i e d , a n d t r u t h f u l o r u n t r u t h f u l because

reality sui generis. A g a i n , this does n o t p r e c l u d e o u r b e i n g able to

i n s p e e c h , n o m a t t e r w h a t t h e e m p h a s i s , g r a m m a t i c a l sentences a r e

a d o p t , i n r e g a r d t o l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s o r systems o f s y m b o l s , e i t h e r

e m b e d d e d i n relations t o reality i n such a way t h a t i n an acceptable

an objectivating attitude directed to the material substratum or a

s p e e c h a c t s e g m e n t s o f e x t e r n a l n a t u r e , society, a n d i n t e r n a l n a t u r e

p e r f o r m a t i v e attitude directed to the semantic content o f i l l o c u t i o n -

always a p p e a r s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . L a n g u a g e i t s e l f also a p p e a r s i n s p e e c h ,

a r y acts.

f o r s p e e c h is a m e d i u m i n w h i c h t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e a n s t h a t a r e e m -

T h e m o d e l i n t u i t i v e l y i n t r o d u c e d h e r e is t h a t o f a c o m m u n i c a t i o n

p l o y e d i n s t r u m e n t a l l y are also r e f l e c t e d . I n s p e e c h , s p e e c h sets i t s e l f

i n w h i c h g r a m m a t i c a l s e n t e n c e s a r e e m b e d d e d , b y way o f u n i v e r s a l

o f f f r o m t h e r e g i o n s o f e x t e r n a l n a t u r e , society, a n d i n t e r n a l n a t u r e

validity claims, i n t h r e e r e l a t i o n s t o reality, t h e r e b y assuming

as a r e a l i t y s u i g e n e r i s , as s o o n as t h e s i g n - s u b s t r a t u m , m e a n i n g , a n d

corresponding

the

pragmatic functions o f representation, establishing

i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations, a n d expressing one's o w n subjectivity. External

nature r e f e r s t o e v e r y t h i n g t h a t c a n b e e x p l i c i t l y asserted

as t h e c o n t e n t o f s t a t e m e n t s . H e r e , " o b j e c t i v i t y " m i g h t d e s i g n a t e t h e w a y i n w h i c h o b j e c t i f i e d r e a l i t y a p p e a r s i n s p e e c h . A n d " t r u t h " is t h e c l a i m w i t h w h i c h we assert v a l i d i t y f o r a c o r r e s p o n d i n g

proposition.

d e n o t a t i o n o f a linguistic utterance can be distinguished. T h e f o l l o w i n g table represents schematically the correlations that obtain for a. t h e d o m a i n s o f r e a l i t y t o w h i c h e v e r y s p e e c h a c t takes u p r e l a t i o n , b. the attitudes o f the speaker p r e v a i l i n g i n p a r t i c u l a r m o d e s communication,

of

92

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Chapter 1


c.

2. [Added to 1979 English translation:] I shall focus on a n idealized case of communicative action, namely, "consensual interaction," i n which participants share a tradition and their orientations are normatively integrated to such an extent that they start from the same definition of the situation a n d do not disagree about the claims to validity that they reciprocally raise. T h e following schema locates the extreme case of consensual interaction in a system of different types of social action. Underlying

t h e v a l i d i t y claims u n d e r w h i c h t h e r e l a t i o n s t o reality are estab-

lished, d.

and

t h e g e n e r a l f u n c t i o n s t h a t g r a m m a t i c a l sentences assume i n t h e i r

r e l a t i o n s to reality. Modes of

General

Social action

Domains of

communication:

Validity

functions

reality

Basic a t t i t u d e s

claims

speech

Cognitive:

Truth

Representation

'The" of

world

external

of

o f facts

Objectivating attitude

nature "Our"

world

o f society

Interactive:

Rightness

Establishment

Conformative

of

attitude

interpersonal

legitimate

relations "My"

world

Expressive:

Truthfulness

Disclosure

of internal

Expressive

speaker's

nature

attitude

subjectivity

Language

of

sibility

Acknowledgment

helpful

G. G r e w e n d o r f f o r

their

c r i t i c i s m s o f a f i r s t d r a f t o f t h i s essay. T h e y w i l l h a v e

their

d i s a g r e e m e n t s w i t h t h i s r e v i s e d v e r s i o n as w e l l .

Consensual action

/\

Action

Openly strategic action

Discourse

Latently strategic action

Manipulation

Systematically distorted communication

this typology is the question of which categories of validity claims participants are supposed to raise a n d react to. These action types can be distinguished by virtue of their relations to the validity basis of speech: a. Communicative versus Strategic Action. I n communicative action, a basis of mutually recognized validity claims is presupposed; this is not the case in strategic action. I n the communicative attitude, it is possible to reach a direct mutual understanding oriented toward validity claims; in the strategic attitude, by contrast, only an indirect mutual understanding via determinative indicators is possible.

Comprehen-

I w o u l d l i k e t o t h a n k E. T u g e n d h a t a n d

Action oriented toward reaching understanding

J. H .

Notes 1. [Added to 1979 English translation:] Hitherto the term "pragmatics" has referred to the analysis of particular contexts of language use and not to the reconstruction of universal features of using language (or o f employing sentences in utterances). T o mark this contrast, I introduced a distinction between "empirical" a n d "universal" pragmatics. I a m no longer happy with this terminology; the term "formal pragmati c s " — a s an extension of "formal semantics"—would serve better. "Formalpragmatik" is the term preferred by F. Schütze, Sprache Soziologisch Gesehen, 2 vols. (Munich, 1975); cf. the summary, pp. 911-1024.

b. Action Oriented toward Reaching Understanding versus Consensual Action. I n consensual action, agreement about implicitly raised validity claims can be presupposed as a background consensus by reason of common definitions of the situations; such agreement is supposed to be arrived at in action oriented toward reaching understanding. I n the latter case strategic elements may be employed under the proviso that they are meant to lead to a direct mutual understanding. c. Action versus Discourse. I n communicative action, it is naively supposed that i m plicitly raised validity claims can be vindicated (or made immediately plausible by way of question and answer). I n discourse, by contrast, the validity claims raised for statements a n d norms are hypothetically bracketed a n d thematically examined. As in communicative action, the participants in discourse retain a cooperative attitude. d. Manipulative Action versus Systematically Distorted Communication. Whereas in systematically distorted communication at least one o f the participants deceives himself about the fact that the basis of consensual action is only apparendy being maintained, the manipulator deceives at least one of the other participants about her own strategic attitude, in which she deliberately behaves in a pseudoconsensual manner. 3. K . - 0 . Apel, "Sprechakttheorie u n d transzendentale Sprachpragmatik—zur Frage ethischer N o r m e n , " in K . - 0 . Apel, ed., Sprachpragmatik und Philosophic (Frankfurt, 1976), pp. 10-173.

94

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W h a t Is U n i v e r s a l Pragmatics?

4. I n the framework of Southwest G e r m a n Neo-Kantianism, E m i l Lask has earlier reconstructed the concept of "transsubjective validity"—in connection with the meaning of linguistic expressions, the truth of statements, and the beauty of works of t — a s worthiness to be recognized. Lask's philosophy of validity combines motifs from Lotze, Bolzano, Husserl, and, naturally, Rickert. "Valid value (geltender Wert) is worthiness to be recognized, recognition-value, that which deserves devotion, that to which devotion is due, thus that which demands or requires devotion. To be valid is value, demand, norm. . . . All such terms as 'worthiness,' 'deserve,' 'be due,' 'dem a n d ' are correlative concepts; they point to a subjective behavior corresponding to validity: worthy to be treated or regarded in a certain way—this demands a certain behavior." E . Lask, " Z u m System der Logik," Ges. Schriften, vol. 3 (Tubingen, 1924), p. 92.

strative inference" in R. P. Botha, The Justification of Linguistic Hypotheses (The Hague,

5. [Editor's note:] Cf. note 1 above.

16. J . R. Ross, " O n Declarative Sentences," i n j . Rosenbaum, ed., Readings in English Transformational Grammar (Waltham, Mass., 1970), pp. 222-277; J . D. MacCawley, ' T h e Role of Semantics in a Grammar," in E . B a c h and T. Harms, eds., Universals in Linguistic Theory (New York, 1968), pp. 125-170; D . Wunderlich, "Sprechakte," i n U . Maas and D . Wunderlich, Pragmatik und sprachliches Handeln (Frankfurt, 1972), pp. 69-188, and " Z u r Konventionalität von Sprechhandlungen," in D. Wunderlich, ed., Linguistische Pragmatik (Frankfurt, 1972), pp. 11-58.

a r

6. Y Bar-Hillel fails to appreciate this i n his critique " O n Habermas's Hermeneutic Philosophy of Language," Synthese26 (1973): 1-12. His critique is based on a paper I characterized as provisional. "Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen Kompetenz," in J . Habermas and N . L u h m a n n , Theorie der Gesell¬ schaft oder Sozialtechnobgie (Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 101-141. Bar-Hillel has, I feel, misunderstood me on so many points that it would not be fruitful to reply in detail. I only hope that in the present sketch I can make my (still strongly programmatic) approach clear even to readers who are aggressively inclined and hermeneutically not especially open. 7. E . g . , K - O . Apel, Transformation derPhilosophie, vol. 2 (Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 406ff, and "Programmatische Bemerkungen zur Idee einer transzendentalen Sprachprag¬ matik," in Annates Universitatis Tukuensis Sarja, Series B, O s a Tom, 126 ( T u k u , 1973), pp. 11-35. 8. Charles Morris, "Foundations of the T h e o r y of Signs," i n Encylopedia of Unified Science, vol. 1, no. 2 (Chicago, 1938), and Signs, Language, Behavior (New York, 1955). 9. Cf. my remarks on Morris in On the Logic of the Social Sciences, trans. S. W. Nicholsen and G . A . Stark (Cambridge, Mass., 1988), pp. 63ff. 10. Y Bar-Hillel, "Indexical Expressions," in Aspects of Language (Jerusalem, 1970), pp. 69-88, and "Semantics and Communication," in H . Heidrich, Semantics and Communication (Amsterdam, 1974), pp. 1-36. Taking Bar-Hillel as his point of departure, A . Kasher has proposed a formal representation embedding linguistic expressions in extralinguistic contexts. " A Step Forward to a T h e o r y of Linguistic Performance," in Y Bar-Hillel, ed., Pragmatics of Natural Languages (Dordrecht, 1971), pp. 84-93; cf. also R. C . Stalnaker, "Pragmatics," i n D. Davidson and G . H a r m a n , Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht, 1972), pp. 380-387.

14. F. Kiefer, " O n Presuppositions," in F. Kiefer and N . Ruwet, eds., Generative Grammar in Europe (Dordrecht, 1973), pp. 218-242; K. H . Ebert, "Präsuppositionen im Sprechakt," in A. ten-Cate and P. Jordens, eds., Papers from the Seventh Linguistic Colloquium at Nijmegen (Tübingen, 1973), pp. 45-60; F. Petöfi, Präsuppositionen in Linguistik und Philosophie (Frankfurt, 1974). 15. H . P. Grice, "Logic and Conversation," i n P. Cole and J . L . Morgan, eds., Syntax and Semantics, vol. 3 (New York, 1974); and D . G o r d o n and G . Lakoff, "Conversational Postulates" MS (1973).

17. C . J . Fillmore, "Pragmatics and the Description of Discourse," in P. Cole, ed., Radical Pragmatics (New York, 1981); G . Posner, Textgrammatik (Frankfurt, 1973). 18. J . Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics (New York, 1968); J . J . Katz, Semantic Theory (New York, 1972). 19. P. F. Strawson, Logico-LinguisticPapers

( L o n d o n , 1971).

20. A. C . Danto, Analytic Philosophy of Action (Cambridge, 1973); S. Hampshire, Thought and Action ( L o n d o n , 1960); D. S. Schwayder, The Stratification of Behaviour ( L o n d o n , 1965); Care and Landesman, eds., Readings in the Theory of Action ( L o n d o n , 1968). 21. P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (London, 1958); C. Taylor, " E x p l a i n i n g Action," Inquiry 13 (1973): 54-89; H . von Wright, Explanation and Understanding ( L o n d o n , 1971), and " O n the Logic and Epistemology of the Causal Relation," in P. Suppes, ed., Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, vol. 4 (Stanford, 1973), pp. 239-312. 22. W. P. Alston, Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964). 23. J . Bennett, ' T h e Meaning-Nominalist Strategy," Foundations (1973): 141-168; S. R. Schiffer, Meaning (Oxford, 1972).

of Language

10

11. R. M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford, 1952); G . H . von Wright, Norm and Action ( L o n d o n , 1963); N. Rescher, Topics in Philosophical Logic (Dordrecht, 1968).

24. Cf. the bibliography by E . von Savigny, in J . L . Austin, Zur Theorie aer Sprechakte (Stuttgart, 1972), pp. 203ff.

12. L . Apostel, " A Proposal on the Analysis of Questions," in Logique et Analyse 12 (1969): 376-381; W. K u h l m a n n , Reflexion zzvischen Theorie und Kritik (Frankfurt, 1975).

25. G . Grewendorf, "Sprache ohne Kontext," in Wunderlich, ed., Linguistische Pragmatik, pp. 144-182.

13. S. Toulmin, The Uses of Argument (Cambridge, 1974); W. C . Salmon, The Foundation of Scientific Inference (Pittsburgh, 1967); cf. the summary chapter on "nondemon-

26. H . P. Grice, "Meaning," Philosophical Review 66 (1957): 377-388, and "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," reprinted in Grice, Studies in the

96

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W h a t Is U n i v e r s a l P r a g m a t i c s ?

Ways of Words (Cambridge, Mass., 1989), pp. 117ff.; D. K. Lewis, Convention (Cambridge, 1969).

41. Ibid., pp. 14ff.

27. Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, pp. 89ff. 28. H . - G . Gadamer emphasizes this in Truth and Method (New York, 1975). 29. G . Ryle, The Concept of Mind ( L o n d o n , 1949); cf. the interpretation of E . von Savigny in Die Philosophie der normalen Sprache (Frankfurt, 1974), pp. 91ff. 30. R. Carnap and W. Stegmüller, Induktive Logik und Wahrscheinlichkeit (Wien, 1959), p. 15. 31. D . Wunderlich, Grundlagen der Linguistik (Hamburg, 1974), p. 209. 32. For an analysis of what explication in the sense of rational reconstruction means, cf. H . Schnädelbach, Reflexion und Diskurs (Frankfurt, 1977), the chapter on " E x p l i kativer Diskurs," pp. 277-336. 33. N. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Mass., 1965). 34. Wunderlich, Grundlagen, pp. 210-218. 35. Botha, Justification, pp. 75ff., speaks i n this connection of external versus internal linguistic evidence. 36. Wunderlich, Grundlagen, p. 216. I f I understand him correctly, H . Schnelle gives an empirical interpretation to the model-theoretic version of linguistics in Sprachphilosphie und Linguistik (Hamburg, 1973), pp. 82-114. 37. Botha, Justification, p. 224, thinks that a speaker can not only report correct linguistic intuitions falsely but can also have false linguistic intuitions; but the construct of pretheoretical knowledge does nor permit this possibility. I think it makes sense to assume that linguistic intuitions can be "false" only if they come from incompetent speakers. Another problem is the interplay of grammatical and nongrammatical (for example, perceptual) epistemic systems in the formation of diffuse judgments about the acceptability of sentences, that is, the question of isolating expressions of grammatical rule consciousness or, as the case may be, of isolating genuinely linguistic intuitions. Cf. T. G . Bever, ' T h e Ascent of the Specious," in D. C o h e n , ed., Explaining Linguistic Phenonema (New York, 1974), pp. 173-200. 38. I n this connection, U . Oevermann points out interesting parallels with Piaget's concept of reflecting abstraction (cf. J . Piaget, The Principles of Genetic Epistemohgy (New York, 1972)): perhaps the procedure of rational reconstruction is merely a stylized and, as it were, controlled form of the reflecting abstraction the child carries out when, for example, she "reads off" her instrumental actions the schema that underlies them. 39. W. J . M. Levelt, Formal Grammars in Linguistics and Psycholinguistics, vols. (Amsterdam, 1974). 40. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 5-7.

1-3

42. I n responding to the doubts that Botha raises against the "clear case principle" (Justification, p. 224), I would like to reproduce an argument that J . J . Katz and T. G . Bever have brought against similar doubts in a paper critical of empiricism, " T h e Fall and Rise of E m p i r i c i s m , " in T. G. Bever, J . J . Katz, and D. T. Langendoen, eds., An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Ability (New York, 1976): Such a theory . . . seeks to explicate intuitions about the interconnectedness of phonological properties in terms of a theory of the phonological component, to explicate intuitions about the interconnectedness of syntactic properties in terms of a theory of the syntactic component, and to explicate intuitions about the interconnectedness of semantic properties in terms of a theory of the semantic component. T h e theory of grammar seeks finally to explicate intuitions of relatedness among properties of different kinds in terms of the systematic connections expressed in the model of a grammar that welds its components in a single integrated theory of the sound-meaning correlation in a language. These remarks are, of course, by way of describing the theoretical ideal. But as the theory of grammar makes progress toward this ideal, it not only sets limits on the construction of grammars and provides a richer interpretation for grammatical structures but it also defines a wider and wider class of grammatical properties and relations. I n so doing, it marks out the realm of the grammatical more clearly, distinctly, and securely than could have been done on the basis of the original intuitions. As Fodor has insightfully observed, such a theory literally defines its own subject matter in the course of its progress: T h e r e is then an important sense in which a science has to discover what it is about; it does so by discovering that the laws and concepts it produced in order to explain one set of phenomena can be fruitfully applied to phenomena of other sorts as well. It is thus only in retrospect that we can say of all the phenomena embraced by a single theoretical framework that they are what we meant, for example, by the presystematic term "physical event," "chemical interaction," or "behavior." To the extent that such terms, or their employments, are neologistic, the neologism is occasioned by the insights that successful theories provide into the deep similarities that underlie superficially heterogeneous events. (J. A. Fodor, Psychological Explanation [New York, 1968], pp. 10-11.) 43. H . Leuninger, M. H . Miller, and F. Müller, Psycholinguistik (Frankfurt, 1973), and H . Leuninger, M. H . Miller, and F. Müller, eds., Linguistik und Psychologie (Frankfurt, 1974); H . Leuninger, "Linguistik u n d Psychologie," in R. Bartsch and T. Vennemann, eds., Linguistik und Nachbarwissenschaften (Kronberg, 1973), pp. 225-241. 44. E . H . Lenneberg, Biologische Grundlagen der Sprache (Frankfurt, 1972), and " E i n Wort unter u n s , " in Leuninger, Miller, and Müller, eds., Linguistik und Psychologie, pp. 53-72. 45. L . Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," in D . Goslin, ed., Handbook of Socialization Theory and Research (Chicago, 1969), and " F r o m Is to Ought," in T. Mischel, ed., Cognitive Development and Epistemohgy (New York, 1971), pp. 151-236. 46. O n this point, cf. U . Oevermann, "Kompetenz u n d Performanz" (Max-Planck¬ Institut für Bildungsforschung, 1974).

98

99

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W h a t Is U n i v e r s a l Pragmatics?

47. I . Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N. Kemp-Smith (New York, 1961), p. 138.

in the Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1971), pp. 614-628, "Austin on Locutionary and Elocutionary Acts," Philosophical Review 77 (1968): 405-424, reprinted in Rosenberg and Travis, eds., Readings, pp. 262-275, Speech Acts (Cambridge, 1969), and "Linguistik u n d Sprachphilosophie," in Bartsch and Vennemann, Linguistik und Nachbarwissenschaften, pp. 111-126. O t h e r sources include: W. P. Alston, Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964), and "Linguistic Acts," American Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1964): 138-146; L . J . C o h e n , " D o Illocutionary Forces Exist?," Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1964): 118-137, reprinted in Rosenberg and Travis, Readings, pp. 580-598, and "Speech Acts," Current Trends in Linguistics 12 (1970); R. M. Hare, "Meaning and Speech Acts," Philosophical Review 79 (1970): 3-24, and "Austin's Distinction between Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts," in R. M. Hare, Practical Inferences ( L o n d o n , 1972); D. Holdcroft, "Performatives and Statements," Mind 83 (1974): 1-18; P. F. Strawson, "Intention and Convention in Speech Acts," Philosophical Review 73 (1964): 439-460, reprinted in Rosenberg and Travis, Readings, pp. 599-613; S. T h a u , T h e Distinction between Rhetic and Illocutionary Acts," Analysis 32 ( 1 9 7 1 / 7 2 ) : 177-183; C. Travis, "A Generative T h e o r y of Speech Acts," in Rosenberg and Travis, Readings, pp. 629-644; G . J . Warnock, " H a r e on Meaning and Speech Acts," Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 80-84; Wunderlich, Grundlagen, pp. 309-352.

48. B. Stroud, T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Arguments," Journal of Philosophy 9 (1968): 241-254; J . Hintikka, T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Arguments," Nous 6 (1972): 174-281; and M. S. G r a m , "Categories and Transcendental Arguments," Man and World 6 (1973): 252-269, and T r a n s c e n d e n t a l Arguments," Nous 5 (1971): 15-26. 49. R. Bittner, T r a n s z e n d e n t a l , " i n Handbuch philosophischer Grundbegriffe, vol. 5 (Munich, 1974), pp. 1524-1539. 50. F o r example, the reception of Kant by the Erlangen school assumes a transcendental status for the basic concepts of protophysics only in a limited sense; cf. the discussion volume edited by G . Böhme, Protophysik (Frankfurt, 1975). 51. Piaget's Kantianism is typical of this approach. 52. Cf. K . - 0 . Apel's introductions to Volumes 1 and 2 of C . S. Peirce's Schriften (Frankfurt, 1967 and 1970). 53. Cf. my "Postscript," in Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. J . Shapiro (Boston, 1971); cf. also R. Bubner, Transzendentale Hermeneutik," in R. Simon-Schäfer and C. W. Zimmerli, eds., Wissenschaftstheorie der Geisteswissenschaften (Hamburg, 1975), pp. 57-70.

60. Chomsky, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, pp. 3ff. 61. These qualifications are stated below in the discussion of Searle's principle of expressibility.

54. F. Kambartel, Erfahrung und Struktur (Frankfurt, 1968). 55. J . Habermas, "Wahrheitsfheorien," in Festschrift für Walter Schulz (Pfullingen, 1973), pp. 211-265, reprinted i n Habermas, Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt, 1984). 56. W. Seilars, "Presupposing," Philosophical Review 63 (1954): 197-215; P. F. Strawson, " A Reply to Mr. Seilars," Philosophical Review 63 (1954): 216-231. 57. U . Oevermann, T h e o r i e der individuellen Bildungsprozesse" Institut für Bildungsforschung, 1974).

(Max-Planck¬

58. O n this point, cf. the controversy between Q u i n e and Chomsky: N . Chomsky, "Quine's Empirical Assumptions," and W. V. O. Q u i n e , "Replies," both in D. Davidson and J . Hintikka, eds., Words and Objections (Dordrecht, 1969), pp. 53-68 and 292-352; W. V. O . Quine, "Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory," in Davidson and H a r m a n , eds., Semantics of Natural Language. H . Schnelle, Sprachphilosophie und Linguistik (Hamburg, 1973) is also typical of methodological behaviorism i n linguistics. 59. J . L . Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford, 1962); cf. the bibliography on the theory of speech acts compiled by E . von Savigny for the G e r m a n edition of this work (see note 24 above), pp. 204-209; J . L . Austin, "Performative Utterances," i n his Philosophical Papers (Oxford, 1970), pp. 233-252, and "Performative-Constative," in C . E . Caton, ed., Philosophy and Ordinary Language (Urbana, 111., 1963), pp. 22-33. Additional Austin bibliography can be found in von Savigny, Die Philosophie der normalen Sprache, pp. 162-166. See also J . R. Searle, "What Is a Speech Act?," in M. Black, ed., Philosophy in America (Ithaca, 1965), pp. 221-239, reprinted i n j . Rosenberg and C . Travis, eds., Readings

62. P. F. Strawson, Individuals ( L o n d o n , 1959); M. Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language ( L o n d o n , 1973); E . Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A. G o r n e r (Cambridge, 1982). 63. O n the analysis of intentionality and the expression of intentions, cf. W. Sellars, "Empiricism and the Philosophy of M i n d , " in Metaphysics ( L o n d o n , 1968); W. Sellars and R. Chisholm, "Intentionality and the Mental," i n Minnesota Studies, vol. 1 (Minneapolis, 1963), pp. 507-539; W. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics (London, 1968); E . Tugendhat, "Phänomenologie u n d Sprachanalyse," in Festschrift für Gadamer, vol. 2 (Tübingen, 1970), pp. 3 - 2 4 ; J . Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief(Ithaca, 1962); C . Taylor, "Explaining Action," Inquiry 13 (1970): 54-89. O n the analysis of expressive speech acts, cf. P. M. S. Hacker, Insight and Illusion (Oxford, 1972), chs. 7-9. 64. Cf. D . Steinberg and L . Jakobovits, eds., Semantics (Cambridge, 1971), pp. 157¬ 484; H . E . Boekle, Semantik (Munich, 1972). 65. T h e work of P. W. Alston is a good example. 66. F. von Kutschera, Sprachphilosophie (Munich, 1971), pp. 117-161; Schnelle, Sprachphilosophie und Linguistik, pp. 190-240; Wunderlich, Grundlagen, pp. 238-273. 67. P. WatzlawickJ. H . Beavin, and D. D.Jackson, Pragmatics of Human (New York, 1967).

Communication

68. A communication theory that is supposed to reconstruct conditions of action oriented toward reaching understanding does not necessarily require as its basic unit of analysis pairs of complementary speech acts—that is, reciprocally performed and accepted speech acts; but it does require, at least, a speaker's utterance that can not

100 Chapter 1

only be comprehended but can also be accepted by at least one other subject capable of speech and action. 69. D . Wunderlich, "Zur Konventionalitât von Sprechhandlungen," in Wunderlich, ed., Linguistische Pragmatik, p. 16; cf. also the linguistic characterization of the standard form given there (which I do not deal with h e r e ) , and Wunderlich's analysis of advising in Grundlagen, pp. 349ff. 70. Exceptions are avowals that, when rendered explicit, can also take on a negative form, for example, " I do not want (hereby) to conceal from you that. . . ." 71. Deviating from a widespread practice, I do not think it advisable to distinguish propositions (Aussagen) from assertions (Behauptungen) in such a way that, although a proposition is embedded i n a specific speech situation through being asserted, it does not receive its assertoric force therefrom. I am of the opinion, rather, that the assertoric force of a proposition cannot be reconstructed except through reference to the validity claim that anyone i n the role of a competent speaker raises for it in asserting it. Whether this claim can, if necessary, be discursively vindicated, that is, whether the proposition is 'Valid" (true), depends on whether it satisfies certain truth conditions. We can, to be sure, view propositions monologically, that is, as symbolic formations with an abstract truth value without reference to a speaker; but then we are abstracting precisely from the speech situation i n which a prepositional content, owing to the fact that it is asserted as a proposition, receives a relation to reality, that is, fulfills the precondition of being true or false. T h i s abstraction naturally suggests itself (and often remains hidden even from the logician) because the truth claim raised by the speaker is universaUst—that is, precisely of such a nature that, although it is raised i n a particular situation, it could be defended at any time against anyone's doubts. 72. S. Kanngiesser, "Aspekte zur Semantik u n d Pragmatik," Linguistische Berichte 24 (1973): 1-28, here p. 5. 73. Wunderlich, Grundlagen, pp. 337ff. 74. Cf. the schema in note 2 above. 75. I . Dornbach, "Primatenkommunikation" MS., (1975). O n the relatively early differentiation of different types of speech acts in the linguistic development of the child, see the pioneering dissertation of M. Miller, "Die Logik der frûhen Spra¬ chentwicklung" (University of Frankfurt, 1975). 76. I n a letter to me, G. Grewendorf cites the following counterexample: signing a contract, petition, and so forth, while simultaneously objectifying the corresponding illocutionary act. But only the following alternative seems possible: either the contract signing is carried out, in such a way that it has legal force, with the help of a performative utterance—in which case there is no objectification—or the nonverbal contract signing is accompanied by a statement: " S signs contract x"—in which case it is a question of two independent illocutionary acts carried out parallel to one another (in such a way that there is, normally, a division of roles: the statesman signs, the reporter reports the signing). 77. C o h e n , "Do Illocutionary Forces Exist?," p. 587.

101 W h a t Is Universal Pragmatics?

78. W. P. Alston, "Meaning and U s e , " in Rosenberg and Travis, eds., Readings, p. 412: " I can find no cases in which sameness of meaning does not hang on sameness of illocutionary act." 79. F o r ontogenetic studies, a combination of a Piagetian theory of meaning for the cognitive schemata developed in connection with manipulated objects (cf. H . G . Furth, Piaget and Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1969)) and a Meadian theory of meaning for the concepts developed in connection with interactions (cf. Arbeits¬ gruppe Bielefelder Soziologen, eds., Alltagswissen, Interaktion und gesellschaftliche Wirk¬ lichkeit, 2 vols. (Hamburg, 1973)) seems promising to me. 80. B. Richards argues against this in "Searle o n Meaning and Speech Acts," Foundations of Language 7 (1971): 536: "Austin argued that sentences such as R a (I promise that I shall pay within one year) never assert anything that is either true or false, i.e., never assert propositions. H e r e we agree; but this in no way upsets the claim that R a nevertheless expresses a proposition . . . viz. the proposition that R a . " Richards does not equate the prepositional content of the speech act, R a , with the prepositional content of the dependent sentence: " I shall pay within one year," but with the content of the objectified speech act, Ra, which must, however, then be embedded in a further speech act, Rv; for example, " I tell you, I promised him that I shall pay within one year." I regard the confusion of performative sentences with the assertoric reporting of their content as a category mistake (which, incidentally, diminishes the value of Richards's argument against Searle's principle of expressibility, in particular against his proposal to analyze the meaning of speech acts in standard form in terms of the meaning of the sentences used in the speech acts). 81. It follows from this proposal that each of the universal-pragmatic subtheories, that is, the theory of illocutionary acts as well as the theory of elementary sentences (and that of intentional expressions) can make its specific contribution to the theory of meaning. I n Austin's choice of the terms " m e a n i n g " and "force," the descriptivist prejudice continues to resonate; it is a prejudice, I might add, that has been out of date since Wittgenstein at the latest, if not since Humboldt, according to which the theory of the elementary sentence, which is to clarify sense and reference, can claim a monopoly on the theory of meaning. ( O f course, this prejudice also keeps reference semantics alive.) 82. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 132. 83. Ibid., pp. 147-148; Searle, Speech Acts, pp. 64ff. 84. Austin, "Performative Utterances," p. 248. 85. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, p. 144. 86. Ibid., pp. 145ff. Cf. also Austin, "Performative-Constative," p. 31: T o begin with, it is clear that if we establish that a performative utterance is not unhappy, that is, that its author has performed his act happily and in all sincerity, that still does not suffice to set it beyond the reach of all criticism. It may always be criticized in a different dimension. L e t us suppose that I say to you " I advise you to do it;" and let us allow that all the circumstances are appropriate, the conditions for success are fulfilled. I n saying that, I actually do advise you to do

102

103

Chapter 1


i t — i t is not that I state, truely or falsely, thatl advise you. It is, then, a performative utterance. T h e r e does still arise, all the same, a little question: was the advice good or bad? Agreed, I spoke in all sincerity, I believed that to do it would be in your interest; but was I right? Was my belief, in these circumstances, justified? O r again—though perhaps this matters less—was it in fact, or as things turned out, in your interest? T h e r e is confrontation of my utterance with the situation i n , and the situation in respect to which, it was issued. I was fully justified perhaps, but was I right?

95. D. Holdcroft ignores this distinction, "Performatives and Statements," Mind 83 (1974): 1-18, and thus comes to the false conclusion that only the speech acts that we call institutionally bound are subject to conventional regulations in the sense of the sentence: " A sentence type is a performative if and only if its literal and serious utterance can consütute the performance of an act which is done in accordance with a convention, which convention is not merely a grammatical or semantical one." 96. I n Wunderlich's analysis of advising (see Grundlagen, p. 350), his conditions B 4-6 make up the content of the obligations.

87. Austin, How to do Things with Words, pp. 144-145. 88. Habermas, "Vorbereitende Bemerkungen," pp. l l f f . 89. Austin, "Performative Utterances," pp. 250-251. 90. Ibid., p. 251. 91. Austin, "Performative-Constative," pp. 31-32. 92. [Added i n 1983:] I n casually mentioning this restriction, I was unaware of the problems connected with i t What I took at the time to be trivial is in fact in need of careful justification: the thesis that the use of language oriented toward reaching understanding represents the original mode of language use. Cf. chapter 2 i n the present volume, pp. 122ff. 93. Searle, Speech Acts, p. 63. 94. O n Wunderlich's analysis of advising (Grundlagen, pp. 349ff.) the general contextual conditions would be as follows: (A) S makes it understood in a conventional manner that (that is, S should give the advice only if these conditions obtain, and H should accordingly believe that they obtain): 1. S knows, believes, or assumes (depending on preceding communication) that a. H finds himself i n an unpleasant situation Z; b. H wants or desires to reach some other, more pleasant situation Z' ^ Z; c. H does not know how Z' can be reached; d. H is in a position to do a. 2. S believes or assumes that e. H does not already want to do a; f. H can reach a more pleasant situation Z " (relative optimum) with a than with any alternative action a'. 3. T h e following obligations are established for H : (7) if one of the subconditions listed under (a) through (f) does not obtain (or, more precisely, i f H knows, believes, or assumes that it does not obtain), then H will make this understood to S in a conventional manner.

97. H . Delius, " Z u m Wahrheitscharakter egologischer Aussagen," in Brockman and Hofer, eds., Die Wirklichkeit des Unverständlichen ( T h e Hague, 1974), pp. 38-77.

2 Social Action, Purposive Activity, and Communication (1981)

I f w e f o l l o w W e b e r ' s s t u d i e s i n t h e s o c i o l o g y o f r e l i g i o n , i t is a n e m p i r i c a l — a n d thus to begin w i t h an o p e n — q u e s t i o n why all three rationality complexes differentiated o u t after the disintegradon o f t r a d i t i o n a l w o r l d v i e w s have n o t f o u n d a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l

embodiment

t o a n e q u a l e x t e n t i n t h e o r d e r s o f l i f e o f m o d e r n societies, a n d w h y they d o n o t d e t e r m i n e the c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices o f everyday life e a c h t o t h e same d e g r e e . T h r o u g h h i s basic a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c a s s u m p tions,

h o w e v e r , W e b e r p r e j u d i c e d t h i s q u e s t i o n i n s u c h a way t h a t

processes o f societal r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n c o u l d c o m e i n t o v i e w o n l y f r o m the standpoint o f purposive rationality. I w o u l d like, therefore, to discuss t h e c o n c e p t u a l b o t d e n e c k s i n h i s t h e o r y o f a c t i o n a n d t o use t h i s c r i t i q u e as t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t f o r a n a l y z i n g f u r t h e r t h e c o n c e p t of communicative action. I n this sketch I shall n o t be d e a l i n g w i t h the analytic t h e o r y o f a c t i o n d e v e l o p e d i n t h e A n g l o - S a x o n w o r l d . T h e studies c a r r i e d o u t 1

u n d e r t h i s title ( t h e r e s u l t s o f w h i c h I h a v e d r a w n u p o n e l s e w h e r e ) 2

b y n o m e a n s r e p r e s e n t a u n i f i e d a p p r o a c h . W h a t t h e y d o have i n c o m m o n is t h e m e t h o d o f c o n c e p t u a l analysis a n d a r e l a t i v e l y n a r r o w f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e p r o b l e m . A n a l y t i c a c t i o n t h e o r y is f r u i t f u l

for

c l a r i f y i n g t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y . H o w e v e r , i t is l i m i t e d to the atomistic m o d e l o f action by a n isolated actor a n d neglects the mechanisms

for coordinating action t h r o u g h which interper-

sonal relations c o m e about. I t conceptualizes action o n the o n t o l o g i c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f e x a c t l y o n e w o r l d o f e x i s t i n g states o f a f f a i r s

106

107

Chapter 2

Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, and C o m m u n i c a t i o n

a n d n e g l e c t s t h o s e a c t o r - w o r l d r e l a t i o n s t h a t are essential t o s o c i a l

I n t e n t i o n a l i s t s e m a n t i c s is b a s e d o n t h e c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e i d e a t h a t

i n t e r a c t i o n . As actions are r e d u c e d t o purposive i n t e r v e n t i o n s i n t h e

u n d e r s t a n d i n g the m e a n i n g o f a symbolic expression X c a n be traced

o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f m e a n s - e n d s r e l a t i o n s stands i n t h e

b a c k t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e i n t e n t i o n o f s p e a k e r S t o give h e a r e r

H

f o r e g r o u n d . F i n a l l y , a n a l y t i c a c t i o n t h e o r y u n d e r s t a n d s its task t o b e

t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g b y m e a n s o f a s i g n . I n t h i s way, a d e r i v a t i v e

a m e t a t h e o r e t i c a l c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f basic c o n c e p t s ; i t is n o t c o n c e r n e d

m o d e o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t o w h i c h s p e a k e r s c a n have r e -

w i t h t h e e m p i r i c a l usefulness o f basic a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c

c o u r s e i f t h e d i r e c t r o a d t o m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung) is

assumptions

a n d t h u s is scarcely c o n n e c t e d w i t h c o n c e p t f o r m a t i o n i n t h e social

o b s t r u c t e d , is s t y l i z e d i n t o t h e o r i g i n a l m o d e o f r e a c h i n g

sciences. I t g e n e r a t e s a set o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s t h a t are

s t a n d i n g . T h e a t t e m p t o f i n t e n t i o n a l i s t s e m a n t i c s t o base t h e m e a n -

too

unspecific f o r the purposes o f social theory. O n the

field

i n g o f t h e s y m b o l i c e x p r e s s i o n X o n w h a t S m e a n s (mdnt)

under-

b y X, o r

o f a n a l y t i c a c t i o n t h e o r y , e m p i r i c i s m is r e p e a t i n g

i n d i r e c t l y gives t o u n d e r s t a n d b y X, m i s c a r r i e s . F o r a h e a r e r

to

batdes l o n g since f o u g h t . O n c e again t h e r e are debates c o n c e r n i n g

u n d e r s t a n d w h a t S m e a n s b y X — t h a t is, t h e m e a n i n g (Bedeutung)

of

t h e r e l a t i o n o f m i n d a n d b o d y ( i d e a l i s m versus m a t e r i a l i s m ) , c o n -

X — a n d f o r h i m t o b e a w a r e o f t h e i n t e n t i o n t h a t S is p u r s u i n g i n

c e r n i n g r e a s o n s a n d causes ( f r e e w i l l versus d e t e r m i n i s m ) , c o n c e r n -

u s i n g X — t h a t is, t h e p u r p o s e t h a t S w a n t s t o a c c o m p l i s h w i t h h e r

ing

behavior

and

action

(objectivistic

versus

nonobjectivistic

d e s c r i p t i o n s o f a c t i o n ) , c o n c e r n i n g t h e l o g i c a l status o f e x p l a n a t i o n s

a c t i o n — a r e t w o d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s . S w i l l o n l y t h e n have c a r r i e d o u t successfully

her intention of inducing i n H a meaning-intention

o f a c t i o n , c o n c e r n i n g causality, i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , a n d so o n . T o p u t t h e

(Bedeutungsintention)

m a t t e r i n a p o i n t e d way: a n a l y t i c a c t i o n t h e o r y t r e a t s t h e v e n e r a b l e

w i t h h i m a n d u n d e r s t a n d s what S m e a n t (gemeint hat) i n c a r r y i n g o u t

p r o b l e m s o f t h e p r e - K a n t i a n p h i l o s o p h y o f consciousness i n a n e w

h e r c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t i o n . H, i f h e k n o w s o n l y t h e

p e r s p e c t i v e , w i t h o u t p u s h i n g t h r o u g h t o t h e basic q u e s t i o n s

tive i n t e n t i o n o f S, w i l l n o t u n d e r s t a n d w h a t Smeans

of a

sociological t h e o r y o f action. F r o m a sociological

i f H r e c o g n i z e s S"s i n t e n t i o n t o

communicate communica-

(mdnt),

that concerning which she w a n t s t o c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h h i m .

p o i n t o f view, i t m a k e s sense t o b e g i n

t h a t is,

9

with

For a t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , o n l y those analytic theories

c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . ' T h e necessity f o r c o o r d i n a t e d a c t i o n g e n e r -

o f m e a n i n g are i n s t r u c t i v e t h a t start f r o m t h e s t r u c t u r e o f linguistic

ates i n s o c i e t y a c e r t a i n n e e d f o r c o m m u n i c a t i o n , w h i c h m u s t b e m e t

expressions r a t h e r t h a n f r o m speakers' i n t e n t i o n s . T h e theory, h o w -

i f i t is t o b e p o s s i b l e t o c o o r d i n a t e a c t i o n s e f f e c t i v e l y f o r t h e p u r p o s e

ever, m u s t k e e p i n v i e w t h e p r o b l e m o f h o w t h e a c t i o n s o f several

o f satisfying n e e d s . " A n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y , w i t h t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n -

actors can be

i n g a t its c o r e , d o e s o f f e r a p r o m i s i n g p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e f o r a t h e o r y

mechanism

o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n t h a t p l a c e s l i n g u i s t i c processes o f r e a c h i n g

i n t e r l a c e d i n s o c i a l spaces a n d h i s t o r i c a l t i m e s . T h e o r g a n o n

u n d e r s t a n d i n g (sprachliche Verständigung), as t h e m e c h a n i s m f o r

o f K a r l B ü h l e r is r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h i s c o m m u n i c a t i o n - t h e o r e t i c l i n e

3

co-

l i n k e d up with one

another with the help of

o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t is, h o w t h e y c a n

the be

model

o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n , a t t h e f o c a l p o i n t o f i n t e r e s t . T h i s is less t r u e o f

o f i n q u i r y . B ü h l e r starts f r o m t h e s e m i o t i c m o d e l o f a l i n g u i s t i c s i g n

t h e a p p r o a c h t o m e a n i n g t h e o r y t h a t stands closest t o a c t i o n t h e o r y

used by a speaker (sender) w i t h t h e a i m o f c o m i n g to an u n d e r -

i n o n e respect, namely, t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i s t semantics

s t a n d i n g w i t h a h e a r e r ( r e c e i v e r ) a b o u t o b j e c t s a n d states o f a f f a i r s .

4

t h a t goes b a c k

1 0

t o s t u d i e s b y G r i c e , was f u r t h e r d e v e l o p e d b y L e w i s , a n d l a t e r was

H e d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h r e e f u n c t i o n s o f t h e use o f signs: t h e c o g n i t i v e

w o r k e d o u t by S c h i f f e r

f u n c t i o n o f r e p r e s e n t i n g a state o f a f f a i r s , t h e expressive f u n c t i o n o f

5

6

7

and Bennett. This nominalistic theory of 8

m e a n i n g is n o t s u i t a b l e f o r c l a r i f y i n g t h e c o o r d i n a t i n g

mechanism

m a k i n g k n o w n s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse) o f t h e speaker, a n d

o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n b e c a u s e i t analyzes t h e a c t o f

t h e a p p e l l a t i v e f u n c t i o n o f d i r e c t i n g r e q u e s t s t o addressees. F r o m

reaching understanding according

t h i s p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e l i n g u i s t i c s i g n f u n c t i o n s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y as s y m -

t o w a r d consequences.

to a m o d e l o f action o r i e n t e d

b o l , s y m p t o m , a n d s i g n a l . " I t is a symbol i n v i r t u e o f b e i n g c o r r e l a t e d

108

109

Chapter 2

Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d C o m m u n i c a t i o n

w i t h o b j e c t s a n d states o f a f f a i r s , a symptom ( i n d i c a t i o n , i n d e x ) i n

T h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g was finally e s t a b l i s h e d as a f o r m a l s c i e n c e

v i r t u e o f its d e p e n d e n c e o n t h e sender, w h o s e i n w a r d n e s s i t ex-

o n l y w i t h t h e step f r o m r e f e r e n c e

presses, a n d a signal i n v i r t u e o f its a p p e a l t o t h e h e a r e r , w h o s e

semantics. T h e semantics f o u n d e d by Frege a n d d e v e l o p e d t h r o u g h

e x t e r n a l o r i n t e r n a l b e h a v i o r i t steers l i k e o t h e r t r a f f i c s i g n s . "

t h e e a r l y W i t t g e n s t e i n t o D a v i d s o n a n d D u m m e t t gives c e n t e r stage

11

T h e r e is n o n e e d h e r e t o g o i n t o t h e r e c e p t i o n a n d c r i t i q u e o f t h i s m o d e l o f language i n linguistics a n d psychology

1 2

since t h e decisive

d e v e l o p m e n t s o f i t have c o m e , w i t h o n e e x c e p t i o n ,

1 3

f r o m the ana-

semantics to t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l

t o t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n s e n t e n c e a n d state o f a f f a i r s , b e t w e e n l a n guage a n d the w o r l d . disengaged

1 5

W i t h this o n t o l o g i c a l t u r n , semantic t h e o r y

itself f r o m t h e view t h a t t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n

l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e . A t least t h e t h r e e m o s t i m p o r t a n t a n a -

c a n be c l a r i f i e d o n t h e m o d e l o f n a m e s t h a t d e s i g n a t e objects.

lytic theories o f m e a n i n g can be w o r k e d i n t o B i d d e r ' s m o d e l i n such

m e a n i n g o f sentences, a n d t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f sentence m e a n i n g s ,

The

a w a y t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h e o r y is f u r t h e r d e v e l o p e d f r o m w i t h i n —

cannot be separated f r o m language's i n h e r e n t r e l a t i o n to the validity

t h r o u g h t h e f o r m a l analysis o f r u l e s f o r u s i n g l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s -

o f s t a t e m e n t s . Speakers a n d h e a r e r s u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f a

sions—and n o t f r o m w i t h o u t — t h r o u g h a cybernetic r e f o r m u l a t i o n

s e n t e n c e w h e n t h e y k n o w u n d e r w h a t c o n d i t i o n s i t is t r u e . C o r r e -

o f t h e transmission process. T h i s m e a n i n g - t h e o r e t i c l i n e o f develop-

spondingly, they u n d e r s t a n d the m e a n i n g o f a w o r d w h e n they k n o w

m e n t o f t h e o r g a n o n m o d e l l e a d s u s away f r o m t h e o b j e c t i v i s t i c

w h a t c o n t r i b u t i o n that w o r d makes to t h e capacity for t r u t h o f a

c o n c e p t i o n o f processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g as i n f o r m a t i o n

s e n t e n c e f o r m e d w i t h its h e l p . T h u s , t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s

flows b e t w e e n senders a n d r e c e i v e r s

a n d i n the direction o f the

d e v e l o p e d t h e thesis t h a t t h e m e a n i n g o f a s e n t e n c e is d e t e r m i n e d

f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c c o n c e p t o f i n t e r a c t i o n a m o n g subjects c a p a b l e o f

b y its t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s . T h e i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e mean-

1 4

s p e a k i n g a n d a c t i n g , i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t is m e d i a t e d t h r o u g h acts o f

ing o f a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n a n d t h e v a l i d i t y o f a s e n t e n c e f o r m e d

reaching understanding.

w i t h its h e l p was first w o r k e d o u t , t h e n , f o r t h e d i m e n s i o n o f t h e

L i n k i n g u p w i t h t h e p r a g m a t i s t t h e o r y o f signs i n t r o d u c e d b y Peirce a n d developed by M o r r i s , C a r n a p m a d e the symbolic

l i n g u i s t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f states o f a f f a i r s .

com-

T o b e s u r e , t h i s t h e o r y is c o m m i t t e d t o a n a l y z i n g a l l s e n t e n c e s o n

p l e x , w h i c h B ü h l e r h a d f i r s t c o n s i d e r e d o n l y f u n c t i o n a l i s t i c a l l y , ac-

t h e m o d e l o f assertoric sentences. T h e l i m i t s o f this a p p r o a c h

cessible t o a n i n t e r n a l l y d i r e c t e d analysis o f l a n g u a g e f r o m s y n t a c t i c

c o m e v i s i b l e as s o o n as t h e d i f f e r e n t m o d e s o f u s i n g s e n t e n c e s are

a n d s e m a n t i c p o i n t s o f view. T h e c a r r i e r s (Träger) o f m e a n i n g are

brought

n o t i s o l a t e d signs b u t e l e m e n t s o f a l a n g u a g e system, t h a t is, sen-

g u i s h e d b e t w e e n t h e assertoric o r i n t e r r o g a t i v e f o r c e o f assertions o r

t e n c e s w h o s e f o r m is d e t e r m i n e d b y s y n t a c t i c r u l e s a n d w h o s e se-

questions a n d the s t r u c t u r e o f the p r o p o s i t i o n a l sentences e m p l o y e d

m a n t i c c o n t e n t is d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e r e f e r e n c e t o d e s i g n a t e d o b j e c t s

in

o r states o f a f f a i r s . W i t h C a r n a p ' s l o g i c a l syntax a n d t h e basic as-

t h r o u g h A u s t i n t o Searle, t h e f o r m a l s e m a n t i c s o f s e n t e n c e s was

s u m p t i o n s o f r e f e r e n c e s e m a n t i c s , t h e w a y was o p e n e d f o r a f o r m a l

extended

analysis o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e . O n t h e o t h e r

s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e b u t is o p e n t o a n u n b i a s e d analysis

these

under

formal consideration.

Frege

had

already

be-

distin-

utterances. A l o n g the line f r o m the later Wittgenstein t o s p e e c h acts. I t is n o

longer

limited

to the

repre-

h a n d , C a r n a p c o n s i d e r e d t h e a p p e l l a t i v e a n d expressive f u n c t i o n s o f

o f t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e s . T h e use t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g

l a n g u a g e as p r a g m a t i c aspects o f l a n g u a g e use t h a t s h o u l d b e l e f t t o

m a k e s t h e p r a g m a t i c aspects o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n , t o o , acces-

e m p i r i c a l analysis. O n t h i s view, t h e p r a g m a t i c s o f l a n g u a g e is n o t

sible t o c o n c e p t u a l analysis. T h e t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts t h e n m a r k s

d e t e r m i n e d b y a g e n e r a l system o f r e c o n s t r u c t i b l e r u l e s i n s u c h a

t h e first s t e p t o w a r d a f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s t h a t e x t e n d s t o n o n c o g n i -

w a y t h a t i t c o u l d b e o p e n e d u p t o c o n c e p t u a l analysis l i k e s y n t a x a n d

tive m o d e s o f e m p l o y m e n t . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , as t h e a t t e m p t s a t a

semantics.

s y s t e m a t i z a t i o n o f speech-act classes f r o m S t e n i u s t h r o u g h K e n n y t o

110

111

Chapter 2


Searle show, i t r e m a i n s t i e d t o t h e n a r r o w o n t o l o g i c a l tions

presupposi-

o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics. T h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g

attain t h e level o f i n t e g r a t i o n o f the c o m m u n i c a t i o n

can

w h e n they c o m e to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h one another about somet h i n g i n o n e w o r l d , t h e y base t h e i r c o m m u n i c a t i o n o n a c o m m o n l y

theory that

s u p p o s e d system o f w o r l d s . I n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n I h a v e p r o p o s e d t h a t

B u h l e r a d v a n c e d i n a p r o g r a m m a t i c way o n l y i f i t is a b l e t o p r o v i d e

we differentiate the external w o r l d i n t o an objective w o r l d a n d a

a systematic g r o u n d i n g f o r t h e a p p e l l a t i v e a n d expressive f u n c t i o n s

s o c i a l w o r l d , a n d t h a t w e i n t r o d u c e t h e i n t e r n a l w o r l d as a c o m p l e -

o f language

m e n t a r y concept to the external w o r l d . T h e corresponding validity

( a n d p e r h a p s also f o r t h e " p o e t i c " f u n c t i o n , r e l a t e d t o

t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e a n s t h e m s e l v e s , w h i c h is e m p h a s i z e d

byjakobson),

c l a i m s o f t r u t h , Tightness, a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhafiigkeit) c a n t h e n

i n t h e s a m e way t h a t t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s has d o n e f o r t h e

s e r v e as a g u i d e i n t h e c h o i c e o f t h e o r e t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e s f o r j u s t i f y -

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n . I have t a k e n t h i s p a t h w i t h m y r e f l e c t i o n s

i n g t h e basic m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e use, o r f u n c t i o n s o f l a n g u a g e , a n d

o n universal pragmatics.

classifying

1 6

Buhler's t h e o r y o f language functions c o u l d be c o n n e c t e d w i t h

the

speech

acts t h a t v a r y w i t h

individual

languages.

B u h l e r ' s a p p e l l a t i v e f u n c t i o n w o u l d a c c o r d i n g l y have t o b e s p l i t u p

the m e t h o d s a n d insights o f t h e analytic t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g a n d be

i n t o r e g u l a t i v e a n d i m p e r a t i v e f u n c t i o n s . I n t h e r e g u l a t i v e use

m a d e the centerpiece o f a theory o f communicative action oriented

l a n g u a g e , p a r t i c i p a n t s raise n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i n v a r i o u s ways

of

t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g i f we c o u l d generalize the c o n c e p t

a n d relate t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e i r shared social w o r l d ; i n the i m p e r a -

a n d identify validity

tive use o f l a n g u a g e , t h e y r e l a t e t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d ,

c o n d i t i o n s n o l o n g e r o n l y o n t h e semantic level, f o r sentences, b u t

w h e r e b y t h e s p e a k e r raises a c l a i m t o p o w e r vis-a-vis t h e addressee i n

o f validity beyond

the t r u t h of propositions

o n the pragmatic level, f o r utterances. For this purpose, the para-

o r d e r t o g e t h i m t o a c t i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e i n t e n d e d state o f a f f a i r s

d i g m c h a n g e i n t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e t h a t was i n t r o d u c e d b y

comes i n t o existence. A t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n w o r k e d o u t a l o n g

A u s t i n ( a n i l l u m i n a t i n g h i s t o r i c a l a c c o u n t o f w h i c h has b e e n g i v e n

these lines i n f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c t e r m s c o u l d be m a d e f r u i t f u l f o r a

by A p e l )

sociological

1 7

m u s t be radicalized i n such a way t h a t the b r e a k w i t h t h e

t h e o r y o f a c t i o n i f we c o u l d show h o w

communicative

" l o g o s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f l a n g u a g e , " t h a t is, w i t h t h e p r i v i l e g i n g o f

a c t s — t h a t is, s p e e c h acts o r e q u i v a l e n t n o n v e r b a l

its r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n , also has c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r t h e c h o i c e

o n the function of coordinating action a n d make their contribution

o f o n t o l o g i c a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s i n t h e t h e o r y o f l a n g u a g e . I t is n o t

to the construction o f interactions.

m e r e l y a q u e s t i o n o f a d m i t t i n g o t h e r m o d e s o f l a n g u a g e use o n a n e q u a l f o o t i n g w i t h t h e a s s e r t o r i c ; w e have t o e s t a b l i s h v a l i d i t y c l a i m s a n d w o r l d r e l a t i o n s f o r t h e s e o t h e r m o d e s as was d o n e f o r assertoric m o d e .

1 8

the

I t is w i t h t h i s i n m i n d t h a t I have p r o p o s e d t h a t

we d o n o t oppose the i l l o c u t i o n a r y role to the propositional c o m p o n e n t , s e e i n g t h e f o r m e r as a n i r r a t i o n a l f o r c e a n d t h e l a t t e r as t h a t w h i c h g r o u n d s validity; rather, we s h o u l d conceive the i l l o c u t i o n a r y r o l e as t h e c o m p o n e n t t h a t specifies which v a l i d i t y c l a i m a s p e a k e r is r a i s i n g w i t h h e r u t t e r a n c e , how she is r a i s i n g i t , a n d f o r what.

Finally, c o m m u n i c a t i v e

a c t i o n is d e p e n d e n t

expressions—take

o n situational con-

texts, w h i c h i n t u r n represent segments o f t h e l i f e w o r l d o f t h e p a r ticipants

i n i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e c o n n e c t i o n o f a c t i o n t h e o r y t o t h e basic

concepts o f social t h e o r y can be r e n d e r e d secure o n l y by m e a n s o f t h e c o n c e p t o f t h e l i f e w o r l d ; t h i s c a n b e i n t r o d u c e d as a c o m p l e m e n t a r y c o n c e p t t o c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n v i a t h e analyses o f b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e s t i m u l a t e d by W i t t g e n s t e i n .

1 9

W i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f these i n t e r m e d i a t e r e f l e c t i o n s , I c a n a t best h o p e t o m a k e this p r o g r a m plausible. S t a r t i n g f r o m two versions

W i t h the i l l o c u t i o n a r y force o f a n utterance, a speaker can m o t i -

o f W e b e r ' s a c t i o n t h e o r y , I w o u l d l i k e first t o m a k e c l e a r t h e c e n t r a l

vate a h e a r e r t o a c c e p t t h e o f f e r c o n t a i n e d i n h e r s p e e c h a c t a n d

i m p o r t a n c e o f the p r o b l e m o f c o o r d i n a t i n g actions. F o l l o w i n g this,

t h e r e b y t o e n t e r i n t o a rationally motivated binding and bonding rela-

I shall t r y to make Austin's distinction between illocutionary a n d

and

p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts f r u i t f u l f o r d e m a r c a t i n g a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d

s p e a k i n g subjects c a n r e l a t e t o m o r e t h a n o n l y o n e w o r l d , a n d t h a t

r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g f r o m a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success. O n

tionship

(Bindung).

This conception

presupposes that acting

112

113

Chapter 2


t h e basis o f t h i s , I s h a l l e x a m i n e t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d -

f r o m a t e l e o l o g i c a l m o d e l o f a c t i o n a n d specifies "subjective

i n g (bindende) f o r c e o f t h e o f f e r s c o n t a i n e d i n s p e e c h acts a n d t h e

i n g " as a ( p r e c o m m u n i c a t i v e )

mean-

r o l e o f criticizable validity claims. A discussion o f c o m p e t i n g p r o p o s -

p u r s u e h i s o w n i n t e r e s t s , s u c h as a c q u i r i n g p o w e r o r w e a l t h , o r h e

als f o r c l a s s i f y i n g s p e e c h acts w i l l s e r v e t o c o n f i r m m y views. F i n a l l y ,

c a n a t t e m p t t o l i v e u p t o values s u c h as p i e t y o r h u m a n d i g n i t y , o r

I w a n t t o s h o w a few o f t h e t r a n s i t i o n s f r o m t h e f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c

h e c a n seek s a t i s f a c t i o n i n l i v i n g o u t affects a n d desires. T h e s e utili-

a c t i o n i n t e n t i o n . A n actor can e i t h e r

value-related, o r affectual g o a l s , w h i c h a r e b r o k e n d o w n i n t o

l e v e l o f analysis t o e m p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s , a n d , o n t h e basis o f t h e

tarian,

relation between

situation-specific purposes, are f o r m s o f t h e subjective m e a n i n g t h a t

the literal a n d context-dependent

meanings

of

s p e e c h acts, t o e x p l a i n w h y t h e c o n c e p t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n has t o be s u p p l e m e n t e d by a c o n c e p t o f t h e l i f e w o r l d .

a c t i n g subjects c a n c o n n e c t w i t h t h e i r g o a l - d i r e c t e d a c t i v i t y .

22

S i n c e W e b e r starts f r o m a m o n o l o g i c a l l y c o n c e i v e d m o d e l o f act i o n , h e is u n a b l e t o i n t r o d u c e t h e c o n c e p t o f " s o c i a l a c t i o n " b y w a y o f a n e x p l i c a t i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t o f m e a n i n g . I n s t e a d , h e has

T w o Versions of Weber's T h e o r y o f Action

to

e x p a n d t h e m o d e l o f p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y w i t h t w o f u r t h e r specificaas a basic c o n c e p t o f

t i o n s so t h a t t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n a r e satisfied: (a) a n

a c t i o n t h e o r y a n d , w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h i s c a t e g o r y , d i s t i n g u i s h e s ac-

o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t h e b e h a v i o r o f o t h e r a c t i n g subjects, a n d ( b ) a

t i o n s f r o m o b s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o r : "We s h a l l speak o f ' a c t i o n ' i n s o f a r

r e f l e x i v e r e l a t i o n t o o n e a n o t h e r o f t h e a c t i o n o r i e n t a t i o n s o f several

as t h e a c t i n g i n d i v i d u a l a t t a c h e s a s u b j e c t i v e m e a n i n g t o h i s b e h a v -

i n t e r a c t i n g subjects. T o be s u r e , W e b e r v a c i l l a t e s as t o w h e t h e r h e

i o r — b e i t overt o r covert, omission o r acquiescence."

s h o u l d r e g a r d c o n d i t i o n (a) as s u f f i c i e n t f o r s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n o r

W e b e r i n i t i a l l y i n t r o d u c e s " m e a n i n g " (Sinn)

Weber does

20

n o t rely here o n a theory of m e a n i n g b u t o n an intentional theory

s h o u l d also r e q u i r e ( b ) . I n s e c t i o n 1 o f Economy and Society h e says

o f consciousness. H e does n o t elucidate " m e a n i n g " i n

m e r e l y : " A c t i o n is ' s o c i a l ' i n s o f a r as its s u b j e c t i v e

connection

meaning

takes

w i t h the m o d e l o f linguistic m e a n i n g s a n d does n o t relate i t to the

a c c o u n t o f t h e b e h a v i o r o f o t h e r s a n d is t h e r e b y o r i e n t e d i n its

linguistic m e d i u m o f possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t to

course."

the

2 3

O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n s e c t i o n 3 W e b e r stresses t h a t t h e

in

a c t i o n o r i e n t a t i o n s o f p a r t i c i p a n t s h a v e t o b e reciprocally r e l a t e d t o

i s o l a t i o n t o b e g i n w i t h . A t t h i s first s w i t c h p o i n t , W e b e r p a r t s c o m -

o n e a n o t h e r : " T h e t e r m 'social r e l a t i o n s h i p ' w i l l be used t o d e n o t e

beliefs

a n d i n t e n t i o n s o f a n a c t i n g subject, w h o

is p r e s e n t e d

p a n y w i t h a t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . W h a t c o u n t s as f u n d a -

t h e b e h a v i o r o f a p l u r a l i t y o f a c t o r s i n s o f a r as, i n its m e a n i n g f u l

mental

c o n t e n t , t h e a c t i o n o f e a c h takes a c c o u n t o f t h a t o f t h e o t h e r s a n d

is n o t

the

interpersonal

relation between

a t least

two

speaking a n d a c t i n g subjects—a r e l a t i o n t h a t refers back to l i n g u i s t i c

is o r i e n t e d i n t h e s e t e r m s . "

2 4

processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g — b u t t h e p u r p o s i v e a c t i v i t y o f

For the construction o f a t h e o r y o f action, another decision

a s o l i t a r y a c t i n g subject. A s i n i n t e n t i o n a l i s t s e m a n t i c s , t h e p r o c e s s

even m o r e i m p o r t a n t . S h o u l d Weber i n t r o d u c e the rationalizable

o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n l a n g u a g e is c o n c e i v e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e

aspects o f a c t i o n o n t h e basis o f t h e t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t i o n m o d e l ,

m o d e l o f i d e o l o g i c a l l y a c t i n g subjects r e c i p r o c a l l y i n f l u e n c i n g o n e

s h o u l d t h e c o n c e p t o f social i n t e r a c t i o n serve as a basis f o r t h a t

a n o t h e r . " A l a n g u a g e c o m m u n i t y is r e p r e s e n t e d i n t h e i d e a l - t y p i c a l ,

p u r p o s e ? I n t h e first case, W e b e r has t o l i m i t h i m s e l f t o t h e r a t i o n -

' p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l ' l i m i t case b y n u m e r o u s i n d i v i d u a l acts . . . w h i c h

a l i z a b l e aspects y i e l d e d b y t h e m o d e l o f p u r p o s i v e activity, t h a t is, t o

are o r i e n t e d to the expectation stdndnis')

of gaining 'understanding'

f r o m others for an i n t e n d e d m e a n i n g . "

s t a n d i n g c o u n t s as a d e r i v a t i v e p h e n o m e n o n

2 1

(Ver-

Reaching under-

t h a t is t o b e

construed

w i t h t h e h e l p o f a p r i m i t i v e c o n c e p t o f i n t e n t i o n . T h u s , W e b e r starts

is or

t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f m e a n s a n d e n d s . I n t h e s e c o n d case, t h e q u e s t i o n arises w h e t h e r t h e r e are d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f r e f l e x i v e r e l a t i o n s

of

a c t i o n o r i e n t a t i o n s a n d t h u s also a d d i t i o n a l aspects u n d e r w h i c h actions can be rationalized.

114

115

Chapter 2


T h e Official Version

Table 2.1 The official typology of action

Weber distinguishes between

p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l , v a l u e - r a t i o n a l , af-

Types of action in descending order of rationality

Subjective meaning covers these elements: Means

Ends

Values

Consequences

purposive activity: u t i l i t a r i a n , value-related, a n d affectual goals. T h e n

Purposive-rational

" t r a d i t i o n a l a c t i o n " f o l l o w s as a r e s i d u a l c a t e g o r y t h a t is, t o

Value-rational Affectual

+ + +

+ + +

+ + -

+ -

Traditional

+

-

-

-

f e c t u a l , a n d t r a d i t i o n a l a c t i o n . T h i s t y p o l o g y is b a s e d o n c a t e g o r i e s o f a c t i o n goals t o w a r d w h i c h a n actor can o r i e n t herself i n

her

begin

w i t h , n o t f u r t h e r d e t e r m i n e d . T h i s t y p o l o g y is o b v i o u s l y g u i d e d b y a n i n t e r e s t i n d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h e d e g r e e s t o w h i c h a c t i o n is r a t i o n a l i z a b l e . H e r e , W e b e r d o e s n o t s t a r t f r o m t h e social r e l a t i o n s h i p . H e r e g a r d s as r a t i o n a l i z a b l e o n l y t h e m e a n s - e n d s r e l a t i o n o f cally conceived, m o n o l o g i c a l

ideologi-

action. I f one adopts this perspective,

t h e o n l y aspects o f a c t i o n o p e n t o o b j e c t i v e a p p r a i s a l are t h e effectiveness o f a causal i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t o a n e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n a n d t h e truth o f the e m p i r i c a l statements t h a t u n d e r l y the m a x i m or the p l a n o f a c t i o n — t h a t is, t h e s u b j e c t i v e b e l i e f a b o u t a p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n o f m e a n s . T h u s W e b e r c h o o s e s p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l (zweckrationat) a c t i o n as t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t f o r h i s t y p o l o g y :

r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l ; i n a f f e c t u a l a c t i o n , t h i s is t r u e o f t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s a n d t h e values; i n a c t i o n t h a t is m e r e l y h a b i t u a l i z e d , o f t h e e n d s as well (table 2.1). O f course, Weber can a c c o m m o d a t e "value-rational" action i n this c o n s t r u c t i o n o n l y by attaching to i t a restrictive m e a n i n g . T h i s type can i n c l u d e o n l y action o r i e n t a t i o n s o f a n ethics o f c o n v i c t i o n n o t o f a n ethics o f responsibility. Moreover,

and

i t does n o t take i n t o

a c c o u n t t h e p r i n c i p l e d c h a r a c t e r o n t h e basis o f w h i c h t h e P r o t e s -

Social action, like all action, may be o r i e n t e d i n f o u r ways. I t may be: (1) instrumentally rational [zweckrational), that is, d e t e r m i n e d by expectations as to the behavior o f objects i n the e n v i r o n m e n t a n d o f other h u m a n beings; these expectations are used as "conditions" or "means" for the a t t a i n m e n t o f the actor's own rationally pursued a n d calculated ends; (2) value-rational (wertrational), that is, d e t e r m i n e d by a conscious belief i n the value f o r its o w n sake o f some ethical, aesthetic, religious or other f o r m o f behavior, i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f its prospects o f success; (3) affectual (especially emotional), that is, d e t e r m i n e d by the actor's specific affects a n d feeling states; (4) traditional, that is, d e t e r m i n e d by i n g r a i n e d h a b i t u a t i o n .

t a n t e t h i c , f o r e x a m p l e , q u a l i f i e s as a f r a m e w o r k f o r a m e t h o d i c a l c o n d u c t o f life. T h e p o s t t r a d i t i o n a l structures o f consciousness t h a t W e b e r finds i n e t h i c a l l y r a t i o n a l i z e d w o r l d v i e w s c a n n o t , o n a n a l y t i c grounds

a l o n e , b e i n c l u d e d i n a n a c t i o n t y p o l o g y t h a t rests o n

a

c a t e g o r i z a t i o n o f nonsocial a c t i o n s ; f o r m o r a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s is r e l a t e d t o t h e c o n s e n s u a l r e g u l a t i o n o f interpersonal c o n f l i c t s o f a c t i o n . T h e Unofficial Version

25

If

one

Schluchter,

follows 2 6

an

interpretation

advanced

by

Wolfgang

this typology can be r e c o n s t r u c t e d i n accordance w i t h

W h e n W e b e r a t t e m p t s t o set u p a t y p o l o g y o n t h e c o n c e p t u a l

level

o f s o c i a l a c t i o n , h e e n c o u n t e r s a d d i t i o n a l aspects o f t h e r a t i o n a l i t y

t h e f o r m a l properties o f p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l a c t i o n . A n actor behaves

o f a c t i o n . Social

actions

can

be

distinguished according

to

p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l l y w h e n she c h o o s e s ends f r o m a c l e a r l y a r t i c u l a t e d

mechanisms f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g i n d i v i d u a l actions, f o r instance,

h o r i z o n o f values a n d o r g a n i z e s s u i t a b l e means i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n

the ac-

of

c o r d i n g t o w h e t h e r a social r e l a t i o n is b a s e d o n interest positions a l o n e

a l t e r n a t i v e consequences. I n t h e series o f types o f a c t i o n s p r o p o s e d b y

o r also o n normative agreement. I n t h i s way, W e b e r d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e

W e b e r , t h e r a n g e o f w h a t t h e a c t i n g s u b j e c t takes i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n

s h e e r f a c t i c i t y o f a n e c o n o m i c o r d e r f r o m t h e social v a l i d i t y o f a l e g a l

n a r r o w s step b y step. I n v a l u e - r a t i o n a l a c t i o n , t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s a r e

o r d e r . I n t h e o n e case, social r e l a t i o n s g a i n s t a b i l i t y t h r o u g h a f a c t u a l

screened o u t o f t h e subjective m e a n i n g a n d thus w i t h d r a w n f r o m

i n t e r m e s h i n g o f interest positions; i n the other, t h r o u g h the recogn i t i o n o f n o r m a t i v e validity claims. T o

be

sure, c o o r d i n a t i o n

of

117

116


Chapter 2

actions secured, to begin w i t h , merely t h r o u g h a c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y o f interests can be superimposed n o r m a t i v e l y by the a d d i t i o n o f "validity-based a g r e e m e n t , " norms."

2 7

Table 2.2 An alternative typology of action Degree of rationality of action

t h a t is, b y " d e f e r e n c e t o c o n v e n t i o n o r l e g a l

W e b e r elucidates this i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the

o f t r a d i t i o n s i n t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m " c u s t o m " (Sitte) t o

development "convention":

" I t is b y way o f c o n v e n t i o n a l r u l e s t h a t m e r e l y f a c t u a l r e g u l a r i t i e s o f a c t i o n , i.e., usages, are f r e q u e n d y t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o b i n d i n g n o r m s , g u a r a n t e e d p r i m a r i l y by psychological

coercion."

Coordination

Low

High

Through interest positions

De facto customary action (Sitte)

Strategic action. ( Interessenhandeln)

Through normative agreement

Conventional action based on agreement ( Gemeinschaftshandeln)

Postconventional action based on agreement ( Gesellschaftshandeln)

2 8

I n t e r a c t i o n b a s e d o n complementarity of interests exists n o t o n l y i n t h e f o r m o f c u s t o m — t h a t is, o f d u l l , i n s e n s i b l e h a b i t u a t i o n — b u t also at t h e level o f r a t i o n a l c o m p e t i t i v e behavior, f o r e x a m p l e i n m o d e r n

meinschaftshandeln)

c o m m e r c e , i n w h i c h p a r t i c i p a n t s have f o r m e d a clear consciousness

tations o f the participants, b u t t h r o u g h the higher,

o f t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y as w e l l as o f t h e c o n t i n g e n c y o f t h e i r i n t e r e s t

stage o f m o r a l - p r a t i c a l r a t i o n a l i t y . B e c a u s e h e d o e s n o t d o t h i s , a

n o t t h r o u g h the purposive-rational action orienpostconventional

p o s i t i o n s . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , i n t e r a c t i o n b a s e d o n normative consen-

specific c o n c e p t o f v a l u e - r a t i o n a l i t y c a n n o t g a i n t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e

sus d o e s n o t o n l y take t h e f o r m o f t r a d i t i o n - b o u n d , c o n v e n t i o n a l

a c t i o n t h e o r y t h a t i t w o u l d have t o b e a c c o r d e d i f t h e e t h i c a l r a t i o n -

a c t i o n ; t h u s , t h e m o d e r n l e g a l system is d e p e n d e n t o n a n e n l i g h t -

a l i z a t i o n t h a t W e b e r e x a m i n e d a t t h e l e v e l o f c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s is t o

e n e d belief i n legitimacy, w h i c h r a t i o n a l n a t u r a l l a w — w i t h the idea

b e g r a s p e d i n t e r m s o f its c o n s e q u e n c e s f o r systems o f social a c t i o n .

o f a basic c o n t r a c t a m o n g f r e e a n d e q u a l s — t r a c e s b a c k t o p r o c e d u r e s o f r a t i o n a l w i l l - f o r m a t i o n . I f o n e p u r s u e s these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , t h e n i t m a k e s sense t o c o n s t r u e types o f social a c t i o n (a) to the k i n d of coordination

involved, and

(b)

according

according

to

the

d e g r e e o f r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p (see t a b l e 2 . 2 ) .

W e b e r was n o t a b l e t o m a k e

his u n o f f i c i a l typology o f

for

action

f r u i t f u l f o r t h e q u e s t i o n o f societal r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . T h e official vers i o n , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , is so n a r r o w l y c o n c e i v e d t h a t w i t h i n its f r a m e w o r k social a c t i o n c a n b e assessed o n l y u n d e r t h e aspect o f purposive rationality. F r o m this conceptual

perspective, the r a t i o n -

T h e r e a r e s o m e i n d i c a t i o n s s u g g e s t i n g s u c h a t y p o l o g y i n Economy

a l i z a t i o n o f a c t i o n systems has t o b e r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t

t h e r e is r e l a t i v e l y s t r o n g e v i d e n c e f o r i t i n t h e essay

a n d d i f f u s i o n o f types o f p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l a c t i o n s p e c i f i c t o subsys-

"Some Categories o f Interpretive S o c i o l o g y . " 1 shall n o t pursue this

t e m s . I f processes o f s o c i e t a l r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n a r e t o b e i n v e s t i g a t e d in

h e r e , h o w e v e r , because W e b e r d o e s n o t c l e a r l y c a r r y t h r o u g h , a t t h e

their entire breadth, o t h e r a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s are r e q u i r e d .

and

Society,

29

3 0

level o f t h e a c t i o n o r i e n t a t i o n s themselves, tion

between

social r e l a t i o n s m e d i a t e d

those m e d i a t e d by n o r m a t i v e agreement.

the interesting distinc-

by interest positions

and

( I shall r e m e d y this b e l o w

I w o u l d like therefore to take u p o n c e again the concept o f c o m municative action e x p o u n d e d i n the i n t r o d u c t i o n upon

speech-act theory, to a n c h o r

3 1

a n d , by d r a w i n g

i n its c o n c e p t u a l

foundations

i n t h e s e c t i o n b e g i n n i n g o n p a g e 119.) M o r e s e r i o u s is t h e f a c t t h a t

t h o s e r a t i o n a l i z a b l e aspects o f a c t i o n n e g l e c t e d i n W e b e r ' s o f f i c i a l

w h i l e W e b e r does distinguish between t r a d i t i o n - b o u n d a n d r a t i o n a l

a c t i o n t h e o r y . I n t h i s way, I h o p e t o c a p t u r e i n a c t i o n - t h e o r e t i c t e r m s

a g r e e m e n t , h e e x p l a i n s t h i s r a t i o n a l a g r e e m e n t i n a d e q u a t e l y , as w e

t h e c o m p l e x c o n c e p t o f r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t W e b e r d i d e m p l o y i n his

have seen above, u s i n g t h e m o d e l o f a r r a n g e m e n t s a m o n g subjects

c u l t u r a l analyses. I s h a l l b e s t a r t i n g f r o m a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f a c t i o n

o f p r i v a t e law. A t a n y r a t e , h e d o e s n o t t r a c e i t b a c k t o t h e m o r a l -

that relies o n t h e u n o f f i c i a l version o f Weber's a c t i o n t h e o r y insofar

practical

as social a c t i o n s a r e d i s t i n g u i s h e d a c c o r d i n g t o t w o a c t i o n o r i e n t a -

would

foundations

have b e c o m e

(Gesellschaftshandeln)

of

discursive

clear

will-formation. Otherwise

at this p o i n t

that action

in

it

society

is d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m a c t i o n i n c o m m u n i t y (Ge-

tions, corresponding

to the c o o r d i n a t i o n o f action t h r o u g h interest

positions and t h r o u g h normative agreement

(see t a b l e 2.3).

118

119

Chapter 2


Table 2.3 Types of action

t i o n s o f t h e s i t u a t i o n is a n essential c o m p o n e n t o f t h e i n t e r p r e t i v e accomplishments required for communicative action.

Action orientation Action situation

Oriented toward success

Oriented toward reaching understanding

Nonsocial

Instrumental action

—

Social

Strategic action

Communicative action

Orientation toward Success versus Orientation toward Reaching Understanding I n i d e n t i f y i n g s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n as types, I a m assuming

T h e m o d e l o f purposive-rational a c t i o n takes as its p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e t h e v i e w t h a t t h e a c t o r is p r i m a r i l y o r i e n t e d t o w a r d a t t a i n i n g a n e n d ( w h i c h has b e e n r e n d e r e d s u f f i c i e n t l y p r e c i s e i n t e r m s o f p u r p o s e s ) , t h a t h e selects m e a n s t h a t s e e m t o h i m a p p r o p r i a t e i n t h e given

situation, and

that he

calculates

other

q u e n c e s o f a c t i o n as s e c o n d a r y c o n d i t i o n s

forseeable

conse-

o f success. Success is

d e f i n e d as t h e o c c u r r e n c e i n t h e w o r l d o f a d e s i r e d state, w h i c h c a n , i n a g i v e n s i t u a t i o n , be causally e f f e c t e d b y g o a l - o r i e n t e d a c t i o n o r o m i s s i o n . T h e effects o f a c t i o n t h a t o c c u r c o m p r i s e

t h e results o f

a c t i o n ( t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e set p u r p o s e has b e e n a c h i e v e d ) ,

the

consequences o f action ( w h i c h t h e actor foresaw a n d i n t e n d e d , o r m a d e a l l o w a n c e f o r ) , a n d t h e side-effects ( w h i c h t h e a c t o r d i d n o t f o r e s e e ) . W e c a l l a n a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success

instrumentalwhen

we c o n s i d e r i t u n d e r the aspect o f f o l l o w i n g t e c h n i c a l r u l e s o f a c t i o n a n d assess t h e d e g r e e o f e f f i c i e n c y o f a n i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t o a c o m p l e x o f circumstances

a n d events. W e

call an action o r i e n t e d t o w a r d

success strategic w h e n w e c o n s i d e r i t u n d e r t h e aspect o f f o l l o w i n g r u l e s o f r a t i o n a l c h o i c e a n d assess t h e d e g r e e o f e f f i c i e n c y o f its i n f l u e n c i n g the decisions o f a r a t i o n a l c o u n t e r p a r t i n action. I n s t r u m e n t a l actions can be c o n n e c t e d w i t h social i n t e r a c t i o n s ; strategic a c t i o n s a r e themselves s o c i a l a c t i o n s . B y c o n t r a s t , I s h a l l s p e a k o f communicative

action, whenever

involved are c o o r d i n a t e d

the plans o f action o f the

actors

n o t t h r o u g h egocentric calculations

of

success b u t t h r o u g h acts o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I n c o m m u n i c a tive a c t i o n , p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e n o t p r i m a r i l y o r i e n t e d t o w a r d t h e i r o w n i n d i v i d u a l successes; t h e y p u r s u e t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l goals o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e y c a n h a r m o n i z e t h e i r p l a n s o f a c t i o n o n t h e basis o f c o m m o n situation definitions. To this extent the negotiation o f d e f i n i -

that concrete actions

can be

classified f r o m

these

p o i n t s o f view. I use t h e t e r m s " s t r a t e g i c " a n d " c o m m u n i c a t i v e " n o t m e r e l y t o d e s i g n a t e t w o a n a l y t i c aspects u n d e r w h i c h o n e a n d t h e same a c t i o n can be d e s c r i b e d — o n t h e o n e

h a n d , as a r e c i p r o c a l

i n f l u e n c i n g o f o n e a n o t h e r by agents a c t i n g i n a purposive-rational m a n n e r a n d , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , as a p r o c e s s o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a m o n g m e m b e r s o f a l i f e w o r l d . Rather, social actions c a n be distinguished according to w h e t h e r the participants adopt either a success-oriented a t t i t u d e or one o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . A n d , u n d e r suitable c o n d i t i o n s , these attitudes s h o u l d be i d e n t i f i a b l e o n t h e basis o f t h e i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e

o f the partici-

p a n t s t h e m s e l v e s . T o b e g i n w i t h , t h e r e f o r e , a c o n c e p t u a l analysis o f t h e t w o a t t i t u d e s is r e q u i r e d . W i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f a c t i o n t h e o r y , c o n c e p t u a l analysis o f t h e t w o a t t i t u d e s c a n n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d as a p s y c h o l o g i c a l task. I t is n o t m y a i m to characterize behavioral dispositions empirically, b u t to g r a s p g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s o f processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , f r o m w h i c h conditions f o r p a r t i c i p a t i o n can be derived that may be characterized formally. To e x p l a i n w h a t I m e a n by "an attitude o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , " I have t o analyze t h e c o n cept o f

"reaching

understanding"

(Verständigung). T h i s is n o t

a

q u e s t i o n o f t h e p r e d i c a t e s a n o b s e r v e r uses w h e n d e s c r i b i n g p r o c esses o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t o f t h e p r e t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l edge

of

competent

speakers,

who

can

themselves

distinguish

intuitively situations i n w h i c h they are e x e r t i n g a n i n f l u e n c e

upon

others f r o m those i n w h i c h they are c o m i n g to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g with t h e m , a n d w h o f u r t h e r k n o w w h e n t h e i r a t t e m p t s at r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g f a i l . I f w e w e r e a b l e t o specify e x p l i c i t l y t h e s t a n d a r d s o n w h i c h t h e speakers i m p l i c i t l y base t h e s e d i s t i n c t i o n s , we w o u l d b e i n a position to explain the concept o f reaching understanding.

120

121

Chapter 2


Reaching understanding

a

w i t h a communicative intent. T h e concepts o f speaking a n d reaching

acting

u n d e r s t a n d i n g reciprocally i n t e r p r e t one another. For this reason,

(Verständigung) is c o n s i d e r e d t o b e

p r o c e s s o f a c h i e v i n g u n i t y (Einigung)

a m o n g speaking and

subjects. H o w e v e r , a g r o u p o f p e r s o n s c a n f e e l at o n e i n a m o o d t h a t

we can analyze t h e f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c

is so d i f f u s e t h a t i t is d i f f i c u l t t o specify t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t

or

ented toward reaching understanding i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h the m o d e l

like-

of the attitude o f participants i n communication, one of w h o m — i n

for

t h e s i m p l e s t c a s e — c a r r i e s o u t a s p e e c h act, t o w h i c h t h e o t h e r takes

t h e i n t e n t i o n a l o b j e c t t o w h i c h i t is d i r e c t e d . S u c h a c o l l e c t i v e m i n d e d n e s s (Gleichgestimmtheit)

d o e s n o t satisfy t h e c o n d i t i o n s

features o f the attitude o r i -

t h e t y p e o f a g r e e m e n t (Einverständnis) i n w h i c h a t t e m p t s at r e a c h i n g

a "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n ( e v e n t h o u g h u t t e r a n c e s i n t h e

u n d e r s t a n d i n g t e r m i n a t e w h e n t h e y a r e successful. A

tive p r a c t i c e s o f e v e r y d a y l i f e u s u a l l y d o n o t h a v e a s t a n d a r d l i n g u i s -

tively

communica-

a c h i e v e d a g r e e m e n t , o r o n e t h a t is m u t u a l l y p r e s u p p o s e d i n

communicative

a c t i o n , is p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d . O w i n g

communica-

tic f o r m a n d o f t e n h a v e n o v e r b a l f o r m at a l l ) .

to

I f w e a p p r o a c h t h e task o f d i s t i n g u i s h i n g a c t i o n s o r i e n t e d t o w a r d

this linguistic structure, i t c a n n o t m e r e l y be i n d u c e d t h r o u g h o u t -

success f r o m a c t i o n s o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g b y way

side i n f l u e n c e ; i t has t o b e a c c e p t e d ( o r p r e s u p p o s e d ) as v a l i d b y t h e

o f a n analysis o f s p e e c h acts, w e e n c o u n t e r t h e f o l l o w i n g d i f f i c u l t y .

participants. T o this extent i t can be distinguished f r o m merely

de

O n t h e o n e h a n d , w e are r e g a r d i n g t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e acts, w i t h t h e

f a c t o a c c o r d (Übereinstimmung). Processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g

h e l p o f w h i c h speakers a n d hearers c o m e t o a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t

a i m at a n a g r e e m e n t t h a t m e e t s t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f r a t i o n a l l y m o t i -

s o m e t h i n g , as a m e c h a n i s m

v a t e d assent (Zustimmung)

of communicative

to the content o f an utterance. A

commu-

n i c a t i v e l y a c h i e v e d a g r e e m e n t has a r a t i o n a l basis; i t c a n n o t

be

reaching

f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g actions. T h e c o n c e p t

a c t i o n is p r e s e n t e d i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e acts o f

understanding, w h i c h l i n k the teleologically

structured

i m p o s e d by e i t h e r party, w h e t h e r i n s t r u m e n t a l l y t h r o u g h i n t e r v e n -

plans o f action o f different participants a n d thereby

tion

i n d i v i d u a l acts i n t o a n i n t e r a c t i o n c o m p l e x , c a n n o t t h e m s e l v e s b e

in

the

situation directly, or

strategically

through

exerting

first

combine

i n f l u e n c e o n t h e d e c i s i o n s o f o n e p a r t y o n t h e basis o f a c a l c u l a t i o n

reduced to teleological

o f success. A g r e e m e n t c a n i n d e e d o b j e c t i v e l y be o b t a i n e d b y f o r c e ;

c o n c e p t o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n is i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h a

b u t w h a t c o m e s t o pass manifestly t h r o u g h o u t s i d e i n f l u e n c e o r t h e

t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g that, like i n t e n t i o n a l i s t semantics, tries to c o n c e p -

use o f v i o l e n c e c a n n o t s u b j e c t i v e l y c o u n t as a g r e e m e n t .

Agreement

actions. T o

this extent, the

paradigmatic

t u a l i z e r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g as t h e s o l u t i o n t o a p r o b l e m o f

co-

rests o n c o m m o n convictions. T h e s p e e c h act o f o n e p e r s o n succeeds

o r d i n a t i o n a m o n g subjects a c t i n g w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d success.

o n l y i f t h e o t h e r accepts t h e o f f e r c o n t a i n e d i n i t b y t a k i n g ( h o w e v e r

O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , n o t e v e r y l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n is

i m p l i c i d y ) a "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n o n

a v a l i d i t y c l a i m t h a t is i n

p r i n c i p l e c r i t i c i z a b l e . B o t h E g o , w h o raises a v a l i d i t y c l a i m w i t h h i s

an example of

action

oriented

toward reaching

understanding.

W i t h o u t d o u b t , t h e r e are c o u n t l e s s cases o f i n d i r e c t m u t u a l u n d e r -

u t t e r a n c e , a n d A l t e r , w h o r e c o g n i z e s o r r e j e c t s i t , base t h e i r d e c i s i o n s

s t a n d i n g (indirekte Verständigung), w h e t h e r w h e r e o n e s u b j e c t , i n g i v -

o n p o t e n t i a l reasons.

i n g a n o t h e r t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g t h r o u g h signals, i n d i r e c d y gets

I f we were n o t i n a p o s i t i o n to refer to the m o d e l o f speech, we c o u l d n o t even b e g i n t o analyze w h a t i t m e a n s f o r two subjects t o come

to

an

understanding

with

one

another.

Reaching

under-

s t a n d i n g is t h e i n h e r e n t t e l o s o f h u m a n l a n g u a g e (Sprache). T o s u r e , l a n g u a g e a n d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g are n o t r e l a t e d t o

be one

a n o t h e r as m e a n s t o e n d . B u t w e c a n e x p l a i n t h e c o n c e p t o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g o n l y i f w e specify w h a t i t m e a n s t o use s e n t e n c e s

h i m t o f o r m a c e r t a i n o p i n i o n o r t o a d o p t c e r t a i n i n t e n t i o n s by way o f an inferential processing o f perceptions o f the situation, or where one

subject, o n

t h e basis o f a l r e a d y h a b i t u a l i z e d e v e r y d a y c o m -

m u n i c a t i v e practices, i n c o n s p i c u o u s l y harnesses a n o t h e r f o r h e r o w n p u r p o s e s , t h a t is, i n d u c e s h i m t o b e h a v e i n a d e s i r e d way b y m a n i p u latively e m p l o y i n g linguistic means, thereby i n s t r u m e n t a l i z i n g h i m f o r h e r o w n success. S u c h e x a m p l e s o f t h e use o f l a n g u a g e w i t h a n

122

123

Chapter 2


o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d consequences seem t o decrease t h e value

of

s p e e c h acts as t h e m o d e l f o r a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r standing. T h i s w i l l t u r n o u t n o t t o b e t h e case o n l y i f i t c a n b e s h o w n t h a t

i n g o n l y i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n s t h e i r a u t h o r is p u r s u i n g a n d t h e e n d s h e w a n t s t o r e a l i z e . J u s t as the meaning of what is said is c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, the intention of the actor is c o n s t i t u tive f o r t e l e o l o g i c a l

actions.

t h e use o f l a n g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is t h e

W h a t A u s t i n calls perlocutionary effects arise f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t i l l o -

original mode o f l a n g u a g e use u p o n w h i c h i n d i r e c t l y r e a c h i n g u n d e r -

c u t i o n a r y acts t a k e o n a r o l e i n a t e l e o l o g i c a l c o n t e x t o f a c t i o n .

standing, giving to understand something or letting something

be

S p e e c h acts, l i k e a c t i o n s i n g e n e r a l , c a n p r o d u c e s i d e effects t h a t t h e

u n d e r s t o o d — i n g e n e r a l , t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l use o f l a n g u a g e — i s p a r a -

a c t o r d i d n o t f o r e s e e ; these a r e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects i n a t r i v i a l

s i t i c . I n m y view, A u s t i n ' s d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n i l l o c u t i o n s a n d p e r l o -

sense, w h i c h I s h a l l n o t c o n s i d e r h e r e . Less t r i v i a l a r e t h e p e r l o c u -

cutions accomplishes j u s t that.

t i o n a r y effects t h a t r e s u l t f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts s o m e -

A s is w e l l k n o w n , A u s t i n d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n l o c u t i o n a r y , i l l o c u tionary, a n d perlocutionary acts.

H e applies the t e r m " l o c u t i o n a r y "

32

t o t h e c o n t e n t o f p r e p o s i t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s ("/>") o r o f n o m i n a l i z e d p r e p o s i t i o n a l sentences

( " t h a t p").

Through

locutionary

acts, t h e

s p e a k e r expresses states o f a f f a i r s ; she says s o m e t h i n g . T h r o u g h illocutionary acts, t h e s p e a k e r p e r f o r m s a n a c t i o n b y s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g . The

i l l o c u t i o n a r y r o l e establishes

employed

the m o d e o f a sentence

(Mp)

as a s t a t e m e n t , p r o m i s e , c o m m a n d , a v o w a l , o r t h e l i k e .

U n d e r s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n s , t h e m o d e is e x p r e s s e d b y m e a n s o f a p e r f o r m a t i v e v e r b i n t h e first p e r s o n p r e s e n t ; t h e a c t i o n m e a n i n g c a n b e seen p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t h e f a c t t h a t " h e r e b y " c a n b e a d d e d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t o f t h e s p e e c h act: " I h e r e b y

to

promise

y o u ( c o m m a n d y o u , c o n f e s s t o y o u ) t h a t p." F i n a l l y , t h r o u g h perlocutionary acts, t h e s p e a k e r p r o d u c e s a n e f f e c t

u p o n the hearer.

By

c a r r y i n g o u t a s p e e c h act she b r i n g s a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d . T h u s , t h e t h r e e acts t h a t A u s t i n d i s t i n g u i s h e s c a n b e

characterized

w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g phrases: t o say something; t o act by s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g ; t o b r i n g a b o u t s o m e t h i n g through a c t i n g b y s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g . A u s t i n makes s p e e c h a c t (Mp), component,

his conceptual

incisions i n such a way t h a t

the

composed of an illocutionary and a prepositional

is p r e s e n t e d

as a s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t act t h a t t h e s p e a k e r

always p e r f o r m s w i t h a c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t , t h a t is, w i t h t h e a i m t h a t a hearer may u n d e r s t a n d a n d accept his u t t e r a n c e .

3 3

T h e self-

s u f f i c i e n c y o f t h e s p e e c h a c t is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e sense t h a t the c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t o f t h e speaker a n d the i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m h e is p u r s u i n g f o l l o w f r o m t h e m a n i f e s t m e a n i n g o f w h a t is s a i d . I t is a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r w i t h t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t i o n s . W e i d e n t i f y t h e i r m e a n -

t i m e s t a k e o n r o l e s i n c o n t e x t s o f s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e s e effects e n s u e w h e n e v e r a s p e a k e r acts w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d success a n d , i n d o i n g so, s i m u l t a n e o u s l y c o n n e c t s s p e e c h acts w i t h i n t e n tions

a n d i n s t r u m e n t a l i z e s t h e m f o r purposes t h a t are o n l y c o n t i n -

g e n d y r e l a t e d t o t h e m e a n i n g o f w h a t is s a i d . T h e r e yet is a f u r t h e r sense i n w h i c h to p e r f o r m a locutionary act, a n d t h e r e i n an i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, may also be to p e r f o r m an act o f another k i n d . Saying s o m e t h i n g w i l l often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects u p o n the feelings, thoughts, or actions o f the audience, or o f the speaker, or o f o t h e r persons: a n d i t may be d o n e w i t h the design, i n t e n t i o n , or purpose o f p r o d u c i n g t h e m ; a n d we may t h e n say, t h i n k i n g o f this, that the speaker has p e r f o r m e d an act i n the n o m e n c l a t u r e o f w h i c h reference is made either only obliquely . . . or even . . . n o t at all, to the performance o f the l o c u t i o n a r y or i l l o c u t i o n a r y act. We shall call the performance o f an act o f this k i n d the performance o f a perlocutionary act or perlocution. 3i

T h e d e m a r c a t i o n b e t w e e n i l l o c u t i o n a r y a n d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts has g i v e n rise t o a n e x t e n d e d c o n t r o v e r s y .

35

F r o m i t have e m e r g e d f o u r

criteria o f demarcation. a. T h e

i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m a speaker pursues w i t h an

utterance

f o l l o w s f r o m t h e m e a n i n g — c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r s p e e c h a c t s — o f w h a t is s a i d i t s e l f ; s p e e c h acts a r e , i n t h i s sense, s e l f - i d e n t i f y i n g . W i t h t h e 3 6

h e l p o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, a s p e a k e r lets i t b e k n o w n t h a t she w a n t s w h a t she says t o b e u n d e r s t o o d as a g r e e t i n g , c o m m a n d , w a r n i n g , e x p l a n a t i o n , a n d so f o r t h . H e r c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t does n o t

go

beyond w a n t i n g the hearer to understand the manifest content

of

t h e s p e e c h act. B y c o n t r a s t , t h e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f a speaker, l i k e t h e e n d s p u r s u e d w i t h g o a l - d i r e c t e d a c t i o n s g e n e r a l l y , does n o t f o l -

124

125

Chapter 2


l o w f r o m t h e m a n i f e s t c o n t e n t o f t h e s p e e c h act; t h i s a i m c a n

be

i n f e r r e d o n l y b y way o f t h e a c t o r ' s i n t e n t i o n . F o r e x a m p l e , a h e a r e r w h o u n d e r s t a n d s a r e q u e s t d i r e c t e d t o h i m c a n j u s t as l i t t l e k n o w t h e r e b y w h a t else t h e s p e a k e r h a s i n v i e w i n u t t e r i n g i t as a n o b s e r v e r w h o sees a n a c q u a i n t a n c e h u r r y i n g a l o n g t h e s t r e e t c a n k n o w w h y h e is i n a h u r r y . T h e addressee c o u l d a t best i n f e r t h e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y aims f r o m the c o n t e x t .

3 7

speaker's

T h e three r e m a i n i n g crite-

(3)

a s s e r t i o n d e s c r i b e d i n (1) is n o t a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r a c h i e v i n g a p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t . I n a n o t h e r c o n t e x t , t h e h e a r e r c o u l d j u s t as w e l l react t o t h e same u t t e r a n c e w i t h relief. T h e same holds f o r (4)

acts.

her below,

we can deduce the conditions for the corresponding i l l o c u t i o n a r y success o f t h e speaker, b u t n o t t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y success t h a t a speaker a c t i n g w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d success m i g h t w a n t t o a c h i e v e , o r d i d a c h i e v e , i n a g i v e n case b y c a r r y i n g o u t t h i s s p e e c h act. I n t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f p e r l o c u t i o n s , as i n ( 3 ) a n d ( 4 ) b e l o w , k i n d s o f success a r e i n c l u d e d t h a t g o b e y o n d t h e m e a n i n g o f w h a t is s a i d a n d t h u s b e y o n d w h a t a n addressee c o u l d u n d e r s t a n d directly. (1)

s e n t e d b y ( 1 ) i f H u n d e r s t a n d s h e r a s s e r t i o n a n d a c c e p t s i t as t r u e . T h e same h o l d s f o r

firm.

I n a n o t h e r c o n t e x t t h e same w a r n i n g c o u l d j u s t as w e l l s t r e n g t h e n S i n h e r r e s o l v e , f o r i n s t a n c e i f S h a r b o r s a s u s p i c i o n t h a t H does n o t w i s h h e r w e l l . T h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects m u s t t h e r e f o r e r e f e r t o a c o n t e x t o f t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t i o n t h a t goes beyond t h e speech a c t .

3 8

c. F r o m c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f t h i s k i n d , A u s t i n c o n c l u d e d t h a t i l l o c u t i o n a r y success s t a n d s i n a conventionally r e g u l a t e d o r internal c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e s p e e c h act, w h e r e a s

p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects r e m a i n

effects o f a s p e e c h a c t d e p e n d o n f o r t u i t o u s c o n t e x t s a n d , u n l i k e t h e success o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, a r e n o t course, o n e

m i g h t use

(4)

fixed

by c o n v e n t i o n s .

3 9

Of

as a c o u n t e r e x a m p l e . O n l y i f t h e a d -

dressee takes t h e w a r n i n g s e r i o u s l y is u n e a s e a p l a u s i b l e r e a c t i o n , a n d o n l y i f she d o e s n o t t a k e i t s e r i o u s l y is a f e e l i n g o f reassurance

/ / w a r n e d S n o t to give n o t i c e t o h e r f i r m .

H w i l l h a v e a c h i e v e d i l l o c u t i o n a r y success w i t h t h e u t t e r a n c e r e p r e s e n t e d b y ( 2 ) i f S u n d e r s t a n d s h i s w a r n i n g a n d accepts i t as t r u e o r r i g h t — d e p e n d i n g o n w h e t h e r i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t i t has m o r e t h e sense o f a p r o g n o s i s o r o f a m o r a l a p p e a l . I n a n y case, a c c e p t i n g t h e u t t e r a n c e described i n (2) provides g r o u n d s f o r o b l i g a t i o n s t o act i n a c e r t a i n way o n t h e p a r t o f t h e a d d r e s s e e a n d f o r c o r r e s p o n d i n g e x p e c t a t i o n s o n t h e p a r t o f t h e speaker. W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e exp e c t e d s e q u e l o f a c t i o n a c t u a l l y c o m e s t o pass has n o e f f e c t o n t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y success o f t h e speaker. I f , f o r i n s t a n c e , S d o e s n o t give n o t i c e , t h i s is n o t a p e r l o c u t i o n a r i l y a c h i e v e d e f f e c t b u t t h e c o n s e quence o f a communicatively achieved

H m a d e S uneasy w i t h his w a r n i n g against g i v i n g notice to

e x t e r n a l t o t h e m e a n i n g o f w h a t is s a i d . T h e p o s s i b l e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y

5 a s s e r t e d t o / / t h a t she gave n o t i c e t o h e r f i r m .

S w i l l h a v e a c h i e v e d i l l o c u t i o n a r y success w i t h t h e u t t e r a n c e r e p r e -

(2)

firm,

F r o m t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n i t f o l l o w s t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y success o f t h e

ria h a v e t o d o w i t h t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s e l f - i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h b. F r o m t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f a s p e e c h act, as i n (1) a n d ( 2 )

T h r o u g h i n f o r m i n g H t h a t she h a d g i v e n n o t i c e t o h e r

S gave H a f r i g h t (as she i n t e n d e d t o d o ) .

agreement and thus the

f u l f i l l m e n t o f a n o b l i g a t i o n t h a t t h e addressee t o o k u p o n h i m s e l f w i t h h i s "yes" t o a s p e e c h a c t o f f e r . C o n s i d e r n o w :

p l a u s i b l e . I n s o m e cases, t h e m e a n i n g c o n v e n t i o n s o f t h e a c t i o n p r e d i c a t e s w i t h w h i c h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts a r e f o r m e d e x c l u d e c e r t a i n classes o f p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects. N o n e t h e l e s s , these effects are c o n n e c t e d w i t h s p e e c h acts n o t m e r e l y i n a c o n v e n t i o n a l way. W h e n a h e a r e r a c c e p t s a n a s s e r t i o n b y S as t r u e , a c o m m a n d as r i g h t , a n a d m i s s i o n as t r u t h f u l , h e t h e r e w i t h i m p l i c i d y d e c l a r e s h i m s e l f r e a d y to b i n d his f u r t h e r action to c e r t a i n c o n v e n t i o n a l obligations. By contrast, t h e f e e l i n g o f unease w h i c h a f r i e n d arouses i n S w i t h a w a r n i n g t h a t t h e l a t t e r takes s e r i o u s l y is a state t h a t m a y o r m a y n o t ensue. d. S i m i l a r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h a v e m o t i v a t e d S t r a w s o n t o r e p l a c e t h e criterion of conventionality with another criterion of demarcation.

4 0

A speaker, i f she w a n t s t o b e successful, m a y n o t l e t h e r p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s b e k n o w n , w h e r e a s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s c a n be a c h i e v e d o n l y

127

126


Chapter 2

t h r o u g h b e i n g expressed. E l o c u t i o n s are expressed openly; p e r l o c u tions

m a y n o t b e " a d m i t t e d " as s u c h . T h i s d i f f e r e n c e c a n also b e s e e n

i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e p r e d i c a t e s w i t h w h i c h p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts a r e d e s c r i b e d ( t o give a f r i g h t t o , t o cause u n e a s e , t o p l u n g e i n t o d o u b t , to p u t someone i n a bad m o o d , to mislead, to offend, to infuriate, t o h u m i l i a t e , a n d so f o r t h ) c a n n o t a p p e a r a m o n g t h o s e used

predicates

t o c a r r y o u t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts w i t h t h e h e l p o f w h i c h

c o r r e s p o n d i n g p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects c a n b e a c h i e v e d . P e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts c o n s t i t u t e t h a t subclass o f t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t i o n s t h a t c a n

be

c a r r i e d o u t w i t h t h e h e l p o f s p e e c h acts o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t t h e a g e n t d o e s n o t d e c l a r e o r a d m i t t o h e r a i m s as s u c h . W h e r e a s t h e sense o f t h e d i v i s i o n i n t o l o c u t i o n a r y a n d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts is t o separate t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t f r o m t h e m o d e o f s p e e c h acts as a n a l y t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t aspects, t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e s e t w o types o f acts, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts, o n t h e o t h e r , is b y n o m e a n s a n a l y t i c a l i n c h a r a c t e r . P e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects c a n b e a c h i e v e d w i t h t h e h e l p o f s p e e c h acts o n l y i f t h e l a t t e r a r e incorporated as means i n t o t e l e o l o g i c a l , s u c c e s s - o r i e n t e d a c t i o n s . P e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts are a n i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e i n t e g r a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts i n t o c o n t e x t s o f s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e y a r e p a r t o f t h e i n t e n d e d sequel o f a c t i o n o r o f t h e results o f a teleological a c t i o n t h a t an actor undertakes w i t h the i n t e n t i o n o f i n f l u e n c i n g a hearer i n a c e r t a i n w a y w i t h t h e h e l p o f successful i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts. T o b e s u r e , s p e e c h acts c a n serve t h i s nonillocutionary

aim of influencing hearers

o n l y i f they are suited to achieving i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims. I f t h e h e a r e r

interactions. W h a t we m e a n

by r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d

an

a t t i t u d e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , has t o b e c l a r i f i e d solely i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts. A n a t t e m p t a t r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g u n d e r t a k e n w i t h t h e h e l p o f a s p e e c h act succeeds w h e n a s p e a k e r achieves h e r i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m i n A u s t i n ' s sense. F r o m t h i s i t also f o l l o w s t h a t w e c a n n o t e x p l a i n i l l o c u t i o n a r y success i n t e r m s o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e p u r p o s i v e l y a c h i e v e d success o f a teleological a c t i o n . I l l o c u t i o n a r y aims are d i f f e r e n t f r o m those p u poses t h a t c a n b e a c h i e v e d under the description o f s o m e t h i n g t o b e brought about i n the world. P e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects, l i k e t h e successful r e s u l t s o f

teleological

a c t i o n s g e n e r a l l y , m a y b e d e s c r i b e d as states i n t h e w o r l d b r o u g h t a b o u t t h r o u g h i n t e r v e n t i o n i n the w o r l d . By contrast, i l l o c u t i o n a r y successes a r e a c h i e v e d

at t h e level o f i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations

which participants i n communication

on

c o m e to an understanding

w i t h o n e a n o t h e r a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d . I n t h i s sense, t h e y a r e n o t i n n e r w o r l d l y , b u t e x t r a m u n d a n e . A t m o s t , successful i l l o c u tionary

acts o c c u r w i t h i n t h e l i f e w o r l d t o w h i c h t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n

communication

belong

and that forms the background for their

processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e y c a n n o t b e i n t e n d e d u n d e r t h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f causally p r o d u c e d effects. T h i s m o d e l o f action

oriented

toward reaching

understanding, which I

develop

b e l o w , is o b s c u r e d r a t h e r t h a n i l l u m i n a t e d b y A u s t i n ' s d i s t i n c t i o n between illocutions and perlocutions.

ideologically

F r o m the f o r e g o i n g i t appears that we can conceive perlocutions

able to b r i n g the

as a s p e c i a l class o f s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n s i n w h i c h i l l o c u t i o n s a r e

f a i l e d t o u n d e r s t a n d w h a t t h e s p e a k e r was s a y i n g , a a c t i n g , success-oriented speaker w o u l d n o t be

s t a n d i n g , p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t w h e n these a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o strategic

h e a r e r , b y m e a n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e acts, t o b e h a v e i n t h e d e s i r e d

employed

way. T o t h i s e x t e n t , w h a t w e i n i t i a l l y d e s i g n a t e d as " t h e use o f l a n -

has

g u a g e w i t h a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d c o n s e q u e n c e s " is n o t a n o r i g i n a l

i d e o l o g i c a l l y a c t i n g s p e a k e r has t o a c h i e v e h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m —

use o f l a n g u a g e b u t t h e s u b s u m p t i o n o f s p e e c h acts t h a t serve i l l o -

t h a t t h e h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d w h a t is s a i d a n d e n t e r i n t o t h e o b l i g a -

c u t i o n a r y a i m s u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success.

tions

A s s p e e c h acts b y n o m e a n s always f u n c t i o n i n t h i s way, h o w e v e r , i t m u s t also b e p o s s i b l e t o c l a r i f y t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o s t r u c t u r e s o f p u r p o s i v e activity. T h e t e l e o l o g i c a l a c t o r o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d success is n o t c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r the

successful a c c o m p l i s h m e n t

of

processes o f

reaching

under-

as m e a n s i n t e l e o l o g i c a l c o n t e x t s o f a c t i o n . A s S t r a w s o n

shown,

this

employment

is s u b j e c t

to

certain

provisos.

A

c o n n e c t e d w i t h the acceptance o f the offer contained i n the

speech a c t — w i t h o u t b e t r a y i n g his p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m . T h i s proviso lends

to

perlocutions

the

peculiarly asymmetrical

character

of

c o n c e a l e d s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n s . T h e s e are i n t e r a c t i o n s i n w h i c h a t least one

o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s is a c t i n g s t r a t e g i c a l l y , w h i l e h e

deceives

o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s r e g a r d i n g t h e f a c t t h a t h e is not satisfying t h e

128

129

Chapter 2


presuppositions

u n d e r w h i c h i l l o c u d o n a r y aims n o r m a l l y can

be

f e e l d e c e i v e d a n d a d o p t i n t u r n a s t r a t e g i c a t t i t u d e , b r e a k i n g away

a c h i e v e d . F o r t h i s r e a s o n also, t h i s t y p e o f i n t e r a c t i o n is n o t s u i t a b l e

f r o m action o r i e n t e d toward reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g . O f course, i n

as t h e m o d e l f o r a n analysis t h a t is s u p p o s e d t o e x p l a i n t h e l i n g u i s d c

c o m p l e x a c t i o n c o n t e x t s , a s p e e c h a c t t h a t is p e r f o r m e d

mechanism o f coordinating action w i t h the help o f the illocutionary

cepted directly according to the presuppositions o f

b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g effects o f s p e e c h acts. F o r t h i s p u r p o s e i t w o u l d

a c t i o n c a n a t t h e same t i m e have a s t r a t e g i c status a t other levels o f

b e advisable t o select a t y p e o f i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t is n o t b u r d e n e d w i t h

i n t e r a c t i o n , t h a t is, c a n have p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects o n third parties.

and

ac-

communicative

t h e a s y m m e t r i e s a n d p r o v i s o s o f p e r l o c u t i o n s . I have c a l l e d t h e t y p e

T h u s , I c o u n t as c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n t h o s e l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i -

o f i n t e r a c t i o n i n w h i c h all p a r t i c i p a n t s h a r m o n i z e t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l

ated interactions i n w h i c h all participants pursue i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims,

p l a n s o f a c t i o n w i t h o n e a n o t h e r a n d t h u s unreservedly p u r s u e t h e i r

a n d only i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s , w i t h t h e i r s p e e c h acts. O n t h e

i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims "communicative

h a n d , I r e g a r d as l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n t h o s e i n t e r -

action."

A u s t i n , t o o , analyzes s p e e c h acts i n c o n t e x t s o f i n t e r a c t i o n . I t is precisely the p o i n t o f his a p p r o a c h character

o f linguistic utterances

to work out the performative on

t h e basis o f

institutionally

other

a c t i o n s i n w h i c h a t least o n e o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s w a n t s t o p r o d u c e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects o n h i s o p p o s i t e n u m b e r w i t h h i s s p e e c h acts. A u s t i n d i d n o t k e e p these t w o cases s e p a r a t e as d i f f e r e n t types

of

b o u n d s p e e c h acts s u c h as b a p t i z i n g , b e t t i n g , a p p o i n t i n g , a n d t h e

i n t e r a c t i o n , b e c a u s e h e was i n c l i n e d t o i d e n t i f y s p e e c h a c t s — t h a t is,

like, i n w h i c h the obligations issuing f r o m the performance

o f the

acts o f r e a c h i n g

speech act are u n a m b i g u o u s l y r e g u l a t e d by a c c o m p a n y i n g

institu-

tions

o r n o r m s o f action. However, A u s t i n confuses t h e p i c t u r e by

understanding—with the linguistically mediated

i n t e r a c t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s . H e d i d n o t see t h a t s p e e c h acts f u n c t i o n as a coordinating mechanism

f o r other a c t i o n s . T h e y m u s t be

disen-

n o t t r e a t i n g t h e s e i n t e r a c t i o n s , i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h w h i c h h e analyzes

gaged f r o m such contexts o f communicative action before they can

t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g f o r c e o f s p e e c h acts, as differ-

b e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o s t r a t e g i c i n t e r a c t i o n s . A n d t h i s is p o s s i b l e i n

ent in type f r o m t h o s e i n t e r a c t i o n s i n w h i c h p e r l o c u t i o n a r y

effects

t u r n o n l y because s p e e c h acts h a v e a r e l a t i v e i n d e p e n d e n c e i n r e l a -

o c c u r . S o m e o n e w h o m a k e s a b e t , a p p o i n t s a n o f f i c e r as s u p r e m e

t i o n t o c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n ; h o w e v e r , t h e m e a n i n g o f w h a t is said

c o m m a n d e r , gives a c o m m a n d , a d m o n i s h e s o r w a r n s , m a k e s a p r e -

always p o i n t s t o t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f i n t e r a c t i o n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f c o m -

d i c t i o n , tells a story, m a k e s a c o n f e s s i o n , reveals s o m e t h i n g , a n d so

municative action. T h e difference

f o r t h is a c t i n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a n d c a n n o t , at the same level of inter-

c o n t e x t o f i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t i t c o n s t i t u t e s t h r o u g h its a c t i o n - c o o r d i -

action, p r o d u c e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects a t a l l . A s p e a k e r c a n

pursue

nating accomplishments

between

a s p e e c h act a n d

can be r e c o g n i z e d m o r e

the

easily i f , u n l i k e

p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s o n l y w h e n h e deceives h i s c o u n t e r p a r t c o n c e r n -

A u s t i n , one does n o t r e m a i n fixated o n the m o d e l o f institutionally

i n g t h e f a c t t h a t h e is a c t i n g s t r a t e g i c a l l y — w h e n , f o r e x a m p l e ,

b o u n d speech acts.

he

41

gives t h e c o m m a n d t o a t t a c k i n o r d e r t o g e t h i s t r o o p s t o r u s h i n t o a trap, o r w h e n he proposes a bet o f $3,000 i n o r d e r to

embarrass

s o m e o n e , o r w h e n h e tells a s t o r y late i n t h e e v e n i n g i n o r d e r

to

d e l a y a guest's d e p a r t u r e , a n d so o n . I t is c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t i n c o m m u n i c a t i v e action u n i n t e n d e d consequences may o c c u r at any time;

b u t as s o o n as t h e r e is a d a n g e r t h a t t h e s e w i l l b e a t t r i b u t e d t o

t h e s p e a k e r as i n t e n d e d effects, t h e l a t t e r f i n d s i t n e c e s s a r y t o o f f e r explanations

a n d denials, a n d i f n e e d be, apologies, i n o r d e r

to

d i s p e l t h e false i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e s e side effects a r e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects. O t h e r w i s e , h e has t o e x p e c t t h a t t h e o t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s w i l l

M e a n i n g a n d Validity O n t h e basis o f t h e c o n t r o v e r s i a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n i l l o c u t i o n a r y a n d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts, I h a v e a t t e m p t e d t o s h o w t h a t w h i l e s p e e c h acts c a n i n d e e d b e e m p l o y e d strategically, t h e y h a v e a c o n s t i t u t i v e m e a n i n g o n l y f o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n . T h e l a t t e r is d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m strategic a c t i o n by t h e fact t h a t a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s unreservedly

pursue

i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims i n o r d e r to arrive at an agreement that provides t h e basis f o r a c o n s e n s u a l c o o r d i n a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l l y p u r s u e d p l a n s

130

131

Chapter 2


conditions

d i r e c d y f r o m t h e social validity o f n o r m s

agreement

i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts) n o r o w e d t o a c o n t i n g e n t l y a v a i l -

t h a t is t o f u l f i l l t h i s f u n c t i o n o f c o o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n . I n d o i n g so, I

a b l e r e s e r v o i r o f p o t e n t i a l s a n c t i o n s (as i t is i n t h e case o f i m p e r a t i v e

o f action. I n w h a t follows I w o u l d like to explicate the t h a t have t o b e satisfied b y a c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a c h i e v e d

(as i t is i n t h e case o f

s h a l l t a k e as m y m o d e l e l e m e n t a r y p a i r s o f u t t e r a n c e s , e a c h o f w h i c h

expressions o f will)? F r o m the perspective o f a hearer to w h o m a n

consists o f t h e s p e e c h a c t o f a s p e a k e r a n d t h e a f f i r m a t i v e r e s p o n s e

u t t e r a n c e is a d d r e s s e d , w e c a n d i s t i n g u i s h t h r e e levels o f r e a c t i o n t o

o f a hearer. Consider the f o l l o w i n g

a ( c o r r e c d y p e r c e i v e d ) s p e e c h act: t h e h e a r e r understands t h e u t t e r -

(1)

examples:

4 2

I (hereby) promise y o u that I shall come a r o u n d t o m o r r o w .

(2)

You are requested to stop s m o k i n g .

(3)

I confess t o y o u t h a t I find y o u r a c t i o n s

(4)

a n c e , t h a t is, h e grasps t h e m e a n i n g o f w h a t is s a i d ; w i t h h i s "yes" o r " n o " t h e h e a r e r takes a position o n t h e c l a i m r a i s e d w i t h t h e s p e e c h act, t h a t is, h e a c c e p t s o r rejects t h e s p e e c h - a c t o f f e r ; a n d i n c o n s e quence o f an achieved

loathsome.

I can predict (to you) that the vacation w i l l be spoiled by

rain.

agreement,

t h e h e a r e r d i r e c t s his a c t i o n

a c c o r d i n g t o conventionally fixed obligations to act in a certain way. T h e pragmatic l e v e l o f t h e a g r e e m e n t e f f e c t i v e f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n c o n n e c t s t h e semantic l e v e l o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g m e a n i n g w i t h t h e empirical l e v e l of further developing—in a manner dependent o n the context—the

W e c a n r e c o g n i z e i n e a c h case w h a t a n a f f i r m a t i v e r e s p o n s e w o u l d

a c c o r d relevant to t h e sequel o f i n t e r a c t i o n . H o w this

m e a n a n d w h a t k i n d o f i n t e r a c t i o n sequel i t w o u l d g r o u n d .

comes a b o u t can be e x p l a i n e d by means o f the t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g ;

(1')

Yes, I s h a l l d e p e n d o n i t .

(2')

Yes, I s h a l l c o m p l y .

(3')

Yes, I b e l i e v e y o u d o .

(4')

Yes, w e ' l l have t o t a k e t h a t i n t o a c c o u n t .

W i t h h i s "yes," t h e h e a r e r a c c e p t s a s p e e c h - a c t o f f e r a n d g r o u n d s a n a g r e e m e n t ; t h i s a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n s t h e content of the utterance o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d o n t h e o t h e r c e r t a i n guarantees immanent to speech acts a n d c e r t a i n obligations relevant for the sequel of interaction. T h e a c t i o n p o t e n t i a l t y p i c a l o f a s p e e c h act finds e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e s p e a k e r raises f o r w h a t she s a y s — i n a n e x p l i c i t s p e e c h a c t w i t h the h e l p o f a performative verb. I n acknowledging her claim, the h e a r e r a c c e p t s a n o f f e r m a d e w i t h t h e s p e e c h act. T h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y success is r e l e v a n t t o t h e a c t i o n i n s o f a r as a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r is t h e r e b y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t is e f f e c t i v e f o r c o o r d i n a t i o n , t h a t o r d e r s t h e p o s s i b l e scope o f a c t i o n a n d sequels o f i n t e r a c t i o n , a n d t h a t opens u p to the hearer possible points o f c o n n e c t i o n b y way o f g e n e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e s f o r a c t i o n . T h e q u e s t i o n n o w arises, f r o m w h e r e d o s p e e c h acts d r a w t h e i r p o w e r t o c o o r d i n a t e a c t i o n s , w h e n t h i s a u t h o r i t y is n e i t h e r b o r r o w e d

connection

admittedly, for this purpose, the formal-semantic approach t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g s e n t e n c e s has t o b e The formal-pragmatic approach the

expanded.

limited

4 3

to m e a n i n g t h e o r y begins w i t h

q u e s t i o n o f what it means to understand an utterance—that

is, a

sentence e m p l o y e d communicatively. F o r m a l semantics makes a c o n c e p t u a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m e a n i n g (Bedeutung) a n d t h e m e a n i n g (Meinung)

o f a sentence

o f t h e speaker, w h o , w h e n she uses t h e

s e n t e n c e i n a s p e e c h act, c a n say s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n w h a t i t literally means. B u t this distinction cannot be developed i n t o a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l s e p a r a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e f o r m a l analysis o f s e n t e n c e m e a n i n g s a n d t h e e m p i r i c a l analysis o f s p e a k e r s ' m e a n i n g s e x p r e s s e d i n utterances; for the literal m e a n i n g o f a sentence cannot be

ex-

p l a i n e d a t a l l a p a r t f r o m t h e s t a n d a r d c o n d i t i o n s f o r its c o m m u n i c a tive

employment.

To

be

s u r e , f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c s m u s t also t a k e

p r e c a u t i o n s t o e n s u r e t h a t i n t h e s t a n d a r d case w h a t is m e a n t d o e s n o t d e v i a t e f r o m t h e l i t e r a l m e a n i n g o f w h a t is s a i d . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , o u r analysis is l i m i t e d t o s p e e c h acts c a r r i e d o u t under

standard

conditions. T h i s is i n t e n d e d t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e s p e a k e r m e a n s (meint) n o t h i n g else t h a n t h e l i t e r a l m e a n i n g o f w h a t she says. I n a d i s t a n t a n a l o g y t o t h e basic a s s u m p t i o n s o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics, I n o w w a n t to trace back u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n utterance to

132

133

Chapter 2


k n o w l e d g e o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a h e a r e r m a y a c c e p t i t . We

u t t e r a n c e t h a t S is a t t e m p t i n g t o g e t h i m t o p e r f o r m a n a c t i o n

understand a speech act when we know what makes it acceptable. F r o m t h e

H o w e v e r , t h i s v i e w fails t o r e c o g n i z e t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g

s t a n d p o i n t o f t h e speaker, t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f a c c e p t a b i l i t y a r e i d e n t i -

s u c h i m p e r a t i v e s . I n u t t e r i n g a n i m p e r a t i v e , a s p e a k e r says what H is

a.

4 7

of

c a l t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r h e r i l l o c u t i o n a r y success. A c c e p t a b i l i t y is

t o d o . T h i s direct form o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e n d e r s s u p e r f l u o u s

n o t d e f i n e d h e r e i n a n o b j e c t i v i s t i c sense, f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a n

a speech act by means o f w h i c h t h e speaker c o u l d i n d i r e c d y get a

observer, b u t i n the p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e o f a p a r t i c i p a n t i n c o m -

hearer

m u n i c a t i o n . A s p e e c h a c t m a y b e c a l l e d " a c c e p t a b l e " i f i t satisfies t h e

o f imperatives

c o n d i t i o n s t h a t a r e necessary i n o r d e r f o r t h e h e a r e r t o t a k e a "yes"

paraphrases:

p o s i t i o n o n t h e c l a i m r a i s e d b y t h e speaker. T h e s e c o n d i t i o n s c a n n o t be

satisfied one-sidedly,

e i t h e r relative to the speaker o r to

the

h e a r e r . T h e y a r e r a t h e r c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e intersubjective recognition o f a l i n g u i s t i c c l a i m , w h i c h , i n a w a y t y p i c a l o f a g i v e n class o f s p e e c h acts, g r o u n d s a n a g r e e m e n t w i t h a s p e c i f i e d

content

concerning

obligations relevant for the sequel o f i n t e r a c t i o n . F r o m the standpoint o f a sociological t h e o r y o f action, m y p r i m a r y interest m u s t be to m a k e clear t h e m e c h a n i s m relevant to the coor-

(5a)

to p e r f o r m can

a certain action. T h e better

be

described

illocutionary meaning through

the

following

48

S t o l d H t h a t h e s h o u l d t a k e c a r e t o see t h a t "p" c o m e s t o

pass. (5b)

S s i g n i f i e d t o / / t h a t h e s h o u l d b r i n g a b o u t "p."

(5c)

T h e request (demand)

u t t e r e d b y S is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d i n

t h e sense t h a t / / s h o u l d b r i n g a b o u t

"p."

H e r e "p" d e s i g n a t e s a state i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d t h a t , r e l a t i v e t o t h e

d i n a t i n g a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s o f s p e e c h acts. T o t h i s e n d I s h a l l c o n c e n -

time

trate o n

t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a h e a r e r is m o t i v a t e d t o

r e m a i n i n g constant, can come i n t o existence t h r o u g h an i n t e r v e n -

a c c e p t t h e o f f e r c o n t a i n e d i n a s p e e c h act, a s s u m i n g t h a t t h e l i n g u i s -

t i o n o r o m i s s i o n b y t h e a d d r e s s e e — f o r i n s t a n c e , t h e state o f n o t

tic expressions e m p l o y e d are g r a m m a t i c a l l y w e l l f o r m e d a n d t h a t t h e

s m o k i n g that H brings about by p u t t i n g o u t his l i t cigarette.

g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s typical f o r a given type o f speech act are satisfied.

44

A hearer understands the meaning o f an utterance

w h e n , i n a d d i t i o n to grammatical conditions o f well-formedness general contextual conditions,

4 5

and

h e k n o w s t h o s e essential conditions

u n d e r w h i c h he c o u l d be m o t i v a t e d by a speaker t o a n a f f i r m a t i v e response.

4 6

T h e s e acceptability conditions in the narrower sense r e l a t e t o

t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y r o l e t h a t S i n t h e s t a n d a r d case expresses w i t h t h e h e l p o f a p e r f o r m a t i v e a c t i o n p r e d i c a t e . B u t l e t us l o o k

conditions

A h e a r e r accepts t h e i m p e r a t i v e (5) by r e s p o n d i n g a f f i r m a t i v e l y t o it with: (5')

Yes, I s h a l l d o w h a t is r e q u e s t e d o f m e .

I f we restrict ourselves t o c o n d i t i o n s o f acceptability i n the n a r r o w e r sense, t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h H a c c e p t s ( 5 ) f a l l i n t o t w o c o m ponents. a. T h e h e a r e r s h o u l d u n d e r s t a n d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g

of

a t a g r a m m a t i c a l l y c o r r e c t i m p e r a t i v e sen-

i m p e r a t i v e s i n s u c h a way t h a t h e c o u l d p a r a p h r a s e t h i s m e a n i n g

t e n c e , f o r m u l a t e d as a n i m p e r a t i v e u n d e r a p p r o p r i a t e c o n t e x t u a l

w i t h sentences l i k e (5a), ( 5 b ) , o r (5c) a n d c o u l d i n t e r p r e t t h e p r o -

conditions:

p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t " t o s t o p s m o k i n g " as a n i m p e r a t i v e d i r e c t e d t o

(5)

first

o f t h e u t t e r a n c e , lies i n t h e f u t u r e a n d t h a t , o t h e r

h i m . I n fact, t h e h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s t h e i m p e r a t i v e (5) i f he k n o w s

I (hereby) request y o u to stop s m o k i n g .

t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h "p" w o u l d o c c u r a n d i f h e k n o w s w h a t

I m p e r a t i v e s are o f t e n u n d e r s t o o d o n t h e m o d e l o f p e r l o c u t i o n a r y

h e h i m s e l f w o u l d have t o d o o r n o t t o d o i n t h e g i v e n

acts, as a t t e m p t s b y a n a c t o r S t o g e t i f t o c a r r y o u t a c e r t a i n a c t i o n .

i n o r d e r t h a t these c o n d i t i o n s be satisfied. As o n e m u s t k n o w t h e

O n t h i s view, S p e r f o r m s a n i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e o n l y w h e n

t r u t h conditions of a proposition i n order to understand i t , one

she

connects with her utterance the i n t e n t i o n that H infer f r o m the

circumstances

134

135

Chapter 2


conditions

T h i s p i c t u r e is c o m p l i c a t e d i n a n i n s t r u c t i v e way w h e n w e pass

u n d e r w h i c h i t w o u l d c o u n t as satisfied. W i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f a

f r o m g e n u i n e o r simple i m p e r a t i v e s t o normatively authorized i m p e r a -

p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g , t h e s e conditions of

tives o r c o m m a n d s . L e t us c o m p a r e ( 5 ) w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g — a v a r i a n t

must, i n order to understand an imperadve, k n o w the

satisfaction—formu-

lated to begin w i t h i n semantic t e r m s — a r e i n t e r p r e t e d i n terms o f obligations relevant for the sequel o f interaction. T h e hearer u n d e r stands a n i m p e r a t i v e i f he k n o w s w h a t he m u s t d o o r n o t d o i n o r d e r t o b r i n g a b o u t a state "p" d e s i r e d b y S; h e t h e r e b y also k n o w s

how

h e c o u l d l i n k u p h i s a c t i o n s w i t h t h o s e o f S.

of (2): (6)

I (hereby) d i r e c t y o u to stop s m o k i n g .

T h i s utterance presupposes recognized n o r m s

(for example,

the

safety r e g u l a t i o n s f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l a i r t r a v e l ) a n d a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l

b. A s s o o n as w e c o n c e p t u a l i z e

the understanding o f imperatives

f r a m e w o r k a u t h o r i z i n g t h o s e h o l d i n g c e r t a i n p o s i t i o n s (e.g., f l i g h t

f r o m this perspective, b r o a d e n e d

to include the context o f interac-

attendants) u n d e r certain conditions

tion,

i t b e c o m e s clear t h a t k n o w l e d g e o f " s a t i s f a c t i o n c o n d i t i o n s " is

n o t s u f f i c i e n t f o r k n o w i n g w h e n a n i m p e r a t i v e is a c c e p t a b l e . A seco n d c o m p o n e n t is l a c k i n g , n a m e l y , k n o w l e d g e o f the conditions of the agreement t h a t first grounds adherence t o t h e o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r the

sequel o f interaction. T h e hearer fully understands the i l l o c u -

tionary

(e.g., p r e p a r i n g t o l a n d )

to

d i r e c t a c e r t a i n class o f p e r s o n s ( h e r e , t h e passengers) t o s t o p s m o k i n g by appealing to certain regulations. O n c e again, the i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g can be specified t h r o u g h the conditions mentioned under d i r e c t i v e s (Anweisungen),

initially

( a ) , b u t i n t h e case o f

the i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g does n o t o n l y

m e a n i n g o f the imperative only i f he knows w h y t h e speaker

point t o c o n d i t i o n s ( b ) , w h i c h have t o b e c o m p l e t e d o n t h e basis o f

e x p e c t s t h a t she c a n i m p o s e h e r w i l l o n h i m . W i t h h e r i m p e r a t i v e ,

t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e s p e e c h act; r a t h e r , t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s f o r a c c e p t i n g

t h e s p e a k e r raises a claim t o p o w e r , t o w h i c h t h e h e a r e r , i f h e a c c e p t s

t h e l i n g u i s t i c c l a i m , a n d t h u s f o r a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n S a n d H, result

it, yields. I t belongs to t h e m e a n i n g o f a n i m p e r a t i v e t h a t the speaker

from t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y act itself. I n t h e case o f i m p e r a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n s

h a r b o r s a justified e x p e c t a t i o n t h a t she w i l l b e a b l e t o c a r r y t h r o u g h

o f w i l l , S has g o o d r e a s o n s t o e x p e c t t h a t / / w i l l y i e l d t o h e r w i l l o n l y

h e r c l a i m to power; a n d this holds only u n d e r the c o n d i t i o n that S

i f she has a t h e r d i s p o s a l s a n c t i o n s w i t h w h i c h she c a n , i n a r e c o g -

k n o w s t h a t h e r addressee has r e a s o n s t o y i e l d t o h e r p o w e r c l a i m .

n i z a b l e m a n n e r , t h r e a t e n o r e n t i c e H. So l o n g as S d o e s n o t a p p e a l

S i n c e , t o b e g i n w i t h , w e have u n d e r s t o o d i m p e r a t i v e s as s h e e r e x -

to the validity o f n o r m s , i t makes n o difference w h e t h e r the reservoir

p r e s s i o n s o f w i l l , these r e a s o n s c a n n o t l i e i n t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n -

o f p o t e n t i a l s a n c t i o n s is d e j u r e o r d e f a c t o . F o r so l o n g as S u t t e r s

ing

a g e n u i n e ( s i m p l e ) i m p e r a t i v e , t h a t is, expresses n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n

o f t h e s p e e c h act i t s e l f ; t h e y c a n r e s i d e o n l y i n a r e s e r v o i r

of

p o t e n t i a l s a n c t i o n s t h a t is e x t e r n a l l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e s p e e c h act.

h e r o w n w i l l , she i n f l u e n c e s H's m o t i v e s i n a m e r e l y e m p i r i c a l way

T h u s the conditions of satisfaction have to be supplemented with conditions

by t h r e a t e n i n g h i m w i t h h a r m o r by o f f e r i n g h i m rewards.

of sanction i n o r d e r t o c o m p l e t e t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f a c c e p t a b i l i t y .

g r o u n d s f o r accepting expressions o f w i l l are r e l a t e d to motives o f

A h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s a n i m p e r a t i v e ( 5 ) i f h e k n o w s (a) t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a n a d d r e s s e e c a n b r i n g a b o u t t h e d e s i r e d state (not smoking)

a n d (b)

t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h S has

good

reasons to expect that H w i l l feel c o n s t r a i n e d to y i e l d to the w i l l o f S ( f o r e x a m p l e , t h e t h r e a t o f p e n a l t i e s f o r v i o l a t i n g safety r e g u l a tions).

O n l y b y k n o w i n g b o t h c o m p o n e n t s (a) a n d ( b )

does the

h e a r e r k n o w w h a t c o n d i t i o n s have t o b e m e t i f a h e a r e r is t o b e a b l e

the final

The

hearer t h a t t h e speaker can i n f l u e n c e o n l y empirically, i n the i n s t a n c e b y m e a n s o f v i o l e n c e o r g o o d s . I t is a d i f f e r e n t m a t t e r

w i t h n o r m a t i v e l y a u t h o r i z e d i m p e r a t i v e s s u c h as c o m m a n d s a n d d i rectives. I n c o n t r a s t t o ( 5 ) , w i t h

(6)

t h e speaker appeals to

the

v a l i d i t y o f safety r e g u l a t i o n s a n d , i n i s s u i n g d i r e c t i v e s , raises a c l a i m to validity. R e g i s t e r i n g a validity claim is n o t t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f a c o n t i n g e n t

t o r e s p o n d a f f i r m a t i v e l y , as i n ( 5 ' ) , t o t h e i m p e r a t i v e ( 5 ) . I n k n o w i n g

w i l l ; a n d r e s p o n d i n g a f f i r m a t i v e l y t o a v a l i d i t y c l a i m is n o

these c o n d i t i o n s , he k n o w s w h a t makes t h e u t t e r a n c e acceptable.

e m p i r i c a l l y m o t i v a t e d d e c i s i o n . B o t h acts, p u t t i n g f o r w a r d a n d rec-

merely

136

137

Chapter 2


o g n i z i n g a validity c l a i m , are subject to c o n v e n t i o n a l restrictions,

I n a l l cases i n w h i c h t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y r o l e expresses n o t a

because such a c l a i m can be rejected o n l y i n t h e f o r m o f c r i t i c i s m

claim b u t a validity claim, the place o f the empirically m o t i v a t i n g

a n d can be

force o f a reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l sanctions ( c o n t i n g e n t l y l i n k e d w i t h

d e f e n d e d against a criticism o n l y i n the f o r m o f

a

r e f u t a t i o n . S o m e o n e w h o resists a d i r e c t i v e is r e f e r r e d t o p r e v a i l i n g

s p e e c h acts)

regulations a n d n o t to t h e penalties that can be e x p e c t e d i f they are

speaker's assuming a w a r r a n t y f o r validity claims.

n o t followed. A n d one w h o doubts the validity o f the u n d e r l y i n g n o r m s has t o give reasons—whether

challenging the legality o f the

power

is t a k e n b y t h e r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e o f

the

T h i s h o l d s n o t o n l y f o r r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts l i k e ( 1 ) a n d ( 2 ) , b u t also f o r e x p r e s s i v e a n d c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts l i k e ( 3 ) a n d ( 4 ) . J u s t

r e g u l a t i o n , t h a t is, c h a l l e n g i n g t h e l a w f u l n e s s o f its s o c i a l v a l i d i t y , o r

as w i t h

c h a l l e n g i n g t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f t h e r e g u l a t i o n , t h a t is, its c l a i m t o b e

i n t e n t i o n t o b r i n g a b o u t a d e s i r e d state, a n d j u s t as w i t h ( 2 ) she raises

r i g h t o r j u s t i f i e d i n a m o r a l - p r a c t i c a l sense. V a l i d i t y c l a i m s a r e inter-

a normative validity claim for her imperative that H b r i n g about a

nally c o n n e c t e d w i t h r e a s o n s . T o t h i s e x t e n t , t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e

state d e s i r e d b y S, so w i t h ( 3 ) t h e s p e a k e r m a k e s a c l a i m t o t r u t h f u l -

(1)

a s p e a k e r produces a n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m f o r

her

acceptability o f directives can be t a k e n f r o m the i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n -

ness f o r a d i s c l o s e d i n t e n t i o n a l s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e (Erlebnis),

i n g o f a s p e e c h act itself; t h e y d o n o t n e e d t o b e c o m p l e t e d

by

w i t h ( 4 ) a t r u t h c l a i m f o r a p r o p o s i t i o n . I n ( 3 ) i t is t h e d i s c l o s u r e o f

T h u s a h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s t h e d i r e c t i v e (6) i f h e k n o w s (a) t h e

w a r d o f a p r o p o s i t i o n , f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r assumes

c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h a n addressee c o u l d b r i n g a b o u t t h e d e s i r e d

a w a r r a n t y i n m a k i n g a confession (3) o r a p r e d i c t i o n (4). T h u s a

state ( n o t s m o k i n g ) , a n d ( b ) t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h S c o u l d

h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s t h e a v o w a l (3) i f h e k n o w s (a) t h e c o n d i t i o n s

have c o n v i n c i n g reasons t o r e g a r d a n i m p e r a t i v e w i t h t h e c o n t e n t

u n d e r w h i c h a p e r s o n c o u l d e x p e r i e n c e l o a t h i n g f o r "p," a n d ( b ) t h e

(a)

c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h S says w h a t she m e a n s a n d t h e r e b y takes o n

additional c o n d i t i o n s o f s a n c t i o n .

and

a previously c o n c e a l e d e m o t i o n a l a t t i t u d e , i n (4) the p u t t i n g f o r -

as v a l i d — t h a t is, as n o r m a t i v e r / j u s t i f i e d . T h e c o n d i t i o n s

(a)

p e r t a i n t o o b l i g a t i o n s t o a c t i n a c e r t a i n w a y t h a t arise o u t o f a n

a w a r r a n t y f o r the consistency o f h e r f u r t h e r behavior w i t h

a g r e e m e n t based o n the intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e n o r m a t i v e

a v o w a l . A h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s (4) i f h e k n o w s (a) t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t

validity c l a i m raised f o r a c o r r e s p o n d i n g

w o u l d make the p r e d i c t i o n true, a n d (b) the conditions u n d e r w h i c h

tions

imperative.

4 9

The

condi-

(b) p e r t a i n to t h e acceptance o f t h e validity c l a i m itself. We

have t o d i s t i n g u i s h h e r e b e t w e e n t h e validity o f a n a c t i o n o r o f t h e n o r m u n d e r l y i n g i t , t h e claim t h a t t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r i t s v a l i d i t y a r e s a t i s f i e d , a n d t h e redemption o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m r a i s e d , t h a t is, t h e justification (of the claim) that the conditions for the validity o f an a c t i o n o r o f t h e u n d e r l y i n g n o r m are satisfied. W e a r e n o w i n a p o s i t i o n t o say t h a t a s p e a k e r c a n rationally motivate a h e a r e r t o a c c e p t h e r s p e e c h act o f f e r b e c a u s e — o n t h e basis o f a n i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n between

validity, validity c l a i m , a n d the r e d e m p t i o n o f a validity

c l a i m — s h e c a n assume t h e w a r r a n t y (Gewähr) f o r p r o v i d i n g , i f n e c essary, c o n v i n c i n g r e a s o n s t h a t w o u l d s t a n d u p t o a h e a r e r ' s c r i t i c i s m o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m . T h u s a s p e a k e r owes t h e b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g f o r c e o f h e r i l l o c u t i o n a r y success n o t t o t h e v a l i d i t y o f w h a t is s a i d b u t t o the coordinating effect of the warranty t h a t she o f f e r s — a w a r r a n t y t o r e d e e m , i f necessary, t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m r a i s e d w i t h h e r s p e e c h act.

this

S c o u l d have c o n v i n c i n g r e a s o n s f o r h o l d i n g a s t a t e m e n t w i t h t h e c o n t e n t (a) t o b e t r u e . O f c o u r s e , t h e r e a r e also i m p o r t a n t a s y m m e t r i e s . T h u s t h e c o n d i tions

m e n t i o n e d u n d e r (a) d o not, i n t h e cases o f expressive a n d

c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts l i k e (3) a n d ( 4 ) , h a v e t o d o w i t h o b l i g a t i o n s to act i n a c e r t a i n way r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n o f the validity claims i n question; they relate only to u n d e r s t a n d i n g the p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f a

first-person

s e n t e n c e o r a n assertoric

s e n t e n c e f o r w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r c l a i m s v a l i d i t y . I n t h e case o f r e g u l a tive s p e e c h acts l i k e ( 1 ) a n d ( 2 ) , t h e c o n d i t i o n s (a) l i k e w i s e r e l a t e to understanding the propositional content o f an intention or i m perative sentence for w h i c h the speaker produces o r claims n o r m a tive v a l i d i t y ; b u t h e r e t h e c o n t e n t simultaneously c i r c u m s c r i b e s

the

o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e s e q u e l o f i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t arise f o r t h e hearer f r o m acceptance o f the validity claim.

138

139

Chapter 2


I n g e n e r a l , obligations t o act i n a c e r t a i n way result f r o m t h e m e a n i n g o f expressive s p e e c h acts o n l y i n t h e sense t h a t t h e s p e a k e r specifies a c t i o n s w i t h w h i c h h e r b e h a v i o r m a y n o t b e

inconsistent.

whereas

i n t e n t i o n a l sentences a c q u i r e a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y role

only

t h r o u g h being transformed i n t o declarations o f i n t e n t i o n or

an-

nouncements. W h e r e a s i m p e r a t i v e s have i n t h e m s e l v e s a n i l l o c u t i o n -

T h a t a s p e a k e r m e a n s w h a t she says c a n b e m a d e c r e d i b l e o n l y i n

ary

t h e c o n s i s t e n c y o f w h a t she d o e s a n d n o t t h r o u g h p r o v i d i n g r e a s o n s .

s a n c t i o n s — i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s , w h i c h h a v e , so t o speak, lost t h e i r

T h u s , addressees w h o h a v e a c c e p t e d a c l a i m t o t r u t h f u l n e s s c a n

i m p e r a t i v e f o r c e in foro interno, c a n r e g a i n a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e

e x p e c t a c o n s i s t e n c y o f b e h a v i o r i n c e r t a i n respects; h o w e v e r ,

t h r o u g h b e i n g c o n n e c t e d w i t h validity claims, w h e t h e r i n the f o r m

this

expectation follows f r o m the conditions given u n d e r (b). O f course,

force—albeit

one

that

calls

for

supplementation

by

o f e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts l i k e

c o n s e q u e n c e s also arise f r o m t h e w a r r a n t i e s o f f e r e d w i t h t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i n r e g u l a t i v e a n d c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, b u t t h e s e

validity-

related o b l i g a t i o n s t o p r o v i d e , i f necessary, j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r n o r m s o r g r o u n d i n g for propositions

have relevance

for action only o n

a

m e t a c o m m u n i c a t i v e level. O n l y those obligations to prove t r u s t w o r t h y {Bewdhrungsverpflichtungen)

t h a t t h e s p e a k e r takes o n w i t h

ex-

pressive s p e e c h acts have d i r e c t r e l e v a n c e f o r t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f i n t e r a c t i o n . T h e y c o n t a i n a n offer to the hearer to check against the c o n s i s t e n c y o f t h e s p e a k e r ' s s e q u e n c e s o f a c t i o n w h e t h e r she m e a n s w h a t she says.

50

I n g e n e r a l , n o special o b l i g a t i o n s t o act i n a c e r t a i n way f o l l o w f r o m t h e m e a n i n g o f c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts. O b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e s e q u e l o f i n t e r a c t i o n arise f r o m t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y c o n d i t i o n s stated u n d e r

(a)

a n d (b)

o n l y i n s o f a r as s p e a k e r a n d

h e a r e r o b l i g a t e themselves t o base t h e i r a c t i o n o n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f s i t u a t i o n s t h a t d o n o t c o n t r a d i c t t h e s t a t e m e n t s a c c e p t e d as t r u e . We

have

distinguished genuine

(or

simple)

imperatives,

with

(7)

I c o n f e s s t o y o u t h a t i t is m y i n t e n t i o n t o . . .

o r i n t h e f o r m o f n o r m a t i v e s p e e c h acts l i k e (8)

I (hereby) declare to y o u m y i n t e n t i o n to . . .

W i t h a n n o u n c e m e n t s like (8) the speaker enters i n t o a weak n o r m a tive b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p t o w h i c h t h e addressee c a n a p p e a l i n a s i m i l a r w a y as t o a p r o m i s e . T h e n o r m a t i v i z a t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s c a n serve as a m o d e l for grasping the transformation o f simple imperatives into n o r m a tively a u t h o r i z e d imperatives, o r mands.

The

o f sheer imperatives i n t o

com-

imperative (5), by b e i n g boosted w i t h a n o r m a t i v e

validity c l a i m , can be t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o t h e directive (6). W i t h this, the c o m p o n e n t o f the acceptability conditions

given u n d e r

(b)

changes; the c o n d i t i o n s o f sanction s u p p l e m e n t i n g the imperative p o w e r c l a i m are replaced by t h e r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s f o r accepting

a c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m . B e c a u s e these

conditions

w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r c o n n e c t s a c l a i m t o p o w e r , f r o m s p e e c h acts w i t h

can be d e r i v e d f r o m t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y r o l e itself, n o r m a t i v e l y a u t h o -

w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r raises a c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m . W h e r e a s v a l i d i t y

rized imperatives gain an autonomy

claims are i n t e r n a l l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h reasons a n d a c c o r d a r a t i o n a l l y

imperatives.

m o t i v a t i n g force t o t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y r o l e , p o w e r claims have to be covered by a reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l sanctions i f they are to be capable o f b e i n g c a r r i e d t h r o u g h . H o w e v e r , i m p e r a t i v e s a d m i t o f a secondary normativization.

T h i s can be illustrated by the r e l a t i o n that

holds

between i n t e n t i o n a l sentences a n d declarations o f i n t e n t i o n . I n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s b e l o n g i n t h e s a m e c a t e g o r y as t h e i m p e r a t i v e sentences

with

which

imperatives

are

formed.

We

can

interpret

i n t e n t i o n a l sentences as i n t e r n a l i z e d i m p e r a t i v e s a d d r e s s e d b y t h e speaker to herself.

51

O f c o u r s e , i m p e r a t i v e s are i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts,

t h a t is m i s s i n g f r o m

simple

T h i s m a k e s i t c l e a r o n c e a g a i n t h a t o n l y t h o s e s p e e c h acts w i t h w h i c h a speaker connects a criticizable validity c l a i m can, by v i r t u e of their own power

a n d o w i n g t o t h e v a l i d i t y basis o f l i n g u i s t i c

communication oriented toward reaching understanding, motivate a h e a r e r t o a c c e p t a speech-act o f f e r , a n d t h e r e b y b e c o m e e f f e c t i v e as a m e c h a n i s m f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n .

5 2

F o l l o w i n g these reflections, t h e c o n c e p t o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , w h i c h w e have i n t r o d u c e d i n a p r o v i s i o n a l way, n o w n e e d s t o

be

r e n d e r e d m o r e precise. We b e g a n by i n c l u d i n g i n c o m m u n i c a t i v e

141

140

Chapter 2


action all interactions i n w h i c h those involved coordinate t h e i r i n d i -

r e s p o n s e , t h e addressee c o n t e s t s t h e l i g h t n e s s o f ( 1 ) a n d ( 2 ) , t h e

v i d u a l p l a n s u n r e s e r v e d l y o n t h e basis o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a c h i e v e d

t r u t h f u l n e s s o f ( 3 ) , a n d t h e t r u t h o f ( 4 ) . T h i s p i c t u r e is i n c o m p l e t e ,

agreement. W i t h the specification "unreservedly p u r s u i n g i l l o c u t i o n -

h o w e v e r , i n a s m u c h as e v e r y s p e e c h a c t c a n b e c o n t e s t e d ( t h a t is,

a r y a i m s , " w e m e a n t t o e x c l u d e cases o f l a t e n t l y s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n , i n

r e j e c t e d as i n v a l i d ) u n d e r m o r e t h a n o n e aspect.

w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r inconspicuously

e m p l o y s successful i l l o c u t i o n a r y

acts f o r p e r l o c u t i o n a r y p u r p o s e s . H o w e v e r , i m p e r a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n s o f w i l l a r e i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts w i t h w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r openly d e c l a r e s h e r a i m o f i n f l u e n c i n g the decisions o f her opposite n u m b e r , she has t o r e l y f o r t h e success o f h e r p o w e r c l a i m o n

whereby

supplementary

L e t us assume t h a t a s e m i n a r p a r t i c i p a n t u n d e r s t a n d s t h e f o l l o w i n g imperative addressed to h i m by the professor (9)

Please b r i n g m e a glass o f w a t e r .

n o t as a n a k e d i m p e r a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n o f w i l l b u t as a s p e e c h a c t

nonnorma-

carried out i n an attitude oriented toward reaching understanding.

tively a u t h o r i z e d i m p e r a t i v e s , s p e a k e r s c a n u n r e s e r v e d l y p u r s u e i l l o -

T h e n he can i n p r i n c i p l e reject this request u n d e r three validity

c u t i o n a r y a i m s a n d n o n e t h e l e s s a c t strategically.

aspects. H e c a n e i t h e r c o n t e s t t h e n o r m a t i v e Tightness o f t h e u t t e r -

sanctions. For this reason, w i t h g e n u i n e imperatives o r

N o t a l l s p e e c h acts a r e c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , b u t o n l y those w i t h w h i c h the speaker connects criticizable c l a i m s . I n t h e o t h e r cases, w h e n a s p e a k e r is p u r s u i n g

validity

undeclared

a i m s w i t h p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts, a i m s w i t h r e g a r d t o w h i c h t h e h e a r e r c a n t a k e n o p o s i t i o n a t a l l , o r w h e n a s p e a k e r is p u r s u i n g i l l o c u tionary

aims r e g a r d i n g w h i c h the hearer c a n n o t

take a

grounded

p o s i t i o n , as i n r e l a t i o n t o i m p e r a t i v e s , t h e p o t e n t i a l f o r a b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g relationship m o t i v a t e d by i n s i g h t i n t o reasons—a potential

that

is always

contained

in

linguistic

communication—

remains unexploited.

ance: (9')

N o . You can't treat m e like one o f y o u r employees.

o r h e c a n contest t h e subjective t r u t h f u l n e s s o f t h e u t t e r a n c e : (9")

N o . You really only want to p u t m e i n a b a d light i n f r o n t o f

the other seminar participants. or he can deny that certain existential presuppositions (9"')

obtain:

N o . T h e n e a r e s t w a t e r t a p is so f a r away t h a t I c o u l d n ' t g e t

b a c k b e f o r e t h e e n d o f t h e session.

Validity C l a i m s

I n t h e f i r s t case, w h a t is c o n t e s t e d is t h a t t h e a c t i o n o f t h e p r o f e s s o r is r i g h t i n t h e g i v e n n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t ; i n t h e s e c o n d , t h a t t h e

Having distinguished communicative

actions f r o m all o t h e r

social

p r o f e s s o r m e a n s w h a t she says b e c a u s e she w a n t s t o a c h i e v e a c e r t a i n

actions t h r o u g h t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g effect, i t

p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effect; i n t h e t h i r d , p r o p o s i t i o n s are contested whose

m a k e s sense t o o r d e r t h e m u l t i p l i c i t y o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e acts a c c o r d -

t r u t h t h e p r o f e s s o r has t o p r e s u p p o s e i n t h e g i v e n

circumstances.

i n g t o types o f s p e e c h acts. A n d t o g u i d e o u r classifying o f s p e e c h

W h a t we have s h o w n i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h this e x a m p l e holds t r u e

acts w e m a y use t h e o p t i o n s o p e n t o a h e a r e r o f t a k i n g a r a t i o n a l l y

f o r all s p e e c h acts o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . I n c o n -

m o t i v a t e d "yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n o n t h e u t t e r a n c e o f a speaker. I n

texts o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e

o u r previous examples, we have assumed t h a t the speaker

u n d e r each o f t h r e e aspects: t h e a s p e c t o f t h e l i g h t n e s s t h a t t h e

precisely one validity c l a i m w i t h h e r utterance. W i t h the p r o m i s e

raises (1),

a c t i o n , s p e e c h acts c a n always b e

rejected

speaker claims f o r h e r action i n r e l a t i o n to a n o r m a t i v e context

(or,

she c o n n e c t s a v a l i d i t y c l a i m f o r a d e c l a r e d i n t e n t i o n ; w i t h t h e d i r e c -

i n d i r e c t l y , f o r these n o r m s themselves);

tive

( 2 ) , a validity c l a i m f o r a n i m p e r a t i v e ; w i t h t h e avowal ( 3 ) , a

ness t h a t t h e s p e a k e r c l a i m s f o r t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i -

validity claim for the expression o f a feeling; a n d w i t h the p r e d i c t i o n

ences t o w h i c h she has p r i v i l e g e d access; a n d f i n a l l y , t h e aspect o f

(4), a validity claim for a statement. Correspondingly, w i t h a

t h e t r u t h t h a t t h e speaker, w i t h h e r u t t e r a n c e , c l a i m s f o r a s t a t e m e n t

"no"

t h e aspect o f t h e t r u t h f u l -

142

143

Chapter 2


(or for the existential presuppositions o f the context o f a n o m i n a l -

takes u p a r e l a t i o n t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d o f l e g i t i m a t e o r d e r s ;

i z e d p r o p o s i t i o n ) . T h i s s t r o n g thesis c a n b e t e s t e d a g a i n s t n u m e r o u s

( b ) t o m a k e m a n i f e s t s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s — t h a t is, t o r e p r e s e n t

cases a n d m a d e p l a u s i b l e b y r e f l e c t i o n s t h a t t a k e us b a c k t o B i d d e r ' s

oneself—whereby

m o d e l o f the functions o f language.

t h e s u b j e c t i v e w o r l d t o w h i c h she has p r i v i l e g e d access; a n d (c)

T h e t e r m " r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g " ("Verständigung") m e a n s , a t

t h e s p e a k e r takes u p a r e l a t i o n t o s o m e t h i n g i n

r e p r e s e n t ( o r p r e s u p p o s e ) states a n d e v e n t s , w h e r e b y t h e

to

speaker

t h e m i n i m u m , t h a t at least t w o subjects c a p a b l e o f s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n

takes u p a r e l a t i o n t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d o f e x i s t i n g states o f

u n d e r s t a n d a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n i n a n i d e n t i c a l way. T h e m e a n i n g

a f f a i r s . C o m m u n i c a t i v e l y a c h i e v e d a g r e e m e n t is m e a s u r e d

o f an elementary expression

against

consists i n t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t i t

precisely t h r e e criticizable validity claims, because actors, i n c o m i n g

m a k e s t o t h e m e a n i n g o f a n a c c e p t a b l e s p e e c h act. A n d t o u n d e r -

to an understanding about something with one another and thereby

s t a n d w h a t a s p e a k e r w a n t s t o say w i t h s u c h a n act, t h e h e a r e r has t o

making

k n o w t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h i t can be accepted. T o this e x t e n t ,

speech act i n precisely t h r e e w o r l d - r e l a t i o n s a n d c l a i m i n g validity f o r

u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständnis) a n e l e m e n t a r y e x p r e s s i o n a l r e a d y p o i n t s

i t u n d e r e a c h o f these aspects. S o m e o n e w h o r e j e c t s a c o m p r e h e n -

beyond

t h e m i n i m a l m e a n i n g o f t h e t e r m Verständigung. W h e n

a

themselves

understood,

cannot

sible s p e e c h a c t c o n t e s t s a t least o n e

avoid

embedding

each

o f these validity claims. I n

(Einverständnis)

r e j e c t i n g a s p e e c h a c t as ( n o r m a t i v e l y ) w r o n g o r u n t r u e o r u n t r u t h -

c o m e s a b o u t b e t w e e n ( a t least) t w o subjects c a p a b l e o f s p e e c h a n d

f u l , t h e h e a r e r w i t h h i s " n o " gives e x p r e s s i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e

a c t i o n . However, this does n o t rest o n l y o n the intersubjective recog-

u t t e r a n c e d o e s n o t f u l f i l l its f u n c t i o n s o f s e c u r i n g a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l

n i t i o n o f a single, thematically emphasized validity c l a i m . Rather, a n

r e l a t i o n s h i p , o f m a n i f e s t i n g subjective

agreement

s e n t i n g states o f a f f a i r s — t o t h e f a c t t h a t i t is n o t i n a g r e e m e n t w i t h

h e a r e r accepts a speech-act o f f e r , a n a g r e e m e n t

o f t h i s s o r t is a c h i e v e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a t t h r e e levels.

experiences,

or of

repre-

T h e s e m a y easily b e i d e n t i f i e d i n t u i t i v e l y i f w e b e a r i n m i n d t h a t i n

our w o r l d o f l e g i t i m a t e l y o r d e r e d i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s , o r w i t h t h e

c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n a s p e a k e r selects a c o m p r e h e n s i b l e l i n g u i s t i c

speaker's w o r l d o f s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s o r w i t h the w o r l d o f e x i s t i n g

e x p r e s s i o n o n l y i n o r d e r t o r e a c h a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g with a h e a r e r

states o f a f f a i r s .

about s o m e t h i n g a n d t h e r e b y t o m a k e herself u n d e r s t o o d . I t b e l o n g s t o t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t o f t h e s p e a k e r (a) t h a t she p e r f o r m a s p e e c h act t h a t is right i n r e s p e c t t o t h e g i v e n n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t , so t h a t a n i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n t h a t is r e c o g n i z e d as l e g i t i m a t e m a y c o m e a b o u t b e t w e e n h e r a n d t h e h e a r e r ; ( b ) t h a t she e x p r e s s truthfully h e r b e l i e f s , i n t e n t i o n s , f e e l i n g s , wishes, a n d t h e l i k e , so t h a t t h e h e a r e r w i l l give c r e d e n c e t o w h a t is s a i d ; a n d (c) t h a t she m a k e a true s t a t e m e n t ( o r correct e x i s t e n t i a l p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s ) , so t h a t t h e h e a r e r m a y a c c e p t a n d share t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e speaker. T h e f a c t t h a t the

intersubjective c o m m o n a l i t y

of

a communicatively

achieved

a g r e e m e n t exists a t t h e levels o f n o r m a t i v e a c c o r d , m u t u a l t r u s t i n s u b j e c t i v e s i n c e r i t y , a n d s h a r e d p r o p o s i t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e c a n b e explained i n t u r n t h r o u g h the functions o f reaching understanding i n language. A s t h e m e d i u m f o r r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , s p e e c h acts s e r v e (a) t o establish a n d renew i n t e r p e r s o n a l relations, w h e r e b y t h e speaker

A l t h o u g h s p e e c h acts o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e always i n v o l v e d i n t h i s way i n a c o m p l e x n e t o f w o r l d - r e l a t i o n s , t h e illocutionary r o l e — u n d e r standard conditions, the meaning of the illocutionary component—determines

t h e aspect o f validity u n d e r

w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r w a n t s h e r u t t e r a n c e t o b e u n d e r s t o o d first and foremost. W h e n she m a k e s a s t a t e m e n t , asserts, n a r r a t e s , e x p l a i n s , r e p r e s e n t s , p r e d i c t s , discusses s o m e t h i n g , a n d t h e l i k e , she is s e e k i n g a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e h e a r e r based o n t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f a t r u t h c l a i m . W h e n t h e speaker utters a

first-person

e x p e r i e n t i a l sentence, dis-

closes, reveals, confesses, m a n i f e s t s s o m e t h i n g , a n d t h e l i k e , a g r e e m e n t c a n c o m e a b o u t o n l y o n t h e basis o f t h e r e c o g n i t i o n o f a c l a i m t o t r u t h f u l n e s s . W h e n t h e s p e a k e r gives a n o r d e r o r m a k e s a p r o m ise, a p p o i n t s o r w a r n s s o m e b o d y , b a p t i z e s o r w e d s s o m e b o d y , b u y s s o m e t h i n g , a n d t h e l i k e , a g r e e m e n t d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r those i n v o l v e d a c c e p t t h e a c t i o n as r i g h t . T h e s e basic m o d e s a p p e a r

in

g r e a t e r p u r i t y t h e m o r e c l e a r l y r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is o r i e n t e d

144

145

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toward only one d o m i n a n t validity claim. Consideradons

of expedi-

T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n a m o n g e x a c d y t h r e e basic m o d e s o f u s i n g l a n -

e n c y suggest b e g i n n i n g analysis w i t h i d e a l i z e d o r pure cases of speech

guage w i t h an o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o u l d be

acts. I a m t h i n k i n g h e r e o f

g r o u n d e d o n l y i n t h e f o r m o f a n e l a b o r a t e d t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts.

• c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h elementary propositional (assertoric) sentences a r e u s e d ; • e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h elementary experiential sentences ( i n the first person present) appear; a n d o f

I c a n n o t c a r r y o u t t h e n e c e s s a r y analyses h e r e , b u t I w o u l d l i k e t o take u p a few p r i m a facie objections to t h e p r o p o s e d p r o g r a m . L e i s t has f o r m u l a t e d m y basic thesis as f o l l o w s : " F o r a l l S a n d a l l H, i n a l l s p e e c h acts t h a t b e l o n g t o a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d w h i c h are i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y a n d p r o p o s i t i o n a l l y dif-

• r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts i n w h i c h e i t h e r elementary imperative sentences

f e r e n t i a t e d a n d i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y u n b o u n d , i t is m u t u a l k n o w l e d g e t h a t

(as i n c o m m a n d s ) o r elementary intentional sentences (as i n p r o m i s e s )

t h e s p e a k e r is r e q u i r e d t o s p e a k i n t e l l i g i b l y , t o b e t r u t h f u l , t o t a k e

appear.

h i s u t t e r a n c e as t r u e , a n d a n o r m r e l e v a n t t o h i s a c t as r i g h t . "

I n a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y t h e r e is a n e x t e n s i v e l i t e r a t u r e o n e a c h o f these complexes. H e r e , i n s t r u m e n t s have b e e n d e v e l o p e d a n d analyses c a r r i e d o u t t h a t m a k e i t p o s s i b l e t o e x p l a i n t h e u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t o w a r d w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r is o r i e n t e d a n d t o

characterize

m o r e p r e c i s e l y t h e basic a t t i t u d e s t h a t t h e s p e a k e r t h e r e b y a d o p t s . I a m r e f e r r i n g h e r e t o t h e objectivating attitude i n w h i c h a n e u t r a l o b s e r v e r behaves t o w a r d s o m e t h i n g t h a t h a p p e n s i n t h e w o r l d ; t o t h e expressive attitude i n w h i c h a s u b j e c t i n r e p r e s e n t i n g h i m s e l f r e veals t o a p u b l i c s o m e t h i n g w i t h i n h i m t o w h i c h h e has p r i v i l e g e d access; a n d

finally,

t o t h e norm-conformative attitude i n w h i c h a m e m -

b e r o f s o c i a l g r o u p s satisfies l e g i t i m a t e b e h a v i o r a l e x p e c t a t i o n s .

To

e a c h o f these f u n d a m e n t a l a t t i t u d e s t h e r e c o r r e s p o n d s a c o n c e p t o f "world." L e t Mp r e p r e s e n t any e x p l i c i t s p e e c h act, w h e r e " M " stands f o r t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t a n d "p" f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l

component;

and let M

e

c

sive, a n d M

d e s i g n a t e t h e c o g n i t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , M r

the

5 3

expres-

t h e r e g u l a t i v e . W e c a n t h e n , o n t h e basis o f t h e a f o r e -

m e n t i o n e d basic a t t i t u d e s , d i s t i n g u i s h i n t u i t i v e l y t h e senses i n w h i c h t h e speaker wants the p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t o f h e r speech act t o b e i n t e r p r e t e d . I n a v a l i d u t t e r a n c e o f t h e t y p e M p, c

"p" s i g n i f i e s a

state o f a f f a i r s t h a t exists i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d ; i n a v a l i d u t t e r a n c e o f t h e t y p e M p, e

"p" s i g n i f i e s a s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e t h a t is m a n i -

f e s t e d a n d a s c r i b e d t o t h e internal world o f t h e speaker; a n d i n a v a l i d u t t e r a n c e o f t h e type M p, r

"p" s i g n i f i e s a n a c t i o n t h a t is r e c o g n i z e d

as l e g i t i m a t e i n t h e s o c i a l w o r l d .

5 4

To

begin w i t h , this f o r m u l a t i o n requires t h e e x p l a n a t o r y c o m m e n t that, f r o m the s t a n d p o i n t o f the t h e o r y o f i n t e r a c t i o n , I d e l i m i t speech acts " o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g " f r o m s p e e c h acts t h a t a r e i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o strategic a c t i o n c o n t e x t s , e i t h e r because t h e latter, l i k e g e n u i n e

imperatives, are c o n n e c t e d o n l y w i t h

power

c l a i m s a n d t h u s p r o d u c e n o i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g eff e c t o n t h e i r o w n , o r because t h e s p e a k e r is p u r s u i n g p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s w i t h s u c h u t t e r a n c e s . N e x t , I w o u l d n o t use t h e

expression

" m u t u a l k n o w l e d g e , " w h i c h comes f r o m i n t e n t i o n a l i s t semantics, b u t speak r a t h e r o f " c o m m o n s u p p o s i t i o n s . " F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e t e r m " r e q u i r e d " suggests a n o r m a t i v e sense; I w o u l d r a t h e r — d e s p i t e weak transcendental connotations—speak t h a t have to be

o f "general

satisfied i f a c o m m u n i c a t i v e

conditions"

agreement

is t o

a c h i e v e d . F i n a l l y , I find l a c k i n g h e r e a h i e r a r c h i c a l o r d e r the well-formedness

the be

between

o r c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y o f the linguistic expres-

s i o n as a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d the claims to truthfulness, propositional t r u t h , a n d normative ness, o n

t h e o t h e r h a n d . T h e a c c e p t a n c e o f these c l a i m s

Tight-

brings

about an agreement between S a n d H that grounds obligations that are relevant f o r t h e sequel o f i n t e r a c t i o n . I d i s t i n g u i s h f r o m these the w a r r a n t y assumed by the speaker to r e d e e m t h e validity c l a i m he raises, as w e l l as t h e r e c i p r o c a l o b l i g a t i o n t h a t t h e h e a r e r u n d e r t a k e s w i t h the negation o f a validity claim. R e s e r v a t i o n s have b e e n e x p r e s s e d m a i n l y i n r e g a r d t o t h e a s s u m p t i o n s (a) t h a t w i t h every s p e e c h a c t o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g exactly three v a l i d i t y c l a i m s are r a i s e d ; ( b ) t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y

146

147

Chapter 2


c l a i m s c a n b e adequately distinguished f r o m o n e a n o t h e r ; a n d (c) t h a t v a l i d i t y c l a i m s have t o b e a n a l y z e d i n formal-pragmatic

terms, t h a t is,

o n t h e level o f t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e e m p l o y m e n t o f sentences.

n o r m a t i v e contexts can be i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e m e a n i n g o f nonregu¬

a. C a n w e m a i n t a i n t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f t h e c l a i m t o t r u t h , e v e n t h o u g h w e o b v i o u s l y c a n n o t raise a t r u t h c l a i m w i t h speech acts?

55

T h e s i t u a t i o n is s o m e w h a t d i f f e r e n t w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f t h e c l a i m t o Tightness. I t m a y b e o b j e c t e d t h a t n o r e l a t i o n t o

nonconstative

I t is c e r t a i n l y t h e case t h a t w e c a n raise t h e c l a i m t h a t

lative speech acts. propriate," disclosures

56

reports

However, c o m m u n i c a t i o n s are sometimes " i n a p "out

of

place,"

confessions

"embarrassing,"

" h u r t f u l . " T h e fact that they can go w r o n g u n d e r this

a n asserted p r o p o s i t i o n "p" is t r u e o n l y w i t h c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts.

aspect is b y n o m e a n s e x t r i n s i c t o n o n r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts; r a t h e r

B u t a l l o t h e r s p e e c h acts also c o n t a i n a p r o p o s i t i o n a l

component,

i t n e c e s s a r i l y r e s u l t s f r o m t h e i r c h a r a c t e r as s p e e c h acts. F r o m t h e i r

n o r m a l l y i n the f o r m o f a n o m i n a l i z e d propositional sentence "that

i l l o c u t i o n a r y c o m p o n e n t w e c a n see t h a t t h e s p e a k e r also e n t e r s i n t o

T h i s m e a n s t h a t t h e s p e a k e r also r e l a t e s t o states o f a f f a i r s w i t h

i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h c o n s t a t i v e a n d e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts;

p."

n o n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, n o t d i r e c d y t o b e s u r e — t h a t is, n o t i n t h e

a n d w h e t h e r o r n o t these r e l a t i o n s f i t t h e e x i s t i n g n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t

p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e o f o n e w h o t h i n k s o r is o f t h e o p i n i o n , k n o w s ,

i n q u e s t i o n , t h e y b e l o n g t o t h e w o r l d o f l e g i t i m a t e (social) o r d e r s .

o r b e l i e v e s t h a t "/>" is t h e case. T h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s o f s p e a k ers w h o

employ

first-person e x p e r i e n t i a l sentences i n expressive

T h e r e have also b e e n o b j e c t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e c o m p l e t e n e s s o f t h e table o f validity claims. I f o n e compares this w i t h the conver-

s p e e c h acts a n d i m p e r a t i v e o r i n t e n t i o n a l s e n t e n c e s i n r e g u l a t i v e

sational postulates p r o p o s e d by G r i c e ,

s p e e c h acts a r e o f a n o t h e r k i n d . T h e y a r e i n n o way d i r e c t e d t o t h e

o n l y c e r t a i n p a r a l l e l s b u t also c e r t a i n a s y m m e t r i e s . T h u s , t h e r e is n o

e x i s t e n c e o f t h e state o f a f f a i r s m e n t i o n e d i n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m -

c o u n t e r p a r t t o t h e p o s t u l a t e t h a t t h e s p e a k e r s h o u l d always m a k e a

5 7

f o r example, one

finds

not

p o n e n t . H o w e v e r , i n saying w i t h a n o n c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h a c t t h a t she

c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e t o p i c t h a t is r e l e v a n t i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e g i v e n

desires o r detests s o m e t h i n g , t h a t she w a n t s t o b r i n g a b o u t s o m e -

conversation. A p a r t f r o m the fact that such a c l a i m to the relevance

t h i n g o r see i t b r o u g h t a b o u t , t h e s p e a k e r presupposes t h e e x i s t e n c e

o f a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o c o n v e r s a t i o n is r a i s e d b y t h e h e a r e r a n d r e l a t e d

o f other, n o t m e n t i o n e d , states o f a f f a i r s . I t b e l o n g s t o t h e c o n c e p t o f

t o a t e x t ( r a t h e r t h a n t o a n i n d i v i d u a l s p e e c h a c t ) — t h a t is, c a n n o t

a n o b j e c t i v e w o r l d t h a t states o f a f f a i r s a r e l o c a t e d i n a n e x u s a n d d o

b e s u b j e c t e d t o a "yes" o r " n o " t e s t — t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y o f s u c h a r e -

n o t h a n g i s o l a t e d i n t h e air. T h e r e f o r e , t h e s p e a k e r c o n n e c t s existen-

q u i r e m e n t w o u l d be d i f f i c u l t to establish. T h e r e are obviously situ-

tial presuppositions w i t h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t o f h e r s p e e c h

ations—informal

act; i f n e e d b e , t h e s e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s c a n b e r e n d e r e d e x p l i c i t i n t h e

c u l t u r a l m i l i e u s — i n w h i c h a c e r t a i n r e d u n d a n c y o f c o n t r i b u t i o n s is

f o r m o f a s s e r t o r i c sentences. T o t h i s e x t e n t , n o n c o n s t a t i v e

nearly m a n d a t o r y .

speech

acts, t o o , have a r e l a t i o n t o t r u t h . Moreover,

social

gatherings, for

example,

or

even

entire

5 8

b. R e s e r v a t i o n s have also b e e n e x p r e s s e d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e p o s -

this holds n o t only for propositionally differentiated

sibility o f sharply d i s c r i m i n a t i n g between claims to t r u t h a n d claims

s p e e c h acts; i l l o c u t i o n a r i l y a b b r e v i a t e d s p e e c h a c t s — f o r e x a m p l e , a

t o t r u t h f u l n e s s . Is i t n o t t h e case t h a t a s p e a k e r w h o t r u t h f u l l y u t t e r s

" h e l l o " u t t e r e d as a g r e e t i n g — a r e u n d e r s t o o d as s a t i s f y i n g n o r m s

t h e o p i n i o n "p" m u s t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y raise a t r u t h c l a i m f o r "p"? I t

f r o m w h i c h t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t o f t h e speech act c a n

be

a p p e a r s t o b e i m p o s s i b l e " t o e x p e c t o f S t h a t h e is s p e a k i n g t h e t r u t h

s u p p l e m e n t e d — f o r e x a m p l e , i n t h e case o f a g r e e t i n g , t h e w e l l - b e i n g

i n a n y o t h e r sense t h a n t h a t S w a n t s t o s p e a k t h e t r u t h — a n d t h i s

o f t h e addressee o r t h e c o n f i r m a t i o n o f h i s social status. T h e e x i s -

m e a n s n o t h i n g else t h a n t o b e t r u t h f u l . "

tential presuppositions o f a greeting include, a m o n g other things,

r e l e v a n t t o t h e class o f expressive s p e e c h acts i n its e n t i r e t y b u t o n l y

5 9

This objection

is n o t

t h e presence o f a person f o r w h o m t h i n g s can go w e l l o r badly, his

to those utterances i n whose p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o m p o n e n t a c o g n i t i o n

m e m b e r s h i p i n a social g r o u p , a n d so f o r t h .

verb i n the

first

person

present

( s u c h as I t h i n k , k n o w ,

believe,

149

148


Chapter 2

suspect, a m o f t h e o p i n i o n " t h a t p") o c c u r s . A t t h e same t i m e , t h e r e is also a n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n

these p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e s ,

w h i c h can be expressed by means o f c o g n i d o n verbs, a n d constadve s p e e c h acts. W h e n s o m e o n e asserts o r a s c e r t a i n s o r d e s c r i b e s "p"

she

Wittgenstein's private language a r g u m e n t i n o r d e r to show that t h e s a m e a s s e r t o r i c v a l i d i t y c l a i m is c o n n e c t e d w i t h s u c h

first-person

e x p e r i e n t i a l s e n t e n c e s as (11)

I am i n pain.

(12)

I am afraid of being raped.

s i m u l t a n e o u s l y is o f t h e o p i n i o n t h a t , k n o w s , o r b e l i e v e s " t h a t p." M o o r e already p o i n t e d o u t the paradoxical character o f utterances like

as w i t h a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s w i t h t h e s a m e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t :

(10+)

I t is r a i n i n g n o w , b u t I d o n ' t b e l i e v e t h a t i t is r a i n i n g n o w .

6 0

Despite these i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n s , however, a h e a r e r can be rejecti n g t w o different v a l i d i t y c l a i m s w i t h h i s r e j e c t i o n o f (10)

(13)

H e is i n p a i n .

(14)

S h e is a f r a i d o f b e i n g r a p e d .

w h e r e b y t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n s i n t h e first a n d t h i r d

I t is r a i n i n g n o w .

person

a r e s u p p o s e d t o have t h e s a m e r e f e r e n c e .

I f Tugendhat's

a s s i m i l i a t i o n thesis is c o r r e c t , t h e n e g a t i o n o f ( 1 1 ) o r (12) has t h e

I n t a k i n g a negative position, he can m e a n b o t h

same sense as t h e n e g a t i o n o f ( 1 3 ) o r ( 1 4 ) . I t w o u l d be r e d u n d a n t (10')

N o , that isn't true.

to postulate a truthfulness claim alongside the claim to t r u t h . F o l l o w i n g W i t t g e n s t e i n , T u g e n d h a t takes as h i s s t a r t i n g p o i n t a n

and

expressive g e s t u r e , t h e c r y " o u c h , " a n d i m a g i n e s t h a t t h i s l i n g u i s t i -

(10")

N o , y o u d o n ' t m e a n w h a t y o u are saying.

cally r u d i m e n t a r y c r y o f p a i n is r e p l a c e d b y a n expressive u t t e r a n c e

I n t h e f i r s t case, t h e h e a r e r u n d e r s t a n d s ( 1 0 ) as a c o n s t a d v e u t t e r a n c e , i n t h e s e c o n d , as a n e x p r e s s i v e u t t e r a n c e . O b v i o u s l y , t h e n e g a tion

o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n "p" j u s t as l i t t l e i m p l i e s t h e n e g a t i o n o f t h e

b e l i e f " t h a t p" as, conversely, ( 1 0 " ) i m p l i e s t h e n e g a t i o n o f t h e p o s i t i o n t a k e n i n ( 1 0 ' ) . T o b e s u r e , t h e h e a r e r m a y s u p p o s e t h a t whenever S asserts "p" she also b e l i e v e s " t h a t p." B u t t h i s d o e s n o t a f f e c t t h e f a c t t h a t t h e t r u t h c l a i m r e l a t e s t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e state o f a f f a i r s w h e r e a s t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s c l a i m has t o d o o n l y w i t h t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f t h e o p i n i o n o r t h e b e l i e f " t h a t p." A m u r d e r e r w h o

makes

a c o n f e s s i o n c a n m e a n w h a t h e says a n d y e t , w i t h o u t i n t e n d i n g t o d o so, b e s a y i n g w h a t is u n t r u e . H e c a n also, w i t h o u t i n t e n d i n g t o d o so, s p e a k t h e t r u t h a l t h o u g h , i n c o n c e a l i n g

his k n o w l e d g e

of the

facts o f t h e case, h e is l y i n g . A j u d g e w h o h a d s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e a t h e r d i s p o s a l c o u l d c r i t i c i z e t h e t r u t h f u l u t t e r a n c e as u n t r u e i n t h e o n e case, a n d t h e t r u e u t t e r a n c e as u n t r u t h f u l i n t h e o t h e r . As against this, Ernst T u g e n d h a t tries to m a k e d o w i t h a single validity c l a i m .

6 1

H e takes u p t h e e x t e n d e d d i s c u s s i o n c o n n e c t e d w i t h

r e p r e s e n t e d at t h e semantic level by t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l sentence (11). W i t t g e n s t e i n denies to such e x p e r i e n t i a l sentences t h e character o f statements.

6 2

H e assumes t h a t a c o n t i n u u m exists b e t w e e n b o t h n o n -

cognitive f o r m s o f expressing p a i n , the gesture a n d the sentence. For T u g e n d h a t , b y c o n t r a s t , t h e c a t e g o r i a l d i f f e r e n c e consists i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e e x p e r i e n t i a l s e n t e n c e c a n b e false, b u t n o t t h e g e s t u r e . H i s analysis leads t o t h e r e s u l t t h a t w i t h t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f t h e c r y i n t o a n e x p e r i e n t i a l sentence w i t h the same m e a n i n g , "an expression is p r o d u c e d t h a t , a l t h o u g h i t is u s e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e same r u l e as t h e c r y , is t r u e w h e n i t is u s e d c o r r e c t l y ; a n d t h u s t h e r e arises t h e s i n g u l a r case o f assertoric s e n t e n c e s w h i c h c a n b e t r u e o r false b u t w h i c h are nonetheless n o t c o g n i t i v e . " sentences like (11)

6 3

For this reason, experiential

a r e not s u p p o s e d t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m

assertoric sentences w i t h t h e same p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t l i k e

(13)

o n t h e basis o f t h e c r i t e r i o n o f w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e y a d m i t o f t r u t h . B o t h c a n b e t r u e o r false. O f c o u r s e , e x p e r i e n t i a l s e n t e n c e s e x h i b i t t h e p e c u l i a r i t y t h a t they express a n " i n c o r r i g i b l e k n o w l e d g e ; " t h u s ,

150

151

Chapter 2


true.

w h e r e b y t h e p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n i n t h e first p e r s o n i n (15) a n d t h e

t h e r e exists a ' V e r i f i c a t o r y

p e r s o n a l p r o n o u n i n t h e t h i r d p e r s o n i n ( 1 6 ) a r e t o have t h e s a m e

w h e n e v e r t h e y a r e u s e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e r u l e s t h e y must b e Between

t h e sentences ( 1 1 )

and

(13)

s y m m e t r y , " i n t h e sense t h a t ( 1 3 ) is t r u e w h e n e v e r

( 1 1 ) is u s e d i n

T u g e n d h a t explains this c o n n e c t i o n ties

reference.

I t b e c o m e s c l e a r a t a g l a n c e t h a t i f ( 1 5 ) is i n v a l i d , t h e

s p e a k e r is d e c e i v i n g t h e h e a r e r , w h e r e a s i f ( 1 6 ) is i n v a l i d , t h e s p e a k e r

c o n f o r m i t y w i t h the rules. t h r o u g h t h e special

proper-

o f the singular t e r m " I , " w i t h w h i c h the speaker designates

is t e l l i n g t h e h e a r e r s o m e t h i n g t h a t is n o t t r u e , a l t h o u g h she n e e d n o t i n t e n d t o d e c e i v e h i m . T h u s i t is l e g i t i m a t e t o p o s t u l a t e

for

h e r s e l f w i t h o u t a t t h e same t i m e t h e r e b y i d e n t i f y i n g h e r s e l f . E v e n i f

e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts a different v a l i d i t y c l a i m t h a n f o r

h i s thesis is c o r r e c t , h o w e v e r , t h i s d o e s n o t solve t h e p r o b l e m

s p e e c h acts w i t h t h e same m e a n i n g . W i t t g e n s t e i n c o m e s v e r y close

of

constative

e x p l a i n i n g h o w a sentence can have a n assertoric character a n d t h u s

t o t h i s i n s i g h t a t o n e p o i n t i n h i s Philosophical Investigations,

a d m i t o f t r u t h a n d yet n o t a d m i t o f b e i n g e m p l o y e d cognitively, t h a t

h e is s h o w i n g , i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e p a r a d i g m case o f a c o n f e s s i o n ,

is, f o r r e p r e s e n t i n g e x i s t i n g states o f a f f a i r s .

t h a t e x p r e s s i v e u t t e r a n c e s d o n o t have a d e s c r i p t i v e s e n s e — t h a t is,

I n g e n e r a l , t h e r u l e s f o r e m p l o y i n g a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s indicate a c o g n i t i o n ; o n l y i n t h e case o f expressive s e n t e n c e s is t h e

correct

e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n also s u p p o s e d t o guarantee its t r u t h . B u t a h e a r e r w h o w a n t s t o a s c e r t a i n w h e t h e r a s p e a k e r is d e c e i v i n g h i m w i t h t h e s e n t e n c e ( 1 1 ) has t o test w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e s e n t e n c e ( 1 3 ) is t r u e . T h i s shows t h a t expressive s e n t e n c e s i n t h e f i r s t p e r s o n d o n o t p r i m a r i l y serve t h e p u r p o s e o f e x p r e s s i n g

cogni-

t i o n s , t h a t a t m o s t t h e y derive t h e t r u t h c l a i m a s c r i b e d t o t h e m f r o m t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g assertoric s e n t e n c e s i n t h e t h i r d p e r s o n ; f o r o n l y t h e l a t t e r c a n represent t h e state o f a f f a i r s t o w h o s e e x i s t e n c e t h e t r u t h c l a i m refers. T h u s T u g e n d h a t falls i n t o t h e d i l e m m a o f h a v i n g to characterize i n a c o n t r a d i c t o r y way w h a t a speaker means w i t h experiential

s e n t e n c e s . O n t h e o n e h a n d , t h i s is s u p p o s e d t o b e a m a t t e r

o f k n o w l e d g e f o r w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r c l a i m s v a l i d i t y i n t h e sense o f p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h ; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , this k n o w l e d g e c a n n o t have t h e status o f a c o g n i t i o n , f o r c o g n i t i o n s c a n b e r e p r e s e n t e d o n l y i n a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s t h a t c a n i n p r i n c i p l e b e c o n t e s t e d as u n t r u e . B u t t h i s d i l e m m a arises o n l y i f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m t o t r u t h f u l n e s s — w h i c h is analagous t o t r u t h — i s identified with t h e c l a i m t o t r u t h . T h e d i l e m m a dissolves as s o o n as o n e

shifts f r o m t h e s e m a n t i c

to the

p r a g m a t i c l e v e l a n d c o m p a r e s s p e e c h acts r a t h e r t h a n s e n t e n c e s . Consider (15)

I have t o confess ( t o y o u ) t h a t I ' v e b e e n i n p a i n f o r days.

(16)

I c a n r e p o r t ( t o y o u ) t h a t h e ' s b e e n i n p a i n f o r days.

where

d o n o t a d m i t o f t r u t h — a n d y e t c a n be valid or invalid. T h e criteria for the t r u t h o f the confession that I t h o u g h t such-and-such are n o t the criteria f o r a t r u e description o f a process. A n d the importance o f the t r u e confession does n o t reside i n the fact that i t is a reliable r e p o r t o f a certain process. I t resides rather i n the special consequences w h i c h can be drawn f r o m a confession whose t r u t h is guaranteed by the special criteria o f truthfulness. * 6

c. W i t h t h e s e a r g u m e n t s w e have a l r e a d y t o u c h e d u p o n t h e t h i r d g r o u p o f o b j e c t i o n s , w h i c h is d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t a f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c approach

t o t h e analysis o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . T h e s e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s ,

f o l l o w i n g t h e m o d e l o f l e g a l c l a i m s , have t o d o w i t h r e l a t i o n s b e tween persons a n d are o r i e n t e d t o w a r d intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n . T h e y are raised f o r t h e validity o f symbolic expressions, i n the stand a r d case f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f t h e s e n t e n c e w i t h p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t t h a t is d e p e n d e n t

on an illocutionary component.

I t thus

makes

sense t o r e g a r d a v a l i d i t y c l a i m as a c o m p l e x a n d d e r i v a t i v e p h e nomenon

that can be traced back to t h e u n d e r l y i n g

phenomenon

o f t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f sentences. B u t t h e n s h o u l d we n o t l o o k f o r these c o n d i t i o n s o n t h e semantic level o f a n a l y z i n g assertoric, e x p e r i e n t i a l , i m p e r a t i v e , a n d i n t e n t i o n a l sentences, r a t h e r t h a n o n t h e p r a g m a t i c level o f t h e e m p l o y m e n t

of

s u c h s e n t e n c e s i n c o n s t a t i v e , expressive, a n d r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts? Is n o t p r e c i s e l y a t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts, w h i c h h o p e s t o e x p l a i n t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g effect t h r o u g h a w a r r a n t y o f f e r e d b y t h e s p e a k e r f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f w h a t she says, a n d t h r o u g h a

152

153

Chapter 2


corresponding

r a t i o n a l m o t i v a t i o n o n t h e p a r t o f the hearer,

de-

arises b e c a u s e n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e is f u l l o f s e n t e n c e s w h i c h a r e n o t

p e n d e n t o n a t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g t h a t e x p l a i n s f o r its p a r t u n d e r w h a t

e f f e c t i v e l y d e c i d a b l e , o n e s f o r w h i c h t h e r e exists n o effective p r o c e -

c o n d i t i o n s t h e sentences e m p l o y e d a r e v a l i d ?

dure for d e t e r m i n i n g whether or n o t their t r u t h conditions

A t issue i n t h i s d e b a t e a r e n o t q u e s t i o n s o f t e r r i t o r i a l b o u n d a r i e s

fulfilled."

are

6 7

o r o f n o m i n a l d e f i n i t i o n s b u t w h e t h e r t h e concept of the validity o f a

B e c a u s e k n o w i n g t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o f a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s is

s e n t e n c e c a n b e c l a r i f i e d i n d e p e n d e n d y o f t h e concept of redeeming the

p r o b l e m a t i c i n m a n y , i f n o t i n m o s t cases, D u m m e t t stresses t h e

validity claim r a i s e d t h r o u g h t h e u t t e r a n c e o f t h e s e n t e n c e . I a m

difference between k n o w i n g the conditions that make a sentence

d e f e n d i n g t h e thesis t h a t t h i s is n o t p o s s i b l e . S e m a n t i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n s

true a n d k n o w i n g the grounds

o f d e s c r i p t i v e , expressive, a n d n o r m a t i v e s e n t e n c e s , i f o n l y t h e y a r e

s e n t e n c e as t r u e . R e l y i n g o n basic a s s u m p t i o n s o f i n t u i t i o n i s m , h e

t h a t e n t i d e a s p e a k e r t o assert a

c a r r i e d t h r o u g h c o n s i s t e n t l y e n o u g h , f o r c e us t o c h a n g e t h e l e v e l o f

goes o n t o r e f o r m u l a t e t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g as f o l l o w s : " [ A ] n

analysis. T h e v e r y analysis o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f sen-

u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a s t a t e m e n t consists i n a c a p a c i t y t o r e c o g n i z e

t e n c e s itself c o m p e l s us t o analyze t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e i n t e r s u b j e c ¬

w h a t e v e r is c o u n t e d as v e r i f y i n g i t , i.e., as c o n c l u s i v e l y e s t a b l i s h i n g i t

tive r e c o g n i t i o n o f c o r r e s p o n d i n g v a l i d i t y claims. A n e x a m p l e o f this

as t r u e . I t is n o t n e c e s s a r y t h a t w e s h o u l d have a n y m e a n s o f d e c i d i n g

can

be

found

in Dummett's

development

of truth-conditional

semantics.

the

t r u t h o r falsity o f t h e statement, o n l y t h a t we be capable

r e c o g n i z i n g w h e n its t r u t h has b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d . "

fit*

of

6 8

D

D u m m e t t starts f r o m t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t a n a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e has t o satisfy t o b e t r u e a n d t h e

knowledge

t h a t a s p e a k e r w h o asserts t h e s e n t e n c e as t r u e has o f t h e s e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s — c o n d i t i o n s t h a t a t t h e same t i m e d e t e r m i n e t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e s e n t e n c e . K n o w i n g t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s consists i n knowing how one ascertains w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e y a r e satisfied i n a g i v e n case. T h e o r t h o d o x version o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics, w h i c h tries t o e x p l a i n u n d e r s t a n d i n g the m e a n i n g o f a sentence i n terms o f k n o w i n g its t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s , is b a s e d o n t h e u n r e a l i s t i c a s s u m p t i o n t h a t f o r e v e r y s e n t e n c e , o r a t least f o r e v e r y assertoric s e n t e n c e , p r o c e d u r e s a r e a v a i l a b l e f o r e f f e c t i v e l y d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r o r n o t its t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a r e satisfied. T h i s a s s u m p t i o n rests t a c i d y o n a n e m p i r i c i s t t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e t h a t ascribes a f u n d a m e n t a l status t o t h e s i m p l e p r e d i c a t i v e sentences o f a n o b s e r v a t i o n l a n g u a g e . B u t n o t e v e n t h e a r g u m e n t a t i o n game t h a t T u g e n d h a t postulates f o r v e r i f y i n g such s e e m i n g l y e l e m e n t a r y s e n t e n c e s consists i n a d e c i s i o n

procedure

t h a t c o u l d b e a p p l i e d l i k e a n a l g o r i t h m , t h a t is, i n s u c h a w a y t h a t f u r t h e r d e m a n d s for g r o u n d i n g are e x c l u d e d

in principle.

6 6

I t is

e s p e c i a l l y c l e a r i n t h e case o f c o u n t e r f a c t u a l s , u n i v e r s a l e x i s t e n t i a l sentences, a n d sentences w i t h a t e m p o r a l i n d e x — i n g e n e r a l ,

any

s e n t e n c e s r e f e r r i n g t o p l a c e s a n d t i m e s t h a t are a c t u a l l y inaccessib l e — t h a t effective d e c i s i o n p r o c e d u r e s a r e l a c k i n g . ' T h e

difficulty

I t is p a r t o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a s e n t e n c e t h a t w e are c a p a b l e

of

r e c o g n i z i n g grounds t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e claim t h a t its t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s a r e s a t i s f i e d could be redeemed. T h u s , t h i s t h e o r y e x p l a i n s t h e m e a n i n g o f a s e n t e n c e o n l y i n d i r e c d y t h r o u g h k n o w i n g t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f its v a l i d i t y , b u t d i r e c d y t h r o u g h k n o w i n g g r o u n d s t h a t are

objectively

available to a speaker f o r r e d e e m i n g a t r u t h c l a i m . N o w a speaker m i g h t still p r o d u c e such g r o u n d s a c c o r d i n g to a p r o c e d u r e t h a t can be a p p l i e d m o n o l o g i c a l l y ; t h e n even an explanation

o f t r u t h conditions i n terms o f g r o u n d i n g a t r u t h claim w o u l d

n o t m a k e i t necessary t o m o v e f r o m t h e semantic level o f sentences to t h e p r a g m a t i c level o f u s i n g sentences communicatively. D u m m e t t stresses, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e s p e a k e r is b y n o m e a n s a b l e t o u n d e r t a k e the

r e q u i r e d verifications i n a deductively c o m p e l l i n g m a n n e r

on

t h e basis o f r u l e s o f i n f e r e n c e . T h e set o f g r o u n d s available i n a n y g i v e n i n s t a n c e is c i r c u m s c r i b e d b y i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s o f a u n i v e r s e o f linguistic structures that can be surveyed only argumentatively. D u m m e t t p u r s u e s t h i s i d e a so f a r t h a t i n t h e e n d h e gives u p e n t i r e l y t h e basic i d e a o f v e r i f i c a t i o n i s m . A verificationist t h e o r y comes as close as any plausible t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g can do to e x p l a i n i n g the m e a n i n g o f a sentence i n terms o f the grounds o n w h i c h i t may be asserted; i t must o f course distinguish a speaker's actual grounds, w h i c h may n o t be conclusive, or may be i n d i r e c t , from the k i n d

154

155

Chapter 2


o f direct, conclusive grounds i n terms o f w h i c h the m e a n i n g is given, particularly for sentences, like those i n the future tense, for w h i c h the speaker c a n n o t have grounds o f the latter k i n d at the time o f utterance. B u t a falsificationist theory . . . links the c o n t e n t o f an assertion w i t h the c o m m i t m e n t that a speaker undertakes i n m a k i n g that assertion; an assertion is a k i n d o f gamble that the speaker w i l l n o t be proved w r o n g .

b e e n d i v i d i n g s p e e c h acts i n t o t h r e e classes: r e g u l a t i v e , expressive,

69

I see t h i s as a n i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e f a l l i b i l i s t i c c h a r a c t e r o f t h e d i s cursive v i n d i c a t i o n o f validity claims. I c a n n o t go i n t o t h e details o f D u m m e t t ' s t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g h e r e . W h a t is i m p o r t a n t is o n l y t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y c l a i m t h e s p e a k e r raises f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f a sent e n c e b e c r i t i c i z a b l e i n p r i n c i p l e . I n a n y case, t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l sem a n t i c s i n its r e v i s e d f o r m takes i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e f a c t t h a t t r u t h conditions cannot be explicated independently f r o m k n o w i n g how to redeem

a corresponding

truth claim. To understand an

a s s e r t i o n is t o k n o w w h e n a s p e a k e r has g o o d r e a s o n s t o assume a w a r r a n t y t h a t t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e t r u t h o f t h e asserted s e n t e n c e are satisfied. s h o w n f o r expressive

a n d n o r m a t i v e sentences t h a t

semantic

analysis p u s h e s b e y o n d i t s e l f . T h e d i s c u s s i o n t h a t has a r i s e n f r o m W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s analysis o f e x p e r i e n t i a l s e n t e n c e s m a k e s c l e a r t h a t t h e c l a i m c o n n e c t e d w i t h expressions The

m e a n i n g o f t h e expressive

is g e n u i n e l y a d d r e s s e d

7 0

t o others.

a n d declarative f u n c t i o n already

suggests a p r i m a r i l y c o m m u n i c a t i v e sions.

o f a critical e x a m i n a t i o n o f o t h e r classificatory schemes. A s is w e l l k n o w n , a t t h e e n d o f h i s series o f l e c t u r e s o n " H o w t o D o T h i n g s w i t h Words," A u s t i n t r i e d his h a n d at a typology o f speech acts. H e o r d e r e d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts o n t h e basis o f p e r f o r m a t i v e v e r b s a n d d i s t i n g u i s h e d f i v e types ( v e r d i c t i v e s , e x e r c i t i v e s ,

e m p l o y m e n t o f such

expres-

T h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e v a l i d i t y o f n o r m s is e v e n

c l e a r e r . H e r e , t o o , a n analysis t h a t starts w i t h s i m p l e p r e d i c a t e s f o r s e e m i n g l y subjective e m o t i o n a l r e a c t i o n s t o v i o l a t i o n s o r

impair-

m e n t s o f p e r s o n a l i n t e g r i t y leads step-by-step t o t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e , i n d e e d t r a n s s u b j e c t i v e , m e a n i n g o f basic m o r a l c o n c e p t s .

7 1

O n the C l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f S p e e c h A c t s I f o u r thesis h o l d s t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y o f s p e e c h acts o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g can be contested u n d e r precisely t h r e e u n i v e r s a l aspects, w e m i g h t c o n j e c t u r e t h a t a system o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s also u n d e r l i e s t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f types o f s p e e c h acts. I f so, t h e u n i v e r s a l i t y thesis w o u l d also h a v e i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r a t t e m p t s t o classify s p e e c h acts f r o m t h e o r e t i c a l p o i n t s o f view. T h u s f a r I h a v e t a c i d y

commissives,

behabitives, a n d expositives), w i t h o u t d e n y i n g the provisional character o f this classification.

72

I n f a c t , i t is o n l y f o r t h e class o f c o m m i s -

sives t h a t A u s t i n gives us a c l e a r c r i t e r i o n o f d e m a r c a t i o n :

with

p r o m i s e s , t h r e a t s , a n n o u n c e m e n t s , vows, c o n t r a c t s , a n d t h e l i k e , t h e speaker c o m m i t s h i m s e l f t o c a r r y i n g o u t c e r t a i n actions i n t h e f u t u r e . T h e speaker enters i n t o a n o r m a t i v e b i n d i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t o b l i g e s h i m t o a c t i n a c e r t a i n way. T h e r e m a i n i n g classes a r e n o t s a t i s f a c t o r i l y d e f i n e d , e v e n i f o n e takes i n t o a c c o u n t t h e d e s c r i p t i v e character o f the classification. T h e y d o n o t m e e t the r e q u i r e m e n t s o f distinctness a n d disjunctiveness;

A s i n t h e case o f t h e m e a n i n g o f a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e s , i t c a n also be

a n d constative. I w o u l d n o w like t o justify this classification by way

7 3

A u s t i n ' s classificatory scheme

d o e s n o t r e q u i r e us always t o assign d i f f e r e n t p h e n o m e n a f e r e n t c a t e g o r i e s n o r t o assign e a c h p h e n o m e n o n

to dif-

to at m o s t

one

category. T h e class o f v e r d i c t i v e s c o m p r i s e s

utterances w i t h w h i c h ' j u d g -

m e n t s " o r " v e r d i c t s " — i n t h e sense o f a p p r a i s a l s a n d assessments— are m a d e . A u s t i n does n o t d i s t i n g u i s h h e r e between j u d g m e n t s w i t h d e s c r i p t i v e c o n t e n t a n d t h o s e w i t h n o r m a t i v e c o n t e n t . T h u s t h e r e is s o m e o v e r l a p w i t h b o t h t h e e x p o s i t i v e s a n d t h e e x e r c i t i v e s . T h e class o f e x e r c i t i v e s c o m p r i s e s , t o b e g i n w i t h , a l l d e c l a r a t i v e s , t h a t is e x p r e s sions f o r i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y — f o r t h e m o s t p a r t , l e g a l l y — a u t h o r i z e d d e c i sions

(such

as

sentencing,

adopting,

appointing, nominating,

r e s i g n i n g , a n d so f o r t h ) . T h e r e is o v e r l a p n o t o n l y w i t h v e r d i c t i v e s ( s u c h as n a m i n g a n d a w a r d i n g ) b u t also w i t h b e h a b i t i v e s ( s u c h as p r o t e s t i n g ) . T h e s e b e h a b i t i v e s i n t u r n f o r m a class t h a t is p r e t t y h e t e r o g e n e o u s i n c o m p o s i t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n t o verbs f o r standardized e x p r e s s i o n s o f f e e l i n g ( s u c h as c o m p l a i n t s a n d c o m m i s e r a t i o n s ) , i t contains expressions f o r institutionally b o u n d utterances ( c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s , curses, toasts, e x p r e s s i o n s o f w e l c o m e ) as w e l l as e x p r e s s i o n s f o r s a t i s f a c t i o n s ( a p o l o g i e s , t h a n k s , a l l sorts o f m a k i n g g o o d ) . F i n a l l y , t h e class o f e x p o s i t i v e s d o e s n o t d i s c r i m i n a t e b e t w e e n

constatives,

156

157

Chapter 2


w h i c h s e r v e t o r e p r e s e n t states o f a f f a i r s , a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e s , w h i c h (like asking, replying, addressing,

c i t i n g , a n d so f o r t h ) r e f e r

to

s p e e c h itself. A l s o t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m t h e s e a r e t h e e x p r e s s i o n s w i t h w h i c h w e d e s i g n a t e t h e e x e c u t i o n o f o p e r a t i o n s ( s u c h as d e d u c i n g , i d e n t i f y i n g , c a l c u l a t i n g , classifying, a n d t h e l i k e ) .

Searle's s h a r p e n e d v e r s i o n o f A u s t i n ' s s p e e c h - a c t t y p o l o g y m a r k s t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t o f a d i s c u s s i o n t h a t has d e v e l o p e d i n t w o d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s . T h e first is c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y Searle's o w n e f f o r t s t o p r o v i d e a n o n t o l o g i c a l g r o u n d i n g f o r t h e five types o f s p e e c h acts; t h e o t h e r is d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e a t t e m p t t o d e v e l o p t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n

S e a r l e has a t t e m p t e d t o s h a r p e n A u s t i n ' s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n .

He

of

no

s p e e c h acts f r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f e m p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s so as t o

l o n g e r orients h i m s e l f t o w a r d a list o f p e r f o r m a t i v e verbs d i f f e r e n t i -

m a k e i t f r u i t f u l f o r t h e analysis o f s p e e c h - a c t s e q u e n c e s i n e v e r y d a y

a t e d w i t h i n a specific l a n g u a g e , b u t t o w a r d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y i n t e n -

communication.

74

t i o n s o r a i m s t h a t speakers p u r s u e w i t h v a r i o u s types o f s p e e c h acts, independendy

o f the f o r m s i n w h i c h they are realized i n i n d i v i d u a l

languages. H e arrives at a clear a n d i n t u i t i v e l y c o n v i n c i n g

classifica-

t i o n o f s p e e c h acts: assertive ( o r c o n s t a t i v e ) , c o m m i s s i v e , d i r e c t i v e , d e c l a r a t i v e , a n d expressive. T o s t a r t w i t h , Searle i n t r o d u c e s

assertive

( c o n s t a t i v e , r e p r e s e n t a t i v e ) s p e e c h acts as a w e l l d e f i n e d class. F r o m A u s t i n h e f u r t h e r takes o v e r t h e class o f c o m m i s s i v e s a n d c o n t r a s t s these w i t h t h e directives. W h e r e a s w i t h t h e f o r m e r t h e speaker c o m m i t s h e r s e l f t o a n a c t i o n , w i t h t h e l a t t e r she t r i e s t o m o t i v a t e t h e h e a r e r t o c a r r y o u t a c e r t a i n a c t i o n . A m o n g t h e d i r e c t i v e s , Searle c o u n t s o r d i n a n c e s , requests, i n s t r u c t i o n s , i m p e r a t i v e s , i n v i t a t i o n s , as w e l l as q u e s t i o n s

a n d entreaties. H e r e , h e does n o t d i s c r i m i n a t e

b e t w e e n n o r m a t i v e l y a u t h o r i z e d i m p e r a t i v e s — s u c h as p e t i t i o n s , r e p r i m a n d s , c o m m a n d s , a n d t h e l i k e — a n d s i m p l e i m p e r a t i v e s , t h a t is, n o n a u t h o r i z e d expressions o f w i l l . F o r this reason, the d e l i m i t a t i o n o f d i r e c t i v e s f r o m d e c l a r a t i v e s is also n o t v e r y s h a r p . I t is t r u e t h a t f o r d e c l a r a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n s a r e r e q u i r e d t o sec u r e t h e n o r m a t i v e o b l i g a t o r y c h a r a c t e r of, f o r i n s t a n c e , a p p o i n t i n g , a b d i c a t i n g , d e c l a r i n g war, a n d g i v i n g n o t i c e ; b u t t h e i r n o r m a t i v e m e a n i n g is s i m i l a r t o t h a t o f c o m m a n d s a n d d i r e c t i v e s . T h e last class c o m p r i s e s expressive s p e e c h acts. T h e s e a r e d e f i n e d b y t h e i r a i m — namely, that w i t h t h e m , t h e speaker sincerely brings to expression h e r p s y c h o l o g i c a l a t t i t u d e s . B u t S e a r l e is u n c e r t a i n i n h i s a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h i s c r i t e r i o n ; t h u s , t h e e x e m p l a r y cases o f avowals,

disclosures,

a n d r e v e l a t i o n s are m i s s i n g . A p o l o g i e s a n d e x p r e s s i o n s o f j o y a n d s y m p a t h y a r e m e n t i o n e d . E v i d e n d y , Searle has a l l o w e d h i m s e l f t o b e l e d astray b y A u s t i n ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f b e h a b i t i v e s a n d has t a c k e d o n t o t h i s class i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts l i k e c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s a n d g r e e t i n g s as w e l l .

I t is a l o n g t h i s l a t t e r p a t h t h a t w e

find

the w o r k o f linguists a n d

s o c i o l i n g u i s t s s u c h as W u n d e r l i c h , C a m p b e l l , a n d K r e c k e l .

7 5

For em-

p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s , social l i f e - c o n t e x t s p r e s e n t t h e m s e l v e s as c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n s t h a t i n t e r m e s h i n social spaces a n d h i s t o r i c a l t i m e s . T h e patterns o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces realized i n p a r t i c u l a r languages r e f l e c t t h e s t r u c t u r e o f these n e t w o r k s o f a c t i o n s . T h e l i n g u i s t i c possibilities f o r p e r f o r m i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts—whether i n the

fixed

f o r m o f grammatical modes or i n the more flexible forms of performative verbs, sentence particles, sentence i n t o n a t i o n s , a n d the l i k e — provide

schemata

for

establishing

interpersonal

relations.

i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces constitute the knots i n the n e t w o r k o f

The

commu-

n i c a t i v e s o c i a l i z a t i o n (Vergesellschaflung); t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y l e x i c o n is, as i t w e r e , t h e s e c t i o n a l p l a n e o n w h i c h t h e l a n g u a g e a n d t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l o r d e r o f a society i n t e r p e n e t r a t e . T h i s s o c i e t a l i n f r a s t r u c t u r e o f l a n g u a g e is i t s e l f i n f l u x ; i t varies i n d e p e n d e n c e o n i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d f o r m s o f l i f e . B u t t h e s e v a r i a t i o n s also e m b o d y a l i n g u i s t i c c r e a t i v i t y t h a t gives n e w f o r m s o f e x p r e s s i o n t o t h e i n n o v a t i v e m a s t e r y o f unforeseen situations.

7 6

Indicators that relate to general dimensions

o f the speech situ-

a t i o n a r e i m p o r t a n t f o r a p r a g m a t i c c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts. W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e temporal dimension t h e r e is t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r p a r t i c i p a n t s a r e o r i e n t e d m o r e t o w a r d t h e f u t u r e , t h e past, o r t h e p r e s e n t , o r w h e t h e r t h e s p e e c h acts a r e t e m p o r a l l y n e u t r a l . W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e social dimension t h e r e is t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t f o r t h e s e q u e l o f i n t e r a c t i o n arise f o r t h e speaker, t h e h e a r e r , o r f o r b o t h p a r t i e s . A n d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e dimension of objectivity (die sachliche Dimension) t h e r e is t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e t h e m a t i c e m p h a s i s lies m o r e o n t h e o b j e c t s , t h e a c t i o n s , o r t h e a c t o r s t h e m s e l v e s . K r e c k e l uses these i n d i c a t o r s t o p r o p o s e a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n

158

159

Chapter 2

Social A c t i o n , Purposive Activity, a n d

o n w h i c h she bases h e r analyses o f e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i o n table

(see

2.4).

Table 2.4 Classification according to three paradigmatic indicators Speaker (S)

C e r t a i n l y , t h e a d v a n t a g e o f t h i s a n d s i m i l a r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s consists i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y p r o v i d e us w i t h a g u i d e l i n e f o r

Communication

ethnolinguistic

Hearer (H)

Cognition oriented (C)

Cognition oriented (C)

Does the speaker indicate that he has taken up the hearer's message?

Does the speaker try to influence the hearer's view of the world?

tively evident character o f classifications t h a t l i n k u p w i t h semantic

Examples: agreeing acknowledging, rejecting

Examples: asserting, arguing, declaring

analyses a n d t a k e a c c o u n t o f t h e e l e m e n t a r y f u n c t i o n s o f l a n g u a g e

Person oriented (P)

Person oriented (P)

( s u c h as t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n

Does the speaker refer to himself a n d / o r his past action?

Does the speaker refer to the person of the hearer a n d / o r his past action?

i n t u i t i v e l y e v i d e n t types; t h e y l a c k t h e t h e o r e t i c a l p o w e r t o i l l u m i n a t e

Examples: justifying, defending, lamenting

Examples: accusing, criticizing, teasing

our intuitions.

Action oriented (A)

Action oriented (A)

Does the speaker commit himself to future action?

Does the speaker try to make the hearer do something?

Examples: promising, refusing, giving in

Examples: advising, challenging, ordering

a n d s o c i o l i n g u i s t i c d e s c r i p d v e systems; t h e y a r e b e t t e r a b l e t o c o p e w i t h t h e c o m p l e x i t i e s o f n a t u r a l settings t h a n are typologies t h a t start f r o m illocutionary intentions a n d aims rather t h a n f r o m features o f s i t u a t i o n s . B u t t h e y pay f o r t h i s a d v a n t a g e by r e l i n q u i s h i n g t h e i n t u i -

o f states o f a f f a i r s , t h e e x p r e s s i o n

experiences, and the establishment o f interpersonal relations).

of

The

classes o f s p e e c h acts t h a t a r e a r r i v e d a t i n d u c t i v e l y a n d c o n s t r u c t e d i n accordance w i t h pragmatic

indicators

do

not consolidate into

Searle m a k e s t h e m o v e t o w a r d a theoretically motivated

Past

typology of

speech acts b y g i v i n g a n o n t o l o g i c a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n ary intentions a n d the p r o p o s i t i o n a l attitudes that a speaker pursues o r a d o p t s w h e n she p e r f o r m s assertive ( c o n s t a t i v e ) , d i r e c t i v e , c o m missive, declarative,

Present

a n d e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts. I n d o i n g

so,

he

d r a w s u p o n t h e f a m i l i a r m o d e l t h a t d e f i n e s t h e w o r l d as t h e t o t a l i t y

Future

Source: M. Kreckel, Communicative Acts and Shared Knowledge in Natural Discourse (London, 1981), p. 188.

o f e x i s t i n g states o f affairs, sets u p t h e s p e a k e r / a c t o r as a n a u t h o r i t y outside o f this w o r l d , a n d allows f o r precisely two linguistically m e diated relations between actor a n d w o r l d : the cognitive relation o f a s c e r t a i n i n g facts, a n d t h e i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t r e l a t i o n o f r e a l i z i n g a g o a l o f a c t i o n . T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y i n t e n t i o n s may t h e n be c h a r a c t e r i z e d i n t e r m s o f t h e d i r e c t i o n i n w h i c h s e n t e n c e s a n d facts a r e s u p p o s e d t o b e b r o u g h t i n t o a c c o r d . T h e a r r o w p o i n t i n g d o w n w a r d s (-1) says t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e s a r e s u p p o s e d t o f i t t h e facts; t h e a r r o w p o i n t i n g u p w a r d s (T) says t h a t t h e facts a r e t o b e f i t t e d t o t h e s e n t e n c e s . T h u s , t h e a s s e r t o r i c f o r c e o f c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts a n d t h e f o r c e o f d i r e c t i v e s p e e c h acts a p p e a r as f o l l o w s : Constative h Directive!

^C(p) tl(H

b r i n g s a b o u t p)

imperative

w h e r e b y C stands f o r c o g n i t i o n s o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l

attitudes

of

t h i n k i n g , b e i n g o f t h e o p i n i o n , b e l i e v i n g , a n d t h e l i k e , a n d I stands for intentions or the propositional

attitudes o f wanting, wishing,

i n t e n d i n g , a n d t h e l i k e . T h e a s s e r t o r i c f o r c e s i g n i f i e s t h a t S raises a truth claim for

vis-à-vis H; t h a t is, she assumes a w a r r a n t y f o r t h e

a g r e e m e n t o f t h e a s s e r t o r i c s e n t e n c e w i t h t h e facts (-1); t h e i m p e r a tive f o r c e s i g n i f i e s t h a t 5 raises a p o w e r c l a i m vis-à-vis / / f o r s e e i n g t o it that " / / b r i n g s about

t h a t is, she assumes a w a r r a n t y f o r h a v i n g

t h e facts b r o u g h t i n t o a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e

(Î).

I n d e s c r i b i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y forces by means o f the r e l a t i o n between l a n g u a g e a n d t h e w o r l d , Searle has r e c o u r s e t o c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f a s s e r t o r i c a n d i m p e r a t i v e s e n t e n c e s . H e finds h i s t h e o r e t i c a l s t a n d p o i n t f o r classifying s p e e c h acts i n t h e dimension of validity.

161

160


Chapter 2

B u t h e restricts h i m s e l f to t h e perspective o f the speaker a n d disre-

I t is e v i d e n t t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a d e c l a r a t i o n o f war, a

recogni-

r e s i g n a t i o n , t h e o p e n i n g o f a session, t h e r e a d i n g o f a b i l l , o r t h e

o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s — t h a t is, consensus-formation. T h e m o d e l o f t w o

l i k e c a n n o t be i n t e r p r e t e d a c c o r d i n g to the scheme o f two directions

linguistically mediated relations between a solitary actor a n d the one

o f fit. I n p r o d u c i n g i n s t i t u t i o n a l facts, a s p e a k e r d o e s n o t at a l l r e f e r

gards the dynamics of the n e g o d a d o n a n d intersubjecdve tion

o b j e c t i v e w o r l d has n o p l a c e f o r t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n participants i n communication w h o come to an understanding with one

another

about

something

i n the world. W h e n

worked

out,

Searle's o n t o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n p r o v e s t o b e t o o n a r r o w . The

c o m m i s s i v e s p e e c h acts s e e m a t first t o fit easily i n t o t h e

m o d e l . W i t h a s p e e c h act o f t h i s t y p e , S assumes a w a r r a n t y vis-à-vis H f o r b r i n g i n g t h e facts i n t o a g r e e m e n t w i t h t h e i n t e n t i o n a l s e n -

However,

w o r l d , by a d o u b l e a r r o w c o i n e d i n respect to the objective w o r l d : declarative

D X (p)

the

use

of

sive s p e e c h acts, w h o s e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e

be

an-

commissive

states o f a f f a i r s . Searle is c o n s i s t e n t e n o u g h t o give e x p r e s s i o n t o t h e

i n t e n t i o n a l sentences i n

w e saw t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f

c a n j u s t as l i t d e

characterized i n terms o f an actor's relations to t h e w o r l d o f existing

s p e e c h acts c a n n o t b e e x p l a i n e d t h r o u g h t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f satisfaction

embarrass-

m e n t t h a t Searle s y m b o l i z e s t h i s m e a n i n g , w h i c h b e l o n g s t o another

q u i r e d . T h i s e m b a r r a s s m e n t r e c u r s o n c e a g a i n i n t h e case o f e x p r e s -

Î I ( 5 b r i n g s a b o u t p)

i n analyzing

nouncements,

i n i t i a t e s n e w i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s . I t is p u r e l y o u t o f

w h e r e b y n o special p r o p o s i t i o n a l attitudes are supposed to be r e -

tence u t t e r e d ( Î ) : Commissive C

t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d ; r a t h e r h e acts i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e l e g i t i m a t e o r d e r s o f t h e social w o r l d a n d a t t h e same t i m e

f o r t h e a n n o u n c e d i n t e n t i o n t o a c t i n a c e r t a i n way. I t is o n l y

t h e l a t t e r t h a t is m e a n t b y ( Î ) . R a t h e r , w i t h c o m m i s s i v e s p e e c h acts, t h e s p e a k e r binds h e r w i l l i n t h e sense o f a normative obligation; a n d t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e reliability of a declaration o f i n t e n t i o n a r e

inapplicability o f his scheme t h r o u g h a n e i t h e r / n o r sign: e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts

E 0

(p)

w h e r e b y a n y p r o p o s i t i o n a l a t t i t u d e a t a l l is p o s s i b l e .

of

W e c a n a v o i d t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f Searle's a t t e m p t a t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n ,

q u i t e a d i f f e r e n t s o r t t h a n t h e c o n d i t i o n s t h a t t h e s p e a k e r satisfies

w h i l e r e t a i n i n g his f r u i t f u l t h e o r e t i c a l a p p r o a c h , i f we start f r o m t h e

w h e n she, as a n actor, realizes h e r i n t e n t i o n . Searle w o u l d h a v e t o

f a c t t h a t t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s o f s p e e c h acts a r e a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h

d i s t i n g u i s h c o n d i t i o n s o f v a l i d i t y f r o m c o n d i t i o n s o f success.

t h e intersubjecdve r e c o g n i t i o n o f claims to p o w e r a n d validity, a n d

I n a s i m i l a r way, w e d i s t i n g u i s h e d n o r m a t i v e l y a u t h o r i z e d i m p e r a tives s u c h as d i r e c t i v e s , c o m m a n d s , o r d i n a n c e s ,

a n d the like f r o m

s h e e r i m p e r a t i v e s ; w i t h t h e f o r m e r t h e s p e a k e r raises a n o r m a t i v e validity claim, with the latter an externally sanctioned power. For this reason,

claim

n o t e v e n t h e i m p e r a t i v e sense o f

to

simple

imperatives can be e x p l a i n e d t h r o u g h t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r satisfying the

imperative

sentences e m p l o y e d

t h e r e i n . Even

i f that

were

s u f f i c i e n t , Searle w o u l d h a v e d i f f i c u l t y r e s t r i c t i n g t h e class o f d i r e c tives t o t h e class o f g e n u i n e i m p e r a t i v e s a n d d e m a r c a t i n g t h e f o r m e r f r o m directives a n d c o m m a n d s , since his m o d e l does n o t allow f o r c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e validity ( o r f o r t h e satisfaction) o f n o r m s . T h i s l a c k is especially n o t i c e a b l e w h e n S e a r l e t r i e s t o a c c o m m o d a t e d e c l a r a t i v e s p e e c h acts i n h i s system.

i f we f u r t h e r i n t r o d u c e n o r m a t i v e Tightness a n d s u b j e c t i v e

truthful-

ness as v a l i d i t y c l a i m s a n a l a g o u s t o t r u t h a n d i n t e r p r e t t h e m t o o i n terms o f a c t o r / w o r l d relations. T h i s revision yields the f o l l o w i n g classification: • W i t h imperatives t h e s p e a k e r r e f e r s t o a d e s i r e d state i n t h e o b j e c tive w o r l d , a n d i n s u c h a w a y t h a t h e w o u l d l i k e t o g e t H t o b r i n g a b o u t t h i s state. I m p e r a t i v e s c a n b e c r i t i c i z e d o n l y f r o m t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f w h e t h e r t h e a c t i o n d e m a n d e d c a n b e c a r r i e d o u t , t h a t is, o n t h e basis o f c o n d i t i o n s o f success. H o w e v e r , r e j e c t i n g i m p e r a t i v e s n o r m a l l y m e a n s r e j e c t i n g a c l a i m t o p o w e r ; s u c h r e j e c t i o n is n o t b a s e d o n c r i t i c i s m b u t i t s e l f expresses a will. • W i t h constative speech acts t h e s p e a k e r r e f e r s t o s o m e t h i n g i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , a n d i n s u c h a way t h a t h e w o u l d l i k e t o r e p r e s e n t a

162

163

Chapter 2


state o f a f f a i r s . T h e n e g a t i o n o f s u c h a n u t t e r a n c e m e a n s t h a t

H

u n d e r t h e s a m e class o f r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts. O n e c a n see f r o m t h i s

contests t h e c l a i m t o t r u t h r a i s e d b y S f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n asserted.

t h a t t h e basic m o d e s a r e i n n e e d o f f u r t h e r d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n . T h e y

• With

regulative speech acts t h e s p e a k e r r e f e r s t o s o m e t h i n g i n a

c a n n o t b e u s e d f o r t h e analysis o f e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i o n u n t i l w e

c o m m o n social w o r l d , a n d i n such a way t h a t h e w o u l d l i k e

to

s u c c e e d i n d e v e l o p i n g t a x o n o m i e s f o r t h e whole spectrum of illocution-

e s t a b l i s h a n i n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n r e c o g n i z e d as l e g i t i m a t e . T h e

ary forces d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n a p a r t i c u l a r l a n g u a g e w i t h i n t h e b o u n d a -

n e g a t i o n o f s u c h a n u t t e r a n c e m e a n s t h a t H contests t h e n o r m a t i v e

r i e s o f a s p e c i f i c basic m o d e . O n l y v e r y f e w i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t s — l i k e

l i g h t n e s s c l a i m e d by S f o r his a c t i o n .

asserting a n d ascertaining, p r o m i s i n g a n d c o m m a n d i n g , confessing

• W i t h expressive speech acts t h e s p e a k e r r e f e r s t o s o m e t h i n g i n h i s subjective w o r l d , a n d i n such a way t h a t h e w o u l d l i k e t o reveal t o a p u b l i c a n e x p e r i e n c e t o w h i c h h e has p r i v i l e g e d access. T h e n e g a tion

o f s u c h a n u t t e r a n c e m e a n s t h a t H doubts t h e c l a i m r a i s e d b y S

to t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s o f his self-representation. Communicatives

a n d disclosing—are

standardized

i n p a r t i c u l a r languages characterize n o t o n l y the r e l a t i o n i n general t o v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , b u t t h e way i n w h i c h a s p e a k e r lays c l a i m t o t r u t h , Tightness, o r t r u t h f u l n e s s f o r a s y m b o l i c e x p r e s s i o n . P r a g m a t i c i n d i cators—such

c o n s t i t u t e a f u r t h e r class o f s p e e c h acts. T h e y c a n

so g e n e r a l t h a t t h e y c a n c h a r a c t e r i z e a basic

m o d e as s u c h . N o r m a l l y , t h e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f e x p r e s s i o n

as t h e d e g r e e o f i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e p e n d e n c e o f s p e e c h

acts, t h e o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d past a n d f u t u r e , t h e

speaker/hearer

also b e u n d e r s t o o d as t h a t subclass o f r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h a c t s — q u e s -

o r i e n t a t i o n , t h e t h e m a t i c f o c u s , a n d so f o r t h — c a n h e n c e f o r t h

tioning

us t o g r a s p

a n d answering, addressing, objecting, a d m i t t i n g , a n d

the

systematically the

illocutionary

help

modifications of validity

l i k e — t h a t serve t h e organization of speech, i t s a r r a n g e m e n t i n t o t o p i c s

claims. O n l y a n e m p i r i c a l p r a g m a t i c s t h a t is t h e o r e t i c a l l y g u i d e d w i l l

a n d c o n t r i b u t i o n s , the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f conversational roles, t h e r e g u -

b e a b l e t o d e v e l o p speech-act t a x o n o m i e s t h a t are i n f o r m a t i v e , t h a t

lation o f turn-taking i n conversation, a n d the l i k e .

is, n e i t h e r b l i n d n o r e m p t y .

7 7

B u t i t makes

m o r e sense t o r e g a r d t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e s r a t h e r as a n i n d e p e n d e n t

H o w e v e r , t h e p u r e types o f l a n g u a g e use o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g

class a n d t o d e f i n e t h e m t h r o u g h t h e i r reflexive relation to the process

u n d e r s t a n d i n g a r e s u i t a b l e as g u i d e l i n e s f o r c o n s t r u c t i n g t y p o l o g i e s

of communication; f o r t h e n w e c a n also i n c l u d e t h o s e s p e e c h acts t h a t

o f linguistically mediated interaction. I n communicative action, the

either refer directly to validity claims ( a f f i r m i n g , denying, assuring,

plans o f a c t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l p a r t i c i p a n t s are c o o r d i n a t e d by m e a n s

c o n f i r m i n g , a n d the l i k e ) o r t h a t refer to h o w validity claims are

o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g effects o f s p e e c h acts. F o r

dealt w i t h argumentatively ( g r o u n d i n g , justifying, r e f u t i n g , suppos-

this reason, we m i g h t conjecture

i n g , p r o v i n g , a n d the like).

e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts also c o n s t i t u t e c o r r e s p o n d i n g types o f l i n g u i s -

F i n a l l y , t h e r e is t h e class o f operatives, t h a t is, s p e e c h a c t s — s u c h

as

that constative, regulative, a n d

t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n . T h i s is o b v i o u s l y t r u e o f r e g u l a t i v e a n d

i n f e r r i n g , i d e n t i f y i n g , c a l c u l a t i n g , classifying, c o u n t i n g , p r e d i c a t i n g ,

e x p r e s s i v e s p e e c h acts, w h i c h are c o n s t i t u t i v e f o r n o r m a t i v e l y r e g u -

a n d t h e l i k e — t h a t designate t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f constructive rules ( o f

l a t e d a n d d r a m a t u r g i c a l a c t i o n , respectively. A t first g l a n c e t h e r e

l o g i c , g r a m m a r , m a t h e m a t i c s , a n d t h e l i k e ) . O p e r a t i v e s p e e c h acts

seems t o b e n o t y p e o f i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t w o u l d c o r r e s p o n d i n a s i m i l a r

have a p e r f o r m a t i v e sense b u t no genuine communicative sense; t h e y

w a y t o c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts. H o w e v e r , t h e r e a r e c o n t e x t s o f a c t i o n

s e r v e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t o describe w h a t o n e d o e s i n c o n s t r u c t i n g s y m -

t h a t d o n o t p r i m a r i l y serve t h e p u r p o s e o f c a r r y i n g o u t c o m m u n i c a -

bolic expressions i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h r u l e s .

t i v e l y h a r m o n i z e d p l a n s o f a c t i o n ( t h a t is, p u r p o s i v e activities) b u t

7 8

I f o n e takes t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n as basic, c o m m i s s i v e s a n d d e c l a r a tives, as w e l l as i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y b o u n d s p e e c h acts ( b e t t i n g , m a r r y i n g ,

themselves

m a k e c o m m u n i c a t i o n possible a n d stabilize i t — f o r i n -

stance, c h a t t i n g , c o n v e r s i n g , a n d a r g u i n g — i n g e n e r a l , c o n v e r s a t i o n

o a t h - t a k i n g ) a n d satisfactives ( w h i c h r e l a t e t o excuses a n d a p o l o g i e s

t h a t i n a c e r t a i n c o n t e x t b e c o m e s a n e n d i n itself. I n s u c h cases, t h e

f o r v i o l a t i n g n o r m s , as w e l l as t o r e p a r a t i o n s ) , m u s t a l l b e

p r o c e s s o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is d e t a c h e d f r o m t h e i n s t r u m e n -

subsumed

164

165

Chapter 2


t a l r o l e o f s e r v i n g as a m e c h a n i s m f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n , a n d t h e communicative

n e g o t i a t i o n o f topics gains i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d

be-

c o m e s t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n . I s h a l l speak o f " c o n v e r s a tion"

whenever

t h e w e i g h t is s h i f t e d i n t h i s way f r o m

purposive

V

ja' O

a c t i v i t y t o c o m m u n i c a t i o n ; a r g u m e n t a t i o n is p e r h a p s t h e m o s t i m -

3

CO

p o r t a n t special case o f c o n v e r s a t i o n . A s i n t e r e s t i n t h e t o p i c s n e g o tiated

is p r e d o m i n a n t h e r e , w e c o u l d p e r h a p s say t h a t

s p e e c h acts have c o n s t i t u t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r

S S

constative

'u

conversations.

p u r e t y p e s — o r b e t t e r , limit cases—of

a

1

communicative action: conver-

a

•3

'•B

T h u s o u r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f s p e e c h acts c a n serve t o i n t r o d u c e t h r e e

•5 a

bJO

3

sation, normatively regulated action, a n d dramaturgical action. I f we f u r t h e r take i n t o account t h e i n t e r n a l relations between

strategic bo C

a c t i o n a n d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y acts o r i m p e r a t i v e s , w e a r r i v e a t t h e clas-

bo

a •a

•a

s i f i c a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d i n t e r a c t i o n s i n t a b l e 2.5.

c o

I

o

F o r m a l and Empirical Pragmatics E v e n i f t h e p r o g r a m f o r a t h e o r y o f s p e e c h acts t h a t I h a v e

a x

o

z

here

m e r e l y o u d i n e d w e r e c a r r i e d o u t i n d e t a i l , o n e m i g h t ask w h a t w o u l d be gained for a useful sociological t h e o r y o f action by such a f o r m a l p r a g m a t i c a p p r o a c h . T h e q u e s t i o n arises, a t least, w h y w o u l d n o t a n empirical-pragmatic a p p r o a c h be better f o r this, an a p p r o a c h

."

o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d its i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g , h o w e v e r , o n e has t o

(2)

Give m e the m o n e y I n e e d now.

s i n c e r e l y m e a n s w h a t she says a n d , o v e r a n d a b o v e t h i s , w h y she

(2')

Y o u a r e n ' t basically l o o k i n g f o r m o n e y a t a l l b u t f o r s o m e -

b e l i e v e s she m a y e x p e c t t h e a d d r e s s e e t o c o m p l y w i t h h e r i m p e r a t i v e .

t h i n g quite different (namely affection).

k n o w (as i n t h e case o f d e c l a r a t i o n s o f i n t e n t i o n ) w h y t h e s p e a k e r

A n i m p e r a t i v e is r a t i o n a l o n l y i f ( a p a r t f r o m its v i a b i l i t y ) t h e a c t o r

(2")

I c o u l d n ' t g e t t h a t a m o u n t o f m o n e y t o g e t h e r so q u i c k l y .

324

325

Chapter 7

Some F u r t h e r Clarifications of the Concept o f Communicative Rationality

i i . O f c o u r s e , t h e m o d e o f l a n g u a g e use w o u l d have t o c h a n g e as

b e h a v i o r b u t — a s i n t h e case o f a s s e r t i o n s — a c t o r - i n d e p e n d e n t

rea-

an-

sons; h o w e v e r , u n l i k e t h e reasons f o r a s s e r t i o n s , t h e y are n o t reasons

n o u n c e m e n t s o r i m p e r a t i v e s is i t s e l f t h e m a t i z e d . S u c h a c h a n g e i n

f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f states o f a f f a i r s b u t r a t h e r f o r t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f

topic

orientation toward an

n o r m a t i v e l y b i n d i n g expectations. C o n n e c t e d w i t h regulative speech

" a g r e e m e n t " t h a t goes b e y o n d m e r e " r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . " S u c h

acts s u c h as p r o m i s e s , d e c l a r a t i o n s , a n d c o m m a n d s is a v a l i d i t y c l a i m

s o o n as t h e t r u t h would

of

t h e assertions

necessitate

transition

to

presupposed an

with

such

a s w i t c h f r o m t h e use o f l a n g u a g e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r -

t h a t has a b u i l t - i n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d v i n d i c a t i o n i n p r a c t i c a l d i s -

s t a n d i n g t o o n e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d a g r e e m e n t m a y also be i l l u s t r a t e d

courses. I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g o f t h i s

i n a d i f f e r e n t way w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e e x a m p l e s g i v e n , f o r i n e a c h

s o r t o f s p e e c h act, o n e

case t h e r e is a f u r t h e r p o s s i b l e w a y i n w h i c h i t c a n be

e x p l a i n s w h y a n a c t o r feels a u t h o r i z e d o r o b l i g e d

negated.

has t o k n o w t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t

that

to p e r f o r m a

c e r t a i n a c t i o n o r w h y , as f a r as t h e a d d r e s s e e is c o n c e r n e d , she m a y (1"')

Y o u lack the g o o d w i l l necessary t o take o n such a s t r e n u -

r e c k o n w i t h h i s c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e i m p e r a t i v e . I n s o f a r as t h e p a r -

ous c o m m i t m e n t .

ticipants intersubjectively recognize a n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d

(1"")

Y o u d o n ' t have the legal a u t h o r i t y f o r that.

(2"')

N o , I d o n ' t owe y o u a n y t h i n g .

a c c e p t r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts as v a l i d f o r t h e same reasons. I n contrast to a n epistemically achieved consensus, however, this

H e r e , h o w e v e r , t h e s p e e c h acts a r e p r e s u m e d t o h a v e a d i f f e r e n t i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g . For, n o w , t h e n e g a t i o n o f (1) a n d (2) r e f e r s t o normative v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h a t c o m e i n t o p l a y o n l y w h e n i n t e n t i o n a l and and

i m p e r a t i v e sentences are " e m b e d d e d " i n n o r m a t i v e are

"authorized"

by

a

normative

(for

example, w i t h i n the framework o f a shared l i f e w o r l d ) , they can

background.

n o u n c e m e n t o f the s i g n i n g o f the c o n t r a c t c o u l d be a

contexts The

an-

commissive

speech a c t — f o r instance, a promise w i t h w h i c h the actor c o m m i t s h e r s e l f t o s o m e t h i n g — o r else a d e c l a r a t i v e s p e e c h act, w i t h w h i c h t h e s p e a k e r d i s c h a r g e s a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l task ( f o r e x a m p l e , t h e d u t y o f a representative o f the B o a r d to i n f o r m the p u b l i c ) . T h e i m p e r a t i v e t o h a n d o v e r t h e m o n e y c o u l d i m p l y a f r i e n d ' s r e q u e s t , a super i o r ' s c o m m a n d , a c r e d i t o r ' s d e m a n d , a n d so f o r t h . T h r o u g h backing o f this k i n d , declarations o f i n t e n t i o n a n d i m p e r a t i v e s are t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o normatively authorized e x p r e s s i o n s

of

w i l l s u c h as p r o m i s e s , d e c l a r a t i o n s , a n d c o m m a n d s . W i t h t h i s , t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g a n d v a l i d i t y basis o f t h e u t t e r a n c e s

change.

N o r m a t i v e reasons d o n o t d e t e r m i n e t h e p r u d e n t i a l assessments o f arbitrarily choosing d e c i s i o n m a k i n g subjects; t h e y d e t e r m i n e r a t h e r t h e d e c i s i o n s o f subjects w h o bind their wills a n d are t h u s a b l e t o e n t e r i n t o o b l i g a t i o n s . I n c o n t r a s t t o t h e case o f " n a k e d " d e c l a r a t i o n s o f i n t e n t i o n s a n d " s i m p l e " i m p e r a t i v e s , n o r m a t i v e r e a s o n s are

not

actor-relative reasons f o r one's o w n ( o r a n o t h e r ' s ) p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l

n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d less as a r e s u l t t h a n as a p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e . I n t h e case o f r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts,

the

p r e s u p p o s e d n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d a g r e e m e n t serves as a r e s e r v o i r f o r s h a r e d reasons, w h e r e a s i n t h e case o f c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts, t h e reasons themselves

serve as a v e h i c l e

motivated agreement.

for achieving a rationally

A t a n y r a t e , t h i s is h o w i t is w i t h a v a l u e

consensus e x i s t i n g w i t h i n the h o r i z o n o f t r a d i t i o n s h a n d e d d o w n i n a q u a s i - n a t u r a l way. H o w e v e r , a c e r t a i n a n a l o g y w i t h a n achieved e p i s t e m i c a g r e e m e n t is e s t a b l i s h e d o n t h e p o s t t r a d i t i o n a l l e v e l o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n w h e r e a consensus o f t h e above k i n d can n o l o n g e r be taken for granted, w i t h the result that the justifying n o r m s t h e m selves r e q u i r e j u s t i f i c a t i o n .

(At this p o i n t , I w o u l d like simply to

m e n t i o n that w h a t we n o r m a l l y deal w i t h u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g "pract i c a l r e a s o n " is n o t a n e l e m e n t a r y p h e n o m e n o n

b u t r a t h e r goes

b a c k t o a n e n t w i n e m e n t — e f f e c t e d w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f social i n t e r a c t i o n s — o f epistemic a n d teleological rationality w i t h

commu-

nicative rationality.)

C o m m u n i c a t i v e v e r s u s Strategic A c t i o n I have c o m p a r e d " n a k e d " o r " s i m p l e " a n n o u n c e m e n t s a n d i m p e r a tives w i t h n o r m a t i v e l y e m b e d d e d o n e s i n o r d e r t o u n d e r t a k e a d i f -

326

327

Chapter 7

Some F u r t h e r Clarifications o f the Concept o f Communicative Rationality

f e r e n t i a t i o n w i t h i n the d i m e n s i o n o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d to

Tightness c l a i m s as w e l l ; i n t h e case o f s t r o n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n ,

cast l i g h t o n t w o k i n d s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e l a n g u a g e use. W e n o w have

n o t j u s t a r b i t r a r y f r e e d o m o f c h o i c e b u t a u t o n o m y i n t h e sense o f

t o see h o w t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n affects t h e f u n c t i o n o f a c t i o n c o o r d i n a -

t h e c a p a c i t y t o b i n d o n e ' s w i l l o n t h e basis o f n o r m a t i v e i n s i g h t s is

t i o n . U p t o n o w we have c o n s i d e r e d o n l y s p e e c h acts, t h a t is, l i n g u i s -

presupposed.

tic

expressions,

i n c l u d i n g t h e a s p e c t f r o m w h i c h t h e y themselves

r e p r e s e n t actions. However, t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y

I n t h e case o f b o t h o f t h e e x a m p l e s c o n s i d e r e d o f e x p r e s s i o n s

of

embod-

w i l l that are n o t e m b e d d e d normatively, i n t e n t i o n a l a n d i m p e r a t i v e

i e d i n i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts e x t e n d s b e y o n d v e r b a l u t t e r a n c e s t o social

s e n t e n c e s are a l r e a d y b e i n g u s e d c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y , t h a t is, w i t h t h e

a c t i o n s o r i n t e r a c t i o n s as w e l l . ( A s p e c i a l class o f t h e s e — n o r m a t i v e l y

illocutionary a i m o f b r i n g i n g the hearer to a rationally motivated

r e g u l a t e d social a c t i o n s — h a s a l r e a d y b e e n l o o k e d a t a n y h o w i n c o n -

agreement.

n e c t i o n w i t h t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e s o f r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts.) W i t h

t o w a r d success, c a n c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r p l a n s o n l y i f o n e o f t h e m ac-

I n s u c h cases, h o w e v e r ,

t h e a c t o r s , w h o are o r i e n t e d

M a x W e b e r , w e c a n d e f i n e social a c t i o n s g e n e r a l l y as a c t i o n s w h e r e b y

cepts t h e seriousness o f t h e i n t e n t i o n s o r i m p e r a t i v e s u t t e r e d b y t h e

a c t o r s , i n p u r s u i n g t h e i r p e r s o n a l p l a n s o f a c t i o n , are also g u i d e d b y

o t h e r (as w e l l as t h e truth o f t h e b e l i e f s i m p l i e d b y t h e m ) . T w o

t h e e x p e c t e d a c t i o n o f o t h e r s . W e w i l l speak o f communicative action

v a l i d i t y c l a i m s a r e i n v o l v e d : t h e s i n c e r i t y o f t h e resolve o r t h e d e c i -

w h e r e actors c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r plans o f a c t i o n w i t h one a n o t h e r by

s i o n , a n d t h e t r u t h o f w h a t is b e l i e v e d .

way o f l i n g u i s t i c processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h a t is, i n s u c h

u n d e r s t a n d i n g d o e s n o t yet e x t e n d t o n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s .

a way that they d r a w o n t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d

On

this level, r e a c h i n g

bonding

C h a r a c t e r i s t i c f o r a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n i n t h e w e a k sense o f a n o r i e n -

p o w e r s (Bindungskrdfte) o f s p e e c h acts f o r t h i s c o o r d i n a t i o n . I n stra-

t a t i o n t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g is t h e l i m i t e d n a t u r e o f t h e

tegic a c t i o n , this p o t e n t i a l f o r c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y r e m a i n s

a g r e e m e n t , w h i c h c a n n o t be r e a c h e d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e m o t i v a t i n g

u n e x p l o i t e d , even w h e r e t h e i n t e r a c t i o n s are l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d .

i n t e n t i o n s a n d preferences

Because t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n strategic a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r plans o f

t h e i r purposive rationality. I n this respect, r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g

a c t i o n w i t h o n e a n o t h e r b y way o f a r e c i p r o c a l e x e r t i o n o f i n f l u e n c e ,

here means merely that the hearer understands the content o f the

themselves, b u t m e r e l y w i t h r e g a r d to

l a n g u a g e is u s e d n o t c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y , i n t h e sense e l u c i d a t e d , b u t

d e c l a r a t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n o r i m p e r a t i v e a n d d o e s n o t d o u b t its s e r i -

w i t h a n orientation toward consequences. F o r analysis o f t h e l a t t e r use o f

ousness ( a n d v i a b i l i t y ) . T h e basis f o r t h e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g ef-

l a n g u a g e , so-called p e r l o c u t i o n s p r o v i d e a s u i t a b l e key.

fective i n a c t i o n c o o r d i n a t i o n is solely t h e a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e c l a i m to t r u t h f u l n e s s r a i s e d f o r a d e c l a r a t i o n o f i n t e n t i o n o r f o r a n i m p e r a tive, t o w h i c h t h e d i s c e r n i b l e r a t i o n a l i t y o f t h e resolve o r o f t h e

T w o Sorts o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e A c t i o n

d e c i s i o n attests.

I w i l l s p e a k o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n in a weak sense w h e n e v e r r e a c h -

This common

basis r e s t r i c t s t h e f r e e c h o i c e o f t h e actors a c t i n g

i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g a p p l i e s t o facts a n d t o a c t o r - r e l a t i v e r e a s o n s f o r

c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y i n a n a t t i t u d e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success o n l y i n s o f a r

one-sided

as t h e y e x p e c t e a c h o t h e r t o r e n o u n c e

e x p r e s s i o n s o f w i l l ; I w i l l speak o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n

a l l i n t e n t i o n s to deceive

in a strong sense as s o o n as r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g e x t e n d s t o t h e

( w h i c h a r e p e r m i s s i b l e i n s t r a t e g i c a c t i o n ) . I n weak communicative

n o r m a t i v e reasons f o r t h e s e l e c t i o n o f t h e goals t h e m s e l v e s . I n t h e

action t h e a c t o r s d o n o t as yet e x p e c t e a c h o t h e r t o b e g u i d e d b y

l a t t e r case, t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s r e f e r t o i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d v a l u e

c o m m o n n o r m s o r values a n d t o r e c o g n i z e r e c i p r o c a l o b l i g a t i o n s . I

orientations that—going beyond

preferences—bind

w i l l s p e a k o f strong communicative action o n l y w h e n a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y

their personal

t h e i r wills. I n weak c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n the actors are o r i e n t e d

act c a n b e c r i t i c i z e d w i t h r e g a r d t o a l l t h r e e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , r e g a r d l e s s

solely t o w a r d c l a i m s t o t r u t h a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s ; i n s t r o n g c o m m u n i -

o f w h e t h e r t h e n o r m a t i v e v a l i d i t y c l a i m is r a i s e d e x p l i c i t l y , as i n

cative a c t i o n t h e y are o r i e n t e d t o w a r d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y r e c o g n i z e d

r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts ( c o m m a n d s , p r o m i s e s ) , o r r e m a i n s u n t h e m a -

i

328

329

Chapter 7

S o m e F u r t h e r Clarifications of the C o n c e p t of C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality

t i z e d . E v e n assertions a n d c o n f e s s i o n s , w i t h w h i c h e x p l i c i t c l a i m s t o

as m u c h as i t is i n t h e case o f n o r m a t i v e s t a t e m e n t s ; s t a t e m e n t s o f

t r u t h a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s are r a i s e d , c a n b e c r i t i c i z e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o

f a c t a n d " o u g h t " s e n t e n c e s have t o b e c a p a b l e o f b e i n g m a d e i n t e l -

t h e n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t o f t h e u t t e r a n c e as " o u t o f p l a c e , "

"brazen,"

l i g i b l e f o r a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s f o r t h e s a m e reasons. H o w e v e r , a c o g n i t i v e

" e m b a r r a s s i n g , " a n d so o n — i n s h o r t , as n o r m a t i v e l y i n a p p r o p r i a t e .

a g r e e m e n t a b o u t facts r e q u i r e s t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n

I n s u c h cases, t h e y v i o l a t e t h e l e g i t i m a t e l y r e g u l a t e d i n t e r p e r s o n a l

o n l y t o t a k e these a g r e e d - u p o n facts i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n t h e s u b -

r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f a social w o r l d to w h i c h t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u -

sequent course o f t h e i r i n t e r a c t i o n . I n c o n t r a s t t o a n o r m a t i v e agree-

nication belong.

m e n t , a c o g n i t i v e a g r e e m e n t d o e s n o t a f f e c t t h e way i n w h i c h t h e

F r o m n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t s s u c h as t h e s e , r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h

acts

a c t o r s select a n d p u r s u e t h e i r a c t i o n goals; i t d o e s n o t a f f e c t w h e t h e r

derive the c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h the speaker may r e g a r d h i m s e l f

t h e y a r e g u i d e d e x c l u s i v e l y by t h e i r p e r s o n a l p r e f e r e n c e s o r w h e t h e r

as a u t h o r i z e d f o r d i r e c t i v e s , c o m m a n d s ,

re-

t h e y a r e also g u i d e d b y b i n d i n g n o r m s ( a n d values h e l d i n e s t e e m

so

by a l l m e m b e r s ) . Whereas i n weak c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n o n l y c o n -

imperatives, advice,

quests, p r o m i s e s , c o n t r a c t s , n e g o t i a t i o n s , a n n o u n c e m e n t s ,

and

f o r t h . T o t h i s e x t e n t l i g h t n e s s c l a i m s , w i t h w h i c h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts

stative s p e e c h acts a n d n o r m a t i v e l y n o n a u t h o r i z e d e x p r e s s i o n s

o f t h i s s o r t are c o n n e c t e d , r e l y o n s o m e t h i n g i n a social w o r l d i n a

w i l l c o m e i n t o play, s t r o n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n d e m a n d s a use o f

m a n n e r a n a l o g o u s t o t h e way i n w h i c h t h e t r u t h c l a i m s c o n n e c t e d

l a n g u a g e t h a t also r e f e r s t o s o m e t h i n g i n a s o c i a l w o r l d . I n c i d e n t a l l y ,

w i t h c o n s t a t i v e s p e e c h acts r e l y o n s o m e t h i n g i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d

t h i s also h o l d s f o r t h o s e expressive s p e e c h acts t h a t — u n l i k e d e c l a r a -

( e v e n i f n o r m s are " c o n t r o v e r s i a l " i n a d i f f e r e n t way t h a n facts a n d

tions o f i n t e n t i o n a n d imperatives—do n o t refer to (future) actions,

a r e b y n o m e a n s i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e a c t i n g subjects i n t h e s a m e way

f o r e x a m p l e , expressions o f feeling.

of

as t h e e n t i t i e s t o w h i c h w e r e f e r w h e n w e state facts a b o u t t h e m ) . A t any rate, u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f postmetaphysical t h i n k i n g , claims to t h e n o r m a t i v e Tightness o f u t t e r a n c e s — l i k e t r u t h c l a i m s — m a y

be

d i s c u r s i v e l y v i n d i c a t e d , w h i c h m e a n s o n t h e basis o f r e a s o n s t h a t are t h e same reasons f o r a l l m e m b e r s o f t h e s o c i a l w o r l d i n q u e s t i o n . T h e a i m i n s u c h cases is a n o r m a t i v e a g r e e m e n t ; u n l i k e a m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o n c e r n i n g t h e seriousness ( a n d v i a b i l i t y ) o f r e s o l u t i o n s a n d decisions, such a n o r m a t i v e a g r e e m e n t extends n o t o n l y to the a c t o r - r e l a t i v e p r e m i s e s o f t h e p u r s u i t o f a c t i o n goals s e l e c t e d o n t h e basis o f a r b i t r a r y f r e e c h o i c e , b u t also t o t h e

actor-independent

m o d e o f s e l e c t i n g l e g i t i m a t e goals. I n s t r o n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s p r e s u m e n o t o n l y t h a t t h e y are g u i d e d b y facts a n d say w h a t t h e y h o l d t o b e t r u e a n d w h a t t h e y m e a n , b u t also t h a t t h e y pursue their action plans only w i t h i n the boundaries o f n o r m s a n d values d e e m e d to be v a l i d .

P e r l o c u t i o n s , t h e Use o f Language O r i e n t e d t o w a r d Consequences, a n d Strategic A c t i o n C o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is e m b o d i e d i n l a n g u a g e g a m e s i n w h i c h the participants take a position o n criticizable validity claims. I n the " w e a k " f o r m s o f t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e a n d c o m m u n i cative a c t i o n , c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y is e n t w i n e d w i t h t h e p u r posive

rationality

success—although

of

actors

in

an

attitude

oriented

toward

still i n such a way that t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims

dominate t h e " p e r l o c u t i o n a r y " effects t h a t i n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s m a y b e s t r i v e n f o r as w e l l . " P e r l o c u t i o n a r y " is, o f c o u r s e , t h e n a m e w e give t o t h e effects o f s p e e c h acts t h a t , i f n e e d b e , c a n also b e b r o u g h t a b o u t causally b y n o n l i n g u i s t i c a c t i o n s . I n t h e f o l l o w i n g , I a m i n t e r e s t e d i n ( i ) t h o s e s p e e c h acts a n d ( i i ) t h o s e i n t e r a c t i o n s i n

U n d e r l y i n g c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n i n t h e w e a k sense is t h e p r e s u p -

w h i c h the relationship o f dependency n o r m a l l y existing between

p o s i t i o n o f a n o b j e c t i v e w o r l d t h a t is t h e same f o r a l l ; i n s t r o n g

i l l o c u t i o n a r y a n d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s a n d effects is r e v e r s e d . I n

c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n the p a r t i c i p a n t s over a n d above this c o u n t o n

s u c h cases, c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y r e t r e a t s , l e a v i n g gaps t h a t c o n -

a s o c i a l w o r l d t h a t is s h a r e d b y t h e m i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y . C e r t a i n l y ,

stitute a k i n d o f contrast o r foil f o r the peculiar b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g

a g r e e m e n t is r e c k o n e d w i t h i n t h e case o f assertoric s t a t e m e n t s j u s t

p o w e r o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts.

331

330

S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s o f the C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y

Chapter 7

i . I w o u l d l i k e t o b e g i n b y d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h r e e classes o f p e r l o c u d o n a r y effects. P e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t s i r e s u l t g r a m m a t i c a l l y f r o m t h e c o n t e n t o f a successful i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t — a s w h e n a v a l i d c o m m a n d is e x e c u t e d , a p r o m i s e is k e p t , a d e c l a r e d i n t e n t i o n is r e a l i z e d , o r w h e n assertions a n d c o n f e s s i o n s c o n s i s t e n t l y fit w i t h t h e s u b s e q u e n t

i n g as a d e t e r r e n t o v e r s h a d o w s

its i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g as a n a n -

n o u n c e m e n t . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , a t h r e a t s u c h as (4) I f y o u d o n ' t give Peter t h e m o n e y I ' l l i n f o r m y o u r s u p e r i o r that . . .

course o f the i n t e r a c t i o n . H e r e , the i l l o c u t i o n a r y aims r u l e the per-

may

l o c u t i o n a r y o n e s . B y c o n t r a s t , p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effectS2 a r e g r a m m a t i -

n o u n c e m e n t f r o m the two points o f view o f the lack o f truthfulness

be

challenged

not

only

as

a literally

meant

"naked"

an-

c a l l y n o n r e g u l a t e d , t h a t is, c o n t i n g e n t , c o n s e q u e n c e s o f a s p e e c h act

o f the declaration o f intention a n d the lack o f t r u t h o f the existential

t h a t , h o w e v e r , o c c u r o n l y as a r e s u l t o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y success—as

p r e s u p p o s i t i o n ; i t c a n also be c h a l l e n g e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e c o n t e x -

w h e n a p i e c e o f news, d e p e n d i n g o n t h e c o n t e x t , d e l i g h t s o r startles

t u a l c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e i n t e n d e d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effect2. (4) m a y be

t h e receiver, o r w h e n a n i m p e r a t i v e e n c o u n t e r s r e s i s t a n c e , a c o n f e s -

n e g a t e d n o t o n l y w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m s expressly r a i s e d

s i o n a w a k e n s d o u b t , a n d so f o r t h . F i n a l l y , p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t s

w i t h t h i s i l l o c u t i o n a r y act, as i n

be achieved

3

can

o n l y i n a m a n n e r t h a t is inconspicuous as f a r as t h e

addressee is c o n c e r n e d ; t h e success o f t h i s k i n d o f strategic a c t i o n — a k i n d t h a t r e m a i n s l a t e n t f o r t h e o t h e r p a r t y — i s also d e p e n d e n t

on

t h e m a n i f e s t success o f a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act. T h e so-called perlocutions c o n s t i t u t e a s p e c i a l case t h a t is i n t e r e s t i n g f o r a n a l y t i c p u r p o s e s . T h e s e , t o o , r e q u i r e successful i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts as t h e i r v e h i c l e ; h o w e v e r , i n t h e case o f p e r l o c u t i o n s , e v e n t h e

(4')

You d o n ' t really m e a n w h a t y o u are saying.

(4")

Y o u d o n ' t h a v e a n y t h i n g y o u c a n use a g a i n s t m e .

I n a d d i t i o n , the context presupposed

apparent d o m i n a n c e o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m — s t i l l n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e

(4"')

for a long time.

1 2

T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y act o f a s s e r t i n g (3)

You are behaving like a swine.

takes o n a d i f f e r e n t m e a n i n g i n l i g h t o f t h e openly p u r s u e d p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f o f f e n d i n g t h e h e a r e r , f o r t h e n t h e a s s e r t i o n c o u n t s as s l a n d e r , o r as a r e p r o a c h , o r as a n i n s u l t . I n a s i m i l a r way, a n y i l l o c u t i o n a r y act w h a t s o e v e r c a n , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e c o n t e x t , c o u n t as a n expression o f m o c k e r y o r d e r i s i o n because t h e literally expressed i l l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n i n g is b l o t t e d o u t a n d r e i n t e r p r e t e d b y t h e set p e r l o c u t i o n a r y a i m o f s h o w i n g u p t h e addressee ( o r b y t h e a l r e a d y o c c u r r i n g effect o f t h i s ) . T h r e a t s represent a special sort o f p e r l o c u t i o n . T h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y a c t o f a n n o u n c i n g a c o n d i t i o n a l n e g a t i v e s a n c t i o n a c q u i r e s t h e sense o f a threat t h r o u g h the explicit reference to the i n t e n d e d perlocut i o n a r y effects o f d e t e r r i n g t h e addressee. I t s p e r l o c u t i o n a r y m e a n -

con-

tested:

last class o f p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t I

mentioned—disappears.

b y t h e speaker, w i t h i n w h i c h

(4) first b e c o m e s a t h r e a t f o r a specific a d d r e s s e e , c a n also b e

Y o u c a n ' t t h r e a t e n m e w i t h t h a t — h e has a l r e a d y k n o w n i t

I n s u c h a case t h e s p e e c h act is n o t s t r i c t l y s p e a k i n g contested; r a t h e r i t is s i m p l y e x p l a i n e d w h y t h e i n t e n d e d e f f e c t w i l l n o t o c c u r a n d w h y t h e p e r l o c u t i o n r e m a i n s ineffective. O n l y i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts t h a t c a n b e valid o r invalid m a y b e (However,

contested.

p e r l o c u t i o n s o f this k i n d can be r e - e m b e d d e d

in a

n o r m a t i v e c o n t e x t i n a s e c o n d a r y way b e c a u s e , o f c o u r s e , t h e c o n d e m n a t i o n o f m i s d e m e a n o r s i n a m o r a l o r a l e g a l sense a p p e a l s t o a n o r m a t i v e b a c k g r o u n d c o n s e n s u s a n d t o t h i s e x t e n t , d e s p i t e its p e j o r a t i v e c o n n o t a t i o n , is d i r e c t e d t o w a r d a g r e e m e n t . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , s u c h normatively embedded r e p r o a c h e s — u n l i k e a c t i o n s t h a t

do

n o t r e a l l y a i m t o say a n y t h i n g b u t , i n s a y i n g s o m e t h i n g , a i m t o o f f e n d s o m e o n e — c a n b e r e j e c t e d o n t h e basis o f reasons. S o m e t h i n g s i m i l a r t o w h a t h o l d s f o r m o r a l r e p r o a c h e s , c o n d e m n a t i o n s , a n d so o n also h o l d s , f o r e x a m p l e , f o r l e g a l t h r e a t s o f p u n i s h m e n t ; d u e t o t h e

332

333

Chapter 7

S o m e F u r t h e r C l a r i f i c a t i o n s of t h e C o n c e p t o f C o m m u n i c a t i v e R a t i o n a l i t y

l e g i t i m a t i n g b a c k g r o u n d consensus a b o u t the n o r m s o f p u n i s h m e n t

ever, t h e t r u t h values t h a t g u i d e e a c h o f t h e m f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w

themselves,

o f t h e i r respective personal

the threatened

punishment

is r e g a r d e d

as a

conse-

q u e n c e o f a l e g a l system f o r w h i c h a g r e e m e n t is p r e s u p p o s e d ) . i i . I n strategic a c t i o n c o n t e x t s , l a n g u a g e f u n c t i o n s i n g e n e r a l

p r e f e r e n c e s a n d goals are n o t t r a n s -

f o r m e d i n t o t r u t h claims, w h i c h h a v e a b u i l t - i n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d ac-

i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e c o g n i t i o n , a n d w h i c h t h e y t h e r e f o r e raise p u b l i c l y ,

c o r d i n g to the p a t t e r n o f p e r l o c u t i o n s . H e r e , linguistic c o m m u n i c a -

w i t h a c l a i m to discursive v i n d i c a t i o n . (We are f a m i l i a r w i t h this f o r m

tion

of indirect communication

is subordinated t o t h e p r e r e q u i s i t e s o f p u r p o s i v e - r a t i o n a l a c t i o n .

f r o m diplomatic intercourse

between

Strategic i n t e r a c t i o n s are d e t e r m i n e d by the decisions o f actors i n

m u t u a l l y mistrustful parties or f r o m m i l i t a r y contexts: i n the C u b a n

a n a t t i t u d e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success w h o reciprocally observe o n e

an-

m i s s i l e crisis, f o r e x a m p l e , t h e p r o v e r b i a l s h o t across t h e b o w s [ o f

other. They confront one another u n d e r conditions o f d o u b l e con-

t h e Russian ships] h a d to replace t h e missing i l l o c u t i o n a r y force o f

t i n g e n c y as o p p o n e n t s w h o , i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h e i r p e r s o n a l p l a n s o f

the verbal announcement

a c t i o n , exert influence o n o n e a n o t h e r ( n o r m a l l y o n t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l

c o u l d i n f e r t h e seriousness o f A m e r i c a n i n t e n t i o n s . )

w i t h a signal f r o m w h i c h the o p p o n e n t

attitudes o f the o t h e r ) . They suspend the performative attitudes o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n i n s o f a r as t h e y t a k e o n t h e p a r t i c i p a t -

C o m m u n i c a t i v e Rationality a n d L i n g u i s t i c W o r l d - D i s c l o s u r e

i n g speaker a n d hearer roles f r o m the perspective o f t h i r d persons. F r o m t h e l a t t e r v a n t a g e p o i n t , i l l o c u t i o n a r y a i m s are n o w r e l e v a n t

A g l a n c e at t h e results o f o u r reflections

o n l y as c o n d i t i o n s f o r p e r l o c u t i o n a r y effects. T h u s , u n l i k e i n t h e

relationship

communicative

s h o u l d n o t be c o n s t r u e d over-eagerly. N o t e v e r y use o f l a n g u a g e is

communicate

use o f l a n g u a g e ,

strategically a c t i n g subjects

who

with one another do n o t pursue their illocutionary

aims unreservedly.

between

communicative

ness n o w d i s a p p e a r s : all s p e e c h acts a r e r o b b e d o f t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g power. N o t only—as i n weak

communicative

a c t i o n — a r e the shared n o r m a t i v e contexts a n d the

corresponding

serves t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g

line of the schema): Modes o f language

c l a i m s t o n o r m a t i v e Tightness l a c k i n g h e r e ; e v e n t h e c l a i m s t o t r u t h

Propositional and intentional

Noncommunicative

a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s r a i s e d w i t h n o n r e g u l a t i v e s p e e c h acts are n o l o n g e r

sentences used " m e n t a l l y "

a i m e d d i r e c t l y at t h e r a t i o n a l m o t i v a t i o n o f t h e h e a r e r b u t a t g e t t i n g

("pure" representation and

t h e addressee t o d r a w h i s conclusions f r o m w h a t t h e s p e a k e r i n d i r e c t l y

"monological" action planning)

p a n t s u n d e r s t a n d o n e a n o t h e r , t h a t is, i f t h e y f e e d p a r a s i t i c a l l y o n a c o m m o n linguistic knowledge

( t h a t they have l e a r n e d i n contexts o f

c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n ) . Because t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f

communica-

tive a c t i o n are s u s p e n d e d , h o w e v e r , t h e y n o w m a k e use o f t h i s c o m -

on

t h e basis o f i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y r e c o g n i z e d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s (see t h e last

E x e m p l a r y types

gives h i m t o u n d e r s t a n d . N a t u r a l l y , t h i s is p o s s i b l e o n l y i f t h e p a r t i c i -

the

language

c o m m u n i c a t i v e (see t h e first e n t r y i n t h e f o l l o w i n g s c h e m a ) a n d n o t every linguistic c o m m u n i c a t i o n

W i t h t h i s , even t h e n a r r o w basis o f r e c i p r o c a l l y a s s u m e d t r u t h f u l -

so f a r shows t h a t

rationality and

use

N o r m a t i v e l y n o n e m b e d d e d ex-

Oriented toward reaching

pressions o f w i l l

u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung)

C o m p l e t e l y i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts

Oriented toward

(expressive, n o r m a t i v e , consta-

(Einverständnis)

p e t e n c e o n l y i n d i r e c t l y t o give e a c h o t h e r t o u n d e r s t a n d w h a t t h e y

tive)

b e l i e v e o r w a n t . C e r t a i n l y , s t r a t e g i c a l l y a c t i n g subjects p r e s u m e o f

Perlocutions

agreement

O r i e n t e d t o w a r d consequences

e a c h o t h e r t h a t , i n s o f a r as t h e y m a k e d e c i s i o n s r a t i o n a l l y , t h e y base

(indirect mutual

t h e i r d e c i s i o n s o n b e l i e f s t h a t t h e y themselves h o l d t o be t r u e . H o w -

u n d e r s t a n d i n g — Verständigung)

335

334


Chapter 7

T h e m o d a l i t i e s o f l a n g u a g e use specify, i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h v a r i o u s

c a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d . W e speak o f " r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n " n o t o n l y ( l i k e F r e u d )

a c t o r ' s a t t i t u d e s , f o u r d i f f e r e n t types o f l i n g u i s t i c a l l y s t r u c t u r e d ac-

i n t h e sense o f a r e t r o s p e c t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f wishes a n d a c t i o n s b u t

t i o n o f w h i c h , however, o n l y t w o e m b o d y c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y

(like Weber)

(see t h e s e c o n d a n d t h i r d e n t r i e s i n t h e f o l l o w i n g s c h e m a ) .

f o r m s o f life o f collectives. Such f o r m s o f life consist o f practices a n d a web o f traditions, institutions, customs, a n d competencies that may

Types o f a c t i o n / a c t o r ' s

b e c a l l e d " r a t i o n a l " t o t h e d e g r e e t h a t t h e y a r e conducive t o t h e

Modes o f language

attitude

s o l u t i o n o f p r o b l e m s t h a t arise. T o t h i s e x t e n t , a l t h o u g h f o r m s o f l i f e

use

Objectivating Intentional

Nonsocial action

Noncommunicative

action

Oriented toward

—

q u a l i f y as c a n d i d a t e s f o r t h e t e r m " r a t i o n a l , " t h e y d o so o n l y i n t h e

Performative

i n d i r e c t sense t h a t t h e y c o n s t i t u t e t h e m o r e o r less " c o n g e n i a l " b a c k -

—

g r o u n d f o r establishing discursive p r o c e d u r e s

and for developing

r e f l e x i v e c a p a c i t i e s . I n t h i s way, t h e y c a n p r o m o t e

capacities

for

Weak

p r o b l e m s o l v i n g t h a t f o r t h e i r p a r t enable r a t i o n a l beliefs, actions,

reaching

communicative

and communication.

understanding

action

W i t h its c a t e g o r i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d g r a m m a t i c a l p r e s t r u c t u r i n g

(Verständigung)

o f t h e b a c k g r o u n d consensus o f t h e l i f e w o r l d , l a n g u a g e m a k e s a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h i s enabling o f r a t i o n a l b e h a v i o r . I n r e a c h i n g u n d e r -

Social interactions

w i t h respect to the l i f e - c o n d u c t o f persons a n d the

Oriented toward

—

s t a n d i n g w i t h one a n o t h e r a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n the objective w o r l d ,

Strong

agreement

communicative

(Einverständnis)

action

Oriented toward

Strategic

consequences

interactions

their lifeworld. N o m a t t e r h o w h i g h they c l i m b , the h o r i z o n retreats before t h e m , w i t h the result that they can never b r i n g the lifeworld as a luhole before them—as is p o s s i b l e w i t h t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d — a n d

—

s u r v e y i t as a w h o l e . I t is n o c o i n c i d e n c e t h a t t h i s B e i n g - i n - t h e - W o r l d , as a n a l y z e d b y H e i d e g g e r , c a n b e i l l u s t r a t e d b y t h e s t r a n g e s e m i t r a n -

Clearly, the linguistic m e d i u m extends f u r t h e r t h a n c o m m u n i c a tive r a t i o n a l i t y . W i t h t h e e p i s t e m i c r a t i o n a l i t y o f k n o w l e d g e ,

the

teleological rationality o f action, a n d the communicative rationality o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g we have b e c o m e a c q u a i n t e d w i t h t h r e e a u t o n o m o u s aspects o f r a t i o n a l i t y t h a t a r e i n t e r w o v e n b y way o f t h e common m e d i u m o f l a n g u a g e . F u r t h e r m o r e , these c o r e s t r u c t u r e s a r e i n t e r n a l l y r e l a t e d t o d i s c u r s i v e p r a c t i c e s ( a n d , as S c h n a d e l b a c h rectly emphasizes, to a c o r r e s p o n d i n g reflexivity o f the

c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t o r s always a l r e a d y o p e r a t e w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n o f

cor-

consciously

s c e n d e n c e o f a l a n g u a g e t h a t , a l t h o u g h w e c a n use i t as a m e a n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , is n o n e t h e l e s s n e v e r a t o u r d i s p o s a l : w e always o p erate

t h r o u g h the m e d i u m of

language

a n d can

never

perfor-

m a t i v e l y — s o l o n g as we s p e a k — o b j e c t i f y i t as a w h o l e . I n t h i s way, t h e l i f e w o r l d , w h i c h is i t s e l f a r t i c u l a t e d i n t h e m e d i u m o f l a n g u a g e , o p e n s u p f o r its m e m b e r s a n i n t e r p r e t i v e h o r i z o n f o r e v e r y t h i n g t h a t they

experience

i n the world,

about w h i c h they reach

under-

standing, a n d f r o m w h i c h they can learn.

c o n d u c t e d life o f persons). T h e i r r e l a t i o n to the level o f a r g u m e n -

W e h a v e p r e s u m e d u p t o n o w t h a t l a n g u a g e has a s t r u c t u r e - f o r m -

t a t i o n a n d r e f l e c t i o n is as c o r r o b o r a t i v e a u t h o r i t i e s . B u t w h a t d o e s

i n g p o w e r w i t h r e g a r d to beliefs, actions, a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e u t t e r -

l a n g u a g e as such h a v e t o d o w i t h t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f b e l i e f s , a c t i o n s ,

ances. H o w e v e r , s u c h a g l o b a l r e f e r e n c e t o " l a n g u a g e " c o n c e a l s t h e

c o m m u n i c a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s , a n d persons?

g e n u i n e c o n t r i b u t i o n t h a t l a n g u a g e m a k e s w i t h its w o r l d - d i s c l o s -

A f i r s t i n d i c a t i o n is d e r i v e d f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t these

expressions

a r e e m b e d d e d i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a l i f e w o r l d t h a t is i n t u r n l i n g u i s t i -

ing productivity.

1 3

Certainly, the epistemic

core structure o f

the

p r o p o s i t i o n is p a r t o f t h e l o g i c a l s e m a n t i c s o f n a t u r a l l a n g u a g e s . T h e

336

337

Chapter 7


propositional

constitute the

a - r a t i o n a l . T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t i t is i r r a t i o n a l . E v e n a l i n g u i s t i -

structural core o f rational action. Moreover, communicative ration-

attitudes o f the c o m p e t e n t

speaker

cally c r e a t i v e r e n e w a l o f o u r v i e w o f t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e t h a t a l l o w s

a l i t y is e x p r e s s e d i n p r a c t i c e s o f s p e e c h t h a t , w i t h t h e i r d i a l o g u e r o l e s

us t o see o l d p r o b l e m s i n a c o m p l e t e l y n e w l i g h t d o e s n o t f a l l o u t o f

a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e presuppositions, are geared t o w a r d the i l l o c u -

t h e b l u e — i t is n o

d o n a r y a i m o f intersubjective r e c o g n i t i o n o f validity claims.

The

d i s c l o s i n g i n t e r p r e t i v e k n o w l e d g e m u s t c o n t i n u o u s l y p r o v e its t r u t h ;

v a r i o u s aspects o f r a t i o n a l i t y a n a l y z e d i n t h e f o r e g o i n g are reflected i n

i t m u s t p u t a c t i n g subjects i n a p o s i t i o n t o c o m e t o g r i p s w i t h w h a t

linguistic structures. However, this entire rationality complex,

happens t o t h e m i n the w o r l d , a n d t o l e a r n f r o m mistakes. O n t h e

on

" D e s t i n i n g o f B e i n g " (Seinsgeschick).

For world-

w h i c h a society's c a p a c i t i e s f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d l e a r n i n g i n a l l its

o t h e r h a n d , the retrospectively p r o d u c e d

d i m e n s i o n s d e p e n d , o b v i o u s l y d o e s n o t , as i t w e r e , s t a n d o n its o w n

i n t e r p r e t i n g l i n g u i s t i c k n o w l e d g e a r e j u s t as l i t t l e a n a u t o m a t i c r e s u l t

t w o f e e t b u t r a t h e r n e e d s a l i f e w o r l d b a c k g r o u n d w h o s e substance is

o f successful p r o b l e m s o l v i n g . I t is m o r e a m a t t e r o f stimulating t h e

revisions o f this w o r l d -

articulated i n the m e d i u m o f language: a l i f e w o r l d b a c k g r o u n d that

linguistic i m a g i n a t i o n — P e i r c e spoke o f abductive f a n t a s y — t h r o u g h

f o r m s m o r e o r less s u i t a b l e c o n t e x t s , a n d p r o v i d e s r e s o u r c e s , f o r

f a i l e d a t t e m p t s t o solve p r o b l e m s a n d f a l t e r i n g l e a r n i n g processes.

a t t e m p t s t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d t o solve p r o b l e m s .

T h e w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g p o w e r o f l a n g u a g e is n e i t h e r r a t i o n a l

nor

T h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e sense i n w h i c h f o r m s o f l i f e c a n be " r a t i o n a l "

i r r a t i o n a l ; as a n e n a b l i n g c o n d i t i o n f o r r a t i o n a l b e h a v i o r i t is i t s e l f

d i r e c t s a t t e n t i o n t o t h e c i r c u l a r p r o c e s s t h a t takes p l a c e b e t w e e n , o n

a-rational. T h r o u g h o u t the h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o p h y this a-rational char-

the one h a n d , the linguistically p r i o r interpretive knowledge

a c t e r has r e p e a t e d l y f a i l e d t o b e r e c o g n i z e d . A t a n y r a t e , p h i l o s o p h i -

that

discloses t h e w o r l d f o r a l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y i n a m o r e o r less

cal i d e a l i s m f r o m Plato t h r o u g h K a n t to H e i d e g g e r

p r o d u c t i v e way a n d , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e m o r e o r less i n n o v a t i v e

d i s c e r n e d Logos a t w o r k i n t h e t o t a l i z i n g p o w e r o f t h e s u b s t a n t i v e

i n n e r w o r l d l y l e a r n i n g processes t h a t a r e m a d e possible b y m e a n s o f

linguistic interpretation o f the w o r l d . Philosophical idealism singled

this, t h r o u g h w h i c h knowledge

o u t this "reason"

o f t h e w o r l d is a c q u i r e d a n d

p a n d e d , a n d i m p e t u s is g i v e n f o r r e v i s i o n o f t h e a n t e c e d e n t

ex-

inter-

(Vernunft)

has

as t h e c a p a c i t y f o r k n o w l e d g e

always

of the

t o t a l i t y a n d a c c o r d e d i t a n overriding i m p o r t a n c e vis-à-vis " u n d e r -

p r e t i v e k n o w l e d g e . H e r e w e s h o u l d d i s t i n g u i s h t h r e e levels: t h e level

s t a n d i n g " (Verstand),

o f l i n g u i s t i c a r t i c u l a t i o n o f t h e l i f e w o r l d b a c k g r o u n d , t h e level o f

w i t h p r o b l e m s t h a t are p o s e d f o r us i n t h e w o r l d . I n t h e o n t o l o g i c a l

c o n c e i v e d as t h e c a p a c i t y f o r d e a l i n g r a t i o n a l l y

practices o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h i n such an intersubjectively

p a r a d i g m , r e a s o n was d e e m e d t o be t h e c a p a c i t y f o r c o n t e m p l a t i v e l y

shared lifeworld, a n d the level o f the objective w o r l d , f o r m a l l y pre-

g r a s p i n g t h e o r d e r o f b e i n g as a w h o l e . O n t h e K a n t i a n r e a d i n g o f

s u p p o s e d b y t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n , as t h e t o t a l i t y o f

t h e m e n t a l i s t p a r a d i g m , r e a s o n c o n t i n u e d t o b e seen as t h e c a p a c i t y

e n t i t i e s a b o u t w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is s a i d . T h e i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n

f o r ideas, a l t h o u g h t h e w o r l d - c o n s t i t u t i n g p o w e r o f these ideas was

world-disclosure a n d i n n e r w o r l d l y l e a r n i n g processes—an interac-

n o w c o n c e i v e d as t h e t o t a l i z i n g a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f t h e t r a n s c e n d e n -

t i o n t h a t expands k n o w l e d g e a n d alters meanings—takes place o n

t a l s u b j e c t . H o w d i f f i c u l t i t is, e v e n i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c p a r a d i g m , t o

t h e m i d d l e level w h e r e , w i t h i n t h e h o r i z o n o f t h e i r l i f e w o r l d , c o m -

b r e a k f r e e f r o m i d e a l i s m , c a n be seen i n t h e case o f H e i d e g g e r w h o

m u n i c a t i v e l y a c t i n g subjects r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h o n e

another

about something i n the world. T h e w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e a l l o w s us t o see e v e r y t h i n g t h a t we e n c o u n t e r i n t h e w o r l d n o t m e r e l y f r o m t h e p o i n t o f

still

conceived

Truth"

epochal

world-disclosures

(Wahrheitsgeschehen).

as

the

"Happening

O n l y a soberly conducted,

of

pragmatic-

l i n g u i s t i c t u r n p e r m i t s us t o r e l i e v e t h e w o r l d - c o n s t i t u t i n g a n d a r t i c u l a t i n g p o w e r o f l a n g u a g e o f t h e b u r d e n o f c l a i m s t o knowledge.

v i e w o f specific aspects a n d r e l e v a n t p r o p e r t i e s b u t also as e l e m e n t s

L i n g u i s t i c w o r l d - d i s c l o s u r e stands i n a c o m p l e m e n t a r y r e l a t i o n t o

o f a w h o l e , as p a r t s o f a c a t e g o r i a l l y o r g a n i z e d t o t a l i t y . A l t h o u g h i t

t h e r a t i o n a l a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s o f s u b j e c t s i n t h e w o r l d w h o are f a l -

d o e s h a v e a relation t o r a t i o n a l i t y , i t i t s e l f is, i n a c e r t a i n sense,

l i b l e , t h o u g h c a p a b l e o f l e a r n i n g . S e e n i n t h i s way, r e a s o n

can

338

339

Chapter 7


w i t h d r a w i n t o the idealizations o f validity claims a n d the f o r m a l - p r a g -

• A s p e a k e r a n d a n addressee w h o h a v e c o m m a n d o v e r a c o m m o n

matic presupposition o f worlds; i t renounces every f o r m o f totalizing

language

knowledge, n o matter h o w concealed, w h i l e nonetheless

translation)

requiring

o f the c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t i e s — s e t i n their c o n t i n g e n t lifew o r l d contexts—a universalist a n t i c i p a t i o n o f a m u t e d

(or w h o c o u l d establish a c o m m o n

l a n g u a g e b y way o f

• A s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n t h a t c a n be s c r u t i n i z e d b y b o t h p a r t i e s

"transcen-

• A n intersubjectively shared (or sufficiently "overlapping")

dence f r o m w i t h i n " that does justice to the irrefutably u n c o n d i t i o n a l

back-

ground understanding

c h a r a c t e r o f w h a t is h e l d - t o - b e - t r u e a n d w h a t o u g h t - t o - b e .

• A l o c a l l y s i t u a t e d u t t e r a n c e o f a speaker, w i t h a "yes" o r

"no"

p o s i t i o n o n i t b y a n addressee

A p p e n d i x o n a Pragmatic T h e o r y o f Meaning

To e x p l a i n this I rely o n two assumptions: Some implications for a pragmatic t h e o r y of m e a n i n g result f r o m

1. L i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n essentially exists i n o r d e r f o r o n e p e r -

the distinction between the above-mentioned different modalities o f

son to reach u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h a n o t h e r a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n t h e

l a n g u a g e use. S u c h a t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g m o d i f i e s t h e basic thesis o f

world.

t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s as d e v e l o p e d b y F r e g e a n d W i t t g e n s t e i n i n t h e f o l l o w i n g way: o n e u n d e r s t a n d s a n i l l o c u t i o n a r y act w h e n o n e

2. R e a c h i n g

k n o w s w h a t m a k e s i t a c c e p t a b l e . T h i s thesis starts f r o m t h e p r e m i s e

validity c l a i m raised by the speaker f o r a p r o p o s i t i o n .

t h a t t h e addressee's r e c o g n i t i o n o f t h e v a l i d i t y c l a i m r a i s e d f o r w h a t

These specifications

is s a i d is t o b e w o n b y m e a n s o f a n a c c e p t a b l e speech-act o f f e r , so t h a t she is b r o u g h t t o a c c e p t t h e s p e e c h act i t s e l f as v a l i d .

1 4

At

u n d e r s t a n d i n g implies that the hearer recognizes a

o f e x p l a n a n d u m a n d explanans lead to

the

explanation:

first

glance, however, expressions o f w i l l t h a t are n o t e m b e d d e d n o r m a -

• T o u n d e r s t a n d a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n is t o k n o w h o w o n e

tively, s u c h as i m p e r a t i v e s a n d d e c l a r a t i o n s o f i n t e n t i o n (also s p e e c h

use i t i n o r d e r t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h s o m e o n e a b o u t s o m e -

acts specific t o c o n f l i c t s i t u a t i o n s s u c h as i n s u l t s a n d t h r e a t s ) , p r e s e n t

t h i n g i n the w o r l d .

counterexamples.

C l e a r l y , i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts o f t h i s k i n d h a v e

could

no the

N a t u r a l l y , u n d e r s t a n d i n g a l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n is n o t t h e s a m e as

a s s u m p t i o n that l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n aims f u n d a m e n t a l l y at

reaching understanding about something with the help of an utter-

a g r e e m e n t seems c o m p l e t e l y c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e f o r , i f t h a t w e r e t h e

a n c e h e l d t o b e v a l i d . N o n e t h e l e s s , as has a l r e a d y b e e n o b s e r v e d b y

built-in o r i e n t a t i o n toward a consensual

acceptance. I n d e e d ,

case, i t w o u l d have t o b e p o s s i b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e

t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l semantics, i n language t h e d i m e n s i o n s o f m e a n i n g

use o f l a n g u a g e as a n o r i g i n a l m o d e o f l a n g u a g e use, w h e r e a s a l l

a n d v a l i d i t y are i n t e r n a l l y c o n n e c t e d ; m o r e o v e r , t h e y are c o n n e c t e d

i n d i r e c t f o r m s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , i n w h i c h o n e p a r t y gives a n o t h e r

i n such a way t h a t one understands a speech act w h e n o n e

t o u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g , w o u l d h a v e a d e r i v a t i v e status. I w a n t t o

t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r w h i c h i t m a y b e a c c e p t e d as v a l i d . A n o r i e n t a -

knows

( i ) b e g i n b y r e c a l l i n g t h e basic f e a t u r e s o f t h e p r a g m a t i c c o n c e p t i o n

t i o n t o w a r d t h e possible v a l i d i t y o f u t t e r a n c e s is p a r t o f t h e p r a g m a t i c

o f m e a n i n g , a n d t h e n (ii) u n d e r t a k e two revisions.

conditions n o t just o f reaching understanding b u t o f linguistic u n d e r s t a n d i n g itself. ( I n c i d e n t a l l y , this e x p l a i n s w h y we can l e a r n to

i . T h e p r a g m a t i c t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g sets o u t t o e x p l a i n w h a t i t is t o u n d e r s t a n d a s p e e c h act. I n t h e p e r f o r m a n c e

speak o n l y u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e a c t i o n , t h a t is, i n

o f s p e e c h acts,

p r a c t i c e s f r o m w h i c h i t emerges w h e n t h e g i v e n l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y

sentences are used w i t h " c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t . " I n o r d e r f o r this

accepts w h a t as v a l i d . )

i n t e n t i o n to be realized, t h e f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , a t least, m u s t be satisfied:

i

340

I

341

Chapter 7

j

Some F u r t h e r Clarifications o f the Concept o f Communicative Rationality

N o t " t r u t h " b u t an epistemically inflected, generalized concept o f

t h r o u g h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e p r e f e r e n c e s o f t h e speakers i n a n a t t i t u d e

" v a l i d i t y " i n t h e sense o f " r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y " is t h e k e y c o n c e p t

oriented

for a pragmatic

perlocutions,

t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g . T h i s a p p r o a c h has, o f c o u r s e ,

t h e c o n s e q u e n c e t h a t t h e v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s o f a s p e e c h act

are

t o w a r d success ( a n d , t h u s , f r o m t h e i r p e r s p e c t i v e ) .

be

criticized f r o m the p o i n t o f view o f the t r u t h o f the assumptions

i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h the h e l p o f t h e reasons t h a t , u n d e r s t a n d a r d c o n d i -

i m p l i e d i n a g i v e n case ( a b o u t c o n d i t i o n s f o r

tions,

p e r l o c u t i o n a r y e f f e c t s ) . O f c o u r s e , s i n c e p e r l o c u t i o n s as such d o

c a n serve t o v i n d i c a t e a c o r r e s p o n d i n g v a l i d i t y c l a i m . K n o w i n g

t h e kinds of reasons w i t h w h i c h a s p e a k e r c o u l d v i n d i c a t e t h e v a l i d i t y

Even

w h i c h r i d e o n t h e b a c k s o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts, c a n

!

context-dependent not

r e p r e s e n t i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts a n d a r e n o t g e a r e d t o w a r d r a t i o n a l ac-

c l a i m r a i s e d f o r w h a t is s a i d is p a r t o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g a s p e e c h act.

ceptability, this k i n d o f negation

( T h i s e x p l a i n s t h e h o l i s t i c c o n s t i t u t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c k n o w l e d g e as

explanation

w e l l as t h e i n t e r p é n é t r a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i c k n o w l e d g e a n d k n o w l e d g e

the given circumstances.

can

h a v e t h e sense o n l y o f

as t o w h y t h e p e r l o c u t i o n a r y

an

a i m c a n n o t be a t t a i n e d i n

of the world.) i i . Previously, I h a d p r e s u m e d t h a t t h e a c c e p t a b i l i t y o f s p e e c h acts d e p e n d s o n the k n o w l e d g e o f reasons t h a t justify an

Notes

illocutionary 1. H . Schnädelbach, " U b e r Rationalität u n d Begründung," in Zur Rehabilitierung des animal rationale (Frankfurt, 1992), p. 63.

success a n d c a n r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e a n a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n s p e a k e r a n d h e a r e r . I n o w h a v e t o revise t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n i n v i e w o f differentiation w i t h i n the concept o f reaching understanding,

my and

2. H . Schnädelbach, "Philosophie als Theorie der Rationalität," in Zur Rehabilitierung, pp. 47f.

the

3. [Editor's note:] Schnädelbach (as quoted by Habermas) speaks of the "reflexive having" of expressions, knowledge, actions, intentions, utterances, and so on. Since it is not possible in English to speak of "having" expressions, actions, or utterances, "reflexive character" or "reflexivity" has been used as appropriate.

i n v i e w o f t h e status o f s p e e c h acts s u c h as i n s u l t s a n d t h r e a t s . To

understand

a s p e e c h act is t o k n o w t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r

i l l o c u t i o n a r y o r p e r l o c u t i o n a r y success t h a t t h e s p e a k e r c a n a c h i e v e w i t h i t ( w i t h t h i s , w e t a k e a c c o u n t o f p e r l o c u t i o n s w h o s e success, h o w e v e r , p r e s u p p o s e s c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y act

em-

4. Schnädelbach, Zur Rehabilitierung, p. 76.

p l o y e d i n a g i v e n case). O n e knows the c o n d i t i o n s for the i l l o c u t i o n a r y or success o f a s p e e c h act w h e n

one

5. J . Habermas, "Individuation through Socialization," in Postmetaphysical Thinking trans, by W. M. Hohengarten (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), pp. 149-204.

perlocutionary

knows the kinds of

actor-inde-

6. T h i s explains the wealth of ways of using the term "rational" in academic language; cf. the various "types of rationality" identified in H . L e n k and H . E Spinner, "Rationalitätstypen, Rationalitätskonzepte u n d Rationalitätstheorien im Uberblick," in H . Stachowiak, ed., Handbuch pragmatischen Denkens (Hamburg, 1989), pp. 1-31.

p e n d e n t o r actor-relative reasons w i t h w h i c h the speaker c o u l d v i n d i c a t e h e r v a l i d i t y c l a i m discursively. M u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g

between

a c t o r s i n a n a t t i t u d e o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success is also p o s s i b l e ( i n a w e a k sense) i f t h e seriousness ( a n d v i a b i l i t y ) o f a n a n n o u n c e m e n t or an imperative

7. H . I . Brown, Rationality (London, 1988); cf. also the early work of H . Schnädelbach, " U b e r den Realismus," Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 111 (1972): 88ff.

(or threat) can be p r o v e n w i t h the h e l p o f actor-

relative reasons for t h e r a t i o n a l i t y o f a c o r r e s p o n d i n g resolve. H e r e , those reasons "relative to a given a c t o r " are v a l i d that, f r o m t h e p o i n t

8. G . H . von Wright, Explanation and Understanding ( L o n d o n , 1991), pp. 83-132.

o f v i e w o f t h e addressee, c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d as g o o d - r e a s o n s - f o r - t h e -

9. See chapter 5 in the present volume, pp. 270ff.

given-actor.

10. E . Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A. C o r n e r (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 391ff.

T h e s e r e v i s i o n s take a c c o u n t o f t h e f a c t t h a t s p e e c h acts a r e i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts e v e n w h e n

they are c o n n e c t e d o n l y w i t h claims to

t r u t h a n d truthfulness, a n d w h e n

t h e s e c l a i m s t o t h e seriousness

(and

decisions can

viability) of intentions

and

be j u s t i f i e d

11. Cassirer assigned the "meaning function" to the epistemic use of language, which in science is specified as the mathematical representation of regularities or as

only

i

342 Chapter 7

8 Fregean "thoughts;" see E . Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. 3, trans. R. Manheim (New Haven, 1957), pp. 279ff.

Richard Rorros Pragmatic Turn (1996)

12. F. Hundschnur, "Streitspezifische Sprechakte," Protosouologie 4 (1993): 140ff. 13. O n the world-disclosing function of language, cf. Cristina Lafont, "Welterschließung u n d Referenz," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 41 (1993): 491-505; also Martin Seel, "Über Richtigkeit u n d Wahrheit," ibid.: 509-524. 14. See chapters 2 and 6 in the present volume, pp. 116ff. and pp. 278-306, respectively.

I n " T r o t s k y a n d t h e W i l d O r c h i d s " R i c h a r d R o r t y casts a r o m a n t i c eye b a c k o v e r h i s d e v e l o p m e n t as a p h i l o s o p h e r .

1

Using the f o r m o f

a "narrative o f m a t u r a t i o n , " he presents his intellectual d e v e l o p m e n t as a p r o g r e s s i v e d i s t a n c i n g o f h i m s e l f f r o m h i s a d o l e s c e n t d r e a m ; t h i s was t h e d r e a m o f f u s i n g i n a s i n g l e i m a g e t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y b e a u t y of wild orchids

a n d the liberation f r o m profane

suffering of

an

e x p l o i t e d society: t h e d e s i r e " t o h o l d r e a l i t y a n d j u s t i c e i n a s i n g l e v i s i o n " (Yeats). T h e e x i s t e n t i a l b a c k g r o u n d

to Rorty's

neopragma-

t i s m is h i s r e b e l l i o n against t h e false p r o m i s e s o f p h i l o s o p h y : a p h i l o s o p h y t h a t p r e t e n d s t o be a b l e t o satisfy a e s t h e t i c a n d m o r a l n e e d s i n s a t i s f y i n g t h e o r e t i c a l ones. O n c e u p o n a t i m e , m e t a p h y s i c s w a n t e d t o i n s t r u c t its p u p i l s i n s p i r i t u a l exercises i n v o l v i n g a p u r i f y i n g c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f the g o o d i n the beautiful. B u t the y o u t h f u l Rorty, w h o h a d a l l o w e d h i m s e l f t o be

filled

w i t h enthusiasm by Plato, Aristotle,

a n d T h o m a s A q u i n a s , p a i n f u l l y comes to realize t h a t the prospect o f c o n t a c t w i t h t h e r e a l i t y o f t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y h e l d o u t by c o n t a c t at o n c e desirable a n d reconciliatory—although

theory—a

possibly a t t a i n -

able i n t h e m o r e d e f i n i t e f o r m s o f prayer, c a n n o t be achieved a l o n g the p a t h o f

philosophy.

As a r e s u l t , R o r t y r e m e m b e r s

Dewey—

s c o r n e d by M c K e o n , L e o Strauss, a n d M o r t i m e r A d l e r — w h o h a d n o t yet b e e n c o m p l e t e l y

forgotten

i n t h e C h i c a g o o f t h e 1940s.

The

realization t h a t everyday reality conceals n o h i g h e r reality, n o r e a l m o f b e i n g - i n - i t s e l f t o be d i s c l o s e d ecstatically, a n d t h a t e v e r y d a y p r a c tices leave n o r o o m f o r a redemptory v i s i o n , c u r e s t h e s o b e r e d R o r t y

344

345

Chapter 8

R i c h a r d Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

o f h i s P l a t o n i c sickness. T o b e s u r e , t h e m e m o r y o f t h e e x o t i c s i g h t

o f a d e f l a t i o n a r y strategy as r e g a r d s t h e p r o b l e m o f t r u t h o r t h r o u g h

a n d the overpowering smell o f the w i l d orchids i n the mountains of

a n i d e a l i z a t i o n o f t h e process o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n i t s e l f . O n t h e o n e h a n d ,

h i s c h i l d h o o d i n t h e n o r t h w e s t o f N e w Jersey c a n n o t b e e x t i n g u i s h e d

I w i l l t a k e issue w i t h t h e d e f l a t i o n a r y s t r a t e g y t h a t r e l i e s o n a s e m a n -

completely.

tic c o n c e p t i o n

I t is r o u g h l y t h u s i n t e r m s o f h i s o w n l i f e - h i s t o r y t h a t R o r t y t o d a y e x p l a i n s t o us t h e m o t i v e s f o r h i s v i e w o f t h e d u a l d o m i n a n c e

of

o f t r u t h , e m p h a s i z i n g i n s t e a d t h e advantages

of a

pragmatic viewpoint. O n the o t h e r h a n d , again f r o m a pragmatic perspective, I w i l l criticize a k i n d o f epistemization o f the idea

of

D e w e y a n d H e i d e g g e r d e v e l o p e d i n Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.

t r u t h t h a t I m y s e l f o n c e p r o p o s e d . I n d o i n g so I w i l l d e v e l o p a n

Strangely e n o u g h , this self-presentation contains n o reference to the

a l t e r n a t i v e t o t h e l i q u i d a d o n o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l c l a i m s t o t r u t h . I t is

p a r a m o u n t role played by W i t t g e n s t e i n , the t h i r d party i n the alli-

t h i s l i q u i d a t i o n t h a t has u l t i m a t e l y c o m p e l l e d R o r t y t o e f f e c t a p r o b -

ance. Rorty's r e p o r t o n t h e experiences o f his o w n

lematic n a t u r a l i z a t i o n o f l i n g u i s t i f i e d r e a s o n — o r , at any rate, o n e

philosophical

d e v e l o p m e n t b r e a k s o f f w i t h h i s r e a d i n g o f H e g e l as h i s s t u d e n t days

that leads to f u r t h e r p r o b l e m s .

i n Yale d r a w t o a close a n d h i s w o r k as a p r o f e s s i o n a l p h i l o s o p h e r is o n l y a b o u t to begin. H i s t r a i n i n g i n analytic p h i l o s o p h y w i t h his real

A Platonicalfy M o t i v a t e d Anti-Platonist

t e a c h e r , W i l f r i d Sellars, h i s basic c o n v i c t i o n o f t h e t r u t h o f p h y s i c a l i s m , h i s successful c a r e e r as a y o u n g a n a l y t i c steps i n h i s d e v e l o p m e n t

philosopher—these

R i c h a r d R o r t y is o n e o f t h e m o s t o u t s t a n d i n g a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s ,

a r e n o t m e n t i o n e d at a l l . H o w e v e r , i t is

c o n s i s t e n t l y a r g u i n g i n a n i n f o r m e d a n d a s t u t e way. B u t h i s p r o g r a m

solely h i s a m b i v a l e n c e t o w a r d t h e t r a d i t i o n o f analytic p h i l o s o p h y —

f o r a p h i l o s o p h y t h a t is t o d o away w i t h a l l p h i l o s o p h y seems t o

t h e o n l y t r a d i t i o n i n w h o s e l a n g u a g e R o r t y has l e a r n e d t o a r g u e a n d

spring m o r e f r o m the melancholy of a disappointed metaphysician,

using w h i c h he continues

bril-

d r i v e n o n b y n o m i n a l i s t spurs, t h a n f r o m t h e s e l f - c r i t i c i s m o f a n

l i a n t l y — t h a t c a n e x p l a i n w h y h e a t t r i b u t e s a c u l t u r a l l y c r i t i c a l sig-

e n l i g h t e n e d a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h e r w h o wishes t o c o m p l e t e t h e l i n -

n i f i c a n c e t o h i s a n t i - P l a t o n i c t u r n , a s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a t is s u p p o s e d t o

g u i s t i c t u r n i n a p r a g m a t i s t way. I n 1 9 6 7 , w h e n a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y

to e x p o u n d

his e x c i t i n g teachings

e x t e n d far b e y o n d his o w n person a n d his private switch o f p h i l o -

( i n b o t h its v e r s i o n s ) h a d a c h i e v e d w i d e s p r e a d r e c o g n i t i o n c o m p a -

sophical

r a b l e to t h a t e n j o y e d by N e o - K a n t i a n i s m i n the p e r i o d b e f o r e t h e

allegiance.

I w i l l deal briefly w i t h this m o t i v a t i o n f o r a k i n d o f p h i l o s o p h i z i n g

F i r s t W o r l d War, R o r t y e d i t e d a r e a d e r w i t h t h e d e m a n d i n g l y l a c o n i c

t h a t w a n t s t o b i d f a r e w e l l t o i t s e l f as s u c h b e f o r e c o n f i n i n g m y s e l f t o

t i t l e , The Linguistic

d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e n e o p r a g m a t i c c o n c e p t i o n itself.

m a r k s a b r e a k i n t h e h i s t o r y o f a n a l y t i c t h o u g h t . T h e texts c o l l e c t e d

F r o m the pragmatic radicalization o f the linguistic t u r n Rorty ob-

i n t h e r e a d e r are m e a n t t o serve a d o u b l e p u r p o s e . I n s u m m i n g u p

tains a nonrealist u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f knowledge.

a t r i u m p h a n t progression,

I n order to

test

Turn.

T h i s r e a d e r , as w e c a n see i n r e t r o s p e c t ,

t h e y are i n t e n d e d a t t h e same t i m e t o

w h e t h e r h e r a d i c a l i z e s t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n i n t h e r i g h t way, I w i l l t h e n

s i g n a l its e n d . A t a n y r a t e , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g h i s l a u d a t o r y g e s t u r e , t h e

compare the contextualist approach with the epistemological

doubt

m e t a p h i l o s o p h i c a l distance f r o m w h i c h the e d i t o r c o m m e n t s o n the

o f t h e m o d e r n s k e p t i c . I n d o i n g so I w i l l r e c a l l a p r o b l e m t h a t was

t e x t s b e t r a y s t h e H e g e l i a n message t h a t e v e r y m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f S p i r i t

always c o n n e c t e d w i t h c o h e r e n c e c o n c e p t i o n s o f t r u t h : t h e p r o b l e m

t h a t a c h i e v e s m a t u r i t y is c o n d e m n e d t o d e c l i n e . A t t h a t t i m e R o r t y

o f h o w t r u t h is to b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y . I n

gave t h e s t a r t i n g s i g n a l t o a d i s c o u r s e t h a t has s i n c e g i v e n i t s e l f t h e

r e s p o n d i n g t o t h i s q u e s t i o n , t h e r e is a p a r t i n g o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l ways.

n a m e " p o s t a n a l y t i c . " I n his i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e r e a d e r , h e speculates

W h e r e a s R o r t y assimilates t r u t h t o j u s t i f i c a t i o n at t h e e x p e n s e

of

o n t h e " f u t u r e " o f a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y — a f u t u r e t h a t relegates i t t o

everyday realist i n t u i t i o n s , o t h e r s a t t e m p t to take a c c o u n t o f these

t h e past tense. I n t h e face o f a s t i l l i n t a c t o r t h o d o x y , R o r t y p o i n t s t o

i n t u i t i o n s even w i t h i n the linguistic p a r a d i g m , w h e t h e r w i t h the h e l p

three approaches that concur i n their contradiction of the general

346

347

Chapter 8


basic a s s u m p t i o n t h a t " t h e r e a r e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r u t h s s t i l l w a i t i n g t o

even today, s o m e t h i n g o f a " d o c t r i n e , " s o m e t h i n g o f t h a t i n i m i t a b l e

be d i s c o v e r e d t h a t c a n b e j u s t i f i e d o n t h e basis o f a r g u m e n t s . " R o r t y

c o m b i n a t i o n o f w i l d o r c h i d s a n d T r o t s k y : h i s i m i t a t i o n o f t h e ges-

l i n k s these

t u r e , a t least, o f i n s i g h t t h a t is at o n c e stimulating a n d rich in practical

anti-Platonic approaches w i t h

the names

Heidegger,

W i t t g e n s t e i n , a n d W a i s m a n n (whose p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o g r a m Rorty

consequence. H o w e v e r , t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l n e e d t o l i b e r a t e p h i l o s o p h y

even

f r o m the sterility o f a pusillanimous postmetaphysical t h i n k i n g can

t h e n described

i n terms similar to his later d e s c r i p t i o n

of

Dewey's p r a g m a t i s m ) .

n o w be satisfied o n l y postmetaphysically. T h e f a r e w e l l to analytic

T h i s d i s t a n c e d gaze o n a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y i n n o way c o n c e a l s t h e

p h i l o s o p h y c a n n o t lead back to a devalued metaphysics. For this

i m m e n s e r e s p e c t o f t h e i n i t i a t e w h o h e r e steps o u t s i d e o f h i s own

r e a s o n , t h e o n l y r e m a i n i n g o p t i o n is t o d r a m a t i z e t h e f a r e w e l l t o

t r a d i t i o n : " L i n g u i s t i c p h i l o s o p h y , o v e r t h e last t h i r t y years, has suc-

p h i l o s o p h y i n g e n e r a l . O n l y i f t h e act o f l e a v e - t a k i n g i t s e l f w e r e t o

ceeded

release a s h o c k a n d i n t e r v e n e i n t o e v e r y d a y l i f e w o u l d p h i l o s o p h y

in putting

the entire philosophical

tradition, f r o m

Par-

m e n i d e s t h r o u g h Descartes a n d H u m e t o B r a d l e y a n d W h i t e h e a d ,

"at t h e m o m e n t o f its f a l l " b e a b l e t o a c q u i r e a m o r e t h a n p u r e l y

o n t h e d e f e n s i v e . I t has d o n e so b y c a r e f u l a n d t h o r o u g h s c r u t i n y o f

a c a d e m i c s i g n i f i c a n c e . B u t h o w is a s e p a r a t i o n f r o m a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o -

t h e ways i n w h i c h t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h e r s h a v e u s e d l a n g u a g e i n t h e

p h y c a r r i e d o u t w i t h analytic means s u p p o s e d to achieve

f o r m u l a t i o n of their problems. This achievement

o f a k i n d that w o u l d allow analytic t h o u g h t to be i l l u m i n a t e d

is s u f f i c i e n t t o

p l a c e t h i s p e r i o d a m o n g t h e g r e a t ages o f t h e h i s t o r y o f p h i l o s o phy."

2

O n l y t h e i r r e s i s t i b i l i t y o f a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y ' s a r g u m e n t s ex-

p l a i n s R o r t y ' s real g r i e f . T h i s i r r e s i s t i b i l i t y leads h i m t o b i d f a r e w e l l t o t h e a l l u r i n g p r o m i s e s o f m e t a p h y s i c s so i r r e v o c a b l y t h a t , e v e n post analytic philosophy, there can be n o alternative to postmetaphysical t h i n k i n g . N o n e t h e l e s s , R o r t y , t h e n as n o w , is i n search o f s o m e m o d e o f t h i n k i n g t h a t , as A d o r n o p u t s i t a t t h e e n d o f Negative Dialectics, shows s o l i d a r i t y w i t h m e t a p h y s i c s a t t h e m o m e n t o f its f a l l . T h e r e is 3

m e l a n c h o l y i n the s t r a i n e d i r o n y p r o p a g a t e d today by Rorty: "Rorty's p o s t - p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n t e l l e c t u a l is i r o n i c b e c a u s e h e realizes t h a t t r u t h is n o t a l l h e w o u l d l i k e i t t o b e . I r o n y d e p e n d s essentially o n a k i n d o f nostalgie de la vérité." E v e n t h e r o m a n t i c d i v i s i o n o f l a b o r b e t w e e n 4

i r o n y a n d seriousness, H e i d e g g e r a n d Dewey, c a n n o t ease t h e p a i n . B e c a u s e m e t a p h y s i c s has c o m m a n d o n l y o v e r t h e l a n g u a g e o f k n o w l e d g e , t h e a e s t h e t i c i z a t i o n o f its c l a i m t o t r u t h a m o u n t s t o a n anaest h e t i c i z a t i o n o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n as m e r e c u l t u r a l h e r i t a g e . T h e r e a l i t y o f t h e ideas w i t h w h i c h P l a t o n i c t h e o r y p r o m i s e d t o b r i n g us i n t o c o n t a c t is n o t t h e s a m e as t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y a p p e a l o f aesthetic experience. W h a t once aspired to be " t r u e " i n an e m p h a t i c sense c a n n o t b e p r e s e r v e d i n t h e m o d e o f t h e " e d i f y i n g . " I n f o r f e i t i n g t h e b i n d i n g p o w e r o f its j u d g m e n t s , m e t a p h y s i c s also loses its substance.

5

one

last t i m e i n t h e b r i l l i a n c e o f its g r e a t t r a d i t i o n ? A s I u n d e r s t a n d h i s naturalistically refracted impulse

toward great philosophy,

Rorty

w a n t s t o give a n a n s w e r t o t h i s q u e s t i o n . R o r t y b e g i n s b y s h o w i n g t h a t a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y shares a f u n d a m e n t a l p r e m i s e w i t h t h e t r a d i t i o n i t has d e v a l u e d . T h i s is t h e c o n viction

that

"there

are

philosophical

truths

still w a i t i n g

to

be

discovered." T h a n k s to a very G e r m a n idea that he borrows f r o m H e i d e g g e r , R o r t y t h e n a t t r i b u t e s a d r a m a t i c w e i g h t i n e s s t o t h i s proton pseudos o f W e s t e r n m e t a p h y s i c s . A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s H e i d e g g e r i a n t h e sis, t h e p r o f a n e d e s t i n i e s o f t h e West a r e s u p p o s e d t o have b e e n f u l f i l l e d o n l y w i t h i n t h e scope o f a n e p o c h a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f b e i n g ; m o r e o v e r , o n e g o v e r n e d by m e t a p h y s i c s . O f c o u r s e , u n l i k e H e i d e g ger, R o r t y c a n n o l o n g e r stylize p o s t m e t a p h y s i c a l t h i n k i n g p o s t a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y as a sacral " C o m m e m o r a t i o n o f B e i n g " des Seins).

(Andenken

Rorty understands the deconstruction o f the history o f

m e t a p h y s i c s as a d e f l a t i o n a r y d i a g n o s i s i n W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s sense. A n t i P l a t o n i s m d r a w s its e m i n e n t l y p r a c t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o n l y f r o m t h e severity o f t h e sickness t h a t i t is s u p p o s e d t o c u r e . T h e u n m a s k i n g o f P l a t o n i s m is a i m e d , b e y o n d

s c h o l a s t i c i s m , a t a c u l t u r e t h a t is

a l i e n a t e d f r o m i t s e l f p l a t o n i s t i c a l l y . I f , finally, t h e act o f l e a v e - t a k i n g is n o t t o e x h a u s t i t s e l f i n n e g a t i o n , R o r t y has t o o p e n a p e r s p e c t i v e that w i l l enable a new self-understanding that can take the place o f

W h e n o n e is f a c e d w i t h t h i s d i l e m m a i t is possible t o u n d e r s t a n d the move Rorty

significance

finally

m a k e s i n o r d e r t o give b a c k t o p h i l o s o p h y ,

t h e o l d , d e f l a t e d o n e . W i t h t h i s e n d i n view, h e a d a p t s D e w e y ' s H e g e l i a n i s m f o r h i s o w n p u r p o s e s i n s u c h a w a y t h a t a p e r s p e c t i v e is

348

349

Chapter 8


o p e n e d o n everyday practices t h a t are n o l o n g e r d i s t o r t e d by P l a t o n -

j e c t s . F o r classical e p i s t e m o l o g y , t h e r e is a c o n s t i t u t i v e s e p a r a t i o n

ist p r e j u d i c e s . I n t h i s way, l i k e H e g e l , e v e n t h e "last" p h i l o s o p h e r s

between i n n e r a n d o u t e r — a d u a l i s m o f m i n d a n d b o d y — t h a t ap-

capture their own time once more i n thought.

peals t o t h e p r i v i l e g e d access o f t h e first p e r s o n t o h e r o w n e x p e r i -

Rorty knows, o f course, that such m e t a p h i l o s o p h i c a l reflections cannot transform the self-understanding of philosophy o n

their

o w n . H e cannot get outside o f p h i l o s o p h y w i t h o u t using p h i l o s o p h y

ences. T h e e p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y o f t h e first p e r s o n is s u s t a i n e d by t h e wellsprings o f three paradigm-constituting assumptions:

6

t o c l a i m v a l i d i t y f o r h i s t h o u g h t s . R o r t y w o u l d n o t be t h e s c r u p u l o u s

1. t h a t w e k n o w o u r o w n m e n t a l states b e t t e r t h a n a n y t h i n g else;

a n d sensitive, suggestive, a n d s t i m u l a t i n g p h i l o s o p h e r t h a t h e is w e r e

2. t h a t k n o w i n g takes place e s s e n t i a l l y i n t h e m o d e o f r e p r e s e n t i n g

h e t o i n s i s t solely o n t h e r h e t o r i c a l r o l e o f t h e r e e d u c a t o r .

objects; a n d

The

d i a g n o s i s o f a false s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t o o , r e m a i n s a m a t t e r f o r

3. t h a t t h e t r u t h o f j u d g m e n t s rests o n e v i d e n c e t h a t v o u c h e s f o r

t h e o r y . R o r t y has t o p r o v i d e a r g u m e n t s i f h e is t o c o n v i n c e

their certainty.

his

colleagues that the "Platonic" d i s t i n c t i o n between " c o n v i n c i n g " a n d " p e r s u a d i n g " m a k e s n o sense. H e has t o p r o v e t h a t e v e n a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y r e m a i n s captivated by t h e spell o f the metaphysics against w h i c h i t is b a t t l i n g .

i n these

assumptions three c o r r e s p o n d i n g m y t h s — t h e

m y t h o f t h e g i v e n , t h e m y t h o f t h o u g h t as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , a n d t h e m y t h o f t r u t h as c e r t a i n t y . I t is s h o w n t h a t we c a n n o t c i r c u m v e n t t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n as t h e m e d i u m f o r t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d c o m -

T h e Pragmatic T u r n

m u n i c a t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e . T h e r e are n o u n i n t e r p r e t e d

R o r t y ' s i m p o r t a n t b o o k Philosophy and the Mirror

of Nature

(1979)

p u r s u e s a n u m b e r o f a i m s . B y c a r r y i n g t h r o u g h t o its c o n c l u s i o n t h e d e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f the p h i l o s o p h y o f consciousness, he wants to c o m p l e t e a n o t yet c o m p l e t e d l i n g u i s t i c t u r n i n such a way t h a t t h e Platonist self-misunderstanding deeply r o o t e d i n o u r culture

be-

c o m e s o b v i o u s . M y d o u b t s r e l a t e t o t h e s e c o n d step. D o e s t h e p r a g m a t i c t u r n , w h i c h R o r t y r i g h t l y d e m a n d s i n t h e face o f s e m a n t i cally f i x a t e d a p p r o a c h e s ,

Analysis o f t h e linguistic f o r m o f o u r experiences a n d t h o u g h t s discovers

r e q u i r e a n anti-realist u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f

knowledge? a. T h e basic c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e subj e c t has, f r o m P e i r c e t o W i t t g e n s t e i n a n d H e i d e g g e r , b e e n s u b j e c t e d to a relendess critique. R o r t y draws o n c o n t e m p o r a r y a r g u m e n t s ( a m o n g o t h e r s t h o s e o f Sellars, Q u i n e , a n d D a v i d s o n ) i n o r d e r t o e x p o s e t h e basic a s s u m p t i o n s o f m e n t a l i s t e p i s t e m o l o g y w i t h a v i e w t o a c r i t i q u e o f r e a s o n . T h e i d e a s o f "self-consciousness"

a n d "sub-

j e c t i v i t y " i m p l y t h a t t h e k n o w i n g s u b j e c t c a n disclose f o r i t s e l f a p r i v i l e g e d s p h e r e o f i m m e d i a t e l y accessible a n d a b s o l u t e l y c e r t a i n e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse) w h e n i t d o e s n o t f o c u s d i r e c t l y o n o b j e c t s b u t r a t h e r r e f l e x i v e l y o n i t s o w n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s (Vorstellungen)

o f ob-

experiences

t h a t a r e accessible o n l y p r i v a t e l y a n d e l u d e p u b l i c

(Erfahrungen)

assessment a n d c o r r e c t i o n . M o r e o v e r , k n o w l e d g e o f o b j e c t s is n o t a n adequate m o d e l for the knowledge o f propositionally structured states o f a f f a i r s . F i n a l l y , t r u t h is a p r o p e r t y o f c r i t i c i z a b l e p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t c a n n o t b e l o s t ; i t c a n be j u s t i f i e d o n l y o n t h e basis o f r e a s o n s — it

cannot

be

authenticated o n

the

basis

of

the

genesis

of

representations. Rorty, o f course, connects this critique o f m e n t a l i s m w i t h the m o r e far-reaching a i m o f radicalizing t h e linguistic t u r n . H e wants to show "what philosophy o f language comes to w h e n p u r i f i e d o f attempts to i m i t a t e e i t h e r K a n t o r H u m e . " So l o n g as t h e s u b j e c t - o b j e c t r e l a t i o n 7

is p r o j e c t e d m e r e l y o n t o t h e s e n t e n c e - f a c t

relation, the resulting

s e m a n t i c answers r e m a i n t i e d t o t h e m e n t a l i s t m o d e o f q u e s t i o n i n g . So l o n g as t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (Darstellung) t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (Vorstellung)

o f states o f a f f a i r s — l i k e

o f o b j e c t s — i s c o n c e i v e d as a t w o 8

p l a c e r e l a t i o n , t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n leaves t h e " m i r r o r o f n a t u r e " — a s metaphor for knowledge of the world—intact. R o r t y w a n t s t o m a k e f u l l use o f t h e c o n c e p t u a l scope t h a t has b e e n o p e n e d u p by t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e . W i t h Peirce he replaces

350

351

Chapter 8


the two-place r e l a t i o n between r e p r e s e n t i n g subject a n d r e p r e s e n t e d

r e a l i s m " i n m i n d . P u t n a m ' s " i n t e r n a l r e a l i s m " stresses t h a t t h e c o n -

object w i t h a three-place relation: the symbolic expression, w h i c h

d i t i o n s f o r t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f k n o w l e d g e c a n b e a n a l y z e d o n l y in

a c c o r d s v a l i d i t y to a state o f a f f a i r s , f o r a n i n t e r p r e t i v e c o m m u n i t y .

connection with t h e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y o f a m u t u a l

T h e o b j e c d v e w o r l d is n o l o n g e r s o m e t h i n g t o be r e f l e c t e d b u t is

u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h r e g a r d t o w h a t is s a i d . O n R o r t y ' s view, " b e i n g

s i m p l y t h e c o m m o n reference p o i n t f o r a process o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n

i n t o u c h w i t h r e a l i t y " has t o b e t r a n s l a t e d i n t o t h e j a r g o n o f " b e i n g

(Verständigung) b e t w e e n m e m b e r s o f a c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y

i n t o u c h w i t h a h u m a n c o m m u n i t y " i n such a way that the realist

w h o come to an u n d e r s t a n d i n g w i t h one another w i t h regard to

i n t u i t i o n , to w h i c h m e n t a l i s m w a n t e d to d o j u s t i c e w i t h its M i r r o r o f

s o m e t h i n g . T h e c o m m u n i c a t e d facts c a n n o m o r e be s e p a r a t e d f r o m

N a t u r e a n d its c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d r e p r e -

the

p r o c e s s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a n t h e supposition o f a n o b j e c t i v e

sented object, disappears completely. F o r Rorty, every k i n d o f r e p r e -

w o r l d can be separated f r o m t h e intersubjectively shared i n t e r p r e t i v e

s e n t a t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d is a d a n g e r o u s i l l u s i o n .

h o r i z o n w i t h i n w h i c h t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n c o m m u n i c a t i o n always a l -

Now,

ready operate. Knowledge n o longer coincides w i t h the correspon-

epistemic a u t h o r i t y o f t h e first p e r s o n singular, w h o inspects h e r

d e n c e o f s e n t e n c e s a n d facts. F o r t h i s r e a s o n , o n l y a l i n g u i s t i c t u r n

i n n e r self, is d i s p l a c e d b y t h e first p e r s o n p l u r a l , b y t h e " w e " o f a

t h a t is r i g o r o u s l y c a r r i e d t o i t s c o n c l u s i o n c a n , i n o v e r c o m i n g m e n -

c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y i n f r o n t o f w h i c h every person justifies

t a l i s m , also o v e r c o m e t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l m o d e l o f t h e M i r r o r o f

h e r views. H o w e v e r , i t is o n l y t h e e m p i r i c i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h i s n e w

Nature.

i t is c e r t a i n l y t h e case t h a t w i t h

the pragmatic t u r n

the

a u t h o r i t y t h a t leads R o r t y t o e q u a t e " k n o w l e d g e " w i t h w h a t is ac-

b. I a m i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r R o r t y p e r f o r m s t h i s plausible pragmatic radicalization o f the linguistic t u r n i n the right way. I f w e n o l o n g e r r e f e r e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s o n l y t o l a n g u a g e as t h e g r a m m a t i c a l f o r m o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (Darstellung),

c e p t e d as " r a t i o n a l " a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s t a n d a r d s o f o u r r e s p e c t i v e communities. J u s t as L o c k e a n d H u m e r e f e r r e d t h e i r m e n t a l i s t r e f l e c t i o n s t o t h e

relating

consciousness o f e m p i r i c a l persons, K a n t r e f e r r e d his to t h e c o n -

t h e m i n s t e a d t o l a n g u a g e as i t is u s e d c o m m u n i c a t i v e l y , a n a d d i t i o n a l

sciousness o f subjects " i n g e n e r a l . " L i n g u i s t i c r e f l e c t i o n s , t o o , c a n b e

d i m e n s i o n is o p e n e d u p . T h i s is t h e d i m e n s i o n o f i n t e r a c t i o n s a n d

r e f e r r e d to c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t i e s " i n g e n e r a l . " B u t Rorty, t h e

t r a d i t i o n s — t h e p u b l i c space o f a l i f e w o r l d s h a r e d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y

n o m i n a l i s t , stands i n t h e e m p i r i c i s t t r a d i t i o n a n d refers epistemic

b y t h e l a n g u a g e users. T h i s e x p a n d e d p e r s p e c t i v e allows t h e e n t w i n -

a u t h o r i t y t o t h e r e c e i v e d social p r a c t i c e s o f " o u r " r e s p e c t i v e c o m m u -

i n g o f the epistemological a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s o f the socialized i n d i -

n i t i e s . H e r e g a r d s t h e u r g e " t o see s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n as

v i d u a l s w i t h t h e i r processes o f c o o p e r a t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n t o

m o r e t h a n j u s t such practices"

b e c o m e visible: "Once conversation replaces c o n f r o n t a t i o n [ o f per-

the c o n n e c t i o n between, o n the one h a n d , the contextualist inter-

sons w i t h states o f a f f a i r s ] , t h e n o t i o n o f t h e m i n d as M i r r o r

11

as n o n s e n s i c a l . R o r t y h i m s e l f m a k e s

of

p r e t a t i o n o f the pragmatic t u r n a n d the anti-realist u n d e r s t a n d i n g

N a t u r e can be discarded." T h e " c o m m u n i c a t i o n m o d e l " o f k n o w l -

o f knowledge a n d , o n the o t h e r h a n d , the rejection o f a Kantian

e d g e h i g h l i g h t s t h e p o i n t t h a t w e h a v e n o u n f i l t e r e d access t o e n t i -

strategy o f analysis:

ties

reaching

t i o n a n d o f s o c i a l p r a c t i c e , r a t h e r t h a n as a n a t t e m p t t o m i r r o r

9

in

the

world,

independent

of

our

practices

of

12

" I f we see k n o w l e d g e as a m a t t e r o f c o n v e r s a -

u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d the linguistically constituted context o f o u r life-

n a t u r e , w e w i l l n o t b e l i k e l y t o envisage a m e t a p r a c t i c e w h i c h w i l l b e

w o r l d : " E l e m e n t s o f w h a t w e c a l l ' l a n g u a g e ' o r ' m i n d ' p e n e t r a t e so

the c r i t i q u e o f all possible f o r m s o f social p r a c t i c e . "

deeply i n t o w h a t we call 'reality' t h a t t h e v e r y p r o j e c t o f r e p r e s e n t i n g

a f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c a t t e m p t w o u l d be a relapse i n t o f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m .

o u r s e l v e s as b e i n g ' m a p p e r s ' o f s o m e t h i n g ' l a n g u a g e - i n d e p e n d e n t '

I n t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y t h e basic c o n c e p t s o f s u b j e c t i v i t y a n d

is f a t a l l y c o m p r o m i s e d f r o m t h e s t a r t . "

self-consciousness h a d , w i t h " t h e m e n t a l " a n d " i n t r o s p e c t i o n , " r e -

1 0

T h i s is a q u o t a t i o n f r o m H i l a r y P u t n a m w i t h w h i c h R o r t y agrees. N o n e t h e l e s s , R o r t y has s o m e t h i n g o t h e r t h a n P u t n a m ' s " i n t e r n a l

1 3

For Rorty, such

spectively, s e c u r e d f o r p h i l o s o p h y — w h i c h a t t h a t t i m e h a d t o find a new

place

alongside t h e n e w

physics—an

object d o m a i n a n d

a

352

353

Chapter 8

Richard Rorty's Pragmatic T u r n

m e t h o d o f its o w n . A s a r e s u l t , p h i l o s o p h y was a b l e t o u n d e r s t a n d

k n o w i n g d o n o t offer a n s w e r s , g o o d o r b a d , to L o c k e ' s q u e s t i o n s , any m o r e

i t s e l f as a f o u n d a t i o n a l d i s c i p l i n e t h a t c h e c k e d a n d j u s t i f i e d t h e

t h a n L o c k e ' s r e m a r k s a b o u t l a n g u a g e offer a n s w e r s to F r e g e ' s .

f o u n d a d o n s o f all o t h e r disciplines. R o r t y n o w holds t h e view that

T h i s discontinuity m e a n s t h a t p h i l o s o p h i c a l q u e s t i o n s are n o t s e t t l e d

t h i s same f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g takes possession o f t h e

through

p h i l o s o p h y o f l a n g u a g e w h e n i t stops s h o r t o f a c o n t e x t u a l i s t u n d e r -

t h e y h a v e lost t h e i r m a r k e t v a l u e . T h i s also h o l d s f o r t h e q u e s t i o n o f

standing of knowledge

the objectivity o f

a n d justification. Universalist approaches

within the philosophy of language—such

as R o r t y d i s c e r n s i n D u m -

m e t t a n d others—come u n d e r suspicion

here.

On

finding

1 6

t h e r i g h t answers; r a t h e r , t h e y f a l l i n t o disuse o n c e knowledge.

t h e m e n t a l i s t view, o b j e c t i v i t y is e n s u r e d

when

the

repre-

s e n t i n g s u b j e c t r e f e r s t o h i s o b j e c t s i n t h e r i g h t way. H e c h e c k s t h e subjectivity o f his representations against the objective w o r l d : "'sub-

C o n t e x t u a l i s m a n d S k e p t i c i s m as P r o b l e m s S p e c i f i c to P a r t i c u l a r

j e c t i v e ' c o n t r a s t s w i t h ' c o r r e s p o n d i n g t o w h a t is o u t t h e r e , ' a n d t h u s

Paradigms

m e a n s s o m e t h i n g l i k e ' a p r o d u c t o n l y o f w h a t is i n h e r e . ' "

1 7

O n the

l i n g u i s t i c view, t h e s u b j e c t i v i t y o f b e l i e f s is n o l o n g e r c h e c k e d d i r e c t l y W h e n R o r t y r e g a r d s c o n t e x t u a l i s m as t h e necessary c o n s e q u e n c e o f

t h r o u g h confrontation with the w o r l d b u t rather t h r o u g h

a f u l l y e x e c u t e d l i n g u i s t i c t u r n , h e is r i g h t i n o n e r e s p e c t : c o n t e x t u -

agreement

a l i s m d e s i g n a t e s a p r o b l e m t h a t c a n o c c u r o n l y w h e n we r e c k o n

on

t i v e ' c o n s i d e r a t i o n is o n e w h i c h has b e e n , o r w o u l d b e , o r s h o u l d b e ,

a r e a s o n e m b o d i e d i n l i n g u i s t i c p r a c t i c e s . B u t h e is w r o n g t o

see

set aside b y r a t i o n a l d i s c u s s a n t s . "

achieved i n the c o m m u n i c a t i o n 18

public

c o m m u n i t y : "a ' s u b j e c -

W i t h this, the intersubjectivity o f

c o n t e x t u a l i s m at t h e s a m e time as t h e s o l u t i o n t o t h e p r o b l e m . T h i s

r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g replaces t h e objectivity o f e x p e r i e n c e . T h e

v i e w has its r o o t s , i f I a m c o r r e c t , i n a p r o b l e m a t i c u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f

l a n g u a g e - w o r l d relation becomes d e p e n d e n t o n c o m m u n i c a t i o n

philosophical

paradigms.

tween speakers a n d hearers. T h e v e r t i c a l w o r l d - r e l a t i o n o f

L i k e , for example, A p e l a n d T u g e n d h a t , Rorty regards the history of philosophy metaphysics,

as a succession o f t h r e e p a r a d i g m s . epistemology, a n d the philosophy

course, the philosophy

o f language

H e speaks o f

of language.

1 4

Of

has d e t a c h e d i t s e l f o n l y h a l f -

be-

repre-

s e n t a t i o n s of s o m e t h i n g , o r o f p r o p o s i t i o n s about s o m e t h i n g , is b e n t b a c k , as i t w e r e , i n t o t h e h o r i z o n t a l l i n e o f t h e c o o p e r a t i o n participants i n communication.

The

intersubjectivity of the

of life-

w o r l d , w h i c h subjects i n h a b i t i n c o m m o n , displaces t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f

h e a r t e d l y f r o m m e n t a l i s m . R o r t y believes t h a t t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n can

a w o r l d t h a t a solitary subject confronts: "For pragmatists, the desire

b e c a r r i e d t h r o u g h c o n s i s t e n t l y t o its c o n c l u s i o n o n l y i n t h e f o r m o f

f o r o b j e c t i v i t y is n o t t h e desire t o escape t h e l i m i t a t i o n s o f o n e ' s

a c r i t i q u e o f r e a s o n t h a t takes its leave o f p h i l o s o p h y as s u c h .

c o m m u n i t y , b u t s i m p l y t h e d e s i r e f o r as m u c h i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e a g r e e -

1 5

I t is

n o t j u s t t h e p r o b l e m s b u t t h e way o f p o s i n g p r o b l e m s t h a t c h a n g e s

m e n t as p o s s i b l e . "

w i t h the leap f r o m one p a r a d i g m to the next:

p e r s p e c t i v e s i n s u c h a way t h a t e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s as s u c h a r e

1 9

R o r t y w a n t s t o say: t h e p a r a d i g m s h i f t t r a n s f o r m s

passé. T h i s p i c t u r e o f a n c i e n t a n d m e d i e v a l p h i l o s o p h y as c o n c e r n e d w i t h things, t h e p h i l o s o p h y of t h e s e v e n t e e n t h t h r o u g h t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r i e s w i t h

T h e contextualist understanding o f the linguistic t u r n f r o m which

ideas, a n d t h e e n l i g h t e n e d c o n t e m p o r a r y p h i l o s o p h i c a l s c e n e w i t h words h a s

t h i s a n t i - r e a l i s m e m e r g e s goes b a c k t o a c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e rise a n d

c o n s i d e r a b l e plausibility. B u t this s e q u e n c e s h o u l d n o t be t h o u g h t o f as

fall o f paradigms that excludes c o n t i n u i t y o f theme between

o f f e r i n g t h r e e c o n t r a s t i n g views a b o u t w h a t is p r i m a r y , o r w h a t is f o u n d a -

d i g m s as w e l l as l e a r n i n g processes t h a t e x t e n d across p a r a d i g m s . I n

tional.

I t is n o t that A r i s t o d e t h o u g h t t h a t o n e c o u l d best e x p l a i n i d e a s a n d

w o r d s i n t e r m s o f t h i n g s , w h e r e a s D e s c a r t e s a n d R u s s e l l r e a r r a n g e d the o r d e r o f e x p l a n a t i o n . It w o u l d b e m o r e c o r r e c t to say that A r i s t o t l e d i d n o t

f a c t , t h e t e r m s i n w h i c h we u n d e r t a k e a c o m p a r i s o n reflect o u r hermeneutic

of

para-

paradigms

starting p o i n t — a n d , thus, our own

para-

h a v e — d i d n o t feel the n e e d o f — a t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e , a n d t h a t D e s c a r t e s

d i g m . T h a t R o r t y selects f o r h i s c o m p a r i s o n

the frame of reference

a n d L o c k e d i d not have a theory of m e a n i n g . Aristotle's r e m a r k s about

o f o b j e c t i v i t y , s u b j e c t i v i t y , a n d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y r e s u l t s f r o m t h e basic

354

355

Chapter 8


c o n c e p t u a l perspective f r o m w h i c h we n o w describe the linguistic

tained the ontological

paradigm: the idea that the t r u t h o f j u d g -

t u r n o f mentalism. O n the other h a n d , the picture o f a contingent

ments

by

succession o f i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e

g r o u n d e d i n r e a l i t y itself. T h i s " r e s i d u a l " i n t u i t i o n , as i t w e r e , w h i c h

p a r a d i g m s d o e s n o t i n a n y w a y fit

w i t h this description. Rather, f r o m the perspective o f t h a t f r a m e

is g u a r a n t e e d

a

correspondence

with

r e a l i t y t h a t is

of

h a d l o s t n o n e o f its suggestive p o w e r w i t h t h e s w i t c h o f p a r a d i g m ,

r e f e r e n c e , a s u b s e q u e n t p a r a d i g m a p p e a r s as a n a n s w e r t o a p r o b l e m

j o i n e d f o r c e s w i t h t h e n e w s k e p t i c a l q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r — a n d i f so,

b e q u e a t h e d t o us b y t h e d é v a l u a t i o n o f a p r e c e d i n g p a r a d i g m . C o n -

how—the

t r a r y t o w h a t R o r t y supposes, p a r a d i g m s d o n o t f o r m a n a r b i t r a r y

j e c t is t o b e g r o u n d e d o n t h e basis o f t h e e v i d e n c e o f o u r

sequence b u t a dialectical relationship.

e x p e r i e n c e s . I t is t h i s q u e s t i o n t h a t first p r o v o k e s t h e

N o m i n a l i s m r o b b e d t h i n g s o f t h e i r i n n e r n a t u r e o r essence a n d

agreement between representation a n d represented

quarrel between Idealism and E m p i r i c i s m .

2 0

ob-

subjective

epistemological

However, i n light o f this

d e c l a r e d g e n e r a l c o n c e p t s t o b e c o n s t r u c t i o n s o f a finite m i n d . S i n c e

g e n e a l o g y i t b e c o m e s a p p a r e n t — a n d t h i s is m y m a i n p o i n t

then, comprehending

has

t h a t c o n t e x t u a l i s m is b u i l t i n t o t h e basic c o n c e p t s o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c

lacked a foundation i n the conceptual constitution o f beings them-

p a r a d i g m j u s t as s k e p t i c i s m is b u i l t i n t o m e n t a l i s m . A n d o n c e a g a i n ,

selves. T h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e o f m i n d w i t h n a t u r e c o u l d n o l o n g e r b e

t h e i n t u i t i o n s r e g a r d i n g t r u t h t h a t c a r r y o v e r o r s t i c k w i t h us f r o m

t h a t w h i c h is (das Seiende) i n t h o u g h t

c o n c e i v e d as a n o n t o l o g i c a l

relation, the rules of logic n o

longer

r e f l e c t e d t h e laws o f r e a l i t y . Pace R o r t y , m e n t a l i s m r e s p o n d e d t o t h i s challenge by reversing the o r d e r

o f explanation. I f the

knowing

subject can n o l o n g e r derive the standards f o r k n o w l e d g e f r o m a d i s q u a l i f i e d n a t u r e , i t has t o s u p p l y t h e s e s t a n d a r d s f r o m a r e f l e x i v e l y d i s c l o s e d s u b j e c t i v i t y itself. R e a s o n , o n c e e m b o d i e d o b j e c t i v e l y i n t h e o r d e r o f n a t u r e , retreats to subjective spirit. W i t h this, the b e i n g - i n i t s e l f (das Ansich) o f t h e w o r l d is t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f a w o r l d t h a t is g i v e n f o r us, t h e s u b j e c t s — a w o r l d o f o b j e c t s o r phenomena.

represented

Whereas u p to t h e n , the constitution of the

w o r l d o f being-in-itself h a d enabled a correspondence o f with reality—true judgments—the p o s e d to be

truth of judgments

thought

is n o w

measured against the certainty o f evident

sup-

subjective

e x p e r i e n c e s (Erlebnisse). R e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l t h o u g h t leads t o o b j e c t i v e k n o w l e d g e i n s o f a r as i t c o m p r e h e n d s t h e p h e n o m e n a l

world.

the

preceding

paradigms

lead

to

an

intensification

of

here—

these

problems. J u s t as t h e d i s p u t e a b o u t u n i v e r s a l s at t h e e n d o f t h e M i d d l e A g e s c o n t r i b u t e d to the devaluation o f objective reason, the critique of i n t r o s p e c t i o n a n d p s y c h o l o g i s m at t h e e n d o f t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y c o n t r i b u t e d to t h e shaking u p o f subjective

reason. W i t h the

d i s p l a c e m e n t o f reason f r o m the consciousness o f t h e k n o w i n g subj e c t t o l a n g u a g e as t h e m e d i u m b y m e a n s o f w h i c h a c t i n g subjects c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h one another, the o r d e r o f explanation changes o n c e m o r e . E p i s t e m i c a u t h o r i t y passes o v e r f r o m t h e k n o w i n g s u b ject, w h i c h supplies f r o m w i t h i n herself the standards for the objectivity o f experience, to the j u s t i f i c a t o r y practices o f a linguistic c o m m u n i t y . U p to t h e n the intersubjective v a l i d i t y o f beliefs h a d resulted f r o m the subsequent convergence o f thoughts or

repre-

sentations. I n t e r p e r s o n a l agreement h a d b e e n e x p l a i n e d by the o n -

T h e c o n c e p t o f subjectivity i n t r o d u c e d a dualism between i n n e r

tological a n c h o r i n g o f t r u e j u d g m e n t s o r by the shared psychological

a n d outer that seemed to c o n f r o n t the h u m a n m i n d w i t h the pre-

o r t r a n s c e n d e n t a l e n d o w m e n t s o f k n o w i n g subjects. F o l l o w i n g t h e

c a r i o u s task o f b r i d g i n g a c h a s m . W i t h t h i s , t h e way was c l e a r e d f o r

linguistic t u r n , however, all explanations take the p r i m a c y o f a c o m -

s k e p t i c i s m i n its m o d e r n f o r m . T h e p r i v a t e c h a r a c t e r o f m y p a r t i c u -

mon

l a r s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s , o n w h i c h m y a b s o l u t e c e r t a i n t y is b a s e d ,

events i n t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , l i k e t h e s e l f - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n

simultaneously

p r o v i d e s r e a s o n t o d o u b t w h e t h e r t h e w o r l d as i t

ences t o w h i c h t h e s u b j e c t has p r i v i l e g e d access, is d e p e n d e n t o n t h e

a p p e a r s t o us is n o t i n f a c t a n i l l u s i o n . T h i s s k e p t i c i s m is a n c h o r e d

i n t e r p r e t i n g use o f a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e . F o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e t e r m

l a n g u a g e as t h e i r s t a r t i n g p o i n t . D e s c r i p t i o n

o f states

and

of experi-

i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i v e c o n c e p t s o f t h e m e n t a l i s t p a r a d i g m . A t t h e same

" i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e " n o l o n g e r r e f e r s t o t h e r e s u l t o f a n observed c o n v e r -

t i m e i t c o n j u r e s u p m e m o r i e s o f t h e c o m f o r t i n g i n t u i t i o n t h a t sus-

gence o f the thoughts or representations o f various persons, b u t to

356

357

Chapter 8


the p r i o r commonality of a linguistic preunderstanding or horizon

m e n t t h a t w o u l d e n s u e i f we did have t o a s s i m i l a t e t h e o n e t o t h e

o f the l i f e w o r l d — w h i c h , f r o m the perspective

of the participants

o t h e r . I t m a k e s us aware o f a p r o b l e m t o w h i c h c u l t u r a l r e l a t i v i s m

which the members of a c o m m u -

p r e s e n t s a s o l u t i o n t h a t is false b e c a u s e i t c o n t a i n s a p e r f o r m a t i v e

t h e m s e l v e s , is presupposed—within nication

community

find

themselves

before

they

reach

under-

self-con tradic t i o n .

s t a n d i n g w i t h one a n o t h e r a b o u t s o m e t h i n g i n the w o r l d . Finally, the c o n t e x t u a l i s t q u e s t i o n , w h i c h s h o u l d n o t b e c o n f u s e d w i t h t h e epis-

T r u t h and Justification

t e m o l o g i c a l d o u b t o f skepticism, results f r o m this p r i m a c y o f the i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y o f s h a r e d b e l i e f s o v e r c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h r e a l i t y (a

Even i n the comprehension

r e a l i t y t h a t is always a l r e a d y i n t e r p r e t e d ) .

o r events i n t h e w o r l d , l a n g u a g e

o f e l e m e n t a r y p r o p o s i t i o n s a b o u t states a n d reality interpenetrate i n a

T h e p r a g m a t i c t u r n leaves n o r o o m f o r d o u b t as t o t h e e x i s t e n c e

m a n n e r t h a t f o r us is indissoluble. T h e r e is n o n a t u r a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f

o f a w o r l d i n d e p e n d e n t o f o u r descriptions. Rather, f r o m Peirce to

isolating the constraints o f reality that m a k e a statement t r u e f r o m

W i t t g e n s t e i n , t h e i d l e C a r t e s i a n d o u b t has b e e n r e j e c t e d as a p e r f o r -

t h e s e m a n t i c r u l e s t h a t lay d o w n t h e s e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s . W e

mative contradiction: " I f you tried to d o u b t everything you w o u l d

e x p l a i n w h a t a f a c t is o n l y w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e t r u t h o f a s t a t e m e n t

n o t g e t as f a r as d o u b t i n g a n y t h i n g . T h e g a m e o f d o u b t i n g i t s e l f

o f f a c t , a n d w e c a n e x p l a i n w h a t is r e a l o n l y i n t e r m s o f w h a t is t r u e .

p r e s u p p o s e s c e r t a i n t y . " O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a l l k n o w l e d g e is f a l l i b l e

B e i n g , as T u g e n d h a t says, is v e r i t a t i v e b e i n g .

a n d , w h e n i t is p r o b l e m a t i z e d , d e p e n d e n t o n j u s t i f i c a t i o n . A s s o o n

beliefs o r sentences can i n t u r n be j u s t i f i e d o n l y w i t h t h e h e l p o f

as t h e s t a n d a r d f o r t h e o b j e c t i v i t y o f k n o w l e d g e passes f r o m p r i v a t e

o t h e r b e l i e f s a n d sentences, w e c a n n o t b r e a k f r e e f r o m t h e m a g i c

certainty to p u b l i c practices o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n , " t r u t h " becomes a three-

circle o f o u r language.

p l a c e c o n c e p t o f v a l i d i t y . T h e v a l i d i t y o f p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t are f a l l i b l e

conception

i n p r i n c i p l e is s h o w n t o b e v a l i d i t y t h a t is j u s t i f i e d for a p u b l i c .

B e c a u s e w e c a n n o t c o n f r o n t o u r s e n t e n c e s w i t h a n y t h i n g t h a t is n o t

2 1

2 2

2 4

Since the t r u t h

can

of

T h i s f a c t suggests a n a n t i - f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t

o f knowledge and a holistic conception

of justification.

M o r e o v e r , because i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c p a r a d i g m t r u t h s are accessible

i t s e l f a l r e a d y s a t u r a t e d l i n g u i s t i c a l l y , n o basic p r o p o s i t i o n s c a n

o n l y i n t h e f o r m o f r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y , t h e q u e s t i o n n o w arises o f

d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h a t w o u l d be p r i v i l e g e d i n b e i n g a b l e t o l e g i t i m a t e

h o w i n t h a t case t h e t r u t h o f a p r o p o s i t i o n c a n s t i l l b e i s o l a t e d f r o m

t h e m s e l v e s , t h e r e b y s e r v i n g as t h e basis f o r a l i n e a r c h a i n o f j u s t i f i c a -

t h e c o n t e x t i n w h i c h i t is j u s t i f i e d . U n e a s e w i t h r e g a r d t o t h i s p r o b -

t i o n . R o r t y r i g h t l y e m p h a s i z e s " t h a t n o t h i n g c o u n t s as j u s t i f i c a t i o n

l e m b r i n g s o l d e r i n t u i t i o n s a b o u t t r u t h o n t o t h e scene. I t a w a k e n s

unless b y r e f e r e n c e t o w h a t we a l r e a d y a c c e p t , " c o n c l u d i n g f r o m t h i s

m e m o r y o f a correspondence between t h o u g h t a n d reality or o f a

" t h a t t h e r e is n o way t o g e t o u t s i d e o u r b e l i e f s a n d o u r l a n g u a g e

c o n t a c t w i t h r e a l i t y t h a t is s e n s o r i a l l y c e r t a i n . T h e s e i m a g e s , w h i c h

as t o find s o m e test o t h e r t h a n c o h e r e n c e . "

be

so

2 5

a r e s t i l l suggestive d e s p i t e h a v i n g l o s t t h e i r b e a r i n g s , are b e h i n d t h e

T h i s does n o t m e a n , o f course, t h a t the c o h e r e n c e o f o u r beliefs

q u e s t i o n o f h o w the fact t h a t we c a n n o t transcend t h e linguistic

is s u f f i c i e n t t o c l a r i f y t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e c o n c e p t o f t r u t h — w h i c h

h o r i z o n o f j u s t i f i e d b e l i e f s is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t t r u e

has n o w b e c o m e c e n t r a l . C e r t a i n l y , w i t h i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c p a r a d i g m ,

p r o p o s i t i o n s fit t h e facts. I t is n o a c c i d e n t t h a t t h e

contemporary

t h e t r u t h o f a p r o p o s i t i o n c a n n o l o n g e r be c o n c e i v e d as c o r r e s p o n -

r a t i o n a l i t y debates circle a r o u n d t h e concepts o f t r u t h a n d refer-

d e n c e w i t h s o m e t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d , f o r o t h e r w i s e w e w o u l d have t o

ence.

J u s t as s k e p t i c i s m d o e s n o t s i m p l y a s s i m i l a t e b e i n g t o a p p e a r -

be able to "get outside o f language" w h i l e u s i n g language. Obviously,

a n c e b u t r a t h e r gives e x p r e s s i o n t o t h e uneasy f e e l i n g t h a t w e might

we c a n n o t c o m p a r e linguistic expressions w i t h a piece o f u n i n t e r -

b e u n a b l e t o separate t h e o n e f r o m t h e o t h e r c o n v i n c i n g l y , n e i t h e r

p r e t e d o r " n a k e d " r e a l i t y — t h a t is, w i t h a r e f e r e n c e t h a t e l u d e s o u r

does contextualism, p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d , equate t r u t h w i t h j u s t i f i e d

linguistically b o u n d inspection.

a s s e r t i b i l i t y . C o n t e x t u a l i s m is r a t h e r a n e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e e m b a r r a s s -

i d e a o f t r u t h was a b l e t o t a k e a c c o u n t o f a f u n d a m e n t a l aspect o f t h e

2 3

2 6

Nonetheless,

the correspondence

358

359

Chapter 8


m e a n i n g of the truth predicate. This aspect—the n o t i o n o f uncon-

n o t be u n d e r s t o o d i n analogy to the inwardness o f a r e p r e s e n t i n g

d i t i o n a l v a l i d i t y — i s swept u n d e r t h e c a r p e t i f t h e t r u t h o f a p r o p o s i -

s u b j e c t w h o is as i f c u t o f f f r o m t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d o f r e p r e s e n t a b l e

t i o n is c o n c e i v e d as c o h e r e n c e w i t h o t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n s o r as j u s t i f i e d

objects. T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between j u s t i f i a b i l i t y a n d t r u t h , a l t h o u g h

a s s e r t i b i l i t y w i t h i n a n i n t e r c o n n e c t e d system o f assertions.

Whereas

i n n e e d o f c l a r i f i c a t i o n , signals n o g u l f b e t w e e n i n n e r a n d o u t e r , n o

w e l l - j u s t i f i e d assertions c a n t u r n o u t t o b e false, we u n d e r s t a n d t r u t h

d u a l i s m t h a t w o u l d h a v e t o b e bridged a n d t h a t c o u l d give rise t o t h e

as a p r o p e r t y o f p r o p o s i t i o n s " t h a t c a n n o t b e l o s t . " C o h e r e n c e d e -

s k e p t i c a l d o u b t as t o w h e t h e r o u r w o r l d as a whole is a n i l l u s i o n . T h e

p e n d s o n practices o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n t h a t l e t themselves be g u i d e d by

p r a g m a t i c t u r n p u l l s t h e r u g f r o m u n d e r t h i s s k e p t i c i s m . T h e r e is a

standards that change f r o m t i m e to time. T h i s accounts f o r

the

s i m p l e r e a s o n f o r t h i s . I n e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s , w e c a n n o t use l a n g u a g e

q u e s t i o n : " W h y does t h e f a c t t h a t o u r b e l i e f s h a n g t o g e t h e r , s u p p o s -

w i t h o u t acting. S p e e c h i t s e l f is e f f e c t e d i n t h e m o d e o f s p e e c h acts

i n g t h e y d o , give t h e least i n d i c a t i o n t h a t t h e y are t r u e ? "

t h a t f o r t h e i r p a r t are e m b e d d e d i n c o n t e x t s o f i n t e r a c t i o n a n d

2 7

shows t h a t , w i t h t h e

e n t w i n e d w i t h i n s t r u m e n t a l a c t i o n s . A s a c t o r s , t h a t is, as i n t e r a c t i n g

t r u t h o f propositions, we c o n n e c t an u n c o n d i t i o n a l c l a i m that p o i n t s

a n d i n t e r v e n i n g subjects, we are always a l r e a d y i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h i n g s

beyond

a b o u t w h i c h we can m a k e statements. L a n g u a g e games a n d practices

T h e " c a u t i o n a r y " use o f t h e t r u t h p r e d i c a t e

2 8

a l l t h e e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e t o us; o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e

e v i d e n c e t h a t we b r i n g t o b e a r i n o u r c o n t e x t s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n has t o

a r e interwoven.

be s u f f i c i e n t t o e n t i t l e us t o raise t r u t h c l a i m s . A l t h o u g h t r u t h c a n -

s e n t e n c e s ( a n d t e x t s ) a n d d r a w u p o n a g r e e m e n t i n a c t i o n a n d ex-

n o t b e r e d u c e d t o c o h e r e n c e a n d j u s t i f i e d a s s e r t i b i l i t y , t h e r e has t o

perience

be a n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n between t r u t h a n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n . H o w , o t h e r -

view o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f language, Husserl's

w i s e , w o u l d i t be p o s s i b l e t o e x p l a i n t h a t a j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f "p"

conclusion

suc-

cessful a c c o r d i n g t o o u r s t a n d a r d s , p o i n t s i n f a v o r o f t h e t r u t h o f "p," a l t h o u g h t r u t h is n o t a n a c h i e v e m e n t t e r m a n d d o e s n o t d e p e n d o n

" A t some p o i n t . . .

w e h a v e t o leave t h e r e a l m o f

(for instance, i n using a p r e d i c a t e ) . "

3 1

F r o m the point of phenomenological

t h a t w e "are always a l r e a d y i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h i n g s " is

confirmed. F o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e q u e s t i o n as t o t h e i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n

be-

h o w w e l l a p r o p o s i t i o n can be j u s t i f i e d . M i c h a e l W i l l i a m s describes

tween justification a n d t r u t h — a connection

t h e p r o b l e m as a d i s p u t e b e t w e e n

ideas:

may, i n l i g h t o f t h e e v i d e n c e a v a i l a b l e t o us, raise a n u n c o n d i t i o n a l

" F i r s t , t h a t i f we are t o h a v e k n o w l e d g e o f a n o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , t h e

t r u t h c l a i m t h a t a i m s b e y o n d w h a t is j u s t i f i e d — i s n o t a n e p i s t e m o -

t r u t h o f w h a t we b e l i e v e a b o u t t h e w o r l d m u s t be i n d e p e n d e n t

l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n . I t is n o t a m a t t e r o f b e i n g o r a p p e a r a n c e . W h a t is

two equally reasonable

of

that explains why we

o u r b e l i e v i n g i t ; a n d s e c o n d , t h a t j u s t i f i c a t i o n is i n e v i t a b l y a m a t t e r

at stake is n o t t h e c o r r e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f r e a l i t y b u t

o f s u p p o r t i n g b e l i e f s b y o t h e r b e l i e f s , h e n c e i n t h i s m i n i m a l sense a

practices t h a t m u s t n o t fall a p a r t . T h e c o n t e x t u a l i s t unease betrays a

matter of coherence."

w o r r y a b o u t the s m o o t h f u n c t i o n i n g o f language games a n d prac-

2 9

T h i s leads t o t h e c o n t e x t u a l i s t q u e s t i o n :

everyday

"Given o n l y knowledge o f w h a t we believe a b o u t the w o r l d , a n d h o w

tices. R e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g c a n n o t f u n c t i o n u n l e s s t h e p a r t i c i -

o u r b e l i e f s fit t o g e t h e r , h o w c a n w e s h o w t h a t these b e l i e f s a r e l i k e l y

pants refer

to be t r u e ? "

i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e l y s h a r e d p u b l i c space w i t h w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g t h a t is

3 0

T h i s q u e s t i o n s h o u l d n o t , however, be u n d e r s t o o d i n a skeptical sense, f o r t h e c o n c e p t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h w e , as s o c i a l i z e d i n d i -

to

a single

objective

m e r e l y s u b j e c t i v e c a n be c o n t r a s t e d .

w o r l d , thereby stabilizing the 3 2

T h i s supposition o f an objec-

tive w o r l d t h a t is i n d e p e n d e n t o f o u r d e s c r i p t i o n s f u l f i l l s a f u n c t i o n a l

ourselves w i t h i n t h e l i n g u i s t i c a l l y dis-

r e q u i r e m e n t o f o u r processes o f c o o p e r a t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a t i o n .

lifeworld

unquestioned

W i t h o u t t h i s s u p p o s i t i o n , e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s , w h i c h rest o n t h e ( i n a

b a c k g r o u n d o f intersubjectively shared convictions, proven true i n

c e r t a i n sense) P l a t o n i c d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n b e l i e v i n g a n d k n o w i n g

p r a c t i c e , w h i c h m a k e s n o n s e n s e o f t o t a l d o u b t as t o t h e accessibility

unreservedly, w o u l d c o m e apart at t h e s e a m s .

o f t h e w o r l d . L a n g u a g e , w h i c h w e c a n n o t "get o u t s i d e o f , " s h o u l d

t h a t w e c a n n o t i n a n y way m a k e this d i s t i n c t i o n , t h e r e s u l t w o u l d b e

v i d u a l s , always a l r e a d y closed

horizon

of

find our

implies

an

33

I f i t were to t u r n o u t

360

361

Chapter 8


more

o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n r e m o v e d f r o m everyday practices remains w i t h i n

of a pathological self-misunderstanding than an illusionary

u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e w o r l d . W h e r e a s s k e p t i c i s m suspects a n e p i s t e -

the reach o f "our" practices.

35

m o l o g i c a l mistake, c o n t e x t u a l i s m supposes a faulty c o n s t r u c t i o n i n t h e way w e l i v e .

T h e S e m a n t i c C o n c e p t i o n o f T r u t h a n d the P r a g m a t i c P e r s p e c t i v e

C o n t e x t u a l i s m t h u s raises t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r a n d , as t h e case m a y b e , h o w t h e i n t u i t i o n t h a t w e c a n i n p r i n c i p l e d i s t i n g u i s h be-

T a r s k i ' s C o n v e n t i o n T — " ' / > ' is t r u e i f a n d o n l y i f p"—relies

t w e e n w h a t - i s - t r u e a n d w h a t - i s - h e l d - t o - b e - t r u e c a n be b r o u g h t i n t o

d i s q u o t a t i o n a l use o f t h e t r u t h - p r e d i c a t e t h a t c a n b e i l l u s t r a t e d , f o r

on

a

t h e l i n g u i s t i c p a r a d i g m . T h i s i n t u i t i o n is n o t " r e a l i s t " i n a n e p i s t e m o -

instance, by the example o f c o n f i r m i n g a n o t h e r person's statements:

l o g i c a l sense. E v e n w i t h i n p r a g m a t i s m t h e r e is a p a r t i n g o f ways w i t h

" E v e r y t h i n g t h a t t h e witness said y e s t e r d a y is t r u e . " W i t h t h i s , t h e

r e g a r d to this question. Some are pragmatist e n o u g h

s p e a k e r m a k e s h i s o w n " e v e r y t h i n g t h a t was s a i d , " i n s u c h a way t h a t

to take seri-

ously realist everyday i n t u i t i o n s a n d t h e i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n between

he could repeat the corresponding

a s s e r t i o n s i n t h e stance o f t h e

c o h e r e n c e a n d t r u t h t o w h i c h t h e y attest. O t h e r s r e g a r d t h e a t t e m p t

first

t o c l a r i f y t h i s i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n as h o p e l e s s , t r e a t i n g e v e r y d a y r e a l i s m

respects. F o r o n e t h i n g , i t p e r m i t s a g e n e r a l i z i n g r e f e r e n c e t o s u b j e c t

p e r s o n . T h i s use o f t h e t r u t h - p r e d i c a t e is n o t e w o r t h y i n t w o

as a n i l l u s i o n . R o r t y w a n t s t o c o m b a t t h i s i l l u s i o n b y r h e t o r i c a l m e a n s

m a t t e r t h a t is m e n t i o n e d b u t n o t e x p l i c i t l y r e p r o d u c e d . T a r s k i uses

a n d p l e a d s f o r reeducation. W e o u g h t t o g e t u s e d t o r e p l a c i n g t h e

this p r o p e r t y i n o r d e r to construct a t h e o r y o f t r u t h that generalizes

desire for objectivity w i t h the desire f o r solidarity a n d , w i t h W i l l i a m

a b o u t a l l i n s t a n c e s o f "T." F o r a n o t h e r , t h e t r u t h - p r e d i c a t e w h e n

J a m e s , t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g " t r u t h " as n o m o r e t h a n t h a t i n w h i c h i t is

u s e d i n t h i s way establishes a r e l a t i o n o f e q u i v a l e n c e

g o o d for "us"—the liberal members of Western culture or Western

linguistic expressions—the

s o c i e t i e s — t o b e l i e v e . " [ P r a g m a t i s t s ] s h o u l d see themselves as w o r k -

e x p l a n a t i o n d e p e n d s o n t h i s . For, t h r o u g h e x p l o i t i n g t h e d i s q u o t a -

between

two

w h o l e p o i n t o f t h e T a r s k i a n strategy o f

i n g a t t h e i n t e r f a c e b e t w e e n t h e c o m m o n sense o f t h e i r c o m m u n i t y ,

t i o n a l f u n c t i o n , t h e inaccessible " r e l a t i o n o f c o r r e s p o n d e n c e " b e -

a c o m m o n sense m u c h i n f l u e n c e d b y G r e e k m e t a p h y s i c s

tween language a n d w o r l d o r sentence a n d fact can, i t appears,

a n d by

reflected o n t o the tangible semantic r e l a t i o n between

i n a l o n g - t e r m a t t e m p t t o c h a n g e t h e r h e t o r i c , t h e c o m m o n sense,

sions o f a n o b j e c t l a n g u a g e a n d t h o s e o f a m e t a l a n g u a g e . N o m a t t e r

a n d self-image o f t h e i r c o m m u n i t y . "

expres-

h o w o n e conceives o f the representational f u n c t i o n o f statements,

3 4

Before I deal w i t h this proposal, I w o u l d like to e x a m i n e w h e t h e r t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s are as h o p e l e s s as R o r t y assumes. A r e t h e r e

not

p l a u s i b l e e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r t h e f a c t t h a t a j u s t i f i c a t i o n successful i n o u r justificatory context points i n favor o f the

context-independent

t r u t h o f the j u s t i f i e d proposition? I a m interested above a l l i n two attempts at explanation: a d e f l a t i o n a r y one, w h i c h disputes " t r u t h " has a n y n a t u r e a t a l l t h a t c o u l d

the

be

p a t r i a r c h a l m o n o t h e i s m . . . . T h e y s h o u l d see t h e m s e l v e s as i n v o l v e d

be

explicated; a n d

that an

epistemic one, w h i c h inflates the idea o f a j u s t i f i e d assertion to such an extent that t r u t h becomes the l i m i t concept o f the justificatory p r o c e s s . O f c o u r s e , d e f l a t i o n i s m is p e r m i t t e d t o d e - t h e m a t i z e c o n c e p t o f t r u t h o n l y to t h e e x t e n t that this c o n c e p t can

the

continue

w h e t h e r as " s a t i s f a c t i o n " o f t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s o r as " f i t t i n g " t h e facts t o t h e s e n t e n c e s , w h a t is e n v i s a g e d relations that extend beyond

i n e v e r y case a r e p i c t u r e s

language.

of

I t n o w seems p o s s i b l e t o

c l a r i f y t h e s e p i c t u r e s w i t h t h e h e l p o f i n t e r r e l a t i o n s t h a t are internal to language. T h i s i n i t i a l i d e a a l l o w s us t o u n d e r s t a n d w h y w e a k r e a l i s t c o n n o t a t i o n s are c o n n e c t e d w i t h the semantic c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h — e v e n i f i t is c l e a r t h a t t h i s c o n c e p t i o n c a n n o t s u s t a i n a s t r o n g e p i s t e mological realism i n the manner o f Popper.

3 6

N o w , i t was a l r e a d y n o t i c e d a t a n e a r l y stage t h a t t h e conception

semantic

o f t r u t h c a n n o t v i n d i c a t e its c l a i m t o b e a n e x p l i c a t i o n

o f the full m e a n i n g o f the truth-predicate.

3 7

T h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s is

t o s u s t a i n r e a l i s t i n t u i t i o n s , w h i l e t h e e p i s t e m i c c o n c e p t i o n is a l l o w e d

t h a t t h e d i s q u o t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n is n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y i n f o r m a t i v e b e -

t o i d e a l i z e t h e j u s t i f i c a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t its i d e a

cause i t a l r e a d y p r e s u p p o s e s t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n .

One

362

363

Chapter 8


u n d e r s t a n d s t h e m e a n i n g o f C o n v e n t i o n T w h e n o n e k n o w s w h a t is

o f science, f o r r e n d e r i n g the f u n c t i o n i n g o f o u r practices o f i n q u i r y

meant (gemeint) w i t h t h e r i g h t - h a n d side o f t h e b i c o n d i t i o n a l . T h e

t r a n s p a r e n t , this w o u l d still n o t dissipate t h e c o n t e x t u a l i s t d o u b t . For

m e a n i n g o f the truth-predicate i n the sentence " E v e r y t h i n g that the

this d o u b t extends n o t only to the c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d selection

of

w i t n e s s s a i d yesterday is t r u e " is p a r a s i t i c o n t h e assertoric m o d e o f

theories, i n d e e d , n o t o n l y to practices o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n i n general:

t h e witness's assertions. B e f o r e a n a s s e r t i o n c a n be q u o t e d i t m u s t

w i t h respect to the pretheoretical o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t r u t h i n h e r e n t

b e " p u t f o r w a r d . " T h i s p r e s u p p o s e d assertoric m e a n i n g c a n b e a n a -

i n everyday practices, a semantic c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h simply does n o t

l y z e d i n a n e x e m p l a r y way b y l o o k i n g a t t h e "yes" a n d " n o "

h e l p us a t a l l .

positions

o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n w h o raise o r r e f u t e o b j e c t i o n s ; i t

W h a t is a t issue i n t h e l i f e w o r l d is t h e p r a g m a t i c r o l e o f a J a n u s -

c a n also b e seen i n t h e " c a u t i o n a r y " use o f t h e t r u t h - p r e d i c a t e , w h i c h

faced n o t i o n o f t r u t h that mediates between behavioral certainty a n d

recalls t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h a t even

d i s c u r s i v e l y j u s t i f i e d assertibility. I n t h e n e t w o r k o f e s t a b l i s h e d

prac-

p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t have b e e n j u s t i f i e d c o n v i n c i n g l y c a n t u r n o u t t o b e

tices, i m p l i c i t l y r a i s e d v a l i d i t y c l a i m s t h a t have b e e n a c c e p t e d a g a i n s t

false.

a b r o a d b a c k g r o u n d o f intersubjectively shared convictions

The truth-predicate belongs—though

n o t exclusively—to the lan-

consti-

tute the rails a l o n g w h i c h behavioral certainties r u n . However,

as

be

s o o n as t h e s e c e r t a i n t i e s lose t h e i r h o l d i n t h e c o r s e t o f s e l f - e v i d e n t

e l u c i d a t e d ( a t least p a r t l y ) a c c o r d i n g t o its f u n c t i o n s i n t h i s l a n g u a g e

beliefs, they are j o l t e d o u t o f t r a n q u i l l i t y a n d t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a

g u a g e g a m e o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n . F o r t h i s r e a s o n its m e a n i n g c a n

g a m e , t h a t is, i n t h e pragmatic dimension o f a p a r t i c u l a r e m p l o y m e n t

corresponding

o f the predicate. Whoever confines herself to the semantic

subject to debate. I n m o v i n g f r o m a c t i o n to r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e ,

dimen-

n u m b e r o f questionable topics that thereby b e c o m e 3 9

sion o f sentences a n d o f m e t a l i n g u i s t i c c o m m e n t a r i e s o n sentences

w h a t is i n i t i a l l y n a i v e l y h e l d - t o - b e - t r u e is r e l e a s e d f r o m t h e m o d e o f

c o m p r e h e n d s only the reflection o f a p r i o r linguistic practice that,

b e h a v i o r a l c e r t a i n t y a n d assumes t h e f o r m o f a h y p o t h e t i c a l p r o p o -

How-

s i t i o n w h o s e v a l i d i t y is l e f t o p e n f o r t h e d u r a t i o n o f t h e d i s c o u r s e .

ever, t h e d e f l a t i o n a r y t r e a t m e n t o f t h e c o n c e p t o f t r u t h , t h r o u g h its

T h e a r g u m e n t a t i o n takes t h e f o r m o f a c o m p e t i t i o n f o r t h e b e t t e r

s e m a n t i c d i m m i n g o f t h e p r a g m a t i c m e a n i n g o f t r u t h , has t h e a d -

a r g u m e n t s i n f a v o r of, o r against, c o n t r o v e r s i a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s , a n d

vantage o f a v o i d i n g discussions a b o u t the " n a t u r e " o f t r u t h w i t h o u t

serves t h e c o o p e r a t i v e s e a r c h f o r t r u t h .

as r e m a i n s t o be s h o w n , e x t e n d s e v e n i n t o e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s .

4 0

h a v i n g to f o r f e i t a m i n i m a l o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d the d i s t i n c t i o n be-

W i t h this d e s c r i p t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t o r y practices g u i d e d by t h e idea

tween k n o w i n g and believing, between being-true a n d being-held-to-

o f t r u t h , h o w e v e r , t h e p r o b l e m is p o s e d a n e w o f h o w t h e systematic

be-true.

elementary

m o b i l i z a t i o n o f g o o d reasons, w h i c h a t b e s t l e a d t o j u s t i f i e d b e l i e f s ,

epistemological

is s u p p o s e d n o n e t h e l e s s t o b e a d e q u a t e f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f d i s c r i m i -

views. I f i t c a n be s h o w n t h a t t h e s e m a n t i c c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h is

n a t i n g between j u s t i f i e d a n d unjustified t r u t h claims. To begin w i t h ,

This

distinctions

strategy

from

the

aims dispute

at

uncoupling

about

these

substantial

s u f f i c i e n t t o e x p l a i n t h e u s u a l m e t h o d s o f i n q u i r y a n d t h e o r y selec-

I s i m p l y w a n t to k e e p h o l d o f t h e p i c t u r e o f a c i r c u l a r process t h a t

t i o n — t h a t is, s u f f i c i e n t also t o e x p l a i n w h a t c o u n t s as "success" o r

p r e s e n t s i t s e l f t o us f r o m a p e r s p e c t i v e

"growth i n knowledge"

t h e o r y o f a c t i o n : shaken-up b e h a v i o r a l certainties are t r a n s f o r m e d

i n the scientific enterprise—we

c a n rescue

e x p a n d e d by means o f the

t h e weak realist supposition o f a w o r l d i n d e p e n d e n t o f o u r descrip-

on

tions w i t h o u t boosting u p the concept o f t r u t h i n an

raised f o r h y p o t h e t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s ; these claims are tested discur-

cal-realist way.

epistemologi-

38

O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , science is n o t t h e o n l y s p h e r e — a n d n o t e v e n

the

level o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n i n t o controversial validity

claims

s i v e l y — a n d , as t h e case m a y b e , v i n d i c a t e d — w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t t h e discursively accepted t r u t h s can r e t u r n t o t h e r e a l m o f a c t i o n ; w i t h

t h e p r i m a r y o n e — i n w h i c h t h e t r u t h - p r e d i c a t e has a use. E v e n i f a

t h i s , b e h a v i o r a l c e r t a i n t i e s (as t h e case m a y b e , n e w o n e s ) , w h i c h r e l y

d e f l a t i o n a r y c o n c e p t o f t r u t h were sufficient f o r e l u c i d a t i n g the fact

o n beliefs u n p r o b l e m a t i c a l l y h e l d t o be t r u e , are p r o d u c e d o n c e

364

365

Chapter 8


m o r e . W h a t still r e m a i n s t o be e x p l a i n e d is t h e m y s t e r i o u s p o w e r o f

T h e Epistemic Conception of Truth in a Pragmatic Perspective

t h e d i s c u r s i v e l y a c h i e v e d a g r e e m e n t t h a t authorizes t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s unreservedly

T h e stubborn p r o b l e m o f the relation between t r u t h and justifica-

j u s t i f i e d assertions as t r u t h s . F o r i t is c l e a r f r o m t h e d e s c r i p t i o n f r o m

in

a r g u m e n t a t i o n , i n t h e role o f actors, to accept

t i o n makes understandable the a t t e m p t to distinguish " t r u t h " f r o m

t h e p o i n t o f view o f a c t i o n t h e o r y t h a t a r g u m e n t a t i o n c a n f u l f i l l t h e

"rational acceptability" t h r o u g h an idealization o f the conditions o f

r o l e o f troubleshooter w i t h r e g a r d t o b e h a v i o r a l c e r t a i n t i e s t h a t have

j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T h i s a t t e m p t p r o p o s e s t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d ac-

b e c o m e p r o b l e m a t i c o n l y i f i t is g u i d e d b y t r u t h i n a c o n t e x t - i n d e -

c o r d i n g t o " o u r " s t a n d a r d s is d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m a t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n

p e n d e n t — t h a t is,

i n t h e s a m e way t h a t a p r o p o s i t i o n j u s t i f i e d i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t is

unconditional—sense.

A l t h o u g h w h e n w e a d o p t a r e f l e x i v e a t t i t u d e we k n o w t h a t a l l knowledge

is f a l l i b l e , i n e v e r y d a y l i f e w e c a n n o t s u r v i v e w i t h h y -

p o t h e s e s a l o n e , t h a t is, i n a p e r s i s t e n t l y f a l l i b i l i s t way. T h e

organized

d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m a p r o p o s i t i o n that c o u l d be j u s t i f i e d i n any c o n t e x t . A p r o p o s i t i o n is " t r u e " i f i t c o u l d epistemic

conditions

(Putnam)

4 1

or

be j u s t i f i e d u n d e r

could

win

argumentatively

f a l l i b i l i s m o f scientific i n q u i r y can deal hypothetically w i t h c o n t r o -

reached agreement i n an ideal speech situation ( H a b e r m a s )

v e r s i a l v a l i d i t y c l a i m s i n d e f i n i t e l y because i t serves t o b r i n g a b o u t

an ideal c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y ( A p e l ) .

a g r e e m e n t s t h a t are uncoupled f r o m a c t i o n . T h i s m o d e l is n o t s u i t a b l e

may be

4 3

ideal

4 2

or in

W h a t is t r u e is w h a t

a c c e p t e d as r a t i o n a l u n d e r i d e a l c o n d i t i o n s .

Convincing

f o r t h e l i f e w o r l d . Certainly, we have t o m a k e decisions i n t h e life-

objections

w o r l d o n t h e basis o f i n c o m p l e t e i n f o r m a t i o n ; m o r e o v e r , e x i s t e n t i a l

Peirce.

risks s u c h as t h e loss o f t h o s e closest t o us, sickness, o l d age,

d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h e i d e a l state a d o p t e d ; i n p a r t t h e y s h o w t h a t a n

and

have b e e n r a i s e d t o t h i s p r o p o s a l , w h i c h dates b a c k t o

The

objections

are

directed

i n p a r t against

conceptual

d e a t h are t h e m a r k o f h u m a n l i f e . H o w e v e r , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g these

i d e a l i z a t i o n o f j u s t i f i c a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s c a n n o t a c h i e v e its g o a l

u n c e r t a i n t i e s , everyday r o u t i n e s rest o n a n u n q u a l i f i e d t r u s t i n the

cause i t e i t h e r distances t r u t h t o o f a r f r o m j u s t i f i e d a s s e r t i b i l i t y o r

knowledge o f lay p e o p l e as m u c h as e x p e r t s . W e w o u l d step o n

n o r far enough.

no

b r i d g e , use n o car, u n d e r g o n o o p e r a t i o n , n o t e v e n eat a n e x q u i s i t e l y p r e p a r e d m e a l i f we d i d n o t c o n s i d e r t h e k n o w l e d g e safeguarded,

used to

be

i f we d i d n o t h o l d t h e assumptions e m p l o y e d i n the

p r o d u c t i o n a n d e x e c u t i o n o f o u r a c t i o n s t o be t r u e . A t a n y r a t e , t h e

The

first

k i n d o f objection

draws a t t e n t i o n to the

nature o f the n o t i o n of "complete" fixed

or "conclusive"

be-

paradoxical knowledge—

as a l i m i t c o n c e p t — t h a t , w h e n its i n c o m p l e t e n e s s a n d f a l l i b i l i t y

is t a k e n away f r o m i t , w o u l d n o l o n g e r b e

(human)

knowledge.

4 4

performative need for behavioral certainty rules out a reservation i n

P a r a d o x i c a l , t o o , is t h e i d e a o f a

p r i n c i p l e w i t h r e g a r d t o t r u t h , e v e n t h o u g h we k n o w , as s o o n as t h e

guage that w o u l d b r i n g to a standstill all f u r t h e r c o m m u n i c a t i o n

naive p e r f o r m a n c e

a l l f u r t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , " w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t w h a t is meant as a

o f a c t i o n s is i n t e r r u p t e d , t h a t t r u t h c l a i m s c a n

b e v i n d i c a t e d o n l y d i s c u r s i v e l y — t h a t is, o n l y w i t h i n t h e

final

consensus o r definitive l a n or

relevant

s i t u a t i o n o f i d e a l m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g s t a n d s r e v e a l e d as a s i t u -

c o n t e x t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n . T r u t h may be assimilated n e i t h e r to behav-

a t i o n b e y o n d t h e necessity f o r ( a n d t h e p r o b l e m s c o n n e c t e d w i t h )

i o r a l certainty n o r to j u s t i f i e d assertibility. Evidently, o n l y s t r o n g

l i n g u i s t i c processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g . "

conceptions of knowledge

of

d i r e c t e d n o t j u s t a g a i n s t a n i d e a l i z a t i o n t h a t h y p o s t a t i z e s f i n a l states

Platonism—can do justice to the unity o f the illocutionary m e a n i n g

as attainable states i n t h e w o r l d . E v e n i f t h e i d e a l r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s a r e

o f assertions, w h i c h t a k e o n d i f f e r e n t r o l e s i n t h e r e a l m s o f a c t i o n

u n d e r s t o o d as a i m s t h a t are n o t a t t a i n a b l e i n p r i n c i p l e , o r a t t a i n a b l e

a n d d i s c o u r s e respectively. W h e r e a s i n e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s

only

a n d t r u t h — o p e n to the accusation

"truths"

approximately,

i t remains

"paradoxical

4 5

T h i s o b j e c t i o n is

t h a t we

would

be

p r o p u p behavioral certainties, i n discourses they p r o v i d e t h e refer-

o b l i g e d t o strive f o r t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f a n i d e a l w h o s e r e a l i z a t i o n

ence p o i n t f o r t r u t h claims that are i n p r i n c i p l e fallible.

w o u l d be the e n d o f h u m a n h i s t o r y . "

4 6

As a regulative idea,

the

366

367

Chapter 8


critical p o i n t o f the o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t r u t h becomes clear

only

is, t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y as w e a r e f a m i l i a r w i t h i t : " I c a n -

w h e n t h e f o r m a l o r p r o c e s s u a l p r o p e r t i e s o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n , a n d not

n o t see w h a t ' i d e a l i z e d r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y ' c a n m e a n e x c e p t 'ac-

its aims, are i d e a l i z e d .

c e p t a b i l i t y t o a n i d e a l c o m m u n i t y . ' N o r c a n I see, g i v e n t h a t n o s u c h

T h e s e c o n d k i n d o f o b j e c t i o n leads t o t h e same c o n c l u s i o n . T h e s e objections

are d i r e c t e d n o t a g a i n s t t h e i n c o h e r e n t r e s u l t s o f t h e

c o m m u n i t y is g o i n g t o have a G o d ' s eye view, t h a t t h i s i d e a l c o m m u n i t y c a n b e a n y t h i n g m o r e t h a n us as w e s h o u l d l i k e t o b e . N o r c a n

i d e a l i z a t i o n o f t h e t a r g e t e d states b u t a g a i n s t t h e o p e r a t i o n o f i d e a l i -

I see w h a t ' u s ' c a n m e a n h e r e e x c e p t : us e d u c a t e d ,

z a t i o n itself. N o m a t t e r h o w t h e v a l u e o f t h e e p i s t e m i c c o n d i t i o n s is

t o l e r a n t , w e t l i b e r a l s , t h e p e o p l e w h o a r e always w i l l i n g t o h e a r t h e

enhanced

o t h e r side, t o t h i n k o u t a l l t h e i r i m p l i c a t i o n s , e t c . "

t h r o u g h i d e a l i z a t i o n s , e i t h e r t h e y satisfy t h e

uncondi-

sophisticated,

4 9

t i o n a l character o f t r u t h claims by means o f requirements that cut

O f course, i t can be objected to this that an idealization o f the

o f f a l l c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e p r a c t i c e s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n f a m i l i a r t o us, o r

j u s t i f i c a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s does n o t i n a n y way have t o t a k e t h e " t h i c k "

else t h e y r e t a i n t h e c o n n e c t i o n t o p r a c t i c e s f a m i l i a r t o us b y p a y i n g

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f o n e ' s o w n c u l t u r e as its p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e ; r a t h e r ,

the price that r a t i o n a l acceptability does n o t exclude the possibility

it can start w i t h the f o r m a l a n d processual characteristics o f justifica-

o f e r r o r e v e n u n d e r these i d e a l c o n d i t i o n s , t h a t is, d o e s n o t s i m u l a t e

t o r y p r a c t i c e s i n g e n e r a l t h a t , a f t e r a l l , a r e t o b e f o u n d i n all c u l -

a p r o p e r t y " t h a t c a n n o t b e l o s t " : " I t w o u l d be a p p a r e n t e i t h e r t h a t

t u r e s — e v e n i f n o t b y a n y m e a n s always i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d f o r m . T h e

t h o s e c o n d i t i o n s a l l o w t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e r r o r o r t h a t t h e y a r e so

fact that the practice o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n compels the participants

i d e a l as t o m a k e n o use o f t h e i n t e n d e d c o n n e c t i o n

themselves

abilities."

with human

I n h i s d e b a t e s w i t h P u t n a m , A p e l , a n d m e , R o r t y m a k e s use

of

these objections n o t i n o r d e r to d i s c r e d i t t h e e p i s t e m i z a t i o n o f t r u t h b u t i n o r d e r t o r a d i c a l i z e i t . W i t h h i s o p p o n e n t s h e shares t h e view that the standards f o r the r a t i o n a l acceptability o f propositions, alt h o u g h t h e y c h a n g e h i s t o r i c a l l y , d o n o t always d o so a r b i t r a r i l y . A t least f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s , r a t i o n a l i t y s t a n d a r d s are o p e n t o c r i t i q u e a n d c a n b e " r e f o r m e d , " t h a t is, i m p r o v e d o n t h e basis o f g o o d reasons. U n l i k e P u t n a m , h o w e v e r , R o r t y d o e s n o t w a n t t o t a k e a c c o u n t o f t h e f a c t o f l e a r n i n g processes b y c o n c e d i n g t h a t j u s t i f i c a t o r y practices are g u i d e d by a n idea o f t r u t h t h a t transcends t h e j u s t i f i c a t o r y c o n t e x t i n q u e s t i o n . H e c o m p l e t e l y rejects i d e a l i z i n g l i m i t concepts a n d interprets the difference

between justification

a n d t r u t h i n s u c h a way t h a t a p r o p o n e n t is p r e p a r e d i n a g i v e n case t o d e f e n d h e r views n o t o n l y h e r e a n d n o w b u t e v e n i n f r o n t o f a n o t h e r a u d i e n c e . W h o e v e r is o r i e n t e d t o w a r d t r u t h i n t h i s sense is w i l l i n g "to justify his convictions i n f r o n t o f a c o m p e t e n t o r " t o i n c r e a s e t h e size o r d i v e r s i t y o f t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n a l nity."

4 8

audience" commu-

O n R o r t y ' s view, e v e r y i d e a l i z a t i o n t h a t goes b e y o n d t h i s w i l l

founder

on

to make pragmatic assumptions w i t h a counterfactual

c o n t e n t fits i n w e l l w i t h t h i s . W h o e v e r e n t e r s i n t o d i s c u s s i o n w i t h t h e

4 7

the p r o b l e m

t h a t i n i d e a l i z i n g we m u s t always

serious i n t e n t i o n o f b e c o m i n g

convinced o f s o m e t h i n g t h r o u g h d i a -

l o g u e w i t h o t h e r s has t o p r e s u m e

performatively that the partici-

p a n t s a l l o w t h e i r "yes" o r " n o " t o b e d e t e r m i n e d solely b y t h e f o r c e o f the better a r g u m e n t . However, w i t h this they

assume—normally

i n a c o u n t e r f a c t u a l w a y — a s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n t h a t satisfies i m p r o b a b l e c o n d i t i o n s : openness to the p u b l i c , inclusiveness,

equal rights to

p a r t i c i p a t i o n , i m m u n i z a t i o n against e x t e r n a l o r i n h e r e n t c o m p u l s i o n , as w e l l as t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s ' o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( t h a t is, t h e s i n c e r e e x p r e s s i o n

of utterances).

5 0

I n these

u n a v o i d a b l e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n , t h e i n t u i t i o n is exp r e s s e d t h a t t r u e p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e r e s i s t a n t t o spatially, socially, a n d t e m p o r a l l y u n c o n s t r a i n e d a t t e m p t s t o r e f u t e t h e m . W h a t we h o l d t o b e t r u e has t o b e d é f e n d a b l e o n t h e basis o f g o o d r e a s o n s n o t m e r e l y i n a d i f f e r e n t c o n t e x t b u t i n a l l p o s s i b l e c o n t e x t s , t h a t is, a t a n y t i m e a n d against anybody. T h i s provides t h e i n s p i r a t i o n f o r the discourse t h e o r y o f t r u t h : a p r o p o s i t i o n is t r u e i f i t w i t h s t a n d s a l l a t t e m p t s t o refute i t u n d e r the d e m a n d i n g conditions o f rational discourse.

51

H o w e v e r , t h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t i t is also t r u e for this reason. A

take

t r u t h c l a i m r a i s e d f o r "p" says t h a t t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s f o r "p" are

s o m e t h i n g f a m i l i a r as o u r p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e ; u s u a l l y i t is " u s , " t h a t

satisfied. W e have n o o t h e r way o f a s c e r t a i n i n g w h e t h e r o r n o t t h i s

368

369

Chapter 8


is t h e case e x c e p t b y way o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n , f o r d i r e c t access t o

t h e g r a m m a t i c a l f a c t t h a t , w h e n w e p u t f o r w a r d t h e a s s e r t i o n "p" i n

u n i n t e r p r e t e d t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s is d e n i e d t o us. B u t t h e f a c t t h a t t h e

a p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e , we have t o b e l i e v e t h a t "p" is t r u e u n c o n d i -

t r u t h c o n d i d o n s are satisfied d o e s n o t i t s e l f b e c o m e a n

epistemic

f a c t j u s t because w e c a n o n l y establish w h e t h e r these c o n d i t i o n s satisfied b y way o f discursive v i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e t r u t h

t i o n a l l y e v e n t h o u g h , w h e n we a d o p t a r e f l e x i v e a t t i t u d e , w e

cannot

are

r u l e o u t t h a t t o m o r r o w , o r s o m e w h e r e else, r e a s o n s a n d e v i d e n c e

claim—whereby

c o u l d e m e r g e t h a t w o u l d i n v a l i d a t e "/>." H o w e v e r , t h i s d o e s n o t y e t

w e have a l r e a d y h a d t o i n t e r p r e t t h e t r u t h c o n d i t i o n s i n l i g h t o f t h e

e x p l a i n w h y we a r e permitted t o r e g a r d a t r u t h c l a i m e x p l i c i t l y r a i s e d

r e l e v a n t sorts o f r e a s o n s f o r t h e c l a i m i n q u e s t i o n .

f o r "p" as v i n d i c a t e d as s o o n as t h e p r o p o s i t i o n is r a t i o n a l l y a c c e p t e d

A consistently epistemic r e a d i n g o f the discourse-theoretical

expla-

n a t i o n o f t r u t h already founders o n the p r o b l e m that n o t all o f the processual properties m e n t i o n e d retain a "connection

u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f r a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e . W h a t d o e s i t m e a n t o say t h a t t r u t h c l a i m s c a n b e " v i n d i c a t e d " discursively?

with human

abilities." Nonetheless, w i t h regard to the argumentative presuppo-

The Pragmatic Conception o f T r u t h

sitions o f g e n e r a l inclusiveness, e q u a l rights t o p a r t i c i p a t i o n , f r e e d o m f r o m repression, a n d o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d reaching u n d e r s t a n d i n g , we

I t is s t i l l u n c l e a r

c a n i m a g i n e in the present w h a t a n a p p r o x i m a t e l y i d e a l s a t i s f a c t i o n

p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t is p r e s u m e d t o b e j u s t i f i e d i d e a l l y — w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s

w o u l d l o o k like. T h i s does n o t h o l d f o r a n t i c i p a t i o n o f the f u t u r e , o f

o f finite m i n d s . W e l l m e r speaks i n t h i s r e g a r d o f a " s u r p l u s " r e s i d i n g

future corroboration

i n the " a n t i c i p a t i o n o f f u t u r e c o r r o b o r a t i o n . " Perhaps i t w o u l d

(Bewährung) .

5 2

T o be sure, the o r i e n t a t i o n to-

what i t is t h a t authorizes us t o r e g a r d as t r u e a

be

w a r d t h e f u t u r e , t o o , essentially has t h e c r i t i c a l p o i n t o f r e m i n d i n g us

b e t t e r t o say t h a t p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n w h o c o n v i n c e t h e m -

of the ethnocentric

selves o f

l i m i t a t i o n a n d the fallibility o f every actually

the justification of

a controversial

validity claim

have

a c h i e v e d a g r e e m e n t , n o m a t t e r h o w r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d ; t h a t is, i t

r e a c h e d a p o i n t w h e r e they have b e e n b r o u g h t by t h e u n c o n s t r a i n e d

serves as a r e m i n d e r t o us o f t h e p o s s i b l e f u r t h e r d e c e n t e r i n g o f t h e

f o r c e o f t h e b e t t e r a r g u m e n t t o a c e r t a i n shift in perspective. W h e n , i n

p e r s p e c t i v e o f o u r j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y . T i m e , h o w e v e r , is a c o n -

t h e course o f a process o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n , p a r t i c i p a n t s attain t h e

straint o f a n o n t o l o g i c a l k i n d . Because a l l r e a l discourses, c o n d u c t e d

conviction that, having taken o n b o a r d all relevant i n f o r m a t i o n a n d

i n a c t u a l t i m e , are l i m i t e d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e f u t u r e , w e c a n n o t k n o w

h a v i n g w e i g h e d u p all the relevant reasons, they have exhausted t h e

w h e t h e r p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t are r a t i o n a l l y acceptable today w i l l , even

reservoir o f p o t e n t i a l possible o b j e c t i o n s to

u n d e r a p p r o x i m a t e l y i d e a l c o n d i t i o n s , assert t h e m s e l v e s a g a i n s t a t -

c o n t i n u i n g a r g u m e n t a t i o n have b e e n , as i t w e r e , u s e d u p . A t a n y r a t e

t h e n all motives for

t e m p t s t o r e f u t e t h e m i n t h e f u t u r e as w e l l . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h i s

t h e r e is n o l o n g e r a n y r a t i o n a l m o t i v a t i o n f o r retaining a h y p o t h e t i c a l

very limitedness condemns o u r

with

a t t i t u d e t o w a r d t h e t r u t h c l a i m r a i s e d f o r "p" b u t t e m p o r a r i l y l e f t

r a t i o n a l a c c e p t a b i l i t y as sufficient proof o f t r u t h : " W h e n e v e r w e raise

o p e n . F r o m the perspective o f actors w h o have t e m p o r a r i l y a d o p t e d

finite

m i n d s to be

content

t r u t h c l a i m s o n t h e basis o f g o o d a r g u m e n t s a n d c o n v i n c i n g

evi-

a reflexive a t t i t u d e i n o r d e r to restore a partially d i s t u r b e d back-

d e n c e w e presume . . . t h a t n o n e w a r g u m e n t s o r e v i d e n c e w i l l c r o p

ground

u p i n the future that w o u l d call o u r t r u t h claim i n t o q u e s t i o n . "

t r u t h c l a i m m e a n s t h a t a l i c e n s e is issued f o r r e t u r n t o t h e a t t i t u d e

5 3

I t is n o t so d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r s t a n d w h y p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n , as subjects c a p a b l e o f s p e e c h a n d a c t i o n , have t o b e h a v e i n t h i s way i f w e l o o k a t a p r a g m a t i c d e s c r i p t i o n o f t h e i r d i s c o u r s e s , w h i c h a r e e m b e d d e d i n t h e l i f e w o r l d . I n e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s , as w e have seen, socialized i n d i v i d u a l s are d e p e n d e n t o n b e h a v i o r a l certainties,

understanding,

the de-problematization

of

the

disputed

o f a c t o r s w h o a r e i n v o l v e d i n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e w o r l d m o r e naively. As s o o n as t h e d i f f e r e n c e s i n o p i n i o n a r e r e s o l v e d b e t w e e n " u s " a n d " o t h e r s " w i t h r e g a r d t o w h a t is t h e case, " o u r " w o r l d c a n m e r g e o n c e more with "the" world. W h e n t h i s s h i f t takes p l a c e w e , w h o as p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a -

w h i c h r e m a i n c e r t a i n t i e s o n l y so l o n g as t h e y a r e s u s t a i n e d b y a

t i o n a c c e p t t h e t r u t h c l a i m f o r "p" as j u s t i f i e d , r e a p p o i n t t h e state o f

knowledge

a f f a i r s " t h a t p"—problematized

t h a t is a c c e p t e d u n r e s e r v e d l y . C o r r e s p o n d i n g

t o t h i s is

u p t o n o w — w i t h its r i g h t s as a n

370

371

Chapter 8


a s s e r t i o n Mp t h a t c a n b e r a i s e d f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e

of the

first

c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h e f a l l i b i l i t y o f t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . Conversely,

p e r s o n . A n a s s e r t i o n t h a t has b e e n disposed of a r g u m e n t a t i v e l y i n t h i s

t h i s f a l l i b i l i s t c o n s c i o u s n e s s also reacts b a c k u p o n e v e r y d a y

w a y a n d r e t u r n e d t o t h e r e a l m o f a c t i o n takes its p l a c e i n a n i n t e r -

w i t h o u t thereby destroying the dogmatism

subjectively shared l i f e w o r l d f r o m w i t h i n whose h o r i z o n we,

actors, w h o

the

a c t o r s , r e f e r t o s o m e t h i n g i n a s i n g l e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . I t is a m a t t e r

no

h e r e o f a formal s u p p o s i t i o n , n o t o n e t h a t p r e j u d g e s s p e c i f i c c o n t e n t

too,

n o r o n e t h a t suggests t h e g o a l o f t h e " c o r r e c t p i c t u r e o f t h e n a t u r e

convictions.

o f t h i n g s " t h a t R o r t y always c o n n e c t s w i t h a r e a l i s t i n t u i t i o n . B e c a u s e a c t i n g subjects have t o c o p e w i t h " t h e " w o r l d , t h e y c a n n o t

practices

of the lifeworld. For

as p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n have

learned

that

c o n v i c t i o n is p r o o f a g a i n s t c r i t i c i s m , d e v e l o p i n t h e l i f e w o r l d , r a t h e r less d o g m a t i c

attitudes toward

T h i s stereoscopic p e r c e p t i o n

their

problematized

o f processes o f c o o p e r a t i o n

and

avoid

c o m m u n i c a t i o n , layered a c c o r d i n g t o a c t i o n - c o n t e x t s a n d d i s c o u r s e s ,

b e i n g realists i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e i r l i f e w o r l d . M o r e o v e r , t h e y are

a l l o w s us r e c o g n i z e t h e embeddedness o f d i s c o u r s e s i n t h e l i f e w o r l d .

a l l o w e d t o b e realists b e c a u s e t h e i r l a n g u a g e g a m e s a n d p r a c t i c e s , so

Convictions play a d i f f e r e n t role i n a c t i o n t h a n i n discourse a n d

l o n g as t h e y f u n c t i o n i n a w a y t h a t is p r o o f a g a i n s t d i s a p p o i n t m e n t ,

" p r o v e t h e i r t r u t h " i n a d i f f e r e n t way i n t h e f o r m e r t h a n i n t h e l a t t e r .

" p r o v e t h e i r t r u t h " (sich bewähren) i n b e i n g c a r r i e d o n .

I n everyday practices, a prereflexive " c o p i n g w i t h the w o r l d " decides

This pragmatic authority responsible for c e r t a i n t y — i n t e r p r e t e d i n

w h e t h e r convictions " f u n c t i o n " o r are d r a w n i n t o t h e m a e l s t r o m o f

a r e a l i s t way w i t h t h e h e l p o f t h e s u p p o s i t i o n o f a n o b j e c t i v e w o r l d —

p r o b l e m a t i z a t i o n , w h e r e a s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n i t d e p e n d s solely

is s u s p e n d e d o n t h e r e f l e x i v e l e v e l o f d i s c o u r s e s , w h i c h are r e l i e v e d

reasons w h e t h e r controversial validity claims deserve r a t i o n a l l y m o -

on

of the burdens o f action and where only arguments count. Here, our

tivated

gaze t u r n s away f r o m t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , a n d t h e d i s a p p o i n t m e n t s

t i o n b e t w e e n j u s t i f i c a t i o n a n d t r u t h poses i t s e l f o n l y o n t h e r e f l e x i v e

we e x p e r i e n c e i n o u r d i r e c t dealings w i t h i t , to focus exclusively o n

level; however, o n l y the i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n actions a n d discourses

o u r c o n f l i c t i n g interpretations o f the w o r l d . I n this intersubjective

p e r m i t s a n answer t o this q u e s t i o n . T h e c o n t e x t u a l i s t d o u b t

dimension

b e d i s s i p a t e d so l o n g as w e p e r s i s t i n r e m a i n i n g o n t h e l e v e l

o f contested

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , an assertion

" p r o v e s its

r e c o g n i t i o n . I t is t r u e t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e i n t e r n a l r e l a -

by

of

t r u t h " solely o n t h e basis o f r e a s o n s , t h a t is, w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e

a r g u m e n t a t i o n a n d neglect

a u t h o r i t y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r p o s s i b l e r e f u t a t i o n , n o t f o r p r a c t i c a l l y ex-

s o n a l u n i o n , as i t w e r e — o f t h e k n o w l e d g e o f t h o s e w h o act i n t o t h e

p e r i e n c e d d i s a p p o i n t m e n t . H e r e , however, the fallibilist conscious-

knowledge o f those w h o argue, w h i l e equally neglecting the transfer

ness t h a t w e c a n e r r e v e n i n t h e case o f w e l l - j u s t i f i e d b e l i e f s d e p e n d s

o f knowledge i n the opposite direction. O n l y the e n t w i n i n g o f the

o n an o r i e n t a t i o n toward t r u t h whose roots e x t e n d i n t o the realism

two d i f f e r e n t p r a g m a t i c roles played by t h e Janus-faced c o n c e p t o f

o f everyday practices—a realism n o l o n g e r i n force w i t h i n

t r u t h i n action-contexts a n d i n r a t i o n a l discourses respectively

discourse.

the transformation—secured

cannot per-

can

T h e orientation toward unconditional t r u t h , which compels partici-

e x p l a i n w h y a j u s t i f i c a t i o n successful i n a l o c a l c o n t e x t p o i n t s i n f a v o r

pants i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n to presuppose ideal justificatory conditions

of the context-independent

a n d requires o f t h e m an ever-increasing decentering o f the justifica-

t h e o n e h a n d , t h e c o n c e p t o f t r u t h allows t r a n s l a t i o n o f shaken-up

t r u t h o f t h e j u s t i f i e d b e l i e f . J u s t as, o n

t i o n c o m m u n i t y , is a r e f l e x o f t h a t o t h e r d i f f e r e n c e — r e q u i r e d i n t h e

b e h a v i o r a l c e r t a i n t i e s i n t o p r o b l e m a t i z e d p r o p o s i t i o n s , so t o o ,

l i f e w o r l d — b e t w e e n believing a n d k n o w i n g ; this d i s t i n c t i o n relies o n

the o t h e r h a n d , does the

t h e s u p p o s i t i o n , a n c h o r e d i n t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e use o f l a n g u a g e , o f

p e r m i t t h e translation back o f d i s c u r s i v e l y j u s t i f i e d assertions

a single objective w o r l d .

reestablished behavioral certainties.

5 4

I n t h i s way, t h e l i f e w o r l d w i t h its s t r o n g ,

a c t i o n - r e l a t e d c o n c e p t i o n s o f t r u t h a n d k n o w l e d g e projects i n t o discourse a n d provides tion—that

keeps

the reference p o i n t — t r a n s c e n d i n g justifica-

alive

among

participants in argumentation

a

firmly

on

retained orientation toward truth into

T o e x p l a i n t h i s w e have o n l y t o b r i n g t o g e t h e r i n t h e r i g h t way t h e p a r t i a l statements assembled h e r e u p t o now. I n t h e l i f e w o r l d actors depend

o n b e h a v i o r a l c e r t a i n t i e s . T h e y have t o c o p e w i t h a w o r l d

372

373

Chapter 8


presumed

t o be o b j e c t i v e a n d , f o r t h i s r e a s o n ,

distinction between

believing and k n o w i n g .

5 5

operate with

There

the

is a practical

necessity t o r e l y i n t u i t i v e l y o n w h a t is u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y

held-to-be-

edge o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h reflexive experiences i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n i n t o h a r m o n y w i t h the everyday realism ascribed to t h e l i f e w o r l d . I f t h e actors i n the l i f e w o r l d — t e m p o r a r i l y — c a n n o t a v o i d b e i n g "realists,"

t r u e . T h i s m o d e o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y h o l d i n g - t o - b e - t r u e is r e f l e c t e d o n

so m u c h t h e w o r s e f o r t h e m . I n t h a t case i t is u p t o t h e

t h e d i s c u r s i v e level i n t h e c o n n o t a t i o n s

to r e f o r m the misleading commonsense c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h .

o f t r u t h claims that p o i n t

b e y o n d the given context o f justification a n d require the supposition

philosophers

T o be sure, d e f l a t i o n i s m , o p e r a t i n g a l o n g t h e lines o f

Michael

o f ideal justificatory c o n d i t i o n s — w i t h a resulting decentering o f the

W i l l i a m s w i t h a s e m a n t i c c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h , is s t i l l t o o s t r o n g f o r

j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y . F o r this reason, the process o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n

t h i s p u r p o s e . I n s t e a d , R o r t y r i g o r o u s l y c a r r i e s t h r o u g h t o its c o n c l u -

c a n be g u i d e d by a n o t i o n o f t r u t h t h a t transcends justification

al-

s i o n a n e p i s t e m i z a t i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t o f t r u t h . Because t h e r e is

t h o u g h i t is always already operatively effective in the realm of action. T h e

n o t h i n g a p a r t f r o m j u s t i f i c a t i o n , a n d because n o t h i n g follows f o r t h e

f u n c t i o n o f the validity o f statements i n everyday practices

explains

t r u t h o f a p r o p o s i t i o n f r o m its j u s t i f i e d a s s e r t i b i l i t y , t h e c o n c e p t o f

w h y t h e discursive v i n d i c a t i o n o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s m a y at t h e s a m e t i m e

t r u t h is superfluous. " T h e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n j u s t i f i c a t i o n a n d t r u t h

b e i n t e r p r e t e d as t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n o f a p r a g m a t i c n e e d f o r j u s t i f i c a -

is o n e

t i o n . T h i s n e e d f o r j u s t i f i c a t i o n , w h i c h sets i n t r a i n t h e t r a n s f o r m a -

j u s t i f i c a t i o n t o o n e a u d i e n c e is n o t j u s t i f i c a t i o n t o a n o t h e r . "

t i o n o f shaken-up behavioral certainties i n t o problematized validity

t h e o n l y n o n r e d u n d a n t use o f t h e t r u t h - p r e d i c a t e — t h e " c a u t i o n a r y "

w h i c h makes n o difference

except for the r e m i n d e r 5 6

that Even

c l a i m s , c a n b e satisfied o n l y b y a t r a n s l a t i o n o f d i s c u r s i v e l y j u s t i f i e d

one—requires

beliefs back i n t o behavioral t r u t h s .

p l e m e n t i n g a new vocabulary that does w i t h o u t a c o n c e p t o f t r u t h

B e c a u s e i t is, i n t h e e n d , t h i s i n t e r a c t i o n t h a t dissipates t h e c o n textualist d o u b t

about

everyday

realist intuitions,

the

objection

r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I t is a m a t t e r o f i n v e n t i n g a n d i m -

a n d e l i m i n a t e s r e a l i s t i n t u i t i o n s ( s u c h as t h e s u p p o s i t i o n o f a n o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , t a l k o f r e p r e s e n t i n g facts, a n d so f o r t h ) : "We s i m p l y

seems l i k e l y t h a t t h e w h o l e d i s p u t e is p r e j u d i c e d b y m y t e n d e n t i o u s

refuse t o t a l k i n a c e r t a i n way, t h e P l a t o n i c way. . . . O u r e f f o r t s a t

description o f the e m b e d d i n g

p e r s u a s i o n m u s t t a k e t h e f o r m o f g r a d u a l i n c u l c a t i o n o f n e w ways o f

o f discourses i n the l i f e w o r l d . Rorty

w o u l d certainly n o t deny the c o n n e c t i o n between r a t i o n a l discourse

speaking, rather t h a n of straightforward argumentation w i t h

a n d a c t i o n . H e w o u l d also a g r e e w i t h o u r e s t a b l i s h i n g o f a c o n n e c -

ways o f

tion between

the two perspectives: between

the perspective

speaking."

old

5 7

of the

p a r t i c i p a n t s i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n w h o seek t o c o n v i n c e e a c h o t h e r

of

T h e Naturalization o f Linguistified R e a s o n

the correctness o f t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , a n d the perspective o f a c t i n g subjects i n v o l v e d i n t h e i r language

games a n d practices.

However,

R o r t y ' s p r o g r a m o f r e e d u c a t i o n has p r o v o k e d q u e s t i o n s a n d o b j e c -

R o r t y w o u l d n o t d i s t i n g u i s h these perspectives f r o m each o t h e r i n

tions.

s u c h a way t h a t t h e o n e

o f p r o o f f o r h i s u n w i l l i n g n e s s t o leave t h e l a n g u a g e

is r e l a t i v i z e d a g a i n s t t h e o t h e r . F o r

the

p u r p o s e o f his d e s c r i p t i o n , he b o r r o w s f r o m the perspective o f par-

5 8

I n t h e first i n s t a n c e , R o r t y h i m s e l f m u s t s h o u l d e r t h e b u r d e n of

common

sense as i t is. A s a r u l e , p r a g m a t i s t s m a k e s u b s t a n t i a l a l l o w a n c e s f o r

ticipants i n argumentation the i m p r i s o n m e n t i n dialogue that pre-

t h e m s e l v e s o n t h e basis t h a t t h e i r views a r e a t o n e w i t h

v e n t s us f r o m b r e a k i n g f r e e f r o m c o n t e x t s

o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; at the

sense. S t r a n g e l y e n o u g h , n e o p r a g m a t i s t s b o a s t o f t h e i r r o l e as " a t h e -

same t i m e , he borrows f r o m the perspective

o f actors t h e m o d e o f

ists i n a n o v e r w h e l m i n g l y r e l i g i o u s c u l t u r e . " T h e i r t h e r a p y is s u p -

common

c o p i n g w i t h t h e w o r l d . I t is t h r o u g h t h e blending into one another o f

posed

these

is

p h i l o s o p h e r s t o t h e d i s t o r t i o n s f o r w h i c h P l a t o n i s m is r e s p o n s i b l e i n

c e r t a i n t y t h a t p r o m p t s R o r t y t o ask t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h y

d a i l y l i f e itself. I n o r d e r t o m a k e p l a u s i b l e P l a t o n i s m ' s i d e a l i s t v i o -

w e s h o u l d i n t h e first p l a c e a t t e m p t t o b r i n g t h e c o n t e x t u a l i s t k n o w l -

l e n c e , R o r t y has t o l e t h i m s e l f i n f o r a d i a g n o s i s o f t h e h i s t o r y o f

opposing

formed—a

perspectives

that

the

ethnocentric

certainty

to

reach

through

the

pathological

language

games

of

374

375

Chapter 8


W e s t e r n m e t a p h y s i c s as a h i s t o r y o f d e c l i n e . H o w e v e r , w h a t H e i d e g -

i n g size a n d e v e r - i n c r e a s i n g d i v e r s i t y — t h a t is, c o n d i t i o n s t h a t h a m -

g e r o r D e r r i d a , f o r e x a m p l e , have t o say i n t h e i r o w n f a i r l y m e t a -

p e r t h e p o s s i b l e success o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n i n c e r t a i n , n o t c o m p l e t e l y

p h y s i c a l ways

a r b i t r a r y , ways.

about

the

critique of

metaphysics

is, o n

Rorty's

e s t i m a t i o n , m o r e p a r t o f t h e " e d i f y i n g " l i t e r a t u r e t h a t is s u p p o s e d t o

R o r t y c a n n o t e x p l a i n t h i s i m p e d i m e n t t o t h e success o f a r g u m e n -

b e r e s e r v e d f o r p r i v a t e p e r f e c t i o n o f t h e self a n d c a n n o t , a t a n y r a t e ,

t a t i o n t h a t is u n n e c e s s a r y f r o m a f u n c t i o n a l p o i n t o f view. W i t h t h e

serve t h e p u b l i c c r i t i q u e o f a l i e n a t e d l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s .

o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d "more a n d m o r e , " "larger a n d larger," a n d " i n -

5 9

O f course, m o r e i m p o r t a n t t h a n the m o t i v a t i o n f o r this enterprise

creasingly diverse" audiences, R o r t y b r i n g s a weak idealization i n t o

is t h e q u e s t i o n o f its v i a b i l i t y . I w o u l d l i k e t o c o n c l u d e w i t h j u s t t w o

p l a y t h a t , o n h i s p r e m i s e , is f a r f r o m s e l f - e v i d e n t . A s s o o n as t h e

questions i n this regard:

concept of truth

a. Is t h e e n v i s a g e d r e v i s i o n o f o u r s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g

compatible

w i t h t h e f a c t o f a n a b i l i t y t o l e a r n t h a t is n o t a l r e a d y c o n s t r i c t e d a

is e l i m i n a t e d i n f a v o r o f a

context-dependent

epistemic validity-for-us, the n o r m a t i v e reference p o i n t necessary t o e x p l a i n w h y a p r o p o n e n t s h o u l d e n d e a v o r t o seek a g r e e m e n t f o r "p" beyond the boundaries of her own group is m i s s i n g . T h e i n f o r m a d o n t h a t

priori?

t h e a g r e e m e n t o f a n i n c r e a s i n g l y l a r g e a u d i e n c e gives us i n c r e a s i n g l y

b . W h a t is t o h a p p e n t o t h e n o r m a t i v e c h a r a c t e r o f r e a s o n , a n d h o w

less r e a s o n

c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e is t h e p r o p o s e d n e o - D a r w i n i s t s e l f - d e s c r i p t i o n

of

r a t i o n a l beings?

to fear that we w i l l be r e f u t e d presupposes the v e r y

i n t e r e s t t h a t has t o b e e x p l a i n e d : t h e d e s i r e f o r "as m u c h i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e a g r e e m e n t as p o s s i b l e . " I f s o m e t h i n g is " t r u e " i f a n d o n l y i f i t

a. T h e p r o g r a m o f a r a t i o n a l r e v i s i o n o f d e e p l y r o o t e d P l a t o n i c p r e j u d i c e s presumes we are capable o f a l e a r n i n g process t h a t n o t o n l y can take place w i t h i n a given vocabulary a n d a c c o r d i n g to the s t a n d a r d s p r e v a i l i n g i n a g i v e n c o n t e x t b u t t h a t seizes h o l d o f t h e v o c a b u l a r y a n d standards themselves. T h i s reason

alone

requires

R o r t y to p r o v i d e a suitable equivalent f o r an o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d t r u t h t h a t aims b e y o n d the p r e v a i l i n g c o n t e x t o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n . I f , however, the d i s t i n c t i o n between " t r u e " a n d ' j u s t i f i e d " shrinks to the fact that t h e p r o p o n e n t is p r e p a r e d t o d e f e n d "p" e v e n i n f r o n t o f a different a u d i e n c e , t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t f o r s u c h a n a n t i c i p a t i o n [ o f t r u t h ] is missing. R o r t y counters this o b j e c t i o n by conceding a cautious idealization o f j u s t i f i c a t o r y c o n d i t i o n s . H e allows t h a t w h a t t r a d i t i o n a l l y was c a l l e d t h e " p u r s u i t o f t r u t h " m i g h t j u s t as w e l l be d e s c r i b e d as

is r e c o g n i z e d as j u s t i f i e d "by u s " b e c a u s e i t is g o o d " f o r u s , " t h e r e is n o rational motive for e x p a n d i n g the circle o f members. N o reason exists f o r t h e d e c e n t e r i n g e x p a n s i o n o f t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n c o m m u n i t y e s p e c i a l l y since R o r t y d e f i n e s " m y o w n e t h n o s " as t h e g r o u p i n f r o n t o f w h i c h I f e e l o b l i g e d t o give a n a c c o u n t o f myself. T h e r e is, h o w ever, n o n o r m a t i v e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r a n y f u r t h e r o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d the a g r e e m e n t o f "strangers," m e r e l y an e x p l a n a t o r y p o i n t e r t o w a r d t h e a r b i t r a r y f e a t u r e s o f a " l i b e r a l W e s t e r n c u l t u r e " i n w h i c h "we i n t e l l e c t u a l s " a d o p t a m o r e o r less u n d o g m a t i c a t t i t u d e . B u t even w e a r e a s s u r e d b y R o r t y t h a t , "we m u s t , i n p r a c t i c e , p r i v i l e g e o u r o w n g r o u p , e v e n t h o u g h t h e r e c a n be n o n o n c i r c u l a r j u s t i f i c a t i o n d o i n g so."

for

61

b. I n l o s i n g t h e r e g u l a t i v e i d e a o f t r u t h , t h e p r a c t i c e o f j u s t i f i c a -

larger

t i o n loses t h a t p o i n t o f o r i e n t a t i o n b y m e a n s o f w h i c h s t a n d a r d s o f

a n d larger g r o u p s o f i n t e r l o c u t o r s " : "We h o p e to j u s t i f y o u r b e l i e f to

j u s t i f i c a t i o n are d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m " c u s t o m a r y " n o r m s . T h e sociolo-

as m a n y a n d as l a r g e a u d i e n c e s as p o s s i b l e . "

g i z i n g o f the practice o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n means a n a t u r a l i z a t i o n o f rea-

the "pursuit o f intersubjective, u n f o r c e d agreement a m o n g 6 0

R o r t y , i t is t r u e , d o e s "ever-

s o n . A s a r u l e , social n o r m s c a n b e d e s c r i b e d n o t m e r e l y f r o m t h e

r e t r e a t i n g g o a l , " t h a t is, as a r e g u l a t i v e i d e a . E v e n t h e l a r g e r a u d i -

p o i n t o f v i e w o f a s o c i o l o g i c a l o b s e r v e r b u t also f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e

ence a n d the o v e r a r c h i n g c o n t e x t are supposed to be n o m o r e t h a n

o f p a r t i c i p a n t s i n l i g h t o f t h e s t a n d a r d s t h e y h o l d t o be t r u e . W i t h o u t

n o t w a n t t h i s t o b e u n d e r s t o o d as a n o r i e n t a t i o n t o w a r d a n

a different audience

a n d a different context. Nonetheless,

adds to this description the qualifications m e n t i o n e d :

Rorty

ever-expand-

a reference

t o t r u t h o r reason, however, t h e standards

themselves

w o u l d n o l o n g e r have any p o s s i b i l i t y o f s e l f - c o r r e c t i o n a n d w o u l d

376

377

Chapter 8


t h u s f o r t h e i r p a r t f o r f e i t t h e status o f n o r m s

capable o f

j u s t i f i e d . I n this respect, they w o u l d n o l o n g e r even be

being

entiation between

the perspectives o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t a n d the

ob-

customary

server. I n t e r p e r s o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , w h i c h a r e o w e d t o t h e i n t e r s u b -

n o r m s . T h e y w o u l d b e nothing more than social facts, a l t h o u g h t h e y

j e c t i v e possession o f a s h a r e d l a n g u a g e , a r e a s s i m i l a t e d t o t h e p a t t e r n

w o u l d c o n t i n u e to c l a i m v a l i d i t y " f o r u s , " t h e r e l e v a n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n

o f adaptive behavior (or i n s t r u m e n t a l a c d o n ) . A c o r r e s p o n d i n g

c o m m u n i t y . If, despite

differentiation between

t h i s , t h e p r a c t i c e o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n is n o t

to

the strategic a n d t h e nonstrategic

de-

use

of

c o l l a p s e , a n d i f t h e p r e d i c a t e " r a t i o n a l " is n o t t o lose its n o r m a t i v e

language, between

c h a r a c t e r — t h a t is, i f b o t h are t o c o n t i n u e t o be a b l e t o f u n c t i o n —

ented toward reaching understanding, robs Rorty o f the

t h e r a t i o n a l i t y s t a n d a r d s v a l i d f o r us h a v e t o b e , i f n o t j u s t i f i e d , t h e n

means for d o i n g justice to the intuitive distinctions between convinc-

at least e x p l a i n e d .

i n g a n d p e r s u a d i n g , b e t w e e n m o t i v a t i o n t h r o u g h r e a s o n s a n d causal

F o r t h i s R o r t y falls b a c k o n a n a t u r a l i s t d e s c r i p t i o n o f

human

a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d success a n d a c t i o n

e x e r t i o n o f influence, between

ori-

conceptual

learning and indoctrinadon.

The

b e i n g s as o r g a n i s m s t h a t d e v e l o p t o o l s i n o r d e r t o a d a p t t h e m s e l v e s

c o u n t e r i n t u i t i v e m i n g l i n g o f t h e o n e w i t h t h e o t h e r has t h e u n p l e a s -

o p t i m a l l y t o t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t w i t h t h e a i m o f satisfying t h e i r n e e d s .

a n t c o n s e q u e n c e t h a t we lose t h e c r i t i c a l s t a n d a r d s o p e r a t i n g i n

L a n g u a g e , t o o , is s u c h a t o o l — a n d n o t , f o r i n s t a n c e , a m e d i u m f o r

e v e r y d a y l i f e . R o r t y ' s n a t u r a l i s t strategy leads t o a c a t e g o r i a l l e v e l - i n g

r e p r e s e n t i n g r e a l i t y : " N o m a t t e r w h e t h e r t h e t o o l is a h a m m e r o r a

o f d i s t i n c t i o n s o f s u c h a k i n d t h a t o u r d e s c r i p t i o n s lose t h e i r sensitivity

g u n o r a b e l i e f o r a s t a t e m e n t , t o o l - u s i n g is p a r t o f t h e i n t e r a c t i o n

f o r differences t h a t d o make a difference i n everyday

o f t h e o r g a n i s m w i t h its e n v i r o n m e n t . "

6 2

m e r e l y gives e x p r e s s i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t i n t e l l i g e n t o p e r a t i o n s

f o r t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n o f a species t h a t , t h r o u g h a c t i n g , m u s t

" c o p e " w i t h reality. T h i s n e o - D a r w i n i s t self-description d e m a n d s an w i t h "successful a d a p t a t i o n t o t h e e n v i r o n m e n t , " m e r e l y e x c h a n g e s one k i n d o f objectivism for another: the objectivism o f

"represented"

reality f o r the objectivism o f i n s t r u m e n t a l l y "mastered" reality. A l t h o u g h a d m i t t e d l y , w i t h t h i s , t h e d i r e c t i o n o f fit f o r i n t e r a c t i o n h u m a n b e i n g s a n d w o r l d is c h a n g e d , w h a t r e m a i n s

the

s a m e is t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t o f a n o b j e c t i v e w o r l d as t h e t o t a l i t y o f e v e r y t h i n g t h a t we c a n , i n t h e o n e case, " r e p r e s e n t , " i n t h e o t h e r , "deal w i t h . " The

pragmatic

Notes

are

i r o n i c p r i c e . F o r Rorty, i n r e p l a c i n g t h e " c o r r e c t d e s c r i p d o n o f facts"

between

63

W h a t a p p e a r s t o us as t h e

normative dimension of the linguistically constituted h u m a n m i n d functional

practices.

1. R. Rorty, 'Trotsky a n d the Wild O r c h i d s , " Common Knowledge 3 (1992): 140-153. 2. R. Rorty, ed., The Linguistic Turn. Recent Essays in Philosophical Method (Chicago, 1970), p. 33. 3. T. W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans, by E . B. Ashton ( L o n d o n , 1973), p. 408 (amended translation). 4. M. Williams, Unnatural Doubts (Princeton, N.J., 1996), p. 365 (n. 51). Cf. also R. Rorty, "Is Derrida a Quasi-Transcendental Philosopher?," Contemporary Literature (1995): 173-200. 5. Cf. T h e exchange between T. McCarthy and R. Rorty in Critical Inquiry 16 (1990): 355-370, 633-641. 6. Rorty, Linguistic Turn, p. 39.

t u r n was

supposed to replace the

representa-

t i o n a l i s t m o d e l o f k n o w l e d g e w i t h a c o m m u n i c a t i o n m o d e l t h a t sets successful i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung) i n t h e p l a c e o f a c h i m e r i c a l o b j e c t i v i t y o f e x p e r i e n c e . I t is, h o w e v e r , p r e c i s e l y t h i s i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e d i m e n s i o n t h a t is i n t u r n c l o s e d o f f i n a n o b j e c t i v a t i n g d e s c r i p t i o n o f processes o f c o o p e r a t i o n

and com-

m u n i c a t i o n t h a t c a n b e g r a s p e d as s u c h o n l y f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e

of

p a r t i c i p a n t s . R o r t y uses a j a r g o n t h a t n o l o n g e r p e r m i t s a n y d i f f e r -

7. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, N.J., 1979), p. 261. 8. [Editor's note:] Habermas notes that in English the word "representation" is used to refer to both Darstellung and Vorstellung. 9. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 170. 10. H . Putnam, Realism with a Human Face (Cambridge, Mass., 1990), p. 28; R. Rorty, "Putnam and the Relativist Menace, "Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993): 443. 11. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 390.

378

379

Chapter 8


12. Ibid., p. 179: " [ T h e contexualist view] threatens the n e o K a n t i a n image of philosophy's relation to science and to culture. T h e urge to say that assertions and actions must not only cohere with other assertions and actions but 'correspond' to something apart from what people are saying and doing has some claim to be called the philosophical urge."

29. Williams, Unnatural Doubts, p. 266.

13. Ibid., p. 171. 14. Cf. H . Schnädelbach, "Philosophie," in E . Martens and H . Schnädelbach, eds., Grundkurs Philosophie (Hamburg, 1985), pp. 37-76. 15. [Editor's note:] Habermas remarks that the subtitle to the G e r m a n translation of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is A Critique of Philosophy (Eine Kritik der Philosophie) . 16. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 263. 17. Ibid., p. 339. 18. Ibid. 19. R. Rorty, Philosophical Papers I: Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge, 1991), p. 23. 20. Only the empiricists were prepared to call "objective" the experience (Erfahrung) that "corresponds to what is there outside" (Rorty). T h e transcendental idealists, by contrast, reduce even the objectivity of experience to necessary subjective conditions of possible experience. 21. L . Wittgenstein, On Certainty, trans, by D. Paul and G . E . M. Anscombe (Oxford, 1969), §115, p. 125. 22. H . Schnädelbach, " T h e s e n über Geltung u n d Wahrheit," in Zur Rehabilitierung des animal rationale (Frankfurt, 1992), pp. 104—115. 23. With respect to a critique of Rorty's approach, I will confine myself in the following to the problem of truth. However, I would like to indicate, at least, that we would not be able to explain the possibility of learning processes without reference to the capacity for recognizing the same entities under different descriptions. 24. E . Tugendhat, Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A. C o r n e r (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 50ff. 25. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 178. 26. Cf. Williams, Unnatural Doubts, p. 232: "We need only ask whether or not the 'direct' grasping of facts on which such comparison depends is supposed to be a cognitive state with propositional content. I f it isn't, it can have no impact on verification. But if it is, all we have been given is another kind of belief." 27. Ibid, p. 267. 28. R. Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson, and T r u t h , " in E . Lepore, ed., Truth and Interpretation (Oxford, 1986), p. 343.

30. Ibid., p. 249. 31. F. Kambartel, "Universalität richtig verstanden," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 44 (1996): 249. 32. It is no accident that I introduced the formal-pragmatic concept of the grammatical supposition of an objective world in the context of the theory of action. Cf. J . Habermas The Theory of Communicative Action, trans. T. McCarthy, vol. 1 (Boston, 1984), pp. 75-101; vol. 2 (Boston, 1987), pp. 119ff. 33. Cf. Williams, Unnatural Doubts, p. 238: "All that is involved in the idea of an objective world as 'what is there anyway' is that an objective proposition's being true is one thing and our believing it to be true, or being justified in believing it to be true, something else again." 34. R. Rorty, "Is T r u t h a Goal of Inquiry? Davidson vs. Wright," Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1995): 281-300 (here, p. 300). 35. D. Davidson pursues a third strategy that could be called "theoreticist" or, as he himself proposes, "methodological;" cf. D. Davidson, " T h e Folly of Trying to Define T r u t h , " Journal of Philosophy 93 (1996): 263-278. Davidson uses the semantic conception of truth, understood in a nondeflationary way, as the undefined basic concept for an empirical theory of language. Both the concept of truth, which is used as a theoretical term in his theory of language, and the theory itself, which is supposed to explain the comprehension of linguistic expressions, can prove their truth (sich bewähren) at one and the same time. For this reason, Davidson's implicit "theory of truth" can be discussed only in connection with his theory as a whole. I n general, I see the following difficulty: on the one hand, Davidson disputes that the concept of truth has a content capable of being explicated, to this extent allying himself with the deflationist polemic against attempts to explain the meaning of truth; on the other hand, he has to secure for the truth-predicate, over and above its disquotational function, a certain content as far as the theory of rationality is concerned in order to explain the veridical nature of beliefs. To this extent he joins forces with Putnam and Dummett, who insist that Tarski's Convention T says nothing about the actual meaning of truth. Standing between these two positions, Davidson, instead of merely using the concept, sees himself compelled to write learned treatises on a concept he declares to be "indefinable"—treatises in which he does, at least, in a metacritical way, isolate the realist intuitions bound up with truth. Cf. D. Davidson, " T h e Structure and Content of T r u t h , " Journal of Philosophy 87 (1990): 279-328. Davidson holds onto the idea that we can know something of an objective world "which is not of our own making." This view separates him from Rorty who attempts in vain to pull Davidson over to his own side of an abolitionist understanding of truth. Cf. D. Davidson, " A Coherence Theory of T r u t h and Knowledge," in A. Malachowski, ed., Reading Rorty (Oxford, 1990), pp. 120-139; cf. also Rorty, "Pragmatism, Davidson, and T r u t h . " For a comparison of Davidson's and my own approaches to the theory of language, see B. Fultner, Radical Interpretation or Communicative Action (Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1995). 36. K. R. Popper, ' T r u t h , Rationality and the Growth of Scientific Knowledge," in Conjectures and Refutations (London, 1963), pp. 215-250.

380

381

Chapter 8


37. E . Tugendhat, "Tarskis semantische Definition der Wahrheit," Philosophische Rundschau 8 (1960): 131-159, reprinted in his Philosophische Aufsätze (Frankfurt, 1992), pp. 179-213.

53. Wellmer, "Wahrheit," p. 163; cf. the corresponding reflections on "superassertibility" in C. Wright, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, Mass., 1992).

38. I refer here to positions held bv P. Horwich and A. Fine; cf. M. Williams, " D o We (Epistemologists) Need a Theory of T r u t h ? , " Philosophical Topics 14 (1986): 223-242. 39. I introduced this distinction in the Christian Gauss Lectures on founding sociology in the theory of language (1971); cf. J . Habermas, Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt, 1984), pp. 1-126, esp. pp. 104ff. 40. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, pp. 22-42. 41. H . Putnam, "Introduction," in Realism and Reason (Cambridge, 1983). 42. J . Habermas, "Wahrheitstheorien," in Habermas, Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. 43. K . - 0 . Apel, "Fallibilismus, Konsenstheorie der Wahrheit u n d Letztbegründung," in F o r u m für Philosophie, ed., Philosophie und Begründung (Frankfurt, 1987), pp. 116¬ 211. 44. C . Lafont, "Spannungen im Wahrheitsbegriff," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 42 (1994): 1007-1023; Williams, Unnatural Doubts, pp. 233ff. 45. A. Wellmer, "Ethics and Dialogue," in The Persistence of Modernity, trans. D. Midgley (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), p. 175 (amended translation). 46. A. Wellmer, "Wahrheit, Kontingenz, Moderne," in Endspiele (Frankfurt, 1993), p. 162. English translation as Endgames: Essays and lectures on the Irreconcilable Nature of Modernity (Cambridge, Mass., 1998).

54. Cf. Lafont "Spannungen im Wahrheitsbegriff," p. 1021: "Only the presupposition of a single objective world . . . permits [us] to make the unconditional validity of truth compatible with a fallible understanding of knowledge." 55. I cannot in the present context deal with moral and other normative validity claims that have a built-in orientation toward discursive vindication. They lack the property of "transcending justification" that accrues to truth claims through the supposition of a single objective world built into the communicative use of language. Normative validity claims are raised for interpersonal relationships within a social world that is not independent of "our making" in the same way as is the objective world. T h e discursive treatment of normative claims is, however, "analogous to truth" insofar as the participants in practical discourse are guided by the goal of a commanded, permitted, or forbidden "single right answer." T h e social world is intrinsically historical, that is, ontologically constituted in a different way than the objective world. F o r this reason, in the case of the social world, the idealization of the justificatory conditions cannot include an "anticipation of future corroboration (Bewährung)," in the sense of an anticipated refutation of future objections (Wingert) , but only in the critical sense of a proviso concerning approximation, that is, a proviso concerning the justification community's actually achieved state of decentering. T h e discursive vindication of a truth claim says that the truth conditions, interpreted as assertibility conditions, are satisfied. I n the case of a normative validity claim, the discursively achieved agreement grounds the corresponding norm's worthiness to be recognized; to this extent the agreement itself contributes to the satisfaction of the norm's conditions of validity. Whereas rational acceptability merely indicates the truth of a proposition, it provides a constructive contribution to the validity of norms. 56. Rorty, " I s T r u t h a Goal of Inquiry?," p. 300.

47. Davidson, " T h e Structure a n d Content of T r u t h , " p. 307.

57. R. Rorty, "Relativism: Finding and Making," Ms. (1995), p. 5.

48. R. Rorty, "Sind Aussagen universelle Geltungsansprüche?," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie & (1994): 982f.

58. T. McCarthy, "Philosophy and Social Practice: Richard Rorty's 'New Pragmatism,'" in Ideals and Illusions (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), pp. 11-34.

49. Rorty, "Putnam and the Relativist Menace," pp. 451f.

59. R. Rorty, "Habermas, Derrida, and the Functions of Philosophy," Revue Internationale de Philosophie 49 (1995), 437-460; cf. my reply in ibid., pp. 553-556.

50. J . Habermas, "Remarks on Discourse Ethics," in Justification and Application, trans. C. C r o n i n (Cambridge, Mass., 1993), pp. 30ff, pp. 58f.

60. Rorty, "Is T r u t h a Goal of Inquiry?," p. 298.

51. L . Wingert, Gemeinsinn und Moral (Frankfurt, 1993), p. 277.

61. Rorty, Philosophical Papers I, p. 29.

52. [Editor's note:] T h e G e r m a n term "sich bewähren" and its cognates have generally been rendered here as "prove to be true" (in the sense of "turn out to be t r u e " ) , so as to preserve in translation its connection with "wahr" true. Sich bewähren is proving to be true in the sense of standing the test, withstanding critical scrutiny. However, because it is the term that Albrecht Wellmer used to render "corroboration" in his influential discussion of Popper, where the reference is clearly to Wellmer's idea of "anticipating future Bewährung" "corroboration" is used. See A. Wellmer, Critical Theory of Society, trans. J . C u m m i n g (New York, 1974).

62. Rorty, "Relativism: Finding and Making," pp. 1 If. 63. T h e same objectivism and the same kind of insensitivity could be shown through reference to Rorty's egocentric or ethnocentric description of processes of interpretation, for example, of hard cases of intercultural understanding (Verständigung). Unlike Gadamer, Rorty does not have recourse to the symmetrical conditions for an adoption of perspectives learned by speakers and hearers in learning the system of personal pronouns and making possible a reciprocal convergence of interpretive

382 Chapter 8

9 horizons that, initially, are far apart. Instead, he takes as his starting point an asymmetrical relationship between " u s " and "them," so that we have to judge their utterances according to our standards and assimilate their standards to ours; cf. J . Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. W. M. Hohengarten (Cambridge, Mass., 1992), pp. 135ff. This assimilatory model of understanding (Verstehen) partially coincides with Davidson's model of interpretation. However, what for Davidson is the result of a methodological decision to view the interpretation of linguistic expressions as the application of the hypotheses of an empirically turned theory of truth, results for Rorty from the decision (of strategic significance for his theory) in favor of a naturalist descriptive vocabulary.

O n the Distinction between Poetic and Communicative Uses of Language (1985)

1 F r o m this c o m p l e x discussion [between Jacques D e r r i d a a n d J o h n S e a r l e ] , J o n a t h a n C u l l e r selects as t h e c e n t r a l issue t h e q u e s t i o n o f 1

w h e t h e r J o h n A u s t i n succeeds i n m a k i n g w h a t a p p e a r s t o b e a t o t a l l y harmless,

provisional,

and

purely

methodological

move.

Austin

w a n t s t o a n a l y z e t h e r u l e s i n t u i t i v e l y m a s t e r e d by c o m p e t e n t speakers, i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h w h i c h t y p i c a l s p e e c h acts c a n b e

executed

successfully. H e b e g i n s t h i s analysis by f o c u s i n g o n s e n t e n c e s f r o m normal e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s t h a t are u t t e r e d s e r i o u s l y a n d u s e d as simply and

literally as p o s s i b l e . T h u s ,

t h e u n i t o f analysis, t h e

standard

s p e e c h act, is t h e r e s u l t o f c e r t a i n a b s t r a c t i o n s . T h e t h e o r e t i c i a n s p e e c h acts d i r e c t s h i s a t t e n t i o n t o a s a m p l e o f n o r m a l

of

linguistic

utterances f r o m w h i c h all complex, derivative, parasidc, a n d

deviant

cases h a v e b e e n e x c l u d e d . U n d e r l y i n g t h i s d e m a r c a t i o n is a c o n c e p tion of "customary" or n o r m a l linguistic practice—a concept of

"or-

d i n a r y l a n g u a g e " w h o s e h a r m l e s s n e s s a n d c o n s i s t e n c y D e r r i d a calls i n t o q u e s t i o n . A u s t i n ' s i n t e n t i o n is c l e a r : h e w a n t s t o analyze t h e u n i v e r s a l p r o p e r t i e s of, f o r e x a m p l e , " p r o m i s e s " w i t h r e s p e c t t o cases i n w h i c h the u t t e r a n c e o f c o r r e s p o n d i n g sentences actually

functions

as a p r o m i s e . N o w , t h e r e are c o n t e x t s i n w h i c h s u c h s e n t e n c e s lose t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e o f a p r o m i s e . S p o k e n b y a n a c t o r o n t h e stage, as p a r t o f a p o e m , o r e v e n w i t h i n a m o n o l o g u e , a p r o m i s e , as A u s t i n tells us, b e c o m e s " p e c u l i a r l y n u l l a n d v o i d . " T h e same h o l d s f o r a

384

385

Chapter 9

O n the Distinction between Poetic a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e U s e s of L a n g u a g e

p r o m i s e t h a t o c c u r s i n a q u o t a t i o n , o r f o r o n e t h a t is m e r e l y m e n -

is r e m o v e d f r o m t h e q u o t e d p r o m i s e t h r o u g h t h e f o r m o f i n d i r e c t

t i o n e d . I n such contexts,

and

s p e e c h : i t is t h e r e b y t a k e n o u t o f t h e c o n t e x t i n w h i c h i t " f u n c t i o n s , "

performative

t h a t is, i n w h i c h i t c o o r d i n a t e s t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e v a r i o u s p a r t i c i p a n t s

t h e r e is n o

serious o r binding use,

s o m e t i m e s n o t e v e n a literal use, o f t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g

repeats

i n i n t e r a c t i o n a n d gives rise t o c o n s e q u e n c e s r e l e v a n t f o r a c t i o n .

o r s i m u l a t e d o r i n d i r e c t m o d e s o f use are " p a r a -

O n l y t h e s p e e c h a c t a c t u a l l y p e r f o r m e d i n a g i v e n i n s t a n c e is effective

s e n t e n c e , b u t r a t h e r a d e r i v a t i v e o r p a r a s i t i c use. As Searle insistently,

fictional

s i t i c " i n t h e sense t h a t l o g i c a l l y t h e y p r e s u p p o s e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a

as action; t h e p r o m i s e m e n t i o n e d i n q u o t a t i o n , o r r e p o r t e d , d e p e n d s

s e r i o u s , l i t e r a l , a n d b i n d i n g use o f t h e s e n t e n c e s g r a m m a t i c a l l y a p -

g r a m m a t i c a l l y u p o n t h i s . S u c h a s e t t i n g d e p r i v i n g i t o f its i l l o c u t i o n -

p r o p r i a t e f o r p r o m i s e s . C u l l e r e x t r a c t s essentially t h r e e

objections

ary force constitutes the bridge between

quotation and

fictional

f r o m D e r r i d a ' s texts; these a r e a i m e d a t s h o w i n g t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . E v e n a c t i o n o n t h e stage rests o n a basis o f e v e r y d a y

s u c h a use o f l a n g u a g e a n d a r e m e a n t t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e u s u a l

actions ( o n t h e p a r t o f t h e actors, d i r e c t o r , stageworkers, a n d t h e a t e r

d i s t i n c t i o n s between serious a n d s i m u l a t e d , l i t e r a l a n d m e t a p h o r i c a l ,

employees); i n the context o f this f r a m e w o r k , promises can f u n c t i o n

everyday a n d

fictional,

a n d c u s t o m a r y a n d parasitic m o d e s o f speech

in a different way t h a n t h e y d o " o n stage," g i v i n g rise t o o b l i g a t i o n s relevant f o r the sequel o f a c t i o n . D e r r i d a makes

collapse. a. W i t h h i s i n i t i a l a r g u m e n t , D e r r i d a p o s i t s a n o t v e r y i l l u m i n a t -

no

attempt to

" d e c o n s t r u c t " this distinctive f u n c t i o n a l m o d e o f everyday

i n g l i n k between quotability a n d iterability, o n the one h a n d , a n d fictionality,

b o n d i n g (bindende) f o r c e o f l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s , A u s t i n d i s c o v e r e d

o n t h e o t h e r . T h e q u o t a t i o n o f a p r o m i s e is o n l y a p p a r -

ently something

secondary i n comparison

with a directly made

communicative

action. I n the

language

within

illocutionary binding

and

a m e c h a n i s m f o r c o o r d i n a t i n g a c t i o n t h a t subjects n o r m a l s p e e c h —

promise, for the indirect r e p o r t i n g of a performative utterance i n a

s p e e c h t h a t is p a r t o f e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s — t o

q u o t a t i o n is a f o r m o f r e p e t i t i o n , a n d as q u o t a b i l i t y p r e s u p p o s e s t h e

f r o m those o f

p o s s i b i l i t y o f r e p e t i t i o n i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h a r u l e , t h a t is, c o n v e n -

T h e c o n s t r a i n t s u n d e r w h i c h i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts d e v e l o p a n a c t i o n -

fictional

constraints different

speech, s i m u l a t i o n , a n d i n t e r i o r m o n o l o g u e .

t i o n a l i t y , i t b e l o n g s t o t h e essence o f e v e r y c o n v e n t i o n a l l y g e n e r a t e d

c o o r d i n a t i n g f o r c e a n d give rise t o c o n s e q u e n c e s r e l e v a n t f o r a c t i o n

u t t e r a n c e — a n d t h u s also t o t h a t o f p e r f o r m a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s — t h a t i t

d e f i n e t h e d o m a i n o f " n o r m a l " l a n g u a g e . T h e y c a n b e a n a l y z e d as

c a n b e q u o t e d a n d , i n t h e b r o a d e r sense,

those i d e a l i z i n g suppositions t h a t we have to m a k e i n c o m m u n i c a t i v e

fictionally

reproduced: " I f

i t w e r e n o t possible f o r a character i n a play to m a k e a p r o m i s e , t h e r e c o u l d be n o promises

action.

i n real life, f o r w h a t makes i t possible to

b. T h e s e c o n d a r g u m e n t r a i s e d b y C u l l e r , w i t h D e r r i d a , a g a i n s t

p r o m i s e , as A u s t i n tells us, is t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c o n v e n t i o n a l p r o c e -

A u s t i n a n d Searle relates t o j u s t s u c h i d e a l i z a t i o n s . A n y g e n e r a l i z i n g

dure, o f formulas one

a

analysis o f s p e e c h acts has t o b e a b l e t o specify g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l

p r o m i s e i n 'real life,' there m u s t be iterable p r o c e d u r e s o r f o r m u l a s

c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y success o f s t a n d a r d i z e d s p e e c h acts.

s u c h as a r e u s e d o n stage. ' S e r i o u s '

S e a r l e , i n p a r t i c u l a r , has t a k e n o n t h i s t a s k . L i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n s ,

role-playing. "

can repeat. For m e

t o be a b l e t o m a k e

b e h a v i o r is a s p e c i a l case o f

3

however,

2

I n this a r g u m e n t , D e r r i d a obviously already presupposes w h a t he

moreover,

change their meanings

depending

o n shifting

contexts;

c o n t e x t s are so c o n s t i t u t e d as t o be o p e n t o e v e r - w i d e r -

wants to prove: that every c o n v e n t i o n t h a t p e r m i t s t h e r e p e t i t i o n o f

r e a c h i n g s p e c i f i c a t i o n . I t is o n e o f t h e p e c u l i a r i t i e s o f o u r

e x e m p l a r y a c t i o n s i n t r i n s i c a l l y possesses n o t m e r e l y a s y m b o l i c b u t

t h a t w e c a n release u t t e r a n c e s f r o m t h e i r o r i g i n a l c o n t e x t s a n d t r a n s -

also a

fictional

c h a r a c t e r . B u t i t w o u l d first have t o b e s h o w n

language

that

p l a n t t h e m i n t o d i f f e r e n t o n e s — D e r r i d a speaks o f " g r a f t i n g . " I n t h i s

r e l a t i n g t o p l a y u l t i m a t e l y are i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m

m a n n e r , we c a n , i n r e l a t i o n t o a s p e e c h a c t s u c h as a " m a r r i a g e v o w , "

n o r m s o f a c t i o n . A u s t i n uses t h e q u o t a t i o n o f a p r o m i s e as a n e x a m -

t h i n k o f ever-new a n d m o r e i m p r o b a b l e contexts; t h e specification

p l e o f a d e r i v a t i v e o r p a r a s i t i c f o r m because t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e

o f g e n e r a l c o n t e x t u a l c o n d i t i o n s does n o t r u n u p against any n a t u r a l

conventions

386

387

Chapter 9

O n the Distinction between Poetic a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e U s e s of L a n g u a g e

limits: "Suppose that the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r a m a r r i a g e

ceremony

p o s i t i o n s ; b u t these i d e a l i z a t i o n s are n o t l o g o c e n t r i c , a r b i t r a r y acts

were m e t b u t that one o f the partners were u n d e r hypnosis, o r again

that theoreticians b r i n g to bear o n u n m a n a g e a b l e

t h a t t h e c e r e m o n y w e r e i m p e c c a b l e i n a l l respects b u t h a d b e e n

t o give t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f m a s t e r i n g t h e m ; r a t h e r , t h e y are p r e s u p -

c a l l e d a ' r e h e a r s a l , ' o r f i n a l l y , t h a t w h i l e t h e s p e a k e r was a m i n i s t e r

positions that the participants themselves have to make i f c o m m u n i -

licensed

cative a c t i o n is t o b e p o s s i b l e at a l l .

to p e r f o r m weddings

and the couple had obtained a l i -

cense, the t h r e e o f t h e m were o n this occasion a c t i n g i n a play that, coincidentally, included a w e d d i n g c e r e m o n y "

4

Such a v a r i a t i o n o f

contexts i n order

c. T h e r o l e o f i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s c a n also b e c l a r i f i e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h s o m e o t h e r c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h i s s a m e state o f a f f a i r s .

contexts p r o d u c i n g changes i n m e a n i n g c a n n o t i n p r i n c i p l e be ar-

Because c o n t e x t s

r e s t e d o r c o n t r o l l e d , because c o n t e x t s c a n n o t b e e x h a u s t e d , t h a t is,

d i r e c t i o n whatsoever,

t h e y c a n n o t b e m a s t e r e d t h e o r e t i c a l l y o n c e a n d f o r a l l . C u l l e r shows

i n g s ; i t is t h e t e x t i t s e l f t h a t m a k e s p o s s i b l e its u n c o n t r o l l a b l e effec-

are

changeable a n d

can

be

expanded in

any

t h e same t e x t c a n b e o p e n t o d i f f e r e n t r e a d -

c o n v i n c i n g l y t h a t A u s t i n c a n n o t escape t h i s d i f f i c u l t y e v e n b y t a k i n g

tive

refuge

the

p a r a d o x i c a l s t a t e m e n t t h a t e v e r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is i n e v i t a b l y a m i s i n -

thoughts o f bride, b r i d e g r o o m , or priest that decide the validity o f

t e r p r e t a t i o n , a n d every u n d e r s t a n d i n g a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , does n o t

the ceremony, b u t their actions a n d the circumstances u n d e r w h i c h

follow f r o m this venerable h e r m e n e u t i c insight. Culler justifies the

t h e y are c a r r i e d o u t . " W h a t c o u n t s is t h e p l a u s i b i l i t y o f t h e d e s c r i p -

s t a t e m e n t " A l l r e a d i n g s are m i s r e a d i n g s " as f o l l o w s : " I f a t e x t c a n b e

t i o n o f the circumstances:

u n d e r s t o o d , i t can i n p r i n c i p l e be u n d e r s t o o d repeatedly, by d i f f e r -

i n the i n t e n t i o n s o f speakers a n d hearers.

d u c e d create a frame utterances."

I t is n o t

w h e t h e r the features o f the c o n t e x t ad-

that alters t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y force o f

the

history

(Wirkungsgeschichte).

ent readers

However,

i n d i f f e r e n t circumstances.

Derrida's

deliberately

T h e s e acts o f r e a d i n g

u n d e r s t a n d i n g are n o t , o f course, i d e n t i c a l . T h e y involve

5

Searle has r e a c t e d t o t h i s d i f f i c u l t y b y i n t r o d u c i n g a q u a l i f i c a t i o n

tions a n d differences,

or

modifica-

b u t d i f f e r e n c e s w h i c h are d e e m e d n o t

to

to the effect that the literal m e a n i n g o f a sentence does n o t c o m -

m a t t e r . W e c a n t h u s say . . . t h a t u n d e r s t a n d i n g is a special case o f

p l e t e l y fix t h e v a l i d i t y c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e s p e e c h act i n w h i c h i t is

misunderstanding, a particular deviation or determination of misun-

employed;

d e r s t a n d i n g . I t is m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h o s e misses d o n o t m a t t e r . "

r a t h e r , i t d e p e n d s o n t a c i t s u p p l e m e n t a t i o n b y a system

o f b a c k g r o u n d assumptions r e g a r d i n g the n o r m a l i t y o f general con-

H o w e v e r , C u l l e r leaves o n e t h i n g o u t o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n . T h e

6

produc-

d i t i o n s i n the w o r l d . These prereflective b a c k g r o u n d certainties are

tivity

o f a h o l i s t i c n a t u r e ; t h e y c a n n o t b e e x h a u s t e d by a c o u n t a b l y

so l o n g as a l l p a r t i c i p a n t s r e t a i n h o l d o f t h e r e f e r e n c e p o i n t o f a

set o f s p e c i f i c a t i o n s .

finite

Sentence-meanings, n o m a t t e r h o w w e l l ana-

l y z e d , t h u s are v a l i d o n l y r e l a t i v e t o a s h a r e d b a c k g r o u n d

knowledge

t h a t is c o n s t i t u t i v e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d o f a l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y .

How-

o f the process o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g r e m a i n s u n p r o b l e m a t i c

only

p o s s i b l e , a c t u a l l y r e a c h e d , m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verständigung) i n w h i c h t h e same u t t e r a n c e s are a s s i g n e d t h e same m e a n i n g . A s G a d a mer

has s h o w n ,

even the h e r m e n e u t i c

endeavor, w h i c h aims

to

ever, Searle m a k e s c l e a r t h a t p o s i t i n g s u c h a r e l a t i o n b y n o m e a n s

b r i d g e t e m p o r a l a n d c u l t u r a l distances, r e m a i n s o r i e n t e d t o w a r d t h e

b r i n g s w i t h i t t h e m e a n i n g - r e l a t i v i s m t h a t D e r r i d a a i m s t o show. So

idea o f a possible, actually achieved,

l o n g as l a n g u a g e g a m e s a r e f u n c t i o n i n g a n d t h e p r e u n d e r s t a n d i n g c o n s t i t u t i v e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d has

not broken

down,

participants

agreement.

U n d e r t h e pressure to make decisions i n h e r e n t i n everyday c o m municative

practices,

participants are

dependent on

an

action-

r e c k o n w i t h c o n d i t i o n s i n t h e w o r l d — a n d clearly, r i g h t l y s o — t h a t

coordinating

a r e a s s u m e d as " n o r m a l " i n t h e i r l i n g u i s t i c c o m m u n i t y . A n d i n cases

f r o m this k i n d o f "serious s i t u a t i o n , " t h e m o r e they can free t h e m -

where individual background convictions

problematic,

selves f r o m t h e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n o f a n a c h i e v a b l e c o n s e n s u s .

t h e y f u r t h e r assume t h a t t h e y c o u l d i n p r i n c i p l e r e a c h a r a t i o n a l l y

B u t they can never w h o l l y free themselves f r o m t h e idea t h a t m i s i n -

m o t i v a t e d a g r e e m e n t . B o t h are s t r o n g , t h a t is t o say, i d e a l i z i n g s u p -

t e r p r e t a t i o n s w o u l d i n p r i n c i p l e have to be criticizable i n terms o f

do become

agreement.

The

more

removed

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are

388

389

Chapter 9

O n the D i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n P o e t i c a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e U s e s o f L a n g u a g e

a n a g r e e m e n t a i m e d f o r i n a n i d e a l way. T h e i n t e r p r e t e r d o e s n o t

functions,

impose this idea o n her object; rather, i n the p e r f o r m a t i v e attitude

s i o n a n d speaker, h e a r e r , a n d state o f a f f a i r s r e p r e s e n t e d .

o f a p a r t i c i p a t i n g o b s e r v e r , she takes i t o v e r f r o m t h o s e p a r t i c i p a t i n g

c o n c e p t u a l i z e d t h i s i n h i s s e m i o t i c s c h e m a as t h e s i g n f u n c t i o n s

d i r e c t l y w h o c a n act communicatively

expression, appeal, a n d representation. To the extent that language

only on the presupposition of interThus, I do

Buhler of

8

to

f u l f i l l s a p o e t i c f u n c t i o n , h o w e v e r , i t d o e s so i n t h e r e f l e x i v e r e l a t i o n

m a r s h a l a W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n positivism o f language games against D e r -

o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s s i o n t o itself. C o n s e q u e n t l y , r e f e r e n c e t o a n

r i d a ' s thesis. I t is n o t a n y g i v e n h a b i t u a l i z e d p r a c t i c e t h a t d e c i d e s j u s t

object, i n f o r m a t i o n a l content, and truth-value—validity conditions

w h a t m e a n i n g is a t t r i b u t e d t o a t e x t o r a n u t t e r a n c e .

in general—are

subjectively identical ascriptions of meaning.

n o t wish

i t has t o p r o d u c e r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e l i n g u i s t i c e x p r e s -

Rather, lan-

7

e x t r i n s i c t o p o e t i c l a n g u a g e ; a n u t t e r a n c e is p o e t i c

g u a g e g a m e s w o r k o n l y because t h e y p r e s u p p o s e i d e a l i z a t i o n s t h a t

t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t i t is d i r e c t e d t o t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e d i u m itself, t o its

transcend

own linguistic f o r m . Roman Jakobson integrated this

any p a r t i c u l a r l a n g u a g e g a m e , idealizations

that—as

necessary c o n d i t i o n o f possible m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g — g i v e

a

rise t o

specification

i n t o an e x p a n d e d schema of language functions. I n addition to the

t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a n a g r e e m e n t t h a t is o p e n t o c r i t i c i s m o n t h e basis

basic f u n c t i o n s , w h i c h g o b a c k t o B u h l e r — e x p r e s s i n g

o f v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . A l a n g u a g e o p e r a t i n g u n d e r these k i n d s o f c o n -

intentions, establishing

s t r a i n t s is s u b j e c t t o a n o n g o i n g test. E v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e

states o f a f f a i r s — a n d t w o f u r t h e r f u n c t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o m a k i n g c o n -

tices, i n w h i c h a c t o r s h a v e t o r e a c h u n d e r s t a n d i n g a b o u t

prac-

something

interpersonal

relations, and

the speaker's representing

t a c t a n d t o t h e c o d e , h e ascribes t o l i n g u i s t i c u t t e r a n c e s a p o e t i c

i n the w o r l d , stand u n d e r the n e e d to prove t h e i r w o r t h ; such a p r o o f

f u n c t i o n , w h i c h d i r e c t s o u r a t t e n t i o n t o " t h e message as s u c h . "

o f w o r t h is m a d e p o s s i b l e i n t h e first p l a c e by these i d e a l i z i n g s u p -

a r e less c o n c e r n e d h e r e w i t h a c l o s e r c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e p o e t i c

p o s i t i o n s . I t is o n t h e basis o f t h i s n e e d f o r e v e r y d a y l i n g u i s t i c p r a c -

f u n c t i o n ( i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h w h i c h t h e p r i n c i p l e o f e q u i v a l e n c e is

tices t o p r o v e t h e i r w o r t h t h a t o n e m a y d i s t i n g u i s h , w i t h A u s t i n a n d

p r o j e c t e d f r o m t h e axis o f s e l e c t i o n t o t h e axis o f c o m b i n a t i o n )

S e a r l e , b e t w e e n " c u s t o m a r y " a n d " p a r a s i t i c " uses o f

w i t h a n i n t e r e s t i n g c o n s e q u e n c e t h a t is i m p o r t a n t f o r o u r

language.

U p t o t h i s p o i n t I have c r i t i c i z e d D e r r i d a ' s t h i r d a n d f u n d a m e n t a l a s s u m p t i o n only to the e x t e n t t h a t (against Culler's o f D e r r i d i a n arguments)

reconstruction

I have d e f e n d e d t h e possibility o f

demar-

c a t i n g n o r m a l l a n g u a g e f r o m derivative f o r m s . I have n o t y e t s h o w n how

fictional

speech can be d e m a r c a t e d

f r o m t h e n o r m a l ( t h a t is,

e v e r y d a y ) use o f l a n g u a g e . T h i s a s p e c t is t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t o n e f o r Derrida. I f "literature" and universal insurmountable

"writing" constitute

textual context

the m o d e l

a

within which all genre

d i s t i n c t i o n s u l t i m a t e l y dissolve, t h e y c a n n o t b e s p l i t o f f f r o m d i s c o u r s e s as a n a u t o n o m o u s r e a l m o f

for

fiction.

other

For the l i t e r a r y critics

w h o f o l l o w D e r r i d a i n t h e U n i t e d States, t h e thesis o f t h e

autonomy

o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c w o r k o f a r t is u n a c c e p t a b l e f o r t h e f u r t h e r r e a s o n t h a t t h e y w a n t t o set t h e m s e l v e s o f f f r o m t h e f o r m a l i s m o f

New

C r i t i c i s m a n d f r o m s t r u c t u r a l i s t aesthetics. The from

than

problem

o f d e l i m i t i n g n o r m a l ( f r o m o t h e r k i n d s of) speech: "Any a t t e m p t to reduce the sphere o f poetic f u n c t i o n to poetry or to confine poetry t o p o e t i c f u n c t i o n w o u l d be

a delusive

oversimplification.

Poetic

f u n c t i o n is n o t t h e sole f u n c t i o n o f v e r b a l a r t , b u t o n l y its d o m i n a n t , d e t e r m i n i n g f u n c t i o n , w h e r e a s i n a l l o t h e r v e r b a l a c t i v i t i e s i t acts as a s u b s i d i a r y , accessory c o n s t i t u e n t . T h i s f u n c t i o n , b y p r o m o t i n g t h e p a l p a b i l i t y o f signs, d e e p e n s t h e f u n d a m e n t a l d i c h o t o m y

o f signs

a n d objects. H e n c e , w h e n d e a l i n g w i t h poetic f u n c t i o n , linguistics c a n n o t l i m i t i t s e l f t o t h e field o f p o e t r y . "

1 0

Poetic speech, therefore,

is t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d o n l y by v i r t u e o f t h e p r i m a r y a n d s t r u c t u r e f o r m i n g f o r c e o f a c e r t a i n f u n c t i o n t h a t is always f u l f i l l e d

together

with other language functions. Richard O h m a n n

m a k e s use

of Austin's approach i n order

to

e x a m i n e t h e s p e c i f i c f e a t u r e s o f p o e t i c l a n g u a g e i n t h i s sense. F o r

Prague Structuralists originally tried to distinguish poetic

h i m , t h e p h e n o m e n o n i n n e e d o f e x p l a n a t i o n is t h e

fictionality

of

to

t h e l i n g u i s t i c w o r k o f a r t , t h a t is, t h e g e n e r a t i o n o f a e s t h e t i c a p p e a r -

communicative

a n c e (Schein), w i t h w h i c h a s e c o n d a r e n a , s p e c i f i c a l l y r e m o v e d f r o m

o r d i n a r y language w i t h respect to the relation o f each

e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c r e a l i t y . I n s o f a r as l a n g u a g e o c c u r s i n

We

9

390

391

Chapter 9

O n the D i s t i n c t i o n between Poetic a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e Uses o f Language

practices.

p e n d e n c e o f t h e l i t e r a r y w o r k o f a r t i n D e r r i d a ' s sense. She d o e s n o t

W h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s p o e t i c l a n g u a g e is its " w o r l d - g e n e r a t i n g " capac-

consider nctionality, the bracketing o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y force, a n d the

i t y : " A l i t e r a r y w o r k creates a w o r l d . . . b y p r o v i d i n g t h e r e a d e r w i t h

u n c o u p l i n g o f poetic language f r o m everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e prac-

impaired a n d i n c o m p l e t e s p e e c h acts w h i c h h e c o m p l e t e s by s u p p l y -

tices t o b e decisive selective c r i t e r i a , b e c a u s e f i c t i o n a l e l e m e n t s

ing the appropriate circumstances."

l a n g u a g e s u c h as j o k e s , i r o n y , fantasies, s t o r i e s , a n d p a r a b l e s p e r v a d e

r e a l i t y , is o p e n e d u p o n t h e basis o f o n g o i n g e v e r y d a y

11

T h e p e c u l i a r disempowerment o f

a n d i n n o way constitute an

of

s p e e c h acts, w h i c h g e n e r a t e s f i c t i o n s , consists i n t h e f a c t t h a t s p e e c h

o u r everyday discourse

acts a r e r o b b e d o f t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e , r e t a i n i n g i l l o c u t i o n a r y

universe c u t o f f f r o m "the w o r l d ' s business." Conversely, w o r k s o f

autonomous

m e a n i n g s o n l y as r e f r a c t e d b y i n d i r e c t r e p o r t i n g o r q u o t a t i o n : " A

n o n f i c t i o n , m e m o i r s , t r a v e l r e p o r t s , h i s t o r i c a l r o m a n c e s , e v e n romans

l i t e r a r y w o r k is a d i s c o u r s e w h o s e s e n t e n c e s l a c k t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y

a clef o r t h r i l l e r s t h a t , l i k e T r u m a n C a p o t e ' s In Cold Blood, a d a p t a

f o r c e s t h a t w o u l d n o r m a l l y a t t a c h t o t h e m . I t s i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e is

factually d o c u m e n t e d

m i m e t i c . . . . Specifically, a l i t e r a r y w o r k p u r p o r t e d l y i m i t a t e s a series

f i c t i o n a l w o r l d , e v e n t h o u g h we o f t e n c o u n t these p r o d u c t i o n s , f o r

o f s p e e c h acts, w h i c h i n f a c t h a v e n o o t h e r e x i s t e n c e . B y d o i n g so, i t

t h e m o s t p a r t a t least, as " l i t e r a t u r e . " P r a t t uses t h e r e s u l t s o f studies

leads t h e r e a d e r t o i m a g i n e a speaker, a s i t u a t i o n , a set o f a n c i l l a r y

i n sociolinguistics by W. L a b o v

events, a n d so o n . "

T h e bracketing o f illocutionary force virtualizes

is, t h e " s t o r i e s " t o l d s p o n t a n e o u s l y o r o n r e q u e s t i n e v e r y d a y l i f e ,

t h e r e l a t i o n s t o t h e w o r l d i n w h i c h t h e s p e e c h acts a r e i n v o l v e d

o b e y t h e s a m e r h e t o r i c a l laws o f c o n s t r u c t i o n as, a n d e x h i b i t s i m i l a r

t h a n k s t o t h e i r i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e , a n d releases t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n

structural characteristics to, literary narratives. "Labov's data m a k e

interaction f r o m an o b l i g a t i o n to reach u n d e r s t a n d i n g about some-

it necessary t o a c c o u n t f o r n a r r a t i v e r h e t o r i c i n t e r m s that are n o t

t h i n g i n t h e w o r l d o n t h e basis o f i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s i n s u c h a

exclusively l i t e r a r y ; t h e fact that Active o r m i m e t i c a l l y o r g a n i z e d

way t h a t t h e y c a n c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r p l a n s o f a c t i o n a n d t h u s e n t e r

utterances can o c c u r i n almost any r e a l m o f e x t r a l i t e r a r y discourse

i n t o o b l i g a t i o n s r e l e v a n t t o t h e s e q u e l o f a c t i o n : " S i n c e t h e quasi¬

requires that we d o

s p e e c h acts o f l i t e r a t u r e are n o t carrying

w o r d s , t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n a w o r k ' s A c t i v i t y a n d its l i t e r a r i n e s s is

1 2

on the world's

business—de-

scribing, u r g i n g , contracting, etc.—the reader may well attend to them i n a nonpragmatic way."

1 3

Neutralizing their b i n d i n g and

b o n d i n g f o r c e relieves t h e d i s e m p o w e r e d i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts f r o m t h e pressure

to make

decisions i n t r i n s i c to everyday

practices, removes t h e m f r o m the sphere

communicative

o f n o r m a l speech, a n d

thereby empowers t h e m for the playful creation of new worlds—or, rather, for the u n m i t i g a t e d d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f the world-disclosing force o f innovative linguistic expressions. T h i s specialization i n the world-disclosing f u n c t i o n o f language

explains the peculiar

self-

referentiality o f poetic language to w h i c h Jakobson refers a n d that p r o m p t s G e o f f r e y H a r t m a n t o p o s e t h e r h e t o r i c a l q u e s t i o n : "Is n o t literary language

the n a m e we give to a d i c t i o n whose f r a m e

of

r e f e r e n c e is s u c h t h a t t h e w o r d s s t a n d o u t as w o r d s ( e v e n as s o u n d s ) r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g , at once, assimilable

meanings?"

1 6

way c r e a t e

an

unambiguously

to prove that natural narratives, that

t h e same f o r A c t i v i t y o r m i m e s i s . I n o t h e r

1 7

Nonetheless,

the fact that n o r m a l language

is p e r m e a t e d

with

fictional, narrative, metaphorical—in general, with rhetorical—elem e n t s does n o t yet speak against t h e a t t e m p t to e x p l a i n t h e a u t o n o m y o f the linguistic w o r k o f art by the b r a c k e t i n g o f i l l o c u t i o n a r y f o r c e s . For, a c c o r d i n g

to Jakobson,

n c t i o n a l i t y is a d i s t i n g u i s h i n g

feature s u i t e d to d e m a r c a t i n g l i t e r a t u r e f r o m everyday discourses only to the extent that the world-disclosing f u n c t i o n o f

language

predominates over the other linguistic functions a n d determines the s t r u c t u r e o f t h e l i n g u i s t i c c o n s t r u c t . I n a c e r t a i n respect, i t is t h e r e f r a c t i o n a n d p a r t i a l s u b l a t i o n (Aufhebung)

o f illocutionary validity

c l a i m s t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s t h e s t o r y f r o m t h e eyewitness

statement,

t e a s i n g f r o m i n s u l t i n g , i r o n y f r o m m i s l e a d i n g , h y p o t h e s i s f r o m assert i o n , f a n t a s y f r o m p e r c e p t i o n , t h e t r a i n i n g m a n e u v e r f r o m t h e act o f

i n order to r e f u t e — a d -

warfare, a n d the i m a g i n e d scenario f r o m t h e r e p o r t o n an actual

o f speech-act t h e o r y — t h e thesis o f t h e i n d e -

c a t a s t r o p h e . B u t i n n o n e o f these cases d o t h e i l l o c u t i o n a r y acts lose

M a r y L . Pratt refers to O h m a n n ' s s t u d i e s m i t t e d l y by means

1 4

indirect."

case i n n o

1 5

392

393

Chapter 9

O n the Distinction between Poetic a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e Uses of L a n g u a g e

t h e i r action-coordinating b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g force. Even i n the

m a t i c a n a l y s t o f l a n g u a g e stalks l i t e r a r y t e x t s f r o m o u t s i d e , as i t w e r e .

cases a d d u c e d f o r t h e sake o f c o m p a r i s o n , t h e c o m m u n i c a t i v e

func-

O f c o u r s e , t h e l a t t e r have to satisfy a final c o n d i t i o n ; i n t h e case o f

t i o n s o f t h e s p e e c h act r e m a i n i n t a c t i n s o f a r as t h e f i c t i o n a l e l e m e n t s

literary texts, tellability must gain p r e d o m i n a n c e

c a n n o t be detached f r o m contexts o f life-practice. T h e world-disclos-

t i o n a l characteristics: " I n the e n d , tellability can take p r e c e d e n c e

i n g f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e d o e s n o t g a i n i n d e p e n d e n c e vis-a-vis t h e

over assertibility itself."

expressive,

m a n d s a n d s t r u c t u r a l constraints o f everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e

r e g u l a t i v e , a n d i n f o r m a t i v e f u n c t i o n s . By c o n t r a s t , p r e -

(which

Pratt

2 0

O n l y i n t h i s case d o

defines

by

means

of

over other functhe f u n c t i o n a l de-

Grice's

prac-

cisely t h i s m a y be t h e case i n T r u m a n C a p o t e ' s l i t e r a r y t r e a t m e n t o f

tices

conversational

a p a r t i c u l a r event, n o t o r i o u s i n legal circles a n d carefully researched;

p o s t u l a t e s ) lose t h e i r f o r c e . T h a t e v e r y o n e is c o n c e r n e d t o p r e s e n t

f o r w h a t g r o u n d s t h e primacy a n d t h e s t r u c t u r i n g f o r c e o f t h e p o e t i c

h e r c o n t r i b u t i o n to the conversation i n f o r m a t i v e l y , to be relevant,

f u n c t i o n is n o t t h e d e v i a t i o n o f a f i c t i o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n f r o m t h e

straightforward, a n d to avoid obscure, ambiguous, a n d l o n g w i n d e d

d o c u m e n t a r y r e p o r t o f a n e v e n t , b u t t h e e x e m p l a r y way o f d e a l i n g

u t t e r a n c e s a r e i d e a l i z i n g s u p p o s i t i o n s o f normal language i n c o m m u -

w i t h i t t h a t takes t h e case o u t o f its c o n t e x t a n d m a k e s i t t h e o c c a s i o n

nicative action, b u t n o t o f poetic speech: " O u r tolerance,

for an innovative, world-disclosing, a n d eye-opening representation

p r o p e n s i t y , f o r e l a b o r a t i o n w h e n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e t e l l a b l e suggests

indeed

i n w h i c h the rhetorical means of representation depart f r o m com-

that, i n G r i c e a n terms, the standards o f quantity, quality, a n d m a n n e r

m u n i c a t i v e r o u t i n e s a n d take o n a life o f t h e i r o w n .

f o r d i s p l a y t e x t s d i f f e r f r o m t h o s e G r i c e suggests f o r

I t is i n t e r e s t i n g t o see h o w P r a t t is c o m p e l l e d

to w o r k o u t this

speech i n his m a x i m s . "

declarative

2 1

counterproposal

I n t h e e n d , t h e analysis leads t o a c o n f i r m a t i o n o f t h e thesis t h a t

b e g i n s w i t h a n analysis o f t h e s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n t h a t p o e t i c s p e e c h

i t w o u l d like to refute. To the degree that the poetic, world-disclosing

shares w i t h o t h e r d i s c o u r s e s — t h a t a r r a n g e m e n t w h e r e b y a n a r r a t o r

f u n c t i o n o f language

o r l e c t u r e r t u r n s t o a p u b l i c a n d calls its a t t e n t i o n t o a t e x t . T h e t e x t

l a n g u a g e escapes t h e s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t s a n d c o m m u n i c a t i v e f u n c -

p o e t i c f u n c t i o n against h e r w i l l . H e r sociolinguistic

gains p r i m a c y a n d s t r u c t u r e - f o r m i n g f o r c e ,

be-

t i o n s o f e v e r y d a y l i f e . T h e space o f fiction, w h i c h is o p e n e d u p w h e n

f o r e i t is r e a d y f o r d e l i v e r y . F i n a l l y , b e f o r e a t e x t c a n lay c l a i m t o t h e

linguistic f o r m s o f expression b e c o m e reflexive, results f r o m t h e fact

is s u b j e c t e d t o c e r t a i n p r o c e d u r e s o f p r e p a r a t i o n a n d s e l e c t i o n

p a t i e n c e a n d capacity f o r j u d g m e n t o f t h e a u d i e n c e , i t has t o satisfy

that the i l l o c u t i o n a r y b i n d i n g a n d b o n d i n g forces b e c o m e

c e r t a i n c r i t e r i a o f r e l e v a n c e : i t has to be worth telling. T h e r e l i a b i l i t y is

t i v e — a s d o t h e i d e a l i z a t i o n s t h a t m a k e p o s s i b l e a use o f

assessed i n t e r m s o f t h e m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f s o m e s i g n i f i c a n t e x e m p l a r y

oriented toward reaching understanding, thereby enabling a coordi-

e x p e r i e n c e . I n its c o n t e n t , a t e l l a b l e t e x t r e a c h e s b e y o n d t h e l o c a l

n a t i o n o f plans o f action that operates via the intersubjective recog-

c o n t e x t o f t h e i m m e d i a t e s p e e c h s i t u a t i o n a n d is o p e n t o f u r t h e r

n i t i o n o f criticizable validity claims. O n e

e l a b o r a t i o n : "As m i g h t b e e x p e c t e d , t h e s e t w o f e a t u r e s — c o n t e x t u a l

d e b a t e w i t h A u s t i n as a d e n i a l o f t h i s d o m a i n o f e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i -

detachability and susceptibility to elaboration—are equally i m p o r -

cative p r a c t i c e s , w h i c h is s t r u c t u r e d a c c o r d i n g t o a l o g i c o f its o w n ;

tant characteristics o f l i t e r a r y u t t e r a n c e s . "

1 8

O f course, l i t e r a r y texts

share these characteristics w i t h "display texts" i n g e n e r a l . T h e latter are characterized w i t h respect to t h e i r special c o m m u n i c a t i v e

ineffeclanguage

c a n also r e a d D e r r i d a ' s

the d e n i a l o f such a d o m a i n corresponds to t h e d e n i a l o f an a u t o n o mous realm of

fiction.

func-

t i o n s : t h e y are d e s i g n e d t o s e r v e "a p u r p o s e I have d e s c r i b e d as t h a t o f v e r b a l l y r e p r e s e n t i n g states o f a f f a i r s a n d e x p e r i e n c e s w h i c h are

2

h e l d t o b e u n u s u a l o r p r o b l e m a t i c i n s u c h a way t h a t t h e addressee

Because D e r r i d a d e n i e s b o t h o f t h e a b o v e , h e is a b l e t o analyze a n y

will respond

given discourse i n accordance w i t h the m o d e l o f poetic

a f f e c t i v e l y i n t h e i n t e n d e d way, a d o p t t h e i n t e n d e d

language,

e v a l u a t i o n a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t a k e p l e a s u r e i n d o i n g so, a n d g e n e r -

a n d d o so as t h o u g h l a n g u a g e i n g e n e r a l w e r e d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e

a l l y find t h e w h o l e u n d e r t a k i n g w o r t h i t . "

p o e t i c use o f l a n g u a g e

1 9

O n e sees h o w t h e p r a g -

specialized

i n world-disclosure.

F r o m this

394

395

Chapter 9


v i e w p o i n t , l a n g u a g e as s u c h c o n v e r g e s w i t h l i t e r a t u r e o r i n d e e d w i t h

t e r m i n e s e v e r y t h i n g w i t h i n t h e w o r l d . A c c o r d i n g t o R o r t y , science

" w r i t i n g . " T h i s aestheticizing of language,

a n d m o r a l i t y , e c o n o m i c s a n d p o l i t i c s , a r e at t h e m e r c y o f a p r o c e s s

twofold denial of the independent

which is purchased

with the

logics of normal and poetic speech, also

of language-creating

p r o t u b e r a n c e s i n just the same way as a r t a n d

e x p l a i n s D e r r i d a ' s i n s e n s i t i v i t y t o w a r d t h e t e n s i o n - f i l l e d p o l a r i t y be-

philosophy.

t w e e n t h e p o e t i c , w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g f u n c t i o n o f l a n g u a g e a n d its p r o -

tions flows r h y t h m i c a l l y between the r e v o l u t i o n i z i n g a n d n o r m a l i z a -

saic, i n n e r w o r l d l y f u n c t i o n s ; t h e s e f u n c t i o n s a r e t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t

tion

by a m o d i f i e d version o f B u h l e r ' s schema o f language f u n c t i o n s .

between two situations i n all d o m a i n s o f c u l t u r a l life:

2 2

of

L i k e K u h n i a n history o f science, the f l u x o f i n t e r p r e t a -

language. Rorty

observes this b a c k - a n d - f o r t h

movement

L i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d processes s u c h as t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f k n o w l edge, the transmission o f culture, the f o r m a t i o n of personal identity, socialization,

and

social i n t e g r a t i o n

involve

mastering

problems

p o s e d i n t h e w o r l d ; t h e y owe t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f l e a r n i n g p r o c -

O n e is t h e sort o f s i t u a t i o n e n c o u n t e r e d w h e n p e o p l e pretty m u c h a g r e e o n w h a t is w a n t e d , a n d a r e t a l k i n g a b o u t h o w best to get it. I n s u c h a s i t u a t i o n t h e r e is n o n e e d to say a n y t h i n g t e r r i b l y u n f a m i l i a r , for a r g u m e n t is typically a b o u t t h e t r u t h o f a s s e r t i o n s r a t h e r t h a n a b o u t t h e utility o f v o c a b u l a r i e s .

esses, w h i c h D e r r i d a c a n n o t a c k n o w l e d g e , t o t h e i n d e p e n d e n t l o g i c s

T h e c o n t r a s t i n g s i t u a t i o n is o n e i n w h i c h e v e r y t h i n g is u p for grabs at

o f these p r o b l e m s a n d t h e l i n g u i s t i c m e d i u m t a i l o r e d t o deal w i t h

o n c e — i n w h i c h t h e motives a n d t h e t e r m s o f d i s c u s s i o n s a r e a c e n t r a l

t h e m . F o r D e r r i d a , l i n g u i s t i c a l l y m e d i a t e d processes i n t h e w o r l d are

subject of argument. . . .

e m b e d d e d i n a world-constituting

w o r d s i n n e w s e n s e s , to t h r o w i n t h e o c c a s i o n a l n e o l o g i s m , a n d t h u s to

context that prejudices everything;

t h e y a r e f a t a l i s t i c a l l y at t h e m e r c y o f t h e h a p p e n i n g s o f t e x t c r e a t i o n b e y o n d t h e i r c o n t r o l , o v e r w h e l m e d by the poetic-creative transformation of a background

designed by archewriting, a n d c o n d e m n e d

t o be t e m p o r a l l y a n d s p a t i a l l y l i m i t e d . A n a e s t h e t i c

contextualism

b l i n d s h i m to the fact t h a t everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e

practices, by

I n s u c h p e r i o d s p e o p l e b e g i n to toss a r o u n d o l d

h a m m e r o u t a n e w i d i o m w h i c h i n i t i a l l y attracts a t t e n t i o n to itself a n d o n l y later gets p u t to w o r k .

2 3

O n e n o t i c e s h o w t h e N i e t z s c h e a n p a t h o s o f a Lebensphilosophie has m a d e t h e l i n g u i s t i c t u r n b e c l o u d s t h e s o b e r i n s i g h t s o f

pragma-

t i s m ; i n t h e p i c t u r e p a i n t e d by R o r t y , t h e r e n o v a t i v e p r o c e s s o f l i n -

v i r t u e o f t h e i r b u i l t - i n idealizations, m a k e possible l e a r n i n g p r o c -

guistic world-disclosure

esses i n t h e w o r l d , i n r e l a t i o n t o w h i c h t h e w o r l d - d i s c l o s i n g

o f c r i t i c a l t e s t i n g t h a t are p a r t o f i n n e r w o r l d l y p r a c t i c e s . T h e

power

that

n o l o n g e r has a counterpoise i n t h e processes

o f i n t e r p r e t i n g l a n g u a g e has t o prove its worth. T h e s e l e a r n i n g p r o c -

and "no" of communicatively

esses d e v e l o p a n i n d e p e n d e n t l o g i c t h a t t r a n s c e n d s a l l l o c a l b a r r i e r s

rically o v e r d e t e r m i n e d

"yes"

a c t i n g a c t o r s is p r e j u d i c e d a n d r h e t o -

by t h e i r linguistic contexts to such a degree

because experiences a n d j u d g m e n t s are f o r m e d o n l y i n the l i g h t o f

t h a t t h e a n o m a l i e s o c c u r r i n g d u r i n g t h e phases o f e x h a u s t i o n

criticizable validity claims. D e r r i d a neglects the p o t e n t i a l f o r nega-

p r e s e n t e d o n l y as s y m p t o m s o f w a n i n g v i t a l i t y , as a g i n g processes, as

tion

processes a n a l o g o u s t o n a t u r a l o n e s — a n d a r e n o t seen as t h e r e s u l t

i n h e r e n t i n t h e v a l i d i t y basis o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g

u n d e r s t a n d i n g ; h e allows t h e c a p a c i t y t o solve p r o b l e m s t o d i s a p p e a r b e h i n d the world-creating capacity o f language; the f o r m e r capacity

are

o f unsuccessful s o l u t i o n s t o p r o b l e m s a n d invalid answers. I n n e r w o r l d l y linguistic practices d r a w t h e i r p o w e r o f

negation

is possessed by l a n g u a g e as t h e m e d i u m t h r o u g h w h i c h t h o s e a c t i n g

f r o m v a l i d i t y claims t h a t go b e y o n d t h e h o r i z o n s o f the c u r r e n t l y

communicatively

given context. B u t the contextualist c o n c e p t i o n o f language, laden

enter i n t o relations to the w o r l d w h e n e v e r

reach understanding with one another about something i n the

they ob-

as i t is w i t h Lebensphilosophie,

is i n s e n s i t i v e t o t h e a c t u a l l y e x i s t i n g

jective w o r l d , i n t h e i r c o m m o n social w o r l d , o r i n the subjective

force o f the counterfactual, w h i c h makes itself felt i n the idealizing

w o r l d s t o w h i c h e a c h has p r i v i l e g e d access.

presuppositions o f communicative

R i c h a r d R o r t y c a r r i e s o u t a s i m i l a r act o f l e v e l i n g . U n l i k e D e r r i d a , h o w e v e r , h e does n o t r e m a i n i d e a l i s t i c a l l y o f m e t a p h y s i c s as a t r a n s c e n d e n t h a p p e n i n g

fixated

u p o n the history

(Ubergeschehen) t h a t d e -

action. For this reason, D e r r i d a

a n d R o r t y also f a i l t o r e c o g n i z e t h e p e c u l i a r status o f d i s c o u r s e s , w h i c h are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d f r o m everyday c o m m u n i c a t i o n

and tailored

t o a single v a l i d i t y d i m e n s i o n ( t r u t h o r n o r m a t i v e Tightness), t h a t is,

397

396


Chapter 9

to a single c o m p l e x o f p r o b l e m s modern

(questions o f t r u t h or justice). I n

societies, t h e s p h e r e s o f s c i e n c e , m o r a l i t y , a n d l a w have

c r y s t a l l i z e d a r o u n d these f o r m s o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n . T h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g c u l t u r a l systems o f a c t i o n a d m i n i s t e r problemsolving capacities i n a way s i m i l a r t o t h a t i n w h i c h t h e e n t e r p r i s e s o f a r t a n d l i t e r a t u r e a d m i n i s t e r capacities for world-disclosure. Because D e r r i d a o v e r g e n e r a l izes t h i s o n e l i n g u i s t i c f u n c t i o n — t h e p o e t i c — h e n o l o n g e r n o t i c e s the complex relation between

the n o r m a l language

of

everyday

p r a c t i c e s a n d t h e t w o n o n e v e r y d a y s p h e r e s , w h i c h are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , as i t w e r e , i n o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n s . T h e p o l a r t e n s i o n b e t w e e n w o r l d -

exoteric respect, c r i t i c i s m accomplishes a process o f t r a n s l a t i o n o f a u n i q u e k i n d . I t draws the e x p e r i e n t i a l c o n t e n t o f the w o r k o f a r t i n t o n o r m a l language; the innovative potential o f art a n d literature for t h e f o r m s o f life a n d life-histories t h a t r e p r o d u c e themselves via everyday c o m m u n i c a t i v e action can be unleashed o n l y i n this m a i e u tic way. T h i s

innovative

potential then

finds

expression

in

the

c h a n g e d c o m p o s i t i o n o f a n evaluative v o c a b u l a r y — i n t h e r e n o v a t i o n of value-orientations

a n d n e e d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s — w h i c h alters

the

tincture o f modes o f life t h r o u g h altering modes o f perception. Like literary criticism, philosophy,

t o o , takes u p a p o s i t i o n w i t h

d i s c l o s u r e a n d p r o b l e m s o l v i n g is h e l d t o g e t h e r w i t h i n t h e c l u s t e r o f

t w o f r o n t s — o r a t least t h i s is t r u e o f m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y , w h i c h n o

f u n c t i o n s o f everyday language; b u t a r t a n d l i t e r a t u r e , o n t h e

longer promises to vindicate the claims o f r e l i g i o n i n the n a m e o f

h a n d , a n d science, m o r a l i t y , a n d law, o n

one

t h e other, specialize i n

t h e o r y . O n t h e o n e h a n d , i t d i r e c t s its i n t e r e s t t o t h e f o u n d a t i o n s

of

experiences a n d k i n d s o f k n o w l e d g e t h a t develop a n d can be w o r k e d

s c i e n c e , m o r a l i t y , a n d l a w a n d a t t a c h e s t h e o r e t i c a l c l a i m s t o its state-

o u t w i t h i n t h e c a t c h m e n t a r e a o f j u s t one l i n g u i s t i c f u n c t i o n a n d one

ments. I t distinguishes itself by posing p r o b l e m s w i t h a universalist

o f v a l i d i t y , respectively. D e r r i d a h o l i s t i c a l l y levels these

t h r u s t a n d b y its s t r o n g t h e o r e t i c a l strategies, t h e r e b y m a i n t a i n i n g

complicated relations i n order to equate philosophy w i t h literature

a n i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e sciences. A n d yet p h i l o s o p h y is n o t

dimension

a n d c r i t i c i s m . H e fails t o r e c o g n i z e t h e special status t h a t b o t h p h i -

simply an esoteric c o m p o n e n t o f a c u l t u r e o f experts. I t maintains

l o s o p h y a n d l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m , e a c h i n its o w n way, assume as m e d i a -

j u s t as i n t i m a t e a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e t o t a l i t y o f t h e l i f e w o r l d a n d

tors between the cultures o f experts a n d t h e everyday w o r l d .

w i t h s o u n d c o m m o n sense, e v e n i f i t r e l e n t l e s s l y a n d

O n the one h a n d , literary criticism, institutionalized i n Europe since t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f a r t [ f r o m o t h e r v a l u e s p h e r e s ] . I t reacts t o t h e i n c r e a s i n g a u t o n o m y

of

l i n g u i s t i c w o r k s o f a r t b y m e a n s o f d i s c o u r s e s s p e c i a l i z i n g i n quest i o n s o f taste. I n s u c h d i s c o u r s e s , t h e c l a i m s w i t h w h i c h l i t e r a r y texts a p p e a r a r e s u b m i t t e d t o e x a m i n a t i o n — c l a i m s t o " a r t i s t i c t r u t h , " aesthetic h a r m o n y , e x e m p l a r y validity, innovative power, a n d authentic-

subversively

shakes u p t h e c e r t a i n t i e s o f e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s . I n t h e face o f systems of knowledge

differentiated according

to particular dimensions

of

validity, p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h i n k i n g represents t h e lifeworld's interests i n the totality o f f u n c t i o n s a n d structures t h a t are clustered and combined i n communicative

together

action. Admittedly, it maintains

t h i s r e l a t i o n t o t o t a l i t y by m e a n s o f a r e f l e x i v i t y l a c k i n g i n t h e l i f e w o r l d ' s b a c k g r o u n d , w h i c h is p r e s e n t i n t u i t i v e l y .

of

I f o n e b e c o m e s aware o f this ( h e r e m e r e l y sketched) t w o - f r o n t

normative

p o s i t i o n o f [ l i t e r a r y ] criticism a n d p h i l o s o p h y — t o w a r d the everyday

r i g h t n e s s , t h a t is, t o t h e o r e t i c a l a n d p r a c t i c a l discourses. I t is, h o w -

w o r l d , o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d t o w a r d t h e special cultures o f a r t a n d

ever, n o t m e r e l y a n e s o t e r i c c o m p o n e n t o f a c u l t u r e o f e x p e r t s b u t ,

l i t e r a t u r e , s c i e n c e , m o r a l i t y , a n d law, o n t h e o t h e r — i t b e c o m e s c l e a r

o v e r a n d above t h i s , has t h e task o f m e d i a t i n g b e t w e e n t h e c u l t u r e s

what the leveling o f the genre distinction between philosophy

o f experts a n d the everyday w o r l d .

literature, a n d the assimilation o f philosophy

ity. I n t h i s r e s p e c t , a e s t h e t i c a r g u m e n t a t i o n specializing

T h i s bridging function

c r i t i c i s m is s i m i l a r t o t h e f o r m s

in propositional truth and

o f a r t c r i t i c i s m is m o r e c l e a r l y e v i d e n t w i t h

r e g a r d t o m u s i c a n d t h e p l a s t i c arts t h a n w i t h r e g a r d t o l i t e r a r y w o r k s , w h i c h are, o f course, already f o r m u l a t e d i n the m e d i u m

of

l a n g u a g e , e v e n i f i t is a p o e t i c , s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l o n e . I n t h i s s e c o n d ,

to literature and

and of

l i t e r a t u r e t o p h i l o s o p h y (as c o n t e n d e d a b o v e ) , m e a n . S u c h a l e v e l i n g mixes

u p the constellations

i n w h i c h the rhetorical elements

of

l a n g u a g e t a k e o n entirely different roles. T h e r h e t o r i c a l e l e m e n t o c c u r s i n its pure form o n l y i n t h e s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l i t y o f p o e t i c e x p r e s s i o n , t h a t

398

399

Chapter 9

O n the D i s d n c t i o n between Poetic a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e U s e s of L a n g u a g e

is, i n t h e l a n g u a g e o f f i c t i o n , w h i c h specializes i n w o r l d - d i s c l o s u r e .

a c h i e v e m e n t . Conversely, the l i t e r a r y - c r i d c a l capacity f o r

T h e n o r m a l l a n g u a g e o f e v e r y d a y l i f e , t o o , is i n e r a d i c a b l y r h e t o r i c a l ;

loses its p o t e n c y w h e n , as e n v i s i o n e d by D e r r i d a ' s d i s c i p l e s i n l i t e r a -

b u t h e r e , w i t h i n the cluster

ture departments,

of m u l t i p l e language functions,

the

r h e t o r i c a l elements recede. I n the routines o f everyday practices, the world-constituting

linguistic

framework

is n e a r l y

appropriating

the content

of

a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e i n t o a c r i t i q u e o f m e t a p h y s i c s . T h e false assimi-

The

l a t i o n o f o n e enterprise to the o t h e r robs b o t h o f t h e i r substance.

s a m e h o l d s f o r t h e s p e c i a l i z e d l a n g u a g e s o f science a n d t e c h n o l o g y ,

A n d so w e r e t u r n t o t h e issue w i t h w h i c h w e s t a r t e d . W h o e v e r t r a n s -

law, m o r a l i t y , e c o n o m i c s , p o l i t i c a l s c i e n c e , a n d so f o r t h . T h e y ,

too,

poses t h e r a d i c a l c r i t i q u e o f r e a s o n i n t o t h e d o m a i n o f r h e t o r i c i n

a r e n o u r i s h e d by t h e i l l u m i n a t i n g p o w e r o f m e t a p h o r i c a l t r o p e s ; b u t

o r d e r t o d e f u s e t h e p a r a d o x o f s e l f - r e f e r e n t i a l i t y also d u l l s t h e s w o r d

the rhetorical e l e m e n t s — a l t h o u g h by no means tamed,

paralyzed.

i t switches f r o m

judgment

exterminated—are

as i t w e r e , a n d e n l i s t e d f o r s p e c i a l p u r p o s e s o f

problem-

solving.

o u t o f this a p o r i a .

The rhetorical dimension

f a c e d w i t h tasks t h a t are p a r a d o x i c a l

k n o w l e d g e is a c c u m u l a t e d u n d e r j u s t o n e

which

aspect o f v a l i d i t y , i n t o

everyday linguistic practices i n w h i c h the various language functions a n d aspects o f v a l i d i t y r e m a i n i n t e r m e s h e d , f o r m i n g a s y n d r o m e . A t t h e s a m e t i m e l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m a n d p h i l o s o p h y are s u p p o s e d

to

a c c o m p l i s h t h i s task o f m e d i a t i o n u s i n g m e a n s o f e x p r e s s i o n t a k e n f r o m p a r t i c u l a r l a n g u a g e s s p e c i a l i z i n g i n q u e s t i o n s o f taste o r t r u t h . T h e y c a n resolve t h i s p a r a d o x o n l y by r h e t o r i c a l l y e x p a n d i n g a n d t h e i r special languages to the e x t e n t r e q u i r e d

to

link

u p — i n a targeted way—indirect c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w i t h manifest

pro-

positional contents. This explains the strong rhetorical strain charof

studies

by

2 4

Notes

i n s i m i l a r ways. T h e y a r e s u p -

posed to feed the contents o f e x p e r t cultures, i n each o f

acteristic

l i t e r a r y critics

and

philosophers

alike.

E m i n e n t c r i t i c s a n d m a j o r p h i l o s o p h e r s a r e also w r i t e r s o f s t a t u r e . I n their rhetorical accomplishments, literary criticism and philoso-

1. [Editor's note]: Habermas is here referring to the 1970s debate between Jacques Derrida and J o h n Searle. In his essay "Signature Event Context," in Margins of Philosophy (Chicago, 1982), pp. 307-330, Derrida devotes the last section to a discussion of Austin's theory. Searle refers to this in "Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to D e r r i d a , " Glyph 1 (1977): 198-208 (Derrida's essay also appeared in Glyph 1). Derrida's response appeared in Glyph 2 (1977): 162-254, under the tide "Limited I n c abc. . . . " I n his discussion of Derrida, Habermas draws on J . Culler, On Deconstruction (Ithaca, N . Y , 1982). 2. Culler, On Deconstruction, p. 119. 3. J . Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge, 1969), and Expression and Meaning (Cambridge, 1979). 4. Culler, On Deconstruction, pp. 121ff. 5. Ibid., p. 123. 6. Ibid., p. 176.

p h y have a family r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h l i t e r a t u r e — a n d to this extent,

7. Cf. ibid., pp. 130ff.

w i t h o n e a n o t h e r as w e l l . H o w e v e r , t h e i r f a m i l y r e l a t i o n s h i p d o e s n o t

8. K. Biihler, Sprachtheorie (Jena, 1934), pp. 24ff.

e x t e n d b e y o n d t h i s . For, i n e a c h o f these e n t e r p r i s e s , rhetoric are subordinated form of

o f eliminating the

plays a d i f f e r e n t a n d m o r e i m p o r t a n t

r o l e i n t h e l a n g u a g e s o f l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m a n d p h i l o s o p h y . B o t h are

enriching

o f t h e c r i t i q u e o f r e a s o n . T h e false p r e t e n s i o n

g e n r e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n p h i l o s o p h y a n d l i t e r a t u r e c a n n o t l e a d us

the tools o f

r e s p e c d v e l y t o t h e d i s c i p l i n e o f a different

argumentation.

If, following Derrida's r e c o m m e n d a t i o n , philosophical

thinking

w e r e to be relieved o f the d u t y o f solving p r o b l e m s a n d m a d e to assume t h e f u n c t i o n o f l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m , i t w o u l d b e r o b b e d

not

m e r e l y o f its seriousness, b u t also o f its p r o d u c t i v i t y a n d c a p a c i t y f o r

9. R. Jakobson, "Linguistics and Poetics," in T. A. Sebeok, ed., Style in Language (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), pp. 350-377, here p. 356. 10. Ibid. 11. R. O h m a n n , "Speech-Acts and the Definition of Literature," Philosophy and Rhetoric^ (1971): 17. 12. Ibid., p. 14.

400

401

Chapter 9

O n the D i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n P o e t i c a n d C o m m u n i c a t i v e U s e s o f L a n g u a g e

13. Ibid., p. 17.

answers to have. Today, however, it is evident that the scope of universalist questions—for instance, the question of the necessary conditions for the rationality of utterances, or of the general pragmatic presuppositions of communicative action and argumentation—does indeed have to be reflected in the grammatical form of universal propositions; it does not, however, have to be reflected in any unconditional validity or "ultimate foundations" claimed for such universalist propositions or for their theoretical framework. T h e fallibilist consciousness of the sciences has long since caught up with philosophy as well. With this kind of fallibilism, we, philosophers and nonphilosophers alike, do not in any way dispense with truth claims. Such claims cannot be raised in the performative attitude of the first person in any other way than as claims that—qua c l a i m s — transcend space and time. But we are also aware that there is no zero-context for truth claims. T r u t h claims are raised here and now and have a built-in orientation toward criticism. H e n c e we reckon with the trivial possibility that they will be revised at some future date or in some other context. Just as it always has, philosophy understands itself as the guardian of rationality in the sense of a claim of reason endogenous to our form of life. I n its work, however, philosophy prefers a combination of strong propositions with weak status claims; this is so little totalitarian that there is no call for a totalizing critique of reason against it. O n this point cf. J . Habermas, "Philosophy as Stand-in and Interpreter," in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and S. W. Nicholsen(Cambridge, Mass., 1990).

14. G . Hartman, Saving the Text (Baltimore, 1981), p. xxi. 15. Cf. also R. O h m a n n , "Speech, Literature and the Space Between," New Literary History 5 (1974): 34ff. 16. W. Labov, Language in the Inner City (Philadelphia, 1972). 17. M. L . Pratt, A Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse (Bloomington, 1977), p. 92. I am grateful to Jonathan Culler for drawing my attention to this interesting book. 18. Ibid., p. 148. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid., p. 147. 21. Ibid. 22. Cf. J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston, 1984), pp. 273ff. 23. R. Rorty, "Deconstruction and Circumvention," in his Philosophical Papers II: Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 85-107, here p. 88, and Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis, 1982), esp. the introduction and chapters 6, 7, and 9. 24. At any rate, our reflections have brought us to the point from where we can see why Heidegger, Adorno, and Derrida get into this aporia at all. T h e y continue to defend themselves as though, like the first generation of Hegelian disciples, they were still living in the shadow of the "last" philosopher. They are still battling against the "strong" conceptions of theory, truth, and system that have in fact belonged to the past for over a century and a half. T h e y still think they have to arouse philosophy from what Derrida calls "the dream of its heart." They believe they have to tear philosophy away from the delusion of expounding a theory that has the last word. Such a comprehensive, closed, and definitive system of propositions would have to be formulated in a language that is self-explicating, that neither needs nor permits further commentary, and that thereby brings to a standstill the effective history (Wirkungsgeschichte) in which interpretation is heaped upon interpretation endlessly. Rorty speaks of the demand for a language "which can receive no gloss, requires no interpretation, cannot be distanced, cannot be sneered at by later generations. It is the hope for a vocabulary which is intrinsically and self-evidently final, not only the most comprehensive and fruitful vocabulary we have come up with so far" (Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, pp. 93f.). I f reason were bound, under penalty of demise, to hold on to these classical goals of metaphysics, pursued from Parmenides to Hegel; if reason as such (even after Hegel) stood before the alternative of either insisting on the strong conceptions of theory, truth, and system as they were customary in the great tradition or of renouncing itself, then an adequate critique of reason would have to be so very radical that it could scarcely avoid the paradox of self-referentiality. Nietzsche saw the matter in this way. A n d , unfortunately, Heidegger, Adorno, and Derrida, too, still seem to confuse the universalist posing of questions that continues to be part of philosophy with the long since abandoned claims to universalist status that philosophy once alleged its

10 Questions and Counterquestions (1985)

1 I a m happy to accept the editor's invitation to r e s p o n d to the articles b y R i c h a r d R o r t y , M a r t i n Jay, T h o m a s M c C a r t h y , a n d J o e l W h i t e book.

1

T h o u g h c r i t i c a l , t h e i r f r i e n d l y s p i r i t reveals t h a t w e a r e a l l

concerned,

i f n o t w i t h t h e same p r o b l e m s , t h e n a t least w i t h t h e

same t h e m e s . A t t h e same t i m e , i t is i m m e d i a t e l y a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e r e is s o m e d i f f e r e n c e

between

us, f o r i n s t a n c e , b e t w e e n

Rorty and

m y s e l f . T h e gaps b e t w e e n t h e d i f f e r e n t u n i v e r s e s o f d i s c o u r s e

be-

c o m e so w i d e a t t i m e s t h a t t h e m i x t u r e o f r e c i p r o c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , s u p p o s i t i o n s , a n d m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g s s u d d e n l y also serves t o r e v e a l residual unconscious presuppositions, implications, a n d b a c k g r o u n d assumptions. A l l this a m o u n t s to the q u i t e n o r m a l confusion i n c o n v e r s a t i o n a m o n g f r i e n d s w h o have sufficiently d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s o f view. T h e c o n f u s i o n o f l i n e s o f a r g u m e n t is m u c h m o r e d r a s t i c i n c o n t r o v e r s i e s a m o n g adversaries w h o , f e e l i n g t h a t t h e i r i d e n t i t y is t h r e a t ened

by

the

others'

fundamental

convictions,

struggle

with

r h e t o r i c a l w e a p o n s . Scarcely a n y o n e w o u l d d i s a g r e e t h a t s u c h d i s t a n c e s a n d o p p o s i t i o n s have i n c r e a s e d a n d i n t e n s i f i e d i n t h e m o d e r n age, w h i c h has i t s e l f b e c o m e a p h i l o s o p h i c a l t o p i c o f t h e first r a n k since t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y . I n d i v i d u a l s , g r o u p s , a n d n a t i o n s h a v e d r i f t e d f a r a p a r t as r e g a r d s t h e i r b a c k g r o u n d s o f b i o g r a p h i c a l a n d s o c i o c u l t u r a l experience. T h i s p l u r a l i z a t i o n o f d i v e r g i n g universes o f

405

404

Questions and Counterquestions

C h a p t e r 10

d i s c o u r s e is p a r t o f s p e c i f i c a l l y m o d e r n e x p e r i e n c e ; t h e s h a t t e r i n g o f n a i v e c o n s e n s u s is t h e i m p e t u s f o r w h a t H e g e l calls " t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f r e f l e c t i o n . " W e c a n n o t n o w s i m p l y w i s h t h i s e x p e r i e n c e away; we c a n o n l y n e g a t e i t . I n t h e f r a m e w o r k o f o u r c u l t u r e , i n v e s t e d as i t is with

r e f l e c t i o n , t h e t h r u s t o f t h i s e x p e r i e n c e has t o be

worked

t h r o u g h n o t o n l y p o l i t i c a l l y b u t also p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y . T o d a y w e

can

s u r v e y t h e s p e c t r u m o f answers g i v e n b y p h i l o s o p h e r s : r o u g h l y speaki n g , i t e x t e n d s a l l t h e way f r o m h i s t o r i c i s m t o t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i s m . O n t h e o n e h a n d , D i l t h e y , W e b e r , Jaspers, a n d K o l a k o w s k i t a k e a n a f f i r m a t i v e p o s i t i o n o n t h e g r o w i n g p l u r a l i s m o f "gods a n d d e m o n s " (Glaubensmachte),

existential m o d e s o f b e i n g , myths, value attitudes,

a n d metaphysical o r r e l i g i o u s worldviews. A p h i l o s o p h y t h a t treats f o r m s o f t r u t h i n t h e p l u r a l is s u p p o s e d t o leave t o t h e sciences t h e j o b o f p r o v i d i n g an adequate reservoir o f consensual knowledge. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , p h i l o s o p h e r s s u c h as H u s s e r l , t h e e a r l y W i t t g e n s t e i n , P o p p e r , a n d A p e l a l l a t t e m p t t o m a i n t a i n , a t a h i g h e r l e v e l o f abstract i o n , t h e u n i t y o f r e a s o n , e v e n i f o n l y i n a p r o c e d u r a l sense. T h e y distill t h e c o m m o n characteristics o f r a t i o n a l activity that m u s t i m p l i c i t l y b e p r e s u p p o s e d i n t h e p l u r a l i s m o f "gods a n d d e m o n s " a n d i n t h e a r g u m e n t a t i v e collisions b e t w e e n universes o f discourse.

In

t h i s way, t h e r e arise w h a t R o r t y calls " m e t a n a r r a t i v e s , " t h a t is, t h e theories o f rationality that are supposed to a c c o u n t f o r why, a n d i n w h a t sense, we c a n s t i l l c o n n e c t o u r c o n v i c t i o n s as w e l l as o u r

de-

scriptive, n o r m a t i v e , a n d evaluative statements w i t h a t r a n s c e n d i n g

the most ambitious project: he wants to destroy the t r a d i t i o n o f the p h i l o s o p h y o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s — f r o m its C a r t e s i a n b e g i n n i n g s — w i t h t h e a i m o f s h o w i n g t h e pointlessness o f t h e e n t i r e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e foundations and limits of knowledge.

H e concludes that

philoso-

p h e r s , t o be r i d o f t h e p r o b l e m , n e e d o n l y r e c o g n i z e t h e h y b r i d c h a r a c t e r o f t h e i r c o n t r o v e r s i e s a n d give t h e field o v e r t o t h e p r a c t i tioners o f science, politics, a n d daily life. L i k e the later W i t t g e n s t e i n , R o r t y sees p h i l o s o p h y i t s e l f as t h e sickness w h o s e s y m p t o m s i t p r e v i o u s l y a n d u n s u c c e s s f u l l y t r i e d t o c u r e . B u t R o r t y is s t i l l e n o u g h

T h e s e a r e p h i l o s o p h i c a l answers t o t h e unavoidable e x p e r i e n c e o f between

r e l a t i v i s m a n d a b s o l u t i s m , a n unmediated c o n f r o n t a t i o n e m e r g e s between pure historicism a n d pure transcendentalism. A t that p o i n t , t h e f a i l u r e s o f b o t h p o s i t i o n s b e c o m e c l e a r : t h e o n e side c a r r i e s t h e b u r d e n o f self-referential, pragmatic contradictions a n d paradoxes t h a t v i o l a t e o u r n e e d f o r c o n s i s t e n c y ; t h e o t h e r side is b u r d e n e d w i t h a f o u n d a d o n a l i s m t h a t conflicts w i t h o u r consciousness o f t h e fallib i l i t y o f h u m a n k n o w l e d g e . N o o n e w h o reflects o n this s i t u a t i o n w o u l d w a n t t o be l e f t i n t h i s b i n d . I n the c o n t e x t o f o u r discussion h e r e , this r e a d i n g o f t h e present s i t u a t i o n is n o t r e a l l y i n d i s p u t e , a l t h o u g h R o r t y , B e r n s t e i n , a n d I r e a c t t o i t i n d i f f e r e n t ways. F o r c e f u l l y f r e e i n g h i m s e l f f r o m

the

of

a p h i l o s o p h e r t o give a r e a s o n f o r h i s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n t h a t w e a v o i d t h e Holzweg

of philosophical justification; one

shouldn't

scratch

w h e r e i t d o e s n ' t i t c h . I t is j u s t t h i s a s s u m p t i o n t h a t " i t d o e s n ' t i t c h " t h a t I find p r o b l e m a t i c . F o r m s o f l i f e a r e t o t a l i t i e s t h a t always e m e r g e i n t h e p l u r a l . T h e i r c o e x i s t e n c e m a y cause f r i c t i o n , b u t t h i s difference d o e s n o t a u t o m a t i c a l l y r e s u l t i n t h e i r incompatibility. S o m e t h i n g s i m i l a r is t h e case f o r t h e p l u r a l i s m o f values a n d b e l i e f systems. T h e c l o s e r t h e p r o x i m i t y i n w h i c h c o m p e t i n g "gods a n d d e m o n s " h a v e t o l i v e w i t h e a c h o t h e r i n political c o m m u n i t i e s , the m o r e tolerance they d e m a n d ; b u t they are n o t i n c o m p a t i b l e . C o n v i c t i o n s c a n c o n t r a d i c t o n e a n o t h e r o n l y w h e n t h o s e c o n c e r n e d w i t h p r o b l e m s d e f i n e t h e m i n a s i m i l a r way, b e l i e v e t h e m t o r e q u i r e r e s o l u t i o n , a n d w a n t t o d e c i d e issues o n t h e basis o f g o o d r e a s o n s . T o b e s u r e , i t is also a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f m o d e r n i t y t h a t w e

v a l i d i t y c l a i m t h a t goes b e y o n d m e r e l y l o c a l c o n t e x t s .

m o d e r n i t y ; w h e n t h e y are s h a r p e n e d i n t o t h e o p p o s i t i o n

s t r a i g h t j a c k e t o f a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h y , R i c h a r d R o r t y has u n d e r t a k e n

have

g r o w n a c c u s t o m e d t o l i v i n g w i t h d i s a g r e e m e n t i n t h e r e a l m o f questions t h a t a d m i t o f " t r u t h ; " we simply p u t controversial validity claims t o o n e side " f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g . " N o n e t h e l e s s , w e p e r c e i v e this p l u r a l i s m o f c o n t r a d i c t o r y c o n v i c t i o n s as a n i n c e n t i v e f o r l e a r n i n g p r o c esses; w e l i v e i n t h e e x p e c t a t i o n o f future r e s o l u t i o n s . As l o n g as w e retain the perspective o f participants a n d d o n o t merely l o o k over o u r o w n s h o u l d e r s as h i s t o r i a n s a n d e t h n o g r a p h e r s , w e m a i n t a i n precisely the distinctions that Rorty wants to retract: between valid a n d s o c i a l l y a c c e p t e d views, b e t w e e n g o o d a r g u m e n t s a n d t h o s e t h a t a r e m e r e l y successful f o r a c e r t a i n a u d i e n c e a t a c e r t a i n t i m e . I n believing t h a t he can consistently replace the i m p l i c i t l y n o r m a tive c o n c e p t i o n o f " v a l i d a r g u m e n t s " w i t h t h e d e s c r i p t i v e c o n c e p t o f " a r g u m e n t s h e l d t o b e t r u e f o r us a t t h i s t i m e , " R o r t y c o m m i t s a n

406

407

C h a p t e r 10


of

Rorty absolutizes the perspective o f the observer, Bernstein remains

w h a t w e d e s c r i b e f r o m a t h i r d - p e r s o n p e r s p e c t i v e as a r g u m e n t a t i v e

o b j e c t i v i s t fallacy. We c o u l d n o t e v e n u n d e r s t a n d t h e m e a n i n g

w i t h i n the perspective o f the p a r t i c i p a n t a n d enters i n t o a debate

c o n d u c t i f we h a d n o t already l e a r n e d the p e r f o r m a t i v e a t t i t u d e o f

t h a t t o d a y leads b e y o n d t h e m i s t a k e n a l t e r n a t i v e s o f h i s t o r i c i s m a n d

a p a r t i c i p a n t i n a r g u m e n t a t i o n , t h a t is, w h a t i t m e a n s f r o m

transcendentalism,

the

a debate g o i n g

o n between Gadamer, A r e n d t ,

p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e f i r s t p e r s o n t o raise a v a l i d i t y c l a i m t h a t p o i n t s

Rorty, a n d m e , a m o n g others.

b e y o n d t h e p r o v i n c i a l a g r e e m e n t s o f t h e specific local c o n t e x t . O n l y

r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e diverse p a t h s o f t h i s d i s c u s s i o n — a d i s c u s s i o n

t h i s c a p a c i t y gives o u r opinions t h e c h a r a c t e r o f convictions.

t h a t has n o t y e t c o m e t o a c l o s e — w i t h a p r o p o s a l f o r a t h e o r e t i c a l

( T h i s is

3

B e r n s t e i n does n o t e n d his s p l e n d i d

n o less t r u e f o r e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s t h a n f o r a r g u m e n -

solution; he ends i t rather w i t h a practical r e c o m m e n d a t i o n :

tative d i s p u t e s a b o u t t h e h y p o t h e t i c a l v a l i d i t y o f s t a t e m e n t s . )

ought

Any

t o act u n d e r

the presupposition

we

o f the u n i f y i n g power

of

mutual understanding produced in communication and reproduced

communicative

reason. I n order to make this a r g u m e n t m o r e i n t e l -

i n t h e l i f e w o r l d is b a s e d o n a r e s e r v o i r o f p o t e n t i a l r e a s o n s t h a t m a y

ligible, let me

c i t e a thesis o f H e r b e r t S c h n a d e l b a c h w i t h w h i c h

be c h a l l e n g e d ,

B e r n s t e i n w o u l d probably agree: " t h a t the difference

reasons t h a t f o r c e us t o t a k e a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d

between what

p o s i t i o n o f "yes" o r " n o . " T h i s calls f o r a different t y p e o f a t t i t u d e f r o m

w e always c l a i m f o r o u r r a t i o n a l i t y a n d w h a t w e a r e a c t u a l l y a b l e t o

t h a t w h i c h w e b r i n g t o t h e c l a i m s o f m e r e l y i n f l u e n t i a l ideas. F r o m

explicate

the perspective o f the p a r t i c i p a n t , a m o m e n t

is

u n d e r s t a n d t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f h i s b o o k c o r r e c d y , i t is f o r t h i s r e a s o n

under-

t h a t B e r n s t e i n f r o m the start locates t h e m o m e n t o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l i t y

o f unconditionality

b u i l t i n t o t h e conditions o f a c t i o n o r i e n t e d t o w a r d r e a c h i n g

s t a n d i n g . F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e first p e r s o n , t h e q u e s t i o n

of

as r a t i o n a l c a n i n p r i n c i p l e n e v e r b e

eliminated."

4

b u i l t i n t o t h e u n i v e r s a l i s t v a l i d i t y claims o f o u r c o m m u n i c a t i v e

If I

prac-

w h i c h b e l i e f s a r e j u s t i f i e d is a q u e s t i o n o f w h i c h b e l i e f s a r e b a s e d o n

tices i n t h e h o r i z o n o f practical r e a s o n ; h e finds i n t h e

g o o d r e a s o n s ; i t is n o t a f u n c t i o n o f l i f e - h a b i t s t h a t e n j o y s o c i a l

tive i n f r a s t r u c t u r e o f t h e l i f e w o r l d a p r a c t i c a l p o s t u l a t e , o n e t h a t is

c u r r e n c y i n s o m e places a n d n o t i n o t h e r s .

d i c t a t e d b y r e a s o n itself. H e refuses t o r e g a r d t h e p r o c e d u r a l u n i t y

A n d because i n t h e m o d e r n

age

t h e gaps b e t w e e n

competing

convictions reach deep i n t o the d o m a i n of questions that " a d m i t o f t r u t h , " t h e r e exists, c o n t r a r y t o R o r t y , a p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n t e r e s t " t o see s o c i a l p r a c t i c e s o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n as m o r e t h a n j u s t s u c h T h e stubbornness with w h i c h philosophy

practices."

communica-

o f r a t i o n a l i t y w i t h i n the historical a n d c u l t u r a l m u l t i p l i c i t y o f standards

o f r a t i o n a l i t y as a q u e s t i o n

t h a t is accessible t o

theoretical

treatment.

2

I s u s p e c t t h a t b e h i n d B e r n s t e i n ' s a r g u m e n t a t i v e strategy t h e r e lies

clings to the role o f the

a n a b s o l u t i z i n g o f t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e p a r t i c i p a n t t h a t is c o m p l e -

" g u a r d i a n o f r e a s o n " c a n h a r d l y be d i s m i s s e d as a n i d i o s y n c r a s y self-absorbed intellectuals, especially i n a p e r i o d

in which

of

basic

m e n t a r y t o R o r t y ' s a b s o l u t i z i n g o f t h a t o f t h e o b s e r v e r . I d o n o t see why one

c o u l d n o t , at least i n a p r e l i m i n a r y way, e x p l o r e a third

i r r a t i o n a l i s t u n d e r c u r r e n t s are b e i n g t r a n s m u t e d o n c e a g a i n i n t o a

path—one

t h a t I have e m b a r k e d u p o n w i t h m y t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i -

d u b i o u s f o r m o f p o l i t i c s . I n m y o p i n i o n , i t is p r e c i s e l y t h e n e o c o n -

cative a c t i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o t h i s a p p r o a c h , p h i l o s o p h y s u r r e n d e r s its

servatives w h o a r t i c u l a t e , intensify', a n d s p r e a d t h i s m o o d o f t h e t i m e s

c l a i m to be

v i a t h e mass m e d i a — w i t h s u c h a n e f f e c t t h a t " i t i t c h e s . "

enters i n t o a nonexclusive division o f labor w i t h the

t h e sole r e p r e s e n t a t i v e

i n matters o f rationality and reconstructive

sciences. I t has t h e a i m o f c l a r i f y i n g t h e p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s 2

of

the

r a t i o n a l i t y o f processes o f r e a c h i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t m a y b e p r e s u m e d t o b e u n i v e r s a l because t h e y a r e u n a v o i d a b l e . T h e n

philoso-

I n h i s latest b o o k , R i c h a r d B e r n s t e i n gives us a n o t h e r a n s w e r : i n -

p h y shares w i t h t h e sciences a f a l l i b i l i s t c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n t h a t its

stead o f b i d d i n g farewell to p h i l o s o p h y f r o m t h e artificially a l i e n a t e d

strong universalist suppositions

viewpoint o f an ethnologist, he turns i t toward the practical. W h i l e

play w i t h e m p i r i c a l theories.

5

require confirmation i n an inter-

This revisionary self-understanding

of

408

409

C h a p t e r 10


the r o l e o f p h i l o s o p h y m a r k s a b r e a k w i t h t h e aspirations o f first

b e m a i n t a i n e d i f p h i l o s o p h y w e r e t o b e t r a n s f o r m e d i n s u c h a way

philosophy

as t o e n a b l e i t t o c o p e w i t h t h e e n t i r e s p e c t r u m o f aspects o f r a t i o n -

(Ursprungsphilosophie) i n a n y f o r m , e v e n t h a t o f t h e t h e -

o r y o f knowledge; b u t i t does n o t m e a n that p h i l o s o p h y

abandons

its r o l e as t h e g u a r d i a n o f r a t i o n a l i t y . W i t h its s e l f - i m p o s e d

a l i t y — a n d w i t h t h e h i s t o r i c a l f a t e o f a r e a s o n t h a t has b e e n a r r e s t e d

modesty

a g a i n a n d a g a i n , i d e o l o g i c a l l y m i s u s e d a n d d i s t o r t e d , b u t t h a t also

o f m e t h o d , a p h i l o s o p h y s t a r t i n g f r o m f o r m a l pragmatics preserves

s t u b b o r n l y raises its v o i c e i n e v e r y i n c o n s p i c u o u s act o f successful

the possibility o f speaking o f r a t i o n a l i t y i n the singular. U n l i k e the

c o m m u n i c a t i o n . S u c h a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n is p o s s i b l e o n l y i f p h i l o s o p h y

sciences, i t has t o a c c o u n t r e f l e c t i v e l y f o r its o w n c o n t e x t o f e m e r -

does n o t r e m a i n

gence and

shared this

thus for

its o w n

place i n history.

6

For

this

reason,

fixation,

fixated

o n t h e n a t u r a l sciences. H a d R o r t y

not

he m i g h t have e n t e r t a i n e d a m o r e flexible a n d

" m e t a n a r r a t i v e s , " i n t h e sense o f f o u n d a t i o n a l " u l t i m a t e g r o u n d i n g s "

accepting

o r t o t a l i z i n g p h i l o s o p h i e s o f h i s t o r y , c o u l d n e v e r e v e n arise.

n o t all p h i l o s o p h i z i n g can be s u b s u m e d u n d e r the p a r a d i g m o f the

The

most i m p o r t a n t achievement

o f such

an approach

is t h e

possibility o f clarifying a concept o f communicative rationality that escapes t h e snares o f W e s t e r n l o g o c e n t r i s m .

relationship to the philosophical

t r a d i d o n . Fortunately,

p h i l o s o p h y o f consciousness. R o r t y b e l i e v e s t h a t t h e n e e d i n t h e m o d e r n age f o r

self-reassur-

Instead o f following

a n c e is a c a p r i c i o u s p r o b l e m c r e a t e d b y i n t e l l e c t u a l s — i n d e e d , e v e n

Nietzsche's p a t h o f a totalizing a n d self-referential critique o f reason,

a t y p i c a l l y G e r m a n p r o b l e m . I n h i s v i e w i t arises f r o m t h e e s o t e r i c

w h e t h e r i t be via H e i d e g g e r to D e r r i d a , o r via Bataille to F o u c a u l t ,

7

Weltschmerz o f s m a l l i n t e l l e c t u a l c i r c l e s , f r o m t h e p r e o c c u p a t i o n

with

a n d t h r o w i n g t h e b a b y o u t w i t h t h e b a t h w a t e r , i t is m o r e p r o m i s i n g

a w o r l d t h a t was lost a l o n g w i t h t h e r e l i g i o u s b e l i e f s o f t h e i r f a t h e r s .

t o seek t h i s e n d t h r o u g h t h e analysis o f t h e already o p e r a t i v e

B u t does i t n o t r e m a i n a n o p e n q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r o r n o t the socially

tial f o r r a t i o n a l i t y c o n t a i n e d i n everyday practices o f

poten-

communica-

integrative powers o f religious t r a d i t i o n t h a t have b e e n shaken

up

t i o n . H e r e the validity dimensions o f propositional t r u t h , n o r m a t i v e

b y e n l i g h t e n m e n t c a n find a n e q u i v a l e n t i n t h e u n i f y i n g , c o n s e n s u s -

r i g h t n e s s , a n d subjective t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhaftigkeit) o r a u t h e n t i c i t y

c r e a t i n g p o w e r o f reason? T h i s was i n d e e d t h e m o d v a t i o n

behind

are e n t w i n e d w i t h each other. F r o m this n e t w o r k o f a b o d i l y a n d

G e r m a n I d e a l i s m ; t h i s type o f i d e a l i s m has f o u n d e q u a l l y i n f l u e n t i a l

interactively shaped, historically situated reason, o u r

philosophical

proponents

t r a d i t i o n has s e l e c t e d o u t o n l y t h e s i n g l e t h r e a d o f

propositional

w h i c h R o r t y p r e f e r s t o p l a c e h i m s e l f . W h a t is p e r h a p s

i n t h e t r a d i t i o n o f P e i r c e , R o y c e , M e a d , a n d Dewey, i n

German

humanity. T h e c o m m o n g r o u n d that unites b o t h von H u m b o l d t and

H e g e l i a n - M a r x i s t version a n d i n the early R o m a n t i c version taken u p

p r a g m a t i s m w i t h t h e l a t e r W i t t g e n s t e i n a n d A u s t i n is t h e i r o p p o s i -

b y N i e t z s c h e . T h e same t h e m e r e s o n a t e s n o t o n l y i n p o s t s t r u c t u r a l i s t

t i o n t o t h e ontological p r i v i l e g i n g o f t h e w o r l d o f e n t i t i e s , t h e episte-

F r a n c e ; s i n c e t h e 1960s, a n d I n e e d n o t r e m i n d R o r t y o f t h i s , t h e

mological p r i v i l e g i n g o f c o n t a c t

d i s c u s s i o n o f m o d e r n i t y i n c o n f l i c t w i t h i t s e l f has n o w h e r e b e e n so

w i t h o b j e c t s o r e x i s t i n g states

of

is t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l

specifically

t r u t h a n d t h e o r e t i c a l reason a n d stylized i t i n t o the m o n o p o l y o f

concept of alienation, b o t h i n the

a f f a i r s , a n d t h e semantic p r i v i l e g i n g o f assertoric s e n t e n c e s a n d p r o -

l i v e l y as i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s — a d m i t t e d l y , m o r e

positional t r u t h . Logocentrism means neglecting the complexity o f

scientists a n d p s y c h o l o g i s t s t h a n a m o n g a n a l y t i c p h i l o s o p h e r s .

so a m o n g

social

reason effectively o p e r a t i n g i n t h e l i f e w o r l d , a n d r e s t r i c t i n g reason

S c h o r s k e e v e n t h o u g h t h e c o u l d see i n t e l l e c t u a l a f f i n i t i e s b e t w e e n

t o its c o g n i t i v e - i n s t r u m e n t a l d i m e n s i o n (a d i m e n s i o n , w e m i g h t a d d ,

t h e c o n t e m p o r a r y A m e r i c a n scene a n d W e i m a r G e r m a n y . W h i l e t h e

Carl

t h a t has b e e n n o t i c e a b l y p r i v i l e g e d a n d selectively u t i l i z e d i n p r o c -

e x p r e s s i o n " p o s t m o d e r n " was n o t i n v e n t e d b y A m e r i c a n n e o c o n s e r -

esses o f c a p i t a l i s t m o d e r n i z a t i o n ) .

vatives, t h e y a t least p o p u l a r i z e d i t .

R o r t y takes W e s t e r n l o g o c e n t r i s m as a n i n d i c a t i o n o f t h e e x h a u s -

D o n o t these a n d s i m i l a r signs i n d i c a t e t h a t i n t e l l e c t u a l s a r t i c u l a t e

t i o n o f o u r p h i l o s o p h i c a l d i s c o u r s e a n d as a r e a s o n t o b i d f a r e w e l l

shifts i n m o o d , w h i c h t h e y i n n o way i n v e n t b u t w h i c h h a v e i n s t e a d

t o p h i l o s o p h y as s u c h . T h i s way o f r e a d i n g t h e t r a d i t i o n c o u l d

p a l p a b l e social a n d o f t e n e c o n o m i c causes? A s a g o o d p r a g m a t i s t , I

not

410

411

C h a p t e r 10

Questions a n d Counterquestions

hold

problems

M a r c u s e . I n The Theory of Communicative Action, m y d i s c u s s i o n o f M a x

t h r o u g h i n t e n t i o n a l l y i n c i t i n g d o u b t is q u i t e l i m i t e d . I share Peirce's

t h e view that a p h i l o s o p h e r ' s

capacity to create

Weber's t h e o r y o f c u l t u r e a n d his diagnosis o f t h e times r e q u i r e d

d o u b t a b o u t any type o f Cartesian d o u b t . P r o b l e m s e m e r g e i n situ-

understanding the autonomous art that emerged i n m o d e r n Europe

a t i o n s o v e r w h i c h we a r e n o t i n c o n t r o l ; t h e y a r e s o m e t h i n g t h a t

( t o g e t h e r w i t h a r t c r i t i c i s m i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d since t h e e i g h t e e n t h

o b j e c t i v e l y h a p p e n s t o us. T h e s l o g a n t h a t l e f t i s t i n t e l l e c t u a l s a r e t h e

c e n t u r y ) as t h e p r o d u c t o f a d i s i n t e g r a t i o n a n d as t h e r e s u l t o f a

cause o f t h e m i s e r y t h e y analyze has b e e n b a n d i e d a b o u t f o r t o o l o n g

process o f r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . W e b e r d e s c r i b e d t h e r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n

a m o n g r i g h d s t i n t e l l e c t u a l s i n G e r m a n y t o b e c r e d i b l e . I t is n o m o r e

w o r l d v i e w s as a p r o c e s s o f d e c o m p o s i t i o n

c r e d i b l e i n t h e a t t r a c t i v e p a c k a g i n g o f a t h e o r y o f t h e n e w class.

t h e o n e h a n d , t h e basic s u b s t a n t i v e c o n c e p t s w i t h w h i c h t h e w o r l d

and differentiation.

of On

T o m e , t h e n o t i o n o f i n t e l l e c t u a l " v a l u e e l i t e s " is a b s o l u t e l y w o r t h -

orders o f "salvation h i s t o r y " a n d c o s m o l o g y were c o n s t r u c t e d have

less. L i k e R o r t y , I have f o r a l o n g t i m e i d e n t i f i e d m y s e l f w i t h t h e

d i s s o l v e d ; w i t h t h i s d i s s o l u t i o n , o n t i c , m o r a l , a n d expressive aspects

r a d i c a l d e m o c r a t i c m e n t a l i t y t h a t is p r e s e n t i n t h e best A m e r i c a n

are n o l o n g e r fused i n t o o n e a n d t h e same c o n c e p t . W i t h o u t t h e

traditions a n d articulated i n A m e r i c a n pragmatism. This mentality

possibility o f recourse

takes s e r i o u s l y w h a t a p p e a r s t o s o - c a l l e d r a d i c a l t h i n k e r s as so m u c h

t h e o l o g i c a l a n d m e t a p h y s i c a l f o r m s o f g r o u n d i n g lose t h e i r c r e d i b i l -

t o G o d a n d t h e c o s m i c o r d e r as a n o r i g i n ,

r e f o r m i s t naïveté. Dewey's " a t t e m p t t o c o n c r e t i z e c o n c e r n s w i t h t h e

ity. O n

d a i l y p r o b l e m s o f o n e ' s c o m m u n i t y " expresses b o t h a p r a c t i c e a n d

relatively i n d e p e n d e n t o f o n e a n o t h e r have arisen alongside a sub-

a n a t t i t u d e . I t is a m a x i m o f a c t i o n a b o u t w h i c h i t is i n f a c t s u p e r f l u -

jectivized " f a i t h . " Philosophy, forced i n t o the position o f mediator,

ous t o p h i l o s o p h i z e .

becomes dependent

Rorty puts i n question the entire u n d e r t a k i n g o f the theory of c o m m u n i c a t i v e action. As o p p o s e d t o this f o r m o f q u e s t i o n i n g , the r e s e r v a t i o n s o f M a r t i n Jay, T h o m a s M c C a r t h y , a n d J o e l W h i t e b o o k

t h e o t h e r h a n d , p r o f a n e f o r m s o f " k n o w l e d g e " that are

K a n t ' s t h r e e Critiques,

o n these. A s d o c u m e n t e d

i n the division o f

questions o f t r u t h are d i f f e r e n t i a t e d f r o m

q u e s t i o n s o f j u s t i c e a n d these i n t u r n f r o m q u e s t i o n s o f taste. O r i g i n a t i n g i n t h e e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y , i d e a l i s t aesthetics s t r i c t l y

c o n c e r n p a r t i c u l a r steps i n its e x e c u t i o n . T h e s e a u t h o r s d i r e c t t h e i r

d i s t i n g u i s h e d aesthetic pleasure f r o m o t h e r " e m p i r i c a l " f o r m s

of

attention to complications i n m y a t t e m p t to w o r k o u t the concept of

s a t i s f a c t i o n ; t h a t is, i t s e p a r a t e d t h e b e a u t i f u l a n d t h e s u b l i m e , o n

c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y . Jay p o i n t s o u t a n u n d e r - i l l u m i n a t e d as-

the one h a n d , f r o m the useful a n d the desirable, o n the other. A r t

p e c t ; M c C a r t h y t o u c h e s u p o n a c e n t r a l d i f f i c u l t y ; W h i t e b o o k deals

e m e r g e s w i t h its o w n p r o p e r c l a i m , as d o s c i e n c e a n d t e c h n o l o g y , l a w

w i t h a p r o b l e m t h a t e m e r g e s as a c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e t h e o r y . W i t h i n

a n d m o r a l i t y . M a x W e b e r speaks o f t h e i n t e r n a l o r i n d e p e n d e n t l o g i c

the f r a m e w o r k o f a b r i e f reply, I can r e s p o n d o n l y by a l l u d i n g to h o w

(Eigensinn)

I have d e a l t w i t h s o m e o f these p r o b l e m s i n t h e past a n d h o w I w o u l d

also s e p a r a t e d f r o m o n e a n o t h e r i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y i n t h e f o r m o f f u n c -

o f e a c h o f these t h r e e c u l t u r a l v a l u e s p h e r e s , w h i c h a r e

l i k e t o w o r k o n o t h e r s i n t h e f u t u r e . A n a d d e d d i f f i c u l t y h e r e is t h a t

t i o n a l l y s p e c i f i e d systems o f a c t i o n . S i n c e t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f A r -

o n l y M c C a r t h y directs his r e m a r k s to m y m o r e recent works.

n o l d H a u s e r i n t o t h e social h i s t o r y o f m o d e r n a r t , t h i s d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n o f a r t has f r e q u e n t l y b e e n a n a l y z e d . T h e r e is n o n e e d

3

here to go

institutional

8

i n t o t h e e x t e r n a l aspects o f t h e

t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the forms o f p r o d u c t i o n o f art, the purposes W i t h a g r e a t d e a l o f h e r m e n e u t i c sensitivity, M a r t i n Jay has c o l l e c t e d

to

w h i c h i t was p u t , o r t h e m o d e s o f its r e c e p t i o n i n t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m

a n d i n t e r p r e t e d m y scattered r e m a r k s o n t h e q u e s t i o n o f aesthetic

sacrally b o u n d a r t , t h r o u g h t h e a r t o f t h e c o u r t a n d p a t r o n , t o

m o d e r n i t y . I n e v e r y case these r e m a r k s h a d a s e c o n d a r y

character

b o u r g e o i s c o m m e r c i a l i z e d a r t . W h a t is i n d i s p u t e a r e t h e i n t e r n a l

t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y arose o n l y i n t h e c o n t e x t o f o t h e r t o p i c s a n d

aspects o f t h e i n d e p e n d e n t l o g i c o f a u t o n o m o u s a r t since t h e e i g h t -

always i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e discussions a m o n g A d o r n o , B e n j a m i n , a n d

e e n t h c e n t u r y . O n e o f t h e t w o q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d b y M a r t i n Jay is t h e

9

412

413

C h a p t e r 10


e x t e n t t o w h i c h o n e c a n speak o f a n a e s t h e t i c - p r a c t i c a l rationality, o r e v e n o f a learning process, i n t h i s s p h e r e . T h e r e is a n u n m i s t a k a b l e i n d i c a t o r f o r t h e f a c t t h a t a c e r t a i n type o f " k n o w i n g " is o b j e c t i f i e d i n a r t w o r k s , a l b e i t i n a d i f f e r e n t way t h a n i n t h e o r e d c a l discourse or i n legal o r m o r a l representations. These objectivations o f spirit, too, are f a l l i b l e a n d hence criticizable. A r t c r i t i c i s m arose a t t h e same t i m e as t h e a u t o n o m o u s w o r k o f a r t ; a n d , since t h e n , i t has b e c o m e a n e s t a b l i s h e d i n s i g h t t h a t t h e w o r k o f a r t calls f o r t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , e v a l u a t i o n , a n d e v e n " l i n g u i s t i f i c a t i o n " (Versprachlichung)

o f its s e m a n t i c c o n t e n t . A r t c r i t i c i s m has d e v e l o p e d

f o r m s o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h a t specifically d i f f e r e n t i a t e i t f r o m

the

argumentative forms of theoretical and moral-practical discourse.

1 0

As d i s t i n c t f r o m merely subjective p r e f e r e n c e , the fact that we l i n k j u d g m e n t s o f taste t o a c r i t i c i z a b l e v a l i d i t y c l a i m p r e s u p p o s e s n o n a r b i t r a r y s t a n d a r d s f o r t h e j u d g m e n t o f a r t . A s t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l disc u s s i o n o f " a r t i s t i c t r u t h " reveals, w o r k s o f a r t raise c l a i m s regard to their unity or h a r m o n y

(Stimmigkeit),

with

their authenticity,

a n d t h e success o f t h e i r e x p r e s s i o n s , a g a i n s t w h i c h t h e y m a y

be

assessed a n d i n t e r m s o f w h i c h t h e y m a y f a i l . F o r t h i s r e a s o n I b e l i e v e t h a t a p r a g m a t i c l o g i c o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n is t h e m o s t

appropriate

g u i d i n g t h r e a d w i t h t h e h e l p o f w h i c h t h e " a e s t h e t i c - p r a c t i c a l " type o f r a t i o n a l i t y can b e d i f f e r e n t i a t e d o v e r a n d against o t h e r types o f rationality. W h e n we r e f e r t o l e a r n i n g processes, i t is t h e w o r k s o f a r t t h e m selves, a n d n o t t h e d i s c o u r s e s a b o u t t h e m , t h a t are t h e l o c u s o f directed

and

c u m u l a t i v e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s . As M c C a r t h y

correctly

notes, w h a t accumulates are n o t epistemic contents b u t , rather, the effects o f t h e d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n , w i t h its o w n i n d e p e n d e n t

logic, o f a

s p e c i a l s o r t o f e x p e r i e n c e : p r e c i s e l y t h o s e aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e s o f w h i c h o n l y a d e c e n t e r e d , u n b o u n d s u b j e c t i v i t y is c a p a b l e . A u t h e n t i c e x p e r i e n c e s o f t h i s type a r e p o s s i b l e o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e categories o f the p a t t e r n e d expectations

o f organized daily experi-

ence collapse, that the r o u t i n e s o f daily action a n d conventions

of

o r d i n a r y l i f e are d e s t r o y e d , a n d t h e n o r m a l i t y o f f o r e s e e a b l e a n d a c c o u n t a b l e c e r t a i n t i e s are s u s p e n d e d . T h e e v e r - m o r e r a d i c a l u n c o u p l i n g o f this p o t e n t i a l for experience, the p u r i f i c a t i o n o f

the

aesthetic

the

f r o m admixtures o f the cognitive,

the useful, a n d

m o r a l , is m i r r o r e d i n t h e r e f l e c t i o n s o f t h e e a r l y R o m a n t i c (especially

period

i n F r i e d r i c h Schlegel's w o r k ) , i n the aestheticism

of

B a u d e l a i r e a n d t h e S y m b o l i s t s , i n t h e p r o g r a m o f I'art pour I'art, i n the surrealistic celebration

o f i l l u m i n a t i o n t h r o u g h s h o c k effects,

w i t h its a m b i v a l e n c e o f a t t r a c t i o n a n d r e p u l s i o n , o f b r o k e n c o n t i n u ity, o f t h e s h u d d e r o f p r o f a n i z a t i o n , o f a g i t a t e d d i s g u s t — i n s h o r t , i n the r e f l e c t i o n o f those m o m e n t s

i n w h i c h the bewildered

subject

"transgresses h i s b o u n d a r i e s , " as B a t a i l l e p u t s i t . W h a t is r e f l e c t e d i n these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s a n d declarations

is a t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f

the

f o r m o f aesthetic e x p e r i e n c e , i n d u c e d by avant-garde a r t itself, i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e d e c e n t e r i n g a n d u n b o u n d i n g o f subjectivity. A t the same t i m e , this d e c e n t e r i n g indicates a n increased sensitivity t o w h a t remains unassimilated i n the interpretive achievements o f

prag-

matic, epistemic, a n d m o r a l mastery o f the demands a n d challenges o f e v e r y d a y s i t u a t i o n s ; i t effects a n o p e n n e s s t o t h e e x p u r g a t e d elem e n t s o f the unconscious, the fantastic, a n d the m a d , the m a t e r i a l a n d t h e b o d i l y — t h u s t o e v e r y t h i n g i n o u r speechless c o n t a c t w i t h r e a l i t y t h a t is so

fleeting,

so c o n t i n g e n t , so i m m e d i a t e , so i n d i v i d u a l -

i z e d , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y so f a r a n d so n e a r t h a t i t escapes o u r n o r m a l categorical

grasp.

B e n j a m i n c a l l e d t h i s style o f e x p e r i e n c e " c o n c e n t r a t e d

distrac-

t i o n " a n d set i t o f f f r o m t h e c o n t e m p l a t i v e style o f e x p e r i e n c e . T h e characteristics a n d tendencies o f the d e v e l o p m e n t o f avant-garde art, a n a l y z e d r e p e a t e d l y since B e n j a m i n a n d A d o r n o , p o i n t i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f t h e f o r m e r style o f e x p e r i e n c e . T h e loss o f a u r a a n d t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f a l l e g o r y are c o n t i n u o u s w i t h t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e o r g a n i c a l l y u n i f i e d w o r k o f a r t a n d its p r e t e n d e d t o t a l i t y o f m e a n i n g ; o n e can t h i n k h e r e o f the i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f t h e ugly, o f the negative as s u c h . B y t r e a t i n g m a t e r i a l s , m e t h o d s , a n d t e c h n i q u e s

reflectively,

t h e a r t i s t o p e n s u p a space f o r e x p e r i m e n t a n d p l a y a n d t r a n s f e r s t h e a c t i v i t y o f t h e g e n i u s t o "free c o n s t r u c t i o n " (freie Arbeit) .

n

Forced

n o v e l t y , d e p e n d e n c e o n t h e latest t r e n d s , a n d t h e a c c e l e r a t e d p a c e o f fads p e r p e t u a t e t h e creative b r e a k w i t h t h e t r a d i t i o n a n d s e r v e t o m a k e a l l stylistic m e a n s e q u a l l y accessible. A r t b e c o m e s a l a b o r a t o r y , the critic an expert, the development o f art the m e d i u m o f a learni n g p r o c e s s — h e r e , n a t u r a l l y , n o t i n t h e sense o f a n a c c u m u l a t i o n o f epistemic

contents, o f a n aesthetic " p r o g r e s s , " w h i c h is p o s s i b l e o n l y

414

415

C h a p t e r 10


i n i n d i v i d u a l d i m e n s i o n s , b u t n o n e t h e l e s s i n t h e sense o f a c o n c e n -

interpretadons a n d normative expectations

trically e x p a n d i n g , progressive e x p l o r a t i o n o f a r e a l m o f possibilities

t a l i t y i n w h i c h these m o m e n t s

structurally opened u p w i t h the autonomization of art. ( I do

r e s p e c t , m o d e r n a r t h a r b o r s a Utopia t h a t b e c o m e s a r e a l i t y t o t h e

not

a n d transforms the to-

are r e l a t e d t o e a c h o t h e r . I n t h i s

k n o w w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e results o f Piaget's g e n e t i c p s y c h o l o g y are

degree that the m i m e t i c powers sublimated i n the w o r k o f art

as a p p r o p r i a t e h e r e f o r t h e analysis o f t h i s " l e v e l o f l e a r n i n g " as t h e y

resonance i n the mimetic relations o f a balanced a n d undistorted

a r e f o r t h e analysis o f t h e stages o f p o s t c o n v e n t i o n a l c o n c e p t i o n s o f

intersubjectivity i n everyday life. However, this does n o t r e q u i r e t h e

law a n d morality. I t e n d to be r a t h e r skeptical.)

liquidation

o f a n a r t set o f f f r o m l i f e i n t h e m e d i u m o f

find

aesthetic

the

appearance, b u t r a t h e r a changed constellation o f a r t a n d t h e l i f e w o r l d .

i n d e p e n d e n c e of art i n a culture o f experts a n d the cultural impov-

I d e v e l o p e d these ideas e a r l i e r a t t h e s u g g e s t i o n o f A l b r e c h t W e l l -

M a r t i n Jay's o t h e r q u e s t i o n

concerns the relation between

e r i s h m e n t o f t h e l i f e w o r l d . J a y asks w h y I d o n o t decide between A d o r n o a n d Benjamin—between

unambiguously

the esotericism

of

mer.

1 3

I n t h e m e a n t i m e , W e l l m e r has e l a b o r a t e d

i n g e n i o u s way t h a t I can here be

content

t h e m i n such an

simply to refer to his

t h e exclusive, often h e r m e t i c a l l y sealed avant-garde w o r k o f a r t , a n d

treatment.

t h e h o p e s f o r p r o f a n e i l l u m i n a t i o n i n e x o t e r i c mass a r t . H e n o t e s

m e n t b u t o n l y t o r e p e a t h i s m a i n thesis i n o r d e r t o o f f e r i t as a n

I d o n o t wish to retrace W e l l m e r ' s subtle l i n e o f a r g u -

a n s w e r t o M a r d n Jay's q u e s t i o n . T h e f a c t t h a t w e c a n d i s p u t e t h e

t h a t I s e e m t o find s o m e t r u t h i n b o t h p o s i t i o n s . P e t e r B ü r g e r takes a n u n a m b i g u o u s

1 4

p o s i t i o n . I n h i s view,

the

r e a s o n s f o r e v a l u a t i n g a w o r k o f a r t i n a e s t h e t i c d i s c o u r s e is, as w e

i m p u l s e o f several a v a n t - g a r d e m o v e m e n t s t o r e b e l a g a i n s t t h e i n s t i -

said, a n u n m i s t a k a b l e i n d i c a t i o n f o r a validity c l a i m i n h e r e n t i n

t u t i o n a l i z a t i o n o f a r t , a g a i n s t its b e i n g s p l i t o f f f r o m t h e l i f e w o r l d ,

w o r k s o f a r t . T h e aesthetic "validity" o r " u n i t y " t h a t we a t t r i b u t e t o a

was c o r r e c t d e s p i t e

not

w o r k r e f e r s t o its s i n g u l a r l y i l l u m i n a t i n g p o w e r t o o p e n o u r eyes t o

a

w h a t is s e e m i n g l y f a m i l i a r , t o disclose a n e w a n a p p a r e n d y f a m i l i a r

p r o m i s e o f h a p p i n e s s , w h o s e s u p e r a b u n d a n c e r a d i a t e s b e y o n d a r t , is

reality. T h i s v a l i d i t y c l a i m a d m i t t e d l y stands f o r a potential f o r " t r u t h "

p a r t o f a r t itself. B u t t h i s i n t e n t i o n c a n n o t b e r e a l i z e d i n t h e way i n

that can be released only i n the w h o l e c o m p l e x i t y o f life experience;

w h i c h the surrealists w a n t e d , t h r o u g h t h e l i q u i d a t i o n o f

aesthetic

therefore, this " t r u t h p o t e n t i a l " may n o t be c o n n e c t e d to (or even

a p p e a r a n c e (Schein) as t h e m e d i u m o f a r t i s t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h i s

identified w i t h ) j u s t one of the three validity claims constitutive for

false s u b l a t i o n (Aufhebung)

communicative

the failure o f the surrealist r e v o l t .

differ w i t h this j u d g m e n t

p e r se. T h e

1 2

I do

intention of redeeming

o f art i n t o life certainly does n o t pre-

a c t i o n , as I have p r e v i o u s l y b e e n i n c l i n e d t o m a i n -

clude the possibility o f a correct m e d i a t i o n o f art w i t h the l i f e w o r l d .

t a i n . T h e o n e - t o - o n e r e l a t i o n s h i p t h a t exists b e t w e e n t h e p r e s c r i p t i v e

A n aesthetic

into

validity o f a n o r m a n d the n o r m a t i v e validity claims raised i n r e g u -

j u d g m e n t s o f taste b y t h e p r o f e s s i o n a l a r b i t e r s , t h a t is n o t m e r e l y t o

l a t i v e s p e e c h acts is n o t a p r o p e r m o d e l f o r t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e

circulate i n the realm o f art alone, w o u l d entail a change i n the

potential for t r u t h o f works o f art a n d the transformed relations

status o f a n , as i t w e r e , e x p e r i m e n t a l l y u n b o u n d subjectivity.

b e t w e e n self a n d w o r l d s t i m u l a t e d b y a e s t h e t i c e x p e r i e n c e .

e x p e r i e n c e t h a t is n o t s i m p l y t o b e t r a n s p o s e d

I f a e s t h e d c e x p e r i e n c e is i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t h e c o n t e x t o f i n d i v i d u a l l i f e - h i s t o r i e s , i f i t is u t i l i z e d t o i l l u m i n a t e a s i t u a t i o n a n d t o t h r o w l i g h t o n i n d i v i d u a l l i f e - p r o b l e m s — i f i t a t a l l c o m m u n i c a t e s its i m pulses t o a c o l l e c t i v e f o r m o f l i f e — t h e n a r t e n t e r s i n t o a

N e i t h e r t r u t h n o r t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhaftigkeit) m a y be a t t r i b u t e d u n m e t a p h o r i c a l l y to w o r k s o f a r t , i f o n e u n d e r s t a n d s " t r u t h " a n d " t r u t h f u l n e s s " i n the sense of a pragmatically differentiated, everyday c o n c e p t of truth. We

language

c a n e x p l a i n t h e way i n w h i c h t r u t h a n d t r u t h f u l n e s s — a n d e v e n n o r m a t i v e

g a m e t h a t is n o l o n g e r t h a t o f a e s t h e t i c c r i t i c i s m b u t b e l o n g s r a t h e r

t i g h t n e s s — a r e m e t a p h o r i c a l l y i n t e r l a c e d i n w o r k s o f a r t o n l y by a p p e a l i n g

t o e v e r y d a y c o m m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s . I t t h e n n o l o n g e r affects o n l y o u r evaluative language o r m e r e l y renews the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f needs that color o u r perceptions;

rather, i t reaches i n t o o u r

cognitive

to t h e fact t h a t the w o r k o f art, as a s y m b o l i c f o r m a t i o n w i t h a n aesthetic validity c l a i m , is at the s a m e t i m e o b j e c t o f a n experience, i n w h i c h t h e t h r e e d i m e n s i o n s o f validity a r e unmetaphorically i n t e r m e s h e d .

1 5

416

417

C h a p t e r 10


4

t o " o u r s , " so t h a t i n t h e case o f a c o n t r a d i c t i o n w e e i t h e r revise o u r preconceptions

Thomas

M c C a r t h y raises t w o sorts o f o b j e c t i o n s :

first,

against m y

o r relativize " t h e i r " standards o f rationality against

"ours."

systematic i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f W e b e r ' s d i a g n o s i s o f t h e t i m e s ; a n d sec-

T h e s e p r e c o n c e p t i o n s d o i n d e e d l e a d t o t h e r a t h e r " s t r o n g " thesis

o n d , a g a i n s t m y analysis o f i n t e r p r e t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g . S i n c e I b e -

t h a t w e cannot u n d e r s t a n d reasons w i t h o u t a t least i m p l i c i t l y evaluat-

lieve t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p e s t a b l i s h e d b y M c C a r t h y b e t w e e n t h e t w o

ing t h e m . M c C a r t h y argues t h a t t h i s c o n c l u s i o n is false, since, e v e n

p r o b l e m s is a r t i f i c i a l , I w i l l first d e a l s e p a r a t e l y w i t h t h e p r o b l e m o f

i f i t is t h e case t h a t i t is necessary t o t a k e u p a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d

the objectivity of understanding.

"yes" o r " n o " p o s i t i o n o n reasons i n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e m , t h e

I n t h e field o f m e a n i n g t h e o r y , I h o l d t h e v i e w t h a t we u n d e r s t a n d

i n t e r p r e t e r c a n n o t o n l y a g r e e o r d i s a g r e e w i t h t h e m b u t c a n also

under

p r a c t i c e a k i n d o f a b s t e n t i o n ; h e has t h e o p t i o n o f " l e a v i n g t o o n e

w h i c h i t c o u l d be a c c e p t e d as v a l i d b y a h e a r e r . T h i s p r a g m a t i c a l l y

side" t h e question o f the validity o f " t h e i r " rationality standards ( a n d

e x t e n d e d v e r s i o n o f t r u t h - c o n d i t i o n a l s e m a n t i c s is s u p p o r t e d b y t h e

h e n c e o f the reasons themselves). However, I t h i n k t h a t such a n

f a c t t h a t w e c o n n e c t t h e e x e c u t i o n o f s p e e c h acts t o v a r i o u s v a l i d i t y

a b s t e n t i o n is also a r a t i o n a l l y m o t i v a t e d p o s i t i o n , j u s t as m u c h as a

a literally m e a n t speech act w h e n we k n o w the c o n d i t i o n s

(or o f the existential

"yes" o r a " n o , " a n d i n n o way relieves us o f t h e necessity o f t a k i n g

p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s o f t h e i r p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t ) , c l a i m s t o t h e Tight-

a p o s i t i o n . A b s t e n t i o n i n this c o n t e x t does n o t really signify a t r u e

ness o f a n u t t e r a n c e ( w i t h r e s p e c t t o e x i s t i n g n o r m a d v e

d e c l a r a t i o n o f n e u t r a l i t y b u t o n l y signals t h a t we a r e p u t t i n g

claims: claims to the t r u t h o f p r o p o s i t i o n s

contexts),

off

a n d c l a i m s t o t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s (Wahrhaftigkeit) o f a n e x p r e s s e d i n t e n -

problems for the time being a n d wish to suspend o u r interpretive

t i o n . W i t h these c l a i m s w e issue, as i t w e r e , a w a r r a n t y f o r

their

e f f o r t s . F o r e x a m p l e , so l o n g as w e are u n a b l e t o see a p e r s p i c u o u s

v i n d i c a t i o n , s h o u l d t h i s b e n e c e s s a r y — a b o v e a l l b y o f f e r i n g , a t least

internal relation between the categorial frameworks o f Aristotelian

i m p l i c i t l y , reasons f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f o u r s p e e c h acts. A h e a r e r k n o w s

a n d N e w t o n i a n physics, we d o n o t k n o w p r e c i s e l y i n w h a t sense

t h e c o n t e n t o f w h a t is said w h e n h e k n o w s w h a t r e a s o n s ( o r w h a t

Aristotle, i n contrast to N e w t o n , w a n t e d to " e x p l a i n " n a t u r a l proc-

sorts o f r e a s o n s ) t h e s p e a k e r w o u l d give f o r t h e v a l i d i t y o f h e r s p e e c h

esses. S i m p l y n o t i n g t h e c o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n

act ( u n d e r a p p r o p r i a t e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ) . T h e i n t e r p r e t e r ( e v e n

the

c o m e s close t o c o n f e s s i n g t h a t w e d o n o t y e t u n d e r s t a n d t h e physics

formed

a n d m e t a p h y s i c s o f A r i s t o t l e as w e l l as w e d o t h e basic a s s u m p t i o n s

social

scientific i n t e r p r e t e r w h o

deals w i t h

linguistically

data), does n o t u n d e r s t a n d symbolically p r e s t r u c t u r e d objects ( i n t h e n o r m a l case, c o m m u n i c a t i v e u t t e r a n c e s )

i f h e d o e s n o t also

u n d e r s t a n d t h e reasons p o t e n t i a l l y r e l a t e d t o t h e i r v a l i d i t y c l a i m s . N o w t h e i n t e r e s t i n g p o i n t is t h a t r e a s o n s a r e o f a special n a t u r e .

a b o u t n a t u r e i n classical

various

paradigms

mechanics.

T h e r a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w h i c h G a d a m e r always e m p h a s i z e d , b e c o m e s especially c l e a r i n e x t r e m e cases s u c h as, f o r example, the interpretation o f mythical narratives. U n d e r c u t t i n g or

T h e y c a n always b e e x p a n d e d i n t o a r g u m e n t s t h a t w e t h e n u n d e r -

l e a v i n g t o o n e side ( o r m e r e l y s h a k i n g o n e ' s h e a d w h i l e a c c e p t i n g )

s t a n d o n l y w h e n we recapitulate (nachvolhiehen)

t h e totalisdc categories

them i n the light of

of a worldview within w h i c h the narrative

some standards of rationality. T h i s " r e c a p i t u l a t i o n " requires a recon-

i n t e r w e a v i n g a n d (as i t a p p e a r s t o us) t h e c a t e g o r i c a l c o n f u s i o n

s t r u c t i v e a c t i v i t y i n w h i c h we b r i n g i n t o p l a y o u r o w n s t a n d a r d s o f

s u r f a c e p h e n o m e n a lay c l a i m t o e x p l a n a t o r y p o w e r m e r e l y i n d i c a t e

of

r a t i o n a l i t y , a t least i n t u i t i v e l y . F r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a p a r t i c i p a n t ,

that we are p u t t i n g o f f — p r e m a t u r e l y b r e a k i n g o f f — t h e i n t e r p r e t i v e

h o w e v e r , o n e ' s o w n s t a n d a r d s o f r a t i o n a l i t y m u s t always c l a i m g e n -

p r o c e s s . T h i s is t a n t a m o u n t t o c o n f e s s i n g t h a t w e d o n o t y e t u n d e r -

eral validity, w h i c h can be restricted o n l y subsequently f r o m the

stand the p o i n t o f mythical m o d e s o f t h o u g h t . We u n d e r s t a n d t h e m

perspective o f a t h i r d person. I n short, the interpretive reconstruc-

o n l y w h e n w e c a n say w h y t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s h a d g o o d r e a s o n s f o r t h e i r

t i o n o f reasons requires t h a t we place " t h e i r " standards i n r e l a t i o n

c o n f i d e n c e i n t h i s type o f e x p l a n a t i o n . B u t i n o r d e r t o achieve

this

418

419

C h a p t e r 10


d e g r e e o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g , w e have t o e s t a b l i s h a n i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n

5

between

" t h e i r " s o r t o f e x p l a n a t i o n a n d t h e k i n d we a c c e p t as c o r -

r e c t . W e m u s t be a b l e t o r e c o n s t r u c t t h e successful a n d u n s u c c e s s f u l

I first w a n t t o isolate t h o s e e l e m e n t s o f W e b e r ' s t h e o r y o f c u l t u r e t h a t

l e a r n i n g processes t h a t s e p a r a t e " u s " f r o m " t h e m ; " b o t h m o d e s o f

I a p p r o p r i a t e d i n t o m y o w n view ( a ) . I n so d o i n g , w e t h e n e n c o u n t e r

e x p l a n a t i o n have t o b e l o c a t e d

M c C a r t h y ' s c o n c e r n f o r t h e costs o f a p r o c e s s o f

w i t h i n t h e same u n i v e r s e o f

dis-

disenchantment

c o u r s e . So l o n g as t h i s is n o t a c h i e v e d , t h e f e e l i n g r e m a i n s t h a t o n e

t h a t n o w leaves o p e n o n l y t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a p r o c e d u r a l u n i t y o f

d o e s n o t u n d e r s t a n d s o m e t h i n g . I t is t h i s p e r p l e x i t y t h a t finds its

reason

appropriate

McCarthy

expression

i n the

suspension

of

one's interpretive

efforts.

finally

across

different

forms

of

argumentation

(b).

treats t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e synthesis o f t h e d i f f e r e n -

t i a t e d m o m e n t s o f r e a s o n u n d e r t h r e e q u i t e d i s t i n c t aspects. H e lists

B u t i t d o e s n o t f o l l o w f r o m t h i s t h a t t h e sciences t h a t m u s t establish h e r m e n e u t i c nounce

cutting

the

access t o t h e i r o b j e c t d o m a i n

objectivity

of

knowledge.

hermeneutist position i n various ways.

I

have

also h a v e t o criticized

rethis

t h a t c a n n o t b e s u b s u m e d u n d e r t h e same a n a l y t i c

( t h a t is, t h e p e r s p e c t i v e

o f t h e v a r i o u s basic a t t i t u d e s

t o w a r d t h e o b j e c t i v e , t h e social, a n d t h e s u b j e c t i v e w o r l d s )

(c).

see

a. T o b e g i n w i t h , l e t m e t u r n t o w h a t I h a v e a p p r o p r i a t e d f r o m

any difficulty i n achieving some theoretical knowledge even i n those

W e b e r ' s t h e o r y o f c u l t u r e . I n W e b e r ' s view, t h e a s s e r t i o n o f a d i f f e r -

domains

16

I n principle, I do not

three problems perspective

o f r e a l i t y w i t h w h i c h w e have c o n t a c t p r i m a r i l y t h r o u g h

e n t i a t i o n o f " v a l u e s p h e r e s " e a c h w i t h its o w n i n d e p e n d e n t

logic—

n o r m - c o n f o r m a t i v e o r expressive a t t i t u d e s . M y r e s e r v a t i o n s c o n c e r n

w h i c h was i n s p i r e d b y t h e n e o - K a n t i a n s E m i l L a s k a n d H e i n r i c h

o n l y those theoretical positions that i g n o r e the h e r m e n e u t i c d i m e n -

R i c k e r t — c a n plausibly be d e f e n d e d i n r e g a r d to m o d e r n E u r o p e o n

sion

t w o levels:

of

access t o

the object d o m a i n

entirely.

1 7

I f the

sentence

first,

o n t h e level o f ideas t h a t c a n b e t r a n s m i t t e d i n

M c C a r t h y c r i t i c i z e s is t o b e r e a d as r e p o r t i n g m y o w n view, " t h a t

traditions

n o t h i n g c a n be l e a r n e d i n t h e o b j e c t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e a b o u t

inner

a r t i s t i c p r o d u c t i o n s ) ; b u t also, s e c o n d , o n t h e l e v e l o f c u l t u r a l a c t i o n

only i n the

systems, i n w h i c h c o r r e s p o n d i n g " d i s c o u r s e s " a n d a c t i v i t i e s a r e g i v e n

n a t u r e qua s u b j e c t i v i t y , "

18

t h e n i t may be u n d e r s t o o d

sense o f a r e j e c t i o n o f purely o b j e c t i v i s t a p p r o a c h e s t o p s y c h o l o g y .

(scientific

professionally

theories, m o r a l a n d legal beliefs,

and institutionally organized

as w e l l as

f o r m . T h e differentia-

the

t i o n o f value spheres corresponds to a d e c e n t e r e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f

r a t i o n a l i t y c o m p l e x e s t h a t have b e e n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n m o d e r n t i m e s

t h e w o r l d , w h i c h is a n i m p o r t a n t i n t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e p r o f e s -

a n d h a v e a c h i e v e d a c e r t a i n a u t o n o m y d o n o t , as i t w e r e , also c o m -

sionalized t r e a t m e n t o f cultural traditions separated i n t o questions

m u n i c a t e w i t h o n e a n o t h e r a n d h a v e t h e i r r o o t s i n o n e a n d t h e same

o f t r u t h , j u s t i c e , a n d taste. T h i s m o d e r n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e w o r l d

r e a s o n . I n m y view, t h i s t o p i c c a n b e t r e a t e d i n d e p e n d e n d y

makes possible a hypothetical a p p r o a c h to p h e n o m e n a a n d e x p e r i -

M c C a r t h y is f u r t h e r i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e q u e s t i o n

problem

of

o f the the

ences, w h i c h a r e i s o l a t e d f r o m t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f l i f e w o r l d c o n t e x t s

of

a n d a n a l y z e d u n d e r e x p e r i m e n t a l l y v a r i e d c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s is e q u a l l y

Max

t r u e f o r t h e states o f a n o b j e c t i f i e d n a t u r e , f o r n o r m s a n d m o d e s o f

U n f o r t u n a t e l y , i n response to

a c t i n g , a n d f o r t h e reflective experiences o f a n " u n b o u n d " subjectiv-

interpretive understanding.

schema reproduced

of whether

For

this purpose,

b y M c C a r t h y is n o t r e a l l y a f r u i t f u l p o i n t

d e p a r t u r e . I t s p u r p o s e was o n l y t o r e p r e s e n t t h e c o n t e n t o f W e b e r ' s f a m o u s Zwischenbetrachtung}

9

earlier objections, I m a d e the mistake o f r e f e r r i n g to this schema i n

i t y (set f r e e f r o m t h e p r a c t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s o f e v e r y d a y l i f e ) .

a systematic w a y .

w e l l - k n o w n d i s t i n c t i o n m a d e by c o g n i t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t a l

20

A n d M c C a r t h y does the same here. M y previous

The

psychology

carelessness t h u s m a k e s i t necessary i n w h a t f o l l o w s t o d i s t i n g u i s h

between

more

a n d the l e a r n i n g o f contents, o n the other, certainly may n o t

views.

carefully between

my interpretation of Weber and my

own

s t r u c t u r a l l y d e f i n e d levels o f l e a r n i n g , o n t h e o n e

hand, be

a p p l i e d i n t h e same way t o s c i e n c e , m o r a l i t y , a n d a r t . I n t h i s r e s p e c t , my f o r m u l a t i o n s were not careful

enough.

420

421

C h a p t e r 10


Compared

to the g r o w t h o f theoretical knowledge, described

by

M c C a r t h y as t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n o f c o n t e n t s across p a r a d i g m shifts, the trends i n the development

o f a r t (discussed m o r e

extensively

a b o v e ) d o n o t so m u c h s i g n i f y a n a c c u m u l a t i o n o f c o n t e n t s as t h e progressive c o n s t i t u t i o n o f a specific d o m a i n o f a u t o n o m o u s a r t a n d aesthetic

experience p u r i f i e d o f cognitive and m o r a l admixtures;

t h e y also s i g n i f y e x p a n d i n g e x p l o r a t i o n s t h a t i l l u m i n a t e m o r e

and

m o r e o f t h i s r e a l m o f e x p e r i e n c e . Yet t h i s c o n c e n t r i c e x p a n s i o n is n o t a c c o m p a n i e d by the f a m i l i a r effect o f a d e v a l u a t i o n o f f o r m e r l y h e l d i n s i g h t s t h a t is t y p i c a l f o r c u m u l a t i v e l e a r n i n g processes. M o r a l a n d legal theories occupy a m i d d l e position. H e r e , too, we observe the constitution o f a d o m a i n o f autonomous

can

morality and

m o r a l u n i v e r s a l i s m t h a t d i s t i l l s a class o f r a t i o n a l l y solvable

problems

u n d e r t h e s i n g l e aspect o f j u s t i c e o u t o f t h e c o m p l e x i t y o f t h e c o n t e x t s o f e t h i c a l l i f e . L e a r n i n g processes i n t h i s s p h e r e are s i m i l a r t o a t h e o r e t i c a l progress achieved w i t h i n the l i m i t s o f a single parad i g m . T h u s , i n t h e m o d e r n age, t h e e x p l i c a t i o n a n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f m o r a l i n t u i t i o n s m a k e a c e r t a i n " p r o g r e s s " t h a t is n o t e x h a u s t e d i n ever-new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f t h e same m o r a l p r i n c i p l e .

o b j e c t i v a t i n g , n o r m - c o n f o r m a t i v e , a n d expressive attitudes t o w a r d t h r e e d i f f e r e n t w o r l d s (objective, social, o r s u b j e c t i v e — i n short, to states o f a f f a i r s , n o r m s , o r subjective e x p e r i e n c e s ) ; i t also a l l o w s us t o v a r y t h e s e a t t i t u d e s i n r e l a t i o n t o o n e a n d t h e same w o r l d . I f w e k e e p t o t h e s c h e m a i n figure 10.1 ( o r i g i n a l l y figure 11 i n v o l u m e 1 o f The Theory of Communicative

Action),

b u t leave aside its a p p l i c a t i o n t o

W e b e r ' s d i a g n o s i s o f t h e t i m e s a n d p u r s u e i n s t e a d a systematic l i n e o f t h o u g h t , the three forms of argumentation corresponding to the m o d e r n c o m p l e x e s o f r a t i o n a l i t y c a n , to begin with, b e c o r r e l a t e d w i t h t h e f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c r e l a t i o n s a l o n g t h e d i a g o n a l ( 1 . 1 , 2.2, 3 . 3 ) . b. B a s e d o n r e f l e c t i o n s i n t h e t h e o r y o f m e a n i n g , I t a k e as m y s t a r t i n g p o i n t t h e v i e w t h a t facts, n o r m s , a n d s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s have t h e i r primary l o c u s i n " t h e i r " c o r r e s p o n d i n g w o r l d s

(objective,

s o c i a l , o r s u b j e c t i v e ) , a n d in the first instance a r e accessible, o r i d e n tifiable, o n l y f r o m the perspective o f a n actor w h o adopts a c o r r e sponding

norm-conformative,

or

e x p r e s s i v e ) . I t is i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h i s l i n e a r o r d e r i n g t h a t t h e

attitude

(be

it objectivating,

first

o f t h e t h r e e q u e s t i o n s M c C a r t h y t r e a t s a t t h e e n d o f h i s a r t i c l e arises. H o w is i t t h a t w e c a n t a l k i n a n o b j e c t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e a b o u t s o m e -

H o w e v e r , t h e thesis t h a t c a p i t a l i s t m o d e r n i z a t i o n c a n b e

grasped

t h i n g i n t h e s u b j e c t i v e o r social w o r l d s , t h a t is, a b o u t t h o s e e l e m e n t s

as a selective a c t u a l i z a t i o n o f t h e r a t i o n a l i t y p o t e n t i a l c o n t a i n e d i n

t h a t w e first e x p e r i e n c e as s o m e t h i n g s u b j e c t i v e o r t h a t w e first e n -

m o d e r n structures o f consciousness requires the c o u n t e r f a c t u a l sup-

c o u n t e r as s o m e t h i n g n o r m a t i v e ? I n t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c o u r s e ( f o r i n -

p o s i t i o n o f a nonselective m o d e l o f societal r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . I n this

stance, s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o u r s e ) w e c a n i n c o r p o r a t e these e l e m e n t s o n l y

c o n n e c t i o n , I have s u g g e s t e d t h a t f o r t h e v a l u e s p h e r e s o f s c i e n c e ,

i f w e t h e m a t i z e s u b j e c t i v e e x p e r i e n c e s a n d n o r m s as states o f a f f a i r s

m o r a l i t y , a n d a r t i n m o d e r n E u r o p e "we s h o u l d be a b l e t o

after h a v i n g t r a n s f o r m e d t h e m i n t o c o m p o n e n t s o f the

2 1

demon-

objective

strate p l a u s i b l e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e s w i t h t y p i c a l f o r m s o f a r g u m e n t a -

w o r l d . I n everyday

t i o n , e a c h o f w h i c h is s p e c i a l i z e d i n a c c o r d w i t h a u n i v e r s a l v a l i d i t y

m u c h t r o u b l e , i n t r a n s f o r m i n g expressive utterances (or sentences

claim."

i n t h e first p e r s o n ) i n t o e q u i v a l e n t s t a t e m e n t s i n t h e t h i r d

2 2

T h u s , t h e b u r d e n o f p r o o f is p u t o n t h e t h e o r y o f a r g u m e n -

c o m m u n i c a t i o n we c e r t a i n l y succeed, w i t h o u t person,

t a t i o n ; l e a v i n g aside e x p l i c a t i v e d i s c o u r s e a n d t h e r a p e u t i c c r i t i q u e ,

or i n accurately r e p o r t i n g the c o n t e n t o f n o r m a t i v e utterances

t h i s has t o d i s t i n g u i s h a n d c l a r i f y t h e systematic c o n t e n t o f t h r e e

imperatives f r o m the p o i n t o f view o f the t h i r d person. O n the level

different forms of argumentation: empirical-theoretical

discourse,

o f s c i e n t i f i c d i s c o u r s e , however, t h e r e is a t e n d e n c y t o d e l i m i t t h e

I t was d u e t o t h e c o n t e x t

o b j e c t d o m a i n s of, f o r e x a m p l e , p s y c h o l o g y o r s o c i o l o g y b y n e g l e c t -

o f Weber's diagnosis o f the times t h a t I d i d n o t i n t r o d u c e t h e three

i n g t h e i r h e r m e n e u t i c dimensions i n such a way t h a t t h e c o m p o -

r a t i o n a l i t y c o m p l e x e s v i a a r g u m e n t a t i o n t h e o r y b u t b y way o f a

n e n t s o f t h e s o c i a l o r subjective w o r l d s are n a t u r a l i s t i c a l l y a s s i m i l a t e d

m o r a l discourse, a n d aesthetic c r i t i q u e .

2 3

or

s c h e m a t h a t was s u p p o s e d t o r e p r e s e n t t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f a d e -

t o p h y s i c a l e n t i t i e s o r t o o b s e r v a b l e b e h a v i o r . I n e a c h case, t h e y a r e

centered understanding o f the w o r l d . Indeed, the m o d e r n

under-

m a d e i n t o c o m p o n e n t s o f t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d , i n h e r e n t l y accessible

standing o f the w o r l d structurally opens u p the possibility o f taking

o n l y i n t h e o b j e c t i v a t i n g a t t i t u d e ; t h a t is, t h e y a r e f o r c e d i n t o t h e

422

423

C h a p t e r 10


\

basic c o n c e p t u a l

Worlds 1 Basic \ attitudes \

f r a m e w o r k o f physicalism o r b e h a v i o r i s m . As

op-

p o s e d t o t h i s n a t u r a l i s t r e d u c t i o n , t h e p o i n t h e r e is s i m p l y t o d e 2 Social

Objective

3 Subjective

1 Objective

fend

nonobjectivist

approaches

in

psychology

and

the

social

sciences. Mutatis

mutandis, t h e same q u e s t i o n s arise f o r m o r a l - p r a c t i c a l d i s -

course a n d , i n d i r e c t l y , f o r aesthetic c r i t i c i s m . T h e s e f o r m s o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n a r e also i n h e r e n t l y r e l a t e d t o c o m p o n e n t s o f o n e s p e c i f i c

3 Expressive

w o r l d , t h e social o r t h e subjective. H e r e , t o o , e l e m e n t s o f t h e o t h e r

Art

t w o w o r l d s m u s t b e b r o u g h t i n t o p l a y i n s u c h a w a y as t o a v o i d t h e d a n g e r s of, respectively, moralism a n d aestheticism, j u s t as p r e v i o u s l y t h e d a n g e r o f objectivism h a d t o b e a v o i d e d . W e c a n t h u s o b s e r v e t h a t s c i e n c e , m o r a l i t y , a n d a r t have n o t o n l y b e e n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from one

A Cognitive-instrumental rationality

1 Objectivating

another, t h e y also c o m m u n i c a t e

X

1 1

with one another. B u t w i t h i n

the

boundaries o f each expert culture, the d i f f e r e n t m o m e n t s o f reason c o m e i n t o c o n t a c t w i t h e a c h o t h e r i n s u c h as w a y as t o a v o i d v i o l a t i n g

Science j | Social Technology ,technologies

t h e i n d e p e n d e n t l o g i c o f t h e d o m i n a n t f o r m o f a r g u m e n t a t i o n spec i a l i z e d e i t h e r i n t r u t h , n o r m a t i v e Tightness, o r a e s t h e t i c u n i t y . T h i s

Moral-practical

is o n e

rationality

Action}

2 Normconformative

X Law

c o n c e r n o f t h e last c h a p t e r o f The Theory of

Communicative

4

A t this p o i n t the motivation b e h i n d McCarthy's criticism becomes

|^ Morality

clear: a n interest i n the q u e s t i o n o f h o w t h e m o m e n t s o f reason can retain their u n i t y w i t h i n d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n a n d o f h o w this u n i t y can be

3 Expressive

X

T

Aesthetic-practical

'

rationality

schematic

presentation

o f Weber's diagnosis

of

the

times

leads

M c C a r t h y to conflate three quite distinct questions u n d e r a single Eroticism

j 1 1

Figure 10.1 Rationalization complexes

a d e q u a t e l y e x p r e s s e d i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l analysis. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , m y

Art

v i e w p o i n t . A s has j u s t b e e n s h o w n , f o r m a l - p r a g m a t i c r e l a t i o n s p l a y a r o l e i n t h e analysis o f these i n t e r a c t i o n s b e t w e e n

the

cognitive,

m o r a l , a n d expressive m o m e n t s o f r e a s o n . B u t t h e o t h e r t w o q u e s t i o n s r e a l l y have n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h t h i s p r o b l e m : first, t h e q u e s t i o n o f h o w the k n o w l e d g e p r o d u c e d i n e x p e r t cultures can be m e d i a t e d w i t h e v e r y d a y p r a c t i c e s ( w h i c h I have a l r e a d y t o u c h e d u p o n a b o v e i n r e l a t i o n to the constellation " a r t a n d l i f e " ) ; a n d second, the quest i o n o f w h e t h e r we can provide an e q u i v a l e n t f o r the m e a n i n g

of

traditional worldviews—for their meaning-bestowing function. c. W i t h t h e e m e r g e n c e o f a u t o n o m o u s a r t a n d science, p r o b l e m s o f m e d i a t i o n a r i s e — s u c h as t h e r e l a t i o n o f a r t a n d l i f e , o r o f t h e o r y a n d practice. Since Hegel, a c o r r e s p o n d i n g

p r o b l e m has e m e r g e d

424

425

C h a p t e r 10


t h a t has t o d o w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n o f m o r a l i t y a n d e t h i c a l l i f e (Sitt¬ This problem

w o r l d v i e w b u t o n l y o n t h i s side o f t h e e x p e r t c u l t u r e s , i n t h e n o n -

has less t o d o w i t h a n expressive a t d t u d e

r e i f i e d c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices o f everyday life. I n d e e d , i n a c e r t a i n

t o w a r d t h e social w o r l d t h a n w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t t h e i n s i g h t s o f a

way, t h e u n i t y o f r e a s o n is a tergo always a l r e a d y r e a l i z e d i n c o m m u -

postconventional m o r a l i t y w o u l d r e m a i n w i t h o u t any i m p a c t o n real

nicative action—namely,

l i f e u n l e s s m o r a l i t y is a n c h o r e d i n c o n c r e t e f o r m s o f e t h i c a l l i f e . T h e

knowledge o f it. A philosophy that wants to b r i n g this i n t u i t i o n to a

deontological

c o n c e p t u a l l e v e l m u s t r e t r i e v e t h e s c a t t e r e d traces o f r e a s o n i n c o m -

lichkeit).

ethics d e v e l o p e d i n t h e K a n t i a n t r a d i t i o n d o

indeed

offer a s o l u t i o n to the p r o b l e m o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n ; they show h o w

i n s u c h a way t h a t w e h a v e a n i n t u i t i v e

to

m u n i c a t i v e p r a c t i c e s themselves, n o m a t t e r h o w m u t e d t h e y m a y b e .

choose between controversial n o r m s o f a c t i o n w i t h g o o d reasons ( i n

However, i t c a n n o t simply repeat t h e a t t e m p t , l o n g since discredited,

l i g h t o f w h a t c o u l d be w i l l e d b y a l l ) . B u t t h e y d o n o t o f f e r

t o p r o j e c t s o m e t h e o r e t i c a l p i c t u r e o f t h e w o r l d as a w h o l e .

solution for two resultant problems:

first,

any

t h a t o f t h e application o f

j u s t i f i e d n o r m s t h a t are g e n e r a l a n d a b s t r a c t e d f r o m a n y

I t h i n k I have l e a r n e d f r o m t h e t r a d i t i o n o f H e g e l i a n - M a r x i s m ,

content;

f r o m t h e h i s t o r y o f c r i t i c a l social t h e o r y f r o m M a r x t o B e n j a m i n ,

a n d s e c o n d , t h a t o f t h e efficacy o f p u r e m o r a l i n s i g h t s t h a t h a v e b e e n

Bloch, Marcuse, a n d A d o r n o , that any a t t e m p t to e m b e d the per-

g a i n e d u n d e r the c o n d i t i o n o f abstracting f r o m available m o t i v a -

spective o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n i n a p h i l o s o p h y o f h i s t o r y o f n a t u r e , h o w -

t i o n s . A u t o n o m o u s m o r a l i t y owes its g a i n i n r a t i o n a l i t y t o t h e t r a n s -

ever i n d i r e c t l y i t is d o n e , m u s t p a y t h e p r i c e o f d e d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g

f o r m a t i o n o f q u e s t i o n s o f t h e g o o d l i f e i n t o p r o b l e m s o f j u s t i c e . As

f o r m s o f k n o w l e d g e b e h i n d whose categorial distinctions we can n o

a consequence of this deontological

abstraction, i t can provide only

l o n g e r r e t r e a t i n g o o d c o n s c i e n c e . A l l t h i s is n o t r e a l l y a n a r g u m e n t

answers t o q u e s t i o n s l a c k i n g s p e c i f i c c o n t e x t s . T h i s n e c e s s a r y d i s r e -

b u t m o r e a n e x p r e s s i o n o f s k e p t i c i s m i n t h e face o f so m a n y f a i l e d

gard for the complexity o f concrete forms o f life, i n w h i c h m o r a l

a t t e m p t s t o h a v e o n e ' s cake a n d eat i t t o o : t o r e t a i n b o t h K a n t ' s

m o m e n t s a r e always i n t e r l a c e d w i t h e v a l u a t i v e , c o g n i t i v e , a n d e x p r e s -

i n s i g h t s a n d , a t t h e same t i m e , t o r e t u r n t o t h e " h o m e "

sive m o m e n t s , calls f o r s p e c i f i c c o m p e n s a t i o n s t h a t m a k e g o o d t h e

from

deficits w i t h regard to the a p p l i c a t i o n a n d realization o f m o r a l i n -

M c C a r t h y or others will someday succeed i n f o r m u l a t i n g the c o n t i -

sights. I a m n o t a b l e t o g o f u r t h e r i n t o t h i s q u e s t i o n

n u i t i e s b e t w e e n h u m a n h i s t o r y a n d n a t u r a l h i s t o r y so c a r e f u l l y t h a t

here.

2 5

T h e discussions o f m o r a l i t y a n d e t h i c a l l i f e , o f t h e o r y a n d p r a c t i c e , a n d o f a r t a n d life all center a r o u n d the idea o f n o n r e i f i e d

everyday

c o m m u n i c a t i v e practices, a f o r m o f life w i t h structures o f a n u n d i s -

which

these

same i n s i g h t s h a v e d r i v e n us.

(Behausung)

But,

perhaps,

they are weak e n o u g h to be plausible a n d yet s t r o n g e n o u g h p e r m i t us t o r e c o g n i z e h u m a n b e i n g s ' p l a c e i n t h e c o s m o s

to

(Scheler),

at least i n b r o a d o u t i i n e s .

t o r t e d intersubjectivity. Such a possibility m u s t today be w r u n g f r o m t h e professional, specialized,

self-sufficient cultures o f experts

and

6

f r o m t h e f u n c t i o n a l i m p e r a t i v e s o f state a n d e c o n o m y t h a t d e s t r u c t i v e l y i n v a d e b o t h t h e e c o l o g i c a l basis o f l i f e a n d t h e

communicative

T h e philosophical purpose b e h i n d Joel Whitebook's attempt to op-

i n f r a s t r u c t u r e of o u r l i f e w o r l d . T h i s s a m e i n t u i t i o n is e x p r e s s e d i n

pose to " l i n g u i s t i c i d e a l i s m " t h e t r u t h o f t h e materialist t r a d i t i o n

M a r x ' s Utopian perspective o n t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f p h i l o s o p h y : to the

f r o m Feuerbach

e x t e n t that the reason expressed i n Hegel's p h i l o s o p h y can be

em-

S c h o o l accords w i t h M c C a r t h y ' s a r g u m e n t s against b a n n i n g a l l sub-

philosophy

stantive m o m e n t s f r o m the c o n c e p t o f a p r o c e d u r a l rationality. T h e

s o m e h o w b e c o m e s p o i n t i e s s . F o r M a r x , p h i l o s o p h y r e a l i z e d is p h i -

theoreticians o f Western M a r x i s m were relentless i n t h e i r search f o r

l o s o p h y s u b l a t e d (aufgehoben).

some A r c h i m e d i a n p o i n t between K a n t a n d H e g e l f r o m w h i c h they

b o d i e d i n the forms of life o f an emancipated

society,

The theory of communicative

action

t h r o u g h M a r x a n d F r e u d to the later F r a n k f u r t

gives t h i s i d e a a n o t h e r r e a d i n g : t h e u n i t y o f r e a s o n c a n n o t b e rees-

m i g h t retrieve the materialist tradition w i t h o u t surrendering

tablished o n t h e level o f c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s i n terms o f a substantive

justificatory achievements of formalist t h o u g h t , o n the one h a n d , or

the

426

427

C h a p t e r 10


the meaning-bestowing capacity o f holistic t h o u g h t , o n the other.

p l a i n s t h e c e n t r a l i m p o r t a n c e a n d i n d i v i d u a t i n g effects o f t h e O e d i -

T h e s e p h i l o s o p h e r s w e r e i n a g r e e m e n t o n t h e g o a l ; t h e y d i f f e r e d as

p a l c o n f l i c t t h a t r e m a i n s decisive f o r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e s t r u c -

t o h o w t o a t t a i n i t since t h e y c o u l d n o t a v o i d p a y i n g s o m e p r i c e f o r

t u r e o f p e r s o n a l i t y . S t r u c t u r a l l y d e s c r i b e d levels o f i n t e r a c t i o n serve

it, w h e t h e r excising part o f Kant, o r H e g e l , or M a r x . M c C a r t h y a n d

h e r e as a c o n c e p t u a l b r i d g e c o n n e c t i n g d e v e l o p m e n t a l l o g i c a n d

W h i t e b o o k chastise m e e i t h e r f o r c u t t i n g t o o m u c h f r o m H e g e l a n d

developmental dynamics.

2 8

( i v ) F i n a l l y , s u c h a r e a d i n g o f f e r s a cate-

totalizing forms of thought (McCarthy), or too m u c h f r o m M a r x and

gorial f r a m e w o r k i n w h i c h metapsychology

m a t e r i a l i s m ( W h i t e b o o k ) . I n t h e i r c o m m o n diagnosis o f too m u c h

w i t h t h e basic c o n c e p t s o f r e s e a r c h o n s o c i a l i z a t i o n a n d t h e f a m i l y .

K a n t i a n i s m , b o t h a g r e e w i t h R o r t y , w h o is d i s t u r b e d less b y t h e

I n Parson's version, t h e vocabulary o f a t h e o r y o f drives f o r m u l a t e d

l a t t e r ' s f o r m a l i s m t h a n b y its s u p p o s e d f o u n d a t i o n a l i s m .

i n t e r m s o f e n e r g y loses its c u r r e n c y h e r e .

can be connected

up 2 9

W h i t e b o o k ' s analysis sheds l i g h t o n t h e r e c e p t i o n o f F r e u d i a n i d

A s I see i t , n o t h i n g o f s i g n i f i c a n c e is l o s t i n t h i s r e a d i n g . T h e

p s y c h o l o g y b y H o r k h e i m e r , M a r c u s e , a n d A d o r n o , as w e l l as o n t h e i r

h y d r a u l i c m o d e l a n d its r e l i a n c e o n a m e c h a n i c s o f i n s t i n c t u a l e n -

c r i t i q u e o f e g o p s y c h o l o g y a n d t h e f a m o u s thesis o f t h e " e n d o f t h e

e r g y has o n l y a m e t a p h o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r , e v e n f o r F r e u d h i m s e l f . I n

i n d i v i d u a l . " W h i t e b o o k h i m s e l f r e t a i n s a m o r e o r less o r t h o d o x i n -

a n y case, o n e c a n n o t have b o t h t h e a n a l y t i c i n s t r u m e n t o f a d e p t h

t e r p r e t a t i o n o f F r e u d ; f r o m a clinical perspective, he regards the

h e r m e n e u t i c s a n d a t h e o r y o f drives f o r m u l a t e d i n quasi-physicalist

c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f e g o p s y c h o l o g y m o r e as s u p p l e m e n t s t o t h e classical

concepts. T h e F r e u d o - M a r x i s m o f the earlier F r a n k f u r t School c o u l d

F r e u d . I n m y view, h o w e v e r , t h e a c h i e v e m e n t o f H e i n z H a r t m a n n

conceptually integrate psychology

a n d h i s allies lies i n h a v i n g d e m o n s t r a t e d t h e n e e d t o revise m e t a -

m e c h a n i z a t i o n o f i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n ; b u t , as W h i t e b o o k shows, t h i s r e -

psychology;

the revision itself s h o u l d c o m e rather f r o m cognitive

d e v e l o p m e n t a l psychology.

Piaget's a p p r o a c h

a n d sociology only t h r o u g h the

sults i n a false a n t a g o n i s m b e t w e e n t h e d o m a i n o f t h e o r g a n i s m ,

c a n s u p p l e m e n t as-

w h i c h is d e s c r i b e d i n b i o l o g i c a l t e r m s , a n d t h e d o m a i n o f t h e social

sumptions about the psychodynamic development o f the child with

apparatus, w h i c h invades the i n d i v i d u a l f r o m t h e outside. I t c e r t a i n l y

h y p o t h e s e s a b o u t t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f c o g n i t i v e s t r u c t u r e s , so as t o

m a k e s m o r e sense t o a t t e m p t t o i n t e g r a t e b o t h d i s c i p l i n e s f r o m t h e

give us a h a n d l e o n , a n d m a k e e m p i r i c a l l y t e s t a b l e , t h e i m p l i c i t l y

b e g i n n i n g w i t h i n t h e same c o n c e p t u a l f r a m e w o r k . S u c h a f r a m e w o r k

n o r m a d v e c o n t e n t o f s u c h c o n c e p t s as "ego

s t r e n g t h , " "conscious

w o u l d p e r m i t us t o u n d e r s t a n d t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f p e r s o n a l i t y as

c o n f l i c t r e s o l u t i o n , " a n d "the r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l o f drives." I have p r o -

s o c i a l i z a t i o n (Vergesellschaftung), a n d t o u n d e r s t a n d s o c i a l i z a t i o n as

posed a c o m m u n i c a t i o n - t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f approaches de-

individualization.

r i v i n g f r o m P i a g e t a n d F r e u d . T o m y m i n d , t h i s p r o p o s a l has a n u m b e r o f advantages:

( i ) I t creates a c o m m o n

ground

between

Freud's therapeutic a n d metapsychological writings, by c o n n e c t i n g t h e s t r u c t u r a l m o d e l o f i d , ego, a n d superego w i t h the

experiences

gained i n the c o m m u n i c a t i o n between patient a n d analyst. T h i s version conceptualizes

2 6

(ii)

clinical intuitions about deviant and

successful processes o f e g o d e v e l o p m e n t b y m a k i n g d e f e n s e m e c h a n i s m s c o m p r e h e n s i b l e as i n n e r - p s y c h i c c o m m u n i c a t i o n d i s t u r b a n c e s and

by

relating

the

extremes

of

overly

defined/deficient

ego

boundaries (isolation/diffusion) to the pragmatic presuppositions o f intact intersubjectivity a n d u n d i s t o r t e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n .

2 7

(iii)

R e a d i n g psychoanalysis i n t e r m s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h e o r y also e x -

If one

is c l e a r a b o u t t h e p u r e l y methodological c h a r a c t e r o f t h i s

decision, one

n e e d n o t fear t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s W h i t e b o o k has i n

m i n d . I t is o n l y f r o m t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f a r e i f y i n g t h e o r y o f d r i v e s that the extralinguistic referent o f b o t h the structure and autonomy o f " i n n e r n a t u r e " gets l o s t a l o n g w i t h t h e v o c a b u l a r y o f i n s t i n c t a n d d r i v e e n e r g y , c a t h e x i s , d i s p l a c e m e n t , a n d so f o r t h . B u t t h e e s s e n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e a c t u a l l y consists o n l y i n r e p l a c i n g " d r i v e e n e r g i e s " w i t h " i n t e r p r e t e d needs" a n d d e s c r i b i n g "instinctual vissicitudes" f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f i d e n t i t y f o r m a t i o n a n d processes o f i n t e r a c t i o n . O n this r e a d i n g , i n s p i r e d by the t h e o r y o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , i n n e r n a t u r e is n o t i n a n y way v a p o r i z e d i n t o a c u l t u r a l i s t h a z e .

3 0

I t does

n o t d e t e r m i n e i n a d v a n c e t h a t t h e s u b s t r a t u m o f i n n e r n a t u r e has

428

429

C h a p t e r 10


to f i t h a r m o n i o u s l y i n t o linguistic structures, a n d even be

utterly

structures o f rationality, b o t h i n the development

of the individual

a b s o r b e d i n t o t h e m . B u t such a categorial f r a m e w o r k does d e c i d e i n

a n d i n social e v o l u t i o n . I s h a l l l i m i t m y s e l f h e r e t o t h e m o r a l a n d

favor o f t h e perspective

by

l e g a l d i m e n s i o n , since b o t h W h i t e b o o k a n d M c C a r t h y , e a c h i n h i s

p a r t i c i p a n t s . O n e d o e s give u p b i o l o g i c a l o r p h y s i c a l i s t t h i r d - p e r s o n

o w n way, r e n e w t h e c r i t i q u e o f e t h i c a l f o r m a l i s m ( a n d b o t h w i t h

descriptions o f the organic substratum. This change i n

r e f e r e n c e t o t h e s a m e passage i n m y essay o n B e n j a m i n ) .

o f a l i f e w o r l d intersubjectively shared

perspective

d o e s n o t e n t a i l t h e e l i m i n a t i o n o f i n n e r n a t u r e as a n e x t r a l i n g u i s t i c

First o f a l l , I have t o p o i n t o u t t h a t I have revised m y earlier interpretation

referent.

3 2

o f t h e p o s t c o n v e n t i o n a l stage o f m o r a l j u d g m e n t .

3 3

is l e d astray b y s o m e o f m y r e m a r k s t h a t b e l o n g t o

Even i f the a p p r o a c h o f a discourse ethics favored by A p e l a n d myself

another context. They were made apropos the question of whether

were to be accepted i n p h i l o s o p h i c a l discussions, i t w o u l d o n l y have

a theory of natural evolution could

achieved an adequate description

Whitebook

be

projected

f r o m such

an

of the

conditions o f p r i n c i p l e d

i n t e r n a l perspective. N a t u r a l l y , I a m e n o u g h o f a materialist to take

m o r a l j u d g m e n t as s u c h . Previously, I was n o t s u f f i c i e n t l y c l e a r a b o u t

as m y s t a r t i n g p o i n t t h a t K a n t is r i g h t o n l y t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t h i s

t h e f a c t t h a t s u c h a c o m p e t e n c e f o r j u d g m e n t d o e s n o t eo ipso p r e -

s t a t e m e n t s a r e c o m p a t i b l e w i t h D a r w i n . I have n e v e r h a d a n y d o u b t s

s u p p o s e a f l e x i b l e e g o i d e n t i t y , e v e n i f i t n o l o n g e r accepts as g i v e n

a b o u t the primacy o f n a t u r a l history over the history o f the h u m a n

t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f n e e d s (as d o e s K a n t i a n e t h i c s ) b u t r a t h e r (as

species. N o n e t h e l e s s ,

i n discourse ethics) opens t h e m to a n u n c o n s t r a i n e d intersubjective

i t is b e t t e r n o t t o t r y t o resolve a l l p r o b l e m s

w i t h t h e same t h e o r y , o r e v e n w i t h t h e o r i e s o f t h e same t y p e . T h e

process o f w i l l f o r m a t i o n . T h e cognitive

n e o - D a r w i n i a n t h e o r y o f e v o l u t i o n has a d i f f e r e n t status a n d f o r m

a c t i o n s a n d n o r m s has t o be s u p p l e m e n t e d i f i t is t o b e c o m e e f f e c t i v e

capacity to j u s t i f y m o r a l

f r o m N e w t o n i a n physics, o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d R o m a n t i c

theories

i n the c o n t e x t o f ethical life. O n l y a capacity f o r j u d g m e n t ( i n f o r m e d

o f n a t u r e , o n t h e o t h e r . T h e t h r e e t h e o r i e s are n o t c o n c e r n e d w i t h

by p r a c t i c a l reason) makes possible a n a p p l i c a t i o n o f abstract a n d

t h e s a m e " n a t u r e . " " I n s t i n c t u a l n a t u r e " as d e a l t w i t h , respectively, i n

g e n e r a l n o r m s t h a t is a p p r o p r i a t e t o p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s ; o n l y m o -

e t h o l o g y a n d psychoanalysis is j u s t as d i s t i n c t . I t seems t o m e t h a t t h e

tivational resources a n d structures o f i n n e r c o n t r o l makes possible

s i n g l e m o s t i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n h e r e is w h e t h e r t h a t " i n n e r n a t u r e "

a c t i o n s t h a t are i n a c c o r d w i t h m o r a l i n s i g h t . W i t h o u t t h e c a p a c i t y

w h o s e f a t e f u l e n t w i n e m e n t i n l i f e - h i s t o r i e s is t h e o b j e c t o f p s y c h o -

for j u d g m e n t a n d motivation, the psychological conditions for trans-

analysis c a n b e b e t t e r e x p l a i n e d t h r o u g h i n t e r a c t i o n a l c o n c e p t s o r

l a t i n g m o r a l i t y i n t o e t h i c a l l i f e are m i s s i n g ; w i t h o u t t h e c o r r e s p o n d -

t h r o u g h concepts w i t h m o r e strongly physicalist o r biological c o n n o -

i n g p a t t e r n s o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n a n d i n s t i t u t i o n s , t h a t is, w i t h o u t " f i t t i n g "

t a t i o n s . T h e v a l u e o f a t h e o r y is s u r e l y a m a t t e r o f e m p i r i c a l f r u i t f u l -

f o r m s o f l i f e t o e m b o d i e d m o r a l p r i n c i p l e s , t h e social c o n d i t i o n s f o r

ness a n d n o t a m a t t e r o f t h e s p e c u l a t i v e c o n t e n t o f its f u n d a m e n t a l

t h e i r c o n c r e t e e x i s t e n c e are m i s s i n g . T h i s is t h e s u b s t a n c e o f H e g e l ' s

concepts.

c r i t i q u e o f K a n t ' s t h e o r y o f m o r a l i t y , a c r i t i q u e t h a t has always b e e n

3 1

I t is, h o w e v e r , q u i t e l e g i t i m a t e t o ask h o w i t is t h a t I c a n h o l d o n t o t h o s e m a t e r i a l i s t m o t i f s t h a t F r e u d o - M a r x i s m d r e w o n i n its t h e o r y o f d r i v e s . W h i t e b o o k suspects t h a t a t h e o r y o f society t h a t n o takes o v e r i n t a c t t h e F r e u d i a n t h e o r y o f d r i v e s necessarily

longer

truncates

an i m p o r t a n t normative d i m e n s i o n , namely, that o f happiness.

At

t h e same t i m e , h e also sees a n excess o f u t o p i a n i s m b u i l t i n t o " l i n g u i s t i c i d e a l i s m . " T h e " c o n c e r n f o r h a p p i n e s s " seems necessarily

to

b e c o m e s e c o n d a r y t o t h e " p a s s i o n f o r j u s t i c e " i n a t h e o r y t h a t gets i n v o l v e d w i t h g e n e t i c s t r u c t u r a l i s m a n d d i r e c t s its i n t e r e s t t o g e n e r a l

r e c o g n i z e d i n t h e c r i t i c a l t h e o r y o f society. A u t o n o m y

i n Kant's

sense, w i t h t h e s t r i c t s e p a r a t i o n o f d u t y a n d i n c l i n a t i o n a n d w i t h o u t t h e awareness o f t h e ego's c o m m u n i c a t i v e

access t o its o w n i n n e r

n a t u r e , also s i g n i f i e s u n f r e e d o m ; A d o r n o d e v e l o p e d t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s i n t h e t h i r d p a r t o f h i s Negative Dialectics. I n

psychological

t e r m s , t h i s m e a n s t h a t i n n e r n a t u r e is n o t t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o t h e perspective judgment

o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n m e r e l y t h r o u g h t h e capacity o f m o r a l (as i t is r e c o n s t r u c t e d

i n terms o f a discourse

ethics).

R a t h e r , s u c h a p e r s p e c t i v e is a t t a i n e d o n l y t h r o u g h t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f

430

431

C h a p t e r 10


a n e g o - i d e n t i t y m a k i n g p o s s i b l e "a f r e e d o m t h a t l i m i t s i t s e l f i n t h e

happiness. S u c h speculations are surely idealist i n the b a d

intention

given the o v e r w h e l m i n g

of

happiness."

reconciling,

if not

of

identifying, worthiness

with

sense

experience of individual unhappiness and

c o l l e c t i v e s u f f e r i n g , a n d i n v i e w o f s o c i a l c a t a s t r o p h e s t h a t are

3 4

I n t h e t h e o r y o f society, t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n m o r a l i t y a n d e t h i c a l

t e r r i b l e because, f o r all t h e i r quasi-naturalness,

they do n o t

so

arise

life can be f o u n d i n the contrast b e t w e e n general structures o f the

f r o m n a t u r a l necessity. O v e r a n d o v e r a g a i n , t h e necessary c o n d i -

l i f e w o r l d t h a t are c a p a b l e o f b e i n g r a t i o n a l i z e d , o n t h e o n e

t i o n s f o r a " g o o d l i f e " are carelessly a n d a r b i t r a r i l y v i o l a t e d . I t is f r o m

hand,

a n d t h e p l u r a l i t y o f e x i s t i n g l i f e w o r l d s i n t h e i r specific, c o n c r e t e

this experience that the t r a d i t i o n o f t h o u g h t that unites M a r x a n d

historical totalities, o n the other. Particular f o r m s o f life a n d life-his-

F r e u d d r a w s its i n s p i r a t i o n . I a m i n f u l l a g r e e m e n t w i t h W h i t e b o o k

t o r i e s f o r m a c o n t e x t t h a t r e m a i n s i n t h e b a c k g r o u n d a n d is e x p e r i -

i n m y d e s i r e n o t t o give u p this f o r m o f m a t e r i a l i s m .

e n c e d by us o n l y as a h o r i z o n ; t h i s c o n t e x t c a n n o t b e o b j e c d v a t e d in toto. C e r t a i n l y , d i f f e r e n t l i f e w o r l d s m a y b e c o m p a r e d u n d e r d i f f e r -

I n c o n c l u s i o n , I d o n o t w a n t t o pass o v e r i n s i l e n c e t h e f a c t t h a t M c C a r t h y a n d W h i t e b o o k t o u c h u p o n a basic p h i l o s o p h i c a l

problem

e n t a b s t r a c t p o i n t s o f view; b u t o n l y a f e w s u c h aspects a r e so g e n e r a l

t h a t , i f I a m c o r r e c t , s t i l l awaits a n a d e q u a t e r e s o l u t i o n t h i s side o f

t h a t t h e y c a n b e d e t a c h e d f r o m t h e c u l t u r a l p a r a d i g m s o f a specific

H e g e l i a n l o g i c : H o w is i t p o s s i b l e t o w e a k e n t h e c l a i m s o f

l i f e w o r l d . T h i s is t r u e , f o r i n s t a n c e , o f p r o b l e m s o l v i n g c a p a c i t i e s t h a t

a b o u t t o t a l i t i e s so t h a t t h e y m a y b e j o i n e d t o g e t h e r w i t h

can be m e a s u r e d against the s t a n d a r d o f universal validity claims

statements a b o u t general

statements stronger

structures?

( s u c h as p r o p o s i t i o n a l t r u t h a n d n o r m a t i v e r i g h t n e s s ) a n d t h a t c a n a c c u m u l a t e i n the d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e forces o f p r o d u c t i o n , i n the

Note

g r o w t h o f t h e o r e t i c a l k n o w l e d g e , as w e l l as i n p r o g r e s s i n t h e stages of moral judgment.

However, happiness, u n l i k e justice or

knowl-

e d g e , is n o t a c o n c e p t t h a t relates t o o n l y o n e o f these d i m e n s i o n s a n d t o g e n e r a l s t r u c t u r e s o f t h e l i f e w o r l d . I t is r e l a t e d t o p a r t i c u l a r constellations

o f lived practices, value orientations, traditions, a n d

c o m p e t e n c i e s as a w h o l e . I t s o b j e c t is always a h i s t o r i c a l l y u n i q u e c o n f i g u r a t i o n . We d o

i n d e e d h a v e m o r e o r less d e f i n i t e

feelings

a b o u t t h e success o f m o d e s o f l i f e a n d — w i t h less d e c e p t i o n — a b o u t t h e i r f a i l u r e . B u t e n o r m o u s d i f f i c u l t i e s s t a n d i n t h e way o f c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g , as we c a n d o i n t h e case o f m o r a l i t y , these clinical i n t u i t i o n s a b o u t t h e " g o o d l i f e " i n a u n i v e r s a l l y b i n d i n g way, a l t h o u g h t h i s was o n c e t h e a i m o f classical e t h i c s . O n e has t o b e satisfied w i t h r e c o g n i z i n g necessary c o n d i t i o n s f o r s u c h a l i f e . M a n y o f those w h o have b e e n raised i n a Protestant m i l i e u t e n d toward the p r e s u m p t i o n that the balance o f happiness, overall a n d i n the l o n g r u n , c a n n o t be drastically altered. B u t even this goal w o u l d n o t b e a c h i e v e d i f e v e r y g e n e r a t i o n d i d n o t set other g o a l s f o r t h e m s e l v e s a n d u n d e r t a k e a n e w Utopian e f f o r t s t o c h a n g e t h e b a l a n c e o f h a p p i n e s s . P e r h a p s i t is a r e m n a n t o f t h e o d i c y t o assume t h a t e v e r y f o r m o f l i f e i n h e r e n t l y possesses t h e same c h a n c e t o find its

1. [Editor's note:] T h e reference is to the following essays in R. Bernstein, ed., Habermas and Modernity (Cambridge, Mass., 1985): R. Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity;" M. Jay, "Habermas and Modernism;" T. McCarthy, "Reflections on Rationalization in The Theory of Communicative Action;" J . Whitebook, "Reason and Happiness: Some Psychoanalytic Themes in Critical T h e o r y . " 2. R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, N.J., 1979), p. 390. 3. R. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (Philadelphia, 1983). 4. H . Schnadelbach, in W. Kuhlmann and D. Bohler, eds., Kommunikation und Reflexion (Frankfurt, 1983), p. 361. 5. J . Habermas, "Philosophy as Stand-in and Interpreter," in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. C. Lenhardt and S. W. Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass., 1990). 6. J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston, 1987), pp. 398ff. 7. I have never used the term "neoconservative" in this connection. I did once, in passing, compare the critique of reason in Foucault and Derrida to the "Young Conservatives" of the Weimar Republic. Usually Hans Freyer, A r n o l d G e h l e n , Martin Heidegger, Ernst Junger, and Carl Schmitt are numbered among this group. T h e y all take from Nietzsche the radical gesture of a break with modernity and a revolutionary renewal of premodern energies, most often reaching back to archaic times. Like any comparison, it has its weaknesses, but in the G e r m a n context it does illuminate

432

433

C h a p t e r 10


intellectual affinities that, notwithstanding the politically contrasting positions, stem from the authority of Nietzsche (see my essay "Modernity versus Postmodernity," New German Critique 22 (1981): 3-22).

conviction and the more pronounced consideration of hedonistic motives bring the perspectives of the calculation of consequences and the interpretation of needs into play within universalistic ethics, perspectives that lie within the cognitive and expressive validity domains; in this way, materialistic ideas can also be given their due, without endangering the autonomy of the moral perspective. Finally, post-avant-garde art is characterized by the simultaneous presence of realistic and 'committed' (engagiert) tendencies along with the authentic continuation of classical modernity, out of which the independent logic of the aesthetic sphere was distilled. With realistic and 'committed' art, cognitive and moral-practical moments enter once again into art, at the level of the wealth of form set free by the avant-garde" (Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, pp. 396ff.).

8. Cf. P. Bürger, Theory of the Avant Garde (Minneapolis, 1983). Cf. also his "Institution Kunst," in Vermittlung, Rezeption, Funktion (Frankfurt, 1979), and Kritik der idealistischen Ästhetik (Frankfurt, 1983). 9. J . Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston, 1984), pp. 157ff. 10. Ibid., pp. 40ff., and the references given there. 11. Bürger, Kritik der idealistischen Ästhetik, pp. 104ff. 12. Cf. also P. Bürger, "Das Altern der Moderne," i n j . Habermas and L . von Friedeberg, eds., Adorno Konferenz 1983 (Frankfurt, 1983), pp. 177ff. 13. Habermas, "Modernity versus Postmodernity," pp. 12ff. 14. See A. Wellmer, ' T r u t h , Semblance, Reconciliation," in The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics, and Postmodernism, trans. D . Midgely (Cambridge, Mass., 1991). 15. Ibid., p. 165. 16. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, pp. 120ff. and 130ff.; and " I n terpretative Social Science and Hermeneuticism," in N. H a n n , R. Bellah, P. Rabinow, and W. Sullivan, eds., Social Science as Moral Inquiry (Berkeley, 1983), pp. 251-270. 17. J . Habermas, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, trans. S. W. Nicholsen and G . A. Stark (Cambridge, Mass., 1988).

25. Cf. Habermas, "Über Moralität und Sittlichkeit: Was macht eine Lebensform rational?," in Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik (Frankfurt, 1991), pp. 31ff. 26. T h i s was, in any case, my intention in the F r e u d chapter of my Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. J . Shapiro (Boston, 1971). I do not find any basis in F r e u d for the strict separation between a clinically justified theory of neurosis and a metapsychological superstructure that Adolf Grünbaum proposes in "Freud's Theory: T h e Perspective of a Philosopher of Science," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 57, no. 6 (1983). T h i s separation completely obscures the specific roots of Freudian theory in the experiences of the analytic dialogue. Such an operation may be useful for the argumentative purpose of assimilating Freudian theory to the standard model of unified science, only to reject it then for failing to measure up to its standards. At the same time, it expresses the decision not to consider the hermeneutic character of this science. 27. Cf. J . Habermas, "A Review of Gadamer's Truth and Method," in On the Logic of the Social Sciences, and "Überlegungen zur Kommunikationspathologie," in Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt, 1984). 28. Habermas, "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action," in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action.

18. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, p. 237. 19. Ibid., p. 238. 20. J . Habermas, "A Reply to My Critics," in J . B. T h o m p s o n and D. H e l d , eds., Habermas: Critical Debates (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), pp. 248ff. 21. O n this "rather risky model," cf. my Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1, pp. 239ff. 22. Ibid.

29. R. Döbert, J . Habermas, and G. Nunner-Winkler, Entwicklung des Ichs (Köln, 1977), pp. 9ff. 30. K. H o r n expresses similar reservations in "Geheime kulturalistische Tendenzen der modernen psychoanalytischen Orthodoxie," in Psychoanalyse als Wissenschaft (Frankfurt, 1971), pp. 93ff.' 31. With respect to the empirical questions, I would like to point out that my reflections on the change in symptoms typical of our times and on the significance of the adolescent crisis are quite similar to those of Whitebook. Cf. Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2, pp. 386ff.

23. Cf. my excursus on argumentation theory, ibid., pp. 18-42. 24. " I n each of these spheres, the process of differentiation is accompanied by a countermovement that always re-incorporates the other two, initially excluded validity aspects under the primacy of the dominant one. I n this way, nonobjectivist approaches to the human sciences also bring into play the perspectives of moral and aesthetic critique, while not endangering the primacy of the question of truth; only in this way is a critical theory of society possible. T h e discussion of an ethics of responsibility or

32. Cf. J . Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity," in Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston, 1979), pp. 78ff. 33. Cf. Habermas, " A Reply to My Critics." See also the essays in Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. 34. Cf. Habermas, "Moral Development and Ego Identity."

Selected Bibliography and Further Reading

This bibliography is meant to lead readers further into the literature related to Habermas's program of formal pragmatics. I have included mainly secondary discussions of Habermas's writings rather than the sources that he cites (these are documented in the notes to the various chapters). T h e exception is where Habermas mentions a particular writer repeatedly or deals in detail with her or his work. F o r Habermas's work itself, I have included only those primary texts evidently relevant to formal pragmatics or deemed by h i m to be correlative. English translations have been cited where available. Agger, B e n , 1981. "A Critical Theory of Dialogue," Humanities in Society 4:

7-30.

Ajzner, J a n , 1994. "Some Problems of Rationality, Understanding, and Universalistic Ethics in the Context of Habermas's T h e o r y of Communicative Action," Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24(4): 466-484. Aladjem, Terry K., 1995. " O f Truth and Disagreement: Habermas, Foucault and Democratic Discourse," History of European Ideas 2 0 ( 4 - 6 ) : 909-914. Apel, Karl-Otto, 1967. Analytic Philosophy of Language and the Geisteswissenschaften (Dordrecht: Reidel). Apel, Karl-Otto, ed., 1976a. Sprachpragmatik und Philosophic (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp). Apel, Karl-Otto, 1976b. "Sprechakttheorie u n d uranszendentale Sprachpragmatik— zur Frage ethischer N o r m e n , " in Apel, ed., Sprachpragmatik und Philosophic, pp. 10¬ 173. Apel, Karl-Otto, 1980a. Towards a Transformation of Philosophy, trans. G . Adey and D. Frisby ( L o n d o n : Routledge and Kegan Paul). Apel, Karl-Otto, 1980b. "Hermeneutic Philosophy of Understanding as a Heuristic Horizon for Displaying the Problem-Dimension of Analytic Philosophy of Meaning," Philosophy and Social Criticism 7: 241-259. Apel, Karl-Otto, 1980c. " T h r e e Dimensions of Understanding Meaning in Analytic Philosophy: Linguistic Conventions, Inventions, and Reference to Things," Philosophy and Social Criticism 7: 115—142.

437

436 Selected Bibliography a n d F u r t h e r Reading

Selected Bibliography a n d Further R e a d i n g

Apel, Karl-Otto, 1981a. " C . S. Peirce a n d the Post-Tarskian Problem of an Adequate Explication of the Meaning of T r u t h , " Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 18: 3-17.

Bernstein, Richard, 1983. Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Practice (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).

Apel, Karl-Otto, 1981b. "Intentions, Conventions, and Reference to Things," in H . Parret and J . Bouveresse, eds., Meaning and Understanding (Berlin: de Gruyter). Apel, Karl-Otto, 1987a. "Sprachliche Bedeutung, Gültigkeit," Archivio di Filosofa 55 (1987): 51ff.

Wahrheit

und

normative

Apel, Karl-Otto, 1987b. "Fallibilismus, Konsenstheorie der Wahrheit u n d Letztbegründung," in F o r u m für Philosophie, ed., Philosophie und Begründung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp), pp. 116-211. Apel, Karl-Otto, 1992a. "Is Intentionality More Basic than Linguistic Meaning?," in E . Lepore a n d R. Van Gulick, eds., fohn Searle and his Critics (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 31-55.

Bernstein, Richard, ed., 1985. Habermas and Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press). Berten, André, 1989. "L'éthique et la Politique," Revue Philosophique de Louvain 87: 74-96. Bogen, David E . , 1989. "Reappraisal of Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action in Light of Detailed Investigations of Social Praxis," journal for the Theory of Sodal Behaviour 19: 47-77. Bohman, James, 1985. Language and Social Crititism, P h . D . Dissertation, Boston U n i versity. B o h m a n , James, 1986. "Formal Pragmatics a n d Social Criticism," Philosophy and Social Crititism 11: 331-353.

Apel, Karl-Otto, 1992b. "Illokutionäre Bedeutung u n d normative Gültigkeit: Die transzendentalpragmatische Begründung der uneingeschränkten kommunikativen Verständigung," Protosoziologie 2: 2-15.

Bohman, James, 1988. "Emancipation and Rhetoric: T h e Perlocutions a n d Illocu¬ tions of the Social Critic," Philosophy and Rhetoric 21 (3): 185-204.

Apel, Karl-Otto, 1992c. "Normatively G r o u n d i n g 'Critical Theory,'" in A. Honneth, T. McCarthy, C. Offe, and A. Wellmer, eds., Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).

B o h m a n , James, 1992. "Critique of Ideologies," in M. Dascal, D. Gerhardus, K. L o renz, a n d G . Meggle, eds., Philosophy of Language: An International Handbook of Contemporary Research ( B e r l i n / N e w York: de Gruyter).

Austin, J . L . , 1961. "Performative Utterances," in Austin, Philosophical Papers (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 233-252.

B o h m a n , James, 1994. "World Disclosure a n d Radical Criticism," Thesis Eleven 37: 82-97.

Austin, J . L . , 1962. How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Bohman, James, a n d Terence Kelly, 1996. "Intelligibility, Rationality, and Comparison," Philosophy and Sodal Crititism 22(1): 81-100.

Austin, J . L . , 1963. "Performauve-Constative," in C . E . Caton, ed., Philosophy and Ordinary Language (Urbana, 111.: University of Illinois Press), pp. 22-33.

Bühler, Karl, 1934. Sprachtheorie (Jena: Fischer).

Bar-Hillel, Y , 1973. " O n Habermas's Hermeneutic Philosophy of Language," Synthese 26: 1-12.

Canovan, Margaret, 1983. " A Case of Distorted Communication: A Note on Habermas and Arendt," Political Theory 11: 105-116.

Bartels, Martin, 1982. "Sprache u n d soziales H a n d e l n : eine Auseinandersetzung mit Habermas' Sprachbegriff," Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 36: 226-233.

Chomsky, Noam, 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).

B a u r m a n n , Manfred, 1985. "Understanding as an A i m and Aims of Understanding," in Seebaß and Tuomela, eds., Sodal Action.

Cobben, P., 1984. "Habermas' Theorie van het Kommunikatieve Handelen," Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 46: 216-268.

Beatty, Joseph, 1979. "Communicative Competence and the Skeptic," Philosophy and Sodal Crititism 6: 267-288.

Comesana, Manuel, 1994. " L a Teoria de la Verdad en Habermas," Dianoia 40: 245¬ 261.

Belardinelli, Sergio, 1991. " L a teoría consensual de la verdad de Jürgen Habermas," Anuario Filosófico, pp. 115-123. Bernstein, Jay, 1992. "De-Divination a n d the Vindication of Everyday-Life: Reply to Rorty," Tijdschrift voor Filosofe 54(4): 668-692.

Cometti, Jean-Pierre, 1992. "Raison, Argumentation et Légitimation: Habermas, Apel et les Apories de la Communication," Philosophiques 19(1): 3-24. Cooke, Maeve, 1993. "Habermas and Consensus, " European Journal of Philosophy 1(3): 247-267.

438

439

Selected Bibliography a n d F u r t h e r Reading

Selected Bibliography a n d Further Reading

Cooke, Maeve, 1994. Language and Reason: A Study of Habermas's Pragmatics (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).

G e i m a n n , Kevin Paul, 1990. "Habermas's Early Lifeworld Appropriation: A Critical Assessment," Man and World 23(1): 63-83.

Corredor, Cristina, 1993. "Intentos de formulación de u n a teoría general de actos de habla (J Searle y J Habermas)," Revista de Filosofía 6: 119-130.

Geuss, Raymond, 1981. The Idea of a Critical Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press).

Cotesta, Vittoria, 1986. "Riferimento e Verita," AQUINAS

Griffioen, Sander, 1991. ' T h e Metaphor of the Covenant in Habermas," Faith and Philosophy 8 ( 4 ) : 524-540.

29: 465-502.

Courtois, Stephane, 1994. " L e faillibilisme de Jürgen Habermas et ses difficultés: u n faillibilisme conséquent est-il possible?," Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 33(2): 253-282. Couture, Tony, 1993. "Habermas, Values, a n d the Rational, Internal Structure of Communication, "Journal of Value Inquiry 2 7 ( 3 - 4 ) : 403-416. Culler, Jonathan, 1985. "Communicative Competence and Normative F o r c e , " New German Critique 35: 133ff. C u s h m a n , D. P., and P. K. Tompkins, 1980. " A T h e o r y of Rhetoric for Contemporary Society," Philosophy and Rhetoric 13: 43-67. Czuma, Hans, 1981. "Rede oder Gewalt," Conceptus 15: 102-111. Dallmayr, F r e d , 1987. "Life-World and Communicative Action," in B. Parekh, ed., Political Discourse (New Delhi: Sage), pp. 152-178. Derrida, Jacques, 1977. "Signature Event Context," reprinted in Derrida. Margins of Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). Derrida, Jacques, 1977. "Limited I n c abc . . . ." Glyph 2: 162-254. Dews, Peter, 1996. " T h e T r u t h of the Subject: Language, Validity and Transcendence in L a c a n a n d Habermas," in P. Dews a n d S. Critchley, eds., Deconstructive Subjectivities (Albany: S U N Y P r e s s ) , pp. 149-168. Dorschel, Andreas, 1988. "Is T h e r e Any Normative Claim Internal to Stating Facts?," Communication and Cognition 21: 5-16. Dorschel, Andreas, 1990. "Handlungstypen u n d Kriterien: Z u Habermas' Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns" Zätschrift für Philosophische Forschung 44(2) : 220-252. Dummett, Michael, 1973. Frege: Philosophy of Language (New York: Harper & Row). Dummett, Michael, 1976. "What Is a T h e o r y of Meaning?," in G . Evans a n d j . McDowell, eds., Truth and Meaning (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Ferrara, Alessandro, 1987. " A Critique of Habermas's Consensus T h e o r y of T r u t h , " Philosophy and Social Criticism 13: 39-67. Fultner, Barbara, 1995. Radical Interpretation or Communicative Action, Ph.D. Dissertation, Northwestern University. Fultner, Barbara, 1996. ' T h e Redemption of T r u t h : Idealization, Acceptability and Fallibilism in Habermas' Theory of Meaning," International Journal of Philosophical Studies 4 ( 2 ) : 233-251.

Grondin, J e a n , 1989. "Habermas und das Problem der Individualität," Philosophische Rundschau 36: 187-205. Haarscher, Guy, 1986. "Perelman and Habermas," Law and Philosophy 5: 331-342. Habermas, Jürgen, 1971. Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. J . Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press). Habermas, Jürgen, 1973. "Wahrheitstheorien," reprinted in Habermas, Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Habermas, Jürgen, 1976a. "Some Distinctions in Universal Pragmatics," Theory and Society 3: 155-167. Habermas, Jürgen, 1976b. "Universalpragmatische Hinweise auf das System der I c h Abgrenzungen," in M. Auwärter, E . Kirsch, and M. Schröter, eds., Kommunikation, Interaktion, Identität (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp). Habermas, Jürgen, 1979. Communication and the Evolution of Society, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press). Habermas, Jürgen, 1982. "A Reply to my Critics," i n j . B. Thompson and D. Held, eds., Habermas: Critical Debates (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press), pp. 219-283. Habermas, Jürgen, 1983. "Interpretative Social Science a n d Hermeneuticism," in N. H a a n , R. Bellah, P. Rabinow, and W. Sullivan, eds., Social Science as Moral Inquiry (New York: Columbia University Press). Habermas, Jürgen, 1984. Vorstudien und Ergänzungen zur Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp). Habermas, Jürgen, 1984/1987. The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols., trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press). Habermas, Jürgen, 1985a. "A Reply to Skjei's 'A C o m m e n t on Performative, Subject, and Proposition in Habermas's Theory of Communication,'" Inquiry 28: 87¬ 122. Habermas, Jürgen, 1985b. "Remarks on the Concept of Communicative Action," in Seebaß and Tuomela, eds., Social Action. Habermas, Jürgen, 1987. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. F. Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).

440

441

Selected Bibliography a n d F u r t h e r R e a d i n g

Selected Bibliography a n d Further R e a d i n g

Habermas, Jürgen, 1988. On the Logic of the Social Sciences, trans. S. W. Nicholsen and G . A. Stark (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).

Kambartel, F., and H . J . Schneider, 1981. "Constructing a Pragmatic Foundation for Semantics," in G. Fl0istad, ed., Contemporary Philosophy A New Survey, vol. 1 (The Hague: Nijhoff), pp. 155-178.

Habermas, Jürgen, 1990. "Philosophy as Stand-in and Interpreter," in Moral Consaousness and Communicative Action, trans. C . L e n h a r d t and S. W. Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass: T h e M I T Press). Habermas, Jürgen, 1992. Postmetaphysical Thinking, trans. W. M. Hohengarten (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press). Habermas, Jürgen, 1993. "Remarks on Discourse Ethics," in Habermas, Justification and Application, trans. C . C r o n i n (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press). Habermas, Jürgen, 1996. Between Facts and Norms, trans. W. Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press). Hall, J . A., 1982. "Gellner and Habermas on Epistemology and Politics. Or, Need We Feel Disenchanted?," Philosophy of the Social Sciences 12: 384—408. Healy, Paul, 1987. "Is Habermas's Consensus T h e o r y a Theory of T r u t h ? , " Irish Philosophical fournal 4: 145—152. Heath, Joseph, 1995. "Threats, Promises and Communicative Action," European fournal of Philosophy 3(3): 225-241. Hesse, Mary, 1995. "Habermas and the Force of Dialectical Argument," History of European Ideas 21(3): 367-378. H o h n , H a n s j o a c h i m , 1989. "Vernunft—Kommunikation—Diskurs: Z u Anspruch und Grenze der Transzendentalpragmatik als Basistheorie der Philosophie," Freie Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 36: 93-128.

Keuth, Herbert, 1979. "Erkenntnis oder Entscheidung: die Konsenstheorien der Wahrheit u n d der Richtigkeit von Jürgen Habermas," Zeitschrift ßr allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 10: 375-393. Kissling, Christian, 1991. "Habermas et la theologie: Notes pour une discussion entre la theologie et la Theorie de l'agir communicationnel," Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie, pp. 235-244. Kolb, David, 1992. "Heidegger and Habermas on Criticism and Totality," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52(3): 683-693. Kompridis, Nikolas, 1994. " O n World Disclosure: Heidegger, Habermas, and Dewey," Thesis Eleven 37: 29-45. Kujundzic, Nebojsa, and William Buschert, 1993. "Staging the Life-World: Habermas and the Recuperation of Austin's Speech Act Theory," fournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 23 (1): 105-116. Lafont, Cristina, 1993. La Razon como Lenguaje (Madrid: V i s o r ) . Lafont, Cristina, 1994. "Spannungen im Wahrheitsbegriff," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 42(6): 1007-1023. Lara, Maria Pia, 1995. "Albrecht Wellmer: Between Spheres of Validity," Philosophy and Social Criticism 21(2): 1-22. Leist, Anton, 1977. "Was heißt Universalpragmatik?," Germanistische Linguistik 5/6.

H o n n e t h , Axel, 1979. "Communication and Reconciliation: Habermas's Critique of A d o r n o , " Telos 39(1): 45-61.

Leist, Anton, 1989. "Dieseits der 'Transzendentalpragmatik': gibt es sprachpragmatische Argumente für Moral?," Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung AS: 301-317.

Husserl, E d m u n d , 1970. The Crisis of the European Sciences, trans. D. C a r r (Evanston, III.: Northwestern University Press).

Levin, David Michael, 1994. "Making Sense: T h e Work of Eugene G e n d l i n , " Human Studies 17(3): 343-353.

Iking, Karl-Heinz, 1976. "Geltung als Konsens," Neue Hefte für Philosophie 10: 20-50.

Machado, C . E . J . , 1988. ' T h e Concept of Rationality in Habermas: T h e 'Linguistic T u r n ' of the Critical T h e o r y " (in Portuguese), Trans/Form/Acao, pp. 31-44.

Ingram, David, 1982. " T h e Possibility of a Communication Ethic Reconsidered: Habermas, Gadamer, and Bourdieu on Discourse," Man and World 15: 149-161. Ingram, David, 1987. Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason (New Haven: Yale University Press). Johnson, James, 1991. "Habermas on Strategic and Communicative Action," Political Theory 19(2): 181-201. Johnson, James, 1993. "Is Talk Really Cheap? Prompting Conversation between Critical T h e o r y and Rational C h o i c e , " American Political Science Review 87(1): 74-93.

McCarthy, Thomas, 1978. The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press). McCarthy, Thomas, 1979. 'Translator's Introduction," i n j . Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press). McCarthy, Thomas, 1980. "Reflections on Rationalization in The Theory of Communicative Action, " in Bernstein, ed. Habermas and Modernity. McCarthy, Thomas, 1991. "Practical Discourse: O n the Relation of Morality to Politics," in Ideals and Illusions (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).

442

443

Selected Bibliography a n d F u r t h e r R e a d i n g

Selected Bibliography a n d Further Reading

McCumber, J o h n , 1985. "Critical T h e o r y and Poetic Interaction," Praxis International 5: 268-282.

Roderick, Rick, 1985. "Habermas on Rationality," Man and World 18: 203-218.

McGuire, R., 1977. "Speech Acts, Communicative Competence and the Paradox of Authority," Philosophy and Rhetoric 10: 30-45. Merrill, Sarah A., 1990. "Linguistics as a Borderline Case," in Merrill, ed., Abeunt Studio in Mores: A Festschrift for Helga Doblin on Philosophies of Education and Personal Learning or Teaching in the Humanities and Moral Sciences (New York: L a n g ) . Mertens, T., 1986. "Habermas en Searle: Kritische Beschouwingen bij de Theorie van het Communicatieve Handelen," Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 48: 66-93. Misak, Cheryl, 1994. "Pragmatism and the Transcendental T u r n in Truth and Ethics," Transactions of the Charles S. Peine Society 30(4): 739-775.

Roderick, Rick, 1986. Habermas and the Foundations of Critical Theory (New York: St. Martin's Press). Rorty, Richard, 1979. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press). Rorty, Richard, 1989. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: University of C a m bridge Press). Rorty, Richard, 1991a. Philosophical Papers I: Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Rorty, Richard, 1991b. Philosophical Papers II: Essays on Heidegger and Others (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Misgeld, Dieter, 1977. "Discourse and Conversation: T h e T h e o r y of Communicative Competence a n d Hermeneutics in the Light of the Debate between Habermas and Gadamer," Cultural Hermeneutics 4: 321-344.

Rorty, Richard, 1994. " S i n d Aussagen universelle Geltungsansprüche?," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 42(6): 975-988.

Murphy, Peter, 1985. "Meaning, T r u t h , a n d Ethical-Value," Praxis International 5: 225-246.

Rosenberg, J . and C . Travis, eds., 1971. Readings in the Philosophy of Language (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice H a l l ) .

Nagl, Ludwig, 1984. " D i e Wahrheitsfrage zwischen sprachanalytischer Transformation u n d historisch-systematischer Dimensionierung," Philosophische Rundschau 31: 85-94.

Saiedi, Nader, 1987. " A Critique of Habermas's T h e o r y of Practical Rationality," Studies in Soviet Thought 33: 251-265.

Nielsen, Kai, 1994. "How to Proceed in Philosophy: Remarks after Habermas," Thesis Ekvm 37: 10-28. Nordquist, J o a n , 1986. Social Theory: A Bibliographic Series, no. 1: Jürgen Habermas: A Bibliography (Santa Cruz: Reference & Research). Nordquist, J o a n , 1991. Social Theory: A Bibliographic Series, no. 22: Jürgen Habermas II: A Bibliography (Santa Cruz: Reference & Research). Nusser, Karl-Heinz, 1985. 'Totalität ohne Subjekt," Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 39: 590-599. Oehler, Klaus, 1995. " A Response to Habermas," in K. L . Ketner, ed., Peirce and Contemporary Thought: Philosophical Inquiries (New York: Fordham University Press). Pettit, Philip, 1982. "Habermas on T r u t h and Justice," in G . H . Parkinson, ed., Marx and Marxisms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 207-228. Pickard, Dean, 1993. "Habermas, A Postmodern Critique," Auslegung 19(1): 1-21. Power, Michael, 1993. "Habermas a n d Transcendental Arguments: A Reappraisal," Philosophy of the Social Sciences 23(1): 26-49. Rasmussen, David M., 1990. Reading Habermas (Oxford: Blackwell). Redding, Paul, 1989. "Habermas's T h e o r y of Argumentation," The Journal of Value Inquiry 23: 15-32.

Schatzki, Theodore, 1986. ' T h e Rationalization of Meaning and Understanding: Davidson and Habermas," Synthese 69: 51-79. Scheit, Herbert, 1991. Wahrhat—Diskurs—Demokratie: Wahrheit" (Freiburg: Karl Alber).

Studien zur "Konsensustheorie der

Schiller, Hans-Ernst, 1990. " Z u r sozialphilosophischen Bedeutung des Sprachbegriffs Wilhelm von Humboldts," Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 44(2): 253-272. Schmidt, James, 1979. "Offensive Critical Theory: Reply to H o n n e t h , " Telos 39(1): 62-70. Schnädelbach, Herbert, 1977. Reflexion und Diskurs (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp). Schnädelbach, Herbert, 1992. ' T h e s e n über Geltung u n d Wahrheit," in Schnädelbach, Zur Rehabilitierung des animal rationale (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp). Schneider, Hans J . , 1982. "Gibt es eine 'Transzendental-' Universalpragmatik'?," Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 36: 208-225. Schurz, Gerhard, 1980. "Soziale Erwartungen u n d ideale Sprechsituation: ein formales Modell," Conceptus 14: 47-57. Searle, J . R., 1969. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

444

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Selected Bibliography a n d F u r t h e r Reading

Selected Bibliography and Further Reading

Searle, J . R., 1971a. "Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts," in Rosenberg and Travis, eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Language, pp. 262-275.

Tietz, Udo, 1994. "Transformation der Sprachanalyse," Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 42(5): 861-881.

Searle, J . R., 1971b. "What Is a Speech Act?," in Rosenberg and Travis, eds., Readings in the Philosophy of Language, pp. 614-628.

Trans, Van-Doan, 1989. " O n H u m a n Rationality. Habermas's T h e o r y of Consensus," Philosophical Review (Taiwan) 12: 389-430.

Searle, J . R., 1977. "Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to D e r r i d a , " GlyphV. 198-208.

Tugendhat, Ernst, 1982. Traditional and Analytical Philosophy, trans. P. A. C o r n e r (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Searle, J . R., 1979. Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Searle, J . R., 1981. "Intentionality and Method," fournal of Philosophy 78: 720-733. Searle, J . R., 1983. Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Searle, J . R., 1984. Minds, Brains, and Science (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press). Searle, J . R., 1986. "Meaning, Communication, and Representation," in R. E . Grandy and R. Warner, eds., Philosophical Grounds of Rationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Searle, J . R., 1989. "How Performatives Work," Linguistics and Philosophy 12: 535-558. Seebafi, G . , and R. Tuomela, eds., 1985. Social Action (Dordrecht: Reidel). Skirbekk, Gunnar, 1983. "Pragmatism in Apel and Habermas," in G . Fl0istad, ed., Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey (The Hague: Nijhoff), pp. 387-416. Skjei, Erling, 1985. "A C o m m e n t on Performative, Subject, and Proposition in Habermas's T h e o r y of Communication," Inquiry 28: 87-104. Southgate, David, 1995. "Insanity Ascriptions: A Formal Pragmatic Analysis," Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 25(3): 219-235. Speranza, Jorge L . , 1991. " U n Grice alemán? E n torno de las estrategias conversacionales: acercade Habermas acerca de G r i c e , " Revista Latin de Filosofía 17(1): 133-148. Sullivan, William M., 1978. "Communication and the Recovery of Meaning: An Interpretation of Habermas," International Philosophical Quarterly 18: 69-86. Swart, H . A. P., 1979. "Kritiek van Habermas' Consensus-Theorie van de Waarheid," Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 71: 167-172. Swindal, James, 1994. " T h e Problem of Problematization in Discourse Ethics," Philosophy and Social Criticism 20(3): 1-18.

Tugendhat, Ernst, 1985. " ] . Habermas on Communicative Action," in Seebaß and Tuomela, eds., Social Action. Tugendhat, Ernst, 1986. Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, trans. P. Stern (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press). Turski, George, 1979. Gnosis 1: 29-44.

"Some Considerations on Intersubjectivity and Language,"

Umhauer, G e r d , 1983. " Z u m normativen Fundament sprachlicher Verständigung in der Konzeption einer 'idealen Sprechsituation,'" Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 37: 88-101. Van Nieuwstadt, J . , 1983. "De Relatieve Zelfstandigheid van Taalhandelingen," Kennis en Methode 7: 356-367. Van Zyl, Albert, 1995. ' T h e Dilemma of Grounding in the Modernity-Postmodernity Debate," South African Journal of Philosophy 14(4): 168-174. Visker, Rudi, 1992. "Habermas on Heidegger and Foucault: Meaning and Validity in the Philosophical Discourse of Modernity," Radical Philosophy 61: 15-22. Wagner, Gerhard, and Heinz Zipprian, 1991. "Intersubjectivity and Critical C o n sciousness: Remarks on Habermas's Theory of Communicative Action," Inquiry 34(1): 49-62. Ware, Robert X . , 1982. "Habermas's Evolutions," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12: 591-620. Weber, Max, 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Soaology, ed. G . Roth and C . Wittich, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press). Weber, Max, 1981. "Some Categories of Interpretive Understanding," Quarterly 22: 151-180.

Sodological

Wellmer, Albrecht, 1991. The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics, and Postmodernism, trans. D. Midgely (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).

Tejera, Victorino, 1996. "Has Habermas Understood Peirce?," Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 32(1): 107-125.

Wellmer, Albrecht, 1992. "What Is a Pragmatic T h e o r y of Meaning?," in A. H o n n e t h , T. McCarthy, C . Offe, and A. Wellmer, eds., Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).

T h o m p s o n , J o h n B., 1982. "Universal Pragmatics," in Thompson and Held, eds., Habermas: Critical Debates (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press), pp. 116-133.

Wellmer, Albrecht, 1998. Endgames: Essays and Lectures on the Irreconcilable Nature of Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: T h e M I T Press).

446 Selected Bibliography a n d Further R e a d i n g

White, Stephen K., 1988. The Recent Work of Jürgen Habermas: Reason, Justice and Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Index

Whitton, Brian J . , 1992. "Universal Pragmatics a n d the Formation of Western Civilization: A Critique of Habermas's T h e o r v of H u m a n Moral Evolution," History and Theory 31(3): 299-312. Wood, Allen, 1985. "Habermas's Defence of Rationalism," New German Critique 25: 145ff. Z i m m e r m a n n , Rolf, 1984. "Emancipation and Rationality: Foundational Problems in the Theories of Marx and Habermas," Ratio 26: 143-166. Z i m m e r m a n n , Rolf, 1985. Utopie—Rationalität—Politik (Freiburg: Karl Alber).

Acceptability conditions, 8-9, 11, 82¬ 83, 132-133, 139, 200, 225, 233, 269, 297, 312, 339-340, 367. See also Speech acts, acceptability of; Truth conditions; Validity claims, acceptability of Accountability, 186, 267, 310 Action, 114-118, 217, 313. See also Discourse, vs. action analytic theory of, 105-107 as purposive activity, 105, 112-114, 121-123, 126, 163, 170, 203, 215, 217-219, 221, 224, 298, 301, 314 {see also Communicative action; Strategic action) communicative (see Communicative action) coordination of (see Verständigung, as action-coordinating mechanism) instrumental, 118, 226, 299, 377 linguistic vs. nonlinguistic, 59-60, 216¬ 220 oriented toward reaching understanding (see Verständigung) oriented toward success (see Strategic action) purposive-rational (zweckrational), 114, 117-118, 234, 332 (see also Rationality, purposive) social, 2, 21, 62-63, 93n2, 106, 113¬ 119, 169, 205, 207, 213n47, 220, 233¬ 235, 326, 334 sociological theory of, 105-106, 111¬ 112, 132, 227, 234 strategic (see Strategic action) symbolic, 63

teleological (see Action, as purposive activity) Adorno, T. W., 346, 410, 412, 414, 425¬ 426, 429 Aesthetic experience, 245-246, 412¬ 415, 420 Aesthetic modernity, 410 Agreement. See Consensus. See also Verständigung, vs. Einverständnis in a strict sense (Einverständnis), 17¬ 18, 321-324, 328-329 Alexander, J„ 27, 199, 201, 203, 207 Alston, W. P., 67 Analytic philosophy, 25, 51, 144, 344¬ 348, 405 Apel, K . - 0 . , 21-22, 25, 43, 110, 197, 207, 352, 365-366, 404, 429 Argumentation, 4, 14-15, 164, 170¬ 171, 240, 307, 311, 334, 362-371, 406, 420-423. See also Communicative Action; Discourse idealizing suppositions of, 4-5, 14-15, 367-368, 370 Art, 18, 171, 246, 389-390, 395-397, 411-415, 420, 433n24. See also Aesthetic experience; Criticism; Expert cultures; Validity, aesthetic; Validity claims, aesthetic autonomy of, 388, 391, 393, 396, 411, 413-414, 420 and lifeworld, 396-397, 4 1 2 ^ 1 5 Austin, J . L . , 3, 6-7, 15, 56, 66-82, 101n86, 110-111, 122-123, 125, 128-129, 155, 195-196, 217, 232, 282, 289-291, 294, 383-386, 408

448

449

Index

Index

Bar-Hillel, Y., 27 Bataille, G . , 408, 413 Behaviorism, linguistic, 26-27, 278 Benjamin, W., 410, 412, 414, 425 Bennett, J . , 27, 106, 229, 278 Berger, J . , 207 Bernstein, R., 404, 406-407 Binding and bonding power. See Speech acts, binding and bonding power of Bühler, K., 17, 107, 110-111, 196-197, 228, 277-280, 284, 293-296, 298, 389, 394 Bürger, R, 414 Carnap, R., 25, 33-34, 108 Cartesian doubt, 243, 356, 358, 410 Chomsky, N . , 35, 37-38, 40-41, 46-47, 183 Commands. See Imperatives Communication general presuppositions of, 2, 21, 24, 44, 48, 80, 145, 207, 339 indirect, 121, 285, 302, 333, 338 (see also Strategic action) pathologies, 93n2, 168-169 Communication community, 207, 338, 350-351, 353, 355-356, 360, 3 6 5 - 367 Communicative action, 3-5, 22-24, 57, 62-63, 93n2, 105, 111, 118, 128-129, 140-142, 145, 163-164, 167, 169, 203-205, 215, 222, 224, 233, 236, 299, 326, 425. See also Language, communicative use of; Verständigung functions of, 16, 111, 247 idealizing suppositions of, 4-5, 15, 144, 166, 169, 190, 207, 240, 332, 385-386, 393, 395 and lifeworld, 6, 111, 237 (see also Lifeworld; Knowledge, background) obligations resulting from, 4, 82-87, 124, 130-131, 137-138, 145, 198, 223, 233, 300 primacy of, 2-2, 15, 21, 102n92, 122, 306n33 rationality of (see Rationality, communicative) vs. strategic action, 93n2, 119-129, 145, 167, 169, 203-206, 217, 220¬ 227, 248, 293, 298-304, 377 theory of, 1, 8, 55, 106-107, 110, 112, 164, 170, 174, 183, 200, 207-208, 240, 293, 407, 410

weak vs. strong, 18, 326-329, 332, 334 (see also Verständigung, vs. Einverständnis) Communicative competence, 2, 47-50, 53-54 Communicative rationality. See Rationality, communicative Comprehensibility, 22-24, 49-50, 79, 87, 145, 291. See also Validity claims Consensus, 4, 13-14, 23, 142-145, 160, 185-186, 188, 201, 203-204, 221, 236, 294, 298-299, 325, 353, 364¬ 365. See also Agreement, in a strict sense (Einverständnis); Verständigung Contextual conditions of meaning. See Meaning, contextual conditions of Contextualism, 196, 344, 351-360, 363, 371-372, 395 Conversation, 163-164, 170, 212n45 Criticism, art and literary, 396-399, 411-412, 414, 423 Culler, J . , 383-388 Culture, 186, 248, 250-253, 395-396, 411, 419. See also Lifeworld, three domains of Davidson, D., 8, 109, 194, 348, 379n35 Declarations, 272-274, 292, 321-325, 327, 338. See also Performatives D e r r i d a . J . , 18, 383-388, 393-396, 398¬ 399, 400n24, 408 Dewey, 343-344, 346-347, 409-410 Dialogue, 184-187 Directions of fit, 158-161, 195, 263¬ 265, 273, 286-287, 291-292, 376 Discourse, 4, 13-14, 86-87, 170, 236, 309-311, 314, 363, 367-372, 393, 395-396, 412, 421, 423. See also Argumentation vs. action, 93n2, 206, 313, 364, 369¬ 372 Discourse ethics, 13, 188, 367, 370, 429. See also Justice Dramaturgical action, 163-164, 170¬ 171, 205 Dummett, M., 7-9, 11-12, 51, 109, 152¬ 154, 194, 229, 231, 278, 287-288, 296, 352 Dürkheim, E . , 207 Epistemology, 239, 348-352 Ethical life (Sittluhkdt), 191, 243, 424, 429-430

Ethnocentrism, 372, 375, 381n63 Expert cultures, 171, 192, 240, 395¬ 398, 411, 413-414, 419-420, 423-425 Fallibilism, 12, 154, 236, 243-244, 312¬ 313, 337, 349, 356, 364-365, 368¬ 371, 401n24, 404, 407, 412. See also Validity claims, criticizability of Fictionality. See Language, poetic use of Freedom, 310-311, 316, 430 Frege, G . , 7-8, 51, 66, 109, 193-195, 229, 278, 281-282, 286, 338 Freud, S., 307, 335, 425-428, 431, 433n26 Gadamer, H . - G . , 387, 407, 417 Gehlen, A., 307 Grice, H . P., 27-28, 106, 147, 229, 259, 278-279, 284, 393 Hartman, G . , 390 Hartmann, H . , 426 Hegel, G . W. F., 184, 191, 344-345, 348, 404, 424-426, 429 Heidegger, M., 253-254, 335, 337, 344, 346-348, 408 Historicism, vs. transcendentalism, 404, 407 Humboldt, W. von, 183-192, 297, 209nn2,4,6, 408 Husserl, E . , 237, 239-240, 242-243, 259, 280, 359, 404 Ideal speech situation, 13-14, 365, 367¬ 368 Illocutionary acts, 7, 10, 57-58, 64-70, 73-74, 82, 85, 122-123, 126, 163, 266, 289-290, 333, 340 Illocutionary aims, 122-123, 125, 127, 201-204, 218, 258, 268-271, 299, 315-316 Illocutionary force, 7-8, 15, 55-57, 66¬ 67, 72, 75-77, 81-83, 85, 88, 110, 157, 159, 195-196, 232, 266, 272, 292, 294, 296, 383-386, 390. See also Speech acts, binding and bonding power of and speaker's warranty, 4, 8, 83-88, 130, 136-138, 145, 198, 222, 233, 269, 299, 316 Illocutionary success, 83, 124-128, 130, 132, 136, 201-204, 218, 223, 315,

340, 385. See also Speech-act offer; Speech acts, success of Imperatives, 61, 67, 76, 132-141, 145, 160-161, 199-201, 226, 264-268, 275n8, 286-287, 292, 295-296, 302¬ 304, 319, 321-327, 338. See also L a n guage, strategic use of; Power claims; Speech acts, regulative; Strategic action, manifest Information theory, 26-27 Insults, 226-227, 330, 338. See also Perlocutions; Strategic action, manifest; Threats Intentional sentences, 10, 138-139, 296, 318. See also Language, expressive use of; Promises; Semantics, i n tentionalist; Speech acts, expressive Jakobson, R., 196, 389-391 Jay, M., 410-415 Justice, 5, 12, 396, 411, 424. See also Discourse ethics vs. happiness, 18, 428-431 Justification, 5, 11-14, 197, 307, 325, 351-352, 355-356, 365, 370, 372, 375-376, 406, 424. See also Discourse; Fallibilism; T r u t h , vs. justification; Validity claims, criticizability of / vindication of Kanngiesser, S., 61, 106 Kant, I . , 42-43, 45, 240, 311, 337, 349, 351, 411, 425-426, 428-429 Knowledge, 170-171, 340 background, 16, 167, 171-173, 242¬ 245, 283, 386 (see also Lifeworld) cultural, 248-250, 253 (see also Lifeworld, three domains of) horizontal (Horizontwissen), 241-242 (see also Lifeworld, as background) implicit, 33, 40, 46-47, 171-174, 237¬ 238, 240, 309 intuitive, 2, 39, 235, 242, 309 (see also Rule consciousness) practical vs. objective, 33, 35, 39, 238, 312 prereflective, 2, 16, 33, 40, 119, 171, 237 topic-dependent contextual, 241¬ 242 unthematic, 237-238, 240-244, 246 Kreckel, M., 157-159

450

451

Index

Index

Labov, W., 391 Language cognitive use of, 10, 75-78, 80-81, 86, 89, 144, 289 (see abo Speech acts, constative) communicative use of, 10, 15, 142, 207, 315, 318-320, 338, 370 (see also Communicative action) communicative use vs. poetic use of, 384-385, 388-398 dividing vs. unifying capacity of, 187¬ 188 expressive use of, 80-81, 87, 89, 144 (see also Speech acts, expressive) functions of, 49-50, 54, 72, 79, 81, 89¬ 90, 92, 107, 110-111, 142-143, 165, 192, 196-199, 228, 231, 277-278, 282, 288, 293, 389 {see also Btihler, K.) holistic nature of, 58, 90, 233, 297 interactive use of (see Language, regulative use of) knowledge of a, 2, 233, 245, 261-262 297 noncommunicative use of, 10, 317¬ 320, 333-334 (see also Rationality, epistemic / teleological) parasitic use of, 15, 122, 201, 224, 302, 384, 388 (see also Strategic action) poetic use of, 15, 168, 383-384, 389¬ 390, 392-393, 397-398 (see also Language, world-disclosing function of) pragmatic dimension of (see Sentence, vs. utterance) problem-solving capacity of, 15, 192, 394, 396 reflexivity of, 39, 64-65, 217, 284 regulative use of, 75-78, 81, 86, 89, 111, 144, 289 representational function of, 50-52, 58 strategic use of, 5, 17, 201, 224, 302, 377 (see also Strategic action) uncircumventability of, 335, 349-350, 355-59, 372 (see also Lifeworld, as background) validity basis of, 3, 17, 21-25, 74, 88 (see also Validity claims) world-disclosing function of, 15, 191¬ 192, 204, 246, 253-254, 335-337, 390-396 (see also Language, poetic use of)

Language games, 7, 196-197, 203, 217, 254, 283, 288-289, 292, 329, 359, 362, 370, 372-373, 386, 388, 414, 420 L e a r n i n g process, 41, 170, 192, 204, 246, 252-253, 336, 353, 366, 374, 394, 405, 412-413, 418 Lifeworld, 111, 174, 187, 189, 208, 236¬ 246, 250-251, 334, 350, 353, 363¬ 364, 368, 370-373, 407-408; 430. See also Communicative Action as background, 16, 127, 172, 174, 206, 208-209, 227, 243, 245, 283, 335¬ 336, 350, 356, 358, 363, 370, 386 (see also Knowledge, background) cultural impoverishment of the, 414 invasion of, 424 rationalization of the, 191, 430 reproduction of the, 16, 190-191, 200, 246-247 (see also Culture) as resource, 191, 209, 247, 336 as stabilizing factor, 16, 237, 240, 245, 359 three domains of, 208, 247-251 Locutionary acts, 66, 72-73, 75, 122¬ 123, 289-290 Logocentrism, 110, 195, 337, 408 L u h m a n n , N . , 235 Marcuse, H . , 410, 425 Marx, K., 206, 234, 254, 424-426, 431 McCarthy, T., 410, 412, 415-426, 431 Mead, G . H „ 187, 308, 409 Meaning, 192-198, 227-233, 239. See also Semantics contextual conditions of, 7, 11-12, 16, 52, 61, 67-68, 172-173, 227-228, 385-387 intentionalist theory of, 106, 121, 257 (see abo Semantics, intentionalis) nominalist theory of, 106, 354 pragmatic theory of, 6-7, 9-10, 12, 16, 52, 66-67, 72, 131, 197-199, 227¬ 233, 298, 338-341, 416 semantic theory of, 6, 9, 51-52, 131, 193-195, 228 (see abo Pragmatics, formal vs. formal semantics; Semantics, truth-conditional) use theory of, 6-7, 48, 51, 67, 109, 196, 229, 278, 282-284 and validity, 66, 129-140, 193, 197, 227-228, 253, 270-271, 282, 288, 300, 339 (see abo Language, validity basis of)

Mentalism, 259, 337, 348-355, 411. See Power claims, 111, 137-138, 200-201, abo Meaning, intentionalist theory of 226, 264, 266-267, 303. See abo I m peratives; Language, strategic use of; Metaphysics, 343, 346-348, 352, 374, Strategic action, manifest 394 Modernization, 420. See abo RationalizaPragmatics tion empirical, 157-158, 163, 172, 197, 351 Morality, 190-191, 395-397, 424, 429¬ 430. See abo Expert cultures; Validity formal vs. empirical, 2, 26, 28-29, 35¬ claim, normative 41, 45, 52, 54-55, 164-168, 351 formal vs. formal semantics, 6-7, 9¬ Morris, C . W., 26-27, 278 10, 26-28, 51-52, 54, 151-154, 192¬ Mutual understanding. See Verständigung 194, 196, 198-199 formal vs. universal, 1-2, 9 2 n l Neoconservatism, 406, 409, 431n7 intersubjectivist vs. intentionalist, 257¬ Neo-Darwinism, 374, 376, 428 260, 263, 268-269, 271 Neo-Kantianism, 345 universal vs. transcendental hermeneuNeopragmatism, 13, 343-344, 373 O h m a n n , R., 389-390 Organon model. See Bühler, K. Paradigm shift, 110, 189, 337, 346, 352¬ 355, 417, 420 Peirce, C. S., 43, 243, 313, 337, 348¬ 349, 356, 365, 409-410 Performative attitude, 65, 71, 89-91, 132, 166, 205, 219, 224, 299-301, 310, 312, 316, 319, 332, 369, 388, 406. See abo World-relations Performatives, 7, 271-273. See abo Declarations Perlocutionary acts, 111, 122-127, 140, 167, 226-227. See abo Perlocutions; Strategic action Perlocutionary effects, 123-129, 167, 201-202, 223, 301-302, 316, 329¬ 332 Perlocutions, 326, 329-333, 340-341. See abo Insults; Language, strategic use of; Strategic action, manifest; Threats Personality structures, 247-250, 253 Philosophy of consciousness, 279-281, 348, 405, 409 Philosophy, role of, 347-348, 351-352, 395-399, 400n24, 405-409, 411, 424. See abo Paradigm shift Piaget,J., 46, 53, 414, 426 Platonism, 186, 194, 337, 343-348, 359, 373-374 Pluralism, 403-407, 430 Popper, K., 295, 307, 361, 404 Postmetaphysical thinking, 5, 312, 328, 346-347. See abo Rationality, communicative

tics, 41-46 Pratt, M. L . , 390-393 Promises, 68, 83, 267-268, 324-325, 327, 383-384. See abo Imperatives; Speech acts, regulative Psychoanalysis, 169, 426-428 Putnam, H . , 13, 350, 365-366 Rationality, 219, 307-308, 325, 404, 407-409, 418, 420-423 aesthetic-practical, 412 communicative, 4—5, 18, 120, 136, 139-140, 168, 171, 188, 190, 192, 198-199, 207, 220, 222, 233, 240, 294, 300, 309, 315-317, 319, 323, 326, 329, 333-334, 336, 407-408, 410 (see abo Postmetaphysical thinking) discursive, 188, 190, 307-311, 334 epistemic, 309, 311-313, 334 purposive, 105, 114, 117, 203, 219¬ 220, 234-235, 323, 327, 329 teleological, 113, 170, 203, 206, 309, 313-314, 322, 334 (see abo Action, as purposive activity) three core structures of, 18, 105, 308¬ 311, 314, 334, 336 Rationalization, 105, 117, 171, 174, 335, 411, 420, 422 Realism, 351, 353, 360-362, 370, 372-373 Reconstruction, rational, 2, 28-41, 190, 207, 416 Reconstructive sciences, 29, 46, 407 Rorty, R., 13, 343-354, 357, 360, 366¬ 367, 370, 372-377, 381n63, 394-395, 404-410, 426 Rule consciousness, 2, 33-36, 45, 383. See abo Knowledge, intuitive Ryle, G . , 33

452

453

Index

Index

Sanctions, 131, 134-138, 200-201, 225, 264-265, 303. See also Imperatives; Perlocutions; Power claims; Strategic action, manifest; Threats Schiffer, S. R., 106, 229, 278, 285 Schluchter, W., 114 Schnadelbach, H . , 10, 307-308, 334, 407 S e a r l e . J . R., 3, 6-7, 61-62, 81-84, 156¬ 161, 172-174, 194, 197, 242, 258¬ 275, 291-295, 383-386 Semantics. See also Meaning formal, 6, 10, 51, 54, 192, 194-195, 197, 229, 278, 280-282 (see also Pragmatics, formal vs. formal semantics) intentionalist, 54, 106-107, 112, 121, 229, 278-280, 284 (see also Pragmatics, intersubjectivist vs. intentionalist) reference, 52, 108, 281 truth-conditional, 8, 109-110, 152, 154, 193-194, 228-232, 282, 286¬ 287, 295, 338 Sentence vs. utterance, 2, 6-7, 26, 48¬ 53, 66-69, 193. See also Pragmatics, formal vs. formal semantics Skepticism, 344, 354-356, 359-360 Social action. See Action, social Social integration, 221, 236, 247, 250¬ 254. See also Communicative action Socialization, 157, 174, 187, 189, 209, 247-248, 250-253, 427, 429. See also Communicative action, functions of Social order, 4-5, 16, 105, 227, 233¬ 239, 251. See also Society Society, 89-92, 174, 186, 235, 245-254. See also Lifeworld, three domains of; Social order; World-concepts Speech, validity basis of. See Language, validity basis of Speech-act offer, 70, 82, 110, 120, 130¬ 132, 136, 198, 233. See also C o m m u n i cative action; Illocutionary success; Speech acts, acceptability of Speech acts, 74-75, 79, 84, 86, 128, 139, 141, 269, 293, 296-297, 340, 385, 390 acceptability of, 11, 74, 82, 84, 87-88, 132, 139, 141, 197-198, 220, 232¬ 233, 297-298, 316, 338, 340 (see also Acceptability conditions; Meaning, contextual conditions of; Speech acts, success of) binding and bonding power of, 15, 76, 84-85, 110, 128, 136, 163, 205,

208, 221-224, 233, 299, 326, 332, 385, 390, 392-393 (see also Illocutionary force; Verständigung, as actioncoordinating mechanism) classification of, 3, 7, 75, 77, 81, 109, 140, 154-165, 180n85, 196, 267, 273, 291-292, 295 consensual, 21, 24 constative, 58, 73-77, 86-87, 137-138, 144, 161-163, 267-268, 290, 292, 325, 328 (see also Language, cognitive use of; Validity claims, to truth) double structure of (see Speech acts, illocutionary and propositional componet of) expressive, 80, 87, 137-138, 144, 147, 151, 156, 161-163, 292-293, 295 (see also Language, expressive use of; Validity claims, to truthfulness) illocutionary and propositional component of, 57-58, 63-74, 110, 122, 144, 232, 290, 294 indirect, 166, 265 (see also Communication, indirect) institutionally bound, 60-62, 76, 82, 85, 88, 128-129, 131, 162 institutionally unbound, 60-62, 76, 83, 85, 88 propositionally differentiated, 58-64, 146 regulative, 3, 86-87, 137, 144, 162¬ 163, 295-296, 325, 327-328 (see also Language, regulative use of; Validity claims, to normative lightness) self-referential structure of, 123-124, 217, 219, 237, 272-273, 284-285 standard form of, 56-64, 68, 122, 131, 166-167, 217, 259, 271, 294, 300¬ 301, 383 success of, 49, 56, 74, 81-82, 87, 120 (see also Illocutionary success) Speech-act theory, 7-8, 28, 46-47, 55¬ 56, 109, 194, 229, 289-293, 295 Strategic action, 4, 24, 63, 118, 123, 126-129, 169, 202-205, 224-226, 249, 326, 330, 332-334. See also Action, instrumental; Communicative action, vs. strategic action; Imperatives; Language, strategic use of; Perlocutionary acts derivative status of, 3, 15, 21, 332 latent, 140, 169, 201-203, 223-224, 301-302, 304 manifest, 201, 225-226, 302-304

Strawson, P. E . 27, 42, 125, 127, 285 Systems, 234-235, 254-255, 396-397, 411, 419 Tarski, 194, 361 Taylor, C , 183, 185, 188, 190-191 Threats, 226, 265-266, 275n8, 303-304, 330-331, 338. See also Imperatives; I n sults; Language, strategic use of; Perlocutions; Strategic action, manifest T r u t h , 5, 11, 14-15, 75, 193-194, 349, 354-363, 375, 379n35, 404. See also Semantics, truth-conditional; Validity claims, to truth and argumentation, 5, 14—15, 362, 368 vs. justification, 355, 357-360, 363¬ 375, 406 pragmatic theory of, 13—15, 345, 357¬ 358, 360, 364-365, 367-372 as regulative idea, 13-14, 365-366, 374-375 and sensorial certainty, 356 T r u t h conditions, 6, 8-11, 14, 152-154, 172, 193-197, 231, 263, 268, 281¬ 282, 286-287, 356-357, 361, 368. See also Acceptability conditions; Semantics, truth-conditional Tugendhat, E . , 148-150, 152, 201, 352, 357 Validity aesthetic, 121, 396, 412, 415 (see also Art; Validity claims, aesthetic) dimensions of, 6, 22, 141-143, 159, 197-198, 208, 228-232, 291, 293, 295, 396-397, 408 (see also World-concepts) moral, 12-13, 15 (see also Discourse ethics; Justice; Morality; Validity claims, normative) Validity claims, 3, 8, 22-24, 49, 52-54, 68, 73, 81, 85-86, 88-89, 92, 110¬ 111, 135-136, 138, 140-154, 186, 188, 192, 197, 232, 240, 293-294, 416. See also Communicative action; Language, validity basis of; Meaning, and validity aesthetic, 412, 415 (see also Validity, aesthetic) criticizability of, 11-12, 120, 143, 154, 206, 231, 236, 296, 394-395 (see also Fallibilism; Validity claims, vindication of)

discursive thematization of, 86-87 (see also Discourse) normative, 199-200, 208, 234, 303, 381n55 (see also Morality; Validity, moral) to normative Tightness 3, 22, 76-79, 81, 88-89, 91, 115, 136-137, 141, 143, 147, 292, 327-328, 332 (see also Imperatives; Speech acts, regulative) suspension of, 63, 168, 205, 225, 390¬ 391, 393 (see also Language, poetic use of) to truth, 3, 22, 74-81, 88-90, 137, 141, 143, 146-147, 150, 153-154, 231-232, 326-328, 332-333, 359 (see also Speech acts, constative) to truthfulness, 3, 22, 80-81, 88-89, 91, 137, 293, 326-328, 332 (see also Speech acts, expressive) types of, 3, 23, 81, 92, 165, 230, 270¬ 271, 295, 317 (see also Speech acts, classification of) universal, 3, 8, 15, 22, 34, 75, 77, 81, 86, 89-90, 144, 146, 154, 430 universalist, 397, 400n24, 404, 407 (see also Discourse ethics) vindication of, 5, 9, 11-13, 22, 24-25, 73, 136, 152-154, 195, 198, 222, 240, 266, 297, 300, 312, 316, 340, 363¬ 364, 368-369, 372, 416 (see also Argumentation; Fallibilism) Verständigung, 2, 11, 15, 1 9 n l , 21-24, 27-28, 44-45, 48, 50, 88-89, 93n2, 119-121, 127, 142-143, 183-184, 186, 199, 227, 247, 298, 339, 387, 406. See also Communicative action; Consensus as action-coordinating mechanism, 105-107, 111, 121, 129-132, 139, 163, 167, 187-188, 199, 206, 221, 223, 233, 247, 249, 298-300, 326¬ 327, 385, 387 vs. Einverständnis ("weak" vs. "strong" mode of), 17-18, 320-325, 328, 333¬ 334, 340 (see also Communicative action, weak vs. strong) as "telos" of human language, 120, 188, 203, 218, 227, 300, 316 Weber, M., 105, 112-118, 171, 213n47, 307, 326, 335, 404, 411, 416, 418-421 Weiss, J . , 207-208 Wellmer, A., 365, 368-369, 414

454 Index

Whitebook,J., 410, 425-431 Williams, M., 358, 373 Wittgenstein, L . , 6, 8, 51, 109, 149, 151, 173-174, 196, 229, 278, 282-284, 288-289, 292, 316, 338, 344, 346¬ 348, 356, 404-405, 408 World-concepts, 89-92, 111, 295-296, 350. See also Validity, dimensions of World-disclosure. See Language, worlddisclosing function of World-relations, 49-50, 68, 89-92, 110, 143-144, 158-159, 161-162, 165-166, 186, 245-246, 295-296, 301, 353¬ 354, 376, 390, 394, 419, 421. See also Performative attitude Worldviews, rationalization of, 115, 411 Wunderlich, D., 27, 34-35 Z i m m e r m a n n , R., 192-193, 199, 201

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